CR 2006/3
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 28 February 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 28 février 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc AhmedMahiou
Milenko Kreća
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
AlKh.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MM. Ahmed Mahiou,
KMrilenko ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Masters in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Directo
r
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. (Cambridge),
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebić, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. (Cambridge),
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The session is open and I give the floor to
Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET: Thank you very much, Madam President.
R EMARQUES SUR LA COMPÉTENCE DE LA COUR
LE PRINCIPE RES JUDICATA
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, po ur la troisième fois, j’ai le grand honneur de
me présenter devant vous comme avocat de la République de Bosnie-Herzégovine ⎯ le grand
honneur car c’est toujours un privilège d’apparaître dans ce grand hall de justice; mais pas le
plaisir, pas le plaisir car l’affaire est trop grave; les enjeux sont trop immenses; les principes en
cause sont trop fondamentaux, les faits sont trop dramatiques pour qu’il puisse être question de
plaisir. Notre responsabilité, la vôtre, Madame et Messieurs les juges, est écrasante: il s’agit de
rien moins que d’établir la responsabilité d’un Etat dans un génocide qui s’est traduit par la mort de
plus de centmillepersonnes, des hommes, des fe mmes, des enfants, simplement parce qu’ils
n’étaient pas nés serbes, qui s’est traduit par des souffrances physiques et morales abominables
infligées aux membres d’un groupe ethnique dans l’ intention de l’éradiquer, de «nettoyer» un
territoire prétendument partie d’une «Grande Se rbie», née de l’imagination criminelle des
dirigeants de l’époque d’un Etat voisin, et par l’exode forcé de plusieurs centaines de milliers de
personnes, chassées de chez elles au nom de la «pureté raciale» et de préjugés ethnicoreligieux.
2. Et pourtant, malgré cela, et pour la quatri ème fois, la Bosnie-Herzégovine juge prudent de
justifier à nouveau votre compétence 1, fût-ce, à ce stade en tout cas, très brièvement. Tout, en
effet, porte à croire que la Pa rtie adverse va, une nouvelle fois, essayer de vous convaincre de ne
pas vous prononcer sur le fond ⎯je dis «la Partie adverse» mais j’ai failli dire: «nos amis, de
1Pour les précédentes plaidoiries de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, voir notamment Application de la convention pour
la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c.Serbie-et-Monténégro), exceptions
er
préliminaires, CR 96/8 (1 mai 1996), p. 68-86, par. 20-40 et CR 96/11 (3 mai 1996), p. 36-55; Demande en revision de
l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c.Y ougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires(Yougoslavie c.Bosnie-Herzégovine) ,
CR 2002/41 (5 novembre 2002), p. 31-55, par. 5-67 et CR 2002/43 (7 novembre 2002), p. 20-24, par. 18-24. Voir aussi :
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c.Serbie-et-Monténégro), mesures conservatoires , CR 93/12 (1ravril 1993), p. 24-29 et CR 93/33 (25 août 1993),
p.28-34 (F. Boyle); Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Bosnie-Herzégovine c.Serbie-et-Monténégro), exceptions préliminaires , CR 96/9 (1 ami 1996), p. 14-42 (B. Stern) et
p. 42-58 (T. Franck), CR 96/11 (3 mai 1996), p. 55-78 (B. Stern). - 11 -
l’autre côté de la barre». Car c’est cela le para doxe : la Serbie-et-Monténégro est devenue un Etat
démocratique, qui reconnaît les fautes énormes du ré gime passé tout en refusant de les assumer
devant vous, comme si un Etat pouvait échapper à se s responsabilités internationales en changeant
de régime ou de nom. Ceci, Madame et Messie urs de la Cour, vous ne sauriez l’admettre: une
élection, même démocratique, n’abolit pas le p assé et ne saurait rendre justice à des centaines de
milliers de morts, de torturés, d’exilés. Un Etat accusé de génocide ne peut échapper à sa
responsabilité, et moins encore à une responsabilité de ce type qui résulte de la violation des
normes impératives du droit international les mieux établies, par des arguties de procédure.
L’Allemagne, l’Italie, ont, en d’ autres temps, su assumer leurs responsabilités pour des faits tout
aussi atroces; ce serait la grandeur de la Serbie-et-Monténégro de suivre ces exemples.
3. Oh! certes, Madame le président, le droit est le droit et la Cour ne peut exercer sa
compétence que si celle-ci est établie. Mais ce droit, vous l’avez dit ⎯ et vous l’avez même redit
et re-redit, puisque, à trois, voire à quatre reprises, vous avez écarté l’argumentation de la
Yougoslavie qui tentait de vous convaincre de votre incompétence :
⎯ dans vos ordonnances des 8 avril et 13septemb re1993, sans préjuger, bien sûr, votre
2
compétence définitive pour connaître du fond de l’ affaire ou de la recevabilité de la requête ,
vous avez constaté que l’articleIX de la convention de 1948 sur le génocide semblait
«constituer une base sur laquelle la compétence de la Cour pourrait être fondée, pour autant
que l’objet du différend a trait à «l’interpréta tion, l’application ou l’exécution» de la
convention, y compris les différends «relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de
génocide ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III» de la convention» 3;
⎯ sans doute ne s’agissait-il que d’une constatation prima facie et aviez-vous souligné que la
solution adoptée par l’Assemblée générale et le conseiller juridique des Nations Unies quant au
statut de la République fédéra tive de Yougoslavie (Serbie-et-Monténégro) ne laissait «pas de
susciter des difficultés juridiques» 4; mais c’est en pleine connaissance de ces difficultés, sur
2
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 8 avril 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 23, par. 51.
3 Ibid., p. 16, par. 26 et ibid., mesures conservatoir es, ordonnance du 13 septembre 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993,
p. 338, par. 25.
4 Ibid., ordonnance du 8 avril 1993, p. 14, par. 18. - 12 -
lesquelles les Parties se sont longuement expliquées dans leurs plaidoiries écrites et orales sur
5
les exceptions préliminaires que, par votre arrêt du 11 juillet 1996, vous avez, à la
quasi-unanimité, écarté ces exceptions en constatant notamment qu’«il n’a pas été contesté que
la Yougoslavie soit partie à la convention sur le génocide» 6; et la Cour, «étant parvenue à la
7
conclusion qu’elle a compétence en l’espèce, tant ratione personae que ratione materiae » ,
«dit qu’elle a compétence sur la base de l’article IX de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide, pour statuer sur le différend» 8; et de conclure : «Ayant établi
sa compétence en vertu de l’articleIX de la c onvention sur le génocide, et ayant conclu à la
recevabilité de la requête, la Cour peut désormai s procéder à l’examen du fond de l’affaire sur
cette base» 9; ceci, Madame le président, est chose jugée;
⎯ après une longue période d’inertie, marquée se ulement par les demande s répétées de la
10
Bosnie-Herzégovine qui souhaitait que cet ex amen soit mené dans les meilleurs délais , la
Yougoslavie a demandé, en 2001, la revision de l’ arrêt de 1996, en arguant d’un prétendu «fait
er
nouveau» qui aurait tenu à ce que son admission aux NationsUnies, le 1 novembre 2000,
aurait «révélé» qu’elle n’était pas partie au Stat ut au moment de l’arrêt et «ne demeurait pas
liée par l’articleIX de la convention sur le génocide…» 11; et par son arrêt du 3février2003,
rendu à la majorité de dix voix contre trois, la Cour a rejeté cette requête.
4. Après avoir précisé que «la résolution 47/ 1» de l’Assemblée géné rale, demandant à la
République fédérative de Yougoslavie de présente r une demande d’admission aux NationsUnies,
«ne portait notamment pas atteinte au droit de la RFY d’ester devant la Cour…» et «ne touchait pas
5CR 96/5 (29 avril 1996), p. 12-14 (R. Etinski) et p. 49-59 (E. Suy), CR 96/6 (29 avril 1996), p. 8-33 (E. Suy),
CR 96/10 (2 ami 1996), p. 18-28 (E. Suy), p. 28-33 (G. Perazic) et voir ci-dessus, note 1.
6
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 610, par. 17.
7
Ibid., p. 617, par. 34.
8
Ibid., p. 623, par. 47.2. a).
9
Ibid., p. 622, par. 46.
10Voir les lettres de l’agent et de l’agent adjointde la Bosnie-Herzégovine des 17 juin 1999, 21juin1999,
15septembre 1999, 4 octobre 1999, 11 octobre 1999, 20 mars 2000, 23 mars 2000, 8 mai 2000, 19juin2000,
21 septembre 2000 et 6 octobre 2000.
11
Demande en revision de l’arrêt du 11 ju illet 1996 en l’affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention pour la
prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosni e-Herzégovine c.Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires
(Yougoslavie c. Bosnie-Herzégovine), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 9-10, par. 19. - 13 -
davantage à la situation de la RFY au regard de la convention sur le génoc ide», la Cour, dans son
arrêt de 2003, a tenu
«à souligner que la résolution 55/12 de l’Assemblée générale en date du
er
1 novembre2000 [c’est la résolution par laquelle la République fédérative de
Yougoslavie était admise aux Nations Unies] ne peut avoir rétroactivement modifié la
situation sui generis dans laquelle se trouvait la RFY vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des
NationsUnies pendant la période 1992-2000, ni12a situation à l’égard du Statut de la
Cour et de la convention sur le génocide» .
C’est ce que vous avez jugé en 2003.
5. Bien entendu, Madame le président, nous n’ignorons pas que, dans les arrêts qu’elle a
rendus, le 15 décembre 2004, sur les exceptions pr éliminaires soulevées par huit Etats membres de
l’OTAN à l’encontre des requêtes formées contre eux dans les affaires relatives à la Licéité de
l’emploi de la force , la Cour a dit n’avoir pas compétence pour se prononcer, en se fondant
notamment sur l’admission de la RFY aux Nations Unies.
6. Ni ces arrêts, ni la circonstance sur laquelle ils se fondent, l’admission de la RFY
(devenue depuis la Serbie-et-Monténégro) aux Na tionsUnies, n’ont, cependant, d’incidence sur
votre compétence, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, pour vous prononcer sur le fond de la présente
affaire.
I. Les arrêts du 15 décembre 2004 dans les affaires de la Licéité de l’emploi
de la force n’ont aucune incidence en la présente affaire
7. Madame le président, il ne me paraît pas utile de passer beaucoup de temps à se demander
quelle pourrait être l’incidence dans la présente affaire des huit arrêts que vous avez rendus le
15décembre2004 dans les affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force . La réponse me
paraît aller de soi : ils n’en ont aucune.
8. Ces arrêts ont été rendus dans des affair es complètement distinctes de celle qui nous
occupe aujourd’hui, à l’égard de Parties défenderesses différentes, et plaidées par la
Serbie-et-Monténégro dans un esprit complètement opposé à celui qui avait inspiré l’argumentation
qu’elle avait développée dans notre affaire et sur laquelle tant la Cour que la Bosnie-Herzégovine
s’étaient fondées en1996. Les décisions de2004 ne sauraient à l’évidence être revêtues de
l’autorité de la chose jugée vis-à-vis de la Bo snie-Herzégovine qu’elles ne concernent en aucune
12
Ibid., p. 27-28, par. 69 et 70. - 14 -
manière. L’article 59 du Statut est formel : «La décision de la Cour n’est obligatoire que pour les
parties en litige et dans le cas qui a été décidé.»
9. A maintes reprises, la Cour a eu l’occasion de rappeler qu’au même titre que ses arrêts au
fond, ses décisions en matière de compétence sont res judicata et qu’elle ne saurait (je cite votre
arrêt de1999 dans l’affaire relative à la Frontière terrestre et maritim e entre le Cameroun et le
Nigéria) «remettre en cause l’autorité de la chose jugée qui [s’y] attache» à l’occasion d’une phase
13
ultérieure de l’affaire . C’est aussi très exactement ce que vous avez dit dans vos arrêts de 2004,
dans lesquels vous avez précisé que celui de 2003 «ne saurait en aucun cas revêtir une quelconque
autorité de la chose jugée» pour les espèces alors en examen 14. Vous avez ajouté :
«Lorsque la Cour se prononce sur sa compétence dans une affaire déterminée,
c’est uniquement pour décider si elle peut connaître de cette affaire au fond, et non
pour procéder à l’élucidation d’une questi on controversée de nature générale. Une
décision de la Cour devrait avoir, selon l es termes de l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire du
Cameroun septentrional , «des conséquences pratiques en ce sens qu’[elle devrait]
pouvoir affecter les droits ou ob ligations juridiques existants des parties, dissipant
ainsi toute incertitude dans leurs relations juridiques» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p.34; les
italiques sont de la Cour); et telle est la conséquence de la décision que la Cour
15
rendrait sur sa compétence en l’espèce.»
10. L’inverse est évidemment vrai et vous ne sauriez, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour,
transposer la solution des arrê ts de2004 à la présente espèce ⎯dans laquelle, il faut le rappeler,
vous avez, en toute connaissance de cause, reconnu votre compétence avec l’autorité définitive de
la chose jugée pour les deux Parties qui se présentent aujourd’hui devant vous. Ceci d’autant
moins que, dans les affaires de la Licéité de l’emploi de la force , aucune des Parties n’a avancé
d’argument en faveur de votre compétence: l’une comme les autres avaient le même intérêt à ce
que vous décliniez votre compétence et il ne vous a ppartenait sans doute pas de soulever d’office
des questions sciemment ignorées par les Parties. La situation est, évidemment, complètement
différente dans notre affaire.
13 Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le
Cameroun et le Nigeria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires (Nigeria c. Cameroun) , arrêt
C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 31, par. 16; voir aussi Usine de Chorzów, compétence, arrêt n 8, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n° 9, p. 23
et affaire du Détroit de Corfou, fixation du montant des réparations(Royaume-Uni c. Albanie) , C.I.J. Recueil 1949,
p.248; arrêt du 18 août 1972, Appel concernant la compétence du Conseil de l’OACI (Inde c. Pakistan, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 56, par. 18.
14Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Belgique), arrêt du 15 décembre 2004, par. 80.
15Ibid., par. 38. - 15 -
II. L’admission de la Serbie-et-Monténégro aux Nations Unies
n’a aucune incidence en la présente affaire
11. Nous sommes parfaitement conscients, Mada me le président, qu’en2003, lorsqu’elle a
rejeté la requête en revision de la Yougoslavie, la Cour s’est f ondée sur les règles particulières qui
gouvernent la revision et je n’essaierai pas de me fair e plus sot que je le suis en confondant un fait
nouveau au sens de l’article 61 du Statut avec un fa it qui pourrait être de nature à vous conduire à
ne pas exercer votre compétence pour d’autres raisons. Mais il se trouve que l’admission de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro aux Nations Unies n’est ni l’un , ni l’autre. Ce n’est pas un fait nouveau au
sens de l’article61 ⎯vous l’avez jugé en2003 dans un arrêt re vêtu de l’autorité définitive de la
chose jugée et il n’y a aucune raison d’y revenir. Mais ce fait n’a certainement pas non plus
vocation à remettre en cause la décision que vous avez prise dans votre arrêt de1996 ⎯ en
admettant que vous le puissiez. Or vous ne le pouvez pas et, le puissiez-vous, vous avez donné à la
décision par laquelle vous avez retenu votre comp étence des fondements que l’admission de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro aux Nations Unies ne contredit nullement.
A. L’arrêt de 1996 est revêtu de l’autorité de chose jugée
12. Sans doute, Madame et Messieurs les jug es, votre arrêt de1996 ne porte-t-il que sur la
compétence de la Cour et la recevabilité de la requête. Il n’en reste pas moins que, sur ces deux
points, il est «définitif et sans recours» sous le s seules réserves de la possibilité de recours en
interprétation ou en revision. Le simple fait que la Cour ait accepté de connaître de la demande en
revision de la Yougoslavie montre bien d’aille urs qu’en dehors de ces hypothèses, il s’agit d’un
arrêt comme un autre qui ne peut être contesté d’aucune autre façon 1. Or nul ne prétend qu’il soit
obscur et nécessite une interprétation; quant à la revision, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a essayé cette
voie; sans succès.
13. En d’autres termes, dès lors qu’en l’ab sence de fait nouveau au sens de l’article61 du
Statut, il n’est pas susceptible de revision, l’arrêt de1996 doit être exécuté et, comme elle l’a
expressément constaté dans son arrêt sur les excepti ons préliminaires ainsi que je l’ai rappelé, la
Cour «peut désormais procéder à l’examen du fond de l’affaire» sur la base de l’articleIX de la
16Voir aussi Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en l’affaire deFrontière terrestre et
maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires (Nigéria c. Cameroun), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 35, par. 10. - 16 -
convention sur le génocide ⎯ou, plus exactement, elle le doit faute de désistement de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine : «cet arrêt est définitif et sans recours [en ce qui concerne la compétence de la
17
Cour] et … en conséquence il y a à cet égard chose jugée» ⎯ et c’est vous, Madame et Messieurs
de la Cour que je viens de citer dans l’affaire du Détroit de Corfou.
14. La Cour aurait d’autant plus mauvaise gr âce à remettre en question ce qu’elle a jugé il y
a maintenant dix ans, que, et je le dis avec regret et gravité, Madame le président, cette affaire a
attendu treizeans ⎯ treize ans… ⎯ depuis le dépôt de la requê te bosniaque, pour faire enfin
l’objet de plaidoiries orales. Je ne m’étendrai pas sur les raisons pour lesquelles il en est ainsi
⎯ raisons que l’agent adjoint de la Bosnie-Herzégovine a rappelé hier matin ⎯ et je me bornerai à
dire qu’elles ne relèvent pas de la responsabilité de l’Etat demandeur. Il serait désastreux pour
l’image de la Cour et de la justice internationale qu’un Etat puisse échapper à l’établissement de ses
responsabilités grâce à son attitude dilatoire ou à l’ encombrement du rôle de la Cour ou à son
hésitation à se prononcer sur le fond.
15. Et ces considérations sont encore plus pressantes en l’espèce pour les raisons suivantes :
1)les faits internationalement illicites qui, selon le demandeur, engagent la responsabilité de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro ne sont pas d’anodins manquements à des règles «tout-venant» du droit
international mais, pour repre ndre la terminologie finalement retenue par la Commission du
droit international dans ses articles de 2001 sur la responsabilité; ce sont des «violations graves
d’obligations découlant de normes impératives du droit international général»;
2l’Etat défendeur porte la responsabilité, peut-être pas exclusive mais, à l’évidence,
prédominante, de la lenteur avec laquelle la pr océdure a progressé dans cette affaire pourtant si
importante et qui fut sans aucun doute si urgente: c’est la Yougoslavie qui a fait tout ce qui
était en son pouvoir pour retarder l’issue; c’est elle qui a multiplié les manŒuvres dilatoires; et
il serait plus que choquant qu’elle puisse main tenant se prévaloir d’un changement de
circonstances alors que, l’affaire eût-elle pu être jugée dans un dé lai raisonnable de deux, trois,
ou même quatreans après le dépôt de la re quête, ou même avec une célérité normale après
l’intervention de l’arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires, aucun problème de compétence ne se
17
Détroit de Corfou, fixation du montant des réparations, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 248. - 17 -
serait posé ⎯ je rappelle à cet égard que la duplique de la Yougoslavie a été déposée au Greffe
le 22février1999 ⎯ 1999 ⎯, plus d’un an et huit mois avant que cet Etat soit admis aux
Nations Unies, non plus comme continuateur de l’ex-Yougoslavie comme il le prétendait, mais
comme un Etat nouveau, successeur parmi d’autres de la RSFY; et ceci est d’autant plus
important que
3)il ne tenait qu’à la Yougoslavie ⎯ maintenant Serbie-et-Monténégro ⎯ de «clarifier la
18
situation» comme elle le dit en demandant son admission aux NationsUnies comme le
19
Conseil de sécurité et l’As semblée générale le réclamaient avec insistance depuis 1992 , alors
que, contre tous les avis, elle s’est durant plus de huit ans obstinée dans ses prétentions
unilatérales, seule cause de la perpétuation de la situation sui generis sur laquelle la Cour s’est
fondée pour rendre son arrêt de 1996.
16. Il va de soi qu’un Etat ne peut tenir ai nsi en échec la justice internationale. Comme l’a
rappelé la Cour permanente, «il est certainement incompatible avec le caractère des arrêts que rend
la Cour et avec la force obligatoire qui y est attachée par les articles59 et63, alinéa2, de son
20
Statut, que celle-ci prononce un arrêt que l’un e ou l’autre partie pourrait rendre inopérant» . Et il
en va d’autant plus certainement ainsi en la présente espèce que :
B.L’admission de la Serbie-et-Monténégro au x NationsUnies ne remet pas en cause la
motivation de l’arrêt de 1996
17. Durant la procédure sur la demande en revision, la Yougoslavie a voulu, Madame et
Messieurs les juges, vous faire remonter le temps et vous convaincre que son admission aux
NationsUnies le 1 ernovembre2000 constituait un fait nouveau de nature à remettre en cause la
21
décision sur la compétence que vous avez prise en 1996 . Ce fait n’entre pas dans les prévisions
de l’article 61 et, faute de revision, votre arrêt ne saurait être remis en cause. Mais je souhaite aller
plus loin et imaginer que ce soit possible. Même dans cette hypothèse ⎯que j’admets pour les
18
Voir la Demande en revision de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 (23/04/2001), p.24-30, par.18-21, p.49, par.35 et
p.50, par.37. Lors des plaidoiries sur la Demande en revision, voir CR2002/40 (4/11/2002), p.36-39, par.3.3-3.11 et
p. 41-43, par. 4.2-4.09 (T. Varady); CR 2002/42 (6/11/2002), p. 21-22, par. 2.18-2.21 et p. 27, par. 2.35 (T. Varady).
19Voir S/RES/777 du 19 septembre 1992 et A/RES/47/1 du 22 septembre 1992.
20Zones franches de la Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex, ordonnance du 6 décembre 1930, C.P.J.I. série A n° 24,
p. 14.
21Voir la Demande en revision (23/04/2001), p.31-49, par.22-35 et CR2002/40 (4/11/2002), p.35-45,
par. 2.66-4.16 (T. Varady) et CR 2002/42, p. 21-27, par. 2.18-2.37 (T. Varady). - 18 -
seuls besoins de la discussion, il n’y aurait pas, dans l’admission de la Yougoslavie à
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, un motif pour revenir sur votre arrêt de 1996.
18. Dans celui-ci, la Cour, qui, à aucun moment, ne se fonde sur le statut de l’Etat défendeur
par rapport aux NationsUnies, constate d’emblée «qu’il n’a pas été contesté que la Yougoslavie
soit partie à la convention sur le génocide» 22. En ce qui concerne la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Cour
estime qu’elle «pouvait devenir partie à la conve ntion par l’effet du mécanisme de la succession
d’Etats» 23 et prend soin d’insister sur les caractères et l’importance particuliers de la convention
24
qui justifient l’adhésion la plus large . En outre, aux paragraphes 30 et 33 de son arrêt de 1996, la
Cour s’interroge sur la portée de sa compét ence pour se prononcer sur le différend que la
Bosnie-Herzégovine lui a soumis et conclut «qu’en visant la «responsabilité d’un Etat à raison d’un
acte de génocide ou de l’un quelconque des autr es actes énumérés à l’articleIII», l’articleIX
n’exclut aucune forme de responsabilité d’Etat» 25. Comme l’ont rappelé plusieurs juges dans
l’opinion individuelle commune jointe à l’arrêt du 3février dernier dans l’affaire des Activités
armées sur le territoire du Congo, «ArticleIX speaks not only of disputes over the interpretation
and application of the Convention, but over the “fulfilment of the Convention». Further, the
disputes that may be referred to the Court under ArticleIX «include those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide».» 26
19. Si je me suis quelque peu attardé sur la motivation de votre arrêt sur la compétence
de1996, Madame et Messieurs les juges, ce n’est que pour montrer que votre raisonnement n’est
pas fondé sur l’appartenance ou non de la Yougos lavie aux NationsUnies. Tout au plus
constatez-vous en passant que nul n’a contesté que celle-ci fût partie à la convention sur le
génocide ⎯«nul» c’est-à-dire pas la Bosnie-Herzégovine (cela va de soi puisqu’elle fonde la
compétence de la Cour sur l’article IX de cette convention); mais pas non plus la Yougoslavie qui,
22
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 610, par. 17.
23
Ibid., p. 611, par. 20.
24Ibid., p. 611-612, par. 22-23.
25Ibid., p. 616, par. 32.
26
Activités armées sur le territoir e du Congo (nouvelle requête:2002(République démocratique du Congo
c. Rwanda), opinion individuelle commune de Mme le juge Higgins et MM. les juge s Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada et
Simma, par. 28. - 19 -
pourtant, a soulevé pas moins de sept exceptions pré liminaires. Et, parmi celles-ci, pas non plus la
moindre allusion à une possible absence de partic ipation aux NationsUnies. En omettant
délibérément de soulever cette exception, la Yougoslavie a créé une situation d’ estoppel peut-être
et, en tout cas, ne saurait, de bonne foi, se rétracter et venir déclarer aujourd’hui qu’à la réflexion il
y avait une huitième exception préliminaire qu’e lle aurait «oublié» de soulever en1995 et vous
demander d’y faire droit, au mépris des dispositions de l’article 79 du Règlement de la Cour. Au
surplus, on doit sûrement considérer qu’en om ettant de soulever une telle exception, la
Yougoslavie a, à cet égard, accepté de facto la compétence de la Cour sur ce point et créé une sorte
de forum prorogatum, que la bonne foi la plus élémentaire lui interdit de contester à nouveau
aujourd’hui.
20. Et pour cause d’ailleurs : la Yougoslavie est demeurée Membre des Nations Unies. Les
résolutions 777 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité et 47/1 de l’Assemblée générale l’invitent, certes, à
présenter une demande d’admission aux Nations Unies et décident «qu’elle ne participera pas aux
travaux de l’Assemblée générale» mais elles se gardent bien de l’exclure de l’Organisation.
Comme l’avait précisé le Secrétaire général adjoint, conseiller juridique, la résolution 47/1
«ne met pas fin à l’ appartenance de la Yougoslavie à l’Organisation et ne la suspend
pas. En conséquence, le siège et la plaque portant le nom de la Yougoslavie
subsistent… La mission de la Yougoslavie auprès du Siège de l’Organisation des
NationsUnies, ainsi que les bureaux occup és par celle-ci, peuvent poursuivre leurs
activités, ils peuvent recevoir et distribuer des documents. Au Siège, le Secrétariat
continuera de hisser le drapeau de l’ancie nne Yougoslavie … La résolution n’enlève
pas à la Yougoslavie le droit de participer aux travaux des organes autres que ceux de
l’Assemblée [et, plus tard, de l’ECOS OC]. L’admission à l’Organisation des
Nations Unies d’une nouvelle Yougoslavie, en vertu de l’article 4 de la Charte, mettra
27
fin à la situation créée par la résolution 47/1.»
Au surplus, la Yougoslavie a continué de s’acquitter ⎯ et s’est acquittée ⎯ d’une contribution au
budget de l’Organisation 28.
21. Il va de soi que cette situation n’était p as celle d’un Etat non-membre mais celle d’un
Etat qui avait fait l’objet de sanctions internes. J’ajoute que les objections constantes de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine et des autres Etats issus de la dissolution de l’ex-Yougoslavie ne tenaient pas à
27
Lettre du 29 septembre 1992 aux représentants permanents de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et de la Croatie
(NationsUnies, doc. A/47/485), citée dans l’ordonnance du 8avril1993C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 13-14, par. 17 et dans
l’arrêt du 3 février 2003, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 13-14, par. 31 (les italiques sont dans l’original).
28Voir l’arrêt du 3 février 2003, ibid., p. 19-20, par. 45-47. - 20 -
la présence de la RFY au sein des Nations Unies, mais à sa prétention d’y continuer exclusivement
l’ex-Yougoslavie alors qu’ils la considér aient comme un Etat successeur comme un autre ⎯ ce
qu’elle a fini par reconnaître en 2000. Mais il paraît évident que ce tte persistance dans l’erreur ne
saurait profiter aujourd’hui à l’Etat défendeur : c’est lui qui, en s’obstinan t à s’opposer à la volonté
du Conseil de sécurité et de l’Assemblée générale, a créé et perpétué la situation sur laquelle la
Cour s’est fondée pour rendre son arrêt de 1996; il ne pourrait aujourd’hui venir contester qu’il
était Membre des NationsUnies (il s’est accroché à son statut qu’il voulait, à tort, privilégié) et,
d’ailleurs, il l’était, Membre des NationsUnies, même si ce n’était qu’avec de moindres droits; il
ne pourrait aujourd’hui venir pl aider l’erreur de bonne foi ⎯il n’a commis aucune erreur et il
n’était pas de bonne foi.
22. De tout ceci, la Cour a été pleinement c onsciente. Dès qu’elle a été saisie de l’affaire,
en1993, dans sa première ordonnance en indi cation de mesures conservatoires, celle du
8 avril 1993, elle a cité de larges extraits de la lettre du conseiller juridique des Nations Unies que
j’ai lus en partie il y a un instant tout en admettant que «la solution adoptée ne laisse pas de susciter
29
des difficultés juridiques» . Surtout, comme la Cour l’explique de manière limpide dans son arrêt
du 3 février 2003 sur la demande en revision, dont je crois devoir citer un large extrait :
«l’admission de la RFY en tant que membre de l’ONU a eu lieu plus de quatre années
après le prononcé de l’arrêt dont elle sollicite la revision. Or, au moment où cet arrêt a
été rendu, la situation qui prévalait était celle créée par la résolution 47/1 de
l’Assemblée générale. A cet égard, la Cour observera que les difficultés concernant le
statut de la RFY, survenues entre l’adoptio n de cette résolution et l’admission de la
RFY à l’ONU le 1 ernovembre 2000, découlaient de la circonstance que, même si la
prétention de la Yougoslavie à assurer la continuité de la personnalité juridique
internationale de la RSFY n’était pas «gé néralement acceptée»…, les conséquences
précises de cette situation (telles que la non-participation aux travaux de l’Assemblée
générale ou du Conseil économique et social et aux réunions des Etats parties au pacte
international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, etc.) étaient déterminées au cas par
cas.
La résolution 47/1 ne portait notamment p as atteinte au droit de la RFY d’ester
devant la Cour ou d’être partie à un différend devant celle-ci dans les conditions fixées
par le Statut. Elle ne touchait pas davantage à la situation de la RFY au regard de la
convention sur le génocide. Pour «mettr[e] fin à la situation créée par la
résolution47/1», la RFY devait présenter une demande d’admission à l’Organisation
des NationsUnies comme l’avaient fait les autres Républiques composant la RSFY.
Tous ces éléments étaient connus de la Cour et de la RFY au jour du prononcé de
l’arrêt. Ce qui toutefois demeurait inconnu en juillet1996 était la réponse à la
29
C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 14, par. 18. - 21 -
question de savoir si et quand la RFY présenterait une demande d’admission à
l’Organisation des NationsUnies et si et quand cette demande serait accueillie,
mettant ainsi un terme à la situation créée par la résolution 47/1 de l’Assemblée
générale.
CoLuar ⎯ car c’est toujours la Cour qui parle dans son arrêt de 2003 ⎯ tient
en outre à souligner que la résolution 55/12 de l’Assemblée générale en date du
1 novembre 2000 ne peut avoir rétroactivement modifié la situation sui generis dans
laquelle se trouvait la RFY vis-à-vis de l’Or ganisation des NationsUnies pendant la
période 1992-2000, ni sa situation à l’égard du Statut de la Cour et de la convention
sur le génocide.» 30
23. Ainsi donc :
⎯ pour rendre son arrêt de 1996, la Cour s’est fondée sur la situation sui generis existant alors;
⎯ cette situation lui était parfaitement connue et tenait à l’attitude de la Yougoslavie elle-même;
et
⎯ l’admission de la RFY en tant que successeur (et non plus comme continuateur) de
l’ex-Yougoslavie n’a en aucune manière modifié rétroactivement la situation sur laquelle s’est
fondée la Cour.
24. Celle-ci était compétente pour se prononcer sur la requête de la Yougoslavie en1993,
en1996, en2003, et elle l’est toujours en2006, l’admission de ce pays aux NationsUnies a
modifié la situation pour l’avenir mais n’a pas effa cé d’«un trait de vote» la situation antérieure,
celle au vu de laquelle la Cour s’est prononcée dé finitivement par son arrêt de1996. Il n’y a
assurément pas là une circonstan ce autorisant à remettre en cause l’autorité, sacrée pour une cour
de justice, qui s’attache, Madame et Messieurs les juges, à votre décision de 1996.
25. Ceci, Madame le président, conclut cette brève plaidoirie «de précaution», que nous
avons cru devoir consacrer, à nouveau et pour la tr oisième fois, à des questions de compétence.
Mais la Bosnie-Herzégovine tient à dire que, sur ce point, elle se trouve en position de «défendeur»
et que si la Serbie-et-Monténégro tenait à rouvrir ce débat, pourtant déjà tranché, elle réserve
formellement son droit d’y revenir tout le temps qui pourrait être nécessaire lors du second tour des
plaidoiries orales : je n’ai avancé que certains d es arguments qui nous paraissent pouvoir l’être, je
l’ai fait assez brièvement; nous en avons d’autres en réserve si la nécessité s’en faisait sentir.
Madame et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre attention; et je vous prie Madame
le président, de bien vouloir appeler à ce tte barre mon éminent collègue et ami, le
30
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 28, par. 70-71 (les italiques sont de nous). - 22 -
professeur Thomas Franck, qui entamera les plaidoiri es de la Bosnie-Herzégovine sur les questions
de preuves, si importantes dans la présente affaire. Merci beaucoup.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. I now call Professor Franck.
Mr. FRANCK: Madam President, it is a profound honour and privilege to plead once again
at the Bar of the World Court. Members of the Court, I will be discussing this morning the sources
of evidence that we will adduce to prove that genocide was committed in Bosnia. I would like to
begin by emphasizing that Bosnia’s case rests on the overwhelming evidence that genocide was
committed and to examine the sources of that evidence.
1. Sources of evidence
1. Since at least 20 March 1993 ⎯ when Bosnia and Herzegovina first filed its Application
instituting proceedings in this Court ⎯ you have been receiving evidence of shocking crimes
against humanity and egregious violations of inte rnational law’s most sacred text: the Genocide
Convention. Unfortunately, in the intervening 13 years, the evidence of these heinous crimes has
continued to pile up, alongside the mounds of corp ses unearthed in more recent years. While it is
sad that the evasive manoeuvrings of the Respondent has so long delayed us in reaching this day of
judgment, the passing years, month by month, have made ever more irrefutable the evidence of
what happened and who was responsible.
2. That evidence, as this Court will see, is now so overwhelming that it cries out for the
validation which only this Court can give. With such validation, at last, can come surcease in the
suffering and the anger; without it would come in credulity, disbelief, and more agony. We ask
you to hear this evidence as judges, of course, but also as, potentially, the designated authors of an
indelible chapter in the history of humanity’s climb from the depths of depravity to a higher
consciousness.
3. For its part in that process, Bosnia will have to inundate you with our evidence, and we
apologize in advance for forcing you to relive, once ag ain, that horrific time in all its gory detail.
The evidence calls to us from everywhere a nd echoes down the halls of a dreadful decade,
compounded by the feckless denials of its perpetrators. - 23 -
4. We ask you to take judicial notice of that which is notorious: notorious in its awfulness
and notorious, also, in the sense that it is so well known.
5. We will ask you to watch visual evidence of what is otherwise virtually unbelievable.
6. We will ask you to listen again, as it is related on the public r ecord, to the anguished
voices of the victims: but in particular, not in person, but as related unde r oath and subject to
cross-examination in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
7. We will present the professional opinions of respected experts and the first-hand reports of
seasoned reporters.
8. We will recall the facts found by United Nations rapporteurs and resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Security Council that fix facts and ascribe responsibility.
9. We will ask you to note decisions by ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, which, this past decade, have weighed some of the same, or similar, evidence as we will
be presenting to you, and have drawn factual a nd legal deductions, much as you will now have to
do.
10. Permit me a few words with respect to each of these sources of evidence.
2. Judicial notice and inferences
11. There will be presented to you notorious facts that are so well known that it would be
appropriate for this Court to take judicial notice of them without requiring further proof, subject to
their refutation of course, by the Respondent, if they are so able. For example, the fact that 7,000
to 8,000 persons were put to death at Srebrenica in just a few days in July1995, and that many
thousands more were deported, is now so well known that it can no longer be contested. It has
been reported by the High Representative for Bo snia and cited in several cases before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Y ugoslavia, and we will be reminding the Court of
these findings. But now, in 2006, the crimes, and the realities and the motives behind these crimes
have become so notorious as to be undeniable. There can no longer be any need to prove that most
of those who were murdered were Muslims, as were the thousands of women who were raped. We
will present evidence, but often it will be primarily for the record. We know that you, the judges,
already know many of these things. - 24 -
12. As C.F.Amerasinghe has written in his recent book: “Judicial notice is... a measure
through which international tribunals can rely on some facts in a pending case without requiring the
party that relies on them to provide proof thereof.” 31 That this Court will take notice of “the
32
notoriety of the facts” was recognized in 1951, in the Fisheries case and, again, in the Nuclear
Tests cases 33. Similarly, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Island of Palmas case referred to its power to
34
consider notorious facts by taking judicial notice of them . Article21 of the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal makes specific provisions for the taking of judicial notice of facts of common
knowledge which, in the circumstances of the litigation, are self-evident and, thus, do not need to
be proven.
13. Related to the concept of judicial notice is that of judicial presumptions. These, as
Amerasinghe has pointed out, are logical deductions made from evidence of certain facts to the
35
probable, if also rebuttable, ex istence of certain other facts . As the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has said in the Velasquez Rodriguez case 36:
“The practice of international and domes tic courts shows that direct evidence,
whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be
legitimately considered in reaching a decisi on. Circumstantial evidence, indicia and
presumptions may be considered, so long as th ey lead to conclusions consistent with
the facts.”
14. In the present case we will mostly present di rect evidence, whenever it is available.
Nevertheless, for reasons of economy, we will ask the Court to consider some facts as “notorious”
because of the frequency and regularity with which they have entered the public domain: mostly
through reports of reliable observers.
15. But we will also ask the Court to draw inferences from patterns ⎯ patterns of facts to
conclusions that are logically or experientially inescapable, even if they cannot be proven with
direct evidence. For example, where an intent mu st be demonstrated, we ask the Court to consider
31C. F. Amerasinghe, Evidence in International Litigation 160-161 (2005).
32
I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 138-139.
33
I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 9, para. 17.
341928 2 United Nations, Reports of the International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), pp. 841-842.
35Id., Chapter 11.
361988 IACHR, Series C: Decisions and Judgments No. 4, p. 135, para. 130. - 25 -
direct evidence of what was said and done, with what frequency and to whom, and how, as indirect
evidence of the perpetrators’ intent.
16. Such inferences are especially appropriate in the circumstances of this litigation. We
will ask this Court to take judicial notice of the context in which this case arises: as an
international war in which the Respondent has been declared by the Security Council of the United
Nations to have intervened with force in the terr itory of the Applicant. Since the aggressor has not
been defeated and has not surrendered, many impor tant sources of evidence remain within the sole
domain of the régime in Belgrade and its archival materials are not fully accessible to the Applicant
or to this Court, even though some of the rele vant documents have been provided to the Yugoslav
Tribunal, but under conditions of non-disclosure to us and to you. This makes it inevitable that
certain facts about the perpetrators’ intent and, also, the attribution of acts in Bosnia to the
authorities in Belgrade will have to be demonstr ated, yes, by inference from activities and events
on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as to wh ich evidence can be adduced, that is as to the
activities themselves which can be pr oven here. It should be up to the Respondent to rebut these
logical inferences with evidence that is solely within its control.
17. As this Court said in the Corfu Channel case at the merits phase, the State seeking to
prove facts that are solely within the purview of the other party and which are unavailable to it
“should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial
evidence. This indirect evidence is admitte d in all systems of law, and its use is
recognized by international decisions. It mu st be regarded as of special weight when
it is based on37 series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single
conclusion.”
This, the Court thought, was especially so when
“the fact of . . . exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has
a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State
as to . . . events. By reason of this exclusiv e control, the other State, the victim of the
breach of international law, is . . . unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to
responsibility.” 38
It is true that, in the circumstances of that case, the Court did not need to make an inference
because the facts were otherwise established. Where, however, this is not so ⎯ as in some matters
37
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18.
38Ibid. - 26 -
pertaining to the present case ⎯ then the Court should, of course, resort to the logical inferences
that connect what is knowable with what must be presumed.
18. That courts have the right to do so is further confirmed by the World Trade Organization
Appellate body’s 1999 decision in the Civilian Aircraft case where it was established that “the
Panel had the legal authority and the discreti on to draw inferences from the facts before it ⎯
including the fact that Canada had refused to provide information sought by the Panel” 39. This
merely restates again the general principle set fo rth by the United States-Mexican General Claims
Commission in the Parker case to the effect that the parties before it “are sovereign nations who
are in honour bound to make full disclosure of the facts in each case so far as such facts are within
their knowledge or can reasonably be ascertained by them... no matter what their effects may
40
be” . The right to draw negative inferences from the failure of a State to provide evidence or to
suppress evidence under its sole control is further confirmed by arbitral practice: as for example, in
41
the French-Greek Lighthouse case arbitration of 1956 .
19. This is precisely a case in which the dr awing of such inferences from incomplete
production of evidence is warranted. In our case, the first-hand documentary evidence essential to
establish the link of State responsibility between events in Bosnia and the authorities in Belgrade is
solely within the control of Belgrade. To the ex tent that we have been unable to persuade the
Respondent to give us access to the unredacted official documents we have requested, this Court is
left to draw logical inferences. It will be asked to do so, however, only on the basis of excellent
inferential evidence detailing acts, and patterns of acts, committed in Bosnia that speak eloquently,
leading us to make surmises about what has been withheld that are virtually inescapable to the
ordinary mind. These inferences will necessarily bear both on the question of whether the killings,
rapes, torture and forced displacement, that is, ethnic cleansing, perpetrated against non-Serbs in
Bosnia were manifestations of intentional genocide and, also, whether that genocide is attributable
to the authorities in Belgrade.
39
Canada ⎯ Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, para. 203.
4Administrative Decisions and Opinions, 39-40, cited in D. V. Sandifer, Evidence Before International
Tribunals, p.115 (1975 ed.).
4France v. Greece, Claim No. 6, PCA (1956), 23 ILR at 678. - 27 -
20. The drawing of inferences is well establis hed in circumstances where relevant evidence
is in the sole possession of the party that refuses to disclose it. We only ask the Court to act
consistently with its own practice, in this r espect, and in accordance with the common practice of
other international tribunals.
21. To summarize: to whatever extent, if any, the Respondent fails to produce exculpatory
evidence or evidence requested by th e other party or by the Court, either in response to a direct
request, or in response to supported allegations made against it in written pleadings, it is
appropriate ⎯ it is appropriate, we urge ⎯ for the Court to draw a negative inference supporting
the Applicant’s version of the di sputed facts. Article 49 of the International Court of Justice
Statute confers authority on this Court to do so; authority that is important to the judicial function.
Even in the absence of such a formal order for production, however, it is up to the parties to honour
their obligation to produce the evidence under their control, when only that could satisfy the need
to provide a full explanation of events previo usly demonstrated before this Court. As
JudgeBuergenthal has written, w ith reference to his experience at the Inter-American Court, it is
appropriate to make adverse inferences agains t a party that has not produced documents
42
exclusively available to it .
22. Let us be clear: during the course of pr eparations for this case, it has become evident
that the Respondent, however reluctantly, has provided documents relevant to this case to the
ICTY, after that Tribunal issued orders compe lling their production. Although some of these
documents, or parts thereof, have been made public through the Tribunal, others have been
designated for withholding and othe rs have been partially redacted at the request of the
Respondent. We have become convinced by evidence, and it is quite logical to presume, that this
wilful withholding of evidence from this Court is itself evidence of the damage these documents
could do in undermining the Respondent’s defence in the present case.
3. Visual evidence
23. I would like next to turn to the question of our presentation of vis
ual evidence. Almost
ten years after the Srebrenica massacre, a vivid video surfaced in Serbia and was made available to
4Buergenthal, Judicial Fact-Finding: The Inter-American Human Rights Court , in Lillich, ed., Fact-Finding
before International Tribunals, 1992, p. 266. - 28 -
this Court and to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The graphic video
shows the deliberate killing, after torture, of six Muslim men by members of the Serbian
paramilitary unit. As The New York Times observed at the time,
“While the number of those killed re presents a tiny proportion of those who
died in July 1995, the video is being seen as irrefutable evidence that Serbia’s [public]
police forces, and not just Bosnian Serb fo rces, took part in the massacre, evidence
that challenges the commonly held view among Serbs that the atrocity never took
43
place.”
Some of these pictures, while exceedingly painful to watch, are the most effective refutations of the
lies told by the criminals. Accordingly, this and other visual evidence of genocide will be
presented to you, to make tangible the data and statistics that portray a European descent into
barbarity that the drafters of the Genocide Convention had sought to bar forever.
4. Public witness testimony and documents from the former Yugoslavia
24. The Applicant will not be calling witnesses befo re this Court, because, had we chosen to
do so, had we chosen to let the victims speak for themselves directly to you, we would have had to
summon them in a chorus of thousands. Their accounts have already been publicly recited and
examined in great detail before the Internationa l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Instead, counsel for Bosnia will direct this Court to the witness testimony recorded in proceedings
at the ICTY and also to the associated documenta ry evidence, which has been authenticated and
attributed to organs of the Government in Belgrade or their surrogates. We will direct the attention
of this Court to the findings of that Criminal Tribunal, where the witnesses’ accounts and various
incriminating documents have been subject to the rigorous procedural requirements of
authentication, cross-examination and proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”, before being found
credible by that international panel of eminen t jurists. Rather than recall the witnesses and
reproduce all the evidence de novo, we will present them through the rigorous filter of the ICTY’s
demanding adversary process. Th rough references to the proceedings and judgments of that
Tribunal, we will let the witnesses speak, their credibility often further augmented by having
endured the test of confronting their victimizers.
43
The New York Times, International, June 3, 2005, p. A3. - 29 -
25. You will next be hearing the reasons, advanced by my colleague, Magda Karagiannakis,
why the evidence of fact and the procedures genera ted by the proceedings before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia merit the most serious consideration by this Court.
But, Madam President, I have several more sources of evidence, which I would like to
discuss with this Court, in order to make clear the reasons and the methods by which they are being
introduced to you. May I respectfully request th at we take our break and that I would resume
thereafter?
The PRESIDENT: Yes, Professor Franck. The Court will rise for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.10 a.m. to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Franck.
Mr. FRANCK: Madam President, Members of the Court.
5. Reports and determinations of United Nations organs and institutions
26. We have been examining sources of evid ence to which we will be making reference
during these coming weeks, and I would like next to discuss our use of reports and determinations
of United Nations organs and institutions. We will, of course, be reminding the Court of the
written texts setting out findings of fact made by the United Nations Security Council, the United
Nations General Assembly, as well as by United Nations experts and rapporteurs. It is normal for
this Court to give great weight to such evidence, as established again in your 2005 decision in the
44
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda case. There, you said:
“the Court will... give weight to evidence that has not, even before this litigation,
been challenged by impartial persons for the correctness of what it contains. The
Court moreover notes that evidence obtained by examination of persons directly
involved, and who were subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in
examination and experienced in assessing large amounts of factual information, some
of it of a technical nature, merits special attention.”45 (Emphasis added.)
44
Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of te Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), 19 December 2005, especially paras. 60-62.
4Id., para. 61 - 30 -
We, Bosnia, will be basing our case very largely on just such evidence, as we did earlier during the
written pleadings.
27. The Respondent, in its Rejoinder of 22 February 1999, has asked the Court, without
46
further proof, to conclude that “[a]ll th ese materials are of dubious evidential value” . Common
sense, common decency, and the role of this Cour t as a principal organ of the United Nations all
mandate a rejection of this cavalier and even c ontemptuous approach to evidence, all of which
confirms, over and over, the essential and irrefutable ingredients of the Applicant’s contention that
genocide was committed by the Respondent.
28. These organs and institutions have spoken with full authority. The United Nations
Security Council and the General Assembly ha ve responded to the crisis in Bosnia and
Herzegovina by discharging their roles as th e primary and secondary institutions for the
maintenance of international peace and security, in conformity with the authority conferred on
them by the Charter as construed by this Court ever since the Certain Expenses case 47. Moreover,
both principal organs of the United Nations system were acting in accordance with Article VIII of
the Genocide Convention which provides that “ (a)any Contracting Party may call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide . . .”.
29. The resolutions passed and the decisions ta ken by these organs also represent the sum of
the informed judgments of the Member States, many of which were in a position to know what was
happening as it happened, because they are situated in the vicinity of the conflict, or because they
gave refuge to the victims, or because their diplom ats were in place to report at first hand on the
unfolding disaster.
30. Their conclusions both as to the facts and the applicable law, inform, and are apparent in,
the resolutions passed by these au thorized institutions as they so ught to fulfil their responsibilities
under the Charter of the United Nations and the Genocide Convention. In accordance with its
responsibility, for example, the Security Council demanded, as early as 15May1992, in
resolution752 (1992), that “all forms of interferen ce... by units of the Yugoslav People’s Army
46
Page 474, para. 3.1.4.
4Certain Expenses, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151. - 31 -
(JNA)... cease immediately” and that those units either be withdrawn or disbanded with their
weapons placed under international monitoring. Th is resolution also called for an end to the
forcible expulsion of persons and “any attempt to change the ethnic composition of the
population”. Evidently, the Members of the Council, after due deliberation, were able to conclude
that the Yugoslav Army, sometimes acting with Bosnian Serb units, was engaged in activities
which, multiplied many times over, as we shall s how, must be seen as a constitutive element of
genocide. That verdict cannot be dismissed, as the Respondent has sought to do, as “of dubious
evidential value”.
31. In passing a resolution which recognized both the role of the JNA ⎯ the Yugoslav
Army ⎯ and also these activities which are ingredient s of genocide, these other ingredients, the
Security Council was responding not only to the reports of the media, non-governmental
organizations, the information of the Council Me mbers’ own diplomatic and intelligence services,
but also to information and documentation pr ovided to the Council by the United Nations
Secretary-General, who, on 12 May 1992, reported that the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the
acquiescence and participation of the JNA ⎯ with the acquiescence and participation of the
JNA ⎯ were engaged in a campaign to create “ethni cally pure regions” through “the seizure and
48
intimidation of the non-Serb population” . The Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council
links the JNA directly to the deliberate killing of Muslims and to the creation of conditions
49
calculated to bring about the physical destruction of their community , the very elements of
genocide. Two weeks later, the Secretary-Gene ral again reported the continuing activities of the
50
JNA against civilian populations “on a scale not seen in Europe since World WarII” . The
Security Council took these reports of the Secretary-General to be factually credible and so, we
urge, should you.
32. After further confirmation by the Secretar y-General, on 30 May 1992, of the continuing
intervention of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council acted, adopting extensive
economic and military sanctions against the former Yugoslavia “until the Security Council decides
4S/23900, para. 5, 12 May 1992.
49
Id., para. 6.
5S/24000, paras. 5 and 6, 26 May 1992. - 32 -
that the authorities . . . including the . . . JNA have taken effective measures” to stop their
prohibited activities 5. Evidently, the Secretary-General’s reporting was deemed credible by the
Member States. That credibility extended to two essential determin ations: that the acts amounted
to extermination of Muslims in Bosnia and that responsibility for these acts is attributable to
Belgrade.
33. Despite these measures, the Secretary-General continued to report, into 1993, that the
52
JNA forces were not being withdrawn . In response, the Council, again fully accepting the
53
credibility of the Secretary-General’s reporting, further tightened sanctions on Belgrade .
34. The General Assembly was equally explicit in identifying the elements of genocide being
perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina during this period and in specifically attributing
responsibility to the FRY. On 18 December 1992, in resolution 47/80, the General Assembly noted
the baleful record of
“killings, torture, beatings, rape, disappearanc es, destruction of houses, and other acts
or threats of violence aimed at forcing individuals to leave their homes... the
systematic terrorization and murder of non-combatants, the destruction of vital
services, the besieging of cities and the use of military force against civilian
populations and relief operations”
as a result of which “the Muslim population [is] threatened with virtual extermination ” (emphasis
added). The General Assembly added that Bo snian Serbs and “the Yugoslav Army and the
political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility ” (emphasis added) and
affirmed that States are to be held accountable for such acts “which their agents commit upon the
54
territory of another State” . These conclusions concerning th e factual situation on the ground ⎯
the acts being committed that are tantamount to ge nocide, and the attribution of those acts to
Belgrade ⎯ are not amateur guesswork. They are the sy nthesis of what national and international
observers on the ground were reporting to th e Governments whose representatives drafted these
resolutions. They are anything but speculative.
51Resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992.
52
A/47/869, 18 January 1993.
53Resolution 820 (1993), 17 April 1993.
54Resolution 47/147, 18 December 1992. - 33 -
35. The next year, in resolution 48/153, the United Nations General Assembly again
reiterated its finding of systematic offences “co mmitted as a matter of policy” and amounting to
genocide, for which responsibility, it found, lies in part with Bosnian Serbs but also with “political
and military leaders in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)” who share
“primary responsibility for most of these violations”. Permit me, Madam President, to reiterate the
General Assembly’s conclusion: that the leader ship of Serbia and Montenegro, as a matter of
policy, was engaging in activities in Bosnia that amounted to genocide. In the following year, the
55
General Assembly, overwhelmingly, voted for resolution 44/88 which:
“Condemns vigorously the violations of the human rights of the Bosnian people
and of international humanitarian law co mmitted by the parties to the conflict,
especially those violations committed as polic y, flagrantly and on a massive scale, by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs.”
There were 109 votes in favour of this resolution and none opposed. These votes wer
e cast by
senior diplomats representing every region, every ideology and every religion. The Governments
that authorized their representatives to cast these votes were not engaging in attributional
conjectures about vague facts. The resolutions thus must be given their due weight in the
deliberations of this, the principal legal organ of the United Nations system.
36. These solemn determinations by the S ecurity Council and the General Assembly, the
former being acts of the Security Council ac ting under the mandate of its authority under
ChapterVII of the United Nations Charter, surely deserve full faith and credit in this Court’s
deliberations as it fulfils its role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations system. In
numerous decisions and advisory opinions, this Court has made it clear that it is “concerned to lend
its support to the purposes and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, in particular the
56
maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes...” In
the instance of its recent Advisory Opinion on th e wall in the Occupied Territories, as in many
others, your Court has lent full credence to the facts reported in communications by the United
Nations Secretary-General 57 and other official United Nations sources, and set out in the General
55
20 December 1993.
56
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of
9 July 2004, p. 68, para. 161.
5Id., pp. 29-30, para. 57. - 34 -
58
Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion . Among these are reports of the Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories,
as well as relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. In the 1974
Nuclear Test (Australia v. France) case, this Court took note of the findings of the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation reported to the General Assembly 59. In
the aforementioned Congo v. Uganda case, you took note of resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council, reports of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission, reports of
the Secretary-General and of a United Nations panel of experts and the Porter Commission
60
Report . All of this of course, we have carefu lly footnoted in the written version of these
pleadings. We will similarly present the Court with evidence of facts found by the principal organs
of the United Nations system and of its experts and subsidiary organs: sources, we believe, entitled
to the usual high degree of credence.
37. More graphically specific and detailed accounts of the killings, rapes, and concerted
campaigns of ethnic cleansing and the destruction of Muslim religious and cultural property are
provided by the Report of the Commission of Expe rts established in accordance with Security
Council resolution 780 (1992) 61, the report of the Security Council Mission established pursuant to
62
resolution 819 (1993) and by the Reports of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights in 1993 and 1995 63. Mazowiecki conducted his investigations,
often in situ, while the events he was reporting were actually going on. In Congo v. Uganda, this
64
Court said it would “prefer contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge” .
These reports are exactly that. They are set out in Part 3 of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s pleadings of
15April1994 and its Annexes, and in later writte n pleadings. They constitute a deep well, one
getting ever deeper, of factual evidence that is internally consistent and corroborative of an
58Id., p. 7, para. 1. The resolution is: ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003.
59I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 258, para. 18.
60
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), para. 61.
61
S/25274, 10 February 1993.
62S/25700, 30 April 1993.
63E/CN.4/1994/3, 5 May 1993 and E/CN.4/1996/9, 22 August 1995.
64Congo v. Uganda, id., para. 61. - 35 -
irrefutable design for deliberately planned and sy stematically executed genocide. In our oral
pleadings, this Court will be reminded of some of these findings. You will be asked to see them as
part of a seamless skein of other evidence we w ill present: evidence that is powerful, shocking
and, after this Court has spoken, at last will become undeniable.
6. “Reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the State”
38. I would like next to examine with you reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct
unfavourable to the State uttering them. Again, in Congo v. Uganda, this Court said that it “will
give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the
65
State represented by the person making them” . We will be presenting you with such evidence
against interest, not only by Republika Srpska co-President Mrs. Plavsi ć when she decided to plead
guilty before the ICTY, but also in heedless pr oclamations filled with ambitious and murderous
hatred by leaders of this genocide, without realiz ing in the least the legal implications of their
braggadocio.
39. For example, during a public speech to the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, on
18-19 July 1994, the then President Radovan Karadzić announced “our first strategic goal: to drive
our enemies by the force of war from their homes, th at is, the Croats and Muslims, so that we will
66
no longer be together in a state” . The ICTY has heard direct testimony that Karadzi ć also said,
67
“We will use this Serbian-supported war machine to make life impossible for civilians . . .” In an
intercepted telephone conversati on of 12October 1991, speaking of the Muslim population,
Karadzić said, “they will disappear, that people will disa ppear from the face of the earth . . . They
do not understand that there would be bloods hed and that the Muslim people would be
68
exterminated.” Co-PresidentPlavsi ć has confirmed that, by October 1991, she and the
leadership ⎯ in her words ⎯ “knew and intended that the separation of the ethnic communities
would include the permanent removal of ethnic populations, either by agreement or by force
65
Id., para. 61.
66Dr.Donia Expert Report pp.3-4; UNICTY Prosecutor v. Milosević, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, case
No. IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004, para.241.
67UNICTY Prosecutor v. Milosević, id. para. 240.
68UNICTY Prosecutor v. Milosevi ć, id. para. 241; exhibit 613, tab88 (intercepted communication with
Gojko Djogo, dated 12 October 1991). - 36 -
and... that any forcible removal of non-Serb s from Serbian-claimed territories would involve a
69
discriminatory campaign of persecution” .
40. Can one imagine words from principal actor s in this genocide that could more clearly
disadvantage the State on whose behalf they were speaking? And that that State, for whom and
with whom these leaders worked so intimately, hand-in-glove? In July 1991, Mr. Babić, a leader of
the Serb-breakaway Republika Srpska Kra jina, had a conversation with Milosevi ć and Karadzić in
which the Bosnian Serb leader develops his plans to bring about their grand design of Greater
70
Serbia, and Milosević warns Babić not to get in Karadzi ć’s way . He meant: let Karadzi ć do his
dirty work without hindrance. By his own words you will appreciate the total involvement of
Milosević and his cohorts in Belgrade’s massacre of non-Serbs in Bosnia.
7. The evidence of facts and the findings of law of the Yugoslav Criminal Tribunal
41. I would like next to discuss the evidence of facts and findings of law of the Yugoslav
Criminal Tribunal, although I will do so briefly b ecause it is the subject of much more discussion
on my part tomorrow. Throughout these pleadings, we will be referring to the jurisprudence of the
ICTY and, to a lesser extent, the ICTR. My colleague, Ms Magda Karagiannakis, will next speak
of the Yugoslav Criminal Tribunal’s procedures. It will be obvious that much of what we, and the
world, know about the horrors of Srebrenica and th e siege of Sarajevo, and much else, has become
known due to the meticulous investigations, and tena cious judicial trial and appellate processes of
these chambers. Both tomorrow and on Thursday I will be discussing in far more detail that
jurisprudence.
42. These decisions will be seen to be partic ularly helpful in clarifying what the Genocide
Convention means by requiring proof of “an intent to destroy”, what is meant by “destroy”, what is
meant by the Convention’s requirement of a demonstration that the intent to destroy was directed at
the destruction of the group “in whole or in part” and, finally what was meant by requiring proof
that the project of destruction aimed at destroying the group “as such”. As to each of these difficult
legal points we now have, as we did not in 1993, a rich jurisprudence which I will be summarizing.
69
UNICTY Prosecutor v. Plavsić, Factual Basis for Plea of Guilty, case No. IT-00-39 & 40, 30 September 2002,
para. 10.
7UNICTY Prosecutor v. Milosević, id., para. 253. The warning is not to “stand in Radovan’s way”. - 37 -
43. Permit me a moment to summarize what I have said today: the facts of this case have
had the benefit of an extraordinary period ⎯ almost a decade and a half ⎯ of fermentation. They
have been established by the most credible s ources of the international system. The multiple
findings overlie and overlap one another and they are entirely confirmatory, each of all. They have
been openly reported, ventilated, exposed to deba te, cross-examination, investigative reporting and
judicial as well as political decision making. There are no surprises here, although there may still,
perhaps, be astonishment and, to the extent the world has retained its c
apacity to feel, there may
still be horror.
44. But while all the evidence is there, either explicitly or implicitly, it has never been fully
exposed before this Court. This body, uniquely the “conscience of humanity” can speak for that
conscience. It, uniquely, has an opportunity to put together the myriad facts, total them up,
proclaim the sum. That sum is genocide. Not the genocide of individual miscreants ⎯ that is the
task of the ICTY ⎯ but the genocide for which the State must take responsibility.
45. Serbia so far has not done so. It remains responsible until it squares itself not only with
Bosnia but with a world that has such a high-st akes interest in the Genocide Convention’s still
fragile capacity to protect us all.
Thank you, Madam President. I now ask you to give the floor to Ms Magda Karagiannakis.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Franck. I call Ms Karagiannakis.
Ms KARAGIANNAKIS:
1. Madam President, Members of the Court. This is the first time I appear before you, and
may I begin by saying that it is a great honour to appear before this Court.
2. During the course of Bosnia and Herzegovina ’s oral pleadings, the Court will be referred
to sources emanating from numerous United Nations bodies including the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 71.
71
Hereinafter ICTY or Tribunal. - 38 -
3. The purpose of this pleading is to address si gnificant aspects of the criminal process at the
United Nations ICTY. This will be done in order to explain why materials from this source may be
considered as credible and reliable and therefore may be of assistance to this Court.
4. The independent United Nations Tribunal has spent more than ten years investigating and
making extensively referenced and reasoned factual findings on specific topics of relevance to the
case before this Court, that is, the events that occurred in the former Yugoslavia from 1991. It has
done so using the conservative methods of its criminal investigative, trial and appellate process. Of
course, evidentiary sources coming from the ICTY are delimited by factors including the temporal
and territorial scope of particular cases. Nevertheless, the World Court may be assisted by the facts
originating from this source, when considering the broader questions that it is faced with.
5. As the Court is aware, Bosnia has made use of publicly available ICTY sources in its
Reply. The weight that they should be accorded has been addressed in those written pleadings, and
72
has been addressed today .
6. Since the filing of our Reply, a significant body of materials has emanated from the ICTY.
While much of the work of the Tribunal, as it relates to Bosnian Serb a nd Serbian defendants is
irrelevant to this case, we have sought to limit ourselves by referring to the most pertinent
materials. In general, it is safe to say that the Tribunal has confirmed and amplified the evidence
and the facts set out in our Reply.
7. The public ICTY materials that may be of help to the Court include:
⎯ indictments and pre-trial briefs;
⎯ Rule 61 decisions;
⎯ trial judgments;
⎯ evidentiary sources from trial proceedings;
⎯ decisions on motions for acquittal;
⎯ sentencing judgments;
⎯ appeals judgments; and finally,
⎯ adjudicated facts.
72
Chapter 3, Section 2, paras. 30-41. - 39 -
A. Indictments and pre-trial briefs
8. The ICTY process begins with an investigation conducted by the Prosecutor 73. During an
investigation the Prosecutor may question suspects, victims, witnesses, collect evidence and
conduct on-site investigations. The Prosecutor may also seek the assistance of any State authority
or relevant international body. Usually, this is done to obtain documents. At all times, States are
74
obliged to co-operate with the Tribunal .
9. If the Prosecutor believes that there is a prima facie case, she prepares an indictment
75
containing a concise statement of the facts and the crimes with which the accused is charged .
76
The indictment is brought before a si ngle judge, along with supporting materials . These
materials are made up of individual pieces of evid ence, usually in the form of witness statements
and documents, which support each of the specific allegations in the indictment.
10. An indictment is then submitted to a j udge. The reviewing judge examines each of the
counts of the indictment, with the supporting materials, in order to determine whether a prima facie
77
case exists against the accused . A prima facie case for this purpose is made out if there is
evidence, if accepted and not contradicted by the accused, upon which a reasonable finder of fact
78
could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused . If the indictment passes
this test then it is confirmed and an arrest warrant is issued.
11. In sum, indictments constitute a source of facts that have been substantiated by evidence,
tested by a judge and found to be proven to a prima facie standard.
12. The main indictments to which we refer th e Court are those of officials of the FRY, who
are indicted for participating in crimes in Bosnia and whose trials have not commenced, or have not
yet concluded. They include the indictments against:
⎯ Slobodan Milosović;
73
Article 18 of the Statute of the ICTY (“Statute”) and Ru le 39 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the
ICTY (“Rule” or “Rules”).
74
Article 29 of the Statute.
75
Article 18 (4) of the Statute.
76Rule 47 (B).
77Article 19 (1) of the Statute and Rule 47 (E).
78
ICTY Prosecutor v. Milosević, Decision on Application to Amend Indictment and on Confirmation of
Amended Indictment, case No. IT-99-37-I 29 June 2001, para. 3. - 40 -
79
⎯ General Momcilo Perisić, who was the Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army ;
⎯ Jovica Stanisić, who was the Chief of the State Security Service of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Republic of Serbia ⎯ this is otherwise referred as the Serbian DB ⎯ and
Franki Simatović, the Commander of the Special Operations Unit of the Serbian DB 80.
13. After an indictment is confirmed and before the trial begins, the accused will be provided
with the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief 81. This document summarizes and refers to the evidence from
the investigation of the defendant, which is the basis of the indictment.
B. Rule 61 decisions
14. I now move to the source of Rule 61 decisi ons. The next ICTY source that this Court is
referred to is Rule 61 decisions. Rule61 provid es that if, within a reasonable time, a warrant of
arrest has not been executed in relation to an indictment, a judge who confirmed the indictment can
invite the Prosecutor to report on the measures taken to execute the warrant. If the judge is
satisfied that all reasonable steps have been take n to secure the arrest of the accused, a judge can
order that the indictment be submitted by the Prosecutor to the trial chamber.
15. The Prosecutor then submits the indictment to the trial chamber in open court, together
with all the evidence that was before the judge who initially confirmed it. The Prosecutor may also
examine any witness whose statemen t has been submitted to the confirming judge, before the trial
chamber.
16. If the chamber is satisfied on that evidence, that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment, it shall
so determine and an international arrest warrant will be issued.
17. A Rule 61 decision is one step further than a confirmed indictment in terms of veracity.
These proceedings are presented to three judges as opposed to one. Furthe r, the evidence of the
witness is heard orally as opposed to being contained in a statement. Accordingly, the judges have
79
ICTY Prosecutor v. Perisić, Amended Indictment, case No. IT-04-81, 26 September 2005.
80ICTY Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanisić and Franki Simatovi ć, Amended Indictment, case No. IT-03-69,
9 December 2003.
81Rule 65ter. - 41 -
an opportunity of observing the demeanour of th e witness. The judges th en produce a written and
reasoned decision.
18. Rule 61 proceedings are a discretionary procedure. They were initiated at the Tribunal in
its early years when there were few accused pe rsons in custody. As time progressed and more
indictees were arrested and brought to trial, the focus of the Tribunal’s resources went to trials and
appeals.
19. The most notable Rule 61 decision, to wh ich the Court has already been referred in our
Reply, is the Rule 61 decision in the Karadzić and Mladi ć case which dealt with the charges of
genocide against these two notorious Bosnian Serb leaders 82.
C. Trial judgments
20. The next source is trial judgments. One of the more important Tribunal sources that may
assist the Court is factual findings from trial judgments of the ICTY. These factual findings
provide a wealth of materials that may be very relevant to the Court’s task in this case.
21. The overriding burden of the Bench when conducting a trial at the ICTY is to ensure that
the trial is “fair and expeditious and that proceed ings are conducted in accordance with the rules of
procedure and evidence, with full respect for th e rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses” 83.
22. The rights of the accused, which the chamber is bound to protect, are enumerated in
Article21 of the Tribunal Statute. This Article incorporates minimum guarantees set out in
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They include:
⎯ the accused’s right to a fair and public hearing;
⎯ the presumption that the accused is innocent until proven guilty; and
⎯ the accused’s right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf.
23. These basic principles are actually put into practice in the criminal proceedings before
the trial chambers. Even before the trial pro cess begins the accused is provided with extensive
82
ICTY Prosecutor v. Karadzić & Mladić, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, case No. IT-95-5/18,
11 July 1996.
83Article 20. - 42 -
pre-trial disclosure including the supporting materials to his indictment and relevant witness
statements. He is also provided with the pre-trial brief summarizing the evidence against him.
24. Significantly, the accused is provided with evidence or information which may exculpate
84
him . He is, through his counsel, empowered to electronically access and search the hundreds and
thousands of pages of evidence in the documentary collections of the Prosecutor. These collections
include masses of original documents seized from, or provided by, State, military and civilian
authorities of the former Yugoslavia, including those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika
Srpska and Serbia Montenegro.
25. In addition to all of this material, the defence conducts its own investigations and collects
its own evidence from whatever source it thinks is relevant.
26. It is these materials that the defence uses to test the evidence and the allegations of the
prosecutor during trial. The defence can test the prosecutor’s case through its cross-examination of
witnesses and objections, if any, to the admissibility of documents and other tangible evidence.
27. Madam President, Members of the Court, the actual trials at the ICTY are nearly always
marathons which only increase in length with the bread th of the crime base alleged, the time span
of the crimes and the importance of the accuse d in a military or political hierarchy. The
proceedings usually last months, if not years, and can involve hundreds, if not thousands, of
documentary exhibits and numerous witnesses.
28. A trial chamber seised of a wide-rangi ng case, both temporally and geographically, may
put a time-limit on the presentation of the case. This will usually be done pursuant to the
chamber’s general discretion to ensure an expeditio us trial. In such case s, the prosecutor reduces
the evidence she presents and focuses on critical or exemplary aspects of the charges against the
particular accused in question. In this way the practicalities of ensuring that the accused has a
speedy trial may affect the scope and the volume of evidence that is presented. This of course, in
due course, will affect the scope and breadth of the trial chamber’s final judgment.
29. During the trial, each party is entitled to call witnesses and present evidence 85. Most
importantly the parties’ witnesses are confronted and tested through cross-examination by the
84
Rule 68.
8Rule 85. - 43 -
opposing party. After the parties have finished examining witnesses, the judges will generally ask
questions. In fact, a judge may, at any stage, put any question to any witness.
30. After the parties have finished presen ting their cases, the chamber may then call
additional witnesses or call upon the parties to produce additional witnesses or other evidence 86. In
this way, the judges may seek to get more evidence on issues that have not been answered to their
satisfaction.
31. During the trial, parties may object to the admission of certain documents on grounds
including lack of authenticity or reliability. Such objections are followed by either written or oral
submissions. In some cases evidence is called regarding the authenticity of documents; and finally
the judges will make a decision regarding admissibility.
32. In matters of admissibility the procedure of the Tribunal, with its unique mix of common
law and civil law rules on procedure and evidence, does not purport to conform to any particular
system or tradition. Rather, it is inspired by the need for a fair determination of the matter before
it. The general rules regarding the exclusion of evidence applied in common law systems are not
followed by the trial chambers as a rule. The main reason for this is that these rules were
developed in the context of a system of trial by jury . In a jury trial there is the absolute need to
keep away from the lay jurors, prejudicial material of little or no probative value that may be
difficult for them to remove from their minds. Proceedings before the Tribunal are instead
conducted by professional judges, who, by virtue of their training and experience are able to
87
consider each piece of evidence wh ich has been admitted, and de termine its appropriate weight .
Thus the Tribunal judges follow in the tradition of this Court and have a broad discretion regarding
the assessment of evidence. However, the Tribunal is different from the World Court in that it
applies the highest standard of proof in interna tional litigation, that is, the standard of “beyond
reasonable doubt”. I will address this standard later on in this pleading.
33. The chambers at the Yugoslav Tribunal are not bound by national rules of evidence 88;
however, if there is a lacuna in the rules a chamber may apply principles which will best favour a
86
Rule 98.
87See ICTY Prosecutor v. Oric, Order Concerning Guidelines on Evidence and the Conduct of Parties During
Trial Proceedings, case No. IT-03-68-T, T.Ch. II, 21 October 2004, paras. 7 and 11.
88Rule 89. - 44 -
fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the
general principles of law. The expression “general principles of law” in this context has been
interpreted by the Tribunal as being similar to the expression in Article 38, paragraph 1, (c), of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. As such it has been construed to mean rules accepted
in the domestic laws of all States. Therefore, this provision permits the ICTY chambers to apply
the general principles of municipal jurisprudence if the Tribunal Rules are silent on a particular
issue of evidence 89.
34. Rule 89(C) sets out the basic standard of admissibility of evidence. It states that a
chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value. When
determining whether to admit evidence, it has to c onsider the reliability of evidence because if it is
not reliable, it cannot have either probative value or be relevant to the case 90.
35. Documentary evidence is often tested acco rding to this standard. However, before
documents are even presented for admission by the Prosecutor, a number of steps will be taken to
confirm their authenticity and their relevance.
36. First, the source of the document will be i ndicative of its authenticity. Most often the
document will be sourced to a collection of documents provided by a State or through the execution
of a search warrant on a military or political body of one of the former Yugoslav Republics. Often,
if the document is provided by State authority such as, for example Bosnia and Herzegovina or
Serbia and Montenegro, the documents will have gone through an authentication or verification
process by the State authorities before being prov ided to the ICTY. Second, incoming documents
are read by the ICTY military and/or political an alysts who seek to authenticate them by judging
them against the form and the substance of other documents that are considered to be authentic.
Often the Prosecutor will interview the authors or previous custodians of materials to ensure their
authenticity. When the authenticity is challenged by the defence, the Prosecutor will lead evidence
from these sources and the investigators who sei zed or received the materials in order to
authenticate them.
89
ICTY Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. Celebici , Decision on the Motion to Allow Witnesses K, L and M to Give
Their Testimony by Means of Video-Link Conference, case No. IT-96-21-T, T. Ch., 28 May 1997, paras.8 and 10.
90ICTY Prosecutor v. Blagojević et al., Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Intercept-Related Materials,
case No. IT-02-60-T, T. Ch. I Sec. A, 18 December 2003, para. 14. - 45 -
37. In order for a document to be admitted in to evidence as a trial exhibit, the trial chamber
must be satisfied that it “presents sufficient indicia of reliability to make out a prima facie case” for
91
its admission . Once a document is admitted, the trial chamber maintains a discretion as to what
weight it is to be given in the final judgment.
38. The trial chamber’s discretion regarding the admission of evidence and then, the weight
it is to be accorded in the final judgment, is not unfettered. A chamber may “exclude evidence if
92
its probative value is substantially outweighe d by the need to ensure a fair trial” . Further, if the
evidence is obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is
antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings, the evidence must be
excluded.
39. ICTY trial chambers are permitted to take judicial notice of certain facts. Rule94(A)
states that a “Trial Chamber shall not require pr oof of facts of common knowledge but shall take
judicial notice thereof”. This rule has been used by chambers to take judicial notice of historical
background facts to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
40. In one case judicial notice was taken of
“many public documents which bear substantial authority ⎯ in particular, resolutions
of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, the Final Report of the
United Nations Commission of Expert s, reports of the United Nations
Secretary-General, and declarations and statements from the European Community
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” . 93
In this case judicial notice was taken of general background, political and military facts, regarding
the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
41. Many of these aforementioned United Nati ons documents have been referred to in
Bosnia’s Reply and will be referred to during the course of proceedings. The fact that a criminal
tribunal has taken judicial notice of some of the facts contained in these documents only serves to
bolster their probative value.
91
ICTY Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić , Order on the Standards Governing the Admission of Evidence , case
No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch. II, 15 February 2002, para. 18.
92
Rule 89 (D).
93ICTY Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Judgment, case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para. 90. - 46 -
42. Finally and most significantly, a guilty finding may be reached only when the trial
chamber is satisfied that the guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt 94. This is one of the
cornerstones of the criminal process. It is only when this high hurdle of proof is met that an
accused can be convicted before the Tribunal.
43. The “beyond reasonable doubt” standard is the highest standard of proof in international
litigation95. This standard has been interpreted as m eaning that the judge must reach a finding
based on the highest probability that a certain sequence of acts led to the commission of the crime
by the accused. Therefore, a judge cannot rely on the balance of probabilities but must affirm guilt
by excluding all other reasonable possibilities. The transparency of this pr ocess is ensured by the
96
duty to render a reasoned decision .
44. This standard has been confirmed and clarified by ICTY case law, specifically in relation
to the high standard of proof applied to cases based on circumstantial evidence. The Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY has held:
“A circumstantial case consists of evidence of a number of different
circumstances which, taken in combination, point to the guilt of the accused person
because they would usually exist in combination only because the accused did what is
alleged against him... Such a conclusion must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not sufficient that it is a reasonable conclusion available from that
evidence. It must be the only reasonable conclusion available. If there is another
conclusion which is also reasonably open from that evidence, and which is consistent
97
with the innocence of the accused, he must be acquitted.”
45. In conclusion, Madam President and Members of the Court, it may be said that trial
judgments of the ICTY are reliable and credible. The trial process requires a strict adherence to the
principles and procedures of fair trial. The trial chamber applies a high standard of proof to the
evidence before it. In doing so, it must assess th e testimony of persons directly involved in the
events in question and of experts. That test imony will have been tested through the rigorous
cross-examination by experienced counsel and ques tioning from the Bench. Documents must also
be tested before they are admitted and then the appropriate weight must be assigned to them in light
94Rule 87 (A).
95
C. F. Amerasinghe, Evidence in International Litigation, 235-239 (2005).
96S. Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings 97-100 (2005) and Rule 98 (C).
97ICTY Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. Judgment, case No. IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, para. 458. - 47 -
of all the evidence. This is all done by a Bench of three professiona l, independent judges
experienced in assessing large amounts of factual and technical evidence.
D. Evidentiary sources from trial proceedings
46. Madam President, Members of the Court, we will also be referring to evidentiary sources
from the trial proceedings. These will include public exhibits, witness testimony and expert reports
that have been admitted into evidence during trial.
47. This will be done in situations where pa rticular proceedings are ongoing and there is no
final merits judgment. There are two major ongoi ng trials at the ICTY that have particular
relevance to your deliberations. The first is the case of Momcilo Krajisnik. He was the Speaker of
the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, a member of the joint presidency of the Republika Srpska,
during 1992 and the right-hand man to Radovan Karadzić. He has been charged with genocide for
the events in Bosnia during 1992. The other and mo st relevant trial in progress at the moment is
the case of Slobodan Milosević. He is charged with genocide in relation to the crimes that occurred
in northern and eastern Bosnia, Sarajevo and Sr ebrenica, covering the time period from 1992 to
98
1995 .
48. The particular evidence to which the Cour t will be referred by Bosnia will have passed
the admissibility threshold and may be considered re liable, especially if it is consistent with other
reliable evidence which has already been presented for your consideration.
E. Decisions on motions for acquittal
49. Decisions on motions for acquittal are ye t another source to which reference will be
made. At the close of the Prosecutor’s case and be fore the opening of the defence case, the trial
chambers usually hear a defence application asking the chamber to enter a judgment of acquittal on
all or some of the counts of the indictment on the basis that there is no evidence capable of
supporting a conviction. After hearing the parties, the trial chamber will render a decision.
9ICTY Prosecutor v. Krajisnik , case No. IT-00-39 and 40 and ICTY Prosecutor v. Milosevi ć,
case No. IT-02-54-T. - 48 -
50. Thus, even before the end of the trial and at the end of the prosecu
tion case, the
sufficiency of the evidence is assessed by a trial chamber 99.
51. The test for determining whether the eviden ce is insufficient to sustain a conviction is:
whether there is evidence upon which a tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused on the particular charge . This test is not whether the trier of fact would
actually arrive at a conviction beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecution evidence, but whether it
100
could do so .
52. There are two decisions on motions for ac quittal which may be most relevant the Court
101
in this case. The first and most important one comes from the Milosevi ć case and the second
one comes from the Krajisnik case 102. Madam President, Members of the Court, in both of these
cases, the respective trial chambers have found that there was sufficient evidence upon which a
tribunal of fact could be satisfied that genocid e was committed in certain municipalities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and that both accused could be found guilty of this.
F. Sentencing judgments
53. Additional sources of facts from the ICTY which will be presented are sentencing
judgments. Among the potentially helpful sentenci ng judgments are those made in respect of
persons who have pleaded guilty. In these cases, the sentencing judgment is accompanied by a
statement of the defendant’s agreed facts, which underlie his or her plea of guilty.
54. A guilty plea must be voluntary and informed . It will not be accepted by a trial chamber
unless it is satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused’s
participation in it, either on the basis of independent indicia or on the lack of any material
disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case 103.
99
Rule 98bis.
100ICTY Prosecutor v. Jelisić, case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 37.
101ICTY Prosecutor v. Milosevi ć, Decision on motion for Judgment of Acquittal , case No. IT-02-54-T,
16 June 2004, para. 183.
102Prosecutor v Momcilo Krajisnik , Judgment on the Defence Motion for Acquittal under Rule98 bis, case
No. IT-00-39-T delivered orally on Friday 19 August 2005, transcript pp. 17128-17130.
103Rule 62bis. - 49 -
55. In satisfying itself, the chamber can obtain direct testimony from the accused and can
also question him in order to clarify ambiguities 104. If it is satisfied with the facts which underlie
the plea, the chamber will proceed to a sentencin g hearing. This may also include witness
testimony and other evidence which speaks to th e crimes which have been committed and other
factors which may aggravate or mitigate sentence.
56. There have been an increasing number of guilty pleas in the Tribunal which may be
worthy of this Court’s consideration. Those who have admitted their guilt include:
⎯ army officers such as Dragan Obrenovi ć and Momir Nikolić, who pleaded guilty in relation to
the events surrounding the Srebrenica massacre and the mass forcible transfer;
⎯ camp commanders and guards such as Dragan Nikoli ć, with respect to Susica camp in
Vlasenica municipality, and Goran Jelesić for his role in Luka Camp in Brcko; and
⎯ municipal officials such as Stevan Todorović and Blagoje Simić, regarding the ethnic cleansing
of Bosanski Samać and the detention of Muslims in that municipality.
57. There are two accused who have pleaded guilty that merit particular attention. The first
is Miroslav Deronjić. He was the President of the Serbian Democratic Party, otherwise referred to
as the SDS, and subsequently of the Crisis Sta ff, in Bratunac municipality. He worked with
Bosnian Serb leaders and organs of the SFR Y to commit crimes against humanity upon the
non-Serb people in his municipality. Accordingl y, his sentencing judgment and related facts and
testimony are pertinent to this case 105.
58. Finally and most significantly, this Court will be presented with the sentencing judgment
and agreed facts of Mrs.Biljana Plavsi ć, a member of the collective presidency of the Republika
Srpska during 1992 and a close associate of Radovan Karadzi ć. She agreed that she participated in
a joint criminal enterprise, along with officials and organs of the FRY, to persecute Muslims across
37 municipalities in Bosnia during 1991 and 1992. Th e goal of this persecution was to achieve the
ethnic separation of Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia by force. As such, the factual findings in the
106
judgment and Mrs. Plavisić’s agreed facts are certainly relevant to the issues in this case .
104
See ICTY Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, case No. IT-02-61-S, 30 March 2004, para. 29.
10ICTY Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, case No. IT-02-61-S, 30 March 2004.
10ICTY Prosecutor v. Plavsić, Sentencing Judgment, case no. IT-00-39 and 40/1, 27 February 2003 and ICTY
Prosecutor v. Plavsić, Factual Basis for Plea of Guilt, case no. IT-00-39 and 40, 30 September 2002. - 50 -
G. Appeals Chamber judgments
59. I now move to the source of Appeals Ch amber judgments. As in all fair criminal
systems, there is a right of appeal. The results of such appeals are reflected in detailed and
reasoned Appeals Chamber decisions issued by the fi ve judges of the ICTY Chamber. Bosnia will
be referring the Court to Appeals Chamber judgments: obviously, these judgments count among
the most reliable of the ICTY sources.
60. Article 25 of the ICTY Statute allows both convicted persons and the Prosecutor to
appeal (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or (b) an error of fact which has
occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The Appeal s Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the
decisions taken by the trial chambers.
61. An appeal in the Tribunal is not a retrial. The Appeals Chamber will in principle only
take into account the following factual evidence: evidence referred to by the trial chamber in the
body of the judgment or in a related footnote; evidence contained in the trial record and referred to
by the parties; and additional evidence admitted on appeal 107.
62. With respect to errors of fact, the party a lleging this type of error must provide evidence
both that the error was committed and that this occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The Appeals
Chamber has regularly pointed out that it does not lightly overturn factual findings because first
instance courts are in a better position than the Appeals Chamber to assess witnesses’ reliability
and credibility and determine the probative value of the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals
Chamber will not call the findings of fact into question where there is reliable evidence upon which
the trial chamber might reasonably have based its findings.
63. Where a party contends that a trial cham ber has made an error of law, the Appeals
Chamber, as the final arbiter of the law of the Tr ibunal, must determine whether such an error of
substantive or procedural law was in fact made . However, the Appeals Chamber is empowered
only to reverse or revise a trial chamber’s decision when there is an error of law invalidating it.
Therefore, not every error of law leads to a reversal or revision of a decision of a trial chamber 108.
107
ICTY Prosecutor v. Plaskić, Judgment, case No. IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para. 13.
10ICTY Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. , Judgment, case No. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, paras.11, 12
and 38. - 51 -
H. Judicial notice and adjudicated facts
64. Another source of factual findings from the ICTY is a special category of facts that have
been adjudicated at one or more trials and have b een confirmed on appeal or not appealed at all.
Thus these facts have been tested and upheld in the ICTY and are of the highest order of reliability.
This category of factual findings is referred to as adjudicated facts.
65. In this case a trial chamber may, “at the request of a party or proprio motu, . . . decide to
take judicial notice of adjudicated facts or doc umentary evidence from other proceedings of the
Tribunal relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings” 109. While trial chambers may take
judicial notice of factual findings in other cases they may not take judicial notice of the legal
characterization of the facts.
66. By taking judicial notice of an adj udicated fact, a trial chamber establishes a
well-founded presumption for the accuracy of the fact , which therefore does not have to be proven
again at trial. However, the adjudicated fact may, subject to that presumption, be challenged at that
trial.
67. Three basic requirements should be met before a trial chamber may consider a fact as
adjudicated. First, the fact must not be the subject of a reasonable dispute between the parties.
Second, the said fact must have been the subject of adjudication in the previous case and not based
upon agreement between parties in previous procee dings or a plea agreement. Finally, the facts
from a previous judgment must not have been appeal ed or, if subjected to appeal, they must have
been upheld by the Appeals Chamber 110 .
68. A pertinent example of an adjudicated facts decision by a trial chamber has been made in
the Krajisnik case 111. In that case the chamber took judicial notice of hundreds of adjudicated facts
relating to the following topics: the role of th e JNA in Bosnia, the takeover of Prijedor and the
camps in that municipality, the takeover of Foca and the detention facilities and sexual assaults in
that municipality and finally the takeover of Visegrad municipality.
109Rule 94 (B).
110ICTY Prosecutor v. Milosevic , Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial
Chamber’s 10April2003 Decision on Prosecu tion Motion for Judicial Notice of Ad judicated Facts, IT-02-54-AR73.5,
28 October 2003.
111ICTY Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Decision on Third and Fourth Prosecu tion Motions for Judi cial Notice of
Adjudicated Facts, IT- 00-39-PT, 24 March 2005. - 52 -
Conclusion
69. In conclusion, Madame President and Memb ers of the Court, the Tribunal materials that
have been referred to and the factual findings in judgments in particular, are subjected to multiple
stages of rigorous testing by the parties and ultimat ely by the trial and appeals judges of the ICTY.
This testing has been conducted according to th e thorough and conservative standards of the
Tribunal’s criminal process. As such, these sources may be considered as credible and reliable and,
therefore, may be of great assistance to the Court in this case.
70. Madam President, that concludes my pleadings on this topic. I see that I have concluded
earlier, and I apologize for that. However, it may be a good opportunity to have an early lunch?
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Ms Karagiannakis. I understand from that last
remark that the next pleadings of Bosnia and Herzegovina will begin after the lunch break. The
Court will now rise and resume at 3 p.m.
The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.
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Public sitting held on Tuesday 28 February 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding