Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/9
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Friday 25 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 25 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,
Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel;
Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,
Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Assistants; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,
M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme conseils ;
M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,
Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,
MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des
affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme assistants ; - 6 -
Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;
Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -
MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;
M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,
MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,
Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,
Csounsel;
Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Asdvisers;
H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,
MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents ;
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,
M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseillers ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -
Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,
as Diplomatic Advisers;
Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,
Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,
as Administrative Staff. - 11 -
M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,
comme conseillers diplomatiques ;
M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,
M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,
comme personnel administratif. - 12 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today to hear the continuation of the
first round presentation of Greece. I shall now invite ProfessorAlainPellet to continue his
statement that he started yesterday.
M. PELLET : Merci Monsieur le président.
L ES LIMITES INHÉRENTES À L EXERCICE DE LA FONCTION JUDICIAIRE (SUITE )
I. Un arrêt dépourvu de toute portée effective (suite)
[Projection n 1 ⎯ Article 22 de l’accord intérimaire.]
12. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieu rs les juges, lorsque je me suis arrêté hier
soir, un peu abruptement, j’avais entrepris de m ontrer que l’arrêt que l’ex-République yougoslave
de Macédoine vous appelle à rendr e serait dépourvu de toute portée. Ou bien le demandeur vous
appelle à décider qu’il peut continuer à dema nder son admission à l’OTAN, et il n’y a pas de
différend ; ou bien il vous demande que la décision prise au sommet de Bucar est est irrégulière et
vous ne sauriez le faire sans vous prononcer sur l’attitude de l’OTAN et de ses Etats membres,
absents de l’instance. En outre et de toute manière, pour ce faire, il vous faudrait prendre en
considération non pas l’article11 seul, comme le demandeur vous l’enjoint, mais l’ensemble de
l’accord ⎯ notamment l’article 22, dont le texte est projeté en ce moment.
13. Or, de deux choses l’une, Monsieur le président :
⎯ ou bien, la déclaration de Bucarest, qui diffère l’admission de l’ARYM, est une décision licite
de l’organisation, conforme au traité de l’Atlantique Nord, et il s’ensuit que toute position de la
Grèce prise en tant que membre de l’OTAN rentre dans les prévisions de cet article 22, relatifs
aux «droits et aux devoirs découlant d’accords...multilatéraux»; par voie de conséquence,
cette position ne saurait violer l’accord intérimaire, la Grèce n’ayant fait que s’acquitter des
obligations conventionnelles qu’elle a envers les autres membr es de l’Alliance et envers
l’organisation elle-mêm;eces obligations sont préservées par l’article;2le
professeur Reisman reviendra sur ce point tout à l’heure ; - 13 -
⎯ ou bien, si la position prêtée à la Grèce durant le sommet de Bucarest n’était pas en conformité
avec ses droits et obligations en vertu du traité de l’Atlantique Nord, elle ne serait alors pas
couverte par l’article 22 mais pour le déterminer, la Cour devrait nécessairement se prononcer
d’abord sur la licéité de la position collective, le position commune, prise par l’ensemble des
Etats membres et de la décision de l’organisation elle-même. Une telle appréciation ne pourrait
être faite sur la base de l’accord intérimaire; elle devrait l’être en fonction des règles en
vigueur à l’OTAN ; ce faisant, la Cour outrepasserait tout aussi clairement sa compétence.
[Fin de la projection n o 1.]
14. Mais un prononcé de la haute juridiction su r le fond aurait une autre conséquence : si la
Cour passait outre son incompétence manifeste et rendait tout de même un arrêt, celui-ci serait res
inter alios acta pour l’OTAN, pourtant seule à même de donner satisfaction à l’ARYM. Pour cette
raison, l’arrêt ne serait pas susceptible de produi re d’effets et il serait contraire au caractère
exclusivement judiciaire de vos fonctions que vous le rendiez, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges:
«Si la Cour devait poursuivre l’affaire et déclarer toutes les allégations du demandeur justifiées au
fond, elle n’en serait pas moins dans l’impossibilité de rendre un arrêt effectivement applicable.»
(Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaum e-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p.33.) C’était vrai dans l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional que je viens de
citer ; ce l’est dans celle qui nous occupe. Dans son arrêt de 1963, la Cour a refusé de se prononcer
sur une violation imputée au Royaume-Uni du fait que ceci n’aurait pu avoir aucun effet sur la
1
situation qui avait résulté de la violation alléguée . Il en va de même ici : un arrêt faisant droit aux
demandes de l’Etat requérant n’au rait pas la moindre conséquence su r la situation de celui-ci au
sein de l’OTAN à laquelle il est toujours candidat ⎯avec le soutien de la Grèce dès lors que la
condition rappelée par le sommet de Bucarest aura été satisfaite.
15. Le président de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine lui-même était arrivé à ce
constat avant même que la Cour soit saisie :
«we can initiate certain procedures in front of the United Nations or the international
courts… But, at the same time we should be fully aware that it is not going to solve
our problem with the blockade for our join ing NATO and repeating the same scenario
1
Voir affaire du Cameroun septentrional, ibid. ; passage cité in CR 2011/6, p. 17, par. 9 (Klein). - 14 -
with the European Union. These organi zations cannot be joined with an UN
resolution or with a court decision , but with a consensual decision by all their
members, including the Republic of Greece.» 2
16. Il y a à ceci une autre ⎯ et deuxième raison : en s’efforçant désespérément de limiter ses
demandes à la seule position supposée de la Grèce, le demandeur tente de soustraire à votre
examen le différend global qui l’oppose à l’OTAN (e t, d’ailleurs aussi à la Grèce) puisqu’il veut
restreindre votre compétence à un seul aspect, non décisif, de ses griefs. Mais il ne peut pas vous
priver ainsi, artificiellement, de la connaissance et de l’appréciation de pans essentiels du dossier.
Comme la Cour l’a rappelé avec force dans son avis consultatif dans l’affaire de l’ Accord de siège
de l’OMS :
«une règle du droit international, coutumier ou conventionnel, ne s’applique pas dans
le vide ; elle s’applique par rapport à des faits et dans le cadre d’un ensemble plus
large de règles juridiques dont elle n’est qu ’une partie. Par c onséquent, pour qu’une
question présentée dans les termes hypothétiques de la requête puisse recevoir une
réponse pertinente et utile, la Cour doit d’ abord s’assurer de sa signification et en
mesurer toute la portée dans la situati on de fait et de droit où il convient de
l’examiner.» (Interprétation de l’accord du 25mars1951 entre l’OMS et l’Egypte,
avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 76, par. 10.)
17. Ce qui vaut en matière consultative s’applique tout autant au contentieux: vous ne
sauriez, dans notre affaire, prendre position sur les actions prêtées à la Grèce sans vous interroger
aussi sur le contexte global dans lequel celles-ci sont intervenues et sur l’attitude et des autres Etats
membres et de l’OTAN elle-même. Or cela, de l’aveu même de l’Etat demandeur, vous ne pouvez
le faire: «Any decisions by NATO following that objection are not and cannot be the subject of
3
these proceedings.»
18. Le problème pour l’ARYM est qu’elle a beau s’obstiner à vouloir limiter l’objet de sa
requête, elle ne peut pas obliger la Cour à l’ex aminer ainsi en tout autisme contextuel. Nos
contradicteurs martèlent que «c’est un acte séparé, clairement individualisable et clairement
attribuable à l’Etat défendeur qui se trouve à la base de la requête. C’est cet acte qui constitue
l’objet de la requête, indépendamment, disent-ils, des conséquences ultérieures qu’il a eues au sein
2
Compte rendu sténographique de la septième séance de la vingt-septième session du Parlement de la République
de Macédoine, tenue le 3 novembre 2008, p. 1 et p. 10-17, contre-mémoire, annexe 104 ; les italiques sont de nous.
3Réplique, p. 78, par. 3.31, CR 2011/5, p. 63, par. 13 (Klein). - 15 -
4
de l’OTAN» . Mais, Monsieur le président, quel est donc «cet acte» que l’on nous présente
comme séparé et clairement individualisable sans ja mais le citer et le dater? Et on comprend
pourquoi : parce qu’il n’existe pas ; la Grèce a pris toute sa part ⎯ la part qu’exigeait sa qualité de
membre de l’organisation et le respect des règles de celle-ci ⎯ toute sa part au processus complexe
et long de consultation qui a abouti à la décision du sommet de Bucarest. Comme l’a dit à juste
titre le professeur Murphy, «those steps were directly «joined» with the formal decision process of
5
NATO on accession» . Et la décision résultant de ce processus est, elle, bien un «acte»
reconnaissable et individualisable; mais d’«act e» de la Grèce, après deux ans et demi de
procédure, le demandeur n’en a toujours individua lisé aucun. Au surplus, il est tout à fait clair,
Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, que vous ne po urriez déterminer si la décision de l’OTAN est
la conséquence du comportement prêté au défe ndeur sans vous prononcer sur les actes et de
l’organisation elle-même et des autres Etats membr es, qui ont tous concouru à la décision prise au
sommet de Bucarest et constamment réaffirmée depuis lors. Or une telle détermination est
indispensable pour apprécier l’existence ou non d’une objection de la part de la Grèce.
19. Dès lors, les conclusions du demandeur tombent sous le coup du principe de l’ Or
monétaire 6 tel que mon contradicteur et ami, le professeurKlein, l’a lui-même défini lundi
7
dernier . Ce faisant en effet, l’ARYM, qui ne peut individualiser un acte quelconque attribuable à
la Grèce, demande bien à la Cour de se pronon cer sur une décision de l’OTAN, ce que la haute
juridiction ne saurait faire ⎯pas davantage qu’elle n’aurait pu admettre «un appel devant [elle]
d’une décision défavorable du Conseil de sécurité» ( Activités militaires et paramilitaires au
Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.Etat s-Unis d’Amérique), compétence et recevabilité,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 436, par 98).
4 CR2011/5, p.63, par.13 (Klein); note de renvoi omise; voir aussi CR2011/6, p.14, par. 5 (Klein) ; p. 29,
par. 29 (Murphy) ; ou réplique, p. 79, par. 3.33.
5CR 2011/6, p. 26, par. 18 (Murphy).
6Voir également contre-mémoire, p. 122-123, par. 6.95-6.98 ou duplique, p. 56-58, par. 3.36.
7
CR2011/5, p.64-65, par.15-16. Voir Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943 , question préliminaire, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p.19; Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p.259, par.50, Timor oriental (Portugal c.Austra lie), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1995 , p.101, par.26 et
Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005,
p. 238, par. 203. - 16 -
20. Je sais bien, Monsieur le président, qu’il est arrivé que la Cour considère qu’un différend
global peut être divisible en plusieurs éléments aux fins de l’établissement de sa compétence 8.
Mais le différend dont l’ARYM prétend l’avoir saisie ne peut être dissocié ni de celui qui oppose
cet Etat à l’OTAN et à l’ensemble de ses Etats membres, ni ⎯ et c’est mon troisième point ⎯ du
différend sur le nom, dont les Parties s’accorden t à considérer qu’il ne relève pas de votre
9
compétence .
21. Certes, comme elle l’a déclaré dans l’affaire du Droit d’asile et rappelé plus récemment
dans celle du Mandat d’arrêt, la Cour a «le devoir de répondr e aux demandes des parties telles
qu’elles s’expriment dans leurs conclusions finales, mais aussi celui de s’abstenir de statuer sur des
points non compris dans lesdites demandes ainsi exprimées» ( Demande d’interprétation de l’arrêt
du 20novembre 1950 en l’affaire du droit d’asile (Colombie c. Pérou), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1950 ,
p. 402) 10. Mais, en la présente occurrence, malgré l’insistance de l’ARYM, vous ne pouvez pas
contourner la question du différend sur le nom: el le est le passage obligé de tout raisonnement
pouvant vous conduire à accueillir ou à rejeter les conclusions du demandeur. Comment
pourriez-vous déterminer (comme l’ARYM vous le demande) si la Grèce a violé l’obligation lui
incombant en vertu de l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire
⎯ sans, par exemple, vous prononcer sur la question de savoir si le demandeur a respecté, et est
prêt à respecter, ses propres obligations en vertu du paragraphe 2 de la résolution 817 (1993) du
Conseil de sécurité et de l’article 5, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire lui-même 11? et
⎯ plus généralement, sans fournir l’interprétation ⎯d’ailleurs réclamée par le demandeur
12
lui-même ⎯ de la résolution817 (1993) du Cons eil de sécurité à laquelle renvoient les
articles 5, paragraphe 1, et 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire, qui fixent les obligations
transitoires des Parties dans l’attente du règlement de leur divergence ; ou
8
Voir Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua . o lombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 860, par. 45, et la jurisprudence citée.
9
Mémoire, p.85, par.5.1; réplique, p.69-74, par. 3.9-3.21 ; contre-mémoire, p. 98-104, par. 6.32-6.51 ;
duplique, p. 44-47, par. 3.16-3.20.
10 Voir aussi: Mandat d’arrêt du 11avril2000 (République dé mocratique du Congo c.Belgique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 18-19, par. 43.
11 Voir notamment duplique, p. 166-170, par. 7.53-7.70.
12 Voir CR 2011/7, p. 31-37, par. 33-52 (Murphy). - 17 -
⎯ sans déterminer si l’obligation prévue à l’article 5 ⎯ toujours ⎯ interdit au demandeur d’user
dans les instances internationales d’un nom ou autre que la désignation provisoire ou de
poursuivre activement une politique de reconnais sance incompatible avec le processus de
négociation ;
et comment pourriez-vous décider si les conditions de la clause de sauvegarde de l’article 11 sont
remplies,
⎯ sans établir quelles étaient les obligations r espectives des Parties dans le processus de
règlement du différend sur le nom, auquel l’article 5 fait justement référence ?
En somme, comme Michael Reisman l’a montré de manière plus précise hier après-midi, à l’exact
13
opposé de ce que prétend l’ARYM , même si le différend sur le nom n’est pas l’objet avoué de la
requête, la Cour ne peut tout simplement pas éviter de se prononcer sur ce différend ⎯ ce qu’exclut
l’article 21.
22. Ainsi, quelle que soit la définition de l’ objet de la requête que l’on retient, on se trouve
devant l’une des branches de l’alternative qui doive nt conduire la Cour à refuser de se prononcer,
conformément au dictum de1974 dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires que j’ai citées tout à
14
l’heure :
⎯ si la question est de savoir si l’ARYM peut, avec des chances raisonnables de succès, persister
dans sa demande d’admission à l’OTAN, une réponse affirmative ne fait aucun doute : il serait
contraire à la fonction exclusivement judiciaire de la Cour de se prononcer sur ce point en
l’absence de tout différend entre les Parties ;
⎯ si la question soumise à la Cour est celle de l’admission de l’ARYM à l’OTAN, elle ne
pourrait, de toute manière exercer sa compétence ⎯en admettant que celle-ci soit établie ⎯
car elle ne serait pas à même d’«assurer le règl ement régulier de tous les points en litige ainsi
que le respect des «limitations inhérentes à l’exerci ce de la fonction judiciaire»» et elle devrait
décliner l’exercice d’une compétence douteuse qui, de toute manière, se révélerait vain ; et,
13
Cf. réplique, p. 71, par. 3.14. CR 2011/5, p. 59-60, par. 7-8 (Klein).
14Voir supra, par. 2. - 18 -
⎯ si la question était réellement de déterminer si la Grèce s’est opposée à cette admission, la Cour
n’en devrait pas moins, toujours, refuser d’exercer sa compétence car, pour la trancher, elle
devrait nécessairement se prononcer sur dive rs aspects du différend que l’ARYM entend lui
dissimuler et sur lesquels elle n’a, au demeurant, pas compétence.
Référence pour référence à la Grèce classique : ce n’est pas d’une épée de Damoclès qu’il s’agit 15
mais d’un nŒud gordien ; et ce nŒud, pour cause d’article 21, vous ne pouvez pas le trancher.
II. Une interférence irrecevable dans un processus politique
23. Il y a, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, une autre raison pour laquelle les demandes de
l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine sont incompatibles avec l’exercice des fonctions
judiciaires de la Cour. En effet, si vous l es examiniez pour, finalement, les rejeter, vous vous
ingéreriez dans un processus éminemment politique dont vous compromettriez, voire risqueriez
d’empêcher, l’aboutissement heureux.
24. J’ai appris avec étonnement mardi, en écoutant le professeurKlein que nous aurions
invoqué un motif d’irrecevabilité qu’il a appelé la «réserve judiciaire» 16. lcrte
considérablement. Nous sommes évidemment c onscients que ce n’est pas «parce qu’un différend
juridique soumis à la Cour ne constitue qu’un asp ect d’un différend politique, [que] la Cour doit se
refuser à résoudre dans l’intérêt des parties les questions juridiques qui les opposent» ( Personnel
diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Té héran (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c.Iran), arrêt,
17
C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 20, par. 37) . Mais l’objection que nous soulevons est différente : nous ne
prétendons pas que vous ne pouvez pas vous prononc er car le problème dont l’ARYM vous a saisi
est politique (même s’il l’est éminemment), mais nous disons ⎯ ce qui est fort différent ⎯ que, si
vous vous prononciez, même sur les seuls aspect s juridiques qu’il comporte, vous tiendriez en
échec une décision du Conseil de sécurité et compromettriez les chances de succès des négociations
entre les Parties que le Conseil a ordonnées et auxque lles elles se sont engagées par l’article5 de
l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995.
15
Voir CR 2011/6, p. 15, par. 6 (Klein).
16
Ibid., p. 18, par. 12.
17Voir aussi Activités militaires et paramilites au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 439, par. 105. - 19 -
o
[Projection n 2 ⎯ Article 5, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire.]
25. Cette disposition est ainsi rédigée :
«Les Parties conviennent de poursuivre les négociations sous les auspices du
Secrétaire général de l’Organisation d es Nations Unies, conformément à la
résolution 845 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en vue de parvenir à régler le différend
mentionné dans cette résolution et dans la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil.»
[Fin de la projection n 2. Projection n 3 ⎯ Résolution 817.]
o
26. Dans cette résolution, reproduite dans le dossier des juges, à l’onglet n 2, le Conseil de
sécurité, notant «qu’une divergence a surgi au sujet du nom» de l’ARYM, divergence «qu’il
faudrait régler dans l’intérêt du maintien de re lations pacifiques et de bon voisinage dans la
région», prie instamment la Grèce et l’ex-Ré publique yougoslave de M acédoine de coopérer pour
arriver à un règlement rapide de ce problème. Il réitère cette demande ⎯ dont le
professeur Reisman a analysé la portée hier après-midi ⎯ dans la résolution 845 de la même année.
27. L’obligation de négocier sur le nom du dema ndeur résulte donc à la fois d’une décision
du Conseil de sécurité et de l’engagement conventionnel pris par les Parties dans l’article5 de
l’accord intérimaire.
o
[Fin de la projection 3. Projection n 4 ⎯ Extrait de la déclaration de Bucarest.]
La déclaration adoptée par les pays de l’OTAN lors du sommet de Bucarest ⎯ qui est
o
projetée à l’écran et se trouve à l’ongletn 17 du dossier des juges ⎯ se borne à réitérer cette
obligation.
28. Avec tout le respect dû à la Cour, il n’est surement pas abusif de penser qu’il n’appartient
pas à l’«organe judiciaire principal» des Nations Unies de délier l’ARYM de cette obligation, dont
l’origine remonte aux résolutions du Conseil de sé curité de 1993, qu’elle a expressément acceptée
par l’accord intérimaire et que rappelle la déclaration de Bucarest.
o
[Fin de la projection n 4.]
29. Comme en matière consultative 18, il est essentiel que la Cour veille, dans l’exercice de sa
fonction contentieuse, à ne pas se laisser instrumentaliser par le demandeur.
18Voir Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance relative au Kosovo , avis
consultatif du 22 juillet 2010, opinion dissidente de M. le juge Bennouna, par. 15. - 20 -
30. Or c’est à l’évidence ce qui se produirait si la haute juridiction faisait droit aux
conclusions de l’ARYM: celle-ci obtiendrait, pa r un arrêt de la Cour, la consécration de la
politique du fait accompli qu’elle mène avec obstina tion depuis 1993 et qu’elle n’a pu arracher par
la négociation ou plutôt qu’elle n’a pu arracher par sa po litique constante d’ obstruction aux
négociations 19, que Mme Telalian a rappelée hier.
31. Non seulement la solution du différend ne re lève pas de la compétence de la Cour, mais
en outre, en l’occurrence, en cautionnant la pol itique du fait accompli du demandeur en lieu et
place d’un règlement négocié, elle serait contraire à l’intégrité de la fonction judiciaire. Ainsi que
la Cour l’a expliqué dans Nicaragua, elle «doit s’abstenir de tout acte qui risquerait de faire
inutilement obstacle à un règlement négocié» (Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et
contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1986 , p.143,
20
par. 285) .
Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de m’avoir écouté avec votre
bienveillance habituelle. Et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir autoriser le
professeur Crawford à me succéder à la barre.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Alain Pellet for his statement. Now I invite
Professor James Crawford to the Bar.
Mr. CRAWFORD:
Interpretation of Article 11 of the Interim Accord
Introduction
Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you this morning on
behalf of Greece.
19
Voir contre-mémoire, p. 33-36, par. 4.2-4.13 et duplique, p. 166-177, par. 7.53-7.70.
20Voir aussi Zones franches de la Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex, ordonnance du 19 août 1929, C.P.J.I. série A
no22, p. 13 (extrait cité dans l’arrêt de 1986). - 21 -
1. My purpose is to open Greece’s case on the merits. I do this not as a concession on any
point already made by my colleagues in their discussion of jurisdiction and admissibility. But it is
necessary to respond to the Applicant’s singular clai m, if you should nevertheless decide that you
have jurisdiction over the claim and that it is admissible.
2. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the key interpretative issue in this case concerns
Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord, read as it mu st be in the context of the treaty as a whole,
including Article 22.
3. The Applicant’s presentation of Article 11 (1) had a number of remarkable features.
⎯ The first feature is that Article 11(1) was treated in antiseptic separation from the rest of the
21
Interim Accord . On this view Article 11(1) is a free-standing unilateral obligation ⎯
binding only on Greece. Indeed, it is a self-cont ained régime in which Greece is manacled
while the Applicant is free. It is a clause wh ich, they say, has its own object and purpose, yet
the Applicant is free to subvert that object and purpose provided only that it maintains the
appearance of negotiations for a universal, singular name.
⎯ The second feature is that even within the confines of the so-called régime of Article 11 (1), the
first limb ⎯ the obligation not to object ⎯ gets all the airspace, all the attention. Yet
Article 11 (1) walks on two feet and it walks upri ght. For the first limb of Article 11 cannot be
dissociated from the second limb ⎯ the second limb is a condition for the operation of the first,
which Greece would otherwise never have consented to.
4. As to this second feature, counsel opposite had considerable difficulty in grasping the
character of a condition. For example, Professor Mu rphy made much of the third-party principle.
He says that the safeguard clause cannot create rights and obligations for third States, because there
is no obligation for them to breach 22. But this is not the point, for the safeguard clause is triggered
irrespective of the legal characterization of the act s in question. The issue is simply whether the
Applicant is to be referred to in the future differently than as stipulated in Security Council
resolution 817 ⎯ “for all purposes”. The safeguard clause, on its plain language, is triggered in
21
CR 2011/6, pp. 50-62, paras. 4-31 (Sands).
2CR 2011/6, p. 35, para. 46 (Murphy). - 22 -
that event, and in the first instance it is for Greece as the acting State to determine whether the
condition is satisfied. It is a provision in a bilateral treaty: to say that it does not bind third States
is to say nothing about its operation as a condition. Indeed because it does not bind third States ⎯
and may not even oblige the Applicant ⎯ it is more important as a safeguard for Greece.
5. That takes me back to the first feature wh ich I have mentioned. In this presentation, for
the purposes of argument, I propose to assume that Ar ticle 11 (1) is indeed a unilateral promise by
Greece, and that it imposes no new obligation on the Applicant, nor, of course, on any third State. I
will also assume, again for the purposes of argument, that Article 11 (1) is self-contained, and that
what goes on or does not go on in the rest of the Interim Agreement can have ⎯ short of the
outright termination of the Agreement ⎯ no consequences for the interp retation or application of
Article11(1). In that way, I will be meeti ng the Applicant’s argument on its own ground. But
even so ⎯ even on these assumptions ⎯ the conclusion must be that Greece did not breach
Article11(1), and that even if the first limb of Article11(1) is engaged, Greece was entitled to
rely on the second equal limb, the safeguard clause.
6. One final preliminary remark on the Applican t’s approach to interpretation. To determine
the meaning of Security Council resolution817 (1993), the Respondent spends remarkably little
time on the text of the resolution. Instead, it produces an affidavit which it took from
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, a distinguished British diplomat, but one who was not based at the United
Nations at the time the resolution was a dopted. Professor Sands asks rhetorically ⎯ he was in a
remarkably rhetorical mode ⎯ “Has the Respondent produced any evidence ⎯ any evidence
whatsoever ⎯ other than its own statements, to promot e a contrary view to that expressed by
Ambassador Greenstock? No, Mr. President, [he rhetorically answered] it has not.” 23 It is true that
Greece, in response to Sir Jeremy, has secured no a ffidavit, whether based on the recollections of a
diplomat about events that took place 18years a go, whether in the form of hearsay and whether
qualified by the affiant himself as based solely on his recollections and as reflecting no more than
an “informal” understanding about what the Applicant, and I quote, “would be likely to” do 24. I
hope we may be forgiven for having had to rely on the actual text of Security Council
23
CR 2011/5, p. 27 para. 10 (Sands).
2Statement by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, 29 May 2010. Reply, Ann. 59; emphasis added. - 23 -
resolution817, as of the Interim Accord, read of course in accordance with Articles31-33 of the
Vienna Convention. Professor Sands seemed rather to rely on a new rule of interpretation: perhaps
we should call it Article 33 bis: “when the recollections of retired diplomats are ambiguous or
obscure, it is permissible to turn, for the purposes of clarification only, to the text itself”.
The Component Elements of Article 11, paragraph 1: an overview
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn to an overview of Article 11, paragraph 1, of
the Interim Accord, in order to recall its overall st ructure and to consider some general issues of
interpretation that it presents. I will then turn to the two clauses of the Article, to examine each in
greater depth.
8. Article11, paragraph1, of the Interi m Accord gives the Applicant a valuable new
opportunity. It is an opportunity it certainly did not and does not have unde r general international
law. It was a major concession by Greece when it promised, under the first clause of Article11,
paragraph 1, “not to object”.
9. When a State qualifies or curtails a right which it holds, such as the right not to object to
another State’s admission to an international organization, it would be surprising if the State did not
exercise considerable care in the negotiations. So it was with Greece when accepting Article11,
paragraph1. The promise is in specific, negative terms. It is a promise “not to object”. The
drafting history reveals that these were words delib erately selected to confer a particular, limited
right on the other party, and, correspondingly, to oblige Greece in a particular, limited way.
10. Then there is the safeguard clause — the second clause of Article 11, paragraph 1. The
Applicant talks about the second clause as “granting” a right to Greece. It says that “the Parties
have strictly limited the conditions in which the grant of the Respondent’s right to object may be
exercised” 25. But it is quite wrong to begin one’s analysis of the second clause as a “grant” of
something to Greece. It is not a clause telling Greece what Greece is to get. To the contrary, it is a
clause telling the Applicant what it is not to get. The safeguard clause is an indispensable limiting
term in the bargain which Greece entered into, when Greece gave something, but was careful not to
25
Memorial, para. 4.30; emphasis added. - 24 -
give everything. What Greece gave was the promise “not to object”— limited by the plain
meaning of those words and, moreover, limited by the safeguard clause.
11. How does the safeguard clause limit the sc ope of Greece’s obligation? It does so by
making clear that Greece retains and preserves that which Greece already had— the right to
object— in the event that the Applicant is to be referred to differently than as required under
Security Council resolution 817 in any organizati on of which Greece is a member. The safeguard
clause protects Greece’s interest in a negotiated settlement of the difference concerning the name.
It does so by making clear that, under Article 11, paragraph 1, Greece’s promise meets its limit, “if
and to the extent the Party of the second part is to be referred to in such organization or institution
differently” than as stipulated. In other words, if the Applicant is to attempt to impose another
name, in disregard of the negotiation process, it forfeits the benefit of Greece’s promise.
Article 11, paragraph 1: specific issues of interpretation
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to some specific issues of interpretation
of Article 11, paragraph 1.
The obligation “not to object”
13. The first issue concerns the scope of the obligation “not to object”:
“the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership
of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations
and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member”. [PP]
14. The Applicant does not agree that those words mean what they say. In its pleadings it
says:
“The obligation encompasses any implicit or explicit act or expression of
disapproval or opposition in word or deed to the Applicant’s application to or
membership of an organization or institution. An act of objection may be expressed in 26
different forms, including in writing and or ally, by silence or in some other form.”
[PP]
And it goes on: “The formulation encompasses positiv e acts, such as a vote, as well as a failure to
act, such as the failure to attend a meeting where participation is necessary in order to express a
required view.” 27
26
Memorial, para. 4.25.
2Ibid., para. 4.26. See also Reply, para. 4.16. - 25 -
15. Now it is worth considering exactly what these statements could mean. They potentially
encompass a wide variety of conduct. In the Applicant’s words, “ any implicit or explicit act or
expression of disapproval or opposition in word or deed” could fall within the prohibition of
Article11, paragraph1. What is an “implicit ” expression? To cover expressions as well as their
“implicit” counterparts goes a very long way. A raised eyebrow? A resigned sigh? An outright
grimace? An unreconciled groan? What is an “implicit” act? Greece would have accepted not
only a wide obligation, but an obligation exceedingly difficult to interpret, if it really had agreed to
avoid “implicitly” acting in a certain way. What ever these terms might mean, the implication is
that any example of such act or such an expression can constitute a breach — treaty breaches fall
off the trees like leaves in autumn. According to the Applicant, “[a]n act of objection may be
expressed in different forms, including in writing and orally, by silence or in some other form”. So
too does the act of objection include, in its view, “a failure to act, such as the failure to attend a
meeting where participation is necessary in order to express a required view”.
16. Now these are remarkable assertions. An obligation, to be meaningful, should be
expressed in terms that an allegation of breach is susceptible to ordinary methods of proof. In his
presentation, Professor Murphy said as follows:
“Under the Respondent’s theory, all that the Applicant gained was the
Respondent’s obligation to abstain from voti ng or to vote ‘yes’ when the Applicant’s
request for admission was formally voted on at NATO, as a part of a process in which
no such voting occurs . Thus, for one of the key international organizations that the
Applicant wished to join, Article 11(1) has absolutely no meaning. Such an
28
interpretation is, we submit, nonsensical.” (Emphasis in the original.)
But there is nothing nonsensical, in a system governed by the rule of law, in requiring that an
Applicant adduce the evidence of the specific breach it alleges. Not all international organizations
are alike. The decision-making processes of some organizations produce a record of votes, vetoes,
abstentions, objections, and all the other incidents of their procedure. In NATO, there is no record
of a vote, as the organization takes no vote. Bu t the Applicant, alleging that Greece objected and
thus prevented NATO from inviting it to member ship, offers no NATO record in any form
whatever to substantiate its claim of an allege d objection, and it offers no explanation of the
omission. I am afraid that as a non-member, the Applicant must take NATO as it finds it.
28
CR 2011/6, p. 27, para. 20 (Murphy). - 26 -
17. In any event, a single, precise and negative obligation is what the Parties to the Interim
Accord actually agreed. But the Applicant seek s a new and far-reaching interpretation of the
phrase “not to object”. According to it, Greece is in breach for failing to attend meetings, for
failing to express a required view. Article 11, paragraph 1, says nothing a bout attending meetings.
It is an obligation “not to object”. Under this interpretation not showing up would be a breach.
18. But even the mildly affirmative act of s howing up is not enough. Greece is supposed to
“express a required view”. The minutes of pros pective NATO meetings are secreted in the
interstices of Article 11 (1). To say that Greece has an obligation to participate and to “express a
required view”, implies that the Agreement should stipulate what the “required view” might be.
But, in respect of this interpolated requirement, the Interim Accord says nothing at all.
The drafting history
19. The Applicant seeks to draw the Court into the drafting history of the Interim Accord, in
an effort to expand the scope and meaning of Greece’s obligation. But the drafting history
confirms the plain meaning of the text.
20. One draft proposed that: “The Parties will not hamper each othe r’s participation in
international organizations.” 29 This would have been reciprocal , and it would have been, if vague,
certainly far-reaching. On 23April 1994, the Parties considered a draft which retained the “not
hamper” clause, and made the obligation even fu rther-reaching. The draft would have required
Greece to “support the full participation of [the Ap plicant] in the CSCE and other European and
international organizations” 30. A State carrying out such terms in good faith could expect to be
asked to do a good deal — not just to refrain from obj ecting. It must have been prepared to do any
of the various things which might “support” the other State’s participation. This draft was rejected.
21. Another draft, dated 15 March 1995, would have obliged Greece “not to object” but also
“not to impede” 3. This, arguably, was a wider formulation still. It would have concerned not only
admission, but co-operative arrangements, arrangements like NATO’s Membership Action Plan.
The 15 March 1995 draft also illustrates that the Part ies understood an obligation “not to object” as
2See Counter-Memorial, Ann. 148.
30
Ibid.
3Ibid. - 27 -
something distinct from an obligation “not to impede”. The draft included both obligations. The
text adopted includes only the former. The dr afting history, far from supporting the expansive
interpretation of the first clause of Article 11, pa ragraph 1, contended for by the Applicant, shows
that the Parties considered texts which would have established an expansive meaning but rejected
them. Greece agreed “not to object” and nothing else. That is the maximum possible scope of the
commitment contained in Article 11, paragraph 1.
Obligation of conduct or result
22. The Applicant frequently describes the ob ligation in Article 11(1) as if it were an
obligation of result: according to it, the provision must be understood in light of the importance to
it of gaining admission to all the interna tional organizations “it wished to join” 32. Recall
Professor Murphy’s statement that the Interim Accord establishes the App licant’s “ability to secure
membership in international organizations” 33 and his further statement that the admission of the
Applicant to the Council of Europe and the OSCE “demonstrates” the meaning of Article 11 (1) as
applied to NATO 34. Greece does not contest that membership is an important goal for the
Applicant. Greece agreed to a special obligation, in connection with that goal—but it did not
warrant that the Applicant, in every case, would fulfil the goal. Nor, of course, could Greece have
done so: it is for each organization to decide each candidacy in accordance with its own rules of
procedure; and specialized, closed organizations each have their own rules of substance governing
admission of new members. Yet ProfessorMurphy says it is “nonsensical” to consider these
procedures when applying Article11(1). My colleague ProfessorReisman will explain how
Article22 confirms and establishes that the ru les of NATO cannot be occluded by the Parties’
bilateral undertaking in Article11. I would only add this: taken on its own, the text of
Article 11 (1), in light of the purpose of assisting the Applicant to gain admission — a purpose so
important to the Applicant— specifies a particul ar operation in international institutions which
Greece is obliged to refrain from using — Greece is not to object. It hardly makes a nonsense of
the clause to say that this is what the Parties agreed in 1995. Indeed, they had to negotiate long and
3CR 2011/6, p. 27, para. 20 (Murphy).
33
Ibid., p. 23, para. 10 (Murphy).
3Ibid., p. 27, para. 21 (Murphy). - 28 -
hard to agree to so much. It is a perfectly natural interpretation of the words, that they are
concerned with the rules and procedures of the rele vant organizations. This is an interpretation
consistent with Greece’s interest in avoiding an omnibus commitment of indefinite scope, possibly
beyond Greece’s competence to fulfil; and it is consistent with the Applicant’s interest in assuring
that vetoes and objections do not block its admission.
23. The Applicant insists that Article 11 (1) establishes an obligation of result, when it serves
its purpose, but it switches to saying that the obligation is purely one of conduct, when that is
needed to advance its case. Thus, for example, we are told that the admission of the Applicant to
the Council of Europe and the OSCE “demonstrates” the meaning of Article 11 (1) 35. Then we are
36
told that this case “is, at its heart, about the Respondent’s conduct” . What the Applicant really
wants Article 11 (1) to say is that Greece is res ponsible for every instance in which the Applicant’s
candidacy to an international organization of which Greece is a member is denied or delayed. No
such standard was stipulated by the Parties to the Interim Accord.
Conclusion on the first limb of Article 11 (1)
24. A final word on the first limb of Article11 (1). It applies generally to all international
organizations, but this does not mean it app lies in precisely the same way to different
organizations, or that no account is to be taken of the differences between them. According to
Professor Murphy,
“[b]oth Parties also agree, or at least the Respondent does not dispute, that the term
‘international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions’ includes NATO
and the European Union... consequen tly, both Parties agree that this clause
established an obligation upon the Respondent not to object to the application or
membership of the Applicant in NATO” 37.
Now I say nothing at all about the European Union (EU) ⎯ whether or not it is an international
organization or institution may be debated. Th e Court may think it is international on some
occasions and not international on others, but the EU is not at issue in these proceedings. No doubt
NATO is an international organization but if by this the Applicant wishes to equate a military
35CR 2011/6, p. 27, para. 21 (Murphy).
36
Ibid., p. 29, para. 29 (Murphy).
37Ibid., p. 24, para. 14 (Murphy). - 29 -
alliance to a regional meteorological organization, th en it is off the mark. Article11(1) must be
read in conjunction with Article22. As Prof essorReisman will explain, the obligation which
Article11(1) established cannot be stated without considering the “rights and duties” of Greece
under each organization’s constitutive instrument.
The safeguard of Greece’s existing rights
25. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I tu rn to the second limb of Article 11 (1), the
safeguard clause. To understand Greece’s obligation ⎯ the extent of that obligation ⎯ under
Article 11, paragraph 1, it is imperative to consider the second half of the provision as well. This is
one paragraph consisting of two clauses of equal weight and co-ordinate authority.
26. The safeguard clause exists to protect Greece’s legal right to negotiate a settlement of the
difference concerning the name. It accomplishes th is by assuring continued use of the provisional
name for all purposes ⎯ for all purposes ⎯ within international organizations, until the Parties can
agree a permanent name. So for the App licant to make its own, chosen name a fait accompli and
thus to evade the inconvenience of real negotiati ons, it must convince the Court that the safeguard
clause is trivial. But the safeguard clause is an operative clause of the Interim Accord. So long as
it still functions as intended, the Applicant must fa ce the possibility, like it or not, that Greece will
meet attempts to thwart the negotiated settlement of the difference with an appropriate response.
Issues of syntax
27. As I said a moment ago, the safeguard cl ause defines the situation in which Greece has
not obliged itself in respect of a ca ndidacy in an international organization. The definition is
simple enough, and the words which the Parties agreed express it clearly enough. Greece is under
no obligation under Article11, paragraph1 ⎯ no obligation ⎯ “if and to the extent the Party of
the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)”. [PP]
28. These are the words the Parties chose. Th e Applicant here has contested almost every
element of their syntax. - 30 -
29. First, this is an expression in the passive voice, it designates no particular actor. It is
inclusive. The definition includes situations in wh ich the organization is to refer to the Applicant
differently than as stipulated. It includes situati ons in which member States are to do so or in
which officers or organs of the organization are to do so. This is the result of the chosen
grammatical function — “is to be referred to”.
30. Earlier drafts, which the Parties rejected , would have taken a different approach. For
example, the drafts of 21 July 1995 and 21 August 1995 would have read as follows:
“however, [Greece] reserves the right to obj ect to any membership referred to above
if, and to the extent, the provisional reference under wh ich the Party of the second
part is to be admitted to such organization or institution differs from that in
paragraph 2 of . . . Resolution 817 (1993)” (emphasis added). [PP]
Is to be admitted. Only the organization admits a candidate. To limit the situation to cases where
the Applicant has been admitted under another name would have limited the safeguard clause to a
very particular case. The Parties rejected this r estricted formulation. Professor Murphy apparently
wishes they had accepted it. He says, “the second clause of Article 11(1)... [i]n effect.. . says
that the Respondent can object if the Applicant is to be admitted to an international organization” 38.
But the actual text provides that the Respondent can object “if and to the extent that [the Applicant]
is to be referred to” differently.
31. This is not the only occasion the Applicant has sought to revert to phrasing which the
Parties plainly rejected. In its Reply, the Applicant said as follows:
“The text does not reserve a right to object if the Applicant ‘is to be referred to
in such organization or institution, or intends to call itself in its relations with the
organization or institution, differently than’ the provisi onal reference. The clause
might have been written that way, but it was not. Instead, the language addresses how
the Applicant is to be ‘referred to in such or ganization or institution’, not how it is to
call itself.”9 [PP]
The emphasis is in the original.
32. The Applicant means that the phrase “intends to call itself in its relations with the
organization or institution” adds to and extends the meaning of th e phrase “is to be referred to in
such organization or institution”. But the problem is that the phrase “is to be referred to” already,
self-evidently, includes the putative additional phrase. The phrase “is to be referred to”, absent any
38
CR 2011/6, p. 38, para. 56 (Murphy).
39Reply, para. 4.53; (emphasis in the original). - 31 -
indication of who or what is making the reference, includes all possible actors. The Reply goes on
to say: “[the] language addresses how the Applicant is to be ‘referred to in such organization or
40
institution’, not how it is to call itself ” . [PP] Note the positioning of the internal inverted
comma, the word “to be” is outside it. Repeati ng the point whether with “to be” or without “to
be” ⎯ to be or not to be ⎯ does not however change the syntax. The verb “to be” remains part of
the play and part of the Interim Accord as adopted. The passive voice remains all-inclusive. Even
moving the inverted comma, so as to exclude the verb “to be” does not alter its meaning. [PP ⎯
with corrected version]
33. The Applicant also switches prepositions. In several paragraphs in its Reply, the
Applicant says that the question, under the safeguard clause, is whether the Applicant is to be
41
referred to by NATO differently than stipulated . But the words of the safeguard clause are “to be
referred to in” the organization or institution. The Applicant says that the safeguard clause “allows
the Respondent to object to the Applicant’s ‘membershi p’ if the Applicant is to be referred to ‘in’
42
the organization or institution differently . . .” . [PP]
34. I draw your attention again to the use of inverted commas. Putting the word “in” inside
inverted commas may demonstrate unease, but it does not make the safeguard clause go away; nor
does it transform the word “in” to the word “by”.
35. The phrase “if and to the extent” is also c onsistent with the Parties’ intention that the
definition in the safeguard clause includes the conduct of actors within international organizations,
not just the organizations themselves. A clause stipulating the condition simply “if” the Applicant
is to be referred to differently might be susceptible to the interpretation that this is an on/off switch,
an either/or. As the Applicant would have it, if the organization itself admits it under a different
name or officially adopts the use of a different name, the switch is on; Greece may object. But this
is not how the clause works, because it is not how it is written. I am sorry for the Applicant in
having to descend so far into the text, but the textual interpretation is what this is about. The clause
as written says “if and to the extent ” the Applicant is to be referred to differently. The words “to
40
AR, para. 4.53; emphasis added.
41
Ibid., paras. 4.33-4.36.
42Ibid., para. 4.33. - 32 -
the extent” would lack effet utile if the Applicant’s interpretation were imposed on the clause as a
whole: the words “to the extent” are inconsiste nt with an on/off switch. To the extent the
condition may be satisfied— for example, becau se some States members of an organization may
defect from the stipulated provisional name. To that extent, the safeguard clause is triggered, to the
extent the organization itself might use a different name, without doing so for all purposes— for
example, when its officers are instigated to use a different name, the safeguard clause is triggered.
The condition in the safeguard clause is triggered “if and to the extent” the Applicant is to be
referred to differently. This is consistent with the object and purpose of the Interim Accord to
protect Greece’s interest in the negotiation process: if, even to an extent , the Applicant instigates
the use of a different name, the risk is presented of the entrenchment of that name, and, measure by
measure, the negotiation process would become irrelevant. Indeed, as we shall see, that is precisely
the plan.
36. Furthermore the safeguard clause denotes a future situation ⎯ the Applicant “is to be
referred to” differently than as stipulated. As with Hamlet, the “to be” is a “to be” of the future.
This too is clear from the syntax. The Appli cant argues that only an existing practice of an
43
organization establishes the situation . But the Parties chose the words of the safeguard clause
carefully. If they had said that the situation triggering the safeguard clause can exist only after an
organization admits the Applicant under a different name, or after that State, as a member, manages
to entrench a different name in the practice of the organization, then the safeguard clause would
have safeguarded nothing at all. Greece agreed to confer a special right, expressed as an obligation
not to object. It did not give a licence to underm ine the interim arrangement. If Greece reasonably
foresees that the Applicant is to be referred to di fferently than as stipulated, then Greece retains the
right to object.
37. It is contended that Greece’ interpretati on “totally detaches the ability to object from the
44
circumstances of the Applicant’s impending membership” . But it is precisely the “circumstances
of the Applicant’s impending membership” which the safeguard clause is concerned with.
Professor Murphy says that the result of the safegua rd clause is that “if the Respondent thinks that,
43
AR, paras. 4.33-4.36.
44CR 2011/6, p. 36, para. 49 (Murphy). - 33 -
five years later the Applicant joins NATO, it is possible that France or Botswana or Turkey ⎯ or
for that matter the Hague Rotary Club ⎯ might, in a communication with NATO, call the
45
Applicant the ‘Republic of Macedonia’, th en the Respondent is entitled to object” . This calls for
two remarks. First, on behalf of the stalwarts of The Hague Rotary Club, I object to their being
dragged into the case ⎯ but I give you the web reference to the membership rules of The Hague
Rotary Club 46. Secondly, Professor Murphy has already accep ted that there is a future element in
the safeguard clause: it preserves Greece’s right to act, before the situation has so deteriorated that
Greece has lost its right to a negotiated settlement of the difference. The reservation of right under
Article11(1), second limb, has a purpose. It is not a mere legalistic ploy to claw back or, as
47
Professor Murphy has put it, to “carve out” , rights as against the Applicant’s interests. It is a vital
provision, agreed to protect Greece’s interest in the balancing arrangement of the Interim Accord,
and in particular to assure that the Applicant liv es up to the obligation to negotiate, with Greece, a
final definitive name. When I return later this mo rning to consider the Applicant’s rendition of the
facts, I will recall that Greece had more than good reason to believe that the Applicant, “given the
circumstances of its impending membership”, was not living up to the obligation to negotiate.
Indeed, in a stunning admission of realpolitik trumping agreed commitments under international
law, we have the Applicant’s word for it.
Procedural issues
38. Faced with these difficulties, the Applicant ta kes refuge in procedure. It attempts to
introduce a requirement of notice, as a precondition of Greece exercising its pre-existing right. It
complains that: “At no time did the Respondent seek to justify its objection on the ground that the
Applicant would be referred to in NATO differently than in paragraph2 of... Security Council
resolution 817” 48.
45CR 2011/6, p. 36, para. 49 (Murphy).
46
See http://www.rcthm.org/membership.html.
47CR 2011/6, p. 22, para. 4 (Murphy).
48AM, para. 1.5. - 34 -
49
39. But the safeguard clause contains no procedural requirement , it is a pure condition, it is
a pure limit on the extent of an obligation. You may contrast Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Interim
Accord, which expressly requires the Party complaining of a breach of that provision to “bring such
alleged use to the attention of the other Party” 50. The safeguard clause is silent on the point. If the
first limb of Article11(1) operates automatically, as the Applicant affirms, then so too does the
second limb which is the condition on the extent of the first limb.
Greece’s margin of appreciation
40. It follows from these elements of syntax, as well as from the actual language and purpose
of Article11, paragraph1, that Greece has a margin of appreciation to consider relevant factors
when judging whether the Applicant “is to be referred to” differently than as stipulated. It is true
that this gives Greece an important function in car rying out the terms of Article11, paragraph1.
But it is consistent with that paragraph as a whol e, and with the Interim Accord as a whole, that
Greece’s agreement not to object is carefully balan ced. This considerable concession was made in
the hope that the Applicant would do its part to maintain a stable relationship with Greece pending
the definitive settlement of the difference. In particular, it is made in the hope that Greece would
be engaged in negotiations in good faith to achieve that definitive settlement.
Evidence which Greece in good faith interprets to show that the Applicant has failed in its
obligations in this regard is relevant to Greece’ s determination under the safeguard clause. Indeed,
it is relevant even if they are not obligations, even if they are simply triggers for the exercise of a
conditional right. If the evidence is that the Appli cant, in relevant organizations, at least to an
extent, “is to be referred to” differently, then Greece may exercise its retained right.
49
RCM, paras. 7.75-7.77.
50Art. 7, para. 3, reads in full:
“If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony
is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such a lleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the
other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do
so.” - 35 -
41. Later this morning, I will return to address the application of Article 11, paragraph 1, to
the events of 2008, with your permission, Mr. Presi dent. For present purposes, all I need to say is
that the evidence, as at April 2008, was more than sufficient for a State to say, in good faith, that
the Applicant was not to be referred to consistently with the provisions of the Interim Accord.
42. Moreover, if the Applicant were correct to deny that Greece has any right to consider the
circumstances of its conduct, the question would ari se: whose function is it to decide whether the
safeguard clause condition is triggered? The organi zation is not a party to the Interim Accord and,
in any event, the question is not a simple matter of the organization’s present official policy: the
question concerns practice by States within the organization, as well as anticipated future conduct
of the Applicant. To say that it is for the A pplicant to decide would be strange indeed: the
discretion in that case would be all on one side.
Subsequent practice of the Parties
43. Mr. President, the Applicant relies heavily on what it calls the subsequent practice of the
Parties, in an attempt to characterize the safe guard clause as applying only where an international
organization has admitted the Applicant under a name other than that stipulated. The Applicant
notes the many organizations in which it has used another name, and observes, correctly, that
Greece did not invoke the safeguard clause in those cases 51. According to Professor Murphy:
“In none of those instances did the Respondent invoke the [safeguard]
clause . . . Perhaps the Respondent would have us believe that it was simply choosing
to look the other way... However, the fa r more plausible interpretation is that the
Respondent itself fully understood what the second clause meant, and understood that
it did not allow for an objection based so lely on th52Applicant’s own use of its
constitutional name in relations with the organization.”
Professor Sands, though referring to Article22 rather than the safeguard clause, also relied on
subsequent practice of the Parties: “The subse quent practice of the Parties confirms that our
interpretation has got to be the correct one.” 53
51
CR 2011/6, pp. 42-43, para. 68 (Murphy).
52
Ibid.
53Ibid., p. 54, para. 14 (Sands). - 36 -
44. Now Article31, paragraph3 (b), of the Vienna Convention provides that one of the
factors which shall be taken into account in interp reting a treaty is “any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes th e agreement of the parties regarding its
54
interpretation” . That a practice exists ⎯ that something does or does not happen ⎯ isnot
dispositive in interpreting the treaty. The “subsequent practice . . . of the parties” is not dispositive.
It must be such as “establishes [their] agreement” . This requires a detailed study of the practice,
and of the reasons for it. 55
45. Such a study is always subject to context. A bilateral accord adopted to normalize
relations between parties which ha ve had considerable differences ove r a range of issues is a very
specific context. An objection falling squarely within the letter of such a treaty may well not be in
its spirit. It would be strange to say to the party that its rights begin to drop away as a result of its
decision to pursue the objects and purposes of the treaty above and beyond the strict provisions of
its plain language. And it is certainly not th e case that a breach by one party establishes the
“agreement of the parties” regarding the interpre tation of the provision breached. That would give
any treaty party a right of unilateral revision. Ιt would not be interpretation; it would be the end of
the law of treaties.
46. The Applicant deprecates the idea that a party might forebear and refrain from exercising
an available right ⎯ “perhaps the Respondent would have us believe that it was simply choosing to
56
look the other way . . .” . Βut it scarcely examines the practice. As Professor Reisman explained
yesterday, the Applicant’s conduct in the several years before the Bucharest Summit gave rise to
serious concerns. I will consider the Applicant’s conduct further when I return to address the
application of Article 11 (1) to the facts of 2008.
47. In fact Greece has shown that the arrange ment, in truth, was not problem-free. The
Applicant’s conduct attracted protests from Gree ce on a number of occasions. Not on every
occasion. Not in every possible forum. But the purpose of the Interim Accord was to normalize
relations, on the understanding that the Parti es were committed to finding a solution to the
54
1155 UNTS 331.
55
E.g. in case concerningKasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999(II),
pp. 1076-1087, paras. 52-63.
56CR 2011/6, pp. 42-43, para. 68 (Murphy). - 37 -
difference, not more differences to overwhelm th e solution. My colleague ProfessorPellet will
recall some of the instances, before 2008, in which Greece protested the Applicant’s failure to fulfil
its part of the bargain under the Interim Accord.
How the Applicant would rewrite Article 11, paragraph 1
48. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the Applicant would like to re-write Article11,
paragraph 1. According to its reconstruction, there was no reservation by Greece of a pre-existing
right: the promise of the Applicant is no prom ise at all but merely an acknowledgment of a
supposed entitlement which it has graciously accepted to forego under a particular, narrow
exception. On this interpretation, Greece gave nothing, the Applicant a great deal.
49. And Greece, under this interpretation, would only hold the privilege when an
organization has already voted to admit the Applicant other than under the stipulated designation.
That is not what the Parties agreed.
50. Professor Murphy concluded his presentation with a story about the lamentations of
Mr. X 57 ⎯ a bit like the lamentations of Jeremiah! Mr. X cannot use his given name because the
club requires him to go by the provisional name of “Member X”. Saying that you should see the
present case in light of that example, Professor Murp hy says that Article 11 (1) is a trade of rights
and obligations between the Parties. But Prof essor Abi-Saab has recalled the long series of
substantive concessions given to the Applicant and placing constraints on Greece. What the
Applicant gave in return was simple: it had to use a provisional designation, “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”, or Greece’s promise unde r Article11(1) lapsed. And even this
concession had limits. The Applicant did not agree th at it had to be called “Mr.X”. It did not
agree to go by the name “Republic X”, or for that matter, “X of the Sec ond Part”. The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia received the promi se to negotiate a final, definitive name. To
make the process of negotiation meaningful, both Parties had to accept that situation and both
Parties had to act in good faith. But the Appli cant has not negotiated in good faith. Moreover,
57
CR 2011/6, pp. 48-49, paras. 86-87 (Murphy). - 38 -
Mr. President, Members of the Court, the present case is not about an individual joining a private
members’ club, even a rotary club. It is a case about States, and their rights and obligations under
bilateral and multilateral treaties over the long run.
51. The Applicant forgets that it never had a “r ight” to be admitted to every organization or,
indeed, to any organization. Professor Reisman will address that problem in a moment.
52. The point for present purposes is that the Parties agreed a particular text, carefully
negotiated to establish certain ob ligations. The Applicant not only would have you overturn that
text; but, in doing so, the new bargain that this would impose would be oblivious to the actual
legal relations that existed before hand between the Parties. This is the interim situation in which
the Applicant is to be referred to for all purpo ses as stipulated, until the Parties agree on a final
settlement of that difference. The Parties have pledged to negotiate that settlement, not to impose it
unilaterally. These are legal obligations. They are the necessary background to Article11,
paragraph 1. Greece’s interest in preserving the interim situation is an essential one, because if it is
ignored, the pledge to negotiate will be empty of all meaning. Greece accepted a conditional
obligation “not to object”. It did not capitulate to a global settlement in disregard of the Security
Council resolution, and reaffirmed in Article5, pa ragraph1, of the Interim Accord, that the only
settlement is to be the one mutually agreed.
Conclusion
53. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the Applicant would have the Court interpret
Article 11 (1) as if its first part says more than th e plain meaning of the words; and if its safeguard
clause, its second part, means nothing at all. With your permission, I will come back to the
application of Article 11(1) to our facts in a while. In the meantime, in a sort of entr’acte,
Professor Reisman hopes to say something about Article 22.
Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. - 39 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorJames Crawford for his statement. I now invite
Professor Michael Reisman to take the floor.
Mr. REISMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.
A RTICLE 22 OF THE INTERIM A CCORD
1. Mr. President, yesterday I had the privilege of addressing the Court on Greece’s objections
to jurisdiction. My colleague, ProfessorPellet, considering other objections, treated Article22 of
the Interim Accord. I would now like to explai n why, should the Court determine that it has
jurisdiction and that the case is admissible and s hould it further determine that Greece contravened
Article 11, why Article 22 defeats the Applicant’s claims.
2. Article22 is something of a latecomer to this case. The 125page Memorial did not
discuss it and in its single accurate reference, the Applicant blandly summarized it as “the Accord’s
effect on third states and international organizations” 58. It was only after the Counter-Memorial
addressed the centrality of Article 22 to the claim that the Applicant expressed its views on it.
[Slide 2]
3. Article 22 provides, as you can see:
“This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does
not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral
agreements already in force that the parties have concluded with other states or
international organizations.”
4. First, Article 22 is a legal provision of a treaty. It is not, as the Applicant would have it,
“simply a factual statement”, apparently absentmindedly misplaced in the body of a treaty. Neither
is it an explanatory, background or aspirational provision, of the sort one might find in a
59
preamble . Nor is it, as the Applicant argues, a “routine provision directed at declaring as a matter
of fact, the effect of the Interim Accord on third parties”0. As a legal provision in an international
instrument, it was inserted to add and to mean so mething, not to restate a general principle and
certainly not to mean nothing.
58
Memorial, para. 4.12.
59
Reply, para. 5.12.
6Ibid., para. 5.14. - 40 -
5. Second, placement of Article 22 in the sec tion entitled “Final Clauses” is not an accident.
Provisions located in “Final Clauses” are there be cause their applicability is generally not confined
to a particular part of the treaty. On Monday, counsel recited the chapter headings and explained
how the Interim Accord’s provisions were grouped. Final Clauses relate to many of these chapters.
Thus, Article 21, paragraph 2, establishing jurisdictio n, is in the Final Clauses because it applies to
many chapters of the Interim Accord, rather than to any one particular chapter. Mr.President,
Article 22 is set in the Final Clauses because th e range of issues which contemporary treaties and
international organizations address, potentially relat e Article22 to every provision in the Interim
Accord that prescribes an obligation whose perfor mance might infringe on rights and duties of
Greece (or the Applicant) under a treaty then in force.
6. Third point: Article 22 does not prescribe a mandatory procedure for its application. If an
obligation arising from the Interim Accord infri nges an obligation arising from a prior treaty,
Article 22 establishes that the obligation arising from the prior treaty prevails.
7. Article22 is comprised of two distinct components. Its first [slide 3] is a general
interpretive directive: the treaty is not to be understood as directed against any other State or
entity; now, given the history of the Balkans, as reviewed by Ms Telalian and already well known
to the Court, that was a prudent inclusion. As can be seen in the highlighted section, this
component is expressly directed to “any other state or entity”.
8. The second clause states that the Interim Accord does not infringe on the rights and duties
of the Parties to the Interim Accord resulting fro m their agreements in force at the time of the
conclusion of the Interim Accord. The Applicant contends that Article22 “is concerned with the
rights and duties of third parties, not the rights and duties of the Applicant or the Respondent” 61. In
other words, as counsel argued on Tuesday, Article 22 simply restates the pacta tertiis rule: pacta
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, a principle codified as a “General Rule” in the Vienna Convention 62.
9. The Applicant does not explain why a general rule, which applies in any case, would have
to be restated or what would be the effet utile of restating it. The Applicant’s interpretation would
render Article 22 essentially an exercise in redundanc y. But the Applicant’s interpretation cannot
61
Reply, para. 5.18.
62Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 34. - 41 -
even be supported textually. Yesterday, I obser ved the Applicant’s propensity to imply words in
both the Interim Accord and resolution 817 to make their texts read as it would prefer. Here, too,
words have been conjured: the words “of third parties” must be slipped into Article22 after the
word “duties” in order to sustain the meaning whic h the Applicant seeks. [Slide 4] But the words,
“of third parties” are not there, while the capitalized word “Parties”, referring to the parties in the
treaty is there. If one accepted the Applicant’ s phantom words, the words “that the Parties have
concluded” would become redundant. Even imagining those phantom words were actually there,
the Applicant does not explain, if the second clause of Article 22 refers to third parties and not to
Greece and the Applicant, how the Interim Accord could, on this reading, infringe on “the duties”
of third parties.
10. The Applicant tries to further interpret Article 22 into redundancy by contrasting it with
Article14, paragraph2, and Artic le19, paragraph2. These provisions deal with issues such as
road, rail, maritime and air transport as well as tr ansit of persons and go ods, customs matters and
the issuance of visas. As the Applicant was not party to the European Union, it may have been
unaware that these are all areas in which Europ ean Union member States have delegated their
competences to the European Commission. It was therefore natural, at least for the Greek drafters
of the Interim Accord, to provide explicitly fo r such provisions, so as not to infringe upon the
exclusive competences assigned to the European Commission in these fields. But Article 22, by its
terms, addresses all bilateral and multilateral treaties of the Parties then in force.
11. The two clauses comprising Article22 share a general concern with consequences
outside the treaty, but they deal with distinctly different issues; and that is why they are redacted in
separate clauses. The first clause, as I said, affirms that it is not directed against “any other State or
entity”. The second clause of Article22 relates to the effect which the Parties’ prior rights and
obligations from previous treaties will have on the obligations assumed in the Interim Accord. This
is, I should emphasize, not an unusual concern of treaty makers fashioning agreements, especially
those that have existential implications. Consider Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty: [slide 6]
“Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force
between it and any other of the parties or any third State is in conflict with the
provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international
engagement in conflict with this Treaty.” - 42 -
The North Atlantic Treaty [slide 7] underlines the problem and highlights the role of the second
clause of Article 22.
12. Without Article22 in Final Clauses, one might have assumed that the Parties had
intended to privilege and give priority to some or all of the rights and obligations in the Interim
Accord over rights and obligations deriving from ear lier international agreements, which either of
the Parties had concluded or at least have left the question open for negotiation or decision by a
court or tribunal. Lest there be an assumption th at the Parties were adopting such an approach, the
second component of Article22 explicitly subord inates in case of infringements the rights and
obligations which Greece assumed in the Interim Accord to the prior “rights and duties” which
Greece owed as a result of other bilateral and multilateral treaties, already in force, including rights
and duties owed to international organizations.
13. I turn, Mr.President, to the relation between the second part of Article22 and the
relevant part of Article11 of the Interim Acco rd; it may be usefully illustrated graphically, as
Greece showed in its Counter-Memorial. To avoid shifting back and forth between slides, let me
link, in a single slide, the relevant parts of the two provisions of the Interim Accord. I am going to
edit out the safeguard clause at the end of Article 11, paragraph 1, but only in order to focus more
sharply on the role of Article 22, and I will indicate that it is I who joined the two separate elements
by inserting a bracketed conjunction; brackets, of course, being the conventional means of
indicating that a word, not originally in the te xt, has been interpolated . On Tuesday, learned
counsel protested that Greece is rewriting the Inte rim Accord. We trust the Court will appreciate
that this entirely transparent exercise, which was clearly explained in Greece’s written submissions,
is for purposes of facilitating analysis. As you can see, it says in relevant parts: [slide 8]
“the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership
of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations
and institutions of which the Party of the Firs t Part is a member . . . [but] this Interim
Accord... does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from the bilateral and
multilateral agreements already in force that the parties have concluded with other
States or international organizations”.
Mr. President, the graphic juxtaposition of the rele vant components of Article 22 with the relevant
components of Article 11 shows that the obligati on assumed in Article 11 is subordinated to prior
rights and duties of Greece and the Applicant r esulting from agreements with other international - 43 -
organizations. Now, this is not, as the Appli cant argues in its Reply and in its argument on
Tuesday, an interpretation that allows Greece to “violate” Article 11. That is circular, positing that
an application of Article 22 constitutes a per se viol ation of any provision to which it might apply.
In the régime of the Interim Ac cord, every obligation in the treaty is potentially contingent on
Article 22. When Article 22 does apply, the obligation in Article 11 yields. In so far as Greece has
rights or duties ⎯and that includes, Greece submits, the duty to exercise lawful judgment in
decisions in certain other types of organizations ⎯ rights and duties in an organization under a
treaty existing prior to the entry into force of th e Interim Accord and an obligation of the Interim
Accord could infringe those rights or duties, the obligation in the Interim Accord yields to the right
or duty arising under the treaty already in force. [Slide 9]
14. I turn to those rights and duties. It is not, Mr.President, Greece’s argument that the
rights and duties of every organization to which it belongs at the entry into force of the Interim
Accord necessarily prevails over the Interim Accord by operation of Article 22. But the inclusion
of Article22 in the treaty shows that the drafters intended that some might. In order to analyse
which ones might, Greece distinguished two general categories of orga nization: organizations that
aspire to universality or, as our French colleagues call them, organisations à vocation universelle,
and limited-membership organizations or organisations fermées . In the first category, the
presumption is in favour of membership, whic h may often be secured by little more than
adherence; essentially, new members are added by a process of membership application and
almost pro forma approval. Entities that aspire to universality are usually technical organizations.
Many of them, by their nature, need as many me mbers as possible to be optimally effective and
they rely for their effectiveness on what economists call “the network” effect: whether it is a fax
machine, a telephone or a universal organization, scarcity does not, as it usually does, correlate
with value. To the contrary: the more members and users there are, the more valuable the machine
or organization becomes. In these types of organi zations, duties of members in such organizations
with respect to new admission applications woul d not likely present conflicts with duties arising
from the Interim Accord to which Article 22 would apply. - 44 -
15. The second category of international orga nization, limited-member organizations, is
comprised of organizations with confined membersh ip. By contrast to organizations which aspire
to universality, limited-membership organizations ac complish their specific missions by restricting
membership to those States which not only are ab le to fulfil the formal entry and performance
requirements, but whose admission is believed necessary to further the shared purposes of the
organization. Membership in these organizations characteristically entails substantial commitments
and corresponding dependencies. Thus, the admi ssion of each new member has the potential for
affecting the commitments and obligations of prior members. Hence, the criteria for membership
and the procedures for decision about it tend to be more stringent. In each membership decision,
every existing member bears a heavy responsibility to other members and to the organization as a
whole. Duties of members with respect to app lications for membership could present a conflict
with the duties of the Interim Accord to which Article 22 applies.
16. Military alliances, Mr. President, are quintessential limited-member organizations. They
involve commitments fundamental to the security a nd even existence of the members, so decisions
about who may accede to membership and contribute ⎯ and not detract from ⎯ the central
purpose of the alliance are fraught with especially heavy responsibility.
17. Now, one can argue over whether a particular organization aspires to universality or is a
limited-membership organization or whether some or ganizations have changed. But there is only
one thing over which one cannot argue. NATO, a mu tual defence organization, can in no way be
confused with an organisation à vocation universelle. It is obviously a limited-membership
organization and its membership admission practic e, as detailed in Greece’s written submissions
and recalled yesterday by AmbassadorSavvaides, is , consequently, careful and stringent. Every
member bears obligations to other members to exercise plenary judgment in each membership
decision, lest the candidate be inducted into th e Alliance burdened by unresolved conflicts with a
member or pursuing policies and practices that could cause dissension within a region of concern to
the Alliance. No surprise, then, th at the NATO “Membership Action Plan” ⎯ the MAP plan that
several of my colleagues mentioned ⎯ prescribes that in instructions to those who would become
members of NATO, that: [slide 10] - 45 -
“Aspirants would also be expected to . . . settle ethnic disputes or external
territorial disputes including irredentist clai ms or internal jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly
relations.”63 [End slide 11]
In argument on Tuesday, the Applicant’s counsel mocked these criteria, on their merits and for
having been disseminated by electronic press relea se. In doing so, he unintentionally betrayed
profound misunderstanding of the gravity of d ecision-making in the councils of the military
alliance, faced with life and death choices about the use of military force. As for the MAP criteria,
they represent a policy commitment of NATO; th eir mode of dissemination turns on the selection
of the most efficacious means of reaching a desi red audience. Nor, as Ambassador Savvaides said
yesterday, are the MAP standards the only articula tion of the criteria to be deployed in judging
membership applications. The point of emphasis is that if a NATO member were to believe that a
candidate did not fulfil those requirements, would it not owe it to the Alliance community to raise
the issue in the membership process? The expectation that it might have to do so is why Article 22
and Article 11 intersect.
18. But the Applicant argues that Article 22 could not have meant this because “[t]he whole
point of the Applicant’s insistence on securing the co mmitment of the respondent in Article 11 (1)
was to overcome such objections” 64. Immediately after this myopic and one-sided view of
Article11, the Applicant says something, repeated twice on Tuesday, that is so revealing of its
blind spot in this entire case that it must be quoted verbatim: [slide 12]
“When Article11(1) entered into force on 13October1995 the Respondent
[Greece] immediately dropped its objections to the Appli cant’s membership in such
organizations. Objections were dropped in relation to the Council of Europe, and then
with respect to the Organization for S ecurity and Co-operation in Europe, and
membership in numerous other organiza tions became open to the Applicant in the
65
immediate aftermath of concluding the Interim Accord.” [Slide 13]
Exactly! Exactly! “In the immediate aftermath of concluding the Interim Accord”, Greece had no
reason not to count on the Applicant’s good-faith performance of its obligations under the Interim
Accord with respect especially to the sensitive issue of the name. The Applicant had yet to reveal
its counter-strategy, secretly practiced over a pe riod of years but only publicly revealed by
6NATO, Membership Action Plan (MAP), 24 Apr. 1999, Counter-Memorial, Ann. 21, p. 3.
64
Reply, para. 5.19.
6Ibid. - 46 -
President Crvenkovski in 2008. As long as Gree ce had no reason to apprehend conflicts between,
on the one hand, the obligations of the Interim Accord ⎯ especially those relating to the settlement
of ethnic disputes, respect for national symbols, irredentist claims, good-neighbourly relations and
the good-faith negotiation of the name issue ⎯ no conflict between them and, on the other hand,
Greece’s obligations to NATO with respect to membership decisions, Article 22 was not applicable
and would not have come into operation. Only afte r the Applicant’s strategy of persistent violation
of resolution817 and Article11, became clear, could Article22 have become operative for
purposes of the Applicant’s NATO application. Greece’s actions, which the Applicant invokes in
its effort to demonstrate the vacuity of Article 22, proves exactly the opposite: they show how and
why and when Article 22 was designed to work.
19. Yet, the Applicant argues, if Article 22 is meaningful, then “the Respondent would have
been entitled, even after the conclusion of the Interim Accord, to object to the Applicant’s
66
membership in such organizations” . Exactly. Moreover, even if Article11, paragraph 1, were
not being intentionally violated, as I think we have shown that it is, yet some action or
characteristic of the Applicant raised questions about the propriety of its membership in a
limited-membership organization in which Gre ece was a member, Article22 recognizes that
Greece might have a duty to object consistent with the Interim Accord.
20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Greece submits that the Applicant’s claim on the
merits fails because of Article 22.
21. Mr. President, I see that we are close to the habitual pause. May I ask you to call on my
colleague Professor Crawford immediately afterwards. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Michael Reisman for your statement. And as has
been suggested by the Respondent, I think this is an appropriate moment for us to have a short
coffee-break. We resume our session in ten minutes at 11.45 a.m. The Court is adjourned.
The Court adjourned from 11.35 to 11.50 a.m.
66
Reply, para. 5.20. - 47 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now the Court resumes the session, the continuation of
the pleadings on the Respondent’s side. I now invite ProfessorJamesCrawford to take the floor.
But before, ProfessorJamesCrawford, you start your presentation, I have one small request,
transmitting the request from the interpreters, that in your last intervention you spoke too fast and
the interpreters could not really catch up withwhat you were saying and that, I guess, is to your
disadvantage. So I hope that you will keep that point in mind. Thank you.
Mr.CRAWFORD: I will do my best, Sir. The excitement of The Hague Rotary Club got
too much for me.
A PPLICATION OF A RTICLE 11 OF THE INTERIM A CCORD TO THE EVENTS OF 2008
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I return now to address the application of Article 11,
paragraph 1, and in particular of the safeguard clause, to the events of 2008.
I. Applying the non-objection clause
2. On Tuesday Professor Murphy gave you the Applicant’s interpretation of paragraph 1. He
67
said: “[t]he language is simple [and] straightforward” . So far so good. But he also said that the
language was “unrestricted” 6. In fact, the Applicant’s interpretation is without limit and, as I have
already explained, not supported by the text. It refers to one thing and one thing only ⎯ an
obligation not to object.
3. And, in fact, the Applicant makes a very specific claim. It alleges a particular objection at
the Bucharest Summit of the North Atlantic Treat y Organization as a result of which a particular
outcome was reached on a particular day. But it is completely unable to specify the particular act
in question.
4. The Applicant is plainly trying to plead a claim falling within Article11(1). The
obligation in Article11(1) is not an obligation notto “talk about an application”, not to “express
views about an application”. It is not an obligation “not to object . . . in [the] parliament” or “in the
streets outside [the] parliament”; or, for that ma tter, in the margins of the NATO. As my friend
67
CR 2011/6, p. 26, para. 19.
68Ibid. - 48 -
Professor Bastid-Burdeau ⎯ whose accession to the Bar we all celebrate ⎯ noted, the obligation
accepted by Greece under Article11(1) was “certe s tout à fait inhabituelle en droit
international . . . peut-être même sans précédent . . .” 69. Greece accepted the language of
Article11(1) because the constraint it places on Greece, is not boundless or vague, however
unprecedented. All Greece promised to do was not to object ⎯ and that can only be done in and in
relation to the organization in question.
5. The Applicant has adduced certain factual evidence, consisting of statements of various
officials of the respondent State. The fact that these statements were made is uncontested. They
are mostly in the public record ⎯ indeed, most of them were formulated and delivered for wide
public consumption through major print and broad cast channels. In no way do we resile from
them. The difference between the Parties is to the relevance of those statements to what actually
took place at the Bucharest Summit in the light of paragraph 1.
6. Indeed Professor Murphy set out a dossier of public statements. To quote from his
presentation, “This evidence arises from the Re spondent’s own written and oral diplomatic
communications, and from statements by its senio r officials made publicly and within its own
70
formal governmental institutions.” But governmental institutions of Greece are not the same as
NATO. As for “written and oral diplomatic communi cations”, important as they are, this is only a
very general description. In agreeing not to object, Greece did not become voiceless or mute.
More is needed before one can say that these communications constituted an “objection” in the
context of NATO.
7. Now what the Applicant o ffers in evidence certainly reflects the general position that had
emerged in 2008. It is a fact that Greece had become deeply concerned by the conduct of the
Applicant, and especially its attitude toward the negotiations over the name difference. But the
Applicant’s case is, and has to be, that there was an objection in a particular sense, so as to give rise
to international responsibility under paragraph 1. It is not enough for the evidence to show that the
Applicant’s conduct had irritated Greece, or, for that matter, driven Greek officials to distraction, in
69
CR 2011/7, p. 32, para. 19 (Bastid-Burdeau).
7CR 2011/5, p. 44, para. 21 (Murphy). - 49 -
the context of the negotiated settlement. The evidence has to be measured against the
Article 11 (1) obligation.
8. To give one example from Professor Murphy ’s presentation, the then Foreign Minister of
Greece, Ms Bakoyannis, said, and I quote, “The Greek side sees good neighbourly relations and the
resolution of problems as a prerequisite for membership in the Alliance.” 71 This stated briefly one
of NATO’s accession criteria, but it was not an objection. The Foreign Minister was speaking with
a journalist.
9. Then there was Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis’s statement of 22February2008. He
said “without a mutually accepted solution to the main issue, there can be no invitation to
participate in the Alliance” 72. This was a statement, one might call it a prediction, in the
Parliament of Greece, not in NATO. Another statement by the Prime Minister, a little later in
2008, said,
“The philosophy, the strategic goal, th e framework, the basic elements of our
policy are well-known. The strategy we mappe d out is clear. Our will for a mutually
acceptable solution [to the name difference] is genuine. Our position, ‘no solution ⎯
no invitation,’ is clear. If there is no solution, our neighbouring state’s aspirations to
participate in NATO will remain unrealised.” 73
This was a speech in Parliament as well; it was not a vote or objection under the rules of NATO.
10. Professor Murphy refers to a further speech of the Prime Minister, this time from the end
of March 2008. He said: “These past few months, we have responsibly made it clear that without
a mutually acceptable solution the road to NATO cannot be opened for our neighbouring country.
It cannot be invited to join.” 74 This was a speech to the governing party’s Parliamentary Group on
27 March 2008 ⎯ a statement in a national political forum. ProfessorMurphy also refers to an
article by the Foreign Minister in the International Herald Tribune on 31 March 2008, saying that
75
Greece would not be able to “strongl y back” the Appli cant’s NATO candidacy . This would,
perhaps, have established a breach, if the obligat ion had been “to strongly back the Applicant’s
71
AM, Ann. 73, quoted CR 2011/5, p. 44, para. 23.
72
Video available at www.youtube.com/wa tch?v=JrWBlzCQahQ&feature=related, quoted at CR2011/5, p.45,
para. 26.
73Applicant’s Reply, Ann. 97, quoted at CR 2011/5, p. 45, para. 27 (Murphy).
74AM, Ann. 88, quoted at CR 2011/5, p. 46, para. 30.
75AM, Ann. 90, quoted at CR 2011/5, pp. 46-47, para. 31. - 50 -
candidacies in the international media”. But first the obligation is not one of active support. And
secondly, however much the media may shape our impressions, and shape the actions of
politicians, legally, and fortunately, these are not the forums that count.
11. The Applicant talks about an aide mémo ire of Greece “for use in discussion with all
76
NATO member States” . The aide mémoire stated, amongst other things: “The satisfactory
conclusion of the [name] negotiations is a sine qua non in order to enable Greece to continue to
77
support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Skopje.” Giving this document the interpretation most
favourable to the Applicant, it might perhaps be called a “NATO document”, in the limited sense
that it was intended for NATO member States. But it is impossible to see how it constituted an
“objection”, when Greece simply reiterated a criterion of the organization that must be fulfilled if
the member States are “to continue to support” the Applicant’s membership goals.
12. In short, the Applicant is at some loss to show an objection in NATO. Indeed,
Professor Murphy conceded a crucial point. He said: “The consensus procedure means that ‘there
78
is no voting or decision by the majority’, and no formal ‘veto’ procedure.” Now, this may seem a
rather formal point. But in international organiza tions, as in international law, formalities matter.
It is a putative act of Greece in the NATO organization which is central to the Applicant’s claim.
13. ProfessorMurphy sought to fill the gap by sheer assertion. Thus, he said, “those steps
were directly ‘joined’ with the formal decision process of NATO on accession” 79. By “steps” he
meant the statements various Greek officials ma de about the Applicant’s NATO aspirations. He
seems to equate those statements to formal démarches in the form of, for example, explanations of
vote. They were nothing of the sort, as I have shown: there was no record of a vote to explain;
there were no explanations of vote, such as me mber States adopt in United Nations organs and
other multilateral bodies.
76AM, Ann. 129, quoted at CR 2011/5, p. 44, para. 24.
77
Ibid.
78CR 2011/5, p. 53, para. 53 (Murphy).
79CR 2011/6, p. 26, para. 18 (Murphy). - 51 -
14. To speak of events within an internati onal organization, it is necessary to speak rather
precisely about the rules of the organization. Am bassador Savvaides yesterday spoke to you about
80
those. His conclusions may be summarized as follows :
(i) NATO is an Alliance established for defen ce and the political consolidation of peace in
Europe;
(ii) within NATO, consultation and consensus are not only indispensable principles, they are
the mechanisms by which the Alliance reaches decisions;
(iii) NATO’s chief decision-ma king body, the North Atlantic Council, does not take roll-call
votes on draft resolutions; it contains no procedure for a veto;
(iv) NATO admits new members through a multi-step process, under which the Alliance sets
requirements, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty 81;
(v) as with other organizations whose constitu tive instruments limit membership to chosen
States, admission is by NATO’s choice. It is an act of the organization and not of any
member State;
(vi) because all decisions in NATO are the pr oduct of consensus, the act of admitting a new
member is the product of consensus of all the member States; correspondingly, the act of
continuing a State’s candidacy is the product of consensus as well.
15. AmbassadorSavvaides’ main points have been confirmed by statements of NATO
ambassadors; by authoritative NATO documents; and by NATO’s highest-ranking official. This
material is set out in the written pleadings 82. I will briefly recall here the statements of the
Secretary General.
16. There was the occasion on which a re porter asked about a veto in NATO. The
SecretaryGeneral responded as follows: “Th[is] last remark I do not understand and I’ll not
83
comment on. NATO does not know the word veto. We operate by consensus . . .” [PP] Now
80
CR 2011/8, pp. 21-26, paras. 2-18 (Savvaides).
81See RCM, para. 7.41, for the details of the process.
82RCM, para. 7.46; RR, para. 3.41.
83
Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer after the informal Meeting of NATO
Defense Ministers, with Invitees with non NATO ISAF Contributing Nations, Cracow, Po land, dated 19Feb.2009,
available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090219c.htmlespondent’s Ann. 33. - 52 -
true, this was an off-the-cuff remark to a reporte r. But the Secretary General said the following
some months later in a press conference with the Foreign Minister of Greece in Athens:
“NATO does[not] know the word veto. NATO does know the word consensus.
And although some people might have been disappointed, there was a consensus in
Bucharest last year, and there was a consensu s again in Strasbourg-Kehl. So there is
no veto. NATO doesn’t know the word veto, and no nation has ever vetoed anything
84
in NATO.” [PP ⎯ add sequentially to previous PP]
This was the decision of the Bucharest Summit, as characterized by the senior official of the
Alliance, its Secretary General.
17. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you heard the Applicant on Monday refer to the
statement of the Prime Minister of Greece of 3April2008. The Prime Minister said: “Due to
Greece’s veto, FYROM is not joining NATO.” 85 [PP ⎯ add sequentially to previous two PP].
This was the central piece of evidence in support of the Applicant’s contention that there was a
breach of paragraph 1.
18. After mentioning this statement, Pr ofessorMurphy went on to refer to the Armed
Activities case ( Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005 , p.201, para.61), where you said that you
would “give particular attention to reliable ev idence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable
to the State represented by the person making them”. But not all evidentiary disputes are alike.
The Armed Activities case did not entail a dispute as to the character of the decision-making rules
of a closed multilateral organization; far from it. You also considered, in respect of the Porter
Report in that case, and I quote, “since its publication, there has been no challenge to the credibility
of this Report, which has been accepted by both Parties” ( ibid.). The purpose for which the
Applicant introduces the Prime Minister’s statement into evidence is to support the contention that
Greece used a NATO procedure to object to the Applicant’s candidacy. But however much the
Prime Minister might have liked to take credit for a so-called “veto” ⎯ PrimeMinisters tend to
like to take credit for what are perceived as favourable outcomes ⎯ that did not change the rules of
84
Statements of Foreign Minister of Greece MsBakoyannis and NATO Secretary General Scheffer following
their meeting, Athens, 14 May 2009, available http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/140509_H1918.htm
Respondent’s Ann. 141.
8AM, Ann. 99, quoted at CR 2011/5, p. 47, para. 33 (Murphy). - 53 -
NATO. As you have heard, from the senior officer of NATO, that is not the reality of the
organization ⎯ Prime Minister, or no Prime Minister.
19. It is worthwhile here, following an Application, two complete rounds of written
submissions and an oral round, to note exactly wh at the Applicant has omitted to say. As much as
it locates an alleged breach of paragraph1 at the Bucharest Summit, the Applicant does not
produce any evidence, in the form of NATO authority, concerning any act carried out by Greece
under NATO procedures, to support the contention ⎯ the contention at the very foundation of its
claim ⎯ that Greece vetoed the admission of the A pplicant to NATO. There are references to
remarks by political leaders, directed for public consumption. There are suggestions that Greece
somehow commandeered a consensus and supplanted the NATO process by an individual act of
will ⎯ a modern Athanasius contra mundum ⎯ or at least the world of NATO. The allegation
which the Applicant makes at the base of its claim is that Greece “objected to” and thus defeated a
motion to admit the Applicant forthwith. If it had existed, the simplest thing of all would have
been to show, by some formal record, by some offi cial statement of the Alliance, or in some other
way, that Greece had objected, and, thus objecting, had caused the A pplicant not to be admitted.
The Applicant produces nothing of the sort, and for a simple reason: nothing of the sort exists.
II. The Applicant’s continuing campaign to be referred to differently than as stipulated
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the second clause of paragraph 1, the
safeguard clause. The Applicant has attempted to dismiss the safeguard clause by reference to
legal arguments, which I have already addressed. It also attempts to dismiss it on the factual
record. It is important that the safeguard clause be applied properly to the factual record — and to
the factual record as a whole.
22. Professor Murphy on Monday noticed th at Greece’s appreciation of the Applicant’s
conduct has changed over time, and that is true. He said that “[f]or at least ten years following the
adoption of the Interim Accord, the Respondent accep ted that... it could not object to the
Applicant’s admission to international organizations, so long as the provisional reference would be
used in that organization” 8. I don’t think the evidence goes quite so far. The position is that for
86
CR 2011/5, p. 43, para. 19. - 54 -
the first ten years the Applicant did not object ⎯ no acceptance of opinion juris is shown in the
record. But Professor Murphy, as he did so ofte n, paraphrased the safeguard clause condition, and
again I emphasize the need to consider the clause as actually adopted. Greece did not object, that is
the fact, to the Applicant’s admission to various organizations. Professor Murphy pointed out that,
“as late as 2005”, the Respondent accepted and even supported the Applicant’s candidacy. I would
only note in passing that he omitted to draw atte ntion to the legal situation, that the support
rendered by Greece was over and above the obligation in Article11, paragraph1. But that is not
the important point for present purposes.
23. The important point is the timing, and the fact that paragraph 1 is a reservation of rights.
Those rights remain whether or not they are ex ercised on particular occasions. Professor Murphy
87
says, “the position appears to have begun changing in 2004 to 2005...” . Though he says that
“the evidence does not pinpoint with laser pr ecision the exact moment when the Respondent
88
changed its position...” . He refers also to “the formal recognition by various countries,
including the United States, of the Applicant under its constitutional name” 89. He does not develop
the point and instead passes directly to an account of how Greece’s position “hardened” 90⎯ as of
around 2004 to 2005, Greece no longer gave active support to the candidacies and the reason is that
something had gone wrong. He does not say what had gone wrong.
24. Mr.President, Members of the Court, on Monday my friend Professor Sands was kind
enough not to call me the elephant in the room, pe rhaps this was because, pachydermatous or not, I
91
was not in the room . This was in connection with one of the Respondent’s tertiary arguments,
put forward in the alternative as a defence. Ther e is however an elephant in the room, and nobody
on the Applicant’s side has dared to mention it. This is the stratagem, which the Applicant adopted
in the mid-2000s covertly, which the Applicant implemented for several years with readily
observable results, and which the Applicant fina lly articulated publicly through its President,
President Crvenkovski. The Respondent already has set out that statement, in which the President
87CR 2011/5, p. 43, para. 20.
88
Ibid., para. 19.
89
Ibid., para. 20.
90Ibid., para. 20.
91Ibid., p. 36, para. 26. - 55 -
explained the stratagem and gave a report as to its progress in 2008 92. [PP] In addition to points
made by my colleagues, a number of further points need to be made in respect of this statement.
25. First, there is the timing of the statement, and the timing of the strategy it finally
articulates. So when was this strategy ⎯ which up to 2008 “due to understandable reasons, was
never publicly announced” ⎯ originally put into effect? It was a strategy, which the President
described in 2008 as having been in effect “in r ecent years”. The recognition of the Applicant’s
preferred designation by the United States, to which Professor Murphy referred, was in
November2004. The multiple recognitions of the name to which the President referred
accumulated in particular at that time and in the several years afterwards. Greece hardly needed
the President of the applicant State to alert it to wh at was happening. It was perfectly clear that the
Applicant has been, as the President would eventua lly publicly admit, at “work simultaneously on
constant increase of the number of countries which recognize [its] constitutional name and thus [to]
strengthen our proper political capital in internatio nal field which will be needed for the next
phases of the process”.
26. What was the “next phase” to which the President referred? Evidently, it would establish
the so-called “constitutional name” so far and so wi de, that the Applicant would have rendered the
agreed process of negotiation utterly irrelevant to th e real world. That strategy began in or around
2004. The fact that Professor Murphy did not mention the President’s statement of 2008 does not
make the strategy disappear. Its effect was very much in evidence ⎯ from the Applicant’s point of
view, the strategy was by that time “exceptiona lly successful” and the prospects for its further
success gave the Applicant considerable encouragement.
27. Meanwhile, until the Applicant’s strate gy renders the negotiation process a nullity, the
Applicant will pay lip service to the obligation to negotiate ⎯ but by no means will it let that
obligation get in the way of the pursuit of its final goal. It may be that it is entitled to have that
final goal; it is not entitled to hold us to our prom ise in Article 11 whilst sustaining the campaign
for that final goal: that is the fundamental point. To come to the table but maintain a position
which was, and I quote the President, “always the same and unchanged” is the very definition of
92
Rejoinder, para. 7.62. - 56 -
bad faith in negotiations. You have been clear, for example in your Advisory Opinion on Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, that an obligation to negotiate enta ils considerably more than that
(Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 , p.264,
para. 99).
28. Greece has an interest, which was of paramount importance in 1995, and continues
today, to secure an agreed and mutually acceptable settlement of the difference by the adoption of a
name erga omnes; a name for the applicant State which is neither a provocation nor a threat. The
Interim Accord was the instrument to which Greece agreed in 1995 in order to protect that interest.
It was willing to accept an unusual constraint on its autonomy as a State. But that was part of the
larger bargain.
29. Counsel for the Applicant have said that Greece asserts that the safeguard clause is
triggered simply “because the Respondent is unha ppy about political decisions reached by third
States in recent years in their diplomatic relations with the Applicant” 9. This is a reference to the
mounting practice, instigated by the Applicant, of third States not using the stipulated general
designation as per Security Council resolution817(1993). It does not matter whether that
resolution establishes obligations for other States. The reference to the resolution in the Interim
Accord does not, as I have already said, establish oblig ations on third States. A bilateral treaty by
definition cannot do so. What matters is that Gree ce agreed to a serious and unusual constraint on
its own conduct, when it accepted Article 11, paragraph 1. The second clause protects Greece from
a limitless application of that constraint. PresidentCrvenkovski foresees the “next phases” of the
Applicant’s strategy opening even broader horizons for the Applicant. In hi s words, that will lead
States generally to “recognize and use our cons titutional name on [a] b ilateral and multilateral
plan[e].” Note the words ⎯”on [a] bilateral and multilateral pl an[e]”. Greece does not for one
moment challenge the axiomatic position that, absent a special direction, for example from the
Security Council, every State makes its own decisi on as to what States to recognize, what States to
have diplomatic relations with, what name to call States by and other such political questions; the
question of the name is a political question. Even if the Applicant and the Respondent had
93
CR 2011/6, p. 44, para. 73 (Murphy). - 57 -
attempted, bilaterally, to place a new limit on third State rights, they could not have done so. The
question here is not about the rights of third States. In so far as the Applicant has raised their rights
as an objection, this is a distraction. The matter really at issue here is the scope and continuing
character of the constraint on Greece under Article 11, paragraph 1 – under a bilateral treaty.
29. If the Applicant’s strategy is succeeding, as the President claims, then since it extends to
the “multilateral plan[e]”, it is obvious that the Applicant soon “is to be referred to” not only in, but
also probably by, international organizations ⎯ not as designated in Security Council
resolution 817 (1993) ⎯ but as the Applicant would prefer. This is truly a “multilateral plan”. At
this point, what is left of the guarantee under the Interim Accord on wh ich Greece relies? The
negotiation process will be a dead letter. The so -called “constitutional name” will be entrenched.
One does not have to share the view that that na me is unacceptable, and th at question is expressly
reserved from this Court. We have heard already from the other side about dead parrots,
horse-drawn coaches, elephants and pebbles: no doubt Professor Sands will explain what these
have in common. But the parties to the Interim A ccord stipulated that the matters it addressed on a
bilateral level are not trivial. To the parties, or at least to Greece, the subject-matter of the Interim
Accord is entirely serious. With all respect, having regard to Article 21, paragraph 2, it is not for
this Court to say otherwise.
30. But, worse still, even if the Applicant’s interpretation and application of Article11 is
correct, Greece will still be obliged “not to object”. This is an absurd result. It does not follow
from the plain language of the safeguard clause. That clause was intended to protect Greece,
precisely in circumstances which began to emerge in the mid-2000s under the Applicant’s strategy
to entrench a name, marginalize the negotiations, and seize the benefits, while casting off the
burdens, of the Interim Accord. Pacta sunt servanda, say our opponents, repeatedly 94. But they
are selective not only in their interpretation of their agreements, but also in those they keep: the
others they dismiss with sarcasm and frivolity ⎯ mere pebbles on the route to realizing their
multilateral plan.
9CR2011/5, pp.21, 22, paras.14, 20 (Miloshoski); ibid., p. 28, para. 12 (Sands); CR 2011/6, p. 51, para. 6
(Sands). - 58 -
Mr. President, Members of the Court, the facts in evidence in 2008 already had triggered the
safeguard clause. There was no longer any legal b asis to constrain Greece from objecting, if it did
object.
31. As I noted earlier, the Applicant contends that the safeguard clause operates, only on the
procedural precondition that Greece, before hand, has articulated a justification.
ForeignMinisterMiloshoski, as the Co-Agent, made a similar point in his opening statement on
95
Monday . But there is nothing in Article 11, paragraph 1, to make prior notification a requirement
for invoking the safeguard clause. This is a classical case of a party seeking to change a rule to fit
inconvenient facts. But the problem here for the Applicant is worse than that, for the Applicant not
only introduces a procedural requirement wh ich does not exist; it also seeks to change the facts.
Greece made it very clear, before the Bucharest Summit, that it recognized what the Applicant was
trying to do. That is to say, Greece protested that the Applicant “is to be referred to differently” in
various organizations than as stipulated. Professor Pellet will set out the record of the Applicant’s
disregard for the provisional name in the Genera l Assembly and other international institutions ⎯
practice which clearly indicated to Greece that th e conditions satisfying the safeguard clause were
met. He will do so in the context of breaches of the Interim Accord and of the exception of
non-performance. For my purpose, however, it does not matter whether the Applicant’s conduct
was a breach or not. What matters is that it had not obtained from Greece a guarantee of support or
abstention independent of its own adherence to the Interim Agreement. If the Applicant was free to
undermine that Agreement and acted to do so, all bets were off. If the Applicant was at liberty then
so was Greece.
Conclusion
32. Mr.President, Members of the Court. To conclude: from the facts, it is clear that the
Applicant is, and will continue to be, referred to by a different name in international organizations
than that stipulated: its diplomats will see to that, even when serving in rotational roles as the
chairmen of United Nations committees and sub-comm ittees. It is well with in Greece’s margin of
appreciation to recognize that the safeguard clause condition, as at April 2008, was satisfied.
95
CR 2011/5, p. 21, para. 15. - 59 -
33. Even if Greece may seem to have “objected” in the sense of the first clause, the first limb
of Article 11, paragraph 1, it did so in circum stances which the Interim Accord expressly provides
that Greece may retain the right to object, and in response to the Applicant’s attempts to disrupt the
balancing arrangement in the Interim Accord to which it had committed itself, Greece had the right
to act. The Applicant has sought in every available quarter to secure the use of a name not agreed
with Greece. That amounts to an attempt to dera il, admittedly in slow-motion, the agreed process
of negotiation. It does not matter for Greece what caused the train to leave the tracks: whether it
was deliberate acts of the Applicant itself; mistak es by others manning the switches, or whatever.
The result has been clear: instead of accepting a name agreed by both Parties through negotiation,
the Applicant has sought to deprive Greece of its ri ght, under the bilateral treaty, to a negotiated
settlement. NATO accordingly made a judgment that the Applicant had not satisfied the
requirements of good neighbourly relations incumbent on all member States. That was not a
breach of the first limb of Article 11, but if it w as, or if it was of the occasion of such a breach, the
safeguard clause amply covered the situation.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, I tha nk you for your attention. May I invite you,
Mr.President, to call on the next speaker for Greece, Professor Alain Pellet, who has, in
single-handed combat, won the right to argue for the exceptio.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor James Crawford, for your statement. I now invite
Professor Alain Pellet to take the floor.
M. PELLET :
LES VIOLATIONS PAR L ’EX-R ÉPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE DE M ACÉDOINE
DE SES OBLIGATIONS RELATIVES AU NOM
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieu rs les juges, l’ARYM s’évertue à corseter
l’objet du différend dont la Cour de céans est sa isie en le limitant à l’interprétation et à
l’application d’une disposition, une seule, de l’accord intérimaire : l’article 11, paragraphe 1 (voire,
si l’on se fie à la lecture manifestement biaisée que le demandeur en fait, à la première phrase de ce - 60 -
96
paragraphe…) . En réalité, les faits soumis à la Cour par le demandeur portent sur le seul aspect
de l’accord intérimaire que l’article21 soustrait à votre compétence ⎯comme le professeur
Reisman et moi l’avons montré auparavant. Si toutefois la Cour acceptait d’exercer sa compétence
⎯ce qu’elle ne devrait sûrement pas faire ⎯, force lui serait d’admettre que le différend qui
oppose les Parties est plus large que ce que prétendent nos contradicteurs.
2. Il ne saurait faire de doute que c’est à la Cour
«de définir elle-même, sur une base objective, le différend qui oppose les parties, en
examinant la position de l’une et de l’autre :
«C’est donc le devoir de la C our de circonscrire le véritable
problème en cause et de préciser l’objet de la demande.»». ( Compétence
en matière de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), compétence de la Cour,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 447-448, par. 28-30.)
3. En la présente espèce, la Cour ne saura it se prononcer sur les demandes de l’ARYM, sans
les resituer dans leur contexte : la décision prise par le sommet de Bucarest des pays membres de
l’OTAN n’a pas été prise tout à trac, telle une temp ête apparaissant soudain dans un ciel serein.
Elle est la conséquence d’une longue série de manquements par l’ARYM à ses obligations en vertu
de l’accord intérimaire. La Grèce a protesté de plus en plus fermement au fil des années contre ces
violations, qui font peser une menace grave sur «les relations pacifiques et de bon voisinage dans la
97
région» comme le Conseil de sécurité l’avait pressenti dans sa résolution 817 (1993) . Du reste, la
Cour ne s’y est pas trompée ; elle a donné à la présente affaire le nom qui convient : « Application
de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995» sans en limiter l’objet à l’application de l’article 11,
paragraphe 1, moins encore à sa première phrase.
4. Et on le comprend: le splendide isol ement dans lequel nos c ontradicteurs tentent
d’enfermer le différend en répétant ad nauseam qu’il s’agit d’«un cas tout simple et limité
98
d’application de pacta sunt servanda» («a simple and narrow case of pacta sunt servanda» ), eût
non seulement été contraire à tous les canons de l’in terprétation, mais aurait en outre privé la Cour
de toute possibilité de comprendre les circonsta nces dans lesquelles la décision contestée est
96
Voir notamment réplique, p.8, par.1.3, citant le mémoire, par.1.1. Voir aussi CR2011/5, p.21, par.14
(Miloshoski).
97Voir aussi la lettre datée du 19 août 1994, adressée au Secrétaire général par le président du Conseil de sécurité,
S/1994/979.
98CR 2011/5, p. 21, par. 14 (Miloshoski) ; voir aussi ibid., p. 28, par. 12 (Sands). - 61 -
intervenue et donc d’en apprécier la licéité. Cette décision n’est en effet qu’une réponse aux
manquements répétés de l’ARYM à ses obligations en vertu non seulement de l’article11
lui-même, mais aussi de plusieurs autres dispositions de l’accord intérimaire ⎯ l’article 5, qui en
est d’ailleurs indissociable ; mais aussi d’autres, et en particulier les articles 6 et 7.
5. Je vais, ce matin ⎯ si on peut encore parler de matin ⎯, revenir sur le mépris total dans
lequel l’Etat demandeur tient les obligations lui incombant qui sont liées à la recherche d’un nom
mutuellement acceptable et conforme au principe de bon voisinage et Mme Telalian traitera ensuite
cet après-midi des autres violations attribuables à l’ARYM qui témoignent de l’attitude irrédentiste
de ce pays et qui menacent également les relations de bon voisinage et le maintien de la paix dans
la région.
I. Les violations de l’article 5 de l’accord intérimaire
6. Avec votre permission, Monsieur le préside nt, je commencerai par les violations par le
demandeur de l’article 5 de l’accord intérimaire. Cette disposition constitue l’une des premières et
des principales dispositions organisant les «relations amicales et mesures de confiance» entre les
Parties et c’est dans ce cadre général que leurs autres obligations doivent être lues. Comme l’a
montré mon maître et ami Georges Abi-S aab, il s’agit d’un élément fondamental du quid pro quo
sur lequel repose l’accord dans son ensemble; la Grèce n’aurait jamais accepté de ne pas «élever
des objections» à l’encontre de la candidature du demandeur dans les organi sations internationales
99
dont elle est membre ⎯ une concession «sans précédent» comme on l’a souligné ⎯ si elle avait
pu penser que les négociations sur le nom ne serai ent pas poursuivies de bonne foi par l’ARYM.
Et ce sont les tentatives d’enterrement des négocia tions par celle-ci qui ont dissipé les illusions de
la Grèce.
[Projection n o1 ⎯ Résolution 817 (1993), par. 1 et 2.]
7. Une telle attitude est directement et indiscutablement contraire aux conditions posées par
la résolution817(1993) par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité recommandait à l’Assemblée générale
d’admettre le demandeur aux Nations Unies étant entendu qu’il devait «être désigné
provisoirement, à toutes fins utiles (for all purposes) à l’Organisation, sous le nom
99
CR 2011/7, p. 32, par. 19 (Bastid-Burdeau). - 62 -
d’«ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine» en attendant que soit réglée la divergence qui a surgi
au sujet de son nom», étant entendu aussi que cette divergence deva it être réglée par des
négociations menées sous les auspices de la conférence internationale sur l’ex-Yougoslavie.
8. Lors de la conclusion de l’accord intérimaire, la Grèce a cependant voulu croire à la bonne
foi de l’ARYM qui s’est engagée directement à son égard, par un traité en bonne et due forme, à
«poursuivre les négociations sous les auspices du Secrétaire général de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies, conformément à la résolution 845 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en
vue de parvenir à régler le différend men tionné dans cette résolution et dans la
résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil».
o
[Fin de la projection n 1.]
9. Ces espoirs ont été déçus: malgré cet engagement formel de l’Etat demandeur, qui
reconnaissait la force obligatoire des directives du Conseil de sécurité, l’a ttitude constante de ce
pays a consisté à vider les négociations auxquelles il s’était engagé de toute substance. Et l’on ne
peut douter que, ce faisant, il a gravement manqué à ses engagements conventionnels.
10. Avant de montrer que tel est, sans aucun doute, le cas en l’espèce, quelques mots,
Monsieur le président, si vous le voulez bien, sur la portée de cet engagement de négocier dont on a
déjà parlé.
[Projection n o2 ⎯ Article 5 de l’accord intérimaire.]
A. La portée de l’obligation de l’article 5
11. L’obligation de négociation découlant du premier paragraphe de l’article5 de l’accord
intérimaire, qui est projeté derrière moi, présente les caractéristiques suivantes :
100
1) il s’agit d’une obligation de négocier de bonne foi ;
2) elle doit aboutir à un résultat(« régler le différend» mentionné dans les résolutions817 et
101
845 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité) ; et
3) le différend en question porte indiscutablement sur le nom de l’Etat demandeur dans la présente
102
instance .
De brefs commentaires sur chacun de ces aspects suffisent.
100
Contre-mémoire, p. 180-184, par. 8.35-8.39 ; duplique, p. 166-175, par. 7.53-7.66.
101
Duplique, p. 175-176, par. 7.67-7.68.
102Duplique, p. 167-170, par. 7.54-7.60. - 63 -
12. Il existe une riche jurisprudence sur la signification que revêt l’obligation de négocier.
Elle peut se résumer en une formule: les Parties doivent négocier de bonne foi avec la volonté
103
d’aboutir et sans priver la négociation de son objet .
13. Au surplus, en l’espèce, l’obligation assumée par l’ARYM va plus loin: elle est de
négocier, certes, mais à ce pactum de negociando s’ajoute une obligation d’aboutir à un accord
⎯ pactum de contrahendo.
«La portée juridique de l’obligation considérée dépasse celle d’une simple
obligation de comportement; l’obligation en cause ici est celle de parvenir à un
résultat précis … par l’adoption d’un comportement déterminé, à savoir la poursuite
de bonne foi de négociati ons en la matière.» ( Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi
d’armes nucléaires, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 264, par. 99.)
14. Il s’agit là d’une obligation non de simple comportement mais bien de résultat. Il ne
suffit pas que l’ARYM se présente à la table de négo ciations, il faut encore qu’elle y participe de
bonne foi avec la volonté d’aboutir et que, finalement, l’accord se fasse.
15. Quant à l’objet de cette obligation, l’article 5 est limpide. Il s’agit «de parvenir à régler
le différend mentionné dans» les résolutions 817 et 845 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité, résolutions
qui, elles-mêmes, renvoient à la «divergence qui a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat» dont le Conseil
a recommandé l’admission aux NationsUnies, c’est-à-dire l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine. Du reste, si le moindre doute pouvait subsister à cet égard, le paragraphe2 de
l’article5 mentionne expressément le «différend qui…oppose [les Parties] en ce qui concerne le
nom de la seconde Partie», c’est-à-dire l’ARYM.
[Fin de la projection nº 2 ⎯ Projection n o3 ⎯ Résolution 817 (1993) (extraits).]
16. Et j’y insiste, Monsieur le président: «le» nom, son nom pour tous usages; pas «un»
nom à vocation spécifique, fonctionnelle ou limitée, dont l’utilisation serait restreinte aux relations
bilatérales entre les deux pays.
103 Voir notamment: Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (R épublique fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark)
(République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pay s-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1969 , o.47, par. 85. Voir aussTrafic ferroviaire
entre la Lithuanie et la Pologne, avis consultatif, 1931, C.P.J.I. sérieA42, p.116 ou, Compétence en matière de
pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c.Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1974, p. 33, par. 78 ; Interprétation de l’accord du
25mars1951 entre l’OMS et l’Egypte, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 95, par. 49 ; Délimitation de la frontière
maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 299, par. 112 ;
ou sentences arbitrales, 16novembre1957, Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne c. France), RSA , vol. XII, p.306-307;
26 janvier 1972, Affaire concernant des réclamations consécutives à des décisions du Tribunal arbitral mixte gréco-
allemand établi en vertu de l’article304 figurant à la Partie X du Traité de Versailles (entre la Grèce et la République
fédérale d’Allemagne), RSANU, vol. XIX, p. 64. - 64 -
17. Ceci ressortait on ne peut plus clairement de la position très solennellement prise par la
Grèce dans le cadre des discussions qui ont condu it à l’admission de l’ex-République yougoslave
de Macédoine aux Nations Unies et qui sont à l’origine du compromis qui a permis de débloquer la
situation, et de l’article 5 de l’accord intérimaire :
«les trois aspects principaux de cette résolution, à savoir le règlement de la divergence
dont fait l’objet le nom de l’Etat demandeur , l’adoption de mesures de confiance
voulues et la procédure d’admission du nouvel Etat à l’Organisation des Nations Unies
sous un nom provisoire, forment un ensemble intégré et indivisible, seul susceptible de
résoudre les litiges existant encore entre la Grèce et la nouvelle République» 104.
18. C’est sur cette base ⎯ et parce qu’il était entendu que l’ARYM acceptait cette condition
reprise dans la résolution817(1993) ⎯ que celle-ci a été admise aux NationsUnies. C’est sur
cette base que l’accord intérimaire de 1995 a été conclu et c’est sur cette base que son article 5 a été
rédigé.
[Fin de la projection nº 3.]
B. L’ARYM a vidé l’article 5 de toute substance
19. L’ARYM s’est employée à vider cette obligation, pourtant clairement définie, de toute
substance. Elle l’a fait principalement de deux manières :
⎯ d’une part, en redéfinissant unilatéralement l’objet même de la négociation ;
⎯ d’autre part, en s’efforçan t de créer un fait accompli donnant l’impression que toute
négociation serait superflue.
a) La redéfinition unilatérale par l’ARYM de l’objet de la négociation
20. Le premier stratagème utilisé par l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de Macédoine pour vider
son obligation de négociation de toute portée a consisté à inventer un objet de négociation ne
correspondant nullement à ce qui avait été convenu tant lors de son admission aux NationsUnies
que dans l’accord intérimaire. Cette «trouvaille» est couramment appelée la «formule double»
(«the dual formula») ; elle consiste à considérer que le seul objet des négociations porte sur le nom
qui s’appliquerait dans les seuls rapports bilatéra ux entre les Parties à l’exclusion de tout autre
104Lettre du 6 avril 1993 adressée au président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de la Grèce
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, document des Nations Unies S/25543 ; les italiques sont de nous. Voir aussi
le mémorandum transmis au Conseil de sécurité par la Grèce: A/47/877-S/25158, 25 janvier 1993 ; les italiques sont de
nous ; version anglaise dans le contre-mémoire, annexe 146. - 65 -
usage dans les relations internationales et, a fortiori, dans l’ordre juridique national de l’ARYM.
Ceci est, à l’évidence, incompatible avec les engagements pris en 1993 et en 1995.
[Projection n 4 ⎯ Déclaration du premier ministre.]
21. Et pourtant, Monsieur le président, telle est la position, obstinément constante et
cyniquement assumée, adoptée par le demandeur. C’est celle qu’a affichée en 1997 le président de
105 106 107
l’ARYM de l’époque, M.Gligorov , et qui a été réitérée en 1998 et en 2002 par ses
ministres des affaires étrangères successifs et en 2007, en pleine discussion préalable au sommet de
l’OTAN, par la voix de son premier ministre qui a écarté d’un revers de la main toute proposition
du médiateur qui proposerait un nom différent pour son Etat de celui qu’il avait choisi et sur lequel
il s’était pourtant engagé à négocier :
«there is one point, which definitely we cannot accept ⎯the one that says that the
Republic of Macedonia should accept a name different from its constitutional one for
international use. This provision of the document is unacceptable for the Republic of
Macedonia and we cannot discuss it. Hence it m108be considered that the Macedonian
Government is rejecting this provision.» (2 novembre 2007)
M. Gruevski ne pouvait mieux résumer la position ⎯ parfaitement constante ⎯ de l’ARYM dans
les «négociations» (mais il faut assortir le mot de guillemets…): «nous voulons bien «négocier»
[traduisez: nous asseoir à une table de négocia tion pour «faire comme si» l’on négociait»], à
condition de ne pas envisager un quelconque chan gement du nom qui est précisément l’objet
convenu de la négociation à laquelle nous nous sommes engagés…».
22. Et ce n’est pas parce que le demandeur se targue d’avoir accepté une des propositions du
médiateur à la veille du sommet de l’OTAN, en mars 2008 109 ⎯ ce qu’il n’a d’ailleurs pas fait ⎯
qu’il peut convaincre qu’il a négoc ié de bonne foi. Skopje s’est toujours efforcée d’entretenir la
confusion sur la réalité et l’étendue de ses soi-di sant acceptations ; ainsi, s’agissant de celle que le
105«Kiro Gligorov: The Neighbour» o Vima, 29.6.1997, cité dans Aristotle Tziampiris, «The Name Dispute in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia After the Signing of the Interim accord» in Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy
Symbiosis, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, 2005, p.234 (disponible:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=…-
8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=13760).
106Idem, p. 234-235.
107Idem, p. 248-249.
108«Prime Minister Gruevski’s Statement on Nimetz ’s Draft-Framework of Understanding» Macedonian
Information Agency, dated 2 November 2007, disponible : http://www.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?vId+29113595&lId=2 ,
visited on 16 November 2009 ; contre-mémoire, annexe 128.
109Réplique, par. 2.63-2.64 ou 5.87 ; CR 2011/5 (Miloshoski), p. 19, par. 10. - 66 -
demandeur aurait donnée en 2008, la cacophonie règne toujours aujourd’hui au plus haut sommet
de l’Etat : ainsi dans une lettre adressée au Secrét aire général des Nations Unies en février 2011, le
ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Miloshoski écrivait :
«Au cours de ces négociations, la République de Macédoine [sic] a accepté des
propositions formulées par M.Nimetz qui serviraient de point de départ à un
règlement, y compris celle de mars 2008 (« République de Mac110ine(Skopje)») que
la République hellénique a malheureusement rejetée» .
Suite à cette lettre, le premier ministre Gruevski a aussitôt tenu à faire une mise au point, en
précisant que: «In 2008, even before Bucharest, we did not accept the name’s amending, but for
the Nimetz proposal to be put on referendum» (ces deux déclarations figurent à l’onglet n o 19 du
dossier des juges). Il est clair que cette «concession» de pure façade, que le demandeur tente
aujourd’hui de parer des vertus de la bonne fo i, n’a été faite que pour conforter sa position à
Bucarest. Du reste, début mars 2008, Skopje main tenait que toute concession de sa part ne pouvait
se faire que dans le cadre de la formule double et que son négociateur, l’ambassadeur
NikolaDimitrov, présentait cette formule co mme «une ligne rouge que nous ne pouvons
dépasser»: «Skopje insists on using its constitutional name «Republic of Macedonia» on the
international stage and agreed to adopt a mutua lly acceptable name strictly for relations with
Greece.» 111
23. Vous ne devez pas vous y tromper, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges : qu’il s’agisse du
premier ministre Gruevski ou de l’ambassadeur Dimitrov, nous ne sommes pas en présence
d’écarts de langage dus à l’inadvertance ou inspirés par des considérations politiques
conjoncturelles, mais bien de l’expression délibérée d’une stratégie soigneusement murie.
[Fin de la projection n o4. Projection n 5 ⎯ Discours du président Crvenkovski.]
Comme l’a admis le président de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine lui-même, dans
un discours au Parlement de ce pays 112, que MmeTelalian, M.Reisman et M.Crawford, il ya
quelques instants encore, ont déjà cité, mais qui est suffisamment important pour que j’y revienne
110Lettre datée du 15février2011, adressée au Secrét aire général par le représentant permanent de
l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès des l’Organisation des NationsUnies, document des NationsUnies
A/65/735–S/2011/76, p. 3.
111«NATO Urges Macedonia Solution», Balkan Insight.com (3 March 2008) ; réplique, annexe 98.
112Stenography Notes from the 7 tSequel of the 27thSession of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia,
held on 3 November 2008 ; contre-mémoire, annexe 104, p. 1. - 67 -
trois minutes, il s’est agi là d’une stratégie systématique revenant à s’arc-bouter sur la double
formule ⎯ ce qui revient, en réalité, à vider les négociations de toute substance. Ce que, du reste,
le presidentCrvenkovski a reconnu non sans quelque cynisme: «that position is considered by
everyone…as a means for repealing the negotiati ons, or at least freezing them for a longer
period» 113. L’aveu, Monsieur le président, se su ffit à lui-même sans qu’il soit nécessaire
d’épiloguer et établit à suffisance que le demandeur n’a pas respecté
l’obligation de négocier de
bonne foi que lui imposent l’article 5 de l’accord intérimaire et les résolutions 817 et 845 (1993) du
Conseil de sécurité auxquelles cette disposition renvoie. Et j’aurais pu parler de double aveu car il
est frappant qu’à aucun moment durant les plaidoiries orales les avocats du demandeur n’ont fait la
moindre allusion à cette question de la formul e double, pourtant largement analysée dans nos
écritures 114. Il y a des silences éloquents et qui sonnent comme des confessions ou des non
possumus…
[Fin de la projection n o 5.]
b) La poursuite du «fait accompli»
24. Mais il y a autre chose, Monsieur le président. Dans ce même discours au Parlement du
3 novembre 2008 ⎯ le président Crvenkovski a ajouté que la stratégie de l’ARYM comportait un
second volet consistant :
«to work simultaneously on constant increase of the number of countries which
recognize our constitutional name and thus strengthen our proper political capital in
international field which will be needed for the next phases of the process.
115
It must be stated that in this field we were exceptionally successful.»
25. Ce «triomphalisme» n’est pas totalement infondé puisque, à l’instigation insistante de
l’ARYM, un grand nombre d’Etats se sont en effet laissé convaincre de reconnaître celle-ci sous le
113 th th
Stenography Notes from the 7 Sequel of the 27 Session of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia,
held on 3 November 2008; contre-mémoire, annexe 104, p.5. Voir aussi Annual Address of Branko Crvenkovski,
President of the FYROM in Parliament, Stenography Notes from the 37 thSession of the Parliame nt of the Republic of
Macedonia, held on 18 December 2008 ; contre-mémoire, annexe 105, p. 4.
114
Voir duplique, p. 167-173, par. 7.54-7.63.
115 Stenography notes from the 7th sequel of the 27th se ssion of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia ,
held on 3 November 2008 (emphasis adde d), p.27-7/10 and 27-7/ 11; contre-mémoire, annexe 104. Voir aussi
Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the FYRO M, Verbal Note of the Permanent Mission of the FYROM to
the UnitedNations, addressed to all Permanent Missions to the United Na tions, No. 63/2005, dated 15 Apr 2005 ;
duplique, annexe 21. - 68 -
nom qu’elle revendique. Mais, comme juristes ⎯et nous sommes tous(et ne pouvons être que)
juristes dans cette enceinte dédiée à Thémis… ⎯ comme juristes donc, nous ne pouvons que nous
poser une question : «Et alors ?». Et alors ? ... Rien ! Les Etats qui ont jugé bon de reconnaître le
demandeur sous ce nom ne sont pas liés par l’accord intérimaire ⎯le demandeur est lié par
l’accord intérimaire. En cédant aux sollicitations de l’ARYM ⎯ ce que la Grèce regrette, ces Etats
n’ont pas manqué à une obligation leur incombant. En menant cette politique systématique de
sollicitations, et en s’efforçant de créer ainsi, non sans cynisme, un fait accompli, le demandeur,
lui, a violé son obligation de négocier de bonne foi.
26. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, vous ne sauriez accepter d’être placés ainsi devant un
tel fait accompli et admettre que, «par des moyens détournés», l’ARYM réussisse «à éluder les
obligations» (Oscar Chinn, arrêt, 1934, C.P.J.I. série A/B n o 63, p. 86) que lui imposent l’article 5
de l’accord intérimaire et les résolutions 817 et 845 (1993). Ces obligations ne sont pas modifiées
par les tentatives du demandeur visant à les redéfinir unilatéralement en les limitant à la «formule
double» qu’il prétend imposer, et que ni la Grèce, ni le médiateur des Nations Unies n’ont jamais
acceptée. Elles ne sont pas rendues obsolètes par le fait accompli politique que l’ARYM tente de
créer mais qui demeure sans incidence juridique. En ne respectant pas ces obligations, celle-ci a
manqué gravement à l’une des obligations qui cons tituent la contrepartie la plus essentielle de
l’engagement pris par la Grèce de ne pas s’oppo ser à la demande d’admission de l’Etat demandeur
dans des organisations dont elle est membre ⎯ un engagement dont le professeur Bastid-Burdeau a
souligné avec raison qu’il n’était «pas courant et peut-être même sans précédent» 116.
o
[Projection n 6 ⎯ Article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire.]
II. Les violations de l’article 11 de l’accord intérimaire
27. Monsieur le président, cet engagement, qui figure dans l’article11, paragraphe1, de
l’accord intérimaire constitue, avec la reconnai ssance de l’ARYM, l’une des concessions majeures
consenties par la Grèce en faveur de la «seconde Partie». Mais il était évidemment conditionné au
respect par celle-ci de ses propres obligations conventionnelles ⎯à la fois, celles découlant de
116CR 2011/7, p. 32, par. 19 (Bastid-Burdeau). - 69 -
l’accord de1995 dans son ensemble et celle figurant plus précisément dans l’article11 lui-même,
qui comporte sa propre clause de sauvegarde :
«however, the Party of the First Part [Greece] reserves the right to object to any
membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part [the
FYROM] is to be referred to in such orga nization or institution differently than in
paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993)».
28. Mes collègues MichaelReisman, hier, et JamesCrawford, ce matin, ont déjà consacré
une partie de leurs interventions à analyser mi nutieusement le contenu et la portée de cette
disposition. Je m’en voudrais de répéter ⎯ inévitablement moins bien ⎯ ce qu’ils ont dit. Qu’il
me suffise de résumer pour les besoins de ma présentation :
1) le droit dont se prévaut le demandeur n’est pas inconditionnel: il est subordonné à une
appellation particulière au sein de l’organisation dans laquelle il aspire à être admis ;
2) il résulte de la résolution 817 (1993) du Con seil de sécurité, à laquelle renvoie l’article 11, que
ce nom est celui d’«ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine» ;
3) ceci, «à toutes fins utiles à l’organisation»(c ’est plus clair en anglais: «for all purposes»
⎯mais, d’une façon générale, la traduction française effectuée par les NationsUnies est
étrange ⎯ pour le dire poliment !) ; et
4) cela s’applique «en attendant que soit réglée la divergence qui a surgi au sujet du nom» de la
«seconde Partie» ⎯divergence qui, nous le savons, n’est toujours pas réglée du fait de
l’obstruction à laquelle se livre le demandeur ; et,
5) il va de soi que cette appréciation doit être faite ex ante : une fois l’admission acquise, elle est
irréversible.
[Fin de la projection n 6.]
29. La litanie des violations par l’ARYM de cette disposition ainsi définie est longue ⎯ elles
sont systématiques, massives et délibérées. J’en retiens deux exemples, significatifs car ils
montrent que, pour atteindre ses buts, le demande ur n’hésite pas à abuser des fonctions qu’il
occupe dans ces organisations. Ainsi, en septemb re 2007, M. Kerim, l’ambassadeur de l’ARYM à
l’ONU, qui avait été élu président de la soixante-deuxièmesession de l’Assemblée générale, a
ouvertement ignoré les obligations qui lui incombaien t à la fois comme représentant de son pays et
comme organe des NationsUnies, en introduisant et présentant obstinément le président - 70 -
117
Crvenkovski comme «président de la République de Macédoine» . Il en fut de même au sein du
Conseil de l’Europe: l’ARYM y a exploité sa présidence du comité des ministres pour imposer,
118
dans cette enceinte aussi, l’usage du nom contesté .
30. Le demandeur se prévaut de sa propre prati que dans les organisations dans lesquelles il a
été admis grâce à la non-objection du défendeur : «the Applicant has always used its constitutional
name in written and oral communications with th e United Nations, its members and officials : and
the same has been the case in all other international organizations» 119.
31. Mais cette pratique ⎯qui émane du demandeur lui-même ⎯ n’a en aucune manière le
sens que celui-ci lui prête : loin d’établir l’existence d’une préte ndue «exception» en sa faveur à la
règle posée par la deuxième phrase du paragraphe premier de l’article11 de l’accord intérimaire,
son énoncé constitue un aveu, une «admission agai nst interest». Il montre que l’ARYM a
constamment violé son engagement, résultant de cette disposition et des résolutions l’admettant
dans les organisations en question, de ne pas s’a ppeler, ni se faire appeler, autrement que par son
nom provisoire au sein de celles-ci. De même, le demandeur ne saurait s’abriter derrière le
memorandum du 13septembre1995 sur les «mesures pratiques» liées à l’accord intérimaire 120 :
d’abord, il ne concerne pas l’ attitude à suivre au sein des organisations internationales dont
l’ARYM est membre ; ensuite, il n’en résulte nu llement que celle-ci puisse s’autodésigner par son
nom proclamé : il y est au contraire prévu que, si cela advient, la Grèce n’y donnera suite qu’une
fois que le nom résultant de la résolution 817 (1993) lui aura été surimposé 121.
32. Ces précédents, malheureusement nombreux et concordants, établissent surabondamment
que la Grèce et les autres Etats membres de l’OTAN avaient ⎯ et ont toujours ⎯ d’amples motifs
à penser que l’invitation adressée au demandeur de joindre l’Alliance produirait inévitablement les
mêmes effets: une fois admise, l’ARYM s’empresserait de faire fi de ses engagements et
d’imposer à nouveau le fait accompli de sa présence en se prévalant du nom dont elle se refuse à
117
Voir contre-mémoire, p. 61, par. 4.67, ou duplique, p. 150-151, par. 7.28-7.29.
118
Duplique, p. 157-158, par. 7.37.
119CR 2011/5, p. 26, par. 9 (Sands) ; les italiques sont de nous ; voir aussi ibid., p. 21, par. 16 (Miloshoski), p. 41,
par. 13 (Murphy) ; CR 2011/6, p. 39, par. 59 et p. 41, par. 64 (Murphy) ou réplique, par. 4.61.
120Mémoire, vol. III, annexe 3 ; voir CR 2011/5, p. 21, par. 16 (Miloshoski) ou ibid., p. 28, par. 11 (Sands).
121Voir notamment le contre-mémoire de la Grèce, p. 27-28, par. 3.31-3.37. - 71 -
négocier de bonne foi le changement en dépit des obligations résultant de l’accord intérimaire et de
la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité.
33. Le professeur Murphy s’est demandé qua nd le défendeur a décidé de se rallier au
consensus de Bucarest. Il présente les choses autrem ent, mais à tort : il n’y a pas de droit de veto
122
au sein de l’OTAN ⎯ il en convient ; et il est tout de même extraordinaire de prétendre que le
défendeur a refusé de participer au consensus ⎯«the Respondent refused to join [the]
123
consensus» ⎯ alors qu’il s’y est complètement rallié ! Mais notre contradicteur a raison de dire
124
que «[t]he evidence does not pinpoint with laser precision the exact moment when» this occurred
⎯car je pense qu’il n’y a pas de moment précis. Simplement, petit à petit, la Grèce a pris
conscience que l’obstination de l’ARYM à ne pas r especter l’article 11 sur l’utilisation de son nom
agréé au sein des organisations internationales dont elle était devenue membre, son refus de
négocier de bonne foi, sa persévérance dans la volonté de créer un fait accompli, éloignaient un peu
plus chaque jour la perspective d’un règlement du différend sur le nom du demandeur, et ont fini
par avoir raison de la longue patience du défendeur. Du même coup, les références à
l’avant-accord intérimaire ou à la période qui a immédiatement suivi sa conclusion n’ont pas grand
sens 125: qu’il s’agisse de l’avis n 6 de la commission Badinter, de l’admission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine (sous cette appellation) aux Nations Unies, au Conseil de l’Europe ou à
l’OSCE, tout cela s’est produit lorsque tout donnait à penser que le demandeur se plierait aux
injonctions du Conseil de sécurité et respecterait ses engagements en vertu de l’accord. On ne peut
plus, aujourd’hui, le penser raisonnablement.
34. Monsieur le président, «[ l]’un des principes de base qui président à la création et à
l’exécution d’obligations juridiques, quelle qu’en soit la source, est celui de la bonne foi. La
confiance réciproque est une condition inhérent e de la coopération internationale.» ( Essais
nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c.France), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1974 , p.473, par.49.) La Grèce
n’est pas convaincue que l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine ait fait siens ces sages
122Voir CR 2011/6, p. 26, par. 18 (Murphy).
123
Ibid.
124CR 2011/5, p. 43, par. 19 (Murphy).
125Voir CR 2011/6, p. 46-47, par. 79-80. - 72 -
principes. Son attitude remet complètement en cau se l’équilibre entre les obligations des Parties
que réalise l’accord intérimaire, dont le professeur Abi-Saab a décrit le caractère fondamentalement
synallagmatique ⎯ j’y reviendrai tout à l’heure.
Auparavant, Monsieur le président, si vous le voulez bien, MmeTelalian présentera à la
reprise de l’audience cet après-midi les autres violations de l’accord intérimaire commises par le
demandeur. Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie vivement de l’attention que vous
m’avez prêtée et je vous souhaite un très bon appétit.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Alain Pellet for his statement. Greece will conclude
this round of oral argument at th is afternoon’s sitting from 3 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. The Court is
adjourned.
The Court rose at 1.00 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 25 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)