Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2009/7
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Thursday 12 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 12 mars 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes
(Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Judges Shi
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Judge ad hoc Guillaume
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
ShiMM.
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
TCinçade
Yusuf
Greugesood,
Gjil.eume, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the Republic of Costa Rica is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde-Alvarez, Ambassador, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
as Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Emeritus Professor of Interna tional Law, Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies, Geneva, member of th e International Law Commission, member of
the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, associate member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
Ms Kate Parlett, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, Solicitor
(Australia), PhD candidate, University of Cambridge (Jesus College),
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Aguilar-de Beauvillie rs Urbina, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Chief of Staff to the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
Mr. Sergio Vinocour, Minister and Consul General of Costa Rica to the French Republic,
Mr. Norman Lizano, Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Carlos Garbanzo, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations
Office at Geneva,
Mr. Fouad Zarbiev, PhD candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva,
Mr. Leonardo Salazar, National Geographic Institute of Costa Rica,
as Advisers;
Mr. Allan Solis, Third Secretary at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Assistant Adviser. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Costa Rica est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde-Alvarez, ambassadeur, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du
Costa Rica,
comme agent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.LuciusCaflisch, professeur émérite de dro it international de l’Institut de hautes études
internationales et du développement de Ge nève, membre de la Commission du droit
international, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut de hautes études internationales
et du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M.SergioUgalde, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du CostaRica,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Arnoldo Brenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica,
MmeKateParlett, conseiller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du CostaRica,
Solicitor (Australie), doctorante à l’Université de Cambridge (Jesus College),
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Aguilar-de Beauvilliers Urbina, ambassadeur du CostaRica auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M.RicardoOtarola, chef d’état-major auprès du vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du
Costa Rica,
M. Sergio Vinocour, ministre et consul général du Costa Rica en République française,
M. Norman Lizano, consul général du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M.CarlosGarbanzo, conseiller à la mission pe rmanente du Costa Rica auprès de l’Office des
Nations Unies à Genève,
M.FouadZarbiev, doctorant à l’Institut de haut es études internationales et du développement de
Genève,
M. Leonardo Salazar, Institut géographique national du Costa Rica,
comme conseillers ;
M. Allan Solis, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseiller adjoint. - 6 -
The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, former Chairman of the
International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law,
University of Oxford, member of the Institut de Droit International; Distinguished Fellow, All
Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of Internati onal Law at the University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, United States of America, former member of the
International Law Commission,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and
former Chairman of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Paul Reichler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the
United States Supreme Court, member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Irene Blázquez Navarro, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
Ms Clara E. Brillenbourg, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar
of the United States Supreme Court, member of the Massachusetts Bar, member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit International de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs of Nicaragua,
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
as Assistant Counsel. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, ancien président de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) de l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Distinguished
fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur de droit international à la McGeorge School of Law de
l’Université du Pacifique à Sacramento (Etats-Unis d’Amérique), ancien membre de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit international,
M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Fole y Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de dro it international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Irene Blázquez Navarro, docteur en droit international public, Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid,
Mme Clara E. Brillenbourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux des districts de
Columbia et de New York,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des
barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du Massachusetts et du district de
Columbia,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
comme conseils adjoints. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
The Court meets today to hear the second round of oral argument of the Republic of
Nicaragua. I now give the floor to Mr. Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Mr. President.
I. AREAFFIRMATION OF THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THE TREATY
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is my task to respond to the
presentations of my friends on the other side of the Court relating to the general character of the
Treaty of Limits and the nature of the legal interests which result from that Treaty.
2. Before examining the observations of Prof essorsCrawford and Caflisch individually, I
must point to the weak analytical foundation common to both speeches. Both fail to give full faith
and credit to the sovereignty of Nicaragua, that is to say, Nicaragua’s title to the river as a whole.
This legal interest, this title to territory, is nocreated by the Treaty but is the result of the
determination of the boundary. The legal result of the fixing of the international boundary is the
existence of a title to territory.
3. It is a consequence of two elements in combination:
⎯ First, the implementation of the territorial settle ment by means of fixing a boundary which
allocated the extensive region of Nicoya to Cost a Rica, and the region of the San Juan River to
Nicaragua.
⎯ Second, the necessary result, in general internationa l law, was the establishment of title for
Nicaragua.
4. Mr.President, counsel for CostaRica insist on treating title or sovereignty as if it is
divisible into several layers of jurisdictional rights, of navigation, of communication, and so forth.
5. What is missing here is the qualitative difference between title and the regulatory power
which goes with title on the one hand and, on the ot her hand, the entitlement to treaty rights on the
part of another State, rights which can only be vi ndicated by claim, and by methods of peaceful
settlement. Because Nicaragua is the territorial sovereign, the title holder, she has not only the - 9 -
legal power but the legal duty to maintain pu blic order and appropriate conditions of safe
navigation on the San Juan.
6. It is this basic condition, this basic system of public order which is recognized in the
decision of the Claims Commission in the McMahan case. The system depends upon the principle
that the power of control and decision inheres in the sovereign, and the question is, who has that
power? The answer is Nicaragua and not Costa Rica. The Treaty provisions are administered by
the territorial sovereign.
7. My outline of this system of public order, that is, the maintenance of the discipline of the
Treaty, provoked ProfessorCrawford to refer to the outline as an extraordinary statement. But,
Mr.President, if ProfessorCrawford did arrive at the local market of Sarapiquí with his eggs still
unbroken, and ready for sale, this would be the resu lt of the system of public order which he finds
extraordinary.
8. Both Professor Crawford and Professor Caflisch share the same confusion concerning the
coexistence of certain rights and the regulatory powers of the State with title to territory.
9. This confusion is apparent in the conclusi ons proposed to the Court by Professor Caflisch
(CR 2009/6, p. 40, para. 13).
10. First, he says that the instrument of 1858 is a treaty establishing a boundary with a
multifaceted legal régime governing a waterway. This formulation involves a failure to draw the
legal conclusions from the establishing of a b oundary, especially, one which constitutes the
settlement of a major territorial dispute.
11. Secondly, he says that sovereignty and the right of navigation are “pieces of one and the
same picture” and that it cannot be said that the one dominates the other. This formulation
encapsulates the recurrent failure of our opponents to distinguish between the question of rights and
the enforcement and protection of those rights.
12. In fact in his third conclusion Professor Caflisch recognizes that Nicaragua can “exercise
her sovereignty via measures and regulations” that are not unlawful, discriminatory or
unreasonable. This, Mr. President, is a belated acceptance of the system of public order created by
the Treaty and by general international law. - 10 -
13. I have now addressed the false prem ises on which the reasoning of CostaRica
concerning sovereignty rests, and I can now return to some of the specifics of the submissions of
Professor Crawford.
14. It will be of assistance to the Court if I first of all indicate what Professor Crawford did
not deal with in response to my first round speech.
15. First, he steers clear of the doctrine of c ontemporary international law. And it is not the
case that ProfessorCrawford has left this asp ect of the matter to his colleague, because
ProfessorCaflisch shows a similar reticence when it comes to the doctrine. ProfessorCaflisch
confines his response to say that “Mr. Brownlie has cited a number of aut horities to establish that
there is no general right or freedom of river navigation in Latin American practice” (CR2009/6,
p.0, para.5). ProfessoC r aflisch accepts this position and so, presumably, does
Professor Crawford.
16. And this is all highly relevant because it emphasizes that the Treaty provisions on
navigation are exceptional and form an inherent element in the territorial settlement.
17. I must return to the reticences of Professor Crawford.
18. As I have pointed out, he avoids reference to doctrine tout court .
19. Secondly, he avoids reference to third State eviden ce, including the Note dated
28May1858 from Mr.Mirabeau B.Lamar to the United States Secretary of State. Mr.Lamar
recognized the extent of the territorial concession made by Nicaragua. The Court will recall that he
was the United States Resident Minister to the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
20. Thirdly, ProfessorCrawford plays down the evid ence that the 1858Treaty involved the
settlement of a long-running territorial dispute be tween CostaRica and Nicar agua. The relevant
paragraphs of the first Rives Report, cited in my first speech, are not rebutted. Moreover, the
wording of the preamble to the Treaty of Limits is ignored, along with the provisions of Article I,
which explicitly indicate the historical background.
21. Fourthly, ProfessorCrawford leaves on one side the whole question of the legal
consequences of the existence of Nicaraguan title over the San Juan as a result of the 1858 Treaty.
22. I move on to the thesis of ProfessorCrawfo rd according to which the Nicoya theory is
wrong and, he says, in any event irrelevant (CR 2009/6, pp. 12-14, paras. 16-26). - 11 -
23. Counsel for Costa Rica makes heavy going of this issue. The documents show that the
question of title to Nicoya remained open until th e Treaty of 1858. The Memorial of CostaRica
expressly recognizes that the question of Nicoya was not finally settled until the 1858Treaty; I
refer to the Memorial, page 12, paragraph 2.14. And the position was confirmed by the first article
of the Juarez-Cañas Treaty of 1857.
24. If ProfessorCrawford were correct about the history, the 1858Treaty would have been
unnecessary.
25. ProfessorCrawford raises questions about the extent of Nicoya (CR2009/6, p.12,
paras. 17-18). Nicaragua stands by the map publis hed by Fermin Ferrer, but would adopt the same
argument as before on the basis of the judges’ folder for round2, tab53. This is said to be the
representation of Nicoya as described by Rives. This version still presents Nicoya as very
extensive, and including the southern coast of Lake Nicaragua. Thus, it still indicates the
subject-matter of a substantial territorial dispute.
26. Professor Crawford’s final point is to the effect that “the obvious purpose of the Treaty”
was the interoceanic canal (CR2009/6, pp.14-15, paras.27-30). No doubt the Treaty had many
aspects but Nicaragua does not accept that the object and purpose of the 1858Treaty was not the
settlement of the long-standing territorial dispute but “the interoceanic canal”. It is true that
ArticleVIII of the Treaty contemplated the possibility of a canal. At the same time it would be
astonishing to see the Treaty itself as an interoceanic treaty.
27. And in respect of the issue of natural rights raised in the second Rives Report, it is true
that Point 11 of Cleveland’s Third Article refers to “cases where the construction of the canal will
involve an injury to the natural rights of CostaRi ca...” and provides then that CostaRica may
“demand compensation”.
28. I shall move now to the decision of the Permanent Court in the S.S. “Wimbledon” case,
in which the Judgment used the phrase “general a nd peremptory” in relation to Article380 of the
Treaty of Versailles. This was invoked by Pr ofessorCrawford in the second round (CR2009/6,
pp.8-9, para. 3).
29. Professor Crawford accepts that the Treaty of Versailles has a distinct character from the
1858Treaty, which was “general and peremptory”, whilst the latter ⎯ the bilateral Treaty of - 12 -
1858 ⎯ is “bilateral rather than general”. But he nonetheless considers it to be relevant. With
respect, this reliance on the S.S. “Wimbledon” decision displays excessive optimism. The case
could not be more different from the present. The context is the multilateral peace treaty of
Versailles and the refusal of access to the Kiel Canal by the German authorities on the basis of
obligations of neutrality. And so the circumstanc es were unusual in several respects. In the words
of the Permanent Court:
“The Court considers that the terms of Article 380 are categorical and give rise
to no doubt. It follows that the canal has ceased to be an internal and national
navigable waterway, the use of which by th e vessels of states other than the riparian
state is left entirely to the discretion of that state, and that it has become an
international waterway intended to provid e under treaty guarantee easier access to the
Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the world. Under its new régime, the Kiel Canal
must be open, on a footing of equality, to all vessels, without making any distinction
between war vessels and vessels of commerce, but on one express condition, namely,
that these vessels must belong to na tio1s at peace with Germany.” ( Judgments, 1923,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, pp. 22-23.)
30. Mr.President, in the result, the Perman ent Court is deciding that Germany could not
invoke the law of neutrality and that is peremptory indeed. But the subject-matter has no relevance
for the present case. The strange result, however, is that at the end of the day Costa Rica appears
to espouse the categorization of the right of navigation as peremptory. And yet when Nicaragua
described the CostaRican analysis as involving a peremptory right of navigation, counsel for
CostaRica protested. I refer to the argument of ProfessorCaflisch in the second round
(CR 2009/6, p. 40, para. 15).
31. I return to some specific points raised in the presentation of ProfessorCaflisch
(CR2009/6, p.41, para.16). He refers to the decision of the General Claims Commission in the
case of McMahan. He quotes a passage already included in the transcript (CR2009/4, p.32,
para. 59) but does not deny the relevance and authority of the decision itself. The decision adopts
the basic system of public order which I have already outlined this morning.
1“La Cour estime que l’article 380 est formel et ne prêt e à aucune équivoque. Il en résulte que le canal a cessé
d’être une voie navigable intérieure, nationa le, dont l’usage par les navires des Pui ssances autres que l'Etat riverain est
abandonné à la discrétion de cet Etat, et qu’il est devenu une voie internationale, de stinée à rendre plus facile, sous la
garantie d’un traité, l’ accès de la Baltique, da ns l’intérêt de toutes les nations du monde. Sous son régime nouveau, le
Canal de Kiel doit être ouvert, sur le pied de l’égalité, à t ous les navires, sans qu'’il y ait à distinguer entre les navires de
guerre et les navires de commerce, mais à une condition expresse, c’est que ces navires ressortissent à des nations en paix
avec l'Allemagne.” - 13 -
32. My distinguished opponent also states that “a treaty right to free navigation cannot be
regulated out of existence by invoking Nicaragua ’s sovereignty” (CR 2009/6, pp. 40-41, para. 15).
And he adds: “This observation is also va lid for the passages quoted from Wheaton and
O’Connell.”
33. These statements involve tilting at windmills and the Court certainly is in a setting
appropriate for such sport. In any event,Wheaton and O’Connell do not support the position of
CostaRica. The relevant passages appear in my first round speech at paragraphs55 to57
(CR2009/4, p.31). Both Wheaton, published in 1866, and O’Connell, published in 1970, accept
that any right of navigation is subject to the regulatory power of the riparian State.
Mr. President, I have now concluded my s ubmissions in the second round and I thank the
Court for its kind attention. I would ask you now to invite Professor Remiro to the podium.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Brownlie, for yo ur presentation. I now give the floor to
Professor Remiro Brotóns.
M. BROTÓNS :
II.LE DROIT DE LIBRE NAVIGATION DU C OSTA R ICA «CON OBJETOS DE COMERCIO »SUR UN
TRONÇON DU FLEUVE SAN J UAN
1. Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est dans les arbres de la ville d’Olivabassa,
née de l’imagination fertile d’Italo Calvino, que le baronnet Cósimo de Piovasco se promenait sans
jamais toucher le sol et c’estlà qu’il rencontra, un jour, une col onie d’aristocrates espagnols en
exil, qui vivaient également perchés dans les bananiers et les ormes de la ville. Pourquoi ? Parce
que les magistrats locaux, qui voulaient leur donner refuge, se devaient néanmoins de respecter
l’ancien traité conclu avec le roi d’Espagne, en vertu duquel ils ét aient tenus de lui extrader tout
fugitif posant son pied sur le sol d’Olivabassa
2I.Calvino, Il barone rampante, 1957; trad. française: Le baron perché, 1959 (voir Ed. du Seuil, Collections
Points, n32, Paris, 2001) ; trad. anglaise : The Baron in the Trees, 1959. - 14 -
2. Eh bien, Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est cela que vous propose
maintenant le CostaRica, en défendant une décision policy-oriented en vue de laquelle la Partie
demanderesse n’a aucun scrupule à manipuler le canon d’interprétation codifié dans l’article 31 de
la convention de Vienne. Mais, êtes-vous les juges d’Olivabassa ?
2. Reductio ad absurdum et principe de bonne foi
3. Lundi dernier, les conseils du CostaRica ont tenté, dans un ultime effort, de vous
convaincre d’accepter leurs prétentions tout à fait dépourvues de fondement, réduisant les
conclusions auxquelles une application correcte de la règle générale d’interprétation conduit
naturellement à l’absurde.
4. Les conseils du CostaRica nous parlent de paysans qui se déplacent avec leurs Œufs au
3
marché de Sarapiquí et qui ne peuvent retourner chez eux parce qu’ils les ont tous vendus , ou
encore d’un producteur du café obligé de faire le tour du capHorn alors que sa récolte prend la
4
route du SanJuan vers l’Europe . Ils affirment avec désinvolture que l’expression objetos de
comercio contenue dans l’articleVI du traité Jerez-Cañas a pour objet de clarifier et d’étendre
le
5
droit perpétuel de libre navigation accordé sans limites au CostaRica . Tout en accusant le
Nicaragua de vouloir remplacer l’interprétation résultant de la règle générale par une interprétation
6
fondée sur les moyens complémentaires , les conseils du CostaRica font prévaloir le rapport
7
de Rives sur le texte du traité .
5. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’en est assez! L’opération interprétative
menée par le CostaRica est difficilement compa tible avec le principe de bonne foi, principe
essentiel dans la règle générale d’interprétation. Il est évident que les bateaux destinés au transport
de marchandises ne changent pas leur qualification quand, une fois leurs marchandises déchargées
au port, ils naviguent sur lest. Tous n’ont pas forcément de charge pour leur voyage de retour et
certains comme les pétroliers ou les navires qui transportent du gaz liquide ou des déchets
3 CR 2009/6, p. 17, par. 35.
4 CR 2009/6, p. 31, par. 43.
5
CR 2009/6, p. 17, par. 34.
6 CR 2009/2, p. 73, par. 63.
7 CR 2009/6, p. 15, par. 29. - 15 -
dangereux naviguent en général à vide au retour. Et il va de soi que les commerçants peuvent
accompagner leurs marchandises.
6. Le Costa Rica s’obstine à proposer une interp rétation de son droit de navigation qui prive
la limitation de le faire «con objetos de comercio » de tout effet; il soutient que son droit de
navigation est plus que libre, absolu. Néanmoins, même la traduction anglaise de l’articleVI du
traité Jerez-Cañas chérie par le CostaRica limite ce droit de navigation costa-ricien: «said
navigation being for the purposes of commerce». Il est donc évident qu’on ne peut soutenir
sérieusement que les objets de commerce sont une extension du droit de navigation illimitée.
Toutes les références au droit de navigation dans le traité reposent, expressément ou implicitement,
sur le texte de l’article VI et sa limitation «con objetos de comercio».
3. Une navigation «con objetos de comercio»
7. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, nous avons déjà longuement débattu sur la
8
signification du syntagme «objetos de comercio» .
8. Conformément au sens ordinaire des termes da ns le contexte du traité, le Nicaragua croit
avoir démontré que naviguer «con objetos de comercio», c’est bien naviguer «avec les choses qui
font l’objet d’une activité commerciale», c’est naviguer avec des marchandises. Mais même dans
l’hypothèse où la Cour considèrerait que l’article VI du traité Jerez-Cañas se réfère, sous couvert de
cette expression, aux finalités commerciales, le résultat ne changerait pas pour autant, car à
l’époque où le traité a été conclu, le commerce n’était rien d’autre que le trafic de marchandises.
9. La Partie adverse n’a pas avancé lors du deuxième tour de ses plaidoiries des éléments ou
raisonnements qui nous obligent à modifier notre positi on. Cependant, si vous me le permettez, je
souhaite faire des brefs commentaires à propos de certaines questions reprises par le CostaRica
lundi dernier.
10. La première concerne les tableaux présentés par le CostaRica afin de prouver que
l’expression «objetos de comercio» signifie «fins commerciales» et que le trafic commercial est
décrit par d’autres termes quand on veut se référer aux marchandises.
8
CR 2009/4, p. 37-40, par. 6-15. - 16 -
9
11. Le Nicaragua croit avoir discrédité la valeur probante de ces tableaux . Il y a bien sûr
d’autres termes utilisés dans le trafic commercia l pour identifier les choses impliquées dans
l’activité commerciale et qui sont, peut-être, u tilisés dans le trafic commercial plus fréquemment
que celui de «objetos». Mais, si nous nous en tenons au critère du Costa Rica 10, les «commodities»
ne seraient pas des «commodities», car elles n’appara issent pas une seule fois dans la liste que le
Costa Rica lui-même a établie. Or, ce terme de «c ommodities» ne fait-il pas partie des termes les
plus populaires, et donc des plus courants, de la langue commerciale anglaise ?
12. La signification du terme «objeto» au singu lier (et il en est d’ailleurs de même au
pluriel), dépend du contexte dans lequel il est utilisé. Il s’agit d’un terme polysémique dont on ne
peut déterminer le sens que grâce à son contexte.
13. Citons, à titre d’exemple, cette définition d’opérations liées au commerce tirée du Corpus
diachronique de l’espagnol actuel . Il s’agit «d’opérations indépendantes, qui ont pour objet de
faciliter l’achat et la vente des objets de commerce, ou de servir de médiation dans ce type
11
d’affaires» . Et voila ! Nous trouvons là, dans la même phrase, «objet» comme finalité et «objets
de commerce» comme marchandise.
14. C’est pourquoi on ne peut tirer aucune conclusion basée sur l’interprétation de ce terme
hors de son contexte ; dans notre cas, il s’agit bien d’objets de commerce («objetos de comercio»).
Et c’est bien là ce que le Nicaragua met en question : le sens que le Costa Rica donne à des objets
au pluriel quand ces objets sont liés au commerce et qu’on prétend naviguer avec eux.
15. Pourquoi l’expert du Costa Rica, M. Moreno de Alba, passe-t-il sous silence tous les cas
du syntagme «objetos de comercio» que recense le Corpus diachronique, ouvrage qu’il connaît et
qu’il invoque à l’appui d’autres points ? La réponse est bien simple : parce que, dans tous les cas,
le syntagme «objetos de comercio» est compri s au sens de «choses faisant l’objet d’activités
12
commerciales» .
9
CR 2009/4, p. 40-44, par. 16-27.
10
CR 2009/6, p. 25, par. 18-20.
11Dossier de plaidoiries, 5 mars 2009, plaidorie de M.AntonioRe miroBrotons, liste de documents,
document 1 : CORDE «objetos de comercio».
12CR 2009/6, p. 39, par. 15. - 17 -
16. En outre, le seul point qui pourrait appu yer l’interprétation finaliste du syntagme
«objetos de comercio» que propose le Costa Rica se trouve dans les traités qui ont suivi le modèle
du traité Jay; rappelons que ces traités, conclus par le CostaRica avec les Etats-Unis en1851 et
par le Nicaragua en 1857, 1859 et 1867, se réfèrent au droit des citoyens des parties à «louer et
occuper des maisons et des entrepôts para los objetos de su comercio (for the purpose(s) of their
commerce)», une fois énoncé leur droit «to come with their Ships and Cargoes to the Lands,
13
Countries, Cities, Ports Places and Rivers within their Dominions and Territories» .
17. Le terme «objets» dans l’expression «para los objetos de su comercio» peut donc être
interprété tant au sens de «choses» ou «march andises» qu’au sens de «fins commerciales».
L’expert du Costa Rica lui–mê me admet l’ambigüité du texte 14. A notre avis la seule raison pour
donner dans ce cas un certain crédit à la seconde interprétati on réside dans le fait qu’elle a été
traduite par «for the purposes of commerce» dans le texte anglais du traité, qui fait également foi.
Mais eu égard au contexte des dispositions mentionnées, les activités commerciales portent sur des
cargaisons, c’est-à-dire, sur des marchandises qu’on emmagasine dans les entrepôts, ce qui renvoie
à nouveau au seul commerce des marchandises.
18. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les jug es, il y a des différences significatives entre ces
traités et le traité Jerez-Cañas. Ce dernier est un traité portant sur des limites territoriales et non un
traité d’amitié, de commerce et de navigation comme les autres. Il ne repose pas sur un modèle.
On y parle de navigation avec des objets de commerce et non de louer des entrepôts pour les objets
de commerce. Le traité Jerez-Cañas fait autorité seulement en espagnol. Le traité Jerez-Cañas est
singulier, absolument singulier.
19. Le conseil du Costa Rica triomphe parce que dans aucun des huit cas citant «objetos de
comercio» mentionnés dans le Corpus diachronique de l’espagnol actuel, tous avec une
signification indubitable de «choses faisant l’objet d’activités commerciales», la préposition «con»
précède le syntagme, telle qu’elle figure à l’article VI du traité 15. Cela n’affecte pas l’interprétation
13
CR 2009/4, p. 41-42, par. 21-25.
14J.G.Moreno de Alba, Dictamen sobre el significado del sintagma «c on objetos de comercio» en el contexto
del artículo 6º del «Tratado de límites entr e CostaRica y Nicaragua» (14 de abril de 189 de noviembre de 2008,
par. III.3 (Documents Annexed to Letter from Agent of Costa Rica dated 27 November 2008, Ann. I).
15CR 2009/6, p. 22, par. 11. - 18 -
16
de l’expression , mais, pour les besoins de la démonstration, peut-on trouver un seul cas dans le
tableau présenté par le CostaRica dans lequel la préposition «con» précède le terme «objetos»?
La réponse est clairement non. En fait, on peut dire que la fo rmule de l’article VI nous met devant
un hapax, c’est-à-dire, un cas unique, sans aucune c onfirmation: le syntagme «con objetos de»
17
plus un substantif («commerce» dans notre cas) ne correspond à aucune pratique qui soit connue .
e
4. La notion de comercio (commerce) vers le milieu du XIX siècle
20. Dans le contexte du milieu du XIX siècle, «commerce» visait le trafic de marchandises.
Le Nicaragua croit que ce fait a été bien établi et démontré avec les arguments exprimés au premier
18
tour de ses plaidoiries . La preuve grammaticale et la pra tique conventionnelle confirment cette
affirmation.
21. Le CostaRica admet que tel était le cas, mais il insiste sur la deuxième acception de
e
«commerce» au XIX siècle, défini comme «communication et relations de groupes de personnes et
de peuples avec d’autres» 19. Certes ! Mais le Costa Rica n’explique pas comment cette acception
pourrait, d’une manière ou d’une autre, être retenue dans le texte et le contexte de l’articleVI du
traité Jerez-Cañas et pourrait conduire à écarter la première définition du commerce communément
acceptée.
22. L’acception du terme commerce promue par le Costa Rica est aujourd’hui reléguée à la
huitième et dernière acception du Dictionnaire et est, d’ailleurs, comme je l’ai signalé en passant
au premier tour, tombée en désuétude 20. Il n’y a pas de contradic tions parmi les conseils du
Nicaragua sur ce point. Le Nicaragua ne préten d pas tirer profit du fait que cette acception,
toujours secondaire, est aujourd’hui obsolète, si ce n’est pour attirer l’attention sur l’intérêt que lui
porte le CostaRica, soucieux de relier à l’acception la plus large du mot «commerce» des
16 Voir M. Seco Reymundo, Dictamen sobre el sintagma «con objetos de comercio» en el texto del Tratado de
Límites entre CostaRica y Nicar agua suscrito el 15deabril de 1858 , par.6 (duplique du Nicaragua (DN), vol.II,
annexe 64).
17
Voir M. Seco Reymundo, Dictamen…, par. 8.
18 CR 2009/4, p. 43-46, par. 28-42.
19 CR 2009/6, p. 30, par. 30.
20
CR 2009/4, p. 44, par. 35. - 19 -
développements bien plus récents, qui n’étaien t pas imaginables pour les auteurs du traité
Jerez-Cañas en 1858.
23. Comprendre le mot «commerce» dans le cadre de l’articleVI du traité comme
«communication et relations de groupes de personne s et de peuples avec d’autres» équivaut à faire
de commerce un synonyme de «communication». Cependant, le commerce présume la
communication, mais ne se confond pas avec elle, à moins qu’une intention contraire puisse être
démontrée.
24. En résumé, c’est la première accepti on de commerce qui exprime le mieux le sens
commun et courant du terme et il n’y a dans le traité aucune indication qui permettrait une
acception différente. Force est donc de s’en tenir à cette première acception.
5. Le transport de passagers
25. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, le conseil du Costa Rica estime avoir fourni
la preuve que le transport de passagers est compri s dans le droit de libre navigation découlant de
21
l’article VI du traité Jerez-Cañas . Mais où se trouve-t-elle ⎯ la preuve ? Contrairement à ce que
soutient le CostaRica, le transport de passager s est exclu de la notion de commerce au milieu
e
du XIX siècle et, en particulier, de la notion de commerce retenue par l’article VI du traité.
26. Tout d’abord, le commerce est défini comme «négociation et trafic qui se fait en
achetant, en vendant, en échangeant des choses»; c’est la première acception du terme dans tous
e 22
les dictionnaires pendant tout le XIX siècle et encore aujourd’hui . Mais elle est d’autant plus
intéressante qu’aucune des autres acceptions de commerce, qui incluent même deux jeux de cartes,
ne fait la moindre allusion au transport de passagers.
27. En second lieu je rappelle la position du CostaRica lui-même dans l’arbitrage
Cleveland 23, déjà évoquée par le Nicaragua au premier tour 24 et sur laquelle reviendra tout de suite
mon collègue, le professeur Pellet: dans sa ques tion «rhétorique» le demandeur se référait
expressément au «transport de marchandises» à l’exclusion de celui des passagers.
21
CR 2009/6, p. 31, par. 41.
22
CR 2009/4, p. 43, par. 29-30.
23DN, vol. II, annexe 5.
24CR 2009/4, p. 58-59, par. 20-21 ; CR 2009/5, p. 31-32, par. 13. - 20 -
28. En troisième lieu, il faut rappeler que si durant une période remontant à1849 des
passagers ont, en effet, été transportés en grand nomb re sur le fleuve, cette pratique était le fait du
Nicaragua, mais en aucune manière celle du Costa Rica. Si le Costa Rica avait un droit quelconque
au transport de passagers sur le fleuve San Juan, on ne peut que s’étonner qu’il n’en ait fait aucun
usage pendant plus de cent trente ans. Ce n’est qu’à partir de 1994 que le Costa Rica s’est aventuré
à promouvoir un tourisme régulier et important sur le San Juan. Auparavant, le Nicaragua n’avait
nul besoin de rappeler au Costa Rica ce que «objetos de comercio» signifiait dans le traité.
29. En quatrième lieu, et comme le Nicaragua l’a expliqué de manière détaillée dans ses
pièces écrites, le transport de passagers en tant qu’activité commerciale fut soigneusement exclu du
25
droit de navigation reconnu par l’article VI du traité .
30. Finalement, le Nicaragua n’a pas gardé un silence «assourdissant» que lui veut attribuer
26
le CostaRica au sujet de la clause relative à la prétention du Gouvernement et des citoyens
costa-riciens de bénéficier d’un libre passage pour le fleuve SanJuan d’un océan à l’autre,
renfermée dans les traités conclus par le Nicaragua avec les Etats-Unis, la France et la
Grande-Bretagne entre1857 et1860. Dans la duplique du Nicaragua on peut trouver la réponse
adéquate 27. En fin de compte cette clause se limitait à préserver les prétentions des citoyens et du
Gouvernement costa-riciens à un libre passage dans la perspective de la construction éventuelle
d’un canal interocéanique traversant partiellement le fleuve San Juan.
Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges je vous remercie de votre très aimable attention et
ayant conclu mon exposé, je vous prie, Monsieur le président, d’appeler le professeur Pellet à cette
barre pour la suite des plaidoiries du Nicaragua.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Remiro Brotóns, for your presentation. I now give
the floor to Professor Alain Pellet.
25
Contre-mémoire du Nicaragua (CMN), p. 161-165, par. 4.1.37-4.1.48 ; DN, p. 151-154, par. 3.90-3.95.
26CR 2009/6, p. 31, par. 42.
27DN, p. 153-154, par. 3.9. - 21 -
M. PELLET :
III. NTERPRÉTATION DU TRAITÉ (SUITE )
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, il m’incombe ce matin de me pencher à
nouveau sur l’interprétation de l’expression «avec des marchandises» («con objetos de comercio»)
en répondant aux arguments avancés par les profe sseursCrawford etKohen sur ce point, que le
professeur Remiro Brotóns n’a encore pas réfutés. Sans m’astreindre à un plan «à la française», je
le ferai en suivant en substance l’ordre dans lequel nos contradicteurs ont formulé leurs critiques.
1. Le paradoxe du professeur Crawford : «moins = plus»
2. Monsieur le président, je pars pour l’in stant du principe que le droit (perpétuel) de
navigation du Costa Rica sur le fleuve ⎯ pas forcément sur l’éventuel futur canal… ⎯ soit acquis
à la condition que cette navigation se fasse avec des marchandises comme «objetos de comercio».
Voyons si, indépendamment de l’analyse lexicale et grammaticale à laquelle AntonioRemiro a
28
procédé, ceci est aussi absurde que le dit le professeurCrawford dont les conceptions
mathématiques laissent perplexe puisque pour lui «moins = plus», «cependant = de plus»,
«pero = más aún».
3. Permettez-moi de remarquer d’abord, Messieurs les juges, que je ne comprends plus du
tout pourquoi la Partie costa-ricienne s’obstine à défendre une interprétati on différente de la nôtre
puisque JamesCrawford a expliqué que «même si» (even if) , l’expression contestée signifie
29
««articles de commerce» ou «articles of trade», these are words of extension, not limitation» .
Then, pourquoi, alors, s’opposer à une définition si avantageuse qui, loin de limiter les droits du
Costa Rica, les étendrait ? Il est rare que toute une équipe de conseils joue ainsi contre son camp…
4. Il faut dire que le raisonnement de notre contradicteur est pour le moins alambiqué. Si je
l’ai bien compris, il nous dit :
1) le Nicaragua a reconnu au Costa Rica un droit de libre navigation ;
28
Cf. CR 2009/6, p. 16-18, par. 32-38.
29Ibid., p. 17, par. 33. - 22 -
2) par hypothèse, la liberté de navigation suppose l’ exonération de taxes, d’impôts et de droits de
douane ; et,
3) si l’on précise ensuite que ceci s’applique aux marchandises, cette précision «is not there as a
limitation of the right of free navigation; it ma kes it clear that the freedom extends to trade
goods you may be carrying with you. The words are, quite simply, not words of limitation at
30
all.»
5. Mais, Monsieur le président, si, par défin ition, la libre navigation implique l’exonération
des droits de douane, comme ceux-ci ne peuvent être appliqués qu’à des marchandises ou à des
services, il est clair qu’en précisant que la liberté en question s’applique à la navigation «avec des
marchandises» comme «objetos de commercio», le s rédacteurs du traité entendait bien signifier
qu’elle ne s’appliquait qu’à une telle navigation. Cette formule, à l’évidence, n’étend rien ⎯ elle
restreint. «Moins = moins».
2. La parabole de la poule et des Œufs
31
6. Mais… il y a la parabole de la poule de M. Crawford . Si je peux lui donner un conseil :
le plus avisé serait qu’il se rende au marché de Sarapiquí non seulement avec ses Œufs, mais aussi
avec sa poule ⎯qui, elle aussi est un objet de commerce ⎯ et qu’il revienne avec elle. Cela lui
éviterait les désagréments qu’il redoute et lui ferait de la compagnie.
7. Plus sérieusement, je pense qu’il devrait ga rder à l’esprit que toute interprétation doit être
faite de bonne foi, être raisonnable, et donner aux dispositions conventionnelles un sens utile.
Ainsi que la Cour l’a rappelé dans son avis consultatif de 1950 : «[L]e premier devoir d’un tribunal,
appelé à interpréter et à appliquer les dispositions d’un traité, est de s’efforcer de donner effet ,
selon leur sens naturel et ordinaire, à ces dispositions prises dans
leur contexte» ( Compétence de
l’Assemblée générale pour l’admission d’un Etat aux Nations Unies, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 4 ; les italiques sont de nous). Pour que la liberté de navigation reconnue au
CostaRica par l’articleVI du traité Cañas-Je rez ait un effet utile, il faut l’interpréter
30
Ibid., par. 34 (Crawford).
31Ibid., par. 35. - 23 -
⎯ raisonnablement ⎯ comme permettant au professeur éleveur de poules de revenir de Sarapiquí
sans ses Œufs.
8. Au surplus, prise au pied de la lettre, la fabulette de la poule ne permet pas davantage de
donner un effet utile à l’interprétation du CostaRica lui-même qu’à celle du Nicaragua: si le
professeurCrawford va à Sarapiquí avec l’intention d’y faire du commerce (à des fins
commerciales) mais s’en revient avec celle de se divertir ou d’admirer le paysage, sans aucune
«intention commerciale», il ne peut pas davantage se prévaloir de la liberté de navigation reconnue
par l’articleVI du traitéJerez-Cañas. Et la mê me chose vaut pour l’argument qu’il veut tirer de
32
son expérience personnelle lorsqu’il se plaint qu’on ne l’a pas assez contrôlé .
3. Un défi sans pertinence
9. J’en viens, Monsieur le président, au «déf i» que nous a lancé le professeur Crawford. Il
me semble que, quand bien même il n’y aurait aucu n exemple de traité rédigé conformément à la
réécriture de l’article VI du traité de 1858 opérée pa r mon contradicteur (qui voudrait y lire «si, et
seulement si, il s’agit d’une navigation avec des marchandises» ⎯ «if and only if this navigation is
33
with articles of trade» ), cela ne signifierait pas que le tra ité Cañas-Jerez serait dépourvu de sens,
34
ou que l’interprétation que nous en faisons serait absurde («an obvious nonsense» ). Notre
instrument, comme la Partie costa-ricienne l’a fort justement souligné 35, est très particulier : traité
de frontières, il fixe une limite à la rive (ce qui, en soi, est inhabituel), tout en octroyant des droits
(de navigation perpétuelle avec des marchandises) à l’Etat n’ayant pas la souveraineté sur le fleuve.
Les chances statistiques de retrouver exactement la même clause dans un autre traité sont donc très
faibles.
10. Chaque instrument est unique et ce sont «ses termes» 36qui sont l’objet de
l’interprétation, pas un «concept» abstrait ou une formule hypothétique. Les termes «avec des
32
CR 2009/6, p. 18, par. 37 (Crawford).
33 Ibid., par. 36.
34 Ibid.
35 CR 2009/2, p. 32, par. 7 ; p. 34, par. 12 (Caflisch) ; CR 2009/3, p. 22, par. 2 (Caflisch) ; CR 2009/6, p. 38-39,
par. 7 et 8 ; p. 40, par. 13 i) (Caflisch) ; p. 66, par. 8 (Ugalde-Alvarez).
36
Voir Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe lib yenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 21-22, par. 41 ; Ile
de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1060, par. 20. - 24 -
37
marchandises» («con objetos de comercio») doivent avoir un effet utile ⎯que lui donne
l’interprétation qu’en propose le Nicaragua, mais dont le prive celle du Costa Rica : car pour aller
dans le sens costa-ricien, il aurait été suffisant d’accorder un «droit perpétuel de libre navigation»
(tout court) pour assurer à la Pa rtie demanderesse un droit aussi ab solu et aussi illimité qu’elle le
réclame.
4. Navigation sur le San Juan
11. Monsieur le président, je ne peux malheureusement pas contre-interroger le
témoinCrawford mais si, comme je le suppose, il a emprunté l’un de ces petits bateaux qui
o
transportent les touristes sur le San Juan [projection n 1], un coup d’Œil suffisait aux militaires
chargés de procéder à l’inspection pour s’assu rer qu’il ne s’agissait pas de commerce de
marchandises; bien sûr, il eût pu s’agir de marchandises illicites, adroitement cachées dans les
bagages ou dans les chaussettes du professeurCrawford ⎯mais a-t-il l’allure d’un dangereux
contrebandier ou d’un trafiquant de drogue ? Ceci dit, on ne peut raisonnablement prétendre, je l’ai
dit, que la liberté de navigation dont dis pose le Costa Rica soit illimitée ou «absolue». [Fin de la
projection n o1.] Je signale d’ailleurs au passage, Monsieur le président, que si cet adjectif
(«absolu») n’apparaît peut-être que quatre fois da ns les écritures du CostaRica et sans que l’on
38
puisse imputer à celui-ci une interprétation excessive et déraisonnable , en revanche, le professeur
Caflisch qui, j’en suis sûr, est l’ interprète fidèle de la position de la Partie costa-ricienne l’a, pour
39
sa part, utilisé pas moins de quatre fois lors de sa seule présentation de mardi de la semaine
dernière, pour caractériser le droit de navigation reconnu dans le traité de 1858.
12. Revenons au voyage ⎯sans Œufs cette fois ⎯ du professeur Crawford. Il semble se
plaindre que les douaniers ou la police des frontières du Nicaragua n
e l’aient pas interrogé sur les
marchandises qu’il transportait ⎯ou non: «But it made no difference whether I had articles of
40
trade or not. No one asked if I was carrying articles of trade» . Mais ceci relève de la logique la
plus élémentaire, Monsieur le président: le principe, sur le fleuve, c’est la souveraineté du
37
Voir, par exemple, Détroit de Corfou (Royaume-Uni c. Albanie), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 24.
38
CR 2009/6, p. 8, par. 2 (Crawford).
39CR 2009/3, p. 23, par. 7, p. 30, par. 23, p. 31, par. 26, p. 33, par. 33.
40Ibid. - 25 -
Nicaragua; si M.Crawford entendait se prévaloir de la liberté de navigation garantie à son client
par le traité de 1858, c’était à lui de préciser qu’ il se trouvait dans le cadre de l’exception ; il ne le
pouvait pas; il le dit lui-même: «Je suis allé là -bas sans articlede commerce» («I went there
without any articles of trade») ⎯et comme, à juste titre d’ailleurs, touriste qu’il était, il ne se
considérait pas lui-même comme une marchandise, comme un objeto de comercio, il ne pouvait pas
se prévaloir de l’exception et il ne s’en est pas prévalu.
5. Retour à la sentence Cleveland
13. Monsieur le président, j’en viens maintenant aux reproches tous azimuts que nous
adresse le professeurMarceloKohen, auxquels AntonioRemiroBrotóns a déjà répondu pour
partie. Remontons d’abord aux années 1886-1888, c’est-à-dire l’argumentation des Parties devant
Cleveland et la sentence de celui-ci.
Les argumentations des Parties
14. S’agissant de «l’approche du CostaRica» m on ami et contradicteur persiste et signe.
Mais, c’est pour mieux esquiver le problème. [Projection n o 2.] Il a projeté à l’écran la réponse du
CostaRica à ce qu’il appelle la «question rhétor ique» sur laquelle nous avions insisté durant le
premier tour 41et que, cette fois, je projette à mon tour :
«Does this mean that Costa Rica cannot under any circumstances navigate with
public vessels in the said waters, whether the said vessel is properly a man-of-war, or
simply a revenue cutter, or any other vessel intended to prevent smuggling, or to carry
orders to the authorities of the bordering districts, or for any other purpose not exactly
within the meaning of transportation of merchandise?» 42
15. La question donc ⎯ rhétorique ou pas ⎯ que se posait le CostaRica (avec une pointe
d’indignation sous-jacente) revenait à faire valoir que, si Cleveland ne lui reconnaissait pas le droit
de naviguer avec des vaisseaux publics, il sera it réduit au seul transport des marchandises
(transportation of merchandise) . [Fin de la projection n o 2 ; projection n 3.] Evidemment sa
propre réponse était qu’il ne devait pas en aller ainsi et qu’il était
41CR 2009/4, p. 58-59, par. 20-21 (Pellet) ; CR 2009/5, p. 31-32, par. 13 (McCaffrey).
42DN, vol. II, annexe 5, Argument on the Question of thValidity of the Treaty of Limits Between CostaRica
and Nicaragua and Other Supplementary Points Connected with it, submitted to the President of the United States of
America, Filed on Behalf of the Government of Costa Rica ; les italiques sont de nous. - 26 -
«indiscutable que le Costa Rica peut naviguer sur le San Juan avec des bateaux publics
qui ne sont pas des vrais navires de guerre… Le sens de l’expression «navigation
commerciale» inclut nécessairement la poli ce douanière, l’acheminement du courrier
43
ainsi que tout autre service public de même nature» .
16. Seulement voilà, Cleveland, lui, a donné une réponse différente : au lieu de reconnaître la
liberté de navigation pour tous les navires publics costa-riciens autre que les «vrais navires de
guerre», il limite celle-ci aux seuls navires du service des douanes, et je cite la sentence Cleveland,
«dans la mesure où cette navigation est en relation avec, et liée au» (as may be related to and
connected with…) [le] droit qui lui est reconnu à l’articleVI du traité. [Reprise de la
o
projection n 2.] Dès lors, comme le Costa Rica le re doutait, les bateaux des douanes mis à part, il
en est réduit, de son propre aveu, au seul trans port des marchandises («exactly within the meaning
of transportation of merchandise»).
17. De son côté, selon le professeurMarcelo Kohen, le Nicaragua, s’il avait eu des doutes
sur le bien-fondé de la traduction de l’expression «con objetos de comercio» par «for the purposes
of commerce» aurait dû rajouter l’expression esp agnole entre parenthèses après sa traduction,
comme il l’avait fait pour d’autres mots. Mais tous ces termes (trois mots isolés et deux
expressions) ont comme caractéristique commune de concerner des problèmes qui, eux, étaient en
cause devant l’arbitre, ce qui n’était pas le cas de l’expression «avec des marchandises» 4.
18. Quoi que semble en penser M. Kohen, cette absence de désaccord est aussi ce qui interdit
de voir dans la traduction des deux Parties de l’expression «objetos de comercio» par «purposes of
commerce» un quelconque accord concernant l’in terprétation de cette expression. Certes, le
conseil du Costa Rica a tout à fait raison de souligner que les Etats peuvent se mettre d’accord sans
désaccord préalable 45. En revanche, un accord ne saurait être inadvertant; il ne peut résulter que
de la rencontre de deux volontés : en l’espèce, le Costa Rica et le Nicaragua ont traduit l’expression
aujourd’hui litigieuse de la même manière mais il s’agit là d’un fait, pas de la rencontre délibérée
de deux volontés ⎯ ou d’une formule proposée par l’un des Etats à laquelle l’autre aurait consenti.
43MCR, vol. 6, annexe 207, p. 155 [traduction du Greffe]. Texte anglais original : «The answer seems to be very
simple . . . It seems to be beyond discussion that Costa Rica can navigate in the San Juan river with public vessels, which
are not properly men-of-war. Within the meaning of the words, commercial navigation, both the revenue police, the
carrying of the mails, and all other public services of the same kind are necessarily included» (ibid., p. 155-156). Dossier
o
de plaidoiries, onglet n AP-3.
44Voir CR 2009/2, p.60, par.47 (Kohen); CR 2009/4, 5 mars 2009, p.57, par.19 (Pellet); CR 2009/6, p.29,
par. 31 (Kohen).
45CR 2009/6, p. 29, par. 31. - 27 -
Et j’ajoute que c’est là un fait dont le contexte m ontre qu’il n’a nullement la signification dont le
CostaRica veut le revêtir ⎯il suffit de penser à l’interprétation de la Partie costa-ricienne elle-
même dans l’argumentation écrite qu’elle avait proposée au président Cleveland, et dont je viens de
o
redire quelques mots. [Fin de la projection n 2bis.]
La sentence
19. Reste, Monsieur le président, la sentence elle-même. A cet égard, le professeur Kohen a
beau me taxer «d’imagination débordante» 46 ou «étendue» 47, «d’affirmations des plus légères» 48,
49
de «fébrilité» ⎯et j’en passe (ça fait beaucoup de noms d’oiseaux dans une seule page du
compte rendu…); [projection4] le fait est que le libellé du «Deuxièm ement» est vraiment
troublant, très troublant :
«The Republic of CostaRica under said Treaty [the 1858 Treaty] and the
stipulations contained in the sixth article thereof, . . . may navigate [the river San Juan]
with such vessels of the Revenue Service as may be related to and connected with her
enjoyment of the ‘purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in said article . . .»
50
20. D’abord, il y a les guillemets. Ré pétant ce qui est dit dans la réplique , Marcelo Kohen
nous dit qu’ils «s’expliquent tout simplement par le fait que Cleveland était en train de citer les
termes de l’article VI tels que traduits par les deux Parties» 51. Comme je l’avais indiqué la semaine
dernière, ce n’est guère convaincant. Monsieur le président, la sentence n’utilise les guillemets
qu’en une seule autre occasion, pour attirer, justement, l’attention sur un problème
52
d’interprétation . Par ailleurs et à l’inverse, Cleveland procède, évidemment, à la citation de très
nombreux mots ou expressions figurant dans le traité et traduits de façon identique par les Parties
sans, pour autant, éprouver le besoin de les me ttre entre guillemets: c’est le cas par exemple des
«natural rights» («droits naturels») qu’il évoque au point10 de la troisième partie de sa sentence
sans les assortir de guillemets bien qu’il s’agisse d’une citation de l’articleVIII du traité, dont la
46Ibid., p. 27, par. 24.
47
Ibid., par. 26.
48
Ibid., par. 24.
49
Ibid., par. 25.
50RCR, p. 65, par. 3.68.
51CR 2009/6, p. 27-28, par. 26.
52
Voir CR 2009/4, p. 58, par. 19. - 28 -
traduction n’allait tout de même pas de soi; de même, l’arbitre n’a pas considéré nécessaire de
mettre entre guillemets, dans le point 1 de la sentence, l’expression «the extremity of Punta Castilla
of the mouth of the San Juan de Nicaragua River» dans le point 10 bien qu’il s’agisse de citations
pures et simples de l’article II du traité.
21. [Projection 4-1.] Mais il y a plus important encore. Relisons ensemble, Messieurs les
juges, si vous le voulez bien, le membre de phrase dans lequel figure l’expression entre guillemets :
«may navigate [the river San Juan] with such vessels of the Revenue Servic e as may be related to
and connected with her enjoyment of the ‘purpo ses of commerce’». Mais comment peut-on jouir
de «fins commerciales» (how can you enjoy «purposes of commerce» ?). Pris à la lettre cela n’a
53
aucun sens ⎯ ni en français (Marcelo Kohen l’avait bien vu même si, maintenant il s’en défend ),
ni en anglais. [Projection 4-2.] Et l’on comprend l’embarras des traducteurs du Greffe qui
proposent une traduction très libre en français, s’ éloignant considérablement du texte anglais:
«mais elle peut naviguer sur ledit fleuve avec des bateaux du service des douanes dans l’exercice
54
du droit d’usage de ce fleuve «aux fins du commerce» que lui reconnaît ledit article» . Alors là,
oui, cela fait sens ⎯ mais cela fait sens aussi si l’on remplace «aux fins du commerce» par «avec
des marchandises»; et cela peut aussi se lire en anglais «may navigate with such vessels of the
Revenue Service as may be related to and connected with her enjoyment of her right of navigation
on the river for ‘purposes of commerce’ or, as well, «with articles of commerce». Et cela confirme
aussi, Monsieur le président, que Cleveland, ayant sans doute vu le problème, s’est prudemment
abstenu de le trancher en recourant à ces guillemets troublants ⎯mais ils n’ont pas l’air de
beaucoup troubler mon collègue et ami de l’autre côté de la barre… [Fin de la projection 4-2.].
6. Bref retour sur l’interprétation évolutive
22. Monsieur le président, n’étant pas partic ulièrement élitiste, je me réjouis vivement de
l’avènement d’un tourisme de masse, permettant au plus grand nombre de profiter des beautés de
notre bonne vieille planète. Mais je ne vois pas bien ce que ces considérations de philosophie
sociale viennent faire ici ? Que le tourisme existât au temps de Mark Twain, aucun doute (même si
53
Voir CR 2009/6, p. 27, par. 24.
54MCR, vol. 2, annexe 16, p. 34 [traduction du Greffe]. - 29 -
je n’ai pas l’impression qu’il ait effectué son voya ge de 1863 entre San Francisco et New York en
55
qualité de touriste ⎯mais plutôt comme passager ce qui, comme mon ami AntonioRemiro l’a
expliqué, est quelque chose de différent). Mais ce qui importe pour nous, c’est que le mot
«tourisme» n’avait alors aucune connotation comme rciale et qu’il n’est tout simplement pas
pensable que les rédacteurs du traité Cañas-Jerez aient eu le tourisme à l’esprit lorsqu’ils ont rédigé
l’article VI.
56
23. Cela me conduit à redire quelques mots de l’interprétation évolutive ⎯sans qu’il me
semble utile de m’y attarder. Au fond, le prof esseur Kohen s’est borné lundi à répéter le peu qu’il
avait dit à ce propos durant le premier tour 57 : il faut s’en tenir au précédent du Plateau continental
58
de la mer Egée . Mais il ne suffit par de dire que le mot «commerce» est «générique» pour être
débarrassé du problème. Il faut encore se demander comment il était interprété à l’époque (pour
déterminer quelle était l’intention des Parties) et si cette signification n’a pas subi une évolution
telle que l’on s’éloigne par trop de celle que les négociateurs avaient en tête au moment de la
conclusion du traité 59. Or, je l’ai montré la semaine derniè re, ce serait le cas, si l’on en venait à
inclure dans les «marchandises» ou même dans les «fins commerciales», le tourisme ⎯ une
e
activité qui existait au XIX siècle, mais que nul n’aurait songé à qualifier de «commerciale».
7. L’absence de pratique subséquente
24. Reste à savoir, Monsieur le président, si la pratique subséque nte devrait (ou pourrait)
conduire à adopter une position différente, voire même s’il existerait une coutume internationale
qui obligerait l’Etat fluvial à autoriser la navigation des touristes sur ses fleuves et rivières. Cette
seconde «piste», à vrai dire, me paraît assez extravagante ⎯ je ne la mentionne que parce que mon
fougueux contradicteur s’obstine à interpréter ains i l’arrêt de la Cour dans l’affaire de l’Ile de
60 61
Kasikili/Sedudu . Je l’avais montré , dans cette affaire, c’est en vertu de l’accord exprès des deux
55
Voir http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-32179301_ITM.
56Voir CR 2009/4, p. 49-55, par. 3-12.
57CR 2009/2, p. 67, par. 73 et note 192.
58CR 2009/6, p. 35, par. 58.
59
Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, deuxième phase, avis
consultatif, C.I.J.Recueil1950 , p.229 et Droits des ressortissants des EtatsUnis d’Amérique au Maroc (France
c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 196.
60
CR 2009/6, p. 33, par. 48. - 30 -
62
Etats concernés, que la pratique antérieure a été juridiquement consacrée et entérinée par la Cour .
Or, à l’évidence, pas d’accord en ce qui nous concerne.
25. Mais pas non plus de pratique, Monsieur le président ! Les trois très brefs paragraphes
63
qu’y consacre mon contradicteur ne répondent pas à l’argumentation que j’avais fait valoir à cet
égard durant le premier tour 64, et ne vont guère au-delà d’affirmations que le professeur Kohen ne
prend la peine ni d’expliciter, ni de discuter. Il me suffira donc de dire :
1) que s’il y a eu, en effet, dans un lointain passé, un trafic relativement intense de passagers
⎯ Antonio Remiro en a parlé ⎯, celui-ci était exclusivement le fait du Nicaragua , pas du
Costa Rica ;
2) en tout état de cause, il n’a jamais été questi on de tourisme organisé sur le San Juan avant une
période fort récente ;
3) si, au tout début du phénomène, une certaine tolérance a pu se manifester, une simple tolérance
ne crée pas de droit (comme le CostaRica le répète à l’envi ⎯en matière de pêche de
65
subsistance par exemple , ou de dispense de l’exigence d’un visa pour les Costa-Riciens
66
riverains du fleuve notamment) ; en revanche,
4) dès que le phénomène a pris de l’ampleur (e n même temps que les prétentions du Costa Rica à
une interprétation de plus en plus extensive et ab solue de ses prétendus droits sur le fleuve), le
Nicaragua s’y est vigoureusement opposé.
26. Pas de pratique subséquente, pas d’accord u ltérieur, Monsieur le président. L’article VI
du traité de 1858 doit être lu tel qu’en lui-même, en fonction des intentions des négociateurs de cet
instrument. Et cette intention, telle qu’elle ressort du texte de cette disposition, de son contexte et
des circonstances de cette adoption est claire : le Costa Rica peut se prévaloir d’un droit, perpétuel
(mais non absolu), de libre navigation sur le fl euve, avec des marchandises mais, certainement pas,
pour les touristes ou avec des touristes. De même, si les bateaux des douanes peuvent naviguer
61CR 2009/4, p. 55, par. 12.
62
Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1107, par. 102.
63
CR 2009/6, p. 33-34, par. 51-53.
64CR 2009/4, p. 55-64, par. 13-32.
65CR 2009/6, p. 63, par. 30 (Crawford).
66CR 2009/3, p. 27-28, par. 19 (Caflisch) ; CR 2009/6, p. 17, par. 35 (Crawford). - 31 -
librement sur le fleuve, conformément à la désion du président Cleveland, ceci ne leur est
possible que dans le strict exercice de ce d’usage du fleuve, ce que mon collègue et ami le
professeurMcCaffrey va établir maintenant si vous voulez bien lui donner la parole, Monsieur le
président ?
27. Pour ma part, il ne me reste qu’à voremercier de la bienve illante attention que vous
m’avez à nouveau prêtée.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Alain Pellet, for your presentation
. I now give the
floor to Professor Stephen McCaffrey.
Mr. McCAFFREY: Thank you, Mr. President.
IV. COSTA RICA ’S NAVIGATION ON THE SAN JUAN R IVER WITH PUBLIC VESSELS :
THE TREATY OF L IMITS AND THE CLEVELAND AWARD
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you again today on
behalf of the Republic of Nicaragua.
1. Introduction
2. This morning I will show how Costa Rica misunderstands and mischaracterizes the
provisions of the 1858Treaty of Limits and th e 1888Cleveland Award concerning navigation on
the San Juan River by public vessels. Costa Rica persists in reading Article VI of the Treaty as if it
contained only nine words: “Costa Rica shall ha ve perpetual rights of free navigation.” Actually,
that is not true ⎯ she adds to this phrase six more words, which are purely of her own invention.
Those words are: “with all kinds of public vessels”. She pays lip service ⎯ but only barely ⎯ to
Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the river, but th en through a multi-pronged attack, seeks to fragment
Nicaragua’s sovereignty into so many effete and helpless bits that Nicaragua is prevented from
fulfilling her responsibility to police and regulriver, let alone exercising her rights in the
waterway ⎯ which, after all, is part of her territory . For all of CostaRica’s objections to them,
Nicaragua’s regulations concerning navigation by Costa Rica on the San Juan ⎯ again, Nicaraguan
territory ⎯ are in line with those true international waterways, su ch as the Rhine, which is - 32 -
governed by what PaulReuter called the “doyen of international organizations”, the Central
67
Commission for Navigation on the Rhine .
3. Mr.President, my specific task this morning is to address two points: first, the
1858Treaty as interpreted by the Cleveland Award provides no basis for the rights CostaRica
claims to navigate with her public vessels on the San Juan; and second, ArticleIV of the
1858Treaty also provides no basis for the navigational rights CostaRica claims for her public
vessels.
2. The 1858 Treaty as interpreted by the Cleveland Award provides no basis for the
rights Costa Rica claims to navigate with her public vessels on the San Juan
4. Mr.President, Members of the Court, as to the first point, in her quest for rights of
navigation by public vessels on the San Juan, Co staRica places greatest store in the Cleveland
Award. Here she focuses principally on three argu ments: first, that the Cleveland Award did not
determine CostaRica’s rights to navigate w ith any and all public vessels; second, that
President Cleveland actually enlarged, not restricted, George Rives’s recommendations concerning
navigation by CostaRican public vessels; and th ird, that CostaRica’s failure to exercise her
limited right to navigate on the San Juan with revenue vessels does not destroy that right. I will
take these arguments up in turn.
5. First, Mr.President, ProfessorCrawford argued again on Monday that in his Award,
PresidentCleveland did not determine CostaRica’ s rights to navigate with any and all public
68
vessels . He persisted in this argument despite the fundamental illogic of it: Nicaragua has
sovereignty ⎯ sovereignty ⎯ over the river, which forms part of her territory; Costa Rica has only
rights to navigate “con objetos de comercio” under the Treaty. The Treaty having granted no other
rights to CostaRica in Nicaraguan sovereign territory, how could there possibly be further
rights ⎯ further rights ⎯ that PresidentCleveland did not explicitly recognize? You cannot
recognize what is not there. Finding that there c ould be further navigational rights would make a
mockery of the 1858Treaty. This is doubtless the major reason why PresidentCleveland was so
careful to keep the only kind of public vessels he allowed to navigate on the San Juan, revenue
67
See generally http://www.ccr-zkr.org/.
6CR 2009/6, p. 51, para. 4 et seq. - 33 -
vessels, on such a short leash. In light of Nicara gua’s “sumo imperio” over the river, interpreting
Article VI of the Treaty and the Second Article of the Cleveland Award to permit navigation by the
veritable armada of kinds of public vessels argued for by CostaRica would, to borrow from the
language of Article 31 of the 1969 Vi enna Convention, lead to a result which would be manifestly
absurd and unreasonable. Such an interpretation should therefore be rejected by the Court.
6. Second, Mr. President, Professor Crawford we nt to great lengths on Monday to attempt to
shrink down to something akin to mere courtesies the “privileges” of navigation on the San Juan by
CostaRican warships and revenue vessels recommended by GeorgeRives. He did this in a
Herculean, but ultimately futile, effort to convince the Court of the following improbable
proposition: that PresidentCleveland, by allowing only carefully restricted navigation by
CostaRican revenue vessels, somehow gave CostaRica much more than Rives, who would have
allowed both Costa Rican revenue vessels and warships to navigate on the San Juan, and with only
those restrictions that were generally recognized internationally. It would take a magician to pull
this off, and Professor Crawford is a very good one. He attempted this analytical sleight of hand by
contrasting the “privileges” recommended by Rives with the “rights” recognized by
President Cleveland.
7. But however they are characterized, the authorizations recommended by Rives and those
granted by PresidentCleveland could not be mo re different. When all is said and done, the
arbitrator took a recommendation that naviga tion by warships and revenue vessels would be
allowed and whittled it down to what he evidently co nsidered to be the barest of essentials:
navigation with revenue vessels that was related to and connected with navigation “con objetos de
comercio”, or that was necessary to the protectio n of the enjoyment thereof. Especially given
Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the river, there is nothing left from which to conjure supposed
additional rights of navigation by public vessels.
8. Incidentally, as my colleague ProfessorPe llet has just noted, ProfessorCrawford also
challenges the use by me and other counsel of Nicaragua of the expression in Spanish “con objetos
de comercio”, in lieu of the English translation of this expression submitted to President Cleveland
by both Nicaragua and Costa Rica “for purposes of commerce”. But, Mr.President, as
Professor Pellet has just pointed out, the Treaty itself was negotiated and concluded in Spanish, not - 34 -
English. Nicaragua has amply demonstrated in her written pleadings 69 that the meaning of this
expression was not at issue in the arbitration; there was simply no dispute ab out it by the Parties at
the time. President Cleveland took great pains to make clear that his ruling was without prejudice
to the meaning of the expression by enclosing it in quotation marks in the Second Articleof his
Award.
9. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I turn now to CostaRica’s third point.
ProfessorCrawford states that “whether CostaRi ca exercises its treaty right to navigate with
70
revenue service vessels is irrelevant”, because “the right survives independently of its exercise” .
But here ProfessorCrawford misses the point: CostaRica has not exercised her right to navigate
with revenue vessels because she has not exercised her right to navigate “con objetos de comercio”.
She therefore has engaged in a campaign, for over a century, to transform her right to navigate with
revenue vessels into a right to navigate with public vessels of all kinds and descriptions, both
armed and unarmed. It is this that is not permitted by the Treaty of Limits and the Cleveland
Award, and that is therefore not permitted by Nicaragua on her sovereign territory ⎯ not
navigation by revenue vessels related to and connected with navi gation “con objetos de comercio”
or necessary to the protection thereof, with which Nicaragua has never interfered. As CostaRica
71
herself has amply shown , PresidentCleveland knew well wh at a revenue vessel was, and
therefore knew that this expression, “vessels of the revenue service” as he put it, had a very specific
meaning. A revenue vessel is not a police boat. A revenue vessel is not a boat carrying arms and
personnel to resupply border posts. In short, a revenue vessel is not a public boat performing the
myriad functions CostaRica would like to perform with her public vessels on the river. Wishing
does not make it so. Therefore, although CostaRi ca’s failure to exercise her limited right to
navigate on the San Juan with revenue vessels does not destroy the right, it most certainly does not
extend it or enlarge it.
10. Mr.President, finally on this point, on Monday CostaRica continued to beat the dead
horse of the Cuadra-Lizano Joint Communiqué ⎯ or perhaps that is an inappropriate metaphor
6CMN, paras. 3.1.19 et seq.
70
Ibid., para. 14.
7E.g., CR 2009/3, p. 13, para. 23. - 35 -
since the communiqué was never alive in the first pl ace. Here Professor Crawford tries mightily to
convince the Court that this document had nothi ng to do with Nicaragua giving permission to
Costa Rica to navigate with arms on the San Juan. He then tries much less mightily to show, in fact
he only states, that the communiqué reflected the status quo ante.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Cuadra-Lizano Joint Communiqué would have
constituted a blanket authorization for use of Co sta Rican public vessels under specified conditions
and for a single and very specific purpose: the resupplying of her border posts. Nothing more.
Not policing the river, not the provisio n of services to the riparian population ⎯ nothing but the
resupplying of border posts. After 120 years, this is the extent of navigation by Costa Rican public
vessels that Nicaragua was willing to consider ⎯ and in fact it was considered in the context of a
problem of the moment: resupplying border pos ts. CostaRica has not resupplied these posts via
the San Juan in the past ten years.
12. But, Mr.President, the important point here is that CostaRica would not have been so
covetous of this stillborn communiqué ⎯ she would not have needed this authorization ⎯ if she
actually had, and believed she had, a right to navigate with vessels carrying arms and personnel to
her border posts. As to whether the communiqué reflected past practice, if it had, why would
Costa Rica have sought the authorization so ferventl y? In any event, the fact that the communiqué
does not reflect past practice has already been shown by my colleague Mr. Reichler.
3. Article IV of the 1858 Treaty also provides no basis for the navigational rights
Costa Rican claims for her public vessels
13. Mr.President, Members of the Court, turning to my second point, CostaRica in her
second round effectively conceded that Article IV of the Treaty of Limits provides no basis for her
to defend or otherwise police the river by boat. The best she could do by way of responding to the
undeniable fact that Article IV says nothing about Costa Rica’s uniting in the defence of either the
bays or the river by boat was to caricature the manner in wh ich she would have to fulfil this
72
obligation as “synchronized swimming” ⎯ a nice image, to be sure, but unfortunately there
would be nothing for her to synchronize with since Nicaragua would prefer to exercise her
72
Ibid., p. 54, para. 11. - 36 -
obligations of defence of the river by boat, as she alone is entitled to do. Costa Rica also conflates
ArticleIV’s provision for “defense” of the co mmon bays and the river “in case of attack from
73
without” with “protect[ion] of commerce on the river”, implying that both of these are authorized
74
by ArticleIV . As the Court is well aware, ArticleIV says nothing ⎯ indeed the entire
1858Treaty says nothing ⎯ about protection of commerce on the river by CostaRica. That idea
was a creature of the Cleveland Award, which I addressed earlier, and as we have seen
President Cleveland was very careful to restrict any protection to revenue vessels, not other kinds,
75
and only when necessary to the protection of navigation “con objetos de comercio” . Perhaps
Costa Rica was led to confuse defen ce with protection by her earlier idea ⎯ from which she now
seems to have backed away ⎯ that the San Juan is an “international river”. For the purpose of
76
Costa Rica’s navigational rights it certainly is not, for reasons that Nicaragua has shown , and as
Costa Rica now seems to accept.
14. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I will close on the subject of CostaRica’s
contention concerning policing and defending the river by boat with the wise words of a former
President of CostaRica herself. In his memoir, Su pensamiento , President DonRicardo
JiménezOreamuno, who served as President dur ing three periods between 1910 and 1936, wrote
the following of what he called “the obligation assu med by CostaRica to take part in the river’s
defense in the event of foreign aggression”:
“Costa Rica shall take part in this defense when the foreseen hypothesis [foreign
aggression] takes place.
Meanwhile, in full peace, without the slightest risk of hostilities, to pretend that
our ships of war navigate the river in orde r to take part in a defense provoked by no
attack is to arrive at the subtlety with which the Nicaraguans have examined the treaty.
Through Article4, CostaRica was obliged to defend the San Juan as an ally of
Nicaragua. When has one seen that an ally, being an ally, purports to have the right,
in the absence of war, to transit with its troops the allied territo77 to navigate with
warships her interior waters or station armadas in her ports?”
73
Article IV of the 1858 Treaty.
74
CR 2009/6, p. 54, para. 11 (Crawford).
75Cleveland Award, Second Article.
76E.g., CR 2009/04, pp. 19, et seq. (Brownlie).
77
Don Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno, Su pensamiento, Editorial Costa Rica, San José, Costa Rica, 1980, p. 55. For
the full quotation see CMN, pp. 222-223, in which the former Presidentalso re fers to navigation by CostaRican
“merchant ships” under Article VI of the Treaty. - 37 -
15. Mr.President, the eloquent words of th e former CostaRican President speak for
themselves, and confirm the only sensible interpretation of the 1858 Treaty.
16. Mr.President, Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation. I thank you for
your courtesy and kind attention. Mr.Presi dent, I request that you call upon my colleague,
Mr. Paul Reichler, perhaps after the coffee break. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor McCaffre y, for your presentation. Yes, indeed, as
you suggest, I am going to call for a short coffee brea k before I ask Mr. PaulReichler to take the
floor.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 to 11.45 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to Mr. Paul Reichler.
RMEr. HLER:
V. THE LAWFULNESS OF NICARAGUA ’S REGULATIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF THE P ARTIES
WITH RESPECT TO NAVIGATION BY PUBLIC VESSELS
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I am honoured once again to appear before you
today. I will respond first to ProfessorCaflisch’s presentation regarding the lawfulness of
Nicaragua’s regulation of navigation on the Sa nJuan River, and then I will respond to
ProfessorCrawford’s presentation on the practice of the Parties with regard to navigation by
Costa Rican public vessels.
1. The lawfulness of Nicaragua’s regulations
2. Mr. President, after listening to Professor Ca flisch on Monday, I can begin today with the
good news that Nicaragua’s right to regulate navigation on the San Juan River is no longer disputed
by CostaRica. It is now possible, for the first ti me, to say that both Parties agree that Nicaragua
has the right to regulate navigation on the river, including navigation by Costa Rica, provided that
Nicaragua’s regulation of that navigation is reasonable, non-arbitr ary and non-discriminatory. As
Professor Caflisch said on Monday: “[W]hen menti oning regulations, [the authorities] specify that - 38 -
they must be reasonable, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory. This has been, and also is, the position
of Costa Rica: riparian States may regulate if they respect these conditions.” 78
3. With the Parties now in agreement that Ni caragua has the right to regulate CostaRican
navigation on the SanJuan River, provided that the regulations put in place by Nicaragua are
reasonable, the burden for the Court has been reduced: the Court need only decide whether
Nicaragua’s regulations are proven by Costa Rica to be unreasonable.
4. On this subject, I am afraid, the Parties are still divided. While ProfessorCaflisch now
accepts that Nicaragua has the right to regulate navi gation, he sticks firmly to his guns on the issue
of the reasonableness of Nicaragua’s regulations. In fact, he made many of the same arguments in
the second round that he made in the first one. I have already responded to all of his criticisms
made the first time around. Today I will respond onl y to Professor Caflisch’s new criticisms, or at
least his new twists on old criticisms, about each of the five regulations that he has challenged.
(a) Stopping and registering
5. The first of these regulations is the requirement that all vessels, Nicaraguan as well as
CostaRican, stop and register upon entering and exiting the protected area of the river.
ProfessorCaflisch did not question Nicaragua’s judgment that this regulation safeguards the
79
environment, and deters and prevents criminal activity on or adjacent to the river . Instead, he
focused his criticism of this regulation on what he called Nicaragua’s charges “for each and every
journey a fee of US$5 plus a handling fee of US$2 for entering the country and another handling
80
fee of US$2 for leaving it” . He further complained that “it is a lot for the inhabitants of a poor
area of Costa Rica whose daily lives depend on the river” 8. I am afraid that Professor Caflisch has
his facts wrong, and his regulations confused.
6. First, there are no charges for stopping and re gistering, and no fees for entry onto the river
or for what he called “handling”. The evidence is undisputed on this point. ProfessorCaflisch
apparently has confused this regulation with a different one, concerning immigration, and which
78CR, 2009/6, p. 42, para. 21.
79
CR 2009/5, pp. 16-20, paras. 25-33.
80CR 2009/6, p. 43, para. 24.
81Ibid. - 39 -
applies only to foreign tourists, who are required to purchase a tourist card whose cost is $5 and to
pay a fee of $4 for the service of immigration processing 82. The evidence is also undisputed that
these requirements are not applied to local Costa Rican inhabitants, who are free to navigate on the
river without acquiring tourist cards or passing through Nicaraguan immigration 83. Whether poor
or not, they do not pay any of these fees. Profes sorCaflisch’s complaint about this regulation,
then, is based on fees for stopping and registering which are not charge
d, and a burden on local
residents that they do not bear.
(b) Inspection and departure clearance
7. The second challenged regulation is the departure clearance certificate. Professor Caflisch
did not question the evidence that the requirement to undergo an inspection and obtain a departure
clearance certificate promotes navigational safety, a nd deters and prevents illegal trafficking in
protected wildlife species, arms and drugs 84.
WPh8.ftsaflrisch did say about the departure clearance certificate is really quite
unusual. He transformed himself from counsel a nd advocate in these proceedings to witness, and
actually provided personal testimony in support of his own argument. Here are his words:
“I have witnessed both the handling of the stopping and registering
requirements and the inspection of the boa ts to check their seaworthiness and the
identity of the cargo and passengers. I was unlucky; though a fee was paid, I saw no
inspection of the boat. There was no ser vice rendered for which a fee could be
collected.” 85
It is not every day that counsel before this C ourt turn themselves into fact witnesses. That
Professor Caflisch felt the need to do so suggests that Costa Rica’s argument against this regulation
is so devoid of real evidentiary support that coun sel must himself try to fill the gap with his own
personal testimony.
9. The evidence ⎯ the real evidence ⎯ shows that inspections are regularly performed, and
departure clearance certificates are regularly issu ed, for a fee of $5 to cover the cost of the
inspection. In fact, the real evidence, which was submitted by Co staRica herself, in the form of
82CR 2009/5, p. 25, para. 43.
83
CR 2009/5, p. 24, para. 42; RN, Vol. I, paras. 4.88-4.89; RN, Vol. II, Anns. 70, 73, and 78.
84
CR 2009/5, pp. 20-23, paras. 34-38; RN, pp. 198-199, 204-206, 208-209.
85CR 2009/6, p. 44, para. 25. - 40 -
affidavits and publicly reported statements by Co staRican nationals who navigated on the river,
contradicts the anecdotal testimony provided by ProfessorCaflisch, and confirms that inspections
are routinely performed and departure clearance certificates are issued for payment of a small fee 86.
Annex 101 of Costa Rica’s Memorial in particular describes an inspection, in meticulous detail, of
the Costa Rican witness’s boat and cargo. The Memorial ⎯ the Memorial itself states: “Nicaragua
required that all CostaRican vessels stop at every Nicaraguan Army post along the river for
87
inspection . . .”
10. In fact, it was CostaRica herself which urged Nicaragua to establish posts along the
San Juan River to register and inspect passing vessels, and to issue departure clearance certificates.
The Final Minutes of the 1997 meeting of the Binational Nicaragua-CostaRica Commission
recorded that, at Costa Rica’s request,
“It was agreed that Nicaragua will make efforts to establish posts at determined
sites, so as to extend coverage in the fight against [drug trafficking] . . . With respect
to the movement of vessels, it was considered necessary that they navigate only if duly
registered by the posts that issue corresponding navigation certificates; in this case the
88
posts at San Juan del Norte, San Carlos and Sarapiquí.”
11. In the first round, ProfessorCaflisch acknowledged that CostaRica agreed to the
registration and inspection of vessels, and the issu ance of departure clearance certificates, at these
posts in order to fight drug trafficking. This , of course, is alone sufficient to establish the
89
reasonableness of the requirements . In the second round, ProfessorCaflisch tried a new
approach. This time, he said that the Minutes of the Binational Commission did not specify
whether the agreed registration, inspection and departure clearance of vessels would be done in
90
Nicaragua or Costa Rica . I am afraid that Professor Caflisch has got the geography wrong again.
[SlidePSR] Projected on the screen before yo u is a sketch-map from Nicaragua’s Rejoinder
91
showing the location of Nicaragua’s posts on the river . The fact that these posts are there is
undisputed by Costa Rica. You will see the posts, indicated by the red triangles on the Nicaraguan
86MCR, Vol. V, Ann. 116, p. 591; RCR, Vol. II, Ann. 54, p. 288.
87
MCR, p. 35, para. 3.24.
88
RN, Vol. II, Ann. 4, pp. 23-24.
89CR 2009/3, p. 29, para. 22.
90CR 2009/6, pp. 45-46, para. 30.
91RN, Vol. I, p. 190, sketch-map 7. - 41 -
side, at the precise locations mentioned in the Minutes: San Juan del Norte, Boca San Carlos and
Sarapiquí. ProfessorCaflisch might not know where they are, but CostaRica does. As recorded
by the Binational Commission: “Nicaragua will make efforts to establish posts at determined
sites . . .” These are the sites. The same ones specified in those Minutes.
12. ProfessorCaflisch complains that Nicar agua has charged different amounts for the
departure clearance inspection, and that this is arbitrary 92. He displayed a certificate reflecting the
payment of a $25 inspection fee and said that on other occasions Nicaragua has charged $5. This is
93
true, but it is not arbitrary. The $25certificate is dated May 2001 . Two months later, the
Nicaraguan authorities issued a Plan of Action which, among other things, reduced the fee to $5 ⎯
largely in response to protests from CostaRica ⎯ and the fee has remained at that level ever
94
since . Arbitrary it is not.
13. Professor Caflisch challenged my assertion, from last Friday, that local residents are not
required to pay this fee. He said there were six a ffidavits from local residents, in four of which the
95
witness declared that he paid the fee . We read those affidavits and, again, ProfessorCaflisch
shows he is unfamiliar with the geography of the area. Three of these four “damaging” affidavits
are from residents of Barra del Colorado, which is situated not on the San Juan but on Costa Rica’s
96
Caribbean coast, far removed from the river . These are not local residents. The fourth affidavit
97
is from a retired tour boat operator . Another affidavit, which is from a local resident, states that
the neighbours in the area all carry “a courtesy departure clearance” 98. The truth then, is exactly as
published in Nicaragua’s Plan of Action, issued in July 2001: “CostaRicans whose domicile is
99
located in the adjacent proximities shall be issued a courtesy departure clearance certificate . . .” .
92CR, 2009/6, p. 44, para. 25.
93
MCR, Ann. 241 (b).
94
RN, Ann. 48; See also MCR, Vol. 3, Ann. 72.
95
CR, 2009/6, p. 44, para. 27.
96MCR, Vol. IV, Anns. 92 and 96; RCR, Vol. 2, Ann. 51.
97MCR, Vol. IV, Ann. 103.
98RCR, Vol. II, Ann. 50, p. 280.
99
RN, Vol. II, Ann. 48, p. 306. - 42 -
(c) Night-time navigation
14. The third challenged regulation is the pr ohibition on navigation after nightfall.
Nicaragua has fully supported with evidence the justification for this regulation, which is
100
navigational safety . In particular, Nicaragua has supplied evidence of the real dangers
101
associated with navigation after dark on this particular river . CostaRica has not offered any
evidence to the contrary. Or, at least Costa Rica offered none until Monday when her star witness,
ProfessorCaflisch, told the Court that the river had few obstacles and he did not find it to be so
102
dangerous . I am afraid that, in this regard, Professo rCaflisch is in conflict with CostaRica’s
own long-standing position on the dangers of na vigation on the SanJuan River, a position
Costa Rica has held at least ever since she told President Cleveland in 1887: “it is well known that
the navigation of the SanJuan River encounters many obstacles, not only on account of its
shallowness at certain places, but also owing to its rapids and other dangers” 103.
15. Professor Caflisch argued on Monday that, even if navigation on the river is dangerous,
Nicaragua discriminates against Costa Rican navigation by permitting night-time navigation on the
upper portion of the river, where CostaRica enjo ys no navigation rights, but not permitting it on
the lower portion, where she has Treaty rights. Th is time, I must say, ProfessorCaflisch got his
geography right. But, most unfortunately, there are other problems. In his speech on Monday, as
reproduced in the compte rendu, he cited two different timetables for the same ferry service that
operates on the upper portion of the river; the timetables were apparently downloaded from the
Internet over the weekend, for the purpose of responding to my speech of last Friday 104. One of the
cited timetables, which is in your judges’ fold er, was not mentioned by ProfessorCaflisch on
105
Monday. It shows that the ferry does not operate at night . The other timetable, on which
Professor Caflisch based his argument to the Court, and which he displayed, shows that it does 106.
100RN, pp. 199-200, 209-211.
101
Ibid.
102
CR, 2009/6, p. 46, para. 31.
103RN, Vol. II, Ann. 5, pp. 160-161.
104CR2009/6, p4.7, n1.50: http://www.nicatour.net/en/nicaragua/orario_lanchas _rio_san_juan.asp and
http://www.visitariosanjuan.com/elcastillo/elcastillo-comollegar-es.html.
105See http://www.visitariosanjuan.com/elcastillo/elcastillo-comollegar-es.html.
106
See http://www.nicatour.net/en/nicaragua/orario_lanchas_rio_san_juan.asp. - 43 -
Since this is the same ferry service, one of Professo rCaflisch’s timetables has to be wrong. This
alone raises doubts about the probative value of his ev idence. So we investigated this further.
After his speech, we contacted by email the tr avel agency whose timetable ProfessorCaflisch
relied on, and asked if that timetable is corre ct. It turns out it is not, according to the
correspondence we received back from the travel agency, which we would be happy to make
available to the Court and to the Costa Rican side. There is no night-time navigation on the upper
portion of the San Juan, just as there is no such navigation on the lower portion. There is no basis
for any argument that Costa Rica has been discriminated against.
16. It is undeniable, and even Professor Caflisch denies it no longer, that the prohibition on
night-time navigation on the lower SanJuan is a pplicable equally to Nicaraguan and CostaRican
vessels. There is no evidence in the record, and no reason to believe, that Nicaragua would deprive
herself of the ability to navigate at night on this portion of the river just to harass or make a
political point to Costa Rica. To the contrary, Ni caragua’s population centre at San Juan del Norte
is only reachable by the river. It is cut off co mpletely from the rest of Nicaragua and the outside
world after dark, because of Nicaragua’s prohibi tion on night-time navigation. By contrast,
CostaRica’s sightseeing boats are only interested in transiting the river in the daytime, since the
sights cannot be seen at night. Nicaragua is thus hu rt more than CostaRica by this regulation.
Nevertheless, Nicaragua believes it is justified because of the danger to human life associated with
night-time navigation on this river. When ProfessorCaflisch suggests that these dangers can be
107
better addressed by requiring or installing lights on all vessels, or along the shore , he asks the
Court ⎯ sitting here in The Hague and far removed from the SanJuan River ⎯ to substitute its
own judgment for that of Nicaragua and decide what measure is most appropriate and cost effective
to ensure navigational safety on a river it has never seen. Surely that is not a role the Court wishes
to play. The regulatory measure adopted by Nicaragua is demonstrably reasonable, and it does not
discriminate against Costa Rica. The enquiry necessarily stops there.
107
CR 2009/3, p. 32, para. 26 (v). - 44 -
(d) Flying the flag
17. The fourth regulation challenged by Professo rCaflisch is the requirement that certain
vessels fly the Nicaraguan flag while navigating on the river. Nicaragua only applies this
requirement to the very few ves sels that have masts or turrets 108, and there is no evidence that any
CostaRican vessel has ever been prohibited from navigating on the river because of a failure or
refusal to fly the Nicaraguan flag. Does Costa Rica have evidence that any vessel was ever stopped
from navigating because of failure to fly the flag? Professor Caflisch himself provided the answer:
109
“Of course not . . .” Then what is Costa Rica complaining about? Professor Caflisch agreed that
flying the flag of the riparian sovereign is an accepted international custom 110. Then how can he
argue that Nicaragua’s regulation requiring the same thing is “unreasonable”?
(e) Visas
18. The fifth and final regulation challenged by CostaRica is the requirement that foreign
nationals, including CostaRicans, obtain a Nicarag uan visa before entering Nicaragua, including
when they enter Nicaragua via the San Juan River. Professor Caflisch suggested that there was no
justification for Nicaragua to require visas of persons operating or ridi ng on tour boats because
“boatmen and their passengers transit on the ri ver without entering Nicaragua for any length of
111
time” . With respect, that misses the point in at least two ways. First, as a sovereign State,
Nicaragua has the same right as every other State, in its discretion, to require foreign nationals,
including their government officials, to obtain a valid visa before entering her territory, for
whatever length of time, and it cannot be questione d that one enters Nicaragua when one enters the
SanJuan River. Second, many countries require vi sas even for very short stays; in the United
States, for example, a visa is required even to transit through a United States airport from one
international flight to another, without otherwise entering the country. And the tourist excursions
along the SanJuan implicate Nicaragua far more than that. [Slide PSR] The journey that
Costa Rican tour boats make on the San Juan, with its dramatic views of flora and fauna native to
10CR, 2009/5, p. 26, para. 45.
109
CR, 2009/6, p. 8, para. 35.
110CR, 2009/6, p. 48, para. 36.
11CR 2009/6, p. 49, para. 40. - 45 -
the river and the adjacent environmental reserves on the Nicaraguan side, is featured in advertising
brochures distributed by Costa Rican tour operators:
“CostaRica, in particular SanJuan, has a rich history [I note that here the
San Juan is claimed to be part of Costa Rica] . . . We’ll then take a ride to Siquirres,
which is a bit of a jaunt, but well worth it for what comes next: a delightful glide
down the San Juan River . . .” 112
There are faster, cheaper and more comfortabl e means of transport between the Costa Rican
interior and her Caribbean coastal resorts. The reason for the river tour is nature sightseeing, and
the most attractive part of the voyage, according to the promotional literature of the CostaRican
tour operators, is along the San Juan 113. That is why the tour boats linger there.
19. ProfessorCaflisch suggests that Nicara gua’s visa requirement imposes a hardship on
Costa Rica’s boatmen, who allegedly cannot afford the fee. To be sure, nobody likes to pay for a
visa, and nobody likes standing in a queue to get one . But that is true almost everywhere, and does
not constitute a reason to deny Nicaragua her sovereign right to control her borders, or the entry of
foreign nationals into her territory. CostaRica does not allow any Nicaraguans into her territory
without a visa.
20. Nicaragua, however, exempts local CostaRican riparians from her visa requirements.
ProfessorCaflisch said on Monday that this is not so, and cited affidavits from those he called
114
“local riparians” who said that they had to get Nicaraguan visas to na vigate on the river . Well,
we read the affidavits too. None was submitted by a local riparian or commercial boatman. All
115
were signed by non-riparian tour boat operators, who are not exempt from the visa requirement .
21. ProfessorCaflisch painted the picture of a hypothetical CostaRican tour boat operator,
whom he said would be bankrupted by all of Nicar agua’s fees. So much, he said, for what he
116
rather sardonically called “Mr.Reichler’s non-burdensome immigration regulations” . I prefer
not to deal in hypotheticals, but in evidence. The evidence, which Costa Rica has never denied, is
that CostaRica’s tourism traffic on the SanJuan River increased by more than 350 per cent
112http://www.pedalandseaadventures.com/costa-rica-adventure.html.
113
See e.g., ibid. and http://oasisnaturetours.com/gallery/index.html.
114
CR 2009/6, p. 48, para. 38, n. 156.
115MCR, Anns. 85, 87, 91, 92, 93, 95 and 189; RCR, Anns. 51 and 52.
116CR 2009/6, p. 49, para. 39. - 46 -
between 1998, when Costa Rica says Nicaragua first began to systematically deny her rights on the
117
San Juan River, and 2004, the year before this lawsuit began . That allows me to reply in kind to
Professor Caflisch: so much for his burdensome immigration regulations.
22. Mr.President, the challenges that Cost aRica has made in the second round, to the
reasonableness of Nicaragua’s regulations, do not fare any better than the challenges that were
made in the first round, or in the written pleadings . Costa Rica now accepts that Nicaragua has the
right to regulate all navigation on the San Juan Ri ver, provided that her regulations are reasonable,
non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory. Nicaragua has submitted evidence demonstrating the
reasonableness of all five of her challenged regula tions. Costa Rica has failed to prove that any of
them is unreasonable, or to prove that they are arbitrary or discriminatory in any way. As a
consequence, her challenges to all of them must fail.
2. The practice of the Parties
23. Mr.President, I will now respond to my good friend and renow ned poultry farmer,
ProfessorCrawford, and his remarks on the practice of the Parties with regard to navigation by
Costa Rican public vessels.
24. What is most remarkable about Professo r Crawford’s presentation is his abandonment of
ground long held sacred by Costa Rica. Until Monday, Costa Rica had argued throughout this case
that the practice of the Parties with respect to navigation by police and other public vessels was of
singular importance, and that it supported CostaRica’s reading into the 1858Treaty and the
Cleveland Award a right of navigation on the San Juan River for all of her public vessels. It came
as quite a surprise to me, then, when I heard Professor Crawford say that the practice of the Parties
118
with regard to this matter is now “entirely subordinate”, and that it is of “less significance” .
While surprising, ProfessorCrawford’s sudden turna bout is understandable, especially in light of
the evidence that has been emphasized in these hearings. It a ppears that CostaRica has come to
the conclusion, during the oral proceedings, that th e practice of the Parties is no longer helpful to
her, and she has now chosen to distance herself from it. I could say, perhaps a bit metaphorically,
117
CR 2009/5, p. 25, para. 44.
11CR, 2009/6, p. 55, para. 14; p. 56, para. 16. - 47 -
that, as regards the practice of the Parties, the Co sta Rican army has fled the field of battle, except
that, of course, as we all know, Costa Rica says she has no army. There can be no doubt, however,
that, on this matter, her “Public Forces,” or wh atever she chooses to call them, have abandoned
ship.
25. ProfessorCrawford spoke about navigation by three kinds of public vessels: revenue
vessels, police vessels, and other government vessels. I will separately address each of these.
(a) Revenue vessels
26. I start with revenue vessels. The evidence does not show that Costa Rica has exercised
her right to navigate on the SanJuan River with these vessels. The point is not seriously
challenged by Costa Rica. Nor could it be. She has presented only a handful of documents even
purporting to show that she exercised her right to navigate on the river with revenue vessels in
activities related to and connected with navigati on “con objetos de comercio”, and none of the
documents states that any such navigation on the SanJuan River actually took place 119.
Professor Crawford did nothing to refute this basic point. Bereft of any other documentary support,
he called the Court’s attention to a single report, dated 26 July 1968, and said that Nicaragua’s
argument can be “disproved by reference to only one example” 120. Well, he had better say that,
because one example is all he has. But even his lonely example proves nothing.
27. The report on which ProfessorCrawford re lies says only that the revenue guards went
121
from their base at Boca San Carlos to a place called Infiernito to carry out a mission . It does not
say that they travelled on the San Juan River to ge t there. Professor Crawford does not deny this.
[Slide PSR] However, he projected a sketch-map on the screen, the same one that is now before
you, pointed to the locations of Boca San Carlos and Infiernito, and said that the revenue guards’
transit on the SanJuan may be inferred because it takes much less time to travel between these
points by boat; the route by automobile is long and circuitous; and, in the rainy season the roads
are practically impassable 122.
119MCR, para. 4.89, n. 234; RCR, Ann. 33, p. 245.
120
CR 2009/5, p. 56, para. 17.
121RCR, Ann. 33, p. 245.
122Ibid. - 48 -
28. Let us give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he is entitled to his inference. What
would it prove? Only that there was one instan ce of navigation on the SanJuan by CostaRican
revenue vessels. Between 1858 and today, there is no other report or official record of any other
such navigation ⎯ that is, navigation on the SanJuan by CostaRican revenue vessels. The
affidavits cited by ProfessorCrawford on Monday are not official reports or contemporaneous
records, and they do not help him because they refer only to navigation by police vessels, not
revenue vessels and the navigation they describe is unrelated to commerce, however that word is
defined. The point is clear. Costa Rica could not have had a practice of navigating on the San Juan
with her revenue vessels. If she had had one, there would be numerous official reports and records,
and Costa Rica would have produced at least some of them.
29. The reason there was no such practice is also clear. There was never any commercial
navigation on the SanJuan that required the presence, operation or protection of CostaRican
revenue vessels, and this is what led Costa Rica to close all her customs posts on the San Juan, and
even on the internal rivers that connect to the San Juan, many decades ago 123. These facts were not
challenged by Professor Crawford, nor could they be.
30. Nicaragua has never disagreed that, rega rdless of actual use, CostaRica continues to
enjoy the right to navigate that was specified by President Cleveland in the second paragraph of his
Award. But it is important to be clear about what th at right is. It is the right reflected in that
paragraph to navigate with reve nue vessels, and only with revenue vessels, when related to and
connected with navigation “con objetos de comercio”. It is not a right available to police or other
government vessels; and it may not be exercised even by revenue vessels except in relation to and
connected with navigation “con objetos de comercio”.
(b) Police vessels
31. This leads me directly to the second group of Costa Rican vessels: police vessels. Here,
Costa Rica makes a deliberate effort ⎯ and regrettably my friend Professor Crawford is one of the
perpetrators ⎯ to confuse revenue vessels with police vessels. He would have the Court believe
that the police have become revenue guards, and th at their boats have become revenue vessels, so
123
CR 2009/5, p. 45, para. 9. - 49 -
that police boats would enjoy the same rights as revenue vessels under the Cleveland Award. I
respectfully submit that the Court should have none of it. The evidence does not support it.
CostaRica presented to the Court only two offici al police reports showing navigation by police
124
vessels on the SanJuan . One of the documents, from 1992, describes a single voyage on the
125
San Juan . The purpose is not reported. There is certainly no mention of customs or
revenue-related activity. The other document, which has now been discussed by counsel for both
Parties, is a detailed report by a local poli ce commander recording navigation on the SanJuan
126
River between 1994 and 1998 . It makes no mention ⎯ no mention whatsoever ⎯ of any police
navigation related to revenue, customs or fiscal matters, and no mention of any navigation related
to trade or commerce. This is because these were not, these were never, activities with which the
police were ever concerned. CostaRica has made no suggestion that her police posts on the
San Juan are customs posts. They are not. The documents produced by Costa Rica thus refute her
effort to assimilate police vessels to revenue vessel s, because they show that the police have not
performed, do not perform, revenue or customs-related activities. They demonstrate that ⎯ as
ProfessorMcCaffrey explained this morning ⎯ the right PresidentCleveland found for revenue
vessels is limited to those vessels, and is not available to police vessels.
32. Professor Crawford made every effort to depict these police vessels as unthreatening and
innocuous. He displayed a photograph of them with a smiling CostaRican policeman in the
127 128
foreground . He referred to them especially as “humble” vessels . Well, Mr.President,
Members of the Court, there is nothing humble about these. [Slide PSR] Projected before you are
the weapons carried by Costa Rican police officer s on these “humble” vessels: M-16s and Galils,
129
and the like . This is not our photograph. It is CostaRica’s, and can be found in her
Memorial 130. The photograph, so helpfully supplied by CostaRica, explains why, during the
12CR 2009/5, pp. 46-47, paras. 11-12.
125
RCR, Vol. 2, Ann. 38.
126
MCR, Vol. VI, Ann. 227.
127
Costa Rican judges’ folders, Round Two, slide 65; MCR, Vol. I, pp. 78bis and 86bis.
12CR 2009/6, p. 56, para. 15.
12MCR, p. 84bis.
130
MCR, p. 83bis. - 50 -
period in the 1990s when Nicaragua authorized Co sta Rican police vessels to navigate on the river
for the purpose of resupplying their posts, she required that all weapons be stowed on the floor of
the vessel, under supervision of a Nicaraguan soldier who was required to be on board.
33. In regard to this practice, the evidence shows that both Parties recognized that Costa Rica
had no right to navigate on the river with police vessels, and that she could not do so without first
seeking and obtaining Nicaragua’s prior permission. The Court is, by now, quite familiar with the
aide-memoire of July2000 recording the statements of CostaRica’s Public Security Minister and
131
the Ministry’s International Legal Adviser to this effect . Professor Crawford gave us no reason
to disregard or disbelieve this contemporaneous official record of a high-level meeting between the
two States, which was duly authenticated by its author . He took two shots at it. Missed with both.
In the first one, he simply repeated what he said in the first round, that there is no evidence that
132
CostaRica received or approved the document . Unlike love, his argument is not better the
second time around! In fact, he admitted on Monday that Costa Rica received and took note of the
document, as it surely could not have failed to do, in July2008, when it was annexed to and
133
discussed within Nicaragua’s Rejoinder . Yet, he offered no reason why Costa Rica submitted no
affidavits or other documents refuting, or even mentioning, the aide-memoire or the statements
contained therein. Surely if the damaging statements attributed to her Minister of Public Security
and the Ministry’s International Legal Adviser were inaccurate, Costa Rica would have submitted
affidavits from these government officials to that effect. The inference, if not the conclusion, to be
drawn is that affidavits were not supplied because they would not have been helpful to Costa Rica.
34. ProfessoC r rawford’s second shot at the aide-memoire is the affidavit of
Colonel Walter Navarro, which is the only one Costa Rica submitted after the close of the written
pleadings 134. The Navarro affidavit makes no mention of the July 2000 meeting, no mention of the
aide-memoire and no mention of the statements attr ibuted in it to his senior officers. There is no
denial that these statements were made. All Colone l Navarro says is that in his own meetings with
13RN, Vol. II, Ann. 68.
132
CR 2009/6, p. 59, para. 24.
13CR 2009/6, p. 59, para. 23.
13CR 2009/6, p. 59, para. 24. - 51 -
Nicaraguan army officers, held after he assumed command of the Costa Rican police forces along
the San Juan in May of 1998, no permission was sought for Costa Rican police vessels to navigate
on the river. All this tells us is what we already know: that Colonel Navarro implemented a new
policy between May and July of 1998, as part of which Costa Rica stopped requesting authorization
from Nicaragua before navigating on the river, to which Nicaragua responded by prohibiting all
further navigation by CostaRican police vessels. ColonelNavarro’s affidavit does not even
address, let alone refute, the statements made by hi s superior officers two years later, in July of
2000, as recorded in the aide-memoire.
35. Now, ProfessorCrawford has attempted to call me to account on my use of the
CostaRican police report to show that, pursuant to the new policy implemented by
ColonelNavarro, CostaRica forcibly detained Ni caraguan nationals, ordere d them to board her
armed police vessels, and transported them on the ri ver to her police posts. He claimed that I was
wrong about this, and that the detained Nicaraguans were actually transported on land, not by
135
boat . Well, I would now like to call him back. Le t us, for a moment, return to the sketch-map
that ProfessorCrawford displayed on Monday. [S lide PSR] He used this, as I mentioned a few
moments ago, to claim entitlement to an inference that, in travelling between Infiernito and Boca
San Carlos in 1968, the Costa Rican forces used the river, even though the report in question does
not say that. Now, ProfessorCrawford and I do ag ree that the police report that I cited on Friday
says that the detained Nicaraguan nationals were transported between La Cureña and Boca San
Carlos, both of which are depicted on the same map 136.
36. Unlike Professor Crawford, I make no request for a mere inference that the Costa Rican
police travelled with their Nicaraguan detainees in tow by river rather than by road, because, unlike
ProfessorCrawford, I can cite proof that they we nt by boat. The proof is actually supplied by
CostaRica herself, which has said, on repeated occasions in this case, that La Cureña is not
reachable by land transport. Indeed, CostaRica cited the inaccessibility of La Cureña by land as
her reason for closing the post there after Nicarag ua prohibited further police navigation on the
135
CR 2009/5, p. 56, para. 17.
13MCR, Vol. VI, Ann. 227, p. 963. - 52 -
137
river . Even in these oral pro ceedings, Professor Crawford himself declared that La Cureña was
inaccessible by land: that is in CR 2009/3, page 18, paragraph 35. So how can Professor Crawford
now argue that the Nicaraguans we re transported from La Cureña to Boca San Carlos by land? I
will show you. The original report, in Spanish of course, says that the detained Nicaraguans were
transported in “movil 711” 138. [Slide PSR] “Movil” in Spanish and in this context, means “mobile
139 140
unit” . But look how CostaRica translated it into English in her annexes: “vehicle” . [Slide
PSR] Somebody on the Costa Rican side, through the miracle of modern translation, turned a boat
into a car. Of course, ProfessorCrawford, who is not a Spanish speaker, would not have been
aware of this linguistic gamesmanship.
(c) Other public vessels
37. I turn next and last to navigation with other government vessels. No argument was made
by ProfessorCrawford that either the 1858Treat y or the Cleveland Award created a right for
Costa Rica to navigate on the San Juan River w ith her public vessels for the purpose of performing
governmental services. Instead, his entire spee ch on Monday was devoted not to making a legal
argument but solely to portraying Nicaragua as the “bad guy” in this case. We heard repeatedly
from him that Nicaragua has “prohibited” or “p revented” CostaRican gove rnment officials from
141
delivering vital education, health and other social services .
38. In his attempt to support these charges, ProfessorCrawford relied on a number of
affidavits from Costa Rican government officials and other interested parties. We have read them,
and, even if taken at face value, they do not support his argument. But before turning to their
contents, I would like to say a few words about how this Court might wish to treat them.
Professor Crawford employs a double standard. For him, the five affidavits from Nicaraguan army
commanders should be disregarded by the Court because, because they are affidavits from
Nicaraguan army commanders 142. No other reason is given. On the other hand, affidavits from
137RCR, para. 3.94.
138
MCR, Vol. VI, Ann. 227, p. 986.
139
Larousse, Gran Diccionario: Español-Ingles/Ingles-Español (2d. ed., 2002), p. 493.
140MCR, Vol. VI, Ann. 227, p. 963.
141See, e.g., CR 2009/6, p. 60, para. 27; p. 61, para. 28.
142CR 2009/3, p. 18, para. 36; p. 51, para. 27. - 53 -
Costa Rican government officials and workers should be given full faith and credit. Please forgive
me if find something uneven about this attitude. Nicaragua asks only for equality of treatment.
Either the affidavits submitted by both Parties are to be treated as “evidence”, or none are.
39. The affidavits relied on by Professor Crawford do not show that Nicaragua prevented or
prohibited Costa Rican government officials from navi gating on the San Juan. The affidavits that
report a prevention of navigation expressly refer to navigation in police vessels, after 1998, when
Nicaragua stopped authorizing police vessels to navigate on the river. Only CostaRican officials
riding in police vessels would have been affected. By contrast, navigation by Costa Rican officials
in privately-owned vessels has not been affected by the prohibition that is applicable only to police
vessels. This includes transport-for-hire of CostaRican officials by local boatmen in what
ProfessorCrawford perhaps euphemistically referred to as “river taxis”. Nicaragua has not
prohibited or interfered with such transport; the affidavits cited by Professor Crawford do not state
otherwise.
40. Professor Crawford expressly referred to th e affidavit of Dr. Laura Navarro, as evidence
that Nicaragua imposed “a prohibition... upon Costa Rican public workers . . . navigating the
143
San Juan River” . The affidavit reveals, however, that there was no Nicaraguan prohibition at all,
merely a requirement that CostaRican officials seek a Nicaraguan visa or other formal
144
authorization before entering Nicaragua and travelling on the river . Professor Crawford also did
not mention that Dr.Navarro, far from being prohibited, was actually given authorization by
Nicaragua to travel on the SanJuan, and the writte n proof of this is in Annex47 of CostaRica’s
Reply. Dr.Ching, whose affidavit was also invoked by ProfessorCrawford, was likewise given
145
authorization by Nicaragua to navigate on the San Juan .
41. Nicaragua has never had a policy of prev enting or prohibiting navigation by Costa Rican
civilian officials. The evidence shows that Nicaragua’s practice has been to authorize such
navigation, subject only to two requirements, w hose reasonableness I discussed earlier: that the
officials possess visas to enter Nicaragua and that the vessels stop and register at the Nicaraguan
143
CR 2009/6, p. 61, para. 27.
144
RCR, Ann. 57.
14CMN, Ann. 53. - 54 -
post upon entering and exiting the river. To be sure, as I previously acknowledged, there have been
delays in the issuance of some visas, in a few cases lengthy delays, as ProfessorCrawford noted.
But this is not internationally wrongful conduct. There can be no wrongfulness without violation
of a right, and Costa Rican public officials do not have a right to a Nicaraguan visa, or to navigate
on the SanJuan in public vessels for the purpo se of delivering governmental services. In any
event, Costa Rica’s evidence of de lays in issuing visas is almost entirely from 2005 and 2006. By
2007, even she acknowledges, in her Reply, “Nicaraguan authorities have responded quite quickly
146
to Costa Rican requests for permission to navigate” .
42. Mr. President, I will conclude today, as ProfessorCrawford did on Monday, with
fishing ⎯ just a few words. The Parties are now agreed that CostaRica neither has nor claims a
right of her nationals to engage in commercial or sport fishing 147. It is Nicaragua’s position that
Costa Rica has also failed to prove the existence of either a customary or a treaty right to engage in
subsistence fishing. Nevertheless, subsistence fi shing in the SanJuan River can easily be, and in
practice is, carried out from the shore, and Nicaragua confirms that it is not, and has not been, her
policy to prevent subsistence fishing from the right bank of the river by CostaRican nationals.
Costa Rica has demonstrated no need, for subsistence purposes, to fish by boat in the middle of this
particular river. That is the method used by commercial fishermen, large and small. It is
Nicaragua’s right to prohibit this practice in her sovereign waters, which in this case are part of the
environmentally protected areas of the SanJuan River Wildlife Refuge and the SanJuan
River-Nicaragua Biosphere Reserve.
43. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my presentation. I thank you once
again for your patience and your courtesy and I ask you now to call on the distinguished Agent of
Nicaragua, Ambassador Carlos Arguëllo.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.PaulReichler, for your presentation. I now call
HisExcellency Dr. Carlos Arguëllo Gómez, the Ag ent of Nicaragua, to offer the Agent’s speech
and submissions.
146
RCR, para. 4.36.
14CR 2009/6, p. 63, para. 30. - 55 -
AMRr. UËLLO:
1. Thank you, Mr.President, distinguished Me mbers of the Court. This final presentation
will first address the question of the remedies soughtby both Parties and will conclude with the
presentation of the Nicaraguan submissions.
1. Remedies sought by Costa Rica (Costa Rica’s submissions)
2. Costa Rica has requested the Court to make a declaration on nine specific points that cover
her rights of navigation on the San Juan River as understood by Costa Rica. She also requests the
Court to declare that Nicaragua should cease and make reparation for all breaches of these alleged
rights and, finally, that Nicaragua should give assurances that her future behaviour will be to the
satisfaction of Costa Rica.
3. The nature and extent of the limited rights of navigation of CostaRica on the SanJuan
River have been analysed by Nicaragua thr oughout the written pleadings and during these oral
pleadings. The remedies sought by CostaRica are simply based on a different interpretation of
these rights and thus any response to the specific question of remedies cannot be separated from the
main arguments developed throughout the pleadings of this case.
4. The few additional comments made during th ese oral pleadings by ProfessorCrawford
under this specific heading of “Remedies” were addressed by ProfessorPellet. No substantive
content has been added to this issue during the second round of oral pleadings by Costa Rica. For
this reason, I will only address this issue by way of summary with a short comment on each
heading of Costa Rica’s submissions. Before discuss ing each of the nine headings in particular it
must be pointed out that the submissions, a lthough seemingly the same as those in her Memorial
and Reply, have in fact been modified by the assertions of CostaRica’s representatives during
these hearings to the effect that Nicaragua has th e right to regulate the navigation on the river and
also the right to dredge the San Juan in accordance with the 1858 Treaty and the Cleveland Award.
5. The first submission of Costa Rica prays th e Court to declare that Nicaragua is under “the
obligation to allow all Costa Rican vessels and th eir passengers to navigate freely on the San Juan
for purposes of commerce, including communicati on and the transportation of passengers and
tourism”. In so far as CostaRica asks the Court to reiterate what the 1858Treaty states, that is, - 56 -
that the Court declare that CostaRica may na vigate freely “con objetos de comercio”, this
declaration would be unnecessary. Nothing woul d be served by a reiteration of the wording of
ArticleVI of the Treaty. That is why CostaRi ca seeks an interpretation of the Treaty that would
equate the phrase of the authentic Spanish text “c on objetos de comercio” w ith the English text of
“purposes of commerce” and, furthermore, not satisfied with the way the English translation seems
to inflate her rights, CostaRica wants the Court to add to the 1858 text that this navigation “for
purposes of commerce” includes “communication and the transportation of passengers and
tourism”. The right of navigation “con objetos de comercio” has now evolved in Costa Rica’s view
into an obligation to allow “all Costa Rican vessels” –– that is, public and private –– to navigate for
purposes of commerce understood as covering any human activity. After writing “any human
activity”, I went back thinking that this might sound exaggerated but after renewed consideration I
could not think of any human activity that is not covered by commerce in this blown-up
interpretation that even includes communication.
6. The second declaration requested by CostaRica is “the obligation not to impose any
charges or fees on Costa Rican vessels and their passengers for navigating on the river”. Nicaragua
does not impose charges or fees for navigating on the river in accordance with the 1858Treaty.
There is no proof that Nicaragua has ever done so. Of course, the wording of CostaRica’s
submission is studiously misleading. Nicaragua is obligated not to impose charges or fees for
navigation “con objetos de comercio” and not simp ly for navigating on the river with any purpose
whatsoever. And this is what Nicaragua has been doing as Mr. Reichler has just been explaining.
7. Next, Costa Rica requests the obligation fro m Nicaragua: “[T]he obligation not to require
persons exercising the right of fre e navigation on the river to carr y passports or obtain Nicaraguan
visas.” This submission has two points. One is that passengers should not have to carry passports.
But the question would be, what other better method of identification could be substituted for this
universal accepted method? Should Nicaragua as k them to have their birth certificate as an
alternative means of identification? On the question of the need for a visa I would suggest that our
Costa Rican colleagues attempt to enter and naviga te, for example, the nearby Rhine River without
any passports or visas. Of course, the comparison is not exact. The Rhine is an international river
under multiple sovereignty whilst the SanJuan is an entirely Nicaraguan river. Once on the - 57 -
SanJuan river the person is inside Nicaragua a nd can go anywhere in the Nicaraguan territory.
Thus, if no visa is required to enter the river then there would be no immigration control for
entering Nicaragua.
8. The other submission of Costa Rica is “the obligation not to require CostaRican vessels
and their passengers to stop at any Nicaraguan post along the river”. As a matter of principle, the
sovereignty over the river gives Nicaragua the auth ority of the “sumo imperio” to order vessels to
stop and be inspected on any part of the river which is after all Nicaraguan territory.
Professor Caflisch is aware of this and has suggested 148 that in lieu of this procedure of stopping at
the two or three Nicaraguan posts along the river, perhaps Nicaragua could increase its patrols on
the river. Since these patrols naturally would have the right to stop and inspect, the suggestion of
Professor Caflisch is a bit bizarre.
9. The next submission is “the obligation not to impose other impediments on the exercise of
the right of free navigation, including timetables for navigation and conditions relating to flags”.
Again this is a question of the right of regulatio n which indisputably is an attribute solely of
Nicaragua. As a point of comparison on this issue we might point out that the CostaRican land
border posts are closed at night. I could add by personal experience, since the field apparently is
open to personal appreciations and reminiscences by counsel, that if you are travelling from
Nicaragua to CostaRica through this leg of the Pan American highway ⎯ the most important
international highway of the Americas ⎯, and you reach the border crossing at night, you have to
find sleeping accommodation to wait for morning for th e border post to open and get through. The
reason given for this schedule at the land border crossing is that it is for the convenience of the
personnel and also for reasons of security. These re asons are even more cogent in the semi-jungle
reaches of a very dangerous river and yet these regulations on the river are portrayed as a form of
harassment.
10. On the question of the use of the flag on the vessels, it must be recalled that 99 per cent
of the river traffic consists of small boats in th e nature of canoes that do not carry nor are they
148
CR 2009/3, p. 28, para. 20. - 58 -
obliged to carry flags. The 1 per cent that norma lly proudly waves the Costa Rican flag is asked to
fly the Nicaraguan flag.
11. The next CostaRican submission is “the obligation to allow CostaRican vessels and
their passengers while engaged in such navigation to land on any part of the bank where navigation
is common without paying any charges, unless expressly agreed by both Governments”. This
Costa Rican submission presumably is based on the last part of Article VI of the 1858 Treaty. The
text of this Treaty does not stipulate that landing on any part of the river is free of charges. It
clearly says that this landing will be without pa yment of duties or imposts. In Spanish, “sin
cobrarse ninguna clase de impuestos”. So even in 1858 any charges for services were not included
in this mandate. But the whole question in the present day is moot. It is surprising that Costa Rica
should claim this right on the basis of the 1858 Treaty which has been superseded by treaties well
known to the Parties. Today there are no rights of landing anywhere along the river without
payment of duties. If CostaRica maintains th is position then it should be published in all the
media that anyone can land on any part of the ri ver and unload cargo without paying duties. This
would come as an enormous surprise in all of the Ce ntral American countries. If this were true, all
commercial treaties from the last 100 years would not be applicable along the river. But this is all
fantasy; any Nicaraguan who lands on the Costa Rican margin with or without merchandise should
travel with his lawyer in order to get him out of jail.
12. The next submission refers to “the oblig ation to allow CostaRican official vessels the
right to navigate the San Juan, including for the purposes of resupply and exchange of personnel of
the border posts along the right bank of the river with their official equipment, including service
arms and ammunition, and for the purposes of protec tion as established in the relevant instruments,
and in particular the Second Article of the Clevel and Award”. This Costa Rican claim is not based
on the 1858 Treaty since it gives no such rights to Costa Rica even by way of a hint. Besides, it has
not crossed the Nicaraguan authorities’ minds to request that hapless, army-less Costa Rica come to
the military defence of the San Juan River.
13. The Cleveland Award is the only instrument that allows Costa Rica a form of navigation
not limited to vessels “con objetos de comercio”. But the Cleveland Award is absolutely clear in
limiting this right to those “vessels of the reve nue service related to and connected with her - 59 -
enjoyment of the ‘purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in said article, or as may be necessary to
the protection of said enjoyment”. The words added by President Cleveland are not a superfluous
description of what a revenue vessel is supposed to do since their description is part of any
dictionary definition. The only purpose of President Cleveland’s use of the words is to make clear
that this right of protection by revenue vessels is limited to the right of navigation for the purposes
envisioned in the Treaty and does not extend to the maintenance of the whole security needs of the
State of Costa Rica.
14. The next submission refers to “the oblig ation to facilitate and expedite traffic on the
SanJuan, within the terms of the Treaty of 15 April 1858 and its interpretation by the Cleveland
Award of 1888, in accordance with Article 1 of the bilateral Agreement of 9 January 1956”.
Nicaragua has always complied with the mandate s of the 1858Treaty and the Cleveland Award
and needs no reminder of this obligation. The bila teral Agreement of 1956 is absolutely irrelevant
to the issues before the Court and has been quietly laid to rest during these pleadings.
15. Then, the final submission is “the obligation to permit riparians of the Costa Rican bank
to fish in the river for subsistence purposes”. Mr. Reichler has just addressed this point and I will
limit myself to saying that as a question of rights, Nicaragua holds absolute title to any and all of
the resources of the SanJuan River. This has been recognized by CostaRican counsel 149. As a
matter of humanity and good neighbourliness, Nica ragua has never stopped subsistence fishery
from the CostaRican margin of the river. Natu rally, it is a question that has to be regulated
because an undefined permission for subsistence fishery could easily be used to cover any type of
fishing, including commercial fish ing, in the special circumstances of the river where the type of
fishing gear for one and the other might be confused.
16. With the preceding overview and comments on the substantive declarations requested by
Costa Rica on the alleged violations of her rights by Nicaragua, any further rebuttal of Costa Rica’s
claims for reparation for these violations or of assurances of this respect by Nicaragua is
unnecessary. The one claim cannot subsist without th e other. But it could be added further that
149
CR 2009/3, p. 23, para. 7, first subpara. (Caflisch). - 60 -
even those rights claimed by CostaRica have not been demonstrated to have been prejudiced or
denied by Nicaragua in the 150-year existence of the 1858 Treaty.
2. Declarations requested by Nicaragua
17. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, in normal circumstances Nicaragua
as respondent State would have limited its submi ssions to a request for the rejection of the
CostaRican claims. After consideration, the c onclusion reached by Nicaragua is that the real
objective of this case is to try to open up or l oosen up the clear stipulations of the 1858 Treaty and
the Cleveland Award. Today, CostaRica has felt no embarrassment in emphasizing before the
Court and public opinion its purported lack of an army and at the same time to request and insist on
the demand that is at the origin of this litigation: that is, CostaRica’s alleged rights to navigate
freely, not only with public vessels for any purpose, but also with armed public vessels. At the
same time, CostaRica is attempting to magnify the meaning of free navigation “con objetos de
comercio” (with objects of commerce) to encompass any present-day human endeavour.
18. For this reason, Nicaragua decided to requ est of the Court a declaration reaffirming her
sovereign rights and jurisdiction on certain concrete issues.
19. The first declaration requested is that CostaRica is obliged to comply with the
regulations for navigation and landing in the Sa nJuan, imposed by Nicaraguan authorities, in
particular related to matters of health and security. Nicaragua has never imposed arbitrary
regulations and there is no evidence whatsoever provi ded by Costa Rica that this has ever been the
case. In the course of the present proceedings, Co sta Rica has clearly recognized Nicaragua’s right
150
to dictate these regulations and the requested declaration will only reaffirm this obligation.
20. The second declaration requested is that Co sta Rican vessels have to pay for any special
services provided by Nicaragua in the use of the Sa n Juan, either for navigation or landing on the
Nicaraguan banks. The 1858 Treaty liberates Costa Rica from paying duties or taxes for navigation
but does not include services provided. It is incont rovertible that Nicaragua has a right to charge
150
See, e.g., CR 2009/3, p. 22, para. 4 (Caflisch). - 61 -
for these services in the same way as fees for special services are charged in all river navigation.
151
Professor Caflisch agrees that as a matter of principle Nicaragua has this right.
21. The third declaration is that Costa Rica has to comply with all reasonable charges for the
modern improvement in the navigation of the river with respect to its situation in 1858. This
declaration does not have the purpose of subj ecting CostaRica to charges for the normal
maintenance of the river. The intent of this d eclaration is to make clear that the 1858Treaty or
the1888 Cleveland Award did not provide CostaRi ca with the free benefit of any and all such
improvements including those that might imply the u se of the Nicaraguan land territory that is not
subject to any right of free navigation by Costa Rica.
22. The fourth declaration is that CostaRica may only use the revenue service boats in the
way stipulated by the Cleveland Award, that is, during and with special reference to actual transit
of the merchandise authorized by the Treaty. The r eason for this declaration or rather this request
for a reaffirmation of what the Cleveland Award s tipulates is that any decision by the Court must
be at least as careful on this issue as was President Cleveland. The reason for the specific wording
of the Cleveland Award on this question of the na vigation has been explained a few minutes ago.
We might add that if the limits on the right to navigate with th ese revenue vessels are not those set
forth by the Cleveland Award, then in fact Costa Rica would de facto be able to navigate the river
with heavily armed vessels by simply painting them with the name “revenue cutter”.
23. The fifth declaration was to the effect that Nicaragua has the right to dredge the San Juan
in order to return the flow of water to that obtaini ng in 1858, even if this affects the flow of water
152
to other present-day recipients of this flow such as the Colorado River. Professor Crawford has
conceded in clear language Nicaragua’s right to dredge the river in conformity with the stipulations
of the 1858 Treaty and the Cleveland Award. This concession is in fact satisfactory to Nicaragua.
151
Ibid., p. 28, para. 21.
15CR 2009/3, p. 68, para. 25, and CR 2009/6, p. 63, para. 31. - 62 -
3. Summary statement
24. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, having concluded the previous
observations on the remedies sought by the Parties, I would continue with some final general
comments.
A. Historical background
25. The historical background that led to the signing of the 1858 Treaty has been gone over
repeatedly throughout the written and oral pleadings and we will spare the Court further iterations
on this issue.
26. The circumstances of the conclusion of th is Treaty in 1858 have also been explained in
detail in our written pleadings. It was pointed out and contested by Professor Crawford that in my
first presentation I had said that Nicaragua had si gned this Treaty under a cloud of duress. Since
this case is not about the validity of the 1858 Treaty but about its interpretation, the pertinence of
the use of this word to characterize the contex t in which the Treaty of 1858 was signed is not
relevant. But, under any other name, the facts spea k for themselves. At the moment of signing the
Treaty Nicaragua had just been devastated by a war against a foreign invader, GeneralWalker.
CostaRica was occupying the SanJuan River and had given an ultimatum to Nicaragua to
surrender the fortifications of the San Juan. Nicaragua responded by declaring war on Costa Rica.
It would seem unnecessary to recall that this war and this occupation were occurring inside
Nicaragua and not CostaRica. All this can be reviewed in the Nicaraguan Counter-Memorial 15.
Perhaps the best way to portray the events is by citing the Note sent by the S ecretary of State of the
United States, Mr. Lewis Cass, on 30 July 1857 to th e special agent of the United States to Central
America:
“Reports have reached here . . . that the government of Costa Rica . . . intends to
appropriate to itself portions of the Territory of Nicaragua... Such a design is so
unjust in itself, in view of the circumstances . . . she would violate the solemn pledges
given when she proposed to go to the aid of Nicaragua by attempting to convert this
154
into a war of conquest.”
27. I am sure that State Secretary Cass would not have been surprised by my use of the word
“duress” to characterize the situation under which Nicaragua found itself in that period.
153
Paras. 1.2.35-1.247.
15CMN, para. 1.2.42. - 63 -
B. Interpretation of the 1858 Treaty
28. The main issue presently before the Court is the interpretation of a treaty entered into in
1858 by two Spanish-speaking nations. If this case had been before a tribunal of Spanish-speaking
judges or arbitrators the insistence by Costa Rica in using an English translation of the text as the
definitive version for interpreting the treaty would have been surprising. If we eliminate from the
pleadings all reference by CostaRica to the English text presented to PresidentCleveland from
which the other English translations are derived, for example, that published in the British papers,
there is very little argument on the plain Spanish te xt. If we start from the plain text in Spanish
“libre navegacion... con objetos de comercio” a nd translate it literally into English we come up
with the phrase “free navigation... with objects of commerce”. The French version, which is a
language closer to Spanish, would render it as “libre navigation . . . avec des objects de commerce”.
The only way that we could come up with the English translation of “purposes of commerce” or the
French “aux fins du commerce” is if the Spanish text had used the very common everyday phrases
of “con fines comerciales” or “con propositos comerciales” or even “con objetivos comerciales”. It
is as unusual in Spanish, to say the least, to express the meaning of the very common expression
“con fines” or “con propositos comerciales” with the phrase “con objetos comerciales” just as it
would be unusual to use the phrase “with objects of commerce” or “avec des objets de commerce”
for the same purpose in English or French.
29. The text in Spanish is clear. But even conceding for argument that there were any doubts
as to its meaning it would be surprising that in a treaty of limits the meaning would be construed in
the most overreaching way against the sovereign State.
30. There is a word in the English language presently in vogue: “repurpose”, which in
practice applies to anything that was made or meant for one thing and is used for another. This in
fact is what Costa Rica wants the Court to accomp lish with the 1858 Treaty: to repurpose it to fit
any type of navigation and, even more so, to fit any type of human activity on the river.
31. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, I will now proceed to read the
submissions of Nicaragua.
On the basis of the facts and legal consid erations set forth in the Counter-Memorial,
Rejoinder and oral pleadings, may it please the Court to adjudge and declare that: the request of - 64 -
Costa Rica in her Memorial, Reply and oral pleadings are rejected in general, and in particular, on
the following bases:
(a) Either because there is no breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Limits of 15 April 1858 or
any other international obligation of Nicaragua.
(b) Or, as appropriate, because the obligation breach of which is alleged, is not an obligation under
the provisions of the Treaty of Limits of 15 April 1858 or under general international law.
Moreover the Court is also requested to make a formal declaration on the issues raised by
Nicaragua in SectionII of ChapterVII of her Count er-Memorial, in SectionI, ChapterVI, of her
Rejoinder and as reiterated in these oral pleadings.
32. Before concluding this statement, we wi sh to most sincerely thank you, Mr.President
and distinguished Members of the Court, for your kind attention and patience with our pleadings.
Our special thanks also to the Registry for its expert and always welcome assistance as well as to
the translators and interpreters.
33. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, Nicaragua would conclude this
presentation by reiterating her traditional and unwave ring respect for the decisions of this highest
world tribunal. We are certain that the Court’s judgment will be a turning point for the better in the
history of the relations of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Amb assador Argüello Gómez. The Court takes
note of the final submissions which the Ambassador, the Agent of Nicaragua, has just read on
behalf of the Republic of Nicaragua, as it took note of the final submissions of the Republic of
Costa Rica on Monday 9March. There are a few questions to put to the Parties from some
Members of the Court. I shall now give the floor to Judges Koroma, Keith and Bennouna, who
have questions for the Parties. First, I call upon Judge Koroma, if you please.
Judge KOROMA: Thank you. I wish to assure the Parties that I am not oblivious to
possible archival constraints on their part, because of historical reasons. I will, however, appreciate
it if they could answer the following question. Can either Party provide evidence as to whether
Costa Rican locals and immigrants used the San Juan River in the period around 1858, when the - 65 -
Treaty of Limits was concluded, and can either Party provide evidence as to the nature and scope of
the subsequent practice in the use of the river by Costa Rican locals and immigrants? Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Koroma. Next, I call upon Judge Keith, if you please.
Judge KEITH: Thank you, Mr. President. This is a question for both Parties. On the
assumption that Costa Rica’s right of navigation under Article VI of the 1858 Treaty does extend to
the carriage of passengers, must the passengers or someone on their behalf make a payment for the
carriage to the operator of the vessel for the carriag e to fall within that right? I appreciate, of
course, that Nicaragua rejects the assumption on which the question is based. Thank you,
Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Keith. Finally, I call upon JudgeBennouna. You
have the floor.
M. le juge BENNOUNA : Merci, Monsieur le président. Ma question s’adresse également
aux deux Parties. C’est donc la question suiv ante. Lorsqu’il a adopté des mesures pour la
régulation de la navigation sur le fleuve San Juan , le Nicaragua a-t-il chaque fois informé et/ou
consulté, au préalable, le CostaRica? Comme je dispose, Monsieur le président, du texte en
anglais de cette question, vous me permettrez aussi de la lire en anglais, peut-être pour satisfaire à
ce qu’on pourrait appeler l’égalité de traitement dans l’écoute en direct de la question. Je ne
garantis pas par contre l’égalité de l’accent avec lequel la question sera prononcée. When it
adopted measures for the regulation of navigation on the San Juan River, did Nicaragua, each time,
inform and/or consult Costa Rica in advance? Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, JudgeBennouna. The precise text of these three questions
will be sent, in written form, to the Parties as soon as possible. In accordance with the usual
practice, the Parties are invited to provide their wr itten replies to the questions not later than 6 p.m.
on Thursday 19March 2009. Any comments a Party may wish to make, in accordance with
Article 72 of the Rules of Court, on the replies by the other Party must be submitted no later than
6 p.m. on Thursday 26 March 2009. - 66 -
This brings us to the end of the two weeks of hearings devoted to the oral arguments in this
case. I should like to thank the Agents, coun sel and advocates of the two Parties for their
statements during these last two weeks. In accord ance with the usual practice I shall request both
Agents to remain at the Court’s disposal to provide any additional information the Court may
require.
With this proviso, I now declare closed the oral proceedings in the case concerning the
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (CostaRica v . Nicaragua). The Court will
now retire for deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in due course as to the date
on which the Court will deliver its judgment.
As the Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 1.10 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 12 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)