Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/6
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Monday 12 March 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 12 mars 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans
la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieigtgins
Vice-Prsi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc TorresBernárdez
Gaja
Couevrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident
RanMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skjoteiskov,
BeTroáesz.
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassa dor of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Samuel Santos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua,
Mr.Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Member of the International
Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit interna tional, Distinguished Fellow, All Souls College,
Oxford,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Research Associate, Neth erlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht
University,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.Robin Cleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F. G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Mr. Dick Gent, Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
MsTania Elena Pacheco Blandino, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsNadine Susani, Doctor of Public Law, Centre de droit international de Nanterre(CEDIN),
University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Assistant Advisers;
Ms Gina Hodgson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Ana Mogorrón Huerta,
as Assistants.
The Government of the Republic of Honduras is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Max Velásquez Díaz, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the French Republic,
H.E. Mr. Roberto Flores Bermúdez, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the United States
of America,
as Agents; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Arguëllo Gómez, ambassad eur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Samuel Santos, ministre des affaires étrangères de la République du Nicaragua,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,Distinguished
fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, research associate à l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer de
l’Université d’Utrecht,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris X- Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad autónoma de Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. Dick Gent, consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, premier secrétaire de l’ambassade de la République du
Nicaragua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Nadine Susani, docteur en droit public, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Université de Paris X-Nanterre,
comme conseillers adjoints ;
Mme Gina Hodgson, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Ana Mogorrón Huerta,
commaessistantes .
Le Gouvernement de la République du Honduras est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Max Velásquez Díaz, ambassadeur de la République du Honduras auprès de la
République française,
S. Exc. M. Roberto Flores Bermúdez, ambassad eur de la République du Honduras auprès des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme agents ; - 6 -
H.E. Mr.Julio Rendón Barnica, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
MrP.ierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law, University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas), and the European University Institute in Florence,
Mr. Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodríguez, Professor of International Law, Universidad Complutense de
Madrid,
Mr.Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., Profess or of International Law, London School of
Economics and Political Science,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London,
Mr.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de dr oit international à l’Université de ParisI
Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr. David A. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green & MacRae, LL.P., Washington, D.C., member of the
California State Bar and District of Columbia Bar,
Mr. Carlos Jiménez Piernas, Professor of International Law, Universidad de Alcalá, Madrid,
Mr. Richard Meese, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Milton Jiménez Puerto, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Honduras,
H.E. Mr.Eduardo Enrique Reina García, Deputy Mini ster for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Honduras,
H.E. Mr. Carlos López Contreras, Ambassador, National Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr.Roberto Arita Quiñónez, Ambassador, Director of the Special Bureau on Sovereignty
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. José Eduardo Martell Mejía, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the Kingdom of
Spain,
H.E. Mr. Miguel Tosta Appel, Ambassador, Chairm an of the Honduran Demarcation Commission,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. MsPatricia Licona Cubero, Ambassador, Advi ser for Central American Integration Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Ms Anjolie Singh, Assistant, University College London, member of the Indian Bar,
Ms Adriana Fabra, Associate Professor of International Law, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, - 7 -
S. Exc. M. Julio Rendón Barnica, ambassadeur de la République du Honduras auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit in ternational public à l’Université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) et à l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence,
M. Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodríguez, professeur de droit international à l’Université Complutense
de Madrid,
M. Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., professeur de droit international à la London School of
Economics and Political Sciences,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de droit international à l’Université ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M. David A. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., membre du
barreau de l’Etat de Californie et du barreau du district de Columbia,
M. Carlos Jiménez Piernas, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Alcalá (Madrid),
M. Richard Meese, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Milton Jiménez Puerto, ministre des affaires étrangères de la République du Honduras,
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Enrique Reina García, vice-mi nistre des affaires étrangères de la République
du Honduras,
S. Exc. M. Carlos López Contreras, ambassadeu r, conseiller national au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Roberto Arita Quiñónez, ambassadeur, directeur du bureau spécial pour les affaires de
souveraineté du ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. José Eduardo Martell Mejía, ambass adeur de la République du Honduras auprès du
Royaume d’Espagne,
S. Exc. M. Miguel Tosta Appel, ambassadeur, président de la commission hondurienne de
démarcation du ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. Mme Patricia Licona Cubero, ambassad eur, conseiller pour les affaires d’intégration
d’Amérique Centrale du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Anjolie Singh, assistante au University College de Londres, membre du barreau indien,
Mme Adriana Fabra, professeur associé de dro it international à l’Université autonome de
Barcelone, - 8 -
Mr. Javier Quel López, Professor of International Law, Universidad del País Vasco,
Ms Gabriela Membreño, Assistant Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Sergio Acosta, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Honduras in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Assistant Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas D. Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers. - 9 -
M. Javier Quel López, professeur de droit international à l’Université du Pays basque,
Mme Gabriela Membreño, conseiller adjoint du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Sergio Acosta, ministre conseiller à l’amba ssade de la République du Honduras au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers adjoints ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas D. Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. The Court meets today to
hear the first round of oral argument of the Re public of Honduras. I recall that Honduras will
conclude its first round of oral argument on Frid ay 16 March, and I now give the floor to the
Agent.
Mr. VELÁSQUEZ:
1. Thank you, Madam President. Madam Pres ident, Members of the Court, it is a great
honour for me to appear before the Court and to represent my country as its Agent in this case.
2. Our delegation is today joined by His Excellency Mr. Milton Jiménez Puerto, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.
3. Honduras is a peaceful and law-abiding nation committed to the international rule of law.
It has been involved in several cases before this Court and has always abided with the judgments.
4. The Constitution of Honduras emphasizes the central importance of international law.
Article8 guarantees the primacy of international law. Article9 defines Honduras’s international
boundaries by reference to international judgments, arbitral awards and treaties. And Article15
expressly provides for compliance with judgments rendered by this Court and other competent
international tribunals.
5. This morning I can be brief. I will not trouble the Court with a full reiteration of the
Honduran position, which will be de veloped by our counsel. As Agent, however, it falls to me to
address a number of overarching issues of principle. I will address five matters that have become
particularly pertinent following Nicaragua’s oral presentation last week. Then I will have the
pleasure of introducing the counsel who will speak for Honduras.
My 6. first observation relates to geography, a matter that plays a central role in this case. In
his opening statement, the Agent of Nicaragua made an “elementary description” of the territories
of Nicaragua and Honduras and rebuked Honduras for claiming that any part of its coast faced east.
I respectfully suggest that, when addressing this Co urt, resort should be made to authoritative legal
sources rather than an encyclopaedia. If one consults the 1906 Arbitral Award issued by
HisMajesty the King of Spain, we find that th e Honduran territory is described as having the
following borders: “on the South with Nicaragua, on the South-West and West with the Pacific - 11 -
Ocean, San Salvador and Guatemala; and on the North, North-East and East with the Atlantic
1
Ocean . . .” . It seems that with its statement, Nicaragua now wishes to revise the recognition of
Honduras territory, including the islands, in the 1906 Ar bitral Award. I need not remind this Court
that the validity and binding force of that Award were confirmed by this Court in 1960.
My 7. second observation concerns the sudden and dramatic change of direction that was
taken last week by Nicaragua. The Court will have noted that Nicaragua’s Application brought
only a maritime delimitation dispute to the Court. This led the Court to identify this case as the
case concerning Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.
There was no reference to any dispute regarding so vereignty over islands in the Application. On
the contrary, Nicaragua chose not to address the is lands that lie most closely to Honduras’s coast,
islands that have long been treated as being subject to the sovereignty of Honduras. Now
Nicaragua has come belatedly to recognize the fact that the islands are a central part of the
geography.
8. Sovereignty over the islands has a decisive impact on the maritime delimitation. The fact
that Nicaragua had nothing to say about the isla nds in its Application speaks loudly about the
merits of the new claim it has chosen to make, at this unprecedentedly late stage.
9. Madam President, Members of the Court, the principles and rules of international law
pertaining to territorial sovereignty are clear. They point decisively to the conclusion that
Honduras has title to the islands north of the 15th parallel. That sovereignty cannot be ignored.
There is no question of the Court proceeding out side the framework of international law and
rendering a judgment exaequo et bono , which could incidentally draw a line of attribution
transferring sovereignty over these islands from Honduras to Nicaragua.
T1he. third observation is to recall that Honduras is here as the Respondent. Honduras has
negotiated maritime boundaries in the Caribbean Sea with Colombia, Mexico, and the United
Kingdom with regard to the Cayman Islands. W ith Nicaragua we have always considered the
15th parallel as a boundary agreed between our two c ountries. It is why we accepted Nicaragua’s
1977 invitation to negotiate a definitive delimit ation of the boundary which had already been
1
Arbitral Award made by H.M.Alf onsoXIII, King of Spain, in theder dispute between the Republics of
Honduras and Nicaragua (Annexes to Application (No. 2), p. 20). - 12 -
agreed in practice. But the abrupt change in government and policies in Nicaragua meant that
those negotiations never took place.
11. Having been called before the Court, H onduras has participated in the proceedings in
good faith, and is confident that the Court will confirm its position. That position is a
long-standing one. It is not new. It does not seek to disrupt the long-standing relationship between
our two neighbouring States. It is not dependent upon novel or imaginative legal theories. The
position of Honduras is grounded in hi story, geography and the conduct of the Parties. For many
years Nicaragua too was comfortable with this position. For that reason, from the beginning of the
present proceedings, Honduras has reasserted the “t raditional line” based upon reciprocal conduct
and resulting from a long-standing modus vivendi.
12. The fourth observation I wish to raise concerns the starting-point of our boundary
delimitation. Nicaragua made the accusation at paragraph1.14 of its Reply, of an “Honduran
attempt to take over part of the right bank of the Ri verCoco”. That is not true. The territory to
which Nicaragua was referring is not on the right bank of the River Coco, but on a small island that
has built up in the mouth of the Rio Coco today. I emphasize today. That is clear from the maps
appearing in the Honduran pleadings.
13. On behalf of Honduras I wish to emphasize ⎯ and wish the record to show very
clearly ⎯ that this island does not belong to Nicaragua . The 1906Award is very clear on this
matter: the island is part of Honduras, not Nicaragua.
14. The fifth ⎯ and final ⎯ observation concerns the line of delimitation that Honduras
proposes. Counsel will demonstrate that the lin e Honduras claims can be achieved through the
strict application of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the 1982United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the juri sprudence of the Court. On this side of the
room we have noted that Nicaragua has changed its case. An application for the delimitation of
maritime spaces is, apparently, about to beco me a case on sovereignty over islands. The
distinguished Agent of Nicaragua indicated that a new submission would be made on this aspect, as
well as a revised submission on the starting-point of the line of delimitation. We will pay close
attention to the new submission, as well as the clarification of the existing one. It may be that these - 13 -
will require Honduras to reflect further on its fina l submissions, a matter on which we reserve our
position.
15. Madam President, let me now turn to the outline of the Honduran presentations in this
first round of oral proceedings and introduce the counsel who will present the Honduran position.
16. Professor Christopher Greenwood will begin with some fundamental observations about
the case, and provide an overview of the approach that will be taken by Honduras.
17. ProfessorLuis Ignacio Sánchez Rodrígu ez will then address the question of State
succession and the role and place of uti possidetis in this maritime boundary case between the
Parties. He will show clearly that the islands north of the 15thparallel belong to Honduras by
virtue of the uti possidetis principle and that this has important consequences for the maritime
boundary.
18. Professor Philippe Sands will then addr ess the conduct of the Parties. His first
presentation will be on effectivités over the islands; his second presentation, later in the week, will
address conduct in relation to respect for the traditional line dividing the maritime area, along the
15th parallel.
19. Professor Carlos Jiménez Piernas will a ddress the diplomatic history, showing the
change of policy in Nicaragua’s position in s upport of the traditional line between Honduras and
Nicaragua. His presentation will also show that Nicaragua did not, before these proceedings were
underway, claim sovereignty over the islands.
20. Professor Jean-Pierre Quéneudec will addr ess the geographic context. He will focus
attention on the area to be delimited, the relevant coasts and the main geographic features to be
considered.
21. Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy will then address the applicable law, with particular
reference to the delimitation of the maritime spaces.
22. After Professor Sands’s second presentation on conduct, Mr. David Colson will examine
the Honduran line in detail and address its equitable character.
23. As usual Honduras is providing judges’ folders containing copies of the graphics they are
going to show on the screen. In addition, counsel will indicate the references in the written text of
their pleading. - 14 -
24. Madam President, this concludes my openi ng statement. I wish to thank you and the
distinguished Members of the Court for your kind attention. May I ask that you now call on
Professor Christopher Greenwood.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Your Excellency. I now call
Professor Greenwood.
GMRr.ENWOOD:
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, may it please the Court. It is an honour to
appear before you today on behalf of the Repub lic of Honduras and a personal pleasure for me to
do so during your presidency, Madam President.
(1) Introduction
2. My task this morning is to give an overview of the arguments of Honduras ⎯ both the
positive arguments in support of the boundary li ne claimed by Honduras and our arguments in
response to the case put last week by Nicaragua. As in the written pleadings, my colleagues and I
will refer ⎯ for simplicity ⎯ to the line constituting the traditional boundary between the two
States as being the 15th parallel, rather than giving the exact co-ordinate, which is 14° 59.8'.
3. In accordance with the Rules of Court , Honduras will concentrate on the issues that
continue to divide the Parties and will not repeat what is said in its written pleadings. For the
avoidance of doubt, however, let me make clear that ⎯ save to the extent that the contrary is
expressly stated ⎯ Honduras stands by the entirety of its written pleadings.
(2) The issues between the Parties
4. Madam President, it is a matter fo r regret that the pleadings to date ⎯ far from reducing
the issues dividing the Parties ⎯ have in fact increased them. That was made clear by the
distinguished Agent of Nicaragua when he told the Court, last Monday, that “in its final
submissions at the end of these oral pleadings” Nicaragua “will specifically request a decision on
3
the question of sovereignty” over the islands .
2
Art. 60 (1).
3CR 2007/1, p. 46, para. 103. - 15 -
5. Now, the Application by which Nicaragua seised the Court was confined to a claim for a
maritime boundary. There was no mention of any dispute over land territory of any kind. The
Memorial was also largely silent on this subject. The Reply said rather more, but even then there is
no hint that Nicaragua was seeking a judgment from the Court that it had title to the islands.
6. Then, Madam President, we had the extr aordinary spectacle of the claimant telling the
Court on the first day of the oral hearings that it wanted to turn the case about a maritime boundary,
which it had chosen to put to the Court, into a case a bout title to land as well. And all of this more
than seven years after the filing of the Application and three-and-a-half years after the close of the
written pleadings in which Honduras had specifically raised the fact that Nicaragua had not made a
claim in respect of the islands!
7. Nevertheless, Madam President, Nicaragua ’s remarkable volte-face has one important
advantage. Its promised new submission places in stark relief the nature of the task facing the
Court. Now that the Court is asked to decide both on title to the islands and on the maritime
boundary, two matters become clear.
8. First, the order in which th e two issues has to be addressed ⎯ it is a well-established
principle that it is the sovereignty of the State over land territory which de termines the extent and
the boundaries of its maritime spaces. As it is often put “the land dominates the sea” ( North Sea
Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of G ermany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969 , p. 51, para. 96; Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978 , p. 36, para. 86; Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2001, p. 97, para. 185). Now, this necessarily means that a court faced with a dispute over
land and maritime spaces ⎯ as the Court is now ⎯ must resolve the question of sovereignty over
the land before it turns to the maritime boundary. Moreover, it is plain that the choice of
methodology for drawing the maritime boundary is determined by the relationship of the land
territory of one party to the land territory of the other ⎯ as Mr.Brownlie put it, “the method
reflects coastal relationships” 4. It follows that the first question ⎯ which party has sovereignty
4
CR 2007/2, p. 16, para. 32. - 16 -
over the islands ⎯ has to be determined before the methodology to be used in answering the
second question ⎯ where is the maritime boundary ⎯ can be selected.
9. Secondly, Madam President, it is now clear ⎯ if it was not before ⎯ that there are two
quite separate bodies of law for the Court to apply. The determination of the maritime boundary is
governed by the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. But those provisions have
no relevance to the prior question of title to the islands. Title to land territory ⎯ whether mainland
or insular ⎯ is governed by quite different and distinct principles of international law.
10. It follows that this case calls, first, for a decision on title to the islands by application of
the principles of customary international law rega rding title to land territory. And only once that
decision is made, the relationship of the land territory of Honduras to Nicaragua becomes clear and
the focus then shifts to the maritime spaces. At that point, the Court is asked to determine the
boundary between the maritime territories of the Parties by an application of the law of the sea.
11. Now, Nicaragua has not expressly denied either of these propositions ⎯ it is difficult to
see how it could do so. It has even paid lip ser vice to them at various times. But its entire
argument last week was an attempt to avoid them . Mr. Brownlie took you straight to his favoured
bisector method, ignoring the islands completely. While he told the Court that the method of
maritime delimitation had to reflect the coastal relationship between the Parties ⎯ which is plainly
correct ⎯ it seems that it is only those coasts to which he wants to refer which affect the
methodology.
12. But the real clue to Nicaragua’s strate gy was buried away in the Agent’s speech. In
paragraphs77 to 79 of that speech, the distinguished Agent for Nicaragua said ⎯ and I quote ⎯
“Nicaragua considered that by using a bisector as a method of delimitation, sovereignty over these
features [as he calls the islands], could be attributed to either Party depending on the position of the
5
feature involved with respect to the bisector line” . So, first choose the method of maritime
delimitation, then apply it to determine the maritime boundary and then the title to the islands will
follow, will simply fall into place. In plain words, what Nicaragua is suggesting is that it is the
5
CR 2007/1, p. 38, para. 77. - 17 -
method of maritime delimitation which will determine the question of sovereignty over land ⎯ the
land will follow the sea rather than dominate it.
13. Now, Madam President, that simply cannot be right. This is not a case in which it has
been ⎯ or could be ⎯ suggested that the Parties have ask ed the Court to decide a question
exaequo et bono ; it is a case in which each question has to be decided in accordance with law.
And there is no law which justifies the proposition that title to land can be determined by the
methodology of maritime delimitation. Nicaragua’s strategy is subtle. It has been advanced ⎯ as
one would expect ⎯ in the most skilful way but it is quite simply wrong in law and Honduras has
every confidence that the Court will see it for what it is.
14. Unfortunately, the last-minute nature of Nicaragua’s change of case means that the Court
has not had from the Parties the assistance it is entitled to expect regarding certain essential
elements of this case ⎯ certain essential elements of the issues now before it. In an attempt to
remedy that deficiency, Honduras has substantially revised the presentations we had planned to
give. But the overall case of Honduras is simple: title to the land must be decided first, and must
be decided in accordance with the law applicable to the acquisition and retention of land territory.
Only once that question has been decided is it possible to determine which methodology is
appropriate for determining the location of the ma ritime boundary and to apply that method to the
facts of the present case.
(3) Theearliercases
15. Madam President, before turning to the dis pute over the islands, it is necessary to say a
little about the historical location of the present pro ceedings. This is not, of course, the first time
that the boundary between these two countries has b een the subject of legal proceedings. There
have been two earlier cases ⎯ the 1906 arbitration before the King of Spain (Arbitral Award Made
by the King of Spain on 23December1906 (I.C.J. Pleadings 1958 , Vol.I, p.18)) and the
proceedings before this Court in 1960 (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 192). They are important
parts of the background to the present proceedings and the passages that have been cited to you
cannot properly be understood out of context, so it may be useful if I say something about the
Award and the 1960 decision as a whole. - 18 -
16. Let me start with the 1906 Award. Four point s about that reward are particularly worthy
of note. First, the compromis, which was contained in the 1894 Gamez-Bonilla Treaty ( ibid.,
p.199), was firmly based on the principle of uti possidetis juris. Thatismadequiteclearby
Article II (3) and (4) of the Treaty.
17. Secondly, in applying that principle, the King of Spain dealt specifically with an issue
which Nicaragua raised last week, namely that the coastal settlements on that part of the Caribbean
coast were subject ⎯ in the period immediately prior to independence ⎯ to the Captain-General of
Guatemala rather than the Governor of Honduras or Nicaragua. Now, what the Award said about
that point is this:
“although it is nevertheless true that these settl ements remained directly subject to the
Captain-General’s command of Guatemala, bot h Parties agreed to recognize that this
fact in no way altered the territory of th e provinces of Nicaragua and Honduras, the
latter Republic having shown by means of certified copies of despatches and accounts
that before and after 1791 the Intendant Governorship of Comayagua” ⎯ which is the
old name for Honduras ⎯ “superintended everything appertaining to its competence
in Tujillo, Rio Tinto, and Cape Gracias a Dios.” (Arbitral Award Made by the King of
Spain on 23 December 1906, I.C.J. Pleadings, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.)
18. Thirdly, Madam President, in those pro ceedings Nicaragua claimed that the boundary
line “continue par le centre du cours d’eau jusqu’ a sa rencontre avec le méridien qui passé
au-dessus du Cap Camarón et suit ce méridien jusqu’a la mer, laissant au Nicaragua Swan Island”
(ibid., Vol.I, p.624). Swan Island is depicted here on illustration No.1. This submission was
rejected ⎯ the Nicaraguan submission ⎯ but it demonstrates that Nicaragua considered that uti
possidetis justified both a straight line boundary into th e sea and title to an island some 90 nautical
miles offshore.
19. Lastly, the 1906 Award defined the terminus of the land boundary at
Cape Gracias a Dios ⎯ only part of the terms were read to you by counsel for Nicaragua last
Friday ⎯ let me read you the whole passage:
“The extreme common boundary point on the coast of the Atlantic will be the
mouth of the River Coco, Segovia or Wanks, where it flows out in the sea close to
Cape Gracias a Dios, taking as the mouth of the river its principal arm between Hara
and the Island of San Pio where said cape is situated, leaving to Honduras the islets
and shoals existing within said principal arm before reaching the harbour bar, and
retaining for Nicaragua the southern shore of the said principal mouth with the said
Island of San Pio, and also the bay and town of Cape Gracias a Dios and the arm or
estuary called Gracias which flows to Gracias a Dios Bay, between the mainland and
said island of San Pio.” (Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 25-26; emphasis added.) - 19 -
Madam President, on the screen one sees the island of Hara, here, the larger island, and then there
are these two islets, here: those are islets formed in the mouth of the main channel of the river and
the Award clearly allots them to Honduras. The isla nd of San Pio is this area down here, which is
part of Nicaragua, under the terms of the Award (figure 2).
20. Now, Madam President, despite the very clear duty in the 1894Treaty to honour the
award ⎯ Nicaragua refused to comply with important parts of it and remained in occupation of
part of the land marked with the striped shading on illustration No. 3. This is a map submitted in
the distinguished Agent of Nicaragua’s folder last week: but we have added the purple colouring to
make clear the area north of the Rio Coco wh ich the 1906 Award adjudged was part of Honduras.
Now, Nicaragua declined to wit hdraw from a part of that area, although there is no evidence to
support the assertion by Nicaragua last week that it remained in control of the coastal strip of
territory between the boundary mark at Cape Gracias a Dios and the northernmost tip ⎯ here ⎯
which is Cap Falso. I would just highlight one point about this and that is that Nicaragua and
Honduras took the question of the validity of the Aw ard to this Court in 1960 and the Court upheld
the validity of the Award and its binding character ( I.C.J. Report 1960, p.192). Only one of the
arguments do I want to refer to, and that is Ni caragua’s argument that the Award did not observe
the rules laid down in the 1894Treaty. The Court said “this complaint is without foundation
inasmuch as the decision of the arbitrator is based on historical and legal considerations (derecho
histórico) in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article II” (ibid., p. 215). The Court will recall
that those were the provisions in the 1894 Treaty which embodied the principle of uti possidetis.
21. So, Madam President, the Court rejected the suggestion that the land north of the
River Coco was, as Nicaragua’s map describes it “the historic extent of Nicaragua”. Between 1906
and the final implementation of the Court’s Judgm ent in 1962, to the extent that Nicaragua
occupied land north of the Rio Coco, it did so illegally. It was an illegal occupation of land which
was lawfully the sovereign territory of Honduras. The precise consequences of that fact will be
addressed later; for now, the important point is to see that occupation for what it was: a clear
violation of Nicaragua’s intern ational legal obligations. Nicaragua finally withdrew from any - 20 -
territory north of the Rio Coco not in 1963, as was suggested last week, but according to
6
Nicaragua’s Memorial, in May 1961 .
22. Before leaving this map, let me just make two other points about it. The first is that the
title “[t]he historic extent of Nicaragua” h as apparently been added for these proceedings ⎯ the
map in the 1958pleadings before the Court is not so described. The Court might wonder at
Nicaragua’s decision to add, wholly unnecessarily, a title which is manifestly inaccurate in view of
the Award and the Court’s earlier decision.
23. Secondly, Madam President, the addition of that description, now, for the purpose of this
case is interesting in another respect: the map doe s not show the islands which are the subject of
the current dispute.
24. The last step in the earlier proceedings which needs to be mentioned is that, following
the Judgment of the Court in 1960, a Mixed Commission was established by the Inter-American
Peace Committee to verify the starting-point of th e land boundary at the mouth of the River Coco.
It was that Commission which fixed the starting-point, shown on the next illustration (figure 4), at
14° 59.8' N, 83° 8.9' W. The copy of the map in your judges’ folder may be a little easier to pick
out than the large illustration at the back.
(4) Title to the islands
(a) The nature and location of the islands
25. Now, Madam President, let me turn to the dispute regarding the islands: and I sill spend
rather longer on this than on the maritime boundary precisely because it is not so fully covered in
the written pleadings. Counsel for Nicaragua last week used every euphemism in the English
language ⎯ and I should say, given ProfessorPellet’s presence, every euphemism in the French
language was doubtless used as well ⎯ to avoid referring to these islands as islands. Even when
telling the Court he would be seeking a declarati on regarding sovereignty over them, the Agent for
Nicaragua preferred to speak of “features”. But no amount of playing with words should be
allowed to distract the Court from the simple fact that there are four substantial islands lying just to
the north of the 15th parallel: Sava nna Cay, South Cay; Bobel Cay and Port Royal Cay (figures 5
6
MN, p. 30, para. 27. - 21 -
and 6). This map, which has just come up, is designed to concentrate on the particular area. I
should make one point clear, if I may: when it refers to the disputed maritime area ⎯ this is a part
of the disputed area ⎯ it is not our suggestion that the disputed area lies simply between the red
and black lines and we will have more to say about that.
26. Savanna Cay, which is depicted on the next illustration, No. 7, is 28 nautical miles from
the Honduran side of the mouth of the River Coco an d 8.2 nautical miles north of the 15th parallel.
In 1999 a group of Honduran officials visiting the islands, in connection with immigration controls,
found 26people living there (CMH, Ann. 146). Now the photograph which you see here ⎯ a
double photograph, the first one taken from the sea is a view of the island itself, Savanna Cay, and
then below that is the triangulation marking, wh ich was placed there in 1980 to 1981 (figure 8).
That was pursuant to a 1976 arrangement between the Government of Honduras and the United
States Department of Defense for collaborative wo rk in “hydrographic su rveys of the ports and
coastal waters of Honduras”. That arrange ment is to be found in Annex152 of the
Counter-Memorial.
27. Then let me turn to South Cay, the next island (figure 9), that is 41 nautical miles from
the Honduran side of the RiverCoco and 8.2nauti cal miles north of the 15thparallel. We have
here a photograph (figure 10), which shows again the island ⎯ this time an aerial shot ⎯ and the
triangulation mark placed there under the 1976Arrange ment. At the time of the 1999 visit, there
7
were 19 people living on the island .
28. The next island is Bobel Cay (figure 11), which is 27 nautical miles from the Honduran
side of the mouth of the Coco and 4.76 nautical mi les north of the 15th parallel. Again, we have a
photograph of the island (figure 12) and of the 1976 triangulation mark, which shows quite clearly
that it is an official Honduran instrument. In addition to that, a radio antenna some 10 m high was
placed there in 1975 by the Union Oil Company operating under a concession from Honduras
8
(figure 13) . While there was no one living on Bobel Cay when it was visited in 1999, there have
been people living there at various times during the last three decades, as my learned friend
Professor Sands will show tomorrow.
7
CMH, Ann. 146.
RH, Ann. 264 from which, p. 157, the photograph is taken. - 22 -
29. Finally, there is Port Royal Cay (figure 14), which is 32 miles from the mouth of the
Coco and 7 nautical miles north of the 15th para llel. Now unfortunately we have no photograph in
9
the record of the island, but the 1999 visit found evidence of recent habitation .
30. In addition to these four main islands (figure 15) ⎯ all of which can now be seen on the
next illustration ⎯ there is also a number of smaller islands and cays in the same area (figure 16).
The four main islands and the cays adjacent to them are sometimes referred to collectively as
“Media Luna”, although, confusingly, that term is also used to describe one of the smaller cays and
a reef in the area. I will just highlight them on the screen: there is the reef; there is Media Luna
Cay; but “Media Luna” is also used as a term to describe the group there. One sees it in that sense
in an Annex in the Nicaraguan Reply. Annex 31 to the Reply is an extract from an unofficial
volume entitled, in its English translation, The Geographic Index of Nicaragua, that was published
in 1971. It contains the following definition of “Media Luna” or “Half Moon”. Underneath that
term we find this definition: “Group of cays and reefs located approximately 70 kilometres east of
capeGraciasaDios, on the submarine shelf. It includes the following islets: Logwood, Bobel,
Savanna, South, Half Rock, Alargado Reef and Cock Rock. It is located at Latitude 15 degrees, ten
minutes North and Longitude 82 degrees, 35 minutes.”
31. Let me also mention Logwood, which is one of those expressly referred to in the
Geographic Index (shown on figure 16) ⎯ Logwood is just there. On older maps this is frequently
referred to by the name “Palo de Campeche”. And it is under that name that it was the subject of
some of the earlier effectivités on the part of Honduras.
32. Madam President, Nicaragua has devoted a lot of time and energy to telling the Court
that these islands are small, insignificant and cannot sustain permanent habitation. They are small,
yes; Honduras has never suggested otherwise. But they are not insignificant, as the photographs
demonstrate, and the largest islands are not uninhabited. Those who live there are fishing people
who migrate during the year as the fish stocks and conditions change but who tend to return each
year and to stay for large parts of the year, and there is clear evidence of that in the Honduran
pleadings, to which my learned friend Professor Sands will refer tomorrow.
9
CMH, Ann. 146. - 23 -
33. Moreover, in spite of Nicaragua’s best e fforts to paint the islands as unstable features at
constant risk of being submer ged by changing conditions, the phot ographs I have just shown the
Court make plain that the four main islands are not at all in that category ⎯ there are records of
these islands, including records of persons living on them, going back to th e nineteenth century.
They certainly bear comparison with the islands with which the Court dealt in the recent
Indonesia/Malaysia case ( Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002 , p.625) and the Qatar/Bahrain case
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2001, p. 40).
34. Most importantly, Madam President, they are islands for the purpose of Article121 of
the Law of the Sea Convention ⎯ naturally formed and above sea level at high tide ⎯ and they are
not “rocks which cannot sustain hum an habitation or economic life of their own”, within the sense
of Article 121 (3). Indeed, that is not contested by Nicaragua and represents a point of agreement
between the Parties.
(b) The attribution of sovereignty over the islands
35. These then are the characteristics of the islands. The next question is how the Court is to
go about the business of resolving the two competing claims to sovereignty. In the first place, it is
clear that, contrary to what is suggested by Ni caragua, the resolution of such competing claims
cannot be accomplished by the process of drawi ng a maritime boundary line, whether by the
bisector or any other method, and then treating th at as a line of allocation which gives sovereignty
over the islands to the State on whose side of th at maritime boundary each island happens to lie.
That approach is completely contrary to principl e and the practice of the Court and other tribunals,
in resolving mixed land and maritime disputes. And the Court ⎯ albeit in a slightly different
context ⎯ has observed that:
“a ‘boundary’, in the ordinary meaning of the term, does not have the function that
Indonesia attributes to the allocation lin e that was supposedly established by
ArticleIV out to sea beyond the island of Sebatik, that is to say allocating to the
parties sovereignty over the islands in the area.” (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Spiadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 648, para. 43.) - 24 -
36. Instead, Madam President, the task of de termining sovereignty over the islands requires
the application of the principles of international law on acquisition and maintenance of title to land.
Since both Parties were formerly part of the Spanish Empire, there are potentially two stages to this
task. The first is to apply the principle of uti possidetis juris. If the application of this principle
establishes that the island passed on independence to one or other Party, that is conclusive unless
there is clear evidence that that Party has subsequently abandoned or lost title. The second stage is
to examine the practice, or effectivités, of each Party in relation to the disputed islands. The
principle of uti possidetis will be addressed in detail by Prof essor Sánchez Rodríguez later this
morning and the effectivités by Professor Sands tomorrow. I shall merely offer a brief overview.
(c) The critical date
37. But before doing so, I must say a little about the question of the critical date since this
concept has featured so prominently in Nicara gua’s arguments last week. MadamPresident,
Nicaragua’s arguments regarding the critical date are both confused and wrong in law. Nicaragua
contends that the critical date in this case is May1977. Why? Because that is when its
Government approached the Honduran Governme nt to propose conversations regarding the
boundary, a proposal accepted by Honduras. Now for this exchange of letters to constitute a
critical date ⎯ let alone the critical date ⎯ it would have to mark what the Court termed in the
Indonesia/Malaysia case “the date on which the dispute between the Parties crystallized”, and it
would only be that if it was when conflicti ng claims to the islands were advanced ( ibid., p.682,
para. 135).
38. It is worth, therefore, looking at the letters on which Nicaragua relies, to see exactly what
they say. Nicaragua’s letter ⎯ illustration No. 17 ⎯ is now on screen. The critical passage, which
is highlighted, reads as follows: “my Government wishes to initiate conversations leading to the
determination of the definitive marine and sub-ma rine delimitation in the Atlantic and Caribbean
Sea zone”.
39. And here in No.18 is the reply from the Foreign Minister of Honduras. The critical
passage (again highlighted) accepts with pleasure th e invitation to negotiations in the terms set out
in Nicaragua’s earlier letter. Three comments are called for about these letters. - 25 -
40. First, they make no mention whatever of any dispute regarding the islands. They refer
only to negotiations “leading to the determination of the definitive marine and sub-marine
delimitation”. By no stretch of the imagination could they be said to have crystallized a dispute
over the islands, nor do they hint at, let alone contain, conflicting claims to those islands.
Nicaragua has confused what, it is now clear, are two separate disputes: one over title to the
islands and the other over the determination of the maritime boundary. Even if the letters could be
said to mark the critical date for the maritime disput e, they clearly do not do so with regard to the
dispute over the islands.
41. Secondly, Madam President, even in r espect of the maritime boundary, it is frankly
difficult to see these letters as marking a crystallization of any dispute. No conflicting claims are
made to anything. Instead, Nicaragua proposes, and Honduras accepts, negotiations ⎯ not on an
identified dispute, but for the purpose of arriving at a definitive delimitation. The language used ⎯
far from crystallizing a dispute ⎯ does not even suggest the existe nce of one. On the contrary, it
suggests that the Parties are largely in agreement a nd all that is called for is the establishment of a
definitive boundary line. I will say more about that later, if I may.
42. Lastly, even if the letters did mark a cr itical date, they would not act so as to exclude
evidence ⎯ or even attach to it reduced weight ⎯ if that evidence related to acts which, in the
Court’s words, “are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of
improving the legal position of the Party which relies on them”. The acts on which Honduras relies
in connection with the islands fall into just th at category. Thus, to take one example, the
installation on Savannah, South Cay and Bobel Ca y of the triangulation marks may have taken
place in 1980-1981 but it followed naturally and directly from th e arrangement with the United
States, concluded in 1976. Similarly, the visit by the immigration officials in 1999, to which I have
already referred, was clearly a continuation of earlier such visits.
43. What then is the critical date ⎯ if indeed there is one ⎯ in respect of the dispute about
sovereignty over the islands? The reality is that there may be more than one critical date. To the
extent that the issue of title turns on the application of uti possidetis, the critical date is 1821 ⎯ the
date when Honduras and Nicaragua obtained independe nce from Spain. So far as the consequence
of effectivités is concerned, any critical date is obviously much later. As the Chamber made plain - 26 -
in its 1992 Judgment in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier case, there is nothing unusual in
having different critical dates for different issues in a case of this kind ( Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicar agua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992 ,
p. 351, para. 67).
44. Given the difficulty that Nicaragua has ha d in making up its mind what case it wants to
bring to the Court, the Court might well feel that the critical date for the islands was last Monday
morning! Certainly, it cannot be earlier than the date of filing the Memorial ⎯ 21 March 2001 ⎯
since this was the first time that Nicaragua asserted that it had title to the islands. No such assertion
can be found in the Application and, Madam Pres ident, Nicaragua knows how to make a claim of
title to islands in an application to this Court. Members of the Court might like to compare the
Application in the present case with the Applica tion Nicaragua made against Colombia, in the
proceedings you will be hearing later this year.
45. It follows that in this case, Madam President, the Court can and should take full account
of any effectivités which predate the filing of the Memorial. And of course, acts of recognition by
one State of another State’s title and statements ag ainst interest would be relevant no matter when
they were made.
(d) Uti possidetis juris
46. Now with that in mind, let me say a little about the application of uti possidetis, although
ProfessorSánchezRodríguez will deal with this i ssue in greater detail and with greater expertise
than I can bring to bare. At the outset it is impor tant to note that there is agreement between the
Parties on one particularly significant issu e, namely that the islands were not terrae nullius at the
time of independence and have not become terrae nullius at any subsequent time. That was
expressly accepted by Professor Remiro Brotóns last Wednesday 10.
47. It is plain that the islands did not remain Spanish ⎯ any rights Spain might have claimed
to retain after the independence of the Central American States it formally relinquished in the
treaties it concluded with them in the 1850s an d 1860s. In the case of Honduras, the Treaty of
Recognition of 15March1866 expressly provided th at Spain recognized the sovereignty of
10
CR 2007/3, p. 36, paras. 85 and 86. - 27 -
Honduras over her mainland territory and the adjace nt islands and renounced any claims it might
11
have had . There is a similar provision in the treat y between Nicaragua a nd Spain concluded in
1850 12. Obviously neither treaty establishes which of the two successor States acquired title by
way of uti possidetis but they do make clear that there can be no Spanish claim in the
post-independence era. Nor are the islands claime d by any other State on the basis of a title not
derived from Spain.
48. So the only question is this: to which of the successor States did Spain’s rights to the
islands devolve? And he re, Madam President, it is noticeable that Nicaragua does not make a
claim to have succeeded to Spain’s rights with rega rd to the islands. Nor has any such claim ever
been made by, for example, Guatemala. Hondur as and Honduras alone claims sovereignty on the
basis of uti possidetis. That is what makes this case marked ly different from that decided by the
Chamber in 1992, where both El Salvador and Honduras advanced such claims ( Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute (ElSalvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1992, p. 351).
49. Instead, Madam President, Nicaragua cont ends that the islands were under Spanish
sovereignty prior to independence but either they ha d not been attributed to one or other province
or it cannot be established to which province they appertained. On that basis, ProfessorRemiro
told the Court last week, “il faudra alors avoir recours à d’autres titres ou appliquer le principe de
la proximité” (CR 2007/3, p. 36, para. 85).
50. Madam President, Nicaragua has sought to make light of this issue but the approach
which it urges on the Court really does rai se serious difficulties. The principle of uti possidetis has
emerged as an important principle in the law of title to territory, precisely because of the stability it
brings to the vital issue of borders and sovereignt y. In the case of what was formerly the Spanish
Empire in the Americas, the principle means that wh atever territory was Spanish at the time of the
collapse of that empire devolved to one or other of the successor States ⎯ the principle is
comprehensive in its scope.
11
CMH, Vol. II, Ann. 8.
1RN, Vol. II, Ann. 11. - 28 -
51. In the present case, there is no dispute that the islands were Spanish immediately prior to
independence, no dispute that they have been re nounced by Spain, no dispute that they have not
been terrae nullius at any relevant time and, crucially , they are claimed on the basis of
uti possidetis by only one of Spain’s successor Stat es. In these circumstances to hold ⎯ as
Nicaragua invites you to do ⎯ that no title can be established at all on the basis of uti possidetis
would be seriously to undermine the effectiveness of that principle.
52. Moreover, as Professor Sánchez Rodríguez will explain, Nicaragua’s analysis is quite
simply wrong. The evidence ⎯ accepted, as we have seen, in the 1906 Award ⎯ is that the coast
as far south as Cape Gracias a Dios and including the coastal settlements formed part of Honduras,
or Comayagua as it used to be called. Th e “adjacent islands that lie along its coasts” ⎯ to use the
term employed in the Treaty of 1866 ⎯ were included within that province.
53. Those islands are closer to the coast of H onduras than the coast of any other part of the
then Spanish Empire. And here, Madam President, I should just make the point that it is adjacency
to the coasts which is mentioned in 1866 and whic h was significant throughout the Spanish period.
Nicaragua’s attempt to build a proximity argum ent on the basis of the distance between these
islands and Edinburgh Cay 1, just south of the 15th parallel, really is clutching at straws.
54. In addition, the practice during the imperial period was to make extensive use of lines of
latitude and meridians as the basis for determining the attribution of small islands to one or other of
the mainland provinces. We saw an instance of Nicaragua relying unsuccessfully on such an
approach in relation to a meridian in its argument s in the 1906arbitration. In the present case, it
was the 15thparallel, running out to sea from Ca peGracias aDios, which was treated as the
boundary in the imperial era.
55. So for all these reasons, Honduras maintains that the principle of uti possidetis provides a
solid Honduran title to the islands north of the 15th parallel.
(e)Effectivités
56. Let me now turn, Madam President, to the issue of effectivités in relation to the islands.
The effectivités in this case are entirely post-colonial and, as the 1992 Judgment demonstrates, they
13
CR 2007/1, p. 51, para. 8. - 29 -
are relevant in two ways: first, as confirmation of the uti possidetis title and, secondly, as an
alternative, free-standing basis of sovereignt y in the event that the Court finds that uti possidetis
does not provide a sufficiently clear answer.
57. Nicaragua said nothing last week about the law on this subject. Fortunately, the Court
has recently reviewed that law in its Judgment in the Indonesia/Malaysia case. The Court there
quoted with approval an earlier statement by the Permanent Court in the Eastern Greenland case in
these terms:
“a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of
cession but merely upon the continued displa y of authority, involves two elements
each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and
some actual exercise or display of such authority” ( Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan
and Pulau Sipadan, I.C.J. Reports2002, p. 682, para. 134, quoting Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 53, p. 45).
In that context, the Court made clear that the ex tent of conduct required was closely related to the
nature of the territory in question. To quot e again, this time from the Court itself in
Indonesia/Malaysia:
“In particular, in the case of very small islands which are uninhabited or not
permanently inhabited ⎯ like Ligitan and Sipadan, which have been of little
economic importance (at least until recently) ⎯ effectivités will indeed generally be
scarce.” (Ibid., para. 134.)
Now these considerations are of particular importa nce here. The islands, like Ligitan and Sipadan,
are small and of limited economic importance, a lthough important enough to those who fish in the
area around them, and fish from them. It is also noticeable, Madam President, that the Court in
Indonesia/Malaysia quoted with approval another passage from the Eastern Greenland case, in
these terms:
“It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial
sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with
very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other
State could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of
claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries. ( P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46.)”
58. Now, Madam President, Nicaragua seeks to restrict reference to those effectivités as far
as it can and for a very good reason ⎯ there are no effectivités to which Nicaragua can point in
support of its own claim and, try as it might, it has no answer to the evidence of significant
Honduran activity in relation to the islands. It has therefore sought to minimize the role of - 30 -
effectivités in two ways: by restricting the period within which they can be found and by launching
and attack on the evidence advanced by Honduras. Each of these tactics calls for a brief comment.
59. So far as the first is concerned, Nicaragua seeks to exclude or at least minimize the
importance of anything occurring after May 1977 bu t, as we have seen, that cannot be the critical
date for the dispute about the islands.
60. But it has quietly sought to advance anot her argument to restrict the period of time.
Nothing that happens before1963 could be re levant because it has said until that date it was
Nicaragua that controlled the coast to the north of Cape Gracias a Dios. Well, Madam President, a
few comments about that. This led incidentally to the distinguished Agent for Nicaragua’s rather
nice comment about how the period was so short that the practice couldn’t even have reached the
age of maturity and consent, so brief was it. It’s a nice line, Madam President, but it’s wildly
inaccurate. First of all, Nicaragua itself concedes that it withdrew from the territory north of the
Cape by May1961, not 1963; so the dates are wrong. Secondly, there is no evidence before the
Court that it was Nicaragua that controlled the coast as opposed to some of the inland areas
between CapeGracias aDios and CapeFalso. Th irdly, Madam President, even if Nicaragua had
controlled the coast during this period, it was doing so unlawfully, in violation of the principle of
uti possidetis and in a clear breach of its obligation under the 1894Treaty to give effect to the
1906 Award of the King of Spain. Now it challenged that Award certainly, but it challenged it, and
before this Court, on grounds that convinced not one single Member of the Court except for the
ad hoc judge nominated by Nicaragua.
61. Now that illegality has two important con sequences for these purposes. First, it is plain
that Nicaragua cannot be allowed to derive any legal benefit from it ⎯ the principle of ex injuria
jus non oritur precludes it from doing so. Secondly, to the extent that there is any practice linking
the islands to the coast north of Cape Gracias a Di os during the period of the occupation, that must
be taken to inure today to the benefit of Honduras, the lawful sovereign, and not to have somehow
survived to the benefit of Nicaragua even after the latter’s belated withdrawal from the occupied
territory.
62. And there is another consequence, more practical than juridical. Until the Nicaraguan
withdrawal, there was a degree of uncertainty for third parties ⎯ whether States or individuals, and - 31 -
for the governments ⎯ about the ultimate fate of the territory north of Cape Gracias a Dios. So it
is not surprising that, when that problem is fi nally resolved by the Court’s 1960Judgment, the
result if an intensification of activity in relation to the areas just offshore.
63. That’s Nicaragua’s first tactic. Her sec ond tactic has been to launch an attack on the
evidence tendered by Honduras. In part that has consisted of the usual forensic device of trying to
portray inconsistencies between the statements of different witnesses. That is fair enough as far as
it goes although the Court might feel the underlying assumption ⎯ that you can take a witness
statement made by a fisherman and apply the same techniques of interpretation you would apply to
a double-taxation treaty ⎯ might perhaps be a little far-fetched. But counsel for Nicaragua went
much further and appeared to be alleging that some at least of these witness statements were
artificially manufactured and could not be relied upon by the Court.
64. Madam President, you and your colleagues will be very well aware that that is a serious
suggestion and one which no advocate before this Court should make unless he has evidence to
support it. Nicaragua has not offered you a shred of evidence to support that allegation. In fact, the
witness statements were the product of a vis it to the islands by one of my colleagues ⎯ a member
of the English Bar ⎯ who understands perfectly well his duty to this Court in relation to the
preparation of evidence and who was subject, of cour se, to the very strict disciplinary code of the
English Bar in everything he did, wherever he di d it. The witnesses were told that their evidence
was sought in connection with proceedings in this Court ⎯ that is perfectly natural and perfectly
proper ⎯ but their testimony was their own and was honestly given. To suggest otherwise without
any evidential basis for doing so would be wholly improper. We are sure, Madam President, that
the suggestion was made inadvertently, or, at least, without full realization of the implications and
we hope to hear and say nothing more about it. Obviously, if we do hear more of this, then we
shall have more to say, a great deal more to say, in the second round.
65. So let me turn now to what the evidence of effectivités before the Court shows. Given
the small size of the islands and the shifting nature of habitation ⎯ factors the Court has stressed
are of considerable importance ⎯ there is in fact a surprisingly substantial body of Honduran
effectivités. They fall into seven broad categories. - 32 -
66. First, there are statements in Honduran laws. Not surprisingly, Honduran law does not
list every island appertaining to Honduras by name; very few legal systems would do. But despite
that, successive Constitutions of Honduras and its ag rarian laws make express mention of Palo de
Campeche ⎯ Logwood Cay ⎯ as falling within the territory of Honduras together with “all others
located in the Atlantic”. The 1982 Constitution also expressly refers to Media Luna, as well as
Rosalind Bank and Serranilla. In view of the close proximity of the islands, the reference to Palo
de Campeche and other islands in the Atlantic mu st be taken to include Bobel, PortRoyal,
Savannah and South Cay. Moreov er, we have already seen that the term “Media Luna” is
frequently used to refer to the entire group of islands and cays, including evidence on which
Nicaragua relies before the Court.
67. Secondly, Madam President, there is the application of Honduran law on the islands.
That can be seen in, for example, the applica tion of Honduran criminal law, detailed in
paragraphs 6.20 and 6.21 of the Counter-Memorial a nd in the witness statements referred to there.
The application of that law to cases of theft and assault, amongst others on South Cay, Savannah
and Bobel. Civil law has been applied to di ving accidents and other in cidents on and around the
islands and cays.
68. Thirdly, Honduras has applied its immigra tion laws to the islands. The 1999 visit to
which I referred earlier and which is the subject of Annex146 to the Counter-Memorial, is one
example, but it is clear from a reading of the re port that there had been earlier such immigration
visits.
69. Fourthly, there is the fishing activity carried on from the islands. In the
Indonesia/Malaysia case, the Court made clear ⎯ in the context of an Indonesian claim ⎯ that
“activities by private persons cannot be seen as effectivités” but significantly it added “if they do
not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental authority” ( Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002 , p.683, para.140). But that is precisely what happened here. The fishing
activity carried on from the cays has been subject ⎯ as numerous witnesses have testified ⎯ to the
grant of bitacoras ⎯ licences ⎯by the authorities of Honduras.
70. Fifthly, there is the evidence of the oil concession practice. Suffice it to say for now that
Honduras ⎯ and only Honduras ⎯ has granted oil concessions for the areas around the islands and - 33 -
the only oil companies which have operated on or around those islands have been Honduran
concessionaires: the building of the radio mast by Union Oil on their Bobel Cay in 1975, is an
example.
71. Sixthly, there is the evidence, already touched on, of the joint Honduran/UnitedStates
survey.
72. And lastly, as Professor Sands will demonstrate, there is the assertion by Honduras in its
foreign relations of sovereignt y over the islands and the acceptance of those assertions by other
governments ⎯ a factor considered particularly important, for example, in the Eastern Greenland
case.
73. By contrast, Nicaragua has put befo re the Court no evidence of comparable effectivités
on its part. Indeed, it cannot be said to have shown any effectivités at all. It is reduced to relying
on a geographical index, which is not an offi cial governmental publication, an internal
BritishGovernment letter in highly qualified terms which a ppears never to have been
communicated to either Honduras or Nicaragua, and the 1982 fishing boat arrests, which on
Nicaragua’s own arguments, relate to control of maritime rights under the law of the sea and cannot
be regarded as an assertion of sovereignty over the islands themselves.
74. These points will be developed later by my colleagues but one has only to look at them in
summary to see that Honduras has a substantial record of conduct in relation to the islands whereas
Nicaragua has no significant activity at all. Honduras will submit that the evidence before the
Court is clear, it is compelling, it is more extensive than that relied on by the Court in, for example,
the Indonesia/Malaysia case, and more than sufficient to establish Honduran sovereignty over these
islands.
(4) The Maritime Boundary
(a) The significance of the islands for the maritime boundary
75. Madam President, I have taken some ti me over the dispute concerning the islands
because Nicaragua’s change of case means that th is has not been as fully argued as the maritime
boundary dispute. But there is another reason and that is that sovereignty over the islands is the
key to a proper understanding of the maritime bounda ry. Once the situation of those islands is - 34 -
understood, four matters immediately become a pparent with regard to the maritime boundary
dispute.
76. First, Nicaragua’s justification for jumping straight to its preferred bisector method is the
confident assertion given to the Court by Mr.Brownlie that the construction of a provisional
14
equidistance line is impossible . But that is simply wrong. Illustration 19 shows just such a line.
77. Article 121, paragraph2, of the Law of the Sea Convention is quite unequivocal:
anything which is an island under Article 121, paragr aph 1, that is to say, “a naturally formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above wa ter at high tide” carries the same right to a
territorial sea as other land territory. In addition, unless it falls under Article 121, paragraph 3, as a
rock which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own, it also generates a
continental shelf and an EEZ entitlement. The islands in this case are all islands within Article 121
and they do not fall within the provisions of Article121, paragraph3. The evidence tendered by
Honduras would make that clear, but it is not disputed in any event. Accordingly, they are a part of
the land territory of one Party or the other. They therefore can ⎯ and must ⎯ play a part in the
construction of a provisional equidistance line.
78. They would be just as relevant in this respect, incidentally, if they were part of the
territory of Nicaragua rather than, as is clearly the case, part of Honduras. To illustrate this
proposition the next illustration, No. 20, shows the provisional equidistance line calculated as if the
islands south of the navigation channel were Nicaraguan; south of the navigation channel but north
of the 15th parallel. Interestingly that line is still well to the south of the bisector line which
Nicaragua invites you to draw.
79. But the point for the moment is not the location of the line but the possibility of
constructing it. Once it is clear that drawing a pr ovisional equidistance line is possible, then the
justification for departing from the normal practice in maritime boundary cases and rushing to the
use of a bisector method ⎯ the line preferred by Nicaragua ⎯ and there is nothing provisional
about that line, nothing at all. That justification simply falls away.
14
CR 2007/3, p. 10, para. 192. - 35 -
80. Secondly, Madam President, an important part of the maritime case is about the
territorial sea, not the continental shelf or exclusive zone. But just how important a part becomes
apparent only when one considers the islands.
81. As counsel for Nicaragua helpfully reminde d the Court last week, the provisions of the
Law of the Sea Convention regarding the drawing of a territorial sea boundary could not be clearer.
Article3 gives the coastal State a right to a territori al sea to a breadth of 12nautical miles. That
right is of course subject to the rights of other States to their territorial seas, but it cannot be
displaced by claims to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone. Moreover, where two
adjacent States, such as Honduras and Nicaragua, ha ve overlapping territorial sea claims, in the
absence of agreement on some other method, the u se of the median line or equidistance method is
mandatory except where “it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to
define the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith”.
82. The next illustration, No.21, shows the application of these principles to the present
dispute; shows all of the islands in the area with a 12-mile arc drawn around them. As the matter
has been raised by Nicaragua, let me say a word about the method by which this map has been
prepared. The basis is United States NIMA chart 28140, for the area north of the 15th parallel, and
United States NIMA chart28130, which covers the area south of the 15thparallel. Each of the
offshore features, shown as having a territorial sea, is marked as an island on those charts and thus
has an automatic entitlement to a territorial sea. The next illustra tion, No.22, is an enlarged
rendition from NIMA 28140 showing two islands, the area which is above water at high tide being
the smaller area in the darkest shading. If one just looks for a moment at Port Royal Cay here, you
see the small area in the top right-hand corner: that is the area that is proud of the water at high
tide. The green area around it, the penumbra, is th e area which is only proud of the water at low
tide. As provided in for in Article 5 of the Law of the Sea Convention, the ex tent of the territorial
sea is measured from the low-water line.
83. We have applied this criterion both north and south of the 15thparallel. Nicaragua’s
complaint last week that we had not done so consistently may, we suggest, be based on a
misunderstanding of the markings on the charts. The depiction of that part of an island visible only
at low water is easily confused with the marking for “dangerous shoals”. And there is an example - 36 -
here from south of the 15th parallel: this marking here, the dotted line, that is a “dangerous shoals”
or “dangerous waters” marking; there are plenty of those in this area, it is a notoriously dangerous
area for navigation (figure 23). Now, Madam President, that is an area which is permanently below
water and is therefore irrelevant for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea,
although of course it is obviously very important for the purposes of navigation.
84. Thirdly, Madam President, once it is reali zed that the islands are part of Honduras, it
becomes clear that the bisector approach advanced by Nicaragua produces a result which is wholly
indefensible. If one superimposes the lines cl aimed by Nicaragua and by Honduras on the map
showing the territorial seas around all of the isla nds, then it becomes clear that the Nicaraguan line
would be unworkable ⎯ one looks at illustration No.24. South of the Nicaraguan line would lie
large areas of Honduran territory and territorial waters ⎯ this whole are here. No wonder that
Nicaragua has belatedly sought to claim the islands north of the 15th parallel: its entire strategy in
relation to its claimed single maritime boundary si mply falls apart if those islands are Honduran.
But that fact cannot alter the law applicable to the dispute concerning the islands and when that law
is applied it is clear that Nicaragua simply has no case. The implications for its maritime boundary
are then all too apparent. Mr. Brownlie told the Court last week that two of the goals of maritime
delimitation were clarity and simplicity. But where are they in this picture? In the patchwork quilt
which the Nicaraguan line would create? Or in the line which has served the Parties for many
years as a clear, simple and straightforward boundary for their activities in the region?
85. Lastly, Madam President, the realization that the islands form part of the territory of
Honduras brings into stark relief the inequity of what Nicaragua is urging on the Court.
Nicaragua’s proposed line would cut off the Honduran mainland from the islands and their
territorial seas; it would deprive Honduras of acc ess to the natural resources of the area around its
islands and it would have obvious implications fo r the security of Honduras in that the Honduran
islands would be isolated within Nicaraguan maritime spaces.
Madam President, I have about another 15 mi nutes to go, but I wonder whether that would
be a convenient moment for the Court to break? I am happy to carry on if you would prefer.
The PRESIDENT: I think we would prefer you to conclude your statement. - 37 -
Mr. GREENWOOD: Certainly Madam President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Mr. GREENWOOD: :
(b) The flaws in Nicaragua’s approach
86. Well, Madam President, the next part deals w ith this issue, which is that even on its own
terms, Nicaragua’s line is plainly deficient and the arguments advanced to show that it produces an
equitable result are flawed. Let us examine the area claimed by Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan coast
terminates at the 15th parallel ⎯ at Cape Gracias a Dios. The 1906 Award and the 1960 Judgment
make that a given. If we then consider the area to the north of the 15thparallel, in illustration
No. 25, we see that Nicaragua has simply no territo rial presence there at all, whatever it may once
have claimed. We also see, incidentally, why the 1906 Award described Honduras as bounded to
the east, as well as north and north-east, by the Caribbean.
87. In these circumstances, it is not immediat ely obvious to the impartial observer why it is
equitable for Nicaragua to have a continental sh elf and a zone extending to the 17thparallel and
perhaps beyond (figure 26). One is left with the sense that Nicaragua is desperately trying to gain
at sea as much as possible of what she might have had if the King of Spain or this Court had found
in her favour in relation to the land dispute. Bu t they did not. Nicaragua failed in its claim to a
large slice of the territory of Honduras and that failure has consequences at sea as well as on land.
88. Moreover, Madam President, the methodol ogy proposed by Nicaragua is flawed. We
have already seen that its use was predicated on the impossibility of drawing a meaningful
provisional equidistance line whereas in fact drawing such a line is perfectly possible. We have
also seen that the proposed bisector line produ ces unworkable results b ecause of the Honduran
islands. But the Nicaraguan methodology is deficient even on its own terms.
89. There is nothing inherently wrong with using a bisector method to construct a maritime
boundary ⎯ it is one of the methods, albeit not the most widely used, in State practice. But the
line is only as good as the angle which it bisects. Nicaragua’s angle is supposed to have been
constructed by taking account of the coastal directi ons of the Parties. It treats the two coasts as - 38 -
straight lines, as we can see from illustration No. 27. In the case of some coastal fronts, that might
be a perfectly reasonable approach but here it cr eates an angle that bears no relationship to the
actual coasts at all (figure28). Between the lin e drawn as representing the Nicaraguan coastline
2
and the actual location of the coast is nearly 7,000 km of the Caribbean Sea ⎯ that is in this area
here.
90. But what Nicaragua does to Honduras is even more dramatic. The line drawn to
represent what is supposed to be the coastal direction of Honduras is so far from the actual coast
that there are 22,500km 2 of land between that line and the sea. Now, the total land area of
2
Honduras is only some 112,000km . So what Nicaragua asks you to do is to cast adrift, so to
speak, one fifth of the total landmass of the Honduras ⎯ a block more than 100,000 times the size
of the iceberg which sank the Titanic. No wonder these waters are marked as dangerous for
navigation on all the charts!
91. The reality is that the angle chosen by Ni caragua is wholly artificial. It comes nowhere
near being a true reflection of the relationship between the two coasts.
92. Nor are the other arguments advanced by Ni caragua in an attempt to show that its line
achieves an equitable result convincing. Other members of the Honduran team will deal with them
in detail: let me just highlight four points.
93. First, Nicaragua rebukes Honduras for not ap preciating that security considerations can
be a relevant circumstance in achieving an equita ble result. We heard quite a lot about that last
week, how we got this point wrong. But the qu estion is not whether security considerations can be
a relevant circumstance, but whether on the facts of this particular case they are a relevant
circumstance. And Nicaragua has not shown any Nicaraguan security considerations that would be
adversely affected by the adoption of their preferred line rather than that advanced by Honduras. In
fact it is Nicaragua’s line which has security im plications for Honduras because of the position of
the islands.
94. Secondly, Nicaragua has made much of the so-called “Nicaraguan Rise” depicted here in
illustration30. It looks, Madam President, a little bit like the horn on the “orange rhinoceros”
which Professor Pellet mentioned to you last week ⎯ and it must be said it is about as relevant to
this case as such a mythical beast. - 39 -
95. Of course, Nicaragua does not actually acquire rights in the maritime area simply by
calling a submarine geomorphological feature the “Nicaraguan Rise”. The Chamber in the Gulf of
Maine case had no difficulty rejecting the suggestion that rights in that Gulf could be attributed to
the United States because it was called the Gulf of Maine rather than the Gulf of Nova Scotia.
96. But there is a far more fundamental problem with Nicaragua’s argument and that is that
the Court has made it clear (for example in its decision in the Libya/Malta case) that
geomorphological features such as the “Nicar aguan Rise” cannot determine the method of
delimitation to be adopted or have any substantial weight in relation to the equity of the boundary
to be determined. When one looks at the ot her features in the present case, such as the
long-standing practice regarding the grant of oil concessions depicted here on illustration31, and
the reality of Honduran sovereignty over the isla nds, it becomes more than ever apparent that
reliance on a submarine feature to which it is adve ntitiously given the name “Nicaraguan Rise” is
wholly misplaced.
97. Thirdly, Madam President, Nicaragua’s argument about equitable access to natural
resources: this is really nothing more than an attempt to repackage its “Nicaragua Rise argument”
in a more contemporary way. Nicaragua argues that for the Court to prefer the Honduran line to its
own would be inequitable, because it would deny Nicaragua access to the resources of the
“Nicaragua Rise”. But Nicaragua has offered no evidence that natural resources are particularly
linked to the “Nicaragua Rise”. It makes an assertion to that effect as regards fisheries and then
adds that “a similar correlation can be assumed to exist in relation to the incidence of oil and
15
natural gas” .
98. But that is not enough to single out this particular part of the sea-bed and the waters
above it. A far more pertinent consideration is that for many years both Parties have treated as
giving equitable access a boundary along the 15th parallel. The use of that boundary by both
Parties in granting oil concessions is particularly marked (see figure 31). Although Nicaragua has
told the Court that its concessions could have gone north of the 15th parallel, the simple fact is that
they did not do so. Even where a potential oil field straddling that line was to be developed by the
15
MN, p. 127, para. 7. - 40 -
same corporate group ⎯ Union Oil ⎯, the two Governments granted separate concessions to
separate subsidiaries with the 15thparallel as the divi ding line. That is as clear an act of mutual
consent by the two States as one could hope to find. Nicaragua’s suggestion that this was done for
the convenience of Union Oil is quite simply fanc iful. Members of the Court might like to ask
themselves, why on earth would one corporation wa nt to be saddled with the complication of two
separate concessions, granted to two separate subsidiaries, by two separate governments, if it could
have made do with a single concession for a single company from a single State?
99. Lastly, Madam President, there is the argument about the effect of the right to
development. Now I am as attached to the ri ght to development as Mr.Brownlie, but what
implications does it have for where you draw a single maritime boundary? The Court has made
clear, repeatedly, that it does not consider that the function of maritime delimitation is to
compensate at sea for the relative wealth or poverty of States on land. And here, where both
Parties are developing countries with gross domestic products per capita among the lowest in Latin
America, there really cannot be any argument for saying that one Party’s right to development must
permit encroachment on the maritime spaces which would otherwise pertain to the other.
100. Madam President, as Honduras is the Respondent, I have begun by considering the case
made against us. Let me now ⎯ and in conclusion on the maritime boundary ⎯ say something
about the case for the Honduran line. That will be de alt with in detail by my colleagues later in the
week but there are four points which stand out.
101. The first is a very simple but absolutely fundamental point. It is that Honduras’s line ⎯
in marked contrast to Nicaragua’s ⎯ does what a single maritime boundary, or any maritime
boundary, should do: it runs between Honduran terr itory on the one side and Nicaraguan territory
on the other. There are no enclaves, no encroachment. This can be seen most clearly in illustration
No. 24, if we could look at that again.
102. The second point is that the Honduran lin e is constructed using real coastlines, real
territory, not artificial “coastal directions” which either lie well to seaward of the real coast or leave
huge tracts of territory between the “coastal direction” and the sea. Maritime boundaries have to be
based on real, not virtual, geography. We do not live in a virtual world removed from reality, as
the Nicaraguan bisector seems to. - 41 -
103. The third point, Madam President, is that the Honduran line is based in the conduct of
the Parties in relation to fisheries, oil concessions and other activities which will be detailed in later
speeches. The position regarding the oil con cessions is particularly clear, as illustration 31
demonstrates. The Parties’ conduct in respect of those concessions is conduct which, in the words
of the Court in Cameroon/Nigeria, is “based on express or tacit agreement” (Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 448, para. 304).
104. Last week, Mr. Brownlie told the Court th at “if there had been Nicaraguan consent, we
16
would not be before the Court today” . Well, if that were the test, Madam President, you would
never hear a case of breach of treaty in this Court, or a case on failure to honour any undertaking of
any kind. But that is not what happens and it is not the test. And, frankly, it is a statement that has
particularly little credibility coming from Nicara gua. Nicaragua had c onsented to honour the
Arbitral Award in the 1894 Treaty, but for 50 years it refused to do so for reasons which convinced
no one except its own nominated ad hoc judge when the matter came before this Court.
105. The reality is that Nicaragua had a change of heart when it had a change of government,
just as it had a change of heart at the same time about the 50-year-old treaty with Colombia. But
changes of heart cannot retrospectively alter hist ory any more than changes of government can do
so.
106. The last point, Madam President, is that the Honduran line is actually more favourable
to Nicaragua than a provisional equidistance line would be. (Figure 24 again.)
107. None of these factors stands by itsel f. Whatever Nicaragua may say, Honduras ⎯ I am
afraid that what has come up here is not the illustration I had intended to show you: there is
another one which shows the Honduran line and the provisional equidistance line earlier in your
judges’ folder. None of these factors stands by itself, Madam President. Whatever Nicaragua may
say, Honduras does not, and has not, relied on one argu ment to the exclusion of all others. What it
relies on is the combination of this range of considerations which together show that the
15th parallel ⎯ a clear and simple line if ever there was one ⎯ meets the requirements of the law
of the sea and delivers an equitable result.
16
CR 2007/5, p. 31, para. 23. - 42 -
108. That, in summary, is Honduras’s case. I would now ask you, Madam President, perhaps
after the coffee break, to call upon my colleague Pr ofessor Sánchez Rodríguez to begin the task of
developing that case in detail.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorGreenwood. The Court will now briefly rise and
resume in about ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.40 to 11.50 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Sánchez Rodríguez.
M. SÁNCHEZ :
Madame et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, permettez-moi de commencer mon
intervention en exprimant l’honneur que je ressens de comparaître à nouveau devant vous.
1. L’objet principal de la première partie de mon intervention consiste à démontrer :
⎯ premièrement, qu’avant 1821 et aussi immédiatement après, le cap Gracias a Dios constituait la
limite terrestre et maritime entre les provinces du Honduras et du Nicaragua ;
⎯ deuxièmement, qu’à l’occasion de la sentence du roi d’Espagne de 1906, le Nicaragua a tenté,
sans aucun succès d’ailleurs, de réclamer des fro ntières terrestres, insulaires et maritimes
situées plus au nord, en l’espèce au cap Camarón pa ssant par le méridien 85° ouest. C’est dire
qu’il a tenté de modifier l’orientation initiale des côtes et des îles nicaraguayennes dans l’océan
Atlantique d’une perspective ouest-est en une projection nord-sud et pour ce faire, il a demandé
d’une façon précise, une ligne passant par un accident géographique et par une coordonnée
déterminée. Mais le roi d’Espagne a affi rmé en 1906, à l’identique, ce qu’avait décidé
e
avant1821 la Couronne d’Espagne, c’est -à-dire que le Nicaragua jusqu’auXX siècle était
dépourvu d’une quelconque projection insulaire et maritime au nord du cap Gracias a Dios. La
prétention actuelle du Nicaragua d’avancer au nord de ce cap est ainsi déniée tant par l’histoire
que par le droit ; et,
⎯ troisièmement, que durant la plus grande partie du si ècle passé, l’attitude et le comportement
réciproque des deux Etats tenaient pour établi le ur consentement implicite de reconnaître au
cap Gracias a Dios une projection à la fois terrestre et maritime. - 43 -
2. Pour ce faire, je me verrai obligé de me référer à l’histoire commune des deux provinces
avant l’indépendance aux fins de fixer l’ uti possidetis de 1821, ainsi qu’à l’histoire commune
partagée par les deux Parties alors devenues des Etats nouveaux et indépendants. Le Nicaragua
considérait depuis l’indépendance que sa seule pr ojection dans la mer des Caraïbes était en
direction de l’est, comme le prouve sa pratique législative et conventionnelle et il a tenté d’y
remédier sans succès en 1906 pour avancer vers le no rd. Après, il a accepté la situation terrestre,
insulaire et maritime pendant plusieurs décennies. Aujourd’hui, à nouveau, il retourne à ses vieux
démons. Il recherche par une autre voie ⎯ celle de l’évolution du droit de la mer ⎯ un remède à
ce qui avait déterminé son statut juridique défini tif (ou plutôt, au statut qui ne lui a jamais
correspondu et, par conséquent, ne lui a jamais été reconnu) en1906, et en1960 précisément
devant cette même Cour dans la seconde des décisi ons citées. Dans cet ordre d’idées, je ne peux
moins faire que d’attirer l’attention sur la contra diction d’un tel comportement avec le principe de
stabilité et d’intangibilité des frontières héritées de la décolonisation.
A.La signification du cap Gracias a Dios co mme limite terrestre et maritime durant la
période coloniale : l’histoire et le droit colonial
3. Au cours de la période coloniale, la limite administrative entre les provinces du Honduras
et du Nicaragua suivait le Rio Segovia (appelé aussi la rivière Coco ou Wanks) jusqu’à son
17
embouchure au cap Gracias a Dios . Cette limite séparait les territoires des juridictions de toutes
les autorités civiles et militaires de la colonie, lesquels territoires comprenaient non seulement la
terre ferme mais encore les possessions maritime s adjacentes ainsi que les eaux continentales et
insulaires qui baignaient le continent et les îl es. C’est pour cette raison que la province du
Honduras exerçait son autorité au nord du cap Graci as a Dios et la province du Nicaragua au sud
dudit promontoire.
e
4. Toutes les références au cap Gracias a Dios le situent au, ou à proximité du 15 parallèle
nord et il n’y a aucune preuve que sa dénominati on et sa localisation aient soulevé des doutes et
posé des problèmes tant durant l’époque de la colonie qu’après l’indépendance en1821. Les
preuves de cela ont été présentées devant cette Cour par le Nicaragua lui-même dans l’affaire
17
Voir DH, chap. 5. - 44 -
décidée en1960 (voir C.I.J. Mémoires 1958, Sentence arbitrale rendue par le roi d’Espagne
le23décembre1906 (Honduras c. Nicaragua) , volI, annexes au contre-mémoire, p.379-432).
C’est ainsi qu’une note du 23 novembre 1844 du ministre commun du Honduras et du Nicaragua au
ministre des affaires étrangères de Sa Maj esté britannique reconnaissait expressément la
souveraineté du Nicaragua sur la côte atlantique «d epuis le cap Gracias a Dios jusqu’au nord de la
ligne le séparant du Costa Rica» 18.
5. Je ferai remarquer, en outre, qu’il n’existe aucun précédent, d’aucune sorte, de différends
ou de conflits de limites dans cette région jusqu’ en 1870-1875, ce qui implique que la conduite des
parties postérieure à l’indépendan ce corrobore pendant cinquante années l’ uti possidetis juris
19
de1821. Comme d’ailleurs aussi la doctrine scientifique , qui cependant observe que ces
premières divergences ne se limiteront pas au cap Gracias a Dios mais aussi à d’autres secteurs de
la frontière. C’est ce que confirme l’article I du traité Gámez-Bonilla du 7 octobre 1894, qui se lit
comme suit 20:
«Les Gouvernements du Honduras et du Nicaragua nommeront des
commissaires qui, dûment autorisés, organiseront une commission mixte des limites
chargée de résoudre de façon amicale tous les doutes et tous les différends pendants et
de tracer sur le terrain la ligne fr ontière indiquant la limite entre les
deux Républiques.»
6. Mais encore plus pertinent pour la présente affaire, c’est la reconnaissance explicite par
les deux Parties de l’application du principe de l’ uti possidetis juris dans ledit traité, en l’espèce au
paragraphe3 de son articleII, qui dit 21 : «Il sera entendu que chaque république est maîtresse des
territoires qui, à la date de l’indépendance, c onstituaient respectivement les provinces du Honduras
et du Nicaragua.» Parce que la sentence de 1906 et l’arrêt confirmatif rendu par cette Cour en 1960
établissent bien la frontière entre les deux Etats au large du Rio Segovia et son point terminal à
l’embouchure de ladite rivière au cap Gracias a Di os, il s’ensuit nécessairement que le Nicaragua,
juridiquement ou moralement, ne devrait pas aujourd’hui réclamer les îles et les espaces maritimes
18CMH, vol. 2, annexe 5.
19
CMH, vol. 1, p. 31-32, par. 3.7.
20Ibid.
21Ibid. - 45 -
adjacents au nord dudit promontoire sans porter gravement atteinte à l’ uti possidetis et sans mettre
en évidence l’incohérence manifeste de son comportement.
7. Or, d’une façon surprenante et injustifiée, le Nicaragua nie ou interprète à nouveau à sa
guise, dans cette affaire, le principe de l’ uti possidetis juris. Ceci m’oblige à aborder, maintenant,
les caractéristiques essentielles de ce principe dans le cadre de l’Amérique hispanique.
8. Il est connu que le principe de l’ uti possidetis juris ne contredit pas le droit international
sur la délimitation des espaces maritimes en vigueur mais qu’au contraire il s’y intègre pleinement
grâce à l’article 15 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de mer de 1982. Cet article 15,
en définissant le principe général de la délimitati on de la mer territoriale entre Etats voisins sur la
base de la règle de l’équidistance, envisage une exception importante. La règle précédente ne
s’appliquera pas en raison de l’existence de titres historiques ou d’autres circonstances spéciales, et
parmi ces dernières, sans doute auc un, se distingue l’application de l’ uti possidetis continental et
insulaire. Pour cette raison, en conformité av ec le droit international en vigueur, la règle de
l’équidistance ne saurait prévaloir sur le droit a pplicable tel que déterminé par les circonstances
historiques de l’affaire.
9. Et je dis que le Nicaragua a te nté de déprécier l’application de l’ uti possidetis dans le
22
présent contentieux . Il ignore ou manipule la jurispruden ce internationale en général et la
jurisprudence de cette Cour en particulier. Il cache les difficultés et les carences que provoque
dans son argumentation l’application dudit principe aux espaces maritimes.
10. Comme je l’ai déjà démontré, en ne c itant seulement que quelques précédents de la
pratique historique en la matiè re, le Nicaragua se tr ouve dans l’incapacité de mettre en question
l’application de l’uti possidetis aux espaces maritimes parce qu’il a toujours accepté ce titre comme
fondement de ses délimitations frontalières. Le Nicaragua ne peut soutenir aujourd’hui que le
manque d’équité ⎯pour autant que cette affirmation soit fondée ⎯ rendrait inapplicable ce
23
principe à la délimitation des espaces maritimes . Parce que, si l’on accepte ce principe, l’on
accepte aussi son équité. Ainsi que l’a défendu le professeur Remiro Brotóns, membre distingué de
22
RN, vol. I, p. 49-68, par. 4.1-4.68.
23RN, vol. I, p. 49, par. 4.2. - 46 -
l’équipe du Nicaragua, «es equitativo todo lo que ha sido consentido libremente» 24 [«tout ce que à
quoi il a été consenti librement est équitable»]. Ce qui signifie que le Nicaragua ne peut en même
temps accepter et rejeter le principe selon ce qui lu i convient. En outre, l’invocation d’une équité
abstraite ne saurait exclure le droit applicable (C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 33, par. 78).
11. Qu’il me soit permis, Madame et Messieu rs les juges, d’énon cer quelques évidences
relativement à ce principe. Il est vrai que le principe de l’ uti possidetis ne se retrouve pas à
l’identique, que ce soit quant à son origine ou que ce soit quant à sa nature, dans toutes les
hypothèses de décolonisation. Dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du
Mali) ⎯ délimitation entre deux Etats successeurs d’un même colonisateur ⎯ la Chambre de la
Cour l’a décrit comme «un principe d’ordre général nécessairement lié à la décolonisation où
qu’elle se produise» ( arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p.566, par.23). Dans la présente affaire, il faut
prendre en considération que la succession d’Etat s s’est produite au sein d’une puissance coloniale
unique. Ceci implique que le droit directeur de la succession au territoire soit l’ordonnancement
interne de l’Etat prédécesseur au regard de la délimitation de ses circonscriptions administratives
internes. Ce sont ces dernières qui se transforme ront en Etats. Tout ceci nous ramène au droit
colonial espagnol en Amérique.
12. Relativement à l’ uti possidetis hispanique, il convient de prendre en compte, en premier
lieu, ce qu’a affirmé le Conseil fédéral suisse dans sa sentence de 1922 dans l’affaire des questions
de limites entre la Colombie et le Venezuela: «This general principle offered the advantage of
establishing an absolute rule that there was not in the old Spanish America any terra nullius.»25
Dans le même sens, la sentence de la Chambre de la Cour de 1992 a pris la position que : «Ainsi le
principe de l’ uti possidetis juris touche autant à la recherche du titre à un territoire qu’à
l’emplacement de frontières; un aspect essentiel de ce principe est certainement d’écarter la
possibilité d’un territoire sans maître.» ( Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime
(El Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 387, par. 42.)
24
A. Remiro Brotóns , «Problemas de fronteras en América: la delimitación de los espacios marinos», in
A.Mangas Martín (éd.), La Escuela de Salamanca y el Derecho Inte rnacional en América: del pasado al futuro,
Salamanca, 1993, p. 129, dans l’original en caractères gras.
25UNRIAA, vol. I, p. 228. - 47 -
13. Ce fut la sentence arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989 dans l’affaire Guinée-Bissau/Sénégal
⎯délimitation entre deux Etats successeurs de deux puissances coloniales différentes ⎯ qui
attacha l’application in genere du principe de l’ uti possidetis juris à la décolonisation, sans
admettre des régimes distincts selon qu’il s’agit de la terre ou de la mer: «D’un point de vue
juridique, il n’existe aucune raison d’établir d es régimes juridiques selon l’élément matériel où la
limite est fixée.»26
14. Et puis, dans l’arrêt El Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua (intervenant) de1992, la
Chambre de la Cour fut encore plus concrète en faisant deux affirmations importantes sur
l’application dudit principe. En premier lieu, qu’«en effet, le principe de l’ uti possidetis juris
devrait s’appliquer aux eaux du golfe ainsi qu’aux terres» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p.589, par.386);
et, en second lieu, que :
«La Chambre ne doute pas que le point de départ de la dé termination de la
souveraineté sur les îles doive être l’ uti possidetis juris de 1821. Les îles du golfe de
Fonseca ont été découvertes par l’Espagne en 1522 et sont demeurées pendant
trois siècles sous la souveraineté de la C ouronne espagnole. Lorsqu’en 1821 les Etats
d’Amérique centrale sont devenus indépenda nts, aucune des îles n’était un territoire
sans maître; la souveraineté sur ces îles ne pouvait donc être acquise par occupation
de territoire.» (Ibid., p. 558, par. 333.)
Permettez-moi, Madame le président, à propos de ce passage jurisprudentiel que je viens de citer,
de tenter de donner une explication raisonnable a ux raisons ayant conduit le Nicaragua à demander
initialement dans sa requête la délimitation des espaces maritimes, pour ensuite, dans son mémoire,
⎯en une sorte d’arrière-pensée (afterthought) ⎯, réclamer la souveraineté sur les îles situées au
nord du 15 parallèle. Ce pays et ses conseillers ont immédiatement détecté que s’ils n’invoquaient
pas la souveraineté sur lesdites îles, ils étaient dépourvus d’une affaire digne d’être soutenue devant
vous.
15. En conclusion, dans la phase écrite, les tentatives du Nicaragua de nier l’application de
l’uti possidetis juris aux espaces maritimes adjacents aux territoires continental et insulaire sont
dépourvues de tout fondement. La jurisprudence internationale n’a laissé aucun espace au doute en
relation à la projection de ce principe tant pour les îles que pour les eaux adjacentes à la terre
ferme. En ce qui concerne les îles, toutes celles adjacentes aux territoires continentaux
26
ILM, vol. 83, p. 36, par. 63. - 48 -
appartenaient à l’Espagne et toutes passèrent automatiquement à leurs successeurs centraméricains
en 1821, sauf quand elles firent l’objet de revendi cations par un Etat tiers non hispanique. Cette
dernière situation ne fut pas celle des îles et cay es honduriennes. Ignorer ce fait implique de faire
l’impasse sur l’application du principe tel qu’il a été envisagé dans le récent arrêt de la Chambre de
la Cour de 1992 que je viens de citer.
16. Ce que j’ai dit au sujet des îles s’appli que également à la mer territoriale espagnole, qui
s’est transformée ipso jure et ipso facto en mer territoriale, tant continentale qu’insulaire, des
nouveaux Etats de par leur émancipation coloniale. En effet, la Couronne d’Espagne, au moyen
d’une cédule royale du 17décembre1760, a établi à cette date une extens ion de 6millesmarins
27
(2lieues) des eaux continentales et insulaires espagnoles , non seulement pour des raisons de
sécurité et de défense, mais encore pour lutter cont re la contrebande, très fréquente sur les côtes de
la mer des Caraïbes. Par conséquent, la succession sur le territoire comprenait aussi la partie des
eaux sous juridiction qui existaient pour toutes les côtes américaines de l’Empire espagnol à la date
critique de 1821.
e
17. D’autre part, dans les réformes réalisées au XVIII siècle, et plus spécifiquement, en
conséquence de la création en 1739 de la vice-r oyauté de la Nouvelle-Grenade (aussi appelée
Santa Fé de Bogotá), la Couronne a promulgué deux ordonnances royales successives sur le même
sujet de fond: l’amélioration de la capacité opérationnelle des circonscriptions militaires et
logiquement de leurs zones maritimes.
18. L’ordonnance royale du 23 août 1745 28a créé deux juridictions militaires, une au nord,
qui s’étendait du Yucatan au cap Gracias a Dios , et une autre au sud, de ce même cap au
Rio Chagres, toutes deux dépendantes de la capitainerie générale du Guatemala. Selon le texte de
cette ordonnance royale et la pratique habitue lle de gouvernance appliquée par les autorités
espagnoles, il résultait de cette disposition que les compétences sur la zone maritime environnante
étaient aussi divisées. Il revenait alors d’un côté au Gouvernement du Honduras la compétence sur
27Voir le texte dans J. A. de Yturriaga (éd.), España y la actual revisión del Der echo del Mar., vol.II, Primera
Parte (Textos y Documentos), Madrid, 1974, p. 47.
28Voir les citations clés du rapport de la commission d’examen, qui servirent de base à la décision du
roi d’Espagne dans la sentence de 1906, en CMH, vol. 1, p. 74-75, par. 5.13. - 49 -
29
la côte atlantique jusqu’au cap Gracias a Dios. Etait réservé à la Commandancia générale du
Nicaragua, territoire depuis lors plus orienté vers l’océan Pacifique qu’Atlantique, la zone maritime
relative à la Costa de los Mosquitos, depuis le cap Gracias a Dios jusqu’au sud. Nier une
affirmation aussi élémentaire consiste à dénier l’évidence.
19. Un demi-siècle plus tard, une autre ordonnance royale en date du 20novembre1803,
datant d’à peine dix-huitans avant la déclarati on d’indépendance de la Ce ntramérique, confirmait
la réalité de la distribution des espaces. Le ro i d’Espagne retirait de la capitainerie générale du
Guatemala les îles de San Andrès et la côte des Mo squitos, depuis le cap Gracias a Dios jusqu’au
Rio Chagres, les faisant dépendre de la vice-ro yauté de Santa Fé et nommant un gouverneur pour
les îles. Il est alors évident qu’il résultait de ce texte que le cap Gracias a Dios servait de limite
entre la capitainerie générale du Guatemala et la vice-royauté de Santa Fé. J’ajoute que la zone au
nord du cap Gracias a Dios restait sous l’autori té de la capitainerie générale du Guatemala,
30
concrètement sous le Gouvernement du Honduras .
[Carte LISR 1]
20. Quant aux compétences des capitaineries générales, il faut savoir qu’elles s’exerçaient
sur «les forces de terre et de me r» dans tous les espaces pourvus de côtes, de sorte à prévenir les
menaces et les risques que la méticuleuse réglementation juridique tentait d’éviter. A cet égard, les
preuves historiques sont abondantes: levés hydr ographiques, choix de ports sûrs (tels que
Puerto Cortés et Puerto Trujillo), constructions de fortifications , répression de la contrebande et
actions militaires diverses contre les Britanniques et l es Indiens mosquitos sur la côte et la mer du
31
Honduras, au nord du cap Gracias a Dios . Tout spécialement, il convient de souligner les
compétences, en temps de paix, des capitaineries générales pour la répression de la contrebande
(celle du «commerce illicite») qui ex igeaient nécessairement l’exercice de leur autorité tant sur la
terre que sur la mer situées sous leur autorité.
29Je préviens que «Commandancia» est un terme générique qui signifie «avoir des fonctions de chef». Appliqué
à un territoire, il indique une autorité subordonnée à celle du capitaine général d’abord et à celle du gouverneur ensuite.
30CMH, vol. 1, p. 76-77, par. 5.17 ; DH, vol. 2, annexe 266, (rapport cité, p. 7 et 14 (où sont clairement exposées
les compétences des gouverneurs, qui reflètent dans un cadre lo cal les facultés dont la capit ainerie générale pouvait être
titulaire).
31Carte illustrative de ce qui est décrit dans le CMvol. 1, p. 75-76, par. 5.14-5.15 ; DH, vol. 2, annexe 266,
p. 16-20. - 50 -
21. Je tiens à souligner que l’ordonnance royale du 20 novembre 1803 ⎯ curieusement
oubliée dans une note de bas de pa ge de la réplique du Nicaragua ⎯ manifeste la volonté explicite
du monarque espagnol d’établir les circonscriptio ns militaires correspondant à la capitainerie
générale du Guatemala et à la vice-royauté de Santa Fé dans la mer des Caraïbes. Le cap Gracias a
Dios constituait la limite entre la capitainerie et la vice-royauté. Sa projection maritime s’orientait
vers l’est de sorte que toutes les îles et les eaux adjacentes situées à l’est et au nord dudit
promontoire correspondaient à la juridiction militaire et maritime de la cap itainerie générale du
Guatemala dans l’océan Atlantique. Par con séquent, l’ordonnance précitée constituait un titre
parfait pour l’origine et la preuve de l’ uti possidetis juris . Si le Nicaragua persiste à nier ce qui
précède, c’est qu’il continue à rejeter un fait qui s’impose à l’évidence.
22. Tout ceci autorise l’Etat successeur (en l’espèce le Honduras), conformément au droit
espagnol de l’outre-mer, d’invoquer le principe de l’ uti possidetis juris en sa faveur sur les îles et
les eaux adjacentes au nord du cap Gracias a Dios 3. Je désire attirer l’attention de la Cour sur le
fait que toutes les tentatives du Nicaragua d’ignore r, de minorer ou de dénaturer l’importance de
l’ordonnance royale de 1803 au regard du cap Gracias a Dios et des espaces maritimes adjacents
ont été définitivement réfutées par les opinions de deux des spécialistes espagnols les plus réputés
en droit et dans les circonscriptions géographiques de la Couronne d’Espagne dans la région, et qui
se trouvent en annexes à la duplique du Honduras.
33
23. Ainsi, les tergiversations du Nicaragua au regard de l’uti possidetis en général, et de la
sentence arbitrale de 1906 en particulier, sont dépourvues de sens et sont réfutées expressément par
le droit colonial espagnol. Il est certain que le ro i d’Espagne à fixé en 1906 la limite terrestre entre
les deux Etats. Mais, en conformité avec le droit colonial espagnol, sa décision affecte aussi
irrémédiablement la souverainet é sur les possessions insulaires et sur les eaux adjacentes tant du
continent que des îles, au moins jusqu’à 6 milles marins (2 lieues) de largeur.
24. De fait, le Nicaragua a prétendu sans succès que la sentence arbitrale de 1906, en vertu
de l’ uti possidetis juris qu’aujourd’hui il renie, l’aurait reconnu comme souverain à l’est du
32
DH, vol.2, annexe 266, p.13 et 8-10. Les capitainesgénéraux des armées étaient spécifiquement comparés
aux capitaines généraux de la ma rine et détenaient un pouvoir général de contrôle et de décision sur toutes les forces
militaires de la circonscription, y compris les forces navales.
33RN, vol. I, p. 57 et suiv., par. 4.30 et suiv. - 51 -
méridien 85°ouest, identifiant ledit méridien co mme une frontière terrestre, insulaire et maritime
avec le Honduras. Ses conclusions devant l’arbitre quant à la dernière partie du tracé de la frontière
ne laissent subsister aucun doute: «elle [la limite ] suit cette même rivière qui s’appelle ici le
Patuca ; elle continue par le centre du cours d’eau jusqu’à sa rencontre avec le méridien qui passe
au-dessus du cap Camarón et suit ce méridien jusqu’ à la mer, laissant au Nicaragua Swan Island»
(C.I.J.Mémoires 1958, Sentence arbitrale re ndue par le roi d’Espagne le 23décembre1906
o 34
(Honduras c. Nicaragua), vol. I, annexe n 11 à la réplique du Honduras, p. 624) .
[Carte LISR 2]
25. Mais le roi d’Espagne, en donnant plein effet aux preuves présentées en l’affaire, a rejeté
la prétention nicaraguayenne au méridien 85° ouest qui passe par le cap Camarón. Il choisit le cap
35
Gracias a Dios , qui se situe approximativement au para llèle15°. En vertu du principe de res
judicata, le Nicaragua ne peut aujourd’hui ressuscite r subrepticement son ancienne revendication,
écartée il y a un siècle (en 1906), et aspirer encore une fois à la souveraineté sur des îles et des eaux
36
situées au nord du cap Gracias a Dios .
26. L’histoire prouve, au final, la projec tion du Gouvernement hondurien vers le nord, au
nord-est et à l’est du cap GraciasaDios comme l’indique le traité de reconnaissance de
l’indépendance du Honduras de1866. Mais con fronté à l’affirmation du Honduras que le cap
GraciasaDios, en tant que limite d’une juri diction militaire, s’identifiait fondamentalement
pendant la période coloniale avec le parallèle 15° 37, le Nicaragua a tenté de discréditer aussi, sans
38
aucune preuve, l’importance dudit parallè le en tant que frontière maritime . Ce qui est certain,
c’est que l’utilisation de critères géographiques fac ilement identifiables, tels des parallèles et des
méridiens, était habituelle dans la pratique co loniale espagnole lorsqu’il s’agissait de diviser des
34 Voir le rapport de la commission d’examen de la ques tion des limites entre les Républiques du Honduras et du
Nicaragua, soumis à S.M.AlphonseXIII, arbitre, le 22 juillet 1906. Cette pr étention nicaraguayenne est aussi reprise
textuellement dans le rapport du Conseil d’Etat espagnol du 15 décembre 1906 qui a assumé les conclusions de la
o
commission d’examen précitée. (Dossier n 94.446, p.3.) Pour une représ entation graphique de la prétention
nicaraguayenne rejetée, voir le CMH, vol. I, planche 9.
35
CMH, vol. 1, p. 72-73, par. 5.6-5.10.
36 CMH, vol. 1, p. 74, par. 5.11-5.12.
37 CMH, vol. 1, p. 18-19, par. 2.11.
38
RN, vol. I, p. 56-59, par. 4.26-4.37. - 52 -
juridictions internes qui englobaient aussi les espaces maritimes de leurs autorités militaires
(comme c’est le cas dans notre affaire). C’était la seule alternative valable pour diviser de manière
claire et indubitable les espaces maritimes respectif s de leurs autorités militaires, sur lesquels le
Honduras a exercé et exerce des compétences ét atiques de façon pacifique, continue et
ininterrompue.
27. L’utilisation de la géographie astronomique tant dans la délimitation de leurs empires
respectifs par les puissances ibériques (Espagne et Po rtugal) que dans le droit colonial de chaque
puissance est amplement prouvé par les spécialistes. L’utilisation des parallèles était fréquente
dans l’Amérique hispanique pour séparer les compétences des capitaines généraux espagnols dans
la région, comme le prouve la carte du vice-ro i de la Nouvelle-Grenade (ou SantaFe) de1774,
conservée au Musée naval de Madrid. Sur cette carte, on y constate de façon expresse la ligne,
passant à l’endroit qui était alors appelé Cabo Blanco, très proche du parallèle 5 osud, comme limite
39
générale avec la vice-royauté de Lima .
28. Ce qui précède peut s’étendre également à l’Amérique non hispanique. En ce qui
concerne la colonie du Brésil, le Portugal a décidé de contrôler l’espace le plus accessible, la côte.
Cela a consisté (entre 1534 et 1536) à la répartir en une série de capitaineries que suivait la ligne du
littoral. Les limites septentrionales et méridionales de la terre et de la mer de chaque capitainerie
étaient constituées de deux parallèles géographiques et l’éventuelle limite intérieure (vers le
continent) était le méridien de Tordesillas 40.
29. Dans la présente affaire, si je m’en tiens au rôle du cap Gracias a Dios, situé aux environs
du 15 eparallèle, comme ligne qui séparait cartographiquement les compétences terrestres et
navales de la capitainerie générale du Guatem ala (qui projetait ses possessions au nord de ce
39
Voir Geographical Plan of the Viceroyalty of Sant a Fé de Bogota, New Kingdom of Granada, 1779 dans DH,
vol. 2, annexe 232. Plan geográfico del Virreynato de Stª Fe de B ogotá, Nuevo Reyno de Granada que manifiesta su
demarcación territorial, islas, rios pr incipales, provincias, plazas de arma s, lo que ocupan los indios bárbaros y
naciones extranjeras, demostrando los dos c onfines de Lima y Méjico y establec imientos de Portugal sus lindantes: con
notas históricas del ingreso anual de sus rentas reales y noticias relativas a su actual estado civil, político y militar.
[Plan géographique de la vice-royauté de Santa Fe de Bogotá, nouveau Royaume de Grenade qui montre la démarcation
territoriale, les îles, les principales rivières, les places d’armes, ce qu’occupent les Indiens barbares et les nations
étrangères et qui montre les deux limites de Lima et de Mexico et les établissements du Portugal: avec des notes
historiques du revenu annuel de rentes royales et les notices d’état civil, politiques et militaires.] Formado en servicio del
Rey Ntro Sr por el Dor D. Francisco Antonio Moreno Escandon, fiscal protector de la Real Audiencia de Stª Fe y juez
conservador de rentas. Gobernando el re yno el Excmo. Sr. Baylio Frey D. Pe dro Messia de la Cerda, Marqués de la
Vega Armijo (Ms ; col ; 147x200 cm.,dans en MN Sig. 27-C-10, [1774]).
40 DH, vol. 2, annexe 267, rapport, épigraphe «parallèle» ; voir en particulier les cartes qui y sont jointes. - 53 -
parallèle) et la vice-royauté de Santa Fe (qui proj etait les siennes au sud), je ne peux que conclure
qu’il constituait une référence à la fois simple et précise à cet effet de division cartographique, par
sa connaissance notoire et évidente pour tout marin qui aurait navigué dans ces eaux. Ledit cap et
son parallèle correspondant (15° nor d) délimitaient (conformément au droit des Indes) les eaux de
la capitainerie générale du Guatemala et celle du Gouvernement du Guatemala, de façon claire et
parfaite et dans tous ces aspects, et spécialement l’aspect juridique 4.
B.L’insoutenable position du Nicaragua sur l’histoire et sur l’ uti possidetis juris dans la
présente affaire
30. L’invocation de l’ uti possidetis dans la présente affaire de délimitation maritime se
justifie, du point de vue du droit intertemporel, par son application à la prés ente controverse en sa
qualité de droit applicable pour les parties tant en 1821, qu’en 1906, qu’en 1960 et qu’aujourd’hui.
C’est-à-dire, tout au long de la vie des deux Républiques du Nicaragua et du Honduras, le principe
a toujours constitué l’argument juridique fondamental pour la délimitation de leurs espaces. Mais
ce n’est pas tout, le cap GraciasaDios imp liquait une délimitation équitable conforme à
l’uti possidetis juris et le parallèle 15° est aussi en conformité avec les principes de délimitation du
nouveau droit de la mer.
31. En effet, d’un point de vue matériel, bien que l’application de ce legal title fut
initialement territoriale, tant continentale qu’ insulaire, son applica tion sur certains espaces
maritimes ne peut être mise en doute. Prenant co mme point de départ le principe connu «la terre
domine la mer», la souveraineté sur les cô tes continentales ou insulaires s’accompagne
inévitablement de la possession sur la mer territo riale desdites côtes. De sorte que la mer
territoriale du Nicaragua et du Honduras, dès l’ indépendance en1821, comportait les marques
respectives de la souveraineté territo riale. De plus, quand émergea au XX esiècle le concept de
plateau continental, les compétences étatiques sur ce nouvel espace découlèrent ab initio et
ipso jure de la souveraineté sur les espaces correspondant s, de sorte que la convention de Genève
de 1958 n’a même pas exigé une proclamation formelle pour l’exercice des compétences reconnues
aux pays riverains. Et, quand la convention d es NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer de1982 a
41Ibid., rapport, épigraphe «La côte atlan tique centraméricaine» et «Application au thème du Honduras», et la
«Conclusion». - 54 -
réglementé la zone économique exclusive, à l’ origine des compétences sur cet espace se trouvait
également la souveraineté territoriale de l’Etat riverain.
32. Dans sa requête du 8 décembre 1999, le Ni caragua a demandé à la Cour la délimitation
de ses espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes «conformément aux principes et circonstances
pertinentes que le droit intern ational général reconnaît comme s’ appliquant à une délimitation
[d’une frontière maritime unique]». Relativemen t à cette demande, je me permets de rappeler
troiséléments fondamentaux. En premier lieu , l’ uti possidetis juris est «un principe d’ordre
général nécessairement lié à la décolonisation où qu’elle se produise» (cf. Différend frontalier
(Burkina Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986 , p. 566, par. 23), et son caractère de
principe général de droit international a été c onfirmé sans aucun genre de doutes par cette Cour
en1992, qui l’a appliqué aussi aux eaux maritimes (cf. Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et
maritime (ElSalvador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1992 , p.589,
par. 386). En second lieu , ce principe est inhérent à l’idée d’équité, entre autres raisons par son
acceptation par les deux Parties 42. Enfin, dans l’Amérique hispanique, il n’existait pas de terra
43
nullius , l’horloge s’étant arrêtée à la date de l’i ndépendance, la délimitation maritime fut menée à
bien par la Cour à partir d’une condition sine qua non, et avec la photographie à ce même jour : la
certitude de la souveraineté territoriale ⎯ continentale et insulaire ⎯ de chaque Partie, c’est-à-dire
du titre dérivé de l’uti possidetis juris.
33. La requête nicaraguayenne du 6 décembre 2001 déposée devant ce tte Cour contre un
autre Etat hispanique voisin a reconnu tout ce que je viens de rappeler. En particulier ⎯ et j’attire
l’attention de la Cour sur ce point ⎯ la requête a reconnu la projection insulaire et maritime de l’uti
possidetis juris sur les espaces et les éléments adjacents au territoire continental, la projection
globale en direction de l’orient de toute la masse continentale ainsi que la validité et le caractère
opératoire de ce principe «à la délimitation complè te et définitive des espa ces maritimes relevant
44
du Nicaragua, ainsi qu’à toute délimitation à laquelle il pourrait y avoir lieu de procéder» . Dans
cette situation concrète, le Ni caragua ne soulève aucun doute su r le caractère équitable ou non
42Cf. DH, vol. I, p. 29-30, par. 3.03-3.05.
43
Cf. Ibid., p. 23-34, par. 3.10 et 3.15.
44Cf. Ibid., p. 30 et 31, par. 3.58-3.59. - 55 -
équitable de l’ uti possidetis juris. De plus, en demandant l’application de ce principe pour la
détermination des espaces maritimes correspondants au Nicaragua, ainsi que pour la délimitation
des espaces avec la Colombie, il est clair que le Nicaragua considère l’équité comme étant un
élément inhérent à ce principe de l’uti possidetis.
34. Le virage copernicien dé tecté dans les deux requêtes nicaraguayennes au cours de la
brève période de moins de deux années peut être qualifié de spectaculaire, mais aussi comme étant
intrinsèquement contradictoire, puisque ce que le Nicaragua argumente en sa faveur contre la
Colombie en2001 il l’a rejeté initialement en re lation avec le Honduras en1999. Il s’agit d’une
conduite que je pourrais qualifier de schizophrénique (argumenter quelque chose et son contraire),
mais le bon sens nicaraguayen se situe sans nul doute dans son ultime prise de position en date : à
savoir, la reconnaissance complète de l’application de l’uti possidetis pour la délimitation équitable
des espaces maritimes qui concernent des limites continentales et insulaires.
35. Il est bien connu que la sentence arbitrale de 1906 a fixé le point terminal de la frontière
terrestre entre les deux pays au cap Gracias a Dios. On sait aussi que ce cap était parfaitement
e
connu des géographes et des navigateurs depuis le XVI siècle, qu’il établissait une division
objective et évidente avec une projection d’ouest en est, facilement perceptible, et que son résultat,
du point de vue des espaces insula ires et maritimes adjacents, ne pouvait être autre que de laisser
les îles, îlots et cayes au nord de cette projec tion au Honduras, tandis que ceux situés au sud au
Nicaragua 45. Il est de plus certain que depuis 1821 aucun litige n’a surgi entre les deux pays
relativement à leurs mers territoriales respectives et aux îles situées immédiatement au nord et au
sud du parallèle 15°. Ce comportement des Parti es doit indubitablement être situé dans le contexte
de l’article15 de la convention des NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer qui fait de l’existence de
droits historiques ou d’autres circonstances spécia les une exception à l’application de la ligne
d’équidistance. Et ici, on est confronté à un dr oit historique et une circonstance spéciale d’une
grande ampleur: l’ uti possidetis juris tel qu’il a été déclaré obligatoire par la sentence arbitrale
de 1906.
45
Cf. CMH, vol. I, chap. V, p. 71 et suiv. - 56 -
36. Lorsque le Nicaragua met en cause la va lidité de la sentence de 1906 devant votre Cour,
il le fait parce que sa prétention antérieure avait ét é écartée spécifiquement par le tribunal arbitral :
à savoir, une frontière qui passerait par le méridien 85° correspondant au cap Camarón aurait laissé
toutes les terres continentales et l es îles adjacentes sous sa souverain eté. Mais, au contraire, la
46
sentence décida en faveur du cap Graci as a Dios et son parallèle correspondant . Les parallèles et
méridiens sont des moyens faciles pour définir et concrétiser une limite. Ces moyens furent
revendiqués par les deux parties en 1906 et il a été décidé en faveur du Honduras. En tout cas, ces
moyens sont habituels dans les délimitations territoriales et maritimes des Amériques espagnole et
portugaise, comme s’est chargé de le démont rer un des plus distingués géographe espagnol
spécialisé dans l’Amérique hispanique 47. De toute façon, l’utilisation récurrente par le Nicaragua
de la notion d’ «adjacence» est patente, de 1821 à 2001, en passant par 1906. Il s’ensuit que j’attire
vigoureusement l’attention sur la qualification pa r l’autre Partie du con cept «îles adjacentes»
48
comme étant «ambiguë» et «inacceptable» . Une autre fois encore, nos adversaires font surgir des
affirmations contradictoires et irréconciliables. Nos collègues de l’autre Partie devraient expliquer
à la Cour pour quelles raisons l’ appel hondurien à l’adjacence mérite des jugements si négatifs,
alors que le Nicaragua en a fait de même de 1821 à 2001, en passant par 1906 et 1960. Un Etat
peut-il maintenir devant cette Cour une chose et son contraire sans aucune sanction sur la solidité et
la rigueur de ses arguments ?
37. Les effectivités républicaines immédiatemen t postérieures à la date de l’indépendance
prouvent clairement l’ uti possidetis terrestre et insulaire que j’ai mentionné précédemment. Il ne
s’agit pas d’une opinion soudaine ou partiale. Tout au contraire, les effectivités républicaines ont
été affirmées par la voie juridictionnelle en 1906 et le Nicaragua, un siècle plus tard, et en
méconnaissance notoire de l’arrê t de cette Cour en 1960, revient à la charge de nouveau
quaranteannées plus tard. Ce qui signifie que p our le Nicaragua le principe de base de la
res judicata n’existe pas. En 1906, il a été décidé avec force obligatoire que le cap Gracias a Dios
constituait la frontière terrestre dans l’océan Atlantique entre les deux pays. Cette sentence a ajouté
46
Cf. Ibid., p. 72-74, par. 5.8-5.12 ; DH, p. 37-38, par. 3.23-3.25.
47Cf. DH, vol.I, p.40, par.3.30 et 3.31; et vol.II, annexe267 dans laquelle figure l’opinion du géographe
espagnol.
48Cf. RN, vol. I, p. 61, par. 4.43 ; aussi DH, vol. I, p. 43, par.3.40. - 57 -
quelques affirmations remarquables: a) que le Nicaragua n’a jamais exercé sa juridiction au nord
du cap Gracias a Dios; b) que le seul pays qui ait exercé sa juridiction au sud dudit cap a été le
Honduras, quoique de façon éphémère et imprécise ; c) que la pratique diplomatique postérieure à
l’indépendance prouve que le Nicaragua avait touj ours reconnu le cap Gracias a Dios comme la
frontière commune ; d) que le principe de Gracias a Dios est «le point qui correspond le mieux aux
raisons du droit historique, d’équité et de car actère géographique, pour servir de frontière
commune, entre les deux Etats en litige»; et e) que le cap Gracias a Dios constitue la frontière
commune entre les deux Etats «pour le littoral atlantique» ( C.I.J. Mémoires 1958, Sentence
arbitrale rendue par le roi d’Espagne le 23décembre1906 (Honduras c.Nicaragua) , vol.I,
p. 21-23). Le Nicaragua a méconnu l’autorité de la «res judicata» en 1906, il a récidivé son mépris
en 1960 et continue à combattre la chose jugée en 2007.
38. Une autre question particulière relative à l’ uti possidetis juris en Amérique hispanique
sur laquelle je désire attirer l’a ttention de la Cour à cause de sa pertinence particulière pour la
présente affaire, et qui a fait l’objet de constantes disqualifications de la part de nos adversaires, est
relative à la prise en compte du cap Gracias a Di os et du parallèle 15° nord comme un point clé de
la séparation des compétences militaires (c’est-à-dire territoriales, insulaires et maritimes) à la date
critique de l’uti possidetis, c’est-à-dire en 1821.
39. Le Honduras a démontré de façon catégori que que le cap Gracias a Dios séparait, depuis
l’ordonnance royale de 1803, la capitainerie généra le du Guatemala de la capitainerie générale de
Santa Fé de la Nouvelle-Gre nade (aujourd’hui Santa Fé de Bogotá en Colombie) 49. Il convient de
rappeler devant la Cour que l’importance que ces capitaineries générales comportaient au regard de
l’uti possidetis insulaire et maritime a été reconnue expr essément par le Nicaragua dans sa requête
50
du 6 décembre 2001 à l’encontre de la Colombie .
40. Par conséquent, tout lecteur objectif sera frappé par la nouvelle contradiction intrinsèque
des affirmations et des thèses nicaraguayennes, sel on qu’elles sont destinées au Honduras ou à la
Colombie. D’une part, parce que le Nicaragua tente de rabaisser l’importance de cette donnée
49
Cf. CMH, vol. I, p. 74-78, par. 5.13-5.18.
50Cf. ibid., p. 83, par. 5.31. - 58 -
51
décisive . D’autre part, parce que le Nicaragua a tenté, sans succès, et ce qui est pire encore sans
la moindre rigueur historique, de dénaturer l’impor tance centrale de l’ordonnance royale de 1803.
Le Honduras a produit une opinion d’un expert, peut -être le plus grand spécialiste espagnol de
l’administration militaire de la C ouronne d’Espagne en Amérique. Cette opinion, sur laquelle je
reviendrai évidemment, réfute totalement les artif ices, les subterfuges et les inexactitudes contenus
dans la position nicaraguayenne 5. Les conclusions de l’expert s’avèrent déterminantes et
avalisent, en tout, les affirmations contenues dans le contre-mémoire du Honduras, et ont servi de
base pour la ratification qu’en fait le Honduras dans sa duplique. Le Honduras possède un probate,
e
original, full and legal title sur les terres et les îles situées au nord du 15 parallèle qui passe par le
cap Gracias a Dios. Quant au Nicaragua, il n’a apporté aucune preuve, ni même une simple
apparence de la possession d’un titre juridique sur ce point.
41. En résumé, le Nicaragua nie que le Honduras ait un quelconque titre dérivé de
l’uti possidetis (ceci étant, le Nicaragua en accepte le pr incipe) sur les îles, cayes et îlots situés au
nord du parallèle15. Mais les faits et les pre uves objectives apportés par cette Partie démentent
sans un quelconque doute sa vaine prétention, de la même manière qu’émerge la réalité nue. Le
e
Nicaragua ne prouve rien au nord du 15 parallèle. Et il doit être pris en compte que chacune de
ces îles situées à cet endroit possède sa propre mer territoriale. Le Nicaragua a soutenu que le
concept d’« îles adjacentes » est ambigu et inacceptable (c’est-à-dire qu’il nie l’ uti possidetis
insulaire en soutenant qu’il ex iste des territoires insulaires nullius), mais il a été démontré par le
Honduras que ce concept non seulement était inhérent à toute la pratique coloniale espagnole, mais
encore qu’il avait été accepté par la jurispruden ce. Elle a été même défendue par le Nicaragua,
précisément dans la même région, dans sa réclama tion contre la Colombie. Le Nicaragua soutient
enfin que l’application de l’uti possidetis est sans pertinence au regard du plateau continental et de
53
la zone économique exclusive actuels . Cette dernière affirmation ne tient pas debout car elle
ignore de façon flagrante le principe essentiel que la terre domine la mer et aussi pour le plateau
continental que pour la zone économique exclusive. Il est vrai que la réglementation de cette zone
51
Cf. RN, vol. I, p. 56-59, 60 et 66, par. 4.26-4.37, 4.40, 4.41, 4.60 et 4.61.
52
Cf. DH, vol. I, p. 35-41, par. 3.18-3.32, et vol. II, annexe 266.
53Cf. ibid., p. 43 et 44, par. 3.40. - 59 -
est très tardive dans la législation nicaraguayenne car sa loi sur le plateau continental et la mer
adjacente du 19 décembre 1979 ne vise pas exactement cet espace. Je rappellerai, dans ce contexte,
que son adhésion à la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982 est postérieure
au dépôt de sa demande. En résumé, la fragile construction nicaraguayenne sur l’ uti possidetis
juris est confrontée à une complète démolition de l’éd ifice mal édifié et comportant de nombreuses
malfaçons argumentaires et probatoires.
42. Madame et Messieurs les juges, qu’il me soit permis de rappeler que les deux pièces
écrites présentées par le Nicaragua n’ont pas seulemen t été élaborées sur la base de contradictions
constantes dans son argumentation, mais encore avec une singular isation étonnante: son amnésie
continue de la jurisprudence in ternationale la plus directemen t pertinente à l’affaire qui nous
occupe.
43. Dans cet ordre d’idées, je dois reconnaîtr e devant la Cour que les écrits honduriens ne
présentent aucune singularité sur ce principe, ayant été construits à partir d’une application littérale,
rigoureuse, réitérée et systématique de la juri sprudence internationale. Ce rejet viscéral
nicaraguayen de la jurisprudence internationa le applicable est particulièrement éloquent
relativement à l’arrêt de1992. Pourquoi? Pour des raisons parfaitement explicables. Parce que
cet arrêt affirme: a)la pertinence de l’ uti possidetis juris pour son application aux espaces
continentaux, insulaires et maritimes; b) l’inexistence de territoires nullius ou sans maître en
Amérique hispanique; c)la pertinence du concept d’«îles adjacentes»; d) l’importance des
capitaineries générales; e)la possibilité d’évaluer le comportement des Parties postérieur à
l’indépendance, comme moyen de confirmation de l’ uti possidetis existant ; et f)la pertinence du
principe susmentionné pour générer des droits, au -delà de la mer territoriale, sur le plateau
continental et sur la zone économique exclusiv e (par exemple, celle du Honduras dans l’océan
Pacifique).
44. Un des leitmotive du Nicaragua pour rejeter l’application de l’ uti possidetis juris aux
espaces maritimes (ignorant même la mer territorial e du continent et des îles) réside dans sa
complète inadéquation avec le nouveau droit de la mer, spécialement en relation avec le plateau
continental. Naturellement, cette position implique une ignorance flagrante de la jurisprudence - 60 -
établie par cette Cour en1992, malgré l’interven tion du Nicaragua dans cette affaire. Comme l’a
affirmé la Cour dans l’arrêt El Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua (intervenant) :
«Le droit de la mer moderne n’en a pas moins ajouté la mer territoriale, qui
s’étend à partir de la ligne de base, c’est-à-dire de la laisse de basse mer ou la ligne de
fermeture des eaux revendiquées à titre de souverain; il a reconnu le plateau
continental, qui s’étend au-delà de la mer territoriale et appartient de plein droit à
l’Etat côtier; il confère à l’Etat côtier le droit de revendiquer une zone économique
exclusive s’étendant jusqu’à 200 milles de la ligne de base servant à mesurer la mer
territoriale.
Il ne saurait être douteux que ce droit, qui s’applique aux espaces maritimes,
aux fonds marins et au sous-sol au large d’ une côte, s’applique maintenant à la zone
qui s’étend au large du golfe de Fonseca; et que, comme toujours, le titre afférent à
ces droits dépend de la situation territoriale de la côte dont relèvent les droits et la
reflète.» (Arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 608, par. 419-420.)
45. Comment mes éminents collègues de l’autre côté de la barre ont-ils pu ou voulu ignorer
ou oublier cet important passage de l’arrêt de la Cour de1992 lorsqu’on pr end en compte le fait
que le Nicaragua était un Etat intervenant dans ce tte affaire? Le plateau continental ou la zone
économique exclusive proviendraient-ils de nulle pa rt ou, au contraire, procéderaient-ils de la
souveraineté terrestre et seraient-ils adjacents à me r territoriale ? Si la terre domine la mer, ce qui
ne fait pas l’ombre d’un doute pour cette Cour, n’est- ce pas alors de la plus haute importance et ne
se pose-t-il pas une question préalable pour él ucider les titres juridiques dérivés de l’ uti possidetis
juris dans notre affaire, respectivement au Nicaragua et au Honduras ? Est-il possible de délimiter
leurs espaces maritimes sans la détermination préalable des titres territoriaux qui génèrent les droits
concernant ces espaces que chaque riverain peut ét ablir? Dans notre affaire, il est essentiel de
savoir si le Nicaragua possède un quelconque type de titre juridique au nord du cap Gracias a Dios.
Si le Nicaragua est dépourvu de titre au nord de Grac ias a Dios, et j’ai prouvé que tel était le cas,
sur quelle base juridique justifie-t-il ses prétenti ons maritimes? Et nos prestigieux collègues ne
peuvent ignorer le fait que les îles situées au nord du parallèle 15° génèrent aussi leur propre mer
territoriale, leur plateau continental et leur zone économique exclusive. Le titre insulaire est, par
conséquent, un titre définitif aux fins de la prétention du Nicaragua à une quelconque mer
territoriale, plateau continental ou zone économique exclusive au nord du cap Gracias a Dios.
46. Je me permets de me rapporter ici encore à l’arrêt de cette Cour de 1992 lorsqu’il s’agit
de la question de l’évolution du droit dans le temps. C’est la vraie raison pour laquelle le - 61 -
Nicaragua s’est efforcé de retirer cette affaire de son contexte historico-juridique et prétend le
situer dans le domaine exclusif du «nouveau» droit de la mer, en ignorant aussi l’«ancien» droit de
la mer. Ce dernier droit n’est pas du tout in compatible avec le nouveau, comme nous le rappelle
l’arrêt de la Cour précité, parce que, à l’origine, des espaces maritimes étatiques à délimiter, il y a
la compétence territoriale de l’Etat. A présent, lorsque le Nicaragua cons tate qu’il est dépourvu
d’un titre juridique original sur le territoire en qu estion, il tente d’utiliser l’inacceptable raccourci
du «nouveau» droit de la mer. Madame, Messieurs l es juges, l’autorité de cette Cour ne faisait pas
l’ombre d’un doute en1992, et ceci continue d’être d’actualité, malgré les artifices persistants
utilisés par le Nicaragua. Pourquoi, ce pays ignore-t- il l’autorité de la chose jugée de la sentence
arbitrale de 1906 ? Justement, c’est parce qu’elle écarte sa prétention initiale d’établir la frontière
terrestre au méridien 85° et de lui attribuer les îles du Cygne (que le Nicaragua appelle ensuite des
«îles adjacentes»), c’est-à-dire qu’elle a nié la proj ection vers le nord et le nord-est de la mer des
Caraïbes de ce pays, le roi d’Espagne limitant strict ement ladite projection vers l’est et jusqu’au
54
cap Gracias a Dios . Aujourd’hui, le Nicaragua s’entête à i gnorer l’autorité de la chose jugée de
l’arrêt de la Cour de1960, qui a confirmé la validité de ce qui pr écède. Il fait aussi la sourde
oreille à la jurisprudence établie par cette Cour en1992. Tout ceci pour revendiquer aujourd’hui
une projection insulaire et maritime au nord du parallèle qui passe par le cap GraciasaDios,
projection rejetée, comme je viens de le dire, par le roi d’Espagne en1906. Il est alors difficile
d’expliquer les arguments historico-juridiques sur lesquels s’appuie le Nicaragua pour la prétention
qu’il soutient aujourd’hui devant cette Cour.
47. A mon avis, ce que le Nicaragua doit clarifier définitivement, ce sont les points suivants :
Premièrement, accepte-t-il ou non l’application de l’ uti possidetis aux îles? Deuxièmement,
accepte-t-il ou non que chaque île possédait sa propre mer territoriale en1821 et a continué à ce
faire aujourd’hui ? Troisièmement, accepte-t-il ou non le caractère opératoire dans notre affaire du
concept d’«îles adjacentes»? Quatrièmement, accepte-t-il ou non uniquement l’ uti possidetis
insulaire pour les îles peuplées ou pour toutes les îles, îlots et cayes de la zone? Et,
cinquièmement, accepte-t-il ou non qu’en règle générale ell es génèrent un plateau continental ? Je
54
Tout ceci, en relation avec la prétention du Nicaragua formulée en 1904 et sur laquelle il a été décidé en 1906
est parfaitement illustré par la carte présentée dans le contre-mémoire du Honduras, vol. III (première partie), planche 9. - 62 -
demande à mes distingués collègues nicaraguayens de présenter des réponses concrètes à chacun de
ces points. Je les invite à réfléchir à ce qui pourra it constituer une contradiction flagrante avec leur
thèse à l’encontre de la Colombie, autre thèse dont est saisie la Cour.
Madame le président, je peux continuer deux minutes et laisser la deuxième partie de mon
exposé pour demain ?
The PRESIDENT: Yes. I think that would be convenient.
M. SÁNCHEZ: Thank you very much indeed.
48. Je prends un exemple révélateur. Au chap itreIV de sa réplique, le Nicaragua soutient
que le principe juridique (pas la doctrine) de l’ uti possidetis juris n’est pas applicable aux îles
55
adjacentes et, en tout cas, aux îles lointaines et dépeuplées . Une pareille affirmation est
extrêmement dangereuse pour le Ni caragua, parce que, en outre qu’e lle ignore l’inexistence de
terra nullius (y compris insulaire) en Amérique hispanique, elle rejette en même temps le principe
de la succession d’Etats sur le territoire, comme l’ a démontré l’autre sentence arbitrale d’une reine
d’Espagne dans l’affaire de l’ Ile d’Aves. Pourquoi toutes les îles, îlots et cayes et archipels situés
au sud du cap Gracia a Dios (à une large distance de la côte) seraient-ils nicaraguayens, si ce n’est à
cause de la distance qui les sépare de la côte, de l’existence d’effectivités coloniales sur ceux-ci, de
leur superficie et de leur caractère habité ou no n? Et, à titre de pure hypothèse, s’il était déclaré
judiciairement qu’à la date critique de1821, lesdites îles étaient nicaraguayennes en vertu du
principe de l’uti possidetis juris, le titre originaire ne servirait-il pas pour affirmer ses droits sur le
plateau continental et la zone économique exclusive adjacente ? Je n’oublie pas qu’un jugement ou
une sentence ne constitue pas le titre original dérivé de l’ uti possidetis juris , mais qu’il déclare
simplement son existence.
Il est 13 heures, je crois. Si vous voulez, je m’arrête ou je continue deux ou troisminutes.
Je ne veux pas vous perturber, vraiment.
55Voir tout spécialement les affirmations faites par lNicaragua dans RN, vol.I, p.52, par.4.16; p.54,
par. 4.21 ; p. 56, par. 4.28 ; p. 60, par. 4.40-4.41 ; p. 61, par. 4.43 ; p. 65, par. 4.57 ; p. 66, par. 4.60-4.62 ; p. 67, par. 4.64,
etc. - 63 -
The PRESIDENT: It is very kind of you. I think it is for you to decide,
ProfessorSánchezRodríguez, whether you wish to stop now or in a few minutes’ time. What is
clear is that you will have to continue tomorrow. So please choose, within the next few moments, a
convenient point to stop.
M. SÁNCHEZ: Thank you.
49. Le Nicaragua n’a rien dit sur le co mportement des Parties depuis le moment
immédiatement postérieur à l’indépendance comm e élément confirmatif de l’existence de l’ uti
possidetis juris communément accepté et reconnu par les Pa rties. Cependant, et en prenant en
compte l’affirmation que la «[l] a législation est l’une des formes les plus frappantes de l’exercice
du pouvoir souverain» ( Statut juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt, 1933 , C.P.J.I. sérieA/B
56
n° 53, p.48), la législation nicaraguayenne posté rieure à1821 ne saurait être plus explicite .
L’article 2 de la Constitution de 1826 définit le territoire comme se projetant uniquement vers l’est
dans la mer des Antilles tandis que vers le nord est mentionné uniquement l’Etat du Honduras. Et
l’article premier de la Constitution politique de 1911 inclut aussi dans le territoire national les «îles
adjacentes», et tout ceci dans le contexte de l’acceptation commune de l’ uti possidetisjuris .
Pourquoi alors aujourd’hui nos collègues de l’autre Partie ne donnent-ils aucun crédit au législateur
constitutionnel du pays qu’ils représentent ?
50. La réalité est que depuis 1821, pendant pl us de centcinquanteannées, les deux Parties
ont considéré à tout moment que leurs mers terr itoriales respectives se situaient au nord et au sud
du cap Gracias a Dios. Et que toutes les îles situées au nord relevaient de la souveraineté
hondurienne, tandis que celles au sud étaient nicaragua yennes. C’est un fait objectif que le point
terminal de la frontière terrestre, à l’embouchure du Rio Coco, au cap Gracias a Dios, était localisé
sur le parallèle 15°. Où pourraient alors comme ncer ou se terminer les mers territoriales
respectives ? Si la souveraineté sur la mer territori ale provient de la terre et si la souveraineté sur
les îles adjacentes provient de la souveraineté sur l es espaces territoriaux continentaux, et en tenant
compte de l’ uti possidetis existant en1821, déclaré par le ro i d’Espagne en 1906, à quel titre
juridique peut prétendre le Nicaragua sur ces espaces maritimes ou la souveraineté insulaire au
56
Cf. DH, vol. I, p. 41-42, par. 3.34-3.35. - 64 -
nord du cap Gracias a Dios? Aucun, Madame et Messieurs les juges. Absolument aucun.
Madame le président, merci beaucoup.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Sánchez Rodríguez. The Court now
rises and will resume at 10 o’clock tomorrow morning for the continuation of the case of Honduras.
The Court rose at 1.10 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 12 March 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras)