Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2008/21
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2008
Public sitting
held on Friday 5 September 2008, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2008
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 5 septembre 2008, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Cot
Oxman
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vce-prh,ident
RanMjv.
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skoteiskov,
CotMM.
jOges an, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Romania is represented by:
Mr. Bogdan Aurescu, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Professor
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Buchar est, President of the Romanian Branch of the
International Law Association, member of th e Permanent Court of Arbitration, substitute
member of the Venice Commission,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Cosmin Dinescu, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E Mr. Călin Fabian, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
As Co-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of Inte rnational Law, University of Oxford, member
of the English Bar, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
a s Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Simon Olleson, member of the English Bar, 13 Old Square Chambers,
as Counsel;
Mr. Gicu Boroşi, Director General, National Agency for Mineral Resources,
Mr. Mihai German, Deputy Director General, Nati onal Agency for Mineral Resources, member of
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Mr. Eugen Laurian, Counter-Admiral (retired),
Mr. Octavian Buzatu, Lieutenant Commander (retired),
Mr. Ovidiu Neghiu, Captain, Ministry of Defence of Romania,
as Technical and Cartographic Experts;
Mr. Liviu Dumitru, Head of the Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Roumanie est représenté par :
M. Bogdan Aurescu, directeur général au ministère roumain des affaires étrangères, chargé de
cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Bucarest, président de la section roumaine de
l’Association de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, membre
suppléant de la Commission de Venise,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
M.CosminDinescu, directeur général des affair es juridiques du ministère roumain des affaires
étrangères,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Călin Fabian, ambassadeur de Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat, Matrix
Chambers,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., professeur de droit internati onal à l’Université d’Oxford, titulaire de la
chaire Chichele, membre du barreau d’Anglet erre, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseil et avocat ;
M. Simon Olleson, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 13 Old Square Chambers,
comme conseil ;
M. Gicu Boroşi, directeur général de l’agence nationale des ressources minières,
M. Mihai German, directeur général adjoint de l’agence nationale des ressources minières, membre
de la Commission des limites du plateau continental de l’ONU,
M. Eugen Laurian, contre-amiral (en retraite),
M. Octavian Buzatu, capitaine de corvette (en retraite),
M. Ovidiu Neghiu, capitaine, ministère roumain de la défense,
comme experts techniques et cartographes ;
M. Liviu Dumitru, chef de l’unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère roumain des
affaires étrangères, - 6 -
Ms Irina Ni ţă, Second Secretary, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Romania in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Catrinel Brumar, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Mirela Pascaru, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Ioana Preda, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Olivia Horvath, Desk Officer, Public Diplom acy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Romania,
as Advisers.
The Government of Ukraine is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, Adviser to th e Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Professor of International Law,
National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,
Mr. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, Director of the Lega l and Treaty Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor emeritus of International Law at the University of ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., Member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the Rome Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine,
Ms Cheryl Dunn, Member of the State Bar of California, Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Nick Minogue, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales,
Mr. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, Acting Head of International Law Division, Legal and Treaty
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, - 7 -
Mme Irina Niţă, deuxième secrétaire, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade de Roumanie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Catrinel Brumar, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Mirela Pascaru, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Ioana Preda, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Olivia Horvath, responsable du départem ent des relations diplomatiques du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
commceonseillers.
Le Gouvernement de l’Ukraine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine, professeur de droit international à
l’Académie Mohyla (Université nationale de Kiev),
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
M. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, directeur du départem ent des affaires juridiques et des traités du
ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de dr oit international à l’Université de ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine,
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de Californie, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Nick Minogue, Solicitor à la Cour suprême d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, directeur par intérim de la division du droit international, département
des affaires juridiques et des traités du ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine, - 8 -
Mr. Maxime O. Kononenko, First Secretary of the Embassy of Ukraine in the French Republic,
Ms Mariana O. Betsa, Second Secretary of th e Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil, C. Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Major General Borys D. Tregubov, Assistant to the Head of the State Border Protection Service of
Ukraine,
as Technical Advisers. - 9 -
M. Maxime O. Kononenko, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine en France,
Mme Mariana O. Betsa, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil., C. Geol., F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. Borys D. Tregubov, général de division, assistant du chef du service de protection des frontières
d’Etat de l’Ukraine,
comme conseillers techniques. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. We meet for the continuation of
the first round presentations of Romania. Mr. Müller has the floor.
M. MÜLLER : Thank you, Madam President.
L E RÔLE DES EFFECTIVITÉS DANS LA DÉLIMITATION
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un honneur immense de se présenter
devant vous à cette barre. Pour commencer la prés entation de la Roumanie ce matin, il me revient
de montrer que les soi-disant «effectivités» qu’invoqu e la partie ukrainienne, même si elles étaient
pertinentes ⎯ce qui, en fait, n’est pas le cas comme mon collègue et ami CosminDinescu va
l’expliquer tout à l’heure ⎯, les effectivités, disais-je, ne sont pas susceptibles de produire l’effet
juridique que l’Ukraine veut leur attacher. Ces «effectivités» ou «activités étatiques» 1 ne peuvent
pas, en droit, constituer «a relevant circumst ance which operates in favour of the continental
shelf/EEZ claim line proposed by Ukraine» 2.
2. Le choix du terme «effectiv ité» peut certes surprendre. Le mot n’apparaît pas une seule
fois dans les écritures des deux Parties. Néanmo ins, c’est bien d’effectivités qu’il s’agit quand
l’Ukraine invoque, sous le couvert des circons tances pertinentes, «the Parties’ conduct
concern[ing] the exercise of sovereign activities (e .g. in respect of the licensing of hydrocarbon
exploration and exploitation) as well as obliga tions assumed by the respective States, notably
3
regarding activities of the State border guard in policing fishing areas» . En d’autres termes, il
s’agit, selon les dires de l’Ukrain e, d’activités constituant des actes accomplis à titre de souverain
(Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nica ragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Honduras) , arrêt du 8octobre2007, par.186 et 206; Différend frontalier (Burkina
Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1986 , p. 586, par. 63 ; Statut juridique du
Groënland oriental, arrêt, 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B n o 53, p. 45-46) dans la zone litigieuse.
1Contre-mémoire de l’Ukraine (CMU), p. 212.
2
CMU, p. 213, par. 8.41.
3
CMU, p. 212, par. 8.40. - 11 -
3. Bien que ceci déplaise à nos contra dicteurs de l’autre côté de la barre , je vais limiter ma
présentation à des arguments purement juridiques ⎯parce que c’est bien d’une question de droit
qu’il s’agit ⎯ pour démontrer que c’est à juste titre que ces «effectivités» «ne disent pas leur
5
nom» . Dans la délimitation maritime, elles ne peuve nt être prises en compte que sous une forme
toute particulière et dans des circonstances très strictes dont l’Ukraine fait une application pour le
moins approximative(II). En principe cependant, l es «effectivités» ne jouent en tant que telles
aucun rôle dans l’exercice de la délimitation dont vous êtes saisis (I).
I. Le principe : l’absence d’influence des effectivités sur la délimitation maritime
4. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, il ne fait aucun doute que, dans la
délimitation territoriale, les «effectivités» ont un rô le bien déterminé et je vais vous épargner la
lecture du dictum bien connu dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/Mali) qui le
confirme (Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1986 ,
p.86-587, par6 .3. Voir aussi Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime
(ElSalvador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1992 , p. 398, par. 61 ;
Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée
équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p.353, par.68, p.354, par.70 ou p.415,
par. 223 ; Souveraineté sur Pulau Lig itan et Pulau Sipadan (In donésie/Malaisie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 678, par. 126 ; Différend frontalier (Bénin/Niger), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005,
p. 120-121, par. 47 ou p. 127, par. 77).
5. Bien que le principe soit clair en ce qui concerne la délimitation territoriale, sa
transposition pure et simple à la délimitation mar itime est fort douteuse. En effet, comme la
Chambre l’a souligné dans ce même arrêt ⎯ Burkina Faso/Mali ⎯, «le processus par lequel le
juge détermine le tracé d’une frontière terrestre entre deux Etats se distingue nettement de celui par
lequel il identifie les principes et règles appli cables à la délimitation du plateau continental»
(Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1986 , p.578,
4
Duplique de l’Ukraine (DU), p. 120, par. 6.75.
5N. Ros, «Les effectivités» in Institut du droit économique de laLe processus de délimitation maritime ,
Colloque international, Monaco, 27-29 mars 2003, Pedone, Paris, 2004, p. 211. - 12 -
par.47) en particulier, et à la délimitation maritime en général. Et c’est justement le rôle des
«effectivités» qui change considérablement quand on passe de la terre à la mer et son sous-sol.
6. Cette différence s’explique d’abord par des considérations pratiques. Il est insensé
d’exiger d’une façon ou d’une autre, une occupation effective de la mer ou du plateau continental.
Il est également difficile d’imaginer comment un Etat peut accomplir des actes à titre de souverain
dans sa zone économique exclusive ou sur son plat eau continental avec la même constance et avec
la même intensité que sur son territoire terrestre . Pour emprunter les mots de MM.Lucchini et
VŒlckel, «le milieu marin, en raison de sa nature même, est impropre à une occupation effective ;
il ne se prête aussi que difficilement à des actes attestant de l’administration d’un Etat» 6. Certes,
l’exigence de l’occupation eff ective n’est pas absolue, mais modulable en raison des
caractéristiques particulières de l’espace concerné ( Statut juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt,
o
1933, C.P.J.I. sérieA/B n 53, p.46. Voir également Délimitation maritime et questions
territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c.Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2001 , p.100,
par. 197-198 ; Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pul au Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 682, par. 134 ; Différend territorial et maritim e entre le Nicaragua et le
Honduras dans la mer des Ca raïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras) , arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 174.)
Même «modulable», la transposition n’a pas eu lieu et le droit des espaces maritimes ne connaît pas
l’exigence de l’exercice effectif des compétences de l’Etat dans ces espaces.
7. Tout au contraire, aussi bien la conventi on de Genève sur le plateau continental que la
convention des NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer disposent que «[l] es droits de l’Etat
[riverain][ou côtier] sur le plateau continental sont indépendants de l’occupation effective ou
fictive»7. La Cour a endossé ce principe dans son arrêt sur le Plateau continental de la mer du
Nord: «Pour reprendre le terme de la convention de Genève, [le droit inhérent à un plateau
continental] est «exclusif» en ce sens que, si un Etat riverain choisit de ne pas explorer ou de ne pas
exploiter les zones de plateau continental lu i revenant, cela ne concerne que lui.» (Plateau
6 Droit de la mer , t. 2 ⎯ Délimitation, navigation et pêche, vol.1 ⎯ Délimitation, Pedone, Paris, 1996, p.28.
Voir aussi N. Ros, op. cit. (note 5), p. 200.
7Art. 2, par. 3, de la convention de Genève sur le plateau continental ( RTNU, vol. 499, p. 315) et art. 77, par. 3,
de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (RTNU, vol. 1834, p. 36). - 13 -
continental de la mer du Nord (République féd érale d’Allemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 22, par. 19.)
8. D’une façon comparable, si un Etat choisit de ne pas exploiter les eaux surjacentes de son
plateau continental ou d’y exercer des droits so uverains, cela ne regarde que lui et ne peut
aucunement signifier que ses eaux sont «sans maître» et ouvertes à l’«occupation» d’un ou
plusieurs autres Etats. Dès 1951, la Cour a exclu toute opposabilité de principe des actes pris à titre
de souverain dans les espaces maritimes: «L a délimitation des espaces maritime a toujours un
aspect international; elle ne saurait dépendre de la seule volonté de l’Etat riverain telle qu’elle
s’exprime dans son droit interne.» ( Pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c .orvège), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 132; Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Islande), fond,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 22, par. 49 ; Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République
fédérale d’Allemagne c. Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 191, par. 41. Voir également
Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya ar abe libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1982 , p.66-67,
par.87.) Que l’Etat riverain exprime sa vol onté par des actes juridiques ou par des activités
accomplies à titre de souverain ne change rien au principe: la délimitati on maritime n’en dépend
pas.
9. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, ce n’est donc pas l’homme ou les activités qui
importent; c’est «la terre [qui] domine la mer» ( Différend territorial et maritime entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la m er des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras) , arrêt du
8 octobre 2007, par. 113 ; Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn
(Qatar c. Bahreïn), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001 , p. 97, par. 185 ; Plateau continental de la mer
Egée (Grèce c.Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1978 , p. 36, par. 86 ; Plateau continental de la mer
du Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1969 , p.51, par.96) comme votre Cour le rappelle
constamment. Contrairement à ce qu’on a pu constater dans l’appropriatio n terrestre, il importe
alors peu qu’un Etat procède à des actes à titre de souverain sur un espace maritime ou pas. Ce
n’est pas le plus rapide ou le plus fort qui acqui ert un titre plus valable sur cet espace. Ce ne sont
pas l’homme et les activités c oncurrentes auxquelles il se livre qui constituent la base des - 14 -
opérations d’attribution et de dé limitation maritimes; c’est la nature avec ses avantages et ses
inconvénients qui gouverne. Dans la mer et sur son sous-sol, ex facto ius non oritur.
10. La jurisprudence de la Cour et des tribunaux arbitraux est d’a illeurs particulièrement
constante sur cette question, notamment eu égard à la pratique pétrolière des Etats. Dans l’affaire
relative à la Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria cette Cour a ainsi
considéré que «les concessions pétrolières et les puits de pétrole ne sauraient en eux-mêmes être
considérés comme des circonstances pertinentes jus tifiant l’ajustement ou le déplacement de la
ligne de délimitation provisoire» ( Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria
(Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p. 447-448,
par.304). Sur cette base, la Cour n’a pas pris en compte la pratique pétr olière dans la région à
délimiter entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria, qui était pourtant bien plus importante que dans le cas
8
présent. Contrairement à ce que l’Ukrain e veut faire croire dans sa duplique , cette jurisprudence
est loin d’être isolée. Dans ce même arrêt (entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria), la Cour a fondé son
raisonnement sur sa jurispruden ce antérieure dans l’affaire du Plateau continental entre la Tunisie
et la Libye et dans celle de la Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du
Maine. L’Ukraine tait le fait que, dans la première de ces deux affaires, la Cour n’a pas tenu
compte pour l’ajustement de la ligne de l’équidistance provisoire, de «la ligne en direction du nord
servant de limite aux zones pétrolières libyennes» (Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1982 , p.83, par.117). Dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine , la
Chambre de la Cour a également considéré que la pratique pétrolière ne pouvait constituer un
élément à prendre en compte ( Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du
Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 310-311, par. 150-151).
11. Une telle position a été également adopt ée par différents tribunaux arbitraux qui, sans
exception, ont tous refusé de considérer la pr atique pétrolière des Etats concernés comme des
circonstances pertinentes. C’est le cas de la sentence arbitrale rendue il y a tout juste un an
concernant la délimitation maritime entre le Guyana et le Suriname qui, se référant expressément à
la jurisprudence de la Cour dans l’affaire Cameroun c.Nigéria ⎯que je viens de citer ⎯, est
8
DU, p. 120, par. 6.77. - 15 -
arrivée à la conclusion que «the oil practice of the Parties cannot be taken into account in the
9
delimitation of the maritime boundary in this case» . Cette solution est confirmée par les sentences
10
arbitrales rendues dans l’affaire entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau , dans celle entre la France et
le Canada concernant Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 11 et dans celle entre la Barbade et
12
Trinité-et-Tobago . Dans cette dernière sentence ⎯ Barbade et Trinité-et-Tobago ⎯, le tribunal
arbitral a expressément précisé qu’il ne considérait pas que «the activities of either Party, or the
responses of each Party to the activities of the othe r, themselves constitute a factor that must be
taken into account in the drawing of an equitable delimitation line» 13.
12. Madame le président, le principe est donc bi en clair. Il a été établi dans de nombreuses
décisions de votre Cour et des tribunaux arbitraux : les «effectivités» ne constituent pas un élément
à prendre en considération pour la délimitation maritime. C’est donc en vain que l’Ukraine prétend
que «[w]hereas Ukraine has consistently carried out and/or licensed sovereign and economic
14
activities in the relevant area, Romania has not» . Même si cette allégation correspondait à la
réalité, ce qui n’est pas le cas, ces activités ne pourraient pas constituer une circonstance pertinente
ou changer la ligne d’équidistance.
II. L’exception : les effectivités en tant que preuve d’un accord
15
13. Pour échapper à ce principe de la non-prise en compte de ses soi-disant «nombreuses»
«effectivités» ⎯ dont le nombre est pourtant très relatif comme mon collègue Cosmin Dinescu va
le montrer dans quelques instants ⎯, l’Ukraine se fonde exclusivemen t sur l’arrêt de la Cour dans
l’affaire du Plateau continental entre la Tunisie et la Libye dont j’ai parlé brièvement il y a un
16 17
instant et qui a été discuté dans la réplique roumaine . A en croire la duplique, nos collègues de
9Guyana/Suriname, sentence arbitrale, 17 septembre 2007, par. 390, en ligne : http://www.pca-cpa.org/
10
RSA, vol. XIX, p. 174, par. 63.
11
RSA, vol. XXI, p. 295-296, par. 89-9.
12
Sentence arbitrale, 11 avril 2006, par. 364, en ligne : http://www.pca-cpa.org/
13Ibid., par. 366.
14CMU, p. 212, par. 8.39.
15CMU, p. 253, par. 11.1 viii) ; DU, p. 153, par. 9.3 xii).
16
Voir supra, par. 10.
17
Réplique de la Roumanie (RR), p. 246-247, par. 7.3. - 16 -
l’autre côté de la barre font une interprétation inex acte de ce précédent. Il est vrai que la Cour a
marqué un certain intérêt pour la pr atique pétrolière de la Tunisie et de la Libye à proximité de la
côte et de la ligne de facto qui en résultait. Mais, selon ses propres mots, elle devait «tenir compte
de tous les indices existants au sujet de la ligne ou des lignes que les Parties elles-mêmes ont pu
considérer ou traiter en pratique comme équitables» (Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 84, par. 118). C’est à ce titre que l’accord tacite qui
découlait de la pratique pétrolière ainsi que le modus vivendi instauré par la France et l’Italie dans
les années1930 et respecté depuis lors par la Tunisie et la Libye ont été pris en considération: il
s’agissait d’évaluer le caractère équitable de la délimitation ( ibid., p. 70-71, par. 93-96 et p. 83-85,
par.117, 119-120. Voir aussi Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du
Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique) , arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p.310, par.150.) Les
«effectivités» pétrolières ne jouent donc plus le rôle des «effectivités» terrestres dont, faute de titre,
il suffit de démontrer l’existence et la supériorité en qualité et en nombre pour établir une
occupation effective; les «effectivités» maritimes ne peuvent être prises en compte que si elles
reflètent un accord sur lequel elles reposent et qui, lui ⎯ l’accord, donc ⎯, pourrait constituer une
circonstance pertinente pour la délimitation. L’Ukraine, qui attache bien trop d’importance à
prouver la réalité de ses «effectivités», perd complètement de vue cet aspect des choses.
14. Pourtant, la jurisprudence postérieure confirme entièrement et très clairement ce rôle que
les «effectivités» peuvent éventue llement jouer. Dans l’affaire Cameroun c.Nigéria, la Cour, en
résumant sa jurisprudence, y compris celle de1982 entre la Tunisie et la Lybie, et celle des
tribunaux arbitraux, conclut :
«si l’existence d’un accord exprès ou tacite entre les parties sur l’emplacement de
leurs concessions pétrolières respectives pe ut indiquer un consensus sur les espaces
maritimes auxquels elles ont droit, les concessions pétrolières et les puits de pétrole ne
sauraient en eux-mêmes être considérés comme des circonstances pertinentes justifiant
l’ajustement ou le déplacement de la ligne de délimitation provisoire. Ils ne peuvent
être pris en compte que s’ils reposent sur un accord exprès ou tacite entre les
parties.» (Frontière terrestre et maritime entre la Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun
c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)) , fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002,
p. 447-448, par. 304 ; les italiques sont de nous.) 18
18Voir aussi La Barbade/Trinité-et-Tobago, sentence arbitrale , 1avrl006, par.64, en lig:e
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/> ; Guyana/Suriname, sentence arbitrale , 17 septembre 2007, par. 390, en ligne :
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/>. - 17 -
C’est dans le but de trouver un tel accord tacite préexistant que vous avez récemment fait référence,
pour les besoins de la délimitation maritime, à la pratique du Nicaragua et du Honduras, sans pour
autant la trouver pertinente (Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras
dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 254-256).
15. Il ne suffit donc pas de démontrer que des activités à titre de souverain ont été
accomplies dans les zones revendiquées. Ceci reste sans importance. Seule l’existence d’un
accord entre les parties, même tacite ou implicite, peut être prise en compte en tant que
circonstance pertinente et c’est à ce titre que les «effectivités» peuvent inte rvenir: en tant que
preuve de l’accord entre les parties sur lequel ils reposent. C’est cet accord et la ligne de facto en
résultant qui seuls peuvent être pertinents aux fins de la délimitation.
16. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, c’est loin d’être un détail. Tout au contraire,
pour accomplir ce rôle particulier ⎯c’est-à-dire démontrer l’accord sur lequel elles reposent ⎯,
les «effectivités» doivent nécessairement revêtir certaines caractéristiques.
17. En premier lieu ⎯ et sur ce point la délimitation mar itime ne se distingue guère de son
homologue terrestre ⎯ seules les activités étatiques antérieures à la date critique pourraient être
pertinentes. La raison en est simple et vous l’avez très clairement exprimée dans votre arrêt
d’octobre dernier entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras : les actes postérieurs à la date critique «ne sont
généralement pas pertinents en tant qu’ils sont le fait d’un Etat qui, ayant déjà à faire valoir
certaines revendications dans le cadre d’un différend juridique, pourrait avoir accompli les actes en
question dans le seul but d’étayer celles-ci» (ibid., par. 117). Sur cette base, vous n’avez alors pris
en compte que des événements intervenus ju squ’en1982 pour arriver à la conclusion qu’aucun
accord tacite n’a été établi entre les parties quant à la délimitation maritime (ibid., par. 258 ; voir
aussi, ibid., par.124.) Nul doute alors que la date critique a la même importance et la même
fonction dans les délimitations ma ritime et terrestre: il est immatériel qu’un Etat, une fois un
différend sur la délimitation maritime cristallisé, multiplie ses activités dans la zone en litige afin
de créer l’illusion qu’il existait un accord de facto concernant la frontière maritime entre les parties.
La Cour
«ne saurait prendre en considération des actes qui se sont produits après la date à
laquelle le différend entre les Parties s’est cristallisé, à moins que ces activités ne
constituent la continuation normale d’activ ités antérieures et pour autant qu’elles - 18 -
n’aient pas été entreprises en vue d’améliorer la position juridique des Parties qui les
invoquent» (Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie) ,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.682, par.135; Différend territorial et maritime entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c.Honduras), arrêt
du 8octobre2007, par.117. Voir également, Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour) , arrêt du 23 mai 2008,
par. 179-180.)
Mon collègue CosminDinescu montrera tout à l’he ure que ce principe tout simple disqualifie la
totalité des soi-disant «effectivités» invoquées pa r l’Ukraine, toutes survenues après la date
critique, après le moment où l’Ukraine ne pouvait pa s ne pas être au courant de la position de la
Roumanie 19.
18. Même si ces «effectivités» devaient être ad missibles, Madame le président, elles ne sont
pas, pour autant, aptes à démontrer un quelconque accord ou modus vivendi quant à la délimitation
équitable entre les Parties devant la Cour. Permettez-moi d’emprunt er encore une fois les termes
de votre arrêt dans l’affaire entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras: «Les éléments de preuve attestant
l’existence d’un accord tacite doivent être convain cants. L’établissement d’une frontière maritime
permanente est une question de grande importance, et un acco rd ne doit pas être présumé
facilement.» (Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des
Caraïbes (Nicaragua c.Honduras) , arrêt du 8octobre2007, par.253.) Dans l’arrêt concernant la
délimitation du Plateau continental entre la Libye et Malte, la Cour a ainsi refusé de prendre en
compte la pratique des parties étant donné qu’elle n’a pas pu
«déceler d’un côté ou de l’autre un type de comportement suffisamment net [ou, en
anglais, any pattern of conduct ] pour constituer soit un acquiescement soit une
indication utile des vues de l’une des Par ties sur une solution équitable qui diffère
sensiblement des thèses avancées par cette même Partie devant la Cour» ( Plateau
continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte) , arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p.29,
par. 25).
La sentence arbitrale dans l’affaire entre Terre-N euve-et-Labrador et la Nouvelle-Ecosse, affirme
également que
«pour décider qu’une limite (non réglée ou déterminée par accord) a été établie par
suite d’une conduite, il faut montrer qu’il ex istait entre les deux parties concernées un
type de comportement net [«an unequivocal pattern of conduct» dans la version
19
CR 2008/20, p. 60, par. 14 (Aurescu). - 19 -
anglaise de la sentence] par rapport à la zone et étayant la limite ⎯ ou l’aspect de la
limite ⎯ objet de la contestation» . 20
21
19. Ainsi, ni une concession pétrolière unique , ni une pratique pétrolière s’inscrivant dans
une période de temps relativement courte (sept ans par exemple dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine)
(Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 310-311, par. 151) ne peut produire un effet quelconque
sur la délimitation maritime ou prouve r l’existence d’un accord tacite ou un modus vivendi. Dans
l’affaire Libye/Tunisie qui, de l’avis de l’Ukraine, constituerait un précédent pertinent, le
modus vivendi s’était justement établi dans les années tr ente et a été respecté jusqu’au milieu des
années soixante-dix ⎯c’est-à-dire pendant une bonne quarantaine d’années ( Plateau continental
(Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 93, par. 133 B) 4)). Même
en cherchant bien, il est difficile de trouver une quelconque ressemblance entre ce modus vivendi et
les «effectivités» ukrainiennes ⎯ pompeusement dénommées dans la duplique de l’Ukraine
22
«historical pattern of State activities» ⎯ qui, elles, ne s’étalent, avec beaucoup de bonne volonté,
que sur une petite dizaine d’années avec des grand es interruptions. M.Dinescu va vous en dire
plus dans quelques instants.
[Projection 1 : les «effectivités» dans la zone litigieuse présentées par l’Ukraine [DU, fig. 6-2].]
20. Madame le président, l’Ukraine semble également oublier que les «effectivités» et
l’accord qu’elles sont censées faire apparaître, devraient concerner la zone en litige et d’une
certaine façon une frontière de facto. Un regard, même rapide, sur le croquis actuellement projeté
derrière moi montrant l’ensemble des «effectivités» présentées par l’Ukraine, ne peut cependant
montrer qu’un seul fait : la zone de délimitation est disputée entre les deux Parties. On a du mal à y
23
déceler un «prevailing understanding» entre les Parties, comme l’Ukraine l’affirme. Les
«effectivités» ukrainiennes prises isolément ne peuvent même pas raisonnablement confirmer la
ligne de délimitation réclamée par l’Ukraine.
20
Sentence arbitrale (deuxième phase) , 26 mars 2002, p.58, par.3.5 et, pour la version anglILR, vol.128,
p. 544. Voir aussi la sentence arbitrale dans la premiè re phase de la même affaire, 17mai 2001, par. 6.8 ( ILR, vol. 128,
p. 488).
21
Voir Affaire de la délimitation de la frontière maritime, entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau , sentence
arbitrale, 14 février 1985, RSA, vol. XIX, p. 149.
22DU, p. 138, par. 7.23.
23DU, p. 119, par. 6.74. - 20 -
21. Pas de ligne de facto, pas de «pattern of conduct» prouvant d’une façon ou d’une autre
un accord entre les deux Parties, ou un acquiescement de la part de la Roumanie concernant d’une
manière quelconque la délimitation maritime. Ceci n’est d’ailleurs guère surprenant étant donné
que la Roumanie a protesté à plusieurs reprises contre ces soi-disant «effectivités» ukrainiennes
empêchant par là-même l’établissement d’un quelconque modus vivendi.
[Fin de la projection.]
22. Madame le président, l’absence d’accord sur lequel les prétendues «effectivités» auraient
pu déboucher les rend donc non pertinentes pour l es besoins de la délimitation maritime. Certes,
chaque différend est unique et connaît ses propres particularités factuelles. Néanmoins, les
précédents que je viens d’évoquer et qui constituen t sans aucun doute une jurisprudence constante,
sont un guide utile et suffisant permettant daffirmer que les «effectivités» dont l’Ukraine se
prévaut sans «dire leur nom» ne constituent certainement pas des «circonsta nces pertinentes» aux
fins de l’ajustement de la ligne provisoire d’équidistance.
23. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour, ceci conclut ma présentation. Je vous
remercie très vivement de votre attention et jvous prie, Madame le président, de bien vouloir
donner la parole à M. Dinescu, qui va continuer la présentation de la Roumanie.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Müller. I now call Mr. Dinescu.
Mr. DINESCU: Thank you very much, Madam President.
XI.U KRAINE ’SA RGUMENT B ASED ON EFFECTIVITÉS
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, you have heard my colleague DanielMüller
who explained the role of effectivités in maritime delimitation as a matter of legal principle. He
showed that the situations in which effectivités may be taken into account in maritime delimitation
are exceptional, the well-established rule be ing that, unlike in land border delimitation, effectivités
are not relevant. Our case is no exception to this established rule.
2. Still, in its written pleadings, Ukraine subm its that what it terms “State activities in the
relevant area” ⎯ in fact, effectivités ⎯ “cannot be ignored and constitu te a relevant circumstance - 21 -
which operates in favour of the continental shelf/EEZ claim line proposed by Ukraine” 24. In spite
of Romania’s arguments regarding the irrelevance of these “State activities” for the present dispute,
Ukraine reiterates its position in its Rejoinder, trying to dismiss Romania’s Reply as being
restricted to “legal arguments and limited atte mpts to pick holes in the evidence filed by
Ukraine” 25.
3. As to legal arguments, I wonder, Madam President, Members of the Court, what would be
the content of the pleadings in a case before the C ourt if not “legal argumen ts”? As to “picking
holes in the evidence”, that again seems appropriate in a legal case, which is decided on the basis of
relevant evidence. But I do have a quibble with “picking holes” ⎯ for Ukraine’s case seems to us
mostly made of holes, so much so that one has to pick the bits of fabric in its case against a
background of irrelevance! Let me explain why.
4. Within the list of State activities which Ukraine considers relevant for the present dispute,
it includes licences granted for sea-bed exploration a nd exploitation within th e relevant area, and
fishing practices in the same area; the latter refer, in fact, not to fishing as such but to naval patrols
by Ukrainian vessels to enforce Ukrainian fishery laws in the area.
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Dinescu, could I ask you to speak a little more slowly for the
interpreters?
Mr. DINESCU: Yes. Yes, of course.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Mr. DINESCU: Notwithstanding the fact that, in any event, effectivités are irrelevant for our
case, I will analyse these matters one by one. However, before doing so, I will refer briefly to two
issues that must be considered when analysin g any State activity in the delimitation area: the
critical date, on the one hand, and the relevance of the 1997 Additional Agreement, on the other.
24
CMU, p. 213 , para. 8.41.
2RU, p. 120, para. 6.75. - 22 -
(a) Critical date
5. The issue of the critical date of the crysta llization of the dispute which is now before the
Court was only briefly referred to in the written pleadings of the two Parties 2. The Agent of
Romania expanded on it yesterday, when assessing the steps taken by Ukraine to artificially
develop Serpents’ Island. Further, my collea gue Daniel Müller explained the significance of
establishing critical dates in disputes, which consists ⎯ to use your own words in the
Nicaragua v. Honduras case ⎯ in
“distinguishing between those acts performed à titre de souverain which are in
principle relevant for the purpose of assessing and validating effectivités, and those
acts occurring after such critical date, wh ich are in general meaningless for that
purpose, having been carried out by a State which, already having claims to assert in a
legal dispute, could have take n those actions strictly with the aim of buttressing those
claims” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute betw een Nicaragua and Honduras in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, para. 117).
6. In his presentation, the Agent of Romania concluded that the critical date in our case is, at
the latest, the date of the exchange of diplomatic correspondence between Romania and Ukraine in
1995 27. He also mentioned that the difference of positions between the two Parties was well
known earlier. In the following minutes I will analyse this question in more detail.
7. One particular aspect of our case is the fact that one Party ⎯ Ukraine ⎯ is the successor
of another State ⎯ USSR ⎯ which, at the time of its disappearance in 1991, was already in
dispute with Romania regarding maritime delimi tation in the Black Sea. Through the dissolution
of the USSR, the dispute regarding the maritime delimitation transformed itself from a
“Romania-USSR” dispute into a “Romania-Ukraine” di spute. In fact, the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and its legal disappearance occurred while the process of negotiations on delimitation was
still ongoing 28. Thus, at the moment of its independence, Ukraine was perfectly well aware that,
among other succession issues, it had “inherited” a maritime dispute with its southern neighbour,
Romania.
8. This is confirmed by the subsequent conduc t of the two Parties. The 1995 exchange of
correspondence, introduced into the pleadings, may I remind you, by Ukraine, is one relevant
2See, for instance, the brief mention of the critical date in RR, p.165, para. 5.106.
27
CMU, Anns. 25 and 26.
2See MR, Ann. 31. - 23 -
29
example. This exchange consists of a Romani an Note Verbale sent to Ukraine on 28 July 1995
and of a Ukrainian response, dated 7 November 1995 30. You may find these notes as tabs XI-1 and
XI-2 in your folders. In its Note, Romania referred inter alia to the Romanian-Soviet negotiations
for the delimitation of the maritime areas in the Black Sea, it defined by geographical co-ordinates
the area which was in dispute, and it also underlined that there was no comprehensive agreement
between those two States on the delimitation of their maritime areas in the Black Sea. From this
Note it can be seen that Romania maintained its claim after the dissolution of the USSR and
assumed that Ukraine, as the successo r of the former Soviet Union, also maintained the Soviet
claim.
9. In its response, dated 7 November 1995, Ukraine, among other issues, assumed ⎯ to use
its own words ⎯ “succession” to what it called the Soviet “title” regarding the continental shelf.
Yet, offering no explanations, Ukraine advanced a delimitation claim that was more than double
the former Soviet claim.
10. It is thus clear from the 1995 exchange that, at that time ⎯ November ⎯ both Parties
were aware of the existence and the scope of their maritime dispute in the Black Sea.
11. Having underlined these elements, I conc lude these short considerations on the critical
date of the dispute, a dispute the existence of which at the moment of Ukraine’s independence was
never contested by either of the Parties, and was in any case confirmed by the 1995 exchange of
Notes.
(b) Relevance of the Additional Agreement
12. Madam President, I turn now to the 1997 Ad ditional Agreement. Romania referred to it
31
in its Reply in relation to the “State activities” in th e relevant area, and concluded that “any
practice occurring after the conclusion of the 1997 Agreement is irrelevant in the present
32
proceedings”. In its Rejoinder, Ukraine did not contest the substance of Romania’s arguments .
29
CMU, Ann. 25.
30
CMU, Ann. 26.
31RR, pp. 248-249, paras. 7.8-7.9.
32RU, p. 121, para. 6.80. - 24 -
Still, I would like to underline two points regarding the relevance of the Additional Agreement with
respect to the State activities introduced into the pleadings by Ukraine.
13. First, by the Additional Agreement ⎯ whose paragraph 4 is included as tab XI-3 in your
folders ⎯ the two Parties clearly recognized in writi ng the existence of a dispute regarding the
maritime delimitation, and set the framework for future negotiations to conclude a delimitation
agreement. However, since this was not the fi rst instance when the dispute between the Parties
regarding the maritime delimitation became apparent ⎯ as I have just demonstrated ⎯ the
Agreement’s provisions regarding the existence of the dispute were a mere confirmation of a
factual situation that had already existed for a long time.
14. Second, the Additional Agreement established, through its paragraph 4 (f), a particular
régime for the activities of exploration and explo itation of the mineral resources in the disputed
area. The language of the text is as follows:
“Until reaching a solution concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf,
the Contracting Parties shall refrain from e xploitation of the mineral resources of the
zone submitted to delimitation, the coordi nates of which shall be established at the
beginning of the negotiations on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.” 33
15. This text says nothing about the exploration of the mineral resources. Both during their
bilateral negotiations and during the present proceed ings, the Parties have been in agreement that
this is to be interpreted as meaning that such activities, i.e. of exploration, are permitted to either of
them. Co-ordinates of the area in dispute that was to be discussed were exchanged at the beginning
of the negotiations, in 1998; this area coincides generally with the area in dispute as resulting from
the different claim lines advanced by the Parties during the present proceedings.
Pa1r6araph (f) of the 1997 Agreement once again recognized expressly the existence of
the maritime dispute. More importantly, the text also established the basis for the conduct of the
two Parties from then on: they agreed to mutually tolerate each other’s exploration activities in the
delimitation area, without prejudice to the final delimitation.
17. Thus, even ignoring the fact that any exploration activities conducted after 1997 would in
any case be after the critical date, they could not prejudge the result of the delimitation: they would
33
MR, Ann. RM 2; also CMU, Vol. 2, Ann. 1. - 25 -
not be the expression of the exercise of sovereign rights by a party, but of tolerated conduct,
mutually agreed upon.
18. As for the exploitation activities ⎯ they were simply and explicitly banned, so their
eventual conduct post-1997 would amount to a breach of the Additional Agreement. As such,
these activities could not be the basis for any right and could not prejudge the final outcome ⎯ ex
injuria non oritur jus.
The PRESIDENT: I am going to have to ask you again. The French interpreter is having to
follow you at a gallop and it is really in your interests that the francophone judges understand well
what you are saying
Mr. DINESCU: I apologize, and I will try to do my best.
19. Madam President and Members of the Court, having clarified these aspects specific to
our case, I turn now to the State activities in the delimitation area, as invoked by Ukraine.
Gas and oil licences
[Slide 1: The disputed area and the Ukrainian concessions]
20. In its pleadings Ukraine states that it “has consistently licensed the exploration of
maritime areas within the areas of continenta l shelf/exclusive economic zone claimed by
Ukraine” 34 ⎯ and I emphasize the word “consistently”. It also states that these areas “ include the
35
Olympiiska, the Gubkina and the Delphin blocks” . But, in fact, Ukraine invokes only these three
instances in which it has licensed oil and gas activities in the delimitation area ⎯ an image of these
three blocks can be seen now on the screen and is also included in your folders, as tab XI-4.
21. All three concessions were granted well after Ukraine’s independence, at times when it
was well aware of the existence of its dispute with Romania ⎯ the Delphin block on
36 37 38
1 October 1993 , Olympiiska in 2001 and Gubkina in 2003 . Ukraine adduced no evidentiary
34RU, p. 126, para. 6.96
35
RU, p. 126, para. 6.96.
36
CMU, p. 213, paras. 8.44-8.46; also Ann. 97, Ukrainian text.
37CMU, p. 214, para. 8.48
38CMU, p. 214, para. 8.51 - 26 -
support regarding activities prior to the dissolution of the USSR (1991) or in the first two years of
its independence, between 1991 and 1993. In fact, no exploratio n, let alone exploitation, of the
areas now in dispute was conducted by Ukraine before 1993.
22. Furthermore, the latter two examples i nvoked by Ukraine represent concessions granted
after the entry into force of the Additional Agreement. As Ukraine admits, albeit in a contradictory
manner, they refer to activities of exploration ⎯ exploitation being forbidden under the Additional
39
Agreement) ; in other words, they were in line with the provisions of the Additional Agreement,
which provided for the possibility of the Par ties undertaking exploration activities and also
specifically recognized the existence of the disput e. Thus these concessions can by no means be
regarded as an expression of the exercise of Ukraine’s sovereign rights in that area.
[End of slide 1]
[Slide 2: the disputed area, the Delphin bl ock and the Romanian concessions as presented by
Ukraine]
23. Regarding the other concession ⎯ the Delphin block, as can be seen now on the screen
(also in your folders at tab XI-5), this block covers only a very limited part of the area in dispute.
Its limits do not even remotely coincide with the Ukrainian claim line. Nor do these limits coincide
with the maximum line of the Romanian concessions as represented by Ukraine . Granting a
licence for this block was not an episode in a longer, continuous Ukrainian, or Soviet, practice.
Consequently, the specific conditions required in or der for the oil and gas licences to be taken into
account in maritime delimitation are not met.
24. Furthermore, contrary to the repeated Ukrainian statements according to which no protest
40
in relation to the grant of this concession was made by Romania ⎯ Romania in fact did protest:
its Note Verbale from 1995, which you may find at tab 1 in your folders, as well as the 1993
aide-memoire to which reference is made in that Note, were triggered by reports about Ukraine’s
intention to grant this concession 4.
39
CMU, footnote 47 at p. 214, RU p. 122, para. 6.81; but see also CMU, p.214, paras. 8.48 and 8.51, where it is
mentioned that the permits in the two areas were granted for “exploration and exploitation”.
40
RU, pp. 120-121, para. 6.78; p. 122, para.6.83; pp.126-127, para.6.96.
41CMU, Vol. 3, Ann. 25. - 27 -
25. In conclusion, the Delphin licence, like the other two, h as no relevance for the present
proceedings.
[End of slide 2]
[Replay of slide 1]
26. Madam President and Members of the C ourt, quite apart from any consideration of
timing or of the particulars of the case, we mainta in that the three examples relied on by Ukraine
completely fail to comply with the conditions that might have rendered them “eligible” for
consideration as relevant for delimitation:
⎯ they do not represent a well-established, constant and uniform practice ⎯ since the first licence
dates from 1993 and was followed by only two others, after some eight years;
⎯ their location does not coincide, even in very rough terms, with the Ukrainian claimed area;
and
⎯ they are not based on, and do not lay the basis fo r, a tacit agreement with Romania. On the
42
contrary, they were protested by Romania .
27. Regarding the Romanian protests in r esponse to the grant of these licences, Ukraine
criticizes the fact that Romania’s diplomatic correspondence, dated after 1997, refers to the
relevant provisions of the A dditional Agreement regarding expl oitation versus exploration of
mineral resources 43. But this is entirely understandable: in fact, it was the Additional Agreement
that regulated the Parties’ conduct regarding oil and gas activities after 1997.
[End of slide 1]
28. Before concluding this part of my intervention dedicated to the gas and oil activities, I
would like to refer briefly to Romania’s practice in this respect. In its written pleadings, Romania
did not say that these activities were relevant for the delimitation. Still, even after our rebuttal of
Ukraine’s position, Ukraine insisted in its Rejoinder that account should be taken of the gas and oil
activities in the maritime area. Under these circ umstances, some Ukrainian statements regarding
Romania’s practice need to be corrected.
[Slide 3: Romania’s activities in the delimitation area]
42
RR, pp. 252-255, paras. 7.21-7.30.
4See RU, p. 125, para. 6.91. - 28 -
29. First, Ukraine considers that Romania’s re view of its own practice is “characterized by
an absence of evidentiary support” 4. This allegation is unfounded. We annexed to our Reply
several examples of seismic profiles taken from different zones in the disputed area. These profiles
resulted from intense Romanian exploration activiti es in the 1980s and 1990s. An illustration of
the area covered by these activities is now on the screen and may be found in your folders at
tab XI-6. We have superimposed on the area covered by the seismic profiles the blocks licensed by
Romania after 1990. As you can see, these blocks represent only a part of Romania’s gas and oil
activities in the Black Sea. And, as you can al so see, the area covered by Romania’s activities
coincides almost perfectly with the area now claimed by Romania.
30. Evidence regarding Romania’s exploration activities in the Black Sea may be found in
specialized publications. Studies published by the well-known Marine Geology magazine refer to
the activities conducted from the 1970s by Romanian State-owned companies such as GeoEcoMar
45
and Petrom . These studies confirm that the area of interest for Romania’s exploration covered
practically all of the area presently claimed by Romania.
[End of slide 3]
31. Madam President and Members of the Court, I turn now to a different issue. Ukraine
implies that the outer limits of the Romanian blocks, licensed in the early 1990s to foreign
companies, somehow form a line beyond which “R omania lacked confidence that it possessed
rights to the continental shelf or Exclusive Economic Zone” 46. This might be very simply
answered by quoting from Ukraine’s Rejoinder: “There is no obligation for a State to issue
licences in respect of all its maritime areas, and it would be premature and commercially
unreasonable for a State to take any steps to license areas that have yet to be identified as
47
prospective.”
44RU, p. 125, para. 6.92; see also p. 125, para. 6.93.
45The Danube submarine canyon (Black Sea): morphology and sedimentary processes, Marine Geology 206
(2004) 249-265; Upper Quaternary wa ter level history andsedimentation in the northwestern Black Sea, Marine
Geology 167 (2000) 127-146, also available onttp://www.geo.edu.ro/sgr/mod/downloads/PDF/Winguth-MarGeo-2000-
167-127.pdf; Messinian event in the Black Sea: Evidence of a Messinian erosional surface , Marine Geology 244 (2007)
142-165, also available onttp://www.elsevier.com/
46RU, pp. 125-126, para. 6.94; see also pp. 12-121, para. 6.78; p.122, para. 6.81.
47Ibid., p. 122, para. 6.82. - 29 -
32. The reality was explained by Romania in its Reply. We conceived the limits of those
blocks in such a way as not to overlap to what Romania thought, at the time, might be the
maximum Ukrainian claim 48. In order to avoid any possible problems, Romania wished to grant
concessions only for those areas that were not claimed by other States ⎯ and it founded this
decision on the state of play in the Romanian-Soviet negotiations, which it assumed would be
“taken over” by USSR’s successor State. It was a course of conduct of the Romanian authorities,
in good faith, to which no other interpretation or meaning can be given.
33. Romania’s 1995 Note Verbale, which is at ta b XI-1 in your folders, further clarifies the
issue:
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs [of Ro mania] reminds that, at the negotiations
with the former USSR, the last round of wh ich was held in 1987, the proposals were
presented with regard to the delimitation, which defined a perimeter approximately
of7,700 sq. km. claimed by both parti es... A gentlemen’s agreement existed
between the two Parties not to carry out ac tivities for exploration and exploitation of
the mineral wealth in the above-menti oned area as long as the agreement on the
49
delimitation of the continental shelf is not concluded.”
34. The area in dispute defined in 1987 a pproximately corresponds, at its south-western
limit, with the outer limit of the Romanian concessi ons. Only in 1995 did it become apparent that
Ukraine claimed more than double the area that its predecessor had claimed. In fact, Romania gave
effect to this gentlemen’s agreement referred to in the 1995 Note, not to carry out exploration and
exploitation activities in the disputed area, as known to Romania at that time, when it confined its
licences to a perimeter in which it thought, bona fide, that its sovereign rights were not contested
by any third party.
35. Such precautionary conduct is normal when States conduct themselves in good faith. It
was also recognized by this Court. Thus, in your recent Judgment in the Nicaragua v. Honduras
case (case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, para.254), you quoted
your earlier finding from the Indonesia/Malaysia case:
“These limits may have been simply the manifestation of the caution exercised
by the Parties in granting their concessions. This caution was all the more natural in
the present case because negotiations were to commence soon afterwards between
48
RR, p. 256, paras. 7.35, 7.36.
4CMU, Vol. 3, Ann. 25; English translation as provided by Ukraine. - 30 -
Indonesia and Malaysia with a view to delimiting the continental shelf.” ( Sovereignty
over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2002, p. 664, para. 79.)
This finding is all the more relevant in our case, since negotiations on the delimitation of the
maritime areas in the Black Sea had been ongoing for more then 30years at the moment of the
granting of the concessions by Romania.
36. In this context, it is surprising what double standards are applied by Ukraine in treating
licences granted by the two Parties in the dis puted area. On the one hand, the Ukrainian
concessions, covering sparse and limited parts of the disputed area, of which only one was licensed
before the conclusion of the 1997 Additional Agreement –– but in any case at a date when Ukraine
was well aware of the existence of the dispute –– and all of which had been the object of protest by
Romania, so the Ukrainian concessions, I say, should apparently count in the delimitation process.
On the other hand, Romania’s activities, covering the whole area in dispute, all of them dating from
before the conclusion of the Additional Agreem ent and before the moment when Romania was
aware of Ukraine’s eventual claim, and none of them protested to by Ukraine, should not count!
37. Nevertheless, we do not claim that the gas and oil practice of the two States is relevant
for this dispute. To quote the Court’s dictum from the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, “oil concessions
and oil wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant circumstances justifying the
adjustment or shifting of the provisional delimita tion line. Only if they are based on express or
tacit agreement between the parties may they be taken into account.” (Case concerning the Land
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp.447-448, para.304.) In the present case
there is nothing even faintly approaching an expr ess or tacit agreement capable to influence the
delimitation. Accordingly, the conclusion is evid ent: the oil and gas practice of the two States
cannot be considered as a relevant circumstance able to influence the delimitation line.
38. Still, just for the record ⎯ the Romanian gas and oil practice is more likely to meet the
criteria for relevance than Ukrain e’s practice, which, beyond the sp ecial régime regulated by the
Additional Agreement, is limited geographically ⎯ to a minor part of the area in dispute,
temporally ⎯ it started two years after Ukraine’s independence, and materially ⎯ it covers only
exploration activities. - 31 -
Naval patrols in the delimitation area
[Slide 4: fisheries surveillance activities in the disputed area, as presented by Ukraine]
39. The second State activity invoked by Ukraine in support of its claims over the disputed
area is represented by the naval patrols of Ukrain ian vessels enforcing Ukrainian fisheries laws. In
50 51
its Counter-Memorial and its Rejoinder , Ukraine refers to 14 incidents which supposedly
occurred in the disputed area, during the cour se of which Ukrainian police vessels supposedly
caught fishermen allegedly involved in illegal fishi ng. As evidence for these incidents, Ukraine
quotes diplomatic correspondence between itself a nd Bulgaria and Turkey, one press release, as
well as seven witness statements of members of the Ukrainian Coast Guard. These incidents are
summarized in Annex 20 of Ukraine’s Rejoinder a nd are schematically presented on figure 6-1 of
the Ukrainian Rejoinder, which is now on the scr een, and which you may find at tab XI-7 in your
folders. All these facts, combined with the a lleged Romanian inactivity in respect to fishing
practices, should ⎯ in Ukraine’s submission ⎯ be regarded as a relevant circumstance enforcing
Ukraine’s case 5.
40. However, Ukraine readily admits that these activities were indeed contested by Romania.
It recognizes that “Romania responded through di plomatic channels that it did not accept the
53
validity of the Ukrainian interim boundary line” and that “Romania has not formally recognized
54
the line communicated by Ukraine in 1995” . That “line” mentioned by Ukraine is,
Madam President and Members of the Court, the claim line communicated by Ukraine to Romania
in November 1995. As you will remember, that Ukrainian Note was preceded by a Romanian Note
dating from earlier that year, and by anot her document from 1993 by which Romania had
communicated to Ukraine its claims in respect of the maritime areas.
41. In fact, not even one incident reported by Ukraine dates from before 1995. In other
words, all incidents are subsequent to the moment that I identified earlier as being at the latest the
critical date. Moreover, all but one of the inci dents occurred also after 1997, when the Additional
50CMU, pp. 216-219, paras. 8.58-8.65.
51
RU, pp. 127-132, paras. 6.97-6.111.
52
CMU, p. 219, para. 8.65 ; RU, p. 132, para. 6.111.
53CMU, p. 217, para. 8.62.
54RU, p. 128, para. 6.102. - 32 -
Agreement was concluded. The affidavits anne xed to Ukraine’s Rejoinder refer to specific
incidents that occurred after 1998. Only one stat ement mentions generally that “between 1991 and
2004, boarding guards ships of the Odessa Force detained approximately 20Turkish poaching
vessels and seven vessels of the Republic of Bu lgaria for illegal fishing in these waters” 55;
however, the individual incidents which are then detailed in the same affidavit are all subsequent to
1997 (the first one is dated 2000). In these circumstances, it is clear that no Ukrainian naval patrol
is relevant for our case, since a ll cases invoked are subsequent to the critical date and all but one
are subsequent to the conclusion of the Additional Agreement. All the naval incidents introduced
by Ukraine are thus irrelevant.
42. Even though this conclusion is straightfo rward, I will very briefly refer to certain
elements put forward by Ukraine in its Rejoinder.
43. My first remark concerns the affidavits relied upon by Ukraine. On several occasions,
the Court has analysed the evid entiary value of affidavits. For instance, in the recent
Nicaragua v. Honduras case, you observed that
“witness statements produced in the form of affidavits should be treated with caution.
In assessing such affidavits the Court must take into account a number of factors.
These would include whether they were made by State officials or by private persons
not interested in the outcome of the pro ceedings and whether a particular affidavit
attests to the existence of facts or represen ts only an opinion as regards certain events.
The Court note[d] that in some cases evidence which is contemporaneous with the
period concerned may be of special value. Affidavits sworn later by a State official
for purposes of litigation as to earlier facts will carry less weight than affidavits sworn
at the time when the relevant facts occurred. In other circumstances, where there
would have been no reason for private persons to offer testimony earlier, affidavits
prepared even for the purposes of litigation will be scrutinized by the Court both to see
whether what has been testified to has been influenced by those taking the deposition
and for the utility of what is said.” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in th e Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment
of 8 October 2007, para. 244.)
44. With these observations firmly in mind, I would simply stress that all statements
introduced by Ukraine appear to have been produced for the specific purpose of being used in these
proceedings; in fact they seem to follow a pre-dr afted model, as if they were forms whose blanks
were filled in by their signatories. All the si gnatories are serving within the Ukrainian navy ⎯ so
they are State officials ⎯ and they do not refer to contemporary facts, but in all instances save one,
55
RU, Ann. 15. - 33 -
to facts which occurred between three and nine years before the date of the affidavit. The probative
force of this evidence should be assessed in the light of these factors.
45. Second, quite simply, the area covered by the incidents does not coincide with the
Ukrainian claimed area; moreover, accordi ng to Ukraine itself, two incidents occurred outside the
disputed area ⎯ as is visible from the figure which is now on the screen.
46. Third, Ukraine in its Rejoinder observed that “it is striking that this section of Ukraine’s
Counter-Memorial [dedicated to fishing practices] prompted the Romanian Embassy in Ankara on
16November 2006 to send a diplomatic Note to th e Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeking
comfort that Turkey had not endorsed the delimitation line claimed by Ukraine” 56 and that “it is
furthermore remarkable that, whereas Romania w as quick to contact the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Romania did not notify the relevant Ukrainian authorities to challenge Ukraine’s
authority to patrol areas in which these incidents occurred” 57. But besides stating that it was struck
by the Romanian démarche to Turkey and observing that the lack of any démarche to Ukraine itself
was remarkable, Ukraine draws no conclusion from these facts.
47. I find it very hard to see any basis on which Ukraine could have been struck or amazed.
It was entirely normal for Romania to approach Turk ey in respect to the unsettled situation of the
Romanian-Ukrainian delimitation, after Ukraine suggested in its Counter-Memorial that Turkey
58
had recognized its claims in the disputed area .
48. As to the supposed absence of any Romanian protest against Ukraine’s activities in
question, this is likewise easy to understand. Ukra ine states that press releases were issued by the
59
Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affair s whenever such incidents occurred . Still, only one such
“press release” (from 1998) was enclosed by Ukraine, as Annex 106 of its Counter-Memorial. We
did not find on the websites of the Ukrainian Minist ry of Foreign Affairs or of any other Ukrainian
institution any press release regarding the incidents mentioned in the pleadings or any other similar
incident ⎯ even though press releases relating to various other issues from the same periods are
56
RU, pp. 130-131, para. 6.107.
57
RU, pp. 130-131, para. 6.107.
58See CMU, pp. 217-219, para. 8.64.
59RU, p.130-131, para. 6.107. - 34 -
available on line. Beyond this lack of publicity regarding these alleged incidents, there was no real
need to protest: Romania’s position regarding the delimitation had been repe atedly and constantly
affirmed during the negotiations that were ongoing at the times these incidents are supposed to
have happened.
49. Finally, Ukraine concludes in its Reply that “the significance of Ukraine’s fisheries
surveillance activities is that Ukraine has carried out these activities within an area that Ukraine has
consistently considered to fall within Ukraine’ s EEZ, and that Romania has tacitly respected by
[the] legitimacy of Ukraine’s activities” 60⎯ I end this quotation from the Ukrainian pleadings.
Frankly, I fail to understand how Ukraine could have considered that that area fell within its EEZ
and how Romania could have tacitly respect ed this, when all these activities happened after the
critical date and all but one occurred in parallel with the process of bilateral negotiations , where
the Parties had put forward their respective claim lines.
[End of slide 4]
Conclusion
50. To summarize, in relation to the State activities conducted in the delimitation area relied
upon by Ukraine, our conclusion is short and simple: neither the oil an d gas concessions, nor the
fisheries practice are relevant for the present disput e. As such, they cannot influence in any way
whatsoever the maritime delimitation between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea.
51. Madam President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention.
Madam President, I would ask you to call on my colleague, Professor James Crawford, to continue
the presentation of Romania.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Dinescu. Professor Crawford, do you want to
make this start now with a break, or would you rather have a clear run after a short pause?
Mr. CRAWFORD: I think it would be conveni ent to speak for about 15minutes, and then
we will have gotten the heat and burden of the day over before the break.
60
RU, p.131, para. 6.110. - 35 -
The PRESIDENT: Yes.
CMRA. WFORD:
XII. R OMANIA S D ELIMITATION L INE
Introduction
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, I have now to explain and justify Romania’s
claim line in some further detail, and to respond to Ukraine’s criticisms of it. This is largely an
exercise of synthesis, pulling together the various strands of argument you have heard over the past
few days. Taken together, these support Romania’ s position that the appropriate approach to the
delimitation involves four steps:
⎯ first, restricting Serpents’ Island to a 12-mile maritime zone ⎯ in fact the “marine boundary
zone” agreed in 1949;
⎯ secondly, constructing a provisional equidistance line in the sector governed by the adjacent
mainland coasts of the Parties and relating that line to the 12-mile line around Serpents’ Island;
⎯ third, constructing a provisional median line as between their opposite mainland coasts; and
⎯ fourth, considering whether the provisional equidistance/median line so drawn requires
adjustment in light of any relevant circumstances.
2. This approach is fully in accordance with the principles contained in Article4 of the
Additional Agreement, which, as the Court will recall, referred to:
⎯ “the principle stated in Article 121 of the Un ited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 . . .” 6;
⎯ [“le principe énoncé à l’article 121 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer du
10 décembre 1982 . . .”];
⎯ “the principle of the equidistance line in ar eas submitted to delimitation where the coasts are
adjacent and the principle of the median line in areas where the coasts are opposite”
61
Additional Agreement, para. 4 (a).
62Ibid., para. 4 (b). - 36 -
⎯ [“le principe de la ligne d’équidistance dans les zones à délimiter lorsque les côtes sont
adjacentes et le principe de la ligne médiane lorsque les côtes se font face”];
⎯ “the principle of taking into consideration the special circumstances of the zone submitted to
63
delimitation” ;
⎯ [“le principe selon lequel les circonstances spéciales de la zone à delimiter doivent être prises
en compte”];
⎯ “the principle of equity and the method of proportionality . . .” 64;
⎯ [“le principe de l’équité et la méthode de la proportionnalité . . .”].
The issues are right, and the order is right.
3. In this presentation I will deal with the first four of those five points; Professor Lowe will
deal with the fifth ⎯ the principle of equity and as it relates to equity, the method of
proportionality. In this speech I will do four things.
⎯ First I will summarize the reasons why Serpents’ Island is to be restricted to a 12-mile
maritime zone and why it does not provide an y base point for the construction of the EEZ
continental shelf line.
⎯ Secondly, I will address the points raised by Uk raine as to the use of the Sulina dyke and
Sacalin peninsula as base points.
⎯ Thirdly, I will discuss point X, and its location: point X is, as you will recall, the point on the
agreed boundary located on the 12-mile arc around Serpents Island, it is the point of departure
for the rest of the maritime boundary.
⎯ Fourthly, I will describe the base points go verning the construction of the provisional
equidistance line based on the adjacent coasts of the Parties, and show you the construction of
that line, with its turning points, before doing the same in relation to the points governing the
median line located on the Romanian and Ukrainian opposite coasts.
⎯ Finally, I will ask whether the boundary so determined requires adjustment in light of any
relevant circumstances.
63
Ibid., para. 4 (e).
64Ibid., para. 4 (c). - 37 -
A. The boundary around Serpents’ Island: a reprise
4. Turning then to the boundary around Serpents’ Island, Romania’s position, you will not be
surprised to hear, is that Serpents’ Island is entitle d to no more than a 12-mile territorial sea, and
that it may not be used as a base point for the construction of the line beyond 12miles. This is
based on a number of considerations, all leading to the same conclusion:
(a) first, there was an agreed boundary around Serpents’ Island, resu lting from the 1949general
and specific procès-verbaux, and confirmed by subsequent agreements. It was thereby agreed
that the State boundary would go around the 12-mil e arc formed by the exterior margin of the
“maritime boundary zone” (“la zone frontière maritime”) “around” or “surrounding” (“qui
entoure”) Serpents’ Island. As a result of those agreements, the areas to the south of that
boundary appertain to Romania, there is no hint in the 1949Agreements or subsequently that
the area to the south is high seas. That understanding of the parties was confirmed by the maps
produced by Romania and the Soviet Union in the years following, as well as by more recent
maps produced by Ukraine itself;
[Slide 1: the effect of Ukraine’s and Romania’s provisional equidistance lines]
(b) secondly, as demonstrated by ProfessorPellet, quite apart from the existence of the agreed
boundary around the island, your jurisprudence and that of other interna tional tribunals shows
that it is appropriate to disregard small insular features disconnected from the mainland in
constructing a provisional equidistance/median line. This is especially so where the feature
would have a disproportionate effect on the provisional equidistance line. That Serpents’
Island would have such a disproportionate eff ect can be seen from the comparison shown on
the screen (which is tabXII-1 in your folders): an isolated feature of 0.17sqkm produces a
difference of 7,000sqkm in the maritime zones ⎯ or to put it another way, every eroding
square metre of the rock generates 40 sq km of maritime zone. In accordance with prevailing
international practice it is appropriate that Serpents’ Island be restricted, at best, to a 12-mile
enclave. Indeed, but for the 1949 Agreement there would have been a good case for giving it
less than that;
[End slide 1] - 38 -
(c) thirdly, as demonstrated by Dr.Aurescu a nd ProfessorLowe, Serpents’ Island generates no
entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusiv e economic zone since it constitutes a “rock”
within the meaning of Article121, paragraph 3, of the 1982 Convention. Ukraine’s frantic
attempts to modify the character of the island ⎯ all of which occurred after the critical date ⎯
demonstrate that Serpents’ Island is incapable of sustaining human habitation or economic life
of its own. If it could do so, there was no need to force it to do so.
Madam President, that would be a convenient moment. I’m about to start on pointX, and
the argument on point X is ⎯ if I may say so ⎯ inseverable, like point X itself.
The PRESIDENT: Yes. The Court will then briefly rise.
The Court adjourned from 11.10 to 11.25 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Yes, Professor Crawford.
CMRA. WFORD:
B. Point X
5. Madam President, Members of the Court, I turn to my second point, the character and
location of point X.
[Slide 2: detail of the chart entitled “Western Pa rt of the Black Sea From Odessa to the Sulina
Mouth”, produced by the Ukrainian State Hydrographic Institution Branch “Ukrmorcartographia”
(2001)]
6. You can see on the screen the all-purpose boundary “surrounding” Serpents’ Island on the
2001 chart produced by Ukraine, which I showed y ou on Wednesday and which is at tab XII-2 in
your folders for this speech. As you can see, the boundary goes around the exterior margin of the
12-mile zone to a point located in the east. But even after that point, the arc is depicted as
continuing all the way around, until it meets the outer limit of Ukraine’s territorial sea generated by
its mainland coast.
7. The compiler of the 2001 Ukraine chart understood the effect of the 1949 and subsequent
agreements. It is for this reas on that the sector of the boundary along the 12-mile arc to the north
of the point at which the boundary changes character is marked using the international symbol for - 39 -
the outer limit of the territorial sea, since to the other side are waters which form indisputably part
of Ukraine’s EEZ.
[End slide 2]
8. Ukraine, of course, makes much of the fact that the terminal point ⎯ the point where the
65
boundary changes character on the 12-mile arc was not defined in the agreements . But the
various charts all depict the boundary running arou nd the “margin” (“la limite extérieure”) and,
where there is room on the chart, they depict it running to a point located to the east of Serpents’
66
Island, and they do so consistently . This is the point we have referred to as point X.
[Slide 3: the construction of point X]
9. In its Reply, Romania demonstrated that point X, as shown on these series of maps,
coincided with the point at which a line drawn from the last agreed point on the Romanian/Soviet
land/river boundary and drawn on a bearing perpendi cular to the closing line across relevant points
on the other side of Musura bay as they were in 194 9, i.e., the small Soviet islet and the outer end
67
of the Sulina dyke . This was depicted on figure RR21 in the Reply, and you can see the process
of construction on the screen now, using an enlargement of the 1957 Soviet chart entitled “Western
Part of the Black Sea” 68⎯ it is at tab XII-3 in your folders.
10. First, a closing line is drawn across the relevant points located at either side of the
Musura mouth, points being as they were at the time. Then from the last point on the land/river
boundary agreed in 1949, border sign 1437, a line is constructed which is perpendicular to the
closing line across the Musura mouth. The point at which that perpendicular line crosses the
12-mile arc constituted by the exterior margin of the “marine boundary zone” corresponds to the
final point of the boundary depicted on the various charts, point X. The co-ordinates of point X as
depicted on those charts can be calculated (45° 14' 20" N, 30° 29' 12" E). Here and in the
remaining part of the speech, I will not speak the co -ordinates but I am grateful to the Registry for
including them.
65RU, para 3.12.
66
MR, para 11.54.
67RR, para 4.97.
68MR, Ann. 16 and MR, Ann. 17. - 40 -
[End slide 3]
11. It may be noted that point X is located some distance to the north of the current mainland
coast equidistance line. This is the result of two fa ctors; first, the extension of the Sulina dyke in
the intervening years, and, second, the fact that the relevant point for construction of the mainland
coasts equidistance line is not the small insular formation located on the Ukrainian coast, but a
point located somewhat further north of the Ukrainian coast located on Cape Kubansky.
12. As a result, it is necessary for the Court to arrive at a solution which joins point X to the
mainland provisional equidistance line. I will return to this shortly. It is in principle a similar
problem to that which the Court faced in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, in a part of the maritime
boundary there.
13. But even if there were no subsequent practi ce of the Parties, even if the charts and maps
relied upon by Romania had never been produced , it remains the case that there had to be a
point X. As soon as you accept that the Parties agreed a 12-mile marine boundary around Serpents’
Island; as soon as you accept that that zone did not stop after a short space around point F ⎯ then,
as a matter of logic, there must be a point from which the boundary running along the exterior
margin of the marine boundary zone would depa rt from this “exterior margin” and join the
mainland coasts provisional equidistance line. The sam e thing is true if you accept the alternative
submissions that Serpents’ Island should be semi-enclaved as a matter of equity or that it is a rock,
under Article 121 (3). On any of those three hypotheses, there must be a point X. Whether or not
point X is located precisely where we propose, it must be located thereabouts.
14. The reason is that the provisional mainla nd-coast equidistance line intersects with the
12-mile arc around Serpents’ Island at a point ve ry close to where the boundary is shown as
terminating, or as changing its character, on the various maps and charts.
[Slide 4: the mainland coasts equidistance line a nd its intersection with the 12-nautical-mile arc
around Serpents’ Island in the region of point X]
15. You can see this from the graphic now on the screen and at tab XII-4 in your folders.
This shows the provisional equidistance line dr awn from points on the Parties’ adjacent mainland
coasts, as they are now. Ukraine accepts that up to the point where Romania’s 12-mile territorial
sea intersects with the 12-mile marine boundary zone around the island ⎯ point F on the - 41 -
graphic ⎯ the marine boundary is settled by agreement. This boundary delimits first internal
waters, then territorial seas, of the two States. Point F marks the agreed starting-point of your
delimitation. Ukraine asserts that it is the same as the innominate and u ndefined endpoint shown
on map 134, but as I have shown you, that is not true. That point is located some distance to the
north-west along the 12-mile arc.
16. Now, setting to one side the practice demonstrating the understanding of the Parties as to
the extent of the agreed boundary line under the 1949 and subsequent agreements, it is obvious that
a mainland coast equidistance line passes through the marine boundary zone around Serpents’
Island, emerging to the east, where it then play s the role of the provisional delimitation line
between the exclusive economic zones and continen tal shelves of the Parties in the remaining
sector governed by their adjacent coasts.
[End slide 4]
[Slide 5: Ukraine’s north-west facing coast looking on to Karkinits’ka Gulf]
17. Let me contrast this with Ukraine’s case. The graphic you can see on the screen is at
tab XII-5 in your folders. Ignoring the clear effect of the 1949 and subsequent agreements, as well
as the applicable rules of international law re lating to maritime delimitation and the express
provision of Article 121 (3), Ukraine argues that base points on Serpents’ Island should be used for
the construction of a provisional equidistance line. As a consequence, on Ukraine’s approach,
Serpents’ Island, as it were, concentrates within itself all the potentialities of Ukraine’s distant but
still allegedly relevant coastline. And this is so ev en in relation to portions of the coast that do not
even face onto the area of the delimitation. For example, the north-west-facing coast looking on to
Karkinits’ka Gulf ⎯ which we have called segment7, which is shown as a relevant coast in this
graphic ⎯ that has effect through a projection from Serpents’ Island. That north-west-facing coast
somehow manages to do a sharp U-turn, to leap westwards more than 100 miles, and to empower
Serpents’ Island ⎯ this tiny spot ⎯ to project itself much further to the south, occluding much of
Romania’s coastal frontage. But in this semi-enc losed sea, Serpents’ Island is in no relevant
coastal relationship to that or most of the rest of Ukraine’s allegedly relevant coast. Serpents’
Island acts as a focus for coasts which do not face it, which do not relate to it and which are a long - 42 -
distance away. That is an inadmissible proce dure. But Ukraine has provided no other basis on
which its line can be constructed than the basis of this focal point of Serpents’ Island.
[End slide 5]
[Slide 6: the maritime boundary in the region of point X]
18. By contrast Romania’s position is in lin e with normal procedures of delimitation. As
shown in tab XII-6 in your folders, in this sector of adjacent coasts you draw a provisional
equidistance line from relevant base points. Since there is only one island here and ⎯ for the
reasons we have given ⎯ it should be discounted. The provisional equidistance line is drawn from
points on the mainland coast.
19. Given the clear language of the 1949 a nd subsequent agreements, the delimitation
beyond the agreed boundary commences from point X, wherever precisely you decide to locate it.
Accordingly, it is necessary for th e Court to identify an appropriate solution joining point X to the
mainland coasts provisional equidistance line. We ha ve put forward our case as to how to do that:
this involves the construction of a line joinin g pointX to a point on the mainland provisional
equidistance line, located approximately half of the distance between pointX and where the
opposite coast of Crimea comes into play, that is, point T. This intermediate point we have referred
to as point Y, and you can see it on the screen.
20. If there had been no practice of the Par ties demonstrating that the all-purpose boundary
extended as far as pointX–– due east–– the process might have been simpler, but it would not
have been very different in the result. All th e Court would have needed to do was to start the
delimitation beyond the agreed boundary, from th e point at which the provisional mainland
equidistance line intersected with the 12-mile arc around Serpents’ Island and then to follow the
equidistance line.
[End slide 6]
C. Ukraine’s criticism of Romania’s base points
21. Madam President, Members of the Court, I come to my third poin t: Ukraine’s criticism
of the construction of the provisional equidistance line. - 43 -
22. In its Counter-Memorial, Ukraine critici zed the fact that Romania used “a man-made
feature” 69 for the construction of its provisional equidi stance line, and that it used “artificial base
points on Romania’s side represented by the seawardmos t extension of an artificial structure, the
70
Sulina Dyke” . It then proceeded to show what the equidistance line would have been if both
Serpents’ Island and the Sulina dyke were ignored 71.
23. But as a matter of international law, the tw o issues are completely distinct; they cannot
be traded off in this way. You cannot trade off coastal base points and offshore islands as if they
were eiusdem generis. And, in fact, Ukraine did use the b ase point located on the Sulina dyke in
72
order to construct its “strict” provisional equidistance line which uses Serpents’ Island .
24. The same approach was continued in Ukraine’s Rejoinder. There, Ukraine states that:
“Even though Sulina Dyke is an artificial structure that does not actually form
part of Romania’s coast, Ukraine has accepted that it provides one set of base points
for the plotting of the provisional equidi stance line because the Dyke forms part of
73
Romania’s baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured.”
74
It adopts a similar approach to this in relation to the Sacalin peninsula .
[Slide 7: Ukraine’s provisional equidistance line compared with Ukraine’s claim line]
25. But these grudging concessions cost Ukraine very little. As you can see from the
projection now on the screen–– which is at tab XII-7 in your folders–– having constructed its
all-points provisional equidistance line, Ukraine’s ap proach is that that provisional line should be
“rotated” further to the south in order to obtain an “equitable” result by reference to a “coastal
ratio”, determined on the basis of the proportion of the area allocated to each of the Parties
compared to the proportion of what Ukraine claims to be the lengths of their relevant coasts.
26. I leave to one side for the moment Uk raine’s mistaken appro aches to identifying the
relevant coasts, which I dealt with the other day. I would only point out –– and you will search in
vain for any explanation of this point in Ukra ine’s written pleadings–– that as you can see, its
69CMU, para. 4.13.
70
CMU, para. 4.14.
71
CMU, fig. 4-2.
72See, e.g., CMU, fig. 9-2; cf. CMU, paras. 7.90, 9.23.
73RU, para. 5.15; see also para. 4.68.
74RU, para. 5.16. - 44 -
claimed boundary is not an exact rotation of its a ll-points equidistance line. Rather, except for the
kink in the initial section, the turning point of which seems to have been arbitrarily chosen, it
essentially follows an azimuth and bears little re lation to the “strict” all-points provisional
equidistance line. On this approach, the provisiona l equidistance line, whatever points are used to
construct it, plays little role.
[End slide 7]
27. But, however this may be, the Court has to delimit the maritime boundary in accordance
with international law, not a devised system of arithmetical proportions, not a geometrical exercise
performed on a cartographer’s desk, and I will sh ow you that Romania is indeed justified under
international law in using its coastal base points.
[Slide 8: satellite photo of the Sulina dyke]
28. On the screen and at tab XII-8, you can see a satellite photograph of the Sulina dyke as it
was in 2006. It is a permanent harbour work of some respectable antiquity. Construction
commenced in 1856, at the outset of the work of the European Commission of the Danube –– the
Court will be pleased to see something related to the European Commissi on back. It has been
progressively extended since to deal with the progressive deposition of silt from the Danube. The
dyke is part of the harbour works of Sulina, which you can see on the screen; it provides the main
75
navigational channel from the Black Se a to that harbour and to the Danube . It is fully integrated
with the mainland coast of Romania.
29. In fact, it is becoming more integrated. You will notice on the screen the sand island to
the north of the Sulina dyke, just a few hundred metres back from the eastern extremity of the dyke.
That feature was not there in 1949 or in 1974; it is new and as yet has no name –– perhaps after
this case it will be called “insula haga” (?) or “ostrov haga” (?) depending on which side of the
boundary it is on! It is cut by the agreed te rritorial sea boundary, which we have added to the
satellite photograph. Even if the Sulina dyke was not there, there would be a Romanian base point
on that sand island. But you can see in the aggrad ation of the coastline and the development of
75
RR, para. 3.69. - 45 -
such features the reason for the progressive extension of the Sulina dyke protecting the navigable
channel.
30. The fact that the dyke is “man-made” is neither here nor there; its use as a base point is
in accordance with Article 11 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which provides:
“[f]or the purposes of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour
works which form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as forming part
of the coast”
[“[a]ux fins de la délimitation de la mer territoriale, les installations permanentes
faisant partie intégrante d’un système portu aire qui s’avancent le plus vers le large
sont considérées comme faisant partie de la côte”].
Of course, both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone are measured from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
[End slide 8]
31. That full effect may be given to harbour works as base points was confirmed in the
Dubai v. Sharjah Award. There, the Tribunal referred to Article 8 of the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea, and to the 1980 draft of what would become Article11 of the 1982 Convention,
and stated that:
“there is a body of practice, and of conventional law, in which full effect has been
given to harbour works in the constructi on of frontal maritime boundaries as between
opposing States. The same principles apply to the construction of lateral maritime
boundaries as between adjacent States as to the construction of frontal maritime
boundaries between opposing States.” 76
Dubai v. Sharjah was, of course, a lateral or adjacent coast situation.
32. In 1997, Romania deposited a list of the co-ordinates of the baselines from which its
territorial sea is measured with the Secretary- General in accordance with Article16 of the
1982 Convention 77. That list included a base point located on the outer end of the Sulin
a dyke, as
well as specifying a point located on the Sacalin pe ninsula. No State raised any question or
objection to that list.
76
Boundary Dispute between Dubai and Sharjah (Emirate of Dubai v. Emirate of Sharjah) , Award of
19 October 1981, 91 ILR 543, at 662-663.
7RR, Ann. 3. - 46 -
33. Finally, I note that Ukraine accepted the use of Sulina dyke as a base point, for the
purposes of the 2003 Treaty, which established th e position of the final point of the maritime
78
boundary separating the Parties’ territorial seas .
[Slide 9: satellite photos of the Sacalin peninsula and Serpents’ Island seen from the same altitude]
34. I turn to Ukraine’s criticism of the use of Sacalin peninsula as a base point. It mentions
that the peninsula “is a sand spit (which was previously a small island) with no human habitation or
79
economic activity of its own” . But, as you can see from the satel lite image on the slide, which is
at tabXII-9 in your folders, the Sacalin peninsula constitutes an integral part of Romania’s
mainland territory 80. And in the end, Ukraine expressly accepts that it is a valid base point . 81
35. Incidentally, in the quotation which I have just read to you from the Rejoinder, Ukraine
refers to a small island “with no human habitation or economic activ ity of its own”. That is a
helpful quotation in its own way; it is a good description of Serpents’ Island, omitting its rocky
character. By contrast, the Sacalin peninsula, to which Ukraine applies that description, is 12 km in
length, and 3.5 sq km in area ⎯ about 20 times the size of Serpents’ Island –– and, of course, it is
part of the coast. You can see we have superi mposed Serpents’ Island on the satellite photo as it
would appear at the same altitude. We do not think that the analogy applies, but in the
circumstances, we are grateful for Ukraine’s refe rence to a small island w ith no human habitation
and economic life of its own.
[End slide 9]
D. The construction of the provisional equidistance/median line
36. Madam President, Members of the Court, I come to the construction of the provisional
equidistance/median line.
[Slide 10: the construction of the equidistance line in the sector of adjacent coasts]
37. On the screen, you can now see the gene ral area relevant to this portion of the
delimitation. This is tab XII-10 in your folders. The territorial sea boundary out to point F and the
78RR, para. 53.
79
RU, para. 5.16.
80RR, para. 3.68
81RU, para. 5.16. - 47 -
agreed boundary along the 12-mile arc is shown. I recall the relevant coasts for this segment of the
boundary are, on the Romanian side, the coast down to the Sacalin peninsula, and on the Ukrainian
side, the coast up to point S.
38. As for the construction of the equidistance line in this sector, the relevant points are
⎯ on the Romanian side, the end of the Sulina dyke [45° 08' 42" N, 29° 46' 20" E];
⎯ on the Ukrainian side, Cape Kubansky [45° 19' 31" N, 29°45' 58" E], which governs the
equidistance line in the initial portion, and Cape Burnas [45°50'40"N, 30°12'00"E], which
82
governs the equidistance line from the point which Romania has referred to as point D .
39. You can now see the construction of the equidistance line based on the mainland
adjacent coasts on the screen. For the sake of clarity, and given that no eff ect is to be given to
Serpents’ Island for this purpose, Serpents’ Island is temporarily removed.
40. The equidistance line is shown as running all the way out from the coast. Initially it is
governed by the point on the end of the Sulina dy ke and Cape Kubansky on the Ukrainian side.
From the turning point, point D 83[45°12'10"N, 30°59'46"E], the controlling point is Cape
Burnas and the line then proceeds until it reaches the tripoint, point T [45° 09' 45"N, 31°08' 40" E].
The tripoint is equidistant from the Sulina dyke, Cape Burnas, and the point located on the opposite
Ukrainian coast at the westernmost tip of Cape Tarkhankut. From this point, the line becomes a
median line between opposite coasts. 84
[End slide 10]
[Slide 11: The maritime boundary in the area of Serpents’ Island]
41. Madam President, Members of the Court, I explained earlier the location of point X, that
is slightly to the north of the mainland coast equidistance line. The slide now on the screen
demonstrates how it is to be joined to the provisional equidistance line. This and subsequent slides
are at tab XII-11. First let us focus on the immediate vicinity of Serpents’ Island, and restore
Serpents’ Island as well as the 12-mile arc around to point X. As I mentioned earlier, obviously,
the 12-mile arc must intersect with the mainland coasts equidistance line at some point. The
82MR, paras 11.65-11.66; cf. MR, Ann. 27, point 2.
83
MR, para 11.74.
84MR, para 11.74. - 48 -
existence of point X in this vicinity is a necessary consequence of the location of Serpents’ Island
close to the mainland coasts equidistance line; its position, if it had not already been agreed, would
be a function of the construction of the equidistance line, and its intersection with the 12-mile arc.
42. In its pleadings, Romania argued that joining point X with the provisional equidistance
line by the shortest possible course, a line perpendi cular to the equidistance line, would not lead to
an equitable solution, as it would create a tiny sliver of Romanian maritime area surrounded by,
except on its south side, areas appertaining to Ukraine 85. In these circumstances, the appropriate
course is to draw a line to another point, point Y.
43. Point Y [45° 11' 59" N, 30° 49' 16" N] is located on the mainland coast provisional
equidistance line, practically equidistant between the point at which the equidistance line intersects
86
the agreed boundary on the 12-mile arc and point T .
87
44. As noted in the Memorial, the area enclosed in this triangle is approximately 68 sq km .
45. That area equates to the maritime area which was lost to Romania by agreeing in 1949
that, rather than proceeding on the basis of equi distance, Serpents’ Island would be accorded the
88
full 12-mile maritime boundary zone .
46. Ukraine in its Counter-Memorial objected that the location of point Y was “mysterious”,
89
and further that it amounted to “compensation” and an attempt to obtain “distributive justice” . As
to the first point, the location of point Y is anything but mysterious ⎯ it is a response to the need to
take account of the understanding of the Parties as to the effect of the previous agreement, and the
location of point X, as well as the principle that, in the absence of relevant circumstances, further
90
departure from the equidistance line is not justified . As for the allegation that Romania is seeking
to obtain some form of “distributive justice”, Ro mania merely noted the correlation of the areas in
91
question as a fact to be borne in mind when considering the overall equity of the situation .
85
MR, para 11.68-11.71; RR, paras 8.33.
86
MR, para 11.71.
87
MR, para 11.72.
8MR, para 11.72.
8CMU, paras 4.16-4.18.
9RR, para 8.34.
91
RR, para 8.36 - 49 -
[End slide 11]
[Slide 12: Romania’s claim line in the sector of adjacent coasts]
47. Madam President, Members of the Court, the slide now on the screen ⎯ this is
tab XII-12 ⎯ shows the entirety of Romania’s claim line in the sector based on adjacent coasts out
to the tripoint.
[Slide 13: The construction of the median line in the sector of opposite coasts]
48. Madam President, Members of the Court, I turn to the sector where the Parties’ coasts lie
in a relation of oppositeness. As I explained on Tu esday, and as shown in tab XII-13, the relevant
coasts are the whole of Romania’s coast, all of which projects onto the delimitation area, and the
Ukrainian coast south of Cape Tarkhankut down to Cape Sarych.
49. The relevant points governing the provisional equidistance line between the opposite
coasts are:
⎯ on the Romanian side, the eastern end of the Sulina dyke [45° 08' 42" N, 29° 46' 20" E], and
92
⎯ the south-eastern point of the Sacalin peninsula [44° 47' 21" N, 29°32' 55" E] ;
⎯ and on the Ukrainian side, the westernmost ti ps of Cape Tarkhankut [45°20'50"N,
32° 29' 43" E], and
⎯ Cape Khersones [44° 35' 04" N, 33° 22' 48" E] 93.
They identify themselves readily.
50. Using these points, the median line commences at point T, and proceeds in a general
southerly direction to a turning po int [44° 35' 00" N, 31° 13'43"E] at which point it ceases to be
governed by the end of the Sulina dyke, and is g overned by the Sacalin peninsula on the Romanian
side. From there it continues broadly southwards to the turning point [44° 04' 05" N, 31° 24' 40" E]
at which the median line governing point on the Ukra inian side changes to Cape Khersones. From
that point it continues again, in a broadly southwards direction until it reaches a point we have
described as point Z [43° 26' 50" N, 31° 20' 10" E], the last point in our alphabet 94.
92
MR, para. 11.78.
93
MR, para. 11.79; and Ann. MR 27, points 14 and 19.
94MR, para. 11.80. - 50 -
51. Point Z is located at a point approxim ately equidistant from the Romanian, Ukrainian
and Turkish coasts: it is located slightly farthe r from the Bulgarian coastline. It approximately
coincides with point L, which was agreed as the final point in the Soviet/Turkish Agreement, and
95
point10, which was similarly agreed in the Bulgarian/Turkish Agreement , both of which my
colleague Mr. Dinescu has already described. Draw ing the line as far as point Z will therefore not
affect the rights of other Black Sea States. Although the Court can always use its customary arrow
to avoid difficulties in that regard.
[End slide 13]
[Slide 14: the maritime boundary between Romania and Ukraine]
52. On the screen you can now see both th e provisional median line and the provisional
equidistance line using the relevant coasts — this slide is at tab XII-14.
E. The absence of any relevant circumstances necessitating adjustment of the
provisional equidistance/median line
53. Madam President, Members of the Court, finally I must address the question whether
there exist any relevant circumstances which call fo r an adjustment in the provisional equidistance
line that I have just described.
54. On this issue I can be succinct — for once, you may say! First of all, my colleagues have
already dealt with the subject in some detail in th e preceding days. Secondly, the fact is that there
are no relevant circumstances which require an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line, but
for the presence of Serpents’ Island, whose conse quences we have already analysed in detail.
Other factors which might be considered to cons titute relevant circumstances support maintaining
the provisional equidistance line unchanged.
55. Ukraine relies on four circumstances as bei ng “relevant” in this regard. The first, the
“coastal geography” and Ukraine’s geographic pr edominance in the relevant area, is, as
ProfessorPellet has explained, an attempt to double count the geography which is already taken
into account in the construction of the line itself.
95
MR, para. 11.81. - 51 -
56. The next two “relevant circumstances”— the “effectivités” that are invoked by
Ukraine — the “effectivités” supposedly constituted by the gas and oil activities and their supposed
action in relation to illegal fishing, are, as demonstr ated by my colleagues this morning, irrelevant.
Even if proved to their full extent, which they have not been, they would not entail or even imply a
tacit agreement as to the course of the boundary. In fact, almost all of them occurred after the
critical date.
57. The fourth “relevant circumstance” relied on by Ukraine is, of course, the comparative
distance in the relevant coastal lengths of the Parties. This issue will be taken up by
Professor Lowe in a moment. But I would limit myself to making two brief observations:
(a) First, Ukraine’s approach in purporting to rely on the entirety of its coasts as relevant for this
purpose is simply wrong. Portions of Ukraine’s coast wh ich lie in no relation of oppositeness
or adjacency to Romania’s coast, which do not proj ect onto the relevant area or are located at a
considerable distance from it, should not be taken into account. I demonstrated this on
Wednesday.
(b) Secondly, and quite apart from the mistaken basis on which Ukraine embarks on its exercise of
comparing the relevant coasts of the Parties, the use it attempts to make of that comparison is
fundamentally flawed. It also contradicts the ju risprudence of the Court. Ukraine wants to use
the comparative length of its relevant coasts as dictating the adjustment of its all-points
provisional equidistance line, so that it comports better with the ratio between the relevant
coasts. This is to apply a quasi-arithmetical process of apportionment, based on a correlation
between the ratio of coastal lengths and the division of the relevant area, an exercise you have
repeatedly condemned. Comparing relevant coastal lengths operates as a check that the
delimitation produced by the earlier process— the well-established process— is not as a
whole disproportionate, and this is part of an asse ssment of the overall equity of the situation.
In other words, comparison of the relevant coasts of the Parties and the division of the relevant
area is a check for the purpose of disproportion, it is not a criterion imposing an arithmetically
proportioned outcome. And, as I have said alr eady, Ukraine proposes no alternative to this
arithmetical exercise based on the advance guard of Serpents’ Island. - 52 -
58. As for the other relevant circumstances which have been discussed by the Parties,
Ukraine denies that the semi-enclosed nature of the Black Sea and the presence of other riparian
States and their maritime boundaries c onstitute relevant circumstances 96. These two
circumstances, however, are interconnected: pr e-existing delimitations are relevant precisely
because of the semi-enclosed nature of the sea. We do not therefore have to get into the argument
whether they would be relevant in the open co ast situation, an issue which arose in the Trinidad
and Tobago/Barbados case, where the coast could not have been more open. The semi-enclosed
nature of the sea is undoubtedly highly relevant to the present delimitation, because it magnifies —
just as Serpents’ Island magnifies— the dispr oportion which Ukraine’s method entails and the
cut-off effect which it has. Far from requiring any adjustment of the provisional line, however,
these factors— the semi-enclosed sea and the general practice of equidistance in this
semi-enclosed sea— militate against any adjustment. They support the conclusion that
equidistance should be adhered to as much as possible.
[End slide 14]
Conclusion
59. Madam President, Members of the Court, I have shown you the relevant points for the
construction of the provisional equidistance line. I have introduced Serpents’ Island into this
equation. I have explained that there exist no ot her relevant circumstances requiring an adjustment
of the provisional equidistance line, and indeed that the relevant circumstances that do exist
militate the other way. The last stage in this process is to ask whether the delimitation that we have
proposed is appropriate: is on the whole equitable as between the Parties. With your permission,
Madam President, Professor Lowe will now address that question.
Madam President, Members of the Court, thank you for your patient attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford. We now call Professor Lowe.
96
CMU, paras. 4.33-4.50, 8.66-8.99; RU, paras. 6.4-6.34. - 53 -
Mr. LOWE: Thank you.
XIII. C HECKING THE E QUITABLE C HARACTER OF THE D ELIMITATION
Introduction
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, you have heard the justification for each
element of Romania’s claimed delimitation line from Professor Crawford. It is common ground
between the Parties that as a matter of law the ultimate test is whether the delimitation line achieves
an equitable solution; and my submissions a ddress the question whether Romania’s line does
indeed produce an equitable solution.
2. The Parties are divided on the question of the precise content of the relevant legal
principles and their application to the facts of this case.
3. It is common ground that it is necessary to decide whether the provisional equidistance
line, after its adjustment to take account of relevant circumstances, has — or has not — produced
an unacceptable disproportionality between the resulting sea areas attaching to each of the
Parties97.
4. There is a consistent line of jurispruden ce, cited in the written pleadings, which indicates
the necessity for this final check on the adjusted equidistance or median line. The necessity derives
from the fact that the analysis pr ior to this stage has had a close focus on particular geographical
features and factors. Adjustments to the provisional equidistance line may have been made; and
while each adjustment might appear reasonable if vi ewed in isolation, the cumulative effect of the
adjustments ⎯ or lack of adjustments ⎯ may be to produce an overall delimitation that does not
satisfy the imperative rule that the end result must be equitable.
5. It is also common ground that any dispropor tionality used to be something to be assessed
by reference to the lengths of the relevant coasts and to the maritime areas ascribed to each Party as
a result of the delimitation.
97MR, Chap. 12; CMU, para. 7.3.
98MR, Chap. 12; CMU, Chap. 10; RR, Chap. 9; RU, Chap. 8 - 54 -
6. That necessarily entails a determination of what the relevant coastline is. It would, for
example, plainly be absurd to take account of the lengths of Russia’s Arctic and Baltic coastlines in
the context of a delimitation in the Black Sea. Th e exercise also plainly entails a determination of
what the overall delimitation area is: otherwise it is impossible to determine how much is ascribed
to each Party.
7. The Parties are agreed that the proper approach to proportionality is a comparison between
the ratio of the lengths of the Parties’ relevant co asts and the ratio of the areas within the relevant
delimitation area which are ascribed to each Party as a result of the provisional delimitation line, as
adjusted by taking account of the relevant circumstances.
8. There is, however, no agreement between the Parties on th e question of what the relevant
coasts and the relevant delimitation area are in this case. Each side has put forward its own view;
and the two views are incompatible.
9. What does one do now? Well, plainly, th e Court cannot arbitrarily choose one or other
view, or arbitrarily choose a third view, on the question of relevant coastal lengths and sea areas.
The decision must be principled and reasoned.
10. The necessity for a principled and reasoned approach flows from th e nature of the task
before the Court. It is worth recalling the words of the Court in the Libya/Malta case (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports1985, p. 39, para. 45):
“the ‘Application of equitable principles is to be distinguished from a decision ex
aequo et bono and as the Court put it in its 1969 Judgment:
‘it is not a question of applying e quity simply as a matter of abstract
justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application
of equitable principles, in accordance with the ideas which have always
underlain the development of the legal régime of the continental shelf in
this field’ (I. C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 85).”
11. Let me deal first with the question of the relevant coasts, and then with the question of
the delimitation area.
12. Professor Crawford has alr eady addressed you on these points, and I shall not repeat his
detailed submissions. I shall highlight some ma tters, and otherwise focus on the question of
checking the equitable character of the line. - 55 -
The relevant coasts
[Slide: the median line between the relevant Romanian and Ukrainian opposite coasts]
13. I should say that all slides which are going to be on the screen are also in your folders,
and this is tab1. As you can see, Romania has included the whole of its coastline between its
boundaries with Ukraine and Bulgaria as its relevant coast. Ukraine appears to object to this 99on
the ground that the “[s]egment of this coast, south of the Sacalin peninsula, has absolutely no effect
on the construction of Romania’s claim line”.
14. As you will see from the map on the screen, which is taken from figure 32 in Romania’s
Memorial, that is indeed true. The base point at Sacalin is closer to the equidistance line than is
any point on the baseline south of Sacalin. Th e coastline south of Sacalin does not control the
location of the equidistance line.
[End slide]
[Slide: the maritime zones generated by the Romanian coast]
15. But the coastline south of Sacalin certainly generates the maritime zones. One might
think of the maritime zones being generated by the coast rather like waves rolling out from ⎯
instead of towards ⎯ the shore. Each part of the overall maritime zone is generated by the section
of coast where the waves roll out, as it were; so that each part of the zone is generated by the
nearest part of the coastline.
16. You will see that the northern area of Romania’s maritime zone is generated by the
Romanian coastline north of Sacalin, and the s outhern area of Romania’s maritime zone is
generated by the Romanian coastline between Cons tanta and the Romania-Bulgaria border. And
obviously, the area of Romania’s maritime zone between the northern and southern parts is
generated by the Romanian coastline between those northern and southern parts of its coast.
17. You may recall the reference in the North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment to “the rights
of the coastal State in respect of the area of c ontinental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation
of its land territory into and under the sea” ( I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 19). It is plainly the
case that the southern part of Romania’s continental shelf is generated by the southern part of
99
CMU, para. 10.12. - 56 -
Romania’s coast. It would be absurd to argue that the southern part is “generated by” the final base
point at Sacalin.
[End slide]
18. The absurdity becomes even clearer if one considers what a base point actually is.
[Slide: the equidistance line between the Romanian and Ukrainian coasts]
You can see that the equidistance line between Romania and Ukraine is created by reference
to two points on the Romanian coast: one on the Sulina dyke, and one on the Sacalin peninsula.
These are the points on the Romanian coastline that happen to be closest to the nearest points on
Ukraine’s coastline. And they are points. In mathematical terms, they are infinitely small points.
But points cannot be compared in the assessment of prop ortionality. It makes no sense at all to
compare ratios of points with ratios of sea areas. It would be a mathematical nonsense.
[End slide]
[Slide: maritime zones are not generated by base points]
19. Indeed, it would be illogical even to tr y to compare base points, because it is not the
points that generate the maritime zones, somehow ra diating out into waters lying in front, to each
side, and even behind, the point, as the figure on the screen now shows. It is the coastline that
generates the maritime zones, as the passage from the North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment,
which is substantially repeated in Article 76 (1) of the Law of the Sea Convention, makes perfectly
clear.
[End slide]
[Slide: the maritime zones generated by the Romanian coast]
As this Court put it in Tunisia/Libya case, the continental shelf ⎯ and the point applies
equally to the EEZ ⎯ lies “in front of their respective coasts” (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 74).
The maritime zone does not radiate out from a single point on the coast: it lies “in front of” (ibid.)
the whole length of the coast. A maritime zone is generated by the coastline along which ⎯
adjacent to which, in front of which ⎯ it lies.
20. Base points are, quite simply, not relevant at all to the generation of the entitlement.
Base points are relevant only to the geometrical task of drawing the provisional equidistance line. - 57 -
21. And that is why it is plainly correct to include the whole of Romania’s coastline as the
relevant coast. It is the whole of the Romani an coastline that generate s Romania’s entitlement to
maritime zones.
[End slide]
Indeed, Ukraine seems to accept this point, as yo u will see from figure 4.9, at page 80 of its
Rejoinder. That figure shows Ukraine’s view of Romania’s coastal projections; and it shows the
zones projecting outwards from the entire length of Romania’s coastline, from the border with
Ukraine in the north to the border with Bulgaria in th e south. It is obvious that it is the projection,
the natural prolongation, of the southern part of the coast which is the basis of Romania’s
entitlement to the southern part of its continental shelf and EEZ. To deny this part of the Romanian
coast the capacity to generate an entitlement in this area would overthrow the fundamental
principles of the jurisprudence that this Court has developed over the last 40 years.
22. Let me turn to Ukraine’s coast.
[Slide: the part of the Ukrainian coast irrelevant for the delimitation with Romania]
Ukraine objects to the exclusion from the relevant coast of that part of its coastline that lies
between point S and Cape Tarkhankut. Why did Romania exclude that part of Ukraine’s coast?
23. The answer is obvious. It is a straightfo rward application, in the context of Ukraine’s
coast, of the principle to which I have already referred. The relevant coast is the coast that
generates the entitlement to maritime zones: th at is, the coast whose projection, whose natural
prolongation, extends over the area in question so as to give the coastal State the entitlement to
maritime zones.
[End slide]
24. Those projections are illustrated on figureRR5, the fold-out page36 of Romania’s
Reply, on which the next few slides are based.
[Slide: the projection of the Ukrainian coast]
That map shows the projection of every segme nt of Ukraine’s coast, from the border with
Romania in the west to Cape Sarych on the Crimean peninsula in the east.
25. The segments have been drawn by simplifying the coast. It is necessary to simplify the
coast in order to arrive at a practical figure for the length of the coastline. As is well known, there - 58 -
is no true answer to the question, how long is a coastline? It all depends on the scale at which one
follows all the sinuosities and indentations in th e coast. Does one lay the measuring tape around
each headland, or around each rock, or around each gr ain of sand? All measurements of coastal
length are simplifications designed to match the practicalities of the task at hand.
26. The drawing of straight lines to represent the coast in this case is an exercise similar to
the drawing of straight baselines around the coast in accordance with Article7 of the
1982 Convention. Article 7, paragraph 3, stipulates that strai ght baselines “must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast”, and the sa me discipline has been
observed by Romania in drawing the segments. Each segment lies between points at which the
general direction of the coast changes.
27. It is, we submit, important that there be a coherence of approach in all areas of maritime
delimitation, and that situations are avoided in which what is regarded as “the coast” for the
purpose of one kind of delimitation exercise, the kind now before the Court, follows a significantly
different course from the coast whose low-water mark or straight baseline system, properly drawn,
would generate a State’s maritime zones.
28. Well, Romania believes that the segments which it has drawn in figureRR5 faithfully
apply those principles, and that their lengths are the relevant lengths for the purpose of the “equity
check”.
29. As Professor Crawford showed you, Uk raine’s segments1 and 2 in the west project
outwards, and extend over the area that is claimed by Romania. Those segments of coast therefore
generate an entitlement to an area of maritime zones which overlaps with the area generated by
Romania’s coast and which therefore needs to be delimited. Those segments of coast should,
accordingly, be taken into consideration as part of the relevant coast.
30. So, too, should segment 8, on the Crimean peninsula between Cape Tarkhankut and Cape
Sarych. It generates a seaward projection which ov erlaps with Romania’s coastal projection; and
it is accordingly a part of Ukraine’s relevant coast.
31. In theory, if a segment were very long, one might ask if the whole segment should be
counted as “relevant coast”, or only part of th e segment. In the present case, however, that
question does not arise, because the whole of segments1 and 2 and of segment8, generate - 59 -
maritime zones which overlap with the maritime zones generated by Romania’s relevant coast. But
to anticipate my next points, no other segments do.
32. Segment 3, which proceeds north-eastwards from pointS to Odessa, projects in a more
northerly direction than segment 2 and its projection does not overlap with the area generated by
Romania’s coast. There is, therefore, no need to delimit the maritime zones generated by
segment 3. Romania has no entitlement to any part of them, and it makes no claim to any part of
them. This segment of Ukraine’s coast should not, therefore, be taken into consideration as part of
the relevant coast for the purposes of the “equitable result” check.
33. The case of segment 4 is a little more complex. The seaward projection of segment4,
eventually overlaps with areas generated by the Romanian coast, if it is extended far enough, as this
map makes clear. But the important point is that wherever these extended projections do overlap,
the points within the area of overlap would be closer to Ukraine’s segme nts1 and 2 than they
would be to Ukraine’s segment 4. And it is theref ore more rational to say, that such areas are the
projections, the natural prolongations, of Ukraine’s segments1 and 2 than that they are the
projections of Ukraine’s segment4. Segments 1 and 2 eclipse the effect of segment 4. That is
what we have called the principle of comparative proximity. That is why Romania has included
segments 1 and 2 but excluded segment 4.
34. The same point can be made in respect of segment 6. By the stage that the projection of
segment 6 comes anywhere near Romania’s projection, the areas in question are closer to Ukraine’s
segments1, and 2, and 8, all of which Romania accepts are part of the relevant coast, than to
segment 6. Segments 1, 2 and 8 eclipse segment 6. And that is why segment 6 is not a part of the
relevant coast.
35. Both segment5, which I skipped over, a nd segment7, project seaward in directions
which make it evident that they can have no rele vance whatever for the delimitation. Any overlap
of their projections is solely with other Ukrain ian waters, not with zon es generated by Romania’s
coastline or claimed by Romania. Ukraine’s segments 5 and 7 are therefore not part of its relevant
coast for the purposes of this delimitation.
36. And as we have said, segment 8, on th e Crimean peninsula generates a projection
overlapping with Romania’s coastal projection, and is clearly part of the relevant coast. - 60 -
[End slide]
37. So, Romania applies the principle that the relevant coast is the coast that generates the
entitlement to maritime zones: that is, the coast whose projection ⎯ whose natural prolongation ⎯
extends over the area in question, which is the area of overlap between the zones generated by the
coasts of the two States, so as to give the coastal State the basis for its claim to the area in question.
38. This analysis yields actual coastal lengt hs of 269.67 km for Romania and 388.14 km for
Ukraine ⎯ a ratio between the Romanian and Ukrainian coasts of 1:1.439. If the simplified
“segment” lines are used, Romania’s coastal length is 204.90 km, and Ukraine’s 292.63 ⎯ a ratio
of 1:1.428.
39. I should make three points about Ukraine’s position on the relevant coasts, to emphasize
the points made earlier by Professor Crawford. Ukraine’s position is illustrated in its Rejoinder.
[Slide: the relevant Ukrainian coast and its projection, according to Ukraine]
You can see on the screen Ukraine’s figures4- 1, depicting its relevant coast, and 4-4,
depicting the projection of its coastal front.
40. First, to focus on the right-hand chart, you will notice that the coastal fronts which
generate Ukraine’s claimed maritime zones depart markedly from the general direction of the coast.
The 160 km line between Odessa and Karkinits’ka Gulf, for example, lies around 35 km ⎯ about
19 nautical miles ⎯ from the coast in its western part. These straight coastal frontages do not
simplify the coast: they positively distort it.
41. Second, the projections from these coasts become relevant by overlapping with
Romania’s coastal projections; but Ukraine can ac hieve this only by having projections which
radiate out from the ends of the lines marking th e coastal front. The areas projected from those
lines do not, to use the Court’s term, “lie in front” of the coastal frontage: they spill out sideways,
southwards, making angles of up to 140°.
42. Third, even on Ukraine’s account as pres ented in its figure4-4, the coastline in
Karkinits’ka Gulf, immediately north of the Cr imean peninsula, has no relevant projection
whatever. Yet, Ukraine’s figure 4-1, on the left, s hows that the whole of that coast is counted by
Ukraine as relevant coast. - 61 -
43. It is for these reasons that Romania submits that Ukraine’s account of its relevant coasts
lacks a rational and principled basis.
[End slide]
44. I turn now to the question of the relevant area.
The relevant area
45. The relevant area is the area of overlapping entitlements of the Parties 100. And it is
important to appreciate that it is the overlapping entitlements, and not the overlapping claims, that
defines the area: and a moment’s thought will show why.
46. First, the area of overlapping claims has no objective existence. It is purely subjective.
It is subjective because a State can make whatever claim it chooses, no matter how implausible
others might consider that claim to be.
[Slide: graphic representing States with opposite coastlines of the same length]
47. The point can be illustrated simply. If we take two States, A and B, with coastlines of
equal length facing each other and, say, 200 miles apar t: State A claims the waters out to a point a
few miles on the far side of the median line. State B claims all of the waters extending 80 per cent
of the way across to State A, far across the me dian line. The Court follows the established
procedure and first draws a provisional median line, and then, there being no special circumstances
that call for any adjustment of the median line, applies the proportionality test to check that the
result is equitable.
48. If the Court compares the ratio of their coastal lengths with the ratio of the waters that are
ascribed to each State within the area of overlapping claims, it will find a coastal length ratio
of 1:1. But it will find that, say, 90 per cent of the area of overlap between the two claims has been
given to State A. That appears at first sight to be wholly disproportionate.
49. But it is not at all disproportionate. The equidistance line quite obviously produces a
perfectly equitable, proportionate delimitation. It is a paradigmatic case. It may give 90 per cent of
the area of overlapping claims to State A; but it gives 50per cent of the waters between the two
100
Reply, para. 3.85. - 62 -
States to each State. Why should the Court shift the provisional equidistance line because there is a
disproportionate division of the area of overlapping claims?
50. If State B claimed a greater or lesser extent of the waters, the ratio of areas produced by
the provisional equidistance line within the area of overlapping claims would obviously change.
But would that mean that the equitableness of the result changes, even though the provisional
equidistance line remains the same throughout?
51. The fallacy is clear. In looking at the area of overlapping claims, one is looking at the
wrong thing.
[End slide]
52. The correct approach ⎯ and the only rational approach ⎯ is evident if one recalls the
fundamental principle ⎯ that each segment of the relevant co astline must be permitted to generate
its own maritime zones. Those zones will extend up to the proper delimitation line: they cannot go
further without encroaching upon the areas that prop erly belong to the other State. But the coast
generates all of the waters up to that delimitation line, not only the waters that happen to fall within
the limits of an arbitrary overlapping claim made by another State.
53. That is the approach that this Court has adopted, for example in the Tunisia/Libya case,
where it defined the area in which the Parties sought the delimitation of “the continental shelf in
front of their respective coasts” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 74) in terms of the area
of overlap between areas “which can be consider ed as lying off the Tunisian or off the Libyan
coast” (ibid.).
54. So, one looks at the whole of the zones gene rated by the coast. The relevant area is the
area that is to be delimited. That must, obviou sly, in general terms include the area where the
zones projected from the two coasts overlap.
55. But because the aim of delimitation must, in Romania’s submission, be that each
segment of the relevant coast is permitted to ge nerate its own maritime zones, up to the proper
delimitation line.
56. Because in principle, each State generates an entitlement that reaches all the way from
the coast, right up to the coastline of the neighbouring State. It follows that what must be counted
is the full extent of those waters that each segment of the coast generates. That includes both the - 63 -
waters that lie within the area of overlapping claims, and also the areas, typically closer to shore,
which each State believes indisputably belong to the other State, and to which it makes no claim.
57. So in short,
(a) the relevant coasts are derived from the simplified lines representing the coastlines, divided into
segments to mark major changes in the direction in which the coast faces;
(b) all segments of the coast that generate waters which wholly or partly overlap with waters
generated by the coasts of the other Party are relevant coasts; and
(c) the relevant area is the area of waters generated by the relevant coasts. More precisely, the
relevant area means all of the waters generated by projections from the relevant coasts, whether
or not claimed by the other State.
58. That is the approach that Romania has adopted.
[Slide: the relevant coasts and the relevant area]
Professor Crawford explained the boundaries of the relevant area to you. It includes the
areas generated by the relevant Ukrainian segments, 1, 2, and 8. It excludes, in the north, the areas
generated by the other segments, which do not prod uce overlapping entitlements. In the south, it
runs along the hypothetical equidistance line between Romania and Bulgaria, then along the
median line between Romania and Turkey, and fina lly follows the Ukrainian-Turkish boundary as
far as the meridian passing through Cape Sarych, wh ich is the final point on Ukraine’s relevant
coast at the southern end of segment 8. And it excludes the tiny triangle in the extreme south-east
corner which lies more than 200 miles from Romania
59. Romania submits that the relevant delim itation area is, accordingly, that now illustrated
on the screen. And it has an area of 86,050.3 sq km.
[End slide]
Proportionality
60. That brings me to my final point: the proportionality check itself. That is a convenient
name for it, although, as the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case put it, “it is - 64 -
disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality which is the relevant criterion or
101
factor” .
61. Though that point is common ground between the Parties, it is worth emphasizing it. As
a consistent line of jurisprudence makes clear, it is certainly not the case that a Court should design
a delimitation so as to give to each of the Par ties a share of the waters in question that is
proportionate to their relative coastal lengths, so that if State A has a relevant coastline 40miles
long and the relevant coast of State B is 60 mil es long, State A should have about 40 per cent and
State B about 60 per cent of the waters. That is not the role of what is called the “proportionality
check” or “proportionality test”.
62. The proper approach is clear. As the Tribunal said in the Eritrea/Yemen case, “the
principle of proportionality . . . is not an independent mode or principle of delimitation, but rather a
test of the equitableness of a delimitation arrived at by some other means” 102. The Tribunal draws
a provisional equidistance line; it adjusts it to ta ke account of any relevant circumstances; and
then it checks to see whether the adjusted line produces an equitable result. If one State’s share of
the area is grossly disproportionate to its share of the combined lengths of the relevant coasts of the
two States, the result might be thought inequitable and to call for further correction (see Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp. 67-69, paras. 66-69).
[Slide: The division of the relevant area between Romania and Ukraine by Romania’s claim line]
63. In this case, the lengths of the relevant coasts of the two States, determined as I have
described, are in a ratio of approximately 1:1.4 ⎯ i.e., the relevant Ukrainian coast is 1.4 times as
long as the relevant Romanian coast, and the figures are set out in paragraphs 12.6 and 12.7 of our
Memorial.
64. We have described how the relevant ar ea was determined; and we have described how
the maritime boundary should be determined, on the basis of the existing agreements between
Romania and Ukraine and of the application of established principles of international law
concerning maritime delimitation.
101
RR, para. 9.5.
102
Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, Second Stage: Maritime Delimitation, award dated 17 December 1999, para. 165. - 65 -
65. The boundary line so determined divides the relevant area between Romania and Ukraine
in the ratio of 1:1.7 ⎯ that is, Ukraine gets 1.7 times as much of the relevant area as does Romania.
One might say that this favours Ukraine, given that the coastal length ratio is not 1.7:1 but 1.4:1.
But Romania accepts that this result is within the range of “not disproportionate” results.
66. Romania accordingly submits that the boundary line quite clearly satisfies the
proportionality check. For example, in the Eritrea/Yemen case, the Tribunal found that the coastal
lengths were in a ratio of 1.31:1, and the maritime spaces in a ratio of 1.09:1, and that this was not
disproportionate 103. The “disproportion” in Eritrea/Yemen was about one fifth ⎯ the area ascribed
to Eritrea was about four fifths of what might have been expected if the respective maritime spaces
were strictly proportionate to the respective lengths of the relevant coastline.
67. In the Tunisia/Libya case, this Court ascribed about 60 per cent of the area to Tunisia
and 40 per cent to Libya, whereas their coastal lengths were in the proportions of about 69 per cent
to 31 per cent (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91, para. 131).
68. But the ratios in the present case are even closer to strict proportionality. Ukraine, on the
approach that I have described, would gain something like 105 per cent ⎯ one twentieth more ⎯
than it might expect if the maritime spaces were strictly proportionate to the relevant coastal
lengths. This is well within the limits of what has been regarded as “not disproportionate” by
international tribunals; and the line needs no correction in order to achieve an equitable result.
[End slide]
No cut-off
69. There are two other matters that I must deal with briefly: the principle of non-
encroachment or no-cut-off, and the question of security.
[Slide: graphic illustrating the cut-off effect]
70. Some tribunals have emphasized the need to ensure that one State’s maritime zones do
not cut off, or encroach upon, those of another. This diagram shows the situation which must be
10Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration , Second Stage: Maritime Delimitation, award dated
17 December 1999, para. 168. - 66 -
avoided. Equidistance lines drawn at State B’s boun daries with States A and C, result in State B’s
entitlement being cut off. It is similar to the North Sea Continental Shelf situation.
[End slide]
[Slide: the lack of cut-off effect as a result of Romania’s claim line]
71. In the present case, as the Court will see from the displayed map, it is very clear that
Romania’s claim does not cut off the natural prolongation of Ukraine’s territory. Romania’s line is
essentially an equidistance line constructed from th eir respective coasts, with the addition for
Ukraine of the “Serpents’ Island semi-circle” resulting from the 1949 Agreement. There is no
encroachment or cut-off.
Economic and security interests
72. Some earlier delimitation judgments have re ferred also to the need to ensure that the
delimitation, which the Court has in mind, does not imperil a State’s security interests or threaten
catastrophic consequences for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the
countries concerned.
73. But there is no evidence at all to suggest that the delimitation advanced here would
adversely affect Ukraine’s security or lead to any such catastrophic consequences; and Ukraine has
not suggested otherwise.
Closing
74. Madam President, Members of the Court, there is one final point that I should make.
75. As in most human activities, there are different styles in negotiation and in litigation. In
the context of maritime delimitation, some adopt what one might call the “marketplace approach”,
making an initial claim that is so expansive that it does not express even a genuine aspiration, but
simply signals the start of serious bargaining, like merchants at the start of the haggling down of an
unrealistic asking price for goods. My wife bought a silver bracelet in Marrakesh market for one
third of its initial asking price, and everyone seemed happy –– though the local businessman was
probably the happier of the two. Then there are those who do not take the marketplace approach,
but who go straight in with a realistic propositio n and then expect to engage in some serious
argument to discover what, if anything, is wrong with it, and how it might need to be adjusted. - 67 -
76. In this case, Romania has very deliberately chosen to put forward a reasonable, realistic
claim. We do not say that other approaches to litigation are wrong. We do, however, submit that a
State should not be penalized for taking a rea listic approach and making a modest, but decent,
objective and justified claim.
77. Ukraine might appear to have adopted the other approach.
[End slide]
[Slide: the cut-off effect produced by the Ukrainian claim line]
Its proposed line seems to treat Romania even worse than Germany would have been treated
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases by a strict application of the equidistance line.
78. The Ukrainian proposal is a good example of a cut-off. It encroaches upon Romania’s
entitlement, and the inequity of the result is immediately obvious from the map displayed 104.
79. And more than that, it has no basis in principle. It treats the 12-nautical-mile circle
around Serpents’ Island, agreed by the Parties, as if it did not exist, apart from a small arc of the
circle that borders Romania’s territorial sea. It then constructs a line between the coast of Romania
and what is, for the most part, the coast of Serp ents’ Island, and drives it down, southwards, right
across the front of the Romanian coast. It is the kind of line that one sees drawn between opposite
States; but this is no median line. Here it is drawn so that the line is at one point
153nauticalmiles from Ukraine’s eastern coast but only 17nautical miles from the Romanian
coast which faces it.
80. At first sight, the Ukraine line is utterly l acking in credibility. But, Ukraine says, that is
because Serpents’ Island may be invisible to the naked eye on a map on this scale, but it has an
immensely magnified effect upon the limit of the maritime boundary.
81. But that is not so. As we have shown, this approach contradicts the delimitation already
agreed by the Parties in the procès-verbaux of 1949, 1963 and 1974. Under the consistent
jurisprudence on maritime delimitation, Serpents’ Island would not have this effect. Article121,
paragraph3, of the Law of the Sea Convention stip ulates that Serpents’ Island does not have this
effect. And it was accepted by the Parties in the 1997 Additional Agreement as a principle
104
RR, fig. 32. - 68 -
applicable to this delimitation, that Serpents’ Is land would not have this effect. There is no basis
upon which Ukraine can even start to build its case.
[End slide]
[Slide: the division of the relevant area between Romania and Ukraine by Romania’s claim line]
82. Romania has been reasonable and realistic in presenting its claim, first in negotiations,
now in the Court. It is confident that the Court will reflect on the inherent merits of the cases
advanced by the Parties and will not be tempted to split the difference in the misplaced belief that
this would produce a just result and keep both Parties happy.
[End slide]
83. Unless we can be of further assistance, Madam President, that concludes my presentation
and, at the same time, this round of Romania’s pleadings and I thank you and the Court for your
patience and attention over this past week.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Lowe. This does indeed mark the end of today’s
sitting and brings to an end the first round of th e oral argument by Romania. The Court will meet
again starting on Tuesday, 9 September from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., in order to hear the first round of
the oral argument of Ukraine. Ukraine will then conclude its first round of oral argument on Friday
12 September, having until 1 p.m. available to it that morning. The Court now rises.
The Court rose at12.50 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 5 September 2008, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine)