Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2008/31
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2008
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 16 September 2008, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding,
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2008
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 16 septembre 2008, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président,
faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire
(Roumanie c. Ukraine)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Cot
Oxman
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Al-Khasawneh,vice-président
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skoteiskov,
CotMM.
jOges an, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Romania is represented by:
Mr. Bogdan Aurescu, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Professor
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Buchar est, President of the Romanian Branch of the
International Law Association, member of th e Permanent Court of Arbitration, substitute
member of the Venice Commission,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Cosmin Dinescu, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E Mr. Călin Fabian, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
As Co-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of Inte rnational Law, University of Oxford, member
of the English Bar, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former
Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
a s Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Simon Olleson, member of the English Bar, 13 Old Square Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Gicu Boroşi, Director General, National Agency for Mineral Resources,
Mr. Mihai German, Deputy Director General, Nati onal Agency for Mineral Resources, member of
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Mr. Eugen Laurian, Counter-Admiral (retired),
Mr. Octavian Buzatu, Lieutenant Commander (retired),
Mr. Ovidiu Neghiu, Captain, Ministry of Defence of Romania,
as Technical and Cartographic Experts;
Mr. Liviu Dumitru, Head of the Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Roumanie est représenté par :
M. Bogdan Aurescu, directeur général au ministère roumain des affaires étrangères, chargé de
cours à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Bucarest, président de la section roumaine de
l’Association de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, membre
suppléant de la Commission de Venise,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
M.CosminDinescu, directeur général des affair es juridiques du ministère roumain des affaires
étrangères,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Călin Fabian, ambassadeur de Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat, Matrix
Chambers,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., professeur de droit internati onal à l’Université d’Oxford, titulaire de la
chaire Chichele, membre du barreau d’Anglet erre, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Simon Olleson, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, 13 Old Square Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Gicu Boroşi, directeur général de l’agence nationale des ressources minières,
M. Mihai German, directeur général adjoint de l’agence nationale des ressources minières, membre
de la Commission des limites du plateau continental de l’ONU,
M. Eugen Laurian, contre-amiral (en retraite),
M. Octavian Buzatu, capitaine de corvette (en retraite),
M. Ovidiu Neghiu, capitaine, ministère roumain de la défense,
comme experts techniques et cartographes ;
M. Liviu Dumitru, chef de l’unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère roumain des
affaires étrangères, - 6 -
Ms Irina Ni ţă, Second Secretary, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Romania in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Catrinel Brumar, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Mirela Pascaru, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Ioana Preda, Third Secretary, Borders and Maritime Delimitation Unit, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Romania,
Ms Olivia Horvath, Desk Officer, Public Diplom acy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Romania,
as Advisers.
The Government of Ukraine is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, Adviser to th e Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Professor of International Law,
National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,
Mr. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, Director of the Lega l and Treaty Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor emeritus of International Law at the University of ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., Member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the Rome Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine,
Ms Cheryl Dunn, Member of the State Bar of California, Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Nick Minogue, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales,
Mr. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, Acting Head of International Law Division, Legal and Treaty
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, - 7 -
Mme Irina Niţă, deuxième secrétaire, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade de Roumanie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Catrinel Brumar, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Mirela Pascaru, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Ioana Preda, troisième secrétaire, unité frontières et délimitation maritime du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
Mme Olivia Horvath, responsable du départem ent des relations diplomatiques du ministère
roumain des affaires étrangères,
commceonseillers.
Le Gouvernement de l’Ukraine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Volodymyr A. Vassylenko, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine, professeur de droit international à
l’Académie Mohyla (Université nationale de Kiev),
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Oleksandr M. Kupchyshyn, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
M. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal, directeur du départem ent des affaires juridiques et des traités du
ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de dr oit international à l’Université de ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Vasyl G. Korzachenko, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d’Ukraine,
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de Californie, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Nick Minogue, Solicitor à la Cour suprême d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Oleksii V. Ivaschenko, directeur par intérim de la division du droit international, département
des affaires juridiques et des traités du ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine, - 8 -
Mr. Maxime O. Kononenko, First Secretary of the Embassy of Ukraine in the French Republic,
Ms Mariana O. Betsa, Second Secretary of th e Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil, C. Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Major General Borys D. Tregubov, Assistant to the Head of the State Border Protection Service of
Ukraine,
as Technical Advisers. - 9 -
M. Maxime O. Kononenko, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine en France,
Mme Mariana O. Betsa, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Ukraine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., D. Phil., C. Geol., F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. Borys D. Tregubov, général de division, assistant du chef du service de protection des frontières
d’Etat de l’Ukraine,
comme conseillers techniques. - 10 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. This morning,
PresidentHiggins will not be sitting. We ar e meeting to continue with the second round of
pleadings by Romania, and I give the floor to Professor Vaughan Lowe. You have the floor.
Mr. LOWE: Thank you, Mr. Vice-President, Members of the Court.
VII. C ONSTRUCTION OF THE EQUIDISTANCE LINE
1. We turn now to the explanation of the c onstruction of the equidistance line. We have
explained this in detail in the first round, and here I shall deal with it summarily, addressing in
context the points which have been raised by our friends on the other side.
2. The Parties are agreed that the settled prac tice is now to adopt a three-stage approach:
first, drawing the provisional, “strict”, equidist ance line; secondly, adjus ting that line to take
account of special circumstances; and third, checking the equitableness of the result.
Base points
3. Last Friday, ProfessorQuéneudec gave you a detailed analysis of the approach to the
drawing of the equidistance line, at the end of which he concluded that you draw the line that is
equidistant from the closest base points on the coasts of each of the two States. He said that the
only question is that of the proximity of the relevant points. At times Ukraine seemed to contradict
that by suggesting that base points can be used only once, in order to avoid “double counting”: but
that suggestion has no basis whatever in tr eaty or customary law or in principle.
Professor Quéneudec’s insistence on the use of the most proximate points, whatever they might be,
is plainly correct; and we respectfully agree with him.
4. Where we disagree is in the identification of the relevant base points. Ukraine says that
we pretend to be unaware of the fact that the e quidistance line is to be established objectively and,
in this first stage, without concern for special circumstances. Specifically, it says that we ignore
Serpents’ Island.
5. We do not ignore Serpents’ Island. We considered it: and in our view it falls within
paragraph 3 of Article 121; and we treat it accordingly. - 11 -
Judge Oxman’s question
6. It is convenient here to answer Judge Oxman’s first question. He asked, in essence, if
Article 121 applies to marine areas within 200 nauti cal miles of the mainland. The answer is, yes.
Article 121 is entitled “Regime of islands”. It constitutes the whole of Part VIII of the Convention,
which is itself entitled “Regime of islands”. Part VIII appears after the parts of the Convention
dealing with the territorial sea, the contiguous z one, the EEZ, the continental shelf, and the high
seas.
7. Article 121 purports to define the legal régi me of islands. There is nothing in the Article
which says that it applies only to islands on the hi gh seas, or beyond the EEZ or continental shelf,
or at a certain distance from the coast. Nothing in the Convention even hints at that possibility.
Nor is there anything in the travaux préparatoires which indicates that any such limitation should
be read into the words of the Article.
8. Given the fact that, with the exception of coral islands and mid-ocean ridges, islands
naturally tend to occur relatively close to land mass es rather than in mid-ocean, any such addition
to the words of the Article would dramatically cut down the scope of its application. And that fact
alone should caution against the implication into the Article of limitations that appear nowhere in
the text.
9. Article121 is a treaty text; and in our submission there is no proper approach to its
interpretation, observing the basic disciplines of the law of treaties, which could lead one to
suppose that it is limited in its application to areas more than 200 miles from mainland coasts.
10. In our view, the plain words of Article 121 mean what they say. Neither we nor Ukraine
have in our pleadings argued that a geographical limitation should be read into its scope. The
closest that Ukraine got was Ms Malintoppi’s suggestion that the drafters of the Article had in mind
1
features such as Rockall, far out at sea . But even if her intuition is correct, and even if it
represented the mental state of the 150 or so delegations which signed the Convention ⎯ and we
can find no evidence on these matters ⎯ it is beside the point. When the Court has to interpret the
Convention, the question is not what a paradigm atic case of a paragraph3 island would be. The
question is what, as a matter of law, are the limits of the category of island established by
1
CR 2008/29, p. 17, para. 52. - 12 -
paragraph 3, and whether Serpents’ Island falls within them. And for that task the Court must rely
on the wording of the treaty, and not rely on intuition to write into the text limitations that the
drafters did not put there.
Serpents’ Island is not a base point for an EEZ or continental shelf delimitation: Article 121
11. I turn to the question of base points. Ukraine raises several objections to our
classification of Serpents’ Island within paragraph 3 of Article 121. It says that it is not a rock but
an island; and that it is not what the drafters of Article121 had in mind in drafting paragraph3,
because it is too big and not far enough from the coast.
12. “Rock” is not a term of art defined in the Convention; and “rocks” and “islands” are not
mutually exclusive categories. We have pointed out that all rocks are necessarily islands within the
meaning of Article121(1). Rockall, a photogra ph of which MsMalintoppi showed you on the
screen, is a paragraph 1 island, and is also a paragraph 3 rock.
13. Ukraine also referred to the treatment of the Eddystone Rock in the Western Approaches
arbitration 30years ago, in 1977. But that decision was based, as Professor Quéneudec rightly
pointed out, on the fact that France had already ag reed that the rock should be treated as a base
point for the 6- and 12-mile British fishing zones, which ⎯ under the 1964 European Fisheries
Convention ⎯ were to be measured from the baseline of Britain’s territorial sea, which was then
three miles.
14. At the date of that award, the 1982 Convention was five years away from its final form,
and 17years away from its entry into force. The Western Approaches case was pleaded on the
basis of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and, because of the effect of reservations to the
1958 Convention, on the basis of customary international law, which the tribunal found to be
practically the same as the 1958 Convention. Article 121 was simply not applicable, not relevant,
in that case. The pleadings are not public, but what we do know of them from the text of the award
indicates that the parties focused on the question whether Eddystone was an island or a low-tide
elevation. That case would no doubt be pleaded di fferently today. But, as I say, the decision was
based on other grounds, and in a case to which Article 121 had no relevance. - 13 -
15. Ukraine also referred to the configuration of Serpents’ Island and its relationship with the
coast. That is a pertinent point. The Convention deals with the generation of EEZs and continental
shelves by offshore features such as Serpents’ Is land in two ways. If they are located in the
immediate vicinity of the coast, they can perhaps be used as base points in a straight baseline
system, under Article7. If they are not within the immediate vicinity of the coast, they can
generate no more than a territorial sea.
16. Serpents’ Island is not in the vicinity of the coast, and Ukraine has not sought to use it in
its straight baseline system. Ukraine’s counsel stated last week that Serpents’ Island “was not
situated at the beginning or at the end of any straight baseline segment” 2 and that “there were no
3
straight baselines... connecting the island with the mainland” . It therefore cannot generate
anything other than the 12-mile territorial sea ⎯ and that is stipulated in Article121 of the
Convention. ProfessorPellet will make some fu rther observations on the question of Serpents’
Island’s relationship with the coast shortly.
17. Article 121, paragraph 3, refers to “rocks”. It does not define the term “rock”; but it is
clear from the reference to “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own” that there must be some rocks that can sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own. If that were not so, the reference to sustaining habitation or economic life would be
superfluous. It necessarily follows that some features which are “rocks” are large enough to sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own; and such rocks may well be as large as Serpents’
Island, or even larger.
18. That is why we say that the crucial crite rion under paragraph 3 is the one criterion that is
explicitly spelled out: the application of that paragraph specifically to features that cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own. Romania is not arguing for some interpretation of
the Convention or of its effect which is based upon implied terms and hidden meanings.
Article121, paragraph 3, is absolutely clear and explicit in stipulating th at: “Rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of thei r own shall have no exclusive economic zone or
2
CR 2008/26, p. 26, para. 27 (Bundy).
3CR 2008/26, p. 25, para. 23 (Bundy). - 14 -
continental shelf.” That rule binds Ukraine and Romania; and its application as a matter of law
cannot be avoided.
19. MsMalintoppi concentrated on establishing that Ukraine was doing nothing to increase
4
the size of Serpents’ Island . We accept that, though we also think that making a small barren
island into a slightly larger barren island would not affect its legal status.
20. Her analysis of the central questi on of human habitation and economic life was
economical. She said, “It has water and it has vegetation.” 5 No further explanation, no evidence
was offered. The existence of the grass and th e moss we concede. She did not say how many
bottles of water the island has, or how soon they will run out.
21. She says that the dependency on the mainland for the basic resources is quite common,
6
and that complete self-sufficiency cannot be expected . We made the same point. But she did not
respond to our further point, that an island that is totally dependent for food, water and every other
human need is indistinguishable from a steel platform, and is, on any definition, an island incapable
of sustaining human habitation.
22. The answer to the question of what lif e Serpents’ Island itself can sustain, without
airlifting supplies onto it, is easy to see. There is no suggestion that the island has sources of fresh
water. Rainfall is very low: the figure of about 366 mm each year is given in the study in Annex 6
of our Memorial; and that is, on average, 1 mm of rain each day. The World Health Organization
daily needs figure for water is 15-20 litres per capita per day 7. We invite Ukraine to explain to the
Court how they think that the island can sustain human habitation on that basis.
23. On the question of the island’s capacity to support economic life, Ukraine claims no
more than that it has the potential to do so 8. It offers no evidence on that point. It does not try to
explain how, or when, that might happen. We do not accept that there is any realistic prospect of
Serpents’ Island sustaining either human habitation or economic life of its own. If Ukraine thinks
4
CR 2008/29, p. 12, para. 35.
5
CR 2008/29, p. 11, para. 30.
6CR 2008/29, p. 17, para. 51.
7World Health Organization, Technical Note No. 9 (Draft revised: 7.1.05), Minimum water quantity needed for
domestic use in emergencies: http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/List_of_Guidelines_for_Health_Emerge…
Minimum_water_quantity.pdf
8CR 2008/29, p. 16, para. 50. - 15 -
differently, again we invite it to explain to the Court exactly how and when it sees the island
sustaining economic life of its own. It has simply not addressed our extensive factual arguments,
which I will not repeat.
24. Ms Malintoppi also referred to the fact that Ukraine had agreed not to deploy offensive
weapons on Serpents’ Island, as an indication that Romania must have thought that the island was
9
habitable . The logic of this argument is elusive. There are also treaties forbidding the deployment
of weapons on the sea-bed and on the moon; but it is hard to see that the existence of those treaties
evidences the possibility of either location sustaining human habitation.
25. Serpents’ Island can only generate an entitle ment to an EEZ or a continental shelf if it is
capable of sustaining either human habitation or economic life of its own. If it is not, it cannot
generate either zone. And if it cannot generate either zone, it cannot be used as a base point in the
first stage of constructing an equidistance line for the delimitation of either an EEZ or a continental
shelf. That is our point, and it has not been answered.
26. The fallacy in Ukraine’s argument is th e suggestion that the rigid objectivity of the
stage1 construction of the equidistance line requi res no legal analysis, that one simply runs a
measure from each base point regardless of its character; but that is not what the law is.
27. The measurement for an EEZ equidistance line can only be made from base points that
are relevant to the generation of an EEZ. The measurem ents for a continental shelf equidistance
line can only be made from base points that are relevant to the generation of a continental shelf.
The Convention to which Romania and Ukraine si gned up, and which they ratified, and whose
relevant provisions they chose to incorporate in the 1997 Agreement, establishes a distinct category
of islands “which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” and stipulates
that those islands do not generate an EEZ or continental shelf. We submit that Serpents’ Island
falls into that category, and that it is therefore ne cessarily irrelevant to the construction of an EEZ
or continental shelf equidistance line.
28. Ukraine has also suggested 10that the fact that Romania pursued its efforts at
UNCLOSIII to have an articleincluded in th e Convention expressly precluding “uninhabited”
9
CR 2008/29, p. 11, para. 30.
1CR 2008/29, pp. 17-16, paras. 53-60. - 16 -
islands from influencing maritime delimitation because it did not consider that Serpents’ Island was
covered by Article 121, paragraph 3. Romania’s purpose was, as Ukraine conceded, to secure the
inclusion of a provision in the Convention dealing with the Serpents’ Isla nd situation. Romania
made proposals early on; it remained active in nego tiations; and near the end of the conference it
tried unsuccessfully to have a provision with a wide r scope than Article 121 inserted. But the fact
that it sought the added protection of a wider provision, perhaps anticipating the ingenious attempts
of Ukraine to extract itself from Article 121 (3), should be no surprise.
29. As the Court knows, that is only a part of our case on Serpents’ Island. We submit that
there is in existence a binding agreement between the Parties as to how the island will be dealt
with: Professor Crawford has dealt with that.
30. We also submit that in any event, even if the island were in principle admissible as a base
point, as a “paragraph2” island in Article121 terms, an island of that size and character in a
geographical context such as exists here should, according to the established practice in maritime
delimitation, be given no effect in a delimitation. Professor Pellet addressed this point in the first
round: and I will not rehearse his arguments. I will simply emphasize five points:
⎯ first, this argument has been examined only ve ry briefly by the other side, and they have
avoided commenting on the carefully prepared syn optic table that we attached to our first
round pleadings and which is reproduced again in your folders as tab 1;
11
⎯ second, by way of exception, Mr. Bundy made, at some length, the argument that since every
island has a baseline, so has Serpents’ Island; and hence he alleges, “it is entirely appropriate
to use base points situated on that baseline for purposes of constructing the provisional
equidistance line” 1. As we have said, this begs the question. We have no doubt that all
islands, including Serpents’ Island, have a baseline. But the real question is whether the
baseline in question is to be taken into c onsideration for constructing the provisional
equidistance line. And in our submission, the answer established by the practice of States and
by the case law of this Court and of other international tribunals, is clearly, no;
11
CR2008/26, pp.23-26, paras.15-29; see also CR2008/ 24, p.32, para.54; CR2008/28, p.50, para.70
(Bundy), and CR 2008/29, p. 28, para. 34 (Quéneudec).
1CR 2008/26, p. 26, para. 29. - 17 -
⎯ third, even though there is no legal obligation upo n States to notify their “normal” baselines, it
is telling that Ukraine has notified all of its baselines to the United Nations, except for the
baseline on Serpents’ Island;
⎯ fourth, for his part, Professor Quéneudec has contended that Serpents’ Island is a coastal island
and that, as such, it must be a base point taken into consideration at the early stage of the
establishment of the provisional equidistance line. But it is not a coastal island, as
Professor Pellet will show in a moment; and
⎯ fifth, it cannot reasonably be asserted, as Professor Quéneudec suggested last Friday, that
Romania accepted Serpents’ Island as a base point when it signed the 2003 Treaty 1. Article 1
of this Treaty simply determines the “meeting point of the outer limits” of the respective
14
“territorial seas of the Contracting Parties”. As ProfessorCrawford said , the Parties agreed
what they could, and they left the resolution of the rest of the dispute pending. That
2003 Treaty is not relevant to the question of the use of Serpents’ Island as a base point for the
delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ.
31. Before leaving the question of Serpents’ Island, I should recall that our friends opposite
have not given any explanation as to why they remained silent in the face of Romania’s
declarations made on signature and on ratificati on of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS),
and of why they agreed to the adoption of Article121 in the famous Article4 of the
1997Agreement. We do not say that they were legally obliged to respond to Romania’s
declaration in the same way that they did res pond to the Philippines UNCLOS declaration. There
is a right to silence. But it is also possible to draw inferences from silence; and in Romania’s view
Ukraine did not object to Romania’s declarations, or to the adoption of Article121 in 1997,
because it did not then find them objectionable.
32. MsMalintoppi gave a correct but incomple te account of the work of the International
15
Law Commission on this topic . It is indeed right that the Special Rapporteur on reservations to
treaties considered that, with regard to interpretative declarations, silence cannot ipso facto
13CR 2008/29, p. 34, para. 46 (Quéneudec).
14
CR 2008/30, p. 50, para. 25 (Crawford).
15CR2008/29, pp. 20-21, paras. 64-68. - 18 -
constitute agreement, in contrast with the position concerning reservations under Article20,
paragraph 5, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. But this is only half of the story.
33. In certain circumstances, as was highlig hted by the ILC Special Rapporteur in his
thirteenth report, “a State or an international organization may be considered as having acquiesced
16
to an interpretative declaration by reason of its silence or its conduct, as the case may be” . The
present circumstances are among those which can tri gger this legal effect of Ukraine’s silence 17.
Romania’s declaration could not concern any rock other than Serpents’ Island and Ukraine was
well aware of this, and it accepts that fact. In th e circumstances, one would have expected Ukraine
to react in order to preserve its rights; but it di d not. And in our submission, it is now “stopped or
18
precluded from challenging the validity and effect” of Romania’s declaration.
34. By way of conclusion, Mr. Vice-President, on this important aspect of the case, largely
ignored by our colleagues, let me reiterate that Serpents’ Island can play no role in the construction
of the equidistance line and that this conclusion is independent of the fact that Serpents’ Island
must be characterized as a rock according to Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Convention. As the
19
Agent of Romania said yesterday , this is not an argument “in the alternative”. Each argument,
based on the 1949Agreement, on practice concerning small features in delimitation, and on
Article 121, stands by itself; and the three arguments complement one another.
Sulina dyke
35. Let me now turn to Sulina dyke. Ukraine hinted at some sort of trade-off between the
dyke and Serpents’ Island: “Let us have th e Serpents’ Island base points and you can use the
Sulina dyke.” At first sight this looks like a m ugger’s offer: “Give me your wallet and you can
keep your watch.”
36. But Ukraine’s position is, we are sure, by no means so crude. It is, as we understand it,
aimed not at the construction of the provisional equidistance line but at the stage two exercise of
16
A/CN.4/600, para. 316. See also para. 313.
17
CR 2008/20, pp. 53 et seq., paras. 73 et seq.
18Decision regarding delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 13 Apr. 2RIAA, Vol.XXV,
p. 111, para. 3.9.
19CR 2008/30, p. 11, para. 5 (Aurescu). - 19 -
considering Serpents’ Island as a special circumstance; and it suggests that Sulina dyke, too,
should be considered a special circumstance. Mr.Müller’s presentation yesterday explained that
the dyke is a long-standing, substantial structur e connected to the coast, and within the general
profile of the coastline to the north, to which it will no doubt shortly be joined by the effects of
siltation. The new sandbar is clear evidence of that process. The dyke is also essential to maintain
the navigability of the Danube, and access to the Black Sea port of Sulina and to the Danube river
ports. No plausible case has been made for not givi ng it its full legal effect as a base point. But in
case there should be thought to be a suggestion that Romania is not entitled to use Sulina dyke as a
base point at all, I will address that point.
[Graphic: tab 2]
37. I do so because the point has been raised by our friends, and it involves a significant
point of principle. I should, however, make clear that on Ukraine’s vi ew the dyke makes little
difference to the equidistance line. The graphic on the screen, tab2 in your folders, shows that
effect. The green line is Ukraine’s equidistan ce line, as it would be drawn giving effect to
Serpents’ Island, but giving no effect to Sulina dyke, and drawing the line instead from base points
on Romania’s natural coast. The red line shows Ukraine’s equidistance line drawn using Serpents’
Island and also using Sulina dyke. The difference, as you can see, is small, and limited to the first
dozen miles of the line, before base points on the natural coastline of Romania take over. The dyke
has, however, more effect on the mainland equidistance line drawn by Romania and it is, in our
submission, therefore, a point of some importance. [End graphic]
38. Ukraine also appears to have miscalcu lated the effect of Sulina dyke on Romania’s
equidistance line. [Graphic: tab3] Mr.Bundy showed you in his tab9, what he said was the
effect of the dyke 20. He said that the red line represents the equidistance line without Sulina dyke
and the blue line the equidistance line using Sulin a dyke as a base point. In fact, the red line
appears to have been calculated using a baseline some way inland from the natural coast of Sulina.
If the coast is drawn from the furthest point of th e natural coast, the true equidistance line is that
20
CR 2008/24, pp. 32-33, para. 58 (Bundy). - 20 -
shown in yellow on the chart, and it has signifi cantly less effect on the equidistance line than
Ukraine has claimed. [End graphic]
39. [Graphic: tab 4] While we are looking at this area let me also refer to Ukraine’s drawing
of the perpendicular from the coast at this point. Th eir perpendicular line is extraordinary. It cuts
right across the Danube delta, lopping off the eastern part, an area of 990 sq km, including Sacalin.
The line drawn in red, incidentally, is not Roma nia’s perpendicular drawn from the adjacent coast:
that is a line designed to illustrate the construction of point X, as Professor Crawford explained two
weeks ago. [End graphic] But let me return to the point of principle.
40. Mr. Müller has shown you the facts concerning the dyke and its essential, integral role in
the maintenance of Sulina and the Danube ports.
41. Mr. Bundy’s suggestion that natural features such as Serpents’ Island should be treated at
least as favourably as artificial features such as Sulina dyke is one way in which one might have
framed a treaty provision on the subject; but it is not the way in which the law has developed and
now exists.
42. The International Law Commission’s 1956 Commentary on what became Article 8 of the
1958 Territorial Sea Convention 21, and then Article 11 of the 1982 Convention, is instructive. It is
short, and the relevant paragraphs –– which are in your folders as tab 5 –– read as follows:
“(2) Permanent structures erected on the coast and jutting out to sea (such as
jetties and coast protective works) are assimilated to harbour works.
(3) Where such structures are of excessive length (for instance, a jetty extending
several kilometres into the sea), it may be asked whether this article could still be
applied or whether it would not be necessary, in such cases, to adopt the system of
safety zones provided for in article 71 for inst allations on the continental shelf. As
such cases are very rare, the Commission, wh ile w22hing to draw attention to the
matter, did not deem it necessary to state an opinion.”
43. This Commentary makes it plain that the ILC considered that the text of Article 8, which
is identical to the first sentence of Article11 of the Law of the Sea Convention, applied to coast
protective works ⎯ a category into which the dyke clearly fa lls. It also shows that the ILC asked
whether long jetties extending several kilometres into the sea should fall within its proposed rule.
21“For the purpose of delimiting the territorial see outermost permanent harbour works which form an
integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.”
22YILC, 1956, I,0l..(Commentary to Draft Article 8);
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_1_8… - 21 -
Jetties are not the same as coastal protection works. A jetty is typically a structure rather like a
pier, supported on legs made of wood or iron, although it may have a solid construction. But even
in the case of jetties, despite the ILC having raised the question, the 1958 Conference did not
exclude them from the “permanent harbour works” rule.
44. The 1982 Convention does add one qualificati on to the rule. It is the second sentence of
Article11, which reads “Off-shore in stallations and artificial islands shall not be considered as
permanent harbour works”. And, again, one sees that the question of the
scope of the rule and its
application to various kinds of structure was c onsidered; and, again, a deliberate position was
taken, this time by UNCLOS III. Sulina dyke is clearly not an “off-shore installation” ⎯ that is a
term used in Article 56 of the Convention to refer to offshore oil platforms and the like. Nor is it
an artificial island. It remains, with other coast protective works, within the category of permanent
harbour works which States are entitled to use as base points. Mr. Bundy raises a good question,
but there has been a clear and certain answer to it for the past half century: coast protection works
of this kind do indeed qualify as base points.
45. We would also draw your attention to th e fact that Sulina dyke was referred to by
Ukraine in its own list of base points, while Serpents’ Island was not. The first point of the
Ukrainian baseline is described in the Ukrainian law as being
“the point of intersection of the line of the State sea border between the Russian
Federation and the Socialist Republic of Ro mania connecting the eastern tip of the 23
north entrance of the pier of the Sulina canal with the east islet of Tsyganka island” .
46. So, the answer to the proposal for equiva lence between Serpents’ Island and Sulina dyke
is to be found in the Convention itself. The Convention ⎯ the law ⎯ treats them differently and
that is why they must be treated differently in the process of delimitation.
47. Once the question of those base points is settled, the task of constructing the provisional
equidistance line is mechanical 24 and there is little room for disagreement ⎯ although there is, of
course, disagreement over what was agreed in 1949. The line proceeds as we have shown it. It has
23See MR, Ann.27; and List of Geographical Coordinates of Points Defining the Baselines for Measuring the
Breadth of the Territorial Sea,Exclusive Economic Zone and the C ontinental Shelf in the Black Se, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/UKR_1992_Co….
24Cf. CR 2008/29, p. 23, para. 5 (Quéneudec). - 22 -
two main sectors, one controlled by base points on adjacent coasts, one by base points on opposite
coasts, and the course of that line is dictated by the geography and by those base points.
48. Having drawn the provisional equidistance line, the next task is to consider what, if any,
adjustments are necessary to take account of special circumstances; and I would ask you now, Sir,
to call now on Professor Pellet, who will address that question.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Th ank you for your speech and, as you suggest,
I call on Professor Alain Pellet.
M. PELLET :
VIII. LA DEUXIÈME PHASE DE LA DÉLIMITATION
LES CIRCONSTANCES PERTINENTES
1. Merci beaucoup Monsieur le président ; il faut que j’essaye de ne pas m’emmêler entre les
«Madame la» et les «Monsieur le». Monsieur le pr ésident, Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi, je
vous prie, de rappeler le raisonne ment que nous avons suivi jusqu’à présent. Peut-être est-ce une
réduction cartésienne de la complexité des choses ⎯ bien que j’ai noté que le professeur Lowe ait
présenté les choses de la même manière ⎯ mais, décidément, lorsque l’on s’en tient aux grandes
lignes, notre affaire me paraît raisonnablement simple . Si l’on suit le raisonnement en trois temps
traditionnel :
⎯ la ligne d’équidistance doit être tracée en fonction des points de base pertinents des deux Etats ;
mais l’île des Serpents, n’est pas susceptible de constituer un tel point⎯ contrairement à la
digue de Sulina, alors que l’Ukraine assimile ar tificiellement l’une à l’autre, comme on vient
de le rappeler ;
⎯ une fois la ligne tracée, elle peut être ajustée si des circonstances pertinentes l’exigent afin
d’arriver à un résultat équitable ⎯c’est le stade auquel nous en sommes arrivés, et c’est ce
qu’il m’incombe d’aborder ce matin ;
⎯ ensuite peut intervenir, le cas échéant, le t est de la proportionnalité; le professeurLowe
reviendra à cette barre pour en traiter tout à l’heure. - 23 -
2. Pour être complet, je rappelle que, dans ses lignes générales, cette méthode s’applique tant
à la délimitation de la mer territoriale qu’à celle de la zone économique exclusive ou du plateau
continental. Toutefois, en l’espèce, une délimitation entre la mer territoriale de l’île des Serpents et
les espaces maritimes roumains qui l’entourent, a été arrêtée par voie d’accord et il n’y a pas lieu
d’y revenir. Si cependant vous c onsidériez qu’il faudrait y procéder de novo, ce que nous ne
pensons pas, il conviendrait alors d’appliquer globalement la même méthode à compter du point F,
celui qui est fixé à l’articlepremier du traité de 2003. Je m’en tiendrai, pour l’instant, à notre
position, que le professeur Crawford à expliquée à no uveau hier matin: elle consiste à considérer
que les Parties se sont mises d’accord en 1949 pour doter l’île des Serpents d’un espace maritime
de 12 milles marins, accord qui a été constamment confirmé depuis lors. Cependant, pour ne rien
laisser au hasard, je reviendrai cependant briè vement sur ce point, ne fût-ce que pour montrer que
la solution qui devrait être adoptée en l’absence de délimitation préexistante, serait nettement plus
favorable à la Roumanie que celle résultant de l’accord de 1949.
3. Monsieur le président, pour déterminer l’ incidence que pourraient avoir les circonstances
pertinentes en la présente espèce, je m’interroge rai brièvement, dans un pr emier temps, sur leur
définition et sur le rôle qu’elles sont appelées à j ouer dans la délimitation maritime, en essayant de
dégager les points d’accord entre les Parties et ceux, malheureusement encore nombreux, qui les
divisent. Puis, sans essayer de suivre un beau plan équilibré «à la française » (tout cartésien que je
suis), je m’interrogerai, sur les effets éventuels des circonstances pertinentes invoquées de part et
d’autre.
1. Le rôle des circonstances pertinentes
4. A priori, Monsieur le président, les Partie s semblent être maintenant d’accord sur la
définition et le rôle (ils vont de pair) des circonsta nces pertinentes. Pour faire vite, elles admettent
toutes deux :
⎯ qu’il s’agit de considérations pouvant conduire à in fléchir le tracé de la ligne d’équidistance
25
tracée lors de la première phase de l’opération conduisant à la délimitation ;
25Voir CR2008/24, p.28-29 (Bundy); CR2008/26, p.14, par.59 (Quéneudec) ou CR2008/29, p.24, par.7
(Quéneudec). - 24 -
⎯ que le but de cette deuxième phase est de parvenir à un résultat équitable ⎯un point sur
lequel, d’ailleurs, je trouve que nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre, qui sont pourtant, en
général, fort «didactiques», ont été assez di screts; sans s’y appesantir, ils conviennent
26
néanmoins que tel est bien l’objectif : un résultat équitable ;
⎯ les Parties s’accordent également pour considérer qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’opérer de distinction
entre les circonstances spéciales de l’article 15 de la convention sur le droit de la mer et qui
trouvent application lorsqu’il s’agit de délim iter la mer territoriale, et les circonstances
pertinentes, auxquelles on a recours pour la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du
plateau continental 27 ;
⎯ et nous convenons également, des deux côtés de la barre, qu’à l’occasion de cette étape
28
«délicate» , en l’absence de règles précises ⎯ conventionnelles ou coutumières, la
subjectivité du juge ⎯que je ne m’aventurerai tout de même pas à comparer à un
29
épicier… ⎯joue inévitablement un certain rôle, tant pour l’identification des circonstances
pertinentes que pour ce qui est des conséquences à en tirer 30.
5. Mais Monsieur le président, il y a subjec tivité et subjectivité et admettre que le juge
dispose d’un certain pouvoir d’appréciation ne signifie pas qu’il peut faire «n’importe quoi». Il y a
un monde entre ce que l’on appelle pouvoir «discrétionnaire» en droit administratif français
(peut-être cette notion est-elle plus compréhensib le hors du monde latin sous le nom de «marge
d’appréciation» ⎯ margin of appreciation ) et, de l’autre, l’exercice arbitraire de se pouvoir
d’appréciation. Il s’en déduit notamment que l’équité à laquelle il s’agit de parvenir est un concept
31
juridique, encadré par des règles de droit, et non une pure notion impressionniste ; et aussi que la
première des circonstances éventuellement pertinentes est constituée par les traités que les parties à
l’exercice de délimitation auraient pu conclure entre elles ou par lesquels elles sont liées.
26Voir cependant CR 2008/29, p. 42, par 102 (Quéneudec).
27
Voir CR 2008/24, p. 28, par. 38 (Bundy) ou CR 2008/26, p. 10, par. 40-41 (Quéneudec).
28
CR 2008/26, p. 16, par. 68 (Quéneudec).
29Voir CR 2008/29, p. 37, par. 77 (Quéneudec).
30Voir CR 2008/26, p. 16, par. 68 ou p. 19, par. 81-82 (Quéneudec) ou CR 2008/29, p. 41, par. 94 (Quéneudec).
31Voir sentence arbitrale du 26 mars 2002, Arbitrage entre la province de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador et la
province de la Nouvelle-Ecosse, par. 5.18. - 25 -
6. En l’espèce, cela veut dire qu’il faut tenir co mpte d’abord et avant tout de la délimitation
conventionnelle de la mer territoriale autour de l’île des Serpents, à laquelle les Parties ont procédé
en 1949 et qu’elles ont confirmée depuis lors : cet accord est «intouchable» en soi et doit recevoir
son plein effet ; en revanche, s’il produit des effets inéquitables, la Cour peut tenir compte de ces
distorsions pour procéder à la délimitation au -delà de la zone qu’il concerne; c’est une
circonstance pertinente. De manière plus géné rale, il vous appartient, Messieurs de la Cour,
d’appliquer, prioritairement, tous les traités conclus entre les Parties en relation avec la délimitation
à laquelle vous avez été priés de procéder ⎯au premier rang desquels l’accord additionnel de
1997.
7. Une autre remarque s’impose. Nos contradicteurs se sont délectés de la fameuse formule
de l’arrêt de1969 selon laquelle «[i]l n’est jama is question de refaire la nature entièrement»
[«There can never be any question of completely refashioning nature…»] ( Plateau continental de
la mer du Nord (République fédérale d’ Allemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p.49, par.91), qu’ils ont ressassée avec une
32
gourmandise satisfaite, en la répétant pas moins de neuf fois . Cette affirmation fait partie de la
vulgate du droit de la délimitation maritime et le moment n’est pas à une remise en cause
«académique». Je voudrais seulement faire remarquer que le dictum de1969 comporte un
adverbe : «[i]l n’est jamais question de refaire la nature entièrement» ⎯ et, un peu plus loin dans le
même paragraphe : «Il ne s’agit donc pas de refaire totalement la géographie.» [«It is therefore not
a question of totally refashioning geography…»] (Ibid., p. 50, par. 91 ; les italiques sont de nous.)
8. C’est que, comme l’a magistralement démontré le professeurProsperWeil, c’est
l’équidistance de la première phase qui reflète le plus fidèlement la natu re ou la géographie; les
circonstances pertinentes interviennent comme un co rrectif afin «de remédier à une particularité
non essentielle d’où pourrait résulter une injustifiable différence de traitement» [«a question… of
abating the effects of an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of
treatment could result»] (ibid.). Ce faisant, inévitablement, elles «refont» quelque peu la nature ou
la géographie: «la correction de la ligne d’équi distance a … pour objet véritable d’établir une
32Voir CR2008/24, p.21, par.10, ou p.22, par.12, p36, par.73 (Bundy); CR2008/26, p.30, par.47, p.41,
par.94 (Bundy); CR2008/28, p.43, par.37 (Bundy), p.59,par.26 (Malintoppi); CR2008/29, p.26, par.19, ou p.41,
par. 97 (Bundy). - 26 -
délimitation correspondant à une géographie reconstituée, plus équitable aux yeux des juges que la
géographie réelle» 33. C’est vrai pour les circonstances dont la Partie ukrainienne voudrait vous
faire croire qu’elles sont plus particulièrement pertinentes, comme pour celles qui le sont
réellement.
[Projection n 1: délimitation finale selon l’Ukraine (dossier documentaire de l’Ukraine,
o
onglet n 83)]
9. Nos collègues de l’autre côté de la barre devraient sans doute convenir que le but des
circonstances pertinentes est justement de remédi er, dans des limites raisonnables, aux injustices
flagrantes résultant de la géographie ⎯et que cela est vrai de toute circonstance pertinente, y
compris et d’abord de celles qu’ils invoquent ⎯ à cette nuance près qu’ils leur font produire des
effets qui ne sont pas raisonnables (par exemple lorsqu’ils «font glisser» leur ligne d’équidistance,
intenable en elle-même, pour, disent-ils, «parveni r à un tracé qui tienne pleinement compte de la
très grande disproportion de [la] longueur des côtes» 34). Le professeurJames Crawford vous a
35
entretenu hier de ce que nos amis ukrainiens appellent pudiquement un «glissement» .
[Fin de la projection n o 1.]
10. Pour en terminer avec ces considérations gé nérales, Monsieur le président, je dirai trois
choses :
1) c’est l’équidistance qui reflète la nature et la géographie existantes le plus fidèlement possible ;
2) comme, en effet, il ne saurait être question de re faire entièrement la nature ou la géographie, il
convient de ne s’écarter de la ligne d’équidistance que si l’injustice en découlant est manifeste ;
et,
3) cet exercice n’est pas une sorte de poker menteur favorisant celui qui a le plus de culot, c’est
une opération juridique encadrée par plus de règles, dégagées par la pratique et la jurisprudence,
que nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre le concèdent.
11. C’est à la lumière de ces remarques qu’il faut examiner tour à tour les diverses
circonstances pertinentes qu’ont invoquées les Parties :
⎯ la configuration générale des côtes de la mer Noire et divers facteurs qui lui sont liés ;
33
Prosper Weil, Perspectives du droit de la délimitation maritime, Paris, Pedone, 1988, p. 233.
34CR 2008/29, p. 43, par. 106 (Quéneudec).
35CR 2008/30, p. 21-22, par. 6-9 (Crawford). - 27 -
⎯ l’île des Serpents (en elle-même et par comparaison peut-être avec la digue de Sulina) ; et
⎯ la disparité entre la longueur des côtes respectives de la Roumanie et de l’Ukraine.
2. La configuration générale des côtes
12. Monsieur le président, pour les besoins de la discussion, je suis prêt à admettre que la
configuration générale des côtes peut constituer une circonstance pouvant peut-être être prise en
considération en vue d’ajuster la ligne d’équidistance ⎯donc, en ce sens, une «circonstance
pertinente». Mais pour déterminer s’il doit en aller ainsi, c’est d’abord «le cadre géographique
[global] dans lequel la délimitati on devra s’opérer» [the general geographical context in which the
delimitation will have to be effected] comme vous l’avez dit dans Libye/Malte (Plateau continental
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1985 , p.50, par.69) 36, qu’il faut
envisager.
13. L’Ukraine refuse de s’intéresser à ce cad re global et ne considère comme pertinentes à
cet égard que deux circonstances : la disparité de la longueur de ses côtes par rapport à celles de la
Roumanie (sur laquelle je reviendr ai) et le fait qu’elle-même Ukrain e borde la zone pertinente sur
trois côtés, ce à quoi on peut peut-être ajouter les considérations de sécurité et de navigation qu’elle
fait valoir ⎯ disons l’effet d’empiètement.
14. La Partie ukrainienne semble accorder une grande importance au fait que l’espace
37 38
maritime concerné constituerait un golfe bordé par des eaux en majorité ukrainiennes . Il en
résulterait une «prédominance» de l’Ukraine, qui devrait avoir une incidence en sa faveur sur le
39
tracé de la ligne .
[Projection n° 2 : la part de la Roumanie I.]
15. Monsieur le président, il suffit de jeter un Œil sur la carte qui se trouve dans le dossier
des juges sous le n° VIII-1 et qui est projetée en ce moment, pour voir que la ligne proposée par la
Roumanie ⎯qui repose sur l’équidistance pure et si mple, donne une image fidèle de la
36
Voir aussi, par exemple, la sentence arbitrale du 14 février 1985, Délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la
Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau, RSANU., vol. XIX, p. 189, par. 108-109.
37CR 2008/29, p. 38, par. 79 (Quéneudec).
38 Cf. CR2008/24, p.21, par.8 et 10 (Bundy); CR2008/26, p.37, par.76 (Bundy) ou CR2008/29, p.26,
par. 20-21, p. 27, par. 24, ou p. 38, par. 79 (Quéneudec).
39 CR2008/29, p.38, par.81, ou p.42, par.101 (Quéneudec) ; voir aussi CR2008/24, p.21, par.8, ou p.34,
par. 63 (Bundy). - 28 -
configuration générale des côtes, sans frustrer en quoi que ce soit l’Ukraine, qui se taille la part du
lion dans la zone concernée.
[Fin de la projection n° 2. Projection n° 3 : la part de la Roumanie II.]
La carte que vous voyez maintenant, et qui porte le n° VIII-2 dans votre dossier, illustre elle,
la méthode de délimitation ukrainienne; vous pouvez y constater à quelle portion congrue la
Roumanie serait réduite si l’on appliquait cette méthode au profit de l’Ukraine et aussi de la
Bulgarie. Inévitablement, le triangle vert qui représente les espaces maritimes que la Partie
ukrainienne concède généreusement à la Roumanie, fait penser à la situation de l’Allemagne [Fin
o o
de la projection n 3. Projection n 4 : Plateau continental de la mer du Nord. ] dans les affaires du
Plateau continental de la mer du Nord, dans laquelle l’effet d’en fermement résultait de la
concavité générale de la côte des trois Etats en cause. Ici, il y a aussi une concavité ⎯ partielle
mais assez prononcée ⎯de la côte roumaine qu’il n’y a aucune raison de ne pas prendre en
compte.
o o
[Fin de la projection n 4. Projection n 5 : concavité virtuelle de la côte (dossier documentaire de
la Roumanie, vol. II, onglet VII-2).]
Mais cet effet de concavité est aggravé dans des proportions considérables par l’inclusion
totalement artificielle de l’île des Serpents dans ses lignes de base à laquelle procède l’Ukraine.
«Une exagération d’une telle importance des conséquences d’un accident géographique naturel doit
être réparée ou compensée dans la mesure du possi ble parce qu’elle est en soi créatrice d’inéquité»
[So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical feature must be remedied
or compensated for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity] (Plateau continental de la
mer du Nord (République fédérale d’Al lemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1969 , p.49, par.89) comme vous l’avez dit dans
l’arrêt de 1969.
[Fin de la projection n o 5. Projection n° 5 bis : retour à la projection n 3.]
40
16. Quant à l’effet d’empiètement (c ut-off effect) dont se plaint l’Ukraine , il me semble
qu’il suffit de regarder à nouveau la carte n o VIII-1 pour constater qu’autant la Roumanie en serait
40Voir not. CR2008/24, p.35, par.68 (Bundy); CR2008/28, p.45, par.45 et 47 (Bundy); CR2008/29, p.49,
par. 30 (Bundy). - 29 -
fortement victime si vous veniez à adopter le tracé défendu par la Partie ukrainienne, autant on voit
mal ce que celle-ci peut reprocher au tracé que nous proposons, puisqu’il n’y a aucun port
significatif dans cette partie de la côte ukrainienne (Odessa se trouve à 160 kilomètres au nord de la
frontière). Au contraire, la limite que l’Ukraine voudrait vous voir endosser complique
singulièrement l’accès au port de Sulina et à la br anche maritime du Danube par laquelle transite,
41
bon an, mal an, 2 500 000 tonnes de marchandises . Au surplus, le tracé ukrainien exclut, à terme,
tout contact direct de la zone maritime roumaine avec la partie turque de la mer Noire et impose à
la Roumanie un tête-à-tête avec ses deux voisins, alors qu’une délimitation équitable basé sur
l’équidistance ne rend nullement cet enfermement inévitable.
o o
[Fin de la projection n 5 bis. Projection n 6: les frontières maritimes dans la mer Noire
redessinées conformément à la méthode ukrainienne.]
17. Ceci attire également l’attention sur la nature semi-fermée de cette mer singulière,
entièrement soumise aux droits souverains des Etat s riverains. Des délim itations conventionnelles
y existent entre la Turquie d’une part, la Bulgarie, l’Ukraine, la Russie et la Géorgie d’autre part ;
elles suivent en fait d es lignes d’équidistance ⎯sous réserve de la limite de 12milles marins
autour de l’île des Serpents. Vous pouvez voir ce ci à l’écran sous réserve donc de mes 12 milles
marins. Ajoutons sur ce schéma, qui se trouve à l’ongletVIII-3 du dossier des juges, les lignes
d’équidistance qui, selon nous, devraient constituer les futures frontières maritimes. Tout ceci
paraît raisonnable, et reflète équitablement la géographie côtière générale de la mer Noire. Par
contre, je me demande ce que pe nserait l’Ukraine si les frontières maritimes dans la mer Noire
étaient révisées ou fixées en application de la mé thode qu’elle voudrait voir appliquer à sa propre
frontière avec la Roumanie… En fait, Monsieur le président, je ne me le demande pas: elle en
penserait que ce n’est pas équitable ⎯ et elle aurait raison. Du mê me coup, ce n’est pas conforme
aux principes juridiques qui doivent trouver applica tion, qui incluent celui, rappelé avec une clarté
particulière dans la sentence ar bitrale de1985, dans l’affaire Guinée/Guinée-Bissau : «Une
délimitation visant à obtenir un résultat équitable ne peut ignorer les autres délimitations déjà
41Administration fluviale du bas Danube (Gala ţi, Roumanie), Statistiques concerna nt le trafic de navires sur le
Danube maritime, online: http://www.afdj.ro/statistics_en.html. - 30 -
42
effectuées ou à effectuer dans la région.» Et j’ajoute que, si l’Ukraine a parfaitement raison de
dire, par la voix de mon amie Loretta Malint oppi, que les traités conclus par des tiers sont res inter
43
alios acta à l’égard des Etats qui n’y sont pas parties , elle ne peut pas être tenue pour un tiers par
rapport au traité de1978 conclu entre la Turquie et l’URSS 44, à laquelle elle a succédé. Elle
bénéficie de ce traité qui la lie en tant que successeur de l’Union soviétique et il n’y a aucun
inconvénient à le prendre en considération dans l’appréciation de ce que l’on pourrait appeler la
«géographie maritime globale» de la mer Noire, cet accord rendant pleinement compte de la
configuration générale des côtes. Cette circons tance confirme l’équité de notre ligne mais
appellerait à corriger considérablement la ligne ukr ainienne afin de l’aligner davantage sur le
principe d’équidistance dont elle s’écarte dramatiquement.
o
[Fin de la projection n 6.]
18. Voici, Monsieur le président, ce que j’avais à dire sur la configuration générale des côtes
et les facteurs qui lui sont liés en tant que circ onstances pertinentes. J’en viens maintenant à la
principale circonstance pertinente, dont la prise en compte dès la première phase de l’élaboration
de la ligne ukrainienne exerce une distorsion particulièrement marquée et totalement inacceptable
sur celle-ci : il s’agit, bien sûr, de l’île des Serpents.
3. L’île des Serpents en tant que circonstance pertinente
19. Comme le professeur Lowe l’a montré tout à l’heure, l’île des Serpents ne peut pas avoir
d’effet sur l’établissement de la ligne d’équidistance, qu’on la considère comme un rocher au sens
du paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, ou que,
sans se préoccuper de sa qualification au regard de cette disposition, on lui applique les principes
bien établis relatifs au rôle des îles de ce genre en matière de délimitation des frontières maritimes
entre Etats dont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face. Mais, si notre île n’a aucun rôle à jouer
dans la première phase de la délimitation, elle existe et, à ce titre, doit être réintroduite dans le jeu à
titre de circonstance spéciale.
42
Sentence du 14février1985, Délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau ,
RSANU, vol. XIX, p. 183, par. 93 ; voir aussi sentence arbitrale du 11 avril 2006, Barbade et Trinité-et-Tobago, par. 340.
43
Voir CR 2008/28, p. 58, par. 20 et 22 (Malintoppi).
44RTNU, vol. 1247, p. 144 (n° 20344). - 31 -
20. Lors de notre plaidoirie de premier tour, m’appuyant sur un tableau résumant la
jurisprudence pertinente ⎯que je me suis à nouveau permis d’ inclure dans le dossier des juges,
cette fois sous l’ongletVIII-4, j’avais montré que l’on pouvait déduire de la pratique
juridictionnelle et arbitrale un certain nombr e de principes généraux appliqués de manière
constante. La réponse de M. Bund y ? «The important point, however ⎯ and this is a point which
Romania’s pleadings have conspicuously overlooked ⎯ is that each delimitation situation is unique
and each case must be assessed in the light of its own particular geographic facts and
45
circumstances.» C’est, Monsieur le président, une fuite commode devant l’obstacle.
21. En fait, sur la base de la jurisprudence résumée dans le tableau de l’ongletVIII-4, on
peut ⎯quoi qu’en dise M e Bundy ⎯ dégager quelques principes généraux 46, que je me permets
d’énoncer à nouveau puisque mon contradicteur et ami n’a jugé utile ni de les réfuter ni de les faire
siens :
1) les petites formations insulaires, se trouvant au large des côtes et excl ues, comme la nôtre doit
l’être, de la phase de construction de la ligne d’équidistance, bénéficient au mieux d’un
demi-effet ⎯ encore s’agit-il exclusivement de formations marines infiniment plus étendues et,
en général, bien plus peuplées, que l’île des Serpents (en admettant que l’on pût parler de
population serpentine en ce qui la concerne) 47 ;
2) dans d’autres cas, des îles, parfois bien plus considérables (y compris les îles anglo-normandes
elles-mêmes dans l’arbitrage de la mer d’Iroise) se sont vu reconnaître, au grand maximum, une
48
mer territoriale de 12 milles marins ;
3) souvent, de très petites îles (d’une manière géné rale celles qui sont les plus comparables à la
nôtre) n’ont été à l’origine d’aucune correction de la ligne d’équidistance initiale.
Et ceci indépendamment, je le répète, de leur définition au regard de l’artic le 121 de la convention
sur le droit de la mer.
45
CR 2008/28, p. 50, par. 66 (Bundy).
46
CR 2008/20, p. 36, par. 57 (Pellet).
47Voir CR 2008/20, p. 31-33, par. 52 (Pellet).
48Ibid., p. 33-34, par. 53 (Pellet). - 32 -
22. Il est d’ailleurs assez curieux que la Partie ukrainienne nous reproche de ne pas tenir
compte des circonstances de chaque espèce alors que le tableau n oVIII-4 décrit, sous une forme
certes résumée mais que je crois parfaitement honnête et objective, les circonstances mêmes que la
Cour ou les tribunaux arbitraux ont eux-mêmes mentionnées à l’appui de leurs décisions de
minimiser l’impact des îles en question sur la délimi tation. Il est vrai que, lors de son intervention
du 11septembre, RodmanBundy a déployé de gra nds efforts pour mettre en évidence ce qu’il
présente comme des particularités propres à certaines des affaires que j’avais citées qui, selon lui,
49
les distingueraient radicalement de la nôtre . Cette approche appelle à nouveau trois remarques :
⎯ en premier lieu, il est significatif que, dans tous ces cas, les circonstances que cite mon
contradicteur n’aient, précisément, pas été citées par la Cour ou les tribunaux arbitraux à
l’appui de leurs décisions de ne pas laisser les îles en question exercer un effet trop important
sur le tracé final de la frontière maritime ;
e
⎯ en deuxième lieu, et surtout, cédant aux démons qui obsèdent la Partie ukrainienne, M Bundy
met en avant, dans sept cas sur les dix qu’il évoque, la questi on de la (dis)proportion de la
longueur des côtes des Etats concernés 50 ! Mais, Monsieur le président, ceci est totalement
irrationnel, pour dire le moins : si la proportio nnalité peut, dans certains cas exceptionnels, être
une circonstance pertinente, la présence d’une petite île exerçant une distorsion très excessive
sur le tracé de la ligne en est une autre ! Il est tout aussi … absurde ⎯ je ne peux m’empêcher
de lâcher le mot… ⎯ de vouloir expliquer l’impact de la circonstance pertinente que constitue
51
une petite île par la configuration générale de la côte ⎯ ce que M. Bundy a fait à six reprises ,
alors que, comme je viens de le rappeler, il s’agit là encore d’une autre catégorie de
circonstances pertinentes. Cela confirme, si b esoin en est, que la Partie ukrainienne ne parle
52
qu’un langage: celui de la proportionnalité ⎯c’est son concombre , le concombre des
49CR 2008/28, p. 51-53, par. 71-82 (Bundy).
50Dans les affaires de la Mer d’Iroise (ibid., p.51, par.74), Libye/Tunisie (p. 51, par. 75), Libye/Malte (p.52,
par. 76), Jan Mayen (ibid.), Barbade/ Trinité-et-Tobago (ibid.), Erythrée/ Yémen (p. 52, par. 78), Golfe du Maine (p. 53,
par. 81-82).
51Voir les affaires de la Mer d’Iroise (ibid., p. 51, par. 74), Libye/Tunisie (p. 51, par. 75), Doubaï/Sharjah (p. 52,
par. 77), Erythrée/ Yémen (p. 52, par. 78), Nicaragua/Honduras (ibid.), Qatar/Bahreïn (p. 52, par. 79).
52Voir CR 2008/30, p. 18-19, par. 24 (Aurescu). - 33 -
mauvais élèves roumains! Ceci ne saurait, d écidément, constituer l’alpha et l’oméga de la
délimitation maritime !
⎯ j’ajoute en troisième lieu que la Cour et les tribunaux arbitraux ne se sont aventurés qu’avec
beaucoup de prudence sur ce terrain de la disparité entre les côtes des Parties ⎯ qu’il s’agisse
du «test de proportionnalité» dont parlera tout à l’heure le professeurLowe ou, plus encore
peut-être, d’en faire une circonstance pertinente, comme je le montrerai dans un instant.
23. Pour tenter de faire de l’île des Serpents (ou aux Serpents : je ne sais pas pourquoi mon
53
éminent ami le professeurQuéneudec semble préférer cette appellation ?...) une circonstance
pertinente qui devrait exercer un effet correcteur ma jeur sur l’orientation de la ligne, nos collègues
de l’autre côté de la barre s’emploient à l’affubler de caractéristiques qu’elle n’a pas. Selon eux, il
s’agirait :
54
⎯ d’une île «très en vue» (prominent) dans la mer Noire ⎯ dixit Mme Malintoppi ; il est vrai
qu’avec un sens plus aigu de la litote, M.Quéneudec remet les choses au point et concède
55
qu’elle n’est «certes pas très grande» et que ses dimensions sont «relativement modestes» ;
⎯ et il s’agirait, selon les cas, d’un «élément de la longue côte ukrainienne» (an element of the
long coastline of Ukraine 56), d’une partie intégrante de la géographie côtière (part of the coastal
57 58 59
geography ) ou de la «configuration côtière» , voire d’une «île côtière» ou, encore plus
60
imprudemment, d’une «avancée côtière» .
o
[Projection n°7: l’île des Serpents comme «avancée côtière» (onglet n VII-6 du dossier
documentaire de premier tour de la Roumanie).]
24. Certes, Monsieur le président, si l’Ukrain e incluait l’île des Serpents dans ses lignes de
base droites, on pourrait parler d’«avancée côtière» ⎯mais elle ne le fait pas, et, comme je l’ai
53
Voir CR 2008/29, p. 25, par. 16, p. 28, par. 34, p. 30, par. 42, p. 31, par. 47, p. 32, pa r. 48, p. 41, par. 96 et 97,
p. 43, par. 105 (Quéneudec).
54
CR 2008/29, p. 10, par. 29 (Malintoppi).
55
Ibid., p. 41, par. 98, et p. 28, par. 35.
56CR 2008/24, p. 15, par. 22 (Vassylenko).
57Ibid., p.34, par.64-65 (Bundy); CR2008/28, p.34, par.64 (B undy); voir aussi p.39, par.19, p.45, par.45,
ou p. 48, par. 60 (Bundy).
58CR 2008/29, p. 26, par. 16 (Quéneudec).
59Ibid., p. 30, par. 40-41 (Quéneudec).
60
Ibid., p. 42, par. 99 (Quéneudec). - 34 -
61
montré lors du premier tour de nos plaidoiries , elle ne pourrait pas le faire. Et pour une raison
très simple : l’île des Serpents n’est pas une île côtière ; elle n’est pas intégrée dans la géographie
côtière de l’Ukraine, mais elle constitue une formation maritime isolée loin de la côte, avec laquelle
elle n’entretient aucune relation pa rticulière (même si je prie la C our et la Partie ukrainienne de
bien vouloir excuser l’erreur que j’ai commi se il y a quinze jours en donnant pour distance, en
62
réalité, celle qui sépare l’île des Serpents de Sulina !).
[Fin de la projection n o 7.]
25. M.Quéneudec a donné, avec une robuste assurance, lors de sa dernière plaidoirie de la
semaine dernière, une définition inédite de ce qu’il faut entendre par «île côtière». Selon lui,
«[q]uand il y a chevauchement» entre la mer te rritoriale du continent et la mer territoriale
63
engendrée par l’île, «on est en présence d’une île côtière» . Cette définition a sûrement le grand
mérite à ses yeux de correspondre à la situation de l’île des Serpents mais elle n’a pas celui d’être
généralement admise. Et je me permets simplement de rappeler que, dans l’arbitrage entre les deux
Guinée, le tribunal a défini des îles côtières, comme celles «qui ne sont séparées de la terre ferme
que par des bras de mer ou cours d’eau de faible largeur et qui lui sont souvent reliées à marée
64
basse, [et] doivent être considérées comme parties intégrantes du continent» ?
[Projection n°8 : les îles côtières ukrainiennes.]
26. Monsieur le président, l’île des Serpents n’est pas une île côtière: éloignée de la côte,
isolée dans la mer Noire, contrairement à de «vrai es» îles côtières qui s’intègrent, elles, dans la
«géographie côtière» ukrainienne, et que, d’aille urs, l’Ukraine a notifiées comme points de base à
65
la Division du droit de la mer des NationsUnies . Tel est le cas, notamment des îlesTsyganka,
Koubansky ou Djarylgatch qui se trouvent pour Tsyganka et Djarylgatch, respectivement à
700mètres et 6,1km de la côte, tandis que Kouba nsky est intégrée dans le delta du Danube. On
61
CR 2008/20, p. 19-20, par. 25 (Pellet).
62
Voir CR 2008/20, p. 10, par. 2 (Pellet) ; voir aussi CR 2008/29, p. 29, par. 37-38 (Quéneudec).
63 CR 2008/29, p. 30, par. 41 (Quéneudec).
64 Sentence du 14 février 1985, Délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau ,
RSANU, vol. XIX, p. 183-184, par. 95.
65 Voir mémoire de la Roumanie (MR), annexe 27. - 35 -
peut relever en outre que ces îles ont des superficies très considérables de, respectivement, 4,6 km²,
25 km² et 62 km². Voilà de vraies îles côtières.
o o
[Fin de la projection n 8. Projection n 9 : l’île des Serpents comme circonstance (non) pertinente.]
27. Que faire alors de cette petite formati on insulaire isolée et inhospitalière? Une
circonstance pertinente sans doute, mais qui ne devr ait guère avoir d’incidence sur le tracé de la
frontière établie au départ sans la prendre en c onsidération. De deux choses l’une, Monsieur le
président :
⎯ ou bien, comme nous le croyons, l’espace maritime lui revenant a été fixé en1949 et il n’y a
pas lieu d’y revenir : pacta sunt servanda ; dans ce cas, l’arc de 12 milles tracé autour de l’île
des Serpents doit ensuite rejoindre la ligne d’équidistance comme le professeurLowe l’a
indiqué tout à l’heure ;
⎯ ou bien l’Ukraine maintient ⎯et la Cour accepte ⎯que cette délimitation s’est arrêtée au
pointF (ouA dans la nomenclature ukrainienne) et, dans cette seconde hypothèse, pour
reprendre la formule célèbre du Commander Kenn edy lors de la première Conférence des
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, il faut la traiter selon ses mérites 66(on its merits).
28. Malheureusement pour la Partie ukrainienne, les «mérites» de l’île des Serpents sont fort
limités et il n’y a aucune raison d’infléchir de manière importante la ligne d’équidistance tracée
67
initialement pour tenir compte de cet «élément parasite» somme toute fort secondaire. Vous
apercevez sur l’écran, Messieurs les juges, la ligne d’équidistance tracée, comme il se doit, sans
l’île des Serpents. Si on doit traiter celle-ci «sel on ses mérites», tout à fait indépendamment de la
question de savoir s’il s’agit ou non d’un rocher, un arc de cercle de 12 milles autour de l’île paraît
fort excessif et il serait sans doute plus logique et plus équitable de ne lui accorder vers le sud
qu’une mer territoriale de six milles marins. Toutefois, puisque délimitation conventionnelle il y a
eu, c’est bien une mer territoriale délimitée par un arc de cercle de 12 milles qu’il convient de lui
reconnaître. C’est faire amplement justice à cette circonstance à peine pertinente que constitue l’île
des Serpents.
66Voir Nations Unies, Documents officiels de l’Assemblée générale, vol. VI, Quatrième Commission, 32 séance
doc. A/CONF.13/42, p. 92, par. 3.
67Cf. L. Lucchini et M. Voelckel, Droit de la mer, tome 2, vol. 1, Délimitation, Pedone, Paris, 1996, p. 259. - 36 -
o
[Fin de la projection n 9.]
Mr. President, since I probably still have 15 mi nutes to go and since the second part of our
presentation would be shorter than the remaining time, it might be the right time to have a break.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you very much, Professor Pellet. I think
this would be the right time to take a short break.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.35 a.m.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. Professor Pellet, would you
kindly continue with your speech.
M. PELLET : Thank you very much.
4. La disparité entre les longueurs des côtes des Parties
29. J’en viens maintenant, Monsieur le pr ésident, à l’antienne obsessionnelle de nos amis
ukrainiens : la proportionnalité, qui semble constituer leur indépassable horizon.
30. Qu’elle ait un rôle à jouer en matière de délimitation maritime, nul n’en disconvient.
Mais :
⎯ elle ne saurait intervenir durant la première phase, celle de la construction de la ligne
d’équidistance ;
⎯ elle est une circonstance pertinente parmi d’autres (et, à vrai dire , elle n’entre en lice au second
stade, celui dont je suis en train de parler, que tout à fait exceptionnellement) ; et
⎯ d’une manière générale, ce n’est qu’à l’occasion de la troisième étape qu’elle
intervient ⎯ parfois, pas toujours ⎯ pour tester le caractère équitable de la frontière une fois la
ligne d’équidistance éventuellement ajustée en fonction des circonstances pertinentes de
l’espèce.
Je ne m’intéresse pour l’instant qu’au premier de ces deux aspects : le cas où la disparité entre les
côtes pertinentes des deux Etats est tellement manifeste qu’elle peut apparaître comme une
circonstance conduisant à ajuster la ligne d’équi distance au stadeII. Mon collègue et ami
Vaughan Lowe traitera du test de proportionnalité dans un instant. - 37 -
31. Une remarque préalable cependant ⎯qui concerne non pas la deuxième, mais la
première étape. Contrairement à ce qu’ils professent parfois du bout des lèvres 68, les avocats de
l’Ukraine utilisent bel et bien la différence entre la longueur des côtes non seulement à la
deuxièmeétape de leur raisonnement, puis à la troi sième, mais aussi à la première, celle de la
construction initiale de la ligne d’équidistance. Et lors de la phase écrite, ce n’est que sur la base
de la proportionnalité que la ligne d’équidistance avai t été construite. Lors de la phase orale, ceci
est à nouveau apparu avec une netteté particulière dans la plaidoirie de M. Bundy du 11 septembre :
alors qu’il était censé critiquer la ligne d’équidistance retenue par la Roumanie, il n’a eu de cesse
d’introduire la disparité marquée qui existe rait entre les longueurs des côtes des Parties 69. Or,
décidément, Monsieur le président, la proporti onnalité ne saurait tenir lieu de méthode de
délimitation : «l’utilisation de la proportionnalité comme véritable méthode ne trouve aucun appui
dans la pratique des Etats ou leurs prises de position publiques … non plus que dans la
jurisprudence» [«the use of proportionality as a method in its own right is wanting of support in the
practice of States, in the public expression of their views …, or in the jurisprudence»] ( Plateau
continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/M alte), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1985, p.45-46, par.58; voir
aussi, par exemple, Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine
70
(Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1984 , p.323, par.185) , et ceci demeure
vrai.
32. Quant au recours à la proportionnalité (ou «disproportionnalité») en tant que circonstance
pertinente, il est sans doute exagéré d’affirmer, comme l’a fait le professeurQuéneudec, qu’«une
inégalité flagrante ou même une simple disparité des longueurs côtières a été regardée à plusieurs
reprises comme une circonstance appelant une modi fication plus ou moins importante de la ligne
d’équidistance» 71. L’exagération est double, Monsieur le président; contrairement à cette
surprenante allégation,
68
Voir par exemple CR 2008/24, p. 29, par. 42, ou p. 35, par. 67 (Bundy).
69CR 2008/28, p. 44, par. 45 ; p. 46, par. 49 ; p. 50, par. 67 (Bundy).
70Sentence arbitrale du 17 décembre 1999, Sentence du Tribunal arbitral rendue au terme de la seconde étape de
la procédure entre l’Erythrée et la République du Yémen (Délimitation maritime), RSANU XXII, p.372, par.165;
sentence arbitrale du 26 mars 2002, Arbitrage entre la province de Terre-Neu ve et du Labrador et la province de la
Nouvelle-Ecosse, par. 5.17.
71CR 2008/26, p. 18, par. 77 (Quéneudec). - 38 -
1) ni la Cour, ni aucun tribunal arbitral n’ a jamais procédé à un ajustement de la ligne
d’équidistance dans l’hypothèse d’une «simple disparité»; la jurisprudence sur ce point est
constante et bien établie: pour constituer une ci rconstance pertinente, la disparité en question
doit être «substantielle» ( Ibid., ; ou Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le
Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil2002 ,
p.446, par.301), «forte» ( Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 50, par. 67), et seule une «très grande différence de longueurs des côtes
pertinentes» (ibid., p. 49, par. 66 ; voir aussi Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre
le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c.Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1993 , p.67, par.65)
peut justifier un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance ; en conséquence,
2) il y est, à vrai dire, procédé très exceptionnellement.
33. M. Quéneudec en a trouvé trois exemples : les affaires du Golfe de Maine, Libye/Malte et
de Jan Mayen 72 ; comme je suis un adversaire honnête et scrupuleux, je note qu’il a oublié le
quatrième (et seul autre) exemple d’un ajuste ment effectué sur la base du principe de
proportionnalité: la sentence arbitrale de 2006 dans l’affaire Barbade/Trinité-et-Tobago . Aucun
de ces quatre uniques précédents ⎯dont deux seulement nous intéressent directement pour
l’instant ⎯ n’est comparable à notre affaire :
⎯ Très clairement, dans deux au moins de ces quatre cas, la disparité entre la longueur des côtes
des Parties a joué un rôle correcteur non pas au stade des circonstances pertinentes, mais à celui
du test final (c’est le cas s’agissant de Libye/Malte, d’une part ( Plateau continental
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1985 , p.45-46, par.58-59), et de
Barbade et Trinité-et-Tobago, d’autre part 73).
⎯ On ne peut pas tenir compte de ces deux affaires à ce stade car, malgré l’amalgame que
semblent vouloir faire nos adversaires, les pa ramètres à prendre en considération sont
différents :
«L’étude de la comparabilité ou non-co mparabilité des longueurs de côte est un
élément du processus par lequel une limite équitable est obtenue en partant d’une ligne
médiane initiale ; le critère d’une proportionnalité raisonnable de ces longueurs est en
72
CR 2008/26, p. 18, par. 77 (Quéneudec).
73Sentence arbitrale du 11 avril 2006, Barbade et Trinité-et-Tobago, par. 376. - 39 -
revanche un moyen qui peut être utilisé pour s’assurer de l’équité d’une ligne
quelconque, indépendamment de la méthode utilisée pour aboutir à cette ligne.»
(Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe lib yenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985,
p. 49, par. 66.)
Au stade qui nous intéresse, c’est la longueur respective des côtes des Parties qui importe.
o
[Projection n 10 : golfe du Maine.]
⎯ Dans Golfe du Maine, la Chambre a pris en compte une différence de 1,38 à 1 dans la longueur
des côtes des Parties pour procéder à un ajustement arrivant à un ratio de 1 à 1 ⎯ce qui est
une exception totalement isolée, tous les arrêts et toutes les sentences arbitrales se plaisant au
contraire à souligner (qu’il s’agisse de la phase deux ou de la phase trois) que
«quand une forte disparité est à retenir comme circonstance pertinente, une définition
rigoureuse n’est pas indispensable et elle n’est d’ailleurs pas appropriée. Si la
disparité n’apparaît qu’après définition et comparaison minutieuses des côtes, il est par
hypothèse improbable qu’elle soit d’une ampl eur telle qu’on puisse lui attribuer un
poids quelconque comme circonstance pertinente.» (Ibid., p. 49, par. 67.)
Ce qui peut se lire comme un désaveu de la méthode retenue dans Golfe du Maine . Au
surplus, comme le montre la projection en cours, la translation de la ligne effectuée par la
Chambre ⎯qui ne concerne qu’un secteur limité de la frontière maritime qu’elle devait
établir, a été assez réduite, comme le montre le croquis; il en irait très différemment dans
notre affaire si la Cour donnait une suite favorable aux prétentions de la Partie ukrainienne.
Monsieur le président, je ne suis pas sûr que l’arrêt de1985 mérite toutes les critiques dont
mon collègue JamesCrawford l’a accablé hier, mais ce qui est sûr, et il l’a fort bien montré,
est que la situation du «golfe d’Ukraine» ⎯ si golfe il y a ⎯ n’a strictement rien à voir avec
celle du golfe du Maine ⎯ et les avocats de l’Ukraine, qui se déclarent si attachés au caractère
spécifique, propre à chaque situation devraient, je pense, être sensibles à ces différences qui
sautent aux yeux…
o
[Fin de la projection n 10.]
⎯ S’agissant de Jan Mayen , la disproportion était de 1 à 9,1 ou 9,2, selon les calculs
(Délimitation maritime dans la région située en tre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark
c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p.65, par.61); étant donné son importance, la Cour a
estimé être en présence de l’une de ces situations
«dans lesquelles le rapport existant entre la longueur des côtes pertinentes et les
surfaces maritimes qu’elles génèrent par application de la méthode de l’équidistance - 40 -
est si disproportionné qu’il a été jugé nécessai re de tenir compte de cette circonstance
pour parvenir à une solution équitable» (ibid., p. 67, par. 65).
Mais cet ajustement, dicté par une disparité vraiment très considérable entre les côtes des
Parties (et sans commune mesure avec celle exis tant dans notre espèce, quels que soient les
côtes de référence et le mode de calcul retenu) , c’est cette énorme disparité qui a conduit la
Cour à effectuer une translation de la ligne d’équidistance qui est très loin de refléter le rapport
entre les côtes du Groenland, d’une part, de Jan Mayen, d’autre part: la surface maritime
allouée à Jan Mayen demeure hors de toute pr oportion avec l’énorme différence qui existe
entre les côtes des deux territoires.
⎯ Par contraste, dans l’affaire du Plateau continental entre la Tunisie et la Libye, la Cour a
considéré que le «résultat, qui [tenait] compte de toutes les circonstances pertinentes, paraît
satisfaire au critère de proportionnalité en tant qu’aspect de l’équité», bien qu’il traduisît un
rapport des zones maritimes revenant aux Par ties de 1 à 1,5 pour un rapport des côtes de
1 à 2,23 74; de même dans l’affaire entre la province de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador et la
province de la Nouvelle-Ecosse, le Tribunal arbitral a estimé que des rapports de côtes de 52 et
48 % rapportés à des rapports de zones de 39 et 61 % ou de 33 et 67 % pour les côtes comparés
75
à 38 et 62 % pour les zones n’étaient pas «révélateurs d’une disproportionnalité stupéfiante» .
34. Monsieur le président, malgré l’enthous iasme manifesté par nos contradicteurs pour la
proportionnalité, il n’y a pas grand-chose à tirer de tout ceci. Comme le disent à la fois Shakespeare
et … Daniel Müller 76, tout cela fait «beaucoup de bruit pour rien»!
⎯ il est extrêmement rare que la disparité des côtes des Parties intervienne à titre de «circonstance
pertinente» en matière de délimitation maritime;
⎯ lorsque c’est le cas, la Cour et les tribunaux arbitraux ont toujours considéré que des marges
considérables étaient parfaitement tolérables à cet égard (à l’exception de la Chambre de la
Cour dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine ; mais il s’agit d’un précédent un peu «limite» et qui,
pour le reste, ne présente, de toutes façons aucune similitude avec notre affaire) ; et,
74
Arrêt du 24 février 1982, Rec. 1982, p. 91, par. 131.
75S.A., 26 mars 2002, Arbitrage entre la province de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador et la province de la
Nouvelle-Ecosse, par. 5.18.
76CR 2008/30, 15 septembre 2008, p. 66, par. 2 (Müller). - 41 -
⎯ en la présente espèce, aucune disparité manifeste et extrême de la longueur des côtes
respectives Parties n’existe, et ceci que l que soit le mode de calcul retenu ⎯ le
professeurVaughan Lowe sera plus spécifique à cet égard lorsqu’il va présenter, dans un
instant, le fameux «test de proportionnalité»; il ne nous a pas paru nécessaire de répéter deux
fois l’énoncé de ces précisions.
[Projection n 10 bis : la part de la Roumanie I (reprise de la projection n 2).]
35. Mais, surtout, le plus important est aille urs, Monsieur le président: la proportionnalité
n’est, en tout état de cause, que l’une des circ onstances pertinentes qui pourraient éventuellement,
si les conditions étaient réunies ⎯ quod non, être prises en considération pour infléchir, le cas
échéant, et en les prenant toutes en compte, la ligne d’équidistance tracée par la Roumanie
conformément au droit international, afin de parvenir à un résultat équitable. Or toutes les
circonstances de l’espèce concourent à la même conclusion: cette li gne n’appelle aucune
correction ; le résultat auquel elle conduit est équitable comme le montre la carte qui est, à nouveau
projetée à l’écran.
o o
[Projection n 10 ter : la part de la Roumanie II (reprise de la projection n 3).]
36. La ligne ukrainienne qui repose sur une ligne d’équidistance construite sur des bases
arbitraires et qui a été retouchée au nom de circonstances non pertinentes, conduit, elle, à un
résultat inéquitable.
37. Je ne doute pas, Monsieur le président, que la démonstration à laquelle va procéder mon
excellent collègue, le professeur Vaughan Lowe, au sujet du test de proportionnalité «de troisième
phase» confirmera pleinement cette conclusion. Et je vous prie de bien vouloir lui donner à
nouveau la parole. Merci infiniment, Messieurs de la Cour, pour l’attention que vous m’avez
prêtée.
[Fin de la projection.]
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Professor Pellet, for your speech. I
now call on Professor Vaughan Lowe. - 42 -
LMOW. E:
IX. C HECKING EQUITABLENESS ; CONCLUSION
1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court: the end is in sight! I shall respond to
Ukraine’s submissions concerning the equitableness of our respective proposals and briefly
summarize our position and the key points that still divide the Parties.
Judge Oxman’s second question
2. Before I do so it is convenient to respond to JudgeOxman’s second question, which
related to the relevance of Articles33 and 303 on the contiguous zone, and of Article8 of the
2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: and this question was put
only to Romania.
3. Romania introduced a contiguous zone law in 1990, and it notified its extent in 1997 by a
77
map that was introduced into the pleadings by Ukraine . [Graphic: tab 1] That map, now on the
screen, is the map which we wished to show you yesterday. You can see the line indicating the
outer limit of the territorial sea, the first of tlines parallel to the coast; the territorial sea is
shaded in pink. Further out, the contiguous zone is shaded in green: and at the top of the chart, in
the region of Serpents’ Island, you can see clearly that the northernmost point of the outer limit of
the territorial sea, is located on the arc around Serpents’ Island, and that the lateral limit of the
shading indicating the contiguous zone also follows an arc around the island. This is in full
conformity with the 1949 procès-verbaux. Ukraine has never challenged that map, and it must be
considered to have accepted the claim that it depicts ⎯ which is, of course, quite irreconcilable
with the claim line that Ukraine advances here. [End graphic]
4. Neither Party has put forward a case which refers to a contiguous zone claim extending
beyond the limits of the EEZ claim that it makes. Indeed, the excl usive nature of the competences
established by Article303 of the Law of the Sea Convention, and by Article8 of the
2001Convention on the Protection of the Underwat er Cultural Heritage, makes it difficult to see
77
CMU, Ann. 41. - 43 -
how it would be possible for one State’s contiguous zone to overlap with the contiguous zone or
EEZ of another State.
5. Romania’s contiguous zone will therefore consist of the waters lying between 12and
24 miles from its baseline, on the Romanian side of the boundary that the Court will draw.
6. We recognize that Article121, paragr aph3, precludes only claims to an EEZ or
continental shelf off the islands to which it applies. It does not preclude a claim to a contiguous
zone. But that causes no difficulties in the present case, because neither Party has suggested that
the limits of its contiguous zone should be any diffe rent from the limits of the first 12 miles of its
EEZ, either now or in the future: and Ukraine has, at present, no legislation on the EEZ.
7. Moreover, as the Court is by now well aware, Romania considers that an all-purpose
maritime boundary was fixed in 1949. And that boundary would apply equally to the contiguous
zone. Romania has also submitted that under contemporary delimitation practice Serpents’ Island
would in any event certainly get no more than a 12-mile territorial sea, and would probably get
much less.
Equitableness of the line
8. Let me turn now to the question of the check on the equitableness of the line. Throughout
78
its oral pleadings Ukraine insisted that this is not a case about Serpents’ Island , and that Romania
was attempting to impose an artificial focus on the case so as to divert attention from what are truly
the key features of the case.
9. My first point is that the attention that Romania has paid to Serpents’ Island is no more
than a reflection of its significance in this case. [Graphic] We have shown you what the
equidistance line drawn without Serpents’ Island looks like. It is a fact that Romania believes that
the provisional equidistance line must be drawn without using Serpents’ Island as a base point, and
that Ukraine thinks it should be drawn using Serpents’ Island as a base point: and it is this
difference between the Parties which produces the greatest difference in their respective provisional
equidistance lines.
78
See e.g. CR 2008/24, p. 15, paras 22 and 23 (Vassylenko); CR 2008/28, p. 48, para. 60 (Bundy) - 44 -
10. Romania has given Serpents’ Island so much attention because so much hangs on the
question of its legal status and effect. We think th at Ukraine in fact shares this view, and that this
is the explanation for its attempts to create and artificially sustain a small settlement on the island.
[End graphic]
11. Ukraine may say that this view is mi sconceived, because it focuses upon the stage one
drawing of the provisional equidistance line, when the overwhelmingly significant task is the stage
two adjustment to take account of what it calls th e predominant characteristics in the general area
of the delimitation. Those characteristics, it says, are the fact that the area, first, is like a gulf, three
sides of which are Ukrainian coast, and second, that Ukraine’s coast is much longer that Romania’s
coast.
12. Similarly, Ukraine stresses that you should take account of these characteristics at stage
two, and not leave them until stage three where th ey would perform the different role of a check
upon the equitableness of the adjusted delimitation line.
The importance of a stage-by-stage approach
13. Romania attaches much importance to the proper application of the stage-by-stage
approach. It might be thought that if one is to draw a provisional equidistance line, and then check
it against coastal lengths and coastal areas for its equitableness, the order in which one applies the
various tests does not matter much ⎯ that it all amounts to the same thing in the end. In
Romania’s submission, that is not so. The correct application of the successive stages of
delimitation is more than pedantry, and more even than the matter of following the established
practice and discipline in this field. It can actually affect the outcome.
14. Let me explain briefly. The choice of the provisional equidistance line is of great
significance. The Parties are agreed that the stage three equitableness test is not a matter of
correcting the provisional equidistance line so as to deliver to each Party a share of the relevant
area that is mathematically proportionate to its share of the combined relevant coast. The
requirement is not to achieve proportionality, but rather to avoid gross disproportionality.
15. We have referred to cases such as Eritrea/Yemen in which the Tribunal found that the
coastal lengths were in a ratio of 1.31:1, and the marine spaces in a ratio of 1.09:1, and that this was - 45 -
not disproportionate . There one State received about one fifth less of the area than it might have
expected under strict proportionality. But consider how this works in practice.
[Graphic]
16. Assume that the relevant area is 150miles across, and that a provisional equidistance
line, adjusted to take account of coastal lengths and other special circumstances ⎯ one might think
of a configuration similar to Jan Mayen ⎯ is set along a line 40miles off StateA, and 110miles
off State B. The proportionality test is applied, and it shows that a strict proportionality of coastal
lengths and coastal areas would place the line 50 miles off State A. The tribunal sees that State A
has been given around one fifth less of the ar ea than it might have expected under strict
proportionality. It follows Eritrea/Yemen and says that this is not grossly disproportionate, and it
upholds the provisional adjusted equidistance line.
17. But if the adjusted provisional equidi stance line had first been placed not 40, but
70miles off StateA, so that StateB got 80miles, it could be said that StateB has been given
around one fifth less of the area ⎯ 80 rather than 100miles ⎯ that it might have expected under
strict proportionality. Here, too, the tribunal could follow Eritrea/Yemen and say that this is not
grossly disproportionate and upholds the adjusted provisional equidistance line.
18. The proportionality test can consecrate ve ry different lines, regarding each of them as
producing a result within the bounds of equitable proportionality. But the results are obviously not
the same: here, one line gives StateA 40miles, the other 70miles ⎯ 75percent more than the
first. That is why we say that it is essential to get the provisional equidistance line right in the first
place. The order of the stages is critical. And it is also a useful reminder of the perils of relying
too heavily upon proportionality as an indication of fairness. [End graphic]
19. It is for these reasons that Romania has pa id close attention to the proper construction of
the provisional equidistance line, and to the three-stage approach to the delimitation process.
Ukraine’s argument on the disparity in coastal lengths
20. Ukraine’s strategy of placing relative co astal lengths in centre stage is perfectly
understandable. Each Party is putting its strongest case to the Court: that is how litigation works.
79
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, Second Stage: Maritime Delimitation, award dated 17 Dec. 1999, para. 168. - 46 -
But there is a risk that the insistence on relative coastal lengths may distract attention from the need
to follow the correct procedure to prepare the ground for the proper application of the
proportionality test.
21. There is a risk, which Ukraine has perhap s not entirely avoided, that proportionality of
coastal lengths and sea areas will slide into the role of an independent method of adjusting the
provisional equidistance line, and of establishing the final delimitation line. And that is precisely
what it is not supposed to do: “the principle of proporti onality . . . is not an independent mode or
principle of delimitation, but rather a test of the equitableness of a delimitation arrived at by some
other means” 80.
22. Ukraine seems to suggest that because it has a long coast the provisional equidistance
line should be adjusted to give it a greater sea ar ea. But why should that be so? [Graphic] The
graphic on the screen shows a reasonably straight co astline with States of different coastal lengths.
And a glance at it is enough to see that there is no basis here for an argument that the provisional
equidistance lines should be adjusted so as to reflect the very different coastal lengths of the States.
In the case of adjacent States, it is hard to see what reason there could be for regarding relative
coastal lengths as a special circumstance. [End graphic]
23. Ukraine’s response seems to be that we are ignoring two overwhelmingly important
factors: the uniqueness of the coastal configuration 81, and the fact that Ukraine surrounds the
82
delimitation area on three sides .
24. The uniqueness we concede: it is as indis putable as it is unhelpful. There is a lapel
badge which says: “Remember. You’re unique; just like everybody else.” Each delimitation is
different: but the point of having legal principl es is to inject an element of consistency and
reasoned justice into the approach to this important task.
[Graphic]
25. As for the three-sided argument: first, it is not really true. As we have shown you,
Romania’s coast south of Sacalin projects onto an area that is not bounded by the Ukrainian coast,
80Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, Second Stage: Maritime Delimitation, award dated 17 Dec. 1999, para. 165.
81
CR 2008/28, p. 50, para. 66 (Bundy).
82CR 2008/28, p. 52, para. 77 (Bundy); CR 2008/29, p. 38, para. 79 (Quéneudec). - 47 -
although Ukraine has an interest in it by virtue of the southerly projection from its coast around
Cape Sarych. [End graphic]
26. And second, there is a point which is smothered by the confidence and vigour with which
my colleague and friend Mr.Bundy trumpets the three-side argument. So what? To take a
paradigmatic case, if State A has half of one side –– [Have you lost the ––] With your indulgence,
Mr. President, all the linguistic finesse that I coul d muster would not be an adequate substitute for
this graphic.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Take your time.
Mr. LOWE: [Graphic] To take a paradigmatic case, if State A has half of one side of a gulf,
and State B has two-and-a-half sides, what Mr. Bundy would call three sides, the equidistance line
would give State B three quarters, and State A one quarter, of the area of the gulf. What is wrong
with that? Ukraine would no doubt say that it is wrong because the areas are in a ratio of 3:1, but
the coastal lengths are in a ratio of 5:1. And that is precisely my point. If one thinks that the
disparity in ratios is excessive, on what other gr ound than coastal length might one object? The
“three sides” argument is a repetition of the coastal lengths argument ⎯ a cucumber, as my Agent
would call it. [End graphic]
27. The Court has made the clear distinction between the stage two application and the stage
three application of a reference to the disparity in coastal lengths. ProfessorQuéneudec cites the
83
Court’s 1985 Libya/Malta decision . As he points out, the Court said there that a disparity in
coastal lengths can indeed be relevant both at stage two, as a reason for adjusting the provisional
equidistance line, and in stage three in the context of the proportionality test.
28. It is in the paragraph which follows that which Professor Quéneudec quoted to the Court
that the Court explained this point, in a manner that bears directly upon this case. It said:
“The question as to which coasts of th e two States concerned should be taken
into account is clearly one which has eventua lly to be answered with some degree of
precision in the context of the test of proportionality as a verification of the equity of
the result. Such a test would be meaningless in the absence of a precise definition of
the ‘relevant coasts’ and the ‘relevant area’, of the kind which the Court carried out in
the Tunisia/Libya case. Where a marked disparity requires to be taken into account as
83
CR 2008/29, p. 40, para. 89 (Quéneudec), citing I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 49, para. 66. - 48 -
a relevant circumstance, however, this ri gorous definition is not essential and indeed
not appropriate. If the disparity in question only emerges after scrupulous definition
and comparison of coasts, it is ex hypothesi unlikely to be of such extent as to carry
weight as a relevant circumstance.” (I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 49, para. 67.)
In29. Libya/Malta the coastal ratio was 8:1. In this case the coastal ratio is 1.4:1 in favour
of Ukraine, and the relevant coastal area is divide d in a ratio of 1.7:1 in favour of Ukraine. The
figures are in paragraph 12.6 of our Memorial. The disparity in coastal lengths only becomes clear
when one measures the ratios down to one decimal place.
30. Ukraine’s attempt to cast Romania in the ro le of Malta, and itself in the role of Libya is,
we submit, unsustainable. If relative coastal lengths were to be regarded as a factor requiring the
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line in cases such as this now before the Court, that
would elevate the proportionality issue into the dominant principle for maritime delimitation ⎯
into the dominant method of maritime delimitation ⎯ and it would contradict 50years of
international jurisprudence.
31. Plainly, the disparity in coastal lengths in this case is a matter, not for the stage two
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line but for the stage three proportionality test.
32. Ukraine says that we take this view because we ignore its northern coast.
ProfessorCrawford touched yesterday on the question of relevant coasts, but it is central to the
question of proportionality, and there is a little more that needs to be said about it.
33. Once we venture beyond the mantra of the land dominating the sea, the Parties have
fundamentally different conceptions of the relationship between the coast and the sea. [Graphic]
Ukraine’s view ⎯ and I hope that I characterize it both fairly and accurately ⎯ is that any portion
of coastal land generates an entitlement to an EEZ within 200 miles of any part of that portion of
84
land . ProfessorCrawford showed you Mr.Bundy’s graphic showing the northern coast
generating maritime entitlements for Ukraine like an X-ray, passing through solid land masses in
the Tarkhankut peninsula to generate maritime zones on the other side of that land mass. It is a
formidable feat 85.
84See, e.g., CR 2008/24, p. 23, para. 18 (Bundy).
85
CR 2008/30, p. 31, paras. 38-39 (Crawford). - 49 -
34. ProfessorCrawford also showed you what is wrong with that approach 86. [Add one
wave, then a second wave, etc. ⎯ slowly] You can follow the development. If there were only a
6- or 12-mile zone there would be little overlap. Only at the land boundary would delimitation be
necessary. It is only when the coasts generate wi der zones that an acute problem of delimitation
arises. It is a truism, but worth seeing played out on the screen: a delimitation problem only arises
when the available space does not permit each segment of coast to generate its own entitlement to a
maritime zone without overlapping with an area generated by another coast.
35. And the point that is crucial in this case is that Ukraine’s northern coast is not squeezed
out by Romania’s coasts. Its maritime zones do not overlap with Romania’s maritime zones. They
overlap with Ukraine’s maritime zones, and it is Ukraine’s western and eastern coasts which
squeeze out, or eclipse, the effect of Ukraine’s northern coast. [End graphic]
36. The point can be made in a different way. Take the position illustrated on the screen.
[Graphic] On this basis, waters lying immediatel y adjacent to the low-water mark of StateA and
within StateA’s territorial sea, 198miles west of the land boundary between StateA and
State B ⎯ point1 on the graphic ⎯ can be said, according to Ukraine, to be “generated by” the
coast of State B. Of course, they can also be said to be generated by the coast of State A; and there
is therefore a need to delimit the maritime zones of States A and B.
37. We are, no doubt, agreed that in this paradigmatic case the proper delimitation line is a
perpendicular, an equidistance line, drawn at th e land boundary between A and B. But though we
may agree on the result, Romania certainly does not accept the oversimplified rationalization
proposed by Ukraine.
38. The difference between us is evident if one looks at the graphic and asks, which coast
generates point1? Ukraine would say, both the coasts of StateA and the coast of StateB ⎯ or,
perhaps, more precisely, the coasts of State A and of State B in so far as each lies within 200 miles
of point 1. But in our view, that response is unhelpful.
39. Naturally, we accept that if StateA did not exist, StateB’s coast would generate the
maritime zone at point1; and that if StateB di d not exist, StateA’s coast would do so. We can
86
CR 2008/30, p. 31, para. 40 (Crawford). - 50 -
see, too, that as a table-top exercise in delimitation, it can make geometrical sense to draw the radii
and semicircles as they are drawn in the graphic in order to construct the line on the map. But the
cartographical construction of the line and the le gal analysis which precedes it are tasks of a very
different character.
40. The legal analysis must be consistent with rules of international law, and reflect the
principles and concepts underlying the law in this area. The cartographer, on the other hand, can
properly take a geometrical approach; and that essential difference in focus is why Ukraine’s
approach ⎯ perfectly proper as a tool for the cartographer ⎯ is not much help for the lawyer, as a
step in the legal analysis prior to the geometrica l construction of the line. And this is where we
differ. [End graphic]
41. Let me recall those fundamental legal principles. In the first round we referred to the
passage from the Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases in which the Court spoke of
the necessity for “applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable
principles, in accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal
régime of the continental shelf in this field . . .” (I. C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 85).
42. That reference was no mere adornment to our pleading. The need to approach the task of
delimitation, “in accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development of the
legal régime of the continental shelf”, and now of the EEZ, is of primordial importance. The
central underlying idea is that of “prolongation”: the idea that each segment of coast must be
allowed, as far as possible, to generate its own maritime zones; the idea that maritime zones are
prolongations, extensions, projections, of the adj acent land territory. In our submission, Ukraine
has lost sight of those fundamental principles in the presentation of its case on relevant coasts.
43. In Romania’s view, one must ask, not what segments of coasts could generate an
entitlement to a maritime zone at any given point in the waters adjacent to the two States, but
rather, what segments of coast do generate the entitlement at any given point. [Graphic] As we
have shown you, it is not the northern coast that generates Ukraine’s entitlement to waters that
overlap with waters to which Romania has an entitle ment. It is segments 1, 2 and 8 of Ukraine’s
coast that generate that entitlement. That was why we excluded the northern coast, and how we - 51 -
arrived at the ratio for coasts of 1:1.4 in favour of Ukraine, and for maritime areas of 1:1.7 in
favour of Ukraine. [End graphic]
44. [Graphic] That is also why we object to the exclusion by Ukraine of the “eastern
triangle”, south of Cape Sarych. Romania’s claim there is obviously generated by its coast south of
Sacalin 87. Far from fizzling out somewhere to the west of Cape Sarych, the claim extends across
the Black Sea. Romania looks, at this point, straight across to Russia and Georgia. Ukraine wishes
to see itself as omnipresent in the region; but ther e are areas where it is not the only, or even the
predominant, presence. It has an interest in th ese waters between Romania and Russia; and so, of
course, does Romania. Beyond Romania’s 200-mile limit the area remains an area of overlapping
entitlements, even where it is not an area of overlap ping claims. It is a part of the relevant area
which you are asked to delimit. [End graphic]
45. [Graphic] Even if the northern coast of Ukraine were to be taken into account, with the
exception –– as is shown on this graphic –– of the Karkanitska gulf, which cannot possibly be said
to generate areas overlapping with Romania’s mari time entitlement, the ratio of coastal lengths
would still only be 1:2.31, and the ratio of maritime areas, using Romania’s maritime delimitation
line, would be 1:2.01, both in fa vour of Ukraine. Following Ukraine’s model, these ratios are
calculated taking into account the lengths of the co asts, not of their baselines as we did in the
written Pleadings, and this explains the slight diffe rence in areas. This, we submit, is well within
the range of “not disproportionate” results; a nd it confirms that the Romanian delimitation line
achieves an equitable result. [End graphic]
46. [Graphic] Ukraine says that our line cuts off its coast; as Professor Pellet said, we do not
accept that. We say that Ukraine’s line cuts off Romania’s coast. There is no accepted
mathematical index of cut-off or occlusion; and I think that I can best assist the Court on this point
by setting out side-by-side maps showing the alleged “cut-offs” of each side’s delimitation line,
and leaving it to the Court to decide whether eith er of the claims does result in a cut-off. [End
graphic]
87
CR 2008/30, p. 32, para. 45 (Crawford). - 52 -
47. There are, in Romania’s view, no special circumstances of a kind which would warrant
any principled adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. Mr.Bundy made a rather
half-hearted attempt to say that it is Ukraine which polices these areas, and that this gives it a
particular interest. But if the waters were ac knowledged to be Romanian, it is Romania that would
be policing them, to the extent that activity in that area of the sea requires policing.
48. There is a further point. Romania submits that equitableness is also to be appraised by
reference to the way in which the delimitation so lution gives effect to, and does not undermine,
pre-existent agreements between the Parties. I am not referring to the 1949 procès-verbaux ⎯
which have been discussed at length and whose eff ects are crystal clear. But last week counsel for
Ukraine embarked upon a complicated interpreta tion of a provision of the 2003Border Régime
Treaty 88, to which ProfessorCrawford referred briefly yesterday 89. The provision in question,
Article1 of the 2003Treaty, reads as follows: “The territorial seas of the Contracting Parties
measured from the baselines shall permanently have, at the meeting point of their outer limits, the
width of 12 maritime miles.”
49. [Graphic] Under this provision, the Parti es envisaged that, should it be necessary for the
position of the final point to be moved b ecause of the extension of Sulina dyke, new
procès-verbaux would be concluded. Thus, the tw o Parties agreed that in future it might be
necessary that the final point be moved to preserve the breadth of Romania’s territorial sea.
50. But the only possible way in which this could be done ⎯ given that the final point would
also have to be 12 miles from Serpents’ Island ⎯ would be to move it around the 12-nautical-mile
arc which surrounds Serpents’ Island.
51. This would be perfectly possible if the maritime boundary follows the 12-nautical-mile
arc around Serpents’ Island, as Romania submits. But it would be impossible if Ukraine’s
delimitation line were adopted. With Ukraine’s proposed line, an extension to the Romanian
territorial sea of the kind provided for in the 2003 Treaty would overlap with the Ukrainian EEZ or
continental shelf. [End graphic]
88
CR 2008/29, p. 34, para. 46 (Quéneudec).
8CR 2008/30, p. 50, paras. 25-26 (Crawford). - 53 -
52. So we submit that the desirability of upholding, rather than undermining, the
2003 agreement is a further factor reinforcing the equitable result achieved by Romania’s proposed
line.
53. And for these reasons, Romania submits that its delimitation line is in full conformity
with international law.
Romania’s proposed delimitation line
[Graphic]
54. Let me conclude by summarizing Romania’s proposed delimitation line.
55. In the sector of adjacent coasts, let me st art in the east, at pointT, where the further
course of the line southwards becomes controlled by base points on the opposite coasts and the line
ceases to be an adjacent coast delimitation line and becomes an opposite coast delimitation line.
56. Moving west from point T, Romania has used a provisional equidistance line drawn from
the mainland coasts. In fact, the provisional equi distance line that we have used in this case is
drawn not from the tip of Sulina dyke but from the lighthouse on the naturally-formed island that is
almost at the end of the dyke. The difference, which came to light only recently when Romania
obtained computerized cartographic software, mean s that the mainland equidistance line that we
have used is slightly south of the true equidistance line, to Ukraine’s slight advantage.
57. Serpents’ Island is not used as a base point because its maritime entitlement was fixed by
agreement in 1949, and it would in any even t not generate a larger zone under established
delimitation principles and, furthermore, Article 121 (3) of the Law of the Sea Convention limits it
to a 12-nautical-mile zone.
58. In the west, the provisional equidistan ce line encounters the 12-mile zone drawn by
agreement around Serpents’ Island in 1949. Roma nia maintains that it was agreed that the
maritime boundary between Romania and then the U SSR was fixed right round to a point at the
east of the 12-mile zone, leaving Serpents’ Island on the Soviet side of the boundary. That point is
labelled pointX. The shortest line between pointX and the provisional equidistance line would
follow a course practically impossible to police. It would involve a sliver from point X down to the
equidistance line, and Romania has theref ore suggested a pragmatic adjustment ⎯ not in order to - 54 -
give one State more or less maritime area, butsimply to make the implementation of the line
workable.
59. If there had been no delimitation in 1949, Romania would have proposed the
equidistance line drawn from the mainland as thmaritime boundary. Romania concedes that a
12-mile maritime zone exists around Serpents’ Iland, and that this zone would necessitate a
departure from the provisional equidistance line in favour of Ukraine.
60. And, finally, from point T, the boundary tracks south along the equidistance line, until it
reaches the median line between the Romanian and Turkish coasts. [End graphic]
61. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I must thank you for your patient attention over
these last days. That concludes my presentation on behalf of Romania and I would ask you now to
call upon the Agent for Romania to make Romania’s closing submissions. Thank you, Sir.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you very much, Professor Lowe, for your
speech. I now call on the Agent of Romania, Dr.Aurescu, to make conclusions and final
submissions for Romania. You have the floor, Sir.
AMUr. ESCU:
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE A GENT OF R OMANIA
1. Mr.President and Members of the Court, it is my task now, in my capacity as Agent of
Romania, to present, at the end of this second and final round of pleadings, our concluding remarks
as well as Romania’s submissions in this case. In doing this today, 16September2008, it is
exactly four years since the filing with this Court, on behalf of Romania, of the Application
instituting proceedings in this case, on 16 September 2004.
2. Mr.President and Members of the Court, you have already h eard our detailed legal
arguments and it is not necessary to review theagain here. With your permission, I will only
outline very briefly the salient elements of our case.
(a) An initial part of the maritime boundary between Romania and Ukraine was settled by way of
agreement ⎯ namely the Romanian-Soviet Agreement of 1949, confirmed by subsequent - 55 -
understandings of the same nature; these treatie s are binding on Ukraine, as a successor to the
former Soviet Union.
(b) The plain text of these agreements and the cart ographic materials annexed to them show that
the intention of the Parties was to establish a maritime boundary following the 12-nautical-mile
arc surrounding Serpents’ Island, up to a point due east of this maritime feature. The official
cartographers and map makers of Romania, of the USSR and later Ukraine, as well as of other
countries, consistently depicted this boundary on various maps and charts of the concerned area
of the Black Sea, using the appropriate symbols ⎯ and indeed, it appears that the competent
hydrographic service of Ukraine has never ceased to do so, even after the start of these
proceedings before the Court.
(c) The remainder of the boundary is to be determined by employing the method regularly used by
this Court and by the arbitral tribunals, na mely the “equidistance/median line-relevant
circumstances” rule.
(d) In the current case, the application of this method involves, in a first stage, the plotting of an
equidistance line between the relevant adjacen t coasts and of a median line between the
relevant opposite coasts of the two countries. No account is to be taken when drawing the
provisional equidistance/median line of the tiny rocky feature of Serpents’ Island, which would
unreasonably deflect this line.
(e) Romania is entitled to use for purposes of plotting the provisional equidistance/median line the
most advanced points of its coastline, namely the Sulina dyke and the Sacalin peninsula, which
are, indisputably, an integral part of the syst em of straight baselines duly notified by Romania
to the United Nations.
(f) No relevant circumstance warrants the adjustment of the provisional equidistance/median line.
(g)Even if there were no pre-existing conve ntional delimitation, State practice and the
jurisprudence of international courts demonstrat e that Serpents’ Island should play no role in
the adjustment of the provisional line, given its natural characteristics and location, of course,
with the minor exception of the 12-mile zone it already has. I make here a very slightly
technical correction to a statement by Professo rLowe when he answered JudgeOxman’s
question: in fact, he meant to say that Ukraine has presently no legislation on contiguous zone. - 56 -
(h) In any case this feature is a rock within the meaning of Article121(3) of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and it is not entitled to a continental shelf and an exclusive
economic zone.
(i) The frantic attempts of Ukraine at artificially altering the natural characteristics of Serpents’
Island ⎯ undertaken precisely for the purposes of this case ⎯ are devoid of legal significance,
except as an implicit admission against interest by Ukraine of the status of Serpents’ Island as a
rock under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
(j) The circumstances invoked by Ukraine are of no significance for the maritime delimitation to
be achieved; the alleged geogr aphical predominance of Ukraine is merely the result of an
attempt to include in the coasts relevant for the purposes of delimitation between Romania and
Ukraine stretches of the Ukrainian coastline that have nothing to do with it.
(k) There is no marked disparity between the releva nt coasts of the Parties and consequently no
need to adjust the provisional equidistance/median line in order to take account of such a factor.
(l) The limited Ukrainian oil and gas activities or th e so-called incidents involving fishing boats,
which allegedly occurred in the delimitation zone, are totally i rrelevant for determining the
delimitation line. And, finally:
(m)The proportionality test confirms the equitable character of the boundary advocated by
Romania.
3. MrP. resident, our case is straightforward: the boundary we claim is the
equidistance/median line plus the already agreed boundary around or surrounding Serpents’ Island.
The line put forward by Romania is based on the actual geography of the area and, in particular, on
the spatial relations between the coasts of the two States. It is consistent with the pattern of
maritime delimitations that prevails in the small, semi-enclosed Black Sea and does not affect the
rights or interests of third States. It is also apparent from a look at the map ⎯ as well as confirmed
by conducting the proportionality test ⎯ that Romania’s proposal leads to a balanced delimitation
between the two countries. Romania’s line is decent, fair and reasonable and does not encroach on
Ukraine’s entitlements, leaving to Ukraine all the maritime areas lying off its coasts.
4. Mr. President, we end where we began: with international law. International law is the
prominent sovereign that all actors and actions of the international community should follow and - 57 -
respect. The inspired words of NicolaeTitulescu, whose distinguish ed effigy can be seen not far
from this Great Hall of Justice, close to the Peace Pa lace, come to my mind: he used to define the
State sovereignty “comme étant grevée d’une ‘servitude internationale en faveur de la Paix’ et du
droit international”.
5. It was in accordance with international law that Romania has tried to solve the issue of the
delimitation of its maritime spaces in the north-western basin of the Black Sea by negotiations with
the Soviet Union and, after its dissolution, with Ukraine ⎯ even if the claims put forward by the
Ukrainian side were much more ambitious than the Soviet ones. It was only after it became
obvious that these talks were sterile and that prolonging them would be pointless that we decided to
seise the Court with this matter.
6. Mr.President and Members of the Court, we respectfully maintain that the boundary
proposed by Romania during the current proceedings is drawn in full accordance with the relevant
norms of international law and that it will achieve an equitable delimitation of the continental shelf
and of the exclusive economic zones for both our countries.
7. Mr. President, before reading Romania’s s ubmission, I would like to respectfully thank
you, the distinguished Members of this Court, for the attention, patience and courtesy shown during
these three weeks of pleadings. I would also like to thank the Registry for the courteous, helpful
assistance awarded to us in all matters related to this case during all these four years of
proceedings, including for the smooth running of th ese hearings and for looking after all the other
administrative details. I would also like to extend our gratitude as well to the excellent interpreters,
who have done a wonderful job at keeping up with the sometimes galloping pace of our speeches.
Last but not least, I would also like to thank MadameLaurenceBlairon, the Head of the
Information Department, and her staff, who have been very helpful to our team and to the
representatives of our media. Special words of gratitude go to all my team ⎯ which is young but
very efficient— and the term “young” also incl udes, of course, ProfessorsPellet, Crawford and
Lowe. Without each and every one of its members, a ll this effort to promote the legal interests of
my country before the World Court would have been impossible.
8. Mr. President, Members of the Court, having regard to the legal considerations and to the
evidence put forward in the written and oral plead ings, Romania respectfully requests the Court to - 58 -
draw a single maritime boundary dividing the mariti me areas of Romania and Ukraine in the Black
Sea, having the following description:
(a)from pointF, at 45°05'21"N, 30°02'27"E, on the 12-nautical-mile arc surrounding
Serpents’ Island, to point X, at 45° 14' 20" N, 30° 29' 12" E;
(b) from point X in a straight segment to point Y, at 45° 11' 59" N, 30° 49' 16" E;
(c) then on the line equidistant between the relevant Romanian and Ukrainian adjacent coasts, from
point Y, passing through point D, at 45° 12' 10" N, 30° 59' 46" E, to point T, at 45° 09' 45" N,
31° 08' 40" E;
(d) and then on the line median between the re levant Romanian and Ukrainian opposite coasts,
from poinTt ⎯ passing through the points of 44° 35' 00" N, 31° 13' 43" E and of
44° 04' 05" N, 31° 24' 40" E, to point Z, at 43° 26' 50" N, 31° 20' 10" E.
9. Mr.President and Members of the Court, that brings to a close my presentation and the
pleadings of Romania in this case. Let me express, once again, on behalf of my country, our deep
trust in the International Court of Justice as well as in the noble virtues of international law. I
would like to thank you very much for your patient and kind attention.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank you very much, Dr. Aurescu. The Court
takes note of your final submissions which you have now read on behalf of Romania.
Ukraine will present their oral reply on Thursday, 18 September 2008, from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.
and also on Friday, 19 September 2008, from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. Thank you all.
The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 12.45 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Tuesday 16 September 2008, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine)