Corrigé
Corrected
CR2012/36
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2012
Public sitting
lzeld on Friday 14 December 2012, at 3 p.m., at tlzePeace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in tlze case conceming tMaritime Dispute
(Peru v. Chile)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNÉE2012
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 14 décembre2012, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidencede. Tomka, président,
en l'affaire Différendmaritime
(Pérouc. Chili)
COMPTE RENDU -2-
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepùlveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia
Registrar Couvreur - 3 -
Présents: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepùlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotriikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
MmesXue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges
MM. Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier -4-
Tlze Government oftlze Republic of Peru is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Allan Wagner, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Minister of
Defence, former Secretary-General of the Andean Community, Ambassador of Peru to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Rafael Roncagliolo, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Special Envoy;
H.E. Mr. JoséAntonio Garcia Belaunde, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Jorge Châvez Soto, Ambassador, member of the Peruvian Delegation to the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Eversheds
LLP, Paris,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de Droit International,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,former Member
and former Chainnan ofthe International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de
Droit International,
Mr. Tullio Treves, Professor at the Faculty of Law, State University of Milan, former judge of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Senior Consultant, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt
and Mosle, Milan,
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
as Counsel and Advocates;
-----~-~.·-----~--··---""·-·"····-
·········-·-·----·Mr;-Eduardo-Ferrero;·member·ofthePei1Tiaiiè11t~eütirt~orA:r6Tiraiîüi1;rôirrïèr-MTilisterfôrFore1grt==.:.::-
-·-··------·--·---·p;ffair!çme·mbenJf·the-Per
uvian·-nelegatian-to-the-Third-tJN-eonference·on-the-Law-ofihe-sea
;-----·- ····-··-·--
Mr. Vicente Ugarte del Pino, former President of the Supreme Court of Justice, former President of
the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, former Dean of the Lima Bar Association,
Mr. Roberto Mac Lean, former judge of the Supreme Court of Justice, former member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
H.E. Mr. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador ofPeru to Unesco,
as State Advocates; - 5-
Le Gouvernement de la Républiquedu Pérouest représenté par:
S. Exc. M. Allan Wagner, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures, ancien ministre
de la défense, ancien secrétaire généralde la Communauté andine, ambassadeur du Pérou
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rafael Roncagliolo, ministre des relations extérieures,
comme envoyéspécial;
S. Exc. M. JoséAntonio Garcia Belaunde, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
S. Exc. M. Jorge Chavez Soto, ambassadeur, membre de la délégation péruvienne à la
troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieuressur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et .
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associéde l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Tullio Treves, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'Universitéde Milan, ancien juge du Tribunal
international du droit de la mer, conseiller principal, cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt et
Mosle, Milan,
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G, membre du barreau d'Angleterre, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Eduardo Ferrero, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, ancien ministre des relations
extérieures, membre de la délégationpéruvienne à la troisième conférence des Nations Unies
sur le droit de la mer,
M. Juan Vicente Ugarte del Pino, ancien présidentde la Cour suprêmede justice, ancien président
de la Cour de justice de la Communautéandine, ancien bâtonnier, barreau de Lima,
M. Roberto Mac Lean, ancien juge de la Cour suprêmede justice, ancien membre de la Cour
permanente d'arbitrage,
S. Exc. M. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
ambassadeur du Pérouauprèsde l'Unesco,
comme avocats de l'Etat ; - 6-
Minister-Counsellor Marisol Agi.iero Colunga, LL.M., former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs on Law of the Sea Matters, Co-ordinator of the Peruvian Delegation,
H.E. Mr. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, Ambassador, Adviser ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
Mr. Juan JoséRuda, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Legal Adviser of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., New York University School of Law,
as Assistant Counsel;
Mr. Carlos Enrique Gamarra, Vice Admirai (retired), Hydrographer, Adviser to the Office for Law
of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ·
as Special Adviser;
Mr. Ramon Bahamonde, '(\'LA.A , dvisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
H Mr. Alejandro Deustt1+1aM , .A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Jaime Valdez, Lieutenant Commander (retired), National Cartographer of the Peruvian
Delegation,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Mr. Paul Duclos, Minister-Counsellor, LL.M., M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the
Ministry_ofForejgn_Affaü:s,
Mr. Alfredo Fortes, Counsellor, LL.M., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
Mr. JoséAntonio Torrico, Counsellor, M.A., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. CésarTalavera, First Secretary, M.Sc., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advisers; - 7 -
Mme Marisol Agüero Colunga, LL.M., ministre-conseiller et ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieures sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer, coordonnateur de la
délégationpéruvienne,
S. Exc. M. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, ambassadeur, conseiller du ministère des relations
extérieuressur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
M. Juan JoséRuda, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, conseiller juridique du ministère
des relations extérieures,
comme conseils ;
M. Benjamin Samson, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., facultéde droit de l'Universitéde New York,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Le vice-amiral (en retraite) Carlos Enrique Gamarra, hydrographe, conseiller auprès du bureau du
droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
comme conseiller spécial;
M. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Alejandro Deustua, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des relations
extérieures,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
Le capitaine de corvette (en retraite) Jaime Vaidez, cartographe de la délégationpéruvienne,
Le capitaine de vaisseau (en retraite) Aquiles Carcovich, cartographe,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Paul Duclos, ministre-conseiller, LL.M., M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des
relations extérieures,
M. Alfredo Fortes, conseiller, LL.M., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. José AntonioTorrico, conseiller, M.A., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. CésarTalavera, premier secrétaire,M.Sc., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ; -8-
Ms EvelyCamposSancheEmbassyof Perin thKingdomof the Netherlands,
Ph.D. candidate, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam,
Ms Charis Tan, Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore, member, Solicitor,
England and Wales, Eversheds
Mr. Raymundo Tullio Treves, Ph.D. candidate, Max Planck Research School for Successful
Disputes Settlement, Heidelberg,
as Assistants.
The Government oftlze Republic ofC/lile is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Albert van Klaveren Stork, Ambassador, former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ministry Foreign Affairs, Professorat the University ofChile,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Alfredo Moreno Charme, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile,
as National Authority;
H.E. Mr. Juan Martabit Scaff, Ambassador ofChile to the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
H.E. Ms Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, National Director ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry
Affairs,fessorat the University ofChile, member of the Institut de droit international,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and
Development, Geneva, and at the University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr. JamesCrawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Janulsson, President of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, President of
the Administrative Tribunal of the OECD, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
_ _.·.:~. :.:.:.~\•~lQ=•n.EA.\•!.2~!!.~Y::~!:T:: D_.1_Ç:l~:~l!ttQ~.:_:_tBf
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Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor oflnternational Law, University of Florence,
Mr. Georgiosochilos, Avocat à la Cour and Advocate of the Greek Supreme Court, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer
Mr. Samuel Wordswoiih; fnernber Ofthe Erf the Paris Bàr, Essex Court
Chambers,
Mr. Claudio Grossman, Dean,son Professor of International Law, American University,
Washington College of Law,
as Counsel and Advocates; - 9-
Mme Evelyn Campos Sanchez, ambassade du Pérou au Royaume des Pays-Bas, doctorant à
l'Amsterdam Center for International Law, Université d'Amsterdam,
Mme Charis Tan, avocat et solicitor (Singapour), membre du barreau de New York, solicitor
(Angleterre et Pays de Galle), cabinet Eversheds LLP,
M. Raymundo Tullio Treves, doctorant à l'International Max Planck Research School, section
spécialiséedans le règlement des différends internationaux, Heidelberg,
comme assistants.
Le Gouvernement de la République du Chili est représentépar :
S. Exc. M. Albert van Klaveren Stork, ambassadeur, ancien vice-ministre des relations extérieures,
ministère des relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Alfredo Moreno Charme, ministre des relations extérieures du Chili,
comme membre du Gouvernement;
S. Exc. M. Juan Martabit Scaff, ambassadeur du Chili auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. Mme Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, directeur national, frontières et limites, ministère des
relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili, membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
comme coagents ;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du
développement de Genève et à l'Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de l'Institut de
droit international,
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers,
M. Jan Paulsson, président du Conseil international pour l'arbitrage commercial, président du
Tribunal administratif de l'OCDE, cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. David A. Colson, avocat, cabinet Patton Boggs LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de l'Etat de Californie et du district de Columbia,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l'Université de Florence,
M. Georgios Petrochilos, avocat à la Cour et à la Cour suprême grecque, cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d'Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
M. Claudio Grossman, doyen, professeur titulaire de la Chaire R. Geraldson, American University,
facultéde droit de Washington,
comme conseils et avocats ; - 10-
H.E. Mr. Hernan Salinas, Ambassador, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professor,
Catholic University ofChile,
H.E. Mr. Luis Winter, Ambassador, Ministry ofForeign Affairs,
Mr. Enrique Barros Bourie, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Julio Faundez, Professor, University of Warwick,
Ms Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Andres Jana, Professor, University of Chile,
Ms Mariana Durney, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. John Ranson, Legal Officer, Professor oflnternational Law, Chilean Navy,
Mr. Ben Juratowitch, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Motohiro Maeda, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Special Adviser, Sovereign Geographie, member of the North Carolina
Bar,
H.E. Mr. Luis Goycoolea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Antonio Correa Olbrich, Counsellor, Embassy ofChile in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, Second Secretary, Embassy of Chile ir1 the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales and in Queensland, Australia,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore, Maryland, member ofthe Bars
ofVirginia and the District of Columbia,
-------- --MsAlexandra van der Meulen,-Avocat-à-la Gour-and member-ofthe-Bar-of-the-State-ofN ew-York,------
Mr. Francisco Abriani, member ofthe Buenos Aires Bar,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor oflnternational Law, University ofMacerata,
qs Acfyisers; .
Mr. Julio Poblete, National Division ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Fiona Bloor, United Kingdom Hydrographie Office,
Mr. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd.,
as Technical Advisers. - 11 -
S. Exc. M. Hernan Salinas, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
professeur à l'Université catholique du Chili,
S. Exc. M. Luis Winter, ambassadeur, ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Enrique Barras Bourie, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Julio Fa(mdez, professeur à l'Universitéde Warwick,
Mme Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Andres Jana, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
Mme Mariana Durney, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
M. John Ranson, conseiller juridique, professeur de droit international, marine chilienne,
M. Ben Juratowitch, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Motohiro Maeda, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, conseiller spécial, Sovereign Geographie, membre du barreau de Caroline
du Nord,
S. Exc. M. Luis Goycoolea, ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Antonio Correa Olbrich, conseiller à l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, deuxième secrétaire de l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland (Australie)),
Mme Nienke Grossman, professeur adjoint à l'Université de Baltimore, Maryland, membre des
barreaux de l'Etat de Virginie et du district de Columbia,
Mme Alexandra van der Meulen, avocat à la Cour et membre du barreau de l'Etat de New York,
M. Francisco Abriani, membre du barreau de Buenos Aires,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associéde droit international à l'Universitéde Macerata,
comme conseillers ;
M. Julio Poblete, division nationale des frontières et des limites, ministère des relations extérieures,
Mme Fiona Bloor, services hydrographiques du Royaume-Uni,
M. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd,
comme conseillers techniques. - 12-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. The sitting is open. The Court meets
this afternoon to hear the conclusion of Chile's second round of oral argument. 1 shall now give
the floor to Mr. Samuel Wordsworth. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. WORDSWORTH:
THE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE STATES' PRACTICE
1. Introduction
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear
before you, and a privilege to have been asked by Chile to pull together the thréads of the acts of
the Parties that post-date the agreements reached in 1952 and 1954, placing these in their
appropriate legal framework.
2. Peru has approached the practice of the Parties on the basis of two principles: and you
now know them well- first, that there is a heavy burden of proof in terms of establishing the
existence of a maritime boundary, and second, that practice must be concordant, common and
consistent.
3. The first point can be dealt with very speedily. Peru has belatedly recognized that Chile
1
does not have a tacit agreement case ,and that its repeated reference to the dicta from Nicaragua v.
Honduras is inapposite 2•
4. But that is not quite the end of burden of proof- because Peru has its own positive case
~--------~---~----~---~----:-----,---:----:~::-----:----~----::--:------·-:::--:-:--:-:---,-~--------~--------------- ------------------
practical and provisional arrangement with respect to a fishing
5. Where, one might ask, is that agreement to be found? And where is the practice that is
consistent with it, or that establishes a tacit agreement to the same effect? Peru has to meet the
burden in that respect, and must do so against the backdrop of Article IV of the Santiago
Declaration and also Article 1 of the Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement where, and
1CR 2012/33,p. 32,para.4.
2Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 2007, para253;cf. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 2009, para.68.
3See e.g. CR2012/33, p.27, para.109; p.36, para.19; p.43,para. 41. - 13 -
beyond any shadow of doubt, the Parties saw fit to refer to their existing maritime boundary in
express and carefully thought through language. And, if 1can take a leaf out of Peru's pleadings
for one moment, the existence of a provisional fishing line agreement in this case is certainly not
easily to be presumed.
2. Article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna Convention
6. Moving on to the question of the threshold to be met for practice to be material for the
purposes of Article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention, there are six points to be made; and, in
making these, 1 will be addressing the points on Article 31 (3) (b) that Sir Michael Wood made on
Tuesday.
4 5
7. First, both in its written pleadings and in its submissions last week , Peru sought to
characterize the 1954 Agreement on the Special Maritime Frontier Zone as forming part of the
Parties' practice for the purposes of Article 31 (3) (b). That is as defensive as it is misconceived,
and nothing more need be said on the point.
8. Secondly, when one cornes to the actual practice, the Parties are naturally agreed that, to
come within Article 31 (3) (b), the practice must establish the agreement of the Parties on
interpretation. However, the Court has also beard from Peru that "great caution is required when
looking at practice in order to confirm or establish boundary agreements, in particular international
maritime boundary agreements" ,- a proposition made by Sir Michael in the first round. He said
that "the situation in the present case is Iike that described" in the Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute case, and quoted a passage on how the Parties' practice could not prevail over the
absence from the treaty of any specifie reference to the term delimitation. And the passage was
apparently so on point that it was worth a repeat on Tuesdai.
9. But, and 1suspect the Court will already have this point, the passage relied on concerns
the interpretation of a compromis by which the two Parties had referred their dispute to the Court.
4RP, Chap. IV, paras. 4.1-4.2, and then 4.3 et seq.
5
See CR 2012/28, pp. 26-28.
6CR 2012/28, p. 27, para. 5, referring to Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras;
Nicaragua intervening), Judgment,.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 586, para. 380.
7CR 2012/33, p. 32, para. 14. - 14-
The passage has nothing whatsoever to do with interpretation of a boundary agreement. It so
happened that there was no express request in that compromis to carry out a delimitation exercise,
and the Court continued in the very next sentence after the passage on which Sir Michael relied:
"Whenever in the past a special agreement has entrusted the Court with a task related to
8
delimitation, it has spelled out very clearly what was asked of the Court ... " So, the context could
not be more different and, however many times it is repeated, this passage is of no assistance at ali
to the Court in the current case- which, of course, concerns a maritime boundary and not the
scope of the Court's jurisdiction under a special agreement.
10. Thirdly, Sir Michael referred to Sir lan Sinclair's formulation on concordant, common
and consistent practice and, no doubt with the due deference owed by one former Foreign Office
legal adviser to another, added a further qualification of his own- that the practice should be
9
clear • In fact, Sir lan, who was at the Vienna Conference, merely said that: "The value and
significance of subsequent practice will naturally depend on the extent to which it is concordant,
common and consistent. [And he continued] A practice is a sequence offacts or acts and cannot in
10
general be established by one isolated factor act or even by severa! individual applications."
11. That is entirely as would be expected, and 1 should add that Sir Ian's formulation itself
originated in the Hague Academy lectures of Mustafa Yasseen, whose emphasis was on the
practice being "concordante, commune et d'une certaine constance" 11• And that qualification-
"d'une certaine constance"- makes obvious sense, as there are no absolutes here. What matters is
whether the practice overall establishes an agreement on interpretation. On the facts then before it,
~-~~~~~ ~ ~ - ~~ -~ ~ -- ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ - ~ ~--- ~ ~~ -~ ~- - ~- - ~ ~ - -~ - - ~ - ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - r ~ - ~ ~ - ~ -~ ~ - ~ -~ ~ ~ - ~~ - - ~ ~ - -~- ~ - - ~ - ~ ~
--~-~--~-- th-e- -u rt-e-ld_ that this was not the case in Kasfkilj/_§§jluduIsland __ ,whichSit: Micha~_iQQ t_;k_y_o _u
but any comparison of (i) the decades of positive affirmations in this case, by both States, of the
existence oftheir maritime boundary with (ii) the limited practice ofNamibia and the predominant
silence of Botswana in Kasikili/Sedudu Island is pure wishful thinking.
8Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1992, p. 586, para. 380.
9CR 2012133, p. 32, para. 15.
10
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, p. 137.
11Yasseen, Recueil des cours 1976, p. 48.
12
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports I999 (II), p. 1087, para. 63. - 15-
12. Fourthly, it was said that "virtually ali" of the practice in this case was ruled out because
13
it was not in application of the Santiago Declaration • But this implies a requirement that the
practice must, in arder to establish agreement on interpretation, expressly refer to a given treaty.
There is no such requirement either stated orto be inferred from Kasikili/Sedudu Island, which you
were taken to. There, the test applied by the Court was whether the facts relied on constituted
"subsequent practice by the parties inthe interpretation of the treaties" 14•
13. And to take an example close to home, as it were, in the Beagle Channel case, the
relevant acts of Chile did not expressly refer to the Boundary Treaty of 1881 then in issue. They
were nonetheless held by the tribunal- which, of course, comprised five judges or former judges
of this Court- to be material to its interpretation, the critical factors being that the acts were
15
"public and well-known to Argentina, and that they could only derive from the Treaty" •
14. This case, however, is much stronger: the relevant acts are acts of both Chile and
Peru- acting in public, in a way weil known to each other, not least because they were actually
writing to each other on issues relating to the maritime boundary as weil as acting bilaterally in
certain instances. And the relevant acts were such that they could only derive from the Santiago
Declaration and its confirmation in 1954. In this respect, Peru has been wholly unable to put
before you some other tenable legal basis on which the Parties might have been acting- there is
no agreement for the establishment of a provisional fisheries tine, and Peru has been unable to
make any plausible case that there was.
15.lt would have been positively unusual if, each time Chile or Peru referred to their agreed
boundary in the decades of practice before you, they had also referred to the 1952 Declaration
and/or the 1954 agreements. Of course, there are various examples in the practice where the
16
Parties do explicitly refer to these treaties ; but the maritime boundary between Chile and Peru is
a long-settledjuridical fact, and was regarded as such by bath States. They repeatedly acted upon
13
CR 2012/33, p. 34, para. 11.
1Kasikili/Sedudulsland (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (Il), p. 1087, para. 80.
1Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, Award of 18 February 1977, United
Nations, RIAA, Vol. 21, para. 169. See also Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua/Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, para. 40.
16
CMC, Vol. III, Ann. 134, p. 843, Art. 1; RC, Vol. II, Anns. 53, 59-63 and 65-67; MP, Vol. II, Anns. 31 and 32;
CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 167. - 16-
the basis of that juridical fact in their unilateral and bilateral practice- as has been demonstrated
with notable clarity by Mr. Petrochilos. In short, the concordant practice can only be explained on
the basis that the two States regarded their maritime zones as delimited by the parallel they agreed
to in the Santiago Declaration and confirmed in 1954.
16. My fifth point is that it is inappropriate, as weil as plain inaccurate, for Peru to
characterize the practice post-1954 as a "montage of clippings" 1• The different elements of
practice must be considered individually and taken into account according to the extent that such
"constitutes objective evidence ofthe understanding of the parties asto the meaning of' Article IV
of the Santiago Declaration 18• Chile has not advocated a "global view" of practice as Sir Michael
suggested 19,and while Chile recognizes that the task of the Court in going through the details may
be unenviable, it is nonetheless regarded by Chile as essential.
17. And, to make the obvious point, the acts in question caver a broad spectrum. The acts of
the two States in agreeing the 1968-1969 materialization of the parallel of the maritime frontier,
which causes Peru so much difficulty, fall for consideration under Article 31 (3) (a) ofthe Vienna
Convention, as an agreement in application of the 1952 Declaration. At a different point on the
spectrum, and of particular weight within Article 31 (3) (b), a good part of the relevant practice is
contained in bilateral exchanges that expressly refer to and are predicated upon the existence of the
maritime boundary. To take two examples, Mr. Petrochilos has taken you to the negotiations of the
mid-1950s and 1961 on an agreement to permit the two States' fishermen to fish on either side of
the frontier line, and he has also taken you to Chile's proposai to Peru in 1975 that Bolivia should
················ ··6egranted.ifsown''miiriHmeterriforybetween.tne~iJaraiielsoitne-extreme~PûTnts·offnecoasnl1a.c
20
will be ceded" •
(a) So far as concerns the former, Peru itselfwas expressly recognizing the existence of the frontier
line in negotiations with Chile.
17
CR 2012/28, p.25.
18
Kasilcili/Sedudulsland (Botswana!Namibia), Judgment, lC.J Reports 1999 (Ilp. 1087,para.49.
19Cf. CR 2012/33, p.35,para. 18.
20RC, Vol. II, Ann. 26p.141. - 17-
(b) So far as concerns the latter, this was precisely a communication "such as called for sorne
reaction, within a reasonable period, on the part of the [Peruvian] authorities", to borrow the
21
well-known formula from the Temple of Preah Vihear case •
(c) Peru's failure to object undoubtedly has probative value, in particular when taken alongside
Peru's practice in support of the existence of the agreed maritime boundary over the preceding
two decades. The situation was analogons to that in the Guatemala-Honduras Boundary
Arbitration, where the tribunal found:
"If it had been considered that . . . Guatemala was asserting authority over
territory which was, or prior to independence had been, under the administrative
control of Honduras, it can hardly be doubted that these assertions by Guatemala
would have roused immediate antagonism and would have been followed by protest or
22
opposition on the part of Honduras."
18. Just so here. And as this makes clear, and as indeed has been long established, unilateral
23
acts will also suffice if they reveal the agreement of the parties on interpretation •
19. In such circumstances, the unilateral acts must of course be visible to the other concerned
party or parties, and must be such as to require a response, but these criteria are readily met. ln his
two presentations, Mr. Petrochilos has taken you to ample examples of Chilean laws and
regulations, or to industrial fishing permits published in the official gazette, or to acts of arrest or
escorting of Peruvian vessels back to the maritime boundary Iine, including in certain cases hand
over to the Peruvian authorities 24•
20. The after-the-event suggestion that Peru was exercising restraint, in its failure to protest
J4 "J is, with respect, not serious~ bears no relation to the legal and factual context of the Jan Mayen
2Temple ofPreah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits,Judgment, lC.J. Reports 1962, p.23.
2Guatemala-Honduras Boundmy Arbitration, Award of 23 January 1933, United Nations, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA)Vol. 2, p. 1324. See alsoDispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the
Beagle Channel,Award of 18 February 1977, United Nations,RIAA, Vol. 21, para. 169.
2See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties- First and Second Sessions: Documents of the
Conference, 1968-1969, para. 15:
"Such agreement may be expressed through their joint or parallel positive activity, but it may also
be ascertained from the activity of only one of the parties, where there is assent or Jack of objection by the
other party. As is remarked by the International Law Commission, it is sufficient that the other party
accepts that practice."
24
See for example CR 2012/31, pp. 53-54, paras 50-51; pp. 56-57, paras 58-61; pp. 57-58, para. 63 (Petrochilos). - 18-
case that was relied on 25• It certainly bears no plausible relation to the facts of this case, not !east
given that Peru has itself invoked or referred to the maritime boundary on near countless occasions.
21. As my sixth and final point on this tapie, it is also to be noted that practice may still be of
relevance to the Court even where it does not meet the requisite threshold of Article 31 (3) (b).
Thus, in the Kasikili/Sedudu case, the Court found that certain acts, while not constituting
subsequent practice by the parties in the interpretation of the 1890 Treaty, nevertheless supported
the conclusions which the Court had reached through interpretation in accordance with ordinary
meaning 26, while the tribunal in the Ethiopia/Eritrea case found that: "practice or conduct may
affect the legal relations of the Parties even though it cannat be said to be practice in the application
of the Treaty or to constitute an agreement between them" 27•
3. Application of the legal principles to the parties' respective cases on practice
22. How, then, against this legal backdrop, do the Parties' respective cases on practice stand
up to scrutiny?
23. In his first speech last week, Professor Lowe introduced the image of the jigsaw puzzle,
and suggested that Chile was trying to fit together pieces that in fact came from different puzzles 28•
24. The image is not an unhelpful one, as the Court does now have a set of pieces before it,
and the question is whether, when the pieces are fitted together, they reveal the words "Maritime
boundary agreed in 1952, confirmed in 1954", which is of course Chile's case, or "No maritime
boundary; agreement on a near-shore provisional fishing line only", which is the starting-point for
the pieces of the puzzle that simply will not fit so far as concerns the parties' respective cases.
Those pieces will demonstrate to what extent practice has been inconsistent, or lacked
concordance.
25CR 2012/33, p. 36.
26Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, J.C.JReports 1999, para. 80.
2Decision regarding delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Awardof 13April2002, United
Nations, RIAA, Vol. 25, para. 3.6.
2CR 2012/29, p. 21. - 19-
Chile's case
25. First then, Chile's case. As matters have tumed out over the past two weeks, we see that
Peru has an A, B, C of pieces that it says do not fit into Chile's case- that is, Argentina, the two
Bs of Bazan and Bakula, and then the C, which is Chile's conduct, in particular in relation to the
supposed lacunae in terms ofChilean legislation and Chilean maps.
26. Mr. Petrochilos has already dealt with the issue on Argentina when it came to ratification
ofUNCLOS, and Mr. Colson will return later to the points Peru seeks to make by reference to the
form of Chile's 1984 Treaty with Argentina. On Mr. Bakula's memorandum, I need only add that,
in particular when taken with Foreign Minister Wagner's comments recognizing the existence of an
established maritime boundary, this could not be characterized as a communication such as called
for sorne reaction on the part of the Chilean authorities 29• Peru had in no sense made an affirmative
claim to Chile's maritime zone. And of course Peru's subsequent practice bears this out.
27. However, as we have now been taken to task for not focusing on the 1964 Bâzan
opinion 30,I am going to deal with this in a little detail.
28. And like ali the documents that Peru has taken you to, we invite the Court to read the
31
Bazan Opinion in its entirety • It is at tab 167 of your judges' folder, and I invite you to tum to
that.
(a) At the top of the first page of the translation, which is at page 3 oftab 167 and now appearing
on the screen, you will see the heading, which reflects the ultimate conclusion of the opinion.
It reads: "The maritime delimitation between Chile and Peru is the parallel that passes through
the point at which its land frontier touches the sea." And that seems clear enough.
(b) Tuming to page 5 of the tab, at the bottom, you will see the passage that Peru has
emphasized- "it is possible to state such an agreement exists". You were not taken to the
32
remainder of the sentence ,which makes clear that no equivocation was intended. Mr. Bazan
considered that consequently the agreement "must be followed".
29
CR 2012/28, p. 25.
3°CR 2012/33, p. 36.
31RC, Vol. II, Ann. 47.
32CR 2012/28, p.43. -20-
(c) Likewise, at the top of page 7 of the tab, one sees the reference to Article IV of the
1952 Declaration as "a provision that, although it does not constitute an express pact for
determining the lateral boundary of the respective territorial seas, starts by assuming that this
boundary coïncides with the parallelPeru did not, however, take you to Mr. Bazan's
concluded view on Article IV, lower down on page 7, which"the aforementioned
number IV unquestionably reveals that, for the contracting parties, what delimits their territorial
seas is neither the prolongation of the land frontier, nor a perpendicular to the coast, nor the
median line, but a geographie parallel". And one can readily see how Peru might skip over that
as it tries to claim Mr. Bazan for one of its own.
(d) At the bottom of page 7, Mr. Bazan starts to consider the 1954 Agreement on the Special
Maritime Frontier Zone and notes how its Article 1 contains an explicit recognition of the
maritime boundary. We agree. The passage continues onto page 9, and leads to a passage that
3
Peru took you to, outits contexBut the analysis -vDeclaratir-limits itself to
reaffirming, an emphatic and positive manner, a pre-existent fact upon which Chile, Peru and
:ti \H- Ecuador are in agreementtt ifthe fact that the boundary between their territorial seas is a
'' ""*- ("geographipara ilananalyls at lealylup~oratteexistence in 1954 of an agreed
maritime boundary, and not sorne practical and provisional arrangement.
(e) Notably, Peru also did not take you to Mr. Bazan's overall conclusion, at page 11 of the tab,
that
"the maritime boundary between Chile and Peru follows the parallel that passes
tlrrough:_~the:point::at::which~:th:e:~land:: ave:notierreaches::the::sea;:::because~they-
----------------... arranged-in-the-exercise-of-their-soverean-agreement-whose-scope-and- ..--·---
characteristics they themselves indicated in the international instruments referred to
above".
(f) You will also recall being shown the sketch-map that accompanies the opinion, which shows
the geographie parallel, but also a median line and a perpendYou were not,
however, taken to the relevant passage in twhich is just above the conclusion on
page 11 of your tabwhere this sketch is introduced. Mr. Bazan explains that if any other
delimitation than a parallel bad been applied, "our 200-mile zone would have been truncated
3CR 2012/33, p. 37. - 21 -
from Iquique or from Pisagua to Arica, while the Peruvian zone would have advanced towards
the south of this port and place itselfbetween the waters subject to our sovereignty and the high
seas". Thus, he continued, in words that in fairness you rnight have been taken to: "The
attached drawing shows more clearly the inadmissibility of the situation that would have
resulted" (ernphasis added). In other words, the sketch-rnap shows precisely the two lines other
than the parallel that Chile would never have agreed to.
29. So rnuch, then, for what Mr. Bazan in fact said. There are three short points:
30. First, the Note contains the views of a past legal adviser, contained in an advice given for
internai purposes, but in so far as weight attaches to it, it is in support of Chile's case. The
conclusion on the existence of a maritime boundary is unequivocal, and the differences in his legal
reasoning may stern from the fact that he does not refer to, and may not have considered, the 1952
and 1954 Minutes.
31. Secondly, when the advice was subsequently published in the annual Mernoria of Chile's
Foreign Ministry, Peru did not raise any hint of concern, including with the key conclusion- that
the maritime boundary followed a parallel of latitude.
32. Finally, the Bazan opinion is dated 15 Septernber 1964. When it cornes to the Partie[S'
bilateral relations, this evidently was not perceived as calling into question the existence of an
agreed maritime boundary; and how could it? In the next major step in terrns of the rnaterial
practice, Chile and Peru set about the task of "the installation of leading marks to materialise the
parallel of the maritime frontier" that, of course, is a quote from Peru's letter to Chile of
5 August 1968 34•
33. 1rnove very briefly on from the As and Bs to the Cs, that is Chilean conduct.
34. The supposed lacunae did not exist, as Mr. Petrochilos has shown. Chile's legislation
does not reflect the gap that Peru would wish for, whilst Peru's case on rnaps is dependent on the
Bakula memorandum, the supposed importance of which has now fallen away. The bare fact
rernains that Chile published several maps showing the maritime boundary- to which Peru did
not protest until eight years after publication of the first map.
34
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 47. -22-
Peru's case
35. To return, then, to Professor Lowe's analogy, it is very obvious when one cames to the
comparison that there are, by contrast, multiple pieces that Peru cannat fit into the jigsaw that it has
put before you. These start from the need to give meaning to the key wording of Article IV of the
Santiago Declaration, and then go forward through the various sets of Minutes, the
1954 Agreements, the 1955 Supreme Resolution of Peru, which of course expressly refers to the
Santiago Declaration and which Peru's Minister ofExternal Relations took the care oflodging with
the United Nations legislative series by Note Verbale dated 22 August 1972 35, and then there are
the 1968-1969 agreements on materialization of the maritime boundary, and then the further
abundant practice.
36. Peru has done what it can, but it cannat explain these away- neither by reference to the
facts, nor by reference to the applicable legal principles.
37. In this respect, it is useful to pause, to imagine just what Peru's conduct would have been
in these decades if it had truly believed that there was no maritime boundary in place and that the
agreed line was truly just a provisional Iine for fishing purposes. In such a case, you would have
been shawn:
(a) First, the language of provisional nature and practical arrangement and near-shore application
that Peru's counselseeks belatedly to read into the Agreement on a Special Maritime Frontier
Zone, not to say an Agreement with a rather different title;
(b) Second, equivalent language of reservation in the 1968-1969 agreements on the materialization
- ~ ~ ~ · ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ -· ~ ~ ~ . ~- - - - ~ ~ - - - ~ - ~ ~ - - · ~ ~ · - 3 6 ~ ~ - - ~ ~ ~ - -~ ~ ~ - · - - - ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ - · - ~ - --~ - ~ · - · ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
expressly to the "limite maritimo" ;
(c) Third, Peru would have relied on the absence of Acts where Peru has invoked or referred to the
maritime boundary- so, for example, no 1955 Supreme Resolution and no Iodging of that
Resolution with the United Nations;
35CMC, Vol. IV,Ann. 164, p. 990 at fn. 1.
36
CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 6, p. 34. -23-
(d) Fourth, you would have been shawn a long series of protests by Peru in response to the
occasions on which Chile has invoked the maritime boundary in its relations with Peru and,
37
likewise, so far as concems Ecuador's invocation ofthe boundary ;
(e) Fifth, you would have seen sorne opposition or reaction by Peru where other States have
referred to the maritime boundary, whether before this Court 38,or in their publications such as
39
those of the United States of America or China that Mr. Crawford took you to in opening ;
(f) And, finaliy, you would have been shawn sorne form of reaction to the judicial views of
40
President Bustamante y Rivero , or to the clearly expressed views of President Jiménez de
Aréchaga 41,and other commentators 42•
38. But of course none of this exists. The evidence is ali to the contrary.
4. Conclusion
39. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the reality is that this is a case where bath Parties
have, through the ir practice, recognized the existence of the maritime boundary, and that practice
was always precisely as would be expected, given that bath were recognizing an agreed maritime
boundary. Peru is seeking belatedly to deconstruct practice that readily satisfies the criteria for
Article 31 (3) (b), and is also bath coherent and comprehensive.
40. As to the competing jigsaw puzzles, there is a simple reason why the Peruvian pieces
cannat be fitted into the case it has brought before you. It is that, until very recently and until
Peru's case was conceived sorne five or ten years aga, the completed puzzles of bath Parties read
"maritime boundary agreed in 1952, confirmed in 1954".
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1thank you for your kind attention and ask you please
to cali Professor Dupuy to the tloor.
3CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 212.
3See CMC, paras. 2.230-2.234; RC, paras. 5.7-5.8.
3CMC, Vol. IV, Anns. 216,219,220 and 222; CMC, Vol. VI, fig. 13; CMC, Vol IV, Ann. 218; CMC, Vol. VI,
fig. 14.
4North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 1969, separate opinion of President Bustamente y Rivero, p. 61,
para. 6(b).
41
CMC, Vol. V, Ann. 280.
42
See CMC, paras. 2.237-2.262; RC, paras. 5.16-5.17. -24-
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Wordsworth. Je passe la parole au professeur Dupuy.
Vous avez la parole, Monsieur.
M.DUPUY:
L'ATTITUDE DE L'EQUATEUR
1. Monsieur le président, mardi dernier, le conseil du Pérou, étant intervenu sur cette
question, a tentéde vous persuader de deux choses- il s'agit de l'attitude de l'Equateur. D'abord,
qu'étaient imaginaires les affirmations du Chili selon lesquelles le Pérouavait fait toute une série
de concessions à l'Equateur à propos de l'existence de la frontière maritime entre les deux pays ;
ensuite, que cette frontière n'avait en réalitéétéfixéeque tout récemment, le 2 mai 2011, preuve,
selon lui, que, jusque-là, elle n'existait pas. Le conseil du Pérouvoulait ainsi, fùt-ce implicitement,
vous conduire à la conclusion que 1'Equateur partageait la thèse du Pérousur la nouveautéde cette
délimitation.
2. Cela nous impose de recadrer le débat,Monsieur le président. Le point de fait et de droit
qui est d'importance pour la Cour n'est pas à ce stade de savoir quelle est la thèse du Pérou à
l'égardde sa frontière maritime avec son voisin du nord; ce qui est en cause à présentest ce que
pense et ce qu'a toujours pensé l'Equateur, troisième Etat partie aux accords de 1952 et de 1954.
L'Equateur a-t-il toujours considéréque les frontières maritimes entre les trois pays, donc aussi les
siennes avec le Pérou,avaient étéfixéesdès le 18 aoüt 1952 ? Ou bien partage-t-il la conception
du Péroud'après laquelle cette frontière serait encore flambant neuve, puisqu'elle ne daterait que
3. Dans le second cas, la thèse du Pérouen sortirait renforcée. Dans le premier au contraire,
la Cour devrait constater que deux sur trois des Etats parties à la déclaration de Santiago, le Chili et
l'Equateur, partagent la mêmeinterprétation à l'égard du contenu de la déclaration de Santiago,
puisque la nature conventionnelle de celle-ci est désormais admise par le Pérou. La position de
l'Equateur est donc tout simplement déterminante dans la présenteaffaire; ceci explique, ainsi que
je l'ai montré la semaine dernière, pourquoi le Pérou s'est donné tant de mal pour que vous ne
puissiez entendre dans cette salle la réponsedu grand absent. - 25-
4. Dans ces conditions, la meilleure façon d'utiliser ce second tour, fût-ce au prix de
certaines répétitionsdes faits déjàrapportés dans ma plaidoirie de la semaine dernière, à laquelle
aucun des éléments n'a subi de contestation véritable, est de revenir sur les manifestations
successives de la constance de l'Equateur. Ceci constituera la première des deux parties de ma
plaidoirie. La seconde sera consacrée au réexamen de la ligne frontière qui figure sur la carte
annexéeà l'échange de notes entre le Pérouet l'Equateur du 2 mai 2011.
1.La chronologie des manifestations de l'interprétationéquatorienne
de la déclarationde Santiago
5. Monsieur le président,nous avons préparépour les membres de la Cour un document de
travail sous forme d'un tableau. Vous le trouverez aux onglets n° 170 et 171 de votre dossier. Le
premier d'entre eux est en anglais, le second en français. Ce tableau est constitué de la façon
suivante. Dans la première colonne en partant de la gauche, vous trouverez des dates; celles
auxquelles les actes ou, selon les cas, des faits juridiques sont intervenus. Ils ont tous un point
commun. Ils émanentdu mêmeauteur. Cet auteur, c'est l'Equateur 43.
6. Dans la seconde colonne, toujours en partant de la gauche, vous trouverez la description
du texte chaque fois considéré,qu'il s'agisse de résolutions ou communiqués, unilatéraux ou
conjoints, de notes diplomatiques, de communiqués de presse émanant du ministère des affaires
étrangèreséquatorien,de cartes marines ou de rapports de commissions parlementaires.
7. Dans la troisième colonne, vous pourrez lire le passage pertinent du document en cause et
vous constaterez ainsi ce qu'il dit explicitement. Enfin, dans la dernière colonne sur la droite de ce
tableau, vous trouverez les référencesdes annexes dans lesquelles l'intégralitéde ces textes peut
êtreretrouvée.
8. La consultation d'un tel tableau est très instructive. Tous ces documents, tous,
Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, disent deux choses. La première, c'est
que pour l'Equateur les frontières maritimes entre les trois Etats ont étéfixées dès 1952. La
seconde, c'est que le texte à l'origine de cette détermination est toujours le même. C'est la
43
A l'exception de l'annexe 79 au contre-mémoiredu Chili, qui émanedu Péroumais qui rapporte les propos de
l'Equateur. -26-
déclaration de Santiagoqui, dois-je le rappeler, fut aussi jusqu'à 2005 la position que
partageaitPérou.
9. Le temps étantimportant dans cette histoire comme dans bien d'autres, pour bien réaliser
que l'Equateur dit la mêmechoseet après le 2 mai 2011, vous pourrez de plus consulter à
l'onglet 173 de votre dossier une échellechronologique sur laquelle sont rapportées les dates
d'émission des mêmesdocuments que ceux recensésdanseau qui la précède,eux-mêmes
déjàclassésdans l'ordre chronologique.
1O. Alors, je pourrais m'arrêterlà et vous laisser étudier ce tableau dans vos bureaux
respectifs, tantrle de lui-même. J'aurais pu m'en tenir là, d'autant que vous auriez peut-être
préférentendre à ce propos une plaidoirie plus coloréepour animer l'argumentation chilienne,
avec fleurs de rhétoriqueet effets de manche, les miennes étantassez grandes pour cela
11. Hélas,non, Monsieur le président! Il faut ici se confronter aux faits, rien qu'aux faits.
C'est eux, eux seuls qui vous diront, qui vous rediront quelle est, aujourd'hui comme hier, la
position intangibleEquateur à propos de la date de créationde sa frontièreavec le Pérouet du
choix du parallèlegéographiquecomme son vecteur fondamental.
12. Je vais toutefois faire en sorte de ne pas solliciter de façon excessive votre attention,
étantentendu que vous aurez toutir de consulter à nouveau ce document pour les besoins de
la préparation du jugement que vous rendrez dans la préPour ce faire, me
permettrai de faire une sélectionparmi ces documents mêmesitsont également
pertinents.
_______________ _e~~_~~_~v_liisctéjm à-~pa~ria.(!~_a§nsemalne ·e_1arioliÇèruat9rleiine
sur les lignes de base de 1971, à laquelle le Péroun;je reviendrai plutôt sur le
quatrièmedocument dans le tableau qui vous est présenté.Faisant suite à la résolutiondu Congrès
national équatorienadoptéequinze jours plus tôt, c'est la déclarationconjointe des présidentsde
l'Equateur et du Chili en date dumbre 2005;yiréaffirment l'un et l'autre la pleine
validitédes frontièresmaritimes établiespar la déclarationde 1952 et leur plein accord relatif à la
zone frontalière maritime spéciale. Rappelons que cette prise de position commune est destinéeà
44CR 2012/32, p. 15, par. 14 (Dupuy); CMC, vol. IV, annexe 212, p. 1263. -27-
contrer les prétentionsmanifestéespar le Pérou,celui-ci se décidantalors à contester ouvertement
45
l'existence de ces frontières •
14. Je dirigerai ensuite votre attention sur un document mentionnésur la deuxième page de
votre tableau. Il s'agit de celui qui précise,le 7 février 2008, que la déclarationde Santiago et le
traitéprécitéde 1954 ne se contentent pas de fixer de simples critères de délimitationmais qu'ils
établissentbien cette délimitationelle-même. L'Equateur insiste là-dessus car il se défiedes seuls
46
«critères» dont parle à ce propos le Pérou , notion par définitionrevisable et peu compatible avec
la stabilitédes frontièresexistantes.
15. Toujours en page 2 du tableau, outre le communiqué conjoint du 6-7 septembre 2009
publiéune fois encore par l'Equateur et le Chili qui reprend la désignationdes traitésde 1952 et
de 1954 comme fondement d'une délimitation effective, vous retrouverez en particulier le
communiquédu présidentCorrea, le présidentéquatorien,datant du Il octobre 2010 que je citais
aussi vendredi dernier47• Souvenez-vous. Ce document est une mise en demeure sinon une menace
adresséepar lui au Pérou. C'est celui dans lequel le présidentde l'Equateur dit:
<<Slies frontièressont légalementratifiéesen accord avec la charte nautique- il s'agit
de la charte IOA 42- il n'y aurait pas besoin d'une intervention dans la procédure;
mais si la charte nautique est contestéepar le Pérou,nous envisagerions sérieusement
la possibilitéd'intervention de l'Equateur dans la procédureouverte à La Haye».
16. On constate que cette déclaration,émanantd'un homme politique qui n'est pas juriste de
formation, n'est pas parfaitement rigoureuse au regard de la terminologie, le terme «ratifica» est ici
techniquement inapproprié. Il n'en demeure pas moins que ce document reste de la première
importance. C'est lui qui place le Péroudevant ses responsabilités. Ou il accepte la frontière
existante ou l'Equateur demande à intervenir devant vous.
17. Or, on sait ce qui s'en suivit. Le Pérouobtempéraet accepta la charte IOA 42, celle-là
mêmequi comporte la vignette que M. Bundy semble avoir oubliée,et sur laquelle sont reportées
les référencesexplicites aux traités de 1952 et 1954 comme étant à l'origine de la frontière
45
CR 2012/32, p. 16, par. 18(Oupuy).
46
OC, vol. III, annexe 108, par. 2.
47CR 2012/32, p. 22-23, par. 47 (Oupuy); OC, vol. III, annexe 144. -28-
existante, constituée,comme on le voit sur la charte, par le parallèlegéographiquequi remonte bel
et bien au août 1952.
18. Nous sommes alors le 11 octobre 2010, soit cinquante-huit ans après l'adoption de la
déclarationde Santiago et encore huit moischangede lettres du 2 mai 2011 entre Quito et
Lima.
19. Quoi qu'il en soit, le Pérouobtempère. Il ne dit mot et il consent à reconnaître la charte,
alors mêmequ'elle porte cette mention dontil du Pérous'est bien gardéde reparler: celle
qui réfèrela ligne de parallèle entre les deux Etats non à leur accord à venir mais aux traités
existants; mention réitéréec,omme onouviendra, dans la carte géographiqueofficielle que
nous vous avons présentéedansssier qui vous étaitprésentélors des plaidoiries chiliennes du
7 décembre•
20. Le dernier document vers lequelje vous invite à diriger votre attention est le dernier dans
le tableau, il figure en page 3 et c'est le plus récentpuisqu'il remonte aux 25 et 26 juillet derniers,
date de l'adoption paronseil réunissantcette fois les ministres du Chili et de l'Equateur. Il
confirme quees uns et les autres sont une fois de plus d'accord pour se référeraux accords
de 1952 et 1954 comme origine des frontières maritimes entreats. Or, nous sommes
cette fois-là quinze moisl'échangede notes intervenu entre le Pérouet l'Equateur. Ainsi,
que l'on se situe avant ou après l'échange de notes, riengé quant à la position
équatorienne.
21. Je pourrais ainsi continuer à pointer du doigt toutes les piècesde ce tableau dont encore
___ __-_~~---t:ïnefois-chacunae.s-·elême ae-Ela-scol1gstaenceeae-~lap-osrf_ioü_n-e_qu~tori~nn:e
comme des absences de protestation du Pérou, celui-ci sachant bien, depuis la déclaration du
présidentCorrea, quelle serait pour lui la sanctiont explicitement face à son voisin du
Nord ce qu'il affirme à l'égarddu Chili, à savoir qu'ilde frontièremaritime.
22.On voit donc bien que l'affirmation péruvienne tendant à accréditer la thèse selon
laquelle l'accord entre l'Equateur etne remonterait qu'au 2 mai 2011 est, pour dire le
48
CR 2012/32, p. 20, par. 36-37 (Dupuy). - 29-
moins, erronée. Venons-en alors au réexamende la ligne de délimitationretenue dans cet échange
de notes.
II. Le tracéde la ligne frontièreattachéà l'échangede notes entre l'Equateur
et le Péroudu 2 mai 2011
23. Le conseil du Pérou a fait semblant de croire que les termes de l'échangede notes
intervenu le 2 mai 2011 nous embarrasseraient 49• Fort bien! Examinons les donc, les termes de
cet échangede notes: mon ami, M. Bundy, estime déterminantque le paragraphe 2 de l'échangede
notes comporte le terme «shall extend along the line». Pourtant, tout aussitôt après,il vous a donné
lui-mêmela clef de ce futur de l'indicatif dont il entendait pourtant tirer l'idée que l'accord
intervenu établissait une frontière nouvelle. Il y a là, certes, une nouveauté par rapport à la
50
situation précédente, mais je l'ai déjà signalée vendredi dernier • C'est que le point
d'aboutissement de la frontière maritime glisse sur la ligne du parallèle, toujours le même,pour
êtredésormaisdéplacévers l'ouest, et j'en redirai les causes dans un instant. Vous retrouvez ici la
carte produite devant vous le 7 décembre.
24. Ce déplacementlatéral de la frontière maritime ne place nullement l'Equateur, quant à
lui, en porte-à-faux par rapport à la constance de sa position renvoyant à la déclarationde 1952
comme source du parallèlede latitude et axe de délimitation. La déclarationde Santiago définissait
en effet la frontière avec certitude; mais ses trois cosignataires avaient entendu préserverl'avenir
et conserver la possibilitéd'une extension de la projection de leur zone de juridiction au-delà des
200 milles nautiques, auxquels, finalement, ils se sont arrêtésp ,réfigurantainsi la largeur de la zone
économiqueexclusive. On en voit la preuve dans la formulation de l'article II de la déclarationqui
parle d'une distance minimale de 200 milles nautiques.
25. Ce qui compte, en l'occurrence, et qui garantit la cohérencede la position de l'Equateur
avec celle qu'il a toujours retenue, c'est que le parallèlegéographiqueest bien celui-là mêmequi
résultaitdepuis toujours de l'application de la déclarationde Santiago.
26. Revenons alors à la cause de la translation vers le large du point d'aboutissement de la
frontière maritime qui explique l'emploi du futur dans la note du 2 mai 2011. Cette cause,
49CR 2012/33, p. 62, par. 9-10 (Bundy).
5
°CR 2012/32, p. 21, par. 39 (Dupuy). -30-
51
Monsieur le président,je l'ai illustréedans ma plaidoirie:elle est constituée
par l'ultime concession faite par aux aspirations que l'Equateur avait de longue date
exprimées. Celle de fermer l'entièretédu golfe de Guayaquil par des lignes de base droites, non
plus seulement du cotééquatorien,c'est-à-dire au nord du parallèle, comme cela existait depuis la
loi équatorienne de 1971, mais au sud,ceptant désormaisde s'aligner c'est le cas de le
dire, sur les lignes de base droites équatoriennes.
27. Dès lors, et ceci, en effet, pour l'avenir, fhtur, c'est-à-dire à partir de cet
échange de notes du 2 mai qui, mais dans cette seule mesure, constitue un nouvel accord.
Seulement'est un accord qui se place, au sens le plus spatial du terme, toujours sur le rail du
parallèle déjàexistant, puisqu'il résultaitde la déclarationde Santiago, ce que l'Equateur a rappelé
sursa charte nautique, mais que le Pérouse garde de reconnaître officiellement.
28. Celaa nullement empêchél'Equateur de réaffirmer sans risque de contradiction, cette
fois dans cadre de la rencontre du conseil interministériel chiléno-équatoriendes 25 et 26 juillet
derniers, son fidèleattachement aux accords de 1952
29. Ainsi, pour nous résumer, Monsieurent, ce qui s'est passéavec l'échange de
notes du 2 mai11 entre Quito et Lima, c'est bel et bien le ralliement du Pérou aux positions
toujours défenduespar l'Equateur. Cet accord réalisela rencontre suraphique de
deux diplomaties, c'est-à-dire, aussi, de deux arrière-pensées.èle est confortée,
mais Lima veut affirmer qu'elle est nouvelle cependant que Quito considère qu'elle
changé, puisqu'elle existait depuis 1952. Le Péroua pu ainsi «sauver la face», si j'ose
--~~ ~==-m~'expriinainsei ~'a) p_s~rsif aJ:!i~_e~.e~~einenrcju'e c~-ar te_-=__1___ __
nautique, laquelle renvoie aux accords de 1952 et 1954, il en est revenu au parallèle issu de la
déclaration. Et l'Equateur, quant à lui,hanger à ses convictions ; il n'a pas eu besoin de
le réitérerpuisqu'il l'avait déjà dit sur ses cartes de 2010, désormais acceptées par le Pérou,
condition dontprésidentCorrea avait dit que, si elle étaitremplie, elle lui permettrait de renoncer
à intervenir dans la présenteaffaire.
5CR 2012/p20-21, par. 39 (Dupuy). - 31 -
30. Monsieur le président,il me resterait à vous redire combien le tracéprolongévers le
large, de la frontièremaritime glissant ainsi sur le rail du parallèleest parvenu au point B. Ceci, je
vous le rappelle, apporte la preuve que, contrairement aux termes de l'échangede notes, le point
terminal de la frontière maritime vers l'ouest ne résultepas d'une lecture de l'article IV de la
déclarationqui s'appuierait exclusivement sur la présencedes îles, laquelle l'aurait fait seulement
parvenir au point A. Je me permets à cet égardde vous adresser à ma plaidoirie du 7 décembre.
52
dernier ainsi qu'à la carte qui l'accompagnait à l'onglet 75 aujourd'hui.
31. Qu'il me soit seulement permis pour finir de vous signaler ici qu'en ce qui concerne
l'application de l'article IV de la déclarationde Santiago, les distinguésdéfenseursdu Péroun'ont
pas pris le temps d'accorder leurs violons! Lors de la mêmesession de plaidoiries, celle du matin
de mardi dernier, notre éminentcollègueVaughan Lowe vous expliquait que cette disposition ne
pouvait se comprendre que si l'on poursuivait le parallèle bien au-delà des 200 milles nautiques,
53
jusqu'à rencontrer la zone maritime rayonnant autour du groupe des Galapagos ;cependant que
M. Bundy voulait quant à lui voir dans l'accord réalisépar l'échangede notes du 2 mai 2011
l'application des principes d'un article IV qui s'appliquerait non plus à l'archipel lointain des
Galapagos mais aux îles toute proches des côtes54•
J'en ai ainsi terminé,Monsieur le présidentavec cette présentationde la constance de la
position équatorienne. Je vous remercie de votre attention et je vous prie de passer la parole à
M. Colson.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. And I give the floor to
Mr. Colson.
52CR 2012/32, p. 19,par.32.
5CR 2012/33, p.18,par.45.
54
CR2012/34, p.19,par.55. -32-
Mr. COLSON:
Alta mar
1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. To begin, I would note for the Registry
and the translators that paragraph 7 of the statement that they have in front of them is being deleted
from this presentation. This presentation will respond to what Professor Pellet said about the
alta mar/Outer Triangle issue, and there are a few additional points to make.
1. Two essential points of agreement between the Parties
2. I believe that at this stage we can say that Professor Pellet and I are in agreement on two
essential points: first, that similar situations to the alta mar/Outer Triangle issue are present in
State practice; and secondly, that international law allows for delimitation even where the re is no
overlap of the arcs of circles describing the outer limits of neighbouring 200-nautical-mile zones.
3. Professor Pellet in his second round, moved away from the refrain we beard in the first
round where he said that Chile was preventing Peru from having this area- even by force, he
55
said • In the second round, his technique changed and he asked the rhetorical question as to why
Peru would have agreed to a boundary with Chile that has such a large alta mar area. I cannot
answer the rhetorical question- I was not there. But 1 expect it bas something to do with
President de Aréchega's observation that the Pacifie States of South America looked upon
themselves as having a "direct and linear projection" into the sea 56• Overlapping 200-nautical-mile
arcs and wrap-around zones have no place in that conception.
5. So there is no difference of legal principle here; the question is only whether the
agreement of the Parties fully delimited both Chile and Peru's 200-nautical-mile zones.
6. I would like to turn to a few observations about what Professor Pellet said about three of
the State practice examples we used last week.
55
CR 2012/29,p. 46,para.6 (Pellet).
56CMC, Ann. 280, p.794. -33-
2. Grisbadarna 57
7. [Start graphie 1] Professor Pellet drew attention to the map we produced, which recorded
the fact that the parties had extended their boundary in subsequent agreements, and he drew
attention to the fact that the subsequent 1968 Continental Shelf Agreement 58 applied the
equidistance method. 1 agree, but what 1 would like to emphasize is a different point. And that
point is that when these parties extended their zones and reached new delimitation agreements, the
boundary line established by the award in the Grisbadarna tribunal was not altered. Just as
Norway could not claim the alta mar area because of the Grisbadarna award, it has remained
unavailable to Norway in these subsequent agreements. It is on the Swedish side of the boundary
line and it has always remained so. [End graphie 1/Start graphie 2]
3. Colombia-Ecuador
59
8. The second observation concerns the Colombia-Ecuador boundary • As we recall, this
Agreement establishes the parallel of latitude of the land boundary terminus as the
Colombia-Ecuador maritime boundary, and it hasan alta mar area. And as Professor Dupuy noted
0
last Frida/ , when this Agreement was ratified, the explanation given before the Colombian
Congress was that the delimitation by the geographie panillel from the land boundary terminus
"was in particular chosen by the signatory countries of the Santiago Declaration for delimiting their
respective maritime jurisdictions" and that record went on "[i]t is evident that, in the Pacifie Ocean,
this line [of parallel] constitutes a clear, fair and simple frontier, which meets the interests of the
two countries adequately" 6• Peru's case has taken us into a twilight zone: the 1975
Colombia-Ecuador boundary Agreement, once thought to be the last in time of the boundary
agreements amongst the Santiago Declaration States, has become, in Peru's rendition ofhistory, the
first delimitation agreement amongst those States.
57The Grisbl'zdarnaCase (Norwayv. Sweden), Award 23 October 1909 (unofficial English translation available
at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag id=!29).
58Agreement between Sweden and Norway Conceming the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, 24 July 1968
(entry into force 18 March 1969) 968United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 241.
59Agreement between Colombia and Ecuador, 23 August 1975 (entered into force 22 December 1975), 996 UNTS
239.
6°CR 2012/31, p. 26, para. 9.
61CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 214; see also Ann. 215. - 34-
9. But let us take a minute to look over this agreement and to test it against Mr. Bundy's
62
five-point guide to boundary treaties • There is of course no such guide or checklist in the Law of
the Sea Convention, and what we will see is that in the practice of States they may not have known
of, or made use of, Mr. Bundy's checklist.
1 O.The agreement is on the screen now- it is at tab 178 of your folders. Mr. Bundy's first
point was that a maritime boundary agreement should refer to the fact that the subject-matter
concerns the maritime boundary- and you can see here that Article 1 refers to the "limit between
their ... marine and submarine areas" 63• So we will give this agreement a passing grade on this
point.
11. His second criterion is that a boundary agreement should specify the zones that are being
delimited. This agreement is vague in that regard: it refers to "sovereignty, jurisdiction or
64
supervision" in general terms • We are tough graders so we are going to fail the agreement on this
point.
12. His third criterion is that the starting-point be specified with co-ordinates. This
agreement clearly faits to meet that standard. The 1975 Agreement contains no co-ordinates, and it
was not until this year of2012 that these parties agreed on the precise co-ordinates of the boundary
parallel65• In Mr. Bundy's test, the agreement fails this criterion, but Colombia and Ecuador need
not fear because, as you noted in Cameroon v. Nigeria in speaking to delimitation in the Lake Chad
area, the fact that an agreement may "have sorne technical imperfections and that certain details
remain[] to be specified" (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
para. 50) does not mean that a boundary agreement is not in place.
13. Mr. Bundy's fourth criterion is that the entire course of the boundary, including the
endpoints, should be specified, either by co-ordinates or by stating exactly how far out to sea the
boundary extends from its starting-point. Here again the agreement fails. The parties intend that
62
CR 2012/29, pp. 15-16, para. 61 (Bundy).
63
Agreement between Colombia and Ecuador, 23 August 1975 (entered into force 22 December 1975), 996 UNTS
239.
64/bid., Art. 3.
65Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Republics of Ecuador and Colombia, published 13 June 2012,
Ann. CH-2. - 35-
the parallel serves for all purposes and that the line continues to divide new clairns 66• [End
graphie 2/Start graphie 3] There is no specified endpoint. Indeed, at the tirne of the agreement,
Ecuador had a 200-rnile zone, but Colombia had not declared one, and did not do so for three years,
declaring it on 4 August 1978, but the intent of the parties is clear: the parallel governs for ali
purposes and, of course, the parallel now delirnits the 200-nautical-rnile zones of both countries.
And we can see there is an alta mar area on the rnap that we have prepared, depicting the
agreement, now on the screen (tab 179).
14. Finally, Mr. Bundy's fifth criterion is that the agreement include a rnap. Here, the rnap
on the screen is our rnap. There is no rnap annexed to this treaty.
15. This agreement fails on four of the five criteria Mr. Bundy laid out. But 1 believe he
would agree that the 1975 Colornbia-Ecuador Treaty is a boundary treaty. [End graphie 3/Start
graphie 4]
4. The 1984 Chile-Argentina Treaty
67
16. My third observation concerns the 1984 Chile-Argentina Treaty • And we can see this
now on the screen. It has a relatively large alta mar area (tab 180). Professor Pellet referred to the
historical context of this agreement. His references asto why and how this agreement carne about 68
are not exactly how Chile sees it, but I think we can both agree that the 1984 Treaty between
Argentina and Chile arose out of circurnstances of an arbitration result that was not well-received
by the Argentine Governrnent of the tirne, near war, mediation by the Pope, leading to a broad and
comprehensive set of understandings. These circurnstances are vastly different from those
associated with the Santiago Declaration. Yet Peru has consistently tried to rnake sornething out of
~ bt.~Hthe differences in the ~texts I&Nthe 1952 Santiago Declaration and the 1984 Chile-Argentina
69
Treaty , even though there are 32 years of State practice, nurnerous international judicial and
arbitral decisions dealing with the subject and three Law of the Sea Conferences between the two
66Agreement between Colombia and Ecuador, 23 August 1975 (entered into force 22 December 1975), 996 UNTS
239, Art. 1.
67Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Chile and Argentina, signed at Vatican City on 29 November 1984
(entered into force on 2 May 1985), 1399 UNTS89, CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 15.
68CR 2012/34, p. 23, para. 7 (Pellet).
69CR 2012/29, pp. 15-16, paras 61-62 (Bundy). -36-
events. And, Peru agrees, the circumstances in which these agreements were reached are vastly
different. [End graphie 4]
17. Penl's argument is somewhat similar to two arguments Denmark made in the Jan Mayen
case that the Court dismissed. There Denmark sought to hold Norway to standards of conduct
applied elsewhere. In one case, Denmark argued it should receive similar treatment to that Norway
had given to Iceland in a Norway-Iceland delimitation agreement (Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Green/and and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, IC.J. Reports 1993,
pp. 75-76, para. 83). On this point the Court said, at paragraph 86 of the Judgment:
"By invoking against Norway the Agreements of 1980 and 1981, Denmark is
seeking to obtain by judicial means equality oftreatment with Iceland ... But in the
context of relations governed by treaties, it is always for the parties concerned to
decide, by agreement, in what conditions their mutual relations can best be balanced."
(Ibid.,p. 77, para. 86.)
18. If that is true for delimitation method, it certainly must be true for the texts in which
delimitation agreements are recorded.
19. The second argument made by Denmark concerned Norway's Bear Island, and the
internai delimitation established by Norway between the Exclusive Economie Zone of the
Norwegian mainland and the :fisheries protection zone around Svalbard. In that internai
delimitation, Norway gave Bear Island Iess than full effect so its maritime area would not eut into
the full 200-nautical-mile zone off the Norwegian mainland. And Denmark wanted the same for
Greenland. This Danish argument again was dismissed by the Court. The argument was about
delimitation, it was not about the form of the agreement, but what the Court said about the
_______ar_gument_is_.infonnatiY...ltsaid:. _··-·---·----···-
"So far as Bear Island is concerned, this territory is situated in a region
unrelated to the area of overlapping claims now to be dèlimited. In that respect, the
Court would observe that there can be no legal obligation for a party to a dispute to
transpose, for the settlement of that dispute, a particular solution previously
adopted ... jnanother c_ontext." (Ibid.,p. 76, para. 85.)
20. Again, if that is the principle that relates to delimitation method itself, it must certainly
apply to the form of a delimitation agreement adopted by the same State 32 years apart and in
vastly different geographical and historical circumstances. - 37-
21. Thus, the debating point contrasting the Peru and Argentina situations is no more than
that. The fact that there is a difference in the legal texts of the Santiago Declaration and the
1984 Chile-Argentina Treaty is irrelevant.
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the all-purpose maritime boundary delimiting the
full 200-nautical-mile zones of Chile and Peru has served them weil for 60 years. That there is an
alta mar area available to the international community is not unusual in the practice of States.
Here, it is simply the result of a delimitation of the full 200-nautical-mile zones of Chile and Peru
that respects each State's direct and frontal projection into the sea.
Thank you, Mr. President. 1 thank the Court for its attention and 1 ask that you cali upon
Professor Crawford.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Colson. Professor Crawford, it is now your turn. Y ou
have the :floor.
Mr. CRAWFORD:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
1. Introduction
1.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, you already have firmly on board the point that
0
this is not a tacit agreement case- this is not Nicaragua v. Honduras, and Peru now accepts thae .
Nor is Chile's case to be equated with other cases in which one party argued that there was an
existing boundary agreement:
(a) It is not a case involving an attempt to apply to maritime boundaries an agreement covering
71
division of territorial sovereignty, as in Nicaragua v. Colombia, first phase •
(b) It is not a case based on the application of an agreement defining "State borders" to the EEZ
72
and continental shelf, as in Romania v. Ukraine .
7°CR 2012/33, p. 32,para.4 (Wood).
71Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaraguav. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, LC.J. Reports
2007 (!!),p. 34para. 115.
72Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.Ukraine), Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 2009,p.25,paras.64
and 70. - 38-
(c)is not a case based on conduct, either relat,as Gulf oferies or oil concessions
Maine, Jan anCameroovNigeria.
1.2. Nor is this a case of an agreement derived from use of a line for "specifie, limited
purposes", as Professor Lowe wouldor a line representing a "provisional
arrangement of a practical nature", as he and S•Chile's caseuld have you believe
rests on actual agreements between the Parties, applied and observed for 60 years: no reservations,
no without-prejudice provisions, no indication of intIism, provisional or limited application.
for the Court to interpr,which are specifie to this case.
2. Historical continuity: thzonesuring 200-mile
2.1. The Parties agree that they were making history with their 200-mile zones. But they
ended up, after a fashion, making law as weil. The key point is that those claims came to be
accepted, and came to form part of general international law. The zones established in 1952 are
historically continuons with tin Chile's case modulated by its accession to
the 1982Convention. They were never wiin Peru's case they were never
modifieto this day Peru maintains its "dominion" over its air space above its maritime zone,
although subject to a right of "innocent passage"! But the point for present purposes is that Chile,
Peru and Ecuador stood togetherf their zones, and their eventual prize was general
acceptance.
2.2. Now Peru argues that the fact that these States were the first
7
...~~=~w =i=t=~~=:~=: :~!:r~:~tTal~d.~cty~a!"v!er~y~~d:iffi~cP e1=~t::.:=:
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Green/and and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, JC.J.
Reportsp. 56, para. 40.
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundmy in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America),
Judgment,. Repopp. 310-311, paLand and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (vNigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervep. 447, para. 304.C.J. Reports 2002,
75
CR 2012/29, p. 20, para. 17(Lowe).
CR 2012/28, p. 29, para. 11 (Wood); CR 2012/29, p. 20, para. 17 (Lowe); CR 2012/33, p. 27, para 109
(Lowe); and p. 28, para. 112 (Lowe).
77
Maritime Deithe Black SvUkraine), Judgment,p. 86, para. 68.2009,
CR 2012/33, p. 53, para. 8 (Treves). -39-
accepted by the international community, a new boundary agreement was required to delimit those
zones.
2.3. In support of this argument, Professor Treves referred to your decision in
79
Romania v. Ukraine • He argued "a delimitation agreement concerning the territorial sea could
not apply to the continental shelf and the exclusive economie zone, as the parties 'would be
80
expected to conclude a new agreement for this purpose'". The last phrase is, of course, taken
from your Judgment in Romania v. Ukraine. But the key point in Romania v. Ukraine was that the
agreements dealt exclusively with the border of the territorial sea, to 12nautical miles, as you held.
On distance grounds atone, those instruments could not be said to be concerned with the EEZ and
the continental shelf. In such circumstances, the parties "would be expected to conclude a new
agreement" to delimit their claims to 200 miles, as you noted. There is nothing in the decision
which supports a conclusion that States with existing delimited 200-mile zones, declared at a time
when such zones were disputable, would have to re-delimit them once the zones became
compatible with general international law. On that basis the Gulf of Paria Treaty needs to be
renegotiated. That would be fundamentally contrary to the principle of stability of boundaries,
reflected in Articles 74 (4) and 83 (4) of the Law of the Sea Convention and applicable to
boundaries concluded before the Convention was itself concluded. Boundary agreements last for
centuries: they must be able to survive changes in custom to be stable, and this is true- one
might say, a fortiori- if the agreements are at the origin of the change. In international law it is
possible to do something for the first time.
2.4. Professor Treves sought support from the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal in
81
Guinea Bissau v.Senega/ • The Tribunal there was asked to determine whether a 1960Agreement
applied to create a single maritime boundary out to 200 nautical miles 8• That Agreement
purported to effect a delimitation of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the continental
79
CR 2012/33, p. 56, para. 24 (Treves).
80Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukral.C.JReports 2009, p. 87, para. 69.
81CR 2012/33, pp. 55-56, para. 23 (Treves).
82
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, Award, 31 July 1989, English translation in 83 ILR 1, para. 29 (citing Arbitration
Agreement, Art. 2). -40-
3
shelF • The Tribunal concluded that the Agreement had the force of law only with respect to those
zones, but not with respect to the EEZ. In contrast to the Santiago Declaration, there was no
suggestion that either Guinea Bissau or Senegal, or their colonial predecessors, had purported to
exercise authority over anEEZ as such. In contrast, the international recognition of200-mile zones
in 1982 was heralded by Chile, Ecuador and Peru as vindication of the claims they had been ·.
making for 30 years. Those tluee States proudly announced to the 1982 Conference that "[t]he
universal recognition of the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the coastal State within the
200-mile limit ... is a fundamental achievement" for the Santiago Declaration States84• There was
no need for them to declare new zones, of the same breadth and essentially the same content, just as
there was no need to re-delimit them.
3. Equity :fequidistance
3.1. Peru has not quite had the courage explicitly to admit that it agreed its maritime
boundary and to ask you to replace it with a new one consistent with modern equidistance
methodology. It says instead that it could not possibly have agreed such a boundary which was so
obviously inequitable 8• Why was it inequitable? Because it did not follow an equidistance line.
For Peru's logic to be correct, the delegatesn Santiago in 1952 would have had to be aware of the
equidistance methodology as a means to delimit the maritime zones of adjacent States and regarded
that methodology as a way to achieve equity. Neither option applies, the first because the
Technical Commission advising the ILC did not explain the equidistance methodology until some
.~=~!Ï.Il:!~:lat.ei:~~;::!~.e~~.e.C:~ ...............
·······-·-·-···-·····--·-~~~··--·-··-~·-·-···---·-···s7~········-···--··-·······~·············-·-··············-~················-···
synonymous with equidistance .
83
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, Award, 31 July 1989, English translation in 83 ILR 1, para. 85 (citing Arbitration
Agreement,Art.2).
84
MP, Vol. III, Ann. 108, pp. 632. See also CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 50, p. 447; and Ann. 51, p. 451.
85
See, e.g., CR 2012/34, p. 39, paras. 42-43 (Pellet); CR 2012/33, p. 52, para. 4 (Treves).
8CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 233, p. 1377.
8North Sea Continental Shelf, JudI.C.JReports 1969, p. 41, para. 69. - 41 -
3.2. Peru does say that it would have been "highly unlikely" for the delegates in Santiago to
have delimited their extended zones 88• But I remind you that in 1954 those very same States, for
the most part the very same delegates, explicitly agreed that:
"A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either side of the paralle! which
constitutes the maritime boundary between the two countries." 89
The best evidence of what they thought they were doing is what they expressly said, two years
later, that they had done.
4. Peru's putative claims in 1954: the history that did not happen
4.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an insult to their memory to say that they did
not know their own interests, or rather the interests of the States they represented. [Start graphie]
Imagine ifPeru had attended the 1954 conference claiming the Ecuador boundary they showed you
the other day, and the boundary they now claim against Chile! Imagine if they had come to 1954
with those claims on the table. You can see them on the screen now (tab 182). After what had
happened at Santiago, Peru would have been told, very firmly by both delegations, not to be
ridiculous. Indeed, we know as a fact from the Bazan opinion, that Mr. Wordsworth has just taken
you to, that that would have been Chile's reaction. If Peru had persisted in its claims, the Lima
Conference would have failed, would have broken up in disarray. The supporters of distant water
fishing States would have exulted. Consensus amongst the three States which stood at the time
contra mundum would have been shattered. [End graphic/start next graphie]
4.2. Nothing of the sort happened. Instead they agreed on protecting "the parallel which
constitutes the maritime boundary between the two countries", a parallel identified with Hito No. 1.
And great benefits flowed to them, and notably to Peru, which became the second-most prolific
producer of fish products in the world. And they did not know their own interests. [End graphie]
5. Stability of boundariès
5.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the final moments of his submissions on
Tuesday, having putto you the last of Peru's changeable arguments, Professor Pellet told you that
88
CR 2012/33, p. 52, para. 4 (Treves).
89MP, Vol. II, Ann. 50, p. 276, Art. 1; emphasis added. -42-
this case offered an opportunity to impose an equitable solu•iPeru asks you to pretend that
H you may do so on a blank canvas. This is tt9to disregard the principal rule for maritime
boundaries: and thats agrt:-ement.
5.2. I spoke last Friday, admittedly rather briefly, about the legal basis of the fundamental
principle of stability of boundaries. Peru has not challenged this, except to say that you have an
opportunity to replace a stable arrangement with one it finds more equitAnd where would
91
that leave matters in unsettling this agreed boundary ? The short answer iit would create a
legallandscape characterized by serious uncertainty, at two levels:
(a) First, in the context of the present case, States would have ali along been acting on a false basis
whenever they relied on an agreed maritime boundary which was not an equidistance tine. I
am not just thinking of the parties to the Declaration itself, but to the express reference to the
92
Declaration in establishing a maritime boundary, by third States; of reliance upon the
Declaration by States in argument in cases before y,and by judges of this Court and of
reliance by States in cases before arbitral tribunawith express reference to establishing
maritime boundaries along parallelsof latitude• And then, of course, there are also the
9
°CR 2012/34, p. 39, para. 43 (Pellet).
91
See RC, Chap. V.
-~~- -~-~---- ~--~S~ee,-e.g.,-CMC 2;6;VndCM.X,VoLIV,nnn.218.-- --- --~--~ ~-~---~--------------------
93
---~---------- -I-n--No-t-th-Sea-Gontinental-Shelf-(Federal-Republic-of-Germany!Denmarlc),-see~Reply.submitted~by.the-Eederal--------------
Republic of Germany on 31 May 1968, Annex "International and Inter-state Agreements concerning the Delimitation of
Continental Shelves and Territorial Waters", Chile-Peru-Ecuador, I.C.J Pleadings, Vol. I, p. 437; Rejoinder submitted by
the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 30 August 1968, /.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. I, p. 496,
para. 68; in Delimitation of theBoundaii~yhe Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), see
Memorialof the United States submitted on 27 September 1982, /.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. II, p. 101, para. 265;
Counter-Memorial Canada submitted on 28 June 1983, /.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. III, p. 239, para. 639; Annex to the
Replyof Canada submitted on 12 December 1983, /.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. V, p 182; in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), see Counter-Meinorial submitted by Libya on 26 October 1983, /.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. II, p. 110,
footnote 5; Expert Opinion by Dr. J.R.V. Prescott, Ann. 4 to the Reply submitted by Malta on 12 July 1984, /.C.J.
Pleadings, Vol. I, p. 245: see Table 4, p. 267; in Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Green/and and Jan Mayen
(Denmarkv. Nonvay), see Memorial submitted by the Kingdom ofDenmark on 31 July 1989, /.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. I,
para. 364.
94
North Sea Continental She/f. Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 41, para. 69; see also separate opinion of
President Bustamante y Rivero, ibid., p. 61, para. 6 (b).
9Guyana v. Suriname, VerbatimRecord of the Hearing, 14 December 2006, pp. 872 and 874.
9Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), I.C.J. Verbatim Record of the public sitting held on 16 March 2007, CR 2007/10, p. 31, para. 150. -43-
instances of express reliance on the maritime boundaries established by the Santiago
97
Declaration by States engaged in their own delimitation negotiations in the region •
(b) [Start graphie] Secondly, Peru's approach would inevitably cali into question other settled
boundary agreements in the region. This could be so where they are based entirely or in part on
98
parallels of latitude, such as those commonly used in the practice of American States • It
could be so for agreed boundaries based on meridians of longitude 99,or indeed any other
boundary not based on the equidistance line. One can already imagine the arguments from
States that may now perceive themselves to have been disadvantaged by a settled boundary-
to the effect that agreed delimitations were in fact not agreed, or were merely temporary or
provisional or practical or inshore arrangements.
5.3. And in the specifie context ofthe boundary between Chile and Peru-two States with,
let us say, a troubled history- there bas been peaceful coexistence on either side for more than
half a century. You will hear from the Agent about the importance of the boundary to the local
community, which has developed in reliance upon it.
Quieta, Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, non movere. [End graphie]
Thank you for your patient attention. Mr. President, could you now cali upon the Chilean
Agent to conclude Chile's submissions.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Crawford. And 1 invite the Agent for
Chile to make concluding remarks and to present final submissions. You have the floor,
Ambassador.
Mr. van KLAVEREN STORK:
9See, for example, CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 9, p. 65; CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 214, p. 1277; see also CMC, Vol. IV,
Ann. 215, p. 1285.
9See tab 120 ofjudges' folders.
99
See CMC, paras 2.44-2.49; see also agreements between Gambia and Senegal, J. I.Charney and
L. M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I, 1993, Report 4-2Kenya and Tanzania, ibid.,
Report 4-5; The Netherlands (Antilles) and Venezuela, ibid., Report 2-12; Colombia and Panama, ibid., Report 2-5; and
CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 9, p. 65. -44-
1. Introduction
1.1. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, it is an honour to address you once again, this time
to conclude Chile's second round in this cChile is a country committed to the peaceful
settlementf disputes and the rule of law in international relations. In this spirit, my distinguished
counterpart, Ambassador Allan Wagner, graciously recognized Chile's participation as a Guarantor
State in the peace process betweenu and Ecuador.Our shared values, coupled with mutual
respect, have facilitated co-operation on severa!For example, after a complex process
involving numerous negotiations and setbacks,9 we concluded an Agreement related to port
facilities foru in Arica, in accordance with the Treaty of Lima. No pending boundary issues
remained; that was our belief.
2. The existing maritime boundary
2.1. In 1952, Chile, Peru and Ecuador opened "entirely new ground in the Law of the Sea by
making their00-nautical-mile (n.m.) claim•"In the words of the Santiago Declaration, we
assertedexclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction" over the sea-bed, subsoil and wate• column
Together, we instituted a regional system of delimitation premised on "the parallel at the point at
102
which the land frontierthe States concerned reaches the s•This method of delimitation
became the practice States on the west coast of South America.
2.2. In 1954, Chile, Ecuador andPeru concluded severa! agreements, including the
Agreement on a Special Maritime Frontierne, based explicitly on our pre-existing maritime
103
boundary • And in 1968 and 1969, Chile and Peru decided "physically to give effect to the
~------------~~------~---~~----~---~-~~---~~-----------·~-·--~··-·----··---·--···-·-~----····-~0·-··-··-.·--·--1·-·-----~·-·-···---·------
------------ para1Jel_thatP.~Se§ M_afru~r~!QQ_Ulm!b~ht_i~>.2!!h!~g!"la}~dtajlti'm_e._!:~.<~undal)'~'--:_------~-u
The Partiesjointly determined and marked Hito No. 1, as the farthest seaward point on the coast in
105
1929 and 1930 • Hito No. 1 has always served as the reference point for the start of the maritime
boundary.Peru's own 2001 Law on Territorial Demarcation of the Province of Tacna expressly
10
°CMC, Vol. V, Ann.p.286.
101
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 47, Arts. II and III.
102
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 47, Art. IV.
103
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 50.
104
CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 6.
105
MP, Vol. II, Ann. 45; MP, Vol. II, Ann. 54; MP, Vol. II, Ann. 55. -45-
recognized the position of Hito No. 1 as the starting-point of the land boundary. Article 3 states,
106
and I quote, "The boundary starts at Boundary Marker No. 1 (Pacifie Ocean) ... " End of
quotation. The land boundary was fully settled and falls outside the Court'sjurisdiction.
2.3. Mr. President, Members of the Court, over the course of these proceedings, Chile has
clearly demonstrated the existence of a maritime delimitation agreement. And the subsequent
practice confirming the existing maritime boundary is nothing short of overwhelming. Peru, on the
other hand, has been unableto establish its case.
2.4. There is no need for the Court to delimit a maritime boundary between Chile and Peru.
The maritime boundary has long been settled. That is why Peru objected neither to descriptions of
the maritime boundary, nor to its enforcement, for over half a century. That is why Peru and Chile
have respected the parallel constituting the maritime boundary. That is why Peru has never
exercised jurisdiction to the south of the parallel, including the "alta mar", and Chile did not
exercise jurisdiction to the north.
2.5. And that is why the people of Arica and Iquique would be substantially affected by a
disruption of the stable maritime frontier. The port of Arica isjust 15 km from the boundary with
Peru. A significant proportion of the country's small and medium sized fishing vessels, of crucial
importance to the economy of the region, are registered at Arica, and at the next port to the south,
Iquique. The local population- close to half a million- has developed in reliance on the settled
boundary. Arica also serves the interests of Peru and Bolivia, providing key facilities to those
countries.
3. The consequences of overturuing a settled maritime boundary
3.1. Mr. President, the consequences of overturning a maritime boundary over half a century
old are grave. The parallel of Hito No. 1 constitutes a functioning, stable, clear and peaceful
maritime boundary. At this very moment, vessels are crossing the parallel by sea and air. Nobody,
not the captains, not the pilots, not even the Government of Peru, can deny that Peru applies its law
to the north of the parallel, while Chile does so to the south. And nobody can deny that Ecuador
10CMC, Vol. IV, Ann. 191, Art. 3. Peru amended its law the day after filing its Application in this Court. -46-
and Peru, too, have exercised jurisdiction to the north and south of a boundary parallel derived
from the 1952 Santiago Declaration.
3.2. Five years have elapsed sincePeru filed its Application to initiate these proceedings.
Chile has defended its existing maritime boundary witheru with the determination and vigour that
such a serious endeavour requires. Boundaries, after ali, establish the reach State's sovereign
powers. And the good faith observance of existing treaties is at the heart of peaceful relations
among States. Chile looks forward to a reaffirmation of the stable maritime boundary between
Peru and Chile, and the continuation and deepening of friendly relations with the people and
Government of Peru.
4. Conclusion and submissions
4.1. Chile would like to express its sincere gratitude to you, Mr. President, and distinguished
Members of the Court, for your patience and attention throughout the written and oral proceedings.
1 would like to express my deep appreciation, as weil, to the Registrar, M. Philipe Couvreur, and .
his staff, the interpreters, and everyone else who supports the workhis venerable institution.
4.2.1 would like to thank our distinguished team of advocates, advisers, experts and other
members of the Chilean delegation. And 1 am especially grateful to the co-Agents for their
unwavering dedication. Allow me also to acknowledge and reciprocate the kind words of my
colleague and friend, Ainbassador Allan Wagner.
4.3. Mr. President, Members of the Court, based on the facts and arguments set out in Chile's
...~~- ~~···- ~~--Counter,Memorial,R .euriog.nhdseroaanproceedings, Chile respectfully requests the.
.-~~·~~~~-~ ~--Courtio:·~- ········~--·-·~~·---~~--~·~·------·---~-·-·~-....-...-~·-~~-~~·~~~-~·-.~··~-~~~--~~·
(a) dismiss Peru's claims in their entirety;
(b) adjudge and declare that:
(i) the respective maritime zone entitlementsf Ghi!e.and Peru have been fully delimited by
agreement;
(ii) those maritime zone entitlements are delimited by a boundary following the parallel of
latitude passing through the most seaward boundary marker of the land boundary between - 47-
Chile and Peru, known as Hito No. 1, having a latitude of 18° 21'00" S under
WGS84 Datum; and
(iii) Peru has no entitlement to any maritime zone extending to the south ofthat parallel.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your generous attention. Chile's oral
pleadings are now at an end.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Ambassador van Klaveren Stork.
The Court takes note ofthe final submissions which Your Excellency has now read on behalf
ofthe Republic ofChile.
This indeed brings an end to the oral proceedings. I should like to thank the Agents, counsel
and advocates for the Parties for the excellence of their arguments and statements and for
maintaining a courteous and mutually respectful spirit during these proceedings.
In accordance with practice, I shall request the Agents of the Parties to remain at the Court's
disposai to provide any additional information it may require. With this proviso, I now declare
closed the oral proceedings in the case concerning the Maritime Dispute (Peru v. ChiZe).
The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in due
course of the date on which the Court will deliver its Judgment at a public sitting. As the Court has
no other business before it today, the sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 4.30 p.m. :' 7
Il~.
Public sitting held on Friday 14 December 2012, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning the Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile)