Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2012135*
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2012
Public sitting
held on Friday 14 December 2012, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the caseoncerning theMaritime Dispute
(Peru v. Chile)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNÉE2012
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 14 décembre2012, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidencede. Tomka, président,
en l'affaire duifférendmaritime
(Pérouc. Chili)
COMPTE RENDU
'Reissued for technical reasons. -2-
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepulveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia
Registrar Couvreur - 3 -
Présents: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepùlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
MmesXue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M; Bhandari, juges
MM. Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier -4-
The Government of the Republic of Peru is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Allan Wagner, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Minister of
Defence, former Secretary-General of the Andean Community, Ambassador of Peru to the
Kingdomof the Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Rafael Roncagliolo, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Special Envoy;
H.E. Mr. José AntonioGarcia Belaunde, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Jorge Chavez Soto, Ambassador, memberPeruvian Delegation to the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Eversheds
LLP, Paris,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate membernstitut de Droit International,
Mr. Alainellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairmanthe International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de
Droit International,
Mr.Tullio Treves, Professorat the Faculty of Law, State University of Milan, former judge of the
International Tribunal for the Lawa, Senior Consultant, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt
and Mosle, Milan,
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
as Counsel and Advocates;
·=····=~=• Mr=~•E=:<:.ïi.lardo•Ferrero;•=m.em.I>er=ort11e~Per maeTïeiïFe·•~.-==
~ ~ ----~------ffairs;~member-ofthe~Peruvian~Delegatioirto~theThird~tJN~eonference~oiTthe-I:;aw~ofthe~sea;--~--~----~-·-·
Mr. Vicente Ugarte del Pino, former President of the Supreme Court of Justice, former President of
the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, former Dean of the Lima Bar Association,
Mr. Roberto Mac Lean, former judge Supreme Court of Justice, former member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
H.E. Mr. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
AmbassadorfPeru to Unesco,
as State Advocates; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Pérouest représentépar:
S. Exc. M. Allan Wagner, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures, ancien ministre
de la défense, ancien secrétaire généralde la Communauté andine, ambassadeur du Pérou
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rafael Roncagliolo, ministre des relations extérieures,
comme envoyéspécial;
S. Exc. M. JoséAntonio Garcia Belaunde, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
S. Exc. M. Jorge Châvez Soto, ambassadeur, membre de la délégation péruvienne à la
troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieures sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associéde l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Tullio Treves, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'Université de Milan, ancien juge du Tribunal
international du droit de la mer, conseiller principal, cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt et
Mosle, Milan,
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G, membre du barreau d'Angleterre, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Eduardo Ferrero, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, ancien ministre des relations
extérieures, membre de la délégationpéruvienne à la troisième conférence des Nations Unies
sur le droit de la mer,
M. Juan Vicente Ugarte del Pino, ancien présidentde la Cour suprêmede justice, ancien président
de la Cour de justice de la Communauté andine, ancien bâtonnier, barreau de Lima,
M. Roberto Mac Lean, ancien juge de la Cour suprêmede justice, ancien membre de la Cour
permanente d'arbitrage,
S. Exc. M. Manuel Rodrfguez Cuadros, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
ambassadeur du Pérouauprès de l'Unesco,
comme avocats de l'Etat; - 6-
Minister-Counsellor Marisol Agüero Colunga, LL.M., former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs on Law of the Sea Matters, Co-ordinator of the Peruvian Delegation,
H.E. Mr. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, Ambassador, Adviser ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
Mr. Juan JoséRuda, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Legal Adviser ofthe Ministry
ofForeign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., New York University School of Law,
as Assistant Counsel;
Mr. Carlos Enrique Gamarra, Vice Admirai (retired), Hydrographer, Adviser to the Office for Law
ofthe Sea ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Special Adviser;
Mr. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
H Mr. Alejandro Deustuaa, M.A., Advisory Office for the Law ofthe Sea ofthe Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Jaime Valdez, Lieutenant Commander (retired), National Cartographer of the Peruvian
Delegation,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Mr. Paul Duclos, Minister-Counsellor, LL.M., M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,.
Mr. Alfredo Fortes, Counsellor, LL.M., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. JoséAntonio Torrico, Counsellor, M.A., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. CésarTalavera, First Secretary, M.Sc., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
as Advisers; - 7 -
Mme Marisol Agüero Colunga, LL.M., ministre-conseiller et ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieures sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer, coordonnateur de la
délégationpéruvienne,
S. Exc. M. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, ambassadeur, conseiller du ministère des relations
extérieuressur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
M. Juan JoséRuda, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, conseiller juridique du ministère
des relations extérieures,
comme conseils ;
M. Benjamin Samson, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., facultéde droit de l'Universitéde New York,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Le vice-amiral (en retraite) Carlos Enrique Gamarra, hydrographe, conseiller auprès du bureau du
droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
comme conseiller spécial;
M. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Alejandro Deustua, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des relations
extérieures,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
Le capitaine de corvette (en retraite) Jaime Valdez, cartographe de la délégationpéruvienne,
Le capitaine de vaisseau (en retraite) Aquiles Carcovich, cartographe,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Paul Duclos, ministre-conseiller, LL.M., M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des
relations extérieures,
M. Alfredo Fortes, conseiller, LL.M., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. JoséAntonio Torrico, conseiller, M.A., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. CésarTalavera, premier secrétaire,M.Sc., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ; - 8 -
Ms Evelyn Campos Sanchez, Embassy of Peru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ph.D. candidate, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam,
Ms Charis Tan, Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore, member of the New York Bar, Solicitor,
England and Wales, Eversheds LLP,
Mr. Raymundo Tullio Treves, Ph.D. candidate, Max Planck Research School for Successful
Disputes Settlement, Heidelberg,
as Assistants.
The Government ofthe Republic ofChile is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Albert van Klaveren Stark, Ambassador, former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professorat the University of Chile,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Alfredo Moreno Charme, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile,
as National Authority;
H.E. Mr. Juan Martabit Scaff, Ambassador ofChile to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
H.E. Ms Marià Teresa Infante Caffi, National Director ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Professorat the University ofChile, member of the Institut de droit international,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and
Development, Geneva, and at the University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Jan Paulsson, President of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, President of
the Administrative Tribunal of the OECD, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
Mr. Luigi Condàrelli, Professor oflnternational Law, University of Florence,
Mr. Georgios Petrochilos, Avocat à la Cour and Advocate of the Greek Supreme Court, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,
Mr. Claudio Grossman, Dean, R. Geraldson Professor of International Law, American University,
Washington College of Law,
as Counsel and Advocates; - 9-
Mme Evelyn Campos Sanchez, ambassade du Pérou au Royaume des Pays-Bas, doctorant à
l'Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universitéd'Amsterdam,
Mme Charis Tan, avocat et solicitor (Singapour), membre du barreau de New York, solicitor
(Angleterre et Pays de Galle), cabinet Eversheds LLP,
M. Raymundo Tullio Treves, doctorant à l'International Max Planck Research School, section
spécialiséedans le règlement des différends internationaux, Heidelberg,
comme assistants.
Le Gouvernement de la Républiquedu Chili est représenté par:
S. Exc. M. Albert van Klaveren Stark, ambassadeur, ancien vice-ministre des relations extérieures,
ministère des relations extérieures, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Alfredo Moreno Charme, ministre des relations extérieures du Chili,
comme membre du Gouvernement ;
S. Exc. M. Juan Martabit Scaff, ambassadeur du Chili auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. Mme Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, directeur national, frontières et limites, ministère des
relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili, membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
comme coagents ;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du
développement de Genève et à l'Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de l'Institut de
droit international,
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Ihstitut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers,
M. Jan Paulsson, président du Conseil international pour l'arbitrage commercial, président du
Tribunal administratif de l'OCDE, cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. David A. Colson, avocat, cabinet Patton Boggs LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de l'Etat de Californie et du district de Columbia,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Florence,
M. Georgios Petrochilos, avocat à la Cour et à la Cour suprême grecque, cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d'Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
M. Claudio Grossman, doyen, professeur titulaire de la Chaire R. Geraldson, American University,
facultéde droit de Washington,
comme conseils et avocats ; - 10-
H.E. Mr. Hernan Salinas, Ambassador, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professor,
Catholic University ofChile,
H.E. Mr. Luis Winter, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Enrique Barras Bourie, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Julio Faundez, Professor, University of Warwick,
Ms Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Andres Jana, Professor, University ofChile,
Ms Mariana Durney, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. John Ranson, Legal Officer, Professor oflnternational Law, Chilean Navy,
Mr. Ben Juratowitch, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Motohiro Maeda, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Special Adviser, Sovereign Geographie, member of the North Carolina
Bar,
H.E. Mr. Luis Goycoolea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Antonio Correa Olbrich, Counsellor, Embassy ofChile in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, Second Secretary, Embassy of Chile in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted England and Wales and in Queensland, Australia,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore, Maryland, member of the Bars
ofVirginia and the District Columbia,
· ----·--- ·~-sA lexandra van-derMeulen,A voGat-à-la-Gourand-member-of-the-Bar-oftheState of-New-York,---- ······ --
Mr. Francisco Abriani, member of the Buenos Aires Bar,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor oflnternational Law, University ofMacerata,
as Advisers;
Mr. Julio Poblete, National Division ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Fiona Bloor, United Kingdom Hydrographie Office,
Mr. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd.,
as Technical Advisers. - 11 -
S. Exc. M. Hernan Salinas, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
professeur à l'Universitécatholique du Chili,
S. Exc. M. Luis Winter, ambassadeur, ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Enrique Barros Bourie, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Julio Fa(mdez, professeur à l'Universitéde Warwick,
Mme Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Andres Jana, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
Mme Mariana Durney, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
M. John Ranson, conseiller juridique, professeur de droit international, marine chilienne,
M. Ben Juratowitch, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Motohiro Maeda, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, conseiller spécial, Sovereign Geographie, membre du barreau de Caroline
du Nord,
S. Exc. M. Luis Goycoolea, ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Antonio Correa Olbrich, conseiller à l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, deuxième secrétaire de l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland (Australie)),
Mme Nienke Grossman, professeur adjoint à l'Université de Baltimore, Maryland, membre des
barreaux de l'Etat de Virginie et du district de Columbia,
Mme Alexandra van der Meulen, avocat à la Cour et membre du barreau de l'Etat de New York,
M. Francisco Abriani, membre du barreau de Buenos Aires,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associéde droit international à l'Universitéde Macerata,
comme conseillers ;
M. Julio Poblete, division nationale des frontières et des limites, ministère des relations extérieures,
Mme Fiona Bloor, services hydrographiques du Royaume-Uni,
M. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd,
comme conseillers techniques. - 12-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good morning. The sitting is open. The Court meets
this morning to hear Chile begin the presentation of its second round of oral argument. I shall now
give the floor to Professor James Crawford. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT: REBUTTAL
1.Introduction
1.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, history happens forwards. History happens
day-by-day. As the English poet Philip Larkin asked:
"Where can we live but days?
Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats 1
Running over the fields."
1.2. In this case, by contrast, Peru sees history entirely backwards. The equidistance line,
introduced to international law by Commander Kennedy in 1954, is seen as already "intuitive"
in 1952: Professor Lowe's entire presentation on Tuesday proceeded on a presumption of an
equidistance entitlement that was entirely anachronistic. The now-standard three-part delimitation
process is applied retrospectively, whereas you started on that long journey in 1969.
The 1954 Agreement on a Special Maritime Frontier Zone was said to be a "provisional
arrangement of a practical nature" within the meaning of UNCLOS Article 74 (4) again applyi,g
-----------~----~---··
2. The 1947 Proclamations
2.1. I start with the transactions of 1947-1954, and within that the 1947 Proclamations. The
1947 Proclamations provide the circumstances in which the Santiago Declaration was concluded
3
and constitute its essential background. The Santiago Declaration aimed at their "legalization" •
1Phillip Larkin, "Days", Collected Poems (1988) 67, cited in J. Crawf&rdT. Viles, "International Law on a
Given Day" in J. Crawford,International Law as an Open System. Selected Ess2002, p. 69.
2See, e.g., CR 2012/28, p. 29, paraIl (Wood); CR 2012/29, p. 20, para. 17 (Lowe); CR 2012/33, p. 27,
para. 109(Lowe), and p. 28, para. 112(Lowe).
3CMC, Vol. IIAnn. 59, p. 487. - 13-
2.2. The Chilean Proclamation was not as clear as the Peruvian on the method of measuring
the 200-mile seaward projection. It referred to the "mathematical parallel". The same term was
used in the Chilean draft of Article IV, but was replaced by a reference to the geographical parallel.
4
2.3. Peru's Supreme Decree of 1947 came second. Its method of projection was crystal
clear. Peru has not said much about it, but it has said enough for the Court to know how it worked
and that that is common ground. The significahce of the method of projection- a tracéparallèle
constructed using parallels of latitude- is that Peru had no claim south ofthe parallel ofthe point
where its land boundary with Chile reached the sea, white Chile claimed up to that same parallel.
There was no gap, no overlap, and Peru does not suggest the contrary. Nor did Peru's Petroleum
Law of 1952 change the position asto laterallimits, as Mr. Colson will show you.
2.4. Peru attempts to superimpose the common approach between Chile and Peru to the
~ H different geographical circumstanceslbetv.'eeRthe Argentina-Chile boundary. [Graphie] No one in
the 1952 negotiations raised that point. The focus was on the parties to the Declaration.
2.5. In any event, Peru's remarks on the application of the 1947 Declaration to Chile's
southern coast near Argentina ignore the presence of islands there. Chile's Declaration specifically
claimed a 200-mile radial maritime zone for ali its islands. You can see from tab 122 [graphie],
how islands affected Chile's maritime projection in the south, as delimited by agreement in 1984
[graphie], leaving a largeAlta Mar to Chile's detriment. [End graphie]
2.6. What matters for this case is that Peru and Chile proceeded on the common basis that
their 1947 Proclamations gave them abutting 200-mile maritime projections, with no overlap.
2.7. [Start text slide] Professor Lowe then turned to paragraph 3 ofthe Declaration (tab 123).
He characterized it as establishing a "whaling and deep sea fishery" zone 5• True, it starts by saying
that "protection zones for whaling and deep sea fishery" will be established. It adds "by virure of
6
this declaration of sovereignty" •
2.8. The next sentence is not concerned just with whaling or fishing either. It says, in full,
"Protection and control is hereby declared immediately over all the seas contained within the
4
MP, Vol. II, Ann.6, p. 26.
5
CR 2012133,p. 23, para. 83 (Lowe).
6MP, Vol. II,Ann. 27, p.131, para. 3. - 14-
perimeter formed by the coast and the mathematical parallel projected into the seas at a distance of
7
200 nautical miles from the coasts of Chilean territory." [End text slide]
3. The 1952 and 1954 Agreements
(a) 1952
3.1. I turn to the 1952 and 1954 Agreements. I am going to deal first and separately with
1952 and 1954, and then with the relation between them. Peru considers that the lateral limits of
each State's maritime entitlements were not even discussed at Santiago. In effect, it says that the
parties had exclusive zones of sovereignty but without lateral boundaries and therefore without a
perimeter. "Perimeter" was one other term that Peru failed to confront on Tuesday: it used the
word only once, without comment, in a quotation from a Chilean document 8•
3.2. Peru does say that Article IV of the Santiago Declaration limited the maritime projection
of islands at the parallel of the point where the land boundary of the States concerned reached the
sea. So, on Peru's own case this "whaling conference" reached agreement on !ines in the sea
laterally limiting maritime spaces, at !east to sorne extent. But that "sorne extent" destroys
Professor Lowe's beautifully presented rhetorical house of cards.
3.3. So there are only two questions left. First, were these !ines in the sea adopted in order to
protect the insular projection of the Galapagos Islands from the "intuitive" equidistance line, as
Peru announced for the first time on Tuesday 9,at the last possible moment in a case which has
lasted five years? Or were these !ines in the sea maritime boundaries, as Chile has consistently
3.4. The second question is whether Article IV was a declaration of policy about how future
delimitations should be made, as Peru says, or whether it actually effected those delimitations, as
we say.
3.5. That brings us to the ordinary meaning of Atiicle IV. In this regard, Professor Lowe
announced on Tuesday his conversion to the textual approach 10• True, he maintained that the
7
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 27, p. 131, para. 3; emphasis added.
8
CR 2012/33, p. 16, para. 32 (Lowe, quoting Chile's draft Art. III).
/bid.,para. 27 (Lowe).
1/bid.,p. 21, para. 69 (Lowe). - 15 -
object and purpose of the Santiago Conference was whaling- it was a "whaling conference" 11•
Professor Condorelli will deal further with that. But mainly, Professor Lowe favoured textual
interpretation- though when it came to 1954, it was textual interpretation in the absence of the
text!
3.6. Chile has consistently made the point that in order to know whether an island is within
200 miles of a neighbouring State's general maritime zone, it is necessary to know the whereabouts
of the general maritime zone. Professor Lowe did not even attempt an answer to that point.
Professor Pellet did. He invoked Descartes 12,saying that he was going to discredit my simplistic
logic. Descartes would have been disappointed with what followed. The point remained
unanswered. Indeed, it is unanswerable- you cannot tell whether point A is within 200 miles of
point B unless you know where both points are; but perhaps 1 am being insufficiently
Descartesian.
3.7. [Start slide: 1952 Minutes] The 1952 Minutes record that Article IV started life with
tl1reeparagraphs, within draft article III (tab 124) 13• This was its ftrst paragraph: "The zone
indicated comprises ali waters within the perimeter formed by the coasts of each country and a
mathematical parallel projected into the sea to 200 nautical miles away from the mainland, along
the coastal fringe." This reproduced the system of measurement used by Chile in its
1947 proclamation. Using that method, the "perimeters" of the maritime zones were delimited by
parallels of latitude.
3.8. The second paragraph of draft article III granted islands a 200-nautical-mile radial
projection.
3.9. The effect of the third paragraph was that if an island was Jessthan 200 miles from the
general maritime zone, as measured in the ftrst sentence- namely by a "mathematical parallel"-
then the insular zone was to stop when it reached the general maritime zone of the adjacent State.
3.1O.Now we come to the intervention of Mr. Fernandez, to which Professor Lowe referred
on Tuesday. Mr. Fernandez wished "to provide more clarity to Article 3, in order to avoid any
11
CR2012/33,p.14,para.14(Lowe); seea1soibid.,p.17,para.42(Lowe).
12CR 2012/34, p. 32, para. 29 (Pellet).
13MP, Vol. II,Ann. 56, p. 317. - 16-
error in the interpretation of the interferenHe had a specifiese of islands".
suggestion as to how to do this.t the declaration be drafted on the basis that the
boundaryne of the jurisdictional zone of each country be the respective parallel from the point at
which the frontiercountries touches or reaches the sea".
3.11. The delegates saw no ambiguity with respect to their general maritime zones. They
were to be within theer" formed by the mathematical parallel and the coast, joined by
reference lines that were parallels of latitude.
3.12. They sawbiguity with respect to islands further than 200 miles from the general
zonef the adjacent State. These were to have a full200-mile-radial projection.
3.13. The only need for further clarity was with respect to the overlap created
projectionsslands within 200 miles of the adThe suggestion that.
Mr. Fernandez made was that thish by ththe same that delimited
the general maritime zoneacent States. That was the "parallel from the point at which the
frontierthe countries concerned touches or reaches the sea". The Minutes record that: "Ali the
delegates werereement with that The Peruvian Chairman and the Chilean
delegate then redrafted the article.
[End text slide]
3.14. This took the form IV as we nonly too weil, you might think
(tab 125). [Text slide] The first paragraph, establishing that the general maritime
zones were measured, and given a perimeter, by the mathematical parallel, was deleted. But this
__-=-~_-_==r=~=1o<!f_f1Yf~a1ig~ie~~fQ-liemit~oi~~~i~et~Iemenf~ a§=-ta=kel
paragraph of the draft and added to the last sentence of the final text of what became Article IV.
That element was that the lateral component of the perimeter of the maritime zones, insular and
general, was parallel at the point at which the land frontier of the States concerned reaches the
sea". That was the maritime boundary, and that is why Article IV looks the way it does.
3.15. When the interpretationV was raised in Lima two years later, the Peruvian
delegate specifically referred to these Minutes tois of Article IV of Santiago
"the three countries consider the matter on the dividing tine of the jurisdictional waters resolved - 17-
and that said line is the parallel starting at the point at which the land frontier between both
14 15
countries reaches the sea"' • The 1954 Minutes record agreement on that too .
3.16. Peru made much of the point that Article II of Santiago refers to the 200-mile zones as
"a norm of their international maritime policy", suggesting that the word "policy" implies
16
equivocation or the absence of any rule on the matter • There are three points in response.
(a) First, the Declaration did reflect a "policy", a very deliberate and important one. It was a
policy of action. In this respect it was Iike the Truman Proclamation. The Truman
Proclamation declared the ''policy ofthe United States with respect to the natural resources of
the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf' 17• It was an immediately effective
international claim.
(b) Secondly, the Santiago Declaration declared a "norm" ofpolicy- in other words, a rule to be
followed.
(c) Thirdly, policy and law are not disjunctive, as this episode shows.
18
3.17. Peru says that the Declaration was de lege ferenda . That is no doubt true for third
States; sorne of them protested actively while others retained reservations about these questions.
But there are, again, three key points here.
(a) The first is that the zones proclaimed in 1952 are the zones that exist today. They have never
been withdrawn or abandoned. The parties maintained the zones, including their boundaries,
19
through the "long years" to which you referred in Romania v. Ukraine ,until they won general
acceptance for them. There was no discontinuity.
(b) The second point is that from the moment the Declaration was signed it was law for the parties;
it imposed obligations on them inter se and it is not contested by our colleagues opposite
that it was invalid.
1CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 38, pp. 3-4 (see tab 6 ofChile'sjudges' folder, day 1).
1/bid., Ann. 39, p. 10(see tab 7 ofChile'sjudges' folder, day 1).
16
CR 2012/33, p. 14, para. 14 (Lowe).
17
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 88, p. 407; emphasis added.
18
CR 2012/33, p. 53, para. 11 (Treves).
19
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 87, para. 70. - 18-
(c) Thirdly, Peru in particular actively enforced the zone as an existing entity. The Diez Canseco
20
fired 16 cannon shots at unarmed ChThe Onassis whaling fleet was
21
intercepwithin the zone, inarrested and fined •A Unitedion
States air force plane which bad not notified its overflight of the zone was fired at and a crew
memberilleSuch attacks were all apparently de lege ferenda! Peru used force and it did
soto defend its claim ofsovereignty.
3.18.lidArt. III] The Peruvian mantra is that the Santiago Declaration concerned only
whales, and maybe some fish.ough they think that ifthey say this enough times the Court
will be convinced not to read Article III126)."The exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over this maritime zone shall also encompass exclusive sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the seabed and the subsoilu's case, also the air space.
Theres no trace ofwhaling here, unless it concerns the elusive southern burrowing whale, balaena
cunicularia australis,ation to Peru's claim to sovereignty over air space, the even rarer
flying whale,na citivolus. [End slide]
3.19. This was a distance-based claim to the continental shelf. Peru just ignores
3.20. The Peruvian argument that the whole of the Santiago Declaration is just speculation
about something that may or may not happen in the future overlooks two further crucial points.
First, the Declaration gave treaty status to the claims made in 1947, and both
concerned the continental shelf to a distances as well as the waters above it.
Secondly, the Peruvian Petroleum Law of March 1952 applied to 200 miles of Peruvian continental
····-=-=-~-~==~nelf~:~:T~~~~! -~we!~~li~t~ra.~o~!~i_~c_f>~!~_~t
but it did not convert them into aspirational policy documents.
3.21. Mr. President, Memberst, on Tuesday we did not hear any meaningful
attempt to grapple with the actual agreements asm, but we did hear some
2
°CMC, Vol. Ip785; see ap557 and CCM, Volp1864-1865.15,
CMC, Vol. IVp986.. 163,
22
/biVol. V, pp374-275;ibiVol. IV, p1321-1322.
MP, Vol. Ip35, Art. 14 (4). - 19-
creative ideas, and we heard them for the first time 24. You will recall this extraordinary diagram.
[Graphie]
3.22. Peru's proposed interpretation of the treaty provision at the heart of this case changed
just three days ago, in their second round of oral argument. In a way that tells you all you need to
know.
3.23. Peru's new argument is rendered futile by its premises. Its first premise is that in 1952,
using equidistance tines to delimit the maritime zones was "intuitive" 25• That is wrong. Its second
premise is that in 1952 the parties to the Santiago Declaration were using arcs of circles to measure
the projection oftheir maritime claims. That is wrong too, as Mr. Colson will reiterate.
3.24. But let me accept those two premises for the sake of argument. Peru's new
hot:H. interpretation makes a mockery of Article IV. Article IV is clear that each State~a "general
ha. -\:m~>ritime zone" and that each '.'islandor group of islands" IRa4lits own "maritime zone". Until
Tuesday this was common ground. You will recall Peru's explanation in its written pleadings of
the maritime zones of Ecuador's islands in the Gulf of Guayaquil- the projection of which was
limited by the parallelof latitude of the point where the land boundary reaches the sea 2•
3.25. On Tuesday, Peru abandoned that idea and adopted instead an equidistance tine in the
Gulf of Guayaquil giving "full effect to islands". [Graphie] Full effect under modern delimitation
principles, placing base points on islands and creating a unified maritime zone, but depriving
islands in theGulf oftheir agreed effect under the Santiago Declaration.
3.26. Professor Lowe did show you, briefly, what Santa Clara's projection would look like
under Article IV [slide], but then it disappeared again, leaving a question mark over this area that I
have shaded yellow. [Slide] The explanation seemed to be that Santa Clara created no maritime
projection separate from the mainland coast. Only, we were told, the Galapagos did that. And so
only they, it seems, are the beneficiaries of the protection 27 of Article IV. This is new and
unjustified by the text.
24
See CR 2012/33 p. 15 para. 26 to p. 21 para. 68, and para. 71 (Lowe).
25
/bid.p. 16, para. 27 (Lowe).
2MP, para. 2.6 and fig. 2.2; RP, paras. 4.77 and 4.103 to 4.105.
2CR 2012/33 p. 18, para. 44 (Lowe). - 20-
3.27. It completely ignores the first sentence of Article IV. Santa Clara, like every other
island in the Gulf of Guayaquil and every other Chilean, Peruvian and Ecuadorean island, was
granted its own 200-mile-radial projection by the Santiago Declaration. Where the radial
projection of Santa Clara hit the parallel passing through the point where the land boundary
reached the sea, it was truncated at that parallel by force of Article IV. So Peru's fresh
interpretation is contradicted by the plain terms ofthe Santiago Declaration.
3.28. [Slide] On Tuesday Peru then postulated that the intuitive equidistance line would
continue out, intuitively, through the 200-mile-radial projection of the Galapagos. Ecuador's
delegate in 1952 seems to have identified the parallel as a way to protect the maritime zone of the
Galapagos against the ravages of the intuitive equidistance line, and insisted on the result that you
can see on your screens [slide]. He earned the praise of Professor Lowe, who called his point "a
28
very shrewd one" • Shrewd indeed ifthe Ecuadorean delegate foresaw equidistance, foresaw arcs
of circles, and without any means to calculate an equidistance line, hypothesized where it would
run through the zone of the Galapagos and determined that the parallel would be more favourable.
3.29. There is another problem. Peru's diagram from Tuesday used base points on Santa
Clara to construct the equidistance line, but it does not use any in·the Galapagos. Odd that these
islands that Peru says Ecuador wanted to protect were ignored in the construction of the
equidistance line. In Tuesday's revelation Peru just continued the equidistance line created by
Santa Clara and Peru's mainland out to sea for 800 miles, ignoring the archipelago maritime zone it
traversed.
account base points on the Galapagos in the construction of his intuitive equidistance line, he
would have seen that the Galapagos were perfectly capable ofprotecting themselves. [Slide] That
is the equidistance line of Peru, including the Galapagos: giving full effect, of course, but that is
what Article IV says.
3.31. There is yet another problem. The Santiago Declaration did not deJete ail the islands in
the south-east Pacifie. [Slide] Consider the Desventuradas islands, which are Chilean. If the
28
CR 2012/33, p.18,para.49 (Lowe). - 21 -
1952 delegates had been projecting equidistance lines out beyond 200 miles- as they reserve the
right to do-, and which is the basis ofPeru's new hypothesis, then they would have reached these
Chilean islands not long after they reached the Galapagos. When the equidistance line arrived, it
would have placed that "group of islands" within 200 miles of the "general maritime zone" of the
adjacent State.
3.32. It would have followed ineluctably from the text of Article IV that their maritime zone
would be delimited not by the equidistance line, but "by the parallel at the point at which the land
frontier of the States concerned reaches the sea". [Slide] You can see that on the slide. This is
what their "protected" zone would have looked like: it may be termed the "hernia" effect. Any
interpretation of Article IV which produces that result is plainly ridiculous.
3.33. The only sensible way to interpret Article IV is that the maritime boundary is the
parallel of latitude and that it delimits each State's frontal projection and insular projections alike:
otherwise it will not work.
3.34. We now have common ground that the delegates in Santiago in 1952 agreed something
about the spaces in which their maritime claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction would involve. We
also have common ground that whatever use they were making of the parallel they were making it
weil beyond 200 miles from shore. That, by the way, is the end ofPeru's claim to theA/ta Mar.
3.35. You have three alternatives before you as to what the States agreed in 1952. The first
is Peru's, from Tuesday, which looks like this [slide]. The second is as modified to give Santa
Clara its effect under Article IV, as Peru did before Tuesday: it would look like this [slide]. I do
not know if that is more or less intuitive. The third is the line that Chile and Ecuador have
consistently said, from 1952 until today, was the one settled in Article IV: it looks like this [slide].
3.36. So the question is which one of these three alternatives the delegates in Santiago in
1952 agreed, when they settled their maritime boundaries using "lines of simple and easy
29
recognition" , which allowed them to co-operate in the defence of their new maritime zones
against the protests ofthird States? With respect, that question answers itself.
29
RC, Vol. II, Ann. 2p.115. -22-
(b) 1954
3.37. 1 turn to the transactions of 1954, on which Peru spent very little time on Tuesday.
Peru's approach to treaty interpretation is particularly striking in connection with the
1954 Agreement Relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone. Peru would have you ignore the
plain meaning of the words "maritime boundary" appearing in Article 1. A more conventional
textual approach would start with the words "maritime boundary" and ask what their ordinary
meaning is.
3.38. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the ordinary meaning of maritime boundary is
maritime boundary.
3.39. [Siide] You can see Peru's departure from ordinary language visually on the screen
(tab 129). Here is the Special Maritime Frontier Zone. And here is Peru's claimed boundary. The
two are completely different: they do not overlap, because the frontier zone starts 12 miles
offshore. A maritime frontier zone that nowhere contains a maritime frontier would indeed be
special.
3.40. Peru hopes to minimize the harm that this Agreement so obviously does to its case by
characterizing it as one that applies only near the shore. It specifically did not apply near the shore.
It applied only after the first 12 miles of the boundary. There is nothing, nothing, to quote
Professor Lowe, to suggest that the maritime boundary so clearly acknowledged in the Agreement
was anything other than a complete maritime boundary for the full extent of each Party's maritime
claim. [End slide]
paragraph 4, of UNCLOS. Weil, the Court, of course, has seen a "provisional arrangement of a
practical nature" before in the lcelandic Fisheries case. The agreement in that case expressly
indicated that it was an "interim agreement relating to fisheries ... , pending a settlement of the
substantive dispute and without prejudice to the legal position or rights of either Government" 3•
There are many other examples of such provisional arrangements. The 1954 Maritime Frontier
Zone Agreement looks nothing like a provisional arrangement.
30
Agreement of 13 November 1973, quoted in Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. !ce/and), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 17-18, para. 36. -23-
3.42. What it does look like can be seen from the 1975 Colombia-Ecuador Agreement,
which also establishes a buffer zone. The Spanish text is nearly identical to Article 1 of the
1954 Agreement 31•
32
3.43. On Tuesday moming Professor Lowe accused Chile of finding references to the
"parallel" and pretending that they meant "maritime boundary". He said: "That is the fault that
runs throughout Chile's case; that is the crack that makes Chile's case fall apart." 33 Strong words:
he could find just one example, but he said it was a "fine" example. It was Annex 120 to Chile's
Rejoinder, a resolution of the CPPS containing a draft of the Special Maritime Frontier Zone
Agreement. You will find it in tab 128 ofyour folders. Professor Lowe pointed out that there is an
inaccurate translation, and on Chile's behalfl apologize for that. You see here the original Spanish
in the resolution with an accurate translation, taken from our Rejoinder 34•
3.44. [Slide] You can see that the same document includes the words "International
Maritime Boundary". It refers to "violations of the maritime frontier". But Professor Lowe is
correct that when the CPPS draft went to the delegates at Lima, Article 1 referred only to the
parallel, not to any maritime boundary. So far, so good. The Court will be interested to see what
happened to this draft at the Lima Conference.
3.45. This is what happened, and 1quote from the Minutes:
"Upon the proposai by Mr. Salvador Lara, the concept already declared in
Santiago that the parallel starting at the boundary point on the coast constitutes the
maritime boundary between the neighbouring signatory countries, was incorporated in
this article."
Article 1was thus amended as follows:
"A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either side of the parallel which
constitutes the maritime boundary between the two countries."
Professor Lowe did mention some extracts from these Minutes, but he said not a word about this
passage. The final text of Article 1ofthe 1954 Agreement replicates exactly this text. [End slide]
31
Agreement between Colombia and Ecuador, 23 August 1975 (entered into force 22 December 1975), 996 UNTS
239.
32
See CR 2012/33, p. 29, paras. 114-116 (Lowe).
33/bid.
34RC, para 5.11. -24-
3.46. Another argument Peru has now abandoned is that this agreement applied only between
Ecuador and Peru. The delegate of Ecuador, Mr. Lara, intervened on a tapie that had nothing to do
with islands. The Agreement does not contain the word islands. The three States agreed on treaty
language that made explicit what "parallel" they were referring to. It was ''the parallel which
constitutes the maritime boundary".
3.47. Professor Lowe asked how cartographers could have drawn a map showing the
maritime boundary on the basis of Article IV 35• The answer is: they would have done so exactly in
the way that Peru instructed them to do in its Supreme Resolution of 1955. That specifically
referred to Article IV of the Santiago Declaration and specified how its maritime dominion was to
be depicted on maps.
3.48. Professor Lowe also asked whether the negotiators in Santiago would have thought that
36
they had just delimited maritime boundaries • We have already seen what they said in the
Minutes. He showed you a report of the Peruvian Congress recording what in 1955 the
Government thought had happened in Santiago and Lima. Peru put tinee of the 11 pages of this
document in your session 2 folder on Tuesday, omitting the page that explicitly refers to Peru's
"maritime boundaries" 37• Peru showed you Mr. Pefia Prado's signature 38, but it said nothing about
his speech to Congress explaining that the 1952 and 1954 inter-State conferences established
39
maritime boundaries •
(c) 1952 and 1954
--~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-------------------------------------------------<to--------------------
"half-competent lawyer" would see that the Santiago Declaration did not delimit a boundary .
[Siide] Weil, President Jiménez de Aréchagawas not half a competent lawyer. In his view, and I
quote from tab 130:
3CR 2012/33, p. 21, para. 70 (Lowe).
3/bid.,p. 14, para. 16(Lowe).
37
Peru's judges' folder, session 2, 4 Dec. 2012, tab 31; cf. RP, Vol. II, Ann. 6; RC, Vol. III, Ann. 78 and RC,
para. 2.80.
3Peru'sjudges' folder, second round, Il Dec. 2012, tab 99.
39
CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 246, p. 1467.
4
°CR 2012/33, p. 30, para. 122(Lowe). -25-
"That the maritime boundary is, in fact, constituted by a parallel of latitude from
the mainland was confirmed by the parties in an agreement signed on
4 December 1954. The first articleof that agreement refers to the parallel which
constitutes the maritime boundary between the two countries."1
That is what more than a half-competent lawyer thinks.
3.50. Peru argues that if the Santiago Declaration did not vault over the high barrier it sets
for· delimitation agreements, then the subsequent agreements cannot do either. Peru's
determination to separate the chain of events, from 1952 to 1954 to 1955, ignores the integration
clause in the 1954 Agreements, and, in relation to the Agreements of 1968 and 1969, it also ignores
Article 31 (3)(a) ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties.
3.51. Asto the relationship between 1952 and 1954, the Parties agreed that the 1954 Special
Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement is an integral part of the Santiago Declaration. The
Agreements of 1952 and 1954, taken separately and together, establish the existence of an agreed
maritime boundary to the fhll extent of each State's maritime zone. They are to be read together,
and read together they say explicitly that "the parallel which constitutes the maritime boundary
between the two countries" is "the parallel at the point at which the land frontier of the States
concerned reaches the sea".
Quod iterum, Mr. President, Members of the Court, erat demonstrandum.
Mr. President, I would ask you to callupon Mr. David Colson.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford, and I give the floor to Mr. Colson. At
the same time 1ask him, kindly, to move the microphone to his left, more to the centre. No. That
way. Yes, thank you. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. COLSON:
PERU'S 1955 SUPREME RESOLUTION AND THE OUTER LIMIT OF PERU'S ZONE
1.1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. Professor Crawford has again
reviewed carefully the Santiago Declaration and the 1954 Agreement on the Special Maritime
Frontier Zone. And 1will return to the 1955 Supreme Resolution, and respond to points made by
Professor Lowe and Sir Michael Wood about the arcs-of-circles and trace parallel methods.
41
CMC, Vol. V, Ann. 27p. 1647. -26-
1. Introduction
1.2. To begin, 1 should say something about the differences 1 have with opposing counsel
about the definition of the outer timit found in Peru's 1952 Petroleum Law and Professor Lowe's
argument that you can only refer to a minimum distance ifyou use the arcs-of-circles method.
1.3. First, as to the definition of the outer timit of Peru's zone found in the 1952 Petroleum
Law. It refers to the outer timit as "an imaginary tine drawn seaward at a constant distance of
42
200 miles from the low-water tine along the continental coast" .
1.4. It does not say how that constant distance is to be measured. It could be a constant
distance of 200 miles measured along the geographie parallels or a constant distance where every
point on the outer timit is measured from the nearest point on the coast. Likewise, concerning
43
Professor Lowe's concern about a minimum distance , a minimum distance of 200 miles may be
obtained by the trace parallel as measured along successive parallels, or by the arcs-of-circles
method. The word minimum, used as we know in Article II of the Santiago Declaration, does not
mean arcs of circles, although Professor Lowe would tike you to betieve thaé 4.
1.5. [Start graphie 1] The classic definition of arcs-of-circles method is found in Article 6 of
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which you will find at
tab 132 ofyour folders and it is now on the screen. The same words, exactly the same words, are
repeated in Article 4 of the 1982 Convention. Those words say: "The outer timit ofthe territorial
sea is the tine every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to
45
the breadth of the territorial sea."
------------.-.---s--you-may note,there are two--elements-oLthis-definition-missing_ f_romJhe_J~etroleum
---~--------------~-------46-------------~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--~--------·----·-·------·-·
Law definition reference to every point on the outer timit; and reference to nearest points on
the coast. It is the combination of these two elements that properly describe the arcs-of-circles
4MP, Vol. II, Ann. 8, p. 35.
4CR 2012/33, p. 16, para. 34 (Lowe).
4CR 2012/28, p. 13, para. 6 (Lowe).
4Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, 516 United
Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 205 (entered into force 10 September 1964); see also United Nations Convention onthe
Law of the Sea, signed at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Art. 4. ·
4MP, Vol. Il, Ann. 8, p. 35, Art. 14 (4) ("Continental Shelf. There shaH be the zone lying between the western
limitf the coastal zone and an imaginary line drawn seaward at a constant distance of200 miles from the low-water line
along the continentaloast.") -27-
method. They are missing from the Petroleum Law and Peru's 1955 Supreme Resolution. So we
stand by our view that Peru's 1952 Petroleum Law and the 1955 Supreme Resolution did not
introduce the arcs-of-circles method into Peru's practice. [End graphie 1]
2. Peru's 1955 Supreme Resolution
1.7. To promote his argument that the 1955 Supreme Resolution concerned only the outer
limit of Peru's zone, Sir Michael Wood put a great deal of weight on Peru's arrest of the Onassis
Fleet as being the reason for Peru's promulgation of the Supreme Resolution 47. There is no
evidence in the record for this. Sir Michael Wood made no citation in his two presentations when
he mentioned this point. And for the Iast few days we have searched materials available to us to
see if we might have overlooked this point, to no avail. Garcia Sayan does indeed mention the
arrest of the Onassis fleet in his monograph, but he does not connect that event to the
1955 Supreme Resolution 48 . We have been wondering why Peru has offered no evidence of this
assertion, if it is so certain about it. If there are internai documents of Peru that say this, we have
not seen them, the Court has not seen them, and we wonder what else they might say.
1.8. Sir Michael Wood also asserted that the Onassis Fleet was caught whaling outside the
9
trace parallelline but within the arcs-of-circles line as measured from Peru's coasé . Again, he did
not cite any evidence in the record for this. [Start graphie 2] The evidence submitted by Peru
however, in fact suggests to the contrary. The Report of Peru's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
annexed to Peru's Memorial records the arrest ofthe Onassis Fleet on 15November 1954, and that
Report states that the arrest occurred 126miles from Punta Aguja, but it does not specizy the
50
direction . The graphie now on the screen and at tab 134 ofyour folders shows the maritime area
within 126miles of Punta Aguja- (which is of course larger than 126 statute miles, and therefore
our estimate is conservative). As you can see, the entire area is inside the 200-mile trace parallel
measured from Peru's coast. There is something seriously wrong with Sir Michael's account of the
background of the 1955 Supreme Resolution. [End graphie 2/Start graphie 3 with cali-out]
47
CR 2012/33, p. 39, para. 29 (Wood); see also CR 2012/28, p. 35, para. 38 (Wood).
48See MP, para. 4.86, citing E. Garcia Sayan, Notas sobre la Soberania Mm·itima del Pen/, 1955, pp. 35-37.
49CR 2012/33, p. 39, para. 29 (Wood).
50
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 98, p. 577. -28-
1.9. In any event, what we do know for a fact is that Chile submitted in its
Counter-Memorial a letter from the Minister of Defence of Peru to the Foreign Minister of Peru
dated 21 November 2000 with the annex to that letter. This letter is at tab 133 ofyour folders, and
you can see it now on the screen. 1will not read it out, but 1invite you to read it carefully. Clearly
the Minister of Defence of Peru just 12 years ago did not understand the 1952 Petroleum Law or
the 1955 Supreme Resolution as Peru's counsel claim today. This letter was discussed in Chile's
Counter-Memorial at paragraph 2.121 and a copy ofthe letter with its annex is found in Annex 189
to the Counter-Memorial. I apologize for incorrectly referring to the Rejoinder rather than the
Counter-Memoriallast week when 1mentioned this letter, but the citation in the prepared statement
was correct. 1noted then that we had not heard from Peru about this letter- not in the Reply and
not in the first round of oral presentation- and we did not hear about it in Peru's second round,
either. [End graphie 3]
1.1O.Chile stands by its position that the 1955 Supreme Resolution was for the purpose of
describing the limits of ali of Peru's zone and it served that purpose. The 1955 Supreme
Resolution was specifically mentioned- and quoted in full- in the Official Message to Congress
by Peru's Foreign Minister in the Parliamentary process for ratification of the agreements of 1952
51
and the agreements of 1954 • And, as we know, the 1954 Agreement on the Special Maritime
Frontier Zone was clearly concerned with the laterallimits ofPeru's zone, referring to the "parallel
52
[of latitude] which constitutes the maritime boundary" .
1.11. Peru has noted that 1said that the Court does not need to decide the question of when
argument. Peru is so focused on the arcs-of-circles methodology and the picture of overlapping
200-nautical-mile zones on the screen, it has yet to understand that the argument it makes cuts
against its case and is entirely supportive of the presentation of Chile before this Court.
1.12. With the Court's indulgence 1would like to conduct a short demonstration to prove my
point.
51
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 95, p. 547. Page 3 of the document is omitted from Peru's Annex but appears in the full
document deposited with the Registry with Peru's Memorial, doc. 78.
52
/bid., Vol. II, Ann. 50, Art. 1. - 29-
3. Arcs-of-circles method/trace parallel demonstration
1.13. As we said last week, the result of the fact that both States used t~e trace parallel
method, and parallels of latitude as the geometrie construction lines, meant the two zones abutted
along the parallel of latitude of the land boundary and had other important consequences. This
discussion was at page 37 ofthe transcript from Thursday afternoon's pleading. Interestingly, Peru
did not really contest this. Sir Michael Wood made an offhand remark about the importance Chile
53
attaches to this but he did not contest it . We do attach importance toit. The graphie now on the
screen shows the situation as it would have been in 1947 and at least up to 1952 when Peru passes
its Petroleum Law.
1.14. If Peru is right and its Petroleum Law required Peru's zone to be defined by an
arcs-of-circles method, with the outer limit being a line every point of which is at a distance of
200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the baseline that being a proper definition of arcs of
circles, not the formula in the Petroleum Law of "constant distance"- the situation would have
been as shown now on the graphie. Since Chile maintained the trace parallel method, Chile's
claimed zone would not have strayed north of the parallel oflatitude of the land boundary terminus.
But 200-nautical-mile arcs of circles drawn from Peru's coast would overlap Chile's 200-mile
zone.
1.15. A very unhappy area of overlap would be created. This situation- if it bad
happened- would obviously have caused a dispute with Chile. There is no way that Chile would
have convened the Santiago Conference later in 1952 if Peru had taken such an aggressive position
towards Chile at that time. The energy needed to defend the 200-mile claims against the major
maritime powers would have been dissipated and would have had to have been directed towards a
bilateral boundary dispute. That did not happen. Chile and Peru co-operated. This is a strong
indication that Peru's Petroleum Law was not understood by Peru or Chile to require the
arcs-of-circles method.
1.16. Next, the Santiago Declaration is adopted. Article II, as we know, provided that any
State could expand its 200-mile zone. Peru accepts that Article II applied to Chile. But if Chile
were to expand its claim and exercise its rights under Article Il, and Peru bad an arcs-of-circles
53
CR 2012/33, p.39,para.33 (Wood). -30-
claim at the time, the area of dispute between Chile anTheeru would only have grown.
arcs-of-circles wrap-around Chile's zone would black any opportunity for Chile to
expand its claim as Chile bad the right to do under Article that way. It
surely cannat be that the Santiago Declaration was intended that Articles II and IV work that way.
1.17. Turning to Articleoes not accept that Article IV created a legal boundary
between Chile and although it accepts that Chile bas the right to expand its zone under
4
ArticleThI. the "narraa good ward used by Prof5last weethe
narrative thatuggests is not one of symmetrical overlapping arcs to be happily divided by an
equidistance tine,ested by Pro.eInstead, the logic of Peru's narrative is that,
following the Santiago Declaration, theretween Chile and Peru, that Peru's zone
overlaps Chile's zone, and thatany seaward extension of Chile's zone, preventing
Chile from benefiting from Article II. An unlikely scenario.
6
1.18. Next cames the 1954 Agreement on a Speci.l Maritime Frontier
accepts that the agreed boundary parallel is operative, at !east to some extent. So now, one way or
another, the parallel must enter intoeference to the parallel in the
1954 Agreement on the Special Maritime Frontier Zone means thatallenge
Chile's 200-mile zone with its arcs of circles, nor denies Chile the right to expand its claim by
blocking it with Peru's natioOf course, Peru says that the Agreement on a
Special Maritime Frontier Zone was tentative, or provisional. Thissoning
byPeru's counsel. Peru made no such reservations at the time.
~--~--~-~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~-~r:~-~ \fVôj~~ ~a~tJ1-:~~fay~
requires that Peru's outer limit stop at the boundary parallels. So, if Peru is using arcs of circles,
and the decree requires the outer limit to stoplatitude of the land boundary
terminus, that pointawn on the next graphie and labelled point X.
CR 2012/33, p. 54, para. 15 and p. 55, paras. 19 and 20 (Treves).
/bid., pp. 15-16, paras. 26-27 (Lowe).
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 50.
CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 170, p. 1025. - 31 -
1.20. Chile's understanding is that by operation of Articles II and IV of the Santiago
Declaration, it was understood and agreed that the boundary parallel would serve to delimit ali
present and prospective claims. On this basis it did not matter whether Chile or Peru or both used
trace parallel or arcs-of-circles, or whether they expanded their zones beyond the 200-nautical-mile
Iimit. Their common narrative was that they would never cross the boundary parallel because it
was their common, agreed, all-purpose limit.
1.21. This is why we have said that the arcs-of-circles argument does not help Peru. In fact,
when it is assessed in light ofPeru's 1955 Supreme Resolution, it confirms Chile's position. Chile
and Peru viewed themselves as Pacifie States. As President de Aréchegasaid, having a "direct and
58
linear projection oftheir land territories and land boundaries into the adjacent seas" . Or perhaps
it is as President Bustamante y Rivero said in his separate opinion in the North Sea cases,
"obtaining shelves of a rectangular shape" (North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, IC.J Reports
1969, separate opinion of President Bustamante y Rivero, p. 61, para. 6 (b)). There was no
conception of an arcs-of-circles overlap or of an arcs-of-ch·cles wrap-around of the outer limit of
Chile's zone, as Peru suggests today.
Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Court for its attention and ask that you cali on
Professor Condorelli.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Colson. Je passe la parole au professeur Condorelli.
M. CONDORELLI : Merci, Monsieur le président.
REMARQUES SUR L'OBJET ET LE BUT DES TRAITÉS DE 1952 ET 1954
1. Introduction
1. La reconnaissance (tardive) par le Pérou que la déclaration de Santiago est un traité
comporte la reconnaissance (tardive elle aussi, mais très bienvenue) que les critères et principes
d'interprétation relatifs aux traités lui sont pleinement applicables. On ne peut que se réjouirde
voir les plaideurs péruviensdécouvrirenfin cette véritéélémentaireet de les voir obligésà essayer
de surmonter leur peur à ce sujet, et obligéspar conséquentde se lancer dans des propos visant à en
58
CMC, Vol. V, Ann. 280,p.1655. - 32-
faire application. Un débatbien fourni a pu se déroulerfinalement (et heureusement) sous les yeux
de la Cour, qui pourra donc trancher en pleine connaissance des arguments pertinents exposésde
part et d'autre.
2. Il y a un instant, le professeur Crawford a présentéà nouveau le point de vue chilien
concernant l'interprétationqu'il faut donner aux traités en question, et a réponducomme il se doit
aux objections de dernière heure formuléespar la Partie adverse. Il m'incombe, quant à moi, de
compléter son propos par quelques remarques concernant l'objet et le but des accords de 1952
et 1954. La Partie péruvienne,en effet, essaie de tirer l'eau au moulin de sa thèseau moyen d'une
opérationconsistant en substance à travestir ou minimiser l'objet et le but desdits traités: ceux-ci
sont présentés,en effet, comme ayant un objet et un but excluant d'emblée que les parties
contractantes aient pu avoir l'intention de délimiter leurs zones maritimes respectives ou de
confirmer et d'appliquer une telle délimitation. La présenteplaidoirie vise à mettre en lumière
cette tentative de travestissement et à la déjouer.
3. Comme le souligne la Commission du droit international dans son commentaire au
point 3.1.6. du Guide de la pratique sur les réservesaux traités,l'opérationinterprétativevisant à
identifier l'objet et le but du traité(qui relève, comme le dit le professeur Pellet, de l'«esprit de
finesse») doit êtreconduite de bonne foi «en tenant compte de ses termes et dans leur contexte» 59•
Comme en témoignela Commission, votre Cour déduitl'objet et le but d'un traité,isolémentou de
manièrecombinée,d'élémentsvariables, tels le titre dutraité 6, le préambule 6\ un article placéen
têtedu traité qui «doit êtreregardé comme fixant un objectif à la lumière duquel les autres
(République islamique d'Iran c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), exception préliminaire, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recuei/1996 (II), p. 814, par. 28), voire un article du traitéqui démontre«le principal souci
59Guide de la pratique sur les réserves auxtraités,commentaire au point 3.1.6 (Déterminationde l'objet et du but
du traité), rapportde la Commission du droit international à 1'Assemblée générale, Soixante-troisième session,
26 avril-3 juin et 4 juillet-12 août 2011 (doc. A 66/10/Add.1), p. 446-447.
6°Certains emprunts norvégiens(Francec. Norvège),arrêt,C.l.J. Recuei/1957, p24.
61
Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d'Amériqueau Maroc (France c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),arrêt,
C.l.J. Recueil 1952, p. 196; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua
c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),fond, arrêt,C.!.J. Recueil 198p. 138, par. 275 ;Différendterritorial (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne/Tchad), arrêt,C.l.J. Recueil/994,p. 25-26, par. 52; etSouverainetésur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan
(indonésie/Malaisie),arrêt,.l.J. Recueil2002p. 652, par. 51. - 33-
2
de chaque partie contractante» lors de la conclusion du traitë , ou encore les travaux
63 4
préparatoires , ou l'économiegénéraledu traité • Je note en passant que parmi les élémentsà
prendre en considération la Commission ne fait pas figurer la teneur des invitations à la conférence
diplomatique dont le traité à interpréter est issu ou le libellé de l'ordre du jour de celle-ci: un
prétenduargument sur lequel insistent éperdumentnos amis de l'autre côtéde la barre. En effet,
comme l'observait le professeur Crawford jeudi 6 décembre, les invitations ou l'agenda sont loin
65
d'êtredéterminants: «what matters is what the States agreed when they met» et, j'ajoute, ce qui
compte est l'objet et le but qu'ils ont décidéd'assigner à l'accord qu'ils ont conclu.
2. L'objet et le but de la déclarationde Santiago
4. Monsieur le président,quels sont l'objet et le but de la déclarationde Santiago? Dans ses
écritureset plaidoiries, le Péroules présenteen suivant essentiellement deux approches.
5. La première met en exergue que, au moyen de la déclaration,les parties contractantes ont
entendu réagir«in the face of predatory whaling and fishing by foreign fleets» -ce sont les mots
de l'ambassadeur Wagner 66• Les Parties- nous explique-t-on- ont décidédans ce but d'étendre
à 200 milles nautiques leur juridiction exclusive sur les ressources naturelles de la mer. Après
l'agent du Pérou,qui a donnéle ton dans son introduction du 3 décembredernier, tous les plaideurs
67
de l'autre côtéde la barre, et spécialement les professeurs Lowe et Wood , ont évoquéà tour de
rôle le but limitépoursuivi par la déclaration,qui concernerait donc pour l'essentiel l'endiguement
de la chasse à la baleine à outrance et de l'exploitation sauvage de la pêche. Tel étantle but de la
déclaration, il n'avait pas de sens -nous suggère-t-on de se soucier des frontières entre les
zones maritimes des trois pays.
62Île de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt,C.!.J. Recuei/1999 (Il), p. 1072-1073, par. 43.
63Différendterritorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt,C.I.J. Recuei/1994, p. 27-28, par. 55-56; Ile de
Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil/999 (Il), p. 1074, par. 46.
64Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d'Iran c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), exception préliminaire,
arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil/996 (Il), p. 813, par. 27; et Souverainetésur Pu/au Ligitan et Pu/au Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie),
arrêt,C.I.J. Recuei/2002, p. 652, par. 51.
65
CR 2012/30, p. 53, par. 3.47 (Crawford).
66
CR 2012/27, p. 19, par. 10 (Wagner).
67CR 2012/28, p. 17, par. 28 (Lowe); ibid., p. 18, par. 32 et p. 23, par. 54; ibid., p. 28, par. 9 (Wood);
CR 2012/33, p. 14, par. 16 (Lowe). - 34-
6. La deuxième approche fait valoir plutôt (mais pas nécessairementen alternative) que le
but de la déclarationde Santiago «was more on maintaining a common front against third States
than on creating national maritime zones» -c'est ce qu'a prétendu le professeur Lowe
68
mardi dernier • Et le professeur Pellet d'alléguer à peu près dans le mêmesillage : «nous ne
sommes pas en présence d'un accord de délimitation, mais bien d'un manifeste, décrivant la
69
politique que les Etats signataires entendaient suivre à l'égarddu reste du monde» ; en somme,
une sorte de -comme il l'appelle- «acte unilatéralcollectif» par lequel les trois signataires
énonçaient «leur politique commune en vue de la conservation et de l'exploitation des ressources
70
naturelles à l'égardde tous les autres Etats du monde» • Dans ces conditions -vous assure le
professeur Pellet- on comprend pourquoi les Etats «ne se sont ... pas souciés du détail de la
délimitationdes zones sur lesquelles ils proclamaient leur souverainetéetjuridiction exclusives» 71•
7. Ces deux approches ont ceci de commun: elles sont façonnées de manière qu'elles
semblent justifier l'injustifiable: à savoir, que l'on néglige, voire qu'on oublie carrément de
prendre en compte les dispositions de la déclaration de Santiago portant sur la délimitation des
zones maritimes revendiquées: c'est exactement ce qu'on a prétendufaire du côtépéruvien.
8. Un point est à mettre au clair aussitôt. Le Chili ne soutient pas du tout ce que le Pérou
voudrait lui faire dire, à savoir que la déclaration de 1952 ne serait qu'un accord centrésur la
délimitation maritime, c'est-à-dire un traité dont la délimitation serait le seul objet et but 72•
Indiscutablement, l'objet et le but de la déclarationsont bien plus larges. Toutefois, les descriptifs
qu'en présente le Péroules amputent gravement. Le but de la déclarationde Santiago n'est de loin
déprédationdu patrimoine halieutique des mers baignant les côtes des Etats signataires, et des
3
baleines en particulier, mais il est (comme le proclame haut et fort le préambule/ d'assurer à leurs
peuples respectifs l'ensemble des ressources naturelles des zones maritimes en question en
68
CR 2012/33, p. 26,par.97 (Lowe).
69
CR 2012/34, p. 33,par.30 (Pellet).
70Ibid.p. 34,par.31 (Pellet).
71Ibid.p.34, par.30 (Pellet).
72CR 2012/33, p. 19,par.56 (Lowe).
73
MP, vol. II, annexe 47p.259. - 35-
soumettant celles-ci à leur souveraineté et juridiction exclusives, y compris pour ce qui est des
fonds et des sous-sols marins: or, il n'y a pas que je sache de baleines souterraines! Quant à la
deuxième approche, elle met correctement en exergue l'aspect de la déclaration concernant la
politique internationale maritime commune des trois parties à l'égarddu reste du monde, mais elle
oublie totalement de relever le volet interpartes de la proclamation de souveraineté et juridiction
exclusives. Pourtant la déclarationle dit explicitement de la façon la plus claire qui soit : à chacun
sa zone maritime ! Autrement dit, la souveraineté revendiquéeest certes proclamée par les trois
Etats de façon concertée, mais elle porte pour chacun des trois sur une zone maritime dont ils
conviennent qu'elle est distincte par rapport à celle des deux autres.
9. Une prise en compte adéquatede l'objet et du but de la déclarationde Santiago amène à
considérer comme parfaitement conséquent et logique que l'on puisse y trouver les critères
permettant d'identifier les limites de la zone maritime de chacune des trois parties par rapport à
celle de l'Etat limitrophe : il aurait étéétonnant qu'il en aille autrement ! L'article IV répond
pleinement à cette exigence.
3. L'objet et le but des accords de Lima de 1954
10. Monsieur le président,j'en viens maintenant à l'objet et au but des accords de Lima de
1954, dont on sait bien qu'ils sont assortis tous les six d'une clause commune qui qualifie leurs
dispositions comme faisant partie intégranteet complémentaire des accords de 1952, et donc en
particulier de la déclarationde Santiago. Cette relation d'intégrationavec la déclarationde 1952
est affichée de façon parfaitement cohérente dans les considérants de la convention
complémentaire à la déclaration de souveraineté sur la zone maritime de 200 milles. Ce titre
indique d'ailleurs on ne peut plus clairement quelle idée précise a présidéà l'élaboration des
instruments de 1954: ces accords ont étéconclus dans le but de réaliserl'intention expriméeen
1952 de «souscrire des accords et conventions pour l'application des principes relatifs à cette
74
souveraineté» • La référenceà 1'article VI de la déclarationde Santiago -où figurent des mots
analogues 75- est évidente,et ceci contribue à expliquer pourquoi les accords de 1954, accords
74
MP, vol. II, annexe 51, p. 280 (deuxième considérantde la convention complémentaire).
75Ibid., annexe 47, p. 259. -36-
relatifs à l'application des principes convenus en 1952, se destinent à mettre en Œuvre ces derniers
en les complétantdans la mesure du nécessaire,mais en excluant d'embléetoute modification ou
altération. Rien, bien rien, ne justifie l'allégationpéruvienneque les instruments en question
seraient provisoires ou transitoires. d'ailleurs que les principes établis par la
déclarationde Santiago, dont les accords de 1954 doivent assurer l'exécution,sont conçus comme
s'inscrivant dans la durée.
11. L'objet et le but des accords de 1954 ne pourraient pas êtremieux précisés. Leurs
référencesmultiples aux frontières latéralesentre les zones maritimes des trois Etats démontrentet
confirment donc que ces frontières avaient étébien établiesparago et qu'il
s'agissait en 1954 d'adopter des mesures d'applicationest d'ailleurs
clairement explicitéparque chacun des six accords s'ouvre par la proclamation que les Etats
contractants agissent en les adoptantavec ce qui a étéconcordé»dans la résolution
n°X adoptéele 8 octobre 1954 par la commission permanente de la coriférencesur l'exploitation et
la conservation des ressources maritimes du Pacifique Sud: il s'agit, je le rappelle, de la résolution
par laquelle étépris acte de ce que, moyennant les accords de 1952, les trois pays <<Ont
76
déterminéles zones maritimes sur lesquelles ils ontjuridiils y et souverainetéexclusives»
onthacun juridiction et souverainetéexclusives !
12. La Partie péruviennea redit mille fois par des motssuxriésque les référencesrépétéea
frontières maritimes entre les parties signataires figurant danspéciale
frontalière maritime dépendraientdu «limited purpose», du but limitéde cet instrument qui «was to
···-·····-·-····--····
··-····-·.·.·.......--···· ··-······- ............... ·-·-·-· ....... -··-···-··-··········
···· .................. ····- ..... ··········-····-·-···
·_·_...................77··-· ··-······-·-····· ..- ········--····-·····
..-····~~~t!.<!i~E':I!~sJ! .l..S!.!lll~f_fi!shg_t~Q.!~:!Da.l_!~·-_·o~.herm~!l
but limité,allègue-t-on, une sorte de brèvefrontière spécialepour la pêchede proximitéaurait été
provisoirement établie, sans que cela ait la moindre implication quant
générale.st une explication qui ne tient pas debout, outre qu'elle ne trouve pas le moindre
encrage dans les textes des accords de 1954, commewford vient de le réitérer.
Mais'est de surcroît une explication qui se réfèreàun seul des six accords de Lima de 1954, alors
que des dispositions de tous les cinqitement référenceelles aussi aux frontières
76CMC, vol. II,annexe 40, p. 358.
77
CR2012/28, p. 28, par. 9(Wood). Voir aussi ibid., p. 31, par. 21; CR2012/33, p. 27, par. 109 (Lowe). - 37-
latéralesentre les zones maritimes des trois pays ou en présupposentouvertement l'existence: ceci
sans le moindre rapport avec la pêchede proximité,ainsi que j'ai eu l'occasion de le démontrer
78
dans ma plaidoirie de vendredi dernier . La Cour saura tenir compte du fait que nos amis de
l'autre côtéde la barre ont préférégarder sur cet argument de poids un silence impénétrable.
13. Ceci complète ma plaidoirie, Monsieur le président. Je vous remercie de tout cŒur,
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, de votre patiente attention, et je vous prie, Monsieur le président,
de bien vouloir inviter à la barre le professeur Dupuy, peut-êtreaprèsla pause, c'est comme vous le
déciderez.
Le PRESIDENT: Merci, professeur Condorelli. Vu le temps, j'invite le professeur Dupuy à
se présenteret plaider au nom du Chili.
M.DUPUY:
L'INITIATIVE PRISE À SANTIAGO ET LA CONSTRUCTION D'UNE ÉQUITÉ
RÉGIONALE À VOCATION UNIVERSELLE
1. Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, la question poséeaux Parties par
M. lejuge Bennouna a le grand méritede nous permettre de resituer la déclarationde Santiago dans
son contexte historique; elle permet aussi de cerner la portéede la déclarationpour l'affirmation de
la solidaritéà l'échellerégionaleaux fins de promouvoir, dans une vision renouveléedes buts du
droit international, la recherche de l'équité.Equitéqu'il fallait bâtir tant entre les parties qu'entre
eux et les autres, c'est-à-dire à cet égard entre pays parvenus à des stades différents de
développementéconomique.
2. A n'en pas douter, les trois Etats parties à la déclarationde Santiago étaientpleinement
conscients de l'audace et de la nouveauté de leur initiative pour affirmer conjointement leur
«souverainetéet compétenceexclusives sur la mer» jusqu'à une distance de 200 milles nautiques
de leurs côtes, selon les termes de l'article II de la déclaration.
3. Dans cette brève plaidoirie, j'aborderai trois points, d'une part le contexte historique dans
lequel il faut comprendre cette initiative (1); ensuite, !a portéejuridique qui en étaitescomptéepar
78
CR 2012/32, p. 54 et suiv., par. 33 et suiv. - 38-
ses promoteurs (II) ; enfin, et surtout, la visée fondamentale de ladite déclaration, qui était de
promouvoir un renouveilement du droit international fondésur une reconception de l'équitéentre
Etats, tant à l'échellerégionalequ'universelle.
1. Contexte historique de la déclaration
4. Pour présenter en termes concis une longue histoire, je serais tenté de dire que la
déclaration de Santiago est à resituer entre Harry Truman, Alejandro Alvarez, et la recherche
ultérieure d'un nouvel ordre international, tant dans le domaine économique que politique et
environnemental. Truman, parce que c'est lui qui a ouvert la voie à l'affirmation unilatéralede
droits souverains sur de nouveaux espaces maritimes ; Alvarez, parce que, grand internationaliste
chilien déjà conscientdes disparitésde développementet des dangers de la mainmise des grandes
puissances sur un droit international de la mer qui leur devait sa formulation, il en appela
inlassablement, jusqu'au soir de sa vie, à l'affirmation d'un «droit international nouveau», pour
reprendre le titre du petit livre qu'il fit paraître en 1960. On trouve dans cet ouvrage testament,
comme écrità la hâte pour résumerles idéesqu'il avait toujours défendues,à la fois la spécificité
régionalede la tradition juridique internationale en Amériquelatine et l'aspiration universelle à une
revision des finalitésd'un nouveau droit international, un droit qui devait désormais percevoir la
souveraineté non plus seulement dans sa dimension étroitement politique mais également
économique. Les idéesexprimées par Alvarez n'étaientpas seulement les siennes; elles étaient
ressenties, plus ou moins confusément par tous les peuples du sous-continent américain,à la fois
puissances occidentales lui portaient de longue date.
5. C'est par ce dernier trait, notamment, que la déclarationde Santiago apparaît comme le
premier manifeste d'une revendication à la fois politique, économique et, pour employer un
vocable qui n'étaitpas encore à l'époqueen usage, environnementale. La volontéde protégerles
ressources naturelles étaléesau large de leurs côtes apparaît aux Etats comme une nécessité
économique pour la protection des droits de leurs «peuples», notion explicitement énoncéeà
l'article II de la déclaration. - 39-
6. Il y a déjà là, en germe, toute l'affirmation d'un nouveau «droit intemational du
développement». Particulièrement étudiépar l'un des membres de cette Cour 7, et appuyésur la
résolution1803 de l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies, on sait qu'il s'organisera, au nom du
droit des peuples et à peine dix ans après la déclaration de Santiago, autour du principe de
souverainetépermanente sur les ressources naturelles. J'en viens ainsi à l'examen de la portéeque
les trois Etats parties à la déclarationentendaient attacher à leur audacieuse initiative.
II. Portéede la déclaration
7. Le Chili, Je Pérouet l'Equateur savaient qu'ils allaient s'attirer les foudres des grandes
puissances maritimes. Et de fait, comme nous l'avons vu, une salve de protestations véhémentes
fut tiréed'abord par Je Royaume-Uni, puis par les Etats-Unis, la Norvège, la Suède, Je Danemark,
les Pays-Bas 80. Bien des pavillons des Etats possédantdes navires au long cours semblaient ainsi
converger vers ces rives éloignéespour refuser à ces Etats côtiers de revendiquer sur la mer des
droits que celui de l'époque,tout entier dominépar une conception extensive de la libertéde la
haute mer, leur déniaitsi manifestement.
8. On peut au demeurant avoir une idéeprécise de l'étatdu droit de la mer à l'époque
exactement contemporaine de la déclaration; il suffit pour cela de consulter les tout premiers
travaux que la nouvelle Commission du droit intemational consacra au régimeet à la délimitation
de la mer territoriale et de la haute mer 81 mais aussi du plateau continental. Il est très frappant, à
cet égard,de constater qu'en matière de délimitation maritime, mêmesi l'idéed'un recours à la
ligne médianese fait jour, elle inspire un manifeste scepticisme à des membres de la Commission
aussi éminentsque Manley Hudson ou Georges Scelle; l'un et l'autre affirmaient alors leurs doutes
quant à la possibilitéd'établirun quelconque principe en la matière, au regard de la diversitédes
situations particulières 82.
79M. Bennouna, Droit international du développement,Paris, Berger-Levraut, 1983, voir en particulier p. 101 et
suiv.
° CMC, vol. III, annexe 60, p. 489; ibid., annexe 68, p. 527; ibid., annexe 62, p. 501 ; ibid., annexe 63, p. 505;
ibid., annexe 64, p. 509; ibid., annexe 65, p. 513; ibid., annexe 66, p. 517.
81Voir en particulier le mémorandum présentépar le Secrétariat,Nations Unies, document. A/CN.4/32 (1950),
Annuaire de la Commission du droit international1950, vol. II, p. 67.
82
Annuaire de la Commission du droit international 1951, vol. 1,procès-verbaux de la troisième session, p. 287,
par. 120; Annuaire de la Commission du droit internationall952, vol. 1,procès-verbaux de la quatrième session, p. 184,
par. 46. -40-
9. Ce qui prévaut, en revanche, de façon manifeste, c'est la nécessitéde parvenir à la
délimitationpar voie d'accord. L'entente négociéeentre riverains d'une mer commune demeure la
voie privilégiéesinon exclusive, le recours au juge ou à l'arbitre international n'apparaissant qu'au
cas où les parties n'auraient décidémentpas pu trouver une solution mutuellement satisfaisante.
1O.Conscients de cet étatdu droit, les troial'accord, celui constitué
par la déclaration mais aussi par ceux qui l'ont accompagnée, en 1952, puis suivie, en 1954. La
déclaration affirme solennellement le but de protection des ressources naturelles, en assignant à
chacun sa zone spatiale de compétences, sur la base des premières délimitations déjàaffirmées par
le Chili et le Pérou en 1947, et en suivant la tradition régionale du recours au parallèle
géographique.
11. Ainsi confrontés à l'étatrestrictif du droit positif international de l'époquetel qu'opposé
aux visées protectrices, prospectives des trois Etats concernés, doit-on distinguer deux aspects à
1'effet des traitésconclus à Santiago en 1952, puis à Lima en 1954.
12. Inter se, interpartes, comme disait le professeur Condorelli, c'est-à-dire entre les parties,
ces traités, à commencer par la déclaration, sont bien évidemment une source d'obligations
réciproques,dont le régimeest gouvernépar le principe pacta sunt servanda.
13. A l'égarddes tiers, cependant, se pose la question de leur opposabilité, en dépitdu fait
qu'ils appartiennent en principe à la catégorie des traitésdits objectifs dans la mesure où ils fixent
des frontières territoriales, fussent-elles maritimes.
14. Mêmesi cette opposabilité à l'égarddes Etats tiers est recherchée, elle n'est évidemment
-~~~~-~----~~~~~=~-iJas_}lcqiii~~~~_l.iili~ini§~~ Ê~:--l-i1~
protestations à laquelle ils furent confrontés. Perçue dans la perspective historique du sort qui
devait êtrela sienne, ne füt-ce qu'à moyen terme, on constate néanmoins dans quelle mesure la
sériedes accords de 1952 et 1954 manifeste combien les Etats concernés avaient perçu avant bien
d'autres la nécessitéde revision du droit international de la mer en fonction des exigences du droit
des peuples au développement.
15. LXXesiècle est, plus que tout autre avant lui, une période d'«accélération de
l'histoire», et déjàen 1969, lors de l'arrêtde principe émanantde votre Cour, on sait combien les
parties au différend mais aussi la majorité des juges en son sein prennent cette délimitation - 41 -
trilatéralepar voie de parallèlesgéographiquescomme un fait juridique susceptible d'une prise en
considération. On ne saurait dèslors s'étonnerde la satisfaction expriméepar M. Bakula, un nom,
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, qui ne vous est sans doute pas totalement inconnu, lorsqu'il
déclaraau nom du Pérou,cette fois le 2 mai 1975, à la 48èm séancede la troisième conférencedes
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer:
«Peru had decided in 1947 to exercise full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
seas adjacent to its coasts up to a distance of 200 miles. It was not the first or the only
State to do so: the right has been recognized as legitimate by the International Court
of Justice. Such acts of sovereignty obviously had an influence on the development of
the law of the Sea. Some 30 developing countries were already exercising their right
to safeguard their natural resources, economie independence and sovereignty by
83
similar measures.»
16. Cette intervention de M. Bakula est d'autant plus remarquable que l'arrêtde la Cour
auquel il se réfèreest celui intervenu dans l'affaire des Pêcheriesnorvégiennes, lequel comporte
une opinion individuelle du juge Alejandro Alvarez dans laquelle il commente la situation des
84
limites maritimes en Amériquelatine .
17. Pour conclure sur le destin de la déclaration de Santiago, Monsieur le président,
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, on pourrait dire qu'elle est l'un des premiers coups, mais il est
rude, portés à la doctrine dite de «l'objecteur persistant», lorsqu'on sait que le droit de la mer
contemporain reconnaît désormaissur une base coutumière l'extension des droits souverains des
Etats sur une zone allant jusqu'à 200 milles nautiques de leurs côtes. Qu'est-ce que la déclaration
de Santiago? C'est, aussi, une stratégienormative qui a réussi...
18. Monsieur le président,j'en viens alors, et pour finir, toujours dans le prolongement de
l'heureuse interrogation expriméepar M. lejuge Bennouna, à la dimension équitablede la solution
retenue par la déclaration de Santiago.
83 Intervention de M. Bâkula, 48e séance de la troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer,
2 mai 1975, document A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.48, extrait desOfficial Records of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Volume IV (Summmy Records, Plenmy, General Committee, First, Second and Third Committees, as
weil as Documents of the Conference, Third Sessiop. 77, par. 23, <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/
lawofthesea-1982/docs/vol_IV /a_conf-62_c-2_sr-48.pdt>.
84 Affaire des Pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recuei/1951,opinion individuelle de
M. Alvarez, p. 147, 150. -42-
IILa recherche d'une solution nouvelle, fondéesur l'équité
19. Le professeur Condorelli vous a rappeléil y a un instant toute l'importance qui s'attache
à l'objet et au but d'un traité pour enJe n'y revienEnai pas.tions.
revanche, ce qu'il reste à souligner, c'est la dimension solidaire de cette action conjointe. Une
initiative d'une telle nouveauté,dont ils pressentaient toutes les tempêtesqu'elle allait déchaîner,
ne pouvait pas êtreprise isolémentpar l'un ou l'autre d'entre eux, quelle que soit la longueur de ses
côtes.
20. Il fallait, d'un commun accord, oublier définitivement les séquelles d'une guerre
désormaisancestrale à laquelle ils avaient donné jadisle nom de l'océanqui les bordait, et affirmer
ainsi cette solidarité des riverains occidentaux du sous-continent latino-américain face aux
convoitises hauturières des pavillons étrangers. Les trois signataires de la déclarationde Santiago
partageaient non seulement la culture, l'histoire et l'héritagebolivarien mais aussi le mêmeniveau
de développement. Surtout, ils étaient également exposés au danger des prédations venant des
tierIl était indispensable d'établir un front commun, chacun agissant à l'intérieur de sa
circonscription maritime pour la réalisationd'une identique finalité.
21. Du reste, si leur initiative conjointe a connu le succès qu'on évoquait,c'est précisément
parce qu'elle s'appuyait sur cette conjonction de revendications partagéeset l'on sait comment ils
réaffirmèrentencore au début de la troisième conférence sur le droit de la mer cette solidarité
agissante et p•ospective
22. Aux fins de parvenir au succès de cet effort commun pour repousser vers le large les
-~~~ir~~~~~J>~ ~Çl~il~!,!<{;l:9_~~ll()(;_:~t~~•:~))llE~----_:!<;lPi~'~==-===-=
simple et le mieux-corum à l'échelle régionale, do-parte-----~--- fut rappelée notamment
présidentJiménez d•Ce système, c'est, comme vous le savez, celui des parallèles
87
géographiquesque vous voà l'écranaraître
8MP, vol. III, annexe 108, p. 631 et voir onglet n°138 du dossier de plaidoiries du Chili Gour 3).
8CMC, vol. V,annexe 279, p. 1647.
87
Voir onglet n° 139 du dossier de plaidoiries du Chili Gour 3). -43-
23. Ainsi que vous pouvez le voir, la série des parallèles qui se succèdent entre les trois
Etats, bientôt rejoints par la Colombie et le Panama 88 est le moyen quasi spontané choisi par eux
pour affirmer solidairement l'extension de leurs «souveraineté et compétences» sur les mers,
chacun sachant ainsi immédiatement à l'intérieur de quelle zone il devra veiller au respect des
ressources communes, communes du moins pour ce qui concerne en particulier les ressources
halieutiques, car les baleines et les poissons méconnaissentvolontiers les frontières maritimes !
24. Comme l'Equateur le dira dans une note adresséeà l'Argentine, les trois Etats parties aux
accords de 1952 et 1954, bientôt réunis au sein de la commission permanente du Pacifique Sud
pour renforcer leur coopération, ont employé des lignes de délimitation «à la fois simples et
89
aisémentreconnaissables» • Face au périlcroissant d'appauvrissement des ressources naturelles, il
fallait agir vite et avec toute l'efficacitérequise.
25. L'impératif de coopération ainsi dégagéest du reste mentionné dans les minutes de la
convention complémentaire de 1954 précisémentdestinéeà l'organisation de la coopération entre
les Etats membres 9.
26. Ainsi, voit-on s'affirmer de façon particulièrement marquante le fait que, loin d'être
contraire à l'équité, le choix des parallèles de latitude en fut le véhiculeet le garant. Il établissait,
sur une base considéréecomme égalitaire,les fondements comme les moyens de la solidaritéactive
contre un danger qui menaçait chacun individuellement et tous à la fois.
27. C'est, au demeurant, ce qui est illustrépar la conduite d'un homme dont le Pérous'est
bien gardé de prononcer le nom lors de son second tour de plaidoiries : le
présidentBustamante y Rivero, successivement maître d'Œuvre de la délimitation péruvienne en
tant que président de la République, puis président de la Cour internationale de Justice. Je ne
reviendrai pas sur l'arrêtde la Cour sur le Plateau continental de la mer du Nord. Est-il besoin ici
de rappeler qu'il est l'arrêtde principe précisémenten matière d'équitédans le droit de la
délimitationdes frontières maritimes ?
88
CMC, vol. IV, annexe 214, p. 1273, 1277 et traitéreàla délimitation des zones marines et sous-marines et
à des sujets connexes entre la Colombie et le Panama, 20 novembre 1976, Nations Unies, Recueil des Traités,vol. 1074,
p. 221 (onglet n°64 du dossier de plaidoiries du Chili Gour 2)).
89
DC, vol. II, annexe 22, p. 115.
9°CMC, vol. II, annexe 38, p. 339. -44-
28. Si la Cour se tourne à présent vers ce que donnerait la remise en cause du partage
équitable et solidaire que constituait dès 1952 le recours aux parallèles en lui substituant par
exemple des délimitations fondéessur l'équidistanceentre tous les pays concernés,elle constatera
91
que le seul paysà entirerparti serait précisémentle Péro• En affirmant aujourd'hui qu'il faut
substituer l'équidistance aux frontières établies par voie d'accord en 1952 et 1954, le Pérou
prétend, dans une posture individualiste, rompre avec l'esprit mêmequi présidaà cette alliance
régionalecontre l'appauvrissement des ressources naturelles.
29. Cette prétentionest néanmoinsintenable, comme du reste le manifeste la concession que
le Péroua dû faire à l'Equateur en revenant avec lui à la ligne de parallèle qui n'avait au demeurant
jamais cesséd'exister.
30. Décidément,Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, on ne saurait
construire l'équitésur les décombresde la solidarité vous remercie.
The PRESIDENT: Merci Monsieur Dupuy. The sitting is suspended for 20 minutes.
The Court adjournedfrom 11.35 to 11.55 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and 1invite Professor Paulsson
to address the Court. You have thefloor,Sir.
Mr. PAULSSON:
...--~T:RE1268ll262:MIXEQ C-··O·-··\··-I--S-I---- _______
1. Peru's attempt to trivialize the 1968/69 Mixed Commission
1. The subject of the 1968/1969 Commission is a very important one but 1 will spend no
more than five or six minutes on it because what needs to have been said has been said. Peru has
attempted to trivialize the 1968/1969 events. As he didthe first round, Sir Michael Wood spent,
it seemed, less than just a few minutes on what he calleddismissively- "the 1968/69 coastal
lights". That is ali he would like you to think it coastallights.
91
Voir onglet n° 140 du dossier de plaidoiries du Chili Uour 3). -45-
2. He took you to only one set of documents, namely an Exchange of Notes, first an
92
anonymous Note from the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 6 February 1968 ,to the
93
Chilean chargéd'affaires, and then to the chargéd'affaires' answer •
3. He said that these Notes were "the key instruments", and "not those referred to by
94
Chile" • That dispensed him, he seemed to think, from even mentioning -let alone discussing-
the many formai high-level documents 1reviewed with you at sorne length in the first round.
4. This is the single-page Peruvian Note Sir Michael showed you- it is at tab 142. It is
hardiy impressive. You can just look at it; the original version in Spanish on the left. We do not
see what department it came from; we do not know who signed it; it is described generically as
coming "from the Ministry".
5. Sir Michael was eager to make the point that there is no reference in this Note to
materializing the maritime boundary. That may be so. But when he paraphrased the text and
referred to the leading marks as being "for fishermen", it must be said that those words do not
appear in the Note either- nowhere; read it as long as you like- they were introduced by him.
6. And that is ali he said, totally neglecting the voluminous agreements and related
correspondence in 1968/1969, between high officiais of the two States. What he showed you was
an unremarkable lower leve! exchange that took place before the serious events started.
5
7. 1 reviewed the high-level instruments last Frida/ • Just to recall a few: following the
communications in February and Marcl1, the Parties' delegates met in April 1968. As you see on
your screens now, also at tab 143, they were given the task "to materialise the parallel [you will
96
remember these words] of the maritime frontier originating at Hito No. 1" • They carried out field
97
work on the ground and at sea , and proposed the construction of two leading marks along the
parallel of Hito No. 1. In an Exchange of Notes in August 1968, the Parties confirmed their
92
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 71.
93
/bid.Ann. 72.
94
CR 2012/33, p. 43, para. 42 (Wood).
95CR 2012/31, p. 22, para. 16; p. 24, para. 25; p. 26, para. 24; and p. 28, para. 28 (Paulsson).
96MP, Vol. II, Ann. 59, first para.
97Ibid.second para. -46-
acceptance of the delegates' proposai in its entiret/ 8• This was an international agreement,
Mr. President, creating obligations for both sides to respect them in good faith. The Notes repeated
the phrase "to materialise the parallel of the maritime frontier". The Peruvian Note of 5 August is
now shown on your screens, also at tab 144; you will recall, it was signed by
99
Mr. Pérezde Cuéllar •
8. In the same Exchange of Notes, the Parties agreed to ask the Mixed Commission to
"verizy the position of Hito No. 1 and indicate the definitive location of the towers or leading
100
marks" • And the Mixed Commission conducted elaborate field work in August 1969, including
topographically determining the parallel that runs through Hito No. 1 and fixing the location of the
leading marks. As you see now on your screens, and also at tab 145, on 22 August 1969, the heads
of the delegations submitted to their governments a formai joint report recording the Commission's
work, entitled "Act of the Chile-Peru Mixed Commission in Charge of Verizying the Location of
101
the Boundary Marker No. 1 and Signalling the Maritime Boundary" •
9. So you see, time and time again the senior officiais of both States repeat that they were
materializing the maritime boundary. Time after time. Sir Michael disciplined himself never once
to acknowledge these repeated statements of the purpose of the Mixed Commission. He bravely
told you to the contrary that the purpose was "the avoidance of incidents between artisanal
fishermen ... in the early 1960s" 102• Where did he get this? Certainly not in any single Iineof any
single page of any single document from 1968/1969. It is pure invention. That this was felt
necessary tells you something about the merits of the argument.
·········=:~---~~-----~}·o.·u~vèntfieô~timènts~~fiit_t_wèJïav~-jt!_srioo_g~~=at;-·iris~-_!io-won:aer·nùir·Per~Jü1foee~:=======·=~-==
Iooking hard for ways to attempt to trivialize the agreements of 1968/1969. Peru thinks it has
found two. I will start with the first-this is Peru's contention that these agreements had the sole
effect near the shore, and so are not significant for the courseof the boundary further out to sea.
98
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 74, first ibid.Ann. 75, second para.
99
/bid.
100
/bid.second para. See also MP, Vol. II, Ann. 75, third para.
10CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 6.
10CR 2012/34, p. 15, para. 37 (Wood). - 47-
2. Materialization of the full boundary
11. It was agreed that the lights were to be visible for approximately 15 miles 103• To achieve
104
that, it was also agreed that they would each be more than 20 metres tall • The materialization of
the parallel of the maritime boundary went beyond the beams of light. We know this because the
two States agreed to install a "radar reflector" on each tower 10, to be used for navigation by larger
vessels equipped with radar. Fishermen in the 1960s were not generally equipped with radar. Peru
insists on referring to "coastal lights". This is not a term ever used by the States in 196811969.
They called them "leading marks" 10, and that included radar reflectors.
12. Leading marks are used by sorne other States to allow mariners to identizy the maritime
boundaries precisely. For example, the 1980 Protocol, between the Soviet Union and Turkey, of
107
their Joint Commission concerning leading marks signalling the maritime boundary •
13. In any event- and this is the important point- obviously the length of a boundary that
is signalled is not determined by the range of the lights.
3. The boundary materialized a pre-existing division
of the Parties' maritime zones
14. That brings us to Peru's second attempt to downgrade the obvious significance of the
agreements between the Parties in 1968/1969. They deny the evidence of an all-purpose maritime
boundary- they insist it was just a practical arrangement concerned only with artisanal fishing.
But what the representatives ofthe Parties said in 1969 was that they were signalling "the maritime
boundary"- el Umite maritimo 108 . They were not ignorant of the significance of the word
"boundary". The head of the Peruvian delegation, Mr. President, was an Ambassador. Peru's
delegation included representatives of the Navy. The Head of Chile's delegation was the
Secretary-General of the Directorate of International Boundaries. Mr. Pérezde Cuéllarcertainly
103
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 59, para. 2 (c).
10CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 6, p. 41; MP, Vol. II, Ann. 59, paras. 2 (a) and 2 (b).
10MP, Vol. II, Ann. 59, paras. 2 (a) and 2 (b).
10/bid.; MP, Vol. III, Ann. 74; ibid., Ann. 75.
10CMC, Vol. V, Ann. 310, p. 1840.
108
/bid., Vol. II, Ann. 6, p. 35. -48-
knew the significance of the ward "frontier" when he wrote to Chile concerning "the installation of
109
leading marks to materialise the parallel ofthe maritime frontier" .
15. Those are words; how about actions? You will recall the Diez CCmseco incident.
Sir Michael said that in connection with that incident, Peru "referred to 'the frontier line',-not to
110
any international maritime boundary" . We see that the two States used boundary andfrontier
interchangeably. If it is Peru's case that frontier does not mean boundary then 1do not think we
have very much more to say. Or perhaps just one thing about the Diez Canseco. According to
Peru's own report of the incident- Peru's own report- on 22 March 1966, the Diez Canseco
fired 16 canon shots "to intimidate" two Chilean fishing vessels that had transgressed "the frontier
111
line" , or lineafronteriza. Using force in defence of a State's frontier cannat be explained away
by linguistic quibbles constructed 45 years later. The two States materialized and signalled a
maritime boundary, a real one, as made emphatically clear in the Act of the Mixed Commission of
22 August 1969 112•
NON-PERTINENCE OF THE LAND BOUNDARY
1. 1 turn now to my second presentation which concerns the non-pertinence of the land
boundary for your Court. My essential aim in this presentation is to persuade you of something
that can be said in fewer words than a Tweet. 1can say it in exactly 12 words: this Court need not
and cannat concern itselfwith the land boundary.
2. This conclusion follows from two propositions which I will deal with in arder.
--------1.-This.Courtdoes.not.have.judsdictionto .d . etermine.theJocation _______ ~_-~------~------------
of the land boundary terminus
3. First, this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the location of the land boundary
terminus. Mr. Bundy told you that "Peru simply requests the Court to adjudge and declare that the
maritime boundary between the Parties starts at Point Concordia as defined in the 1929-1930 legal
109
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 7p.435.
110
CR 2012/28, p.39,para.51 (Wood).
11CMC, Vol. III,Ann. 75.
11/bid., Vol. II, Ann. 6. - 49-
113
instruments" • That however is not the wording ofPeru's submission. The submission adds that
Point Concordia is "defined as the intersection with the low-water mark of a 10-kilometre radius
arc" 114• But, the Iow-water mark is not mentioned anywhere in the "instruments" of 1929 and
1930. Peru interprets those instruments as though there were an agreed point on the low-water line
but, if there is one thing we ail know, it is that there is no such agreement. This did not stop
Professor Pellet, in the last moment of his final presentation, from referring to "le point Concordia
tel qu'il a étédéfini conventionnellement en 1929 et 1930 [the Point Concordia as it had been
defined by agreement in 1929 and 1930]" 115•
4. Since the question whether there is such a point and, if so, where it is, are both questions
concerning the proper interpretation of the 1929 Treaty of Lima, the Court has no jurisdiction over
either ofthem. And in fact Peru does not, it seems, contest that absence ofjurisdiction.
5. Another way of saying this is as follows. Peni insists on applying the 1929 Treaty and
insists in particular that the completion of the land boundary requires a Punto Concordia at the
low-water mark. Chile does not accept that this is the effect of the 1929 Treaty. The Treaty has
already definitively settled the land boundary question and contains its own specifie provisions on
demarcation. Peru in fact seeks to put this dispute before you, although it does not concern this
Court. This case, not incidentally, is formally entitled "Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile)". The
1929 Treaty serties the question of how disputes under that Treaty are to be resolved. The Bogota
Pact does not allow settled matters to be questioned. 1will not repeat the detailed references 1gave
116
you in the first round •
6. Be this as it may, Peru insists that the land border terminates at 18° 21' 08" S as depicted
on this slide (tab 147), which Peru likes, and which was showed to you during each ofMr. Bundy's
presentations.
7. But how does that one map disprove that the land boundary does follow the Hito No. 1
117
line, as the many Peruvian sources 1referred you to last week indicate ? One example. Here is
11eR 2012/34, p. 18, para. 48 (Bundy).
11/bid., p. 44, para. 12 (Wagner).
115
/bid., p. 38, para. 40 (Pellet).
116
eR 2012/31, p. 39, paras 24-27 (Paulsson).
117
/bid., p. 34, para. 14 (Paulsson). -50-
Peru's Law of January 2001 defining the administrative boundaries of Peru's southernmost
province -Tacna.You can find it in tab 148. This Law provided that, on the inland side,
Tacna's boundary followed the international boundary down to Hito No. 1. Between Hito No. 1
and westward to the Pacifie Ocean, it was necessarily the parallelhe simple
reason that Article 3 ofthat Law defines the scope of the territory and in so doing reveals that there
is no Peruvian territory south ofthe H•to No. 1 parallel
8. Peru amended this 20on 17 January 2008. Mr. President, when did Peru make
its Application in this case? The day before.
9. The difference between these two different endpoints, as best as we can determine it by
looking at Peru's large-scale charts, is 46 metres of beach (tab 149). Peru surely did not bring this
case to argue about 46 metres of beach.
1O.Peru wants to convince you that sinee the land boundary terminus should be 46 metres to
the south of the maritime boundary, the entire maritime boundary at the Hito No. 1 parallel is now
to be seen as a legal impossibility.
11. On Tuesday Peru said that the Parties "agree that the intersection of the land boundary
with the low-water line is a matter that h•sIt would be more accurate to say
that the Parties agree that the land boundary has been fully settled. Peru has recently started to say
that the land boundary ends at the low-water line, at Point 266. That, let me be very clear, is
something Chile does not accept. Last Friday 1explained, as we did in our written pleadings, that
the Court has no jurisdiction over that matter, which belongs to the Treaty of Lima.
_________ -_--__---~-~~r:z~--AI~~~_!i~_:: ~_a~fei~~}~nea-_aMir•e~neaa--uii:-lm-i~§~~affer
196 km-boundary, consciously stopped at a stable poHito No. 1. Peru now
says that the fact that they did not take a few more steps, into a mixding
on the time of day and month, from that moment on it was impossible to fix the maritime border
anywhere except at the precise spot on the low-water line they should have gone to, even if by
1CMC, Vol.IV, Ann. 191, Art. 3.
119
RP, Vol. II, Ann. 16.
1°CR 2012/34, p. 12, para. 27 (Bundy). - 51 -
1952/1954 or 1968/1969 that spot would be out to sea, or up on the shore. This is nonsense. Let us
consider the highlights of the land-boundary story.
13. In 1928, Members of the Court, Peru and Chile put an end to nearly half a century of
estrangement by re-establishing diplomatie relations. The next year, they concluded the Treaty of
Lima, an historie document duly acknowledged and praised by the League of Nations. An
emblematic feature of that Treaty was of course the boundary agreement. Let us recall Article 2
(tab 150): "the frontier between the territories of Chile and Peru, shall start from a point on the
coast to be named 'Concordia"' 12•
On "the coast" you see - la costa not "at the low-water line". ln paragraph 2.1 of its
Reply, Peru flatly denied that Hito No. 1 is "on the coast". That is surely surprising. Some of us
have houses which we describe as being "on the coast" without meaning that one of its walls is
always wet.
14. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries gave their delegates identical
instructions to determine and mark the border on the coast. Here is the instruction given by the
Peruvian Ministry 122(tab 151).
15.Note the heading. 1hope you see it better than 1: Hito Concordia. Not Punto Concordia,
as Mr. Bundy would have liked. And it identifies it as the "starting point, on the coast, of the
borderline". This is a formai instruction of the Government of Peru. It says the Hito Concordia is
the starting point. Note that the line to be traced goes westward "running to intercept the
seashore".
"Starting point, on the coast" ... "line running to intercept the seashore".
16. These lines are so simple that you would think that they might be quoted just the way 1
read them to you. But no, the first time Peru mentioned this document, in its Memorial 12, it
preferred to paraphrase, and this is what Peru wrote: "Point Concordia was to be the point of
intersection between the Pacifie Ocean and an arc with a radius of 10 km ... ". Thus Peru, with no
textual basis, introduced the notion of intersecting with "an ocean", and not with "the seashore".
121
MP, Vol. Il, Ann. 45, Art. 2.
122
/bid., Vol. III, Ann. 87.
12MP, para. 1.36. -52-
And it referred to Point Concordia instead of Hito Concordia, which was Hito No. 1. Peru had the
audacity to write in paragraph 2.7 of its Reply, that Hito No. 1 was- 1 am quoting now- "no
more than one of a number of boundary markers created at various placés along the boundary".
But you cam1ot do this by taking liberties with your paraphrasing. We can all read the official
instruction: the Hito Concordia is the "punto inicial de la linea fronteriza".
17. This fonnal governmental instruction was perfectly in accord with the 1929 Treaty,
where you will not find the expression "low-water tine" anywhere.
18. The third document in this sequence is the Final Act of the 1930 Mixed Commission,
which recorded that it had concluded its work in accordance with the joint instructions (tab 152).
This Final Act describes the "demarcated boundary tine" as starting from "un punto en la orilla del
mar"- "a point on the seashore". The Act also confirmed that markers had been "positioned or
estabtished" in order to "definitively fix the said frontier tine between Chile and Peru on the
land" 12• Hito No. 1 is described as being on the orilla del mar, the shore, and on the
125
18° 21' 03" latitude •
19. 1 emphasize, Mr. President, the words definitivamente as applying to the whole border,
and the location orilla del mar for Hito No. 1.
20. So, this Final Act of the 1930 Mixed Commission was also perfectly in accord with the
1929 Treaty, where you will not find the expression "low-water tine" anywhere.
21. One looks, Members of the Court, in vain for a "Punto Concordia" seaward of Hito
No. 1. In fact it was not only decided to give this symbolic name "Concordia" to one of the hitos,
22. This was confirmed- I will not show it to you but if you like you can look at it at
tab 153 by a further Act which was signed two weeks later by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
126
ofPeru and the Chilean ambassador to Peru acting as plenipotentiary (tab 153). lt describes Hito
~C>M H No. 9- perhaps something new for you- as totallydifferen tl~other hitos- "a monument
124
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 54, p. 308, second and third paras.
125
/bid., p. 309.
12MP, Vol. II, Ann. 55. -53 -
of reinforced concrete measuring seven metres high" 12• There is no mystery here. The local
people did not walk around the Ionely sand dunes around the coast. On the average day, it is safe
to say that there are zero visitors to Hito No. 1, which is really not much to look at. Hito No. 9, on
the other hand, which bas been called Hito Concordia since 1930, is placed alongside the railroad
from Arica to Tacna, and hundreds ofPeruvian and Chilean passengers can until now every day see
this imposing monument from the ir windows- Hito Concordia- with the engraved Iikenessesof
the two countries' presidents of the time.
23. Stability had been the purpose of selecting Hito No. 1 as the most seaward of the
80 boundary markers of the 196-km land boundary. We have seen that the 1930 demarcation
exercise bad the objective of fixing such a point on the coast as close as possible to the sea without
endangering stability. As Ecuador explained to Argentina in 1969- you will remember- the
parties to the Santiago Declaration adopted parallels of latitude as their maritime boundaries
128
because they were "!ines of easy and simple recognition" • Using Hito No. 1 as the reference
point to materialize the operative parallel by constructing two Ieading marks to signal it gave
further effect to that objective. No one on either side ever uttered a word about the need for a point
on the Iow-water Iine until Peru decided to go to court.
24. For anyone to hear of Peru's ghostly Point 266, wherever it may be, we had to await the
year 2005.
25. On Tuesday, Mr. Bundy chided us for having used an updated Peruvian chart showing
that Peru's Point 266 is 180 m outdated. In fact if Peru's Iarge-scale charts are outdated that is
Peru's problem; it is for them to respect the requirement of UNCLOS Article 5. Mr. Bundy
certainly did not help his case when he showed you this chart, which he said was updated 129• This
is what he showed you, it is at tab 154, Point 266, Point Concordia, appearing to be very close to
the shore indeed. But what he did not tell you was that he was now using a chart with a scale of
1:500,000 ten times smaller than the "outdated" one and certainly not in compliance with
UNCLOS Article 5. With this minuscule scale, the size of Peru's fictional Point 266 is 500 m in
12MP, Vol. II, Ann. 55p.315.
12RC, Vol. II, Ann. 2p. 199.
129
CR 2012/34, p. 18, para. 46. -54-
diameter. In other words, Point 266 is not only off the low-water mark, but when one locates its
centre it is situated 250 rn out to sea. This was pure smoke and mirrors. Un tour de passe-passe;
unjuego de masse. 1am sure there is no harm; it will mislead no orie.
26. Peru's Punto Concordia is a pure invention. We can of course understarid what Peru was
really saying, which I imagine is something like this:
The Mixed Commission in 1930 should have followed the arc down to the
low-water line. When they got there, they should have baptized that spot the Punto
Concordia. And if they had done so, according to Peru, the impostor Punto Concordia
would have been at the parallel of 18° 21'08". And so that is where Punto Concordia
should be.
27. But Chile and Peru never did that. They never baptized a Punto Concordia. They rather
adopted the stable Hito No. 1 as the punta inicial de la lineafronteriza. And in so doing, they were
in perfect compliance with the terms ofthe 1929 Treaty.
28. Mr. Bundy complains that Chile did not go along with Peru's invitation, in 2005, that the
two States should now agree to the location of a phantom point which the Mixed Commission in
1930 plainly dispensed with. There was no reason for Chile to accept this invitation in 2005. On
the contrary, there was every reason for Chile not to do so, because this is Peru's invitation: Peru's
invitation to participate in this exercise was on the premise that there exists no maritime boundary,
as you can see in this letter now shown on the screen, tab 155. This was not mentioned by
Mr. Bundy.
29. 1come to the end of my first proposition. My purpose has not been to start an argument
here as to the terminus of the land boundary. The point was only to make you see that there could
settlement of the land boundary. That matter would be subject to the jurisdictional régimeof the
Treaty under which that purportedly definitive settlement was reached: the Treaty of Lima of
1929. That reality does not affect the task of your Court.
The second and shorter of my two propositions: -55-
2. In any event, the validity of a sea boundary does not depend on its
meeting the land boundary at the low-water mark
30. Peru has advanced a theory of a fatal rendezvous: when a maritime boundary reaches the
low-water line, it must always find the land boundary waiting for it at that spot. If this were so, the
maritime border will always be unstable if the shore is unstable. So if the shoreline advances or
recedes a few metres, a 200-mile-long maritime border must be relocated (tab 156). This is a very
unattractive proposition.
31. Is it true that coastlines change? To answer that question I cannot improve on
Mr. Bundy's own demonstration, perhaps unintentional. As I just said, he showed you a map-
the one with the 1:500,000 scale which he said- I quote- was "up-to-date" and "accurate".
That's interesting. Why do coastal maps need to be updated? Mr. Bundy gave you the answer: to
130
replace charts- I quote again- that "use outdated coastal geography" • And Mr. Bundy's
concern about keeping up with "geography"- he may have meant "geomorphology"- is
certainly appropriate in the present context. These are very long, flat beaches. ·This is a desert
environment- hardiy any vegetation, no rain to speak of, and much space for strong winds to
move the dry sand. And there are earthquakes.
32. So it is nonsense to suggest that the maritime boundary could only have originated from
a low-water line on the land boundary as fixed in 1930. That would bizarrely either force the
terminus of the land boundary into the water, or the terminus of the maritime boundary onto the
land- depending on the movement of the shore.
33. Peru says "the land dominates the sea". This expression is the kind of general maxim
which can seldom provide the solution to any legal dispute. In North Sea Continental Shelf, that
maxim had the general and uncontroversial effect of supporting the importance of closely
examining- and now I quote the words of the Court- the "geographical configuration of the
coastline ... whose continental shelves are to be delimited" (North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), IC.J.
Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96). That does not assist Peru. In fact, when he attempted to summarize
the case law regarding "the land dominates the sea" Mr. Bundy said this: "Itis thus the coast that
13CR 2012/34,p.18,para.46 (Bundy). -56-
131
generates maritime entitlements." Who can disagree with that? But this reference to the
significance of the "coast" is a long way from saying that there is sorne kind of weird jus cogens
duty to rendezvous at the low-water line.
34. In fact the principe of the land dominating the sea was perfectly well respected by both
Peru and Ch ile. The 1930 Commission had fixed the most seaward of the 80 hitos at Hito No. 1.
This was a location which in accordance with their instructions as you have seen was "on the
shore"- "a la orilla del mar", "sur le littoral". So when the two States materialized the maritime
boundary sorne 20 years later, they referred themselves to the first land boundary marker on the
132
shore- a la orilla del mar- as the point which would determine the maritime boundary • So
you see, they indeed allowed the land to dominate the sea.
35. Incidentally, Peru finds itself embarrassed today to explain its own straightforward
acceptance of the parallel of Hito No. 1 in the important Diez Canseco incident, as weil as in the
entire 1968-1969 sequence, and furthennore, in every one of the multiple instances reviewed by
Mr. Petrochilos on the first round. If Point 266 was the right answer, why wasn't there any
in.sistenceby Peru- or even a whisper of a hint of a suggestion- that the Hito No. 1 parallel was
wrong? Or that it was necessary to agree to Point 266 or sorne other point to the south-west of
Hito No. 1?
36. The truth is that for half a century Peru saw nothing wrong with Hito No. 1. The fiction
of the required rendezvous at the low-water line did not emerge until Peru had decided to go to
Court-just as no one had ever heard of Point 266 until2005.
point above the low-water tine to serve as a stable reference point for the maritime boundary. We
could only be perplexed at Mr. Bundy's attempt to dismiss Chile's account of the significant
international preceden con firming that maritime boundary agreements are not subject to sorne
kind of jus cogens obligation to rendezvous on the beach. His discussion of Guyana-Suriname, for
example, at paragraph 41, was as strange as if he was talking about sorne other unknown case.
131
CR 2012/29,p.42,para32 (Bundy).
132
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 59; CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 6. -57-
38. There were two inland reference points in Guyana that, when aligned, created an azimuth
which resulted in a 10° line that was the historical boundary. Both ofthese reference points were
on Guyana territory. With modern methods it was possible to use one of these pillars- this is
pillar No. 61 -as the reference point from which to extend a 10° azimuth into the sea.
39. This is exactly our situation. There is a reference point- Hito No. 1- and a precise
line- the parallel of latitude -just as there was in Guyana-Suriname.
40. The tribunal's award in that case was very careful; the maritime boundary is described to
start on the low-water Iine on the 10° azimuth from the inland point 61.
41. You have the same situation in ail of our other examples that Mr. Bundy breezily
dismissed without any analysis 13•
42. Incidentally, in Guyana-Suriname too, a jurisdictional issue arose and the tribunal
responded to it with a degree of prudence which Chile believes will commend itself to your Court.
In paragraph 308 of its award, the tribunal wrote this:
"The Tribunal recalls that Suriname argued that it does not have jurisdiction to
determine any question relating to the land boundary between the Parties. The
Tribunal's findings have no consequence for any land boundary that might exist -
between the Parties, and therefore ... this jurisdictional objection does not arise."
43. A perfect precedent, Mr. President.
44. As for our examples of dry coasts, they stand unrebutted. Dry coasts do not offend
international law, and are consistent with significant State practice. There is no jus cogens rule
against them. The only issue is whether the Parties agreed to the Hito No. 1 parallel as their
maritime boundary. The records of 1968-1969 answer that question with a compelling yes.
Members of the Court, Mr. President, thank you very much. Mr. Petrochilos stands ready.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Paulsson. I give the floor to Mr. Petrochilos. You
have the tloor, Sir.
133
CR 2012/34, p.16,para.42 (Bundy). -58-
Mr. PETROCHILOS: Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court.
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT PRACTICE OF THE PARTIES•
A. Pero does not grapple with the evidence
1. The Parties' practice is before the Court. The evidence is extensive. The Parties agree
that their practice evidencesan agreement between them; they disagree only as to what agreement
that was.
2. Peru says there was an undocumented, informai practice about a fisheries Iine, which was
also applied in a range of non-fisheries contexts.
3. Peru's theory breaks dawn at two Ievels. The first is that the boundary which the Parties
observed could not have been a fisheries Iine, because Peru never had a fisheries zone to delimit by
a fisheries Iine. We heard no disagreement from Peru with that straightforward proposition in the
first round. In fact, Peru's all-encompassing 200-mile "maritime dominion" covers the waters, the
sea-bed, the subsoil, and also the air space. That is the zone Peru had, that is the zone Peru
enforced: it enforced it vis-à-vis Chile, it enforced it vis-à-vis the world. That zone cannat be
delimited by a fisheries line.
4. Secondly, Peru's argument breaks dawn on the evidence. I opened last week by referring
to 15 official documents. The first of the three slides I used is now on your screens, and you will
also find it under tab 158. These 15 documents are either official Peruvian texts, which were
communicated to Chile, or documents that Chile and Peru created jointly, mostly in the 1960s.
absolutely nothing."
5. The documents stand, and their plain terms make the case ofChile better than an advocate
can. As you can see, they speak of"the maritime frontier ofPeru", Peru's "maritime frontier", the
Parties' "maritime boundary", and other all-encompassing, unqualified, and unreserved terms.
6. I will say this again, Mr. President: the ordinary meaning of the words "maritime
boundary" is maritime boundary. But Peru it now says it means- and I quote from Peru's
•Abbreviations: MP= Memorial of Peru; CMC = Counter-Memorial of Chile; RP = Reply of Peru; RC =
Rejoinder of Chile. -59-
opening speech - it means "partial arrangements of a provisional nature for specifie purposes in
the sea areas lying close to [the Parties'] coasts"134•
7. Mr. Lowe had something to say about the documentary record, but wisely he kept a safe
135
distance from it. He said that Chile latches on to any reference to a "parallel" • Weil, that is not
whatthese documents say: they speak of a maritime boundary, they speak of a maritime frontier.
8. Counsel for Peru also suggested that the references to a maritime boundary were "without
prejudice" to a future delimitation 136• With respect, the documents - which are Peruvian
documents, which you will find under tab 158 -are emphatically with prejudice. Peru was
asserting jurisdiction over Chilean nationals, it was arresting them, it was fining them, it was
shooting across their bows: these are matters of international responsibility of States, and a State is
expected to give a legal basis for its action. And Peru did. It referred to the maritime boundary.
B. The record evidences the Parties' agreement on their maritime boundary
9. 1now turn to address the evidence. To refresh memories, we have plotted on a chart the
data on record that can be plotted. With your indulgence, 1will be able to show you only a sample
ofPeru's practice, but a similar diagram for Chile's practice will also be under tab 159.
1O.So, on your screens, here is our canvas
now you see the positions from the boundary at which Peru's navy corvette, Diez Canseco, was
pursuing Chilean boats, in 1966- you see the little dots;
and now the positions from the boundary at which Peru arrested, and then fined, Chilean boats
in 1989 and 2000;
and here you see Peru's madel reporting point of entry into its maritime dominion -the little
triangle;
and now you see the point of authorized entry into Peru's air space;
and now you have the endpoint ofPeru's authorization ofthe submarine cable;
and finally you have the points of entry into and exit from Peru's maritime dominion, as were
reported to Peru to comply with its regulations.
134
eR 2012/27, p. 19, para. 12(Wagner).
135
eR 2012/33, p. 28, para. 112 and p. 29, para. 115 (Lowe).
13eR 2012/28, p. 29, para. Il (Wood). - 60-
And if you connect the that will be a straightforward you will see the course of
the maritime boundary.
11. Peru's arguments about individual pieces of evidence are limited. The Court may find it
helpful to hachecklist of the evidence to which both Parties make reference in this hearing.
This you will find at tabnd there you will see that most entries on the list are in normal
typeface on a white background. These are the elementse that Peru has not taken issue
within this hearing; they are uncontested. The highlighted entries indicate evidence by Chile
whose meaningeru contests, or evidence advanced by Peru. 1will be addressing the contested
issues, the highlighted entries: and you may even wish to take out the checklist from your folders
and use it as a guide to the points thats.
1. Bolivia's proposed maritime corridor would have been bounded by the Chile-Peru
maritime boundary
12. 1 start with the Bolivian proposed land corridor and maitem 1 on the
checklist.
13. What Chile proposed in 1975 is now on your screens, and also under tab 161. Chile said:
"[T]he cession will include the land territory thus described and the maritime territory between the
parallelsf the extreme points of the coast that will be ceded (territorial sea, economie zone and
continentallf)." (Emphasis added.) Plainly, Chile's proposai applied the pre-existing boundary
parallel between Chile and
14. Now to Peru's position on the issue, also on your screens. Peru accepted "[e]xclusive
------------- o-~oleireyjgrh!e-i~~j-~!_.9n_!h~ o_JI:t~itrs_nde_share<!~Qver_~ ____l__y~-----------
While, as Sir Michael pointed out, Peru's agreement was needed on the ,theitorial cessions
factf the matter is that Peru did take a position on the maritime zones for Bolivia.
DidPeru say that it was for Peru, and not for Chile, to grant the proposed maritime zone to
Bolivia? No.
DidPeru say that the maritime parallel with Chile could not have served as the boundary for
the Bolivian maritime zone? No.
137
CR 2012/p45,par50 (Wood). - 61 -
But would Peru, and should Peru, have raised such col1cerns if it believed it had claims to the
south of the parallel? Of course it would and of course it should.
15. Counsel opposite referred to the records of discussions between Chile and Peru. I
submitted last week to the Court that these records confirmed the following: "In a meeting
between Chile and Peru in July 1976, it was common ground that their maritime boundary had
been established; and also that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was applicable
138
between them." That is what 1said. My friend did not say otherwise. He said, however, that
139
"unilateral records are inherently unreliable" • With respect, they are not. Chile and Peru had no
difficulties with their maritime boundary in 1976. Chile could not have been preparing a record for
a dispute that was yet to be conceived by Peru and was submitted only decades later. And,
ultimately, it was open to Peru, if it wished, to provide its own records, along with additional
documents that it submitted to the Court before this hearing.
140
16. Counsel also suggested that the records submitted by Chile were incomplete • Weil, he
will find the complete documents in the documentation that Chile deposited with the Registry in
July 2011 141•
2. Sovereign control by navies: Peru's maritime district No. 31 conforms with the
maritime boundary
17. And now to item 3.1 on the checklist. Last week, 1 used a diagram to show that in
defining the areas of sovereign control by their navies, in 1987 and 1988, bath Parties respected
their maritime boundary. The diagram is now on your screens, and also at tab 162.
18. Peru took issue with this. It says that its Maritime District 31 - now highlighted- was
142
of "necessity" left undefined because there was no maritime boundary • But District 31 was not
left undefined. Its upper limit is the parallel of 16° 25' S; its lower limit is defined "as the frontier
13eR 2012/31, p. 44, para. 16(Petrochilos).
139
eR 2012/33, p. 46, para. 51 (Wood).
140/bid..
141Record of the fourth Meeting of the second round ofehile-Peru Discussions, 8 July 1976, deposited with.the
Registry,Il July 2011, as doc. No 7.
142eR 2012/33, p. 41, para. 36 (Wood). - 62-
boundary [limite fronterizo] between Peru and Chile" 143• If Peru wished to leave the lower limit
undefined, it would have said that the District extends "to the maximum extent of Peru's waters",
or "to an area to be defined by international agreement", or something of the sort. But the law is
definite; it speaks of a "frontier boundary". It was also open to Peru to include words of
reservation in its law, as Nicaragua had done in similar circumstances in the Nicaragua v.
144
Honduras case • But it did not.
19. Last week, 1 pointed out that Peru's present reading would have made its navy's task
unfeasible; and that it also conflicts with the Peruvian navy's actual enforcement record of the
boundary parallel. And we received no answer.
20. Peru's account of this law was thought up for this litigation and cannot be credited.
Maritime District 11, which is in the north- now highlighted- was defined in the 1987 law as
extending up to "the maritime frontier with Ecuador" 145• Peru acknowledged this last Tuesday 146,
but in the same breath, Peru tells the Court that there was no boundary with Ecuador until last
147
year • 1leave it there.
3. Co-operation between navies in enforcing the maritime boundary
21. 1turn now to item 5.4, which is on page 2 of your checklist- co-operation between the
Chilean and Peruvian navies in enforcing the boundary. The navies concluded an agreement in
1995. The agreement requires that boats arrested be taken to "the international political boundary"
and then handed over to the other State's navy. Last week, 1 also described the record of the
tab 163 of your folders for review at an appropriate time. It is entitled "Final Minutes of
143
Re, Vol. III, Ann. 90, p. 558, Art. A-020301 (j).
144
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaraguav.
Honduras), l.C.J. Reports 2007para. 254.
145
Re, Vol. III, Ann. 90, p. 557, Art. A-020301 (a).
14eR 2012/33, p. 41, para. 36 (Wood).
14eR 2012/28, p. 64, para. 38 (Bundy).
14eR 2012/31, pp. 57-58, para. 63 (Petrochilos).
149
eR 2012/33, p. 42, para. 37 (Wood). - 63-
Understanding" and it is signed by two Admirais- one for Chile, one for Peru. It is an agreement.
And in 2003, when Peru asked that the 1995 agreement be "set aside"- these were Peru's words
"set aside"- Peru itself described it as being an "agreement[] in force" 150•
4. Records ofChile's arrests south ofthe boundary parallel
23. Turning to item 5.6 on the checklist, on page 2; a few words about the records of Chile's
arrests of Peruvian fishermen. Counsel stated that "ali of [the] arrests [in 1984] took place just
151
offshore, and ali but one took place south of the equidistance line" •
24. Once more, my friend chose not to take account of Chile's formai complaint to Peru in
1965 about Peruvian vessels fotmd in waters 15 miles south of the boundary and 45 miles to the
west of the city of Arica 152• This location is weil offshore and it also happens to be 10 miles to the
north of the equidistance line. And there is every reason to believe that Chile continued to enforce
the boundary parallel in the same way, weil offshore, between 1965 and 1984.
5. Pern never authorized scientific research south of the boundary parallel
25. Now item 7- marine scientific research. This is a subject that hardly causes excitement
among lawyers. Weil, Sir Michael changed ali that. He came armed with a website extract, which
has behind it reams of new data. Last Tuesday, he submitted these extracts from the website of a
United States Government research agency, NOAA, and he suggested that these showed that
"Peruvian vessels conducted scientific research regarding fisheries and other matters south of the
153
parallel line between 1961 and 1965" . The website in fact says that this was oceanographie
research- nothing to do with fisheries- but that is hardly the problem.
26. Chile addressed marine research in its Counter-Memorial in March 2010. Peru replied
that such activities are irrelevant to prove a boundary agreement 15• It seems Peru now thinks
marine research does matter after ali, and Sir Michael's speech last Tuesday was Peru's first
substantive response.
15
°CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 29, para. C.l.
15CR 2012/33, p. 42, para. 38 (Wood).
15MP, Vol. III, Ann. 68, p. 407, paras. 1and 2; CR2012/31, p. 54, para. 52 (b) (Petrochilos).
153
CR2012/33, p. 47, para. 57 (Wood).
154
See RP, para. 4.26. - 64-
27. But tardiness is not the only problem with Peru's arguments.
First, Peru has not provided any record at alieruvian authorizations for research south of
the boundary parallel at any time. These extracts do not provide you any authorizations.
Secondly, the official Peruvian reports that we were able to find in the very little time available
since last Tuesday indicate that,1964 and 1965, the two Peruvian vessels mentioned by my
friend were involved in multinational research organized jointly by Colombia, Ecuador, Peru
and Chile. In fact, we also found a Press report from Arica in April 1965, which says that one
of the two Peruvian vessels was participating in "studies that both countries carr[ied] out off
their respective coasts". Chile will make these reports, which are in Spanish, available to the
Registry.
Thirdly, the data on thenited States website were submitted by Peru in 2003, but they were
updated or revised about a yearo- although, of course, they concern 40-year old research.
It is impossible to accept these data inthe circumstances.
28. Mr. President, Chile standsby its submission. There is no evidence that Peru has
purported to authorize any research project southhe boundary parallel at any time.
6. Official texts which did not require explicit reference to the maritime boundary
29. Now to item 9.2 on the checklist, which is at page 4. Mr. Colson has already addressed
item 9.1, whichis Peru's 1955 Supreme Resolution. On Tuesday, Sir Michael put up a slide
155
entitled"no reference to a lateral maritime boundary with Peru in Chilean legisla•He listed
~~~~ ~~~~~-~~~~~~~fChvielean-text ~sh~~~~arngume nLthaLChile.'slaws and regulationsdo~notre tfe~rth-e~~~~~~ ~~~~-~~~
~ ~ ~ ~- ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~~ ~ ~- ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ - - ~ ~· ~ · ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ · · · ~ - ~ - · - ~ -~ - · ~ ~ ~ ~ · · · ~ · · · - · · ~ · ~ · · - · ~ - · -
was somehow significant.
30. His list includes the message from Chile's Government to Congress on the approval of
the agreements reached in Santiago in 195215• It also includes the Decree which ratified these
157
agreements after congressionalproval • The role of such a Decree is simply to reproduce the
155
CR 2012/28, pp. 41-42, paras. 61 and 64 (Wood).
156
Message from the Chilean Executive to the Congress for the Approval of the 1952 Agreements, July 1954,
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 92.
157
Supreme Decree No. 432 of23 September 1954, MP, Vol. II, Ann. 30. - 65-
treaty text and confirm its approval. In the same manner, the Decree ratifying the 1984 Treaty with
158
Argentina does not state that this was a delimitation agreement, although of course it was. So
there is no point for Peru here.
159
31. As to the remaining three texts , the answer is common. The 200-mile zone of
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction under the Santiago Declaration became part of Chile's law
160
upon ratification • Subsequent laws and regulations that act upon the 200-mile zone need not in
every case set out every particular of that zone. In fact, the last two of the texts that Peni invoked
refer in express tenns, or by citation to legal instruments, to Chile's 200-mile zone as established
by the Santiago Declaration 161•
32. And that, I submit, is the key point here- and it is a point that Peru fails altogether to
grapple with- these laws and regulations concerned the Chilean 200-mile zone, established and
defined by the Santiago Declaration. They proceeded on the premise that Chile had a zone, and
that this was separate and distinct from the Peruvian and Ecuadorian zones.
7. Chile did confirm the maritime boundary with Pero in the context of
ratification ofUNCLOS
33. I turn now to item 10, which is on page 4 of the checklist. Peru said that Chile's
declaration upon ratification of UNCLOS- this was in 1997- mentions the 1984Treaty with
Argentina but not the Santiago Declaration. You are asked to infer from this that Chile considered
it had a maritime boundary with Argentina, but not with Peru 162• As Peru did not take you to the
document, we included it in your folders under tab 164. Itis a lengthy declaration which, in due
course, may merit a careful read.
34. The background to the text is as follows. A difficulty had arisen with Argentina, since
1982 in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, in respect of the legal status and navigation
158
RP, Vol. II, Ann. 22.
15Decree No. 292 of 25 July 1953, MP, Vol. II, Ann. 29; Decree No. 130 of Il February 1959, MP, Vol. IV,
Ann. 117; Decree No. 432 of 4 June 1963, MP, Vol. II, Ann. 31.
16MP, Vol. Il, Ann. 30.
16CMC, Vol. III, Ann. 117; MP, Vol. II, Ann. 31.
162
CR 2012/33, p. 14, para. 13 (Lowe). - 66 -·
163
régime of the Strait of Magellan and other chan•eArgentina stated its position in a
declaration upon ratifyingS, that was in 1995•4Then further objections and responses
165
followed but failed to resolve the issuehile felt it necessary to record its position in its
own declaration upon ratificationCLOS, two years later, in 199Paragraph 2 of the
declaration introduces the 1984 Treaty. The following paragraphs address the issue that bad arisen
with Argentina, in termshe application of Part II and Part III of UNCLOS.
35. So, in short, Chile's declaration was responsive to Argentina's, and it was not a trivial
listingfChile's delimitation agreements.
36.But there is one more point: in 1994, the President of Chile had advised Congress that
theUNCLOS provisions on delimitation were "absolutely compatible with the agreements in force
166
between Chile and its neighbouring countries, Peru and"• And that too was a public
statement, and three years before thedeclaration.But Peru chooses to ignore it. This
important document at also at tab 164.
8. Boundaries of functional zones agreed to coïncide with the maritime boundary
37. The last item on the checklist is No. 11, also on page 4, and it concerns functional zones,
such as Search and Rescue Zones,and Flight Information Regions, FIRs.
38. On the diagram on your screens and also tab 165, you see that the Parties' maritime
167
boundary also forms the border between (i) thezones of Chile and Peru, (ii) their
navigational warning areas, also called NAVAREAs(iii) the FIR of Lima, of Peru, and FIR
..····~~ ·f·!·:·\·!·1·t·~·f·l .i.~..- -·- ·l·.····:.~...·Çl. 1i!~l~~~
16Statement by the Delegation of Argentina, 1 April 1982, A/CONF.62/WS/l7 and Statement by the Delegation
ofChileAprill2 A/2,NF.62/WS/l9.
164
Law ofthe Sea Information CircularNo. 5, March 1997, p. 32.
165
Note verbale No. 107/96 of Chile to the United Nations of 9 September 1996, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 33,
1997, p. 83; Note verbale of Argentina to the United Nations of 14 May 1997, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 35, 1997,
p.lOI.
16RC, Vol. Il, Ann. 68, p. 383.
1/bidVol. III, Ann. 133, p. 832; and Ann. 134, p. 851.
168
RC, Vol. V, fig. 77.
169
CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 243, p. 1453. - 67-
39. The record shows that these limits of these functional zones were fixed, not without
prejudice to boundaries, which is the general position, but they were fixed on the specifie basis that
they would coïncide with a maritime boundary.
(a) So, starting with NAYARBAs, in 1975 Chile and Peru agreed, within the IMO process, that
170
these zones should be divided along "the latitude of the border between Chile and Peru" •
Peru does not dispute that the latitude of the border between Chile and Peru means the maritime
boundary 171•
(b) And as for the Parties' FIRs, as you see on the screen now, these were modified in 1962-
Peru's FIR became smaller in 1962- and that was in order to follow the maritime-boundary
172
parallel • This was recorded in the relevant Chilean Decree, which was of course published;
and Peru did not object.
(c) Lastly, when Chile's maritime SAR was defined by a decree, and this was in 1976, the parallel
of Hito No. 1 was fixed as the Iimit of that zone, and it was referred to there as "the Northern
173 174
Boundary parallel" : and again, Peru lodged no protest •
C. The relevant practice spans the period to August 2007
40. 1come now, Mr. President, to the third and final set of my observations, which will be
brief, and they concern the life, or the time-span of the relevant evidence. Earlier in these
proceedings it had been suggested that the Bakula Note of 1986 was a significant event in that
regard. This has been quietly abandoned by Peru in its closing argument. They were right to do so,
for three reasons.
41. The first reason is that, as I showed the Court last week, the Bakula Note was- and was
regarded in Peru as an "isolated event". The conduct of both Parties- not only Chile, but also
Peru- continued after 1986 much in the same way as before 175• 1described that Peru did much
that confirmed the boundary. And 1 also showed that Peru did not oppose Chile's continuing
17Re, Vol. HI, Ann. 125, p. 3, para. 16.
17eR 2012/28, p. 60, para. 24 (Bundy).
172
Re, Vol. II, Ann. 48.
173
eMe, Vol. HI, Ann. 132, Title Il, pa1..
174
Re, Vol. III, Ann.l26.
175
eR 2012/31, p. 67, para. 98 (Petrochilos). - 68-
affirmation of the boundary, including the three Chilean nautical charts in 1992, in 1994, and in
176
1998 which were met with no reservation by Peru until2000 •
42. The second reason is that immediately after the Bâkula Note, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Peru confirmed the existence of the maritime boundary with Chile; confrrmed that this
was a boundary under the Santiago Declaration; and confirmed that Peru had sought a
renegotiation of an existing boundary. That is to say, in 1986, Peru raised no dispute about the
existence or the legal source of the Parties' boundary.
43. The Minister's statements are at Annexes 141 and 142 to Chile's Rejoinder. Peru does
not take issue with them. And so, like the ministerial statements that the Court relied upon in the
FYROMv. Greece case very recently 17, they are key evidence ofPeru's position. And in fact we
heard from Ambassador Wagner that after 1986 Peru had other priorities than renegotiating the
178
boundary with Chile • And we respect this; but it carries legal consequences.
44. The third reason for which the evidential clock does not stop in 1986 - and in fact
continues to run until today- is a legal one. It is clear on the authorities, including your
jurisprudence, that an invitation to negotiate a boundary, as the Bâkula Note was, does not create a
eut-off date for the evidence. What is required is an affirmative claim to a maritime area, which is
then resisted by the other side. Until such time there is no legal dispute. No legal dispute has
179
crystallized and the evidential clock runs •
45. And, as I explained last week, Peru asserted no such claim to waters south of the
boundary parallel until August of 2007 180• And even after this time, continuation of the Parties'
176Ibid.p. 68, para. 99 (Petrochilos).
17Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniav.
Greece), Judgment of 5 December 20Il, para. 81.
17CR 2012/34, pp. 41-42, para. 6 (Wagner).
179
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), l.C.J. Reports 2007 (11p. 659, paras. 48-53, 121-122, 130-131Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Boundmy
Delimitation, International Legal MateriaVol. 25, 1986, p. 252, paras. 31-32.
18See MP, Vol. II, Ann. 24 and Vol. IV, fig. 2.4. - 69-
46. Now, Mr. President and Members of the Court, this concludes my pleading. I am
grateful for your attention. Mr. Wordsworth will continue with Chile's presentation after the
pause-déjeuner.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Petrochilos. The Court will meet again this afternoon
between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. to hear the conclusion of Chile's second round of oral argument and its
final submissions. Thank you. The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 1.00 p.m.
Public sitting held on Friday 14 December 2012, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning the Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile)