Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2009/22
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THHEGUE
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 1 octobre 2009, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Tomka, vice-président,
faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire relative à des Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay
(Argentine c. Uruguay)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Thursday 1 October 2009, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-President Tomka, Acting President, presiding,
in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Tomka, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Grejugesood,
BeTroresz.
juiesesa, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Vice-President Tomka, Acting President
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Judges ad hoc TorresBernárdez
Vinuesa
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement de la République argentine est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mme Susana Ruiz Cerutti, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique du ministère des relations
extérieures, du commerce international et du culte,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Horacio A. Basabe, ambassadeur, directeur général de l’Institut du service extérieur de
la nation, ancien conseiller juridique du ministère des relations extérieures, du commerce
international et du culte, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
S. Exc. M. Santos Goñi Marenco, ambassadeur de la République argentine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagents ;
M.AlainPellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Philippe Sands QC, professeur de droit internatio nal au University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers, Londres,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement, Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Genève,
M. Alan Béraud, ministre à l’ambassade de la République argentine auprès de l’Union européenne,
ancien conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du
culte,
M.DanielMüller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Homero Bibiloni, secrétaire d’Etat à l’environnement et au développement durable,
comme autorité gouvernementale ;
M. Esteban Lyons, directeur national du contrôle environnemental du secrétariat à l’environnement
et au développement durable,
M.HowardWheater, docteur en hydrologie de l’ Université de Bristol, professeur d’hydrologie à
l’Imperial College, directeur de l’Imperial College Environment Forum,
M. Juan Carlos Colombo, docteur en océanographie de l’Université de Québec, professeur à la
faculté des sciences et au musée de l’Université de La Plata, directeur du Laboratoire de chimie
environnementale et de biogéochimie de l’Université de La Plata,
M.NeilMcIntyre, docteur en ingénierie envir onnementale, maître de conférences à l’Imperial
College, Londres, - 5 -
The Government of the Republicof Argentina is represented by:
H.E. Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Worship,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Horacio A. Basabe, Ambassador, Director of the Argentine Institute for Foreign Service,
former Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Fore ign Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
H.E. Mr. Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr. Philippe Sands QC, Professor of International Law at the University College London, Barrister
at Matrix Chambers, London,
Mr.MarceloKohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva,
Mr.AlanBéraud, Minister at the Embassy of the Argentine Republic to the European Union,
former Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Homero Bibiloni, Federal Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development,
as Governmental Authority;
Mr.EstebanLyons, National Director of Environm ental Control, Secretariat of Environment and
Sustainable Development,
Mr. Howard Wheater, PhD in Hydrology at Bristol University, Professor of Hydrology at Imperial
College and Director of the Imperial College Environment Forum,
Mr. Juan Carlos Colombo, PhD in Oceanography at the University of Québec, Professor at the
Faculty of Sciences and Museum of the National University of La Plata, Director of the
Laboratory of Environmental Ch emistry and Biogeochemistry at the National University of
La Plata,
Mr.NeilMcIntyre, PhD in Environmental Engineering, Senior Lecturer in Hydrology at Imperial
College London, - 6 -
Mme Inés Camilloni, docteur en sciences atmosphériques, professeur de sciences atmosphériques à
la faculté des sciences de l’Université de Buenos Aires, maître de recherche au conseil national
de recherche (CONICET),
M.GabrielRaggio, docteur en sciences techni ques de l’Ecole polytechnique fédérale de
Zürich (ETHZ) (Suisse), consultant indépendant,
comme conseils et experts scientifiques ;
M.HolgerMartinsen, ministre au bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires
étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
M. Mario Oyarzábal, conseiller d’ambassade, bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
M.FernandoMarani, secrétaire d’ambassade, amb assade de la République argentine au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M.GabrielHerrera, secrétaire d’ambassade, bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
MmeCynthiaMulville, secrétaire d’ambassade, bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres, spécialisée en droit de l’environnement et en
droit du développement,
Mme Mara Tignino, docteur en droit, chercheur à l’Université de Genève,
M.MagnusJeskoLanger, assistant d’enseignement et de recherche, Institut de hautes études
internationales et du développement, Genève,
comme conseillers juridiques.
Le Gouvernement de l’Uruguay est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos Gianelli, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Carlos Mora Medero, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.AlanBoyle, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d’Angleterre,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,
M.LawrenceH.Martin, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de la Cour suprême des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts, - 7 -
MsInésCamilloni, PhD in Atmospheric Sciences, Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at the
Faculty of Sciences of the University of Bue nos Aires, Senior Researcher at the National
Research Council (CONICET),
Mr.GabrielRaggio, Doctor in Technical Scienc es of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Zurich (ETHZ) (Switzerland), Independent Consultant,
as Scientific Advisers and Experts;
Mr.HolgerMartinsen, Minister at the Office of the Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Worship,
Mr.MarioOyarzábal, Embassy Counsellor, Office of the Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, International Trade and Worship,
Mr. Fernando Marani, Embassy Secretary, Embassy of the Argentine Republic in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Gabriel Herrera, Embassy Secretary, Office of the Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Worship,
Ms Cynthia Mulville, Embassy Secretary, Office of the Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Worship,
MsKateCook, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London, specializing in environmental law and law
relating to development,
Ms Mara Tignino, PhD in Law, Researcher at the University of Geneva,
Mr.MagnusJesko Langer, teaching and research assistant, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva,
as Legal Advisers.
The Government of Uruguay is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos Gianelli, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the United States of
America,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Carlos Mora Medero, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.AlanBoyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, Member of the
English Bar,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Florence,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme
Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, - 8 -
M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur à la McGeorge School of Law de l’Université du Pacifique,
Californie, ancien président de la Commission du droit international et rapporteur spécial aux
fins des travaux de la Commission relatifs aux cours d’eau internationaux,
M. Alberto Pérez Pérez, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de la République,
Montevideo,
M.PaulS.Reichler, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de la Cour suprême des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du barreau du district de Columbia,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Marcelo Cousillas, conseiller juridique à la direction nationale de l’environnement, ministère du
logement, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement de la République orientale de
l’Uruguay,
M. César Rodriguez Zavalla, chef de cabinet au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
orientale de l’Uruguay,
M.CarlosMata, directeur adjoint des affaires juri diques au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République orientale de l’Uruguay,
M. Marcelo Gerona, conseiller à l’ambassade de la République orientale de l’Uruguay au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, avocat, admis au barreau de la République orientale de
l’Uruguay et membre du barreau de New York,
MA. damKahn, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
M.AndrewLoewenstein, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
MmeAnaliaGonzalez, LLM, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, admise au barreau de la République
orientale de l’Uruguay,
Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux des districts de
Columbia et de New York,
MmeCicelyParseghian, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
M. Pierre Harcourt, doctorant à l’Université d’Edimbourg,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Macerata,
Mme Maria E. Milanes-Murcia, MA, LLM, JSD Candidate à la McGeorge School of Law de
l’Université du Pacifique, doctorante à l’Université de Murcia, admise au barreau d’Espagne,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Mme Alicia Torres, directrice nationale de l’environneme nt au ministère du logement, de
l’aménagement du territoire etde l’environnement de la République orientale de l’Uruguay,
M.EugenioLorenzo, conseiller technique à la direction de l’envir onnement du ministère du
logement, de l’aménagement du territoir e et de l’environnement de la Ré publique orientale de
l’Uruguay, - 9 -
Mr.StephenC.McCaffrey, Professor at the McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific,
California, former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission and Special Rapporteur for
the Commission’s work on international watercourses,
Mr.AlbertoPérezPérez, Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of the Republic,
Montevideo,
Mr.PaulS.Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court
and the District of Columbia,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Marcelo Cousillas, Legal Counsel at the Nationa l Directorate for the Environment, Ministry of
Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Mr.CésarRodriguezZavalla, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay,
Mr.CarlosMata, Deputy Director of Legal Affair s, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay,
Mr.MarceloGerona, Counsellor of the Embassy of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Attorney at law, admitted to the Bar of the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay and Member of the Bar of New York,
Mr. Adam Kahn, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Mr.AndrewLoewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,
MsAnaliaGonzalez, LLM, Foley Hoag LLP, adm itted to the Bar of the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay,
MsClaraE. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
MsCicelyParseghian, Foley Hoag LLP, Me mber of the Bar of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,
Mr. Pierre Harcourt, PhD Candidate, University of Edinburgh,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the School of Law, University of Macerata,
Ms Maria E. Milanes-Murcia, M.A., LLM; JSD Candidate, McGeorge School of Law, University
of the Pacific; PhD Candidate, University of Murcia; admitted to the Bar of Spain,
as Assistant Counsel;
Ms Alicia Torres, National Director for the Environment at the Ministry of Housing, Territorial
Planning and Environment of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Mr.EugenioLorenzo, Technical Consultant for the National Directorate for the Environment,
Ministry of Housing, TerritorialPlanning and Environment ofthe Eastern Republic of Uruguay, - 10 -
M.CyroCroce, conseiller technique à la direction de l’environnement du ministère du logement, de
l’aménagement du territoire etde l’environnement de la République orientale de l’Uruguay,
Mme Raquel Piaggio, bureau de la gestion des eaux (O.S.E.), consultante technique à la direction de
l’environnement du ministère du logement, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement
de la République orientale de l’Uruguay,
M.CharlesA.Menzie, PhD., Principal Scientist et directeur d’EcoSciences Practice chez Exponent,
Inc., à Alexandria, Virginie,
st
M. Neil McCubbin, Eng., Bsc. (Eng), 1 Class Honours, Glasgow, Associate of the Royal College of
Science and Technology, Glasgow,
comme conseillers scientifiques et experts. - 11 -
Mr. Cyro Croce, Technical Consultant for the National Directorate for the Environment, Ministry of
Housing, Territorial Planning and Enviro nment of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Ms Raquel Piaggio, Water Management Administration ⎯ O.S.E. ⎯ Technical Cons ultant for the
National Directorate for the Environment, Mini stry of Housing, Territorial Planning and
Environment of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Mr. Charles A. Menzie, PhD., Principal Scientist and Director of the EcoSciences Practice at
Exponent, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia,
Mr. Neil McCubbin, Eng., BSc. (Eng), 1st Class Honours, Glasgow, Associate of the Royal College
of Science and Technology, Glasgow,
as Scientific Advisers and Experts. - 12 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court
meets today to hear the second round of oral argument of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. I now
give the floor to Mr. Martin. You have the floor, Sir.
MMAr. TIN:
ANSWER TO ARGENTINA ’SA RGUMENTS ON A RTICLE 7
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is, again, a privilege to appear before you on
behalf of Uruguay. Uruguay is mindful of your admonition last week not to repeat ourselves, and
to keep our observations as brief as possible. We will make every effort to follow your guidance.
2. My task before you this afternoon is to respond to Argentina’s second round presentation
concerning the Parties’ agreements to dispense w ith CARU’s preliminary review of the ENCE and
Botnia projects under Article7, and to proceed straight to the consultations and negotiations
contemplated in later articles. As you will hear, nothing Argentina said on Monday (CR 2009/20)
or Tuesday (CR 2009/21) this week undermines any of the points about which we spoke to you last
week.
3. Before turning to my primary task, however, there is one enduring point of confusion that
must be addressed. It is this: throughout these proceedings, virtually every single one of
Argentina’s counsel has, on multiple occasions, referred to the preliminary environmental
authorizations Uruguay issued to ENCE in 2003, and to Botnia in 2005, as “building” or
“construction” permits. Their purpose was cleato suggest that Uruguay had already committed
itself to what Argentina never tires of callia fait accompli upon the mere issuance of the
preliminary authorizations.
4. The trouble is, Mr.President, Argentina’s counsel are wrong. Individually, and as a
group, they have badly misunderstood the purpose of a preliminary environmental authorization ⎯
known as an “AAP” ⎯ under Uruguayan law. As Uruguay discussed at length in its written
1
pleadings , an AAP is, as its very name suggests, merely preliminary authorization that does
nothing more than reflect the Government’s in itial determination that, based on the review
1
CMU, paras. 1.15, 1,32, 3.10-3.12; RU, paras. 1.18, 2.47. - 13 -
2
conducted to date, a proposed project is environmentally viable . An AAP serves two
administrative functions. First, it establishes the environmental requirements with which the
project must comply. Second, it sets the further environmental reviews and authorizations required
3
to assess compliance with these environmental requirements . It distinctly does not, by itself,
authorize construction.
5. An AAP is thus not the endpoint of th e permitting process, as Argentina would like the
Court to believe, but rather the beginning. After an AAP is issued, the interactive process between
Uruguay and the initiating company continues, and Uruguay retains the right to, and does in fact,
insist on modifications to projects before even construction, much less operation, can begin 4. To
be sure, an AAP is a necessary step in the permitting process. But by no means is it, by itself,
sufficient to allow construction to begin.
6. The Botnia project proves the point. After Uruguay issued the Botnia AAP in
February2005, the project was required to and di d in fact receive no fewer than eight additional
authorizations before it was finally permitted to enter operation in November2007. [Slide1 on.]
These included:
⎯ the approval for the removal of vegetation and earth movement (dated 12 April 2005);
⎯ the approval for the construction phase of the cellulose plant (dated 18 January 2006);
⎯ the approval for the construction of the wastewater treatment plant (dated 10 May 2006);
⎯ the approval for the construction of solid industrial waste landfill (dated 9 April 2007); and
5
⎯ the approval for operations (dated 31 October 2007) .
7. As the Court can see from this list, which is also included in your judges’ folders at tab 1,
the actual construction of the cellulose plant itself did not begin until nearly a full year after the
6
AAP had issued .
8. Two other examples will suffice to illustra te the wholly preliminary and contingent
character of an AAP. [Slide 1 off.] The first is the case of the proposed Traspapel cellulose plant
2CMU, para. 3.10.
3
RU, para. 2.47.
4
CMU, para. 3.11; RU, para. 2.47.
5CMU, para. 4.92, footnote 662; RU, para. 2.48.
6CMU, para. 3.117. - 14 -
that Uruguay considered in the mid-1990s in exactly the spot where Botnia now sits. The
Traspapel AAP was issued in August1995 7. Yet, the project was subsequently dropped and the
plant never built. I should note too that when it la ter came to CARU’s attention that Uruguay had
issued the Traspapel AAP without notifying th e Commission under Article7, no one in CARU,
including none of Argentina’s delegates, objected or adopted the position that the applicant State
has in this case; that is, that notice to CARU must come before even the most preliminary
8
authorization can issue . By itself, this should give the Court considerable pause about the viability
of Argentina’s argument on this point.
9. The contingent character of an AAP is also demonstrated in the case of ENCE. By now,
the Court knows well that the ENCE AAP was is sued in October2003. The project progressed
further than the Traspapel project had, and a permit for ground clearing was issued on
9
28November2005, more than two years later . Even so, the ENCE project too was later
abandoned and the plant never built.
10. The conclusion is clear: the mere issu ance of the Botnia and ENCE AAPs did not imply
that construction, much less operation, was inevitable.
11. I return then to the Parties’ agreements to dispense with CARU’s preliminary review
under Article7 in favour of immediate direct d ealings. I start by noting some welcome points of
agreement. First, in their speeches earlier in the week, both Professors Pellet and Kohen finally
acknowledged that there is, exactly as Uruguay has always said, no impediment to the Parties’
agreeing to set aside any of the Statute’s procedural steps in favour of others 10. Second, although
counsel did not directly acknowledge the facts, their failure to deny that Uruguay provided
Argentina a raft of information, and consulted with it about both the ENCE and Botnia plants, must
be taken as an admission of those facts.
7CMU, para. 2.61.
8
CMU, para. 2.63.
9CMU, para. 3.115; RU, para. 3.48; CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 25.
10CR 2009/14, p. 13, para. 4 (Kohen); CR 2009/20, p. 23, para. 22 (Pellet). - 15 -
12. There are, however, two key differences that remain between us. First, whether the
Parties did, in fact, agree to dispense with the Article 7 notice. And second, whether Argentina did
or did not agree that the plants will be built. I will deal with each of these issues in turn.
13. With respect to the Parties’ agreement to dispense with notice to CARU under Article 7,
counsel for Argentina doggedly sticks to their argu ment that the Parties never so agreed. Rather,
they say, what the Parties did in March2004 w as merely agree to send the ENCE matter back to
CARU so it could perform its initial screening func tion under Article7. C ounsel’s persistence is
admirable, but I respectfully submit that their argument makes no more sense today than it did
when we addressed you last week. As we have shown, it would be nonsensical for the Parties,
working at the highest levels, to invest so mu ch of their time and effort only to achieve an
agreement to send the matter back to CARU for a wholly preliminary review, the only purpose of
which is to determine whether higher level contacts are necessary. Although we may be here
speaking about the finer points of international proc edural law, there is nothing that requires us to
set aside our common sense.
14. Quite apart from the logical problems inherent in Argentina’s argument, it is also
demonstrably incorrect. Last week I discussed how CARU’s paralysis led the Uruguayan Foreign
Ministry to send nearly 1,700 pages of documentation ⎯ that is 1,683 pages, to be precise ⎯ about
the ENCE plant directly to its Argentine counterpart in October and November2003 11.
Argentina’s own evidence shows that this direct intervention of the two Foreign Ministries actually
occurred at Argentina’s request, precisely because CARU was paralysed. [Slide 2 on.] In the
words of a 2005Report to the Argentine Senate prepared by the Chief of Staff to the Cabinet of
Ministers, which you can find at tab 2 of your judges’ folders:
“As a consequence of this grave situat ion, and not finding within the ambit of
CARU the necessary consensus to resolve the matter, CARU halted its sessions and
consideration of the matter was left to both Foreign Ministries . . .
In this context and by virtue of the impasse at CARU, the Argentinean Foreign
Ministry requested the technical information corresponding to Uruguay . In
November 2003, in accordance with the proposal by Argentinean Foreign Ministry ,
the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry sent the documentation related to the Cellulose
project in M’Bopicuá, presented by the company before the Department of the
11
CMU, para. 3.40. - 16 -
Environment (DINAMA) when it requested the e12ironmental authorisation, to the
Argentinean Embassy in Montevideo.”
15. Last week I described for you what happened after the information the Argentine Foreign
Ministry had requested was dispatched and receive d. [Slide 2 off.] In particular, Argentina’s
technical advisers to CARU proceeded to analyse it and prepared a report in which they came to
the unambiguous conclusion that “ there would be no significant environmental impact on the
13
Argentine side” .
16. On Tuesday, for the first time in the hi story of this case, we heard Argentina finally
acknowledge the existence of this report. In his address, Professor Kohen dismissed it as nothing
more than the Argentine advisers’ “initial opinions” expressed in their “individual capacities” 14.
This is a remarkable statement, Mr.President. More than anything else, it reflects, I suspect,
Argentina’s continuing unease with the issue. Individual capacities? The description of the
Argentine technical report Uruguay has submitte d comes from one of the most official
governmental sources imaginable; that is, a formal statement by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign
Affairs included in a year-end report to the Chamber of Deputies. No, Mr.President, this is
undeniably the official position of the Argentine Government as a whole, and cannot so easily be
tossed aside.
17. It is against this background, and in th is context, that the Foreign Ministers met on
2March 2004 and agreed on the way forward, as later documented in the CARU Minutes on
15May 2004. In particular, it was agreed that the ENCE plant would be built and that CARU
would focus its efforts on monitoring water quality.
18. When he spoke on Tuesday, ProfessorKohen accused me of being selective and
15
incomplete in my presentation of documents to the Court . He is right. But the reason is not what
he suggests. The truth is, Uruguay was and is faced with an embarrassment of riches. There was
12
RU, Vol. II, Ann. R14 (Statement by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Argentine Senate, p. 616;
emphasis added.
13CMU, Vol.III, Ann.46 (Statement by Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Culture,
included in Report of the Head of the Argentine Cabinet of Ministers, AlbertoAngelFernandez, to the Argentine
Chamber of Deputies Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chamber of Deputies, Report No.64, p.136 (Mar.2005));
emphasis added.
14CR 2009/21, pp. 42-43, para. 20 (Kohen).
15CR 2009/21, p. 37, para. 5 (Kohen). - 17 -
and is just too much good material to work with. The limited time available compelled us to be
choosy.
19. Mr. President, time constraints today are even greater and I could not possibly do justice
to the evidence in the r ecord on this point, most of it from Argentine official sources. In the
footnotes of this speech, you will find references pointing you to the many documents cited in
Uruguay’s written pleadings that prove our view of events is correct 16. I invite the Court to review
these documents, not just as they are presented in our pleadings, but in their entirety. Uruguay has
every confidence that when you do so, you will see that our depiction of the facts is the right one.
20. For our purposes today, allow me to cite just one more. [Slide 3 on.] A statement from
the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chamber of Deputies described the
2004 agreement as follows:
“Said agreement respects, on one hand, the Uruguayan national character of the
project, and on the other hand, the regulations in force that regulate the waters of the
Uruguay River through the CARU.
Likewise, it includes a work methodology for the three phases of construction
of the project: the project, the construction and the operation.
Thus, inclusive control procedures were carried out on the Uruguay River which
17
means they will continue after the plants are in operation.”
As you can see, there is nothing the least bit cond itional about the facts that the plants “will” come
into operation.
21. [Slide3 off.] ProfessorKohen has also argued that the Minutes from the 15May 2004
CARU meeting he presented to the Court on Tu esday show that the Commission was still
expecting to conduct an Article 7 review on the ENCE plant 1. It was not. Uruguay invites the
Court to examine closely the portions of the Minutes included in Argentina’s judges’ folders. The
16
CARU Minutes No. 01/04, pp.18-19, p.33 (15May 2004) ; CMU, Vol.IV, Ann.99; Presidency of the
Republic of Uruguay Web Site, “M’Bopicuá: Working Methodology Established” (3 Mar. 2004), CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 17;
La Nación (Argentina), “Uruguay Promises to Inform the Government about th e Paper Mill” (3Mar.2004), CMU,
Vol.IX, Ann.183; Statement by Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Argentine Senate, Report No.65, p.617
(Mar. 2005), CMU, Vol. III, Ann. 47; Stat ement by Argentine Ministry of Forei gn Affairs to the Chamber of Deputies,
Report No. 64, p. 136 (Mar. 2005), CMU, Vol. III, Ann. 46; Annual Report of the State of the Nation for 2004, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Culture,105 (Mar.2005), CMU, Vol.III, Ann.48; Memorandum from
Minister Counsellor DanielCastillos to Ambassador Dr.Albe rto VolontéBerro, para.5 (1Apr.2004), CMU, Vol.II,
Ann. 18; Proposed Special Minutes, Final Version, para. VIII (28 Apr. 2004), CMU, Vol. IX, Ann. 200.
17CMU, Vol.III, Ann.46 (Statement by Argentine Ministry of Foreign A ffairs to the Chamber of Deputies,
p. 136); emphasis added.
18CR 2009/21, p. 38, para. 9 (Kohen). - 18 -
Court will see that they very plainly contradict Ar gentina’s argument. The text Argentina offers
actually underscores the fact that the Commissi on was looking ahead towards construction and the
eventual operation of the plant. To be sure, Uruguay was to convey the environmental
management plans ⎯ known as “EMPs” ⎯ for the construction and operation of the ENCE plant
to CARU for purposes of soliciting the Commission’ s comments, but these were to be “dismissed
or decided with the company” in Uruguay’s discretion 19. Exactly as Uruguay has always
maintained, CARU was given a technical role in reviewing information relating to the
environmental impacts of the plant and in monitoring water quality. But there is nothing to suggest
that the fact that the plant would be built was anything other than a given.
22. ProfessorKohen tried to make much of the fact that Uruguay never provided the
20
pertinent information about ENCE in 2004 . But the simple truth is it would have been impossible
for Uruguay to turn over the materials in 2004 ⎯ because they did not exist! The only EMP ⎯ for
land movement ⎯ ever issued to ENCE is dated much later, in November 2005, obviously well
after 2004, and after the GTAN consultations had already approached impasse.
23. Ultimately, perhaps the most persuasive proof of the fact that the Foreign Ministers did
not agree to send the matter back to CARU for re view under Article 7 is CARU’s own subsequent
conduct. Argentina has cited nothing ⎯ because there is nothing ⎯ in the record to suggest that
the Commission was waiting for notification under Article 7. For the reasons I have already talked
about too much, the very idea makes no sense. All that CARU did was proceed to design the joint
monitoring programme known as PROCEL, exactly as the Foreign Ministers had agreed.
24. Having touched again on PROCEL, let me ma ke one additional point. In his first round
presentation on 16September, ProfessorKohen to ld you that the Parties’ agreement on PROCEL
did not mean that Argentina had accepted th e plants, because PROCEL was intended only to
collect baseline data in the event the plants might later be built, not to conduct actual operational
monitoring 21. This argument is also wrong, as the final text of PROCEL as adopted in CARU
19
RU, para. 3.48.
20
CR 2009/21, p. 40, para. 12 (Kohen).
2CR 2009/14, p. 17, para. 17 (Kohen). - 19 -
makes clear. I will cite just one part, although I cer tainly invite the Court to review the plan in its
entirety. On the very first page, it states:
“The plan entails a continuous monitoring process whereby trends can be
determined every three work years so as to evaluate the long-term impact of the
22
effluents by analyzing the findings of these three-yearly surveys.”
Plainly, the eventual operation of the plant is understood, accepted and being planned for.
25. As Uruguay showed last week, the agreem ent that the ENCE plant would be built was
later extended to Botnia. On Tuesday, Argen tina took issue with our argument, although it
contented itself with just two observations. Fi rst, ProfessorKohen suggested we were merely
23
playing “grammatical” games . Second, it would have been impossible, he said, for Argentina to
have accepted the Botnia plant in 2004 because the Botnia AAP was not issued until
February 2005 24. Neither argument is persuasive.
26. With respect to the statement that Uruguay’s argument is grammatical gamesmanship,
Professor Kohen is, in effect, making light of Argentina’s own official sources, and suggesting the
texts do not mean what they actually say. As we previously demonstrated, formal documents from
the highest levels of the Argentine Government show conclusively that the dispute with respect to
both plants ⎯ plural ⎯ had been put to an end. [Slide 4 on.] Projected before you now is the
same document I showed to you last Wednesday (CR 2009/18). It is from a 2004 year-end report
to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Mr.Pr esident, I do not intend to dwell long on this
document. I merely want to highlight the fact th at the plural reference to both plants is not a
typographical error or clerical oversight, as Arge ntina would have you believe. You see the
frequent references to “plants”. Today, I would dr aw your particular attention to the reference at
the bottom of the screen to “both plants”. In the original Spanish, this is “las dos plantas”. Plainly,
the authors of this document knew exactly what they were saying.
27. Nor is this the only high-level document that proves our point. [Slide 4 off.] I
previously showed you the PROCEL plan as adopted in CARU, and thus agreed to by Argentina,
22
CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 109.
23
CR 2009/21, pp. 44-45, para. 25 (Kohen).
2CR 2009/21, p. 45, para. 26 (Kohen). - 20 -
that refers to the “plants” and the “facilities”, plural 25. Here is another one. [Slide 5 on.] This
26
from what Argentina itself has called a “detailed history” of the dispute set forth in a report to the
Argentine Senate:
“In November 2004, the technical advi sors completed the development of the
‘Environmental Quality Monitoring Plan for the Uruguay River in Areas of Cellulous
Plants’. The said Plan was approved by the agreement of both delegations to the
CARU during plenary meeting on 12 Nove mber 2004. The actions from the
Monitoring Plan are centered in areas of possible influence by the projects mentioned
and include the implementation of monitori ng actions by CARU for the protection of
27
the quality of the waters . . .”
28. Argentina’s argument that it would have been impossible for it to agree to the installation
of the Botnia plant in 2004 because the AAP had not yet been issued also misses the mark. [Slide 5
off.] On Tuesday, our learned opponents suggested that Uruguay was saying that Argentina agreed
to Botnia “even before it knew anything about it” 28. We are doing no such thing. In fact, the
undisputed evidence shows that Argentina and CARU were aware of the Botnia project long before
2005, as early as October 2003, when company representatives met with Argentine Government
officials in Buenos Aires to discuss Botnia’s po tential investment in Uruguay. According to a
contemporaneous account of that meeting, Arge ntine officials were “flexible and helpful” 29.
Around that same time, Botnia also issued a press release announcing the company’s plans in
Uruguay 30.
29. Several months later, in April 2004, Ar gentine and Uruguayan de legates to CARU met
with Botnia representatives to learn more about the company’s plans. The CARU Minutes do not
detail the contents of the meeting but do characterize it as “informative” 31. Then, in August 2004,
CARU actually sent a formal delegation to Finl and, which included members of the Argentine
32
Government, to learn more about the company and its cellulose plant technology .
25CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 109.
26
RA, para. 2.104.
27
RU, Vol. II, Ann. R14 (Statement by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Argentine Senate, p. 618).
28
CR 2009/21, p. 45, para. 28 (Kohen).
29CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 16.
30CMU, Vol. IX, Ann. 199.
31CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 101.
32
CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 105. - 21 -
30. In November 2004, CARU sent DINAMA a letter seeking an update on the
administrative status of the Botnia plant in Uruguay 33. In December, DINAMA replied and
34
forwarded Botnia’s application for an AAP .
31. Argentina and CARU were thus well aware of and kept regularly informed about the
Botnia project beginning long before the AAP was issued in February2005. There is nothing
remarkable, let alone impossible, about the fact that Argentina and CARU accepted the project and
incorporated it into their plans even before the AAP was issued.
32. Mr.President, I come then to my final destination, the GTAN, about which
ProfessorCondorelli will have more to say shortly. The Court is, by now familiar with the
5 May 2005 letter from Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Rafael Bielsa, asking that Uruguay agree to
“a more direct intervention” than CARU could offer. Even assu ming that Argentina is right that
there was no prior agreement concerning Botnia, and that the matter was ripe for review in CARU
under Article7, we say that Minister Bielsa’s le tter is proof positive that the Parties mutually
agreed to dispense with that review. I ndeed, just as was the case with ENCE in 2003 35, it was
Argentina that sought a more direct intervention of the higher-level authorities.
33. Speaking for Argentina, ProfessorKohen offered a two-part response. First, he
highlighted Argentina’s request to consider relocating the plants stated in the same letter to support
36
an argument that the letter shows th ere was no prior agreement on Botnia . Professor Condorelli
will deal with this question momentarily.
34. Second, Argentina says the plain implic ations of its own invitation to go around CARU
are disproven in the Commission’s Minutes from a meeting the very next day, 6May2005. The
Court may recall that on that day, the Chairman of Argentina’s delegation to CARU protested
37
Uruguay’s alleged failure to refer the Botnia project to the Commission under Article 7 . Indeed,
Professor Kohen called these protests “conclusive” proof that the Parties had not agreed to bypass
33CMU, para. 3.29.
34
Ibid.
35
See supra, para. 32.
36CR 2009/21, pp. 49-50, para. 42 (Kohen).
37CR 2009/21, pp. 46-47, para. 32 (Kohen). - 22 -
38
CARU . Yet, this lone reference, coming just one day after Minister Bielsa’s letter, and at a time
when CARU was almost certainly unaware of it, and three weeks before the Foreign Ministers met
on 31 May to concretize the agreement to establish GTAN, does not support Argentina’s argument.
35. Significantly more probative ⎯ indeed, truly conclusive ⎯ is the fact that, aside from
this single statement, which was made even be fore GTAN was created, Argentina cites no other
evidence suggesting that CARU expected to have any role in the process b esides monitoring water
quality after the plants came into operation, exactly as Minister Bielsa indicated in his 5 May 2005
letter. This is not a mere failure of proof; Argentina cites no evidence because there is no
evidence. Nothing in the CARU Minutes indicates that the Commission, or even the Argentine
delegation thereto, expected to conduct an Article 7 review of Botnia after GTAN was created.
The Parties had clearly decided to byp ass that step and go straight to the
government-to-government consultations and negotiations contemplated in Article 12.
36. Mr. President, I am reminded of the questi on Ambassador Gianelli posed to Argentina in
his opening speech last week. He asked: “[I]f not co nsulting, what is it that [Argentina’s] officials
were doing for six months in 2005 and 2006 when they met 12 times with Uruguayan counterparts
39
to exchange information and views under the auspices of GTAN?” It is quite remarkable that we
never actually heard an answer to that ques tion from Argentina during the course of these
proceedings. The reason is obvious. As much as it might wish to deny the fact now, Argentina
itself has previously recognized on repeated occasi ons that its officials in GTAN were indeed
40
negotiating and consulting pursuant to Article 12 of the Statute .
37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you again for your generous attention. I ask
that you give the floor to Professor Condorelli.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Mr.Martin. Je donne la parole à
M. le professeur Condorelli. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur le professeur.
38
CR 2009/21, p. 49, para. 40 (Kohen).
39
CR 2009/16, p. 16, para. 19 (Gianelli).
40See, for example, MA, para. 2.72; Argentina’s Application instituting proceedings, para. 4 (4 May 2006). - 23 -
M. CONDORELLI :
L E GTAN, LA C OUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE ET L ARTICLE 12 DU STATUT
I. NTRODUCTION
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, mon intervention d’aujourd’hui sera brève, et
ce pour deux raisons. La première est que j’entend s m’en tenir très strictement aux instructions et
aux souhaits de la Cour, qui nous demande d’utiliser ce second tour de plaidoiries exclusivement
afin de répondre aux remarques et observations pr ésentées par la Partie adverse sans rouvrir des
thèmes et répéter des arguments sur lesquels les Parties se sont déjà exprimées de manière pleine et
approfondie. La deuxième raison est que, concernant le sujet sur lequel je suis censé intervenir, les
plaideurs de l’autre côté de la barre se sont exhibés ⎯ il est vrai ⎯ dans des plaidoiries très
éloquentes, extrêmement bien faites et à première vue convaincantes, mais en réalité les arguments
qu’ils ont fait valoir ne constituent pour essentiel que la répétition des mêmes arguments que
l’Uruguay a déjà réfutés: des arguments qui on t certes été enrobés de mots nouveaux, lesquels
toutefois n’en changent pas la substance. Je pourrai donc m’acquitter de ma tâche assez
rapidement.
2. Comme au premier tour de plaidoiries, je vais centrer mes propos sur l’article 12 du statut
et les questions connexes. Je me borne à rappeler le sens de cette disposition : si un accord n’a pas
pu se former entre les Parties au travers des procédures et des étapes de négociation envisagées aux
articles 7 à 11 du statut, quant à la réalisation d’un projet d’une Partie tombant sous la prévision de
l’article7 du fait d’être susceptibles de causer un préjudice sensible à l’autre Partie, un dernier
délai de centquatre-vingtsjours doit être destinéà la recherche d’un accord entre les Parties au
moyen de négociations directes. En cas d’échec, votre Cour peut être saisie pour le règlement du
différend.
A. Le GTAN et l’article 12 du statut du fleuve Uruguay
3. Logiquement, la première interrogation sur laquelle il faut nécessairement se pencher est
toujours celle-ci : le GTAN a-t-il constitué, ou n on, le mécanisme de négociation directe prévu par
l’article12, à savoir cet espace de négociation ente les Parties devant précéder la saisine de la
Cour d’après cette disposition du statut? Monsie ur le président, la réponse positive continue de - 24 -
s’imposer: rien de ce qu’ont allégué nos contradi cteurs ne le met en doute. Une telle réponse
positive s’impose à tous, mais elle s’impose plus spécialement à l’Argentine pour la simple raison
que c’est elle qui l’a donnée très officiellement, d’abord à l’Uruguay, et ensuite à la Cour. Je
n’entends bien sûr pas reprendre les preuves inc ontournables de cela que je me suis permis de
rappeler à la Cour le 24 septembre dernier, ni citer à nouveau les documents diplomatiques et les
propos réitérés de la Partie adve rse par lesquels celle-ci a, non p as admis, mais revendiqué que le
GTAN ⎯pour utiliser les mots de son ministre des affaires étrangères ⎯ «was the instance of
direct negociation between both countries in relation with the dispute over the construction project
for the two industrial cellulose plants» 41. J’aimerais seulement ajouter à ce stade que le bien-fondé
d’un tel constat se trouve finalement confirmé ⎯quoique sans doute involontairement ⎯ par les
propos qu’a tenus lundi dernier le professeurPellet, quand il a admis, en discutant justement du
GTAN, que «il ne s’agissait pas de renvoyer la question à la CARU comme nos contradicteurs
nous le font dire, mais bien de trouver une solution négociée, bilaté rale, au différend concernant le
42
respect du statut du fleuve Uruguay» . Je ne saurais mieux dire : le professeur Pellet a tout à fait
raison. Le GTAN était effectiv ement l’instrument au travers duquel il avait été convenu entre les
Parties de tenter de régler leur différend en négociant directement, ainsi que l’envisage l’article 12
du statut. Faut-il rappeler que le GTAN n’a eu a s’occuper que des usines de pâte à papier, à savoir
des échanges d’information et du suivi quant aux effets de leur fonctionnement sur l’écosystème
fluvial, et que c’est suite à l’échec des consultati ons menées au moyen du GTAN et à cause de cet
échec que l’Argentine a décidé de saisir votre Cour, ainsi qu’elle a tenu à le notifier officiellement
à l’Uruguay ?
4. Une observation concernant la question de savoir pourquoi le GTAN a été mis sur pied et
pourquoi les Parties ont décidé qu’il convenait de mener désormais les consultations au sujet des
usines au travers de ce moyen de négociation directe, et non pas au travers de la CARU. Je dois
avouer que j’ai été fort surpris d’entendre mon cher ami le professeurKohen se lancer dans la
remarque que voici :
41
Discours du ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Argentine, JorgeTaiana, du 12février2006 devant la
commission des affaires étrangères de la Chambre des députés, requête introductive d’instance, 4 mai 2006, annexe 3.
42CR 2009/20, p. 16, par. 6 (Pellet). - 25 -
«Le professeur Condorelli a invoqué un prétendu «blocage des travaux de la
CARU» à ce moment-là qui aurait justifié la création du GTAN. Messieurs les juges,
il n’en est rien. Il a dû se tromper avec la situation existant entre novembre 2003 et
43
mai 2004. Au premier semestre 2005 la CARU fonctionnait normalement.»
Mais Monsieur le président, le professeurKohe n se trompe d’adresse lorsqu’il formule une telle
critique. Ce n’est pas l’Uruguay, ce n’est pas moi, c’est l’Argentine qui a défini le GTAN comme
une «instance de négociation étab lie par les deux Parties du fait du manque d’accord au sein de la
44
CARU» . L’Argentine l’a fait non pas par des mots enfouis dans l’un quelconque des milliers de
document échangés entre les Parties, mais par la note diplomatique au moyen de laquelle elle a
notifié à l’Uruguay sa décision de saisir votre Cour, à savoir le premier document, le plus
important, qu’elle a annexé a sa re quête introductive d’instance. Que dire de plus quant au peu de
crédibilité des allégations auxquelles je viens de me référer ?
5. Dans leurs plaidoiries nos contradicteurs n’ ont pas considéré utile d’expliquer à la Cour
pourquoi le GTAN avait été créé. Mais il y a autre chose au sujet de laquelle ils ont adopté la
même attitude, que je qualifierais celle du silence embarrassé: comme M eMartin vient de le
souligner lui aussi, ils n’ont toujours pas dit un seul mot, pas un mot, sur ce que le GTAN a fait
pendant six mois d’activité, ils n’on commenté d’aucune façon la démonstration analytique que
l’Uruguay a offerte dans ses écritures quant à la qua ntité et à la qualité des informations transmises
à l’Argentine et quant à la liste bien complète des sujets sur lesquels les consultations au sein du
GTAN se sont développées 4. Votre Cour se souvient très certainement que M eReichler et
moi-même nous sommes revenus enco re et encore sur cela avec b eaucoup de détails la semaine
dernière 46. Qu’il plaise à la Cour de constater que l’ absence totale d’objections de quelque sorte
que ce soit du côté argentin implique alors la reconnaissance que le GTAN a effectivement
fonctionné en tant qu’enceinte de consultation et de négociation directe entre les Parties. Une
consultation qui a porté sur tous les thèmes indiqu és dans l’accord entre les Parties instituant le
GTAN, à savoir, ceux relatifs aux risques environnementaux susceptibles d’être causés par le
«fonctionnement» des usines, comme le dit explicitement le texte de l’accord en question.
43
CR 2009/21, p. 48, par. 37 (Kohen).
44Note n 149/2005 du secrétaire des affaires étrangères de l’Argentine à l’ambassadeur d’Uruguay en Argentine
du 14 décembre 2005, requête introductive d’instance, 4 mai 2006, annexe II.
45Contre-mémoire de l’Uruguay (CMU), par. 3.100.
46CR 2009/16, p. 44, par. 16 (Reichler) ; CR 2009/19, p. 20, par. 17 (Condorelli). - 26 -
Je rappelle que cet accord est consigné dans le communiqué de presse du 31mai2005 qui a été
montré plusieurs fois à votre Cour ces derniers j ours tant par les plaideurs d’une Partie que de
l’autre, et ceci tant dans la langue originale, l’espagnol, que dans les traductions anglaise et
française. Et je voudrais faire noter aussi à la Cour, en passant, que la Partie argentine s’est bien
gardée de contester qu’il s’agit indiscutablement et à tous les effets d’un accord international liant
les Parties, auquel le principe pacta sunt servanda est pleinement applicable: nos contradicteurs
l’interprètent certes à leur manière, mais ils ne mettent nullement en discussion sa nature
d’instrument conventionnel à caractère obligatoire.
6. S’agissant des thèmes discutés au sein du GTAN, il m’incombe de dire un mot au sujet
d’une allégation qui a été répétée je ne sais pas combien de fois par les orateurs de l’autre côté de la
barre. Ainsi que je l’ai signalé, ceux-ci se sont certes concertés pour passer sous sile
nce ce sur quoi
les consultations via GTAN ont porté. En revanche, ils ont insisté sans cesse, l’un après l’autre, sur
un sujet qui à leur sens aurait dû faire l’objet des c onsultations alors que l’Uruguay s’y est opposé.
Voilà la preuve, s’écrient-ils, de l’unilatéralisme de l’Uruguay, de sa volonté d’imposer un fait
accompli, contrairement à l’esprit requis de bonne foi qui devrait s’imposer dans un tel contexte.
Le professeur Kohen, en particulier, a cité deux fois 47 un passage d’une déclaration uruguayenne au
sein du GTAN dans laquelle le représentant de l’Uruguay s’est exprimé ainsi: «la raison pour
laquelle l’usine s’est installée à un endroit déterminé n’est pas du ressort du groupe (GTAN) et elle
ne figure pas parmi ses compétences, puisque outre le fait même d’être une décision antérieure au
présent gouvernement, la localisation des usines est déjà un fait» 48.
7. Est-ce vraiment un propos indéfendable, une affirmation scandaleuse, comme s’en
indignent nos contradicteurs? Est-ce vrai ment l’expression d’un inacceptable «souverainisme
unilatéraliste», pour utiliser l’une des expressions hautes en couleurs dont mon ami le
professeurPellet se plaît souvent de parer ses propos 49? Mais loin de là, Messieurs les juges!
L’Uruguay est en train de faire valoir très correctement que la question de l’emplacement de Botnia
ne rentrait pas dans la sphère de compétence du GTAN parce qu’ainsi en ont décidé les deux
47CR 2009/13, p. 19, par. 25 (Kohen,) ; CR 2009/14, p. 20, par. 27 (Kohen).
48
Mémoire de l’Argentine (MA), par. 2.65 et annexe, livre 4, annexe 4.
49CR 2009/20, p. 17, par. 9 (Pellet). - 27 -
parties contractantes en prescrivant expressément cette limitation de compétence dans le texte
même de l’accord international qu’elles ont conclu. La prétention argentine en question était donc
effectivement irrecevable d’après l’engagement qui liait les deux Etats: autrement dit, si «la
localisation des usines est un fait», comme l’a souligné l’Uruguay, c’est parce que les Parties en ont
décidé ainsi au moyen d’un accord dont l’Argentine ne pouvait pas et ne peut toujours pas se délier
unilatéralement. Faut-il rappeler encore que pa r cet accord l’Uruguay et l’Argentine ont convenu
qu’au moyen du GTAN il fallait mener des études et des analyses supplémentaires et procéder à
l’échange d’informations et de suivi quant à l’ effet que le fonctionnement des usines aura sur
l’écosystème fluvial. L’emplacement des usines était un fait acquis, toujours d’après le texte même
de l’accord: les consultations devaient être dé sormais centrées sur les risques environnementaux
pouvant être éventuellement causés par leur fonction nement et sur les mesures à prendre pour les
neutraliser.
8. Mon cher contradicteur, Marcelo Kohen, s’élève avec vigueur contre cette interprétation 50.
Son argument prend appui sur le fait que le GTAN a été créé par les deux présidents le 5 mai 2005.
Pour le professeurKohen il est inconcevable que l’accord ayant créé le GTAN puisse être
interprété comme l’Uruguay le soutient (et comme je viens de le rappeler), étant donné que le
même jour le ministre argentin, M.Bielsa, demandait à son homologue uruguayen que l’on
envisageât la relocalisation des usines et que («preuve accablante» 51, dit M.Kohen) le lendemain
même le délégué argentin à la CARU protestait cont re la violation de l’article7 du statut du fait
d’une autorisation donnée à Botnia.
9. Mais le professeur Kohen oublie de prendre en considération deux points, fort importants
tous les deux. Le premier est que la note du ministre argentin à son collègue uruguayen du
5 mai 2005 exprime ni plus ni moins que la proposition de la Partie argentine, son souhait quant au
contenu à donner d’après le proposant à l’accord à c onclure concernant la négociation directe entre
les Parties au sujet des usines : je veux dire, le futur accord GTAN. Le second point est qu’il est
vrai que le même jour, le 5 mai, les deux président s se sont entendus sur le principe de la création
du GTAN. Mais il s’agissait justem ent d’une entente de principe, qui ne spécifiait nullement sur
50
CR 2009/21, p. 48-49, par. 37-41 (Kohen).
51CR 2009/21, p. 49, par. 41 (Kohen). - 28 -
quoi les consultations via GTAN devaient porter. Il a fallu des négociations diplomatiques serrées
se prolongeant sur presque un mois, il a fallu de nombreux échanges de propositions et de
contre-propositions, pour que l’on en arrivât enfi n a mettre au point un texte acceptable et accepté
par les deux Parties. Ce texte, dont de toute év idence le contenu ne correspond pas totalement aux
souhaits exprimés par le ministre argentin un mois auparavant, la Cour a pu le lire de nombreuses
fois: c’est celui qui est consigné dans le communiqué de presse du 31mai2005. Par l’accord
finalement conclu les deux Parties reconnai ssaient explicitement que les usines «se están
construyendo» (sont en train d’être construites) en Uruguay, et concordent quant au fait que via le
GTAN il faudra mener des consultations quant a ux «conséquences que sur l’écosystème du fleuve
Uruguay qu’ils partagent aura le fonctionnement des usines de pâte à papier» 52. Aux conséquences
du fonctionnement, Monsieur le président, non pas à la localisation des usines.
10. Mais, s’écrie le professeur Kohen, l’Uruguay admet donc que les travaux de construction
de Botnia avaient bien débuté en mai 2005 : que l’Uruguay soit cohérent, alors, et «ne vienne pas
53
nous dire que l’autorisation de construction de l’usine…n’a été délivrée qu’en janvier2006!» .
Malheureusement mon aimable contradicteur se laisse emporter trop vite : l’Uruguay n’a rien caché
quant au fait qu’avant l’autorisation de construction, qui date effectivement de janvier 2006, il avait
bien autorisé la réalisation in situ de divers travaux préparatoires, d’ailleurs certains bien visibles :
il a même indiqué ouvertement, tant la liste de ces travaux de prép aration que la date de chaque
autorisation y relative 54. Cependant tous les travaux d’avant janvier2006 laissaient pleinement
ouvertes les possibilités de choisir les meilleures techniques afin d’éviter au mieux les risques
environnementaux. Nos contradicteurs se sont laissés aller volontiers à l’ironie facile au sujet des
travaux préparatoires en question et à leur visibilité, mais n’ont pas démontré pourquoi à leur sens
leur caractère préparatoire serait à exclure concerna nt, par exemple, le nivèlement d’un terrain ou
l’élévation d’un bâtiment administratif ou encore la mise en place de fondations, s’étant agi en
particulier de travaux insusceptibles par nature d’affecter tant soit peu la navigation ou le régime du
fleuve Uruguay, ou encore la qualité de ses eaux.
52
MA, vol. IV, annexe 3 et CR 2009/19, p. 17-18, par. 12-13 (Condorelli).
53
CR 2009/21, p. 50, par. 42 (Kohen).
54CMU, p. 232, par. 3.116. - 29 -
B. La CIJ et l’article 12 du statut
11. J’en viens maintenant, Monsieur le pr ésident, aux quelques remarques qui s’imposent
concernant le rôle de la Cour en la présente affa ire et quant au jeu de l’article12 à ce sujet. Ici
aussi les plaideurs de la Partie adverse n’ont rien ajouté de remarquable aux considérations qu’ils
avaient déjà avancées. Et ⎯ cela est à souligner ⎯ ils n’ont nullement répondu, en particulier, aux
arguments que l’Uruguay a fait valoir pour démont rer à votre Cour que l’article12, dûment
interprété à la lumière de l’objet et du but du traité ainsi que du droit international général, permet à
la Partie intéressée de réaliser l’ouvrage proj eté, une fois épuisées sans succès les négociations
directes et en attendant la décision finale de la Cour que l’autre Partie aura saisie. Cela étant
entendu, bien sûr, que personne ne conteste la plén itude de la compétence de votre Cour s’agissant
de décider si des faits illicites en violation du statut ont été commis et s’agissant aussi de
déterminer le cas échéant les remèdes qu’il convient d’imposer à l’Etat responsable. Du coup, je
n’ai pas besoin de revenir sur cette question: votre Cour en sera soulagée. Je me borne donc à
insister sur les conclusions qui vous ont été présentées sur ce thème par l’Uruguay, notamment au
moyen de ma plaidoirie du 28 septembre dernier.
12. Il convient cependant que j’insiste également sur ce qui apparaît désormais comme un
véritable entêtement de la Partie adverse, qui s’obstine à nier ce qu i est indéniable : à savoir qu’il a
bien saisi la Cour suite à l’épuisement sans succès des négociations directes prévues à l’article 12,
donc sur la base de cette disposition. Ainsi que j’ai eu déjà l’occasion de le mettre au clair,
l’Argentine a déclaré très officiellement tant à l’Uruguay qu’à la Cour qu’elle se tournait vers votre
haute juridiction sur la base de l’article 12 : la Cour ne saurait admettre maintenant qu’elle change
de cap à la douzièmeheure. Il convient d’ailleur s d’ajouter que, d’après le statut, il n’y a pas de
place pour une saisine de la Cour qui serait basée exclusivement sur l’article12, comme
l’Argentine voudrait nous le faire croire: l’article12 en effet, fait renvoi, pour le règlement des
différends dont il est question, à l’article 60, la seule disposition dans le statut où votre Cour figure.
Autrement dit, le recours à la Cour doit toujour s nécessairement se fonder sur l’application de la
clause compromissoire de l’article 60, et ce même pour les cas des différends naissant à l’issue de
la procédure prévue par le chapitre II du statut. En somme, l’Argentine n’ aurait pu introduire son - 30 -
instance auprès de la Cour sans se référer à l’article60, et ce, même si le différend qui l’oppose
présentement à l’Uruguay a incontestablement à sa base l’article 12 justement.
13. Permettez-moi toutefois de remarquer que lors des plaidoiries un rapprochement sensible
entre les Parties est apparu à ce sujet, grâce au fait que le demandeur a avancé de plusieurs pas dans
la bonne direction. En effet, l’Uruguay avait touj ours soutenu et continue de soutenir que la Cour
est appelée en la présente affaire à déterminer si oui ou non l’usine Botnia peut causer un préjudice
sensible à l’Argentine en affectant la qualité des eaux du fleuve, ce qui constitue l’étape finale de la
procédure prévue au chapitre II du statut ; mais le défendeur n’a jamais contesté la compétence de
la Cour à vérifier le respect de toutes les obligations prescrites par le statut, y compris celles de
caractère procédural. Quant au demandeur, on l’a vu désormais adopter ⎯ notamment par
l’entremise du professeur Pellet ⎯ une attitude moins déraisonnable. Auparavant il soutenait que,
la Cour ayant été saisie par l’Argentine, non pas su r la base de l’article 12 mais exclusivement sur
la base de l’article 60, il s’ensuivrait que «le rôle que la Cour est appelée à jouer dans la présente
55
affaire n’est pas de porter l’appréciation fi nale que lui confie l’article12 du statut…» .
Maintenant les propos de l’Argentine sont beau coup plus nuancés: vous avez entendu en effet le
professeur Pellet se laisser aller mardi dernier à une concession remarquable :
«Nous ne prétendons pas qu’il n’appartient pas à la Cour, dans le cadre de la
présente instance, de déterminer si l’usine Botnia peut causer un préjudice sensible à
l’Argentine ou affecter le régime du fleuve ou la qualité de ses eaux, mais nous avons
la ferme conviction que la compétence de la Cour va très au-delà de cette
56
détermination.»
La Cour aura sans doute pris note de ce rapprocheme nt significatif, mais aussi de ses implications
inévitables: puisqu’il est désormais clairement admi s par le demandeur qu’il appartient à la Cour
dans la présente affaire (je souligne ces mots du professeur Pellet) de décider si l’usine Botnia peut
ou non causer un préjudice sensible à l’Argentine et au fleuve, il faut alors admettre aussi
inévitablement que, si votre Cour décide que le prétendu préjudice ne subsiste pas ou n’est pas
grave, elle ne pourra que reconnaître le droit de l’Uruguay à poursuivre avec l’exploitation de
Botnia. Il va de soi dans cette logique ⎯ dans laquelle l’Argentine s’inscrit elle aussi désormais ⎯
55
Réplique de l’Argentine (RA), p. 142, par. 1.174.
56CR 2009/21, p. 58, par. 14 (Pellet). - 31 -
qu’envisager le démantèlement de l’usine même en cas d’absence de préjudice écologique sensible
est purement et simplement dépourvu de sens.
14. Il faut encore, Monsieur le président (ce sera là mon dernier point), que je présente à la
Cour quelques commentaires aux allégations de la Partie adverse suivant lesquels la thèse qui vous
est soumise par l’Uruguay porterait préjudice à l’autor ité de votre Cour et abolirait les garanties,
auxquelles l’Argentine a droit, d’obtenir une «évaluation impartiale par votre haute juridiction de la
possibilité de construire les usines» 57 : je suis en train de parler, bien entendu, de la thèse que j’ai
moi-même défendue devant vous la semaine dernière, d’après laquelle un projet peut être réalisé,
une fois les négociations terminées sans succès, mê me avant que votre Cour n’ait pris sa décision
finale. Permettez-moi de présenter ma réponse de façon synthétique en trois points seulement.
15. Premier point. Il va de soi ⎯ me semble-t-il ⎯ que l’autorité de votre Cour ne
souffrirait d’aucun préjudice si vous acceptez le point de vue défendu par l’Uruguay. C’est le
contraire qui est vrai, puisque la thèse uruguayenne implique la reconnaissance de la pleine
compétence de la Cour à prendre toute décisi on qu’elle jugerait juridiquement appropriée et
équitable, y compris le cas échéant celle ordonna nt l’arrêt, la modification voire même le
démantèlement de l’usine, si par impossible la Cour devait juger que l’Uruguay est responsable de
faits illicites d’une gravité telle qu’ils justifieraient de telles mesures radicales.
16. Deuxième point. Il est indiscutable que l’ Argentine a droit à une évaluation impartiale
de la situation, et a aussi le droit indéniable d’obtenir le cas échéant une pleine restauration de la
légalité enfreinte en cas de faits illicites dont il sera it constaté qu’elle a été la victime. L’Uruguay
n’a jamais contesté cela : bien au contraire, il r econnaît qu’il a l’obligation absolue de respecter la
décision que la Cour adoptera et de surcroît a ré pété solennellement dans ce prétoire même son
engagement à l’observer scrupuleusement. Dans ces conditions, a-t-il un sens de prétendre
⎯ comme le fait l’Argentine ⎯ que la thèse soutenue par l’Uruguay serait (pour rendre hommage
58
encore une fois au langage multicolore du professeur Pellet) une «ode à l’unilatéralisme» assurant
la primauté à la logique du fait accompli ? A-t-il un sens de parler de faits accomplis devant des
57
CR 2009/20, p. 18, par. 9 (Pellet).
58CR 2009/20, p. 17, par. 8 (Pellet). - 32 -
faits que votre Cour est habilitée à défaire? J’ose répondre moi-même à ces questions: non,
Messieurs les juges, cela n’a aucun sens.
17. Troisième point. Il est vrai que le jugement final de votre Cour ne peut intervenir qu’à
l’issue d’une procédure dont la longueur est tributai re pour beaucoup de l’attitude des Parties et de
leur conduite dans le procès. Mais il convient de rappeler encore une fois que votre Cour a un rôle
important à jouer même en cours de procédur e, au cas où l’Etat qui s’oppose à l’ouvrage se
considère menacé par un préjudice irréparable causé par ce dernier. Il va de soi que je suis en train
de faire allusion aux mesures provisoires urgentes à effet obligatoire, dont l’indication peut être
demandée par la Partie intéressée à tout stade de la procédure devant votre Cour. C’est d’ailleurs
celui-là le rôle que la Cour a joué quand, le 13juillet2006, elle a rejeté la demande argentine en
indication de mesures provisoires au motif que «l’Argentine n’a pas, à l’heure actuelle, fourni
d’éléments qui donnent à penser que la pollution éventuellement engendrée par la mise en service
des usines serait de nature à causer un préjudice irréparable au fleuve Uruguay» ( Usines de pâte à
papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c.Uruguay), mesures conservatoires , ordonnance du
13 juillet 2006, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p.132, par.75). Il est certain que le même rôle, votre Cour
aurait pu le jouer encore, notamment depuis la mise en fonctionnement de l’usine en2006, si le
demandeur était vraiment convaincu ⎯comme il le soutient dans ses écritures et dans ses
plaidoiries orales ⎯ que Botnia fait courir à l’écosystème fl uvial et à l’Argentine des risques de
préjudices irréparables. Or, l’Argentine ne l’a pas fait, ce qui ⎯ que cela soit dit en passant ⎯ met
fortement en discussion la crédibilité de ses allé gations relatives aux ris ques irréparables qui
découleraient d’ores et déjà des prétendues vi olations par l’Uruguay de ses obligations
substantielles prescrites par le statut de 1975.
C. Conclusion
18. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les jug es, après la réfutation que nous avons présentée
e
M Martin et moi-même de l’argumentaire proposé dernièrement par l’Argentine concernant les
obligations procédurales découlant du statut du fleuve Uruguay, il est temps maintenant d’en venir
aux obligations substantielles. Pu is-je vous prier, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner la
parole à mon collègue et ami, le professeur McCaffrey. Merci. - 33 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Je remercie M. le professeur Condorelli. Now I
give the floor to Professor McCaffrey. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. McCAFFREY: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the
Court, it is an honour to appear before you on ce again on behalf of the Oriental Republic of
Uruguay.
S USTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
I. NTRODUCTION
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you have now heard Uruguay’s responses to
Argentina’s procedural arguments, which, as Mr . Martin and Professor Condorelli have shown, do
not withstand scrutiny. I will now begin the task of showing why Argentina added nothing in her
second round to her already weak environmental ca se. Following me today on this subject will be
my colleague Professor Boyle, and tomorrow my colleague Mr. Reichler.
II.A RGENTINA ’S CASE WOULD PREVENT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT BY U RUGUAY
2. Mr.President, despite what her Agent said on Tuesday (CR2009/21) about the friendly
relations between her country and Uruguay, Argentina ⎯ for reasons best known to herself ⎯
seems determined to frustrate Uruguay’s efforts to develop economically in a manner that is
environmentally sustainable ⎯ as the RioDeclaration put it, to ensure that “environmental
59
protection [constitutes] an integral part of the development process”ruguay has shown that the
Botnia plant and the multilayered processes by wh ich it was reviewed and approved meet all the
requirements for sustainable development, despite all the horror stories conjured up by counsel for
Argentina. Argentina’s efforts even extended to a desperate, though ultimately futile, attempt to
question the competence of the IFC, the world’s pr incipal financial institution for the financing of
private sustainable development projects in developing countries. Argentina presumably felt
compelled to go to this extreme because the IFC’s repeated and carefully considered evaluations of
the plant and its environmental performance destroy Argentina’s substantive environmental case.
5Rio Declaration on Environment and DevelopmPrinciple4, United Nati ons doc.A/CONF.151/26, ILM,
Vol 31, 1992, p. 874. - 34 -
3. My task this afternoon is to show how Argentina misunderstands and misapplies the
concept of sustainable development to the facts of this case. Professor Bo yle will then show why
Argentina’s claims on environmental impact asse ssment, monitoring and pollution must fail, and
that Uruguay has met all its international obliga tions with respect to these matters. Tomorrow,
Mr.Reichler will show why Argentina’s envi ronmental case remains without foundation on the
facts.
A. The involvement of the IFC in this case is fully consistent with the principle of speciality
4. Mr. President, several of Argentina’s counsel have made arguments that call into question
the competence of the International Finance Corpor ation and even whether its mandate pertains to
environmental issues at all. If the legitimacy of the IFC’s approval of projects can be questioned in
the way Argentina advocates, investors could be reluctant to commit to project funds, and
beneficiary States could stand to lose development financing much needed to realize the State’s
sustainable development goals. My colleague Mr.Reichler has addressed the objectivity of the
independent experts on the Botnia mill commissioned by the IFC. In this presentation I will
confine myself to showing that environmental issues fall squarely within the IFC’s core
competence, and that its conclusions on that subject are entitled to great weight.
5. Mr.President, on Monday, ProfessorBoissondeChazournes said that the IFC is an
institution with limited competence, which conducts its operational activities in the domain of the
promotion of private investment 60. She referred to the “principle of speciality”, quoting from this
Court’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, given in response to the request by the World Health Organization, and said: “C’est ainsi
61
que les compétences de la SFI devaient être comprises à la lumière du principe de spécialité.”
6. What the Court said in that Advisory Opinion was the following:
“International organizations are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is
to say, they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of
which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to
them.” ( Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 78, para. 25.)
60
CR 2009/20, p. 38, para. 29.
6Ibid. - 35 -
The Opinion continues:
“The Permanent Court of International Jus tice referred to this basic principle in
the following terms:
‘As the European Commission [of the Danube] is not a State, but
an international institution with a special purpose, it only has the
functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive Statute with a view to the
fulfilment of that purpose, but it has power to exercise these functions to
their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose restrictions upon
it.’ (Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, Advisory
Opinion, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 14, p. 64.)” (Legality of the Use by a State
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (I), p. 78, para. 25.)
7. If the IFC were substituted for the Eur opean Commission in this passage, Uruguay could
not have said it better. The “principle of speciality” of course applies to the IFC ⎯ but what is its
“special” mission? Professor Boisson de Chazournes herself answered this question: the
promotion of private investment 62. But any private investment? No ⎯ that is not the IFC’s or
indeed the World Bank’s mission. The IFC promotes private investment in projects in developing
countries that are a part of the efforts of those c ountries to develop in a way that is socially and
63
environmentally sustainable . Indeed, the centrality of environmental sustainability to the IFC’s
mission is, as Mr. Reichler explained last Thursday (CR 2009/19), embodied in the organization’s
development of sophisticated environmental standards against which it measures proposed projects.
Argentina has never challenged this. It is thus against these standards that the 182 members of the
IFC “collectively determine its policies and approve investments” 64 (quoting from the IFC
website). One of the investments those 182 countri es approved was of course the Botnia plant. In
a word, the IFC was acting precisely within its “special” competence in this case: it was providing
support for private investment in a project that is an important part of Uruguay’s efforts to develop
economically in a way that is environmentally sustainable.
8. Professor Boisson de Chazournes devoted considerable effort to showing that as she put it,
65
referring to the IFC, “Elle n’est pas dotée d’un pouvoir de qualification juridique.” Well,
62
See the IFC’s Articles of Agreement, Art.1, availa ble at http://www.ifc.org/ ifcext/about.nsf/Content/
ArticlesofAgreement .
63
See the IFC’s Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/
sustainability.nsf/Content/SustainabilityPolicy
64Ibid.
65CR 2009/20, p. 38, para. 29. - 36 -
Mr. President, nobody ⎯ including Uruguay ⎯ said it did. This is a hapless straw person
constructed, then demolished, by Argentina. Uruguay’s point is that the evaluations of the IFC,
supported by independent technical expertise, are entitled to great weight as evidence in this case.
9. Yet ProfessorBoissondeChazournes attacks the IFC on this ground as well, saying that
66
Uruguay “accorde une place excessive aux évaluations de la SFI” . She supports this assertion by
referring to what this Court said in the Armed Activities case about the need to evaluate carefully
evidence derived from a single source (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 2005, p.201, para.61). Yet, in the
same paragraph of that Judgment, this Court sugg ested that this approach should not apply when
the source is an independent, neutral, third part y, experienced in evaluating “large amounts of
factual information, some of it of a technical nature” 67. According to that Judgment, evidence from
68
such a source “merits special attention” . Further reasons for giving special weight to the reports
prepared for the IFC have been given by Mr. Reichl er. But the point I would like to leave with the
Court is that the IFC approved this project, which is precisely the kind of function it was
established to perform.
B. Phosphorus: the Botnia plant complies with European standards
10. Of course, Mr.President, the IFC a pproved the Botnia mill for construction and
operation in Uruguay, on the Uruguay river. Again, in their second round, Argentina’s advocates
repeatedly suggested that the Botnia plant could not have been built in Europe, and their reason
was always the same: phosphorus. Professor Sands asserted again and again in various statements
that the Botnia plant would comply with European standards are “demonstrably false” 69. But I am
afraid that it is ProfessorSands’s argument that is demonstrably false. ProfessorSands seems to
have missed the fact that Mr. McCubbin already demonstrated that a mill of Botnia’s size and scale
could be, and was, built on a European river, the El be, that is far smaller than the Uruguay river.
He showed that when Germany commissioned the most modern pulp mill in Europe in 2002, the
66CR 2009/20, p. 41, para. 34.
67
Ibid.
68Ibid.
69CR 2009/21, pp. 13-14, para. 5. - 37 -
Stendal mill, its phosphorous discharges were considerably higher relative to the flow of the
Elbe ⎯ whose flow is only 15percent of the Uruguay’s ⎯ than are those of the Botnia mill
relative to the Uruguay river ⎯ this is illustrated on the screen, and is at tab6 of your folders.
None of Argentina’s advocates even attempted to refute this incontrovertible fact.
11. Nor is this a unique comparison. As Mr.McCubbin pointed out, there is no river in
Western Europe that is larger than the Uruguay river. Thus, European pulp mills, many of which
discharge phosphorus in greater amounts than does Botnia, are located on rivers that are
significantly smaller than the Uruguay. For example, the Zellstoff Pols mill was built on the Mur
river in Austria, and discharges 50 per cent more phosphorus than the Botnia mill, even through it
is sited on a river with an average flow of only 139 cubic meters per second, which is over 30 times
smaller than the flow of the Uruguay river. As a result, the incremental phosphorous load to the
Mur is more than 50times larger than Botnia’s to the Uruguay. Similarly, the M-real mill in
France, on the Seine, discharges over 40 tons of phosphorus per year, that is, more than three times
the amount discharged by Botnia, into a river with a flow less than 10percent the size of the
Uruguay. A similar wide discrepancy may be seen with the Kwidzyn mill in Poland, which is sited
on the Vistula. That mill discharges three times the amount of phosphorus as the Botnia plant, but
into a river less than one-sixth the size of the Uruguay. And StoraEnso’s Imatra mill in Finland
discharges slightly more phosphorus than does Botnia, but into a river, the Vuoksi, whose flow is
70
less than 10 per cent that of the Uruguay river .
12. Returning for a moment to the Uruguay ri ver, another point that Mr.McCubbin raised
that Argentina did not attempt to refute was the fa ct that approximately 19,000 tons of phosphorus
flow past FrayBentos each year, not including any contribution from Botnia. In contrast, only
15tons (using Botnia’s 2008performance) or lo wer (using its 2009performance) are contributed
by Botnia ⎯ this is shown on the screen and at tab 7 of your folders. And of this amount, almost
71
3 tons come from the pre-existing level of phos phorus in the river water used by the plant . Thus,
for every ton of phosphorus discharged into the river by Botnia, more than 1,000tons are
70
RU, Ann. 83, p. 5-9, table 5-1.
7IFC, Cumulative Impact Study, Ann.H, CMU, Vol.VIII, Ann.176, p. D3.19; Uruguay’s Submission of New
Documents, 30 June 2009, Ann. S7, p. D3.2. - 38 -
contributed from other sources, including from Argentine industry and agriculture. Again,
Argentina’s advocates made no effort to challenge these figures; the Court may therefore treat
them as established facts.
13. Indeed, not only is Botnia’s phosphorous contribution insignificant in comparison to the
overall phosphorous load of the river ⎯ less than 1/1000th of that load ⎯ Uruguay is making
efforts to offset the entirety of that comparativel y modest contribution. This is consistent with
Uruguayan law, which provides that:
“If any water body does not comply with the conditions established for its
classification, the Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Affairs
[or MVOTMA using the Spanish initials] shall establish recovery programs for the
water body with the aim of achieving the conditions adopted.” 72
14. That is why, to comply with both the le tter and spirit of this law, and to protect the
quality of the Uruguay river water, Uruguay has take n strong measures not only to offset Botnia’s
phosphorous discharges, but to go beyond Botnia ’s discharges and reduce the overall phosphorous
contribution from the Uruguayan side.
15. As described by ProfessorBoyle, OSE, Uruguay’s State Water Works, has contracted
with Botnia for the treatment of the FrayBentos sewage. [Tab 8.] Pipelines will soon connect
FrayBentos to the Botnia plant’s waste water- treatment facility. When the construction is
completed, the quantity of phosphorus removed from the Fray Bentos sewage, and no longer
discharged into the Uruguay river, is expected to offset substantially the phosphorus presently
emitted by the Botnia plant. Beyond this, the OSE has secured World Bank financing for sewage
treatment facilities at the cities of Salto and Paysan dú, further upriver. As the slide on the screen
demonstrates, when these additional phosphorous re ductions are taken into account, the combined
results will much more than offset Botnia’s en tire contribution of phosphorus to the river. This
slide is at tab 8 of your folders.
16. Mr. President, for all its talk about phos phorus, algal blooms and eutrophication, for all
its protestations over the urgent need to protect this fragile and threatened watercourse, what has
Argentina done to address the problem of phosphorus in the river?
72
Decree No. 253/79, Regulation of Water Quality (9 May 1979, as amended), Art. 10; CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 6. - 39 -
17. The answer would appear to be nothing. If a discharge of phosphorus into the river is
such a concern, why does Argentina not regulate it? In fact, Argentina has no laws or regulations
that limit the discharge of phosphorus into the Uruguay river by Argentine industries, farmers,
ranchers or municipalities. Despite Argentina’s constant refrain that eight or 15 tons of phosphorus
from the mill are far too much, it has never even tried to challenge the fact that 25times that
amount is discharged into ÑandubaysalBay by Argentina, as was explained by Mr.McCubbin.
Argentine companies operate industrial enterprises that discharge effluents, including phosphorus,
into the river directly, or via tributaries like the Gualeguaychúriver; thousands of hectares of
Argentine farmland and ranch land border on the river, and shed their phosphorus-bearing
fertilizers and animal feeds into it; and Argentine cities like Gualeguaychú, Colón and Concepción
del Uruguay, continue to dump sewage into the river every single day. If Argentina were truly
driven by a desire to protect the Uruguay river from excess phosphorus, would it not start there, by
cleaning up its own house? But again, it has passed no law, adopted no regulation, to limit
phosphorous discharges from its own side of the river.
18. Mr. President, the 1975 Statute establishes the right of equitable use of the river’s water.
There is nothing equitable about Argentina’s making whatever industrial, agricultural or municipal
uses of the water she desires ⎯ regardless of the amount of phosphorus contributed to the river ⎯
while, at the same time, preventing Uruguay from making use of the river in a way that does not
add phosphorous concentration ⎯ does not add to the phosphorous concentration of the water. The
inequity is especially striking in view of the measures being taken by Uruguay that will more than
offset the phosphorus discharged by the plant and produce an overall net effect of lowering the
amount of phosphorus in the river.
C. There is no evidence that the Botnia plant has affected tourism in Gualeguaychú
or Ñandubaysal Bay
19. Mr. President, Argentina’s obstinance in opposing the mill is all the more unfathomable
because the plant has simply not had an effect on Argentina’s uses of the river. Argentina
continues to argue, in the face of all the evidence, including her own, that the Botnia plant has
affected tourism in Gualeguaychú and in Ñandubaysal Bay. - 40 -
20. In her speech last Monday, Professor Boisson de Chazournes bravely tried again to make
this argument 73, like a salmon swimming upstream but being stopped by a dam. The “dam” in this
case is, of course, the actual evidence. In fact, Professor Boisson de Chazournes admitted that
tourism had actually increased in Gualeguaychú and the Ñandubaysal beaches. She gave two
remarkable explanations for this. Her explanations were that there are now more tourists because
of the efforts of the Gualeguaychú Tourism Council and because a kind of touristic schadenfreude:
curious people are attracted by unf ortunate situations. Whatever the explanation, as I have noted
last week, the city of Gualeguaychú is profiti ng mightily from the increased visitations and can
hardly complain that the plant is causing a precip itous drop in tourism. Nor is this unexpected.
Mr.Reichler and I have also noted that Argen tina’s own Scientific and Technical Report states a
74
number of times that Ñandubaysal Bay is not affected by factors in the river , such as effluents
from the Botnia plant. [Tab9.] Nor has the “natural beauty” of the beach or Gualeguaychú ⎯
referred to by counsel for Argentina even though the Statute obviously does not deal with it ⎯ nor
has this been significantly affected by the sight of the plant, as shown in the picture on the screen
taken of the plant from the beach in Ñandubaysal Bay with a 35 mm lens ⎯ which shows the view
as seen with the naked eye. If it is difficult to make the plant out across the river, perhaps this
arrow [slide] will be of assistance. The picture is at tab 9 of your folders.
21. So much for Argentina’s factual claim that Uruguay’s use of the river is incompatible
with Argentina’s. Nonetheless, in both the first 75and second rounds Argentina asserted that
tourism and even leisure in Gualeguaychú and on the beaches are an “existing use” with which the
76
plant is incompatible . At this juncture, I would simply note that even to the extent that these are
uses of the river ⎯ swimming, for example ⎯ and even assuming they qualify as “existing uses”,
and finally, assuming arguendo that they would be affected by the mill, despite the evidence, that
73CR 2009/20, pp. 30-32, paras. 9-16.
74Argentina Scientific and Technical Report, Chap. 3.2, para. 4.1.2 (arguing that Argentina’s scientists were able
“to clearly set the bay apart, as it acts as an ecosystem that is relatively detached from the Uruguay river” and that the
data “shows that the bay is an environment that is detached fro m the short term fluctuations of the river”); para. 4.3.1.2
(pointing to data that “reinforces the interpretation that th e bay is an environment that is relatively detached from the
river”); and para.1 (arguing that thBay “is apparently not tied to the rive r’s natural and human-derived short-term
variations”).
75See, for example, CR 2009/13, pp. 16-17, paras. 15-17 (Kohen).
76CR 2009/20, p. 30, para. 9, and p. 32, paras. 13-16 (Boisson de Chazournes). - 41 -
would not compel a conclusion that the mill could not operate. “Existing uses” are only one factor
to be considered in arriving at an equitable and reasonable utilization under Article6 of the
77
1997Convention on International Watercourses , which the Parties agree should inform the
interpretation of the Statute 78; and this factor is listed together with “potential uses” of the
watercourse, of which the Botnia plant was certainly one. Under Article 10 of the Convention, any
conflict between uses is to be resolved with refe rence to the principle of equitable and reasonable
79
utilization, not by giving one use automatic priority over the other .
22. All of which means I need not take mu ch of the Court’s time by responding to the
breathtaking claim, also made by ProfessorSands (CR2009/21, p.14, para.5), that Uruguay is
80
legally bound vis-à-vis Argentina, under your 1974 decision in the Nuclear Tests case by
statements not only by Uruguay, but also the IF C and even Botnia, about the plant’s compliance
with European law and BAT standards. Certainl y, there can be no question of Uruguay’s having
intended to bind herself vis-à-vis Argentina in this regard. To be sure, the Botnia plant is required
to comply with European Union BAT ⎯ Uruguay has always insisted it must, and in fact, has
made compliance with European Union BA T an express condition of its permits and
authorizations. As for European Union law, Uruguay has not agreed to import it into the applicable
law for purposes of the 1975 Statute. But that do es not mean European Union law has no role to
play in this case; it provides a useful yardstic k against which to measure Botnia’s environmental
performance. It is thus highly significant that Argentina has failed to show that any European
Union law or regulation would be transgressed, even were it to apply. In fact, no European Union
law has been transgressed. In short, application of European Union law merely confirms that the
plant comports with all the requirements of sustainable development.
77
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Us es of International Wa tercourses, A/RES/51/869,
21 May 1997, Art. 6.
78
See, for example, RA, para. 1.140.
79Ibid., Art. 10 (2).
80Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1974, p. 472, para. 46. - 42 -
III. C ONCLUSION
23. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in conclusion, both Parties in this case have
acknowledged its significance. Indeed, the importance of the case extends well beyond a pulp mill
on the River Uruguay. What the Court decides in this case will have a profound influence on the
efforts of the developing countries of the world to raise the living standards of their populations ⎯
in other words, to develop economically in a manne r that is environmentally sustainable. Uruguay
has full confidence that the Court will ensure that the promise of sustainable development will not
be left unfulfilled.
24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your kind attention. I invite you to
call to the podium my learned colleague Professor Boyle, perhaps after a coffee break. Thank you.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Professor McCaffrey, for your
presentation. Indeed the time has come for the Court to take a break. The hearing is suspended for
15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 4.30 to 4.45 p.m.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is resumed and I
give the floor to Professor Boyle. You have the floor, Sir.
BMOr. LE:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a pleasure to appear before you
once again. I have three submissions for y ou this afternoon in response to Argentina’s
environmental case.
2. First, I would like to argue that, contrary to the claims of ProfessorsBoisson de
Chazournes and Wheater, the environmental imp act assessment carried out by Uruguay was
comprehensive and soundly based. It meets all of Uruguay’s obligations under the 1975Statute
and international law with regard to the envir onmental impact assessment. And for the sake of
brevity, I will use the term EIA in future. - 43 -
3. Secondly, contrary to the claims in particular of Professor Wheater, Uruguay’s monitoring
programme is sophisticated, it is superior to any programme introduced by Argentina, and it is fully
capable of detecting changes in the riparian e nvironment that could signal potential environmental
harm.
4. Thirdly, Argentina’s writte n and oral pleadings fail to make out any case for jurisdiction
over alleged air pollution, nor do they sustain its arguments on Articles 36 and 41 of the Statute.
5. In short, Argentina has done nothing to show that there is any violation of Uruguayan law,
or of the 1975 Statute, or of international law with regard to transboundary environmental risk.
I.E NVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
6. Let me turn then to environmental impact assessment. First, some theory. The point of an
EIA in international law is to enable the appropriate authorities to assess the potential for
81
significant transboundary harm . The International Law Commission interpreted the phrase
“significant harm” in the following way: they said “[t]he harm must lead to a real detrimental
effect... in other States. Such detrimental effects must be susceptible of being measured by
factual and objective standards.” 82 Measured by that test, the evid ence in the record shows that all
potentially significant impacts on the river’s wate r quality and ecology we re assessed well before
83
the decision to authorize the plant was taken . So were the potential impacts of airborne
emissions, wind direction, reverse flow and lo w flow, algae blooms, and the capacity of the
receiving environment ⎯ but I will come back to all of those in a moment.
7. At several points in his speeches Pr ofessorWheater described the Botnia EIA as
84
“inadequate” and DINAMA’s assessment of it as “uncritical” . But an “uncritical” DINAMA
would surely not have written in its report that, “[i]n the documents provided by Botnia during the
81Art.7, Draft Articles on Prevention of TransboundarHarm, International Law Commission, Report on the
work of its fifty-third Session (23Apr., 1June, and 2July-10Aug.2001), United Nations, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No.10 (A/56/10), p.157; Princi ple17, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development; Art.2, 1991 UNECE C onvention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, (hereinafter “Espoo Convention”).
82Commentary to Art.2, Draft Articles on Prevention oTransboundary Harm, Inte rnational Law Commission,
Report on the work of its fifty-third Session (23 Apr.-1 June, and 2 July-10 Aug. 2001), Official Records of the General
Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), p. 152.
83CR 2009/18, pp. 24-28, paras. 41-53 (Boyle).
84For example, CR 2009/20, pp. 55-59, paras. 6-12 (Wheater). - 44 -
EIA evaluation process, the following were noted: information gaps, contradictions (even within
the same document) and tangential and unsatisfactory responses” 85. And there was more about
Botnia: “The information received could also be characterized as being at once both voluminous
86
and vague, as well as repetitive, i rrelevant, and of rather poor quality” , something you might see
on a rather bad student essay. Yes, that was the uncritical DINAMA on the Botnia EIA. But, what
happened then? Well, in fact, DINAMA responde d to the Botnia EIA by requesting further
information from Botnia and compelling it to improve the quality of the EIA until the final
87
assessment was complete in its judgment . That is what a regulatory agency is supposed to do.
DINAMA was no pushover for Botnia . In the end DINAMA was satis fied that, and I will quote
from their report, “those issues not deeply studied would not cause impacts that would be difficult
to mitigate or compensate”. And, as for those issues where there was in sufficient knowledge they
decided to adopt, and I will quote, “a continual a nd exhaustive monitoring of all parameters and
88
bio-indicators, as necessary” . So, yes, DINAMA was critical of the EIA initially submitted. But
by the time they took the decision to recommend approval of the plant by the Environment
Ministry, DINAMA was fully satisfied that Botn ia had supplied all the information necessary and
in sufficient detail to merit a favourable report, and also to specify the conditions under which the
plant would be permitted to operate. That is, after all, the point of an EIA: to assist those who
have to license the plant to take an informed decision about the likelihood of harm and the
conditions under which the plant would operate. So, DINAMA fully supported and recommended
the decision to approve the Botnia plant.
8. Argentina’s second argument is that the EIA was not timely. They said that an EIA must
be carried out in full before any authorization to c onstruct is granted. And they claim that that was
not what occurred. So let me take you through the facts once more. Publication in summary form
of the Botnia EIA took place on 7December2004 89. A public hearing was organized in
85DINAMA, EIA Report for the Botnia Plant (11 Feb. 2005), CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20, para. 6.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid., para. 1.
88Ibid., para. 8.
89Botnia EIA submitted to DINAMA, published 7 Dec. 2004, RU, IM, Vol. II, Ann. 15, para. 3.3. - 45 -
Fray Bentos by DINAMA on 21 December 2004 . DINAMA’s final EIA report was published on
91
11 February 2005 . The initial environmental authorizati on was granted on 14February2005.
And my learned colleague Mr. Martin explained earlier this afternoon the full implications of that
authorization. It was not an authorization to construct, it was provisional. There can simply be no
argument: the Botnia EIA and all of the asso ciated procedures for public consultation and
comment were completed before any authoriza tion of any kind was given. Argentina’s only
argument to the contrary is that the Botnia EIA approved by DINAMA was so inadequate that it
cannot be regarded as an EIA at all. So let us consider that argument as developed by Argentina’s
counsel.
9. Professor Sands said that the key issues were ignored in the Botnia EIA. Well, it is again
evident that he does not know the evidence. Th ere is extensive discussion of eutrophication and
92 93
algal blooms in the Botnia EIA , and the issue is referred to in DINAMA’s EIA report . This was
certainly not a problem of which Botnia and DI NAMA were unaware. After all, such blooms had
happened before, especially since the opening of the Salto dam in 1979. It was also quite
reasonable for DINAMA to conclude that the Botn ia plant would not make matters worse if the
nutrient loading from the plant were adequately regulated ⎯ as it has been. The capacity of the
receiving environment, we were told, was not taken into account but it was fully assessed in the
Botnia EIA ⎯ indeed there are two whole chapters on th e subject and they are neither short nor
easy to miss 94. There is an entire chapter on airborne emissions 95. The discussion of river flow
96
occupies some 20pages . It is clear to anybody who actua lly reads these reports that on this
evidence DINAMA was duly diligent in considering all of the relevant matters before the decision
to authorize a plant was taken.
90DINAMA, EIA Report for the Botnia Plant (11 Feb. 2005), CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20, paras. 1 and 7.
91DINAMA, EIA Report for the Botnia Plant (11 Feb. 2005), CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
92Botnia EIA, paras. 6.2.1.2.f and 6.3.3.1, CMU, Ann. 160.
93
DINAMA EIA Report, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20, paras. 4.6 and 6.1.
94
Botnia EIA, CMU, Vol. VI, Anns. 159 and 160.
95
Ibid., Ann. 159, Sec. 5.2.3.
96Studies of Plume Dispersion and Sediment Studies, A dditional Report 5 of the Botnia EIA, Ann.VIII,
12 Nov. 2004, CMU, Vol. VII, Ann. 164; DINAMA Environmental Impact Assessment Report for the Botnia Plant
11Feb.2005, CMU, Vol.II, Ann.20; Botnia EIA submitte d to DINAMA, Chap.5, “Characterization of the Existing
Environment, CMU, Vol. VI, Ann. 159. - 46 -
10. The Botnia EIA, in its final form as approved by DINAMA, is complete and adequate.
Among other things, it covers the possible transboundary impact of the Botnia plant 97, the river’s
flow characteristics ⎯ including reverse flow ⎯ 98, air pollution , water quality 100, biodiversity 10,
102
the occurrence of algal blooms . I will say more about identification of alternative sites in a
moment, but the crucial point is that alternative sites, at this stage, had already been identified,
evaluated and rejected. The choice of FrayBentos, as you will see in a moment, was never a
foregone conclusion. Uruguay thus invites the Court to hold that the Botnia EIA, as approved by
DINAMA, was carried out in a timely fashion, before the grant of any authorization to construct or
operate and in accordance with the requirements of international law.
11. Argentina’s advocates devoted a great deal of energy to pointing out alleged
inadequacies, mistakes, and flaws in the vari ous environmental assessments carried out on the
Botnia proposal. They are plainly inviting the Court to hold that what was done was not done well,
is not sufficient, and cannot sustain the decision to authorize the plant. In effect they are
impugning the judgment, the competence and the good faith, not only of Uruguay but also of the
International Finance Corporation, as you have heard from ProfessorMcCaffrey. Environmental
impact assessments on such large projects are ofte n the focus of intense controversy, both in
national courts and increasingly in international courts. And those opposed to these projects will
rarely ever be satisfied by an EIA, however vol uminous and detailed it may be, so it is no surprise
that Argentina has made these arguments. One would expect no less.
12. But what constitutes an environmental impact assessment in accordance with
international law is a question for lawyers, it is not a question for technicians. Whatever a
technical expert may say, national case law emphasi zes that an EIA need not address every aspect
of a project in depth, and that its purpose is to assist the decision maker and alert the public, not to
test every possible hypothesis or provide detailed so lutions to theoretical problems that may have
97DINAMA, Botnia EIA Report, paras. 4.1 and 4.2, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
98
Ibid., para. 3.2, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
99
Ibid., paras. 4.2 and 6.2, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
100Ibid., paras. 3.2, 4.1 and 6.1, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
101Ibid., paras. 3.5 and 6.6, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20.
102Ibid., para. 6.1, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20. - 47 -
103
been identified . We might also recall the sensible prescription found in the United Nations
Environment Programme’s Principle 5, which says that “environmental effects in an EIA should be
assessed with a degree of detail commensurate with their likely environmental significance” 10. So
from that perspective the relevant question is whether the assessments actually undertaken provided
evidence on which it was reasonable to base the decisions which DINAMA, and the Environment
Ministry, and the IFC took with respect to the likely impact of the plant on the river or on
105
Argentina . Uruguay invites the Court to conclude that they did so.
13. But as Uruguay has also consistently argued, EIA is a process, not a single event. If new
issues emerge or new problems have to be dealt with, they can be addressed at later stages. And
the sufficiency of an EIA process must then be j udged as a whole, not simply by reference to the
Botnia EIA in 2004. All the assessments may then be taken into account, including DINAMA’s
EIA report and information subsequently supplied by Botnia at DINAMA’s request, and the IFC’s
final Cumulative Impact Study, which was finalized in September 2006: and the final CIS fully
supported the conclusions already reached by DINAMA.
14. Now, even Argentina’s experts agree that the environmental impact assessment of the
Botnia plant was consistent with international nor ms and standards of care. Let me quote from the
Wheater report ⎯ and here is what it says: “The fina l Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIS) was
much improved, and mainly c onsistent with what might reasonably be expected from an
international impact assessment.” 106 Similarly, if we look at Argentina’s Latinoconsult report, this
107
says that the final Cumulative Impact Study “is consistent with current professional practice” .
Well, these endorsements are impossible to reconcile with the personal opinions that were
expressed by ProfessorWheater in his oral submissions to the Court on Monday afternoon
103
See Prineas v. Forestry Commission of New South Wales (1983) 49 LGRA 402; The Belize Alliance of
Conservation Non-Governmental Organisationsv. The Department of the Environment (2003), Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council (from Belize Ct. App.), RU, Vol. IV, Ann. R84; Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360
(1989); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Wilderness Society Inc. v. Hon. Malcolm
Turnbull, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources[2007],FCAFC175 (22 Nov. 2007).
10UNEP, Principles and Goals of EIA, 17 Jun. 1987, as endorsed by United Nations General Assembly
resolution 42/184 (1987).
10US and Canada ⎯ Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R and
WT/DS321/AB/R (14 Nov. 2008), para 591; Argentina ⎯ Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Footwear,
WT/DS121/AB/R (14 Dec. 1999), para 121.
10Wheater Report, op.cit., p. 1 (introductory para.), MA, Vol. V, Ann. 5.
10Latinoconsult Report, op. cit., p. 13, MA, Vol. V, Ann. 3. - 48 -
(CR 2009/20). Could it be that he was himself uncritical in writing his earlier assessment? Or has
he just, perhaps, changed the state of his mind? Does he, perhaps, not know his own evidence?
His long website CV makes no mention of any expe rtise in environmental impact assessment. In
his even longer list of publications not one appears to be about environmental impact assessment.
So it is strange that Argentina did not call an expe rt to testify on EIA when it is so critical of the
process in this case.
15. The wealth of data and evaluation in the Botnia EIA, the DINAMA report, and the final
CIS, more than justifies the decision to authorize the plant and the conclusion that it would pose no
risk to Argentina or to the river. Such an EIA meets the requirements of Uruguayan law and it
meets the requirements of international law, and Argentina has cited no precedents to the contrary.
16. Well, it is now time to look at one of Argentina’s more insistent arguments ⎯ that the
choice of a site at Fray Bentos was a fait accompli and that the Botnia EIA should have considered
alternative and more suitable sites. Uruguay rejects all these arguments. On this issue Argentina
has given the Court an erroneous account of the facts, and of the law.
17. It is almost certainly common knowledge to anyone who has ever eaten Fray Bentos
corned beef that Fray Bentos is the site of wh at was once the largest meat processing plant in Latin
America. It is the oldest industrial site in Uruguay. So Fray Bentos is no stranger either to odours,
or to effluents. The choice of the FrayBent os site for the Botnia mill may be understood by
reference to five factors 108:
⎯ proximity to existing plantations of eucalyptus;
⎯ good transport links and the ready availability of labour in Fray Bentos;
⎯ the availability of water that can be extracted and returned to the river without risk of pollution
or the loss of the drinking water supply;
⎯ the dispersal of effluent into a very large rive r capable of diluting it, even at low flow; and
finally
⎯ the suitability of the site.
108
IFC, Cumulative Impact Study (Sep. 2006), Chap. 2.3, CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173. - 49 -
18. The Botnia EIA and DINAMA’s own studies demonstrated to DINAMA’s satisfaction
that the siting of a plant at FrayBentos would have no harmful impact on the river and none on
Argentina. The IFC’s final CIS also reviewed the siting of the plant, and they confirmed the
receiving capacity of the river, the lack of any ha rmful impact, and the proximity of plantations.
Their experts found that Botnia had sufficiently cons idered the relevant environmental issues when
deciding where to locate the plant; and they confirmed the environmental suitability of the
109
location .
19. But there is nevertheless no basis for sayi ng that Botnia or Uruguay failed to consider
alternative sites or that the choice of FrayBent os was a fait accompli. Once again, Argentina’s
counsel simply do not know the evidence. The materi al on site selection and alternative sites is set
out in considerable detail in the IFC’s Final Cumulative Impact Study 110. It shows that, well before
selecting Fray Bentos, Botnia evaluated four locations in total: at La Paloma, at Paso de los Toros,
Nueva Palmira, and at Fray Bentos. And, anticipating Professor Sands, one of those potential sites
was indeed on the coast ⎯ the one at La Paloma. That site had to be rejected at the outset because
of the limited availability of fresh water ⎯ sadly, pulp mills cannot use sea water to process pulp.
20. A detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the three remaining sites was
111
then carried out . And the details again are set out in the final CIS. Paso de los Toros was
rejected because of concerns over effluent dilution at low flow, and also potential conflict with
other water uses. Nueva Palmira and FrayBent os were both on the Uruguay river. But the
FrayBentos site was preferre d over Nueva Palmira essentially for logistical and environmental
reasons ⎯ there was better availability of timber at lo cations closer to FrayBentos, which would
112
reduce the environmental impact of heavy lorries .
21. So it is simply beyond reasonable argument that Botnia did consider various sites before
opting for FrayBentos, and their reasoning is full y documented in the final CIS. If there is an
109See Final CIS, op. cit., pp. 2.9-2.12, CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173.
110
IFC, Cumulative Impact Study, Sep. 2006, Chap. 2.3.
111IFC, Cumulative Impact Study, Sep. 2006, Chap. 2.3, CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173.
112IFC, Cumulative Impact Study, Sep. 2006, Chap. 2.3, table 2.3-1, CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173. - 50 -
obligation to consider alternative locations at an early stage then Botnia did so. And that is
probably sufficient to dispose of Argentina’s arguments on this issue.
22. But the Court should also look carefully at the legal precedents relied on by Argentina’s
counsel. Argentina claims that as a matter of law an environmental impact assessment must
include a review of alternative sites. That is wh at they say. So let us see what the treaties, the
guidelines and the State practice have to say about a lternative sites. I think the results are quite
revealing.
23. Now, ProfessorBoisson de Chazour nes based her argument on Principle4 (c) of the
United Nations Environment Programme’s Goal s and Principles of Environmental Impact
Assessment, adopted in 1987 and also on the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, which I shall refer to as the Espoo Convention, and the
113
1998 IFC Environment Assessment Operational Policies .
24. Read fully, all of these sources demonstr ate the precise opposite of Argentina’s position.
Just for good measure, and given Argentina’s asser tion that Uruguay must comply with European
Union standards, I will also make some refere nce in a moment to the European Union’s EIA
directive 11. But the fundamental point is that there is no requirement in any of these instruments
to consider alternative locations as part of an EIA unless it is necessary in the circumstances to do
so. And the point about the present case is that it was never necessary to do so once the evidence
showed that there would be no significant risk to the river or to Argentina if the plant was located
at Fray Bentos.
II. UNEP PRINCIPLES
25. So let us just have a look at Principle 4 (c) of the UNEP Principles. This provides that an
EIA should include, at a minimum, “[a] description of practical alternatives, as appropriate”. That
is what it says.
11CR 2009/14, p. 27, fn 60.
11Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessm ent of the effects of certain public and private
projects on the environment, Official Journal, L175, 5.7.1985, p.40, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of
3 March 1997, Official Journal, L 73, 14.3.1997, p. 5, and Directive 2003/35/E C of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 May 2003, Official Journal, L 156, 25.6.2003, p. 17. - 51 -
26. As is, I am sure, clear to the Court from that text, Principle4 (c) simply mentions
“practical alternatives”, a phrase which is then qualified with the words “as appropriate”. It says
nothing about alternative locations, as Argentina would have had you believe . But how have these
guidelines been interpreted and applied? Well, I would like to draw to the Court’s attention
UNEP’s 2008 Desalination Resource and Guidance Manual for Environmental Impact
Assessments 115. Yes, I would not normally want to refer you to a document of that kind but it is
helpful here. While obviously this was intended primarily for desalination projects, the document
outlines a typical EIA process. It also considers what might constitute a practical alternative.
While alternative location is given as one option, it is neither mandatory nor presented as part of an
exhaustive list ⎯ it is just one of a number of options from a non-exhaustive list. And other
options also listed for consideration include technological alternatives, or altering the scale of the
116
project, or altering the process which is used . Consideration of these alternatives should start,
according to the guidelines, early in the planning of a new project, well before the EIA. Well, that
is exactly what Botnia did, when it considered the four possible sites referred to earlier. And it also
considered the relative merits of elemental ch lorine free technology and totally chlorine free
technology, as you heard last week. And it cons idered the relevant merits of secondary waste
treatment and tertiary waste treatment ⎯ again, as you heard last week. And it is those
technological options that were clearly the most re levant alternatives, and the choice between them
had significant environmental implications, as were pointed out last week, particularly in response
to the Court’s questions. The details of all of th is, the details of Botnia’s thinking on ECF and
117
TCF, on secondary treatment and tertiary treatment, are set out fully in its EIA .
115UNEP (2008), Desalination Resource and Guidance Manual for Environmental Impact Assessment, United
Nations Environment Programme at http://www.unep.org.bh/Newsroom/pdf/EIA-guidance-final.pdf.
116Ibid., p. 23, para. B.4.5 where it states:
“The consideration of alternatives to a proposal is a requirement of many EIA systems, and
should ideally begin in the early EIA stages... when the tolerance and disposition to make major
modifications to the project is still high. Possiblternatives include alternative location, technology,
scale or process, but also the ‘no project’ alternative . . .
Possible alternatives to the project or project pa rts should be briefly list ed and described in the
EIA to indicate that alternative options have been seriously considered and evaluated. Reasoning should
be provided why certain options have been dismissed or selected, leading to the one or two project
configuration(s) that are eventually investigated in the EIA.”
117CMU, Vol. VI, Ann. 158. - 52 -
27. The UNEP Manual then goes on to make clear that other major alternatives ⎯ and this
would include alternative locations ⎯ need to be seriously considered only if the EIA has revealed
significant impacts ⎯ which, of course, the Botnia EIA did not reveal, because there were none.
But let me quote the passage from UNEP:
“As project planning progresses and cons olidates, major alternatives will only
be seriously considered if the EIA has rev ealed significant impacts . . . that cannot be
mitigated otherwise. The investigation of impact mitigation measures should thus be
understood as a process, [and I am still quoting UNEP] which starts with the
consideration of major alternatives in ear ly project planning and continues after
118
potential impacts have been analyzed.”
That passage explains very clearly the position th at Uruguay has consistently taken. Given the
favourable EIA findings, it was simply not necessary to give further consideration to alternative
sites. It would have been futile.
III. ESPOO C ONVENTION
28. But let us also have a look at the Espoo Convention. The same conclusions are evident if
119
we do so . Appendix II, entitled “Content Of Th e Environmental Impact Assessment
Documentation”, provides as follows. It says the documentation shall contain: “(b) A description,
where appropriate, of reasonable alternatives (fo r example, locational or technological) to the
120
proposed activity and also the no-action alternative.”
29. I notice the words “for example”, “where appropriate” and “reasonable” in this
Appendix. In the same way that the UNEP Principles and the UNEP Manual provide a
non-exhaustive list of possible alternatives, so too does AppendixII of the Espoo Convention. It
cannot realistically be read to mandate assessing a lternative sites in the EIA as a matter of course.
But there is also State practice on what is meant by “reasonable alternatives” under the Espoo
Convention, and it is more helpful to Uruguay than to Argentina.
30. We can find the information on State practice in publications of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe reviewing the Espoo Convention. Their Review of
118
UNEP (2008), Desalination Resource and Guidance Manual for Environmental Impact Assessment, United
Nations Environment Programme, p.17, para. A.2.7.
11The Espoo Convention Preamble expressly refers to the UNEP Principles. See the authentic text at link from
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/eia.htm.
12App. II (b), Espoo Convention. - 53 -
121
Implementation 2006 covered the period between 2003-2005 , and is based primarily on
responses to questionnaires sent to States about the implementation of the Convention.
Question19 asked how States interpreted “rea sonable alternatives” for the purposes of the
122
Appendix. And paragraphs 62 and 63 of the Review provide an overview of the responses ⎯ but
let me summarize them.
31. The answers reveal a wide range of different practices with respect to “reasonable
alternatives” in an EIA 123. There is no single definition that emerges from State practice. But, and
I think this is the most important point, few States regard the identification of alternative sites as
mandatory. In general, “reasonable alternatives” have to be identified on a case-by-case basis.
Some countries simply require an EIA to indicate wh at alternatives have actually been considered.
So, once again, let me look at the practice disclosed here in Europe. Consideration of alternative
sites will depend on the nature of the project a nd whether locating it somewhere else would avoid
the risk of harm.
IV. E UROPEAN EIA D IRECTIVE
32. Before I leave alternative sites, I should add a last few words about the European Union
124
EIA directive . Article 5 (3) of the directive requires member States to adopt necessary measures
to ensure that a developer supplies information th at includes: “an outline of the main alternatives
studied by the developer and an indication of th e main reasons for his choice, taking into account
the environmental effects”.
33. Again, this does not specify “alternative sites”. There is no reason to doubt that Botnia’s
EAI would comply with Article5(3) of the Euro pean Union directive. But in June2001, the
European Commission also published guidance on EI A screening, under Article 4 of the directive,
12ECE/MP.EIA/11. Available at: http://www.unece.org/env/eia/implementation/review_implementation.htm.
12Ibid., 2.0, pas.2-63. The individual count ry survey responses are available at:
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/implementation/review_implementation_2006….
12Ibid.
124
Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessm ent of the effects of certain public and private
projects on the environment, Official Journal L175, 5.7.1985, p.40, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of
3 Mar. 1997, Official Journal L 73, 14.3.1997, p.5, and Directive 2003/3of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 May 2003, Official Journal L 156, 25.6.2003, p. 17. - 54 -
125
and scoping under Article5 . The aim of the guidance is to provide practical help to those
involved in these stages of the EIA process, dr awing upon experience from Europe and around the
world.
34. In regard to Article5(3), the scoping guidance says this ⎯ and I think this is a good
summary:
“Some Member States have made cons ideration of alternatives a mandatory
requirement for EIA whilst others leave it to the developer to decide if alternatives are
relevant to their project. It is, however , widely accepted good practice to consider
alternatives during project planning, to examine their environmental impacts in
deciding which alternative to choose and to report the appraisal of alternatives in the
EIS. Alternatives are, essentially, different ways in which the developer can feasibly
meet the project’s objectives, for example by carrying out a different type of action,
[or] choosing an alternative location or a dopting a different technology or design for
the project.” 126
35. So that is what the European Union says. And I think you will probably agree with me
that that is yet another restatement of the wide definition given to alternatives for the purposes of
an EIA. All of these precedents, whether we look at UNEP, or Espoo, or the European Union, tell
the same story. So in fact does the World Bank’s practice, but at this hour on a Thursday afternoon
I will not bore you by going through that. But wh ichever one you choose to look at, none of them
supports Argentina’s case on alternative sites. They all encourage States to take a practical and
common-sense approach. They show that an EIA is not the mechanistic process, certainly not the
one that Argentina would like you to endorse. A lternatives are not just about identifying different
locations. They are about finding an environmentally acceptable solution. And that, I submit, is
precisely what Uruguay did with respect to the Botnia mill. It considered alternative technologies
and operating processes at an early stage in the process in order to select an environmentally
beneficial and sustainable plant. The record shows that Botnia set out those alternatives in the EIA
documentation. Uruguay also considered the potential transboundary impact of this plant at Fray
Bentos and concluded that the site was entirely su itable: there would be no harmful impact on the
127
river or on Argentina . Once that became clear, as I have said before, there was then no practical
125
Guidance on EIA Screening, 2001, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-guidelines/g-
screening-full-text.pdf.
12Guidance on EIA Scoping, 2001, para. 6.2, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-
guidelines/g-scoping-full-text.pdf.
12DINAMA EIA Report, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 20. - 55 -
need to consider alternative sites. Only if the evidence had shown the likelihood of significant
harm to the river or to Argentina would Urugua y have been required under any of these precedents
to consider alternative sites. And that is precisely the point that Uruguay has made all along:
requiring Botnia to consider alternative sites once again would have been an exercise in futility,
and it would only have been necessary if the Fray Be ntos site had proved to be unsuitable. But it
did not prove to be unsuitable. And that, I respectfully suggest, disposes conclusively of
Argentina’s arguments about alternative sites.
36. Before we leave EIA, however, there is one further argument that requires a brief
response ⎯ the alleged failure to consult the public likely to be affected in Argentina. As I pointed
out in my previous speech, the Argentine public were in fact given the opportunity to make
representations during the public hearing at Fray Bentos. The details of that are set out in the
information provided to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and also recorded in the
initial environmental authoriza tion issued on 14February2005 128⎯ I will not bore you by
repeating those details here.
37. Uruguay does not doubt for one moment that public consultation is a nd should be part of
an EIA, as it was in this instance. Nor does it doubt that Argentine citizens are entitled on a
non-discriminatory basis to participate in public hearings held in Uruguay and to make written
representations to the relevant authorities, as they did in this instance. That was the essence of its
response to the Inter-American Commission and it remains Uruguay’s position on this question
today. The case of Claude Reyes on which ProfessorBoissondeChazournes relied earlier in the
week has nothing to do with the right of “populations riveraines susceptibles d’être affectées” to be
adequately consulted, but it concerns instead the right of citizens to obtain documents and
information from governmental authorities. So , we can now move on to monitoring, and I
apologize for having to go over this again, but it is necessary to rebut Argentina’s wholly
unmeritorious criticisms, which were repeated yet again earlier this week.
128
Interim Measures, June 2006, Observations of Uruguay, Vol. II, Exhibit 15, Sect. 3. - 56 -
V. M ONITORING
A. IFC endorsement
38. As I outlined for the Court last week, the environmental monitoring of the Botnia plant
involves substantial, and co-ordinated efforts by Botnia, the company, and by the Uruguayan
129
Government . The Court can have full confidence in the adequacy of this integrated and
comprehensive programme, as the IFC’s independent technical experts have unequivocally and
repeatedly endorsed it 130.
39. The IFC’s pre-commissioning review found that the various aspects of the monitoring
programme combine, in their words, to create a plan that is “extremely comprehensive and
131
exceed[s] the commitments identified in the CIS” . Indeed, after noting that the programme
132
covers all the necessary components a nd follows “well established protocols” , the IFC’s experts
also went on to say that the monitoring plan for th e Botnia plant is much more extensive than the
133
programmes in place in Canada and other well-regulated jurisdictions . Since the Botnia plant
began operating almost two years ago, the IFC’s i ndependent experts have repeatedly reconfirmed
their endorsement of the monitoring régime 13.
40. So Professor Wheater appears to be the only person who is dissatisfied with the way that
Uruguay monitors the environmental performance of the Botnia plant ⎯ but that was only his
opinion. His few specific criticisms regarding alleged pollution “incidents” are not supported by
the evidence or even by common sense, so, I will not waste the Court’s time demonstrating point
by point why that is so. But I would like to ta ke a few moments to demonstrate the excellence of
Uruguay’s monitoring programme.
129
RU, paras. 4.63-4.66.
130
RU, paras. 4.67 & 4.73-4.74; 3rd EcoMetrix Report, Mar.2009, Uruguay’s Submission of New Documents,
30 June 2009, Ann. S7, pp. ES.ii-ES.iii and 1.2 (describing the “comprehensive monitoring” involved).
131
RU, para. 4.67 (quoting IFC, Pre-Commissioning Review, Nov. 2007, RU, Vol. III, Ann. R50, p. ES.iv).
13RU, paras. 4.67-4.68 (quoting IFC, Pre-Commissioning Review, Nov. 2007, RU, Vol. III, Ann. R50, p. ES.iv).
13RU, paras. 4.67-4.72.
134
RU, paras. 4.73-4.74; 3rd EcoMetrix Report, Mar. 2009, Uruguay’s Submission of New Documents,
30 June 2009, Ann. S7, pp. ES.ii-ES.iii and 1.2. - 57 -
B. Pre-operational monitoring
41. This programme is grounded on substa ntial pre-operational monitoring. DINAMA
conducted 15months of pre-ope rational water quality monitoring 135, not the seven you were told
136
by Argentina, and it required Botnia to conduct even more . These many months of
pre-operational monitoring, which targeted the region of the Uruguay river nearest the plant,
augmented almost 15years of more general mon itoring that had been carried out within CARU
137
under the PROCON programme . So, in total, Uruguay has been involved in over 16years of
pre-operational water quality monitoring of the Uruguay river. How much more can Argentina
reasonably expect?
C. Number of sampling stations
42. Uruguay’s post-operational monitoring progra mme involves 16sampling stations, all of
138
them located on the River Uruguay . And the Botnia plant collects samples at a further four
stations, so the total of 22 139is more than double the nine sampling stations established in the
140
PROCEL plan, which both Uruguay and Argentina agreed was sufficient in November 2004 .
D. Station location
43. Of DINAMA’s 16 monitoring stations, three are located in close proximity to the Botnia
plant, and the others substantially upstream and downstream so that they can reasonably function as
control points. Uruguay has also established a station to monitor the effects of the Fray Bentos
sewage outfall. So this overall set-up allows Urugua y to monitor the actual effects, if any, of the
Botnia plant.
135
DINAMA, Performance Report for the First Year of Operation of the Botnia Plant and the Environmental
Quality of the Area of Influence, May2009, (hereina fter “DINAMA May 2009 Water Quality Report”), Uruguay’s
Submission of New Documents, 30 June 2009, Ann. S2, App. I, p. 1/54.
136
Botnia Environmental Management Plan for Opera tions, App.3 (Environmental Monitoring and Follow-
up.Plan), 24 Sep.2007, RU, Vol.II, Ann.R41, p.6/66 (est ablishing that Botnia conduct ed pre-operational monitoring
from April 2005 until the start of operations in Nov. 2007, or over 18 months).
137
CMU, paras. 7.5-7.9 (explaining that PROCON was established in 1987 and was carried out through 2005).
138
DINAMA May 2009 Water Quality Report, op. cit., Ann. S2, App. I, pp. 2-3/54, fig. 2.1 and table 1.
139
Botnia Environmental Management Plan for Oper ations, App., (Environmental Monitoring and
Follow-up. Plan), 24 Sep. 2007, RU, Vol. II, Ann. R41, para. 2.2.2.2.
140
Subcommittee on Water Quality and Prevention of Po llution Report No.247, 8-12-Nov.2004, approved in
CARU Minutes No.08/04, 12Nov.2004, Plan for Monitoring the Environmental Quality of the Uruguay River in the
Areas of the Pulp Mills (hereinafter “PROCEL”), CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 109, p. 1961. - 58 -
E. Sampling frequency
44. And as far as the frequency of the monitoring is concerned, that is one of the subjects of
Professor Wheater’s specific criticisms, DINAMA conducts some 150 per cent of the water quality
141
analysis that Argentina consider ed to be sufficient under PROCEL ⎯ and that is half as much
again ⎯ and at exactly the same frequency as the Argentine scientists responsible for Chapter 4 of
Argentina’s Scientific and Technical Report 142. DINAMA also conducts sediment sampling three
143
times as often as was required under PROCEL ⎯ in agreement with Argentina.
45. ProfessorWheater is also wrong when he says that Uruguay’s monitoring programme
involves no continuous monitoring 144. Botnia’s effluent would be the direct source of any
Botnia-related changes in the water of the Uruguay river. Now, that effluent is continuously
145
monitored for certain critical parameters, such as conductivity . It is electronically linked to a
real time “contingency prevention” and reporting system 146, the essence of that is that it allows
Botnia and DINAMA to recognize any important cha nges in the effluent ch aracteristics, and that
obviously allows them in turn to take preventive action when they realize there is the possibility of
any impacts on the quality of the river’s water. Argentina has not proposed any alternative superior
147
to this integrated and practical system .
141
PROCEL, op. cit., CMU, Vol.IV, Ann.109, p.1961 (establish ing that sampling was to be conducted four
times a year); DINAMA Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Plant in Fray Bentos , RU, Vol.IV, Ann.R86, p.12/40
(establishing that DINAMA is to conduct water quality sampling six times a year).
14Argentina’s Scientific and Technica l Report, Chap.4, p.63 (establishing that the Argentine scientists
responsible for Chap. 4 of the Report conducted samples once every two months between May 2008 and January 2009).
14PROCEL, op. cit., CMU, Vol.IV, Ann.109, p.1961 (establish ing that sediment monitoring was to be
conducted once annually); DINAMA Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Plan t in Fray Bentos (Version 2: May 2007),
Oct. 2007, RU, Vol. IV, Ann. R86, App. B, para. B.3 (establishing that DINAMA is to conduct sediment sampling three
times a year).
14See, for example, CR 2009/15, p. 26, para. 15 (Wheater).
14IFC Pre-commissioning Review, Nov.2007, RU, Vol.III, Ann.R50, p.10.3 , table10.1. See also DINAMA
Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Plants in Fray Bentos, Preliminary Draft, Aug.2006, CMU, Vol.II, Ann.31, App.3
(“Continuous: Volume, T, pH, Conductivity” and “The measuring parameters continue with real-time information”).
14DINAMA Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Plants in Fray Bentos, May2007, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 39, para. 39
(explaining that there is “remote access to the monitoring data in real time”); Botnia Environmental Management Plan
for Operations, App. 5 (Analysis of Environmental Risks), 30 June 2007, RU, Vol. II, Ann. R43, p. 2, table 1 (explaining
that if certain limits are reached such that “there is a possib ility that the permitted levels will be exceeded, production is
cut back”); Botnia Environmental Management Plan for Operations, App.6 (Contingency Plan), 20Sep.2007, RU,
Vol.II, Ann.R44, p.21, para.3.2.1 (establishing that, if decreasing production fails to nor malize the effluent, the plant
manager is under the legal obligation to report the situation to DINAMA immediately).
14See CR2009/17, pp.26-27, para.15 (Wheater) (implying that Uruguay should monitor the water of the
Uruguay river on an hourly or daily basis in order to pi ck up changes “lasting from hours to days”). See also Standard
Methods, 20th Edition, 1999 (for BOD5) and DINAMA Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Plant in Fray Bentos
(Version 2 ⎯ May2007), Oct.2007, RU, Vol.IV, Ann.R86, App.A, tableA1 (establishing that the analysis of certain
water quality parameters, such as BOD5, require up to five days of turnaround time, such that meaningful hourly or daily
monitoring would be impossible). - 59 -
F. Scope of monitoring
46. And, contrary also to ProfessorWheat er’s allegations, Uruguay has ensured that
substantial water and sediment quality monitoring has been conducted during the operation of the
Botnia plant. While PROCEL planned only for the monitoring of 28 water and six sediment
148
parameters , DINAMA has fully executed every aspect of its 68-parameter water quality
monitoring plan and its 18-parameter sediment quality monitoring plan 149. It has required even
more substantial water quality monitoring from Botnia . But Dr.Wheater is correct that Botnia is
150
committed to monitoring 72water quality parameters . This is exactly what the company has
done 151, and Argentina has provided no evidence to the contrary 152.
47. So DINAMA has fully complied with its obl igations to ensure that Botnia operates
within the requirements of its authorization. And Botnia is also required to monitor its own
effluents. DINAMA has repeatedly established, via audits and reports, that the company is holding
153
up its end of the bargain .
48. ProfessorWheater also says that Argentina’s monitoring programme is better than
Uruguay’s because it involves what he calls an “ecosystematic” approach 154⎯ I think that means
“ecosystemic”. But this is a false comparison, even according to Argentina’s own counsel. On
148
PROCEL, op. cit., CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 109, p. 1962.
14DINAMA Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Plant in Fray Bentos (Version 2: May 2007), Oct. 2007, RU, Vol. IV,
AnnR. 86, p.-10/40 and 14/40, tablesA1 and B1 (w here some entries involve multiple parameters);
DINAMA, May2009 Water Quality Report, op. cit., Uruguay’s Submission of New Documents, 30June2009,
Ann.S2, Water and Data Tables; DINAMA Surface Water and Sediment Quality Data Report (six-month
report: January-June 2009), July009, Ann1s. and 2, original Spanish version available at
http://www.mvotma.gub.uy/dinama/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=312. Translation submitted to the Court on
14 September 2009.
15Botnia Environmental Management Plan for Operati ons, App.3 (Environmental Monitoring and Follow-Up
Plan), 24 Sep. 2007, RU, Vol. II, Ann. R41, pp. 7-11/66, table 1.
15DINAMA, Six-Month Report on the Botnia Environm ental Performance Plan (11 Nov. 2008-31 May 2009),
2009Ju(yere2nafter “DINAM 2A009Julyotnia Performance
Repor4,),aprr.ai.ginal Spanish version available at:
http://www.mvotma.gub.uy/dinama/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=312. Translation submitted to the Court on
14 September 2009.
152
The fact that Botnia’s website includes data on only six especially important parameters (CR2009/17,
pp.32-33, para.28 (Wheater)) is not evidence that that the company has failed to co mplete its full monitoring program.
Botnia is under no obligation to report all of its sampling data to the public.
153
DINAMA July 2009 Botnia Performance Report, op. cit., p. 4, para. 2 (“Five inspections and tow audits of the
implementation of the environmental management operation... were carried out” between 10Nov.2007 and
31 May 2009. No violations have ever been recorded.)
154
CR 2009/17, p. 28, para. 18 (Wheater). - 60 -
Monday, you were told by Professor Boisson deChazournes that Uruguay’s monitoring
programme is also based on an ecosystemic approach 155.
49. Uruguay’s monitoring involves robust study of the river’s aquatic organisms. As far as
fish are concerned, Uruguay quite deliberately focuses its analysis on the two most abundant
species whose members spend th eir entire lives in the Uruguay river and they could therefore
156
accurately reflect changes actually caused by the Botnia plant . Even ProfessorWheater
157
concedes that Uruguay’s study of these fish populations involves “detailed analysis” . And
Uruguay has deliberately chosen not to focus on the Sabalo that forms the basis for Dr. Colombo’s
fish study because those are a migratory species that feed and breed far away in the polluted waters
of the Rio de la Plata and the Parana river 158⎯ not much point in monitoring those. This means
that the Sabalo are entirely inappropriate for the monitoring of Botnia’s effects on the environment.
And Dr.Colombo has himself established that th ey reflect contamination from sources far away
from the plant 159.
50. So, these are perhaps rather too many specific examples of the problems with
ProfessorWheater’s argument. But they also de monstrate to the Court that Uruguay oversees an
excellent programme to monitor the environmental performance of the Botnia plant. The IFC’s
independent experts have repeatedly confirme d that this is true, and comparison between
Uruguay’s programme and PROCEL, to which Argen tina agreed, highlights that the programme is
more than adequate.
51. Professor Wheater’s criticisms of the monitoring programme essentially boil down to the
allegation that Uruguay has either neglected or b een unable to “look for connections between...
155
CR2009/20, p.28, para.4 (Boisson de Chazournes) (ar guing that “toutes les éval uations environnementales
réalisées dans le cadre du projet Botnia ... auxquelles se réfère l’Uruguay de manière intensive reposent toutes sur une
approche écosystémique”).
156
See DINAMA Monitoring Plan for Cellulose Pulp in Fray Bentos (Version 2: May2007), Oct.2007, RU,
Vol. IV, Ann. R86, p. 23/40.
157
CR 2009/15, p. 28, para. 18 (Wheater).
158
Argentina’s Scientific and Technica l Report, Chap.5, pp.3, 5-8, 18and 22; CR2009/14, p.50, para.24
(Colombo) (“The main channel of the Uruguay river is a . . . migration route for several fish species.”).
159J.C. Colombo, C. Bilos, M.R. Lenicov, D. Co lautii, P. Landoni & C. Brochu, “Detritivorous fish
contamination in the Río de la Plata estuary: a critical accumulation pathway in the cycle of anthropogenic compounds”,
Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 57: 1139-1150, 2000, p. 1141 (reporting “major com ponents of organic contaminants and trace
metals in Río de la Plata” Sabalo), available at http://article.pubs.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/RPAS/rpv?hm=HInit&afpf=f00-
031.pdf&journal=cjfas&volume=57 (last visited on 30 Sep. 2009). - 61 -
deteriorating water quality and... ecosystem impacts” 160⎯ that is what he said. But Uruguay’s
monitoring has established ⎯ and the IFC’s independent experts have confirmed ⎯ that the Botnia
plant has no negative effect on water quality. That is what Dr. Colombo’s water quality data show
as well. So there is no deteriorating water quality to which ecosystem impacts could be connected.
Surely Uruguay cannot be faulted for failing to detect what is not there.
52. Finally, if Professor Wheater’s critique had any merit ⎯ any merit at all ⎯ then it would
be very easy to modify and strengthen the monitoring scheme, with or without Argentina’s
co-operation.
VI. P OLLUTION AND CHANGES TO THE ECOLOGICAL
BALANCE OF THE R IVER
53. Enough of monitoring. That brings us finally to Articles36 and 41, and Argentina’s
claims about pollution and the ecological balance of the river. So, let me start with the simple
points. Air pollution first. ProfessorBoiss on de Chazournes performed a characteristically
graceful tango around the CARU Digest ⎯ as one would expect ⎯ and she discovered that the
definition of “industrial pollution” includes gas emissions. Indeed so. But these are gas emissions
that have an impact on the aquatic environment pursuant to Article 41 ⎯ that is all, they are not a
reference to air pollution in general, or to acid rain, or to transboundary odours. The CARU Digest
still regulates none of these things. Neither does th e Statute. And Argentina has still provided no
proof ⎯ indeed it has not made any case at all ⎯ to show that airborne emissions from the Botnia
plant have caused any pollution of the rive r itself. Its evidence focuses on odours in
Gualeguaychú ⎯ but that is not the river. Common sense would tell us that phosphorus in rivers is
not normally deposited there by industrial chimneys , but Argentina is remarkably coy about what
other pollutants it thinks have been deposited in the river from the air. And if airborne depositions
have not caused non-compliance with CARU water quality standards then they cannot possibility
be in breach of the Statute. Uruguay reiterates its previous arguments that the plant has not caused
air pollution of the river and that Argentina’s case on air pollution beyond the river is outside the
scope of Article 60 of the Statute and the jurisdiction of the Court.
160
CR 2009/15, p. 28, para. 18 (Wheater). - 62 -
54. Now, Article 36. Professor Sands has reread Article 36 and he still thinks that it obliges
Uruguay to prevent “any” ⎯ “any” was his emphasis ⎯ change in the ecological balance. Well, I
could simply reiterate my argument that the ordinary meaning of the text, read in context and in the
161
light of its object and purpose, contradicts that interpretation . But let us also look at the
authentic Spanish text of Article36: this does not seem to include the word “any”, not even in
Spanish. And we can look at the text and compare it with the unofficial English translation used by
Professor Sands.
55. So here is the Spanish –– and I hope you will pardon my Spanish: it is not one of my
languages: “Las Partes coordinarán, por intermedio de la Comisión, las medidas adecuadas a fin de
evitar la alteración del equilibrio ecológico... [a fin de evitar la alteración del equilibrio
ecológico].” Rather obviously to me, this text does not support Professor Sands’s interpretation. It
does not say “cualquier alteración”, which is what you would expect, if it did. But enough of
modern languages.
56. Article36 still, even today, envisages action by both parties: the “co-ordination” ⎯ is
the word it uses in English ⎯ of measures to avoid changes in the ecological balance. And it says
that in all three languages. And this is the point that Professor Sands seems to have missed. By its
very nature it is an obligation that could only be fulfilled jointly, not one which imposes unilateral
obligations. Argentina has not identified what more Uruguay could do to co-ordinate measures
under Article 36. It has co-operated in adopting the necessary rules through the CARU Digest, as I
explained last week. Argentina might also like to recall that if effluents from the Botnia plant are
capable of producing ecological change then so are effluents from Gualeguaychú industrial park.
Uruguay’s interpretation of Article 36 at least has the merit of allowing both parties to decide how
much change, if any, they wish to tolerate.
57. Thirdly, let us just say something about the burden of proof. On Monday (CR 2009/20),
my good friend Professor Pellet offered the Court the remarkable proposition that the Statute places
the burden of proof equally on both parties. We ll, I read the compte rendu with reasonable care,
but he cited no provisions of the text and he offered no reasoning in support of his analysis in his
161
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31. - 63 -
remarks to you. The straightforward reading of th e text reveals nothing that might sustain what I
am sure the Court will probably correctly recognize as a characteristic Gallic flourish. Eh bien.
58. That brings us finally to phosphorus. On Tuesday Argentina’s counsel referred to
phosphorus and argued that Urugua y had failed to comply with the European Union’s Water
162
Quality Directive . Well, even if that directive were app licable in this case, which it is not, it is
utterly unhelpful to Argentina. It is true that the Directive envisages the progressive elimination of
priority hazardous substances, including nonylphenols, although it does not ban them entirely. But
the Botnia plant, of course, does not use nonylphe nols, a point to which Mr.Reichler will return
tomorrow. And Argentina does not regulate them, as we know, nor does CARU. The European
Union directive also promotes reduction of pollutants, including phosphorus. But it does not
prohibit the introduction of new sources of phosphor ous emissions. Rather, what it does, is to
require member States to co-operate in the mana gement of transboundary river basins so as to
facilitate the objectives of the directive. So phosphorus in the transboundary rivers of the European
Union has to be tackled jointly, over a longish period of time. That sounds very familiar. Uruguay
already regulates phosphorus and it would like to have some co-operation from Argentina in
making further reductions. But I have to say that if the European Union directive were applicable
law in this case, Uruguay would be in compliance with it. Argentina would not.
59. Uruguay has never concealed the fact that its water quality standard for phosphorus is
regularly exceeded, and was exceeded ev en before the Botnia plant was built 163. It is there in the
Counter-Memorial. The reason for this is quite simple: as Professor McCaffrey showed earlier this
afternoon, the cause of phosphorus in the River Ur uguay has nothing to do with Botnia and very
much to do with Argentina’s input, which dwarfs Botnia’s.
60. Now on Monday, Professor Sands told us not only that Argentina had proposed a CARU
standard for phosphorus, but he also said that Uruguay blocked it. And to support these claims, he
referenced various sources that do not appear anywhere in the record 16. However, we were able to
162
CR 2009/21, p. 13, para. 5 and pp. 30-32, paras. 35-36 (Sands).
16CMU, paras. 4.91-4.92.
16CR 2009/20, pp. 30-31, para. 35, fns. 36 and 37 (Sands). While Argentina has continued to insist on relying on
evidence outside of the record to lend cr edibility to its alleged cl aims, Uruguay would be happ y to submit the relevant
documents to the Court, should it so desire. - 64 -
locate them and we can now report that Professor Sands is unambiguously wrong on both counts.
First, no Argentine delegate ever proposed a phosphorus standard in CARU. Second, Uruguay
165
never blocked a proposal since it did not exist, it could not and would not . So much for the pulp
fiction. What is the real story?
61. Now, what these documents do tell us, wh en you read them, is that in April 2005,
CARU ⎯ just to recall, that means the delegations of both States ⎯ requested that the
Commission’s technical advisers should study the issue of phosphorus in the river 166. The
technical advisers presented the requested study. Now, by definition, these CARU technical
advisers are clearly not members of the Argentine delegation, despite what Professor Sands might
like you to believe 167. But nowhere in this document did the technical advisers actually propose
establishing a CARU standard for phosphorus. So even if they were, it would not make any
difference. So what was the outcome of this gr and report? A suggestion to further evaluate the
168
sources of phosphorus in the river, which was adopted by CARU . And very little more resulted
from that exercise.
62. And so the time passed, an d until one year later, when, if you believe ProfessorSands,
Uruguay blocked another Argentine proposal for phos phorus regulation, included, so he says, in a
larger proposal for CARU “to take a holis tic ecological approach to its activities” 169. There is one
part of this statement that is correct. Urugua y did reject the proposal as a whole, because the
revisions proposed went beyond CARU’s authority under the Statute. But even this expansive
proposal did not actually include any mention of the claimed phosphorus standard. So Uruguay
was not rejecting a proposal to regulate phosphorus , it was rejecting a proposal to rewrite the
1975Statute and the responsibilities of CARU ⎯ totally different things. And we searched high
and low in Argentina’s supporting evidence and, yet again, we found no proposal to adopt a
165
CARU Minutes 05/2005, cited in CR 2009/21, p. 30, para. 35, fn. 36 (containing a technical report prepared by
CARU Technical Secretary, proposing further evaluation of the sources of phosphorus in the river); CARU
Minutes 07/2006, cited in CR 2009/21, p. 30, para. 35, fn. 37 (containing reference to Argentina’s proposal for expanded
monitoring but not proposing any phosphorous standard).
166
CARU Minutes 05/2005, cited in CR 2009/21, p. 30, para. 35, fn. 36.
167
CARU Minutes 07/2006, cited in CR 2007/21, p. 30, para. 35, fn. 37.
16CARU Minutes 07/2006, cited in CR 2007/21, p. 30, para. 35, fn. 37.
16CR 2009/21, pp. 30-31 (Sands). - 65 -
phosphorus standard. Probably not surprising, since Argentina has itself never adopted a
phosphorus standard, as ProfessorMcCaffrey told you, and all we have been able to identify is a
suggestion from the technical advisers that phosphorous levels should be evaluated, as was already
170
being done .
63. In these circumstances the actions of Uruguay in permitting phosphorous discharges to
the river cannot possibly be charact erized as a breach of the 1975Statute or of Uruguayan law.
Nor has Argentina proved any harm to the river resulting therefrom ⎯ its only real evidence
focuses on the algal bloom of 4February. But algal blooms are not evidence of ecological
change ⎯ they come and go, they are a long-standing and normal feature of the river. Argentina
has not shown that this particular bloom caused any harm. Given the other evidence Argentina has
produced one would at least have expected some pictures of dead fish. The Court’s own pond
currently has an algal bloom, let me tell you, but th e fish are still very much alive. They certainly
were at a quarter to three this afternoon ⎯ and so are the seven ugly ducklings.
64. Well, I think that is probably enough on phosphorus, so let me come to my conclusions.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
65. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you ha ve been told that pulp mills are inherently
risky. Some older ones may be, but this mill at this location seems inherently benign and
unproblematic, provided it is properly monitored and the permits are enforced. That was
DINAMA’s original judgment and a ll of the evidence you have heard suggests that it was a sound
judgment. The evidence also shows that the plant is properly monitored and that the permits can be
and will be and have been enforced.
66. Argentina says that Uruguay has been ne gligent and incapable of dealing with the
scientific issues, including most importantly the flow of the river, the environmental impact
assessment and monitoring. But Uruguay’s own ev idence shows that all of the important issues
were fully understood and comprehensively assessed, in advance, at the appropriate time. Its
monitoring data is more comprehensive, more re liable, and based on a far longer run of baseline
data than Argentina’s. Argentina’s own science h as been more helpful to Uruguay than to its own
17CARU Minutes 07/2006, Report No. 264 of the Underco mmission of Water Quality and Prevention, p. 02442,
cited in CR 2009/21, p. 31, para. 35, fn. 37. - 66 -
side, and it has failed to identify either actual harm or any real risk of harm. Only things that might
be associated with the plant but it has no proof. The Court can and should take a common-sense
approach to this evidence, but Mr. Reichler will say more about that tomorrow.
67. The precautionary principle has also been invoked by Argentina, but it has made ⎯ I
think it fair to say ⎯ no real effort either this week or in its opening submissions to demonstrate
any likelihood of serious or irre versible harm that would be re quired for that principle to be
applicable. As I explained to the Court last week , Uruguay has made sure that there is no risk of
serious or irreversible harm by requiring the u se of modern technology with waste minimization
techniques and processes that eliminate persistent or ganic pollutants and other toxic substances, in
accordance with Agenda21 of the Rio Conference. Uruguay has done all that a diligent
government should have done in the circumstances to assess, to eliminate and to regulate the risk of
pollution or ecological harm. The results are evident in the absence of pollution or harm, in the
continued compliance with CARU water quality st andards and compliance with Articles 36 and 41
of the Statute. But ProfessorReichler will also say more on the evidence about those questions
tomorrow.
68. Finally, you have also been told that this is an important environmental case, but that is
obvious to all of us. Uruguay has sought throug hout these proceedings to be guided by and to
promote a coherent view of in ternational environmental law ⎯ one that reflects the consensus of
developed and developing States forged at Ri o in 1992 and subsequent ly developed by the
International Law Commission and in other contexts by the United Nations. That is why Uruguay
has not taken a narrow reading of the 1975 Statute, even though on certain issues, most obviously
the environmental impact assessment, there is at best only a very slender basis in the text itself. At
the heart of the Rio consensus is of course the concept of sustainable development with its
emphasis on integrating economic development with environmental protection. The balance that
this concept entails is equally reflected in the Draft Articles of the ILC on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm and in the United Nations Convention on Interna tional Watercourses. It is
regrettable that that balance has not been reflect ed in the arguments advanced by Argentina. One
may wonder what vision of international environm ental law motivates Argentina, but it is not one
that rests on firm or widely accepted foundations in contemporary international society. Nor does - 67 -
it rest on the jurisprudence of this Court or on the conclusions of the International Law
Commission. Uruguay has no doubt whatever that the Court shares its own concern for
environmental protection. As this case has once again shown, the environment is certainly not an
abstraction.
69. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it has been an honour to address you in this case on
behalf of Uruguay and I thank you for your patience and attentiveness.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank ProfessorBoyle for his presentation.
The Court now rises and will resume tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.
The Court rose at 5.50 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 1 October 2009, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Tomka, Acting President, presiding, in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)