Non Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2010/8
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2010
Public sitting
held on Monday 13 September 2010, at 10.20 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2010
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 13 septembre 2010, à 10 h 20, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale
sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judge ad hoc Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
jugeGaja,. ad hoc
Cgoffrerr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Georgia is represented by:
Ms Tina Burjaliani, First Deputy-Minister of Justice,
H.E. Mr. Shota Gvineria, Ambassador of Georgia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
a s Agents;
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), Pr ofessor of International Law, McGill University,
Member of the Bar of New York,
as Co-Agent and Advocate;
Mr.James R.Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whew ell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr.PhilippeSands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers,
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
as Advocates;
Ms Nino Kalandadze, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Giorgi Mikeladze, Consul, Embassy of Georgia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Khatuna Salukvadze, Head of the Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Nino Tsereteli, Deputy Head of the Department of State Representation to International Human
Rights Courts, Ministry of Justice,
Mr.ZacharyDouglas, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AndrewB.Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
MsAmy Senier, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of th e Bars of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and New York,
as Advisers. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de Géorgie est représenté par :
Mme Tina Burjaliani, premier vice-ministre de la justice,
S. Exc. M. Shota Gvineria, ambassadeur de Géorgie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents ;
M.PayamAkhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), pr ofesseur de droit international à l’Université
McGill, membre du barreau de New York,
comme coagent et avocat;
M.James R.Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers,
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers,
M. Paul S. Reichler, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, W ashington D.C., membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
comme avocats ;
Mme Nino Kalandadze, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Giorgi Mikeladze, consul à l’ambassade de Géorgie aux Pays-Bas,
MmeKhatuna Salukvadze, chef du département des affaires politiques au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
MmeNino Tsereteli, chef adjoint chargé de la représentation de l’Etat auprès des juridictions
internationales des droits de l’homme au ministère de la justice,
M. Zachary Douglas, avocat, Matrix Chambers, chargé de cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université
de Cambridge,
M.Andrew B.Loewenstein, cabinet Foley Ho ag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
MmeClara E.Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
MmeAmySenier, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts et de New York,
comme conseillers. - 6 -
The Government of the Russian Federation is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Kirill Gevorgian, Director, Legal Departme nt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
H.E.Mr.Roman Kolodkin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agents;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, Dr. jur. (Heidelberg), LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of International Law
at the University of Potsdam, Director of the Postdam Center of Human Rights, Member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr.Samuel Wordsworth, member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Evgeny Raschevsky, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mr. M. Kulakhmetov, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Mr. V. Korchmar, Principal Counsellor, Fourth CIS Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
Mr.GrigoryLukyantsev, Senior Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations, New York,
Mr.IvanVolodin, Acting Head of Section, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
Mr.MaximMusikhin, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
MsDianaTaratukhina, Third Secretary, Perman ent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations, New York,
Mr.ArsenDaduani, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Sergey Leonidchenko, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
MsSvetlanaShatalova, Attaché, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States of
America,
Ms Daria Golubkova, expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Mr. M. Tkhostov, Deputy Chief of Administration, Government of North Ossetia-Alania, - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie est représenté par :
S.Exc.M.KirillGevorgian, directeur du département des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
S. Exc. M. Roman Kolodkin, ambassadeur de la Fédération de Russie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comma egents ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.Andreas Zimmermann, docteur en droit (Université de Heidelberg), LL.M. (Harvard),
professeur de droit international à l’Université de Potsdam, directeur du centre des droits de
l’homme de Potsdam, membre de laCour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Evgeny Raschevsky, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
M. M. Kulakhmetov, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M.V.Korchmar, conseiller principal au qu atrième département de la Communauté d’Etats
indépendants du ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M.GrigoryLukyantsev, conseiller principal à la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M.IvanVolodin, chef de division par intérim du département des affaires juridiques du ministère
des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M. Maxim Musikhin, conseiller à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas,
MmeDianaTaratukhina, troisième secrétaire à la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M. Arsen Daduani, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas,
M.SergeyLeonidchenko, attaché au département des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
MmeSvetlanaShatalova, attaché à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Etats-Unis
d’Amérique,
Mme Daria Golubkova, expert au ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M. M. Tkhostov, chef adjoint de l’administration, gouvernement d’Ossétie du Nord-Alanie, - 8 -
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
Mr.Christian Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Pr ofessor of International Law, University of
Glasgow,
MsAlina Miron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Ms Elena Krotova, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Ms Anna Shumilova, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mr. Sergey Usoskin, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
as Advisers. - 9 -
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
M.ChristianTams, LL.M., docteur en droit (U niversité de Cambridge), professeur de droit
international à l’Université de Glasgow,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Elena Krotova, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
Mme Anna Shumilova, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
M. Sergey Usoskin, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners,
commc eonseillers. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
The Court meets today, pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Court, to hear the
oral arguments of the Parties on the Preliminary Objections raised by the Respondent in the case
concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation).
Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Georgian nationality, Georgia availed
itself of its right under Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute and chose Mr. Giorgio Gaja to sit as
judge ad hoc in the case. Judge Gaja was installed as judge ad hoc in 2008, during the phase of the
present case that was devoted to the request for the indication of provisional measures.
*
I shall now briefly recall the procedure so far followed in this case. On 12 August 2008, the
Government of Georgia filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings
against the Russian Federation in respect of a dispute concerning “actions on and around the
territory of Georgia” in breach of the Internati onal Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965. In its Application, Georgia invoked Article 22 of the
said Convention to found the jurisdiction of the Court.
On 14August2008, Georgia, referring to Article41 of the Statute, filed in the Registry of
the Court a Request for the indication of provis ional measures in order “to preserve [its] rights
under the International Convention on the Eliminati on of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to
protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert
with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries”.
By an Order of 15October2008, the Court, after hearing the Parties, indicated certain
provisional measures to both sides.
By an Order of 2December2008, the President of the Court, taking account of the
agreement of the Parties, fixed 2 September 2009 as the time-limit for the filing of a Memorial by
Georgia and 2July2010 as the time-limit for th e filing of a Counter-Memorial by the Russian
Federation. Georgia’s Memorial was filed within the time-limit thus prescribed. - 11 -
On 1December2009, within the time-limit set by Article79, paragraph1, of the Rules of
Court, the Russian Federation raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Consequently, by an Order dated 11 December 2009, the Court, noting that by virtue of Article 79,
paragraph5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, fixed
1April2010 as the time-limit for the presentation by Georgia of a written statement of its
observations and submissions on the preliminary objections made by the Russian Federation.
Georgia filed such a statement within the time-limit so prescribed, and the case thus became ready
for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.
The Court has decided, in accordance with Article53, paragraph2, of the Rules of Court,
and having consulted the Parties, that copies of the pleadings in the case and documents annexed
will be made accessible to the public on the openi ng of the oral proceeding. Furthermore, in
accordance with the Court’s practice, these pleadings without their annexes will from today be put
on the Court’s internet site.
I note the presence at the hearing of the Agents , counsel and advocates of both Parties. In
accordance with the arrangements on the organizati on of the procedure decided by the Court, the
hearings will comprise a first and a second round of oral argument. Each Party will have one full
session of three hours for the first round and a session of two hours for the second round.
The Russian Federation will present its first round of oral arguments on its preliminary
objections this morning. In this first sitting of the first round of oral arguments, the Russian
Federation may, if so required, avail itself of a s hort extension of time beyond 1p.m., in view of
the time taken up by the earlier public session today.
Georgia will present its first round of oral argument on the preliminary objections of the
Russian Federation on Tuesday 14 September, at 10 a.m.
The Russian Federation will then present its oral reply on Wednesday 15September at
4p.m., for a speaking time of two hours. Georgia will then present its oral reply on Friday
17 September at 10 a.m., for a speaking time of two hours.
Thus, I shall now give the floor to Mr. Kirill G. Gevorgian, Agent of the Russian Federation. - 12 -
Mr.GEVORGIAN: Mr.President, Distinguished Members of the Court, it is an honour to
appear again before you. Let me start by congratulating Their Excellencies Xue Hanqin and
JoanDonoghue upon election as judges of this Court. I could not express more eloquently the
complimentary awards that you, Mr. President, just said in their regard.
1. This case originates in conflicts between Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians that go deep
into the history. The more modern phase of those conflicts started in the late 1980s, when the
authorities of Georgia openly stood for a “Georgia for Georgians”, taking no account of the
autonomous status that had been enjoyed by the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 1. Not
surprisingly, this led to protests in those regions. In response, Georgia abolished their autonomy.
The tensions led to full-fledged armed conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia in 1991-1992,
and between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1992-1993, r esulting in thousands of victims and in the
displacement of tens of thousands of persons of various ethnicities 2.
2. Then came years of relative stability, not least due to Russian mediation and peacekeeping
within the framework of broader international efforts. But starting from 2004, the new authorities
of Georgia led by PresidentSaakashvili embarked on a new approach which involved repeated
attempts to solve the problems with South Ossetia and Abkhazia by armed force. Those attempts
culminated in August 2008, with Georgia unleashing a massive armed attack against the population
of South Ossetia and against Russian peacekeeping units, in breach of Georgia’s obligations under
international law and, in partic ular, under the relevant agreements pertaining to the settlement of
the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.
3. As evidenced by the Independent In ternational Fact-Finding Mission, which was
established by the European Union in December 2008 with the aim of investigating the origins and
the course of the armed conflict: “Open hostilities began with a large-scale Georgian military
operation against the town of Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas, launched in the night of 7to
1Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation (POR), Ann. 25, Human RighWatch/Helsinki, “Bloodshed
in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict” (1992), p. 8.
2See, e.g., ibid., p. 17; also Memorial of Georgia (MG), A nn.40, Report of the Representative of the
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally disp laced persons, Addendum, Mission to Georgia, Walter Kälin,
24 March 2006, para. 8. - 13 -
3
8August2008. Operations started with a massive Georgian artillery attack” . The Georgian
offensive deliberately targeted the peacekeeping units stationed in South Ossetia, though, as the
4
Fact-Finding Mission Report rightly emphasizes , there is no evidence to support any claims that
the Russian soldiers had forfeited their international legal status.
4. In such circumstances, the Russian Federation had no other choice but to exercise its
inherent right to self-defence and protect its peacekeepers 5.
5. As you recall, it was that armed conflict th at led to the initiation of proceedings in this
Court. It must be emphasized that the Appli cation was only lodged when it became clear that
Georgia’s military venture had failed. The obvious objective of the applicant State was to portray
itself as a victim of the conflict that it itself had started. To seise the Court, Georgia needed to
construct at least some jurisdictional basis. Hence the sudden appearance onto the scene of the
International Convention on the Elimination of A ll Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). And
this is an entirely artificial jurisdictional basis, given that Georgia had never before mentioned that
Convention or notified Russia of a claim of racial discrimination in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Georgia unscrupulously turned the facts upside down and presented its long-standing conflicts with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a dispute with Russia regarding the interpretation and application of
CERD.
6. Mr. President, the context brings to the fore the two exceptional features of this case.
7. The first is that the applicant State has ⎯ quite unlawfully ⎯ sought to impose by the use
of brutal military force its own solution to the highly complex regional problems opposing Georgia,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In doing so, Georgi a has attacked the internationally recognized
peacekeeping units, acting in gross violation of in ternational humanitarian law, and in complete
disregard for the established principle of peaceful se ttlement of disputes. Russia is convinced that
in such circumstances, the applicant State must not be allowed to benef it from the privilege of
having its fabricated claims considered by the C ourt on the merits. One immediate question to be
3
POR, Ann. 75, Independent Interna tional Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (Sep. 2009),
Vol. I, p. 19, para. 14.
4Ibid, p. 23, para. 20.
5United Nations Security Council, Le tter dated 11Aug. 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2008/545. - 14 -
asked in this respect is, would the Court have ever been seised of this case if Georgia had
succeeded in its military operation?
8. Mr. President, the second exceptional feature of the current proceedings is that the claims
are brought to the Court against the State that for more than 15 years had been acting as a facilitator
and peacekeeper. The true parties to the conf licts were Georgia, on the one hand, and South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other.
9. Russia undertook those functions at the request of the conflicting parties, and was
recognized in that capacity by the United Nations, the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent
States ⎯ as well as by Georgia itself. Thus, the United Nations Security Council in a number of
resolutions acknowledged that the Russian peac ekeeping forces in Abkhazia were a stabilizing
factor in the conflict zone 6. The OSCE was continuously taking a similar position with regard to
the role of Russia in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict 7. Similar assessments were made by Georgian
Government representatives throughout the period of the alleged “dispute”. Not only did Georgia
explicitly request the deployment of the peacekeeping troops 8, but it was constantly recognizing
Russia as “an active participant in the process designed to find a peaceful solution to the Abkhazian
9
conflict” which had “taken on a great responsibility with regard to this peace process” ⎯ as it was
put by the Georgian Foreign Minister at the Un ited Nations General Assembly in 1994, or else as
10
“the guarantor of long-term peace in the Caucasus” ⎯ to use words of the Prime Minister of
Georgia spoken in 2005.
6Security Council resolution1187 (1998). Similar ac knowledgements can be found in resolutions1255 (1999),
1287 (2000), 1311 (2000), 1393 (2002), 1427 (2002), 1462 (2003), 1494 (2003), 1524 (2004), 15
54 (2004), 1582 (2005),
1615 (2005).
7Written Statement of Georgia (WSG), Vol. III, Ann. 104, CSCE, Budapest Document 1994: Towards a genuine
partnership in a new era, p. 8; MG, Vol. II, Ann. 69, OSCE, Lisbon Document 1996, p. 8, para. 20.
8POR, Ann. 34, United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 4Februa ry 1994 from the Representatives of
Georgia and the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/1994/125 (7 Feb. 1994);
POR, Ann.36, Declaration on measur es for a political settlement of th e Georgian/Abkhaz conflict signed on
4 Apr. 1994;
POR, Ann. 40, Commonwealth of Independent States, Council of the Heads of State, Decision on the use of the
Collective Forces for the Maintenance of Peace in the area of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (22 Aug. 1994), p. 1.
9Ibid.
10
POR, Ann. 57, Press conference of th e Prime Minister of Georgia, Zurab Noghaideli, 13 Dec. 2005, circulated
at the meeting of the Joint Control Commission of 27-28 Dec. 2005. - 15 -
10. It was in its capacity of a mediator that Russia concluded with Georgia the
1992 Agreement on the Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict 11. It was in that
very capacity that Russia was recognized by the OSCE that had been dealing with the South
Ossetian conflict since 1994. It was in that same capacity that Russia assisted negotiations between
the Georgian and the South Ossetian sides w ithin the framework of the Joint Control
12
Commission . It was in reflection of that capacity th at a Russian officer was chosen to lead the
Joint Peacekeeping Forces comprising Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peacekeepers. The
presence of those Forces and the work of the Jo int Control Commission helped to prevent major
violent incidents on the ground until August 2008.
11. As regards the Georgian-Abkhaz conflic t, the conflicting parties sought Russian
mediation that helped achieve several cease-fire agreements during the violent phase of the conflict
in 1992 and 1993. Russia and Georgia repeatedly called for the United Nations Security Council to
deploy an international peacekeeping force in Abkhazia 13.
12. In the framework of the “Geneva process”, the main negotiation forum between Georgia
14
and Abkhazia, Russia served as a facilitator alongside the United Nations . The mediating efforts
resulted in the adoption, in the spring of 1994, of a series of agreements between Georgia and
15
Abkhazia, including the Moscow Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces . Pursuant
to this, Russia provided its military contingent s to the peacekeeping force deployed under the
11MG, Vol. III, Ann. 102, Agreement on Principles of the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict between
the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation (the “Sochi Agreement”) (24 Jun. 1992).
12POR, para. 2.13 et seq.
13United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secret ary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia,
Republic of Georgia, UN doc. S/26023 (1 Jul. 1993), paras. 6 and 10;
POR, Vol.II, Ann.34, UnitedNations Security Council, Letter dated 4 Feb. 1994 from the Permanent
Representatives of Georgia and the Russian Federation addr essed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/1994/125 (7 Feb.
1994).
14
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secret ary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia,
Georgia, UN doc. S/1994/253, para. 7.
15
POR, Ann.37, Agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994
(United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/583, 17 May 1994). - 16 -
auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States 16, as endorsed by the UnitedNations
17
Security Council.
13. Russia was also a member of the UnitedNations Secretary-General Group of Friends
acting as the contact group of the international community on the Abkhaz issue 18. In this capacity,
Russia participated, together with other members of this Group, in the work of the Coordinating
Council of the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides established in 1997 19. In early 2003, in order to give
a fresh impetus to the conflict resolution, Russia initiated the establishment of a tripartite working
20
group, consisting of Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian representatives , a proposal warmly welcomed
by the two conflicting parties.
14. Mr. President, as I have already noted, Georgia’s attitude changed drastically soon after
President Saakashvili came to power in late 2003. The new authorities opted for use of force that
ultimately derailed the negotiation processes. In the course of the following years, armed force was
used by Georgia against both Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the negotiations came to a complete
deadlock; and Georgia’s military preparations we re now proceeding at full speed. So disturbing
was Georgia’s militaristic attitude that the United Nations Security Council repeatedly “urge[d] the
Georgian side to address seriously legitimate Abkhaz security concerns, to avoid steps which could
21
be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant rhetoric” .
15. Addressing this problem, the Russian Federation, through the ch annels open to it as a
mediator, repeatedly proposed to the Georgian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides to sign formal
22
non-use-of-force agreements . Russian mediating efforts continued up to the very last day before
16
POR, Vol. II, Ann.40, Commonwealth of Independent St ates, Council of the Heads of State, Decision on the
Use of the Collective Forces for the Maintenance of Peace in the Area of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict (22 Aug. 1994).
17
POR, Ann. 38, United Nations Security Council, resolution 934 (1994), UN doc. S/RES/934 (30 Jun. 1994).
18The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1993-1995, Chapter VIII, it em 18: the situation in
Georgia.
19MG, Vol. III, Ann. 125, Final statement on the outcome of the resumed meeting held between the Georgian and
Abkhaz parties held in Georgia (17-19 November 1997).
20UnitedNations Security Council, Report of the Secretar y-General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,
UN doc. S/2003/751, p. 2, para. 4.
21UnitedNations Security Council, resolution1666 (2006), (31 Mar 2006); POR, Ann.60, UnitedNations
Security Council, resolution1716 (2006), (13Oct. 2006); UnitedNations Security Council, resolution 1752 (2007),
(13 Apr. 2007).
22
E.g., OSCE, Permanent Council , statements by the Permanent Represen tative of the Russian Federation:
PC.DEL/181/06, 2 March 2006; PC.DEL/457/06, 18 May 2006; PC.DEL/841/06, 8 September 2006; PC.DEL/225/07,
16 March 2007. - 17 -
Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia in August20 08. On 3August, the Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister alerted the head of Georgian diplomacy of the danger of a critical escalation of the
23
conflict . On 7August, a Russian special diplomatic representative who arrived in the region,
24
desperately tried to bring the parties to the negotiation table . Even in the late hours of 7 August
when the attack became imminent, the Co mmander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces,
GeneralKulakhmetov, was trying to persuade th e highest Georgian officials to refrain from
military action. Yet, shortly before midnight, Georgia’s armed forces started the indiscriminate
bombardment, including by multiple-launch rocket sy stems of the city of Tskhinval and Russian
peacekeepers 25.
16. Mr. President, Russia’s mediating role and the sequence of events, in particular over the
several years prior to August 2008, are critical factors when it comes to determining whether or not
the Court has jurisdiction in this case.
17. The fact is that most of the communications that Georgia now portrays as racial
discrimination claims were made in the context of Russian peacekeeping and mediating efforts.
And on this, several remarks are in order.
18. First, Russia was criticized, at various junctures, either by Georgia, or by Abkhazia, or by
South Ossetia 26. That is, no doubt, an incidental part of being a mediator and a peacekeeper.
Equally, Russia itself frequently criticized one party or the other. Russia has always strived to take
a principled stance on the negotiations and to give principled assessments of the parties’ positions
and behaviour. Indeed, when Georgia violated its obligations and started to replace negotiations
with use of force, Russia spoke resolutely agains t this. But equally, when it was South Ossetia or
Abkhazia who acted contrary to their commitments, Russia took a position of principle as well 27.
23Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fede ration, press release No. 1131-04-08-2008, 4August2008,
available atttp://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/A3646BAD2A05EDA4C325749B002BF378.
24Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (Sep.2009), Vol.2, p.208
(available atww.ceiig.ch).
25POR, Ann. 75, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (Sep. 2009),
Vol. I, p. 19, para. 14.
26See, for example, POR, Vol.2, Ann.24, “Russia and Georgia have agreed that South Ossetia does not exist”,
Liana Minasian, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (30 June 1992).
27MG, Ann.12, UnitedNations Security Council, Pr ovisional Verbatim Record of the 3295th Meeting,
19 October 1993 (S/PV.3295), p. 7. - 18 -
This only attests to the good faith and the commitment with which my country exercised its
mandate.
19. Second, Georgia had the right at any tim e to terminate the peacekeeping operations.
Georgia made no such decision until 1September2008. Could this really be the case if Georgia
had indeed believed that over almost two decad es, Russian peacekeepers were committing acts of
racial discrimination against the Georgian population? The answer is obvious.
20. Third, Russian peacekeepers were neither supposed, nor fit to ensure civil administration
and police functions. Law enforcement res ponsibilities were fulfilled by local police units,
including Georgian police in ethnic Georgian villages of South Ossetia 2, and including Abkhaz
police advised by the police component of the United Nations Observer Mission in the area of the
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 2.
21. Fourth, obviously, Georgia did discuss with Russia issues related to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia ⎯ just like Georgia discussed them with othe r facilitators, such as other members of the
Group of Friends or the OSCE. Such discussions of course cannot constitute either a dispute or
negotiations concerning that dispute, unless the in terested party notifies its claims and their
addressee in an unambiguous manner.
22. Mr.President, we are deeply convinced th at, seen in the light of all these elements, the
allegations that Georgia is now relying on can not be qualified as evidence of a dispute under
CERD.
23. Monsieur le Président, permettez moi de faire un bref résumé de mon intervention ⎯
dans l’autre langue officielle de la Cour.
24. Avant l’attaque armée du 8août2008, la Russie était investie de fonctions de maintien
de la paix et de médiation dans les conflits qui affectaient la Géorgie, l’Abkhazie et l’Ossétie du
Sud. Et ce n’est que quand l’échec de cette aventu re militaire est devenu patent, que le demandeur
a saisi la Cour. Ce sont là les caractéristiques essentielles de cette affaire, qui lui confèrent un
caractère exceptionnel. Si on les considère dans leur ensemble, les faits de l’espèce établissent
28
Independent International Fact-inding Mission on the Conflict in Ge orgia, Report, Vol.II, p.14
(September 2009) (available at www.ceiig.ch).
2UnitedNations Security Council, Report of the Secrey-General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,
UN Doc. S/2008/480, p. 1, para. 2. - 19 -
clairement que l’État demandeur utilise la C our pour se poser en victime du conflit qu’il a
lui-même déclenché. Les exceptions préliminaires de la Russie doivent être envisagées par la Cour
dans ce contexte très particulier.
25. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messi eurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre
attention et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette barre mon collègue,
Monsieur l’ambassadeur Roman Kolodkin.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Ambassador Gevorgian for his statement. I now
call upon His Excellency Ambassador RomanKolodki n to make his observations as Agent to the
Russian Federation.
Mr. KOLODKIN: Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is my privilege to
appear once more before this Court.
1. Two years ago the Court took a difficu lt decision when faced with the Request to
introduce provisional measures regarding the Applic ation of Georgia amid uncertainties as to the
situation on the ground and in light of the claims by the Applicant of alleged urgency. That
decision, of course, only related to the Court’s prima facie jurisdiction. We respectfully submit
that a careful analysis during the current stage of proceedings will demonstrate that the Court does
lack jurisdiction to consider the Application on the merits. Let me therefore introduce the
Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation.
2. The only jurisdictional basis invoked by the applicant State is Article 22 of CERD which
provides:
“Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the
interpretation or application of this Conven tion, which is not settled by negotiation or
by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for
decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement”.
Th3e. first preliminary objection voiced by Russia is that , as of the date when the
Application was filed, there was no dispute betw een Georgia and Russia over racial discrimination
against the ethnic Georgian population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. - 20 -
4. It must immediately be noted that Georgia is claiming that the parties were in dispute in so
far as concerns the interpretation or app lication of CERD for 17 or more years 30. In this alleged
“dispute” it is said that Russia is responsible for the killing of thousands of civilians and the forced
displacement of over 300,000 people 31. It is said that “Russia’s conduct constitutes ethnic
32
cleansing on a massive scale” . Yet, this is a “dispute” that the Government of Georgia never
communicated to Russia until the very date of Georgia’s Application to this Court. The undisputed
fact that I want to draw your attention to is that the alleged violations of CERD were never raised
by Georgia vis-à-vis Russia during the 17 or more years of this so-called “dispute” ⎯ not a single
time!
5. Of course, Georgia has put before you vol umes of documentation in an attempt to show
that such a dispute existed. However, this is a case where quantity does not pass into quality. The
documents on which Georgia relies either do not rela te to racial discrimination, or do not mention
Russia as a responsible party, or reveal an agreement rather than a dispute, or else were never
communicated by the Government of Georgia to that of Russia.
6. By contrast, when Georgia really thought that it had a claim against Russia, it expressed it
in a most straightforward manner. The documen ts submitted by the Applicant are full of such
direct accusations. But these concern totally diffe rent issues such as economic co-operation with
the breakaway regions, the slow pace of the withdrawal of Russian military bases, alleged
violations of Georgian airspace, and the like.
7. On the basis of Georgia’s Written Statem ent, the Applicant would want the Court to
believe that, on average, it made a racial discrimination claim against Russia once every three
months or so. One of the most active periods in this regard was the summer of 2006, when such
30
MG, Vol. I, p. 32, para. 2.34; MG, Vol. I, p. 341, para. 9.17.
31
MG, Vol. I, p. 5, para. 1.3.
32MG, Vol. I, p. 6, para. 1.4. - 21 -
33
claims were allegedly voiced at least on five occasions . The diplomatic exchanges of that period
serve as a good example of the contrast between the real issues of concern for Georgia and the lack
of claims on racial discrimination.
8. Those five instances comprise four press statements by Georgian Ministries and one
parliamentary resolution. Yet, an analysis of th e Russian diplomatic archives shows that over the
same period, there were active direct diplomatic contacts between the two Parties. These included
one meeting and at least one te lephone conversation between the Heads of States, one meeting of
the Russian Ambassador in Tbilisi with the Georgian President, at least 11 meetings of the Russian
Ambassador with the Georgian Foreign Minister or his Deputies, and at least four notes of protest
by the Georgian Foreign Minist ry to the Russian Embassy. During none of these diplomatic
exchanges did Georgia make any claim against Russia in relation to racial discrimination in
Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
9. Let me move on to the summer of 2008, and to an exchange of letters between
President Saakashvili and President Medvedev, that Georgia relied on at the hearing on provisional
measures, and that it has now deployed in both its Memorial and its Written Statement 34. Let me
turn first to the letter of PresidentSaakashvili to PresidentMedvedev, date d 24 June 2008, which
you will find at tab6 of the judges’ folder. If I can ask you to turn to this and look at the first
paragraph: no hint there of an allegation of racial discrimination; rather, by contrast, the language
is of Georgia communicating to a mediator in the long-standing Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, a
mediator with whom Georgia wishes to continue a “trustful dialogue”. Precisely the same applies
so far as concerns the second paragraph, where th e Georgian President speaks of his commitment
to “tak[e] the legitimate interests of the Russian Federation into account”; the eighth and the
33
WSG, Vol.IV, Ann.164, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Comments of De puty Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Georgia Merab Antadze concerning the Answers of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Sergey Lavrov to Journalists’ Questions (19 June 2006); WS G, Vol.IV, Ann.165, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Georgia, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the Situation in Tskhinvali district/South Ossetia (14
July 2006); WSG, Vol. IV, Ann. 166, Ministry of Foreign A ffairs of Georgia, Comments of the Department of the Press
and Information on the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation over the situation in the
Kodori Gorge (1 Aug.2006); WSG, Vol.IV, Ann.167, Mini stry of Foreign Affairs ofGeorgia, Comment of the
Department of the Press and Information on the visit of Secretary of State a nd Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation G.Karasin to Abkhazi a, Georgia (10 Aug.2006); WSG, Vol. III, Ann. 82, United Nations General
Assembly, Letter dated 24 July 2006 from the Permanent Repres entative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General, Ann., UN doc. A/60/954 (25 July 2006).
34MG, Anns. 308 and 311. - 22 -
thirteenth paragraphs where he proposes to establish joint Russian-Georgian commissions on
certain issues; the fourteenth paragraph wher e Mr. Saakashvili expresses readiness to assist in the
preparation of the 2014 Olympic Games.
10. Most importantly, in his letter, the Geor gian President proposes to continue the CIS
peacekeeping operation and suggests that Russia co uld serve as one of the “guarantors” of the
implementation of the relevant agreements. As is clear from the eleventh and the
twelfthparagraphs, those agreemen ts were of course to be concluded between “the parties to the
conflict”, that is, Georgia and Abkhazia, and not Russia. Mr.President, is this how one
communicates with a perpetrator of ethnic cleansing? Is this a language that could be understood
to convey a claim under CERD?
11. President Medvedev’s response of 1July2008 appears at tab7, where the English
translation provided by Georgia corrected by us to mark the most evident inaccuracies which might
hinder the understanding of this exchange. According to Georgia’s Written Statement, this letter
35
contains a categorical rejection of the return of ethnic Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia . Mr. President,
it is a relatively short letter; if there is a categorical rejection of anything, it should be easy enough
to find ⎯ yet we have tried, and failed. This is a reply by a mediator advising his Georgian
counterpart as to which measures, in his view, w ould be most suitable for negotiations between the
parties to the conflict in that particular situation.
12. Certainly we do not say that these letters are insignificant. They are important ⎯ after
all, the exchange takes place only a matter of weeks before Georgia’s unlawful use of force in
August2008; but the significance of these letters surely lies in the complete absence of any
relevant allegations by Georgia, and the complete absence of any dispute over racial
discrimination.
13. This is characteristic of the whole period since the Georgian-Abkhaz and
Georgian-Ossetian conflicts started. Active di plomatic intercourse was always ongoing between
Georgia and Russia, covering the whole range of bi- and multilateral issues. Among those, quite
naturally, were the problems related to Abkhazi a and SouthOssetia. Russia was serving as a
35
WSG, Vol. I, p. 73, para. 2.100. - 23 -
facilitator of negotiations and, as the peacekeeper, he lping the sides directly involved to solve the
conflicts peacefully. It was in that capacity that Russia discussed the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
issues with Georgia. But never was the issue of Russia’s responsibility for discrimination against
ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and SouthOssetia ra ised by the Applicant in such diplomatic
contacts.
14. Mr. President, the artificial nature of the so-called dispute is further illustrated by the fact
that, as AmbassadorGevorgian has noted, the A pplication was only lodged when it became clear
that Georgia’s unlawful armed attack had failed. To paraphrase Clausewitz, Georgia is trying to
use judicial procedures as the continuation of war by other means.
15. In contrast, Russia submits that this Court, the highest judicial body of the international
system, should be resorted to in accordance with its purposes, and not misused for the political
advantage of those who gravely violate international law.
16. Mr.President, apart from the general c onsiderations, let us not forget that CERD
establishes its own criteria as to what a dispute is. The term “dispute” is used in the Convention
with respect to particular situations, namely, tho se that have already been brought to the attention
of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ⎯ the CERD Committee,
36
considered by this Committee and not resolved to the satisfaction of the parties .
17. Our counsel will return to this late r, and they will also elaborate on Russia’s second
preliminary objection that concerns the non-compliance by Georgia with the further procedural
requirements set forth in Article 22 of CERD. According to that Article, an applicant State, prior to
seising the Court, must proceed with attempts to settle a dispute by negotiations and through the
procedures established by the Convention.
18. CERD was the first United Nations human rights convention to establish a specialized
independent expert committee to monitor its im plementation and interpret its provisions. An
analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the Convention demonstrates that the formulation of
Article22 was the result of lengthy negotiations where States held competing views as to the
respective roles of the Court and of the CERD Committee. Ultimately, the balanced position
36
CERD, Arts. 11, 12. - 24 -
prevailed: the Court could only be seised af ter negotiations and the Committee procedures had
been tried and had proved unsuccessful. This solution helped to ensure, first, a proper role for the
Committee, and, second, a wide acceptance of the Convention.
19. Currently, as many as 149States accept the Court’s jurisdiction under CERD.
Obviously, like Russia, many of them accepted such jurisdiction on the understanding that before a
dispute may be brought before the Court, the matter would be considered by the CERD Committee.
In fact, otherwise the Committee would lose a significant element of its competence, contrary to
the understanding of the negotiators of the Convention.
20. The Committee offers a wide range of procedures available to the States Parties and to
interested individuals or groups, including the mandatory inter-State communication procedure 37,
which is unique for universal human rights treati es. Apart from inter-State communications, the
38
Committee examines periodic reports of States Parties , as well as communications from
individuals and groups of individuals 39, and, finally, adopts and disseminates general
40
recommendations . The Committee has also elaborated preventive measures that include, early
warning, aimed at preventing existing situations escalating into conflicts and urgent procedures to
respond to problems requiring immediate attention to prevent or limit the scale or number of
41
serious violations of the Convention .
21. The Russian Federation, as a multi-ethnic State, fully supports the principles and the
purposes of the Convention. It not only accepts this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD,
but also recognizes the mandate of the Comm ittee vis-à-vis individual communications under
Article 14.
22. Therefore, if Georgia was so concerned about the proper application of CERD by Russia
and genuinely interested in bringing a CERD claim, ever since it acceded to CERD in 1999, it had
37
CERD, Arts. 11, 12 and 13.
38
CERD, Art. 9, para. 1.
39CERD, Art. 14.
40CERD, Art. 9, para. 2.
41Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN General Assembly, Official Records,
Forty-eighth session, Supplement No. 18 (A/48/18), Ann. 3, pp. 126-130;
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Di scrimination, UN General Assembly, Official Records,
Sixty-second session, Supplement No. 18 (A/62/18), Ann. 3, pp. 115-120. - 25 -
every opportunity to make that claim and, further, when it came to any racial discrimination claim
in the context of the armed conflict in August 2008, it could have had recourse to the Committee’s
urgent procedures. This is all the more obvious, in particular, as at the time when the Application
was submitted to the Court, the CERD Committee was in session and, moreover, was in the process
of finalizing the Concluding Observations on the ei ghteenth and nineteenth periodic reports of the
42
Russian Federation .
23. Georgia did not go along that path. Rather, it deliberately bypassed the Committee
procedures. In doing this, Georgia not only misa pplied the provisions of Article 22 on recourse to
the Court, but also demonstrated a complete lack of respect to the CERD Committee.
24. Georgia has equally ignored the other means of dispute settlement established by
Article22 of the Convention, name ly, negotiations. Just as with the existence of a dispute, the
Applicant has provided the Court with voluminous documentation in an attempt to demonstrate that
it has negotiated with Russia on the issue of the la tter’s responsibility for racial discrimination in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And, here again, those documents only prove that negotiations on the
non-existent dispute have never taken place.
25. Mr. President, this Court is at the summit of the international dispute settlement system.
As such, it is dependent upon the balance and integrity of other elements of that system, namely, in
this case, the required existence of a dispute, ne gotiations, and recourse to the CERD Committee.
It is the responsibility of the Court to maintain and strengthen the integrity of each of those
elements. A finding on jurisdiction as Georgia now seeks would undermine that system and have
multiple negative repercussions.
26. For one, it would be detrimental to the CERD Committee. The elaborate procedures that
I have just touched upon would become obsolete if any interested State were allowed to bypass
them. Legitimizing such bypassing would affect the authority of other human rights treaty bodies
as well.
4POR, Ann.70, Committee on th e Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 73rd session, Consideration of reports
submitted by States Parties under Article9 of the Convntion, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Russian Federation, UN doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/19 (20 Aug. 2008). - 26 -
27. Further, accepting jurisdiction in this case may result in States reviewing their positions
as far as concerns the acceptance of the jurisdic tion of the Court under human rights treaties that
provide for the Court as a mode of dispute settlement.
28. Finally, as noted by Ambassador Gevorgian, it would mean that from now on, it will be
accepted that a State may first use unlawful fo rce to address its pr oblems and, upon failure,
disguise its breach of international law by seising the Court and pretending that it has always
sought to solve those problems by peaceful means.
29. For all these reasons, the second preliminar y objection, like the first one, has, as its
essence, the upholding of the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for the
modern United Nations human rights protection system. And both objections are fully supported
by an analysis of the plain meaning of Article22 of CERD, of the travaux préparatoires, and
indeed of this Court’s case law.
30. Mr. President, Russia’s third and fourth pr eliminary objections concern the applicability
of the CERD beyond the national territory of a given State Party, and the Court’s jurisdiction
ratione temporis.
31. As regards the jurisdiction ratione loci, it is Russia’s position that, in addition to the first
two preliminary objections, the Court has no jurisdiction over Georgia’s Application, for the reason
that the jurisdictional reach of Article 22 of CE RD does not extend to acts or omissions by Russia
allegedly having taken place on the territory of either Abkhazia or SouthOssetia. In the
alternative, such jurisdictional reach is limited to very special circumstances, while Georgia has not
been able to demonstrate that the criteria for est ablishing such circumstanc es have been fulfilled.
However, upon further reflection, we find that this objection is not necessarily of an exclusively
preliminary nature.
32. On the fourth objection, Russia submits that the Court’s jurisdiction, provided it exists at
all, quod non, is limited ratione temporis in that it does not relate to conduct or facts preceding
2 July 1999 ⎯ the day on which Georgia acceded to CE RD. And indeed, Georgia in its Written
Statement itself recognizes that “the 1965 Convention... has no retrospective effect” 43. Given
43
WSG, Vol. I, p. 211, para. 5.11. - 27 -
this, I will not take your time on this matter a nd would respectfully refer you to the relevant
44
reasoning in our written Preliminary Objections .
33. In any event, we are convinced that the Court will not need to reach those issues, since it
evidently lacks jurisdiction on the grounds expressed in the first two preliminary objections.
34. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes the Agents’ statements on behalf of
the Russian Federation. Our counsel will provide you with more details as regards the legal
reasoning of the Preliminary Objections. Mr .SamuelWordsworth will develop the first
preliminary objection, namely, the absence of a dispute between Georgia and Russia.
Professor Alain Pellet will speak on the second objection, that is, the failure by Georgia to fulfil the
further preconditions of Article22 of CERD. This presentation will be continued by
Professor Andreas Zimmermann, who will demonstrate that Georgia has in any event never tried to
settle the alleged dispute by negotiations.
35. Mr.President, I thank you for your attention. May I now ask you to call upon
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, Amba ssador Roman Kolodkin for his statement.
Now I shall give the floor to Mr. Samuel Wordsworth.
WMOr.RDSWORTH:
T HE ABSENCE OF A DISPUTE
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you to develop
Russia’s case that Georgia has not satis fied what the Court called in the Nuclear Tests cases “the
primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function”Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.
France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 476, para. 58; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
45
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 270, para. 55) , that is, Georgia has not established the existence
of a dispute.
44
POR, Chap. VI, pp. 231-238.
45See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Gros, p. 277, para. 2, referring to “the principle that examination of the
question of the reality of the dispute is necessarily a matter which takes priority”. - 28 -
2. Georgia has put its case on the existence of a dispute with an attractive, but deceptive,
simplicity. All it takes, it says, is that: “Georgia says ‘yes’”, by which it means, and asserts, that it
has made “repeated complaints of ethnic discrim ination by Russia” and, then, that “Russia says
‘no’”, and here Georgia says that “Russia has always denied its responsibility for these acts of
ethnic discrimination” 46.
3. As a shorthand statement of the general legal principles, there is little to object to here, in
particular, as Georgia then goes on to accept that the existence of the dispute must predate the filing
47
of the Application . But, it follows that, in the normal c ourse, to demonstrate the existence of a
dispute, all that is required is two documents, ⎯ (i)an assertion of breach of a given treaty, and
(ii) an assertion of positive opposition to that breach. A “yes”, and a “no”. How striking, then, that
Georgia goes on to deploy 80 or more documents in Chapter 2 of its Written Statement in seeking
to demonstrate the existence of a dispute ⎯ for what should really be a straightforward matter.
The point is ⎯ and this is something that I will come back to in more detail ⎯ that Georgia is
seeking to smother the Court in documentation for one reason, which is the absence on the record
of the straightforward “yes” and “no”.
4. But no less important, Georgia’s leap to the general legal principles assumes, quite
wrongly, that there is nothing in CERD that establishes a specific meaning for the term “dispute” in
Article 22. However, it is, of course, the precise choice of words in Article 22 and other relevant
provisions of CERD, that must be the Court’s star ting point in considering this first jurisdictional
objection. And so I will be addressing three issues:
⎯ first, the meaning of the term “dispute” in Article 22, before turning,
⎯ secondly, to the general legal principles, as to which there is, as one might hope, relatively little
debate, and
⎯ finally, and in so far as I am able in the short time available, I will then turn to the issue of what
the extensive documentation that Georgia relies on does, or rather does not, show.
46
Georgia’s Written Statement, para. 2.2.
47Ibid. See also Russia’s Preliminary Objections, paras. 3.23-3.35. - 29 -
a. The meaning of “dispute” under CERD
5. As to the first of these issues, there are three separate terms used in CERD for what might,
consistent with this Court’s jurisprudence, constitute a “dispute” as a matter of general international
law. Article11 uses the term “matter”; Article16 refers to “complaints” as well as “disputes”;
while Article 22 uses the term “dispute” alone.
6. Looking at these in more detail, pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 1, of CERD (and we put
that in tab 1 of the judges’ folder for your convenience; it is at the bottom of the second page of
tab 1):
“If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the
provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention of the
Committee.” (Emphasis added.)
7. The remainder of Article11, paragraph 1, then describes the procedure by which this
“matter” is communicated to the other State party concerned, which must in turn submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter ⎯ within a 3-month period.
Article11, paragraph 2, then establishes a 6-mont h period for the satisfactory adjustment of the
“matter” through bilateral negotiations or any other procedure, failing which either State party has
the right to refer the “matter” again to the Comm ittee. There is no reference to the word “dispute”
anywhere in Article 11 and, as follows from the different terminology used in Article 12, the States
parties are not considered to be involved in a “dispute” until the 5-stage process that I have just
outlined is completed, that is, (i)reference of the matter to the Committee, (ii)communication of
the matter to the receiving State by the Committee, (iii)written explanations or statements by the
receiving State, (iv)attempts to achieve the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, and finally
(v) after expiry of a 6-month period, reference of the matter back to the Committee.
8. Thus, by contrast to Article11, it is onl y in Article12, paragraph 1, and only in the
context of the next stage, that is, the appointment of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, that the
States parties concerned are considered by the Conv ention as: “States parties to the dispute”. In
contrast to Article 11, where the term “dispute” is carefully avoided, there are some six references
to “States parties to the dispute” in Article 12. This cannot be inadvertent ⎯ the parties evidently
wished to distinguish between the communication and adjustment of a non-crystallized matter, and - 30 -
the point at which that matter had been escalated via a 5-stage process such that it could then, but
only then, be properly characterized as a dispute.
9. This same distinction between the non-crysta llized matter and the dispute is reflected in
the relevant parts of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure, Parts XVI and XVII, which we have
placed in the judges’ folder at tab 2. If I can draw your attention in particular to Rule 72 ⎯ and
you will find that on the fourth page of tab 2. Rule72 makes it clear that the dispute only arises
under Article 11, paragraph 2, i.e., only once the 5-stage process has been completed and the matter
has come back to the Committee for the second time, as is foreseen in Article 11, paragraph 2 48.
10. Article 16 then embraces two terms ⎯ “complaint” and “dispute” ⎯ and establishes that
the provisions of CERD “concerning the settlement of disputes or complaints shall be applied
without prejudice to other procedures for settling disputes or complaints in the field of
discrimination laid down in” other instruments or conventions. There is no real mystery as to what
was meant by the term “complaint” ⎯ as the travaux establish, this was the term originally used in
49
Article11 for the communication of the “matter” , and Article16 simply reflects the initial
terminology. So Article16 is again reflecting a distinction between a “complaint”, that is, the
communication of a “matter”, on the one hand, and a “dispute” on the other, but saying that both
can be resolved by other means.
11. But, in contrast, of course, Article22 refe rs only to the term “dispute”, and it is only a
“dispute”, not a “complaint” or a “matter” that can be referred to this Court. Article 22 must then
be interpreted and applied in accordance with the CERD parties’ intention to distinguish between
what they saw as two juridically distinct concepts. This is a point that Georgia has ignored as it is
seeking to bring a non-communicated and non-crystallized “matter” before the Court in a way that
is not permitted by Article 22 50.
48
Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/35/Rev.3.
49See, e.g., UnitedNations General Assembly Official Records, UNdoc. A/ 6181, p.27, para.120 (Georgia’s
Written Statement, Ann.40). See also the discussion in the Third Committee at UNdoc. A/C.3/SR.1353, p.370 et seq.
(Georgia’s Written Statement, Ann. 32).
50See Russia’s Preliminary Objections, paras. 3.19-3.22. - 31 -
12. The point is confirmed by the travaux, and in particular, the first iteration of what
became Article22, then draft Article17, which is on the first page of tab 4 of the judges’ folder.
Draft Article 17 provided:
“The States Parties to this Convention agree that any State Party complained of
or lodging a complaint may, if no solution has been reached within the terms of
article14, paragraph 1, bring the case before the International Court of Justice, after
51
the report provided for in article 14, paragraph 3, has been drawn up.”
13. The Court will immediately note that the term “complaint” is used. That of itself
supports the point that where the drafters meant “co mplaint”, that was the term they used. But the
more important point is that it was only a specific form of “complaint” that could be referred to the
Court ⎯ that is, only one that had gone through the conciliation procedures which, as then drafted,
were contained in draft Articles 11-14, hence th e reference back to Article14. Although the
wording of the provisions on conciliation and sei sin of the Court then went through various
iterations, the basic position that States parties were not entitled to refer a non-crystallized
“complaint” or “matter” to the Court remained the same.
14. Professor Pellet will be returning shortly to the inter-relationship between Articles 11-13
and Article 22, and to the relevant passages of the travaux, to make the point that the seisin of the
Court under Article22 is indeed dependent on prio r recourse to the procedures of Articles 11-13.
My point is slightly different, although it does go hand-in-hand with Professor Pellet’s analysis. It
is that, as a matter of the interpretation of the word “dispute” in Article 22 in its relevant context, a
specific degree of crystallization is required for there to be a “dispute” at all. And, even on
Georgia’s case on the relevant facts, that degree of crystallization is manifestly absent. Georgia has
not even got to stage1 of the required 5-stage procedure, and so the primary condition for the
Court to exercise its judicial function cannot be considered satisfied.
b. Generally applicable principles
15. I move on to the issues under generally applicable principles, in so far as these apply at
all; and the question of whether or not there is a dispute in any given case ⎯ the question of
whether there is the “yes” and the “no” ⎯ is of course one for objective determination, as the Court
51
UN doc. E.CN.4/Sub.2/L.321, p. 6 (Georgia’s Written Statement, Ann. 1). - 32 -
has repeatedly held ( Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First
Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950 , p. 74; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 40, para. 90, and the various cases cited there ).
There are then two facets of this general rule that call for further comment.
16. First, the “yes”, and the issue of whether or not it matters that, in the 17 or 18 years of the
alleged dispute, Georgia never once said to Russi a that it was in breach of CERD. Georgia’s
position is that this is a non-point ⎯ and it relies on the Court’s dicta in the Nicaragua case ⎯ that
“it does not necessarily follow that, because a State has not expressly referred in negotiations with
another State to a particular treaty as having been violated by conduct of that other State, it is
debarred from invoking a compromissory clause in that treaty” ( Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and
52
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 428, para. 83) .
17. There are important differences between this case and Nicaragua, including that the
Court’s jurisdiction was already established in Nicaragua by virtue of the optional clause while,
here, jurisdiction is either established under CERD or not at all; but, consistent with the test of
objective determination, which is what the Nicaragua case reflects in this passage, there is
naturally no absolute requirement that a State must have specified that a given treaty has been
violated in order later to invoke that treaty before the Court. The door remains part open. But
there is then an inevitable questi on as to the existence of a relevant dispute; and the absence of a
specific claim on the record will often be a very important indicator that there is no such dispute.
(a) On the facts of this case, that absence is te lling precisely because of the extended opportunity
that Georgia has had to state a claim under CERD . Here I am not just talking about having
17 or 18 years to formulate a CERD claim, but failing to do so; in a sense, the bigger point is
53
that Georgia has submitted three peri odic reports to the CERD Committee , and has appeared
52Cited by Russia in its Preliminary Objections (see para3.18 and 4.29) and also in the course of its oral
submissions at the provisional measures stage (CR 2008/27, 10 Sep. 2008, para. 15 (Pellet)). Cited by Georgia in its
Written Statement at para. 2.24.
53Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Re ports submitted by States parties under Art. 9 of the
Convention, Initial report of States parties due in 2000, Add.: Georgia, 24May2000, UNdoc.CERD/C/369/Add.1
(1Feb.2001) (POR, Ann.48; WSG, Ann.64). See also Co mmittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Third
Periodic Report of States due in 2004, Add., Georgia, UN doc. CERD/C/461/Add. 1 of 21 Jul. 2004 (WSG, Ann. 70). - 33 -
54
before the Committee on various occasions , yet has never once suggested that Russia was
violating CERD so far as concerns its current claims.
(b) By contrast, in these reports and in its appearances before the CERD Committee, Georgia has
accused “the authorities of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia” of pursuing a policy of
55
“cleansing” founded on racial hatred in Abkhazia . That is an accusation of ethnic cleansing,
reiterated by Georgia on various occasions before the CERD Committee; but this is not, and
cannot be, a relevant “yes” for the purposes of this case: it is not an allegation that is in any
way directed at Russia.
(c) By contrast, there has been one issue before the Committee concerning Russian conduct; but
this concerned the treatment of certain Georgian nationals in Russia in 2006, a matter wholly
unrelated to the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 56. Georgia was of course capable of
formulating claims before the Committee. Th e obvious question is, if Georgia was indeed
making the multiple and serious claims against Russia that it now asserts, why was it silent
before the very Committee that had the direct interest in the matter?
18. The obvious inference is that Georgia did not, in fact, have a CERD claim against Russia
and to draw that inference is entirely consistent with the Court’s dicta in the Nicaragua case.
19. The same obvious inference can be drawn from the fact that ⎯ as just explained by
Ambassador Gevorgian ⎯ the presence of Russian troops as part of a peacekeeping force was
warmly welcomed by Georgia in the 1990s, and im portantly remained the subject of Georgia’s
agreement until September 2008. And, when I u se the phrase “warmly welcomed”, I am thinking
of documents like the Decision of the Joint Control Commission of March 1999, signed by
Georgia, Russia, and the North Ossetian and South Ossetian sides, recording that the
5Summary records, see: CERD/C/SR.1453 of 15 Mar. 2001 (WSG, Ann.65), CERD/C/SR.1454 of
16 Mar. 2001 (WSG, Ann. 67), and CERD/C/SR.1706 of 4 Aug. 2005 (WSG, Ann. 72). See POR, para. 3.52
5Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Re ports submitted by States parties under Art. 9 of the
Convention, Initial report of States parties due in Add., Georgia, 24 May 2000, UN doc. CERD/C/369/Add.1 (1
Feb. 2001), para. 55 (POR, Ann. 48; WSG, Ann. 64).
5Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 73rd session, Consideration of reports submitted by
States parties under Art.9 of the Convention, Concluding Ob servations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Russian Federation, UN doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/19 (20 Aug. 2008), para. 13, (POR, Ann. 70). - 34 -
57
“peacekeeping forces keep on being a majo r sponsor of the peace and calm life” . Is this to be
interpreted as the required “yes”? We say that cannot be.
20. I move on to the “no”, and the issue of whether or not it matters that when it comes to
showing a positive opposition by Russia ( South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v.
South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p.328; see also Certain
Property (Liechtensteinv. Germany), Preliminar y Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2005,
58
p. 18) , that opposition is time and again merely ass erted by Georgia in its Written Statement,
with no footnote references to documents in support 59. And Georgia’s difficulty in locating
documents that show Russia’s positive opposition to a claim under CERD is reflected in its
developed legal case that opposition can be inferred from conduct, or indeed silence 60 .
21. As the existence of a dispute is a matter for objective determination, conduct may indeed
be sufficient. It all depends.
(a) Georgia relies on the Opinion of this Court in the United Nations Headquarters Agreement
case. But, there, the United Nations Secretary-General had expressly sought confirmation that
the arrangements for the PLO Observer Mission would not be curtailed. He had stated that
“without such assurance, a dispute between the United Nations and the United States
concerning the interpretation and application of the Headquarters Agreement would exist”
(Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26June1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988 , p.19,
para. 16) . That confirmation was not forthcoming. In such circumstances, the existence of a
dispute could of course be inferred from the silence of the United States.
(b) The approach of the Court in Cameroon v. Nigeria , which Georgia also relies on, was to
similar effect. Again, the existence of a claim was most clearly placed on the table, and the
effective refusal to respond was in itself of significance (Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
57
POR, paras.2.16-2.17, and Ann.47. In respect of the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia, see ibid,
paras. 2.21-2.30.
58
POR, para. 3.17; cf. WSG at footnote 55.
59See, e.g., WSG at para.2.78 “Russia, of course, has always opposed Georgia’s position” (an assertion with no
supporting document); or at para. 2.81 “Russia, as would be expected, disagreed” (same point).
60See, e.g., WSG at paras. 2.26-2.30. - 35 -
Reports 1998, pp. 313-317, paras. 85-93). By contrast, in the present case, there was no wilful
deafness on Russia’s part. It did not understand there to be claims under CERD asserted
against it by Georgia, and the significance of the silence of Russia is solely to reflect the
absence of these claims.
(c) The remaining cases that Georgia refers to on this point either turn on their very particular
facts, like the Hostages case, or in fact show the Court finding the requisite positive denial on
the record, as with the East Timor ( East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22) and Certain Property cases (Certain Property (Liechtenstein v.
Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 18-19, para. 25). I do,
however, note in passing the late Judge Fleischhauer’s words of warning in the Certain
Property case: “too low a standard [in] the determin ation of the existence of a dispute”, he
said, would “have negative effects on the readiness of States to engage in attempts at peaceful
settlement of disputes” (Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.69, Declaration of Judge ad hoc Freischhauer). Precisely
right ⎯ why bother to await the crystallization of a dispute, States may ask, if the threshold
applied in practice allows them to go straight to the Court ⎯ or, as happened in this case,
straight to the Court, but via an unsuccessful and unlawful recourse to the use of force.
22. And there is a further point on conduct: the exercise of objective determination requires
that the Court look across the entirety of the relevant conduct of the Parties. Just as, when it comes
to the requisite “yes”, the Court must give full weig ht to factors such as Georgia’s failure ever to
articulate a CERD claim, its failure to state or even suggest a claim in communications with the
CERD Committee, and its continued approval of th e presence of Russian peacekeeping forces, so,
when it comes to the requisite “no”, Russia’s conduct must be examined more broadly. For
example, Russia has condemned in the most forthright of terms the Abkhaz authorities’ “flouting of
human rights and its massive ‘ethnic cleansing’” in the early 1990s 61, and Russia has since
reiterated and reaffirmed as fundamentally important the right of return for all refugees and IDPs to
Abkhazia, including by way of statements to the Security Council and in various Security Council
6Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3295th Meeting of 19October1993 (S/PV.3295), p.7 (Georgia’s
Memorial, Ann. 12). - 36 -
62
resolutions that Russia has actively supported (including in 2008) . Is this to be interpreted as the
required “no”? Again, we say that cannot be.
c. The documents that Georgia relies on
23. I move on to the documentation that Georgi a relies on and, as Judge Higgins put it in her
separate opinion in Cameroon v. Nigeria, the legal requirements on the question of the existence of
a dispute must be “systematically tested”, (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p.47, Separate Opinion of
Judge Higgins). And, for each document that Georgia relies on there is a critically important who,
what, when question to be asked ⎯ that is, for each document, the Court must consider to whom
the document and any assertion of a claim that it contains is addressed and to whom it was
communicated, as well as the questions of what and wh en, i.e., what the substance of the claim is,
and to which period it relates.
24. As to the “who” question, a good part of the documentation relied on concerns claims
63
that Georgia has asserted against the authorities of Abkhazia or South Ossetia . Those documents,
and those claims, are irrelevant. Georgia cannot say ⎯ we have in the past asserted a claim against
a body or bodies purporting to exercise authority within our State, and now, as a matter of State
responsibility, you, Russia, are responsible for the ac ts of that body or those bodies, and therefore
we have a dispute with you. For there to be a di spute with Russia, that dispute can only crystallize
from a claim asserted against Russia, and comm unicated to Russia, that Russia could then
positively oppose.
25. And the issue of communication is an important facet of this. It is one thing to contend
that it is enough for an assertion of racial discrimination to be made without any mention of CERD;
but Georgia expects a further indulgence, that it be enough, for example, that the assertion be made
in an interview on Georgian radio or television 64, or in a governmental press release to the
62
Russia’s Preliminary Objections, paras. 2.19-2.20; see also Security Council Resolution 1808 of 15 April 2008
at para. 9 (Russia’s Preliminary Objections, Ann. 67).
63
See, e.g., WSG, e.g., Anns. 64-67, 72; MG, Ann. 36.
64See, e.g., WSG, Ann. 164. - 37 -
65
Georgian News Agency . In fact, around a quarter of the documents in the post-1999 period that
Georgia relies on were not on their face communi cated to Russia, whether in bilateral or
66
multilateral exchanges . But it must be for Georgia to make and communicate a claim, not for
Russia to go out to seek it by watching Georgian television.
26. And this matters because the existence of any dispute concerning racial discrimination
must be determined against a background wher e there were multiple claims being made by
Georgia, in particular, against the South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities, that principally
concerned Georgia’s territorial sovereignty, and as to which Russ ia, of course, had an accepted
status as facilitator 67. There was, to put it colloquially, a very high level of background noise
against which Russia would have had to discern th e existence of the alleged CERD dispute with
Georgia.
27. This background noise is all the more of an issue in circumstances where Georgian
institutions have different functions and may speak with different voices. Many of the documents
that Georgia relies on emanated from its Parliament, but the Georgian Parliament does not
implement Georgia’s foreign policy. To take a c oncrete example, Georgia relies on a resolution of
the Georgian Parliament on 27 May 1998, which, it says, “formally and publicly accused Russia of
carrying out ethnic cleansing” 68. In fact, the Parliament had asserted that “CIS peacekeeping
forces are to a large extent responsible for the tr agedy in Gali district, as they in fact facilitated
raids against the peaceful population and destructi on of villages in their entirety”. But, on the
previous day, and with respect to the very same incident, Georgia’s Permanent Representative
before the Security Council had stated that “the interference of the CIS peacekeepers averted the
massacre of the Georgian population” 69. On this basis, Russia could not conceivably understand
65
See, e.g., WSG, Ann. 173.
66WSG, Anns. 145-146, 155, 158-162, 164-170, 173, 175-182.
67See, e.g., the following docs., all of which are relied on in WS: UnitedNations Security Council res.876
(1993) (MG, Ann.11); OSCE, Budapest Doc.1994: Toward a genuine Part nership in a New Era (1994) (WSG,
Ann.104); OSCE, Lisbon Summit, Lisbon Do c., para.20 of the Summit Declarati on (1996) (MG, Ann.69); Security
Council res.1124 (1997) (MG, Ann.23) ; OSCE, Seventh Meeting of the Mini sterial Council, Deci sion on Georgia,
MC(7).DEC (1998) (WSG, Ann. 105); Security Council res. 1524 (2004) (MG, Ann. 36).
68WSG, para. 2.80, and Ann. 136.
69WSG, Ann. 55. - 38 -
that Georgia was asserting that it was responsible for ethnic cleansing, and was bringing a claim
against Russia in this respect.
28. I turn to the “what” question, where, again, the issue of background noise is very
important. It would not, of course, be enough fo r Georgia to demonstrate the existence of some
other dispute with Russia ⎯ for example, a dispute over the use of force or the alleged
“annexation” of Georgian territory ⎯ to use a term that appears fre quently in the documents that
70
Georgia relies on . Georgia accepts, as it must, the existence of other disputes: on its
characterization, there are disputes as to “Russia’s illegal use of force against Georgia since 1992,
including the armed invasion of Georgian territory by Russian military forces in August2008;
Russia’s repeated and ongoing violations of Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence; and the violations of the la ws of war during periods of armed conflict” 71 . But all
this, it is said, is “beside the point”.
29. Mr.President, Russia’s case is not, as Georgi a would have the Court believe, that the
existence of a dispute as to the use of force or compliance with the laws of war excludes the
72
possibility that there is a separate and justiciable dispute under CERD . The point is that it is the
real dispute, or I should say disputes ⎯ that are between Georgia on the one hand and Abkhazia
and South Ossetia on the other, in relation to the legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 73 ⎯ it
is these disputes that are reflected time and again in the documents on which Georgia now relies,
and also in those documents to which Georgia notab ly does not refer. I am thinking, for example,
of Security Council resolution 1808 of 18 April 20 08, which refers to the assistance provided by
the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator , and to the “important stabilizing role” played
74
by the CIS peacekeeping force in the Abkhazian conflict zone , and which also refers on multiple
occasions to the “Georgian and Ab khazian sides” to the conflict 75. Notably, this resolution called
70
E.g. Letter, February, of Georgia’s representative to the United Nations Secretary-General,
UNdoc.A/60/685 (WSG, Ann.78); statement of the Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 19 April 2008
(WSG, Ann. 177).
71
WSG, para. 2.33.
72
Cf., e.g., WSG, paras. 2.9, 2.35-2.36.
73POR, para. 2.3.
74POR, Ann. 67, at preambular paras. (4) and (7).
75
Ibid., at preambular paras. (4) and (5), and at paras. 3, 7 and 9. - 39 -
on “both sides [in context, this is unquestionably the Georgian and Abkhazian sides] to finalize
without delay the document on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons” 76: so, a
very serious refugee issue, yes; but a dispute between Georgia and Russia about racial
discrimination, no.
30. Finally, a few words on the “when” question. Around a quarter of the 80 or more
documents on which Georgia relies are dated prior to the date of Georgia’s ratification of CERD in
1999, so by definition they cannot evidence a claim then being asserted under CERD. That follows
from any plain reading of Article 22, which requires that there be a dispute between two parties to a
convention.
31. The same basic point applies where Georgia relies on documents furth
er down the
chronological trail that simply refer back to the events of the 1990s. For example, Georgia asserts
in its Written Statement that: “On 21 April 2008, President Saakashvili issued a public statement
in which he assigned responsibility to Russia for the ‘ethnic cleansing of territory in Abkhazia’” 77.
The alleged acts, it is said, all come within the c overage of CERD. But the relevant passage of the
President’s statement starts with the words, “We all remember well that in 1992-1993...”, and
then continuing, and it is in that context alone that the President speaks of ethnic cleansing 78. The
Court can have no jurisdiction over such alleged act s of 1992 and 1993. And by contrast, as to the
events of April 2008, the President’s statement was directed at recent Russian legislation and what
79
he described as the “de facto annexation of [a] very important part of Georgia” . That is not, of
course, a matter that falls within CERD.
32. So what is left at the end of this vital who, what, when process?
80
33. Tellingly, in its Written Statement , Georgia has elected to place up front the various
Georgian statements made in the period 9-12August2008, including a statement made by
PresidentSaakashvili in an interview on CNN on 11August, in which he directly accused Russia
76
Ibid., at para. 7.
77
WSG, para. 2.92.
78WSG, Ann. 178.
79Cf., e.g., also, WSG, para. 2.87 and Ann. 198.
80Ibid., paras. 1.7 and 2.59-2.73. - 40 -
of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia 81. For one, those statements we re made in the context of
Georgia’s unsuccessful and unlawful recourse to th e use of force on the night of 7August2008;
the principal focus of Georgia’s complaints is in fact, and I quote Georgia’s representative at the
82
Security Council meeting of 10 August 2008, “the ongoing Russian aggression and occupation” ;
self-evidently, such statements do not constitute an attempt to identify and achieve the peaceful
settlement of an alleged long-standing dispute ove r racial discrimination. No less important,
Georgia once again falls back on press briefings, at a time when it was in fact engaged in
negotiations with Russia, and was not in fact a lleging in those negotiations breach of CERD or,
indeed, racial discrimination more broadly. A nd there is, of course, no suggestion of a dispute
concerning racial discrimination in the six-poi nt principles agreed by Georgia and Russia on
12 August 2008.
34. Mr.President, less than 24 hours after President Saakashvili’s televised accusation of
ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, Georgia lodged its Application of 12August2008. In these
circumstances, and in particular in the absence of the crystallized dispute as required by Article 22,
we say that the primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function ⎯ the existence of a
dispute ⎯ has not been met in this case.
35. Mr.President, that concludes my remarks. May I ask you to hand the floor to
Professor Pellet?
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Wordsworth for his statement. Before giving the floor to the
next speaker, Professor Alain Pellet on behalf of the Russian Federation, the Court proposes to
have a short break of ten minutes and then will follow with the presentations by
ProfessorAlainPellet and ProfessorAndreasZimmermann, before we conclude the morning
session, if that is agreed?
The Court is adjourned for this short break of ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.45 a.m. to noon
81
Ibid., Ann. 205 (at 6pm EST).
8See Georgia’s representative at the meeting of the S ecurity Council on 10Aug. 2008, UNdoc. S/PV.5953, at
pp. 4-5 (Georgia’s Written Statement, Ann. 96). - 41 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I shall now give the floor to Professor Alain Pellet.
M.PELLET: Monsieur le président, Mesdames les juges ⎯voilà un féminin-pluriel
longtemps attendu et bien plaisant ! Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, donc,
1. L’article22 de la convention CERD, im pose des conditions procédurales, à la fois
préalables et cumulatives, à la sa isine de la Cour, dont aucune n’est remplie. C’est ce qu’il
m’incombe de montrer.
o
[Projection n 1-1]
2. Il n’est sans doute pas inutile de relir e à nouveau le texte de l’article22 en guise
o
d’introduction (il se trouve aussi sous l’onglet n 1 du dossier des juges) :
«Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant l’interprétation ou
l’application de la présente convention, qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de
négociation ou au moyen des procédures e xpressément prévues par ladite convention,
sera porté, à la requête de toute partie au di fférend, devant la Cour internationale de
Justice pour qu’elle statue à son sujet, à moins que les parties au différend ne
conviennent d’un autre mode de règlement.»
3. Une première constatation (de simple bon sens d’ailleurs) s’impose: pour que la Cour
puisse être saisie, il faut qu’existe un différend «e ntre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant
l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente convention». Il n’y a pas de différend de ce type
entre la Géorgie et la Russie comme M eWordsworth l’a montré. Et ceci suffit à disposer de la
question. Du reste, l’indifférence totale qu’ a manifestée la Géorgie pour les mécanismes de
règlement offerts par cette disposition apporte la confirmation de cette évidence factuelle. Au
surplus, cette indifférence constituerait, de toute manière, un obstacle dirimant et insurmontable à
la compétence de la Cour si l’on devait admettre, contre toute raison, qu’un tel différend existe.
4. Jusqu’à la fin des négociations de la convention, l’article 22 a été l’objet d’âpres débats. Il
reflète un compromis global entre ceux qui voulaient laisser l’application de la convention
complètement entre les mains des Etats et ceux qui avaient une approche plus institutionnelle.
Mais parmi ceux-ci, les uns entendaient en confier la surveillance constante à un organe permanent,
dans le cadre d’un mécanisme novateur, pionnier du genre ⎯ qui est du reste demeuré le modèle,
jamais égalé, des organes de surv eillance des traités de droits de l’homme qui ont bourgeonné par
la suite; les autres voulaient donner un rôle quasi exclusif à la Cour en cas de différend entre les
Parties. - 42 -
5. L’article 22 pose donc une condition fondamentale, mais qui se décline en deux moyens,
pour qu’une partie puisse saisir la Cour d’un di fférend qui l’oppose à une autre partie: avoir
essayé, avant la saisine de la Cour, de régler le différend ⎯ c’est l’obligation ; et ces tentatives de
règlement doivent avoir eu lieu au plan diplomati que par la voie de négociations et par le biais du
mécanisme CERD expressément prévu à cet effet ⎯ ce sont les moyens. En d’autres termes,
Mesdames et Messieurs les jug es, l’article22 donne aux Etats parties la possibilité de vous
soumettre unilatéralement un différend sur l’application de la convention ; mais, en même temps, il
garantit aux parties qu’elles auront l’occasion, préalablement à votre saisine , de régler leur
différend par la voie diplomatique et ⎯ et j’insiste sur ce «et»… ⎯ et de concilier leurs points de
vue sous l’égide du Comité. «Préalablement…», ce sera mon premier point ; «et…» ce sera mon
second point.
I.L’EXIGENCE DES TENTATIVES DE RÈGLEMENT PRÉALABLES
[Projection n 1-2]
6. Monsieur le président, selon la Géorgie, «Article 22 does not include any conditions that
are preconditions to the seisin of the Court.» 83 Nos contradicteurs lisent donc l’article22 de la
manière suivante ⎯ je le lis de nouveau, mais à leur manière :
«Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant l’interprétation ou
l’application de la présente convention,…ser a porté, à la requête de toute partie au
différend, devant la Cour inte rnationale de Justice pour qu’ elle statue à son sujet, à
moins que les parties au différend ne conviennent d’un autre mode de règlement.»
Alors que le texte subordonne expressément la saisine de la Cour à une condition ⎯ unique quant à
son résultat, mais double pour ce qui est des moyens de sa réalisation ⎯, la Géorgie n’en voit
aucune. Cette position n’est pas tenable si l’on fait une lecture de bonne foi de l’article 22 en son
entier.
o
[Projection n 1-3]
7. Si l’on reprend les célèbres canons de l’interprétation des traités codifiés dans les
articles 31 et 32 de la convention de Vienne, il est cl air que la lecture géorgienne de l’article 22 de
la convention CERD n’est pas compatible avec le se ns ordinaire à attribuer à ses termes dans leur
83Observations écrites de la Géorgie (OEG), p. 99, par. 3.10. - 43 -
contexte et à la lumière de l’objet et du but de cette disposition et, en particulier, que cette lecture la
prive de tout effet utile (A); les travaux prép aratoires confirment d’ailleurs pleinement cette
interprétation (B), qui est en outre en accord avec la jurisprudence constante de la Cour s’agissant
de clauses similaires (C).
A. Le texte de l’article 22 dans son contexte et le principe de l’«effet utile»
o
[Projection n 1-4]
a) L’utilisation du futur antérieur dans le texte français
8. Monsieur le président, le texte de l’article22 est «clair comme de l’eau de roche»
⎯ crystal clear comme disent les anglophones. Mais le pr oblème avec les textes clairs, c’est qu’il
n’y a pas grand-chose à en dire; il suffit de les lire… Lisons donc à nouveau: «Tout
différend … qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen des procédures
expressément prévues par ladite convention...». «[Q]ui n’aura pas été réglé…», c’est un futur
antérieur et, quoi qu’en dise la Géorgie 84, cela importe.
9. L’utilisation de ce temps verbal suggère clairement, comme son nom même l’indique,
qu’une action antérieure (ici la tentative de rè glement) doit avoir été conclue avant qu’une autre
action (ici, la saisine de la Cour) puisse être déclenchée. Comme l’explique le fameux Bon usage
de Grévisse ⎯ une bible de la langue française : «Le futur antérieur exprime un fait futur considéré
comme accompli…par rapport à un autre fait futur…, ex: Chacun récoltera ce qu’il aura
85
semé.» De même que l’on ne peut récolter si l’on n’a pas semé, de même un Etat ne peut porter
un différend relatif à l’application de la conventio n CERD s’il n’a pas, préalablement, tenté de le
régler autrement (je laisse, pour l’instant, de côté la question de savoir comment). Je sais bien que
l’argument ne vaut que pour la version française mais autant que je sache, le futur antérieur
n’existe pas en russe et n’est ja mais utilisé dans les autres langues officielles dans lesquelles la
convention a été rédigée ⎯ c’est en tout cas vrai en anglais et en espagnol.
84
Voir OEG, p. 122, par. 3.52.
85M. Grevisse et A. Gosse, Le bon usage, 14 éd., De Boeck, Duculot, 2008, p. 1098. - 44 -
b) L’effet utile
10. Monsieur le président, dans le contexte de l’article22 et dans celui plus vaste de la
convention, on ne peut interpréter «qui n’aura pas été réglé» comme une simple constatation
factuelle: cela rendrait l’expression parfaitement superflue et, au-delà, cela priverait le Comité
d’une de ses fonctions essentielles.
o
[Projection n 1-5]
11. Inutile, je pense, de m’appesantir sur le principe de l’effet utile, tant il est solidement
établi et répond à un impératif logique :
«Il serait en effet contraire [a vez-vous dit, dans l’affaire du Détroit de Corfou]
aux règles d’interprétation généralement reconnues de considérer qu’une disposition
de ce genre, insérée dans un compromi s [ou, comme ici, dans une clause
compromissoire], soit une disposition sans portée et sans effet.» ( Détroit de Corfou
86
(Royaume-Uni c. Albanie), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 24.)
12. Or c’est inévitablement ce à quoi aboutit l’interprétation proposée par la Géorgie:
l’article 22 conserve précisément le même sens ⎯ que l’incidente qui gêne la Géorgie y figure ou
pas. Que des tentatives de règlement préalables ai ent eu lieu ou non, la Cour serait de toute façon
compétente dès lors qu’un différend opposerait de ux Etats au sujet de l’interprétation ou de
l’application de la convention. Pour reprendre l’image de Grévisse: la Géorgie entend récolter,
mais sans avoir semé. Cela ne se peut: une telle interprétation laisse sans effet et sans portée
l’expression « qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen des procédures
expressément prévues par ladite convention…».
[Fin de la projection n° 1]
13. La Géorgie insiste sur le fait que, lors que les rédacteurs de la convention ont voulu
87
introduire des conditions à la compétence de la Cour, ils l’ont fait d’une manière expresse . Mais,
Monsieur le président, quoi de plus exprès que les moyens explicitement énoncés dans l’article 22 ?
En renvoyant aux procédures expressément prévues par la convention, l’article 22 montre que l’on
ne saurait s’en remettre aux seuls mécanismes de règlement du droit international général, qu’il
s’agisse de la négociation ou du règlement juridic tionnel par la Cour de céans. Mais ce renvoi
86
Voir aussi, par exemple: le rapport del’organe d’appel de l’OMC sur l’affairArgentine ⎯ Mesures de
sauvegarde à l'importation de chaussures , WT/DS121/AB/R, distribué le 14 décembre 1999, paragraphe 81, États-Unis
⎯ Essence et la jurisprudence citée dans les exceptions préliminaires de la Russie (EPR), p. 85-86, note 180.
87Voir OEG, p. 101, par. 3.16, p. 111, par. 3.33 ou p. 101, par. 3.16. - 45 -
exprès à l’absence de règlement par ces procédures n’a de sens que si celles-ci ont été («auront
été»…) utilisées sans succès auparavant. Sinon, encore une fois, cette condition ⎯ pourtant
expresse ⎯ serait une «non-condition» et n’aurait aucun sens utile.
c) Les relations entre l’article 22 et les articles 11 et 16
14. C’est du reste contre les procédures propres à la convention que la Géorgie concentre ses
attaques. Outre les arguments généraux que je vien s de discuter, elle invoque à l’encontre de leur
caractère nécessairement préalable deux arguments contextuels dont il me faut dire quelques mots.
Ils reposent sur l’articulation de l’article22 avec l’article11 d’une part; avec l’article16 d’autre
part.
15. Commençons par ce dernier, l’article 16, dont le texte est également reproduit à
o
l’onglet n 1 du dossier des juges. Il s’agit d’une clause sans préjudice, à laquelle le dernier
membre de phrase de l’article22 fait écho lo rsqu’il précise que les parties à un différend
concernant l’application de la convention peuvent saisir la Cour à moins qu’elles «ne conviennent
d’un autre mode de règlement». Curieusement, la Géorgie tente de tirer argument de ces
dispositions ⎯ou plutôt de cette disposition car elle isole l’ar ticle16, alors que la fin de
l’article22 que je viens de citer dit exactement la même chose. Mais cette «isolation» est
nécessaire à la Géorgie car sa thèse est entièrement fondée sur le fait que l’article 16 figure dans la
deuxième partie de la convention ⎯ ce qui tiendrait en échec «the Russian Federation’s claim that
reference to negotiation and/or the Article 11 complaint procedure are necessary preconditions to
the exercise of rights under Article 22» 8. Pourquoi c’est nécessaire? J’avoue, Monsieur le
président, que ceci demeure un mystère pour moi :
⎯ L’article 16 est, certes, situé dans la partie II de la convention, mais l’article 22 redit la même
chose plus succinctement.
⎯ Quant à dire que le recours à la procédure de l’article11 n’est pas une précondition
«nécessaire» à la saisine de la Cour au prétexte qu’il est toujours possible de recourir à un autre
mode de règlement, c’est jouer sur les mots. Bien sûr qu’il est toujours loisible à des parties à
un différend de le résoudre par les moyens de leur choix, principe que les articles 16 et 22 se
88
OEG, p. 105, par. 3.21. - 46 -
bornent à refléter. Et bien sûr donc que les Parties pourraient recourir à tout autre moyen
susceptible de permettre de régler le différend et, en ce sens, ni la procédure de l’article 11, ni
le recours à la négociation, ne sont «nécessaires». En revanche, contrairement à la négociation
ou aux procédures expressément prévues par la convention, le recours à ces autres moyens
n’est pas une condition préalable à la saisine de la Cour. En d’autres termes, celle-ci n’est
intéressée par ces autres modes de règlement que dans la mesure où ils auraient permis de
régler le différend (au titre de la «phase Wordswor th» si j’ose dire en ré férence au partage des
tâches entre nous) ; par contre, dans le cadre de la «phase Pellet» ⎯ celle des préconditions à la
saisine de la Cour ⎯, celle-ci n’a plus à se préoccuper de la question de savoir si les parties en
litige ont ou non recouru à ces autres modes : dès lors qu’elle estime qu’il existe un différend,
elle exercera sa compétence si elle constate que les conditions de l’article22 sont remplies;
elle s’y refusera dans le cas contraire ⎯ comme c’est le cas dans notre affaire ; l’article 16 n’a
rien à voir avec ceci.
⎯ Du reste, le fait que cette disposition (l’article16) parle «des autres procédures de règlement
des différends...» et la phrase terminale de l’article 22 «d’un autre mode de règlement», suffit à
exclure qu’il pût s’agir des «procédures expressément prévues» par la convention. Il s’agit à
l’évidence de tout autre chose.
16. La Partie géorgienne ne me para ît pas mieux inspirée lorsqu’elle s’appuie ⎯ toujours à
titre «contextuel» ⎯ sur la rédaction de l’article11 pour contester que la procédure prévue par
cette disposition pût constituer l’une de celles auxquelles l’article22 subordonne la saisine de la
89
Cour .
17. Le premier argument avancé par la Gé orgie semble consister à dire que puisque
l’article11 parle de «question» ou d’«affaire» ⎯les deux termes étant traduits en anglais par
«matter» ⎯ et non de différend ⎯ «dispute» ⎯, la procédure des articles 11 à 13 ne pourrait
constituer un préalable à la soumission d’un différend à la Cour au sens de l’article 22. Comme l’a
montré SamWordsworth, c’est le contraire qui est vrai: au sens de la convention de 1965 une
«question» ne devient un «différend» que si elle a fait l’objet de la procédure de l’article 11 ⎯ et,
89
Voir OEG, p. 100-104, par. 3.14-3.19, et p. 106, par. 3.23. - 47 -
d’ailleurs, les deux articles suivants, 12 et13, qui fi xent la suite de la procédure, parlent, eux,
expressément de «différend».
18. En deuxième lieu, on se demande en quoi le fait que l’article11, paragraphe 2,
subordonne la seconde saisine du Comité à la réalisation préalable de deux conditions, empêcherait
qu’il en soit de même pour la saisine de la Cour au titre de l’article 22.
19. Selon un troisième argument fondé toujours sur l’article11 ⎯qui, décidément, pique
l’imagination des conseils de la Géorgie, le pa ragraphe 3 de cette dis position ferait obligation aux
parties d’épuiser les recours préalables avant de pouvoir saisir le Comité, apparemment dans toutes
les circonstances, ce qui serait absurde 90. Et ce le serait en effet si l’on devait tirer cette
conséquence de la formule de l’article 11, paragraphe 3. Mais il n’en est rien.
20. La Géorgie oublie en effet que l’article 11 renvoie au principe de l’épuisement des
recours internes «conformément aux principes de dr oit international généralement reconnus». Or,
en droit international général, la règle de l’épuisement des recours internes joue dans le cadre de la
protection diplomatique, mais non pour les différends entre Etats, comme le confirme par exemple
le commentaire de l’article14 c) du projet de la CDI sur la protection diplomatique 91. La
conclusion s’impose d’elle-même: avant de saisir la Cour, un Etat doit «épuiser» les procédures
préalables ouvertes par les articles 11 à 13 de la conv ention, mais il n’en résulte pas qu’il devrait,
du même coup, épuiser les recours internes.
B. Les travaux préparatoires de l’article 22
21. Monsieur le président, interprété de bonne foi, dans son cont exte, le texte de l’article 22
est clair : avant qu’un Etat partie à la convention puisse saisir la Cour d’un différend qui l’oppose à
un autre Etat partie au sujet de son application, il doit avoir recours, préalablement, aux moyens de
règlement indiqués dans cette disposition. Les trav aux préparatoires à la convention le confirment
sans aucune ambiguïté.
22. Le texte actuel de l’article 22 trouve son origine dans une proposition faite par M. Inglès,
le membre philippin de la Sous-Commission des dro its de l’homme. Dans une déclaration, que la
90
OEG, p. 106, par. 3.23.
91CDI, projet d’articles sur la protec tion diplomatique et commentaires y rela tifs, A/61/10, p.76, paragraphe9,
du commentaire de l’article 14. - 48 -
Géorgie cite de manière partielle et donc biaisée 92, celui-ci avait d’ailleurs expliqué devant le
comité dont il proposait la création,
«comme son nom l’indique, [ce comité] procéderait à une vérification des faits avant
d’essayer d’arriver à une solution amiable du différend… Faute pour le comité de
parvenir à une solution dans le délai imparti , l’une ou l’a93re partie pourrait porter
l’affaire devant la Cour internationale de Justice.»
23. L’idée a été reprise dans un amendement tardivement présenté à la Troisième
Commission de l’Assemblée générale 94. Je reviendrai sur cet «amendement des trois puissances» à
un autre point de vue dans quelques instants. Dans l’immédiat, je relève que l’un de ses
promoteurs, M.Lamptey, délégué du Ghana, a indiqué: «que l’amendement des trois puissances
s’explique de lui-même. Le projet de convention prévoit certains dispositifs qu’ il convient
95
d’utiliser pour le règlement des différends avant de saisir la Cour internationale de Justice.»
«Avant de saisir la Cour internationale de Justice… », Monsieur le président, « il convient
d’utiliser…» la négociation (qui était déjà mentionnée dans le texte qui avait été proposé par le
Bureau) et les «procédures prévues par la convention». On peut difficilement être plus clair.
24. Emanant des auteurs de l’amendement, ces déclarations dépourvues de toute ambiguïté,
présentent un intérêt tout particulier. Et je re lève en outre que plusie urs autres délégations ont
96 97
abondé dans le même sens, pa r exemple celles des Pays-Bas , de la France ,
92OEG, p. 256, appendice, par. ix ; comp. : EPR, p. 120-121, par. 4.65.
93Nations Unies, Conseil économique et social, projet de convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les
formes de discrimination raciale, compte rendu analytique de la 427 séance, Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427,
p. 13 ⎯les italiques sont de nous; voir au ssi la déclaration des délégués phili ppins à la Commission des droits de
l’homme, M.Quiambao (NationsUnies,eConseil économ ique et social, Commission des droits de l’homme,
compte rendu analytique de la 810 séance, 15 mai 1964, Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/SR.810, p.7-8 (pour le texte anglais
de la déclaration de M.Quiambao, voir OEG, vol.II, annexe15, p.7)) et à la Troisième Commi ssion, M.Garcia
(Nations Unies, Documents officiels de la Troisièm e Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session ,
doc. A/C.3/SR.1344 (16 novembre 1965), p. 338, par. 16 (pour le texte anglais de cette décl aration, voir OEG, vol.II,
annexe 24, p. 314, par. 16)).
94Nations Unies, Conseil économique et social, projet de convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les
formes de discriminati on racial;eMI.nglés, Mesures de mise en Œuvre proposées , Nations nies,
doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321), 17 janvier 1964 (pour le texte anglais, voir OEG, vol. II, annexe 1).
9Nations Unies, Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale , vingtième session,
Nations Unies, doc. A/C.3/SR.1367, p. 485, par. 29 (pour le texte anglais de la dé claration, voir OEG, vol. II, annexe 38,
p. 453, par. 29) ; les italiques sont de nous.
96M.Mommersteeg, NationsUnies, Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée générale ,
vingtième session, doc. A/C.3/SR.1344 (16 novembre 1965), p. 343-344, par.63 (pour le texte anglais de cette
déclaration, voir OEG, vol. II, annexe 24, p. 319, par. 63).
97
M.Boullet, NationsUnies, Documents officiels de la Troisièm e Commission de l’Assemblée générale ,
vingtième session, doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 décembre 1965), p. 386, par. 38 (pour le texte anglais de cette déclaration, voir
OEG, vol. II, annexe 24, p. 454, par. 38). - 49 -
98 99
de l’Italie , ou de la Belgique , sans que cette interprétation fût ja mais contredite. (Le texte de
ces déclarations est reproduit dans le dossier des juges sous l’ongletn o 3). Ceci confirme qu’il
entrait bien dans les intentions des auteurs de la convention de1965 que la Cour ne puisse être
saisie qu’une fois acquis l’échec des procédures prévues par cet instrument ⎯ ainsi que celui des
négociations, bien que les négociations eussent mo ins polarisé l’attention des auteurs de la
convention.
25. Et j’ajoute que le soin mis par les négociateurs à régler ce problème suffit à établir que
l’obligation de saisir le comité ne pouvait être et n’est pas une clause de style sans portée mais bien
une condition, juridiquement indispensable et soigneusement pesée.
C. L’interprétation constante par la Cour de clauses similaires
26. Monsieur le président, j’en viens aux co mparaisons parfois déroutantes effectuées par
nos contradicteurs avec d’autres clauses rédigées différemment, contenues dans d’autres traités, et à
l’analyse qu’en aurait selon eux donné la Cour.
27. La Géorgie invoque en effet «the Court’s longstanding practice, which has been to reject
preliminary objections raised by Respondents on the grounds of an alleged deficiency of
negotiations preceding the institution of judicial proceedings» 100. C’est confondre beaucoup de
choses, Monsieur le président :
⎯ d’abord, nous n’en sommes pas là: à ce stad e, la question n’est pas de savoir si ces
négociations ont effectivement eu lieu ⎯mon collègue AndreasZimmermann montrera dans
quelques instants qu’il n’en est rien, mais de se demander si elles doivent avoir eu lieu avant
que la Cour soit saisie ;
⎯ ensuite, on ne saurait réduire cette question (purem ent juridique) à la négociation : l’article 22
ne s’y limite pas (à la négociation) mais se ré fère également aux «procédures prévues par [la]
convention» ; et je dirais même qu’il se réfère surtout à ces procédures expressément prévues :
98 M. Capotorti, Nations Unies, Documents officiels de la Troisièm e Commission de l’Assemblée générale ,
vingtième session, doc. A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 décembre 1965), p. 386, par. 39 (pour le texte anglais de cette déclaration, voir
OEG, vol. II, annexe 24, p. 454, par. 39).
99 M. Cochaux, Nations Unies, Documents officiels de la Troisièm e Commission de l’Assemblée générale ,
vingtième session, doc.A/C.3/SR.1367, p.487, par. 40 (pour le texte anglais de la déclaration, voir OEG, vol.II,
annexe 38, p. 454, par. 40).
100OEG, p. 117, par. 3.43. - 50 -
ce sont elles que les pères de la convention avaient à l’esprit lorsqu’ils ont entendu subordonner
la saisine de la Cour à des conditions préalables à titre de compromis entre ceux qui ne
voulaient faire confiance qu’aux procé dures diplomatiques ou à la conciliation
institutionnalisée par le traité, et ceux qui se pr ononçaient en faveur de la possibilité de saisir
directement votre haute juridiction 101 ;
⎯ enfin, last but not least , il apparaît que la jurisprudence invoquée par nos contradicteurs n’a
nullement la portée qu’ils leur prêtent.
28. Je ne peux entrer dans les détails, et je me permets de vous renvoyer, Mesdames et
Messieurs les juges, au tableau de la jurisprudence pertinente, qui est annexé au chapitre IV de nos
exceptions. Je souhaiterais seulement souligner que, lorsqu’elle présente cette jurisprudence, la
Géorgie déforme soit le sens de la clause énonçant les conditions de la saisine de la Cour, soit le
sens de l’analyse que la haute juridiction en a faite.
[Projection n° 2]
29. Il en va ainsi, s’agissant de l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires , dont la
102
Partie géorgienne prétend que la Russie n’a pas expliqué ce qui la distinguait de la nôtre ⎯ ce
qui est assez troublant car nous avons consacré cinq pages de nos exceptions à cela 103. Et ceci me
dispense d’ailleurs d’insister sinon pour rappeler rapidement
1) que les termes des clauses compromissoires en cause dans les deux affaires ( Nicaragua et la
nôtre) sont bien différent:scontrairemen t à l’artic22 de la convention CERD
⎯ l’article XXIV du traité d’amitié entre le Nicaragua et les Etats-Unis laissait une large place
à l’appréciation subjective des Parties en parlant de «[t]out différend … qui ne pourrait pas être
réglé d’une manière satisfaisante par la voie diplomatique»( Personnel diplomatique et
consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran (Etats-Uni s d'Amérique c.Iran), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
1980, p. 27, par. 51 ; les italiques sont de nous ); il n’est pas sans intérêt de relever que
contrairement à l’article22, l’article11, para graphe2, de la conventionCERD utilise à peu
près les mêmes termes «Si ... la question n’est pas réglée à la satisfaction des deux Etats.»
101Voir EPR, p. 87-91, par. 4.14-4.19.
102
OEG, p. 118, par. 3.45.
103EPR, p. 96-101, par. 4.29-4.35. - 51 -
2) dès lors, avec tout le respect dû à la mémoir e du grand juge, l’opinion de sirRobertJennings
dont la Géorgie fait tant de cas ne lui est pas d’un grand secours, puisque c’est l’appréciation
que faisaient les parties de la situation que la Cour devait apprécier alors que, dans notre affaire
vous êtes, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, appelés à vous prononcer sur la question
⎯ objective ⎯ de savoir si la négociation ou les pro cédures prévues par la convention CERD
ont permis aux parties de régler leur prétendu différend à son sujet ; car,
3) contrairement à l’article XXIV du traité d’am itié, de commerce et de navigation de 1956 entre
les Etats-Unis et le Nicaragua, qui se bornait à une allusion générale à la voie diplomatique,
l’article22 de la conventionCERD précise les mo yens qui doivent être utilisés pour tenter de
parvenir à un règlement.
[Projection n° 3]
30. Monsieur le président, la seconde a ffaire sur laquelle je souhaite attirer plus
particulièrement l’attention est celle des Activités armées entre la RDC et le Rwanda, dont la
104 105
Géorgie prétend que la Russie aurait avancé une interprétation erronée . Cette affaire est
importante notamment du fait de la similarité des deux clauses compromissoires contenues, d’une
part, dans l’article 22 de la convention CERD et, d’autre part, dans l’article 75 de la Constitution de
l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé («qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou par
l’Assemblée de la santé») : l’une et l’autre utilisent le futur antérieur en français; toutes deux
prévoient deux moyens de règlement préalables, celui de droit commun en droit international
général, la négociation, l’autre spécifique à la conve ntion sur la base de laquelle la Cour est saisie
(dans un cas le mécanisme CERD, dans l’autre l’intervention de l’Assemblée générale de la santé).
Et les deux dispositions lient les deux modes de règlement par la conjonction «ou». La Cour a
donc, très récemment, eu l’occasion de donner son in terprétation d’une clause très similaire à
l’article 22 ; elle n’a aucune raison de s’en départir.
31. Certes, comme la Géorgie le relève, la Cour avait, au paragraphe 99 de son arrêt de 2006,
vérifié s’il y avait un différend au sujet de l’interp rétation ou de l’application de la Constitution de
l’OMS et avait conclu par la négative. Mais elle ne s’est pas arrêtée là (et la Géorgie se garde bien
104
Voir EPR, p. 94-95, par. 4.25.
105OEG, p. 121, par. 3.50. - 52 -
de le préciser alors que c’est essentiel): e lle s’est ensuite assurée que les conditions préalables
fixées par la clause compromissoire n’étaient pas remplies :
«[L]a RDC n’a en tout état de cause pas apporté la preuve que les autres
conditions préalables à la saisine de la C our, fixées par cette disposition, aient été
remplies, à savoir qu’elle ait tenté de régler ladite question ou ledit différend par voie
de négociation avec le Rwanda ou que l’Assemblée mondiale de la santé n’ait pu
résoudre cette question ou ce différend.» ( Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo
(nouvelle requête 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), compétence
et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 43, par. 100.)
En d’autres termes la Cour s’est d’abord demandé s’il existait un différend entre la RDC et le
Rwanda sur l’application de la Constitution de l’OMS, puis elle a fait remarquer que, quand bien
même c’eût été le cas, les «autres conditions préalab les» à sa saisine n’étaient, de toute manière,
pas remplies. De même, dans l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières, et alors que les Parties étaient
d’accord sur l’existence de négociations préalables, la Cour n’en a pas moins estimé nécessaire de
mentionner, d’une manière brève et objective, que les conditions procédurales prévues par la clause
106
compromissoire étaient dans ce cas également remplies .
o
[Fin de la projection n 3]
32. Monsieur le président, c’est très exactemen t cette démarche que la Fédération de Russie
prie la Cour de bien vouloir suivre en la présente espèce :
⎯ d’abord, constater qu’il n’existe pas de différend entre les Parties en ce qui concerne
l’interprétation ou l’appli cation de la convention ⎯et c’est le cas comme l’a montré
Sam Wordsworth ;
⎯ ensuite ⎯ et même dans le cas où, sur ce premier point, vous suivriez la Partie géorgienne sur
le terrain du différend qu’elle a forgé de toutes pièces pour tenter d’établir votre compétence ⎯
ensuite donc, que vous devriez de toute manière décliner son exercice car ⎯ et c’est une très
fidèle paraphrase de l’arrêt que vous avez rendu dans l’affaire RDC /Rwanda ⎯ «la [Géorgie]
n’a en tout état de cause pas apporté la preuve que les autres conditions préalables à la saisine
de la Cour, fixées par [l’ar ticle22 de la convention de 1965], aient été remplies, à savoir
106Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Irac. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), exception préliminaire,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p.809, par. 16; voir auElettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (Etats-Unis d’Amérique
c. Italie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 40-41, par. 46. - 53 -
qu’elle ait tenté de régler ladite question ou ledit différend par voie de négociation» ou par les
procédures expressément prévues par la convention CERD.
33. Et je remarque, Monsieur le président, que, dans cet arrêt de 2006, la Cour a relevé très
expressément que l’article 75 de la Constitution de l’OMS fixait deux conditions préalables et elle
s’est assurée que ni l’une, ni l’autre n’étaien t remplies en utilisant la conjonction «ou» pour
signifier clairement qu’il s’agissait de conditions cumulatives: «qu’elle ait tenté de régler ladite
question ou ledit différend par voie de négociation avec le Rwanda ou que l’Assemblée mondiale
de la santé n’ait pu résoudre cette question ou ce di fférend». C’est à ce «ou», qui figure aussi dans
l’article 22 de la convention de 196 5, auquel j’en arrive maintenant, Mesdames et Messieurs de la
Cour.
II. LES RECOURS PRÉALABLES PRÉVUS PAR L ’ARTICLE 22 SONT CUMULATIFS
[Projection n 4-1]
A. Le texte de l’article 22 dans son contexte
34. Monsieur le président, notre affaire n’est pas la première cause cél èbre dans laquelle les
Parties s’opposent sur la question de savoir si «ou = et». Je laisse de côté le célèbre jugement du
107
comteAlmaviva dans le Mariage de Figaro , mais, je relève que, dans l’affaire de la
Haute-Silésie polonaise, la Cour permanente a reconnu le rôle interchangeable de «et» et de «ou»
dans certaines situations particulières, et relevé que le mot «et» «dans le langage ordinaire comme
108
dans le langage juridique, peut, selon les circonsta nces, être aussi bien alternatif que cumulatif»
(Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise, compétence, arrêt n o6, 1925, C.P.J.I.
o
série A n 6, p. 14).
[Projection n o4-2]
35. Cette polysémie vaut tout autant pour «ou» et, du reste, la Cour de Justice des
Communautés européennes et les juridictions internes n’hésitent pas, lorsque le contexte le justifie,
107Pierre Caron de Beaumarchais,Le mariage de Figaro, acteIII, scène15; voir aussi: Lorenzo Da Ponte,
Le nozze di Figaro (livret pour l’opéra de Mozart), Atto Terzo, Scena quinta.
108Dans le même sens, voir aussi, sntence arbitrale, 17 juillet 1965, Interprétation de l’accord aérien du 6
février 1948 (Etats-Unis c. Italie), RSA, vol. XVI, p. 94-95 (pour le texte français, voir RGDIP 1968, p. 478. - 54 -
109
à donner un sens «cumulatif» à «ou» . Il doit en aller ainsi du «ou» de l’article 22 si l’on prend la
peine de lire sérieusement cette disposition, sans se borner à la lecture paresseuse qu’en fait la
110
Géorgie . Cette lecture n’a vraiment rien d’une évidence dès lors que l’on réfléchit au contexte et
aux conséquences du «ou». Utiliser la conjonction «et» ici aura it rendu la phrase dépourvue de
sens: il est évident qu’il n’y a aucun besoin de tenter à nouveau de régler par la conciliation un
différend qui l’a déjà été par la négociation. L’ introduction d’un «et» aurait conduit à l’absurdité
qui est projetée maintenant: «Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant
l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente Convention qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de
négociation et au moyen des procédures expressément prévues par ladite Convention, sera
porté … devant la Cour internationale de Justice.»
Cela n’a aucun sens : on ne peut régler un différe nd par deux moyens : il l’est par l’un ou l’autre ;
en revanche on peut essayer successivement l’un ou l’autre ⎯et, ici, on le doit dès lors que,
comme je l’ai montré, leur utilisation préalable conditionne la compétence de la Cour.
[Projection n o 4-3]
36. Du reste, il est admis que, dans une phrase négative («qui n’aura pas été réglé…»), la
conjonction «ou» a, en général, un sens coordinate ur; elle est alors synonyme de «ni». Comme
Le bon usage de Grévisse que j’ai déjà cité, le constate : «[o]u s’introduit de plus en plus à la place
111
de ni» ; le célèbre traité de grammaire renvoie d’ailleurs à «et» dans ce cadre . Et de donner un
exemple tiré de Chateaubriand : «Je n’ai pas daigné ôter mon chapeau à leur cercueil, ou consacrer
112
un mot à leur mémoire» ⎯ni ôter mon chapeau, ni consacrer un mot… ⎯ ni par la voie de
négociation, ni par les procédures expressément prévu es par la convention. Il en va de même en
anglais, langue dans laquelle le Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary précise: « Or : Used
after a negative verb to mean not one thing and al so not the other (e.g. The child never smiles or
109Voir CJCE, Grande Chambre, Commission des Communautés européennes (c ontrôle des activités en matière
de pêcheries) (aff. C-304/02), 12 juillet 2005, Rec. p. I-06263, par. 83; High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial
Court, Nakanishi Kikai Kogyosho Limited v. Intermare Transport GMBH [2009] EWHC 994 (Comm), par. 12; Chambre
des Lords, Federal Steam Navigation (1974) 1 WLR 505; High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, R v. Oakes (1959)
2 QB 350.
110
OEG, p. 107, par. 3.25.
111Le bon usage, préc., p. 1399.
112François-René de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’outre-tombe, IV, xi, 4. - 55 -
113
laughs)» ⎯ «the child never smiles nor laughs» or «and also never laughs »; «which is not
settled by negotiation [nor] by the procedures expressly provid ed for in this Convention » or
«which is not settled by negotiation [and also not] by the procedures expressly provided for in this
Convention». Et c’est, bien sûr, la même chose en espagnol et, me dit-on, aussi en russe et en
géorgien ⎯ je ne vais pas m’aventurer sur le terrain du chinois ou de l’arabe…
37. Du reste, le commentaire de Lerner ⎯ qui se borne à une paraphrase de l’article 22, ne
conclut nullement, comme le prétend la Géorgie, «that there is no support for a restrictive
interpretation of Article 22, of the kind now urged by Russia» 114; il ne dit à vrai dire rien d’autre
que ce que dit l’articlelui-même. Mais je note que le compte rendu de la première édition de
l’ouvrage de Lerner dans l’ American Journal ne tire pas les mêmes conclusions de cette glose que
la Géorgie : «A procedure of conciliation is foreseen in cases of such complaints. Should in such a
case no solution be reached by conciliation , the way to the International Court of Justice is
provided for by Article 22.» 115
38. Seule cette interprétation de bon sens donne à l’article 22 un sens utile dont la Géorgie la
prive. Elle est confirmée par les travaux préparatoires de cette disposition.
[Fin de la projection n o 4.3]
B. Les travaux préparatoires de l’article 22
39. J’ai déjà, Monsieur le président, assez largement défloré la présentation de ceux-ci
lorsque j’ai montré qu’ils confir maient que la négociation «ou» le recours aux procédures prévues
par la convention étaient des préalables indispensables à la saisine de la Cour.
116
40. Aux très nombreuses déclarations extraites des travaux préparatoires , qui toutes
démontrent la volonté des rédacteurs de conditionne r la compétence de la Cour en application de
l’article22 à la saisine préalable du Comité CERD en cas d’échec des négociations, l’Etat
demandeur oppose un seul argument : l’article 22 sera it issu d’un processus distinct de celui ayant
113 e
Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary, 3 éd., Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 1001.
114OEG, p. 107, par. 3.41.
115Jacob Robinson, Review: N Lerner, The UN Convention on the E limination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. A Commentary, AJIL, 1972, vol. 66, n 1, p. 230 ; les italiques sont de nous.
116Voir exceptions préliminaires de la Russie (EPR), par. 4.46-4.49. - 56 -
117
abouti à la rédaction des articles11 et12 . A vrai dire, et comme la Géorgie en convient, la
sous-commission, la Commission des droits de l’homme et même, dans un premier temps, la
Troisième Commission, ont discuté conjointement du mécanisme CERD et de la saisine de la CIJ
et, comme je l’ai montré tout à l’heure, tous les avant-projets de clause compromissoire
subordonnaient la compétence de la Cour à l’échec de la phase de conciliati on ; je me permets de
o
vous renvoyer, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, au document figurant à l’ongletn 4 de votre
dossier, dans lequel figure le texte de ces projets.
41. Il est vrai que, pour des raisons d’efficacité des travaux, la Troisième Commission a
118
demandé à son Bureau de préparer un avant-projet de clauses finales . Mais le Bureau n’était pas
le forum approprié pour décider de la question fond amentale de la compétence de la Cour, qui était
l’un des points d’achoppement des négociations. Très naturellement, la Troisième Commission est
donc «convenue que les clauses qui sont indépendantes et qui renvoient à des articles faisant partie
du même groupe seraient revisées compte tenu du texte final de la convention» 119. Fidèle à l’un de
120
ses procédés favoris, la Géorgie ne cite qu’une petite partie de cette phrase ⎯ la première , mais
en se gardant bien d’évoquer la seconde dont il r essort pourtant que les négociateurs n’entendaient
pas ériger une barrière autour des dispositions finales mais, qu’ils prévoyaient, au contraire, de les
reviser en fonction du texte des autres dispositions substantielles concernant la mise en Œuvre de la
convention, qui seraient finalement adoptées.
42. Il apparaît donc, Monsieur le président, que la clause compromissoire a d’abord, et
longtemps, fait l’objet des discussions relatives aux mesures de mise en Œuvre. Ce n’est que
tardivement ⎯ quinze jours avant l’adoption du texte fina l de la clause compromissoire, qu’elle en
121
a été détachée et renvoyée aux clauses finales . Du reste, l’avant-projet du Bureau a bel et bien
été revisé à la lumière du texte final des dispositions sur la mise en Œuvre.
117OEG, appendice, p. 253, par. ii.
118NationsUnies, Documents officiels de la Troisième Commissi on de l’Assemblée générale, vingtièmesession,
déclaration du président, doc. A/C.3/SR.1299 (11 octobre 1965), p. 57, par. 2.
119NationUs nies, Rapport de la Troisième Commissi on de l’Assemblée générale , do. /6181,
18 décembre 1965, p. 36, par. 174 (pour le texte anglais du rapport, voir OEG, vol. II, annexe 40, p. 35, par. 174).
120OEG, appendice, p. 263, par. xxvii.
121
Déclaration de M.Lampte y (Ghana), NationsUnies, Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de
l’Assemblée générale, vingtième session, doc. A/C.3/SR.1349 (19 novembre 1965), p. 373, par.29 (pour le texte anglais
de cette déclaration, voir OEG, vol. II, annexe 28, p. 348, par. 29). - 57 -
[Projection n 5-1]
43. Le texte proposé par le Bureau ⎯qui est projeté en ce moment et qui, comme les
documents dont je vais parler ensuite, se trouve sous l’onglet n o 5 du dossier des juges ⎯ se bornait
à mentionner les négociations comme seule condition préalable à la saisine de la Cour 122.
o
[Projection n 5-2]
44. L’amendement de la Pologne 123 avait pour objet ⎯comme l’a précisé le délégué de ce
pays ⎯ de faire échec à la possibilité de saisine unilatérale de la Cour :
«Le texte suggéré par le Bureau de la Troisième Commission rend obligatoire la
juridiction de la Cour pour tous les Etats pa rties à la convention, alors que le Statut de
la Cour prévoit que cette juridicti on est en principe facultative et n’a
qu’exceptionnellement, en vertu de l’article 36, un caractère obligatoire.» 124
o
[Projection n 5-3]
45. Monsieur le président, c’est pour «sauver» la compétence de la Cour tout en préservant
celle du Comité que le Ghana, la Mauritanie et les Philippines présentèrent l’amendement qu’il est
convenu d’appeler «des trois puissances», dont j’ai déjà dit quelques mots, qui tend «à supprimer la
virgule après le mot «négociation» et à insérer les mots «ou par les procédures expressément
prévues par ladite convention» entre les mots «négociation» et «sera»» 125. Il s’agissait donc
clairement d’ajouter à la condition des négociations préalables celle du recours au Comité, avec le
double objectif de rallier les Etats réticents à la saisi ne de la Cour et de préserver la compétence du
Comité à laquelle les auteurs de l’amendement étaient particulièrement attachés. Et cela a été tout
à fait efficace puisque la proposition reçut un large soutien (comme le montrent, entre autres, les
o
extraits d’interventions à la Troisième Commission reproduites à l’onglet n 3 du dossier des juges)
122NationsUnies, Projet de convention internationale sur l’élimi nation de toutes les formes de discrimination
raciale, Suggestions relatives aux clauses finales présentées par le Bureau de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée
générale, doc.A/C.3/L.1237, 15octobre1965, clauseviii (pour le texte anglais de la pr oposition, voir OEG, vol.II,
annexe 17).
123NationsUnies, Projet de convention internationale sur l’élimi nation de toutes les formes de discrimination
raciale Pologne : amendements aux suggestions de clauses finales proposées par le Bureau de la Troisième Commission,
er
Nations Unies, doc. A/C.3/L.1272 (1 novembre 1965), p. 2 (pour le texte anglai s de cet amendement, voir OEG, vol. II,
annexe 18).
124
M.Dabrowa (Pologne), NationsUnies, Documents officiels de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée
générale, doc.A/C.3/SR. 1358, p.426, par.20 (pour le texte angl ais de la déclaration, voir OEG, vol.II, annexe35,
p. 399, par. 20).
125
Nations nies, Rapport de la Troisième Commissi on de l’Assemblée générale , doc. /6181,
18 décembre 1965, p. 36, par. 197, p. 38. - 58 -
126
et fut adoptée à l’unanimité . Le quid pro quo ainsi réalisé permit de préserver le rôle du Comité
et la saisine unilatérale ⎯ mais conditionnée ⎯ de la Cour.
o
[Fin de la projection n 5-3]
C. L’interprétation constante par la Cour de clauses similaires
46. Monsieur le président, dans les cas de clauses compromissoires de ce genre, y compris
celles dans lesquelles les conditions préalables à sa saisine sont introduites par la conjonction «ou»,
127
la Cour, je l’ai déjà signalé , a méthodiquement vérifié la réalisation des deux conditions. Elle
mentionne d’ailleurs systématiquement qu’il s’agit bien de conditions au pluriel.
47. Tel a été le cas dans l’affaire RDC c. Rwanda dans laquelle la Cour a constaté qu’aucune
des conditions procédurales prévues par l’article 75 de la Constitution de l’OMS n’était remplie. Il
en va de même de l’avis c onsultatif de 1988 relatif à l’ Obligation d’arbitrage, dans lequel, malgré
128
ce qu’en dit la Géorgie , la Cour a vérifié si, à côté des négociations infructueuses, d’autres
modes de règlement des différends avaient été tentés 12, confirmant ainsi le caractère successif des
modes de règlement prévus par la section21 de l’accord de siège entre les Etats-Unis et les
Nations Unies : c’est en effet parce qu’il y avait eu des négociations entre le Secrétariat de l’ONU
et les Etats-Unis et qu’elles avaient clairement éc houé, que la Cour a vérifié si les autres modes de
règlement avaient été actionnés.
48. Il en va de même dans le cas dont la Cour est saisie aujourd’hui. Et c’est d’ailleurs bien
ainsi que vous l’avez entendu, prima facie , Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, dans votre
ordonnance de 2008. Dans un premier temps, vous avez constaté que les questions invoquées par
la Géorgie n’avaient «manifestement pas été résolu es par voie de négociation avant le dépôt de la
requête» (Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de
discrimination raciale (Géorgie c.Fédération de Russie) , mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
126
NationUs nies, Rapport de la Troisième Commissi on de l’Assemblée générale , doc. /6181,
18 décembre 1965, p. 39, par. 200 (pour le texte anglais du rapport, voir OEG, vol. II, annexe 40, p. 38, par. 200).
127Voir supra, par. 30 et 33.
128OEG, p. 109-110, par. 3.30.
129Applicabilité de l’obligation d’arbitrage en vertu de la section 21 de l’accord du 26 juin 1947 relatif au siège
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 34, par. 56. - 59 -
15octobre2008, par.115). Puis vous avez estimé nécessaire, dans un second temps, de
mentionner que le mécanisme CERD n’avait pas été déclenché (ibid., par. 116).
49. Certes, vous n’aviez pas estimé, dans le cadre de cette procédure d’urgence, que «la
tenue de négociations formelles au titre de la convention ou le recours aux procédures visées à
l’article 22 constituent des conditions préalables au xquelles il doit être satisfait avant toute saisine
de la Cour» ( ibid., par.114). Mais, dans le même mouvement, vous avez considéré «que
l’article 22 donne en revanche à penser que la Partie demanderesse doit avoir tenté d’engager, avec
la Partie défenderesse, des discussions sur des questions pouvant relever de la CIEDR» (ibid.).
50. J’avoue avoir quelque difficulté à comp rendre pourquoi il devrait y avoir deux poids,
deux mesures: la négociation et les procédures expressément prévues par la convention sont
placées sur un pied de stricte égalité par l’article 22 et il me semble que, quel que soit le degré de
formalisme qui est requis pour la première, si la Géorgie «doit avoir tenté d’engager» avec la
Russie, des discussions sur les questions qu’elle prétend relever de la convention, il doit en aller de
même des procédures prévues par la convention: la Géorgie doit avoir tenté d’enclencher le
mécanisme de conciliation. Il est clair qu’elle ne l’a pas fait. Cela suffit à établir l’incompétence
de la Cour dans cette affaire.
51. Toutefois, avant d’en terminer, Monsieur le président, je souha ite faire une dernière
remarque.
52. La présente affaire vous donne, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l’occasion de mettre
les choses au point en ce qui concerne la relation qui existe entre les différents organes de mise en
Œuvre, relation qui est soigneusement établie par l es rédacteurs de la convention. La Russie ne
récuse aucunement in abstracto votre compétence de principe, voulue par les rédacteurs de cet
instrument et qu’elle a expressément acceptée en retirant sa réserve à l’article22. Mais il vous
appartient de préserver l’intégrité du mécanisme voulu aussi par les négociateurs et accepté par les
Parties, et de sauvegarder la place du Comité, en tant que gardien «de première ligne» de la
convention. Le système de protection des droits de l’homme, tel qu’il est bâti depuis presque un
demi-siècle, plus qu’un demi-siècle, et qui repo se largement sur les organes de surveillance, est
certainement améliorable. Mais la violation d es règles conventionnelles et procédurales n’est pas - 60 -
la voie de cette amélioration ; et contourner le Comité n’est assurément pas le moyen de renforcer
le système.
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous re mercie vivement de votre attention. Je vous
prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner la parole au professeur Zimmermann.
The PRESIDENT: I thank you, Professor Alain Pellet, for your presentation. Now I give
the floor to Professor Andreas Zimmermann.
Mr.ZIMMERMANN: Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is once again an honour to
appear before the Court.
L ACK OF NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED BY A RTICLE 22 OF CERD
I. Introduction
1. Members of the Court, Georgia has not even argued that it has ever tried to settle the
alleged dispute under CERD by any of the procedures expressly provided for, for that very purpose
in the Convention. If it were a dispute, it is for that reason alone that, as my friend and colleague
Alain Pellet has just shown, Georgia’s reliance on Article 22 of CERD must fail anyhow.
2. But even if one were now to assume, arguendo, not only that there had been a dispute
under CERD at the time the Court was seised, but also that an Applicant could decide to effectively
circumvent the CERD procedures, Georgia’s reliance on Article 22 of CERD must still fail since,
as I will now demonstrate, Georgia has never attempted to settle the alleged dispute by way of
negotiations, as also required by Article 22 of CERD.
II. The notion of “negotiations” under Article 22 of CERD
3. Let me start with some general remarks:
4. As the Court underlined inter alia in the Armed Activities (2002) case (Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (New Applicati on: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
130
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility , Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2006, pp. 40-41, para. 91) ,
negotiations have to be more than mere protests. Rather, an attempt must have been made to
130
Cf. POR, para. 4.40. - 61 -
131
engage the other side so as to provide for a discussion of the specific concerns ⎯ concerns
which, in the case at hand, must have been based on alleged violations of CERD.
5. Moreover, Article22 of CERD considers negotiations and the Convention procedures as
two equivalent avenues to settle a matter arisi ng under CERD before a case is brought before the
Court. Yet, under Article11, paragraph1, of CERD the receiving State has what is both, an
obligation and an opportunity, to provide the Co mmittee with written explanations or statements
clarifying the matter and the action, if any, that may have been taken by that State after a complaint
had been brought before the Committee. In the sa me way negotiations have to provide the State
allegedly having violated CERD with the same underlying opportunity of explaining and defending
its position.
6. As Article 22 of CERD makes clear, negotiations must specifically relate to a dispute with
respect to the interpretation or a pplication “of this Convention”. Th is seems to have been ignored
by Georgia which refers to a large number of alleged “contacts” between itself and Russia bearing
no relation to racial discrimination and even less to CERD. Such “contacts” cannot therefore
amount to negotiations within the meaning of Article22 of CERD ⎯ even more so since, as
demonstrated by my friend and colleague Sam Wordsworth, no dispute under CERD existed at the
time the case was brought.
7. Moreover, the fact that the negotiations under Article22 must, by definition, be with
respect to disputes under “this Convention” necessarily means that discussions preceding
2 July 1999 ⎯ the date of Georgia’s accession to the C onvention and, accordingly, the entry into
force of the Convention as between the parties ⎯ could not constitute ne gotiations within the
meaning of Article 22 of CERD. Indeed, Georgia itself acknowledges that CERD does not possess
retroactive effect 132.
133
8. In line with general rules on the representation of States , negotiations must also be
conducted by organs entitled to represent the Stat e in its external relations. Accordingly,
131
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Order of 8 October 2003, Provisional measures, case
concerning Land reclamation by Singapore in and ar ound the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Reports 2003,
Vol. 7, p. 19, paras. 39-40; cf. POR, para. 4.40.
132
Written Observations of Georgia, para. 5.11.
13Cf. Art. 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. - 62 -
communications originating from the Georgian par liament cannot be considered relevant for the
134
purpose of Article22 of CERD either; still less so contacts between Georgian and Russian
parliamentarians 135.
9. Georgia is now trying to convince the Court that it and Russia were involved in a broad
negotiation process as to the application and implementation of CERD in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia ever since 1991/1992. Yet, in view of the obvious jurisdictional hurdle of Article 22 of
CERD requiring not only the existence of a dispute, but also negotiations as to this alleged dispute
Georgia must attempt to rewrite diplomatic history ⎯ an attempt which does not, however, stand to
scrutiny.
136
10. Inter alia , Georgia claims that allegations of shipments of arms or allegations of
Russia having committed violations of international humanitarian law 137 or finally general
allegations of providing support and assistance 138 could constitute the re quired negotiations under
Article 22 of CERD. Yet, even if those allega tions were true, how could Russia have known that
Georgia was trying to enter into negotiations as to CERD while it was exclusively referring to
certain alleged shipments of arms or violations of the laws of war, which allegations, besides, did
not involve allegations of racial discrimination.
11. Similarly, information provided by Georgia to the Committee against Torture 139 and the
140
Human Rights Committee is not relevant: neither did it contain allegations of breaches of
CERD, nor was it addressed to Russia, as it formed part of Georgia’s periodic reports submitted to
the respective treaty body only.
12. The same goes for discussions within th e United Nations which Georgia now also seeks
to portray as negotiations within the meaning of Article 22 of CERD.
134WSG, para. 3.96; footnote 387.
135
Cf. WSG, para. 3.73; footnotes 324 and 325.
136
WSG, para. 3.96., footnote 388.
137Cf. the letter dated 2 July 1993 from the Head of State of the Republic of Georgia to the President of the
Security Council, UN doc. S/26031, referred to in the WSG, footnote 321.
138WSG, para. 3.96, footnotes 387.
139Cf. WSG, para. 3.73, footnote 328.
140
Cf. WSG, para. 3.109, footnote 413. - 63 -
III. Discussions in the United Nations as alleged Article 22 CERD “negotiations”
13. Mr.President, Georgia refers to a whole range of occasions on wh ich it claims to have
“negotiated” with Russia over questions of CERD within the framework of the United Nations.
14. Yet, Article22 of CERD requires negotia tions between the parties, to which mere
discussions in international fora cannot simply be equated. Georgia seems to disagree, relying on
the South West Africa Judgments 141(South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South
Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319 et seq. (346)). Yet a careful
analysis reveals that the present case is crucially different to this very early precedent.
15. For one, in the South West Africa cases the Court has specifically noted that South Africa
itself ⎯ unlike Russia ⎯ had explicitly acknowledged previous negotiations within the framework
of the United Nations ( South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p.319 et seq. (345)). Moreover, the
dispute concerning the status of Namibia opposed South Africa on the one hand and most, if not
all, Member States of the United Nations on the other. In South West Africa, the Court accordingly
and rightfully so, stressed that within the United Nations setting there had been a “common
adversary State” (ibid ., p.346, also referring to “collective ne gotiations with . . . [said] State in
opposition”).
16. It was only in this quasi-bilateral setting that the Court then considered it unnecessary to
require direct bilateral negotiations involving the States concerned. The case at hand is
fundamentally different.
17. On the one hand, none of the parties ⎯ indeed no third party ⎯ had, prior to bringing
this case, ever considered or alleged that a di spute had arisen between Georgia and Russia under
CERD nor, accordingly, that they had entered into negotiations as to the application or
interpretation of CERD.
18. On the other hand, Article11 paragra ph2, of CERD specifically refers to bilateral
negotiations before a State is able to submit a matter to the CERD Committee. Yet, it would be
contradictory to require formal bilateral negotiations before the Committee, while at the same time
141
Cf. WSG, paras. 359-3.60. - 64 -
dispensing with such requirement of bilateral negotiations when it comes to the much more
stringent and adversarial procedure before the Court.
19. Moreover, certain discussions within th e United Nations to which Georgia makes
reference are also irrelevant, either ratione temporis as originating from a period prior to the entry
142
into force of CERD as between the parties , or because they emanated from the Georgian
parliament and, besides, were directed to the Georgian Government. 143
20. Yet other documents merely mentioned the presence of CIS peacekeepers without
144
containing complaints about their behaviour .
21. Where such complaints were made, they specifically referred to certain provisions of
human rights treaties such as Article 8 of the I CCPR or Article 4 of the European Convention on
Human Rights 145 ⎯ but tellingly did not mention the specific provisions of those treaties dealing
with discrimination, and even less CERD. Yet, now, and for obvious reasons, Georgia claims these
146
were further attempts to enter into negotiations under CERD .
22. On further occasions complaints of racial discrimination were directed at the local
authorities only, while no claims were made that Russian peacekeeping forces were involved in
147
such acts .
23. To the extent Georgia alleged that Russia violated international law, those allegations
referred to consular relations, c onventions on mutual legal assista nce and “the . . . territorial
integrity of States, sovereign equality of States, inviolability of borders and non-interference in
142
Cf., e.g., United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 20 Sep. 1993 from the Permanent Representative of
Georgia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Ann, UN doc. S/26472 (20 Sep. 1993)
(WSG, Vol. III, Anns., Ann. 48), p. 2; cf. also, mutatis mutandis, Letter dated 25 Dec. 1992 from the Chairman of the
Parliament and Head of State of the Republic of Georgia a ddressed to the Secretary-Gene ral, WSG, Vol.III, Anns.,
Ann. 46. For further examples cf. the references in footnote 17.
143Cf. the document referred to in footnote 330 of the WSG (referring to Vol. III, Ann. 82).
144
Cf. WSG, para. 3.106, footnote 404 referring to a letter dated 14 Apr. 1998 from the Permanent Representative
of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secr etary-General, UN doc. S/1998/329 (15 Apr. 1998) (preceding the
entry into force of CERD as between Georgia and Russia), as well as to the letter dated 20 July 1999 from the Permanent
Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/1999/806
(21 July 1999).
145WSG, para. 3.109, footnote 411 referring to WSG, Vol. III, Anns., Ann. 83.
146WSG, para. 3.109.
147
Cf. in particular the truncated quotat the end of para. 3.108. of WSG and ibid., footnote 410 referring to
WSG, Vol. III, Anns., Ann. 77. - 65 -
internal affairs of States” 148. Even the 10August 2008 Security Council meeting 149 ⎯ which
Georgia requested after its own armed attack had proven unsuccessful ⎯ was solely convened to
deal with what Georgia then deliberately and falsely described as a “military aggression launched
by the Russian Federation against Georgia” 150.
24. Accordingly, the whole meeting focused on the use of force and violations of
international humanitarian law but not on racial discrimination ⎯ and even less on violations of
CERD.
25. Nor did Georgia complain about Russia vi olating CERD or otherwise committing acts of
racial discrimination in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia within the framework of the OSCE 15.
IV. Discussions in the OSCE as alleged Article 22 CERD “negotiations”
26. Mr.President, this is quite clear, to give but one example, from Georgia’s statement to
152
the OSCE Permanent Council of 17 April 2008. This statement ⎯ like others ⎯ clearly focused
on issues of territorial integrity and alleged “illegal annexation” rather than on racial
discrimination. What is more, it shows that Ge orgia perceived Russia as not being a party to the
conflict: hence, before the OSCE, in April 2008, Georgia explicitly referred to Security Council
153
resolution 1808 (2008) . This Security Council resolution has, of course, already been discussed
by my friend and colleague Sam Wordsworth, so I can limit myself to repeating that the resolution
had correctly qualified Georgia and the Abkhaz au thorities as disputing parties while referring to
154
Russia as a “facilitator” .
148Cf. letter dated 17 Apr. 2008 from the Chargé d’affair es a.i. of the Permanent Misison of Georgia to the
United Nations addressed to the Secr etary-General, UN doc. A/62/810 (21 Apr. 2008), reproduced in WSG, Vol.III,
Anns. Ann. 91.
149Cf. for the proposition that this meeting entailed negotiations under Art. 22 CERD, WSG, para. 3.76.
150
Letter dated 9 Aug. 2008 from the Permanent Representa tive of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, S/2008/537 (9 Aug. 2008).
151
Thus, inter alia , a 2004 Georgian statement in the OSCE Permanent Council m eeting PC.DEL/654/04
(13 July 2004), p. 1 merely referred to “provocative actions of the handful of separatists” and Russia’s alleged support for
the “separatist mood in the region”, cf. MG, Vol. II, Ann. 77, p. 1.
152Cf. WSG, Vol. III, Anns., Anns. 113 and 114.
153
Cf. OSCE, 709th Plenary Meeting of the Council, St atement by the Delegation of Georgia, PC.JOUR/709
(17 Apr. 2008), p. 4 (WSG, Vol. III, Anns., Ann. 112, referred to in para. 3.84. of WSG.
154
Cf. Security Council resolution 1808 (2008), preambular paras. 4 and 5 as well as operative paras. 1 and 7. - 66 -
27. Accordingly, Georgia’s statement before the OSCE was not meant, and could not be
understood by Russia, as aiming to engage the Russi an Federation in a negotiation process within
the meaning of Article 22 of CERD.
28. In particular, a mere call to engage more actively in the return of IDPs and refugees
could not have bona fide been perceived by Russia as a reference to possible violations of its
obligations under CERD. This is confirmed by th e fact that Georgia, before the OSCE, endorsed
155
the Security Council’s call upon “the sides in conflict” , i.e., Georgia and Abkhazia, to address
the problems of IDPs and refugees.
V. Discussions within the United Nations Geneva Process, the Group of Friends
of Georgia and the CIS as alleged Article 22 CERD ‘negotiations’
29. A very similar point can be made with respect to discussions within the United Nations
Geneva Process. Again, these did not concern CERD issues at all. Georgia now tries to “re-brand”
156
these discussions as negotiations with Russia within the meaning of Article22 of CERD .
However, it suffices to recall that Georgia itself confirmed that Russia had been acting as a mere
facilitator in that process 157and was not involved as a disputing party to negotiations.
30. As to the Group of Friends of Georgia, it similarly suffices to refer to the fact, again
158
acknowledged by Georgia itself , that the participating States, including Russia, have a very
limited status. Those States are “not the sides to the negotiations and shall not be invited to sign
159
documents agreed upon [during] the negotiations” ⎯ unlike the parties, that is, Georgia and
Abkhazia.
31. Lastly, Georgia also attempts to rely on developments within the CIS 160. Someofthe
161
documents are irrelevant ratione temporis or mention contacts between parliamentarians
155
Cf. OSCE, 709th Plenary Meeting of the Council, Statement by the Delegation of Georgia, PC.JOUR/709 (17
Apr. 2008), p. 4 (WSG, Vol. III, Anns, Ann. 112).
156Cf. MG, paras. 8.59 et seq.
157Cf. MG, para. 8.59.
158Cf. MG, para. 8.61.
159
Cf. para. 3 of the Final Statement on the Outcome of the Resumed Meeting Held Between the Georgian and
Abkhaz Parties Held in Georgia (17-19 Nov. 1997), reproduced in MG, Vol. III, Ann. 125.
160
Cf. MG, paras. 8.77-8.80.
161
Cf., e.g., the Decision taken by the Council of the Hes of States of the CIS on further steps towards the
settlement of the Conflict on Abkhazia, Georgia of 2 Apr. 1999, thus pre-dating by three months the entry into force of
CERD as between Georgia and Russia, to which Georgia refers in its memorial, cf. MG, Vol. III, Ann. 127. - 67 -
again 162⎯ or both. Moreover, the documents in question show only Georgia and Abkhazia as
being the disputing parties, while Russia is ⎯ once again ⎯ perceived as facilitating negotiations
between them , Georgia and Abkhazia, but not as being itself a party to any negotiations with
163
Georgia .
32. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the closer we look, the less remains of Georgia’s
version of alleged negotiations.
33. Of course, Georgia did raise the Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts in international fora.
Mentioning a conflict in international fora is , however, not the same as negotiating with the
respondent State about specific treaty breaches.
34. Of course, the Abkhazian and Ossetian c onflicts were frequently at the forefront of
Georgia’s diplomatic communications. But this in fact rather supports Russia’s case: the
exchanges that Georgia fostered on issues such as its territorial integrity and alleged acts of
annexation stand in sharp contrast to the complete absence of references to CERD. The matter was
simply not seen by Georgia itself as a topic relevant for negotiations under CERD ⎯ until, all of a
sudden, Georgia’s approach changed after its illegal use of force proved unsuccessful and then
Georgia turned to the Court on the basis of Article 22 of CERD.
35. Georgia, likewise, did not seek to settle the alleged CERD dispute by way of bilateral
negotiations.
VI. Lack of bilateral negotiations
36. Mr.President, permit me to begin again with three brief remarks of a more general
character. First, just as in the case of multilateral fora, di scussions prior to mid-1999, i.e., prior to
Georgia even becoming a party of CERD per se, cannot constitute attempts to settle an alleged
dispute under CERD.
37. Second, when reading Georgia’s written observations, one gains the clear impression that
Georgia seeks to have it both ways: it claims that ever since 1992 unsuccessful bilateral
162
Cf. inter alia the decision taken by the Council of the Inter-P arliamentary Assembly of the Member-States of
the CIS on the situation of conflict settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia (28 Feb. 1998), MG, Vol. III, Ann. 126.
163Cf. e.g. the Decision taken by the Council of theads of States of the CIS on further steps towards the
settlement of the Conflict on Abkazia, Georgia (2 Apr. 1999) (reproduced in MG, Vol. III, Ann. 127), preambular para. 3. - 68 -
negotiations were ongoing while at the very same time frequently referring to agreements reached
with the Russian Federation ⎯ not least within the framework of the Joint Control Commission ⎯
which successfully settled certain issues as to the ongoing conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
and provided for agreed mechanisms to address certain problems between the parties to the
164
conflict , i.e., Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the one hand and Georgia on the other.
Fi3n8a.lly, third, and just as in the case of multilateral discussions, Russia was continuously
perceived by Georgia as a third-party facilitator ⎯ but why should Russia then consider
discussions with Georgia in this context to constitute negotiations under Article 22 of CERD? This
brings me now to some specific instances of alleged bilateral negotiations 165.
166
39. Let me start with a 2003 meeting of the two Heads of States , which Georgia alleges
amounted to negotiations under CERD. For one, it is worth noting that the Abkhaz side
participated in the discussions. B esides, there was agreement that th e return of IDPs and refugees
167
was a common principal priority for all participants ⎯ hence no disagreement and hence no
need to negotiate on this. And finally, of c ourse, the document that Georgia relies on mentions
neither CERD nor racial discrimination.
40. In the same vein, during a 2004 meeting in Moscow, Georgia again, according to its own
records 168, perceived itself and Abkhazia as those that have to agree on the return of IDPs and
refugees, while the Russian representative fully shared Georgia’s view.
41. A 2004 exchange of letters between the two Presidents, to which Georgia now also refers
as an example of relevant nego tiations under Article22 of CERD 169, in turn did not contain any
170
hint whatsoever of allegations of racial discrimination .
164
See, inter alia, the 1992 Sochi Agreement, the 1992 Final Do cument of the Moscow meeting between
President Yeltsin and President Shevardnadze, the Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and
Displaced Persons, or the 1997 Protocol # 7, Meeting of the JCC for the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict Settlement (13 Feb.
1997).
165
For a full assessment cf. WOR, specifically paras. 4.90-4.95.
166
Cf. WSG, para. 3.86.
16Cf. also the reference to follow-up negotiations, ibid., dealing, however, only with the rehabilitation of certain
railroad tracks.
16Cf. WSG, para. 3.87 referring to ibid, Vol. IV, Anns., Ann. 156.
16Cf. WSG, para. 3.107.
170
Cf. MG, Vol. V, Anns., Ann. 309. - 69 -
42. Finally, there is the exchange of lett ers between Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev of
late June2008, which AmbassadorKolodkin has alr eady dealt with in some detail. For present
purposes, let me just underline that these letters, written only weeks before the present proceedings
171
were instituted, clearly spoke of a dis pute between “the parties to the conflict” , i.e., Georgia and
Abkhazia, and made no mention whatsoever of racial discrimination by Russia. It is indeed telling
that Georgia now claims that Russian peacekeeping forces were “responsible for continuing acts of
violence against ethnic Georgians” 172 while no such allegations were made in the letter, which
accordingly does not constitute an attempt to negotiate under CERD either.
43. Mr.President, Georgia has attempted to ma ke much of the alleged refusal of Russia to
enter into discussions with Georgia after Geor gia had already attacked Russian peacekeepers by
7 August and while Russia was exercising its inherent right of self-defence under the Charter of the
United Nations.
44. In that regard one has to first note that both, Georgia and Russia, at that time were
focused on issues of the legality of the use of forc e and the necessity to abide by applicable norms
of international humanitarian law as constituting lex specialis during times of armed conflict
(Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996(I) ,
p. 240, para. 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 178, para. 106).
45. Moreover, it should also be noted that an international negotiation process had already
started leading to a ceasefire agreement to be conc luded on 12August2008, that is, the very day
Georgia brought its case before the Court. Th at agreement, however, confirmed the uniform
perception of the parties that the conflict was governed by applicable rules of jus ad bellum and
jus in bello, while issues related to CERD were, once ag ain, neither raised with Russia during the
negotiations leading to the adoption of the ceasefire agreement, nor indeed mentioned in the text of
the agreement itself.
46. Finally, it must be noted that, as the Russian representative in the Security Council had
stated publicly on 10August2008, and without Georgia then denying it, that there had been
171
MG, Vol. V, Anns., Ann. 309.
17Cf. WSG, para. 3.75. - 70 -
high-level diplomatic contacts between Russia a nd Georgia even while the armed conflict was
173
ongoing . It is therefore misleading, to say the least, to state that an attempt to start negotiations
within the meaning of Article 22 of CERD was unnecessary since, as Georgia now alleges, Russia
had refused to enter into negotiations.
VII. Concluding observations
47. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Article22 of CERD is a compromissory clause
that must be taken seriously. It is never a light matter to bring a contentious case before this Court.
It is for that reason that the drafters of CERD deliberately decided to require parties to settle
disputes arising under CERD by way of negotiati ons and the procedures expressly provided for in
the Convention. It is all the more important to apply these provisions in circumstances where a
CERD claim has never before been formulated and where suddenly racial discrimination is alleged
on a massive scale.
48. Mr.President, let me summarize: Georgia has ⎯ obviously ⎯ not made use of the
procedures expressly provided for in CERD. For this reason alone, its case cannot be entertained.
49. Moreover, Georgia has neither fulfilled the other procedural requirement set out in
Article 22 of CERD, namely, the requirement of negotiations.
50. It is therefore respectfully submitted that for this additional reason, too, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain Georgia’s Application.
51. Mr.President, this brings me to the e nd of my presentation and, at the same time,
concludes Russia’s first round of oral pleadings. Thank you very much for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorAndreasZimmermann for his statement. Now this
brings to an end today’s sitting. The Court will meet again on Tuesday 14 September at10 a.m. to
hear the first round of oral argument of Georgia.
The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 1.20 p.m.
173
Cf. S/PV.5953, p. 9.
Public sitting held on Monday 13 September 2010, at 10.20 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)