Judgment of 19 December 1978

Document Number
062-19781219-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONACOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

AEGEANSEA

CONTINENTALSHELFCASE
(GREECEv.TURKEY)

JUDGMENT OF 19 DECEMBER 1978

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU PLATEAUCONTINENTAL

DE LAMER ÉGÉE
(GRÈCE c. TURQUIE)

ARRÊT DIJ 19 DÉCEMBRE 1978 Officia1cita:ion
Aegean Sea ContinentalShey,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reportp. 3.8,

Mode officielde citation:
Plateau continentalde lamer Egée,
arrêt,1J. Recueil 1p.3.

1 Node vente:440 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1978

19December 1978
19.78
19December
GeneralList
No. 62 AEGEAN SEA

CONTINENTALSHELFCASE

(GREECE v.TURKEY)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Pursuit of negotiationsduringjudicialproceedings noimpediment to exerciseof
jurisdiction-Existence ofal dispute.
Jurisdiction of the Court-Question of applicability ofneral Act for
Pacific Settlement of International Disputesand relevanceof reservationin Appli-

cant's instrument of accession-Reciprocal enforcement of the reservation in the
procedural circumstancesof the case.
Interpretation of reservation- Whether single resewation or two distinct and
autonomous reservations-Grammaticainterpretation-Intentiof reserving
State having regard to the context-Generic meaning of term 'Yisputesrelating to
territorial statusX-Scope follows evolutionof the law-Present dispute regarding
entitlement toandlimitation of continentalshelfareasrelatesto territorialstatus
of Greece.
Joint communiquéissuedbyHeads of Governmentasbasisofjurisdiction-Ques-
tion oform not conclusive-Interpretation in the light of the context.

JUDGMENT

Present: President JIMÉNDE ARÉCHAGAV ; ice-PresidentNAGENDRSINGH;
Judges FORSTERG , ROS,LACHSD, ILLARD ,ECASTROM , OROZOVS ,ir
Humphrey WALDOCKR , UDA,MOSLERE , LIAS,TARAZI;udge ad hoc
STASSINOPOULOS; Registrar AQUARONE. In the case concerning the Aegean Sea continental shelf,

between
the Hellenic Republic,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Sotirios Konstantopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to the Nether-
lands,

as Agent,
assisted by
Mr. Constantin Economides, Legal Adviser and Head of the Legal Depart-
ment of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Agent, advocate and counsel,
Mr. D. P. O'Connell, Q.C., Member of the English Bar, Chichele Professor of
Public International Law in the University of Oxford,
Mr. Roger Pinto, Professor in the Faculty of Law and Economics, University
of Paris,

Mr. Paul De Visscher, Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of
Louvain,
Mr. Prosper Weil,Professor in the Faculty of Law and Economics, University
of Paris,
Mr. Dimitrios Evrigenis, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economics, Univer-
sity of Thessaloniki,
as advocates and counsel,

H.E. Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos, Ambassador,
as counsel,

Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas, Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of
Athens,
as advocate and counsel,
and by

Mr. Christos Macheritsas, Special Counsellor, LegalDepartment of theGreek
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as expert adviser,

and

the Republic of Turkey,

composed as above,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:
1. Bya letter of 10August 1976,receivedin the Registry of theCourt the same

day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republictransmitted to the
Registrar an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Turkey
in respect of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelfappertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and the rights of the
parties thereover. Inorder to found thejurisdiction of the Court, the Application
relied on, firstly, Article 17 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlernent of
International Disputes of 1928,read together with Article 36, paragraph 1,and
Article 37 of theStatute of theCourt; and secondly, ajoint communiqué issued
at Brussels on 31 May 1975,following an exchange of viewsbetween the Prime
Ministers of Greece and Turkey.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was at
once comrnunicated to the Government of Turkey. In accordance with para-

graph 3of that Article, al1other Statesentitled to appear before the Court were
notified of the Application.
3. Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, the
Government of Greece chose Mr. Michel Stassinopoulos, former President of
the Hellenic Republic,former President of theCouncil of State, to sit asjudge ad
hoc in the case. The Government of Turkey did not seek to exercise the right
conferred on it by that Article to choose a judge ad hoc.
4. On 10August 1976,the same dayas the Application wasfiled,theAgent of
Greece filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the indication of interim
measures ofprotection under Article 33of theGeneral Act of 1928for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, Article 41 of the Statute, and Article 66
of the Rules of Court as adopted on 6 May 1946 and amended on 10 May

1972.
5. On 26 August 1976, a letter, dated 25 August 1976,was received in the
Registry from the Secretary-General of theTurkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
enclosing the "Observations of the Government of Turkey on the request by the
Governrnent of Greece for provisional rneasures of protection dated The Hague,
10August 1976". In these observations, the Turkish Governrnent, inter alia,
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Application.

6. By an Order dated 11September 1976, the Court, after finding that the
circumstances were not then such as to require the exercise of its power under
Article 41 of the Statute to indicate interim measures of protection, decided that
the written proceedings should first be addressed to the question of the juris-

diction of the Court to entertain the dispute.
7. By an Order dated 14 October 1976 the President of the Court fixed
time-limits for the written proceedings on the question of jurisdiction, namely,
18April 1977for the filingof aMernorial by Greece, and 24 October 1977for the
filing of a Counter-Mernorial by Turkey. Bya further Order dated 18April 1977,
at the request of Greece these tirne-limits were extended by the President to
18July 1977and 24 April 1978respectively.The Mernorial of the Government of
Greece wasfiled within the extended time-lirnit fixed therefor, and was cornmu-
nicated to the Governrnent of Turkey. No Counter-Memorial was filed by the
Governrnent of Turkey and, the written proceedings being thus closed, the case
was ready for hearing on 25 April 1978,the day following the expiration of the

time-limit fixed for the Counter-Memorial of Turkey.

8. On 24April 1978,the date fixed for the filing of the Counter-Mernorial of
Turkey, a letter dated the same day was received in the Registry frorn the
Arnbassador of Turkeyto theNetherlands, in which it was stated, inter alia, that
it was evident that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Greek Appli-6 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

cation in thecircumstancesin which it was seisedthereof, and that consequently
the Government of Turkey did not intend toappoint an agent or file a Counter-
Memorial.
9. On 25April 1978,the Court, taking account of a request by the Govern-
ment of Greece, fixed 4 October 1978as the date for the opening of the oral
proceedings on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court. On 11September
1978,a request was made by Greece that the opening of the oral proceedings be
postponed for a substantial period. The Court, after taking into account the
views of both interested States and the course of the proceedings since the
Application was filed,considered that suchapostponement wasnotjustified and

that the hearings, being limited to the question whether the Court had jurisdic-
tion to entertain the dispute, did not affect the issues of substance dividing the
parties, which were the subject of negotiations betweenthem. Consequently, the
Court decided to defer the opening of the oral proceedings only until9 October
1978.
10. On 9, 10,11,12,13, 16and 17October 1978,public hearings wereheld, in
the course of which the Court heard the oral argument, on the question of the
Court's jurisdiction, advanced by Mr. Sotirios Konstantopoulos, Agent of
Greece, Mr. Constantin Economides, Agent, advocate and counsel, and Mr.
Daniel O'Connell, Q.C., Mr. Roger Pinto, Mr. Paul De Visscher, Mr. Prosper
Weil and Mr. Dimitrios Evrigenis, counsel, on behalf of the Government of

Greece. The Turkish Government was not represented at the hearings.
11. The Government of Burma requested that the pleadings and annexed
documents in the case should be made available to it in accordance with
Article 48, paragraph 2, of theRules of Court. Greece and Turkey having been
consulted, and no objection having been made to the Court, it was decided to
accede to the request.
12. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented on behalf of the Government of Greece:

in the Application:

"The Government of Greece requests the Court to adjudge and
declare:
(i) that the Greek islands referred to in paragraph 29[ofthe Application],
as part of the territory of Greece, are entitled to the portion of the
continental shelf which appertainsto them according to the applicable
principles and rules of international law;
(ii) what is the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the
portions of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey in

the Aegean Sea in accordance with the principles and rules of inter-
national law which the Court shall determine to be applicable to the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the aforesaid areas of the
Aegean Sea;
(iii) that Greece is entitled to exercise over its continental shelf sovereign
and exclusive rights for the purpose of researching and exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources;
(iv) that Turkey is not entitled to undertake any activities on the Greek
continental shelf, whether by exploration, exploitation, research or
othenvise, without the consent of Greece;7 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

(v) that the activities of Turkey descnbed in paragraphs 25 and 26 [of the
Application] constitute infringements of the sovereign and exclusive
rights of Greece to explore and exploit its continental shelf or to
authorize scientific research respecting the continental shelf;
(vi) that Turkey shall not continueany further activitiesas describedbove
in subparagraph (iv)within the areas of the continental shelfwhich the
Court shall adjudge appertain to Greece."

in the Memorial:

". . .the Government of Greece requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that, whether, on the basis of Article 17of the General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, 1928, read with Articles 36, para-
graph 2, and 37 of the Statute of the Court, or on the basis of the joint
communiqué of Brussels dated 31 May 1975, the Court is competent to
entertain the dispute between Greece and Turkey on the subject of the
delimitation of the continental shelfappertaining to the two countriesin the
Aegean Sea".

13. At the close of the oral proceedings, the followingwntten submission was
filed in the Registry of the Court on behalf of the Government of Greece:

"The Government of Greece subrnits that the Court be pleased to declare
itself competent toentertain thedispute between Greece and Turkey on the
delimitation of the respective areas of continental shelf appertaining to
either country in the Aegean."

14. No pleadings were filed by the Government of Turkey, and it was not
represented at theoral proceedings; no forma1submissions were therefore made
by that Government. The attitude of the Government of Turkey with regard to
the question of the Court'sjurisdiction has howeverbeen defined in itscommu-
nications to the Court of 25 August 1976,24 April 1978,and 10October 1978.

The last-mentioned communication wasreceivedin the Registry on the morning
of the second day of the public hearings, and was transmitted to the Agent of
Greece by the Registrar later the same day. In these circumstancesaccount can
be taken of its contents only to the extent that the Court finds appropriate in
discharging its duty, under Article 53 of the Statute, to satisfy itself as to its
jurisdiction to entertain the Application.

15. It is to be regretted that the Turkish Government has failed to
appear in order to put forward its arguments on the issues arising in the
present phase of the proceedings and the Court has thus not had the
assistance itmight havederived from such arguments or from any evidence
adduced in support of them. Nevertheless, the Court, in accordance with
its Statute and its settled jurisprudence, must examine proprio motu the

question of its own jurisdiction to consider the Application of the Greek8 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Government. Furthermore, in the present case the duty of the Court to
make this examination on its own initiative is reinforced by the terms of
Article 53 of the Statute of the Court. According to this provision, when-
ever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend
itscase, theCourt, before finding upon themerits, must satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction. Before proceeding further, however, the evolution of the
main events leading to the bringing of this dispute before the Court must
be outlined.

16. Towards the end of 1973theTurkish Government granted licences
to carry out exploration for petroleum in submarine areas of the Aegean
Sea, including areas which encroached upon the continental shelf which,
according to the Greek Government, appertains to certain Greek islands.
By a Note Verbale of 7 February 1974, the Greek Government, basing
itself on international law as codified by Articles 1(b) and 2 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, questioned the validity of
the licences granted by Turkey, reserved its sovereign rights over the
continental shelf adjacent to the coasts of the said islands, and contended
that the continental shelf required to be delimited between the two States
on a basis of equidistance by means of a median line. The Turkish
Government replied, by a Note Verbale of 27 February 1974,that "the
Greek Islands situated very close to the Turkish Coastdo not possess a
[continental] shelf of their own", and disputed the applicability of the

principle of equidistance; while reserving its rights, it stated that it con-
sidered it appropriate to seekby means of agreement a solution in confor-
mity with the rules of international law. In its reply of 24 May 1974,the
Greek Government indicated that it was not opposed to a delimitation
based on the provisions of present day positive international law, "as
codified by the 1958Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf"; the
Turkish Government initsturn,on 5 June 1974,stated that it wastheduty
of the two Governments to use every endeavour to bring about agreed
solutions of the various problems arising by reason of the fact that they
were neighbours in the Aegean Sea; it expressed readiness to enter into
negotiations for the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two
countries.
17. On 29 May 1974theTurkish vesse1Candarlibegan aprogramme of
exploration in waters which were wholly or partly superjacent to the
continental shelfin the Aegean Seawhich,according to theGreek Govern-
ment, appertains to Greece. The Greek Government, in a Note of 14June

1974,observed that this exploration was a breach of Greece's exclusive
sovereign rights and lodged a vigorous protest. The Turkish Government,
in its reply of 4 July 1974,refused to accept the Greek protest. Another
protest in respect of further licences for exploration was made by Greeceon 22 August 1974;Turkey refused to accept it on 16September 1974,and
repeated the suggestion of negotiations.

18. On 27 January 1975 the Greek Government proposed to the
Turkish Governmentthat the differences over the applicable lawaswellas
over the substance of the matter be referred to the International Court of
Justice, and it stated that, without prejudice to itsight to initiate Court
proceedings unilaterally,it sawconsiderableadvantages in reachingjoint-
ly with the Turkish Government a special agreement for reference to the
Court. On 6 February 1975the Turkish Government answered expressing
the hope that the Government of Greece would "agree, with priority, to
enter into negotiations ... on the question of the Aegean Sea continental
shelf", adding that in pnnciple it considered favourably the proposa1 to
refer the dispute jointly to the Court. To this effect it proposed talks
between the two Governments at ministerial level. On 10February 1975

the Greek Government agreed that talks should be held in order to draft
the terms of a special agreement.

19. On 17-19May 1975the Ministersfor Foreign Affairs of Greece and
Turkey met in Rome and gaveinitial consideration to the text of a special
agreement concerning the submission of the matter to the International
Court ofJustice. On 31May 1975the Prime Ministers of the twocountries
met in Brussels and issued thejoint communiqué relied on as conferring
jurisdiction in this case, the terms of whichwillbe examined in detail later
in the present Judgment. They alsodefined the general lineson thebasis of
which the subsequent meetings of the representatives of the two Govern-
ments would take place and decided tobnng fonvardthe date of a meeting
of experts concerning the question of the continental shelf of the Aegean
Sea.
20. In a Note of 30 September 1975theTurkish Government reiterated
theviewithad advanced at the meetingin Rome, that itwould not be in the
interest of thetwocountries to submitthe dispute to the Court withoutfirst
attempting meaningful negotiations. It recalled that in Rome it had also
expressed the viewthat delimitation negotiations should take place paral-
le1with the preparation of a special agreement, and that it had been agreed
that those issues which could not be resolved by negotiations would be
jointly subrnitted to the Court. In a Note of 2 October 1975 the Greek

Government contended that it had been agreedin Brusselson 31May 1975
that the issue would first be formally submitted to the Court and that
talks with a view to an eventual agreed solution were not excluded to
follow.
21. In a Note of 18November 1975the Turkish Government disputed
this interpretation and invited the Greek Government to conduct mean-
ingful negotiations for an agreed equitable settlement, as well as for
consideringjoint submission of unresolved but well-defined legalissues,if
necessary, to the Court. In a Note of 19 December 1975 the Greek Government expressed the view that since negotiation was in any case
necessary in order to proceed with the drafting of the special agreement,it
was understood that if in the course of that negotiation proposals were
made for the elimination of points of disagreement concerning delimita-
tion, those proposals would be given appropriate consideration. In accor-
dance with the viewsexpressed in the above communications, meetings of
experts took place in Berne from 31January to 2 February and on 19and
20June 1976,but no agreement was reached.

22. On 13July 1976 a Turkish Government press release was issued
concerning researches that would be undertaken by the Turkish seismic
research vessel Mta-Sismi Ikin the Turkish territorial sea and the high
seas, and in a statement on Turkish radio on 24 July 1976 the Turkish
Foreign Minister indicated that these researches would be carried out in
the areas of the Aegean claimed byTurkey, and could extend to al1areas of
the Aegean outside the territorial waters of Greece. When the vessel
pursued its researches into areas where, in the viewof the Greek Govern-
ment, the continental shelfappertains to Greece, that Government made a
diplomatic protest to the Turkish Government in a Note Verbale dated
7August 1976,and on 10August 1976referred the matter simultaneously
to the International Court of Justice and to the Security Council.

23. On 25 August 1976 the Security Council adopted resolution 395
(1976) to which the Court has referred in itsOrder of 11September 1976.
The operative part of the Security Council resolution called on the two
Governments "to resume direct negotiations over their differences" and
appealed to them "to do everything within their power to ensure that this
results in mutually acceptable solutions" (para. 3). Paragraph 4 of this
resolution invited:
". ..the Governments of Greece and Turkey in this respect to con-
tinue to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial
means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified
to make to the settlement of any remaining legaldifferences that they
may identify in connection with their present dispute".

24. While the present case was pending before the Court, Greece and
Turkey resumed their negotiations, in accordance with the Security Coun-
cil resolution. Their Ministers for Foreign Affairs met in New York on
1October 1976 and agreed that the question of the delimitation of the
Aegean continental shelfshouldbethe subject of negotiations between the
two Governments with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable settle-
ment. There followed a meeting in Berne between representatives of the
two Governmentsfrom 2 to 11November 1976,whichoutlined the proce-
dure forfuture negotiations. It wasalso agreed that thenegotiations would
be confidential. 25. The subsequent meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two
States in Brusselsended in a Joint Communiqué published on 11Decem-
ber 1976which expressed satisfaction with the previous meeting in Berne.
At their next meeting on 29 January 1977at Strasbourg,the twoMinisters
for Foreign Affairs exchanged views on the subject of the negotiations
relating to the question of the continental shelf which were to begin in
London on 31 January 1977.The Ministers met again at Strasbourg on
28 April 1977and decided to continue negotiations on the subject of the
delimitation of the continental shelf, fixing a meeting of their experts,
which took place in Paris at the beginning of June 1977.Again on 9 De-
cember 1977the Ministers agreed in Brusselsthat thereshouldshortlybea

meeting of the experts on the question of the continental shelf. This
meeting took place in Paris in mid-February 1978.

26. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey met at Montreux on
10-11March 1978and at Washington on 29 May 1978;they decided that a
meeting between the Secretaries-General of the Foreign Ministries of
Greece and Turkey should take place in Ankara on 4-5July 1978.These
officiais, after their meeting in July, decided to meet again in Athens in
September 1978.In Athens they agreed that "the bilateral talks related to
the continental shelf question should be resumed at the appropriate level
on or about the 1of December 1978".

27. In his letter of 24 April 1978to the Registrar, the Ambassador of
Turkey to the Netherlands stated interalia:

"It should, in the view of the Government of Turkey, be recalled
that that Application was filed although the two Governments had
not yet begun negotiations on the substantive issue, as is clearly
apparent from the contents of the Notes exchanged by the two
Governments. It was however always contemplated between them
that they would seek,through meaningful negotiations, to arrive atan
agreement which would be acceptable to both parties."
The letter recalled that the Security Council, by its resolution 395(1976),
called upon both Governments "to settle their problems primarily by

means of direct negotiations in order that these might result in mutually
acceptable solutions". It argued that it wasin pursuance of that resolution
that the Berne Agreement of 11November 1976 provided in Article 1
that:
"The two Parties agree that the negotiatioris shall be frank,
thoroughgoing and pursued in good faith with a view to reaching an
agreement based on their mutual consent with regard to the

delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves." 12 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

28. After recalling the 10-11March 1978meeting at Montreux between
the Prime Ministers, the letter claimed that:

"The necessary conditions for the conduct of frank and serious
negotiations, and the spirit whch should motivate the parties
concerned, with a view to the settlement of their problems by such
negotiations, are not reconcilable with the continuation of interna-
tionaljudicial proceedings."

Furthermore,in aNote Verbale to the GreekGovernment of29 September
1978concerningtheGreek request for apostponement of thebeginningof
the oral proceedings in the case, the Turkish Government objected to the
postponement, and expressed the opinion that:

". . thediscontinuance of theproceedings and theremoval ofthe case
from the list of the International Court of Justice would be more
conducive to the creation of a favourable political climate for an
agreed settlement".

29. The Turkish Government's attitude rnight thus be interpreted as
suggesting that the Court ought not to proceed with the case while the
parties continue to negotiate and that the existence of active negotiations

in progress constitutes an impediment to the Court's exercise ofjurisdic-
tion in thepresent case.The Court isunable toshare thisview.Negotiation
andjudicial settlement are enumerated together in Article 33of the Char-
ter of the United Nations as means for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The jurisprudence of the Court provides various examples of cases in
which negotiations and recourse tojudicial settlement have been pursued
paripassu. Severalcases, the most recent being that concerning the Trialof
Pakistani Prisonersof War(I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 347),show thatjudicial
proceedings may be discontinued when such negotiations result in the
settlement of the dispute. Consequently, the fact that negotiations are
being actively pursued during the present proceedings is not, legally, any
obstacle to the exercise by the Court of itsjudicial function.

30. The above-mentioned observations of the Turkish Government
might also be interpreted as making the point that there is no dispute
between the parties while negotiations continue, so that the Court could

not for that reason be seised of jurisdiction in ths case. As the Court
recognizedin its Order of 11September 1976,the existenceofadispute can
hardly be open to doubt in the present case. Counsel for Greececorrectly
stated that there is in fact a double dispute between the parties:

"There is a dispute about what the continental shelf boundaries in
the Aegean Sea should be, and there is a dispute as to the method
whereby this first dispute should be settled-whether by negotiation alone or by subrnission to a tribunal competent to exercisejurisdiction
in the matter, either following upon negotiations or even in the
absence of them."
31. Again, in the Turkish Ambassador's letter of 24 April 1978, the

further argument isadvanced that the dispute between Greece and Turkey
is "of a highly political nature". But a dispute involving two States in
respect of thedelimitation of their continental shelfcan hardly fail to have
some political element and thepresent dispute is clearly one inwhich "the
parties are in conflict as to their respective rights". Greece has asked the
Court to pronounce on its submissions "in accordance with the ... prin-
ciples and rules of international law". Turkey, for its part, has invoked
legalgrounds in reply to the Greek claim, such as the existence of "special
circumstances". It is clear from the submissions in the Greek Application
and Memorial, as well as in the observations in the various Turkish
diplomatic communications to Greece, that Greece and Turkey are in
conflict as to the delimitation of the spatialxtent of their sovereign rights
over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Thus there are certain
sovereignrights being claimed by both Greece and Turkey, one against the
other and it is manifest that legal rights lie at the root of the dispute that
divides the two States. The Court therefore findsthat a legaldispute exists
between Greece and Turkey in respect of the continental shelf in the
Aegean Sea.

32. The Court will now proceed to the consideration of itsjurisdiction
with respect to this dispute. In paragraph 32of the Application the Greek
Government has specified two bases on which it claims to found the
jurisdiction of the Court in the present dispute. Although it is said in

paragraph 3 of the Greek Memorial on the question of jurisdiction that
these two bases "mutually strengthen each other", they are quite distinct
and will therefore be examined separately.
33. The first basis ofjurisdiction is formulated in paragraph 32 (1) of
the Application as follows :
"Article 17of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, 1928,read together with Articles 36 (1)and 37 of
the Statute of the Court. Respectively on 14 September 1931 and
26 June 1934,Greece and Turkey acceded to this instrument, which is
still in force for both of them. The texts of these accessions were

accompanied by declarations which are irrelevant to the present
case."
34. Article 17of the General Act of 1928forms part of Chapter II of the
Act, entitled "Judicial Settlement", and reads as follows: "Al1disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be
made under Article 39, be subrnitted for decision to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, unless the parties agree,in the manner
hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal. It is
understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular
those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice."

The Article thus provides, under certainconditions, for the reference to the
formerPermanentCourt of International Justice ofdisputes withregard to
which the parties are in conflict asto their respective rights. Article 37 of
the Statute of this Court, however, States that:

"Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of
a matter to ...the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
matter shall, asbetween the parties to thepresent Statute, be referred
to the International Court of Justice."
The effect of that Article, as this Court emphasized in the Barcelona
Traction,Light and PowerCompany,Limited, PreliminatyObjections,case

(I.C.J. Reports1964,at pp. 31-39)is that, as between parties to the Statute,
this Court is substituted for the Permanent Courtin anytreaty or conven-
tion in force, the terms of which provide for reference of a matter to the
Permanent Court. Accordingly any treaty or convention providing for
reference of any matter to the Permanent Court is capable as between the
parties to the present Statute of furnishing a basis for establishing the
Court's jurisdiction in regard to a dispute, on condition that the treaty or
convention applies to the particular matter in question and is in force as
between theparties to that dispute. Clearly, Article 17of theGeneral Act
of 1928,here invoked by Greece, contains ajurisdictional clause which
does provide for reference to the Permanent Court of certain specified
matters, namely, "al1 disputes with regard to which the parties are in
conflict as to their respective rights". It follows that, if the 1928Act is
considered tobe a convention in force between Greece and Turkey and
applicable to the "matter" which is the subject of the present dispute, the
Act, read in combination with Article 37, and Article 36, paragraph 1,of
the Statute, may suffice to establish the Court's jurisdiction in the present
case.
35. The General Act came into force in accordance with its terms on
16August 1929,and Greece became a party to the Act by depositing an
instrument of accession on 14September 1931,subject to certain reserva-

tions. Turkey likewisebecame a party to the Act by depositing an instru-
ment of accession on 26 June 1934 which, also, was subject to certain
reservations. In consequence, the General Act undoubtedly became a
convention in force as between Greece and Turkey on the ninetieth day
following the deposit of Turkey's instrument of accession, in accordance15 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

with Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Act; nor is there any record of either
Greece or Turkey having notified the Secretary-General, in conformity
with Article 45, paragraph 3, of its denunciation of the Act. The Greek
Government maintains that, in these circumstances, theGeneral Act must
be presumed tobe stillin force asbetween Greece and Turkey, in virtue of
paragraph 2 of Article 45, under which the Act is expressed to remain in
force for "successiveperiods of fiveyearsin the caseof ContractingParties
which do not denounce it at least six months before the expiration of the
current period". It further maintains that neither the reservations in
Greece's owninstrument of accession nor those in the Turkish instrument
have any relevance to the present dispute, and that Article 17 of the
General Act accordingly constitutes a valid basis for the exercise of the
Court's jurisdiction in the present case under Article 36, paragraph 1,of
the Statute.

36. The Turlush Government, on the other hand, in the observations
which it transmitted to the Court with its letter to the Registrar of 25
August 1976,contested the Greek Government's right to invokeArticle 17
of the General Act in the present case on both counts. It there took the
position that the General Act is no longer in force and that, whether or not
the General Act is in force, it is inapplicable as between Greece and
Turkey. In thisconnection,the Turkish Government hasemphasized "that
at no time during the exchanges of documents and discussions concerning
the continental shelfareas of the Aegean Seahas any Greek representative
made any mention of the General Act of 1928".

37. In 1948,the General Assembly of the United Nations undertook a
study of the text of theGeneral Act of 1928with a viewto restoring its full
efficacy, since this had been impaired in some respects as a result of the
dissolution of the League of Nations and the disappearance of its organs.
On 29 April 1949,theGeneral Assembly adopted resolution 268A-III, by
which it instructed the Secretary-General to prepare the text of a "Revised
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" incor-
porating the amendments which it had adopted, and to hold it open to
accessionby States. Explaining the reasons for this instruction, the Pream-

ble to the resolution, inter alia, stated:
"Whereasthe amendments hereafter mentioned are of a nature to
restore to the General Act its original efficacy;
Whereas these amendments will only apply as between States
having acceded to the General Act as thus amended and, as a conse-
quence, will not affect the rights of such States, parties to the Act as
established on 26 September 1928,as should claim to invoke it in so
far as it might still be operative." 16 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

The Secretariat, in a memorandum of 4 May 1948,had provided a list of
the States which up to 31 July 1946had acceded to the 1928Act and that
listincluded both GreeceandTurkey. The publication Multilateraltreaties
inrespectofwhichtheSecretary-Generalperformsdepositaryfunctions-List
of signatures, notifications,accessions,etc., as ut 31 December 1977 lists
Greece and Turkey.

38. The question of the status of the General Act of 1928as a conven-
tion in force for the purpose of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court has
already been raised, though not decided, in previous cases before the
Court. In the NuclearTestscasesAustralia and New Zealand each tookthe
position that the 1928Act continues in force for States whch have not

denounced it in conformity with Article 45 of the Act, whereas France
informed the Court that, as a result of the dissolution of the League of
Nations, it considered the Act to be no longer in force (1.C.J. Pleadings,
Nuclear Tests,Vol. II, p. 348).Similarly,in the TrialofPakistani Prisoners
of War case,Pakistan invoked the 1928Act as abasis for the exerciseof the
Court's jurisdiction in that case, whereas in a letter to the Court, the
respondent State, India, stated that the 1928Act "is either not in forceor,
in any case,its efficacyisimpaired by thefact that theorgans of the League
of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice to which it
refershavenow disappeared" (I.C.J. Pleadings,TrialofPakistani Prisoners
of War, p. 143).The Court alsohas cognizance of the fact that on 10Jan-
uary 1974the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations received acommu-
nicationfrom theGovernment of the French Republicreaffirming its view
as stated above, and notifying him that, with respect to any State or any
institution that might contend that the General Act is still in force, the
letter was to be taken as constituting a denunciation of the Act in confor-
mity with Article 45 thereof. The Court is further aware that in a letter to

theSecretaq-General, received on8February 1974,theUnited Kingdom,
after referring to the fact that doubts had been raised as to the continued
legal force of the GeneralAct, gavenotice of itsdenunciation of the Act in
accordancewithArticle 45,paragraph 2,in sofar asit might beconsidered
as still in force, and that by a notification of 15September 1974 India
informed the Secretary-Generalthat it had never regarded itself as bound
by the Act since its independence, whether by succession or otherwise. At
the same time, the Court observes that a considerable number of other
States, listed by the Secretary-Generalas at 31 December 1977as having
acceded to theAct, have not up to thepresent date taken steps to denounce
it nor voiced any doubts regarding the status of the Act today.

39. Although under Article 59of the Statute "the decision of the Court
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case", itisevident that anypronouncement oftheCourtastothe
status of the 1928Act,whether it werefound to beaconventioninforceor
to be no longer in force, may have implicationsin the relations between
States other than Greece and Turkey. Moreover, in the present proceed-
ings thequestionhasalso been raised of theactual relevanceof theGeneral
Act as a potential source of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the
subject-matter of thepresent dispute. In paragraph 32(1) of theApplica-
tion, the text of which has already been set out in paragraph 33above, the
Greek Governmentitself, when invoking the General Act, drew attention
to thefact that both theGreekandTurkishinstruments of accessionto the
Act were accompanied by declarations, and categorically affirmed that
these declarations "are irrelevantto the present case". These declarations
containedreservations to theActmade respectivelybyGreeceandTurkey,
which arefor the most part without relevance to the present dispute. But
this isnot the casein regard to reservation(b)containedin thedeclaration
which accompanied Greece's instrument of accession; for in its observa-
tions of 25August 1976the Turkish Government unequivocally took the
position that,whether or not theGeneral Act isassumed to be stillinforce,
it is subject to a clause, i.e., reservation (b), which would exclude the
Court's competence with respect to the present dispute. The Turkish

Government there declared that in conforrnitywith Article 39,paragraph
3,of the Act, "Turkey opposes reservation (b)to the Greek Application".
In its furtherletter to the Registrar of 24April 1978the Turkish Govern-
ment informed the Court that it maintainedits viewthat the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain theGreekApplication for thereasons whichithad
explained in its earlier letter of 25August 1976.
40. The Court is thus confronted with a situation in which, evenif the
General Act is to be considereda conventionin force, its whole relevance
as a potential source of the Court's jurisdiction in amatter concerninga
coastal State's sovereign rights over the continental shelf is contested by
theTurkishGovernment. Clearly,if theTurkishGovernment's viewof the
effect of reservation(b)on the applicability of the Act as between Greece
and Turkey with respect to the subject-matter of the present dispute is
found by the Court tobe justified, a finding on the question whether the
Act is or is not a conventionin force today ceases to be essential for the
Court's decision regardingitsjurisdiction to entertain the present Appli-
cation. As was pointed out by the Court in the CertainNorwegianLoans
case, when its competence is challenged on two separate grounds, "the
Court is free to base its decision on the ground which in itsjudgment is
more direct and conclusive" (I. C.J.Reports 1957, p. 25). Accordingly,
taking account of thenature of the issueraised in thepresent proceedings
concerning the General Act, the Court will at once address itself to the

effect of reservation (b)on the applicability of the Act with respect to the
subject-matter of the present dispute. 18 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

41. The Greek Govemment has advanced the contention at the public
hearings that reservation(b) should, in any event, be left out of consider-
ation altogether by the Court because the question of its effect on the
application of the General Act with respect to thepresent dispute was not
raised by Turkeyas a preliminaryobjectionin conformity with Article 67
of theRulesof Court. Consequently, inits view,sinceTurkeyhas not filed
a preliminary objection in accordance with the conditions laid down in
Article 67 of the Rules, it cannot be regarded as having "enforced" the
reservation in conformity with Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General
Act.
42. TheGreekGovernment recognizesthat "the Court, whose jurisdic-
tion is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same
degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law" (Mav-
rommatisPalestine Concessions,P.C.Z.J.,SeriesA, No. 2,at p. 34);and also

that in previous cases where the respondent has not appeared, the Court
has taken into account al1theelementsbefore it, including those supplied
byextra-proceduralcommunicationsfromtherespondent,forthe purpose
of satisfying itself as to whether itsjurisdiction was established.It further
recognizes that, even when the respondent has not informed the Court of
its attitude, the Court hasproprio motu enquired into the possible objec-
tions to itsurisdiction in the case. It maintains, however, that in previous
cases the Court has never gone further than to take account of "objec-
tion~,~",legal arguments" or "contentions" advanced by therespondentor
conceived of by theCourt (cf.FisheriesJurisdiction, I.C.J.Reports1973,at
pp. 7-8;Nuclear Tests,1.C.J.Reports1974,at pp. 257and 461).It then asks
whether, in a caselike thepresent, the Court can go so far as to substitute
itself for the absent govemment by enforcingproprio motuin place of that
governmentthe reservation of the Applicant, thus assimilatingthe extra-
procedural expression of a desire to take advantage of the reservation to
the procedural expression of a decision to enforce it. To do so, the Greek
Government suggests,would be to take liberties with the provisions both

of Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General Act and of Article 67 of the
Rules.
43. The procedural objection advanced by Greece to reservation (b)'s
being taken into consideration does not appear to the Court to be convin-
cing.AccordingtotheinformationbeforetheCourt, no mention wasmade
of the General Act during thenegotiations,sothat thefirst mention of the
Act by Greece in the present dispute was in its Application filed on
10August 1976,with which it also filed a request for interim measures of
protection. It wasonly then that theTurkishGovernment had occasion to
consider its position regarding the application of the General Act to the
present dispute.On 18August 1976,theGreekand TurkishGovernments
wereinformed,inconformity withArticle 66,paragraph 8,of the Rules of
Court, that public hearings would open on 25August 1976to afford the
parties the opportunity of presenting their observations on the Greek
request for the indication of provisional measures. On 23August the 19 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Registrar, at the direction of the Court, informed theTurkishAmbassador
to the Netherlands that his Government had the right to address to the
Court in writingany observations that it mighthave on the Greek request.
It was in these circumstances that, by its letter of 25August 1976, the
Turkish Government transmitted to the Court the document entitled
"Observations of theGovernment ofTurkey on therequest by the Govern-
ment of Greece for provisional measures of protection dated The Hague,
10August 1976". In those observations the Turkish Government specifi-
cally referred to the right conferred upon it by Article 39,paragraph 3,of

the General Act to invoke Greece's reservation (b) on the basis of reci-
procity, and then stated: "In conformity with this provision, Turkey
opposes reservation (b)." In the viewof the Court, that forma1statement,
made in responseto a communication from the Court, must be considered
asconstituting an "enforcement" of thereservationwithin themeaning of,
and in conformity with, Article 39, paragraph 3, of the Act.

44. The Turkish Government, it is true, was not represented at the
public hearings on Greece's request for the indication of provisional
measures, and did not afterwards file a preliminary objection or take any
steps in the proceedings. But there is no provision in theRules of Court
which excludes the submission of written observations on a request for
provisionalmeasures; nor isthereanyprovision which excludestheraising
of questions ofjurisdiction in written observationssubmitted in proceed-
ings on theindication of provisionalmeasures.On the contrary, in viewof
theurgencyof arequestforprovisional measures,writtencommunications
not submitted through an agentbut eitherdirectly or through the Ambas-

sador in TheHague haveinvariably been admitted by theCourt; whileone
of the verypurposes of such communications has cornmonlybeen to raise
questions as to the competence of the Court with respect to the particular
case (Anglo-Zranian OilCo.,Z.C.J. Reports1951,p. 91 ;FisheriesJurisdic-
tion,I.C.J. Reports1972,pp. 14and 32;Nuclear Tests,1. C.J. Reports1973,
pp. 100and 136-137; Trial of Pakistani Prisonersof War, 1.C.J. Reports
1973, p. 329).
45. In the present case, the Turkish Government's observations were
immediatelycommunicated to the Greek Agent, and they werereferred to
by counsel for Greece during the hearings concerning the request for
interim measures. Indeed, counsel for Greece then expressly recognized
that by reason of the titleiven to the document theTurkish Government
had placed itself "within the context of Article 66, paragraph 8, of the
Rules of Court", adding:

"Thus, not only has an opportunity ofpresentingobservations been
given to Turkey, but Turkey has in fact, in the letter which it has sent
to the Court and in the document,availed itselfof that opportunity of
presenting observations." 46. TheCourt itself, in its Order of 11September 1976took due notice
of the Turkish Govemment's obsemations (I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 5,
paras. 7 and 8). It also called attention to the invocation by Turkey of
reservation (b)in Greece'sinstrument of accession, and set out the text of
the reservation (ibid, p. 8, para. 19).In that Order, moreover, the Court
expressly stated that, "having regard to the position taken by theTurkish
Governmentin its observationscommunicated to theCourt on 26August
1976, that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Greek Applica-
tion", it was "necessary to resolve first of al1the question of the Court's
jurisdiction with respect to the case" (ibid.,p. 13,para. 45). Accordingly,
after givingitsfinding on the request forinterim measures, theCourt went
on to decide that the present proceedings should be addressed to "the
question of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the dispute".

47. In the proceduralcircumstances of the caseitcannotbe said that the
Court does not now have before it an invocation by Turkey of resemation

(b)whichconformstotheprovisions of theGeneral Act and of the Rules of
Court. Nor can it be said that the Court substitutes itself for the Turkish
Government if it now takes cognizance of a resemation duly invoked in
liminelitisin the proceedings on the request for interim measures. It would
not discharge its duty under Article 53of the Statute if it were to leaveout
of its considerationa reservation,theinvocation of which by the Respon-
dent wasproperlybrought toits noticeearlierinthe proceedings. It follows
that the Court has now to examine the scope of reservation (b) and its
application to the present dispute.

48. The text of the reservations in Greece's instrument of accession
reads as follows :

"Sont exclus des procédures décrites par l'Acte général, sansen
excepter celle de conciliation viséeà son chapitre 1:

a) lesdifférendsnésde faitsantérieurs,soit à l'adhésiondelaGrèce,
soità l'adhésiond'une autre Partie avec laquelle la Grèce vien-
drait à avoir un différend;
b) lesdifférendsportant surdesquestionsque le droit international
laisseà la compétence exclusive des Etats et, notamment, les
différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce,y compris
ceux relatifsàses droits de souverainetésur sesports et ses voies
de communication."

[Translation1

"The following disputes are excluded from the procedures de-
scribed in the General Act, including the procedure of conciliation
referred to in Chapter 1: 21 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

(a) disputes resulting from facts prior either to the accession of
Greece or to the accession of another Party with whom Greece
might have a dispute;
(b) disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solelywithin thedomesticjurisdiction of States, and inparticular
disputes relating to the territorial statusof Greece, including
disputesrelating toitsights ofsovereigntyoverits ports and lines
of communication."

49. The Greek Government maintains on various grounds that reser-
vation (b)cannot be consideredas covering thepresent dispute regarding
the continental shelfof the Aegean Sea.One of thosegroundsconsists of a

contention that, when read correctlyaccordingtoits terms, reservation (b)
does not cover al1disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece but
only suchasboth relate toitsterritorialstatusand at thesametimeconcern
"questions which by international law are solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of States". On this basis, it argues that, as the delimitation of
the continental shelf cannot be considered a question "solely within the
domesticjurisdiction of States", the subject-matter of the present dispute
is not covered by reservation (b).Since this ground is based on an essen-
tiallygrammaticalinterpretation of thereservation,the Court willexamine
it first.

50. The grammatical argument hinges upon the interpretation of the
words "et,notamment,"("and in particular") which precede the reference
to "lesdifférends ayanttrait austatutterritorialdelaGrèce(disputesrelating
to the territorial status of Greece)".hose words are said by the Greek
Governmentto make itplain that the reference to "disputes relatingto the
territorial status of Greece" was not intended to designate an autonomous
category of disputes additional to the category of disputes concerning

matters solely within domestic jurisdiction. The effect of those words,
according to the Greek Government, is to show that in reservation (b)
"disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" are included within
the description of disputes concerning matters solely within domestic
jurisdiction, and are there mentioned merely as a particular example of
such disputes which it was desired to emphasize.
51. In support of this interpretation of the words "et,notamment,"the
Greek Government invokes the authority of Robert's Dictionnaire alpha-
bétiqueet analogique de la langue française (Vol. IV) which explains
"notamment"asmeaning "d'unemanièrequimérited'être notée"(in a way
which deserves to be noted), and adds in brackets: "sertleplus souvent à
attirer I'attentionsur un ouplusieursobjetsparticuliersfaisant partie d'un
ensembleprécédemmendtésigné ousous-entendu" (most often used to draw
attention to one or more particular objects forming part of a previouslydesignatedorunderstood whole).Particularstressis then laidby theGreek
Government on the phrases given by Robert to illustrate the use of the
word notamment,in themajority ofwhichthewordispreceded bytheword
et, but still denotes merely a particular instance of a wider genus or
category. The GreekGovernmentalsocites sirnilarexarnplesof this use of
"et notamment"given in the Dictionnairede IAcadémiefrançaise and in
Littré,Dictionnaire de.lalanguefrançaise. On the basis of this linguistic
evidence, it maintains that the natural, ordinary and current meaning of
this expression absolutelyprecludestheGreek reservation from beingread
as covering disputes regarding territorial status in addition to, and quite
separatelyfrom, disputes regarding matters of domesticjurisdiction.
52. The grammatical interpretation of reservation (b) advanced by
Greece leads to a result which is legally somewhat surprising. Disputes
conceming matters of "domestic jurisdiction" and disputes relating to
"territorial status" are different concepts which, in treaty provisions,
includingArticle 39,paragraph 2, of the GeneralAct, and in reservations

to treaties or to acceptances ofjurisdictionunder Article 36,paragraph 2,
of the Statute, havebeen kept quite separate anddistinct.Furthermore,the
integration of "disputes relating toerritorial status" within thecategory of
disputes concerning matters of "domesticjurisdiction", largely deprives
the former of any significance. Consequently, only if the grammatical
arguments were compelling and decisive would the Court be convinced
that such is the effect which ought to be given to the words "et, notam-
ment," in reservation (b).But those arguments do not appear to the Court
to be so compelling as has been suggested.

53. In thefirst place, thegrammaticalargument overlooks thecommas
placed bothbeforeand after "notamment".To put the matter at its lowest,
one possible purpose of these commas rnight have been to make it clear
that in the phrase "et, notamment, lesdifférend''etc., the word "et" is
intended to be a true conjunctiveintroducing a category of "différends"
additional to those already specified.

54. Another point overlooked by the argument is that the meaning
attributed to "et,notamment,"by Greece is grammatically not the only,
although it may be the most frequent, use of that expression. Robert's
Dictionnaireitself goesno further than to Sayof theword notammentthat it
is "most often" used to drawattention to one of severalparticular objects
forrningpart of acollectivitypreviouslyindicated orimplied.The question
whether in the present instance the expression 'kt, notamment,"has the
meaning attributed to it by Greece thus depends on the context in which
those words were used in Greece's instrument of accession and is not a
matter simply of their preponderant linguistic usage. Even a purely gram-
maticalinterpretation of reservation (b),therefore, leaves open the possi-
bility that the words "et, notamment, les différendsayant trait au statut
territorialelaGrèce"wereintended to specifyan autonomous category of
disputes additional to those concerningmatters of domesticjurisdiction,23 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)
which were also specifically "excluded from the procedures described in
the General Act".

55. In anyevent, "the Court cannot base itselfon a purelygrammatical
interpretation of the text" (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., I.C.J. Reports 1952,
p. 104). A number of considerations of a substantive character point
decisively to the conclusion that resemation (b) in fact contained two
separate and autonomous reservations. One is that the making of reser-
vations to the General Act was expressly authorized and regulated by
Article 39,which allowedonlythereservations"exhaustivelyenumerated"
in paragraph 2 of the Article, namely:

"(a)Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accessioneither of the
Party makingthereservationor ofanyotherParty withwhomthe
said Party may have a dispute;
(b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solelywithin the domesticjurisdiction of States;
(c) Disputesconcerningparticular casesor clearlyspecifiedsubject-
matters, suchasterritorialstatus, ordisputesfallingwithinclearly
defined categories."

Whenamultilateraltreaty thusprovidesin advancefor themakingonlyof
particular, designated categories of resemations, there is clearly a high
probability, if not an actualpresumption, that reservationsmadein terms
used in thetreaty areintended torelate to thecorresponding categoriesin
the treaty.Nordoesthefact that theinstrument of accessionincludesin a
singleparagraph twocategoriesofdisputeswhicharelistedin thetreaty as
separate categories,by itself,in any way dirninishthat probability. When
making resemations under the General Act, States have not, as a rule,
meticulously followed the pattern of resemations set out in Article 39,
paragraph 2; and they have not infrequently grouped together in one
paragraph two or more reservations listed separatelyin the Act.
56. In the present instance, the very structure of reservation (b)hardly
seems consistent with an intention to make "disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece", whichare placed by the General Act in one
category,merelyan exampleof disputesconcerningquestions ofdomestic
jurisdiction, which are placed by the Act in a quite different category. If
that had beentheintention at thetime,it would havebeennatural for those

who drafted Greece'sinstrument of accessionto put the wordsy compris
(including) where the words et, notamment, (and in particular) in fact
appear in reservation (b)and the wordset, notamment,where the wordsy
compris are now found. But that is not how resemation (b) was
drafted.
57. A further consideration is that Greece's declaration accepting
compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause of the Statute of the
Permanent Court contained a provision which, indisputably, was an
autonomous resemation of "disputes relating to the territorial status of
Greece". That declaration, made on 12September 1929,only two years

24before Greece's accession to the General Act, was stated to be subject to
two reservations:
"(a)disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece, including
disputesrelatingtoitsrights of sovereigntyoveritsports and lines
of communication;
(b) disputes relating directly or indirectlyto the application of trea-
tiesor conventions accepted by Greece and providing foranother
procedure".

It can hardly be supposed that Greece should at the same time have
intended to give a scope to its reservation of "disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece" which differed fundamentallyfromthat given
to it both in the General Act and in its declaration under the optional
clause. That Greeceshould have had such an intention seemsal1themore
improbable in that in 1934and again in 1939it renewed its declaration
under the optional clause without modifying in any way the form of its
reservation of "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece".

58. The Greek Government has suggested that an improvementin the
political climate of the time enabled Greece to dispense with an autono-
mous reservation ofdisputesrelating to itsterritorialstatus, and tocontent
itself with the integration of those disputes into its domestic jurisdiction
reservation. But this would not explain why Greece should then have
maintained an autonomous reservation of disputes relating to territorial
status in its acceptance of the optional clause. Another difficulty is that
accession to the General Act involved an even wider risk of claims than
acceptance of the optional clause;for the pacific settlementprocedures of
the GeneralAct are not limitedto the judicial settlement of legal disputes.
Theyalso provide forconciliation with respect todisputes "of everykind",
and even for the possibility, under certain conditions, of arbitration of
political disputes on the basis that the arbitrators may decide ex aequoet
bono.It hardly seemslikely,therefore,that Greeceshouldhave intendedto
have curtailedtheprotection givenby itsreservation of disputesrelating to
territorial status, when subjecting itself to the wider range of procedures
contained in the Act.

59. Equallyunconvincing isa suggestion that, althoughthe scope of the

"territorial status" reservation was reduced by its incorporation in the
reservation of questions of domesticjurisdiction,Greece thereby obtained
a "reinforced barrage", a "qualitatively enhancedprotection" and a "dou-
bly-bolted" door againstthe claims which it was particularlyconcernedto
guard against. This suggestion takesnoaccount of the legalimplicationsof
incorporating "disputes relating to territorial status" into a reservation of
questions of "domesticjurisdiction", as these had been explained by the
Permanent Court in 1923 in its .Advisory Opinion on the Nationality
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 4). The25 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Permanent Court there observed that the question whether a certain
matter is or is not solely within thejurisdiction of a State is an essentially
relative question and depends upon "the development of international
relations". It pointed out that aatter whch is not, in principle,regulated
by international law and is thus a matter within the State's domestic
jurisdiction, will cease to be such if the State has undertaken obligations
towardsother States with respect to that matter. Consequently, and in the
light of historicalcircumstances now tobe described, it is hardly conceiv-
able that Greece intended to reduce the scope of its "territorial status"
reservation by integrating it into its "domestic jurisdiction" reserva-
tion.
60. Greece'smain preoccupationin the yearsfollowing theFirst World
War, so the Court was informed, was to guard against the revival of
Bulgarian aspirations to recover direct access to the Aegean Sea which it

had lost as a result of the territorial changeseffected by the peace treaties.
BytheTreaty of Neuilly of 27November 1919,Bulgariahad renounced al1
its rights and titles over areas of Thrace, but the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers at the same time "undertook to ensure the economic
outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea" (Art. 48).Article4 of theTreaty of
Sèvresof 10August 1920relating to Thrace, put into force by Protocol
XVI of theLausanneConference, provided that Greece "in order to ensure
to Bulgaria free access to the Aegean Sea" recognized her freedom of
transit "over the tenitories and in the ports assigned to Greece under the
present Treaty". The expectation that Bulgaria might seek to secure a
revision of this territorial settlement was the source of Greece's preoccu-
pation and, also, as will be shown shortly, its motive for inserting in its
declaration under the optional clause a reservation of disputesrelatingto
its territorial status. In thepresentconnection,however, what needs to be
emphasized is that the territorial settlement,againstthe revision of which
Greece's "territorial status" reservation was designed to provide a safe-

guard, consisted essentially of a complex of rights and obligations estab-
lished by treaties.Consequently, having regard to the implications of the
Nationality Decrees Opinion, that territorial settlement was by its very
nature one which could not legally be considered as capable of falling
within theconcept of questions of domesticjurisdiction. It follows that, by
integrating its territorialstatus reservation into its reservation ofquestions
of domesticjurisdiction, Greece would automatically have deprived itself
of theprotection which theformer reservation would othenvise have given
it against attempts to use theGeneral Act asa means of effecting arevision
of the territorial settlement established by the peace treaties.

61. This basic objectionto theGreek Government's wayof interpreting
reservation (b) is not removed by another suggestion made in the public
hearings. This was that the series of treatiesconnected with the territorial
arrangements and the treatment of rninorities provided their own special
procedures for thesettlement of disputes, which had priority over those ofthe General Act under Article 29, so that an autonomous reservation of
disputes relating to territorial status was not really indispensable to
Greece. The difficulty with this suggestion, however, is that these proce-
dures by no means covered al1possibleclaimsrelating to territorial status
and to rights of sovereignty over ports and lines of communication. It is
true that the Treaty of Neuilly provided for recourse to the Permanent
Court or to other methods of pacific settlement on questions relating to
minorities and certain other matters, but special procedures were never
established for the settlement of disputes concerning the parts of the
Treaty dealing with Bulgaria's economic outlet to the Aegean Sea.

62. The Court is not, therefore,convinced by the several explanations

which have been put fonvard to account for the difference between
Greece's territorial status reservationin its declarationnder the optional
clause and that in its instrument of accession to the General Act, if the
latter instrument is given the meaning contended for by Greece. It also
appears significant that no support for any of these explanations can be
found inthecontemporary evidenceplacedbeforethe Court relating to the
making of Greece's declaration under the optional clausein 1929and to
thedeposit ofits instrument of accessionin 1931.Thisevidencewillnowbe
examined.

63. During the public hearings on its request for interim measures,the
Greek Government submitted to the Court a document referred to by
counsel as "the travauxpréparatoires of the reservation". This was a letter
addressed by M. Politis to the Greek Foreign Minister on 9 September
1928, setting out the reservations which he recommended that Greece
should make to its acceptance of thePermanent Court'sjurisdiction under
the optional clause. M. Politis was at that time the Rapporteur for the
drafting oftheGeneralAct which wasthen nearingcompletion,andinthat
letter he said,inter afia:

"1 think that it would be wise to safeguard ourselves against an
eventual application of Bulgaria on matters related to Ourterritorial
status, to the access(of Bulgaria) to the Aegean and to theprotection
of Bulgarian-speakingminorities in Greece."

He went on to suggest a possible text of a declaration to give effect to his
recommendation whch contained the following three reservations:
(a) disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece;
(b) disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of

communication;
(c) disputes for the settlement of which the treaties signed by it provide
another procedure. 64. That letter confirms in the clearest mannertheGreekGovernment's
explanation of its motive in introducing a "territorial status" reservation
into its declaration under the optional clause. But it also shows that this

reservation was originally conceived of and formulated as a specific and
autonomous reservation. In the actual declaration the second reservation,
"disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of
communication", wastacked on to, and specifically"included" in,thefirst
reservation of "disputes relating to territorial status". The reason, no
doubt, was that the disputes covered by the second reservation were
realized to becases of "disputes relatingtotheterritorialstatus of Greece".
At any rate, this changein the presentation of the first and second reser-
vations only served to emphasize both the generic and the autonomous
character of Greece's reservation of disputes relating to its "territorial
status". Another point which may be deduced from M. Politis's letter is
that he clearly did not think a reservation of disputesfor the settlement of
which treaties provided another procedure would necessarily cover al1
disputes relating to Greece's "territorial status"; otherwise, he would not
have recornrnended the inclusion of two separate, autonomous reserva-
tions to cover specifically each of these two categories of disputes.

65. In response to a question put by the Court on 9 October 1978,the
Greek Government subrnitted certain interna1 documents relating to the
preparation of Greece'sinstrument of accession to theGeneral Act. These
documentsincluded a first draft of theprojet de loi to be presented to the
GreekChambredesdéputésfor ratification of theinstrument of accession,
the text of theprojet de loi as finally presented, and the exposé des motifs
explainingthe projet de loi to the Chambre des députés;al1of the docu-
ments being accompanied by certified translations into the French
language.
66. The Court considers that the intention to make an autonomous
reservationas to matters relating to territorial status is put beyond doubt
by the explanation of the reservation which was given by the Government
to the Chambre des députés in the exposédes motifs accompanying the
projet de loi. The final paragraph of this document stated:

"We havejudged itnecessary to proceed tothat accessionsubjectto

certain reservations. The latter are those enumerated in Article 2 of
the projet de loi submitted, and consist, on the one hand, of the
repetition of one of the two reservations we formulated when we
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court-reser-
vation (b)-the other being establishedin Article 29 of the Act; and,
on theother hand, of thereservationsenumeratedinArticle 39of the
Act."As the Greek Agent confirmedin reply to a questionput by theCourt, the
words "the repetition of one of the two reservations which we formulated
when we accepted the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Permanent Court"
referunequivocally tothe reservation of "territorialstatus" already used in
Greece's declaration under the optional clause and thus already known to
the Chambre des députés.Theprojet de loi was approvedwithout discus-
sion and without change, so that reservation (b)must be presumed to have

been included in Greece's instrument of accession on the basis of the
explanations given in the exposé des motifs.
67. Accordingly, when theChambre desdéputésauthorized thedeposit
of Greece'sinstrument of accession to theGeneral Act, it could only have
believed that Greece was making its accessionsubject toprecisely the same
reservation of disputesrelatingtoitsterritorial status as the Chambrehad
previously authorized for its declaration under the optional clause. It
seems reasonable to assume that, if any change had been intended in the
scope of the "territorial status" reservation, to which particular impor-
tance was attached by Greece, some indication and explanation of that
change would have been includedin the exposédesmotifs.But there is no
evidence of such a change of intention eitherin the exposédes motifsor in
any other contemporary document before the Court.

68. Having regard to the several considerations which have been
mentioned by the Court, as well as to the explanation of reservation (b)
given in the exposé des motifs,the Court feels bound to conclude that the
wording of reservation (b)did not have the effect of integrating the reser-
vation of disputes relating to territorial status into the reservation of

disputes concerningquestions of domestic jurisdiction. On the contrary,
the Court finds that reservation (b) comprises two reservations, one of
disputes concerning questions of domestic jurisdiction and the other a
distinctand autonomousreservation of "disputes relatingto theterritorial
status of Greece, including disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty
over itsports and lines of communication". Accordingly, it is on this basis
that the Court will now consider the application of reservation (b) to the
present dispute. Moreover, as only this autonomous reservation of
disputes relating to territorial status is relevant in connection with the
present dispute, any further reference to reservation (b)by the Court will
be exclusively to the second part which concerns disputes relating to
Greece's territorial status.

69. The Greek Government maintains that a restrictive viewhas to be
taken of themeaning of the expression "disputes relatingto theterritorial

status of Greece" in reservation (b)by reason of the historical context in
which that expression was incorporated into the reservation. In thisconnection,it invokes thejurisprudence of this Court and the Permanent
Court concerning the interpretation of unilateral declarations of accep-
tance of the Court's jurisdiction (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., I.C.J. Reports
1951, p. 104; Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 15,p. 22; PhosphatesinMorocco,P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 74,pp. 22-
24). According to thisjurisprudence it is indeedclear that in interpreting
reservation (b)regard must be paid to the intention of the Greek Govern-
ment at the time when it deposited its instrument of accession to the
General Act; and it was with that jurisprudence in rnind that the Court
asked the Greek Government to furnish it with any available evidence of
explanations of the instrument of accession given at that time.
70. The Court has already referred to M. Politis's letter to the Greek
ForeignMinister of9September 1928settingout the reservationswhichhe
recommended Greece should make to its declaration under the optional
clause of Article 36of the Statute. One of his recommendationsconcerned
"disputesrelating to theterritorialstatus of Greece" and another "disputes
relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports andlines of communi-
cation". The Greek Governmentis thereforejustified in asking the Court

to conclude that it was the samemotivewhichinspiredtheir inclusion also
in reservation (b)of Greece's accessionto theGeneral Act. It goesfurther,
however,and asks theCourt to interpret reservation (b)in the light of that
motive, soas to restrictits scope to matters of territorial status connected
with attempts to revise the territorial arrangements established by the
peace treaties of the First World War. Moreover, in support of this inter-
pretation of reservation (b),the GreekGovernmenthas alsolaid stress on
the general historical context in which reservations of questions re-
lating to territorial status had come into use in the League of Nations
period.

71. Disputes concerningterritorial status were expressly mentioned in
Article 39,paragraph 2, of the General Act as an example of the "clearly
specified subject-matters"in regard to which reservationsto the Act were
to be perrnitted. Consequently,it is reasonableto presume that there is a
closelinkbetween theconcepts of territorial status in theGeneral Act and
in Greece'sinstrument of accession to it; and that presumption is al1the

stronger when it is recalled that M. Politis was the Rapporteur for the
drafting of the General Act as well as the author of the letter of 9 Sep-
tember 1928whch prompted Greece'srecourse to a reservation under the
optional clauserelatingto territorial status. Thus, the meaning with which
theexpression "territorial status" wasusedin Article 39of theGeneral Act
may clearly have a bearing on its meaning in Greece's instrument of
accession.
72. Counselfor Greece went intothe historical evidencein detail more
especially the use of the expression in the numerous bilateral treaties of30 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

pacific settlement of the inter-war period, and in the proceedings of the
League of Nations connected with the drafting of the Locarno Protocol.
The propositions which theyadvancedon the basis of that evidencewere,
briefly,asfollows.First, thereasonfor theappearance ofexpressions such
as"territorial status", "territorial integrity", "territorial situation", "main-
tenance of frontiers" in treaties of the period, whether in the context of
reservations to pacific settlement provisions, or of territorial guarantees,
was a prevailingapprehension of attempts to modify the post-war settle-
ments. Secondly, although the actual expressionsused might Vary,their
meaning wasessentiallythe same,namelyterritorial situationsor régimes

established by treaties. Thirdly, when the expression "territorial status"
occurred in reservations to treaties of pacific settlement, what the States
had in mind was "disputes which were likelyto arise out of territorial
claims by neighbours dissatisfiedwith existingsolutions". Indeed, itwzs
said that the term "territorial status" in those reservationswas simply "a
'code-word'for intangibility of thefrontiers and territorial statusesestab-
lished by the international instruments in force". The general conclusion
which the Greek Government then asked the Court to draw from that
evidence was that:

"Everything that is known of the contemporary understanding of
such terms as 'territorial status', 'territorial situation'and 'territorial
integrity' in the 1920sindicatesthat theseexpressionsaretobegivena

restrictive interpretation limiredto the maintenanceof the status quo
estabfishedby treaties,normaflyas the result ofpost-war settlement."
(Emphasis added.)

73. In the viewof the Court, the historical evidencemayjustifiably be
said to showthat in the period in question the motivewhich led States to
includein treaties provisionsregarding"territorial status" was,ingeneral,
to protect themselvesagainst possible attempts to modify territorial sett-
lementsestablished by the peace treaties. But it doesnot followthat they
intended those provisionsto be confined to questionsconnected with the
revision of such settlements.Any modification of a territorial "status" or
"situation" or "frontier" is unpalatable to a State; and the strong proba-
bilityisthat a Statewhichhad recourseto areservationofdisputesrelating
to territorial status, or thelike,intended it tobetegeneral.Article 39of
the General Act, it is true, was designed to regulate the formulation of
reservationsand toexcludevagueor subjectivereservations.Butinmaking

expressmention of disputesrelating to territorial status as an exampleof
disputes concerning a clearly specified subject-matter, Article 39 said
nothing of this example being exclusivelydirected against attempts to
revise the territorial settlements established by the peace treaties. 74. In the opinion of the Court, the historical evidence adduced by
Greece does not suffice to establish that the expression"territorial status"
wasused in the League of Nations period, and inparticular in theGeneral
Act of 1928,in the special,restricted, sensecontended for by Greece. The
evidence seems rather to confirm that the expression "territorial status"
was used in its ordinary, generic sense of any matters properly to be
consideredasrelating to theintegrity and legalrégimeof aState'sterritory.
It is significant in thisregard that in the analysis of treaty provisionsmade
in the Systematic Survey of Arbitral Conventionsand Treaties of Mutual
Security, published in 1927by the Secretariat of the League of Nations
(one of the documents used in connectionwith the drafting of the General
Act),reservations of disputesrelating to "territorial integrity", "territorial
status" and "frontiers" were exarnined together as having the same or a
very similar meaning. The Systematic Survey of Treatiesfor thePacific
SettlementofInternationalDisputes1928-1948prepared by the Secretariat

of the United Nations and published in 1948,alsogroups together, under
the title "Disputes relating to territorial status", provisions concerning
"territorial status", "territorial questions""territorial integrity", "present
frontiers". As to the legal writers of the League of Nations period, the
Greek Government itself laid stress on the fact that they consistently
linked together treaty provisions excepting questions relating to "terri-
torial status", "territorial integrity" and "existing frontiers".

75. It followsthat for the same reasonsthe Court isunable to acceptthe
contention advanced in the Memorial that if the authors of the General
Act, or of the arbitration treaties containing a territorial status reserva-
tion:

"had contemplated excluding any disputes concerning the spatial
delimitation of Statejurisdictions, they would not have failed clearly
to mention the familiar category offrontier disputes rather than resort
to the term of territorial status which was a very specific one in the
practice of the time" (Memorial, para. 236).
In the viewof the Court, the term "territorial status" in the treaty practice

of the time did not have the very specific meaning attributed to it by the
Greek Government. As the nature of the word "status" itself indicates, it
was a generic term which in the practice of the time was understood as
embracing the integrity and frontiers, as well as the legal régime,of the
territory in question.This is implicitin the very wording of reservation (b)
itself whichtreats disputes relating to Greece's"rights of sovereigntyover
its ports and lines of communication" as includedin its reservation of
disputes relating to its "territorial status". These disputes by their nature
related to the interpretationand application of existingtreaties rather than
to their revision.
76. Accordingly, the expression "relating to the territorial status of 32 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Greece" in reservation (b) is to be understood as a generic term denoting
any matters properly to be consideredascomprisedwithin the concept of
territorial status under general international law, and therefore includes
not only the particular legal régimebut the territorial integrity and the
boundaries of a State. It is thereforein accordance with this interpretation
of the words "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" that the
Court is called on to determine whether reservation (b) does or does not
havethe effect of excludingthepresent disputefrom thescope of Greece's
accession to the General Act of 1928.

77. The Greek Government, however,has advanced afurther historical
argument by which it seeks to convince the Court that there can be no
question of the applicability of reservation(b)with respect to the present
dispute. This is that the very idea of the continental shelf was wholly
unknown in 1928when the General Act was concluded, and in 1931when
Greece acceded to the Act. It also refers in this connection to the arbitral
award in the Petroleum DevelopmentLtd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi case
(InternationalLaw Reports 1951, p. 144 at p. 152), where the arbitrator
held that the grant of a minera1 oil concession in 1939 was not to be

understood as including the continental shelf. In appreciating the inten-
tion of a party to an instrument there is an essentialdifference between a
grant of rights of exploration and exploitation over a specified area in a
concession and the wording of a reservation to a treaty by which a State
excludes from compulsoryprocedures of pacificsettlementdisputesrelat-
ing to its territorial status. While there may well be a presumption that a
person transferring valuable property rights to another intends only to
transfer the rights which he possesses at that time, the case appears to the
Court to be quite othenvise when a State, in agreeing to subject itself to
compulsoryprocedures of pacificsettlement,exceptsfrom that agreement
a category of disputes which, though covering clearly specified subject-
matters, is of a generickind. Once it isestablishedthat theexpression "the
territorial status of Greece" was used in Greece'sinstrument of accession
as a generic term denoting any matters comprised within the concept of
territorial status under general international law, the presumption neces-
sarily arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the
law and to correspond with the meaningattached to the expression by the

lawinforce at any giventime.Thispresumption, in theview of the Court, is
even morecompelling when it is recalled that the 1928Act was a conven-
tion for the pacific settlement of disputes designed to be of the most
general kind and of continuing duration, for it hardly seems conceivable
that in such a convention terms like "domestic jurisdiction" and "terri-
torial status" were intended to have a fixed content regardless of thesub-
sequent evolution of international law. 78. TheGreek Government invokes as a basis for the Court's jurisdic-
tion in the present case Article 17 of the General Act under which the
parties agreed to submit tojudicial settlement al1disputes with regard to
which they "are in conflict as to their respectiverights". Yettherights that
are the subject of the claims upon which Greecerequeststhe Court in the
Application to exerciseitsjurisdiction under Article 17arethe very rights
over the continental shelf of which, as Greeceinsists, the authors of the
General Act could have had no idea whatever in 1928. If the Greek
Governmentiscorrect, as it undoubtedly is, in assurningthat the meaning
of the generic term "rights" in Article 17follows the evolution of the law,
so as to be capable of embracingrights over thecontinental shelf, it is not
clear why the similar term "territorial status" shouldnot likewisebe liable
to evolveinmeaninginaccordance with "the development of international
relations" (P.C.I.J., SeriesB,No. 4,p. 24).It may alsobe observedthat the
claims which are the subject-matter of the Application relate more parti-

cularly to continental shelf rights claimed to appertain to Greece in virtue
of its sovereignty over certain islands in the Aegean Sea, including the
islands of the "Dodecanese group" (para. 29 of the Application). But the
Dodecanesegroup was not in Greece's possessionwhen it acceded to the
General Actin 193 1;for thoseislandswereceded to Greeceby kaly onlyin
the PeaceTreaty of 1947.In consequence,it seemsclear that, in theviewof
theGreek Government,the term "rights" in Article 17of the General Act
has to be interpreted in the light of the geographical extent of the Greek
State today, not of itsextent in 1931.It would then be a little surprising if
the meaning of Greece'sreservation of disputes relating to its "territorial
status" was not also to evolvein the light of the change in the territorial
extent of the Greek State brought aboutby "the development of interna-
tional relations".
79. Furthermore, the close and necessary link that always exists
between ajurisdictional clauseand reservationsto it, makes it difficultto
accept that the meaning of the clause, but not of the reservation,should
follow the evolution of the law. In the present instance, this difficulty is

underlined by the fact that alongside Greece's reservation of disputes
relating toits "territorial status" inreservationb)isanother reservation of
disputes relating to questions of "domestic jurisdiction", the content of
which, as the Court has already had occasion to note, is "an essentially
relative question" and undoubtedly "depends upon the development of
international relations" (paragraph 59 above).Again, the Court cm seeno
valid reason why onepart of reservation (b) should have been intended to
follow the evolution of international relations but not the other, unless
such an intention should have been made plain by Greece at the time.

80. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court is of the
opinion that the expression in reservation (b) "disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece" must be interpreted in accordance with the
rules of international law as they exist today, and not as they existed in 1931. It follows that in interpreting and applying reservation (b) with
respect to the present dispute the Court has to take account of theevolu-
tion which has occurred in the rules of international law concerning a
coastal State's rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental
shelf.The Court is, therefore, now called upon to examinewhether, taking
into account the developmentsin international law regarding the conti-
nental shelf, the expression "disputes relating to the territorial status of
Greece" should or should not be understood as comprising within it
disputesrelatingtothegeographical-the spatial-extent of Greece's rights
over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.

81. In order to determine whether the present dispute falls within the
scope of reservation (b), theCourt must first clarify thequestion that calls

for decision. The question is not, as Greece seems to assume, whether
continental shelf rights are territorial rights or are comprised within the
expression "territorial status". The real question for decision is, whether
the disputeis one which relatesto the territorial status of Greece.Accord-
ingly, a linguistic argument presented by the Greek Government, and
based on the definitions of the words "statut"(status) and "territorial"in
the Dictionnaire de la terminologiedu droit international,appears to the
Court to be only of marginal interest. No doubt, it is true the expression
territorial status is commonly used in international lawwith reference to a
legal condition or régimeof a territory; but although the expression,as
Article 39, paragraph 2, of the General Act itself indicates, denotes a
categoryorconcept covering clearly specified subject-matters,it is not an
expression which can be said to have rigid legal connotations. On the
contrary,the Court considersit tobe agenericexpression whichcomprises
within its meanings various legal conditions and relations of territory.The
answer to the question whether any given matter is properly to be consi-

dered as relatingto the territorial status of a Statemust,therefore, depend
on the particular circumstances of the case.

82. The subject-matter of thepresent dispute, as appears from the first
two-and principal-submissions in the Application, would require the
Court to decide two questions:
(1) whether certain Greek islands in the Aegean Sea "as part of the
territory of Greece,areentitled to theportion of the continental shelf
which appertains to them accordingto the applicable principles and
rules of international law";
(2) what is "the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the

portions of thecontinental shelf appertainingtoGreeceandTurkey in the Aegean Sea in accordance with the principles and rules of inter-
national law which the Court shall determine to be applicable to the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the aforesaid areas of the
Aegean Sea".

In maintaining that the subject-matter of the dispute embraced by
Greece's submissions does not fa11within the scope of reservation (b), the
Greek Government puts its case in two ways. First, it contends that the
dispute concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary
between Greece and Turkey, and that delimitation isentirely extraneous to
the notion of territorial status (Memorial, para. 236); and, secondly, it
contends that, the continental shelf not being part of the territory of the
coastal State under the applicable rules of international law, the present
dispute regarding rights over thecontinental shelfcannot be considered as
one relatin- to "territorial status".
83. The contention based on the proposition that delimitation is en-
tirely extraneous to thenotion of territorial status appears to the Court to
encounter certain difficulties. Above all, it seems to overlook the basic
character of the present dispute, clearly stated though it is in the first

submission in Greece's Application. The basic question in dispute is
whether or not certain islands under Greek sovereignty are entitled to a
continental shelf of their ownand entitle Greece to cal1fortheboundary to
be drawn between those islands and the Turkish Coast.The veryessenceof
the dispute, as formulated in the Application, is thus the entitlement of
those Greek islands to a continental shelf, and the delimitation of the
boundary is a secondaryquestion to be decided after, and in the light of,
the decision upon the first basic question. Moreover, it is evident from the
documentsbefore the Court that Turkev.which maintains that theislands
in question are meréprotuberances oithe Turkish continental shelf and
have no continental shelf of their own,alsoconsiders the basic question to
be one of entitlement.
84. Quite apart from thefact that the present dispute cannot, therefore,
be viewed as one simply relating to delimitation, it would be difficult to
accept the broad proposition that delimitation isentirely extraneous to the
notion of territorial status. Any disputed delimitation of a boundary
entails somedetermination of entitlement to the areas to be delimited, and
the historical evidence adduced by the GreekGovernment itself showsthat
in the treaty practice in the League of Nations period, the notions of
"territorial integrity", "frontiers" and "territorial status" wereregarded as
closely associated.
85. The dispute relates to the determination of the respective areas of

continental shelf overwhich Greece and Turkey are entitled to exercisethe
sovereign rights recognized by international law. It is therefore necessary
to establish theboundaryor boundaries between neighbouring States, that
is to Say,to drawthe exact line or lineswhere the extension in space of the
sovereignpowers and rights of Greece meets those ofTurkey.Whether it isa land frontier or a boundary line in the continental shelf that is in
question, the process is essentially the same, and inevitably involves the

same element of stability and permanence, and is subject to the rule
excluding boundary agreements from fundamental change of circum-
stances.
86. The second contention mentioned in paragraph 82 above does not
put the question to be decided in its correct context. The question for
decision is whether the present dispute is one "relating to the territorial
status of Greece", not whether the rights in dispute are legally to be
considered as "territorial" rights; and a dispute regarding entitlement to
and delimitation of areas of continental shelf tends by its very nature tobe
one relating to territorial status.The reason is that legallya coastal State's
rights over the continental shelf are both appurtenant to and directly
derived from the State's sovereignty over the territory abutting on that
continental shelf. This emerges clearly from the emphasis placed by the
Court in the North Sea Continental Shelfcases on "natural prolongation"
of the land as a critenon for determining the extent of a coastal State's
entitlement to continental shelf as against other States abutting on the
same continental shelf (I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp. 31et seq.); and this crite-
rion, the Court notes,has been invoked by both Greeceand Turkey during
their negotiations concerningthe substance of the present dispute. As the
Court explained in the above-mentioned cases, the continental shelf is a
legalconceptin which "the principle isapplied that theland dominatesthe
sea" (I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 51,para. 96); and it is solelyby virtue of the

coastal State's sovereignty over the land that rights of exploration and
exploitation in the continental shelf can attach to it, ipsojure, under
international law. In short, continental shelf rights are legally both an
emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of
the coastal State. It follows that the territorial régime-the territorial
status-of acoastal State comprises, ipsojure, therights of exploration and
exploitation over the continental shelf to which it is entitledunder inter-
national law. A dispute regarding those rights would, therefore, appear to
be one which may be said to "relate" to the territorial status of thecoastal
State.

87. The particular circumstances of the present dispute have also to be
taken into account. The basic question at issue, as the Court has aiready
mentioned, istheoneformulated inthefirst submission intheApplication,
andit requiresthe Court to decide whether certainnamed Greekislandsin
the Aegean Sea, "as part of the territory of Greece", are entitled to a
portion of continental shelf. Earlierin the Application, under theheading
"The Subject of the Dispute", it is explainedthat in 1974,when the Greek
Govemment in a diplomatic Note asserted its claim to continental shelf
rightsinrespect of theseislands,theTurkishGovernmentretorted that the
islands "do not possess a [continental] shelf of their own". The twoGovernments, as appears from the Application, maintained their respec-
tivepositions in the diplomaticnegotiations whichfollowed, and in aNote
of 22 May 1976theGreek Government recalled that it had emphasized as
two of the fundamental legalpoints in the dispute: (a)"the territorial and
political unity of the continental and insular parts of theGreek State"; (b)
"the existence of a continental shelf appurtenant to the [Greek] islands
concerned". Inthe sameNote, it had also recalled and rejccted theTurkish
Government's reference to the islands as "mere protuberances on the
Turkish continental shelf" having no continental shelf of their own.
Summarizing its legal position in paragraph 29 of the Application, the
Greek Government names the islands concerned and reaffirms its conten-
tion that they "are an integral part of Greek territory which is entitled to
the portion of [the]continental shelf which appertains to them". It then

expressly rests its claims to continental shelf in respect of those islands
upon "the territorial and political unity of Greece".
88. It followsthat the claims and contentions advanced by Greece in its
first submission directly relate to its territorial status as this was estab-
lished by the various treaties through which was constituted thecorpus of
the territory of the Greek State today. These claims and contentions, as
appears from the Application and the diplomatic correspondence, are
directly contested byTurkey and form the verycoreof the present dispute.
Consequently, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, on this ground
alone, the present dispute is one which "relat[es] to theterritorial status of
Greece".
89. In the present case, moreover, quite apart from the question of the
status of the above-mentioned Greek islands for the purpose of determin-
ing Greece's entitlement to continental shelf, the Court notes that during
the hearings in 1976the Greek Government referred to a certain straight
base-line claimed by Turkey which is, however, contested by Greece.
Although it recognized that the resulting discrepancy between the Greek

and Turkish viewsof the limits ofTurkey's territorial seain the area is not
great, it observed that the discrepancy "obviously affects the question of
the delimitation of the continental shelf". The question of the limits of a
State's territorial sea, as the Greek Government itself has recognized, is
indisputably one which not only relates to, but directly concernsterritorial
status.
90. Having regard to thevarious considerations setout above, the Court
is of the opinion that the present dispute is one which "relat[es] to the
territorial status of Greece" within the meaning of reservation (b) in
Greece's instrument of accession to the General Act. It accordingly finds
that Turkey's invocation of the reservation on the basis of reciprocity has
the effect of excluding the present dispute from the application of Arti-
cle 17 of the Act.38 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

91. In examining the application of the General Act to the present
dispute, the Court has not overlookeda suggestion that the Act has never
been applicable asbetweenTurkey and Greeceby reason of the existence
of the Greco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and
Arbitration signed at Ankara on 30 October 1930 (League of Nations,
Treaty Series, Vol. 125,No. 2841). This Treaty provided for a general
system ofprocedures for thepacific settlement ofdisputes between the two
countries sirnilar to, but in somerespectsdifferentfrom, those providedin
the General Act. It entered into force by exchange of ratifications on
5 October 1931,and under Article 28 was expressed to continue in force
for successiveperiods of fiveyears, unless denounced. The length of these
periods was extended to ten years by an "Additional Treaty" of 27April
1938, which at the same time provided that "the mutual engagements,
bilateral or plurilateral", which the parties had contracted should "con-
tinue to produce their full effect irrespective of the provisions of the
present Treaty" (LeagueofNations, TreatySeries,Vol. 193,No. 4493).By
these Treaties and by the General Act, therefore, Greece and Turkey

appear, prima facie, to have provided for two parallel systems of pacific
settlement, for so long as the 1930 Treaty and the General Act might
continue in force, and both Greece and Turkey have stated that they
consider the 1930Treaty still to be in force.

92. Consequently, if thequestion of the effect of the 1930Treaty on the
applicability of the General Act as between Greeceand Turkeyhad called
for decision in the present proceedings, the Court would have been
confronted with the problem of the CO-existenceof different instruments
establishing methods of peaceful settlement, a question discussed in the
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case (P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 77). In that event it might also have been necessary to examine the
relation between theobligations of the two States under the 1930and 1938
Treaties and those under the General Act in the light of the pertinent
provisions of those instruments-a point whch was the subject of a ques-
tion put by two Members of the Court during the hearings.

93. However, the fact already established by the Court that, by reason
of Turkey's invocation of reservation (6)to the Greek accession, the
General Act is not applicable to the present dispute, and the fact that the
1930Treaty has not been invoked as a basis for the Court'sjurisdiction in
the present proceedings,dispense the Court from any 'needto enter into
these questions.

94. In paragraph 32 (2) of the Application the Greek Government
specified as the second basis on which it claims to establish the Court's
jurisdiction: 39 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

"Thejoint communiquéof Brusselsof 31May 1975,whichfollowed
previous exchangeof views,Statesthat the Prime Ministers of Greece
and Turkey havedecided that theproblems dividingthetwocountries
shouldbe resolvedpeacefully'et, au sujetdu plateaucontinental dela
mer Egée,par la Cour internationale de La Haye'.The two Govern-
ments therebyjointly and severally accepted thejurisdiction of the
Courtinthepresent matter, pursuant toArticle 36(1)of the Statute of
the Court."

95. The Brussels Communiqué of 31 May 1975 does not bear any
signature or initials, and the Court was informed by counsel for Greece
that the Prime Ministers issued it directly to the press during a press
conference held at the conclusion of their meeting on that date. The
TurkishGovernment, in theobservations whichit transmittedtotheCourt
on 25August 1976,considered it "evident that ajoint communiqué does
not amount to an agreement under international law", adding that "If it
were one, it would need to be ratified at least on the part of Turkey"
(para. 15).The Greek Government, on the other hand, maintains thata
joint communiquémay constitute such an agreement. To have this effect,
it says, "It is necessary, and it is sufficient, for the communiqué to
include-in addition to the customaryforms,protestations of friendship,
recital of major principles and declarations of intent-provisions of a
treaty nature" (Memorial,para. 279). Counsel for Greece, moreover, re-

ferred to the issue of joint communiquésas "a modern ritual which has
acquired full status in internationalractice".
96. On the question of form,theCourt need only observe that it knows
of no rule of international law which might preclude ajoint communiqué
from constituting an international agreement to submit a dispute to arbi-
tration orjudicial settlement (cf. Arts. 2, 3and 11of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties). Accordingly,whether the Brussels Commu-
niquéof 31May 1975 does or does not constitute such an agreement
essentiallydepends on the nature of the act or transaction to which the
Communiquégivesexpression;andit doesnot settlethequestion simplyto
refer to the form-a communiqué-in which that act or transaction is
embodied.On thecontrary,in determining what wasindeed thenature of
the act or transaction embodiedin the BrusselsCommuniqué,the Court
must have regard above al1 to its actual terms and to the particular
circumstancesin which it was drawn up.
97. The relevant paragraphs of the Brussels Communiqué read as

follows:
"In the course of their meeting the two Prime Ministers had an
opportunity to give consideration to the problems which led to the
existing situation as regards relations between their countries.
They decided [ont décidét]hat those problems should be resolved
[doivent êtrerésolus]peacefully by means of negotiations and as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International
Court at The Hague. They defined the general lines on the basis of
which the forthcoming meetings of the representatives of the two
Govemments would take place.

In that connection they decided to bring fonvard the date of the
meetingof expertsconcerningthe question of thecontinental shelfof
the Aegean Sea and that of the experts on the question of air
space."
98. In presenting the Communiqué as constituting a definitive agree-
ment between the Prime Ministers to submit the present dispute to the
Court, the Greek Govemment places particular emphasis on the word
"décidé" and the words "doiventêtrerésolus"in the original-French- text
of the secondparagraph. These words,it says,arewords of "decision" and

of "obligation" indicative of a mutual commitment on the part of the
Prime Ministers torefer thedispute totheCourt. Specifically,itclaimsthat
the "agreement" embodied in the Communiqué"is more than an under-
taking to negotiate" and directly "confers jurisdiction on the Court"
(Memorial, Part 2, Section III, Heading A). It likewise claims that the
Communiqué"comrnits the parties to conclude any implementing agree-
mentneeded for theperformance of theobligation"(ibid, Heading B),and
that the refusal by oneparty to conclude such an agreement "permits the
otherparty to seisethe Court unilaterally" (ibid, Heading C). In its view,
moreover, no implementing agreement is required by the Communiqué
which,it says,"enables theparties toresort to theCourt byApplication no
less than by special agreement" (ibid., Heading D). Finally, if it is consi-
dered that "a complementaryagreement isa legalprerequisitefor seisinof
the Court", it maintains that "the two parties are under obligation to
negotiatein good faith theconclusion of such an agreement" (ibid.,Head-
ing E).
99. The Turkish Government, in the observations transmitted to the
Court on 25August 1976,not only denies that the Communiquéconsti-
tutes "an agreement under international law" (para. 15)but alsomaintains
that in any event the two Governments cannot be said to have thereby
"jointly and severallyaccepted thejurisdiction of the Court in the present
matter" when they have never agreed on the scope of the "matter" to be
subrnitted to the Court (para. 14).Examination of the text, it maintains,

shows that the intention was quite different, and that the Communiqué
was "far from amounting to agreement by one State to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Court upon theunilateralapplication of theother State"
(ibid.).According to the Government of Turkey:

". ..it is clear that there was no commitment to submit to the Court
without a special agreement because the followingparagraph said in
thisconnection that thetwoPrimeMinistershaddecided toaccelerate
the meeting of the expertsconcerningthe question of the continental
shelf of the Aegean Sea" (ibid.).41 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)
This means, in its view,that "priority was given to negotiations" on the
substance of the question of thecontinental shelf, and nothing was said in
that connection "even about the negotiation of a special agreement" to
subrnit the question to the Court (ibid.). It also points to the subsequent
efforts of Greece to secure the negotiation of such an agreement as

confirmation of thecorrectness of Turkey'sinterpretation of the Commu-
niqué (para. 16).

100. This divergence of views as to the interpretation of the Brussels
Communiqué makes it necessary for the Court to consider what light is
thrownonitsmeaning by thecontextin which the meeting of 31 May 1975
took place and the Communiqué was drawn up. The first mention of the
Court, accordingto the evidence, was in a GreekNote Verbale of 27 Jan-
uary 1975,that is some four months before the meeting of the two Prime
Ministersin Brussels. In that Note the Greek Governmentproposed that
"the differences over theapplicable law aswellasover thesubstance of the
matter" should be referred to the Court, adding:

"Indeed, theGreekGovernment,withoutprejudiceto theirright to
initiate Court proceedings unilaterally, would see considerable ad-
vantage in reachingjoint& with the Turkish Government a special
agreement ..." (Application, Ann. II, No. 9, emphasis added.)
101. Replying on6 February 1975,the Turkish Government referred to
"meaningful negotiations" as "a basic method for the settlement of inter-

national disputes" and said that, because of the absence of such negotia-
tions, "the issues relatingto the disputes have neither been fully identified
nor elucidated". It then continued:
"However, in principle, the Turkish Government favourably con-
sidersthe GreekGovernment's proposa1to refer thedispute over the
delimitation of the Aegean continental shelfjoint& to the Interna-
tionalCourt ofJustice. To thiseffect and toelaboratethe terms under
which the matter shallbe referred to the said Court, Turkeyproposes
high level talks to be initiated between the two Governments ..."
(Zbid, Ann. II, No. 10,emphasis added.)

On 10February 1975, commenting on the Turkish reply, the Greek
Govemmentnoted with satisfactionthat "the Turkish Governmentaccept
in principle their proposa1 that the question of the delimitation of the
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea be subrnitted jointly to the Intema-
tional Court of Justicein The Hague" (ibid., No. 11,emphasisadded). It
also agreed that "following suitable preparation, talks should be held in
order to draft the terms of the specialagreement (compromisum)required
to that effect" (ibid.).Thisled the Turkish Prime Minister, when explaining42 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

the matter to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 3 March 1975to
Say:
"The Greeks have answered positively to Ourproposa1concerning
talks prior toOurgoing to The Hague. These [talks]did not start yet.
The object of the talks will be the special agreement (compromis)
which will define the basis of the case." (Memorial, para. 268.)

102. According to the information before the Court, those were the
respective positions which the twoGovernments had taken up ashort time
before their ForeignMinisters met in Rome on 17-19May 1975todiscuss,
interalia,thequestion of thecontinental shelf in the Aegean Sea.Further-
more, in the light of thediplomatic exchanges, theGreekGovernment can
hardly have been left in any doubt as to the nature of the proposa1
regarding the Court which the Turkish Government would understand to
be the subject of the discussions at the Rome meeting: namely, a joint
submission of the dispute to the Court hy agreement.

103. Reference is made to the proceedings at the Rome meeting in a
later Greek Note Verbale of2 October 1975,from whichit appears that the
Greek delegation submitteda draft text ofacompromisfor negotiation, but
the Turkish delegation said that they were not yet ready to discuss it and
needed more time to prepare themselves.The meeting ended with the issue

by the two Foreign Ministers on 19May 1975of a brief Joint Communi-
qué,which included the following statements:

"The questions relating to the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea
were discussed and initial consideration was given to the text of a
special agreement concerning the submission of the matter to the
International Court of Justice. ..
It was agreed that the meetings between experts would be con-
tinued in the near future." (Application, Ann. III, No. 1.)

According to the above-mentioned Note Verbale of 2 October 1975, a
committee of experts was to meet atthe earliestpossible date "to negotiate
the special agreement", and to explore a Turkish idea in regard to joint
exploitation. The TurkishGovernment also referred tothe Rome meeting,
in a Note of 18November 1975.It there spoke of the Greek delegation
having :

"... agreed to seeka negotiated settlement of the differences, bearing
also in mind the Turkish proposa1 forjoint exploration and exploi-
tation of resources, and to try to prepare, if necessary, a draft special
agreement for thejoint reference to theInternational Court of Justice
of those aspects of the situation which, they rnight agree, were the
points of genuine disagreement between the two sides" (ihid., Ann.
IV, No. 3).43 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

104. TheCourt can seenothing in the terms of the RomeCommuniqué
of 19May 1975,or in the subsequent accounts of the meeting givenby the
two Governments, which kight indicate that Turkey was then ready to
contemplate, not a joint submission of the dispute to the Court, but a
general acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to it. On the
contrary, the positions of the Greek and Turkish Governments on this
point appear to have been quite unchanged when, only a fewdays later on
31 May 1975,the two Prime Ministers began their meeting in Brussels.

105. Consequently, it isin that context-a previously expressedwilling-
ness on the part of Turkeyjointly to submit the dispute to the Court, after
negotiations and by a special agreement defining the matters to be
decided-that the meaning of the Brussels Joint Communiquéof 31 May
1975 has to be appraised. When read in that context, the terms of the

Communiqué do not appear to the Court to evidence any change in the
position of the Turkish Government in regard to the conditions under
which it wasready toagree to the submission of the dispute to the Court. It
is true that the Communiqué records the decisionof the Prime Ministers
that certain problems in the relations of the two countries should be
resolved peacefully by means of negotiations, and as regards the conti-
nental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the Court. As appears however from
paragraph 97 above, they also defined the general lines on the basis of
which theforthcomingmeetings of the representatives of the two Govern-
ments would take place and decided in that connection to bring forward
the date of the meeting of experts. These statements do not appear to the
Court to be inconsistent with the generalposition taken up by Turkey in
the previous diplomatic exchanges: that it was ready to consider a joint
submission of the dispute to the Court by means of aspecial agreement.At

the same time, the express provision made by the Prime Ministers for a
further meeting of experts on the continental shelf does not seem easily
reconcilablewith an immediateand unqualifiedcommitment to acceptthe
submission of the dispute to the Court unilaterally by Application. In the
light of Turkey's previous insistence on the need to "identify" and "elu-
cidate" the issues in dispute, it seems unlikely that its Prime Minister
should have undertaken such a commitment in such wide and imprecise
terms.

106. The information before the Court concerning the negotiations
between the experts and the diplomatic exchanges subsequent to the
Brussels Communiqué appears to confirm that the two Prime Ministers
did not by their "decision" undertake an unconditional cornmiment t0
submit the continental shelf disputeto the Court. The two sides, it is true,

put somewhatdifferent interpretations upon the meaning of the Commu-
niqué,theTurkish sideinsistingupon the need formeaningful negotiations
on the substance of the dispute before any submission to the Court, the
Greek sidepressing for thecase tobe taken directly to the Court.From the first, however, the Turlush side consistentlymaintained the position that
reference of the dispute to the Court was to be contemplated only on the
basis of a joint submission after the conclusion of a special agreement
defining the issues to be resolved by the Court. Even the Greek Govern-
ment, while arguing in favour of immediate submission of the dispute to
the Court, referredtothedrafting ofaspecialagreement as"necessary" for
submitting the issue to the Court (Notes Verbales of 2 October and
19December 1975,Application, Ann. IV, Nos. 2 and 4). It is also signifi-
cant that nowhere in the diplomatic exchanges or in the negotiations
between the experts does the Greek Government appear to have invoked
the Joint Communiquéas an already existing and complete,direct title of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, although in a Note Verbale of 27 January 1975,
before any Joint Communiqué existed,the Greek Government expressly
reserved its "right to initiate Court proceedingsunilaterally" (presumably
havingin mind the General Act),the Court has not found any mention by
Greece, prior to the filing of the Application, of the possibility that the
dispute might be submitted to the Court unilaterally on the basis of the
Joint Communiqué.

107. Accordingly, having regard to the terms of the Joint Communiqué
of 31 May 1975and to the context in which it was agreed and issued,the
Court can only conclude that it wasnot intended to,and did not, constitute
an immediatecornmitment by the Greek and Turlush PrimeMinisters,on
behalf of their respective Governments, to accept unconditionally the
unilateral submission of thepresent dispute to theCourt. It followsthat, in
the opinion of the Court, the Brussels Communiqué does not furnish a
valid basis for establishingthe Court'sjurisdiction to entertain the Appli-
cation filed by Greece on 10 August 1976.

108. In so finding, the Court emphasizes that the sole question for
decision in the present proceedings is whether it does, or does not, have
jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by Greece on 10August
1976.Havingconcluded that the Joint Communiquéissued in Brusselson
31 May 1975 does not furnish a basis for establishing the Court's juris-
diction in the present proceedings, the Court is not concerned, nor is it
competent, to pronounce upon anyotherimplications which that Commu-
niquémay have in the context of the present dispute. It is for the two
Governments themselves to consider those implications and whateffect, if
any, istobegiven to theJoint Communiquéintheir further efforts to arrive

at an amicable settlement of theirdispute.Nothing that the Court has said
may be understood as precluding the dispute from being brought before
the Court if and when the conditions for establishing itsjurisdiction are
satisfied. 109. For these reasons,

by 12votes to 2,

finds that it iswithoutjurisdiction toentertain theApplication filedby the
Govemment of the Hellenic Republic on 10August 1976.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authontative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of December, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight, in three copies, of which one
willbeplaced in the archivesof theCourt and theotherstransrnittedto the
Government of the Hellenic Republic and to the Government of the
Republic of Turkey respectively.

(Signed) E. JIMÉNEZDE ARÉCHAGA,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

Vice-PresidentNAGENDRS AINGH andJudgesGROS,LACHSM , OROZOV

and TARAZa Ippend separate opinions or declarations to theJudgment of
the Court.

Judge DE CASTRO and Judge adhocSTASSINOPOUL appSend dissenting
opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) E.DE.A.

(Initialled) S. A.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONACOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

AEGEANSEA

CONTINENTALSHELFCASE
(GREECEv.TURKEY)

JUDGMENT OF 19 DECEMBER 1978

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU PLATEAUCONTINENTAL

DE LAMER ÉGÉE
(GRÈCE c. TURQUIE)

ARRÊT DIJ 19 DÉCEMBRE 1978 Officia1cita:ion
Aegean Sea ContinentalShey,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reportp. 3.8,

Mode officielde citation:
Plateau continentalde lamer Egée,
arrêt,1J. Recueil 1p.3.

1 Node vente:440 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1978

19December 1978
19.78
19December
GeneralList
No. 62 AEGEAN SEA

CONTINENTALSHELFCASE

(GREECE v.TURKEY)

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Pursuit of negotiationsduringjudicialproceedings noimpediment to exerciseof
jurisdiction-Existence ofal dispute.
Jurisdiction of the Court-Question of applicability ofneral Act for
Pacific Settlement of International Disputesand relevanceof reservationin Appli-

cant's instrument of accession-Reciprocal enforcement of the reservation in the
procedural circumstancesof the case.
Interpretation of reservation- Whether single resewation or two distinct and
autonomous reservations-Grammaticainterpretation-Intentiof reserving
State having regard to the context-Generic meaning of term 'Yisputesrelating to
territorial statusX-Scope follows evolutionof the law-Present dispute regarding
entitlement toandlimitation of continentalshelfareasrelatesto territorialstatus
of Greece.
Joint communiquéissuedbyHeads of Governmentasbasisofjurisdiction-Ques-
tion oform not conclusive-Interpretation in the light of the context.

JUDGMENT

Present: President JIMÉNDE ARÉCHAGAV ; ice-PresidentNAGENDRSINGH;
Judges FORSTERG , ROS,LACHSD, ILLARD ,ECASTROM , OROZOVS ,ir
Humphrey WALDOCKR , UDA,MOSLERE , LIAS,TARAZI;udge ad hoc
STASSINOPOULOS; Registrar AQUARONE. COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE

19décembre1W8
1978
19décembre
Rôle général
no 62
AFFAIREDU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL

DELAMERÉGÉE

(GRÈCE c.TURQUIE)

COMPÉTENCEDE LA COUR

Lapoursuite des négociations en coursd'instannceefait pas obàl'exercice
de la compétence- Existence d'undifférendjuridique.
Compétencede la Cour - Applicabilitéde l'Actegénérale928pour le règle-
ment pacifique desdifférendsinternationaux et pertinence de la réservefigurant
dans l'instrumentd'adhésiondu demandeur- Mise enjeu de la réserveparréci-
procitédans les circonstances procédurase l'espèce.

Interprétation dela réserve Réserve uniqueou présencede deux réserves
distinctes et indépendantesInterprétation grammatical- Intention de 1'Etat
auteurde la réserve considédaensson context- Sens génériqudee Iéxpression
((différendsayant trait austatut terri)-rSaportée évolue avelcdroit- Le
différend,concernant les droits Etat sur des zonesdeplateau continentalet la
délimitation deces zones,a trait au statut territorialde la Grèce.
Le communiquéconjointpublié par les chfsegouvernement entantque basede

lacompétence - Les questions deforme nesontpas déterminan-eInterprétation
d'après lecontexte.

Présents: M.JIMÉNE DZEARÉCHAGP Ar,ésident; M. NAGENDRS AINGHV ,ice-
Président; MM.FORSTER G,ROS,LACHSD , ILLARD DE CASTRO,

Mo~ozov, sir Humphrey WALDOCM K, . RUDA,MOSLERE , LIAS,
TARAZjIu,ges ; M.STASSINOPOUL jugS,ad hoc ; M. AQUARONE,
Greffier. In the case concerning the Aegean Sea continental shelf,

between
the Hellenic Republic,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Sotirios Konstantopoulos, Ambassador of Greece to the Nether-
lands,

as Agent,
assisted by
Mr. Constantin Economides, Legal Adviser and Head of the Legal Depart-
ment of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Agent, advocate and counsel,
Mr. D. P. O'Connell, Q.C., Member of the English Bar, Chichele Professor of
Public International Law in the University of Oxford,
Mr. Roger Pinto, Professor in the Faculty of Law and Economics, University
of Paris,

Mr. Paul De Visscher, Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of
Louvain,
Mr. Prosper Weil,Professor in the Faculty of Law and Economics, University
of Paris,
Mr. Dimitrios Evrigenis, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economics, Univer-
sity of Thessaloniki,
as advocates and counsel,

H.E. Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos, Ambassador,
as counsel,

Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas, Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of
Athens,
as advocate and counsel,
and by

Mr. Christos Macheritsas, Special Counsellor, LegalDepartment of theGreek
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as expert adviser,

and

the Republic of Turkey,

composed as above,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:
1. Bya letter of 10August 1976,receivedin the Registry of theCourt the same

day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republictransmitted to the
Registrar an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Turkey
in respect of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT)

En l'affaire concernant le plateau continental de la mer Egée,

entre

la Républiquehellénique,
représentéepar
S. Exc. M. Sotirios Konstantopoulos, ambassadeur de Grèce aux Pays-
Bas,

comme agent,
assistépar

M. Constantin Economides,jurisconsulte, chef du département juridique du
ministèredes affaires étrangèresde Grèce,
comme agent, avocat et conseil,

M. D. P. O'Connell, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeurde
droit international publià l'universitéd'Oxford (chaire Chichele),
M. RogerPinto, professeurà lafacultédedroit et desscienceséconomiquesde
l'universitéde Paris,
M. Paul De Visscher, professeur à la faculté de droit de l'université de
Louvain,
M. Prosper Weil, professeurà la facultéde droit et des scienceséconomiques
de l'université deParis,
M. Dimitrios Evrigenis, doyen de la facultéde droit et des sciences écono-

miques de l'universitéde Thessalonique,
comme avocats et conseils,
S. Exc. M. Constantin Stavropoulos, ambassadeur,

comme conseil,
M. Emmanuel Roucounas, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'université
d'Athènes,

comme avocat et conseil,
et par

M. Christos Macheritsas, conseiller spécialau département juridique du
ministère des affaires étrangèresde Grèce,
comme conseiller-expert,

la République turque,

ainsi composée,

rend l'arrêt suivant:

1. Par lettre du 10août 1976reçue au Greffe de la Cour le mêmejour le
ministre des affaires étrangères de la République helléniquea transmis au
Greffier une requêteintroduisant une instance contre la Républiqueturque au
sujet d'un différendrelatiàladélimitationdu plateau continental relevant de laappertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and the rights of the
parties thereover. Inorder to found thejurisdiction of the Court, the Application
relied on, firstly, Article 17 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlernent of
International Disputes of 1928,read together with Article 36, paragraph 1,and
Article 37 of theStatute of theCourt; and secondly, ajoint communiqué issued
at Brussels on 31 May 1975,following an exchange of viewsbetween the Prime
Ministers of Greece and Turkey.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was at
once comrnunicated to the Government of Turkey. In accordance with para-

graph 3of that Article, al1other Statesentitled to appear before the Court were
notified of the Application.
3. Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, the
Government of Greece chose Mr. Michel Stassinopoulos, former President of
the Hellenic Republic,former President of theCouncil of State, to sit asjudge ad
hoc in the case. The Government of Turkey did not seek to exercise the right
conferred on it by that Article to choose a judge ad hoc.
4. On 10August 1976,the same dayas the Application wasfiled,theAgent of
Greece filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the indication of interim
measures ofprotection under Article 33of theGeneral Act of 1928for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, Article 41 of the Statute, and Article 66
of the Rules of Court as adopted on 6 May 1946 and amended on 10 May

1972.
5. On 26 August 1976, a letter, dated 25 August 1976,was received in the
Registry from the Secretary-General of theTurkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
enclosing the "Observations of the Government of Turkey on the request by the
Governrnent of Greece for provisional rneasures of protection dated The Hague,
10August 1976". In these observations, the Turkish Governrnent, inter alia,
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Application.

6. By an Order dated 11September 1976, the Court, after finding that the
circumstances were not then such as to require the exercise of its power under
Article 41 of the Statute to indicate interim measures of protection, decided that
the written proceedings should first be addressed to the question of the juris-

diction of the Court to entertain the dispute.
7. By an Order dated 14 October 1976 the President of the Court fixed
time-limits for the written proceedings on the question of jurisdiction, namely,
18April 1977for the filingof aMernorial by Greece, and 24 October 1977for the
filing of a Counter-Mernorial by Turkey. Bya further Order dated 18April 1977,
at the request of Greece these tirne-limits were extended by the President to
18July 1977and 24 April 1978respectively.The Mernorial of the Government of
Greece wasfiled within the extended time-lirnit fixed therefor, and was cornmu-
nicated to the Governrnent of Turkey. No Counter-Memorial was filed by the
Governrnent of Turkey and, the written proceedings being thus closed, the case
was ready for hearing on 25 April 1978,the day following the expiration of the

time-limit fixed for the Counter-Memorial of Turkey.

8. On 24April 1978,the date fixed for the filing of the Counter-Mernorial of
Turkey, a letter dated the same day was received in the Registry frorn the
Arnbassador of Turkeyto theNetherlands, in which it was stated, inter alia, that
it was evident that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Greek Appli-Grèceet de la Turquie dans la mer Egéeet aux droits desparties au différend sur
ceplateau. Pour établir la compétencede la Cour, la requêteinvoqueen premier
lieu l'article 17de'Acte généralde 1928pour le règlement pacifique des diffé-
rendsinternationaux, rapprochéde I'article36,paragraphe 1,et de I'article 37du
Statut de la Cour, et en second lieu un communiqué conjoint publié àBruxelles
le 31 mai 1975 à l'issue d'un échangede vues entre les premiers ministres de
Grèce et de Turquie.

2. Conformément à I'article 40, paragraphe 2, du Statut, la requêtea été
immédiatement communiquéeau Gouvernement de la Turquie. Conformément
au paragraphe 3 du même article,les autres Etats admis àester devant la Cour
ont été informésde la requête.
3.En application de I'article31,paragraphe 3,du Statut, leGouvernement de
la Grècea désigné M. Michel Stassinopoulos,ancien présidentde la République
hellénique, ancienprésident duConseil d'Etat, pour siégercommejuge adhoc en
l'affaire. LeGouvernement delaTurquie ne s'estpas prévalududroit dedésigner
un juge ad hoc que lui confère le même article.

4. Le 10août 1976,jour du dépôtde la requête, l'agentde la Grèceadéposéau
Greffe de la Cour une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires fondée
sur I'article33 del'Acte généralde 1928pour le règlement pacifique des diffé-
rends internationaux, l'article 41 du Statut et I'article 66 du Règlement de la
Cour adopté le 6 mai 1946et amendéle 10mai 1972.

5. Le 26 août 1976,le Greffe a reçu du secrétaire généraldu ministère des
affaires étrangèresde Turquie une lettre en date du 25 août 1976contenant les
<(Observations du Gouvernement de la Turquie sur la demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires présentéepar le Gouvernement de la Grèce en date, à

La Haye, du 10août 1976 D. Dans ces observations, le Gouvernement de la
Turquie faisait valoir en particulier que la Cour n'avait pas compétence pour
connaître de la requête.
6. Par ordonnance du 1l septembre 1976, la Cour, ayant conclu que les
circonstances n'étaient pas, alors, de nature exiger l'exercice de son pouvoir
d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires en vertu de I'article41 du Statut, a décidé
que la procédure écriteportera d'abord sur la question de la compétencede la
Cour pour connaître du différend.
7. Par ordonnance du 14octobre 1976,le Présidentde la Cour a fixécomme

suit la date d'expiration des délaispour le dépôtdes piècesde procédure écrite
relativesàlaquestion de lacompétence:pour iemémoireduGouvernement de la
Grèce,le 18avril 1977;pour lecontre-mémoiredu Gouvernement de la Turquie,
le24 octobre 1977.Par une nouvelle ordonnance du 18avril 1977,le Président a
prorogéces délais a la demandede la Grècejusqu'aux 18juillet 1977et 24 avril
1978respectivement. Le mémoiredu Gouvernement de la Grèce a été déposé
dans le délai ainsi prorogé et il a été çommuniquéau Gouvernement de la
Turquie. Ce dernier gouvernement n'apas déposéde contre-mémoire; la procé-
dure écriteétant ainsi terminée, l'affairekst trouvée enétatle 25 avril 1978,

c'est-à-dire le lendemain du jour où expirait le délai fixépour le dépôt du
contre-mémoire du Gouvernement de la Turquie.
8. Le 24 avril 1978, soit le jour où expirait le délai fixépour le dépôt du
contre-mémoire de la Turquie, le Greffe a reçu une lettre de l'ambassadeur de
Turquie aux Pays-Bas, datéedu mêmejour, où il était diten particulier que la
Cour n'était manifestementpascompétente pour connaîtrede la requête grecque6 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

cation in thecircumstancesin which it was seisedthereof, and that consequently
the Government of Turkey did not intend toappoint an agent or file a Counter-
Memorial.
9. On 25April 1978,the Court, taking account of a request by the Govern-
ment of Greece, fixed 4 October 1978as the date for the opening of the oral
proceedings on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court. On 11September
1978,a request was made by Greece that the opening of the oral proceedings be
postponed for a substantial period. The Court, after taking into account the
views of both interested States and the course of the proceedings since the
Application was filed,considered that suchapostponement wasnotjustified and

that the hearings, being limited to the question whether the Court had jurisdic-
tion to entertain the dispute, did not affect the issues of substance dividing the
parties, which were the subject of negotiations betweenthem. Consequently, the
Court decided to defer the opening of the oral proceedings only until9 October
1978.
10. On 9, 10,11,12,13, 16and 17October 1978,public hearings wereheld, in
the course of which the Court heard the oral argument, on the question of the
Court's jurisdiction, advanced by Mr. Sotirios Konstantopoulos, Agent of
Greece, Mr. Constantin Economides, Agent, advocate and counsel, and Mr.
Daniel O'Connell, Q.C., Mr. Roger Pinto, Mr. Paul De Visscher, Mr. Prosper
Weil and Mr. Dimitrios Evrigenis, counsel, on behalf of the Government of

Greece. The Turkish Government was not represented at the hearings.
11. The Government of Burma requested that the pleadings and annexed
documents in the case should be made available to it in accordance with
Article 48, paragraph 2, of theRules of Court. Greece and Turkey having been
consulted, and no objection having been made to the Court, it was decided to
accede to the request.
12. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented on behalf of the Government of Greece:

in the Application:

"The Government of Greece requests the Court to adjudge and
declare:
(i) that the Greek islands referred to in paragraph 29[ofthe Application],
as part of the territory of Greece, are entitled to the portion of the
continental shelf which appertainsto them according to the applicable
principles and rules of international law;
(ii) what is the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the
portions of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey in

the Aegean Sea in accordance with the principles and rules of inter-
national law which the Court shall determine to be applicable to the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the aforesaid areas of the
Aegean Sea;
(iii) that Greece is entitled to exercise over its continental shelf sovereign
and exclusive rights for the purpose of researching and exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources;
(iv) that Turkey is not entitled to undertake any activities on the Greek
continental shelf, whether by exploration, exploitation, research or
othenvise, without the consent of Greece; MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 6

dans les conditions où elleen étaitsaisieet qu'en conséquence leGouvernement
de la Turquie n'avait pas l'intention de nommer un agent ni de présenter un
contre-mémoire.

9. Le 25avril 1978la Cour, tenant compte d'une demande du Gouvernement
de la Grèce, a fixé au4 octobre 1978l'ouverture de la procédure orale sur la
question de sa compétence. Le Il septembre 1978, la Grèce a demandé que
l'ouverture de la procédure orale soit renvoyée à une date assez éloignée.La
Cour, ayant pris en considération les vues des deux Etats intéressés etle dérou-
lement de la procédure depuis le dépôtde la requête,a estiméqu'un tel renvoi
n'étaitpasjustifiéet que lesdébats,ne devantporter que sur la question de savoir
si la Cour était compétente pour connaître du différend, n'affectaient pas les

problèmesde fond quiopposaient lesparties et qui faisaient entre ellesl'objet de
négociations. Elle a décidéen conséquence de ne différer l'ouverture de la
procédure orale que jusqu'au 9octobre 1978.

10. Des audiences publiques ont eu lieu les 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16et 17octobre
1978,durant lesquelleslaCouraentendu M. Sotirios Konstantopoulos, agent de
la Grèce, M. Constantin Economides, agent, avocat et conseil, et MM. Daniel
O'Connell, Q.C., Roger Pinto, Paul De Visscher, Prosper Weil et Dimitrios
Evrigenis,conseils,plaider pour le Gouvernement de la Grècesur laquestion de
la compétencede la Cour. Le Gouvernement de la Turquie n'était pasreprésenté

aux audiences.
11. Le Gouvernement de la Birmanie a demandéque les piècesat procédure
écritesoient tenues à sa disposition conformément àl'article 48,paragraphe 2,
du Règlement. La Grèce et la Turquie ayant étéconsultées et aucune objec-
tion n'ayant été présentée à la Cour, celle-ci a décidéde faire droit à la
demande.
12. Dans la procédureécrite,lesconclusions ci-aprèsont étédéposées au nom
du Gouvernement de la Grèce:

dans la requête:

le Gouvernement grec prie la Cour de dire etjuger:

i) qu'en tant que partie du territoire grec les îles grecques viséesau

paragraphe 29 [de la requête]ont droit à la portion du plateau conti-
nental relevant de cesîles conformément aux principes et règlesappli-
cables du droit international;
ii) quel est dans la mer Egéele tracéde la limite (ou des limites) entre les
étendues du plateau continental relevant de la Grèceet de la Turquie
conformément aux principes et règlesdu droit international que la
Cour jugera applicables à la délimitation du plateau continental des
zones susviséesde la mer Egée;

iii) que la Grèce est habilitéeà exercer sur son plateau continental des
droits souverains et exclusifsaux fins de la recherche, de l'exploration
de ce plateau et de l'exploitation de ses ressources naturelles;
iv) que la Turquie n'est habilitéeà entreprendreaucune activité d'explo-
ration, d'exploitation, de recherche ou autre sur le plateau continental
grec sans le consentement de la Grèce;7 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

(v) that the activities of Turkey descnbed in paragraphs 25 and 26 [of the
Application] constitute infringements of the sovereign and exclusive
rights of Greece to explore and exploit its continental shelf or to
authorize scientific research respecting the continental shelf;
(vi) that Turkey shall not continueany further activitiesas describedbove
in subparagraph (iv)within the areas of the continental shelfwhich the
Court shall adjudge appertain to Greece."

in the Memorial:

". . .the Government of Greece requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that, whether, on the basis of Article 17of the General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, 1928, read with Articles 36, para-
graph 2, and 37 of the Statute of the Court, or on the basis of the joint
communiqué of Brussels dated 31 May 1975, the Court is competent to
entertain the dispute between Greece and Turkey on the subject of the
delimitation of the continental shelfappertaining to the two countriesin the
Aegean Sea".

13. At the close of the oral proceedings, the followingwntten submission was
filed in the Registry of the Court on behalf of the Government of Greece:

"The Government of Greece subrnits that the Court be pleased to declare
itself competent toentertain thedispute between Greece and Turkey on the
delimitation of the respective areas of continental shelf appertaining to
either country in the Aegean."

14. No pleadings were filed by the Government of Turkey, and it was not
represented at theoral proceedings; no forma1submissions were therefore made
by that Government. The attitude of the Government of Turkey with regard to
the question of the Court'sjurisdiction has howeverbeen defined in itscommu-
nications to the Court of 25 August 1976,24 April 1978,and 10October 1978.

The last-mentioned communication wasreceivedin the Registry on the morning
of the second day of the public hearings, and was transmitted to the Agent of
Greece by the Registrar later the same day. In these circumstancesaccount can
be taken of its contents only to the extent that the Court finds appropriate in
discharging its duty, under Article 53 of the Statute, to satisfy itself as to its
jurisdiction to entertain the Application.

15. It is to be regretted that the Turkish Government has failed to
appear in order to put forward its arguments on the issues arising in the
present phase of the proceedings and the Court has thus not had the
assistance itmight havederived from such arguments or from any evidence
adduced in support of them. Nevertheless, the Court, in accordance with
its Statute and its settled jurisprudence, must examine proprio motu the

question of its own jurisdiction to consider the Application of the Greek MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 7

v) que les activitésde la 'Turquiedécrites aux paragraphes25 et 26 [de la
requête]enfreignent ledroit souverain etexclusifdelaGrèced'explorer
et d'exploiter son plateau continental ou d'autoriser les recherches
scientifiques sur le plateau continental;

vi) que la Turquie doit s'abstenir de poursuivre ou d'entreprendre des
activitésdu type viséàl'alinéaiv) ci-dessus dans les zones du plateau
continental que la Cour jugera relever de la Grèce)>

dans le mémoire:

leGouvernement grecprie la Cour de dire etjuger que tant sur la base de
l'article 17 de l'Acte généralpour le règlement pacifique des différends
internationaux de 1928,rapproché des articles36, paragraphe 2, et 37 du
Statut de la Cour, que sur celle du communiqué conjointde Bruxelles en
date du 31mai 1975,la Cour acompétencepourconnaître du différend qui
oppose la Grèce àla Turquie au sujet de la délimitationdu plateau conti-

nental relevant des deux pays dans la mer Egée o.

13. A l'issuede la procédure orale, laconclusion écrite ci-aprèsa été déposée
au Greffe au nom du Gouvernement de la Gréce:

<Le Gouvernement gre- conclut au'il. . lai sà la Cour se déclarer
compétentepourconnaître du différendquiopposelaGrèce à laTurquie au
sujet de la délimitation du plateau continental relevant des deux pays dans
la mer Egée.

14. Aucune pièce écrite n'ayant étédéposéepar le Gouvernement de la
Turquie, et celui-ci ne s'étant pas fait représenàela procédure orale,aucune
conclusion n'aétéprise formellement par cegouvernement. Toutefois l'attitude
du Gouvernement de laTurquie en cequi concerne la question de lacompétence
de la Cour a étédéfiniedans ses communications à la Cour des 25 aoîit 1976,
24 avril 1978et 10octobre 1978. Ladernièrede ces communications est parve-
nue au Greffe le matin du deuxièmejour de la procédure oraleet le Greffier l'a
transmise àl'agentdelaGrècedans lecourant delajournée.Danscesconditions,
sa teneur ne peut êtreprise en considérationque dans la mesure où la Cour
l'estimeappropriéen vuede s'acquitter de l'obligationque lui impose l'article53
du Statut de s'assurer de sa compétencepour connaître de la requête.

15. Ilest regrettable que le Gouvernement de la Turquie ne se soit pas
présentépour développer ses arguments sur les questions qui se posent en
la phase actuelle de la procédureet qu'ainsi la Cour n'ait pas eu l'aide que

l'exposéde cesarguments ettoute preuvefournie àl'appui auraient pu lui
apporter. La Cour, conformément à son Statut et à sa jurisprudence
constante, n'en doit pas moins examiner d'office la question de sa propre
compétence pour connaître de la requêtedu Gouvernement de la Grèce.8 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Government. Furthermore, in the present case the duty of the Court to
make this examination on its own initiative is reinforced by the terms of
Article 53 of the Statute of the Court. According to this provision, when-
ever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend
itscase, theCourt, before finding upon themerits, must satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction. Before proceeding further, however, the evolution of the
main events leading to the bringing of this dispute before the Court must
be outlined.

16. Towards the end of 1973theTurkish Government granted licences
to carry out exploration for petroleum in submarine areas of the Aegean
Sea, including areas which encroached upon the continental shelf which,
according to the Greek Government, appertains to certain Greek islands.
By a Note Verbale of 7 February 1974, the Greek Government, basing
itself on international law as codified by Articles 1(b) and 2 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, questioned the validity of
the licences granted by Turkey, reserved its sovereign rights over the
continental shelf adjacent to the coasts of the said islands, and contended
that the continental shelf required to be delimited between the two States
on a basis of equidistance by means of a median line. The Turkish
Government replied, by a Note Verbale of 27 February 1974,that "the
Greek Islands situated very close to the Turkish Coastdo not possess a
[continental] shelf of their own", and disputed the applicability of the

principle of equidistance; while reserving its rights, it stated that it con-
sidered it appropriate to seekby means of agreement a solution in confor-
mity with the rules of international law. In its reply of 24 May 1974,the
Greek Government indicated that it was not opposed to a delimitation
based on the provisions of present day positive international law, "as
codified by the 1958Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf"; the
Turkish Government initsturn,on 5 June 1974,stated that it wastheduty
of the two Governments to use every endeavour to bring about agreed
solutions of the various problems arising by reason of the fact that they
were neighbours in the Aegean Sea; it expressed readiness to enter into
negotiations for the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two
countries.
17. On 29 May 1974theTurkish vesse1Candarlibegan aprogramme of
exploration in waters which were wholly or partly superjacent to the
continental shelfin the Aegean Seawhich,according to theGreek Govern-
ment, appertains to Greece. The Greek Government, in a Note of 14June

1974,observed that this exploration was a breach of Greece's exclusive
sovereign rights and lodged a vigorous protest. The Turkish Government,
in its reply of 4 July 1974,refused to accept the Greek protest. Another
protest in respect of further licences for exploration was made by Greece MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 8

De plus, en l'espèce,l'obligation qu'a la Cour d'entreprendre cet examen
de sa propre initiative est renforcéepar lestermes de l'article 53du Statut.
En vertu de cet article, lorsqu'une des parties ne se présente pas ou
s'abstient de faire valoir sesmoyens, laCour,avant destatueraufond,doit
s'assurer qu'elle a compétence. Avant d'aller plus loin, cependant, il
convient de retracer la chaîne desprincipaux événementsquiont abouti à
ce que la Cour soit saisie du différend.

16. Vers la fin de 1973le Gouvernement de la Turquie a accordédes
permis de recherche pétrolièredans deszonessous-marines de lamer Egée,
y compris des zones empiétant sur le plateau continental qui, d'après le
Gouvernementde la Grèce,relèvede certaines îlesgrecques. Par une note
verbale du 7 février1974le Gouvernement de la Grèce, sefondant sur le
droitinternational telque l'ontcodifiélesarticles 1 b)et 2de laconvention
de Genève sur le plateau continental de 1958,a contestéla validité des
permis accordéspar laTurquie, réservé sed sroits souverains sur leplateau
continentaladjacent aux côtes des îles susviséeset soutenu que leplateau
continental devait êtredélimitéentre les deux Etats sur la base de l'équi-
distance par le tracéd'uneligne médiane.Le Gouvernement de la Turquie
a répondu,par une note verbale du 27février1974,que ((lesîles grecques
situéestoutprèsdelacôteturque nepossèdent pasdeplateau [continental]

propre et a contesté l'applicabilitédu principe d'équidistance; tout en
réservant ses droits, ce gouvernement déclarait qu'il serait opportun de
rechercher par voie d'accord une solution conforme aux règlesdu droit
international. Dans sa réponse du 24 mai 1974, le Gouvernement de la
Grèce a indiqué qu'il n'étaitpas opposé à une délimitation d'après les
dispositions du droitinternational positif actuel, telqu'ilaétécodifiépar
laconvention de Genèvede 1958surleplateau continental O;pour sapart,
le Gouvernement de la Turquie a déclaréle 5juin 1974 que les deux
gouvernements avaient le devoir de déployer tous leurs efforts afin d'ap-
porter des solutions concertées aux différentes questions qui se posent en
raison de leur voisinagedans la mer Egée;il sedéclaraitprêt àentamer des
négociationspour la délimitation du plateau continental entre les deux
Etats.

17. Le 29 mai 1974le navire turc Candarli a entrepris une campagne
d'exploration dans des eaux surjacentes en tout ou partie au plateau
continental de la mer Egéequi, d'après le Gouvernement de la Grèce,
relève decet Etat. Dans une note du 14juin 1974le Gouvernement de la
Grèce a fait observer que cette exploration constituait une violation des
droits de souverainetéexclusifs de la Grèce et a énergiquement protesté.
Dans sa réponsedu 4juillet 1974le Gouvernement de la Turquie a refusé
d'accepter laprotestation grecque. LaGrèceaprotestéune nouvelle foisleon 22 August 1974;Turkey refused to accept it on 16September 1974,and
repeated the suggestion of negotiations.

18. On 27 January 1975 the Greek Government proposed to the
Turkish Governmentthat the differences over the applicable lawaswellas
over the substance of the matter be referred to the International Court of
Justice, and it stated that, without prejudice to itsight to initiate Court
proceedings unilaterally,it sawconsiderableadvantages in reachingjoint-
ly with the Turkish Government a special agreement for reference to the
Court. On 6 February 1975the Turkish Government answered expressing
the hope that the Government of Greece would "agree, with priority, to
enter into negotiations ... on the question of the Aegean Sea continental
shelf", adding that in pnnciple it considered favourably the proposa1 to
refer the dispute jointly to the Court. To this effect it proposed talks
between the two Governments at ministerial level. On 10February 1975

the Greek Government agreed that talks should be held in order to draft
the terms of a special agreement.

19. On 17-19May 1975the Ministersfor Foreign Affairs of Greece and
Turkey met in Rome and gaveinitial consideration to the text of a special
agreement concerning the submission of the matter to the International
Court ofJustice. On 31May 1975the Prime Ministers of the twocountries
met in Brussels and issued thejoint communiqué relied on as conferring
jurisdiction in this case, the terms of whichwillbe examined in detail later
in the present Judgment. They alsodefined the general lineson thebasis of
which the subsequent meetings of the representatives of the two Govern-
ments would take place and decided tobnng fonvardthe date of a meeting
of experts concerning the question of the continental shelf of the Aegean
Sea.
20. In a Note of 30 September 1975theTurkish Government reiterated
theviewithad advanced at the meetingin Rome, that itwould not be in the
interest of thetwocountries to submitthe dispute to the Court withoutfirst
attempting meaningful negotiations. It recalled that in Rome it had also
expressed the viewthat delimitation negotiations should take place paral-
le1with the preparation of a special agreement, and that it had been agreed
that those issues which could not be resolved by negotiations would be
jointly subrnitted to the Court. In a Note of 2 October 1975 the Greek

Government contended that it had been agreedin Brusselson 31May 1975
that the issue would first be formally submitted to the Court and that
talks with a view to an eventual agreed solution were not excluded to
follow.
21. In a Note of 18November 1975the Turkish Government disputed
this interpretation and invited the Greek Government to conduct mean-
ingful negotiations for an agreed equitable settlement, as well as for
consideringjoint submission of unresolved but well-defined legalissues,if
necessary, to the Court. In a Note of 19 December 1975 the Greek MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 9

22 août 1974 àpropos de l'octroi de nouveaux permis de recherche; la
Turquie a rejeté cette protestation le 16 septembre 1974 et réitéré sa
proposition de négociations.
18. Le 27 janvier 1975 le Gouvernement de la Grèce a proposé au
Gouvernement de la Turquie que les divergences au sujet du droit appli-
cable ainsi que sur le fond de la question soient soumises à la Cour
internationale de Justice; il a déclaré que,sans préjudicede son droit de
saisirunilatéralement laCour,ilverrait de trèsgrands avantagàcequ'un
compromissoitétablide concert avecleGouvernement de laTurquie pour
que l'affaire puisse luiêtresoumise. Le 6 février1975leGouvernement de

la Turquie a répondu en exprimant l'espoir que le Gouvernement de la
Grèce acceptera[it] d'entamer en priorité des négociations...sur la
question du plateau continental de la mer Egé))ajoutant qu'ilaccueillait
en principe avec faveur la proposition tendantà saisir conjointement la
Cour du différend.Acette fin, ilproposait que des entretiens commencent
entre les deux gouvernements àl'échelon ministériel. e 10février1975le
Gouvernement de la Grècea acceptéque des entretiens aient lieu afin de
mettre au point le texte d'un compromis.
19. Lesministres desaffairesétrangèresdes deux Etats se sont réunàs
Rome du 17 au 19 mai 1975 et ont commencé à étudier le texte d'un
compromis destiné à soumettre la question à la Cour internationale de

Justice. Le 31 mai 1975 les premiers ministres des deux pays se sont
rencontrés à Bruxelles et ont publié le communiqué conjoint invoqué
comme l'unedes sources dejuridiction en l'espèce,dont les termes feront
l'objetd'un examendétaillédans lasuite du présentarrêt.Ilsont également
définileslignesgénérales sulrabase desquellesauraient lieu lesrencontres
à venir des représentants desdeux gouvernementset ont décidéd'avancer
la date de la réuniond'experts sur la question du plateau continental de la
mer Egée.
20. Dans une note du 30 septembre 1975 le Gouvernement de la
Turquie aréitérél'opinion expriméeà Rome, àsavoir qu'iln'étaitpas dans
l'intérêdtesdeux pays de porter ledifférend devant laCoursans s'efforcer

au préalablede procéder àune négociationqui aitun sens.11arappeléqu'à
Rome ilavait également suggéré quedesnégociations surladélimitationse
déroulent parallèlement àl'élaborationd'un compromis et qu'il avait été
convenu que les problèmes qui ne pourraient êtrerésoluspar des négo-
ciations seraient soumis conjointement à la Cour. Dans une note du
2 octobre 1975 le Gouvernement de la Grèce a soutenu qu'il avait été
entendu à Bruxellesle 31mai 1975que la question serait d'abord officiel-
lement soumise à la Cour et qu'il n'étaitpas exclu que des conversations
aient lieu ensuite en vue de parvenià un accord sur une solution.
21. Dans unenote du 18novembre 1975leGouvernement delaTurquie
a contesté cette interprétation et invité leGouvernement de la Grèceà

procéder àdesnégociationsayant un sensenvuedeparvenird'un commun
accord à un règlement équitable et portant aussi sur la possibilité de
soumettreconjointement, s'ilenétaitbesoin, desproblèmesjuridiques non Government expressed the view that since negotiation was in any case
necessary in order to proceed with the drafting of the special agreement,it
was understood that if in the course of that negotiation proposals were
made for the elimination of points of disagreement concerning delimita-
tion, those proposals would be given appropriate consideration. In accor-
dance with the viewsexpressed in the above communications, meetings of
experts took place in Berne from 31January to 2 February and on 19and
20June 1976,but no agreement was reached.

22. On 13July 1976 a Turkish Government press release was issued
concerning researches that would be undertaken by the Turkish seismic
research vessel Mta-Sismi Ikin the Turkish territorial sea and the high
seas, and in a statement on Turkish radio on 24 July 1976 the Turkish
Foreign Minister indicated that these researches would be carried out in
the areas of the Aegean claimed byTurkey, and could extend to al1areas of
the Aegean outside the territorial waters of Greece. When the vessel
pursued its researches into areas where, in the viewof the Greek Govern-
ment, the continental shelfappertains to Greece, that Government made a
diplomatic protest to the Turkish Government in a Note Verbale dated
7August 1976,and on 10August 1976referred the matter simultaneously
to the International Court of Justice and to the Security Council.

23. On 25 August 1976 the Security Council adopted resolution 395
(1976) to which the Court has referred in itsOrder of 11September 1976.
The operative part of the Security Council resolution called on the two
Governments "to resume direct negotiations over their differences" and
appealed to them "to do everything within their power to ensure that this
results in mutually acceptable solutions" (para. 3). Paragraph 4 of this
resolution invited:
". ..the Governments of Greece and Turkey in this respect to con-
tinue to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial
means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified
to make to the settlement of any remaining legaldifferences that they
may identify in connection with their present dispute".

24. While the present case was pending before the Court, Greece and
Turkey resumed their negotiations, in accordance with the Security Coun-
cil resolution. Their Ministers for Foreign Affairs met in New York on
1October 1976 and agreed that the question of the delimitation of the
Aegean continental shelfshouldbethe subject of negotiations between the
two Governments with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable settle-
ment. There followed a meeting in Berne between representatives of the
two Governmentsfrom 2 to 11November 1976,whichoutlined the proce-
dure forfuture negotiations. It wasalso agreed that thenegotiations would
be confidential. MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 10

résolus maisbien définis à la Cour. Dans une note du 19décembre1975le
Gouvernement de la Grècea déclaré que,puisqu'une négociationétaitde
toute façon nécessairepour procéder à la rédactiondu compromis, il était
entendu que, si, dans le courant de cette négociation, des propositions
étaientfaites pour éliminer lespoints de désaccordrelatifs àla délimita-

tion, ces propositions feraient l'objet d'unexamen approprié. Conformé-
ment aux vues expriméesdans lescommunications susvisées,desréunions
d'experts ont eu lieuà Berne du 31janvier au 2 févrieret les 19et 20juin
1976, sans aboutir àun accord.
22. Le 13juillet 1976 un communiqué de presse a étépubliépar le
Gouvernementde laTurquie au sujet derecherches devant êtreentreprises
par le navire de recherches sismiques turc Mta-Sismik I dans les eaux
territorialesturqueset en haute mer; dans une déclaration radiodiffuséedu
24juillet 1976le ministre desaffairesétrangèresdeTurquie a indiquéque
ces recherches s'effectueraient dans leszones de la mer Egéerevendiquées

par laTurquie et pourraient s'étendreà tous lessecteurs de la mer Egéequi
se trouvent en dehors des eaux territoriales de la Grèce. Le navire ayant
poursuivi sesrecherches dans des zones où leplateau continental relèvede
la Grèce d'après le gouvernement de cet Etat, celui-ci a adressé une
protestation diplomatique au Gouvernement de la Turquie par note ver-
bale du 7 août 1976et, le 10août 1976,a saisi simultanémentde la ques-
tion la Cour internationale de Justice et le Conseil de sécurité.
23. Le 25 août 1976le Conseil de sécurité aadopté la résolution395
(1976) dont la Cour a fait mention dans son ordonnance du 11septembre

1976.Ledispositif decette résolutiondemandait aux deux gouvernements
de reprendre des négociationsdirectes sur leurs différends))et les priait
instamment ((de faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour obtenir que
celles-ci aboutissentà des solutions mutuellement acceptables ))(par. 3).
Le paragraphe 4 de la résolution invitait:

<(les Gouvernements de la Grèce et de la Turquie à continuer à cet
égard à tenir compte de la contribution que les instancesjudiciaires
compétentes,enparticulier la Cour internationale de Justice,peuvent
apporter au règlementde tout différend d'ordre juridique subsistant
qu'ils pourraient identifier dans le contexte de leur litige actuo.

24. Alors que la présente affaire étaiten instance devant la Cour, la
Grèce et la Turquie ont repris leurs négociations conformément à la
résolutiondu Conseil de sécurité. Leurs ministresdesaffairesétrangèresse
sont rencontrés a New York le le' octobre 1976et sont convenus que la
question de la délimitationdu plateau continental de la mer Egéedevrait
faire l'objet de négociationsentre les deux gouvernements en vue de la
recherche d'un règlementmutuellement acceptable. Ces entretiens ont été
suivis d'une réuniondes représentants des deux gouvernements, tenue à
Berne du 2 au Il novembre 1976, qui a fixéles grandes lignes de la

procédure des négociationsfutures. Il a égalementétéconvenu que ces
négociations auraient un caractère confidentiel. 25. The subsequent meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two
States in Brusselsended in a Joint Communiqué published on 11Decem-
ber 1976which expressed satisfaction with the previous meeting in Berne.
At their next meeting on 29 January 1977at Strasbourg,the twoMinisters
for Foreign Affairs exchanged views on the subject of the negotiations
relating to the question of the continental shelf which were to begin in
London on 31 January 1977.The Ministers met again at Strasbourg on
28 April 1977and decided to continue negotiations on the subject of the
delimitation of the continental shelf, fixing a meeting of their experts,
which took place in Paris at the beginning of June 1977.Again on 9 De-
cember 1977the Ministers agreed in Brusselsthat thereshouldshortlybea

meeting of the experts on the question of the continental shelf. This
meeting took place in Paris in mid-February 1978.

26. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey met at Montreux on
10-11March 1978and at Washington on 29 May 1978;they decided that a
meeting between the Secretaries-General of the Foreign Ministries of
Greece and Turkey should take place in Ankara on 4-5July 1978.These
officiais, after their meeting in July, decided to meet again in Athens in
September 1978.In Athens they agreed that "the bilateral talks related to
the continental shelf question should be resumed at the appropriate level
on or about the 1of December 1978".

27. In his letter of 24 April 1978to the Registrar, the Ambassador of
Turkey to the Netherlands stated interalia:

"It should, in the view of the Government of Turkey, be recalled
that that Application was filed although the two Governments had
not yet begun negotiations on the substantive issue, as is clearly
apparent from the contents of the Notes exchanged by the two
Governments. It was however always contemplated between them
that they would seek,through meaningful negotiations, to arrive atan
agreement which would be acceptable to both parties."
The letter recalled that the Security Council, by its resolution 395(1976),
called upon both Governments "to settle their problems primarily by

means of direct negotiations in order that these might result in mutually
acceptable solutions". It argued that it wasin pursuance of that resolution
that the Berne Agreement of 11November 1976 provided in Article 1
that:
"The two Parties agree that the negotiatioris shall be frank,
thoroughgoing and pursued in good faith with a view to reaching an
agreement based on their mutual consent with regard to the

delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves." MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 11

25. La réunion suivante des ministres des affaires étrangères des deux
Etats, tenueà Bruxelles, s'estterminéepar la publication, le 11décembre

1976,d'un communiqué conjoint enregistrant avec satisfaction les résul-
tats de la réunion précédentede Berne.A leur rencontre suivante, quia eu
lieu le 29janvier 1977à Strasbourg, les deux ministres des affaires étran-
gèresont procédé àun échangede vues au sujet des négociations sur la
question du plateau continental qui devaient commencer à Londres le
31janvier 1977.Les ministres se sont rencontrésde nouveau à Strasbourg
le28 avril 1977;ils ont décidde poursuivre les négociationsausujet de la
délimitation du plateau continental et fixéla date d'une réunion d'experts
qui a eu lieu à Pans au début de juin 1977. Le 9 décembre 1977, les
ministresdesaffairesétrangèressontconvenus à Bruxellesqu'unenouvelle
réunion d'expertsse tiendrait bientôt sur la question du plateau continen-

tal. Cette réunion a eu lieuà Parisà la mi-février1978.
26. Lespremiersministres de Grèceetde Turquie ont eu desentretiens
à Montreux les 10et 11mars 1978et à Washingtonle 29 mai 1978;ils ont
décidé quelessecrétairesgénéraud xes ministèresdesaffairesétrangèresde
Grèce et de Turquie se rencontreraient à Ankara les 4 et 5juillet 1978.
Aprèscetteréunion,leshautsfonctionnaires enquestion sont convenus de
reprendre leursconversations à Athènesen septembre 1978.A Athènesils
ont décidéque les conversations bilatérales relatives au plateau conti-
nental reprendraient à l'échelonapproprié le 1"décembre 1978ou aux
environs de cette date >).
*
* *

27. Dans sa lettre au Greffier du 24 avril 1978, l'ambassadeur de
Turquie aux Pays-Bas déclaraitentre autres:
(<Le Gouvernement turc croit utile de rappeler que cette requêtea
étédéposée alorsque les deux gouvernementsn'avaient pas encore
entamé des négociationssur le fond, ainsi qu'ilressort clairement du

contenu des notes échangéesentre les deux gouvernements. Or, il
avait cependant toujours étéquestion entre eux qu'ils chercheraient,
par la voie desnégociationsayant un sens, un accordacceptablepour
les deux parties.>)
Cette lettre rappelait que le Conseil de sécurité,par sa résolution395

(1976), avait demandé aux deux gouvernements (<de résoudre leurs pro-
blèmes,avant tout, par la voiedesnégociationsdirectesen vue d'aboutir à
des solutionsmutuellement acceptables o.Elle faisait valoir que c'étaiten
application de cetterésolutionquel'accordde Bernedu 11 novembre 1976
disposait àl'article :

<<Les deux parties sont d'accord pour que la négociation soit
franche,approfondie et conduite de bonne foi en vue d'aboutir à un
accord basé sur leur consentement mutuel en ce qui concerne la
délimitation du plateau continental entre elles>) 12 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

28. After recalling the 10-11March 1978meeting at Montreux between
the Prime Ministers, the letter claimed that:

"The necessary conditions for the conduct of frank and serious
negotiations, and the spirit whch should motivate the parties
concerned, with a view to the settlement of their problems by such
negotiations, are not reconcilable with the continuation of interna-
tionaljudicial proceedings."

Furthermore,in aNote Verbale to the GreekGovernment of29 September
1978concerningtheGreek request for apostponement of thebeginningof
the oral proceedings in the case, the Turkish Government objected to the
postponement, and expressed the opinion that:

". . thediscontinuance of theproceedings and theremoval ofthe case
from the list of the International Court of Justice would be more
conducive to the creation of a favourable political climate for an
agreed settlement".

29. The Turkish Government's attitude rnight thus be interpreted as
suggesting that the Court ought not to proceed with the case while the
parties continue to negotiate and that the existence of active negotiations

in progress constitutes an impediment to the Court's exercise ofjurisdic-
tion in thepresent case.The Court isunable toshare thisview.Negotiation
andjudicial settlement are enumerated together in Article 33of the Char-
ter of the United Nations as means for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The jurisprudence of the Court provides various examples of cases in
which negotiations and recourse tojudicial settlement have been pursued
paripassu. Severalcases, the most recent being that concerning the Trialof
Pakistani Prisonersof War(I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 347),show thatjudicial
proceedings may be discontinued when such negotiations result in the
settlement of the dispute. Consequently, the fact that negotiations are
being actively pursued during the present proceedings is not, legally, any
obstacle to the exercise by the Court of itsjudicial function.

30. The above-mentioned observations of the Turkish Government
might also be interpreted as making the point that there is no dispute
between the parties while negotiations continue, so that the Court could

not for that reason be seised of jurisdiction in ths case. As the Court
recognizedin its Order of 11September 1976,the existenceofadispute can
hardly be open to doubt in the present case. Counsel for Greececorrectly
stated that there is in fact a double dispute between the parties:

"There is a dispute about what the continental shelf boundaries in
the Aegean Sea should be, and there is a dispute as to the method
whereby this first dispute should be settled-whether by negotiation MER EGÉE (ARRÊT) 12

28. Après avoir rappelé la réunion des premiers ministres à Montreux
les 10 et Il mars 1978,la mêmelettre affirmait:

<(Les conditions requises pour la poursuite de négociations
franches et sérieuses ainsique l'esprit qui-doit gouverner les parties
intéresséesen vue de résoudre leurs problèmespar de telles négocia-
tions sont inconciliables avec la continuation d'une procédure judi-
ciaire internationale.

En outre, dans sa note verbale au Gouvernement de la Grèce du 29 sep-
tembre 1978,relative à la demande grecque d'ajournement de l'ouverture

de la procédure orale en l'affaire, le Gouvernement de la Turquie s'est
opposé à cet ajournement et a exprimé l'opinion que:

<(l'abandon de l'instance et laradiation de l'affairedu rôle de la Cour
internationale de Justice favoriseraient davantage la création d'un
climat politique propice à un règlement concerté )).

29. L'attitude du Gouvernement de la Turquie pourrait donc s'inter-
préter comme sous-entendant que la Cour ne devrait pas connaître de

l'affaire tant que les parties continuent à négocier etque l'existence de
négociationsactivementmenéesempêchelaCour d'exercersacompétence
en l'espèce.La Cour ne saurait partager cette manière de voir. La négo-
ciation et le règlementjudiciaire sont l'une et l'autre citéscomme moyens
de règlement pacifique des différends à l'article 33 de la Charte des
Nations Unies. Lajurisprudence de la Cour fournit divers exemples d'af-
faires dans lesquelles négociations etrèglementjudiciaire se sont poursui-
vis en même temps.Plusieurs affaires, dont la plus récenteest celle du

Procèsde prisonniers de guerrepakistanais (C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 347),
attestent qu'il peut êtremis finà une instancejudiciaire lorsque de telles
négociationsaboutissent a un règlement. Par conséquent,le fait que des
négociations se poursuivent activement pendant la procédure actuellene
constitue pas, en droit, un obstacleà l'exercicepar la Cour de sa fonction
iudiciaire.
30. Les observations susmentionnées du Gouvernement de la Turquie
pourraient aussi êtreinterprétées commerevenant à dire qu'iln'ya pas de

différend entre les parties tant que des négociations sepoursuivent, de
sorte que la Cour,par ce motif, n'aurait pas compétenceenl'espèce. Ainsi
que la Cour l'a reconnu dans son ordonnance du Il septembre 1976,
l'existence d'un différend peut difficilement êtremise en doute dans la
présenteaffaire. Un des conseils de la Grèce a déclaré àjuste titre qu'il
existait en fait un double différendentre les parties:

<Il y a un différendsur ce que doit êtrela délimitationdu plateau

continental de la mer Egée,et il y a un différendquant à la méthode
par laquelle il convient de régler le premierdifférend - faut-il s'en alone or by subrnission to a tribunal competent to exercisejurisdiction
in the matter, either following upon negotiations or even in the
absence of them."
31. Again, in the Turkish Ambassador's letter of 24 April 1978, the

further argument isadvanced that the dispute between Greece and Turkey
is "of a highly political nature". But a dispute involving two States in
respect of thedelimitation of their continental shelfcan hardly fail to have
some political element and thepresent dispute is clearly one inwhich "the
parties are in conflict as to their respective rights". Greece has asked the
Court to pronounce on its submissions "in accordance with the ... prin-
ciples and rules of international law". Turkey, for its part, has invoked
legalgrounds in reply to the Greek claim, such as the existence of "special
circumstances". It is clear from the submissions in the Greek Application
and Memorial, as well as in the observations in the various Turkish
diplomatic communications to Greece, that Greece and Turkey are in
conflict as to the delimitation of the spatialxtent of their sovereign rights
over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Thus there are certain
sovereignrights being claimed by both Greece and Turkey, one against the
other and it is manifest that legal rights lie at the root of the dispute that
divides the two States. The Court therefore findsthat a legaldispute exists
between Greece and Turkey in respect of the continental shelf in the
Aegean Sea.

32. The Court will now proceed to the consideration of itsjurisdiction
with respect to this dispute. In paragraph 32of the Application the Greek
Government has specified two bases on which it claims to found the
jurisdiction of the Court in the present dispute. Although it is said in

paragraph 3 of the Greek Memorial on the question of jurisdiction that
these two bases "mutually strengthen each other", they are quite distinct
and will therefore be examined separately.
33. The first basis ofjurisdiction is formulated in paragraph 32 (1) of
the Application as follows :
"Article 17of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, 1928,read together with Articles 36 (1)and 37 of
the Statute of the Court. Respectively on 14 September 1931 and
26 June 1934,Greece and Turkey acceded to this instrument, which is
still in force for both of them. The texts of these accessions were

accompanied by declarations which are irrelevant to the present
case."
34. Article 17of the General Act of 1928forms part of Chapter II of the
Act, entitled "Judicial Settlement", and reads as follows: tenir aux seulesnégociationsoubien faut-il saisir un tribunal compé-
tent pour connaître du problème, à la suite de négociationsou en
l'absence de toute négociation ? 1)

31. La lettre de l'ambassadeur de Turquie en datedu 24 avril 1978fait
aussi valoir que le différendentre la Grèceet la Turquie est ((de nature
hautement politique )).Cependant un différend opposant deux Etats au
sujet de la délimitation de leur plateau continental peut difficilement ne

pas comporter quelque élément politique, etle différenden cause est à
l'évidence unde ceux au sujet desquels ((les parties se conteste[nt] réci-
proquement un droit >)LaGrècea demandé àla Cour de seprononcer sur
ses conclusions ((conformément aux principes et aux règles du droit
international ))La Turquie, pour sa part, a invoquédes argumentsjuri-
diques en réponse à la demande de la Grèce, en particulier l'existencede
((circonstances spéciales )>Les conclusions présentéesdans la requête et

dans le mémoirede la Grèce, ainsi que les observations faites dans les
diverses communications diplomatiques de la Turquie à la Grèce, indi-
quent clairement que les deux Etats sont en conflit au sujet de la délimi-
tation de l'étendue spatialede leurs droits souverainssur leplateau conti-
nental en mer Egée.Ainsi, certains droits souverains sont invoquéspar la
Grèceet par la Turquie l'unecontre l'autre: il est manifeste que des droits

sont à labasedu différendquioppose lesdeuxEtats. LaCour conclut donc
qu'un différendd'ordre juridique existe entre la Grèce et la Turquie au
sujet du plateau continental de la mer Egée.

32. La Cour en vient maintenant àl'examende sacompétence à l'égard
du présent différend.Au paragraphe 32de sarequêteleGouvernement de
la Grècespécifiedeux bases sur lesquellesil déclarefonder la compétence

de la Cour en l'espèce.Bienqu'il soitaffirméauparagraphe 3du mémoire
de la Grèce sur la question de la compétence que ces deux bases (se
confortent mutuellement O,elles sont tout à fait distinctes et seront donc
examinéesl'une après l'autre.
33. La première base de compétence est présentée ainsiau para-
graphe 32, sous-paragraphe 1, de la requête:

<L'article 17 de l'Acte généralpour le règlement pacifique des
différendsinternationaux de 1928,rapproché des articles 36, para-
graphe 1,et 37du Statut de la Cour. Les 14septembre 1931et 26juin

1934respectivement, la Grèceet la Turquie ont adhéré à cet instru-
ment, qui demeure en vigueur à leur égard.Les textes de leurs adhé-
sionss'accompagnaient de déclarationsquisont sanspertinence en la
présenteespèce.

34. L'article 17de l'Actegénérad le 1928faitpartie du chapitre II de cet
instrument, intitulé (Du règlement judiciaire D, et est rédigécomme
suit: "Al1disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be
made under Article 39, be subrnitted for decision to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, unless the parties agree,in the manner
hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal. It is
understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular
those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice."

The Article thus provides, under certainconditions, for the reference to the
formerPermanentCourt of International Justice ofdisputes withregard to
which the parties are in conflict asto their respective rights. Article 37 of
the Statute of this Court, however, States that:

"Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of
a matter to ...the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
matter shall, asbetween the parties to thepresent Statute, be referred
to the International Court of Justice."
The effect of that Article, as this Court emphasized in the Barcelona
Traction,Light and PowerCompany,Limited, PreliminatyObjections,case

(I.C.J. Reports1964,at pp. 31-39)is that, as between parties to the Statute,
this Court is substituted for the Permanent Courtin anytreaty or conven-
tion in force, the terms of which provide for reference of a matter to the
Permanent Court. Accordingly any treaty or convention providing for
reference of any matter to the Permanent Court is capable as between the
parties to the present Statute of furnishing a basis for establishing the
Court's jurisdiction in regard to a dispute, on condition that the treaty or
convention applies to the particular matter in question and is in force as
between theparties to that dispute. Clearly, Article 17of theGeneral Act
of 1928,here invoked by Greece, contains ajurisdictional clause which
does provide for reference to the Permanent Court of certain specified
matters, namely, "al1 disputes with regard to which the parties are in
conflict as to their respective rights". It follows that, if the 1928Act is
considered tobe a convention in force between Greece and Turkey and
applicable to the "matter" which is the subject of the present dispute, the
Act, read in combination with Article 37, and Article 36, paragraph 1,of
the Statute, may suffice to establish the Court's jurisdiction in the present
case.
35. The General Act came into force in accordance with its terms on
16August 1929,and Greece became a party to the Act by depositing an
instrument of accession on 14September 1931,subject to certain reserva-

tions. Turkey likewisebecame a party to the Act by depositing an instru-
ment of accession on 26 June 1934 which, also, was subject to certain
reservations. In consequence, the General Act undoubtedly became a
convention in force as between Greece and Turkey on the ninetieth day
following the deposit of Turkey's instrument of accession, in accordance MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 14

(Tous différends au sujet desquels les parties se contesteraient
réciproquement undroit seront, sauf lesréserveséventuellesprévues à
l'article 39, soumispour jugement à la Cour permanente de Justice

internationale, àmoins que les parties ne tombent d'accord, dans les
termes prévusci-après, pour recourir à un tribunal arbitral. Il est
entendu que les différendsci-dessus viséscomprennent notamment
ceux que mentionne l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour permanente de
Justice internationale.))

L'articleprévoitdonc que,souscertainesconditions, lesdifférendsau sujet
desquels les parties se contestent réciproquement un droit seront portés
devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, aujourd'hui dispa-
rue. L'article 37 du Statut de la Cour actuelle énonce toutefois que:

Lorsqu'un traitéou une convention en vigueur prévoit le renvoi
à ...la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, la Cour interna-
tionale de Justice constituera cette juridiction entre les parties au
présent Statut. 1)

L'effet de cet article, comme la Cour l'a soulignédans l'affaire de la
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, exceptionspréli-
minaires (C.I.J. Recueil 1964,p. 31-39),est que,entre lesparties au Statut,
la Courinternationalede Justice est substituée à la Cour permanente dans

tout traité ou convention en vigueur prévoyant le renvoi à celle-ci. En
conséquencetout traité ou convention envisageant le renvoi d'une ques-
tion quelconque à la Cour permanente peut, entre les parties au Statut
actuel, servirdefondement à lacompétencede laCour pour connaître d'un
différend,pour autant que le traite ou la convention s'applique à la ques-
tion particulière dont il s'agit et soit en vigueur entre les parties au diffé-
rend. De toute évidence l'article17de l'Actegénéralde 1928,invoquéen
l'espècepar la Grèce,contient une clausejuridictionnelle renvoyant à la
Cour permanente certains cas spécialement prévus, à savoir tous diffé-

rends au sujet desquels les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un
droit )).Il en découleque, si l'Acte de 1928 est considéré comme une
convention en vigueurentre la Grèceet laTurquie etcommeapplicable au
((cas dont il s'agit, l'Acte, seconjuguant avec les articles 37 et 36,para-
graphe 1,du Statut, peut fournir un fondement suffisant à la compétence
de la Cour en l'espèce.

35. L'Acte générae lst entré en vigueur, conformément à ses disposi-
tions, le 16août 1929, et la Grèce y est devenue partie en déposant le

14septembre 1931un instrument d'adhésion assortide certaines réserves.
LaTurquie est demêmedevenuepartie à l'Acteendéposantle26juin 1934
un instrument d'adhésion quicomportait aussi certaines réserves.L'Acte
général esd tonc devenu sansnul doute une convention en vigueur entre la
Grèceet la Turquie le quatre-vingt-dixièmejour suivant le dépôtde l'ins-
trument d'adhésionde laTurquie, aux termes de l'article44,paragraphe 2,15 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

with Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Act; nor is there any record of either
Greece or Turkey having notified the Secretary-General, in conformity
with Article 45, paragraph 3, of its denunciation of the Act. The Greek
Government maintains that, in these circumstances, theGeneral Act must
be presumed tobe stillin force asbetween Greece and Turkey, in virtue of
paragraph 2 of Article 45, under which the Act is expressed to remain in
force for "successiveperiods of fiveyearsin the caseof ContractingParties
which do not denounce it at least six months before the expiration of the
current period". It further maintains that neither the reservations in
Greece's owninstrument of accession nor those in the Turkish instrument
have any relevance to the present dispute, and that Article 17 of the
General Act accordingly constitutes a valid basis for the exercise of the
Court's jurisdiction in the present case under Article 36, paragraph 1,of
the Statute.

36. The Turlush Government, on the other hand, in the observations
which it transmitted to the Court with its letter to the Registrar of 25
August 1976,contested the Greek Government's right to invokeArticle 17
of the General Act in the present case on both counts. It there took the
position that the General Act is no longer in force and that, whether or not
the General Act is in force, it is inapplicable as between Greece and
Turkey. In thisconnection,the Turkish Government hasemphasized "that
at no time during the exchanges of documents and discussions concerning
the continental shelfareas of the Aegean Seahas any Greek representative
made any mention of the General Act of 1928".

37. In 1948,the General Assembly of the United Nations undertook a
study of the text of theGeneral Act of 1928with a viewto restoring its full
efficacy, since this had been impaired in some respects as a result of the
dissolution of the League of Nations and the disappearance of its organs.
On 29 April 1949,theGeneral Assembly adopted resolution 268A-III, by
which it instructed the Secretary-General to prepare the text of a "Revised
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" incor-
porating the amendments which it had adopted, and to hold it open to
accessionby States. Explaining the reasons for this instruction, the Pream-

ble to the resolution, inter alia, stated:
"Whereasthe amendments hereafter mentioned are of a nature to
restore to the General Act its original efficacy;
Whereas these amendments will only apply as between States
having acceded to the General Act as thus amended and, as a conse-
quence, will not affect the rights of such States, parties to the Act as
established on 26 September 1928,as should claim to invoke it in so
far as it might still be operative." MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 15
de l'Acte; rien n'indique que la Grèce ou la Turquie ait notifiéau Secré-

taire généralla dénonciation de l'Acte conformément à l'article45, para-
graphe 3,de cet instrument. Le Gouvernement de la Grècefait valoir que,
dans ces conditions, l'Acte général doitêtreréputé demeureren vigueur
entre la Grèceet la Turquie, en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article45, qui
stipule que l'Acte<<restera en vigueur pour une nouvelle périodede cinq
ans, et ainsi de suite, vis-à-visdesParties contractantes quinel'auront pas
dénoncésix mois au moins avant l'expiration du terme ))Il soutient en
outre que les réservesfigurant tant dans l'instrument d'adhésion de la
Grècequedans celuidelaTurquie sont sansaucunepertinencepar rapport

au présent différendet que l'article 17 de l'Acte général constituepar
conséquentun fondement valable àl'exercicede la compétencede la Cour
en la présenteespèceen vertu de l'article 36, paragraphe 1,du Statut.

36. Dans les observations qu'il a transmises àla Cour par sa lettre au
Greffier du 25 août 1976,leGouvernement de la Turquieconteste quant à
lui le droit du Gouvernement de la Grèce d'invoquer l'article 17de l'Acte
généralen la présente affaire, et cela pour deux motifs. Il soutient que

l'Acte généraln'est plus en vigueur et que, en vigueur ou non, il est
inapplicable entrela Grèce etla Turquie. Acetégardle Gouvernement de
la Turquie souligne <<qu'aucun représentant de la Grèce [n'a]jamais
mentionné l'Acte généralde1928pendant tout letemps qu'ont eu lieu les
échangesde documents et les discussions sur les zones du plateau conti-
nental de la mer Egée )).

37. En 1948l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies a entrepris l'exa-
men du texte de l'Actegénérad le 1928en vue de lui restituer sonefficacité
première, diminuée à certains égards par suite de la dissolution de la
Société desNations et de la disparition de ses organes. Le 28 avril 1949

l'Assembléegénérale aadopté la résolution 268A-III, par laquelle elle
chargeait le Secrétairegénéral d'établir le texte'un (Acte généralrevisé
pour le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux O, en tenant
compte des amendements qu'elle avait adoptés, et de le tenir ouvert à
l'adhésion desEtats.Lesraisons decesinstructionsétaientexpliquéesdans
le préambule de la résolution où il étaitdit en particulier:

<Considérantque les amendementsci-aprèssont de nature à resti-
tuer à l'Acte général son efficacitépremière;
Considérantque ces amendements nejoueront qu'entre les Etats
ayant adhéré à l'Actegénéralainsireviséet,partant, neporterontpas
atteinte aux droits des Etats qui,partiesl'Actetel qu'ilaétéétabllie
26 septembre 1928,entendraient s'en prévaloirdans la mesure où il
pourrait encorejouer. )) 16 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

The Secretariat, in a memorandum of 4 May 1948,had provided a list of
the States which up to 31 July 1946had acceded to the 1928Act and that
listincluded both GreeceandTurkey. The publication Multilateraltreaties
inrespectofwhichtheSecretary-Generalperformsdepositaryfunctions-List
of signatures, notifications,accessions,etc., as ut 31 December 1977 lists
Greece and Turkey.

38. The question of the status of the General Act of 1928as a conven-
tion in force for the purpose of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court has
already been raised, though not decided, in previous cases before the
Court. In the NuclearTestscasesAustralia and New Zealand each tookthe
position that the 1928Act continues in force for States whch have not

denounced it in conformity with Article 45 of the Act, whereas France
informed the Court that, as a result of the dissolution of the League of
Nations, it considered the Act to be no longer in force (1.C.J. Pleadings,
Nuclear Tests,Vol. II, p. 348).Similarly,in the TrialofPakistani Prisoners
of War case,Pakistan invoked the 1928Act as abasis for the exerciseof the
Court's jurisdiction in that case, whereas in a letter to the Court, the
respondent State, India, stated that the 1928Act "is either not in forceor,
in any case,its efficacyisimpaired by thefact that theorgans of the League
of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice to which it
refershavenow disappeared" (I.C.J. Pleadings,TrialofPakistani Prisoners
of War, p. 143).The Court alsohas cognizance of the fact that on 10Jan-
uary 1974the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations received acommu-
nicationfrom theGovernment of the French Republicreaffirming its view
as stated above, and notifying him that, with respect to any State or any
institution that might contend that the General Act is still in force, the
letter was to be taken as constituting a denunciation of the Act in confor-
mity with Article 45 thereof. The Court is further aware that in a letter to

theSecretaq-General, received on8February 1974,theUnited Kingdom,
after referring to the fact that doubts had been raised as to the continued
legal force of the GeneralAct, gavenotice of itsdenunciation of the Act in
accordancewithArticle 45,paragraph 2,in sofar asit might beconsidered
as still in force, and that by a notification of 15September 1974 India
informed the Secretary-Generalthat it had never regarded itself as bound
by the Act since its independence, whether by succession or otherwise. At
the same time, the Court observes that a considerable number of other
States, listed by the Secretary-Generalas at 31 December 1977as having
acceded to theAct, have not up to thepresent date taken steps to denounce
it nor voiced any doubts regarding the status of the Act today.

39. Although under Article 59of the Statute "the decision of the Court
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that Dans un mémorandum du 4mai 1948le Secrétariata fourni une listedes
Etats qui, àla date du 31juillet 1946,avaient adhéré à l'Actede 1928;la

Grèce et la Turquie figuraientsur cette liste. Ellessont toujoursmention-
néesdans la publication intitulée Traités multilatéraux pour lesquels le
Secrétaire généra elxerce lesfonctionsde dépositaire- Etat, au31 décem-
bre 1977, des signatures,ratifications,adhésions,etc.

38. La question de la situation de l'Acte généradle 1928en tant que
convention envigueurauxfinsdel'article37du Statut delaCouradéjàété

soulevéemaisnon tranchéedansdesinstancesprécédentesdevantlaCour.
Dans les affaires desEssais nucléairesl'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande
ont plaidél'une etl'autre quel'Actede 1928restaiten vigueur à l'égarddes
Etats qui ne l'avaient pas dénoncéen application de son article 45, la
France faisant savoir de son côté qu'à la suite de la dissolution de la
Sociétédes Nations elle estimaitque l'Acten'était plusen vigueur (C.I.J.
Mémoires,Essais nucléaires,vol. II, p. 348). De même,dans l'affaire du
Procèsdeprisonniersdeguerrepakistanais,le Pakistan ainvoquél'Actede
1928comme permettant à la Cour d'exercer sa compétence en l'espèce,
alors que dans une lettre adressée à la Cour l'Inde, Etat défendeur, a
déclaréque l'Actede 1928 (n'estpasen vigueur ouque,de toutefaçon, son

efficacitéest diminuéepar lefait que lesorganes dela SociétédesNations
et la Courpermanente deJusticeinternationale dont ilfait mentionsont à
présent disparus ))(C.I.J. Mémoires, Procèdseprisonniersde guerrepakis-
tanais,p. 143).La Coursait égalementque,le10janvier 1974,leSecrétaire
généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies a reçu une communication
par laquelle le Gouvernement de la République française réaffirmaitles
vues indiquéesci-dessuset l'avisait que,àl'égardde tout Etat ou de toute
institution qui soutiendrait que l'Acte général esten vigueur, la commu-
nication en question valait dénonciationde celui-ci conformément à son
article45. La Cour n'ignore pas non plus que, par lettre au Secrétaire
généralreçue par celui-ci le 8 février1974,le Royaume-Uni, après avoir

rappelé que des doutes avaient surgi au sujet du maintien en vigueur de
l'Acte général, en a notifié la dénonciation conformémen t l'article45,
paragraphe 2, dans la mesure où on pouvait leconsidérercomme toujours
en vigueur, et que, par une notification du 15septembre 1974, l'Inde a
informé leSecrétairegénéralqu'elle ne s'étaitjamais considéréeliéepar
l'Acte depuis son indépendance, que ce soit par succession ou de toute
autre manière.La Courconstatepar ailleursquede nombreuxautresEtats
énuméréspalre Secrétairegénéral à la date du 31décembre1977comme
ayant adhéré à l'Acten'ont paspris àcejour de mesurespour ledénoncer,
ni expriméde doutes au sujet de sa situation actuelle.

39. Bienqu'en vertude l'article59du Statut (<la décisionde la Cour[ne
soit] obligatoire que pour les parties en litige et dans le cas qui a été particular case", itisevident that anypronouncement oftheCourtastothe
status of the 1928Act,whether it werefound to beaconventioninforceor
to be no longer in force, may have implicationsin the relations between
States other than Greece and Turkey. Moreover, in the present proceed-
ings thequestionhasalso been raised of theactual relevanceof theGeneral
Act as a potential source of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the
subject-matter of thepresent dispute. In paragraph 32(1) of theApplica-
tion, the text of which has already been set out in paragraph 33above, the
Greek Governmentitself, when invoking the General Act, drew attention
to thefact that both theGreekandTurkishinstruments of accessionto the
Act were accompanied by declarations, and categorically affirmed that
these declarations "are irrelevantto the present case". These declarations
containedreservations to theActmade respectivelybyGreeceandTurkey,
which arefor the most part without relevance to the present dispute. But
this isnot the casein regard to reservation(b)containedin thedeclaration
which accompanied Greece's instrument of accession; for in its observa-
tions of 25August 1976the Turkish Government unequivocally took the
position that,whether or not theGeneral Act isassumed to be stillinforce,
it is subject to a clause, i.e., reservation (b), which would exclude the
Court's competence with respect to the present dispute. The Turkish

Government there declared that in conforrnitywith Article 39,paragraph
3,of the Act, "Turkey opposes reservation (b)to the Greek Application".
In its furtherletter to the Registrar of 24April 1978the Turkish Govern-
ment informed the Court that it maintainedits viewthat the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain theGreekApplication for thereasons whichithad
explained in its earlier letter of 25August 1976.
40. The Court is thus confronted with a situation in which, evenif the
General Act is to be considereda conventionin force, its whole relevance
as a potential source of the Court's jurisdiction in amatter concerninga
coastal State's sovereign rights over the continental shelf is contested by
theTurkishGovernment. Clearly,if theTurkishGovernment's viewof the
effect of reservation(b)on the applicability of the Act as between Greece
and Turkey with respect to the subject-matter of the present dispute is
found by the Court tobe justified, a finding on the question whether the
Act is or is not a conventionin force today ceases to be essential for the
Court's decision regardingitsjurisdiction to entertain the present Appli-
cation. As was pointed out by the Court in the CertainNorwegianLoans
case, when its competence is challenged on two separate grounds, "the
Court is free to base its decision on the ground which in itsjudgment is
more direct and conclusive" (I. C.J.Reports 1957, p. 25). Accordingly,
taking account of thenature of the issueraised in thepresent proceedings
concerning the General Act, the Court will at once address itself to the

effect of reservation (b)on the applicability of the Act with respect to the
subject-matter of the present dispute.décidé ))ilest évidentquetout prononcésurla situation de l'Actede 1928
par lequel la Cour déclareraitquecelui-ciest ou n'estplusuneconvention
envigueurpourrait influencer lesrelationsd'Etats autresquelaGrèceetla

Turquie. Au surplus, en la présente instance, on a également soulevéla
question delapertinence réelledel'Actegénéralcomms eourcepossible de
juridiction de la Cour par rapport à l'objet du présent différend.Au
paragraphe 32,sous-paragraphe 1,de la requête,dont le textea été citéau
paragraphe 33ci-dessus,le Gouvernement de la Grècelui-mêmee ,n invo-
quant l'Acte générala,appelél'attention surlefait que lesinstruments grec
et turc d'adhésionà l'Actesont accompagnésde déclarationset a catégo-
riquement affirmé que ces déclarations sont sans pertinence en la pré-
sente espèce R. Lesdites déclarations comportent des réserves à l'Acte
formuléesrespectivement par la Grèce et par la Turquie, dont la plupart
n'intéressent pasle présent différend. Toutefoisil n'en va pas de même

pour la réserveb)quifiguredans ladéclarationaccompagnantl'instrument
d'adhésionde la Grèce;en effet,dans sesobservationsdu 25 août 1976,le
Gouvernement de laTurquie a indiqué sanséquivoqueque,indépendam-
ment dupoint de savoir sil'Actegénéralesrtéputé demeurerenvigueur,il
est affectéd'une réserve:la réserveb), qui excluraitla compétence de la
Courpourconnaître du présentdifférend.LeGouvernement delaTurquie
ajoute dans sa lettre que, conformément à l'article39, paragraphe 3, de
l'Acte,<<laTurquieinvoque la réserveb)contrelarequêteintroduite par la
Grèce o.Dans sa lettre ultérieureau Greffier du 24 avril 1978,le Gouver-
nement de la Turquie a déclaréqu'il maintenait que la Cour n'avait pas
compétence pour connaître de la requêtegrecque, pour les motifs déjà

exposésdans sa lettre du 25 août 1976.
40. La Cour est donc en présencede la situation suivante: à supposer
que l'Actegénéralsoit à considérer commeune conventionen vigueur,sa
pertinence mêmec ,ommesourceéventuelledecompétencedelaCourpour
connaître d'unequestionrelative auxdroits souverainsd'unEtat côtiersur
leplateau continental, est contestéeparleGouvernement de la Turquie. Il
est clair que, sila Courdevaittenirpour fondéela thèsedu Gouvernement
de la Turquie quant à l'effet de la réserveb) sur l'applicabilitéde l'Acte
entre la Grèceet la Turquie eu égard à l'objet du présent différend,il ne
seraitplusindispensable dedire sil'Acteestactuellementen vigueur avant
de pouvoir statuer sur la compétencede la Cour pour connaître de la

requête.Comme la Cour l'a soulignédans l'affaire relative à Certains
emprunts norvégiens, quand sa compétenceest contestéepour deux motifs
distincts,(la Cour estlibre de basersa décisionsur lemotif qui, selon elle,
est plus direct et décisif>(C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 25). En conséquence,
étantdonné lanature du problèmerelatif à l'Actegénéralque soulèvela
présente instance, la Cour examinera d'abord l'effet de la réserveb) sur
l'applicabilitédel'Acte à l'objet du présent différend. 18 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

41. The Greek Govemment has advanced the contention at the public
hearings that reservation(b) should, in any event, be left out of consider-
ation altogether by the Court because the question of its effect on the
application of the General Act with respect to thepresent dispute was not
raised by Turkeyas a preliminaryobjectionin conformity with Article 67
of theRulesof Court. Consequently, inits view,sinceTurkeyhas not filed
a preliminary objection in accordance with the conditions laid down in
Article 67 of the Rules, it cannot be regarded as having "enforced" the
reservation in conformity with Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General
Act.
42. TheGreekGovernment recognizesthat "the Court, whose jurisdic-
tion is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same
degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law" (Mav-
rommatisPalestine Concessions,P.C.Z.J.,SeriesA, No. 2,at p. 34);and also

that in previous cases where the respondent has not appeared, the Court
has taken into account al1theelementsbefore it, including those supplied
byextra-proceduralcommunicationsfromtherespondent,forthe purpose
of satisfying itself as to whether itsjurisdiction was established.It further
recognizes that, even when the respondent has not informed the Court of
its attitude, the Court hasproprio motu enquired into the possible objec-
tions to itsurisdiction in the case. It maintains, however, that in previous
cases the Court has never gone further than to take account of "objec-
tion~,~",legal arguments" or "contentions" advanced by therespondentor
conceived of by theCourt (cf.FisheriesJurisdiction, I.C.J.Reports1973,at
pp. 7-8;Nuclear Tests,1.C.J.Reports1974,at pp. 257and 461).It then asks
whether, in a caselike thepresent, the Court can go so far as to substitute
itself for the absent govemment by enforcingproprio motuin place of that
governmentthe reservation of the Applicant, thus assimilatingthe extra-
procedural expression of a desire to take advantage of the reservation to
the procedural expression of a decision to enforce it. To do so, the Greek
Government suggests,would be to take liberties with the provisions both

of Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General Act and of Article 67 of the
Rules.
43. The procedural objection advanced by Greece to reservation (b)'s
being taken into consideration does not appear to the Court to be convin-
cing.AccordingtotheinformationbeforetheCourt, no mention wasmade
of the General Act during thenegotiations,sothat thefirst mention of the
Act by Greece in the present dispute was in its Application filed on
10August 1976,with which it also filed a request for interim measures of
protection. It wasonly then that theTurkishGovernment had occasion to
consider its position regarding the application of the General Act to the
present dispute.On 18August 1976,theGreekand TurkishGovernments
wereinformed,inconformity withArticle 66,paragraph 8,of the Rules of
Court, that public hearings would open on 25August 1976to afford the
parties the opportunity of presenting their observations on the Greek
request for the indication of provisional measures. On 23August the 41. LeGouvernement dela Greceasoutenu à l'audiencequ'entout état
de cause la Cour ne devrait pas prendre en considération la réserve b),
parce que la question de sonincidencesurl'applicabilitéde l'Actegénéral
au présent différendn'avait pas étésoulevéepar la Turquie en tant qu'ex-

ception préliminairede la manièreprescritepar l'article 67 du Règlement
delaCour.Pour cegouvernement, par conséquent,laTurquie,n'ayant pas
déposéd'exceptionpréliminairedansles conditions prévues àl'article67
du Règlement, ne peut être considéréc eomme s'étant (<prévalue >>de la
réserveconformément àl'article 39, paragraphe 3, de l'Acte général.

42. Le gouvernement de la Grèce admet que (la Cour, exerçant une
juridiction internationale, n'est pas tenue d'attacheres considérations
de forme la mêmeimportance qu'elles pourraient avoir dans le droit
interne r)(Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, C.P.J.I. sérieA no2,
p. 34)etque,dans lesaffairesprécédentesoùledéfendeurn'apascomparu,

la Cour a pris en considération tous les élémentsdont elle disposait, y
compris ceux qui lui étaient fournis par des communications extra-judi-
ciaires du défendeur, afin de s'assurer qu'elle avait effectivementcompé-
tence. Ilreconnaît en outre que, mêmedans lescas où ledéfendeurn'apas
informé la Cour de son attitude, celle-ci a recherché d'office quelles
pouvaient êtreles objections éventuelles àsajuridiction. Le Gouverne-
ment de la Grèce affirmecependant que,dans les affairesprécédentes,la
Cour n'avaitjamais fait que tenir compte des objections, arguments ou
thèsesjuridiques avancéspar le défendeur ou envisagéspar la Cour (cf.
Compétenceen matière depêcheries,C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 7-8, et Essais
nucléaires,C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 257 et 461). Il demande alors si, en
l'espèce,laCourpeutallerjusqu'à sesubstituer augouvernement absent en
se prévalant d'office,àsa place, de la réservedu demandeur, assimilant

ainsi l'expression extra-judiciaire d'un désirde bénéficierde la réserve
l'expressionjudiciaire de la décisionde s'enprévaloir.Agir ainsiéquivau-
drait, selon le Gouvernement de la Grèce, à prendre des libertés avecles
dispositions tant de l'article 39, paragraphe 3, de l'Acte général, quede
l'article 67 du Règlement.
43. La Cour n'estime pas convaincante cette objection de procédure
opposée par la Grece à ce que soit prise en considération la réserveb).
D'aprèslesrenseignements dont la Cour dispose, la Grècen'afait aucune
allusionà l'Actegénéraa lu coursdes négociations,de sorteque c'estdans
sa requêtedéposéle e 10août 1976,qui étaitaccompagnéed'une demande
enindication demesuresconservatoires,que leGouvernement dela Grèce
a mentionné l'Actepour la première fois dans le présent différend.C'est
donc la première occasion qui ait étéofferte au Gouvernement de la

Turquie de définirson attitude au sujet de l'application de l'Acte général
au différend. Le 18août 1976 les Gouvernements de la Grèce et de la
Turquie ont étéavisésque,conformément à l'article66,paragraphe 8, du
Règlement,des audiencespubliquesauraient lieu àpartir du 25 août 1976
pour leur donner la possibilité de présenter leurs observations sur la 19 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Registrar, at the direction of the Court, informed theTurkishAmbassador
to the Netherlands that his Government had the right to address to the
Court in writingany observations that it mighthave on the Greek request.
It was in these circumstances that, by its letter of 25August 1976, the
Turkish Government transmitted to the Court the document entitled
"Observations of theGovernment ofTurkey on therequest by the Govern-
ment of Greece for provisional measures of protection dated The Hague,
10August 1976". In those observations the Turkish Government specifi-
cally referred to the right conferred upon it by Article 39,paragraph 3,of

the General Act to invoke Greece's reservation (b) on the basis of reci-
procity, and then stated: "In conformity with this provision, Turkey
opposes reservation (b)." In the viewof the Court, that forma1statement,
made in responseto a communication from the Court, must be considered
asconstituting an "enforcement" of thereservationwithin themeaning of,
and in conformity with, Article 39, paragraph 3, of the Act.

44. The Turkish Government, it is true, was not represented at the
public hearings on Greece's request for the indication of provisional
measures, and did not afterwards file a preliminary objection or take any
steps in the proceedings. But there is no provision in theRules of Court
which excludes the submission of written observations on a request for
provisionalmeasures; nor isthereanyprovision which excludestheraising
of questions ofjurisdiction in written observationssubmitted in proceed-
ings on theindication of provisionalmeasures.On the contrary, in viewof
theurgencyof arequestforprovisional measures,writtencommunications
not submitted through an agentbut eitherdirectly or through the Ambas-

sador in TheHague haveinvariably been admitted by theCourt; whileone
of the verypurposes of such communications has cornmonlybeen to raise
questions as to the competence of the Court with respect to the particular
case (Anglo-Zranian OilCo.,Z.C.J. Reports1951,p. 91 ;FisheriesJurisdic-
tion,I.C.J. Reports1972,pp. 14and 32;Nuclear Tests,1. C.J. Reports1973,
pp. 100and 136-137; Trial of Pakistani Prisonersof War, 1.C.J. Reports
1973, p. 329).
45. In the present case, the Turkish Government's observations were
immediatelycommunicated to the Greek Agent, and they werereferred to
by counsel for Greece during the hearings concerning the request for
interim measures. Indeed, counsel for Greece then expressly recognized
that by reason of the titleiven to the document theTurkish Government
had placed itself "within the context of Article 66, paragraph 8, of the
Rules of Court", adding:

"Thus, not only has an opportunity ofpresentingobservations been
given to Turkey, but Turkey has in fact, in the letter which it has sent
to the Court and in the document,availed itselfof that opportunity of
presenting observations." MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 19
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires de la Grèce.Le 23 août

leGreffier,sur lesinstructions de la Cour,afait savoiràl'ambassadeur de
Turquie aux Pays-Bas que son gouvernement avaitle droit d'adresser par
écritàla Cour lesobservations qu'ilpourrait avoir àfaire surla demande
dela Grèce.C'estdanscescirconstances que,par salettre du 25 août 1976,
le Gouvernement de la Turquie a transmis àla Cour le documentintitulé
(Observations du Gouvernement de la Turquie sur la demande en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoiresprésentéepar le Gouvernement de la
Grèce en date, à La Haye, du 10août 1976 )).Dans ces observations, ce

gouvernement viseexpressément ledroit que lui confèrel'article39,para-
graphe 3,de l'Acte générald'invoquerlaréserve b)de la Grècesurla base
de la réciprocité, et déclare : (Conformément à cette disposition, la
Turquie invoque la réserve b). La Cour estime que cette déclaration
formelle, faite en réponse à une communication de la Cour, doit être
considéréecomme revenant à se ((prévaloir de la réserve au senset en
application de l'article 39, paragraphe 3, de l'Acte.

44. 11estvraique leGouvernement delaTurquien'était pasreprésenté
aux audiencessur la demande en indication de mesures conservatoireset
n'a pas ensuitedéposéd'exceptionpréliminaire ni fait acte de procédure.
Mais aucune disposition du Règlementn'exclut la présentation d'obser-
vationsécritessur une demandeen indication de mesures conservatoires;
aucune n'interdit non plus de souleverdes questionsde compétencedans
des observations écritesprésentées ac uours d'uneprocédureyrelative.Au

contraire, étant donné l'urgence d'une demande concernant de telles
mesures, la Cour a toujours accepté les communications écritesqui lui
étaientsoumisesnon par l'intermédiaired'un agent mais soitdirectement,
soitpar lavoiedel'ambassadeur àLa Haye, alorsquesouventl'un desbuts
de cescommunicationsétait en fait de contester la compétencede la Cour
en l'espèce (Anglo-IranianOilCo.,C.I.J.Recueil1951,p. 91; Compétence
enmatière depêcheriesC , .I.J.Recueil 1972,p. 14et 32; Essaisnucléaires,
C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 100 et 136-137; Procèsde prisonniers de guerre

pakistanais, C.I.J. Recueil1973, p. 329).

45. Dans la présente affaire, les observations du Gouvernement de la
Turquie ont étéimmédiatement communiquées à l'agent de la Grèce et
elles ont étécitéespar les conseils de la Grèce au cours des audiences
concernant la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires.En fait
un conseil de la Grèce a expressément reconnu qu'en raison du titre
donné à ce document le Gouvernement de la Turquie s'étaitplacé (<dans
le cadre de l'article 66, paragraphe 8, du Règlement de la Cour )),

ajoutant:

(Ainsi, non seulement la possibilitéde présenter desobservations
a-t-elle étédonnée à la Turquie, mais la Turquie vient précisément,
dans la lettre qu'ellea adresséeà la Cour et dans ce document,faire
usage de cette possibilitéde présenterdes observations. )) 46. TheCourt itself, in its Order of 11September 1976took due notice
of the Turkish Govemment's obsemations (I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 5,
paras. 7 and 8). It also called attention to the invocation by Turkey of
reservation (b)in Greece'sinstrument of accession, and set out the text of
the reservation (ibid, p. 8, para. 19).In that Order, moreover, the Court
expressly stated that, "having regard to the position taken by theTurkish
Governmentin its observationscommunicated to theCourt on 26August
1976, that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Greek Applica-
tion", it was "necessary to resolve first of al1the question of the Court's
jurisdiction with respect to the case" (ibid.,p. 13,para. 45). Accordingly,
after givingitsfinding on the request forinterim measures, theCourt went
on to decide that the present proceedings should be addressed to "the
question of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the dispute".

47. In the proceduralcircumstances of the caseitcannotbe said that the
Court does not now have before it an invocation by Turkey of resemation

(b)whichconformstotheprovisions of theGeneral Act and of the Rules of
Court. Nor can it be said that the Court substitutes itself for the Turkish
Government if it now takes cognizance of a resemation duly invoked in
liminelitisin the proceedings on the request for interim measures. It would
not discharge its duty under Article 53of the Statute if it were to leaveout
of its considerationa reservation,theinvocation of which by the Respon-
dent wasproperlybrought toits noticeearlierinthe proceedings. It follows
that the Court has now to examine the scope of reservation (b) and its
application to the present dispute.

48. The text of the reservations in Greece's instrument of accession
reads as follows :

"Sont exclus des procédures décrites par l'Acte général, sansen
excepter celle de conciliation viséeà son chapitre 1:

a) lesdifférendsnésde faitsantérieurs,soit à l'adhésiondelaGrèce,
soità l'adhésiond'une autre Partie avec laquelle la Grèce vien-
drait à avoir un différend;
b) lesdifférendsportant surdesquestionsque le droit international
laisseà la compétence exclusive des Etats et, notamment, les
différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce,y compris
ceux relatifsàses droits de souverainetésur sesports et ses voies
de communication."

[Translation1

"The following disputes are excluded from the procedures de-
scribed in the General Act, including the procedure of conciliation
referred to in Chapter 1: MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 20

46. La Cour elle-même adûment pris notedesobservationsduGouver-
nement de la Turquie,dans sonordonnance du 11septembre 1976 (C.I.J.
Recueil1976,p. 5,par. 7et 8).Ellea aussiattirél'attention surlefaitquela

Turquie invoquait la réserveb) de l'instmment d'adhésionde la Grèceet
citéle texte de cette réserve (ibid, p. 8, par. 19). En outre, la Cour a
expressémentdéclarédans cette ordonnance qu'a eu égard à la position
prise par le Gouvernementturc dans sesobservationscommuniquées àla
Cour le 26août 1976 selon laquelle la Cour n'a pas compétence pour
connaître de la requêtegrecque il était(<nécessairede résoudre en
premier lieu la question de la compétencede la Cour en l'espèce (ibid.,
p. 13,par. 45).C'est pourquoi, après avoir statuésur la demande en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires,la Cour a décidé que l'instance actuelle
porterait sur<la question de la compétencede la Courpour connaître du

différend M.
47. Dans les circonstancesprocédurales de l'espèce,on ne saurait dire
que la Cour n'est pas en présenced'une invocation par la Turquie de la
réserve b) faite conformément aux dispositions de l'Acte générae lt du
Règlement de la Cour. On ne peut pas dire non plus que la Cour se
substitue au gouvernement de la Turquie si elle tient compte aujourd'hui
d'une réservedûment invoquée in limine litis dans la procédure sur la
demande en indication de mesuresconservatoires. La Cour ne s'acquitte-
raitpas desesresponsabilitésenvertu del'article53duStatut siellelaissait
en dehorsde son examen une réservedont l'invocationpar le défendeura

étédûmentportée àsaconnaissance àun stade antérieurdelaprocédure.Il
s'ensuitquela Cour doit maintenant examiner la portéede la réserveb)et
son application au présent différend.

48. Le texte des réservesfigurant dans l'instmment d'adhésion de la
Grèce est le suivant:

(<Sont exclus des procédures décrites par l'Acte général, sans en
excepter celle de conciliation viséeson chapitre 1:
a) lesdifférendsnésde faits antérieurs,soitàl'adhésion dela Grèce,
soitàl'adhésiond'uneautre Partie aveclaquellela Grèceviendrait
à avoir un différend;
b) lesdifférendsportant sur des questionsque le droit international

laisseà la compétence exclusive des Etats et, notamment, les
différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce,mpris
ceuxrelatifsàsesdroits desouverainetésursesports et sesvoiesde
communication. )) 21 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

(a) disputes resulting from facts prior either to the accession of
Greece or to the accession of another Party with whom Greece
might have a dispute;
(b) disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solelywithin thedomesticjurisdiction of States, and inparticular
disputes relating to the territorial statusof Greece, including
disputesrelating toitsights ofsovereigntyoverits ports and lines
of communication."

49. The Greek Government maintains on various grounds that reser-
vation (b)cannot be consideredas covering thepresent dispute regarding
the continental shelfof the Aegean Sea.One of thosegroundsconsists of a

contention that, when read correctlyaccordingtoits terms, reservation (b)
does not cover al1disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece but
only suchasboth relate toitsterritorialstatusand at thesametimeconcern
"questions which by international law are solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of States". On this basis, it argues that, as the delimitation of
the continental shelf cannot be considered a question "solely within the
domesticjurisdiction of States", the subject-matter of the present dispute
is not covered by reservation (b).Since this ground is based on an essen-
tiallygrammaticalinterpretation of thereservation,the Court willexamine
it first.

50. The grammatical argument hinges upon the interpretation of the
words "et,notamment,"("and in particular") which precede the reference
to "lesdifférends ayanttrait austatutterritorialdelaGrèce(disputesrelating
to the territorial status of Greece)".hose words are said by the Greek
Governmentto make itplain that the reference to "disputes relatingto the
territorial status of Greece" was not intended to designate an autonomous
category of disputes additional to the category of disputes concerning

matters solely within domestic jurisdiction. The effect of those words,
according to the Greek Government, is to show that in reservation (b)
"disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" are included within
the description of disputes concerning matters solely within domestic
jurisdiction, and are there mentioned merely as a particular example of
such disputes which it was desired to emphasize.
51. In support of this interpretation of the words "et,notamment,"the
Greek Government invokes the authority of Robert's Dictionnaire alpha-
bétiqueet analogique de la langue française (Vol. IV) which explains
"notamment"asmeaning "d'unemanièrequimérited'être notée"(in a way
which deserves to be noted), and adds in brackets: "sertleplus souvent à
attirer I'attentionsur un ouplusieursobjetsparticuliersfaisant partie d'un
ensembleprécédemmendtésigné ousous-entendu" (most often used to draw
attention to one or more particular objects forming part of a previously MERÉGÉE (ARRÊT)

49. Le Gouvernement de la Grèce soutient que pour plusieursraisons
l'on ne peut considérerle présent différendrelatif au plateau continental

de la mer Egéecomme l'un de ceux que vise la réserve b). L'une de ces
raisons est que, sil'onen interprète correctement les termes, la réservene
s'appliquepas à tous lesdifférendsrelatifsaustatut territorialde la Grèce,
mais uniquement à ceux qui, à la fois, ont traàtson statut territorial et
portent sur(<desquestionsque ledroitinternational laisse à lacompétence
exclusivedes Etats )).Partant de là, le Gouvernement de la Grèce affirme
que, la question de la délimitationdu plateau continental n'étant pas de

celles que l'on puisse considérer comme réservées <<à la compétence
exclusive des Etats )),l'objet du présent différend n'entre pasdans le
champ d'application de la réserve b). Cet argument reposant sur une
interprétation essentiellement grammaticale de la réserve,la Cour l'exa-
minera en premier lieu.

50. L'argument grammatical est axésur l'interprétation des mots << et,
notamment, précédantla mention des (<différendsayant trait au statut
territorial delaGrèce H.Cesmotsindiquentclairement, d'aprèsleGouver-
nement de la Grèce,qu'il ne s'agissaitpas de désignerpar cette mention
une catégoriede différends distincte, s'ajoutant à celle des différends
portant surdesquestionsquele droit international laisse à la compétence
exclusive des Etats. Selon le Gouvernement de la Grèce, il résultede la
présence desmots <et, notamment, 1)que, dans la réserveb), <<les diffé-

rends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce relèventde la catégorie
desdifférendsportant surdesquestionsque ledroitinternational laisse à la
compétence exclusive des Etats et qu'ils ne sont visésque comme un
exemple particulier de ces différends surlequel on voulait attirer l'atten-
tion.
51. A l'appui de cette interprétation des mots (<et, notamment, ))le
Gouvernement de laGrèceinvoquel'autoritédu Dictionnaire alphabétique

etanalogiquede la languefrançaise de Robert (vol. IV)qui définitle mot
notammentcomme signifiant <(d'une manièrequi mérited'être noté )eet
ajoute entre parenthèses <sert leplus souvent àattirerl'attention surunou
plusieurs objets particuliers faisant partie d'un ensemble précédemment
désignéou sous-entendu ))Le Gouvernement de la Grèce insisteensuite
particulièrement sur les exemples donnéspar Robert pour illustrer l'em-designatedorunderstood whole).Particularstressis then laidby theGreek
Government on the phrases given by Robert to illustrate the use of the
word notamment,in themajority ofwhichthewordispreceded bytheword
et, but still denotes merely a particular instance of a wider genus or
category. The GreekGovernmentalsocites sirnilarexarnplesof this use of
"et notamment"given in the Dictionnairede IAcadémiefrançaise and in
Littré,Dictionnaire de.lalanguefrançaise. On the basis of this linguistic
evidence, it maintains that the natural, ordinary and current meaning of
this expression absolutelyprecludestheGreek reservation from beingread
as covering disputes regarding territorial status in addition to, and quite
separatelyfrom, disputes regarding matters of domesticjurisdiction.
52. The grammatical interpretation of reservation (b) advanced by
Greece leads to a result which is legally somewhat surprising. Disputes
conceming matters of "domestic jurisdiction" and disputes relating to
"territorial status" are different concepts which, in treaty provisions,
includingArticle 39,paragraph 2, of the GeneralAct, and in reservations

to treaties or to acceptances ofjurisdictionunder Article 36,paragraph 2,
of the Statute, havebeen kept quite separate anddistinct.Furthermore,the
integration of "disputes relating toerritorial status" within thecategory of
disputes concerning matters of "domesticjurisdiction", largely deprives
the former of any significance. Consequently, only if the grammatical
arguments were compelling and decisive would the Court be convinced
that such is the effect which ought to be given to the words "et, notam-
ment," in reservation (b).But those arguments do not appear to the Court
to be so compelling as has been suggested.

53. In thefirst place, thegrammaticalargument overlooks thecommas
placed bothbeforeand after "notamment".To put the matter at its lowest,
one possible purpose of these commas rnight have been to make it clear
that in the phrase "et, notamment, lesdifférend''etc., the word "et" is
intended to be a true conjunctiveintroducing a category of "différends"
additional to those already specified.

54. Another point overlooked by the argument is that the meaning
attributed to "et,notamment,"by Greece is grammatically not the only,
although it may be the most frequent, use of that expression. Robert's
Dictionnaireitself goesno further than to Sayof theword notammentthat it
is "most often" used to drawattention to one of severalparticular objects
forrningpart of acollectivitypreviouslyindicated orimplied.The question
whether in the present instance the expression 'kt, notamment,"has the
meaning attributed to it by Greece thus depends on the context in which
those words were used in Greece's instrument of accession and is not a
matter simply of their preponderant linguistic usage. Even a purely gram-
maticalinterpretation of reservation (b),therefore, leaves open the possi-
bility that the words "et, notamment, les différendsayant trait au statut
territorialelaGrèce"wereintended to specifyan autonomous category of
disputes additional to those concerningmatters of domesticjurisdiction,ploi du mot notamment ; dans la plupart des exemples, ce mot est précédé
de et, mais n'en désignepas moins un simplecas particulier d'un genreou
d'une catégorieplusample.11cited'autres exemplesde cetemploi desmots

et notamment, tirésdu Dictionnaire delilcadémiefrançaise et du Diction-
nairedelalanguefrançaise de Littré.Partantde cesconsidérationslinguis-
tiques, leGouvernement de la Grèceaffirme que le sens naturel, ordinaire
etcourantde l'expressioninterdit absolumentd'interpréter la réservede la
Grècecomme applicable aux différendsayant trait au statut territorial en
plus et tout à fait indépendamment des différends portant sur des ques-

tions de compétenceexclusive.

52. L'interprétation grammaticale de la réserveb) présentéepar la
Grèce aboutit à un résultat quelque peu surprenant d'un point de vue
juridique. Lesdifférendsportant sur des questions de <(compétenceexclu-
sive )) et ceux qui ont trait au (statut territorial )) sont des concepts

dissemblablesqui, dans les dispositions des traités,y comprisl'article 39,
paragraphe 2, de l'Acte général,et dans les réservesaux traités ou aux
acceptations de la juridiction obligatoire en vertu de l'article 36, para-
graphe 2,du Statut, demeurent rigoureusement distincts.En outre l'inclu-
sion des tdifférendsayant trait au statut territorial )>dans la catégoriedes
différendsportant surdesquestions de (<compétenceexclusive ))prive en

grande partie la première formule de son sens. Par conséquent, pour
convaincre la Cour que tel est l'effet à attribuer aux mots << et, notam-
ment, ))de la réserveb),ilfaudrait que lesargumentsgrammaticauxsoient
sans répliqueet décisifs. Or la Cour estime qu'ils ne le sont pas autant
qu'on l'a donné à entendre.
53. En premier lieu l'argument grammatical ne tient pas compte des

virgulesquiencadrent lemot <(notamment o.Ilest àtout lemoinspossible
qu'elles aient servi à indiquer que, dans la formule <<et, notamment, les
différends )),le mot ((et)) était destiné à jouer le rôle d'une véritable
conjonctionintroduisant une catégoriede <différends enplus des autres
déjàcitées.

54. Un autre élémend tont l'argument netientpascompte estque lesens
attribuéaux mots ((et, notamment, par la Grècene représentepas d'un
point de vue grammatical le seul usagepossible de cette expression, même
s'ilestleplusfréquent.LedictionnaireRobert lui-mêmeseborne à diredu
mot notamment qu'ilsert <(leplus souvent ))à attirer l'attention sur un ou
plusieurs objets particuliers faisant partie d'un ensemble précédemment

désignéou sous-entendu. La question de savoir si, en l'occurrence, l'ex-
pression ((et,notamment, )alesensquelaGrècelui attribue dépenddonc
de son contexte dans l'instrument d'adhésion de la Grèce; ce n'est pas
simplementune question d'usage prépondérant de la langue. Mêmeune
interprétation purement grammaticale de la réserveb) n'écartepas la
possibilitéque le membre de phrase <et,notamment, les différendsayant

trait au statut territorial de la Grèce ait été destiné à spécifierune
catégorieindépendante de différendsen plus de ceux qui portent sur les23 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)
which were also specifically "excluded from the procedures described in
the General Act".

55. In anyevent, "the Court cannot base itselfon a purelygrammatical
interpretation of the text" (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., I.C.J. Reports 1952,
p. 104). A number of considerations of a substantive character point
decisively to the conclusion that resemation (b) in fact contained two
separate and autonomous reservations. One is that the making of reser-
vations to the General Act was expressly authorized and regulated by
Article 39,which allowedonlythereservations"exhaustivelyenumerated"
in paragraph 2 of the Article, namely:

"(a)Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accessioneither of the
Party makingthereservationor ofanyotherParty withwhomthe
said Party may have a dispute;
(b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solelywithin the domesticjurisdiction of States;
(c) Disputesconcerningparticular casesor clearlyspecifiedsubject-
matters, suchasterritorialstatus, ordisputesfallingwithinclearly
defined categories."

Whenamultilateraltreaty thusprovidesin advancefor themakingonlyof
particular, designated categories of resemations, there is clearly a high
probability, if not an actualpresumption, that reservationsmadein terms
used in thetreaty areintended torelate to thecorresponding categoriesin
the treaty.Nordoesthefact that theinstrument of accessionincludesin a
singleparagraph twocategoriesofdisputeswhicharelistedin thetreaty as
separate categories,by itself,in any way dirninishthat probability. When
making resemations under the General Act, States have not, as a rule,
meticulously followed the pattern of resemations set out in Article 39,
paragraph 2; and they have not infrequently grouped together in one
paragraph two or more reservations listed separatelyin the Act.
56. In the present instance, the very structure of reservation (b)hardly
seems consistent with an intention to make "disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece", whichare placed by the General Act in one
category,merelyan exampleof disputesconcerningquestions ofdomestic
jurisdiction, which are placed by the Act in a quite different category. If
that had beentheintention at thetime,it would havebeennatural for those

who drafted Greece'sinstrument of accessionto put the wordsy compris
(including) where the words et, notamment, (and in particular) in fact
appear in reservation (b)and the wordset, notamment,where the wordsy
compris are now found. But that is not how resemation (b) was
drafted.
57. A further consideration is that Greece's declaration accepting
compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause of the Statute of the
Permanent Court contained a provision which, indisputably, was an
autonomous resemation of "disputes relating to the territorial status of
Greece". That declaration, made on 12September 1929,only two years

24questions de compétence exclusive, lesquels étaient aussi expressément
(exclus des procédures décritespar l'Acte général >).
55. De toute manière la Cour ne saurait se fonder sur une interpré-
tation purement grammaticale du texte )>(Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., C.I.J.
Recueil 1952,p. 104).Nombre de considérationsde fond semblentmiliter
defaçon décisiveenfaveur de laconclusion quela réserveb)comprenait en

fait deux réservesdistincteset indépendantes. L'une de ces considérations
est que la possibilitéde fairedes réserves àl'Actegénérae lst expressément
autorisée et réglementéepar l'article 39, qui n'autorise que les réserves
(limitativement énumérées )>au paragraphe 2 de l'article, à savoir celles
qui concernent:

((a) les différendsnésde faits antérieurs, soit à l'adhésionde laPartie
qui formule la réserve, soit à l'adhésiond'une autre Partie avec
laquelle la première viendrait à avoir un différend;
b) lesdifférendsportant sur des questions que le droitinternational
laisse à la compétence exclusive des Etats;

c) lesdifférendsportant surdesaffairesdéterminéesou desmatières
spécialesnettement définies, telles que le statut territorial ou
rentrant dans des catégories bien précisées. )>

Quand un traitémultilatéral prévoit ainsique seules seront admises des
réservesde catégories déterminées spécialementdésignées,il existe évi-
demment une forte probabilité,sicen'estune véritableprésomption,pour
que lesréservesexpriméesdans des termes repris du traité soientdestinées
à s'appliquer aux catégoriescorrespondantes viséespar celui-ci. En soi,le
fait que l'instrument d'adhésion regroupedans un paragraphe uniquedeux

catégoriesde différends quisont distinctes dans le traité n'affaiblitnulle-
ment cetteprobabilité. D'ordinaire lesEtats qui ont formulédesréserves à
l'Acte général n'ont passuivi scrupuleusement le schéma de l'article 39,
paragraphe 2; ils ont assez souvent regroupé en un seul alinéa deux ou
plusieurs réservesprésentées séparémend tans l'Acte.
56. En l'espèce la structure mêmede la réserveb) ne semble guère

concorder avecl'intention deramener les différendsayant trait au statut
territorial de la Grèce )>,placésdans une catégoriepar l'Acte générala ,u
rang de simple exemple dedifférendsportant sur desquestions de compé-
tence exclusive, que l'Acte met dans une catégorietout à fait distincte. Si
telle avait été leur intention à l'époque,il aurait été normalque les rédac-
teurs de l'instrument d'adhésionde la Grèceemploient lesmots y compris

là où figurent en fait les mots ((et, notamment ))dans la réserveb), et les
mots et notamment là ou l'on trouve les mots ((y compris )>.Mais ce n'est
pas ainsi que la réservea étérédigée.

57. Une autre considération est que la déclaration d'acceptation de la
juridiction obligatoire faite par la Grèce en vertu de la disposition facul-
tative du Statut de la Cour permanente contient une clause qui est, sans

conteste, une réserveindépendante visant les ((différends ayant trait au
statut territorial de laGrèce )).Cette déclarationfaitele 12septembre 1929,
24before Greece's accession to the General Act, was stated to be subject to
two reservations:
"(a)disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece, including
disputesrelatingtoitsrights of sovereigntyoveritsports and lines
of communication;
(b) disputes relating directly or indirectlyto the application of trea-
tiesor conventions accepted by Greece and providing foranother
procedure".

It can hardly be supposed that Greece should at the same time have
intended to give a scope to its reservation of "disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece" which differed fundamentallyfromthat given
to it both in the General Act and in its declaration under the optional
clause. That Greeceshould have had such an intention seemsal1themore
improbable in that in 1934and again in 1939it renewed its declaration
under the optional clause without modifying in any way the form of its
reservation of "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece".

58. The Greek Government has suggested that an improvementin the
political climate of the time enabled Greece to dispense with an autono-
mous reservation ofdisputesrelating to itsterritorialstatus, and tocontent
itself with the integration of those disputes into its domestic jurisdiction
reservation. But this would not explain why Greece should then have
maintained an autonomous reservation of disputes relating to territorial
status in its acceptance of the optional clause. Another difficulty is that
accession to the General Act involved an even wider risk of claims than
acceptance of the optional clause;for the pacific settlementprocedures of
the GeneralAct are not limitedto the judicial settlement of legal disputes.
Theyalso provide forconciliation with respect todisputes "of everykind",
and even for the possibility, under certain conditions, of arbitration of
political disputes on the basis that the arbitrators may decide ex aequoet
bono.It hardly seemslikely,therefore,that Greeceshouldhave intendedto
have curtailedtheprotection givenby itsreservation of disputesrelating to
territorial status, when subjecting itself to the wider range of procedures
contained in the Act.

59. Equallyunconvincing isa suggestion that, althoughthe scope of the

"territorial status" reservation was reduced by its incorporation in the
reservation of questions of domesticjurisdiction,Greece thereby obtained
a "reinforced barrage", a "qualitatively enhancedprotection" and a "dou-
bly-bolted" door againstthe claims which it was particularlyconcernedto
guard against. This suggestion takesnoaccount of the legalimplicationsof
incorporating "disputes relating to territorial status" into a reservation of
questions of "domesticjurisdiction", as these had been explained by the
Permanent Court in 1923 in its .Advisory Opinion on the Nationality
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 4). The MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 24

deux ans seulement avant l'adhésion dela Grèce à l'Acte général,était
assortie de deux réservesqui visaient:

a) les différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce, y
compris ceux relatifs àses droits de souverainetésur sesports et
ses voies de communication;

b) les différendsayant directementou indirectement trait à l'appli-
cation des traités ou conventionsacceptés par elle et prévoyant
une autre procédure o.

On peut difficilement supposer que la Grèce ait voulu à la mêmeépoque
donner à sa réservedes <(différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la
Grèce une portée radicalement autre que celle qu'elle revêt aussi bien
dans l'Actegénéralquedanssadéclarationd'acceptationde la disposition
facultative. Que la Grèceaiteu cetteintention paraîtd'autant plusimpro-

bable qu'en 1934,puis en 1939,elle a renouvelé sadéclaration d'accepta-
tion deladispositionfacultativesans modifier lemoins du mondelaforme
de sa réservevisant les ((différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la
Grèce )).

58. Le Gouvernement de la Grèce a indiqué qu'une améliorationde
l'atmosphère politique à l'époqueavait permis à la Grèce de ne pas
formulerde réserveindépendante pour lesdifférendsayant trait au statut
territorial et de seborner à faire entrer ceux-cidans sa réservede compé-
tence exclusive. En ce cas on ne s'expliquepas pourquoi la Grèce aurait
conservéune réserveindépendante relative aux différends ayant trait au

statut territorial dans son acceptation de la disposition facultative. Une
autre difficultéest que l'adhésion à l'Acte général expose un Etat à un
risque de réclamations plus grand que l'acceptation de la disposition
facultative,car lesprocéduresde règlementpacifiquedesdifférendsinsti-
tuéespar l'Actene sontpas limitéesaurèglementjudiciaire des différends
juridiques. Elles visent aussi la conciliationpour les différends ((de toute

nature )et même lapossibilité,dans certainesconditions, desoumettre des
différendspolitiques à des arbitres ayant la facultéde statuer ex aequoet
bono.Il sembledonc peu probable que,quand elle s'estsoumise à toute la
gamme des procéduresviséespar l'Acte, la Grèce ait entendu réduire la
protection fournie par sa réservedesdifférendsayant trait au statut terri-
torial.

59. Tout aussi peu convaincante estl'idéeque,même se illerestreignait
la portée dela réservede statut territorial >)en l'incorporant àla réserve
desquestions de compétenceexclusive,la Grèce obtenait par là un <(bar-
rage renforcé )),((une protection qualitativement renforcée ))et (un
double verrouillage ))opposésaux revendications contre lesquelles elle
cherchait tout particulièrement à se prémunir. Cette explication ne tient

pas comptedesimplicationsjuridiques del'incorporation des <différends
ayant trait au statut territorial)à une réserveportant sur lesquestions de
((compétenceexclusive O,vu les précisionsapport6.e~par la Cour perma-
nente dans son avis consultatif de 1923 sur les Décretsde nationalité25 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Permanent Court there observed that the question whether a certain
matter is or is not solely within thejurisdiction of a State is an essentially
relative question and depends upon "the development of international
relations". It pointed out that aatter whch is not, in principle,regulated
by international law and is thus a matter within the State's domestic
jurisdiction, will cease to be such if the State has undertaken obligations
towardsother States with respect to that matter. Consequently, and in the
light of historicalcircumstances now tobe described, it is hardly conceiv-
able that Greece intended to reduce the scope of its "territorial status"
reservation by integrating it into its "domestic jurisdiction" reserva-
tion.
60. Greece'smain preoccupationin the yearsfollowing theFirst World
War, so the Court was informed, was to guard against the revival of
Bulgarian aspirations to recover direct access to the Aegean Sea which it

had lost as a result of the territorial changeseffected by the peace treaties.
BytheTreaty of Neuilly of 27November 1919,Bulgariahad renounced al1
its rights and titles over areas of Thrace, but the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers at the same time "undertook to ensure the economic
outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea" (Art. 48).Article4 of theTreaty of
Sèvresof 10August 1920relating to Thrace, put into force by Protocol
XVI of theLausanneConference, provided that Greece "in order to ensure
to Bulgaria free access to the Aegean Sea" recognized her freedom of
transit "over the tenitories and in the ports assigned to Greece under the
present Treaty". The expectation that Bulgaria might seek to secure a
revision of this territorial settlement was the source of Greece's preoccu-
pation and, also, as will be shown shortly, its motive for inserting in its
declaration under the optional clause a reservation of disputesrelatingto
its territorial status. In thepresentconnection,however, what needs to be
emphasized is that the territorial settlement,againstthe revision of which
Greece's "territorial status" reservation was designed to provide a safe-

guard, consisted essentially of a complex of rights and obligations estab-
lished by treaties.Consequently, having regard to the implications of the
Nationality Decrees Opinion, that territorial settlement was by its very
nature one which could not legally be considered as capable of falling
within theconcept of questions of domesticjurisdiction. It follows that, by
integrating its territorialstatus reservation into its reservation ofquestions
of domesticjurisdiction, Greece would automatically have deprived itself
of theprotection which theformer reservation would othenvise have given
it against attempts to use theGeneral Act asa means of effecting arevision
of the territorial settlement established by the peace treaties.

61. This basic objectionto theGreek Government's wayof interpreting
reservation (b) is not removed by another suggestion made in the public
hearings. This was that the series of treatiesconnected with the territorial
arrangements and the treatment of rninorities provided their own special
procedures for thesettlement of disputes, which had priority over those ofpromulguésen Tunisieet au Maroc(C.P.J.I.sérieB no 4).La Cour perma-
nente afait observer dans cet avisquela question de savoirsiune certaine
matière entre ou n'entre pas dans le domaine exclusifd'un Etat est essen-
tiellement relativeet dépenddu (développementdesrapports internatio-
naux o.Elleasoulignéqu'unematièrequin'estpasen principe réglép earle
droit international et relèvepar conséquentde la compétenceexclusivede
l'Etat cessedelefaire sil'Etat a pris, enla mêmematière,desengagements

envers d'autres Etats. Cela étant,et euégard auxcirconstanceshistoriques
qui vont êtrerappelées ci-après, on a quelque peine à concevoir que la
Grèceait entendurestreindrelaportée desaréservede (statut territoria))
en l'incorporant à sa réservede (compétenceexclusive )).
60. Dans les années qui ont suivi la première guerre mondiale, la
préoccupationessentiellede la Grèce,d'aprèslesindicationsdonnées à la

Cour, a étéde se prémunircontre une résurgencedes aspirations de la
Bulgarie à retrouver l'accèsdirect à la mer Egéequ'elle avait perdu à la
suitedesremaniementsterritoriauxopéréspar lestraitésde paix. Envertu
du traité deNeuilly signéle 27novembre 1919,la Bulgarieavaitrenoncé à
tous ses droits et titres sur certains territoires de la Thrace, mais les
principales Puissances alliéeset associées (<s'engage[aient]))en même
temps ((àceque lalibertédesdébouchéé s conomiquesdela Bulgariesurla
mer Egée[fût]garantie (art.48).L'article4du traitéde Sèvresdu 10août
1920relatif à la Thrace, mis en vigueur par le protocole XVI de la confé-

rence de Lausanne, prévoyait qu'(<en vue d'assurer à la Bulgarie le libre
accès à la mer Egée 1la Grèce reconnaissaitsa libertéde transit (<sur les
territoires et dans lesports attribuéslaGrèceenvertu du présent traité )).
Ce qui préoccupait la Grèce étaitla crainte que la Bulgarie ne cherche à
obtenir unerevisiondecerèglementterritorial; commeon leverraci-après,
ce même soucil'a poussée à insérer dans sa déclaration en vertu de la
dispositionfacultativeune réserverelativeauxdifférendsayant trait a son
statut territorial.l convient toutefois de souligner à cet égard que le

règlementterritorial, que la Grèceentendait mettre à l'abri d'unerevision
enformulantla réservedestatut territorial,consistaitpour l'essentielenun
ensemble complexe de droits et d'obligationsétablispar traités. Dèslors,
étantdonnéles implications de l'avisconsultatif sur les Décrets de natio-
nalité,cerèglementterritorial, par sa nature même,ne pouvait êtreconsi-
déréjuridiquementcomme relevant du domaine de la compétenceexclu-
sive.Il s'ensuit qu'enincorporant sa réservedestatut territoriaàsaréserve
des questions de compétenceexclusive la Grèce se privait automatique-
ment delaprotectionquelapremière decesdeuxréservesluiauraitassurée

contre toutetentative de seservirdel'Actegénérap lour obtenir larevision
du règlementterritorial établi par les traitésde paix.
61. Cette objection fondamentale à l'interprétation quele Gouverne-
ment de la Grèce donne de la réserve b) n'est pas écartéepar un autre
argumentquia été avancé àl'audience. Celui-ciconsiste àdireque la série
de traitésserapportant auxarrangementsterritoriaux et au traitement des
minorités prévoyaient, pour le règlement des différends, leurs propresthe General Act under Article 29, so that an autonomous reservation of
disputes relating to territorial status was not really indispensable to
Greece. The difficulty with this suggestion, however, is that these proce-
dures by no means covered al1possibleclaimsrelating to territorial status
and to rights of sovereignty over ports and lines of communication. It is
true that the Treaty of Neuilly provided for recourse to the Permanent
Court or to other methods of pacific settlement on questions relating to
minorities and certain other matters, but special procedures were never
established for the settlement of disputes concerning the parts of the
Treaty dealing with Bulgaria's economic outlet to the Aegean Sea.

62. The Court is not, therefore,convinced by the several explanations

which have been put fonvard to account for the difference between
Greece's territorial status reservationin its declarationnder the optional
clause and that in its instrument of accession to the General Act, if the
latter instrument is given the meaning contended for by Greece. It also
appears significant that no support for any of these explanations can be
found inthecontemporary evidenceplacedbeforethe Court relating to the
making of Greece's declaration under the optional clausein 1929and to
thedeposit ofits instrument of accessionin 1931.Thisevidencewillnowbe
examined.

63. During the public hearings on its request for interim measures,the
Greek Government submitted to the Court a document referred to by
counsel as "the travauxpréparatoires of the reservation". This was a letter
addressed by M. Politis to the Greek Foreign Minister on 9 September
1928, setting out the reservations which he recommended that Greece
should make to its acceptance of thePermanent Court'sjurisdiction under
the optional clause. M. Politis was at that time the Rapporteur for the
drafting oftheGeneralAct which wasthen nearingcompletion,andinthat
letter he said,inter afia:

"1 think that it would be wise to safeguard ourselves against an
eventual application of Bulgaria on matters related to Ourterritorial
status, to the access(of Bulgaria) to the Aegean and to theprotection
of Bulgarian-speakingminorities in Greece."

He went on to suggest a possible text of a declaration to give effect to his
recommendation whch contained the following three reservations:
(a) disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece;
(b) disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of

communication;
(c) disputes for the settlement of which the treaties signed by it provide
another procedure. MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 26

procéduresspéciales,lesquellesavaientpriorité sur cellesde l'Actegénéral
en vertu de son article 29,desorte qu'iln'était pasvraimentindispensable
à la Grècede formulerune réserveindépendante pour lesdifférendsayant
traità son statut territorial. Cet argument se heurte toutefoàsune diffi-
culté:lesprocéduresdont il s'agitne s'appliquaientnullement à la totalité
des demandespouvant mettre en cause le statut territorial et les droits de
souverainetésur les ports et voies de communication. Il est exact que le

traitéde Neuilly prévoyaitle recours à la Cour permanente ou àd'autres
méthodesde règlementpacifiquepour des questionsconcernant lesrnino-
ritéset certains autres sujets, mais il n'a jamais étéétablide procédure
spécialepour le règlementdesdifférendsrelatifs aux clauses du traité sur
les débouchéséconomiquesde la Bulgarie en mer Egée.
62. La Cour n'est donc pas convaincue par les raisons diverses qui ont
étéavancéespour expliquer la différenceentre les réservesdestatut terri-
torial de la Grècefigurant respectivement dans sa déclarationen vertu de
la dispositionfacultative et dans son instrument d'adhésionà l'Actegéné-
ral, sil'ondonne àcedernierinstrument lesensquelui attribue la Grèce.11

paraît également significatif que rien dans les documents de l'époque
communiqués à la Cour au sujet de l'élaboration de la déclaration d'ac-
ceptation de la disposition facultative faite parla Grèce en 1929 et du
dépôtde soninstrument d'adhésionen 193 1ne corrobore cesexplications.
Il convient maintenant d'examiner les documents en question.

63. Au coursdes audiencespubliquessur sa demandeen indication de
mesures conservatoires, le Gouvernement de la Grècea communiqué àla
Cour un document qui traduirait, selon l'un de ses conseils, le(<travaux
préparatoiresde la réserveo.Il s'agitd'une lettre de M. Politis au ministre
des affairesétrangèresde Grèce,en date du 9septembre 1928,indiquant

les réservesdont la Grèce devait, selon lui, assortir son acceptation de la
compétencede la Cour permanente en vertu de la dispositionfacultative.
M. Politisétaità l'époquerapporteur de l'Actegénérald , ont la rédaction
étaitsur le point de s'achever; il écrivaiten particulier:
((Ilserait sagede nous prémunircontreunerequêteéventuelledela

Bulgarie sur des questions relativesnotre statut territoriaà,l'accès
de la Bulgarieàla mer Egéeet àlaprotection des minoritésdelangue
bulgare vivant en Grèce. ))
M.Politisproposait ensuite un projet de déclarationdestiné àdonner effet

à sa recommandation et comportant trois réservesqui visaient:
a) les différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce,
b) les différends relatifà ses droits de souverainetésur ses ports et ses
voies de communication,
c) les différends pour le règlement desquels les traités signéspar elle

prévoient une autre procédure. 64. That letter confirms in the clearest mannertheGreekGovernment's
explanation of its motive in introducing a "territorial status" reservation
into its declaration under the optional clause. But it also shows that this

reservation was originally conceived of and formulated as a specific and
autonomous reservation. In the actual declaration the second reservation,
"disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of
communication", wastacked on to, and specifically"included" in,thefirst
reservation of "disputes relating to territorial status". The reason, no
doubt, was that the disputes covered by the second reservation were
realized to becases of "disputes relatingtotheterritorialstatus of Greece".
At any rate, this changein the presentation of the first and second reser-
vations only served to emphasize both the generic and the autonomous
character of Greece's reservation of disputes relating to its "territorial
status". Another point which may be deduced from M. Politis's letter is
that he clearly did not think a reservation of disputesfor the settlement of
which treaties provided another procedure would necessarily cover al1
disputes relating to Greece's "territorial status"; otherwise, he would not
have recornrnended the inclusion of two separate, autonomous reserva-
tions to cover specifically each of these two categories of disputes.

65. In response to a question put by the Court on 9 October 1978,the
Greek Government subrnitted certain interna1 documents relating to the
preparation of Greece'sinstrument of accession to theGeneral Act. These
documentsincluded a first draft of theprojet de loi to be presented to the
GreekChambredesdéputésfor ratification of theinstrument of accession,
the text of theprojet de loi as finally presented, and the exposé des motifs
explainingthe projet de loi to the Chambre des députés;al1of the docu-
ments being accompanied by certified translations into the French
language.
66. The Court considers that the intention to make an autonomous
reservationas to matters relating to territorial status is put beyond doubt
by the explanation of the reservation which was given by the Government
to the Chambre des députés in the exposédes motifs accompanying the
projet de loi. The final paragraph of this document stated:

"We havejudged itnecessary to proceed tothat accessionsubjectto

certain reservations. The latter are those enumerated in Article 2 of
the projet de loi submitted, and consist, on the one hand, of the
repetition of one of the two reservations we formulated when we
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court-reser-
vation (b)-the other being establishedin Article 29 of the Act; and,
on theother hand, of thereservationsenumeratedinArticle 39of the
Act." 64. Cette lettre confirme on ne peut plus clairement l'explication
donnéepar le Gouvernement de laGrècede laraisonpour laquelleil avait

fait figurer une réservede <(statut territorialdans sadéclarationen vertu
de la dispositionfacultative. Mais ellemontre aussi quecette réserveétait
initialement conçue et formulée comme une réserve spécialeet indépen-
dante. Dans le texte définitifde la déclaration,ladeuxièmeréserve,visant
<(les différends relatifs [aux] droits de souveraineté[de la Grèce]sur ses
ports etsesvoiesdecommunication ))aété rattachée à lapremièresur <<es
différends ayant trait au statut territorial))et a étéexpressément <(com-
prise )>dans cettepremière réserve.La raison en est sansaucun doute que

l'on s'étaitrendu compte que les différendsviséspar la deuxièmeréserve
étaient desexemples de (différendsayant trait au statut territorial de la
Grèce )).En tout cas ce changement de présentation des première et
deuxièmeréservesne faisait que mettre en évidencele caractère à la fois
génériqueet indépendant de la réservegrecque des différendsayant trait
au <statut territorial))Un autre élémentpeut être déduitde la lettre de
M. Politis: d'après luiune réserveexcluant lesdifférendspourlesquelsdes

traités prévoyaientune autre procédure de règlement n'engloberait pas
nécessairementtous ceux qui avaient trait au (<statut territorial))de la
Grèce; s'ilavait étéd'un autre avis, il n'aurait pas recommandéde faire
figurer dans la déclaration 'deux réservesdistinctes et indépendantes,
visant spécifiquementchacune de ces deux catégoriesde différends.
65. En réponse àune question poséepar la Cour le 9 octobre 1978,le
Gouvernement de la Grèce a déposécertains documentsinternesconcer-

nant lapréparation del'instrumentd'adhésiondelaGrèce al'Actegénéral.
Aunombre decesdocumentsfigurent unepremièreversionduprojet deloi
qui devait être présenté à la Chambre des députésgrecque aux fins de la
ratification de l'instrument d'adhésion, letexte du projet de loi tel qu'il a
étéfinalementprésenté e,t l'exposédesmotifsexpliquant leprojet de loi a
laChambredesdéputés; touscesdocumentssont accompagnésde traduc-
tions certifiéesexactes en langue française.
66. La Cour estime que l'explication de la réserve donnée par le

Gouvernement de la Grèce à la Chambre des députésdans l'exposé des
motifsaccompagnant leprojet de loi lève lesdoutesqu'on pourrait encore
avoir au sujet de sonintention de faire une réserveindépendante pour les
questionsayant trait au statut territorial. Ledernieralinéadecedocument
se lit comme suit:

(Nous avons jugénécessairede procéder a cette adhésion sous
certaines réserves. Celles-cisont cellesquisont énumérées àl'article2
du projet de loi soumis, et consistent, d'une part, en la répétitionde
l'une des deuxréservesque nous avons formuléesquand nous avons
accepté la compétence obligatoirede la Cour permanente (réserve
souslettre b)),l'autreétantétabliedansl'article29del'Acte,etd'autre
part, dans les réservesénumérées à l'article39 de l'Acte.As the Greek Agent confirmedin reply to a questionput by theCourt, the
words "the repetition of one of the two reservations which we formulated
when we accepted the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Permanent Court"
referunequivocally tothe reservation of "territorialstatus" already used in
Greece's declaration under the optional clause and thus already known to
the Chambre des députés.Theprojet de loi was approvedwithout discus-
sion and without change, so that reservation (b)must be presumed to have

been included in Greece's instrument of accession on the basis of the
explanations given in the exposé des motifs.
67. Accordingly, when theChambre desdéputésauthorized thedeposit
of Greece'sinstrument of accession to theGeneral Act, it could only have
believed that Greece was making its accessionsubject toprecisely the same
reservation of disputesrelatingtoitsterritorial status as the Chambrehad
previously authorized for its declaration under the optional clause. It
seems reasonable to assume that, if any change had been intended in the
scope of the "territorial status" reservation, to which particular impor-
tance was attached by Greece, some indication and explanation of that
change would have been includedin the exposédesmotifs.But there is no
evidence of such a change of intention eitherin the exposédes motifsor in
any other contemporary document before the Court.

68. Having regard to the several considerations which have been
mentioned by the Court, as well as to the explanation of reservation (b)
given in the exposé des motifs,the Court feels bound to conclude that the
wording of reservation (b)did not have the effect of integrating the reser-
vation of disputes relating to territorial status into the reservation of

disputes concerningquestions of domestic jurisdiction. On the contrary,
the Court finds that reservation (b) comprises two reservations, one of
disputes concerning questions of domestic jurisdiction and the other a
distinctand autonomousreservation of "disputes relatingto theterritorial
status of Greece, including disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty
over itsports and lines of communication". Accordingly, it is on this basis
that the Court will now consider the application of reservation (b) to the
present dispute. Moreover, as only this autonomous reservation of
disputes relating to territorial status is relevant in connection with the
present dispute, any further reference to reservation (b)by the Court will
be exclusively to the second part which concerns disputes relating to
Greece's territorial status.

69. The Greek Government maintains that a restrictive viewhas to be
taken of themeaning of the expression "disputes relatingto theterritorial

status of Greece" in reservation (b)by reason of the historical context in
which that expression was incorporated into the reservation. In thisCommel'agent de la Grècel'a confirméen réponse à une question de la
Cour, les mots <<la répétitionde l'une des deux réservesque nous avons
formuléesquand nous avons acceptéla compétenceobligatoirede la Cour
permanente ))visent sans équivoquepossible la réservede ((statut terri-
torial))quifiguraitdéjàdansla déclarationfaitepar la Grèceau titre de la
dispositionfacultativeetquela Chambre desdéputésconnaissaitdonc.Le
projet deloi ayant étéapprouvé tel quelsansdébat,ilfaut supposerque la
réserve b)a étéinsérée dans l'instrument d'adhésionde la Grèceau vu des

explicationsdonnées dans l'exposédes motifs.
67. Ainsi, quand la Chambre des députés a autoriséle dépôtde l'ins-
trument d'adhésionde la Grèce à l'Acte général, ce nepouvait être que
parce qu'elleétait persuadéequela Grècesubordonnait son adhésion àla
même réserve exactement, celle des différends ayant trait à son statut
territorial, qu'elleavait auparavant autoriséepour la déclaration d'accep-
tation de la dispositionfacultative.Il paraît raisonnable de penser que, si
l'on avait voulu apporter une modification quelconque au champ de la
réservede <(statut territoriaO,à laquelle la Grèce attachait une impor-
tanceparticulière,l'exposé desmotifsauraitcontenu desindications etdes

explications à ce sujet. Or on ne trouve aucune trace d'un pareil change-
ment d'intention, que ce soit dans l'exposédes motifs ou dans tout autre
document contemvorain soumis à la cour.
68. Eu égardauxdiverses considérationsque la Cour a évoquéesa ,insi
qu'àl'explicationde la réserve b)donnéedans l'exposédesmotifs,la Cour
nepeut queconclure que lestermes dans lesquelselleest libelléen'ont pas
eu pour effet d'intégrer laréserve desdifférends ayant trait au statut
territorialà celle des différends portant sur les questions de compétence
exclusive.La Cour constate au contrairequela réserve b)consisteen deux

réserves,l'une visantlesdifférendsportant surlesquestions decompétence
exclusive et l'autre, qui est une réservedistincte et indépendante, <(les
différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce, y compris ceux
relatifsà ses droits de souverainetésur ses Dorts et ses voies de commu-
nication )).C'est donc en partant de cette 'constatation que la Cour va
maintenant examiner si la réserve b) s'applique au présent différend. En
outre, attenduque cette deuxièmeréserveindépendanteestla seulequisoit
pertinente pour leprésent différend,toutemention de la réserve b)dans la
suite du présent arrêt doit êtrceomprise comme ne visant que la seconde

partie de la réserve,relative aux différendsayant trait au statut territorial
de la Grèce.

69. Le Gouvernement de la Grèce soutient que les mots <<différends

ayant trait au statut territorial delaGrèce),quifigurent dans la réserveb),
doivent recevoirune interprétation restrictiveen raison du contextehisto-
rique dans lequel ces mots y ont étéintroduits. A cet égard, il invoque laconnection,it invokes thejurisprudence of this Court and the Permanent
Court concerning the interpretation of unilateral declarations of accep-
tance of the Court's jurisdiction (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., I.C.J. Reports
1951, p. 104; Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 15,p. 22; PhosphatesinMorocco,P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 74,pp. 22-
24). According to thisjurisprudence it is indeedclear that in interpreting
reservation (b)regard must be paid to the intention of the Greek Govern-
ment at the time when it deposited its instrument of accession to the
General Act; and it was with that jurisprudence in rnind that the Court
asked the Greek Government to furnish it with any available evidence of
explanations of the instrument of accession given at that time.
70. The Court has already referred to M. Politis's letter to the Greek
ForeignMinister of9September 1928settingout the reservationswhichhe
recommended Greece should make to its declaration under the optional
clause of Article 36of the Statute. One of his recommendationsconcerned
"disputesrelating to theterritorialstatus of Greece" and another "disputes
relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports andlines of communi-
cation". The Greek Governmentis thereforejustified in asking the Court

to conclude that it was the samemotivewhichinspiredtheir inclusion also
in reservation (b)of Greece's accessionto theGeneral Act. It goesfurther,
however,and asks theCourt to interpret reservation (b)in the light of that
motive, soas to restrictits scope to matters of territorial status connected
with attempts to revise the territorial arrangements established by the
peace treaties of the First World War. Moreover, in support of this inter-
pretation of reservation (b),the GreekGovernmenthas alsolaid stress on
the general historical context in which reservations of questions re-
lating to territorial status had come into use in the League of Nations
period.

71. Disputes concerningterritorial status were expressly mentioned in
Article 39,paragraph 2, of the General Act as an example of the "clearly
specified subject-matters"in regard to which reservationsto the Act were
to be perrnitted. Consequently,it is reasonableto presume that there is a
closelinkbetween theconcepts of territorial status in theGeneral Act and
in Greece'sinstrument of accession to it; and that presumption is al1the

stronger when it is recalled that M. Politis was the Rapporteur for the
drafting of the General Act as well as the author of the letter of 9 Sep-
tember 1928whch prompted Greece'srecourse to a reservation under the
optional clauserelatingto territorial status. Thus, the meaning with which
theexpression "territorial status" wasusedin Article 39of theGeneral Act
may clearly have a bearing on its meaning in Greece's instrument of
accession.
72. Counselfor Greece went intothe historical evidencein detail more
especially the use of the expression in the numerous bilateral treaties ofjurisprudence de la Cour et celle de la Cour permanente au sujet de
l'interprétation des déclarations unilatérales d'acceptationde la compé-
tence (Anglo-IranianOil Co.,C.I.J. Recueil1951,p. 104;Droits des mino-
ritésen Haute-Silésie (écoles minoritaires), .P.J.I. sérieno15, p. 22;
PhosphatesduMaroc,C.P.J.I.sérieA/B no74,p. 22 à24).De fait, ilressort

clairement de cette jurisprudence que, pour interpréter la réserveb), il
convient de prendre en considération l'intention du Gouvernement de la
Grèce àl'époque où celui-cia déposéson instrument d'adhésion à l'Acte
général.C'est en effet compte tenu de cettejurisprudence que la Cour a
demandé à ce gouvernement de lui fournir tous les élémentsdont il
disposait au sujet des explications données à l'époque relativement à
l'instrument d'adhésion.
70. LaCoura déjàévoquéla lettrede M. Politisau ministre des affaires
étrangèresde Grèce en date du 9septembre 1928,énonçantles réserves
qu'ilsouhaitait voir stipuler par laGrècedans sadéclarationenvertu dela
dispositionfacultative del'article 36du Statut. Une desrecommandations
de M. Politis concernait le<différendsayant trait au statut territorial de
la Grèce >)et une autre le<différendsrelatifà sesdroits de souveraineté

sursesportset voiesdecommunication );leGouvernement delaGrèceest
donc justifiéà demander à la Cour de conclure que leur inclusion dans
la réserveb)à l'adhésionde la Grèceà l'Acte générasl'inspirait également
du motif qui vient d'êtreindiqué. Il ne s'en tient cependant pas là et
demande àla Cour d'interpréter laréserveb) en fonction de ce motif, de
manière àréduirele champ d'application de la réserveaux questions de
statut territorialquiseraient misesencausepar destentatives dereviser les
arrangementsterritoriauxétablispar lestraitésdepaix signésàl'issuedela
premièreguerre mondiale. En outre, pour appuyer cetteinterprétation de
la réserveb), le Gouvernement de la Grèce insiste aussi sur le contexte
historiquegénéraldans lequell'usagederéservesportant sur desquestions
ayant trait au statut territorial s'étaitinstaurépoquede la Sociétédes

Nations.
71. Les différendsportant sur le statut territorial étaient expressément
visés àl'article 39, paragraphe 2, de l'Acte général comme exempledes
<<matièresspécialesnettement définies à l'égard desquelleslesréserveà
l'Acte étaient autorisées. On peut donc raisonnablement supposer qu'il
existeun lienétroitentre lesnotions destatut territorial dans l'Actegénéral
et dans l'instrument d'adhésionde la Grèceà cet Acte; cetteprésomption
se trouve encorerenforcée si l'on considèrequeM. Politis, rapporteur de
l'Acte général,était aussi l'auteurde la lettre du 9septembre 1928qui a
amenélaGrèce àsubordonnersonacceptationdeladispositionfacultative
à une réserve relativeau statut territorial. Ainsi, le sens dans lequel l'ex-
pression <<statut territori>étaitutiliséeà l'article 39 de l'Acte général

n'est sans doute pas sans rapport avec celui qu'il avaitdans l'instrument
d'adhésionde la Grèce.
72. Les conseils de la Grècese sont livrésun examen approfondi des
données historiqueset en particulier de l'emploide l'expressiondans les30 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

pacific settlement of the inter-war period, and in the proceedings of the
League of Nations connected with the drafting of the Locarno Protocol.
The propositions which theyadvancedon the basis of that evidencewere,
briefly,asfollows.First, thereasonfor theappearance ofexpressions such
as"territorial status", "territorial integrity", "territorial situation", "main-
tenance of frontiers" in treaties of the period, whether in the context of
reservations to pacific settlement provisions, or of territorial guarantees,
was a prevailingapprehension of attempts to modify the post-war settle-
ments. Secondly, although the actual expressionsused might Vary,their
meaning wasessentiallythe same,namelyterritorial situationsor régimes

established by treaties. Thirdly, when the expression "territorial status"
occurred in reservations to treaties of pacific settlement, what the States
had in mind was "disputes which were likelyto arise out of territorial
claims by neighbours dissatisfiedwith existingsolutions". Indeed, itwzs
said that the term "territorial status" in those reservationswas simply "a
'code-word'for intangibility of thefrontiers and territorial statusesestab-
lished by the international instruments in force". The general conclusion
which the Greek Government then asked the Court to draw from that
evidence was that:

"Everything that is known of the contemporary understanding of
such terms as 'territorial status', 'territorial situation'and 'territorial
integrity' in the 1920sindicatesthat theseexpressionsaretobegivena

restrictive interpretation limiredto the maintenanceof the status quo
estabfishedby treaties,normaflyas the result ofpost-war settlement."
(Emphasis added.)

73. In the viewof the Court, the historical evidencemayjustifiably be
said to showthat in the period in question the motivewhich led States to
includein treaties provisionsregarding"territorial status" was,ingeneral,
to protect themselvesagainst possible attempts to modify territorial sett-
lementsestablished by the peace treaties. But it doesnot followthat they
intended those provisionsto be confined to questionsconnected with the
revision of such settlements.Any modification of a territorial "status" or
"situation" or "frontier" is unpalatable to a State; and the strong proba-
bilityisthat a Statewhichhad recourseto areservationofdisputesrelating
to territorial status, or thelike,intended it tobetegeneral.Article 39of
the General Act, it is true, was designed to regulate the formulation of
reservationsand toexcludevagueor subjectivereservations.Butinmaking

expressmention of disputesrelating to territorial status as an exampleof
disputes concerning a clearly specified subject-matter, Article 39 said
nothing of this example being exclusivelydirected against attempts to
revise the territorial settlements established by the peace treaties.nombreux traités bilatéraux de règlement pacifique de la période de

l'entre-deux-guerres ainsi que lors des débatsde la Sociétédes Nations
relatifsà l'élaborationdu protocole de Locarno. Les arguments qu'ils en
tirent sont en résumé lessuivants. Premièrement, la raison pour laquelle
des expressions comme statut territorial, intégrité territoriale, situation
territorialet maintiendesfrontièresont faitleurapparition dans les traités
de l'époque,que ce soit à propos de réserves à des clauses de règlement
pacifique ou à propos de garantiesterritoriales,était la craintequ'inspirait
alors une éventuelleremise en question des règlementsd'après-guerre.En
second lieu, bien que les expressions utiliséesaient pu varier, leur signi-

fication était essentiellement la même:elles visaient les situations ou les
régimesterritoriauxétablispar lestraités.Enfin,lorsque l'expressionstatut
territorialiguraitdansdes réserves àdes traitésde règlementpacifique, les
Etats avaient en vue <les différends susceptibles d'êtresuscitéspar les
revendications territoriales de voisins non satisfaits par les solutions
établieso.Il a mêmeété soutenuquedans cesréserves <<statut territoria)>
était simplement un terme de langage codépour <intangibilité des fron-
tières et desstatuts territoriaux établispar les instrumentsinternationaux
en vigueur )>La conclusion générale que, selonle gouvernement deman-

deur, la Cour devrait tirer de ces élémentsest que:

<Tout ce que 1'01-s1ait du sens où étaientutiliséesdans les années
1920les expressions (<statut territoria)),<situation territoriale)et
<<intégrité territorial)> indique qu'il faut les interpréterde façon
restrictive,et qu'ellesserapportaientexclusivementaumaintiendustatu
quo établi par des traitésn,ormalementen conséquence du règlement
effectuéaprèsla guerre. (Les italiques sont de la Cour.)

73. Selon la Cour il est légitimed'affirmerque ces donnéeshistoriques
démontrent que,dans lapériodeenquestion, lemotifqui aincitélesEtats à
incluredans leursconventions des dispositionsconcernant le statut terri-
torial était en général le désidre se protéger contre des tentatives éven-
tuelles demodificationdes règlementsterritoriauxétablispar les traitésde
paix. Il ne s'ensuit pas pour autant qu'ilsentendaient que ces dispositions
fussent limitées auxquestions liées à la revision de ces règlements.Toute
modification d'un statut territorial, d'une situation territoriale ou d'une

frontièreest inacceptablepour lesEtats; ilest fortprobable qu'un Etat qui
avait recours à une réservepour les différendsayant trait au statut terri-
torial ou àtoute autre réserveanalogueentendait qu'ellefût de caractère
très généralC. ertes l'article 39de l'Actegénéral tait destinàréglementer
la formulation de réserves à cet Acte et à exclure les réserves vagues ou
subjectives. Mais, bien que cet article mentionne expressémentles diffé-
rendsayant trait au statut territorial comme exemplede différendsportant
surdesmatières spécialesnettement définies,iln'endécoulenullementque
seulesles tentatives de revision des règlements territoriauxétablis par les

traitésde paix étaientainsi visées. 74. In the opinion of the Court, the historical evidence adduced by
Greece does not suffice to establish that the expression"territorial status"
wasused in the League of Nations period, and inparticular in theGeneral
Act of 1928,in the special,restricted, sensecontended for by Greece. The
evidence seems rather to confirm that the expression "territorial status"
was used in its ordinary, generic sense of any matters properly to be
consideredasrelating to theintegrity and legalrégimeof aState'sterritory.
It is significant in thisregard that in the analysis of treaty provisionsmade
in the Systematic Survey of Arbitral Conventionsand Treaties of Mutual
Security, published in 1927by the Secretariat of the League of Nations
(one of the documents used in connectionwith the drafting of the General
Act),reservations of disputesrelating to "territorial integrity", "territorial
status" and "frontiers" were exarnined together as having the same or a
very similar meaning. The Systematic Survey of Treatiesfor thePacific
SettlementofInternationalDisputes1928-1948prepared by the Secretariat

of the United Nations and published in 1948,alsogroups together, under
the title "Disputes relating to territorial status", provisions concerning
"territorial status", "territorial questions""territorial integrity", "present
frontiers". As to the legal writers of the League of Nations period, the
Greek Government itself laid stress on the fact that they consistently
linked together treaty provisions excepting questions relating to "terri-
torial status", "territorial integrity" and "existing frontiers".

75. It followsthat for the same reasonsthe Court isunable to acceptthe
contention advanced in the Memorial that if the authors of the General
Act, or of the arbitration treaties containing a territorial status reserva-
tion:

"had contemplated excluding any disputes concerning the spatial
delimitation of Statejurisdictions, they would not have failed clearly
to mention the familiar category offrontier disputes rather than resort
to the term of territorial status which was a very specific one in the
practice of the time" (Memorial, para. 236).
In the viewof the Court, the term "territorial status" in the treaty practice

of the time did not have the very specific meaning attributed to it by the
Greek Government. As the nature of the word "status" itself indicates, it
was a generic term which in the practice of the time was understood as
embracing the integrity and frontiers, as well as the legal régime,of the
territory in question.This is implicitin the very wording of reservation (b)
itself whichtreats disputes relating to Greece's"rights of sovereigntyover
its ports and lines of communication" as includedin its reservation of
disputes relating to its "territorial status". These disputes by their nature
related to the interpretationand application of existingtreaties rather than
to their revision.
76. Accordingly, the expression "relating to the territorial status of 74. De l'avisde la Cour les élémentshistoriquesinvoquéspar la Grèce
ne suffisent pas à établir quel'expressionstatut territorialétaitemployée à
l'époque delaSociété desNations, et en particulierdans l'Acte généralde
1928,au sens spécialet restrictif que la Grèce voudrait lui attribuer. Ils

paraissent plutôt confirmer que l'expressionstatut territorialétaitutilisée
dans son sens naturel et générique commeenglobant toutes questions de
nature à êtrelégitimementconsidéréescomme serapportant àl'intégrité et
au régimejuridiqueduterritoire d'unEtat. Ilestsignificatif à cetégardque,
dans l'analyse des dispositionsconventionnelles faites dans 1'Etudesysté-

matique des conventionsd'arbitrageet de sécurité mutuellepubliéeen 1927
par le Secrétariatde la Société desNations (l'un des documents qui ont
servi à l'élaborationde l'Acte général),les réservesvisant les différends
relatifs à l'(intégrité territoriale O, au (<statut territorial))et aux (<fron-
tières))étaientexaminéesen bloc comme ayant le mêmesens ou un sens
trèssimilaire. Le Systematic Survey of Treatiesfor thePacijicSettlement of

International Disputes 1928-1948 établi par le Secrétariat des Nations
Unies etpubliéen 1948groupe égalementsousletitre (<Différendsrelatifs
au statut territorial des dispositionsconcernant le (<statut territorial )),
les (<questions territoriales O,l' ntégrité territoriale ))et les (<frontières
existentes )).Quant aux commentateurs de la période de la Société des

Nations, le Gouvernement de la Grèce lui-même soulignequ'ils présen-
taient constamment ensemble les dispositionsconventionnellesexceptant
lesquestions relatives au (<statut territorial))à1'((intégritéterritoriale )et
aux (<frontières existantes )).
75. Il s'ensuit que pour les mêmesraisons la Cour ne peut accepter la
thèse présentée dansle mémoire, suivant laquelle, si les rédacteurs de

l'Acte généralou des traités d'arbitrage contenant une réservede statut
territorial
(avaient pensé excluretous les différendsrelatifs à une délimitation

spatiale des compétences étatiques, ils n'auraient pas manqué de
mentionner clairement la catégorie bien connue des différends de
frontières plutôt que de recourir au terme - trèsspécifiquedans la
pratique de cette époque - de statut territorial (par. 236).

Selon la Cour, dans la pratique conventionnelle de l'époque,l'expression
statut territorial n'avait pas le sens très spécifique que lui attribue le
Gouvernement de la Grèce. Comme l'indique le mot statut, c'étaitune
el~pression (<générique qui, dans la pratique du temps, étaitcomprise

commeenglobant l'intégrité et les frontières, ainsi que le régimejuridique
du territoire dont ils'agissait. Celaressort implicitementdu texte mêmede
la réserveb)quitraite lesdifférendsrelatifsaux <<droits de souverainetéde
laGrècesursesportset sesvoiesdecommunication r>comme comprisdans
sa réservedes différends ayant trait à son (statut territorial ))Par défi-

nition ces différendsconcernaientl'interprétation et l'application de trai-
tésexistants plutôt que leur revision.
76. Ainsi l'expression ayant trait au statut territorial de laGrèce )qui 32 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

Greece" in reservation (b) is to be understood as a generic term denoting
any matters properly to be consideredascomprisedwithin the concept of
territorial status under general international law, and therefore includes
not only the particular legal régimebut the territorial integrity and the
boundaries of a State. It is thereforein accordance with this interpretation
of the words "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" that the
Court is called on to determine whether reservation (b) does or does not
havethe effect of excludingthepresent disputefrom thescope of Greece's
accession to the General Act of 1928.

77. The Greek Government, however,has advanced afurther historical
argument by which it seeks to convince the Court that there can be no
question of the applicability of reservation(b)with respect to the present
dispute. This is that the very idea of the continental shelf was wholly
unknown in 1928when the General Act was concluded, and in 1931when
Greece acceded to the Act. It also refers in this connection to the arbitral
award in the Petroleum DevelopmentLtd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi case
(InternationalLaw Reports 1951, p. 144 at p. 152), where the arbitrator
held that the grant of a minera1 oil concession in 1939 was not to be

understood as including the continental shelf. In appreciating the inten-
tion of a party to an instrument there is an essentialdifference between a
grant of rights of exploration and exploitation over a specified area in a
concession and the wording of a reservation to a treaty by which a State
excludes from compulsoryprocedures of pacificsettlementdisputesrelat-
ing to its territorial status. While there may well be a presumption that a
person transferring valuable property rights to another intends only to
transfer the rights which he possesses at that time, the case appears to the
Court to be quite othenvise when a State, in agreeing to subject itself to
compulsoryprocedures of pacificsettlement,exceptsfrom that agreement
a category of disputes which, though covering clearly specified subject-
matters, is of a generickind. Once it isestablishedthat theexpression "the
territorial status of Greece" was used in Greece'sinstrument of accession
as a generic term denoting any matters comprised within the concept of
territorial status under general international law, the presumption neces-
sarily arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the
law and to correspond with the meaningattached to the expression by the

lawinforce at any giventime.Thispresumption, in theview of the Court, is
even morecompelling when it is recalled that the 1928Act was a conven-
tion for the pacific settlement of disputes designed to be of the most
general kind and of continuing duration, for it hardly seems conceivable
that in such a convention terms like "domestic jurisdiction" and "terri-
torial status" were intended to have a fixed content regardless of thesub-
sequent evolution of international law.figuredans la réserveb) doit êtrecomprisecomme une formulegénérique
désignant toutes les questions qui peuvent légitimementêtreconsidérées

comme entrant dans la notion de statut territorialen droit international
général;elle inclut par conséquent non seulement le régimejuridique
particulier maisl'intégritéterritorialetlesfrontièresd'unEtat. C'estdonc
conformément à cette interprétation des mots <différends ayant trait au
statut territorial de la Grèce1que la Cour est appelée à déterminersi la
réserve b)a ounon pour effet de fairesortir leprésent différenddu champ
d'application de l'adhésionde la Grèce à l'Acte généralde 1928.

77. Le Gouvernement de la Grèce a cependant mis en avant un autre
argument d'ordre historiquedestiné àconvaincrela Cour qu'il esthors de
question que la réserve b) soit applicable au présent différend.Cet argu-

ment est que la notion mêmede plateau continental était totalement
inconnue en 1928,au moment où l'Actegénéralaétéconclu, et en 1931,
lorsque la Grèceya adhéré. Il citeàcepropos la sentencearbitrale rendue
dans l'affairePetroleumDevelopmentLtd. v. Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi (Inter-
national Law Reports 1951,p. 152),danslaquellel'arbitre a décidé qu'une
concession d'hydrocarbures octroyéeen 1939ne devait pas être comprise
comme s'étendant au plateau continental. Quand il s'agit d'apprécier
l'intention d'unepartie àun instrument, ilexisteunedifférenceessentielle

entre l'octroipar concessionde droits d'explorationet d'exploitation dans
une régiondéterminéeet la formulation d'une réserve à un traité, par
laquelleun Etat exclut de procéduresobligatoires de règlementpacifique
lesdifférendsayanttrait àsonstatut territorial. Onpeutfort bienprésumer
qu'une personnequicèdedesdroits depropriétédegrande valeurn'entend
disposerquedesdroits qu'elle possède aumoment de la cession,mais ilen
va tout différemment, de l'avis de la Cour, lorsqu'en acceptant de se
soumettre à des procédures obligatoires de règlementpacifique un Etat
exclut de son acceptationunecatégoriededifférendsqui,bien que concer-
nant des matières spécialesnettement définies,présente un caractère

générique.Une fois admis que l'expression <(le statut territorial de la
Grèce ))a étéemployéedans l'instrument d'adhésion grec commeune
formulegénériqueenglobanttoutesles questionsqui relèventdela notion
de statut territorialen droit international général,il faut nécessairement
présumer que son sens étaitcensé évolueravec le droit et revêtir à tout
moment la significationque pourraient lui donner les règles envigueur.
Selon la Cour, cette présomption s'imposeencoreplus si l'on serappelle
que l'Actede 1928étaitune convention de règlementpacifiquedesdiffé-

rends conçuecomme devant êtredelaportéelaplusgénéraleet sanslimite
de durée; car il ne semble guère concevable que dans un instrument
semblable on ait voulu donner à des expressions comme compétence
exclusive )>et (statut territoria))un contenu invariable quelle que soit
l'évolutionultérieuredu droit international. 78. TheGreek Government invokes as a basis for the Court's jurisdic-
tion in the present case Article 17 of the General Act under which the
parties agreed to submit tojudicial settlement al1disputes with regard to
which they "are in conflict as to their respectiverights". Yettherights that
are the subject of the claims upon which Greecerequeststhe Court in the
Application to exerciseitsjurisdiction under Article 17arethe very rights
over the continental shelf of which, as Greeceinsists, the authors of the
General Act could have had no idea whatever in 1928. If the Greek
Governmentiscorrect, as it undoubtedly is, in assurningthat the meaning
of the generic term "rights" in Article 17follows the evolution of the law,
so as to be capable of embracingrights over thecontinental shelf, it is not
clear why the similar term "territorial status" shouldnot likewisebe liable
to evolveinmeaninginaccordance with "the development of international
relations" (P.C.I.J., SeriesB,No. 4,p. 24).It may alsobe observedthat the
claims which are the subject-matter of the Application relate more parti-

cularly to continental shelf rights claimed to appertain to Greece in virtue
of its sovereignty over certain islands in the Aegean Sea, including the
islands of the "Dodecanese group" (para. 29 of the Application). But the
Dodecanesegroup was not in Greece's possessionwhen it acceded to the
General Actin 193 1;for thoseislandswereceded to Greeceby kaly onlyin
the PeaceTreaty of 1947.In consequence,it seemsclear that, in theviewof
theGreek Government,the term "rights" in Article 17of the General Act
has to be interpreted in the light of the geographical extent of the Greek
State today, not of itsextent in 1931.It would then be a little surprising if
the meaning of Greece'sreservation of disputes relating to its "territorial
status" was not also to evolvein the light of the change in the territorial
extent of the Greek State brought aboutby "the development of interna-
tional relations".
79. Furthermore, the close and necessary link that always exists
between ajurisdictional clauseand reservationsto it, makes it difficultto
accept that the meaning of the clause, but not of the reservation,should
follow the evolution of the law. In the present instance, this difficulty is

underlined by the fact that alongside Greece's reservation of disputes
relating toits "territorial status" inreservationb)isanother reservation of
disputes relating to questions of "domestic jurisdiction", the content of
which, as the Court has already had occasion to note, is "an essentially
relative question" and undoubtedly "depends upon the development of
international relations" (paragraph 59 above).Again, the Court cm seeno
valid reason why onepart of reservation (b) should have been intended to
follow the evolution of international relations but not the other, unless
such an intention should have been made plain by Greece at the time.

80. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court is of the
opinion that the expression in reservation (b) "disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece" must be interpreted in accordance with the
rules of international law as they exist today, and not as they existed in MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 33

78. Le Gouvernement de la Grèce invoque comme fondement de la
compétencede la Cour en l'espècel'article 17de l'Actegénéral,envertu
duquel lesparties ont acceptéde soumettre au règlementjudiciaire tous les
différendsau sujet desquels elles (<se contesteraient réciproquement un
droit >)Or les droits qui font l'objet des prétentions à propos desquelles,
dans la requête, la Grèce demande a la Cour d'exercer sacompétenceen

.ocFrtde l'article 17,sont précisément les droits sur le plateau continental
dont laGrècesoulignequelesauteurs del'Acte généranl'auraient pu avoir
aueune idéeen1928.Sile Gouvernement de la Grèceest fondé,commeil
l'est assurément, à penser que le sens du terme générique (<droit ))dans
Brticle 17évolue avec ledroit en général,de telle sorte qu'il peut s'ap-
pliquer aux droits sur le plateau continental, on voit mal pourquoi l'ex-

pression similaire (<statut territorial)>ne pourrait pas, elle aussi, évoluer
avec le ((développement des rapports internationaux >)(C.P.J.I. sérieB
no4, p. 24). De plus il est a noter que les demandes faisant l'objet de la
requête concernent plus particulièrement les droits sur le plateau conti-
nental qui relèveraitde la Grèceen vertu de sa souverainetésur certaines
îlesde la mer Egée,ycompris lesîlesde l'archipeldu Dodécanèse(par.29
de la requête).Or cet archipel n'appartenait pas a la Grèce quand elle a

adhéré à l'Actegénérae ln 1931,l'Italie leluiayant cédépar letraité depaix
de 1947. Il paraît donc évidentque,pour le Gouvernement de la Grèce,le
mot ((droitO, à l'article 17de l'Actegénéral,doit être interprété compte
tenu de l'étendue géographiqueactuellede l'Etat grec et non de l'étendue
qu'il avaiten 1931. Il serait alorsquelque peu surprenant que le sens de la
réserverelative aux différends ayant trait au statut territorial))de la

Grècen'évoluepas lui aussi en fonction deschangementsd'étendue terri-
toriale de 1'Etatgrec entraînésparle ((développementdes rapports inter-
nationaux )).
79. En outre, vu lelien étroitet nécessairequi existe toujours entre une
clausejuridictionnelle et les réservesdont elle fait l'objet, il est difficile
d'admettreque le sensde la clause,mais non celuide la réserve,varie avec

l'évolutiondu droit. Dans la présente affaire,cette difficultéest accusée
par lefaitque, dans laréserve b),outre l'exclusiondesdifférendsayant trait
au statut territorial),on trouveuneautre réserve,relativeauxdifférends
portant sur des questions de <compétenceexclusive )),dont le contenu,
comme la Cour a déjàeu l'occasionde le noter, est une question essen-
tiellement relative )et qui,sansaucundoute, ((dépenddu développement

des rapports internationaux )) (paragraphe 59 ci-dessus). Là encore la
Cour ne voit pas pourquoi une partie de la réserveb) aurait été destinée à
évolueravec les rapports internationaux mais non son autre partie, si la
Grèce n'a pas clairement annoncé à l'époque quetelle était son inten-
tion.
80. Vu lesconsidérationsqui précèdent,la Courest d'avisquelesmots
(différendsayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce figurant dansla

réserveb) doivent être interprétés conformément auxrègles du droit
international telles qu'ellesexistentaujourd'hui et non tellesqu'elles exis- 1931. It follows that in interpreting and applying reservation (b) with
respect to the present dispute the Court has to take account of theevolu-
tion which has occurred in the rules of international law concerning a
coastal State's rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental
shelf.The Court is, therefore, now called upon to examinewhether, taking
into account the developmentsin international law regarding the conti-
nental shelf, the expression "disputes relating to the territorial status of
Greece" should or should not be understood as comprising within it
disputesrelatingtothegeographical-the spatial-extent of Greece's rights
over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.

81. In order to determine whether the present dispute falls within the
scope of reservation (b), theCourt must first clarify thequestion that calls

for decision. The question is not, as Greece seems to assume, whether
continental shelf rights are territorial rights or are comprised within the
expression "territorial status". The real question for decision is, whether
the disputeis one which relatesto the territorial status of Greece.Accord-
ingly, a linguistic argument presented by the Greek Government, and
based on the definitions of the words "statut"(status) and "territorial"in
the Dictionnaire de la terminologiedu droit international,appears to the
Court to be only of marginal interest. No doubt, it is true the expression
territorial status is commonly used in international lawwith reference to a
legal condition or régimeof a territory; but although the expression,as
Article 39, paragraph 2, of the General Act itself indicates, denotes a
categoryorconcept covering clearly specified subject-matters,it is not an
expression which can be said to have rigid legal connotations. On the
contrary,the Court considersit tobe agenericexpression whichcomprises
within its meanings various legal conditions and relations of territory.The
answer to the question whether any given matter is properly to be consi-

dered as relatingto the territorial status of a Statemust,therefore, depend
on the particular circumstances of the case.

82. The subject-matter of thepresent dispute, as appears from the first
two-and principal-submissions in the Application, would require the
Court to decide two questions:
(1) whether certain Greek islands in the Aegean Sea "as part of the
territory of Greece,areentitled to theportion of the continental shelf
which appertains to them accordingto the applicable principles and
rules of international law";
(2) what is "the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the

portions of thecontinental shelf appertainingtoGreeceandTurkey intaient en 1931.Il s'ensuit que,pour l'interprétation de la réserveb) et son
application au présent différend,la Cour doit tenir compte de l'évolution

des règlesdu droit international relatives auxdroits d'exploration et d'ex-
ploitation d'un Etat riverain sur leplateau continental. La Courdoit donc
recherchermaintenant si, compte tenu du développementdu droit inter-
national relatif au plateaucontinental, l'expression (<différendsayanttrait
au statut territorial de la Grèce ))doit ou non s'entendre comme incluant
les différends relatifs à l'étenduegéographique,spatiale, des droits de la
Grèce sur le plateau continental de la mer Egée.

81. Afin de déterminer si le présent différend entre dans le champ
d'application de la réserveb), la Cour doit d'abord préciserla question à
trancher. Celle-ci n'estpas de savoir si lesdroits sur leplateau continental
sont desdroits territoriaux ou s'ilssont comprisdans l'expression (<statut
territorial i),comme la Grèceparaît le supposer. La vraie question à tran-

cherest de savoir siledifférendatraitau statut territorial delaGrèce.C'est
pourquoi, selon la Cour, l'argument linguistiquedu Gouvernement de la
Grèce,qui sefondesurladéfinition du mot statutet du mot territorialdans
le Dictionnairede la terminologiedu droit international,ne présentequ'un
intérêtmarginal. Ilest sansdoute exactquel'expressionstatut territorialest
souvent employée en droit international pour décrire la situation ou le
régimejuridique d'un territoire; mais, bien que l'expression, comme l'in-
dique l'article 39, paragraphe 2, de l'Acte général lui-même, désign uene
catégorieou un concept s'appliquant à des matières spécialesnettement

définies,on ne saurait dire qu'elleait une significationjuridique rigide. La
Cour estime au contraire que c'est une expression génériquedontle sens
recouvre différentessituationsjuridiques et différentsrapportsjuridiques
intéressantdesterritoires. La réponseau point de savoir s'ilest légitimede
considérer une question comme ((ayant trait au statut territorial i)d'un
Etat dépend donc nécessairementdes circonstancesparticulières de l'es-
pèce.
*

82. Etant donnél'objet du présent différend,tel qu'il ressort des deux
premières - et principales - conclusions de la requête,la Cour serait
appelée à se prononcer sur deux questions, à savoir:

1) sicertaines îlesgrecquesde lamer Egée (en tant quepartieduterritoire
grec ..ont droit à la portion du plateau continental relevant de ces îles
conformément aux principes et règlesapplicables du droit internatio-
nal 1);

2) quel est ((dans lamer Egéeletracéde lalimite(ou deslimites) entre les
étenduesdu plateau continental relevant de la Grèceet de la Turquie the Aegean Sea in accordance with the principles and rules of inter-
national law which the Court shall determine to be applicable to the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the aforesaid areas of the
Aegean Sea".

In maintaining that the subject-matter of the dispute embraced by
Greece's submissions does not fa11within the scope of reservation (b), the
Greek Government puts its case in two ways. First, it contends that the
dispute concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary
between Greece and Turkey, and that delimitation isentirely extraneous to
the notion of territorial status (Memorial, para. 236); and, secondly, it
contends that, the continental shelf not being part of the territory of the
coastal State under the applicable rules of international law, the present
dispute regarding rights over thecontinental shelfcannot be considered as
one relatin- to "territorial status".
83. The contention based on the proposition that delimitation is en-
tirely extraneous to thenotion of territorial status appears to the Court to
encounter certain difficulties. Above all, it seems to overlook the basic
character of the present dispute, clearly stated though it is in the first

submission in Greece's Application. The basic question in dispute is
whether or not certain islands under Greek sovereignty are entitled to a
continental shelf of their ownand entitle Greece to cal1fortheboundary to
be drawn between those islands and the Turkish Coast.The veryessenceof
the dispute, as formulated in the Application, is thus the entitlement of
those Greek islands to a continental shelf, and the delimitation of the
boundary is a secondaryquestion to be decided after, and in the light of,
the decision upon the first basic question. Moreover, it is evident from the
documentsbefore the Court that Turkev.which maintains that theislands
in question are meréprotuberances oithe Turkish continental shelf and
have no continental shelf of their own,alsoconsiders the basic question to
be one of entitlement.
84. Quite apart from thefact that the present dispute cannot, therefore,
be viewed as one simply relating to delimitation, it would be difficult to
accept the broad proposition that delimitation isentirely extraneous to the
notion of territorial status. Any disputed delimitation of a boundary
entails somedetermination of entitlement to the areas to be delimited, and
the historical evidence adduced by the GreekGovernment itself showsthat
in the treaty practice in the League of Nations period, the notions of
"territorial integrity", "frontiers" and "territorial status" wereregarded as
closely associated.
85. The dispute relates to the determination of the respective areas of

continental shelf overwhich Greece and Turkey are entitled to exercisethe
sovereign rights recognized by international law. It is therefore necessary
to establish theboundaryor boundaries between neighbouring States, that
is to Say,to drawthe exact line or lineswhere the extension in space of the
sovereignpowers and rights of Greece meets those ofTurkey.Whether it is conformémentaux principes et aux règlesdu droit international que la
Cour jugera applicables à la délimitation du plateau continental des
zones susviséesde la mer Egée o.

Pour démontrer que l'objet du différend ainsi présenté dansles conclu-
sions delaGrècen'entre pasdans lechampd'application de laréserveb),le
Gouvernement decetEtat développeunedoubleargumentation. Ilaffirme
d'abord que le différend concerne la délimitationdu plateau continental
entre laGrèceetlaTurquie etqueladélimitationest entièrementétrangère
au concept de statut territorial (mémoire,par. 236); en second lieu il
soutient que, le plateau continental ne faisant pas partie du territoire de
1'Etat riverain en vertu des règles applicables du droit international,le
présent différendrelatif aux droits sur le plateau continental ne peut pas
être considéré comme ayant trait au statut territorial.
83. De l'avis de la Cour, l'argument reposant sur l'idéeque la délimi-
tation est entièrementétrangèreau concept destatut territorial rencontre
certaines difficultés.Il semble surtout ne pas tenir compte de l'élément

fondamental du présentdifférend,bien que celui-cisoit clairement énoncé
dans la première conclusion de la requêtegrecque. La question essentielle
que soulèvele différend est la suivante: certaines îles sous souveraineté
grecque ont-ellesdroità leurpropre plateau continental ? La Grèce peut-
elle en conséquencedemander que la limite soit tracéeentre ces îles et les
côtes turques ? L'essencemêmedu différend,tel qu'il est formulédans la
requête,est donc ledroit de cesîlesgrecques à un plateaucontinental et la
définition de la limite est une question secondaire à réglerensuite à la
lumièrede la décisionsur la premièrequestionfondamentale. Au surplus,
ilressortà l'évidencedesdocuments soumis àlaCourque,pour laTurquie,
qui soutient que les îles dont il s'agitne sont quedesprotubérances sur le
plateaucontinentalturc et nepossèdentpas de plateaucontinentalpropre,

la question fondamentale est aussi celle du droit à un plateau.
84. Outreque leprésentdifférendnesauraitdoncêtreconsidéré comme
ayant trait simplement à la délimitation,il serait difficile d'admettre que,
d'une façon générale,ladélimitationsoitentièrementétrangère au concept
de statut territorial. Toute délimitation de frontière contestée obligu
jusqu'à un certain pointà déterminerles titres sur leszonesàdélimiter,et
les preuves historiques apportées par le Gouvernement de la Grèce lui-
mêmemontrent que, dans lapratiquedestraitésdelapériode de la Société
des Nations, les notions d'intégritéterritoriale, de frontièreset de statut
territorialtaientconsidérées commeétroitement liées.
85. Le différend a traià la détermination des zones de plateau conti-

nental sur lesquelleslaGrèceetlaTurquiesont respectivement habilitées à
exercer les droits souverainsconsacréspar le droit international. Il faut
donc établirla limiteou leslimites entre Etats voisins,c'est-à-dire tracer la
ligne exacte ou les lignes exactes de rencontre des espaces où s'exercent
respectivement les pouvoirs et droits souverains de la Grèce et de laa land frontier or a boundary line in the continental shelf that is in
question, the process is essentially the same, and inevitably involves the

same element of stability and permanence, and is subject to the rule
excluding boundary agreements from fundamental change of circum-
stances.
86. The second contention mentioned in paragraph 82 above does not
put the question to be decided in its correct context. The question for
decision is whether the present dispute is one "relating to the territorial
status of Greece", not whether the rights in dispute are legally to be
considered as "territorial" rights; and a dispute regarding entitlement to
and delimitation of areas of continental shelf tends by its very nature tobe
one relating to territorial status.The reason is that legallya coastal State's
rights over the continental shelf are both appurtenant to and directly
derived from the State's sovereignty over the territory abutting on that
continental shelf. This emerges clearly from the emphasis placed by the
Court in the North Sea Continental Shelfcases on "natural prolongation"
of the land as a critenon for determining the extent of a coastal State's
entitlement to continental shelf as against other States abutting on the
same continental shelf (I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp. 31et seq.); and this crite-
rion, the Court notes,has been invoked by both Greeceand Turkey during
their negotiations concerningthe substance of the present dispute. As the
Court explained in the above-mentioned cases, the continental shelf is a
legalconceptin which "the principle isapplied that theland dominatesthe
sea" (I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 51,para. 96); and it is solelyby virtue of the

coastal State's sovereignty over the land that rights of exploration and
exploitation in the continental shelf can attach to it, ipsojure, under
international law. In short, continental shelf rights are legally both an
emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of
the coastal State. It follows that the territorial régime-the territorial
status-of acoastal State comprises, ipsojure, therights of exploration and
exploitation over the continental shelf to which it is entitledunder inter-
national law. A dispute regarding those rights would, therefore, appear to
be one which may be said to "relate" to the territorial status of thecoastal
State.

87. The particular circumstances of the present dispute have also to be
taken into account. The basic question at issue, as the Court has aiready
mentioned, istheoneformulated inthefirst submission intheApplication,
andit requiresthe Court to decide whether certainnamed Greekislandsin
the Aegean Sea, "as part of the territory of Greece", are entitled to a
portion of continental shelf. Earlierin the Application, under theheading
"The Subject of the Dispute", it is explainedthat in 1974,when the Greek
Govemment in a diplomatic Note asserted its claim to continental shelf
rightsinrespect of theseislands,theTurkishGovernmentretorted that the
islands "do not possess a [continental] shelf of their own". The two Turquie. Qu'ils'agissed'une frontière terrestreou d'une limite de plateau
continental, l'opération est essentiellement la même;elle comporte le

même élémen t hérentde stabilitéet de permanence et est soumise à la
règlequi veut qu'un traitéde limitesne soitpas affectépar unchangement
fondamental de circonstances.
86. Le deuxième argument mentionné au paragraphe 82 ci-dessus ne
situe pas la question sur laquelle la Cour doit statuer dans l'optique qui
convient. Cette,question est celle de savoir si le présent différe<<trait
au statut territorial de la Grèce et non de savoir si les droits contestés
doiventêtredu point de vuejuridique considérés commedesdroits (<ter-
ritoriaux)>;or un différend concernant le titre sur des zones de plateau
continentaletladélimitation de ceszones tend par sanature même à avoir
trait au statut territorial. Il enestainsi parceque, du point devuejuridique,

les droits d'un Etat riverain sur le plateau continental relèvent de la
souverainetéde l'Etat sur le territoirequijouxte ceplateau continental et,
en mêmetemps, découlent directement de celle-ci. Il n'est pour s'en
convaincre quede rappeler combien la Cour a insistédans les affairesdu
Plateaucontinentaldela merduNord sur le <prolongement naturel de la
terre comme critère de détermination de l'étendue du droit d'un Etat
riverain sur un plateau continental par rapport à celui d'autres Etats
adjacentssur cemêmeplateau (C. J..Recueil1969, p. 31et suiv.); laCour
constatequececritère a été invoquépar laGrècecommepar laTurquie au
cours de leurs négociationssur le fond du différend actuel. Ainsi que la

Cour l'a expliquédans les affaires susvisées,le plateau continental est un
conceptjuridique àpropos duquel << on applique le principe que la terre
domine la mer (C.Z. RJecueil1969, p. 51,par. 96); ce n'est qu'enraison
dela souverainetéde1'Etatriverain surla terrequedesdroitsd'exploration
etd'exploitationsur leplateaucontinental peuvent s'attacheràcelui-ciipso
jure en vertu du droit international. Bref les droits sur le plateau conti-
nental sont, du point de vue juridique, à la fois une émanation de la
souverainetéterritoriale de l'Etat riverain et un accessoire automatique de
celle-ci.Ils'ensuitquele régimeterritoria- lestatut territori-ld'unEtat
riverain comprend ipsojure les droits d'exploration et d'exploitation du

plateau continental qu'il tient du droit international. Il semblerait donc
qu'on soit fondé à dire d'un différendrelatifà ces droits qu'il a trait au
statut territorial de l'Etat riverain.
87. Il faut d'autre part tenir compte des circonstancesparticulièresdu
présentdifférend.Commela Cour l'adéjàdit, laquestionfondamentale en
cause est cellequi est formuléedans la première conclusion de la requête;
elle supposerait que la Cour décideque certaines îles grecques de la mer
Egée,énumérées (<en tant que partie du territoire gr)),ont droità une
portion du plateau continental. Plus haut dans la requête,sous le titre
<Objetdudifférend O,ilestexpliquéqu'en1974,lorsque leGouvernement
dela Grèce a invoquédans une note diplomatique sesdroits à un plateau

continental pour ces îles, le Gouvernement de la Turquie a répondu
qu'elles(ne possèdentpas de plateau [continental]propre ))Il ressort deGovernments, as appears from the Application, maintained their respec-
tivepositions in the diplomaticnegotiations whichfollowed, and in aNote
of 22 May 1976theGreek Government recalled that it had emphasized as
two of the fundamental legalpoints in the dispute: (a)"the territorial and
political unity of the continental and insular parts of theGreek State"; (b)
"the existence of a continental shelf appurtenant to the [Greek] islands
concerned". Inthe sameNote, it had also recalled and rejccted theTurkish
Government's reference to the islands as "mere protuberances on the
Turkish continental shelf" having no continental shelf of their own.
Summarizing its legal position in paragraph 29 of the Application, the
Greek Government names the islands concerned and reaffirms its conten-
tion that they "are an integral part of Greek territory which is entitled to
the portion of [the]continental shelf which appertains to them". It then

expressly rests its claims to continental shelf in respect of those islands
upon "the territorial and political unity of Greece".
88. It followsthat the claims and contentions advanced by Greece in its
first submission directly relate to its territorial status as this was estab-
lished by the various treaties through which was constituted thecorpus of
the territory of the Greek State today. These claims and contentions, as
appears from the Application and the diplomatic correspondence, are
directly contested byTurkey and form the verycoreof the present dispute.
Consequently, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, on this ground
alone, the present dispute is one which "relat[es] to theterritorial status of
Greece".
89. In the present case, moreover, quite apart from the question of the
status of the above-mentioned Greek islands for the purpose of determin-
ing Greece's entitlement to continental shelf, the Court notes that during
the hearings in 1976the Greek Government referred to a certain straight
base-line claimed by Turkey which is, however, contested by Greece.
Although it recognized that the resulting discrepancy between the Greek

and Turkish viewsof the limits ofTurkey's territorial seain the area is not
great, it observed that the discrepancy "obviously affects the question of
the delimitation of the continental shelf". The question of the limits of a
State's territorial sea, as the Greek Government itself has recognized, is
indisputably one which not only relates to, but directly concernsterritorial
status.
90. Having regard to thevarious considerations setout above, the Court
is of the opinion that the present dispute is one which "relat[es] to the
territorial status of Greece" within the meaning of reservation (b) in
Greece's instrument of accession to the General Act. It accordingly finds
that Turkey's invocation of the reservation on the basis of reciprocity has
the effect of excluding the present dispute from the application of Arti-
cle 17 of the Act.la requêteque les deux gouvernements ont maintenu leurs positions
respectives au cours des négociationsdiplomatiques qui ont suivi et que,
dans une note du 22 mai 1976,leGouvernement de laGrècearappeléqu'il
avait insistésur deux des points fondamentaux en droit que soulevait le
différend: a) <(l'unité territorialeet politique entre lespartiescontinentale
et insulaire del'Etat hellénique O; b) l'existenced'un plateau continental

propre aux îles grecques en question. Il rejetait dans la mêmenote
l'assertion du Gouvernement de la Turquie suivant laquelle ces îles ne
constituaientque de simplesprotubérancessur leplateaucontinental turc,
sansplateau continental propre. Résumant sa positionjuridique au para-
graphe 29 de la requête,le Gouvernement de la Grèceénumèrelesîles en
question et réaffirmequ'elles (font partie intégrante du territoire de la
Grèce et ont droit à la portion [du] plateau continental qui relèvede ces

îles)).Il fonde ensuite expressément sesdroits à un plateau continental
pour ces îles sur Y((unité territoriale et politique de la Grèce )).
88. Il s'ensuitque lesaffirmations et lesthèsesémisespar la Grècedans
sapremièreconclusion ont directementtrait à son statut territorial tel que
l'ont établiles divers traitésparlesquelsleterritoire de 1'Etatgrec a pris sa
configuration actuelle. Ces affirmations et ces thèses,telles qu'ellesfigu-
rent dans la requêteet dans la correspondancediplomatique, sont direc-

tement contestéespar la Turquie et sont au cŒurmêmedu présent diffé-
rend. La conclusions'impose doncque celui-cia (<trait austatut territorial
de la Grèce >),ne serait-ceque pour ce motif.

89. Dans le casprésent,et tout eniaissant decôtéla question du statut
desîlesgrecquessusmentionnéespour cequi estdedéterminerledroit dela
Grèce àun plateaucontinental, laCournotequelorsdesaudiences de 1976

le Gouvernement de la Grèce a fait allusion à une certaine ligne de base
droite revendiquéepar laTurquie etd'ailleurscontestéepar laGrèce.Tout
en reconnaissantquela divergenceentre lespositions grecqueet turquesur
la question des limites de la mer territoriale turque dans la zone dont il
s'agitn'estpas grande, ce gouvernement a soulignéquY<e(lle touche mani-
festement à la question de la délimitation du plateau continental o.De
toute évidence,commele Gouvernement delaGrècelui-mêmel'areconnu,

laquestion deslimites de lamer territoriale d'un Etat non seulement a trait
au <statut territorial))mais concerne directement celui-ci.
90. Eu égard aux diverses considérations qui précèdent, la Cour est
d'avisque ledifférenda ((trait austatut territorial de la Grèc))au sens de
la réserveb) de l'instrument d'adhésionde la Grèce à l'Acte général.Elle
constate en conséquenceque l'invocation de la réservepar la Turquie a
l'effet, par lejeu de la réciprocité,d'exclurele présent différendde l'ap-

plication de l'article 17 de l'Acte général.38 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

91. In examining the application of the General Act to the present
dispute, the Court has not overlookeda suggestion that the Act has never
been applicable asbetweenTurkey and Greeceby reason of the existence
of the Greco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and
Arbitration signed at Ankara on 30 October 1930 (League of Nations,
Treaty Series, Vol. 125,No. 2841). This Treaty provided for a general
system ofprocedures for thepacific settlement ofdisputes between the two
countries sirnilar to, but in somerespectsdifferentfrom, those providedin
the General Act. It entered into force by exchange of ratifications on
5 October 1931,and under Article 28 was expressed to continue in force
for successiveperiods of fiveyears, unless denounced. The length of these
periods was extended to ten years by an "Additional Treaty" of 27April
1938, which at the same time provided that "the mutual engagements,
bilateral or plurilateral", which the parties had contracted should "con-
tinue to produce their full effect irrespective of the provisions of the
present Treaty" (LeagueofNations, TreatySeries,Vol. 193,No. 4493).By
these Treaties and by the General Act, therefore, Greece and Turkey

appear, prima facie, to have provided for two parallel systems of pacific
settlement, for so long as the 1930 Treaty and the General Act might
continue in force, and both Greece and Turkey have stated that they
consider the 1930Treaty still to be in force.

92. Consequently, if thequestion of the effect of the 1930Treaty on the
applicability of the General Act as between Greeceand Turkeyhad called
for decision in the present proceedings, the Court would have been
confronted with the problem of the CO-existenceof different instruments
establishing methods of peaceful settlement, a question discussed in the
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case (P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 77). In that event it might also have been necessary to examine the
relation between theobligations of the two States under the 1930and 1938
Treaties and those under the General Act in the light of the pertinent
provisions of those instruments-a point whch was the subject of a ques-
tion put by two Members of the Court during the hearings.

93. However, the fact already established by the Court that, by reason
of Turkey's invocation of reservation (6)to the Greek accession, the
General Act is not applicable to the present dispute, and the fact that the
1930Treaty has not been invoked as a basis for the Court'sjurisdiction in
the present proceedings,dispense the Court from any 'needto enter into
these questions.

94. In paragraph 32 (2) of the Application the Greek Government
specified as the second basis on which it claims to establish the Court's
jurisdiction: 91. En recherchant si l'Acte général s'applique au présent différend, la
Cour n'a pas omis d'examiner un argument suivant lequel l'Acten'aurait

jamais été applicableentre la Turquie et la Grèce du fait de l'existencedu
traité gréco-turcd'amitié, deneutralitéd,e conciliationetd'arbitrage signé
à Ankara le 30 octobre 1930 (Sociétédes Nations, Recueil des traités,
vol. 125,no 2841). Ce traité prévoyait un systèmegénérad le procédures
pour lerèglementpacifiquedes différends entre les deux Etats, analogues
aux procédures envisagéesdans l'Acte généralmais en différant sur
certains points. Il est entré en vigueur par échange de ratifications le
5 octobre 1931et, envertudesonarticle 28,était tacitementreconduit tous
lescinqans saufdénonciationexpresse.Laduréedespériodessuccessivesa
été portée à dix ans par <(un traité additionnel signéle 27 avril 1938,
lequel disposait en outre que <<les engagements mutuels, bilatéraux et

plurilatéraux )) que les parties avaient contractés ((continue[raient] à
produire leur plein effet indépendamment des dispositions du présent
maité (Sociétédes Nations, Recueil des traités,vol. 193,no 4493). En
raison de l'existencede cestraitésetdecellede l'Actegénérall,a Grèceetla
Turquie semblent doncprima facie avoirprévudeux systèmesparallèlesde
règlementpacifique des différends qui coexisteraient tant que le traitéde
1930et l'Acte général continueraientd'êtreen vigueur; et la Grèce et la
Turquieont déclarél'une et l'autrequ'ellesconsidéraientle traitéde 1930
comme toujours en vigueur.

92. Par conséquent, si la Cour avait dû trancher dans la présente
instance laquestion de l'effetdu traitéde 1930surl'applicabilitéde l'Acte
généralentre la Grèce et la Turquie, elle se serait trouvée devant le pro-
blème de la coexistence de différents instruments instituant desméthodes
de règlement pacifique, problème qui a été examiné dans l'affaire de la
Compagnied'électricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie(C.P.J.I. sérieA/B no77).
Dans cettehypothèse, la Cour aurait peut-être dû aussiétudier la relation
entre lesobligationssouscrites par lesdeux Etats autitredestraitésde 1930
et 1938etcellesqu'ilsont contractéesautitredel'Actegénérae luégardaux
dispositionspertinentes de ces instruments - point qui afait l'objet d'une
question posée par deux membres de la Cour pendant la procédure

orale.
93. Toutefois, la Cour ayant établique l'Acte généraln'est pas appli-
cable au présent différend du fait que la Turquie s'est prévaluede la ré-
serve b)de l'adhésion grecque,etle traitéde 1930n'ayant pas été invoqué
comme fondement de sa compétenceen la présente instance, il n'est pas
nécessaireque la Cour examine ces questions.

94. Au paragraphe 32, sous-paragraphe 2, de la requête, le Gouverne-
ment de laGrècea présentécommesuitla secondedesbasessur lesquelles
il déclarefonder la compétencede la Cour: 39 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

"Thejoint communiquéof Brusselsof 31May 1975,whichfollowed
previous exchangeof views,Statesthat the Prime Ministers of Greece
and Turkey havedecided that theproblems dividingthetwocountries
shouldbe resolvedpeacefully'et, au sujetdu plateaucontinental dela
mer Egée,par la Cour internationale de La Haye'.The two Govern-
ments therebyjointly and severally accepted thejurisdiction of the
Courtinthepresent matter, pursuant toArticle 36(1)of the Statute of
the Court."

95. The Brussels Communiqué of 31 May 1975 does not bear any
signature or initials, and the Court was informed by counsel for Greece
that the Prime Ministers issued it directly to the press during a press
conference held at the conclusion of their meeting on that date. The
TurkishGovernment, in theobservations whichit transmittedtotheCourt
on 25August 1976,considered it "evident that ajoint communiqué does
not amount to an agreement under international law", adding that "If it
were one, it would need to be ratified at least on the part of Turkey"
(para. 15).The Greek Government, on the other hand, maintains thata
joint communiquémay constitute such an agreement. To have this effect,
it says, "It is necessary, and it is sufficient, for the communiqué to
include-in addition to the customaryforms,protestations of friendship,
recital of major principles and declarations of intent-provisions of a
treaty nature" (Memorial,para. 279). Counsel for Greece, moreover, re-

ferred to the issue of joint communiquésas "a modern ritual which has
acquired full status in internationalractice".
96. On the question of form,theCourt need only observe that it knows
of no rule of international law which might preclude ajoint communiqué
from constituting an international agreement to submit a dispute to arbi-
tration orjudicial settlement (cf. Arts. 2, 3and 11of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties). Accordingly,whether the Brussels Commu-
niquéof 31May 1975 does or does not constitute such an agreement
essentiallydepends on the nature of the act or transaction to which the
Communiquégivesexpression;andit doesnot settlethequestion simplyto
refer to the form-a communiqué-in which that act or transaction is
embodied.On thecontrary,in determining what wasindeed thenature of
the act or transaction embodiedin the BrusselsCommuniqué,the Court
must have regard above al1 to its actual terms and to the particular
circumstancesin which it was drawn up.
97. The relevant paragraphs of the Brussels Communiqué read as

follows:
"In the course of their meeting the two Prime Ministers had an
opportunity to give consideration to the problems which led to the
existing situation as regards relations between their countries.
They decided [ont décidét]hat those problems should be resolved
[doivent êtrerésolus]peacefully by means of negotiations and as ((Le communiqué conjoint de Bruxelles en date du 31 mai 1975,

faisantsuiteà deséchangesdevues,énonceque lespremiers ministres
grec et turc ont décidé queles problèmes opposant les deux pays
devraient êtrerésoluspacifiquement (et, au sujet du plateau conti-
nental de la mer Egée,par la Cour internationale de La Haye >)Les
deux gouvernements ont ainsiacceptéconjointementet chacun pour
soi la compétence de la Cour en la matière qui a fait l'objet de la
présenterequête,conformément àl'article36,paragraphe 1,du Statut
de la Cour.

95. Cecommuniquéde Bruxellesdu 31mai 1975neporte ni signatureni
paraphe, et un desconseils dela Grèce a informéla Courque lespremiers
ministresl'ont simplement présentéauxjournalistes au cours d'une confé-

rence de presse tenue à l'issue de leur réunion de cette date. Dans les
observationsqu'il a fait teniràla Cour le 25 août 1976,le Gouvernement
de la Turquie a dit (par. 15) qu'il était (<évident qu'un communiqué
conjoint n'équiva[lait]pas à un accord en droit international ))ajoutant
que <<s'ilen était un,il devrait être ratifiéau moins par la Turquie o.Le
Gouvernement de la Grèce soutient à l'inverse qu'un communiqué
conjoint peut constituer un tel accord. Pour avoir cet effet,(<il faut et il
suffit, selon lui, qu'au-delà des formulesprotocolaires, des protestations

d'amitié, du rappeldes grands principes et desdéclarationsd'intention, le
communiquéconjoint comporte des dispositionsconventionnelles (mé-
moire, par. 279).En outre,un conseil de la Grècea dit delapublication de
communiqués conjoints qu'il s'agissaitd'une <<solennité récentequi a
acquis pleinement droit de cité dans la pratique internationale )).
96. Surla question de la forme, la Courpeut se borner à faire observer
qu'iln'existepas de règlededroit international interdisant qu'un commu-
niqué conjoint constitue un accord international destiné à soumettre un

différend àl'arbitrage ou au règlementjudiciaire (voir lesarticles 2,3 et 11
de laconvention de Vienne sur ledroitdestraités).Enconséquence,que le
communiquéde Bruxelles du 31mai 1975constitue ou non un tel accord
dépendessentiellement de lanature del'acteou dela transaction dont ilest
fait état;onne règlepas la questioneninvoquant laforme de communiqué
donnée audit acte ou à ladite transaction. Au contraire, pour déterminer
quelle était en fait la nature de l'acte ou de la transaction consacrée par
le communiqué de Bruxelles, la Cour doit tenir compte avant tout des

termes employéset descirconstancesdans lesquelles lecommuniquéa été
élaboré.
97. Les alinéas pertinents du communiqué de Bruxelles sont les
suivants:

((Au cours de leur rencontre les deux premiers ministres ont eu
l'occasionde procéder àl'examendesproblèmesquiconduisirent àla
situation actuelle des relations de leurs pays.
Ilsont décidé que cesproblèmesdoiventêtrerésoluspacifiquement
par la voiedesnégociationset concernant leplateau continentalde la regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International
Court at The Hague. They defined the general lines on the basis of
which the forthcoming meetings of the representatives of the two
Govemments would take place.

In that connection they decided to bring fonvard the date of the
meetingof expertsconcerningthe question of thecontinental shelfof
the Aegean Sea and that of the experts on the question of air
space."
98. In presenting the Communiqué as constituting a definitive agree-
ment between the Prime Ministers to submit the present dispute to the
Court, the Greek Govemment places particular emphasis on the word
"décidé" and the words "doiventêtrerésolus"in the original-French- text
of the secondparagraph. These words,it says,arewords of "decision" and

of "obligation" indicative of a mutual commitment on the part of the
Prime Ministers torefer thedispute totheCourt. Specifically,itclaimsthat
the "agreement" embodied in the Communiqué"is more than an under-
taking to negotiate" and directly "confers jurisdiction on the Court"
(Memorial, Part 2, Section III, Heading A). It likewise claims that the
Communiqué"comrnits the parties to conclude any implementing agree-
mentneeded for theperformance of theobligation"(ibid, Heading B),and
that the refusal by oneparty to conclude such an agreement "permits the
otherparty to seisethe Court unilaterally" (ibid, Heading C). In its view,
moreover, no implementing agreement is required by the Communiqué
which,it says,"enables theparties toresort to theCourt byApplication no
less than by special agreement" (ibid., Heading D). Finally, if it is consi-
dered that "a complementaryagreement isa legalprerequisitefor seisinof
the Court", it maintains that "the two parties are under obligation to
negotiatein good faith theconclusion of such an agreement" (ibid.,Head-
ing E).
99. The Turkish Government, in the observations transmitted to the
Court on 25August 1976,not only denies that the Communiquéconsti-
tutes "an agreement under international law" (para. 15)but alsomaintains
that in any event the two Governments cannot be said to have thereby
"jointly and severallyaccepted thejurisdiction of the Court in the present
matter" when they have never agreed on the scope of the "matter" to be
subrnitted to the Court (para. 14).Examination of the text, it maintains,

shows that the intention was quite different, and that the Communiqué
was "far from amounting to agreement by one State to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Court upon theunilateralapplication of theother State"
(ibid.).According to the Government of Turkey:

". ..it is clear that there was no commitment to submit to the Court
without a special agreement because the followingparagraph said in
thisconnection that thetwoPrimeMinistershaddecided toaccelerate
the meeting of the expertsconcerningthe question of the continental
shelf of the Aegean Sea" (ibid.). mer Egéepar la Cour internationale de La Haye. Ils ont définiles
lignes généralessur la base desquelles auront lieu les rencontres
prochaines des représentants des deux gouvernements.

A cet égardilsont décidé d'accélérelra rencontre d'experts concer-

nant laquestion du plateau continental de lamer Egée,ainsique celle
des experts sur la question de l'espace aérien. ))

98. En présentant le communiqué comme un accord ferme entre les
premiers ministres aux fins de saisir la Cour du présent différend,le
Gouvernement de la Grèceattribue une importance particulière au parti-
cipe <(décidé )et aux mots <(doivent êtrerésolus ))employésdans le texte
original français du deuxièmealinéa. Cesmots, dit-il, qui expriment déci-

sion et obligation, montrent que les premiers ministres se sont engagés
réciproquement à porter le différend devant laCour. Plus précisément le
Gouvernement de la Grèce soutient que l' <(cord )) faisant l'objet du
communiqué <estplus qu'un engagementde négocier et <(attribue direc-
tement compétence à la Cour (mémoire,deuxième partie, section III,

intituléA). Il affirme de mêmeque le communiqué <(oblige les partiesà
conclure tout accord d'application nécessaire à l'exécutionde l'obliga-
tion (ibid.,intituléB)et que le refus de conclure un tel accord par l'une
des parties <permet à l'autre partie de saisir unilatéralement la Cour ))
(ibid., intituléC). A son avis, en outre, un accord d'application n'est pas
nécessaireattendu que le communiqué <ouvre aux parties la voie de la

requête commecelledu compromis (ibid.,intituléD). Enfin, à supposer
qu'<(unaccordcomplémentairesoitjuridiquement nécessairepour saisirla
Cour O, le Gouvernement de la Grècesoutient que <les deux parties ont
l'obligation de négocierde bonne foi la conclusion d'un tel accord ))(ibid.,
intitulé E).
99. Dans les observations qu'il a fait tenir à la Cour le 25 août 1976,le

Gouvernement de la Turquienon seulement conteste que lecommuniqué
constitue <un accord en droit international ))(par. 15); il soutient aussi
que de toute façonon ne saurait prétendrequepar cecommuniquélesdeux
gouvernementsaient <(acceptéconjointementetchacun pour soilacompé-
tence de la Cour en la matière )),alors qu'ils n'ontjamais défini d'un

commun accord la <<matière ))à porter devant laCour (par. 14).D'après le
Gouvernement delaTurquie,il ressort du texte mêmedu communiquéque
celui-ci répondait à une intention toute différente et qu'il était <(loin
d'équivaloir à un accord envertu duquel un Etat accepterait de sesoumet-
tre à lajuridiction de la Cour lorsque l'autre Etat déposerait une requête
unilatérale ))(ibid.). Selon le Gouvernement de la Turquie:

<<Il est clair qu'aucun engagement n'étaitpris de s'adresser à la
Coursans compromispuisquele paragraphe suivantdéclare à cesujet
que les deux premiers ministres ont décidé d'avancerla réuniondes
experts s'occupant du plateau continental de la mer Egée. (Ibid.)41 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)
This means, in its view,that "priority was given to negotiations" on the
substance of the question of thecontinental shelf, and nothing was said in
that connection "even about the negotiation of a special agreement" to
subrnit the question to the Court (ibid.). It also points to the subsequent
efforts of Greece to secure the negotiation of such an agreement as

confirmation of thecorrectness of Turkey'sinterpretation of the Commu-
niqué (para. 16).

100. This divergence of views as to the interpretation of the Brussels
Communiqué makes it necessary for the Court to consider what light is
thrownonitsmeaning by thecontextin which the meeting of 31 May 1975
took place and the Communiqué was drawn up. The first mention of the
Court, accordingto the evidence, was in a GreekNote Verbale of 27 Jan-
uary 1975,that is some four months before the meeting of the two Prime
Ministersin Brussels. In that Note the Greek Governmentproposed that
"the differences over theapplicable law aswellasover thesubstance of the
matter" should be referred to the Court, adding:

"Indeed, theGreekGovernment,withoutprejudiceto theirright to
initiate Court proceedings unilaterally, would see considerable ad-
vantage in reachingjoint& with the Turkish Government a special
agreement ..." (Application, Ann. II, No. 9, emphasis added.)
101. Replying on6 February 1975,the Turkish Government referred to
"meaningful negotiations" as "a basic method for the settlement of inter-

national disputes" and said that, because of the absence of such negotia-
tions, "the issues relatingto the disputes have neither been fully identified
nor elucidated". It then continued:
"However, in principle, the Turkish Government favourably con-
sidersthe GreekGovernment's proposa1to refer thedispute over the
delimitation of the Aegean continental shelfjoint& to the Interna-
tionalCourt ofJustice. To thiseffect and toelaboratethe terms under
which the matter shallbe referred to the said Court, Turkeyproposes
high level talks to be initiated between the two Governments ..."
(Zbid, Ann. II, No. 10,emphasis added.)

On 10February 1975, commenting on the Turkish reply, the Greek
Govemmentnoted with satisfactionthat "the Turkish Governmentaccept
in principle their proposa1 that the question of the delimitation of the
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea be subrnitted jointly to the Intema-
tional Court of Justicein The Hague" (ibid., No. 11,emphasisadded). It
also agreed that "following suitable preparation, talks should be held in
order to draft the terms of the specialagreement (compromisum)required
to that effect" (ibid.).Thisled the Turkish Prime Minister, when explaining MER ÉGÉE (ARRÊT) 41

Celasignifiea son avisque (<prioritéétaitdonnéeauxnégociations )surle
fond de la question du plateau continental et il n'a mêmepas étéfait
mention a cet égard de (<la négociation d'uncompromis ))tendant à la
saisinede la Cour (ibid). Le Gouvernement de la Turquie fait également
valoir que les efforts déployésultérieurementpar le Gouvernement de la
Grècepour qu'un tel compromissoit négocié confirment le bien-fondéde

son interprétation du communiqué(par. 16).

100. Cette divergence de vues sur l'interprétation du communiquéde

Bruxelles oblige la Cour à rechercher si les circonstances entourant la
réuniondu 31mai 1975etlarédactionducommuniquépeuvent enéclairer
le sens. D'aprèsle dossier,la Cour est mentionnée pour la première fois
dans une note verbale grecque du 27janvier 1975,c'est-à-direquatre mois
environ avant la rencontre des deux premiers ministresà Bruxelles.Dans
cettenote, leGouvernement delaGrèceproposaitque (lesdivergencesau
sujet du droit applicable ainsi que sur le fond de la question soient

soumises a la Cour, ajoutant:
(Avraidire,etsanspréjudicedesondroit desaisirunilatéralement
la Cour, le Gouvernement grec verrait de très grands avantagesà ce
qu'uncompromissoitétablideconcertavecleGouvernement turc ...
(Requête, ann.II, no9. Les italiques sont de la Cour.)

101. Dans saréponsedu6février1975leGouvernement delaTurquiea
déclaré que (<des négociationsayant un sens constituent un mode fonda-

mental de règlement desdifférendsinternationaux )et qu'enl'absencede
telles négociations <les problèmes sous'-jacentsaux différendsn'ont pu
être ni totalementcernésni élucidés o.Il poursuivait en ces termes:

(Toutefois leGouvernementturc accueilleenprincipe avecfaveur
laproposition du Gouvernement grectendant a saisirconjointementla
Cour internationale de Justice du différend sur la délimitation du
plateau continental de la mer Egée. A cettefin, et pour préciser selon
quelles modalitésladite Cour sera saisie,la Turquie propose que des
entretiens à un niveau élevé commencent entre les deux gouverne-
ments ...))(Requête, ann.II, no 10. Les italiques sont de la Cour.)

Le 10février1975le Gouvernement de la Grèce,commentant la réponse
turque, notait avec satisfaction que (<le Gouvernement turc accepte en
principe sa proposition de soumettre conjointementa la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice à La Haye la question de la délimitation du plateau

continental de la mer Egée (ibid.,no 11,lesitaliquessont dela Cour). Le
Gouvernement de la Grèce marquait également son accord pour que,
(<sous réserved'une préparation appropriée,des entretiens aient lieu afin
de mettre au point le texte du compromis nécessairea cet effet (ibid.)42 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

the matter to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 3 March 1975to
Say:
"The Greeks have answered positively to Ourproposa1concerning
talks prior toOurgoing to The Hague. These [talks]did not start yet.
The object of the talks will be the special agreement (compromis)
which will define the basis of the case." (Memorial, para. 268.)

102. According to the information before the Court, those were the
respective positions which the twoGovernments had taken up ashort time
before their ForeignMinisters met in Rome on 17-19May 1975todiscuss,
interalia,thequestion of thecontinental shelf in the Aegean Sea.Further-
more, in the light of thediplomatic exchanges, theGreekGovernment can
hardly have been left in any doubt as to the nature of the proposa1
regarding the Court which the Turkish Government would understand to
be the subject of the discussions at the Rome meeting: namely, a joint
submission of the dispute to the Court hy agreement.

103. Reference is made to the proceedings at the Rome meeting in a
later Greek Note Verbale of2 October 1975,from whichit appears that the
Greek delegation submitteda draft text ofacompromisfor negotiation, but
the Turkish delegation said that they were not yet ready to discuss it and
needed more time to prepare themselves.The meeting ended with the issue

by the two Foreign Ministers on 19May 1975of a brief Joint Communi-
qué,which included the following statements:

"The questions relating to the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea
were discussed and initial consideration was given to the text of a
special agreement concerning the submission of the matter to the
International Court of Justice. ..
It was agreed that the meetings between experts would be con-
tinued in the near future." (Application, Ann. III, No. 1.)

According to the above-mentioned Note Verbale of 2 October 1975, a
committee of experts was to meet atthe earliestpossible date "to negotiate
the special agreement", and to explore a Turkish idea in regard to joint
exploitation. The TurkishGovernment also referred tothe Rome meeting,
in a Note of 18November 1975.It there spoke of the Greek delegation
having :

"... agreed to seeka negotiated settlement of the differences, bearing
also in mind the Turkish proposa1 forjoint exploration and exploi-
tation of resources, and to try to prepare, if necessary, a draft special
agreement for thejoint reference to theInternational Court of Justice
of those aspects of the situation which, they rnight agree, were the
points of genuine disagreement between the two sides" (ihid., Ann.
IV, No. 3).C'estcequiafait dire au premier ministredeTurquie, lorsqu'ila exposéla
question àl'Assembléenationale turque le 3 mars 1975:
(<LesGrecs ont réagipositivement ànotrepropositiontendant àce
que des entretiens aient lieu avant d'aller La Haye. Ces entretiens
n'ont pas encore commencé; ilsporteront surle compromisqui défi-
nira la base de l'affaire.(Mémoire,par. 268.)

102. Telles étaient, d'aprèsles renseignements soumis à la Cour, les
positions respectives que lesdeux gouvernements avaientadoptéespeu de
temps avant que leurs ministres des affaires étrangères se réunissent à
Rome du 17 au 19 mai 1975 pour discuter entre autres la question du
plateau continental de la mer Egée.En outre, si l'on tient compte de la
correspondancediplomatique, leGouvernement dela Grècepouvait diffi-

cilement conserver des doutes au sujet de la nature de la proposition
concernant la Cour qui, d'après le Gouvernement de la Turquie, devait
faire l'objetdesconversations de Rome: il s'agissaitde soumettre conjoin-
tement le différend à la Cour par voie d'accord.
103. Les entretiens de Rome sont évoqués dans une note verbale ulté-
rieure de la Grèce en date du 2octobre 1975,d'où il ressort que la délé-
gation grecque avait présenté à cette réunion un projet de compromis
devant servir de base de négociationmais que la délégationturqueavait
indiquéqu'ellen'étaitpasencoreprête àexaminercetexte et qu'illuifallait
plus longtemps pour se préparer.La réunions'est terminée sur la publi-
cation par les deux ministres des affairesétrangères,le 19mai 1975,d'un

bref communiqué conjoint où figuraient les passages suivants:
(<Lesquestions relativesau plateau continental de la mer Egéeont
étédiscutéeset une premièreétuded'un texte de compromis concer-
nant la soumission de l'affaire devant la Cour internationale de
Justice a eu lieu..
La continuationdesrencontres desexpertsdans un proche avenir a
étéconvenue. ))(Requête, ann.III, no1.)

D'aprèsla note verbale du 2octobre 1975susmentionnée,il était entendu
qu'un comitéd'experts seréuniraitle plus tôt possible (pour négocierle
compromis et pour examiner plus àfond une suggestion de la Turquie
concernant une exploitation conjointe. Le Gouvernement de la Turquie,
de son côté,a faitégalement référence àcette réunionde Rome dans une

note en date du 18 novembre 1975,où il est indiqué que la délégation
grecque:
« aacceptéde rechercher un règlementnégocié deslitiges,sansperdre
de vue la proposition turque d'exploration et d'exploitation com-
munesdes ressources,et d'essayerde préparer,s'ilen étaitbesoin, un
projet de compromisafin de saisir conjointement la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice des aspects de la situation considéréscomme consti-

tuant lesvéritablespoints de désaccordentre lesdeux parties (ibid.,
ann. IV, no3).43 AEGEAN SEA (JUDGMENT)

104. TheCourt can seenothing in the terms of the RomeCommuniqué
of 19May 1975,or in the subsequent accounts of the meeting givenby the
two Governments, which kight indicate that Turkey was then ready to
contemplate, not a joint submission of the dispute to the Court, but a
general acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to it. On the
contrary, the positions of the Greek and Turkish Governments on this
point appear to have been quite unchanged when, only a fewdays later on
31 May 1975,the two Prime Ministers began their meeting in Brussels.

105. Consequently, it isin that context-a previously expressedwilling-
ness on the part of Turkeyjointly to submit the dispute to the Court, after
negotiations and by a special agreement defining the matters to be
decided-that the meaning of the Brussels Joint Communiquéof 31 May
1975 has to be appraised. When read in that context, the terms of the

Communiqué do not appear to the Court to evidence any change in the
position of the Turkish Government in regard to the conditions under
which it wasready toagree to the submission of the dispute to the Court. It
is true that the Communiqué records the decisionof the Prime Ministers
that certain problems in the relations of the two countries should be
resolved peacefully by means of negotiations, and as regards the conti-
nental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the Court. As appears however from
paragraph 97 above, they also defined the general lines on the basis of
which theforthcomingmeetings of the representatives of the two Govern-
ments would take place and decided in that connection to bring forward
the date of the meeting of experts. These statements do not appear to the
Court to be inconsistent with the generalposition taken up by Turkey in
the previous diplomatic exchanges: that it was ready to consider a joint
submission of the dispute to the Court by means of aspecial agreement.At

the same time, the express provision made by the Prime Ministers for a
further meeting of experts on the continental shelf does not seem easily
reconcilablewith an immediateand unqualifiedcommitment to acceptthe
submission of the dispute to the Court unilaterally by Application. In the
light of Turkey's previous insistence on the need to "identify" and "elu-
cidate" the issues in dispute, it seems unlikely that its Prime Minister
should have undertaken such a commitment in such wide and imprecise
terms.

106. The information before the Court concerning the negotiations
between the experts and the diplomatic exchanges subsequent to the
Brussels Communiqué appears to confirm that the two Prime Ministers
did not by their "decision" undertake an unconditional cornmiment t0
submit the continental shelf disputeto the Court. The two sides, it is true,

put somewhatdifferent interpretations upon the meaning of the Commu-
niqué,theTurkish sideinsistingupon the need formeaningful negotiations
on the substance of the dispute before any submission to the Court, the
Greek sidepressing for thecase tobe taken directly to the Court.From the 104. La Cour ne voit rien dans le texte du communiquéde Rome du
19mai 1975, ni dans la façon dont les deux gouvernementsont évoqué
ultérieurementla réunion, quidonne à penser que la Turquie était alors
disposée à envisager non pas une soumission conjointe du différend àla
Cour, mais une acceptationgénéralede sacompétencepour en connaître.
Il semble mêmeque lespositions des Gouvernements de la Grèceet de la
Turquie sur ce point n'avaient aucunement évoluéau momentoù, à peine
quelquesjours plus tard, le1mai 1975,lesdeuxpremiers ministres sesont

réunis à Bruxelles.
105. C'est doncdans cecontexte - c'est-à-direcomptetenu dufait que
la Turquie s'était auparavant déclaréeprêteà soumettreconjointementle
différend à la Cour après négociationet au moyen d'un compromisdéfi-
nissant les questionsà trancher - qu'il faut apprécierla signification du
communiqué conjoint de Bruxelles du 31mai 1975. Replacésdans ce
contexte, les termes du communiquéne paraissent pas, selon la Cour,
traduire un changement depositionduGouvernement delaTurquie quant
aux conditionsdans lesquellescegouvernement étaitprêt a accepterque le
différend soitporté devantla Cour. Sansdoute le communiqué consacre-
t-il la décisionprise par les premiers ministres, suivant laquelle certains
problèmesintéressantlesrelationsentre lesdeuxpays devaientêtrerésolus

pacifiquementpar la voiede négociationset, concernant leplateau conti-
nentalde lamer Egée,par laCour. Mais,commeonl'a vuauparagraphe 97
ci-dessus,lespremiers ministres avaient aussidéfinileslignesgénéralesdes
entretiensà venirentre lesreprésentantsdesdeuxgouvernements etdécidé
à cet égard d'avancerla rencontre des experts. Il ne semblepasà la Cour
que ces déclarations soient incompatibles avec la position de principe
adoptéepar la Turquiedans la correspondancediplomatiqueantérieure, à
savoir qu'elle était prêtà envisager la saisine conjointede la Cour par
compromis. Au surplus le fait que les premiers ministres prévoyaient
expressémentune nouvelle réunion d'experts sur le plateau continental
paraît difficilement conciliable avec l'idéed'un engagement immédiatet

sans réserved'accepter que le différend soitobmis à la Cour par requête
unilatérale.Etant donné l'insistanceaveclaquelle le Gouvernement de la
Turquie avait auparavant soulignéla nécessité de (cerner et d'(<identi-
fier les questions litigieuses, il semble peu probable que son premier
ministre ait pris un tel engagement dans des termes aussi larges et aussi
imprécis.
106. Lesrenseignements soumis àla Cour sur lesnégociationsentre les
experts et la correspondancediplomatiquepostérieure à la publication du
communiqué de Bruxelles semblent confirmer que les deux premiers
ministres n'ontpas,par leur(<décision ))pris l'engagementinconditionnel

de saisirlaCourdudifférendconcernant leplateau continental.De part et
d'autre, il est vrai, une interprétation assez différenteest donnéede la
signification du communiqué, la Turquie insistant sur la nécessitéde
négociationsqui aient un sens sur lefond du différendavant toute saisine
de la Cour, la Grèce réclamant que la Cour soit immédiatement saisie. first, however, the Turlush side consistentlymaintained the position that
reference of the dispute to the Court was to be contemplated only on the
basis of a joint submission after the conclusion of a special agreement
defining the issues to be resolved by the Court. Even the Greek Govern-
ment, while arguing in favour of immediate submission of the dispute to
the Court, referredtothedrafting ofaspecialagreement as"necessary" for
submitting the issue to the Court (Notes Verbales of 2 October and
19December 1975,Application, Ann. IV, Nos. 2 and 4). It is also signifi-
cant that nowhere in the diplomatic exchanges or in the negotiations
between the experts does the Greek Government appear to have invoked
the Joint Communiquéas an already existing and complete,direct title of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, although in a Note Verbale of 27 January 1975,
before any Joint Communiqué existed,the Greek Government expressly
reserved its "right to initiate Court proceedingsunilaterally" (presumably
havingin mind the General Act),the Court has not found any mention by
Greece, prior to the filing of the Application, of the possibility that the
dispute might be submitted to the Court unilaterally on the basis of the
Joint Communiqué.

107. Accordingly, having regard to the terms of the Joint Communiqué
of 31 May 1975and to the context in which it was agreed and issued,the
Court can only conclude that it wasnot intended to,and did not, constitute
an immediatecornmitment by the Greek and Turlush PrimeMinisters,on
behalf of their respective Governments, to accept unconditionally the
unilateral submission of thepresent dispute to theCourt. It followsthat, in
the opinion of the Court, the Brussels Communiqué does not furnish a
valid basis for establishingthe Court'sjurisdiction to entertain the Appli-
cation filed by Greece on 10 August 1976.

108. In so finding, the Court emphasizes that the sole question for
decision in the present proceedings is whether it does, or does not, have
jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by Greece on 10August
1976.Havingconcluded that the Joint Communiquéissued in Brusselson
31 May 1975 does not furnish a basis for establishing the Court's juris-
diction in the present proceedings, the Court is not concerned, nor is it
competent, to pronounce upon anyotherimplications which that Commu-
niquémay have in the context of the present dispute. It is for the two
Governments themselves to consider those implications and whateffect, if
any, istobegiven to theJoint Communiquéintheir further efforts to arrive

at an amicable settlement of theirdispute.Nothing that the Court has said
may be understood as precluding the dispute from being brought before
the Court if and when the conditions for establishing itsjurisdiction are
satisfied.Mais la position de la Turquie constammentmaintenue dès ledébuta été
quel'on nepouvait envisagerde saisirla Courqueconjointement,une fois
qu'un compromisdéfinissant les questionsque la Cour aurait àtrancher
auraitétéconclu.LeGouvernement delaGrècelui-mêmet,out eninsistant
sur une saisineimmédiatedela Cour, a dit que la rédactionpréalabled'un
compromis était (nécessaire1)(notes verbales du 2 octobre et du 19dé-
cembre 1975,requête,ann.IV, nos2et 4). Il est égalementsignificatif qu'à
aucun moment, ni dans la correspondancediplomatique,ni au cours des
négociationsentre experts, leGouvernement de la Grècene paraisse avoir
invoquélecommuniquéconjointcommeconstituant d'ores et déjàuntitre
de compétencedirect et complet. D'autre part, bien que, avant la publi-

cation de tout communiqué conjoint, le Gouvernement de la Grèce ait
expressémentréservé dans unenote verbaledu 27janvier 1975son <<droit
de saisir unilatéralement la Cour (en songeant probablement à l'Acte
général)l,a Cour ne découvre rienqui donne à penser que la Grèceaurait
évoquéa ,vant le dépôtde sa requête,la possibilitéde porter unilatérale-
ment le différend devant la Cour sur la base du communiquéconjoint.

107. En conséquence,eu égardau texte du communiqué conjoint du
31mai 1975et aux circonstancesdans lesquellescelui-cia été établd i'un
commun accord et publié, la Cour ne peut que conclure que le commu-
niquén'avaitpas pour objetet n'apas eupour effetdeconstituer dela part

des premiersministres de Grèceet de Turquie un engagement immédiat,
pris au nom de leurs gouvernementsrespectifs, d'accepterinconditionnel-
lement que le présentdifférendsoit soumis àla Cour par requête unila-
térale.11endécouleque,selonlaCour, lecommuniquéde Bruxellesn'offre
pas de fondement valable à sa compétencepour connaître de la requête
déposée par la Grècele 10août 1976.
108. Cedisant, la Courtientàsouligne; que la seulequestioà trancher
en la présente instance est celle de sa compétencepour connaître de la
requêtedéposéepar laGrècle e 10août 1976.Ayant conclu que lecommu-
niquéconjointpublié àBruxellesle 31mai 1975ne constitue pas une base

de juridiction dans la présente instance, la Cour n'est pas appelée se
prononcer, et n'a pas compétence pour se prononcer, sur toutes autres
conséquences possiblesde ce document dans le contexte du différend.
C'estaux deux gouvernements eux-mêmes qu'ilappartient d'examinerces
conséquences,ainsique l'effetà attribuer éventuellementau communiqué
conjoint dans leurs efforts ultérieurs en vue de parvenirun règlement
amiable du différendquilesoppose. Rien decequiprécèdene sauraitêtre
interprétécomme empêchantde soumettre le différend à la Cour des lors
que les conditions établissant sajuridiction viendraieàtêtreremplies. 109. For these reasons,

by 12votes to 2,

finds that it iswithoutjurisdiction toentertain theApplication filedby the
Govemment of the Hellenic Republic on 10August 1976.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authontative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of December, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight, in three copies, of which one
willbeplaced in the archivesof theCourt and theotherstransrnittedto the
Government of the Hellenic Republic and to the Government of the
Republic of Turkey respectively.

(Signed) E. JIMÉNEZDE ARÉCHAGA,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

Vice-PresidentNAGENDRS AINGH andJudgesGROS,LACHSM , OROZOV

and TARAZa Ippend separate opinions or declarations to theJudgment of
the Court.

Judge DE CASTRO and Judge adhocSTASSINOPOUL appSend dissenting
opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) E.DE.A.

(Initialled) S. A. 109. Par ces motifs,

par douze voix contre deux,
dit qu'ellen'apas compétencepour connaître de la requêtedépoear le

Gouvernement de la Républiquehellénique le10août 1976.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texteanglaisfaisant foi, au palais de la
Paix,à La Haye, le dix-neuf décembremil neuf cent soixante-dix-huit,en
trois exemplaires, dontunresteradéposéauxarchivesde la Cour etdont
les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de lai-
blique helléniqueet au Gouvernement de la République turque.

Le Président,
(Signé)E.JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA.

Le Greffier,

(Signé)S. AQUARONE.

M.NAGENDRS AINGHV, ice-Président,etMM.GROS,LACHSM , OROZOV
etTARAZ~,j~ge~,j~ignen àtl'arrêt soilt'exposédeleuropinionindividuelle
soit une déclaration.

M. DE CASTROj,uge, et M. STASSINOPOULjO ugS, ad hoc,joignentà
l'arrêtles exposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé)E.J. de A.
(Paraphé)S. A.

ICJ document subtitle

Jurisdiction of the Court

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 19 December 1978

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