Judgment of 27 June 2001

Document Number
104-20010627-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LAGRAND CASE

(GERMANY v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

JUDGMENT OF 27 JUNE 2001

COIJR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE LAGRAND

(ALLEMAGNE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE)

ARRÊT DU 27 JUIN 2001 Officia1citation
LuCrand (Gern7uny v.United Sfutesof Americu),
Judgrnent, IC.J. Rc.ports 2001p. 466

Mode officielde citation:

LaCrund (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 2001p. 466

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No de vente: 822
ISBN 92-1-070921-7 27 JUNE 2001

JUDGMENT

LAGRAND

(GERMANY ilUNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

LAGRAND

(ALLEMAGNE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE)

27 JUIN 2001

ARRÊT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2001 YEAR 2001
27 June
General List
No. 104 27 June2001

LAGRAND CASE

(GERMANY v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

Facts of'the cuse.

Jurisdiction of the Cour- Article I of Optior~ulProtocol concernirzgCom-
pul.~orj Settlement of Disputes to Viennu Convention on Consular Relations of
24 April 1963.
Jurisdiction of Court in respect of Gerrnunj~'sjrst submiss-onRecognitiorî
bjl United Stutes of existence of dispute urising outof'breach of subpuru-

graph (b) of Article 36, paragraph1.of Vienna Convention on Consular Relu-
lions- Recognition bj United States of Court's jurisdiction to heur this dispute
in so furUS concerns Germany's oivn rights - Objection by United States to
Court'sjurisdiction over Gernzany'scluimfiundrd on diplomutic protection -
Objection by United Stutes to Court's juri.rdirtion over alleged breuch of sub-
puragraphs (a) und (c) of Article 36, purcigruph 1, of Convention.

Jurisdiction of Court in respect of Germany's third suhmission concerning
implementation of Order of3 Murch 1999 indicating provisional measures.

Jurisdiction of Court in respect of Germany'sfourth submissio-z Objection
by United States- United States urgument that suhmission seeking guuruntees

of non-repetition fulls outside ternzs of Optional Protocol.

Admissibility of Germany'ssubmissions.
United States objection to admissibility of Germany's second, third and

fourth submissions- United States argunîent that Court cannot be turned into
ultimate court ofuppeal in crirninalproceedings hefore its oizn domestic courts.

United States objection to adnîissibility of Gerrnany's third submission United Starcs cl~ullen~ingnlunner of Gc~rniun~~in '.s~titution oj'present proreed-
ings before the Court.
United Stutes objection to udrni.s.sihility of' Gernzr111~,'fi~r.st .suhrizi.~.sion
Allegation of failure to e.~huustlocal remedies.
United States objection to Gerniun~~'.s~ uhr?iissions - Allegution thut Gcr-

rnany seeking to apply srundilrd to United Stutes cifibrent ,frorn oiix pructice.

Gerrnan~~'sjrstsuhrnission - Questiorl of disrrgurd bj, Uniteil Stutes of'ils
legul obligations to Germuny undcr Articles 5 urlrl36, purugrupli I, of Coni>en-
tion.
Suhmission advunced bj, Gerr~irinj.in oiix right - Recognition b~ Unitrd

Stutes qf breuch of Article 36, prrrcigruph1 (b), of Conilenfion - Article 36,
purugruph 1, establishing interrelutrd rigirilc dcsignerlto,fucilitrrte irnplc~merltu-
tion of .systcni of consulrrrprotrction.

Suhmission by Germany hused on dipioriirlticprotc,ction - Article 36, para-

grupiph1 (b), qf Convention cindohligtrtions ofrc~ceivingStute to iletuined persor1
and to sending Stute.

Germuny '.Ysecond suhnzissiori - Q~iestionof'di.sregurûby Unitcd Stutcs of its
legal obligation under Article 36, puragruph 2, of Convention.

Argurlient qf United Stutes thut Article 36, parugraph 2, crpplicuhleonly to
rights of sending Sturc.
"Procedurul defiult" rule - Di.stinction to he drui1.nhetit.eenrule as such and
upplicution in present cuse.

Germuny'.s third submi.s.sion - Que.stion of divrr.rgerrù by United States of
it.~legal obligation ro cornpl), ~i'itlzOrdcr indicuting prorisionul rneusures of

3 Murch 1999.
Court culled upon to rule e.upress1yon question of' lclgul e1Tect.sof orriers
under Artii,l(l41 of Statute - hlterprerrrtionof tliut provision - Cornparisonqf'
French and Er~glislztests - French und E~zglishversions qf'Stutute "equully
uuthentic" bj, virtue of Article III of Unirrrl Nations Charter - Article 33,

parugruph 4, of Vicwnu Convention on Lrili oj'Treuties - 0hjei.t und purpose
of Stature - Conte.ut - Principle thut part)' to legulproceedings niust ahstain
from any meusure which miglit aggrr~i~uto ~r r.~tendthe di.spute - Prepurcrtory
it7orkof Article 41 - Article 94 of Unitcil Ncrtions Charter.

Question qf'hinding tzuture of Order of 3 Murcli 1999 - Mcusures tuken hl,
United Stutes to givc ef'i~t to Order - No reyuestfor repuration in G~~rnzun~~'s
third submission - Titile pre.s.sureclue to circun~~tuncesin it.liiclzproceedings
1i.ereinstituted.

Gerniuny's fourth submis.sio - Question oJ 'bligution to provide certain

assurunces of non-repetition.468 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

General requestfor assurance of non-repetition- Measures tuken bjl United
Stutes to prevent recurrence of violation of Article 36, paragrapli 1 (b) -
Cornnîitrnent undertaken bji United Stutes to ensure irnplernentation of specijïc
measures adopted in pc$orrnance of obligations under that provision.

Consideration of other assurances requested by Gertnanp - Germunp's char-

acterization of indii~iduulright provided ,for in Article 36, purugruph 1, as
hunlan right - Court's polier to rieternline e.ui.vtenccof violation of itztertiu-
tiotlul obligation and, if nece.s.surp,to llold that dotnestic laii'hriscazrsedviola-
tion - United States lzaving apologized to Gertnunyfor hreach of Article 36,
purugruph 1, of Convention - Germcinynot hui~ingrequested nzaterial reparu-
tion ,for injurp to itself and to LaGrand hrothers - Question of review and
reconsiderution of certuin sentences.

JUDGMENT

Present: President GUILLAUME V;ice-President SHI; Judges OIIA, BEDJAOUI,
RANJEVA,HEKCZEGH,FLEISCHI~AUFR K,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGURE KNO,O~JMANR SE, ZEK,AL-KHASAWNEH,
BIJERGENTHA RLe;istrar COUVREUR.

In theLaGrand case,
hetireen

the Federal Republic of Germany,

represented by
Mr. Gerhard Westdickenberg, Director General for Legal Affairs and Legal
Adviser, Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany,

H.E. Mr. Eberhard U. B.von Puttkamer, Ambassador ofthe Federal Repub-
lic of Germany to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agents ;

Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor of Public International Law at the University
of Munich,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the Uni-
versity of Paris (Panthéon-Assas)and at the European University Institute
in Florence,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,
Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the Public International Law Division,
Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Mr. Daniel Khan, University of Munich,
Mr. Andreas Paulus, University of Munich,
as Counsel; Mr. Eberhard Desch, Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of
Germany,

Mr. S. Johannes Trommer, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in
the Netherlands,
Mr. Andreas Gotze, Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many,
as Advisers;

Ms Fiona Sneddon,
as Assistant,

und
the United States of America,

represented by
Mr. James H. Thessin, Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department of
State,

as Agent;
Ms Catherine W. Brown, Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs,
United States Department of State,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
United States Department of State,

as Deputy Agents;
The Honourable Janet Napolitano. Attorney General, State of Arizona,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Professor of International Law, School of
Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University; former Act-
ing Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,

Mr.Theodor Meron, Counsellor on International Law. United States Depart-
ment of State; Charles L. Denison Professor of International Law, New
York University; Associate Member of the Institute of International Law,

Mr. Stefan Trechsel, Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure, University
of Zurich Faculty of Law,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Shabtai Rosenne, Member of the Israel Bar; Honorary Member of the

American Society of International Law; Member of the Institute of Inter-
national Law,
Ms Norma B. Martens, Assistant Attorney General. State of Arizona,

Mr. Paul J. McMurdie, Assistant Attorney General, State of Arizona,
Mr. Robert J. Erickson, Principal Deputy Chief. Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice.

Mr. Allen S. Weiner, Counsellor for Legal Affairs. Embassy of the United
States of America in the Netherlands.
Ms Jessica R. Holmes. Attaché, Office of the Counsellor for Legal Affairs,
Embassy of the United States of America in the Netherlands,

as Counsel, The Court decided, pursuant to Article 56, paragraph 2. of the Rules, to
authorize the production of the latter group of documents by Germany, it
being understood that the United States would have the opportunity, in accord-
ance with paragraph 3 of that Article, to comment subsequently thereon and to

submit documents in support of those comments. That decision was duly com-
municated to the Parties by letters from the Registrar dated 9 November 2000.

7. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules, the Court, after ascer-
taining the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and docu-
ments annexed would be made available to the public at the opening of the oral
proceedings.
8. Public hearings were held from 13 to 17 November 2000, at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For Gerniriri~.: Mr. Gerhard Westdickenberg,
Mr. Bruno Simma.
Mr. Daniel Khan,
Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul,
Mr. Andreas Paulus,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.

For the United States: Mr. James H. Thessin,
The Horiourable Janet Napolitano,
Mr. Theodor Meron.
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias,
Mr. Stefan Trechsel,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson.

9. At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to Germany. to
which replies were given in writing, in accordance with Article61. paragraph 4,
of the Rules of Court.
In addition. the United States, acting within the time-limit accorded it for
this purpose. commented on the new documeilts filed by Germany on 26 Octo-
ber 2000 (see paragraph 6 above) and produced documents in support of those
comments.

10. In itsApplication, Germany formulated the decision requested in the fol-
lowing terms :

"Accordingly the Federal Republic of Germany asks the Court to
adjudge and declare
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying. convicting and
sentencing Karl and Walter LaGrand, as described in the preceding
statement of facts, violated its international legal obligations to Ger-
many, in its own right and in its right of diplonlatic protectioii of its
nationals, as provided by Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention,

(2) that Germany is therefore entitled to reparation,
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation not to apply the doctrine of 'procedural default' or any other doctrine of
national law, so as to preclude the exercise of the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; and

(4) that the United States is under an international obligation to carry out

in conformity with the foregoing international legal obligations any
future detention of or criminal proceedings against any other German
national in its territory, whether by a constituent, legislative. execu-
tive, judicial or other power, whether that power holds a superior or
subordinate position in the organization of the United States, and
whether that power's functions are of an international or interna1
character;

and that, pursuünt to the foregoing international legal obligations.

(1) the criminal liability imposed on Karl and Walter LaGrand in viola-
tion of international legal obligations is void, and should be recog-
nized as void by the legal authorities of the United States;
(2) the United Statesshould provide reparation, in the form of compensa-
tion and satisfaction, for the execution of Karl LaGrand on 24 Feb-
ruary 1999:
(3) the United States should restore the .rtutus quo unte in the case of

Walter LaGrand, that is re-establish the situation that existed before
the detention of. proceedings against, and conviction and sentencing
of that Germai1 national in violation of the United States' interna-
tional legal obligation took place; and
(4) the United States should provide Germany a guarantee of the non-
repetition of the illegal acts."
11. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were

presented by the Parties:
On brhaif of the Go1lcrnri7cntof Grrr~i~lny,

in the Memorial :
"Having regard to the facts and points of law set forth in the present
Memorial, and without prejudice to such elements of fact and law and to

such evidence as may be submitted at a later time, and likewise without
pi.c.jiidicc.to thc righto ~iipplc.nicii;,id ;inicnd tlic prescritSiibiiii.;.;iaii~.
ihc 1;cdtr;il Rcpliblic ofGci.ni;iii!, rc.;pccil'iill!.rcqiicsis ilic C'o~irtio iidjiid_rc
and declare
(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36
subparagraph 1 (h) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering consular
assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl and

Walter LaCrand, violated its international legal obligations to Ger-
many, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of its
nationals. under Articles 5 and 36 paragraph I of the said Conven-
tion;

(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in par- ticular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Wal-
ter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its

international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36 para-
graph 2 of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention
are intended :

(3) that the United States, by failing to take al1measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its
international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional
measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from
any action which might interfere with the subject matter of a dispute
while judicial proceedings are pending;

and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(4) that the United States shall provide Germany a guarantee that it will
not repeat its illegal acts and ensure that, in any future cases of deten-
tion of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, United
States domestic law and practice will not constitute a bar to the effec-
tive exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention

on Consular Relations."

On helzcrlf'uftlic Goi'errlriltiqf'the United Stutes,

in the Counter-Memorial :
~'Accordingly,on the basis of the facts and arguments set forth in this
Counter-Memorial, and without prejudice to the right further to amend
and supplement these submissions in the future, the United Statesasks the
Court to adjudge and declare that:

(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36 (1) (hl of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. in
that the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly
give to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that
Article, and that the United States has apologized to Germany for this
breach, and is taking substantial measures aimed at preventing any
recurrence; and
(2) That al1other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many are dismissed."

12. At the oral proceedings. the following submissions were presented by the
Parties :

012helinlf uf the Goi'trnrlleritof'G<~itncrnj~,
"The Federal Republic of Germany respectfully requests the Court to
adjudge and declare

(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36,
subparagraph 1 (hi, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering con- sular assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl
and Walter LaGrand. violated its international legal obligations to
Germany. in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of

its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36, paragraph 1, of the said
Convention:

(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in par-
ticular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Wal-
ter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations. and by ultimately executing them, violated its
international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, para-
graph 2. of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention
are intended :

(3) that the United States, by tàiling to take al1measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand was not execiited pending the final deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice on tlie mütter. violated its
international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional
measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from
any action which might interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute

while judicial proceedings are pending:
and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(4) that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it will
not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of detention
of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United

States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In
particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the United
States to provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convic-
tions impnired by a violation of the rights uiider Article 36."

"The United States of America respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and declare that :

(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36. paragraph 1 (hi. of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, in that the competent authorities of the United States did
not promptly give to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification
required by that Article, and that the United States has apologized to
Germany for this breach. and is taking substantial measures aimed at
preventing any recurrence; and
(2) All other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Germany
are dismissed."

13. Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in475 LAGRAND (JCDGMENT)

1962 and 1963 respectively, and were German nationals. In 1967, when
they were still young children, they moved with their mother to take up
permanent residence in the United States. They retnrned to Germany
only once, for a period of about six months in 1974.Although they lived
in the United States for most of their lives, and became the adoptive

children of a United States national, they remained at al1times German
nationals, and never acquired the nationality of the United States. How-
ever, the United States has emphasized that both had the demeanour and
speech of Americans rather than Gernians, that t~either was known CO
have spoken German, and that they appeared in al1respects to be native
citizens of the United States.

14. On 7 January 1982, Karl LaGrand and Walter LaGrand were
arrested in the United States by law enforcement officers on suspicion of
liaving been involved earlier the same day in an attempted armed bank
robbery in Marana, Arizona, in the course of which the bank manager

was murdered and another bank employee seriously injured. They were
subsequently tried before the Superior Court of Pitna County, Arizona,
which. on 17 Februarv 1984. convicted them both of murder in the first
degree, attempted murder in tlie first degree, attempted armed robbery
and two counts of kidnapping. On 14 December 1984, each was sen-
tenced to death for first degree murder and to concurrent sentences of

imprisonment for the other charges.

15. At al1 material times, Germany as well as the United States were
parties to both the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the
Optional Protocol to that Convention. Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of
the Vienna Convention provides that :

"if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State

shall, without delay. int'ormthe consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other mannes. Any conlmunication addressed to tlie consular post
by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be for-

warded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this subparagraph."

It is not disputed that at the time the LaGrands were convicted and sen-
tenced, the competent United States authorities had failed to provide the
LaGrands with the information required by this provision of the Vienna
Convention, and had not informed the relevant German consular post of

the LaGrands' arrest. The United States concedes that the competent
authorities failed to do so, even afterecoming aware that the LaGrands
were German nationals and not United States nationals, and admits thatthe United States has therefore violated its obligations under this provi-
sion of the Vienna Convention.

16. However. there is some dispute between the Parties as to the time
at which the competent authorities in the United States became aware of
the fact that the LaGrands were German nationals. Germany argues that
the authorities of Arizona were aware of this Srom the very beginning,
and in particular that probation officers knew by April 1982.The United

States argues that at the time of their arrest, neither of the LaGrands
identified himself to the arresting authorities as a German national, and
that Walter LaGrand affirmatively stated that he was a United States
citizen. The United States position is that its "competent authorities" for
the purposes of Article 36, paragraph 1 (hl, of the Vienna Convention
were the arresting and detaining authorities, and thatthese became aware

of the German nationality of the LaGrands by late 1984,and possibly by
mid-1983 or earlier, but in any event not at the time of their arrest in
1982.Although other authorities, such as immigration authorities or pro-
bation officers. may have known this even earlier, the United States
argues that these kere not "competent authorities" for the purposes
of this provision of the Vienna Convention. The United States has also

suggested that at the time of their arrest, the LaGrands may themselves
have been unaware that they were not nationals of the United States.

17. At their trial, the LaGrands were represented by counsel assigned
by the court. as they were unable to afford legal counsel of their own
choice. Their counsel at trial did not raise the issue of non-cornpliance
with the Vienna Convention, and did not themselves contact the German
consular authorities.

18. The convictions and sentences pronounced by the Superior Court
of Pima County, Arizona, were subsequently challenged by the LaGrands
in three principal sets of legal proceedings.
19. The first set of proceedings consisted of appeals against the con-
victions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which were

rejected by that court on 30 January 1987. The United States Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its discretion. denied applications by the
LaGrands for further review of these judgments on 5October 1987.

20. The second set of proceedings involved petitions by the LaGrands
for post-conviction relief, which were denied by an Arizona statecourt in

1989. Review of this decision was denied by the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona in 1990, and by the United States Supreme Court in 1991.

21. At the time of these two sets of proceedings, the LaGrands hadstill not been informed by the competent United States authorities of

their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of the Vienna Convention,
and the German consular post had still not been informed of their arrest.
The issue of the lack of consular notification, which had not been raised
at trial, was also not raised in these two sets of proceedings.

22. The relevant German consular post was only made aware of the
case in June 1992 by the LaGrands themselves, who had learnt of their
rights from other sources, and not from the Arizona authorities. In
December 1992, and on a number of subsequent occasions between then

and February 1999, an officia1 of the Consulate-General of Germany in
Los Angeles visited the LaGrands in prison. Germany claims that it sub-
sequently helped the LaGrands' attorneys to investigate the LaGrands'
childhood in Germany, and to raise the issue of the omission of consular
advice in further proceedings before the federal courts.

23. The LaGrands commenced a third set of legal proceedings by filing
applications for writs of hubeus corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona, seeking to have their convictions - or
at least their death sentences - set aside. In these proceedings they raised

a number of different claims, which were rejected by that court in orders
dated 24 January 1995 and 16 February 1995. One of these claims was
that the United States authorities had failed to notify the German con-
sulate of their arrest, as required by the Vienna Convention. This claim

was rejected on the basis of the "procedural default" rule. According to
the United States, this rule:

"is a federal rule that, before a state criminal defendant can obtain
relief in federal court, the claim must be presented to a statecourt. If
a state defendant attempts to raise a new issue in a federal hubeus

corpus proceeding, the defendant can only do so by showing cause
and prejudice. Cause is an external impediment that prevents a
defendant from raising a claim and prejudice must be obvious on its
face. One important purpose of this rule is to ensure that the state
courts have an opportunity to address issues going to the validity of

state convictions before the federal courts intervene."

The United States District Court held that the LaGrands had not shown
an objective external factor that prevented them from raising the issue of

the lack of consular notification earlier. On 16 January 1998, this judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit, which also held that the LaGrands' claim relating to the
Vienna Convention was "procedurally defaulted", as it had not been
raised in any of the earlier proceedings in state courts. On 2 Novem-
ber 1998.the United States Supreme Court denied further review of this
judgment.

24. On 21 December 1998,the LaGrands were formally notified bythe
United States authorities of their right to consular access.

25. On 15January 1999,the Supreme Court of Arizona decided that
Karl LaGrand was to be executed on 24 February 1999,and that Walter
LaGrand was to be executed on 3 March 1999.Germany claims that the

German Consulate learned of these dates on 19January 1999.
26. In January and early February 1999, various interventions were
made by Germany seeking to prevent the execution of the LaGrands. In
particular, the German Foreign Minister and German Minister of Justice
wrote to their respective United Statescounterparts on 27 January 1999;
the German Foreign Minister wrote to the Governor of Arizona on the
same day; the German Chancellor wrote to the President of the United
States and to the Governor of Arizona on 2 February 1999; and the
President of the Federal Republic of Germany wrote to the President of
the United States on 5 February 1999.These letters referred to German
opposition to capital punishment generally, but did not raise the issue of
the absence of consular notification in the case of the LaGrands. The
latter issue was, however, raised in a further letter, dated 22 February
1999,two days before the scheduled date of execution of Karl LaGrand,
from the German Foreign Minister to the United States Secretary of
State.

27. On 23 February 1999,the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency
rejected an appeal for clemency by Karl LaGrand. Under the law of
Arizona, this meant that the Governor of Arizona was prevented
from granting clemency.
28. On the same day, the Arizona Superior Court in Pima County
rejected a further petition by Walter LaGrand, based inter uliu on the
absence of consular notification, on the ground that these claims were
"procedurally precluded".
29. On 24 February 1999, certain last-minute federal court proceed-
ings brought by Karl LaGrand ultimately proved to be unsuccessful. In
the course of these proceedings the United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, again held the issue of failure of consular notification to be
procedurally defaulted. Karl LaGrand was executed later that same day.

30. On 2 March 1999,the day before the scheduled date of execution
of Walter LaGrand, at 7.30p.m. (The Hague time), Germany filed in the
Registry of this Court the Application instituting the present proceedings

against the United States (see paragraph 1 above), accompanied by a
request for the following provisional measures : "The United States should take al1 measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final deci-
sion in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of al1 the
measures which it has taken in implementation of that Order."

By a letter of the same date, the German Foreign Minister requested the

Secretary of State of the United States "to urge [the] Governor [of Ari-
zona] for a suspension of Walter LaGrand's execution pending a ruling
by the International Court of Justice".

31. On the same day, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency met
to consider the case of Walter LaGrand. It recommended against a com-
mutation of his death sentence, but recommended that the Governor of

Arizona grant a 60-day reprieve having regard to the Application filed by
Germany in the International Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the Gover-
nor of Arizona decided, "in the interest of justice and with the victims in
mind", to allow the execution of Walter LaGrand to go forward as
scheduled.
32. In an Order of 3 March 1999. this Court found that the circum-

stances required it to indicate, as a katter of the greatest urgency and
without any other proceedings, provisional measures in accordance with
Article 41 of its Statute and with Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules
(I.C.J. Reports lYYY (1), p. 15, para. 26); it indicated provisional meas-
ures in the following terms

"(a) The United States of America should take al1measures at its
disposa1 to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pend-

ing the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform
the Court of al1the measures which it has taken in implemen-
tation of this Order:

(6) The Government of the United States of America should
transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona."

33. On the same day, proceedings were brought by Germany in the

United States Supreme Court against the United States and the Gover-
nor of Arizona, seeking inter alia to enforce compliance with this Court's
Order indicating provisional measures. In the course of these proceed-
ings, the United States Solicitor General as counsel of record took the
position, inter. ulia, that "an order of the International Court of Justice
indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a
basis for judicial relief'. On the same date, the United States Supreme

Court dismissed the motion by Germany, on the ground of the tardiness
of Germany's application and of jurisdictional barriers under United
States domestic law.

34. On that same day, proceedings were also instituted in the UnitedStates Supreme Court by Walter LaGrand. These proceedings were
decided against him. Later that day, Walter LaGrand was executed.

35. The Court must as a preliminary matter deal with certain issues,
which were raised by the Parties in these proceedings, concerning the
jurisdiction of the Court in relation to Germany's Application, and the
admissibility of its submissions.

36. In relation to thejurisdiction of the Court, the United States, with-
out having raised preliminary objections under Article 79 of the Rules of
Court, nevertheless presented certain objections thereto.
Germany bases thejurisdiction of the Court on Article 1of the Optional
Protocol, which reads as follows:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a
Party to the present Protocol."
Germany contends that the

"proceedings instituted by [it] in the present case raise questions of
the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and of the legal consequences arising from the
non-observance on the part of the United States of certain of its pro-
visions vis-à-vis Germany and two of its nationals".

Accordingly, Germany States that al1four of its submissions

"are covered by one and the samejurisdictional basis, namely Art. 1

of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of
24 April 1963".

37. The Court will first examine the question of its jurisdiction with
respect to the first submission of Germany. Germany relies on para-
graph 1of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which provides:

"With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State: (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of
the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the
sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to com-
munication with and access to consular officers of the sending
State;

(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the send-
ing State if, within its consular district, a national of that State
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison,
custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities

without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person con-
cerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;

(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to con-

verse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal rep-
resentation. They shall also have the right to visit any national
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in
their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consu-
lar officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a
national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly

opposes such action."

38. Germany alleges that the failure of the United States to inform the
LaGrand brothers of their right to contact the German authorities "pre-

vented Germany from exercising its rights under Art. 36 (1) (u) and (c)
of the Convention" and violated "the various rights conferred upon the
sending State vis-à-vis its nationals in prison, custody or detention as
provided for in Art. 36 (1) (h) of the Convention". Germany further
alleges that by breaching its obligations to inform, the United States also
violated individual rights conferred on the detainees by Article 36, para-
graph 1 (u), second sentence, and by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Ger-

many accordingly claims that it "was injured in the person of its two
nationals", a claim which Germany raises "as a matter of diplomatic pro-
tection on behalf of Walter and Karl LaGrand".

39. The United States acknowledges that "there was a breach of the

U.S. obligation . . . to inform the LaGrand brothers that they could ask
that a German consular post be notified of their arrest and detention". It
does not deny that this violation of Article 36, paragraph 1(b), has given
rise to a dispute between the two States and recognizes that the Court hasjurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to hear this dispute in so far as
it concerns Germany's own rights.

40. Concerning Germany's claims of violation of Article 36, para-
graph 1 (a) and ((,),the United States however calls these claims "par-
ticularly misplaced" on the grounds that the "underlying conduct com-
plained of is the same" as the claim of the violation of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b). It contends, moreover, that "to the extent that this
claim by Germany is based on the general law of diplomatic protection,

it is not within the Court's jurisdiction" under the Optional Protocol
because it "does not concern the interpretation or application of the
Vienna Convention". The United States points to the distinction between
jurisdiction over treaties and jurisdiction over customary law and observes
that "[elven if a treaty norm and a customary norm were to have exactly
the same content", each would have its "separate applicability". It con-
tests the German assertion that diplomatic protection "enters through the
intermediary of the Vienna Convention" and submits:

"the Vienna Convention deals with consular assistance . . it does
not deal with diplomatic protection. Legally, a world of difference
exists between the right of the consul to assist an incarcerated
national of his country, and the wholly different question whether
the State can espouse the claims of its national through diplomatic
protection. The former is within the jurisdiction of the Court under
the Optional Protocol; the latter is not . . Germany based its right
of diplomatic protection on customary law . .. [Tlhis case comes
before this Court not under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute,

but under Article 36, paragraph 1. 1sit not obvious .. .that what-
ever rights Germany has under customary law, they do not fa11
within the jurisdiction of this Court under the Optional Protocol?"

41. Germany responds that the breach of paragraph 1 (a) and (c) of
Article 36 must be distinguished from that of paragraph 1 (b), and that

as a result, the Court should not only rule on the latter breach, but also
on the violation of paragraph 1 (u) and (c). Germany further asserts
"that 'application of the Convention' in the sense of the Optional Proto-
col very well encompasses the consequences of a violation of individual
rights under the Convention, including the espousal of respective claims
by the State of nationality".

42. The Court cannot accept the United States objections. The dispute
between the Parties as to whether Article 36, paragraph 1 (u) and (c),of
the Vienna Convention have been violated in this case in consequence of
the breach of paragraph 1 (b) does relate to the interpretation and appli-483 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

cation of the Convention. This is also true of the dispute as to whether
paragraph 1 (h) creates individual rights and whether Germany has
standing to assert those rights on behalf of its nationals. These are con-
sequently disputes within the meaning of Article 1of the Optional Pro-
tocol. Moreover, the Court cannot accept the contention of the United
Statesthat Germany's claimbased on the individual rights of the LaGrand

brothers is beyond the Court's jurisdiction because diplomatic protection
is a concept of customary international law. This fact does not prevent a
State party to a treaty, which creates individual rights, from taking up the
case of one of its nationals and instituting international judicial proceed-
ings on behalf of that national, on the basis of a general jurisdictional
clause in such a treaty. Therefore the Court concludes that it has juris-
diction with respect to the whole of Germany's first submission.

43. The United States does not challenge the Court's jurisdiction in
regard to Germany's second submission. Nor does it as such address the

issue of the jurisdiction of the Court over the third submission concern-
ing the binding nature of the Order of the Court of 3 March 1999 indi-
cating provisional measures. It argues, however, that this submission is
inadmissible (see paragraphs 50 and 53-55 below), and that the Court can
fully and adequately dispose of the merits of this case without having to
rule on the submission.

44. Germany asserts that the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 was
intended to "enforce" the rights enjoyed by Germany under the Vienna
Convention and "preserve those rights pending its decision on the
merits". Germany claims that a dispute as to "whether the United States
were obliged to comply and did comply with the Order" necessarily arises
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and thus falls
within the jurisdiction of the Court. Germany argues further that ques-

tions "relating to the non-compliance with a decision of the Court under
Article 41, para. 1, of the Statute, e.g. Provisional Measures, are an inte-
gral component of the entire original dispute between the parties". More-
over, Germany contends that its third submission also implicates "in an
auxiliary and subsidiary manner . .. the inherent jurisdiction of the Court
for claims as closely interrelated with each other as the ones before the
Court in the present case".

45. The third submission of Germany concerns issues that arise directly
out of the dispute between the Parties before the Court over which the
Court has already held that it has jurisdiction (see paragraph 42 above),
and which are thus covered by Article 1 of the Optional Protocol. The
Court reaffirms, in this connection, what it said in its Judgment in theFisheries Jurisdiction case, where it declared that in order to consider the
dispute in al1its aspects it may also deal with a submission that "is one
based on facts subsequent to the filing of the Application, but arising
directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of that Applica-
tion. As such it falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction . . ."
(Fisheries Jurisdiction (Fedeval Republir of Germuny v. Icelundj, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Rq7orts 1974, p. 203, para. 72). Where the Court has

jurisdiction to decide a case, it also has jurisdiction to deal with submis-
sions requesting it to determine that an order indicating measures which
seeks to preserve the rights of the Parties to this dispute has not been
complied with.

46. The United States objects to the jurisdiction of the Court over the

fourth submission in so far as it concerns a request for assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition. The United States submits that its "juris-
dictional argument [does] not apply to jurisdiction to order cessation of a
breach or to order reparation, but is limited to the question of assurances
and guarantees . . . [which] are conceptually distinct from reparation". It
contends that Germany's fourth submission

"goes beyond any remedy that the Court can or should grant, and
should be rejected. The Court's power to decide cases . . does not
extend to the power to order a State to provide any 'guarantee'
intended to confer additional legal rights on the Applicant State ...
The United States does not believe that it can be the role of the

Court . . . to impose any obligations that are additional to or that
differ in character from those to wl-iichthe United States consented
when it ratified the Vienna Convention."
47. Gerrnany counters this argument by asserting that

"a dispute whether or not the violation of a provision of the Vienna
Convention gives riseto a certain remedy is a dispute concerning
'the application and interpretation' of the aforesaid Convention, and
thus falls within the scope of Art. 1of the Optional Protocol".

Germany notes in this regard that the Court, in its Order of 9 April 1998
in the case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. United States of America). held that

"there exists a dispute asto whether the relief sought by Paraguay is
a remedy available under the Vienna Convention, in particular in
relation to Articles 5and 36 thereof; and ... this is a dispute arising
out of the application of the Convention within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes of 24 April 1963" (I.C.J. Reports 1998,

p. 256, para. 31).Germany asserts also that its fourth submission arises under principles of
State responsibility, according to which Germany is entitled to a "whole
range of remedies" as a consequence of the particular violations alleged
in this case and that these questions of State responsibility "are clearly

within the ambit of the Optional Protocol".

48. TheCourt considers that a dispute regarding the appropriate rem-
edies for the violation of the Convention alleged by Germany is a dispute
that arises out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and
thus is within the Court's jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists over a
dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is

required by the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for
the breach of the obligation (Fuctory rit Cllorz(iiv. P. C.I.J., Serirs A,
No. 9, p. 22).Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction in the present case
with respect to the fourth submission of Germany.

49. The United States has argued that the submissions of Germany are
inadmissible on various grounds. The Court will consider these objec-
tions in the order presented by the United States.

50. The United States objects first to Germany's second, third and

fourth submissions. According to the United States, these submissions
are inadmissible because Germany seeks to have this Court "play the role
of ultimate court of appeal in national criminal proceedings", a role
which it is not empowered to perform. The United States maintains that
many of Germany's arguments, in particular those regarding the rule of
"procedural default", ask the Court "to address and correct .. .asserted
violations of US law and errors of judgment by US judges" in criminal
proceedings in national courts.

51. Germany denies that it requests the Court to act as an appellate
criminal court, or that Germany's requests are in any way aimed at inter-
fering with the administration of justice within the United States judicial
system. It maintains that it is merely asking the Court to adjudge and

declare that the conduct of the United States was inconsistent with its
international legal obligations towards Germany under the Vienna Con-
vention, and to draw from this failure certain legal consequences pro-
vided for in the international law of state responsibility.

52. The Court does not agree with these arguments of the United486 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

States concerning the admissibility of the second, third and fourth Ger-
man submissions. In the second submission, Germany asks the Court to
interpret the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention;
the third submission seeks a finding that the United States violated an
Order issued by this Court pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute; and in

Germany's fourth submission, the Court is asked to determine the appli-
cable remedies for the alleged violations of the Convention. Although
Germany deals extensively with the practice of American courts as it
bears on the application of the Convention, al1three submissions seek to
require the Court to do no more than apply the relevant rules of inter-
national law to the issues in dispute between the Parties to this case. The

exercise of this function, expressly mandated by Article 38 of its Statute,
does not convert this Court into a court of appeal of national criminal
proceedings.

53. The United States also argues that Germany's third submission is
inadmissible because of the manner in which these proceedings were
brought before the Court by Germany. It notes that German consular
officiaisbecame aware of the LaGrands' cases in 1992, but that the Ger-
man Government did not express concern or protest to the United States

authorities for some six and a half years. It maintains that the issue of the
absence of consular notification was not raised by Germany until 22 Feb-
ruary 1999, two days before the date scheduled for Karl LaGrand's
execution, in a letter from the German Foreign Minister to the Secretary
of State of the United States (see paragraph 26 above). Germany then

filed the Application instituting these proceedings, together with a request
for provisional measures, after normal business hours in the Registry
in the evening of 2 March 1999, some 27 hours before the execution of
Walter LaGrand (see paragraph 30 above).

54. The United States rejects the contention that Germany found
out only seven days before the filing of its Application that the authori-
ties of Arizona knew as early as 1982 that the LaGrands were German
nationals; according to the United States, their German nationality was
referred to in pre-sentence reports prepared in 1984, which should

have been familiar to German consular officers much earlier than 1999,
given Germany's claims regarding the vigour and effectiveness of
its consular assistance.
55. According to the United States, Germany's late filing compelled
the Court to respond to its request for provisional measures by acting
r.upurte, without full information. The United States claims that the pro-

cedure followed was inconsistent with the principles of "equality of theParties" and of giving each Party a sufficient opportunity to be heard,
and that this would justify the Court in not addressing Germany's third

submission which is predicated wholly upon the Order of 3 March 1999.

56. Germany acknowledges that delay on the part of a claimant State
may render an application inadmissible, but maintains that international
law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It contends

that it was only seven days before it filed its Application that it became
aware of al1the relevant hcts underlying its claim, in particular, the fact
that the authorities of Arizona knew of the German nationality of the
LaGrands since 1982. According to Germany, it cannot be accused of
negligence in failing to obtain the 1984 pre-sentence reports earlier. It
also maintains that in the period between 1992. when it learned of the

LaGrands' cases, and the filing of its Application, it engaged in a variety
of activities at the diplomatic and consular level. It adds that it had been
confident for much of this period that the United Stateswould ultimately
rectify the violations of international law involved.

57. TheCourt recognizes that Germany may be criticized for the man-

ner in which these proceedings were filed and for their timing. The Court
recalls, however, that notwithstanding its awareness of the consequences
of Germany's filing at such a late date it nevertheless considered it appro-
priate to enter the Order of 3 March 1999, given that an irreparable
prejudice appeared to be imminent. In view of these considerations, the
Court considers that Germany is now entitled to challenge the alleged

failure of the United States to comply with the Order. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Germany's third submission is admissible.

58. The United States argues further that Germany's first submission,
as far as it concerns its right to exercise diplomatic protection with
respect to its nationals, is inadmissible on the ground that the LaGrands
did not exhaust local remedies. The United States maintains that the
alleged breach concerned the duty to inform the LaGrands of their right
to consular access, and that such a breach could have been remedied at

the trial stage, provided it was raised in a timely fashion. The United
States contends that when a person fails, for example, to sue in a national
court before a statute of limitations has expired, the claim is both pro-
cedurally barred in national courts and inadmissible in international tri-
bunal~ for failure to exhaust local remedies. It adds that the failure of
counsel for the LaGrands to raise the breach of the Vienna Convention

at the appropriate stage and time of the proceedings does not excuse the
non-exhaustion of local remedies. According to the United States, thisfailure of counsel is imputable to their clients because the law treats
defendants and their lawyers as a single entity in termsof their legal posi-

tions. Moreover, the State is not accountable for the errors or mistaken
strategy by lawyers.

59. Germany responds that international law requires the exhaustion

of only those remedies which are legally and practically available. Ger-
many claims that in this case there was no remedy which the LaGrands
failed to invoke that would have been available in the specific context of
their case. This is so because, prior to 1992, the LaGrands could not
resort to the available remedies, since they were unaware of their rights

dueto failure of the United States authorities to comply with the require-
ments of the Vienna Convention; thereafter, the "procedural default"
rule prevented them from seeking any remedy.

60. The Court notes that it is not disputed that the LaGrands sought
to plead the Vienna Convention in United States courts after they learned

in 1992 of their rights under the Convention; it is also not disputed that
by that date the procedural default rule barred the LaGrands from
obtaining any remedy in respect of the violation of those rights. Counsel
assigned to the LaGrands failed to raise this point earlier in a timely fash-
ion. However, the United States may not now rely before this Court on
this fact in order to preclude the admissibility of Germany's first submis-

sion, as it was the United States itself which had failed to carry Our its
obligation under the Convention to inform the LaGrand brothers.

61. The United States also contends that Germany's submissions are
inadmissible on the ground that Germany seeks to have a standard
applied to the United States that is different from its own practice.
According to the United States, Germany has not shown that its system

of criminal justice requires the annulment of criminal convictions where
there has been a breach of the duty of consular notification; and that the
practice of Germany in similar cases has been to do no more than offer
an apology. The United States maintains that it would be contrary to
basic principles of administration of justice and equality of the Parties to
apply against the United States alleged rules that Germany appears not

to accept for itself.
62. Germany denies that it is asking the United States to adhere to
standards which Germany itself does not abide by; it maintains that its
law and practice is fully in compliance with the standards which it
invokes. In this regard, it explains that the German Code of CriminalProcedure provides a ground of appeal where a legal norm, including a
norm of international law, is not applied or incorrectly applied and where
there is a possibility that the decision was impaired by this fact.

63. The Court need not decide whether this argument of the United
States, if true, would result in the inadmissibility of Germany's submis-
sions. Here the evidence adduced by the United States does not justify
the conclusion that Germany's own practice fails to conform to the
standards it demands from the United States in this litigation. The
United States relies on certain German cases to demonstrate that Ger-

many has itself proffered only an apology for violating Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention, and that State practice shows that this is the appro-
priate remedy for such a violation. But the cases concerned entailed rela-
tively light criminal penalties and are not evidence asto German practice
where an arrested person, who has not been informed without delay of
his or her rights, is facing a severe penalty as in the present case. It is no

doubt the case, as the United States points out, that Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention imposes identical obligations on States, irrespective
of the gravity of the offence a person may be charged with and of the
penalties that may be imposed. However, it does not follow therefrom
that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be identical in al1
situations. While an apology may be an appropriate remedy in some
cases, it may in others be insufficient. The Court accordingly finds that

this claim of inadmissibility must be rejected.

64. Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction, and that the
submissions of Germany are admissible, the Court now turns to the

merits of each of these four submissions.

65. Germany's first submission requests the Court to adjudge and
declare :

"that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36
subparagraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering con-
sular assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl

and Walter LaGrand, violated its international legal obligations to
Germany, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of
its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36 paragraph 1 of the said
Convention". 66. Germany claims that the United States violated its obligation
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), to "inform a national of the sending
State without delay of his or her right to inform the consular post of his
home State of his arrest or detention". Specifically, Germany maintains

that the United States violated its international legal obligation to Ger-
many under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), by failing to inform the German
nationals Karl and Walter LaGrand "without delay" of their rights
under that subparagraph.

67. The United States acknowledges, and does not contest Germany's
basic claim, that there was a breach of its obligation under Article 36,

paragraph I (b), of the Convention "promptly to inform the LaGrand
brothers that they could ask that a German consular post be notified of
their arrest and detention".

68. Germany also claims that the violation by the United States of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (hl,led to consequential violations of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (u) and (c). It points out that, when the obligation to

inform the arrested person without delay of his or her right to contact the
consulate is disregarded, "the other rights contained in Article 36, para-
graph 1, become in practice irrelevant, indeed meaningless". Germany
maintains that, "[bly informing the LaGrand brothers of their right to
inform the consulate more than 16 years after their arrest, the United
States . . . clearly failed to meet the standard of Article 36 [(l) (ci]". It
concludes that, by not preventing the executioii of Karl and Walter

LaGrand, and by "making irreversible its earlier breaches of Art. 5 and
36 (1) and (2)and causing irreparable harm, the United States violated its
obligations under international law".

69. The United States argues that the underlying conduct complained
of by Germany is one and the same, namely, the failure to inform the

LaGrand brothers as required by Article 36, paragraph I (hl. Therefore,
it disputes any other basis for Germany's claims that other provisions,
such as subparagraphs (u) and (c) of Article 36, paragraph 1, of
the Convention, were also violated. The United States asserts that
Germany's claims regarding Article 36, paragraph 1 (u) and (c), are
"particularly misplaced" in that the LaGrands were able to and did
communicate freely with consular officiaisafter 1992. There was, in

the view of the United States, "no deprivation of Germany's right to
provide consular assistance, under Article 5 or Article 36, to Karl or
Walter LaGrand" and "Germany's attempt to transform a breach of
one obligation into an additional breach of a wholly separate and distinct
obligation should be rejected by the Court."

70. In response, Germany asserts that it is "commonplace that oneand the same conduct may result in several violations of distinct obliga-
tions". Hence, when a detainee's right to notification without delay is vio-

lated, he or she cannot establish contact with the consulate, receive visits
from consular officers, nor be supported by adequate counsel. "There-
fore, violation of this right is bound to imply violation of the other
rights . . . [and] later observance of the rights of Article 36, para-
graph I (a) and (c), could not remedy the previous violation of those
provisions."

71. Germany further contends that there is a causal relationship
between the breach of Article 36 and the ultimate execution of the
LaGrand brothers. Germany's inability to render prompt assistance was,
in its viewa "direct result of the United States' breach of its Vienna Con-
vention obligations". It is claimed that, had Germany been properly
afforded its rights under the Vienna Convention, it would have been able

to intervene in time and present a "persuasive mitigation case" which
"likely would have saved" the lives of the brothers. Germany believes
that, "[hlad proper notification been given under the Vienna Convention,
competent trial counsel certainly would have looked to Germany for
assistance in developing this line of mitigating evidence". Moreover, Ger-
many argues that, due to the doctrine of procedural default and the high

post-conviction threshold for proving ineffective counsel under United
States law, Germany's intervention at a stage later than the trial phase
could not "remedy the extreme prejudice created by the counsel appointed
to represent the LaGrands".

72. The United States terms these arguments as "suppositions about
what might have occurred had the LaGrand brothers been properly
informed of the possibility of consular notification". It calls into question
Germany's assumption that German consular officiaifrom Los Angeles
would rapidly have given extensive assistance to the LaGrands' defence
counsel before the 1984 sentencing, and contests that such consular

assistance would have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceed-
ings. According to the United States, these arguments "rest on specula-
tion" and do not withstand analysis. Finally, the United States finds it
extremely doubtful that the early childhood "mitigating evidence" men-
tioned by Germany, if introduced at the trial, would have persuaded the
sentencing judge to be lenient, as the brothers' subsequent 17 years of
experiences in the United States would have been given at least equal

weight. The United States points out. moreover, that such evidence was
in fact presented at trial.

73. The Court will first examine the submission Germany advances in
its own right. The Court observes, in this connection, that the United
States does not deny that it violated paragraph 1 (h) in relation to Ger-492 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

many. The Court also notes that as a result of this breach, Germany did

not learn until 1992of the detention, trial and sentencing of the LaGrand
brothers. The Court concludes therefrom that on the facts of this case,
the breach of the United States had the consequence of depriving Ger-
many of the exercise of the rights accorded it under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (a) and paragraph 1 fc), and thus violated these provisions of
the Convention. Although the violation of paragraph 1 (h) of Article 36

will not necessarily always result in the breach of the other provisions of
this Article, the Court finds that thcircumstances of this casecompel the
opposite conclusion, for the reasons indicated below. In view of this find-
ing, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with Germany's further claim
under Article 5 of the Convention.

74. Article 36, paragraph 1,establishes an interrelated régime designed
to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection. It
begins with the basic principle governing consular protection: the right of
communication and access (Art. 36, para. 1 (uj). This clause is followed
by the provision which spells out the modalities of consular notification
(Art. 36, para. I (6)). Finally Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), sets out the

measures consular officers may take in rendering consular assistance to
their nationals in the custody of the receiving State. It follows that when
the sending State is unaware of the detention of its nationals due to the
failure of the receiving State to provide the requisite consular notification
without delay, which was true in the present case during the period
between 1982and 1992,the sending State has been prevented for al1prac-

tical purposes from exercising its rights under Article 36, paragraph 1. It
is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether the LaGrands
would have sought consular assistance from Germany, whether Germany
would have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict
would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred
these rights, and that Germany and the LaGrands were in effect pre-

vented by the breach of the United Statesfrom exercising them, had they
so chosen.

75. Germany further contends that "the breach of Article 36 by the
United States did not only infringe upon the rights of Germanyas a State
party to the [Vienna] Convention but also entailed a violation of the indi-
vidual rights of the LaGrand brothers". Invoking its right of diplomatic
protection, Germany also seeks relief against the United States on this

ground.
Germany maintains that the right to be informed of the rights under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, is an individual
right of every national of a State party to the Convention who enters theterritory of another State Party. It submits that this view is supported by
the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention, since the last sentence of that provision speaks of the
"rights" under this subparagraph of "the person concerned", i.e., of the

foreign national arrested or detained. Germany adds that the provision in
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), according to which it is for the arrested per-
son to decide whether consular notification is to be provided, has the
effect of conferring an individual right upon the foreign national con-
cerned. In its view, the context of Article 36 supports this conclusion
since it relates to both the concerns of the sending and receiving States
and to those of individuals. According to Germany, the tvui~uuic pv6puru-

toivrs of the Vienna Convention lend further support to this interpre-
tation. In addition, Germany submits that the "United Nations Dec-
laration on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals
of the country in which they live", adopted by General Assembly resolu-
tion 401144 on 13 December 1985, confirms the view that the right of
access to the consulate of the home State, as well as the information on

this right, constitute individual rights of foreign nationals and are to be
regarded as human rights of aliens.

76. The United States questions what this additional claim of diplo-
matic protection contributes to the case and argues that there are no

parallels between the present case and cases of diplomatic protection
involving the espousal by a State of economic claims of its nationals.
The United States maintains that the right of a State to provide con-
sular assistance to nationals detained in another country, and the right
of a State to espouse the claims of its nationals through diplomatic
protection, are legally different concepts.

The United States contends, furthermore, that rights of consular noti-
fication and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and
not of individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals by
permitting States to offer them consular assistance. It maintains that the

treatment due to individuals under the Convention is inextricably linked
to and derived from the right of the State, acting through its consular
officer, to communicate with its nationals, and does not constitute a fun-
damental right or a human right. The United States argues that the fact
that Article 36 by its terms recognizes the rights of individuals does not
determine the nature of those rights or the remedies required under

the Vienna Convention for breaches of that Article. It points out that
Article 36 begins with the words "[wlith a view to facilitating the exer-
cise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State",
and that this wording gives no support to the notion that the rights and
obligations enumerated in paragraph 1 of that Article are intended
to ensure that nationals of the sending State have any particular rights ortreatment in the context of a criminal prosecution. The truvuus prkpuru-
toires of the Vienna Convention according to the United States do not
reflect a consensus that Article 36 was addressing immutable indivi-
dual rights, as opposed to individual rights derivative of the rights of
States.

77. The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the
obligations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the
sending State. It provides that, at the request of the detained person, the
receiving State must inform the consular post of the sending State of the
individual's detention "without delay". It provides further that any com-
munication by the detained person addressed to the consular post of the
sending Statemust be forwarded to it by authorities of the receiving State

"without delay". Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the following
language: "The said authorities shall inform the person concerned with-
out delay of /lis rights under this subparagraph" (emphasis added).
Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), the sending State's right to
provide consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised
"if he expressly opposes such action". The clarity of these provisions,

viewed in their context, admits of no doubt. It follows, as has been held
on a number of occasions, that the Court must apply these as they stand
(see Acquisition of Polish Nution~~lity,Au'i~isorjOpinion, 1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 7, p. 20; Competence of' the Genrrul A.~semblyfor the
Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 8; Arbitral A~urd of 31 July 1989, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp. 69-70, para. 48; Territorial Dispute (Libyun

Arab JamahiriyulChad), Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1994, p. 25, para. 51).
Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36,
paragraph 1,creates individual rights, which, by virtue of Article 1of the
Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the national State of
the detained person. These rights were violated in the present case.

78. At the hearings, Germany further contended that the right of the
individual to be informed without delay under Article 36, paragraph 1,of
the Vienna Convention was not only an individual right but has today
assumed the character of a human right. In consequence, Germany
added, "the character of the right under Article 36 as a human right
renders the effectiveness of this provision even more imperative". The
Court having found that the United States violated the rights accorded

by Article 36, paragraph 1, to the LaGrand brothers, it does not appear
necessary to it to consider the additional argument developed by Ger-
many in this regard. 79. The Court will now consider Germany's second submission, in
which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:

"that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in
particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl
and Walter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing
them, violated its international legal obligation to Germany under
Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention to give full effect

to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of
the said Convention are intended".

80. Germany argues that, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention
"the United States is under an obligation to ensure that its municipal

'laws and regulations . . .enable full effect to be given to the pur-
poses for which the rights accorded under this article are intended'
[and that it] is in breach of this obligation by upholding rules of
domestic law which make it impossible to successfully raise a viola-
tion of the right to consular notification in proceedings subsequent
to a conviction of a defendant by a jury".

81. Germany points out that the "procedural default" rule is among
the rules of United States domestic law whose application make it impos-

sible to invoke a breach of the notification requirement. According to
Germany, this rule "is closely connected with the division of labour
between federal and state jurisdiction in the United States . . . [where]
[clriminal jurisdiction belongs to the Statesexcept in cases provided for in
the Constitution". This rule, Germany explains, requires "exhaustion of
remedies at the state level before a huhe~scorpus motion can be filed with
federal Courts".

Germany emphasizes that it is not the "procedural default" rule as
such that is at issue in the present proceedings, but the manner in which
it was applied in that it "deprived the brothers of the possibility to raise
the violations of their right to consular notification in US criminal
proceedings".

82. Furthermore, having examined the relevant United Statesjurispru-
dence, Germany contends that the procedural default rule had "made it
impossible for the LaGrand brothers to effectively raise the issue of the
lack of consular notification after they had at last learned of their rights
and established contact with the German consulate in Los Angeles in
1992". 83. Finally, Germany States that it seeks

"[nlothing . . . more than compliance, or, at least, a system in place
which does not automatically reproduce violation after violation of
the Vienna Convention, only interrupted by the apologies of the
United States Government".

84. The United States objects to Germany's second submission, since
it considers that "Germany's position goes far beyond the wording of the
Convention, the intentions of the parties when it was negotiated, and the
practice of States, including Germany's practice".

85. In the view of the United States:
"[tlhe Vienna Convention does not require States Party to create a
national law remedy permitting individuals to assert claims involv-

ing the Convention in criminal proceedings. If there is no such
requirement, it cannot violate the Convention to require that efforts
to assert such claims be presented to the first court capable of
adjudicating them".

According to the United States,

"[ilf there is no obligation under the Convention to create such indi-
vidual remedies in criminal proceedings, the rule of procedural
default - requiring that claims seeking such remedies be asserted at
an appropriately early stage - cannot violate the Convention".

86. The United States believes that Article 36, paragraph 2, "has a
very clear meaning" and

"means, as it says, that the rights referred to in paragraph 1shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiv-
ing State, subject to the proviso that said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights

accorded under the Article are intended".
In the view of the United States,

"[iln the context of a foreign national in detention, the relevant laws
and regulations contemplated by Article 36 (2) are those that may
affect the exercise of specific rights under Article 36 (l), such as

those addressing the timing of communications, visiting hours, and
security in a detention facility. There is no suggestion in the text of
Article 36 (2) that the rules of criminal law and procedure under
which a defendant would be tried or have his conviction and sen-
tence reviewed by appellate courts are also within the scope of this
provision."49 7 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

87. The United States concludes that Germany's second submission
must be rejected "because it is premised on a misinterpretation of
Article 36, paragraph 2,which reads the context of the provision - the

exercise of a right under paragraph 1 - out of existence".

88. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention reads as fol-
lows:

"The rights referred to in paragraph I of this article shall be exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regu-
lations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which

the rights accorded under this article are intended."
89. The Court cannot accept the argument of the United States which

proceeds, in part, on the assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36
applies only to the rights of the sending State and not also to those of the
detained individual. The Court has already determined that Article 36,
paragraph 1,creates individual rights for the detained person in addition
to the rights accorded the sending State, and that consequently the ref-
erence to "rights" in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to

the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained indi-
vidual (see paragraph 77 above).
90. Turning now to the "procedural default" rule, the application of
which in the present case Germany alleges violated Article 36, para-
graph 2, the Court emphasizes that a distinction must be drawn between
that rule as such and its specific application in the present case. In itself,

the rule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The ~rob-
lem arises when the procedural deîault rule does not allow the detained
individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance
on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the competent
national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to provide the

requisite consular information "without delay", thus preventing the
person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending
State.
91. In this case, Germany had the right at the request of the LaGrands
"to arrange for [their] legal representation" and was eventually able to
provide some assistance to that effect. By that time, however, because of

the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), the procedural default rule prevented
counsel for the LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and
sentences other than on United States constitutional grounds. As a result,
although United States courts could and did examine the professional
competence of counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands by reference to

United States constitutional standards, the procedural default rule pre-
vented them from attaching any legal significance to the fact, inter dia,
that the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1,pre-
vented Germany, in a timely fashion, from retaining private counsel forthem and otherwise assisting in their defence as provided for by the Con-
vention. Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the
effect of preventing "full effect [from being] given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are intended", and thus vio-
lated paragraph 2 of Article 36.

92. TheCourt will now consider Germany's third submission, in which
it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:

"that the United States, by failing to take al1measures at its disposa1
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final
decision of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated

its international legal obligation to comply with the Order on pro-
visional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to
refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject matter
of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending".

93. In its Memorial, Germany contended that "[p]rovisional [mleas-
ures indicated by the International Court of Justice [were]binding by vir-
tue of the law of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the
Court". In support of its position, Germany developed a number of argu-
ments in which it referred to the "principle of effectiveness", to the "pro-

cedural prerequisites" for the adoption of provisional measures, to the
binding nature of provisional measures as a "necessary consequence of
the bindingness of the final decision", to "Article 94 (l), of the United
Nations Charter", to "Article 41 (l),of the Statute of the Court" and to
the "practice of the Court".
Referring to the duty of the "parties to a dispute before the Court .. .
to preserve its subject-matter", Germany added that :

"[alpart from having violated its duties under Art. 94 (1) of the
United Nations Charter and Art. 41 (1) of the Statute, the United
States has also violated the obligation to refrain from any action

which might interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute while judi-
cial proceedings are pending".
At the hearings, Germany further stated the following:

"A judgment by the Court on jurisdiction or merits cannot be
treated on exactly the same footing as a provisional measure . ..
Article 59 and Article 60 [of the Statute] do not apply to provisional
measures or, to be more exact, apply to them only by implication;

that is to say, to the extent that such measures, being both incidental and provisional, contribute to the exercise of a judicial function
whose end-result is, by definition, the delivery of a judicial decision.

There is here an inherent logic in the judicial procedure, and to dis-
regard it would be tantamount, as far as the Parties are concerned,
to deviating from the principle of good faith and from what the Ger-
man pleadings cal1 'the principle of institutional effectiveness' . . .
[Plrovisional measures . . .are indeed legal decisions, but they are

decisions of procedure . . . Since their decisional nature is, however,
implied by the logic of urgency and by the need to safeguard the
effectiveness of the proceedings, they accordingly create genuine
legal obligations on the part of those to whom they are addressed."

94. Germany claims that the United States committed a threefold vio-
lation of the Court's Order of 3 March 1999:

"(1) Immediately after the International Court of Justice had ren-

dered its Order on Provisional Measures, Germany appealed to the
US Supreme Court in order to reach a stay of the execution of Wal-
ter LaGrand, in accordance with the International Court's Order to
the same effect. In the course of these proceedings - and in full
knowledge of the Order of the International Court - the Office of

the Solicitor General, a section of the US Department of Justice -
in a letter to the Supreme Court argued once again that : 'an order of
the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is
not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief.

This statement of a high-ranking official of the Federal
Government . . . had a direct influence on the decision of the
Supreme Court.

.............................
(2) In the following, the US Supreme Court - an agency of the
United States - refused by a majority vote to order that the execu-

tion be stayed. In doing so, it rejected the German arguments based
essentially on the Order of the International Court of Justice on Pro-
visional Measures . . .

(3) Finally, the Governor of Arizona did not order a stay of the

execution of Walter LaGrand although she was vested with the right
to do so by the laws of the State of Arizona. Moreover, in the
present case, the Arizona Executive Board of Clemency - for the
first time in the history of this institution - had issued a recommen-
dation for a temporary stay, not least in light of the international

legal issues involved in the case . . ."
95. The United States argues that it "did what was called for by the

Court's 3 March Order, given the extraordinary and unprecedented cir-cumstances in which it was forced to act". It points out in this connection
that the United States Government "immediately transmitt[ed] the Order
to the Governor of Arizona", that "the United States placed the Order in

the hands of the one official who, at that stage, might have had legal
authority to stop the execution" and that by a letter from the Legal
Counsellor of the United States Embassy in The Hague dated
8 March 1999, it informed the International Court of Justice of al1 the
measures which had been taken in implementation of the Order.

The United States further States that:

"[t]wo central factors constrained the United States ability to act.
The first was the extraordinarily short time between issuance of the
Court's Order and the time set for the execution of Walter
LaGrand . ..

.............................
The second constraining factor was the character of the United
States of America as a federal republic of divided powers."

96. The United States also alleges that the "terms of the Court's
3 March Order did not create legal obligations binding on [it]". Itargues
in this respect that "[tlhe language used by the Court in the key portions

of its Order is not the language used to create binding legal obligations"
and that
"the Court does not need here to decide the difficult and contro-

versial legal question of whether its orders indicating provisional
measures would be capable of creating international legal obliga-
tions if worded in mandatory . ..terms".

It nevertheless maintains that those orders cannot have such effects and,
in support of that view, develops arguments concerning "the language
and history of Article 41 (1) of the Court's Statute and Article 94 of the
Charter of the United Nations", the "Court's and State practice under
these provisions", and the "weight of publicists' commentary".

Concerning Germany's argument based on the "principle of effective-

ness", the United States contends that
"[iln an arena where the concerns and sensitivities of States, and not
abstract logic, have informed the drafting of the Court's constitutive
documents, it is perfectly understandable that the Court might have

the power to issue binding final judgments, but a more circum-
scribed authority with respect to provisional measures".

Referring to Germany's argument that the United States "violated the

obligation to refrain from any action which might interfere with the sub-ject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending", the
United States further asserts that:

"The implications of the rule as presented by Germany are poten-

tially quite dramatic, however. Germany appears to contend that by
merely filinga case with the Court, an Applicant can force a Respond-
ent to refrain from continuing any action that the Applicant deems
to affect the subject of the dispute. If the law were as Germany con-
tends, the entirety of the Court's rules and practices relating to pro-

visional measures would be surplussage. This is not the law, and this
is not how States or this Court have acted in practice."

97. Lastly, the United States states that in any case, "[b]ecause of the
press of time stemming from Germany's last-minute filing of the case,
basic principles fundamental to the judicial process were not observed in
connection with the Court's 3 March Order" and that

"[tlhus, whatever one might conclude regarding a general rule for

provisional measures, it would be anomalous - to say the least-
for the Court to construe this Order as a source of binding legal
obligations".

98. Neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the
present Court to date, has been called upon to determine the legal effects
of orders made under Article 41 of the Statute. As Germany's third sub-

mission refers expressly to an international legal obligation "to comply
with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by the Court on
3 March 1999". and asthe United States disputes the existence of such an
obligation, the Court is now called upon to rule expressly on this question.

99. The dispute which exists between the Parties with regard to this
point essentially concerns the interpretation of Article 41, which is worded
in identical terms in the Statute of each Court (apart from the respective
references to the Council of the League of Nations and the Security

Council). This interpretation has been the subject of extensive contro-
versy in the literature. The Court will therefore now proceed to the inter-
pretation of Article 41 of the Statute. It will do so in accordance
with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to paragraph I
of Article 31, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance

with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in
the light of the treaty's object and purpose.
100. The French text of Article 41 reads as follows:

"1. La Cour a le pouvoir d'indicluer,si elle estime que les circons- tances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun
doivent êtreprises à titre provisoire.

2. En attendant l'arrêtdéfinitif, l'indication de ces mesures est
immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité."
(Emphasis added.)

In this text, the terms "indiquer" and "l'indication" may be deemed to be
neutral as to the mandatory character of the measure concerned; by con-
trast the words "doivent êtreprises" have an imperative character.

For its part, the English version of Article 41 reads as follows:

" 1. TheCourt shall have the power to indieute, if it considers that

circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to
be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council."
(Emphasis added.)

According to the United States, the use in the English version of "indi-
cate" instead of "order", of "ought" instead of "must" or "shall", and of

"suggested" instead of "ordered", is to be understood as implying that
decisions under Article 41 lack mandatory effect. It might however be
argued, having regard to the fact that in 1920 the French text was the
original version, that such terms as "indicate" and "ought" have a mean-
ing equivalent to "order" and "must" or "shall".
101. Finding itself faced with two texts which are not in total har-
mony, the Court will first of al1note that accordiiig to Article 92 of the

Charter, the Statute "forms an integral part of the present Charter".
Under Article 111 of the Charter, the French and English texts of the
latter are "equally authentic". The same is equally true of the Statute.
In cases of divergence between the equally authentic versions of the
Statute, neither it nor the Charter indicates how to proceed. In the
absence of agreement between the parties in this respect, it is appropriate

to refer to paragraph 4 of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which in the view of the Court again reflects customary
international law. This provision reads "when a comparison of the authen-
tic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of
Articles 31 and 32 does not remove the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall

be adopted".
The Court will therefore now consider the object and purpose of the
Statute together with the context of Article 41.
102. The object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to
fulfil the functions provided for therein, and, in particular, the basic func-
tion of judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions

in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute. The context in which
Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from503 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

being hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective
rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved.
It follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from
the terms of Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to

indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be
binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity,
when the circumstances cal1 for it, to safeguard, and to avoid preju-
dice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment of
the Court. The contention that provisional measures indicated under
Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and
purpose of that Article.

103. A related reason which points to the binding character of orders
made under Article 41 and to which the Court attaches importance is the
existence of a principle which has already been recognized by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice when it spoke of

"the principle universally accepted by international tribunals and
likewise laid down in many conventions . .. to the effect that the

parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exer-
cising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision
to be given, and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be
taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute" (Elcctricity
Con?panj- qf So$a and Bulg~rriu. Order 5 Drccnlhcr 1939,
P.C.I.J, Series AIB, No. 79, p. 199).

Furthermore measures designed to avoid aggravatiilg or extending dis-
putes have frequently been indicated by the Court. They were indicated
with the purpose of being implemented (see Nuclecrr Tests (Azrstruliu v.
Frunce), InteritplProtc~c.tio1,rrlerqf22 June 1973, 1.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 106; Nucletrr Tc..~tsjNcii9 Zealund v. Frur~ce), Ir~terim Protc.ction,
Order qf 22 Junc 1973, IC.J. Reports 1973, p. 142; Frontier Dispute,
Provisionul Measurcs, Order of 10 Jrrnuurjl 1986, 1.C.J. Reports 1986,

p. 9, para. 18, andp. 11, para. 32, point 1A; Applicatiori (fthe Conyen-
tion or1tlie Prcvention arid Punislzrnentof the Crirne of Grnocide, Proi~i-
sior~ulMeasiires, Orcler of 8 April 1993, 1.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 23,
para. 48, and p. 24, para. 52B; Applicutiotzuf the Corzventionon thc Pre-
vcntion and Punishrnent qf'thc Crinle of Grnocide, Provi.sionu1Mcwsures,
Order of 13 Septenlber 1993. 1.C.J. R6.port.r1993, p. 349, para. 57, and
p. 350, para. 61 (3); Land rrnd M(~ritit~zeBounU'CIrbjet~reor~Cc~n~~roon

(lnd Nigeriu. Proi3isioncrlMerrsurc~.~O, rder of'15 Mcrrcli 1996, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 ll), pp. 22-23, para. 41, and p. 24, para. 49 (1)).

104. Given the conclusions reached by the Court above in interpret-
ing the text of Article 41 of the Statute in the light of its object and
purpose, it does not consider it necessary to resort to the preparatory
work in order to determine the meaning of that Article. The Court

would nevertheless point out that the preparatory work of the Statutedoes not preclude the conclusion that orders under Article 41 have
binding force.
105. The initial preliminary draft of the Statute of the Permanent

Court of International Justice, as prepared by the Committee of Jurists
established by the Council of the League of Nations, made no mention of
provisional measures. A provision to this effect was inserted only at a
later stage in the draft prepared by the Committee, following a proposal
from the Brazilian jurist Raul Fernandes.
Basing himself on the Bryan Treaty of 13 October 1914 between the

United States and Sweden, Raul Fernandes had submitted the following
text:
"Dans le cas où la cause du différend consiste en actes déterminés

déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être,la Cour pourra ordonner,
dans le plus bref délai, à titre provisoire, des mesures conserva-
toires adéquates, en attendant lejugement définitif."(Comitéconsul-
tatif de juristes, Procès-i~erhaus cies séunces du conlité, 16 juin-
24 juillet 1920 (avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 609.)

In its English translation this text read as follows:

"In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts
already committed or about to be committed, the Court may, pro-
visionally and with the least possible delay, order adequate protec-
tive measures to be taken, pending the final judgment of the Court."
(Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proc,è.~-i~r~rh~ ofut'hce Proceedings
of tllr Committee, 16June-24 July 1920(with Annexes), The Hague,

1920, p. 609.)
The Drafting Committee prepared a new version of this text, to which

two main amendments were made: on the one hand, the words "la Cour
pourra ordonner" ("the Court may . . . order") were replaced by "la Cour
a le pouvoir d'indiquer" ("the Court shall have the power to suggest"),
while, on the other, a second paragraph was added providing for notice
to be given to the parties and to the Council of the "measures suggested"
by the Court. The draft Article 2hi.sas submitted by the Drafting Com-

mittee thus read as follows:
"Dans le cas où la cause du différend consiste en un acte effectué
ou sur le point de l'être,la Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle

estime que les circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires
du droit de chacun doivent êtreprises à titre provisoire.
En attendant son arrêt,cette suggestion de la Cour est immédiate-
ment transmise aux parties et au Conseil." (Comité consultatif de
juristes, ProcC".~-i~orh(&~..sé~~ncedsu coniiti, 16juin-24 juillet 1920
(avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 567-568.)

The English version read:

"If the dispute arises out of an act which has already taken place
or which is imminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if it considers that circumstances so require, the provisional measures
that should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and the Council." (Advisory Com-

mittee of Jurists, Procès-ivrhaux of llze Proceedings of theCornnzit-
tee,16June-24 July 1920(with Annexes), The Hague, 1920,pp. 567-
568.)

The Committee of Jurists eventually adopted a draft Article 39, which
amended the former Article 2bis only in its French version: in the second
paragraph, the words "cette suggestion" were replaced in French by the

words "l'indication".
106. When the draft Article 39 was examined by the Sub-Committee
of the Third Committee of the first Assembly of the League of Nations, a
number of amendments were considered. Raul Fernandes suggested again
to use the word "ordonner" in the French version. The Sub-Committee
decided to stay with the word "indiquer", the Chairman of the Sub-Com-

mittee observing that the Court lacked the means to execute its decisions.
The language of the first paragraph of the English version was then made
to conform to the French text: thus the word "suggest" was replaced by
"indicate", and "should" by "ought tom. However, in the second para-
graph of the English version, the phrase "measures suggested" remained
unchanged.

The provision thus amended in French and in English by the Sub-
Coinmittee was adopted as Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice. It passed as such into the Statute of the
present Court without any discussion in 1945.
107. The preparatory work of Article 41 shows that the preference
given in the French text to "indiquer" over "ordonner" was motivated by
the consideration that the Court did not have the means to assure the

execution of its decisions. However, the lack of means of execution and
the lack of binding force are two different matters. Hence, the fact that
the Court does not itself have the means to ensure the execution of orders
made pursuant to Article 41 is not an argument against the binding
nature of such orders.

108. The Court finally needs to consider whether Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter precludes attributing binding effect to orders
indicating provisioi~al measures. That Article reads as follows:

"1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to

which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incum-
bent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures
to be taken to give effect to the judgment."

The question arises as to the meaning to be attributed to the words
"the decision of the International Court of Justice" in paragraph1 of this
Article. This wording could be understood as referring not merely to the
Court's judgments but to any decision rendered by it, thus including

orders indicating provisional measures. It could also be interpreted to
mean onlyjudgments rendered by the Court as provided in paragraph 2
of Article 94. In this regard, the fact that in Articles 56 to 60 of the
Court's Statute both the word "decision" and the word "judgment" are
used does little to clarify the matter.
Under the first interpretation of paragraph 1of Article 94, the text of
the paragraph would confirm the binding nature of provisional meas-

ures; whereas the second interpretation would in no way preclude their
being accorded binding force under Article 41 of the Statute. The Court
accordingly concludes that Article 94 of the Charter does not prevent
orders made under Article 41 from having a binding character.
109. In short, it is clear that none of the sources of interpretation
referred to in the relevant Articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties, incliiding the preparatory work, contradict the conclusions
drawn from the terms of Article 41 read in their context and in the light
of the object and purpose of the Statute. Thus, the Court has reached the
conclusion that orders on provisional measures under Article 41 have
binding effect.

110. The Court will now consider the Order of 3 March 1999. This
Order was not a mere exhortation. It had been adopted pursuant to
Article 41 of the Statute. This Order was consequently binding in
character and created a legal obligation for the United States.

111. As regards the question whether the United States has complied
with the obligation incumbent upon it as a result of the Order of
3 March 1999, the Court observes that the Order indicated two provi-
sional measures, the first of which states that

"[tlhe United States of America should take al1measures at its dis-
posai to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court
of al1 the measures which it has taken in implementation of this
Order".

The second measure required the Government of the United States to"transmit this Order to theGovernor of the State of Arizona". The infor-

mation required on the ineasures taken in implementation of this Order
was given to the Court by a letter of 8 March 1999from the Legal Coun-
sellor of the United States Embassy at The Hague. According to this
letter, on 3 March 1999 the State Department had transmitted to
the Governor of Arizona a copy of the Court's Order. "In view of
the extremely late hour of the receipt of the Court's Order", the letter of

8 March went on to say, "no further steps were feasible".

The United States authorities have thus lirnited themselves to the mere
transmission of the text of the Order to the Governor of Arizona. This
certainly met the requirement of the second of the two measures indi-
cated. As to the first measure, the Court notes that it did not create an

obligation of result, but that the United States was asked to "take al1
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings". The Court agrees that
due to the extremely late presentation of the request for provisional
measures, there was certainly very little time for the United Statesauthori-
ties to act.

112. The Court observes, nevertheless, that the mere transmission of
its Order to the Governor of Arizona without any comment, particularly
without even so much as a plea for a temporary stay and an explanation
that there is no general agreement on the position of the United States
that orders of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures

are non-binding, was certainly less than could have been done even in the
short time available. The same is true of the United States Solicitor Gen-
eral's categorical statement in his brief letter to the United States Supreme
Court that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating pro-
visional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial
relief' (seeparagraph 33 above). This statement went substantially further

than the amicus brief referred to in a mere footnote in his letter, which
was filed on behalf of the United States in earlier proceedings before the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Angel Francisco Breard (see
Brrnrtl v. Greenc, United States Supreme Court, 14April 1998, Intcrnu-
tionul Legul Mufrricils, Vol. 37 (1998). p. 824; Memorial of Germany,
Ailn. 34). In that amicus brief, the same Solicitor General had declared

less than a year earlier that "there is substantial disagreement among
jurists as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional measures is
binding . . . The better reasoned position is that such an order is not
binding."

113. It is also noteworthy that the Governor of Arizona, to whom theCourt's Order had been transmitted, decided not to give effect to it, even
though the Arizona Clemency Board had recommended a stay of execu-
tion for Walter LaGrand.

114. Finally, the United States Supreme Court rejected a separate

application by Germany for a stay of execution, "[gliven the tardiness of
the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate". Yet it would
have been open to the Supreme Court, as one of its members urged, to
grant a preliminary stay, which would have given it "time to consider,
after briefing from al1 interested parties, the jurisdictional and interna-
tional legal issues involved .. ." (FedercrlRrpuhlic of German?;et al. v.
United States rt czl.United States Supreme Court, 3 March 1999).

115. The review of the above steps taken by the authorities of the
United States with regard to the Order of the International Court of Jus-
tice of3 March 1999 indicates that the various competent United States
authorities failed to take al1the steps they could have taken to give effect
to the Court's Order. The Order did not require the United States to
exercise powers it did not have: but it did impose the obligation to "take

al1measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings . ..". The Court finds that
the United States did not discharge this obligation.

Under these circumstances the Court concludes that the United States
has not complied with the Order of 3 March 1999.
116. The Court observes finally that in the third submission Germany

requests the Court to adjudge and declare only that the United States
violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order of
3 March 1999: it contains no other request regarding ihat violation.
Moreover, the Court points out that the United States was under great
time pressure in this case, due to the circumstances in which Germany
had instituted the proceedings. The Court notes moreover that at the
time when the United States authorities took their decision the question

of the binding character of orders indicating provisional measures had
been extensively discussed in the literature, but had not been settled by its
jurisprudence. The Court would have taken these factors into considera-
tion had Germany's submission included a claim for indemnification.

117. Finally, the Court will consider Germany's fourth submission, in
which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare

"that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it
will not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of
detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the
United States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. In particular in cases involving the death penalty, this
requires the United States to provide effective review of and
remedies for criminal convictions impaired by a violation of the
rights under Article 36."

118. Germany States that:

"[cloncerning the requested assurances and guarantees of non-repeti-
tion of the United States, they are appropriate because of the exist-
ence of a real risk of repetition and the seriousness of the injury
suffered by Germany. Further, the choice of means by which full
conformity of the futureconduct of the United States with Article 36
of the Vienna Convention is to be ensured may be left to the United
States."

Germany explains that :
"the effective exerciseof the right to consular notification embodied

in [Article36,]paragraph 2,requires that, where it cannot be excluded
that the judgment was impaired by the violation of the right to con-
sular notification, appellate proceedings allow for a reversal of the
judgment and for either a retrial or a re-sentencing".

Finally, Germany points out that its fourth submission has been so
worded "as to . ..leave the choice of means by which to implement the

remedy [it seeks]to the United States".
119. In reply, the United States argues as follows:
"Germany's fourth submission is clearly of a wholly different
nature than its first three submissions. Each of the first three sub-
missions seeks ajudgment and declaration by the Court that a viola-
tion of a stated international legal obligation has occurred. Such
judgments are at the core of the Court's function, as an aspect of
reparation.

.............................
In contrast, however, to the character of the relief sought in the
first three submissions, the requirement of assurances of non-repeti-
tion sought in the fourth submission has no precedent in the juris-
prudence of this Court and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction
and authority in this case. It is exceptional even as a non-legal

undertaking in State practice, and it would be entirely inappropriate
for the Court to require such assurances with respect to the duty to
inform undertaken in the Consular Convention in the circumstances
of this case." It points out that "US authorities are working energetically to
strengthen the regime of consular notification at the state and local level
throughout the United States, in order to reduce the chances of cases
such as this recurring" and adds that:

"the German request for an assurance as to the duty to inform
foreign nationals without delay of their right to consular noti-
fication . . .seeks to have the Court require the United States to

assure that it will never again fail to inform a German foreign
national of his or her right to consular notification",

and that "the Court is aware that the United States is not in a position to
provide such an assurance". The United States further contends that it
"has already provided appropriate assurances to Germany on this point".
Finally, the United States recalls that:

"[wlith respect to the alleged breach of Article 36, paragraph 2, . . .
Germany seeks an assurance that, 'in any future cases of detention
of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United
States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the
rights under Article 36'".

According to the United States,

"[such an assurance] is again absolute in character .. . [and] seeks to
create obligations on the United States that exceed those that are
contained in the Vienna Convention. For example, the requirement
of consular notification under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention applies when a foreign national is arrested, committed
to prison or to custody pending trial or detained in any other

manner. It does not apply, as the submission would have it, to any
future criminal proceedings. That is a new obligation, and it does
not arise out of the Vienna Convention."

The United States further observes that :
"[elven if this Court were to agree that, as a result of the application
of procedural default with respect to the claims of the LaGrands, the

United States committed a second internationally wrongful act, it
should limit that judgment to the application of that law in the
particular case of the LaGrands. It should resist the invitation to
require an absolute assurance as to the application of US domestic
law in al1 such future cases. The imposition of such an additional
obligation on the United States would .. . be unprecedented in inter-
national jurisprudence and would exceed the Court's authority and

jurisdiction."
120. The Court observes that in its fourth submission Germany seeksseveral assurances. First it seeks a straightforward assurance that the
United States will not repeat its unlawful acts. This request does not
specify the means by which non-repetition is to be assured.

Additionally, Germany seeks from the United States that

"in any future cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against
German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice
the effective exercise of the rightsunder Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations".

This request goes further, for, by referring to the law of the United States,
it appears to require specific measures as a means of preventing recur-

rence.
Germany finally requests that
"[iln particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the
United States to provide effective reviewof and remedies for crimi-
na1 convictions impaired by a violation of the rights under
Article 36".

This request goes even further, since it is directed entirely towards secur-
ing specificmeasures in cases involving the death penalty.

121. Turning first to the general demand for an assurance of non-
repetition, the Court observes that it has been informed by the United
States of the "substantial measures [which it is taking] aimed at
preventing any recurrence" of the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b).
Throughout these proceedings, oral as well as written, the United States
has insisted that it "keenly appreciates the importance of the Vienna
Convention's consular notification obligation for foreign citizens in
the United States as well as for United States citizens travelling and
living abroad"; that "effective compliance with the consular notification
requirements of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention requires constant

effort and attention"; and that

"the Department of State is working intensively to improve under-
standing of and compliance with consular notification and access
requirements throughout the United States, so as to guard against
future violations ofthese requirements".

The United States points out that
"[tlhis effort has included the January 1998publication of a booklet
entitled 'Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal,
State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officiais Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular
Officials to Assist Them', and development of a small reference card
designed to be carried by individual arresting officers".

According to the United States, it is estimated that until now over 60,000
copies of the brochure as well as over 400,000 copies of the pocket card
have been distributed to federal, state and local law enforcement and
judicial officials throughout the United States. The United States is also
conducting training programmes reaching out to al1levels of government.
In the Department of State a permanent office to focus on United States

and foreign compliance with consular notification and access require-
ments has been created.

122. Germany has stated that it "does not consider the so-called
'assurances' offered by the Respondent as adequate". It says

"[v]iolations of Article 36 followed by death sentences and execu-
tions cannot be remedied by apologies or the distribution of leaflets.
An effective remedy requires certain changes in US law and practice".

In order to illustrate its point, Germany has presented to the Court a
"[llist of German nationals detained afterJanuary 1, 1998,who claim not
to have been informed of their consular rights". The United States has

criticized this list as misleading and inaccurate.

123. The Court notes that the United States has acknowledged that, in
the case of the LaGrand brothers, it did not comply with its obligations
to give consular notification. The United States has presented an apology
to Germany for this breach. The Court considers however that an apo-
logy is not sufficient in this case, as it would not be in other cases where

foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of their rights
under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been
subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties.
In this respect, the Court has taken note of the fact that the
United States repeated in al1phases of these proceedings that it is carry-
ing out a vast and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance by

its competent authorities at the federal as well as at the state and local
levels with its obligationunder Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
124. The United States has provided the Court with information,
which it considers important, on its programme. If a State, in proceed-
ings before this Court, repeatedly refers to substantial activities which itis carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certain obligations
under a treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through with
the efforts in this regard. The programme in question certainly cannot
provide an assurance that there will never again be a failure by the

United States to observe the obligation of notification under Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention. But no State could give such a guarantee and
Germany does not seek it. The Court considers that the commitment
expressed by the United States to ensure implementation of the specific
measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), must be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a

general assurance of non-repetition.

125. The Court will now examine the other assurances sought by Ger-
many in its fourth submission. The Court observes in this regard that it
can determine the existence of a violation of an international obligation.
If necessary, itcan also hold that a domestic law has been the cause of
this violation. In the present case the Court has made its findings of vio-

lations of the obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
when it dealt with the first and the second submission of Germany. But it
has not Sound that a United States law, whether substantive or pro-
cedural in character, is inherently inconsistent with the obligations
undertaken by the United States in the Vienna Convention. In the
present case the violation of Article 36, paragraph 2, was caused by the

circumstances in which the procedural default rule was applied, and
not by the rule as such.
In the present proceedings the United States has apologized to Ger-
many for the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1, and Germany has not
requested material reparation for this injury to itself and to the LaGrand
brothers. It does, however, seek assurances:

"that, in any future cases of detention or of criminal proceedings
against German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and

practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations",

and that
"[iln particular in cases involving thedeath penalty, this requires the
United States to provide effective review of and remedies for crimi-

na1 convictions impaired by the violation of the rights under
Article 36".

The Court considers in this respect that if the United States, notwith-
standing its commitment referred to in paragraph 124 above, should fail
in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German
nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals
concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted andsentenced to severe ena alti eIn the case of such a conviction and sen-
tence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review

and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of
the violation of the rights setforth in the Convention.This obligation can
be carried out in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the
United States.
126. Given the foregoing ruling by the Court regarding the obligation

of the United States under certain circumstances to review and reconsider
convictions and sentences, the Court need not examine Germany's further
argument which seeks to found a like obligation on the contention that
the right of a detained person to be informed without delay pursuant to
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention is not only an indi-
vidual right but has today assumed the character of a human right.

127. In reply to the fourth submission of Germany, the Court will
therefore limit itself to taking note of the commitment undertaken by the
United States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted

in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of
the Vienna Convention, as well asthe aforementioned duty of the United
States to address violations of that Convention should they still occur in
spite of its efforts to achieve compliance.

128. For these reasons,

(1)By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 1of the Optional
Protocol concerning theCompulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the

Application filed by the Federal Republic of Germany on 2 March 1999;

IN FAVOUR :President Guillaume; Vice-Prrsident Shi; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINST : Judge Parra-Aranguren ;
(2)(a) By thirteen votes to two,

Find shat the first submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is
admissible ;

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi ; Judgrs Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek,Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST : Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren ; (6) By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that the second submission of the Federal Republic of Germany
is admissible ;

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda;
(c) By twelve votes to three,

Finds that the third submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is

admissible;
IN FAVOUR : Pre~ident Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi ; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh;

AGAINST: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal;

(d) By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that the fourth submission of the Federal Republic of Germany
is admissible;

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi ; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda;

(3) By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay
following their arrest of their rights under Article 36, paragraph I (b), of

the Convention, and by thereby depriving the Federal Republic of Ger-
many of the possibility, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance pro-
vided for by the Convention to the individuals concerned, the United
States of America breached its obligations to the Federal Republic of
Germany and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 1;

IN FAVOURP :resident Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINST J:udge Oda;

(4)By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in
the light of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the convictions
and sentences of the LaGrand brothers after the violations referred
to in paragraph (3) above had been established, the United States

of America breached its obligation to the Federal Republic of Ger-many and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 2, of

the Convention;
IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-Presihnt Shi; Jutlges Bedjaoui,

Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda ;

(5)By thirteen votes to two,

Finds that, by failing to take al1measures at its disposal to ensure that

Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the case, the United States of America
breached the obligation incumbent upon it under the Order indicating
provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999;

IN FAVOURP :iesident Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINSJ Tu:dges Oda, Parra-Aranguren;

(6) Unanimously,

Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of
America to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in

performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention; andfinds that this commitment must be regarded as meeting
the Federal Republic of Germany's request for a general assurance of
non-repetition ;

(7)By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that should nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany

nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention having been respected,
the United States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow
the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in that Convention.

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-Presidetzt Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-

Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of June, two thou-
sand and one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archivesof the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the Government of the United States of
America, respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR:

Registrar.

President GUILLAUME makes the following declaration :

Subparagraph (7) of the operative part of the Court's Judgment envis-
ages a situation where, despite the commitment by the United States
noted by the Court in subparagraph (6), a severe penalty is imposed upon
a German national without his or her rights under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations having
been respected. The Court states that, in such a case, "the United States,

by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration
of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the
rights set forth in that Convention".
This subparagraph represents a response to certain submissions by
Germany and hence rules only on the obligations of the United States in
cases of severe penalties imposed upon German nationals.

Thus, subparagraph (7) does not address the position of nationals of
other countries or that of individuals sentenced to penalties that are not
of a severe nature. However, in order to avoid any ambiguity, it should
be made clear that there can be no question of applying an a contrario
interpretation to this paragraph.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

Vice-President SHIappends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judge ODAappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judges KOROMAand PARRA-ARANGIJREaN ppend separate

opinions to the Judgment of the Court; Judge BUERGENTHA aLpends a
dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initiulled) G.G.

(Initialled) Ph.C.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LAGRAND CASE

(GERMANY v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

JUDGMENT OF 27 JUNE 2001

COIJR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE LAGRAND

(ALLEMAGNE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE)

ARRÊT DU 27 JUIN 2001 Officia1citation
LuCrand (Gern7uny v.United Sfutesof Americu),
Judgrnent, IC.J. Rc.ports 2001p. 466

Mode officielde citation:

LaCrund (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 2001p. 466

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No de vente: 822
ISBN 92-1-070921-7 27 JUNE 2001

JUDGMENT

LAGRAND

(GERMANY ilUNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

LAGRAND

(ALLEMAGNE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE)

27 JUIN 2001

ARRÊT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2001 YEAR 2001
27 June
General List
No. 104 27 June2001

LAGRAND CASE

(GERMANY v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

Facts of'the cuse.

Jurisdiction of the Cour- Article I of Optior~ulProtocol concernirzgCom-
pul.~orj Settlement of Disputes to Viennu Convention on Consular Relations of
24 April 1963.
Jurisdiction of Court in respect of Gerrnunj~'sjrst submiss-onRecognitiorî
bjl United Stutes of existence of dispute urising outof'breach of subpuru-

graph (b) of Article 36, paragraph1.of Vienna Convention on Consular Relu-
lions- Recognition bj United States of Court's jurisdiction to heur this dispute
in so furUS concerns Germany's oivn rights - Objection by United States to
Court'sjurisdiction over Gernzany'scluimfiundrd on diplomutic protection -
Objection by United Stutes to Court's juri.rdirtion over alleged breuch of sub-
puragraphs (a) und (c) of Article 36, purcigruph 1, of Convention.

Jurisdiction of Court in respect of Germany's third suhmission concerning
implementation of Order of3 Murch 1999 indicating provisional measures.

Jurisdiction of Court in respect of Germany'sfourth submissio-z Objection
by United States- United States urgument that suhmission seeking guuruntees

of non-repetition fulls outside ternzs of Optional Protocol.

Admissibility of Germany'ssubmissions.
United States objection to admissibility of Germany's second, third and

fourth submissions- United States argunîent that Court cannot be turned into
ultimate court ofuppeal in crirninalproceedings hefore its oizn domestic courts.

United States objection to adnîissibility of Gerrnany's third submission COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 2001 2001
27juin
Rôle général
27 juin2001 no 104

Faits à l'origine de I'ufluire

Conipéten(~e de la Cour - Article premier du protocole de signature faculta-
tiileconcernant le règler77enotbligatoire des différend.à lu convention de Vienne
sur les relutions consuluires du 24 avril 1963.
Compétence de la Cour pour connuîtrc de lu preniiPre conclusion de ['Alle-

magne - Reconnais:;ancepur les Etats-Unis de l'existence d'un différendrésul-
tunt de lu violation tir.I'ulinhab) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36 de lu convention
tic Vienne sur les relirtions c~onsuluir-s Reconnuissunc.epur les Etats-Unis de
lu conipétencr de lu Cour pour connaître de ce dirérend quant aux droits
propres de l'Allemagne - Objection des Etats-Unis à lu compétencede la Cour
pour connaître de la prétention de I'Allemugne fondée sur lu protection diplo-

matique - Objectiorides Etats-Unis à la conlpétencede lu Cour pour connaître
de lu violation ulléguéedes alinéasa) et c) du purugraphe 1 de l'article 36 de lu
convention.
Compétencede lu Cour pour connaître de lu troisième conclusion de I'Alle-
magne relative à I'upplication de l'ordonnance en indicution de mesures conser-
virtoires du 3 mm 1999.
Compétencede lu Cour pour connaître de la quatrième conclusion de /'Alle-

magne - Objection des Etats-Unis - Conclusion tendant ù l'obtention de
gcirunties de non-répétition n'entrantpas, selon les Etats-Unis, dans les prévi-
sions du protocole df, signature ,facultutii~e.

Recevabilité des conclusionsde I'Allemagne.
Objection des Etats-Unis à la recevabilité desdeuxième. troisième et qua-
trième conclu.~ionsarel'Allemagne - Lu Cour ne pouvant s'ériger,selon les
Etats-Unis, en juridiction statuunt en dernier degréd'appel sur des questions

pénalessoumi.9es ù Itzurstribunaux internes.
Objection des Etats-Unis à lu recevabilitéde lu troisième conclirsionde ['Alle- United Starcs cl~ullen~ingnlunner of Gc~rniun~~in '.s~titution oj'present proreed-
ings before the Court.
United Stutes objection to udrni.s.sihility of' Gernzr111~,'fi~r.st .suhrizi.~.sion
Allegation of failure to e.~huustlocal remedies.
United States objection to Gerniun~~'.s~ uhr?iissions - Allegution thut Gcr-

rnany seeking to apply srundilrd to United Stutes cifibrent ,frorn oiix pructice.

Gerrnan~~'sjrstsuhrnission - Questiorl of disrrgurd bj, Uniteil Stutes of'ils
legul obligations to Germuny undcr Articles 5 urlrl36, purugrupli I, of Coni>en-
tion.
Suhmission advunced bj, Gerr~irinj.in oiix right - Recognition b~ Unitrd

Stutes qf breuch of Article 36, prrrcigruph1 (b), of Conilenfion - Article 36,
purugruph 1, establishing interrelutrd rigirilc dcsignerlto,fucilitrrte irnplc~merltu-
tion of .systcni of consulrrrprotrction.

Suhmission by Germany hused on dipioriirlticprotc,ction - Article 36, para-

grupiph1 (b), qf Convention cindohligtrtions ofrc~ceivingStute to iletuined persor1
and to sending Stute.

Germuny '.Ysecond suhnzissiori - Q~iestionof'di.sregurûby Unitcd Stutcs of its
legal obligation under Article 36, puragruph 2, of Convention.

Argurlient qf United Stutes thut Article 36, parugraph 2, crpplicuhleonly to
rights of sending Sturc.
"Procedurul defiult" rule - Di.stinction to he drui1.nhetit.eenrule as such and
upplicution in present cuse.

Germuny'.s third submi.s.sion - Que.stion of divrr.rgerrù by United States of
it.~legal obligation ro cornpl), ~i'itlzOrdcr indicuting prorisionul rneusures of

3 Murch 1999.
Court culled upon to rule e.upress1yon question of' lclgul e1Tect.sof orriers
under Artii,l(l41 of Statute - hlterprerrrtionof tliut provision - Cornparisonqf'
French and Er~glislztests - French und E~zglishversions qf'Stutute "equully
uuthentic" bj, virtue of Article III of Unirrrl Nations Charter - Article 33,

parugruph 4, of Vicwnu Convention on Lrili oj'Treuties - 0hjei.t und purpose
of Stature - Conte.ut - Principle thut part)' to legulproceedings niust ahstain
from any meusure which miglit aggrr~i~uto ~r r.~tendthe di.spute - Prepurcrtory
it7orkof Article 41 - Article 94 of Unitcil Ncrtions Charter.

Question qf'hinding tzuture of Order of 3 Murcli 1999 - Mcusures tuken hl,
United Stutes to givc ef'i~t to Order - No reyuestfor repuration in G~~rnzun~~'s
third submission - Titile pre.s.sureclue to circun~~tuncesin it.liiclzproceedings
1i.ereinstituted.

Gerniuny's fourth submis.sio - Question oJ 'bligution to provide certain

assurunces of non-repetition. LAGRAND (ARRET) 467

rncrgne - Circonstances dans lesquelles. selon les Etats-Unis, cette dernière a

introduit la prksente instance devant lu Cour.
Objection des Etats-Unis à la rcco~abilitéde Icpremière conclusion deII'Alle-
nllignr - Allégation de non-kpuisen~ent rles voies de recours internes.
Objection de.7 Ettîts-Unis ù la rece~~abilitédes c.onc1usion.sde /'Alle-
magne - Allégatior~.selonlaquelle l'Allemagne chercherait à,fuire appliquer aux

Etats- Unisune norme difjrérentedc~c,ellcquiprévautdans lupratique allemande.

Pren1ii.r~conc.lusionde I'Allernugne - Question de la méconnaissancepar les
Etats-Unis tic,leurs oh1igation.sjuridiques vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne au titre de
1'nrtic.le5 ct du paraj:raphc 1 (le I'articlo36 de lu convention.
C'ont~lusior d~e I'Al'leri~agnco~i son rlonzpropre - Reconnuissuncr pur les
Etcrts-Unis de lu ilioltztioride 1'alinc;ab) dzrparagraphe 1 de I'article 36 de la
coniBention - Paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 ir~stituantun réginleaux éléments

interdépendants con(,irpour,faciliter la rlziscen auvre du sy.stPmede protection
c~ons~rlaire.
Conclu.sion de I'Ailet?iugne,fOrzdkesur la protection diplon7utique - Ali-
néab) du parugrupl~e 1 de I'articl~~ 36 de lu convention et obligations clrI'Etat
de résidence vis-à-visd'une personne détenue etde I'Etat d'envoi.

Deu.uième conclu.sion dc, II'Alleniugne - Questiotz de la n~éconnaissance

par les Etuts-Unis d(yIc~urobligation juridique cn vertu du paragraphe 2 de
l'article 36 de lu conilention.
Paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 ne s'appliquant, selon les Etats- Unis, qu'aux
droits tic I'Etat d'envoi.
Règle de lu ((carence procéduralc>» - Distinction à établir entre cette règle

en tant qirc telle et son application cm1'e.spèce.

Troisième conclusion de l'Allemagne - Question de la méconnaissancepar

les Etats-Unis de leur obligation juridique de se conformer à l'ordonnance en
indication de nzesureJ conscrvutoires du 3 mars 1999.
Cour appelée à seprononcer e.upressémentsur la question des effets juridiques
des ordonnance.^rendues en vertu de l'article 41 du Statut - Interprétation de
cette disposition - Con7parai.sonentre les textes français et anglais - Versions

,frcrnçuisecltanglaise tlu Statut fai.sant ((égalernent,/Oi»en vertu de I'article Ill
de la Charrc des Nations Unies - Paragraphe 4 de I'article33 de la convention
de Vienne sur Ic droit des traitc;s - Objet et but du Statut - Contexte - Prin-
cipe interdisant ù une prirtieù une instancejudiciaire de procéder à aucun acte
susceptible d'aggraver ou d'étendrele diflérend - Travaux préparatoires de

l'article 41 - Article 94 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Questior1du cuructOreobligatoire de l'ordonnance du 3 rnars 1999 - Mesures
prises pur les Etats-Unis pour donner effi.1 à cette ordonnance - Absence
de demande en réparation dans la troisième conclusion de l'Allemagne - Con-
trtrinte.~de temps résirlttrntdes conditions & l'introduction de l'instance.

Quatrième r.onc.lusionde l'Allemagne - Question de l'obligation de fournir
certaines assurances ticnon-répétition.468 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

General requestfor assurance of non-repetition- Measures tuken bjl United
Stutes to prevent recurrence of violation of Article 36, paragrapli 1 (b) -
Cornnîitrnent undertaken bji United Stutes to ensure irnplernentation of specijïc
measures adopted in pc$orrnance of obligations under that provision.

Consideration of other assurances requested by Gertnanp - Germunp's char-

acterization of indii~iduulright provided ,for in Article 36, purugruph 1, as
hunlan right - Court's polier to rieternline e.ui.vtenccof violation of itztertiu-
tiotlul obligation and, if nece.s.surp,to llold that dotnestic laii'hriscazrsedviola-
tion - United States lzaving apologized to Gertnunyfor hreach of Article 36,
purugruph 1, of Convention - Germcinynot hui~ingrequested nzaterial reparu-
tion ,for injurp to itself and to LaGrand hrothers - Question of review and
reconsiderution of certuin sentences.

JUDGMENT

Present: President GUILLAUME V;ice-President SHI; Judges OIIA, BEDJAOUI,
RANJEVA,HEKCZEGH,FLEISCHI~AUFR K,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGURE KNO,O~JMANR SE, ZEK,AL-KHASAWNEH,
BIJERGENTHA RLe;istrar COUVREUR.

In theLaGrand case,
hetireen

the Federal Republic of Germany,

represented by
Mr. Gerhard Westdickenberg, Director General for Legal Affairs and Legal
Adviser, Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany,

H.E. Mr. Eberhard U. B.von Puttkamer, Ambassador ofthe Federal Repub-
lic of Germany to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agents ;

Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor of Public International Law at the University
of Munich,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the Uni-
versity of Paris (Panthéon-Assas)and at the European University Institute
in Florence,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,
Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the Public International Law Division,
Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Mr. Daniel Khan, University of Munich,
Mr. Andreas Paulus, University of Munich,
as Counsel; Dernatzde de carcrctèregénéralvisunt l'obtention d'une assurance de non-
rlpltition - Me.suresprisrs pcrrI~.P Etuts-Unis en tluod'enzpécherla répétition

(le la violation de I'alini ) du paragruphe 1 de l'article 36- Engagetnent pris
pur les Etnts-Unis dd'a.rsurcrlu tiîi.s<en auiw clesnwsurcs splcijïques adoptles
en e.\-kcutionrle leurs obligation.^air titre de cette disposition.
Escirnen des ci litra.s,surunc.e.tslenzundles pur I'Alle~liugt-e Qualificution
yiir I'Allet~iugncdu droit indii*iduilli,uUL[paragraphe 1 de l'urticle 36 conzt~ie
ilrciroitrieI'liorntn- Pouvoir de lu Cour tl'ltublirIciviolation d'une obligatioti
itirc~ritrtioti~ret, si nlc~esstrirr.de constater crlrssiqu'une loi internc u été/a

t~tusc,tle c,ettrJi~io1atn E'c-cu.rcp.rlsentc;r..rur les Etuts- L1npour Iciiliolu-
tion th1perrugrnphe1 cleI'urticle 36 de 10coni>c~ntio -n Absence dc clenicinclede
I'Alletnugne en rèpuïution mutérielle de son prkjudice et de celui r/t,.sj?c;res
LerGrund - Qllestiotl d~irlc.~crtnetict de lu rt>visionde certaine.^condci~nnrr-
tiotis.

Prc;sc~tzts;M. GCILI.ACME p,rlsi~ienr: M. SHI, vice-présiclent; MM. ODA,
BEDJAOUR I,AN.IEVA H,ERCZEGHF,LE:ISCHHAUK ERO,ROMAV . ERESH-
CHETIN, M"lCHIGGINSM , M. PARKA-ARANGUR KENO, IJMANR S. ZEK,
AL-KHASAWNEH. BULKGENTHjA uLe,s; M. COL'VRELg~rR ej,jer.

En l'affaire LaGrand,
entre

la Républiquefédérale d'Allemagne,

représentéepar
M. Gerhard Westdickenberg, directeur général des affaires juridiqueset
conseillerjuridique du ministère fédéral des affairesétrangèresde la Répu-
blique fédérale d'Allemagne,

S. Exc. M. Eberhard U. B. von Puttkamer, ambassadeur de la République
fédérale d'Allemagneauprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents;

M. Bruno Simma, professeur de droit international public à l'université de
Munich.
comme coagent et conseil;

M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit international public a l'univer-
sitéde Paris (Parithéon-Assas)et à l'Institut universitaire européende Flo-
rence,
M. Donald Francis Donovan, du cabinet Debevoise & Plimpton. New York,
M. Hans-Peter Kaul. chef de la division du droit international public du mi-

nistère fédéraldes affaires étrangèresde la République fédéraled'Alle-
magne,
M. Daniel Khan,de l'universitéde Munich,
M. Andreas Paului;. de l'universitéde Munich,
comme conseils ; Mr. Eberhard Desch, Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of
Germany,

Mr. S. Johannes Trommer, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in
the Netherlands,
Mr. Andreas Gotze, Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many,
as Advisers;

Ms Fiona Sneddon,
as Assistant,

und
the United States of America,

represented by
Mr. James H. Thessin, Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department of
State,

as Agent;
Ms Catherine W. Brown, Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs,
United States Department of State,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
United States Department of State,

as Deputy Agents;
The Honourable Janet Napolitano. Attorney General, State of Arizona,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Professor of International Law, School of
Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University; former Act-
ing Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,

Mr.Theodor Meron, Counsellor on International Law. United States Depart-
ment of State; Charles L. Denison Professor of International Law, New
York University; Associate Member of the Institute of International Law,

Mr. Stefan Trechsel, Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure, University
of Zurich Faculty of Law,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Shabtai Rosenne, Member of the Israel Bar; Honorary Member of the

American Society of International Law; Member of the Institute of Inter-
national Law,
Ms Norma B. Martens, Assistant Attorney General. State of Arizona,

Mr. Paul J. McMurdie, Assistant Attorney General, State of Arizona,
Mr. Robert J. Erickson, Principal Deputy Chief. Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice.

Mr. Allen S. Weiner, Counsellor for Legal Affairs. Embassy of the United
States of America in the Netherlands.
Ms Jessica R. Holmes. Attaché, Office of the Counsellor for Legal Affairs,
Embassy of the United States of America in the Netherlands,

as Counsel, M. Eberhard Descli, du ministère fédiral de la justice de la République fédé-
raled'Allemagne,
M. S. Johannes Trommer. de l'ambassade de la République fëdérale d'Alle-
magne aux Pays-Bas.
M. Andreas Gotze, du ministère fédéraldes affaires étrangèresde la Répu-
blique fédérale d'Allemagne,

comme conseillers :
Mn" Fiona Sneddon,
comme assistante,

rf

les Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
représentéspar

M. James H. Thessin. conseiller juridique par intérimdu département d'Etat
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
comme agent ;

Mn" Catherine W. Brown. conseiller juridique adjoint charge des affaires
consulaires au dkpartement d'Etat des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
M. D. Stephen M,athias. conseiller juridique adjoint chargé des questions
concernant les Nations Unies au département d'Etat des Etats-Unisd'Amé-
rique.
comme agents adjoints;

l'honorable Janet Napolitano, Attoriîclj. Generude 1'Etat de l'Arizona.
M. Michael J. Matheson. professeur de droit international à la School of
Advanced International Studies de la Johns Hopkins University, ancien
conseillerjuridiqiue par intérim du département d'Etat des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique.
M. Theodor Meron, conseiller en droit international au département d'Etat
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, titulaire de la chaire Charles L. Denison de
droit internationidà la New York University. membre associéde l'Institut
de droit international,
M. Stefan Trechsel, professeur de droit pénal et de procédure pénale à la

facultéde droit clel'Universitéde Zurich,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Shabtai Rosenile, membre du barreau israélien, membre honoraire de
I'American Society of International Law. membre de l'Institut de droit

international.
Mn" Norma B. Martens, Attoriîc~j, Gent~rriadjoint de I'Etat de l'Ari-
zona,
M. Paul J. McMurdie, Atfornc~~Goîercil adjoint de I'Etat de l'Arizona,
M. Robert J. Erick.son, chef principal adjoint à la section des recours de la
division du droit pénaldu département de lajustice des Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique,
M. Allen S. Weiner, conseiller aux affaires juridiques à I'ambassade des
Etats-Unis d'Amérique aux Pays-Bas.
Mn" Jessica R. Holmes, attachée.bureau du conseiller aux affairesjuridiques
iil'ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique aux Pays-Bas,

comme conseils, LAGRAND (ARRÉT)

ainsi composée,
après délibéréen chambre du conseil,

rend 1'arrt;tsuivarzl
1. Le 2 mars 1999,la République fédérale d'Allemagne(dénomméeci-après
l'«Allemagne») a déposéau Greffe de la Cour une requête introduisant une

instance contre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique (dénommés ci-après les ~Etats-
Unis») pour «violations de la convention de Vienne [du 24 avril 19631sur les
relations consulaires))(dénomméeci-après la ((convention de Vienne »).
Dans sa requête, l'Allemagnefonde la compétence de la Cour sur le para-
graphe 1 de l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour et l'article premier du protocole
de signature facultative concernant le règlement obligatoire des différends qui
accompagne la convention de Vienne (dénomméci-après le «protocole de
signature facultative))).
2. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 40 du Statut. la requête a été
immédiatement comn~uniquéeau Gouvernement des Etats-Unis; et. conformé-
ment au paragraphe 3 de cet article, tous les Etats admis à ester devant la Cour

ont étéinformésde 1;requête.
3. Le 2 mars 1999,joiir du dépotde la requête.le Gouvernement allemand a
égalementdéposéau Greffe de la Cour une demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires fondét:sur l'article 41 du Statut et les articles 73. 74 et 75 du
Reglement.
Par lettre du 2 mars 1999, le vice-président de la Cour. faisant fonction de
président en l'affaire. s'est adressé au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis dans les
tei-messuivants :

~Exerqant la présidence de la Cour en vertu des articles 13 et 32 du
Règlement de la Cour, et agissant conformément aux dispositions du para-
graphe 4 de l'article 74dudit Règlement, j'appelle par la présente l'atten-
tion [du]Gouvernement [des Etats-Unis]sur la nécessitéd'agir de manière
que toute ordonriance de la Cour sur la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires puisse avoir les effets voulus))

Par ordonnancedu 3 mars 1999, la Cour a indiqué certaines mesures conser-
vatoires (voir paragraphe 32 ci-après).
4. Conformément à l'article 43 du Règlement, le greffier a adressé la notifi-
cation prévueau paragraphe 1de l'article 63 du Statut i tous les Etats parties
soit à la convention de Vienne, soit à ladite convention et à son protocole de
signature facultative.
5. Par ordonnance du 5 mars 1999, la Cour, compte tenu des vues des

Parties, a fixéau 16 septembre 1999 et au 27 mars 2000, respectivement, les
dates d'expiration des délais pour le dépôt d'un mémoire de l'Allemagne et
d'un contre-mémoire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
Le mémoireet le contre-mémoire ont étédûment déposéd sans les délaisainsi
prescrits.
6. Par lettre du 26 octobre 2000, l'agent de l'Allemagne a expriméle vceude
son gouvernement de produire cinq documents nouveaux conformément aux
dispositions de l'article 56 du Règlement.
Par lettre du 6 novl-mbre 2000. l'agent des Etats-Unis a fait savoir à la Cour
que son gouvernemerit acceptait la production des premier et deuxième docu-
ments. mais non celle des troisième, quatrième et cinquième documents. The Court decided, pursuant to Article 56, paragraph 2. of the Rules, to
authorize the production of the latter group of documents by Germany, it
being understood that the United States would have the opportunity, in accord-
ance with paragraph 3 of that Article, to comment subsequently thereon and to

submit documents in support of those comments. That decision was duly com-
municated to the Parties by letters from the Registrar dated 9 November 2000.

7. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules, the Court, after ascer-
taining the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and docu-
ments annexed would be made available to the public at the opening of the oral
proceedings.
8. Public hearings were held from 13 to 17 November 2000, at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For Gerniriri~.: Mr. Gerhard Westdickenberg,
Mr. Bruno Simma.
Mr. Daniel Khan,
Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul,
Mr. Andreas Paulus,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.

For the United States: Mr. James H. Thessin,
The Horiourable Janet Napolitano,
Mr. Theodor Meron.
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias,
Mr. Stefan Trechsel,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson.

9. At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to Germany. to
which replies were given in writing, in accordance with Article61. paragraph 4,
of the Rules of Court.
In addition. the United States, acting within the time-limit accorded it for
this purpose. commented on the new documeilts filed by Germany on 26 Octo-
ber 2000 (see paragraph 6 above) and produced documents in support of those
comments.

10. In itsApplication, Germany formulated the decision requested in the fol-
lowing terms :

"Accordingly the Federal Republic of Germany asks the Court to
adjudge and declare
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying. convicting and
sentencing Karl and Walter LaGrand, as described in the preceding
statement of facts, violated its international legal obligations to Ger-
many, in its own right and in its right of diplonlatic protectioii of its
nationals, as provided by Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention,

(2) that Germany is therefore entitled to reparation,
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation not to La Cour a décidé., enapplication du paragraphe 2 de l'article 56 de son
Règlement, d'autoriser la production par l'Allemagne de ce second groupe de
documents. étant entendu que les Etats-Unis auraient, conformément au para-
graphe 3 dudit article, la possibilité de présenter ultérieurement des observa-
tions i ce sujet et de soumettre des documents à l'appui de ces observations.

Cette décision aétédûment communiquée aux Parties par lettres du greffier en
date du 9 novembre 2000.
7. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 53de son Règlement, la Cour,
après s'êtrerenseigntie auprès des Parties, a décidéque des exemplaires des
pièces de procédure et des documents annexés seraient rendus accessibles au
public à l'ouverture de la procédure orale.
8. Des audiences publiques ont été tenuesdu 13 au 17 novembre 2000, au
cours desquelles ont été entendus en leurs plaidoiries et réponses:

Poirr I'Allrr?icrgnr: M. Gerhard Westdickenberg.
M. Bruno Simma,
M. Daniel Khan,
M. Hans-Peter Kaul,
M. Andreas Paulus,
M. Donald Francis Donovan.
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.

Pour 1c.cE. tats-Unis: M. James H. Thessin,
l'honorable Janet Napolitano,
M. Theodor Meron,
Mm' Catherine W. Browri,
M. D. Stephen Mathias,
M. Stefan Trechsel,
M. Michael J. Matheson.

9. A l'audience, des membres de la Cour ont poséi l'Allemagne des ques-
tions auxquelles il a étérépondu par écrit,conformément au paragraphe 4 de
l'article 61 du Règlement.
Dans le délaiqui 11:uravait étéfixéà cet effet, les Etats-Unis ont par ailleurs
présenté desobservai.ions au sujet des documents nouveaux déposéspar 1'Alle-
magne le 26 octobre 2000 (voir paragraphe 6 ci-dessus). et ont eux-mêmespro-
duit des documents ill'appui de ces observatioiis.

10. Dans la requête.la décisiondemandée par l'Allemagne a étéainsi for-
mulée :
«En conséquence, la République fédérale d'Allemagneprie la Cour de

dire et juger que::
1) en arrêtant,détenant.jugeant, déclarant coupables et condamnant Karl et
Walter LaGrand dans lesconditions indiquéesdans l'exposé des faitsqui
précède.les 1:tats-Unis ont violéleurs obligations juridiques internatio-
nales envers l'Allemagne, en son nom propre et dans l'exercicedu droit
qu'elle a d'assurer la protection diplomatique de ses ressortissants. ainsi
qu'il est prévuaux articles 5 et 36 de la convention de Vienne;
2) l'Allemagne a en conséquence droit à réparation;
3) les Etats-Unis ont l'obligation juridique internationale de ne pasppli- apply the doctrine of 'procedural default' or any other doctrine of
national law, so as to preclude the exercise of the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; and

(4) that the United States is under an international obligation to carry out

in conformity with the foregoing international legal obligations any
future detention of or criminal proceedings against any other German
national in its territory, whether by a constituent, legislative. execu-
tive, judicial or other power, whether that power holds a superior or
subordinate position in the organization of the United States, and
whether that power's functions are of an international or interna1
character;

and that, pursuünt to the foregoing international legal obligations.

(1) the criminal liability imposed on Karl and Walter LaGrand in viola-
tion of international legal obligations is void, and should be recog-
nized as void by the legal authorities of the United States;
(2) the United Statesshould provide reparation, in the form of compensa-
tion and satisfaction, for the execution of Karl LaGrand on 24 Feb-
ruary 1999:
(3) the United States should restore the .rtutus quo unte in the case of

Walter LaGrand, that is re-establish the situation that existed before
the detention of. proceedings against, and conviction and sentencing
of that Germai1 national in violation of the United States' interna-
tional legal obligation took place; and
(4) the United States should provide Germany a guarantee of the non-
repetition of the illegal acts."
11. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were

presented by the Parties:
On brhaif of the Go1lcrnri7cntof Grrr~i~lny,

in the Memorial :
"Having regard to the facts and points of law set forth in the present
Memorial, and without prejudice to such elements of fact and law and to

such evidence as may be submitted at a later time, and likewise without
pi.c.jiidicc.to thc righto ~iipplc.nicii;,id ;inicnd tlic prescritSiibiiii.;.;iaii~.
ihc 1;cdtr;il Rcpliblic ofGci.ni;iii!, rc.;pccil'iill!.rcqiicsis ilic C'o~irtio iidjiid_rc
and declare
(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36
subparagraph 1 (h) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering consular
assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl and

Walter LaCrand, violated its international legal obligations to Ger-
many, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of its
nationals. under Articles 5 and 36 paragraph I of the said Conven-
tion;

(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in par- quer la doctrine dite de la ((carence procédurale)) (procedurul defuult).

ni aucune autre doctrine de leur droit interne, d'une manière qui fasse
obstacle à l'exercicedes droits conféréspar l'article 36 de la convention
de Vienne; ei.
4) les Etats-Unis ont l'obligation internationale d'agir conformément aux
obligations jiiridiques internationales si~smentionnéesdans le cas où ils
placeraient en détention tout autre ressortissant allemand sur leur
territoire ou engageraient une action pénale à son encontre à l'avenir,
que cet acte soit accompli par un pouvoir constitué, qu'il soit législatif,
exécutif, judiciaire ou autre, que ce pouvoir occupe une place supé-
rieure ou subordonnée dans l'organisation des Etats-Unis ou que les
fonctions de ce pouvoir présentent un caractère international ou
interne ;

et que, conformément aux obligations juridiques internationales susmen-
tionnées :
1) toute responsabilité pénalequi ait étéattribuéeà Karl et Walter LaGrand

en violation d'obligations juridiques internationales est nulle et doit ètre
reconnue cornme nulle par les autorités légalesdes Etats-Unis;
2) les Etats-Unis devraient accorder réparation, sous la forme d'une
indemnisation ou de satisfaction, pour I'exécutionde Karl LaGrand le
24 février 1999:
3) les Etats-Unis doivent restaurer le stutu quo nnie dans le cas de Wal-
ter LaGrand. c'est-à-dire rétablir la situation qui existait avant les actes
de détention,de poursuite. de déclaration de culpabilité et de condam-
nation de ce ressortissant allemand commis en violation desobligations
juridiques internationales des Etats-Unis:
4) les Etats-Unis doivent donner à l'Allemagne la garantie que de tels
actes illicites ne se reproduiront pas. »

I1. Dans la procédure écrite.les conclusions ci-après ont été présentéepsar
les Parties:

ALI non1 ciu Goiiverncr~il(wdte I'All(~n~ugnr,
dans le mémoire:

((Au vu des points de fait et de droit exposésdans le présent mémoire.et
sans préjudicedes élémentsde fait et de droit et des élémentsde preuve qui
pourront ètre ultérieurement produits, ainsi que du droit de compléter et
d'amender les présentes conclusions. la République fédérale d'Allemagne
prie respectueusement la Cour de dire et juger que:

1) en n'informant pas sans retard Karl et Walter LaGrand après leur
arrestation de leurs droits en vertu de l'alinéahj du paragraphe 1 de
l'article36 clela convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, et
en privant l'Allemagne de la possibilitéde fournir son assistance consu-
laire, ce quii a finalement conduit à l'exécution de Karl et Wal-
ter LaGrancl, les Etats-Unis ont violéleurs obligations juridiques inter-
nationales bis-à-vis de l'Allemagne au titre de l'article 5 et du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 36 de ladite convention. tant en ce qui concerne

les droits propres de l'Allemagne que le droit de cette dernière d'exercer
sa protection diplomatique à l'égardde ses ressortissants;
2) en appliquant des règles de leur droit interne, notamment la doctrine ticular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Wal-
ter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its

international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36 para-
graph 2 of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention
are intended :

(3) that the United States, by failing to take al1measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its
international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional
measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from
any action which might interfere with the subject matter of a dispute
while judicial proceedings are pending;

and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(4) that the United States shall provide Germany a guarantee that it will
not repeat its illegal acts and ensure that, in any future cases of deten-
tion of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, United
States domestic law and practice will not constitute a bar to the effec-
tive exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention

on Consular Relations."

On helzcrlf'uftlic Goi'errlriltiqf'the United Stutes,

in the Counter-Memorial :
~'Accordingly,on the basis of the facts and arguments set forth in this
Counter-Memorial, and without prejudice to the right further to amend
and supplement these submissions in the future, the United Statesasks the
Court to adjudge and declare that:

(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36 (1) (hl of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. in
that the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly
give to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that
Article, and that the United States has apologized to Germany for this
breach, and is taking substantial measures aimed at preventing any
recurrence; and
(2) That al1other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many are dismissed."

12. At the oral proceedings. the following submissions were presented by the
Parties :

012helinlf uf the Goi'trnrlleritof'G<~itncrnj~,
"The Federal Republic of Germany respectfully requests the Court to
adjudge and declare

(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36,
subparagraph 1 (hi, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering con- dite de la «carence procédurale)), qui ont empêchéKarl et Walter
LaGrand de faire valoir leurs réclamations au titre de la convention de
Vienne sur lei;relations consulaires. et en procédant finalement à leur
exécution,les Etats-Unis ont violél'obligation juridique internationale,
dont ils étaient tenus à l'égardde l'Allemagne en vertu du paragraphe 2
de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne, de permettre la pleine réa-
lisation des iïns pour lesquelles sont prévus les droits énoncés à
I'article 36 de ladite convention;
3) en ne prenant pas toutes les mesures dont ils disposaient pour que Wal-

ter LaGrand ne soit pas exécutétant que la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice n'aurait Fiasrendu sa décision définitive en l'affaire,les Etats-Unis
ont violéleur obligation juridique internationale de se conformer à
l'ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la
Cour le 3 ma.rs 1999 et de s'abstenir de tout acte pouvant interférer
avec l'objet d'un différend tant que l'instance est en cours:
et que, conformément aux obligations juridiques internationales susmen-

tionnées.
4) les Etats-Unis devront donner à l'Allemagne la garantie qu'ils ne répé-
teront pas de tels actes illicites et qu'ils feront en sorte que, dans tous
les cas futur:; de détention de ressortissants allemands ou d'actions
pénalesii l'encontre de tels ressortissants, le droit et la pratique internes
des Etats-Unis ne feront pas obstacle à l'exercice effectif des droits
énoncés à I'kirticle 36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations

consulaires. »

dans le contre-mémo,ire :
((Partant. sur la base des faits et moyens exposésdans le présentcontre-
mémoireet sans préjudicede leur droit de modifier et de compléter à l'ave-

nir les présentes concliisions, les Etats-Unis prient la Cour de dire et juger:

1) qu'ils ont violél'obligation dont ils étaienttenus envers l'Allemagne en
vertu de l'alinéah) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne sur les relations consulaires en ce que les autorités compétentes
des Etats-Unis n'ont pas informé sans retard de leurs droits Karl et
Walter LaGrand ainsi que l'exigeait cet article et que les Etats-Unis ont

présenté leursexcuses à l'Allemagne pour cette violation et prennent
des niesures concrètes visant à empêcher qu'ellene se reproduise; et
2) que toutes le:;autres demandes et conclusions de la République fédérale
d'Allemagne sont rejetées. »
12. Dans la procédure orale, les conclusions ci-après ont étéprésentéespar

les Parties:
Ali noiiihi Goirrc~rnetn(w te I'Alittnugtze,

«[L]a République fédérale d'Allemagneprie respectueusement la Cour
de dire et juger que:
1) en n'informant pas sans retard Karl et Walter LaGrand après leur
arrestation de leurs droits en vertu de l'alinéa h) du paragraphe 1 de

l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, et
en privant l'Allemagne de la possibilitéde fournir son assistance consu- sular assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl
and Walter LaGrand. violated its international legal obligations to
Germany. in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of

its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36, paragraph 1, of the said
Convention:

(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in par-
ticular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Wal-
ter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations. and by ultimately executing them, violated its
international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, para-
graph 2. of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention
are intended :

(3) that the United States, by tàiling to take al1measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand was not execiited pending the final deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice on tlie mütter. violated its
international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional
measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from
any action which might interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute

while judicial proceedings are pending:
and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(4) that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it will
not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of detention
of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United

States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In
particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the United
States to provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convic-
tions impnired by a violation of the rights uiider Article 36."

"The United States of America respectfully requests the Court to adjudge
and declare that :

(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under
Article 36. paragraph 1 (hi. of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, in that the competent authorities of the United States did
not promptly give to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification
required by that Article, and that the United States has apologized to
Germany for this breach. and is taking substantial measures aimed at
preventing any recurrence; and
(2) All other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Germany
are dismissed."

13. Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in LAGRAND (ARRET) 474

laire, ce qui a finalement conduit à l'exécution de Karl et Wal-
ter LaCrand, les Etats-Unis ont violéleurs obligations juridiques inter-
nationales vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne au titre de l'article5 et du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 36 de ladite convention, tant en ce qui concerne
lesdroits propres del'Allemagneque le droit de cette dernièred'exercer
sa protection diplomatique à l'égardde ses ressortissants;
3) en appliquant des règlesde leur droit interne, notamment la doctrine
dite de la ((carence procédurale», qui ont empêchéKarl et Walter
LaCraiid de faire valoir leurs réclamationsau titre de la convention de

Vienne sur le:;relations consulaires, et en procédant finalement àleur
exécution,les Etats-Unis ont violé I'obligationjuridique internationale,
dont ilsétaienttenus i l'égardde l'Allemagne en vertu du paragraphe
2 de I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne, de permettre la pleine réa-
lisation des finsour lesquellessont prévusles droits énoncés à I'article
36 de ladite convention;
3) en ne prenant pas toutes les mesures dont ils disposaient pour que Wal-
ter LaGrand ne soit pas exécutétant que la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice n'aurait pas rendu sa décisiondéfinitive enl'affaire. les Etats-Unis
ont violéleur obligation juridique internationale de se conformer i
l'ordon~iance en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la
Cour le 3 mars 1999 et de s'abstenir de tout acte pouvant interférer
avec l'objet d'un différendtant que l'instance est en cours;

et que. conformément aux obligations juridiques internationales susmen-
tionnées,
4) les Etats-Uni!; devront donner àl'Allemagne l'assurance qu'ils ne répé-
teront pas de tels actes illiciteset que, dans tous les cas futurs de déten-

tion de ressortissants allemands ou d'actions pénales à l'encontre de
tels ressortissants, les Etats-Unis veillerontssurer en droit et en pra-
tique l'exerciceeffectif des droits visés'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne sur les relations consulaires. En particulier dans les cas où un
accuséest passible de la peine de mort. cela entraîne pour les Etats-
Unis l'obligation de prévoir le réexameneffectif des condamnations
pénales entachéesd'une violation des droits é~ioncé s I'article 36 de la
convention, ainsi que les moyens pour y porter remède. »

Air riorncliro~/vernerr~er zts Etcit.7-Unis,
«Les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueprient respectueusement la Cour de dire et

juger :
1) qu'ils ont violél'obligation dont ils étaienttenus envers l'Allemagneen
vertu de I'aliiléah) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne sur les relations consulaires en ce que les autorités compétentes
des Etats-Uriis n'ont pas informésans retard de leurs droits Karl et
Walter LaCrand ainsi que l'exigeaitcet article et que les Etats-Unis ont
présenté 1eur.sexcuses à l'Allemagne pour cette violation et prennent
des mesures concrètes visant à empêcher qu'ellene se reproduise; et
2) que toutes le:jautres demandes et conclusions de la Républiquefédérale

d'Allemagne sont rejetées.)>

13. Walter LaGrand et Karl LaGrand étaient nés en Allemagne res-475 LAGRAND (JCDGMENT)

1962 and 1963 respectively, and were German nationals. In 1967, when
they were still young children, they moved with their mother to take up
permanent residence in the United States. They retnrned to Germany
only once, for a period of about six months in 1974.Although they lived
in the United States for most of their lives, and became the adoptive

children of a United States national, they remained at al1times German
nationals, and never acquired the nationality of the United States. How-
ever, the United States has emphasized that both had the demeanour and
speech of Americans rather than Gernians, that t~either was known CO
have spoken German, and that they appeared in al1respects to be native
citizens of the United States.

14. On 7 January 1982, Karl LaGrand and Walter LaGrand were
arrested in the United States by law enforcement officers on suspicion of
liaving been involved earlier the same day in an attempted armed bank
robbery in Marana, Arizona, in the course of which the bank manager

was murdered and another bank employee seriously injured. They were
subsequently tried before the Superior Court of Pitna County, Arizona,
which. on 17 Februarv 1984. convicted them both of murder in the first
degree, attempted murder in tlie first degree, attempted armed robbery
and two counts of kidnapping. On 14 December 1984, each was sen-
tenced to death for first degree murder and to concurrent sentences of

imprisonment for the other charges.

15. At al1 material times, Germany as well as the United States were
parties to both the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the
Optional Protocol to that Convention. Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of
the Vienna Convention provides that :

"if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State

shall, without delay. int'ormthe consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other mannes. Any conlmunication addressed to tlie consular post
by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be for-

warded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this subparagraph."

It is not disputed that at the time the LaGrands were convicted and sen-
tenced, the competent United States authorities had failed to provide the
LaGrands with the information required by this provision of the Vienna
Convention, and had not informed the relevant German consular post of

the LaGrands' arrest. The United States concedes that the competent
authorities failed to do so, even afterecoming aware that the LaGrands
were German nationals and not United States nationals, and admits that LAGRAND (ARRET) 475

pectivement en 196;!et 1963et étaient ressortissants allemands. En 1967,

alors qu'ils étaient encore trèsjeunes, ils sont partis avec leur mère aux
Etats-Unis pour y résiderà titre permanent. Ils ne sont revenus en Alle-
magne qu'une seult: fois. pour une durée d'environ six mois, en 1974.
Bien qu'ils aient passéla plus grande partie de leur existence aux Etats-
Unis et qu'ils aient etéadoptéspar un ressortissant des Etats-Unis, ils ont
toujours conservé leur nationalité allemande et n'ont jamais acquis la

nationalité américaine. Toutefois, les Etats-Unis ont soulignéle fait que
l'un comme l'autre avaient l'allure et la manière de parler d'Américains
plut& que d'Allemiinds, qu'a la connaissance généraleni l'un ni l'autre
ne parlaient allemand et qu'ils semblaient à tous égards êtredes citoyens
natifs des Etats-Unis.
14. Le 7janvier 1982,Karl LaGrand et Walter LaGrand ont étéarrê-

tés aux Etats-Unis par des officiers de police, qui les soupçonnaient
d'avoir pris part plus tôt dans la journée à une tentative de vol à main
armée dans une banque de Marana en Arizona, au cours de laquelle le
directeur de la banque avait ététué et une autre employée grièvement
blessée. Ilsont par la suite ététraduits en justice devant la cour supé-
rieure du comtéde Pima en Arizona, qui, le 17février1984, les a recon-

nus tous deux coupables de meurtre aggravé, de tentative de meurtre
aggravé,de tentative de vol à main arméeet de deux chefs d'enlèvement
de personne. Le 14décembre 1984, ils ont étél'un et l'autre condamnés à
mort pour meurtre aggravé et à des peines confondues d'emprisonnement
pour les autres chefs d'accusation.
15. Lors des fait!;à prendre en considération, tant l'Allemagne que les

Etats-Unis étaient parties à la foiiila convention de Vienne sur les rela-
tions consulaires et au protocole de signature facultativeà ladite conven-
tion. L'alinéa h) dlu paragraphe 1de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne dispose :

«si l'intéresséen fait la demande, les autorités compétentes de 1'Etat
de résidencedoivent avertir sans retard le poste consulaire de 1'Etat
d'envoi lorsque, dans sa circonscriptio~î consulaire, un ressortissant
de cet Etat est arrêté, incarcéréou mis en état de détention préven-

tive ou toute autre forme de détention. Toute communication adres-
séeau poste co~nsulairepar la personne arrêtée,incarcéréeou mise en
étatde détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention doit
également êtretransmise sans retard par lesdites autorités. Celles-ci
doivent sans retard informer l'intéresséde ses droits aux termes du
présent alinéa.»

Il n'est pas contesti: que, lorsque les LaCrand ont été reconnuscoupables
et condamnés, les autorités compétentes des Etats-Unis avaient omis de

leur fournir les informations requises conformément a cette disposition
de la convention de:Vienne et n'avaient pas averti le poste consulaire alle-
mand compétent de l'arrestation des LaGrand. Les Etats-Unis recon-
naissent que les autorités compétentes ne se sont pas acquittées de cette
obligation, même iiprès avoir eu connaissance du fait que les LaGrandthe United States has therefore violated its obligations under this provi-
sion of the Vienna Convention.

16. However. there is some dispute between the Parties as to the time
at which the competent authorities in the United States became aware of
the fact that the LaGrands were German nationals. Germany argues that
the authorities of Arizona were aware of this Srom the very beginning,
and in particular that probation officers knew by April 1982.The United

States argues that at the time of their arrest, neither of the LaGrands
identified himself to the arresting authorities as a German national, and
that Walter LaGrand affirmatively stated that he was a United States
citizen. The United States position is that its "competent authorities" for
the purposes of Article 36, paragraph 1 (hl, of the Vienna Convention
were the arresting and detaining authorities, and thatthese became aware

of the German nationality of the LaGrands by late 1984,and possibly by
mid-1983 or earlier, but in any event not at the time of their arrest in
1982.Although other authorities, such as immigration authorities or pro-
bation officers. may have known this even earlier, the United States
argues that these kere not "competent authorities" for the purposes
of this provision of the Vienna Convention. The United States has also

suggested that at the time of their arrest, the LaGrands may themselves
have been unaware that they were not nationals of the United States.

17. At their trial, the LaGrands were represented by counsel assigned
by the court. as they were unable to afford legal counsel of their own
choice. Their counsel at trial did not raise the issue of non-cornpliance
with the Vienna Convention, and did not themselves contact the German
consular authorities.

18. The convictions and sentences pronounced by the Superior Court
of Pima County, Arizona, were subsequently challenged by the LaGrands
in three principal sets of legal proceedings.
19. The first set of proceedings consisted of appeals against the con-
victions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which were

rejected by that court on 30 January 1987. The United States Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its discretion. denied applications by the
LaGrands for further review of these judgments on 5October 1987.

20. The second set of proceedings involved petitions by the LaGrands
for post-conviction relief, which were denied by an Arizona statecourt in

1989. Review of this decision was denied by the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona in 1990, and by the United States Supreme Court in 1991.

21. At the time of these two sets of proceedings, the LaGrands had LAGRAND (ARRET) 476

étaient des ressortissants allemands et non des ressortissants des Etats-
Unis, et ils admetterit donc avoir manqué a leurs obligations au titre de
cette disposition de la convention de Vienne.

16. Toutefois, la question de savoir a quel moment les autorités com-
pétentes des Etats-Unis ont eu connaissance du fait que les LaGrand
étaient des ressortissants allemands demeure un point litigieux entre les
Parties. Selon l'Allemagne, les autorités de l'Arizona ont été informées de
ce fait dèsl'origine, t:t les agents de mise à l'épreuveétaienten particulier
au courant de ce fait dès avril 1982. Les Etats-Unis allèguent que, au

moment de leur arrestation, ni l'un ni l'autre desLaCrand ne se sont pré-
sentésaux autorités qui ont procédé à celle-ci comme des ressortissants
allemands et que Walter LaGrand a déclaréqu'il étaitcitoyen des Etats-
Unis. La position des Etats-Unis est que leurs ((autorités compétentes))
au sens de l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne étaient les autorités avant ~rocédé a l'arrestation et à la mise en
, .
détention, et que ces dernières ont eu connaissance de la nationalité alle-
mande des LaCrand A la fin de 1984. ou eut-être vers le milieu de
l'année1983,voire plus tôt, mais qu'en tout kat de cause elles ignoraient
ce fait lors de leur arrestation en 1982. Bien uue d'autres autorités. telles
que les services de l'immigration ou les agents de mise a l'épreuve,aient
pu en avoir eu conn;iissance a une date encore antérieure, les Etats-Unis

allèguent qu'il ne s'agissait pas là d'«autorités compétentes)) au sens de
cette disposition de la convention de Vienne. Les Etats-Unis ont égale-
ment laisséentendre que, au moment de leur arrestation, les LaGrand
n'avaient peut-être pas eux-mêmesconscience qu'ils n'étaient pas des
ressortissants des Etats-Unis.
17. Lors de leur procès, les LaGrand étaient représentéspar des avo-

cats commis d'office. car ils n'avaient pas les moyens de s'attacher les ser-
vices de défenseurs de leur choix. Au cours du procès, ces avocats n'ont
pas soulevé la question du non-respect de la convention de Vienne et
n'ont pas pris eux-mêmescontact avec les autorités consulaires alle-
mandes.
18. Les LaGrand ont par la suite contesté les verdicts de culpabilité et
les peines prononcés par la cour supérieuredu comtéde Pima en Arizona

dans le cadre de trois sériesprincipales de procéduresjudiciaires.
19. La première série de procédures a concerné les appels interjetés
devant la cour suprêmede l'Arizona contre les verdicts de culpabilité et
les peines prononcés; cette cour les a rejetésle 30 janvier 1987. La Cour
suprêmedes Etats-Unis, exerçant son pouvoir discrétionnaire, a opposé,
le 5 octobre 1987, une fin de non-recevoir aux recours en revision de ces

décisions forméspar les LaGrand.
20. La deuxième sériede procédures a porté sur des recours ouverts
après condamnationi, rejetés par une juridiction de I'Etat de l'Arizona
en 1989. La cour suprêmede l'Arizona a refuséen 1990 de réexaminer
cette décision et la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis a fait de mêmeen
..91..

21. A l'époqueoii ont étéengagées cesdeux sériesde procédures, lesstill not been informed by the competent United States authorities of

their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of the Vienna Convention,
and the German consular post had still not been informed of their arrest.
The issue of the lack of consular notification, which had not been raised
at trial, was also not raised in these two sets of proceedings.

22. The relevant German consular post was only made aware of the
case in June 1992 by the LaGrands themselves, who had learnt of their
rights from other sources, and not from the Arizona authorities. In
December 1992, and on a number of subsequent occasions between then

and February 1999, an officia1 of the Consulate-General of Germany in
Los Angeles visited the LaGrands in prison. Germany claims that it sub-
sequently helped the LaGrands' attorneys to investigate the LaGrands'
childhood in Germany, and to raise the issue of the omission of consular
advice in further proceedings before the federal courts.

23. The LaGrands commenced a third set of legal proceedings by filing
applications for writs of hubeus corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona, seeking to have their convictions - or
at least their death sentences - set aside. In these proceedings they raised

a number of different claims, which were rejected by that court in orders
dated 24 January 1995 and 16 February 1995. One of these claims was
that the United States authorities had failed to notify the German con-
sulate of their arrest, as required by the Vienna Convention. This claim

was rejected on the basis of the "procedural default" rule. According to
the United States, this rule:

"is a federal rule that, before a state criminal defendant can obtain
relief in federal court, the claim must be presented to a statecourt. If
a state defendant attempts to raise a new issue in a federal hubeus

corpus proceeding, the defendant can only do so by showing cause
and prejudice. Cause is an external impediment that prevents a
defendant from raising a claim and prejudice must be obvious on its
face. One important purpose of this rule is to ensure that the state
courts have an opportunity to address issues going to the validity of

state convictions before the federal courts intervene."

The United States District Court held that the LaGrands had not shown
an objective external factor that prevented them from raising the issue of

the lack of consular notification earlier. On 16 January 1998, this judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals,LaCrand n'avaient toujours pas été informéspar les autorités compé-
tentes des Etats-Unis des droits que leur conférait l'alinéa 6) du para-
graphe 1 de l'articl36 de la convention de Vienne et le poste consulaire

allemand n'avait toiljours pas été informéde leur arrestation. La ques-
tion du défautde notification consulaire, qui n'avait pas étésoulevéelors
du procès initial, ne l'a pas étédavantage lors de ces deux sériesde pro-
cédures.
22. Le poste consulaire allemand compétent n'a étéinformé de cette
affaire qu'en juin 1992 par les LaGrand eux-mêmes, qui avaient eu

connaissance de leurs droits par d'autres sources et non par les autorités
de l'Arizona. En décembre 1992, et à plusieurs reprises entre cette dateet
le mois de février 1.999,un fonctionnaire du consulat générald'Alle-
magne à Los Angeles a rendu visite aux LaGrand dans leur prison.
L'Allemagne allègue qu'elle apar la suite aidé les avocats des LaCrand à
enquêter sur leur enfance en Allemagne et à soulever la question de

l'omission de la notification consulaire lors de procédures ultérieures
devant lesjuridictions fédérales.
33. Les LaGrand ont entamé une troisième sériede procédures judi-
ciaires en introduisant des actions d'habeas corpus devant le tribunal
fédéralde première instance (United Stutes District Court) pour le dis-

trict de l'Arizona, aux fins de faire annuler leurs condamnations - du
moins leur condamnation iimort. Lors de ces procédures, ils ont soulevé
différents moyens qui ont étérejetés par des décisions de ce tribunal
en date du 24 janvier et du 16 février 1995. L'un de ces moyens était
fondésur le fait que les autorités des Etats-Unis avaient manqué à leur
obligation de notifier leur arrestation au consulat d'Allemagne. comme

le prescrit la convention de Vienne. Ce moyen a étérejetépar applica-
tion de la règlede la ((carence procédurale)). D'après les Etats-Unis, cette
règle

(([est] une règle fédéralequi oblige l'accusétraduit devant les tribu-
naux d'un Etat à soumettre ses moyens à un tribunal de cet Etat
avant de pouvoir exercer un recours devant un tribunal fédéral.Si
cet accuséveut soulever une question nouvelle lors d'une procédure

d'lzubeus corpus devant un tribunal fédéral, ilne pourra le faire
qu'en justifiant sa carence antérieure et en démontrant le préjudice
porté par cette carence à sa cause. La justification doit êtreun élé-
ment extérieur qui a empêché l'accuséde faire valoir un moyen et le
préjudice, lui,doit êtreàpriori manifeste. L'une des fonctions impor-
tantes de cette règle est de garantir que les tribunaux des Etats

auront eu I'occa.siond'examiner les oints concernant la validitédes
verdicts de culpabilité prononcés au niveau de 1'Etat avant que les
tribunaux fédér,nux n'interviennent. >)

Le tribunal fédéralde première instance a conclu que les LaGrand
n'avaient pas démontré l'existence d'un élémentextérieur objectif les
ayant empêché de soulever plus tôt la question du défaut de notification
consulaire. Le 16janvier 1998,cette décision aétéconfirmée enappel parNinth Circuit, which also held that the LaGrands' claim relating to the
Vienna Convention was "procedurally defaulted", as it had not been
raised in any of the earlier proceedings in state courts. On 2 Novem-
ber 1998.the United States Supreme Court denied further review of this
judgment.

24. On 21 December 1998,the LaGrands were formally notified bythe
United States authorities of their right to consular access.

25. On 15January 1999,the Supreme Court of Arizona decided that
Karl LaGrand was to be executed on 24 February 1999,and that Walter
LaGrand was to be executed on 3 March 1999.Germany claims that the

German Consulate learned of these dates on 19January 1999.
26. In January and early February 1999, various interventions were
made by Germany seeking to prevent the execution of the LaGrands. In
particular, the German Foreign Minister and German Minister of Justice
wrote to their respective United Statescounterparts on 27 January 1999;
the German Foreign Minister wrote to the Governor of Arizona on the
same day; the German Chancellor wrote to the President of the United
States and to the Governor of Arizona on 2 February 1999; and the
President of the Federal Republic of Germany wrote to the President of
the United States on 5 February 1999.These letters referred to German
opposition to capital punishment generally, but did not raise the issue of
the absence of consular notification in the case of the LaGrands. The
latter issue was, however, raised in a further letter, dated 22 February
1999,two days before the scheduled date of execution of Karl LaGrand,
from the German Foreign Minister to the United States Secretary of
State.

27. On 23 February 1999,the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency
rejected an appeal for clemency by Karl LaGrand. Under the law of
Arizona, this meant that the Governor of Arizona was prevented
from granting clemency.
28. On the same day, the Arizona Superior Court in Pima County
rejected a further petition by Walter LaGrand, based inter uliu on the
absence of consular notification, on the ground that these claims were
"procedurally precluded".
29. On 24 February 1999, certain last-minute federal court proceed-
ings brought by Karl LaGrand ultimately proved to be unsuccessful. In
the course of these proceedings the United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, again held the issue of failure of consular notification to be
procedurally defaulted. Karl LaGrand was executed later that same day.

30. On 2 March 1999,the day before the scheduled date of execution
of Walter LaGrand, at 7.30p.m. (The Hague time), Germany filed in the
Registry of this Court the Application instituting the present proceedings

against the United States (see paragraph 1 above), accompanied by a
request for the following provisional measures : LACRAND (ARRÊT) 478

la cour d'appel des Etats-Unis pour le neuvièmecircuit, qui a également
jugéque le moyen soulevépar les LaGrand concernant la convention de
Vienne étaitentachéde ((carence procédurale)),car il n'avait étésoulevé
dans aucune des procédures introduites auparavant devant les juridic-
tions de I'Etat. Le 2:novembre 1998,la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis a
refùséde réexaminer cette décision.
24. Le 21 décembre 1998,les LaGrand ont étéofficiellement informés
par les autoritésdes Etats-Unis de leur droit de communiquer avec leurs
autoritésconsulaires.
25. Le 15janvier 1999,lacour suprêmede l'Arizona a décidé que Karl
LaCrand devait êtreexécuté le 24 février1999,et que Walter LaGrand le
serait le3 mars 1999.L'Allemagne allègueque le consulat d'Allemagne a

eu connaissance de ces dates le 19janvier 1999.
26. Enjanvier et au débutdu mois de février 1999l,'Allemagnea effec-
tuéplusieurs démarchespour tenter d'empêcherl'exécutiondes LaCrand.
Les ministres allemands des affaires étrangères et de la justice ont ainsi
saisi leurs homologues respectifs aux Etats-Unis le 27janvier 1999;le mi-
nistre allemand des affaires étrangères aécritle mêmejour au gouverneur
de l'Arizona; le chancelier de la République fédéraled'Allemagne s'est
adressé au président des Etats-Unis et au gouverneur de l'Arizona le
2 février1999; le présidentde la Républiquefédéraled'Allemagne a écrit
au président desEtats-Unis le 5 février 1999.Ces lettres faisaient état de
l'opposition de l'Allemagne à la peine capitale d'une manière générale,
mais ne soulevaient pas la question du défautde notification consulaire
dans le cas desLaCirand. Cette dernière question a été toutefois évoquée
dans une lettre ultérieure, adresséele 22 février1999,deux jours avant la
date fixéepour l'exécutionde Karl LaGrand, par le ministre allemand
des affaires étrangèresau secrétaired'Etat des Etats-Unis.
27. Le 23 février 1999, lacommission des grâces de l'Arizona a rejeté

l'appel de Karl LaGrand a la clémence.En vertu de la législationde
l'Arizona, cette décisionsignifiait que le gouverneur de l'Arizona n'avait
plus la possibilitéd',accorder une mesure de grâce.
28. Ce mêmejour, la cour supérieuredu comtéde Pima en Arizona a
rejetéune autre demande de Walter LaGrand fondéenotamment sur le
défautde notification consulaire, au motif que ce moyen étaitentachéde
((carenceprocédurale ».
29. Le 24 février 1999, certaines procédures judiciaires de dernière
minute engagéesau niveau fédéralpar Karl LaGrand se sont avérées
infructueuses. Au coursde ces procédures, lacour d'appel des Etats-Unis
pour le neuvième circuita de nouveau jugéque le moyen tirédu défautde
notification consulaire était entaché de carence procédurale. Karl
LaGrand a étéexécutéplus tard le mêmejour.
30. Le 2 mars 19'39,la veille du jour fixépour l'exécutionde Walter
LaGrand, a 19h 30 (heure de La Haye), l'Allemagne a déposéau Greffe
de la Cour la requêtequi a introduit la présente instancecontre les Etats-

Unis (voir paragraphe 1ci-dessus), accompagnéed'une demande en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires tendant a ce que: "The United States should take al1 measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final deci-
sion in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of al1 the
measures which it has taken in implementation of that Order."

By a letter of the same date, the German Foreign Minister requested the

Secretary of State of the United States "to urge [the] Governor [of Ari-
zona] for a suspension of Walter LaGrand's execution pending a ruling
by the International Court of Justice".

31. On the same day, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency met
to consider the case of Walter LaGrand. It recommended against a com-
mutation of his death sentence, but recommended that the Governor of

Arizona grant a 60-day reprieve having regard to the Application filed by
Germany in the International Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the Gover-
nor of Arizona decided, "in the interest of justice and with the victims in
mind", to allow the execution of Walter LaGrand to go forward as
scheduled.
32. In an Order of 3 March 1999. this Court found that the circum-

stances required it to indicate, as a katter of the greatest urgency and
without any other proceedings, provisional measures in accordance with
Article 41 of its Statute and with Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules
(I.C.J. Reports lYYY (1), p. 15, para. 26); it indicated provisional meas-
ures in the following terms

"(a) The United States of America should take al1measures at its
disposa1 to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pend-

ing the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform
the Court of al1the measures which it has taken in implemen-
tation of this Order:

(6) The Government of the United States of America should
transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona."

33. On the same day, proceedings were brought by Germany in the

United States Supreme Court against the United States and the Gover-
nor of Arizona, seeking inter alia to enforce compliance with this Court's
Order indicating provisional measures. In the course of these proceed-
ings, the United States Solicitor General as counsel of record took the
position, inter. ulia, that "an order of the International Court of Justice
indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a
basis for judicial relief'. On the same date, the United States Supreme

Court dismissed the motion by Germany, on the ground of the tardiness
of Germany's application and of jurisdictional barriers under United
States domestic law.

34. On that same day, proceedings were also instituted in the United «Les Etats-Unis prennent toutes les mesures en leur pouvoir pour
que Walter LaGrand ne soit pas exécuté enattendant la décision
finale en la présente instance, et qu'ils informent la Cour de toutes

les mesures qu'ils ont prises pour donner effet à cette ordon-
nance. »

Par lettre datée du mêmejour, le ministre allemand des affaires étran-
gèresa demandéau !secrétaired'Etat des Etats-Unis de ((prier instamment
le gouverneur [de l'Arizona] de surseoir à l'exécution de Walter
LaGrand tant que la Cour internationale de Justice n'aura pas pris sa
décision )).
3 1. Le mêmejour, la commission des grâces de l'Arizona s'est réunie

Dour examiner le cas de Walter LaGrand. Elle s'est ~rononcéecontre une
commutation de sa condamnation à mort, mais a recommandé au gou-
verneur de l'Arizona, d'accorder un sursis de soixante jours, compte tenu
de la requêtedéposkepar l'Allemagne devant la Cour internationale de
Justice. Le gouverne:ur de l'Arizona a néanmoins décidé,«dans l'intérêt

de la justice et eu égard aux victimes)), d'autoriser l'exécutionde Walter
LaGrand, comme cela avait étéprévu.
32. Par une ordonnance datéedu 3 mars 1999, la Cour a jugé que les
circonstances exigeaient qu'elle indiquât, de toute urgence et sans autre
procédure, des mesures conservatoires, conformément à l'article 41 de
son Statut et au paragraphe 1 de l'article 75 de son Règlement

(C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 15, par. 26); les mesures conservatoires indi-
quées étaient libellée^e la manière suivante:

«u) les Etats-Unis d'Amérique doivent prendre toutes les mesures
dont ils disposent pour que M. Walter LaGrand ne soit pas
exécutétant que la décision définitive enla présente instance
n'aura pas été rendue, et doiventporter à la connaissance de la
Cour toutes les mesures qui auront étéprises en application de

la présente:ordonnance;
h) le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique doit transmettre
la présente:ordonnance au gouverneur de I'Etat d'Arizona. ))

33. Ce mêmejour, l'Allemagne a introduit une action contre les Etats-
Unis et le gouverneur de l'Arizona devant la Cour suprêmedes Etats-
Unis aux fins, entre autres, de faire respecter l'ordonnance de la Cour

portant indication de mesures conservatoires. Au cours de cette procé-
dure, le Solicitor General des Etats-Unis, agissant en tant que conseil de
l'autorité fédérale,a. émis notamment l'avis qu'«une ordonnance de la
Cour internationale de Justice en indication de mesures conservatoires ne
revêtpas un caractère obligatoire et ne peut fonder un recours susceptible
d'êtreexercéen justice)). Le mêmejour, la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis

a rejeté l'action introduite par l'Allemagne pour tardiveté et en raison
d'obstacles en matière de compétence résultantdu droit interne des Etats-
Unis.
34. Ce mêmejoui-, des procédures ont aussi étéengagées par WalterStates Supreme Court by Walter LaGrand. These proceedings were
decided against him. Later that day, Walter LaGrand was executed.

35. The Court must as a preliminary matter deal with certain issues,
which were raised by the Parties in these proceedings, concerning the
jurisdiction of the Court in relation to Germany's Application, and the
admissibility of its submissions.

36. In relation to thejurisdiction of the Court, the United States, with-
out having raised preliminary objections under Article 79 of the Rules of
Court, nevertheless presented certain objections thereto.
Germany bases thejurisdiction of the Court on Article 1of the Optional
Protocol, which reads as follows:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a
Party to the present Protocol."
Germany contends that the

"proceedings instituted by [it] in the present case raise questions of
the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and of the legal consequences arising from the
non-observance on the part of the United States of certain of its pro-
visions vis-à-vis Germany and two of its nationals".

Accordingly, Germany States that al1four of its submissions

"are covered by one and the samejurisdictional basis, namely Art. 1

of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of
24 April 1963".

37. The Court will first examine the question of its jurisdiction with
respect to the first submission of Germany. Germany relies on para-
graph 1of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which provides:

"With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State: LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 480

LaGrand devant la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis. Ces procédures ont
échoué. Walter LaCirand a étéexécuté plustard dans la journée.

35. La Cour doit à titre préliminaire examiner certaines questionssou-
levéespar les Parties à l'instance concernant sa compétence pour con-
naître de la requète de l'Allemagne et la recevabilité des conclusions de

celle-ci.

36. S'agissant de la compétence de la Cour, les Etats-Unis, sans sou-

lever d'exceptions pi-éliminairesen vertu de I'article 79 du Règlement, ont
cependant fait valoir certaines objections à cet égard.
L'Allemagne fonde la compétence de la Cour sur I'article premier du
protocole de signature facultative, qui se lit ainsi:

((Les différends relatifs à l'interprétation ou à l'application de la
convention relè,ventde la compétence obligatoire de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice, qui, à ce titre, pourra êtresaisie par une requête
de toute partie ,nudifférendqui sera elle-mêmepartie au présentpro-

tocole.))
Elle fait valoir que

«[l]'instance introduite par [elle] en l'espèce soulève des questions
relatives à l'interprétation et à l'application de la convention de

Vienne sur les relations consulaires et aux conséquences juridiques
découlant du non-respect par les Etats-Unis de certaines des dispo-
sitions de cet instrument à l'égardde l'Allemagne et de deux de ses
ressortissants)).

En conséquence, 1'A.llemagneaffirme que les quatre conclusions qu'elle a
présentées

((relèvent[toutes] d'une seule et mêmebase de compétence, à savoir
I'article premier du protocole de signature facultative concernant le
règlement obligatoire des différends qui accompagne la convention

de Vienne sur les relations consulaires du 24 avril 1963)).

37. La Cour examinera tout d'abord la question de sa compétence
pour connaître de la première conclusion de l'Allemagne. Celle-ci se pré-

vaut du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne selon
lequel :

«Afin que l'exercice des fonctions consulaires relatives aux ressor-
tissants de I'Etiit d'envoi soit facilité: (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of
the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the
sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to com-
munication with and access to consular officers of the sending
State;

(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the send-
ing State if, within its consular district, a national of that State
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison,
custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities

without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person con-
cerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;

(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to con-

verse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal rep-
resentation. They shall also have the right to visit any national
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in
their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consu-
lar officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a
national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly

opposes such action."

38. Germany alleges that the failure of the United States to inform the
LaGrand brothers of their right to contact the German authorities "pre-

vented Germany from exercising its rights under Art. 36 (1) (u) and (c)
of the Convention" and violated "the various rights conferred upon the
sending State vis-à-vis its nationals in prison, custody or detention as
provided for in Art. 36 (1) (h) of the Convention". Germany further
alleges that by breaching its obligations to inform, the United States also
violated individual rights conferred on the detainees by Article 36, para-
graph 1 (u), second sentence, and by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Ger-

many accordingly claims that it "was injured in the person of its two
nationals", a claim which Germany raises "as a matter of diplomatic pro-
tection on behalf of Walter and Karl LaGrand".

39. The United States acknowledges that "there was a breach of the

U.S. obligation . . . to inform the LaGrand brothers that they could ask
that a German consular post be notified of their arrest and detention". It
does not deny that this violation of Article 36, paragraph 1(b), has given
rise to a dispute between the two States and recognizes that the Court has LAGRAND (ARRET) 481

aj les fonctionnaires consulaires doiventavoir la libertéde commu-
niquer avec les ressortissants de 1'Etat d'envoi et de se rendre
auprès d'eux. Les ressortissants de 1'Etatd'envoi doivent avoir la

mêmeliberté de communiquer avec les fonctionnaires consu-
laires et de se rendre auprès d'eux;
6) si l'intéresséen fait la demande, les autorités compétentes de
I'Etat de résidencedoivent avertir sans retard le Dosteconsulaire
de 1'Etat d'envoi lorsque. dans sa circonscription consulaire. un
ressortissaiit de cet Etat est arrêté. incarcéou mis en état de

détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention. Toute
communic;ltion adressée au poste consulaire par la personne
arrêtée,incarcérée ou mise en état de détention préventive
ou toute autre forme de détention doit également être trans-
mise sans retard par lesdites autorités. Celles-ci doivent sans
retard informer l'intéresséde ses droits aux termes du présent

alinéa;
c) les fonctionnaires consulaires ont le droit de se rendre auprès
d'un ressortissant de 1'Etat d'envoi qui est incarcéré, enétat de
détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention, de
s'entretenir et de correspondre avec lui et de pourvoir à sa repré-

sentation en justice. Ils ont égalementle droit de se rendre auprès
d'un ressortissant de 1'Etatd'envoi qui, dans leur circonscription,
est incarcéréou détenuen exécution d'un jugement. Néanmoins,
les fonctionnaires consulaires doivent s'abstenir d'intervenir en
faveur d'un ressortissant incarcéréou mis en état de détention
préventive ou toute autre forme de détention lorsque l'intéressé

s'y oppose expressément. »

38. L'Allemagne prétend que, en n'informant pas les frères LaGrand
de leur droit de communiquer avec les autorités allemandes, les Etats-
LJnis l'«ont empêché[e] ...d'exercer les droits que lui confèrent les ali-
néas u) et c/ du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 de la convention)) et ont

violé «les différents droits conférés a 1'Etat d'envoi vis-à-vis de ses
ressortissants en prison, en détentionpréventiveou en garde à vue, tels que
prévuspar l'alinéa h) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36de la convention)).
Elle soutient en outre que, en méconnaissant leur obligation d'informa-
tion, les Etats-Unis ont également violéles droits individuels que l'ali-
néa aj du paragraphe 1de I'article 36, deuxième phrase, et l'alinéa h) du

paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 confèrent aux personnes détenues. L'Alle-
magne affirme qu'en conséquenceelle ((a subi un préjudice enla personne
de sesdeux ressortissants», grief qu'elleinvoque ((au titre de la procédure de
protection diplomatique engagéeau nom de Karl et Walter LaGrand)).
39. Les Etats-LJnis reconnaissent «avoir méconnu l'obligation ...

d'informer ... les firèresLaGrand de leur droit à demander qu'un poste
consulaire allemand soit averti de leur arrestation et mise en détention)).
Ils ne contestent pas que cette violation de l'alin6) du paragraphe 1de
I'article 36 a donnénaissance à un différendentre les deux Etats et recon-jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to hear this dispute in so far as
it concerns Germany's own rights.

40. Concerning Germany's claims of violation of Article 36, para-
graph 1 (a) and ((,),the United States however calls these claims "par-
ticularly misplaced" on the grounds that the "underlying conduct com-
plained of is the same" as the claim of the violation of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b). It contends, moreover, that "to the extent that this
claim by Germany is based on the general law of diplomatic protection,

it is not within the Court's jurisdiction" under the Optional Protocol
because it "does not concern the interpretation or application of the
Vienna Convention". The United States points to the distinction between
jurisdiction over treaties and jurisdiction over customary law and observes
that "[elven if a treaty norm and a customary norm were to have exactly
the same content", each would have its "separate applicability". It con-
tests the German assertion that diplomatic protection "enters through the
intermediary of the Vienna Convention" and submits:

"the Vienna Convention deals with consular assistance . . it does
not deal with diplomatic protection. Legally, a world of difference
exists between the right of the consul to assist an incarcerated
national of his country, and the wholly different question whether
the State can espouse the claims of its national through diplomatic
protection. The former is within the jurisdiction of the Court under
the Optional Protocol; the latter is not . . Germany based its right
of diplomatic protection on customary law . .. [Tlhis case comes
before this Court not under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute,

but under Article 36, paragraph 1. 1sit not obvious .. .that what-
ever rights Germany has under customary law, they do not fa11
within the jurisdiction of this Court under the Optional Protocol?"

41. Germany responds that the breach of paragraph 1 (a) and (c) of
Article 36 must be distinguished from that of paragraph 1 (b), and that

as a result, the Court should not only rule on the latter breach, but also
on the violation of paragraph 1 (u) and (c). Germany further asserts
"that 'application of the Convention' in the sense of the Optional Proto-
col very well encompasses the consequences of a violation of individual
rights under the Convention, including the espousal of respective claims
by the State of nationality".

42. The Court cannot accept the United States objections. The dispute
between the Parties as to whether Article 36, paragraph 1 (u) and (c),of
the Vienna Convention have been violated in this case in consequence of
the breach of paragraph 1 (b) does relate to the interpretation and appli-naissent que la Cour a compétence en vertu du protocole de signature
facultative pour connaître de ce différend dans la mesure ou ce dernier
concerne les droits propres de l'Allemagne.
40. Les Etats-Unis en revanche jugent «particulièrement mal fondé))
l'argument de l'Allemagne selon lequel il y aurait eu violation des ali-
néasa) et c) du piiragraphe 1 de I'article 36, au motif que ((le compor-

tement critiqué est Ileême))que celui visépar l'allégationde violation de
l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1de I'article 36. Ilsfont en outre valoir que la
prétention allemande, fondée sur le droit généralde la protection diplo-
matique, ne relèvepas de la compétencede la Cour en vertu du protocole
de signature facultative, parce que cette prétention (<ne concerne pas
l'interprétation ou l'application de la convention de Vienne)). Les Etats-

Unis soulignent a cet égard la distinction qu'il faut opérer entre la com-
pétence en matière conventionnelle et la compétence relative au droit
coutumier, et font observer que, «[m]êmesi une norme conventionnelle et
une norme couturriière avaient exactement le mêmecontenu)), chacune
aurait une «applicabilité distincte)). Les Etats-Unis contestent I'affirma-
tion selon laquelle le moyen tiréde la protection diplomatique invoqué
par l'Allemagne «entre en ligne de compte par le truchement de la

convention de Vierine)) et soutiennent:
<<laconvention de Vienne traite de l'assistance consulaire ..et non
de la protection diplomatique. Juridiquement un monde sépare le

droit du consu.1d'assister un ressortissant de son pays incarcéréet la
question totalement différente de savoir si I'Etat peut endosser les
réclamations cle ses ressortissants au titre de la protection diploma-
tique. Le premier entre dans le champ de la compétence de la Cour,
en vertu du protocole de signature facultative, non la seconde ...
L'Allemagne fonde son droit de protection diplomatique sur le droit
coutumier ... liaCour est saisie de la présente affaire au titre non pas

du paragraphe 2 mais du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36de son Statut.
N'est-il pas évident ...que quelques droits qu'ait l'Allemagne en
vertu du droii. coutumier, ils ne ressortissent pas a la compétence
conféréeà la Cour par le protocole de signature facultative?))

41. En réponse, l'Allemagne soutient que la violation des alinéas a) et
c) du paragraphe 1de I'article 36 doit êtredistinguée de la violation de
l'alinéa b) du mêrneparagraphe et qu'en conséquence la Cour doit se
prononcer non seulement sur cette dernière violation, mais encore sur
celle des alinéasal et c). L'Allemagne estime en outre «que «l'applica-
tion de la convenlion», au sens du protocole de signature facultative,

englobe bien les conséquencesde la violation des droits que la convention
reconnaît aux individus, y compris le fait pour 1'Etat d'envoi de faire
siennes les demandes y relatives)).
42. La Cour ne saurait retenir les objections formulées par les Etats-
IJnis. En effet, le différend qui oppose les Parties sur le point de savoir si
les alinéas a) et c) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne ont été violésen l'espècedu fait de la violation de l'alinéab) a483 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

cation of the Convention. This is also true of the dispute as to whether
paragraph 1 (h) creates individual rights and whether Germany has
standing to assert those rights on behalf of its nationals. These are con-
sequently disputes within the meaning of Article 1of the Optional Pro-
tocol. Moreover, the Court cannot accept the contention of the United
Statesthat Germany's claimbased on the individual rights of the LaGrand

brothers is beyond the Court's jurisdiction because diplomatic protection
is a concept of customary international law. This fact does not prevent a
State party to a treaty, which creates individual rights, from taking up the
case of one of its nationals and instituting international judicial proceed-
ings on behalf of that national, on the basis of a general jurisdictional
clause in such a treaty. Therefore the Court concludes that it has juris-
diction with respect to the whole of Germany's first submission.

43. The United States does not challenge the Court's jurisdiction in
regard to Germany's second submission. Nor does it as such address the

issue of the jurisdiction of the Court over the third submission concern-
ing the binding nature of the Order of the Court of 3 March 1999 indi-
cating provisional measures. It argues, however, that this submission is
inadmissible (see paragraphs 50 and 53-55 below), and that the Court can
fully and adequately dispose of the merits of this case without having to
rule on the submission.

44. Germany asserts that the Court's Order of 3 March 1999 was
intended to "enforce" the rights enjoyed by Germany under the Vienna
Convention and "preserve those rights pending its decision on the
merits". Germany claims that a dispute as to "whether the United States
were obliged to comply and did comply with the Order" necessarily arises
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and thus falls
within the jurisdiction of the Court. Germany argues further that ques-

tions "relating to the non-compliance with a decision of the Court under
Article 41, para. 1, of the Statute, e.g. Provisional Measures, are an inte-
gral component of the entire original dispute between the parties". More-
over, Germany contends that its third submission also implicates "in an
auxiliary and subsidiary manner . .. the inherent jurisdiction of the Court
for claims as closely interrelated with each other as the ones before the
Court in the present case".

45. The third submission of Germany concerns issues that arise directly
out of the dispute between the Parties before the Court over which the
Court has already held that it has jurisdiction (see paragraph 42 above),
and which are thus covered by Article 1 of the Optional Protocol. The
Court reaffirms, in this connection, what it said in its Judgment in the LAGRAND (ARRET) 483

trait à l'interprétation eta l'application de la convention. Il en est de
mêmedu différendsur le point de savoir si l'alinéah) créedesdroits pour
les particuliers et si l'Allemagne a qualité pour faire valoir ces droits au

nom de ses ressortissants. Ces différends entrent par suite dans les prévi-
sions de l'article premier du protocole de signature facultative. Par
ailleurs, la Cour ne peut accepter la thèsedes Etats-Unis selon laquelle la
demande de l'Allemagne fondée sur les droits individuels des frères
LaGrand ne relève:pas de sa compétence, au motif que la protection

diplomatique serait une notion de droit international coutumier. Cela ne
fait pas obstacleà ce qu'un Etat partie à un traitéqui créedesdroits pour
les individus puisse prendre fait et cause pour l'un de ses ressortissants et
mettre en mouvement l'action judiciaire internationale en faveur de ce
ressortissant sur la base d'une clause attributive de compétence figurant
dans un tel traité. La Cour en conclut qu'elle a dès lors compétence pour

connaître dans son ensemble de la première conclusion de l'Allemagne.

43. Les Etats-Unis ne contestent pas la compétence de la Cour pour
connaître de la deuxième conclusion de l'Allemagne. En outre, ils ne

traitent pas en tant que telle de la question de la compétence de la Cour
pour connaître de la troisième conclusion concernant le caractère obli-
uatoire de l'ordoninance de la Cour du 3 mars 1999 en indication de
mesures conservatoires. Ils affirment cependant que cette conclusion est
irrecevable (voir paragraphes 50 et 53-55 ci-après), et que la Cour

peut statuer pleinement et de manière adéquate sur le fond de l'affaire
sans avoir à se prononcer sur ladite conclusion.
44. L'Allemagne affirme que l'ordonnance du 3 mars 1999 avait pour
but d'«assurer le respect » des droits que la convention de Vienne confère
à l'Allemagne et de ((préserverces droits dans l'attente d'une décisionsur
le fond)). L'Allemagne prétend que le différend relatif à la question de

savoir «si les Etats-Unis étaient tenus de se conformer a l'ordonnance, et
s'ils s'ysont effectivement conformés)),constitue donc bien un différend
relatif à l'interprétation et à l'application de la convention et, partant, un
différend qui relève de la compétence de la Cour. Elle avance en outre
que des questions «relatives au non-respect d'une décision de la Cour
prise aux termes di1paragraphe 1de l'article 41 du Statut, c'est-à-dire les

mesures conservatoires, font partie intégrante de l'ensemble du différend
initial entre les Pa.rties)>.Enfin, l'Allemagne soutient que sa troisième
conclusion relèveaussi. «de manière accessoire et subsidiaire. de la com-
pétence inhérente de la Cour pour connaître de demandes aussi étroite-
ment liées lesunes aux autres que celles dont elle est saisie en l'espèce)).
45. La troisième conclusion de l'Allemagne porte sur des questions qui

découlent directement du différendopposant les Parties devant la Cour, à
l'égard desquellesla Cour a déjà conclu qu'elle était compétente (voir
paragraphe 42 ci-dessus), et qui relèvent dès lors de l'article premier du
protocole de signature facultative. A cet égard, la Cour réaffirme ceFisheries Jurisdiction case, where it declared that in order to consider the
dispute in al1its aspects it may also deal with a submission that "is one
based on facts subsequent to the filing of the Application, but arising
directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of that Applica-
tion. As such it falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction . . ."
(Fisheries Jurisdiction (Fedeval Republir of Germuny v. Icelundj, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Rq7orts 1974, p. 203, para. 72). Where the Court has

jurisdiction to decide a case, it also has jurisdiction to deal with submis-
sions requesting it to determine that an order indicating measures which
seeks to preserve the rights of the Parties to this dispute has not been
complied with.

46. The United States objects to the jurisdiction of the Court over the

fourth submission in so far as it concerns a request for assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition. The United States submits that its "juris-
dictional argument [does] not apply to jurisdiction to order cessation of a
breach or to order reparation, but is limited to the question of assurances
and guarantees . . . [which] are conceptually distinct from reparation". It
contends that Germany's fourth submission

"goes beyond any remedy that the Court can or should grant, and
should be rejected. The Court's power to decide cases . . does not
extend to the power to order a State to provide any 'guarantee'
intended to confer additional legal rights on the Applicant State ...
The United States does not believe that it can be the role of the

Court . . . to impose any obligations that are additional to or that
differ in character from those to wl-iichthe United States consented
when it ratified the Vienna Convention."
47. Gerrnany counters this argument by asserting that

"a dispute whether or not the violation of a provision of the Vienna
Convention gives riseto a certain remedy is a dispute concerning
'the application and interpretation' of the aforesaid Convention, and
thus falls within the scope of Art. 1of the Optional Protocol".

Germany notes in this regard that the Court, in its Order of 9 April 1998
in the case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. United States of America). held that

"there exists a dispute asto whether the relief sought by Paraguay is
a remedy available under the Vienna Convention, in particular in
relation to Articles 5and 36 thereof; and ... this is a dispute arising
out of the application of the Convention within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes of 24 April 1963" (I.C.J. Reports 1998,

p. 256, para. 31). LAGRAND (ARRÉT) 484

qu'elle a dit dans l'affaire de la Con7pCtenceen mutiire de pêcl~eries,

lorsqu'elle a estimé que, afin de considérer le différend sous tous ses
aspects, elle pouvait aussi connaître d'une conclusion qui ((se fonde sur
des faits postérieurs au dépôtde la requêtemais découlant directement de
la question qui fait l'objet de cette requêtA.ce titre, elle relèvede la com-
pétencede la Cour ... ))(Con7pc;tenceLwtnutiCre de pêcheries(Républiyuc
f<;riC'rulde'AlI~mugt~ec.Islande), jbnd arrêt,C. I.J.Recueil 19 74, p. 203,

par. 72.) Lorsque la Cour a compétencepour trancher un différend,elle a
égalementcompétencepour se prononcer sur des conclusions la priant de
constater qu'une ordonnance en indication de mesures rendue aux fins de
préserverles droits des Parties à ce différendn'a pas étéexécutée.

46. Les Etats-Unis contestent que la Cour soit compétente pour sta-
tuer sur la quatrième conclusion de l'Allemagne, dans la mesure où cette
conclusion tend à l'obtention d'assurances et de garanties de non-
répétition.Ils affirment que «la compétence qu'aurait la Cour d'ordon-
ner la cessation d'une violation ou d'ordonner une réparation n'englobe pas
la question desassurances et desgaranties ...[lesquelles]sont conceptuelle-

ment différentesde la réparation)). Ils soulignent que la quatrième conclu-
sion de I'Allemagni:
«va bien au-delà de toute mesure de réparation que la Cour peut ou

devrait accorder, et qu'elle devrait par conséquent êtrerejetée. Le
pouvoir qu'a la Cour de trancher des affaires ...n'englobe pas celui
d'ordonner à uinEtat de fournir une «garantie» visant à conférerdes
droits additiorinels à 1'Etat requérant...[Lles Etats-Unis ne croient
pas qu'il appartienne à la Cour ...d'imposer des obligations qui
viennent s'ajouter à celles qu'ils ont acceptéeslorsqu'ils ont ratifiéla

convention de Vienne ou qui diffèrent de celles-ci.»
47. A l'encontre de cet argument, l'Allemagne fait valoir

«qu'un différend portant sur la question de savoir si une disposition
de la convention de Vienne donne droit à certains remèdes est un
différend relatiiA <<l'applicationet A l'interprétation)) de la conven-
tion susmentionnée, et entre ainsi dans les prévisions de l'article
premier du protocole de signature facultative)).

L'Allemagne relève:à ce sujet que, dans l'ordonnance qu'elle a rendue
le 9 avril 1998en l'affaire relativeà la Converztionde Vienne sur les rela-
tions consuluires (Prrraguuy c. Efuts- Unisd'Amérique), la Cour a déclaré :

«il existe un différendsur la question de savoir si la solution recher-
chéepar le Paraguay figure parmi les mesures possibles en vertu de la
convention de Vienne, en particulier au regard des dispositions des
articles5 et 36 de cette convention; et ... il s'agit là d'un différend

relatif à l'application de la convention au sens de l'article premier du
protocole de si,gnature facultative concernant le règlement obligatoire
des différendsdu 24 avril 1963 >>(C.I.J.Rec.ueil1998, p. 256, par. 31).Germany asserts also that its fourth submission arises under principles of
State responsibility, according to which Germany is entitled to a "whole
range of remedies" as a consequence of the particular violations alleged
in this case and that these questions of State responsibility "are clearly

within the ambit of the Optional Protocol".

48. TheCourt considers that a dispute regarding the appropriate rem-
edies for the violation of the Convention alleged by Germany is a dispute
that arises out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and
thus is within the Court's jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists over a
dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is

required by the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for
the breach of the obligation (Fuctory rit Cllorz(iiv. P. C.I.J., Serirs A,
No. 9, p. 22).Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction in the present case
with respect to the fourth submission of Germany.

49. The United States has argued that the submissions of Germany are
inadmissible on various grounds. The Court will consider these objec-
tions in the order presented by the United States.

50. The United States objects first to Germany's second, third and

fourth submissions. According to the United States, these submissions
are inadmissible because Germany seeks to have this Court "play the role
of ultimate court of appeal in national criminal proceedings", a role
which it is not empowered to perform. The United States maintains that
many of Germany's arguments, in particular those regarding the rule of
"procedural default", ask the Court "to address and correct .. .asserted
violations of US law and errors of judgment by US judges" in criminal
proceedings in national courts.

51. Germany denies that it requests the Court to act as an appellate
criminal court, or that Germany's requests are in any way aimed at inter-
fering with the administration of justice within the United States judicial
system. It maintains that it is merely asking the Court to adjudge and

declare that the conduct of the United States was inconsistent with its
international legal obligations towards Germany under the Vienna Con-
vention, and to draw from this failure certain legal consequences pro-
vided for in the international law of state responsibility.

52. The Court does not agree with these arguments of the United LAGRAND (ARRET) 485

L'Allemagne soutient en outre que sa quatrième conclusion relève des
principes de la responsabilité des Etats, selon lesquels elle est en droit de
faire valoir «toute la gamme des voies de droit)) disponibles au titre des
violations particulilires alléguéesen l'espèce,et que ces questions de res-
ponsabilité de 1'Etiit ((entrent clairement dans le cadre du protocole de
signature facultative)).

48. La Cour considère qu'un différend portant sur les voies de droit à
mettre en Œuvre au titre d'une violation de la convention qu'invoque
l'Allemagne est un différend concernant l'interprétation ou l'application
de la convention et qui de ce fait relèvede la compétence de la Cour. S'il
est établi que la Cour a compétence pour connaître d'un différend por-
tant sur une question déterminée,elle n'a pas besoin d'une base de com-
pétence distincte pour examiner les remèdes demandés par une partie

pour la violation en cause (Usine de CC'Irzbu,, C. P.J.I. s6rie A no 9,
p. 22). La Cour a par suite compétence en l'espècepour connaître de la
quatrième conclusion de l'Allemagne.

49. Les Etats-Uriis font valoir que les conclusions de l'Allemagne sont
irrecevables pour diverses raisons. La Cour examinera ces objections en
suivant la présentai:ionqui en a été faitepar les Etats-Unis.

50. La première objection présentéepar les Etats-Unis est dirigée
contre les deuxièmr:,troisième et quatrième conclusions de l'Allemagne.
Selon les Etats-Unis, ces conclusions seraient irrecevables, motif pris de
ce que l'Allemagne cherche à faire jouer à la Cour «le rôle d'une juridic-
tion statuant en dernier degré d'appel sur des questions pénales soumises
aux tribunaux internes)), rôle qu'elle n'est pas habilitée a jouer. Ils font

valoir que de nombreux arguments développéspar l'Allemagne, en par-
ticulier ceux relatif:; à la"rèele de la ((carence ~rocédurale)).reviennent à
demander à la Cour d'«examiner et de réparer ..de prétendues viola-
tions du droit des Etats-Unis et des erreurs d'appréciation qui auraient
étéle fait de juges clesEtats-Unis» a l'occasion d'affaires pénales portées
devant des juridictions internes.
51. L'Allemagne nie, pour sa part, qu'elle demande à la Cour d'agir

comme une juridiction d'appel en matière pénale, ou que ses demandes
visent d'une quelcoinque manière à s'immiscer dans l'administration de la
justice des Etats-Ui2is. Elle prierait simplement la Cour de dire et juger
que la conduite des Etats-Unis a méconnu les obligations juridiques
internationales dont ils étaient tenus à son endroit en vertu de la conven-
tion de Vienne, et de tirer de cette méconnaissance certaines consé-

quences juridiques prévuespar le droit international de la responsabilité
des Etats.
52. La Cour ne souscrit pas à l'argumentation des Etats-Unis relative486 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

States concerning the admissibility of the second, third and fourth Ger-
man submissions. In the second submission, Germany asks the Court to
interpret the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention;
the third submission seeks a finding that the United States violated an
Order issued by this Court pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute; and in

Germany's fourth submission, the Court is asked to determine the appli-
cable remedies for the alleged violations of the Convention. Although
Germany deals extensively with the practice of American courts as it
bears on the application of the Convention, al1three submissions seek to
require the Court to do no more than apply the relevant rules of inter-
national law to the issues in dispute between the Parties to this case. The

exercise of this function, expressly mandated by Article 38 of its Statute,
does not convert this Court into a court of appeal of national criminal
proceedings.

53. The United States also argues that Germany's third submission is
inadmissible because of the manner in which these proceedings were
brought before the Court by Germany. It notes that German consular
officiaisbecame aware of the LaGrands' cases in 1992, but that the Ger-
man Government did not express concern or protest to the United States

authorities for some six and a half years. It maintains that the issue of the
absence of consular notification was not raised by Germany until 22 Feb-
ruary 1999, two days before the date scheduled for Karl LaGrand's
execution, in a letter from the German Foreign Minister to the Secretary
of State of the United States (see paragraph 26 above). Germany then

filed the Application instituting these proceedings, together with a request
for provisional measures, after normal business hours in the Registry
in the evening of 2 March 1999, some 27 hours before the execution of
Walter LaGrand (see paragraph 30 above).

54. The United States rejects the contention that Germany found
out only seven days before the filing of its Application that the authori-
ties of Arizona knew as early as 1982 that the LaGrands were German
nationals; according to the United States, their German nationality was
referred to in pre-sentence reports prepared in 1984, which should

have been familiar to German consular officers much earlier than 1999,
given Germany's claims regarding the vigour and effectiveness of
its consular assistance.
55. According to the United States, Germany's late filing compelled
the Court to respond to its request for provisional measures by acting
r.upurte, without full information. The United States claims that the pro-

cedure followed was inconsistent with the principles of "equality of the LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 486

à la recevabilité des deuxième, troisième et quatrième conclusions de
l'Allemagne. Par sa deuxième conclusion, l'Allemagne demande à la
Cour d'interpréter la portéedu paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de la conven-
tion de Vienne; par sa troisième conclusion, elle prie la Cour de dire que
les Etats-Unis ont violéune ordonnance qu'elle a rendue conformément à

l'article 41 de son Statut; et, par sa quatrième conclusion, l'Allemagne
demande a la Cour de déterminer quels sont les remèdes à apporter aux
violations alléguéesde la convention. Mêmesi l'Allemagne s'est longue-
ment étendue sur la pratique des tribunaux américains relative à I'appli-
cation de la convention, ces trois conclusions visent exclusivement à prier

la Cour d'appliquer les règlespertinentes de droit international aux ques-
tions litigieuses opposant les Parties à l'instance. L'exercice de cette fonc-
tion, expressément prévuepar l'article 38 de son Statut, ne fait pas de
cette Cour une juridiction statuant en appel sur des questions pénales
soumises aux tribunaux internes.

53. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent également que la troisième conclusion
de l'Allemagne est irrecevable compte tenu des circonstances dans les-
quelles celle-ci a introduit la présente instance devant la Cour. Ils font

valoir que les agenis consulaires allemands ont pris connaissance en 1992
des affaires relatives aux LaGrand, mais que, pendant six ans et demi
environ, le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas fait part de ses préoccupa-
tions aux autorités des Etats-Unis et n'a pas élevéde protestations à ce
sujet. Ils font observer que c'est seulement le 22 février 1999, soit deux

jours avant la date prévuepour l'exécutionde Karl LaGrand, que I'Alle-
magne a soulevé la question du défaut de notification consulaire, dans
une lettre adressée au secrétaired'Etat des Etats-Unis par le ministre alle-
mand des affaires étrangères(voirparagraphe 26 ci-dessus). L'Allemagne
a ensuite saisi la Cour d'une requête introductive d'instance ainsi que

d'une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires. dans la soiréedu
2 mars 1999. après les heures normales de travail au ~reffe, soit environ
ving--se-t heures avant l'heure fixéepour l'exécutionde Walter LaGrand
(voir paragraphe 30 ci-dessus).
54. Les Etats-Unis rejettent l'argument selon lequel l'Allemagne

n'aurait découvert que sept jours avant le dépôt de sa requêteque les
autorités de l'Arizona avaient étéau courant dès 1982 de la nationalité
allemande des frères LaGrand; selon les Etats-Unis, celle-ci avait été
mentionnée dans des rapports de 1984 préalables au prononcé de la
peine, dont les agents consulaires allemands auraient dû avoir connais-
sance bien avant 1999, a en croire les affirmations de l'Allemagne rela-

tives au sérieuxet ,il'efficacitéde son assistance consulaire.
55. Selon les Etats-Unis, le fait que l'Allemagne ait déposésa requête
aussi tardivement a.contraint la Cour à répondre à la demande en indica-
tion de mesures conservatoires sans que le défendeur ait pu êtreentendu
et sans qu'elle dispose de toutes les informations voulues. Les Etats-UnisParties" and of giving each Party a sufficient opportunity to be heard,
and that this would justify the Court in not addressing Germany's third

submission which is predicated wholly upon the Order of 3 March 1999.

56. Germany acknowledges that delay on the part of a claimant State
may render an application inadmissible, but maintains that international
law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It contends

that it was only seven days before it filed its Application that it became
aware of al1the relevant hcts underlying its claim, in particular, the fact
that the authorities of Arizona knew of the German nationality of the
LaGrands since 1982. According to Germany, it cannot be accused of
negligence in failing to obtain the 1984 pre-sentence reports earlier. It
also maintains that in the period between 1992. when it learned of the

LaGrands' cases, and the filing of its Application, it engaged in a variety
of activities at the diplomatic and consular level. It adds that it had been
confident for much of this period that the United Stateswould ultimately
rectify the violations of international law involved.

57. TheCourt recognizes that Germany may be criticized for the man-

ner in which these proceedings were filed and for their timing. The Court
recalls, however, that notwithstanding its awareness of the consequences
of Germany's filing at such a late date it nevertheless considered it appro-
priate to enter the Order of 3 March 1999, given that an irreparable
prejudice appeared to be imminent. In view of these considerations, the
Court considers that Germany is now entitled to challenge the alleged

failure of the United States to comply with the Order. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Germany's third submission is admissible.

58. The United States argues further that Germany's first submission,
as far as it concerns its right to exercise diplomatic protection with
respect to its nationals, is inadmissible on the ground that the LaGrands
did not exhaust local remedies. The United States maintains that the
alleged breach concerned the duty to inform the LaGrands of their right
to consular access, and that such a breach could have been remedied at

the trial stage, provided it was raised in a timely fashion. The United
States contends that when a person fails, for example, to sue in a national
court before a statute of limitations has expired, the claim is both pro-
cedurally barred in national courts and inadmissible in international tri-
bunal~ for failure to exhaust local remedies. It adds that the failure of
counsel for the LaGrands to raise the breach of the Vienna Convention

at the appropriate stage and time of the proceedings does not excuse the
non-exhaustion of local remedies. According to the United States, thisfont valoir que la procédure suivie n'a pas respectéle principe de ((l'éga-
litédes Parties)), ni le droit de chaque Partie à être entendue dans des

conditions satisfaisantes, et que par conséquent la Cour ne devrait pas
examiner la troisième conclusion de l'Allemagne, qui repose entièrement
sur l'ordonnance du 3 mars 1999.
56. L'Allemagne reconnaît pour sa part que le retard d'un Etatdeman-
deur peut rendre une requêteirrecevable, mais soutient que le droit inter-
national ne fixe aucun délai spécifiqueen la matière. Elle fait valoir que

c'est sept jours seulement avant le dépôt de sa requête qu'elle a eu
connaissance de tous les faits pertinents sur lesquels elle fonde son action,
et en particulier du fait que les autorités de l'Arizona avaient étéau cou-
rant dès 1982 de la nationalité allemande des frères LaGrand. L'Alle-
magne ne saurait, estime-t-elle, êtreaccuséede négligencepour ne pas
avoir obtenu plus i.ôt les rapports de 1984 préalables au prononcé de la

peine. Elle soutient également qu'entre 1992, annéeoù elle a eu connais-
sance des affaires relatives aux LaGrand, et le dépôt de sa requête,elle a
effectué diversesdkmarches aux niveaux diplomatique et consulaire. Elle
a-jouteque pendant une grande partie de cette période elle était persuadée
que les Etats-Unis finiraient par remédier aux violations du droit inter-
national en cause.
57. La Cour reconnaît que l'Allemagne peut êtrecritiquée pour la

manière dont l'instance a été infroduite etpour le moment choisi pour
l'introduire. La Cour rappelle toutefois que, tout en étant consciente des
conséquencesde l'introduction de l'instance par l'Allemagne à une date si
avancée, elle n'en a pas moins estimé approprié de rendre son ordon-
nance du 3 mars 1999.un préjudiceirréparable semblant imminent. Dans
ces conditions, la Cour estime que l'Allemagne est en droit de se plaindre

aujourd'hui de la non-application, alléguéepar elle, de ladite ordonnance
par les Etats-Unis. En conséquence, la Cour conclut que la troi-
sièmeconclusion de l'Allemagne est recevable.

58. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent aussi que la première conclusion de
l'Allemagne, en tant qu'elle concerne son droit à exercer sa protection
diplomatique à l'égardde ses ressortissants, est irrecevable parce que les
frères LaGrand n'avaient pas épuiséles voies de recours internes. Les
Etats-Unis font valoir que le manquement alléguéconcernait l'obligation
d'informer les frères LaGrand de leur droit de communiquer avec leur

consulat et qu'un tel manquement aurait pu facilement êtreréparéau
stade du procès si la question avait étésoulevée entemps opportun. Selon
les Etats-Unis, quand, par exemple, une personne omet d'agir devant un
tribunal national avant l'expiration des délaisde forclusion, sa demande
ne peut plus êtreexaminée devant les juridictions nationales et elle est
irrecevable devant les juridictions internationales pour non-épuisement

des voies de recours internes. Ils ajoutent que le fait que les avocats des
LaGrand n'avaient pas soulevé en temps opportun le moyen tiréde lafailure of counsel is imputable to their clients because the law treats
defendants and their lawyers as a single entity in termsof their legal posi-

tions. Moreover, the State is not accountable for the errors or mistaken
strategy by lawyers.

59. Germany responds that international law requires the exhaustion

of only those remedies which are legally and practically available. Ger-
many claims that in this case there was no remedy which the LaGrands
failed to invoke that would have been available in the specific context of
their case. This is so because, prior to 1992, the LaGrands could not
resort to the available remedies, since they were unaware of their rights

dueto failure of the United States authorities to comply with the require-
ments of the Vienna Convention; thereafter, the "procedural default"
rule prevented them from seeking any remedy.

60. The Court notes that it is not disputed that the LaGrands sought
to plead the Vienna Convention in United States courts after they learned

in 1992 of their rights under the Convention; it is also not disputed that
by that date the procedural default rule barred the LaGrands from
obtaining any remedy in respect of the violation of those rights. Counsel
assigned to the LaGrands failed to raise this point earlier in a timely fash-
ion. However, the United States may not now rely before this Court on
this fact in order to preclude the admissibility of Germany's first submis-

sion, as it was the United States itself which had failed to carry Our its
obligation under the Convention to inform the LaGrand brothers.

61. The United States also contends that Germany's submissions are
inadmissible on the ground that Germany seeks to have a standard
applied to the United States that is different from its own practice.
According to the United States, Germany has not shown that its system

of criminal justice requires the annulment of criminal convictions where
there has been a breach of the duty of consular notification; and that the
practice of Germany in similar cases has been to do no more than offer
an apology. The United States maintains that it would be contrary to
basic principles of administration of justice and equality of the Parties to
apply against the United States alleged rules that Germany appears not

to accept for itself.
62. Germany denies that it is asking the United States to adhere to
standards which Germany itself does not abide by; it maintains that its
law and practice is fully in compliance with the standards which it
invokes. In this regard, it explains that the German Code of Criminal LAGRAND (ARRET) 488

violation de la convention de Vienne n'excuse pas le non-épuisement des
voies de recours internes. Selon les Etats-Unis, cette carence des avocats

est imputable à leurs clients, puisqu'il est de règle qu'un accusé et son
avocat constituent une seule et mêmeentitéau regard des positions juri-
diques qu'ils adoptent. De plus, un Etat ne saurait être tenu responsable
des erreurs commises par des avocats, ni des stratégies inappropriées
adoptées par eux.
59. L'Allemagne répond que le droit international exige seulement
l'épuisementde celles des voies de recours qu'il estjuridiquement et maté-

riellement possible de mettre en Œuvre. Selon elle,iln'existait en l'espèce
aucun recours que les LaGrand pouvaient invoquer dans le contexte par-
ticulier de l'instance les concernant et qu'ils auraient négld'exercer. En
effet, avant 1992,ils n'étaientpas en mesure d'exercer les recours qui leur
étaient ouverts puisqu'ils n'étaientpas au courant de leurs droits, du fait
que les autorités des Etats-Unis avaient manqué de se conformer aux

prescriptions de la convention de Vienne; par la suite, la règle de la
((carence procéduralen les a empêchés d'exercertout recours.
60. La Cour note qu'il n'est pas contesté que les frères LaGrand ont
cherché à se prévaloir des dispositions de la convention de Vienne devant
les tribunaux américains après avoir pris connaissance en 1992 du droit
qu'ils tenaient de ladite convention; iln'est pas davantage contesté qu'a

cette époque la règle de la carence procédurale a fait que les LaGrand
n'ont pu obtenir qu'il soit remédié A la violation de ce droit. Les avocats
commis d'office pour les défendre n'ont pas soulevé cette question en
temps voulu. Cependant les Etats-Unis ne sauraient se prévaloir
aujourd'hui devant la Cour de cette circonstance pour faire obstacle à la
recevabilité de la première conclusion de l'Allemagne, dès lors qu'ils
avaient eux-mêmesfailli à l'exécutionde leur obligation, en vertu de la

convention, d'informer les frères LaGrand.

61. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent également que les conclusions de I'Alle-
magne sont irrecevables au motif qu'elle cherche A faire appliquer par les

Etats-Unis une norme différente de celle qui prévaut dans la pratique
allemande. Aux dires des Etats-Unis, l'Allemagne n'a pas montré que son
système judiciaire exigeait l'annulation de condamnations pénalesen cas
de manquement à l'obligation de notification consulaire et, confrontée à
des affàires de ce genre, elle s'est bornéedans la pratique à présenter des
excuses. Pour les Etats-Unis, il serait contraire aux principes fondamen-

taux de bonne adrninistration de la justice et d'égalitéentre les Parties
d'appliquer à l'encontre des Etats-Unis des règles que l'Allemagne elle-
même, enapparence, ne suivrait pas.
62. L'Allemagne: se défend de demander aux Etats-Unis d'appliquer
des normes qu'elle ne respecterait pas elle-mêmeet soutient que, dans son
droit comme dans sa pratique, elle respecte pleinement les normes qu'elle
invoque. Elle préciseà cet égard que le code de procédure pénale alle-Procedure provides a ground of appeal where a legal norm, including a
norm of international law, is not applied or incorrectly applied and where
there is a possibility that the decision was impaired by this fact.

63. The Court need not decide whether this argument of the United
States, if true, would result in the inadmissibility of Germany's submis-
sions. Here the evidence adduced by the United States does not justify
the conclusion that Germany's own practice fails to conform to the
standards it demands from the United States in this litigation. The
United States relies on certain German cases to demonstrate that Ger-

many has itself proffered only an apology for violating Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention, and that State practice shows that this is the appro-
priate remedy for such a violation. But the cases concerned entailed rela-
tively light criminal penalties and are not evidence asto German practice
where an arrested person, who has not been informed without delay of
his or her rights, is facing a severe penalty as in the present case. It is no

doubt the case, as the United States points out, that Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention imposes identical obligations on States, irrespective
of the gravity of the offence a person may be charged with and of the
penalties that may be imposed. However, it does not follow therefrom
that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be identical in al1
situations. While an apology may be an appropriate remedy in some
cases, it may in others be insufficient. The Court accordingly finds that

this claim of inadmissibility must be rejected.

64. Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction, and that the
submissions of Germany are admissible, the Court now turns to the

merits of each of these four submissions.

65. Germany's first submission requests the Court to adjudge and
declare :

"that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand
without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36
subparagraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering con-
sular assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl

and Walter LaGrand, violated its international legal obligations to
Germany, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of
its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36 paragraph 1 of the said
Convention". LAGRAND (ARRET) 489

mand prévoit un recours dans les cas où une norme juridique, y compris
une norme de droit international, n'a pas étéou a étémal appliquée, et
où il existe une possibilitéque la décision enait étéaltérée.

63. Point n'est besoin pour la Cour de décidersi l'argument en ques-
tion des Etats-Unis, à supposer qu'il fût exact, rendrait les conclusions de
l'Allemagne irrecevables. En l'occurrence, les élémentsproduits par les
Etats-Unis ne permettent pas de conclure que la pratique de l'Allemagne
s'écartedes normes dont elle demande l'application en l'espècede la part
des Etats-Unis. Les Etats-Unis se sont fondéssur certaines affaires alle-

mandes pour démontrer que l'Allemagne elle-mêmes'était contentée
d'offrir des excuses lorsqu'elle avait violé l'article 36de la convention de
Vienne et que la pratique des Etats fait apparaître qu'il s'agitlà d'un
remède approprié en cas de violation. Les affaires citées concernaient
toutefois des peines relativement légères etne constituent pas des preuves
de la pratique que suit l'Allemagne lorsqu'une personne arrêtée,qui n'a

pas été informée sans retard de ses droits, risque une peine sévère.comme
cela a étéle cas en l'espèce.Sans doute l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne impose-t-il aiuxEtats des obligations identiques quelle que soit la
gravitéde l'infraction imputéeà une personne et de la peine qui peut lui
êtreinfligée,comme le soulignent àjuste titre les Etats-Unis. Mais il n'en
résulte pas que les remèdes à retenir en cas de violation de cet article
dussent être identiques dans toutes les situations. Si de simples excuses

peuvent constituer un remèdeapproprié dans certains cas, elles pourraient
se révélerinsuffisantes dans d'autres. Aussi la Cour estime-t-elle que ce
motif d'irrecevabilité doit êtrerejeté.

64. Ayant établi qu'elle était compétente et que les conclusions de
l'Allemagne étaient recevables, la Cour examinera maintenant au fond

chacune des quatre conclusions en question.

65. Dans sa première conclusion. l'Allemagne demande à la Cour de
dire et juger que:

<(enn'informai-it pas sans retard Karl et Walter LaGrand après leur
arrestation de leurs droits en vertu de l'alinéa du paragraphe 1 de
l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires,
et en privant l'Allemagne de la possibilitéde fournir son assistance
consulaire, ce qui a finalement conduit a l'exécutionde Karl et Wal-

ter LaGrand. les Etats-Unis ont violé leurs obligations juridiques
internationales. vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne au titre de l'articl5 et du
paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de ladite convention, tant en ce qui
concerne les di-oits propres de l'Allemagne que le droit de cette der-
nière d'exercer saprotection diplomatique à l'égardde ses ressortis-
sants)). 66. Germany claims that the United States violated its obligation
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), to "inform a national of the sending
State without delay of his or her right to inform the consular post of his
home State of his arrest or detention". Specifically, Germany maintains

that the United States violated its international legal obligation to Ger-
many under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), by failing to inform the German
nationals Karl and Walter LaGrand "without delay" of their rights
under that subparagraph.

67. The United States acknowledges, and does not contest Germany's
basic claim, that there was a breach of its obligation under Article 36,

paragraph I (b), of the Convention "promptly to inform the LaGrand
brothers that they could ask that a German consular post be notified of
their arrest and detention".

68. Germany also claims that the violation by the United States of
Article 36, paragraph 1 (hl,led to consequential violations of Article 36,
paragraph 1 (u) and (c). It points out that, when the obligation to

inform the arrested person without delay of his or her right to contact the
consulate is disregarded, "the other rights contained in Article 36, para-
graph 1, become in practice irrelevant, indeed meaningless". Germany
maintains that, "[bly informing the LaGrand brothers of their right to
inform the consulate more than 16 years after their arrest, the United
States . . . clearly failed to meet the standard of Article 36 [(l) (ci]". It
concludes that, by not preventing the executioii of Karl and Walter

LaGrand, and by "making irreversible its earlier breaches of Art. 5 and
36 (1) and (2)and causing irreparable harm, the United States violated its
obligations under international law".

69. The United States argues that the underlying conduct complained
of by Germany is one and the same, namely, the failure to inform the

LaGrand brothers as required by Article 36, paragraph I (hl. Therefore,
it disputes any other basis for Germany's claims that other provisions,
such as subparagraphs (u) and (c) of Article 36, paragraph 1, of
the Convention, were also violated. The United States asserts that
Germany's claims regarding Article 36, paragraph 1 (u) and (c), are
"particularly misplaced" in that the LaGrands were able to and did
communicate freely with consular officiaisafter 1992. There was, in

the view of the United States, "no deprivation of Germany's right to
provide consular assistance, under Article 5 or Article 36, to Karl or
Walter LaGrand" and "Germany's attempt to transform a breach of
one obligation into an additional breach of a wholly separate and distinct
obligation should be rejected by the Court."

70. In response, Germany asserts that it is "commonplace that one LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 490

66. L'Allemagne soutient que les Etats-Unis ont violéI'obligation que

leur imposait l'alinéa b) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 ((d'avertir sans
retard un ressortissant de 1'Etat d'envoi de son droit d'informer le poste
consulaire de son Etat d'origine de son arrestation ou de sa détention)).
Plus précisément,elle fait valoir que, en n'avertissant pas «sans retard))
les ressortissants allemands Karl et Walter LaGrand des droits qu'ils
tenaient de cette disposition, les Etats-Unis ont méconnu I'obligation
juridique internationale dont ils étaient tenus envers elle, au titre de l'ali-

néa b) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36.
67. Les Etats-Unis ne contestent pas la principale demande de 1'Alle-
magne et reconnaissent qu'ils ont violé l'obligation découlant de I'ali-
néah) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention ((d'informersans
retard les frères LaGrand de leur droit de demander à ce que leurs arres-
tations et mises en détention soient notifiées iiun poste consulaire alle-

mand ».
68. L'Allemagne prétend aussi que la violation par les Etats-Unis de
l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1de I'article 36a entraîné par voie de consé-
quence celle des alinéas uj et c) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36. Selon
l'Allemagne, dès lors que I'obligation d'informer sans retard la personne
arrêtéede son droit de contacter le consulat est méconnue, il s'ensuit que
«les autres droits qu'énonce le paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 perdent

en pratique toute pertinence, voire toute signification)). Elle soutient
que, (<[e]n informant, plus de seize ans après leur arrestation, les
frères LaGrand de leur droit d'aviser le consulat, les Etats-Unisne se sont
manifestement ... pas conformés a la norme prescrite par [l'alinéac) du
paragraphe 1de] I'articl36)).Elle conclut que, en n'empêchantpas I'exé-
ciition de Karl et de Walter LaCrand, et en ((rendant ... irréversibles leurs

violations antérieures de I'article 5 et des paragraphes 1 et 2 de
I'article36,causant de ce fait un préjudiceirréparable, les Etats-Unis ont
violéles obligations qui sont les leurs en vertu du droit international)).
69. Les Etats-Unis font valoir que, fondamentalement, l'Allemagne se
plaint d'un seul et mêmecomportement, à savoir le fait qu'ils n'ont pas
informé les frères LaGrand, comme le prescrit l'alinéa b) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 36. Ils contestent donc tout autre fondement aux

demandes de l'Allemagne, selon lesquelles d'autres dispositions, telles que
les alinéas a) et c) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention,
auraient aussi étéviolées. Ilsaffirment que les allégations de l'Allemagne
concernant les alinéas a) et c) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36 sont ((par-
ticulièrement mal fondées)),étant donné que les LaGrand ont pu com-
muniquer libremerit avec les fonctionnaires consulaires après 1992 et

l'ont effectivement fait. Ils considèrent que l'Allemagne n'a pas ((étépri-
vée de son droit de fournir son assistance consulaire à Karl et Wal-
ter LaGrand, en vertu de l'article 5 ou de l'article 36)) de la convention,
et que <<latentative que fait l'Allemagne de transformer la violation d'une
obligation en une violation supplémentaire d'une obligation totalement
distincte doit êtrerejetéepar la Cour)).
70. En réponse, l'Allemagne affirme qu'il est «courant qu'un seul etand the same conduct may result in several violations of distinct obliga-
tions". Hence, when a detainee's right to notification without delay is vio-

lated, he or she cannot establish contact with the consulate, receive visits
from consular officers, nor be supported by adequate counsel. "There-
fore, violation of this right is bound to imply violation of the other
rights . . . [and] later observance of the rights of Article 36, para-
graph I (a) and (c), could not remedy the previous violation of those
provisions."

71. Germany further contends that there is a causal relationship
between the breach of Article 36 and the ultimate execution of the
LaGrand brothers. Germany's inability to render prompt assistance was,
in its viewa "direct result of the United States' breach of its Vienna Con-
vention obligations". It is claimed that, had Germany been properly
afforded its rights under the Vienna Convention, it would have been able

to intervene in time and present a "persuasive mitigation case" which
"likely would have saved" the lives of the brothers. Germany believes
that, "[hlad proper notification been given under the Vienna Convention,
competent trial counsel certainly would have looked to Germany for
assistance in developing this line of mitigating evidence". Moreover, Ger-
many argues that, due to the doctrine of procedural default and the high

post-conviction threshold for proving ineffective counsel under United
States law, Germany's intervention at a stage later than the trial phase
could not "remedy the extreme prejudice created by the counsel appointed
to represent the LaGrands".

72. The United States terms these arguments as "suppositions about
what might have occurred had the LaGrand brothers been properly
informed of the possibility of consular notification". It calls into question
Germany's assumption that German consular officiaifrom Los Angeles
would rapidly have given extensive assistance to the LaGrands' defence
counsel before the 1984 sentencing, and contests that such consular

assistance would have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceed-
ings. According to the United States, these arguments "rest on specula-
tion" and do not withstand analysis. Finally, the United States finds it
extremely doubtful that the early childhood "mitigating evidence" men-
tioned by Germany, if introduced at the trial, would have persuaded the
sentencing judge to be lenient, as the brothers' subsequent 17 years of
experiences in the United States would have been given at least equal

weight. The United States points out. moreover, that such evidence was
in fact presented at trial.

73. The Court will first examine the submission Germany advances in
its own right. The Court observes, in this connection, that the United
States does not deny that it violated paragraph 1 (h) in relation to Ger- LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 491

mêmecomportement se traduise par plusieurs manquements à des obli-

gations différentes)).Ainsi, lorsque le droità notification sansretard d'un
détenu est violé, cedernier ne peut ni entrer en communication avec le
consulat, ni recevoir la visite des fonctionnaires du consulat, ni être
assisté par un avocat compétent. «En conséquence, la violation de ce
droit implique fatalement la violation des autres droits ...[et] respecter
par la suite les droits conféréspar les alinéasu) et c) du paragraphe 1 de

l'article36 ne pouvait remédier au fait que ces dispositions avaient été
précédemmentviolé~e ).
71. L'Allemagne soutient égalementqu'il y a un lien de causalitéentre
la violation de l'article6 et l'exécution finaledes frères LaGrand. Selon
elle, l'incapacité où elle s'est trouvée de leur fournir promptement une
assistance est une ((conséquence directe du manquement des Etats-Unis

aux obligations qui sont les leurs en vertu de la convention de Vienne)).
Elle fait valoir que, si elle avait pu exercer correctement ses droits en
vertu de cette convention, elle aurait étéen mesure d'intervenir à temps et
de présenter, ((de manière convaincante, un dossier de circonstances atté-
nuantes », de sorte qu'il est((probable » que les frères LaGrand ((auraient

eu la vie sauve)). Elle est convaincue que, «si la notification appropriée,
prévuepar la convention de Vienne, avait étéeffectuée,des avocats com-
pétents auraient certainement sollicité l'assistance de l'Allemagne pour
exposer l'argument tiré des circonstances atténuantes)). De plus, elle sou-
tient que, en raison de la doctrine de la carence procédurale et des condi-
tions rigoureuses qu'impose le droit des Etats-Unis à celui qui cherche à

prouver, après le verdict de culpabilité, que l'avocat était incompétent,
son intervention à un stade postérieur à celui du procès ne pouvait pas
((réparer le préjudice grave causé par les avocats commis d'office des
LaGrand D.
72. Les Etats-Unis qualifient ces arguments de <<suppositions ... au
sujet de ce qui aurait pu se passer si les frères LaCrand avaient été

dûment informés de la possibilitéde communiquer avec leur consulat ».
Ils mettent en doute la thèse de l'Allemagne selon laquelle les fonction-
naires du poste consulaire allemand de Los Angeles auraient apporté
rapidement une assistance importante aux avocatsdes LaGrand avant les
verdicts de culpabilité de 1984 et contestent que cette assistance consu-
laire aurait influésur le résultat des procédures pénales. Selon eux, ces

arguments «relèvent de la spéculation)) et ne résistent pas à l'analyse.
Enfin, il leur paraît extrêmementdouteux que les ((preuves de circons-
tances atténuantes))relatives àla primeenfance des fréresLaGrand, qu'in-
voque l'Allemagne. auraient, si elles avaient été produites au procès, per-
suadélejuge de faire preuve d'indulgence; un poids au moins égalaurait
en effet étédonné aux dix-sept années qu'ils avaient passées ultérieure-

ment aux Etats-Unis. De plus, les Etats-Unis notent quede telles preuves
ont en fait étéprésentéesau procès.
73. La Cour examinera tout d'abord la conclusion présentéepar 1'Alle-
magne en son nom propre. La Cour note à ce propos que les Etats-Unis
ne nient pas avoir violé,à l'encontre de l'Allemagne, l'alinéab) du para-492 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

many. The Court also notes that as a result of this breach, Germany did

not learn until 1992of the detention, trial and sentencing of the LaGrand
brothers. The Court concludes therefrom that on the facts of this case,
the breach of the United States had the consequence of depriving Ger-
many of the exercise of the rights accorded it under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (a) and paragraph 1 fc), and thus violated these provisions of
the Convention. Although the violation of paragraph 1 (h) of Article 36

will not necessarily always result in the breach of the other provisions of
this Article, the Court finds that thcircumstances of this casecompel the
opposite conclusion, for the reasons indicated below. In view of this find-
ing, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with Germany's further claim
under Article 5 of the Convention.

74. Article 36, paragraph 1,establishes an interrelated régime designed
to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection. It
begins with the basic principle governing consular protection: the right of
communication and access (Art. 36, para. 1 (uj). This clause is followed
by the provision which spells out the modalities of consular notification
(Art. 36, para. I (6)). Finally Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), sets out the

measures consular officers may take in rendering consular assistance to
their nationals in the custody of the receiving State. It follows that when
the sending State is unaware of the detention of its nationals due to the
failure of the receiving State to provide the requisite consular notification
without delay, which was true in the present case during the period
between 1982and 1992,the sending State has been prevented for al1prac-

tical purposes from exercising its rights under Article 36, paragraph 1. It
is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether the LaGrands
would have sought consular assistance from Germany, whether Germany
would have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict
would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred
these rights, and that Germany and the LaGrands were in effect pre-

vented by the breach of the United Statesfrom exercising them, had they
so chosen.

75. Germany further contends that "the breach of Article 36 by the
United States did not only infringe upon the rights of Germanyas a State
party to the [Vienna] Convention but also entailed a violation of the indi-
vidual rights of the LaGrand brothers". Invoking its right of diplomatic
protection, Germany also seeks relief against the United States on this

ground.
Germany maintains that the right to be informed of the rights under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, is an individual
right of every national of a State party to the Convention who enters thegraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne. La Cour relève en
outre que, par suite de cette violation, l'Allemagne a appris seulement
en 1992la détention.,lejugement et la condamnation des frères LaGrand.
La Cour en conclut que, au vu des faits de l'espèce,le manquement des
Etats-Unis a eu pour conséquence d'interdire a l'Allemagne d'exercer les
droits que lui confèrent les alinéaa) et c) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36
et, partant, qu'il y a bien eu violation de ces dispositions de la conven-

tion. Bien que la violation du seul alinéa h) du paragraphe 1 de
l'article 36 n'entraîne pas toujours nécessairement la violation des autres
dispositions de cet article, la Cour est amenéA conclure que tel est le cas
en l'espècepour lesraisons exposéesci-après.Compte tenu de cetteconclu-
sion, point n'est besoin pour la Cour d'examiner le grief additionnel de
l'Allemagne concernant l'article 5 de la convention.
74. Le paragraphe 1de l'article 36 institue un régimedont les divers

élémentssont interdépendants et qui est conçu pour faciliter la mise en
Œuvre du systèmede protection consulaire. Le principe de base régissant
la protection consulaire est énoncédès l'abord: le droit de communica-
tion et d'accès(alinka u) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36). La disposition
suivante préciseles modalités selon lesquelles doit s'effectuer la notifica-
tion consulaire (alinéa h) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36). Enfin, I'ali-
néac) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 énonce les mesures que les agents
consulaires peuvent prendre pour fournir leur assistance aux ressortis-

sants de leur pays détenus dans 1'Etat de résidence. 11 s'ensuit que,
lorsque 1'Etat d'envoi n'a pas connaissance de la détention de l'un de
ses ressortissants, parce que I'Etat de résidencen'a pas effectuésans retard
la notification consulaire requise, ce qui fut le cas en l'espèceentre 1982
et 1992,1'Etat d'envoi se trouve dans l'impossibilitépratique d'exercer,a
toutes fins utiles, les droits que lui conférele paragraph1de l'article 36.
Peu importe à cet égardde savoir, aux fins de la présente instance, si les

LaGrand auraient sollicité l'assistanceconsulaire de l'Allemagne, si 1'Alle-
magne leur aurait apporté une telle assistance et si un verdict différent
aurait alors étéprorioncé. Il suffit de constater que la convention confé-
rait ces droits, et que l'Allemagne et les LaGrand, eussent-ils souhaité
s'en prévaloir, onten fait été empêché dse le faire en raison de la violation
commise par les Etats-Unis.

75. L'Allemagne soutient ensuite que «la violation de l'article 36 par
les Etats-Unis ne porte pas seulement atteinte [a ses] droits ... en tant
qu'Etat partie a la convention, mais constitue également une violation
des droits individuels des frères LaCrand ». Agissant au titre de la protec-
tion diplomatique, elle demande également la condamnation des Etats-
Unis sur ce terrain.

Pour l'Allemagne. le droit d'êtreinforméau moment de son arrestation
des droits conféréspar l'alinéa 6) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la
convention de Vienne est un droit qui appartient à tout ressortissant d'unterritory of another State Party. It submits that this view is supported by
the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention, since the last sentence of that provision speaks of the
"rights" under this subparagraph of "the person concerned", i.e., of the

foreign national arrested or detained. Germany adds that the provision in
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), according to which it is for the arrested per-
son to decide whether consular notification is to be provided, has the
effect of conferring an individual right upon the foreign national con-
cerned. In its view, the context of Article 36 supports this conclusion
since it relates to both the concerns of the sending and receiving States
and to those of individuals. According to Germany, the tvui~uuic pv6puru-

toivrs of the Vienna Convention lend further support to this interpre-
tation. In addition, Germany submits that the "United Nations Dec-
laration on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals
of the country in which they live", adopted by General Assembly resolu-
tion 401144 on 13 December 1985, confirms the view that the right of
access to the consulate of the home State, as well as the information on

this right, constitute individual rights of foreign nationals and are to be
regarded as human rights of aliens.

76. The United States questions what this additional claim of diplo-
matic protection contributes to the case and argues that there are no

parallels between the present case and cases of diplomatic protection
involving the espousal by a State of economic claims of its nationals.
The United States maintains that the right of a State to provide con-
sular assistance to nationals detained in another country, and the right
of a State to espouse the claims of its nationals through diplomatic
protection, are legally different concepts.

The United States contends, furthermore, that rights of consular noti-
fication and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and
not of individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals by
permitting States to offer them consular assistance. It maintains that the

treatment due to individuals under the Convention is inextricably linked
to and derived from the right of the State, acting through its consular
officer, to communicate with its nationals, and does not constitute a fun-
damental right or a human right. The United States argues that the fact
that Article 36 by its terms recognizes the rights of individuals does not
determine the nature of those rights or the remedies required under

the Vienna Convention for breaches of that Article. It points out that
Article 36 begins with the words "[wlith a view to facilitating the exer-
cise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State",
and that this wording gives no support to the notion that the rights and
obligations enumerated in paragraph 1 of that Article are intended
to ensure that nationals of the sending State have any particular rights or LAGRAND (ARRET) 493

Etat partie A la convention de Vienne, lorsqu'il pénètresur le territoire
d'un autre Etat partie. Cette interprétation serait corroborée par les
termes de l'alinéa bj du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention

de Vienne pris dans leur sens ordinaire, car la dernière phrase de cette dis-
position fait état des ((droits)), au titre dudit alinéa, de ((l'intéressé)),
c'est-à-dire du ressortissant étrangerarrêtéou détenu.L'Allemagne ajoute
que l'alinéab) du pa.ragraphe 1 de l'article 36, qui stipule qu'il appartient
à la personne arrêtéede décider si son consulat doit être averti,a pour

effet de conférer un droit individuel au ressortissant étranger concerné.
Elle considère que le contexte de l'article 36 conforte cette conclusion
puisqu'il vise tant 1e.sintérêtsde I'Etat d'envoi et de 1'Etat de résidence
que les intérêtsdes particuliers. Elle affirme que les travaux préparatoires
de la convention de Vienne étayent cette interprétation. Elle soutient en
outre que la «Déclaration sur les droits de l'homme des personnes qui ne

possèdent pas la nationalité du pays dans lequel elles vivent)), adoptée
par l'Assemblée générald ees Nations Unies par sa résolution no 401144
du 13décembre 198.5,confirme que le droit de se mettre en rapport avec
le consulat de 1'Etat de nationalité. de mêmeque le droit d'être informé
de ce droit, sont des droits que possède tout individu en sa qualité de
ressortissant étranger et qui doivent êtreconsidéréscomme des droits de

la personne humaini: reconnus aux étrangers.
76. Les Etats-Unis, pour leur part, s'interrogent sur ce que cette pré-
tention supplémentaire relative à la protection diplomatique apporte au
cas d'espèce et ils soutiennent qu'il n'y a rien de commun entre la pré-
sente affaire et les cas de protection diplomatique portant sur la défense

par un Etat de récl.amationsd'ordre économique de ses ressortissants.
Pour les Etats-Unis, le droit pour un Etat d'apporter une assistance
consulaire à des ressortissants détenus dans un pays étranger et le droit
pour un Etat d'end,osser les revendications de ses ressortissants par la
voie de la protectiori diplomatique sont des concepts juridiquement dif-
férents.

Les Etats-Unis soutiennent en outre que ce sont les Etats et non les
individus qui sont titulaires des droits que reconnaît la convention de
Vienneen matièrede notification consulaire,mêmesi lesindividuspeuvent
bénéficierde ces droits, du fait que les Etats sont autorisés à leur offrir
une assistance consulaire. Ils affirment que le traitement qui doit être

réservéaux individus aux termes de la convention est indissociablement
liéau droit de 17Etat,agissant par l'intermédiaire de ses agents consu-
laires, de communiquer avec ses ressortissants- et découle dece droit- et
qu'il ne constitue ni un droit fondamental ni un droit de l'homme. A leur
avis, le fait qu'aux termes de l'article 36 les droits des individus soient
reconnus ne détermine pas la nature de ces droits ni les voies de droit

dont la convention de Vienne appelle l'existence en cas de violation de
cette disposition. Ils soulignent que l'article 36 débute ainsi «[alfin que
l'exercice des fonctions consulaires relatives aux ressortissants de 1'Etat
d'envoi soit facilité)),et que ce libelléne conforte pas l'idéeselon laquelle
les droits et obligations visés au paragraphe 1 de cet article onttreatment in the context of a criminal prosecution. The truvuus prkpuru-
toires of the Vienna Convention according to the United States do not
reflect a consensus that Article 36 was addressing immutable indivi-
dual rights, as opposed to individual rights derivative of the rights of
States.

77. The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the
obligations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the
sending State. It provides that, at the request of the detained person, the
receiving State must inform the consular post of the sending State of the
individual's detention "without delay". It provides further that any com-
munication by the detained person addressed to the consular post of the
sending Statemust be forwarded to it by authorities of the receiving State

"without delay". Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the following
language: "The said authorities shall inform the person concerned with-
out delay of /lis rights under this subparagraph" (emphasis added).
Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), the sending State's right to
provide consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised
"if he expressly opposes such action". The clarity of these provisions,

viewed in their context, admits of no doubt. It follows, as has been held
on a number of occasions, that the Court must apply these as they stand
(see Acquisition of Polish Nution~~lity,Au'i~isorjOpinion, 1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 7, p. 20; Competence of' the Genrrul A.~semblyfor the
Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 8; Arbitral A~urd of 31 July 1989, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp. 69-70, para. 48; Territorial Dispute (Libyun

Arab JamahiriyulChad), Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1994, p. 25, para. 51).
Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36,
paragraph 1,creates individual rights, which, by virtue of Article 1of the
Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the national State of
the detained person. These rights were violated in the present case.

78. At the hearings, Germany further contended that the right of the
individual to be informed without delay under Article 36, paragraph 1,of
the Vienna Convention was not only an individual right but has today
assumed the character of a human right. In consequence, Germany
added, "the character of the right under Article 36 as a human right
renders the effectiveness of this provision even more imperative". The
Court having found that the United States violated the rights accorded

by Article 36, paragraph 1, to the LaGrand brothers, it does not appear
necessary to it to consider the additional argument developed by Ger-
many in this regard. LAGRAND (ARRIT) 494

pour fonction de garantir aux ressortissants de 1'Etatd'envoi desdroits
ou un traitement particuliers dans le cadre d'une procédure pénale.Les
Etats-Unis estiment que les travaux préparatoires de la convention de
Vienne ne font pas apparaître qu'il y ait eu consensus sur le fait que

I'article 36 vise des droits intransgressibles de l'individu par opposition
a des droits individuels dérivés desdroits des Etats.
77. La Cour constate que l'alinéa b) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36
énonceles obligations que 1'Etatde résidence a vis-à-vis d'une personne
détenueet de 1'Etatd'envoi. Ildispose que, àla demande de la personne
mise en détention, I'Etat de résidencedoit informer «sans retard)) le
poste consulaire de 1'Etatd'envoi de la détention deI'individu. IIdispose
en outre que toute communication par la personne détenueadresséeau
poste consulaire de 1'Etatd'envoi doit lui être transmisepar les autorités
de 1'Etat de résidence«sans retard)). Il est significatif que cet alinéase
termine par la disposition suivante: lesdites autorités ((doivent sans

retard informer l'intéresséde ses droits aux termes du présent alinéa))
(les italiques sont de la Cour). En outre, en vertu de l'alinéc) du para-
graphe 1de l'article 36, le droit de 1'Etatd'envoi de prêter son assistance
consulaire à la Dersonne en détention ne Deut s'exercer si celle-ci «s'v
oppose expressémerit)). La clarté de ces dispositions, lues dans leur
contexte, ne laisseeii rien a désirer. Dece fait, et comme il a étéjugé à
plusieurs reprises, la Cour est tenue de les appliquer telles qu'elles sont
(voir Acquisition de la nationalitP polonuisc, avis consultatif: 1923,
C.P.J.I. sPrir B no 7,p. 20; Conzpétrncede II'A~~e~~zhlgé érnéralepour
l'admission d'un Etat uux Nations Unies, avis consultatif:
C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 8; Sentence urhitrale du 31 juillet 1989, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 69-70, par. 48; Diffërrnd territorial (Jamahiriya

arczbelibyenne/Tchad), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 25, par. 51).Compte
tenu du libelléde ces dispositions, la Cour conclut que le paragraphe 1
de I'article 36 créedes droits individuels qui, en vertu de I'article premier
du protocole de signature facultative, peuvent être invoqués devant la
Cour par 1'Etat dont la personne détenue a la nationalité. En l'espèce,
ces droits ont étéviolés.
78. A l'audience, l'Allemagne a en outre soutenu que le droit de
l'intéresséd'être informé sans retard aux termes du paragraphe 1 de
I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires
n'étaitpas seulement un droit individuel, mais avait aujourd'hui acquis
le caractère d'un droit de l'homme. De ce fait, elle ajoute que«le carac-

tère de droit de l'homme que revêtle droit prévu a I'article 36 rend
I'effectivitéde cette disposition plus impérieuseencore)). La Cour ayant
conclu à la violation par les Etats-Unis des droits que lesfrèresLaGrand
tiraient du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36, il ne lui paraît pas nécessaire
d'examiner l'argumentation supplémentaire développéepar l'Allemagne
à cet égard. 79. The Court will now consider Germany's second submission, in
which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:

"that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in
particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl
and Walter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing
them, violated its international legal obligation to Germany under
Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention to give full effect

to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of
the said Convention are intended".

80. Germany argues that, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention
"the United States is under an obligation to ensure that its municipal

'laws and regulations . . .enable full effect to be given to the pur-
poses for which the rights accorded under this article are intended'
[and that it] is in breach of this obligation by upholding rules of
domestic law which make it impossible to successfully raise a viola-
tion of the right to consular notification in proceedings subsequent
to a conviction of a defendant by a jury".

81. Germany points out that the "procedural default" rule is among
the rules of United States domestic law whose application make it impos-

sible to invoke a breach of the notification requirement. According to
Germany, this rule "is closely connected with the division of labour
between federal and state jurisdiction in the United States . . . [where]
[clriminal jurisdiction belongs to the Statesexcept in cases provided for in
the Constitution". This rule, Germany explains, requires "exhaustion of
remedies at the state level before a huhe~scorpus motion can be filed with
federal Courts".

Germany emphasizes that it is not the "procedural default" rule as
such that is at issue in the present proceedings, but the manner in which
it was applied in that it "deprived the brothers of the possibility to raise
the violations of their right to consular notification in US criminal
proceedings".

82. Furthermore, having examined the relevant United Statesjurispru-
dence, Germany contends that the procedural default rule had "made it
impossible for the LaGrand brothers to effectively raise the issue of the
lack of consular notification after they had at last learned of their rights
and established contact with the German consulate in Los Angeles in
1992". LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 495

79. La Cour passera maintenant à l'examen de la deuxième conclusion
de l'Allemagne, par laquelle cette dernière demande à la Cour de dire et
juger que:

«en appliquant des règles de leur droit interne, notamment la doc-
trinedite de la ((carence procédurale)), qui ont empêché Karl et Wal-
ter LaGrand de faire valoir leurs réclamations au titre de la conven-

tion de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, et en procédant finale-
ment à leur exécution, les Etats-Unis ont violéI'obligation juridique
internationale, dont ils étaient tenus à l'égard de l'Allemagne en
vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article36 de la convention de Vienne, de
permettre la pleine réalisation des fins pour lesquelles sont prévusles

droits énoncés ;il'articl36 de ladite convention)).
80. L'Allemagne soutient que, aux termes du paragraphe 2 de l'article
36 de la convention de Vienne,

«les Etats-Unis ont I'obligation de faire en sorte que leurs «lois et
règlements [internes] ... permet[tent] la pleine réalisation des fins

pour lesquelles les droits sont accordés en vertu du présent article))
[et qu'ils] manquent à cette obligation en faisant observer des règles
de droit interne qui rendent impossible l'invocation d'un moyen tiré
de la violation du droit à la notification au consulat lors de la pro-
cédure consécutive à la déclaration de culpabilité d'un accusé ou
d'un prévenu par un jury ».

81. L'Allemagne souligne que la règlede la «carence procédurale)) est
l'une des règles du 'droit interne des Etats-Unis dont l'application rend

impossible l'invocation d'un moyen tiréde la violation du droit à la noti-
fication. Selon l'Allemagne, cette règle «est Stroitement liéeà la sépara-
tion des compétencesentre lesjuridictions fédéraleset lesjuridictions des
Etats qui prévaut aux Etats-Unis ..[où la] compétence pénalerevient aux
Etats fédéréss,auf dans les cas prévuspar la constitution)).Ladite règle,
expose l'Allemagne, exige (l'épuisementdes voies de recours internes au

niveau de 1'Etat fédéré avant qu'un recours tendant à l'obtention d'une
ordonnance d'l~aheuscorpus ne puisse être introduit devant les juridic-
tions fédérales)).
L'Allemagne souligne que ce n'est pas la règle de la «carence procédu-
raie))en tant que telle qui est en question dans la présente instance mais

la manière dont elle a été appliquéeen ce sens qu'elle «a privé les
frères LaGrand de la possibilitéde soulever, dans le cadre de procédures
pénales devant les instances judiciaires des Etats-Unis, les moyens tirés
de la violation de leur droit d'avertir leur consulat)).
82. Par ailleurs, ayant examiné la jurisprudence pertinente des Etats-
Unis, l'Allemagne soutient que la règle de la carence procédurale <<a

empêché les frères LaGrand de soulever la question de l'absence de noti-
fication adressée au consulat après avoir enfin eu connaissance de leurs
droits et pris contact avec le consulat d'Allemagne à Los Angeles en
1992 D. 83. Finally, Germany States that it seeks

"[nlothing . . . more than compliance, or, at least, a system in place
which does not automatically reproduce violation after violation of
the Vienna Convention, only interrupted by the apologies of the
United States Government".

84. The United States objects to Germany's second submission, since
it considers that "Germany's position goes far beyond the wording of the
Convention, the intentions of the parties when it was negotiated, and the
practice of States, including Germany's practice".

85. In the view of the United States:
"[tlhe Vienna Convention does not require States Party to create a
national law remedy permitting individuals to assert claims involv-

ing the Convention in criminal proceedings. If there is no such
requirement, it cannot violate the Convention to require that efforts
to assert such claims be presented to the first court capable of
adjudicating them".

According to the United States,

"[ilf there is no obligation under the Convention to create such indi-
vidual remedies in criminal proceedings, the rule of procedural
default - requiring that claims seeking such remedies be asserted at
an appropriately early stage - cannot violate the Convention".

86. The United States believes that Article 36, paragraph 2, "has a
very clear meaning" and

"means, as it says, that the rights referred to in paragraph 1shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiv-
ing State, subject to the proviso that said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights

accorded under the Article are intended".
In the view of the United States,

"[iln the context of a foreign national in detention, the relevant laws
and regulations contemplated by Article 36 (2) are those that may
affect the exercise of specific rights under Article 36 (l), such as

those addressing the timing of communications, visiting hours, and
security in a detention facility. There is no suggestion in the text of
Article 36 (2) that the rules of criminal law and procedure under
which a defendant would be tried or have his conviction and sen-
tence reviewed by appellate courts are also within the scope of this
provision." 83. L'Allemagne indique enfin qu'elle ne demande

((rien de plus que le respect de la convention de Vienne ou du moins
la mise en place d'un régimequi ne permette pas la violation auto-
matique et répétée de la convention, avec, pour seule interruption,
les excuses du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis)).

84. Les Etats-Unis s'opposent A la deuxième conclusion de 1'Alle-
magne, car ils estiment que ((la prétention de l'Allemagne va bien au-delà

du texte de la convention, de l'intention des parties lorsqu'elles l'ont
négociéeet de la pratique des Etats, y compris celle de l'Allemagne».
85. De l'avis des Etats-Unis, en effet,

(([l]aconventiori de Vienne n'oblige pas les Etats qui y sont parties à
instituer dans leur droit interne un recours permettant aux particu-
liers d'invoquer dans des procédures pénalesdes griefs fondéssur la
convention [, et, à] défaut d'une telle obligation, exiger de faire valoir
ces griefs devant la premièrejuridiction susceptible d'en connaître ne
saurait emporter violation de la convention ».

Selon les Etats-Unis,

«[s]i la convention n'impose aucune obligation d'accorder de telles
mesures de réparation à des individus dans des poursuites pénales,la
règlede la carence procédurale - qui exige de faire valoir le plus tôt
possible et au moment approprié les moyens visant à obtenir de

telles mesures de réparation - ne saurait par conséquent violer la
convention ».
86. Les Etats-Unis considèrent que le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36«a

un sens très clair)) el:qu'il
((signifie, comme dit le texte lui-même,que les droits visésau para-
graphe 1 doivent s'exercer dans le cadre des lois et règlements de

1'Etat de résidence, étant entendu, toutefois, que ces lois et règle-
ments doivent permettre la pleine réalisation des fins pour lesquelles
les droits sont accordés en vertu de l'article)).

De leur point de vue,
«[d]ans le cas cl'un ressortissant étranger détenu, les lois et règle-

ments applicables visésau paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 sont ceux qui
peuvent avoir une incidence sur l'exercice des droits expressément
reconnus au paragraphe 1 de cette disposition, par exemple les lois et
règlements concernant le moment choisi pour procéder aux commu-
nications, les heures de visite et la sécuritédans l'établissement de
détention. Rieri n'indique dans le texte du paragraphe 2 de

l'article 36 que les règles de droit pénal et de procédure pénale en
vertu desquelles un accusé serait jugé ou ferait réexaminer par les
juridictions d'appel la déclaration de culpabilité et la peine pro-
noncées à son encontre entrent également dans les prévisions de
cette disposition.»49 7 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

87. The United States concludes that Germany's second submission
must be rejected "because it is premised on a misinterpretation of
Article 36, paragraph 2,which reads the context of the provision - the

exercise of a right under paragraph 1 - out of existence".

88. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention reads as fol-
lows:

"The rights referred to in paragraph I of this article shall be exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regu-
lations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which

the rights accorded under this article are intended."
89. The Court cannot accept the argument of the United States which

proceeds, in part, on the assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36
applies only to the rights of the sending State and not also to those of the
detained individual. The Court has already determined that Article 36,
paragraph 1,creates individual rights for the detained person in addition
to the rights accorded the sending State, and that consequently the ref-
erence to "rights" in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to

the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained indi-
vidual (see paragraph 77 above).
90. Turning now to the "procedural default" rule, the application of
which in the present case Germany alleges violated Article 36, para-
graph 2, the Court emphasizes that a distinction must be drawn between
that rule as such and its specific application in the present case. In itself,

the rule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The ~rob-
lem arises when the procedural deîault rule does not allow the detained
individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance
on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the competent
national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to provide the

requisite consular information "without delay", thus preventing the
person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending
State.
91. In this case, Germany had the right at the request of the LaGrands
"to arrange for [their] legal representation" and was eventually able to
provide some assistance to that effect. By that time, however, because of

the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation
under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), the procedural default rule prevented
counsel for the LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and
sentences other than on United States constitutional grounds. As a result,
although United States courts could and did examine the professional
competence of counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands by reference to

United States constitutional standards, the procedural default rule pre-
vented them from attaching any legal significance to the fact, inter dia,
that the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1,pre-
vented Germany, in a timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for 87. Les Etats-Unis concluent que la deuxième conclusion de 1'Alle-
magne doit êtrerejetée ((parce qu'elle se fonde sur une interprétation
erronéedu paragraphe 2 de I'article 36,qui ferait complètement abstrac-
tion du contexte de cette disposition - l'exercice d'un droit en applica-

tion du paragraphe ID.
88. Le paragraphe 2 de I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne est ainsi
libellé:

((Les droits visés au paragraphe 1 du présent article doivent
s'exercer dans le cadre des lois et règlements de 1'Etat de résidence,
étant entendu, i.outefois, que ces lois et règlements doivent permettre
la pleine réalisation des fins pour lesquelles les droits sont accordés
en vertu du présent article.))

89. La Cour ne saurait retenir l'argument des Etats-Unis qui repose en
partie sur l'hypothèse que le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 ne s'applique
qu'aux droits de l'ltat d'envoi et non à ceux de la personne mise en

détention. La Cour a déjà établique le paragraphe 1 de I'article 36crée
des droits individuels pour les personnes détenues, en sus des droits
accordés à 1'Etat d'envoi, et que, par voie de conséquence, les «droits»
visésau paragraphe 2désignentnon seulement les droits de 1'Etatd'envoi,
mais aussi ceux des personnes détenues (voir paragraphe 77 ci-dessus).

90. S'agissant de la règlede la ((carence procéduralen, dont I'applica-
tion dans la présente affaire a constitué, selon l'Allemagne, une violation
du paragraphe 2 de I'article 36, la Cour tient à souligner qu'il y a lieu
d'établir une distinction entre cette règleen tant que telle et son applica-
tion en l'espèce. En elle-même,cette règle ne viole pas I'article 36de la
convention de Vienne. Le problème se pose lorsque la règlede la carence

procédurale ne permet pas à une personne détenue de faire recours contre
sa condamnation et sa peine en prétendant, sur la base du paragraphe 1
de l'article 36 de la convention, que les autorités nationales compétentes
ne se seraient pas acquittées de leur obligation d'informer ((sans retard))
les autorités consul;iires compétentes, empêchant par là même cetteper-
sonne de solliciter et d'obtenir l'assistance consulaire de'Etat d'envoi.

91. En l'espèce. l'Allemagne avait le droit, à la demande des frères
LaGrand, «de pourvoir à [leur] représentation en justice)) et elle a été
finalement en mesure de le faire. Toutefois, a l'époque,du fait du man-
quement des autorités américainesà leurs obligations aux termes de l'ali-
néa h j du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36,la règlede la carence procédurale
a empêchéles avocats des LaGrand de remettre en cause de façon effi-

cace, si ce n'est sur la base du droit constitutionnel des Etats-Unis, leurs
condamnations et leurs peines. En conséquence, bien que les tribunaux
américains fussent habilités à examiner, au regard des normes constitu-
tionnelles des Etats-,Unis, la compétence professionnelle des avocats des
frères LaGrand commis d'office en raison de l'indigence de ces derniers,
et bien qu'ils eussent procédé a cet examen, la règlede la carence procé-
durale les empêcha.itd'attacher des conséquences juridiques au fait,them and otherwise assisting in their defence as provided for by the Con-
vention. Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the
effect of preventing "full effect [from being] given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are intended", and thus vio-
lated paragraph 2 of Article 36.

92. TheCourt will now consider Germany's third submission, in which
it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:

"that the United States, by failing to take al1measures at its disposa1
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final
decision of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated

its international legal obligation to comply with the Order on pro-
visional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to
refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject matter
of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending".

93. In its Memorial, Germany contended that "[p]rovisional [mleas-
ures indicated by the International Court of Justice [were]binding by vir-
tue of the law of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the
Court". In support of its position, Germany developed a number of argu-
ments in which it referred to the "principle of effectiveness", to the "pro-

cedural prerequisites" for the adoption of provisional measures, to the
binding nature of provisional measures as a "necessary consequence of
the bindingness of the final decision", to "Article 94 (l), of the United
Nations Charter", to "Article 41 (l),of the Statute of the Court" and to
the "practice of the Court".
Referring to the duty of the "parties to a dispute before the Court .. .
to preserve its subject-matter", Germany added that :

"[alpart from having violated its duties under Art. 94 (1) of the
United Nations Charter and Art. 41 (1) of the Statute, the United
States has also violated the obligation to refrain from any action

which might interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute while judi-
cial proceedings are pending".
At the hearings, Germany further stated the following:

"A judgment by the Court on jurisdiction or merits cannot be
treated on exactly the same footing as a provisional measure . ..
Article 59 and Article 60 [of the Statute] do not apply to provisional
measures or, to be more exact, apply to them only by implication;

that is to say, to the extent that such measures, being both incidental LAGRAND (ARRET) 498

notamment, que la violation des droits prévus au paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle36 n'avait pas permis à l'Allemagne d'assurer en temps opportun aux
frères LaGrand le concours d'avocats privéset de les assister, de manière
générale,dans leur défense, comme le prévoit la convention. Dans ces
conditions, la règlede la carence procédurale a eu pour effet d'empêcher

<<lapleine réalisation des fins pour lesquelles les droits sont accordés en
vertu du présentart.icle» et a ainsi violéles dispositions du paragraphe 2
de l'article 36.

92. La Cour passera maintenant à l'examen de la troisième conclusion
de l'Allemagne, par laquelle cette dernière prie la Cour de dire et juger
que :

«en ne prenant pas toutes les mesures dont ils disposaient pour que
Walter LaGrarid ne soit pas exécutétant que la Cour internationale
de Justice n'aurait pas rendu sa décision définitive en l'affaire,les

Etats-Unis ont violé leur obligation juridique internationale de se
conformer à 1'1ordonnanceen indication de mesures conservatoires
rendue par la Cour le 3 mars 1999 et de s'abstenir de tout acte pou-
vant interférer avec l'objet d'un différend tant que l'instance est en
cours ».

93. Dans son mémoire, l'Allemagne a soutenu que «[l]es mesures
conservatoires indiquées par la Cour internationale de Justice [avaient]
force obligatoire en vertu du droit établipar la Charte des Nations Unies
et le Statut de laCour)). A l'appui de sa thèse, l'Allemagne a développé
plusieurs arguments en se référantau ((principe de l'effet utile)), aux

((conditions de procédure pour l'adoption des mesures conservatoires)),
au caractère obligatoire des mesures conservatoires comme ((conséquence
nécessairedu caractère obligatoire de l'arrêt définitif))a,u ((paragraphe 1
de I'article 94 de la Charte des Nations Unies)), au ((paragraphe 1 de
l'article 41 du Statuit de la Cour)), ainsi qu'à la ((pratique de la Cour)).
Mentionnant l'obligation qu'auraient les parties à un différenddevant
la Cour ...de préserver son objet)), l'Allemagne a ajouté que:

cc[m]isà part le manquement aux obligations qui leur incombent en
vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'articl94 de la Charte des Nations Unies
et du paragraphe 1de l'article 41 du Statut, les Etats-Unis ont éga-

lement manque à leur obligation de s'abstenir de tout acte pouvant
interféreravec l'objet d'un différendtant que l'instance est en cours)).
A l'audience, l'Allemagne a en outre préciséce qui suit:

«On ne peut pas mettre totalement sur le mêmepied un jugement
de la Cour intervenant sur sa compétence ou sur le fond et une
mesure conservatoire ...l'article 59 et l'article 60 [du Statut] ne
s'appliquent pa.saux mesures conservatoires ou plus exactement ...ne

s'y appliquent que par implication; c'est-à-dire dans la mesure, à la and provisional, contribute to the exercise of a judicial function
whose end-result is, by definition, the delivery of a judicial decision.

There is here an inherent logic in the judicial procedure, and to dis-
regard it would be tantamount, as far as the Parties are concerned,
to deviating from the principle of good faith and from what the Ger-
man pleadings cal1 'the principle of institutional effectiveness' . . .
[Plrovisional measures . . .are indeed legal decisions, but they are

decisions of procedure . . . Since their decisional nature is, however,
implied by the logic of urgency and by the need to safeguard the
effectiveness of the proceedings, they accordingly create genuine
legal obligations on the part of those to whom they are addressed."

94. Germany claims that the United States committed a threefold vio-
lation of the Court's Order of 3 March 1999:

"(1) Immediately after the International Court of Justice had ren-

dered its Order on Provisional Measures, Germany appealed to the
US Supreme Court in order to reach a stay of the execution of Wal-
ter LaGrand, in accordance with the International Court's Order to
the same effect. In the course of these proceedings - and in full
knowledge of the Order of the International Court - the Office of

the Solicitor General, a section of the US Department of Justice -
in a letter to the Supreme Court argued once again that : 'an order of
the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is
not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief.

This statement of a high-ranking official of the Federal
Government . . . had a direct influence on the decision of the
Supreme Court.

.............................
(2) In the following, the US Supreme Court - an agency of the
United States - refused by a majority vote to order that the execu-

tion be stayed. In doing so, it rejected the German arguments based
essentially on the Order of the International Court of Justice on Pro-
visional Measures . . .

(3) Finally, the Governor of Arizona did not order a stay of the

execution of Walter LaGrand although she was vested with the right
to do so by the laws of the State of Arizona. Moreover, in the
present case, the Arizona Executive Board of Clemency - for the
first time in the history of this institution - had issued a recommen-
dation for a temporary stay, not least in light of the international

legal issues involved in the case . . ."
95. The United States argues that it "did what was called for by the

Court's 3 March Order, given the extraordinary and unprecedented cir- LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 499

fois incidente et provisoire, où elles contribuent à l'exercice d'une
fonction judiciaire dont le résultat final est, par définition, le pro-
noncéd'une décisionde justice. C'est là qu'il y a une logique inhé-

rentea la procédure judiciaire dont la méconnaissance équivaudrait
pour les Partie:; s'écarterde la bonne foi et de ce que les écritures
allemandes appellent «the prinriplr of'institutional qffec.tivenes...
[LJes mesures conservatoires ... sont bien des décisionsjuridiques,
mais des décisions de procédure ... Leur caractère décisoire étant
cependant impliquépar la logique de l'urgence et la nécessitéde sau-

vegarder l'efficacitéde la procédure, elles créentpar conséquent des
obligations proprement juridiques à la charge de leurs destina-
taires))

94. L'Allemagne prétend que les Etats-Unis ont commis une triple vio-
lation de I'ordonnailce de la Cour du 3 mars 1999:
<<1) Immédiatement après que la Cour internationale de Justice a

rendu son ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires,
l'Allemagne s'est adressée a la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis afin
d'obtenir un sursisa l'exécutionde Walter LaGrand, conformément
à l'ordonnance de la Cour internationale de Justice qui tendait à la
mêmefin. Au cours de cette procédure. et en parfaite connaissance
de l'ordonnance de la Cour, le bureau du Soliritor G~nrral, un ser-
vice relevant du département de la justice des Etats-Unis, a avancé

une nouvelle lois, dans une lettre adressée à la Cour suprême,
qu'«une ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires éma-
nant de la Cour internationale de Justice n'a pas force obligatoire et
n'ouvre pas de recours susceptible d'êtreexercéen justice)).
Cette déclaration émanant d'un haut fonctionnaire du gouverne-
ment fédéral... a exercéune influence directe sur la décision de la
Cour suprême.

2) Par la suite, la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis (organe institu-
tionnel des Etats-Unis) a refusé,par un vote a la majorité, d'ordon-

ner un sursis à l'exécution.Ce faisant, elle a rejetéles arguments de
l'Allemagne qui étaient fondésessentiellement sur l'ordonnance en
indication de mesures conservatoires de la Cour internationale de
Justic...
3) Enfin, le gouverneur de l'Arizona n'a pas ordonné le sursis a
l'exécutionde Walter LaGrand bien qu'il ait étéen droit de le faire
en vertu de la loi de 1'Etat d'Arizona. Par ailleurs, en la présente

affaire, la commission des grâces de l'Arizona a, pour la première
fois dans son histoire, recommandé le sursis à titre temporaire, en
particulier au vu des questions de droit international soulevéesen
l'espèce...»

95. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent qu'ils «se sont conformés à l'ordon-
nance de la Cour du 3 mars compte tenu des circonstances extraordi-cumstances in which it was forced to act". It points out in this connection
that the United States Government "immediately transmitt[ed] the Order
to the Governor of Arizona", that "the United States placed the Order in

the hands of the one official who, at that stage, might have had legal
authority to stop the execution" and that by a letter from the Legal
Counsellor of the United States Embassy in The Hague dated
8 March 1999, it informed the International Court of Justice of al1 the
measures which had been taken in implementation of the Order.

The United States further States that:

"[t]wo central factors constrained the United States ability to act.
The first was the extraordinarily short time between issuance of the
Court's Order and the time set for the execution of Walter
LaGrand . ..

.............................
The second constraining factor was the character of the United
States of America as a federal republic of divided powers."

96. The United States also alleges that the "terms of the Court's
3 March Order did not create legal obligations binding on [it]". Itargues
in this respect that "[tlhe language used by the Court in the key portions

of its Order is not the language used to create binding legal obligations"
and that
"the Court does not need here to decide the difficult and contro-

versial legal question of whether its orders indicating provisional
measures would be capable of creating international legal obliga-
tions if worded in mandatory . ..terms".

It nevertheless maintains that those orders cannot have such effects and,
in support of that view, develops arguments concerning "the language
and history of Article 41 (1) of the Court's Statute and Article 94 of the
Charter of the United Nations", the "Court's and State practice under
these provisions", and the "weight of publicists' commentary".

Concerning Germany's argument based on the "principle of effective-

ness", the United States contends that
"[iln an arena where the concerns and sensitivities of States, and not
abstract logic, have informed the drafting of the Court's constitutive
documents, it is perfectly understandable that the Court might have

the power to issue binding final judgments, but a more circum-
scribed authority with respect to provisional measures".

Referring to Germany's argument that the United States "violated the

obligation to refrain from any action which might interfere with the sub-naires et inéditesdans lesquelles ils ont étécontraints d'agir)). Ils souli-
gnent àcet égardque leGouvernement des Etats-Unis a transmis ((immédia-

tement l'ordonnance au gouverneur de l'Arizona)); que cles Etats-Unis ont
remis celle-ci entre les mains du seul responsable qui, à ce stade, aurait pu
encore avoir légalement le pouvoir d'empêcher l'exécution)); etque, par
une lettre du 8 mars 1999émanant du conseiller juridique de l'ambassade
des Etats-Unis à L.a Haye, ils ont porté iila connaissance de la Cour

internationale de Justice toutes les mesures qui avaient étéprises en appli-
cation de l'ordonnance.
Les Etats-Unis précisent enoutre ce qui suit:

(([dieux élémenitsprincipaux réduisaient la capacité d'agir des Etats-
Unis. Il y avait tout d'abord le délaiextrêmementbref entre le pro-
noncéde l'ordonnance de la Cour et l'heure fixéepour l'exécutionde
Walter LaGrand ...

.............................
Le deuxième obstacle était la nature mêmedes Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique en tant que république fédéraleau sein de laquelle les pouvoirs
sont partagés. )>

96. Les Etats-Uriis avancent égalementque le ((libelléde l'ordonnance
de la Cour du 3 mars n'a pas créé d'obligations juridiquescontraignantes
pour [eux])). Ils font valoirà cet égardque (([Ilestermes employés par la

Cour dans les passages clésde son ordonnance ne sont pas de ceux qui
sont utiliséspour ci-éerdes obligations juridiques contraignantes)) et que
(([ploint n'est..besoin en l'espècepour la Cour de trancher la ques-

tion juridique difficile et controversée de savoir si ses ordonnances
en indication cle mesures conservatoires sont susceptibles de donner
naissance à des obligations juridiques internationales si elles sont
expriméesen d.estermes impératifs...».

Ils n'en soutiennent: pas moins que ces ordonnances ne peuvent avoir de
tels effets et. l'appui de cette thèse, développent des arguments portant
sur «le libelléet la genèsedu paragraphe 1 de I'article41 du Statut de la
Cour et de l'article 94 de la Charte des Nations Unies)),la ((pratique de
la Cour et des Etatij au regard de ces dispositions))ainsi que sur l'«auto-

ritéde la doctrine des publicistes)).
Concernant l'argument de l'Allemagne tiré du ((principe de l'effet
utile)), lestats-Unis prétendent que

~[dlans un domaine où ce sont les préoccupations et les susceptibi-
litésdes Etats et non la logique abstraite qui ont guidéla rédaction
des actes constitutifs de la Cour, il est parfaitement compréhensible
que celle-ci puisse avoir le pouvoir de rendre des arrêts définitifs
obligatoires, mais ait un pouvoir plus restreint en ce qui concerne

l'indication de mesures conservatoires)).
Se référantà l'argument de l'Allemagne selon lequel ils auraient ((man-
qué à ieur obligation de s'abstenir de tout acte pouvant interférer avecject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending", the
United States further asserts that:

"The implications of the rule as presented by Germany are poten-

tially quite dramatic, however. Germany appears to contend that by
merely filinga case with the Court, an Applicant can force a Respond-
ent to refrain from continuing any action that the Applicant deems
to affect the subject of the dispute. If the law were as Germany con-
tends, the entirety of the Court's rules and practices relating to pro-

visional measures would be surplussage. This is not the law, and this
is not how States or this Court have acted in practice."

97. Lastly, the United States states that in any case, "[b]ecause of the
press of time stemming from Germany's last-minute filing of the case,
basic principles fundamental to the judicial process were not observed in
connection with the Court's 3 March Order" and that

"[tlhus, whatever one might conclude regarding a general rule for

provisional measures, it would be anomalous - to say the least-
for the Court to construe this Order as a source of binding legal
obligations".

98. Neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the
present Court to date, has been called upon to determine the legal effects
of orders made under Article 41 of the Statute. As Germany's third sub-

mission refers expressly to an international legal obligation "to comply
with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by the Court on
3 March 1999". and asthe United States disputes the existence of such an
obligation, the Court is now called upon to rule expressly on this question.

99. The dispute which exists between the Parties with regard to this
point essentially concerns the interpretation of Article 41, which is worded
in identical terms in the Statute of each Court (apart from the respective
references to the Council of the League of Nations and the Security

Council). This interpretation has been the subject of extensive contro-
versy in the literature. The Court will therefore now proceed to the inter-
pretation of Article 41 of the Statute. It will do so in accordance
with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to paragraph I
of Article 31, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance

with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in
the light of the treaty's object and purpose.
100. The French text of Article 41 reads as follows:

"1. La Cour a le pouvoir d'indicluer,si elle estime que les circons- LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 501

I'objet d'un différend tant que l'instance est en cours)), les Etats-Unis
font en outre valoi:rce qui suit:

«Les conséquences découlantde la règleformuléepar l'Allemagne

peuvent être tout a fait extraordinaires. Celle-ci semble affirmer
qu'un requérant pourrait, par la simple saisine de la Cour, forcer un
défendeur a s'abstenir dans le futur de tout acte qui, selon le deman-
deur. serait susceptible d'affecter l'objet du différend. Si tel était
l'étatdu droit, l'ensemble des règleset pratiques de la Cour relatives
aux mesures cc)nservatoires seraient surabondantes. Telle n'est pas la

règlede droit ~:ttelle n'est pas davantage l'attitude que les Etats ou
la Cour ont adoptée en pratique.»

97. Enfin, les Etats-Unis exposent qu'en tout étatde cause <<[l]dépôt
au dernier momenl. de la requêtepar l'Allemagne, qui n'a laisséaucun
temps pour réagir, a fait que les principes fondamentaux du règlement
judiciaire n'ont pu êtrerespectésdans le cas de l'ordonnance rendue le
3 mars par la Cour ))et que

«[dlèslors, qut:lle que soit la conclusion à laquelle on puisse parvenir
au sujet d'un principe généralapplicable aux mesures conservatoires,
il serait tout le moins anormal pour la Cour de voir dans I'ordon-

nance qui nous occupe en l'espèce une source d'obligations juri-
diques contrai),antes )).

98. A ce jour, ni la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ni la
présente Cour n'ont étéappelées a se prononcer sur les effets juridiques
des ordonnances qu'elles ont rendues en vertu de l'article 41 du Statut.
Etant donné que la troisième conclusion de l'Allemagne se réfèreexpres-
sément à une obligation juridique internationale <(de se conformer à
l'ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour

le 3 mars 1999)) et que les Etats-Unis contestent l'existence d'une telle
obligation, la Cour est maintenant appeléeà se prononcer expressément
sur cette question.
99. Le différend existant à cet égard entre les Parties concerne essen-
tiellement I'interprktation de l'article 41, qui est libelléen termes iden-
tiques dans le Statut des deux Cours (sous réservede la référence faite

respectivement au Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations et au Conseil de
sécurité).Cette interprétation a fait l'objet d'abondantes controverses
doctrinales. La Cour passera donc maintenant a l'interprétation de
l'iirticle 41 du Stai:ut. Elle procédera à cette interprétation conformé-
ment au droit international coutumier qui a trouvé son expression dans
l'article 31 de la convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités.
Selon le paragraphie 1 de l'article 31, un traité doit êtreinterprétéde

bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire à attribuer A ses termes dans leur
contexte et a la lumière de son objet et de son but.
100. Le texte français de l'article 41 se lit comme suit:

« 1. La Couir a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circons- tances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun
doivent êtreprises à titre provisoire.

2. En attendant l'arrêtdéfinitif, l'indication de ces mesures est
immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité."
(Emphasis added.)

In this text, the terms "indiquer" and "l'indication" may be deemed to be
neutral as to the mandatory character of the measure concerned; by con-
trast the words "doivent êtreprises" have an imperative character.

For its part, the English version of Article 41 reads as follows:

" 1. TheCourt shall have the power to indieute, if it considers that

circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to
be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council."
(Emphasis added.)

According to the United States, the use in the English version of "indi-
cate" instead of "order", of "ought" instead of "must" or "shall", and of

"suggested" instead of "ordered", is to be understood as implying that
decisions under Article 41 lack mandatory effect. It might however be
argued, having regard to the fact that in 1920 the French text was the
original version, that such terms as "indicate" and "ought" have a mean-
ing equivalent to "order" and "must" or "shall".
101. Finding itself faced with two texts which are not in total har-
mony, the Court will first of al1note that accordiiig to Article 92 of the

Charter, the Statute "forms an integral part of the present Charter".
Under Article 111 of the Charter, the French and English texts of the
latter are "equally authentic". The same is equally true of the Statute.
In cases of divergence between the equally authentic versions of the
Statute, neither it nor the Charter indicates how to proceed. In the
absence of agreement between the parties in this respect, it is appropriate

to refer to paragraph 4 of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which in the view of the Court again reflects customary
international law. This provision reads "when a comparison of the authen-
tic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of
Articles 31 and 32 does not remove the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall

be adopted".
The Court will therefore now consider the object and purpose of the
Statute together with the context of Article 41.
102. The object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to
fulfil the functions provided for therein, and, in particular, the basic func-
tion of judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions

in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute. The context in which
Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from LAGRAND (ARRET) 502

tances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun
doivent êtreprises à titre provisoire.
2. En attendant l'arrêtdéfinitif, l'indicution de ces mesures est
immédiatement notifiéeaux parties et au Conseil de sécurité. ))(Les
italiques sont de la Cour.)

Dans ce texte les termes «indiquer» et «l'indication» peuvent être consi-

déréscomme neutres au regard du caractère obligatoire des mesures en
question; en revanche les mots «doivent être prises)) ont un caractère
impératif.
Quant à elle, la version anglaise de l'article 41 se lit comme suit:

«1. The Coiurt shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to

be taken, to p:reservethe respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.))
(Les italiques !sontde la Cour.)

Selon les Etats-Unis, l'emploi dans la version anglaise des verbes «indi-
caten au lieu de <<order», «ought» au lieu de <<must»ou c<shall», et

((suggested ))au lieu de ((ordered » impliquerait que les décisions prisesau
titre de I'article 41 ne revêtentpas un caractère obligatoire. On pourrait
cependant faire valoir. compte tenu du fait que la version française a été
en 1920 la version originelle, que des verbes tels que «indicate» et

~ought ))ont un sens qui est équivalent à «order» et ((must)) ou <<shall)).
101. Se trouvant. en présence de deux textes qui ne sont pas en totale
harmonie, la Cour notera tout d'abord que, selon I'article 92 de la
Charte, le Statut «fait partie intégrante)) de la Charte. En vertu de
I'article 111 de la Charte. les versions francaise et annlaise de celle-ci
w
font «également foi)). 11en va donc de mêmé pour le Statut.
En cas de divergence entre des versions faisant foi du Statut, ni celui-ci
ni la Charte n'indiquent la manière de procéder. En l'absence d'accord
entre les partiesà clrtégard,il convient doncde se référeraux dispositions
du paragraphe 4 de l'article 33de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des

traités qui, de l'avis de la Cour, reflète là encore le droit international
coutumier. Aux termes de cette disposition, ((lorsque la comparaison des
textes authentique:; fait apparaître une différence de sens que l'applica-
tion des articles 31 et 32 ne permet pas d'éliminer, on adoptera le sens
qui, compte tenu de l'objet et du but du traité, concilie le mieux ces

textes)).
La Cour passera donc maintenant à l'examen de l'objet et du but du
Statut, ainsi que du contexte de I'article 41 du Statut.
102. L'objet et le but du Statut sont de permettre à la Courde remplir
les fonctions qui lui sont dévoluespar cet instrument, et en particulier de

s'acquitter de sa mission fondamentale, qui est le règlementjudiciaire des
différends internatiionaux au moyen de décisionsobligatoires conformé-
nient à l'article59 du Statut. L'article 41, analysédans le contexte du Sta-503 LAGRAND (JUDGMENT)

being hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective
rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved.
It follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from
the terms of Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to

indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be
binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity,
when the circumstances cal1 for it, to safeguard, and to avoid preju-
dice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment of
the Court. The contention that provisional measures indicated under
Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and
purpose of that Article.

103. A related reason which points to the binding character of orders
made under Article 41 and to which the Court attaches importance is the
existence of a principle which has already been recognized by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice when it spoke of

"the principle universally accepted by international tribunals and
likewise laid down in many conventions . .. to the effect that the

parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exer-
cising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision
to be given, and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be
taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute" (Elcctricity
Con?panj- qf So$a and Bulg~rriu. Order 5 Drccnlhcr 1939,
P.C.I.J, Series AIB, No. 79, p. 199).

Furthermore measures designed to avoid aggravatiilg or extending dis-
putes have frequently been indicated by the Court. They were indicated
with the purpose of being implemented (see Nuclecrr Tests (Azrstruliu v.
Frunce), InteritplProtc~c.tio1,rrlerqf22 June 1973, 1.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 106; Nucletrr Tc..~tsjNcii9 Zealund v. Frur~ce), Ir~terim Protc.ction,
Order qf 22 Junc 1973, IC.J. Reports 1973, p. 142; Frontier Dispute,
Provisionul Measurcs, Order of 10 Jrrnuurjl 1986, 1.C.J. Reports 1986,

p. 9, para. 18, andp. 11, para. 32, point 1A; Applicatiori (fthe Conyen-
tion or1tlie Prcvention arid Punislzrnentof the Crirne of Grnocide, Proi~i-
sior~ulMeasiires, Orcler of 8 April 1993, 1.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 23,
para. 48, and p. 24, para. 52B; Applicutiotzuf the Corzventionon thc Pre-
vcntion and Punishrnent qf'thc Crinle of Grnocide, Provi.sionu1Mcwsures,
Order of 13 Septenlber 1993. 1.C.J. R6.port.r1993, p. 349, para. 57, and
p. 350, para. 61 (3); Land rrnd M(~ritit~zeBounU'CIrbjet~reor~Cc~n~~roon

(lnd Nigeriu. Proi3isioncrlMerrsurc~.~O, rder of'15 Mcrrcli 1996, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 ll), pp. 22-23, para. 41, and p. 24, para. 49 (1)).

104. Given the conclusions reached by the Court above in interpret-
ing the text of Article 41 of the Statute in the light of its object and
purpose, it does not consider it necessary to resort to the preparatory
work in order to determine the meaning of that Article. The Court

would nevertheless point out that the preparatory work of the Statute LAGRAND (ARRET) 503

tut, a pour but d'éviterque la Cour soit empêchée d'exercer ses fonctions
du fait de l'atteinte portée aux droits respectifs des parties à un différend
soumis à la Cour. IIressort de l'objet et du but du Statut, ainsi que des
termes de l'article 41 lus dans leur contexte, que le pouvoir d'indiquer des
mesures conservatoires emporte le caractère obligatoire desdites mesures,

dans la mesure où le pouvoir en question est fondé sur la nécessité,
lorsque les circonstances l'exigent, de sauvegarder les droits des parties,
tels que déterminéspar la Cour dans son arrêtdéfinitif,et d'éviter qu'ily
soit porté préjudice. Prétendre que des mesures conservatoires indiquées
en vertu de l'article 41 ne seraient pas obligatoires serait contraire à l'objet
et au but de cette dlisposition.
103. Un motif connexe qui va dans le sens du caractère obligatoire des

ordonnances rendw~sau titre de l'article 41, et auquel la Cour attache de
l'importance, est l'existence d'un principe que la Cour permanente de
Justice internationale adéjàreconnu lorsqu'elle a évoquéle

((principe universellement admis devant les juridictions internatio-
nales et consacré d'ailleurs dans maintes conventions ... d'a~res

lequel les parties en cause doivent s'abstenir de toute mesure suscep-
tible d'avoir une répercussion préjudiciablei l'exécutionde la déci-
sion à intervenir et, en général, nelaisser procédei aucun acte, de
quelque nature qu'il soit, su'sceptibled'aggraver ou d'étendre le dif-
férend» (Compugnic)d'él~ctricité de Sojia et de Bulgarie, ordonnance
d~r5 dkcetnbre 1939. C.P.J.1. sérieAIB n" 79, p. 199).

Aussi bien des mesures tendant à éviterl'aggravation ou l'extension des
différends ont-elles fréquemment été indiquéespar la Cour. Ces mesures
étaient destinées B être exécutées (voir Essais nuclé~~ires(Australie
c. France), n~.nrrcs conservatoires. ordonnance du 22 juirz 1973,
C. 1.J. Rec~rc.il 1973. p. 106; es sui.^ nnc1éuire.s (Nouvelle-Zélande
c. France). mc.su,Ves c~onscrvatoires, ordonnance du 22 juin 1973,
C. I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 142; Diffrrend fiontalier, tlresures corîser~~crtoires,

ordonnance du 10janvier 1986, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 9, par. 18,et p. 11,
par. 32, point 1A; Application tke la convetztionpour l(rprévention etIr
rCpre.\.sioti(lu critnc~de gkt~ocide,mesures con.ser~~crtois,rdonnuncr du
8 a11ril1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 23, par. 48, et p. 24, parB;5Appli-
ccltionde la con~~rntionpour la pré~~entiore?t kt/ rkpression du crime de
génocide, mesures conservatoirc~s,ordonnance du 13 septembre 1993,
C.I.J. Recuril 1993, p. 349, par.57.et p. 350, par. 61, alinéa3; Frontii.re

terrestre et maritirire entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria,mesures conserva-
toires, ordonnance du 15 mars 1996, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (/), p. 22-23,
par. 41, et p. 24, par. 49, alinéa 1).
104. Compte tenu des conclusions auxquelles la Cour est parvenue ci-
dessus en interprétant le texte de l'article 41 du Statuta lumière de son
objet et de son but, elle n'estime pas nécessairede faire appel aux travaux

préparatoires pour déterminer le sens de cet article. La Cour fera
néanmoins observer que les travaux préparatoires relatifs au Statut nedoes not preclude the conclusion that orders under Article 41 have
binding force.
105. The initial preliminary draft of the Statute of the Permanent

Court of International Justice, as prepared by the Committee of Jurists
established by the Council of the League of Nations, made no mention of
provisional measures. A provision to this effect was inserted only at a
later stage in the draft prepared by the Committee, following a proposal
from the Brazilian jurist Raul Fernandes.
Basing himself on the Bryan Treaty of 13 October 1914 between the

United States and Sweden, Raul Fernandes had submitted the following
text:
"Dans le cas où la cause du différend consiste en actes déterminés

déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être,la Cour pourra ordonner,
dans le plus bref délai, à titre provisoire, des mesures conserva-
toires adéquates, en attendant lejugement définitif."(Comitéconsul-
tatif de juristes, Procès-i~erhaus cies séunces du conlité, 16 juin-
24 juillet 1920 (avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 609.)

In its English translation this text read as follows:

"In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts
already committed or about to be committed, the Court may, pro-
visionally and with the least possible delay, order adequate protec-
tive measures to be taken, pending the final judgment of the Court."
(Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proc,è.~-i~r~rh~ ofut'hce Proceedings
of tllr Committee, 16June-24 July 1920(with Annexes), The Hague,

1920, p. 609.)
The Drafting Committee prepared a new version of this text, to which

two main amendments were made: on the one hand, the words "la Cour
pourra ordonner" ("the Court may . . . order") were replaced by "la Cour
a le pouvoir d'indiquer" ("the Court shall have the power to suggest"),
while, on the other, a second paragraph was added providing for notice
to be given to the parties and to the Council of the "measures suggested"
by the Court. The draft Article 2hi.sas submitted by the Drafting Com-

mittee thus read as follows:
"Dans le cas où la cause du différend consiste en un acte effectué
ou sur le point de l'être,la Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle

estime que les circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires
du droit de chacun doivent êtreprises à titre provisoire.
En attendant son arrêt,cette suggestion de la Cour est immédiate-
ment transmise aux parties et au Conseil." (Comité consultatif de
juristes, ProcC".~-i~orh(&~..sé~~ncedsu coniiti, 16juin-24 juillet 1920
(avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 567-568.)

The English version read:

"If the dispute arises out of an act which has already taken place
or which is imminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if it LAGRAND (ARRET) 504

s'opposent pas à la conclusion que les ordonnances rendues en vertu de

l'article 41 ont forci: obligatoire.
105. La première:version de l'avant-projet de Statut de la Cour per-
manente de Justice internationale, tel que préparé par le comité de
juristes constitué par le Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations, ne traitait pas
des mesures conservatoires. Une disposition à cet égardne fut incorporée

que plus tard dans le projet élaboré parle comité, ila suite d'une proposi-
tion du juriste brésilien Raul Fernandes.
S'inspirant du traité Bryan conclu le 13 octobre 1914 entre les Etats-
Unis et la Suède. Raul Fernandes avait soumis le texte suivant:

((Dans le cas.où la cause du différendconsiste en actes déterminés
déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être. laCour pourra ordonner,

dans le plus bref délai,iititre provisoire, des mesures conservatoires
adéquates, en attendant le jugement définitif.» (Comité consultatif
de juristes, Proc6.y-rerbuu.~des séances duconiiti.. 16juin-24 juillet
1920 (avec annexes), La Haye. 1920,p. 609.)

Dans sa traduction anglaise, ce texte se lisait comme suit:

<<lncase the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts
already committed or about to be committed, the Court may, pro-
visionally and with the least possible delay, order adequate protec-
tive nieasures to be taken, pending the final judgment of the Court.))
(Advisory Cornmittee of Jurists, Proc$s-verbuu.~ of'the Prnc~eccli~~gs

oj'rlie Comrnitt~e, 16June-24 July 1920(with Annexes), The Hague,
1920. p. 609.)
Le comitéde rédaction établitune nouvelle version de ce texte auquel

deux modifications principales furent apportées: d'une part, l'expression
((la Cour pourra ordonner)) (((the Court may ... order))) fut remplacée
par «la Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer)) («the Court shall have the power
to suggest))) et, d'autre part, un second alinéa fut ajouté, prévoyant la
transmission aux piirties et au Conseil de la ((suggestion de la Cour)). Le

projet d'article 2bi:idu comité de rédaction étaiten conséquence libellé
comme suit :

((Dans le caij où la cause du différendconsiste en un acte effectué
ou sur le point de l'être,la Cour a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle
estime que les circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires
du droit de chacun doivent êtreprises à titre provisoire.
En attendant son arrèt. cette suggestion de la Cour est immédia-

tement transmise aux parties et au Conseil.))(Comité consultatif de
juristes,Proct.:i-i~crhc~udes séances ducomité. 16juin-24 juillet 1920
(avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 567-568.)

Sa version anglaise se lisait ainsi:
«If the displute arises out of an act which has already taken place

or which is imiminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if it considers that circumstances so require, the provisional measures
that should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and the Council." (Advisory Com-

mittee of Jurists, Procès-ivrhaux of llze Proceedings of theCornnzit-
tee,16June-24 July 1920(with Annexes), The Hague, 1920,pp. 567-
568.)

The Committee of Jurists eventually adopted a draft Article 39, which
amended the former Article 2bis only in its French version: in the second
paragraph, the words "cette suggestion" were replaced in French by the

words "l'indication".
106. When the draft Article 39 was examined by the Sub-Committee
of the Third Committee of the first Assembly of the League of Nations, a
number of amendments were considered. Raul Fernandes suggested again
to use the word "ordonner" in the French version. The Sub-Committee
decided to stay with the word "indiquer", the Chairman of the Sub-Com-

mittee observing that the Court lacked the means to execute its decisions.
The language of the first paragraph of the English version was then made
to conform to the French text: thus the word "suggest" was replaced by
"indicate", and "should" by "ought tom. However, in the second para-
graph of the English version, the phrase "measures suggested" remained
unchanged.

The provision thus amended in French and in English by the Sub-
Coinmittee was adopted as Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice. It passed as such into the Statute of the
present Court without any discussion in 1945.
107. The preparatory work of Article 41 shows that the preference
given in the French text to "indiquer" over "ordonner" was motivated by
the consideration that the Court did not have the means to assure the

execution of its decisions. However, the lack of means of execution and
the lack of binding force are two different matters. Hence, the fact that
the Court does not itself have the means to ensure the execution of orders
made pursuant to Article 41 is not an argument against the binding
nature of such orders.

108. The Court finally needs to consider whether Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter precludes attributing binding effect to orders
indicating provisioi~al measures. That Article reads as follows:

"1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to

which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incum-
bent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it considers that circumstances so require, the provisional measures
that should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either Party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and the Council. ))(Advisory Com-
mittee of Jurists, Proc?s-verbuus of'the Proceedings of the Contnzit-
tee, 16June-24 July 1920(with Annexes), The Hague, 1920, pp. 567-
568.)

Le comitéde juristes adopta finalement un projet d'article 39, qui ne
modifiait l'ancien projet d'article 2bis que dans sa version française: au
second alinéa,lestermes ((cettesuggestion))furent remplacéspar lesmots
((l'indication».
106. Lorsque la Sous-Commission de la Troisième Commission de la
première Assemblée de la Sociétédes Nations examina le projet d'ar-
ticle 39,plusieursamendements furent considérésR .aul Fernandessuggéra
a nouveau d'employer le verbe ((ordonner))dans la version française. La

Sous-Commission décidade maintenir le verbe ((indiquer )),le président
de la Sous-Commission relevant que la Cour n'avait pas les moyens
d'assurerl'exécutionde ses décisions.La terminologie utilisée aupremier
alinéade la version anglaise fut alignéesur le texte français: ainsi, le mot
<<suggest» fut remplacépar le terme « indicate>>,et((should )>par ((ought
to». Toutefois, dans le second alinéade la version anglaise, l'expression
((ineasuressuggested)) ne fut pas modifiée.
La disposition aiinsiamendée en françaiset en anglais par la Sous-
Con~missionfut adoptéecomme article 41 du Statut de la Cour perma-

nente de Justice internationale. Ellepassacomme telledans le Statut de la
présenteCour sans faire l'objet d'aucune discussion en 1945.
107. Lestravaux préparatoiresde l'article41 font ainsi apparaître que
la préférencedonnee dans le texte français au verbe ((indiquer))au lieu
d'<<ordonner)a)étémotivéepar la considération quela Cour n'avait pas
les moyens d'assurerl'exécutionde ses décisions. Mais l'absence de voies
d'exécutionet le défaut de caractèreobligatoire d'une disposition sont
deux questions differentes. Dèslors, le fait que la Cour ne dispose pas de

moyens pour assurer elle-même l'exécution des ordonnances prises en
vertu de l'article41 ne constitue pas un argument contre le caractèreobli-
gatoire de ces ordonnances.
108. La Cour doit enfin examiner si l'article 94 de la Charte des
Nations Unies s'oppose à ce qu'effet obligatoire soit reconnu aux ordon-
nances indiquant cles mesures conservatoires. Cet article se lit comme
suit:

« 1. Chaque Membre des Nations Unies s'engage à seconformer à

la décision de la Cour internationale de Justice dans tout litige
auquel il est partie.
2. Si une partie A un litige ne satisfait pas aux obligations qui lui
incombent en vertu d'un arrêtrendu par la Cour, l'autre partie peut
recourir au Conseil de sécurité et celui-ci,s'illejuge nécessaire,peut deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures
to be taken to give effect to the judgment."

The question arises as to the meaning to be attributed to the words
"the decision of the International Court of Justice" in paragraph1 of this
Article. This wording could be understood as referring not merely to the
Court's judgments but to any decision rendered by it, thus including

orders indicating provisional measures. It could also be interpreted to
mean onlyjudgments rendered by the Court as provided in paragraph 2
of Article 94. In this regard, the fact that in Articles 56 to 60 of the
Court's Statute both the word "decision" and the word "judgment" are
used does little to clarify the matter.
Under the first interpretation of paragraph 1of Article 94, the text of
the paragraph would confirm the binding nature of provisional meas-

ures; whereas the second interpretation would in no way preclude their
being accorded binding force under Article 41 of the Statute. The Court
accordingly concludes that Article 94 of the Charter does not prevent
orders made under Article 41 from having a binding character.
109. In short, it is clear that none of the sources of interpretation
referred to in the relevant Articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties, incliiding the preparatory work, contradict the conclusions
drawn from the terms of Article 41 read in their context and in the light
of the object and purpose of the Statute. Thus, the Court has reached the
conclusion that orders on provisional measures under Article 41 have
binding effect.

110. The Court will now consider the Order of 3 March 1999. This
Order was not a mere exhortation. It had been adopted pursuant to
Article 41 of the Statute. This Order was consequently binding in
character and created a legal obligation for the United States.

111. As regards the question whether the United States has complied
with the obligation incumbent upon it as a result of the Order of
3 March 1999, the Court observes that the Order indicated two provi-
sional measures, the first of which states that

"[tlhe United States of America should take al1measures at its dis-
posai to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court
of al1 the measures which it has taken in implementation of this
Order".

The second measure required the Government of the United States to LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 506

faire des recommandations ou décider des mesures à prendre pour

faire exécuter l'arrê))
La question se pose de savoir quel sens doit êtreattribué aux mots «la
décision de la Cour internationale de Justice)) au paragraphe 1 de cet

article. Ce libellé pourrait s'entendre comme visant non seulement les
arrêtsde la Cour, inais toute décision rendue par elle, et s'appliquant
ainsi aux ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires. Ces mots
pourraient aussi être interprétés comme désignantseulement les arrêts
rendus par la Cour tels que visésau paragraphe 2 de l'article 94. A cet

égard,l'utilisation faite aux articl56 à 60 du Statut de la Cour des mots
((décision» et (arrêt» n'ajoute guère de clarté au débat.
Dans la première interprétation du paragraphe 1de I'article 94, celui-ci
confirmerait le caractère obligatoire des mesures conservatoires; dans la
seconde, il ne s'opposerait nullement à ce que ce caractère obligatoire leur
soit reconnu au titre de l'article 41 du Statut. La Cour en conclut que
I'article 94 de la Charte ne fait en tout état de cause pas obstacle au

caractère obligatoire des ordonnances rendues au titre de l'article 41.
109. En définitive, aucune des sources d'interprétation mentionnées
dans les articles pertinents de la convention Je Vienne sur le droit des
traités, y coinpris les travaux préparatoires, ne contredit les conclusions
tirées des termes de I'article 41 lus dans son contexte à la lumiére de

l'objet et du but du Statut. Ainsi, la Cour parvient à la conclusion que les
ordonnances indiquant des mesures conservatoires au titre de l'article 41
ont un caractère obligatoire.

110. La Cour passera maintenant a l'examen de I'ordonnance du

3 mars 1999.Celle-ci ne constituait pas une simple exhortation. Elle avait
étéadoptée en vertu de l'article 41 du Statut. Ladite ordonnance avait
par suite un caractère obligatoire et mettait une obligation juridique à la
charge des Etats-Unis.

111. S'agissant de la question de savoir si les Etats-Unis se sont acquit-
tésde l'obligation découlant pour eux de l'ordonnance du 3 mars 1999,la
Cour observe qu'elle a indiqué, dans cette ordonnance, deux mesures
conservatoires, don.t la première énoncece qui suit:

«[Iles Etats-Unis d'Amérique doivent prendre toutes les mesures
dont ils disposent pour que M. Walter LaGrand ne soit pas exécuté
tant que la décision définitiveen la présente instance n'aura pas été
rendue, et doivent porter à la connaissance de la Cour toutes les
mesures qui a,uront été prisesen application de la présente ordon-

nance)).
Par la seconde mesure indiquée, la Cour demandait aux Etats-Unis de"transmit this Order to theGovernor of the State of Arizona". The infor-

mation required on the ineasures taken in implementation of this Order
was given to the Court by a letter of 8 March 1999from the Legal Coun-
sellor of the United States Embassy at The Hague. According to this
letter, on 3 March 1999 the State Department had transmitted to
the Governor of Arizona a copy of the Court's Order. "In view of
the extremely late hour of the receipt of the Court's Order", the letter of

8 March went on to say, "no further steps were feasible".

The United States authorities have thus lirnited themselves to the mere
transmission of the text of the Order to the Governor of Arizona. This
certainly met the requirement of the second of the two measures indi-
cated. As to the first measure, the Court notes that it did not create an

obligation of result, but that the United States was asked to "take al1
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings". The Court agrees that
due to the extremely late presentation of the request for provisional
measures, there was certainly very little time for the United Statesauthori-
ties to act.

112. The Court observes, nevertheless, that the mere transmission of
its Order to the Governor of Arizona without any comment, particularly
without even so much as a plea for a temporary stay and an explanation
that there is no general agreement on the position of the United States
that orders of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures

are non-binding, was certainly less than could have been done even in the
short time available. The same is true of the United States Solicitor Gen-
eral's categorical statement in his brief letter to the United States Supreme
Court that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating pro-
visional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial
relief' (seeparagraph 33 above). This statement went substantially further

than the amicus brief referred to in a mere footnote in his letter, which
was filed on behalf of the United States in earlier proceedings before the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Angel Francisco Breard (see
Brrnrtl v. Greenc, United States Supreme Court, 14April 1998, Intcrnu-
tionul Legul Mufrricils, Vol. 37 (1998). p. 824; Memorial of Germany,
Ailn. 34). In that amicus brief, the same Solicitor General had declared

less than a year earlier that "there is substantial disagreement among
jurists as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional measures is
binding . . . The better reasoned position is that such an order is not
binding."

113. It is also noteworthy that the Governor of Arizona, to whom the LAGRAND (AKRET) 507

((transmettre la présente ordonnance au gouverneur de 1'Etat de 1'Ari-
zona)). Les renseignements demandés quant aux mesures prises en appli-

cation de l'ordonni~nce ont étéfournis à la Cour par une lettre du
8 mars 1999 du conseiller juridique de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis aux
Pays-Bas. Aux termes de cette lettre, le département d'Etat a transmis, le
3 mars 1999, copie de I'ordonnance de la Cour au gouverneur de 1'Ari-
zona. «Vu l'heure extrêmement tardive à laquelle l'ordonnance de la
Cour a étéreçue)), est-il expliquédans la lettre du 8 mars, ((aucune autre

démarche n'a pu être entreprise)).
Les autorités des Etats-Unis se sont ainsi limitéesà transmettre le texte
de l'ordonnance au gouverneur de l'Arizona. C'était là certainement
satisfaire aux conditions poséesdans la seconde des deux mesures indi-
quées. Quant à la première mesure, la Cour relève qu'ellene créait pas
une obligation de résultat, mais qu'il était demandé aux Etats-Unis de

((prendre toutes les mesures dont ils disposent pour que M. Wal-
ter LaGrand ne soit:pas exécutétant que la décisiondéfinitiveen la pré-
sente instance n'aura[it] pas été rendue)).La Cour reconnaît que, en rai-
son de la ~résentation extrêmement tardive de la demande en indication
de mesures conserv;atoires, il est certain que les autorités des Etats-Unis

ont disposéde très peu de temps pour agir.
112. La Cour relève néanmoins que la simple transmission de son
ordonnance au gouverneur de l'Arizona, sans l'accompagner d'aucun
commentaire, sans mêmedemander en particulier de surseoir temporai-
rement à I'exécutioriet sans expliquer qu'il n'existait pas de consensus sur
la position des Etats-Unis selon laquelle les ordonnances de la Cour

internationale de Justice indiquant des mesures conservatoires n'ont pas
force obligatoire, était assurément trèsen deçà de ce que l'on aurait pu
attendre desautoritésdes Etats-Unis, dans les délais - si brefs eussent-ils
été - dont elles disposaient. Il en va de mêmede la déclaration catégo-
rique faite par le Solicitor Genrrul, dans la brève lettre qu'il a adresséeà
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis, selon laquelle «une ordonnance de la

Cour internationale de Justice en indication de mesures conservatoires ne
revêtpas un caractère obligatoire et ne peut fonder un recours susceptible
d'êtreexercé enjusi.ice)>(voir paragraphe 33 ci-dessus). Cette déclaration
allait considérablement plus loin que celle figurant dans le mémoiresou-
mis par les Etats-Unis à titre d'amicus curiue dans le cadre d'un recours
antérieur devant la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis en l'affaire relative à

Angel Francisco Breard (voir Brcard c. Greene, Cour suprême des Etats-
Unis, 14 avril 1998, Internationul Lcgul Mutrriuls, vol. 37, 1998, p. 824;
mémoire de I'Allennagne, annexe 34), auquel elle se borne à faire réfé-
rence dans une simple note au bas de sa lettre. Dans ce mémoire,le même
Solicitor Gcnerul avait en effet déclarémoins d'un an auparavant que
((quant à l'effet obligatoire qu'aurait une ordonnance en indication de

mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour internationale de Justice, les
juristes sont profondément divisés sur cette question ...La thèse la
meilleure est qu'une telle ordonnance n'a pas un caractère obligatoire.))
113. Il y a par a.illeurs lieu de relever que le gouverneur de l'ArizonaCourt's Order had been transmitted, decided not to give effect to it, even
though the Arizona Clemency Board had recommended a stay of execu-
tion for Walter LaGrand.

114. Finally, the United States Supreme Court rejected a separate

application by Germany for a stay of execution, "[gliven the tardiness of
the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate". Yet it would
have been open to the Supreme Court, as one of its members urged, to
grant a preliminary stay, which would have given it "time to consider,
after briefing from al1 interested parties, the jurisdictional and interna-
tional legal issues involved .. ." (FedercrlRrpuhlic of German?;et al. v.
United States rt czl.United States Supreme Court, 3 March 1999).

115. The review of the above steps taken by the authorities of the
United States with regard to the Order of the International Court of Jus-
tice of3 March 1999 indicates that the various competent United States
authorities failed to take al1the steps they could have taken to give effect
to the Court's Order. The Order did not require the United States to
exercise powers it did not have: but it did impose the obligation to "take

al1measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings . ..". The Court finds that
the United States did not discharge this obligation.

Under these circumstances the Court concludes that the United States
has not complied with the Order of 3 March 1999.
116. The Court observes finally that in the third submission Germany

requests the Court to adjudge and declare only that the United States
violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order of
3 March 1999: it contains no other request regarding ihat violation.
Moreover, the Court points out that the United States was under great
time pressure in this case, due to the circumstances in which Germany
had instituted the proceedings. The Court notes moreover that at the
time when the United States authorities took their decision the question

of the binding character of orders indicating provisional measures had
been extensively discussed in the literature, but had not been settled by its
jurisprudence. The Court would have taken these factors into considera-
tion had Germany's submission included a claim for indemnification.

117. Finally, the Court will consider Germany's fourth submission, in
which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare

"that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it
will not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of
detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the
United States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of LAGRAND (ARRÉT) 508

auquel I'ordonnance de la Cour avait ététransmise a décidéde ne pas
donner suite à cette ordonnance, alors que la commission des grâces de

l'Arizona lui avait recommandé de surseoir à l'exécution de Walter
LaCrand.
114. Enfin, la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis a rejeté la demande de
l'Allemagne tendant également au sursis à l'exécution, «[e]u égard à la
tardiveté de la procédure engagéeet aux obstacles d'ordre juridictionnel

que cela soulève». Elle eût cependant pu, comme l'un de ses membres le
lui avait demandé, ordonner un sursis temporaire qui lui auraitdonné <<le
temps d'étudier, après avoir entendu toutes les parties concernées, les
questions juridictionnelles et les questions de droit international en jeii...
(R6publiyue ji.dirul~ d'Allenzugnr et autres 1.Etuts-Unis et autre. Cour
suprême des Etats-IJnis, 3 mars 1999).

115. L'examen des mesures prises par les autorités des Etats-Unis et
rappelées ci-dessusrévèleque les diverses autoritéscompétentesdes Etats-
Unis n'ont pas pris toutes les mesures qu'elles auraient pu prendre pour
donner effet à I'ordonnance que la Cour internationale de Justice a reri-
due le 3 mars 1999. Celle-ci n'exigeait pas des Etats-Unis qu'ils exercent
des pouvoirs qu'ils n'avaient pas; mais elle leur imposait effectivement

l'obligation de ((prendre toutes les mesures dont ils disposent pour que
M. Walter LaCrand ne soit pas exécutétant que la décisiondéfinitiveen
la présente instance [n'aurait] pas été rendue...)). La Cour estime que les
Etats-Unis ne se soi~tpas acquittés de cette obligation.
Dans ces conditions. la Cour conclut que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas res-
pectél'ordonnance du 3 mars 1999.

116. La Cour reli:vefinalement que dans sa troisièmeconclusion I'Alle-
magne demande seiilement à la Cour de dire et juger que les Etats-Unis
ont violé leur obligation juridique internationale de se conformer A
l'ordonnance du 3 imars 1999: ladite conclusion ne contient Das d'autre
demande au sujet cle cette violation. De plus, la Cour souligne que les
Etats-Unis étaientconfrontés en l'espèce a de fortes contraintes de temps,

résultant des conditions dans lesquelles l'Allemagne avait introduit I'ins-
tance. Elle relèveégalementqu'à l'époqueoù les autorités des Etats-Unis
ont pris leur décision la question du caractère obligatoire des ordon-
nances en indication de mesures conservatoires avait été abondamment
discutée dans la doctrine, mais n'avait pas ététranchée par la jurispru-
dence. La Cour aurait pris ces facteurs en considération si la conclu-

sion de l'Allemagne avait comporté une demande à fin d'indemnité.

117. La Cour examinera enfin la quatrième conclusion de l'Allemagne,
par laquelle cetted'erniéredemande à la Cour de dire et juger que:

«les Etats-Unis devront donner à l'Allemagne l'assurance qu'ils ne
répéteront pas de tels actes illicites et que, dans tous les cas futurs de
détention de reissortissants allemands ou d'actions pénalesa l'encon-
tre de tels ressfortissants, les Etats-Unis veilleront à assurer en droit the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. In particular in cases involving the death penalty, this
requires the United States to provide effective review of and
remedies for criminal convictions impaired by a violation of the
rights under Article 36."

118. Germany States that:

"[cloncerning the requested assurances and guarantees of non-repeti-
tion of the United States, they are appropriate because of the exist-
ence of a real risk of repetition and the seriousness of the injury
suffered by Germany. Further, the choice of means by which full
conformity of the futureconduct of the United States with Article 36
of the Vienna Convention is to be ensured may be left to the United
States."

Germany explains that :
"the effective exerciseof the right to consular notification embodied

in [Article36,]paragraph 2,requires that, where it cannot be excluded
that the judgment was impaired by the violation of the right to con-
sular notification, appellate proceedings allow for a reversal of the
judgment and for either a retrial or a re-sentencing".

Finally, Germany points out that its fourth submission has been so
worded "as to . ..leave the choice of means by which to implement the

remedy [it seeks]to the United States".
119. In reply, the United States argues as follows:
"Germany's fourth submission is clearly of a wholly different
nature than its first three submissions. Each of the first three sub-
missions seeks ajudgment and declaration by the Court that a viola-
tion of a stated international legal obligation has occurred. Such
judgments are at the core of the Court's function, as an aspect of
reparation.

.............................
In contrast, however, to the character of the relief sought in the
first three submissions, the requirement of assurances of non-repeti-
tion sought in the fourth submission has no precedent in the juris-
prudence of this Court and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction
and authority in this case. It is exceptional even as a non-legal

undertaking in State practice, and it would be entirely inappropriate
for the Court to require such assurances with respect to the duty to
inform undertaken in the Consular Convention in the circumstances
of this case." LAGRAND (ARRET) 509

et en pratique l'exercice effectif des droits visésà l'article 36 de la
convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires. En particulier
dans les cas où un accusé est passible de la peine de mort, cela

entraîne pour les Etats-Unis l'obligation de prévoir le réexamen
effectif des condamnations pénales entachées d'une violation des
droits énoncés 11l'article 36 de la convention, ainsi que les moyens
pour y porter remède.»

118. L'Allemagne expose que :

«[s]'agissant des assurances et garanties de non-répétitionà fournir
par les Etats-Unis, cette mesure est appropriée en raison de l'exis-
tence d'un véritablerisque de répétition etde la gravitédu préjudice
subi par l'Allemagne. En outre, les Etats-Unis peuvent se voir accor-

der le soin de choisir les moyens permettant d'assurer la pleine
conformité de leur comportement futur il l'égardde l'article 36 de la
convention de Vienne.»

Elle préciseque:

<l'exercice effectif du droit à la notification consulaire énoncéeau
paragraphe 2 [de l'article 361exige que, dans les cas où il n'est pas
exclu que lejugement prononcé soit viciépar la violation du droit à
la notification c:onsulaire, des procédures de recours permettent de
revenir sur la dkcision et soit de revoir le verdict de culpabilité, soit
de prononcer une autre peine)).

Enfin, l'Allemagne souligne que sa quatrième conclusion a étélibellée
«de façon à laisser a.ux Etats-Unis le choix des moyens propres à mettre

en Œuvre les mesures [qui leur sont demandées])).
119. En réponse, les Etats-Unis exposent ce qui suit :

<tLa quatrième conclusion de l'Allemagne est à l'évidenced'une
nature comp1èti:ment différente de celle des trois premières. Dans
chacune des trois premières conclusions, l'Allemagne demande à la
Cour un prononcé déclarant qu'il y a eu violation d'une obligation
juridique internationale déterminée. Pareils prononcés sont au cŒur

mème de la fonction de la Cour, représentant un aspect de la répara-
tion.
.............................

contrairement, toutefois, à la forme de réparation demandée dans
les trois premiéres conclusions, la demande d'assurances de non-
répétition formuléedans la quatrième est sans précédentdans lajuris-
prudence de la Cour et outrepasserait sa compétence et son pouvoir
en la présente affaire. Il est exceptionnel dans la pratique des Etats,

même à titre d'engagement non juridique, et il serait parfaitement
incongru pour la Cour d'exiger de telles assurances à propos de
l'obligation d'informer énoncéedans la convention sur les relations
consulaires, vu les autres circonstances de l'affaire. It points out that "US authorities are working energetically to
strengthen the regime of consular notification at the state and local level
throughout the United States, in order to reduce the chances of cases
such as this recurring" and adds that:

"the German request for an assurance as to the duty to inform
foreign nationals without delay of their right to consular noti-
fication . . .seeks to have the Court require the United States to

assure that it will never again fail to inform a German foreign
national of his or her right to consular notification",

and that "the Court is aware that the United States is not in a position to
provide such an assurance". The United States further contends that it
"has already provided appropriate assurances to Germany on this point".
Finally, the United States recalls that:

"[wlith respect to the alleged breach of Article 36, paragraph 2, . . .
Germany seeks an assurance that, 'in any future cases of detention
of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United
States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the
rights under Article 36'".

According to the United States,

"[such an assurance] is again absolute in character .. . [and] seeks to
create obligations on the United States that exceed those that are
contained in the Vienna Convention. For example, the requirement
of consular notification under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention applies when a foreign national is arrested, committed
to prison or to custody pending trial or detained in any other

manner. It does not apply, as the submission would have it, to any
future criminal proceedings. That is a new obligation, and it does
not arise out of the Vienna Convention."

The United States further observes that :
"[elven if this Court were to agree that, as a result of the application
of procedural default with respect to the claims of the LaGrands, the

United States committed a second internationally wrongful act, it
should limit that judgment to the application of that law in the
particular case of the LaGrands. It should resist the invitation to
require an absolute assurance as to the application of US domestic
law in al1 such future cases. The imposition of such an additional
obligation on the United States would .. . be unprecedented in inter-
national jurisprudence and would exceed the Court's authority and

jurisdiction."
120. The Court observes that in its fourth submission Germany seeks Ils font valoir que ((lesautoritésaméricaines s'emploient résolument à
renforcer l'application des règlesen matière de notification consulaire au
niveau des Etats et au niveau local sur tout [leur] territoire ...afin de
réduireles risques de voir se reproduire une situation comme celle))adve-
nue en l'espèceet ajoutent que:

«la demande d'assurance présentéepar l'Allemagne en ce qui
concerne l'obligation d'informer sans retard les ressortissants étran-
gers de leur droit ë notification consulaire ...tend à ce que la Cour
ordonne aux Etats-Unis d'assurer qu'ilsne manqueront plus jamais
d'informer un ressortissant étrangerallemand de son droit à la noti-
fication consulaire»,

et que: «la Cour sait bien qu'[ils]ne sont pas en mesure d'offrir une telle
assurance)). Ils soutiennent par ailleurs avoir((déjàfourni des assurances
appropriées à 1'Allernagnesur ce point)).
Enfin, les Etats-Unis rappellent que:

«[e]n ce qui concerne la violation alléguéedu paragraphe 2 de
l'article6 ...,[l']Allemagnecherche a obtenir l'assurance que, «dans
tous les cas f~iturs de détention de ressortissants allemands ou
d'actions pénal(-sà l'encontre de tels ressortissants, les Etats-Unis
veilleront à assurer en droit et en pratique l'exercice effectif des
droits visésa l'article36)).

Selon eux,
«[une telle mesi~re]est là encore d'un caractère absolu ..[et] tendà
créerpour [eux]des obligations excédantcellesqui sont prévuesdans
la convention de Vienne. Ainsi, la notification consulaire exigéepar

l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention s'ap-
plique aux cas ou un ressortissant étranger est arrêté, incarcéro éu
mis en étatde détentionpréventiveou autre. Elle ne s'applique pas,
comme le voutirait la conclusion de l'Allemagne, à toute future
action pénale. C'est là une nouvelle obligation, qui ne découlepas de
la convention de Vienne. ))
Les Etats-Unis font de surcroît observer que:

«[qluand bien nnême la Cour estimerait qu'en opposant la règlede la
carence procédurale aux recours des LaGrand les Etats-Unis ont
commis un deuxième acte internationalement illicite, elle devrait
limiter ce prononcé à l'application qui a été faitede cette règledans
le cas particulier desLaGrand. Elle doit résistera l'invitation qui lui
est faite de pretscrire une assurance absolue couvrant l'application

future par les Etats-Unis de leur droit interne dans toutes lesaffaires
de ce genre. Innposer une telle obligation additionnelle aux Etats-
Unis serait ...sans précédentdans la jurisprudence internationale et
outrepasserait le pouvoir et la compétencede la Cour. ))
120. La Cour relèveque, dans sa quatrième conclusion, l'Allemagneseveral assurances. First it seeks a straightforward assurance that the
United States will not repeat its unlawful acts. This request does not
specify the means by which non-repetition is to be assured.

Additionally, Germany seeks from the United States that

"in any future cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against
German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice
the effective exercise of the rightsunder Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations".

This request goes further, for, by referring to the law of the United States,
it appears to require specific measures as a means of preventing recur-

rence.
Germany finally requests that
"[iln particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the
United States to provide effective reviewof and remedies for crimi-
na1 convictions impaired by a violation of the rights under
Article 36".

This request goes even further, since it is directed entirely towards secur-
ing specificmeasures in cases involving the death penalty.

121. Turning first to the general demand for an assurance of non-
repetition, the Court observes that it has been informed by the United
States of the "substantial measures [which it is taking] aimed at
preventing any recurrence" of the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b).
Throughout these proceedings, oral as well as written, the United States
has insisted that it "keenly appreciates the importance of the Vienna
Convention's consular notification obligation for foreign citizens in
the United States as well as for United States citizens travelling and
living abroad"; that "effective compliance with the consular notification
requirements of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention requires constant

effort and attention"; and that

"the Department of State is working intensively to improve under-
standing of and compliance with consular notification and access
requirements throughout the United States, so as to guard against
future violations ofthese requirements".

The United States points out that
"[tlhis effort has included the January 1998publication of a booklet
entitled 'Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal,
State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officiais Regarding LAGRAND (ARRET) 511

veut obtenir plusieurs assurances. En premier lieu, elle veut obtenir des
Etats-Unis une assurance pure et simple qu'ils ne répéteront pas leurs
actes illicites. Cette demande ne précisepas les moyens à mettre en Œuvre

pour assurer la non-répétitionde tels actes.
En outre, I'Allemiigne cherche à obtenir des Etats-Unis que

«pour toutes les affaires futures impliquant la détention de ressor-
tissants allemands ou des actions pénales à leur encontre, le droit et
la pratique internes des Etats-Unis ne feront pas obstacle à l'exercice
effectif des droits prévusà I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne sur
les relations consulaires».

Cette demande va plus loin, dans la mesure où, en se référantau droit des
Etats-Unis, elle paraît appeler l'adoption de mesures spécifiques visant a
empêcherque de tels actes illicites se reproduisent.
L'Allemagne demande enfin que

«dans les cas où un accusé est passible de la peine de mort, cela
entraîne pour les Etats-Unis l'obligation de prévoir le réexamen
effectif des condamnations pénales entachées d'une violation des

droits énoncésà I'article 36 de la convention, ainsi que les moyens
pour y porter remède)).
Cette demande va encore plus loin, car elle tend exclusivement à ce que

des mesures spécifiqluessoient prises dans les cas où un accuséest passible
de la peine de mort.
121. Concernant tout d'abord la demande, de caractère général,visant
l'obtention d'une assurance de non-répétition, la Cour relève que les
Etats-Unis l'ont iniforméedes «mesures importantes [qu'ils prennent]

visant à empêcherque [cette violation de l'alinéa b) du paragraphe 1 de
I'article 361 se repr,oduise». Tout au long de la procédure, tant orale
qu'écrite, dans cette affaire, les Etats-Unis ont insisté sur le fait qu'ils
étaient(<profondémentconscients de l'importance de l'obligation de noti-
fication consulaire prévue par la convention de Vienne pour les citoyens
étrangers se trouvant aux Etats-Unis ainsi que pour les citoyens améri-

cains voyageant et demeurant à l'étranger)),((qu'il faut, pour assurer le
plein et entier respect des conditions qu'impose I'article 36de la conven-
tion de Vienne en matière de notification consulaire, déployer des efforts
constants et faire preuve d'une vigilance continuelle» et que

<<ledépartement d'Etat ne ménage aucun effort pour mieux faire
connaître et mieux faire respecter sur tout le territoire des Etats-Unis
les prescriptions applicables en matière de notification consulaire et
de communication entre consulats et ressortissants étrangers afin de
prévenir toute nouvelle violation de celles-ci)).

Les Etats-Unis soulignent que

«parmi ces efforts, on relève notamment la publication en jan-
vier 1998d'une brochure intitulée((Communicationsentre les consu-
lats et les ressortissants étrangers et informations à fournir aux uns Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular
Officials to Assist Them', and development of a small reference card
designed to be carried by individual arresting officers".

According to the United States, it is estimated that until now over 60,000
copies of the brochure as well as over 400,000 copies of the pocket card
have been distributed to federal, state and local law enforcement and
judicial officials throughout the United States. The United States is also
conducting training programmes reaching out to al1levels of government.
In the Department of State a permanent office to focus on United States

and foreign compliance with consular notification and access require-
ments has been created.

122. Germany has stated that it "does not consider the so-called
'assurances' offered by the Respondent as adequate". It says

"[v]iolations of Article 36 followed by death sentences and execu-
tions cannot be remedied by apologies or the distribution of leaflets.
An effective remedy requires certain changes in US law and practice".

In order to illustrate its point, Germany has presented to the Court a
"[llist of German nationals detained afterJanuary 1, 1998,who claim not
to have been informed of their consular rights". The United States has

criticized this list as misleading and inaccurate.

123. The Court notes that the United States has acknowledged that, in
the case of the LaGrand brothers, it did not comply with its obligations
to give consular notification. The United States has presented an apology
to Germany for this breach. The Court considers however that an apo-
logy is not sufficient in this case, as it would not be in other cases where

foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of their rights
under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been
subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties.
In this respect, the Court has taken note of the fact that the
United States repeated in al1phases of these proceedings that it is carry-
ing out a vast and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance by

its competent authorities at the federal as well as at the state and local
levels with its obligationunder Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
124. The United States has provided the Court with information,
which it considers important, on its programme. If a State, in proceed-
ings before this Court, repeatedly refers to substantial activities which it LACRAND (ARRÊT) 512

et aux autres: directives à l'intention des fonctionnaires fédéraux,
fonctionnaires des Etats, fonctionnaires locaux et autres fonction-
naires chargés de l'application des lois concernant les ressortissants

étrangers aux Etats-Unis et le droit des fonctionnaires consulaires de
leur prêter assistance)) et la mise au point d'une petite carte dont
seront porteurs les agents autorisés à procéder à des arrestations)).

D'aprésles Etats-Unis, on estime à l'heure actuelle à soixante mille exem-
plaires le nombre de:brochures diffuséeset à plus de quatre cent mille le
nombre de petites cartes remises aux agents de la force publique et aux
autorités judiciaires au niveau fédéral,au niveau des Etats et au niveau

local dans l'ensemblmdeu pays. Les Etats-Unis ont lancéen outre des pro-
grammes de formation s'adressant aux fonctionnaires à tous les échelons
de l'administration. Un bureau permanent chargé de veiller au respect
par les Etats-Unis et les pays étrangers de leurs obligations en matière de
notification et de communication consulaires a étécrééau sein du dépar-

tement d'Etat.
122. L'Allemagne:a déclaréqu'elle ne considérait pas «les prétendues
«assurances» proposées par le défendeur comme adéquates)). Elle ajoute
que

((lorsque des violations de I'article 36sont suivies par des condam-
nations à mort et des exécutions, il n'est pas possible, pour toute
mesure de réparation, de formuler des excuses ou de distribuer des

brochures. Pouir que la mesure soit efficace, il faut apporter certains
changements ail droit et à la pratique des Etats-Unis.))

Pour illustrer son propos, l'Allemagne a présenté à la Cour «une liste de
ressortissantsallema.nds mis en détention aux Etats-Unis après le le'jan-
vier 1998 qui affirment ne pas avoir été informésde leurs droits consu-
laires)). Les Etats-Unis ont critiqué cette liste comme fournissant des
informations trompeuses et inexactes.

123. La Cour relkve que les Etats-Unis ont reconnu, dans le cas des
frères LaGrand, qu'ils avaient manqué à leurs obligations en matière de
notification consulaire. Les Etats-Unis ont présentédes excuses à 1'Alle-
magne pour ce manquement. La Cour considère cependant que des
excuses ne suffisent pas en l'espèce, comme d'ailleurs chaque fois que

des étrangers n'ont pas étéaviséssans retard de leurs droits en vertu du
paragraphe 1de I'article 36de la convention de Vienne et qu'ils ont fait
l'objet d'une détention prolongée ou étécondamnés à des peines sévères.
A cet égard, la Cour a pris note du fait que, à tous les stades de la
procédure, les Etats-Unis ont rappelé qu'ils mettaient en Œuvre un pro-
gramme vaste et détaillépour assurer le respect par les autorités compé-

tentes, tant au niveau fédéralqu'au niveau des Etats et au niveau local,
de leurs obligations résultant de I'article 36de la convention de Vienne.
124. Les Etats-Unis ont communiqué à la Cour des informations
qu'ils jugent importantes sur leur programme. Or si, dans le cadre d'une
instance, un Etat fait référencede maniére répétée devant la Cour auxis carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certain obligations
under a treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through with
the efforts in this regard. The programme in question certainly cannot
provide an assurance that there will never again be a failure by the

United States to observe the obligation of notification under Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention. But no State could give such a guarantee and
Germany does not seek it. The Court considers that the commitment
expressed by the United States to ensure implementation of the specific
measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), must be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a

general assurance of non-repetition.

125. The Court will now examine the other assurances sought by Ger-
many in its fourth submission. The Court observes in this regard that it
can determine the existence of a violation of an international obligation.
If necessary, itcan also hold that a domestic law has been the cause of
this violation. In the present case the Court has made its findings of vio-

lations of the obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
when it dealt with the first and the second submission of Germany. But it
has not Sound that a United States law, whether substantive or pro-
cedural in character, is inherently inconsistent with the obligations
undertaken by the United States in the Vienna Convention. In the
present case the violation of Article 36, paragraph 2, was caused by the

circumstances in which the procedural default rule was applied, and
not by the rule as such.
In the present proceedings the United States has apologized to Ger-
many for the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1, and Germany has not
requested material reparation for this injury to itself and to the LaGrand
brothers. It does, however, seek assurances:

"that, in any future cases of detention or of criminal proceedings
against German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and

practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations",

and that
"[iln particular in cases involving thedeath penalty, this requires the
United States to provide effective review of and remedies for crimi-

na1 convictions impaired by the violation of the rights under
Article 36".

The Court considers in this respect that if the United States, notwith-
standing its commitment referred to in paragraph 124 above, should fail
in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German
nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals
concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and LAGRAND (ARRET) 513

activités substantielles auxquelles il se livre aux fins de mettre en Œuvre
certaines obligations découlantd'un traité,cela traduit un engagement de
sa part de poursuivre les efforts entrepris à cet effet. Certes, le pro-
gramme en cause ne peut fournir I'assurance qu'iln'y aura plusjamais de

manquement des autorités des Etats-Unis à l'obligation de notification
prévue à I'article 36 de la convention de Vienne. Mais aucun Etat ne
pourrait fournir une telle garantie, et l'Allemagnene cherche pasl'obte-
nir. La Cour estime que l'engagement prispar les Etats-Unis d'assurer la
mise en ceuvre des mesures spécifiquesadoptées en exécution de leurs
obligations au titre de l'alinéa du paragraphe 1de I'article 36 doit être
considérécomme satisfaisant a la demande de l'Allemagne visant à obte-
nir une assurance généralede non-répétition.
125. La Cour passera maintenant a l'examen des autres assurances
demandéespar l'Allemagnedans sa quatrièmeconclusion. A cet égard,la
Cour constate qu'elle peut établir la violation d'une obligation interna-
tionale. Si nécessaire,elle peut aussi constater qu'une loi interne a étéla
cause de cette violation. La Cour, en la présente instance, a conclu,

lorsqu'elle atraitéde la premièreet de la deuxième conclusion de 1'Alle-
magne, à la violation des obligations existant au titre de I'article 36de la
convention de Vienne. Mais ellen'a pas trouvéde loi américaine,de fond
ou de procédure, qui, par nature, soit inconipatible avec les obligations
que la convention de Vienne impose aux Etats-Unis. En la présenteins-
tance, la violation du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 a découlé des circons-
tances dans lesquell~rsa été appliquée lrèglede la carence procédurale,
et non de la règleelle-même.
Les Etats-Unis ont en l'espèceprésenté leursexcuses à l'Allemagne
pour la violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 et l'Allemagne n'apas
sollicitéréparationinatérielledu préjudicesubi tant par elle que par les
frèresLaGrand. Elle n'en cherche pas moins à obtenir l'assurance que:

((dans tous lescas futurs de détentionde ressortissants allemands ou
d'actions pénalesi l'encontre de tels ressortissants, les Etats-Unis
veille[ntà assurer, en droit et en pratique, l'exercice effectifdes
droits visés l'article 36 dela convention de Vienne sur les relations
consulaires»

et que

«[e]nparticulieir,dans lescas où un accuséest passible de la peine de
mort, cela entraîne pour les Etats-Unis l'obligation de prévoir le
réexamen effectif des condamnations pénalesentachéesd'une viola-
tion des droits énoncésà I'article 36 de la convention, ainsi que les
moyens pour y porter remède)).
La Cour estime à cet égard que,si les Etats-Unis, en dépitde l'engage-
ment viséau paragraphe 124ci-dessus, manquaient à leur obligation de

notification consulaire au détriment de ressortissants allemands, des
excuses ne suffiraient pas dans les cas où les intéressésauraient fait
l'objet d'une détention prolongéeou étécondamnés à des peines sévères.sentenced to severe ena alti eIn the case of such a conviction and sen-
tence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review

and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of
the violation of the rights setforth in the Convention.This obligation can
be carried out in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the
United States.
126. Given the foregoing ruling by the Court regarding the obligation

of the United States under certain circumstances to review and reconsider
convictions and sentences, the Court need not examine Germany's further
argument which seeks to found a like obligation on the contention that
the right of a detained person to be informed without delay pursuant to
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention is not only an indi-
vidual right but has today assumed the character of a human right.

127. In reply to the fourth submission of Germany, the Court will
therefore limit itself to taking note of the commitment undertaken by the
United States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted

in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of
the Vienna Convention, as well asthe aforementioned duty of the United
States to address violations of that Convention should they still occur in
spite of its efforts to achieve compliance.

128. For these reasons,

(1)By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 1of the Optional
Protocol concerning theCompulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the

Application filed by the Federal Republic of Germany on 2 March 1999;

IN FAVOUR :President Guillaume; Vice-Prrsident Shi; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINST : Judge Parra-Aranguren ;
(2)(a) By thirteen votes to two,

Find shat the first submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is
admissible ;

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi ; Judgrs Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek,Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINST : Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren ; LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 514

Dans le cas d'une telle condamnation, les Etats-Unis devraient permettre
le réexamenet la revision du verdict de culpabilité et de la peine en tenant

compte de la violati.on des droits prévus par la convention. Cette obliga-
tion peut êtremise en Œuvre de diverses façons. Le choix des moyens doit
revenir aux Etats-C nis.

126. Etant donné,laconclusion a laquelle elle est ainsi parvenue concer-
nant l'obligation pour les Etats-Unis, dans certaines circonstances, de

réexaminer et de reviser le verdict de culpabilité et la peine, point n'est
besoin pour la Cour d'examiner l'argumentation supplémentaire de 1'Alle-
magne tendant à fonder une telle obligation sur le fait que le droit d'une
personne détenue d'êtreinforméesans retard aux termes du paragraphe 1
de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne ne serait pas seulement un droit
individuel, mais aurait aujourd'hui acquis le caractère d'un droit de

l'homme.
127. En réponse à la quatrième conclusion de l'Allemagne, la Cour se
bornera donc a prendre acte de l'engagement pris par les Etats-Unis
d'assurer la mise en Œuvre des mesures spécifiquesadoptées en exécution
de leurs obligations au titre de l'alinh) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36

de la convention de Vienne, ainsi que de l'obligation susviséequ'ont les
Etats-Unis de prendre les mesures qui s'imposent en cas de violation de
cette convention, si de telles violations se produisaient en dépitdes efforts
déployéspour en assurer le respect.

128. Par ces motifs,

1) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit qu'elle a cornipétence,sur la base de l'article premier du protocole

de signature facultative concernant le règlement obligatoire des diffé-
rends à la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires du 24 avril
1963, pour connaître de la requête déposéepar la République fédérale
d'Allemagne le 2 mars 1999;

POUR :M. Guillaunie,président;M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Oda, Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin, MmeHiggins,
MM. Kooijman:~,Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
CONTRE : M. Parra-Aranguren ;

2) a) Par treize voix contre deux,
Dit que la premiere conclusion de la République fédérale d'Allemagne

est recevable;
POUR M: . Guillaume,président;M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Bedjaoui,Ran-
jeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mme Higgins,
MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
CONTRE : MM. Oda, Parra-Aranguren ; (6) By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that the second submission of the Federal Republic of Germany
is admissible ;

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda;
(c) By twelve votes to three,

Finds that the third submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is

admissible;
IN FAVOUR : Pre~ident Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi ; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh;

AGAINST: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal;

(d) By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that the fourth submission of the Federal Republic of Germany
is admissible;

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-President Shi ; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda;

(3) By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay
following their arrest of their rights under Article 36, paragraph I (b), of

the Convention, and by thereby depriving the Federal Republic of Ger-
many of the possibility, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance pro-
vided for by the Convention to the individuals concerned, the United
States of America breached its obligations to the Federal Republic of
Germany and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 1;

IN FAVOURP :resident Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINST J:udge Oda;

(4)By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in
the light of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the convictions
and sentences of the LaGrand brothers after the violations referred
to in paragraph (3) above had been established, the United States

of America breached its obligation to the Federal Republic of Ger- 6) Par quatorze voix contre une,

Dit que la deuxième conclusion de la République fédéraled'Allemagne
est recevable;

roi R: M. Guillaume. prfisident; M. Shi, vic-e-président;MM. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczcgh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, MlncHiggins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

CONTRE: M. Oda:
c) Par douze voix contre trois.

Dit que la troisième conclusion de la République fédéraled'Allemagne
est recevable;

POUR:M. Guillaume, président; M. Shi, vice-prfisidelrrzt; M. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczcgh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mm' Higgins,
MM. Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh ;

CONTRE M:M. Oda, Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal;

(1) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Dit que la quatrième conclusion de la République fédéraled'Alle-
magne est recevable;

POLIRM : . Guillaume, président; M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mn" Higgins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

CONTRE: M. Oda;

3) Par quatorze voix contre une,

Dit que, en n'informant pas sansretard Karl et Walter LaGrand, après
leur arrestation, des droits qui étaient les leurs en vertu de l'ab)ndu
paragraphe I de l'article 36 de la convention et en privant de ce fait la
République fédérale d'Allemagne de la possibilité de fournir aux intéres-
sés,en temps oppoirtun, l'assistance prévue par la convention, les Etats-
Unis d'Amérique oint violéles obligations dont ils étaient tenus envers la

République fédéraled'Allemagne et envers les frères LaGrand en vertu
du paragraphe 1de l'articl36;
POUR : M. Guillaume, président: M. Shi, vice-président MM. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, MmeHiggins,

MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
CONTRE M:. Oda;

4) Par quatorze ,voixcontre une,

Dit que, en ne permettant pas, a la lumière des droits reconnus par la
convention, le réexamen et la revision des verdicts de culpabilité des
frères LaGrand et tie leurs peines, une fois constatées les violations rap-
pelées au paragraphe 3) ci-dessus, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont violé

l'obligation dont ilrsétaient tenus envers la République fédéraled'Alle-many and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 2, of

the Convention;
IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-Presihnt Shi; Jutlges Bedjaoui,

Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda ;

(5)By thirteen votes to two,

Finds that, by failing to take al1measures at its disposal to ensure that

Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the case, the United States of America
breached the obligation incumbent upon it under the Order indicating
provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999;

IN FAVOURP :iesident Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,
Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

AGAINSJ Tu:dges Oda, Parra-Aranguren;

(6) Unanimously,

Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of
America to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in

performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Convention; andfinds that this commitment must be regarded as meeting
the Federal Republic of Germany's request for a general assurance of
non-repetition ;

(7)By fourteen votes to one,

Finds that should nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany

nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention having been respected,
the United States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow
the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in that Convention.

IN FAVOUR : President Guillaume ; Vice-Presidetzt Shi; Judges Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-

Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of June, two thou-
sand and one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives LAGRAND (ARRÊT) 516

magne et envers lei, frères LaGrand en vertu du paragraphe 2 de I'ar-
ticle 36 de la convention;

POUR:M. Guillaume, président; M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, MmeHiggins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

CONTRE M:. Oda:

5) Par treize voir; contre deux,

Dit que, en ne primant pas toutes les mesures dont ils disposaient pour
que Walter LaCrand ne soit pas exécutétant que la Cour internationale
de Justice n'aurait pas rendu sa décision définitive en l'affaire, les Etats-
Unis d'Amérique o.nt violél'obligation dont ils étaient tenus en vertu de
l'ordonnance en indlication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour

le3 mars 1999:
POUR:M. Guillaume, président; M. Shi, ilice-président;MM. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh. Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mm' Higgins,
MM. Kooijmans. Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;

<olu~ut:MM. Oda, Parra-Aranguren ;

6) A l'unanimité.,

Prend clcte de l'engagement pris par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique d'assu-
rer la mise en Œuvre des mesures spécifiques adoptées en exécution de
leurs obligations au titre de l'alinb) du paragraphe 1de l'article 36 de
la convention; etdit que cet engagement doit êtreconsidérécomme satis-

faisant à la demande de la République fédéraled'Allemagne visant à
obtenir une assurarice généralede non-répétition;

7) Par quatorze voix contre une,

Dit que, si des ressortissants allemands devaient néanmoins être
condamnés à une peine sévèresans que les droits qu'ils tiennent de I'ali-
néah) du paragra~lhe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention aient été respec-
tés,les Etats-Unis d'Amérique devront, en mettant en Œuvre les moyens

de leur choix, permettre le réexamen et la revision du verdict de culpabi-
litéet de la peine en tenant compte de la violation des droits prévus par
la convention.

POUR:M. Guillaume, prksident; M. Shi, vice-président;MM. Bedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Mm" Higgins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
CONTRE: M. Oda.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la

Paix, a La Haye, le vingt-sept juin deux mille un, en trois exemplaires,
dont l'un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres serontof the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the Government of the United States of
America, respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR:

Registrar.

President GUILLAUME makes the following declaration :

Subparagraph (7) of the operative part of the Court's Judgment envis-
ages a situation where, despite the commitment by the United States
noted by the Court in subparagraph (6), a severe penalty is imposed upon
a German national without his or her rights under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (h), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations having
been respected. The Court states that, in such a case, "the United States,

by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration
of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the
rights set forth in that Convention".
This subparagraph represents a response to certain submissions by
Germany and hence rules only on the obligations of the United States in
cases of severe penalties imposed upon German nationals.

Thus, subparagraph (7) does not address the position of nationals of
other countries or that of individuals sentenced to penalties that are not
of a severe nature. However, in order to avoid any ambiguity, it should
be made clear that there can be no question of applying an a contrario
interpretation to this paragraph.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

Vice-President SHIappends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judge ODAappends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judges KOROMAand PARRA-ARANGIJREaN ppend separate

opinions to the Judgment of the Court; Judge BUERGENTHA aLpends a
dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initiulled) G.G.

(Initialled) Ph.C.transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République fédérale

d'Allemagne et au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Le président,
(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

Le greffier,

(SignL;) Philippe COUVREUR.

M. GUILLAUME p,résident, fait la déclaration suivante:

L'alinéa7) du dispositif de l'arrêtde la Cour envisage le cas où, malgré
l'engagement des Etats-Unis dont la Cour a pris acte à l'alinéa6),des
ressortissants allemands seraient condamnés à une peine sévèresans que
les droits qu'ils tiennent de l'al6)édu paragraphe 1de l'articl36 de
la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires aient été respectés.

La Cour dit qu'en pareille hypothèse «les Etats-Unisdevront, en mettant
en Œuvre les moyei~sde leur choix, permettre le réexamen et la revision
du verdict de culpabilité et de la peine en tenant compte de la violation
des droits prévuspar la convention)).
Cet alinéadu dispositif répond à certaines conclusions de l'Allemagne
et statue de ce fait exclusivement sur les obligations des Etats-Unis dans

le cas où des ressortissants allemands seraient condamnésiides peines
sévères.
L'alinéa 7)ne se prononce donc pas sur la situation des ressortissants
d'autres pays ou sur celle de personnes condamnées a des peines n'ayant
pas un caractère sitvère. En vue cependant d'éviter toute ambiguïté, il
convient de préciser qu'il ne saurait faire l'objet d'une interprétation u

c'ontrario.

(Signi.) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

M. SHI, vice-préisident,joint à I'arrêtl'exposéde son opinion indivi-

duelle; M. ODA, juge, joint à I'arrêt l'expode son opinion dissidente;
MM. KOROMA et PARRA-ARANGURE jg, s. joigneniiI'arrêtles exposés
de leur opinion individuelle; M. BUERGENTHAjL u,ge, joint à I'arrêt
l'exposéde son opinion dissidente.

(Paraphi.) G.G.

(Puruphk) Ph.C.

ICJ document subtitle

Mertis

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 27 June 2001

Links