INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASECONCERNINGTHE LAND,ISLAND AND
MARITIME FRONTIER DISPUTE
(EL SALVADOWHONDURAS)
APPLICATION BY NICARAGUA FOR PERMISSION
TO INTERVENE
JUDGMENT OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1990
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER
TERRESTRE, INSULAIRE ET MARITIME
(EL SALVADOWHONDURAS)
REQUÊTE DU NICARAGUA À FIN D'INTERVENTION
ARRÊT DU 13 SEPTEMBRE1990 Officia1citation :
Land,Islandand MaritimeFrontierDispute (ElSalvador/Honduras),
ApplicationtoZntewene,Judgment,I.C.J.Repo,. 92990p
Mode officiel de ci:ation
Différendfrontalietrerrestre,insulaireetmaritime(ElSalvador/Honduras),
requête$n d'intervention,t,.. ecueil1990,p.92
Salesnumber
Nodeven:e 584 1 INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE
YEAR 1990
~enêra Llist
No. 75
13 September1990
CASECONCERNINGTHE LAND, ISLAND AND
MARITIMEFRONTIER DISPUTE
(ELSALVADORIHONDURAS)
APPLICATION BYNICARAGUAFORPERMISSION
TO INTERVENE
InterventionunderArticle62of theStatute.
Article81of theRulesof Court- Timelinessof theApplicationforpermission to
intervene- Applicationfiled ut advanced stage of the proceedingscontaining
requestfor changingcompositionofChamberoritsmandate - Whetherdefinition
of disputebyprior negotiationonsubjectof interventionecessary.
Significancefor thepresentApplicationofdecisionincaseconcemingMonetary
GoldRemovedfromRome in1943.
Interest of a legalnature whichrnaybe affected by the decisionin the-case
Limits on scopeofpennitted interventi-n Burden ofproof on State seeking to
intervene.
InterestassertedbyNicaragua - WhetherNicaraguaninterestofa legalnature
rnaybe affectedby decisiononclaimby oneParty that thereexistsin Gulfof Fon-
seca "condominium"of riparianStates and claimby otherPartythat thereexists
"communityof interests" betweenthoseStates- Whethersufficient demonstra-
tionof affectedinterestof a legalnatureof Nicaraguaindelimitationof maritime
spaceswithin theGulf- Whetherinterestingeneral legalrulesandprinciplessu$
ficient- Whethersufficientdemonstrationof affectedinterestofa legalnatureof
Nicaraguainquestionof entitlementof PartiesoutsideGulfto territorialsea,con-
tinentalshelfor exclusiveonomiczone, andpossibledecisionon delimitation.
Objectof interventio- Objectof informingthe Courtof natureof legalrights
of Nicaraguawhich rnaybe in issue Objectofprotectinglegalrightsby al1legal
4meansavailable - No requestbyState seekingtointerveneforjudicialpronounce-
ment on itsownclaims.
Whethera validlink ofjurisdiction betweenState seeking to interveneand the
parties isarequirementfor interventio- Relationshipbetweeninterventionand
theprincipleof consensualjurisdicti-n Permissiontointervenedoesnot of itself
make thepermitted State aparty to thecase.
Proceduralrightsof Statepermitted to intervene.
JUDGMENT
Present: Judge SETTE-CAMAR Pre,sident of the Chamber; Judges ODA,
Sir Robert JENNINGS J;udges ad hoc VALTICOT S, RRESBERNARDEZ;
R~~~s~~~~VALENCIA-OSPINA.
In the case concemingthe land, island and maritimefrontierdispute,
between
the Republic of El Salvador,
represented by
Dr. Alfredo Martinez Moreno,
as Agent and Counsel,
H.E. Mr.Roberto Arturo Castrillo Hidalgo, Ambassadorto the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent,
and
H.E. Dr. José ManuelPacas Castro, Minister for Foreign Relations,
assistedby
Mr. Keith Highet, Adjunct Professor of International Law at the Fletcher
School of Lawand Diplomacy and Member ofthe Barsof New York and
the District of Columbia,
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Director of the Research Centre for
International Law, University of Cambridge, Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus at Universitéde droit, d'économieet
de sciencessocialesde Paris,
as Counseland Advocates,
and
Mr. Anthony J.Oakley,
Lic.Celina Quinteros,
Lic.Ana Elizabeth VillaltaVizcara,
as Counsellors,
and
the Republic of Honduras,represented by
H.E. Dr. Ramon Valladares Soto,Ambassador to the Netherlands,
as ~~ent,
assisted by
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., Ll.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of
International Law,Universityof Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocate,
and
Mr. Arias de Saavedray Muguelar, Minister, Embassyof Honduras at The
Hague,
Mrs. SaloméCastellanos,MinisterCounsellor,Embassyof Honduras at The
Hague,
as Advisers,
Upon the Applicationforpermission to intervenesubmitted by the Republic
of Nicaragua,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Carlos Argüello Gbmez, Ambassador,
as Agent and Counsel,
assistedby
Mr. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., F.B.A, Chichele Professor of Public International
Law,Universityof Oxford; Fellowof Al1Souls College,Oxford,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotons,Professor of PublicInternational Law,Univer-
sidad Autonoma de Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates,
THE CHAMBE ORF THEINTERNATION CAOLURTOF JUSTICfEormed to deal with
theabove-mentioned case,
composed as above,
after deliberation,
deliversthfollowingJudgment :
1. Byajoint notification dated 11December 1986,filed inthe Registryofthe
Courtthe same day,the Ministersfor Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hon-
duras and the Republic of El Salvadortransmitted to the Registrara certified
copy of a Special Agreement in the Spanish language entitled~OMPROMISO
ENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETER A LA DECISION DE LA CORTE
INTERNACIONAL DEJUSTICIALA CONTROVERSIA FRONTERIZATERRESTRE,INSULAR Y
MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS ESTADOS, SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE
ESQUIPULAS,REPUBLICADE GUATEMALA,ELDIA 24 DEMAYO DE 1986';and entering
into force on 1October 1986.
2. The Parties have not up to the present supplied the Court with an agreed
translation of the Special Agreement into one of the officia1languages of the
Court, and neither Party has submitted a translation of its own.
3. The Spanishtext of the SpecialAgreement reads as follo:s "COMPROMISOENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETERA LA DECI-
SION DE LA CORTE INTERNACIONALDE JUSTICIALA CONTROVERSIA FRONTERIZA
TERRESTRE, INSULAR Y MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS ESTADOS,
SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE ESQUIPULAS, REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA, EL DIA
24 DE MAYO DE 1986
El GobiernodelaRepdblicadeHondurasy elGobiernodelaRepublicade
El Salvador,
Considerandoque el 30de octubrede 1980,en la ciudadde Lima, Peni,
suscribieronelTratadoGeneraldePaz,pormediodelmal, interalia,delimi-
taron la frontera terrestrede ambas Republicas en aquellasseccionesen
dondeno existia controversia;
Considerandoquedentrodelplazoprevistoenlosarticulos19y 31delTra-
tadoGeneraldePaz,de30deoctubrede 1980,noseIlegba unarreglodirecto
sobre las diferenciasde limites existentescon respect0a las demas zonas
terrestresen controversia,y e10 relativoa la situacibnjuridica insulary de
losespaciosmaritimos;
Han designado como sus respectivosPlenipotenciarios,Honduras al
SeiiorMinistro de RelacionesExteriores,AbogadC oarlos LhpezContreras,y
El Salvador al Seiïor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Licenciado
RodolfoAntonioCastilloClaramount,quienes,una vezencontradosenbuena
y debidaforma susPlenosPoderes;
CONVIENENEN LO SIGUIENTE:
Articulol0
Constitucionde unaSala
1. En aplicacibndel Articulo 34 del Tratado Generalde Paz suscrito el
30 de octubrede 1980,las Partessometen las cuestionesmencionadasen el
ArticuloSegundodelpresenteCompromisea unaSala delaCorteInternacio-
na1deJusticia, compuestapor tresmiembros,conla anuenciade lasPartes,
las males la expresaranenforma conjuntaal Presidentede la Corte,siendo
estaconformidadesencialparala integracibndelaSala,queseconstituirade
acuerdoa losProcedimientosestablecidosenelEstatuto de la Cortey en el
presenteCompromiso.
2.Adicionalmente, integraranla Sala dosjueces ad-hoc especialmente
nombradosunoporElSalvador y otroporHonduras;losquepodrantenerla
nacionalidadde lasPartes.
Articulo2O
Objetodellitigio
Las Partessolicitana laSala :
1. Quedelimitela Iineafronteriza en las zonOssecciones nodescritasen
elArticulo16del TratadoGeneraldePaz,de 30de octubrede 1980.
2. Que determinelasituacibnjuridica insulary de losespaciosmaritimos.
Articulo3O
Procedimiento
1. Lus Partes solicitan ala Sala autorizarque elprocedimiento escrito
consistaen :a) una Memoria presentadapor cada una de las Partes, a mas tardar diez
mesesdespuésde lanotificacibnde esteCompromisoa laSecretariade la
CorteInternacionaldeJusticia;
b) una Contramemoriapresentadapor cadauna de lasPartes, amas tardar
diezmesesdespuésde lafecha enquesehaya recibidolacopiacertificada
de laMemoria delaotraParte;
c) unaréplica presentadaporcadauna delasPartes,amas tardardiezmeses
despuésde la fecha en que se haya recibido lacopia certificada de la
ContramemoriadelaotraParte;
d) la Cortepodra autorizar, Oprescribirlapresentacibnde una Dhplica,si
lasPartes estandeacuerdoa esterespect0 OsilaCortedecidede oficioO a
solicitudde una de las Partes si estapieza deprocedimiento es necesaria.
2. Las piezas antes mencionadasdelprocedimientoescritoy sus anexos
presentadas al Secretario,no seran trasmitidas a la otra Parte, en tanto el
Secretarionohayarecibidolapieza deprocedimientocorrespondientea dicha
parte.
3. Elprocedimiento oral,la notificacibndelnombramientode losrespecti-
vosagentesdelasPartesy cualesquieraotrascuestionesprocesales,seajusta-
ran a 10dispuestoen elEstatutoy elReglamentode la Corte.
Articulo4O
Idiomas
El casose ventilaraen losidiomasinglésyfiancés, indistintamente.
Articulo5O
Derecho aplicable
Dentro del marcodel apartadoprimer0 delArticulo 38 delEstatuto de la
CorteIntemacionaldeJusticia,laSala,aldictarsufallo, tendraencuentalas
normasde derechointemacionalaplicablesentrelasPartes,incluyendo,enIo
pertinente,lasdisposicionesconsignadasen el Tratadogeneralde Paz.
Articulo6O
Ejecuciondela Sentencia
1. Las Partes ejecutaranla sentenciade la Sala en un todo y con entera
buenafe. A estefin, la ComisibnEspecialde Demarcacibnque establecieron
medianteel Conveniode II defebrero de 1986,iniciara lademarcacionde la
Iineafronteriza$~adapor lasentencia,amas tardartresmesesdespuésde la
fecha de la misma y continuara diligentemente sus actuaciones hasta
concluirla.
2. Parata1efecto,seaplicaranlasreglasestablecidassobre lamateria,enel
mencionadoConveniode creacibnde la ComisionEspecialde Demarcacibn.
Articulo7O
Entradaenvigor y Registro
1. ElpresenteCompromisoentraraenvigorel l0deoctubrede 1986,unavez
quese haya cumplidoconlosprocedimientosconstitucionalesde cadaParte.
2. Sera registradoen la Secretaria Generalde las Naciones Unidas de
conformidadcon elArticulo 102delaCartadelaNacionesUnidas,conjunta-
mente Opor cualquierade las Partes.Al mismo tiempo se hara del conoci-
mientode la OrganizacibndelosEstadosAmericanos. Articulo S0
Notificacibn
1. En aplicacibndel Articulo 40 del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional
deJusticia,elpresenteCompromisoseranotificadoalSecretariode la misma
por nota conjuntade las Partes. Esta notzjïcacionse efectuaraantes del
31 de diciembrede 1986.
2. Si esa notzjicacibnnose efectuade conformidadconel parrafoprece-
dente,elpresenteCompromisopodra ser notzjïcado alSecretariode la Corte
por cualquierade las Partes dentrodel plazode unmes siguiente alafecha
previstaenelparrafoanterior."
4. The Special Agreementwas, as indicated in its title, signed in the City of
Esquipulas,Republic of Guatemala, on 24May 1986;its preamble referstothe
conclusion on 30 October 1980,in Lima, Pem, of a General Peace Treaty
between the two States, whereby, interalia,they delimited certain sections of
their common land frontier; and the Special Agreement records that no direct
settlement had been achieved in respect of the remaining land areas, or as
regards "the legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces".
5. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court and
Article 42 ofthe Rules of Court, copies of the joint notification and Special
Agreement weretransmitted by the Registrar to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, the Membersofthe United Nationsand otherStatesentitledto
appear beforethe Court.
6. The Parties were dulyconsulted,on 17Febmary 1987,as to the composi-
tion of the chamber of the Court contemplated by the Special Agreement, in
accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 17,para-
graph 2,of the Rules of Court.
7. ThePartiesinthe course of such consultationconfirmed what wassaid in
the Special Agreement,that as regards the number ofjudges to constitute such
chamber, they approved, pursuant to Article 26 of the Statute, that number
being fixed atthreejudges withthe addition of twojudges adhocchosenbythe
Parties pursuant to Article 31,paragraph 3,of the Statute.
8. In March 1987the Court was notified of the choice by El Salvador of
Mr. Nicolas Valticosto sit as judge ad hocin the chamber; in April 1987,the
Court was notified of the choice by Honduras of Mr. Michel Virallyto sit as
judge ad hocin the chamber.
9. Byan Order of 8 May 1987the Court decidedto accede to the request of
the Parties to form a special chamber to deal with the case, and declared that
at an election held on 4 May 1987Judges Oda, Sette-Camara and Sir Robert
Jennings had been electedto form, with the judges ad hocreferred to above,
a chamber to deal with the case, and declared further such a chamber to
havebeen dulyconstituted, withthe followingcomposition :JudgesOda, Sette-
Camara and Sir Robert Jennings and Judges ad hocValticos and Virally.On
29 May 1987 the Chamber elected Judge Sette-Camara as its President,
pursuant to Article 18,paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court.
10. Judge adhocvirally diedon 27January 1989,and by a letterdated 8 Feb-
mary 1989the Agentof Hondurasinformedthe Court that his Governmenthad
chosen Mr. SantiagoTorres Bernardezto sit asjudge ad hocin his place. Byan
Order dated 13 December 1989the Court declared the composition of the
Chamber formed to deal with the case to be as follows: Judge Sette-Camara,President of the Chamber; JudgesOda and SirRobertJennings;Judges ad hoc
Valticosand Torres Bernardez.
Il. By Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Special Agreeement the Parties
requested that the writtenproceedingsshould consist of a Memorial,a Coun-
ter-Memorial and a Reply to be filed by each of the Parties within time-limits
there stated,and the Special Agreementfurther provided that the Court might
authorize or directthe filing of Rejoinders.Byan Order dated 27May 1987,the
Court fixed the time-limit for the Memorials, and by an Order dated 29 May
1987the Chamber authorized the filing of Counter-Memorials and Replies
pursuant to Article92,paragraph 2,of theRulesof Court, and fixed time-limits
therefor.
12. The Memorials weredulyfiled withinthe time-limitof 1June 1988fixed
therefor.The time-limitsforthe remaining pleadings were,at the request of the
Parties,extended by Ordersmade bythe President ofthe Chamber on 12Janu-
ary 1989and 13December 1989.TheCounter-Memorialsand the Replieswere
dulyfiled within the extended time-limitsthus fixed, namely 10Febniary 1989
and 12January 1990respectively.TheSpecial Agreement,however,included a
provision for a possible further exchange of pleadings, so that even when the
Replies of the Partieshad been filed,the date of the closure of the written pro-
ceedings,within the meaning of Article 81,paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court,
would remain stillto be finallydetermined.
13. Pursuant to Article53,paragraph 1,ofthe Rulesof Court, requestsbythe
Govemments of Nicaragua and Colombiaforthepleadings and annexeddocu-
ments to be made available to them were granted,in the case of Nicaragua on
15June 1988,and inthe caseof Colombia on 27January 1989,and ineach case
after the views ofthe Partieshad been ascertained.
14. On 17November 1989the Republic of Nicaraguafiled in the Registryof
the Court an Applicationfor permission to intervene in the case,which Appli-
cationwasstatedto be made byvirtue of Article36,paragraph 1,and Article62
of the Statute of the Court. In that Application, the Govemment of Nicaragua
contended that itsrequestfor permissionto intenene, "not onlybecauseit isan
incidentalproceedingbut also for. ..reasons of elemental equity(that of con-
sent and that of the equality of States)", was"a matter exclusivelywithin the
procedural mandate of the fullCourt".
15. By an Order dated 28 Febmary 1990,the Court, after considering the
written observations of the Parties on the question thus raised, whether the
Application for permission to intervene was to be decided upon by the full
Court or by the Chamber, and the observations of Nicaragua in response to
those observations, stated that
"the question whether an applicationfor permission to intervene in a case
under Article 62 of the Statute shouldbe granted requires ajudicial deci-
sionwhetherthe Stateseekingto intenene 'hasan interest of a legalnature
which maybe affected by the decision'in the case,and can therefore only
be determined by the body which willbe called upon to givethe decision
on the merits of the case";
and found that it was for the Chamber formedto deal with the present case to
decide whetherthe Applicationby Nicaraguafor permissionto interveneunder
Article 62 of the Statute should be granted.
16. Pursuant to Article83,paragraph 1,ofthe Rulesof Court,thetwo Parties
wereon 5March 1990invitedto fumishtheir written observationsonthe Appli-cation for permission to intemene filed by Nicaragua on 17November 1989.
Both Parties submitted such observations within the time-limit fixed by the
President of the Chamber. Honduras stated that it would see no objection to
Nicaragua being permitted to intemene for the sole purpose of presenting its
viewson the legalstatus of the waters within the Gulf of Fonseca; El Salvador
requested the Chamber to denythe permission soughtby Nicaragua.
17.Sinceobjectionhad thus been made to the Applicationfor permission to
intervene, public sittingswere held, pursuant to Article 84,paragraph 2,of the
Rules of Court, in order to hear the State seekingto interveneand the Parties,
on 5,6, 7 and 8 June 1990.In the course of those sittings the Chamber was
addressed by:
ForNicaragua: H.E. Mr.Carlos ArgüelloGomez,
Mr.Ian Brownlie,
Mr.Antonio RemiroBrotons.
ForEISalvador: H.E. Dr. AlfredoMartinez Moreno,
Mr. Prosper Weil,
Mr.ElihuLauterpacht,
Mr. Keith Highet.
ForHonduras: H.E. Dr. Ramon ValladaresSoto,
Mr. DerekW.Bowett.
18. In its Application for permission to intemene, Nicaragua stated by way
of conclusion that it
"respectfully requests the Court to recognize the validity of Nicaragua's
claimto intemene inthe proceedings betweenthe Republic of ElSalvador
and the Republic of Honduras" (para. 20).
At the outset of the oral proceedings it was statedthat
"Nicaragua maintains,before this Chamber of the Court, its Applica-
tion for permissionto intemene but modified inthe sensethat the requests
made in Sections 23 and 24 of its original Application of 17 November
1989are not being submittedfor decision by this Chamber."
(The requests referred to are set out in paragraph 41below.)
19. Onbehalf of ElSalvador,the followingsubmissionwaspresented during
the oral proceedings:
"That the Application of the Republic of Nicaraguato intemene in the
case in process between El Salvadorand Honduras be rejected."
20. On behalf of Honduras, the following submission as to the Application
for permission to intervene was presented during the oralproceedings :
"First, Honduras would see no objection to Nicaragua being permitted
to intemene inthe existingcaseforthe sole purpose of expressingitsviews
on the legal status of the waters within the Gulf. Nicaragua has, under
Article 62,no right to intemene,and the Court in granting its permission,
may limit that permission to the extent necessary to safeguard the legal
interests of the requesting State. Indeed,it can be arguedthat the Court is
bound to impose such limitson its permission." 21.During the oral proceedings, both Parties also made clear their con-
tinued oppositionto the requests containedin paragraphs 23 and 24 of the
Nicaraguan Application (setout in paragraph41 below).
22. Nicaragua's requestto bepermittedto intervene isin respectofthe
proceedingsinstituted by the notification of the Special Agreement con-
cluded on 24 May 1986between El Salvador and Honduras. Article 2 of
the SpecialAgreement,which defines the subject ofthe dispute,reads,in
the original Spanish text, as follows:
"LasPartes solicitana laSala :
1. Quedelimitelalineafronterizaenlaszonas O seccionesnodescri-
tas en elArticulo16 del TratadoGeneralde Paz, de30 de octubrede
1980.
2. Quedeterminelasituacionjuridicainsulary delosespaciosmari-
timos."
As noted above (paragraph 2), the Parties have not so far supplied the
Chamber with an agreed translation of the Special Agreement into
English or French, notwithstandingthe fact that the Special Agreement
itselfprovides (Art. 4) for the proceedings to be conducted in English or
French.Forthe purposes ofthepresentJudgment, however,the Chamber
considers that it can make use of the followingtranslation of Article 2,
prepared by the Registryofthe Court :
"The Partiesrequestthe Chamber:
1. Todelimitthefrontier lineinthe areasorsectionsnotdescribed
in Article 16ofthe General PeaceTreaty of 30October 1980.
2. To determine the legal situation of the islands and maritime
~paces.~'
23. The dispute between El Salvador and Honduras which is the sub-
ject of the Special Agreement concerns several distinct though in some
respects interrelated matters. The Chamber is asked first to delimit the
land frontier line between the two States in the areas or sections not
described inArticle 16ofthe General PeaceTreatyconcluded bythem on
30October 1980;Nicaraguais not seekingto interveneinthisaspect ofthe
proceedings (paragraph 40 below). The Chamber is also to "determine
the legalsituation ofthe islands", and that ofthe "maritime spaces". The
geographical context of the island and maritime aspects of the dispute,
and the nature and extent of that dispute as appears from the Parties'
claimsbefore the Chamber, is as follows.
24. The Gulf of Fonseca lies on the Pacific coast of Central America,
opening to the ocean in a generally south-westerlydirection.The north-
Westcoast of the Gulf is the land territory of El Salvador, and the south-
east coast that of Nicaragua; the land territory of Honduras liesbetweenthe two,witha substantial coaston theinner part ofthe Gulf.Theentryto
the Gulf,between Punta Arnapala in El Salvador to the north-west, and
Punta Cosigüina in Nicaragua tothe south-east,issome 19nautical miles
wide.Thepenetration ofthe Gulffromalinedrawn betweenthesepoints
variesbetween30and 32nautical miles.Withinthe Gulf ofFonseca,there
is a considerablenumber ofislands and islets.
25. El Salvador recognizes the sovereignty of Honduras over
ZacateGrande,the largestisland ofthe Gulf, whichislinked by aroad to
the Honduran mainland, and asksthe Chamber to findthat
"El Salvador has and had sovereigntyover al1the islands inthe Gulf
of Fonseca,withthe exception ofthe Island of Zacate Grande which
can be consideredasforming part ofthe coast of Honduras".
Hondurasforits part invitesthe Chamberto find that theislands ofMean-
guera and Meanguerita are the only islands in dispute between the Par-
ties, so that the Charnber is not, according to Honduras, called upon to
determine sovereignty over any of the other islands, and to declare the
sovereignty of Honduras over Meanguera and Meanguerita. Although
the Farallones are not mentioned in their submissions, the Chamber
understands from the pleadings of the Parties and from their oral argu-
ments in the course of the present incidental proceedings that those
islands, which lie on Nicaragua's side ofthe Gulf,are excludedfromthe
claims of the Parties. Neither Party has laid claimto the Farallones, and
counselfor Nicaraguahas statedbefore the Chamber, withoutcontradic-
tion by either of the Parties, that Nicaragua's sovereigntyoverthe Faral-
loneshasbeen expresslyrecognizedbytheParties.Forthe purposes ofthe
present Application for permission to intervene, there appears to be no
need to determine atthis stagethe extentofthe Chamber'sjurisdiction in
respect ofthe islands ofthe Gulf; both Partiesare agreed that theCham-
ber should determine sovereignty over Meanguera and Meanguerita,
and - withthe exception ofthe Farallones - these arethe islandswhich
lie closestto the coast of Nicaragua.
26. The detailed history of the dispute is not here to theurpose, but
two events concerningthe maritime areas must be mentioned. First, the
waters within the Gulf of Fonseca between Honduras and Nicaragua
were to an important extent delimited in 1900 bya Mixed Commission
established pursuant to a Treaty concluded between the two States on
7 October 1894.Thepublished records ofthe delimitationestablished by
the Mixed Commission describe that delimitationlineas follows:
"DesdeelpuntoconocidoconelnombredeAmatillo,enlaparteinfe-
riordelno Negro,lalinealimitrofeesunarectatrazadaendireccibnal
volcandeCosigüina,con rumboastronbmicoSur,ochenta y seisgrados,
treintaminutosOeste(S.86" 30'O.),y distanciaaproximadadetreinta
y sietekilbmetros(37Kms)hastaelpuntomediodelabahiadeFonseca, 102 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
equidistantede lascostasde una y otraRepublica,por estelado;y de
estepunto,siguela divisiondelasaguasdelabahiaporunalinea,tam-
biénequidistantedelasmencionadascostas,hastallegaralcentrodela
distanciaquehayentrelaparte septentrionaldelaPuntadeCosigüina y
la meridional de la isla de El Tigre."("Limites definitivos entre
Honduras y Nicaragua", Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
1938,p. 24.)
[Translation]
"From the point known as Amatillo, in the lower reaches of the
RiverNegro,the delimitation isa straightlinedrawninthe direction
ofthevolcan0ofCosigüina,astronomicbearing south, 86degrees,30
minutes West(S.86" 30'W.),for a distance of approximately thirty-
sevenkilometres (37km)to the centralpoint of the Bay ofFonseca,
equidistant from the coasts of the two Republics, on thisde; and
from that point it followsthe division of the waters of the bay by a
line,alsoequidistantfrom the saidcoasts,to arriveatthecentreofthe
distance between the northern part of Punta de Cosigüina and the
southern part of the island of El Tigre."
There was some controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua at the
hearings as to the position of the seaward terminus of this delimitation
line,butitappears that forboth Statesthe lineesnot extend sofarasto
meet a closingline between Punta Amapala and Punta Cosigüina.
27. Thesecond eventto be mentioned isthe following.In 1916El Sal-
vador brought proceedings against Nicaragua in the Central American
Court ofJustice, claiming interaliathat the Bryan-Chamorro Treatycon-
cluded by Nicaragua withthe United States ofAmerica,forthe construc-
tion of a naval base, "ignored and violated the rights of-ownership
possessed by El Salvador in the Gulf of Fonseca". According to the
Judgement in the case,El Salvador'scontention was:
"Queporelhechodehaberpertenecidoesasaguas,porlargosaiïos,
a una sola entidadpolitica,cual era el dominio Espaiïolen Centro-
América y despuésa laRepublicaFederalCentroamericanar,esultauna
verdadconcluyenteque,disueltala Federacibnsin haberseefectuado
delimitacionentre los tresEstadosribereiïosrelativaa susoberania en
las aguasdelGolfo,han continuadoesostresEstadosconun dominio
comun en ellas." (Corte de Justicia Centroamericana, Sentencia,
9de marzo de 1917,p. 8.)
In an Englishtranslationpublished in 1917bythe LegationofElSalvador
in Washington, and printed inthe 1917volumeofthe AmericanJournalof
InternationalLaw:
"That because,foralongperiod ofyears,those watersbelongedto
a singlepolitical entity,to wit,the SpanishColonial Government in
Central America,and, later,to the FederalRepublic ofthe Center of103 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDUR (AUDGMENT)
America,the fact conclusivelyresults that, on the dissolution of the
federation without having effected a delimitation among the three
riparian States of their sovereigntytherein, the ownership of those
waters continued in common in those three States." (AJIL, 1917,
p. 677.)
Nicaragua appeared in the proceedings and resisted the claim, contend-
ing (interalia)
"que las antiguasprovincias espariolad se Nicaragua, Honduras y
ElSalvador,porsu adyacencia,son dueriasdel Golfo,en elsentidode
queacadaunacorrespondeunapartedeé1;pero noenelsentidode que
poresoexistaentrelasreferidasRepublicas,unacomunidadenlaacep-
cidnjundica delapalabra.Huy indemarcaciondefronteras,10cual es
distintodedominio comun"(CJC,Sentencia,p. 20),
i.e.,that
"the ancient Spanish provinces of Nicaragua,Honduras and El Sal-
vador, by reason of the fact that they are adjacent,are owners of the
Gulf in thesensethat to each belongs a part thereof, but not in the
sensethat, thereby, a communityinthe legalacceptation ofthe word
exists among those republics. Demarcation of frontiers therein is
lacking; but thi... does not result in common ownership." (AJIL,
1917,p. 688.)
28. The Decision of the Central Arnerican Court of Justice dated
9 March 1917was divided intothree parts. Inthe first part, the voting of
thejudges was recorded on a number of specificquestionsarising in the
case,and thispart recordstheunanimous view ofthejudges that theinter-
national status of the Gulf of Fonseca was that it was "anhistoric bay
possessed ofthe characteristics of a closed sea"JIL, 1917,p. 693).The
second part is an "Examination of facts and law", and the third part the
forma1decision, adopted by four votes to one. In the second part, the
Court found :
"CONSIDERAN quOr:econocidaporeste Tribunallacondicionjun-
dica delGolfodeFonsecacomoBahia historica,concaracteresdemur
cerrado,se ha reconocido,en consecuencia,como condueriosde sus
aguasa lostrespaisesribereriosE, lSalvador,Hondurasy Nicaragua,
exceptoen la respectivaleguamarina del litoral,que es del exclusivo
dominiode cadaunode ellos;y queen ordenal condominioexistente
entre losEstadosen litigi... se tomo en cuentaque en las aguasno
litorales delGolfoexisteunaporcibnde ellasendondese empalman O
confunden lasjurisdiccionesde inspectionpara objetosdepolicia,de
seguridadyfines fiscales; yotraendondeesposibleque nosuceda10
mismo.Por 10 tanto, el Tribunalhadecididoque entreEl Salvador y
Nicaraguaexisteelcondominioenambasporciones,puesto queestan
dentro del Golfo;pero con la salvedad expresade los derechos que correspondena Honduras como coparticipe en esas mismas por-
ciones."(CJC,Sentencia,pp. 55-56.)
"WHEREAS :The legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca having been
recognizedbythis Courtto be that of a historic baypossessed ofthe
characteristics of a closed sea, the threeiparian States of El Sal-
vador, Honduras and Nicaragua are, therefore, recognized as
coownersofitswaters,exceptas to thelittoralmarine league which is
the exclusiveproperty of each, and with regard to the coownership
existing between the States here litigant, the Court ... took into
account the fact that as to a portion ofthe non-littoral waters of the
Gulfthere wasan overlapping orconfusion ofjurisdiction inmatters
pertaining to inspection forpolice and fiscalurposes and purposes
ofnational security, and that, asto anotherportion thereof, it ispos-
siblethat no suchoverlapping and confusiontakesplace.The Court,
therefore, has decided that as between El Salvador and Nicaragua
coownership existswithrespectto both portions, sincethey areboth
within the Gulf; with the express proviso, however,that the rights
pertaining to Honduras as coparcener in those portions are not
affected bythat decision." (AJIL, 1917,p. 716.)
It is amatter of public record that on 24 November 1917Nicaragua
addressed to the Statesof Central Americaa lengthyNote
"for thepurpose of explaining and justifying the attitude that was
forced upon [theNicaraguan]Government ofignoring and rejecting
the two Judgements rendered against it by the Central American
Court ofJustice",
i.e., the 1917Judgement and an earlier Judgement in a case brought by
Costa Rica against Nicaragua.
29. The Central American Court of Justice had been informed of the
existenceof the delimitation of part ofthe waters of the Gulf effected by
Honduras and Nicaragua, and referred to above. In its Judgement that
Court noted that
"lalineatrazada ... solo Ilegohasta unpunto medio entre la isla del
Tigrey Puntade Cosigüina,dejandosindividir ...unaconsiderablepor-
cibndeaguascomprendidaentrelaIineatrazadadesdePuntaAmapala
a PuntaCosigüina y elpunto terminalde ladivisionentreHondurasy
Nicaragua "(CJC, Sentencia,p. 50).
"the line drawn ... only extends as far as a point midway between
Tigre Island and Cosigüina Point, thus leavingundivided ... a con-
siderable portion of the waters embraced between the line drawn
from Amapala Pointto CosigüinaPoint and the terminalpoint ofthe
divisionbetween Honduras and Nicaragua" (AJIL, 1917,p. 711).105 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JAS)GMENT)
Referringalso to an overlaporintersection, attheentrance tothe Gulf, of
"the two lines (distant twelve milesfromthe coast)that mark the respec-
tive limits of the zone of maritime inspection" (AJIL, 1917,p. 702) of
El Salvadorand Nicaragua,the Central American Court ofJusticestated
that
"Porconsiguienteh , ayqueconcluirenque,exceptuandoesaparte,el
resto de las aguas delGoifoha quedadopro-indiviso, en estado de
comunidadentreEl Salvador y Nicaragua,y en quepor laparticular
configuracibndel mismo,esas aguas quedanfrente afrente, confun-
diéndoseporunempalme ..."(CJC, Sentencia,p. 50.)
"Consequently,it must be concluded that, with the exception of
that part[SC.t,he area delimited between Honduras and Nicaragua],
the rest of the waters of the Gulf have remainedundivided and in a
stateofcommunitybetween ElSalvadorand Nicaragua, and that, by
reason of the particular configuration of the Gulf, those waters,
thoughremainingface to face,were ...confounded byoverlapping."
(AJIL, 1917,p. 711.)
30. It isclaimedby El SalvadorinitsMemorial inthe present casethat
"On the basis ofthe 1917judgement an objectivelegalrégimehas
been established in the Gulf. Even if initially the judgement was
binding only in respect ofthe directparties tothe litigation,Nicara-
guaand ElSalvador,the legaistatusrecognizedtherein hasbeen con-
solidated in the course of time; its effectsextend to third States,and
in particular, they extend to Honduras"
and further that the juridical situation of the Gulfoes not permit the
dividingup ofthe watersheld in condominium", withthe exception of "a
territorial sea within the Gulf', recognized by the Central American
Court of Justice. It therefore asks the Chamber to adjudge and declare
that
"The juridical position of the maritimespaces within the Gulf of
Fonseca corresponds to the juridical position established by the
Judgement of the Central American Court of Justice rendered
March9th 1917,asaccepted and applied there after."
It alsocontends in itsCounter-Memorial that
"So faras the maritimespacesare concerned,the Parties have not
askedthe Chamber either to trace a line of delimitation orto define
the Rules and Principles of PublicInternational Lawapplicable to a
delimitation of maritime spaces, eithernside or outside the Gulf of
Fonseca." 31. Honduras initsReplyrejectstheviewthat the 1917Judgementpro-
ducedor reflectedan objectivelegalrégime,contendingthat inthe caseof
"ajudgment orarbitralaward layingdownadelimitationas between
the parties to a dispute, the solution therein adopted can only be
opposedto the parties. Asforother States,whicharealientothe case,
a decisionwhichaffectstheirrightscannotbeopposedto them. This
is indeed the case for Honduras with respect to the 1917Judgement
of the Central Arnerican Court, which was the outcome of proceed-
ingsin which it did not participate."
It also observesthat
"it is not the 1917Judgement which confers sovereignty upon the
riparian States over the waters of the Bay of Fonseca. That sover-
eignty antecedes considerablythat judgment between two riparian
States, since it dates back to the creation of the three States con-
cerned."
Honduras's contentionas to the legalsituation ofthe maritime spaces,to
be examined further below, involvestheir delimitation between the Par-
ties. It considers that the Chamber has jurisdiction under the Special
Agreementto effect suchdelimitation,and hasindicatedwhat,inthe view
of Honduras, should be the course ofthe delimitation line.
32. As regardsmaritimespacessituated outside the closingline of the
Gulf, Honduras asksthe Chamber to find that the "community of inter-
ests" between El Salvador and Honduras as coastal States of the Gulf
implies that they each have an equal right to exercisejurisdiction over
such spaces.Onthis basis, it asksthe Chamber to determinealine ofdeli-
mitation extending 200 miles seaward, to delimit the territorial sea, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the two Parties.
El Salvador however contends that the Chamber does not, under the
Special Agreement, have jurisdiction to delimit maritime areas outside
the closing line of the Gulf. El Salvador denies that Honduras has any
legitimateclaimto anypart of the continentalshelfor exclusiveeconomic
zone in the Pacific,oiitsidethe Gulf;it ishoweverpreparedto acceptthat
thisquestionbe decided by the Chamber.
33. Afeature ofthe present caseisthat on none ofthe three aspectsof
the dispute referredto inArticle2,paragraph 2,ofthe SpecialAgreement,
to which the Application for permission to intervene relates, - the
islands,the waters ofthe Gulf, and the waters outside the Gulf - arethe
Partiesin agreementas to the issuestobe decided by the Chamber under
the Special Agreement. In considering whether Nicaragua has a legal
interest which maybe affected by the decision in the case,so asto justifyitsintervention,the Chamber has accordinglyto bearinmindthat a num-
ber of issuesmay or may not fa11to be determined by it under eachhead.
34. By a letter dated 20 April 1988,the Ambassador of Nicaragua to
the Netherlandsrequested thatthe pleadingsbemadeavailableto Nicara-
gua under Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, a request
granted (above,paragraph 13)on 15June 1988afterascertainment ofthe
views ofthe Parties.That letterreferredto the Order ofthe Court of8May
1987constitutingthe Chamber inthis case,and stated :
"Whilst Nicaragua doesnot atthis stageintend to availitselfofthe
provisionsofArticle62ofthe Statuteofthe Court, the purpose ofthe
present communication is to inform the Court that the possibility
offered by Article 62isunder active consideration. In this context 1
am instructed to conveythe view ofmy Governmentthat Nicaragua
has an interest of a legalnature whichmaybe affected by a decision
ofthe Chamber constitutedforthe purpose ofdecidingthe Casecon-
ceming the Land, Island and Maritime FrontierDispute between
El Salvadorand Honduras. Moreover,inthe lightofthe principle of
consent as invoked by the Court in the Monetary Gold case,
Z.C.J.Reports1954,p. 19,atp.32,myGovernmentconsidersit neces:
saryto reserveitsposition generallyin relation to the Court's Order
of 8May 1987."
Copies ofthisletterweretransmitted to thetwo Partiesbythe Registrarof
the Court.
35. In itsApplicationfor permission to intervene, filed on 17Novem-
ber 1989,Nicaragua stated that the Application was made by virtue of
Article 36, paragraph 1,and Article 62 of the Statute. An application
under Article 62 is required by Article 81,paragraph 1,of the Rules of
Courtto befiled "as soonas possible,and not laterthan the closureofthe
written proceedings". The Application of Nicaragua was filed in the
Registryofthe Court twomonthsbeforethe time-limitfixedforthefiling
ofthe Parties' Replies.
36. ByArticle 81,paragraph 2,ofthe RulesofCourt a Stateseekingto
intervene is required to specifythe caseto whichit relates andto set out:
"(a) the interest of a legal nature which the Stateapplying to inter-
veneconsidersmaybeaffectedbythedecisioninthat case;
(6) thepreciseobjectofthe intervention;
(c) anybasis ofjurisdiction whichisclaimedto existasbetweenthe
Stateapplyingtointerveneandtheparties tothe case".
Nicaragua's contentions on each of those requirements are as follows.108 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
37. Astothe interestofalegalnature (Article81,paragraph 2 (a),ofthe
RulesofCourt),Nicaragua StatesasfollowsinitsApplication :"Ascanbe
appreciated in Article 2ofthe SpecialAgreement. ..,the Government of
Nicaragua has an interest of a legal nature which must inevitably be
affected by a decision of the Chamber." (Para. 2.) It then proceeds to
enumerate the "particular considèrations supporting this opinion" as
includingthe following :
"(a) The phrasing of paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the SpecialAgree-
ment,whichreferscomprehensivelyto 'la situacionjuridica insu-
larydelosespaciosmaritimos'.
(b) Thetitle of the Special Agreementwhich refersto 'lacontrover-
siafronteriza terrestre,insulary maritima existenteentrelosdos
Estados'.
(c) Thegeographicalsituationinthe Gulf of Fonseca and the adja-
centmaritime areas.
(d) The essential character of the legal principles, including rele-
vant equitableprinciples, whichwould berelevant to the deter-
mination of the questions placed on the agenda by the Special
Agreement.
(e) The general recognition by authoritative legal opinion that the
issues relating to the Gulf of Fonseca involve a trilateral con-
troversy.
@ Theleadingrole of coasts and coastalrelationshipsin the legal
régimeof maritime delimitation and the consequence in the
case ofthe Gulf of Fonseca that itwould be impossibleto carry
outadelimitation whichtookintoaccount onlythecoastsinthe
Gulfoftwoofthethree riparian States.
(g) The fact that a possible element in the regulation of the legal
situation ofmaritime spaces,especiallyin a caselikethat ofthe
Gulf ofFonseca,wouldbethe designation ofone ormorezones
ofjoint exploration and exploitationseetheReport oftheCon-
ciliation Commission in the Jan Mayen ContinentalShelfcase,
Intemational LawReports(ed.E.Lauterpacht), Vol.62,p. 108."
(Application,para. 2.)
38. Article 81,paragraph 2 (b), of theules of Court requires a statq-
ment of "the precise object of the intervention". In Nicaragua's Applica-
tion,it is stated that
"The interventionfor which permission is requested has the fol-
lowingobjects :
First,generallyto protectthe legalrightsofthe Republic ofNicara-
gua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas by al1
legalmeans available.
Secondly,to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Court ofthe nature ofthelegalrightsofNicaragua whicharein issue
inthe dispute. Thisformofinterventionwould havethe conservative purpose of seekingto ensure that the determination ofthe Chamber
did not trench upon the legalrights and interests of the Republic of
Nicaragua ..."(Application,paras. 4-6.)
Nicaragua goes on to statethat it "intends to subject itselfto the binding
effect of the decision to be given" (Application,para. 6). The Chamber
takesnote ofthat statement.
39. The further requirement ofArticle 81,paragraph 2 (c)ofthe Rules
ofCourt,that an applicationfor permissionto intervenesetout "anybasis
ofjurisdiction which is claimed to existas between the Stateapplying to
intervene and the parties to the case", isdealt with in the Application as
follows. Nicaragua contends that, for reasons which are there briefly
stated,"In the opinion of the Government of NicaraguaArticle 62ofthe
Statute, which is the governing instrument, does not require a separate
title ofjurisdiction..."(Application,para. 7.)Nicaragua does not assert
the existence of any basis ofjurisdiction other than the Statute itself; it
addsthat
"Moreover, Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Statute states that the
jurisdiction ofthe Court 'comprises. ..al1matters speciallyprovided
for. ..intreaties and conventionsin force'; andthe Statute isitselfa
'treatyin force'."(Application,para. 7.)
40. In itsApplicationNicaragua further statesthat itsrequest to inter-
vene is "limited to that part of the object of the Special Agreement con-
tained in paragraph 2 of Article 2", Le.,the request that the Chamber
"determine the legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces" and
that it "wishesto makeveryclearthat it has no intention of interveningin
those aspects of the procedure relating to the land boundary which is in
dispute between El Salvador and Honduras" (Application, "Preliminary
Statements").
41. In its Application to the Court for permission to intervenedated
17November 1989Nicaragua also stated that
"The practical consequence of a favourableresponse to the pres-
entrequest willbe the reformation ofthe Chamber aspresently con-
stitutedand there-ordering ofthewrittenproceedingsas arrangedby
the Order of27May 1987.WhilstmyGovernment isbound totakeal1
availablesteps in order to protect its legal interests, it is concerned
to proceed in a spirit of goodwill and CO-operationin face of a pro-
cedure which has already been initiated. Consequently, it is the
intention of my Government to propose not a reformation of the
Chamber and its jurisdictional basis tout courtbut only the making
of those changes strictly necessary in order to maintain the mini-
mum standards of efficacy and procedural fairness" (para. 23 of
that Application),
and that "Nicaragua inthe alternative would requestthat, for those reasons
of elementalfairnessexplained above ...,the Court should, in any
case,excludefromthe mandate ofthe Chamber anypowers ofdeter-
mination ofthejuridical situation of maritime areas both withinthe
Gulf ofFonseca and alsointhe PacificOceanand, in effect,limitthe
Chamber'smandate to those aspectsoftheland boundary which are
in dispute between El Salvador and Honduras." (Para. 24 of that
Application.)
In its Order of 28February 1990,the Court obsemed on the first of these
contentions that
"while Nicaragua has thus referred to certain questions concerning
the composition of the Chamber, it has done so only in contempla-
tion of a favourableresponse being givento itsrequestfor intemen-
tion" ;
andon the second,that "whileNicaraguacontemplates a limitationofthe
mandate of the Chamber, itsrequest tothat effectis put fonvard only 'in
the alternative"'; and the Court concluded that it "isus not calledupon
to pronounce on any of these questions", whichit referred to as "contin-
gentonthe decisionwhetherthe applicationforpermissionto intemene is
to be granted", thatdecision being an "anterior question".
42. Atthehearings,the AgentofNicaragua, inhisfirststatement tothe
Chamber, referred to the Court's Order and stated that
"now that Nicaragua isbeforethe Chamber reiteratingits petition to
intemene, it does so without submitting to the Chamber on this
opportunitythe twoquestionsthat thefullCourt statedcould onlybe
resolvedafterthe decisiononthe Applicationfor permissiontointer-
vene wasmade bythe Chamber. ..Nicaraguamaintains,beforethis
Chamber of the Court, its Application for permission to intemene
but modified inthe sensethat the requestsmade in Sections23and 24
of its original Application of 17November 1989are not being sub-
mitted for decision by this Chamber".
Inreplytoa questionbythe Chamber,the Agentmadeitclearthat Nicara-
guaaccepted that the decisiononinterventionisentirelyforthe Chamber,
which has fullauthority to decide on it and stated further:
"The Chamber iscorrectinunderstanding that Nicaraguaaccepts
that it is theamber which is properly seised of an application by
Nicaragua for permission to intervenebeforeit in the case concern-
ingthe Land,IslandandMaritimeFrontier Dispute(ElSalvador/Hon-
duras);and that Nicaragua recognizesthat the eventual decision of
the Chamber granting or refusing permission to intervene will be
binding and final ...
Theonlylimitationwehavemadeto Ouroriginalapplicationtothe full Court was that we are not putting at this moment before the
Chamber anyrequest that itreconstitute itselforthat it excludefrom
its own competence ratione materiae those aspects of the case that
Nicaragua had requested that the full Court exclude fromthe man-
date ofthis Chamber. ..
. .. what we are putting before the Chamber is the simple and
unconditional request to be allowed permission to intervenein the
present casebased on Article 62ofthe Statute ..."
43. Some of the arguments of El Salvador have been put forward as
grounds forthe Chamber to rejectthe Application of Nicaragua inlimine,
without there being any need for further examination of its compliance
with Article 62 of the Statute of the Court. These will therefore be
examinedfirst.
44. First, El Salvador claims that the Application fails to fulfil the
requirement in Article 81, paragraph 2 (c),of the Rules of Court that a
State seekingto interveneisto setout initsapplication "any basisofjuris-
diction which is claimed to exist as between the Stateapplying to inter-
vene and the parties to the case". Nicaragua does not set out any such
basis in itsApplication but arguesthat Article 62ofthe Statute "does not
require a separate title ofjurisdiction" (para. 7).The Chamber does not
see here any forma1 defect, justifying dismissal of the Application
inlimine, sincethe Rule only requiresstatement of "any basis ofjurisdic-
tion which is claimedto exist". ElSalvadoralso advances the viewthat a
"jurisdictionallink"betweentheStateseekingto interveneandtheparties
is a necessary condition for intervention. The Court, however, has
observed in an earlier casethat
"although this question is one of the Court's jurisdiction, it has no
priority ofthekindwhichattachestoajurisdictionalobjection stricto
sensu,and neednot be examinedin advanceofthe other contentions
put forward bythe Partieseitherasobjections to the admissibilityof
the Application, or as grounds for refusing it" (I.C.J. Reports 1984,
p. 8,para. Il).
El Salvador'scontentions on the question of the jurisdictional link will
thereforebe examined later (paragraphs 93-101).
45. Second, El Salvador contends that Nicaragua's Application is
defectivebecause it does not comply with the requirement of Article 81,
paragraph 2 (b),of the Rules of Court that a Stateapplying to intervene
indicateinitsApplication "the preciseobjectoftheintervention". Nicara-
gua's Application has two paragraphs (quoted in paragraph 38 above)
stating the object of the intervention. El Salvadornonetheless contends
(interalia)that Nicaraguahas not complied withthe requirement to indi-
cate "the preciseobject":it does not "indicateitsposition with respect to
thefundamental issueinthe case,whichisto definethe objectofthelitiga-tion and consequently the scope of the powers of the Chamber", and
"theseomissionsmakethe Application defective".IntheChamber'sview,
however,Nicaraguahas givenan indication ofan objectwhichcould cer-
tainlybe defined in a more precise waybut is not so evidentlylacking in
precision as to justify the Chamber in rejectingthe Application inlimine
for non-compliance with Article 81 of the Rules of Court. Whether, as
El Salvador also claims,Nicaragua's objectin intervening isnot a proper
one is aseparate matter to be considered below (paragraphs 85-92).
46. Thirdly, El Salvador contends further that "Nicaragua is time-
barred or estoppedfrom seekingchangesinthe procedural aspects ofthe
principal proceedings". El Salvador refers tothe provision of Article81,
paragraph 1,ofthe RulesofCourt wherebyan applicationforpermission
to intervene isto be filed "as soon as possible, and notater than the clo-
sureofthewritten proceedings". In itswrittenobservationsonthe Appli-
cation, El Salvador emphasized the words "as soon as possible", and
contended that, inviewofNicaragua'srequestsinparagraphs 23and 24of
the Application,forthe reformation of the Chamber and the re-ordering
ofthe writtenproceedings(paragraph 41 above),it shouldnot havepost-
poneditsApplicationfor nearlythreeyearsafterbeingnotified ofthe pro-
ceedings; and that the Applicationfor permission to interveneshouldbe
declined because Nicaragua is"out of time". Atthe hearingsthe Agentof
El Salvador, continuing to urge that the Application was "untimely",
stated that El Salvadorwasfullyawarethat the relevant time-limits"have
in the technical sensebeen complied with by Nicaragua", and explained
that it wasrequestingthe Chamber to rejectthe NicaraguanApplication,
"not because it fails to meet a technical requirement of the Rules but
because it fails to meet the substantiverequirements of the Statute". The
contention appears to be that Nicaragua's Application is untimely, not
onlyinitselfbut because ofthe lateraisingofthemattersinparagraphs 23
and 24thereof,whichwouldbedisruptiveatthepresentadvancedstage of
the proceedings; and that the Chamber has and should exercisea discre-
tion to rejectthe Application inlimineon thisground.
47. In its observations on the Nicaraguan Application for permission
to intervene,ElSalvadorin fact setsoutanumber ofgrounds ofobjection
to the matters raised inparagraphs 23and 24ofthat Application.To give
effectto Nicaragua's statedintention to seeka "reordering ofthe written
proceedings" would, it is contended, "infringethe Rules of Court", "fail
to recognize the acquired rights of the litigant Parties", and "create an
unfair situation by placing Nicaragua in an advantageous position vis-
à-visthe Parties, already committedas they are by the contents of their
pleadings, to which Nicaragua has been given access". Nicaragua's
intended requestforthe "reformationofthe Chamber aspresentlyconsti-
tuted" isdescribed by ElSalvadoras an "extravagant and unprecedented
claim",to allowwhichwould "violateessentiallegalprinciples". Tomod-
ify the constitution of the Chamber without the consent of the Parties"would infringe Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute". Nicaragua's
proposa1that the Court should "exclude fromthe mandate ofthe Cham-
ber any powers of determination of the juridical situation of maritime
areas ... and, in effect, limitthe Chamber's mandate" to the land boun-
dary dispute is an "extraordinary request" which "can onlybe explained
bythe mistaken assumption that a Chamber isabodysubordinated to the
Court". Al1these matters are, in the view ofEl Salvador, "totally disrup-
tive of the orderly unfolding of the judicial process". El Salvador con-
cludesthat
"Al1these serious defectsinthe NicaraguanApplication, resulting
fromthe extravagantrequests itadvances, leadtothe necessaryrejec-
tion bythe Chamber ofsucha defectiveapplication.The Chamber is
not confronted here with a serious request for what the Court has
qualified as a 'genuineintervention'..."
At the hearings, El Salvador urged rejection of the Nicaraguan Applica-
tion because acceptance of it "would wreak havoc on the Parties to this
caseand wouldcreate an unconscionablesituation ofinterference,rather
than one of orderlyadvancement ofthe proceedings".
48. The Chamber ishereonlyconcernedto considerwhethertheobjec-
tions addressed by El Salvador to paragraphs 23and 24of that Applica-
tion would justify its rejection inlimine.Thispoint has to be considered
notwithstanding the fact that the Court has categorized the content of
those paragraphs as contingent on the decision whether or not to grant
permission to intervene,and Nicaraguahas made it clearthat it isnot
"putting at this moment before the Chamber any request that it re-
constitute itself or that it exclude from its own cornpetence ratione
materiaethose aspects ofthe casethat Nicaragua had requested that
the full Court exclude from the mandate of this Chamber" (para-
graph 42above).
49. A rejection of the Application on these grounds would only be
appropriate if the Chamber were to conclude that the inclusion of the
requests in paragraphs 23and 24of the originalApplicationinvalidated
the entireApplication.The Chamber does not howeverconsider that this
isthe case.
50. Finally, El Salvador relies on the fact that there has been "no dis-
cussionwhatsoeverbetween Nicaragua and either ofthe original Parties
regardingtheposition ofthe Gulf ofFonseca". Therefore,itisargued,it is
premature to bring such issues before the Chamber, and counter to the
established rule "that beforeproceedingsare brought in the Court, there
must be a defined dispute which ... has matured through the process of
negotiation between the parties".
51. The Chamber does not consider that there is any requirementfor
the definition of a disputein prior negotiationsbefore an applicationan
be made for permission to intervene.The function of intervention is, asindicatedin the 1984Judgment onthe Application of Italyfor permission
to intemene in the case conceming the ContinentalShelf (LibyanArab
Jamahiriya/Malta), and as explained below, something wholly different
from the determination of a further dispute between the State seekingto
intemene and oneorboth oftheparties. Inthat Judgmentthe Courtfound
thatthatApplicationcould not begranted because, interalia,to giveeffect
to it "the Court would be calledupon ...to determinea dispute, or some
part of a dispute, between Italy and one orboth of the principal Parties"
(I.C.J.Reports1984,p.20,para.3 l),withouttheconsent ofthoseparties. It
would therefore be inappropriate to require, as a condition of intemen-
tion,the existenceof such a dispute,defined by prior negotiations.
52. AstheCourt has made clearinprevious cases(I.C.J.Reports1981,
p. 19,para. 33; I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 9,para. 13),in order to obtain per-
missionto intemene under Article62ofthe Statute,aStatehas to showan
interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the Court's decision
in the case, or that un intérêtd'ordjrueridique estpour lui en cause - the
criterion stated in Article 62. In the present case, Nicaragua has gone
further :citing the case conceming Monetaly GoldRemovedfrom Rome
in 1943(I.C.J. Reports 1954,p. 19),it has argued that its interestsare so
much part of the subject-matter of the case that the Chamber could not
properly exerciseitsjurisdiction withoutthe participation of Nicaragua.
It willbe convenient to examinethiscontention first.
53. In the view of Nicaragua,the decision in the Monetaly Goldcase
"emphasized the impropriety of exercisingjurisdiction in face of a sub-
stantial interest of athird State in the verysubject-matterofthe decision"
(Application,para. 12). During the oralproceedingsthe Agentof Nicara-
gua claimed,adapting to the present casethe terms of the decision in the
Monetas, Goldcase,that
"where ... the vital issueto be settledconcems the rights of Nicara-
gua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the waters outside it,the Court can-
not, without the consent of that third State, give a decision on that
issuebinding upon any State ...".
What is apparently being suggested is that in such circumstances the
failure of a third State to intemene, or even refusa1of a request for per-
missionto intemene, may deprive theCourt ofthe right with propriety to
exerciseajurisdiction conferredupon it by a specialagreement between
two other States.
54. In the Monetaly Golddecision,the Court was dealing withthe fol-
lowing argument (as reported in the Court's Judgment) which had been
addressed to it : "It has been suggested that Albania might have intervened.The
provisionsofArticle62ofthe Statutegiveto athird State,whichcon-
siders that it 'hasan interest of a legalnature which rnaybe affected
by the decision in the case',the right to requestpermission to inter-
vene. It has been contended that the inclusion of the provisions for
interventionindicate that the Statute contemplates that proceedings
rnaycontinue,notwithstanding that athirdStaternayhavean interest
of a legalnature which might enable it to intervene. It is argued that
the fact that a third State, in this case Albania, rnay not choose to
interveneshould not make it impossiblefor the Court to givejudg-
ment on rights as between the Parties." (Z.C.J.Reports 1954,p. 32.)
The Court didnot rejectthiscontention; as wasto be expresslystatedin a
later Judgment, a State which considers that its legal interest rnay be
affectedby a decision in a casehasthe choice,to interveneor not to inter-
vene; and if itdoes not, proceedings rnaycontinue, and that State ispro-
tectedbyArticle59ofthe Statute(Z.C.J.Reports1984,p.26,para. 42).The
Court's reply inthe MonetaryGoldcase to the argument addressed to it
was as follows :
"Albaniahas not submittedarequest to the Courttobe permitted
to intervene. In the present case, Albania's legalinterests would not
only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-
matter of the decision.In such a case,the Statutecannot be regarded,
by implication, as authorizing proceedings to be continued in
the absence of Albania." (Loc.cit.,p. 32.)
Whatthen was "the verysubject-matter ofthe decision" inthat case?The
first submission in the Italian Application was
"(1) that the Governments of the French Republic,Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America should
deliver to Italy any share of the monetarygold that might be dueto
Albania under Part III ofthe Paris Act ofJanuary 14th,1946,inpar- ,
tialsatisfactionfor thedamagecausedtoItaly by theAlbanianlawof
January 13th,1945."(Z.C.J.Reports1954,p. 22,emphasisadded.)
Thus the circumstances ofthe Monetary Goldcase were such that a deci-
sion would determine a question of the international responsibility of
Albania vis-à-visItaly.Asthe Courtput it :
"To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania
without her consent would run counter to a well-established prin-
ciple of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, namely,
that the Court can onlyexercisejurisdiction overaStatewithitscon-
sent." (Z.C.J.Reports1954,p. 32.)
55. Thusthe Court's findingwasthat, whilethe presenceinthe Statute
ofArticle62mightimpliedlyauthorizecontinuance oftheproceedings in 116 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
the absence of a State whose "interests of a legal nature" might be
"affected", this did not justify continuance ofproceedingsin the absence
of a State whose international responsibilitywould be "the very subject-
matter ofthe decision". The Court did not need to decide what the posi-
tion would have been had Aibania applied for permission to intervene
under Article 62.
56. If in the present case the legal interests of Nicaragua would form
part of "the very subject-matter of the decision", as Nicaragua hassug-
gested, this would doubtless justify an intervention by Nicaragua under
Article 62 of the Statute, which lays down a less stringent criterion. The
question would then arise, however, whether such intervention under
Article 62 of the Statute would enable the Chamber to pronounce upon
the legalinterests of Nicaragua whichit issuggestedby Nicaragua would
formthe verysubject-matter ofthe decision.The Chamber willtherefore
first consider whetherNicaragua has shownthe existence of an "interest
ofa legalnature whichrnaybeaffectedbythe decision", soastojustify an
intervention; and ifsuch isthe case,willthen consider whetherthat inter-
est rnay in fact form "the very subject-matter of the decision" as did the
interests of Aibania in the case concerning MonetaryGoldRemovedfrom
Romein1943.
57. Article 62of the Statute contemplatesintervention on the basis of
an interest of a legalnature "which rnaybe affected bythe decision inthe
case". In the present case however,what is requested of theChamber by
the Special Agreement is not a decision on a single circumscribed issue,
but severaldecisionsonvarious aspectsofthe overalldispute betweenthe
Parties, as indicated in paragraphs30 to 33 above. The Chamber has to
consider the possible effect on legal interests asserted by Nicaragua
of its eventualdecision on each of the different issues which might fa11
to be determined,in order to define the scope of any intervention which
rnaybe found to bejustified under Article 62ofthe Statute.
58. If aStatecan satisfythe Courtthat ithasaninterestofalegalnature
which rnaybe affected by the decision in the case,it rnaybe permitted to
intervenein respect ofthat interest. Butthatoes not mean that the inter-
vening State isthen alsopermitted to make excursionsinto other aspects
of the case.This is recognizedby Nicaragua; it claims only that itsinter-
ests of a legal nature rnaybe affected by the decision of the Chamber on
the "legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces", but not by the
decision on the land frontier, and accordingly Statesin its Application
"that it has no intention of intervening inose aspects of the procedure
relatingto the land boundary whichisindispute between ElSalvadorand
Honduras" (Application, "Preliminary Statements"). Since the scope of
any permitted intervention has to be determined, the Chamber has to
consider the matters of the islands,the situation of the waters within theGulf, the possible delimitation of the waters within the Gulf, the situa-
tion of the waters outside the Gulf, and the possible delimitation of the
waters outside the Gulf.
59. Whether al1of these matters are indeed raised by the wording of
Article2,paragraph 2,ofthe SpecialAgreementisitselfdisputed between
the Parties to the case. Accordingly,the list of matters to be considered
must inthisphase ofthe proceedingsbe entirelywithoutprejudice to the
meaning of Article 2, paragraph 2, as a whole, or of any of the terms as
used in that Article. The Chamber clearly cannot take any stand in the
present proceedings on the disputes between the Parties concerningthe
proper meaning of the Special Agreement: it must determine the ques-
tions raised by Nicaragua's Application while leaving these questions of
interpretation entirelyopen.
60. In itsApplication forpermissionto intervene,Nicaragua gavea list
(set out in paragraph 37above) of considerationssupporting its conten-
tionthat it has an interest of a legalnature which maybe affected by the
decision of the Chamber. No further or more specific indication was
givenin the Applicationeither ofthe legalinterest or interests claimedto
exist or of the way in which the future decision of the Chamber might
affect that interest. During the hearings, the Agent of Nicaragua
explained that
"In describingthe legalinterestsNicaragua wantstoprotectinthis
case,we have consideredit unnecessary to allege or claim a specific
rightinsidethe Gulf of Fonseca. It isenoughto indicate ...that both
Parties, among other questions that affect our interests, are asking
the Chamber to define or clarify the general or overall status of the
whole Gulf of Fonseca in which Nicaragua plainly has rights that
are evenrecognizedaccordingto their respective convenienceby the
Parties ... On the other hand, if the Chamber were to consider the
request of Honduras and proceeded to delimitthe waters inside the
Gulf, it is obvious from looking at any chart that no such delimita-
tion is possible without affecting our interests, if this delimitation
involvesthe whole ofthe Gulf of Fonseca."
61. There was in this connection some argumentbefore the Chamber
on the question ofthe extent of theburden of proof on a State seekingto
intemene: how far such a State needs to demonstrate the elements
required in order to satisfy Article 62. Nicaragua was ofthe viewthat it
need only show a "provisional standard of proof'; and that it would be
"inappropriate forthe applicant to gotoofaron the question ofthe valid-
ity ofthe interests it claims". TheParties to the casetook issuewiththese
arguments. In the Chamber's opinion, however,it is clear, first, that it is
for a State seeking to intervene to demonstrate convincingly what it
asserts,and thus to bear theburden ofproof; and, second,that ithas only
to show that its interest "may" be affected, not that it will or must be
affected.What needs to be shown by a State seekingpermission to inter- 118 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
vene can onlybejudged inconcret0and inrelation to al1thecircumstances
of a particular case. It is for the Statekingto intenene to identifythe
interestofalegalnature whichitconsidersmaybeaffectedbythe decision
inthe case,andto showinwhat waythat interestmaybeaffected;it isnot
forthe Court itself - or in the present casethe Chamber - to substitute
itselffor the Statein that respect.
62. Itneeds,moreover,toberecalledinthisconnection that thepresent
case raises a further problem, namely that the Parties to the case are in
dispute about the interpretation of the very provision of the Special
Agreement - paragraph 2ofArticle2 - whichisinvokedin Nicaragua's
Application. This means that the legal interests of Nicaragua have to be
assessed,in relation to the issuesinthe case,under two different possible
situations:an eventualfinding bythe Chamber infavour of ElSalvador's
view ofthe meaning of Article 2, paragraph 2; or an eventualfinding in
favour of the view of Honduras. This difficulty is not only one for the
Chamber inconsideringthepresentApplication - forobviously,asmen-
tioned above,itmustnotinany wayanticipateits decisionofthesematters
on the merits - but also for Nicaragua in framingits Application, even
thoughit wasgiven accessto the pleadings under Article 53,paragraph 1,
of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless,there needs finallyto be clearidenti-
fication of any legalinterests that maybe affected by thedecision on the
merits. Ageneralapprehension is not enough.The Chamber needs to be
told what interestsofa legalnature mightbeaffected byitseventual deci-
sion onthe merits.
63. Nicaragua has presented a particular argument whereby it would
apparently be dispensedfromproducing evidenceofthe existenceofthe
legalinterests on whichit relies,by reason ofthe assertions ofthe Parties.
Thisargumenthasat timesbeendenominated"equitableestoppel" and at
times "recognition"; initsclearestform itwasput forward atthe hearings
as follows :
"In the submissionofthe Government of Nicaraguathe assertions
offactand lawonthepart ofElSalvadorand Honduras inthecourse
ofthese proceedingsconstitute recognition ofthe existenceofmajor
legal interestspertaining to Nicaragua which form an inherent part
ofthe parce1oflegalquestionsplacedinfront ofthe Chamber bythe
SpecialAgreement."
So far as Nicaragua relies on estoppel,the Chamber will only saythat it
seesno evidenceof someessentialelementsrequired by estoppel :a state-
ment or representationmade byone party to another and relianceupon it
bythat otherparty to his detriment orto the advantage ofthe party mak-
ing it. The indications to be found in the pleadings of the views ofthe
Parties as to the existence or nature of Nicaraguan interests within or
without the Gulf, no doubt amount to someevidencewhichthe Chamber
can take into account. None of these howeveramounts to an admission,
recognition orstatementthat,inthe view ofthe Partyconcerned,thereareinterests of Nicaragua such that they may be affected by the decision of
the Chamber in the case.
64. TheChamber willnowturn to consideration ofthe severalspecific
issuesinthe casewhichmay cal1fordecision,asindicatedinparagraph 58
above,inorder to determinewhetherithasbeenshown that suchdecision
may affecta Nicaraguan interest of a legalnature.
65. Sofar asthe decision requested ofthe Chamber bythe Parties isto
determine the legalsituation ofthe islands,itisnot clearwhetherNicara-
gua has advanced, or now maintains,a contention that its legal interests
maybe directlyaffected bythe decision ofthe Chamber asto sovereignty
overindividual islands.Nicaraguareferred initsApplication tothetitle of
the SpecialAgreementandto Article 2,paragraph 2,thereof, which refer
both to the islands andto the maritimespaces (Quedetenninelasituacion
juridica insulary de losespaciosmaritirnos).During the hearings,counsel
for Nicaragua stated that, Nicaragua's sovereignty overthe Farallones
being expresslyrecognizedby the Parties,Nicaragua has in principle no
direct interest in the determination of the legal situation of the other
islands in the Gulf. It was however also stated on behalf of Nicaragua
during the hearingsthat, insofar as the decision concerning sovereignty
over the islands might have repercussionson a decision concerning deli-
mitation of the waters of the Gulf, Nicaragua is legitimatelyand directly
interested in the islands as a circumstance of possible relevance for the
delimitation of maritime areas within and withoutthe Gulf.
66. TheChamber concludesthat,insofarasthedisputerelates to sover-
eigntyoverthe islands, it should not grant permission for intervention by
Nicaragua,inthe absence of any Nicaraguan interest liableto be directly
affected by a decision onthat issue.Anypossible effectsofthe islandsas
relevantcircumstancesfordelimitation ofmaritimespaces fa11to be con-
sidered in the context of the question whether Nicaragua should be per-
mittedtointerveneonthebasisofalegalinterestwhichmaybeaffectedby
a decision on the legal situation of the waters of the Gulf. The Chamber
therefore turns tothat question.
67. It is ElSalvador's casethat, as between El Salvador,Honduras and
Nicaragua, there exists "a régimeof community, CO-ownershipor joint 120 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
sovereignty"oversuchofthe watersofthe Gulf of Fonseca "as lieoutside
the areaofexclusivejurisdiction", an "objectivelegalrégime"onthe basis
of the 1917Judgement of the Central American Court of Justice. The
nature of that régime,as conceived by the Central American Court,
appears sufficientlyfor present purposes fromthe extractsfromthe 1917
Judgement inparagraphs 27and 28above.Onthat basis, ElSalvadorcon-
sidersthatthe juridical situation ofthe Gulf does not permit the dividing
up ofthe watersheld in condominium. El Salvadoralso contends thatthe
SpecialAgreementdoes not conferjurisdiction to effectany such delimi-
tation.
68. Honduras on the other hand contends, interalia,
- that "the Gulf sspecificgeographicalsituation createsa specialsitua-
tion between the riparian States which generates a community of
interests" which in turn "calls for a special legal régimeto determine
theirmutual relations" ;
- that the community of interests "does not mean integration and the
abolition ofboundaries" but, on the contrary,"the cleardefinition of
thoseboundaries asacondition ofeffectiveCO-operation" ;
- that eachofthe three riparian States"has an equalright to aportion of
theinternal waters";
- that the maritime spaces to be delimited have "the status of internal
watersbecausethe Gulf ofFonsecaisan historicbay" ;but that never-
thelessitwouldnotbe correct "to rule outthe application to suchdeli-
mitation oftheprinciples and rulesthat havegraduallybeenidentified
in international case-law overthe past twenty years" forthe delimita-
tion ofmaritimespaces.
69. Honduras considersthat Nicaraguahasdemonstrated a legalinter-
est whichwould be affected by the decision on the question whether the
watersofthe Gulfaresubjectto acondominium,observingthat itisincon-
ceivable that the waters could be a condominium as regards two of the
riparian States,but not as regards the third. It therefore does not oppose
an intervention limited to the protection of Nicaragua's legal interest in
this question.
70. ElSalvador, however, denies that Nicaragua has a case for inter-
vention even in thismatter. It arguesthatthe Chamber isnot called upon
"to attribute to the waters of the Gulf an objective legal régimevalid
erga omnesand thereby applicable to Nicaragua without its havingbeen
able to make its voice heard"; and that the question to be decided is
whether the régimeof a condominium,
"which wasdeclaredapplicablebetween El Salvadorand Nicaragua
in a Court decision having the force of resjudicata between the two
countries, can be regarded as applicable to Honduras. Whatever
decision the Chamber reaches on this issuethejuridical situation of
Nicaragua will remain unchanged, in its relations both with El Sal-
vador and with Honduras." 71. The Chamber however notes that El Salvador in its pleadingshas
specificallyclaimedthe existenceofan "objectivelegalrégime"ofcondo-
minium in the waters of the Gulf (paragraph 67above). Further, the fact
that this régimewas found to be applicable by the Central American
Court of Justice in a case in which Nicaragua was the respondent party,
appearsto the Chamberto reinforceNicaragua'sassertion ofalegalinter-
estwhichmaybe affected by any decisioninthis matter. Asappears from
the above quotation, El Salvador'sargumentstarts from the proposition
that the 1917Judgement of the Central American Court is resjudicata
between El Salvadorand Nicaragua.The Chamber hasnoted above(par-
agraph 28)that in 1917Nicaraguainformedthe States ofCentral America
that it did not accept that Judgement.That very question of res judicata,
even though not directly in issue before the Chamber since El Salvador
doesnot contend that Honduras wasaparty tothecaseand assuchbound
by the decision,underlies the asserted opposability of the Judgement to
Honduras, sothat a decisionon suchopposabilitymayaffectthe interests
of Nicaragua.
72. Quite apart fromthe question ofthe legalstatus ofthe 1917Judge-
ment, however,the fact is that El Salvador now claimsthat the waters of
the Gulf are subject to a condominium of the coastal States, and has
indeed suggested that that régime"would in any case have been appli-
cable to the Gulf under customary international law". Nicaragua has
referred to the fact that Nicaragua plainly has rights in the Gulf of Fon-
seca,the existenceof which isundisputed, and contends that
"The condominium, ifit is declared to be applicable, would by its
very nature involve three riparians, and not only the parties to the
SpecialAgreement."
Inthe opinion ofthe Chamber,thisisasufficientdemonstration byNicar-
agua that it has aninterest of a legalnature inthe determinationwhether
or notthis isthe régime governingthe waters ofthe Gulf: the verydefini-
tion ofacondominiumpointstothisconclusion.Furthermore,a decision
in favour of some of the Honduran theses would equallybe such as may
affectlegalinterests of Nicaragua.The "community ofinterests" whichis
the starting-point of the arguments of Honduras is a community which,
like the condominium claimed by El Salvador, embraces Nicaragua as
one of the three riparian States, and Nicaragua must therefore be inter-
estedalsoin that question.Nicaragua contends that in this respect
"any decisiontaken bythe Chamber - whether indecidinginfavour
of one Party orthe other orby decidingotherwise - isnecessarily a
decision whose very subject-matter would be the determination of
the rights of the threeiparian Statesin respect of the Gulf of Fon-
seca,and of the waters outside the Gulf".
The Chamber, therefore, finds that Nicaragua has shown to the Cham-122 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JAS)GMENT)
ber'ssatisfactionthe existence of an interest of a legalnature which may
be affected by itsecision on these questions; andthat this is so notwith-
standing the fact that, as its Agent explained at the opening hearing,
Nicaragua has "considered it umecessary to allege or claim a specific
rightinsidethe Gulf of Fonseca".
73. Onthe otherhand, whilethe Chamber isthus satisfiedthat Nicara-
gua has a legal interest which may be affected by the decision of the
Chamber onthequestionwhether ornotthe watersofthe Gulf ofFonseca
are subject to a condominium or a "community of interests" ofthe three
riparian States,itcannotacceptthecontention ofNicaraguathatthe legal
interest of Nicaragua "would fom the very subject-matter of the deci-
sion", in the sense in which that phrase was used in the case conceming
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943to describe the interests of
Albania (seeparagraphs 52-56above).Sofar asthe condominium is con-
cemed,the essentialquestionin issuebetweenthe Parties isnotthe intrin-
sic validity of the 1917Judgement of the Central American Court of
Justice as between the parties to the proceedings in that Court, but the
opposability to Honduras, which was not such a Party, either of that
Judgement itself or of the régimedeclared by the Judgement.Honduras,
while rejectingthe opposability to itself of the 1917Judgement,oes not
ask the Chamber to declare it invalid. If Nicaragua is permitted to inter-
vene, the Judgment to be given by the Chamber will not declare, as
between Nicaragua and the other two States,that Nicaragua does or does
not possessrightsunder acondominium inthe waters ofthe Gulfbeyond
itsagreeddelimitationwith Honduras,but merelythat, asbetween El Sal-
vador and Honduras,the régimeofcondominiumdeclared bytheCentral
American Court is or is not opposable to Honduras. It isrue that a deci-
sionofthe Chamber rejecting El Salvador'scontentions, and finding that
there is no condominiumin the waters of the Gulf which is opposable to
Honduras, would be tantamount to a finding that there is no condomi-
nium at all. Similarly,afinding that there isnoch "community ofinter-
ests" as is claimed by Honduras, between El Salvador and Honduras in
their capacity asriparian States of the Gulf, would be tantamount to a
finding that there isnouch "community ofinterests" inthe Gulf at all.In
eitherevent,suchadecisionwouldtherefore evidentlyaffectaninterestof
a legal nature of Nicaragua; but even so that interest would not be the
"verysubject-matterofthe decision" inthe waythat the interests ofAlba-
nia were in the case concerning Monetary Gold Removed from Romr in
1943. As explained above (paragraph 56), it follows from this that the
question whetherthe Chamber would have power to take a decision on
these questions,without the participation of Nicaragua in the proceed-
ings,does not arise;but thatthe conditionsfor an interventionby Nicara-
gua inthis aspect ofthe casearenevertheless clearlyfulfilled. 74. Ifthe Chamber werenot satisfied that there isacondominium over
the waters of the Gulf of such a kind as to exclude any delimitation, it
might then be calledupon, ifit weresatisfied that ithasjurisdiction to do
so,to effectadelimitation.The Chamber hastherefore atthe present stage
to considerwhethera decision asto delimitation ofthe waters ofthe Gulf
might affect an interest of a legal nature appertaining to Nicaragua, in
order to determinewhetherNicaragua mightbe permitted to intervenein
respect of this aspect of the case also. Ites not, however,have to con-
siderthe possible effecton Nicaragua'sinterestsof everypossibledelimi-
tation which might bearrived at; it isforthe State seekingto interveneto
showthat itsinterestsmightbe affectedbyaparticular delimitation, orby
delimitationin general.Honduras has already indicated in its pleadings
how,in itsview,the delimitationshouldbe effected.El Salvador,consist-
entlywithitsposition,hasnotindicatedits viewson possiblelinesofdeli-
mitation. Nicaragua, for its part, has not given any indication of any
specificline of delimitation which it considers would affect its interests.
75. Honduras contends that Nicaragua has demonstrated no legal
interest whichmaybe affected by a decision on a delimitationline within
the Gulf as between Honduras and El Salvador. It observesthat
"Such a delimitationline isproposed by Honduras, not by El Sal-
vador, and the Honduran proposa1iscarefulto avoidany encroach-
ment into areas within the Gulf which might be claimed by Nicara-
gua. Moreover,whatevertheHonduran proposa1mightbe,the Court
itselfhas al1the powers necessaryto ensurethat anyline ofdelimita-
tion whichitmightdrawwouldnot betotheprejudice ofNicaragua's
interests."
Atthe hearings it was explainedthat, forthe delimitationclaimed,
"Honduras has proposed a method which divides the Gulf into a
western and eastern section ... It has been the aim of Honduras to
confine the relevant area for the purposes of a delimitation with
El Salvadorto the western sector of the Gulf."
Honduras relied on what it asserted to bethe reasonableassumptionthat
"there canbenojustifiable claimbyNicaragua to anypart ofthewatersof
this western sector". This argument was, in counsel's contention, re-
inforced by the fact that "as between Honduras and Nicaragua, the
waters of the Gulf are in large part already delimited" by the900Com-
mission, whichdelimitation would debar Nicaragua from making claims
in the westernhalf of the Gulf. El Salvadoralsocontends that if, contrary
to its own arguments on the competence of the Chamber under the
Special Agreement,the Chamber proceeds to effecta delimitation, "Nicaragua has rights in the Gulf and in the Pacific,but in the light
of the geographical and legal situation, these rights would not be
affectedby any such decisionin the present case".
76. Asfortheargumentsadvanced byNicaragua whichmighttouch on
thisquestion ofdelimitation,the mostgeneralmaybe seeninitspresenta-
tion, as a'consideration supporting its assertion of a legalinterest, of the
"essential character of the legal principles, including relevant equitable
principles, whichwould be relevantto the determination ofthe questions
placed on the agenda by the Special Agreement" (Application,
para. 2 (d)).The Chamber does not howeverconsider that an interest ofa
third Statein the general legalrules and principles likelyto be applied by
the decision can justify an intervention. Even when, as in the case of
Malta'sApplication forpermissionto intervenein the casebetween Libya
and Tunisia, the State seekingto intervene "does not base itsrequest for
permission to intervene simply on an interest in the Court's pronounce-
ments in the caseregardingthe applicablegeneralprinciples and rules of
international law",but "basesitsrequeston quitespecificelements"inthe
case (I.C.J.Reports1981,p. 17,para. 30),the interest invoked cannot be
regarded as one which "may be affected by the decision in the case"
(I.C.J.Reports 1981,p. 19,para. 33).The consideration urged in para-
graph 2 (d)ofthe Application isthus insufficientto showthe existenceof
an interest of a legalnature.
77. With specific reference to delimitation, Nicaragua's Application
refersto :
"The leading role of coasts and coastal relationships in the legal
régimeof maritimedelimitation and the consequence in the case of
the Gulf of Fonsecathat itwould beimpossibleto carryouta delimi-
tation which took into account only the coastsin the Gulf of two of
the three riparian States" (para. 203);
but the "role ofcoastsand coastalrelationships"inmaritimedelimitation
again involvesgeneral legal rules and principles. The contention that in
the Gulf of Fonseca "it would be impossible to carry out a delimitation
which took into account only the coasts in the Gulf of two of the three
riparian States" would be more convincingwereit not forthe fact that in
1900a maritime boundary was defined in the Gulf between Nicaragua
and Honduras. In any event, the question is whether a legal interest of
Nicaragua would be "affected" by such maritimedelimitation. It occurs
frequentlyin practicethat a delimitationbetweentwoStatesinvolvestak-
ingaccount ofthe Coastof athird State; butthe taking into account of al1
the coastsand coastalrelationships withinthe Gulf as ageographicalfact
forthe purpose ofeffectingan eventualdelimitationas betweentworipar-
ian States - El Salvador and Honduras in the instant case - in no way
signifiesthat by such an operation itselfthe legalinterest of a third ripar-
ian State ofthe Gulf, Nicaragua, maybe affected. In any case,it isforthe
ApplicantState inthe presentproceedings to demonstrate to the satisfac-tion of the Chamber that this would be actuallythe case in the present
instance. This Nicaragua has failed to do. As for the other arguments
advanced by Nicaragua,in paragraph 2 (g)of itsApplication,in support
of its position,these appear to the Chamber to refer to altogether too
remotea contingencytojustify aninterventioninthepresent proceedings.
78. Paragraph 2 (c) of the Application advances "The geographical
situation in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas" as a
considerationsupportingthe contention that Nicaraguahas aninterest of
a legalnature whichmaybeaffected bythe decision. Setting aside forthe
momentthe question ofthe "adjacent maritime areas", the essentialdiffi-
cultyinwhichthe Chamber findsitself,onthismatterofapossibledelimi-
tation within the waters of the Gulf, is that Nicaragua did not in its
Applicationindicateanymaritimespacesin which Nicaragua mighthave
a legalinterest which couldbe said to be affected by a possible delimita-
tionlinebetween ElSalvadorand Honduras.Theareainwhich suchmar-
itimespacescould exist isin any eventlimited,inview ofthe delimitation
effected in 1900with Honduras. In the oral proceedings counsel for
Nicaraguadid referto "the factthat itwillbe necessarytojoin somepoint
on the closing line of the Gulf with the western terminus of the line of
1900";an observation which,whileat anyratefocusingconsideration on
a particular area of the Gulf waters, stillfailed to make any casethat the
Nicaraguan interest involved would be affected by the Honduran pro-
posed delimitation line. The Agent of Nicaragua also suggestedthat the
Chamber might, in making any delimitation within the Gulf between
ElSalvadorand Honduras, havetotakeaccount of"navigation routesina
Gulf whose mouth is lessthan 20miles wideand the reasonablesecurity
interests of the riparians", but this consideration is too general to justify
interventionin relation to adecision on delimitation in the present case.
79. Accordinglythe Chamber isnotsatisfiedthat adecisioninthepres-
ent case either as to the law applicable to a delimitation, or effecting a
delimitation, between Honduras and El Salvador, of the waters of the
Gulf (except as regards the alleged "community of interests"), would
affect Nicaragua's interests. The Chamber therefore considers that
although Nicaragua has, for purposes of Article62ofthe Statute, shown
an interestofa legalnature whichmaybeaffectedbythe Chamber'sdeci-
sion on the question of the existence or nature of a régimeof condomi-
nium or community of interests within the Gulf of Fonseca, it has not
shownsuchaninterestwhichmightbeaffectedbytheChamber'sdecision
on anyquestion ofdelimitationwithintheGulf.Thisfindingalsodisposes
of the question, referred to in paragraph 66 above, of the possible rele-
vance of a decision in the island dispute. 80. The Chamber now turns to the question of the possible effect on
Nicaragua's legalinterests of itsfuturedecision on the waters outside the
Gulf, referred to by Nicaragua as "the adjacent maritime areas". In
respect of these waters the Parties to the case are again divided as to the
meaning of Article 2ofthe SpecialAgreement.Honduras claimsthat
"In requesting the Courtto determine 'the legalsituationinthe ...
maritime areas',theParties havenecessarilyendowed the Court with
competence to delimit the zones of territorial sea and the exclusive
economic zones pertaining to Honduras and El Salvador respec-
tively."
Consistentlywith its interpretation of Article 2ofthe SpecialAgreement,
Honduras asksthe Chamber to endorsethe delimitationline advanced by
Hondurasforthe waters outside the Gulf as "productive of an equitable
solution". El Salvadorinterpretsthe Special Agreement as not authoriz-
ing the Chamber to effect any delimitation; it contends furthermore that
there is no connection between the rights of Honduras as a coastal State
within the Gulf havinga right of accessto the high seas,and any claimby
Honduras to a territorial, sea and exclusive economic zone beyond the
closingline of the Gulf. El Salvadoralso refersto the Farallones,belong-
ingto Nicaragua, andto certainislands claimedby El Salvador,and con-
tends that "These islands andthe waters associated with them effectively
deprive Honduras of directcontact withthe Pacificthroughthe mouth of
the Gulf of Fonseca."
81. Both Parties contend that Nicaragua has no legal interest which
may be affected by the decision on the "legal situation" of the maritime
spaces outside the Gulf. El Salvador observesthat if its interpretation of
the Special Agreement is accepted, Nicaragua's rights vis-à-vis El Sal-
vador willsubsistunaffected; but contends that evenifthe Chamber were
to decidethat Honduras hasrightsoverthewatersoutsidethe Gulf,andto
delimit them by its Judgment, it could do so "without Nicaragua being a
partytothe proceedings". BothParties deny that the carrying out by the
Chamber of their respective interpretations of Article 2 could affect
Nicaragua's legal interests. The Stateseekingto intervene is, however,of
the viewthat its own legal interestsin these waters must be affected by a
decision of the Chamber onthe basis of eitherinterpretation of Article 2.
82. Whether a State is entitled to a territorial sea, continental shelf,or
exclusiveeconomiczone isa question to be decided by application ofthe
principles and rules of the law of the sea on those matters.As observed
above (paragraph 76),an interest in the application of general legal rules
and principles is not the kind of interest which willjustify an application
for permissionto intervene.Inthe present case,the legalrégimewithinthe
Gulf - whatever it maybe found bythe Chamber to be - willno doubt
alsoberelevantto any decisiondelimitingthewatersoutsidetheGulf; butthis, in the view ofthe Chamber, tends solelyto strengthen Nicaragua's
claimto intervene in relation to the legal régimeof the maritime spaces
insidethe Gulf,not tojustify an interventionin relation to the legalsitua-
tion ofthe maritimespaces outside.
83. This question furthermore cannot be considered separatelyfrom
the question setbythe Honduran thesis,accordingto whichthe Chamber
is required by the Special Agreementto effect a maritimedelimitationin
the area outside the Gulf. As already observed (paragraph 74above),the
Chamber does not haveto considerthe effectsof everypossible delimita-
tion, but merely to consider whether the State seeking to intervene has
shown the existence of a legal interest, and has shown that that interest
maybe affected by a delimitationdecision.Honduras moreover has inits
pleadingsproduced a proposed scheme of delimitation, and has charted
it; and inthecontext ofthepresentproceedingsHonduras hasexpounded
this scheme to the Chamber, and shown how it is designed to avoid
entirelyanyimpingement upon waters outsidethe Gulf whichmightcon-
ceivablybe claimedby Nicaragua.Counselfor Honduras explained that
onlypart ofthe Honduran coasthad beentaken intoaccountfor that deli-
mitation, the remainder ofthe Honduran coastbeing ignored "because it
is relevant to some future delimitation between Honduras and Nicara-
gua"; andthat
"by the same reasoning we have limited the relevantmaritime area
to the east by a line drawn from [apoint midway alongthe closing-
line] perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, out to
200miles, ...".
He concluded that
"The result is that Nicaraguan claims, both in respect of the
closing-line and the maritime areas outside, are untouched. Pro-
vided,provided only, that you can assume that Nicaragua has no
plausible claim to the waters beyond the mid-point of the closing
line,... or to the waters west ofthe perpendicular projected from
that mid-point."
84. In these incidental proceedings, and before hearing argument on
the merits, the Chamber cannot pass upon Honduras's demonstration
concerningits proposa1for delimitation of the waters outside the Gulf;
but that demonstration did cal1for some indication in response, by the
State seekingto intervene,ofhow those proposalswouldaffecta specific
interestofthat State,orwhat otherpossibledelimitation would affectthat
interest.Nicaraguahas responded to this schemeof Honduras,but again
very much in general terms. At the hearings, the Agent of Nicaragua
simply said that "Outside the Gulf of Fonseca, it is plain from looking atany chart and from the graphics presented by the Parties in their written
pleadings" - and he referred specificallyto the charts showing Hondu-
ras'sproposed delimitation - "that no such demands can be made in the
PacificOceanwithout affectingthelegalinterestofNicaraguato asignifi-
cant extent." The Chamber does not find the matter so plain. Nicaragua
was shown by Honduras both a proposed delimitation line and a pro-
posedline marking offwhat Honduras callsthe "relevantmaritime area".
The charted proposition of Honduras thus gave Nicaragua the opportu-
nityto indicate howthe Honduran proposals mightaffect"to asignificant
extent" anypossible Nicaraguan legalinterestinwatersWestofthat Hon-
duran line. ThisNicaragua did not do. Nicaragua failed to indicate how
this delimitation, or any other delimitation regarded by it as a possible
one, would affectan actual Nicaraguan interest of a legalnature, and the
Chamber therefore cannot grant Nicaragua permission to intervene over
the delimitation ofthe waters outside the Gulf closingline.
85. Having found that Nicaragua has shown an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by certain of the decisions which may be
required by the Special Agreement,the Chamber has now to turn to the
question ofthe objectof Nicaragua'sApplicationfor permissionto inter-
vene inthe case.Astatement ofthe "precise object ofthe intervention" is
required by Article 81,paragraph 2 (b),of the Rules of Court; and it is
clearfrom previousdecisionsofthe Court that itisbound to consider"the
objectofthe Application andthe wayin whichthat objectcorresponds to
what is contemplated by the Statute", and to satisfy itselfthat the object
of the intervention corresponds to what is envisaged by the Statute
(I.C.J. Reports1984,p. 18,para. 28).
86. Nicaragua's indication,in its Application for permission to inter-
vene,ofthe objectofitsintervention inthepresent case,alreadyquoted in
paragraph 38above,was as follows :
"The interventionfor which permissionis requested has the fol-
lowing objects:
First,generallytoprotectthe legalrightsoftheRepublic ofNicara-
gua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas by al1
legalmeans available.
Secondly,to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Court ofthenature ofthe legalrightsofNicaragua whichareinissue
inthe dispute. Thisformofinterventionwould havethe conservative
purpose of seekingto ensure that the determination ofthe Chamber
did not trench upon the legalrights and interests of the Republic of
Nicaragua. .."Thatindicationshouldbereadinthe lightofthe statement ofthe Agentof
Nicaragua at the hearings that
"if theChamber should feel that the Application of Nicaragua goes
too far or remains too limited, Nicaragua would be willingto adjust
to any procedure indicated by the Chamber. The only thing that
Nicaragua seeks isto protect itslegalinterestsand itwilldoso in any
waythe Statute allows."
It has been contended, in particular by ElSalvador, that Nicaragua has
not stated the "precise object" of its intervention in compliance with
Article 81, paragraph 2 (b),of the Rules of Court, and that its stated
object is not a proper object, and that for these reasons Nicaragua's
Applicationshouldnot be accepted.
87. El Salvador complains that although Nicaragua States that its
object is to "protect the legal rights of the Republic of Nicaragua in the
Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas", and to "inform the
Court ofthe nature of the legal rights of Nicaragua which are in issuein
the dispute", itoesnotsufficientlyindicate whatthose rightsare claimed
to be, how they maybe affected, or what substantive purpose Nicaragua
seeks to achieve. In order to be permitted to intervene,a State does not
have to show that it has rights which need to be protected,but merelyan
interestofalegalnature whichmaybeaffectedbythe decisioninthe case.
This matter oflegalinterests has howeverbeen dealt with and decided by
the Chamber in the earlier part of this Judgment (paragraphs 72, 79
and 84);so it isin relation to those Nicaraguaninterests of a legalnature
which the Chamber has found to exist that the Chamber must now
examinethe declaredobject of the intervention. Nicaragua's substantive
purpose appears to beto informthe Chamber ofitsrights orinterests,and
to protectthem "by al1legalmeans available", i.e.,to preventthem being
affectedby the Chamber's decision,orto ensurethat a decision affecting
them is only taken after Nicaraguahas been heard.
88. In its written observations on the Application for permission to
intervene, El Salvador referred to this aspect of the Application and
argued that
"[The] differing descriptions of the object of the intervention,
oscillating between the purpose of protecting its rights by al1legal
means available and the conservativepurpose of merely informing
the Chamber ofitsrights,constitute an attempt to avoidthe dilemma
confrontinga State seekingto intervene ...If the object ofthe inter-
vention isto inform the Court of itsrights or claims,Nicaragua will
have a fullopportunity todo so(as Italydid) inthe oralproceedings
to be convened in accordance with Article 84, paragraph 2, of the
Rules, without any need to allow its intervention. If, on the other
hand, the object ofthe application isto protect its claimsbyal1legal
means, including that of seeking a favourablejudicial pronounce-
ment on these claims,then such a purpose willsignifythe introduc- tion by Nicaragua of additional disputes, requiring a valid link of
jurisdiction, which does not exist."
89. It appears to the Chamber that the consequence of that argument
would be that intervention, not merely in the present case but in most
cases, would have to be refused, if not for the one reason, then for the
other, and that the purposes of Article 62 of the Statute would thus be
frustrated.The Chamber cannot accept such a position. In the first place,
with regard to the stated object of informingthe Court of a third State's
rights, it is evident that if it were necessaryfor a State which considered
that itslegalinterestsmightbe affectedbythe decisionin a caseto givean
exhaustiveaccount of these interestsin its application for permission to
intervene,orat the hearings held to considerwhetherpermission to inter-
veneshouldbegranted,therewouldbe no point inthe institution ofinter-
vention and in the further proceedings to which it should give rise under
the Rules of Court. It istruethat inthe circumstances ofthe caseconcern-
ing the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), the Court
found itself able to take into account,in itsecision onthe merits, infor-
mation about Italian claims presented to it during the proceedings on
Italy's unsuccessfulapplicationto intervene.Butthereasonforthe refusa1
ofpermission to intervenein that casewasnot that the Court wasalready
sufficientlyinformed ofItaly'sinterestsby thoseproceedings.Nor wasita
finding that Italy had not sufficientlyindicated the interests to be pro-
tected or presentedthemin an inappropriate manner.
90. So far as the object of Nicaragua's intervention is "to inform the
Court of the nature of the legal rights of Nicaragua which are in issue in
the dispute", itcannotbe said thatthis objectisnot a proper one:it seems
indeed to accord with the function of intervention. It is true that Nicara-
guainitsApplication wentonto statethat ithas "the conservative purpose
ofseekingto ensurethat thedeterminations ofthe Chamber didnottrench
upon the legalrights and interestsofthe Republic of Nicaragua. .."The
expression"trench upon the legalrights and interests" islanguagenot to
be found in Article62ofthe Statute,whichrefersto the possibilitythat an
"interest ofa legalnature" mightbe "affected" bythe decision. If "trench
upon" was intended perhaps to go further than the language of the Sta-
tute,then itshouldbebornein mindthat itwouldhardlybepossible,given
Article 59of the Statute and indeed the decision in the case concerning
Monetaty GoldRemovedfromRomein1943(paragraphs 54-55above),for
a decision ofthe Courtto "trench upon" the legalright of athird State.It
seemsto the Chamber howeverthat it isperfectlyproper, and indeed the
purpose ofintervention,for an intervenerto informthe Chamber ofwhat
it regards as itsrights or interests,inder to ensure that no legalinterest
maybe "affected" without the intervenerbeing heard;and thatthe usein
an application to interveneof a perhaps somewhatmoreforceful expres-sion is immaterial,provided the object actuallyaimed at is a proper one.
Nor can the Chamber disregard in this connectionthe indication by the
Agentof Nicaragua,quoted in paragraph 86above,that Nicaragua seeks
to protectits legalinterest solelyin such wayas the Statute allows.
91. Secondly, as to the other aspect of the dilemma alleged by El Sal-
vador,it doesnot seemto the Chamber to followthat fora Stateto seekby
intervention "to protectits claimsby al1legalmeans" necessarilyinvolves
the inclusionin such means of "that of seekinga favourablejudicial pro-
nouncement" on itsown claims.Counselfor El Salvador recognizedthat
Nicaragua was not seeking to introduce an additional dispute. He
observed howeverthat
"Nicaragua does not declare as one of its objects that it seeksto
join the proceedingsasaparty andto beboundas suchbytheCourt's
decision" ;
and he suggested that its statementsin this connection are equivocal. It
was also suggested that Nicaragua's reference, in paragraph 24 of its
Application, to a possible new caseto be brought by agreement
"suggestsstronglythat Nicaragua recognizesthat itsparticipation in
the case in any meaningful sense is dependent upon the consent of
the principal Parties";
and El Salvador contends that a jurisdictional link is a requirement for
intervention. However, in the course of the oral proceedings Nicaragua
made veryclearthrough counsel that it "is not claimingto introduce, via
itsintervention,a new dispute in addition to that of the Parties"; and the
samepointismade inparagraph 8oftheApplication.CounselforNicara-
gua also recognized that "intervention under Article 62 of the Statute of
the Court was not intended" for that purpose.
92. In the light ofthese statements, it appears to the Chamber that the
objectstated first in Nicaragua's Application, namely "generally to pro-
tect the legalrights of the Republic of Nicaragua in the Gulf of Fonseca
and the adjacentmaritime areasby al1legalmeans available", isnot to be
interpreted as involving the seeking of a judicial pronouncement on
Nicaragua's own claims. The "legal means available" must be those
afforded by the institution of intervention for the protection of a third
State's legal interests.So understood, that object cannot be regarded as
improper.
93. The Chamber has now further to consider the argument of El
Salvadorthat for Nicaragua to intervenein these proceedings between El 132 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
Salvador and Honduras, it must in addition show a "valid link ofjuris-
diction" between Nicaragua and those two States. The requirement of
Article 81,paragraph 2 (c),of the Rules of Court, for the statementin an
applicationfor permissiontointerveneof"anybasis ofjurisdiction which
is claimedto existasbetween the Stateapplying to interveneandthe par-
ties to the case", and Nicaragua's attitude to this, have been referred to
above (paragraph 39). In its Application, Nicaragua does not assert the
existence of any basis of jurisdiction other than the Statute itself, and
expressesthe viewthat Article62doesnot requirea separate titleofjuris-
diction.Nicaraguaalso recalls,inparagraph 24ofthe Application,that it
has a valid and unconditional declaration of acceptance ofjurisdiction
under Article 36,paragraph 2, ofthe Court's Statute; but it does not rely
onthat declarationinthepresent proceedings. ElSalvadorand Honduras
have also made declarations under that Article,but they contain reserva-
tions which, according to those States respectively,would prevent their
beinginvoked to seisethe Court of the matters the subject of the present
case.
94. Thequestion iswhetherthe existenceof a valid link ofjurisdiction
with the parties to the case in the senseof abasis ofjurisdiction which
couldbeinvoked, bya Stateseekingto intervene,inorder to institutepro-
ceedings against either or both of the parties- is an essential condition
forthe granting ofpermissionto intervene under Article62ofthe Statute.
In what follows,therefore,the expression"jurisdictional link" or "link of
jurisdiction" isusedinthis sense.Thequestion hasbeen raisedinprevious
casesbeforethe Court in which permission has been sought to intervene
under Article 62. In the case concerningthe ContinentalShelf(Tunisia/
LibyanArab Jamahiriya), the Court found it unnecessary to decide the
question, since it had reached the conclusion that, for other reasons,
Malta'srequestfor permission to intervenewasnot one to which it could
accede (I.C.J. Reports 1981,p. 20, para. 36). In the case concerningthe
Continental Shelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta), the Court againfound
it possible "to reach adecision on the present Application without gen-
erally resolving the vexed question of the 'valid link of jurisdiction"'
(I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 28,para. 45).It did so however by stating two al-
ternative lines of argument, one on the basis that such a link would be
required, and one onthe basisthat itwould not, and observingthat inthe
circumstances of the case before it, "either of two approaches ... must
result in the Court being bound to refuse the permission to intervene
requested by Italy" (I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 22, para. 34). Although that
Judgment contains a number ofvaluable observationson the subject,the
question remains unresolved. Sincein the present case the Chamber has
reached the conclusion that Nicaragua has shown the existence of an
interest of a legal nature which maybe affected by the decision, and that
the intervention of Nicaragua has a proper object, the only remaining
question is whether a jurisdictional link is required; andsince it is con-
cededthat no suchlinkexists,the Chamber isobligedto decidethepoint.In order to do so, it must consider the general principle of consensual
jurisdiction in itsrelation with the institution of intervention.
95. There can be no doubt ofthe importance ofthisgeneralprinciple,
upon whichthe State seekingto intervenehas itself,initsApplication,laid
considerable emphasis. Asthe Permanent Court of International Justice
expressed it,the Court operates
"bearing inmindthefactthat itsjurisdiction islimited,that itisinvar-
iablybased onthe consent ofthe respondent and only existsin sofar
asthisconsenthasbeen given"(MavrommatisPalestine Concessions,
JudgmentNo.2, 1924,P.C.ZJ ..,SeriesA, No.2,p. 16).
Thus the pattern of internationaljudicial settlement under the Statute is
that two or more Statesagree that the Court shall hear and determine a
particulardispute. Suchagreementmaybegivenadhoc,bySpecialAgree-
ment or othenvise, or may result from the invocation,in relation to the
particulardispute, ofacompromissoryclause of atreatyorofthemechan-
ismofArticle 36,paragraph 2,ofthe Court's Statute.Those Statesarethe
"parties" to the proceedings, and arebound bythe Court's eventualdeci-
sion because they have agreed to confer jurisdiction on the Court to
decide the case, the decision of the Court having binding force as pro-
vided for in Article 59of the Statute. Normally, therefore, no other state
may involveitself in the proceedingswithoutthe consent of the original
~arties.
96. Nevertheless, procedures for a "third State to intervenein a case
areprovidedin Articles62and 63ofthe Court's Statute.Thecompetence
of the Court in thismatter of intervention is not, like its competence to
hear and determinethe dispute referred to it,derivedfromthe consent of
the parties to the case,but from the consent given bythem, in becoming
parties to the Court's Statute, to the Court's exercise of its powers con-
ferred by the Statute. There is no need to interpret the reference inAr-
ticle 36, paragraph 1,of the Statute to "treaties in force" to include the
Statute itself; acceptance of the Statute entails acceptance of the compe-
tenceconferred onthe Court byArticle62.Thusthe Court hasthecompe-
tence to permit an intervention eventhough it be opposed by one orboth
oftheparties tothecase; astheCourt statedin 1984,"theopposition[to an
intervention] of the parties to a case is, though very important, no more
than one elementto be taken into account by the Court" (Z.C.J.Reports
1984,p. 28, para. 46). The nature of the competence thus created by
Article 62 of the Statute is definable by reference to the object and pur-
pose of intervention,asthis appearsfrom Article 62of the Statute.
97. Intervention under Article 62 of the Statute is for the purpose of
protectinga State's "interest ofa legalnature" that mightbeaffected by a
decision in an existing case already established between other States,
namelythe parties to the case.It isnot intended toenable athird State totack on a new case, to become a new party, and so have its own claims
adjudicated by the Court. A case with a new party, and new issuesto be
decided,wouldbe a newcase.Thedifferencebetweenintervention under
Article62,and thejoining ofa newparty to acase,isnot onlyadifference
in degree; it is a difference in kind. Asthe Court observedin 1984,
"There isnothing in Article62to suggestthat itwasintended as an
alternative means of bringing an additional dispute as a casebefore
the Court - a matter dealt within Article40ofthe Statute - or asa
method ofasserting the individualrights of a Statenot a party to the
case." (ContinentalShelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriya/Malta),Applica-
tion toIntervene,I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 23,para. 37.)
98. It is noteworthy that intervention is dealt with in Chapter III of
the Court's Statute, which is headed "Procedure". This approach was
adopted bytheCourt alsowhenitdrew up and revisedits RulesofCourt,
whereintervention appearsin SectionDofthe Rules,headed "Incidental
Proceedings". Incidental proceedings by definition must be those which
are incidentalto a casewhichisalreadybefore theCourtor Chamber. An
incidental proceeding cannot be one which transforms that case into a
different case with differentparties.
99. Intervention cannot havebeenintended tobe employedasasubsti-
tute for contentious proceedings. Acceptance of the Statute by a State
doesnot ofitselfcreatejurisdiction to entertain aparticular case :the spe-
cificconsent oftheparties isnecessaryforthat. If an intervenerwereheld
tobecomea party to a casemerelyasaconsequence ofbeingpermittedto
intervene in it, this would be a very considerable departure from this
principle of consensualjurisdiction. That the incidentaljurisdiction con-
ferredbyArticle62ofthe Statuteiscircumscribedbythegeneralprinciple
of consensual jurisdiction over particular disputes was stated by the
Court in its Judgment on the Italian Application to intervenein the case
concerning the ContinentalShelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta),when
the Court was carefulnot toadopt a position in which
"it wouldbe admitting that theprocedure ofintervention under Arti-
cle 62 would constitute an exception to the fundamental principles
underlying its jurisdiction; primarily the principle of consent, but
also the principles of reciprocity and equality of States. The Court
considersthat an exception ofthiskind could not be admittedunless
it were veryclearlyexpressed." (I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 22,para. 35.)
It is therefore clear that a State which is allowed to intervene in a case,
does not,byreasononly ofbeing anintervener,becomealsoaparty to the
case.It istrue, conversely,that, provided that there be the necessarycon-
sentbytheparties to the case,theintervenerisnot prevented byreason ofthat statusfrom itselfbecoming a party to the case.That the competence
givento the Court in Article62ofthe Statuteisnot extendable to making
an intervenera party to the case unless the parties to the case have con-
sented to the change appears also to be the view of Nicaragua, which
stated during the oralproceedings that "Article62isapart ofthe inciden-
ta1jurisdiction and there isno compellinglogicrequiringits provisionsto
be seenasan 'exception'tothe principle ofconsent".Thereisfurthermore
in international law no process for joinder of a new party, or parties,
whether as appellant or respondent, by move of the Court itself. The
Court referred in 1984to "the absence in the Court's procedures of any
system of compulsory intervention, whereby a third State could be cited
bytheCourtto comeinasparty.. ."(ContinentalShelfLibyanArabJama-
hiriya/Malta),ApplicationtoZnterveneI ,.C.J.Reports1984,p. 25,para. 40)
and againto the fact that the Court does not possessthe power "to direct
that athird Statebe made a party to proceedings" (MilitaryandParamili-
tary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. UnitedStates of
America),I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 431,para. 88).
100. It thus follows also from the juridical nature and from the pur-
poses of intervention that the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction
between the would-beintervener andthe parties is not a requirementfor
the successofthe application. Onthe contrary,the procedure ofinterven-
tionisto ensurethat aStatewithpossiblyaffectedinterests maybepermit-
ted to interveneeventhoughthere isnojurisdictional link and ittherefore
cannot become a party. Article 8 1,paragraph 2 (c),of the Rules of Court
Statesthat an application under Article62ofthe Statute shallsetout "any
basis ofjurisdiction which is claimedto existasbetween the State apply-
ing to intervene and the parties to the case"; the use of the words "any
basis" (and in Frenchthe formula"toutebase de compétencequi ...exis-
terait") shows that a valid link of jurisdiction is not treated as a
sine qua nonfor intervention (cf. also ContinentalShelf(Tunisia/Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya),Applicationto Intenene, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 16,
para. 27).
101. The Chamber therefore concludesthat the absence of ajurisdic-
tionallink between Nicaragua and the Partiestothis caseisnobarto per-
mission being givenforintervention.
102. Sincethisisthefirstcase inthehistoryofthetwo Courts inwhicha
Statewillhavebeenaccordedpermissionto intervene under Article62of
the Statute,itappears appropriateto givesomeindication ofthe extent of
the procedural rights acquired by the interveningState as a result of that
permission.Thisisparticularlydesirable sincethe interventionpermitted
relatesonly to certain issuesofthe manysubmittedtothe Chamber. Inthe
first place, as has been explained above, the intervening State does notbecome party to the proceedings, and does not acquire the rights, or
become subject to the obligations, which attach to the status of a party,
under the Statute and Rules of Court, or the general principles of pro-
cedural law. Nicaragua, as an intervener, has of course a right to be
heard by the Chamber. That right is regulated by Article 85of the Rules
ofCourt, whichprovides for submissionofawrittenstatement, and parti-
cipationin the hearings. Time-limitswillbe fixed for a written statement
by Nicaragua, and observations thereon by the Parties, in accordance
with Article 85,so soon afterthe deliveryof the present Judgment asthe
appropriate consultations can be held.
103.The scope of the intervention in thisparticular case, in relation to
the scope of the case as a whole, necessarily involves limitations of the
right ofthe intervenerto be heard. An initiallimitation isthat it isnot for
the intervener to address argumentto the Chamber on the interpretation
ofthe SpecialAgreementconcluded betweenthe Parties on 24May 1986,
because the SpecialAgreementis,for Nicaragua, resinteraliosacta.
104.Nicaragua has disclaimedany intention of involvingitself in the
dispute overthe land boundary. The Chamber has found that Nicaragua
has notshownthe existenceofanyinterest ofa legalnature whichmaybe
affected by itsdecision on "the legalsituation ofthe islands". Asregards
the decisionrequired ofthe Chamber concerningthe legalsituation ofthe
maritime spaces within the Gulf, the Chamber has indicated (para-
graph 72above)that Nicaraguahasa legalinterestwhichmaybeaffected
bya decisionastothelegalrégimeofthosewaters,i.e.,adecisioninfavour
ofthecontention ofElSalvador,thatthe watersoftheGulfaresubject to a
régimeofcondominium, ora decisioninfavourofthe contention ofHon-
duras, that there exists a "community of interests" between the three
States in the waters of the Gulf. Nicaragua has not demonstrated to the
satisfaction of theChamber the existence of an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by any decision of the Chamber delimiting the
waters of the Gulf of Fonseca between El Salvador and Honduras, or by
any decision as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces outside the
Gulf, including any decision on entitlement or on delimitation between
El Salvador and Honduras, and intervention in those respects has not
been justified. The Chamber therefore finds that Nicaragua should be
permitted to intervene but solelyin respect of the Chamber's considera-
tion ofthe legalrégimeofthe maritime spaceswithinthe Gulf of Fonseca,
and to participate in the proceedings in the case in accordance with
Article 85of the Rules of Court. 105. For these reasons,
Unanimously,
1.Findsthat the Republic of Nicaragua has shown that it has an inter-
estofa legalnature whichmaybe affectedbypart ofthe Judgment ofthe
Chamber onthe meritsin the present case,namelyitsdecisiononthe legal
régimeof the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca,but has not shown such an
interestwhichmaybeaffectedbyanydecisionwhichthe Chamber maybe
required to makeconcerningthedelimitation ofthose waters,oranydeci-
sion as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces outside the Gulf, or
any decision astothe legalsituation ofthe islands in the Gulf;
2. Decidesaccordingly that the Republic of Nicaragua is permitted to
interveneinthe case,pursuant to Article62ofthe Statute,to the extent,in
the manner and forthe purposes set out in the presentJudgment,but not
furtheror otherwise.
Done in Englishand in French,the English text being authoritative, at
the PeacePalace,TheHague,thisthirteenth day of September,one thou-
Sandnine hundred and ninety,infourcopies,one ofwhichwillbeplaced
inthe archivesoftheCourt and the otherstransmitted to the Government
of Nicaragua, the Government of El Salvador, and the Government of
Honduras, respectively.
(Signed)JoséSETTE-CAMARA,
President ofthe Chamber.
(Signed)Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.
Judge ODAappends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Chamber.
(Initialled)J.S.C.
(Initialled)E.V.O.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASECONCERNINGTHE LAND,ISLAND AND
MARITIME FRONTIER DISPUTE
(EL SALVADOWHONDURAS)
APPLICATION BY NICARAGUA FOR PERMISSION
TO INTERVENE
JUDGMENT OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1990
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER
TERRESTRE, INSULAIRE ET MARITIME
(EL SALVADOWHONDURAS)
REQUÊTE DU NICARAGUA À FIN D'INTERVENTION
ARRÊT DU 13 SEPTEMBRE1990 Officia1citation :
Land,Islandand MaritimeFrontierDispute (ElSalvador/Honduras),
ApplicationtoZntewene,Judgment,I.C.J.Repo,. 92990p
Mode officiel de ci:ation
Différendfrontalietrerrestre,insulaireetmaritime(ElSalvador/Honduras),
requête$n d'intervention,t,.. ecueil1990,p.92
Salesnumber
Nodeven:e 584 1 INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE
YEAR 1990
~enêra Llist
No. 75
13 September1990
CASECONCERNINGTHE LAND, ISLAND AND
MARITIMEFRONTIER DISPUTE
(ELSALVADORIHONDURAS)
APPLICATION BYNICARAGUAFORPERMISSION
TO INTERVENE
InterventionunderArticle62of theStatute.
Article81of theRulesof Court- Timelinessof theApplicationforpermission to
intervene- Applicationfiled ut advanced stage of the proceedingscontaining
requestfor changingcompositionofChamberoritsmandate - Whetherdefinition
of disputebyprior negotiationonsubjectof interventionecessary.
Significancefor thepresentApplicationofdecisionincaseconcemingMonetary
GoldRemovedfromRome in1943.
Interest of a legalnature whichrnaybe affected by the decisionin the-case
Limits on scopeofpennitted interventi-n Burden ofproof on State seeking to
intervene.
InterestassertedbyNicaragua - WhetherNicaraguaninterestofa legalnature
rnaybe affectedby decisiononclaimby oneParty that thereexistsin Gulfof Fon-
seca "condominium"of riparianStates and claimby otherPartythat thereexists
"communityof interests" betweenthoseStates- Whethersufficient demonstra-
tionof affectedinterestof a legalnatureof Nicaraguaindelimitationof maritime
spaceswithin theGulf- Whetherinterestingeneral legalrulesandprinciplessu$
ficient- Whethersufficientdemonstrationof affectedinterestofa legalnatureof
Nicaraguainquestionof entitlementof PartiesoutsideGulfto territorialsea,con-
tinentalshelfor exclusiveonomiczone, andpossibledecisionon delimitation.
Objectof interventio- Objectof informingthe Courtof natureof legalrights
of Nicaraguawhich rnaybe in issue Objectofprotectinglegalrightsby al1legal
4 COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE
ANNÉE 1990 1990
13septembre
Rôlno75éral
13 septembre1990
AFFAIREDU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER
TERRESTRE,INSULAIREETMARITIME
(ELSALVADORIHONDURAS)
REQUÊTE DU NICARAGUAÀ FIN D'INTERVENTION
Interventionfondée surl'article62du Statut.
Article1duRèglementdelaCour - Présentationentempsutiledelarequêeà
fin d'intervent-oRequêtedéposéà e unstade avancéde la procédureet conte-
nant une demande de modification de la compositionde la Chambre ou de son
mandat - Questiondesavoirs'ilestnécessdedéfinirledgférendau moyende
néPortée,au regardde la requdu Nicaragua,de la décisionrendue enfaire
de l'Ormonétairepris à Rome en 1943.
Intérêdt'ordrejuridiquesusceptibleaffectépar ladécisàrendreenl'es-
pèce- Limitation de laportéede I'interventionau_oChargede la preuve
incombantà I'Etatdemandant à intervenir.
Intérêt invoquér leNicaragu- Questiondesavoirsi un intdt'ordrejuri-
diqueduNicaraguaestsusceptibled'êteffectépar unedécisionsurlathèsed'une
Partie, selon laquelleil existe dans le golfede Fonsecaun «condominium» des
Etats riverains,oupar une décision surla thèsedeePartie,selon laquelleil
existeentreeuxune((communautéd'intér»t- Questiondesavoirs'ila suffi-
samment démontréqu'il existe un intérêdt'ordrejuridique du Nicaragua en
matièrede délimitationdes espacesmaritimes dans le golfe et que etstintérê
susceptibled'être affectéestionde savoirsi un intrtelatifà des règleset
principesjuridiques d'ordregénérasluffitstiondesavoirs'ila suffam-
ment démontréqu'ilexiste un intdt'ordrejuridique du Nicaraguasusceptible
d'êtreaffectépar une éventuelledécisionsur un droit des Parties, en dehorsdu
golf,à unemer territoriale,unplateau continentalouunezone économiqueexclu-
sive, ou sur unedélimitation.
Objetde l'interventionObjet consistantà informerla Courde la nature des
droitsdu Nicaraguaquipeuvent être en litigejet consistantàprotégerdesmeansavailable - No requestbyState seekingtointerveneforjudicialpronounce-
ment on itsownclaims.
Whethera validlink ofjurisdiction betweenState seeking to interveneand the
parties isarequirementfor interventio- Relationshipbetweeninterventionand
theprincipleof consensualjurisdicti-n Permissiontointervenedoesnot of itself
make thepermitted State aparty to thecase.
Proceduralrightsof Statepermitted to intervene.
JUDGMENT
Present: Judge SETTE-CAMAR Pre,sident of the Chamber; Judges ODA,
Sir Robert JENNINGS J;udges ad hoc VALTICOT S, RRESBERNARDEZ;
R~~~s~~~~VALENCIA-OSPINA.
In the case concemingthe land, island and maritimefrontierdispute,
between
the Republic of El Salvador,
represented by
Dr. Alfredo Martinez Moreno,
as Agent and Counsel,
H.E. Mr.Roberto Arturo Castrillo Hidalgo, Ambassadorto the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent,
and
H.E. Dr. José ManuelPacas Castro, Minister for Foreign Relations,
assistedby
Mr. Keith Highet, Adjunct Professor of International Law at the Fletcher
School of Lawand Diplomacy and Member ofthe Barsof New York and
the District of Columbia,
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Director of the Research Centre for
International Law, University of Cambridge, Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus at Universitéde droit, d'économieet
de sciencessocialesde Paris,
as Counseland Advocates,
and
Mr. Anthony J.Oakley,
Lic.Celina Quinteros,
Lic.Ana Elizabeth VillaltaVizcara,
as Counsellors,
and
the Republic of Honduras,droitspar tous les moyensjuridiquespossibles - Etat désireuxd'intervenirne
demandantpas qu'il soitstatuésur sespropresdemandes.
Questionde savoirsi l'existenced'un lien valabledejuridiction entre I'Etat
demandantà interveniretlesparties estuneconditiondel'interventio- Rapport
entre l'interventionet leprincipede lajuridiction consensuellearelle-même,
l'autorisationd'intervenirnefait pas de 1'Etatqui en bénéfenepartie à I'ins-
tance.
Droitsque 1'Etatautoriséà interveniracquierten matièredeprocédure.
Présents: M. SETTE-CAMAp Rré,sidentde la Chambre; M. ODAet sir Robert
JENNINGS,~U~M ~S; . VALTICO etSTORREB SERN~DEZ j,gesad hoc;
M.VALENCIA-OSPIG Nref,fier.
En l'affairedu différendfrontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime,
entre
la République d'El Salvador,
représentéepar
M.Alfredo Martinez Moreno,
commeagent et conseil,
S. Exc. M. Roberto Arturo Castrillo Hidalgo, ambassadeur aux Pays-Bas,
comme coagent,
et
S.Exc. M.José ManuelPacas Castro, ministre des relations extérieures,
assistésde
M. Keith Highet, professeur adjoint de droit international à la Fletcher
Schoolof Lawand Diplomacy et membre desbarreaux de NewYorket du
district de Columbia,
M. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C.,directeur du Research Centre for Inter-
national Law de l'universitéde Cambridge; Fellowdu Trinity Collegede
Cambridge,
M. ProsperWeil,professeur émérite àYuniversitéde droit, d'économie edte
sciences socialesde Paris,
comme conseils et avocats,
et de
M. Anthony J. Oakley,
MmeCelina Quinteros,
MmeAna Elizabeth VillaltaVizcara,
comme conseillers,
la Républiquedu Honduras,represented by
H.E. Dr. Ramon Valladares Soto,Ambassador to the Netherlands,
as ~~ent,
assisted by
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., Ll.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of
International Law,Universityof Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocate,
and
Mr. Arias de Saavedray Muguelar, Minister, Embassyof Honduras at The
Hague,
Mrs. SaloméCastellanos,MinisterCounsellor,Embassyof Honduras at The
Hague,
as Advisers,
Upon the Applicationforpermission to intervenesubmitted by the Republic
of Nicaragua,
represented by
H.E. Mr. Carlos Argüello Gbmez, Ambassador,
as Agent and Counsel,
assistedby
Mr. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., F.B.A, Chichele Professor of Public International
Law,Universityof Oxford; Fellowof Al1Souls College,Oxford,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotons,Professor of PublicInternational Law,Univer-
sidad Autonoma de Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates,
THE CHAMBE ORF THEINTERNATION CAOLURTOF JUSTICfEormed to deal with
theabove-mentioned case,
composed as above,
after deliberation,
deliversthfollowingJudgment :
1. Byajoint notification dated 11December 1986,filed inthe Registryofthe
Courtthe same day,the Ministersfor Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hon-
duras and the Republic of El Salvadortransmitted to the Registrara certified
copy of a Special Agreement in the Spanish language entitled~OMPROMISO
ENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETER A LA DECISION DE LA CORTE
INTERNACIONAL DEJUSTICIALA CONTROVERSIA FRONTERIZATERRESTRE,INSULAR Y
MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS ESTADOS, SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE
ESQUIPULAS,REPUBLICADE GUATEMALA,ELDIA 24 DEMAYO DE 1986';and entering
into force on 1October 1986.
2. The Parties have not up to the present supplied the Court with an agreed
translation of the Special Agreement into one of the officia1languages of the
Court, and neither Party has submitted a translation of its own.
3. The Spanishtext of the SpecialAgreement reads as follo:sreprésentéepar
S.Exc. M. Ramon Valladares Soto,ambassadeuraux Pays-Bas,
comme agent,
assistéde
M.Derek W.Bowett,C.B.E.,Q.C.,Ll.D.,F.B.A.,professeur de droitinterna-
tionalà l'université de Cambridge,titulaire de la chaire Whewell,
comme conseil et avocat,
et de
M. Arias de Saavedra y Muguelar, ministre, ambassade du Honduras aux
Pays-Bas,
MmeSaloméCastellanos, ministre-conseiller à l'ambassade du Honduras
aux Pays-Bas,
commeconseillers,
Sur la requêteàfin d'interventiondéposéepar la Républiquedu Nicaragua,
représentéepar
S.Exc. M. Carlos Argüello Gbmez, ambassadeur,
commeagent et conseil,
assistéde
M. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international public à
l'université d'Oxford, titulairede la chaireChichele; Fellowde l'Al1Souls
Colleged'Oxford,
M.Antonio Remiro Brotons,professeur de droitinternationalpublic àl'Uni-
versidad Autonoma de Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats,
LACHAMBRE DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICcEonstituée pour con-
naître de l'affairesusmentionnée,
ainsi composée,
aprèsdélibéré,
rend l'arrêst ivant:
1. Par notification conjointe du 11décembre1986déposée au Greffede la
Cour le même jour, les ministres des relations extérieuresde la Républiquedu
Honduras etde la Républiqued'El Salvadoronttransmis au Greffierune copie
certifiéeconformed'un compromis en langueespagnoleintitulé ((COMPROMISO
ENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETER A LA DECISION DE LA CORTE
INTERNACIONAL DE JUSTICIALA CONTROVERSU FRONTERIZA TERRESTRE,INSULAR Y
MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS ESTADOS, SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE
ESQUIPULAS,REPUBLICADEGUATEMALA,ELDIA 24 DE MAYODE 1986»,dont l'entrée
en vigueur étaitfixéeaule*octobre 1986.
2. Jusqu'à présentles Parties n'ont pas fouràla Cour de traduction com-
mune de ce compromis dans l'une des langues officiellesde la Cour et ni l'une
ni l'autren'en a soumis sa propre traduction.
3. Letexte espagnoldu compromis est ainsi libellé: "COMPROMISOENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETERA LA DECI-
SION DE LA CORTE INTERNACIONALDE JUSTICIALA CONTROVERSIA FRONTERIZA
TERRESTRE, INSULAR Y MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS ESTADOS,
SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE ESQUIPULAS, REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA, EL DIA
24 DE MAYO DE 1986
El GobiernodelaRepdblicadeHondurasy elGobiernodelaRepublicade
El Salvador,
Considerandoque el 30de octubrede 1980,en la ciudadde Lima, Peni,
suscribieronelTratadoGeneraldePaz,pormediodelmal, interalia,delimi-
taron la frontera terrestrede ambas Republicas en aquellasseccionesen
dondeno existia controversia;
Considerandoquedentrodelplazoprevistoenlosarticulos19y 31delTra-
tadoGeneraldePaz,de30deoctubrede 1980,noseIlegba unarreglodirecto
sobre las diferenciasde limites existentescon respect0a las demas zonas
terrestresen controversia,y e10 relativoa la situacibnjuridica insulary de
losespaciosmaritimos;
Han designado como sus respectivosPlenipotenciarios,Honduras al
SeiiorMinistro de RelacionesExteriores,AbogadC oarlos LhpezContreras,y
El Salvador al Seiïor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Licenciado
RodolfoAntonioCastilloClaramount,quienes,una vezencontradosenbuena
y debidaforma susPlenosPoderes;
CONVIENENEN LO SIGUIENTE:
Articulol0
Constitucionde unaSala
1. En aplicacibndel Articulo 34 del Tratado Generalde Paz suscrito el
30 de octubrede 1980,las Partessometen las cuestionesmencionadasen el
ArticuloSegundodelpresenteCompromisea unaSala delaCorteInternacio-
na1deJusticia, compuestapor tresmiembros,conla anuenciade lasPartes,
las males la expresaranenforma conjuntaal Presidentede la Corte,siendo
estaconformidadesencialparala integracibndelaSala,queseconstituirade
acuerdoa losProcedimientosestablecidosenelEstatuto de la Cortey en el
presenteCompromiso.
2.Adicionalmente, integraranla Sala dosjueces ad-hoc especialmente
nombradosunoporElSalvador y otroporHonduras;losquepodrantenerla
nacionalidadde lasPartes.
Articulo2O
Objetodellitigio
Las Partessolicitana laSala :
1. Quedelimitela Iineafronteriza en las zonOssecciones nodescritasen
elArticulo16del TratadoGeneraldePaz,de 30de octubrede 1980.
2. Que determinelasituacibnjuridica insulary de losespaciosmaritimos.
Articulo3O
Procedimiento
1. Lus Partes solicitan ala Sala autorizarque elprocedimiento escrito
consistaen :«COMPROMIS0 ENTREHONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETERA LA DECI-
SIONDE LA CORTE INTERNACIONALDEJUSTICIA LA CONTROVERSIA FRONTERIZA
TERRESTRE, INSULAR Y MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS ESTADOS,
SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE ESQUIPULAS,REPUBLICADE GUATEMALA,EL DIA
24 DE MAYODE 1986
El GobiemodelaRepublicade Hondurasy elGobiemodela Republicade
El Salvador,
Considerando que el 30de octubrede 1980,en la ciudadde Lima, Ped,
suscribieronelTratadoGeneraldePaz,pormediodelmal, interalia, delimi-
taron la frontera terrestrede ambas Republicas en aquellasseccionesen
dondeno existiacontroversia;
Considerando quedentrodelplazoprevistoenlosarticulas19y 31delTra-
tadoGeneraldePaz,de30deoctubrede 1980,nosellegoa unarreglodirecto
sobre las dijërencias de limites existentescon respect0a las demas zonas
terrestresen controversia,y e10 relativoa la situacibnjuridica insulary de
losespaciosrnaritimos;
Han designado como sus respectives Plenipotenciarios,Honduras al
SefiorMinistrodeRelacionesExteriores,AbogadoCarlosLbpezContreras,y
El Salvador al Sefior Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Licenciado
RodolfoAntonioCastilloClaramount,quienes,unavezencontradosenbuena
y debidaforma susPlenosPoderes;
CONVIENENEN LO SIGUIENTE .'
Articulo l0
Constitucion de una Sala
1. En aplicaciondel Articulo 34 delTratado Generalde Paz suscrito el
30 de octubrede 1980,las Partes sometenlas cuestionesmencionadasen el
ArticuloSegundodelpresenteCornpromiso a unaSaladela Corte Zntemacio-
na1deJusticia,cornpuestapor tres miembros,conla anuenciade lasPartes,
las cualesla expresaranenforma conjuntaal Presidentede la Corte,siendo
esta conformidadesencialparalaintegracibndelaSala,queseconstituirade
acuerdoa los ProcedimientosestablecidosenelEstatuto de la Cortey en el
presenteCompromiso.
2. Adicionalmente,integraranla Sala dosjueces ad-hoc especialmente
nombradosunopor ElSalvadory otroporHonduras;losquepodrantenerla
nacionalidadde lasPartes.
Articulo 2O
Objeto del litigio
Las Partessolicitana laSala :
1. Quedelimitelalineafronteriza enlaszonas Oseccionesno descritasen
elArticulo16del TratadoGeneraldePaz,de30de octubrede 1980.
2.Que determinelasituacibnjuridica insulary de losespaciosmaritimos.
Articulo 3O
Procedimiento
1. Las Partes solicitana la Sala autorizar que elprocedimientoescrito
consistaen :a) una Memoria presentadapor cada una de las Partes, a mas tardar diez
mesesdespuésde lanotificacibnde esteCompromisoa laSecretariade la
CorteInternacionaldeJusticia;
b) una Contramemoriapresentadapor cadauna de lasPartes, amas tardar
diezmesesdespuésde lafecha enquesehaya recibidolacopiacertificada
de laMemoria delaotraParte;
c) unaréplica presentadaporcadauna delasPartes,amas tardardiezmeses
despuésde la fecha en que se haya recibido lacopia certificada de la
ContramemoriadelaotraParte;
d) la Cortepodra autorizar, Oprescribirlapresentacibnde una Dhplica,si
lasPartes estandeacuerdoa esterespect0 OsilaCortedecidede oficioO a
solicitudde una de las Partes si estapieza deprocedimiento es necesaria.
2. Las piezas antes mencionadasdelprocedimientoescritoy sus anexos
presentadas al Secretario,no seran trasmitidas a la otra Parte, en tanto el
Secretarionohayarecibidolapieza deprocedimientocorrespondientea dicha
parte.
3. Elprocedimiento oral,la notificacibndelnombramientode losrespecti-
vosagentesdelasPartesy cualesquieraotrascuestionesprocesales,seajusta-
ran a 10dispuestoen elEstatutoy elReglamentode la Corte.
Articulo4O
Idiomas
El casose ventilaraen losidiomasinglésyfiancés, indistintamente.
Articulo5O
Derecho aplicable
Dentro del marcodel apartadoprimer0 delArticulo 38 delEstatuto de la
CorteIntemacionaldeJusticia,laSala,aldictarsufallo, tendraencuentalas
normasde derechointemacionalaplicablesentrelasPartes,incluyendo,enIo
pertinente,lasdisposicionesconsignadasen el Tratadogeneralde Paz.
Articulo6O
Ejecuciondela Sentencia
1. Las Partes ejecutaranla sentenciade la Sala en un todo y con entera
buenafe. A estefin, la ComisibnEspecialde Demarcacibnque establecieron
medianteel Conveniode II defebrero de 1986,iniciara lademarcacionde la
Iineafronteriza$~adapor lasentencia,amas tardartresmesesdespuésde la
fecha de la misma y continuara diligentemente sus actuaciones hasta
concluirla.
2. Parata1efecto,seaplicaranlasreglasestablecidassobre lamateria,enel
mencionadoConveniode creacibnde la ComisionEspecialde Demarcacibn.
Articulo7O
Entradaenvigor y Registro
1. ElpresenteCompromisoentraraenvigorel l0deoctubrede 1986,unavez
quese haya cumplidoconlosprocedimientosconstitucionalesde cadaParte.
2. Sera registradoen la Secretaria Generalde las Naciones Unidas de
conformidadcon elArticulo 102delaCartadelaNacionesUnidas,conjunta-
mente Opor cualquierade las Partes.Al mismo tiempo se hara del conoci-
mientode la OrganizacibndelosEstadosAmericanos.a) una Memoriapresentadapor cada una de las Partes, a mas tardar diez
mesesdespuésde la notificacibnde esteCompromisoa laSecretana de la
CorteIntemacionaldeJusticia;
b) una Contramemoriapresentadapor cadaurtade lasPartes, amas tardar
diez mesesdespuésde lafecha en quesehaya recibidola copiacertzficada
delaMemoriadelaotraParte;
c) unaréplica presentadaporcadaunadelasPartes,a mas tardardiezmeses
despuésde lafecha en que se haya recibidola copiacertificada de la
ContramemoriadelaotraParte;
d) la Cortepodra autorizar, Oprescribir lapresentacibnde una Duplica,si
lasPartes estandeacuerdoa esterespect0 O silaCortedecidedeoficio O a
solicituddeunadelasPartessiestapieza deprocedimientoesnecesaria.
2. Las piezas antes mencionadasdelprocedimientoescritoy sus anexos
presentadas al Secretario,no seran trasmitidasa la otra Parte, en tanto el
Secretarionohayarecibidolapieza de procedimientocorrespondientea dicha
parte.
3. El procedimientooral,lanotifiacibn delnombramientode losrespecti-
vosagentesdelasPartesy cualesquieraotrascuestionesprocesales,seajusta-
ran a 10dispuestoen elEstatutoy elReglamentode la Corte.
Articulo 4O
Idiomas
El casose ventilaraen losidiomasinglésyfrancés,indistintamente.
ArticuloS0
Derecho aplicable
Dentrodel marcodel apartadoprimer0 delArticulo 38 del Estatuto de la
CorteIntemacionaldeJusticia, laSala,aldictarsu fallo, tendraencuentalas
normasdederechointemacionalaplicablesentrelasPartes,incluyendo,en 10
pertinente,lasdisposicionesconsignadasen el Tratadogeneralde Paz.
Articulo 6O
Ejecucionde la Sentencia
1. Lus Partes ejecutaranla sentenciade la Sala en un todoy con entera
buenafe. A estefin, la ComisibnEspecialde Demarcacibnque establecieron
medianteelConveniode II defebrero de 1986,iniciaralademarcacionde la
IineafronterizafSiadapor lasentencia,a mas tardar tresmesesdespuésde la
fecha de la misma y continuara diligentemente sus actuaciones hasta
concluirla.
2. Parata1efecto,seaplicaranlasreglasestablecidassobrelamateria,en el
mencionadoConveniode creacibnde la ComisibnEspecialde Demarcacion.
Articulo 7O
Entradaenvigory Registro
1. ElpresenteCompromisoentraraen vigorell0 deoctubrede 1986,una vez
quese haya curnplidoconlosprocedimientosconstitucionalesde cada Parte.
2. Sera registradoen la Secretana Generalde las Naciones Unidas de
conformidadconelArticulo102dela CartadelaNacionesUnidas,conjunta-
mente Opor cualquierade las Partes.Al rnismotiempo se hara delconoci-
mientode la Organizacibnde losEstadosAmericanos. Articulo S0
Notificacibn
1. En aplicacibndel Articulo 40 del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional
deJusticia,elpresenteCompromisoseranotificadoalSecretariode la misma
por nota conjuntade las Partes. Esta notzjïcacionse efectuaraantes del
31 de diciembrede 1986.
2. Si esa notzjicacibnnose efectuade conformidadconel parrafoprece-
dente,elpresenteCompromisopodra ser notzjïcado alSecretariode la Corte
por cualquierade las Partes dentrodel plazode unmes siguiente alafecha
previstaenelparrafoanterior."
4. The Special Agreementwas, as indicated in its title, signed in the City of
Esquipulas,Republic of Guatemala, on 24May 1986;its preamble referstothe
conclusion on 30 October 1980,in Lima, Pem, of a General Peace Treaty
between the two States, whereby, interalia,they delimited certain sections of
their common land frontier; and the Special Agreement records that no direct
settlement had been achieved in respect of the remaining land areas, or as
regards "the legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces".
5. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court and
Article 42 ofthe Rules of Court, copies of the joint notification and Special
Agreement weretransmitted by the Registrar to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, the Membersofthe United Nationsand otherStatesentitledto
appear beforethe Court.
6. The Parties were dulyconsulted,on 17Febmary 1987,as to the composi-
tion of the chamber of the Court contemplated by the Special Agreement, in
accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 17,para-
graph 2,of the Rules of Court.
7. ThePartiesinthe course of such consultationconfirmed what wassaid in
the Special Agreement,that as regards the number ofjudges to constitute such
chamber, they approved, pursuant to Article 26 of the Statute, that number
being fixed atthreejudges withthe addition of twojudges adhocchosenbythe
Parties pursuant to Article 31,paragraph 3,of the Statute.
8. In March 1987the Court was notified of the choice by El Salvador of
Mr. Nicolas Valticosto sit as judge ad hocin the chamber; in April 1987,the
Court was notified of the choice by Honduras of Mr. Michel Virallyto sit as
judge ad hocin the chamber.
9. Byan Order of 8 May 1987the Court decidedto accede to the request of
the Parties to form a special chamber to deal with the case, and declared that
at an election held on 4 May 1987Judges Oda, Sette-Camara and Sir Robert
Jennings had been electedto form, with the judges ad hocreferred to above,
a chamber to deal with the case, and declared further such a chamber to
havebeen dulyconstituted, withthe followingcomposition :JudgesOda, Sette-
Camara and Sir Robert Jennings and Judges ad hocValticos and Virally.On
29 May 1987 the Chamber elected Judge Sette-Camara as its President,
pursuant to Article 18,paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court.
10. Judge adhocvirally diedon 27January 1989,and by a letterdated 8 Feb-
mary 1989the Agentof Hondurasinformedthe Court that his Governmenthad
chosen Mr. SantiagoTorres Bernardezto sit asjudge ad hocin his place. Byan
Order dated 13 December 1989the Court declared the composition of the
Chamber formed to deal with the case to be as follows: Judge Sette-Camara, Articulo 8O
Notificacion
1. En aplicacibndel Articulo 40 del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional
deJusticia,elpresenteCornprorniso sera notzficadoalSecretariode larnisrna
por nota conjuntade las Partes. Esta notificacibnse efectuaraantes del
31de diciernbrede 1986.
2. Si esa notificacibnnose efectuade conformidadcon elparrafoprece-
dente,elpresenteCornprornisp oodra ser notzficadoalSecretariode la Corte
por cualquierade las Partes dentrodelplazo de unmessiguiente alafecha
previstaenelparrafo anterior.))
4. Comme l'indiqueson titre, le compromis a été signé à Esquipulas(Répu-
bliquedu Guatemala) le 24mai 1986;sonpréambuleseréfèreàla conclusion,
le 30 octobre 1980, à Lima (Pérou),d'un traitégénéralde paix entre les deux
Etats,traitédanslequelilétaitnotammentprocédé àladélimitationdecertains
secteurs de leur frontièreterrestre commune; en outre, il est pris acte dans le
compromis qu'aucun règlementdirect n'a été atteint ence qui concerne les
autres zones terrestres ou«la situationjuridique des îles et des espaces mari-
times».
5. ConformémentàI'article40,paragraphe 3,du Statutde la Cour et à l'ar-
ticle42du Règlementde la Cour, le Greffieratransmiscopie de lanotification
conjointe et du compromis au Secrétaire générad l e- l'organisation des
Nations Unies, aux Membres des Nations Unies et aux autres Etats admis à
ester devantla Cour.
6. Le 17février1987,les Parties ont étédûment consultéesau sujet de la
composition de la chambre de la Cour envisagéedans le compromis, en appli-
cation del'article26,paragraphe 2,du Statut et de l'article 17,paragraphe,du
Règlementde la Cour.
7. Lors de ces consultations, les Parties ont confirméce qui était dit dansle
compromis, àsavoir qu'ellesconsentaient,conformémentàl'article26du Sta-
tut, à ce que le nombre des juges qui feraient partie de la chambre soit fixé
à trois, plus deux juges ad hocchoisis par les Parties conformémentà l'ar-
ticle 31,paragraphe 3,du Statut.
8. En mars 1987,la Cour a été informée queM. Nicolas Valticos avait été
désigné par El Salvadorpour siégercommejuge ad hocà la chambre; en avril
1987,elle a étéinforméeque M. Michel Virallyavait étédésigné par le Hondu-
ras pour siégercommejuge ad hocà la chambre.
9. Par ordonnance du 8 mai 1987,la Cour a décidéd'accéder à la demande
des Parties tendant à ce que soit constituéeune chambre spéciale pour con-
naîtredelaprésenteaffaireet elleadéclaréquele4mai 1987 M.Oda, M.Sette-
Camara et sir Robert Jennings, juges, avaient été élup sour former, avec les
juges ad hocsusmentionnés,la chambre qui serait saisie de l'affaire, ajoutant
que cette chambre avait étédûment constituéedans la compositionsuivante:
M. Oda, M. Sette-Camara et sir Robert Jennings, juges, et MM. Valticos
et Virally, juges ad hoc.Le 29 mai 1987la Chambre a éluM. Sette-Camara
comme président,conformémentà l'article 18,paragraphe 2, du Règlement
de la Cour.
10. M. Virally, juge ad hoc,est décédé le 27janvier 1989et, par lettre du
8 février1989,l'agent du Honduras a fait savoir à la Cour que son gouverne-
ment avait désigné M. SantiagoTorres Bernhrdezpour siéger commejuge ad
hoc à sa place. Par ordonnance du 13décembre1989,la Cour a déclaréque la
Chambre constituée pour connaître de l'affaire étaitcomposéecomme suit:President of the Chamber; JudgesOda and SirRobertJennings;Judges ad hoc
Valticosand Torres Bernardez.
Il. By Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Special Agreeement the Parties
requested that the writtenproceedingsshould consist of a Memorial,a Coun-
ter-Memorial and a Reply to be filed by each of the Parties within time-limits
there stated,and the Special Agreementfurther provided that the Court might
authorize or directthe filing of Rejoinders.Byan Order dated 27May 1987,the
Court fixed the time-limit for the Memorials, and by an Order dated 29 May
1987the Chamber authorized the filing of Counter-Memorials and Replies
pursuant to Article92,paragraph 2,of theRulesof Court, and fixed time-limits
therefor.
12. The Memorials weredulyfiled withinthe time-limitof 1June 1988fixed
therefor.The time-limitsforthe remaining pleadings were,at the request of the
Parties,extended by Ordersmade bythe President ofthe Chamber on 12Janu-
ary 1989and 13December 1989.TheCounter-Memorialsand the Replieswere
dulyfiled within the extended time-limitsthus fixed, namely 10Febniary 1989
and 12January 1990respectively.TheSpecial Agreement,however,included a
provision for a possible further exchange of pleadings, so that even when the
Replies of the Partieshad been filed,the date of the closure of the written pro-
ceedings,within the meaning of Article 81,paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court,
would remain stillto be finallydetermined.
13. Pursuant to Article53,paragraph 1,ofthe Rulesof Court, requestsbythe
Govemments of Nicaragua and Colombiaforthepleadings and annexeddocu-
ments to be made available to them were granted,in the case of Nicaragua on
15June 1988,and inthe caseof Colombia on 27January 1989,and ineach case
after the views ofthe Partieshad been ascertained.
14. On 17November 1989the Republic of Nicaraguafiled in the Registryof
the Court an Applicationfor permission to intervene in the case,which Appli-
cationwasstatedto be made byvirtue of Article36,paragraph 1,and Article62
of the Statute of the Court. In that Application, the Govemment of Nicaragua
contended that itsrequestfor permissionto intenene, "not onlybecauseit isan
incidentalproceedingbut also for. ..reasons of elemental equity(that of con-
sent and that of the equality of States)", was"a matter exclusivelywithin the
procedural mandate of the fullCourt".
15. By an Order dated 28 Febmary 1990,the Court, after considering the
written observations of the Parties on the question thus raised, whether the
Application for permission to intervene was to be decided upon by the full
Court or by the Chamber, and the observations of Nicaragua in response to
those observations, stated that
"the question whether an applicationfor permission to intervene in a case
under Article 62 of the Statute shouldbe granted requires ajudicial deci-
sionwhetherthe Stateseekingto intenene 'hasan interest of a legalnature
which maybe affected by the decision'in the case,and can therefore only
be determined by the body which willbe called upon to givethe decision
on the merits of the case";
and found that it was for the Chamber formedto deal with the present case to
decide whetherthe Applicationby Nicaraguafor permissionto interveneunder
Article 62 of the Statute should be granted.
16. Pursuant to Article83,paragraph 1,ofthe Rulesof Court,thetwo Parties
wereon 5March 1990invitedto fumishtheir written observationsonthe Appli-M. Sette-Camara, présidentde la Chambre, M. Oda et sir Robert Jennings,
juges; MM. Valticoset Torres Bemirdez, juges ad hoc.
11.A l'article3,paragraphe 1,du compromislesPartiesont demandéquela
procédure écriteconsiste en un mémoire,un contre-mémoireet une réplique
qui seraient présentéspar chacune des Parties dans les délais indiqués dans
cette disposition; le compromis prévoyait aussique la Cour pourrait'autoriser
ou prescrire la présentation de dupliques. Par ordonnance du 27 mai 1987,la
Cour a fixé la date d'expiration du délai pourle dépôt desmémoires;par
ordonnance du 29 mai 1987,la Chambre a autorisé la présentation de contre-
mémoiresetde répliques conformémen àt l'article92,paragraphe 2, du Règle-
ment et elle a fixédes délaisàcet effet.
12. Lesmémoiresont été dûmentdéposésdansle délai,fixéaulerjuin 1988.
A la demande des Parties, les délaispourle dépôtdes autres piècesde procé-
dureont été prorogéspar desordonnancesduprésidentde laChambre prises le
12janvier 1989et le 13décembre1989.Lescontre-mémoiresetlesrépliquesont
été dûment déposésdanslesdélaisainsiprorogés,àsavoir le 10février1989et
le 12janvier 1990respectivement.Le compromisprévoyaitcependant la possi-
bilité d'unéchangedepiècesadditionnelles, de sorte que,mêmequand lesPar-
ties auraientdéposéleursrépliques,ladate de clôturede laprocédureécriteau
sensde l'article81,paragraphe 1,du Règlementresterait a fixer définitivement.
13. En application de l'article53,paragraphe 1,deson Règlement,la Coura
fait droià des demandes des Gouvernementsdu Nicaraguaet de la Colombie
tendant àce que lespiècesdeprocédureet lesdocumentsquiyétaientannexés
soienttenus à leur disposition; ellya fait droit le 15juin 1988dans le cas du
Nicaragua et le 27juin 1989dans celui de la Colombie, aprèss'être renseignée
auprès des Partiesdans l'un etl'autre cas.
14. Le 17novembre 1989,laRépubliquedu Nicaraguaadéposéau~reffe de
la Courune requêteàfin d'interventiondansl'affaire,requête qui étaie txpres-
sémentsoumiseenvertude l'article36,paragraphe 1,et del'article62du Statut
de la Cour. Dans cette requête, leGouvernementdu Nicaragua soutenait que
celle-ci «relev[ait] exclusivement de la compétencede la Cour plénièreen
matièrede procédure, et ce non seulementparce qu'il s'agitd'une procédure
incidente,maisaussipour [des]raisonsd'élémentaireéquité ..(leconsentement
et l'égalité des EtaB.)
15. Par ordonnancedu 28février1990,aprèsavoir examinéles observations
écrites des Parties sur la question ainsi soulevée celle de savoir s'il devait
être statué surla requêteà fin d'intervention par la Cour plénièreou par la
Chambre - ainsique lesobservationsdu Nicaragua en réponseàcesobserva-
tions, la Cour a déclaréce qui suit:
«la questionde l'admission d'une requêteàfin d'intervention soumise en
vertu del'article62du Statutappelleune décisionjudiciairesur lepoint de
savoirsi«un intérêtd'ordrejuridique estencause » pour 1'Etatdemandant
à intervenir e..elle ne peut donc êtretranchée quepar l'organequi sera
appeléàrendre la décisionsur le fond de l'affaire»;
elle ajugé qu'ilappartenait à la Chambre constituéepour connaître de la pré-
sente affaire de déciderde l'admission de la requêteà fin d'intervention en
vertu de l'article 62du Statutintroduite par le Nicaragua.
16. Conformémentàl'article83,paragraphe 1,du Règlementde la Cour, les
deuxPartiesontétépriéesl,e5mars 1990,de présenterdes observationsécritescation for permission to intemene filed by Nicaragua on 17November 1989.
Both Parties submitted such observations within the time-limit fixed by the
President of the Chamber. Honduras stated that it would see no objection to
Nicaragua being permitted to intemene for the sole purpose of presenting its
viewson the legalstatus of the waters within the Gulf of Fonseca; El Salvador
requested the Chamber to denythe permission soughtby Nicaragua.
17.Sinceobjectionhad thus been made to the Applicationfor permission to
intervene, public sittingswere held, pursuant to Article 84,paragraph 2,of the
Rules of Court, in order to hear the State seekingto interveneand the Parties,
on 5,6, 7 and 8 June 1990.In the course of those sittings the Chamber was
addressed by:
ForNicaragua: H.E. Mr.Carlos ArgüelloGomez,
Mr.Ian Brownlie,
Mr.Antonio RemiroBrotons.
ForEISalvador: H.E. Dr. AlfredoMartinez Moreno,
Mr. Prosper Weil,
Mr.ElihuLauterpacht,
Mr. Keith Highet.
ForHonduras: H.E. Dr. Ramon ValladaresSoto,
Mr. DerekW.Bowett.
18. In its Application for permission to intemene, Nicaragua stated by way
of conclusion that it
"respectfully requests the Court to recognize the validity of Nicaragua's
claimto intemene inthe proceedings betweenthe Republic of ElSalvador
and the Republic of Honduras" (para. 20).
At the outset of the oral proceedings it was statedthat
"Nicaragua maintains,before this Chamber of the Court, its Applica-
tion for permissionto intemene but modified inthe sensethat the requests
made in Sections 23 and 24 of its original Application of 17 November
1989are not being submittedfor decision by this Chamber."
(The requests referred to are set out in paragraph 41below.)
19. Onbehalf of ElSalvador,the followingsubmissionwaspresented during
the oral proceedings:
"That the Application of the Republic of Nicaraguato intemene in the
case in process between El Salvadorand Honduras be rejected."
20. On behalf of Honduras, the following submission as to the Application
for permission to intervene was presented during the oralproceedings :
"First, Honduras would see no objection to Nicaragua being permitted
to intemene inthe existingcaseforthe sole purpose of expressingitsviews
on the legal status of the waters within the Gulf. Nicaragua has, under
Article 62,no right to intemene,and the Court in granting its permission,
may limit that permission to the extent necessary to safeguard the legal
interests of the requesting State. Indeed,it can be arguedthat the Court is
bound to impose such limitson its permission."sur la requête àfin d'intervention déposéepar le Nicaragua le 17novembre
1989.Les deux Parties en ont rése entéans le délaifixéDarle résidentde la
Chambre. Le Honduras a indiguéqu'ilne verrait aucunêobje$ion àce que le
Nicaraguasoit autoriséàinterveniraux seulesfins de rés entesesvues sur la
situationjuridique des eauxsituéesàl'intérieur dugolfe de Fonseca; El Salva-
dor a prié la Chambrede refuser l'autorisation demandéepar le Nicaragua.
17. Comme il avait ainsi été fait objectionà la requêteà fin d'intervention,
des audiences furent tenues conformément à l'article 84, paragraphe 2, du
Règlementde la Cour, les 5,6,7 et 8juin 1990,pour entendre 1'Etatdésireux
d'intervenir ainsi que les Parties. Au cours de ces audiences, la Chambre a
entendu :
PourleNicaragua: S.Exc.M.CarlosArgüelloGomez,
M.Ian Brownlie,
M.Antonio RemiroBrotons.
PourElSalvador: S.Exc. M.Alfredo MartinezMoreno,
M.Prosper Weil,
M.Elihu Lauterpacht,
M.Keith Highet.
PourleHonduras: S. Exc.M.RamonValladaresSoto,
M. DerekW.Bowett.
18. Dans sa requête à fin d'intervention, le Nicaragua a déclaré pour
conclure qu'il
((prierespectueusement la Courdereconnaître lebien-fondéde larequête
du Nicaragua à fin d'intervention dans l'instance entre la République
d'El Salvador et la Républiquedu Honduras» (par. 20).
Au débutdes audiences, il a déclaré:
«le Nicaraguamaintientsarequêteàfin d'interventiondevantlaChambre
de laCour, maissousune forme modifiée,en ce sensqu'ilne demandepas
à la Chambre de se prononcer sur les demandes formuléesaux para-
graphes 23 et 24de sa requêteinitialedu 17novembre 1989».
(Lesdemandes en questionsont reproduitesau paragraphe 41 ci-après.)
19. Aunom d'ElSalvadorla conclusion suivantea été présentéependant la
procédure orale :
«Que la requêtede la République du Nicaragua à fin d'intervention
dans la présenteaffaireentreEl Salvador et le Honduras soit rejetée.»
20. Aunom du Honduras la conclusion suivantea été présentéeau sujetde
la requêteà fin d'intervention,pendant la procédure orale:
((Premièrement,leHonduras ne verraitpas d'objectionàceque le Nica-
ragua soit autoriséàintervenirdans l'affaire en cours aux seulesfins d'ex-
primer son point de vue sur le régimejuridique des eaux du golfe. Aux
termes de l'article62 du Statut, le Nicaragua n'a aucun droit d'intervenir.
Et lorsque la Cour donne à un Etat l'autorisation d'intervenir, elle peut
limiter la portéede cetteautorisation àce qui est nécessairepour protéger
les intérêtsjuridiques decet Etat. On peut mêmesoutenir que la Cour est
tenue de mettre de telles limitesàson autorisation. » 21.During the oral proceedings, both Parties also made clear their con-
tinued oppositionto the requests containedin paragraphs 23 and 24 of the
Nicaraguan Application (setout in paragraph41 below).
22. Nicaragua's requestto bepermittedto intervene isin respectofthe
proceedingsinstituted by the notification of the Special Agreement con-
cluded on 24 May 1986between El Salvador and Honduras. Article 2 of
the SpecialAgreement,which defines the subject ofthe dispute,reads,in
the original Spanish text, as follows:
"LasPartes solicitana laSala :
1. Quedelimitelalineafronterizaenlaszonas O seccionesnodescri-
tas en elArticulo16 del TratadoGeneralde Paz, de30 de octubrede
1980.
2. Quedeterminelasituacionjuridicainsulary delosespaciosmari-
timos."
As noted above (paragraph 2), the Parties have not so far supplied the
Chamber with an agreed translation of the Special Agreement into
English or French, notwithstandingthe fact that the Special Agreement
itselfprovides (Art. 4) for the proceedings to be conducted in English or
French.Forthe purposes ofthepresentJudgment, however,the Chamber
considers that it can make use of the followingtranslation of Article 2,
prepared by the Registryofthe Court :
"The Partiesrequestthe Chamber:
1. Todelimitthefrontier lineinthe areasorsectionsnotdescribed
in Article 16ofthe General PeaceTreaty of 30October 1980.
2. To determine the legal situation of the islands and maritime
~paces.~'
23. The dispute between El Salvador and Honduras which is the sub-
ject of the Special Agreement concerns several distinct though in some
respects interrelated matters. The Chamber is asked first to delimit the
land frontier line between the two States in the areas or sections not
described inArticle 16ofthe General PeaceTreatyconcluded bythem on
30October 1980;Nicaraguais not seekingto interveneinthisaspect ofthe
proceedings (paragraph 40 below). The Chamber is also to "determine
the legalsituation ofthe islands", and that ofthe "maritime spaces". The
geographical context of the island and maritime aspects of the dispute,
and the nature and extent of that dispute as appears from the Parties'
claimsbefore the Chamber, is as follows.
24. The Gulf of Fonseca lies on the Pacific coast of Central America,
opening to the ocean in a generally south-westerlydirection.The north-
Westcoast of the Gulf is the land territory of El Salvador, and the south-
east coast that of Nicaragua; the land territory of Honduras liesbetween 21. Pendantla procédureorale les deux Partiesont aussi précisé qu'elles
continuaientàêtreopposées auxdemandes énoncéa esxparagraphes 23 et24
de larequêtedu Nicaragua(reproduitesauparagraphe 41 ci-apres).
22. La requêtedu Nicaragua à fin d'intervention a trait à l'instance
introduite par la notification du compromisconclu le 24 mai 1986entre
El Salvador et le Honduras. L'article 2du compromis,qui définit l'objet
du différend,estainsirédigé dans saversionoriginale espagnole :
((LasPartes solicitana laSala:
1. Quedelimitelalineafronterizaenlaszonas O seccionesnodescri-
tas en elArticulo16del TratadoGeneralde Paz, de 30 deoctubrede
1980.
2. Quedeterminelasituacibnjuridicainsulary delos espaciosmari-
timos.»
Commeilaété relevé(paragraphe 2ci-dessus),lesPartiesn'ont pasfourni
jusqu'à présentà la Chambre de traduction commune du compromisen
anglais ou en français, bien que le compromis lui-même(art.4) prévoie
que la procéduresedéroulera en anglaisou en français.Aux fins du pré-
sent arrêt, la Chambre estimequ'elle peut néanmoins faire usagede la
traduction ci-aprèsde l'article2,établiepar le Greffe:
LesParties demandent àla Chambre :
1. Qu'elledélimitelalignefrontièredans leszonesousecteursnon
décritsàl'article 16du traité générdle paix du 30octobre 1980.
2. Qu'elledétermine la situationjuridique desîles et des espaces
maritimes.»
23. Ledifférendopposant ElSalvadoretleHonduras,qui estl'objetde
ce compromis, concerne plusieurs questions distinctes quoique liées à
certains égards.Il est demandé à la Chambre de délimiterla frontière
terrestreentre lesdeux Etats dans leszonesou secteursnon décritsà l'ar-
ticle 16du traité généradle paix qu'ilsont conclu le 30 octobre 1980;le
Nicaragua ne demande pas à intervenir dans cet aspect de la procédure
(paragraphe 40 ci-après).Il est demandéaussi àla Chambre de «déter-
mine[r]la situationjuridique des îleDet celledes espacesmaritimes B.
Le cadre géographiquedans lequel s'inscrivent les aspects insulaire et
maritime du différend, ainsique la nature et la portéedu différend tel
qu'ilressort desrevendications émisespar lesParties devantla Chambre,
sont exposésci-apres.
24. Le golfe de Fonseca s'étendsur la côte pacifique de l'Amérique
centrale; il s'ouvresur l'océan dansune direction généralesud-ouest.La
côtenord-ouest du golfefait partie du territoireterrestre d'El Salvadoret
la côte sud-est de celuidu Nicaragua; leterritoire terrestre du Hondurasthe two,witha substantial coaston theinner part ofthe Gulf.Theentryto
the Gulf,between Punta Arnapala in El Salvador to the north-west, and
Punta Cosigüina in Nicaragua tothe south-east,issome 19nautical miles
wide.Thepenetration ofthe Gulffromalinedrawn betweenthesepoints
variesbetween30and 32nautical miles.Withinthe Gulf ofFonseca,there
is a considerablenumber ofislands and islets.
25. El Salvador recognizes the sovereignty of Honduras over
ZacateGrande,the largestisland ofthe Gulf, whichislinked by aroad to
the Honduran mainland, and asksthe Chamber to findthat
"El Salvador has and had sovereigntyover al1the islands inthe Gulf
of Fonseca,withthe exception ofthe Island of Zacate Grande which
can be consideredasforming part ofthe coast of Honduras".
Hondurasforits part invitesthe Chamberto find that theislands ofMean-
guera and Meanguerita are the only islands in dispute between the Par-
ties, so that the Charnber is not, according to Honduras, called upon to
determine sovereignty over any of the other islands, and to declare the
sovereignty of Honduras over Meanguera and Meanguerita. Although
the Farallones are not mentioned in their submissions, the Chamber
understands from the pleadings of the Parties and from their oral argu-
ments in the course of the present incidental proceedings that those
islands, which lie on Nicaragua's side ofthe Gulf,are excludedfromthe
claims of the Parties. Neither Party has laid claimto the Farallones, and
counselfor Nicaraguahas statedbefore the Chamber, withoutcontradic-
tion by either of the Parties, that Nicaragua's sovereigntyoverthe Faral-
loneshasbeen expresslyrecognizedbytheParties.Forthe purposes ofthe
present Application for permission to intervene, there appears to be no
need to determine atthis stagethe extentofthe Chamber'sjurisdiction in
respect ofthe islands ofthe Gulf; both Partiesare agreed that theCham-
ber should determine sovereignty over Meanguera and Meanguerita,
and - withthe exception ofthe Farallones - these arethe islandswhich
lie closestto the coast of Nicaragua.
26. The detailed history of the dispute is not here to theurpose, but
two events concerningthe maritime areas must be mentioned. First, the
waters within the Gulf of Fonseca between Honduras and Nicaragua
were to an important extent delimited in 1900 bya Mixed Commission
established pursuant to a Treaty concluded between the two States on
7 October 1894.Thepublished records ofthe delimitationestablished by
the Mixed Commission describe that delimitationlineas follows:
"DesdeelpuntoconocidoconelnombredeAmatillo,enlaparteinfe-
riordelno Negro,lalinealimitrofeesunarectatrazadaendireccibnal
volcandeCosigüina,con rumboastronbmicoSur,ochenta y seisgrados,
treintaminutosOeste(S.86" 30'O.),y distanciaaproximadadetreinta
y sietekilbmetros(37Kms)hastaelpuntomediodelabahiadeFonseca,est situéentre les deux et comporteun important littoral àl'intérieurdu
golfe. L'embouchure du golfe, entre Punta Amapala (El Salvador) au
nord-ouest et Punta Cosigüina (Nicaragua) au sud-est, a une largeur de
quelque 19milles marins. La pénétrationdu golfe à partir d'une ligne
reliant ces points est de0 à 32 milles marins. A l'intérieurdu golfe de
Fonseca setrouvent un très grand nombre d'îles et d'îlots.
25. El Salvador reconnaît la souveraineté du Honduras sur
Zacate Grande, la plus grande île du golfe, qui est reliéeau Honduras
continental par une chaussée,etprie la Chambre de dire que :
«El Salvador exerceet a exercéune souverainetésur l'ensembledes
îles du golfe de Fonseca, à l'exception de l'île Zacate Grande
qui peut être considéréc eomme faisant partie de la côte du Hon-
duras ).
Pour sa part, le Hondurasprie la Chambre dejuger que seules lesîles de
Meanguera etde Meanguerita sonten litigeentrelesParties,desorte que,
selon lui, la Chambre n'estpas appelée àdéterminerla souverainetésur
l'une quelconquedesautresîles;illaprie enoutre de déclarerlasouverai-
netédu Honduras sur Meanguera et Meanguerita. Bien que les Parties
n'aient pas mentionné les Farallonesdans leursconclusions,la Chambre
déduitdeleursécrituresetdesexposésorauxqu'ellesontfaitsau coursde
la présente procédure incidenteque ces îles, qui se trouvent du côtédu
Nicaragua dans legolfe,sontexcluesdeleursrevendications.Aucunedes
deux Parties ne les a revendiquéeset le conseil du Nicaragua a déclaré
devantlaChambre,sans quel'uneou l'autre desPartieslecontredise,que
la souverainetédu Nicaragua sur cesîlesaétéexpressémentreconnup ear
les Parties. Aux fins de la requêteàfin d'intervention, il ne semble pas
nécessairede déterminer à ce stade l'étenduede la compétencede la
Chambre encequiconcernelesîlesdu golfe;lesdeux Partiesconviennent
que la Chambre devrait déterminer la souverainetésur Meanguera et
Meanguerita; exceptionfaitedesFarallones, cesîlessontlesplusproches
de la côte du Nicaragua.
26. Il n'ya pas lieu de faire ici l'historique détadu différend, mais
deux événements concernantles espaces maritimes doivent être men-
tionnés. Premièrement,les eauxdu golfe de Fonseca s'étendant entrele
Honduras etle Nicaragua ontengrandepartie étédélimitéesen 1900par
une commissionmixte constituéeen application d'un traité conclu entre
lesdeux Etats le7octobre 1894.Lescomptesrendus publiésdela délimi-
tation établiepar la commissionmixtedécriventcommesuitcettelignede
délimitation:
«DesdeelpuntoconocidoconelnombredeAmatillo,enlaparte infe-
riordelrio Negro,lalinealimitrofeesunarectatrazadaendireccibnal
volcandeCosigüina,con mmboastronbmicoSur,ochentayseisgrados,
treintaminutosOeste(S.86"30'0.), y distanciaaproximadadetreinta
y sietekilbmetros(37Kms)hastaelpuntomediodelabahiadeFonseca, 102 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
equidistantede lascostasde una y otraRepublica,por estelado;y de
estepunto,siguela divisiondelasaguasdelabahiaporunalinea,tam-
biénequidistantedelasmencionadascostas,hastallegaralcentrodela
distanciaquehayentrelaparte septentrionaldelaPuntadeCosigüina y
la meridional de la isla de El Tigre."("Limites definitivos entre
Honduras y Nicaragua", Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
1938,p. 24.)
[Translation]
"From the point known as Amatillo, in the lower reaches of the
RiverNegro,the delimitation isa straightlinedrawninthe direction
ofthevolcan0ofCosigüina,astronomicbearing south, 86degrees,30
minutes West(S.86" 30'W.),for a distance of approximately thirty-
sevenkilometres (37km)to the centralpoint of the Bay ofFonseca,
equidistant from the coasts of the two Republics, on thisde; and
from that point it followsthe division of the waters of the bay by a
line,alsoequidistantfrom the saidcoasts,to arriveatthecentreofthe
distance between the northern part of Punta de Cosigüina and the
southern part of the island of El Tigre."
There was some controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua at the
hearings as to the position of the seaward terminus of this delimitation
line,butitappears that forboth Statesthe lineesnot extend sofarasto
meet a closingline between Punta Amapala and Punta Cosigüina.
27. Thesecond eventto be mentioned isthe following.In 1916El Sal-
vador brought proceedings against Nicaragua in the Central American
Court ofJustice, claiming interaliathat the Bryan-Chamorro Treatycon-
cluded by Nicaragua withthe United States ofAmerica,forthe construc-
tion of a naval base, "ignored and violated the rights of-ownership
possessed by El Salvador in the Gulf of Fonseca". According to the
Judgement in the case,El Salvador'scontention was:
"Queporelhechodehaberpertenecidoesasaguas,porlargosaiïos,
a una sola entidadpolitica,cual era el dominio Espaiïolen Centro-
América y despuésa laRepublicaFederalCentroamericanar,esultauna
verdadconcluyenteque,disueltala Federacibnsin haberseefectuado
delimitacionentre los tresEstadosribereiïosrelativaa susoberania en
las aguasdelGolfo,han continuadoesostresEstadosconun dominio
comun en ellas." (Corte de Justicia Centroamericana, Sentencia,
9de marzo de 1917,p. 8.)
In an Englishtranslationpublished in 1917bythe LegationofElSalvador
in Washington, and printed inthe 1917volumeofthe AmericanJournalof
InternationalLaw:
"That because,foralongperiod ofyears,those watersbelongedto
a singlepolitical entity,to wit,the SpanishColonial Government in
Central America,and, later,to the FederalRepublic ofthe Center of equidistantede lascostasde una y otra Republica,por estelado;y de
estepunto,sigueladivisiondelasaguasdelabahiaporunalinea,tam-
biénequidistantedelasmencionadascostas,hastallegaralcentrodela
distanciaquehayentrelaparteseptentrionaldelaPuntadeCosigüinay
la meridionalde la isla de El Tigre.))(«Limites definitivos entre
Honduras y Nicaragua)), ministère hondurien des affaires étran-
gères,1938,p. 24.)
[Traduction]
«Du point connu sous lenom d'Amatillo,surlecoursinférieurdu
rio Negro, la ligne limitrophe est une droite tracéeen direction du
volcandeCosigüina,dequatre-vingt-sixdegrés,trenteminutesouest
derhumb astronomique sud(S 86"30'O),surune distanced'environ
trente-sept kilomètres(37km)jusqu'au point médiande la baie de
Fonseca, àéquidistancedescôtesdel'une etl'autreRépubliques,de
ce côté;et de cepoint, ellesuitle partage des eaux de la baie en une
ligne qui est aussi équidistante desdites côtes, jusqu'à ce qu'elle
atteigne le milieu de la distance entre l'extrémité septentrionalede
Punta de Cosigüinaet l'extrémitéméridionald ee l'îledu Tigre.)
Au cours des audiences, une certaine controverse s'est élevéeentre le
Honduras etleNicaragua au sujetdelaposition du point terminal, versle
large, de cette ligne de délimitation,mais il semble que, pour les deux
Etats, celle-ci ne va pas jusqu'à atteindre une ligne de fermeture reliant
Punta Amapala et Punta Cosigüina.
27. Lesecond événemenq tu'ilfaut mentionner est lesuivant: en 1916,
El Salvadora introduit une instance contre le Nicaragua devant la Cour
dejustice centraméricaine, en soutenant notamment que le traitéBryan-
Chamorro,concluentre leNicaragua etlesEtats-Unisd'Amériqueenvue
de la construction d'une base navale, ((méconnaîtet viole les droits de
copropriétéque possède El Salvador dans le golfe de Fonseca)). Selon
l'arrêtendu dans cetteaffaire, El Salvadorfaisaitvaloir:
«Quepor elhechodehaberpertenecidoesasaguas,porlargosarios,
a una sola entidadpolitica,cual era el dominio Espaiiolen Centro-
América y despuésa laRepublicaFederalCentroamericanar,esultauna
verdadconcluyenteque, disueltala Federacibnsin haberseefectuado
delimitacionentrelos tresEstadosribereriosrelativaa susoberaniaen
lasaguasdel Golfo,han continuadoesostresEstadosconundominio
comun en ellas.))(Corte de Justicia Centroamericana, Sentencia,
9 de marzo de 1917,p. 8.)
[Traduction]
«Que ceseauxayant appartenu pendant de longues années à une
entité politique unique,savoirl'administration espagnoleen Amé-
rique centrale, et, par la suite, République fédéralc eentraméri-103 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDUR (AUDGMENT)
America,the fact conclusivelyresults that, on the dissolution of the
federation without having effected a delimitation among the three
riparian States of their sovereigntytherein, the ownership of those
waters continued in common in those three States." (AJIL, 1917,
p. 677.)
Nicaragua appeared in the proceedings and resisted the claim, contend-
ing (interalia)
"que las antiguasprovincias espariolad se Nicaragua, Honduras y
ElSalvador,porsu adyacencia,son dueriasdel Golfo,en elsentidode
queacadaunacorrespondeunapartedeé1;pero noenelsentidode que
poresoexistaentrelasreferidasRepublicas,unacomunidadenlaacep-
cidnjundica delapalabra.Huy indemarcaciondefronteras,10cual es
distintodedominio comun"(CJC,Sentencia,p. 20),
i.e.,that
"the ancient Spanish provinces of Nicaragua,Honduras and El Sal-
vador, by reason of the fact that they are adjacent,are owners of the
Gulf in thesensethat to each belongs a part thereof, but not in the
sensethat, thereby, a communityinthe legalacceptation ofthe word
exists among those republics. Demarcation of frontiers therein is
lacking; but thi... does not result in common ownership." (AJIL,
1917,p. 688.)
28. The Decision of the Central Arnerican Court of Justice dated
9 March 1917was divided intothree parts. Inthe first part, the voting of
thejudges was recorded on a number of specificquestionsarising in the
case,and thispart recordstheunanimous view ofthejudges that theinter-
national status of the Gulf of Fonseca was that it was "anhistoric bay
possessed ofthe characteristics of a closed sea"JIL, 1917,p. 693).The
second part is an "Examination of facts and law", and the third part the
forma1decision, adopted by four votes to one. In the second part, the
Court found :
"CONSIDERAN quOr:econocidaporeste Tribunallacondicionjun-
dica delGolfodeFonsecacomoBahia historica,concaracteresdemur
cerrado,se ha reconocido,en consecuencia,como condueriosde sus
aguasa lostrespaisesribereriosE, lSalvador,Hondurasy Nicaragua,
exceptoen la respectivaleguamarina del litoral,que es del exclusivo
dominiode cadaunode ellos;y queen ordenal condominioexistente
entre losEstadosen litigi... se tomo en cuentaque en las aguasno
litorales delGolfoexisteunaporcibnde ellasendondese empalman O
confunden lasjurisdiccionesde inspectionpara objetosdepolicia,de
seguridadyfines fiscales; yotraendondeesposibleque nosuceda10
mismo.Por 10 tanto, el Tribunalhadecididoque entreEl Salvador y
Nicaraguaexisteelcondominioenambasporciones,puesto queestan
dentro del Golfo;pero con la salvedad expresade los derechos que caine, il en résultede façon concluante que, une fois la fédération
dissoute,sans qu'il ait été procédé, enes trois Etats riverains,
une délimitationde leur souverainetésur les eaux du golfe,la pro-
priétéde celles-cia continuéd'être commune à cestrois Etats.»
Le Nicaragua a comparu et s'estopposé à cetteprétention,en soutenant
notamment :
«que las antiguasprovinciasespaiïolasde Nicaragua, Honduras y
El Salvador,porsu adyacencia,sondueiïasdel Golfo,enelsentidode
queacadaunacorrespondeunapartede é1;peronoenelsentidodeque
poresoexistaentrelasreferidasRepublicas,unacomunidadenlaacep-
cionjuridicadelapalabra.Huy indemarcaciondefionteras, Iocuales
distintodedominiocomun.»(CJC, Sentencia,p. 20.)
[Traduction]
«que les anciennes provinces espagnoles du Nicaragua,du Hondu-
ras et d'El Salvador,du fait de leuracence, sontpropriétairesdu
golfe, ce qui signifiequ'une partie de celui-ci appartientcune
d'elles, maisnon qu'une communauté, ausensjuridique du terme,
existe pour autant entre lesdites Républiques.Il y a absence de
démarcationdefrontières,cequiestàdistinguerdelapropriétécom-
mune.»
28. Ladécisionrenduepar laCour dejustice centraméricainele9mars
1917estdiviséeentroisparties.Dans lapremièrepartie sontconsignésles
résultatsdesvotesdesjuges surcertainesquestions quiseposaient enl'es-
pèce;on ytrouve consignéel'opinion unanime desjuges selonlaquelle le
régimeinternational du golfede Fonseca estceluid'«une baiehistorique
possédantlescaractéristiquesd'unemerfermée ».La deuxièmepartie est
intituléeExamen desfaitsetconsidérationsde droit»,tandis quelatroi-
sième contient la décisionproprement dite, adoptée par quatre voix
contre une. Dansla deuxièmepartie, la Cour a déclar:
«CONSIDERAN qDuOreconocidaporesteTribunalla condiciojuri-
dicadel GolfodeFonsecacomoBahiahistorica,con caracteresdemur
cerrado, seha reconocido,en consecuencia,como condue5osde sus
aguasa lostrespaisesribereiïos,ElSalvador, HondurasyNicaragua,
exceptoen la respectivaleguamarina dellitoral,que es del exclusivo
dominiode cadauno de ellos;y queen ordenal condominioexistente
entre losEstados en litig..se tom6en cuentaque en las aguas no
litorales delGolfoexisteunaporcionde ellasendondese empalman O
confundenlasjurisdiccionesde inspeccibnpara objetosdepolicia,de
seguridadyfines fiscales; yotraendondeesposibleque nosucedaIo
mismo.PorIotanto, el Tribunal hadecididoque entreEl Salvadory
Nicaraguaexisteelcondominioen ambasporciones,puesto que estan
dentro del Golfo;pero con la salvedad expresade los derechosque correspondena Honduras como coparticipe en esas mismas por-
ciones."(CJC,Sentencia,pp. 55-56.)
"WHEREAS :The legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca having been
recognizedbythis Courtto be that of a historic baypossessed ofthe
characteristics of a closed sea, the threeiparian States of El Sal-
vador, Honduras and Nicaragua are, therefore, recognized as
coownersofitswaters,exceptas to thelittoralmarine league which is
the exclusiveproperty of each, and with regard to the coownership
existing between the States here litigant, the Court ... took into
account the fact that as to a portion ofthe non-littoral waters of the
Gulfthere wasan overlapping orconfusion ofjurisdiction inmatters
pertaining to inspection forpolice and fiscalurposes and purposes
ofnational security, and that, asto anotherportion thereof, it ispos-
siblethat no suchoverlapping and confusiontakesplace.The Court,
therefore, has decided that as between El Salvador and Nicaragua
coownership existswithrespectto both portions, sincethey areboth
within the Gulf; with the express proviso, however,that the rights
pertaining to Honduras as coparcener in those portions are not
affected bythat decision." (AJIL, 1917,p. 716.)
It is amatter of public record that on 24 November 1917Nicaragua
addressed to the Statesof Central Americaa lengthyNote
"for thepurpose of explaining and justifying the attitude that was
forced upon [theNicaraguan]Government ofignoring and rejecting
the two Judgements rendered against it by the Central American
Court ofJustice",
i.e., the 1917Judgement and an earlier Judgement in a case brought by
Costa Rica against Nicaragua.
29. The Central American Court of Justice had been informed of the
existenceof the delimitation of part ofthe waters of the Gulf effected by
Honduras and Nicaragua, and referred to above. In its Judgement that
Court noted that
"lalineatrazada ... solo Ilegohasta unpunto medio entre la isla del
Tigrey Puntade Cosigüina,dejandosindividir ...unaconsiderablepor-
cibndeaguascomprendidaentrelaIineatrazadadesdePuntaAmapala
a PuntaCosigüina y elpunto terminalde ladivisionentreHondurasy
Nicaragua "(CJC, Sentencia,p. 50).
"the line drawn ... only extends as far as a point midway between
Tigre Island and Cosigüina Point, thus leavingundivided ... a con-
siderable portion of the waters embraced between the line drawn
from Amapala Pointto CosigüinaPoint and the terminalpoint ofthe
divisionbetween Honduras and Nicaragua" (AJIL, 1917,p. 711). correspondena Honduras como coparticipe en esas mismas por-
ciones.»(CJC, Sentencia,pp. 55-56.)
[Traduction]
«ATTEND Uque la Cour ayantreconnu que lerégimejuridique du
golfede Fonsecaestcelui d'unebaie historique possédant lescarac-
téristiques d'unemerfermée,lestrois Etatsriverains, El Salvador,le
Honduras et le Nicaragua, sont reconnus en conséquence comme
copropriétairesdeseseaux àl'exceptiondeseauxcomprises à moins
d'unelieuemarine du littoral,qui sont la propriétéexclusivede cha-
cun d'eux; et qu'ence qui concernela copropriété existantentre les
Etatsen litige,laCour..atenu compte du faitque,pour uneportion
des eaux non littorales du golfe,il existeun chevauchement ou une
confusion dejuridiction en matière d'inspectiondes finsde police
oudesécuritéet àdesfinsfiscalesetque,pourune autreportion, cela
peut ne pas être lecas. En conséquence,la Cour a décidé qu'entre
ElSalvadoretleNicaragua ilyacondominium encequiconcerneles
deux portions, puisque l'une et l'autre sont situéesà l'intérieurdu
golfe, mais sous réserveexpressedes droits appartenant au Hondu-
ras en tant que copropriétairede cesportions.
Il est notoire que le 24 novembre 1917le Nicaragua a adresséaux Etats
d'Amérique centraleune longuelettre
((visanà expliqueretàjustifier l'attitude imposéeau Gouvernement
[duNicaragua],laquelleaconsisté àignoreret àrejeterlesdeux arrêts
rendus en sa défaveurpar la Cour dejustice centraméricaine,
à savoir Yarrêtde 1917et un précédent arrêrte ,ndu dans une instance
introduite contre le Nicaragua par le Costa Rica.
29. La Cour de justice centraméricaine avait été informéd ee l'exis-
tence de la délimitation susmentionnée d'unepartie des eaux du golfe,
effectuéepar le Honduras et le Nicaragua. Dans son arrêt,ellea relevé
que
«la linea trazada..solo llegohasta unpunto medio entrela isla del
Tigrey &ta de Cosigüina,dejandosindividir..unaconsiderablepor-
cibndeaguascomprendidaentrelalineatrazadadesdePuntaAmapala
a PuntaCosigüina y elpunto terminalde ladivision entreHondurasy
Nicaragua.»(CJC, Sentencia,p. 50).
[Traduction]
«la lignetracée..s'étendseulementjusqu'à un point situéàmi-che-
minentrel'îledu TigreetPunta deCosigüina,cequilaisseindivise ...
une partie importante des eaux comprises entre la ligne tracéede
Punta Amapala àPunta Cosigüinaetle point terminal de la lignede
divisionentre le Honduras et le Nicaragua.105 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JAS)GMENT)
Referringalso to an overlaporintersection, attheentrance tothe Gulf, of
"the two lines (distant twelve milesfromthe coast)that mark the respec-
tive limits of the zone of maritime inspection" (AJIL, 1917,p. 702) of
El Salvadorand Nicaragua,the Central American Court ofJusticestated
that
"Porconsiguienteh , ayqueconcluirenque,exceptuandoesaparte,el
resto de las aguas delGoifoha quedadopro-indiviso, en estado de
comunidadentreEl Salvador y Nicaragua,y en quepor laparticular
configuracibndel mismo,esas aguas quedanfrente afrente, confun-
diéndoseporunempalme ..."(CJC, Sentencia,p. 50.)
"Consequently,it must be concluded that, with the exception of
that part[SC.t,he area delimited between Honduras and Nicaragua],
the rest of the waters of the Gulf have remainedundivided and in a
stateofcommunitybetween ElSalvadorand Nicaragua, and that, by
reason of the particular configuration of the Gulf, those waters,
thoughremainingface to face,were ...confounded byoverlapping."
(AJIL, 1917,p. 711.)
30. It isclaimedby El SalvadorinitsMemorial inthe present casethat
"On the basis ofthe 1917judgement an objectivelegalrégimehas
been established in the Gulf. Even if initially the judgement was
binding only in respect ofthe directparties tothe litigation,Nicara-
guaand ElSalvador,the legaistatusrecognizedtherein hasbeen con-
solidated in the course of time; its effectsextend to third States,and
in particular, they extend to Honduras"
and further that the juridical situation of the Gulfoes not permit the
dividingup ofthe watersheld in condominium", withthe exception of "a
territorial sea within the Gulf', recognized by the Central American
Court of Justice. It therefore asks the Chamber to adjudge and declare
that
"The juridical position of the maritimespaces within the Gulf of
Fonseca corresponds to the juridical position established by the
Judgement of the Central American Court of Justice rendered
March9th 1917,asaccepted and applied there after."
It alsocontends in itsCounter-Memorial that
"So faras the maritimespacesare concerned,the Parties have not
askedthe Chamber either to trace a line of delimitation orto define
the Rules and Principles of PublicInternational Lawapplicable to a
delimitation of maritime spaces, eithernside or outside the Gulf of
Fonseca."Se référant aussiau fait qu'à l'embouchure du golfe il se produisait un
chevauchementou une intersection «des deux lignes (situéeà 12milles
de la côte) qui marquent les limites respectives de la zone d'inspection
maritime»d'ElSalvador et du Nicaragua,la Cour dejustice centraméri-
cainea déclaréque:
«Porconsiguiente,hayque concluir enque,exceptuandoesa parte, el
resto de las aguas delolfoha quedadopro-indiviso, en estado de
comunidad entreEl Salvador y Nicaragua,y en quepor la particular
configuracibndel misrno,esas aguasquedanfiente afrente, confun-
diéndoseporunempalme ..»(CJC, Sentencia,p. 50.)
[Traduction]
«Parconséquent,ilfaut conclureque, à l'exceptionde cettepartie
[lazone délimitéeentrele Honduras et le Nicaragua], le restant des
eaux du golfeestdemeuréindivisetconstitueune communautéentre
ElSalvadoretleNicaragua, etque,enraison delaconfiguration par-
ticulièredu golfe,ceseauxsetrouventface àface,seconfondant par
chevauchement. »
30. El Salvadorsoutient, dans le mémoirequ'ila présentédansla pré-
senteinstance,que :
«Sur la base de l'arrêtde 1917,un régimejuridique objectif a été
établidans legolfe.Mêmesiinitialement l'arrêntes'imposaitqu'aux
parties directesau litige,le Nicaragua et El Salvador,le régimejuri-
dique reconnu dans cette décisions'estrenforcé avecle temps; ses
effetss'étendent aux Etatstiers, etenparticulier au Honduras,
etquela situationjuridique du golfe((n'autorisepasun partage des eaux
possédées en condominium »,àl'exception«d'une mer territoriale dans
le golfe»,reconnue par la Cour dejustice centraméricaine.El Salvador
prie en conséquencela Chambre de dire etjuger que :
«Lerégimejuridique desespacesmaritimes dans legolfede Fon-
secacorrespond au régimejuridique établipar l'arrêtde la Cour de
justice centraméricainerendu le9mars 1917,tel qu'ila étéacceptéet
appliquéparla suite.»
Il soutient aussi, dans soncontre-mémoire,que:
«En ce qui concerne les espaces maritimes, les Parties n'ont
demandéà la Chambre ni de tracer une ligne de délimitationni de
définirles règleset principes du droit international public appli-
cablesà une délimitationdes espacesmaritimes, soità l'intérieur du
golfede Fonseca,soit àl'extérieur.n 31. Honduras initsReplyrejectstheviewthat the 1917Judgementpro-
ducedor reflectedan objectivelegalrégime,contendingthat inthe caseof
"ajudgment orarbitralaward layingdownadelimitationas between
the parties to a dispute, the solution therein adopted can only be
opposedto the parties. Asforother States,whicharealientothe case,
a decisionwhichaffectstheirrightscannotbeopposedto them. This
is indeed the case for Honduras with respect to the 1917Judgement
of the Central Arnerican Court, which was the outcome of proceed-
ingsin which it did not participate."
It also observesthat
"it is not the 1917Judgement which confers sovereignty upon the
riparian States over the waters of the Bay of Fonseca. That sover-
eignty antecedes considerablythat judgment between two riparian
States, since it dates back to the creation of the three States con-
cerned."
Honduras's contentionas to the legalsituation ofthe maritime spaces,to
be examined further below, involvestheir delimitation between the Par-
ties. It considers that the Chamber has jurisdiction under the Special
Agreementto effect suchdelimitation,and hasindicatedwhat,inthe view
of Honduras, should be the course ofthe delimitation line.
32. As regardsmaritimespacessituated outside the closingline of the
Gulf, Honduras asksthe Chamber to find that the "community of inter-
ests" between El Salvador and Honduras as coastal States of the Gulf
implies that they each have an equal right to exercisejurisdiction over
such spaces.Onthis basis, it asksthe Chamber to determinealine ofdeli-
mitation extending 200 miles seaward, to delimit the territorial sea, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the two Parties.
El Salvador however contends that the Chamber does not, under the
Special Agreement, have jurisdiction to delimit maritime areas outside
the closing line of the Gulf. El Salvador denies that Honduras has any
legitimateclaimto anypart of the continentalshelfor exclusiveeconomic
zone in the Pacific,oiitsidethe Gulf;it ishoweverpreparedto acceptthat
thisquestionbe decided by the Chamber.
33. Afeature ofthe present caseisthat on none ofthe three aspectsof
the dispute referredto inArticle2,paragraph 2,ofthe SpecialAgreement,
to which the Application for permission to intervene relates, - the
islands,the waters ofthe Gulf, and the waters outside the Gulf - arethe
Partiesin agreementas to the issuestobe decided by the Chamber under
the Special Agreement. In considering whether Nicaragua has a legal
interest which maybe affected by the decision in the case,so asto justify 31. LeHonduras rejette,dans saréplique,l'opinion selonlaquellel'ar-
rêtde 1917a créé ou reflétéun régimejuridique objectif et il fait valoir
que, s'agissantd'une
«sentence juridictionnelle ou arbitrale, réglantun cas de délimita-
tion entre les parties àun différend, la solutionadoptée par elle ne
sera opposable qu'aux parties. Quant aux autres Etats, étrangers
l'affaire, ils nepeuvent se voir opposerune sentence qui affecterait
leursdroits.Telestbienlecas du Honduras parrapport àlasentence
rendue en 1917par la Cour centraméricaine àla suite d'une procé-
dure àlaquelle il n'apas participé.»
Il fait aussiobserver que
«ce n'estpas de la sentence de 1917que résulte la souveraineté des
Etatsriverains surleseaux delabaie deFonseca. Elleétaitbienanté-
rieureà ce jugement intervenu entre deux riverains, puisqu'elle
remonte àla création destrois Etats.»
La thèsedu Honduras relative àla situationjuridique des espacesmari-
times, que la Chambre examinera plus loin, implique que ces espaces
maritimessoient délimitésentre les Parties.Il considèreque la Chambre
estcompétenteenvertu du compromispour procéder àune telledélimita-
tion etilaindiquéqueldevraitêtre,selonlui,lecoursdelalignededélimi-
tation.
32. En cequi concerne lesespacesmaritimessituésau-delàde la ligne
de fermeture du golfe,leHondurasdemande à la Chambrede dire que la
«communauté d'intérêts » existant entre El Salvador et le Honduras en
tantqu'Etatsriverains du golfeimplique àleurprofit un droit égaàexer-
cer leurjuridiction sur ces espaces; aussi lui demande-t-il de déterminer
une lignededélimitationjusqu'à200millesaularge,pour délimiterlamer
territoriale, la zone économiqueexclusive et le plateau continental des
deux Parties. En revanche, ElSalvador soutient qu'en vertu du compro-
misla Chambre n'apas compétencepour délimiterdeszonesmaritimes à
l'extérieurde la ligne de fermeture du golfe. El Salvadornie que le Hon-
duras puisse légitimementprétendre à unepartie quelconque du plateau
continental ouà une zoneéconomiqueexclusivedans le Pacifique, à l'ex-
térieurdu golfe; il est pourtant disposà accepter que la question soit
tranchéeparla Chambre.
33. Laprésente affairesecaractérisepar lefait quesuraucun destrois
aspects du différendvisésàl'article2,paragraphe 2,du compromis,aux-
quels la requêteàfin d'intervention atrai- lesîles, leseaux du golfe et
les eaux extérieures au golfe - les Parties ne s'accordent en ce qui
concernelespoints àtrancherpar laChambre envertu du compromis.Au
moment de rechercher si le Nicaragua a un intérêjturidique susceptible
d'être affectpar la décisionà rendre en l'espèce et si cetintérêtst deitsintervention,the Chamber has accordinglyto bearinmindthat a num-
ber of issuesmay or may not fa11to be determined by it under eachhead.
34. By a letter dated 20 April 1988,the Ambassador of Nicaragua to
the Netherlandsrequested thatthe pleadingsbemadeavailableto Nicara-
gua under Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, a request
granted (above,paragraph 13)on 15June 1988afterascertainment ofthe
views ofthe Parties.That letterreferredto the Order ofthe Court of8May
1987constitutingthe Chamber inthis case,and stated :
"Whilst Nicaragua doesnot atthis stageintend to availitselfofthe
provisionsofArticle62ofthe Statuteofthe Court, the purpose ofthe
present communication is to inform the Court that the possibility
offered by Article 62isunder active consideration. In this context 1
am instructed to conveythe view ofmy Governmentthat Nicaragua
has an interest of a legalnature whichmaybe affected by a decision
ofthe Chamber constitutedforthe purpose ofdecidingthe Casecon-
ceming the Land, Island and Maritime FrontierDispute between
El Salvadorand Honduras. Moreover,inthe lightofthe principle of
consent as invoked by the Court in the Monetary Gold case,
Z.C.J.Reports1954,p. 19,atp.32,myGovernmentconsidersit neces:
saryto reserveitsposition generallyin relation to the Court's Order
of 8May 1987."
Copies ofthisletterweretransmitted to thetwo Partiesbythe Registrarof
the Court.
35. In itsApplicationfor permission to intervene, filed on 17Novem-
ber 1989,Nicaragua stated that the Application was made by virtue of
Article 36, paragraph 1,and Article 62 of the Statute. An application
under Article 62 is required by Article 81,paragraph 1,of the Rules of
Courtto befiled "as soonas possible,and not laterthan the closureofthe
written proceedings". The Application of Nicaragua was filed in the
Registryofthe Court twomonthsbeforethe time-limitfixedforthefiling
ofthe Parties' Replies.
36. ByArticle 81,paragraph 2,ofthe RulesofCourt a Stateseekingto
intervene is required to specifythe caseto whichit relates andto set out:
"(a) the interest of a legal nature which the Stateapplying to inter-
veneconsidersmaybeaffectedbythedecisioninthat case;
(6) thepreciseobjectofthe intervention;
(c) anybasis ofjurisdiction whichisclaimedto existasbetweenthe
Stateapplyingtointerveneandtheparties tothe case".
Nicaragua's contentions on each of those requirements are as follows.nature à justifier l'intervention du Nicaragua, la Chambre devra par
conséquenttenircomptedu faitqu'illuifaudra peut-être, àpropos decha-
cun de cesaspects,trancher un certain nombre depoints.
* *
34. Par lettredu 20avril 1988,l'ambassadeur du Nicaragua aux Pays-
Bas a demandé queles piècesde procédure soientmises à la disposition
du Nicaraguaenvertu del'article 53,paragraphe 1,du Règlement;après
s'êtrerenseignéeauprès des Parties,la Cour a fait droitsa demande, le
15juin 1988(paragraphe 13ci-dessus).Dans cette lettre,qui seréférait à
l'ordonnance de la Cour du 8mai 1987constituantla Chambre saisie de
l'affaire, ilétait déclaré
«LeNicaragua n'envisagepas,pour le moment, de seprévaloirde
l'article62du Statutde la Cour, mais il entend, par laprésentecom-
munication,informer laCour quelapossibilitéofferte par cetarticle
est activementà l'étude. Acesujet,je suis chargéd'exposerlepoint
de vue de mon gouvernement, à savoir qu'un intérêt d'ordre juri-
dique est en cause pour le Nicaragua et que cet intértourrait être
affectépar une décisionde la Chambreconstituéepour connaître de
l'affaire duDiffend frontalier terrestre,insulaireet maritime qui
oppose El Salvadorau Honduras. De plus, comptetenu du principe
duconsentementtel qu'ilaétéinvoqué par laCour enl'affairedel'Or
monétaire (C.I.J.Recueil1954,p. 32),mongouvernementjuge néces-
saire de réserversaposition d'unefaçongénéraleencequi concerne
l'ordonnance rendue par la Cour le 8mai 1987.))
Descopies de cette lettreont étéenvoyéespar le Greffier de la Cour aux
deux Parties.
35. Danslarequête àfin d'interventionqu'ila déposéele17novembre
1989,le Nicaragua a déclaré quecelle-ciétait soumiseen vertu de l'ar-
ticle36,paragraphe 1,etdel'article62du Statut.L'article81,paragraphe 1,
du Règlement exige qu'unerequête fondée sur l'article 62 du Statut soit
déposée «le plustôt possible avantla clôture de laprocédure écri».La
requêtedu NicaraguaaétédéposéeauGreffedeC laour deux moisavant
l'expiration du délaifixpour le dépôt desrépliquesdes Parties.
36. Aux termes de l'article 81, paragraphe 2, du Règlement,1'Etat
demandant àintervenirdoit préciserl'affaireque concerne sa requêteet
spécifier:
«a) l'intérêtd'ordrejuridique qui,selo1n'Etatdemandant àinterve-
nir,estpour luien cause;
b) l'objet précidel'intervention;
c) toutebasedecompétencequi,selon1'Etatdemandant àinterve-
nir,existeraitentrelui etlesparties
Lesthèsesdu Nicaragua sur chacun de cespoints sont les suivantes.108 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
37. Astothe interestofalegalnature (Article81,paragraph 2 (a),ofthe
RulesofCourt),Nicaragua StatesasfollowsinitsApplication :"Ascanbe
appreciated in Article 2ofthe SpecialAgreement. ..,the Government of
Nicaragua has an interest of a legal nature which must inevitably be
affected by a decision of the Chamber." (Para. 2.) It then proceeds to
enumerate the "particular considèrations supporting this opinion" as
includingthe following :
"(a) The phrasing of paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the SpecialAgree-
ment,whichreferscomprehensivelyto 'la situacionjuridica insu-
larydelosespaciosmaritimos'.
(b) Thetitle of the Special Agreementwhich refersto 'lacontrover-
siafronteriza terrestre,insulary maritima existenteentrelosdos
Estados'.
(c) Thegeographicalsituationinthe Gulf of Fonseca and the adja-
centmaritime areas.
(d) The essential character of the legal principles, including rele-
vant equitableprinciples, whichwould berelevant to the deter-
mination of the questions placed on the agenda by the Special
Agreement.
(e) The general recognition by authoritative legal opinion that the
issues relating to the Gulf of Fonseca involve a trilateral con-
troversy.
@ Theleadingrole of coasts and coastalrelationshipsin the legal
régimeof maritime delimitation and the consequence in the
case ofthe Gulf of Fonseca that itwould be impossibleto carry
outadelimitation whichtookintoaccount onlythecoastsinthe
Gulfoftwoofthethree riparian States.
(g) The fact that a possible element in the regulation of the legal
situation ofmaritime spaces,especiallyin a caselikethat ofthe
Gulf ofFonseca,wouldbethe designation ofone ormorezones
ofjoint exploration and exploitationseetheReport oftheCon-
ciliation Commission in the Jan Mayen ContinentalShelfcase,
Intemational LawReports(ed.E.Lauterpacht), Vol.62,p. 108."
(Application,para. 2.)
38. Article 81,paragraph 2 (b), of theules of Court requires a statq-
ment of "the precise object of the intervention". In Nicaragua's Applica-
tion,it is stated that
"The interventionfor which permission is requested has the fol-
lowingobjects :
First,generallyto protectthe legalrightsofthe Republic ofNicara-
gua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas by al1
legalmeans available.
Secondly,to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Court ofthe nature ofthelegalrightsofNicaragua whicharein issue
inthe dispute. Thisformofinterventionwould havethe conservative 37. Au sujet de l'intérêt d'ordre juridique (artice1,paragraphe 2 a),
du Règlement),leNicaragua déclarecequisuitdans sarequête :((Comme
lemontrel'article2du compromis ..leGouvernement du Nicaragua a un
intérêtd'ordrejuridiqus eurlequelune décisiondelaChambre aura inévi-
tablement une incidence.» (Par. 2.) Il passe ensuiteàl'énumération des
«considérations particulières»surlesquelles«cetteopinion se fonde»et
ily inclut notamment:
«a) la formulation duparagraphe 2de l'article 2du compromis,qui
faitglobalementréférence à «la situacionjuridica insulary delos
espaciosmaritirnos));
b) letitre du compromis,quifaitréférence à((lacontroversifronte-
riza terrestre,insularymaritimaexistenteentrelosdosEstados));
c) la situation géographiquedu golfe de Fonseca et des espaces
maritimesadjacents ;
d) le caractère essentiel des principes juridiques, y compris les
principes d'équité pertinents, qui compteraientpour trancher
lesquestionsmisesencausepar lecompromis ;
e) le fait qu'il estgénéralement reconnudans la doctrine que les
questions relatives au golfe de Fonseca soulèventun différend
trilatéral;
fl le rôle primordial des côtes et des relations côtières dans le
régimejuridique des délimitations maritimes, dont il résulte,
dans lecasdu golfede Fonseca,qu'ilseraitimpossibledeprocé-
der àune délimitationqui,dans cegolfe,netiendrait compte que
descôtesdedeuxdestroisEtatsriverains;
g) lefaitque,lorsqu'on règlela situationjuridique d'espaces mari-
times - surtoutdansun cascommeceluidugolfede Fonseca -
on peut notamment définirune ou plusieurs zones d'explora-
tion et d'exploitation communes :voir lerapport de la commis-
sion de conciliation dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de
Jan Mayen, International Law Reports (E. Lauterpacht, dir.
pub.),vol.62,p. 108»(requête,par.2).
38. Selon l'article 81, paragraphe 2 b), du Règlementde la Cour, la
requêtedoit spécifier«l'objet précd iel'intervention».Dans larequête à
fin d'interventiondu Nicaragua, il estditque :
«La requête àfin d'intervention apour objet:
Premièrement,deprotéger généralemenp t,ar tous lesmoyensjuri-
diques possibles, les droits de la Républiquedu Nicaragua dans le
golfede Fonseca et dans lesespacesmaritimes adjacents.
Deuxièmementd , 'intervenirdans l'instancepour informerla Cour
de la nature des droits du Nicaragua qui sont en cause dans le litige.
Cetteformed'intervention auraitun but conservatoire:elleviserait à purpose of seekingto ensure that the determination ofthe Chamber
did not trench upon the legalrights and interests of the Republic of
Nicaragua ..."(Application,paras. 4-6.)
Nicaragua goes on to statethat it "intends to subject itselfto the binding
effect of the decision to be given" (Application,para. 6). The Chamber
takesnote ofthat statement.
39. The further requirement ofArticle 81,paragraph 2 (c)ofthe Rules
ofCourt,that an applicationfor permissionto intervenesetout "anybasis
ofjurisdiction which is claimed to existas between the Stateapplying to
intervene and the parties to the case", isdealt with in the Application as
follows. Nicaragua contends that, for reasons which are there briefly
stated,"In the opinion of the Government of NicaraguaArticle 62ofthe
Statute, which is the governing instrument, does not require a separate
title ofjurisdiction..."(Application,para. 7.)Nicaragua does not assert
the existence of any basis ofjurisdiction other than the Statute itself; it
addsthat
"Moreover, Article 36,paragraph 1,of the Statute states that the
jurisdiction ofthe Court 'comprises. ..al1matters speciallyprovided
for. ..intreaties and conventionsin force'; andthe Statute isitselfa
'treatyin force'."(Application,para. 7.)
40. In itsApplicationNicaragua further statesthat itsrequest to inter-
vene is "limited to that part of the object of the Special Agreement con-
tained in paragraph 2 of Article 2", Le.,the request that the Chamber
"determine the legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces" and
that it "wishesto makeveryclearthat it has no intention of interveningin
those aspects of the procedure relating to the land boundary which is in
dispute between El Salvador and Honduras" (Application, "Preliminary
Statements").
41. In its Application to the Court for permission to intervenedated
17November 1989Nicaragua also stated that
"The practical consequence of a favourableresponse to the pres-
entrequest willbe the reformation ofthe Chamber aspresently con-
stitutedand there-ordering ofthewrittenproceedingsas arrangedby
the Order of27May 1987.WhilstmyGovernment isbound totakeal1
availablesteps in order to protect its legal interests, it is concerned
to proceed in a spirit of goodwill and CO-operationin face of a pro-
cedure which has already been initiated. Consequently, it is the
intention of my Government to propose not a reformation of the
Chamber and its jurisdictional basis tout courtbut only the making
of those changes strictly necessary in order to maintain the mini-
mum standards of efficacy and procedural fairness" (para. 23 of
that Application),
and that garantir que les conclusions de la Chambre ne portent pas atteinte
aux droits et intérêtde la Républiquedu Nicaragua ..» (Requête,
par. 4-6.)
Le Nicaragua ajoute qu'il ((entend reconnaître l'effet obligatoire de la
décision qui serarendue » (requête, par.6). La Chambre prend note de
cettedéclaration.
39. La condition suivante, que pose l'article 81, paragraphe 2),du
Règlementde la Cour, à savoirqu'une requête à fin d'intervention spéci-
fie «toute base de compétence qui, selon 1'Etatdemandant àintervenir,
existeraitentre lui et lesparties »,est traitéede la façon suivante dans la
requête :le Nicaragua allègueque,pour les raisons qu'ilindique briève-
ment, «de l'avisdu Gouvernement du Nicaragua,l'article62du Statutde
la Cour, qui est l'instrument de base, n'exigepas un titre de compétence
distinct.»(requête,par.7).Le Nicaragua neprétend pasqu'ilexisteune
base de compétenceautreque le Statutlui-mêmeet ajoute :
«Deplus,l'article36du Statutprécise,ensonparagraphe 1,quela
compétencede la Cour «s'étend ..à tous les cas spécialementpré-
vus ..dans lestraitéset conventionsenvigueur »; or le Statut estlui-
même un «traité en vigueur.»(Requête,par.7.)
40. Dans sa requête,le Nicaragua déclare enoutre que sa demande
d'intervention«ne porte quesurun aspect del'objetdu compromis,celui
qui estexposéauparagraphe 2del'article2»,selonlequellaChambre est
priée de({déterminerla situationjuridique des îles et des espacesmari-
times »,etqu'il«tientàbienpréciserqu'il n'entendpas intervenirdans les
aspects de la procédure concernantla frontière terrestre en litige entre
El Salvador et le Honduras » (requête, «Observations prélimianire»s).
41. Dans la requête à fin d'intervention qu'ila présentéà la Cour le
17novembre 1989,le Nicaragua a aussidéclaréque:
«Une réponse favorableà la présente requête aura pour consé-
quence pratique une reconstitution de la Chambre par rapport àsa
composition actuelle et leréagencementde la procédure écrite telle
qu'ellea étéfixépear l'ordonnance du 27mai 1987.Mon gouverne-
ment estcertestenu deprendre toutes lesdispositionspossiblespour
protégersesintérêtsjuridiquesm, aisilestsoucieuxdeprocéder dans
un esprit de bonne volonté etde coopération face àune procédure
qui a déjàété engagée E.n conséquencemon gouvernement entend
proposer non pas de reconstituer sans autre la Chambre etle fonde-
ment desacompétence,maisuniquement d'opérerlesmodifications
strictementnécessairespour maintenir lesnormes minimales d'effi-
cacitéetd'équité procédurale»(paragraphe 23de la requête),
et que "Nicaragua inthe alternative would requestthat, for those reasons
of elementalfairnessexplained above ...,the Court should, in any
case,excludefromthe mandate ofthe Chamber anypowers ofdeter-
mination ofthejuridical situation of maritime areas both withinthe
Gulf ofFonseca and alsointhe PacificOceanand, in effect,limitthe
Chamber'smandate to those aspectsoftheland boundary which are
in dispute between El Salvador and Honduras." (Para. 24 of that
Application.)
In its Order of 28February 1990,the Court obsemed on the first of these
contentions that
"while Nicaragua has thus referred to certain questions concerning
the composition of the Chamber, it has done so only in contempla-
tion of a favourableresponse being givento itsrequestfor intemen-
tion" ;
andon the second,that "whileNicaraguacontemplates a limitationofthe
mandate of the Chamber, itsrequest tothat effectis put fonvard only 'in
the alternative"'; and the Court concluded that it "isus not calledupon
to pronounce on any of these questions", whichit referred to as "contin-
gentonthe decisionwhetherthe applicationforpermissionto intemene is
to be granted", thatdecision being an "anterior question".
42. Atthehearings,the AgentofNicaragua, inhisfirststatement tothe
Chamber, referred to the Court's Order and stated that
"now that Nicaragua isbeforethe Chamber reiteratingits petition to
intemene, it does so without submitting to the Chamber on this
opportunitythe twoquestionsthat thefullCourt statedcould onlybe
resolvedafterthe decisiononthe Applicationfor permissiontointer-
vene wasmade bythe Chamber. ..Nicaraguamaintains,beforethis
Chamber of the Court, its Application for permission to intemene
but modified inthe sensethat the requestsmade in Sections23and 24
of its original Application of 17November 1989are not being sub-
mitted for decision by this Chamber".
Inreplytoa questionbythe Chamber,the Agentmadeitclearthat Nicara-
guaaccepted that the decisiononinterventionisentirelyforthe Chamber,
which has fullauthority to decide on it and stated further:
"The Chamber iscorrectinunderstanding that Nicaraguaaccepts
that it is theamber which is properly seised of an application by
Nicaragua for permission to intervenebeforeit in the case concern-
ingthe Land,IslandandMaritimeFrontier Dispute(ElSalvador/Hon-
duras);and that Nicaragua recognizesthat the eventual decision of
the Chamber granting or refusing permission to intervene will be
binding and final ...
Theonlylimitationwehavemadeto Ouroriginalapplicationtothe «Subsidiairement, le Nicaragua demandera que, pour les raisons
d'élémentaire équité exposéesplus haut ..la Cour exclue de toute
façondu mandat delaChambretouspouvoirs dedéterminationdela
situationjuridique desespacesmaritimessitués àl'intérieurdu golfe
de Fonsecaainsique dans l'océanPacifiqueetqu'en faitellelimitele
mandat de la Chambre aux aspects de la frontièreterrestre qui sont
en litige entre El Salvador et le Honduras. » (Paragraphe 24 de la
requête.)
Dans sonordonnance du 28février1990,laCourafait observer, àpropos
de la premièredecesdemandes,que :
«sileNicaraguaévoqueainsicertainesquestionsconcernant lacom-
position de la Chambre, il ne le fait que pour le cas où une réponse
favorableserait apportéeàsa requêteàfin d'intervention»;
et,àpropos de laseconde,que sileNicaragua envisageunelimitation du
mandat delaChambre, ilneformuleune telledemandeque «subsidiaire-
ment»; et la Cour a conclu (qu'ainsi [elle]n'estappeléeàse prononcer
sur aucune de cesquestions »,dont elle a dit qu'elles«ne sauraient donc
êtreexaminéesavant la décisionsurle point de savoir si la requête fin
d'intervention doit être admise, décisionqui constitue une ((question
préalableP.
42. Al'audience, lorsde sonpremierexposédevantla Chambre,l'agent
du Nicaragua s'estréféréàl'ordonnancedelaCour eta déclaréque :
((maintenant que le Nicaragua est devant la Chambre et réitèresa
requêteà fin d'intervention,illefaitsansdemander àlaChambre de
répondre auxdeuxquestionsdontlaCour plénièreadéclaré qu'elles
ne pouvaient êtrerésoluesqu'une foisque la Chambre seseraitpro-
noncéesurl'admissiondel'intervention ..le Nicaraguamaintient sa
requêteà fin d'interventiondevantlaChambre dela Cour, maissous
une formemodifiée,encesensqu'ilnedemandepas àlaChambrede
seprononcersur lesdemandesformuléesauxparagraphes 23et24de
sa requête initialedu17novembre 1989».
Répondantà une question poséepar la Chambre, l'agent a préciséque
le Nicaragua acceptait qu'il appartenait entièrementà la Chambre de
prendre la décision surl'intervention et qu'elle avait tout pouvoir pour
statuersur celle-ci; il a ajouté:
«La Chambre ne setrompe pas en comprenant que le Nicaragua
accepteque c'estcetteChambre qui est dûment saisied'unerequête
du Nicaragua à fin d'intervention devant elledans l'affaireDgfé-
rendfrontalierterrestre,insulaireetmaritime(ElSalvador/Honduras);
et que le Nicaragua reconnaît que la décisionfinalepar laquellela
Chambre accorderaou refuseral'autorisation d'intervenirseraobli-
gatoireetdéfinitiv...
La seule limite que nous ayons apportée à notre requête initiale full Court was that we are not putting at this moment before the
Chamber anyrequest that itreconstitute itselforthat it excludefrom
its own competence ratione materiae those aspects of the case that
Nicaragua had requested that the full Court exclude fromthe man-
date ofthis Chamber. ..
. .. what we are putting before the Chamber is the simple and
unconditional request to be allowed permission to intervenein the
present casebased on Article 62ofthe Statute ..."
43. Some of the arguments of El Salvador have been put forward as
grounds forthe Chamber to rejectthe Application of Nicaragua inlimine,
without there being any need for further examination of its compliance
with Article 62 of the Statute of the Court. These will therefore be
examinedfirst.
44. First, El Salvador claims that the Application fails to fulfil the
requirement in Article 81, paragraph 2 (c),of the Rules of Court that a
State seekingto interveneisto setout initsapplication "any basisofjuris-
diction which is claimed to exist as between the Stateapplying to inter-
vene and the parties to the case". Nicaragua does not set out any such
basis in itsApplication but arguesthat Article 62ofthe Statute "does not
require a separate title ofjurisdiction" (para. 7).The Chamber does not
see here any forma1 defect, justifying dismissal of the Application
inlimine, sincethe Rule only requiresstatement of "any basis ofjurisdic-
tion which is claimedto exist". ElSalvadoralso advances the viewthat a
"jurisdictionallink"betweentheStateseekingto interveneandtheparties
is a necessary condition for intervention. The Court, however, has
observed in an earlier casethat
"although this question is one of the Court's jurisdiction, it has no
priority ofthekindwhichattachestoajurisdictionalobjection stricto
sensu,and neednot be examinedin advanceofthe other contentions
put forward bythe Partieseitherasobjections to the admissibilityof
the Application, or as grounds for refusing it" (I.C.J. Reports 1984,
p. 8,para. Il).
El Salvador'scontentions on the question of the jurisdictional link will
thereforebe examined later (paragraphs 93-101).
45. Second, El Salvador contends that Nicaragua's Application is
defectivebecause it does not comply with the requirement of Article 81,
paragraph 2 (b),of the Rules of Court that a Stateapplying to intervene
indicateinitsApplication "the preciseobjectoftheintervention". Nicara-
gua's Application has two paragraphs (quoted in paragraph 38 above)
stating the object of the intervention. El Salvadornonetheless contends
(interalia)that Nicaraguahas not complied withthe requirement to indi-
cate "the preciseobject":it does not "indicateitsposition with respect to
thefundamental issueinthe case,whichisto definethe objectofthelitiga- adressée à la Cour plénière,c'est que nous ne soumettons aujour-
d'hui àla Chambre aucune demandetendant àce qu'elleserecons-
titue ou qu'elle exclue de sa propre compétence ratione materiae
les aspects de l'affairedont le Nicaragua avaitpriéla Cour plénière
de dessaisirla Chambre ...
Ceque noussoumettons àlaChambre, c'est ..lademande simple
et inconditionnelle d'être autorisés à intervenir dans la présente
affaireenvertu de l'article2du Statut ..»
43. Certainsdesarguments d'ElSalvadorontétéavancéspoum r otiver
lerejet inliminelitisparlaChambre delarequêtedu Nicaragua,sans qu'il
soitnécessaired'approfondir laquestiondesaconformitéavecl'article62
du Statut de la Cour. Ces argumentsvontêtreexaminésd'abord.
44. Premièrement, El Salvador soutient que la requêten'est pas
conformeauparagraphe 2c)del'article81du RèglementdelaCour,selon
lequel 1'Etatdemandant àintervenirdoitindiquer danssa requête«toute
base de compétencequi, selon 1'Etatdemandant à intervenir,existerait
entrelui et lesparties.Le Nicaragua n'indique aucune base de cegenre
dans sa requête, mais allègueque l'article62 du Statut «n'exige pas un
titre de compétencedistinct »(par. 7).Pour la Chambre, il n'ya là aucun
vicede forme quijustifie le rejet de la requêteinlimine litis,le Règlement
n'exigeant que l'indication de «toute base de compétence qui ..existe-
rait». El Salvador allègueaussi qu'un «lienjuridictionnel » entre 1'Etat
demandant àintervenir et lesparties estune conditionnécessairede l'in-
tervention. La Cour a cependant fait observer, dans une précédente
affaire,que :
«bien que cettequestion relèvede la compétencede la Cour, ellen'a
pas une priorité comparable à celled'une exceptionjuridictionnelle
stricto sensuet ne doit pas êtreexaminéepréalablement aux autres
allégationsavancéespar les Parties,soitàtitred'objectionsàla rece-
vabilité de la requête, soitcomme motifs justifiant son rejet))
(C.Z. .Recueil1984,p. 8,par. 11).
La Chambre examinera donc plus loin lesallégationsd'El Salvadorrela-
tivesà la questiondu lienjuridictionnel (paragraphes 93 à 101).
45. Deuxièmement,El Salvadorsoutientque la requêtedu Nicaragua
est viciéeparce qu'elle n'estpas conforme au paragraphe 2 b) de l'ar-
ticle81du RèglementdelaCour,selonlequel 1'Etatdemandant à interve-
nir doit indiquer dans sa requête «l'objet précisde l'intervention». La
requêtedu Nicaragua contientdeuxparagraphes(citésau paragraphe 38
ci-dessus)qui énoncentl'objetde l'intervention.NéanmoinsEl Salvador
soutientnotammentqueleNicaraguane s'estpas conformé à l'obligation
d'indiquer 1'«objet précis):il n'aindique [passa]position ..sur la ques-
tion fondamentale en l'espèce, cellede la définitionde l'objet du diffé-tion and consequently the scope of the powers of the Chamber", and
"theseomissionsmakethe Application defective".IntheChamber'sview,
however,Nicaraguahas givenan indication ofan objectwhichcould cer-
tainlybe defined in a more precise waybut is not so evidentlylacking in
precision as to justify the Chamber in rejectingthe Application inlimine
for non-compliance with Article 81 of the Rules of Court. Whether, as
El Salvador also claims,Nicaragua's objectin intervening isnot a proper
one is aseparate matter to be considered below (paragraphs 85-92).
46. Thirdly, El Salvador contends further that "Nicaragua is time-
barred or estoppedfrom seekingchangesinthe procedural aspects ofthe
principal proceedings". El Salvador refers tothe provision of Article81,
paragraph 1,ofthe RulesofCourt wherebyan applicationforpermission
to intervene isto be filed "as soon as possible, and notater than the clo-
sureofthewritten proceedings". In itswrittenobservationsonthe Appli-
cation, El Salvador emphasized the words "as soon as possible", and
contended that, inviewofNicaragua'srequestsinparagraphs 23and 24of
the Application,forthe reformation of the Chamber and the re-ordering
ofthe writtenproceedings(paragraph 41 above),it shouldnot havepost-
poneditsApplicationfor nearlythreeyearsafterbeingnotified ofthe pro-
ceedings; and that the Applicationfor permission to interveneshouldbe
declined because Nicaragua is"out of time". Atthe hearingsthe Agentof
El Salvador, continuing to urge that the Application was "untimely",
stated that El Salvadorwasfullyawarethat the relevant time-limits"have
in the technical sensebeen complied with by Nicaragua", and explained
that it wasrequestingthe Chamber to rejectthe NicaraguanApplication,
"not because it fails to meet a technical requirement of the Rules but
because it fails to meet the substantiverequirements of the Statute". The
contention appears to be that Nicaragua's Application is untimely, not
onlyinitselfbut because ofthe lateraisingofthemattersinparagraphs 23
and 24thereof,whichwouldbedisruptiveatthepresentadvancedstage of
the proceedings; and that the Chamber has and should exercisea discre-
tion to rejectthe Application inlimineon thisground.
47. In its observations on the Nicaraguan Application for permission
to intervene,ElSalvadorin fact setsoutanumber ofgrounds ofobjection
to the matters raised inparagraphs 23and 24ofthat Application.To give
effectto Nicaragua's statedintention to seeka "reordering ofthe written
proceedings" would, it is contended, "infringethe Rules of Court", "fail
to recognize the acquired rights of the litigant Parties", and "create an
unfair situation by placing Nicaragua in an advantageous position vis-
à-visthe Parties, already committedas they are by the contents of their
pleadings, to which Nicaragua has been given access". Nicaragua's
intended requestforthe "reformationofthe Chamber aspresentlyconsti-
tuted" isdescribed by ElSalvadoras an "extravagant and unprecedented
claim",to allowwhichwould "violateessentiallegalprinciples". Tomod-
ify the constitution of the Chamber without the consent of the Partiesrend et, par voie de conséquence, de la portée des pouvoirs de la
Chambre », ((omissions qui vicient la requête». La Chambre estime
cependantque le Nicaragua a indiquéun objetqui pourrait certainement
être défini avecpludse précision maisdont le manque de précisionn'est
pas manifestement tel qu'il autorise la Chambre à rejeter la requête
in limine litispour non-conformité avec l'article81 du Règlementde la
Cour. Quant à savoir si, comme le soutient aussi El Salvador,l'objet de
l'interventiondu Nicaragua n'estpas approprié,c'estuneautre question,
qui sera examinéeplus loin (paragraphes85 à 92).
46. Troisièmement,El Salvadorsoutientque «le Nicaragua estforclos
ouempêché (estopped)dechercheràobtenirdesmodificationsdesaspects
procéduraux de l'instance principale». El Salvador se réfèreau para-
graphe 1de l'article 81du Règlementde la Cour, auxtermes duquel une
requête àfin d'intervention doitêtredéposé«ele plustôt possibleavantla
clôture de la procédure écrite». Dans ses observations écritessur la
requête,El Salvador met l'accent sur les mots «le plus tôt possible)) et
soutient que, étantdonnéles demandes de reconstitution de la Chambre
et de réagencementde la procédure écrite que le Nicaragua formule aux
paragraphes 23 et 24 de sa requête (paragraphe41 ci-dessus), cet Etat
n'aurait pas dû en différerle dépôt pendantprèsde trois ans après avoir
étéaviséde l'instance;il ajoute que la requêteàfin d'intervention devrait
être rejetée puisqule Nicaragua est «hors délai».A l'audience, l'agent
d'ElSalvadoracontinué àfairevaloirquelarequêten'étap itasvenue«en
tempsutile »etadéclaré queson paysserendait tout àfaitcompte que les
délais avaient été ((respectpsar le Nicaragua en un sens formel»; il a
expliquéqu'El Salvadordemandait àla Chambre de rejeterla requêtedu
Nicaragua «non parce qu'elle nesatisfaitpàsquelqueexigencedeforme
du Règlement,maisparcequ'ellenesatisfaitpas aux exigencesdefond du
Statut».Il semblequ'ilsoitsoutenu quelarequêtedu Nicaragua n'estpas
une requête faite«en temps utile»,non seulement par elle-mêmem , ais
aussi parce que c'est tardivement qu'ont été soulevéee sn ses para-
graphes 23et 24des questions qui seraientperturbatrices au stadeoù en
estdéjàlaprocédure, etquela Chambre devraitexercerlepouvoir discré-
tionnaire qui est lesien de rejeter de cefait la requêteinelitis.
47. Dans sesobservationssurlarequêtedu Nicaragua àfin d'interven-
tion, El Salvadorexposeenfait un certain nombre d'objections contreles
questions soulevéesaux paragraphes 23et 24de cetterequête.Il soutient
que donner suite à l'intention déclarédu Nicaragua de demander «le
réagencementde la procédure écrite » constituerait une ((infraction au
Règlementdela Cour »etun «dénidesdroitsacquisaux Parties au diffé-
rend» et que cela «ferait naître une situation inéquitable, telleque le
Nicaragua setrouverait en position avantageuse vis-à-visdes Parties,qui
sesontdéjàengagéesdans lespiècesqu'ellesont déposées etauxquellesle
Nicaragua a ..accès».Lademandede ((reconstitutiondelaChambre par
rapport àsacompositionactuelle O,queleNicaragua entendaitprésenter,
est qualifiéepar El Salvador de ((prétentionsansprécédent e..extrava-
gante» dont l'acceptation {(violeraitdes principes fondamentaux du"would infringe Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute". Nicaragua's
proposa1that the Court should "exclude fromthe mandate ofthe Cham-
ber any powers of determination of the juridical situation of maritime
areas ... and, in effect, limitthe Chamber's mandate" to the land boun-
dary dispute is an "extraordinary request" which "can onlybe explained
bythe mistaken assumption that a Chamber isabodysubordinated to the
Court". Al1these matters are, in the view ofEl Salvador, "totally disrup-
tive of the orderly unfolding of the judicial process". El Salvador con-
cludesthat
"Al1these serious defectsinthe NicaraguanApplication, resulting
fromthe extravagantrequests itadvances, leadtothe necessaryrejec-
tion bythe Chamber ofsucha defectiveapplication.The Chamber is
not confronted here with a serious request for what the Court has
qualified as a 'genuineintervention'..."
At the hearings, El Salvador urged rejection of the Nicaraguan Applica-
tion because acceptance of it "would wreak havoc on the Parties to this
caseand wouldcreate an unconscionablesituation ofinterference,rather
than one of orderlyadvancement ofthe proceedings".
48. The Chamber ishereonlyconcernedto considerwhethertheobjec-
tions addressed by El Salvador to paragraphs 23and 24of that Applica-
tion would justify its rejection inlimine.Thispoint has to be considered
notwithstanding the fact that the Court has categorized the content of
those paragraphs as contingent on the decision whether or not to grant
permission to intervene,and Nicaraguahas made it clearthat it isnot
"putting at this moment before the Chamber any request that it re-
constitute itself or that it exclude from its own cornpetence ratione
materiaethose aspects ofthe casethat Nicaragua had requested that
the full Court exclude from the mandate of this Chamber" (para-
graph 42above).
49. A rejection of the Application on these grounds would only be
appropriate if the Chamber were to conclude that the inclusion of the
requests in paragraphs 23and 24of the originalApplicationinvalidated
the entireApplication.The Chamber does not howeverconsider that this
isthe case.
50. Finally, El Salvador relies on the fact that there has been "no dis-
cussionwhatsoeverbetween Nicaragua and either ofthe original Parties
regardingtheposition ofthe Gulf ofFonseca". Therefore,itisargued,it is
premature to bring such issues before the Chamber, and counter to the
established rule "that beforeproceedingsare brought in the Court, there
must be a defined dispute which ... has matured through the process of
negotiation between the parties".
51. The Chamber does not consider that there is any requirementfor
the definition of a disputein prior negotiationsbefore an applicationan
be made for permission to intervene.The function of intervention is, asdroit ».Modifierla constitution de la Chambre sansle consentement des
Parties «seraitcontraire àl'article26,paragraphe 2,du Statut».Lapropo-
sition du Nicaraguatendant àceque laCour ((exclue ..du mandat de la
Chambre tous pouvoirs de déterminationde la situation juridique des
espacesmaritimes ..et ..en fait..limite le mandat de la Chambre » au
différendsurla frontièreterrestreestune «demande extraordinaire »qui
«ne peut avoird'autre sourcequecetteidéefaussequ'une chambreestun
organe subordonné à la Cour». Pour El Salvador,toutes ces questions
((perturbent complètement le bon déroulement de la procédure judi-
ciaire».El Salvadorconclutque :
«Les graves défauts que présente ainsila requête du Nicaragua,
quidécoulentdel'extravagancede cesdemandes,amèneront néces-
sairementlaChambre àrejeterune requêteainsiviciée.LaChambre
n'estpas saisieicid'unerequêtesérieusv eisant cequelaCoura qua-
lifiéde«véritableintervention.»
A l'audience, El Salvador a demandé que la requêtedu Nicaragua soit
rejetéecar, si elle étaitaccueillie, elle ((porterait préjudice aux Parties
l'instance et créerait une situation inacceptable d'ingérence,et non une
situationpropice au bon déroulementde la procédure ».
48. La Chambre doitmaintenant seborner à sedemander siles objec-
tions qu'El Salvadoradresseauxparagraphes 23et24decetterequêteen
justifieraient le rejetliminelitis.C'estun point qu'elledoit considérer,
bien que la Cour ait dit que le contenu de cesparagraphes ne saurait être
examinéavantladécisionsur lepoint de savoir silarequête à fin d'inter-
ventiondoit êtreadmiseet quele Nicaraguaait précisé :
«nous ne soumettons aujourd'hui à la Chambre aucune demande
tendant àcequ'ellesereconstitue ouqu'elle excluedesapropre com-
pétence rationemateriaeles aspects de l'affaire dont le Nicaragua
avaitprié la Courplénière de dessaisirla Chambre »(paragraphe 42
ci-dessus).
49. Il ne conviendrait de rejeter la requête pources motifs que si la
Chambre concluait que la présence desdites demandes aux para-
graphes 23 et 24 de la requête originale invalidait entièrement cette
requête.La Chambrene considèretoutefoispas que ce soitle cas.
50. Enfin, ElSalvadorsefondesur lefaitqu'«il n'ya eudediscussions
d'aucune sorte entre le Nicaragua et l'une ou l'autre des Partiesinitiales
sur lasituation du golfede Fonseca ».Il estdèslorssoutenuqu'ilestpré-
maturé de porter detelles questions devant la Chambre et que cela est
contraire àlarèglebienétablieselonlaquelle«pour pouvoir engagerune
procédure devant la Cour, un différend défini doit existerqui ...a mûri
dans le cadre d'un processusde négociationentrelesparties ».
51. La Chambre ne considèrepas qu'un différenddoive êtredéfina iu
coursdenégociationspréalablespour qu'une requête àfin d'intervention
puisse êtreprésentée.Commeil a étéindiqué en 1984dans l'arrêt que laindicatedin the 1984Judgment onthe Application of Italyfor permission
to intemene in the case conceming the ContinentalShelf (LibyanArab
Jamahiriya/Malta), and as explained below, something wholly different
from the determination of a further dispute between the State seekingto
intemene and oneorboth oftheparties. Inthat Judgmentthe Courtfound
thatthatApplicationcould not begranted because, interalia,to giveeffect
to it "the Court would be calledupon ...to determinea dispute, or some
part of a dispute, between Italy and one orboth of the principal Parties"
(I.C.J.Reports1984,p.20,para.3 l),withouttheconsent ofthoseparties. It
would therefore be inappropriate to require, as a condition of intemen-
tion,the existenceof such a dispute,defined by prior negotiations.
52. AstheCourt has made clearinprevious cases(I.C.J.Reports1981,
p. 19,para. 33; I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 9,para. 13),in order to obtain per-
missionto intemene under Article62ofthe Statute,aStatehas to showan
interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the Court's decision
in the case, or that un intérêtd'ordjrueridique estpour lui en cause - the
criterion stated in Article 62. In the present case, Nicaragua has gone
further :citing the case conceming Monetaly GoldRemovedfrom Rome
in 1943(I.C.J. Reports 1954,p. 19),it has argued that its interestsare so
much part of the subject-matter of the case that the Chamber could not
properly exerciseitsjurisdiction withoutthe participation of Nicaragua.
It willbe convenient to examinethiscontention first.
53. In the view of Nicaragua,the decision in the Monetaly Goldcase
"emphasized the impropriety of exercisingjurisdiction in face of a sub-
stantial interest of athird State in the verysubject-matterofthe decision"
(Application,para. 12). During the oralproceedingsthe Agentof Nicara-
gua claimed,adapting to the present casethe terms of the decision in the
Monetas, Goldcase,that
"where ... the vital issueto be settledconcems the rights of Nicara-
gua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the waters outside it,the Court can-
not, without the consent of that third State, give a decision on that
issuebinding upon any State ...".
What is apparently being suggested is that in such circumstances the
failure of a third State to intemene, or even refusa1of a request for per-
missionto intemene, may deprive theCourt ofthe right with propriety to
exerciseajurisdiction conferredupon it by a specialagreement between
two other States.
54. In the Monetaly Golddecision,the Court was dealing withthe fol-
lowing argument (as reported in the Court's Judgment) which had been
addressed to it :Cour arendu surlarequêtedel'Italie à fin d'interventiondans l'affairedu
Plateau continental(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),et comme cela est
expliquéci-après,lerôledel'interventionn'estaucunementd'obtenir que
soittranchéunautredifférendentre 1'Etatdemandant àinterveniretl'une
desparties ou lesdeux. Dans cet arrêt,laCoura déclaré que larequêtene
pouvaitpas êtreadmise,notammentparce que «la Cour seraitappelée»,
pour donner effet à l'intervention, «à trancher un différend, ou un élé-
ment de différend,entre l'Italieet l'une oul'autre des Partiesprincipales
ou lesdeux»(C.Z.J.Recueil1984,p. 20,par. 3l), sans le consentement de
celles-ci. Il serait donc inapproprié d'exiger, comme condition d'une
intervention, l'existence d'un tel différend, définipar des négociations
préalables.
52. Ainsi que la Cour l'aprécisédans d'autres affaires (C.Z.J.Recueil
1981,p. 19,par. 33 ;C.Z.J.Recueil1984,p. 9,par. 13),pour être autorisé à
interveniren vertu de l'article 62du Statut,un Etat doit établirqu'ila an
interestofa legalnature whichmaybeaffectedbytheCourt'sdecisioninthe
caseou qu'un intérêtd'ordre juridique estpour lui en cause; tel estlecri-
tèreénoncé àl'article62.Enl'espèce,leNicaragua estalléplusloin :citant
l'affairedel'Ormonétairepris àRomeen1943(C.Z.J.Recueil1954,p. 19),il
a allégué que sesintérêtsfont à cepoint partie de l'objetde l'affaireque,
sans sa participation, la Chambre ne saurait exercer sa juridiction. Il
convient d'examiner cetteallégationenpremierlieu.
53. Selon le Nicaragua, il a étébien indiquédans la décisionrendue
dans l'affaire de l'Or monétaire«qu'il n'estpas convenableque la Cour
exerce la juridiction en présence d'un intérêt importand t'un Etat tiers
dans l'objet mêmede la décision)) (requête, par.12). Pendant les
audiences, l'agent du Nicaragua, adaptant les termes de la décisionren-
due en l'affairede l'Ormonétaire à laprésenteespèce,a soutenu que :
«là où ..la question essentielle à trancher a trai...aux droits du
Nicaragua dans le golfe de Fonseca et sur les eaux situéeshors de
celui-ci...la Cour ne peut, sans le consentement de cet Etat tiers,
rendre sur cette question une décisionqui soit obligatoire pour un
Etat..0
Il sembleen découlerqu'ende telles circonstances l'absence d'interven-
tion d'un Etat tiers, ou mêmele rejet d'une requête àfin d'intervention,
risque de priver la Cour du droit d'exercerdûment lajuridiction qu'elle
tient d'un compromisentredeux autres Etats.
54. Dans la décision qu'ellea rendue en l'affairede l'Or monétaire,la
Cour a examinéun argumentquiluiavaitétéprésentéq et 'ellea exposé
en cestermes dans sonarrêt : "It has been suggested that Albania might have intervened.The
provisionsofArticle62ofthe Statutegiveto athird State,whichcon-
siders that it 'hasan interest of a legalnature which rnaybe affected
by the decision in the case',the right to requestpermission to inter-
vene. It has been contended that the inclusion of the provisions for
interventionindicate that the Statute contemplates that proceedings
rnaycontinue,notwithstanding that athirdStaternayhavean interest
of a legalnature which might enable it to intervene. It is argued that
the fact that a third State, in this case Albania, rnay not choose to
interveneshould not make it impossiblefor the Court to givejudg-
ment on rights as between the Parties." (Z.C.J.Reports 1954,p. 32.)
The Court didnot rejectthiscontention; as wasto be expresslystatedin a
later Judgment, a State which considers that its legal interest rnay be
affectedby a decision in a casehasthe choice,to interveneor not to inter-
vene; and if itdoes not, proceedings rnaycontinue, and that State ispro-
tectedbyArticle59ofthe Statute(Z.C.J.Reports1984,p.26,para. 42).The
Court's reply inthe MonetaryGoldcase to the argument addressed to it
was as follows :
"Albaniahas not submittedarequest to the Courttobe permitted
to intervene. In the present case, Albania's legalinterests would not
only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-
matter of the decision.In such a case,the Statutecannot be regarded,
by implication, as authorizing proceedings to be continued in
the absence of Albania." (Loc.cit.,p. 32.)
Whatthen was "the verysubject-matter ofthe decision" inthat case?The
first submission in the Italian Application was
"(1) that the Governments of the French Republic,Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America should
deliver to Italy any share of the monetarygold that might be dueto
Albania under Part III ofthe Paris Act ofJanuary 14th,1946,inpar- ,
tialsatisfactionfor thedamagecausedtoItaly by theAlbanianlawof
January 13th,1945."(Z.C.J.Reports1954,p. 22,emphasisadded.)
Thus the circumstances ofthe Monetary Goldcase were such that a deci-
sion would determine a question of the international responsibility of
Albania vis-à-visItaly.Asthe Courtput it :
"To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania
without her consent would run counter to a well-established prin-
ciple of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, namely,
that the Court can onlyexercisejurisdiction overaStatewithitscon-
sent." (Z.C.J.Reports1954,p. 32.)
55. Thusthe Court's findingwasthat, whilethe presenceinthe Statute
ofArticle62mightimpliedlyauthorizecontinuance oftheproceedings in «On a fait valoir que l'Albanie aurait pu intervenir. Les disposi-
tions del'article62du Statutdonnent àun Etattiersqui «estime que,
dans undifférend,un intérêtd'ordrejuridique estpour luiencause»,
ledroit d'adresseràla Cour une requête.Il a étésoutenu quel'inser-
tion des dispositions relatives l'intervention montre que le Statut
prévoitla possibilitédecontinuer la procédure,bien qu'un Etattiers
puisse avoir un intérêt d'ordre juridique qui pourrait lui permettre
d'intervenir.Onsoutient quelefaitqu'unEtattiers,dans lecasactuel
l'Albanie,peut déciderde nepas intervenir,nedevraitpas empêcher
la Cour de statuer sur les droits des Parties.)) (C.I.J. Recueil1954,
p. 32.)
La Cour n'a pas rejetécette thèse; comme un arrêt ultérieur devait le
déclarerexpressémentq , uand un Etat estime que, dans un différend,un
intérêtd'ordrejuridique estpour luien cause,ilpeutsoitintervenir,soitne
pas intervenir; s'iln'intervient pas, la procédure peut continuer et il est
protégé par l'article59du Statut (C.I.J.Recueil1984,p. 26,par. 42).Dans
l'affaire de l'Ormonétaire,la Cour a répondu dansles termes ci-après a
l'argumentqui luiavaitétéprésent é
«L'Albanie n'apas adressé à la Cour de requête àfin d'interven-
tion.En l'espèce,lesintérêtsjuridiquesdel'Albanieseraientnonseu-
lementtouchéspar une décision,mais constitueraient l'objet même
de ladite décision.En pareil cas, le Statut ne peut être considéré
comme autorisant implicitementla continuation de la procédureen
l'absencede l'Albanie.»(Loc.cit.,p. 32.)
Quel était alors1'«objet mêmede ladite décision» en l'espèce?La pre-
mièreconclusionde la requêtede l'Italieétait ainsirédig:e
«1) que les Gouvernements de la République française, de la
Grande-Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord et des Etats-Unis d'Arné-
rique devront remettre à l'Italie la quote-part d'or monétaire, qui
reviendraitàl'Albanieauxtermesdelapartie III del'actedeParisdu
14janvier 1946,ensatisfactionpartielledesdommagescausés àl'Italie
par la loialbanaisedu 13janvier 1945.»(C.I.J. Recueil1954,p. 22.Les
italiquessont de la Chambre.)
Lescirconstances de l'affairede l'Ormonétaireétaientdonc telles qu'une
décisionaurait tranchéune question de responsabilitéinternationale de
l'Albanievis-à-visde l'Italie. CommelaCour l'adéclaré :
«Statuersur la responsabilitéinternationalede l'Albaniesansson
consentementseraitagir àl'encontred'un principe de droitinterna-
tional bien établietincorporédans le Statut,à savoirque laCour ne
peut exercer sa juridiction à l'égard d'unEtat si ce n'est avecle
consentement de cedernier.»(C.I.J. Recueil1954,p. 32.)
55. LaCour a doncjugéque,silaprésencedel'article62dans leStatut
pouvait autoriser implicitement la continuation de la procédureen l'ab- 116 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
the absence of a State whose "interests of a legal nature" might be
"affected", this did not justify continuance ofproceedingsin the absence
of a State whose international responsibilitywould be "the very subject-
matter ofthe decision". The Court did not need to decide what the posi-
tion would have been had Aibania applied for permission to intervene
under Article 62.
56. If in the present case the legal interests of Nicaragua would form
part of "the very subject-matter of the decision", as Nicaragua hassug-
gested, this would doubtless justify an intervention by Nicaragua under
Article 62 of the Statute, which lays down a less stringent criterion. The
question would then arise, however, whether such intervention under
Article 62 of the Statute would enable the Chamber to pronounce upon
the legalinterests of Nicaragua whichit issuggestedby Nicaragua would
formthe verysubject-matter ofthe decision.The Chamber willtherefore
first consider whetherNicaragua has shownthe existence of an "interest
ofa legalnature whichrnaybeaffectedbythe decision", soastojustify an
intervention; and ifsuch isthe case,willthen consider whetherthat inter-
est rnay in fact form "the very subject-matter of the decision" as did the
interests of Aibania in the case concerning MonetaryGoldRemovedfrom
Romein1943.
57. Article 62of the Statute contemplatesintervention on the basis of
an interest of a legalnature "which rnaybe affected bythe decision inthe
case". In the present case however,what is requested of theChamber by
the Special Agreement is not a decision on a single circumscribed issue,
but severaldecisionsonvarious aspectsofthe overalldispute betweenthe
Parties, as indicated in paragraphs30 to 33 above. The Chamber has to
consider the possible effect on legal interests asserted by Nicaragua
of its eventualdecision on each of the different issues which might fa11
to be determined,in order to define the scope of any intervention which
rnaybe found to bejustified under Article 62ofthe Statute.
58. If aStatecan satisfythe Courtthat ithasaninterestofalegalnature
which rnaybe affected by the decision in the case,it rnaybe permitted to
intervenein respect ofthat interest. Butthatoes not mean that the inter-
vening State isthen alsopermitted to make excursionsinto other aspects
of the case.This is recognizedby Nicaragua; it claims only that itsinter-
ests of a legal nature rnaybe affected by the decision of the Chamber on
the "legal situation of the islands and maritime spaces", but not by the
decision on the land frontier, and accordingly Statesin its Application
"that it has no intention of intervening inose aspects of the procedure
relatingto the land boundary whichisindispute between ElSalvadorand
Honduras" (Application, "Preliminary Statements"). Since the scope of
any permitted intervention has to be determined, the Chamber has to
consider the matters of the islands,the situation of the waters within thesence d'un Etat dont le's((intérêtsjuridiques risqueraient d'être«tou-
chés» parla décision, celane justifiait pas sa continuation en l'absence
d'un Etat dont la responsabilité internationale constituerait «l'objet
même deladite décision».La Cour n'avaitpasbesoin de décidercequise
serait produit si l'Albanie avaitprésenune requête àfin d'intervention
fondée surl'article62.
56. Si,dans laprésenteaffaire,lesintérêdts'ordrejuridique du Nicara-
gua faisaient partie de «l'objet mêmede la décision)),commecet Etat l'a
fait valoir,une intervention du Nicaragua en vertu de l'articleu Sta-
tut, qui énonceun critère moins rigoureux, se justifierait sans aucun
doute. Mais ils'agirait alorsde savoirsiune intervention de cettenature,
fondéesur l'article62du Statut,habiliterait la Chambre à statuer sur les
intérêts juridiquesdu Nicaragua, qui, selon cet Etat, constitueraient
l'objet même de la décision.La Chambre recherchera donc d'abord si le
Nicaragua a établil'existenced'un intérêt d'ordrjeuridique susceptible
d'êtreaffectéparla décisionetjustifiant l'intervention; sitel estle cas,la
Chambre recherchera ensuite si cet intérêt peut effectivementconstituer
((l'objetmême deladitedécision», àl'instar desintérêtdsel'Albaniedans
l'affairede l'OrmonétaireprisàRomeen 1943.
57. L'article62du Statutenvisagel'interventionsurlabased'un intérêt
d'ordre juridique susceptibled'êtraffectépar ladécisionenl'espèce.Or,
dans la présente affaire,ce que le compromis demande àla Chambre, ce
n'estpas une décisionsurun point unique et défini,mais plusieurs déci-
sions sur divers aspects du différend général qui opposeles Parties,
commeilestindiquéauxparagraphes 30 à33ci-dessus.LaChambre doit
considérerl'effetque chacune de ses éventuellesdécisionsrelatives aux
différents points susceptibles d'être tranchés peut avosirur les intérêts
juridiques invoquéspar le Nicaragua, afin de définirla portée de toute
intervention qui pourrait êtrejugéejustifiéeau regard de l'article62 du
Statut.
58. Siun Etat réussitàétablirde manière satisfaisantedevant la Cour
qu'ila un intérêt d'ordre juridique susceptibled'être affecpér la déci-
sionqui sera rendueen l'espèce,ilpeut être autoriséàintervenirpour les
besoins de cet intérêt. Mais ceae signifiepas que 1'Etatintervenant est
dès lorsaussiautoriséà s'étendresurd'autres aspectsdel'affaire.LeNica-
ragua lereconnaît; il soutient seulementque sesintérêts'ordrejuridique
risquent d'être affectépsar la décisionde la Chambre sur «la situation
juridique des îlesetdesespacesmaritimes »,maisnon parla décisionsur
la frontière terrestre,et il déclarepar conséquentdans sa requête«qu'il
n'entend pas intervenirdanslesaspectsdelaprocédureconcernantlafron-
tière terrestre enlitigeentre El Salvadoret le Honduras »(requête,«Ob-
servations préliminaires))). Puisqu'il importe de définir la portée de
toute interventionquiseraitautorisée,la ChambredoitexaminerlespointsGulf, the possible delimitation of the waters within the Gulf, the situa-
tion of the waters outside the Gulf, and the possible delimitation of the
waters outside the Gulf.
59. Whether al1of these matters are indeed raised by the wording of
Article2,paragraph 2,ofthe SpecialAgreementisitselfdisputed between
the Parties to the case. Accordingly,the list of matters to be considered
must inthisphase ofthe proceedingsbe entirelywithoutprejudice to the
meaning of Article 2, paragraph 2, as a whole, or of any of the terms as
used in that Article. The Chamber clearly cannot take any stand in the
present proceedings on the disputes between the Parties concerningthe
proper meaning of the Special Agreement: it must determine the ques-
tions raised by Nicaragua's Application while leaving these questions of
interpretation entirelyopen.
60. In itsApplication forpermissionto intervene,Nicaragua gavea list
(set out in paragraph 37above) of considerationssupporting its conten-
tionthat it has an interest of a legalnature which maybe affected by the
decision of the Chamber. No further or more specific indication was
givenin the Applicationeither ofthe legalinterest or interests claimedto
exist or of the way in which the future decision of the Chamber might
affect that interest. During the hearings, the Agent of Nicaragua
explained that
"In describingthe legalinterestsNicaragua wantstoprotectinthis
case,we have consideredit unnecessary to allege or claim a specific
rightinsidethe Gulf of Fonseca. It isenoughto indicate ...that both
Parties, among other questions that affect our interests, are asking
the Chamber to define or clarify the general or overall status of the
whole Gulf of Fonseca in which Nicaragua plainly has rights that
are evenrecognizedaccordingto their respective convenienceby the
Parties ... On the other hand, if the Chamber were to consider the
request of Honduras and proceeded to delimitthe waters inside the
Gulf, it is obvious from looking at any chart that no such delimita-
tion is possible without affecting our interests, if this delimitation
involvesthe whole ofthe Gulf of Fonseca."
61. There was in this connection some argumentbefore the Chamber
on the question ofthe extent of theburden of proof on a State seekingto
intemene: how far such a State needs to demonstrate the elements
required in order to satisfy Article 62. Nicaragua was ofthe viewthat it
need only show a "provisional standard of proof'; and that it would be
"inappropriate forthe applicant to gotoofaron the question ofthe valid-
ity ofthe interests it claims". TheParties to the casetook issuewiththese
arguments. In the Chamber's opinion, however,it is clear, first, that it is
for a State seeking to intervene to demonstrate convincingly what it
asserts,and thus to bear theburden ofproof; and, second,that ithas only
to show that its interest "may" be affected, not that it will or must be
affected.What needs to be shown by a State seekingpermission to inter-suivants:les îles, la situation des eaàl'intérieurdu golfe, la délimita-
tion éventuelledeseauxàl'intérieurdugolfe,lasituationdeseaux à l'exté-
rieurdu golfeet la délimitation éventuelledeseauxàl'extérieurdu golfe.
59. Laquestion de savoirsitous cespoints sont effectivementsoulevés
par le libellédu paragraphe 2 de l'articledu compromis est elle-même
litigieuseentrelesPartiesl'affaireA cestadedelaprocédure,lalistedes
points àexaminerdoit donc s'entendre sans préjudiceaucun du sens du
paragraphe 2 de l'article 2, dans son ensemble, ou de l'un quelconque
des termes utilisésdans cet article. Il est clair que la Chambre ne saurait
prendre position, dans la présente procédure,sur les différends entreles
Parties relatifs au sens attribuer au compromis: elle doit statuer sur
les questions soulevéespar la requête duNicaragua, tout en laissant ces
questionsd'interprétation entièrementen suspens.
60. Dans sarequête àfin d'intervention,leNicaragua adresséune liste
(reproduite au paragraphe 37ci-dessus)desconsidérationsqu'ilinvoque
àl'appui de son allégationselonlaquelleil a un intérêt'ordrejuridique
susceptibled'être affectpar la décisionde la Chambre. Aucune indica-
tion supplémentaireou plus précisen'aétédonnéedanlsa requête,nisur
l'intérêotu les intérêts d'ordre jurididont l'existence est alléguéen,i
surlamanièredont ladécisionfuture delaChambrerisque delesaffecter.
Pendant lesaudiences, l'agentdu Nicaragua a expliquécequi suit:
«En décrivantles intérêtsjuridiquesque le Nicaragua veut voir
protégerdans cette affaire, nous n'avonspas jugénécessaired'allé-
guer oude revendiquer un droit particulieràl'intérieurdu golfe de
Fonseca. Ilsuffitd'indique..quelesdeuxParties,entreautresques-
tionsaffectantnosintérêtsd,emandent àlaChambre dedéfiniroude
clarifier lestatutgénérluglobaldel'ensembledu golfede Fonseca
dans lequel le Nicaragua aàl'évidencedes droits qui sont d'ailleurs
reconnus àleurconvenance respectivepar lesParties ..D'autrepart,
si la Chambre examinait la demandedu Honduras et procédait à la
délimitation des eauxà l'intérieurdu golfe, il est évident,au vu de
n'importe quelle carte, qu'une délimitationportant sur l'ensemble
du golfede Fonsecaseraitimpossiblesans que nos intérête sn soient
affectés.
61. A ce propos la question de l'étenduede la charge de la preuve
qui incombe à l'Etat demandant à intervenir a été débattue devant la
Chambre: dans quelle mesure un tel Etat doit-il apporter la preuve des
éléments requisp,our se conformer à l'article62? Le Nicaragua a estimé
qu'ilétaitseulementtenudesatisfaire àun «critèreprovisoiredepreuve ))
etqu'ilserait«inappropriéquelerequérantailletrop loinsurlebien-fondé
des intérêtqsu'il allègue». Les Parties l'affaire ont contesté cesargu-
ments.De l'avisdela Chambre,ilestcependant clair,d'une part, quec'est
à 1'Etatqui demande àintervenird'établir de façon convaincantece qu'il
allègue etdoncdesupporter la chargede lapreuve,d'autrepart, qu'ildoit
seulementdémontrerquesonintérê «tpeut »êtreaffectéetnon qu'illesera
ou qu'illeseranécessairement.Ceque 1'Etatquidemande à intervenirdoit 118 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
vene can onlybejudged inconcret0and inrelation to al1thecircumstances
of a particular case. It is for the Statekingto intenene to identifythe
interestofalegalnature whichitconsidersmaybeaffectedbythe decision
inthe case,andto showinwhat waythat interestmaybeaffected;it isnot
forthe Court itself - or in the present casethe Chamber - to substitute
itselffor the Statein that respect.
62. Itneeds,moreover,toberecalledinthisconnection that thepresent
case raises a further problem, namely that the Parties to the case are in
dispute about the interpretation of the very provision of the Special
Agreement - paragraph 2ofArticle2 - whichisinvokedin Nicaragua's
Application. This means that the legal interests of Nicaragua have to be
assessed,in relation to the issuesinthe case,under two different possible
situations:an eventualfinding bythe Chamber infavour of ElSalvador's
view ofthe meaning of Article 2, paragraph 2; or an eventualfinding in
favour of the view of Honduras. This difficulty is not only one for the
Chamber inconsideringthepresentApplication - forobviously,asmen-
tioned above,itmustnotinany wayanticipateits decisionofthesematters
on the merits - but also for Nicaragua in framingits Application, even
thoughit wasgiven accessto the pleadings under Article 53,paragraph 1,
of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless,there needs finallyto be clearidenti-
fication of any legalinterests that maybe affected by thedecision on the
merits. Ageneralapprehension is not enough.The Chamber needs to be
told what interestsofa legalnature mightbeaffected byitseventual deci-
sion onthe merits.
63. Nicaragua has presented a particular argument whereby it would
apparently be dispensedfromproducing evidenceofthe existenceofthe
legalinterests on whichit relies,by reason ofthe assertions ofthe Parties.
Thisargumenthasat timesbeendenominated"equitableestoppel" and at
times "recognition"; initsclearestform itwasput forward atthe hearings
as follows :
"In the submissionofthe Government of Nicaraguathe assertions
offactand lawonthepart ofElSalvadorand Honduras inthecourse
ofthese proceedingsconstitute recognition ofthe existenceofmajor
legal interestspertaining to Nicaragua which form an inherent part
ofthe parce1oflegalquestionsplacedinfront ofthe Chamber bythe
SpecialAgreement."
So far as Nicaragua relies on estoppel,the Chamber will only saythat it
seesno evidenceof someessentialelementsrequired by estoppel :a state-
ment or representationmade byone party to another and relianceupon it
bythat otherparty to his detriment orto the advantage ofthe party mak-
ing it. The indications to be found in the pleadings of the views ofthe
Parties as to the existence or nature of Nicaraguan interests within or
without the Gulf, no doubt amount to someevidencewhichthe Chamber
can take into account. None of these howeveramounts to an admission,
recognition orstatementthat,inthe view ofthe Partyconcerned,thereareétablirne peut êtreappréciq éue concrètementet que par rapport à toutes
les circonstances de l'espèce. C'est à 1'Etatdésireux d'intervenirqu'il
appartient d'identifierl'intérêdt'ordrejuridique considérépar luciomme
susceptibled'être affectépar la décision rendreen l'espèce etdemontrer
enquoicetintérêtrisqued'êtreaffecté;laCo ele-même - ouenl'occur-
rence la Chambre - n'apas àcet égardàsesubstituer àcet Etat.
62. De plus, il importe de rappelerà cepropos que la présente affaire a
pose un autre problème :les Parties sont en litigeau sujet de l'interpréta-
tion de la disposition mêmedu compromis - le paragraphe 2 de
l'article 2- qui est invoquéedans la requête duNicaragua. Autrement
dit, lesintérêtsjuridiquesdu Nicaragua doivent être évalué psarrapport
aux points litigieuxen l'espècedans deux situations possibles,selon que
la Chambre retiendra en définitivel'interprétation qu'El Salvadod ronne
du paragraphe 2 de l'article 2 ou celle qu'en donne le Honduras. Cette
difficulténe seprésentepas seulement àla Chambre lors de l'examende
la requête (commeil a été signaléplus haut, la Chambre ne doit évidem-
mentpréjugerenriensadécisionaufond surcesaspects);leNicaragua l'a
aussirencontréeen rédigeantsa requête,bienqu'ilait pu avoiraccèsaux
piècesde procédure envertude l'article 53, paragraphe 1,du Règlement
delaCour. Iln'enfautpas moins,enfin decompte,déterminernettement
les intérêts juridiques susceptibles d'être affectpéasr la décisionsur le
fond. Ilnesuffitpas des'enfaireuneidéegénérale Il.faut quelaChambre
soit informée des intérêts juridiques qui risquent d'être affectpé as sa
décisionfinalesur le fond.
63. LeNicaragua a présentéun argument qui sembleraitle dispenser,
en raison de l'attitude des Parties, d'apporter la preuve de l'existence
des intérêts juridiquesqu'il invoque. Cet argument a étéqualifié par-
fois d'«estoppeld'équité » et parfois de «reconnaissance» ; c'est lors
des audiences qu'il a été le plus clairement exposéd,ans les termes sui-
vants :
«Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua considère que les assertions
portant sur lesfaitsetle droit qui ont éémisespar El Salvadoret le
Honduras dans cette affaire valent reconnaissance de l'existence
d'intérêts d'ordrjeridique majeursqui appartiennent au Nicaragua
etquifontpartie intégrantedel'ensembledesquestions dedroit sou-
mises à la Chambre par le compromis.»
Dans la mesure où le Nicaragua se fonde sur l'estoppel,la Chambre se
bornera à dire que quelques éléments essentiels requispour qu'il y ait
estoppelne lui semblent pas avoir été établis, à savoir une déclaration
qu'une partie a faite à une autre partie ou une position qu'elle a prise
enverselleetlefaitquecetteautrepartie s'appuiesurcettedéclarationou
position àson détriment ou àl'avantagede la partie qui l'afaite ou prise.
Les indications que fournissent les écrituresquant aux vues des Parties
sur l'existenceou la nature des intérêtsdu Nicaragua à l'intérieurou à
l'extérieurdu golfeconstituent sans aucundoute des éléments de preuveinterests of Nicaragua such that they may be affected by the decision of
the Chamber in the case.
64. TheChamber willnowturn to consideration ofthe severalspecific
issuesinthe casewhichmay cal1fordecision,asindicatedinparagraph 58
above,inorder to determinewhetherithasbeenshown that suchdecision
may affecta Nicaraguan interest of a legalnature.
65. Sofar asthe decision requested ofthe Chamber bythe Parties isto
determine the legalsituation ofthe islands,itisnot clearwhetherNicara-
gua has advanced, or now maintains,a contention that its legal interests
maybe directlyaffected bythe decision ofthe Chamber asto sovereignty
overindividual islands.Nicaraguareferred initsApplication tothetitle of
the SpecialAgreementandto Article 2,paragraph 2,thereof, which refer
both to the islands andto the maritimespaces (Quedetenninelasituacion
juridica insulary de losespaciosmaritirnos).During the hearings,counsel
for Nicaragua stated that, Nicaragua's sovereignty overthe Farallones
being expresslyrecognizedby the Parties,Nicaragua has in principle no
direct interest in the determination of the legal situation of the other
islands in the Gulf. It was however also stated on behalf of Nicaragua
during the hearingsthat, insofar as the decision concerning sovereignty
over the islands might have repercussionson a decision concerning deli-
mitation of the waters of the Gulf, Nicaragua is legitimatelyand directly
interested in the islands as a circumstance of possible relevance for the
delimitation of maritime areas within and withoutthe Gulf.
66. TheChamber concludesthat,insofarasthedisputerelates to sover-
eigntyoverthe islands, it should not grant permission for intervention by
Nicaragua,inthe absence of any Nicaraguan interest liableto be directly
affected by a decision onthat issue.Anypossible effectsofthe islandsas
relevantcircumstancesfordelimitation ofmaritimespaces fa11to be con-
sidered in the context of the question whether Nicaragua should be per-
mittedtointerveneonthebasisofalegalinterestwhichmaybeaffectedby
a decision on the legal situation of the waters of the Gulf. The Chamber
therefore turns tothat question.
67. It is ElSalvador's casethat, as between El Salvador,Honduras and
Nicaragua, there exists "a régimeof community, CO-ownershipor jointdont la Chambre peut tenir compte. Aucune n'équivautcependant à un
acquiescement, àunereconnaissanceou àunedéclarationd'oùrésulterait
que, selon la Partie intéressée, des intérêts du Nicaragua risqueraient
d'être affectépsar une décisionrenduepar la Chambreen l'espèce.
64. La Chambrepasse maintenant à l'examen desquelques questions
pouvant appeler une décisionen l'espèce, comme ilest indiquéau para-
graphe 58ci-dessus,envuededéterminers'ilaétéétabliquecettedécision
risque d'affecterun intérêtjuridique duNicaragua.
65. La décisionque les Parties demandent à la Chambre consiste
notamment à déterminerlasituationjuridique desîles,maison nevoitpas
clairement, àcet égard,sile Nicaragua a allégué,u allèguemaintenant,
quesesintérêtsjuridiques risquentd'êtredirectementaffectéspar ladéci-
sionquelaChambrerendra au sujetdelasouverainetésurtelleoutelleîle.
Dans sarequête,le Nicaragua s'estréféré au titre du compromis etàson
article2, paragraphe 2, qui mentionnent à la fois les îles et les espaces
maritimes (Quedetenninelasituacibnjuridicainsularydelosespaciosmari-
timos).Seloncequ'a déclaréun conseildu Nicaragua àl'audience,lasou-
verainetéde cet Etat sur les Farallonesétant expressémentreconnuepar
les Parties, ce dernier n'apas en principe d'intérêt directétermina-
tiondelasituationjuridique desautres îlesdu golfe.Toutefoisceconseila
aussidéclaré àl'audience que,dans la mesure où la décisionrelativà la
souverainetésurlesîles pourrait serépercutersurune décisionrelativeà
ladélimitationdeseauxdu golfe,leNicaragua estlégitimementetdirecte-
mentintéresséaux îlesentant quecirconstanceéventuellementpertinente
pourla délimitationd'espacesmaritimessitués àl'intérieur etàl'extérieur
du golfe.
66. La Chambrearrive àla conclusionque, dansla mesure où lediffé-
rend concerne la souveraineté surles îles, elle ne doit pas accorder au
Nicaragua l'autorisation d'intervenir, en l'absence de tout intérêcete
Etat susceptible d'êtredirectementaffectépar une décisionsurce point.
Leseffetséventuelsdesîles,entant que circonstancespertinentes pourla
délimitationdes espacesmaritimes, devront être examinés dans le cadre
delaquestiondesavoirsileNicaraguadoitêtreautorisé àintervenirsur la
base d'unintérêtjuridique susceptibled'être affectarune décisionrela-
tiveà la situationjuridique des eaux du golfe. La Chambre aborde donc
maintenant cettequestion.
67. Selon El Salvador, il existe entre El Salvador, le Honduras et le
Nicaragua «un régimedecommunauté,decopropriétéou de cosouverai- 120 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
sovereignty"oversuchofthe watersofthe Gulf of Fonseca "as lieoutside
the areaofexclusivejurisdiction", an "objectivelegalrégime"onthe basis
of the 1917Judgement of the Central American Court of Justice. The
nature of that régime,as conceived by the Central American Court,
appears sufficientlyfor present purposes fromthe extractsfromthe 1917
Judgement inparagraphs 27and 28above.Onthat basis, ElSalvadorcon-
sidersthatthe juridical situation ofthe Gulf does not permit the dividing
up ofthe watersheld in condominium. El Salvadoralso contends thatthe
SpecialAgreementdoes not conferjurisdiction to effectany such delimi-
tation.
68. Honduras on the other hand contends, interalia,
- that "the Gulf sspecificgeographicalsituation createsa specialsitua-
tion between the riparian States which generates a community of
interests" which in turn "calls for a special legal régimeto determine
theirmutual relations" ;
- that the community of interests "does not mean integration and the
abolition ofboundaries" but, on the contrary,"the cleardefinition of
thoseboundaries asacondition ofeffectiveCO-operation" ;
- that eachofthe three riparian States"has an equalright to aportion of
theinternal waters";
- that the maritime spaces to be delimited have "the status of internal
watersbecausethe Gulf ofFonsecaisan historicbay" ;but that never-
thelessitwouldnotbe correct "to rule outthe application to suchdeli-
mitation oftheprinciples and rulesthat havegraduallybeenidentified
in international case-law overthe past twenty years" forthe delimita-
tion ofmaritimespaces.
69. Honduras considersthat Nicaraguahasdemonstrated a legalinter-
est whichwould be affected by the decision on the question whether the
watersofthe Gulfaresubjectto acondominium,observingthat itisincon-
ceivable that the waters could be a condominium as regards two of the
riparian States,but not as regards the third. It therefore does not oppose
an intervention limited to the protection of Nicaragua's legal interest in
this question.
70. ElSalvador, however, denies that Nicaragua has a case for inter-
vention even in thismatter. It arguesthatthe Chamber isnot called upon
"to attribute to the waters of the Gulf an objective legal régimevalid
erga omnesand thereby applicable to Nicaragua without its havingbeen
able to make its voice heard"; and that the question to be decided is
whether the régimeof a condominium,
"which wasdeclaredapplicablebetween El Salvadorand Nicaragua
in a Court decision having the force of resjudicata between the two
countries, can be regarded as applicable to Honduras. Whatever
decision the Chamber reaches on this issuethejuridical situation of
Nicaragua will remain unchanged, in its relations both with El Sal-
vador and with Honduras."neté»sur leseauxdu golfede Fonseca «qui sontendehors de la zonede
juridiction exclusive», «un régimejuridique objectif» sur la base de
l'arrêt de1917de la Cour de justice centraméricaine.La nature de ce
régime,tel que le concevaitlaCour dejustice centraméricaine,sedégage
suffisamment,auxfinsprésentes,desextraitsdel'arrêt de 1917reproduits
aux paragraphes 27et 28 ci-dessus.Sefondant sur cet arrêt,El Salvador
estime que la situationjuridique du golfe n'autorise pas un partage des
eaux possédées en condominium. 11soutientaussi que le compromis ne
donne pas compétencepour effectuerune telle délimitation.
68. Pour sa part, le Honduras soutientnotamment:
- que «les circonstances géographiques propres ...[au golfe] engen-
drententre lesEtatsriverainsune situationparticulière créatrice d'une
communautéd'intérêts »qui, àsontour, «impose un régimejuridique
particulier pour définirleursrapportsmutuels» ;
- que «la communautéd'intérêtc s, n'estpasl'intégration, elt'abolition
des frontières)),mais au contraire «la claire définition de celles-ci,
commeconditiond'une coopérationefficace »;
- que chacundestroisEtatsriverains «possèdeun droit égal à une por-
tion deceseauxintérieures » ;
- que lesespacesmaritimes à délimiterrelèventdu «statut des eauxin-
térieures puisque legolfe de Fonseca est une baie historique »,mais
qu'il n'enserait pas moins incorrect «d'écarter l'application à cette
délimitation des principes et règlesdégagés progressivementpar la
jurisprudence internationale des vingt dernières années » en matière
dedélimitationdesespacesmaritimes.
69. LeHonduras estimequeleNicaraguaadémontréqu'ilaun intérêt
juridique quiseraitaffectépar la décisionsurlepointde savoirsileseaux
du golfesont soumisesàun condominium;ilfaitobserver qu'il estincon-
cevable que les eaux du golfe puissent faire l'objet d'un condominium
pour deux des Etats riverains, mais non pour le troisième.Il ne s'oppose
donc pas à une intervention qui se limiteraità la protection de l'intérêt
juridique du Nicaragua relatif àcettequestion.
70. En revanche El Salvador nie que le Nicaragua puisse justifier sa
demande d'intervention mêmeàcepropos. Il faitvaloirque la Chambre
n'est pas appelée «à attribuer aux eaux du golfe un régimejuridique
objectifvalable ergaomnesetapplicable àcetitre au Nicaraguasans qu'il
ait pu faire entendre sa voix», et que la questionàtrancher est celle de
savoirsile régimede condominium,
«qui a été déclaré applicable entrE el Salvador et le Nicaragua par
une décisiondejustice ayantforce de resjudicataentre lesdeuxpays
peut êtreregardé commeapplicable au Honduras, Or,quellequesoit
ladécisionquelaChambreprendra surceproblème,lasituationjuri-
dique du Nicaragua resterainchangée,que cesoit dans sesrapports
avec El Salvador ou dans sesrapports avecle Honduras. » 71. The Chamber however notes that El Salvador in its pleadingshas
specificallyclaimedthe existenceofan "objectivelegalrégime"ofcondo-
minium in the waters of the Gulf (paragraph 67above). Further, the fact
that this régimewas found to be applicable by the Central American
Court of Justice in a case in which Nicaragua was the respondent party,
appearsto the Chamberto reinforceNicaragua'sassertion ofalegalinter-
estwhichmaybe affected by any decisioninthis matter. Asappears from
the above quotation, El Salvador'sargumentstarts from the proposition
that the 1917Judgement of the Central American Court is resjudicata
between El Salvadorand Nicaragua.The Chamber hasnoted above(par-
agraph 28)that in 1917Nicaraguainformedthe States ofCentral America
that it did not accept that Judgement.That very question of res judicata,
even though not directly in issue before the Chamber since El Salvador
doesnot contend that Honduras wasaparty tothecaseand assuchbound
by the decision,underlies the asserted opposability of the Judgement to
Honduras, sothat a decisionon suchopposabilitymayaffectthe interests
of Nicaragua.
72. Quite apart fromthe question ofthe legalstatus ofthe 1917Judge-
ment, however,the fact is that El Salvador now claimsthat the waters of
the Gulf are subject to a condominium of the coastal States, and has
indeed suggested that that régime"would in any case have been appli-
cable to the Gulf under customary international law". Nicaragua has
referred to the fact that Nicaragua plainly has rights in the Gulf of Fon-
seca,the existenceof which isundisputed, and contends that
"The condominium, ifit is declared to be applicable, would by its
very nature involve three riparians, and not only the parties to the
SpecialAgreement."
Inthe opinion ofthe Chamber,thisisasufficientdemonstration byNicar-
agua that it has aninterest of a legalnature inthe determinationwhether
or notthis isthe régime governingthe waters ofthe Gulf: the verydefini-
tion ofacondominiumpointstothisconclusion.Furthermore,a decision
in favour of some of the Honduran theses would equallybe such as may
affectlegalinterests of Nicaragua.The "community ofinterests" whichis
the starting-point of the arguments of Honduras is a community which,
like the condominium claimed by El Salvador, embraces Nicaragua as
one of the three riparian States, and Nicaragua must therefore be inter-
estedalsoin that question.Nicaragua contends that in this respect
"any decisiontaken bythe Chamber - whether indecidinginfavour
of one Party orthe other orby decidingotherwise - isnecessarily a
decision whose very subject-matter would be the determination of
the rights of the threeiparian Statesin respect of the Gulf of Fon-
seca,and of the waters outside the Gulf".
The Chamber, therefore, finds that Nicaragua has shown to the Cham- 71. La Chambre relèvenéanmoins que,dans sesécritures,El Salvador
a expressémentaffirmé l'existence d'un ((régimejuridique objectif)) de
condominium sur les eaux du golfe (paragraphe 67 ci-dessus).Il semble
en outre àla Chambre que lefait que laCour dejustice centraméricainea
jugéque cerégimes'appliquait, dans une affaire où le Nicaragua étaitla
partie défenderesse, renforce l'invocationpar le Nicaragua d'un intérêt
juridique susceptibled'être affectpartoute décisionquiseraitrendueen
la matière. Comme il ressort de la citation qui précède, l'argument
d'El Salvadorsupposeque l'arrêd t e 1917de la Cour dejusticeentramé-
ricaineal'autoritédela chosejugéedans lesrelationsentre El Salvadoret
le Nicaragua. La Chambre a déjàrelevé(paragraphe 28 ci-dessus)qu'en
19 17le Nicaragua a informéles Etats d'Amérique centralequ'iln'accep-
tait pas cet arrêt. Cette questionde l'autoritéde la chosejugée,quoique
n'étant pas directementen litigedevant la Chambre puisque El Salvador
nesoutientpasque leHonduras étaitpartie àl'affaireetliéàcetitrepar la
décision,sous-tendl'opposabilité allégué del'arrêatu Honduras, sibien
qu'une décisionrelative àcetteopposabilité pourrait affecterlesintérêts
du Nicaragua.
72. Or,indépendammentdelaquestion du statutjuridique del'arrêd te
1917, ElSalvador n'en soutient pas moins maintenant que les eaux du
golfe sont soumises àun condominium des Etats riverains, et il a même
donné à entendre que ce régime((aurait étéapplicable en tout étatde
causeaugolfeenvertu dudroit international coutumier ».LeNicaragua a
mentionné le fait qu'àl'évidenceil a, dans le golfede Fonseca,des droits
dont l'existence estincontestée,et il a soutenu que
«le condominium, s'il est déclaré applicable,met en cause, par sa
nature mêmet,roisEtatsriverains etnon pas seulementlesparties au
compromis ».
De l'avis de la Chambre, le Nicaragua a ainsi suffisamment démontré
qu'ila un intérêt d'ordre juridiquefairevaloirfaceà une décisionsur le
point de savoirsitel estou non le régimeapplicable auxeaux du golfe:la
définitionmêmedu condominium conduit àcette conclusion. Qui plus
est,une décisionfavorable àcertainesdesthèsesdu Honduras seraitaussi
de nature à affecter des intérêtsjuridiquesdu Nicaragua. La «commu-
nautéd'intérêts », qui forme le point de départ de l'argumentation du
Honduras, est une communauté qui, àl'égaldu condominium invoqué
par ElSalvador,inclut leNicaragua entant qu'undestroisEtatsriverains,
sibien que la question doit revêtiraussi un intérêptour le Nicaragua. Le
Nicaragua allèguequ'à cet égard
((toute décisionque prendra la Chambre - que ce soit en faveur
d'une Partie oude l'autre ou enstatuant autrement estnécessaire-
mentune décisiondont l'objetmême seraladéterminationdesdroits
des trois Etats riverains dans le golfe de Fonseca et sur les eaux
situéesàl'extérieurde ce dernier».
En conséquence, la Chambre conclut que le Nicaragua a démontréde122 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JAS)GMENT)
ber'ssatisfactionthe existence of an interest of a legalnature which may
be affected by itsecision on these questions; andthat this is so notwith-
standing the fact that, as its Agent explained at the opening hearing,
Nicaragua has "considered it umecessary to allege or claim a specific
rightinsidethe Gulf of Fonseca".
73. Onthe otherhand, whilethe Chamber isthus satisfiedthat Nicara-
gua has a legal interest which may be affected by the decision of the
Chamber onthequestionwhether ornotthe watersofthe Gulf ofFonseca
are subject to a condominium or a "community of interests" ofthe three
riparian States,itcannotacceptthecontention ofNicaraguathatthe legal
interest of Nicaragua "would fom the very subject-matter of the deci-
sion", in the sense in which that phrase was used in the case conceming
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943to describe the interests of
Albania (seeparagraphs 52-56above).Sofar asthe condominium is con-
cemed,the essentialquestionin issuebetweenthe Parties isnotthe intrin-
sic validity of the 1917Judgement of the Central American Court of
Justice as between the parties to the proceedings in that Court, but the
opposability to Honduras, which was not such a Party, either of that
Judgement itself or of the régimedeclared by the Judgement.Honduras,
while rejectingthe opposability to itself of the 1917Judgement,oes not
ask the Chamber to declare it invalid. If Nicaragua is permitted to inter-
vene, the Judgment to be given by the Chamber will not declare, as
between Nicaragua and the other two States,that Nicaragua does or does
not possessrightsunder acondominium inthe waters ofthe Gulfbeyond
itsagreeddelimitationwith Honduras,but merelythat, asbetween El Sal-
vador and Honduras,the régimeofcondominiumdeclared bytheCentral
American Court is or is not opposable to Honduras. It isrue that a deci-
sionofthe Chamber rejecting El Salvador'scontentions, and finding that
there is no condominiumin the waters of the Gulf which is opposable to
Honduras, would be tantamount to a finding that there is no condomi-
nium at all. Similarly,afinding that there isnoch "community ofinter-
ests" as is claimed by Honduras, between El Salvador and Honduras in
their capacity asriparian States of the Gulf, would be tantamount to a
finding that there isnouch "community ofinterests" inthe Gulf at all.In
eitherevent,suchadecisionwouldtherefore evidentlyaffectaninterestof
a legal nature of Nicaragua; but even so that interest would not be the
"verysubject-matterofthe decision" inthe waythat the interests ofAlba-
nia were in the case concerning Monetary Gold Removed from Romr in
1943. As explained above (paragraph 56), it follows from this that the
question whetherthe Chamber would have power to take a decision on
these questions,without the participation of Nicaragua in the proceed-
ings,does not arise;but thatthe conditionsfor an interventionby Nicara-
gua inthis aspect ofthe casearenevertheless clearlyfulfilled.manièresatisfaisantel'existenced'un intérêtd'ordrejuridique susceptible
d'être affectpar sadécisionsur cesquestions,et ce,quoique, commeson
agent l'a expliquéà la première audience, le Nicaragua n'ait «pas jugé
nécessaired'alléguer oude revendiquer des droits particuliers à l'inté-
rieur du golfede Fonseca ».
73. Parailleurs,bien qu'illuiaitainsiétédémontrd éemanièresatisfai-
sante que le Nicaragua a un intérêt d'ordre juridique susceptible d'être
affectépar la décisionqu'ellerendra sur lepoint de savoir si les eaux du
golfe de Fonseca sont ou non soumises à un condominium ou à une
((communautéd'intérêts »destroisEtats riverains,laChambrenesaurait
accueillirl'allégationdu Nicaragua d'après laquellel'intéjtridique de
cet Etat constituerait ((l'objet mêmede ladite décision)),au sens où ces
termes ont étéemployésdans l'affaire de l'Or monétairepris à Rome en
1943pour décrireles intérêtd se l'Albanie(voir paragraphes 52à 56ci-
dessus). En ce qui concerne le condominium, le fond du litige entre les
Partiesn'estpaslavaliditéintrinsèquedel'arrêd te1917delaCour dejus-
tice centraméricainedans les relations entre les parties'affaireportée
devant elle,mais l'opposabilitéau Honduras, qui n'yétait pas partie, de
cetarrêltui-mêmeoudurégimequiyestdéclaréapplicable. Le Honduras,
tout en niant que l'arrêtde1917lui soitopposable, ne demande pas àla
Chambre d'enprononcer la nullité.Sile Nicaragua estautorisé à interne-
nir, l'arrêt que rendrala Chambre ne déclarera pas, pour ce qui est des
rapports entre cet Etat et lesdeuxautres,queleNicaraguapossèdeou ne
possèdepas,surleseauxdu golfesituéesau-delàdeladélimitationconve-
nue avecle Honduras, de droits découlant du condominium, mais seule-
mentque,dans lesrapports entre ElSalvadoret leHonduras, lerégimede
condominiumdéclarépar la Cour dejustice centraméricaineest ou non
opposable au Honduras.Certes, silaChambredécidaitderejeterlesallé-
gations d'El Salvador et de conclure qu'il n'existepas, sur les eaux du
golfe, de condominium opposable au Honduras, cela reviendrait à
conclure qu'iln'ya pas de condominiumdu tout. De mêmej,uger que la
«communautéd'intérê» tsdont seréclameleHonduras n'existepas entre
El Salvador et le Honduras en leur qualité d'Etats riverains du golfe
reviendrait àjuger qu'iln'yapas dutout de ((communautéd'intérê» tsde
cegenre dans legolfe.Dans un cas commedans l'autre,la décisionaffec-
terait donc évidemmentun intérêd t'ordrejuridique du Nicaragua; mais
mêmeainsi cet intérêtne constitueraitpas ((l'objemt êmede ladite déci-
sion», comme l'étaientles intérêts de l'Albanie dans l'affaire de l'Or
monétairepris à Rome en1943.De cela résulte,ainsi qu'il a été expliqué
(paragraphe 56ci-dessus),que la question de savoirsila Chambre aurait
lepouvoir de statuersur cesquestionssanslaparticipation du Nicaragua
à l'instancenese posepas, mais que les conditions d'uneintervention du
Nicaragua sur cet aspect de l'affairen'en sontpas moins manifestement
remplies. 74. Ifthe Chamber werenot satisfied that there isacondominium over
the waters of the Gulf of such a kind as to exclude any delimitation, it
might then be calledupon, ifit weresatisfied that ithasjurisdiction to do
so,to effectadelimitation.The Chamber hastherefore atthe present stage
to considerwhethera decision asto delimitation ofthe waters ofthe Gulf
might affect an interest of a legal nature appertaining to Nicaragua, in
order to determinewhetherNicaragua mightbe permitted to intervenein
respect of this aspect of the case also. Ites not, however,have to con-
siderthe possible effecton Nicaragua'sinterestsof everypossibledelimi-
tation which might bearrived at; it isforthe State seekingto interveneto
showthat itsinterestsmightbe affectedbyaparticular delimitation, orby
delimitationin general.Honduras has already indicated in its pleadings
how,in itsview,the delimitationshouldbe effected.El Salvador,consist-
entlywithitsposition,hasnotindicatedits viewson possiblelinesofdeli-
mitation. Nicaragua, for its part, has not given any indication of any
specificline of delimitation which it considers would affect its interests.
75. Honduras contends that Nicaragua has demonstrated no legal
interest whichmaybe affected by a decision on a delimitationline within
the Gulf as between Honduras and El Salvador. It observesthat
"Such a delimitationline isproposed by Honduras, not by El Sal-
vador, and the Honduran proposa1iscarefulto avoidany encroach-
ment into areas within the Gulf which might be claimed by Nicara-
gua. Moreover,whatevertheHonduran proposa1mightbe,the Court
itselfhas al1the powers necessaryto ensurethat anyline ofdelimita-
tion whichitmightdrawwouldnot betotheprejudice ofNicaragua's
interests."
Atthe hearings it was explainedthat, forthe delimitationclaimed,
"Honduras has proposed a method which divides the Gulf into a
western and eastern section ... It has been the aim of Honduras to
confine the relevant area for the purposes of a delimitation with
El Salvadorto the western sector of the Gulf."
Honduras relied on what it asserted to bethe reasonableassumptionthat
"there canbenojustifiable claimbyNicaragua to anypart ofthewatersof
this western sector". This argument was, in counsel's contention, re-
inforced by the fact that "as between Honduras and Nicaragua, the
waters of the Gulf are in large part already delimited" by the900Com-
mission, whichdelimitation would debar Nicaragua from making claims
in the westernhalf of the Gulf. El Salvadoralsocontends that if, contrary
to its own arguments on the competence of the Chamber under the
Special Agreement,the Chamber proceeds to effecta delimitation, 74. S'ilneluiétaitpas démontré demanièresatisfaisantequ'ilexisteun
condominiumsur leseaux du golfe,tel qu'ilexcluetoute délimitation,la
Chambre pourrait être amenée à effectuer une délimitation,pour autant
qu'elle s'estimeraitcompétente à cet effet. A ce stade, la Chambre doit
donc recherchersiunedécisionrelative àladélimitationdeseauxdu golfe
risquerait d'affecter un intérêt'ordre juridique du Nicaragua, et cela
pour déterminersileNicaraguapourraitêtreautoriséàintervenirdans cet
aspect de l'affaire aussi. Maisla Chambre n'apas àexaminerquelpour-
raitêtrel'effetsurlesintérêtdsu Nicaragua detoutedélimitationpossible
à laquelle on pourrait parvenir. C'est à 1'Etatdemandant à intervenir
d'établirque sesintérêtspourraient êta rffectéspar une délimitationpar-
ticulière,ou par toute délimitationengénéralD. ans sesécritures,leHon-
duras a déjàindiqué commentilfaudrait procéder àla délimitationselon
lui. Fidèleà sa position, El Salvador n'a pas fait part de ses vues sur
d'éventuelles lignesde délimitation. Le Nicaragua, pour sa part, n'a
donné d'indication sur aucune ligne de délimitation particulière qui,
d'aprèslui, affecterait sesintérêts.
75. Le Honduras soutient que le Nicaragua n'a démontrél'existence
d'aucun intérêtjuridique susceptiblde'êtreaffectépar unedécisionrela-
tiveà une ligne de délimitationentrele Honduras et El Salvador dans le
golfe.Il fait observer ce:i
«La délimitationest proposéepar le Honduras, mais non par
El Salvador, et dans sa proposition le Honduras prend bien garde
d'évitertout empiétementsurdes zones du golfequi pourraient être
revendiquéespar leNicaragua. Deplus,quelquesoit lecontenude la
proposition du Honduras, la Cour elle-même a les pouvoirs qui lui
permettent deveilleràceque la délimitation à laquelle elleprocéde-
rait éventuellementne porte pas préjudice aux intérêts du Nicara-
gua.B
A l'audience, il a été expliqué quep,our la délimitation demandée,le
Honduras propose
«une méthodequi divise le golfe en un secteur ouest et un secteur
est..Le Honduras vise à limiterla régionpertinente aux fins de la
délimitationavecEl Salvadorau secteurouest du golfe.»
Le Honduras se fonde sur ce qu'ilaffirme être une supposition raison-
nable, àsavoirque «le Nicaragua ne peut faire valoir aucune revendica-
tionjustifiable sur une partie quelconque des eaux de ce secteurouest.
Selon le conseil du Honduras, cet argument est d'autant plus fort que,
((entreleHonduras et leNicaragua, leseaux du golfesontengrande par-
tiedéjàdélimitée» s par la commission de 1900et que cettedélimitation
empêcheraitle Nicaragua de formulerdes revendications dansla moitié
ouest du golfe. El Salvador soutient aussi que, si la Chambre effectuait
une telle délimitation, contrairement à ce qu'il allègue au sujet de la
compétencequ'elletient du compromis, "Nicaragua has rights in the Gulf and in the Pacific,but in the light
of the geographical and legal situation, these rights would not be
affectedby any such decisionin the present case".
76. Asfortheargumentsadvanced byNicaragua whichmighttouch on
thisquestion ofdelimitation,the mostgeneralmaybe seeninitspresenta-
tion, as a'consideration supporting its assertion of a legalinterest, of the
"essential character of the legal principles, including relevant equitable
principles, whichwould be relevantto the determination ofthe questions
placed on the agenda by the Special Agreement" (Application,
para. 2 (d)).The Chamber does not howeverconsider that an interest ofa
third Statein the general legalrules and principles likelyto be applied by
the decision can justify an intervention. Even when, as in the case of
Malta'sApplication forpermissionto intervenein the casebetween Libya
and Tunisia, the State seekingto intervene "does not base itsrequest for
permission to intervene simply on an interest in the Court's pronounce-
ments in the caseregardingthe applicablegeneralprinciples and rules of
international law",but "basesitsrequeston quitespecificelements"inthe
case (I.C.J.Reports1981,p. 17,para. 30),the interest invoked cannot be
regarded as one which "may be affected by the decision in the case"
(I.C.J.Reports 1981,p. 19,para. 33).The consideration urged in para-
graph 2 (d)ofthe Application isthus insufficientto showthe existenceof
an interest of a legalnature.
77. With specific reference to delimitation, Nicaragua's Application
refersto :
"The leading role of coasts and coastal relationships in the legal
régimeof maritimedelimitation and the consequence in the case of
the Gulf of Fonsecathat itwould beimpossibleto carryouta delimi-
tation which took into account only the coastsin the Gulf of two of
the three riparian States" (para. 203);
but the "role ofcoastsand coastalrelationships"inmaritimedelimitation
again involvesgeneral legal rules and principles. The contention that in
the Gulf of Fonseca "it would be impossible to carry out a delimitation
which took into account only the coasts in the Gulf of two of the three
riparian States" would be more convincingwereit not forthe fact that in
1900a maritime boundary was defined in the Gulf between Nicaragua
and Honduras. In any event, the question is whether a legal interest of
Nicaragua would be "affected" by such maritimedelimitation. It occurs
frequentlyin practicethat a delimitationbetweentwoStatesinvolvestak-
ingaccount ofthe Coastof athird State; butthe taking into account of al1
the coastsand coastalrelationships withinthe Gulf as ageographicalfact
forthe purpose ofeffectingan eventualdelimitationas betweentworipar-
ian States - El Salvador and Honduras in the instant case - in no way
signifiesthat by such an operation itselfthe legalinterest of a third ripar-
ian State ofthe Gulf, Nicaragua, maybe affected. In any case,it isforthe
ApplicantState inthe presentproceedings to demonstrate to the satisfac- «le Nicaragua aurait des droits dans le golfe de Fonseca et dans
l'océanPacifique, mais [que] ces droits ne seraient affectéspar
aucune décisionqu'elle rendrait en l'espèce, comme lemontrent la
configuration des lieux et la situationjuridiquP.
76. Quant aux arguments du Nicaragua qui pourraient se rapporter à
cette question de délimitation,leplusgénéraa lpparaîtdansune considé-
ration présentéepar lui à l'appui de l'intérêjturidique qu'il allègue,à
savoirle ((caractèreessentieldesprincipesjuridiques, ycompris lesprin-
cipes d'équité pertinents, qui compteraientpour trancher les questions
mises en cause par le compromis))(requête,par. 2d)). Or la Chambre
n'estimepas qu'unintérêtd'un Etattierp sour desrèglesetprincipesjuri-
diques généraux pouvant être appliqués palra décisionpuisse justifier
une intervention. Même s'ia lrrive, commedans le casde la requête àfin
d'interventionde Malte dans l'affaire qui opposait la Libyeet la Tunisie,
que 1'Etatdemandant à intervenir «ne fonde pas sa demande sur un
simple intérêt à l'égard desprononcésde la Cour concernant les prin-
cipes et règlesde droit international applicables à titre général)),mais
sur «des éléments particuliers de l'affaire»(C.I.J. Recueil1981,p. 17,
par. 30), l'intérêitnvoquéne saurait être considéré comme un intérêt
«susceptible d'être en cause en l'espèce))(C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 19,
par. 33).La considération invoquée au paragraphe 2 d) de la requête ne
suffit donc pas àétablirl'existenced'un intérêtd'ordre juridique.
77. C'esten seréférant expressémentaux délimitationsqulee Nicara-
gua mentionne danssa requête
«le rôle primordial des côtes et desrelationscôtièresdans le régime
juridique des délimitationsmaritimes, dont il résulte,dans lecasdu
golfede Fonseca, qu'ilseraitimpossibledeprocéder àune délimita-
tionqui, dans cegolfe,netiendraitcompteque des côtesde deuxdes
trois Etatsriverains»(par. 2B);
orle«rôle ..descôtesetdesrelations côtières»enmatièrededélimitation
maritime met de nouveau en jeu des règleset principes de droit d'ordre
généralL . 'allégation selon laquelle,dans le golfe de Fonseca, «il serait
impossiblede procéderàune délimitationqui,dans cegolfe,netiendrait
compte que des côtes de deux des trois Etats riverains)), serait plus
convaincante si, en 1900,une frontière maritime n'avait pas été définie
dans legolfeentre leNicaraguaet leHonduras.Quoi qu'ilensoit,ils'agit
de savoirsi un intérêtjuridiquedu Nicaragua serait «affecté» par une
telledélimitationmaritime. Ilarrivesouventenpratique qu'on doivetenir
compte,pour procéderàunedélimitationentredeuxEtats,delacôted'un
Etat tiers, mais le fait detenir compte, en tant que facteur géographique,
detouteslescôtesetrelations côtièresdans legolfede Fonsecapour effec-
tuer une éventuelledélimitationentredeuxEtatsriverains - El Salvador
et le Honduras en l'occurrence - ne signifie aucunement que l'intérêt
juridique d'un troisièmeEtatriverain du golfe - leNicaragua - soitsus-
ceptible d'être affectéen raison mêmede cette délimitation. De toutetion of the Chamber that this would be actuallythe case in the present
instance. This Nicaragua has failed to do. As for the other arguments
advanced by Nicaragua,in paragraph 2 (g)of itsApplication,in support
of its position,these appear to the Chamber to refer to altogether too
remotea contingencytojustify aninterventioninthepresent proceedings.
78. Paragraph 2 (c) of the Application advances "The geographical
situation in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas" as a
considerationsupportingthe contention that Nicaraguahas aninterest of
a legalnature whichmaybeaffected bythe decision. Setting aside forthe
momentthe question ofthe "adjacent maritime areas", the essentialdiffi-
cultyinwhichthe Chamber findsitself,onthismatterofapossibledelimi-
tation within the waters of the Gulf, is that Nicaragua did not in its
Applicationindicateanymaritimespacesin which Nicaragua mighthave
a legalinterest which couldbe said to be affected by a possible delimita-
tionlinebetween ElSalvadorand Honduras.Theareainwhich suchmar-
itimespacescould exist isin any eventlimited,inview ofthe delimitation
effected in 1900with Honduras. In the oral proceedings counsel for
Nicaraguadid referto "the factthat itwillbe necessarytojoin somepoint
on the closing line of the Gulf with the western terminus of the line of
1900";an observation which,whileat anyratefocusingconsideration on
a particular area of the Gulf waters, stillfailed to make any casethat the
Nicaraguan interest involved would be affected by the Honduran pro-
posed delimitation line. The Agent of Nicaragua also suggestedthat the
Chamber might, in making any delimitation within the Gulf between
ElSalvadorand Honduras, havetotakeaccount of"navigation routesina
Gulf whose mouth is lessthan 20miles wideand the reasonablesecurity
interests of the riparians", but this consideration is too general to justify
interventionin relation to adecision on delimitation in the present case.
79. Accordinglythe Chamber isnotsatisfiedthat adecisioninthepres-
ent case either as to the law applicable to a delimitation, or effecting a
delimitation, between Honduras and El Salvador, of the waters of the
Gulf (except as regards the alleged "community of interests"), would
affect Nicaragua's interests. The Chamber therefore considers that
although Nicaragua has, for purposes of Article62ofthe Statute, shown
an interestofa legalnature whichmaybeaffectedbythe Chamber'sdeci-
sion on the question of the existence or nature of a régimeof condomi-
nium or community of interests within the Gulf of Fonseca, it has not
shownsuchaninterestwhichmightbeaffectedbytheChamber'sdecision
on anyquestion ofdelimitationwithintheGulf.Thisfindingalsodisposes
of the question, referred to in paragraph 66 above, of the possible rele-
vance of a decision in the island dispute.façon, c'esà l'Etatdemandant à intervenirdans la présente instancequ'il
incombed'établirdemanièresatisfaisantedevantlaChambreque tel serait
effectivementlecasenl'espèce.Et cela,le Nicaragua nel'apas fait.Quant
aux autres argumentsque le Nicaragua invoque àl'appui de sa thèse, au
paragraphe 2 g)de sa requêtei,ls semblentviserune éventualitbeaucoup
trop incertainepour justifier une interventiondansl'instanceen cours.
78. Leparagraphe 2 c)de la requête propose, comme considération à
l'appui de l'allégation selon laquellele Nicaragua a un intérêdt'ordre
juridique susceptibled'être affectépar la décision,la situation géogra-
phique du golfe de Fonseca et des espacesmaritimes adjacents ».Mis à
part, pour le moment, la question des ((zonesmaritimes adjacentes », la
principale difficultéque rencontre la Chambre àproposd'une éventuelle
délimitationàl'intérieur deseauxdu golfetient àceque leNicaragua n'a
pas indiqué,dans sa requête, d'espaces maritimesoù il pourrait avoir un
intérêtjuridique susceptibled'être considérécommeaffe pcatune éven-
tuellelignededélimitationentreElSalvadoretleHonduras. Lazonedans
laquelle de tels espaces maritimes pourraient se trouver est de toute
manière limitéecomptetenude la délimitation effectuéeen1900avecle
Honduras. Aucoursdelaprocédure orale,leconseildu Nicaragua amen-
tionné «lefaitqu'ilseranécessairederelierun certain pointsur lalignede
fermeture du golfeàl'extrkmitéouest de lalignede 1900 D;cetteobserva-
tion concentre certes l'attention sur une zone déterminée des eauxdu
golfe, mais elle ne parvient quand mêmenullement àjustifier que ledit
intérêd tu Nicaragua serait affectépar la ligne de délimitation proposée
par le Honduras. L'agent du Nicaragua a aussidéclaréque la Chambre,
au moment d'établirune délimitation quelconque à l'intérieurdu golfe
entre El Salvadoret leHonduras, pourrait devoirtenir comptedes ((voies
de navigation dans un golfe dont l'embouchure a moins de 20 milles de
largeur, etdesintérêtdse sécuritéraisonnablesdesEtatsriverains ));mais
cetteconsidérationesttrop générale pour justifier une interventionliée
une décisionsur la délimitationen l'espèce.
79. En conséquence,la Chambre n'estpas convaincuequ'une décision
rendue en l'espècesur le droit applicableàune délimitation deseauxdu
golfeentreleHonduras etElSalvadorou portant délimitationdeceseaux
(sauf en ce qui concerne la ((communauté d'intérêts0 alléguée)a,ffecte-
rait lesintérêtsu Nicaragua. Dès lorsla Chambre estime que le Nicara-
gua,bien qu'ayant établiauxfinsde l'article62du Statut l'existenced'un
intérêt d'ordre juridique susceptibled'être affecptr une décisionde la
Chambre sur la question de l'existenceou de la nature d'un régimede
condominium ou de communauté d'intérêts àl'intérieurdu golfede Fon-
seca, n'apas établi l'existence d'untel intértui puisse être affectpar
une décisiondela Chambre surune quelconque question de délimitation
à l'intérieurdu golfe.Cette conclusionrègleaussilaquestion(mentionnée
auparagraphe 66ci-dessus)del'incidenceéventuelle d'unedécisionsurle
différend relatifaux îles. 80. The Chamber now turns to the question of the possible effect on
Nicaragua's legalinterests of itsfuturedecision on the waters outside the
Gulf, referred to by Nicaragua as "the adjacent maritime areas". In
respect of these waters the Parties to the case are again divided as to the
meaning of Article 2ofthe SpecialAgreement.Honduras claimsthat
"In requesting the Courtto determine 'the legalsituationinthe ...
maritime areas',theParties havenecessarilyendowed the Court with
competence to delimit the zones of territorial sea and the exclusive
economic zones pertaining to Honduras and El Salvador respec-
tively."
Consistentlywith its interpretation of Article 2ofthe SpecialAgreement,
Honduras asksthe Chamber to endorsethe delimitationline advanced by
Hondurasforthe waters outside the Gulf as "productive of an equitable
solution". El Salvadorinterpretsthe Special Agreement as not authoriz-
ing the Chamber to effect any delimitation; it contends furthermore that
there is no connection between the rights of Honduras as a coastal State
within the Gulf havinga right of accessto the high seas,and any claimby
Honduras to a territorial, sea and exclusive economic zone beyond the
closingline of the Gulf. El Salvadoralso refersto the Farallones,belong-
ingto Nicaragua, andto certainislands claimedby El Salvador,and con-
tends that "These islands andthe waters associated with them effectively
deprive Honduras of directcontact withthe Pacificthroughthe mouth of
the Gulf of Fonseca."
81. Both Parties contend that Nicaragua has no legal interest which
may be affected by the decision on the "legal situation" of the maritime
spaces outside the Gulf. El Salvador observesthat if its interpretation of
the Special Agreement is accepted, Nicaragua's rights vis-à-vis El Sal-
vador willsubsistunaffected; but contends that evenifthe Chamber were
to decidethat Honduras hasrightsoverthewatersoutsidethe Gulf,andto
delimit them by its Judgment, it could do so "without Nicaragua being a
partytothe proceedings". BothParties deny that the carrying out by the
Chamber of their respective interpretations of Article 2 could affect
Nicaragua's legal interests. The Stateseekingto intervene is, however,of
the viewthat its own legal interestsin these waters must be affected by a
decision of the Chamber onthe basis of eitherinterpretation of Article 2.
82. Whether a State is entitled to a territorial sea, continental shelf,or
exclusiveeconomiczone isa question to be decided by application ofthe
principles and rules of the law of the sea on those matters.As observed
above (paragraph 76),an interest in the application of general legal rules
and principles is not the kind of interest which willjustify an application
for permissionto intervene.Inthe present case,the legalrégimewithinthe
Gulf - whatever it maybe found bythe Chamber to be - willno doubt
alsoberelevantto any decisiondelimitingthewatersoutsidetheGulf; but 80. La Chambre passe maintenant à la question de l'effetque pourrait
avoirsurlesintérêtsjuridiques du Nicaragua ladécisionqu'ellerendra au
sujetdeseauxextérieuresaugolfe,queleNicaraguanomme((zonesmari-
timesadjacentes».En cequiconcerneceseaux,lesParties à l'affaires'op-
posent une fois encore au sujet du sens de l'article 2 du compromis. Le
Honduras affirme ceci :
((En demandant àla Cour de ((déterminerlerégimejuridique ...
des espacesmaritimes »les Partiesont nécessairementdoté la Cour
de la compétence de délimiterles zones de la mer territoriale et la
zone économique exclusive qui appartiennent au Honduras et à
El Salvador respectivement.»
Danslalogique desoninterprétationdel'article2du compromis,le Hon-
duras demande à la Chambre d'entérinerla ligne de délimitationqu'il
propose pour les eauxextérieuresau golfecar elle ((aboutiraà une solu-
tion équitable».El Salvadorinterprètelecompromis commen'habilitant
pas la Chambre à effectuer une délimitation; en outre, il soutient
qu'aucun lienn'existeentre lesdroits du Honduras en tant qu'Etat côtier
dans legolfe,ayantun droitd'accès àlahaute mer,ettoute prétentiondu
Honduras àune mer territoriale età une zone économiqueexclusiveau-
delàde lalignedefermeturedu golfe.ElSalvadormentionneaussi lesîles
Farallones,commeappartenant au Nicaragua,ainsiquecertaines îlesque
lui-mêmerevendique et il soutient que «ces îles et les eaux correspon-
dantes privent en fait le Honduras d'un contact direct avecl'océan Paci-
fique par l'embouchuredu golfede Fonseca)).
81. Les deux Parties soutiennent que le Nicaragua n'a aucun intérêt
d'ordre juridique susceptible d'être affectpar la décisionrelativeà la
((situationjuridique»desespacesmaritimesextérieursaugolfe.ElSalva-
dor faitobserverque sisoninterprétation ducompromis est acceptée,les
droits du Nicaragua vis-à-visdeluine serontpas affectés;mais ilaffirme
que, mêmesila ChambredevaitdéciderqueleHonduras a desdroitssur
les eaux extérieuresau golfe et venaità les délimiterpar son arrêt,elle
pourrait lefaire((sansqueleNicaraguasoitpartie àl'instance».Lesdeux
Partiesnient que, si la Chambre donne suiteà leurinterprétationrespec-
tive de l'article2,lesintérêtsjuridiques du Nicaraguapuissents'entrou-
ver affectés.Cependant, 1'Etatqui demande à intervenir estime que ses
propres intérêtsjuridiquesdans les eaux dont il s'agitseront nécessaire-
ment affectéspar une décisiondela Chambre,quellequesoitl'interpréta-
tion de l'articleurlaquelle ellesefonde.
82. La question de savoirsi un Etat peut prétendre àune mer territo-
riale, un plateau continental ou une zone économiqueexclusiveest une
question àtrancher par application desprincipesetdes règlesdu droit de
lamerenla matière.Commela Chambrel'a relevé(paragraphe 76ci-des-
sus),un intérêptortant sur l'application de règleset principesjuridiques
générauxn'estpas de nature àjustifier une requêteàfin d'intervention.
Dans la présenteaffaire,lerégimejuridique àl'intérieurdu golfe- quel
qu'il soit selon la décisionde la Chambre - aura sans doute aussi unethis, in the view ofthe Chamber, tends solelyto strengthen Nicaragua's
claimto intervene in relation to the legal régimeof the maritime spaces
insidethe Gulf,not tojustify an interventionin relation to the legalsitua-
tion ofthe maritimespaces outside.
83. This question furthermore cannot be considered separatelyfrom
the question setbythe Honduran thesis,accordingto whichthe Chamber
is required by the Special Agreementto effect a maritimedelimitationin
the area outside the Gulf. As already observed (paragraph 74above),the
Chamber does not haveto considerthe effectsof everypossible delimita-
tion, but merely to consider whether the State seeking to intervene has
shown the existence of a legal interest, and has shown that that interest
maybe affected by a delimitationdecision.Honduras moreover has inits
pleadingsproduced a proposed scheme of delimitation, and has charted
it; and inthecontext ofthepresentproceedingsHonduras hasexpounded
this scheme to the Chamber, and shown how it is designed to avoid
entirelyanyimpingement upon waters outsidethe Gulf whichmightcon-
ceivablybe claimedby Nicaragua.Counselfor Honduras explained that
onlypart ofthe Honduran coasthad beentaken intoaccountfor that deli-
mitation, the remainder ofthe Honduran coastbeing ignored "because it
is relevant to some future delimitation between Honduras and Nicara-
gua"; andthat
"by the same reasoning we have limited the relevantmaritime area
to the east by a line drawn from [apoint midway alongthe closing-
line] perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, out to
200miles, ...".
He concluded that
"The result is that Nicaraguan claims, both in respect of the
closing-line and the maritime areas outside, are untouched. Pro-
vided,provided only, that you can assume that Nicaragua has no
plausible claim to the waters beyond the mid-point of the closing
line,... or to the waters west ofthe perpendicular projected from
that mid-point."
84. In these incidental proceedings, and before hearing argument on
the merits, the Chamber cannot pass upon Honduras's demonstration
concerningits proposa1for delimitation of the waters outside the Gulf;
but that demonstration did cal1for some indication in response, by the
State seekingto intervene,ofhow those proposalswouldaffecta specific
interestofthat State,orwhat otherpossibledelimitation would affectthat
interest.Nicaraguahas responded to this schemeof Honduras,but again
very much in general terms. At the hearings, the Agent of Nicaragua
simply said that "Outside the Gulf of Fonseca, it is plain from looking atincidencesurtoutedécisiondedélimitationdeseauxextérieuresaugolfe;
mais,del'avisdelaChambre,celatend seulement à renforcerla demande
d'intervention du Nicaragua en ce qui concerne le régimejuridique des
espacesmaritimes setrouvant àl'intérieur dugolfeetnon àjustifier qu'il
intervienne en ce qui concerne celui des espacesmaritimesextérieursau
golfe.
83. Cettequestion nepeut enoutreêtreexaminéeindépendammendte
cellequepose la thèsedu Honduras selonlaquelle lecompromisrequiert
la Chambre d'effectuer une délimitation maritime dans la région exté-
rieure au golfe. Commeelle l'a déjàrelevé(paragraphe 74 ci-dessus),la
Chambre n'estpas tenue d'envisager leseffetsde toute délimitationpos-
sible;elledoit seulementexaminer si 1'Etatdemandant àintervenira éta-
blil'existenced'unintérêtjuridique etadémontréqu cetintérêtpeutêtre
affectépar une décisionportant délimitation.Danssesécritures,le Hon-
duras a proposé enoutre un modèlede délimitationet l'aportésur une
carte; dans le cadre de la présente procédure,il a exposéce modèleàla
Chambre etaexpliquécommentilavaitétéconçu pour éviterentièrement
tout empiétementsurdeseauxextérieuresaugolfedont on pourrait ima-
ginerqu'ellessoientrevendiquéespar leNicaragua. Leconseildu Hondu-
ras a expliquéque seuleunepartie de la côtehondurienne avait étéprise
enconsidérationauxfinsde cettedélimitation,tandis quel'onn'avaitpas
tenu comptedu restedela côtehondurienne «parce qu'elleestpertinente
au regard d'une délimitationfuture entrele Honduras et le Nicaragua » ;
et que
«suivant lemêmeraisonnement, nous avonslimitéla zonemaritime
pertinenteà l'estpar une lignetracéeà partir [d'unpoint situéàmi-
chemin de la ligne de fermeture] et perpendiculaire à la direction
généralede la côte,jusqu'à 200milles..»
En conclusion,selonlui :
«Il s'ensuit que les réclamationsdu Nicaragua, tant en ce qui
concernela ligne de fermetureque leszones maritimes àl'extérieur
du golfe,sontintactes.condition,et à conditionseulement, quel'on
puisse partir de l'hypothèseque leNicaragua n'apas de réclamation
plausibleàfaire valoir sur les eaux qui s'étendent au-delàdu point
médiande lalignede fermeture, ..ou surleseaux àl'ouestde laper-
pendiculairetracée àpartir de cepoint médian. fi
84. Au cours de la présente procédure incidente, et avant d'avoir
entendu lesplaidoiries sur lefond, la Chambrenepeut pas seprononcer
surladémonstrationdu Honduras relative à sespropositions dedélimita-
tion deseauxextérieuresau golfe; maiscettedémonstrationappelaitcer-
tainesindications de la part de'Etatdésireuxd'intervenir,pour préciser
comment cespropositions affecteraientun intérêtparticulier du Nicara-
guaouquelleautredélimitationpossibleaffecteraitcetintérêL t.eNicara-
gua a répondu au modèle du Honduras, mais une fois encore en usant
essentiellementdetermesgénérauxL . orsdesaudiences, l'agentdu Nica-any chart and from the graphics presented by the Parties in their written
pleadings" - and he referred specificallyto the charts showing Hondu-
ras'sproposed delimitation - "that no such demands can be made in the
PacificOceanwithout affectingthelegalinterestofNicaraguato asignifi-
cant extent." The Chamber does not find the matter so plain. Nicaragua
was shown by Honduras both a proposed delimitation line and a pro-
posedline marking offwhat Honduras callsthe "relevantmaritime area".
The charted proposition of Honduras thus gave Nicaragua the opportu-
nityto indicate howthe Honduran proposals mightaffect"to asignificant
extent" anypossible Nicaraguan legalinterestinwatersWestofthat Hon-
duran line. ThisNicaragua did not do. Nicaragua failed to indicate how
this delimitation, or any other delimitation regarded by it as a possible
one, would affectan actual Nicaraguan interest of a legalnature, and the
Chamber therefore cannot grant Nicaragua permission to intervene over
the delimitation ofthe waters outside the Gulf closingline.
85. Having found that Nicaragua has shown an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by certain of the decisions which may be
required by the Special Agreement,the Chamber has now to turn to the
question ofthe objectof Nicaragua'sApplicationfor permissionto inter-
vene inthe case.Astatement ofthe "precise object ofthe intervention" is
required by Article 81,paragraph 2 (b),of the Rules of Court; and it is
clearfrom previousdecisionsofthe Court that itisbound to consider"the
objectofthe Application andthe wayin whichthat objectcorresponds to
what is contemplated by the Statute", and to satisfy itselfthat the object
of the intervention corresponds to what is envisaged by the Statute
(I.C.J. Reports1984,p. 18,para. 28).
86. Nicaragua's indication,in its Application for permission to inter-
vene,ofthe objectofitsintervention inthepresent case,alreadyquoted in
paragraph 38above,was as follows :
"The interventionfor which permissionis requested has the fol-
lowing objects:
First,generallytoprotectthe legalrightsoftheRepublic ofNicara-
gua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas by al1
legalmeans available.
Secondly,to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
Court ofthenature ofthe legalrightsofNicaragua whichareinissue
inthe dispute. Thisformofinterventionwould havethe conservative
purpose of seekingto ensure that the determination ofthe Chamber
did not trench upon the legalrights and interests of the Republic of
Nicaragua. .."ragua s'estborné à déclarer:«En dehors du golfe de Fonseca, il ressort
nettementden'importe quellecarteet desdessinsprésentép sar lesParties
dans leurs écritures» - l'agent du Nicaragua s'estexpressémentréféré
aux cartes marines indiquant la proposition de délimitation du Hondu-
ras - «qu'on nepeut demandercela dans l'océanPacifiquesans affecter
sensiblementlesintérêtsjuridiques du Nicaragua ».LaChambrenepense
pas que la questionsoitaussi simple.LeHonduras avaitindiquéau Nica-
ragua à la foisla lignede délimitationqu'ilproposait etla lignequ'ilpro-
posait pour marquer ce qu'ilappelle la «zonemaritime pertinente ». La
proposition du Honduras portée sur la carte donnait ainsi au Nicaragua
l'occasion d'indiquer comment les propositions honduriennes seraient
susceptiblesd'affecter ((sensiblement»tout intérêtjuridique que le Nica-
ragua pourrait avoir dans des eaux situées àl'ouestde la ligne proposée
par le Honduras. Orle Nicaragua ne l'apas fait. Il n'a pas indiquécom-
ment cette délimitation, ou toute autre délimitation qu'il considérait
commepossible, affecteraitun intérêtjuridiqueeffectifdu Nicaragua; la
Chambrenepeut donc accorderau Nicaragual'autorisation d'intervenir
au sujet de la délimitationdes eaux situéesau large par rapportà la ligne
de fermeture du golfe.
85. Ayant conclu que le Nicaragua a démontréqu'il avait un intérêt
d'ordrejuridique susceptibled'êtreaffecté par certainesdes décisionsque
le compromis pourrait exiger, la Chambre doit maintenant examiner la
question de l'objetde la requêtedu Nicaragua à fin d'intervention dans
l'affaire.L'alinéa)duparagraphe 2de l'article81du Règlementprescrit
que «l'objetprécisdel'intervention»doitêtrespécifié;e iltressortclaire-
ment d'autres décisionsde la Cour qu'elle esttenue d'examiner «l'objet
de la requêteet la manièredont celui-ci correspond à ce qu'envisage le
Statut»etdes'assurerquel'objet del'interventioncorrespond àcequi est
envisagépar le Statut (C.Z.J.Recueil1984,p. 18,par. 28).
86. C'est dans les termes ci-après,déjàcitésau paragraphe 38 ci-des-
sus,queleNicaraguaaformulédanssarequêteàfin d'interventionl'objet
de sonintervention en l'espèce :
«La requêteàfin d'interventiona pour objet :
Premièrement, deprotégergénéralemep nt,r tous lesmoyensjuri-
diques possibles, les droits de la Républiquedu Nicaragua dans le
golfede Fonsecaet dans lesespacesmaritimesadjacents.
Deuxièmementd , 'intervenirdans l'instancepour informerla Cour
de la nature des droits du Nicaragua qui sonten cause dans le litige.
Cetteforme d'interventionauraitun but conservatoire :elleviseraià
garantir que les conclusions de la Chambre ne portent pas atteinte
aux droitsetintérêtsde la Républiquedu Nicaragua ..»Thatindicationshouldbereadinthe lightofthe statement ofthe Agentof
Nicaragua at the hearings that
"if theChamber should feel that the Application of Nicaragua goes
too far or remains too limited, Nicaragua would be willingto adjust
to any procedure indicated by the Chamber. The only thing that
Nicaragua seeks isto protect itslegalinterestsand itwilldoso in any
waythe Statute allows."
It has been contended, in particular by ElSalvador, that Nicaragua has
not stated the "precise object" of its intervention in compliance with
Article 81, paragraph 2 (b),of the Rules of Court, and that its stated
object is not a proper object, and that for these reasons Nicaragua's
Applicationshouldnot be accepted.
87. El Salvador complains that although Nicaragua States that its
object is to "protect the legal rights of the Republic of Nicaragua in the
Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas", and to "inform the
Court ofthe nature of the legal rights of Nicaragua which are in issuein
the dispute", itoesnotsufficientlyindicate whatthose rightsare claimed
to be, how they maybe affected, or what substantive purpose Nicaragua
seeks to achieve. In order to be permitted to intervene,a State does not
have to show that it has rights which need to be protected,but merelyan
interestofalegalnature whichmaybeaffectedbythe decisioninthe case.
This matter oflegalinterests has howeverbeen dealt with and decided by
the Chamber in the earlier part of this Judgment (paragraphs 72, 79
and 84);so it isin relation to those Nicaraguaninterests of a legalnature
which the Chamber has found to exist that the Chamber must now
examinethe declaredobject of the intervention. Nicaragua's substantive
purpose appears to beto informthe Chamber ofitsrights orinterests,and
to protectthem "by al1legalmeans available", i.e.,to preventthem being
affectedby the Chamber's decision,orto ensurethat a decision affecting
them is only taken after Nicaraguahas been heard.
88. In its written observations on the Application for permission to
intervene, El Salvador referred to this aspect of the Application and
argued that
"[The] differing descriptions of the object of the intervention,
oscillating between the purpose of protecting its rights by al1legal
means available and the conservativepurpose of merely informing
the Chamber ofitsrights,constitute an attempt to avoidthe dilemma
confrontinga State seekingto intervene ...If the object ofthe inter-
vention isto inform the Court of itsrights or claims,Nicaragua will
have a fullopportunity todo so(as Italydid) inthe oralproceedings
to be convened in accordance with Article 84, paragraph 2, of the
Rules, without any need to allow its intervention. If, on the other
hand, the object ofthe application isto protect its claimsbyal1legal
means, including that of seeking a favourablejudicial pronounce-
ment on these claims,then such a purpose willsignifythe introduc-Cette indication doit être rapprochée dece que l'agent du Nicaragua a
déclaré à l'audience,àsavoirque :
«silaChambre estimequelarequêtedu Nicaraguavatrop loinou est
trop limitée, leNicaragua est disposé à se conformer à toute procé-
dure queluiindiquera la Chambre. Leseulobjectifdu Nicaragua est
de protégerses intérêtsjuridiques etil le fera de n'importe quelle
manièreautoriséepar le Statut. ))
Il a été soutenu,en particulier par El Salvador,que le Nicaragua n'avait
pas indiqué 1'«objet précis» de son intervention, conformément à l'ar-
ticle 81, paragraphe 2 b),du Règlement,que l'objet qu'il avait indiqué
n'étaitpas un objet appropriéetque,partant, la requêtedu Nicaraguane
devraitpas êtreadmise.
87. El Salvador reproche au Nicaragua de déclarer que l'objet de sa
requêteest«deprotéger ..lesdroitsde laRépubliquedu Nicaragua dans
le golfede Fonsecaet dans lesespacesmaritimesadjacents »et «d'infor-
merla Cour delanature desdroitsdu Nicaraguaquisontencause dans le
litige,maisdenepasindiquersuffisamment cequecesdroitssont censés
êtrec, omment ilspourraient êtreaffectés,niquel estau fond lebut que le
Nicaraguacherche àatteindre.Pourêtreautorisé àintervenir,un Etat n'a
pas à établirqu'ila des droits qui doivent êtreprotégés, mais simplement
qu'il aun intérêd t'ordrejuridique susceptible d'êtreaffectépar la déci-
sion àrendre enl'espèce.Cettequestion desintérêtsjuridiques a déjà été
traitée et tranchéepar la Chambre dans la précédente partiedu présent
arrêt(paragraphes 72,79 et84);aussi est-cepar rapport auxintérêtsnica-
raguayens d'ordre juridique qu'ellea considérés comme existantsqu'elle
doit maintenant examiner l'objetdéclarédel'intervention.Fondamenta-
lement, le but du Nicaragua semble être d'informerla Chambre de ses
droits ou intérêtest de leiprotéger «par tous les moyensjuridiques pos-
sibles»,c'est-à-dired'empêcher qu'ilssoientaffectéspar la décisionde la
Chambre,ou de s'assurerqu'une décisionqui les affecteraitne soitprise
qu'après quele Nicaragua aurait étéentendu.
88. Dans ses observations écrites sur la requêteà fin d'intervention,
El Salvador s'estréféré àcet aspectde la requêteeta soutenuceci :
(([Les]descriptions divergentes de l'objet de l'intervention- qui
oscillent entreprotégerles droitsdu Nicaragua par tous les moyens
juridiques possibles etinformersimplement la Chambrede la nature
de ces droits à des fins conservatoires - sont une façon d'essayer
d'échapper audilemme dans lequel se trouve 1'Etatqui souhaite
intervenir..Sil'objet de son intervention est d'informer la Cour de
sesdroits ou desesprétentions,leNicaraguaaura amplementl'occa-
sion de le faire - comme en son temps l'Italie - lorsqu'il sera
entenduainsiquele prévoitl'article84,paragraphe 2,du Règlement,
sansqu'il soitdutout nécessairedel'autoriseràintervenirdans l'ins-
tance. En revanche,sisonpropos estplutôt deprotégersesdroitspar
tous lesmoyensjuridiques - ycompris celuiqui consiste àchercher tion by Nicaragua of additional disputes, requiring a valid link of
jurisdiction, which does not exist."
89. It appears to the Chamber that the consequence of that argument
would be that intervention, not merely in the present case but in most
cases, would have to be refused, if not for the one reason, then for the
other, and that the purposes of Article 62 of the Statute would thus be
frustrated.The Chamber cannot accept such a position. In the first place,
with regard to the stated object of informingthe Court of a third State's
rights, it is evident that if it were necessaryfor a State which considered
that itslegalinterestsmightbe affectedbythe decisionin a caseto givean
exhaustiveaccount of these interestsin its application for permission to
intervene,orat the hearings held to considerwhetherpermission to inter-
veneshouldbegranted,therewouldbe no point inthe institution ofinter-
vention and in the further proceedings to which it should give rise under
the Rules of Court. It istruethat inthe circumstances ofthe caseconcern-
ing the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), the Court
found itself able to take into account,in itsecision onthe merits, infor-
mation about Italian claims presented to it during the proceedings on
Italy's unsuccessfulapplicationto intervene.Butthereasonforthe refusa1
ofpermission to intervenein that casewasnot that the Court wasalready
sufficientlyinformed ofItaly'sinterestsby thoseproceedings.Nor wasita
finding that Italy had not sufficientlyindicated the interests to be pro-
tected or presentedthemin an inappropriate manner.
90. So far as the object of Nicaragua's intervention is "to inform the
Court of the nature of the legal rights of Nicaragua which are in issue in
the dispute", itcannotbe said thatthis objectisnot a proper one:it seems
indeed to accord with the function of intervention. It is true that Nicara-
guainitsApplication wentonto statethat ithas "the conservative purpose
ofseekingto ensurethat thedeterminations ofthe Chamber didnottrench
upon the legalrights and interestsofthe Republic of Nicaragua. .."The
expression"trench upon the legalrights and interests" islanguagenot to
be found in Article62ofthe Statute,whichrefersto the possibilitythat an
"interest ofa legalnature" mightbe "affected" bythe decision. If "trench
upon" was intended perhaps to go further than the language of the Sta-
tute,then itshouldbebornein mindthat itwouldhardlybepossible,given
Article 59of the Statute and indeed the decision in the case concerning
Monetaty GoldRemovedfromRomein1943(paragraphs 54-55above),for
a decision ofthe Courtto "trench upon" the legalright of athird State.It
seemsto the Chamber howeverthat it isperfectlyproper, and indeed the
purpose ofintervention,for an intervenerto informthe Chamber ofwhat
it regards as itsrights or interests,inder to ensure that no legalinterest
maybe "affected" without the intervenerbeing heard;and thatthe usein
an application to interveneof a perhaps somewhatmoreforceful expres- à obtenir une décisionjudiciaire favorable àses demandes - cela
signifiequ'ilintroduit un litigesupplémentaire,exigeantun lienjuri-
dictionnelvalable; or celien n'existepas.n
89. Pour la Chambre, si l'on suivaitcet argument, il faudrait refuser
l'autorisation d'intervenir non seulementdans lecasprésent maisdans la
plupart des cas,pour l'une ou l'autre raison,et lesbuts de l'article 62du
Statutne seraient donc pas atteints. La Chambre ne saurait l'accepter.En
premier lieu, s'agissant de l'objet déclaré d'informelra Cour des droits
d'un Etat tiers,il estévidentque,si1'Etatqui estimeque sesintérêtsjuri-
diques risquent d'être affectép sar la décisionàrendre dans une affaire
devaitprésenter exhaustivementcesintérêtd sans sarequête àfin d'inter-
vention ou aux audiencestenues pour examinerla question de savoirs'il
doit être autoriséà intervenir, l'institution de l'intervention et la procé-
dure à laquelle elledoit ensuite donner lieu en application du Règlement
de la Cour seraient vaines. Certes, dans les circonstances de l'affaire du
Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),la Cour a étéen
mesure de tenir compte, dans la décisionqu'elle a rendue au fond, des
renseignementsrelatifsaux prétentionsde l'Italiequi lui avaient été pré-
sentésau cours de la procéduresur la requête infructueuse àfin d'inter-
vention de cet Etat. Toutefois. sil'autorisation d'intervenir a été refusée
dans ce cas, ce n'est pas parce que la Cour avait déjà étésuffisamment
informéedesintérêd tse'Italiepar cetteprocédure. Cen'estpasnon plus
parce qu'elle a constatéque l'Italie n'avait pas suffisamment indiqué
quels étaientles intérêtsà protéger oules avait indiquésd'une manière
inappropriée.
90. Dans la mesureoùl'interventiondu Nicaragua a pour objet«d'in-
formerla Cour delanaturedesdroits du Nicaragua quisont encausedans
le litige,on ne peut pas dire que cet objet n'estpas approprié:il semble
d'ailleurs conformeau rôle de l'intervention.11estvrai que le Nicaragua,
dans sa requête, ajoutequ'ilpoursuit «un but conservatoire: ..garantir
que les conclusions de la Chambre ne portefit pas atteinte aux droits et
intérêtsjuridiques dela Républiquedu Nicaragua ..»L'expression«por-
ter atteinteà des droits et intérêtjsuridiques)) ne figure pas dans i'ar-
ticle 62 du Statut: celui-ci évoquela possibilitéqu'un «intérêtd'ordre
juridique »soit «affecté»par la décision. Peut-êtrel'expression «porter
atteinte»était-ellecenséeallerplusloinquelestermesdu Statut,maisilne
faut pas oublier que, compte tenu de l'article 59 du Statut et mêmede
l'arrêt rendudans l'affaire de l'Or monétairepris à Rome en 1943(para-
graphes 54et55ci-dessus),une décisiondelaCour ne sauraitguère«por-
ter atteinte aux droits d'un Etat tiers. En revanche, la Chambre estime
qu'ilesttoutà faitapproprié - etc'estd'ailleurslebut del'intervention-
quel'intevenant l'informedecequ'ilconsidèrecommesesdroitsouinté-
rêts,afin de veiller ce qu'aucun intérêd t'ordre juridique ne puisse être
«affecté» sans que l'intervenant ait étéentendu; elle estime aussi que
l'emploi,dans une requêteàfin d'intervention, d'une expression quivasion is immaterial,provided the object actuallyaimed at is a proper one.
Nor can the Chamber disregard in this connectionthe indication by the
Agentof Nicaragua,quoted in paragraph 86above,that Nicaragua seeks
to protectits legalinterest solelyin such wayas the Statute allows.
91. Secondly, as to the other aspect of the dilemma alleged by El Sal-
vador,it doesnot seemto the Chamber to followthat fora Stateto seekby
intervention "to protectits claimsby al1legalmeans" necessarilyinvolves
the inclusionin such means of "that of seekinga favourablejudicial pro-
nouncement" on itsown claims.Counselfor El Salvador recognizedthat
Nicaragua was not seeking to introduce an additional dispute. He
observed howeverthat
"Nicaragua does not declare as one of its objects that it seeksto
join the proceedingsasaparty andto beboundas suchbytheCourt's
decision" ;
and he suggested that its statementsin this connection are equivocal. It
was also suggested that Nicaragua's reference, in paragraph 24 of its
Application, to a possible new caseto be brought by agreement
"suggestsstronglythat Nicaragua recognizesthat itsparticipation in
the case in any meaningful sense is dependent upon the consent of
the principal Parties";
and El Salvador contends that a jurisdictional link is a requirement for
intervention. However, in the course of the oral proceedings Nicaragua
made veryclearthrough counsel that it "is not claimingto introduce, via
itsintervention,a new dispute in addition to that of the Parties"; and the
samepointismade inparagraph 8oftheApplication.CounselforNicara-
gua also recognized that "intervention under Article 62 of the Statute of
the Court was not intended" for that purpose.
92. In the light ofthese statements, it appears to the Chamber that the
objectstated first in Nicaragua's Application, namely "generally to pro-
tect the legalrights of the Republic of Nicaragua in the Gulf of Fonseca
and the adjacentmaritime areasby al1legalmeans available", isnot to be
interpreted as involving the seeking of a judicial pronouncement on
Nicaragua's own claims. The "legal means available" must be those
afforded by the institution of intervention for the protection of a third
State's legal interests.So understood, that object cannot be regarded as
improper.
93. The Chamber has now further to consider the argument of El
Salvadorthat for Nicaragua to intervenein these proceedings between Elpeut-êtreun peuplusloin estsansconséquence,pour autantque l'objectif
effectivementpoursuivi soit approprié.A cesujet,la Chambre ne saurait
méconnaîtrecequ'aindiquél'agentdu Nicaragua, danslestermescitésau
paragraphe 86 ci-dessus,àsavoir que le Nicaragua cherche seulement à
protéger sesintérêtsjuridiques d'une manière autorisé paer le Statut.
91. En second lieu, pour ce qui est de l'autre aspectdu dilemme dont
El Salvador affirme l'existence,la Chambre n'estimepas que, lorsqu'un
Etat cherche, en intervenant,à ((protéger...par tous les moyensjuridi-
ques »sesdroits,ilfaillenécessairementinclureparmi cesmoyens «celui
quiconsiste àchercheràobtenirune décisionjudiciaire favorable»surses
propres demandes. Leconseil d'El Salvadora reconnu que le Nicaragua
ne cherchait pasà saisirla Courd'un litigesupplémentaire.Il a pourtant
ajouté :
«le Nicaragua ne dit pas qu'un de ses objectifs est de chercher à
entrer dans l'instanceentant quepartie età êtreliéàce titre par la
décisionquerendra laCour »;
et il a estiméque les déclarationsdu Nicaragua àcet égard étaient équi-
voques. Il a aussi été avancéque le fait que le Nicaragua envisage, au
paragraphe 24 de sa requête,la possibilité qu'une nouvelle affaire soit
introduite par voie de compromis
«semblebien montrer que le Nicaragua admet que, pour qu'ilparti-
cipe utilement àla procédure,le consentement des Parties princi-
pales estnécessaire»;
et El Salvadorsoutient qu'un lienjuridictionnel est une condition néces-
saire pour intervenir.Cependant,au coursdela procédure orale,le Nica-
ragua a dit très clairement par le truchement de son conseil que le
Nicaragua «ne prétendpas introduire, sous couvert d'intervention, un
nouveau différend, un litige supplémentaire à celui des Parties)); on
trouve la même affirmationau paragraphe 8de la requête.Le conseil du
Nicaragua a aussireconnu que «l'intervention envertu de l'article2du
Statut de laCour n'apas été conçue à cettefin».
92. Compte tenu de ces déclarations, la Chambre estime que l'objet
énoncé enpremier lieudans larequêtedu Nicaragua, quiest «de protéger
généralementp , ar tous les moyensjuridiques possibles, les droits de la
Républiquedu Nicaragua dans le golfe de Fonseca et dans les espaces
maritimes adjacents)), ne doit pas être interprété comme équivalant à
chercher à obtenir une décisionjudiciairesur les propres demandes du
Nicaragua. Les ((moyensjuridiques possibles)) doivent être ceuxque
fournit l'institution de l'interventionpour protéger lesintérêtsjuridiques
d'un Etat tiers. Ainsi compris, cet objet ne peut être considéré comme
inapproprié.
93. LaChambredoitencoreexaminermaintenant l'argument d'El Sal-
vador selon lequel, pour que le Nicaragua puisse intervenir dans laré- 132 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R JADS)GMENT)
Salvador and Honduras, it must in addition show a "valid link ofjuris-
diction" between Nicaragua and those two States. The requirement of
Article 81,paragraph 2 (c),of the Rules of Court, for the statementin an
applicationfor permissiontointerveneof"anybasis ofjurisdiction which
is claimedto existasbetween the Stateapplying to interveneandthe par-
ties to the case", and Nicaragua's attitude to this, have been referred to
above (paragraph 39). In its Application, Nicaragua does not assert the
existence of any basis of jurisdiction other than the Statute itself, and
expressesthe viewthat Article62doesnot requirea separate titleofjuris-
diction.Nicaraguaalso recalls,inparagraph 24ofthe Application,that it
has a valid and unconditional declaration of acceptance ofjurisdiction
under Article 36,paragraph 2, ofthe Court's Statute; but it does not rely
onthat declarationinthepresent proceedings. ElSalvadorand Honduras
have also made declarations under that Article,but they contain reserva-
tions which, according to those States respectively,would prevent their
beinginvoked to seisethe Court of the matters the subject of the present
case.
94. Thequestion iswhetherthe existenceof a valid link ofjurisdiction
with the parties to the case in the senseof abasis ofjurisdiction which
couldbeinvoked, bya Stateseekingto intervene,inorder to institutepro-
ceedings against either or both of the parties- is an essential condition
forthe granting ofpermissionto intervene under Article62ofthe Statute.
In what follows,therefore,the expression"jurisdictional link" or "link of
jurisdiction" isusedinthis sense.Thequestion hasbeen raisedinprevious
casesbeforethe Court in which permission has been sought to intervene
under Article 62. In the case concerningthe ContinentalShelf(Tunisia/
LibyanArab Jamahiriya), the Court found it unnecessary to decide the
question, since it had reached the conclusion that, for other reasons,
Malta'srequestfor permission to intervenewasnot one to which it could
accede (I.C.J. Reports 1981,p. 20, para. 36). In the case concerningthe
Continental Shelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta), the Court againfound
it possible "to reach adecision on the present Application without gen-
erally resolving the vexed question of the 'valid link of jurisdiction"'
(I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 28,para. 45).It did so however by stating two al-
ternative lines of argument, one on the basis that such a link would be
required, and one onthe basisthat itwould not, and observingthat inthe
circumstances of the case before it, "either of two approaches ... must
result in the Court being bound to refuse the permission to intervene
requested by Italy" (I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 22, para. 34). Although that
Judgment contains a number ofvaluable observationson the subject,the
question remains unresolved. Sincein the present case the Chamber has
reached the conclusion that Nicaragua has shown the existence of an
interest of a legal nature which maybe affected by the decision, and that
the intervention of Nicaragua has a proper object, the only remaining
question is whether a jurisdictional link is required; andsince it is con-
cededthat no suchlinkexists,the Chamber isobligedto decidethepoint.senteinstanceentre El Salvador et leHonduras, illuifaut en outre établir
l'existenced'un «lien de juridiction valable)) entre le Nicaragua et ces
deux Etats. La Chambre a déjà mentionné(paragraphe 39 ci-dessus)la
condition que pose l'alinéac)du paragraphe 2 de l'article 81 du Règle-
ment de la Cour, selon lequel la requête à fin d'intervention doit spéci-
fier «toute base de compétencequi, selonl'Etat demandant àintervenir,
existeraitentre lui et lesparties,ainsi que l'attitude du Nicaraguaà cet
égard.Dans sarequête,le Nicaraguan'allèguepas l'existenced'une autre
base de compétenceque le Statut lui-même et exprimel'opinion que l'ar-
ticle 62 n'exige pas un titre de compétence distinct.Au paragraphe 24
de sa requête,le Nicaragua rappelle aussi qu'il a fait une déclaration
valable et inconditionnelle d'acceptation de lajuridiction de la Cour en
vertu de l'article36,paragraphe 2,du Statut de la Cour; pourtant, ilne se
fonde pas sur cette déclarationdans la présente procédure. El Salvador
et le Honduras ont aussi fait des déclarations en vertu de cet article,
mais celles-ci contiennent des réservesqui, selon chacun de ces Etats,
empêcheraient d'invoquerces déclarationspour saisir la Cour des ques-
tions qui font l'objetde la présente instance.
94. Il s'agitde savoirsil'existenced'un lienjuridictionnel valableavec
les partiesà l'instance- autrement dit l'existenced'unebase de compé-
tence qu'un Etat demandant à intervenir pourrait invoquer pour intro-
duire une instance contre l'une ou l'autrepartie - constitue une condi-
tion essentiellepour qu'un Etat puisse êtreadmis à intervenirenvertu de
l'article 62 du Statut. C'est donc dans ce sens que les expressions «lien
juridictionnel»et«lien de compétence»sontemployéesci-après.Laques-
tion a été soulevéa eu cours d'affaires dans lesquelles une requêteà fin
d'intervention avaitétéprésentée àla Cour en vertu de l'article62.Dans
l'affaire du Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne),la
Cour ajugé qu'il n'étap itas nécessairedetrancher laquestion,puisqu'elle
était parvenue,pour d'autres motifs, à la conclusion que la requêtede
Malte à fin d'intervention n'était pasde celles auxquelles elle pouvait
accéder(C.I.J. Recueil1981,p. 20,par. 36).Dansl'affairedu Plateauconti-
nental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte),la Cour a de nouveau estimé
possible «de se prononcer sur la présente requête sans résoudre la ques-
tion délicatedu «lien de compétencevalable»(C.I.J. Recueil1984p , . 28,
par. 45). Toutefois, elle l'a fait en indiquant deux argumentations pos-
sibles, dont l'une se fonde sur le fait qu'un tellien serait nécessaireet
l'autre surlefait qu'ilne le seraitpas, et enrelevantque, dans lescircons-
tances de l'espèce, les«deux manières ..ont l'une et l'autrepour résultat
nécessaired'obligelraCour à rejeterlademanded'interventiondel'Italie ))
(C.I.J.Recueil1984,p.22,par. 34).Cedernierarrêtcontientd'utilesremar-
ques enla matière,maisla question n'estpas résolue.Comme,dans lecas
présent,laChambreestparvenue àlaconclusionqueleNicaraguaaétabli
l'existenced'un intérêt d'ordre juridique susceptibled'être affep ctér la
décision, et comme l'interventiondu Nicaragua a un objet approprié,
seulela question de lanécessitéd'un lienjuridictionnelsepose encore; et
comme il est admis qu'aucun lien de ce genre n'existe, la Chambre estIn order to do so, it must consider the general principle of consensual
jurisdiction in itsrelation with the institution of intervention.
95. There can be no doubt ofthe importance ofthisgeneralprinciple,
upon whichthe State seekingto intervenehas itself,initsApplication,laid
considerable emphasis. Asthe Permanent Court of International Justice
expressed it,the Court operates
"bearing inmindthefactthat itsjurisdiction islimited,that itisinvar-
iablybased onthe consent ofthe respondent and only existsin sofar
asthisconsenthasbeen given"(MavrommatisPalestine Concessions,
JudgmentNo.2, 1924,P.C.ZJ ..,SeriesA, No.2,p. 16).
Thus the pattern of internationaljudicial settlement under the Statute is
that two or more Statesagree that the Court shall hear and determine a
particulardispute. Suchagreementmaybegivenadhoc,bySpecialAgree-
ment or othenvise, or may result from the invocation,in relation to the
particulardispute, ofacompromissoryclause of atreatyorofthemechan-
ismofArticle 36,paragraph 2,ofthe Court's Statute.Those Statesarethe
"parties" to the proceedings, and arebound bythe Court's eventualdeci-
sion because they have agreed to confer jurisdiction on the Court to
decide the case, the decision of the Court having binding force as pro-
vided for in Article 59of the Statute. Normally, therefore, no other state
may involveitself in the proceedingswithoutthe consent of the original
~arties.
96. Nevertheless, procedures for a "third State to intervenein a case
areprovidedin Articles62and 63ofthe Court's Statute.Thecompetence
of the Court in thismatter of intervention is not, like its competence to
hear and determinethe dispute referred to it,derivedfromthe consent of
the parties to the case,but from the consent given bythem, in becoming
parties to the Court's Statute, to the Court's exercise of its powers con-
ferred by the Statute. There is no need to interpret the reference inAr-
ticle 36, paragraph 1,of the Statute to "treaties in force" to include the
Statute itself; acceptance of the Statute entails acceptance of the compe-
tenceconferred onthe Court byArticle62.Thusthe Court hasthecompe-
tence to permit an intervention eventhough it be opposed by one orboth
oftheparties tothecase; astheCourt statedin 1984,"theopposition[to an
intervention] of the parties to a case is, though very important, no more
than one elementto be taken into account by the Court" (Z.C.J.Reports
1984,p. 28, para. 46). The nature of the competence thus created by
Article 62 of the Statute is definable by reference to the object and pur-
pose of intervention,asthis appearsfrom Article 62of the Statute.
97. Intervention under Article 62 of the Statute is for the purpose of
protectinga State's "interest ofa legalnature" that mightbeaffected by a
decision in an existing case already established between other States,
namelythe parties to the case.It isnot intended toenable athird State totenue de trancher la question. A cet effet, elle doit examiner le principe
générad le lajuridiction consensuelle dans sesrapports avecl'institution
de l'intervention.
95. L'importancede ceprincipe générals,urlequel l'Etatdemandant à
intervenir a lui-mêmebeaucoup insistédans sa requête, ne saurait être
mise en doute. Comme la Cour permanente de Justice internationale l'a
dit, la Cour agit
«en considérationdu fait que sa juridiction est limitée,qu'elle se
fondetoujours surleconsentementdudéfendeuretnesauraitsubsis-
ter en dehors des limites dans lesquelles ce consentement a été
donné » (Concessions Mavrommatisen Palestine, arrên to2, 1924,
C.P.J.Z.sérieA no2,p. 16).
Lerèglementjudiciaire international prévudans leStatutobéitdèslorsau
schéma suivant: deux Etats, ou davantage, conviennent que la Cour
connaîtra d'un différendparticulier; leur consentement peut êtredonné
surune base ad hoc,par voie de compromisou autrement, ou résulterde
l'invocation,enprésencede cedifférendparticulier,d'uneclausejuridic-
tionnelle d'un traitéou du mécanismede l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du
Statutdela Cour.CesEtatssont les parties1)àl'instance etilsseront liés
par la décisionque la Cour rendra en définitive,parcequ'ilssont conve-
nus dedonner àla Cour compétencepour trancher l'affairepar une déci-
sion qui aura force obligatoire, comme le prévoit l'article59 du Statut.
Normalement, aucun autre Etat nepeut donc semêler àl'instance sansle
consentementdesparties initiales.
96. Néanmoins,desprocédures permettant àun Etat ((tier)d'interve-
nir dans un procèssont prévuesaux articles62et63du Statut de la Cour.
En matière d'intervention, la compétencede la Cour ne découlepas du
consentement des parties à l'instance,à la différencede sa compétence
pour connaître de l'affaire qui lui a ésoumise,mais du fait qu'en deve-
nant parties au Statutde la Cour ellesont consentiàceque celle-ciexerce
lespouvoirs que lui confèrele Statut.Il n'estpas nécessaired'interpréter
la mention des ((traités ..en vigueur)), qui figure à l'article 36, para-
graphe 1,du Statut,commecomprenant le Statutlui-même;l'acceptation
du Statutimpliqueacceptation delacompétencequel'article62confère à
la Cour. La Cour est donc compétentepour admettre une demande d'in-
terventionmêmesil'une desparties àl'instance, ou lesdeux,s'yoppose;
commela Cour l'adéclaré en 1984((l'opposition [àune intervention]des
parties encause,quoiquetrèsimportante, n'estqu'un élémentd'apprécia-
tion parmi d'autres )(C.Z.J.Recueil1984,p. 28,par. 46). La nature de la
compétence ainsi créép ear l'article 62du Statut se définitpar référence
au but età l'objetde l'intervention,comme celaressort de l'article62du
Statut.
97. Le but d'une intervention fondéesur l'article 62 du Statut est de
protéger un «intérêtd'ordre juridique» d'un Etat susceptible d'être
affectépar une décision,dansune affairependanteentre d'autres Etats, à
savoirlesparties à cetteaffaire.Sonbut n'estpas de mettre1'Etatinterve-tack on a new case, to become a new party, and so have its own claims
adjudicated by the Court. A case with a new party, and new issuesto be
decided,wouldbe a newcase.Thedifferencebetweenintervention under
Article62,and thejoining ofa newparty to acase,isnot onlyadifference
in degree; it is a difference in kind. Asthe Court observedin 1984,
"There isnothing in Article62to suggestthat itwasintended as an
alternative means of bringing an additional dispute as a casebefore
the Court - a matter dealt within Article40ofthe Statute - or asa
method ofasserting the individualrights of a Statenot a party to the
case." (ContinentalShelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriya/Malta),Applica-
tion toIntervene,I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 23,para. 37.)
98. It is noteworthy that intervention is dealt with in Chapter III of
the Court's Statute, which is headed "Procedure". This approach was
adopted bytheCourt alsowhenitdrew up and revisedits RulesofCourt,
whereintervention appearsin SectionDofthe Rules,headed "Incidental
Proceedings". Incidental proceedings by definition must be those which
are incidentalto a casewhichisalreadybefore theCourtor Chamber. An
incidental proceeding cannot be one which transforms that case into a
different case with differentparties.
99. Intervention cannot havebeenintended tobe employedasasubsti-
tute for contentious proceedings. Acceptance of the Statute by a State
doesnot ofitselfcreatejurisdiction to entertain aparticular case :the spe-
cificconsent oftheparties isnecessaryforthat. If an intervenerwereheld
tobecomea party to a casemerelyasaconsequence ofbeingpermittedto
intervene in it, this would be a very considerable departure from this
principle of consensualjurisdiction. That the incidentaljurisdiction con-
ferredbyArticle62ofthe Statuteiscircumscribedbythegeneralprinciple
of consensual jurisdiction over particular disputes was stated by the
Court in its Judgment on the Italian Application to intervenein the case
concerning the ContinentalShelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta),when
the Court was carefulnot toadopt a position in which
"it wouldbe admitting that theprocedure ofintervention under Arti-
cle 62 would constitute an exception to the fundamental principles
underlying its jurisdiction; primarily the principle of consent, but
also the principles of reciprocity and equality of States. The Court
considersthat an exception ofthiskind could not be admittedunless
it were veryclearlyexpressed." (I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 22,para. 35.)
It is therefore clear that a State which is allowed to intervene in a case,
does not,byreasononly ofbeing anintervener,becomealsoaparty to the
case.It istrue, conversely,that, provided that there be the necessarycon-
sentbytheparties to the case,theintervenerisnot prevented byreason ofnant en mesurede grefferune nouvelleaffaire sur laprécédente,dedeve-
nir une nouvelle partie etd'obtenir ainsique la Cour seprononce sur ses
propres prétentions.Uneaffaire avecune nouvellepartie et de nouvelles
questions à trancherserait une affairenouvelle.Ladifférenceentrel'inter-
vention en vertu de l'article62 et la constitution d'une nouvelle partie
une affaire n'estpas seulementune différencede degré;c'estune diffé-
rence de nature.Commela Cour l'arelevéen 1984 :
a Rien dans l'article62n'indique quecetexte aitété conçu comme
un autre moyen de saisir la Cour d'un litige supplémentaire - ma-
tière quirelèvede l'article 40 du Statut- ou comme un moyen de
fairevaloir lesdroitspropres d'unEtatnonpartie à l'instance.»(Pla-
teaucontinental(Jamahiriyaarabe libyenne/Malte),requêtà efin d'in-
tervention,C.I.J.Recueil1984,p. 23,par. 37.)
98. Il ya lieu de releverque l'intervention esttraitéeau chapitre III du
Statut de la Cour, quiporte pour titre ((Procédure».C'estdansla même
ligne que la Cour a rédigépuis reviséson Règlement: l'intervention y
figure àla section D, intitulée ((Procéduresincidentes». Par définition,
les procédures incidentes sont celles qui surviennent incidemment au
cours d'uneaffairedéjàportée devantlaCour ou une chambre.Unepro-
cédureincidentenesauraitêtreuneprocédurequitransforme cetteaffaire
enune affairedifférenteavecdesparties différentes.
99. L'interventionne peut avoir été conçuepour qu'on s'enserve à la
place d'une procédure contentieuse.L'acceptationdu Statut par un Etat
ne créepas en soi de compétencepour connaître d'une affaire particu-
lière:le consentement exprèsdesparties est nécessaire à cet effet. Si'l'on
considéraitqu'un intervenant devientpartie àune affaire du simple fait
qu'ilest autorisé àintervenir dans cetteaffaire, il y aurait là une entorse
grave à cetaspectduprincipe de lajuridiction consensu.el1eL . efaitque la
compétenceincidenteconférée par l'article62du Statutest limitéepar le
principe général de lajuridiction consensuelleen matièrede différends
particuliers a été affirmépar la Cour dans l'arrêtqu'elle a rendu sur la
requête à fin d'interventiondel'Italiedans l'affairedu Plateau continental
(Jamahiriyaarabe libyenne/Malte);la Cour a pris soinde ne pas adopter
une position telle que:
elle admettrait que la procédure de l'intervention fondée surl'ar-
ticle 62 constitue une exception aux principes fondamentaux à la
base desacompétence :enpremier lieuleprincipe du consentement,
mais aussi lesprincipes de réciprocitéetd'égalité entre les Etats. Or
la Cour considère qu'une exception de ce genre ne pourrait être
admise que si elle était très clairementexprimée.» (C.I.J.Recueil
1984,p. 22,par. 35.)
Il est donc patent que 1'Etatadmis à intervenir dans une instance ne
devientpas aussiune partie en cause du seulfait qu'ilestun intervenant.
Réciproquement,il estvrai que,sous réservedu consentementrequisdes
parties encause, l'intervenant n'estpas empêché par sa qualitéd'interve-that statusfrom itselfbecoming a party to the case.That the competence
givento the Court in Article62ofthe Statuteisnot extendable to making
an intervenera party to the case unless the parties to the case have con-
sented to the change appears also to be the view of Nicaragua, which
stated during the oralproceedings that "Article62isapart ofthe inciden-
ta1jurisdiction and there isno compellinglogicrequiringits provisionsto
be seenasan 'exception'tothe principle ofconsent".Thereisfurthermore
in international law no process for joinder of a new party, or parties,
whether as appellant or respondent, by move of the Court itself. The
Court referred in 1984to "the absence in the Court's procedures of any
system of compulsory intervention, whereby a third State could be cited
bytheCourtto comeinasparty.. ."(ContinentalShelfLibyanArabJama-
hiriya/Malta),ApplicationtoZnterveneI ,.C.J.Reports1984,p. 25,para. 40)
and againto the fact that the Court does not possessthe power "to direct
that athird Statebe made a party to proceedings" (MilitaryandParamili-
tary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. UnitedStates of
America),I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 431,para. 88).
100. It thus follows also from the juridical nature and from the pur-
poses of intervention that the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction
between the would-beintervener andthe parties is not a requirementfor
the successofthe application. Onthe contrary,the procedure ofinterven-
tionisto ensurethat aStatewithpossiblyaffectedinterests maybepermit-
ted to interveneeventhoughthere isnojurisdictional link and ittherefore
cannot become a party. Article 8 1,paragraph 2 (c),of the Rules of Court
Statesthat an application under Article62ofthe Statute shallsetout "any
basis ofjurisdiction which is claimedto existasbetween the State apply-
ing to intervene and the parties to the case"; the use of the words "any
basis" (and in Frenchthe formula"toutebase de compétencequi ...exis-
terait") shows that a valid link of jurisdiction is not treated as a
sine qua nonfor intervention (cf. also ContinentalShelf(Tunisia/Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya),Applicationto Intenene, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 16,
para. 27).
101. The Chamber therefore concludesthat the absence of ajurisdic-
tionallink between Nicaragua and the Partiestothis caseisnobarto per-
mission being givenforintervention.
102. Sincethisisthefirstcase inthehistoryofthetwo Courts inwhicha
Statewillhavebeenaccordedpermissionto intervene under Article62of
the Statute,itappears appropriateto givesomeindication ofthe extent of
the procedural rights acquired by the interveningState as a result of that
permission.Thisisparticularlydesirable sincethe interventionpermitted
relatesonly to certain issuesofthe manysubmittedtothe Chamber. Inthe
first place, as has been explained above, the intervening State does notnant de devenir lui-mêmepartie au procès.Le Nicaragua aussi semble
considérerquela compétenceque l'article62du Statut attribue àla Cour
n'estpasextensibleaupoint qu'unintervenantdevienne une partie àl'ins-
tance,à moinsquelespartiesencauseaientconsenti à cechangement; ila
déclaréau cours de la procédure orale que ((l'article62 fait partie de la
compétenceincidenteet[que]rien, enbonne logique,n'oblige à envisager
sesdispositions commeune «exception»au principe du consentement».
En outre, iln'existepas,endroitinternational, deprocédurepermettant à
une partie ouà desparties nouvellesde sejoindre à l'instance,que cesoit
commedemandeur ou commedéfendeur,surordredelaCour elle-même.
En 1984,laCour arelevé «l'absence,dans laprocéduredelaCour, detout
système d'interventionobligatoire par lequel un Etat tiers pourrait être
citépar la Courà esteren tant que parti..»(Plateaucontinental(Jamahi-
riyaarabelibyenne/Malte),requêtà eJind'intervention, .I.J.Recueil1984,
p.25,par. 40)etelleamentionnéune foisencorelefait qu'elle estdépour-
vuedu pouvoir «de prescrire laparticipationàl'instanced'un Etattiers»
(ActivitémilitairesetparamilitairesauNicaraguaetcontrecelui-ci(Nicara-
gua c.Etats-Unisdgmérique),C.I.J.Recueil1984,p. 431,par. 88).
100.Il découledonc aussi de la naturejuridique et des buts de l'inter-
ventionque l'existenced'un lienjuridictionnel entre'Etatquidemande à
interveniret les parties en cause n'estpas une condition du succèsde sa
requête.Au contraire, la procédure del'intervention doit permettre que
1'Etatdont lesintérêtsrisquent d'êtarffectéspuisseêtreautorisé àinter-
venir, alors même qu'inl'existepas de lienjuridictionnel et qu'ilne peut
par conséquent pas devenir partie à l'instance. Aux termes du para-
graphe2 c)del'article 81du Règlementdela Cour,une requête àfin d'in-
tervention fondéesur l'article 62 du Statut doit spécifierute base de
compétencequi,selon 1'Etatdemandant àintervenir,existeraitentreluiet
lesparties»; l'emploi des mots«toute base de compétencequi ...existe-
rait» (dans le texte anglais la formule «any basisu) montre que le lien
dejuridictionvalablen'estpas considérécommeunecondition sine quanon
d'une intervention (voir aussi Plateau continental(Tunisie/Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne), requêt àeJin d'intervention, C.I.J. Recuel981,p. 16,
par. 27).
101. LaChambreconclutenconséquencequel'absencedelienjuridic-
tionnelentreleNicaraguaet lesParties àlaprésenteinstanceneconstitue
pas un obstacleàl'octroide l'autorisation d'intervenir.
102. Comme c'estla premièrefois dans l'existencede la Cour et de sa
devancièrequ'unEtat aura étéautorisé àintervenirenvertu del'article62
du Statut,ilsemblequ'ilyait lieu dedonner quelqueindication de l'éten-
due desdroitsprocéduraux que1'Etatintervenantacquerraune fois auto-
riséàintervenir,d'autant plus que l'autorisation d'intervenirneporte que
sur certains des nombreuxproblèmessoumis à la Chambre. En premier
lieu, comme la Chambre l'a expliquéci-dessus, 1'Etat intervenant nebecome party to the proceedings, and does not acquire the rights, or
become subject to the obligations, which attach to the status of a party,
under the Statute and Rules of Court, or the general principles of pro-
cedural law. Nicaragua, as an intervener, has of course a right to be
heard by the Chamber. That right is regulated by Article 85of the Rules
ofCourt, whichprovides for submissionofawrittenstatement, and parti-
cipationin the hearings. Time-limitswillbe fixed for a written statement
by Nicaragua, and observations thereon by the Parties, in accordance
with Article 85,so soon afterthe deliveryof the present Judgment asthe
appropriate consultations can be held.
103.The scope of the intervention in thisparticular case, in relation to
the scope of the case as a whole, necessarily involves limitations of the
right ofthe intervenerto be heard. An initiallimitation isthat it isnot for
the intervener to address argumentto the Chamber on the interpretation
ofthe SpecialAgreementconcluded betweenthe Parties on 24May 1986,
because the SpecialAgreementis,for Nicaragua, resinteraliosacta.
104.Nicaragua has disclaimedany intention of involvingitself in the
dispute overthe land boundary. The Chamber has found that Nicaragua
has notshownthe existenceofanyinterest ofa legalnature whichmaybe
affected by itsdecision on "the legalsituation ofthe islands". Asregards
the decisionrequired ofthe Chamber concerningthe legalsituation ofthe
maritime spaces within the Gulf, the Chamber has indicated (para-
graph 72above)that Nicaraguahasa legalinterestwhichmaybeaffected
bya decisionastothelegalrégimeofthosewaters,i.e.,adecisioninfavour
ofthecontention ofElSalvador,thatthe watersoftheGulfaresubject to a
régimeofcondominium, ora decisioninfavourofthe contention ofHon-
duras, that there exists a "community of interests" between the three
States in the waters of the Gulf. Nicaragua has not demonstrated to the
satisfaction of theChamber the existence of an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by any decision of the Chamber delimiting the
waters of the Gulf of Fonseca between El Salvador and Honduras, or by
any decision as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces outside the
Gulf, including any decision on entitlement or on delimitation between
El Salvador and Honduras, and intervention in those respects has not
been justified. The Chamber therefore finds that Nicaragua should be
permitted to intervene but solelyin respect of the Chamber's considera-
tion ofthe legalrégimeofthe maritime spaceswithinthe Gulf of Fonseca,
and to participate in the proceedings in the case in accordance with
Article 85of the Rules of Court.devientpas partie àl'instance;iln'acquiert pas lesdroits et n'estpassou-
misauxobligationsquis'attachent àlaqualitédepartie envertu du Statut
et du Règlementde la Courou desprincipesjuridiques générauxde pro-
cédure.Entant qu'intervenant, le Nicaragua a évidemmentledroit d'être
entendu par la Chambre.Cedroit estrégipar l'article85du Règlementde
la Cour,lequelprévoitla présentationd'unedéclaration écriteetlaparti-
cipation àla procédure orale.Desdélaisserontfixép sour laprésentation
d'une déclaration écritpar le Nicaragua puis d'observations écritessur
cettedéclarationpar les Parties, conformément àl'article 85,dèsque les
consultations appropriéesaurontpu avoir lieu aprèsleprononcédu pré-
sent arrêt.
103. Laportéede l'interventiondans ce cas particulier, par rapport
l'affaire dansson ensemble,impliquenécessairementque le droit de l'in-
tervenant d'être entendu soit limité. l'estd'abord par le fait qu'iln'ap-
partient pasà l'intervenantde défendre devantla Chambre desthèsessur
l'interprétationdu compromis conclu entre les Parties le 24 mai 1986,
puisque ce compromis estune resinteraliosactapour le Nicaragua.
104. LeNicaragua s'estdéfendudetouteintention desemêler au diffé-
rend quiconcernelafrontièreterrestre.LaChambre ajugéque leNicara-
gua n'avait pas démontrél'existenced'un intérêt d'ordre juridique sus-
ceptible d'être affectpar la décision qu'ellerendra sur la ((situation
juridique des îles.Pour-cequi estde la décisionquiluiestdemandéeau
sujet de la situationjuridique des espacesmaritimes setrouvantàl'inté-
rieur du golfe, la Chambre a indiqué (paragraphe 72 ci-dessus) que le
Nicaragua a un intérêtjuridique susceptibled'être affecptar une déci-
sionrelativeau régimejuridique deleurseaux,soitpar une décisionfavo-
rable à la thèse d'El Salvador selon laquelle les eaux du golfe sont
soumises à un régimede condominium, soit par une décisionfavorable à
la thèsedu Honduras selon laquelle il existe une ((communautéd'inté-
rêts» entre les trois Etats dans les eaux du golfe. La Chambre considère
que le Nicaragua n'a pas établide manière satisfaisantel'existenced'un
intérêt d'ordre juridique susceptibled'être affeptr une décisionde la
Chambre portant délimitationdeseauxdu golfede Fonsecaentre El Sal-
vador et le Honduras ou par une décisionsur la situation juridique
des espaces maritimes extérieursau golfe, y compris toute décisionsur
des droits ou sur une délimitation entreEl Salvador et le Honduras, et
que l'intervention à l'un ou l'autrede ces titres n'a pas étéjustif.aeL
Chambre conclut en conséquenceque le Nicaragua doit être admis à
intervenir,maisuniquementen ce qui concernel'examenpar la Chambre
du régimejuridique desespacesmaritimessitués àl'intérieurdu golfede
Fonseca, et àparticiper àla procédureen la présente affaire conformé-
ment àl'article85du Règlementde la Cour. 105. For these reasons,
Unanimously,
1.Findsthat the Republic of Nicaragua has shown that it has an inter-
estofa legalnature whichmaybe affectedbypart ofthe Judgment ofthe
Chamber onthe meritsin the present case,namelyitsdecisiononthe legal
régimeof the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca,but has not shown such an
interestwhichmaybeaffectedbyanydecisionwhichthe Chamber maybe
required to makeconcerningthedelimitation ofthose waters,oranydeci-
sion as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces outside the Gulf, or
any decision astothe legalsituation ofthe islands in the Gulf;
2. Decidesaccordingly that the Republic of Nicaragua is permitted to
interveneinthe case,pursuant to Article62ofthe Statute,to the extent,in
the manner and forthe purposes set out in the presentJudgment,but not
furtheror otherwise.
Done in Englishand in French,the English text being authoritative, at
the PeacePalace,TheHague,thisthirteenth day of September,one thou-
Sandnine hundred and ninety,infourcopies,one ofwhichwillbeplaced
inthe archivesoftheCourt and the otherstransmitted to the Government
of Nicaragua, the Government of El Salvador, and the Government of
Honduras, respectively.
(Signed)JoséSETTE-CAMARA,
President ofthe Chamber.
(Signed)Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.
Judge ODAappends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Chamber.
(Initialled)J.S.C.
(Initialled)E.V.O. 105. Par ces motifs,
LACHAMBRE,
à l'unanimité,
1. Dit que la République du Nicaragua a établi qu'elle aun intérêt
d'ordre juridique susceptible d'êtreaffectépar une partie de l'arrêt que
la Chambre rendra au fond en l'espèce, à savoir par la décisionqu'elle
rendra sur le régimejuridique des eaux du golfe de Fonseca,mais qu'elle
n'a pas établi l'existenced'un tel intérêt susceptible d'être afftar
toute décisionque la Chambre peut êtrerequisede rendre en ce qui con-
cerne la délimitationde ces eaux, par toute décisionsur la situationjuri-
dique desespacesmaritimesextérieursau golfeou par toute décisionsur
la situationjuridique des îles du golfe;
2. Décideen conséquenceque la Républiquedu Nicaragua est autori-
sée à intervenir dans l'instance, conformémentàl'article 62 du Statut,
dans la mesure, de la manièreet aux fins spécifidans le présent arrêt,
maisni davantageni autrement.
Fait en anglais et enfrançais, letexte anglaisfaisant foi, au palais de la
Paix,à La Haye, le treize septembre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix, en
quatre exemplaires,dont l'un resteradéposéauxarchivedselaCour etles
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Nicaragua,
au Gouvernement d'El Salvadoret au Gouvernement du Honduras.
Leprésidentde la Chambre,
(Signé)JoséSET~E-CAMARA.
Le Greffier,
(Signé)Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.
M. ODAj,uge,joint àl'arrêlt'exposéde son opinion individuelle.
(Paraphé)J.S.C.
(Paraphé)E.V.O.
Application by Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene
Judgment of 13 September 1990