Uncorrected
Non corrigé
CR 2009/32
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Thursday 10 December 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada, presiding,
on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)
_____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 10 décembre 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
sur la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
des institutions provisoires d’administration autonome du Kosovo
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presidekta
Shi Judges
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Trindade Cançado
Yusuf
Greenwood
Couvgisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
M. Tomka v,ice-président
Shi MM.
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Grejugesood,
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is represented by:
Dr. Liesbeth Lijnzaad;
Professor Dr. Niels Blokker;
Professor Dr. René Lefeber;
Mr. Tom van Oorschot;
Mr. Siemon Tuinstra;
Mr. Michel van Winden;
Ms Daniëlle Best.
Romania is represented by:
Mr. Bogdan Aurescu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
H.E. Mr. Călin Fabian, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr. Cosmin Dinescu, Director-General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Ion Gâlea, Director, Directorate-General of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Felix Zaharia, Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
MsAlina Orosan, Second Secretary, Directorat e-General of Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs;
Ms Irina Niţă, First Secretary, Embassy of Romania in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is represented by:
Mr.Daniel Bethlehem QC, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Kanbar Hosseinbor, Deputy Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland;
MrJ.amesCrawford, S.C., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocate;
_______________________
For the complete list of delegations of all participants, please refer to CR 2009/29. - 5 -
Le Royaume des Pays-Bas est représenté par :
Mme Liesbeth Lijnzaad ;
M. Niels Blokker ;
M. René Lefeber ;
M. Tom van Oorschot ;
M. Siemon Tuinstra ;
M. Michel van Winden;
Mme Daniëlle Best.
La Roumanie est représentée par :
M. Bogdan Aurescu, secrétaire d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères ;
S. Exc. M. Călin Fabian, ambassadeur de la Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.CosminDinescu, directeur général des af faires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères ;
M.IonGâlea, directeur à la direction géné rale des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères ;
M. Felix Zaharia, directeur de cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères ;
MmeAlinaOrosan, deuxième secrétaire à la direction générale des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères ;
Mme Irina Niţă, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de Roumanie au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est représenté par :
M.DanielBethlehem, Q.C., conseiller juridi que du ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth, représentant du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord,
comme conseil et avocat ;
M.KanbarHosseinbor, représentant adjoint du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., professeur de droit inte rnational, titulaire de la chaire Whewell à
l’Université de Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseil et avocat ;
_______________________
Pour consulter la liste complète de toutes les délégations, prière de se reporter au CR 2009/29. - 6 -
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, Member of the English Bar, Member of the Paris Bar,
Ms Shaheed Fatima, Member of the English Bar,
as Counsel;
Dr. Tom Grant, Research Fellow at the Lauterpach t Centre for International Law, University
of Cambridge;
Ms Alice Lacourt, Legal Counsellor, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
Ms Joanne Neenan, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
Ms Joanna Hanson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
MsHelen Fazey, Head of Kosovo Section, Western Balkans Group, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. - 7 -
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris,
Mme Shaheed Fatima, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge ;
MmeAliceLacourt, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth ;
MmeJoanneNeenan, jurisconsulte adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth ;
Mme Joanna Hanson, ministère des affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth ;
Mme Helen Fazey, chef de la section Kosovo du groupe chargé des Balkans occidentaux du
ministère des affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets this morning to
hear the following participants on the question s ubmitted to the Court: the Netherlands, Romania
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I shall now give the floor to the
first speaker, Dr. Liesbeth Lijnzaad, representing the Netherlands.
Ms LIJNZAAD:
1. Introduction
1. Good morning, Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to address this
Court and to clarify my Government’s views on th e question before you. I feel particularly
privileged to address you today on Human Rights Da y: an affirmative answer to the question
before the Court will deliver a clear message to Stat es that effective, dissuasive and proportionate
remedies are available in the event they violate the human rights of peoples within their borders.
2. The law should serve us, the people of the world. Law has developed to facilitate and
regulate the interaction between indi viduals and groups of individuals, such as a people or a State.
For the law to achieve its purpose, it must provide stability. However, it must also provide the
flexibility to allow for societal adjustment when developments in society so require, and it must
provide for effective, dissuasive and proportionate remedies when there has been a breach of the
law. In this case, the law allowed the proclamation of independence by the people of Kosovo.
3. I will address the following points in my statement:
⎯ the existence and exercise of the post-colonial right to self-determination, in particular the
conditions that must be satisfied for a people to exercise the right to external
self-determination; and
⎯ the lawful exercise of the right to external self-determination by the people of Kosovo.
2. The post-colonial right to self-determination
4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , the Court, for the first time,
accepted a right of self-determination outside the context of decolonization. The right to
self-determination includes the right of peoples to freely determine their political status. The - 9 -
proclamation of independence by a people is but on e method of exercising this right of political
self-determination.
5. A people must exercise its right to political self-determination in accordance with
international law. International law includes the prin ciple of territorial integrity. It is therefore
necessary to determine whether the right to self-det ermination has been exercised in a manner that
preserves international boundaries, that is, internal self-determination, or in a manner that involves
a change of international boundaries, that is, ex ternal self-determination. The proclamation of
independence by the people of Kosovo was directed at a change of international boundaries and,
therefore, constitutes an instance of the exercise of the right to external self-determination.
6. A people must first seek to exercise its post-colonial right to political self-determination
with due respect for the principle of territorial integrity, that is, within existing international
boundaries. The right to political self-determination ma y, however, evolve into a right to external
self-determination in exceptional circumstances. This is an exception to the rule and it is therefore
to be construed narrowly. The resort to external self-determination is a last resort and it is subject
to conditions.
7. First, there are substantive conditions. A right to external self-determination only arises in
the event of a serious breach of either:
⎯ the obligation to respect and promote the right to self-determination due to the absence of a
government representing the whole people belong ing to the territory, or the denial of
fundamental human rights to a people; or
⎯ the obligation to refrain from any forcible action which deprives people of this right.
8. There is also a procedural condition. All effective remedies must have been exhausted in
the pursuit of a settlement before a people may have resort to the exercise of the right to external
self-determination. Accordingly, all avenues must have been explored to secure the respect for and
the promotion of the right to self-determination through available procedures, including bilateral
negotiations, the assistance of third parties and, where agreed or accessible, recourse to domestic or
indeed international courts and arbitral tribunals.
9. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in the course of these proceedings, it has been
argued that the existence of the post-colonial ri ght to external self-determination has not been - 10 -
demonstrated by the States supporting it. Ther e is an abundance of literature on the law of
self-determination. It provides a wealth of ma terial, including on the exercise of the right to
external self-determination. It is informative, but it may not be authoritative. The divergence of
views in doctrine prevents, in our view, its use as a source of international law under Article 38 of
the Statute of the Court. To answer the question before it, the Court will need to interpret treaty
provisions relating to self-determination and ascertain the legal opinions and the practice of States
on the matter. Indeed, the written statements, written comments and oral statements in these
proceedings will enable the Court to do exactly that.
10. It is hardly surprising that there are not many instances of the lawful exercise of the right
to external self-determination outside the cont ext of non-self-governing territories and foreign
occupation. First, the post-colonial right to ex ternal self-determination only emerged in the second
half of the last century. Second, as mentioned be fore, substantive and procedural conditions must
be satisfied before a people may resort to exte rnal self-determination. In the course of these
proceedings, many instances have been cited where the people concerned did, indeed, fail to meet
these conditions and could not lawfully exercise the ri ght to external self-determination. Yet, there
are several instances where the international commu nity has accepted the exercise of the right to
external self-determination. We would cite the establishment of Bangladesh and Croatia as
examples.
11. Instances where States disintegrated on the basis of consensual agreement differ from the
present case, but are not necessarily irrelevant. In some of these instances, the peoples concerned
acknowledged that the violation of the right to self-determination in the past had made it
impossible for them to continue living together in one State. We would cite the establishment of
Eritrea and Slovenia as examples.
3. The exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of Kosovo
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the violation of human rights in Kosovo at the end
of the last century has been well documented, in particular by the UnitedNations Special
Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia, and has been recognized by several organs of the
UnitedNations, including the General Assembly , the Security Council and the International - 11 -
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Even Serbia has recognized in these proceedings that
human rights violations have occurred in Kosovo.
13. These violations are at the root of our view that the people of Kosovo are, as a people,
entitled to external self-determination. In our Written Comments, we have submitted that there is a
people in Kosovo. We would point out that, in contrast to what was stated by Serbia in these
proceedings, the Swiss Government has adopted the same position in these proceedings and in
domestic parliamentary proceedings. Today, I w ill further argue that the right to external
self-determination in this case originates in the serious breaches by Serbia of the right to
self-determination of the people of Kosovo an d its corresponding obligations, namely, its
obligation to respect and promote this right, and its obligation to refrain from any forcible action
which deprives the people of Kosovo of this right.
3.1 The breach of the obligation to respect and promote the right to self-determination
14. Thus, there has been a serious breach of the obligation to respect and promote the right to
self-determination of the people of Kosovo, because:
⎯ there was no government representing the whole people in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
and
⎯ there has been a denial of the fundamental human rights in Kosovo.
3.1.1 The absence of a government representing the whole people
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, allow me to address the first point. There was no
government representing the whole people in the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia. In the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo had the status of an autonomous province. The Yugoslav
and Serbian authorities gradually brought Kosovo’s au tonomy to an end and aimed to take control.
Their success in doing so led to the complete marg inalization of the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo.
This process was described by the International Cr iminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its
1
Milutinović judgment of February this year .
1It may be noted that appeals have been filed after the submission of the Written Statement by the Kingdom of the
Netherlands on 17 April 2009 which are still pending. - 12 -
16. In the early 1980s, after the death of PresidentTito, Kosovo Albanians sought full
recognition for Kosovo as a republic. This led to demonstrations, some of which turned violent,
and the police and Yugoslav army were deployed. At the same time, there were increasing calls by
the Serbs to reduce the autonomy of Kosovo. Agai nst the backdrop of the break-up of Yugoslavia,
measures were put in place which involved the federal authorities usurping responsibility for
security within Kosovo. The Tribunal concluded that:
“from around 1989 differences between the aspira tions of the majority of the Kosovo
Albanian population and the designs of the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and
Serbian state authorities created a tense and unstable environment. Efforts by the
authorities to exert firmer control over the province and to diminish the influence of
the Kosovo Albanians on local governance, public services, and economic life
polarised the community. Indeed, laws, polic ies, and practices were instituted that
discriminated against the Albanians, feeding into local resentment and feelings of
persecution.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A so-called ‘parallel system’ thus developed, involving an unofficial
‘government’ and the provision of services to the Kosovo Albanian population
financed by a substantial émigré community and a voluntary ‘solidarity tax’.”
17. These findings demonstrate the absence of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which amounts to a breach of the obligation to
respect and promote the right to self-determinati on in Kosovo. This breach was serious because it
was systematic: the abrogation of autonomous powers together with the discriminatory laws,
policies and practices constitutes evidence that th e breach was organized and deliberate. The
breach was also serious in that it was gross: the necessity for Kosovo Albanians to develop a
parallel system of government constitutes evidence of the flagrant nature of the breach, which
amounted to a direct and outright assault on the values protected by the rule on a representative
government.
3.2 The denial of fundamental human rights
18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now turn to the second point. There has also
been a denial of fundamental human rights to the people of Kosovo. From mid-1998 the political
crisis in Kosovo culminated in an armed conf lict, involving forces of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and Serbia, and forces of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The armed conflict continued - 13 -
throughout the NATO aerial bombardment campaign from 24 March to 10 June 1999. Throughout
the armed conflict incidents occurred in which exces sive and indiscriminate force was used by the
Yugoslav army and the forces of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. This resulted in damage to
civilian property, population displacement, and civilian deaths. The Tribunal found that:
“the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was to ensure continued control
by the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] a nd Serbian authorities over Kosovo and that
it was to be achieved by criminal means. Through a widespread and systematic
campaign of terror and violence, the Kosovo Albanian population was to be forcibly
displaced both within and without Kosovo, the members of the joint criminal
enterprise were aware that it was unrealistic to expect to be able to displace each and
every Kosovo Albanian from Kosovo, so the common purpose was to displace a
number of them sufficient to tip the demogr aphic balance more toward ethnic equality
and in order to cow the Kosovo Albanians into submission.”
19. Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavi a and Serbia deliberately expelled at least
700,000 Kosovo Albanians, either by ordering them to leave, or by creating an atmosphere of terror
in order to effect their departure. Across Kosovo, forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Serbia conducted a broad campaign of violence dir ected against the Kosovo Albanian population,
involving killing, sexual assault and the intentional destruction of mosques.
20. These findings of the Yugoslavia Tribunal demonstrate that the campaign of terror and
violence involved war crimes and crimes agai nst humanity, and resulted in the denial of
fundamental human rights in Kosovo. This amounted to a breach of the obligation to respect and
promote the right to self-determination within Kosovo. This breach was serious because it was
systematic, the joint criminal enterprise in partic ular evidencing that the breach was organized and
deliberate. The breach was also serious in that it was gross: the number of expelled Kosovo
Albanians and the nature and extent of the viol ence directed against them constituted evidence of
the flagrant nature of the breach, which amounted to a direct and outright assault on fundamental
human rights.
3.2 The breach of the obligation to refrain from any forcible action
21. In Kosovo, there has additionally been a serious breach of the obligation to refrain from
forcible action which deprives people of their right to self-determination. This also follows from
the findings of the Tribunal, particularly in r espect of the forcible displacement of Kosovo
Albanians. - 14 -
3.3 The exhaustion of all effective remedies
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, not only the substantive condition, but also the
procedural condition that applies to the exercise by the people of Kosovo of the right to external
self-determination has been met. After all, all ef fective remedies that could be employed to settle
the status of Kosovo had been exhausted. For this purpose, a political process was implemented
under the auspices of the Security Co uncil. It was only after the failu re of all efforts to achieve a
settlement that the Special Envoy of the Secret ary-General concluded on 26March2007 that the
negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually ag reeable outcome on Kosovo’s status had been
exhausted and the only viable option for Kosovo w as independence. These conclusions were fully
supported by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
23. Subsequently, when it appeared that the Security Council was unable to agree on a
resolution that would have endorsed the proposals made by the SpecialEnvoy, a Troika was
established, composed of representatives of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the
United States, to try to find a solution. The Troi ka worked intensively for four months on the issue
of the future status of Kosovo and delivered its report on 4 December 2007. Its objective had been
to facilitate an agreement between the parties. Notwithstanding the high-level, intensive and
substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristi na that the Troika was able to facilitate, an
agreement on the final status of Kosovo could not be reached. As the Troika reported, neither party
was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo.
24. Extensive further discussions took place in a number of meetings of the Security
Council, but did not result in a solution. It w as therefore only after the exhaustion of the political
process and in the absence of further guidance from the Security Council that the independence of
Kosovo was proclaimed on 17 February 2008.
25. The observation of Serbia in its Written Comments, that the procedural condition to
exhaust all effective remedies had not been met, be cause of the very fact of the holding of these
advisory proceedings, is beside the point. The re quest for an advisory opinion was clearly not an
effective remedy for the people of Kosovo as this pe ople could not have submitted a proposal to
that effect to the General Assembly, could not have negotiated the terms of reference or the request
in the General Assembly with the Members of the United Nations, and secured a vote in favour of - 15 -
such a request. It would have been for Serbia to propose to seek an advisory opinion from this
Court during the status negotiations or, alternativel y, to refer the question of the exercise of the
right of external self-determination by the people of Kosovo to an arbitral tribunal. Serbia,
however, has not done so at that time.
26. It has also been said that the people of Kosovo cannot exercise the right to external
self-determination in2008, because the situation in Kosovo has not aggravated since1999. We
have already submitted in our Written Statement that , in this case, the right to self-determination
was not affected by the passage of time since the serious breaches of this right. The time was used,
first, to establish international security and civ il presences in Kosovo and, second, to facilitate a
political process to achieve a political solution of th e situation relating to Kosovo. Thus, the time
was used to satisfy the procedur al condition for the exercise of th e right to self-determination,
namely, the exhaustion of all effective remedies to achieve a settlement on the status of Kosovo.
4. R EFLECTIONS
27. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the emergence of the right to external
self-determination has not been without controversy. On the one hand, the exercise of this right
results in a reconfiguration of the international community and may affect the essential requirement
of stability referred to by the Court in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute. On the other hand,
as a result of past events, it may be that stability can only be achieved through change. The law, in
particular the law on self-determination, provides guidance in this difficult process of change.
28. In the case before us, the law supports th e people of Kosovo. Following the serious
failure of Serbia to comply with its obligations relating to the self-determination of the people of
Kosovo, the people of Kosovo could no longer be e xpected to live together with the people of
Serbia in one State. In this case, lawful use h as been made by the people of Kosovo of the remedy
that international law provides for these very serious human rights violations.
29. Is there reason to fear, as has been argue d in these proceedings, that the recognition by
the Court of the right to external self-determina tion of the people of Kosovo would be a dangerous
precedent ⎯ a precedent that could easily be followed by other groups of individuals who declare
themselves to be a people entitled to self-determination? In our view, such fear is not justified. On - 16 -
the contrary, it would be the absence of an effec tive, dissuasive and proportionate remedy for the
violation of the right to self-determination that endangers peace and stability. The recognition by
the Court of this remedy of last resort, including the conditions that must be satisfied to have
recourse to it, will contribute to peace and stab ility. It will deter States from violating human
rights, and peoples from too readily seeking to avail themselves of this remedy. The conditions set
the bar high. They set it very high indeed.
5.C ONCLUSIONS
30. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is the legal opinion of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands that the right to political self-d etermination includes the right to external
self-determination in the case of a serious breach of the obligation to respect and promote the right
to self-determination, or the obligation to refra in from any forcible action which deprives peoples
of this right where all effective remedies have b een exhausted. The recognition of Kosovo by the
Kingdom of the Netherlands is based on this view and constitutes an instance of State practice in a
case where, exceptionally, the conditions for the exercise of the right to external self-determination
were satisfied.
31. We reaffirm the submissions made in our Written Statement and Written Comments. In
particular, in our statement, we have reaffirmed and argued:
⎯ the existence and exercise of the post-colonial right to self-determination, in particular the
conditions that must be satisfied to resort to the right to external self-determination; and
⎯ the lawful exercise of the right to external self-determination by the people of Kosovo.
32. Furthermore, we have reaffirmed and de monstrated that lawful use was made by the
people of Kosovo of the right of external self-determination, because:
⎯ there has been a serious breach of the oblig ation to respect and promote the right to
self-determination in Kosovo;
⎯ there has also been a serious breach of the ob ligation to refrain from forcible action which
deprives peoples of their right to self-determination in Kosovo; and
⎯ all effective remedies to settle the status of Kosovo have been exhausted. - 17 -
33. It is, therefore, the opinion of my Government that the answer to the question should be
that the proclamation of independence of Kos ovo on 17February2008 is in accordance with
international law.
Thank you for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Liesbeth Lijnzaad for her statement. I shall now give the
floor to His Excellency Mr. Bogdan Aurescu to present the oral statement by Romania.
Mr. AURESCU:
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour and privilege to appear again
before this Court.
2. In September2008, I had the honour to plead, as Agent, counsel and advocate for my
country, in the first contentious case of Romania before the Court ⎯ the case concerning Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine). The Judgment rendered unanimously on
3February2009 proved that recourse to judicial settlement of international disputes is the best
instrument for a country like mine, which places the principles of international law at the very core
of its foreign policy. The decision of the Court was welcomed with the highest degree of
satisfaction by the Romanian people.
3. Mr. President, Romania fully maintains all the arguments submitted in the written phase of
these proceedings. Today, we shall address only certain essential points: first, I will refer to the
propriety of the advisory opinion and the meaning of the question; second, to the applicability of
international law to this case; and, third, to the relevance of Security Council resolutions. My
colleague CosminDinescu will discuss the appli cability in this case of the international law on
self-determination.
Propriety of the advisory opinion
4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it was argued that compelling reasons 2 may prevent
the Court from exercising its competence, such as the lack of legal effect of the opinion on the
status of Kosovo or the impossibility of the Ge neral Assembly to trigger any consequences from
2
CR 2009/25, p. 31, para. 5 (authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence). - 18 -
this opinion. With due respect to the discretiona ry power of the Court to provide an advisory
opinion, the Court should remain consistent with its practice, as stated in the Palestinian Wall
Advisory Opinion : “The present Court has never, in the exercise of this discretionary power,
declined to respond to a request for an advisory opinion.” ( Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 2004 (I), p.156, para. 44.) Moreover, as recalled in the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, “the effect of [an] opinion is a matte r of appreciation” for the United Nations
body requesting it, as the General Assembly has the right to decide for itself the usefulness and the
effect of the opinion ( Legality of the Threat or Use of Nucl ear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (I), p.237, paras.16, 17). Therefore, the Court should not decline to answer the
3
question posed on the ground that it allegedly lacks any legal effect or any useful purpose .
Meaning of the question
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will refer now to the meaning of the question. It
was argued that a declaration of independence per se is just a fact and as such is neither allowed
nor prohibited by international law . But if we were to accept such a narrow interpretation of the
question quod non, then the Court should confirm the conclusion drawn by the delegation of
Austria in its oral statement: “As already stat ed, a declaration of independence as such does not
5
have the effect of creating secession or establishing a State.”
6. However, it is not only the Declaration of Independence that should be analysed by the
Court, but also the legal consequences that this Declaration may directly entail. I would like to
refer to three points on this subject.
7. First, the text of the Declaration cannot be ignored by the Court, as the most important
part of it speaks of a declared “independent and sovereign State”. The Declaration is genuinely
linked to an alleged creation of a State. And it is this alleged creation of a State that is intended, by
3Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Report 2004 (I), p. 163, para. 62.
4CR2009/25, p.38, para. 18 (Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence); CR2009/26, p.12,
paras. 12, 13 (Albania); CR 2009/27, p. 7, para. 5 (Austria); CR 2009/28, p. 23, para. 22 (Bulgaria); CR 2009/30 p. 29,
para. 18 (United States of America).
5CR2009/27, p.8, para.10 (Austria); see also CR2009/ 30, p. 29, para. 18 (United States of America):
“Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence declared a political aspiration”. - 19 -
its authors, to be its direct and immediate legal consequence. Therefore, this issue should be
analysed by the Court. Indeed, as Professor Crawford proposes in his valued work The Creation of
States in International Law , the creation of States cannot be regarded today as a mere question of
fact, but as subject to international law rules and principles 6. Thus, the question is not only whether
the simple issuance of a declaration of independen ce is allowed or prohibited by international law,
but whether international law allows or prohibits unilateral secession in the given circumstances of
7
this case .
8. Second, having in mind the necessity to addr ess the core issue of the case, that is, the
legality of unilateral secession, the Court should not interpret the question narrowly. In its constant
jurisprudence, the Court has often been required to broaden, interpret or even reformulate the
question before it 8. As stated in its Opinion concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of
25March1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion, I.C.JReports1980, pp. 87-89,
paras.34-36), the Court has the power to determin e the “true legal question” under examination.
The “true legal question” in this case refers to whether the creation of a State on the basis of
unilateral secession is legal in the given circumstan ces. There would be no reasons for the Court
not to make use of its well-recognized powers in this respect.
9. Third, the opinion should provide useful guidance for the General Assembly and the other
competent organs of the United Nations. As it has been recalled by the Court’s constant case law,
such as Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, the object of the request for an opinion is “to guide the
United Nations in respect of its own actions” and to assist the General Assembly “for the proper
exercise of its functions” (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 27, paras. 39,
9
41, 42). As stated before , the United Nations organs decide for and by themselves on the
usefulness of an opinion and on the possibility to act on the basis of it. The answer of the Court
could be of real use to the exercise of the functions of the General Assembly, such as those based
6
See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 6.
7See also Written Statement of the United Kingdom, p. 24, para. 1.14.
8Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C. I.J., SeriesB, No.8; Admissibilit y of Hearings of Petitioners by the
Committee on South West Africa, Advi sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 25; Certain Expenses of the United Nations
(Article17, paragraph2, of the Charter) , Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , pp.157-162; Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Oc cupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.Reports2004 (I),p. 154,
para. 38.
9Supra, para. 7, footnotes 6,7. - 20 -
on Articles 4 or 10 of the United Nations Charter, but only if the opinion addresses the “true legal
question”, the core issue of these proceedings, that is represented by the legality of the creation of a
State by unilateral secession, in the given circumstances.
Applicable international law
10. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I would like to emphasize an important issue
regarding the applicable law. It has been argue d that secession is not prohibited by international
law and that the principle of territorial integr ity applies only between States and does not protect
States from secessionist movements and that non- State actors are not bound by this principle 10.
Accepting this statement would lead to extremel y severe consequences for the international legal
order. It would mean that any province, distri ct, county, or even the smallest hamlet from any
corner of any State, is allowed by interna tional law to declare independence and to obtain
secession.
11. The principle of territorial integrity requir es States to refrain from any steps that might
jeopardize the territorial integrity of other States. This includes the obligation not to recognize a
11
territorial change that is c ontrary to international law . The principle embodies two legal
components: first, recognition, and second, the le gality of the territorial change. A misleading
argument has been presented in this Hall of Justi ce, following three steps. One, it was argued that
recognition falls outside the scope of the question submitted to the Court and, therefore, you are not
able to examine it. Two, for this reason, the Cour t cannot examine either the territorial change that
may be the object of recognition. Three, it was argu ed that this territorial change is not regulated
by international law, but, at most, by the domestic law of certain States. Mr. President, Members
of the Court, by this construction, several partic ipants in the pleadings are invoking the so-called
narrow meaning of the question in order to demonstrate that secession is not regulated by
international law. This cannot be accepted. Prohi bition of unilateral secession is one of the two
elements of territorial integrity.
10
CR2009/25, p.30, para. 2, p.43, para. 26 (authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence);
CR 2009/26, p. 13, para. 19 (Albania); CR 2009/30, p. 30, para. 20 (United States of America).
11UN General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), principle 1, para. 9; principle 5, para. 7. - 21 -
12. Even States supporting the Declaration of Independence accept that there is a rule
generally prohibiting secession, and I am quoting from the oral statement of Albania:
“there is no doubt that self-determination does not give rise to a general right of
secession. However, in situations where th e conditions are grossly and systematically
violated and a people is denied full participation in the political life ..., there is no
prohibition against secession . . .12
Mr. President, this is a clear acknowledgement that secession is regulated by international law. The
prohibition of secession is the rule, while the remedial secession in exceptional circumstances is
proposed to be the exception. My colleague Cosmin Dinescu will refer to this shortly.
Relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now go to the next part of my presentation,
concerning the relevance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
14. I will not provide a thorough analysis of the provisions of resolution 1244. I will address
the Court only on four major points: first, the combined effect of resolution1244 and previous
resolutions; second, the alleged distinction between “interim settlement” and “final settlement”;
third, the alleged “exhaustion of negotiation possibilities”; and fourth, the relevance of the absence
of reaction from United Nations bodies.
Combined effect of resolutions ⎯ the status of Kosovo must respect the sovereignty of Serbia
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, resolution 1244 should be seen in connection with
resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203 and 1239, which are recalled in its second preambular paragraph. As
the Court stated in the Namibia Advisory Opinion (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 , p. 51, para. 108), before analysing a
resolution it is necessary for the C ourt to refer to previous resoluti ons, since they have a combined
and cumulative effect.
16. Thus, resolution 1160 is the first to menti on in paragraph 5 that the Council “agrees that
the principles for a solution of Kosovo should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia”. This operative pa ragraph is not subject to any conditions.
12
CR 2009/26, p. 20, para. 8 (Albania). - 22 -
Resolution1199 goes further, speaking of the “commitment of all Member States to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY” ⎯ this is from preambular paragraphs12
and 13 ⎯ and this is reiterated in resolutions 1203 and 1239.
17. Resolution1244 reaffirms in its pream bular paragraph10 this commitment to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. It was argued that this reference in the preamble of
13
the resolution does not entail a legal effect . But such an argument cannot be upheld. First, the
international jurisprudence is consistent in gran ting legal effect to preambles of resolutions and
treaties ⎯ see for instance the Namibia Advisory Opinion 14 or the Beagle Channel Arbitral
15
Award ⎯ and second, the preamble of resolution1244 must be read together with operative
paragraph 5 of resolution 1160 16.
18. Moreover, it was argued that confirmation of territorial integrity is only for the interim
17
period, because of the reference to “Annex 2” . I will make two points on this issue. First, before
mentioning “Annex2”, paragraph 10 refers to the Helsinki Fi nal Act, which sets forth inter alia
two key principles: territorial integrity and inviol ability of frontiers. Second, the combined effect
of resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1244 imposes the legal consequence that the status of Kosovo should
respect the sovereignty of Serbia. As I stat ed before, this prohibits the establishment of
independence without the agreement of both sides concerned.
Distinction between “interim settlement” and “final settlement”
19. It was also argued 18 that a distinction should be ma de between the “final settlement” ⎯
letters (e) and (f) of paragraph11 of resolution12 44, and the “interim settlement” ⎯ letter (a) of
paragraph11, in the sense that only the latter is subject to the legal framing of “substantial
13Written Contribution of the authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence regarding the Written
Statements, p. 67, para. 4.15.
14Legal Consequences for States of th e Continued Presence of South Afri ca in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution276 (1970 ), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 , p. 24, para. 32, p. 46,
para. 92, p. 51, para. 107, p. 52, para. 109, p. 53, para. 115.
15Case Concerning a dispute between Arge ntina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channe l, 18 Feb. 1977, RIAA,
Vol. XXI, p. 89.
16Supra, para. 17.
17CR 2009/30, p. 32, para. 26.
18
Written Statement of France, p.23, para.2.33; CR 2009/25, p.51, para.24 (authors of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence). - 23 -
19
autonomy and self-government” within Serbia. Moreover, it was argued that the final process
should be submitted only to the principles of the Rambouillet Accords, which speak about the “will
of the people”. I will make four comments on these arguments.
20. First, as enshrined in paragraph11 of the preamble of resolution1244, the Security
Council called in the previous resolutions for “substantial autonomy and meaningful
self-administration” for Kosovo without distinc tion between an interim solution and a final
solution. At the same time, both letters (a) and (e) of operative paragraph11 refer to the
Rambouillet Accords. Thus, there is no need for such a distinction.
21. Second, the Rambouillet Accords themsel ves, which should be “taken into account”
according to resolution1244, reaffirm in a number of provisions the sovereignty and territorial
20
integrity of the FRY . For instance, Article1 of the “Framework” sets forth that “the national
communities shall not use their additional rights to endanger the... territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.
22. Third, the fact that the final chapter of the Rambouillet Agreement refers in its Article I.3
to the “will of the people” should definitely not be interpreted in the sense of taking account “only”
of the will of the people. This is only one cr iterion. We should not forget that during the
negotiations for Rambouillet, the delegation of Pr istina stated that “a reference to sovereignty
would constrain the delegation of Kosova to insist on a clearer formulation of the obligation to hold
a referendum” and proposed for the following provi sion to be included in the preamble: “The
people of Kosovo are entitled to exercise the right to self-determination.” But, these proposals
were not accepted. The refe rence to sovereignty remained 21. Moreover, the same paragraphI.3
refers also to the Helsinki Final Act, being well known that two of its core fundamental principles
are territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers.
19CR2009/25, p.52, para. 27 (authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence); CR2009/30, p.61,
para. 22.
20The preamble of the “Rambouillet Agreement”, Art.1 of the Framework, the preamble of Chap.1 of the
Framework, Art. 1 of its Chap. 7.
21Kosova Delegation Statement on New Proposal for a Settlement, 18 Feb. 1999, in Mark Weller, The Crisis in
Kosovo 1989-1999, Documents and Analysis Publishing Ltd., Cambridge, pp. 444-445 ⎯ the Statement provided: “(the
proposal was not accepted)”. - 24 -
23. Fourth, in no way the Security Council c ould have imposed to one State to accept the
secession of a portion of its territory, in the absence of agreement of the parties concerned or in
other situations than those where self-determination applied, in the colonial context. As recalled by
Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in Namibia, the Security Council may not “abrogate or
alter territorial rights, whether of sovereignty or administration” (Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 , p.294, para.115,
dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
The obligation to negotiate
24. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it was argued by certain participants to these
proceedings that the principle of a negotiated and agreed solution was rendered inapplicable by the
22
fact that “all possibilities of negotiation have been exhausted” .
25. In our case, the general international la w obligation to negotiate in good faith precludes
the assumption that all such possibilities have b een exhausted. As the Court recalled in North Sea
Continental Shelf 23case and in Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) , the parties are
under the obligation to negotiate “with a view to a rriving to an agreement, and not merely to go
through a formal process”. From the perspective of this case, it is apparent that this obligation was
not fully respected. I quote from the Written Contribution of the authors of the Declaration:
“Kosovo’s position was clear. Pristina insisted that the settlement should result in the
independence of Kosovo.” 25 So, Kosovo’s position was not only “clear”, but also predetermined
and immovable, from the very beginning of negotiations . It is of course true that the obligation to
negotiate does not imply the obligation to reach an agreement, as the Permanent Court of
International Justice stated in Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland 26. However, the
22
E.g., Written Statement of the United Kingdom, pp. 67-68, 72-76.
23North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47.
24Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 31; Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/Un ited States of America), A ppointment of Expert, Order
of 30 March 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 299.
25Written Contribution of the authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, p. 98, para. 5.13.
26Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 42, p. 116. - 25 -
obligation to negotiate implies the duty to accept the possibility of an agreement, and not to simply
deny it by constant inflexible unilateral conduct.
Absence of a reaction from United Nations organs
after the Declaration of Independence
27
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it was argued that the absence of reaction of the
Security Council after independence was declar ed could be interpreted as an acknowledgement
from the part of the Council ⎯ or the international community in general ⎯ that secession did not
breach any international law rules.
27. The compte rendu of the discussions of the Security Council meeting of
18February2008 provides a clear picture: there was disagreement among its members with
respect to the legality of the attempt to create a new State.
28. Certain States denounced within that meeting the illegality of the Declaration of
Independence, suggesting that United Nations bodi es should take action. No decision was taken,
however. In this context, I recall the Court’s jurisprudence, especially the Advisory Opinion on
Competence of Assembly regarding Admission to the United Nations (Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950 , p.9), stating that “The Court cannot accept the suggestion made... [that] the
absence of a recommendation” could be treated as “equivalent to what is described... as an
‘unfavourable recommendation’”. Thus, an absence of a recommendation is nothing more than an
absence of a recommendation.
29. Indeed, the United Nations position towards the status of Kosovo is “status neutrality” 2.
The fact that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General did not declare the Declaration of
Independence as void, as Serbia requested, must in no way be interpreted as confirming the
Declaration, but as consistent with this “status ne utrality”. As in the case of the Security Council,
this absence of action means nothing more than an absence of action with no legal consequences
attached.
27E.g., Written Contribution of the authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, pp. 175-176, para. 9.27.
Also oral statements: CR2009/25, pp.60 -61, paras.56-61 (authors of the Unilteral Declaration of Independence);
CR 2009/26, p. 13, para. 16 (Albania).
28S/2009/300; S/2009/149; S/2008/692; see, for example, statement of the Sp ecial Representative before the
Security Council, 17June2009: “our status neutrality allows us to use our efforts to nurture and foster regional
co-operation”, doc. SC/9683, Security Council, 6144th Meeting, 17 June 2009. - 26 -
30. What should be the meaning of “status neutrality” of the United Nations? First,
disagreement among the UnitedNations Members bot h on a factual situation and on a legal
question, as the General Assembly recalled in the preamble of resolution 63/3; second, the fact that
the UnitedNations shall not back the position of either side, as long as there is no negotiated
solution between Belgrade and Pristina. This re inforces the conclusion of my previous argument,
that the solution in the case of Kosovo must be negotiated and agreed.
31. Mr. President, Members of the Court, allow me to summarize my arguments: (i) first, no
compelling reasons should prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; (ii) second, the Court
should use its powers to interpret the question, in order to respond to the “true legal question”;
(iii)third, general international law prohibits secessi on; (iv)fourth, the relevant Security Council
resolutions provide for the respect of the territorial integrity of Serbia; (v) fifth, the solution of the
Kosovo status process can be in no other way but negotiated and agreed by the parties.
32. Mr. President, Members of the Court, allow me to express my deepest gratitude for your
kind attention. My colleague Cosmin Dinescu will continue the presentation of Romania.
M. DINESCU :
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur pour moi de paraître
une nouvelle fois devant vous pour présenter la deuxième inte rvention de la Roumanie. Je me
référerai dans mon exposé à l’appl icabilité dans la présente affaire du droit des peuples à disposer
d’eux-mêmes, une question traitée par pas mal de délégations, qui ont abouti, bien évidemment, à
des conclusions diverses, sinon opposées. Avant de faire l’analyse de cette question, je me
référerai brièvement à quelques points connexes.
L’existence ou non d’un droit à la sécession dans le droit international
2. Le premier élément est la question de la sécession. Certains participants à la présente
procédure ont affirmé que, à l’instar des déclara tions d’indépendance, lesquelles ne seraient ni
réglementées, ni interdites par le droit interna tional, la sécession, elle non plus, ne serait ni
29
réglementée, ni interdite par le droit international . Bien-sûr, très fréquemment la sécession est
29
Voir, par exemple, l’exposé écrit du Royaume-Uni, p. 87-93, par. 5.12-5.33. - 27 -
interdite par le droit constitutionnel interne, mais de telles interdictions seraient-elles pertinentes,
étant donné que c’est le droit international qui est appliqué par la Cour, et non le droit interne 30.
3. La Roumanie ne partage pas une telle approche. Mon collègue et ami BogdanAurescu
s’est déjà référé à certains aspects de cette question. J’y ajouterai quelques points importants. En
ce qui concerne la relation entre la sécession et le droit international, on considère pleinement
valables les principes énoncés par la Cour suprême du Canada dans son avis relatif à la sécession
du Québec :
«Le droit international attache une gra nde importance à l’intégrité territoriale
des Etats Nations et, de manière générale, lais se le droit interne de l’Etat existant dont
l’entité sécessionniste fait toujours partie décider de la création ou non d’un nouvel
Etat... Dans les cas, comme celui qui nous occupe, où la sécession unilatérale serait
incompatible avec la c onstitution interne, le dro it international acceptera
vraisemblablement cette conclusion, sous réser31 du droit des peuples à disposer
d’eux-mêmes, ou droit à l’autodétermination…»
4. Donc, dans les situations où le droit intern e des Etats ne permet pas la sécession, elle sera
compatible au droit international seulement si elle était une manifestation du droit des peuples à
disposer d’eux-mêmes. En d’autres mots: la présomption ne serait pas que la sécession soit
conforme au droit international, donc les cas de non-conformité apparaîtraient seulement si la
méconnaissance du droit était établie, mais à l’inverse: la présomption est que la sécession n’est
pas conforme au droit international, et les cas de conformité sont établis seulement s’ils sont basés
soit sur le droit interne de l’Etat en cause, soit sur le droit des peuples à l’autodétermination.
5. Dans ce contexte, sont pertinents les pr opos de Mme Rosalyn Higgins qui, en se référant
aux mots du juge Dillard dans l’affaire du Sahara occidental, cités il y a deux jours dans l’exposé
oral de la Finlande 3, remarquait que «it still has to be said that the territorial issue does come first.
Until it is determined where territorial sovereignty lies, it is impossible to see if the inhabitants
33
have a right of self-determination.»
30
Voir, par exemple, l’exposé écrit du Royaume-Uni, p. 87, par. 5.13.
31 Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec , Cour suprême du Canada, 1998, par.112, disponible sur
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/fr/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html
32 «It is for the people to determine the destiny of thrritory and not the territory the destiny of the people»,
Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 122, dans CR 2009/30, p. 54, par. 7 (Finlande).
33 Higgins, Rosalyn, «International La w and the Avoidance, Containment a nd Resolution of Disputes. General
Course on Public International Law», RCADI, 1991, vol. 230, p. 174. - 28 -
La date critique
6. Le deuxième point dont je vais discuter se ré fère à la question de la date critique. Cette
question est pertinente dans le contexte de l’ analyse de l’applicabilité en l’espèce du droit des
peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes. La Roumanie note que certains participants aux procédures
orales ont accordé de la pertinence à de nombreux éléments de fait ou de droit, soit épuisés
antérieurement à la date de l’a doption de la déclaration d’indépenda nce, soit parus ultérieurement.
A notre avis, baser l’analyse seulement sur des faits qui se sont produ its presque une décennie
avant la date critique, dans des circonstances fondamentalement différentes, représente une
construction complètement artificielle, qui ne pe ut pas être acceptée. Une telle construction
contreviendrait au principe général de droit tempus regit actum.
7. En conséquence, la date à prendre en considération pour l’analyse de l’applicabilité ou
non du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêm es est la date à laquelle la déclaration
d’indépendance a été adoptée par les institutions pr ovisoires d’administration du Kosovo. On ne
peut qu’être d’accord avec la conclusion du Dane mark à cet égard: «17February2008 is the
crucial date» 3.
Le statut du Kosovo dans l’ancienne République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie
8. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, plusieurs délégations se sont référées, dans
leurs plaidoiries, au statut du Kosovo au sein de l’ancienne République soci aliste fédérative de
Yougoslavie (RSFY) et aux événements qui ont conduit à la terminaison de ce statut 35. La
Roumanie ne se prononce pas sur ces aspects du droi t constitutionnel yougoslave et ne prétend pas
les connaître mieux que certaines délégations qui représentent des pays anciens membres de la
Fédération yougoslave.
9. Mais la Roumanie ne peut pas être d’accord avec la conclusion que le statut spécifique du
Kosovo dans le cadre de l’ex-RSFY pourrait jus tifier la sécession unilatérale de la province ou
l’applicabilité du droit à l’autodétermination à la date critique. Si le statut du Kosovo pendant
l’ex-RFSY lui aurait permis d’invoquer avec succès un tel droit à l’époque de l’ex-RSFY est hors
de la discussion : à la date de l’adoption de la déclaration d’indépendance, le Kosovo ne faisait plus
34
CR 2009/29, p. 68 (Danemark).
35
Par exemple, exposé oral de la Croatie, CR 2009/29, p. 59-59, par. 13-45 (Croatie). - 29 -
partie de la République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie ; en effet, à ce moment l’ex-Fédération
yougoslave avait déjà disparu depuis longtemps, la commission Badinter ayant confirmé sa «mort»
dans sa huitièmeopinion seizeans avant. Da ns ce contexte, je voudrais aussi exprimer le
désaccord de la Roumanie avec certains arguments selon lesquels le processus de dissolution de
36
l’ancienne Fédération yougoslave aurait continué après 1992 , en incluant aussi l’indépendance du
Monténégro ou la sécession du Kosovo. Le processu s de dissolution de la République socialiste
fédérative de Yougoslavie, caractérisé par des circonstances particulières, s’est terminé en 1992, tel
que constaté par la commission Badinter, et le s événements des années 2000 se sont produits dans
des circonstances tout à fait différentes.
10. En conclusion, à la date critique, le Kos ovo était partie intégrante de la Serbie, Etat
continuateur de l’ex-République fédérale de Yougoslavie, mais n on de l’ex-République socialiste
fédérative de Yougoslavie. Comme la Cour s’ est déjà prononcée, l’ex-RFY n’a pas été le
continuateur de l’ex-RSFY, mais l’un des cinq Et ats successeurs. Donc, même si le Kosovo aurait
eu un statut particulier au sein de l’ex-RSFY, ce st atut n’était plus applicable dans le cadre du
nouvel Etat. Et c’est de ce nouvel Etat que le Kosovo tente faire sécession par la déclaration
d’indépendance. Par conséquent, l’ancien statut du Kosovo dans l’ancienne Fédération yougoslave
ne peut pas être invoqué comme justifiant un droit de sécession unilatérale ou l’applicabilité des
droits à l’autodétermination. En même temp s, je veux mentionner en passant que l’assertion que,
après la dissolution de l’ex-République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie, le Kosovo n’est plus
37
resté de jure comme partie de la nouvelle Répub lique fédérale de Yougoslavie nous semble au
moins étrange.
La qualité des auteurs de la déclaration d’indépendance
11. Un autre aspect qui doit être clarifié con cerne la qualité dans laquelle les auteurs de la
déclaration d’indépendance ont agi quand ils ont adopté cet acte. Pas mal de participants aux
38
plaidoiries ont opéré une distinction entre les institu tions provisoires d’administration autonome
36
Voir, par exemple, l’exposé oral des Etats-Unis, CR 2009/30, p. 25, par. 7.
37CR 2009/31, p. 34, 41, par. 27-28, 53 (Jordanie).
38Voir, par exemple, l’exposé oral des auteurs de la déclaration d’indépendance, CR2009/25, p.11-17,
par. 34-37 (Müller) ; l’exposé oral de la Norvège, CR 2009/31, p. 45-46, par. 13-15. - 30 -
du Kosovo et les auteurs de la déclaration, qu i ne représenteraient pas ces institutions mais un
pouvoir constituant représentatif du Kosovo.
12. Ad arguendo , disons qu’on accepte une telle interp rétation. Mais est-ce que ce fait
changera les données de notre affaire? A notre avis, la réponse est non. Indépendamment de la
qualité des auteurs de la déclara tion d’indépendance, cette déclar ation, toute ensemble avec la
sécession proclamée par elle, doit respecter les mêmes critères requis par le droit international
applicable dans l’affaire: l’indépendance, co mme solution pour le statut du Kosovo, quoique
proclamée par les institutions provisoires d’admi nistration ou par le pouvoir constitutif du Kosovo,
ne peut pas être unilatérale. En même temp s, la qualité du Kosovo de titulaire ou non du droit à
l’autodétermination ne dépend pas de la qualité des auteurs de la déclaration; il y a d’autres
critères à appliquer.
Droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes ⎯ la règle
13. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, je ferai maintenant l’analyse de l’applicabilité
dans notre affaire du droit des peuples à l’autodé termination. On fonde notre position sur deux
postulats :
a) premièrement, hors du contexte colonial, le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes
s’applique, comme règle, dans le cadre des Etats existants ;
b) et deuxièmement, une possible exception à cette règle serait la «sécession remède», selon
laquelle le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes pourrait s’appliquer à certaines parties des
Etats existants, comme ultime ressort, dans des conditions strictement déterminées.
Je vais me référer aux deux questions dans les minutes suivantes.
14. La doctrine et la jurisprudence concordent en affirmant que, au-delà du contexte colonial
ou des cas d’occupation, la règle établie par le principe d’autodétermination est que les peuples
exercent ce droit dans le cadre des Etats existants. Le dictum de la Cour suprême du Canada, selon
lequel «le droit d’un peuple à disposer de lui-même est normalement réalisé par voie
d’autodétermination interne ⎯ à savoir la poursuite par ce peupl e de son développement politique, - 31 -
39
économique, social et culturel dans le cadre d’un Etat existant» reste pleinement valable et ne fut
contesté par aucun participant à nos plaidoiries.
15. D’ailleurs, la même conclusion a ét é clairement affirmée par l’éminent juriste
JamesCrawford, dans son Œuvre monumentale The Creation of States in International Law. Je
suis sûr que M.Crawford nous dira davantage sur ce sujet aujourd’hui même, mais jusqu’à ce
moment-là, j’oserai le citer :
«[the principle of self-determination] appli es to existing States… In this case the
principle of self-determination normally takes the well-known form of the rule
preventing intervention in the internal affairs of a State, a central element of which is
the right of the people of the State to choose for themselves their own form of
government.» 40
16. Conformément à cette règle, il n’y a aucun conflit entre le droit à l’autodétermination et
le droit à l’intégrité territoriale des Etats; au contraire, les deux se renforcent mutuellement.
Comme l’a dit la Cour suprême du Canada, «le droit à l’autodétermination est censé être exercé par
des peuples, à l’intérieur d’Etats s ouverains existants, et conformément au principe du maintien de
l’intégrité territoriale de ces Etats» . 41
17. Cette approche a été confirmée tout récemment par la mission internationale
indépendante d’enquête sur le conflit en Géorgie, dans son rapport publié en septembre2009:
«outside the colonial context, self-determination is basically limited to internal self-determination.
42
A right to external self-determination in form of a secession is not accepted in state practice.»
18. En appliquant donc le principe de l’auto détermination à notre cas, il en résulte que le
Kosovo n’est pas, et n’a pas été, à la date critique comme dans une quelconque période passée, une
entité ayant le droit à l’autodétermination impliquant la sécession unilatérale de la Serbie. Le droit
39 Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec , Cour suprême du Canada, 1998, par.126, disponible sur
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/fr/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html .
40«Il [le principe de l’autodétermination] s’applique aux Etats déjà existants... Dans ce cas-là, le principe
d’autodétermination prend la forme, très bien connue, de la règle de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre
Etat, dont l’élément central est le droit des peuples d’un Etat de choisi r leur forme de gouvernement.» James Crawford,
La création des Etats dans le droit international(The Creation of States in International Law) , 2 édition, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 126.
41
Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec , Cour suprême du Canada, 1998, par.122, disponible sur
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/fr/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html .
42
«hors du contexte colonial, l’autodétermination est limitée pratiquement à l’autodétermination interne. Un
droit à l’autodétermination externe dans la forme de la sé cession n’est pas accepté dans la pratique des Etats.»; rapport
de la mission internationale indépendante d’enquête sur le conflit en Géorgie (Inde pendent International Fact -Finding
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia), disponible sur http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.htmlp. 141. - 32 -
des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes revient à tous les habitants de l’Etat serbe, y inclus les
habitants du Kosovo, dans le cadre de l’Etat serbe.
19. Dans ce contexte, Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, je voudrais me référer à un
autre argument avancé dans les plaidoiries : la référence à la «volonté du peuple» dans les accords
de Rambouillet constituerait une base pour que le Kosovo jouisse du droit d’autodétermination
impliquant la sécession. Je cite le représentant de la Norvège, qui a déclaré hier que
«There is, therefore, incidentally no n eed in this case to undertake any further
analysis of the principle of self-determination in international law. Resolution1244
establishes, in the confined context of Ko sovo, the unequivocal relevance of the will
of the people of Kosovo in the determination of Kosovo’s future status.» 43
20. Mais la référence à la «volonté du pe uple» ne représente pas la même chose qu’une
référence au droit d’autodétermination. Premiè rement, la «volonté du peuple» n’est pas le seul
critère à être pris en compte dans le processus du règlement définitif pour le Kosovo. Plusieurs
autres critères sont énoncés, y inclus «l’avis des autorités compétentes» ou «l’acte final
d’Helsinki». Rien ne suggère guè re l’existence d’une hiérarchie entre ces critères, qui aurait placé
«la volonté du peuple» au sommet, comme le principal critère à considérer. Deuxièmement, il ne
faut pas oublier que, pendant les négociations des accords de Rambouillet, les représentants de
Pristina avaient proposé l’inclusion expresse du fait que «le peuple du Kosovo» est titulaire du
droit à l’autodétermination ; cette proposition a été rejetée 44.
21. Par conséquent, la notion «volonté du peuple» n’est pas synonyme de «droit des peuples
à disposer d’eux-mêmes» et la ré férence dans le texte des accords de Rambouillet ne peut pas être
lue comme établissant le Kosovo comme titulaire du volet externe de ce droit. Il reste toutefois à
déterminer si les conditions spécifiques du Kosovo à la date critique justifiaient l’application de
l’éventuelle exception à la règle concernant l’autodétermination.
43
CR 2009/31, p. 51, par. 30 (Norvège).
44Kosova Delegation Statement on New Proposal for a Settlement, 18 février 1999, dans Mark Weller, The Crisis
in Kosovo 1989-1999, Documents and Analysis Publishing Ltd., Cambridge, p. 444-445. - 33 -
Droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes ⎯ une exception possible
22. «Scholarship has remained devided on the question of whether international law allows
45
secession outside the colonial context in extreme circumstances.» ; ce texte, extrait du rapport de
la mission internationale d’enquê te sur le conflit en Géorgie, fait preuve des incertitudes qui
persistent encore en doctrine et jurisprudence c oncernant l’existence et la portée d’une exception à
la règle concernant l’application du principe de l’autodétermination dans les cas des Etats existants.
23. Cette exception ⎯ la «sécession remède» ⎯ si on accepte son existence ⎯ n’intervient
que comme ultime solution dans les situations de carence de souveraineté. «As a matter of
international law as it stands ⎯ the savings clause does not imply that whenever the principles of
non-discrimination and adequate representation are vi olated a «people» can lawfully claim a right
to secession.» 46 C’est un extrait du rapport de la miss ion d’enquête sur le conflit en Géorgie qui
conclut
«a limited, conditional extrao rdinary allowance to secede as a last resort in extreme
cases is debated in international legal scholar ship. However, most authors opine that
such a remedial «right»or allowance does not form part of international law as it
47
stands.»
24. Quel que soit le statut de la «sécession remède» dans le droit international contemporain,
il est clair que, pour que cette exception puisse s’ appliquer dans une certaine situation, deux
conditions doivent se trouver réunies :
⎯ en premier lieu, la population d’une certaine par tie de l’Etat en cause doit être soumise aux
violations graves des droits de l’homme ou à d’autres formes d’oppression qui, au niveau
interne, lui nieraient l’exercice du droit à l’aut odétermination ensemble avec le reste de la
population de cet Etat ; et
45 «Les académiques sont restés divisés sur la question si le droit international permet la sécession hors du
contexte colonial dans des circonstances extrêmes.»; rappor t de la mission internationale indépendante d’enquête sur le
conflit en Géorgie (Independent International Fact -Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia), disponible sur
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html, p. 136.
46
«En tant que question du droi t international contemporain ⎯ la clause de sauvegarde n’implique pas que toute
violation des principes de la non-discri mination et la représentation adéquate permettent à un «peuple» à demander
licitement un droit de sécession.» ; rapport de la mission internationale indépendante d’enquête sur le conflit en Géorgie
(Independent International Fact -Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia), disponible sur
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html, p. 138.
47
«Une permission limitée, conditionnée et extraordinaire de sécession comme ultime remède dans des cas
extrêmes est débattue dans les milieux académiques juridiques internationaux. Toutefois, la plupart des auteurs sont
d’opinion qu’un tel «droit» ou permission re mède ne fait pas partie du droit international contemporain.»; rapport de la
mission internationale indépendante d’enquête sur le conflit en Géorgie (Independent International Fact -Finding Mission
on the Conflict in Georgia), disponible sur http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html 141. - 34 -
⎯ en second lieu, dans une telle situation, qu’ il n’existe pas une autre option valable pour
remédier à ces carences dans le cadre de l’Etat respectif.
Les deux conditions sont cumulatives; toutefois, l’analyse de la deuxième s’avère nécessaire
seulement si la première est remplie: seulement si on refuse d’une manière abusive l’exercice
significatif du droit à l’autodétermination interne à la population d’une certaine partie d’un Etat les
évaluations des options réparatrices surgissent, la sécession étant le dernier recours.
25. Faisant l’application de la théorie au cas du Kosovo, il faudrait premièrement répondre
si, à la date critique, la population du Kosovo était soumise à une violation flagrante des droits de
l’homme ou à une autre forme d’oppression qui lui nierait l’exercice de son droit à
l’autodétermination interne dans le cadre de l’Etat serbe.
26. La réponse ne peut être que négative: au moment de l’adoption de la déclaration
d’indépendance, la population du Kosovo n’était pas soumise à une telle violation. Bien que le
Kosovo était placé sous administration provisoi re internationale, en conformité avec la
résolution1244, la Serbie, comme souverain, assurait le respect du droit à l’autodétermination de
son peuple (y compris la population du Kosovo) par le respect complet des arrangements légaux en
vigueur, notamment, au cas du Kosovo, la résolu tion1244. En respectant la résolution1244,
l’Etat serbe prenait, en fait, la mesure qui éta it en son pouvoir à ce moment pour assurer le respect
des droits fondamentaux de la population du Kosovo, y inclus le droit à l’autodétermination.
27. De plus, rien ne laisse à croire que, mê me dans l’hypothèse où le Kosovo avait été sous
le contrôle effectif de l’Etat serbe à la date critique, sa population aurait été soumise aux violations
graves de ses droits qui auraient justifier la sécession remède: même si le rappel des rapports
positifs sur l’état des droits de l’homme en Serbie , rédigés par des institutions impartiales, inclus
48
dans l’exposé écrit de la Roumanie , a été traité de «sélectif» par certains participants aux
présentes plaidoiries 4, on ne peut pas nier que, en ce qui concer ne le respect de l’Etat de droit, de
la démocratie et des droits de l’homme, la Serbie de février 2008 et d’aujourd’hui n’a rien à faire
avec la Serbie de1999. Ce fait est confirmé pa r l’évolution du dialogue entre la Serbie et
48
Voir l’exposé écrit de la Roumanie, p. 43-44, par. 151-156.
49Voir les observations écrites des auteurs de la déation unilatérale d’indépenda nce, note de bas de page
no293. - 35 -
l’Unioneuropéenne, concrétisé par la signature , seulement deux mois après la date critique 50, de
l’accord de stabilisation et d’association, dont l’a pplication intérimaire a été débloquée cette même
semaine 51, confirmant le respect de l’Etat de droit en Serbie, y inclus sous l’aspect de la
coopération avec le Tribunal pénal internationa l pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, l’instance appelée à
investiguer et juger, parmi d’autres, les crimes contre la population du Kosovo.
28. Parce qu’il est bien connu que dans les a nnées 1990 des violations très sérieuses, même
atroces, des droits de l’homme se sont produites au Kosovo. Mais la réponse de la communauté
internationale face à ces violations n’a pas ét é la décision d’appliquer la sécession remède; la
réponse a été la résolution1244 et, aussi, la pré sentation de ces faits à la juridiction du Tribunal
pénal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie. La sécession remède ne peut pas se baser sur des faits produits une
décennie avant ⎯non plus sur des faits futurs, comme s uggéré par certains participants aux
52
présentes plaidoiries , y compris les Pays-Bas, dans la présentation qu’on vient d’entendre.
29. Au moment de la date critique, la popul ation du Kosovo n’était pas l’objet de mauvais
traitements de la part des autorités serbes de nature à justifier une sécession remède. De son côté,
l’Etat serbe respectait, par le respect et la mi se en oeuvre de la résolution1244, ses obligations
visant à assurer le droit à l’autodétermination (donc le volet interne) de la population du Kosovo.
La résolution était le cadre de l’autonomie substa ntielle et de l’auto-administration du Kosovo au
sein de la Serbie, elle était le cadre du respect de l’autodétermination interne. Etant arrivé à cette
conclusion, il n’est pas nécessaire d’analyser la deuxième condition pour que la sécession remède
soit admise, c’est-à-dire s’il y avaient d’autr es options pour assurer l’exercice du droit à
l’autodétermination interne, au sein de la Serbie, de la population du Kosovo. N’existant aucune
violation du droit, il n’était pas besoin d’un remède.
30. En conclusion, à la date critique, les critè res qui auraient pu justifier l’application d’une
«sécession remède» du Kosovo, conçue comme exercice du droit de la population du Kosovo à
l’autodétermination sous le volet externe, n’étai ent pas remplis. Le Kosovo n’était pas une entité
50Le 29 avril 2008.
51
Conclusions du conseil des affaires générales de l’Union européenne du 7 décembre 2009.
52Par exemple, l’exposé oral de l’Allemagne, CR 2009/26, p. 31, par. 35-36. - 36 -
titulaire du droit à l’autodétermination impliquant la sécession unilatérale de Serbie, donc la
sécession désirée, toute ensemble avec la déclara tion d’indépendance la pr oclamant, ne sont pas
conformes au droit international.
Conclusions
31. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les j uges, je voudrais vous présenter nos conclusions,
en vous précisant qu’elles prennent aussi en compte les arguments non traités dans le présent
exposé oral, mais inclus dans l’exposé écrit de la Roumanie :
a) la Cour a la compétence d’entretenir la requête pour avis consultatif et il n y a pas de «raisons
décisives» pour que la Cour refuse de donner l’avis consultatif ;
b) la Cour doit déterminer la «véritable ques tion juridique» posée, en analysant la question
soumise dans son contexte et en liaison avec s es conséquences immédiates et intrinsèques, et
d’une telle manière que la réponse soit utile à l’ Assemblé générale et aux organes principaux
des Nations Unies ;
c)la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance n’est pas conforme aux dispositions de la
résolution1244 du Conseil de sécurité et des autr es résolutions ou documents pertinents; elle
méconnaît aussi le régime juridique établi par les résolutions pertinentes de l’ONU,
particulièrement la résolution 1244, qui est pleinement applicable ;
d)la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance des institutions provisoires d’administration
méconnaît le droit à l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie et le principe de l’inviolabilité de ses
frontières ;
e) le Kosovo n’est pas une entité titulaire du droit à l’autodétermination impliquant la sécession
unilatérale de Serbie et, par c onséquent, la déclaration unilatéra le d’indépendance, ainsi que la
sécession du Kosovo, ne sont pas conformes au droit international.
connclusion, la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance des institutions provisoires
d’administration autonome du Kosovo n’est pas conforme au droit international.
Je vous remercie pour votre attention. - 37 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr.Cosmin Dinescu for his presentation. There is one more
delegation, one more participant delegation which is expected to make its oral statement. I believe
it is a good time now to take a short 15 minutes coffee break. We will reconvene at 11.30 a.m.
The Court adjourned from 11.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I shall now give the floor to Mr. Daniel Bethlehem to
make the oral submission of the United Kingdom.
Mr. BETHLEHEM:
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to appear before you today in
these proceedings in my capacity as Legal A dviser to the United Kingdom Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. This is the eighth day of these oral hearings. We have followed the
submissions closely. Virtually everything of substance that can be said has been said, and
eloquently so. For these submissions we will ther efore endeavour to stand back from the issues
and focus on what we see as the pivotal points for the Court’s deliberations as well as addressing a
number of points made during the course of the hear ings. We refer you to our written submissions
for our more detailed arguments.
The pivotal issues in these proceedings
2. As we see it, there are two pivotal issues. The first is whether resolution 1244 prohibited
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. Th e second is whether Kosovo’s Declaration of
Independence was prohibited by gene ral international law. There are other points, to be sure, but
they arise along the way to these two central questio ns. There are also wider elements, such as the
effect of the many recognitions of Kosovo’s i ndependence, the effect of other post-independence
developments, and Kosovo’s present status. But th ese are not part of the question addressed to the
Court.
3. Mr. President, I will address the first of th ese issues, Professor Crawford will address the
second. - 38 -
General observations
4. Before I turn to resolution 1244, four obser vations of a more general nature are warranted,
addressing, first, the outcome that Serbia seeks in respon se to the question referred to the Court;
second, the current situation in and the status of Kosovo; third, the concerns expressed by some
States at the potentially destabilizing effect of an acceptance of Kosovo’s independence; and,
fourth, the status of those who issued the Declaration of Independence.
Tu5r.ing, first, to the outcome that Serbia seeks in response to the question referred to the
Court. The question as formulated does not engage Kosovo’s present status or the effect of the
recognition of that independence by other States. Behind the question, however, as it is conceived
by its author, is a challenge to Kosovo’s indepe ndence and existence as a State. In his opening
remarks for Serbia last week, AmbassadorBatakovi ć observed that the purpose of the advisory
opinion was to secure an outcome in which Kos ovo would engage with Serbia in good faith to
53
achieve a solution to the question of its status that was consistent with international law .
6. Given this objective, the question that ari ses, and it is an appropriate question for a court
of law, is where the outcome proposed by Serbia would take the two sides; where would it take us,
the international community. In other words, woul d the outcome that Serbia seeks be sustainable?
Professor Shaw, also speaking for Serbia, in seekin g to make the point that international law now
addresses non-State entities in certain specific circum stances, observed: “The clock may not be
54
turned back.” But that is precisely the outcome that Se rbia would wish from the Court. It seeks
an advisory opinion that would compel Kosovo to re-engage with Serbia over its status. There is,
however, no reason whatever to believe that an agreed outcome would be any more achievable now
than it was in the past. Serbia has made it qu ite clear that it will never accept an independent
Kosovo. Kosovo, for its part, has made it quite clear, that, given the legacy of abuse, it cannot
again become part of Serbia. That impasse is as plain now as it was to the Contact Group, to the
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, to the Troika, and to others. That impasse cannot be ignored.
7. A cardinal concern of every court must be to address whether the decision that is asked of
it is capable of meaningful implementation. Courts strive not to order the unsustainable. They do
53
CR 2009/24, p. 35, para. 13.
5CR 2009/24, p. 66, para. 8. - 39 -
not order estranged spouses to continue in a broken marriage. They seldom compel employers to
re-hire aggrieved employees with whom the working relationship has broken down. In the present
case, what we must hope for and what we must work towards is a rapprochement over time
between Serbia and Kosovo under the umbrella of the European Union.
Tur8.ing, second, to the current situation in and status of Kosovo. We are almost two years
on from Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. Foreign MinisterHyseni noted in his opening
remarks that Kosovo is at peace today, with stable political institutions, successful elections
55
recently held, engagement with international partners . This stability is in many respects a feature
and consequence of Kosovo’s independence.
9. In his opening remarks fo r Serbia, Ambassador Batakovi ć suggested that most States
around the world opposed Kosovo’s independence 56. This is not accurate. There is no evidence of
widespread opposition to Kosovo’s independence. On the contrary, as the Court has heard, all of
Kosovo’s neighbours, with the exception of Serbia , have recognized Kosovo’s independence. The
vast majority of the member States of both the European Union and the Council of Europe have
done so. A voting majority of the members of the Security Council at the point at which
resolution1244 was adopted ⎯ that is nine members ⎯ have recognized Kosovo. The total
number of recognitions is 63, with upwards of 40 more having vote d for Kosovo’s membership of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 57. In all likelihood, the vast majority of
States that have not recognized Kosovo have no firm view on the matter, are hesitating in the face
of the chilling effect of the present proceedings, or do not engage in formal practices of
recognition. Apart from those 15 to 20 States that have participated in these proceedings and have,
for their own very particular reasons, declared their opposition to Kosovo’s independence, there is
no evidence of widespread opposition to Kosovo’s independence.
T1urn.ing, third, to the concerns expressed by some States at the potentially destabilizing
effect of an acceptance of Kosovo’s inde pendence. The United Kingdom understands these
concerns and takes them very seriously. In the circumstances that pertain, however, we do not
55CR 2009/25, pp. 6-9, paras. 2-14.
56
CR 2009/24, pp. 31-32, para. 4.
57CR 2009/25, p. 8, para. 10. See also the United Kingdom’s Written Comments, para. 6. - 40 -
believe that the concerns are warranted. It is nonetheless important that they are addressed. We
sought to do so in our Written Statement in the clea rest of terms which, given their importance, I
58
reaffirm here today explicitly . Stability in the international system is important and States in
other parts of the world must have a clear unde rstanding that the events in the Balkans, and
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, do not creat e risks of instability for them. We are very
clear that the situation in Kosovo does not cons titute a precedent for developments elsewhere.
Kosovo’s independence does not open the door for the fracturing of States more generally.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, given these concerns, we would encourage the Court to
consider saying in terms in its advisory opinion that the circumstances pertaining in Kosovo are
highly particular and cannot be relied upon as a precedent in any other situation.
11. Let me dwell a moment longer on the special character of the Kosovo situation. This is,
once again, a point that we have addressed fully in our written submissions, and I do not rehearse it
in any detail here 59. Contrary to the mischaracterization of this argument by some, we do not assert
that Kosovo is to be judged by special rules of inte rnational law, or that it stood outside of the law.
We do not assert a sui generis legal régime. The United Kingdom’s contention is that, for reasons
of the confluence of very particular factual circumstances, the situation of Kosovo does not create a
precedent elsewhere.
12. In his closing remarks for Serbia last week, Mr.Obradovi ć nonetheless stated that “[a]
number of similar situations exist throughout th e world and the independence of Kosovo would
certainly be used as a precedent by separatist movements” 60. He did not, however, quote any
examples of such similar situations. In his submissions for Serbia, however, Professor
Zimmermann gave two examples, Cyprus and Palestine, commenting that,
“[f]ollowing the very logic of the authors of the UDI, it may become possible to argue
that in the situations [of] Palestine or Cyprus, the respective situation has similarly
reached a deadlock and that the international community should accordingly give in to
so-called ‘realities on the ground’ . . .” 61.
58Written Statement, para. 0.19.
59
Written Statement,para. 0.22; Written Comments, paras. 11-14.
60CR 2009/24, p. 92, para. 8.
61CR 2009/24, p. 56, para. 38. - 41 -
13. Let me take these examples in turn. In the case of northern Cyprus, an example also
referred to with concern in the Cypriot submissi ons to the Court, the Security Council expressly
concluded that the attempt to establish a State in the north of Cyprus was contrary to the
62
1960 Treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee . The Council
went on, again expressly, to call upon all States not to recognize any State other than the Republic
63
of Cyprus . In that case, two resolutions of th e Security Council expressly called for the
non-recognition of northern Cyprus. That call has b een steadfastly adhered to by the international
community. An advisory opinion which affirms the legality of Kosovo’s Declaration of
Independence would have no precedential effect in the context of Cyprus.
14. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is not incompatible with any treaty. The Security
Council has not called upon the international co mmunity not to recognize Kosovo. The Council
had competence to do so. It did not do so. Resolution1244(1999) could have said in express
terms what some members of the Security Coun cil at the time now contend that the resolution
intended, namely, that no independence for Kos ovo was possible without Serbian consent. The
resolution did not so provide.
15. The Palestine example is interesting for other reasons, as there is some discussion about
whether the Palestinian governmental institutions might declare the independence of Palestine. On
Serbia’s reasoning, were the Palestinian Legisl ative Council or other Palestinian representative
body to declare the independence of Palestine, that declaration would not be in conformity with
international law as it would have been declared by the Palestinian institutions of self-government
established pursuant to the Oslo Accords betw een Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization and without any apparent competence to make such a declaration. We very much
doubt whether the analysis that Serbia advances woul d be a tenable or credible analysis in that
situation. It is not a tenable and credible analysis in the matter now before you.
16. This brings me to the fourth of my general points, the st atus of those who issued the
Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence was not an act of the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government. Nor did it pur port to be. It was a Declaration of the
62
Security Council resolution 541 (1983).
6Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). - 42 -
representatives of the people of Kosovo, reflec ting what we have described in our Written
Statement as “a unique constitutional moment in the history of Kosovo in which those elected by
64
the people of Kosovo expressed the will of those they represented” . The key issues for
consideration in such circumstances are whethe r those issuing a declaration of independence
represented those for whom they purported to speak and whether, in doing so, their voice was
effective. Those declaring Kosovo’s independence met both criteria.
Kosovo ⎯ retrospect and prospect
17. Mr.President, it is useful to recall the events of 20years ago, in 1989, when Kosovo’s
autonomy within the then Socialist Federal Re public of Yugoslavia was crushed when Serbian
tanks took up positions outside the Kosovo Assembly. I recall th is event, and this passage of time,
to highlight three points. The first is the tragedy that befell the region, and Kosovo, as that period
opened and as the decade unfolded. We have a responsibility not to downplay, not to diminish, the
extent of the human rights catastrophe that befell the people of the region, very largely at the hands
of a dictatorial régime in Belgrade. And the Milutinović judgment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia confirms that atrocities on a very significant scale were
committed against the people of Kosovo.
T1he. second reason for recalling 1989, and the passage of 20 years since then, is to note
how long it took to secure the measure of stability that we now have, and how this was achieved.
The Serbian tanks in front of the Kosovo Assembly building were followed by ten years of trauma.
After this came almost a decade of a search for a solution. This was not a search for a quick fix. It
was rather a search for an enduring accommodation. This aspect was addressed in detail in our
Written Statement, and I adopt the analysis set out therein.
19. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the third reason for recalling 1989, and the
20years that have passed since then, is to look to the future. We are almost two years from
Kosovo’s independence. Kos ovo is at peace today. This stability flows from Kosovo’s
independence. As Bulgaria noted in its submissi ons before the Court, a failure, in 2007-2008, to
unblock the dispute over Kosovo’s st atus would have led to a stalem ate with severe consequences
64
Written Statement, para. 1.12. - 43 -
for the region as a whole 6. Croatia observed that it considered that its recognition of Kosovo’s
66
independence contributed to the creation of conditions for peace and stability in the region . We
hope that the next ten years will bring a stable and brighter future than the two decades that have
gone before.
Resolution 1244 (1999)
20. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I turn to resolution1244(1999). A number of
States speaking before you have recalled that they were members of the Security Council in 1999 at
the time of the adoption of resolution1244(1999) . Argentina has made the point, and Brazil.
China and Russia, as two of the permanent members, were of course closely involved in the
process. The United States was also engaged, and France, and the Netherlands and Slovenia, all of
which have also presented their views to the Cour t on the interpretation of the resolution. The
United Kingdom was also intimately involved in the process.
21. Given the submissions before you, there is no escaping the point that there are duelling
appreciations of what resolution 1244 (1999) meant.
22. What there can be no dispute about, however, is the words on the page. Those words do
not prohibit Kosovo’s independence. The disagre ement comes down to what some contend must
be implied into the resolution. It is also about the way forward when the political process
contemplated by the resolution reached an unbridgeable impasse.
23. In saying this, I must emphasize that the United Kingdom did not come to support
independence for Kosovo quickly or easily. Kosovo independence was not our default or
presumed appreciation. The status-neutral character of the resolution was clear. It did not
preordain any outcome. But, importantly, nor did it preclude any outcome.
24. In essence, resolution1244(1999) did four things. It adopted measures to secure and
maintain an end to violence in Kosovo. It established interim institutions to ensure conditions for
peace and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. It established an interim framework based on
substantial self-government fo r Kosovo taking full account of th e sovereignty and territorial
65
CR 2009/28, p. 18, para. 2.
6CR 2009/29, p. 51, para. 6. - 44 -
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And it put in train a political process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status.
25. This differentiation between the interim phase and the political process is most clearly
illustrated by paragraphs 11 (a) and 11 (e) of the resolution. Our good friends and colleagues,
Romania, commented on this earlier today. Paragraph11 (a) addresses substantial autonomy and
self-government in Kosovo, pending a final settleme nt, and taking full account of Annex2 of the
resolution and the Rambouillet Accords. The refe rence to Annex 2 of the resolution addresses the
principle of sovereignty and the territorial inte grity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during
the interim period. In contrast to subparagraph (a), subparagraph11 (e) uses different language
when addressing the political process designed to dete rmine Kosovo’s future status. Here, there is
no reference to Annex2 and the language of territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The reference is simply to the Rambouillet Accords.
67
26. Both Spain and Russia addressed these provisions in their oral submissions . Romania
made more detailed submissions on this this morni ng. They failed, however, to address the clearly
intentional decision to exclude reference to Annex 2 as an elemen t to be taken into account in the
political process designed to determine Kosovo’s fu ture. As you have heard in these proceedings,
Rambouillet was based on the Hill final draft, which also excluded any Serbian right of veto to the
permanent status outcome. We endorse ProfessorMu rphy’s analysis of this process last week. I
note also that resolution 1244 (1999) did not reaffirm the Security Council’s earlier resolutions. It
simply recalled them.
27. My purposes in making this point are three: first, to emphasize that
resolution1244(1999) contemplated two processes, an interim process and a political process
designed to determine Kosovo’s future, and that th ese processes were addressed differently in the
resolution; second, to highlight that, in line with the a ppreciation that everything was open for
discussion, the territorial integrity of the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia was quite explicitly not a
cornerstone of the political process; and, third, to emphasize that the resolution did not do what it
67
CR 2009/30, respectively pp. 13-14, paras.24-26, and p. 47, paras. 36-40. - 45 -
could have done, had this been in the minds of the members of the Council. It neither precluded
Kosovo’s independence nor required Serbia’s consent to such a development.
28. In the face of the unbridgeable impasse in the political process, the question was how
resolution1244(1999) was properly to be construed and applied. On this, our analysis was, and
remains, clear. The resolution was status neutra l, neither scripting independence nor precluding it.
Exhaustive efforts had been made by the intern ational community, over an eight-year period, to
secure an agreed solution. Those efforts had not been successful. They had, however, culminated
in a carefully considered recommendation by th e United Nations Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy in favour of independence. There was nothing in the resolution which either precluded
independence in these circumstances or required Serbia’s consent.
29. Mr.President, as others have said befo re us, there was a moment after Kosovo’s
Declaration of Independence when the Secu rity Council might have addressed Kosovo’s
independence. It did not do so. The legality of the Declaration of Independence was not impugned
by the Secretary-General. Nor was it impugned by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative.
These developments, or rather their absence, bol ster our assessment that Kosovo’s Declaration of
Independence was not precluded by resolution 1244 (1999).
30. Mr.President, Members of the Court, before I hand over to ProfessorCrawford, let me
conclude by saying that we do not see these proceedings as adversarial to Serbia. The past two
decades have witnessed considerable trauma in the Balkans. Stabilit y is fragile and needs to be
protected, for the benefit of all of the peoples in th e region. Serbia’s democracy is not much older
than Kosovo’s. And, in the endeavour of enhancing stability and prosperity in the region, Serbia is
an important partner with whom we are engaging in friendship and co-operation. We look forward
to enhancing that co-operation, even as we se ek, even through this legal process, to put the
remaining ghosts of the past to rest. In his opening remarks, Foreign Minister Hyseni observed that
“the common future for both Kosovo and Serbia lies in eventual membership for both States in the
68
European Union” . The United Kingdom supports that vision and we will continue to work
towards its realization.
68
CR 2009/25, p. 9, para. 13. - 46 -
31. Mr.President, with your permission, I would now like to ask ProfessorCrawford to
address the second point that will be central to the Court’s deliberations. Together with the
American Declaration of Independence, his text has probably been the most widely quoted in these
proceedings.
Mr. CRAWFORD:
DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The question before the Court
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, according to Serbia, the question you are asked “is a
narrow one inasmuch as it deals with the UDI and does not address related, but clearly distinct
69
issues, such as recognition” . Correspondingly it says that the legality of Kosovo’s Declaration
must be assessed as at 17February2008 70. In short, Serbia wants this Court to condemn the
Declaration of Independence in isolation, and to condemn it as such.
2. But Serbia’s focus on the Declaration and on 17 February is misleading. Recognition and
other “clearly distinct issues” was preci sely what its presentation was about.
ProfessorZimmermann discussed recognition 7. ProfessorShaw did likewise 7: he also included
in the question the requirements of statehood 73. And you have heard how, this morning, our
Romanian friends had to completely rewrite the question in order to give the answer they wanted to
it.
3. In fact, Serbia’s focus on the Declaration of 17 February is a sleight of hand. Serbia wants
the Court to say one historical thing so that it can say another current thing. It wants to draw
conclusions from your answer about 17February , conclusions that relate to the position now ⎯
while withholding from your jurisdiction the many ev ents subsequent to that date which are a
necessary part of any assessment. In other words, it wants you to judge the book of Kosovo
without reading the later chapters ⎯ while nonetheless asserting that it will follow from your
69CR 2009/24, p. 41, para. 17 (Djerić).
70
Serbia R2/518-522.
71
CR 2009/24, pp. 51-52, paras. 8-16 (Zimmerman).
72CR 2009/24, pp. 73-74, paras. 28-32 (Shaw).
73CR 2009/24, p. 74, para. 33 (Shaw). - 47 -
ruling, confined to the Declaration of 17 February , that all subsequent steps, including recognition,
are unlawful. You heard counsel for Serbia cite Si r Hersch Lauterpacht in support of the principle
ex injuria jus non oritur 74. The injuria that Serbia refers to is th e Declaration of Independence.
The injuria Lauterpacht was referring to was the i nvasion of Manchuria; in the following
paragraph he referred to the a nnexation of Ethiopia. These were acts in international relations
which were contrary to the most fundamental norms of the time in response to which the
international community articulated the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition. They are quite unlike
the present case.
4. Lauterpacht’s own view of declarations of independence was precisely the opposite. I
quote:
“International law does not condemn rebellion or secession aiming at
acquisition of independence. The formal renunciation of sovereignty by the parent
State has never been regarded as a condition of the lawfulness of recognition.” 75
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am a devoted but disgruntled South Australian. “I
hereby declare the independence of South Austra lia.” What has happened? Precisely nothing.
Have I committed an internationally wrongful act in your presence? Of course not. Have I
committed an ineffective act? Very likely. I ha ve no representative capacity and no one will rally
to my call. But does international law only conde mn declarations of independence when made by
representative bodies and not, for example, by milita ry movements? Does international law only
condemn declarations of independence when they ar e likely to be effective? It simply does not
make any sense to say that unilateral declarations of independence are per se unlawful ⎯ yet no
State in this case has suggested that general international law contains any more limited prohibition
of such declarations; and none has been articulated in any of the sources of the law.
6. The reason is simple. A declaration issued by persons within a State is a collection of
words writ in water; it is the sound of one ha nd clapping. What matters is what is done
subsequently, especially the reaction of the intern ational community. That reaction may take time
to reveal itself. But here the basic position is clear. There has been no condemnation by the
74
CR2009/24, p.88, para. 30 (Kohen), citing H Lauterpacht,Recognition in International Law (Cambridge,
CUP, 1948) 421.
7Ibid., 8-10. - 48 -
General Assembly or the Security Council; there have been a substantial number of recognitions.
This is all in sharp contrast to cases where there has been a fundamental breach of international law
in the circumstances surrounding the attempt to create a new State ⎯ as with the Bantustans,
Southern Rhodesia, Manchukuo or the TRNC. In such cases the number of recognitions can be
counted on the fingers of one hand, whether or not it is clapping.
7. In this context it must be stressed that international law has an institution with the function
of determining claims to statehood. That institu tion is recognition by other States, leading in due
course to diplomatic relations and admission to international orga nizations. A substantial measure
of recognition is strong evidence of statehood, just as its absence is virtually conclusive the other
way. In this context, general recognition can also have a curative effect as regards deficiencies in
the manner in which a new State came into existence.
76
8. In common with many others who have appeared before you , the United Kingdom
stresses that the Court has been asked a specific question. That question is intelligible and
non-contradictory. Its proponent, Serbia, insisted on its formulation in the face of comments from
77
the United Kingdom and others that it was the wrong question . The question having been asked
in those terms should be answered in those terms.
Illegality of declarations of independence as such ⎯ where is the evidence?
9. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is said that declarations of independence are, as
such, unlawful. Historically, they were the main method by which new States came into existence.
Since when, and by what legal processes, have they been outlawed?
76Anti-Declaration States: CR20 09/24, p.41, para.17 (Djeri ć, Serbia); CR2009/30, p.9, para.7 (Escobar
Hernández, Spain); CR 2009/30, pp. 40-41, para. 4 (Gevorgian, Russian Federation).
Pro-Declaration States: CR2009/25, p.14, para.5 (Wood, Kosovo); CR2009/25, p.63, para.71 (Murphy,
Kosovo); CR2009/26, p.10, para.7 (Frowein, Albania); CR2009/26, p.25, para.4 (W asum-Rainer, Germany);
CR2009/28, p.23, paras.18-20 (Dimitroff, Bulgaria ); CR2009/29, p.52, para.10 (Metelko-Zgombi ć, Croatia);
CR 2009/29, pp. 67, 69, 72 (Winkler, Denmark); CR 2009/30, pp. 23, 36-38, paras. 2-3, 35-40 (Koh, USA).
See also Argentina, which urges consid eration of wider issues, but concedes that the question is not of the type
concerning “ ‘les conséquences juridiques’ d’une situation donnée”, CR2009/26, p.49, para.36 (Ruiz Cerutti,
Argentina).
And see also Burundi, CR2009/28, pp.29-30 (no para.nos .) (d’Aspremont, Burundi): “L’accent mis sur la
conformité au droit international montre très clairement que c’est une question de légalité qui est posée à la Cour. Il n’est
donc nullement demandé à la Cour de se prononcer sur la question de savoir si le Kosovo constituait un Etat au jour de la
déclaration d’indépendance ou au moment de la requête pour avis consultatif.” (Emphasis in original.)
77See Written Statement of the United Kingdom, pp. 19-20, paras. 1.3-1.5. - 49 -
10. Let us look at the sources of international law enumerated in Article 38 (2). No one has
said that Kosovo’s Declaration is prohibited by a particular treaty, comparable to the Cyprus Treaty
78
of Guarantee which forbids separation of any part of Cyprus . So that source of law is not at issue.
11. What about a general practice accepted as law? A prohibition on secession is certainly
not to be found in pre-1919 international law.
12. Nor did the position change after 1919. Th e Aaland Islands Commissioners denied that
any national group had the right “to separate themsel ves from the State of which they form part by
79
the simple expression of a wish” , but there was no suggestion that international law made this
expression of a wish into an internationally wrongful act.
13. Under the Charter too, the position did not change. In order to guarantee the territorial
integrity of States, the Charter prohibited threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of
Member States, but this prohibition is directed at other States. The Charter says nothing as to the
lawfulness or otherwise of declarations of inde pendence adopted by groups or peoples within a
State.
14. State practice since 1945 has been consistent with the earlier position. To take the region
in issue here, the events in the early 1990s in Yugoslavia were the subject of close scrutiny but
neither the United Nations nor the European Union treated the multiple declarations of
80
independence as themselves violative of international law . They may or may not have been
affected, but that is a different thing. Similarly with the Badinter Committee 8.
15. Nor is there any indication of such a prohibition as a general principle of law.
16. I turn to judicial decisions and the opinions of jurists. Issues of statehood have only
occasionally arisen before you. But in dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina you have not
78Treaty of Guarantee (Cyprus-Greece-United Kingdom-Turkey), 16 Aug. 1960, 382 UNTS 2. See also Treaty of
Alliance (Cyprus-Greece-Turkey), Art. II, 16 Aug. 1960, 397 UNTS 287.
79
Report of the Commission of Jurists (Larnaud e, Huber, Struycken), League of Nations Special Supplement
No. 3 (Oct. 1920), pp. 5-6.
80
E.g., CR 2009/30, p. 24, para. 4 (Koh, USA); CR 2009/30, p. 55, paras. 8-9 (Kaukoranta, Finland).
81
See, e.g., respecting Croatia, Opinion No.5 (11Jan.1992), 92 ILR 179, 180; respecting Slovenia, Opinion
No.7 (11Jan. 1992), 92 ILR 188, 189. States noting that the Declarations of Independence of Slovenia and Croatia
attracted no international censure: CR2009/30, p.29, para. 16 (Koh, USA); CR2009/30, p.55, para.9 (Kaukoranta,
Finland); CR2009/27, pp1.0-11, para.8 (Tichy, Austria). See also CR2009/29, pp.0-61, para.9
(Metelko-Zgombić, Croatia) (noting that the Badinter Commission did not treat the Declarations of Independence as
unlawful). - 50 -
suggested that the declarations of independence we re internationally unlawful; you simply cited
them as facts 82. But there is a precedent: the Quebec reference to the Canadian Supreme Court.
There was a major difference in that case. Question 2 concerned whether Quebec had “the right to
effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilatera lly”; here the question is whether Kosovo’s
Declaration of Independence was unlawful under international law. But one cannot have a right to
do that which it is unlawful to do, and the Supreme Court proceedings and opinion are thus relevant
here.
17. Seven international law experts gave evid ence to the Supreme Court. Yet none of them
suggested that there was such a rule . For example, Professor Abi-Saab ⎯ who cannot be accused
of insensitivity to the concerns about the stability of developing States ⎯ said:
“[W]hile international law does not recognize a right of secession outside the
context of self-determination, this does not mean that it prohibits secession. The latter
is basically a phenomenon not regulated by international law . . . it would be erroneous
to say that secession violates the principle of th e territorial integrity of the state, since
this principle applies only in international relations... it does not apply within the
state.” 83
And that was written on behalf of Quebec.
18. The lamented Professor Thomas Franck said:
“[S]ecession is a well-known means of achieving statehood. It cannot seriously
be argued today that international law prohibits secession. It cannot seriously be
denied that international law permits secession . . . [T]he law imposes no duty on any
people not to secede.” 84
85 86
Those propositions were expressly accepted by the experts for Canada . All the experts agreed .
82See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996(II) , pp. 604-605, para. 14.
Yugoslavia’s third and fourth preliminar y objections asserted the unlawfulness of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s “acts on
independence” and declaration of independence. The fourth preliminary objection was eventually withdrawn; the third
the Court rejected, fourteen votes to one (ibid., p. 623, para. 47).
83Ibid., pp. 72-73.
84Ibid., p. 79; emphasis in original.
85See Crawford, “Response to Experts Re ports of the Amicus Curiae”: ibid., p.159, para.9, pp.160-161,
paras. 13-14.
86Reprinted in Anne Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned
(Kluwer, The Hague, 2000); George Abi-Saab, “The Effectivit y Required of an Entity that Declares its Independence in
Order for it to be Considered a State in Internat ional Law,” Pt.III, p.72; ChristineChinkin, 23ff; James Crawford,
“Response to Experts Reports of the Amic us Curiae”, p.159, para.9, p.160, para. 13; Thomas M. Franck, “Opinion
Directed at Question2 of the Reference”, para .2.9, p.78, “Opinion Directed at Response of Professor Crawford and
Wildhaber”, pp.179-180, paras.3-4, p. 181, para. 8; Alain Pellet, “Legal Opinion on Certain Questions of International
Law Raised by the Reference”, p. 122, para. 44, “Legal Opinion on Certain Questions of International Law Raised by the
Reference”, p.212; MalcolmSh aw, “Re: Order in Council PC 1996-1497 of 30September1996”, p.136, para.43,
“Observations Upon the Response of Professor Crawford to the Amicus Curiae’s Expert Reports”, p. 221, para. 24. - 51 -
19. So too did the Supreme Court, in its unanimous opinion, though speaking in the context,
as I have said, of a right to secede. Under the heading “Absence of a Specific Prohibition” it said:
“International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit
denial of such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the
exceptional circumstances required for secession to be permitted under the right of a
people to self-determination . . .”
International law contains neither a right to unila teral secession nor the explicit denial of such a
right ⎯ and the quote then went on with the passage which my friend Mr.Dinescu quoted this
morning, without quoting the introductory words. It is true that the Court emphasized the principle
of territorial integrity to which I will revert, but th e point is that international law, according to the
Court, properly informed, while disfavouring secession, does not prohibit it. Except in extreme
cases there is no “right of unilateral secession” but nor is there the “explicit denial of a right”.
20. Moreover the Supreme Court was acutely aware of the possibility of international
recognition, if Quebec had declared its independen ce, even though it had no right to secede in the
first place .7
21. Turning to that other element of Article 38 (2) (d), la doctrine, it is instructive to search
standard texts for the proposition that declara tions of independence are unlawful and cannot be
validly recognized. It is not to be found in the sixth edition of Shaw, the eighth edition of Brownlie
88
or the ninth edition of Oppenheim edited by Jennings and Watts . It is not in the eighth edition of
Dallier, Forteau and Pellet 89. Instead these books contemplate the continued possibility of
secession. For example Malcolm Shaw ⎯ to take a random example ⎯ says:
87Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998, 2 SCR 217, para. 142; Bayefsky, pp. 500-501.
88
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Harlow: Longman, 1992, Sec. 276, p. 717:
“Revolt followed by secession has been accepted as a mode of losing territory to which there is no
corresponding mode of acquisition. The question at what time a loss of territory through revolt is
consummated cannot be answered once and for all, since no hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding
the time when a state which has broke n off from another can be said to ha ve established itself safely and
permanently. It is perhaps now que stionable whether the term revolt is entirely a happy one in this legal
context. It would s eem to indicate a particular kind of political situation rather than a legal mode of the
loss of territorial sovereignty. If a revolt as a matter of fact results in the emergence of a new state, then
this is the situation [of acquisition of territory by the new state].”
89Droit International Public, 8th ed., Paris: Lextenso éditions, 2009, Sec. 344, p. 585: - 52 -
“ There is, of course [there is, of course], no international legal duty to refrain
from secession attempts: the situation remains subject to the domestic law. However,
should such a secession prove successful in fact , then the concepts of recognition and
the appropriate criteria of statehood would pr ove relevant and determinative as to the
new situation.” 90
I particularly like the phrase “of course”.
22. To conclude, there is no basis for asserti ng a new rule of international law prohibiting
declarations of independence as such.
Why does international law not condemn declarations
of independence as unlawful?
23. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in principle that should complete my task;
international law does not regulate declarations of independence as such, and there is nothing in the
surrounding circumstances, including resolution 1244, to impose any contrary obligation.
24. But it is worth exploring the reasons why in ternational law takes this position. The first
of them is that international law does not attempt to regulate ⎯ in the manner of Article 2 (4) of the
Charter ⎯ the course of conflicts within a State. It is difficult enough to regulate inter-State
conflict, as the Court is only too well aware.
25. A second reason is a formal one. Professo r Shaw sought support for his submission that
international law does prohibit declarations of i ndependence by relying on the general category of
subjects of international law. Waving in the direction of international human rights law, he implied
91
that we are all subjects now . But as you pointed out in the Reparation case, to be a subject of
92
international law says nothing at all abou t the content of your rights and duties . It would be odd
if human groups were given status as subjects preci sely to deny them capacity to become really
effective subjects, that is, States. That irony is replicated at the level of Kosovo. When Serbia
“S’opposent également les environnements juridi ques des deux phénomènes: alors que le droit
international réglemente aujourd’hui de façon trèsprécise le processus de décolonisation, la sécession
n’est pas prise en compte en elle-même par le droit international. Elle l’est seulement en tant que
perturbation des relations internationa les, sous l’angle de la belligéran ce et de l’insurrection . . . La
pratique confirme en général ce ‘d ésengagement’ du droit international en la matière. Quelle que soit sa
légalité au plan interne, la sécession est un fait politique au regard du droit international, qui se contente
d’en tirer les conséquences lorsqu’e lle aboutit à la mise en place dautorités étatique s effectives et
stables.”
90Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge Univer sity Press, 2008, p. 218; emphasis
added.
91CR 2009/24, p. 66, para 8 (Shaw).
92Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the Unite d Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949 ,
pp. 178-180. - 53 -
actually controlled Kosovo, it eliminated its cons titutional status, it went close to expelling its
population: after lawfully losing control, in the aftermath of resolution1244, it now seeks to
elevate Kosovo into a subject of international law ⎯ but only in order to regain the sovereignty it
so signally abused.
26. The third reason relates to the principle of te rritorial integrity. Territorial integrity is not
a trump card which overrides or negates the rest of es tablished international law. It applies, in the
context of instruments such as the Friendly Relations Declaration, to relations between States. Its
primary function is the protection of the State fro m external intervention; it is not a principle
which determines how the State shall be configur ed internally, still less is it a guarantee against
change. True, when new rights are announced in international law ⎯ such as the rights of
93
indigenous peoples ⎯ great care is taken to ensure that th is is not understood as an authorization
to secede. But the question before you is not phrased in terms of authorization.
Summary of the law on declarations of independence
27. Mr. President, Members of the Court, during the course of these proceedings a number of
governments have cited my work on secession in support of what you will already have realized are
94
apparently contrasting conclusions . I hope I can be forgiven, by way of summary, for setting the
record straight. The relevant passage reads:
“It is true that the hostility by all governments to secession in respect of their
own territory has sometimes led to language implying that secession might be contrary
to international law... But this la nguage does not imply the existence of an
international law rule prohibiting secession ... The position is that secession is
neither legal nor illegal in international l95, but a legally neutral act the consequences
of which are regulated internationally.”
28. The text goes on to emphasize that this position of legal neutrality is accompanied by
deference to the territorial sovereign and a relu ctance to accept secession unless there is no other
alternative. That is why the doomsday scenarios of which you have been told do not reflect reality.
The crucial point here, however, is that this relu ctance does not mean either that declarations of
93
See, e.g., CR 2009/24, p. 67, para. 11 (Shaw, Serbia), citing Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
General Assembly resolution 61/295, 13 Sep. 2007, Art. 46.
94CR 2009/24, pp. 79-80, para. 10 (Kohen, Serbia); CR2009/26, p.39, para.10 , p.45, para24 (RuizCerutti,
Argentina); CR 2009/27, p. 19, paras. 18-19 (Mehdiyev, Azerbaijan); CR 2009/28, p. 31 (d’Aspremont, Burundi).
95James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, OUP, 2006, pp. 389-390. - 54 -
independence are internationally unlawful, nor does it take the form of a general prohibition. It is
still a matter for States, through their recognition pr actice, and international organizations through
their admission practice, to consider each case in the light of the circumstances. What Serbia
cannot do is to treat 17February2008 as a critical date, exclude all deve lopments and responses
thereafter, and pretend that international law defi nitively determined the status of Kosovo on that
day. As I have shown, it did not.
Self-determination (including “remedial secession”)
29. Mr.President, Members of the Court, finally, I should say a word about the right of
self-determination. If it were necessary to find an authorization — an express authorization— in
international law for the independence of Kosovo, then it would be necessary for the Court to
address this question. But it is not necessary for yo u to find an authorization in order for you to
answer the question, as I have shown. If the Court finds that the Declaration of 17 February 2008
was not, as such, contrary to international law, it ne ed not reach the issue of self-determination. In
fact, as the pleadings before you have shown, th ere is considerable support for the exercise of
self-determination outside the colonial context. An d that position is tentatively put forward in the
book from which I have quoted. For example, common Article1 of the two Human Rights
Covenants does not limit self-determination to col onial cases but articulates a general right, which
must have some content, especially in extremis.
30. Remedial self-determination was left open by the Canadian Supreme Court which did not
need to decide it, given the advanced position of Quebec within Canada 96. But you would need to
decide it before you could answer the question in the negative, against Kosovo. I stress that
Quebec has never had its distinct status negated a nd then constitutionally denied, nor two thirds of
its people chased violently from their homes and lands.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, that concludes the United Kingdom’s presentation.
Thank you for your patient attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor James Crawford.
96
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 135; reprinted in Bayefsky (ed.), pp. 499-500. - 55 -
This concludes the oral statement and comment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and brings to a close today’s h earings. The Court will meet again tomorrow at
10 a.m. when it will hear Venezuela and Viet Nam. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 12.15 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 10 December 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada, presiding, on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)