CR 2006/9
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Monday 6 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 6 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-Presi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc AhmedMahiou
Kre Milenko ća
Couvrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
AlKh.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MM. Ahmed Mahiou,
KMrilenko ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la fact de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Masters in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Ms Karagiannakis.
KMARs AGIANNAKIS:
P ARAMILITARY UNITS ,VOLUNTEERS AND THE UNITS AND ORGANS
OF THE M INISTRIES OF THE INTERIOR OF THE R ESPONDENT
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, various irregular forces were involved in the
targeting of non-Serbs in Bosnia. They included so -called volunteer units, units of the Ministry of
the Interior of Serbia and other Serbian param ilitary units, and Bosnian Serb paramilitary units.
This morning I am going to address the Court on the role of organs of the Respondent in
controlling, directing and/or supporting these irregular military units. I will also address the
Federal and Serbian Ministries of the Interior and the other means through which they participated
in the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.
A. Volunteers
2. In Bosnia’s Reply we demonstrated that, in the first months of 1992, the ranks of the
“Serbianized” and reorganized JNA were gradually filled up with Serb “volunteers” to make up for
the declining number of conscripts in the JNA. They were engaged in the targeting of the non-Serb
populations of Bosnia. These volunteers were inco rporated into the ranks of the Territorial
1
Defence or the JNA and they were armed and operated under the command of the JNA .
3. Since the filing of our Reply a number of documents have come to light which reinforce
this point and show that, from mid-1991, “volunteer s” were formally incorp orated into the armed
forces of the Respondent, including the Territorial De fence and the Yugoslav army. They are: the
Decree of the Serbian Government on 14August 19 91 on the “Registration of Volunteers in the
Territorial Defence”2. This Decree was followed by the Instructions on Accepting Volunteers into
the Yugoslav army issued by the Federal Secret ariat for National Defence, dated 13September
1991 3. This was, in turn, augmented by the Or der on the Engagement of Volunteers of the
Presidency of the SFRY of 10 December 1991, which stated that the JNA and the Territorial
Reply, pp. 477, 562, 470, 472-473.
2
Exhibit P406, tab 13, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T.
Exhibit P406, tab 14, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T. - 11 -
4
Defence are reinforced by volunteers . In addition, according to Article 39 of the Law on Defence
which was passed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on 18 July 1991, otherwise
referred to as the Serbian Law on Defence, “in case of an imminent war threat and state of
5
emergency, the Territorial Defence could be reinforced by volunteers” . The Presidency of the
SFRY declared an imminent threat of war on 1 October 1991 and this remained in effect until
6
22 May 1992 .
4. According to Radmilo Bogdanovi ć, Serbia’s Minister for Internal Affairs until June 1991
and the President of the Security Council of the former Yugoslavia, Arkan’s so-called notorious
paramilitary group was actually created as a volunteer unit. He said:
“Our national parliament passed the Law on National Defence, with an
amendment according to which volunteer un its could be organized, and put under the
command of the JNA or the Territorial Defence7 Thus Arkan got started. At first with
forty volunteers, later with some more.”
5. These so-called volunteers participated in the ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population
in Serb-claimed areas of Bosnia. For example, as you have already heard, volunteers from Serbia
participated in the ethnic cleansing of Bratunac mu nicipality. Their presence in that municipality
had been agreed upon by the top leadership of the SFRY and the Republika Srpska . 8
B. The Serbian and Federal Ministries of the Interior
6. The Serbian and Federal Ministries of the In terior played a cardinal role in the eventual
ethnic cleansing of Bosnia. Prior to describing this role I shall say a few words about the manner in
which the Ministries of the Interior were organized.
7. In the former Socialist Federation of the Republic of Yugoslavia there were six Ministries
of the Interior, otherwise referred to as MUPs, on the Republic level. They were overseen by the
Federal Ministry of the Interior. After the di ssolution of the SFRY, this federated structure
remained so that there was a Republic of Se rbia MUP, the Serbian MUP, a Republic of
4
Exhibit P387, tab 12, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T.
5
Exhibit P352, tab 24-3, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T.
6Exhibit P151a-1 and P203a, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Strugar, case No. IT-01-42-T.
7Reply, p. 616.
8
Pleading of Laura Dauban 2 March 2006, “Ethnic cleansing on the eastern side of Bosnia and Herzegovina”
(CR 2006/6, pp. 21-23). - 12 -
Montenegro MUP and a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia MUP (FRY MU P). In March 1992 a
MUP for the Bosnian Serbs was established which functioned in the manner of a Republic level
MUP and was eventually called the Republika Srpska MUP 9. Each of these ministries was
responsible for public security and State security . The Serbian MUP was the most powerful of
those ministries and its State Security Service, otherwise referred to as the Serbian DB, was critical
in controlling, directing or supporting various so -called paramilitary formations. JovicaStaniši ć,
was the Chief of the Serbian DB and Frenki Simatovi ć was the Commander of the Special
10
Operations Unit of the Serbian DB . Both of these men have been indicted for their participation
in targeting non-Serbs in Bosnia 11.
8. In its previous written pleadings Bosnia had demonstrated that the Serbian MUP was a
mechanism through which President Miloševi ć and other MUP officials, including Jovica Staniši ć
and Frenki Simatovi ć, controlled the MUP and utilized it to participate in the targeting of
12
non-Serbs in Bosnia . This control has been most recently confirmed by a number of sources.
9. According to the relevant legal provisions, the President of Serbia had authority over the
police forces and personnel of the Serbian MUP. Purs uant to Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Serbian
Defence Law, the President of the Republic could “order use of police in war, during an imminent
war threat and emergency state” 13. Further, Article17 of the Law on Internal Affairs of the
Republic of Serbia passed on 17July 1991 provide d that, during a state of emergency, the MUP
14
was to take the security measures established by the orders and other enactments of the President .
10. The Trial Chamber in the Milošević case has found, in its Decision on the Motion for
Judgement on Acquittal, that President Miloševi ć had both de jure and de facto control over the
15
Serbian MUP and its arm of the State Security Service, the Serbian DB .
9
Pleading of 28 February 2006, Ms Karagiannakis “Politi cal and military preparations” (CR2006/4, p.18,
para. 34.)
10
Reply, p. 597.
11ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Frenki Simatović, case No. IT-03-69, Indictment of
20 December 2005.
12Reply, pp. 597-598; 602.
13Exhibit P352, tab24-3, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T.
14Exhibit P526 tab 21, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T.
15
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, case No.IT-02- 54-T,
16 June 2004, para. 305. - 13 -
11. International diplomats confirmed this cont rol. According to Ambassador Okun, during
meetings and negotiations with members of th e international community, President Miloševi ć was
understood to represent all of the forces opera ting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
16
paramilitary forces .
12. The various forms of involvement of the Se rbian and Federal MUPs in Bosnia have been
set out in our Reply. They included the armi ng of the SDS, the arming of an ethnically pure
Bosnian Serb MUP and the Serbian MUP’s participation in joint operations in Bosnia 17.
13. In our Reply we also have demonstrated that the Serbian MUP participated in the capture
and return of Bosnian Serbs who had crossed the border in order to avoid being conscripted into the
army of the Republika Srpska 18. This activity was denied by the Respondent which stated in its
19
Rejoinder that such allegations are “simply not true” . Despite this denial, these forced
mobilizations have been subsequently confirmed by what we can see of the redacted Supreme
Defence Council minutes. In its seventeenth ses sion, held on 10 and 13 January 1994, the SDC
concluded that its
“decision on sending conscripts to the Republic of Serbian Krajina and
RepublikaSrpska should be implemented on the basis of written requests from the
governments of these two republics. At the request from the police of the two
republics, the MUP of Serbia and Monteneg ro will find and send conscripts who do
20
not respond to call-ups.”
14. The Serbian and Federal Ministries of th e Interior closely co -ordinated intelligence
exchange with the Repulika Srpska MUP. They would exchange information on a daily basis and
would co-ordinate their joint activities. Dragan Kija ć, the Minister of the Interior of the
Republika Srpska (RS) stated, in the 34th Session of the Assembly of Republika Srpska, held from
27August to 1 October 1993, that the National Security Service of the RS MUP “every day
exchanges security information with the Security Service of the VRS, the Republics of Serbia and
16
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, case No.IT-02-54-T,
16 June 2004, paras. 275 and 306.
17
Reply, pp. 597-612.
18Reply, pp. 609-612.
19Respondent’s Rejoinder, p. 562, para. 3.2.1.3.2.
20Minutes from the 17th session of Supreme Defenc e Council (SDC) held on 10/01/1994 and 13/01/1994,
Exhibit 667; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02- 54-T. - 14 -
Montenegro and RSK [Republika Srpska Krajina]” 21. In that same session it was said that
Mico Stanišić, who was the adviser to President Karadži ć and his collaborator, “has the duty of
cooperation between the MUP of Yugoslavia and our MUP, he has his two colleagues who take
care of business up there, and that is under his authority” 22. Thus, these various MUPs were
effectively operating as different organs of a single State.
15. Significantly, the Serbian MUP along w ith Federal MUP and the JNA aided the process
of ethnic purification by organizing, arming, equipping and training the so-called Serbian
23
paramilitaries . Indeed, forces such as Arkan’s men, the Red Berets and the Scorpions were
actually part of the Serbian MUP and others such as Šešelj’s forces were supported by them and
participated in joint operations with them in Bosnia.
C. Forces of the Serbian MUP or those supported by the Serbian MUP
(Red Berets
16. The Red Berets were a unit founded under th e direction of the State Security Service of
24
the Serbian MUP, i.e. the Serbian DB . They were referred to by protected witness B-129 in the
Milošević case as “the special unit of the state security service” 25. This fact is referred to in the
indictment against Stanišić and Simatović 26. President Milošević would read the reports about the
27
activities of the Red Berets . The Red Berets took part in the training of Fikret Abdi ć’s men and
21“The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-95: Highlight s and Excerpts” by Dr. Robert J. Donia submitted
29July 2003; Exhibit No. P 537; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No.IT-02- 54-T, hereinafter “Dr. Donia Expert
Report”, p. 39.
22
Dr. Donia Expert Report, p. 42.
23Reply, pp. 602- 604, 614-625, 632-636, 784.
24ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal , case No.IT-02- 54-T,
16 June 2004, para. 305.
25Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, p. 19420, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
26ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, case No. IT-03-69, Indictment filed on 20 December 2005, para. 3.
27
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal , case No.IT-02-54-T,
16 June 2004, para. 305. - 15 -
with Arkan’s Tigers . They participated in operations in Bosnia including operations targeting the
29
non-Serbs of the Brčko municipality .
(ii)TheScorpions
17. The unit known as the “Scorpions” was de ployed in Bosnia as a unit of the Serbian
MUP.
18. Their history, like that of Arkan’s Serbia n Volunteer Guards and Šešelj’s men, began in
30
Vukovar, where they were led by Slobodan “Boca” Medi ć . According to the Prosecutor at the
31
ICTY, this was done under the auspices of the MUP in Belgrade . In addition, the Scorpions
participated in the special operation called “Pauk” (Spider), which Mr. van den Biesen spoke about
32
on Friday. In fact, Boča and his special unit are directly mentioned in the diary for that operation .
19. The Scorpions have become known for being involved in Srebrenica, and particularly in
relation to the massacre carried out in the woods of Mount Treskavica near Trnovo. Mr.van den
Biesen, during his pleadings on Srebrenica, went into the role of the Scorpions and pointed out that
they were one of the units of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, which was actually mentioned in
Bosnia’s Reply 33. The indictment of Staniši ć and Simatovi ć highlights that the Scorpions were
“ordered” to travel from Croatia , where they were based, to Tr novo and where they were then
under the command of Frenki Simatovi ć, who was running a joint Serbian MUP/State Security
34
command post from Jahorina . The indictment goes on to state that the Scorpions and other
special units attacked Bosnian forces close to Sarajevo, in order to draw them away from
35
Srebrenica and Zepa, in preparation for the planned attacks on the enclave .
28
Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, p. 19546, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
2Testimony of B-1405 at pp. 18156-18157, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54 referred to in the
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal , case No.IT-02- 54-T, 16June2004,
para. 152; Reply, pp. 602-603.
30
Testimony of C-017 given on 11 June 2003, p. 22077, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
3ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, case No. IT-03-69, Indictment filed 20 December 2005.
3Exhibit No. P347, tab 5a, p. 101, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
3Reply, p. 607.
34
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, case No. IT-03-69, Indictment filed 20 December 2005, para. 59.
35
Ibid., para. 60. - 16 -
20. I would like to go through a few documents with the Court which confirm that this unit
was in fact a unit of the Serbian Ministry of the In terior, acting in joint operation with forces of the
Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior in Bosnia (RS MUP), during June and July 1995.
21. The first of these documents is a repor t dated 1 July 1995 from the Special Police
Commander in Trnovo which was sent to the Rep ublika Srpska police forces and MUP. The
document refers explicitly to the Scorpions as a “Ser bian MUP” unit, which is working as part of a
combat group with RS police detachments. It states:
“A combat group consisting of 5th Police Special Detachment and two platoons
each from the Kajman Detachment, the ‘Blu es’ and th36‘Scorpions’ (Serbian MUP)
carried out attacks on the feature of Lucevik.”
22. This is further confirmed by a report from the headquarters of the police forces in Trnovo
dated 24 July 1995, which states: “Night in Tr novo battlefield was calm. ‘Skorpija’, a unit of
Ministry of Interiors of Serbia was replaced by a stand-by police squad from Banja Luka.” 37
23. What this Court saw on the video played last Tuesday was the aftermath of Srebrenica:
the Bosnian Serb forces distributed the Bosnian Muslim prisoners to diffe rent Serb and Serbian
units for the purpose of murdering them. One bus full of prisoners was taken to the base of the
Scorpions at Treskavica, from which about 15 male prisoners were taken from the bus for
execution by members of the Scorpions. Members of the Scorpions took six of the prisoners by
truck to a secluded rural area se veral kilometres from their base. Under the command of Slobodan
38
Medić (Boča), the Scorpions murdered the prisoners by shooting them . Five members of the
Scorpions are currently facing charges for murder in respect of these events, in Belgrade. On
21February 2005, it was reported in the press that one of these accused had admitted that he had
taken part in the murders 39.
36
Exhibit No. P432, tab 16a, ICTY,rosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.T
37
Exhibit No. P432, tab 17a; ICTY,Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T.
38
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, case No. IT-03-69, Indictment filed 20 December 2005, para. 59.
38Ibid., para 62.
39“Scorpions’ member admits to war crime in Srebrenica”, 21 February 2005, Hina, Belgrade. - 17 -
(iii) Arkan’s Tigers otherwise known as the Serbian Volunteer Guard
24. The history of Arkan and his special Volunteer Guard, which is otherwise referred to as
40
Arkan’s Tigers, was set out at length in our Reply . Prior to coming to Bosnia, Arkan, whose real
name was Željko Ražjnatović, and his forces had participated in the ethnic cleansing of Vukovar in
Croatia 41. They then went on to participate in th e most brutal ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in
Bosnia. The United Nations Commission of Expert s stated that, “there were no reports of
paramilitary activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina until early 1992”. The first reports concerned
paramilitary groups supported by Arkan and Šešelj, which were the “the most active paramilitary
42
groups operating throughout the area of the conflict” . Perhaps the most infamous attacks and
ethnic cleansing in which Arkan’s units participat ed, occurred in Bijelina and Zvornik. Arkan’s
units also participated in other parts of Bosnia, for example, in Višegrad and Sanski Most 43.
25. Arkan’s unit was in fact a unit of the State Security Service of the Serbian Ministry of the
Interior or the DB. Protected witnessB-129, who testified in the Milošević case, was a former
secretary at the Serbian Volunteer Guard’s headquarters and the Serbian Party of Unity in Belgrade
from 1993 until 1995. She actually worked for Ar kan from 1994 onwards but during 1993 she had
contact with the Tigers and Arkan because she shared an office with them 4.
26. In her testimony she stated that Arkan’s men acted in the capacity of the reserve force of
the MUP or the DB of Serbia and as such, there was frequent contact between Arkan and
Frenki Simatović, who was the Commander of the Special Operations Unit of the Serbian DB.
While Simatovi ć was in charge of operations involving Ar kan, he needed the authorization of
45
Jovica Stanišić, the Chief of the Serbian DB, in order to make decisions . Medical treatment of
Arkan’s men was taken care of by the DB and they were classed as reserve forces of the MUP on
46
official correspondence regarding this .
40
Reply, pp. 616-620.
41Reply, p. 620.
42Reply, p. 625.
43Reply, pp.626-630, Pleading of Laura Dauban 2 March 2006, “Ethnic cleansing on the eastern side of Bosnia
and Herzegovina” (CR 2006/6, pp. 17-19); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement of
Acquittal, case No. IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004, para. 305.
44Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, pp. 19417-19418, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case
No. IT-02-54.
45Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, p. 19446, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
46
Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, p. 19450, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54. - 18 -
27. Witness B-129 described one of the operations that Arkan had been involved in with the
Serbian DB when they shared a command post in Tr eskavica, close to Sarajevo. In this operation,
47
Muslim prisoners had been captured and were subjected to torture including sexual assault .
Arkan and his men were paid by the Serbian DB us ually in cash which was either delivered to the
headquarters or collected. It wa s sometimes as much as three to four millionDeutschmarks at a
48
time and this was newly printed money which had just come out of the mint .
28. Witness B-129 was very clear as to whose authority the Tigers were operating under:
“The state security, the DB, whenever it didn’t have enough men for the front, it
would take some of the members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard. Or if they didn’t
have enough men to take up a certain position, then they would engage members of
the Serbian Volunteer Guard. The most impor tant thing in this respect is that the
Guard could do nothing on its own, nothi ng without permission from the DB of
Serbia. And as far as the frontline goes, they did as best they could there.” 49
29. This testimony demonstrates, first, that the State Security of the Serbian MUP was
concerned to have sufficient forces on the front, which at this time could only have been in Bosnia.
Second, that Arkan’s forces were deployed in Bosnia and finally that Arkan’s forces had a
subordinate relationship to the State Security Service of the Serbian MUP.
(iv)Šešelj’sparamilitaries
30. One of the most prolific paramilitary forces operating in Bosnia was the paramilitary
force of Vojslav Šešelj. He has been indicted by the Tribunal for participating in the attacks on the
non-Serb population of Bosnia and is currently awaiting trial in The Hague 5. Bosnia has made
extensive reference to the activities of this force in Bosnia in its Reply, particularly in relation to
the support Šešelj’s forces received from the Serbia n and Federal Ministries of the Interior, the
President of Serbia and the JNA. Indeed Šešelj’ s forces participated in joint actions with the
Serbian Ministry of the Interior in Bosnia 51.
47
Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, pp. 19479-19480, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case
No. IT-02-54.
48
Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, p. 19454, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
49Testimony of B-129 given on 16 April 2003, p. 19445, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
50ICTY, Prosecutor v. Šešelj, case No. IT-03-67, Modified Amended Indictment filed on 15 July 2005.
51Reply, pp. 620 – 636 and 602-604; see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgement
of Acquittal, case No. IT-02- 54-T, 16 June 2004, para. 306. - 19 -
(v) Relationship of Serbian MUP special fo rces and associated paramilitaries with the
Army during operations
31. According to the United Nations Commissi on of Experts the JNA and the paramilitaries
were deployed together in municipalities which were “within the strategic arc the Serbs need[ed] to
link all Serbian populations from BiH and Croatia within a contiguous Serbian State”. During
these attacks, these units acted as infantry for th e JNA which in turn provided artillery, armour and
52
command .
32. When Arkan and his unit participated in operations in Croatia, they did so under the
command of the JNA. In particular during the siege of Vukovar, Arkan stated that his men were
53
under the command of the JNA . An exhibit in the Milošević case entitled “Agreement with the
participation of Z.Ražnatovi ć unit in the defence of Pertrijna” and dated 25November 1991,
provides that Arkan’s unit was to participate in fighting on the JNA and Territorial Defence
positions in that Croatian municipality and that his unit would be part of and under the command of
54
the 622nd Motorized Battalion of the JNA .
33. Colonel-General Pani ć confirmed the operational rela tionship between the so-called
paramilitaries and the army. In an interview he gave for the BBC’s “Death of Yugoslavia” series
he stated that, in relation to the operations in the Vukovar area, “[a]ll these formations ⎯ Arkan’s
Tigers, Šešelj’s Chetniks ⎯ were under my command. The people who wanted to act
55
independently were being removed from that area, disarmed and returned home.”
34. In a television interview with Brent Sadler of CNN during the Kosovo crisis and after his
indictment had been publicized, Arkan confirmed that his Tiger paramilitaries were involved in the
wars in Bosnia and Croatia. He went on to say: “In the time, in 1991, when the war, the civilian
war in Yugoslavia starts. I was on the part of the Serbian army. I have no some group [sic], or my
56
own army, I was under the command of the Yugoslav army, defending my country in that time.”
52
Reply, pp. 625-626.
53
Reply, p. 620.
54Exhibit No. P352, tab 172a, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
55Exhibit No. P596, tab 14, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, case No. IT-02-54.
56CNN interview: Brent Sadler with Zeljko Ražjnatovi ć (“Arkan”), 31 March 1999, submitted to the Court by
Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006 as DVD 13. - 20 -
35. When Arkan’s Tigers were deployed in Bosnia prior to the re-hatting of the JNA into the
VRS, they would be under military command. General Mladi ć, the then Commander of the JNA
2nd Military District said as much in an in tercepted telephone c onversation conducted on
13May1992. When a local SDS leader from Ilidža municipality in the greater Sarajevo area
advised him that they had some of Arkan’s men there and asked Mladi ć whether “they are under
our command”. Mladić replied: “All under arms are under my command . . .” 57
D. Bosnian Serb paramilitary formations
36. Bosnian Serb paramilitaries also operated with paramilitary formations from Serbia with
the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party in target ing the non-Serb civilian population in Bosnia.
Their activities have most recently been addressed by the Brdanin Trial Chamber in respect of the
13 municipalities in the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK) in north-western Bosnia . 58
37. This Trial Chamber found that, by the sp ring of 1992, a number of Serb paramilitary
groups had been formed in Bosnia or had arrived from Serbia. Some of these paramilitary groups
were trained and equipped by the JNA and were closely associated with it or with the SDS. At
first, their existence and training was kept secret. The paramilitaries created an atmosphere of fear
and terror amongst the non-Serb inhabitants of Bosnian Krajina by committing crimes against
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats including rape, murder, plunder and the destruction of
property. Serbian paramilitary groups also par ticipated in combat operations of the 1stKrajina
Corps throughout the Autonomous Region of Krajina. This was a JNA Corps that had undergone
the re-hatting process from the JNA to the VRS.
38. In that case the Trial Chamber was satisfi ed that both the army as well as the SDS used
paramilitary groups as an operative tool that contribu ted to taking control of the territory claimed
for the Serbian State within Bosnia, and perman ently removing most of the non-Serbs from this
territory.
5Intercepted conversation between Unkovi ć and Mladi ć, Ratko from 13 May 1992
(ET 0322-0204-0322-0205.doc.) at http://www.domovina.net/tribunal/page_006.php .
5ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Judgement, case No. IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, paras. 97 and 100, 226-228
(general); 98-99, 102;114; 227, 288; 1126 (SOS paramilitaries); 109, 865 and 228 fn. 624 (Wolves of Vucak
paramilitaries). - 21 -
39. From mid-June 1992 onwards, paramilitary gr oups in Bosnia were formally incorporated
into the structure of the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) and put under its command. This formal
incorporation occurred as a result of the Decision on the Prohibition of Forming and Activities of
Armed Groups and Individuals in the Territory of the Republic which are not under the Unique
Command of the Army or Militia. This Decision was adopted by the Presidency of the Republika
59
Srpska on 13 June 1992 .
40. The Trial Chamber in the Brdanin case gave two examples of Bosnian Serb paramilitary
groups which were actually incorporated into the VRS. The first one was the SOS or so-called
Serbian Defence Forces. The establishment and the action of the SOS was orchestrated by the
SDS ⎯ that is the Serbian Democratic Party. This paramilitary group participated in targeting the
non-Serb populations in Banja Luka and Sanski Most municipalities. The other group that was
incorporated into the army was the so-called Wolves of Vu čak group, which was under the
command of Veljko Milanković. This local Bosnian Serb param ilitary group operated in Prnjavor
municipality, where it participated in the attack on the non-Serbs in Lišnjia village. This groups
was incorporated in the 327th Mo torized Brigade of the 1st Krajin a Corps in June 1992. Not only
was this Bosnian Serb paramilitary group incor porated into the army but the army command
60
recommended that its leader be decorated .
E. Conclusions
41. The various forms of involvement of the Serbian and Federal MUPs in Bosnia included
the arming of the SDS and the Bosnian Serb MUP, participation in joint operations in Bosnia,
forced mobilization of Bosnian Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro and close co-operation with the
Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior.
42. There were various irregular formations pa rticipating in the targeting of non-Serbs in
Bosnia, but they were not independent, uncontro lled elements. The JNA and the Serbian MUP
were integral in their arming, equipping and trai ning. In many notable cases they were actually
59
Respondent’s Rejoinder, p. 569, para. 3.2.2.4; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Judgement, case No. IT-99-36-T,
1 September 2004, paras. 97 and 228 (general).
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Judgement, case No. IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, paras. 97 and 100, 226-228
(general); 98-99, 102;114; 227, 288; 1126 (SOS param ilitaries); 109, 865 and 228 fn. 624 (Wolves of Vu čak
paramilitaries). - 22 -
units of the State Security Service of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, or were co-operating with
it, or were volunteers that had been incorporated in to the Territorial Defence or the JNA. Finally,
when these forces participated in operations they were generally placed under military command.
43. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, that concludes my pleading on
this topic. I am going to be followed, with th e Court’s leave, by Mr.Torkildsen who will be
speaking about the financial relationship betw een the FRY, the Republika Srpska and the
Republika Srpska Krajina. Mr.Torkildsen has a Bachelor of Science Degree in management
sciences from the University of Manchester and a Master of Science from City University Business
School. He has had ten years’ experience in th e Norwegian Serious Fraud Office as a Senior
Adviser and Financial Investigator. He was also employed at the ICTY as a financial investigator
for the Office of th e Prosecutor in theMilošević case and, on the basis of his experience and
qualifications, was admitted as an expert to testify in those proceedings. He is currently a partner
in an investigative legal firm in Norway.
44. Madam President, may I ask you to give the floor to Mr. Torkildsen.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms.Karagiannakis. I do now give the floor to
Mr. Torkildsen.
TMOR.KILDSEN:
FINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCY
Introduction
1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, in my presentation this morning I
will go into several topics that all directly or indi rectly have to do with how Belgrade financially
dominated the Serb governmental structures in both the Serb Krajina and in what came to be called
Republika Srpska during the period 1992-1995. Th e first thing I will do is to show the Court why
Belgrade used the sources of finance that they did. I will go on to elaborate how the officers of the
Bosnian Serb army, the VRS, at all times duri ng the period from its creation on 20 May 1992 until
only recently fell under the direct financial respons ibility of the army of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the VJ. I will explain how Belgrade financed the three armies, meaning not only the - 23 -
army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but also the armies of the Bosnian Serbs and the
Republika Srpska Krajina. I will further elabor ate on how the economies were integrated through
the creation of a single economic entity which incl uded the FR Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska and
Republika Srpska Krajina. I will demonstrate the importance of such an entity which was entirely
implemented and entirely controlled by Belgrade. My conclusion will summarize and list the most
important features and deductions of this financial operation executed by Belgrade.
2. It is notable that the financing of Repub lika Srpska by Belgrade was done in complete
secrecy as will be explained through the presentati on of documents which are all in the public
domain. How this financing actually took place will not become clear until these documents can be
put into context and explained how they relate to each other. The financing of the officers of the
Bosnian Serb army is not immediately apparent from documents available to the public.
3. For clarification purposes I have translated several of the figures and numbers referred to
in the various documents which I will discuss into German marks by using the relevant official
exchange rate at the relevant point in time. Th e German mark was the most relevant and widely
available foreign currency used throughout the regi on at the time. In order to give the amounts
some perspective compared to the Euro, it is wo rth mentioning that when the Euro was first
introduced, one German mark was worth approximately 50 per cent of one Euro. This means that
for example 10 million German marks was the equivalent of 5 million Euros, the commonly used
abbreviation for the German mark is DEM.
The Public Accounting Service (SDK)
4. A central role was played by the Public Ac counting Service, also translated as the Public
Auditing Service, in the operation of the moneta ry federation between Se rb-controlled regions.
The Public Accounting Service was a payment serv ice system used within the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for the transfer of funds within and between the federal republics
and the two autonomous regions. In the early 1990s, the Public Accounting Service both facilitated
payments and supervised financial transactions . The Public Accounting Service operated long
before the disintegration of the SFRY. When the disintegration of the SFRY began, the
Serb-controlled regions in Croatia and Bosnia a nd Herzegovina carefully maintained connections - 24 -
between the Bosnian Serb’s part of the SDK syst em and the SDK system of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia. This continued connection was important for
facilitating ongoing money transfers. Unless a functioning payment system existed, cash would
have been the only alternative way of making paym ents available. Thus, the SDK system was of
paramount importance for the Serb-controlled regi ons in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and
their ability to receive their financial funding from the FRY and the Republic of Serbia. The
primary issues made available from the National Bank of Yugoslavia to the Serb-controlled regions
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were cred ited to their respective accounts in the Public
Accounting Service system. “Primary issues” basically means printing of new money. I will
explain this in more detail later in my pleading.
5. At an early stage of the disintegration of the SFRY, the leadership in the Serb-controlled
regions in Croatia and Bosnia a nd Herzegovina realized the importance of taking control of the
Public Accounting Service in the areas they ai med to control. A speech by Radovan Karadži ć 61at
the Plebiscite of the Serb People on 1 November 1991 where Karadži ć is encouraging and
preparing the Bosnia Serbs for what actions need ed to be taken, his speech also highlights the
importance of taking control of the Public Accounting Service:
“Be prepared soon to take over the SDK decisively. I mean, to appoint your
own man in the SDK. Prepare (the ground), first talk to them, ask them whether
they’re ready to work in a moment that is not legal, in accordance with laws and
regulations which you, as the municipality authority, will give them.”
6. The importance of taking control of the P ublic Accounting Service is highlighted and put
into practice a few months later. For instance, in the minutes of a joint meeting of the Council for
National Security and the Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on
15 April 1992 (where both Karadžić and Krajisnik were present) it was agreed that they should:
“send a request to the Governor of the SR J [NBY] to provide 5,000 milliondinars
62
[25millionDEM] in cash and transfer it to the Sokolac Public Auditing Service [SDK]” . Of
61
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 19, also referred to as C4346,
ERN BCS 0027-0632, translation, p. 2.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosević, case No.IT-02-54, Exhibit P427, tab60, also referred to as B3292,
translation, p. 2. - 25 -
course it was important for the Bosnian Serb leader ship to have control of the transfer channel
providing for such amounts of money.
The FRY paid the salaries of the officers of the VRS in the period from 1992 and onwards
7. It is generally known and has been establis hed several times now that the officers of the
VRS have been paid in their entirety by the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia. A large number of
documents exist that refer to the fact that these officers were paid from Belgrade since the
establishment of the VRS on 12 May 1992. At the beginning of the war the officers were paid
through the regular channels of the FRY army (the VJ), meaning that no special arrangements were
made for payments of these officers; from 15 November 1993 onwards they were paid and
administrated through their own personnel centre, the 30th Personnel Centre, within the VJ. This
Personnel Centre was created for the sole purpose of gathering for the needs of the RSarmy
officers. This will become apparent from the documents I will refer to during the course of my
presentation.
8. As discussed earlier, the JNA was relabelled in both Serbia Krajina and Republika Srpska
Krajina, but the officers who served under the ne w labels were not paid from the budgets of
Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina. They remained on the payroll of the JNA and
later the VJ. General Ratko Mladi ć, in his speech to the Assembly of Republika Srpska on 15 and
16 April 1995, provided a consumption review of weapons and other equipment used by the VRS
from the start of the war until 31 December 1994. With respect to the salaries of officers and
civilians he remarked: “From the beginning of th e war, RS did not participate in financing of
63
professional army members.”
9. This statement made by Ratko Mladi ć is consistent with a report named the “Analysis of
Combat Readiness and Activities of the Bosnian Se rb Army in 1992”, dated April 1993. This
report was issued by the main staff of the army of the RS. The document describes three stages in
the “Planning of the development and financing of the VRS Army” during the period 20 May 1992
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 54, also referred to as C4920,
ERN 0084-5813; ERN translation L000-4907, p. 16. - 26 -
until 28 February 1993 . In the first stage, lasting from 20 May 1992 until 30 June 1992, it states
that, “finances were provided mainly from the reso urces at the disposal of the JNA units”. The
report goes on to state that by 30 June 1992 the entire financing of the Bosnian Serb army was
restricted to, “the personal expenditures (salar ies and benefits) of officers, non-commissioned
officers, soldiers working under contract, and work ers who remained in or joined the Army of
Republika Srpska from the former JNA”.
The report explicitly stated that these offi cers and other personnel, “continued to be the
responsibility of the FR Yugoslavia”. That the total financing from Belgrade would have ended on
30 June 1992 is incorrect. The fact is that the total financing of the VRS from Belgrade continued
but this financing was executed in a more di screte manner through Belgrade’s covering the budget
deficits of Republika Srpska. I will explain this relationship later in my presentation.
10. Even if the VRS and the army of the Republika Srpska Krajina officers and some other
personnel continued to be on Belgrade’s payroll from 20 May 1992 onwards, this arrangement was
not formalized in all respects before late in 1993. Pursuant to an order by the President of the FRY
on 10 November 1993, the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Momcilo Perisi ć, issued an order
establishing the 30th Personnel Centre and the 40th Personnel Centre on 15 November 1993. The
30thPersonnel Centre and the 40th Personnel Cent re were to be the administrative centres in
charge of taking care for and administrating the needs of the officers and other personnel serving
65
in, respectively, the VRS and the Army of the Republika Srpska Krajina .
11. Although Bosnian-born Serb members of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (the JNA) had
been ordered to be deployed in Bosnia and Her zegovina, the army of Republika Srpska (the VRS)
was still in constant need of manpower. The FRY army (the VJ) assisted the VRS also in this
respect through incentives offered to the VJ militar y officers who volunteered to serve in the VRS.
Among other things, favourable pe nsion conditions were used as in centives for the officers. This
arrangement is explaine d in a document dated 6 August 1994, issued by the 2nd Krajina Corps
Command of the Bosnian Serb army:
64
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 32, also referred to as C4712,
pp. 127-132.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit B10955. - 27 -
“From the command of the 30th Personnel Centre of the VJ General Staff and
the command of the Republika Srpska Army Ma in Staff we have received subsequent
explanations regarding regulating years of pensionable service at double rate for
professional soldiers (professional officers, professional non-commissioned officers,
contract officers, . . .) and based on that explanation, with a view to regulating years of
pensionable service at double rate. Every unit of the 2nd Krajina Corps and the VRS
(Republika Srpska Army) is authorized to issue certificates only for the period starting
20 May 1992 onward. Those who took pa rt in the war before 20 May 1992 are
instructed to file a request, with the exact description of where they were, in which
unit, upon whose orders, where the unit was and enclose any proof they may have. As
soon as you have collected all the requests, certificates and other proof, forward them
to this command (2KK), and the command of the 30th KC (personnel centre) will
issue certificates to the effect of recognizing years of pensionable service at double
rate.”66
12. VRS officers and non-commissioned officers of the VRS continued to receive their
salaries from the FRY right up until 2002. This is st ated in an article entitled “The Future of the
Army of the Republic of Srps ka” published by the Belgrade based VIP News Services on
5 September 2002, the article mentions 28 February 2002 as the final date . 67
13. As late as 29December 2005 the Belgrade media reported that RatkoMladi ć after his
retirement on 28 February 2002 continued to receive his pension until November 2005, through the
30th Personnel Centre. In other words, according to these sources, Belgrade continued its financial
support for more than ten years after the Srebre nica massacre took place. In November 2005 the
30th Personnel Centre was closed. We are not able to establish whether and how its role is
continued by other State services of the Respondent.
The financing of the armies (the JNA, the VJ, the VRS and the SVK) and
the Republika Srpska as such
How the primary issues printed in Belgrade were used to finance the armies and the other
needs of the FRY, the RS and the RSK
14. On top of direct payments of the officer s of the Bosnian Serb army, nearly the entire
budgets of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina were financed from Belgrade in the
years 1992 and 1993.
66
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit643, tab1, Expert Report of the
Military Analysis Team at the Office of the Prosecutor, Theunes and Borrelli, p. 35.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 57, also referred to as C5353,
FI04-4444. - 28 -
15. Before the disintegration of the SFRY began, the JNA was fina nced through the SFRY
budget. The SFRY budget was generated by custom s and import tax, contributions by the six
socialist republics and the two autonomous pr ovinces and by loans from the National Bank of
Yugoslavia, the NBY. The increasing disintegratio n of the SFRY in 1991 adversely affected the
budget, especially in the area of income. In a proposal dated 21 July 1991 from the Federal
Executive Council, regarding the minimum funds need ed in the budget of the SFRY for the period
July to September 1991, it is stated that the JNA needed 17.8billion dinars, the equivalent of
1.4 billion German marks out of the total SFRY budge t of 26.8 billion dinars for the same period.
In other words, the JNA needed 66 per cent of the total budget. The proposal goes on to estimate
that the National Bank of Yugoslavia would have to provide 52percent of the total budget.
Moreover, the document explains that the am ount to be provided by the National Bank of
68
Yugoslavia would have to come from printing new money . The increase in the percentage of the
budget to be used to fund the JNA in 1992, and the fact that it would be generated by printing new
money, was one reason for the resignation on 20December 1991 of Ante Markovi ć, the last
Croatian President of the SFRY 69.
16. Given the reduced income of the SFRY budget, the most realistic way to finance the JNA
was to borrow the funds. Ordinarily, and in contrast to what actually happened, States wishing to
or required to make up for a budget deficit woul d either issue Government bonds or undertake
privatization of State-owned companies. Not so the SFRY. Its Serbian leadership designated the
National Bank of Yugoslavia as the only availabl e source of borrowing. The National Bank of
Yugoslavia would again finance their loans to the federal budget through “primary issues”. The
creation of primary issue is either the printing of money or the provision of credit by the national
bank. In this case, the National Bank of Yugosla via created money by providing credit to the
SFRY budget for the use of the JNA. The documents referred to, for instance a transcript of the
68
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab5, also referred to as C168,
p. 4.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit C4911, p. F1025396. - 29 -
SFRY Presidency meeting held on 21 August 1991, state that the National Bank of Yugoslavia was
70
printing money that was then loaned to the SFRY for the primary purpose of financing the JNA .
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Torkildsen, could I interrupt you for a moment. This is the first
document that you re relying on which is identifie d by the words “admitted exhibit”. Could you
explain for the Court the distinction between an “exhibit” and an “admitted exhibit”.
Mr. TORKILDSEN: Madam President, all of these documents that I am presenting here
today, except for two or three of them, have all been admitted in the prosecution against
Slobodan Milošević at the ICTY and all of these documents are in the public domain. I am sorry if
it is mentioned in the footnote that some of them have been admitted, implying that others have not
been admitted, because they are all in the public domain from the ICTY.
The PRESIDENT: So “admitted” does not mean “agreed”?
Mr. TORKILDSEN: No.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Mr. TORKILDSEN:
17. During the 143rd session of the SFRY Presid ency, on 1 October 1991, “the Law on the
Provisional Financing of Requirements of the Federation in 1991” was on the agenda. The
Presidency endorsed this law and added that, un til funds were approved, the National Bank of
Yugoslavia could make advance payments to the Federation for the financing of the JNA. The
draft minutes state, inter alia:
“Until funds are approved in the manne r described in paragraph 2 of this
Article, the National Bank of Yugoslavia may make advance payments to the
Federation for the financing of the Yugoslav National Army
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab6, also referred to as
C4274 ⎯ Admitted Exhibit 328 ⎯ tab 26. - 30 -
the SFRY Presidency resolved to recommend to the National Bank of Yugoslavia that,
until conditions were met for adopting the la w, it should make advance payments for
71
financing the JNA . . .”
18. This decision demonstrates that the actual leadership of the National Bank of Yugoslavia
was effectively taken over by the political leader ship. At the time the political leadership was
reduced to the so-called rump Presidency. This process is later described by Mladan Dinki ć .
Mr. Dinkić became the Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia after the fall of Miloševi ć in
the period between 2000 and 2003. He explains:
“In the autumn of 1991, the Serbian leadership took complete control over
Yugoslavia’s monetary policy. The NBJ [i.e. the NBY] remained the central
monetary institution only on paper. Naturally, no one made this public because the
main aim was to enable republican authorities to conduct monetary policy in complete
73
secrecy . . .”
In addition, Mr. Dinkić observes:
“It is quite clear that the state, or rather the ruling party, had a complete
monopoly over the issue of money. The NBJ formally created primary money by
approving credits from the primary issue to banks and direct clients.” 74
19. As we mentioned earlier the primary issues coming from the National Bank of
Yugoslavia were also needed and used for the fina ncing of the Yugoslav army. Besides that, this
method of using primary issues to finance budget defi cits was used by the Serbian leadership in
Belgrade in the years 1992 and 1993 not only to fi nance their own budgets, but also the budgets of
the RS and the RSK.
20. The question then arises, how did Republik a Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina use
the primary issues they received? In short, these payments were used to finance the budget deficits
in the RS and the RSK. A large proportion of th e expenditure of the budgets of the RS and the
RSK were used for military purposes. This is apparent in a large number of documents, for
instance in a request for cash from the Nationa l Bank of the RSK to the National Bank of
Yugoslavia in Belgrade on 24July 1995, the m oney should cover the expenses of the military
71
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 10, also referred to as C4313;
ERN 0050-1747. ERN translation L006-4205/06.
72
Mladan Dinkić, Ekonomija destrukcije: Velika pljacka naroda (1996, Belgrade) ISBN: 868257103X.
73Ibid., p. 81, BCS, p. 84.
74Ibid., p. 84, BCS, p. 87. - 31 -
75
forces and the police . In the RS budget of 1993, published in the Official Gazette of the
Republika Srpska on 30March1994 76, we read that the total budge t is in excess of 732thousand
billion dinars. We further read that close to 731 thousand billion dinars is allocated for specified
purposes. On the next page we see that most of the income is made up from credits, meaning those
primary issues were being provided by the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. This income
labelled credits accounts for an amount in excess of 729thousand billion dinars. Finally, we can
read that most of the amount labelled specified purposes is used to cover “Current Expenses of the
Army” with an amount in excess of 700 thousand billion dinars. Based on the relative proportions
of these figures I can state that financing the Bosnian Serb army accounts for 95.6per cent of the
total budget. In addition, I can conclude that 99.6percent of the budget was financed through
“credits”. This conclusion, that almost the entire RS budget was funded by credits, is supported by
a remark made by Mr.Mileti ć, a Director in the National Bank of Yugoslavia, in a report of his
visit to the National Bank of Republika Srpska between 4 and 8 April 1994 77. Importantly, Miletić
clarifies that the credits were created through primary issue of the National Bank of Yugoslavia
itself. These types of military expenditure were often described, as I have mentioned, as “special”
purpose expenditure. For instance, in a decision of the Government of the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14 May 1992, we read th at, “up to 80 per cent of primary issue will be
used for special purposes” 78.
21. The funds allocated to the armies of the RS and the RSK through their budgets were used
to pay for all of the army needs: conscripts a nd other personnel, to acquire quartermaster supplies
including food, and to replenish ammunition supplies, and so on, and so on. The Combat
Readiness report mentioned earlier provides a good overv iew of the distribution of resources to the
79
various categories of expenditure . I will elaborate further on this report later in my presentation.
75ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 31, also referred to as C4830.
76ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 59, also referred to as C5358,
pp. 153-154.
77ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit C4 769, translation, p.2, BCS
0211-4115.
78ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit B3501, p. 17184.
79
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Combat Readiness Report of the VRS for 1992,
Exhibit P427, tab 32, also referred to as C4712. - 32 -
The funds to cover this expenditure were allocat ed to the army of Republika Srpska through the
Republika Srpska budget.
22. Financing its budget through the use of cr edits, meaning primary issues originating from
Belgrade was not a mechanism used only by the RS and the RSK Governments. In the annual
accounts of the FRY for 1993 80we can read that almost the en tire FRY income is listed as credits
originating from the National Bank of Yugoslavia. Out of the total inco me, which was close to
26 thousand billion dinars, more than 25 thousand billion dinars is a credit from the National Bank
of Yugoslavia. Out of this total income more than 22 thousand billion dinars were used for “Funds
for financing the Yugoslav Army”. This means that out of the total FRY income more than
87 per cent has been used for financing the army of the FRY. I must here mention that the reason
for these enormous figures in nominal values was that the FRY, Republika Srpska and Republika
Srpska Krajina were facing a situation of hyperi nflation as a result of the printing of money in
Belgrade, that by this point in time had lasted for a long period. Therefore the nominal figures as
such must be interpreted with caution; what is important here is the relative proportion of the total
income being used to fund the armies of the FRY and Republika Srpska and the large proportion
being provided by the National Bank of Yugoslavia.
23. When comparing the annual accounts of the RS and the FRY for 1993, it is clear that
their source of finance is the same, the primary i ssues printed in Belgrade. What the RS and the
FRY spend their income on is also more or less th e same, their armies. The only difference being
that the RS has spent an even higher proportion of its income on the army, 95 per cent, compared to
the FRY where “only” 87 per cent was used to cover the needs of the VJ.
24. The primary issues received from the Nati onal Bank of Yugoslavia were also to some
extent redistributed back to companies in the FRY through the procurement made by the VRS from
these companies. Examples of this are apparent in a letter from the RS Ministry of Defence to the
81
National Bank of the RS, dated 18 November 1992 . The letter, and an attachment to it, concerns
funds to be made available from the primary issu es to two companies from which the procurement
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 63, also referred to as B8742,
p. 2.
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab3(a), also referred to as
B4558. - 33 -
will be made. Both companies are situated in the Repub lic of Serbia. It is stated in the letter to the
National Bank of Republika Srpska:
“We are asking you to make payments in YU Dinars from the quota of the
credit extended from primary emission for the need of the Republika Srpska Army to
the following suppliers . . .”
The use of the word “quo ta” in this letter shows that the provision of primary issues from the
National Bank of Yugoslavia to Republika Srpska w as part of a regulated financial plan. Further
evidence of the use of primary issues is contained in a letter from the General Staff of the Army of
Republika Srpska to the Republika Srpska Ministry of Defence, dated 24 November 1992. The
General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska gives its approval for a company named MP DD to
receive a credit from the primary issue in Yugoslav dinars in order to procure material from a
company in Vranje. Vranje is in the Republic of Serbia. Attached to this letter is a request for
credit from the primary issue in Yugoslav dinars from a company called MPDDBLIK in Banja
Luka to the RS Ministry of Defence. The comp any asks for approval of a credit in order to make
procurements from a company in the Republic of Serbia:
“It is known to us that the FRY (Feder al Republic of Yugoslavia) has approved
certain means from the primary emission fo r the needs of the Republika Srpska and
that the realization is handled by the Komercijalna Banka from Belgrade . . .
With this letter we ask you to appr ove us a credit of 100million dinars, the
equivalent amount at the time 213,858 Deutschmarks, for procurement of the basic
82
fabric Drvar, manufactured by the cotton factory JUMKO from Vranje.”
Direct requests for financial funding and stat ements made by the decision-makers in
Belgrade and the receivers in the RS and the RSK regarding their needs and the use of the
funds in the RS and the RSK
25. The government institutions of the Republic of Serbia also provided the materials and
financial funding needed by the Serb-contro lled regions in Croatia during 1991 and 1992.
Actually, the Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Defence played a vital role in financing the
Serb-controlled regions in Croatia. This is illustrated widely in several documents. For example in
two letters from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia to the Government of the
Republic of Serbia, dated 1 November 1991, concerning the provision of resources and funds to the
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, ta(a), also referred to as
B4557. - 34 -
Serbian regions in Croatia. One of these documents is a cover letter from the Ministry of Defence
addressed to the Secretary of the Government of th e Republic of Serbia regarding the inclusion of
the subject of assistance to the Serb-controlled re gions in Croatia on the agenda for that day’s
session of the Government. The other document, an attachment to the cover letter, is a letter from
the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, Lt. Gen. Tomislav Simovi ć, to the Government
of Serbia regarding the funds to be provided by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia
to the “Serbian People” in Croatia. The letter mentions that the total necessary material and
financial assistance to the Serbs in Croatia from Re public of Serbia Ministry of Defence resources
83
until the end of 1991 would amount to close to 1.3 billion dinars . Six documents are attached to
this letter and provide details concerning the amounts descr ibed in the letter. It is stated that out of
the total amount of 1.3 billion dinars an amount in excess of 1.2 billion dina rs has been calculated
on the basis of the approximate numerical strength of the needs of the Territorial Defence of the
Serb-controlled regions in Croatia for November and December 1991.
The amount of 1.2 billion dinars suggested to be received by the Serb-controlled regions in
Croatia from Belgrade, according to official excha nge rates, was equivalent to 92.7 million DEM.
These documents demonstrate that the highest political and military leaders of the Republic of
Serbia were closely involved in decisions to prov ide financing and materials to the Serb-controlled
regions in Croatia.
26. The Government of the Republic of Serb ia and the Governor of the National Bank of
Yugoslavia were directly involved in decisions entailing the financing of the Serb-controlled
regions in Croatia. This follows from the o fficial record of a meeting on 12 November 1992
between the representatives of the Government of the RSK and members of the Government of the
Republic of Serbia, including President Slobodan Miloševi ć and the Governor of the National
Bank. The venue of the meeting was the office of Slobodan Miloševi ć. During this meeting the
parties first of all agreed on the outline and the actual size of the RSK army. Next, it was agreed
that the Republic of Serbia would ensure the necessary funding for this defence system for the RSK
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibits P427, tab(a), also referred to as
C4347 ⎯ Admitted Exhibit 352 ⎯ tab 4, and P427, tab 38, also referred to as C4348 ⎯ Admitted Exhibit 352 ⎯ tab 5. - 35 -
and, further, that Miloševi ć would direct the VJ to finance the military officers and civilian
personnel that remained in the RSK:
“The way of financial help to the Krajina till the end of this year was
established at the meeting. From the domain of the defence, the question of outlining
the organisation of the army of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the question of
financing were set in motion.
The president, Mr.Miloševi ć, accepted the concept of forming the defence
system of Krajina and the basis of this system should consist of 23,000 people . . .
The resolution to immediately start the planning of the means for the needs of
the army and the police, the way it was in 1992, was accepted. This will be
accomplished through the MOD of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina and the MOD
of the Republic of Serbia.
The president Miloševi ć stated his attitude that the means for the maintenance
of the technical devices should be planned via the Yugoslav army and he said that he
will help in realising it and that he will initiate the Yugoslav army to finance the active
officers and the civil personnel that stayed in Krajina. All other needs for financing
the defence should be planned through the MOD. It was agreed that they wo84d
immediately start to plan the means in order to finish this process in time.”
In other words, in November 1992 it was decided in Belgrade, by Mr.Miloševi ć, among others,
what the army of the RSK should look like, how big it would be and how it should be organized.
Also, reference was made to a practice of fina ncing which apparently was in place during 1992.
Explicitly it was decided that this way of financ ing would be continued after 1992. Further it is
confirmed that the Yugoslav army would take care of “technical devices” and of payment of active
officers and civil personnel. If that were not e nough, it was decided that all other financial needs
would be taken care of by the Serbian Ministry of Defence.
27. Later, when Miloševi ć was put in prison in Belgrade, he was interviewed as a suspect
and stated on 2 April 2001:
“As regards the resources spent for weapons, ammunition and other needs of the
army of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, these expenditures
constituted a state secret . . .”5
It is noteworthy to see that Miloševi ć talks about spending for resources for both the Bosnian Serb
army and the Republic of Serbian Krajina as two of a kind. Not only does Miloševi ć take
84
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab11, also referred to as
C4682 ⎯ Admitted Exhibit 352 ⎯ tab 16, p. 02012230.
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 3, also referred to as K2575,
p. 2. - 36 -
responsibility for providing resources to both these armies, he also points at this being a State
secret.
28. As is well known, in earlier years Miloševi ć had stated that the Republic of Serbia spent
substantial amounts of money on Serbs outside Serbia. For instance, in a statement reported by the
Yugoslav News Agency, Tanjug, on 11 May 1993, Milošević remarks:
“In the past two years, the Republic of Serbia ⎯ by assisting Serbs outside
Serbia ⎯ has forced its economy to make mass ive efforts and its citizens to make
substantial sacrifices. These efforts and these sacrifices are now reaching the limits of
endurance. Most of the assistance was sent to people and fighters in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Serbia has lent a great, great deal of assistance to the Serbs in Bosnia. Owing to
86
that assistance they have achieved most of what they wanted.”
29. Colonel General Ratko Mladić provided an analysis of the importance to the VRS of the
Yugoslav finances to the Serb-controlled regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in an early report to
the VRS Main Staff, dated September 1992. Re garding the establishment of the VRS and the
transformation of parts of the former JNA into the VRS, Mladić stated:
“The decisions of the Assembly of Republika Srpska (RS) of 12 May 1992
enabled the armed people, the Serbs in the former JNA and the available material and
equipment (to be used) to transform the units and form the army of Republika
Srpska . . .”87
On the transformation of the JNA into the VRS, Mladić continues:
“Our army is one of the rare ones in history to have started a liberation war with
a very solid material base especially as concerns combat hardware, ammunition, and
food reserves. Apart from the army, the ci vilian population and institutions are also
88
using a large quantity of this, especially food and fuel.”
Madam President, I see that the time is appr oaching 11.20, and if you think it would be an
appropriate moment for the Court to break, I will stop at this time?
86
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 56, also referred to as C4721,
p. 00359910.
87ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab2, also referred to as B5507,
ERN 0104-2296, ERN translation 0110-3317.
88Ibid., ERN 0104-2299, ERN translation 0110-3320. - 37 -
The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. We’ll ta ke a short break of ten minutes now. Thank
you.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please, be seated. You have the floor, Mr. Torkildsen.
TMOr.KILDSEN:
30. The “Combat Readiness Report” of April 1993, issued by the Main Staff of the Army of
the RS, reinforces Mladić’s analysis. This report demonstrates the extent to which the FRY and the
VJ financed the VRS in 1992 and 1993. One chap ter of this report has the heading “Planning of
the Development and Financing of the VRS Army”. It is mentioned in relation to the total
expenditure for the VRS: “By 28 February 1993, which can be taken as the end of the 1992 budget
89
year, the amount spent was 81,932,956,000” . It is also mentioned that this figure constituted
153.21 per cent of the approved budget of the VRS. It is further stated that:
“It is important to mention that the salaries of officers, non-commissioned
officers, soldiers under contract as work ers in the RS Army, who until 19 May 1992
had been members of the JNA, continued to be the responsibility of the
FRYugoslavia, so that these expenditures were not debited from the budget of the
Army of Republika Srpska.” 90
Contained within this chapter is a detailed brea kdown of the total amount of expenditures of the
VRS that I have referred to. Salaries of con scripts, non-commissioned officers and soldiers doing
their regular military service, accounted for 58. 49 per cent of the total expenditure, while
quartermaster support accounted for 29.92 per cent of the total. The salaries accounted for a high
proportion of the total budget; this should be no surprise considering that, “[t]he budget was drawn
up for an army which should have numbered 100,000 soldiers, while its average strength was
212,000 troops” 91.
31. This report clarified that, in effect, the Bosnian Serb army fell directly under the financial
responsibility of Belgrade. This is also exac tly the way it was underst ood and functioned in
89
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 32, also referred to as C4712,
pp. 127-132.
90
Ibid., p. 129.
9Ibid., p. 130. - 38 -
practice. A good example of this responsibility is fo und within a confidential internal letter of the
Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army on 11 September 1992:
“I am asking you to settle this matter with the GS (General Staff) of the Army
of SRJ, who should, and in our opinion has a duty to, help us financially for the
92
purpose of successful combat actions.”
This shows not only that the Bosnian Serb Army di d have a supply problem, but at the same time,
apparently, it is considered to be just normal for the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
resolve this problem financially, and apparently it did.
32. Again, referring to the report issued by the Main Staff of the army of the RS in
April1993, in which the VRS analyses its combat readiness and activities since its formation on
20 May 1992; there was no war production to meet the needs of the VRS and no imports, except
from the FRY 93:
“it was only thanks to the maximum efforts and commitment on the part of all factors
in the Republic and the Army, and the assist ance of FRY and donors that the basic
necessities for life and combat activities could b94assured. This situation remained
basically unchanged until the end of the year.”
33. The situation described in the Combat Readiness Report, remained unchanged in 1993
and also in 1994. Towards the end of 1993, a meeting took place at the headquarters of the
Yugoslav army General Staff on the topic of co-o rdinating tasks between the three armies (VJ,
VRS and army of the RSK). In prepara tion for this meeting, a memorandum dated
17December1993, was produced by the Chief of the Office of the RSK army Commander
95
Cedo Radanković . This memorandum demonstrates that Be lgrade continued its financing of the
two armies, outside the Yugoslav army (VJ). Moreov er, it was expected to continue to do so into
1994:
“We have learned unofficially that of the above total balance of requirements
for 1994, the Federal Government will only be able to provide USD 850 million
[1.5Billion DEM] for all three armed fo rces instead of USD 3.29 billion, i.e.,
25.82percent of the stated requirements. For the SVK this would amount to
USD 79.43 million instead of USD 307.30 million.
9ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 51, also referred to as C4652.
93
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 32, also referred to as C4712,
Combat Readiness Report, ERN BCS 0060-7424, ERN translation 0110-3114.
94
Ibid., Combat Readiness Report, ERN BCS 0060-7428, ERN translation 0110-3120.
9ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 52, also referred to as C4752. - 39 -
Aware of the situation that we are all in together and the continuing
unfavourable trends in all areas of life, we ask that at least these minimal finances not
be reduced any further.” 96
The document refers explicitly to the provision of money “for all three armed forces”, being
the armies of Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
It is clear from this memorandum that all three armies are being financed under one plan. And
also, it refers to “the situation that we are all in together”.
34. In the minutes of the 40th [50th] session of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska
held in Sanski Most on 15 to 16 April 1995, the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS,
Colonel General Ratko Mladi ć, presented a report regarding the current situation in the VRS 97. It
was stated in the report that the VRS received a large part of their ammunition from the supplies
inherited from the JNA and from supplies later prov ided by the VJ. A detailed breakdown of these
98
supplies appears in the report . For instance, it is mentioned re garding the infantry ammunition,
which had been consumed by the VRS, that 42.2 per cent came “from supplies inherited and found
in the former JNA barracks; 47.2 per cent provided by the Yugoslav Army . . .”. This means that
89.4 per cent of the total infantry ammunition consumed by the VRS had been supplied by the JNA
and later by the FRY Army.
35. In a document dated 5 May 1994, contai ning information from the Sarajevo-Romanija
Corps Command, a corps of the VRS, it states that regarding the conscript salaries for February
1994, the VRS General Staff was having problem s securing cash for these salaries from the
National Bank of Yugoslavia:
“In our daily contacts with the National Bank of Yugoslavia, due to substantial
problems we have so far been unable to secure that cash, they have promised us that
they would secure the cash by 6 May 1994, so that the payment would commence on
9 May 1994 at the latest . . .” 99
This supply of cash was made, pursuant to an agr eement with the National Bank of Yugoslavia in
Belgrade and will be further elaborated upon later in this presentation.
96
Ibid., ERN 0207-8161, ERN translation L004-6455/56.
97ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 54, also referred to as C4920,
pp. 5-26.
98Ibid., p. 18. ERN 0084-5822; ERN translation L000-4909.
99ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 55, also referred to as C4777,
p. 1. - 40 -
Primary issues and payments
36. A decision was taken by the Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina on 14 May 1992, regarding the use of the funds available from the primary issues 10:
“Primary issue of the National Bank of Yugoslavia/NBY will be used in accordance with the NBY
Decision on goals and tasks of the common monetary policy . . .”
This strongly suggests that a decision must have been taken in Belgrade already in May 1992
regarding the provision and the use of the primary i ssue. We have seen that in fact the use was for
the benefit of the Bosnian Serb army. This is absolutely clear from the budgets I have presented.
In short, the National Bank of Yugoslavia acting under the instructions of the political
authorities was printing money for Bosnian Serb use. From the decision presented, it is clear that
the purpose of these funds was: “to avoid the adverse effects of war on the economy of the Serbian
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 80percen t of primary issue will be used for special
purposes”. When I reviewed the budget of Republik a Srpska earlier in my presentation, I showed
the Court what these “special purposes” in fact were: the Bosnian Serb army.
37. As I have so far presented, the Govern ment of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina made direct petitions to the Nati onal Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade for the
immediate transfer of funds. The response is reflected in the presented budgets and the annual
accounts of the RS. The situation with lack of financial resources and urgent requests for such
from Belgrade was also the same for Republika Srpska Krajina. This is very well illustrated by the
observation of Martić, at that time the RSK Minister of the Interior, to Miloševi ć: “The RSK has
101
no real sources from which to fill its budget, as you certainly know.”
The creation of a monetary federation and its impact on financing the RS
An overview of the situation
38. During 1992, a single, unified monetary system was initiated and implemented by the
FRY with the co-operation of the RS and the RS K. This was done by establishing the National
100
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab 24, also referred to as B3501
registry, p. 17184.
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit 427, tab21, also referred to as
C4435. - 41 -
Banks of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina and by making sure that these two
national banks were under the control of and di rectly subordinated to the National Bank of
Yugoslavia in Belgrade. The central purpose of this integrated monetary system was to facilitate
the transfer of funds between the territories of the FRY, the RS and the RSK. The unified
monetary system eventually created a single economy operating across the three Serb-controlled
regions. It is clear from the budgets and a nnual accounts of Republika Srpska and Republika
Srpska Krajina that primary issues were a major fi nancial vehicle used by the decision makers in
the FRY and the Republic of Serbia to implement their programme to provide financial support to
the Serb-controlled regions in Bosnia and Herze govina and Croatia in the period from the second
half of 1992 until the end of 1993.
39. As mentioned earlier in my pleadings, a cr ucial mechanism for the transfer of funds and
for the efficient operation of the monetary federa tion was the SDK, the Public Accounting Service
also translated as the Public Auditing Service. The SDK was used to transfer funds between the
FRY and the Serb-controlled regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the period 1992 to
1995.
40. The system of national banks of the former SFRY was gradually restructured in the
period 1992-1994. The National Bank of Republika Srpska (the NBRS) and the National Bank of
Republika Srpska Krajina (the NBRSK) were established in the summer of 1992 with the
assistance and under the supervision of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and were to be controlled
by and subordinated to the NBY. Decisions to pr ovide financial assistance to the Serb-controlled
regions in Bosnia and Herzegovi na and Croatia were in part implemented through the primary
issues granted by the National Bank of Yugoslavi a to the National Bank of Republika Srpska and
the National Bank of Republika Srpska Krajina.
41. In 1992 primary issues from the National Bank of Yugoslavia were put at the disposal of
the Republika Srspka and the Republika Srspka Krajin a. The purpose of the payments made to the
Governments of the RS and RSK was to compensate for their lack of normal financing and income.
The result of the payments was the financing of the Serb institutions, both military and civil,
present in these areas during 1992 to 1995. I would like to explain to the Court and elaborate on
how these relationships worked by referring to specific documents. - 42 -
42. The creation of a new federated system of national banks was re quired because neither
Republika Srspka nor Republika Srspka Krajina had any significant source of financing. At the
same time, their financial needs were persistent and acute. The financial dependence of the RS on
the FRY is shown by an address made by Majo rGeneralGvero, VRS Main Staff, during the
34thPeople’s Assembly of the RS. He in formed the Assembly, in a meeting held on
29 September 1993 102, that: “We had not budget or material supplies for the war to rely on. We
103
have not purchased a single plane, helicopter, tank, artillery piece, etc.”
43. The general financial de pendence of the Republika Srspka Krajina on the Republic of
Serbia is demonstrated by documents from 1991 to 1993 ⎯ most telling, in a document I have
previously referred to, a letter dated 28 April 1993, from Milan Marti ć, the RSK Minister of the
Interior, to Slobodan Miloševi ć, and others, stating: “The RSK has no real sources from which to
104
fill its budget, as you certainly know.”
44. This statement made by Milan Marti ć is exactly pinpointing what was also the situation
in the RS: the RS had no real sources of income to balance its budget in order to cover the needs of
the VRS and other expenses. This is clearly apparent when reviewing the Republika Srpska
Annual Accounts for 1992 and the re-balanced budget for 1993 105, where it is clear that Republika
Srpska has very little regular income originating fro m taxes and duties to pay for their expenses. I
have previously referred to the re-balanced RS budget for 1993 published in the Official Gazette of
Republika Srpska on 30 March 1994 where the entire income in the budget originates from primary
issues, produced in Belgrade, and where more than 90percent of this income is used for the
Bosnian Serb army.
45. A detailed explanation of the relati onship between the National Bank of Republika
Srpska and the National Bank of Yugoslavia is found in the Annual Report of the National Bank of
102
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P 427, tab13, also referred to as
B8287, translation, p. 2.
10Ibid., ERN 0048-0968, ERN translation 0091-6773.
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P 427, tab12, also referred to as
C3383 ⎯ Admitted Exhibit 352 ⎯ tab 20.
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibits P427, tab65, also referred to as
B8744 and P427, tab 59, also referred to as C5358. - 43 -
106
Republika Srpska for 1992 . Here we read: “In the beginning the National Bank of Republika
Srpska was given special support by the National Bank of Yugoslavia.” 107
“Special support” took the form of “work me thodology, printing of money”. Moreover, the
Annual Report states that: “The exchange rate for [RS] dinar was tied to FRY dinar, since the ratio
was 1:1.” 108 This statement is consistent with the summarizing remark in the same document that,
after Bosnia and Herzegovina declared itself an independent State on 3 March 1992, “the territory
of Republika Srpska remained within the same ec onomic system as the FRY. This practically
109
meant that the National Bank pursued the same monetary policy as the NBY.”
46. In a report by the National Bank of Re publika Srpska on the meeting with the Bankers’
Association of the Republika Srspka, held in May 1994 110, this report stated that: the monetary
policies of the RS and the FRY were the same, the economic system was the same. The Republika
Srspka and the FRY belonged to a unified paymen t system, monetary system and unified foreign
exchange market. This document provides furthe r evidence of the complete integration of the
economic and monetary systems of the RS and the FRY.
47. The primary benefit and primary purpose of the federated restructuring of important
aspects of the banking industry and of the creation of the federated banking system was to ensure
the closest of financial links between the FR Y and its satellite entities, Republika Srpska and
Republika Srpska Krajina. Thus, in 1992, the period covered by the NBRS Annual Report, the
finances of the FRY and the RS and the RSK were so closely integrated that Republika Srpska and
Republika Srpska Krajina were themselves hamper ed by the embargo placed on the FRY. The
FRY was, in practice, the only trade and co mmercial partner of bot h Republika Srpska and
Republika Srpska Krajina. However, the modifications in the control of the national banks enabled
a more formalized and, at the same time, mo re subordinated relations hip between Republika
Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina and the FRY.
106
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab14, also referred to as
C4769. This exhibit contains several documents, ERN 0211-4196-4209.
107
Ibid., ERN 0211-4196-4209; page numbers absent; the stat ement is on the page immediately following the
table of contents, the registry page number (top right) is p. 17282.
108
Ibid., ERN 0211-4206, registry page number p. 17275.
10Ibid., ERN 0211-4199, registry page number p. 17281.
11Ibid., ERN 0211-4146-4154, registry page number pp. 17329-17323. - 44 -
The relationship between the National Bank of Yugoslavia (the NBY) and its subordinated
branches, the National Bank of Republika Srpska (the NBRS) and the National Bank of
Republika Srpska Krajina (the NBRSK)
48. A report written by Milivoje Mileti ć, then a Director of the National Bank of
111
Yugoslavia : Mileti ć was assigned by the management of the National Bank of Yugoslavia to
analyse and review the operations of the Nati onal Bank of Republika Srpska in terms of the
elements to implement the Monetary Policy Pr ogramme in the FRY, Republika Srpska and
Republika Srpska Krajina. Mileti ć was visiting the National Bank of Republika Srpska between
4 and 8 April, 1994. Miletić in his report analyses the restructuring of the national banking system;
details the three discrete stages of the restructuring; and explains the workings of the restructured
banks.
“ Phase One: The period when the RS formed the National Bank of RS which
performed the function of the central bank in its territory. This period began in the
second half of 1992.
PhTaso : The period when the ‘Elements for the implementation of the
programme’ began to be applied.
PhThsree : The period when the ‘Programme for the Reconstruction of the
Monetary System and the Strategy for th e Economic Recovery of Yugoslavia’ was
applied.”
Phase One
M4ile.ti ć’s report characterizes the genesis of Phase One:
“This was a time when certain instituti ons of Republika Srpska were formed,
including the National Bank of Republika Srpska [the NBRS]. In such circumstances,
it was normal to issue primary money on the basis of previous experience, coming
primarily from the National Bank of Yugoslavia.” 112
During that period, the monetary and credit policy in Republika Srpska was carried out
primarily through expert co-operation between th e National Bank of Yugoslavia and the National
Bank of Republika Srpska.
Mileti ć’s report, in addition to confirming that the National Bank of Yugoslavia provided
“expert assistance”, as we read in the 1992 NBRS Annual Report ⎯ quoted earlier ⎯ also states
111
Ibid., ERN 0211-4114-0211-4219.
112
Ibid., 0211-4115, translation, p. 2. - 45 -
that the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade directly provided Yugos lav dinars as well, and
further that the largest proportion was given for the budget of the RS:
“From the second half of 1992 onwards, primary money was issued through
banks and the budget so that on 31 Decemb er 1992, the balance of primary issue
credits was 77.8 billion dinars [the e quivalent of 166.4 million DEM]. About
14.3percent of these credits, or 11.1 billio n dinars, were given through the banks,
while the remaining 85.7 per cent or 66. 7 billion dinars [the equivalent of
113
142.6million DEM] were giv114for the budget of Republika Srpska.” [Equivalent
to 166.4 million DEM.]
Phase Two
50. The second phase saw the implementation of the “Programme to Regulate a Single
Monetary Policy in the FRY, the RS and the RS K”. This programme came into force on 1 March
1993, starting with the establishment of “full co-operation” between the National Bank of
Yugoslavia, the NBRS and the NBRSK. However, it readily becomes clear from the report that
“co-operation” is inappropriate as a description of the relationship between the three national
banks. The National Bank of Yugoslavia had the primary role and the NBRS and the NBRSK took
decidedly secondary roles.
M 5l.ti ć’s report goes on to state that the NBRS and NBRSK “would bring all monetary
and credit regulation instruments in line with relevant monetary and credit regulation decisions of
115
the National Bank of Yugoslavia” . Moreover, it was especially stressed that the “interest rate
policy and thus the discount rate, the compul sory reserves policy... would be completely
co-ordinated with relevant instruments of the National Bank of Yugoslavia”. The National Bank of
Yugoslavia would issue orders for the use of th e foreign currency reserves from the National Bank
of Republika Srpska and the National Bank of Republika Srpska Krajina 11.
52. So, the assets of these national banks fell under the direct control of the Belgrade-based
National Bank of Yugoslavia. Mileti ć concludes that, in the implementation of Phase Two of the
policy “the National Bank of Republika Srpska fully co-operated with the NBY”.
113
Ibid., ERN 0211-4115, translation, p. 2.
114
The exchange rate data is based ondata provided directly by the Governor of the NBY or upon the figures
published daily in the Belgrade-based newspaper, Politika. For this calculation, the data is taken from what was published
in Politika on 2 December 1992.
115
Ibid., ERN 0211-4116, translation, p. 3.
11Ibid., ERN 0211-4117, translation, p. 4. - 46 -
Phase Three: “Programme for the Reconstr uction of the Monetary System and the
Strategy for the Economic Recovery of Yugoslavia”
53. The programme created a single monetary region to include the FRY, the RS and the
RSK. This programme came into effect on 1 March 1994. Here, the NBRS is commended by
Miletić because: “As legal tender, the new dinar func tions fully in the territory of the Republika
117
Srpska.” Additionally, “[t]he bank’s interest rate policy is being guided by the National Bank of
118
Republika Srpska in accordance with the intentions of the Programme”
54. The successful monetary integration between the RS and the FRY is also confirmed by a
letter, dated 2June 1995, from the Governor of the National Bank of Republika Srpska to the
National Bank of Yugoslavia. This letter con cerns the withdrawal and replacement of banknotes
by the National Bank of Yugoslavia:
“During the period of banknote replacement National Bank of Republika Srpska
collected 12,506,000 dinars [the equivalent at that time of
12,506,000Deutschmarks]... The said banknotes are hereby delivered to the
treasury of the National Bank of Yugoslavia in order to be replaced by the appropriate
amount of valid banknotes.” 119
55. In order to facilitate and legitimate th e third phase of the programme, the NBRS would
have needed to pass domestic legislation in the form of “National Bank Laws” and “Laws on
Banks”. Miletić’s report notes, however, that, due to “delay ” and the fact that “by-laws have not
been passed by the competent organs” the NBRS took the step of “applying existing regulations of
the National Bank of Yugoslavia a nd regulations passed by the competent organs of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia” 120.
56. Just as the interest and discount rates of the Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska
Krajina were to be governed by those of the Na tional Bank of Yugoslavia, so too was the situation
with the banking regulations. In this context, it is significant that the title given to phase three of
the process described above was “Programme for the Reconstruction of the Monetary System and
the Strategy for the Economic Recovery of Yugoslavia”. There is no mention here of the economic
117
Ibid., ERN 0211-4120, translation, p. 7.
11Ibid., ERN 0211-4120, translation, p. 7.
11ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab16, also referred to as
C4810.
12ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit P427, tab14, also referred to as
C4769, BCS 0211-4120, translation, p. 7. - 47 -
recovery of the RS or the RSK as independent entities. So, the programme is on “the Economic
Recovery of Yugoslavia” and the interest rates of the National Bank of Republika Srpska and
Republika Srpska Krajina are to be governed by the National Bank of Yugoslavia, clearly
indicating the subordinated relationship of the national banks of the RS and the RSK to their parent
bank in Belgrade, the NBY.
57. The operation of the new dinar, the aim of Phase Three, is governed by “Instructions for
work with the National Bank of Republika Srps ka and the National Bank of Republika Srpska
121
Krajina” , which detail the terms and operating conditi ons of the single monetary policy. The
yearly activities of the three entities operate in a structure which, under widely accepted accounting
rules, would govern the relationship between a parent company and its subsidiaries. This is what
these “instructions” “regulating a single monetary policy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina” tell the various banks to do:
“9. To form a single consolidated bala nce sheet of banks and balance sheet of
the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the Nati onal Banks of Republika Srpska and the
Republic of Serbian Krajina will submit their balance sheets and the balance sheets of
the banks from those areas for December 199 3 and January 1994 by 10 March this
year. For the following months, these balance sheets will be submitted to the National
Bank of Yugoslavia Centre for Computer Processing and Statistics according to the
deadlines that have been established by th e National Bank of Yugoslavia for banks
from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Research Centre of the
National Bank of Yugoslavia will make sep arate monetary policy projections for
Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia n Krajina and monitor the fulfilment of
these projections.”122
“Submit their balance sheets and balance sheets of the banks from those areas... 10 March this
year.” The order is dated “Belgrade, 28 February 1994.”
58. We have seen how the National Bank of Re publika Srpska regarded its relationship with
Belgrade and we have seen the instructions from Belgrade to the National Bank of Republika
Srpska tell us about the actual structure of the re lationship. We have also seen that the National
Bank of Yugoslavia’s Director Mileti ć regarded the subsidiary banks as complying well with the
regulations and governing protocols emanating from Belgrade.
121
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit427, tab15, also referred to as
C4764.
12Ibid., BCS 0207-6895, translation, p. 3. - 48 -
59. If all of the issues and documents discussed before would leave any doubt about the true
nature of the financial structure of these three en tities, the Official Note “from the meeting of the
governors of the three national banks”, which t ook place on 12 May 1994, cannot fail to leave the
Court in any doubt whatsoever. This note clearly confirms the subordinated role of the National
Bank of Republika Srpska and the National Bank of Republika Srpska Krajina in their relationship
to the National Bank of Yugoslavia:
“2. The National Bank of Republika Sr pska and the National Bank of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina operate as th e main branches of the Yugoslav National
Bank and under its authority alone.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. The National Bank of Republika Sr pska and the National Bank of the
Republic of Serbian Krajina shall implemen t the decisions of the Yugoslav National
Bank in a disciplined manner.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. The Governor of the National Bank of Republika Srpska and the Governor of
the National Bank of Republika Srpska Kra jina are required to attend the sessions of
the Council of the Yugoslav National Bank without a voting right.” 123
Concluding remarks
60. Madam President, Members of the Cour t, I have demonstrated to you how the
Belgrade-controlled financing was twofold, direct ed at both Serb-controlled areas in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia. The money went directly towards financing the Serb military units and
civilian government organs in both of these Statelets.
The documents I have both referred to and pr esented demonstrate that funding for the army
of the Republika Srpska, the army of the Republik a Srpska Krajina and the army of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia emerged from a single financing plan for all three Serb armies. Further,
these documents show that there existed only one real source for providing funding for these
armies: the National Bank of the Federal Re public of Yugoslavia, which was under the total
control of the Serbian political leadership.
12ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Exhibit 427, tab18, also referred to as
C4779, pp. 2 and 3. - 49 -
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided the financial resources to the army of the
Republika Srpska and the army of the Republika Sr pska Krajina both directly and indirectly:
directly, by paying the salaries for the officers in these armies; indirectly, through the provision of
primary issues from Belgrade to the other two Serbentities to cover the budget deficits of the
Republika Srpska and the Republika Srpska Krajina in 1992 and 1993.
In order to streamline all of this, the onomies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina were organized into a structure that can best be
described as a single economic and monetary entity.
The government institutions of the Federal Re public of Yugoslavia controlled, implemented
and organized this entity.
Madam President, this ends my pleading on financial issues. I would like to ask the Court to
give the floor to Professor Condorelli.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Torkildsen. When the compte rendu is being
prepared of your presentation it will be necessary to indicate, when you do intermittently refer to
the “bundle of documents”, exactly which page ofthose documents is being referred to, at what
juncture and for this to be given a number in the judges’ folder. Thank you.
I call on Professor Condorelli.
COMN. DORE:LLI
L E GENOCIDE EST ATTRIBUABLE AU DEFENDEUR ⎯ CONCLUSIONS JURIDIQUES
(Première partie)
1. Introduction (rappel)
L’attribution au défendeur des comportements, interdits par la convention de 1948, de ses
organes de jure ou de facto, ainsi que des comportements des personnes ou groupes de
personnes ayant agi sur les instructions ou les directives ou sous le contrôle du défendeur
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur pour moi d’apparaître
encore une fois devant votre Cour et je suis très reconnaissant au Gouvernement de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine de la confiance qu’il m’a accord ée en me demandant de plaider en sa faveur.
Ma mission, dans cette première intervention,est de vous présenter les arguments juridiques - 50 -
permettant d’établir que le génocide perpétré contre les non-Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine engage
bien la responsabilité internati onale du défendeur, du fait que les comportements constitutifs du
génocide lui sont attribuables. Après moi, le professeur Pellet viendra compléter l’exposé relatif à
l’attribution au défendeur d’autres conduites (condu ites «ancillaires») qui sont couvertes aussi et
interdites par la convention de1948. Par la su ite encore, je vous dema nderai la permission de
revenir encore à la barre pour compléter l’analys e, en discutant d’abord des effets juridiques
produits par la reconnaissance à posteriori par le dé fendeur de son implication dans le génocide, et
puis, demain matin je pense, de l’attributio n au défendeur des manquements à l’obligation de
prévention et de répression du génocide.
2. Nous allons baser nos exposés sur l’ensemb le des données, tant de caractère factuel que
juridique, qui ont été illustrées dans les pièces écrites du demandeur et par ses conseils qui ont pris
la parole avant moi. Il vous a été démontré en premier lieu ce qui, en réalité, n’avait nul besoin
d’être démontré, tellement c’est un événement notoire, auquel nous avons tous assisté dans
l’horreur: un effroyable génocide, correspondant parfaitement à la définition prévue par la
convention de 1948, a bien été commis contre les populations non serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Déjà au cours de cette démonstration il a été possible de relever un nombre impressionnant de
facteurs, d’indices, de preuves montrant du doigt combien ce génocide met directement en cause le
défendeur, et combien il a d’ailleurs été perçu par la communauté internationale comme le mettant
en cause. Il suffit de rappeler la teneur nette des résolutions pertinentes des divers organes des
Nations Unies des années 1992 et suivantes que le professeur Franck a citées la semaine dernière.
Ces facteurs, indices et preuves ont été ensuite étayés systématiquement au travers d’une
présentation analytique des faits pertinents: des fa its dont la véracité est établie, pour la majorité
d’entre eux, grâce à des vérifications judiciair es approfondies et impartiales, résultant de
procédures contentieuses garantissant pleinement les droits de la défense, comme c’est
indiscutablement le cas pour le Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie. Ai-je besoin de
rappeler l’enseignement de votre Cour, lorsqu’elle ⎯ tout récemment ⎯ a mis en évidence, dans
votre arrêt du 19 décembre dernier, ce qui suit :
«une attention particulière mérite d’être prêtée aux élém ents de preuve obtenus par
l’audition d’individus directement concernés et soumis à un contre-interrogatoire par - 51 -
des juges rompus à l’examen et à l’appréciation de grandes quantités d’informations
124
factuelles, parfois de nature technique» .
3. Ces examens des faits ont permis ⎯pour ainsi dire ⎯ de disséquer la machine
génocidaire: sa conception, l es pièces maîtresses de son agence ment, son fonctionnement tout
entier révèlent, si l’on y regarde de près, la ma in de l’appareil gouvernemental de l’époque du
défendeur. En somme, il est déjà apparu que le génocide a eu lieu grâce à ses décisions et à son
action, qu’il a été exécuté à son instigation, sous sa direction et en appliquant ses directives. La
responsabilité du défendeur est donc engagée non seulement au plan moral et politique, mais
juridique aussi, en application des principes établis du droit international en vigueur. Les principes
que je suis en train maintenant d’évoquer, et dont la Bosnie-Herzégovine demande à votre Cour de
faire application, sont bien entendu ceux relatifs à l’ attribution des faits à l’Etat, dont le contenu et
la portée ont été explicités vendredi dernier par le professeur Pellet.
4. Permettez-moi de rappeler maintenant, pour mémoire, quels sont les critères d’attribution
apparaissant en principe davantage pertinents aux fins de mon exposé. Le premier est celui d’après
lequel l’Etat se voit attribuer tous les comportements de tous ses organes, et ce même au cas où
ceux-ci auraient agi en outrepassant leur compéten ce ou en contrevenant aux instructions reçues:
c’est ce que proclament les articles4 et7 des ar ticles sur la responsabilité des Etats mis au point
par la Commission du droit international. Le sec ond principe est celui, codifié à l’article8 de ce
texte, prévoyant que le comportement d’une pers onne ou d’un groupe de personnes ne revêtant pas
le statut d’organe de l’Etat peut toutefois être considéré comme un fait de l’Etat, d’après le droit
international, si cette personne ou ce groupe de personnes, en adoptant ce comportement, «agit en
fait sur les instructions ou les directives ou sous le contrôle de cet Etat».
5. Il me semble essentiel, à titre liminaire, Ma dame le président, d’attirer votre attention sur
des points importants, relatifs à l’interprétation qu’il convient de donner de chacun de ces deux
principes : des points que le professeur Pellet a par ailleurs déjà discutés en profondeur.
6. Concernant le second principe évoqué, il convient d’insister sur un aspect. L’imputation à
l’Etat des comportements d’individus ne faisant pas partie de son appa reil organique ne peut
intervenir que lorsqu’il est prouvé que l’individu en question, tout en ne revêtant pas la qualité
124Affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (Congo c. Ougand, arrêt du 19décembre2005,
par. 61. - 52 -
d’organe de l’Etat, a agi effectivement «pour son compte»: telle était la formulation, «pour son
compte», retenue par la Commission du droit intern ational en première lecture du projet sur la
responsabilité internationale des Etats. On sa it qu’en deuxième lecture, puis dans la version
finalisée du texte des articles, la formulation du prin cipe a été sensiblement retouchée par souci de
clarté et de précision : la Commission a voulu mieux spécifier ce que «pour le compte» veut dire,
en distillant la pratique internationale qui s’est ép aissie considérablement ces derniers temps. Le
libellé finalement retenu met en exergue qu’un comportement donné d’un individu ou d’un groupe
d’individus doit être considéré comme effectué «pour le compte» d’un Etat (et donc attribué à
celui-ci), dans trois cas de figure: primo, quand l’Etat a donné aux individus en question les
«instructions» afin qu’ils agissent de la sorte; secundo, quand lesdits individus se sont conformés
aux «directives» de l’Etat; tertio, s’ils ont agi «sous le contrôle» de cet Etat. A maintes reprises la
Commission du droit international a in sisté sur le fait qu’il s’agit de conditions alternatives 125 : le
professeur Pellet a déjà cité le rapport de la Co mmission à l’Assemblée de2001, où il est bien
souligné que «dans le texte de l’article 8 les troi s termes «instructions», «directives» et «contrôle»
sont disjoints; il suffit d’établir la réalité de l’un d’entre eux» 126. En somme, si par exemple l’Etat a
127
donné des «orientations précises» (c’est un terme qu’utilise la Commission) , il n’y aura pas
besoin de prouver de surcroît qu’il a directemen t contrôlé les actions des individus s’étant
conformés à ses «directives» pour que ces actions lui soient imputées.
7. J’en viens maintenant au premier principe évoqué, le plus central de tous: celui d’après
lequel sont attribuables à l’Etat tous les actes et toutes les omissions de ses organes. Le seul point
que j’entends souligner à nouveau à titre liminaire t ouche à la notion même d’organe de l’Etat; il
s’agit de la question de savoir quel est l’ordre ju ridique auquel il faut avoir recours afin de
déterminer si, oui ou non, une personne ou un gr oupe de personnes revêt le statut d’organe de
l’Etat. La réponse à cette question ne fait aucun dou te en règle générale : il va de soi que chaque
125L’idée selon laquelle les conditions de l’article 8 sont alternatives est ains i exprimée, lors de la finalisation de
l’article 8, par le président du comité rédaction, le jugeSimma : «Il y a lieude noter qu’il s’agit-là de critères qui
peuvent se substituer l’un à l’autre : le comité de rédaction a estimé qu’ie ne faut pas restreindre la portée de l’article 8 en
exigeant le cumul des deux critères [par exemple, direction et contrôle]», 2562 séance, 13 août 1998, in Annuaire de la
Commission du droit international, 1998, vol. I, p. 306, par. 79.
126
Rapport de la Commission du droit international, cinquante-troisième session, 2001, A/56/10, p. 114, par. 7.
127Ibid. - 53 -
Etat jouit du droit souverain de s’organiser à sa façon et que partant c’est à son droit interne qu’il
revient d’établir qui sont ses organes. Il s’ensuit que, lorsque l’ordre juridique interne de l’Etat
accorde le statut d’organe, l’existence de ce statut est incontestable sur le plan international : tous
les agissements de tous ceux qu’un Etat qualifie, au moyen de son droit interne, comme ses organes
sont des faits de l’Etat en droit international.
8. Mais la primauté absolue du droit interne pour ce qui est de l’identification des organes de
l’Etat ne peut signifier «exclusivité absolue». En effet, il y a des cas dans lesquels le droit
international a son mot à dire dans ce domaine, not amment lorsqu’un Etat, seul maître de son droit
interne, tenterait d’utiliser ce droit de mani ère dolosive afin d’échapper à sa responsabilité
internationale et dans ce but éviterait d’octroyer le statut d’organe à des personnes ou des groupes
de personnes dont il se sert effectivement en tant qu’organes. Or, «il n’est pas … contestable qu’un
Etat ne peut invoquer son droit interne pour se s oustraire à sa responsabilité», alors que «on peut
invoquer le droit interne d’un Etat pour établir sa responsabilité internationale» (c’est le professeur
128
Bennouna qui l’avait observé dans les débats de la Commission) . Par conséquent, il fallait,
comme le dit le rapporteur spécial James Crawford, répondre de façon appropriée «au souci très net
de plusieurs gouvernements d’éviter que la qualifica tion par le droit interne de l’entité considérée
ne soit utilisée pour échapper à une responsabilité qui serait normalement attribuée à l’Etat» 129.
9. On sait bien comment la Commission s’y est finalement prise pour régler cette question.
Le texte final des articles, après avoir consacré au premier alinéa de l’article 4 le principe suivant
lequel est un fait de l’Etat, d’après le droit intern ational, «le comportement de tout organe de
l’Etat», précise dans son deuxième alinéa que «Un organe comprend toute personne ou entité qui a
ce statut d’après le droit interne de l’Etat.» Et le commentaire d’expliquer, par des mots méritant
d’être mis en exergue à nouveau après le professeur Pellet :
«un Etat ne saurait, pour se soustraire à sa responsabilité du fait d’une entité qui agit
véritablement en tant qu’un de ses organes, se contenter de dénier ce statut à l’entité
en question en invoquant son droit intern e. C’est cette idée que rend le mot
«comprend» employé au paragraphe 2.» 130
128 e
Comptes rendus analytiques des séan ces de la cinquantième session, 2555 séance, 4 août 1998, in Annuaire
de la Commission du droit international, 1998, vol. I, p. 258, par. 10.
129
Ibid., p. 261, par. 34.
130Rapport de la Commission du droit international, note 3 ci-dessus, p. 95, par. 11. - 54 -
10. On notera combien cette explication corr espond à l’une des indications données par le
président du comité de rédaction de l’époque à la Commission, le juge Simma, lorsqu’il avait
annoncé. (Je cite en anglais parce que, dans l’ Annuaire, cette phrase n’est pas citée intégralement,
alors qu’on la trouve citée dans une autre publication que j’ai citée dans ma note.)
«The commentary … will explain the supplementary role of international law in
situations in which internal law does not provide any classification or provides an
incorrect classification of a person or an ent131 which in fact operates as a State organ
within the organic structure of the State.»
11. C’est, on le comprend bien, une conception saine, parfaitement en harmonie avec les
caractéristiques d’un système privilégiant l’effec tivité, comme c’est le cas de l’ordre juridique
international. Mais il convient surtout de remarquer que tout récemment votre Cour s’est exprimée
favorablement à son sujet, de façon certes rapide, mais, me semble-t-il, extrêmement claire. Dans
l’arrêt du 19 décembre 2005 en l’affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo
(République démocratique du Congo c.Ouganda) , vous avez réglé par la négative la question de
savoir si les actions d’une milice paramilitaire, le Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC),
devaient être vues comme attribuables à l’Ouganda 132. Vous êtes parvenus à cette conclusion
négative parce que vous avez considéré que la par tie intéressée n’avait pas fourni de preuves
suffisantes pour vous convaincre que le comportement du MLC était celui d’un «organe» de
l’Ouganda au sens de l’article 4 du projet d’artic les de la Commission, voire d’une entité exerçant
des prérogatives de puissance publique pour son compte (art. 5). Donc, votre Cour admet de plano
la possibilité qu’une entité ⎯en l’espèce, une formation paramilitaire ⎯ soit qualifiée, le cas
échéant, d’organe d’un Etat au niveau de l’effectiv ité, alors que le droit interne de l’Etat concerné
n’accorde pas ce statut: il faudra pour cela administrer la preuve que, même à défaut de statut
formel d’organe, l’entité en question «in fact opera tes as a State organ within the organic structure
133
of the State» , pour répéter cette formule efficace. C’est seulement après avoir exclu ⎯ faute de
preuves appropriées ⎯ une telle hypothèse, que vous avez cher ché à déterminer (à la lumière du
131Déclaration du président, note 2 ci-d essus, p. 6. Cependant, le passage cité ne figur e pas dans son intégralité
dans l’Annuaire : le dernier membre de phrase a disparu, alors qu’on le retrouve cité au complet par le juge Simma, «The
Work of the International Law Commission at Its Fiftieth Session (1998)», Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 67,
1998, p. 452.
132Affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du C ongo (République démocratique du Congo c.Ouganda) ,
note 1 ci-dessus, par. 160.
133Note 8 ci-dessus. - 55 -
principe consacré à l’article 8 du texte de la Commission) si le MLC avait agi sur les instructions
ou les directives ou sous le contrôle de l’Ouga nda, et avez estimé ne pas disposer, ici non plus,
d’éléments probants que tel était le cas.
12. Reste, bien sûr, à déterminer quelles s ont les conditions perme ttant d’affirmer qu’une
entité donnée, tout en n’ayant pas le statut d’organe d’après le droit interne de l’Etat, doit tout de
même être assimilée à un organe sur le plan de l’ effectivité. Il y a vingtans, votre Cour avait
donné, en passant, une indication fort suggestive à ce sujet, qui n’est cependant pas reprise dans la
suite du jugement auquel je suis en train de faire allusion. Au paragraphe 110 de l’arrêt de 1986 en
l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Ni caragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua
c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), la Cour avait dit que les preuves fournies à l’époque par le demandeur,
concernant les contras, ne suffisaient pas «à démontrer leur totale dépendance par rapport à l’aide
134
des Etats-Unis» . Or quelques lignes plus tôt, au paragr aphe 109, la Cour avait préfiguré quelles
auraient été, en matière d’attribution, les imp lications d’une pareille «totale dépendance». Le
passage pertinent est le suivant :
«La Cour doit déterminer si les liens entre les contras et le Gouvernement des
Etats-Unis étaient à un tel point marqués par la dépendance d’une part et l’autorité de
l’autre qu’il serait juridiquement fondé d’assimiler les contras à un organe du
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ou de les c onsidérer comme agissant au nom de ce
135
gouvernement.»
En somme, déjà en 1986, votre Cour avait e nvisagé la possibilité qu’u ne entité apparemment
détachée d’un Etat soit tout de même qualifi ée d’organe de cet Etat au cas où sa «totale
dépendance» serait établie. Mais la Cour n’avait pas été plus loin : elle n’avait pas approfondi sa
réflexion sur l’organisation de l’Etat, puisqu’elle avait décidé de se tourner vers la question de
savoir quelles sont les conditions pe rmettant d’établir qu’une personne ne faisant pas partie de la
structure organique de l’Etat a pourtant agi au nom de celui-ci.
13. Ces concepts et suggestions importants doive nt être gardés, à mon sens, à l’esprit tout au
long de l’analyse qui va suivre. Comme il faut garder à l’esprit que l’attribution à l’Etat des
comportements de ses organes (qu’ils soient ou non qualifiés comme tels par le droit interne
134
Activités militaires et param ilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (N icaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 62, par. 110.
135Ibid., par. 109. - 56 -
concerné) joue de jure de manière générale et n’est soumise à aucune condition; en particulier, aux
fins de l’attribution, il n’y a nullement à appor ter la preuve que chacun des comportements des
organes en question a fait l’objet d’instructions ou de directives spécifiques de l’Etat, voire qu’il a
été effectué spécifiquement sous son contrôle. En fin, je rappellerai encore un concept important,
que tout le monde s’accorde à considérer comme i ndiscutable: l’attribution à l’Etat de tous les
comportements de ses organes inte rvient même si ceux-ci ont agi ultra vires , c’est-à-dire en
outrepassant leurs compétences ou en violant les inst ructions reçues par des organes supérieurs.
C’est, on le sait, ce que souligne l’article 7 du texte de la Commission.
14. Madame le président, Messieurs les jug es, je clos ces propos introductifs en vous
annonçant déjà quelle va être la conclusion de ma plaidoirie. La Bosnie-Herzégovine est
convaincue que l’hypothèse que dans votre a rrêt du 19 décembre dernier vous aviez jugée
juridiquement admissible, mais non prouvée en l’espèce, peut être en revanche pleinement prouvée
dans le cas présent. Le défendeur porte la r esponsabilité internationale du génocide parce que
celui-ci a été perpétré par des personnes et des entités qui sont toutes à considérer comme ses
organes : certains parce que qualifiés comme organe s par le droit interne concerné, d’autres parce
qu’ils agissaient en fait en tant qu’organes «within the organic structure of the State».
2. Les actes des organes de jure de la Serbie-et-Monténégro
Le génocide a été conçu, préparé et organisé par des organes de jure du défendeur
15. Madame le président, les pièces écrite s déposées par la Bosnie-Herzégovine et les
plaidoiries que vous avez écoutées jusqu’à présent vous ont présenté toute une série de faits
précédant la perpétration du génocide, des faits qui montrent que l’appareil gouvernemental
yougoslave, confronté à un processus de dislocati on de l’Etat, a d’abord conçu puis préparé le
«nettoyage ethnique» de la partie du territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine ayant été jugée comme
devant revenir aux Serbes sur la base de critères divers, relatifs, d’une part, à la majorité serbe de la
population habitant les diverses circonscriptions te rritoriales et, d’autre part, à cause de prétendus
«titres historiques». Au sommet de la pyramide des responsabilités, concernant tant la conception
et la préparation du génocide que sa mise en oeuvre, il y a, on le sait, la hiérarchie suprême de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie, avec à sa tê te le président de la Serbie, Slobodan Miloševi ć, - 57 -
sub judice en ce moment à quelques pas d’ici pour ⎯ entre autres choses ⎯ crime de génocide. Il
va de soi que tous ces faits préparant le génocide, et mettant en place les instruments par lesquels il
serait réalisé, sont des faits d’organes de l’Etat, voire d’entités habilitées par le droit de cet Etat à
exercer des prérogatives de puissance publique, d onc indiscutablement des faits attribuables à
l’Etat. L’attribution joue ⎯ il ne faut pas l’oublier ⎯ tant pour ce qui est des comportements des
organes du gouvernement central que pour ceux des co llectivités territoriales, ainsi que le souligne
l’article 4, premier alinéa, du texte auquel je suis en train de me référer de la Commission du droit
international. Ceci signifie que toutes les décisions et actions ayant contribué à la préparation du
génocide qui ont été adoptées par les autorités publiques de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie,
y compris celles de la Bosnie-Herzégovine aussi longtemps que celle-ci continuait à constituer une
composante de l’Etat fédéral yougoslave, sont à considérer comme des comportements de jure de
cet Etat, donc attribuables à celui-ci. Une telle attribution ne joue cependant pas ⎯ il faut bien sûr
l’admettre ⎯ pour les conduites des organes des collectivit és territoriales ayant pris dans les faits
une posture sécessionniste, ainsi qu’il ressort d’ailleur s des principes sous-jacents à l’article 10 du
texte de la Commission, relatif au «comportement d’un mouvement insurrectionnel ou autre».
16. Concernant ce que j’ai appelé la mise en place, par l’appareil gouvernemental
yougoslave, des instruments par lesquels le génocid e serait réalisé, la Bosnie-Herzégovine a déjà
attiré l’attention de la Cour sur les grands axes des mesures adoptées. Il s’est agi de la
réorganisation progressive des structures militaires en Bosnie-Herzégovine de manière à concentrer
dans toute la mesure du possible en mains serbes les ressources humaines et matérielles pertinentes.
17. Pour obtenir ce résultat, des dispositions ont été prises, des ordres donnés et exécutés
pour :
1. désarmer les forces de la défense territorial e, qui dépendaient des Républiques fédérées et
étaient recrutées et financées par celles-ci, en plaçant leur armement dans les mains de l’armée
fédérale; puis en distribuant largement ces armes à la défense territoriale des zones à majorité
serbe ou à forte présence serbe, ainsi que , plus généralement, aux Serbes de
Bosnie-Herzégovine, de façon à pouvoir compter su r la coopération de milices locales et de
forces militaires irrégulières loyales envers Belgrade; - 58 -
2.«serbianiser» l’armée fédérale et réorganiser la composition de sa présence en
Bosnie-Herzégovine par des roulements d’ hommes, de manière à concentrer en
Bosnie-Herzégovine du personnel (notamment des o fficiers) d’ethnie serbe originaire de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine, alors que les non-Serbes étaient transférés vers d’autres régions du pays;
3. déplacer les garnisons de l’armée fédérale en Bosnie-Herzégovine ve rs des emplacements à
majorité serbe ou à forte présence serbe, en en augmentant en même temps très
considérablement la consistance.
18. Ce dispositif, Madame le président, sera enfin parachevé par la nomination du
e
général Mladić, d’abord (en avril 1992) en tant que vice-commandant du 2 district militaire de la
JNA (couvrant le territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine), puis comme commandant : il assumera cette
fonction le 10 mai 1992, juste avant le retrait (fictif bien sûr) de la JNA. Cela met en évidence que
la République fédérale de Yougosla vie destinait le général Mladi ć au commandement général des
forces armées serbes de la Bosnie-Herzégovine (la future armée da la Republika Srpska), ainsi qu’il
se produisit effectivement. Autrement dit, le choix de placer le général Mladi ć au commandement
de l’armée serbo-bosniaque fut fait à Belgrade: l’agent adjo int de la Bosnie-Herzégovine,
Phon van den Biesen, a déjà parlé à la Cour de la réunion du leadership politique et militaire serbe
du 30 avril 1992, tenue à Belgrade so us la présidence de Slobodan Miloševi ć, au cours de laquelle
136
cette décision fut prise .
19. C’est grâce à l’adoption de cet ensemble de mesures que le génocide allait pouvoir être
exécuté. Dans la suite de la présente plaidoirie je vais justement discuter de l’attribution à l’Etat
yougoslave des actes criminels rentrant dans la dé finition de génocide, dont la liste est dressée à
l’articleII de la convention (tels, par exemple, le meurtre de membres du groupe, les atteintes
graves à leur intégrité physique ou mentale, etc.). Les actes préparatoires que je viens d’évoquer,
tout en ayant rendu possible le génocide, ne s’id entifient pas avec celui-ci. Leur indiscutable
attribution à l’Etat doit donc être évaluée ⎯ainsi que l’illustrera aujourd’hui même le
professeur Pellet ⎯ surtout dans le cadre de l’analyse concernant les crimes dits «ancillaires»
auxquels se réfère l’article III de la convention, à savoir l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide,
136
CR 2006/4, p.26, par.18. - 59 -
l’incitation au génocide ou la complicité dans le génocide. Mais, du fait de leur cohérence, de leurs
conséquences et de leur enchaînement direct avec tous les événements qu’ils ont contribué à
produire, ces actes préparatoires restent à eux seuls des indicateurs très significatifs d’une
responsabilité du défendeur pour le gé nocide allant bien au-delà de la simple incitation ou de la
complicité.
Des organes de jure du défendeur ont participé activement à la perpétration du génocide
20. Madame le président, Messieurs les jug es, dès qu’on se tourne vers le moment de
l’explosion du conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine, en mars 1992, on assiste à l’entrée en
fonctionnement du dispositif militaire mis en place, dont je viens de rappeler les caractéristiques
principales. Son efficacité redoutable est attestée par le fait qu’en moins de deux mois la majeure
partie du territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine ay ant été préalablement identifiée comme devant
revenir aux Serbes était conquise et placée sous cont rôle serbe. Dans ces zones le «nettoyage
ethnique» allait procéder à plein régime : au moment du retrait officiel de la JNA, le 12 mai 1992,
un grand nombre de non-Serbes avaient déjà été tu és ou avaient été terrorisés de manière à être
induits à s’enfuir. Tous ces faits vous sont pa rfaitement connus, comme il est connu qu’ils sont
l’Œuvre de l’armée fédérale yougoslave: les écritu res et les plaidoiries de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
vous l’ont prouvé en détail, et la jurisprudence désormais très riche du TPIY, dont les constats
judiciaires font pleinement foi, en offre d’éclat antes confirmations. Permettez-moi une citation:
celle d’un passage de l’arrêt Tadić du 7 mai1997, où le Tribunal met en exergue la technique
utilisée par la JNA et note :
«125. Entre mars et mai 1992, plusieur s attaques se produisirent … et les zones
constituant d’importants points d’accès en Bosnie ou bordant les grandes lignes
logistiques ou voies de communication furent investies par la JNA …(liste des
lieux)…
126. En général, la prise militaire d’une ville était marquée par l’intervention de
l’artillerie et de tireurs embusqués et par le regroupement des non-Serbes de la zone,
tactique qui entraînait souvent la mort d es civils et l’exode des non-Serbes. Les
non-Serbes demeurés sur place étaient contraints de converger vers des points de
rassemblement dans la localité et étaien t expulsés. Nombre de non-Serbes furent
emprisonnés, frappés et forcés de chanter des chants tchetniks. Cela fut accompagné - 60 -
de la confiscation des objets137 valeur et de la destruction fréquente des biens
mobiliers et immobiliers.»
21. Voilà, Madame le président, résumé en pe u de mots et de manière fort efficace l’horreur
du «nettoyage ethnique» qui commence, le dé but du génocide. Ce début du génocide est
matériellement ⎯ constatons-le ⎯ l’Œuvre de la JNA, c’est-à-dire d’organes de jure de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie: on ne saurait mettre en doute qu’on est confronté ici à une
série de comportements constituant, en droit inte rnational, des faits de l’Etat. Quant à la
contribution importante des milices locales et des fo rmations paramilitaires venant de Serbie et du
Monténégro, j’aurai l’occasion d’y revenir plus tard, cet après-midi, à l’occasion d’un examen
spécifique sous l’angle de l’attribution de leurs ac tivités à la RFY. Qu’il me soit cependant permis
de rappeler tout de suite ce que la Bosnie-Herzé govine a d’ailleurs déjà prouvé à la Cour, ce matin
notamment, confortée en particulier par les constats du Tribunal pé nal international pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie qui se réfèrent justement à l’épo que dont nous sommes en train de discuter : ces
formations
«opéraient en conjonction avec la JNA et ser vaient de troupes d’infanterie de choc,
comme substitut à l’armée régulière devenue plus pauvre en hommes… La JNA, en
particulier l’armée de l’air, aidèrent ces unités paramilitaires en 1991 et 1992,…les
assistant dans leurs opérations militaires et l es ravitaillant généreusement en armes et
en équipements.» 138
22. Ces passages très pertinents d’un arrê t du Tribunal pénal international pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie comportant une analyse des faits extrêmement approfondie et fiable méritent
d’être cités, ceci d’autant plus que dans sa duplique le défendeur reproche à la Bosnie-Herzégovine
d’avoir utilisé l’arrêt en question de manière sél ective et de ne pas avoir fait référence aux ⎯ à ce
139
qu’il appelle ⎯ «key determinations of the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case» . Voilà un étonnant
reproche ! Tant sur le sujet que je suis maintena nt en train d’examiner que sur le suivant, comme
on le verra, les déterminati ons du TPIY dans l’affaire Tadić concernant les faits sont et restent
parmi les bases de l’argumentation de la Bosn ie-Herzégovine. C’est justement sur ces faits,
notamment ceux qui ont été soigneusement vérifi és «par des juges rompus à l’examen et à
137 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Tadi ć, affaire n IT-94-1-T, Chambre de première instance, jugement, 7 mai 1997,
par. 125-126.
138
Ibid., par. 110.
139Duplique, p. 579, par.3.2.3.11, et p. 582, par. 3.2.3.13. - 61 -
l’appréciation de grandes quantités d’in formations factuelles» (c’est le dictum de votre Cour que
j’ai cité il y a quelques minutes), c’est donc sur cet te base que le demandeur vous prie de baser vos
propres conclusions en droit. Je noterai au passage, à propos de l’affaire Tadić, que s’il y a eu
notoirement désaccord entre la Chambre de premièreinstance et la Chambre d’appel du TPIY
concernant la qualification juridique des faits, et si des opinions différentes sur le sujet se sont
manifestées entre les juges composant chacune des Chambres, il y a eu par contre parfaite
unanimité de vues entre tous les juges des deux Ch ambres concernant les faits, que tout le monde a
considérés comme pleinement établis: en particu lier ceux mettant en évidence le rôle actif très
important joué par la JNA dans les événements de Bosnie-Her zégovine tant avant qu’après
mai1992. C’est justement à cet établissement unanime des faits par le TPIY que votre Cour
voudra sans aucun doute accorder une valeur probatoir e décisive, alors qu’elle tirera ses propres
conclusions en pleine autonomie s’agissant d’en évaluer la portée juridique pour ce qui est de
l’attribution.
23. Permettez-moi maintenant de me pencher justement sur les événements survenus après
les premiers mois du conflit, quand la JNA se retirera formellement du territoire de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine (le 19 mai 1992), en réponse à la résolution 752 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité
demandant la cessation de toute interférence de la part de l’armée yougoslave et exigeant justement
son retrait, voire sa soumission aux autorités de la République de Bosnie-Herzégovine. L’armée
serbo-bosniaque va alors être formée par les mo yens et méthodes qui vous ont été amplement
illustrés, et la Republika Srpska (d’abord sous le nom de République serbe de Bosnie-Herzégovine)
va être proclamée. Dans la suite de ma plaidoiri e, cet après-midi, je m’emploierai à démontrer le
bien-fondé de la conviction du demandeur d’après la quelle les comportements tant de la Republika
Srpska que de l’armée de la Re publika Srpska qui rentrent dans la définition de génocide sont à
attribuer à la RFY, et ce même si ni l’une ni l’autre ne peuvent être qualifiées d’organes de jure de
l’Etat en question.
24. Mais il n’y a pas à attendre cette démonstr ation pour affirmer que restent en tout cas
indiscutablement attribuables à la République fé dérale de Yougoslavie les activités de l’armée
yougoslave effectuées dans le territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovi ne au-delà du 19mai1992. Les
preuves de cette très large participation directe et indirecte après son prétendu retrait, apportées par - 62 -
la Bosnie-Herzégovine, sont nombreuses et concluan tes, ainsi que votre Cour a pu le constater.
L’Assemblée générale ne s’y était donc pas trom pée! Qu’il me soit permis de citer à nouveau,
après le professeur Franck, seulement trois de ses résolutions de l’année 1993 attestant la
continuation de la présence des forces armées yougoslaves en Bosnie-Herzégovine après mai 1992.
Le 7avril1993, l’Assemblée dénonçait «l’appui direct et indirect de l’armée populaire
yougoslave» aux actes agressifs en Bosnie-Her zégovine des «forces irrégulières serbes et
monténégrines» et condamnait ensuite que ces «actes agressifs de la Serbie, du Monténégro et des
forces serbes présentes en Bosnie-Herzégovine», exigeant d’eux qu’ils cessent immédiatement et
que les éléments de l’armée populaire yougosla ve présents en Bosnie-Herzégovine soient
140
effectivement retirés ou placés sous l’autorité du gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine . Puis,
le 26avril1993, l’Assemblée revenait à la char ge, faisant valoir la «responsabilité principale»
(principale, entre autres) de la JNA et des «dirigeants politiques de la Serbie» pour la pratique du
nettoyage ethnique en Bosnie-Herzégovine 141. Puis encore, le 29décembre1993, l’Assemblée
condamnait énergiquement, en particulier, les vi olations des droits de l’homme et du droit
international humanitaire aux dépens ensu ite de la population bosniaque «commises
systématiquement, de façon particulièrement flagrante et massive, par la Serbie et Monténégro» 14.
25. L’Assemblée générale est, on le constate, fort bien renseignée de ce qui se passe sur le
terrain, quoique en termes généraux. Votre Cour aussi qui, dans ses ordonnances du 8 avril 1993 et
du 13septembre1993 en la présente affaire, s’ adressa nommément à la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie pour lui demander de prendre les mesu res en son pouvoir afin de prévenir la
commission du crime de génocide et faire cesser les grandes souffrances affligeant la population de
143
Bosnie-Herzégovine . Par la suite, les constatations judiciaires du TPIY viendront confirmer dans
le détail tout cela. Ces constatations détaillées sont incontestables. Tellement incontestables que le
144
défendeur ne peut qu’en admettre la véracité dans sa duplique . Ce qui, que cela soit dit en
passant, signifie en tout cas admettre que la République fédérale de Yougoslavie violait de manière
140A/RES/47/121.
141A/RES/47/147.
142
A/RES/48/88.
143Réplique, p. 4 et suiv.
144Duplique, p. 576 et suiv., par. 3.2.2.7. - 63 -
flagrante toutes les résolutions de l’Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité (à commencer par
la résolution752 (1992) du Conseil), résolutions qu i exigeaient le retrait complet de la JNA du
territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, ainsi que bien entendu les ordonnances de votre Cour. Mais le
défendeur s’évertue, comment dirai-je, de ne utraliser les conséquences évidentes de cette
admission pour ce qui est de l’attribution, en av ançant un argument absolument extraordinaire:
après le 19 mai 1992, les forces armées de la RFY auraient Œuvré en Bosnie-Herzégovine sous le
commandement des autorités militaires de la Re publika Srpska. Chacun comprend que c’est une
allégation vraiment intenable, puisqu’elle va à l’ encontre de ce qui relève de l’évidence même:
l’évidence d’une Republika Srpska, vous l’avez en tendu, et d’une armée de la Republika Srpska
qui dépendait totalement et à tous égards de la RFY.
26. Je pense, Madame le président, que je ne vais pas entamer un nouveau sujet; je vous
demande donc s’il faut que je m’arrête là pour continuer dans l’après-midi. Merci.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Condor elli. The Court will now rise and we shall
resume at 3 o’clock this afternoon when you will again have the floor.
The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 6 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding