INTERIqATIONCOURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYIDENMARK;
FEDERAL REPIJBLICiOF GERMANYINETHERLANDS)
JUDGMENT OF 20 FEBRUARY1969
COUP: INTERNATIONADE JUSTICE
RECUE1L:DESARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
DE LA MER DU NORD
(RÉPUBLIQUE ]?GDGRALE D9ALLEMAGNE/DANEMARK;
RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D7ALLEMAGNE/PAYS-BAS) Official citation:
North Sea Continental SheljJltdgment, I.C.JReports 1969, p. 3.
Mode officielde citation:
Plateau continental de la mer du Norarrêt,C.I.J.Recueil 1969,p.3.
Sales number
No de vente: 327 20 FEBRUARY 1969
JUDGMENT
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELFCASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYIDENMARK;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAWINETHERLANDS)
AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
DE LA MER DU NORD INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1969
1969
!OFebruary
gos.51 & 52t: 20 February 1969
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,'DENMARK;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYINETHERLANDS)
Continerrtal shelf'nreas iri the h'orrli Sea-Delitriitacrsbetwecn aa'jacerit
States-Advcitirages crnddisadvarrtyye.~of tfie equidistarice rnethod--Tlieory of
just and equitahle apportionrrlent-ltrron~p afitbslthtyry with the prirz-
ciple of the natlrral appurtenance of the shelf to the coastal State-Taof the
Court relates to deliniitntioti riot apportiorriiirrlt.
The eqiiidistance pririciple as errrhodiedirrArticle 6 of the 1958 Genrva Con-
tiner~talShelfCoiivc~nriori-Noti-opposa ohithityprovision to the Federal
Republic of Gerrnar1y,either contrnctrrcrllyor or1~nsis of'cor1ductor estoppel.
Equiclistcrnceatrd the pririciple of naturnl al~prirtenarrce-Miorof closest
pro.rir~iity-Critique of that notioii as not beiilg entailed hy the pririciple of ap-
purtenance-Firndarnerltul clzaracter of the prirrciple of the coritirieritalshelf as
being the natural prolorrgatiotiof the laricltcrritory.
Legal history of cl~li~~zircrtion-Trurna~Procla~rratioti-lrlterr1atiorial Law
Comrnissioïr-1958 Geneva Conferrrrce-Acceptarlce ofc,quidistanceas a prrrely
convetitional rule not reflc~ctingor c~stnllizirrg ofrcristornaryinterriational
law-Effect in this respect of r~.serïatioru mticle of Geneva Convention-Sub-
sequerit State practice insuficienIO coriïrrf the corzvt~r~tir/le into a rule
of c~rstor~~airryrternatiot~alIa~vopinio juris sivenecessitathowtnanifsstetl.
Staterlient of what are the applicable pririciples and r~rlesof Iaiv-Delimitation
by agreement, in accordarrce with eq~ritablepririciples, raking accowit of al1
relevant circunistcinces,antiso asto give eflect to the principle of natural prolonga-
tion-Freedom of the Partiesas to cltoice of rnethod-Varioiis factors relevant
to theriegofiution. JUDGMENT
Present: Presiderlt BUSTAMANT YERIVERO;Vice-President KORE~SKYJ;udges
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICT E,ANAKAJ,ESSUP,MORELLIS ,ir Muhammad
ZAFRULLA KHAN,PADILLA NERVOF , ORSTER,GROS,AMMOUN, BENG-
ZON,PETRENL , ACHS,ONYEAMAJ;udges ad hoc MOSLERS , DRENSEN;
Registrar AQUARONE.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
between
the Federal Republic of Germany,
represented by
Dr. G. Jaenicke, Professor of InternationLaw in the University of Frank-
furt am Main,
as Agent,
assisted by
Dr. S. Oda, Professor of International Law in the University of Sendai,
as Counsel,
Dr. U. Scheuner, Professor of International Law in the University of Bonn,
Dr. E. Menzel, Professor of International Law in the University of Kiel,
Dr. Henry Herrmann, of the Massachusetts Bar, associated with Messrs.
Goodwin, Procter and Hoar, Counsellors-at-Law, Boston,
Dr. H. Blomeyer-Bartenstein, Counsellor 1st Class, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Dr. H. D. Treviranus, Counsellor,Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers,
and by MT.K. Witt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Expert,
and
the Kingdom of Denmark,
represented by
Mr. Bent Jacobsen, Barrister at the Supreme Court of Denmark,
as Agent and Advocate,
assisted by
Sjr Humphrey Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Q.C., Professor of International
-Law in the University of Oxford,
as Counsel and Advocate,
H.E. MT. S. Sandager Jeppesen, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MT. E. Krog-Meyer, Head of The Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Dr. 1. Foighel, Professor in the University of Copenhagen,
MT. E. Lauterpacht, Mernber of the English Bar and Lecturer in the Uni-
versityof Cambridge,5 CONTINENTAL SHELF(JUDGMENI)
Mr. M. Thamsborg, Head of Department, Hydrographic Institute,
as Advisers,
and by
Mr. P. Boeg, Head of Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. U. Engel, Head of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Secretaries,
and between
the Federal Republic of Germany,
represented as indicated above,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
represented by
Professor W. Ripl-iagen, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Professor of International Law at the Rotterdam School of Economics,
as Agent,
assisted by
Sir Humphrey Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Q.C., Professor of International
Law in the University of Oxford,
as Counsel,
Rear-Admira1 W. Langeraar, Chief of the Hydrographic Department,
Royal Netherlands Navy,
MT. G. W. Maas Geesteranus, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Miss F. Y. van der Wal, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Advisers,
and by
Mr. H. Rombach, Divisional Head, Hydrographic Department, Royal
Netherlands Navy,
as Deputy-Adviser,
composed as above,
delivers thefollowing J~tclgrnent:
By a letter of 16February 1967,received in the Registry on20 February 1967,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlandstransmitted to the Registrar:
(a) an original copy, signed at Bonn on 2 February 1967for the Governments
of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany, of a Special Agree-
ment for the submission to the Court of a difference between those two
States concerning the delimitation, as between them, of the continental
shelf in the North Sea;
(b) an original copy, signed at Bonn on 2 February 1967forthe Governments
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, of a Special
Agreement for the submission to the Court of a difference between those6 CONTINENTALSHELF(JUDGMENT)
two Statesconcerning the delimitation, as between them, of the continental
shelf in the North Sea;
(c) an original copy, signed at Bonn on 2 February 1967for the three Govern-
ments aforementioned, of a Protocol relating to certain procedural ques-
tions arising from the above-mentioned Special Agreements.
Articles 1 to 3 of the Special Agreement between the Governments of Den-
mark and the Federal Republic of Germany are as follows:
"Article 1
(1) The International Court of Justice is requested to decide the follow-
ing question:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the
delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf
in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial
boundary determined by the above-mentioned Convention of 9 June
1965?
(2) The Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark and of the Federal
Republic of Germany shall delimit the continental shelf in the North Sea
as between their countries by agreement in pursuance of the decision
requested from the International Court of Justice.
Article 2
(1) The Parties shall present their written pleadings to the Court in the
order stated below :
1. a Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany to be submitted
withi~ six months from the notification of the present Agreement to
the mrt;
2. a Colinter-Meinorial of the Kingdom of Denmark to be submitted
within six months frorn the delivery of the German Memorial;
3. a German Reply followed by a Danish Rejoinder to be delivered
within such tirne-limits as the Court may order.
(2) Additional written pleadings may be presented if this is jointly
proposed by the Parties and considered by the Court to be appropriate to
the case and the circumstances.
(3) The foregoing order of presentation is without prejudice to any
question of burden of proof which might arise.
Article 3
The present Agreement shall enter into force on the day of signature
thereof."
Articles 1 to 3 of the Special Agreement between the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands areas follows:
"Article 1
(1) The International Court of Justice is requested to decide the follow-
ing question:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the
delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf
in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial
boundary determined by the above-mentioned Convention of 1Decem-
ber 1964? (2) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands shall delimit the continental shelf of the
North Sea as between their countries by agreement in pursuance of the
decision requested from the International Court of Justice.
Article 2
(1) The Parties shall present their written pleadings to the Court in the
order stated below :
1. a Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany to be submitted
within six months fromthe notification of the present Agreement to
the Court ;
2. a Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to be sub-
mitted within six monthsfrom the delivery of the German Memorial;
3. a German Reply followed by a Netherlands Rejoinder to be delivered
within such time-limits as the Court may order.
(2) Additional written pleadings may be preseiited if this is jointly
proposed by the Parties and considered by the Court to be appropriate to
the case and the circumstances.
(3) The foregoing order of presentation is without prcjudice to any
question of burden of proof which might arise.
Article 3
The present Agreement shall enter into force on the day of signature
thereof."
The Protocol between the three Governments reads as follows:
"Protocol
At the signature of the Special Agreement of today's date between the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments
of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of the Netherlands respec-
tively, on the submission to the International Court of Justice of the dif-
ferences between the Parties concerning the delimitation of the continental
shelf in the North Sea, the three Governments wish to state their agreement
on the following:
1. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will, within a
month from the signature, notify the two Special Agreements together
with the present Protocol to the International Court of Justice in accor-
dance with Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court.
2. After the notification in accordance with item 1 above the Parties
will ask the Court to join the two cases.
3. The three Governments agree that, for the purpose of appointing a
judge cd hoc, the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark and the King-
dom of the Netherlands shall be considered parties in the same interest
within themeaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Court."
Pursuant to Article 33, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar at
once informed the Governments of Denmark and the Federal Republic of
Germany of the filing of the SpecialAgreements. In accordance with Article 34,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, copies of the Special Agreements were
transmitted to the other Members of the United Nations and to other non-
member States entitled to appear before the Court.8 CONTINENTALSHELF(JUDGMENT)
By Orders of 8 March 1967, taking into account the agreement reached
between the Parties, 21 August 1967 and 20 February 1968were fixed respec-
tively as the time-limits forthe filing of the Memorials and Counter-Memorials.
These pleadings were filed within the time-limits prescribed. By Orders of
1 March 1968, 31 May and 30 Augusl 1968were fixed respectively as the time-
limits for the filing of the Replies and Rejoinders.
Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute of theCourt, the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany chose Dr. Hermann Mosler. Profes-
sor of International Law in the University of Heidelberg, to sit as Judçe ad hoc
in both cases. Referring to the agreement concluded between them accarding
to which they should be considered parties in the same interest within the
meaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute, the Governments of Den-
mark and the Netherlands chose Dr. Max Snrensen, Professor of International
Law in the University of Aarhus, to sit as Judge nd hocin both cases.
By an Order of 26 April 1968,considering that theGovernments of Denmark
andthe Netherlands were, sofar as the choice of a Judge ad hoc was concerned,
to be reckoned asone Party only, the Court fo~indthat those twoGovernments
were in the same interest,joined the proceedings in the two cases and, in modi-
fication of the directions given in the Orders o1 March 1968, fixed 30 August
1968 as the time-limit for the filing of a Common Rejoinder for Denmark and
the Netherlands.
The Replies and the Common Rejoinder having been filed within the time-
limits prescribed, the cases were ready for hearing on 30 August 1968.
Pursuant to Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the pleadings
and annexed documents were, after consultation of the Parties, made available
to the Governments of Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland,
France, Honduras, Iran, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela. Pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the same Article, those pleadings and annexed documents were,
with the consent of the Parties, made accessible to the public as from the date
of the opening of the oral proceedings.
Hearings were held from 23 to 25 October, from 28 October to 1November,
and on 4, 5, 7, 8 and 11 November 1968, in the course of which the Court
heard, in the order agreed between the Parties and accepted by the Court, the
oral arguments and replies of Professor Jaenicke, Agent, and Professor Oda,
Counsel, on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany;
and of Mr. Jacobsen and Professor Riphagen, Agents, and Sir Humphrey
Waldock, Counsel, on behalf of theGovernments of Denmark and the Nether-
lands.
In the course of the written proceedings, the following Submissions were
presented by the Parties:
On behnifof'the Governmentof the Federal Republicof Germany,
in the Memorials:
"May it please the Court to recognize and declare:
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in the
North Sea is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled
to a just and equitable share. CONTINENTAL SHELF (~MENT)
2. The method of determining boundaries of the continental shelf in
sucha way thatevery point ofthe boundar is equidistanfrom the nearest
points of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorialsea of
each State is measured (equidistance method), isnota rule ofcustomary
international law and is therefore not applicable as such between the
Parties.
3.The equidistance methd cannot be employed for the delimitation of
the continental shelf unlesitisestablished by aneement, arbitration, or
othemise, that it will achieveajust and equitable apportionment of the
contintntal shelfamong the Statesconcerned.
4.As to the delimitationof the continentalshelf between the Parties
in the North Sea, the equidistmce method cannot findapplication, since
itwould not apportion ajust and equitable share to the Federal Republic
of Germany";
in the Replies:
"May it please the Court to recognize and declare:
1.The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in the
North Sea is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled
toa just and equitable share.
2. (a)The methodof determining boundaries of the continental shelf
in such a way that every point of theboundary isequidistantfrom the
nearest points ofthe baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured (equidistance method) isnot a rule of cus-
tomary international law.
(6) The rule contained in the second sentence or paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 6 of the Continental ShelfConvention, prescribing that inabsence
of agreement, and unless another boundary isjustified byspeciaI circum-
stances, the boundaryshall be determined by application of the principle
of equidistance, has notkcome customary international law.
(c) Even ifthe rule under (b)would be applicable between the Partics,
specialcircumstances within the meaning of that ruIewouldexclude the
application of the equidistance method in the presencase.
3. (a) The equidistance method cannot be used for the delimitatioof
the continental shelunles it is establisheby agreement, arbitration,or
otherwise, that it will achievajust and equitable apportionment of the
continental shelf among the States concerned.
(b) As to the delimitationof the continental shelbetween the Parties
in the North Sea, the Kingdom of Denmarkand the Kingdom of the
Netherlands cannot rely on the applicationof the equidistance method,
since it would not lead tan equitable apportionment.
4. Consequently, the delimitation of thc continental shelf in the North
Sea between the Parties isa matterwhich has to besettled by agreement.
This agreement should apportion a justand equitable share teach of the
Parties in the light of all factors retevant in this respect."
On behal/of theGovernment ofDenmark,
in its Counter-Memorial:
"Considering that, as noted in the Cornpromis, disagreement exists between the Parties which could not be settled by detailed negotiations,
regarding the further course of the boundary beyond the partial boundary
determined by the Convention of 9 June 1965;
Considering that under theterms of Article 1,paragraph 1,of the Com-
promis the task entrusted to the Court is not to formulate a basis for the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea as between the Parties
ex aequo et bono, but to decide what principles and rules of international
law are applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas
of the continental shelf in theNorth Sea which appertain to each of them
beyond the partial boundary, determined by the above-mentioned Con-
vention of 9 June 1965;
In view of the facts and arguments presented in Parts 1 and 11of this
Counter-Memorial,
May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. The delimitation as between the Parties of the said areas of the con-
tinental shelf in the North Sea is governed by the principles and rules of
international law which are expressed in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf.
2. The Parties being in disagreement, unless another boundary is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary between thern is to be
determined by application of the principle ofequidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
3. Special circumstances which justify another boundary line not having
been established. the boundary between the Parties is to be determined by
application of the principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding
Submission."
On behalf of the Government of the Netherlands,
in its Counter-Memorial :
"Considering that, as noted in the Compromis, disagreement exists
between the Parties which could not be settled by detailed negotiations,
regarding the further course of the boundary beyond the partial boundary
determined by the Treaty of 1 December 1964;
Considering that under the terrns of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the
Compromis the task entrusted to theCourt is not to formulate a basis for
the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea as between the
Partiesex aequo et bono, but to decide what principles and rules of inter-
national law are applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of
the areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to
each of them beyond the partial boundary determined by the above-
mentioned Treaty of 1 December 1964;
In view of the facts and arguments presented in Parts 1 and II of this
Counter-Memorial,
May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. The delimitation as between the Parties of the said areas of the con-
tinental shelf in the North Sea is governed by the principles and rules of
international law which are expressed in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf. 7. The Parties being in disagreement, unless another boundary is justi-
fied by special circumstances, the boundary between them is to be deter-
mined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
3. Special circumstances which justify another boundary line not having
been established, the boundary between tlie Parties is to be deterrnined
.by application of the principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding
Subrnission."
011 I~el~alfofthe Goveriiii~ei~t .f Deiitnark and the Nerherlntids,
in the Common Rejoinder:
"May it further please the Court to adjudge and declare:
4. If the principles and rules of international law mentioned in Sub-
mission 1 of the respective Counter-Mernorials are not applicable as be-
tween the Parties, the boiindary is to be deterrnined between the Parties
on the basis of the exclusive rights of each Party over the continental shelf
adjacent to its coast and of tlie principle that the boundary is to leave to
each Party every point of the continental shelf which lies nearer to its
coast than to the coast of the other Party."
In the course of the oral proceedings, the following Submissions were pre-
sented by the Parties:
On behaifof the Go>sernnzct~ of the Federal Rep~rblic of Gerttzany,
at the hearing on 5 November 1968:
"1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in the
North Sea is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled
to a just and equitable share.
2. (ri) The method of deterinining boundaries of the continental shelf
in such a way that every point of the boundary is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured (equidistance method) is not a rule of cus-
tomary international law.
(b) The rule contained in the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, prescribing that in the absence
of agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary shall be deterrnined by application of tlie principle
of equidistance, has not becorne custornary international law.
(c) Even if the rule under (b) would be applicable between the Parties,
special circun~stances within the meaning of that rule would exclude the
application of the equidistance method in the present case.
3. (a) The equidistance rnethod cannot be used for the delimitation of
the continental shelf unless it is established by agreement, arbitration, or
otherwise, that it will achieve a just and equitable apportionment of the
continental shelf among the States concerned.
(b) As to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties
in the North Sea, the Kingdom of Denrnark and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands cannot rely on the application of the equidistance rnethod,
since it would not lead to an equitable apportionment.12 CONTINENTALSHELF (JUDGMENT)
4. Consequently, the delimitation of the continental shelf, on which
the Parties must agree pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Special
Agreement, is determined by the principle of the just and equitable share,
based on criteria relevant to the particular geographical situation in the
North Sea."
011behalf'ofthe Governnlent of Det~tnark,
at the hearing on 11November 1968,Counsel for that Government stated that
it confirmed the Submissions presented in its Counter-Memorial and in the
Common Rejoinder and that those Submissions were identical t~llrtatisrrilrtandis
with those of the Government of the Netherlands.
Oti behnlf'of the Govertitt~entof rile Netherlatzds,
at the hearing on 1I November 1968 :
"With regard to the delimitation as between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands of the boundary of the
areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each of
them beyond the partial boundary determined by the Convention of
1 December 1964.
May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. The delimitation as between the Parties of the said areas of the con-
tinental shelf in the North Sea is governed by the principles and rules of
international law which are expressed in Article 6, paragrapli 2, of the
Geneva Convention of 1958on the Continental Shelf.
2. The Parties being in disagreement, unless another boundary is justi-
fied by special circumstances, the boundary between them is to be deter-
mined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
3. Special circumstances which justify another boundary line not having
been established, the boundary between the Parties is to be determined
by application of the principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding
Submission.
4. If the principles and rules of international law mentioned in Sub-
mission 1 are not applicable as between the Parties, the boundary is to be
determined between the Parties on the basis of the exclusive rights of each
Party over the continental shelf adjacent to its coast and of the principle
that the boundary is to leave to each Party every point of the continental
shelf which lies nearer to itsoast than to the coast of the other Party."
1. By thetwo Special Agreements respectively concluded between the
Kingdom of Denmark and the Federal Republic ofGermany, and between
the Federal Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Parties
havesubmitted to the Court certain differences concerning "the delimita-tion as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the
North Sea which appertain to each of themV-with the exception of
those areas, situated in the immediate vicinity of the Coast, which have
already been the subject of delimitation by two agreements dated 1
December 1964,and 9 June 1965,concluded in the one case between the
Federal Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and in theother
between the Federal Republic and the Kingdom of Denmark.
2. It is in respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf areas
lying beyond and to seaward of those affected by the partial boundaries
thus established, that the Court is requested by each of the two Special
Agreements to decide wliat are the applicable "principles and rules of
international law". TheCourt is not asked actually to delimit the further
boundaries which will be involved, tliis task being reserved by the Special
Agreements to the Parties, which undertake to effect such a delimitation
"by agreement in pursuance of the decision requested from the ...
Courtm-that is to say on the basis of, and in accordance with, the
principles and rules of international law found by the Court to be
applicable.
3. As described in Article 4 of the North Sea Policing of Fisheries
Convention of 6 May 1882,the North Sea,which liesbetweencontinental
Europe and Great Britain in the east-west direction, is roughly oval in
shape and stretches from the straits of Dover northwards to a parallel
drawn between a point immediately north of the Shetland Islands and
the mouth of the Sogne Fiord in Norway, about 75 kilometres above
Bergen, beyond which is the North Atlantic Ocean. In the extreme north-
west, it is bounded by a line connecting the Orkney and Shetland island
groups; while on its north-eastern side, the line separating it from the
entrances to the Baltic Sea lies between Hanstholm at the north-west
point of Denmark, and Lindesnes at the southern tip of Norway. East-
ward of this line the Skagerrak begins. Thus, the North Sea has to some
extent the general look of an enclosed sea without actually being one.
Round its shores are situated, on its eastern side and starting from the
north, Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and France; while the whole western side is taken up by
Great Britain, together with the island groups of the Orkneys and Shet-
lands. From this it will beseen that the continental shelf of the Federal
Republic is situated between those of Denmark and the Netherlands.
4. The waters of the North Sea are shallow, and the whole seabed
consists of continental shelf at a depth of less than 200 rnetres, except
for the formation known as the Norwegian Trough, a belt of water
200-650 metres deep, fringing the southern and south-western coasts of
Norway to a width averaging about 80-100kilometres. Much the greater
part of this continental shelf has already been the subject of delimitationby a series ofagreementsconcluded between the United Kingdom (which,
as stated, lies along the whole westernide of it) and certain of the States
on the eastern side, namely Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.
These three delimitations were carried out by the drawing of what are
known as "median lines" which, for immediate present purposes, may be
described as boundaries drawn between the continental shelf areas of
"opposite" States, dividing the intervening spaces equally between them.
These lines are shown on Map 1on page 15,together with a similar line,
also established by agreement, drawn between the shelf areas of Norway
and Denmark. Theoretically it would be possible also to draw the follow-
ing median lines in the North Sea, namely United KingdomIFederal
Republic (which would lie east of the present line United Kingdoml
Norway-Denmark-Netherlands) ;Norway/Federal Republic(whichwould
liesouth of the present lineNorwayIDenmark); and NorwayINetherlands
(which would lie north of whatever line is eventually determined to be
the continental shelf boundary between the Federal Republic and the
Netherlands). Even if these median lines were drawn however, the
question would arise whether the United Kingdom, Norway and the
Netherlands could take advantage of them as against the parties to the
existing delimitations,since these lines would, it seems, in each case lie
beyond (i.e., respectively to the east, south and north of) the boundaries
already effectiveunder the existing agreements at present in force. This
is illustrated by Map 2 on page 15.
5. In addition to the partialboundarylines Federal Republic/Denmark
and Federal Republic/Netherlands, which, as mentioned in paragraph 1
above, were respectively established by the agreements of 9 June 1965
and 1 December 1964, and which are shown as lines A-B and C-D on
Map 3 on page 16, another line has been drawn in this area, namely
that represented by the line E-F on that map. This line, which divides
areas respectively claimed (to the north of it) by Denmark, and (to the
south of it) by the Netherlands, is the outcome of an agreement between
those two countries dated 31 March 1966,reflecting the view taken by
them as to what are the correct boundary lines between their respective
continental shelf areas and that of the Federal Republic, beyond the
partial boundaries A-B and C-D already drawn. These further and un-
agreed boundaries to seaward, are shown on Map 3 by means of the
dotted lines B-E and D-E. They are the lines, the correctness of which
in law the Court is in effect, though indirectly, called upon to determine.
Also shown on Map 3 are the two pecked lines B-F and D-F, repre-
senting approximately the boundaries which the Federal Republic would
have wished to obtain in the course of the negotiations that took place
between the Federal Republic and the other two Parties prior to the
submission of the matter to the Court.The nature of these negotiations
must now be described. Map 1 Carte 1
(See paragraphs 3 alid 4) ( Voirparagraphes 3 et 4)
200 metres line ..............,......,......... Isobathe des 200 mètres
--------
Limits fixed by the Limites définies par la
1882 Convention convention de 1882
Median lines Lignes médianes Map 3 Carte 3
(See paragraphs 5-9) (Voirparagraphes 5-9)
The maps in the present Jlcdgment Les cartes jointes auprésc.titarrêtont
were prepared on the basis of docli- été établies d'apri.~ les docunzents
ments submitted to the Court by the soumis à la Courpar lesParties et ont
Parties, and their sole purpose is to pour seul objet d'illustrer graphiquc-
provide a visual illustration of the ment les paragraphes de l'arrêtqui
paragraphs of the Judgment which s'y rkfèrent.
refer tothem. 17 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
6. Under the agreements of December 1964 and June 1965, already
mentioned, the partial boundaries represented by the map lines A-B and
C-D had, according to the information furnished to the Court by the
Parties, been drawn mainly by application of the principle of equidis-
tance, using that term as denoting the abstract concept of equidistance.
A line so drawn, known as an "equidistance line", may be described as
one which leaves to each of the parties concerned al1those portions of
the continental shelf that are nearer to a point on its own coast than
they are to anypoint on the coast of the other Party. An equidistance line
may consist either of a "median" line between "opposite" States, or of
a "lateral" line between "adjacent" States. In certain geographical con-
figurations of wliich the Parties furnished examples, a given equidistance
line may partake in varying degree of the nature both of a median and of
a lateral line. There exists nevertheless a distinction to be drawn between
the two, which will be mentioned in its place.
7. The further negotiations between the Parties for the prolongation
of the partial boundaries broke down mainly because Denmark and the
Netherlands respectively wished this prolongation also to be effected on
the basis of the equidistance principle,-and this would have resulted
in the dotted lines B-Eand D-E, shown on Map 3; whereas the Federal
Republic considered that such an outcome would be inequitable because
it would unduly curtail what the Republic believed should be its proper
share of continental shelf area, on the basis of proportionality to the
length of its North Sea coastline. It will be observed that neither of the
lines in question, taken by itself, would produce this effect, but only both
of them together-an element regarded by Denmark and the Netherlands
asirrelevant to what they viewed as being two separate and self-contained
delimitations, each of which should be carried out without reference to
the other.
8. The reason for the result that would be produced by the two lines
B-Eand D-E, taken conjointly, isthat in the case ofa concave or recessing
coast such as that of the Federal Republic on the North Sea, the effect
of the use of the equidistance method is to pull the line of the boundary
inwards, in the direction of the concavity. Consequently, where two such
lines are drawn at different points on a concave coast, they will, if the
curvature is pronounced, inevitably meet at a relatively short distance
from the coast, thus causing thecontinentalshelfarea they enclose, to take
the form approximately of a triangle with its apex to seaward and, as it
was put on behalf of the Federal Republic, "cutting off" the coastal
State from the further areas of the continental shelf outside of and
beyond this triangle. The effect of concavity could of course equally be
produced for a country with a straight coastline if the coasts of adjacent
countries protruded immediately on either side of it. Tncontrast to this,
the effect of coastal projections, or of convex or outwardly curving coasts
such as are, to a moderate extent, those of Denmark and theNetherlands,
is to cause boundary lines drawn on an equidistance basis to leave the 18 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
coast on divergent courses, thus having a widening tendency on the area
of continental shelf off that coast. These two distinct effects, which are
shown in sketches T-TT1 to be found on page 16, are directly attributable
to the use of the equidistance method of delimiting continental shelf
boundaries off recessing or projecting coasts. It goes without saying that
on these types of coasts the equidistance method produces exactly similar
effects in the delimitation of the lateral boundaries of the territorial sea
of the States concerned. However, owing to the very close proximity of
SLIC~waters to the coasts concerned, these effects are much less marked
and may be very slight,-and there are other aspects involved, which
will be considered in their place. It will suffice to mention here that, for
instance, a deviation from a line drawn perpendicular to the general
direction of the coast, of only 5 kilometres, at a distance of about 5
kilometres from that coast, will grow into one of over30 at a distance of
over 100 kilometres.
9. After the negotiations, separately held between the Federal Republic
and the other two Parties respectively, had in each case, for the reasons
given in the two preceding paragraphs, failed to result in any agreement
about the delimitation of the boundary extending beyond the partial
one already agreed, tripartite talks between al1the Parties took place in
The Hague in February-March 1966, in Bonn in May and again iii
Copenhagen in August. These also proving fruitless, it was then decided
to submit the matter to the Co~~rt.In the meantime the Governments
of Denmark and the Netherlands had, by means of the agreement of
3 1March 1966,already referred to (paragraph 5),proceeded to a delimita-
tion as between themselves of the continental shelf areas lying between
the apex of the triangle notionally ascribed by them to the Federal
Republic (point E on Map 3)and the median line already drawn in the
North Sea, by means of a boundary drawn on equidistance principles,
meeting that liiie at the point marked F on Map 3. On 25 May 1966,
the Government of the Federal Republic, tnking the view that this
delimitation was rcsitzter dios acta, notified the Governments of Den-
mark and the Netherlands, by means of an aide-mémoire, that the
agreement thus concluded could not "have any effect on the question of
the delimitation of the German-Netherlands or the German-Danish parts
of the continental shelf in the North Sea".
10. In pursuance of the tripartite arrangements that had been made
at Bonn and Copenhagen, as described in the preceding paragraph,
Special Agreements for the submission to the Court of the differences
involved were initialled in August 1966 and signed on 2 February 1967.
By a tripartite Protocol signed the same day it was provided (a) that
the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands would notify the
two Special Agreements to the Court, in accordance with Article 40,
paragraph 1,of the Court's Statute, together with the text of the Protocol
itself: (6) that after such notification, the Parties would ask the Court
to join the two cases: and (c) that for the purpose of the appointment 19 CONTI~TNTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
of a judge ad hoc, the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands
should be considered as being in the same interest within the rneaning
of Article 31,paragraph 5, of the Court's Statute. Following upon these
communications, duly made to it in the implementation of the Protocol,
the Court, by an Order dated 26 April 1968, declared Denmark and the
Netherlands to be in the same interest, and joined the proceedings in the
two cases.
11. Although the proceedings have thus been joined, the cases thein-
selves remain separate, at least in the sense that they relate to different
areas of the North Sea continental shelf, and that tliere is no a priori
reason why the Court must reach identical conclusions in regard to
them,-if for instance geographical features present in the one case were
not present in the other. At the same time, the legal arguments presented
on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands, both before and since the
joinder, have been substantially identical, apart from certain matters
of detail, and have been presented either in commori or in close co-opera-
tion. To this extent therefore, the two cases may be treated as one; and
it must be noted that althoughtwo separate delimitations are in question,
they involve-indeed actually give rise to-a single situation. The fact
that the question of either of these delimitations might have arisen and
called for settlement separately in point of tiine, does not alter the
character of the problem with which the Court is actually faced, having
regard to the nianner in which the Parties themselves have brouglit the
matter before it, as described in the two preceding paragraphs.
12. In conclusioi~ as to the facts, it should bc noted that the Federal
Republic has formally reserved its position, not only in regard to the
Danish-Netlierlands delimitation of the lineE-F (Map 3),as noted in
paragraph 9, but also in regard to the delimitations United Kingdom
Denmark and United Kingdom/Netherlands mentioned in paragraph 4.
In both the latter cases the Governinent of the Federal Republic pointed
out to al1 the Governments concerned that the question of the lateral
delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea between the
Federal Repiiblic and the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands
was still outstanding and could not be prejudiced by the agreements
concluded between those two countries and the United Kingdom.
13. Such are the events and geographical facts in the light of which
the Court has to determine what principles and rules of international
law are applicable to the delimitation of the areas of continental shelf
involved. On this question the Parties have taken up fundamentally
different positions. On behalf of the Kingdoms of Denmark and the
Netherlands it is contended that the whole matter is governed by amandatory rule of law which, reflecting the language of Article 6 of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf concluded at Geneva on 29 April
1958,was designated by them as the "equidistance-special circumstances"
rule. According to this contention, "equidistance" is not merely a method
of the cartographical construction of a boundary line, but the essential
eleinent in a rule of law which may be stated as follows,-namely that
in the absence of agreement by the Parties to employ another method or
to proceed to a delimitation on an url hoc basis, al1 continental shelf
boundaries must be drawn by means of an equidistance line, unless,
or except to theextent to which, "special circumstances" are recognized
to exist,-an equidistance line being, it will be recalled, a line every
point on which is the same distance away from whatever point is nearest
to it on the coast of each of the countries concerned-or rather, strictly,
on the baseline of the territorial sea along that coast. As regards what
constitutes "special circumstances", al1 that need be said at this stage
is that according to the view put forward on behalf of Denmark and the
Netherlands, the configuration of the German North Sea coast, its
recessive character, and the fact that it makes nearly a right-angled bend
in mid-course,would not of itself constitute, for either of the two bound-
ary lines concerned, a special circumstance calling for or warranting a
departure fromthe equidistance method of delimitation :only the presence
of some special feature, minor in itself-such as an islet or small pro-
tuberance-but so placed as to produce a disproportionately distorting
effect on an otherwise acceptable boundary line would, soit was claimed,
possess this character.
14. These various contentions, together with the view that a rule of
equidistance-special circumstances is binding on the Federal Republic,
are founded by Denmark and theNetherlands partly on the 1958Geneva
Convention on theContinental Shelf already mentioned (preceding para-
graph), and partly on general considerations of law relating to the conti-
nental shelf, lying outside this Convention. Similar considerations are
eqiially put forward to found the contention that the delimitation on an
equidistance basis of the line E-F (Map 3) by the Netherlands-Danish
agreement of 31 March 1966 (paragraph 5 above) is valid erga omnes,
and must be respected by the Federal Republic unless it can demonstrate
the existence of juridically relevant "special circumstances".
15. The Federal Republic, for its part, while recognizing the utility
of equidistance as a method of delimitation, and that this method can
in many cases be employed appropriately aiid with advantage, denies its
obligatory character for States not parties to the Geneva Convention,
and contends that the correct rule to be applied, at any rate in such
circumstances as those of the North Sea, is one according towhich each
of the States concerned should have a "just and equitable share" of the
available continental shelf, in proportion to the length of its coastline or
sea-frontage. Tt was also contended on behalf of the Federal Republicthat in a sea shaped as is the North Sea, the whole bed of which, except
for the Norwegian Trough, consists of continental shelf at a depth of
less than 200 metres, and where the situation of the circumjacent States
causes a natural convergence of their respective continental shelf areas,
towards a central point situated on the median line of the whole seabed
-or at any rate in those localities where this is the case-each of the
States concerned is entitled to a continental shelf area extending up to
this central point (in effect a sector), or at least extending to themedian
line at some point or other. In this way the "cut-off effect, of which
the Federal Republic complains, caused, as explained in paragraph 8,
by the drawing of equidistance lines at the two ends of an inward curving
or recessed coast, would be avoided.As a means of giving effect to these
ideas, the Federal Republic proposed the method of the "coastal front",
or façade, constituted by a straight baseline joining these ends, upon
which the necessary geometrical constructions would be erected.
16. Alternatively, the Federal Republic claimed that if, contrary to
its main contention, the equidistance method was held to be applicable,
then the configuration of the German North Sea coast constituted a
"special circumstance" such as to justify a departure from that method
of delimitation in this particular case.
17. In putting forward these contentions, it was stressed on behalf of
the Federal Republic that the claim for a just and equitable share did
not in any way involve asking the Court to give a decision e.\:aequo et
botzo (which, having regard to the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 38
of the Court's Statute, would not be possible without the consent of the
Parties),-for the priiiciple of the just and equitable share was one of
the recognized general principles of law which, by virtue of paragraph 1
(c) of the same Article, the Court was entitled to apply as a matter of
the justifia distributivwhich entered into al1legal systems. It appeared,
moreover, that whatever its underlying motivation, the claim of the
Federal Republic was, at least ostensibly, to a just and equitable share
of the space involved, rather than to a share of the natural resources as
such, mineral or other, to be found in it, the location of which could not
in any case be fully ascertained at present. On the subject of location
the Court has in fact received some, though not complete information,
but has not thought it necessary to pursue the matter, since the question
of natural resources is less one of delimitation than of eventual exploita-
tion.
18. It will be convenient to consider first the contentions put forward
on behalf of the Federal Republic. The Court does not feel able to
accept them-at least in the particular form they have taken. Ttconsiders that, having regard both to the language of the Special Agreements and
to more general considerations of law relating to the régime of the
continental shelf, its task in the present proceedings relates essentially
to the delimitation and not the apportionment of the areas concerned,
or their division into converging sectors. Delimitation is a process whicli
involves establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle,
appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination d~ noro of
such an area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not
the saine thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a previously
undelimited area, even though in a number of cases the results may be
comparable, or even identical.
19. More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and equi-
table share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court enter-
tains no doubt is the most fundamental of al1 the rules of law relating
to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, though quite independent of it,-namely that the rights of the
coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes
a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipso fucto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and
as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring the seabe 'and exploiting its naturalÏresources. In short,
there is here an inhere t right. In order to exercise it, no special legal
process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be
performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States have done
this) but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does
not depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of the Geneva
Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal State does
not choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it,
that is its own affair, but no one else may do so without its express
consent.
20. Tt follows that even in such a situation as that of the North Sea,
the notion of apportioning an as yet undelimited area, considered as a
whole (which underlies the doctrine of the just and equitable share), is
quite foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic concept of continental
shelf entitlement, according to which the process of delimitation is
essentially one of drawing a boundary line between areas which already
appertain to one or other of the States affected. The delimitation itself
must indeed be equitably effected, but it cannot have as its object the
awarding of an equitable share, or indeed of a share, as such, at ail,-for
the fundamental concept involved does not admit of there being anything
undivided to share out. Evidently any dispute about boundaries must
involve that there is a disputed marginal or fringe area, to which both
parties are laying claim, so that any delimitation of it which does not
leave it wholly to one of the parties will in practice divide it between
them in certain shares, or operate as if such a division had been made.But this does not mean that there has been an apportionment of some-
thing that previously consisted of an integral, still less an undivided
whole.
* * *
21. The Court will now turn to the contentions advanced on behalf
of Denmark and the Netherlands. Their general character has already
been indicated in paragraphs 13 and 14: the most convenient way of
dealing with them will be on the basis of the following question-namely,
does the equidistance-specialcircumstances principle constitute a manda-
tory rule, either on a con) .tltional or on a customary international law
basis, in such a way as to govern any delimitation of the North Sea
continental shelf areas between the Federal Republic and the Kingdoms
of Denmark and the Netherlands respectively? Another and shorter way
of formulating the question would be to ask whether, in any delimitation
of these areas, the Federal Republic is under a legal obligation to accept
the application of the equidistance-special circumstances principle.
22. Particular attention isdirected to the use, inthe foregoing formula-
tions, of the terms "mandatory" and "obligation". It has never been
doubted that the equidistance method of delimitation is a very convenient
one, the use of which is indicated in a considerable number of cases.
It constitutes a method capable of being employed in almost al1circum-
stances, however singular the results might sometimes be, and has the
virtue that ifnecessary,-if for instance, the Parties are unable to enter
into negotiations,-any cartographer can dofacto trace such a boundary
on the appropriate maps and charts, and those traced by competent
cartographers will for al1practical purposes agree.
23. In short, it would probably be true to Saythat no other method
of delimitation has the same combination of practical convenience and
certainty of application. Yet these factors do not suffice of themselves
to convert what is a method into a rule of law, making the acceptance
of the results of using that method obligatory in al1cases in which the
parties do not agree otherwise, or in which "special circunistances"
cannot be shown to exist. Juridically, if there isuch a rule, it must draw
its legal force from other factors than the existence of these advantages,
important though they may be. It should also be noticed that the counter-
part of this conclusion is no less valid, and that the practical advantages
of the equidistance method would continue to exist whether its em-
ployment were obligatory or not.
24. It would however be ignoring realities if it were not noted at the
same time that the use of this method, partly for the reasons givenin pa-
ragraph 8 above and partly for reasons that are best appreciated by
reference to the many maps and diagrams furnished by both sides in
the course of the written and oral proceedings, can under certaincircum-
stances produce results that appear on the face of thenl to be extra-
ordinary, unnatural or unreasonable. It is basically this fact which un-derlies the present proceedings. The plea that, however this may be,
the results can never be inequitable, because the equidistance principle
is by definition an equitable principle of delimitation, involves a postulate
that clearly begs the whole question at issue.
25. The Court now turns to the legal position regarding the equidis-
tance method. The first question to be considered is whether the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf is binding for al1the Parties
in this case-that is to Say whether, as contended by Denniark and the
Netherlands, the use of this method is rendered obligatory forthe present
delimitations by virtue of the delimitations provision (Article 6) of that
instrument, according to the conditions laid down in it. Clearly, if this
is so, thsn the provisions of the Convention will prevail in the relations
between the Parties, and would take precedence of any rules having a
more general character, or derived from another source. On that basis
the Court's reply to the question put to it in the Special Agreements
would necessarily be to the effect that as between the Parties the relevant
provisions of the Convention represented the applicable rules of law-that
is to say constituted the law for the Parties-and its sole remaining task
would be to interpret those provisions, in so far as their meaning was
disputed or appeared to be uncertain, and to apply them to the particu-
lar circumstances involved.
26. The relebant provisions of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention,
paragraph 2 of which Denmark and the Netherlands contend not only to
be applicable as a conventional rule, but also to represent the accepted
rule of general international law on the subject of continental shelf
delimitation. as it exists independently of the Conveiltion, read as follows:
"1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the
boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States
shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall
be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the
principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is mea-
sured."The Convention received 46 signatures and, up-to-date, there have been
39 ratifications or accessions. It came into force on 10June 1964,having
received the 22 ratifications or accessions required for that purpose
(Article 1l), and was therefore in force at the time when the various
delimitations of continental shelf boundaries described earlier (para-
graphs 1 and 5) took place between the Parties. But, under the formal
provisions of the Convention, it is in force for any individual State only
in so far as, having signed it within the time-limit provided for that
purpose, that State has also subsequently ratified it; or,not having signed
within that time-limit, has subsequently acceded to the Convention.
Denmark and the Netherlands have both signed and ratified the Conven-
tion, and are parties to it, the former since 10June 1964,the latter since
20 March 1966.The Federal Republic was one of the signatories of the
Convention, but has never ratified it, and is consequently not a party.
27. It is admitted on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands that in
these circumstances the Convention cannot, as such, be binding on the
Federal Republic, in the sense of the Republic being contractually
bound by it. But it is coiitended that the Convention, or the régime of
the Convention, and in particular of Article 6, has become binding 011
the Federal Republic in another way,-namely because, by conduct, by
public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic
has unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has
manifested its acceptance of the conventional régime; or has recognized
it as being generally applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf
areas. lt has also been suggested that the Federal Republic had held
itself out as so assuming, accepting or recognizing, in such a manner as
to cause other States, and in particular Denmark and the Netherlands,
to rely on the attitude thus taken up.
28. As regards these contentions, it is clear that only a very definite,
very consistent course of conduct on the part of a State in the situation
of the Federal Republic could justify the Court in upholding them; and,
if this had existed-that is toSay if there had been a real intention to
manifest acceptance or recognition of the applicability of the conven-
tional régime-then it must be asked whyit was that the Federal Republic
did not take the obvious step of giving expression to this readiness by
simply ratifying the Convention. In principle, when a number of States,
including the one whose conduct is invoked, and those invoking it,
have drawn up a convention specifically providing for a particular
method by which the intention to become bound by the régime ofthe
convention is to be manifested-namely by the carrying out of certain
prescribed formalities (ratification, accession), it is not lightly to be
presumed that a State which has not carried out these formalities, though
at al1times fully able and entitled to do so, has nevertheless somehow
become bound in another way. Indeed if it were a question not of
obligation but of rights,-if, that is to say, a State which, though entitledto do so, had not ratified or acceded, attempted to claim rights under
the convention, on the basis of a declared willingness to be bound by it,
or of conduct evincing acceptance of the conventional régime,it would
simply be told that, not having become a party to the convention it
could not claim any rights under it until the professed willingness and
acceptance had been manifested in the prescribed form.
29. A further point, not in itself conclusive, but to be noted, is that
if the Federal Republic had ratified the Geneva Convention, it could
have entered-and could, if it ratified now, enter-a reservation to
Article 6, by reason of the faculty to do so conferred by Article 12of the
Convention. This faculty would remain, whatever the previous conduct
of the Federal Republic might hive beeil-a fact which at least adds to
the difficulties involved by the Danish-Netherlands contention.
30. Having regard to these considerations of principle, it appears to
the Court that only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice
to lend substance to thiscontention,-that is to Sayifthe Federal Republic
were now precluded from denying the applicability of the conveiltional
régime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only
clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that régime,but also Iiad
caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detri-
mentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of this there is
no evidence whatever in the present case.
31. ln these circumstances it seems to the Court that little usef~il
purpose would be served by passing in review and subjecting to detailed
scrutiny the various acts relied on by Denmark and the Netherlands as
being indicative of the Federal Republic's acceptance of the régime of
Article 6;-for instance that at the Geneva Conference the Federal
Republic did not take formal objection to Article 6 and eventually
signed the Convention without entering any reservation in respect of
that provision; that it at one time announced its intention to ratify the
Convention: that in its public declarations concerning its continental
shelf rights it appeared to rely on, or at least cited, certain provisions
of the Geneva Convention. In this last connection a good deal has been
made of the joint Minute signed in Bonn, on 4 August 1964, between
the then-negotiating delegations of the Federal Republic and the Nether-
lands. But this minute made it clear that wliat the Federal Republic
was seeking was an agreed division, rather than a delimitation of the
central North Sea continental shelf areas, and the refereiice it made to
Article 6 was specifically to the first sentence of paragraphs 1 and 2 of
that Article, which speaks exclusively of delimitation by agreement and
not at al1of the use of the equidistance metliod.
32. In the result it appears to the Court that none of the elemeiits
invoked is decisive; each is ultimately negative or inconclusive; al1 are
capable of varying interpretations or explanations. It would be one thing to infer from the declarations of the Federal Republic an admission
accepting the fundamental concept of coastal State rights in respect of
the continental shelf: it would be quite another matter to see in this an
acceptance of the rules of delimitation contained in the Convention.
The declarations of the Federal Republic, taken in the aggregate, might
at most justify the view that to begin with, and before becoming fully
aware of what the probable effectsin the North Sea would be, the Federal
Republic was not specifically opposed to the equidistance principle as
embodied in Article 6 of the Convention. But from a purely negative
conclusion such as this, it would certainly not be possible to draw the
positive inference that the Federal Republic, though not a party to the
Convention, had accepted the régime ofArticle 6 in a manner binding
upon itself.
33. The dangers of the doctrine here advanced by Denmark and the
Netherlands, if it had to be given general application in the international
law field, hardly need stressing. Moreover, in the present case, any such
inference would immediately be nullified by the fact that, as soon as
concrete delimitations of North Sea continental shelf areas began to be
carried out, the Federal Republic, as described earlier (paragraphs 9 and
12),at once reserved its position with regard to those delimitations which
(effected on an equidistance basis) might be prejudicial to the delimitation
of its own continental shelf areas.
34. Since, accordingly, the foregoing considerations must lead the
Court to hold that Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is not, as such,
applicable to the delimitations involved in the present proceedings, it
becomes unnecessary for it to go into certain questions relating to the
interpretation or application of that provision which would otherwise
arise. One should be inentioned however, namely what is the relation-
ship between the requirement of Article 6 for delimitation by agreement,
and the requirements relating to equidistance and special circumstances
that are to be applied in "the absence of" such agreement,-i.e., in the
absence of agreement on the matter, is there a presumption that the
continental shelf boundary between any two adjacent States consists
automatically of an equidistance line,-or must negotiations for an
agreed boundary prove finally abortive before the acceptance of a bound-
ary drawn on an equidistance basis becomes obligatory in terms of
Article 6, if no special circumstances exist?
35. Without attempting to resolve this question, the determination of
which is not necessary for the purposes of the present case, the Court
drawsattention to the fact that the delimitation of the line E-F, as shown
on Map 3, which was effected by Denmark and the Netherlands under
the agreement of 31 March 1966already mentioned (paragraphs 5and 91,
to which the Federal Republic was not a party, must have been based onthe tacit assumption that, no agreement to the contrary having been
reached in the negotiations between the Federal Republic and Denmark
and the Netherlands respectively (paragraph 7), the boundary between
the continental shelf areas of the Republic and those of the other two
countries must be deemed to be an equidistance one;-or in other words
the delimitation of the line E-F, and its validity erga ornrzesincluding
the Federal Republic, as contended for by Denmark andthe Netherlands,
presupposes both the delimitation and the validity on an equidistance
basis, of the lines B-E and D-E on Map 3, considered by Denmark and
the Netherlands to represent the boundaries between their continental
shelf areas and those of the Federal Republic.
36. Sirice,however, Article 6 of the Geneva Convention provides only
for delimitation between "adjacent" States, which Denmark and the
Netherlands clearly are not, or between "opposite" States which, despite
suggestions to the contrary, the Court thinks they equally are not, the
delimitation of the line E-F on Map 3 could not in any case find its
validity in Article 6, even if that provision were opposable to the Federal
Republic. The validity of this delimitation must therefore be sought in
some other source of law. lt is a main contention of Denmark and the
Netherlands that there does in fact exist such another source, furnishing
a rule that validates not only this particular delimitation, but al1delimita-
tions effected on an equidistance basis,-and indeed requiring delimita-
tion on that basisunlessthe Statesconcerned otherwiseagree, and whether
or not the Geneva Convention is applicable. This contention must now
be examined.
37. It is maintained by Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal
Republic, whatever its position may be in relation to the Geneva Con-
vention, considered as such, is in any event bound to accept delimitation
on an equidistance-special circumstances basis, because the use of this
method is not in the nature of a merely conventional obligation, but is,
or must now be regarded as involving, a rule that is part of the corpus
of general international 1aw;-and, like other rules of general or custom-
ary international law, is binding on the Federal Republic automatically
and independently of any specific assent, direct or indirect, given by the
latter. Thiscontention has both a positive law and a more fundamentalist
aspect. As a matter of positive law, it is based on the work done in this
field by internationallegal bodies, on State practice and on the influence
attributed to the Geneva Convention itself,-the claim being that these
various factors have cumulatively evidenced or been creative of the
opitriojurissivr necessitatis, requisite for the formation of new rules of
customary international law. In its fundamentalist aspect, the view put
forward derives from what might be called the natural law of the con-tinental shelf, in the sense that the equidistance principle is seen as a
necessary expression in the field of delimitation of the accepted doctrine
of the exclusive appurtenance of the continental shelf to the nearby
coastal State, and therefore as having an apriori character of so to speak
juristic inevitability.
38. The Court will begin by examining this latter aspect, both because
it is the more fundamental, and was so presented on behalf of Denmark
and the Netherlands-Le., as something governing the whole case; and
because, if it is correct that the equidistance principle is, as the point was
put in the course of the argumerit, to be regarded as inherent in the whole
basic concept of continental shelf rights, then equidistance should con-
stitute the rule according to positive law tests also. On the other hand,
if equidistance should not possess any a priori character of necessity or
inherency, this would not be any bar to its haviiig become a rule of posi-
tive law through influences such as tliose of the Geneva Convention and
State practice,-and that aspect of the matter would remain for later
examination.
39. The a priori argument starts from the position described in para-
graph 19, according to which the right of the coastal State to its conti-
nental shelf areas is based on its sovereignty over the land domain, of
which the shelf area is the natural prolongation into and under the sea.
From this notion of appurtenance is derived the view which, as has al-
ready been indicated, the Court accepts, that the coastal State's rights
exist ipsofucto and ah itzitiowithout there being anyquestion of having to
make good a claim to the areas concerned, or of any apportionment of
the continental shelf between different States. This was one reason why
the Court felt bound to reject the claim of the Federal Republic (in the
particular form which it took) to be awarded a "just and equitable share"
of the shelf areas involved in the present proceedings. Denmark and the
Netherlands, for their part, claim that the test of appurtenance must be
"proximity", or more accurately "closer proximity": al1those parts of
the shelf being considered as appurtenant to a particular coastal State
which are (but only if they are) closer to it than they are to any point
on the coast of another State. Hence delimitation must be effected by a
method which will leave to each one of the States concerned al1 those
areas that are nearest to its own coast. Only a line drawn on equidistance
principles will do this. Therefore, it iscontended, only such a line can be
valid (unless the Parties, for reasoiis of their own, agree on another),
because only such a line can be thus consistent with basic continental
shelf doctrine.
40. This view clearly has much force; for there can be no doubt that
asa matter of normal topography, the greater part of a State'scontinentalshelf areas will in fact, and without the necessity for any delimitation at
all, be nearer to its coasts than to any other. It could not well be other-
wise: but post hoc is not propter hoc, and this situation may only serve
to obscure the real issue, whicli is whether it follows that every part of
the area concerned m~istbe placed in this way, and that it should be as
itwere prohibited that any part should not be so placed. The Court does
not consider that it does follow, either from the notion of proximity it-
self, or from the more fundamental concept of the continental shelf as
being the natural prolongation of the land domain-a concept repeatedly
appealed to by both sides throughout the case, although quite differently
interpreted by them.
41. As regards the notion of proximity, the idea of absolute proximity
is certainly not implied by the rather vague and general terminology
employed in the literature of the subject, and in most State proclamations
and international conventions and other instruments-terms such as
"near", "close to its shores", "off its coast", "opposite", "in front of
the coast", "in the vicinity of", "neighbouring the coast", "adjacent to",
"contiguous", etc.,-al1 ofthem terms of a somewhat imprecise character
which, although they convey a reasonably clear general idea, are capable
of a considerable fluidity of meaning. To take what is perhaps the most
frequently employed of these terms, namely "adjacent to", it is evident
that by no stretch of imagination can a point on the continental shelf
situated say a hundred miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be
regarded as "adjacent" to it, or to any coast at all, in the normal sense
of adjacency, even if the point concerned is nearer to some one coast
than to any other. This would be even truer of localities where, physically,
the continental shelf begins to merge with the ocean depths. Equally, a
point inshore situated near the meeting place of the coasts of two States
can often properly be said to be adjacent to both coasts, even though it
may be fractionally closer to the one than the other. Indeed, local geo-
graphical configuration may sometimes cause it to have a closer physical
connection with the coast to which it is not in fact closest.
42. There seems in consequence to be no necessary, and certainly no
complete, identity between the notions of adjacency and proximity; and
therefore the question of which parts of the continental shelf "adjacent
to" a coastline bordering more than one State fall within the appurte-
nance of which of them, remains to this extent an open one, not to be
determined on a basis exclusively of proximity. Even if proximity may
afford one of the tests to be applied and an important one in the right
conditions, it may not necessarily be the only, nor in al1circumstances,
the most appropriate one. Hence it would seem that the notion of ad-
jacency, so constantly employed in continental shelf doctrine frorn the
start, only implies proximity in a general sense, and does not imply any
fundamental or inherent rule the ultimate effect of which would be to prohibit any State (otherwise than by agreement) from exercising con-
tinental shelf rights in respect of areas closer to the coast of another
State.
43. More fundamental than the notion of proximity appears to be the
principle-constantly relied upon by al1 the Parties-of the natural
prolongation or continuation of the land territory or domain, or land
sovereignty of the coastal State, into and under the high seas,via the bed
of its territorial sea which is under the full sovereignty of that State.
There are various ways of formulating this principle, but the underlying
idea, namely of an extension of something already possessed, is the same,
and it is this idea of extension which is, in the Court's opinion, deter-
minant. Submarine areas do not really appertain to the coastal State
because-or not only because-they are near it. They are near it of
course; but this would not suffice to confer title, any more than, ac-
cording to a well-established principle of law recognized by both sides
in the present case, mere proximity confers per se title to land territory.
What confers the ipsojurc title which international law attributes to the
coastal State in respect of its coiitinental shelf, is the fact that the sub-
marine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the terri-
tory over which the coastal State already has dominion,-in the sense
that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continua-
tion of that territory, an extension of it ind dehe-sea. From this it would
follow that whenever a given submarine area does not constitute a
natural-or the most natural-extension of the land territory of a coastal
State, even though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory
of any otl-ierState, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State;-
orat least it caniiot be so regarded in the face of a competing claim by a
State of whose land territory the submarine area concerned is to be
regarded as a natural extension, even if it is less close to it.
44. In the present case, although both sides relied on the prolongation
principle and regarded it as fundamental, they interpreted it quite dif-
ferently. Both interpretations appear to the Court to be incorrect. Den-
mark and the Netherlands identified natural prolongation with closest
proximity and therefrom argued that it called for an equidistance line:
the Federal Republic seemed to think it implied the notion of the just
and equitable share, although the connection is distinctly remote. (The
Federal Republic did however invoke another idea, namely that of the
proportionality of a State's continental shelf area to the length of its
coastline, which obviously does have an intimate connection with the
prolongation principle, and will be considered in its place.) As regards
equidistance, it clearly cannot be identified with the notion of natural
prolongation or extension, since, as has already been stated (paragraph 8),
the use of the equidistance method would frequently cause areas which
are the natural prolongation or extension of the territory of one State
to be attributed to another, when the configuration of the latter's coast
makes the equidistance line swing out laterally across the former'scoastal front, cutting it off from areas situated directly before that front.
45. The fluidity of al1these notions is well illustrated by the case of
the Norwegian Trough (paragraph 4 above). Without attempting to
pronounce on the status of that feature, the Court notes that the shelf
areas in the North Sea separated from the Norwegian Coast by the 80-
100kilometres of the Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be
adjacent to it, nor to be its natural prolongation. They are nevertheless
considered by the States parties to the relevant delimitations, as described
in paragraph 4, to appertain to Norway up to the median lines shown on
Map 1. True these median lines are themselves drawn on equidistance
principles; but it was only by first ignoring the existence of the Trough
that these median lines fell to be drawn at all.
46. The conclusion drawn by the Court from the foregoing analysis
is that the notion of equidistance as being logically necessary, in the sense
of being an inescapable a priori accompaniment of basic continental
shelf doctrine, is incorrect. Its said not to be possible to maintain that
there is a rule of law ascribing certain areas to a State as a matter of in-
herent and original right (see paragraphs 19 and 20), without also ad-
mitting the existence of some rule by which those areas can be obliga-
torily delimited. The Court cannot accept the logic of this view. The
problem arises only where there is a dispute and only in respect of the
marginal areas involved. The appurtenance of a given area, considered
as an entity, in no way governs the precise delimitation of its boundaries,
any more than uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial rights.
There is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be
fully delimited and defined, and often in various places and for long
periods they are not, as is shown by the case of the entry of Albania into
the League of Nations (Monastery of Saint Naoum, Advisor): Opinion,
1924, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 9,at p. 10).
47. A review of the genesis and development of the equidistance
method of delimitation can only serve to confirm the foregoing conclu-
sion. Sueh a review may appropriately start with the instrument, generally
known as the "Truman Proclamation", issued by the Government of
the United States on 28 September 1945.Although this instrument was
not the firstor only oneto have appeared, it hasin the opinion of the Court
a special status. Previously,various theories as to the nature and extent
of the rights relative to or exercisable over the continental shelf had been
advanced by jurists, publicists and technicians. The Truman Proclama-
tion however, soon came to be regarded as the starting point of the posi-tive law on the subject, and the chief doctrine it enunciated, namely
that of the coastal State as having an original, natural, and exclusive
(in short a vested) right to the continental shelf off its shores, came to
prevail over al1others, being now rellected in Article 2 of the 1958Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. With regard to the delimitation
of lateral boundaries between the continental shelves of adjacent States,
a matter which had given rise to some consideration on the technical, but
very little on the juristicvel, the Truman Proclamation stated that such
boundaries "shall be determined by the United States and the State con-
cerned in accordance with equitable principles". These two concepts, of
delimitation by mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with
equitable principles, have underlain al1 the subsequent history of the
subject. They were reflected in various other State proclamations of the
period, and after, and in the later work on the subject.
48. It was in the International Law Commission of the United Nations
that the question of delimitation as between adjacent States was first
taken up seriously as part of a general juridical project; for outside the
ranks of the hydrographers and cartographers, questions of delimitation
were not much thought about in earlier continental shelf doctrine.
Juridical interest and speculation was focussed mainly on such questions
as what was the legal basis on which any rights at al1 in respect of the
continental shelf could be claimed, and what was the nature of those
rights. As regards boundaries, the main issue was not that of boundaries
between States but of the seaward limit of the area in respect of which
the coastal State could claim exclusive rights of exploitation. As was
pointed out in the course of the written proceedings, States in most cases
had not found it necessary to conclude treaties or legislate about their
lateral sea boundaries with adjacent States before the question of ex-
ploiting the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil arase;-practice
was therefore sparse.
49. In the records of the International Law Commission, which had
the matter under consideration from 1950to 1956,there is no indication
at al1 that any of its members supposed that it was incumbent on the
Commission to adopt a rule of equidistance because this gave expression
to, and translated into linear terms, a principle of proximity inherent in
the basic concept of the continental shelf, causing every part of the shelf
to appertain to the nearest coastal State and to no other, and because
such a rule must therefore be mandatory as a matter of customary inter-
national law. Such an idea does not seem ever to have been propounded.
Had it been, and had it had the self-evident character contended for by
Denmark and the Netherlands, the Commission would have had no alter-
native but to adopt it, and its long continued hesitations over thismatter
would be incomprehensible. 50. It is moreover, in the present context, a striking feature of the
Commissioii's discussions that during the early and middie stages, not
only was the notion of equidistance never considered from the standpoint
of its having a prioraicharacter of inherent necessity: it was never given
any special prominence at all, and certainly no priority. The Commission
discussed various other possibilities as having equal if not superior statlis
such as delimitation by agreement, by reference to arbitration, by drawing
lines perpendicular to the coast, by prolonging the dividing line of ad-
jacent territorial waters (theprinciple of which was itself not as yet settled),
and on occasion the Commission seriously considered adopting one or
other of these solutions. It was not in fact until after the matter had been
referred to a committee of hydrographical experts. which reported in
1953, that the equidistance principle began to take precedence over other
possibilities: the Report of the Commission for that year (its principal
report on the topic of delimitation as such) makes it clear that before
this reference to the experts the Commission had felt unable to formulate
any definite rule at all, the previous trend of opinion having been mainlq.
in favour of delimitation by agreement or by reference to arbitration.
51. It was largely because of these difficulties that it was decided to
consult the Committee of Experts. It is therefore instructive in the con-
text (i.e., of an alleged inherent necessity for the equidistance principle)
to see on what basis the matter was put to the experts, and how theq.
dealt with it. Eq~iidistance was in fact only one of four methods suggested
to them, the other three being the continuation in the seaward direction
of the land frontier between the two adjacent States concerned; the
drawing of a perpendicular to the coast at the point of its intersection
with this land frontier; and the drawing of a line perpendicular to the line
of the "general direction" of the coast. Furthermore the matter was not
even put to the experts directly as a question of continental shelfdelimita-
tion, but in the context of the delimitation of the lateral boundary be-
tween adjacentterritorial waters, no account being taken of the possibility
that the situation respecting territorial waters might be different.
52. The Committee of Experts sirnply reported that after a thorough
discussion of the different methods-(there are no official records of this
discussion)-they had decided that "the (lateral) boundary through the
territorial sea-if not already fixed otherwise-should be drawnaccording
to the principle of equidistance from the respective coastlines". They
added, however, significantly, that in "a number of cases this may not
lead to an equitable solution, which should be then arrived at by negotia-
tion". Only after that did they add, as a rider to this conclusion, that
they had considered it "important to find a formula for drawing the
iiiternational boundaries in the territorial waters of States, which could
also be used for the delimitation of the respective continental shelves of
two States bordering the same continental shelf". CONTINENTALSHELF(JUDGMENT)
53. In this almost impromptu, and certainly contingent manner was
the principle of equidistance for the delimitation of continental shelf
boundaries propounded. It is clear from the Report of the Commission
for 1953 already referred to (paragraph 50) that the latter adopted it
largely on the basis of the recommendation of the Committee of Experts,
and even so in a text that gave priority to delimitation by agreement and
also introduced an exception in favour of "special circumstances" which
the Committee had not formally proposed. The Court moreover thinks
it to be a legitimate supposition that the experts were actuated by con-
siderations not of legal theory but of practical conçenience and carto-
graphy of the kind mentioned in paragraph 22 above. Although there
are no ofiicial records of their discussions, there is warrant for this view
in correspondence passing between certain of them and the Commission's
Special Rapporteur on the subject, which was deposited by one of the
Parties during the oral hearing at the request of the Court. Nor, even
after this, when a decision in principle had been taken in favour of an
equidistance rule, was there an end to the Commission's hesitations, for
as late as three years after the adoption of the report of the Committee
of Experts, when the Commission was finalizing the whole complex of
drafts comprised under the topic of the Law of the Sea, various doubts
about the equidistance principle were still being voiced in the Commis-
sion, on such grounds for instance as that its strict application would be
open, in certain cases, to the objection that the geographical configura-
tion of the coast would render aboundary drawn on this basis inequitable.
54. A further point of some signifieance is that neither in the Com-
mittee of Experts, nor in the Commission itself, nor subsequently at the
Geneva Conference, does there appear to have been any discussion of
delimitation in the context, not merely of two adjacent States, but of
three or more States on the same coast, or in the same viciiiity,-from
which it can reasonably be inferred that the possible resulting situations,
some of which have been described in paragraph 8 above, were never
really envisaged or taken into account. This viewfinds someconfirmation
in the fact tliat the relevant part of paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention speaks of delimiting the continental shelf of "two" adjacent
States (although a reference simply to "adjacent States" would have
sufficed), whereas in respect ofmedian lines the reference in paragraph 1
of that Article is to "two or more" opposite States.
55. In the light of this history, and of the recordgenerally, it is clear
that at no time was the notion of equidistance as an inherent necessity
of continental shelf doctrine entertained. Quite a different outlook was
indeed manifested from the start in current legal thinking. It was, and 36 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
it really remained tothe end, governed by two beliefs;-namely, first, that
no one singlemethod of delimitation waslikelyto prove satisfactory in al1
circumstances, and that delimitation should, therefore, be carried out by
agreement (or by reference to arbitration); and secondly, that it should
be effected on equitable principles. It was in pursuance of the first ofese
beliefs that in the draft that emerged as Article 6 of the Geneva Con-
vention, the Commission gave priority to delimitation by agreement,-
and in pursuance of the second that it introduced the exception in favour
of "special circumstances". Yet the record shows that, even with these
mitigations, doubts persisted, particularly as to whether the equidistance
principle would in al1cases prove equitable.
56. In these circumstances, it seems to the Court that the inherency
contention as now put forward by Denmark and the Netherlands inverts
the true order of things in point of time and that, so far from an equidis-
tance rule having been generated by an antecedent principle of proximity
inherent in the whole concept of continental shelf appurtenance, the
latter is rather a rationalization of the former-an ex postfacto construct
directed to providing a logical juristic basis for a method of delimitation
propounded largely for different reasons, cartographical and other. Given
also that for the reasons already set out (paragraphs 40-46) the theory
cannot be said to be endowed with any quality of logical necessity either,
the Court is unable to accept it.
57. Before going further it will be convenient to deal briefly with two
subsidiary matters. Most of the difficulties felt in the International Law
Commission related, as here, to the case of the lateral boundary between
adjacent States. Less difficulty was felt over that of the median line
boundary between opposite States, although it too is an equidistance line.
For this there seems to the Court to be good reason. The continental
shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be claimed by each of
them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations
meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a
median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal
projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be
eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal division of
the particular area involved. If there is a third State on one of thecoasts
concerned, the area of mutual natural prolongation with that of the
same or anotlier opposite State will be a separate and distinct one, to
be treated in the same way. This type of case is therefore different from
that of laterally adjacent States on the same coast with no immediately
opposite coast in front of it, and does not give rise to the same kind of
problem-a conclusion which also finds some confirmation in the dif-ference of language to be observed in the two paragraphs of Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention (reproduced in paragraph 26 above) as respects
recourse in the one case to median lines and in the other to lateral
equidistance lines, in the event of absence of agreement.
58. If on the other hand, contrary to the view expressed in the preced-
ing paragraph, it were correct to say that there is no essential difference
in the process of delimiting the continental shelf areas between opposite
States and that of delimitations between adjacent States, then the results
ought in principle to be the same or at least comparable. But in fact,
wliereas a median line divides equally between the two oppositecountries
areas that can be regarded as being the natural prolongation of the
territory of each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to one
of the States concerned areas that are a natural prolongation of the
territory of the other.
59. Equally distinct in the opinion of the Court is the case of the
lateral boundary between adjacent territorial waters to be drawn onan
equidistance basis. As was convincingly demonstrated in the maps and
diagrams furnished by the Parties, and as has been noted in paragraph 8,
the distorting effects oflateral equidistance lines under certain conditions
of coastal configuration are nevertheless comparatively small within the
limits of territorial waters, but produce their maximum effect in the
localities where the main continental shelf areas lie further out. There
is also a direct correlation between the notion of closest proximity to
the coast and the sovereign jurisdiction which the coastal State is entitled
to exercise and must exercise, not only over the seabed underneath the
territorial waters but over the waters themselves, which does not exist
in respect of continental shelf areas where there is no jurisdiction over
the superjacent waters, and over the seabed only for purposes of explora-
tion and exploitation.
60. The conclusions so far reached leave open, and still to be con-
sidered, the question whether on some basis other than that of an a
prior ogical necessity, i.e., through positive law processes, the equidis-
tance principle has come to be regarded as a rule of customary interna-
tional Inw, so that it would be obligatory for the Federal Republic in
that way, even though Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is not, as
such, opposable to it. For this purpose it is necessary to examine the
status of the principle as it stood when the Convention was drawn up,
as it resulted from the effect of the Convention, and in the light of State
practice subsequent to the Convention; but it should be clearly under-
stood that in the pronouncements the Court makes on these matters it
has in view solely the delimitation provisions (Article 6) of the Conven-
tion, not other parts of it, nor the Convention as such. 61. The first of these questions can conveniently be considered in the
form suggested on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands themselves
in the course of the oral hearing, when it was stated that they had not
in fact contended that the delimitation article (Article 6) of the Conven-
tion "embodied already received rules of customary lau in the sense
that the Convention was merely declaratory of existing rulrs". Their
contention was, rather, that although prior to the Conference, continental
shelf law was only in the formative stage, and State practice lacked
uniformity, yet "the process of the definition and consolidation of the
emerging customary law took place through the work of the Interna-
tional Law Comniission, the reaction of governments to that work and
the proceedings of the Geneva Conference"; and this emerping customary
law became "crystallized in the adoption of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention by the Conference".
62. Whatever validity this contention may have in respect of at least
certain parts of the Convention, the Court cannot accept it as regards
the delimitation provision (Article 6),the relevant parts of \\hich were
adopted almost unchanged from the draft of the International Law
Commission that formed the basis of discussion at the Conference.
The status of the rule in the Convention therefore depends mainly on
the processes that led ~he Commission to propose it. These processes
have already been reviewed in connection with the Danish-Netherlands
contention of an a prior iecessity for equidistance, and the Court con-
siders this review sufficient for present purposes also, in order to show
that the principle of equidistance, as it now figures in Article6 of the
Convention, was proposed by the Commission with considerable hesita-
tion, somewhat on an experimental basis, at most de lrge fi?rvtlda,and
not at al1de lege lata or as an emerging rule of customary international
law. This is clearly not the sort of foundation on which Article 6 of the
Convention could be said to have reflected or crystallized such arule.
63. The foregoing conclusion receives significant confirmation frorn
the fact that Article 6 is one of those in respect of which, under the
reservations article of the Convention (Article 12) reservations may be
made by any State on signing, ratifying or acceding-for, speaking
generally, it is a characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations
that, in regard to them, some faculty of making unilateral reservations
may, within certain limits, be admitted;-whereas this cannot be so in
the case of general or customary 1aw rules and obligations which, by
their very nature, must have equal force for al1members of the interna-
tional community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of
unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its ownfavour. Consequently, it is to be expected that when, for whatever
reason, rules or obligations of this order are embodied, or are intended
to be reflected in certain provisions of a convention, such provisions
willfigure amongst those in respect of which a right of unilateral reserva-
tion is not conferred, or is excluded. This expectation is, in principle,
fulfilled by Article 12 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention,
which permits reservations to be made to al1the articles of the Conven-
tion "other than to Articles 1 to 3 inclusive"-these three Articles being
the ones which, it is clear, were then regarded as reflecting, or as crys-
tallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international
law relative to the continental shelf, amongst them the question of the
seaward extent of the shelf; the juridical character of the coastal State's
entitlement; the nature of the rights exercisable; the kind of natural
resources to which these relate; and the preservation intact of the legal
status as high seas of the waters over the shelf, and the legal status of
the superjacent air-space.
64. The normal inference would therefore be that any articles that
do not figure among those excluded from the faculty of reservation under
Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously existing or
emergent rules of law;and this is the inference the Court in fact draws in
respect of Article 6 (delimitation), having regard also to the attitude of
the International Law Commission to this provision, asalready described
in general terms. Naturally this would not of itself prevent this provision
from eventually passing into the general corpus of customary interna-
tional law by one of the processes considered in paragraphs 70-81 below.
But that is not here the issue. What is now under consideration is whether
it originally figured in the Convention as such a rule.
65. It has however been suggested that the inference drawii at the
beginning of the preceding paragraph is not necessarily warranted,
seeing that there are certain other provisions of the Convention, also not
excluded from the faculty of reservation, but which do undoubtedly in
principle relate to matters that lie within the field of received customary
law, such as the obligation not to impede the laying or maintenance of
submarine cables or pipelines on the continental shelf seabed (Article 4),
and the general obligation not unjustifiably to interfere witli freedom of
navigation, fishing, and so on (Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 6). These
matters however, al1relate toor are consequential upon principles or rules
of general maritime law, very considerably ante-dating the Convention,
and not directly connected with but only incidental to continental shelf
rights as such. They were mentioned in the Convention, not in order to
declare or confirm their existence, which was not necessary, but simply
to ensure that they were not prejudiced by the exercise of continental
shelf rights as provided for in the Convention. Another method ofprévusdans la Conveiitioii n'y porte pas atteinte. Une autre rédaction
aurait pu éviterl'ambiguïté; il n'en reste pas moins qu'un Etat ayant
formulé une réserve ne serait pas dégagépour autant des obligations
imposéespar le droit maritime généralen dehors et indépendamment de
la Convention sur le plateau continental, et notamment des obligations
énoncées à I'article 2 de la convention surla haute mer conclue au même
moment et définiepar son préambule comme déclaratoire de principes
établis du droit international.
66. L-article 6 relatifà la déliniitation paraità la Cour se présenter
de manière différente.II se rattache directement au régimejuridique du
plateau contine~ital en tant que tel et non à des questions incidentes;
puisque Ia faculté de formuler des réservesn'a pas été exclue à son sujet,
comme elle l'aétépour les articles 1à 3,il est légitimed'en déduirequ'on
lui a attribué une valeur différenteet moins fondamentale et que, con-
trairement à ces articles, il ne traduisait pas le droit coutumier préexistant
ou en voie de forrlîation. Le Danemark et les Pays-Bas ont pourtant
soutenu que le droit d'apporter des réserves à I'article 6 n'étaitpas censé
êtreillimitéet qu'eri particulier il n'allait pas jusqu'à exclure totalement
le principe de délimitation fondésur l'équidistance,car les articles 1et 2
de la Convention, à propos desquels aucune réserve n'est autorisée,
impliqueraient la délimitation sur la base de I'équidistaiîce.11en résul-
terait que le droit de faire des réservesI'article 6 ne pourrait êtreexercé
que d'une manière compatible avec, au moins, le maintien du principe
foiidarnental de l'équidistance. On a souligné à cet égard que, sur les
quatre seules réservesformulées jusqu'à présentau sujet de I'article 6 et
dont l'une au moins a une portéeassez large, aucune ne viseune exclusion
ou un rejet aussi total.
67. La Cour ne juge pas cet argument convaincant pour plusieurs
motifs. En premier lieu, il Liesemble pas que les articles 1 et 2 de la
Convention de Genève aient un rapport direct avec une délimitatioii
entre Etats eii tant que telle. L'article 1 ne vise que la limite extérieure
du plateau continental du côté du large et non pas sa délimitation entre
Etats se faisant face ou entre Etats limitrophes. L'article 2 ne concerne
pas davantage ce dernier point. Or il a étésuggéré, semble-t-il,que la
notion d'équidistarice résulteimplicitement du caractère ((exclusif )attri-
bué par I'article 2, paragraphe 2, aux droits de 1'Etat riverain sur le
plateau continental. A s'en tenir au texte, cette interprétation est mani-
festementinexacte. Levéritablesens de cepassage estque, danstoute zone
de plateau continental où un Etat riverain a des droits, ces droits sont
exclusifs et aucun autre Etat ne peut les exercer. Mais aucune précision
n'yest donnéequant aux zones mêmessur lesquelles chaque Etat riverain
possède des droits exclusifs. Cette question, qui ne peut se poser qu'en
ce quiconcerne les confins du plateau continental d'un Etat, est exacte-
nient, comme on l'a vu au paragraphe 20 ci-dessus in$ne, celle que le
processus de délimitation doit permettre de résoudre et elle relève de
I'article, non de I'article 2. cerned should, at al1 events potentially, be of a fundaiiientally noriii-
creating character such as could be regarded as forniing tlie basis of a
general rule of law. Considered in ubstracto the equidistance principle
might be said to fulfil this rcquirement. Yet in the particulnr form in
which it is embodied in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, and having
regard to the relationship of that Article to other provisions of tlie
Convention, this niust be open to some doubt. ln the first place, Article 6
is so framed asto put second the obligation to make use of the equidis-
tance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation to effect
delimitation by agreement. Such a primary obligation coiistitutes an
unusual preface to what is clainied to be a potential general rule of
law. Without attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon any
question of ,jus cogens, it is well understood that, in practice, rules of
international law can, by agreement, be derogated frorn in particular
cases, or as between particular parties,-but this is not norinally the
subject of any express provision, as it is in Articl6 of the Geneva Con-
vention. Secondly the part played by the notion of special circunistances
relative to the principle of equidistance as embodied in Article 6, and
the very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact mean-
ing and scope of this notion, must raise further doubts as tn the poten-
tially norm-creating character of the rule. Finally, the faculty of making
reservations to Article 6, while it might not of itself prevent thc equidis-
tance principle being eventually received as general law, does ndd con-
siderably to the difficulty of regarding this result as having been brought
about (or being potentially poysible) on the basis of the Convention:
for so long as this faculty continues to exist, and is not the subject of
any revision brought about in consequence of a request niade under
Article 13 of the Conventioii-of which there is at present no official
indication-it is tlie Convention itself which would, for tlie reasoiis
already indicated, seem to deny to the provisions of Article 6 the same
norm-creating character as, for instance, Articles 1and 2 possess.
73. With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary
before a conventional rule can be considered to have become LIgeneral
rule of international law, it might be that, even without the passage of
any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative
participation in theconvention might sufficeof itself, pro\ ided it included
that of States whose interests were specially affected. In the present case
however, the Court notes that, even if allowance is made for the existence
of a number of States to whom participation in the Geneva Convention
is not open, or which, by reason for instance of being land-locked
States, would have no interest in becoining parties to it, tlie number of
ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though respectable, hardly
sufficient. That non-ratification may sometimes be due to factors other
than active disapproval of the convention concerned cari hardly con-
stitute a basis on which positive acceptance of its principles can bc
implied: the reasons are speculntive, but the facts remain. 74. As regards the time element, the Court notes that it is over ten
years since the Convention was signed, but that it is even now less than
five since it came into force in June 1964, and that when the present
proceedings were brought it was less than three years, while less than
one had elapsed at the time when the respective negotiations between
the Federal Republic and the other two Parties for a complete delimita-
tion broke down on the question of the application of the equidistance
principle. Although the passage of only a short period of time is not
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a newle of customary
international law on the basis of what bras originally a purely conven-
tional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period
in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of
States whose interests are specially affected, should have been bot11
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;-
and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
75. The Court must now consider whether State practice in the inatter
of continental shelf delimitation has, subsequent to the Geneva Conven-
tion, been of such a kind as to satisfy this requirement. Leaving aside
cases which, for various reasons, the Court does not consider to be
reliable guides as precedents, such as delimitations effected between the
present Parties themselves, or not relating to international boundaries,
some fifteen cases have been cited in the course of the present pro-
ceedings, occurring mostly since the signature of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, in which continental shelf boundaries have been delimited
according to the equidistance principle-in the majority of the cases by
agreement, in a few others unilaterally-or else the deliniitation was
foreshadowed but has not yet been carried out. Amongst these fifteen
are the four North Seadelimitations United KingdomJNorway-Denrnark-
Netherlands, and NorwayJDenmark already mentioned in paragraph 4
of this Judgment. But even if these various cases constituted inore than
a very small proportion of those potentially calling for deliniitation in
the world as a whole, the Court would not think it necessary to enuinerate
or evaluate them separately, since tliere are, n priori several grounds
which deprive them of weight as precedents in the present context.
76. To begin with, over half the States concerned, whether acting
unilaterally or conjointly, were or shortly became parties to the Geneva
Convention, and were therefore presumably, so far as they were con-
cerned, acting actually or potentially in the application of the Con~entioii.
From their action no inference could legitimately be drawn as to the
existence of a rule of customary international law in favour of the
equidistance principle. As regards those States, on the other Iiand, which
were not, and have not become parties to the Convention, the basis oftheir action can only be problematical and must remain entirely specula-
tive. Clearly, they were not applying the Convention. But from that
no inference could justifiably be drawn that they believed themselves to
be applying a mandatory rule of customary international law. There
is not a shred of evidence that they did and, as has been seen (paragraphs
22 and 23), there is no lack of other reasons for using the equidistance
method, so that acting, or agreeing to act in a certain way, does not of
itself demonstrate anything of a juridical nature.
77. The essential point in this connection-and it seems necessary to
stress it-is that even if these instances of action by non-parties to the
Convention were much more nunierous than they in fact are, they would
not, even in the aggregate, suffice in themselves to constitute the opinio
juris;-for, in order to achieve this result, two conditions must be ful-
filled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice,
but they must also be sucli, or be carried out in such a way, as to be
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of Iaw requiring it. The need for such a belief, Le., the
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the
opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel
that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The
frequency, or even habitua1 cliaracter of the acts is not in itself enough.
There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and
protocol, whicli are performed almost invariably,but which are motivated
only by considcrations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not
by any sense of legal duty.
78. In this respect the Court follows the view adopted by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case, as stated in the fol-
lowing passage, the principle of which is, by analogy, applicable almost
word for word, nzutatis mutandis, to the present case (P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 10, 1927, at p. 28):
"Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found ... were
sufficient to prove ... the circunistance alleged .. .,it would merely
show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting
criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as
being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on
their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible
to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does not allow
one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty;
on the other hand, ... there are other circuinstances calculated to
show that the contrary is true."
Applying this dictum to the present case, the position is simply that in
certain cases-not a great nuinber-the States concerned agreed to draw
or did draw the boundaries concerned according to the principle of
equidistance. There is no evidence that they so acted because they feltlegally compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a rule of custom-
ary law obliging them to do so-especially considering that they might
have been motivated by other obvious factors.
79. Finally, it appears that in almost al1of the cases cited, the delimi-
tations concerned were median-line delimitations between opposite
States, not lateral delimitations between adjacent States. For reasons
which have already been given (paragraph 57) the Court regards the case
of median-line delimitations between opposite States as different in
various respects, and as being sufficiently distinct not to constitute a
precedent for the delimitation of lateral boundaries. In only onesituation
discussed by the Parties does there appear to have been a geographical
configuration which to some extent resembles the present one, in the
sense that a number of States on the same coastline are grouped around
a sharp curve or bend of it. No complete delimitation in this area has
however yet been carried out. But the Court is not concerned to deny to
this case, or any other of those cited, al1evidential value in favour of the
thesis of Denmark and the Netherlands. It simply considers that they
are inconclusive, and insufficient to bear the weight sought to be put
upon them as evidence of such a settled practice, manifested in such
circumstances, as would justify the inference that delimitation according
to the principle of equidistance amounts to a mandatory rule of customary
international law,-more particularly where lateral delimitations are
concerned.
80. There are of course plenty of cases (and a considerable number
were cited) of delimitations of waters, as opposed to seabed, being carried
out on the basis of equidistance-mostly ofinterna1 waters (lakes, rivers,
etc.), and mostly median-line cases. The nearest analogy is that of ad-
jacent territorial waters, but as already explained (paragraph 59) the
Court does not consider this case to be analogous to that of the con-
tinental shelf.
81. The Court accordingly concludes that if the Geneva Convention
was not in its origins or inception declaratory of a mandatory rule of
customary international law enjoining the use of the equidistance prin-
ciple for the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent
States, neither has its subsequent effect been constitutive of such a rule;
and that State practice up-to-date has equally been insuficient for the
purpose.
82. The immediately foregoing conclusion, coupled with that reached
earlier (paragraph 56) to the effect that the equidistance principle could
not be regarded as being a rule of law on any a priori basis of logical necessity deriving froin the fundamental theory of the continental shelf,
leads to the final conclusion on this part of the case that the use of the
equidistance method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas
concerned in the present proceedings. In these circumstances, it becomes
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether or not the configuration
of the German North Sea Coastconstitutes a "special circumstance" for
thepurposes either of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention or of any rule
of customary international law,-since once the use of the equidistance
method of delimitation is deterinined not to be obligatory in any event,
itceases to be legally necessary to prove the existence of special circum-
stances in order to justify not using that method.
83. The legal situation therefore is that the Parties areder no obliga-
tion to apply either the 1958Convention, which is not opposable to the
Federal Republic, or the equidistaiice method as a mandatory rule of
customary law, which it is not. But as between States faced with an issue
concerning the lateral delimitation of adjacent continental shelves, there
are still rules and principles of law to be applied; and in the present case
it is not the fact either thatules are lacking, or that the situation is one
for the unfettered appreciation of the Parties. Equally, it is not the case
that if the equidistance principle is not arule of law, there has to be as
an alternative some other single equivalent rule.
84. As already indicated, the Court is riot called upon itself to delimit
the areas of continental shelf appertaining respectively to each Party,
and in consequence is not bound to prescribe the methods to be em-
ployed for the purposeâ of such a delimitation. TheCourt has to indicate
to the Parties the principles and rules of law in the light of which the
methods for eventually effecting the delimitation will have to be chosen.
TheCourt will discharge this task in such a way as to provide the Parties
with the requisite directions,without substitutiiig itself for them byans
of a detailed indication of the methods to be followed and the factors to
be taken into account for the purposes of a delimitation the carrying out
of which the Parties have expressly reserved to themselves.
85. It emerges from the history of the development of the legal régime
of thecontinental shelf, which has been reviewedearlier, that the essential
reason why the equidistance method is not to be regarded as a rule of
law is that, if it were to be compulsorily applied in al1 situations, this
would not be consonant with certain basic legal notions which, as has
been observed in paragraphs 48 and 55, have from the beginning reflected
the opini ouriisn the inatter of delimitation; those principles being that
delimitation must be the object of agreement between the States con-
cerned, and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance with
equitable principles. On a foundation of very general precepts of justice
and good faith, actual rules of law are here involved which govern thedelimitation of adjacent continent shelves-that is to say, rules binding
upon States for al1de1imitations;-i"\, .short, it is not a question of apply-
ing equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule
of law which itself requires the appllcation of equitable principles, in
accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development
of the legal régimeof the continental shelf in this field, namely:
(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a
view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a
forma1 process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the
automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the
absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be
the case when either of them insists upon its own position without
contemplating any modification of it;
(6) the parties are under an obligation to act in such a way that, in the
particular case, and taking al1 the circumstances into account,
equitable principles are applied,-for this purpose the equidistance
method can be used, biit other methods exist and may be employed,
alone or in combination, according to the areas involved;
(c) for the reasons given in paragraphs 43 and 44, the continental shelf
of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory
and must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the
territory of another State.
86. It is now necessary to examine these rules more closely, as also
certain problems relative to their application. So far as the first rule is
concerned, the Court would recall not only that the obligation to nego-
tiate which the Parties assumed by Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Special
Agreements arises out of the Truman Proclamation, wliich, for the
reasons given in paragraph 47, inust be considered as having propounded
the rules of Iriwin this field,but also that this obligation merelyconstitutes
a special application of a principle which underlies al1 international
relations, and which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes.There is no need to insist upon the fundamental
character of this method of settlement, except to point out that it is
emphasized by the observable fact that judicial or arbitral settlement is
not universally accepted.
87. As the Permanent Court of International Justice said in its Order
of 19August 1929in the case of the Free Zones of UpperSavoy and the
District of Gex, the judicial settlement of international disputes "is
simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such dis-
putes between the parties" (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22, at p. 13).Defining
the content of the obligation to negotiate, the Permanent Court, in its48 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
Advisory Opinion in the case of Railicay Trafic between Litll~raniuat7d
Poland, said that the obligation was "not only to enter into negotiations
but also to pursue them as far as possible with a view to coiicluding
agreements", even if an obligation to negotiate did not imply an obliga-
tion to reach agreement (P.C.I.J., Series AjB, No. 42, 1931, at p. 116).
In the present case, it needs to be observed that whatever the details of
the negotiations carried on in 1965and 1966,they failed of their purpose
because the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands, convinced
that the equidistance principle alone was applicable, in consequence of a
rule binding upon the Federal Republic, saw no reason to depart from
that rule; and equally, given the geographical considerations stated in
the last sentence of paragraph 7 above, the Federal Republic could not
accept the situation resulting from the application of that rule. So far
therefore the negotiations have not satisfied the conditions indicated in
paragraph 85 (a), but fresh negotiations are to take place on the basis
of the present Judgment.
88. TheCourt comes next to the rule of equity. The legal basis of that
rule in the particular case of the delimitation of the continental shelf as
between adjoining States has already been stated. It must however be
noted that the rule rests also on a broader basis. Whatever the legal
reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just,
and therefore in that sense equitable. Nevertheless, when mention is
made of a court dispensing justice or declaring the law, what is meant is
that the decision finds its objective justification in considerations lying
not outside but within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule of
law that calls for the application of equitable principles. There is con-
sequently no question in this case of any decision ex aequo et bono, such
as would only be possible under the conditions prescribed by Article 38,
paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute. Nor would this be the first time that
the Court has adopted such an attitude, as is shown by the following
passage from the Advisory Opinion given in the case of Judgmetztsof the
Admitzistratii7eTribunul of the I.L.O. upon Cornplaints Made against
Unesco(I.C.J. Reports 1956,at p. 100) :
"In view of this the Court need not examine the allegation that
the validity of the judgments of the Tribunal is vitiated by excess of
jurisdiction on the ground that it awarded compensation ex aequo
etbono. Ttwill confine itself to stating that, in the reasons given by
the Tribunal in support of its decision on the merits, the Tribunal
said: 'That redress will be ensured ex aequo et bon0 by the granting
to the complainant of the sum set forth below.' It does not appear
from the context of the judgment that the Tribunal thereby intended
to depart from principles of law. The apparent intention was to Say that, as the precise determination of theactual amount to be awarded
could not be based on any specific rule of law, the Tribunal fixed
what the Court, in other circumstances, has described as the true
measure of compensation and the reasonable figure of such corn-
pensation (Corfu Channel case, Judgment of December 15th, 1949,
Z.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 249)."
89. It must next be observed that, in certain geographical circuin-
stances which are quite frequently met with, the equidistance method,
despite its known advantages, leads unquestionably to inequity, in the
following sense:
(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by
the equidistance line as regards the consequences for the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of
concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is
employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the
coastline the area to be delimited, the more unreasonctble are the
results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of
a natural geographical feature must be remedied or compensated
for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity.
(b) In the case of the North Sea in particular, where there is no outer
boundary to the continental shelf, it happens that the claims of
several States converge, meet and intercross in localities where,
despite their distance from the coast, the bed of the sea still uii-
questionably consists of continental shelf. A study of these con-
vergences, as revealed by the maps, shows how inequitable would
be the apparent simplification brought about by a delirnitation
which, ignoring such geographical circumstances, was based solely
on the equidistance method.
90. If for the above reasons equity excludes the use of the eqiiidistance
method in the present instance, as the sole method of delimitation, the
question arises whether there is any necessity to employ only one method
for the purposes of a given delimitation. There is no logical basis for this,
and no objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a delimitation of
adjoining continental shelf areas by the concurrent use of various
methods. The Court has already stated why it considers that the inter-
national law of continental shelf delimitation does not involve any im-
perative rule and permits resort to various principles or metliods, as may
be appropriate, or a combination of them, provided that, by the applicn-
tion of equitable principles, a reasonable result is arrived at.
91. Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never be
any question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does not
require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted an area
of continental shelf, any more than tliere could be a question of rendering
the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of aState with a restricted coastline. Equality is to be reckoned within the
same plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as these that equity
could remedy. But in the present case there are three States whose North
Sea coastlines are in fact comparable in length and which, therefore,
have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the con-
figuration of one of the coastlines would, if the equidistance method is
used, deny to one of these States treatment equal or comparable to that
given the other two. Here indeed is a case where, in a theoretical situation
of equality within the same order, an inequity is created. What is un-
acceptable in this instance is that a State should enjoy continental shelf
rights considerably different from those of its neiglibours merely because
in the one case the coastline is roughly convex in form and in the other
it is markedly concave, although those coastlines are comparable in
length. It is therefore not a question of totally refashioning geography
whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situation of
quasi-equality as between a number of States, of abating the effects of
an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of
treatment could result.
92. It has however been maintained that no one method of delimita-
tion can prevent such results and that al1can lead to relative injustices.
This argumenthas in effect already been dealt with. It can only strengthen
the view that it is necessary to seek not one method of delimitation but
one goal. It is in this spirit that the Court must examine the question of
how the continental shelf can be delimited when it is in fact the case that
the equidistance principle does not provide an equitable solution. As the
operation of delimiting is a matter of determining areas appertaining to
different jurisdictions, it is a truism to say that the determination must be
equitable; rather is the problem above al1one of defining the means where-
by the delimitation can be carried out in such a way as to be recognized
as equitable. Although the Parties have made it known that they intend
to reserve for themselves the application of the principles and rules laid
down by the Court, it would, even so, be insufficient simply to rely on the
rule of equity without giving some degree of indication as to the possible
ways in which it might be applied in the present case, it being understood
that the Parties will be free to agree upon one method rather than an-
other, or different methods if they so prefer.
93. In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States
may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply
equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of
al1 such considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance
on one to the exclusion of al1others. The problem of the relative weight
to be accorded to different considerations naturally varies with the circum-
stances of the case.
94. In balancing the factors in question it would appear that various
aspects must be taken into account. Some are related to the geological.
others to the geographical aspect of the situation, others again to theidea of the unity of any deposits. These criteria, thougli not entirely
prccisc, can provide adequate bases for decision adapted to the factual
situation.
95. The institution of the continental shelf has ariscn out of the recog-
nition of a physical fact; and the link between this fact and the law, with-
out which that institution would never have existed, remains an im-
portant element for the application of its legal régime. The continental
shelf is, by definition, an area physically extending the territory of niost
coastal States into a species of platforni whicli has attracted the attention
first of geographers and hydrographers and then of jurists. The iinpor-
tance of the geological aspect is empliasired by the care which, at the
beginning of its investigation, the International Law Con-iniission took
to acquire exact information as to its characteristics, as can be seen in
pnrticular from the definitions to be found on page 131 of Volume 1
of the k'c~trrhook of'tlre /~~tenrcctionlnbc.Comtnissio~zfor 1956. The ap-
purtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of whose coastlines it
lies. is thereforc LIfact, and it can be useful to consider the geology of
tliat shelf in order to find out whether the direction taken by certain
configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain
localities, they point-up the whole notion of the appurtenance of the
continental shelf to the State whose tcrritory it does iii fact prolong.
96. The doctrine of the continental slielf is a rccent instance of en-
croachinent on maritime cxpanses whicli, during the greater part of
iiistory, appertained to no-one. Thc contiguouj zone and the continental
shelf are in tliis respect coriczpts of the same kind. In both instances the
principle is applied that the land dominates the sen; it is consequently
necessary to examine closely the gcographicnl configuration of the coast-
lines of the countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited. This
is one of the rensons why the Court does not consider that markedlq
pronounced configurations can bz ignoreci; for, since the land is the legal
source of the power which a State inay cvcrcise over territorial extensions
to seaward, it must first bc clearly established what features do in fact
constitute sucli extensions. Abovc al1 is this the case when what is in-
volved is no longer areas of sca, such as the contiguouszone, but stretches
of submerged land; for the legal régime of the continental shelf is that
of a sail and a subsoil, two words evocativc of the land and not of the sea.
97. Anothcr factor to be taken into consideration in the delimitation
of areas of continental slielf as between abiricent States is the unity of
any deposits. Tlic natural resourccs of the siibsoil of the sea in those parts
which consist of continental shelf are the very object of the legal régime
established subsequent to the Truman Proclamation. Yet it frequently
occurs that the saine deposit lies on both sides of the line dividing a con-
tinental shelf between two States, and since it is possible to exploit such
a deposit from either side, a problem iminediately arises on account of
the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of the
States concerned. To look no farther than the North Sea, the practiceof States shows how this problem has been dealt with, and al1 that is
needed is to refer to the undertakings entered into by the coastal States
of that sea with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation or the
apportionment of the products extracted-(see in particular the agree-
ment of 10 March 1965 between the United Kingdom and Norway,
Article 4; the agreement of 6 October 1965between the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom relating to "the exploitation of single geological
structures extending across the dividing line on the continental shelf
under the North Sea"; and the agreement of 14 May 1962 between the
Federal Republic and the Netherlands concerning a joint plan for ex-
ploiting the natural resources underlying the area of the Ems Estuary
where the frontier between the two States has not been finally delimited.)
The Court does not consider that unity of deposit constitutes anything
more than a factual element which it is reasonable to take into considera-
tion in the course of the negotiations for a delimitation. The Parties are
fully aware of the existence of the problem as also of the possible ways of
sol vi"^ it.
98. A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a reason-
able degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according
to equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the
continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths
of their respective coastlines,-these being measured according to their
general direction in order to establish the necessary balance between
States with straight, and those \vith markedly concave or convex coasts,
or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions. The
choice and application of the appropriate technical methods would be
a matter for the parties. One method discussed in the course of the pro-
ceedings, under the name of the principle of the coastal front, consists
in drawing a straight baseline between the extreme points at either end
of the Coast concerned, or in soine cases a series of such lines. Where the
parties mis11to employ in particular the equidistance method of delimita-
tion. the establishment of one or more baselines of this kind can ~lav
a us'eful part in eliminating or diminishing the distortions that might . ,
result from the use of that method.
99. In a sea with the particular configuration of the North Sea, and
in view of the particular geographical situation of the Parties' coastlines
upon that sea, the methods chosen by them for the purpose of fixing the
delimitation of their respective areas may happen in certain localities to
lead to an overlapping of the areas appertaining to them. The Court
considcrs that such a situation must be accepted as a given fact and
resolved either by an agrecd, or failing that by an equal division of the
overlapping areas, or by agreements for joint exploitation, the latter
solution appearing particularly appropriate when it is a question of
preserving the unity of a deposit. 100. The Court has examined the problems raised by the present case
in its own context, which is strictly that of delimitation. Other questions
relating to the general legal régime ofthe continental shelf, have been
examined for that purpose only. This régimefurnishes an example of a
legal theory derived from a particular source that has secured a general
following. As the Court has recalled in the first part of its Judgment, it
was the Truman Proclamation of 28 September 1945 which was at the
origin of the theory, whose special features reflect that origin. It would
therefore not be in harmony with this history to over-systematize a
pragmatic construct the developments of which have occurred within
a relatively short space of time.
101. For these reasons,
by eleven votes to six,
finds that, in each case,
(A) the use of the equidistance method of delimitation not being
obligatory as between the Parties; and
(B) there being no other single method of delimitation the use of
which is in al1circumstances obligatory;
(C) the principles and rules of international law applicable to the
delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf
in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial
boundary determined by the agreements of 1 December 1964and 9 June
1965, respectively, are as follows:
(1) delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitablc principles, and taking account of al1the relevant circum-
stances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party
:il1thosc parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of
the other;
(2) if, in the applicationof the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation
leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided be-
tween them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally,
unless they decide on a réginieofjoint jurisdiction, user, or exploita-
tion for the zones of overlap or any part of them;
(D) in the course of the negotiations, the factors to be taken into
account are to include: (1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the
presence of any special or unusual features;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological
structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelfreas in-
volved ;
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimi-
tation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to
bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas apper-
taining to the coastal State and the length of its Coast measured in
the general direction of the coastline, account beingaken for this
purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental
shelf delimitations between adjacent States in theme region.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of February, one
thousand nine hundred and sixty-nine, in four copies, one of which will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Government
of the Kingdom of Denmark and to the Government of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, respectively.
(Signed ).L. BUSTAMANT R.,
President.
(Signed S).AQUARONE,
Registrar.
Judge Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHANmakes the following declara-
tion :
1am in agreement with the Judgment throughout but would wish to
add the following observations.
The essence of the dispute between the Parties is that the twodoms
claim that the delimitation effected between them under the Agreement
of 31 March 1966 is binding upon the Federal Republic and that the
Federal Republic is bound to accept the situation resulting therefrom,
which would confine its continental shelf to the triangle formed bynes
A-B-E and C-D-E in Map 3. The Federal Republic stoutly resists that
claim.
Not only is Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958not opposable
to the Federal Republic but the delimitation effectedunder the Agree-
ment of 31March 1966 does not derive fromthe provisions of that Article
as Denmark and the Netherlands are neither States "whose coasts are
opposite each other" within the meaning of the first paragraph of that
Article nor are they "two adjacent States" within the meaning of thesecond paragraph of that Article. The situation resulting from that delimi-
tation, so far as it affects the Federal Republic is not, therefore, brought
about by the application of the principle set out in either of theparagraphs
of Article 6 of the Convention.
Had paragraph 2 of Article 6 been applicable to the deliinitation of
the continental shelf between the Parties to the dispute, a boundary line,
determined by the application of the principle of equidistance, would
have had to allow for the configuration of the coastline of the Federal
Republic as a "special circumstance".
ln the course of the oral pleadings the contention that the principle
of equidistance cum special circumstances had crystallized into a rule of
customary international law was not advanced on behalf of the two
Kingdoms as an alternative to the claim that that principle was inherent
in the very concept of the continental shelf. The Judgment has, in fair-
ness, dealt with these two contentions as if they had been put forward
in the alternative and were thus consistent with each other, and has
rejected each of them on the merits. 1am in agreement with the reasoning
of the Judgment on both these points. But, 1consider, it is worth men-
tioning that Counsel for the two Kingdoms summed up their position
in regard to the effect of the 1958 Convention as follows:
". .. They have not maintained that the Convention embodied al-
ready received rules of customary law in the sense that the Conven-
tion was merely declaratory of existing rules. Their position is rather
that the doctrine of the coastal State's exclusive rights over the
adjacent continental shelf was in process of formation between 1945
and 1958; that the State practice prior to 1958 showed fundamental
variations in the nature and scope of the rights claimed: that, in
consequence, in State practice the emerging doctrine was wholly
Iacking in any definition of these crucial elements as it was also of
the legal rCgime applicable to the coastal State with respect to the
continental shelf;that the process of the definition and consolidation
of the emerging customary law took place through the work of the
International Law Commission, the reaction of governments to that
work and the proceedings of the Geneva Conference; that the
emerging customary law, iiow become more defined, both as to the
rights of the coastal State and the applicable régime, crystallized in
the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention by the Conference;
and that the numerous signatures and ratifications of the Convention
and the other State practice based on the principles set out in the
Convention had the effect of consolidating those principles as cus-
tomary law."
If it were correct that the doctrine of the coastal State's exclusive
rights over the adjacent continental shelf was in process of formation56 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DECL.BENGZON)
between 1945 and 1958 and that in State practice prior to 1958 it was
wholly lacking in any definition of crucial elements as it was also of the
legal régimeapplicable to the coastal State with respect to the continental
shelf,then it would seem to follow conclusively that the principle of
equidistance was not inherent in the concept of the continental shelf.
Judge BENGZON makes the following declarati:n
1 regret my inability to concur with the main conclusions of the
majority of the CourT.agree with my colleagues who maintain the view
that Article of the Geneva Convention is the applicable international
law and that as betweenhese Parties equidistance is the rule for delimita-
tion, which rule may even be derived from the general principles of law.
PresidentBUSTAMANT Y ERIVEROJ,udges JESSUPP,ADILLA NERVO and
AMMOUa Nppend Separate Opinions to the Judgment of the Court.
Vice-PresidentKORETSKY Ju,dges TANAKAM, ORELLIL,ACHS and Judge
ad hoc SDRENSEa ppend Dissenting Opinions to the Judgrnent of the
Court.
(Initialled) J. L. B.-R.
(Initialled) S. A.
INTERIqATIONCOURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYIDENMARK;
FEDERAL REPIJBLICiOF GERMANYINETHERLANDS)
JUDGMENT OF 20 FEBRUARY1969
COUP: INTERNATIONADE JUSTICE
RECUE1L:DESARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
DE LA MER DU NORD
(RÉPUBLIQUE ]?GDGRALE D9ALLEMAGNE/DANEMARK;
RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D7ALLEMAGNE/PAYS-BAS) Official citation:
North Sea Continental SheljJltdgment, I.C.JReports 1969, p. 3.
Mode officielde citation:
Plateau continental de la mer du Norarrêt,C.I.J.Recueil 1969,p.3.
Sales number
No de vente: 327 20 FEBRUARY 1969
JUDGMENT
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELFCASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYIDENMARK;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAWINETHERLANDS)
AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
DE LA MER DU NORD INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1969
1969
!OFebruary
gos.51 & 52t: 20 February 1969
NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,'DENMARK;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYINETHERLANDS)
Continerrtal shelf'nreas iri the h'orrli Sea-Delitriitacrsbetwecn aa'jacerit
States-Advcitirages crnddisadvarrtyye.~of tfie equidistarice rnethod--Tlieory of
just and equitahle apportionrrlent-ltrron~p afitbslthtyry with the prirz-
ciple of the natlrral appurtenance of the shelf to the coastal State-Taof the
Court relates to deliniitntioti riot apportiorriiirrlt.
The eqiiidistance pririciple as errrhodiedirrArticle 6 of the 1958 Genrva Con-
tiner~talShelfCoiivc~nriori-Noti-opposa ohithityprovision to the Federal
Republic of Gerrnar1y,either contrnctrrcrllyor or1~nsis of'cor1ductor estoppel.
Equiclistcrnceatrd the pririciple of naturnl al~prirtenarrce-Miorof closest
pro.rir~iity-Critique of that notioii as not beiilg entailed hy the pririciple of ap-
purtenance-Firndarnerltul clzaracter of the prirrciple of the coritirieritalshelf as
being the natural prolorrgatiotiof the laricltcrritory.
Legal history of cl~li~~zircrtion-Trurna~Procla~rratioti-lrlterr1atiorial Law
Comrnissioïr-1958 Geneva Conferrrrce-Acceptarlce ofc,quidistanceas a prrrely
convetitional rule not reflc~ctingor c~stnllizirrg ofrcristornaryinterriational
law-Effect in this respect of r~.serïatioru mticle of Geneva Convention-Sub-
sequerit State practice insuficienIO coriïrrf the corzvt~r~tir/le into a rule
of c~rstor~~airryrternatiot~alIa~vopinio juris sivenecessitathowtnanifsstetl.
Staterlient of what are the applicable pririciples and r~rlesof Iaiv-Delimitation
by agreement, in accordarrce with eq~ritablepririciples, raking accowit of al1
relevant circunistcinces,antiso asto give eflect to the principle of natural prolonga-
tion-Freedom of the Partiesas to cltoice of rnethod-Varioiis factors relevant
to theriegofiution. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
ANNÉE 1969
1369
20 février
20 février1969 Rôle général
no* 51 & 52
AFFAIRES DU PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
DE LA MER DU NORD
Plateau continental (dela rizerdu Nord- Délimitationentre Etats limitrophes
- Avantages et inconvénientsde la méthode de l'équidistance - Théoriede la
répartitionjuste etéquftable- Inconzpatibilitéde cette théorie avec leprincipe du
rattachernent naturel du plateau continental à I'Etat riverain- La mission de
la Cour concerne la délinritationet rzonla répartition.
Le principe del'équidistancerésultant del'article 6 de la Convention de Genève
de 1958 sur le piabeau continental - Inopposabilité decette disposition à la
Républiquefkdérale d'Allenzagne que ce soit à titre contractilelÙ raison du
comportenlent ou par lejeu de I'estoppel.
Equidistarlce et priizcipe du rattachement natlrrel- niorion de plus grande
proximité - Critiqlte de cette notion, que leprincipe du rattachenient n'implique
pas - Caractèrefondamental du principe selon lequel le plateau continerital est
le prolonge~r~etittiatl~r~edlu territoire.
Historiqire du droit de la délimitation-Proclamation Truman - Cornmission
du droit irirernationa- Conférericede Gerièvede 1958 - Acceptation de l'&qui-
distance en tant que rtgle purenient corrventionnellene consacrant ou ne cristal-
lisant pas une règle de droit irrternutional cout~rmier - Eflet à cet égardde
l'article de la Cotii.eritiorzde Genèverelatif aux réser-esLa pratique ultérieure
des Etats ne sufit pas ù trarisfornier lrrlerègle conventiorznelle en une règle de
droit internariorial coirt~<nz-r L'opinio juris sive necessitatis et ses manifes-
tations.
Priticipes et règles de droit applicables - Délimitation par voie d'accord,
confornzément à des priticipes équitables, eflectuéecompte tenu de toutes les
circonstances pertinentes et afin de donner effet au principe du prolongement
tiaturel- Libertédes Parties quant au choix de la méthode - Divers facteurs
présentant del'intéréptour les négociations. JUDGMENT
Present: Presiderlt BUSTAMANT YERIVERO;Vice-President KORE~SKYJ;udges
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICT E,ANAKAJ,ESSUP,MORELLIS ,ir Muhammad
ZAFRULLA KHAN,PADILLA NERVOF , ORSTER,GROS,AMMOUN, BENG-
ZON,PETRENL , ACHS,ONYEAMAJ;udges ad hoc MOSLERS , DRENSEN;
Registrar AQUARONE.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
between
the Federal Republic of Germany,
represented by
Dr. G. Jaenicke, Professor of InternationLaw in the University of Frank-
furt am Main,
as Agent,
assisted by
Dr. S. Oda, Professor of International Law in the University of Sendai,
as Counsel,
Dr. U. Scheuner, Professor of International Law in the University of Bonn,
Dr. E. Menzel, Professor of International Law in the University of Kiel,
Dr. Henry Herrmann, of the Massachusetts Bar, associated with Messrs.
Goodwin, Procter and Hoar, Counsellors-at-Law, Boston,
Dr. H. Blomeyer-Bartenstein, Counsellor 1st Class, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Dr. H. D. Treviranus, Counsellor,Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers,
and by MT.K. Witt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Expert,
and
the Kingdom of Denmark,
represented by
Mr. Bent Jacobsen, Barrister at the Supreme Court of Denmark,
as Agent and Advocate,
assisted by
Sjr Humphrey Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Q.C., Professor of International
-Law in the University of Oxford,
as Counsel and Advocate,
H.E. MT. S. Sandager Jeppesen, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MT. E. Krog-Meyer, Head of The Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Dr. 1. Foighel, Professor in the University of Copenhagen,
MT. E. Lauterpacht, Mernber of the English Bar and Lecturer in the Uni-
versityof Cambridge,Présents: M. BUSTAMANT YERIVEROP . résident;M. KORETSKYV , ice-Président;
sir Gerald FITZMAURICM E,M. TANAKAJ,ESSUPM , ORELLs I,ir Muham-
mad ZAFRULLAKHAN,MM. PADILLANERVO, FORSTER,GROS,
AMMOUNB ,ENGZON, PETRÉNL , ACHSO, NYEAMA j~,~ges;MM. MOSLER,
SORENSEN jw,ges ad hoc; M. AQUARONE G,refier.
En les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord,
entre
la République fédérale:'Allemagne.
représentéepar
M. G. Jaenicke, professeur de droit internatiànl'université de Francfort-
sur-le-Main,
comme agent,
M. S. Oda, professeur de droit internatiànl'université de Sendai,
comme conseil,
M. U. Scheuner, professeur de droit internationàl'université de Bonn,
M. E. Menzel, professeur de droit internationàl'université de Kiel,
M. Henry Herrmann, du barreau du Massachusetts, membre associé du
cabinet Goodwin.,Procter and Hoar, avocatsà Boston,
M. H. Blomeyer-Bartenstein, conseiller de première classe au ministère des
Affaires étrangères,
M. H. D. Treviranus, conseiller au ministère des Affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers,
et par
M. K. Witt, du ministère des Affaires étrangères,
comme expert,
le Royaume du Danemark,
représentépar
M. Bent Jacobsen, avocat àla Cour suprêmedu Danemark,
comme agent et avocat,
sir Humphrey Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Q.C., professeur de droit inter-
national àl'université d'Oxford,
comme conseil et avocat,
S. Exc. M. S. Sandager Jeppesen, ambassadeur, du ministère des Affaires
étrangères,
M. E. Krog-Meyeir, chef du service juridique du ministère des Affaires
étrangères,
M. 1.Foighel, professeuà l'université de Copenhague,
M. E. Lauterpacht, membre du barreau anglais, maître de conférencesà
l'université de C.ambridge,
55 CONTINENTAL SHELF(JUDGMENI)
Mr. M. Thamsborg, Head of Department, Hydrographic Institute,
as Advisers,
and by
Mr. P. Boeg, Head of Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. U. Engel, Head of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Secretaries,
and between
the Federal Republic of Germany,
represented as indicated above,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
represented by
Professor W. Ripl-iagen, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Professor of International Law at the Rotterdam School of Economics,
as Agent,
assisted by
Sir Humphrey Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Q.C., Professor of International
Law in the University of Oxford,
as Counsel,
Rear-Admira1 W. Langeraar, Chief of the Hydrographic Department,
Royal Netherlands Navy,
MT. G. W. Maas Geesteranus, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Miss F. Y. van der Wal, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Advisers,
and by
Mr. H. Rombach, Divisional Head, Hydrographic Department, Royal
Netherlands Navy,
as Deputy-Adviser,
composed as above,
delivers thefollowing J~tclgrnent:
By a letter of 16February 1967,received in the Registry on20 February 1967,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlandstransmitted to the Registrar:
(a) an original copy, signed at Bonn on 2 February 1967for the Governments
of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany, of a Special Agree-
ment for the submission to the Court of a difference between those two
States concerning the delimitation, as between them, of the continental
shelf in the North Sea;
(b) an original copy, signed at Bonn on 2 February 1967forthe Governments
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, of a Special
Agreement for the submission to the Court of a difference between those M. M. Thamsborg, chef de service à l'Institut hydrographique,
comme conseillers,
et par
M. P. Boeg, chef de:secrétariatau ministère des Affairesétrangères,
M. U. Engel, chef de section au ministère des Affairesétrangères,
comme secrétaires,
et entre
la République fédéraled'Allemagne,
représentéecomme il est dit ci-dessus,
le Royaume des Pays-.Bas,
représenté par
M. W. Riphagen, jiurisconsulte du ministère des Affaires étrangères,profes-
seur de droit international 1'Ecoledes sciences économiques de Rotter-
dam,
comme agent,
sir Humphrey Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Q.C., professeur de droit inter-
nationalà l'université d'Oxford,
comme conseil,
le contre-amiral W. Langeraar, chef du service hydrographique de la Marine
royale des Pays-Bas,
M. Ci.W. Maas Geesteranus, jurisconsulte adjoint du minis re des Affaires
étrangères,
Mlle F. Y. van der Wal, jurisconsulte adjoint du ministère des Affaires
étrangères,
comme conseillers,
et par
M. H. Rombach, c:hefde division au service hydrographique de la Marine
royale des Pays-Bas,
comme conseiller amdjoint,
ainsi composée,
rendl'arrês tuivant:
Par lettre du 16 février 1967, reçue au Greffe le 20 février 1967, Ie ministre
des Affaires étrangèresdes Pays-Bas a adresséau Greffier:
a) un exemplaire original d'un compromis, signé à Bonn le 2 février1967pour
les Gouvernements du Danemark et de la République fédérale d'Allemagne,
soumettant à la Cour un différendentre ces deux Etats relatià la délimita-
tion du plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre eux;
6) un exemplaire original d'un compromis, signé à Bonn le 2 février1967
pour les Gouverriements de la République fédéraled'Allemagne et des
Pays-Bas, soumettant à la Cour un différend entre ces deux Etats relatif6 CONTINENTALSHELF(JUDGMENT)
two Statesconcerning the delimitation, as between them, of the continental
shelf in the North Sea;
(c) an original copy, signed at Bonn on 2 February 1967for the three Govern-
ments aforementioned, of a Protocol relating to certain procedural ques-
tions arising from the above-mentioned Special Agreements.
Articles 1 to 3 of the Special Agreement between the Governments of Den-
mark and the Federal Republic of Germany are as follows:
"Article 1
(1) The International Court of Justice is requested to decide the follow-
ing question:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the
delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf
in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial
boundary determined by the above-mentioned Convention of 9 June
1965?
(2) The Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark and of the Federal
Republic of Germany shall delimit the continental shelf in the North Sea
as between their countries by agreement in pursuance of the decision
requested from the International Court of Justice.
Article 2
(1) The Parties shall present their written pleadings to the Court in the
order stated below :
1. a Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany to be submitted
withi~ six months from the notification of the present Agreement to
the mrt;
2. a Colinter-Meinorial of the Kingdom of Denmark to be submitted
within six months frorn the delivery of the German Memorial;
3. a German Reply followed by a Danish Rejoinder to be delivered
within such tirne-limits as the Court may order.
(2) Additional written pleadings may be presented if this is jointly
proposed by the Parties and considered by the Court to be appropriate to
the case and the circumstances.
(3) The foregoing order of presentation is without prejudice to any
question of burden of proof which might arise.
Article 3
The present Agreement shall enter into force on the day of signature
thereof."
Articles 1 to 3 of the Special Agreement between the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands areas follows:
"Article 1
(1) The International Court of Justice is requested to decide the follow-
ing question:
What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the
delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf
in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial
boundary determined by the above-mentioned Convention of 1Decem-
ber 1964? à la délimitation du plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre eux;
c) un exemplaire original d'un protocole, signé à Bonn le 2 février 1967 pour
les trois gouvernements précités, relatifà certaines questions de procédure
résultant des compromis ci-dessus mentionnés.
Les articles 1à 3 du compromis entre les Gouvernements du Danemark et de
la République fédéraled :'Allemagne son1 ainsi conçus:
((Articlepremier
1) La Cour internationale de Justice est priée de trancher la question
suivante :
Quels sont les principes et les règlesdu droit international applicables
à la délimitation entre les Parties des zones du plateau continental de la
mer du Nord relevant de chacune d'elles, au-delà de la ligne de délimi-
tation partielle déterminéepar la convention susmentionnée du 9 juin
1965?
2) Les Gouver.nements du Royaume du Danemark et de la République
fédéraled'Allemagne délimiteront le plateau continental de la mer du
Nord entre leurs pays par voie d'accord conclu conformément a la décision
demandée a la Cour internationale de Justice.
Article 2
1) Les Parties déposeront devant la Cour les pièces de la procédure
écritedans l'ordre suivant :
1. mémoire de la République fédérale d'Allemagne devant être soumis
dans les six mois qui suivront la notification du présent accord à la
Cour;
2. contre-mémoire du Royaume du Danemark devant êtresoumis dans
les six mois qui suivront la remise du mémoire allemand;
3. réplique alliemande suivie d'une duplique danoise, devant être
soumises dans des délais à fixer par la Cour.
2) Des pièces écrites supplémentaires pourront êtreprésentées si les
Parties leproposi:nt en commun et si la Cour l'estime approprié a l'affaire
et aux circonstances.
3) L'ordre indiqué ci-dessus pour le dépôt des piècesne préjugeen rien
de la charge de la preuve.
Article 3
Le présent accord entrera en vigueur le jour de sa signature.
Les articles1 à 3 du compromis entre les Gouvernements de la République
fédérale d'Allemagneet des Pays-Bas sont ainsi conçus :
((Articlepremier
1) La Cour internationale de Justice est priée de trancher la question
suivante :
Quels sont I,esprincipes et les règlesdu droit international applicables
à la délimitation entre les Parties des zones du plateau continental de la
mer du Nord relevant de chacune d'elles, au-delà de la ligne de délimi-
tation partielle déterminée par la convention susmentionnée du le'
décembre 1964? (2) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands shall delimit the continental shelf of the
North Sea as between their countries by agreement in pursuance of the
decision requested from the International Court of Justice.
Article 2
(1) The Parties shall present their written pleadings to the Court in the
order stated below :
1. a Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany to be submitted
within six months fromthe notification of the present Agreement to
the Court ;
2. a Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to be sub-
mitted within six monthsfrom the delivery of the German Memorial;
3. a German Reply followed by a Netherlands Rejoinder to be delivered
within such time-limits as the Court may order.
(2) Additional written pleadings may be preseiited if this is jointly
proposed by the Parties and considered by the Court to be appropriate to
the case and the circumstances.
(3) The foregoing order of presentation is without prcjudice to any
question of burden of proof which might arise.
Article 3
The present Agreement shall enter into force on the day of signature
thereof."
The Protocol between the three Governments reads as follows:
"Protocol
At the signature of the Special Agreement of today's date between the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments
of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of the Netherlands respec-
tively, on the submission to the International Court of Justice of the dif-
ferences between the Parties concerning the delimitation of the continental
shelf in the North Sea, the three Governments wish to state their agreement
on the following:
1. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will, within a
month from the signature, notify the two Special Agreements together
with the present Protocol to the International Court of Justice in accor-
dance with Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court.
2. After the notification in accordance with item 1 above the Parties
will ask the Court to join the two cases.
3. The three Governments agree that, for the purpose of appointing a
judge cd hoc, the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark and the King-
dom of the Netherlands shall be considered parties in the same interest
within themeaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Court."
Pursuant to Article 33, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar at
once informed the Governments of Denmark and the Federal Republic of
Germany of the filing of the SpecialAgreements. In accordance with Article 34,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, copies of the Special Agreements were
transmitted to the other Members of the United Nations and to other non-
member States entitled to appear before the Court. 2) Les Gouvernements de la République fédérale d'Allemagneet du
Royaume des Pays-Bas délimiteront le plateau continental de la mer du
Nord entre leurs pays par voie d'accord conclu conformément a la déci-
sion demandée 2tla Cour internationale de Justice.
Article 2
1) Les Parties déposeront devant la Cour les pièces de la procédure
écritedans l'ordre suivant :
1. mémoire dela République fédérale d'Allemagne devantêtresoumis
dans les six mois qui suivront la notification du présentaccord à la
Cour;
2. contre-mémoire du Royaume des Pays-Bas devant êtresoumis dans
lessixmois;quisuivront la remise du mémoireallemand;
3. réplique allemande suivie d'une duplique néerlandaise, devant être
soumises dans des délais à fixer par la Cour.
2) Des piécesiécrites supplémentairespourront être présentéessi les
Parties le proposent en commun et si la Cour l'estime approprié à l'affaire
et aux circonstances.
3) L'ordre indiquéci-dessus pou1 le dépôtdes piècesne préjuge en rien
de la charge de la preuve.
Article 3
Le présentacizordentrera en vigueur le jour de sa signature. 11
Le protocole entre:les trois gouvernements est ainsi conçu:
((Protocole
En signant lescompromis intervenus cejour entre le Gouvernement de la
République fédlfraled'Allemagne et les Gouvernements du Royaume du
Danemark et dti Royaume des Pays-Bas aux termes desquels sont soumis
à la Cour internationale de Justice les différendsentre les Parties concer-
nant la délimitadiondu plateau continental de la mer du Nord, les trois
gouvernements tiennent à déclarer leuraccord sur ce qui suit:
1. Le Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas notifiera, dans le mois
de la signature, les deux compromis et le présentprotocole à la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice, conformément à l'article 40, paragraphe1, du Statut
de la Cour.
2. Une fois faite la notification prévue au paragraphe précédent,les
Parties demanderont à la Cour de joindre les deux instances.
3. Les trois gouvernements conviennent qu'aux fins de la désignation
d'un juge ad hoc les Gouvernements du Royaume du Danemark et du
Royaume des Pays-Bas seront considéréscomme faisant cause commune
au sens de l'article1, paragraphe 5, du Statut de la Cour. 11
Conformément à l'article33, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la Cour, le
Greffier a immédiatement notifiéle dépôtdes compromis aux Gouvernements
du Danemark et de la République fédérale d'Allemagne.Conformément a
l'article 34, paragraphe 2, dudit Règlement, copie des compromis a ététrans-
mise aux autres Membres des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'aux autres Etats non
membres admis à ester devant la Cour.8 CONTINENTALSHELF(JUDGMENT)
By Orders of 8 March 1967, taking into account the agreement reached
between the Parties, 21 August 1967 and 20 February 1968were fixed respec-
tively as the time-limits forthe filing of the Memorials and Counter-Memorials.
These pleadings were filed within the time-limits prescribed. By Orders of
1 March 1968, 31 May and 30 Augusl 1968were fixed respectively as the time-
limits for the filing of the Replies and Rejoinders.
Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute of theCourt, the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany chose Dr. Hermann Mosler. Profes-
sor of International Law in the University of Heidelberg, to sit as Judçe ad hoc
in both cases. Referring to the agreement concluded between them accarding
to which they should be considered parties in the same interest within the
meaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute, the Governments of Den-
mark and the Netherlands chose Dr. Max Snrensen, Professor of International
Law in the University of Aarhus, to sit as Judge nd hocin both cases.
By an Order of 26 April 1968,considering that theGovernments of Denmark
andthe Netherlands were, sofar as the choice of a Judge ad hoc was concerned,
to be reckoned asone Party only, the Court fo~indthat those twoGovernments
were in the same interest,joined the proceedings in the two cases and, in modi-
fication of the directions given in the Orders o1 March 1968, fixed 30 August
1968 as the time-limit for the filing of a Common Rejoinder for Denmark and
the Netherlands.
The Replies and the Common Rejoinder having been filed within the time-
limits prescribed, the cases were ready for hearing on 30 August 1968.
Pursuant to Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the pleadings
and annexed documents were, after consultation of the Parties, made available
to the Governments of Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland,
France, Honduras, Iran, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela. Pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the same Article, those pleadings and annexed documents were,
with the consent of the Parties, made accessible to the public as from the date
of the opening of the oral proceedings.
Hearings were held from 23 to 25 October, from 28 October to 1November,
and on 4, 5, 7, 8 and 11 November 1968, in the course of which the Court
heard, in the order agreed between the Parties and accepted by the Court, the
oral arguments and replies of Professor Jaenicke, Agent, and Professor Oda,
Counsel, on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany;
and of Mr. Jacobsen and Professor Riphagen, Agents, and Sir Humphrey
Waldock, Counsel, on behalf of theGovernments of Denmark and the Nether-
lands.
In the course of the written proceedings, the following Submissions were
presented by the Parties:
On behnifof'the Governmentof the Federal Republicof Germany,
in the Memorials:
"May it please the Court to recognize and declare:
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in the
North Sea is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled
to a just and equitable share. Par ordonnances du 8 mars 1967, les délaispour le dépôt des mémoires et
contre-mémoires ont:étéfixés,en tenant compte de l'accord intervenu entre les
Parties, aux 21 août 1967 et 20 février 1968 respectivement. Ces pièces de
procédure ont étédéposéesdans les délais prescrits. Par ordonnances du 1"
mars 1968, les délaispour le dépôt des répliques et dupliques ont été fixésaux
31 mai et 30 août 1968respectivement.
En application de l'article 31, paragraphe 3, du Statut de la Cour, le Gouver-
nement de la République fédérale d'Allemagnea désignéM. Hermann Mosler,
professeur de droit international a l'université de Heidelberg, pour siégertom-
me juge ad hoc dans les deux affaires. Se référanà l'accord conclu entre eux et
aux termes duquel ils devaient êtreconsidéréscomme faisant cause commune
au sens de I'article 131,paragraphe 5, du Statut, les Gouvernements du Dane-
mark et des Pays-Bas ont désigné M. Max S@rensen,professeur de droit inter-
national à l'université de Aarhus, pour siégercommejuge ad hoc dans les deux
affaires.
Par ordonnance du 26 avril 1968, considérant que les Gouvernements du
Danemark et des Pays-Basne comptaient, en ce qui concerneladésignation d'un
juge ad hoc, que pour une seule Partie, la Cour a constaté que ces deux Gouver-
nements faisaient cause commune, joint les instances dans les deux affaires et,
modifiant les prescriptions des ordonnances du 1" mars 1968, fixéau 30 août
1968le délaipour le dépôtd'une dupliquecomniune du Danemark et des Pays-
Bas.
Les répliques et lla duplique commune ayant été déposéesdans les délais
prescrits, les affaires se sont trouvées en étatle 30 août 1968.
En application de I'article 44, paragraphe 2, du Règlement, les pièces de la
procédure écriteont:, après consultation des Parties, étémises à la disposition
des Gouvernen~ents du Brésil,du Canada, du Chili, de la Colombie, des Etats-
lJnis d'Amérique, dc 17Equateur, de la Finlande, de la France, du Honduras, di:
l'Iran, de la Norvège, du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du
Nord, de la Suède et du Venezuela. En application du paragraphe 3 du même
article, ces piècesont, avec l'assentiment des Parties, été renduesaccessibles au
public à dater de l'ouverture de la procédure orale.
Des audiences orit ététenues du 23 au 25 octobre, du 28 octobre au 1"
novembre et les 4, 5, 7, 8 et 11novembre 1968, durant lesquelles ont étéenten-
dus en leurs plaidoiries et réponses, dans l'ordre convenu entre les Parties et
accepté par la Cour: pour le Gouvernement de la République fédérale d'Al-
lemagne, M. Jaenicke, agent, et M. Oda, conseil; et pour les Gouvernements du
Danemark et des Pays-Bas, MM. Jacobsen et Riphagen, agents, et sir Hum-
phrey Waldock, coriseil.
Dans la procédure écrite,les conclusions ci-api-ès ont étéprésentéespar les
Parties:
Au tloln drrGoi~ve,rneinendte la Rkpubliqi~fédéraled'Allei>~agile,
dans les mémoires:
IPlaise à la Cour reconnaître et dire:
1. Que la délimitation du plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre
les Parties est régiepar le principe selon lequel chacun des Etats riverains
a droità une part juste et équitable. CONTINENTAL SHELF (~MENT)
2. The method of determining boundaries of the continental shelf in
sucha way thatevery point ofthe boundar is equidistanfrom the nearest
points of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorialsea of
each State is measured (equidistance method), isnota rule ofcustomary
international law and is therefore not applicable as such between the
Parties.
3.The equidistance methd cannot be employed for the delimitation of
the continental shelf unlesitisestablished by aneement, arbitration, or
othemise, that it will achieveajust and equitable apportionment of the
contintntal shelfamong the Statesconcerned.
4.As to the delimitationof the continentalshelf between the Parties
in the North Sea, the equidistmce method cannot findapplication, since
itwould not apportion ajust and equitable share to the Federal Republic
of Germany";
in the Replies:
"May it please the Court to recognize and declare:
1.The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in the
North Sea is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled
toa just and equitable share.
2. (a)The methodof determining boundaries of the continental shelf
in such a way that every point of theboundary isequidistantfrom the
nearest points ofthe baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured (equidistance method) isnot a rule of cus-
tomary international law.
(6) The rule contained in the second sentence or paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 6 of the Continental ShelfConvention, prescribing that inabsence
of agreement, and unless another boundary isjustified byspeciaI circum-
stances, the boundaryshall be determined by application of the principle
of equidistance, has notkcome customary international law.
(c) Even ifthe rule under (b)would be applicable between the Partics,
specialcircumstances within the meaning of that ruIewouldexclude the
application of the equidistance method in the presencase.
3. (a) The equidistance method cannot be used for the delimitatioof
the continental shelunles it is establisheby agreement, arbitration,or
otherwise, that it will achievajust and equitable apportionment of the
continental shelf among the States concerned.
(b) As to the delimitationof the continental shelbetween the Parties
in the North Sea, the Kingdom of Denmarkand the Kingdom of the
Netherlands cannot rely on the applicationof the equidistance method,
since it would not lead tan equitable apportionment.
4. Consequently, the delimitation of thc continental shelf in the North
Sea between the Parties isa matterwhich has to besettled by agreement.
This agreement should apportion a justand equitable share teach of the
Parties in the light of all factors retevant in this respect."
On behal/of theGovernment ofDenmark,
in its Counter-Memorial:
"Considering that, as noted in the Cornpromis, disagreement exists PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (m) 9
2. Que la mbthodeconsistantB'dktermi Iiseimites du plateau con-
tinental detellsortequetous lespointsde lalignede dtlimitationsoimt
Bquidistantsdespoints la plus prochesdeslignesdehie A partirdtsquel-
Its at mesh lalargeur dela merterritoride dc chacun des Etats(A
thode de I'tquidistancn'estpas unedgle dcdroit internationacoutumitr
et n'tst doncpas applicablentant quetclletntreIwParties.
3. Quela mkthodede I'Quidistana nt sauraitttreutilisk pout dklimitcr
le plateau continentalh moins qu'ilne soit htabli,par voie d'accord,
d'arbitrageou autmment, qu'elleassureraune dpartitionjute etequitable
du plateau wntinental entre lesEtats intktessts.
4. Qu'en cequi concernela dtlin~itation du plateau continentade la
met du Nord entre les PartiesiI ne sauraitetrefait application dela
methode de I'fquidistancecarellen'afloueraipas une partjusteet Bquita-
ble h la Rtpublique fbdkrald'Allernagnen;
dans lesrkpliques:
clplaisehla Cour reconnaitreetdire:
1. Que Iadelimitationdu plateau continentalde lmerdu Nord entrc1-
Partiesest rkgiepar le principe selonlequelchacun desEtats riverains a
droit une part juste et equitable.
2. a) Que la mtthode consistant determiner Its limites du plateau
continental de tellsarte que tous les points de llime de delimitation
soient equidistants des poinles plus prochesdes lignes debast Apartir
desquellw est mesurk Ia largeur de 1ame; territoriak dechacun dcs
Etats (methotiede l'kquidistancen'estpas unerhglede droitinternational
coutumier.
b) Que la rhgleenon& dansla deuxi&mephrase de l'articl6, para-
graph~ 2, de la Convention sur le platcau continental, stipulant qu'h
dtfaut d'accord,et hmoins que descirconstanm swialw ne justifientune
autre delimitation, ccilesto&re par application duprincipedeI'kquidis-
tance, n'at pasdevenue une ttglede droit international coutumier,
C) QUC, rneme si la rkglementionnet hl'alinta b) etait applicableentre
lesParties,dcscirconstanccsrpkiabs au sensde ette rkgles'oppostraicnt
h l'application de la mtthode dI'kquidist dannsla prtstnteaffaire.
3.a) Que la mtthode de I'tquidistance ne saurait itre utiliste pour
delimiter le plateau continentalA moins qu'ilne soitttabli par voie
d'accord, d'arbitrageou autrement, qu'eltassurera urn rbpartitiojuste
et equitabledu plateaucontinental entrlesEtats inttd.
b) Qu'tn ce qui concerm la dtlimitation du plateau continental dela
mer du Nord entre leParties,leRoyaume du Danemark etle Royaume
des Pays-Ba ne peuvent sc fonder sur I'applicationde la mtthode de
l'tquidistancecar ellen'aboutirait paa une &partitiontquitable.
4.Qu'en condquence la dtlimitation du plateau continentadt larner
du Nord entrcles Parties doietrerkglkepar voied'accord;et que cetac-
cord devrait attribueA chacune des Parties une part justettBquitable
wmpte tenu de tous lesfacteurs pertinentA cet tgardr.
Au nom du Gouvernemenldu Donemark,
dms son contre-mdrnoirc:
aConsiderant que,ainsi qu'il est nodans lecornpromis, iexisteentre between the Parties which could not be settled by detailed negotiations,
regarding the further course of the boundary beyond the partial boundary
determined by the Convention of 9 June 1965;
Considering that under theterms of Article 1,paragraph 1,of the Com-
promis the task entrusted to the Court is not to formulate a basis for the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea as between the Parties
ex aequo et bono, but to decide what principles and rules of international
law are applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas
of the continental shelf in theNorth Sea which appertain to each of them
beyond the partial boundary, determined by the above-mentioned Con-
vention of 9 June 1965;
In view of the facts and arguments presented in Parts 1 and 11of this
Counter-Memorial,
May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. The delimitation as between the Parties of the said areas of the con-
tinental shelf in the North Sea is governed by the principles and rules of
international law which are expressed in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf.
2. The Parties being in disagreement, unless another boundary is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary between thern is to be
determined by application of the principle ofequidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
3. Special circumstances which justify another boundary line not having
been established. the boundary between the Parties is to be determined by
application of the principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding
Submission."
On behalf of the Government of the Netherlands,
in its Counter-Memorial :
"Considering that, as noted in the Compromis, disagreement exists
between the Parties which could not be settled by detailed negotiations,
regarding the further course of the boundary beyond the partial boundary
determined by the Treaty of 1 December 1964;
Considering that under the terrns of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the
Compromis the task entrusted to theCourt is not to formulate a basis for
the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea as between the
Partiesex aequo et bono, but to decide what principles and rules of inter-
national law are applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of
the areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to
each of them beyond the partial boundary determined by the above-
mentioned Treaty of 1 December 1964;
In view of the facts and arguments presented in Parts 1 and II of this
Counter-Memorial,
May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. The delimitation as between the Parties of the said areas of the con-
tinental shelf in the North Sea is governed by the principles and rules of
international law which are expressed in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf. les Parties un désaccord qui n'a pu être réglépar des négociations ap-
profondies, quant au prolongement de la ligne de délimitationau-delà de la
ligne de délimitation partielle déterminéepar la convention du 9 juin 1965;
Considérant que, aux termes de l'article premier, paragraphe 1, du
compromis, la tâche qui incombe à la Cour n'est pas de formuler une base
pour la délimitation du plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre les
Parties ex aequo et hono, mais de décider quels sont les principes et les
règlesdu droit international applicables a la délimitation entre les Parties
des zones du plai.eau continental de la mer du Nord relevant de chacune
d'elles, au-delà de la ligne de délimitation partielle déterminée par la
convention susmentionnée du 9 juin 1965;
Vu les faits et ;arguments exposésdans les première et deuxième parties
du présent contre:-mémoire,
Plaise à la Cour dire et juger:
1. Que la délimitation entre les Parties desdites zones du plateau conti-
nental de la mer du Nord est régie par les principes et les règles du droit
international énoncés à l'article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention de
Genève de 1958 sur le plateau continental.
2. Que les Parties étant en désaccord, et a moins que des circonstances
spécialesnejustiEient une autre délimitation, la délimitation entre elles doit
êtreopéréepar application du principe de I'équidistance despoints les plus
proches des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la
mer territoriale de chacun de ces Etats.
3. Que, des ciirconstances spéciales justifiant une autre délimitation
n'ayant pas été établies,la délimitation entre les Parties doit êtreopérée
par application du principe de I'équidistance mentionné dans la conclusion
précédente.
.4u noin du Gouvernemrtlt clesPays-Bas,
dans son contre-mémoire :
<(Considérantque, ainsi qu'il est noté dans le compromis, il existe entre
les Parties Lin désaccord qui n'a pu êtreréglépar des négociations ap-
profondies, quant au prolongement de la ligne de délimitation au-delà de
la ligne de délimitation partielle déterminée par la convention du 1"
décembre 1964;
Considérant que, aux termes de l'article premier, paragraphe 1, du
compromis, la tliche qui incombe à la Cour n'est pas de formuler une
base pour la délimitation du plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre
les Partiesex aequo et bono, mais de décider quels sont les principes et les
règles du droit internationalapplicables à la délimitation entre les Parties
des zones du plateau continental de la mer du Nord relevant de chacune
d'elles, au-delà de la ligne de délimitation partielle déterminée par la
convention susmentionnée du 1" décembre 1964;
Vu les faits et arguments exposésdans les première et deuxième parties
du présent contre-mémoire,
Plaise à la Cour dire et juger:
1.Que la déliinitation entre les Parties desdites zones du plateau con-
tinental de la mer du Nord est régiepar les principes et les règlesdu droit
international énoncésa l'article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention de
Genève de 1958 :surle plateau continental. 7. The Parties being in disagreement, unless another boundary is justi-
fied by special circumstances, the boundary between them is to be deter-
mined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
3. Special circumstances which justify another boundary line not having
been established, the boundary between tlie Parties is to be deterrnined
.by application of the principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding
Subrnission."
011 I~el~alfofthe Goveriiii~ei~t .f Deiitnark and the Nerherlntids,
in the Common Rejoinder:
"May it further please the Court to adjudge and declare:
4. If the principles and rules of international law mentioned in Sub-
mission 1 of the respective Counter-Mernorials are not applicable as be-
tween the Parties, the boiindary is to be deterrnined between the Parties
on the basis of the exclusive rights of each Party over the continental shelf
adjacent to its coast and of tlie principle that the boundary is to leave to
each Party every point of the continental shelf which lies nearer to its
coast than to the coast of the other Party."
In the course of the oral proceedings, the following Submissions were pre-
sented by the Parties:
On behaifof the Go>sernnzct~ of the Federal Rep~rblic of Gerttzany,
at the hearing on 5 November 1968:
"1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties in the
North Sea is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled
to a just and equitable share.
2. (ri) The method of deterinining boundaries of the continental shelf
in such a way that every point of the boundary is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured (equidistance method) is not a rule of cus-
tomary international law.
(b) The rule contained in the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, prescribing that in the absence
of agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary shall be deterrnined by application of tlie principle
of equidistance, has not becorne custornary international law.
(c) Even if the rule under (b) would be applicable between the Parties,
special circun~stances within the meaning of that rule would exclude the
application of the equidistance method in the present case.
3. (a) The equidistance rnethod cannot be used for the delimitation of
the continental shelf unless it is established by agreement, arbitration, or
otherwise, that it will achieve a just and equitable apportionment of the
continental shelf among the States concerned.
(b) As to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties
in the North Sea, the Kingdom of Denrnark and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands cannot rely on the application of the equidistance rnethod,
since it would not lead to an equitable apportionment. 2. Que les Parties étant en désaccord, et à moins que des circonstances
spéciales ne justifient une autre délimitation, la délimitation entre elles
doit êtreopéréepar application du principe de I'équidistancedes points les
plus proches des lignesde base àpartir desquellesest mesurée la largeur de
la mer territoriale de chacun de ces Etats.
3. Que, des circonstances spéciales justifiant une autre délimitation
n'ayant pas étééitablies,la délimitation entre les Parties doitêtreopéréepar
application du principe de I'équidistance mentionné dans la conclusion
précédente. ))
Au notn des Gouvernements du Danemark et des Pays-Bas,
dans la duplique cornmune:
((Plaiseà la Cour dire et juger:
4. Que, si les principes et les règles du droit international mentionnés à
la conclusion no 1 des contre-mémoires ne sont pas applicables entre les
Parties, la délimitation doit s'opérer entre elles sur la base des droits
exclusifs de chacune des Parties sur le plateau continental adjacent a ses
côtes et du principe selon lequel la délimitation doit laisserà chacune des
Parties tous les points du plateau continental qui sont plus près de ses
côtes que des celtesde l'autre Partie11
Au cours de la procédure orale, les conclusions ci-après ont étéprésentées
par les Parties:
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Républiquefidc;rale d'Allemagne,
à l'audience du 5 novembre 1968 :
((1.La délimitation du plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre les
Parties est régie:par le principe selon lequel chacun des Etats riverains a
droità une part juste et équitable.
2. a) La méthode consistant à déterminer les limites du plateau con-
tinental de telle sorte que tous les points de la ligne de délimitation soient
équidistants des points les plus proches deslignes de baseàpartir desquelles
est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale de chacun des Etats (méthode
de l'équidistance) n'est pas une règle de droit international coutumier.
b) La règleénoncéedans la deuxièmephrase de l'article 6, paragraphe 2,
de la Convention sur le plateau continental, stipulant qu'à défautd'accord,
et à moins que des circonstances spécialesne justifient une autre délimi-
tation, celle-ci s'opère par application du principe de I'équidistance, n'est
pas devenue une règlede droit international coutumier.
c) Même siLarègle mentionnée à l'alinéab) était applicable entre les
Parties, des circonstances spécialesau sens de cette règle s'opposeraient à
l'application de la méthode de I'équidistance dans la présente affaire.
3. a) La méthodedel'équidistance nesaurait êtreutiliséepour délimiter
le plateau continental à moins qu'il ne soit établi par voie d'accord, d'ar-
bitrage, ou autrement, qu'elle assurera une répartition juste et équitable du
plateau continental entre les Etats intéressés.
b) En ce qui concerne la délimitation du plateau continental de la mer
du Nord entre les Parties, le Royaume du Danemark et le Royaume des
Pays-Bas ne peuvent se fonder sur l'application de la méthode de l'équi-
distance, car elle n'aboutirait pasà une répartition équitable.12 CONTINENTALSHELF (JUDGMENT)
4. Consequently, the delimitation of the continental shelf, on which
the Parties must agree pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Special
Agreement, is determined by the principle of the just and equitable share,
based on criteria relevant to the particular geographical situation in the
North Sea."
011behalf'ofthe Governnlent of Det~tnark,
at the hearing on 11November 1968,Counsel for that Government stated that
it confirmed the Submissions presented in its Counter-Memorial and in the
Common Rejoinder and that those Submissions were identical t~llrtatisrrilrtandis
with those of the Government of the Netherlands.
Oti behnlf'of the Govertitt~entof rile Netherlatzds,
at the hearing on 1I November 1968 :
"With regard to the delimitation as between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands of the boundary of the
areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each of
them beyond the partial boundary determined by the Convention of
1 December 1964.
May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
1. The delimitation as between the Parties of the said areas of the con-
tinental shelf in the North Sea is governed by the principles and rules of
international law which are expressed in Article 6, paragrapli 2, of the
Geneva Convention of 1958on the Continental Shelf.
2. The Parties being in disagreement, unless another boundary is justi-
fied by special circumstances, the boundary between them is to be deter-
mined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured.
3. Special circumstances which justify another boundary line not having
been established, the boundary between the Parties is to be determined
by application of the principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding
Submission.
4. If the principles and rules of international law mentioned in Sub-
mission 1 are not applicable as between the Parties, the boundary is to be
determined between the Parties on the basis of the exclusive rights of each
Party over the continental shelf adjacent to its coast and of the principle
that the boundary is to leave to each Party every point of the continental
shelf which lies nearer to itsoast than to the coast of the other Party."
1. By thetwo Special Agreements respectively concluded between the
Kingdom of Denmark and the Federal Republic ofGermany, and between
the Federal Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Parties
havesubmitted to the Court certain differences concerning "the delimita- 4. En conséquence la délimitationdu plateau continental dont les Parties
doivent convenir conformément à l'article1,paragraphe 2, du compromis
est déterminéepar le principe de la part juste et équitable, en fonction de
critères applicablesà la situation géographique particulière de la mer du
Nord. '1
Au notn du Gouvernernent du Danemark,
a l'audience du 11 novembre 1968, le conseil de ce Gouvernement a déclaré
qu'il confirmait les c:onclusions présentéesdans son contre-mémoire et dans la
duplique commune et que ces conclusions étaient identiques mutatis mirtandis
à celles du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.
Alrnon1 du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas,
à I'audience du 11 novembre 1968 :
pour ce qui est de la délimitation entre la République fédérale d'Al-
lemagne et le Royaume des Pays-Bas des zones du plateau continental de
la mer du Nord irelevantde chacun d'eux, au-delà de la ligne de délimitation
partielle déterminéepar la convention du le' décembre 1964,
Plaise à la Cour dire et juger:
1. Que la délimitation entre les Parties desdites zones du plateau con-
tinental de la mcerdu Nord est régiepar les principes et les règlesdu droit
international érioncés à l'article 6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention de
Genève de 1958sur le plateau continental.
2. Que les Parties étant en désaccord, et à moins que des circonstances
spécialesnejustifient une autre délimitation, la délimitation entre elles doit
êtreopérée par application du principe de I'équidistance despoints les plus
proches des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la
mer territoriale de chacun de ces Etats.
3. Que, des circonstances spéciales justifiant une autre délimitation
n'ayant pas étéétablies, la délimitation entre les Parties doit êtrcopérée
par application du principe de I'équidistance mentionné dans la conclusion
précédente.
4. Que, si les principes et les règles du droit international mentionnésà
la conclusion no 1ne sont pas applicables entre les Parties, la délimitation
doit s'opérerenitreelles sur la base des droits exclusifs de chacune des Par-
ties sur le plateau continental adjacent à ses côtes et du principe selon
lequel la délimitation doit laisser chacune des Parties tous les points du
plateau continental qui sont plus près de ses côtes que des côtes de l'autre
Partie.1)
1. Par les deux icompromis respectivement conclus entre le Royaume
du Danemark et Ila République fédérale d'Allemagne et entre la Ré-
publique fédérale d'Allemagne et le Royaume des Pays-Bas, la Cour est
saisie de certaine:; divergences concernant ((la délimitation entre lestion as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the
North Sea which appertain to each of themV-with the exception of
those areas, situated in the immediate vicinity of the Coast, which have
already been the subject of delimitation by two agreements dated 1
December 1964,and 9 June 1965,concluded in the one case between the
Federal Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and in theother
between the Federal Republic and the Kingdom of Denmark.
2. It is in respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf areas
lying beyond and to seaward of those affected by the partial boundaries
thus established, that the Court is requested by each of the two Special
Agreements to decide wliat are the applicable "principles and rules of
international law". TheCourt is not asked actually to delimit the further
boundaries which will be involved, tliis task being reserved by the Special
Agreements to the Parties, which undertake to effect such a delimitation
"by agreement in pursuance of the decision requested from the ...
Courtm-that is to say on the basis of, and in accordance with, the
principles and rules of international law found by the Court to be
applicable.
3. As described in Article 4 of the North Sea Policing of Fisheries
Convention of 6 May 1882,the North Sea,which liesbetweencontinental
Europe and Great Britain in the east-west direction, is roughly oval in
shape and stretches from the straits of Dover northwards to a parallel
drawn between a point immediately north of the Shetland Islands and
the mouth of the Sogne Fiord in Norway, about 75 kilometres above
Bergen, beyond which is the North Atlantic Ocean. In the extreme north-
west, it is bounded by a line connecting the Orkney and Shetland island
groups; while on its north-eastern side, the line separating it from the
entrances to the Baltic Sea lies between Hanstholm at the north-west
point of Denmark, and Lindesnes at the southern tip of Norway. East-
ward of this line the Skagerrak begins. Thus, the North Sea has to some
extent the general look of an enclosed sea without actually being one.
Round its shores are situated, on its eastern side and starting from the
north, Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and France; while the whole western side is taken up by
Great Britain, together with the island groups of the Orkneys and Shet-
lands. From this it will beseen that the continental shelf of the Federal
Republic is situated between those of Denmark and the Netherlands.
4. The waters of the North Sea are shallow, and the whole seabed
consists of continental shelf at a depth of less than 200 rnetres, except
for the formation known as the Norwegian Trough, a belt of water
200-650 metres deep, fringing the southern and south-western coasts of
Norway to a width averaging about 80-100kilometres. Much the greater
part of this continental shelf has already been the subject of delimitationParties des zones du plateau continental de la mer du Nord relevant de
chacune d'elles», à l'exception des zones situéeà proximité immédiate
de la côte qui ont déjàétédélimitéespar deux accords signésles 1" dé-
cembre 1964et 9 juin 1965entre la République fédéraleet le Royaume
des Pays-Bas et entre la République fédéraleet le Royaume du Dane-
mark.
2. C'està propos de la délimitation des zones du plateau continental
prolongeant vers le large les zones déjàdélimitéesque la Cour est priée
dans chacun des deux compromis de décider«quels sont les principes et
les règles du droit international applicables)). 11n'est pas demandà la
Cour d'établir effectivement les limites prolongées dont il s'agit; aux
termes des comprornis, cette tâche est réservéeaux Parties qui s'engagent
à procéder à la délimitation ((par voie d'accord conclu conformément
à la décision demaridée à la CourD,c'est-à-dire sur la base et en confor-
mité desprincipes e:tdes règlesde droit international tenus par la Cour
pour applicables.
3. La mer du Nord, telle qu'elle estdécriàl'article 4 de la convention
du 6 mai 1882sur la police de la pêchedans la mer du Nord, a en gros la
forme d'un ovale limité à l'est par le continent européen àtl'ouest par
la Grande-Bretagne:; à partir du Pas de Calais, elle s'étend vers lenord
jusqu'au parallèle passant immédiatement au nord des Shetland et ren-
contrant la Norvège à l'embouchure du Sognefjord (à soixante-quinze
kilomètres environ au nord de Bergen), qui marque le début de l'Atlan-
tique nord. Elle est.bornée à son extrémité nord-ouest par la ligne qui
joint les Orcades aux Shetland et, au nord-est, elleest séparéedes détroits
de la Batique par une ligne allant de Hanstholm (points nord-ouest du
Danemark) au cap Lindesnes (extrémité méridionale de laNorvège);
au-delà commence le Skagerrak. Ainsi, sans constituer réellement une
mer fermée,la mer du Nord en présentedans une certaine mesure l'ap-
parence générale. Elleest bordée à l'est et en partant du nord par la
Norvège, leDanemark, la Républiquefédérale d'Allemagne, lesPays-Bas,
la Belgique et la France, tout le côté ouest étant occupépar la Grande-
Bretagne, avec les archipels des Orcades et des Shetland. Le plateau
continental de la R.épubliquefédéraleest donc situé entre les plateaux
continentaux du Danemark ct des Pays-Bas.
4. Lamer du Nord est peu profonde et son lit est entièrement cons-
titué par un plateau continental à une profondeur de moins de deux
cents mètres,à 1'exc:eptiond'une bande de deux centà sixcent cinquante
mètres de profonde:ur, dite fosse norvégienne, qui longe les côtes sud et
sud-ouest de la Norvège sur une largeur moyenne de quatre-vingts à
cent kilomètres. La majeure partie de ce plateau continental a déjàby a series ofagreementsconcluded between the United Kingdom (which,
as stated, lies along the whole westernide of it) and certain of the States
on the eastern side, namely Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.
These three delimitations were carried out by the drawing of what are
known as "median lines" which, for immediate present purposes, may be
described as boundaries drawn between the continental shelf areas of
"opposite" States, dividing the intervening spaces equally between them.
These lines are shown on Map 1on page 15,together with a similar line,
also established by agreement, drawn between the shelf areas of Norway
and Denmark. Theoretically it would be possible also to draw the follow-
ing median lines in the North Sea, namely United KingdomIFederal
Republic (which would lie east of the present line United Kingdoml
Norway-Denmark-Netherlands) ;Norway/Federal Republic(whichwould
liesouth of the present lineNorwayIDenmark); and NorwayINetherlands
(which would lie north of whatever line is eventually determined to be
the continental shelf boundary between the Federal Republic and the
Netherlands). Even if these median lines were drawn however, the
question would arise whether the United Kingdom, Norway and the
Netherlands could take advantage of them as against the parties to the
existing delimitations,since these lines would, it seems, in each case lie
beyond (i.e., respectively to the east, south and north of) the boundaries
already effectiveunder the existing agreements at present in force. This
is illustrated by Map 2 on page 15.
5. In addition to the partialboundarylines Federal Republic/Denmark
and Federal Republic/Netherlands, which, as mentioned in paragraph 1
above, were respectively established by the agreements of 9 June 1965
and 1 December 1964, and which are shown as lines A-B and C-D on
Map 3 on page 16, another line has been drawn in this area, namely
that represented by the line E-F on that map. This line, which divides
areas respectively claimed (to the north of it) by Denmark, and (to the
south of it) by the Netherlands, is the outcome of an agreement between
those two countries dated 31 March 1966,reflecting the view taken by
them as to what are the correct boundary lines between their respective
continental shelf areas and that of the Federal Republic, beyond the
partial boundaries A-B and C-D already drawn. These further and un-
agreed boundaries to seaward, are shown on Map 3 by means of the
dotted lines B-E and D-E. They are the lines, the correctness of which
in law the Court is in effect, though indirectly, called upon to determine.
Also shown on Map 3 are the two pecked lines B-F and D-F, repre-
senting approximately the boundaries which the Federal Republic would
have wished to obtain in the course of the negotiations that took place
between the Federal Republic and the other two Parties prior to the
submission of the matter to the Court.The nature of these negotiations
must now be described.été délimitép ear lune série d'accords conclus entre le Royaume-Uni
(qui, comme on l'a vu, le borde en totalité du côté ouest)et certains des
Etats riverains du côtéest: la Norvège, le Danemark et les Pays-Bas. Ces
trois délimitations ont étéréaliséespar le tracéde lignes dites ((médiane))
qui, pour le moment, peuvent êtredécrites comme divisant en parties
égales unplateau continental situé entre des Etats ((sefaisant face)).Ces
lignes apparaissent sur la carte 1 (page 15), de mêmequ'une ligne ana-
logue également établiepar voie d'accord et délimitant les zones de
plateau continental de la Norvège et du Danemark. En théorie, l'on
pourrait aussi tracer dans la mer du Nord des lignes médianesentre le
Royaume-Uni et la République fédérale (à l'est de l'actuelle ligne Roy-
aume-UniiNorvège-Danemark-Paye snteala)N,orvège et la Répu-
blique fédérale(au sud de l'actuelle ligne NorvègeIDanemark) et entre
la Norvège et les Pays-Bas (au nord de la ligne, quelle qu'elle soit, qui
sera finalement retl:nue comme délimitant le plateau continental entre
la République fédkrale et les Pays-Bas). Mais, si ces lignes médianes
étaient tracées,la question se poserait de savoir si le Royaume-Uni, la
Norvègeet les Pays,-Baspourraient s'en prévaloir à l'encontre des parties
aux accords de délimitation en vigueur, car elles seraient, semble-t-il,
situées au-delà (c'est-à-dire respectivement à l'est, au sud et au nord)
des limites déjà convenuesdans les accords actuellement existants. Cela
ressort de la carte;!(page 15).
5. Outre les lignes de délimitation partielle République fédéralel
Danemark et République fédérale/Pays-Basqui, comme il est dit au
paragraphe 1 ci-dessus, ont étérespectivement établiespar les accords du
9juin 1965et du le' décembre1964et qui sont représentéespar les lignes
A-B et C-D sur la carte 3 (page 16),une autre ligne a été traceans cette
partie de la mer du Nord: elle est figuréesur la mêmecarte par la ligne
E-F. Cette ligne, qui séparedes zones, revendiquéesau nord par le Dane-
mark et au sud par les Pays-Bas, résulted'un accord du 31 mars 1966
entre les deux pays et correspond à la conception qu'ils se faisaient des
limites entre leurs zones de plateau continental et celle de la République
fédéraleail-delà de la délimitation partielle déjàeffectuéesuivant A-B et
C-D. Ces limites, qui n'ont pas été reconnues, sont représentéessur la
carte 3 par les ligne,$pointilléesB-E et D-E. Ce sont les lignes sur le bien-
fondéjuridique desquelles la Cour est en fait, encore qu'indirectement,
appelée à se prononcer. On peut aussi voir sur la carte 3 deux lignes de
tiretsB-F et D-F indiquant approximativement les limites que la Ré-
publique fédéraleaurait voulu obtenir au cours des négociations menées
avec les deux autres Parties avant que la Cour soit saisie. 11convient
d'indiquer ici en quoi ont consistéces négociations. Map 1 Carte 1
(See paragraphs 3 alid 4) ( Voirparagraphes 3 et 4)
200 metres line ..............,......,......... Isobathe des 200 mètres
--------
Limits fixed by the Limites définies par la
1882 Convention convention de 1882
Median lines Lignes médianes Map 2 Carte 2
(See paragraph4) ( Voirparagraphe 4)
United Kingdom/Norway- Royaume-Uni /Norvège-
Denmark-Netherlands Danemark-Pays-Bas
and Nor\vay:Denmark: etN0rvège:Danemark
------ Royaume-Uni,'République
United KingdomiFederal
Republic fédérale
NorwayiFederal Republic --------- Norvège/République fédérale
Norway INetherlands Map 3 Carte 3
(See paragraphs 5-9) (Voirparagraphes 5-9)
The maps in the present Jlcdgment Les cartes jointes auprésc.titarrêtont
were prepared on the basis of docli- été établies d'apri.~ les docunzents
ments submitted to the Court by the soumis à la Courpar lesParties et ont
Parties, and their sole purpose is to pour seul objet d'illustrer graphiquc-
provide a visual illustration of the ment les paragraphes de l'arrêtqui
paragraphs of the Judgment which s'y rkfèrent.
refer tothem.Sketches illustratingthe geogra- Croquisillustratifsdessituations
phical situations described in géographiques décriteasu para-
paragraph 8 of the Judgrnent graphe 8 de l'arrêt
17 17 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
6. Under the agreements of December 1964 and June 1965, already
mentioned, the partial boundaries represented by the map lines A-B and
C-D had, according to the information furnished to the Court by the
Parties, been drawn mainly by application of the principle of equidis-
tance, using that term as denoting the abstract concept of equidistance.
A line so drawn, known as an "equidistance line", may be described as
one which leaves to each of the parties concerned al1those portions of
the continental shelf that are nearer to a point on its own coast than
they are to anypoint on the coast of the other Party. An equidistance line
may consist either of a "median" line between "opposite" States, or of
a "lateral" line between "adjacent" States. In certain geographical con-
figurations of wliich the Parties furnished examples, a given equidistance
line may partake in varying degree of the nature both of a median and of
a lateral line. There exists nevertheless a distinction to be drawn between
the two, which will be mentioned in its place.
7. The further negotiations between the Parties for the prolongation
of the partial boundaries broke down mainly because Denmark and the
Netherlands respectively wished this prolongation also to be effected on
the basis of the equidistance principle,-and this would have resulted
in the dotted lines B-Eand D-E, shown on Map 3; whereas the Federal
Republic considered that such an outcome would be inequitable because
it would unduly curtail what the Republic believed should be its proper
share of continental shelf area, on the basis of proportionality to the
length of its North Sea coastline. It will be observed that neither of the
lines in question, taken by itself, would produce this effect, but only both
of them together-an element regarded by Denmark and the Netherlands
asirrelevant to what they viewed as being two separate and self-contained
delimitations, each of which should be carried out without reference to
the other.
8. The reason for the result that would be produced by the two lines
B-Eand D-E, taken conjointly, isthat in the case ofa concave or recessing
coast such as that of the Federal Republic on the North Sea, the effect
of the use of the equidistance method is to pull the line of the boundary
inwards, in the direction of the concavity. Consequently, where two such
lines are drawn at different points on a concave coast, they will, if the
curvature is pronounced, inevitably meet at a relatively short distance
from the coast, thus causing thecontinentalshelfarea they enclose, to take
the form approximately of a triangle with its apex to seaward and, as it
was put on behalf of the Federal Republic, "cutting off" the coastal
State from the further areas of the continental shelf outside of and
beyond this triangle. The effect of concavity could of course equally be
produced for a country with a straight coastline if the coasts of adjacent
countries protruded immediately on either side of it. Tncontrast to this,
the effect of coastal projections, or of convex or outwardly curving coasts
such as are, to a moderate extent, those of Denmark and theNetherlands,
is to cause boundary lines drawn on an equidistance basis to leave the 6. Dans les accorclssusmentionnés de décembre1964et juin 1965,les
limites partielles représentéessur lacartepar leslignesA-Bet C-D avaient
été tracées, selonles indications données à la Courpar lesParties, essen-
tiellement par application du principede l'équidistance- cette expression
étantemployéepour désignerle concept abstrait d'équidistance. Laligne
construite suivant ce principe, ou ((ligned'équidistance11peut êtredéfinie
comme celle qui attribue à chacune des parties intéresséestoutes lespor-
tions du plateau continental plus proches d'un point de sacôteque detout
point situé sur la côte de l'autre partie. La ligne d'équidistance peutêtre
soit une ligne ((médiane))entre Etats ((sefaisant face)), soit une ligne
((latérale) entre Et& ((limitrophes1).Dans certaines configurations
géographiques dont les Parties ont fourni des exemples, la ligne d'équi-
distance peut revêtir à des degrés diversle double caractère d'une ligne
médianeet d'une ligne latérale. Une distinction existe néanmoins entre
ces deux types de ligfies,ainsi qu'il sera indiqué par la suite.
7. Les négociations reprises entre les Parties en vue de prolonger les
limites partielles ont échouéprincipalement parce que le Danemark et
les Pays-Bas souhaitaient que le prolongement s'effectuât aussi d'après
le principe de I'équid.istance,ce qui aboutissaità un tracé correspondant
aux lignes pointilléesB-E et D-E de la carte 3; or la République fédérale
jugeait ce résultat inéquitable parce qu'il réduisait exagérémentce
qu'elle estimait devoir êtresa juste part de plateau continental en pro-
portion de la longueur de son littoral sur la mer du Nord. II est à noter
que ce résultat n'était pas attribuable à l'une ou l'autre des lignes prise
isolément, mais à l'effet combinédes deux lignes prises ensemble, effet
que le Danemark et les Pays-Bas considéraient comme sans pertinence,
s'agissant à leur avis de deux délimitations distinctes et autonomes dont
chacune devait être effectuée sans qu'il soit tenu compte de l'autre.
8. L'effetcombinédes deux lignes B-E et D-E s'explique comme suit.
Dans lecas d'une côteconcave ou rentrante comme cellede la République
fédéralesur la mer di1Nord, l'application de laméthodede l'équidistance
tend à infléchir les:lignesde délimitation vers la concavité. Par suite,
quand deux lignes d'équidistance sont tracées à partir d'une côte très
concave, elles se rencontrent inévitablement à une distance relativement
faible de la côte; lazone de plateau continental qu'elles encadrent prend
donc la forme d'une sorte de triangle au sommet dirigévers le large, ce
qui, pour reprendre le terme de la République fédérale, ((ampute))1'Etat
riverain des zones di: plateau continental situéesen dehors du triangle.
Il est évident que le même effetde concavité peut se produire si un
Etat ayant une côte droite est encadrépar deux Etats dont les côtes les
plus proches font saillie par rapport à la sienne. A l'opposé, si lacôte
d'un Etat présentedes saillants ou a une configuration convexe, ce qui
est dans une certaine mesure le cas des côtes du Danemark et des Pays-
Bas, les lignesde délimitation tracéesd'aprèsla méthodede I'équidistance
s'écartent l'une de l'autre, de sorte que la zone de plateau continental 18 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
coast on divergent courses, thus having a widening tendency on the area
of continental shelf off that coast. These two distinct effects, which are
shown in sketches T-TT1 to be found on page 16, are directly attributable
to the use of the equidistance method of delimiting continental shelf
boundaries off recessing or projecting coasts. It goes without saying that
on these types of coasts the equidistance method produces exactly similar
effects in the delimitation of the lateral boundaries of the territorial sea
of the States concerned. However, owing to the very close proximity of
SLIC~waters to the coasts concerned, these effects are much less marked
and may be very slight,-and there are other aspects involved, which
will be considered in their place. It will suffice to mention here that, for
instance, a deviation from a line drawn perpendicular to the general
direction of the coast, of only 5 kilometres, at a distance of about 5
kilometres from that coast, will grow into one of over30 at a distance of
over 100 kilometres.
9. After the negotiations, separately held between the Federal Republic
and the other two Parties respectively, had in each case, for the reasons
given in the two preceding paragraphs, failed to result in any agreement
about the delimitation of the boundary extending beyond the partial
one already agreed, tripartite talks between al1the Parties took place in
The Hague in February-March 1966, in Bonn in May and again iii
Copenhagen in August. These also proving fruitless, it was then decided
to submit the matter to the Co~~rt.In the meantime the Governments
of Denmark and the Netherlands had, by means of the agreement of
3 1March 1966,already referred to (paragraph 5),proceeded to a delimita-
tion as between themselves of the continental shelf areas lying between
the apex of the triangle notionally ascribed by them to the Federal
Republic (point E on Map 3)and the median line already drawn in the
North Sea, by means of a boundary drawn on equidistance principles,
meeting that liiie at the point marked F on Map 3. On 25 May 1966,
the Government of the Federal Republic, tnking the view that this
delimitation was rcsitzter dios acta, notified the Governments of Den-
mark and the Netherlands, by means of an aide-mémoire, that the
agreement thus concluded could not "have any effect on the question of
the delimitation of the German-Netherlands or the German-Danish parts
of the continental shelf in the North Sea".
10. In pursuance of the tripartite arrangements that had been made
at Bonn and Copenhagen, as described in the preceding paragraph,
Special Agreements for the submission to the Court of the differences
involved were initialled in August 1966 and signed on 2 February 1967.
By a tripartite Protocol signed the same day it was provided (a) that
the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands would notify the
two Special Agreements to the Court, in accordance with Article 40,
paragraph 1,of the Court's Statute, together with the text of the Protocol
itself: (6) that after such notification, the Parties would ask the Court
to join the two cases: and (c) that for the purpose of the appointmentdevant cette côte tend à aller en s'élargissant. Ces deux effets distincts,
représentéssur les croquis 1à III(page 16), sont directement imputables
à l'application de la1méthode de l'équidistance lorsque le plateau coii-
tinental à délimiter s'étenddevant une côte rentrante ou saillante. 11va
sans dire que la méthode de l'équidistance a exactement les mêmes
effetslorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer devant le mêmegenre de côte les
limites latérales de la mer territoriale des Etats intéressés.Etant donné
cependant que les eaux territoriales sont à proximité immédiate de la
terre, l'effet est beaucoup moins marqué, voire très faible, et d'autres
élémentsentrent en jeu, qui seront examinés en temps utile. II suffira
pour le moment d'olbserver que par exemple un écart, par rapport à une
ligne tracée perpendiculairement à la direction générale de la côte, qui
ne serait que de cinq kilomètres à une distance de cinq kilomètres en-
viron de la côte dépasserait trente kilomètres à plus de cent kilomètres.
9. Pour les raisons indiquées aux deux paragraphes précédents,les
négociations menéesséparémententre la République fédéraleet chacune
des deux autres Parc.iesn'ont pu aboutir à aucun accord sur la fixation
de limites au-delà des lignes de délimitation partielle déjà convenues. Des
pourparlers tripartites se sont ensuite tenus en 1966, à La Haye en
février-mars puis à Bonn en mai et à Copenhague en août. Ces pour-
parlers s'étant kgalement révéléisnfructueux, il a étédécidéde soumettre
le problème à la Cour. Entre-temps, par l'accord du 31 mars 1966 déjà
mentionné au paragraphe 5, les Gouvernements du Danemark et des
Pays-Bas avaient procédéà une délimitation, entre leurs deux pays, des
zones de plateau continental comprises entre le soinmet du triangle
qu'ils attribuaient tliéoriquement à la République fédérale(point E de
la carte 3) et la ligne médiane qui avait déjà été tracéedans la mer du
Nord; pour ce faire, ils avaient tracésuivant le principe de I'éqiiidistance
une limite rencontrant la ligne médianeau point F de la carte 3. L25 mai
1966,estimant que cette délimitation étaitresinte rliosuctu, le Gouverne-
de la République fédérale a adresséaux Gouvernements du Danemark et
des Pays-Bas un aide-mémoire par lequel il leur notifiait que l'accord
ainsi conclu nesaura.it ((enrien affecter la question de la délimitation des
parties germano-néerlandaise ou germano-danoise du plateau continental
de la mer de Nord )).
10.A la suite de la décision prise à Bonn et à Copenhague par les
trois Etats et évoquéeau paragraphe précédent, des compromis sou-
mettant à la Cour les divergences entre les Parties ont étéparaphés en
août 1966 et signés le 2 février 1967. Un protocole tripartite signé le
mêmejour prévoyait: a) que le Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas
notifierait les deux compromis à la Cour, conformément à l'article 40,
paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour, en mêmetemps que le texte du
protocole lui-même; 6) qu'une fois cette notification faiteles Parties
demanderaient à la Cour de joindre les deux instances; c) qu'aux fins
de la désignation d'un juge ad hoc les Royaumes du Danemark et des 19 CONTI~TNTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
of a judge ad hoc, the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands
should be considered as being in the same interest within the rneaning
of Article 31,paragraph 5, of the Court's Statute. Following upon these
communications, duly made to it in the implementation of the Protocol,
the Court, by an Order dated 26 April 1968, declared Denmark and the
Netherlands to be in the same interest, and joined the proceedings in the
two cases.
11. Although the proceedings have thus been joined, the cases thein-
selves remain separate, at least in the sense that they relate to different
areas of the North Sea continental shelf, and that tliere is no a priori
reason why the Court must reach identical conclusions in regard to
them,-if for instance geographical features present in the one case were
not present in the other. At the same time, the legal arguments presented
on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands, both before and since the
joinder, have been substantially identical, apart from certain matters
of detail, and have been presented either in commori or in close co-opera-
tion. To this extent therefore, the two cases may be treated as one; and
it must be noted that althoughtwo separate delimitations are in question,
they involve-indeed actually give rise to-a single situation. The fact
that the question of either of these delimitations might have arisen and
called for settlement separately in point of tiine, does not alter the
character of the problem with which the Court is actually faced, having
regard to the nianner in which the Parties themselves have brouglit the
matter before it, as described in the two preceding paragraphs.
12. In conclusioi~ as to the facts, it should bc noted that the Federal
Republic has formally reserved its position, not only in regard to the
Danish-Netlierlands delimitation of the lineE-F (Map 3),as noted in
paragraph 9, but also in regard to the delimitations United Kingdom
Denmark and United Kingdom/Netherlands mentioned in paragraph 4.
In both the latter cases the Governinent of the Federal Republic pointed
out to al1 the Governments concerned that the question of the lateral
delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea between the
Federal Repiiblic and the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands
was still outstanding and could not be prejudiced by the agreements
concluded between those two countries and the United Kingdom.
13. Such are the events and geographical facts in the light of which
the Court has to determine what principles and rules of international
law are applicable to the delimitation of the areas of continental shelf
involved. On this question the Parties have taken up fundamentally
different positions. On behalf of the Kingdoms of Denmark and the
Netherlands it is contended that the whole matter is governed by aPays-Bas seraient considérés comme faisant cause commune au sens de
l'article 31, paragraphe 5, du Statut de la Cour. Ces communications
lui ayant étédûment faites en exécutiondu protocole, la Cour a constaté,
par ordonnance dii 26 avril 1968, que le Danemark et les Pays-Bas
faisaient cause communeet elle a joint les instances dans les deux affaires.
11. Malgré la jonction des instances, les affaires restent distinctes en
ceci au moins qu'ellles ont trait à des zones différentes du plateau con-
tinent;il de la mer du Nord et qu'il n'y a pas de raison à .-riori que la
Cour parvienne à leur égard à des conclusions identiques: il se pourrait,
par exemple, que (certaines particularités giographiques existent dans
l'un des cas, mais non dans l'autre. 11reste qu'avant comme après la
jonction des instances les arguments juridiques du Danemark et des
Pays-Bas ont étSen substance les mêmes, sauf sur certains points de
détail, et qu'ils ont étéprésentéssoit en commun, soit en étroite coopé-
ration. Dans cette mesure les deux affaires peuvent donc être traitées
comme une seule e:t l'on doit constater que, si deux délimitations dis-
tinctes sont en cause, elles concernent - on peut mêmedire qu'elles
créent - une situa.tion unique. S'il est vrai que les questions relatives
ces deux délimitations auraient pu se présenter et êtrerégléesà des mo-
ments différents, cela ne modifie en rien la nature du problème qui se
pose en fait~àla Cour, vu la façon dont les Parties elles-mêmesl'ont saisie
(voir les deux paragraphes précédents).
12. Pour achever l'exposé des faits, il conkient de rappeler que la
Képublique fédéralea formellement réservé saposition non seulement
l'égard de la délimitation dano-néerlandaise suivant la ligne E-F de la
carte 3 comme il a été indiquéau paragraphe 9, mais également au sujet
des délimitations entre le Royaume-Uni et le Daneniark et entre le
Royaume-Uni et les Pays-Bas mentionnées au paragraphe 4. Dans ces
deux derniers cas, le Gouvernment de la République fédéralea attiré
l'attention de tous les gouvernements intéresséssur le fait que la question
de la délimitation latéraledu plateau continental de la mer du Nord entre
la République féd6rale et les Royaumes du Danemark et des Pays-Bas
n'étaitpas encore rkgléeet que les accords conclus entre ces deux pays et
le Royaume-Uni ne pouvaient en préjuger la solution.
13. Tels sont les événementset les faits géographiques au vu desquels
la Cour doit déterminer quels sont les principes et les règles de droit in-
ternational applicables à la délimitation des zones de plateau continental
en cause. A ce sujet, les Parties ont adopté des positions fondamentale-
ment différentes. Les Royaumes du Danemark et des Pays-Bas soutien-
nent que l'ensemble de la question est régipar une règle de droit obliga-mandatory rule of law which, reflecting the language of Article 6 of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf concluded at Geneva on 29 April
1958,was designated by them as the "equidistance-special circumstances"
rule. According to this contention, "equidistance" is not merely a method
of the cartographical construction of a boundary line, but the essential
eleinent in a rule of law which may be stated as follows,-namely that
in the absence of agreement by the Parties to employ another method or
to proceed to a delimitation on an url hoc basis, al1 continental shelf
boundaries must be drawn by means of an equidistance line, unless,
or except to theextent to which, "special circumstances" are recognized
to exist,-an equidistance line being, it will be recalled, a line every
point on which is the same distance away from whatever point is nearest
to it on the coast of each of the countries concerned-or rather, strictly,
on the baseline of the territorial sea along that coast. As regards what
constitutes "special circumstances", al1 that need be said at this stage
is that according to the view put forward on behalf of Denmark and the
Netherlands, the configuration of the German North Sea coast, its
recessive character, and the fact that it makes nearly a right-angled bend
in mid-course,would not of itself constitute, for either of the two bound-
ary lines concerned, a special circumstance calling for or warranting a
departure fromthe equidistance method of delimitation :only the presence
of some special feature, minor in itself-such as an islet or small pro-
tuberance-but so placed as to produce a disproportionately distorting
effect on an otherwise acceptable boundary line would, soit was claimed,
possess this character.
14. These various contentions, together with the view that a rule of
equidistance-special circumstances is binding on the Federal Republic,
are founded by Denmark and theNetherlands partly on the 1958Geneva
Convention on theContinental Shelf already mentioned (preceding para-
graph), and partly on general considerations of law relating to the conti-
nental shelf, lying outside this Convention. Similar considerations are
eqiially put forward to found the contention that the delimitation on an
equidistance basis of the line E-F (Map 3) by the Netherlands-Danish
agreement of 31 March 1966 (paragraph 5 above) is valid erga omnes,
and must be respected by the Federal Republic unless it can demonstrate
the existence of juridically relevant "special circumstances".
15. The Federal Republic, for its part, while recognizing the utility
of equidistance as a method of delimitation, and that this method can
in many cases be employed appropriately aiid with advantage, denies its
obligatory character for States not parties to the Geneva Convention,
and contends that the correct rule to be applied, at any rate in such
circumstances as those of the North Sea, is one according towhich each
of the States concerned should have a "just and equitable share" of the
available continental shelf, in proportion to the length of its coastline or
sea-frontage. Tt was also contended on behalf of the Federal Republictoire qu'ils appellent règle ((équidistance-circonstances spéciales)), en
s'inspirant des ternies de l'article 6 de la Convention de Genève du
29 avril 1958sur le plateau continental. Selon cette thèse, l'équidistance
n'est pas simplement une méthodede construction cartographique, mais
l'élément essentied l'une règlede droit qui peut s'énoncerainsi: à défaut
d'un accord entre les parties en vue d'employer une autre méthode ou
de se fonder sur le!;élémentsde fait de l'espèce,toute délimitation de
plateau continental doit suivre la ligne d'équidistance, sauf dans la
mesure où l'existence de ~ccirconstancesspéciales))est reconnue - la
ligne d'équidistance étant, comme l'on sait, une ligne dont chaque point
est à égaledistance du point le plus proche de la côte de chacun des pays
intéressésou, plus précisément,de la ligne de base de la mer territoriale
bordant cette côte. Quant à ce qu'il faut entendre par cccirconstances
spéciales »,il suffira de dire pour le moment que, d'après le Danemark et
les Pays-Bas, la concavité de la côte allemande de la mer du Nord, qui
change de direction en son milieu presque à angle droit, ne constit
soi, ni pour l'une ni pour l'autre des deux lignes de délimitation en cxe?
une circonstance spéciale appelant ou justifiant une dérogation à la
méthode de délimitation fondée sur l'équidistance. A leur avis, seule
pourrait constituer une telle circonstance spéciale une particularité
mineure en soi, corrime un îlot ou un légersaillant, mais produisant sur
une limite par ailleurs acceptable un effet de déviation disproportionné.
14. C'est en partie sur la Convention de Genève de 1958sur le plateau
continental, mentionnée au paragraphe précédent,et en partie sur des
considérations juridiques de caractère généralayant trait au plateau
continental mais extérieures à la Convention que le Danemark et les
Pays-Bas font reposer ces diverses thèses etnotamment leur opinion selon
laquelle une règle équidistance-circonstances spéciales lierait la Répu-
blique fédérale.Ils se fondent sur des considérations analogues pour dire
que la délimitation opéréed'après l'équidistance, suivant la ligne E-F de
la carte 3, par l'accord du 31 mars 1966entre les Pays-Bas et le Danemark
(voir paragraphe 5 ci-dessus) est valableuga omr7es et doit être respectée
par la République Edérale, à moins que celle-ci puisse démontrer I'exis-
tence de ~ccirconstacicesspécial esjuridiquement admissibles.
15. Sans méconnaître l'utilité de l'équidistance comme méthode de
délimitation ni lefait que cette méthode puisse êtreappropriée et présen-
ter des avantages dans de nombreux cas, la République fédérale lui refuse
pour sa part tout caractère obligatoire à l'égard desEtats qui ne sont pas
parties à la Convecition de Genève. Elle affirme que la véritable règle
à appliquer, au moins dans les circonstances propres à la mer du Nord,
est la règle suivant laquelle chacun des Etats en cause devrait obtenir
une ((partjuste et équitable )du plateau continental disponible, propor-
tionnellement à la longueur de son littoral ou de son front de mer. Ellethat in a sea shaped as is the North Sea, the whole bed of which, except
for the Norwegian Trough, consists of continental shelf at a depth of
less than 200 metres, and where the situation of the circumjacent States
causes a natural convergence of their respective continental shelf areas,
towards a central point situated on the median line of the whole seabed
-or at any rate in those localities where this is the case-each of the
States concerned is entitled to a continental shelf area extending up to
this central point (in effect a sector), or at least extending to themedian
line at some point or other. In this way the "cut-off effect, of which
the Federal Republic complains, caused, as explained in paragraph 8,
by the drawing of equidistance lines at the two ends of an inward curving
or recessed coast, would be avoided.As a means of giving effect to these
ideas, the Federal Republic proposed the method of the "coastal front",
or façade, constituted by a straight baseline joining these ends, upon
which the necessary geometrical constructions would be erected.
16. Alternatively, the Federal Republic claimed that if, contrary to
its main contention, the equidistance method was held to be applicable,
then the configuration of the German North Sea coast constituted a
"special circumstance" such as to justify a departure from that method
of delimitation in this particular case.
17. In putting forward these contentions, it was stressed on behalf of
the Federal Republic that the claim for a just and equitable share did
not in any way involve asking the Court to give a decision e.\:aequo et
botzo (which, having regard to the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 38
of the Court's Statute, would not be possible without the consent of the
Parties),-for the priiiciple of the just and equitable share was one of
the recognized general principles of law which, by virtue of paragraph 1
(c) of the same Article, the Court was entitled to apply as a matter of
the justifia distributivwhich entered into al1legal systems. It appeared,
moreover, that whatever its underlying motivation, the claim of the
Federal Republic was, at least ostensibly, to a just and equitable share
of the space involved, rather than to a share of the natural resources as
such, mineral or other, to be found in it, the location of which could not
in any case be fully ascertained at present. On the subject of location
the Court has in fact received some, though not complete information,
but has not thought it necessary to pursue the matter, since the question
of natural resources is less one of delimitation than of eventual exploita-
tion.
18. It will be convenient to consider first the contentions put forward
on behalf of the Federal Republic. The Court does not feel able to
accept them-at least in the particular form they have taken. Ttconsiderssoutient égalementqu'étant donné la formede la mer du Nord, dont le
lit est entièrement constitué, a l'exception de la fosse norvégienne, par
un plateau continerital à une profondeur de moins de deux cents mètres
et où la situation des Etats circonvoisins a pour conséquence naturelle
de faire converger leurs zones de plateau continental vers un point central
situésur la ligne mkdiane divisant tout le lit de la mer, chacun des Etats
intéresséspeut, au moins dans la partie où cette convergence existe,
prétendre à ce que sa zone aille jusqu'à ce point central (formant ainsi
un secteur) ou atteigne en tout cas un point quelconque de la ligne mé-
diane. Ainsi disparaîtrait l'effet'((amputation 1dont se plaint la Répu-
blique fédéraleet qui résulte, comme on l'a vu au paragraphe 8, du
tracé de lignes d'équidistance aux deux extrémitésd'une côte concave
ou rentrante. Pour mettre ces idéesen pratique, la République fédérale
propose la méthode dela ((façademaritime ))qui serait constituée par la
ligne de base droite réunissant les extrémités dela côte et à partir de
laquelle s'effectueraient les constructions géométriquesnécessaires.
16. Subsidiairemt:nt la République fédéralesoutient que, dans le cas
où, contrairement (i sa thèse principale, la méthode de l'équidistance
serait considérée coinme applicable, la configuration ue la côte allemande
de la mer du Nord constituerait une circonstance spéciale justifiant
que l'on s'écarte de cetteméthodeen l'espèce.
17. Dans l'exposé de ces thèse, la Républiq~e fédéralea souligné
qu'en revendiquant une part juste et équitableelle n'invitait nullement la
Cour à statuer p.\:ueqzloet hotio, ce qui, vu l'article 38, paragraphe 2,
du Statut de la Cour, ne serait possible qu'avec l'assentiment des Parties;
elle considère en effet que le principe de la part juste et équitable est
l'un des principes gknérauxde droit reconnus qu'en vertu du paragraphe
1 c)du mêmearticle de son Statut la Cour est habilitée à appliquer au titre
de lajusticz distributive, partie intégrante de tous lessystèmesjuridiques.
Il semble en outre que la demande de la République fédérale, quels
qu'en soient les motifs réels,porte, du moins dans sa présentation, sur
une part juste et équitablede l'espaceen cause plutôt que sur une part des
ressources minérales ou autres ressources naturelles que l'on pourrait y
trouver et dont I'em~lacementne saurait de toute manière être exactement
déterminépour le rhoment. La Cour a obtenu certains renseignements,
encore qu'incomplets, sur cette dernière question mais elle n'a pas jugé
nécessaire d'insister, car cela concerne l'exploitation éventuelle des
ressources du plateau continental plus encore que sa délimitation.
18. Pour la commodité de l'exposé, ilest préférable d'examineren
premier lieu les thè:jesprésentéesau nom de la République fédérale.La
Cour n'estime pas pouvoir les accepter, du moins sous la forme qui that, having regard both to the language of the Special Agreements and
to more general considerations of law relating to the régime of the
continental shelf, its task in the present proceedings relates essentially
to the delimitation and not the apportionment of the areas concerned,
or their division into converging sectors. Delimitation is a process whicli
involves establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle,
appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination d~ noro of
such an area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not
the saine thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a previously
undelimited area, even though in a number of cases the results may be
comparable, or even identical.
19. More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and equi-
table share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court enter-
tains no doubt is the most fundamental of al1 the rules of law relating
to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, though quite independent of it,-namely that the rights of the
coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes
a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipso fucto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and
as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring the seabe 'and exploiting its naturalÏresources. In short,
there is here an inhere t right. In order to exercise it, no special legal
process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be
performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States have done
this) but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does
not depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of the Geneva
Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal State does
not choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it,
that is its own affair, but no one else may do so without its express
consent.
20. Tt follows that even in such a situation as that of the North Sea,
the notion of apportioning an as yet undelimited area, considered as a
whole (which underlies the doctrine of the just and equitable share), is
quite foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic concept of continental
shelf entitlement, according to which the process of delimitation is
essentially one of drawing a boundary line between areas which already
appertain to one or other of the States affected. The delimitation itself
must indeed be equitably effected, but it cannot have as its object the
awarding of an equitable share, or indeed of a share, as such, at ail,-for
the fundamental concept involved does not admit of there being anything
undivided to share out. Evidently any dispute about boundaries must
involve that there is a disputed marginal or fringe area, to which both
parties are laying claim, so that any delimitation of it which does not
leave it wholly to one of the parties will in practice divide it between
them in certain shares, or operate as if such a division had been made.leur a étédonnée.Compte tenu du texte des compromis et de considéra-
tions plus généralestouchant le régimejuridique du plateau continental,
elle est d'avis que sa tâche en l'espèceconcerne essentiellement la délimi-
tation et non point la répartition des espaces visésou leur division en
secteurs convergents. La délimitation est une opération qui consiste à
déterminer les limites d'une zone relevant déjà en principe de 1'Etat
riverain et non à cléfinircette zone de nollo.Délimiter d'une manière
équitable est une ch.ose,mais c'en estune autre que d'attribuer une part
juste et équitable d'une zone non encore délimitée,quand bien mêmele
résultat des deux opérations serait dans certains cas comparable, voire
identique.
19. Ce qui est plus important encore, c'est que la doctrine de la part
juste et équitable semble s'écartertotalement de la règle qui constitue
sans aucun doute possible pour la Cour la plus fondamentale de toutes
les règles dedroit relatives au plateau continental et qui est consacréepar
l'article2 de la Con.vention de Genève de 1958, bien qu'elle en soit tout
à fait indépendante: les droits de 1'Etat riverain concernant la zone de
plateau continental qui constitue un prolongement naturel de son terri-
toire sous la mer existentipsofacto et abinitioen vertu de la souveraineté
de 1'Etatsur ce territoire et par une extension de cette souveraineté sous la
forme de l'exercice de droits souverains aux fins de l'exploration du lit
de la mer et de l'exploitation de ses ressources naturelles. II y a là un
droit inhérent. Poirit n'est besoin pour l'exercer de suivre un processus
juridique particulier ni d'accomplir des actes juridiques spéciaux. Son
existence peut être constatée,comme cela a étéfait par de nombreux
Etats, mais elle ne suppose aucun acte constitutif. Qui plus est, ce droit
est indépendant de son exercice effectif. Pour reprendre le terme de la
Convention de Genive, il est c~exclusifn ce sens que, si un Etat riverain
choisit de ne pas explorer ou de ne pas exploiter les zones de plateau
continental lui revenant, cela ne concerne que lui et nul ne peut le faire
sans son consentement exprès
20. Tlen découle que,mêmedans la situation de la mer du Nord, l'idée
de répartir une zone non encore délimitéeconsidéréecomme un tout,
idéesous-jacente àla doctrine de la part juste et équitable,est absolument
étrangèreet opposée à la conception fondamentale du régimedu plateau
continental, suivant laquelle l'opération de délimitation consiste essen-
tiellement à tracer u.neligne de démarcation entre des zones relevant déjà
de l'un ou de l'autre des Etats intéressés.Certes la délimitation doit
s'effectuer équitablement, mais elle ne saurait avoir pour objet d'attri-
buer une part équitable ni mêmesimplement une part, car la conception
fondamentale en la matière exclut qu'il y ait quoi que ce soit d'indivisà
partager. Tlest évident qu'un différendsur des limites implique néces-
sairement I1existenc:ed'une zone marginale litigieuse réclaméepar les
deux parties et que toute délimitation n'attribuant pas entièrement cette
zone àl'une des parties aboutit en pratiqueàlapartager ou àfaire comme
s'ily avait partage. Mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il y ait répartition deBut this does not mean that there has been an apportionment of some-
thing that previously consisted of an integral, still less an undivided
whole.
* * *
21. The Court will now turn to the contentions advanced on behalf
of Denmark and the Netherlands. Their general character has already
been indicated in paragraphs 13 and 14: the most convenient way of
dealing with them will be on the basis of the following question-namely,
does the equidistance-specialcircumstances principle constitute a manda-
tory rule, either on a con) .tltional or on a customary international law
basis, in such a way as to govern any delimitation of the North Sea
continental shelf areas between the Federal Republic and the Kingdoms
of Denmark and the Netherlands respectively? Another and shorter way
of formulating the question would be to ask whether, in any delimitation
of these areas, the Federal Republic is under a legal obligation to accept
the application of the equidistance-special circumstances principle.
22. Particular attention isdirected to the use, inthe foregoing formula-
tions, of the terms "mandatory" and "obligation". It has never been
doubted that the equidistance method of delimitation is a very convenient
one, the use of which is indicated in a considerable number of cases.
It constitutes a method capable of being employed in almost al1circum-
stances, however singular the results might sometimes be, and has the
virtue that ifnecessary,-if for instance, the Parties are unable to enter
into negotiations,-any cartographer can dofacto trace such a boundary
on the appropriate maps and charts, and those traced by competent
cartographers will for al1practical purposes agree.
23. In short, it would probably be true to Saythat no other method
of delimitation has the same combination of practical convenience and
certainty of application. Yet these factors do not suffice of themselves
to convert what is a method into a rule of law, making the acceptance
of the results of using that method obligatory in al1cases in which the
parties do not agree otherwise, or in which "special circunistances"
cannot be shown to exist. Juridically, if there isuch a rule, it must draw
its legal force from other factors than the existence of these advantages,
important though they may be. It should also be noticed that the counter-
part of this conclusion is no less valid, and that the practical advantages
of the equidistance method would continue to exist whether its em-
ployment were obligatory or not.
24. It would however be ignoring realities if it were not noted at the
same time that the use of this method, partly for the reasons givenin pa-
ragraph 8 above and partly for reasons that are best appreciated by
reference to the many maps and diagrams furnished by both sides in
the course of the written and oral proceedings, can under certaincircum-
stances produce results that appear on the face of thenl to be extra-
ordinary, unnatural or unreasonable. It is basically this fact which un-quelque chose qui constituait auparavant un tout, et encore moins de
quelque chose d'indivis.
21. La Cour en vient maintenant aux thèses avancées au nom du
Danemark et des Pays-Bas. Leur caractère générala déjà été indiqué aux
paragraphes 13 et 14; pour en faciliter l'examen, on peut partir de la
question suivante: le principe équidistance-circonstances spécialescons-
titue-t-il, en vertu d'une convention ou du droit international coutumier,
une règle obligatoire applicable à toute délimitation du plateau contincn-
ta1 de la mer du Nord entre la République fédéraleet les Royaumes du
Danemark et des Pays-Bas respectivement? En bref la République fédé-
rale a-t-elle l'obligation juridique d'accepter en la matière l'application
du principe équidistance-circonstances spéciales?
73. Il convient dc noter l'emploi des termes ohliguioirc et obligatiotl
dans les formules qui précèdent.On n'a jamais douté que la méthode de
délimitation fondée sur l'équidistance soit une méthode extrêmemeiit
pratique dont l'emploi est indiqué dans uii très grand nombre de cas.
Elle peut êtreutiliséedans presque toutes les circonstances, pour singulier
que soit parfois le r~isultat; elle présente l'avantage qu'en cas de besoin,
par exemple si une raison quelconque empêche les parties d'entreprendre
des négociations, tout cartographe peut tracer sur la carte une ligne
d'équidistance &,facto et que les lignes dessinées pzr des cartographes
qualifiéscoïncideront pratiquement.
73. En somme il lesprobablement exact qu'aucune autre méthode de
délimitation ne combine au mêmedegréles avantages de la commodité
pratique et de la certitude dans l'application. Toutefois cela lie sufit pas
à transformer une méthode en règle de droit et à rendre obligatoire
l'acceptatioii de ses résultats chaque fois que les parties ne se sont pas
mises d'accord sur d'autres dispositions ou que l'existence de ~(circons-
tances spécia1es)lne peut êtreétablie. Juridiquement, si une telie règle
existe, sa valeur en droit doit tenir à autre chose qu'à ces avantages, si
importants soient-il:;. La réciproque n'est pas nloiiis vraie: que I'applica-
tion de la méthode de l'équidistance soit obligatoire ou non, ses avaiitages
pratiques resteront les mêmes.
24. Ce serait cependant méconnaître Ies rkalités que de ne pas noter
en mêmetemps que, pour les raisons indiquées ail paragraphe 8 ci-
dessus et pour d'autres raisons qui apparaissent clairement si l'on se
reporte aux cartes et croquis fournis en grand nombre par les Parties
au cours des procédures écriteet orale, l'emploi de cette méthode peut
dans certains cas aboutir à des résultatsde prime abord extraordinaires,
anormaux ou déraisonnables. C'est ce fait, fondailientalement, qui est àderlies the present proceedings. The plea that, however this may be,
the results can never be inequitable, because the equidistance principle
is by definition an equitable principle of delimitation, involves a postulate
that clearly begs the whole question at issue.
25. The Court now turns to the legal position regarding the equidis-
tance method. The first question to be considered is whether the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf is binding for al1the Parties
in this case-that is to Say whether, as contended by Denniark and the
Netherlands, the use of this method is rendered obligatory forthe present
delimitations by virtue of the delimitations provision (Article 6) of that
instrument, according to the conditions laid down in it. Clearly, if this
is so, thsn the provisions of the Convention will prevail in the relations
between the Parties, and would take precedence of any rules having a
more general character, or derived from another source. On that basis
the Court's reply to the question put to it in the Special Agreements
would necessarily be to the effect that as between the Parties the relevant
provisions of the Convention represented the applicable rules of law-that
is to say constituted the law for the Parties-and its sole remaining task
would be to interpret those provisions, in so far as their meaning was
disputed or appeared to be uncertain, and to apply them to the particu-
lar circumstances involved.
26. The relebant provisions of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention,
paragraph 2 of which Denmark and the Netherlands contend not only to
be applicable as a conventional rule, but also to represent the accepted
rule of general international law on the subject of continental shelf
delimitation. as it exists independently of the Conveiltion, read as follows:
"1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the
boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States
shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall
be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the
principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is mea-
sured."l'origine de la présente instance. Affirmer que de toute façon les résultats
ne peuvent jamais êtreinéquitables parce que l'équidistaiice est par dé-
finition un principe de délimitation équitable revient de toute évidence
à une pétition de principe.
25. La Cour étudiera à présent quelle est la situation juridique en ce
qui concerne la méthode de l'équidistance. II convient d'examiner d'abord
si la Convention de Genève de 1958 sur le plateau continental lie toutes
les Parties à la présente affaire, c'est-à-dire si, comme le Danemark et les
Pays-Bas le soutiennent, l'article6 de cette Convention relatif à la déiimi-
tation rend l'application de la méthode de l'équidistance obligatoire eli
l'espèce,dans les conditio~isqu'il prévoitSi tel étaitle cas, les dispositions
de la Convention régiraient manifestement les relations entre les P~lrties
et prendraient le pas sur toute règled'un caractcre plus généralou décou-
lant d'une autre source. A la question poséedans les compromis, la Cour
devrait alors liécessairement répondre que les dispositions pertinentes de
la Convention représentent les règlesde droit applicables entre les Parties,
autrement dit qu'elles constituent le droit pour les Parties, et il ne lui
resterait plus qu'à interpréter ces dispositions, dans la inesurc où leur
sens serait contesttf ou paraîtrait incertain, et à les appliquer aux faits de
l'espèce.
26. Les dispositions pertinentes de l'article 6 de la Convention de
Genève, dont le paragraphe 2, selon le Danemark et les Pays-Bas, ne
serait pas seulement applicable en tant que règle conventionnelle mais
représenterait en outre la règle corisacréepar le droit international général
en matière de déi~mitationdu plateau continental, indépendamment de
la Convention. se lisent comme suit:
((1. Dans le cas où un mêmeplateau continental est adjacent aux
territoires de deuou plusieurs Etatsdont lescôtes se font face, la déli-
mitation du plateau continental entre ces Etats est déterminéepar
accord entre ces Etats. A défaut d'accord, et à moins que des cir-
constances spéciales ne justifient une autre délimitation, celle-ci
est constituée par la ligne médiane dont tous les points sont équidis-
tants despoints les plus proches des lignes de base h partir desquelles
est mesuréela largeur de la mer territoriale de chacun dc ces Etats.
2. Dans le cas où un mêmeplateau continental est adjacent aux
territoires de deux Etats limitrophes, la délimitation du plateau
continental est déterminée par accord entre ces Etats. A défaut
d'accord, et à moins que des circonstances spéciales lie justifient
une autre délimitation, celle-ci s'opère par application du principe
de I'équidistai~cedes points les plus proches des lignes de base à
partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale de
chacun de ces Etats. nThe Convention received 46 signatures and, up-to-date, there have been
39 ratifications or accessions. It came into force on 10June 1964,having
received the 22 ratifications or accessions required for that purpose
(Article 1l), and was therefore in force at the time when the various
delimitations of continental shelf boundaries described earlier (para-
graphs 1 and 5) took place between the Parties. But, under the formal
provisions of the Convention, it is in force for any individual State only
in so far as, having signed it within the time-limit provided for that
purpose, that State has also subsequently ratified it; or,not having signed
within that time-limit, has subsequently acceded to the Convention.
Denmark and the Netherlands have both signed and ratified the Conven-
tion, and are parties to it, the former since 10June 1964,the latter since
20 March 1966.The Federal Republic was one of the signatories of the
Convention, but has never ratified it, and is consequently not a party.
27. It is admitted on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands that in
these circumstances the Convention cannot, as such, be binding on the
Federal Republic, in the sense of the Republic being contractually
bound by it. But it is coiitended that the Convention, or the régime of
the Convention, and in particular of Article 6, has become binding 011
the Federal Republic in another way,-namely because, by conduct, by
public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic
has unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has
manifested its acceptance of the conventional régime; or has recognized
it as being generally applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf
areas. lt has also been suggested that the Federal Republic had held
itself out as so assuming, accepting or recognizing, in such a manner as
to cause other States, and in particular Denmark and the Netherlands,
to rely on the attitude thus taken up.
28. As regards these contentions, it is clear that only a very definite,
very consistent course of conduct on the part of a State in the situation
of the Federal Republic could justify the Court in upholding them; and,
if this had existed-that is toSay if there had been a real intention to
manifest acceptance or recognition of the applicability of the conven-
tional régime-then it must be asked whyit was that the Federal Republic
did not take the obvious step of giving expression to this readiness by
simply ratifying the Convention. In principle, when a number of States,
including the one whose conduct is invoked, and those invoking it,
have drawn up a convention specifically providing for a particular
method by which the intention to become bound by the régime ofthe
convention is to be manifested-namely by the carrying out of certain
prescribed formalities (ratification, accession), it is not lightly to be
presumed that a State which has not carried out these formalities, though
at al1times fully able and entitled to do so, has nevertheless somehow
become bound in another way. Indeed if it were a question not of
obligation but of rights,-if, that is to say, a State which, though entitledLa Convention a étésignéepar quarante-six Etats et elle a reçu à ce jour
trente-neuf ratifications ou adhésions. Elle est entréeen vigueur le10juin
1964, ayant obtenu les vingt-deux ratifications ou adhésions exigées
(article 11);elle étaitdonc en vigueur au moment où lesParties ont effectué
lesdiverses délimitations du plateau continental évoquéesauxparagraphes
1 et 5 ci-dessus. Toutefois, selon ses clauses finales, la Convention n'est
en vigueur à l'égard d'un Etat que si celui-ci, après l'avoir signéedans
les délais prévus,l'a ratifiée ou, sans l'avoir signéedans les délais, y a
adhéréu1térieuremc;nt.Le Danemark et les Pays-Bas ont signéet ratifié
la Convention et y sont parties depuis le 10juin 1964 et le 20 inars 1966
respectivement. La République fédéralea signé la Convention mais elle
ne l'a jamais ratifiéeet n'y est donc pas partie.
27. Le Danemarlc et lcs Pays-Bas admettent que dans ces conditions
la Convention ne saurait en tant que telle être obligatoire pour la Ré-
publique fédérale, c'est-A-dire la lier contractuellement. Ils soutiennent
que la Convention, ou le régimede la Convention et dc son article 6 en
particulier, est néannioinsdevenueobligatoire pour la Républiquefédérale
d'une autre manière: en raison notainment de son comportement, de
ses déclarations publiques et de ses proclamations,la République fédérale
aurait assumé unilatéralement les obligations de la Convention, ou
manifesté son acceptation du régime conventionnel, ou reconnu ce
régiine comme géniiralement applicable en matière de délimitation du
p!ateau continental. II a étéavancé aussi que la République fédéralese
serait présentéecomme assumant les obligati'onsde laconvention, comme
acceptant le régime conventionnel ou comme recorinaissant l'applica-
bilitéde ce régiine,d'une façon qui aurait amenéd'autres Etats, en parti-
culier le Danemark etles Pays-Bas, à tabler sur cette attitude.
38. II est clair quc la Cour ne serait justifiéeà accepter pareilles thèses
que dans le cas où le comportement de la République fédéraleaurait été
absolument net et constant; et mêmedans cette hypothèse, c'est-à-dire
si elle avait eu vraiment l'intention de manifester qu'elle acceptait le
régiine conventionnel ou en reconnaissait l'applicabilité, on devrait se
deinander pourquoi la République fédérale n'apas pris la mesure qui
s'imposait, à savoir iexprimer sa volonté en ratifiant purement et simple-
ment la Convention. En principe, lorsque plusieurs Etats, y compris celui
dont le comportement est invoquéet ceux qui l'invoquent, ont conclu une
convention où ilest spécifiéque l'intention d'êtreliépar le régimecon-
ventionnel doit se manifester d'une n-ianière déterminée, c'est-à-dire
par l'accomplissement de certaines formalités prescrites (ratification,
adhésion), on ne saurait présumer à la légèrequ'un Etat n'ayant pas
accompli ces formalités, alors qu'il était à tout moment en mesure et en
droit de le faire, n'en est pas moins tenu d'une autre façon. D'ailleurs.
s'il s'agissait de droits et non d'obligations, en d'autres termes si un
Etat essayait de revendiquer des droits en vertu d'une convention àto do so, had not ratified or acceded, attempted to claim rights under
the convention, on the basis of a declared willingness to be bound by it,
or of conduct evincing acceptance of the conventional régime,it would
simply be told that, not having become a party to the convention it
could not claim any rights under it until the professed willingness and
acceptance had been manifested in the prescribed form.
29. A further point, not in itself conclusive, but to be noted, is that
if the Federal Republic had ratified the Geneva Convention, it could
have entered-and could, if it ratified now, enter-a reservation to
Article 6, by reason of the faculty to do so conferred by Article 12of the
Convention. This faculty would remain, whatever the previous conduct
of the Federal Republic might hive beeil-a fact which at least adds to
the difficulties involved by the Danish-Netherlands contention.
30. Having regard to these considerations of principle, it appears to
the Court that only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice
to lend substance to thiscontention,-that is to Sayifthe Federal Republic
were now precluded from denying the applicability of the conveiltional
régime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only
clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that régime,but also Iiad
caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detri-
mentally to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of this there is
no evidence whatever in the present case.
31. ln these circumstances it seems to the Court that little usef~il
purpose would be served by passing in review and subjecting to detailed
scrutiny the various acts relied on by Denmark and the Netherlands as
being indicative of the Federal Republic's acceptance of the régime of
Article 6;-for instance that at the Geneva Conference the Federal
Republic did not take formal objection to Article 6 and eventually
signed the Convention without entering any reservation in respect of
that provision; that it at one time announced its intention to ratify the
Convention: that in its public declarations concerning its continental
shelf rights it appeared to rely on, or at least cited, certain provisions
of the Geneva Convention. In this last connection a good deal has been
made of the joint Minute signed in Bonn, on 4 August 1964, between
the then-negotiating delegations of the Federal Republic and the Nether-
lands. But this minute made it clear that wliat the Federal Republic
was seeking was an agreed division, rather than a delimitation of the
central North Sea continental shelf areas, and the refereiice it made to
Article 6 was specifically to the first sentence of paragraphs 1 and 2 of
that Article, which speaks exclusively of delimitation by agreement and
not at al1of the use of the equidistance metliod.
32. In the result it appears to the Court that none of the elemeiits
invoked is decisive; each is ultimately negative or inconclusive; al1 are
capable of varying interpretations or explanations. It would be onelaquelle il n'aurait donnéni sa ratification ni son adhésionalors qu'il était
habilitéà le faire, et s'il alléguaàcette fin qu'il a proclamé sa volonté
d'êtreliépar la convention ou a manifesté par son comportement son
acceptation du réginieconventionnel, on lui répondrait simplement que,
n'étant pas devenu partie à la convention il ne peut revendiquer aucun
droit à ce titre tant qu'il n'a pas exprimésa volonté ou son acceptation
dans les formes prescrites.
29. Un autre point, qui n'est pas en soi décisif,vaut d'êtrerelevé: si
la République fédérale avaitratifié laConvention de Genève, elle aurait
pu formuler une réserve à l'égard del'article 6, en usant de la faculté
offerte par l'article12, et elle pourrait encore le faire aujourd'hui si
elle ratifiait la Convention. Cette possibilité subsisteraitindépendam-
nient du comportenient antérieur de la République fédérale,ce qui ne
fait qu'ajouter aux clifficultéssoulevéespar la thèsedu Danemark et des
Pav2~Bas.
30. Eu igard i ces considérations de principe, la Cour est d'avis que
seule l'existenced'une situation d'estoppel pourrait étayerpareille thèse:
il faudrait que la Rkpublique fédéralene puisse plus contester I'applica-
bilitédu régimeconventionnel, en raison d'un comportement, de déclara-
tions, etc., qui n'auraient passeulement attesté d'une manière claire et
constante son acceptation de ce régimemais auraient également amené
le Danemark ou les Pays-Bas, se fondant sur cette attitude, à modifier
leur position à leur détriment ou àsubir un préjudice quelconque. Rien
n'indique qu'il en soit ainsi en l'espèce.
31. Dans ces conditions, il ne semble guère utileà la Cour d'examiner
en détail les divers actes de la République fédéralequi, selon le Dane-
mark et lesPays-Bas,traduiraient une acceptation du régimedel'article 6:
ainsi, lors de la conférence de Genève,elle n'a pas opposé d'objection
formelle à l'article 6et ellea, pour finir, signé la Conventionsans formuler
de réserve à l'égardde cet article; elle a annoncé à un certain moment
son intention de ratifier la Convention; dans ses déclarations publiques
concernant ses droits sur le plateau continental, elle a paru se fonder sur
certaines dispositions de la Convention ou elle les a en tout cas citées.
A ce sujet on a tiré argument du procès-verbal commun signé à Bonn
le 4 août 1964par l'esdélégations dela République fédérale et des Pays-
Bas lors des négociiationsentre ces deux pays. Mais le texte fait bien
ressortir que la République fédérale cherchaitun accord sur un partage
plutôt que sur une délimitationdes zones centrales du plateau continental
de la mer du Nord et la mention qu'il fait de l'article 6 vise expressément
In première phrase des paragraphes 1 et 2 de cet article, laquelle con-
cerne uniquement la délimitation par voie d'accord et nullement l'emploi
de la méthode de I'iSquidistance.
32. Somme toute, il semble à la Cour qu'aucun des faits invoqués
n'est décisif; tous ,sont en fin de compte négatifs ou non concluants,
tous se prêtent à des interprétations ou explications variées.Autre chose thing to infer from the declarations of the Federal Republic an admission
accepting the fundamental concept of coastal State rights in respect of
the continental shelf: it would be quite another matter to see in this an
acceptance of the rules of delimitation contained in the Convention.
The declarations of the Federal Republic, taken in the aggregate, might
at most justify the view that to begin with, and before becoming fully
aware of what the probable effectsin the North Sea would be, the Federal
Republic was not specifically opposed to the equidistance principle as
embodied in Article 6 of the Convention. But from a purely negative
conclusion such as this, it would certainly not be possible to draw the
positive inference that the Federal Republic, though not a party to the
Convention, had accepted the régime ofArticle 6 in a manner binding
upon itself.
33. The dangers of the doctrine here advanced by Denmark and the
Netherlands, if it had to be given general application in the international
law field, hardly need stressing. Moreover, in the present case, any such
inference would immediately be nullified by the fact that, as soon as
concrete delimitations of North Sea continental shelf areas began to be
carried out, the Federal Republic, as described earlier (paragraphs 9 and
12),at once reserved its position with regard to those delimitations which
(effected on an equidistance basis) might be prejudicial to the delimitation
of its own continental shelf areas.
34. Since, accordingly, the foregoing considerations must lead the
Court to hold that Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is not, as such,
applicable to the delimitations involved in the present proceedings, it
becomes unnecessary for it to go into certain questions relating to the
interpretation or application of that provision which would otherwise
arise. One should be inentioned however, namely what is the relation-
ship between the requirement of Article 6 for delimitation by agreement,
and the requirements relating to equidistance and special circumstances
that are to be applied in "the absence of" such agreement,-i.e., in the
absence of agreement on the matter, is there a presumption that the
continental shelf boundary between any two adjacent States consists
automatically of an equidistance line,-or must negotiations for an
agreed boundary prove finally abortive before the acceptance of a bound-
ary drawn on an equidistance basis becomes obligatory in terms of
Article 6, if no special circumstances exist?
35. Without attempting to resolve this question, the determination of
which is not necessary for the purposes of the present case, the Court
drawsattention to the fact that the delimitation of the line E-F, as shown
on Map 3, which was effected by Denmark and the Netherlands under
the agreement of 31 March 1966already mentioned (paragraphs 5and 91,
to which the Federal Republic was not a party, must have been based onest de déduire des déclarations de la Républiquefédéralequ'elle a admis
la conception fondamentale des droits de 1'Etat riverain sur le plateau
continental; autre chose est d'y voir une acceptation des règles de déli-
mitation prévues par la Convention. Considérées globalement, les
déclarations de la Jképublique fédéralepermettraient tout au plus de
penser qu'au début, avant d'êtrepleinement consciente des effets pro-
bables du principe d.el'équidistancedans le cas de la mer du Nord, la
République fédérale:n'était pas expressément opposée au principe
énoncé à I'article 6 de la Convention. Or une constatation d'un caractère
aussi négatif ne perrnetcertainement pas de tirer la conclusion positive
que, sans être partie à la Convention, la République fédéraleavait
acceptéle régimede I'article 6 de façon à se lier.
33. Il està peine besoin de souligner les dangers que présenterait la
thèse ainsi soutenue par le Danemark et les Pays-Bas si on devait lui
donner une portée généraleen droit international. Au surplus, dans la
présente affaire, cette conclusion serait immédiatement démentiepar le
fait que, sitôtffectukeslespremièresdélimitationsdu plateau continental
de la mer du Nord, la République fidérale a, comme on l'a vu aux
paragraphes 9 et 1'2ci-dessus, réservé saposition à l'égard de tracés
qui, fondés sur I'éqiiidistance,pouvaient nuire iila délimitation de sa
propre zone de plateau continental.
34. Les considérations qui pri-cèdent amènent nécessairement la
Cour à conclure que I'article 6 de la Convention de Genève n'est pas
applicable en tant que tel aux délimitations viséesen l'espèce;il devient
donc superAu de traiter de certaines questions d'interprétation ou d'ap-
plication qui pourraient se poser s'il en allait autrement. On peut néan-
moins en mentionner une, celle de la relation entre la prescription de
l'article relative à la délimitation par voie d'accord et les prescriptions
relativesà l'équidistance et aux circonstances spécialesqui sont appli-
cables ((adéfautd'accord )):existe-t-il une présomption suivant laquelle,
en l'absence d'accord sur la question, toute délimitation d'un plateau
continental entre deux Etats limitrophes est automatiquement fondée
sur l'équidistance, ou bien des négociations sur les limites doivent-elles
avoir définitivement échouépour que l'acceptation de la délimitation
fondée sur l'équidistancedevienne obligatoire en vertu de l'article 6
s'il n'y a pas de circonstances spéciales?
35. Sans vouloir trancher cette question, ce qui n'est pas nécessaire
aux fins de la présente affaire, la Cour souligne que la délimitation
effectuéepar le Danemark et les Pays-Bas suivant la ligne E-F de la
carte 3, en vertu de l'accord du 31 mars 1966 auquel la République
fédérale n'était pas partie (voiparagraphes 5 et 9 ci-dessus), doit avoir
reposé tacitement sur l'idéeque, puisqu'il n'en avait pas été convenuthe tacit assumption that, no agreement to the contrary having been
reached in the negotiations between the Federal Republic and Denmark
and the Netherlands respectively (paragraph 7), the boundary between
the continental shelf areas of the Republic and those of the other two
countries must be deemed to be an equidistance one;-or in other words
the delimitation of the line E-F, and its validity erga ornrzesincluding
the Federal Republic, as contended for by Denmark andthe Netherlands,
presupposes both the delimitation and the validity on an equidistance
basis, of the lines B-E and D-E on Map 3, considered by Denmark and
the Netherlands to represent the boundaries between their continental
shelf areas and those of the Federal Republic.
36. Sirice,however, Article 6 of the Geneva Convention provides only
for delimitation between "adjacent" States, which Denmark and the
Netherlands clearly are not, or between "opposite" States which, despite
suggestions to the contrary, the Court thinks they equally are not, the
delimitation of the line E-F on Map 3 could not in any case find its
validity in Article 6, even if that provision were opposable to the Federal
Republic. The validity of this delimitation must therefore be sought in
some other source of law. lt is a main contention of Denmark and the
Netherlands that there does in fact exist such another source, furnishing
a rule that validates not only this particular delimitation, but al1delimita-
tions effected on an equidistance basis,-and indeed requiring delimita-
tion on that basisunlessthe Statesconcerned otherwiseagree, and whether
or not the Geneva Convention is applicable. This contention must now
be examined.
37. It is maintained by Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal
Republic, whatever its position may be in relation to the Geneva Con-
vention, considered as such, is in any event bound to accept delimitation
on an equidistance-special circumstances basis, because the use of this
method is not in the nature of a merely conventional obligation, but is,
or must now be regarded as involving, a rule that is part of the corpus
of general international 1aw;-and, like other rules of general or custom-
ary international law, is binding on the Federal Republic automatically
and independently of any specific assent, direct or indirect, given by the
latter. Thiscontention has both a positive law and a more fundamentalist
aspect. As a matter of positive law, it is based on the work done in this
field by internationallegal bodies, on State practice and on the influence
attributed to the Geneva Convention itself,-the claim being that these
various factors have cumulatively evidenced or been creative of the
opitriojurissivr necessitatis, requisite for the formation of new rules of
customary international law. In its fundamentalist aspect, the view put
forward derives from what might be called the natural law of the con-autrement lors des négociationsde la République fédérale avecle Dane-
mark et avec les Pays-Bas (voir paragraphe 7 ci-dessus), la délimitation
du plateau continental entre la République fédéraleet les deux autres
pays devait se fonder sur l'équidistance; autrement dit, la délimitation
de la ligne E-F et la validitéà l'égardde tous, y compris la République
fédérale, quelui attribuent le Danemark et les Pays-Bas présupposent
à la fois le tracé et la validité, sur la base de l'équidistance, des lignes
B-Eet D-E de la carte 3, considéréespar le Danemark et les Pays-Bas
comme représentant les limites entre leurs zones de plateau continental
et celle de la République fédérale.
36. D'autre part, l'article 6 de la Convention de Genève se rapporte
uniquement à la délimitation entre Etats ((limitrophes))- ce qui n'est
manifestement pas Uecas du Danemark et des Pays-Bas - ou entre
Etats ((sefaisant factJ- ce qui, de l'avis de la Cour, n'est pas non plus
applicable à ces deux pays, bien que l'on ait avancé le contraire; la déli-
mitation matérialiséepar la ligne E-F sur la carte 3 ne saurait donc de
toute manière se justifier par l'article 6, même s'ilétait opposable à
la République fédéraleC . ette délimitation devrait donc tirer sa validité
d'une autre source d'edroit. L'une des thèses principalesdu Danemark et
des Pays-Bas est qu'il existe bien une autre source de droit, d'où se
dégageune règlejustifiant la délimitation dont il s'agit, ainsi que toute
autre délimitation effectuée selonl'équidistance,et imposant mêmecette
méthode à moins que les Etats intéressésne conviennent d'une autre, et
cela que la Conventi.on de Genève soit ou ne soit pas applicable. Il cori-
vient maintenant d'e:xaminercette thèse.
37. Le Danemark et les Pays-Bas soutiennent que, quelle que soit sa
situation par rapport à la Convention de Genève en tant que telle, la
République fédérale estde toute façon tenue d'accepter la méthode
équidistance-circonstances spécialesen matière de délimitation car, si
l'emploi de cette méthodene s'impose pas à titre conventionnel, il relève
- ou doit désormais être considéré comme relevant - d'une règle de
droit international généralqui, de mêmeque les autres règles de droit
international généralou coutumier, lie la République fédéraleautoma-
tiquement et indépendamment de tout consentement spécial direct ou
indirect. Cette thèse présente deux aspects, l'un de droit positif, l'autre
plus fondamentalistcc. En ce qui concerne le droit positif, elle se fonde
sur les travaux d'organismes juridiques internationaux, sur la pratique
des Etats et sur I'efret attribuéà la Convention de Genève elle-même:
l'ensemble de ces facteurs attesterait ou engendrerait l'opinio juris siile
necessitatis indisperisableà la formation de règles nouvelles de droit
international coutumier. Sous son aspect fondamentaliste, la thèse en
question découle dece qu'on pourrait appeler le droit naturel du plateautinental shelf, in the sense that the equidistance principle is seen as a
necessary expression in the field of delimitation of the accepted doctrine
of the exclusive appurtenance of the continental shelf to the nearby
coastal State, and therefore as having an apriori character of so to speak
juristic inevitability.
38. The Court will begin by examining this latter aspect, both because
it is the more fundamental, and was so presented on behalf of Denmark
and the Netherlands-Le., as something governing the whole case; and
because, if it is correct that the equidistance principle is, as the point was
put in the course of the argumerit, to be regarded as inherent in the whole
basic concept of continental shelf rights, then equidistance should con-
stitute the rule according to positive law tests also. On the other hand,
if equidistance should not possess any a priori character of necessity or
inherency, this would not be any bar to its haviiig become a rule of posi-
tive law through influences such as tliose of the Geneva Convention and
State practice,-and that aspect of the matter would remain for later
examination.
39. The a priori argument starts from the position described in para-
graph 19, according to which the right of the coastal State to its conti-
nental shelf areas is based on its sovereignty over the land domain, of
which the shelf area is the natural prolongation into and under the sea.
From this notion of appurtenance is derived the view which, as has al-
ready been indicated, the Court accepts, that the coastal State's rights
exist ipsofucto and ah itzitiowithout there being anyquestion of having to
make good a claim to the areas concerned, or of any apportionment of
the continental shelf between different States. This was one reason why
the Court felt bound to reject the claim of the Federal Republic (in the
particular form which it took) to be awarded a "just and equitable share"
of the shelf areas involved in the present proceedings. Denmark and the
Netherlands, for their part, claim that the test of appurtenance must be
"proximity", or more accurately "closer proximity": al1those parts of
the shelf being considered as appurtenant to a particular coastal State
which are (but only if they are) closer to it than they are to any point
on the coast of another State. Hence delimitation must be effected by a
method which will leave to each one of the States concerned al1 those
areas that are nearest to its own coast. Only a line drawn on equidistance
principles will do this. Therefore, it iscontended, only such a line can be
valid (unless the Parties, for reasoiis of their own, agree on another),
because only such a line can be thus consistent with basic continental
shelf doctrine.
40. This view clearly has much force; for there can be no doubt that
asa matter of normal topography, the greater part of a State'scontinentalcontinental, en ce serisque le principe de l'équidistanceserait une expres-
sion nécessaire,pour ce qui est de la délimitation, de la doctrine établie
d'après laquelle le plateau continental relève exclusivement de 1'Etat
riverain voisin et aurait doncà priori un caractère en quelque sorte iné-
luctable sur le plan juridique.
38. La Cour étudiera d'abord ce dernier aspect. Il est en effet plus fon-
damental et a été pr'ésentécomme tel par le Danemark et les Pays-Bas,
qui y ont vu un élémentdont toute l'affaire dépend. Au surplus, s'il
était exact que 1'équ.idistancesoit, ainsi qu'on l'a dit en plaidoirie, un
principe inhérent à la conception fondamentale du régimejuridique du
plateau continental, elle devrait aussi constituer la règle applicable
d'après les crithes du droit positif. En revanche, si I'équidistaricen'avait
pas à priori un caractère nécessaire ou inhérent, cela n'empêcherait
nullement qu'elle soit devenue une règlede droit positif par l'effet d'élé-
ments tels que la Convention de Genève ou la pratique des Etats; il
faudrait donc encore examiner cet aspect du problème.
39. L'argument di1caractère à priori procède d'une constatation déjà
faite au paragraphe 19: le droit de 1'Etat riverain sur son plateau con-
tinental a pour fondement la souveraineté qu'il exerce sur le territoire
dont ce plateau continental est le prolongement naturel sous la mer. De
cette notion de rattachement découlel'idée,acceptéepar la Cour comme
on l'a déjà vu,que llesdroits de 1'Etat riverain existent ipsofacto et ab
initio sans que la validité de ses revendications doive êtreétablie ou
sans qu'il soit besoin de procéder à une répartition du plateau conti-
nental entre Etats intéressés.C'est l'un des motifs pour lesquels la Cour
a estimédevoir rejeter,sous la forme qui lui a étédonnée, la demande de
la République fédéraletendant à obtenir une ([partjuste et équitable))
des zones de plateau continental en cause. Le Danemark et les Pays-Bas
prétendent quant à eux que le critèredu rattachement doit êtrela «proxi-
mité» ou plus exactement la «plus grande proximité)): ils considèrent
que toutes les parties du plateau continental plus proches d'un Etat
riverain déterminéque de tout point situésur la côte d'un autre Etat -
mais ces parties-là seulement - relèvent du premier Etat. En con-
séquence la délimita.tiondoit s'opérer selon une méthode attribuant à
chacun des Etats intéresséstoutes les zones qui sont plus proches de sa
propre côte que d'aucune autre. Seule une ligne tracéeselon le principe
de l'équidistance permet d'y parvenir. Seule donc, prétend-on, une telle
ligne peut être valable,à moins que les parties n'en choisissent une autre
pour des raisons qui leur sont propres, car seule elle est compatible avec
la conception fondamentale du plateau continental.
40. Cet argument a incontestablement du poids; il ne fait pas dedoute
que, dans des conditions géographiques normales, la plus grande partieshelf areas will in fact, and without the necessity for any delimitation at
all, be nearer to its coasts than to any other. It could not well be other-
wise: but post hoc is not propter hoc, and this situation may only serve
to obscure the real issue, whicli is whether it follows that every part of
the area concerned m~istbe placed in this way, and that it should be as
itwere prohibited that any part should not be so placed. The Court does
not consider that it does follow, either from the notion of proximity it-
self, or from the more fundamental concept of the continental shelf as
being the natural prolongation of the land domain-a concept repeatedly
appealed to by both sides throughout the case, although quite differently
interpreted by them.
41. As regards the notion of proximity, the idea of absolute proximity
is certainly not implied by the rather vague and general terminology
employed in the literature of the subject, and in most State proclamations
and international conventions and other instruments-terms such as
"near", "close to its shores", "off its coast", "opposite", "in front of
the coast", "in the vicinity of", "neighbouring the coast", "adjacent to",
"contiguous", etc.,-al1 ofthem terms of a somewhat imprecise character
which, although they convey a reasonably clear general idea, are capable
of a considerable fluidity of meaning. To take what is perhaps the most
frequently employed of these terms, namely "adjacent to", it is evident
that by no stretch of imagination can a point on the continental shelf
situated say a hundred miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be
regarded as "adjacent" to it, or to any coast at all, in the normal sense
of adjacency, even if the point concerned is nearer to some one coast
than to any other. This would be even truer of localities where, physically,
the continental shelf begins to merge with the ocean depths. Equally, a
point inshore situated near the meeting place of the coasts of two States
can often properly be said to be adjacent to both coasts, even though it
may be fractionally closer to the one than the other. Indeed, local geo-
graphical configuration may sometimes cause it to have a closer physical
connection with the coast to which it is not in fact closest.
42. There seems in consequence to be no necessary, and certainly no
complete, identity between the notions of adjacency and proximity; and
therefore the question of which parts of the continental shelf "adjacent
to" a coastline bordering more than one State fall within the appurte-
nance of which of them, remains to this extent an open one, not to be
determined on a basis exclusively of proximity. Even if proximity may
afford one of the tests to be applied and an important one in the right
conditions, it may not necessarily be the only, nor in al1circumstances,
the most appropriate one. Hence it would seem that the notion of ad-
jacency, so constantly employed in continental shelf doctrine frorn the
start, only implies proximity in a general sense, and does not imply any
fundamental or inherent rule the ultimate effect of which would be to PLATEAU CONTINENTAL(ARRÊT) 30
des zones de plateau continental relevant d'un Etat seront en fait, et in-
dépendamment de toute délimitation, plus proches de la côte de cet
Etat que d'aucune autre. Le contraire serait étonnant, mais post hoc n'est
paspropter IZOe Ct tout cela ne fait qu'obscurcir la véritablequestion: faut-
ilréellementque toutepartiede la zone relevant d'un Etat soit plus proche
de sa côtequed'aucune autre et y a-t-il en quelque sorte un empêchement
à ce qu'une partie de cette zone fasse exception? De l'avisde la Cour, cela
ne résulte nécessairement nide la notion m5me de ~roximité. ni de la
conception plus fondamentale du plateau continental envisagécomme
prolongement naturel du territoire, conception invoquée à maintes
reprises des deux côi.éspendant toute la procédure mais avec des inter-
prétations trèsdifféri:ntes.
41. En ce qui concerne la notion de proximité, on peut dire que l'idée
d'une proximitéabsolue ne découle certes pas implicitement de la ter-
minologie plutôt vague et généraleemployéedans les ouvrages consacrés
à la question et dans la plupart des proclamations d'Etats, conventions
internationales et autres instruments; on y trouve des termes comme
près, prochede ses côtes,au large(leses côtes,faisant face, devant la côte,
au voisinagede, avoisinant la côte, adjacent, contigu,etc., qui sont tous
assez impréciset qui, tout en donnant une idéegénéralesuffisamment
claire, peuvent avoir un sens trèsdifficileerner. Pour prendre l'exemple
du terme adjacent, qui est peut-êtrele plus fréquemment utilisé, il est
évident que, même avec beaucoup d'imagination, un point du plateau
continental situéà une centaine de milles d'une côte déterminéeou même
beaucou~ moins loin ne saurait êtreconsidéré comme adiacent à cette
côte ou à aucune autre côte au sens normal du mot a4acent, bien qu'il
soit en fait plus proche d'un littoral que d'un autre. Cela est encore plus
vrai des zones où le plateau continentalproprement dit commence à faire
place auxgrandsfonds. De même,un point situéplus prèsde laterre, non
loin du lieu où lescôtes de deux Etats serejoignent, peut souventet juste
titre êtrequalifié'atfjacent aux deux côtes bien qu'il soit légèrementplus
proche de l'une que de l'autre. En fait, la configuration géographique
locale peut parfois lui donner un lien physique plus étroit avec la côte
dont il n'est pas le plus rapproché.
42. Il ne paraît donc pas y avoir d'identiténécessaire,et en tout cas pas
d'identitécomplète, entre les notions d'adjacence et de proximité; dans
cesconditions, la qut:stion de savoir quelles parties du plateau continental
((adjacentà» un littoral bordant plusieurs Etats relèvent de l'un ou de
l'autre reste entièreetne saurait êtrerésolued'après la seule proximité.
Mêmesi la proximité peut être l'un des critères applicables - et un
critère important quand les conditions s'y prêtent -, ce n'est pas néces-
sairement le seul niitoujours le plus approprié. Il semblerait donc que la
notion d'adjacence, employée siconstamment au sujet de la doctrine du
plateau continental et cela dès le début, n'implique la proximité qu'en
un sens général,sans postuler une règlefondamentale ou inhérente dont
l'effet serait en définitived'interdiàetout Etat d'exercer, sauf par voie prohibit any State (otherwise than by agreement) from exercising con-
tinental shelf rights in respect of areas closer to the coast of another
State.
43. More fundamental than the notion of proximity appears to be the
principle-constantly relied upon by al1 the Parties-of the natural
prolongation or continuation of the land territory or domain, or land
sovereignty of the coastal State, into and under the high seas,via the bed
of its territorial sea which is under the full sovereignty of that State.
There are various ways of formulating this principle, but the underlying
idea, namely of an extension of something already possessed, is the same,
and it is this idea of extension which is, in the Court's opinion, deter-
minant. Submarine areas do not really appertain to the coastal State
because-or not only because-they are near it. They are near it of
course; but this would not suffice to confer title, any more than, ac-
cording to a well-established principle of law recognized by both sides
in the present case, mere proximity confers per se title to land territory.
What confers the ipsojurc title which international law attributes to the
coastal State in respect of its coiitinental shelf, is the fact that the sub-
marine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the terri-
tory over which the coastal State already has dominion,-in the sense
that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continua-
tion of that territory, an extension of it ind dehe-sea. From this it would
follow that whenever a given submarine area does not constitute a
natural-or the most natural-extension of the land territory of a coastal
State, even though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory
of any otl-ierState, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State;-
orat least it caniiot be so regarded in the face of a competing claim by a
State of whose land territory the submarine area concerned is to be
regarded as a natural extension, even if it is less close to it.
44. In the present case, although both sides relied on the prolongation
principle and regarded it as fundamental, they interpreted it quite dif-
ferently. Both interpretations appear to the Court to be incorrect. Den-
mark and the Netherlands identified natural prolongation with closest
proximity and therefrom argued that it called for an equidistance line:
the Federal Republic seemed to think it implied the notion of the just
and equitable share, although the connection is distinctly remote. (The
Federal Republic did however invoke another idea, namely that of the
proportionality of a State's continental shelf area to the length of its
coastline, which obviously does have an intimate connection with the
prolongation principle, and will be considered in its place.) As regards
equidistance, it clearly cannot be identified with the notion of natural
prolongation or extension, since, as has already been stated (paragraph 8),
the use of the equidistance method would frequently cause areas which
are the natural prolongation or extension of the territory of one State
to be attributed to another, when the configuration of the latter's coast
makes the equidistance line swing out laterally across the former'scl'accord, ses droits relatifs au plateau continental sur des zones plus
proches de la côted'un autreEtatque de la sienne.
43. Plus fondamental que la notion de proximité semble êtrele prin-
cipe, que les Parties n'ont cesséd'invoquer, du prolongement naturel ou
de l'extension du territoire ou de la souveraineté territoriale de 1'Etat
riverain sous la haute mer. au-delà du lit de la mer territoriale qui relève
cle la plcine souvera.inetéde cet Etat. Il y a plusieurs manières de for-
iniilrr ce principe mais l'idéede base, celle d'une extension de quelque
chose que l'on possè'dedéjà, est la mêmeet c'est cette idéed'extension qui
est décisi\-eselon la Cour. Ce n'est pas vraiment ou pas seulement parce
qii'clles sont proches de son territoire que des zones sous-niarines relèvent
~I'LI Itat riverain. 'Ellesen sont proches certes, mais cela ne suffit pas
pour conférer un titre -pas plus que la simple proximité ne constitue en
soi un titre au domaine terrestre, ce qui est un principe de droit bien
ituhli et admis piir les Parties en l'espèce. En réalitéle titre que le droit
international attribue ipsjure àI'Etat riverain sur son plateau continental
procède de ce que les zones sous-marines en cause peuvent êtreconsidé-
rées comme faisant véritablement partie du territoire sur lequel I'Etat
riverain exerce déjà son autorité: on peut dire que, tout en étant re-
couvertes d'eau, el'les sont un prolongement, une coiitinuatio~i, une
extension de ce territoire sous la mer. Par suite, mêmesi une zone sous-
marine est plus proche du territoire d'un Etat que de tout autre, on ne
saurait considérer qu'elle relève de cet Et:it dés lors qu'elle ne constitue
pas ilne extension natiirelle, ou l'extension la plus naturelle, de son
domaine terrestre et qu'une revendication rivale est foriilulée par un
autre Etat dont ilest possible d'admettre que la zone sous-marine en
question prolonge cle façon naturelle le territoire, tout en étant moins
proche.
34. Dans la présente affaire, on a iiivoqiiédes deux c3tésle principe
du prolongement en le considérant comme fondamental mais on l'a
interprété(le façons très différentes. Lesdeux interprétations paraissent
inexactes à la Cour. Le Danemark et les Pays-Bas ont assimiléle concept
de prolorigeineiit naturel ü celui de plus grande proximité et ils en ont
dkiiiit que le premicr exige le tracé d'une ligne d'équidistance; la Répu-
blique fcdéraleparait avoir pensé qu'ilimplique la notion de la part juste
etéqiiit:ible,bien que le rapport soit très lointain. (La Républiquefédérale
a cependant invoqut une autre idée,celle de la proportionnalité entre la
zone de plateau continental revenant à un Etat et la longueur de son lit-
toral; cette idée, qui a évidemment un lien étroit avec le principe du
prolongement, sera examinéele moment venu.) La notion d'équidistance
ne peut manifestement pas êtreidentifiéeà celle d'extension ou de pro-
longement naturel car, comme on l'a déjà vuau paragraphe 8, l'emploi
de la méthode de l'équidistanceaurait souvent pour résultat d'attribuer à
un Etat des zones prolongeant naturellement le territoire d'un autre
Etat lorsque la configurationcôtière du premier fait dévierlatéralement lacoastal front, cutting it off from areas situated directly before that front.
45. The fluidity of al1these notions is well illustrated by the case of
the Norwegian Trough (paragraph 4 above). Without attempting to
pronounce on the status of that feature, the Court notes that the shelf
areas in the North Sea separated from the Norwegian Coast by the 80-
100kilometres of the Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be
adjacent to it, nor to be its natural prolongation. They are nevertheless
considered by the States parties to the relevant delimitations, as described
in paragraph 4, to appertain to Norway up to the median lines shown on
Map 1. True these median lines are themselves drawn on equidistance
principles; but it was only by first ignoring the existence of the Trough
that these median lines fell to be drawn at all.
46. The conclusion drawn by the Court from the foregoing analysis
is that the notion of equidistance as being logically necessary, in the sense
of being an inescapable a priori accompaniment of basic continental
shelf doctrine, is incorrect. Its said not to be possible to maintain that
there is a rule of law ascribing certain areas to a State as a matter of in-
herent and original right (see paragraphs 19 and 20), without also ad-
mitting the existence of some rule by which those areas can be obliga-
torily delimited. The Court cannot accept the logic of this view. The
problem arises only where there is a dispute and only in respect of the
marginal areas involved. The appurtenance of a given area, considered
as an entity, in no way governs the precise delimitation of its boundaries,
any more than uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial rights.
There is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be
fully delimited and defined, and often in various places and for long
periods they are not, as is shown by the case of the entry of Albania into
the League of Nations (Monastery of Saint Naoum, Advisor): Opinion,
1924, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 9,at p. 10).
47. A review of the genesis and development of the equidistance
method of delimitation can only serve to confirm the foregoing conclu-
sion. Sueh a review may appropriately start with the instrument, generally
known as the "Truman Proclamation", issued by the Government of
the United States on 28 September 1945.Although this instrument was
not the firstor only oneto have appeared, it hasin the opinion of the Court
a special status. Previously,various theories as to the nature and extent
of the rights relative to or exercisable over the continental shelf had been
advanced by jurists, publicists and technicians. The Truman Proclama-
tion however, soon came to be regarded as the starting point of the posi-ligne d'équidistance et ampute le second de zones situéesjuste devant sa
façade maritime.
45. Le cas de la fosse norvégienne (voir paragraphe 4 ci-dessus)
illustre bien lecaractère incertain de toutes ces notions. Sans se prononcer
sur le statut de la fosse, la Cour constate que les zones du plateau con-
tinental de la mer du Nord séparéesde la côte norvégienne par une fosse
de quatre-vingts àcerit kilomètres de large ne sauraientêtreconsidéréesau
point de vue géographiquecomme étantadjacentes àcette côte ou comme
constituant son prolongement naturel. Elles n'en sont pas moins consi-
déréespar les Etats parties aux délimitations décrites au paragraphe 4
comme relevant de la Norvège jusqu'aux lignes médianes portées sur la
carte 1. Certes ces lignes médianes ont ététracées selon le principe de
l'équidistance, mais c'est uniquement parce que l'on n'a pas tenu compte
de l'existence de la fosse norvégienne.
46. La Cour conclut de l'analyse qui précèdequ'il est inexact de con-
sidérerla notion d'équidistance comme logiquement nécessaire, ence sens
qu'elle serait liéede façon inévitable et à priori à la conceptionfondamen-
tale du plateau continental. On a dit qu'il n'est pas possible de soutenir
qu'une règle juridique attribue certaines zones à un Etat au titre d'un
droit inhérent et originaire (voir paragraphes 19 et 20) sans admettre en
mêmetemps l'existericed'une règleobligatoire quant à la délimitation de
ces zones. La Cour rie voit pas la logique de cette thèse. Le problème ne
se pose qu'en cas de litige et uniquement à l'égard des zonesqui forment
les confins. Le fait qu'une zone, prise comme une entité, relèvede tel ou
tel Etat est sans conséquence sur la délimitation exacte des frontières de
cette zone, de mêmeque l'incertitude des frontières ne saurait affecter les
droits territoriaux.Aucune règle nedispose par exemple que les frontières
terrestresd'lin Etat doivent êtrecomplètement délimitéeset définieset il
est fréquent qu'elles ne le soient pas en certains endroits et pendant de
longues périodes, comme le montre la question de l'admission de
l'Albanie à la SociCtédes Nations (Monustère de Saiizt-Naoum, avis con-
sultatif,1924, C.P.J.I. s&rieB no9, p. 10).
*
* *
47. Un examen de la genèse et de l'évolution de la méthode de délimi-
tation fondée sur 1'é:quidistancene fait que confirmer la conclusion ci-
dessus. Il convient de rappeler tout d'abord l'acte, généralementconnu
sous le nom de proclamation Truman, que le Gouvernement des Etats-
Unis a publié le 28 septembre 1945. Bien que cet acte n'ait été ni le
premier ni le seul, il a, selon la Cour, une importance particulière. Au-
paravant, desjuristes, des publicistes et des techniciens avaient avancé
diverses théories sur la nature et l'étenduedes droits existant à l'égarddu
plateau continental ou pouvant être exercés sur lui. La proclamation
Truman devait cependant être bientôt considéréecomme le point detive law on the subject, and the chief doctrine it enunciated, namely
that of the coastal State as having an original, natural, and exclusive
(in short a vested) right to the continental shelf off its shores, came to
prevail over al1others, being now rellected in Article 2 of the 1958Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. With regard to the delimitation
of lateral boundaries between the continental shelves of adjacent States,
a matter which had given rise to some consideration on the technical, but
very little on the juristicvel, the Truman Proclamation stated that such
boundaries "shall be determined by the United States and the State con-
cerned in accordance with equitable principles". These two concepts, of
delimitation by mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with
equitable principles, have underlain al1 the subsequent history of the
subject. They were reflected in various other State proclamations of the
period, and after, and in the later work on the subject.
48. It was in the International Law Commission of the United Nations
that the question of delimitation as between adjacent States was first
taken up seriously as part of a general juridical project; for outside the
ranks of the hydrographers and cartographers, questions of delimitation
were not much thought about in earlier continental shelf doctrine.
Juridical interest and speculation was focussed mainly on such questions
as what was the legal basis on which any rights at al1 in respect of the
continental shelf could be claimed, and what was the nature of those
rights. As regards boundaries, the main issue was not that of boundaries
between States but of the seaward limit of the area in respect of which
the coastal State could claim exclusive rights of exploitation. As was
pointed out in the course of the written proceedings, States in most cases
had not found it necessary to conclude treaties or legislate about their
lateral sea boundaries with adjacent States before the question of ex-
ploiting the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil arase;-practice
was therefore sparse.
49. In the records of the International Law Commission, which had
the matter under consideration from 1950to 1956,there is no indication
at al1 that any of its members supposed that it was incumbent on the
Commission to adopt a rule of equidistance because this gave expression
to, and translated into linear terms, a principle of proximity inherent in
the basic concept of the continental shelf, causing every part of the shelf
to appertain to the nearest coastal State and to no other, and because
such a rule must therefore be mandatory as a matter of customary inter-
national law. Such an idea does not seem ever to have been propounded.
Had it been, and had it had the self-evident character contended for by
Denmark and the Netherlands, the Commission would have had no alter-
native but to adopt it, and its long continued hesitations over thismatter
would be incomprehensible.départ dans l'élaborxtion du droit positif en ce domaine et la doctrine
principale qu'elle énonçait,à savoir que 1'Etatriverain possède un droit
originaire, naturel et exclusif, en somme un droit acquis, sur le plateau
continental situé devant ses côtes, l'a finalement emporté sur toutes les
autres et trouve aujourd'hui son expression dans l'article2 de la Conven-
tion de Genèvede 1958sur le plateau continental. En ce qui concerne la
délimitation latéraledes plateaux continentaux d'Etats limitrophes, pro-
blèmequi avait étéétudiédans une certaine mesure sur le plan technique
mais avait fort peu retenu l'attention sur leplanjuridique, laproclamation
Truman énonçait que la ligne de délimitation serait ((déterminéepar les
Etats-Unis et 1'Etatintéressé conformément à des principes équitables D.
De ces deux notions de délimitation par voie d'accord et de délimitation
conforme à des principes équitablesa procédétoute l'évolutionhistorique
postérieure. On en trouve la trace dans des proclamations faites à partir
de cette époque par divers autres Etats, ainsi que dans les travaux
consacrés depuis lors au problème.
48. C'est à la Comniission du droit international des Nations Unies que
la q~iestion de la délimitation entre Etats limitrophes a été abordée
sérieusementpour la première foisdans une étudejuridique de caractère
général; jusqu'alors eineffet les problèmes de délimitation dans le cadre
de ladoctrine du plateau continental n'avaient guèreretenuque l'attention
des hydrographes et des cartographes. L'intérêe tt la réflexion desjuristes
s'étaient principalement portéssur des questions comme le fondement
juridique et la nature des droits pouvant être éventuellement revendiqués
sur leplateau continerital. S'agissant de lalimitation,le grand problème
n'était pascelui des liinites entre Etats mais celui de la limite vers le large
de l'étenduesur laque:lle1'Etatriverain peut revendiquer des droits d'ex-
ploitation exclusifs. Comme il a été observé au cours de la procédure
écrite, les Etatsn'oni: pas jugé nécessaire,dans la plupart des cas, de
conclure des traités ou de légiférerpour fixer leurs limites maritimes
latérales avec des Etats limitrophes avant que se pose la question de
l'exploitation des ressources naturelles du lit de la mer et de son sous-soi.
La pratique dans ce domaine étaitdonc peu abondante.
49. A lire les documents de la Commission du droit international, qui
s'est occupéede la question de 1950 à 1956,rien n'indique qu'il soit venu
à l'esprit d'aucun deses membres qu'elledût adopter une règlefondéesur
l'équidistance pour le motif qu'une telle règle constituait l'expression
linéaired'un principe deproximitéinhérent à la conception fondamentale
du plateau continental - d'aprèslequel toute partie du plateau relèverait
de I'Etat riverain le :plus procheà 17exclusionde tout autre Etat - et
étaiten conséquence ob!;oatoire en droit international coutumier. Cette
idéene semblejamais avoii -téavancée.Siellel'avait étéetsielle avait eu
le caractère évidentque le Danemark et les Pays-Bas lui prêtent,la Com-
mission n'aurait pu faire autrement que de l'adopter et ses hésitations
prolongées à ce sujet seraient incompréhensibles. 50. It is moreover, in the present context, a striking feature of the
Commissioii's discussions that during the early and middie stages, not
only was the notion of equidistance never considered from the standpoint
of its having a prioraicharacter of inherent necessity: it was never given
any special prominence at all, and certainly no priority. The Commission
discussed various other possibilities as having equal if not superior statlis
such as delimitation by agreement, by reference to arbitration, by drawing
lines perpendicular to the coast, by prolonging the dividing line of ad-
jacent territorial waters (theprinciple of which was itself not as yet settled),
and on occasion the Commission seriously considered adopting one or
other of these solutions. It was not in fact until after the matter had been
referred to a committee of hydrographical experts. which reported in
1953, that the equidistance principle began to take precedence over other
possibilities: the Report of the Commission for that year (its principal
report on the topic of delimitation as such) makes it clear that before
this reference to the experts the Commission had felt unable to formulate
any definite rule at all, the previous trend of opinion having been mainlq.
in favour of delimitation by agreement or by reference to arbitration.
51. It was largely because of these difficulties that it was decided to
consult the Committee of Experts. It is therefore instructive in the con-
text (i.e., of an alleged inherent necessity for the equidistance principle)
to see on what basis the matter was put to the experts, and how theq.
dealt with it. Eq~iidistance was in fact only one of four methods suggested
to them, the other three being the continuation in the seaward direction
of the land frontier between the two adjacent States concerned; the
drawing of a perpendicular to the coast at the point of its intersection
with this land frontier; and the drawing of a line perpendicular to the line
of the "general direction" of the coast. Furthermore the matter was not
even put to the experts directly as a question of continental shelfdelimita-
tion, but in the context of the delimitation of the lateral boundary be-
tween adjacentterritorial waters, no account being taken of the possibility
that the situation respecting territorial waters might be different.
52. The Committee of Experts sirnply reported that after a thorough
discussion of the different methods-(there are no official records of this
discussion)-they had decided that "the (lateral) boundary through the
territorial sea-if not already fixed otherwise-should be drawnaccording
to the principle of equidistance from the respective coastlines". They
added, however, significantly, that in "a number of cases this may not
lead to an equitable solution, which should be then arrived at by negotia-
tion". Only after that did they add, as a rider to this conclusion, that
they had considered it "important to find a formula for drawing the
iiiternational boundaries in the territorial waters of States, which could
also be used for the delimitation of the respective continental shelves of
two States bordering the same continental shelf". 50. Au surplus il est frappant de constater à cet égard que, dans les
discussions qui se sont déroulées à la Commission au début et vers le
milieu de ses travaux, non seulement on n'a jamais considéré quela
notion d'équidistanceait àpriori un caractère de nécessitéinhérente mais
encore on ne lui a jamais reconnu une importance spécialeet certaine-
ment aucune priorité. La Commission a examiné diverses autres pos-
sibilitésen leur accordant une valeur égalesinon supérieure: délimitation
par voie d'accord, délimitation par voie d'arbitrage, délimitation selon
une ligne perpendiculaire à la côte, délimitation par prolongement de la
ligne divisant leseaux territoriales adjacentes, dont leprincipe n'étsit pas
encore établi, etd'autres encore; la Commission a mêmesérieusement
envisagéd'adopter I"une ou l'autre de ces solutions. En fait, c'est seule-
ment après que la question eut étérenvoyée à un comité d'experts-
hydrographes, dont le rapport a été présenté en 1953,que le principe de
I'équidistance a commencé à l'emporter sur les autres possibilités: il
ressort nettement du rapport de la Commission pour 1953(son principal
rapport sur le problème de la délimitation proprement dit) qu'avant d'en
référer aux expertsla Commission ne s'était pasjugée en mesure de
formuler une règle préciseet qu'elle s'était jusque-là surtout montrée
faborable à une délimitation par voie d'accord ou d'arbitrage.
51. Si la Commission a décidéde consulter le comitéd'experts, c'est en
grande partie àcause de ces difficultés.Il est donc instuctif, du point de
vue d'une prétendue nécessitéinhérente du principe de I'équidistance,
d'examiner sur quelle base le problème a été soumisaux experts et com-
ment ils l'ont traité.L'équidistance n'étaiten réalitéque l'une des quatre
méthodesqui leur étaientsuggérées. Les trois autres étaientles suivantes:
prolongement vers le large de la frontière terrestre entre les deux Etats
limitrophes intéressés;tracé d'une ligne perpendiculaire à la côte à
l'endroit où la frontikre entre lesdeux territoires atteint la mer; tracéd'une
ligne perpendiculaire à la ((directiongénérale))de la côte. En outre le
problème n'a pas éttposédirectement aux experts à propos de la délimi-
tation du plateau continental: il l'aétépropos de la délimitationlatérale
des eaux territorialeis de deux Etats limitrophes, sans que l'on se demande
sila situation n'étaitpas différente.
52. Lecomitéd'experts a simplement signalédans son rapport qu'après
une discussion approfondie des diverses méthodes - qui n'a pas fait
l'objet de procès-verbaux officiels- il avait étéd'avis que ([lafrontière
(latérale)entre les mers territoriales respectives de deux Etats adjacents,
là où elle n'a pas déjà étéfixéed'une autre manière, devrait êtretracée
selon le principe d'équidistance de la côte de part et d'autre de l'aboutis-
sement de la frontière)). Il a cependant ajouté, et cela est significatif:
((Danscertains cas, cette méthode ne permettra pas d'aboutir à une solu-
tion équitable, laquelle devraalors êtrerecherchéedans des négociations.1)
C'est seulement après cette conclusion que les experts ont précisé,dans
une observation annexe, qu'ils s'étaient efforcésde trouver des formules
pour tracer les froritières internationales dans les mers territoriales qui CONTINENTALSHELF(JUDGMENT)
53. In this almost impromptu, and certainly contingent manner was
the principle of equidistance for the delimitation of continental shelf
boundaries propounded. It is clear from the Report of the Commission
for 1953 already referred to (paragraph 50) that the latter adopted it
largely on the basis of the recommendation of the Committee of Experts,
and even so in a text that gave priority to delimitation by agreement and
also introduced an exception in favour of "special circumstances" which
the Committee had not formally proposed. The Court moreover thinks
it to be a legitimate supposition that the experts were actuated by con-
siderations not of legal theory but of practical conçenience and carto-
graphy of the kind mentioned in paragraph 22 above. Although there
are no ofiicial records of their discussions, there is warrant for this view
in correspondence passing between certain of them and the Commission's
Special Rapporteur on the subject, which was deposited by one of the
Parties during the oral hearing at the request of the Court. Nor, even
after this, when a decision in principle had been taken in favour of an
equidistance rule, was there an end to the Commission's hesitations, for
as late as three years after the adoption of the report of the Committee
of Experts, when the Commission was finalizing the whole complex of
drafts comprised under the topic of the Law of the Sea, various doubts
about the equidistance principle were still being voiced in the Commis-
sion, on such grounds for instance as that its strict application would be
open, in certain cases, to the objection that the geographical configura-
tion of the coast would render aboundary drawn on this basis inequitable.
54. A further point of some signifieance is that neither in the Com-
mittee of Experts, nor in the Commission itself, nor subsequently at the
Geneva Conference, does there appear to have been any discussion of
delimitation in the context, not merely of two adjacent States, but of
three or more States on the same coast, or in the same viciiiity,-from
which it can reasonably be inferred that the possible resulting situations,
some of which have been described in paragraph 8 above, were never
really envisaged or taken into account. This viewfinds someconfirmation
in the fact tliat the relevant part of paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention speaks of delimiting the continental shelf of "two" adjacent
States (although a reference simply to "adjacent States" would have
sufficed), whereas in respect ofmedian lines the reference in paragraph 1
of that Article is to "two or more" opposite States.
55. In the light of this history, and of the recordgenerally, it is clear
that at no time was the notion of equidistance as an inherent necessity
of continental shelf doctrine entertained. Quite a different outlook was
indeed manifested from the start in current legal thinking. It was, andpourraieilt en mêmetemps servir pour délimiterles frontières respectives
de ((plateau continental ))concerriant les Etats devant les côtes desquels
s'étendce plateau ».
53. C'est de cette manièrepresque improviséeet purement contingente
que le principe de l'iquidistance a étéenvisagépour la délimitation du
plateau continental. 11ressort nettement du rapport de la Comn~ission
du droit internation;il pour 1953 (voir paragraphe 50 ci-dessus) que la
Commission a adoptéce principe essentiellement sur la recommandation
du comitéd'experts mais que, ce faisant, elle a dans le mêmetexte donné
priorité à la délimitation par voie d'accord et a introduit une exception
dans le cas de (circonstances spéciales 1)que le comitén'avait pas formel-
lement proposée. La Cour estime en outre légitimede supposer que les
experts ont étémus par le genre de considérations d'ordre pratique et
cartographique dont il est fait état au paragraphe 22 ci-dessus et non par
des considérations d',ordrejuridique et doctrinal. Bien que leurs discus-
sisns n'aient pas fait l'objet de procès-verbaux officiels, cette opinion
trouve confirmation dans une correspondance échangéeentre certains
d'entre eux et le rapporteur spécialde la Commission, correspondance
déposée aucours de la procédure orale par l'une des Parties sur la de-
mande de la Cour. D'autre part, mêmeaprès avoir pris une décisionde
principe en faveur d'une règle fondéesur l'équidistance,la Commission
a continué àfairepreuve d'hésitation: trois ans après l'adoption du rap-
port du comitéd'experts, au moment où elle mettait la dernière main à
l'ensemble des projets concernant le droit de la mer, le principe de
l'équidistance suscitait encore des doutes parmi ses membres, motif pris
par exemple de ce que son application stricte pourrait prêter à critique
dam des cas où la configuration géographique de la côte rendrait iné-
quitable une limite tracéesur cette base.
54. Un autre élémentsignificatif est à considérer: il semble que ni au
comitéd'experts, ni à la Commission elle-mzme, ni ultérieurement à la
conférence de Genèvela discussion n'ait porté sur les délimitations à
effectuer non pas simplement entre deux Etats limitrophes, mais entre
trois ou plusieurs Etaitsbordant la mêmecôte ou situésdans le voisinage
les uns des autres; il est raisonnable d'en déduireque les situations pou-
vant résiilterde cet [Statde choses, et dont certaines ont Stédécritesau
paragraphe 8 ci-dessus, n'ont jamais été véritablementenvisagées ou
prises en considération. Cette déduction est confirméepar le fait qu'à
l'article6, paragraphe 2, de la Convention deGenèvelepassagepertinent
parle de la délimitationdu plateau continental entre «deux])Etats limitro-
phes - il aurait sufli de dire edes» Etats limitrophes -, alors qu'en ce
qui concerne les ligries médianesentre Etats dont les côtes se font face
l'article6, paragraphe 1,dit sdeux ou plusieurs » Etats.
55. Compte tenu de ces antécédentsetd'une manièreplus généraledu
dossier, il est clairqu'à aucun moment on n'a considéréque la notion
d'équidistance soit liéede facon inhérenteet nécessairea la doctrine du
plateau continental. L'opinion desjuristes s'estmême, dès le début,mani- 36 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
it really remained tothe end, governed by two beliefs;-namely, first, that
no one singlemethod of delimitation waslikelyto prove satisfactory in al1
circumstances, and that delimitation should, therefore, be carried out by
agreement (or by reference to arbitration); and secondly, that it should
be effected on equitable principles. It was in pursuance of the first ofese
beliefs that in the draft that emerged as Article 6 of the Geneva Con-
vention, the Commission gave priority to delimitation by agreement,-
and in pursuance of the second that it introduced the exception in favour
of "special circumstances". Yet the record shows that, even with these
mitigations, doubts persisted, particularly as to whether the equidistance
principle would in al1cases prove equitable.
56. In these circumstances, it seems to the Court that the inherency
contention as now put forward by Denmark and the Netherlands inverts
the true order of things in point of time and that, so far from an equidis-
tance rule having been generated by an antecedent principle of proximity
inherent in the whole concept of continental shelf appurtenance, the
latter is rather a rationalization of the former-an ex postfacto construct
directed to providing a logical juristic basis for a method of delimitation
propounded largely for different reasons, cartographical and other. Given
also that for the reasons already set out (paragraphs 40-46) the theory
cannot be said to be endowed with any quality of logical necessity either,
the Court is unable to accept it.
57. Before going further it will be convenient to deal briefly with two
subsidiary matters. Most of the difficulties felt in the International Law
Commission related, as here, to the case of the lateral boundary between
adjacent States. Less difficulty was felt over that of the median line
boundary between opposite States, although it too is an equidistance line.
For this there seems to the Court to be good reason. The continental
shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be claimed by each of
them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations
meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a
median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal
projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be
eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal division of
the particular area involved. If there is a third State on one of thecoasts
concerned, the area of mutual natural prolongation with that of the
same or anotlier opposite State will be a separate and distinct one, to
be treated in the same way. This type of case is therefore different from
that of laterally adjacent States on the same coast with no immediately
opposite coast in front of it, and does not give rise to the same kind of
problem-a conclusion which also finds some confirmation in the dif-festée en untout autre sens. Elle a procédé,et ellen'a cessédeprocéder,de
deux convictions:en premier lieu il étaitpeu probable qu'une méthodede
délimitation unique donne satisfaction dans toutes les circonstances et la
délimitation devait donc s'opérerpar voie d'accord ou d'arbitrage; en
second lieu la délimitation devaits'effectuer selon desprincipeséquitables.
C'est en raison de la première conviction que la Commission a donné
priorité à la délimitation par voie d'accord dans le projet qui est devenu
l'article 6 de la Convention de Genève et c'est en raison de la seconde
conviction qu'elle a introduit l'exception des ((circonstances spéciales)).
Les documents montrent cependant que, même avecces atténuations, les
doutes ont persisté, enparticulier sur le point de savoir si le principe de
l'équidistancese révéleraitéquitabledans tous les cas.
56. Dans ces conditions, il semble à la Cour que la thèsedu caractère
inhérent, telle qu'elle est formulée maintenant par le Danemark et les
Pays-Bas, renverse 1"ordre réel des chosesdans le temps. Loin qu'une
règled'équidistanceait étéengendrép ear un principe antérieur de proxi-
mité inhérent à la conception fondamentale du plateau continental,
c'estplutôt ce principe qui est une rationalisation de la règle, une cons-
truction à posteriori destinée à fournir une base juridique logique à
une méthode de délimitation proposée pour des raisons surtout extra-
juridiques, cartographiques en particulier. Etant donné en outre que,
pour les motifs déjàexposésaux paragraphes 40 à 46, on ne saurait non
plus dire que la théorie présente un caractère de nécessitélogique, la
Cour n'est pas en mesure de l'accepter.
57. Avant d'aller plus loin, il convient d'examiner brièvement deux
questions incidentes. La plus grande partie des difficultéséprouvéespar
la Commission du droit international concernaient comme ici le cas de
la ligne latérale de délimitation entre Etats limitrophes. Les difficultés
ont été moindrespour ce qui est de la ligne médiane de délimitationentre
Etats dont les côtes se font face, bien qu'il s'agisseà aussi d'une ligne
d'équidistance. Il semble à la Cour qu'il y a une bonne raison à cela.
En effet les zones de plateau continental se trouvant au large d'Etats
dont les côtes se font face et séparant ces Etats peuvent êtreréclamées
par chacun d'eux à titre de prolongement naturel de son territoire. Ces
zones se rencontrent, se chevauchent et ne peuvent donc êtredélimitées
que par une ligne médiane; si 1'011ne tient pas compte des îlots, des
rochers ou des légerssaillants de la côte, dont on peut éliminer l'effet
exagéré dedéviatiori par d'autres moyens, une telle ligne doit diviser
également l'espace clont il s'agit. Si un troisième Etat borde l'une des
côtes, la zone où le prolongement naturel de son territoire recoupe celui
de 1'Etat déjà considéré luifaisant face, ou celui d'un autre Etat lui
faisant face, sera distincte et séparée maisdevra être traitéede la même
manière. Tout différentest le cas d7Etats limitrophes se trouvant sur laference of language to be observed in the two paragraphs of Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention (reproduced in paragraph 26 above) as respects
recourse in the one case to median lines and in the other to lateral
equidistance lines, in the event of absence of agreement.
58. If on the other hand, contrary to the view expressed in the preced-
ing paragraph, it were correct to say that there is no essential difference
in the process of delimiting the continental shelf areas between opposite
States and that of delimitations between adjacent States, then the results
ought in principle to be the same or at least comparable. But in fact,
wliereas a median line divides equally between the two oppositecountries
areas that can be regarded as being the natural prolongation of the
territory of each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to one
of the States concerned areas that are a natural prolongation of the
territory of the other.
59. Equally distinct in the opinion of the Court is the case of the
lateral boundary between adjacent territorial waters to be drawn onan
equidistance basis. As was convincingly demonstrated in the maps and
diagrams furnished by the Parties, and as has been noted in paragraph 8,
the distorting effects oflateral equidistance lines under certain conditions
of coastal configuration are nevertheless comparatively small within the
limits of territorial waters, but produce their maximum effect in the
localities where the main continental shelf areas lie further out. There
is also a direct correlation between the notion of closest proximity to
the coast and the sovereign jurisdiction which the coastal State is entitled
to exercise and must exercise, not only over the seabed underneath the
territorial waters but over the waters themselves, which does not exist
in respect of continental shelf areas where there is no jurisdiction over
the superjacent waters, and over the seabed only for purposes of explora-
tion and exploitation.
60. The conclusions so far reached leave open, and still to be con-
sidered, the question whether on some basis other than that of an a
prior ogical necessity, i.e., through positive law processes, the equidis-
tance principle has come to be regarded as a rule of customary interna-
tional Inw, so that it would be obligatory for the Federal Republic in
that way, even though Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is not, as
such, opposable to it. For this purpose it is necessary to examine the
status of the principle as it stood when the Convention was drawn up,
as it resulted from the effect of the Convention, and in the light of State
practice subsequent to the Convention; but it should be clearly under-
stood that in the pronouncements the Court makes on these matters it
has in view solely the delimitation provisions (Article 6) of the Conven-
tion, not other parts of it, nor the Convention as such.mêmecôte et n'ayant pas de vis-à-vis immédiat; les problèmes soulevés
nesont pas du mêmeordre: cette conclusion est confirméepar larédaction
différentedes deux paragraphes de l'article 6 de la Convention de Genève
reproduits au paragraphe 26 ci-dessus quant à l'utilisation,à défaut
d'accord, de lignes médianesou de lignes latérales d'équidistance selon
le cas.
58. En revanche si, contrairement à l'opinion émiseau paragraphe
précédent,il était exact de dire qu'il n'y a pas de différence essentielle
pour la délimitation du plateau continental entre le casd'Etats se faisant
face et lecas dlEtatc; limitrophes, les résultats devraient êtreen principe
sinon identiques du moins comparables. Or en fait, alors qu'une ligne
médiane tracée entre deux paysse faisant face divise égalementdes zones
qui peuvent êtreconsidéréescomme le prolongement natureldu territoire
de chacun d'eux, il est fréquentqu'une ligne latérale d'équidistancelaisse
à l'un des Etats intéressés des zonesqui sont le prolongement naturel du
territoire de l'autre.
59. Tout différent aussi est, de l'avis de la Cour, le problème de la
délimitation latéraleentre les eaux territorialesd'Etats limitrophes faite
selon l'équidistance.Ainsi que l'ont démontréde façon convaincante les
cartes et croquis fournis par les Parties et ainsi qu'on l'a vu au para-
graphe 8, les effets de déviation que produisent certaines configurations
côtières sur les lignes latirales d'équidistance sont relativement faibles
dans les limites des eaux territoriales mais jouent au maximum à I'em-
placement des zones de plateau continental au large. Il existe aussi une
corrilation directe entre la notion de proximité par rapport à la côte
et la juridiction souveraine que 1'Etat riverain a le droit et le devoir
d'exercer non seulement sur le lit de la mer au-dessous de ses eaux terri-
toriales mais aussi sur ces eaux mêmes,corrélation qui n'existe pas en
ce qui concerne le plateau continental car 1'Etat n'a aucune juridiction
sur leseaux surjacerites et n'a de juridiction sur le lit de la mer qu'à des
fins d'exploration et d'exploitation.
60. Les conclusions précédentes laissentencore sans réponsela ques-
tion de sa\ oir si le principe de l'équidistanceen est venà êtreconsidéré
comme une règle de droit international coutumier pour une autre raison
que la nécessitélogique et à priori, c'est-à-dire par les moyens du droit
positif, de sorte qu'il s'imposerait à la République fédérale à ce titre
bien que l'article6 de la Convention de Genève nelui soit pas opposable
en tant que tel.Il fautà cette fin étudierla place qu'occupait ce principe
lors de la rédaction de la Convention et celle qui lui a étéconféréepar la
Convention elle-mi3me et par la pratique des Etats postérieure à la
Convention; mais il1doit êtrenettement entendu que, dans ses énoncia-
tions en la matière, la Cour envisage uniquement la clause sur la délimi-
tation (article6) et nullement d'autres dispositions de la Convention ni
la Con\,ention en tant que telle. 61. The first of these questions can conveniently be considered in the
form suggested on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands themselves
in the course of the oral hearing, when it was stated that they had not
in fact contended that the delimitation article (Article 6) of the Conven-
tion "embodied already received rules of customary lau in the sense
that the Convention was merely declaratory of existing rulrs". Their
contention was, rather, that although prior to the Conference, continental
shelf law was only in the formative stage, and State practice lacked
uniformity, yet "the process of the definition and consolidation of the
emerging customary law took place through the work of the Interna-
tional Law Comniission, the reaction of governments to that work and
the proceedings of the Geneva Conference"; and this emerping customary
law became "crystallized in the adoption of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention by the Conference".
62. Whatever validity this contention may have in respect of at least
certain parts of the Convention, the Court cannot accept it as regards
the delimitation provision (Article 6),the relevant parts of \\hich were
adopted almost unchanged from the draft of the International Law
Commission that formed the basis of discussion at the Conference.
The status of the rule in the Convention therefore depends mainly on
the processes that led ~he Commission to propose it. These processes
have already been reviewed in connection with the Danish-Netherlands
contention of an a prior iecessity for equidistance, and the Court con-
siders this review sufficient for present purposes also, in order to show
that the principle of equidistance, as it now figures in Article6 of the
Convention, was proposed by the Commission with considerable hesita-
tion, somewhat on an experimental basis, at most de lrge fi?rvtlda,and
not at al1de lege lata or as an emerging rule of customary international
law. This is clearly not the sort of foundation on which Article 6 of the
Convention could be said to have reflected or crystallized such arule.
63. The foregoing conclusion receives significant confirmation frorn
the fact that Article 6 is one of those in respect of which, under the
reservations article of the Convention (Article 12) reservations may be
made by any State on signing, ratifying or acceding-for, speaking
generally, it is a characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations
that, in regard to them, some faculty of making unilateral reservations
may, within certain limits, be admitted;-whereas this cannot be so in
the case of general or customary 1aw rules and obligations which, by
their very nature, must have equal force for al1members of the interna-
tional community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of
unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own 61. Il peut être commode d'examiner la première de ces questions
sous la forme que lui ont donnéele Danemark et les Pays-Bas dans leurs
plaidoiries: ces deux Etats ont alors indiqué qu'en fait ils n'avaient pas
soutenu que l'article de la Convention relatifà la délimitation (article 6)
(consacrait des règ1e:sdéjàreçues de droit coutumier, en ce sens que la
Convention était simplement déclaratoire des règles existantes D. Leur
thèse était plutôt la!suivante: si avant la conférencele droit du plateau
continental n'étaitqu'embryonnaire et si la pratique des Etats manquait
d'uniformité, il n'en restait pas moins que (1la définition et la consoli-
dation du droit coutumier en voie de formation s'étaienteffectuéesgrâce
aux travaux de la Commission du droit international, aux réactions des
gouveriiements devant l'Œuvre de la Commission et aux débats de la
conférence de Genève 1)et que ce droit coutumier en voie de formation
s'était~ccristallisdu fait de l'adoption de la Convention sur le plateau
continental par la conférence 1).
62. Sijuste que salitcette thèseen ce qui concerne du moins certaines
parties de la Convention, la Cour ne saurait la retenir pour ce qui est de
la clause sur la délimitation (article 6) dont les dispositions pertinentes
sont reprises presque sans changement du projet de la Commission du
droit international ayant servi de base de discussion à la conférence.La
valeur de la règle dans la Convention doit donc surtout êtrejugéepar
rapport aux conditions dans lesquelles la Commission a été amenée à
la proposer et qui ont déjàétéexaminéesau sujet de la thèse du Dane-
mark et des Pays-B,as sur le caractère nécessaireet à priori de I'équi-
distance. La Cour considère que cet examen suffit, aux fins du présent
raisonnement. à montrer que le principe de l'équidistance, tel qu'il est
actuellement énoncé à l'article 6 de la Convention, a été proposépar la
Commission avec beaucoup d'hésitation, à titre plutôt expérimental et
tout au plus rl~I<~ge,ferendad,onc certainement pas de lege Iata ni même
à titre de règlede droit international coutumier en voie de formation. Tel
n'est manifestement pas le genre de fondement que l'on pourrait in-
voquer pour prétendre que l'article 6 de la Convention a consacré ou
cristalliséla règlede I'équidistance.
63. La conclusiorl précédentetrouve une confirmation significative
dans le fait que l'articleest l'un desarticlesà l'égard desquelstout Etat
peut formuler des réservesau moment de la signature, de la ratification
ou de l'adhésion, en vertu de l'article de la Convention relatif aux ré-
serves (article 12).Il est en général caractéristique d'unerègleou d'une
obligation purement conventionnelle que la faculté d'y apporter des
réservesunilatérales soit admise dans certaines limites; mais il ne saurait
en êtreainsi dans le cas de règles et d'obligations de droit généralou
coutumier qui par nature doivent s'appliquer dans des conditions égales
à tous les membres de la communauté internationale et ne peuvent donc
êtresubordonnées à un droit d'exclusion exercéunilatéralement et afavour. Consequently, it is to be expected that when, for whatever
reason, rules or obligations of this order are embodied, or are intended
to be reflected in certain provisions of a convention, such provisions
willfigure amongst those in respect of which a right of unilateral reserva-
tion is not conferred, or is excluded. This expectation is, in principle,
fulfilled by Article 12 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention,
which permits reservations to be made to al1the articles of the Conven-
tion "other than to Articles 1 to 3 inclusive"-these three Articles being
the ones which, it is clear, were then regarded as reflecting, or as crys-
tallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international
law relative to the continental shelf, amongst them the question of the
seaward extent of the shelf; the juridical character of the coastal State's
entitlement; the nature of the rights exercisable; the kind of natural
resources to which these relate; and the preservation intact of the legal
status as high seas of the waters over the shelf, and the legal status of
the superjacent air-space.
64. The normal inference would therefore be that any articles that
do not figure among those excluded from the faculty of reservation under
Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously existing or
emergent rules of law;and this is the inference the Court in fact draws in
respect of Article 6 (delimitation), having regard also to the attitude of
the International Law Commission to this provision, asalready described
in general terms. Naturally this would not of itself prevent this provision
from eventually passing into the general corpus of customary interna-
tional law by one of the processes considered in paragraphs 70-81 below.
But that is not here the issue. What is now under consideration is whether
it originally figured in the Convention as such a rule.
65. It has however been suggested that the inference drawii at the
beginning of the preceding paragraph is not necessarily warranted,
seeing that there are certain other provisions of the Convention, also not
excluded from the faculty of reservation, but which do undoubtedly in
principle relate to matters that lie within the field of received customary
law, such as the obligation not to impede the laying or maintenance of
submarine cables or pipelines on the continental shelf seabed (Article 4),
and the general obligation not unjustifiably to interfere witli freedom of
navigation, fishing, and so on (Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 6). These
matters however, al1relate toor are consequential upon principles or rules
of general maritime law, very considerably ante-dating the Convention,
and not directly connected with but only incidental to continental shelf
rights as such. They were mentioned in the Convention, not in order to
declare or confirm their existence, which was not necessary, but simply
to ensure that they were not prejudiced by the exercise of continental
shelf rights as provided for in the Convention. Another method ofvolontépar l'un quelconque des membres de lacommunauté àson propre
avantage. Par conséquent, il paraît probable que, si pour une raison
quelconque I'on consacre ou I'on entend traduire des règlesou des obli-
gations de cet ordre dans certaines dispositions d'une convention, ces
dispositions figureront parmi celles au sujet desquelles le droit de for-
muler des réservesunilatérales n'est pas accordé ou est exclu. C'est ainsi
que I'article12 de 1;iConvention de Genève sur le plateau continental
autorise desréserves Iaux articles de laConvention autres que lesarticles 1
a 3inclus »;ces trois articles sont ceux que l'on a alors manifestement
considérés comme consacrant ou cristallisant des règlesde droit inter-
national coutumier re1atii.e~au plateau continental, règlesétabliesou du
moins en voie de formation et visant notamment la question de l'étendue
du plateau continental vers le large, le caractère juridique du titre de
1'Etat riverain, la nature des droits pouvant êtreexercés, legenre de
ressources naturelles sur lesquelles portent ces droits, le maintien du
régimejuridique des eaux surjacentes au plateau continental en tant que
haute mer, et le maintien du régimejuridique de l'espace aériensitué
au-dessus de ces eaux.
64. 11semble donc normal de conclure que les articles à propos des-
quels la facultéde fi~rmulerdes réserves n'estpas exclue par l'article 12
n'ont pas été considérés comme déclaratoires dr eègles de droit pré-
existantes ou en voie de formation. Telle est bien, en ce qui concerne
l'article 6 sur la délimitation, la déduction tiréepar la Cour, qui tient
également compte de l'attitude, déjàexposée entermes généraux,de la
Commission du droit international à l'égardde cette disposition. Cela
ne suffirait évidemment pas à empêchercette disposition de s'intégrer
au droit international coutumier par l'un des moyens considérésaux
paragraphes 70 à 81 ci-après. Mais là n'est pas la question. Il s'agit
pour l'instant de savoir si la disposition a figurédès l'origine dans la
Convention à titre de règlecoutumière.
65. 011 soutient néanmoins que la déduction dont il est fait état au
débutdu paragraphe précédent n'est pas nécessairementfondéecar il ne
fait pas de doute que certaines autres dispositions de la Convention, à
propos desq~iellesla facultéde faire des réserves n'estpas exclue non plus,
se rapportent en principe à des questions relevant du droit coutumier
établi: telles sont notamment l'obligation de ne pas entraver la pose ou
l'entretien decables ou pipe-lines sous-marins sur le plateau continental
(article4). l'obligation générale dene pas gênerd'une manière injusti-
fiable la navigation, la pèche,etc. (article paragraphes 1et 6). Mais ces
questions concernent toutes, directement ou indirectement, des principes
ou des règles de droit maritime généralqui sont très antérieurs à la
Convention et se rattachent non pas directement mais de manière inci-
denre au régimejuridique du plateau continental en tant que tel. Si on les
a mentionnée4 dans la Convention, ce n'était pas pour diclarer ou
confirmer leur existence, ce qui n'était pasnécessaire,mais simplement
pour faire en sorteque l'exercice desdroits relatifs ail plateau continentalprévusdans la Conveiitioii n'y porte pas atteinte. Une autre rédaction
aurait pu éviterl'ambiguïté; il n'en reste pas moins qu'un Etat ayant
formulé une réserve ne serait pas dégagépour autant des obligations
imposéespar le droit maritime généralen dehors et indépendamment de
la Convention sur le plateau continental, et notamment des obligations
énoncées à I'article 2 de la convention surla haute mer conclue au même
moment et définiepar son préambule comme déclaratoire de principes
établis du droit international.
66. L-article 6 relatifà la déliniitation paraità la Cour se présenter
de manière différente.II se rattache directement au régimejuridique du
plateau contine~ital en tant que tel et non à des questions incidentes;
puisque Ia faculté de formuler des réservesn'a pas été exclue à son sujet,
comme elle l'aétépour les articles 1à 3,il est légitimed'en déduirequ'on
lui a attribué une valeur différenteet moins fondamentale et que, con-
trairement à ces articles, il ne traduisait pas le droit coutumier préexistant
ou en voie de forrlîation. Le Danemark et les Pays-Bas ont pourtant
soutenu que le droit d'apporter des réserves à I'article 6 n'étaitpas censé
êtreillimitéet qu'eri particulier il n'allait pas jusqu'à exclure totalement
le principe de délimitation fondésur l'équidistance,car les articles 1et 2
de la Convention, à propos desquels aucune réserve n'est autorisée,
impliqueraient la délimitation sur la base de I'équidistaiîce.11en résul-
terait que le droit de faire des réservesI'article 6 ne pourrait êtreexercé
que d'une manière compatible avec, au moins, le maintien du principe
foiidarnental de l'équidistance. On a souligné à cet égard que, sur les
quatre seules réservesformulées jusqu'à présentau sujet de I'article 6 et
dont l'une au moins a une portéeassez large, aucune ne viseune exclusion
ou un rejet aussi total.
67. La Cour ne juge pas cet argument convaincant pour plusieurs
motifs. En premier lieu, il Liesemble pas que les articles 1 et 2 de la
Convention de Genève aient un rapport direct avec une délimitatioii
entre Etats eii tant que telle. L'article 1 ne vise que la limite extérieure
du plateau continental du côté du large et non pas sa délimitation entre
Etats se faisant face ou entre Etats limitrophes. L'article 2 ne concerne
pas davantage ce dernier point. Or il a étésuggéré, semble-t-il,que la
notion d'équidistarice résulteimplicitement du caractère ((exclusif )attri-
bué par I'article 2, paragraphe 2, aux droits de 1'Etat riverain sur le
plateau continental. A s'en tenir au texte, cette interprétation est mani-
festementinexacte. Levéritablesens de cepassage estque, danstoute zone
de plateau continental où un Etat riverain a des droits, ces droits sont
exclusifs et aucun autre Etat ne peut les exercer. Mais aucune précision
n'yest donnéequant aux zones mêmessur lesquelles chaque Etat riverain
possède des droits exclusifs. Cette question, qui ne peut se poser qu'en
ce quiconcerne les confins du plateau continental d'un Etat, est exacte-
nient, comme on l'a vu au paragraphe 20 ci-dessus in$ne, celle que le
processus de délimitation doit permettre de résoudre et elle relève de
I'article, non de I'article 2.drafting might have clarified the point, but this cannot alter the fact
that no reservation could release the reserving party from obligations
of general maritime law existing outside and independently of the Con-
vention, and especially obligations formalized in Article 2 of the con-
temporaneous Convention on the High Seas, expressed by its preamble
to be declaratory of established principles of international law.
66. Article 6 (delimitation) appears to the Court to be in a different
position. It does directly relate to continental shelf rights as such, rather
than to matters incidental to these; and since it was not, as were Articles
1 to 3,excluded from the faculty of reservation, it is a legitimate inference
that it was considered to have a different and less fundamental status
and not, like those Articles, to reflect pre-existing or emergent customary
law. It was however contended on behalf of Dentnark and the Nether-
lands that the right of reservation given in respect of Article 6 was not
intended to be an unfettered right, and that in particular it does iiot
evtend tu effecting a total exclusion of the equidistance principle of
delimitation,-for, so it was claiined. delimitation on the basis of thai
principle is implicit in Articles 1 and2 of the Convention, in respect of
which no reservations are permitted. Hence the right of reservation under
Article 6could only be exercised in a manner consistent with the preserva-
tion of at least the basic principle of equidistance. In this coiinection it
was pointed out that, of the no more than four reser+ations so far
entered in respect of Article 6, one at least of which was somewhat far-
reaching, none has purported to effect such a total exclusion or denial.
67. The Court finds this argument unconvincing for a nuniber of
reasons. In the first place, Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Convention
do not appear to have any direct connection with inter-Statedelimitation
as such. Article 1 is concerned only with the outer, seaward, limit of
the shelf generally, not with boundaries between the shelf areas of
opposite or adjacent States. Article 2 is equally not concerned uitli
such boundaries. The suggestion seems to be that the notion of equidis-
tance is implicit in the reference in paragraph 2 of Article2 to the rights
of the coastal State over its continental shclf being "exclusive". So far as
actual language is concerned this interpretation is clearly incorrect. The
true sense of the passage is that in whatever areas of the continental
shelf a coastal State has rights, those rights are exclusive rights, not
exercisable by any other State. But this says nothing as to what in fact
are the precise areas in respect of which each coastal State possesses
these exclusive rights. This question, which can arise only as regards the
fringes of a coastal State's shelf area is, as explained at the end of para-
graph 20 above, exactly what falls to be settled through the process of
delimitation, and this is the sphere of Article6, not Article 2. cerned should, at al1 events potentially, be of a fundaiiientally noriii-
creating character such as could be regarded as forniing tlie basis of a
general rule of law. Considered in ubstracto the equidistance principle
might be said to fulfil this rcquirement. Yet in the particulnr form in
which it is embodied in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, and having
regard to the relationship of that Article to other provisions of tlie
Convention, this niust be open to some doubt. ln the first place, Article 6
is so framed asto put second the obligation to make use of the equidis-
tance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation to effect
delimitation by agreement. Such a primary obligation coiistitutes an
unusual preface to what is clainied to be a potential general rule of
law. Without attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon any
question of ,jus cogens, it is well understood that, in practice, rules of
international law can, by agreement, be derogated frorn in particular
cases, or as between particular parties,-but this is not norinally the
subject of any express provision, as it is in Articl6 of the Geneva Con-
vention. Secondly the part played by the notion of special circunistances
relative to the principle of equidistance as embodied in Article 6, and
the very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact mean-
ing and scope of this notion, must raise further doubts as tn the poten-
tially norm-creating character of the rule. Finally, the faculty of making
reservations to Article 6, while it might not of itself prevent thc equidis-
tance principle being eventually received as general law, does ndd con-
siderably to the difficulty of regarding this result as having been brought
about (or being potentially poysible) on the basis of the Convention:
for so long as this faculty continues to exist, and is not the subject of
any revision brought about in consequence of a request niade under
Article 13 of the Conventioii-of which there is at present no official
indication-it is tlie Convention itself which would, for tlie reasoiis
already indicated, seem to deny to the provisions of Article 6 the same
norm-creating character as, for instance, Articles 1and 2 possess.
73. With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary
before a conventional rule can be considered to have become LIgeneral
rule of international law, it might be that, even without the passage of
any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative
participation in theconvention might sufficeof itself, pro\ ided it included
that of States whose interests were specially affected. In the present case
however, the Court notes that, even if allowance is made for the existence
of a number of States to whom participation in the Geneva Convention
is not open, or which, by reason for instance of being land-locked
States, would have no interest in becoining parties to it, tlie number of
ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though respectable, hardly
sufficient. That non-ratification may sometimes be due to factors other
than active disapproval of the convention concerned cari hardly con-
stitute a basis on which positive acceptance of its principles can bc
implied: the reasons are speculntive, but the facts remain.ment, un caractère fondamentalement normatif et puisse ainsi constituer
la base d'une règle généralede droit. On peut dire que le principe de
l'équidistance, envisagédans l'abstrait, satisfait à cette condition. Néan-
moins, vu la forme particulière qu'il revêtà I'article 6 de la Convention
et étant donné le rapport entre cet article et d'autres dispositions de la
Convention, on ne peut manquer d'avoir des doutes. En premier lieu,
I'article6 est rédigécletelle sorte qu'il fait passer l'obligation de recourir
à la méthode de I'équidistance après l'obligation primordiale d'effectuer
la délimitation par voie d'accord. Cette obligation primordiale précéde-
rait de manière bien inusitée ce que I'on prétend êtrevirtuellement une
règlede droit général. Sans chercher à aborder la question du jus cogem
et encore moins à se prononcer sur elle, on doit admettre qu'en pratique
ilest possible de déroger par voie d'accord aux règles de droit inter-
national dans des cas particuliers ou entre certaines parties, mais cela ne
fait pas normalement l'objet d'une disposition expresse comme dans
I'article6 de la Convention de Genève. En second lieu, le rôle que joue
la notion de circonstances spéciales par rapport au principe de l'équi-
distance consacré à I'article 6 et les controverses très importantes, non
encore résolues, auxquelles ont donné lieu la portée et le sens de cette
notion ne peuvent que susciter d'autres doutes quantau caractère virtuelle-
ment normatif de la règle. Enfin, si la faculté d'apporter des réserves à
I'article6 ne suffit peut-êtrepas à empécher le principe de I'équidistance
de s'intégrer finalement au droit général,elle fait du moins qu'il est
beaucoup plus difficile de soutenir que ce résultat a étéou pourrait être
atteint sur la base di: la Convention: tant que cette faculté demeure et
qu'elle n'est pas modifiéeà la suite d'une demande de revision formulée
en vertu de l'article 13 - demande qu'aucune indication officielle ne
laisse présager pour l'instant -, il semble que ce soit la Convention
elle-mêmequi. pour les raisons déjà énoncées, priveles dispositions de
I'article6 du caractère normatif q~i'ontpar exemple les dispositions des
articles 1et 2.
73. En ce qui concerne les autres éléments généralementtenus pour
nécessairesafin qu'une règleconventionnelle soit considéréecomme étant
devenue une règle généralede droit international, il se peut que, sans
mêmequ'une longue période se soit écoulée, uneparticipation très large
et représentative à la convention suffise, à condition toutefois qu'elle
comprenne les Etats particulièrement intéressés.S'agissant de la présente
affaire, la Cour constate que, mêmesi I'on tient compte du fait que
certains dec Etats ne peuvent participer à la Convention de Genève ou,
faute de littoral par exemple, n'ont pas d'intérêtà y devenir parties, le
nombre des ratifications et adhésions obtenues jusqu'ici est important
mais n'est pas suffisant. On ne saurait s'appuyer sur le fait que la non-
ratification puisse êtredue parfois à des facteurs autres qu'une désappro-
bation active de la convention en cause pour en déduire l'acceptation
positive de ces principes: les raisons sont conjecturales mais les faits
demeurent. 74. As regards the time element, the Court notes that it is over ten
years since the Convention was signed, but that it is even now less than
five since it came into force in June 1964, and that when the present
proceedings were brought it was less than three years, while less than
one had elapsed at the time when the respective negotiations between
the Federal Republic and the other two Parties for a complete delimita-
tion broke down on the question of the application of the equidistance
principle. Although the passage of only a short period of time is not
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a newle of customary
international law on the basis of what bras originally a purely conven-
tional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period
in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of
States whose interests are specially affected, should have been bot11
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;-
and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
75. The Court must now consider whether State practice in the inatter
of continental shelf delimitation has, subsequent to the Geneva Conven-
tion, been of such a kind as to satisfy this requirement. Leaving aside
cases which, for various reasons, the Court does not consider to be
reliable guides as precedents, such as delimitations effected between the
present Parties themselves, or not relating to international boundaries,
some fifteen cases have been cited in the course of the present pro-
ceedings, occurring mostly since the signature of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, in which continental shelf boundaries have been delimited
according to the equidistance principle-in the majority of the cases by
agreement, in a few others unilaterally-or else the deliniitation was
foreshadowed but has not yet been carried out. Amongst these fifteen
are the four North Seadelimitations United KingdomJNorway-Denrnark-
Netherlands, and NorwayJDenmark already mentioned in paragraph 4
of this Judgment. But even if these various cases constituted inore than
a very small proportion of those potentially calling for deliniitation in
the world as a whole, the Court would not think it necessary to enuinerate
or evaluate them separately, since tliere are, n priori several grounds
which deprive them of weight as precedents in the present context.
76. To begin with, over half the States concerned, whether acting
unilaterally or conjointly, were or shortly became parties to the Geneva
Convention, and were therefore presumably, so far as they were con-
cerned, acting actually or potentially in the application of the Con~entioii.
From their action no inference could legitimately be drawn as to the
existence of a rule of customary international law in favour of the
equidistance principle. As regards those States, on the other Iiand, which
were not, and have not become parties to the Convention, the basis of 74. En ce qui concerne l'élémentde temps, la Cour constate qu'il y a
actuellement plus de dix ans que la Convention a étésignéeet moins de
cinq ans qu'elle est entrée en vigueur (juin 1964); lorsque la présente
affaire a étéintroduite, ily en avait moins de trois; enfin moins d'un
an s'était écoulélorsque les négociations bilatéralestendant à une déli-
mitation complète entre la République fédérale et les deux autres Parties
ont échoué surla question de l'application du principe de l'équidistance.
Bienque le fait qu'il ne se soit écoulé qu'unbref laps de temps ne cons-
titue pas nécessairement en soi un empêchement à la formation d'une
règle nouvelle de droit international coutumier à partir d'une règle
purement conventiorinelle à l'origine, ildemeure indispensable que dans
ce laps de temps, aussi bref qu'il ait été,la pratique des Etats, y compris
ceux qui sont particulièrement intéressés,ait étéfréquente et pratique-
ment uniforme dans le sens de la disposition invoquée et se soit mani-
festéede manière à établir une reconnaissance généraledu fait qu'une
règlede droit ou une obligation juridique est en jeu.
75. La Cour doit maintenant rechercher si, depuis la Convention de
Genève, la pratique des Etats en matière de délimitation du plateau
continental a étéde nature à satisfairà cette condition. Abstraction
faite des cas que la Cour,pour divers motifs, ne considèrepas comme des
précédentssur lesquels on puisse se fonder, notamment les délimitations
effectuéesentre les Partiesà la rése enteaffaire ou ne concernant r>asdes
limites internationales, on a citéau cours de la procédure une quinzaine
de cas où des limites de dateau contnental ont étédéterminéesselon le
principe de l'équidistance; la plupart sont postérieursla signature de la
Convention de Genève de 1958; le plus souvent la délimitation a été
opéréepar voie d'accord, parfois elle l'a été unilatéralement, parfois
aussi elle est prévue mais n'a pas encore étéréalisée.Parmi ces quelque
quinze exemples, on relève lesquatre délimitations concernant la mer du
Nord déjà mentionnéesau paragraphe 4 du préîent arrêt:Royaume-Uni/
Norvège-Danemark-Pays-Bas et Norvège,'Danemark. Mêmes'ils repré-
sentaient plus qu'une très faible proportion des cas possibles de délimi-
tation dans le monde, la Cour n'estimerait pas nécessairede les énumérer
ou de les examiner séparémentcar plusieurs raisons leur enlèvent à priori
la valeur de précédentsen l'espèce.
76. Tout d'abord plus de la moitié des Etats intéressés,qu'ils aient
agi unilatéralement ou conjointement, étaient, ou sont bientôt devenus,
partiesà la Convention de Genèveet il est donc permis de suppoîer que
leur action s'inscrivait en fait ou virtuellement dans le cadre de'appli-
cation de la Convention. On ne saurait donc légitimement en déduire
qu'il existeune règlede droit international coutumier consacrant le prin-
cipe de l'équidistance. Pour les Etats qui n'étaient pas et ne sont pas
devenus depuis lors partiesà la Convention, les raisons de leur action netheir action can only be problematical and must remain entirely specula-
tive. Clearly, they were not applying the Convention. But from that
no inference could justifiably be drawn that they believed themselves to
be applying a mandatory rule of customary international law. There
is not a shred of evidence that they did and, as has been seen (paragraphs
22 and 23), there is no lack of other reasons for using the equidistance
method, so that acting, or agreeing to act in a certain way, does not of
itself demonstrate anything of a juridical nature.
77. The essential point in this connection-and it seems necessary to
stress it-is that even if these instances of action by non-parties to the
Convention were much more nunierous than they in fact are, they would
not, even in the aggregate, suffice in themselves to constitute the opinio
juris;-for, in order to achieve this result, two conditions must be ful-
filled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice,
but they must also be sucli, or be carried out in such a way, as to be
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of Iaw requiring it. The need for such a belief, Le., the
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the
opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel
that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The
frequency, or even habitua1 cliaracter of the acts is not in itself enough.
There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and
protocol, whicli are performed almost invariably,but which are motivated
only by considcrations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not
by any sense of legal duty.
78. In this respect the Court follows the view adopted by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case, as stated in the fol-
lowing passage, the principle of which is, by analogy, applicable almost
word for word, nzutatis mutandis, to the present case (P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 10, 1927, at p. 28):
"Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found ... were
sufficient to prove ... the circunistance alleged .. .,it would merely
show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting
criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as
being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on
their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible
to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does not allow
one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty;
on the other hand, ... there are other circuinstances calculated to
show that the contrary is true."
Applying this dictum to the present case, the position is simply that in
certain cases-not a great nuinber-the States concerned agreed to draw
or did draw the boundaries concerned according to the principle of
equidistance. There is no evidence that they so acted because they felt PLATEAU CONTINENTAL(ARRET) 44
peuvent être queproblématiques et restent entièrement du domaine de
la conjecture. Il est clair que ces Etats n'appliquaient pas la Convention,
mais il serait excessif d'en conclure qu'ils croyaient appliquer une règle
de droit international coutumier àcaractère obligatoire. Il n'existe pas le
moindre indice en ce sens et, comme on l'a vuaux paragraphes 22 ët 23,
il ne manquait pas d'autres raisons de recourir à la méthode de l'équi-
distance, de sorte que le fait d'avoir agi ou de s'être engagéagir d'une
certaine façon ne prouve rien sur le plan juridique.
77. L'élément essentie l cet égard - il semble nécessairede le sou-
ligner - est que, mi3mesi pareille attitude avait été beaucoupplus fré-
quente de la part des;Etats non parties à la Convention, ces actes, même
considérés globalement, ne suffiraient pas en eux-mêmes à constituer
l'opiniojuris car, pour parvenir à ce résultat, deux conditions doivent
êtreremplies. Non seulement les actes considérésdoivent représenter
une pratique constante, mais en outre ils doivent témoigner, par Leur
nature ou la manière dont ils sont accomplis, de la conviction que cette
pratique est rendue obligatoire par I'existence d'une règle de droit. La
nécessitéde pareille conviction, c'est-à-dire l'existenced'un élément sub-
jectif, est implicite dans la notion mêmed'opiniojuris sive /i~cessitutis.
Les Etats intéressésdoivent donc avoir le sentiment de se conformer à
ce qui équivaut à une obligation juridique. Ni la fréquence ni mêmele
caractère habituel des actes ne suffisent.II existe nombre d'actes inter-
nationaux, dans le domaine du protocole par exemple, qui sont accomplis
presque invariablement mais sont motivéspar de simples considérations
de courtoisie, d'opportunité ou de tradition et non par le sentiment d'une
obligation juridique.
78. A cet égardla Cour fait sienne l'opinion dela Cour permanente de
Justice internationaledans l'affairedu Lotus, telle qu'elleest énoncéedans
le passage suivant, et dont le principe est applicable par analogie à la
présenteespèce presque mot pour mot mutalis nnltandis (C.P.J.I. série
A no 10, 1927,p. 28:):
n Mêmesilararetédes décisionsjudiciaires que I'on peuttrouver.. .
étaitune preuve suffisante du fait invoqué .. .,il en résulteraitsim-
plement que les Etats se sont abstenus, en fait, d'exercer despour-
suites pénales,et non qu'ils sereconnaissent obligés de ce faire; or,
c'est seulement si l'abstention étaitmotivéepar la conscience d'un
devoir de s'abstenir que I'on pourrait parler de coutume internatio-
nale.Le fait alléguéne permet pas deconclure que lesEtats aient été
conscients de pareil devoir; par contre,... ily a d'autres circons-
tances qui sont de nature à persuader du contraire. »
Si I'on applique ce prononcé à la présente affaire, on doit simplement
constater que dans certains cas peu nombreux des Etats sont convenus
de tracer, ou ont tracé, les limites qui les concernent suivant le principe
de l'équidistance. Rien ne prouve qu'ils aient agi ainsi parce qu'ils s'ylegally compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a rule of custom-
ary law obliging them to do so-especially considering that they might
have been motivated by other obvious factors.
79. Finally, it appears that in almost al1of the cases cited, the delimi-
tations concerned were median-line delimitations between opposite
States, not lateral delimitations between adjacent States. For reasons
which have already been given (paragraph 57) the Court regards the case
of median-line delimitations between opposite States as different in
various respects, and as being sufficiently distinct not to constitute a
precedent for the delimitation of lateral boundaries. In only onesituation
discussed by the Parties does there appear to have been a geographical
configuration which to some extent resembles the present one, in the
sense that a number of States on the same coastline are grouped around
a sharp curve or bend of it. No complete delimitation in this area has
however yet been carried out. But the Court is not concerned to deny to
this case, or any other of those cited, al1evidential value in favour of the
thesis of Denmark and the Netherlands. It simply considers that they
are inconclusive, and insufficient to bear the weight sought to be put
upon them as evidence of such a settled practice, manifested in such
circumstances, as would justify the inference that delimitation according
to the principle of equidistance amounts to a mandatory rule of customary
international law,-more particularly where lateral delimitations are
concerned.
80. There are of course plenty of cases (and a considerable number
were cited) of delimitations of waters, as opposed to seabed, being carried
out on the basis of equidistance-mostly ofinterna1 waters (lakes, rivers,
etc.), and mostly median-line cases. The nearest analogy is that of ad-
jacent territorial waters, but as already explained (paragraph 59) the
Court does not consider this case to be analogous to that of the con-
tinental shelf.
81. The Court accordingly concludes that if the Geneva Convention
was not in its origins or inception declaratory of a mandatory rule of
customary international law enjoining the use of the equidistance prin-
ciple for the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent
States, neither has its subsequent effect been constitutive of such a rule;
and that State practice up-to-date has equally been insuficient for the
purpose.
82. The immediately foregoing conclusion, coupled with that reached
earlier (paragraph 56) to the effect that the equidistance principle could
not be regarded as being a rule of law on any a priori basis of logicalsentaient juridiquement tenus par une règle obligatoire de droit coutu-
mier, surtout si l'on songe que d'autres facteurs ont pu motiver leur
action.
79. Enfin il semble que, dans presque tous les cas de délimitation
invoqués,il s'est agi de tracer des lignes médianesentre Etats se faisant
face et non des limites latérales entre Etats limitrophes. Pour les motifs
déjà indiquésau paragraphe 57, la Cour considère que les délimitations
effectuées selon des lignes médianesentre Etats se faisant face sont à
divers égards différentes des délimitations latérales et qu'elles s'en
distinguent suffisamment pour ne pas constituer un précédentpour la
fixation de limitesaté:ralesI.l semble qu'une seuledes situations évoquées
par les Parties se rapporte une configuration géographiqueressemblant
dans une certaine mesure à celle de la présente espèce, ence sens que
plusieurs Etats sont groupés le long d'une côte fortement incurvée.Or,
jusqu'à présent, il n'a pas étéeffectuéde délimitation complète dans la
régiondont il s'agit. Ce n'est pas que la Cour refuse aux exemples cités
toute valeur probante à l'appui de la thèsedu Danemark et des Pays-Bas;
elle estime simplement qu'ils ne sont pas décisifset ne suffisent pas à
établir, comme on le voudrait, une pratique constante manifestéedans
des circonstances permettant de conclure que la délimitation suivant le
principe de l'équidistanceconstitue une règleobligatoire de droit inter-
national coutumier, en particulier en matière de délimitation latérale.
80. Bien entendu, dans de nombreux cas dont beaucoup ont étémen-
tionnés, l'équidistancea étéappliquée pour délimiter deseaux, par op-
position à des fonds marins: il s'est agi surtout d'eaux intérieures (lacs,
fleuves. etc.) et de délimitations suivant les lignes médianes. Le cas le
plus voisin est celui des eaux territoriales adjacentes mais, ainsi qu'on
l'adéjàvu au paragraphe 59, la Cour ne le considère pas comme analo-
gue à celui du plateau continental.
81. La Cour conclut donc que, si la Convention de Genève n'étaitni
dans ses origines ni dans ses prémicesdéclaratoire d'une règleobligatoire
de droit international coutumier imposant l'emploi du principe de l'équi-
distance pour la délimitation du plateau continental entre Etats limi-
trophes, elle n'a pas non plus par ses effets ultérieurs aboutila forma-
tion d'une telle règle; et que la pratique des Etats jusqu'à ce jour a
égalementétéinsuffisante à cet égard.
82. La conclusion qui précède, jointeà celle qui a déjàétéformuléeau
paragraphe 56 et suivant laquelle le principe de l'équidistancene saurait
êtreconsidérécomme constituant à priori une règle de droit découlant necessity deriving froin the fundamental theory of the continental shelf,
leads to the final conclusion on this part of the case that the use of the
equidistance method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas
concerned in the present proceedings. In these circumstances, it becomes
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether or not the configuration
of the German North Sea Coastconstitutes a "special circumstance" for
thepurposes either of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention or of any rule
of customary international law,-since once the use of the equidistance
method of delimitation is deterinined not to be obligatory in any event,
itceases to be legally necessary to prove the existence of special circum-
stances in order to justify not using that method.
83. The legal situation therefore is that the Parties areder no obliga-
tion to apply either the 1958Convention, which is not opposable to the
Federal Republic, or the equidistaiice method as a mandatory rule of
customary law, which it is not. But as between States faced with an issue
concerning the lateral delimitation of adjacent continental shelves, there
are still rules and principles of law to be applied; and in the present case
it is not the fact either thatules are lacking, or that the situation is one
for the unfettered appreciation of the Parties. Equally, it is not the case
that if the equidistance principle is not arule of law, there has to be as
an alternative some other single equivalent rule.
84. As already indicated, the Court is riot called upon itself to delimit
the areas of continental shelf appertaining respectively to each Party,
and in consequence is not bound to prescribe the methods to be em-
ployed for the purposeâ of such a delimitation. TheCourt has to indicate
to the Parties the principles and rules of law in the light of which the
methods for eventually effecting the delimitation will have to be chosen.
TheCourt will discharge this task in such a way as to provide the Parties
with the requisite directions,without substitutiiig itself for them byans
of a detailed indication of the methods to be followed and the factors to
be taken into account for the purposes of a delimitation the carrying out
of which the Parties have expressly reserved to themselves.
85. It emerges from the history of the development of the legal régime
of thecontinental shelf, which has been reviewedearlier, that the essential
reason why the equidistance method is not to be regarded as a rule of
law is that, if it were to be compulsorily applied in al1 situations, this
would not be consonant with certain basic legal notions which, as has
been observed in paragraphs 48 and 55, have from the beginning reflected
the opini ouriisn the inatter of delimitation; those principles being that
delimitation must be the object of agreement between the States con-
cerned, and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance with
equitable principles. On a foundation of very general precepts of justice
and good faith, actual rules of law are here involved which govern thelogiquement de la conception fondamentale du plateau continental,
amène à conclure sur cet aspect de l'affaire que l'emploi de la méthode
de l'équidistance n'est pasobligatoire pour la délimitation des zones en
cause. Dans cesconditions, la Cour n'a pas àdéterminer silaconfiguration
de la côte allemande de la mer du Nord constitue ou non une (circons-
tance spéciale ))aux fins de l'article 6 de la Convention de Genève ou de
toute règle de droit international coutumier; en effet, dèslors qu'il est
établi que la méthode de délimitation fondéesur l'équidistance n'est en
aucune façon obligatoire, il cesse d'êtrejuridiquement nécessaire de
prouver l'existeilce cle circonstances spéciales pour en justifier la non-
application.
83. La situation juridique est donc que les Parties ne sont tenues d'ap-
pliquer ni la Convention de 1958qui n'est pas opposable à la République
fédérale, nila méthode de l'équidistanceen tant que règleobligatoire de
droit coutumier, ce qu'elle n'est pas. Mais entre Etats qui ont un pro-
blème de délimitation latérale de plateaux continentaux limitrophes il
demeure des règles et principes de droit à appliquer et il ne s'agit, en
l'espèce,ni d'une absence de règles, ni d'une appréciation entièrement
libre de la situation par les Parties. ne s'agit pas non plus, si le principe
de l'équidistance n'est pasla règlede droit, d'avoirà titre subsidiaire une
autre règleunique équivalente.
84. Comnie il a éttSindiqué plushaut, la Cour n'a pas à faire elle-même
une délimitation des zones de plateau continental relevant respectivement
de chaque Partie et elle n'est par conséquent pas tenue de prescrire les
méthodes à utiliser pour procéder à cette délimitation. La Cour doit
indiquer aux Parties les principes et règlesde droit en fonction desquels
devra se faire le choix des méthodes pour effectuer finalement la délimi-
tation. La Cour s'acquittera de cette tâche de manière à fournir aux
Parties les direction:$nécessaires,sans se substituer à elles par une in-
dication détaillée desméthodes à suivre et des éléments à prendre en
considération aux firisd'une délimitation que les Parties se sont formelle-
ment réservéde faire elles-mêmes.
85. 11ressort de l'histoire du développement du régimejuridique du
plateau continental, qui a étérappelée ci-dessus,que la raison essentielle
pour laquelle la méthode de l'équidistancene peut êtretenue pour une
règle de droit est que, si elle devait êtreappliquée obligatoirement en
toutes situations, cette méthode ne coirespondrait pas à certainesnotions
juridiques de base qui, comme on l'a constatéaux paragraphes 48 et 55,
reflètent depuis l'origine l'opiniojuris en matière de délimitation; ces
principes sont que la délimitation doit êtrel'objet d'un accord entre les
Etats intéressés etque cet accord doit se réaliser selon des principes
équitables. Il s'agit là, sur la base de préceptes très généraxejustice et
de bonne foi, de véritablesrèglesde droit en matière de délimitationdesdelimitation of adjacent continent shelves-that is to say, rules binding
upon States for al1de1imitations;-i"\, .short, it is not a question of apply-
ing equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule
of law which itself requires the appllcation of equitable principles, in
accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development
of the legal régimeof the continental shelf in this field, namely:
(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a
view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a
forma1 process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the
automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the
absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be
the case when either of them insists upon its own position without
contemplating any modification of it;
(6) the parties are under an obligation to act in such a way that, in the
particular case, and taking al1 the circumstances into account,
equitable principles are applied,-for this purpose the equidistance
method can be used, biit other methods exist and may be employed,
alone or in combination, according to the areas involved;
(c) for the reasons given in paragraphs 43 and 44, the continental shelf
of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory
and must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the
territory of another State.
86. It is now necessary to examine these rules more closely, as also
certain problems relative to their application. So far as the first rule is
concerned, the Court would recall not only that the obligation to nego-
tiate which the Parties assumed by Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Special
Agreements arises out of the Truman Proclamation, wliich, for the
reasons given in paragraph 47, inust be considered as having propounded
the rules of Iriwin this field,but also that this obligation merelyconstitutes
a special application of a principle which underlies al1 international
relations, and which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes.There is no need to insist upon the fundamental
character of this method of settlement, except to point out that it is
emphasized by the observable fact that judicial or arbitral settlement is
not universally accepted.
87. As the Permanent Court of International Justice said in its Order
of 19August 1929in the case of the Free Zones of UpperSavoy and the
District of Gex, the judicial settlement of international disputes "is
simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such dis-
putes between the parties" (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22, at p. 13).Defining
the content of the obligation to negotiate, the Permanent Court, in itsplateaux continentaux lin~itrophes, c'est-à-dire, de règles obligatoires
pour les Etats pour toute délimitation; en d'autres termes, il ne s'agit
pas d'appliquer l'équité simplementcomme une représentation de la
justice abstraite, mais d'appliquer une règle de droit prescrivant le
recours à des principes équitables conformémentaux idéesqui ont tou-
jours inspiréle développementdu régimejuridique du plateau continental
en la matière, à savoir:
a) les parties sont tenues d'engager une négociation en vue de réaliser
un accord et non pas simplement de procéder à une négociation
formelle comme une sorte de condition préalable à l'application
automatique d'une certaine méthode de délimitation faute d'accord;
les parties ont l'obligation de se comporter de telle manière que la
négociation ait un sens, ce qui n'est pas le cas lorsque l'une d'elles
insistesur sa propre position sans envisager aucune modification;
h) les parties sont tenues d'agir de telle sorte que, dans le cas d'espèce
et compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, des principes équitables
soient appliqués; à cet effet la méthode de l'équidistance peut être
appliquée; d'autres aussi existent et peuvent être utilisées exclusive-
ment ou conjointement selon les secteurs envisagés;
c) pour les raisons exposéesaux paragraphes 43 et 44, le plateau con-
tinental de tout Etat doit 2tre le prolongement naturel de son terri-
toire et ne doit pas empiétersur ce qui est le prolongement naturel du
territoire'un autre Etat.
86. 11convient maintenant d'examiner ces règles de plus près, ainsi
que certains problén~esrelatifs à leur application. En ce qui coiicerne la
première règle, laCour rappelle que l'obligation de négocierassuméepar
les Parties dans l'article, paragraphe 2, des compromis, non seulement
découle de la proclamation Truman qui, pour les motifs énoncésau
paragraphe 47, doit etre considéréecomme ayant poséles règlesde droit
en la matiPre, mais encore ne constitue qu'une application particulière
d'un principe, qui est à la base de toutes relations internationales et qui
est d'ailleurs reconnu dans l'article33 de la Charte des Nations Unies
comme l'une des méthodes de règlement pacifique des différendsinter-
nationaux; ilest inutile d'insister sur le caractère fondamental de cette
forme de règlement sinon pour remarquer qu'il est renforcé par la
constatation que le règlement judiciaire ou arbitral n'est pas générale-
ment accepté.
87. Comme l'a dit la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans
son ordonnance du 19 août 1929 en l'affaire des Zoriesfranclzes de la
Haute-Suvoie et du Pays de Gex, le règlement judiciaire des conflits
internationaux «n'est qu'un succédanéau règlement direct et amiable
de ces conflits entre les partie»(C.P.J.I. sérieA no22, p. 13).Définissant
dans son avis consultatif sur le Traficferroviaire entre la Lithuanie et la48 CONTINENTAL SHELF (JUDGMENT)
Advisory Opinion in the case of Railicay Trafic between Litll~raniuat7d
Poland, said that the obligation was "not only to enter into negotiations
but also to pursue them as far as possible with a view to coiicluding
agreements", even if an obligation to negotiate did not imply an obliga-
tion to reach agreement (P.C.I.J., Series AjB, No. 42, 1931, at p. 116).
In the present case, it needs to be observed that whatever the details of
the negotiations carried on in 1965and 1966,they failed of their purpose
because the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands, convinced
that the equidistance principle alone was applicable, in consequence of a
rule binding upon the Federal Republic, saw no reason to depart from
that rule; and equally, given the geographical considerations stated in
the last sentence of paragraph 7 above, the Federal Republic could not
accept the situation resulting from the application of that rule. So far
therefore the negotiations have not satisfied the conditions indicated in
paragraph 85 (a), but fresh negotiations are to take place on the basis
of the present Judgment.
88. TheCourt comes next to the rule of equity. The legal basis of that
rule in the particular case of the delimitation of the continental shelf as
between adjoining States has already been stated. It must however be
noted that the rule rests also on a broader basis. Whatever the legal
reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just,
and therefore in that sense equitable. Nevertheless, when mention is
made of a court dispensing justice or declaring the law, what is meant is
that the decision finds its objective justification in considerations lying
not outside but within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule of
law that calls for the application of equitable principles. There is con-
sequently no question in this case of any decision ex aequo et bono, such
as would only be possible under the conditions prescribed by Article 38,
paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute. Nor would this be the first time that
the Court has adopted such an attitude, as is shown by the following
passage from the Advisory Opinion given in the case of Judgmetztsof the
Admitzistratii7eTribunul of the I.L.O. upon Cornplaints Made against
Unesco(I.C.J. Reports 1956,at p. 100) :
"In view of this the Court need not examine the allegation that
the validity of the judgments of the Tribunal is vitiated by excess of
jurisdiction on the ground that it awarded compensation ex aequo
etbono. Ttwill confine itself to stating that, in the reasons given by
the Tribunal in support of its decision on the merits, the Tribunal
said: 'That redress will be ensured ex aequo et bon0 by the granting
to the complainant of the sum set forth below.' It does not appear
from the context of the judgment that the Tribunal thereby intended
to depart from principles of law. The apparent intention was to SayPologtzela teneur de l'obligation de négocier,la Cour permanente a dit
que cette obligation (n'est pas seulement d'entamer des négociations,
n-iaisencore de les poursuivre autant que possible, en vue d'arriver à
des accords 11,mêmesi l'engagement de négociern'impliquait pas celui
de s'entendre (C.Y.J.I. sérieA!B no 42, 1931, p. 116). Dans la présente
affaire on doit noter que, quels qu'en aient étélesdétails,les négociations
menéesen1965et 1966n'ont pas atteint leur but parce que lesRoyaumes
du Danemark et des Pays-Bas, convaincus que le principe de l'équidis-
tance était seul applicable et cela par l'effetd'une règleobligatoire pour
la République fédérale,ne voyaient aucun motif de s'écarter de cette
règle,de mêmeque, vu les considérations d'ordre géographique dont il
est fait étatau paragraphe 7 ci-dessus injîne, la République fédéralene
pouvait accepter la situation résultant de l'application de cette règle;
les négociations menéesjusqu'à présent n'ont donc pas satisfait aux
conditions énoncéesau paragraphe 85 a), mais de nouvelles négociations
doivent se tenir sur la base du présentarrêt.
88. La Cour en vient maintenant à la règlede l'équité.Le fondement
juridique de cette règledans lecas particulier dela délimitation du plateau
continental entre Etats limitrophes a déjàétéprécisé. Il faut noter cepen-
dant que cette règle repose aussi sur unc base plus large. Quel que soit
le raisonnement juridique du juge, ses décisions doivent par définition
êtrejustes, donc en ce sens équitables. Néanmoins, lorsqu'on parle du
juge qui rend la justice ou qui dit le droit, il s'agit de justification ob-
jective de sesdécisiorisnon pas au-delà des textes mais selon les textes et
dans ce domaine c'est précisément unerèglede droit qui appelle l'applica-
tion de principes équitables. Il n'est par conséquent pas question en
l'espèced'une décision ex aequo et bot~o,ce qui ne serait possible que
dans les conditions prescrites à l'article 38, paragraphe 2,du Statut de la
Cour. Ce ne serait d'ailleurs pas la première fois que la Cour adopterait
une telle position, airisi que cela ressort de son avis consultatif en l'affaire
des Jugenzents du tribunal administratif de ['O.I.T. sur requête contre
/'Unesco (C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 100) :
(1Dans ces conditions, la Cour n'a pas à examiner la prétention
selon laquelle la validitédes jugements du tribunal serait viciéepar
un dépassement decompétencedu fait qu'il a été accordé des indem-
nitése.r aequo PI bono. Elle se bornera à dire que si le tribunal, dans
les motifs de sa décisionsur le fond, a dit ((que la réparation sera
assurée ex aequo et bon0 par l'allocation au requérant du montant
ci-après»,lecontexte ne fait nullement apparaître que le tribunal ait
entendu par là se départirdes principes du droit. Il a voulu seulement
énoncer que, le calcul du montant de l'indemnité nepouvant pas that, as the precise determination of theactual amount to be awarded
could not be based on any specific rule of law, the Tribunal fixed
what the Court, in other circumstances, has described as the true
measure of compensation and the reasonable figure of such corn-
pensation (Corfu Channel case, Judgment of December 15th, 1949,
Z.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 249)."
89. It must next be observed that, in certain geographical circuin-
stances which are quite frequently met with, the equidistance method,
despite its known advantages, leads unquestionably to inequity, in the
following sense:
(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by
the equidistance line as regards the consequences for the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of
concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is
employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the
coastline the area to be delimited, the more unreasonctble are the
results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of
a natural geographical feature must be remedied or compensated
for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity.
(b) In the case of the North Sea in particular, where there is no outer
boundary to the continental shelf, it happens that the claims of
several States converge, meet and intercross in localities where,
despite their distance from the coast, the bed of the sea still uii-
questionably consists of continental shelf. A study of these con-
vergences, as revealed by the maps, shows how inequitable would
be the apparent simplification brought about by a delirnitation
which, ignoring such geographical circumstances, was based solely
on the equidistance method.
90. If for the above reasons equity excludes the use of the eqiiidistance
method in the present instance, as the sole method of delimitation, the
question arises whether there is any necessity to employ only one method
for the purposes of a given delimitation. There is no logical basis for this,
and no objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a delimitation of
adjoining continental shelf areas by the concurrent use of various
methods. The Court has already stated why it considers that the inter-
national law of continental shelf delimitation does not involve any im-
perative rule and permits resort to various principles or metliods, as may
be appropriate, or a combination of them, provided that, by the applicn-
tion of equitable principles, a reasonable result is arrived at.
91. Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never be
any question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does not
require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted an area
of continental shelf, any more than tliere could be a question of rendering
the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a PLATEAU CONTINENTAL(ARRÊT) 49
être déduitde règlesde droit posées à cet effet, il entendait fixer ce
que la Cour a, en d'autres circonstances, appelé la juste mesure de
la réparation, le chiffre raisonnable de celle-ci(affaire du Dktrdet
Corfou, arrêtdu 15 décembre 1949, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 249). ))
89. 11faut ensuite constater que, malgré ses avantages reconnus, la
méthodedel'équidistanceaboutit dans certainesconditions géographiques
assez fréquentes à créerune incontestable inéquité:
a) La moindre déformationd'unecôte est automatiquement amplifiéepar
la ligne d'équidistancedans ses conséquencespour la délimitation du
plateau continental. C'est ainsi qu'on a vu dans le cas des côtes con-
caves ou convexes que, si l'onapplique la méthodede l'équidistance,
on aboutit à des résultatsd'autant plus déraisonnables que la défor-
mation est considérable et que la zone à délimiterest éloignéede la
côte. Une exagération d'une telle importance des conséquencesd'un
accident géographique naturel doit être réparéo eu compenséedans
la mesure du possible parce qu'elle est en soi créatriced'inéquité.
h) Particulièrement dans le cas de la mer du Nord où le plateau wn-
tinental ne rencontre aucune limite extérieure, il se trouve que les
prétentions de plusieurs Etats convergent, se rencontrent et s'entre-
croisent en des endroits où, en dépit dela distance des côtes, le lit de
la mer consiste encore en un plateau continental. La constatation de
ces convergences, manifestes sur la carte, révèlecombien inéquitable
serait la simplification apparente d'une délimitation qui ne serait
fondée que sur la méthode de l'équidistance en ignorant cette cir-
constance géographique.
90. Si, pour les raisons indiquées ci-dessus, l'équitéinterdit l'emploi
de l'équidistancedans lecas présentcommel'unique méthode dedélimita-
tion, la question se pose de savoir s'il existeune nécessitéquelconque de
n'employer pour une délimitation déterminée qu'uneseule méthode.
Il n'y a aucune base logique à cela et l'on ne voit aucune objection à
l'idéequ'une délimitation de zones limitrophes du plateau continental
puisse être faitepar l'emploi concurrent de diverses méthodes.La Cour a
déjàdit pourquoi elle: coiisidère que le droit international en matière
de délimitation du plateau continental ne comporte pas de règle
impérativeet autorise le recours à divers principes ou méthodes, selonle
cas, ainsi qu'à leur combinaison, pourvu qu'on aboutisse par application
de principes équitables àun résultat raisonnable.
91. L'équitén'implique pas nécessairement l'égalité. Il n'est jamais
question de refaire la nature entièrement et l'équité necommande pas
qu'un Etat sans accès à la mer se voie attribuer une zone de plateau con-
tinental, pas plus qu'il ne s'agit d'égalila situation d'un Etat dont les
côtes sont étendueset celled'un Etatdont lescôtes sont réduites.L'égalitéState with a restricted coastline. Equality is to be reckoned within the
same plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as these that equity
could remedy. But in the present case there are three States whose North
Sea coastlines are in fact comparable in length and which, therefore,
have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the con-
figuration of one of the coastlines would, if the equidistance method is
used, deny to one of these States treatment equal or comparable to that
given the other two. Here indeed is a case where, in a theoretical situation
of equality within the same order, an inequity is created. What is un-
acceptable in this instance is that a State should enjoy continental shelf
rights considerably different from those of its neiglibours merely because
in the one case the coastline is roughly convex in form and in the other
it is markedly concave, although those coastlines are comparable in
length. It is therefore not a question of totally refashioning geography
whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situation of
quasi-equality as between a number of States, of abating the effects of
an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of
treatment could result.
92. It has however been maintained that no one method of delimita-
tion can prevent such results and that al1can lead to relative injustices.
This argumenthas in effect already been dealt with. It can only strengthen
the view that it is necessary to seek not one method of delimitation but
one goal. It is in this spirit that the Court must examine the question of
how the continental shelf can be delimited when it is in fact the case that
the equidistance principle does not provide an equitable solution. As the
operation of delimiting is a matter of determining areas appertaining to
different jurisdictions, it is a truism to say that the determination must be
equitable; rather is the problem above al1one of defining the means where-
by the delimitation can be carried out in such a way as to be recognized
as equitable. Although the Parties have made it known that they intend
to reserve for themselves the application of the principles and rules laid
down by the Court, it would, even so, be insufficient simply to rely on the
rule of equity without giving some degree of indication as to the possible
ways in which it might be applied in the present case, it being understood
that the Parties will be free to agree upon one method rather than an-
other, or different methods if they so prefer.
93. In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States
may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply
equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of
al1 such considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance
on one to the exclusion of al1others. The problem of the relative weight
to be accorded to different considerations naturally varies with the circum-
stances of the case.
94. In balancing the factors in question it would appear that various
aspects must be taken into account. Some are related to the geological.
others to the geographical aspect of the situation, others again to these mesure dans un mêmeplan et ce n'est pas à de telles inégalitésna-
turelles que l'équitépourrait porter remède. Mais en l'espèceil s'agit de
trois Etatsdont lescôtes surla mer du Nord sont justement d'une longueur
comparable et qui par conséquent ont ététraités à peu près également
par la nature, sauf que l'une de ces côtes par sa configuration priverait
l'un des Etats d'un traitement égalou comparable à celui que recevraient
les deux autres si l'on utilisait la méthode de I'équidistance. C'est bien
un cas où, dans une situation théorique d'égalitédans le mêmeplan, une
inéquitéest créée. Cequi est inacceptable en l'espèceest qu'un Etat ait
des droits considérablement différents de ses voisins sur le plateau coii-
tinental du seul fait que l'un a une côte de configuration plutôt convexe
et I'autre une côte de configuration fortement concave, même si la
longueur de ces côtes est comparable. 11ne s'agit donc pas de refaire tota-
lement la géographie dans n'importe quelle situation de fait mais, en
présence d'une situation géographique de quasi-égalitéentre plusieurs
Etats, de remédier à. une particularité non essentielle d'où pourrait
résulter une injustifiable différence de traitement.
92. Il a ét6soutenu qu'aucune méthode de délimitation ne peut em-
pêcherde tels résultats et que toutes peuvent éventuellement aboutir à
une relative injustice. Une réponsea déjkété donnéeà cet argument. 11
renforce d'ailleurs l'opinion selon laquelle on doit rechercher non pas
une méthode unique de délimitation mais un but unique. C'est dans
cet esprit que la Cour doit rechercher comment une délimitation de
plateau continental peut êtreassuréelorsque le principe de I'équidistance
ne donne précisément pas unesolution équitable. Délimiter étant une
opération de détermination de zones relevant respectivement de coin-
pétences différentes,c'est une vérité première dedire que cette détermina-
tion doit êtreéquitable; le problème est surtout de définirles moyens par
lesquels la délimitation peut êtrefixéede manière à êtrereconnue comme
équitable. Bien que les Parties aient manifeîté leur intention de se réserver
l'application des principes et règles établis par la Cour, il serait cepen-
dant insufisant de s'en tenir à la règlede l'équitésansen préciserquelque
peu les possibilitésd'application en l'espèce,étantentendu que les Parties
pourront choisir l'une plutôt quel'autre de ces méthodes 011 qu'elles pour-
ront en préférerde différentes.
93. En réalitéil n'y a pas de limites juridiques aux considérations que
les Etats peuvent examiner afin de s'assurer qu'ils vont appliquer des
procédéséquitables et c'est le plus souvent la balance entre toutes ces
considéiations qui créera l'équitable plutôt que l'adoption d'une seule
considération en excluant toutes les autres. De tels problèmes d'équilibre
entre diverses considérations varient naturellement selon les ci~constances
de l'espèce.
94. Dans la balance des élémentsen cause divers facteurs semblent
devoii êtrepris en considération. Les uns tiennent à l'aspect géologique,
d'autres à l'aspect géographique de la situation, d'autres enfin à l'idéeidea of the unity of any deposits. These criteria, thougli not entirely
prccisc, can provide adequate bases for decision adapted to the factual
situation.
95. The institution of the continental shelf has ariscn out of the recog-
nition of a physical fact; and the link between this fact and the law, with-
out which that institution would never have existed, remains an im-
portant element for the application of its legal régime. The continental
shelf is, by definition, an area physically extending the territory of niost
coastal States into a species of platforni whicli has attracted the attention
first of geographers and hydrographers and then of jurists. The iinpor-
tance of the geological aspect is empliasired by the care which, at the
beginning of its investigation, the International Law Con-iniission took
to acquire exact information as to its characteristics, as can be seen in
pnrticular from the definitions to be found on page 131 of Volume 1
of the k'c~trrhook of'tlre /~~tenrcctionlnbc.Comtnissio~zfor 1956. The ap-
purtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of whose coastlines it
lies. is thereforc LIfact, and it can be useful to consider the geology of
tliat shelf in order to find out whether the direction taken by certain
configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain
localities, they point-up the whole notion of the appurtenance of the
continental shelf to the State whose tcrritory it does iii fact prolong.
96. The doctrine of the continental slielf is a rccent instance of en-
croachinent on maritime cxpanses whicli, during the greater part of
iiistory, appertained to no-one. Thc contiguouj zone and the continental
shelf are in tliis respect coriczpts of the same kind. In both instances the
principle is applied that the land dominates the sen; it is consequently
necessary to examine closely the gcographicnl configuration of the coast-
lines of the countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited. This
is one of the rensons why the Court does not consider that markedlq
pronounced configurations can bz ignoreci; for, since the land is the legal
source of the power which a State inay cvcrcise over territorial extensions
to seaward, it must first bc clearly established what features do in fact
constitute sucli extensions. Abovc al1 is this the case when what is in-
volved is no longer areas of sca, such as the contiguouszone, but stretches
of submerged land; for the legal régime of the continental shelf is that
of a sail and a subsoil, two words evocativc of the land and not of the sea.
97. Anothcr factor to be taken into consideration in the delimitation
of areas of continental slielf as between abiricent States is the unity of
any deposits. Tlic natural resourccs of the siibsoil of the sea in those parts
which consist of continental shelf are the very object of the legal régime
established subsequent to the Truman Proclamation. Yet it frequently
occurs that the saine deposit lies on both sides of the line dividing a con-
tinental shelf between two States, and since it is possible to exploit such
a deposit from either side, a problem iminediately arises on account of
the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of the
States concerned. To look no farther than the North Sea, the practice d'unité de gisement. Ces critères,a défaut de précision rigoureuse, four-
nissent des bases de décisionadaptées aux situations de fait.
95. L'institution du plateau continental est néede la constatation d'un
fait naturel et le lien entre ce fait et le droit, sans lequel elle n'eût jamais
existé,demeure un élémentimportant dans l'application du régimejuri-
dique de l'institution.Le plateau continental est par définition une zone
prolongeant physiquement le territoire de la plupart des Etats maritimes
par cette espèce de socle qui a appelé en preniie~ lieu l'attention des
géographes et hydrographes, puis celle des juristes. L'importance de
l'aspect géologique est marquée par le soin qu'a pris au debut de ses
études la Commission du droit international pour se documenter exac-
tement sur ses caractéristiques, ainsi que cela ressort notamment
des définitions contenues dans l'Annuaire de la Commission du droit
inrcrnario~îal, 1956, volume 1, page 141. L'appartenance géologique du
plateau coritinental aux pays riverains devant leurs cotes est donc un
fait et l'examen de la géologiede ce plateau peut êtreutile afin de savoir
si quelques orientations ou mouvements influencent la délimitation en
précisant en certains points la notion mêmed'appartenance du plateau
continental à 1'Etat dont il prolonge en fait le territoire.
96. La doctrine du plateau continental est I'un des cas récents d'em-
piétement sur des espaces maritimes qui, pendant la plus grande partie
de l'histoire, ne relevaient de personne. Zone contiguë et plateau con-
tinental sont a cet égard du mêmeordre. Dans les deux hypothèses on
applique le principe que la terre domine la mer; il est donc nécessaire
de regarder de près la configuration géographique des côfes des pays
dont on doit délimiter le plateau continental. C'est l'une des raisons pour
lesquelles la Cour ne pense pas qu'on puisse négliger les configurations
nettement excentriques, car puisque la terre est la source juridique du
pouvoii qu'un Etat peut exercer dans les prolongementsmaritimes,encore
faiit-il bien établir en quoi consistent en fait ces prolongemeiits. Et cela
surtout lorsqu'il ne s'agit plus de zones aquatiques comme la zone
contiguë mais d'espaces terrestres submergés, car le régimejilridique du
plateau continental est celui d'un sol et d'un sous-sol, deux mots qui
évoquent la terre et non pas la mer.
97. Un autre élénientà prendre en considération dans la délimitation
des zones de plateau continental entre Etats limitrophes est l'unité de
gisement. Les ressources naturelles du sous-sol de la mer dans la partie
qui constitue le plateau continental sont l'objet mêmedu régimejuri-
dique institué A la suite de la proclamation Truman. Or il est fréquent
qu'un gisenlent s'étende desdeux côtésde la limite du plateau continental
entre deux Etats et, l'exploitation de ce gisement étantpossible de chaque
côté,un problkme naît immédiatement en raison du danger d'une exploi-
tation préjudiciable ou exagéréepar I'un ou l'autre des Etats intéressés.
Sans aller plus loin que la mer du Nord, la pratique des Etats montreof States shows how this problem has been dealt with, and al1 that is
needed is to refer to the undertakings entered into by the coastal States
of that sea with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation or the
apportionment of the products extracted-(see in particular the agree-
ment of 10 March 1965 between the United Kingdom and Norway,
Article 4; the agreement of 6 October 1965between the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom relating to "the exploitation of single geological
structures extending across the dividing line on the continental shelf
under the North Sea"; and the agreement of 14 May 1962 between the
Federal Republic and the Netherlands concerning a joint plan for ex-
ploiting the natural resources underlying the area of the Ems Estuary
where the frontier between the two States has not been finally delimited.)
The Court does not consider that unity of deposit constitutes anything
more than a factual element which it is reasonable to take into considera-
tion in the course of the negotiations for a delimitation. The Parties are
fully aware of the existence of the problem as also of the possible ways of
sol vi"^ it.
98. A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a reason-
able degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according
to equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the
continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths
of their respective coastlines,-these being measured according to their
general direction in order to establish the necessary balance between
States with straight, and those \vith markedly concave or convex coasts,
or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions. The
choice and application of the appropriate technical methods would be
a matter for the parties. One method discussed in the course of the pro-
ceedings, under the name of the principle of the coastal front, consists
in drawing a straight baseline between the extreme points at either end
of the Coast concerned, or in soine cases a series of such lines. Where the
parties mis11to employ in particular the equidistance method of delimita-
tion. the establishment of one or more baselines of this kind can ~lav
a us'eful part in eliminating or diminishing the distortions that might . ,
result from the use of that method.
99. In a sea with the particular configuration of the North Sea, and
in view of the particular geographical situation of the Parties' coastlines
upon that sea, the methods chosen by them for the purpose of fixing the
delimitation of their respective areas may happen in certain localities to
lead to an overlapping of the areas appertaining to them. The Court
considcrs that such a situation must be accepted as a given fact and
resolved either by an agrecd, or failing that by an equal division of the
overlapping areas, or by agreements for joint exploitation, the latter
solution appearing particularly appropriate when it is a question of
preserving the unity of a deposit.comment ce probleme a ététraité et il suffira de relever les engagements
pris par des Etats riverains de la mer du Nord pou1 assurer l'exploitation
la plus efficace ou la répartition des produits extraits (cf. notamment
I'accord du 10mars 1965entre le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège, aiticle 4,
l'accord du 6 octobre 1965 entre le Royaume-Uni et les Pays-Bas sur
cl'exploitation de structures géologiquess'étendantde part et d'aut~ede
la ligne deGparation du plateau continentalsitué sous la mer du Nord »,
et l'accord du 14mai 1962entre la République fédérale et lesPays-Bas sur
un plan d'exploitation commune des richesses du sous-sol dans la zone de
l'estuaire del'Emsoù lafrontièreentre lesdeux Etats n'a pas étédélimitée
de façon définitive).La Cour ne corîsidère pas que l'unité degisement
constitue plus qu'un élémentde fait qu'il est raisonnable de prendre en
considéiation au cours d'une négociation sur une délimitation. Les
Parties sont pleinement informées de l'existencedu probleme coinme des
possibilitésde solution.
98. Un dernier élémenta prendre en considération est le rapport
raisonnable qu'une clélimitation effectuée selon desprincipes équitables
devrait faire apparaître entre l'étenduedu plateau continental relevant
des Etats intéresséset la longueur de leurs côtes; on mesurerait ces côtes
d'après leur direction générale afind'établirl'équilibre nécessaireentre
les Etats ayant des côtes droites et les Etats ayant des côtes fortement
concaves ou convexes ou afin de ramener des côtes très irrégulières 2 des
proportions plus exactes. Le choix et l'application des méthodes tech-
niques appropriées appartiendraient aux parties. L'une des méthodes
examinéespendant la procédure, sous le noin de principe de la façade
maritime, consiste a tracer une ligne de base droite ou, dans certains cas,
une sériede lignes de base droites entre les points extrêmesde la côte
dont il s'agit. Lorsque les parties veulent recourir notamment à la
méthode de délimitation fondée sur l'équidistance, le tracé d'une ou
plusieurs lignes de base de ce genre peut contribuer utilement à éliminer
ou à atténuer les distorsions que l'emploi de cette méthode risque d'en-
traîner.
99. Dans une mer qui a la configuration particulière de la mer du
Nord et en raison de la situation géographique particulière des côtes
des Parties dans cette mer, il peut se faire que les méthodeschoisies pour
fixer la délimitationdes zones respectives conduisent en certains secteurs
iides chevauchements entre les zones relevant des Parties. La Cour con-
sidère qu'ilfaut accepter cette situation comme une donnée de fait et la
résoudresoit par unr: division des zones de chevauchement effectuéepar
voie d'accord ou, a défaut, par parts égales,soit par des accords d'ex-
ploitation en commun, cette dernièresolution paraissant particulièrement
appropriée lorsqu'il :s'agitde préserverl'unitéd'un gisement. 100. The Court has examined the problems raised by the present case
in its own context, which is strictly that of delimitation. Other questions
relating to the general legal régime ofthe continental shelf, have been
examined for that purpose only. This régimefurnishes an example of a
legal theory derived from a particular source that has secured a general
following. As the Court has recalled in the first part of its Judgment, it
was the Truman Proclamation of 28 September 1945 which was at the
origin of the theory, whose special features reflect that origin. It would
therefore not be in harmony with this history to over-systematize a
pragmatic construct the developments of which have occurred within
a relatively short space of time.
101. For these reasons,
by eleven votes to six,
finds that, in each case,
(A) the use of the equidistance method of delimitation not being
obligatory as between the Parties; and
(B) there being no other single method of delimitation the use of
which is in al1circumstances obligatory;
(C) the principles and rules of international law applicable to the
delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf
in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial
boundary determined by the agreements of 1 December 1964and 9 June
1965, respectively, are as follows:
(1) delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitablc principles, and taking account of al1the relevant circum-
stances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party
:il1thosc parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of
the other;
(2) if, in the applicationof the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation
leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided be-
tween them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally,
unless they decide on a réginieofjoint jurisdiction, user, or exploita-
tion for the zones of overlap or any part of them;
(D) in the course of the negotiations, the factors to be taken into
account are to include: 100. La Cour a examinéles problèmes soulevéspar la présenteaffaire
dans son contexte propre, c'est-à-dire aux seules fins de la délimitation.
Si la Cour a abordé d'autres questions ayant trait au régimejuridique
généraldu plateau continental, elle ne l'a fait que dans ce cadre. Le
régimedu plateau continental est l'exemple d'une théorie juridique née
d'une solution particulière qui a fait école.Comme la Cour l'a rappelé
dans la première partie de l'arrêt,c'est la proclamation Truman du
28 septembre 1945qui est à l'origine de la théorieet les particularités de
celle-ci sont le reflet de cette origine.erait donc contraireà l'histoire
de systématiserà l'excèsuneconstruction pragmatique dont lesdéveloppe-
ments se sont présentésdans un délai relativement court.
101. Par ces motifs,
LA COUR,
par onze voix contre six,
dit que, pour l'une et l'autre affaire,
A) l'application de la méthode de délimitation fondéesur l'équidis-
tance n'est pas obligatoire entre les Parties;
B) il n'existe pas d'autre méthodeunique de délimitation qui soit d'un
emploi obligatoire en toutes circonstances;
C) les principes et les règles du droit international applicablesà la
délimitation entrelesParties deszones du plateau continental de la mer du
Nord relevant de chacune d'elles, au-delà des lignes de délimitation
partiellerespectivenlent déterminéespar les accords du 1" décembre
1964et du 9juin 1965,sont les suivants:
1) la délimitation doit s'opérerpar voie d'accord conformément à des
principes équitables et compte tenu de toutes les circonstances per-
tinentes, de manière à attribuer, dans toute la mesure du possible,à
chaque Partie latotalité des zones du plateau continental qui cons-
tituent le prolongement naturel de son territoire sous la mer et
n'empiètent pas sur le prolongement naturel du territoire de l'autre;
2) si, par suite de l'application de l'alinéaprécédent,la délimitation at-
tribue aux Parties des zones qui se chevauchent, celles-ci doivent
êtrediviséesentre les Parties par voie d'accord ou,àdéfaut,par parts
égales, a moins que les Parties n'adoptent un régimede juridiction,
d'utilisation ou d'exploitation commune pour tout ou partie des
zones de chevauchement;
D) au cours des négociations, les facteursà prendre en considération
comprendront : (1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the
presence of any special or unusual features;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological
structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelfreas in-
volved ;
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimi-
tation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to
bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas apper-
taining to the coastal State and the length of its Coast measured in
the general direction of the coastline, account beingaken for this
purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental
shelf delimitations between adjacent States in theme region.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of February, one
thousand nine hundred and sixty-nine, in four copies, one of which will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Government
of the Kingdom of Denmark and to the Government of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, respectively.
(Signed ).L. BUSTAMANT R.,
President.
(Signed S).AQUARONE,
Registrar.
Judge Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHANmakes the following declara-
tion :
1am in agreement with the Judgment throughout but would wish to
add the following observations.
The essence of the dispute between the Parties is that the twodoms
claim that the delimitation effected between them under the Agreement
of 31 March 1966 is binding upon the Federal Republic and that the
Federal Republic is bound to accept the situation resulting therefrom,
which would confine its continental shelf to the triangle formed bynes
A-B-E and C-D-E in Map 3. The Federal Republic stoutly resists that
claim.
Not only is Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958not opposable
to the Federal Republic but the delimitation effectedunder the Agree-
ment of 31March 1966 does not derive fromthe provisions of that Article
as Denmark and the Netherlands are neither States "whose coasts are
opposite each other" within the meaning of the first paragraph of that
Article nor are they "two adjacent States" within the meaning of the PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (AR~T) 54
1) la configuration générale des côtes desParties et la présencede toute
caractéristique spécialeou inhabituelle;
2) pour autant que cela soit connu ou facile à déterminer, la structure
physique et géologiquz et les ressources naturelles des zones de
plateau continental en cause;
3) le rapport raisonnable qu'une délimitation opérée conformément à
des principes équitables devrait faire apparaître entre l'étendue des
zones de plateau continental relevant de 1'Etatriverain et la longueur
de son littoral rnesurée suivant la direction généralede celui-ci,
compte tenu à cette fin des effets actuels ou éventuelsde toute autre
délimitation du plateau continental effectuéeentre Etats limitrophes
dans la mêmerégion.
Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le vingt février mil neufcent soixante-neuf, en quatre
exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour et dont les
autres seront transniis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique fédéraled'Allemagne, au Gouvernement du Royaume du Dane-
mark et au Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Président,
(SignéJ ). L. BUSTAMANT RE.
Le Greffier,
(Signr')S. AQUARONE.
Sir Muhammad Z.AFRULLK AHAN.juge, fait la déclaration suivante:
Je souscris à l'arrêtdans son intégralité mais voudraisajouter les ob-
servations ci-après.
Le différend entre les Parties se ramène pour l'essentiel à ceci: le
Danemark et les Pays-Bas soutiennent que la délimitationeffectuéeentre
eux conformément àl'accord du 31 mars 1966lie la République fédérale
et que celle-ci est tenue d'accepter la situation ainsi créée,dans laquelle
son plateau continental se trouverait limité au triangle formé par les
lignes ABE et CDE de la carte 3. La République fédéralerejette caté-
goriquement cette thèse.
Or. non seulement l'article 6 de la Convention de Genève de 1958
n'est pas opposable à la République fédérale, maisla délimitation ef-
fectuée par l'accord du 31 mars 1966 ne procède pas des dispositions
dudit article, puisque le Danemark et les Pays-Bas ne sont ni des Etats
((dont les côtes se forit face sens du premier paragraphe de cet article,
ni des Etats I(limitrophes11au sens du second paragraphe. La situationsecond paragraph of that Article. The situation resulting from that delimi-
tation, so far as it affects the Federal Republic is not, therefore, brought
about by the application of the principle set out in either of theparagraphs
of Article 6 of the Convention.
Had paragraph 2 of Article 6 been applicable to the deliinitation of
the continental shelf between the Parties to the dispute, a boundary line,
determined by the application of the principle of equidistance, would
have had to allow for the configuration of the coastline of the Federal
Republic as a "special circumstance".
ln the course of the oral pleadings the contention that the principle
of equidistance cum special circumstances had crystallized into a rule of
customary international law was not advanced on behalf of the two
Kingdoms as an alternative to the claim that that principle was inherent
in the very concept of the continental shelf. The Judgment has, in fair-
ness, dealt with these two contentions as if they had been put forward
in the alternative and were thus consistent with each other, and has
rejected each of them on the merits. 1am in agreement with the reasoning
of the Judgment on both these points. But, 1consider, it is worth men-
tioning that Counsel for the two Kingdoms summed up their position
in regard to the effect of the 1958 Convention as follows:
". .. They have not maintained that the Convention embodied al-
ready received rules of customary law in the sense that the Conven-
tion was merely declaratory of existing rules. Their position is rather
that the doctrine of the coastal State's exclusive rights over the
adjacent continental shelf was in process of formation between 1945
and 1958; that the State practice prior to 1958 showed fundamental
variations in the nature and scope of the rights claimed: that, in
consequence, in State practice the emerging doctrine was wholly
Iacking in any definition of these crucial elements as it was also of
the legal rCgime applicable to the coastal State with respect to the
continental shelf;that the process of the definition and consolidation
of the emerging customary law took place through the work of the
International Law Commission, the reaction of governments to that
work and the proceedings of the Geneva Conference; that the
emerging customary law, iiow become more defined, both as to the
rights of the coastal State and the applicable régime, crystallized in
the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention by the Conference;
and that the numerous signatures and ratifications of the Convention
and the other State practice based on the principles set out in the
Convention had the effect of consolidating those principles as cus-
tomary law."
If it were correct that the doctrine of the coastal State's exclusive
rights over the adjacent continental shelf was in process of formationcrééepar cette délimïtation, dans les effets qu'elle a pour la République
fédérale,n'est par conséquent pas due à l'application du principe énoncé
dans l'un ou l'autre cleces deux paragraphes de l'article 6 de la Conven-
tion.
Le paragraphe 2 de l'article6 eût-il été applicableà la délimitation du
plateau continental entre les Parties que la ligne de délimitation déter-
minéepar applicationdu principe de l'équidistanceaurait dû tenir compte
de la configuration de la côte de la République fédéralecomme d'une
ccirconstance spéciale )).
Au cours de la procédure orale, le Danemark et les Pays-Bas n'ont pas
présentéla thèse suivant laquelle le principe ccéquidistance-cii-constances
spéciales 1se serait cristallisé enune règlede droit international coutumier
comme I'un des termes d'une alternative. l'autre étant que ce principe
serait inhérent à la notion mêmede plateau continental. Dans son arrSt
la Cour a cru devoir examiner ces deux thèses comme si elles avaient été
présentéessous la forme d'une alternative et étaient par conséquent
compatibles l'une avec l'autre, et la Cour a rejetéchacune d'elles au fond.
Je souscris dans les deux cas au raisonnement de l'arrêt. Mais je crois
utile de signaler que l'agent du Danemark et des Pays-Bas a résuméla
position des deux gouvernements quant à l'effetde la Convention de 1958
de la façon suivante
(1[Les deux gouvernements] n'ont pas soutenu que la Convention
consacrait des rkgles déjà reçues dedroit coutumier en ce sens qu'elle
était simplement déclaratoire des règles existantes. Ils estiment
plutôt que la doctrine des droits exclusifs d'un Etat riverain sur le
plateau continental adjacent se trouvait en voie de formation entre
1945 et 1958; que la pratique des Etats antérieure a 1958 témoignait
de variations fondamentales quant à la nature et à la portée des
droits revendiqués; qu'en conséquence, dans la pratique des Etats, la
doctrine en voie de formation ne définissait nullement ces éléments
essentiels pas plus qu'elle ne définissait lerégimejuridique applicable
aux Etats riverains en ce qui concerne le plateau continental; que
la définition et la consolidation du droit coutumier en voie de for-
mation s'étaient effectuéesgrâce aux travaux de la Commission du
droit international, aux réactions des gouvernements devant I'aeuvre
de la Commission et aux débats de la conférence de Genève; que ce
droit coutumier en formation, désormais plus précis sur la double
question des droits des Etats riverairis et du régimeapplicabls, s'est
cristallisé du fait de l'adoption de la Convention sur le plateau
continental par la conférence; et que les nombreuses signatures et
ratifications recueillies par la Convention, ainsi que la pratique des
Etats s'inspirant des principes énoncésdans la Convention, ont eu
pour effet de consolider ces principes en tant que droit coutumier. ))
Si l'on admet que la doctrine des droits exclusifs de 1'Etat riverain sur
le plateau continental adjacent à sa côte était en voie de formation entre56 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DECL.BENGZON)
between 1945 and 1958 and that in State practice prior to 1958 it was
wholly lacking in any definition of crucial elements as it was also of the
legal régimeapplicable to the coastal State with respect to the continental
shelf,then it would seem to follow conclusively that the principle of
equidistance was not inherent in the concept of the continental shelf.
Judge BENGZON makes the following declarati:n
1 regret my inability to concur with the main conclusions of the
majority of the CourT.agree with my colleagues who maintain the view
that Article of the Geneva Convention is the applicable international
law and that as betweenhese Parties equidistance is the rule for delimita-
tion, which rule may even be derived from the general principles of law.
PresidentBUSTAMANT Y ERIVEROJ,udges JESSUPP,ADILLA NERVO and
AMMOUa Nppend Separate Opinions to the Judgment of the Court.
Vice-PresidentKORETSKY Ju,dges TANAKAM, ORELLIL,ACHS and Judge
ad hoc SDRENSEa ppend Dissenting Opinions to the Judgrnent of the
Court.
(Initialled) J. L. B.-R.
(Initialled) S. A.1945et 1958et que la pratique des Etats antériàu1958ne fournissait
aucune définition, ni de certains éléments essentiels nidu régimejuri-
dique applicable1'Etatriverain encequi concerne le plateau continental,
on doit, semble-t-il, en tirer la conclusion que le principe de l'équidis-
tance n'était pas inhérent notion de plateau continental.
M. BENGZOjN u,ge,!fait la déclaration su:vante
Je regrette de ne pouvoir souscrire aux conclusions principales émises
par la majoritéde la Cour. Je suis d'accord avec ceux de mescollèguesqui
soutiennent que l'articlede la Convention de Genève constitue le
droit international applicable et qu'entre les Parties la règle de délimi-
tation estl'équidistiance,cette règle pouvant mêmeêtre déduitedes
principes généraux dedroit.
M. BUSTAMAN YTEIVFRO Pr,ésident,MM. JESSUPP,ADILLANERVO et
AMMOUN ju,ges, joignànl'arrêtlesexposésde leur opinion individuelle.
M. KORETSKV Yi,ce-Président,MM. TANAKA , ORELL LI, CHSj,ges,
etM. SPIRENSE jug,e ad Iroc,joignàl'arrêtles exposésde leur opinion
dissidente.
(Paraphé)J. L. B.-R.
(Paraphé)S. A.
Judgment of 20 February 1969