Public sitting held on Wednesday 6 June 2007, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

Document Number
124-20070606-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2007/18
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected

CR 2007/18

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LAAYE

YEAR 2007

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 6 June 2007, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Higgins presiding,

in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2007

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 6 juin 2007, à 16 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,

en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presieitgins
Vice-Presi-nhtasawneh

Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren

Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka

Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna

Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Fortier
Gaja

Registrar Couvreur

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident

RanMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren

Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka

Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna

Skjoteiskov,
FortiMr .
jugesaja, ad hoc

Cgeffrerr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassa dor of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,

as Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Chairman of the International
Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit interna tional, Distinguished Fellow, All Souls College,

Oxford,

Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Research Associate, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht
University,

Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,

Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Irene Blázquez Navarro, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,

MsTania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

MsNadine Susani, Doctor of Public Law, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris X-Nanterre,

as Assistant Advisers.

The Government of Colombia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Ambassador,

as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Ambassador of Colombia to the Kingdom of
theNetherlands; member of the Permanent C ourt of Arbitration and former Minister for

Foreign Affairs,

as Co-Agent;

Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel, member of the Bars of the State of New York, the District of Columbia,
and the Supreme Court of the United States of America; member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; member of the Institute of International Law,

Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar; member of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration; member of the Institute of International Law, - 5 -

Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Carlos José Arguëllo Gómez, ambassad eur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme agent et conseil ;

M.Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, président de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Distinguished

fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,

M. Alex Oude Elferink, research associate à l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer de
l’Université d’Utrecht,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,

M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad autónoma de Madrid,

comme conseils et avocats ;

Mme Irene Blázquez Navarro, docteur en droit in ternational public, Universidad autónoma de

Madrid,

Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua aux Pays-Bas,

Mme Nadine Susani, docteur en droit public, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Université de Paris X-Nanterre,

comme conseillers adjoints.

Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, ambassadeur,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, ambassad eur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, ancien ministre des affaires

étrangères,

comme coagent ;

M. Stephen M. Schwebel, membre des barreaux de l’Etat de New York, du district de Columbia et
de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
membre de l’Institut de droit international,

Sir ArthurWatts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Cour

permanente d’arbitrage, membre de l’Institut de droit international, - 6 -

Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris II; member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; member of the Institute of Inte rnational Law; member of the Académie des

Sciences Morales et Politiques (Institut de France),

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, member of the International Law Commission,

Mr. Rafael Nieto Navia, former Judge of the In ternational Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;
former Judge of the Inter-American Court of Hu man Rights; member of the Permanent Court

of Arbitration; member of the Institute of International Law,

Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Inte rnational Law, Deputy Chief of Mission of the
Colombian Embassy at Madrid, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of
Colombia,

Mr. Enrique Gaviria Liévano, Professor of Public International Law; former Ambassador of
Colombia and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations; former Chairman of the
Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly; former Ambassador of Colombia to

Greece and to the Czech Republic,

Mr. Juan Carlos Galindo Vacha, former Deputy In spector-General before the Council of State,
National Head of the Civil Registry,

as Advocates;

Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in

the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Juan José Quintana, Minister Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia,

Ms Mirza Gnecco Plá, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia,

Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,

Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia,

Ms Daphné Richemond, member of the Bars of Paris and the State of New York,

as Legal Advisers;

Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,

as Technical Adviser;

Ms Stacey Donison,

as Stenographer. - 7 -

M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite de l’Université de Paris II, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de l’Académie des sciences

morales et politiques (Institut de France),

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,

M. Rafael Nieto Navia, ancien juge du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, ancien
juge de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, membre de la Cour permanente

d’arbitrage, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit international, chef adjoint de mission à
l’ambassade de Colombie au Royaume d’Espa gne, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,

M. Enrique Gaviria Liévano, professeur de droit international, ancien ambassadeur de Colombie,
ancien ambassadeur et représentant perman ent adjoint auprès de l’Organisation des
NationsUnies, ancien président de la Sixi ème Commission de l’Assemblée générale de

l’Organisation des Nations Unies, ancien ambassadeur de Colombie en Grèce et en République
tchèque,

M. Juan Carlos Galindo Vacha, ancien inspecteur général adjoint auprès du Conseil d’Etat de la

République de Colombie, chef du bureau de l’état civil,

comme avocats ;

Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ministre plénipotentiaire à l’ambassade de Colombie aux Pays-Bas,

M. Juan José Quintana, ministre-conseiller, ministère des affaires étrangères,

Mme Mirza Gnecco Plá, conseiller, ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, conseiller, ambassade de Colombie aux Pays-Bas,

Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, premier secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères,

Mme Daphné Richemond, membre des barreaux de Paris et de l’Etat de New York,

comme conseillers juridiques ;

M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,

comme conseiller technique ;

Mme Stacey Donison,

commseténographe. - 8 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today to begin hearing the second

round of oral argument. Colombia will present its reply today and Nicaragua on Friday at 10 a.m.

Each Party has two hours at its disposal.

I can I believe immediately give the floor to Professor Weil.

M. WEIL :

1. Madame le président, me conformant aux souhaits que vous avez exprimés, je me

contenterai de répondre à quelques points spécifiques soulevés par nos adversaires.

2. Madame le président, Messieurs les j uges, pour commencer, j’évoquerai l’argument du

Nicaragua selon lequel les exceptions préliminaires de la Colombie appellent un examen au fond et

ne sont donc pas recevables. Cet argument, qui figurait déjà en abondance dans les écritures du
1 2
Nicaragua est revenu à nouveau dans ses plaidoiries orales . Je me vois donc contraint d’y revenir

moi aussi ⎯ mais, rassurez-vous, je le ferai brièvement.

3. Madame le président, la Colombie ne dema nde à la Cour rien d’autre que de remplir la

mission que lui confie le pacte de Bogotá. C’ est le pacte de Bogotá lui-même, et non pas la

Colombie, comme l’insinue la Partie adverse, qui prévoit que lorsqu’est en cause une question

«déjà réglée au moyen d’une entente entre les pa rties» et régie «par des accords ou traités en

vigueur à la date de la signature» du pacte (art.VI), la Cour doit se déclarer incompétente et doit

déclarer le différend terminé (art.XXXIV). Que cette mission, la Cour peut et doit la remplir

maintenant, au stade des exceptions préliminaires, cela est également prescrit en toutes lettres par le

pacte de Bogotá en son article XXXIII. Il est à peine besoin d’ajouter que le Nicaragua a négocié,

signé et ratifié toutes ces dispositions ⎯en particulier je le répè te les articlesVI, XXXIII

et XXXIV. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, la Colombie n’a rien inventé : tout ceci est

dans le pacte !

1OEN, Introduction, p.6, par.11; p.11, par.1.1; p.20,par. 1.23 ; p. 32-33, par. 1.46 ; p. 49, par. 1.88 ; p. 60-
61, par. 2.23 ; p. 74, par. 2.54 ; p. 79, par. 2.62 ; p. 79-81, par. 2.63 ; p. 143, par. 4.6 ; p. 134-136, par. 4.8 ; p. 136,
par. 4.9.

2
CR 2007/17, p. 27, par. 17 ; p. 28, par. 18 (Pellet) ; p. 46, par. 61, 63 (Brotóns). - 9 -

3
4. S’il était vrai, comme le soutient le Nicaragua , qu’en déclarant le différend terminé la

Cour se prononcerait sur le fond, les articles XXXIII et XXXIV du pacte de Bogotá ne trouveraient

jamais à s’appliquer : Comment, en effet, la Cour pourrait-elle jamais se prononcer «au préalable»

sur l’existence d’un différend, comment pourrait-elle jamais déclarer un différend terminé si un tel

prononcé devait, par lui-même, être regardé co mme relevant du fond? L’interprétation que

propose le Nicaragua des articles VI, XXXIII et XXXIV du pacte revient à dénier toute substance à

ces dispositions du pacte et à les rendre inopérantes.

5. Bien qu’il semble faire reproche à la Colombie que «les questions qui se posent à [la

Cour] ne sont pas des problèmes de compétence mais de fond» 4, le Nicaragua consacre de longs

5
développements à des problèmes de fond . Cette distinction entre le fond et la forme dont il fait

tant de cas, le Nicaragua la néglige à nouveau lorsqu’il énonce que «[s]i la Cour acceptait ce que la

Colombie demande, en réalité, elle n’admettrait pas une exception pr éliminaire à sa juridiction,

mais elle se prononcerait en faveur de la Colo mbie sur le fond du différend dont le Nicaragua l’a

6
saisie» . Madame le président, contrairement aux a llégations de nos adversaires, les exceptions

préliminaires de la Colombie portent sur la compétence et ne portent que sur la compétence.

6. Madame le président, je voudrais à présent m’ arrêter un instant sur l’existence et la portée

du différend ⎯ pour reprendre l’excellent intitulé du prof esseur Pellet. Dans chaque affaire portée

devant le juge international, un moment arri ve où l’on est amené à s’interroger sur le but

stratégique poursuivi par la partie adverse, sur ce qu’elle recherche vraiment au travers de sa

tactique judiciaire et au travers de ses arguments . Dans notre affaire, Madame le président, ce

moment de vérité me semble arrivé. Nos adversaire s, je dois l’ajouter, nous ont facilité la tâche en

révélant petit à petit, morceau par morceau, ce qu’ils cherchaient à nous cacher au début ⎯ une

partie de strip-tease intellectuel et juridique en quelque sorte, si je puis me permettre une

comparaison aussi irrespectueuse.

3CR 2007/17, p. 36, par. 17 (Brotóns).
4
CR 2007/17, p. 31-32, par. 28 (Pellet).
5CR 2007/17, p. 38, par. 23 (Brotóns) ; p. 28 et suiv., par. 20 et suiv. (Pellet).

6CR 2007/17, p. 36, par. 18 (Brotóns). - 10 -

7. Dans ses observations écrites relatives aux exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la

Colombie, le Nicaragua reconnaît que le débat qu’il a ouvert autour de la souveraineté sur les îles

est un rideau de fumée destiné à cacher le véritable enjeu de la bataille judiciaire qu’il a entamée, à

savoir la délimitation maritime. Que c’est bien la délimitation maritime qui constitue l’objectif réel

du Nicaragua, cela ressort d’innombrables passages de ses observations écrites : le paragraphe 1.46,

par exemple (p.32), ou le paragraphe 1.48 (p.33), ou le paragraphe 1.50 (p.34), ou le

paragraphe 1.54 (p. 35), ou le paragraphe 1.55 (p. 36), ou le paragra phe 2.44 (p. 69). Et plus aucun

doute n’est permis, plus le moindre doute n’est possible sur les objectifs réels du Nicaragua

lorsqu’on lit au paragraphe3.38 (p.106) de ses observations écrites cet aveu formidable: «The

core of the dispute relates to the maritime delimitation between the Parties.» On pourrait croire à

un lapsus si on ne lisait pas quelques pages plus loin que «the issue of title is not the subject-matter

of the dispute but a necessary prerequisite» 7; ou que, encore «the very subject-matter of the

present dispute is the maritime delimitation of th e respective maritime areas belonging either to

Colombia or to Nicaragua» 8 ; ou encore, que «the very subject-matter of the dispute is the

delimitation of the respective maritime areas on which Colombia and Nicaragua have

9
jurisdiction» . Et hier matin, mon ami le professeur Pellet a confirmé que la demande

nicaraguayenne d’une délimitation maritime «impliq ue et englobe toutes les autres», qu’elle est

«centrale dans la requête et le mémoire du Nicara gua». Quant à la «question du titre territorial»,

a-t-il ajouté, elle n’est pas abordée dans les écritures nicaraguayennes «en tant que telle» 10. «[L]es

questions de souveraineté sur les îles et les rochers ⎯a-t-il encore déclaré ⎯ sont à la fois

11
l’accessoire et le préalable à celle de la délimitation maritime.»

8. Madame le président, le Nicaragua dema nde à la Cour le rejet de ces exceptions

préliminaires ⎯ espérant peut-être que dans une phase ultérieure consacrée au fond ⎯, la Cour lui

accorde une frontière maritime, plus favorable que celle du méridien de 82 o, convenue en

1928-1930. Ce que le Nicaragua attend et espère de son action devant la Cour, me semble-t-il,

7 OEN, p. 108, par. 3.44.
8
Ibid., p. 112, par. 3.53.
9
Ibid., p. 115, par. 3.63.
10CR 2007/17, p. 22-23, par. 6-7 (Pellet).

11CR 2007/17, p. 24, par. 10 (Pellet). - 11 -

c’est une frontière maritime autre que celle du méridien de 82 o qu’il a fixée d’un commun accord

avec la Colombie en 1930 et qui a été respectée par les deux parties pendant des années et des

années.

9. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, le Nicaragua a soumis à la Cour une thèse

complexe et contradictoire, faite d’alternatives et de subsidiaires, de retraites successives. Les

paragraphes 2.18 et suivants (p. 59 et suiv.) de ses observations écrites sont révélateurs à cet égard :

⎯ Dès sa conclusion, soutient le Nicaragua, le traité de 1928 n’était pas valable.

⎯ S’il était valable au moment de sa conclusion, continue le Nicaragua, il est devenu caduc

depuis lors du fait de sa violation par la Colombie.

⎯ De toute manière, poursuit le Nicaragua, ce traité ne couvre pas Roncador, Quitasueno,

Serrana, Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo.

⎯ Quoi qu’il en soit, continue toujours le Nicar agua, ce traité ne concerne que la terre, à

l’exception de toute juridiction maritime.

⎯ Les divergences qui font l’objet de la présente affaire, soutient le Nicaragua, n’étaient pas

apparues à la date de la conclusion du pacte de Bogotá.

⎯ Et, de toute façon, conclut le Nicaragua, les questions soulevées touchent au fond, et la Cour ne

peut pas les résoudre au présent stade des exceptions préliminaires.

10. Madame le président, dans sa requête, le Nicaragua demande à la Cour de dire que le

Nicaragua a la souveraineté sur l’archipel de San Andrés et de déterminer le tracé d’une frontière

12
maritime unique . La souveraineté n’a pas à être établie , elle a déjà été reconnue; aucune ligne

n’a à être tracée, elle est déjà tracée.

11. Ni la lettre ni l’objet du pacte de B ogotá ne peuvent conduire la Cour à rouvrir

aujourd’hui un différend réglé il y a soixante-dix ans. Remettre en cause ce traité qui régit les

relations des parties depuis soixante-dix ans c onstituerait un précédent dangereux pour la stabilité

des relations internationales fondée sur le princi pe du respect des traités. Comme la Cour l’a

déclaré dans l’affaire relative au Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/ Slovaquie) :

«La Cour établirait un précédent aux e ffets perturbateurs pour les relations

conventionnelles et l’intégrité de la règle pacta sunt servanda si elle devait conclure

12
Requête du Nicaragua, par. 8. - 12 -

qu’il peut être unilatéralement mis fin, au motif de manquements réciproques, à un

traité en vigueur entre Etats, que les parties ont exécuté dans une très large mesure et à
un coût considérable pendant des années.» ( Arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p.68,
par. 114.)

12. Madame le président, la Cour sait que la question maritime a été discutée et réglée

en1928-1930 pour que soit mis fin complètement et définitivement à tout différend entre les

deuxpays, sur mer comme sur terre. La Cour sai t qu’une disposition protectrice a été introduite

en l948 dans le pacte de Bogotá en vue de parer à toute tentation ou à toute tentative d’utiliser les

procédures du pacte pour rouvrir une controverse an térieurement réglée. La Cour n’acceptera pas,

nous en sommes confiants, que la plus haute juridiction du monde moderne soit utilisée comme un

instrument de déstabilisation des relations internationales. Pacta sunt servanda, me suis-je permis

de rappeler ⎯ tout comme j’ai rappelé qu’il doit y avoir une fin à tout conflit ⎯ ut finis sit litium.

Voilà, Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, le véritable enjeu de la présente affaire.

13. Madame le président, loin de chercher à se soustraire à la compétence de la

13
Cour ⎯comme l’en a accusé bien à tort l’agent du Nicaragua ⎯ la Colombie demande

respectueusement à la Cour de donner plein effet aux dispositions du pacte de Bogotá et d’exercer

pleinement sa compétence et ses pouvoirs dans le ca dre et dans les limites de ce qui est prévu par

ce traité.

14. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, arrivé au terme de mes observations dans la

présente affaire, je voudrais vous dire ma très pr ofonde gratitude pour la patience dont vous avez

fait preuve à mon égard. Merci.

15. Je vous prie, Madame le président, de vouloir bien donner la parole à mon ami,

M. Stephen Schwebel.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Weil. I now call Mr. Schwebel.

13
CR 2007/17, p. 17-18, par. 43 (Argüello). - 13 -

SCHr.WEBEL:

P RELIMINARY OBJECTION CONCERNING DECLARATION
UNDER THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE

1. Madam President and Members of the Court, it is my task this afternoon to reply to

arguments made by the distinguished counsel of Nicaragua, Mr. Brownlie and Professor Pellet, that

treat the second preliminary objection of Colombia.

Termination of optional clause declarations

2. In respect of the question that took up mo re than half of Mr.Brownlie’s presentation,

namely, whether the jurisprudence of the Court actually requires that a State terminating its

adherence to the optional clause may do so only after a reasonable time, Colombia believes that

there is no need to elaborate on what it said in ipreliminary objections and, very briefly, in the

opening round of these hearings. The question has b een sufficiently canvassed. In any event, it is

not of cardinal importance for the judgment that the Court will make on Colombia’s preliminary

objections.

The practice of the Parties

3. That is so, because the relate d issue that is of cardinal importance is whether, in point of

fact and of law, both Colombia and Nicaragua have acted to terminate or modify their acceptances

of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on notice an d without the lapse of a reasonable time. The

evidence that they have so acted is substantial.

4. Now, did they so act because they were of the view that they were legally entitled to do

so?

5. Speaking for Colombia, I can officially stat e that, in terminating its 1937 adherence to the

Court’s compulsory jurisdiction with immediate effect, Colombia in 2001 did so because it was

convinced that it was entitled to do so, in accordan ce with the law of the matter. That conviction

was heavily influenced by the fact that, a fe w months before, Nicaragua had modified its

declaration with immediate effect. - 14 -

6. While in this I can speak for Colombia, I cannot speak for Nicaragua. When, in 2001,

Nicaragua modified its declaration with immediat e effect, I cannot say whether it believed that it

acted in accord or in di saccord with the law of the matter. But my Nicaraguan colleagues will not

be offended if I say that it may be presumed that Nicaragua, in so acting, believed that it was acting

lawfully.

7. Now as to this concordant practice of both Colombia and Nicaragua, Mr.Brownlie

maintains that Colombia has constructed a “w eak case resting on the alleged practice of the

Parties”. He maintains that “the evidence of the pertinent intention produced on behalf of

Colombia is very weak indeed . . . The pattern of evidence is obscure and confused.”

8. Really? The pertinent letter of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of 5 December 2001,

reproduced in the judges’ folder at tab 12, states that Colombia’s acceptance of the Court’s

compulsory jurisdiction as formulated in its decl aration of 30October1937 is terminated “with

effect from the date of this notification”, that is, 5 December 2001.

9. What was obscure, weak or confused about that? It could hardly be clearer, stronger or

more straightforward than it was and remains.

10. Moreover, the authors of the Yearbooks of the Court had no difficulty in understanding,

and in correctly recording the import of the termin ation of Colombia’s declaration with immediate

effect, as I showed in my opening statement. What Mr. Brownlie found confusing did not confuse

the Court’s clear-minded Registry. In 1984, Nicaragua argued that the Court’s Yearbooks

contained: “The most authentic public record of the acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of

the Court . . .” If Nicaragua maintains otherwise nowadays, it should explain why.

11. As for Nicaragua’s practice, Mr.Brownlie finds it equally “inconclusive”. He

characterizes the Presidential Decree of 22 October 2001 as “inconclusive”. As is shown at tab 15

of the judges’ folder, that Decree of 22October sets out the reservation that the Republic of

Nicaragua “as of this date, makes to its Declarati on, the text of which is as follows: ‘Nicaragua

will not accept, as of 1 November 2001, the jurisdiction or competence of the International Court of

Justice . . .’”.

12. Madam President, the only inconclusive aspect of the Presidential Decree is whether it is

to take effect “as of this date” or “as of 1 November2001”, that is, as of 22Octoberor - 15 -

1 November. But what is crystal clear is that its effect was meant by Nicaragua to be immediate or

virtually so. Nicaragua’s Presidential Decr ee cannot possibly be construed as to embody

reasonable notice. Mr.Brownlie made much of the good faith inherent in reasonable notice. I

leave it to him to inform the Court of whether or not Nicaragua in this case acted in good faith and

in accordance with the law of the matter, and to explain why, if Nicaragua could validly modify its

declaration with immediate effect, Colombia could not so terminate its declaration ⎯ and do so in

good faith.

13. One last word on Mr.Brownlie’s argum ent. He recalled that on 26September2002

Nicaragua and Costa Rica concluded their standsti ll agreement. He maintained that: “It is

inconceivable that such an agreement would be concluded if the notification of 23 October had had

immediate effect.”

14. But, Madam President, far from it being in conceivable, it may readily be conceived why

Nicaragua may have so acted. Colombia had term inated its declaration with immediate effect.

Nicaragua knew perfectly well that it, Nicaragua, had modified its own declaration with immediate

effect. Yet in view of the Application that it had filed against Colombia on 6December2001, it

felt bound to challenge the effectiveness of Colombia’s termination of its declaration. It may have

belatedly dawned on Nicaragua that to sustain that challenge it would do well to cover the tracks of

its own modification of its declaration with immediate effect ⎯ and hence the standstill agreement

with Costa Rica.

The ratione temporis reservation

15. Madam President, I turn now to the argument of ProfessorPellet on the temporal

reservation to Colombia’s 1937 declaration. For the purposes of analysing his able argument, I

shall assume that Colombia’s declaration rema ins in force, without prejudice of course to

Colombia’s position that its termination of its declaration took effect before the filing of

Nicaragua’s Application.

16. Colombia’s declaration of 1937 provides th at it applies “only to disputes arising out of

facts subsequent to 6 January 1932”. - 16 -

17. Professor Pellet argues that the dispute before the Court actually arises not out of the fact

of the 1928 Treaty, nor out of the fact of the 1930 Protocol of Ratification of the Treaty, but that

the dispute arises in three, post-1932 ways. He contends, first, that the dispute arises over the

validity of the 1928 Treaty, a problem which only ar ose in the 1970s when Nicaragua recovered its

freedom of action. He argues, second, that a dispute arose over the interpretation of the

1928Treaty in respect of the definition of the Sa n Andrés Archipelago, notably certain insular or

rocky features. And he argues, third, that a dis pute arose over the meaning to be attributed to the

82ºWmeridian, a question that could not have been resolved or even conceived of before 1932

when the then law of the sea did not include the notions of a continental shelf or an exclusive

economic zone.

18. Professor Pellet further argues that each of the cases in the Court’s jurisprudence

interpreting ratione temporis reservations is fact specific. In this he is certainly correct. Whether a

dispute arises out of facts anterior to or subse quent to a particular date must depend on the facts

specifically in point.

19. The Court’s jurisprudence is constant in tying the facts of a case to the “real cause” of the

dispute. Let us look at the three issues raised by Professor Pellet in this light.

20. First, as to the dispute over the validity of the 1928Treaty. Does Nicaragua now

challenge the Treaty’s validity on the ground that it was only in the 1970s that the Sandinista

revolution triumphed? Or does it challenge the Tr eaty’s validity on the ground that, at the time it

was concluded, its conclusion was, as argued yest erday, then “managed” by the United States?

Surely the latter. Nicaragua’s argument is that , in 1928, the United States was in a position to

dominate the policy-making processes of the Nicaragua n Government and that it used its position

to put through the 1928 Treaty for its own purposes. Quite apart from whether that argument is

factually well grounded or not, it is an argument over the facts as they were, or are alleged to have

been, in 1928 ⎯ which is anterior to 1932.

21. Second, Professor Pellet maintains that a dispute over the geographical reach of the

1928Treaty arose in 1969, in particular over whethe r it includes certain insular or rocky features.

But, even if Professor Pellet is correct in so contending, which Colombia does not accept,

ProfessorPellet in so arguing overlooks th e critical consideration: that it is not when the dispute - 17 -

arose that matters. What matters under the Colomb ian temporal reservation is whether the dispute

arises out of facts anterior to 1932. The facts on this count certainly antedate 1932. The Treaty

was agreed upon in 1928. It specifies its reach “over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia,

SantaCatalina and all the other isla nds, islets and cays that form part of the said Archipelago of

San Andrés” and provides that three named cays are not considered to be included in this Treaty,

“sovereignty over which is in dispute between Colombia and the United States of America”. These

are the facts out of which any dispute as to the territorial and geographical reach of the 1928 Treaty

must turn. And these facts are anterior to 1932.

22. Third, Professor Pellet argues that the dispute over the meaning of the limit of the

82º W meridian prescribed by the Protocol of Excha nge of Ratifications is a dispute that could not

have arisen before 1932, because the very concepts of the continental shelf and exclusive economic

zone were then unknown. But again, it is not a qu estion of when the dispute arose, but of whether

the current dispute arises out of facts subsequent to 6 January 1932. The dispute surely arises out

of the facts of Nicaragua’s proposal–– Nicaragua ’s proposal–– to specify that the Archipelago

does not extend beyond the 82º W meridian and Colombia’s agreement to accept that proposal and

entrench it in the Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications of the Treaty. If those facts did not exist,

there could be no dispute about their meaning. The dispute about their meaning may ⎯

arguably ⎯ have been triggered in 1969, but it turns on and arises out of facts anterior to 1932.

The teaching of the Liechtenstein case

23. The Court, Madam President, has shed illu minating light on reservations of a temporal

character in its Judgment of 2005 in the case concerning Certain Property (Liechtenstein v.

Germany). The basis of jurisdiction invoked by the applicant was the European Convention for the

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. It provided that the Convention shall not apply to disputes

“relating to facts or situations prior to the entry into force of this Convention as between the parties

to the dispute”. Germany contended that the key issue was not the date when the dispute arose, but

whether the dispute related to facts or situations that arose before the critical date. Germany argued

that, since the dispute related to facts or situati ons that pre-dated the 1980 entry into force of the - 18 -

Convention, since its “real source” was such facts, the Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court upheld

Germany’s position and dismissed the case.

24. Liechtenstein maintained, as does Professor Pellet now, that the case of Electricity

Company of Sofia and Bulgaria distinguished between the source of the rights relied on by the

claimant and the source of the dispute and that th at distinction was relevant. Germany argued that

the distinction was not relevant, because none of the legal and factual situations that were the real

cause of the alleged dispute involved acts taken after 1980.

25. After reviewing the Judgments in Phosphates in Morocco, Electricity Company in Sofia

and Bulgaria, and the Right of Passage cases, the Court held that regard must be had to the facts or

situations which must be considered as being “the source of the dispute”, its “real cause”. The case

was “triggered” by latter-day decisions of German courts. But, the Court held, “the critical issue is

not the date when the dispute arose, but the date of the facts or situations in relation to which the

dispute arose” (para.48). It concluded that, wh ile the German court decisions “triggered” the

dispute, “the source or real cause of the di spute” was to be found in the pre-1980 Settlement

Convention and the Beneš Decrees. It accordi ngly upheld Germany’s pr eliminary objection and

dismissed the case.

26. Madam President, this most recent and sear ching examination of its jurisprudence on the

question of reservations ratione temporis decisively sustains the position of Colombia. The true

source and real cause of the current dispute, even as Nicaragua would narrow that dispute to one

over maritime limits, is the establishment in 1 930 of the 82ºWmeridian as the limit between

Colombia and Nicaragua. And 1930 antedates 1932.

27. It may be that Colombia’s 1969 Note protesting a Nicaraguan grant of oil exploration

permits east of the meridian triggered what Nicaragua claims is a post-1932 dispute. But the

source or real cause of the dispute remains and would have to be found in the 1930 Protocol, a legal

instrument that in the instant case duplicates th e role that the Settlement Convention and the

BenešDecrees filled in the Liechtenstein case ( Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 6).

28. Professor Pellet’s argument understandabl y said little of this case, presumably because

its teaching is so hard to reconcile with his anal ysis. But in the submission of Colombia, the Court - 19 -

was right to dismiss the claim of Liechtenstein. It would be as right now to dismiss the claim of

Nicaragua.

Madam President, please give the floor to Sir Arthur Watts.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Schwebel. I now call Sir Arthur Watts.

Sir Arthur WATTS:

G ENERAL NATURE OF C OLOMBIA ’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
AND NICARAGUA ’S COMMENTS ON THEM

1. Madam President and Members of the Court, it is as well, at this point, just to remind

ourselves what this case is about. Coun sel for Nicaragua told us yesterday 14that it was about

maritime delimitation. But it is not, Madam President.

2. The scope of this case is, as the Court has often held, defined by the terms of Nicaragua’s

Application. Nicaragua’s concerns are reflected in its two requests to the Court: first, to declare

that the San Andrés Archipelago belongs to Ni caragua; and second, to determine the maritime

boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia.

3. Let me just also remind the Court of the ear ly political geography of the area by referring

to the sketch-map at tab 2 in the judges’ folder, and now again on the screen.

The exclusively preliminary character of Colombia’s objections

4. To the Application presented by Nicara gua Colombia has presented two preliminary

objections. And these are “preliminary objections”, i. e., objections which have to be disposed of

before the Court addresses the merits.

15
5. Now Nicaragua suggested that in some way it was inappropriate for Colombia to make

preliminary objections, since it was simply a way of avoiding having disputes dealt with by the

Court. But, Madam President, it is trite law that this Court’s jurisdiction is based on consent. As

the Court has said: “An essential point of legal pr inciple is involved here, namely that a party

should not have to give an account of itself on issues of merits before a tribunal which lacks

14
CR 2007 / 17, p. 22, para. 5; p. 30, para. 26; p.31, para. 27 (Pellet).
15CR 2007 / 17, p. 8, para. 3; p.20, para. 50 (Argüello); p. 20, para. 1; p.32, para. 28 (Pellet). - 20 -

16
jurisdiction in the matter . . .” It is Colombia’s right ⎯ and even duty ⎯ to draw to the attention

of the Court circumstances which show that its consent is lacking. That is what Colombia’s

preliminary objections are ⎯ an exercise of legal rights in a c ontext which is central to the Court’s

jurisdiction.

6. But what ⎯ in practice ⎯ does the making of preliminary objections mean for the way

the parties plead to them, and for the way the Court has to address them?

7. So far as the parties are concerned, it does not mean ⎯ as Nicaragua frequently

17
suggests ⎯ that the parties are precluded from touching upon issues which may also need to be

explored in greater detail in a merits phase, if there is one.

8. Preliminary objections cannot be ⎯ and in practice never are ⎯ argued in a void,

removed from all factual context. And that fact ual context may well have to touch on issues the

full exposition of which will come later when ⎯ and if ⎯ the merits phase is reached.

9. One example will suffice. States frequently raise objections ratione temporis ⎯ i.e., that

the case submitted to the Court arises out of circumst ances occurring before some significant date.

Such objections are a regular feature of cases before the Court ⎯ very recently, Germany raised

such an objection in a case brought by Liechtenstein 18, as Mr. Schwebel has recently reminded the

Court, and Colombia raises such an objection in this case. Those objections cannot be argued,

Madam President, without reference to the facts on which the case turns. And ⎯ as the Court’s

Judgment in Liechtenstein v. Germany clearly shows ⎯ the Court itself cannot dispose of the

objection without reference to the underlying facts.

10. This need for parties to refer, at the pr eliminary objections phase, to matters which may

also have to be developed at a later merits ph ase, if any, was expressly recognized by the Court’s

predecessor. The Permanent Court acknowledged that consideration of preliminary objections may

19
necessitate “touch[ing] upon subjects belonging to the merits of the case” .

11. More recently, this Court has itself echoed this view. It has said

16
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 56.
17CR 2007 / 17, p.8, para.4 (Argüello); p. 31, par.28 (Pellet); p.45, para.60 (R emiro); p.61, para.17 (Pellet).

WSN, Introduction, para. 11, paras. 1.46, 1.88.
18Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.6.

19Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 6, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6,
p. 15. - 21 -

“many cases before the Court have shown that although a decision on jurisdiction can
never directly decide any question of mer its, the issues involved may be by no means
divorced from the merits. A jurisdictional decision may often have to touch upon the
20
latter or at least involve some consideration of them” .

12. The same applies, Madam President, to Nicaragua’s repeated suggestions that it is

inappropriate at this stage to consider questions of treaty interpretation: such questions, it is said 21,

are for the merits.

W1e3l.l ⎯ sometimes, perhaps: but by no means necessarily, or always. There are many

examples. Thus, this Court has frequently interpreted Article36 of the Statute in the course of

disposing of objections based on the terms of opti onal clause declarations. In the present case, the

Court, as part of this preliminary objections phase, will have to form a view as to the meaning of

the Pact of Bogotá. And perhaps in part the Es guerra-Bárcenas Treaty also. All of this is proper

material for preliminary objections: none of it involves trespass on the merits.

14. Madam President and Members of the Court, the key to the proper scope of argument on

preliminary objections lies in the Court’s eventual decision. Article 79 of the Rules gives the Court

three options ⎯ to reject the objections, to uphold them, or to “declare that the objection does not

possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character” ⎯ i.e, it may join

them to the merits.

15. The Permanent Court itself said that for an objection to be characterized as preliminary it

must be “submitted for the purpose of excluding an examination by the Court of the merits of the

case”, and that it must be one “upon which the Court can give a decision without in any way

22
adjudicating upon the merits” .

16. And it is with the foregoing judicial guida nce in mind that Colombia approaches its task

in arguing its preliminary objections. If they are upheld ⎯ as Colombia submits that they should

be ⎯ the Court will be unable to proceed to a consid eration of the merits of Nicaragua’s claims:

like it or not, that is how the international judicial system works.

20
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 46, at p. 56.
21
CR 2007/17, pp.30-31, para. 26 (Pellet).
22Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, Preliminary Objections, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 76, p. 22. - 22 -

Nicaragua’s response to Colombia’s preliminary objections

17. Let me go back, Madam President, to Nicaragua’s Application, and Colombia’s

Objections.

18. The dispute submitted by Nicaragua as defined by its Application concerns sovereignty

over the Archipelago of San Andrés, and the maritime boundary between Colombian and

Nicaraguan territory.

19. Colombia’s Objections are that both matters were settled and governed by the

Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty of 1928/1930 and that therefore the Court has no jurisdiction under the

Pact of Bogotá; and, secondly, that the Court equally has no jurisdiction under the optional clause

because Colombia’s declaration has been term inated, and because in any event Nicaragua’s

Application concerned a dispute arising out of facts occurring before 1932.

20. Those Objections are clearly properly made as preliminary objections. And taken at face

value, they are compelling. There was a Treaty of 1928/1930; it did settle and govern both the

sovereignty and the maritime delimitation issues; and Colombia’s optional clause declaration was

withdrawn and the dispute does arise out of pre-1932 facts.

21. But, of course (and quite naturally), Nicar agua does not take Colombia’s Objections at

face value. Let me go quickly through ⎯ and demonstrate the inadequacy of ⎯ the steps by which

Nicaragua seeks to avoid the “face value” conclusi on to which Colombia’s Objections inevitably

lead. And in doing so, Madam President and Memb ers of the Court, it will become apparent that

all Nicaragua’s contentions can be dismissed without trespassing on issues properly belonging to

the merits.

23
22. Nicaragua’s first recourse is to say that the 1928-1930 Treaty is null and void .

Originally two grounds for this conclusion were advanced ⎯ violation of Nicaragua’s Constitution,

and Nicaragua’s lack of treaty-making capacity during the period of American occupation and

control.

23. We heard little about the constitutional ar gument on Tuesday. That is just as well ⎯ a

Constitution which did not identify particular territories and islands as part of Nicaragua can hardly

be “manifestly” violated in the eyes of other States by a treaty dealing with some particular

23
WSN, pp. 12-21, paras. 1.3-1.24; CR 2007/17, p. 22, para. 5 (Pellet); p. 13, paras. 23-25 (Argüello). - 23 -

territories ⎯ especially when those territories are in the eyes of the other State part of its sovereign

territory and not of Nicaragua’s.

24
24. But we did hear more of the “American control” argument . We were told that from the

1920s Nicaragua was effectively under the contro l of the United States and had no independent

25
treaty-making capacity ⎯ until, that is, Nicaragua regained its full national sovereignty in 1979 .

So, Madam President, no treaty-making capacity from the 1920s to 1979.

25. Really?! No United Nations Charter? No Statute of the Court? No Organization of

American States Charter? No Pact of Bogotá? No optional clause declarations? No 1971 Treaty

with the United States abrogating the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty? And so on, through all of

Nicaragua’s international acts over half a century? Those consequences of Nicaragua’s “American

control” argument are alone sufficient to show that the argument is totally untenable. There is no

need to have a discussion on the merits in order to conclude that that argument is inherently

flawed ⎯ and, moreover, has been advanced far too late in the day to be lawfully made ⎯ also a

consideration which has nothing to do with the merits.

26. In fact, Madam President and Members of the Court, Nicaragua has painted itself into a

corner with this argument. If “American control” deprived Nicaragua of the capacity to conclude

the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty of 1928-1930, it also deprived Nicaragua of the capacity to have

made its optional clause declaration of 1929 and to have become a party to the Pact of Bogotá ⎯

and as a consequence, the two titles on which Ni caragua relies as the basis for the Court’s

jurisdiction in this case must equally be null and void!

27. Nicaragua’s next argument which we heard on Tuesday 26was based on Colombia’s

alleged 1969 breach of the 1928-1930 Treaty, which is said to have given rise to a right for

Nicaragua to terminate the Treaty. At least this argument admits that the Treaty was in force in

1969, and therefore also when the Pact of Bogotá was concluded in 1948.

24
CR 2007/17, p. 10, para. 14; p. 11, para. 15 (Argüello); p. 38, para. 23 (Remiro).
25
WSN, pp. 15-21, paras. 1.15-1.24.
2CR 2007/17, pp. 13-14, paras. 26-27 (Argüello); p. 34, para. 10; p. 43, para. 46; p. 44, para. 49 (Remiro). - 24 -

28. But on Tuesday Nicaragua said that the breach lay in Colombia having, out of the blue as

it were, invented a maritime dimension to a treaty which was about territory 27. Leaving aside the

question whether a mere interpretation of a treaty can ever amount to a breach of the treaty giving

28
rise to a right of termination , Nicaragua’s argument is simply wrong in so far as its treats the

1928-1930 Treaty settlement as solely a territorial matter (and this is a recurring theme in

Nicaragua’s arguments).

29. Madam President, you will recall the texts which I put on the screen on Monday ⎯ tab 8

in the judges’ folder and on the screen again now. The texts show the differences in the references

to the dispute in the original Treaty and in the later Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications:

territorial dispute in the former but question in the latter. Yes, the 1928 Treaty dealt only with

territories, but the 1930 Protocol ⎯ an integral part of the whole settlement and registered along

with the Treaty ⎯ specifies the necessary maritime dimension. And as has been explained very

fully29, the maritime element in that Protocol was added specifically at Nicaragua’s initiative and to

meet Nicaragua’s wishes. Indeed ⎯ as our learned opponent, Professor Brotóns, reminded us just

30
yesterday ⎯ the Nicaraguan Congressional Decree approving the Treaty refers to it as putting an

end to “the matter pending” between the two States 31.

30. It may be convenient for Nicaragua to forget about the 1930 Protocol, and Colombia can

understand why Nicaragua might feel embarrassed by it, but it was agreed, at Nicaragua’s

initiative, and it is a very relevant fact which cannot simply be ignored as Nicaragua seems to wish.

31. Nicaragua also said that this Colombian interpretation of the Treaty as having a maritime

dimension was not only a distortion of the essentially territorial treaty, but it was not revealed as

32
being Colombia’s view until 1969 . Colombia’s view regarding the maritime line, however, was

clear right from the time of the 1931 official map to which Nicaragua made no objection. And

Colombia had no occasion to make its views known in writin g before the events of 1969 simply

27CR 2007/17, p. 13, para. 26; pp. 13-14, para. 27 (Argüello); pp. 38-45, paras. 26-45 (Remiro).
28
POC, p. 70, para. 1.116.
29
POC, pp. 40-51, paras. 1.51-1.71; pp. 92-104, paras. 2.41-2.62; CR 2007/16, pp. 21-23, paras. 25-35 (Pellet);
pp. 35-36, paras. 10-13 (Remiro).
30CR 2007/17, pp. 40-41, para. 36 (Remiro).

31MN, Vol. II, Ann. 19, p. 55 [Nicaraguan translation into English].

32CR 2007/17, p. 11, para. 18 (Argüello). - 25 -

because until then there had neve r been any Nicaraguan transgressions across the 82º W meridian,

and thus no occasion for any written assertion of the line’s boundary status. This fact demonstrates

Nicaragua’s acceptance until then of the line’ s status, and Nicaragua’s “acquiescence” which

precludes it from now invoking the breach (even if there were one ⎯ which there was not) as a

ground for terminating the Treaty.

32. Nicaragua’s claim that a Colombian breach of the Treaty gave Nicaragua a right to

terminate the Treaty carries with it two consequences. First, any termination would operate only

in futuro, not ab initio: so the Treaty’s effectiveness up to at least 1969 is not in question. Second,

while a breach may give rise to a right of termina tion, that right has to be exercised. Manifesting

disagreement with the other party’s interpretation is not the same as a formal notice of

33
termination . But Colombia has received no such formal notification of termination.

33. Nicaragua’s next argument in its array of arguments seeking to extricate it from the

compelling legal logic of Colombia’s preliminary objections, is to say that, even if the

Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty were fully in force, it does not mean what Colombia says it means.

34. So, we are told 34, it was only a territorial treaty, not a maritime treaty at all.

35
MadamPresident, I have already explained why that argument is simply ⎯ on its face, and

without any trespass on the merits ⎯ unfounded. If one wishes to ignore part of a treaty

settlement, one is free to do so: but one must not then describe the remaining part of the treaty as if

it were the whole treaty. The 1930 Protocol is there, it is part of the final treaty settlement, and its

language, agreed to by Colombia, reflects Nicaragua’s concerns.

36
35. We were also told that the cays of Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana were not part of

the Archipelago. I will not repeat what Colombia has said elsewhere 37 to explain why precisely the

opposite conclusion follows from the terms of Article I of the Treaty. It is again on the screen, and

at tab 7 (a) in the judges’ folder.

33Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art. 65.1.
34
CR 2007/17, p. 39, para. 32 (Remiro).
35
Paras. 27-30 above. See also CR 2007/16, p. 22, paras. 29, 31; p. 23, paras. 33, 37; p. 24, para. 38 (Pellet).
36CR 2007/17, p. 24, para. 10; p. 27, para. 17; p. 28, para. 20 (Pellet).

37POC, pp. 53-56, paras. 1.76-1.88; CR 2007/17, pp. 18-20, paras. 18-22 (Argüello). - 26 -

36. I will, though, just ask a question: in a treaty which was dealing with outstanding

territorial problems between Colombia and Nicaragua, and particularly with the Archipelago of

SanAndrés, why should those three islands be men tioned at all if they were not part of the

Archipelago? And to answer my own question, they were mentioned simply to make clear that the

parties were not purporting, in accordance with the rest of Article I, to allocate sovereignty over the

islands as part of the Archipelago ⎯ which was something they could not do because, as they

recognized, they were in dispute between the United States and Colombia ⎯ not, I emphasize,

Nicaragua. The position of those three cays was clearly governed by the terms of Article I.

37. This argument about the inclusion of those three islands in the Archipelago is based, I

would note, simply on the terms of the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty. No new argument on the merits

is involved ⎯ the Treaty’s terms dictate the conclusion which has to be drawn.

38. What else new does Nicaragua have to say about the Archipelago? Not much, although a

point was made about Foreign Minister Holguín’s description of the Archipelago as far back as

38
1896 . But the importance of his statement was the express inclusion in the Archipelago of the

more distant cays which Nicaragua contends are not part of it. Thus he expressly mentioned as part

of the Archipelago the cays of Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, as well as Roncador, Quitasueño and

Serrana. That has consistently been Colombia ’s public understanding of the extent of the

Archipelago for over a century.

The non-existent alleged “rounds of negotiations”

39. Madam President, Nicaragua’s final argument in its attempt to escape from Colombia’s

Preliminary Objections was developed at somewhat greater length than some of the others. It was

designed to show that Colombia itself did not belie ve that the matters now in dispute had already

been settled. Colombia, it was said, had been ready to negotiate on those matters, and had indeed

39
made three attempts to do so .

40. Two considerations stand out. First, a willingness to negotiate on a given matter ⎯ even

if there were such a willingness ⎯ does not mean that the matter is not already the subject of an

38
CR 2007/17, p. 19, paras. 47-48 (Argüello).
3WSN, pp. 40-48, pp. 1.70-1.84. CR 2007/17, pp. 14-16, paras. 32-40 (Argüello). - 27 -

agreed settlement. It could just as well mean ⎯ and in diplomatic practice often does mean ⎯ that

the parties are willing to reconsider the earlier agreed settlement and see whether they can improve

upon it. Nicaragua admits that none of what it a lleges were attempts to reopen negotiations came

to any conclusion: and this is fully consistent with the matter in question simply staying settled as

it previously was.

41. But the second consideration is the more impor tant. It is simply incorrect to say that

there were any rounds of negotiations on matters which are now before the Court. Colombia

consistently regarded the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty as having settled the matters it dealt with, and

took no steps, and did nothing, to suggest that that settlement was anything other than a definitive

agreed settlement of the matters then in dispute.

42. Nicaragua has presented a different story. Although Nicaragua is now setting aside the

40
affidavits which it had submitted , it still constructs its version of events by other dubious means.

I regret to say that it has done so by misrepresen ting things said by Colombian representatives, by

distorting records which it has placed before the Court in purported support of its views, and by

giving only a partial account of the context in whic h certain events occurred. Let me substantiate

this in more detail.

43. Nicaragua pretends that there were three so-called rounds of negotiations ⎯ in 1977,

1995 and 2001. Let us see what they amounted to.

44. The first alleged negotiations were said to have taken pl ace in February 1977, between

former Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Montiel Argüell o and Mr.Julio Londoño, then an official in

41
the Colombian Foreign Ministry .

45. Indeed, Mr.Londoño did travel to Managua in 1977. But only once and he stayed for

just two days. And his purpose was to find ways to prevent the recurrence of incidents that had

been taking place along the 82°W meridian, not at all to renegotiate that settled line. In fact,

Mr. Londoño reiterated that the 82° W meridian wa s the maritime limit between the two countries

and that Nicaragua should accept it. He never again met with Mr. Montiel Argüello.

40
CR 2007/17, p. 15, para. 32 (Argüello).
4CR 2007/17, p. 14, para. 32 (Argüello). - 28 -

46. The Agent of Nicaragua went on to say 42 that the “nature and existence” of this alleged

round of negotiations were verified by remarks made by the then President of Colombia,

Mr. Alfonso López Michelsen in March 1977. And, for this, Nicaragua’s Agent relied on part of a

press statement made by President López at the end of a visit to a crafts fair in Costa Rica. He was

answering questions posed by waiting journalists on a wide range of topics. The excerpt which

Nicaragua submits to the Court reads as follows: “We aspire to reach agreements by direct

negotiation on delimitations not only with Nicarag ua but also with Venezuela which is more

43
difficult . . .”

47. But President López was referring to Ni caragua’s purported disavowal, since 1969, of

the 82°W Meridian established as a limit in the 1928/1930 Treaty. He was not saying that he

wanted to negotiate a new limit. He was only say ing that he hoped that the differences caused by

Nicaragua’s rejection of the limit established in 1930 at the 82° W Meridian, could be resolved by

direct negotiations.

48. The distinguished Agent of Nicaragua next referred to certain discussions agreed to in

44
1995 by then Presidents Ernesto Samper and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro .

49. By way of an affidavit full of inaccuraci es and misrepresentations by then Nicaraguan

Foreign Minister Ernesto Leal, Nicaragua refe rs to certain discussions over lunch with the

Colombian Foreign Minister Rodrigo Pardo in 1995 . The Ministers had a varied agenda for the

meeting they wanted to arrange, which included di scussing the positions of the parties with regard

to the 82°W meridian and recommending measures in order to prevent incidents along the

boundary.

50. The purpose of the prospective meeting was explained in an op-ed article by Mr. Pardo

published on 10September 1995 in the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo . Unfortunately,

Nicaragua omits to provide the Court with an English translation of the full version of

MinisterPardo’s article: instead it furnishes a mutilated translation as Annex4 to its Written

Statement.

42
CR 2007/17, p. 15, para. 33 (Argüello).
43
WSN, Vol.I, p.41, para.1.68. The cited quote ends th ere, but in fact continues “because of the shape of the
Gulf of Venezuela and the ‘Monjes’ Islands”, Vol. II, Ann. 12, p. 31.
4CR 2007/17, p. 15, para. 34 (Argüello). - 29 -

51. The full version shows that, on the 82° W meridian, Mr. Pardo stated:

“Colombia has upheld that the meridian not only constitutes a reference with
regard to sovereignty over the islands, cays and banks that are part of the Archipelago
of San Andrés, but that it is also the maritime limit between the two states. Our

country has peacefully and uninterruptedl45exercised its jurisdiction and sovereignty
up to the aforementioned meridian.”

52. On the intended scope for the contemplated discussions, he said:

“ Naturally, it is not about analysing and discussing Colombia’s sovereignty
over the archipelago of San Andrés , backed by multiple historical and legal titles

within the framework of international law, nor about the maritime areas that
correspond to it.

Neither will the legal force or characteristics of the 1928 Treaty, by which
Nicaragua recognised the evident fact that the archipelago of San Andrés belongs to

Colombia, be discussed.” (Emphasis added.)

53. Most importantly, however, Madam Presi dent, the proposed meeting never took place.

The Colombian Government declined to participate in the contemplated discussions because of the

tendentious declarations by Nicaraguan officials claiming that negotiations would be opened for an

alleged maritime delimitation with Nicaragua. They were clearly falsifying the true purpose behind

Colombia’s willingness to hold discussions and in so doing, they indeed triggered, as the Agent of

Nicaragua pointed, an “outcry in certain political-military sectors of Colombia that there should be

no negotiations with Nicaragua” 46.

54. So much, then, for the non-negotiations of 1995.

55. As regards the alleged negotiations in 2001, the Agent of Nicaragua downplays their

47
importance . And it was, I must stress, a meeting requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of

Nicaragua, and not by Minister Fernández de Soto. The last part of the meeting as described in the

affidavit of Aguirre Sacasa was admitted by the Agent of Nicaragua to be just a personal opinion

48
and not a “statement of fact” . Colombia wishes to reaffirm that that account of the meeting is

45
WSN, Vol.II, Ann.4, p.13, contains the extracts selected and translated by Nicaragua. However, pursuant to
Article 50, paragraph 2, of the Rules of C ourt, the complete original text in Spanish has also been furnished to the Court
by Nicaragua and hence communicated to Colombia, in accordance with Article 52, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court. It
is to this latter text that Colombia refers.
46
CR 2007/17, p. 16, para. 37 (Argüello).
47CR 2007/17, p. 17, para. 40 (Argüello).

48Ibid. - 30 -

utterly false: Colombia forcefully rejects it, not just the “personal opinion” of Mr. Aguirre but also

the “facts” adduced in the first part of that affidavit.

56. At that informal encounter, requested (I stress) by the Nicaraguan ⎯ not the

Colombian ⎯ Foreign Minister, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister informed the Colombian

Minister that his Government had decided to bring the “matter” with Colombia before the

International Court of Justice. For his part, Minister Fernández de Soto stated that the Government

of Colombia was prepared, from the legal and politi cal standpoint, to defend its legitimate rights.

Nothing remotely in the nature of a negotiation upon an already-settled matter occurred.

57. So, Madam President, these three alleged rounds of negotiations prove to be no more

than mirages. It is absurd to suggest that meetings of this character could be considered as “rounds

of negotiations” to modify the common boundary, thereby showing (it is said) that Colombia itself

did not regard it as settled. On the contrary, if an ything, they show the consistency of Colombia’s

position in demanding compliance with what was established in the 1928-1930 Treaty with regard

to the 82° W meridian.

58. Madam President, I submit for the Court’s consideration the conclusion that, for the

reasons I have given, Nicaragua’s several attempts to escape the application of Colombia’s

Preliminary Objections are demonstrably unavailing.

59. Madam President and Members of the Cour t, I thank you for the patience and courtesy

with which you have once again listened to my stat ement on behalf of the Republic of Colombia.

Might I invite you, Madam President, now to call upon Colombia’s Agent to conclude the

presentation of Colombia’s case.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Arthur. I now call upon the Agent of Colombia.

LMON. DOÑO:

C LOSING STATEMENT AND FINAL SUBMISSIONS

1. Madam President, distinguished judges, of the 32 provinces that make up my country, the

province of the Archipelago of San Andrés, because of its history, location and characteristics, is of

vital importance for Colombia. The 80,000Colomb ians thriving there work in trade, tourism, - 31 -

agriculture and fishing. These activities have be en governed by Colombian laws and regulations

for the last 200 years.

2. Millions of my fellow countrymen and wome n and thousands of foreigners have visited

the islands forming the Archipelago, its ru ral hamlets, the streets of its capital ⎯ also named

San Andrés ⎯ and have enjoyed its modern tourist facilities.

3. Nicaragua’s attempt to appropriate the Archipelago of San Andrés and its appurtenant

maritime areas is deeply offensive to 43 million Colombians.

4. Were Nicaragua’s attempt to reopen a controversy already settled and governed by a treaty

to succeed, it would open Pandora’s box: any State party to the Pact of Bogotá, dissatisfied with

the boundary treaties in force on the date of its c onclusion, would be given a licence to argue the

emergence of a fabricated dispute after that date . This would render the Pact’s provisions devoid

of purpose, with grave implications for regional security and stability.

5. Colombia regrets the allusion, by the di stinguished Agent of Nicaragua, to a statement

made by the President of the Republic of Colombia, Mr. Alvaro Uribe, when asked about

Colombia’s reaction if Nicaragua were to begin o il explorations in the Archipelago’s appurtenant

maritime areas. The President did no more than to maintain that Colombia’s sovereignty and

jurisdiction would be protected a nd its laws upheld. Colombia, for its part, has spared the Court a

statement of its complaints against the dem eaning statements concerning our country and

Government, made by former Nicaraguan Foreign Ministers and Heads of State.

6. Madam President and distinguished judges, in the written and oral pleadings of its

Preliminary Objections, Colombia has shown that:

1. By the terms of Articles VI and XXXIV of th e Pact of Bogotá, the procedure of judicial

settlement set out in Article XXXI may not be a pplied to the controversy raised by Nicaragua,

and the International Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction over it, because

(a) the 1928-1930 Treaty was in force on 30 April 1948, the date of the Pact’s conclusion;

(b) sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and all the

other islands, islets and cays that form part of the said Archipelago of San Andrés is a

matter settled by and governed by the 1928-1930 Treaty; - 32 -

(c) the maritime limit between Colombia and Nicar agua is a matter set tled by and governed

by the 1928-1930 Treaty;

and consequently, the Court must declare the controversy ended.

2. The Court is without jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute to hear the merits

of the dispute raised by Nicaragua because:

(a) the controversy had been declared ended, th ere is no dispute between the Parties to which

Article 36, paragraph 2, can apply;

(b)the declaration of acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction submitted by

Colombia in 1937 was not in force on the date of the filing of Nicaragua’s Application;

and

(c) in any event, by the terms of the reservation contained in that declaration, the Court lacks

jurisdiction over the claims advanced by Nicaragua in its Application because:

(1) the dispute between Colombia and Nicar agua regarding sovereignty over the islands

of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and all the other islands, islets and cays

that form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés, which was settled by and is governed

by the 1928-1930 Treaty, arose out of facts prior to 6 January 1932;

(2)the establishment of the maritime li mit between Colombia and Nicaragua by the

1928-1930 Treaty is a fact prior to 6 January 1932; and

(3) the existence of the 1928-1930 Treaty is a fact prior to 6 January 1932.

Final submissions

Madam President, I will now proceed to read th e final submissions of Colombia, pursuant to

Article 60 of the Rules of Court:

Having regard to Colombia’s pleadings, written and oral, Colombia respectfully requests the

Court to adjudge and declare that

(1) under the Pact of Bogotá, and in particular in pursuance of Articles VI and XXXIV, the Court

declares itself to be without jurisdiction to h ear the controversy submitted to it by Nicaragua

under Article XXXI, and declares that controversy ended; - 33 -

(2) under Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute of the Court, the Court has no jurisdiction to

entertain Nicaragua’s Application;

and that

(3) Nicaragua’s Application is dismissed.

Madam President, I wish to express, on my behalf and that of the Co-Agent of Colombia and

of all the members of our team, our deepest appreci ation to you, and to each of the distinguished

judges, for the attention you have kindly given to our presentation.

May I also offer our thanks to the Court’s Registrar, his staff and to the interpreters.

Thank you, Madam President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. The Court takes note of the final

submissions which the Agent has read on behalf of Colombia. The Court will meet again on Friday

at 10 a.m. to hear the second round of oral argument of Nicaragua. The Court now rises.

The Court rose 5.30 p.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Wednesday 6 June 2007, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

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