Public sitting held on Tuesday 30 May 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Document Number
087-20000530-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2000/6
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non-Corrigé

Uncorrecteci

InternationalCourt Cour internationale
ofJustice deJustice

THEHAGUE LAHAYE

YEAR2000

Publicsitting

held onTuesday30May2000,ut10am., at thePeacePalace,

PresidentGuillaumepresiding

in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbetween
QatarandBahrain (Qatarv. Bahrain)

VERBATIMRECORD

ANNEE 2000

Audiencepublique

tenuelemardi 30 mai 2000,0 heures,au Palais delaPaix,

sous laprésidendeM. Guillaume,président

enI'aflairedelaDélimitationmaritime etdesquestionsterritorialesentre QataretBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)

COMPTERENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer

Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Judges ad hoc TorresBemhdez
Fortier

Registrar CouvreurPrésents:M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi, vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui

Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins

MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBernitrdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffierTheStateof Qataris representedby:

H.E. Dr.Abdullahbin Abdulatif Al-MuslemaniS, ecretary-Generalof theCabinet,

asAgentand Counsel;

Mr.AdelSherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr. SarniAbushaikha,LegalExpert,

as Counsel;

Mr. EricDavid,Professorof InternationalLaw,Universitélibre deBruxelles,
Dr. AlibinFetaisAl-Meri,Directorof Legal Department,DiwanAmiri,
Mr. Jean-PierreQuéneudec, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
MI. Jean Salmon,Professoremeritusof International Law,Université libre deBruxelles,Member
oftheInstitutde droitinternational,

Mr. R.K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, SupremeCourt of India, Former President ofthe
InternationalBarAssociation,
Sir IanSinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,BarristeratLaw,Memberof theInstitute of InternatiLaw,
SirFrancisVallat, G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Professoremeritus ofInternational Law, University of
London,MemberemeritusoftheInstitutdedroitinternational,
Mr. RodmanR. Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appel deParis, Memberof the New YorkBar, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
MsNanetteE. Pilkington,Avocat àla Courd'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,

as CounselandAdvocates;

Ms CherylDunn,Memberofthe State Bar of California, rereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Ms InesSabineWilk, Lawyerbefore the German Courtof Appeal, Memberof the Charnberof
Lawyers of Germany,

as Counsel;

Mr. ScottB.Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(UnitedStatesofAmerica),
Mr. RobertC. Rizmtti, Project Manager,MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland (UnitedStates of
America),
Ms Stephanie K.Clark, SeniorCartographer, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Marylan(dUnitedStates
of America),

as Experts;

H.E. SheikhHamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,MinisterforForeign Affairs,
H.E. Mr.Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,Minister ofState forForeignAffairs,

as Observers.

TheStateofBahrain is representedby:

H.E.Mr.Jawad SalimAl-Arayed, Minister oS ftateofthe State ofBahrain,

asAgent;L'Etatde Qatarest represéntéepa r

S.Exc.M.Abdullahbin AbdulatifAl-Muslemani,secrétaire généradlugouvernement,

comme agentet conseil;

M. Adel Sherbini, conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha, expertjuridique,

comme conseils;

M. Eric David,professeurde droit internatioàal'universitélibredeBruxelles,

M. Ali binFetaisAl-Meri, directeur des affairesjuridisu conseil del'émir,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeurde droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M.Jean Salmon,professeuréméritd eedroitinternational l'université lide Bruxelles,membre
de 1'Institutde droitinternational,
M. R K. P. Shankardass, avocat principaà la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'Associationinternationale du Barreau,

SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,avocat,membredel'Institut de droiinternational,
Sir Francis Vallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,professeurémérite dedroitinternationaà l'université
de Londres,membre honoraire de l'Institut eroitinternational,
M. RodmanR. Bundy, avocat àla Courd'appel deParis,membredubarreau deNew York,cabinet
FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington,avocatà la Courd'appelde Paris, cabinet FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,

Paris,

comme conseilset avocats;

Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de lYEtat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mme Inès SabineWilk, avocat prèsd'unecour d'appeld'Allemagne,membrede la chambre des

avocatsd'Allemagne,

comme conseils;

M. Scott B. Edmonds, directeurdu service des levéscartographiques, société MapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland (Etats-Unis d'Amérique),

M. Robert C. Rizzutti, administrateur de projet, société MapQuest.com, ColumbiM a,aryland
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographehors classe, société MapQuest.comC,olumbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),

comme experts;

S.Exc.le cheikhHamad bin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,ministredesaffairesétrangères,
S. Exc.M.Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministredYEtatauxaffairesétrangères,

comme observateurs.

L'Etatde Bahreïn estrepresentépar :

S.Exc.M.Jawad Salim Al-Arayed,ministre d7EtatdelYEtatde Bahrein,

comme agent;Dr.FathiKemicha,MemberoftheBarof Paris,Kemicha& Associés (Tunis),
Professor SirElihuLauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E., HonoraryProfessor of theUniversityof Cambridge,
MemberoftheInstitut dedroit international,
Mr.Jan Paulsson,Freshfields,Paris,MemberoftheBarsof ParisandtheDistrictof Columbia,
Professor Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of InternationalLaw of Yale Law
School,Memberof theBarofConnecticut, Associateofthe Institutdedroit international,
Mr.Robert Volterra,Freshfields,London,Member of theBar ofUpperCanada,

ProfessorProsperWeil,Emeritus Professor attheUniversity of ParisII (Panthéon-Assas)M, ember
of the Académiedes sciences moraleset politiques (Institut de Franc, ember of the Institut
de droitinternational,

as Counsel andAdvocates;

SheikhKhalidbin Ahmed Al-Khalifa,First Secretary,Ministryof ForeignAffairs of the Stateof
Bahrain,

Commander Christopher CarletonM , .B.E., Headof the Law of theSea Division of the United
KingdomKydrographicOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields,Paris,Member oftheBarsof Paris andBeijing,
Mr.Graham Coop,Freshfields,Paris,Barxisterand Solicitorofthe HighCourt ofNew Zealandand
Solicitorofthe SupremeCourtof Englandand Wales,
Mr.AndrewNewcombe, Freshfields, Paris, Membeo rftheBar of BritishColumbia,
Dr.BethOlsen,Advisor,Ministryof State ofthe StateofBahrain,

Dr. John Wilkinson,Former Reader atthe University of Oxford, Emeritus Fellow, St.Hugh's
College,Oxford,

asAdvisors;

H.E.SheikhMohammedbin MubarakAl Khalifa, MinisterforForeignAffairs, StateofBahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Ambassador of the State of Bahrain to the

Netherlands,
H.E.Dr.MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,Advisorto HisHighness,theAmirof Bahrain,
Mr.GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-SecretaryofForeign Affairs,StateofBahrain,
Her Excellency Sheikha Haya Al Khalifa, Ambassador ofthe State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr. YousefMahrnood,Directorof the Office oftheForeignMinister,Stateof Bahrain,

as Observers;

Mr. JonAddison,MinistryofStateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms Maisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry ofStateof the State of Bahrain,
Mr.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi, Ministry of Statoef the StateofBahrain,
Mr.HafedhAl-Qassab,Ministry of State ofthe StateofBahrain,
MsAneesaHanna,EmbassyofBahrainin London,

MsJeanetteHarding,Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
MsIva Kratchanova,Ministryof State ofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Mr. Kevin Mottram,Freshfields,
Mr.YasserShaheen,SecondSecretary,Ministry of Foreign AffairsoftheStateof Bahrain,

asAdministrativeStaffM.Fathi Kemicha,membre dubarreaude Paris, cabinet Kemicha & Associés, Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E.,professeur honorairà l'universitéde Cambridge,membrede
l'Institutde droitinternational,
M.Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membre des barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. MichaelReisman,professeurde droit internationala l'universitéde Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associé de l'Institut de droit

international,
M. RobertVolterra,cabinetFreshfields,Londres, membredubarreau du Haut Canada,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur éméritea l'université deParisII (Panthéon-Assas), membrede
l'Académiedes sciencesmoralesetpolitiques(Institutde France),membre del'Institutde droit
international,

commeconseils etavocats;

Le cheikh Khalidbin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, premiersecrétaire, ministère desaffaires étrangères de
1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Le capitaine defrégateChristopherCarleton, M.B.E., directeur dela division du droit maritimedu
bureau hydrographiquedu Royaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfields,Paris,membredesbarreauxde Paris et de Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de

Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseillerdela Cour suprêmed'Angleterre et du Pays de Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinetFreshfields,Paris, membre du barreaude la Colombiebritannique,
Mme Beth Olsen,conseiller,ministèredYEtatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancien maître de conférencea l'université d'Oxford, membre éméritedu
CollègeSaintHugh, Oxford,

commeconseillers;

S. Exc. le cheikhMohammedbin MubarakAl Khalifa, ministredes affairesétrangères de Bahreïn,
S. Exc. le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc. M. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,conseillerde SonAltessel'émirde Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi, sous-secrétaired'Etatauxaffairesétrangèresde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
S. Exc. la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de1'Etatde Bahreïn auprès dela République

française,
M. YousefMahmood,directeurdubureauduministredes affairesétrangères de Bahreïn,

commeobservateurs;

M. Jon Addison,ministèredYEtatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoonAl-Arayed, ministèredYEtatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,

M.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. Hafedh Al-Qassab,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme AneesaHanna,ambassadedeBahreïn, Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding, ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahre'in,
MmeVanessaHarris, cabinet Freshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministèred3Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg,cabinetFreshfields,

M. KevinMottram,cabinetFreshfields,
M. YasserShaheen,second secrétaire,ministère des affairesétrangèresde1'Etatde Bahreïn,

commepersonneladministratif: Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest ouverte et je donne la parole au

Dr.Ali bin FetaisAl-Meri pour 1'Etatde Qatar. Vousavezlaparole. Youhavethe floor.

M. AL-MERI :

B.L'ORGANISATI O NL'ADMINISTRATIONOTTOMANEA QATAR

MonsieurlePrésident,Madameet Messieursde la Cour,

1.Introduction

1. Le conseil qui m'a précédé a expliqué la manière do'etntitépolitique de Qatars'est

progressivement créée, sous leouvernement des Al-Thani,pour s'étendre sur l'intégraée la

péninsulede Qatar au cours de la seconde moitiéduXIXe siècle. La présencedes Ottomans à

Qatar,entre 1871et le début dela premièreguerre mondiale, constitueun des éléments importants

de l'histoire de Qatar pendantcette période. Comme je tâcherai de le démontrer, cette présence

ottomanea confirmél'intégntéterritorialede Qatar,en tantqu'entitédistincte.

2. Pour unebonne compréhensionde la manière dontles Ottomansexerçaient leur autoràté

Qatar, il faut d'abord savoircommentétaitorganisée l'administration ottoeans la régiondu

Golfe. Les documents de l'époquequi se trouvent dans les archives ottomanes, y compris les

cartesdresséespar les Ottomansvers la fin duXIXesiècleet au débutXXe siècle,nousmontrent

que les Ottomans considéraientQatar comme un district administratif sépaet distinct, et que

-contrairement aux thèsesavancéespar Bahreïn - ce districtn'était passimplementlimitéaux

environs de Doha, mais s'étendait sur l'intégralitée péninsule de Qatar,y compris les îles

Hawar.

II. La naturedel'administrationottomanedans la région
L
3. Les Ottomans exerçaient leur autoritédans la partie nord du Golfe par le biais d'une

structurecomplexe,comportantune hiérarchied'unitéasdministratives.Ces unitéscorrespondaient
-.
à desprovinces,des sous-provinces,des districtset des villes.

4. Au sommet de cette structure administrative se trouvait la province ou vilayet de

Bassorah, où les Ottomans avaient établi leurcapitale administrative régionale. Le vilayet deBassorahétaitgouvernéparun officierappelévali. Levilayetde Bassorahétaitlui-même diviséen

quatre sous-provinces,ousanjaks. Il s'agissaitdessanjaks de Bassorah, de Muntefîk,de Ammara

et de Hasa (ou de Nejd). Chacundecessanjaks étaitgouvernépar un officierappelémutassariJ

5.A leur tour, lessanjaks étaientdivisésn districts,oukazas, lesquelsétaientgouvernéspar

un gouverneurlocal, appelé kaimakam.Le kaimakamétablissait habituellementsa résidencedans

la ville principale dukaza et cette villeétaitappeléesaba. Le kaza, pour sa part, étaitdiviséen

unités administrativesplus petites, ou nahiyes, qui pouvaient comprendre plusieurs villesou

villagesfioys).

6. Cette structure permettaitun certainniveau de centralisationde l'administrationottomane,

lesmutasarrifs et kaimakamslocauxétantsubordonnésau vali du vilayet. Enréalitéc ,ependant,il

existaitun haut degré d'autonomie au niveaudu kaza, et il n'étaitpas inhabituelqu'un kaimakam

gouverne demanièretrèsautonomeouquasiindépendante,comme cela étalie t cas pour Qatar.

7. Il a déjàétédit que les Ottomansavaient nommé lecheikh Jassim bin Thani de Qatar en

tant que kaimakamdu kazade Qatar. Les documentsnousmontrent que le cheikh Jassim,tout en

professant une allégeancenominaleaux Ottomans eten tolérantune présencemilitaire ottomane à

Qatar, agissait de temps en temps de manière indépendantd eans la péninsule,et se méfiait des

intentionsdes Ottomans.

III. L'étendue dukaza, ou district,de Qatar

8. Afin que la Cour puisse visualiserla structure administrativequeje viens de décrire,il

convientde regarderquelques cartesde larégion, dressées par les Ottomans àl'époqueconcernée.

Ces cartes illustrent trois choses. Tout d'abord,elles illustrenttrèsclairement la hiérarchie entre

les vilayets,les sanjaks, les kazas et les kasabas. Ensuite, elles démontrent, au-de tout doute

possible, que, contrairementà ce que prétendBahreïn, le kaza ou district de Qatar s'étendaitsur

l'intégralité dla péninsulede Qatar. Enfin, elles nous montrentque les Ottomans considéraient

que Bahreïn, sur lequel ils se prétendaientsuzerains, mais quiétaiten fait acceptécomme étant

gouverné parles cheikhslocaux, se limitaitaux îles principales de Bahrein,à l'exclusion desîles

Hawar.

[Afficherà l'écran la carteno35 del'Atlas] 9. J'aifaitafficher àl'écran ucarte extraitede l'Atlasde Qatar (le no33, qui a été dressée

par les Ottomansvers la fin du XIXe siècleet qui représentele vilayet de Bassorah. Le vilayet

entieresttracé surla carte, et estcoloriéenrose pâle [indiquerla carte].

10. Les quatre sanjab que comportaitle vilayet sont égalementénumérés sulra carte [les

indiquer sur lacarte]. Tout d'abord,il y avait lesanjakde Bassorah lui-mêmeq,ui comprenaitla

région entourantla ville de Bassorah. Au nord etl'ouest de Bassorahétait lesanjakde Muntefik.

A l'est de Bassorahet formant lafrontièreavec l'Iran,se trouvaitle sanjakde Ammara. Et au sud

était leplus granddes quatre,leanjakde Hasa ou deNejd, dont lacapitale provinciale se trouvait

à Al-Hufuf.

11. Pour les besoins de laprésente affaire, c'estle sanjakde Nejd qui est le plus pertinent.

Commeje l'ai déjà indiquéc,e sanjakétait diviséen kazas ou districts, dont l'un étaitle kazade

Qatar.

12. En outre, la Cour remarquera égalementque les îles de Bahreïn sont elles-mêmes

indiquées de manière distincte sulra cartediquersurla carte]. On peut aisémentconstaterque

lesîles deBahreïn,telles qu'elles sont indiquéeseimitentàl'île principalede Bahreïnet auxîles

tout près de ses côtes, comme Muharraq [indiquer]. Ni Zubarah, ni les îles Hawar, qui font

pratiquement partie de la côte de Qatar[indiquer],ne-sont indiquéescomme faisant partie de

Bahreïn. A la différence de Qatar, et en raison sans doute de ses liens étroits avec la

Grande-Bretagne,Bahreïn n'était pasconsidérécommeun kazadistinct.

[Afficherà l'écranla carteno15 del'Atlas]

13.L'étenduedu kazade Qatar ressorttrèsclairement decette deuxième carteottomane de

la région,qui vientd'êtreaffichéel'écran.Il s'agitde lacarteno 15de l'Atlasde Qatar.

14.La Cour constatera de nouveau quele sanjakde Nejd est indiqué surla carte. Si nous

regardons Qatar,nous voyons quele kazade Qatar estégalementindiqué de manièretrès claire,le
*
nom «Qatan>recouvrantune bonnepartie de la péninsule de Qatar. La carte ne laisse aucundoute

quantau faitquele kaza a été considécrommeenglobanttoute lapéninsule.

15.En revanche, le kasabade Qatar, lacapitaledu district,est traité sur la carte demanière

toutà fait différente.Il n'était pas inhabituel qu'une capdee district porte le mêmenom que le

kaza lui-même -comme par exemple Koweït. En conséquence, lacarte indique non seulementlekaza de Qatar mais également la ville de Qatar. Si nous regardons l'encart au bas de la carte

[l'indiquer sur la carte], nousvoyons que la ville de Qatarest indiquée trèsdistinctement comme

constituantle kasaba de Qatar.

16.Cettecartecontredittotalement la thèse de Bahreïn,selon laquelleQatarn'étaitconstitué

que par la ville d'Al-Bida et ses environs. Ce à quoi Bahreïn se réfèrecomme constituanttoute

l'étenduede Qatar n'était,tout simplement, que la capitale de district, ou kasaba, de Qatar.

Comme l'indique la carte, le kaza de Qatar était beaucoup plusétendu,et recouvrait toute la

péninsule.

17. Les informations figurant sur la carte sont confirméespar les documents ottomans

eux-mêmes. Par exemple, il existe un rapport interne ottoman, daté de1895, soit la date

approximative de cette carte, et adresséau Grand Vizir. Ce rapport décrit Qatar comme suit :

((L'endroit appeléQatar, sur la côtà centmilles de la garnisond'Ojair, est commeune languequi

seprojettedanslamer entre Oman etl'île de ~ahreïn.))'

18. Cette description démontreque les Ottomans considéraient que Qatar recouvrait la

péninsule entière, oula «langue» de terre décrite dans ledocument. Le même rapportindique

ensuite que:

«La quasi-totalitéde la population est occupéeà la pêche despoissons et des

perles, et les gens ont également une activité commerciale et de navigation. Le
nombre de leurs bateaux varie entre cinqet six cents ...Le centre administratif dece
kaza est le kasaba d'Al-Bida. Le kasaba d'Al-Bida comporte quelque
deuxmille cinqcent maisons construites de pierre et de chaux. Il comporte
onze villages,situés surlacôte.)?

19.Une foisencore, la Couraura vu que les Ottomansfaisaientune distinctionentre le kaza

de Qatar, recouvranttoute lapéninsule,et le kasaba de Qatar,lequel comporteonzevillagesautour

de la ville d'Al-Bida. Si nous regardonsde nouveau la carte,nous voyons qu'un certain nombre

d'autres villages sont indiqués comme faisant partie du kaza de Qatar. Entre autres, il s'agit,

notamment, de Zubarah [l'indiquer sur la carte], qui a été considéré san aucun doute comme

faisant partie du kaza, et ainsi commeétant en-dehorsdes domaines de Bahreïn. Ces pointsont

'~é~li~uedeQatar,annexe11.4vol.2,p.253
'lbid.égalementété confirmé psr un spécialistede l'histoireottomane,le Dr. Zekenya Kursun, dansson

rapportjoint àla répliquede ~atar~.

20. Bahreïn lui-mêmea fourni des confirmations complémentairesde la structure i

administrativeottomane,dans les documentsqu'il aversésaux débats. Ainsi,en annexe 25 b) au

contre-mémoire de Bahreïn,figure un rapport ottoman sur Qatar, datant de 1893, lequel fait une

distinction très nette entre le territoire duaza de Qatar et la capitale de district de Qatar ou

d'Al-Bida. Comme l'indique ce rapport, les Ottomans voulaient s'assurerde «l'établissement

completde la sécuritéed te latranquillitédanstoutes lespartiesdukaza)?.

21. En outre, en annexe35 b) au contre-mémoirede Bahre'ïn,il y a un nouveau rapport

ottoman de 1909, lequelindique que: «Les districts deZubareet d7Udeydsont des prolongements

de la sous-division de Katar de la province deNejd, et ils occupent des situations importantes.))

(P. 113.)

IV.Conclusions

22. En conclusion,Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, les documents

ottomans de l'époquesont enparfaite conformitéavec les autresdocuments quiont été traitéspar

Mlle Pilkington. Comme ces derniers, ils confirmaient l'intégrité temtonale de Qatar, en tant

qu'entitépolitique, comprenanttoute la péninsulede Qatar. Ils sont également conformesà la

cartographie qui sera traitée plus tardpar M. Bundy. En conséquence,les arguments de Bahreïn

quant à l'étenduelimitéede Qatar vers la findu XIXesiècleet au débutdu XXesiècle,sont sans

aucun fondement,et doiventêtrerejetée sntotalité.

Je remercie la Cour de son attention, et vous prie, Monsieurle président,de bien vouloir

donner la parole àM. Shankardass.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie beaucoup, Dr.Alibin Fetais Al-Men. Now 1give the
*
floorto Mr. Shankardass.

3~nnexe11.75,vol.2,p. 531
4~ontre-mémoirede Bahreïn, annexe25 b),vol.2,p. 73, les italiquessontde nous. MR.SHANKARDASS:

LIMITED EXTENTOF BAHRAI N NDTHE IMPACT OFOIL CONCESSIONS

ON QATA-AHRAIN TERRITORIES

Mr. President,anddistinguishedMembersofthe Court:

May 1Sayit is a great honourand indeeda privilege to appearbefore this Courtagain andto

representthe State of Qatar.

1. My learned colleague,Ms Nanette Pilkington,presented to you yesterday the history of

the territorialscope and integrity of Qatarup to a few years afterthe Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916.

My tasktodayis to addressyoufirst,onthe territorialextentof Bahrainfor approximatelythe same

period; and thereafter, to demonstratetoyou theimpactof oil concessionnegotiationsof the 1920s

andthe 1930son what wereto be regardedas the Sheikhdomsof bothQatarand Bahrain.

2. Asto thextentof Bahrain,1wouldliketo begin,if 1may,by refemng to Bahrain's effort,

in its pleadings, to present an image ofitself as a historical entitycomprisingnotmpact

group of the Bahrain islands, but also including extensivetracts of territory on the Arabian

mainland. Thus,Bahrainclaimsthat "theQatar peninsula, alongwiththe Hasa oases,was part of a

major geographicaland socio-economicunitnownto historians,we aretold, as Greater~ahrain"';

and furthemore, that it exercised authorityand control over al1the waters between the Bahrain

main Island andthe Zubarah coast2. Bahrain has producedno credible evidence to support any

such idea of a Greater Bahrain. Al1that we have seen is ColonelLapie'sFrench map of 1838

includedin Bahrain'semorial~. Eventhis map is in no sense evidenceof any political entity of a

greaterBahraincoveringthe extensiveareamarkedon themap.

3. Qatar does not dispute that the narne "Bahrain" was atone time used as a geographical

description covering different partsof the Arabian mainland together with the Bahrain groupof

islands.

The Court willrecall the statement reproduced in Qatar's Replyof the present Emir of

Bahrain when, writing in 1994he stated thatfrom themiddleof the thirteenthcenturythe name

'~ounter-MemonalofBahrain,para.32.
2~emonal of Bahrain,paras. 16-17.

3~emonal of Bahrain,mapfacingp. 5andpara. 16.

4~eplyof Qatar,Ann.II.79,Vol. 2,p. 555."Bahrain" hasbeen applied"more specificallytothegroup of islandsnow knownas Bahrain". He

also points out that theentire area continued to be loosely referred to as "Bahrain"for centuries

afterwards.

4. Bahrain howeverclaims in its Memorial that the Stateof Bahrain today consists of "an

archipelagowhich includesmore than 50islands,low-tideelevationsand shoals .. ,the territoryon

the north-west Coastof the Qatar peninsulareferred to as the Zubarah region"and of course "the

HawarIslands group"S.

5. My effort will be to show, on the contrary, that the extent of Bahrainhas in fact been

limitedfor a longtime to what the Emir of Bahrain describes as "thegroup of islands now known

as Bahrain" and to demonstrate how this description has been historically and universally

understood. 1propose to do this by analysingthe position bnefly before the Agreementsof 1868

and, insomewhat greaterdetail,afterthat date.

The positionbefore 1868

6. As to the position before 1868, Qatar has already show in its pleadings6,that the

Al-Khalifah occupationof Bahrain in 1783was followed by a conhsed periodup to 1820when

strugglefor control overthe islands,by Muscat, Wahhabis andPersia wereoccuning. Even in the

years after 1820,as Lorimer points out7,and as Dr. Al Baharnaof Bahrain confms8, the intemal

situation in Bahrain during the first half of the nineteenthcentury was highly unstable with the

towns in a state of min and decay, the six sons of the Sheikhpretending to exerciseseparateand

independentpowerandtheongoing dynasticquarrelsbetweentheSheikhs.

7. Lorimer further recordsg that towards the end of the year 1859,in view of another

Wahhabithreat, Sheikh Mohamedof Bahrainmade simultaneous applicationsfor protection to the

Persiansand to the TurkishWali of Baghdad. It is in this contextthat a BritishReport, now filed

'MemonalofBahrain,paras.42-43.

6~ernorialof Qatar,paras3.to3.29; Replyof Qatar, para.3.10.
'Mernonalof QatarAnn. 11.5,Vol.3,p. 265.

8~eplyof Qatar, Ann.11.76,Vol. 2,p. 545.
9~emorialof Qatar,Ann.IL5,Vol.3,p. 295.by Bahrain, points out that "Bahrain once hoisted in succession Turkish, Persian and English

flags"; and goesonto Saythat "shehas beenknownto hoist al1three atonce"I0.

8. 1mention these events merely to indicate that during the whole period after 1783when

Bahrain claims the Al-Khalifah Sheikhs were exercising sovereign authority or dominance

throughout Qatar, the Al-Khalifah were hardly themselves stable in the Bahrain islands or

independent ofotherpowers.

9. The problemof Bahrain'sinstabilitywas only resolvedwith the British decisionof 1861

that the tranquillity of the Persian Gulf seemed to demand that Bahrain shouldbe regarded as

subject neither toTurkey nor to Persia; and that its independence mustbe recognizedl'. In the

sarneyear, Bahrainwas also engagedin whatthe British PoliticalResidentconsidered "aggression

on the Coastof [its] neighbours" and he arrived in Bahrain in May 1861 determined"stemly to

control" Bahrain'sactivities and to see what he could do to preserve the maritime tranquillity

which, he declared,was being openly endangeredby the Shaikh of ~ahrain'~. These were the

eventswhich ledto the Anglo-BahrainTreaty of 1861,whereby Bahrainundertookto abstainfrom

al1maritimeaggressionof everykind,in return for British protectionforthe securityof ~ahrain'~.

10.While the British action in 1861might have helped stabilize Bahrain's situation to some

extent, as the Court will have seen, this did not stop the Al-Khalifah undertaking aggressive

activities across the sea against Qatar in 1867 and 1868 until they were finally punished and

prohibitedby theBritishfrom ever doingso againunderthe 1868Agreements.

Thepositionafter1868

11.Tumingnow, if 1may, Mr. President, totheposition after 1868,I wouldlike to drawthe

Court'sattention to the nurnerous occasions set out in some detail in Qatar'spleadings'4when

Bahrain was describedas being limitedto a group of close islandsand none of these descriptions

'o~upplementalDocumentsof Bahrain,Ann. 1,p. 26.
"Memonal ofQatar, Ann.11.5,Vol. 3,p. 295.

'2~emorialof Qatar,para. 5.3; Mernorialof Qatar,An, ol. 6,p. 27.
"Memonal of Qatar,paras. 5.3-5.4; MernorialofQatar, An, ol.6,p. 31.

I4~eplyof Qatar,paras 3.23-3.36.includedany partofthe Qatarpeninsulaor the Hawar Islands; 1will onlybnefly referto someof

the important ones.
i
12. The Court will recallthat Bahrain was occupiedin the sixteenth century by the

Portuguese and thereafter between1622and 1783by Persia and thatthe Persians continuedto

claim sovereignty over Bahrainright up until 1970when the issue was ultimatelyresolvedas a

result of the Shah ofPersia'sannouncementthat "the island'sinhabitantswere welcometo decide

theirownfate'"'.

13. During the entire penod when the Persian claimwas being pressed, particularlyfrom

1886onwards,Bahrainwas alwaysreferredto either as"oneisland"or "anisland State, consisting

of five islands" or"a group of onelarge andfour smallis~ands"'~.There are ten Persianmaps in

Qatar's MapAtlas,fromMapNo. 89onwards, showing Bahrainas part of Persiaandeach of them

shows only themain Bahrain Island andits adjoining islandsas Persiantemtory. None of them

includetheHawarIslandsor Zubarah. Todemonstratethisposition,may 1showtheCourtjust two

out of the fourofficia1Persianmaps: first, a1950mapofthe GeographicDepartment ofthe Army

[mapNo. 89 nowon the screen]; and second, a 1965 mapof the NationalIranianOil Company

[mapNo. 94 now on the screen],bothshowing onlythe Bahrain mainisland and itsirnmediately

adjoiningislandsaspartof Iran.

14.Next,a description ofBahrainin 1931in the officialpublicationof the TurkishMinistry

of ForeignAffairs, echoeswhat the Emirof Bahrainhas told us, and States: "In the past,al-Hasa

and Qatarwere includedunderthenameBahrain,buttoday, Bahrainrefers onlyto a groupof five

islands"" (whichare thennamed).

15.Contraryto Bahrain'sdescriptionof the "StateofBahrain",al1othersignificanthistorical

referencesto or descriptionsof "Bahrain"after 1868,whichQatarhas listed in its~e~l~'*s ,peci@

only the main Bahrain island and its irnmediatelyneighbounngislands as constituting Bahrain.
\
These include two official British Reports of 1874 and 1880, a study presented to the Royal

"~e~ly of Qatar,para. 3.25.

16Replyof Qatar, paras.3.23to 3.35.
''Replyof Qatar, Ann.11.87,Vol.2,p.625; Reply of Qatar, Ann11-88,Vol. 2, p. 631. These are named as:
"(1)Bahrain ...(2)Moharrek,(3)UmmNa'san,(4) Sitra,(5)Nabi Salih".

lS~eplyof Qatar, para.3.31and related annexes.GeographicalSociety in 1889byJ. TheodoreBentwith an importantrnapreflectinghis description

of Bahrain [map No. 12 which is now on the screen], a Report of 1902 by the German

Ambassador to Persia and, most importantly, Lorimer's description of Bahrain in 1908 as

consistingof:

"the archipelago formed by the Bahrain, Muharraq, Umm Na'asan, Sitrah and Nabi
Salih islands and by a number of lesser islets and rocks ... taken al1together these
form a compactgroup almost inthe middle of the gulf which divides the promontory
of Qatar from theCoastof ~atif 'lg.

16. To return brieflyto Bent'srnap still on the screen, 1would like to stress that this rnap

published in 1890 is representative of a broad spectrum of maps prepared throughout the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,al1of which depictedBahrain in the same way and, in

Qatar'ssubmission,this rnapstill substantiallyshowsthe extentof Bahraintoday.

17. Lorimer'sdescription of the extent of "Bahrain", which 1 have just read out, was

thereafter consistently adopted by British authorities, for example, in the 1916 Handbook of

Arabia, an India OMiceReport of 1928; a British Military Report of 1933, which is annexedto

Bahrain's own~emorial'~and in IndiaOffice and PoliticalResidencycorrespondenceof 1933and

1934to which 1will have occasionto refer shortlywhen dealingwith the oil concessionhistoryof

the 1930s.

18.The Court will therefore seethat in additionto the Persian,Turkish, German and earlier

British descriptionsof 1874, 1880 and 1889,al1descriptions of Bahrain in British records from

1908to 1934are also virtuallyidenticaland clearly demonstratethat "Bahrain"during that period

was regarded by the British as comprised only of the five named islands. Added to al1this

evidence are the numerous maps that my leamed friend Mr.Bundy will address which similarly

show "Bahrain" as consisting of a group of islands. 1, for my part, would invite the Court's

particular attentiontojust two of the maps, as they are officialBritish maps, and thereforeof high

evidentiaryvalue:

(i) First, a portion of theAdrniralty Chart No. 748-B of 1917 [map No. 58 now on the

screen] showing a red line within which lies the Arabian peninsula. This map, which

'9~emonal of QataAnn.11.3,Vol. 3,p. 88.

20~ernonalof Bahrain,Ann.330,Vol. 6,p. 1446. Mr.Bundy will analyse, shows "Bahrain" specificallymarked by a circle enclosingthe

sarnecompactgroupof islands; and

*
(ii) Second,a WarOfficemap of 1924with annotationsby the Foreign Office madein 1933,

whichthe Courtwill nowseeon the screen [mapNo. 771. As Qatarhas shown,thismap

was annotatedby Mr.G.W. (laterSirGeorge)Rende1in connectionwith aMemorandum

in the context of aproposa1to the British Cabinet thatthe dutiesinregard toPersianGulf

States,shouldbe transferredfromtheColonial Officeto theForeignoffice2';

Rendel'sannotationson the map depictedthe contemporaryviewofthe ForeignOffice in

1933 and set out the limits of each of the political entities in the Gulf region. With

respectto Qatar,Rende1left no doubtthat it encompassed theentirepeninsulaobviously

including Zubarah. Bahrain,in contrast, was indicatedas falling withinthe blue line on

the map and its territorial extent limited to the compact groupof islands describedby

Lorimer. In accordancewithBritish viewswhichQatar has shownwere expressedand

prevailed between1933and 1936, the Hawar Islandswere obviously excludedfromthe

limitsof Bahrainandincludedwithinthe limitsofQatar.

19.Important evidencemorerecently researched,confirmingthat Bahrainconsisted onlyof

the group of islands 1have mentioned,is providedby the EnglishAdviserto the Governmentof

Bahrain,Charles (later Sir Charles)Belgravehimself. In anarticle- a copy of which is in the

judges'folders - publishedin theJournalof the CentralAsianSocieîy in 1928 - two years after

he hadtakenup hisofficialposition - Belgravedescnbedthe Bahrain archipelago as consistingof

"a group of small islandsabout seventeenmiles off the Arab Coasthalf-waydown the Persian

~ulf'~'. His detaileddescriptionofthe islandsmakesnomention whatsoever of Hawar orf,or that

matter,ofZubarah.

20.Hadthe HawarIslandsbeenregardedaspart oftheprincipalityof "Bahrain"in 1928,the .

main HawarIsland(JaziratHawar) wouldhavebeen the secondlargestin the group, and specific

attention would certainlyhavebeendirectedto it by Belgravehimself inhis detailed descriptionof

the islands constitutingBahrain.

Z'~eplyof Qata, nn.11.58,Vol.2,p. 335.

22~eplyof Qata, M. 11.81,Vol.2,p. 570. 21. Finally, even in 1970,when a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General

visited Bahrainto ascertainthe wishesof its peopleonthe issueof the Persian claimto Bahrain,his

Report ofthat year - a copy ofthe excerpt is in thejudges'folders- described Bahrainin almost

the sarne ternis as Lorimer and observed: "Onlyfive islands are inhabited but nearly al1the

population liveson tl~ree."'~Even in this Report, there is no mention whatsoever ofHawar or

Zubarah.

22. The Court will thereforesee that contraryto Bahrain's descriptionof its temtones in its

pleadings, fordecades, if not for at leastacentury,the entity referredto by the Emir of Bahrainas

"thegroupof islandsnow knownas Bahrain" clearlymeantthe compact group ofislandswhichmy

leamed fiiend, Professor Salmon, showedyou onBent's1890map yesterday,andwhichhave been

specificallynarnedfromtimeto time.

Oilconcessionof the1930sand the territorialextentofQatarandBahrain

23. Let me now turn to the events followingefforts in the 1920sand 1930stodiscoverand

later produce oil which further confirm the extent of the territories of Bahrain and Qatar as

describedby Qatar in itspleadings.

24. In view of the prospects for the discovery of oilin the area, negotiations beganin the

1920sbetweenprospectiveoil concessionairesandthe Rulersofthe Gulf Sheikhdoms.

25. Bahrain,by virtue of anundertakingof May 191424,and Qatarunder the 1916 ~reap,

had agreed with the British Govenunent not to grant any oil concession overtheir temtories to

anyone without British consent. As noted by a senior British ~fficial~~a,lthough none of their

treaties with thetwo Sheikhdomsentitledthe Britishto make binding boundary determinationsof

their temtones withoutthe consent ofthe Rulers, forthe purposeof the oil concessions,the British,

before giving their required consent, had to ensure that the proposed concessions laywithin the

temtories of eachSheikhdom.

')united Nations SecurityCouncilDoc. SI9772of 30Apnl 1970.
24~emorialof Bahrain,para. 235; MernorialofBahrain,Ann.94, Vol.3,p. 552.

25~emorialof Qatar,Ann.11.47,Vol. 5,p. 181.
26~upplemental ocumentsofQatar,doc. 17,p. 116. 26. Before1discussthe Qatar andBahrain oil concessionsthat came tobe signed,may1first

brieflyrefertoa fewrelevant eventsthat occurred just before oil becamesignificantinthearea.

27. After Ibn Saud had driventhe Turks out ofHasa in 1913,he was initially inclined to

consider himself heir to someof the Sheikhdomswhich wereformerlyin the Wahabeearea of

influence,including Bahrain,QatarandtheTrucialsheikhdoms2'.At thetime he also sought good

relationswiththe British. As Qatarhas shown,the PoliticalResident,SirPercy Cox,had warned

him that thesecould exist onlyonconditionthatIbnSaudwasnot to disturbthe status quoor cause

unrest arnong the Arab principalities whosenilers were in treaty relations with the British

Govement. These,he pointedout, includedtheprincipality ofQatar,the independence of which

under the govemment of the late Sheikh Jasimbin Thani and his successorshad recently been

recognized by the British and Turkish ~overnments*~. The reference of course was to the

Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913. Thereafter, Ibn Saud and the British (represented by

SirPercyCox)entered intoa Treatyin December 1915; ArticleVI of the Treaty incorporated an

undertakingby Ibn Saudto refrainfromany aggression on,or interferencein Bahrain,Qatar and

the otherSheikhdomswhohadtreaty relations with the~ritish".

28. However,despitethis background,in perhapsthe first overt challenge to the temtorial

integrity of Qatar after prospectsfor the discovery of oilhad become promising, Sir Percy Cox

discovered during a meeting in 1922 that Ibn Saud, in his discussions with potential oil

concessionairesfor the Hasaregion,had apparently includedthe Qatar Peninsulawithinthe tractof

territoryforwhichhe waspreparingto negotiate a concession.

It is reportedthat SirPercyCox atoncetookhimto task, remindinghimthathe hadnothingto do

with Qatarandto respectthe termsof the 1915Treaty. Ibn Saud accordingly grantedthe first oil

concessionin 1933to theStandardOilCompanyofCaliforniain respectofthe Hasaregiononly.

27~ounter-~emonalof Qatar,para.3.43.
28~emonalof Qatar,Ann.111.5, ol. 6,p. 283.

2q~emonalof Qatar,Ann.111.6, ol. 6,p. 295.
30~upplementaDlocumentsof Qatar,doc.6,p. 18. 29. Retuniing to oil concessiondevelopments in Bahrain and Qatar,1propose to draw the

Court's attention,to thearious eventsoccurring in the 1920sandalmost in parallel,in the 1930s,

in thehistory ofoilconcessionsrelevantto the boundaries of both Bahrain and Qatar.

30. In 1923,Frank Holmes,who became a well-known figure in the area in relation to oil

concession negotiations,in his capacityas the representativeof the Eastern and GeneralSyndicate

Limited (EGS as it is called), prepared a draft agreement to be concluded with Bahrain for a

petroleum concession31.The draft wasduly signedby Frank Holmes and his signature witnessed.

This draft essentiallyproposed a comprehensive concessionto be granted by the Ruler of Bahrain

to EGS for 70 yearsin the "landknownas THE BAHREINISLANDS"including rightsto set up a

refinery. The Bahrainislands to whichthe proposed concession was to applyare referredto in the

draft concessioninthe followingwordswhich arenow onthe screen:

"THIS GROUP of ISLANDS (hereinafter called THE CONCEDED
TERRITORY)is more particularly shownand delineatedon the MAP attached tothis
Agreement, and MARKEDin RED Colourationthereon, al1the islandsformin Part
of THESHEIKH'sDominionsareincludedin the CONCEDEDTERRITORY."~ f

The map referredto in the draft concessionis also signedby Frank ~olmes~~.1wouldrespectfully

ask the Court to seethis map34now onthe screen [fuiiand zoom] and notice how clearly it marks

the groupof islandscomprisingthetemtory of Bahrain.

31. Admittedly the draft to which the map was attached did not mature into a final

concession (as theproposals it containedwere at the time presumably regardedas excessive and

premature). However, contrary to Bahrain's contentionin its ~ounter-~emorial~~that the purpose

of the red colouringon the map was to define only the areaproposed by EGS, the descriptionof

Bahrain in the draft concession and the map 1 have just shown to the Court, clearly provide

evidenceof whatwas consideredtheterritorialextentof Bahrain. The description refersto "al1the

Islands formingPart of THE SHEIKH'sDominions" and "MARKEDin RED" showing them as

quite distinct from mainland Qatar and its imrnediately adjoining Hawar Islands. Another map

3'~emorialofQatar,Ann.111., ol.6,p. 323.
321bid,.327(emphasisadded).

33~bid.p,.345.
34~bid,.345.

3S~ounter-~emoriaolf Bahrain,para.200.preparedby Mr.Holrnesfiveyearslater,in 1928,[mapNo. 711showingvariousoil concessionsin

the Gulf area and now on the screen [full and zoom]is identicalto the 1923map andsimilarly

showsBahrainin a distinctcolourseparating itfromQatarand theHawarIslands.

32. A ConcessionAgreementwas eventually signedbetweenEGS andthe Ruler ofBahrain

in December 1925. In terms of this Agreement,EGSwas granted an exclusivelicence to explore

the territory of Bahrain and the right thereafter to a mininglease over an area not exceeding

100,000acres tobe selectedbythe Company.Althoughno map wasattachedtothe Agreement, its

terms were to apply "throughoutthe whole of thetemtories under his [that is the Ruler of

Bahrain's]control". As 1 will shortly show,this descriptionwas later expresslycitedby the India

Office to supportthe Britishview in 1933that no area in mainlandQatar northe Hawar Islands

couldbe regardedas part of Bahrain. Bahrain attemptstoarguein its ~ounter-~emorial~~ thatthe

1925Agreementonly appliedto the Bahrainmainisland. Thiscontention, Mr. President,is hardly

consistentwiththe expression"throughoutthe wholeofthe territoriesunderhis control",and even

Qatar does not suggest that the Ruler's controlwas confined onlyto the main Bahrain island.

Furthermore, Bahrain itself admits the intention was that "no geologically significanttemtory

would be excludedfrom the conce~sion"~~I.n any event,this is furtherevidenceof what, in the

contextof thediscoveryof oil, the entity of "Bahraiwas-reallyunderstood tobe in 1925.

33. In the meantime,negotiationshad alsobegunbetween theAnglo-PersianOil Company

(APOCas it wascalled),andthe Rulerof Qatarwithregardto thepossibility of APOC securing an

oil concession in Qatar. In August 1932, APOC, through its representative, Mr.C. C. Mylles,

concludedan ~greement~'with the Ruler of Qatar, wherebyit was granted exclusive exploration

rights fortwoyears withinthe "temtoriesof Qatar"andan exclusiveright to apply for a concession

duringthatperiod. APOCwas alsograntedpermissionto carryout a detailed geologicalsurveyof

Qatar which it undertook early in 1933. The GeologicalSurvey Report of July 1933is an
t

importantpieceof evidenceshowingthat the geologists regardedthe HawarIslandsas part of the

36~ounter-~emonalofBahrain,paras.201-203.

37~bi paa.203.
38~upplemental ocumentsof Qatar,doc. 10,p. 45; doc. 11,p. 47.territoryof Qatar. Theystate in theirreport39that althoughtheydidnotvisitthe islandsof Rubadh

and Howar, theseislandsweretopographicallyso similarto the Abanikpeninsulaonthe mainland

that the Hawar group effectively formed part of that peninsula40. That APOC's geologists

consideredtheHawarIslandsto be part ofQatar'stemtory is furtherconfinnedby the absenceof

theseislandsfrom theareasspecifiedasoutsideor beyondthe Sheikhof Qatar'stemtory4'.

34. Next, and most important, is the rnap produced bythe APOC geologists titled

"Geologicalsketchrnapof Qatarpeninsula"and attached totheir report as the illustrationin plate

No.1which distinctlyillustratesthe temtory of ~atar~~.This rnap is now on the screenand the

Court will see how clearlyit marks areascomprisingQatarand so obviously includingthe Hawar

Islands. 1will returnto this rnaplater,Mr.President,whendealingwiththe final map, alsobased

onthismap, which eventually cameto beattachedtotheQatarOilConcession.

35. The next important steptowards defining the temtory of Qatar was initiated in the

secondhalf of 1933 whenthe Secretaryof State forIndia soughtthe views of the Governrnentof

India on the boundaries ofQatar in connectionwith APOC'snegotiationswiththe Ruler of Qatar

for anoil conce~sion~~.

36. But before 1 describe the extensive activitythat followed upon this initiative of the

Secretaryof State, 1 would like to refer to some simultaneousevents that were alsotakingplace

with regard to determining the extent of Bahrain which could be covered by a second oil

concession. In thejargon of the time, thiswas referred toas a concession whichwould cover

Bahrain's "unallotted area", thatis, the area that would remain after the Bahrain Petroleurn

Company- BAPCOas it came to be called- to whom the 1925 EGS concessionhad been

assignedin themeantirne,had selectedthe 100,000acresthat1have alreadymentioned.

37. Ofparticularsignificancein thecontext ofofficia1British recognition,in the early 1930s,

that the Hawar Islands appertained toQatarand not to Bahrain arethe following fourpieces of

3g~upplementl ocumentsof Qatar,doc. 12,p. 49, atp. 64.

401bid, . 69.
4'lbid.,pp. 66and70.

42~ounter-~ernonal of Qatar, Ann.III.35, Vol.3, p. 185;eferred to as Plate1 under "Illustrations"
Supplemental DocumentsofQatar,doc. 12,p. 51.
43~upplernentl ocumentsof Qatar,doc.7,p. 20.evidencedating from 1933out of the India Officeand Political Residencycorrespondencewhich 1

mentioned earlier:

(1) In connection with determining the territorialextent of the unallotted area for which a new

concessioncouldbe granted,Laithwaite oftheIndia Office,in a letterof 3 May 1933,that is a

few weeks before the initiative on Qatar'sboundaries, wrote to the Petroleurn ~e~artment~''

that: "in considering anygant of a concessionin respect of his 'dominions' or'Bahrein'it

would seemnecessary to have a clear understandingas to preciselywhatis covered".

In thesameletter,Laithwaite mentionedthat "theSheikhmaintains arather nebulous claim to

certain areas on the Arab coast, with which it is unnecessary to deal here" and then baldly

went onto Saythatthe dominions ofthe RulerofBahrainmaybe regardedas consisting of the

Bahrain archipelago. Laithwaitedefinesthe Bahrain archipelagoas comprisingthe samefive

islandsnamed by Lorimerin 1908withoutanymentionof the HawarIslands.

(2) Atelegrarnfrom the Acting Political Resident (Loch)to the SecretaryofState forthe Colonies

of 23 July 1933, about Bahrain oil, points out that it would beprudent to narne the Bahrain

islands ...otherwise controversymay arise over Hawar, and Bahrainclaim to certain places

on the westcoast of Qatarpeninsula4s.

When the Ruler of Bahrain objected to naming the islands covered "so that the question of

Hawar and Qatar (sic) will not be made prominent by their omission", Loch, as Acting

PoliticalResident,went even furtherand recornrnendedto Londonthat the Ruler'sviewmight

be accepted becausehe said, "asHawarIslandis clearlynot one oftheBahrain OU^"^^.

The Court will carefully note Loch'sview, in 1933, that Hawar Island did not appertain to

Bahrain. This is in stark contrast to the support, to which 1 will have occasion to refer in

anotherpresentation, whichboth he and Fowle gavein 1936to the Bahrain claim to the Hawar

Islands.
i

(3) When the Secretaryof State for India requestedthe Political Resident,on 2 August 1933,to

provide him with a "marked map showingthe area recognized as Bahrain Islands", Loch,as

"Memonal of Qatar, Ann.111.8V,ol. 6,p. 435.

4S~emorialof Qatar, Ann111.8V,ol. 6,p. 437.
46~emorialof Qatar, Ann111.8V,ol. 6,p. 449. the Acting Political Resident,responded on 4 August 1933,by enclosing a map publishedin

1906by the Surveyof India. Unfortunately,the map is missing from the Britisharchives,but

Loch'scovering despatch namesthe same five islands listedin his letter of 3May 1933,that 1

havejust mentioned,and certainislets,as "includedin the general term Bahrain~slands"~~.

(4) The consideredview of the India Office at thistime is given in Laithwaite'smer letterto

Starling of 9 August 1933. Laithwaite refersin this letter to the possible risk that a claim

might be put fonvard by the Bahrain concessionaire to "rightsin respect of Hawar .. .".

However,as 1indicated earlier, he pointedout that the explorationlicence of 1925,between

EGS and the Ruler of Bahrain, was in respect of "'the whole of the tenitories' under the

Sheikh's'controln',and he goeson to Say:

"This seems clearly to exclude areas in Qatar and presumably also would

exclude Hawar which belongs in any case geographically to Qatar, and is the
westemmost and largestofa groupof islands,just offthe Qatar~oast."~*

SoLaithwaite,who wasthe mostknowledgeableofficia1inthe India Office at thattimeof the

geography of this part of the Gulf, was unhesitatinglyof the view in 1933that the Ruler of

Bahrain did not exercise any control whatsoever over the Hawar Islands: and nobody in

London,or indeedin the Gulf, soughtto challengethis conclusion.

38. Mr. President, Members of the Court, al1 these pieces of evidence, taken together,

demonstratedecisivelythat for thepurpose of thenew oil concession for Bahrain'sunallottedarea,

the BritishGovemment was firmlyof the view, in 1933,that the Bahrain archipelagoconsistedof

the fivenamedislandsand didnotaccept thatBahrainhad title to the Hawar Islands.

39. Qatar hasalso drawnattention tothe fa~t~t~ hat independentcalculationswere madefor

the India Office,by the PetroleumDepartmentin London in 1933, ofthe area comprisingBahrain

Islands workablefor oil exploitation. Qatar has demonstrated,in its Memorial, that itis beyond

question that the 1933 calculationscould not have included the acreages of the Hawar Islands,

Fasht Dibal,or Qit'at~aradah".

-

47~emorialof Qatar,Ann.111.90, ol. 6, p.457.
48~emorialof Qatar,Ann.111.91, ol. 6, p.467.

49h?emoriaolf Qatar,par..18; Memorialof Qatar,Ann.11.92,Vol. 6,p.473.
5%emorialof Qatar,para6..19. 40. Let me now tum to the events occurringat aboutthe same time with regard to Qatar's

boundaries. Actingon the request of the Secretaryof Statefor India,after someexamination of the

issue, a file note was preparedin India, in January 1934~',which recordsthat the necessity ofthe

determination of the boundaries of Qatarhad arisen in connectionwith APOC'snegotiationswith

the Sheikhof Qatar for an oil concessioninhistemtory. It furtherrecordsthat "we arerequiredto

determine the southem boundary only"and concludesthat theGovernrnent of India accepted the

boundary describedby Lorimer.

41. At the same time, the British authoritiesin Londonundertook anextensive and detailed

examination of what comprisedthe boundariesof Qatar. In connectionwith this investigation a

detailed memorandum was prepared in the India to which Qatarrespectfully draws the

Court's special attention. The Memorandumcontains an elaborate examination ofthe relevant

historical facts about Qatar's southem boundary and contains conclusions to the effect, as

Professor Salmonpointed out,that "theboundariesof Qatar shallbe acceptedas being onthe north,

east and west, the sea"; and on the south,a line running acrossthe base of the peninsula between

two specific points53.A note at the foot of the Memorandumconfms that the above conclusions

were also acceptedby the Governmentof Indiaand the PoliticalResidentin February 1934.

42. The record now availableshowsthatat leastthreeelaborate meetings of a sub-committee

of the British Committee of the Imperia1Defence were held in London early in 1934, on

23 February, 23March, and again on 12April 1934, on the subject of theQatar boundary, where

senior officiais of the Foreign Office, the India Office, and a number of other concemed

departments were present. The India Office Memorandumthat 1havejust mentioned was one of

the documentsconsidered and approvedat these meetings. Theobject of the meetings was stated

to be to determinethe boundaries ofQatarfortwo reasons. Firstly,in view ofthe possibility ofthe

discoveryof oil, the territorythat couldbe coveredby theconcessionthat Qatar was likelyto grant;

and secondly,as efforts were to be madeto persuade theRulerof Qatar to grant the concessionto

APOC, regarded as a British Company,andasthe Rulerof Qatar inconsiderationof agreeingto do

51~upplementaDlocumentsof Qatar,doc.7,p.20.

52~ounter-~emoriaolf Qatar,Ann.111., ol.3,p. 215.
"lbid.,p.220.so, would ask for and be given a British guaranteeof protection of Qatar against aggressionby

land, to determine therefore the geographical limitsof Qatar within which any such British

guaranteeof protection would apply54.

43. Anotheraspectconsideredby the Sub-Cornmitteewasthat an enquiryhad been made on

behalf of the US State Department on the Anglo-TurkishConvention of 1913 in relation to the

course of the boundary betweenQatar and SaudiArabia, that is Qatar's southemboundary; and it

wasbelieved thatthe objectof the enquirywasto ascertainthelimitswithin which the StandardOil

Company of California couldoperateits concessionfkomIbn saud5'.

44. Instructionswerethereforegivento providethe UnitedStates authoritieswiththe texts of

the Anglo-TurkishConventionsof 1913and 1914,reaffixmingthe boundaries of Qatar envisaged

in these Conventions. A specificrecommendation was also made that the proposed British

guaranteeof protectionwould operatewithinthe temtory of Qatarnorth of what cameto be called

the "blueline"laid downin the 1913 onv vent io nnd^thereforethe entirepeninsula.

45. In accordance with the decisionstaken at these meetings, the Political Resident duly

began efforts to persuadethe Ruler, ShaikhAbdullahof Qatar,to agree to gant the oil concession

to APOC. At bis meeting for this purpose with the Ruler on 12March 1934~'~ he not only

discussed the extent of Qatar territory to which the British-QatarTreaty of 1916applied,but also

pressed hirn to grantthe concession toAPOC; andnotified him that the British Government was

prepared in return to protecthim against any attack by land and to help him with the necessary

force.

46. However, as Qatar has shown in its ~e~lJ', during this meeting the Ruler of Qatar

claimed that the British-QatarTreatyof 1916included onlythe Coast. His reason for making this

contentionappearsto havebeen thathe wantedtobe fkeeto granta concessionoverthe bulk ofhis

territory- the "interior",as opposedto the coastline- to the oilCompanyof his choice,without

"~u~~lementalDocuments ofQatar,doc. 8,p. 24.
"Ibid., p. 27.

56~bid,. 32.
"~ounter-~emonal ofBahrain,Ann. 122,Vol.2,p. 412.

58~eplyof Qatar, paras.2.61-2.62.havingto seekBritish approval forsuch a concession. The recordof this meeting5'also indicates

that the Rulerwas somewhat apprehensiveof annoying Ibn Saudby not grantinga concession to

theoilCompanypreferredbythelatter(i.e.,StandardOil, hisAmericanconcessionaire).

47. Qatarhas of coursedrawnattentionto the factthat the PoliticalResident,in response to

what the Rulerhad said aboutthe 1916Treatynot includingthe interior but onlythe Coast,told

ShaikhAbdullah:

"According to Bin Sa'ud's Treatywith the British Government he cannot

interferein your affairsandit is becauseof your Treatywith the Governmentthat he
cannotdo anything andif he does,the Govemmentwillpreventhim. Andyou are the
Rulerofal1Qatarand theTreatyextendsto thewholeofQatar."60

48. In connectionwiththe British guarantee of protection to be providedin return for anoil

concessionforAPOC, theSub-Comrnittee hadalso approved aproposa1for a reconnaissance tobe

undertakenof thetemtory of ~atar~'.

49. As Qatar has shown, an aerial recomaissance of Qatar by the Royal AirForce was

therefore undertaken on 9 May 1934 after permission for over-flight of his territory had been

soughtand received from theRuler of Qatar. A report made thereafter62clearly showsthat the

Hawarmainislandwas includedin this reconnaissanceas part of Qatar,that the aircraft flew over

theislandandtook photographs ofit whichwere thenmadeapart of the report.

50. Thereafter, detailed negotiationswere undertaken extending over the next 12months

withthe Rulerof Qatarinrespectofthetermsof anoil concessionin favourof APOC. Duringthis

period, negotiations betweenthe British authorities and representatives of Ibn Saud were also

conductedtotry and finalizethe southernboundaryofQatar. Qatarhas discussedin somedetailin

its ~e~l~t~ h~position that was taken by the Britishwith SaudiArabia in the 1930s~~ whichwas

that the integrity of the Qatar peninsulahad to be preserved evenif some temtory was to be

allowedtoSaudiArabia eastof the "blue line"in the south. As is now wellknown,thisboundary

S9~ounter-~emoriaolfBahrain, nn. 122,Vol.2,p. 412.

60~bid.
61~upplementDalocumentsof Qatar,doc.8,pp.26and33.

62~ernorialf Qatar,Ann.111.9, ol.6,p.479.
63~eplyofQatar,paras.2.6eseq.

64~yreferenceto MapNo. 84inReplyofQatar MapAtlas.was finally determined manyyears lateras a result of directnegotiationsbetweenSaudiArabiaand

Qatar. However,for the purposes of the proposedQataroil concession infavour of APOC,a line

generally acrossthe south of the peninsula was adoptedas the southem limit of the concession

area. The Concession Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and APOC was finally signed on

17May 1935 with the requisite Britishapproval. Prior to the execution of the Agreement, the

Political Resident duly furnished a guarantee of protection on behalfof Britain to the Ruler of

Qatar by his letter of 11May 1935statingthat the guarantee "willbe extemal, i.e., againstserious

and unprovokedattacks whichmay be made on yourtemtory from outsideyour fr~ntier"~~T . here

was no indication whatsoeverthat the Hawar Islandsor Zubarah were tobe excluded fiom such

territoryor indeedthat it contemplatedan "extemal"attackfiom Hawaror Zubarah!

51.The secondArticle of the Qatar Concessionof May 1935indicatesthe area coveredby it

as being the State of Qatar which is defined as "the whole area over which the Shaikhrules and

which is markedon the north of the linedrawn on the map"which was attached to the Concession

Agreement. TheCourt will notice that the map which is now on the screen is formallysigned by

the Rulerof Qatarand the sameMr. C. C. Mylleson behalfof APOC,to the east of Bahrainand on

the west sideof Qatar.

52. As Qatar has shown in its ~ounter-~emorial~~,there had been some discussion of the

map to be annexedto the Concession Agreementat a meetingheld betweenAPOC representatives

and India Office officiaison 10January 1939', a few months before the Agreementwas entered

into. The only issue conceming the territory of Qatar to be covered by the concession, which

required clarification, was the southem limit of such territory. At the meeting APOC sought

confirmationthat the southemboundaryof Qatar,which hadbeen indicatedto its geologistson the

ground by the Ruler of Qatar personally (and which had subsequentlybeen shown on the map

prepared by the geologists and circulated in February1934)~~,was satisfactory to the British

Governrnentforthe purposes of themap to be attachedtothe concession. Followingthis meeting,

65~emonalof Qatar,Ann.111.98, ol.6,pp.503-504.
66~ounter-~emonaolf Qatar, para3..72(7).

67~ounter-~emoriaolf Qatar,Ann.111, ol. 3, p. 247(inpartpara.7atpp.251-252).
68~ounter-~emoriaolfQatar,Ann.111.3, ol. 3,p.209.Laithwaite ofthe India Office, after consultationwith Rende1of the Foreign Office, informed

APOCon 22January1935,that there wasnoobjectionto the Company's accepting as the southem

limitof the concessionthe linemarkedon the APOCgeologists'rnapof ~atar~'. No questionwas

raisedor doubt expressedaboutanyotherpartofQatartobe shownon themap.

53. Thernapwhichis nowonthe screenand was attached tothe QatarOil Concession,thus

came to be based on the rnap preparedby the APOC geologistsin 1933and enclosedwith their

Reportof thatyear. Thatmap,the Courtwillrecall, showedHawarand Zubarahclearlyas partof

~atar~'. Thatwas the rnap1showedto theCourtearliertoday, andthis is againonthe screen now.

A comparisonof thetwo maps of Qatar,and both are on the screen,clearlydemonstrates thatthe

territoryof Qatarcoveredin the concessionrnapis the sameas inthe geologistsrnapwhichshowed

the extentof QatarincludingHawarand Zubarah. This was only tobe expectedas oneimportant

objectofpreparingtheinitialgeologistsrnapmust necessarily havebeento preparethe finalrnapto

be attached tothe ConcessionAgreement.

54. 1 referredearlier to the documentaryevidence showingthat in 1933, Britishofficials

were clearlyoftheviewthat theHawarIslandswerepart of Qatar. Thereis nothingto suggestthat

this viewhadchangedwhenthe QatarConcession Agreement was signedin May 1935. But when

the selection of the concessionaire for Bahrain'unallottedarea beganto be considered activelyin

1936,andtheRulerofBahrainadvancedaforma1claimto theHawar Islandsin April 1936,British

officials, in circumstances1will havethe opportunityto discussin another presentation,without

anyjustification whatsoever, reversed their earlievriew and began to treat the Hawar Islandsas

part of Bahrain. Itis against this backgroundthat the India Office, in a letter of 14 May 1936,

sought to explainawaythe rnapattached to theQatarconcessionby assertingthat theobjectofthe

rnapwassimplyto defmethe southemboundaryof the concession7'andwas notrelevantto Qatar's

ownershipofHawar. It is Qatar's respecthl submission that todefinethe southemboundaryofthe

concessionmay have been one of the purposes, but it certainly could nothave been the sole

1

69~ounter-~emonaolf Qatar,Ann.111., ol. 3, p.257.
70~ounter-~emorialf Qatar,Ann.111.35,Vol. 3, p. 185; and referredto as Plate1 under "Illustrations"
SupplementaDl ocumentsofQatar,doc. 12,p. 51.

"~emorialofBahrainA, nn.248,Vol.5p.1076.purpose of a rnap attached to an Oil ConcessionAgreementcovering "the wholearea over which

the Shaikhrules".

55.Mr.President, Membersof the Court, in theextensive record of the careful investigation

of the boundaries of Qatar that 1 have described which were to be covered by the 1935 Oil

Concession as well as the British guarantee of protection of those boundaries, there was no

indication or suggestion whatsoever, that either theHawar Islands or Zubarah would not be

includedwithinthe concession areaor the area to be coveredby the guarantee. The rnap attached

to the 1935 Concession clearly depicts the Hawar Islandsas lying on the north of the line

representingthe southem boundary of the concession area. North of that line was the area over

which the Sheikh of Qatar ruled. The area clearly includedthe Hawar Islands, the main island

being specificallynamed "Jezirat Howar". It is inconceivable that govemmentdepartments in

London wouldhave acceptedthis definition of the State of Qatar for the purposes of the 1935

Concessionandthe guaranteeof protectionhad they, or indeedany of them, seriouslythoughtthat

theRuler of Bahrainhadany rights eitherinthe Hawar Islandsor Zubarah.

56. It wouldbe entirelyreasonableto thinkthat ifanyBahrain interestin the peninsula orthe

Hawar Islands was to be taken into account in relation to the oil concession or the guarantee of

protection,this would have beenclearly indicated either by a marking on the rnap attached to the

ConcessionAgreementof May 1935or in a reservationin the terms of the guarantee ofprotection

containedin the Political Resident'sletterof 11May 1935to the Ruler of Qatar. Nosuchmarking

or reservation wasmade for the obvious reason that none of those involved had any thought that

HawarorZubarahwere notpart of Qatar.

57. It is therefore Qatar's submission, Mr. President, in al1 the circumstances 1 have

described,that Bent'srnapprepared forthe RoyalGeographicalSocietyin 1890and Holmes'maps

prepared for oil concessionsin the 1920s correctly illustratetheextent of Bahrain; and the rnap

attached tothe Qatar Oil Concession Agreement,based asit was on the 1933 geologists map, is

irrefutable evidence of the boundaries of Qatar as consisting of the whole peninsula including

Zubarahandthe adjoiningislands includingthe Hawar Islands.

Mr. President, this concludesmy presentation and 1would request you to give the floor to

SirIan Sinclairunlessyou wishthis tobe thetime for the break. Thankyouverymuch. The. PRESIDENT: Thankyou verymuchMr. Shankardass. The Courtwill now suspendits

meetingfor a quarter ofan hour.

TheCourtadjourned from 11.20a.m.to 11.40a.m.

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séance estreprise et je donne maintenantla

parolea SirIan Sinclair. SirIan Sinclair,youhavethe floor.

Sir Ian SINCLAIR: Mr.President,Membersof the Court, it is, as always, a great privilege

and an honour for me to appear before you again, this time on behalf of the State of Qatar.

Mr. President,this morning 1intend to addressthe Court essentiallyon the geographyof theHawar

Islands,togetherwith the principleof proximity.

GEOGRAPHYOFTHEHAWARISLANDSANDTHEPRINCIPLEOFPROXIMITY

Compositionof theHawarIslands: macro-geography

1.At the outset,the Court will note thatthere is a clear differencebetweenthe Partiesas to

the compositionof the collectionof islands,islets and rocks knownas the HawarIslands and as to

the relevance of their location [show Map No.2 in Memorial of Qatar]. From the

macro-geographicalpoint of view demonstratedby the map, which has now been put up on the

screen, it is evident that theHawar Islandsare closely associated with themainland of Qatar and

that each of the islandsin thecollectivityknown bythat narnelies nearer tothe mainlandof Qatar

thanto the main islandofBahrain. Now,if it is suggestedthat this maphas beenpreparedby Qatar

for thepurpose of this case andcannot thereforebe relied upon, let us look at Map No. 100in the

MapAtlas submittedwiththe Qatar Reply [showMap No.100in MapAtlas]. This is of course a

reproduction of Bahrain ChartNo. 5005 publishedin 1987. This Chart portrays the relationship

between the Hawar Islands andthe mainland of Qatar in a manner very similar tothat shownon

Map No. 2 in theMemorialof Qatar whichyouhavejust seen. The Courtmay find it interestingto i

comparethese twomaps which1have shown youwith amap submittedby Bahrainin Volume7 of

the Memorial of Bahrain. Thisin fact is MapNo. 2 in the BahrainMap Atlasand a copyof this is

in your foldersthis morningas item No. 24. The Courtwill note how thismap,becauseit shows orpurportsto show the positionat high

tide- althoughit does not in fact Sayso- exaggeratesthe distancebetween the Hawar Islands

and the mainland of Qatar and foreshortens the distancebetween them and the main islandof

Bahrain. But a side-effect of this somewhat unbalancedpresentation is that Fashtad Dibal and

Qitat Jaradeh are simply not represented on Bahrain MapNo. 2. Perhaps conscious of this

unwelcome side-effect of their map, Bahrainseeks to remedyit by putting a rectangle around the

eastem half of Bahrain Islandand partof the westem coastalarea of Qatar, includingZubarahand

the Hawar Islands,on BahrainMap No. 2 and captioningthis rectangle [demonstrate]:"Formore

detail of the areasee Map6". This is shownby an arrow. Letus therefore now look at MapNo. 6

in the Bahrain Map ~tlas', a copy of this is in your folders as item No. 25. The Court will

immediately note that this map showsthe position at lowtide, but without indicating on themap

that this is so. The result is that Fashtelibal and QitatJaradeh- invisible on Bahrain Map

No. 2- suddenly make an appearance, as do other low-tideelevations such as FashtAl Azm,

Qitat ash Shajarahand Qita'aal Erge. The position of Qatar inrelation tohese named featuresis

clearly set out in paragraphs7.34to 7.41of the QatarReply. Asimilar criticismcan of coursebe

made of the photographs at pages 143to 15 1(a) of Bahrain'sSupplementalDocuments. Al1these

photographs were clearlytaken at high tide rather than low tide so that the distanceswhich they

show, for example, between the tail of Hawar Islandand the mainland of Qatar or between the

Zekritpeninsulaand the HawarIslands,are alwaysexaggerated.

2. But toretum to the configurationof the HawarIslands, both MapNo. 2 in the Memorial

of Qatarand MapNo. 100inthe MapAtlas submittedwiththe Reply of Qatar showthatthe Hawar

Islands as a wholecan be taken as representingfragmentsof land whichbecarnedetachedfrom the

mainland of Qatarat sometime in thepast. Alreadyin its Memorial,Qatarpointed outthat Qatar's

westem coastin the vicinity ofthe HawarIslands is veryragged,and likenedit to "ajigsaw puzzle

with a few missing pieces"2. Those missing pieces are the Hawar Islands themselveswhich are

needed to completethe curveof Qatar'swestem coastbetweenRas al Uwaynatand RasUmmHish

[showMapNo.2 in Memorial of Qataragain]. Fromthisperspective,as the Court will now see

'Memonalof Bahrain,Vol.7.

'Mernorialof Qatar,para.4.2.on the screen, the Hawar Islands can be seen as constitutingan integral part of Qatar'smainland

coast.

3. The geology and geomorphology of the area confirm this conclusion. In its

Counter-Memorial,Bahrain saw"no need to commenton the geology of the Qatar peninsula" nor

indeed of the Hawar 1slands3. We may assume therefore that Bahrain does not contest Qatar's

conclusionthat the bedrock ofthe HawarIslands is the sarneage and type asthat of the adjacent

mainlandof ~atar~. One consequenceof this conclusionis that the area of the Hawar Islands can,

in terms of coastal processes,be said to constitute anintegral part of the Western Qatar coastal

system.

4. Before 1 leave the macro-geography of the Hawar Islands, which 1 have just been

discussing,1would wish to remind the Court of the evidencewhich Qatar already produced-

yesterday, and again this morning- demonstratingthe territorial integnty of Qatar as a whole,

narnely,the entiretyof the peninsula and the immediateoff-lyingHawar Islands. In this context,1

would remind the Members of the Court of the presentationsmade yesterdayand indeed earlier

today by my colleagues, Ms Pilkington and Dr.Fetais. So far as the written pleadings are

concerned,1wouldreferthemto ChapterII of the Counter-Memorialof Qatar,and, in particular, to

ChapterII of the Replyof Qatarwith its many Annexes drawnfrom Turkishas well as British and

other sources. This documentary evidence, read in combination with the map evidence,

demonstratesbeyonda shadowof doubtthat, in the early 1930s,Qatar as a political entity covered

both the peninsulaas a whole, includingZubarah,and theHawar Islands lyingimmediatelyoff the

western coastof the peninsula.

CompositionoftheHawarislands: micro-geography

5. Mr. President,1 have so far concentrated only on the macrogeography of the Hawar

Islands consideredas a collectivity. Butwhat about the microgeographyyoumay ask? Let us start

withthe composition of the collectionof islands,isletsandrocksknown asthe Hawar Islands. For .

a pnncipality which claims that membersof the Dowasirtribe professingallegiance tothe Ruler of

3~ounter-~emorialofBahrain, para.163.

4~emorialof Qatar, para.4.6.Bahrain have been in virtuallyunintempted occupationof the Hawar Islands for over 150years

prior to the 1930s(apart from a period of three to four years inthe 1920s),and which claims to

have administeredthe islands throughoutthis period, it is indeed remarkable how little senior

Bahrainiofficiaisandmembersof the rulingfarnilyof Bahrainknew aboutthe Hawar Islandseven

as late as 1936 [show Map No.9 facing p. 145 of Memorial of Qatar]. When Belgrave first

presenteda Bahrainiclaim to the Hawar Islands inbis letterto the then Political Agent (Loch)on

28 April 1936'~- and a copy of that letter is in your foldersas item No.-26he identifiedthe

Hawar group of islands as including thefollowing named islands, as well as a number of small

islets and 1hope the Court will forgiveme if my pronunciationof some of these named islets

and islandsisnot altogetheraccurate. The listis as follows:

1. Noon

2. Meshtaan

3. Al-Matenad

4. Rubadh

5. Hawar

6. Ginan

7. Mahazwarah

Let us look at these named islands individually. Noon unfortunately cannot be seen on the

map in fiont of you; nor indeedcan Meshtaan. The reason is in fact that they havenothingto do

with the Hawar Islands. We will come back to them later [show Map No. 11 in

Counter-Mernorialof Qatar]. Al-Matteradis a small islet located some 3%miles north west of

RabadAl Gharbiyah,the most north-westerlyof the true HawarIslands. It is here indicatedon the

screen by an arrow [demonstrate]. As you will see, Al-Matteradlies closer to Meshtaan than to

RabadAl Gharbiyah,and shouldnot therefore be counted as oneof the Hawar Islands [showagain

Map No.9 facing p.145 of Memorial of Qatar]. Rubadh, the fourth on the list, is more

cornrnonlyknownas Rabadash Sharqiyah andis here wherethe arrow is pointing [demonstrate].

Hawar Islandis of coursethe mainislandofthe group,normallyreferred to as "JaziratHawar" and

'~ernorial ofQatar,Ann.III.103,Vol. 7,p. 15.it is here again wherethe arrow is pointing [demonstrate]. "Ginan" is of course normally spelt

Janan. Qatarhas neverconsideredJanan, whichis here wherethe arrowis pointing [demonstrate]

to be part of the Hawar group of islands. There is, as the Court will see, a deep water channel

which runs close to Jananbut not toHawar: Qatar will deal more fullywith the question ofJanan

Island within the framework of its presentation on the maritime delimitation. Finally,there is

Mahazwarah,otherwiseknown as "UmmKharurah and shownon the map before you under that

name [demonstrate]. To complete the picture of the islands formally claimedby Bahrain on

28 April 1936,underthe name of the "HawarIslands",1nowhave to showyou anothermap [show

Map No. 6 in Mernorialof Bahrain,Vol. 71. Two "features"(to use a neutral term) are shown

here, quite close to the south-east coast of Bahrain Island,under the names of "QassarNun" and

"HalatNun". Thesearenow indicatedby two arrows [demonstrate].

6. The Persian GulfPilot, in its most recently corrected editionof 4 September, 1997,gives

them the names "SabkhaNoon" and "HalatNoon" and describes them as low islets lying,

respectively,about two miles east and south-east of Ras al Barr. These islets clearly appertainto

Bahrain,and have alwaysso appertained,because they liewithinthe temtorial sea of Bahraineven

when (asin 1936)thattemtorial seawas limited to three miles measured from thelow-water mark

alongthe coast of themain Bahrainisland. "Meshtaan"is describedin thePersian GulfPilot as an

islet on which there is a cairn. It lies about4%miles east-north-eastof SabkhaNoon and is now

indicatedby an arrow [demonstrate]. As can be seen, it liescloser to the main island of Bahrain

than to the mainland of Qatar or evento the Hawar Islands properlyso called. So "Noon" and

"Meshtaan"do not formpart of the HawarIslands. Qatar hasneverclaimed title tothem and finds

it difficult to understand why Bahrain should have regarded them asforming part of the Hawar

group unless Bahrain,despite its protestationsto the contrary, was totally ignorantat the time, in

1936,ofthe compositionof the group.

7. After all, Belgrave did not includein his 1936list the second andthird largest islandsin

terms of area in the Hawar group, narnely, Suwadal Janubiyah and Suwadash Shamaliyah; and %

this despitethe factthat,in his letterof 28 April 1936,he boldly(butquiteuntruthfùlly)assertsthat

"at least four of the larger islands are permanently occupiedby [theRuler ofahrain's]subjects".

We know now that, in 1936,none of the Hawar Islands was "permanently occupied"by anybody;at most, JaziratHawar (but,it would seem,no other island in the group) was visitedby fishermen

from Bahrain,Qatar and other tenitories in the vicinity during the winter time, these fishermen

being accustomedtoengagein seasonalfishingactivitiesin thewaters offHawarIsland.

8. Now, Mr. President,the second attemptto specify islands claimedby Bahrain is to be

found in a memorandum by Belgrave of 14 August 1937 in response to an enquiry fiom

Weightrnan (the then British Political Agent in ~ahrain)~. The memorandum States that, "in

addition to the large islands forming the Bahrain archipelago", five named reefs or islands

(includingFasht Dibalas areef and Qit'atJaradahas an island)belong to Bahrain,as also does"the

Howararchipelago,consistingof nine islands near theQatarcoast". The Courtwill note that,by a

mysterious process of what they presumably will assume to be accretion, the seven islands

mentionedin Bahrain's1936list havenow become nine. The inflationin nurnberswas to continue,

however.

9. The third attempt by Bahrain to specify the Hawar Islands which it claims was in its

"preliminary statement" submitted by Belgrave to Weightrnan on 29 May 1938, within the

frameworkof the supposed"enquiry"being conductedby the British authonties in the Gulf asto

whether the Hawar Islandsappertained to Bahrainor to ~atar'. The Annex to this "preliminary

statement" lists the main HawarIsland and 16 other islands, islets and rocks as constituting the

Hawar groupof islands. Amongthese 16islands,islets androcks will be found,for the first time,

the second and third largest islands in the Hawar group, namely, Suwadal Janubiyah and

Suwadash Shamaliyah(sometimes referredto as "South Sawad"or "NorthSawad"). As 1already

indicated, these two islands had been ornitted fiom Belgrave's 1936 list. Faced with this

unexpected and unexplained growth between 1936 and 1938 in the number of islands said by

Bahrain to constitutethe Hawargroup, the PoliticalAgent in Bahrainin 1946(Galloway)decided

to regardthe Bahrainclaimto the Hawar Islandsas being confinedto the islands, islets and rocks

identifiedin the 1938list; thislist didnot includean an^.

6~emorial of Bahrain,Ann.334, Vol. 6,p. 1455.

'Memonal of Bahrain,Ann.261, Vol. 5,p. 1106.
'Mernorialof QataAnn.IV.92,Vol. 9,p. 435. 10.Bahrain argues that Gallowayshouldnot have excludedJanan fiom the list of islands,

islets and rocks included in the Hawar group, on the ground that the 1938 list submittedby

Belgrave was prefaced by a caveat that the 16 listed islands were onlythose islands on which

beacons had been erectedby Bahrain. This argument,1have to Say,is wholly specious,as 1shall

now irnmediately demonstrate. 1 now show on the screen a copy of the Annex to Bahrain's

"preliminarystatement"of 1938~(and a copyof this you willfind as item No.27 in yourfolders).

It will beseenthat the first sectionof this briefstatementreads:

"This group of islands consists ofone large island approximately11miles long
and at the widest point2 miles in width, with an area of about 17squaremiles which
is known as Hawar island and also a nurnber of islands and rocky islets which are
adjacentto Hawar island."

There then followsthis sentence: "On eachof the islandsthere is a stonebeacon about6 feethigh

surmounted by a pole on the top of which is an oil dm painted red and white, the Bahrain

colours." Qatarhas already shown(and it hasnot beendenied)that thesebeacons were erected by

Bahrain on the Hawar Islands and indeed elsewhere during the winter of 1937/38 in an obvious

attempt to bolster Bahrain'sclaim to sovereignty over theislands, rocks and shoals concemed. A

secondaryaimwas probablyto remedy Bahrain's woefulignoranceof the compositionand indeed

location of the islands. How Belgrave could, in his letter to Loch of 28 April 1936, assert

unblushinglythat "at least four of the larger islands are permanently occupiedby ... subjects [of

the Ruler ofBahrain]who live therein stonehouses as well as barastis ..."when he had noteven

included the second and thirdlargest islands of the Hawar group (the two Suwads) in his list of

seven claimedislands? Howthat happened defiesbelief. At this time, 1936,Belgravehimself had

never even visited any of the Hawar Islands. His first visit tothe main Hawar Islandappearsto

have been on 31 March 1938,accordingto his diaries. What can be said with-certaintyis that the

1936 list of theislands claimedby Bahrain as the HawarIslands is so defective as to lendsupport

to Qatar's suspicionthat, in that year, Bahrainas totally ignorant of the detailed composition and

location of the islands. Indeed, the Ruler of Bahrain and Belgrave were only interested in the

Hawar Islands to the extent that they might yield significant oil revenues if included in a new

concessionto be grantedby the Ruler of Bahrain. This is why Belgrave'sletter of 28 Apnl 1936

'~ernorialofBahrainAnn.261,Vol.5,p. 1110.specificallyadmitsthat the Bahrainclaim to the Hawar Islandsis being submitted"in comection

with the present negotiations for an oil concession over the temtory of Bahrain whichis not

includedin the 1925oil concession". The Courtwill have notedthat these negotiationswerebeing

kept entirelysecretfiom the Rulerof Qatar. Belgrave's letter alsoexplainshiseagerness to engage

in activities on orin relation to the Hawar Islandswhich could buttress or couldbe representedas

buttressing Bahrain'sclaim to the islands. The buildingof a fort on the main HawarIsland, the

beaconingof islets, rocks and shoalsin the area surroundingthe islands or furtherto the north, al1

are part andparce1of a major efforton the part of Bahrain fromearly 1936onwards toportraythe

Hawar group as having been Bahraini for over 150 years. It was, it has to be said, the total

ignorance ofthe Britishauthoritiesin the period between 1936and 1939aboutthe historyof Qatar

in general, and indeed about the physical geography ofthe Hawar Islands in particular, which

contributedin somemeasureto the miscarriageofjustice representedby the 1939Britishdecision

in favour of Bahrain'sclaim to theHawar Islands. This ignorancewas of coursecompounded by

the misleading observationin Lorimer that the main Hawar Islandlies "due Westof the point of

RasAburuk and about5 milesfromit".

Determinationoftheouterlimitof theterritorialsea

11.1tum now fiom the geographyof the HawarIslandsandtheir physical relationshipto the

mainland of Qatar to a discussion of how the outer limit of the territorial sea is determined.

Bahrain appears toaccept that, as regards the determinationof the outer limit of the territorialsea

or the delirnitationofthe "temtorial sea"between opposite States,the normal baselinefiom which

the breadth of the territorial seais measured is the low-water linealong the coast as marked on

large-scalechartsofficiallyrecognizedby the coastal State. Bahrainconcedesthat thisrule applies

to those parts of the coast of the Qatar peninsula that, even by Bahrain's admission,appertainto

~atar" and contends that the sarne rule applies to the coasts of the "ensemble constituting

~ahrain"" .

%fernorialof Bahrain, para. 616.

"~emorial ofBahrain, para. 617. 12. Qatar sees no reason to contest these statementsof principle, at least in so far as they

concemthe determinationof the outerlimit of thetemtorial sea. But it certainlycontinuesto deny

that "the ensemble constituting Bahrain"includesthe HawarIslands, Zubarah or any of the other

maritime "features"between Qatar and Bahrain, titleto which is claimedby Bahrain but contested
,
by Qatar. Applyingthese principles to the mainlandcoast of Qatar, it will be seen that the outer

limit of the temtorial sea appertaining tothe mainlandof Qatar would,in the period between 1936

and 1939when Qatarstill had a three-mile limit (asindeeddid Bahrain)have been the line shown

on the map now on the screen. This is a speciallypreparedmap and a copy of it is in thejudges'

folders as item No.28. Now it will beseenthat this line embraces withinwhat was the territorial

sea of Qatar in the late 1930sabout half of the land area of the main Hawar Island,the whole of

Suwadal Janubiyahand Suwadash Shamaliyah,the wholeof the three Wakurrockslyingbetween

them, the Bu Sedadrocks, the fourBu Saadaislands lyingto the south-westof Suwadal Janubiyah

and part of UmmKharurah (sometimesknown as Al Mahzoura). Lyingjust beyond a three-mile

limit so drawn (but of course well within a three-milelimit drawn from Jazirat Hawar) wouldbe

JaziratAjirah, the two islands calledAl Hajiat, Rabad ash Sharqiyah andRabad al Gharbiyah. In

other words, of the 17named islands, isletsand rocksappearingin Bahrain's1938list, al1but five

are enclosed or partly enclosed by a three-mile limit drawn from the low-water line on Qatar's

mainland coast. So indeed also is JananIsland whichof course Qatardoes not considerto be one

of the Hawar groupand whichwasin anyevent omittedfromBelgrave's1938list.

13.Now, Qatar accepts that a clear distinctionmustbe drawn behveen the determinationof

the outer limit of the temtorial sea of a Stateor other territorial entity,and the delimitationof a

maritime boundary between two States with opposite coasts. As regards the first of these two

operationsthe Courtwill recollectthat, in theAnglo-NorwegianFisheriescase, it had no difficulty

in finding,and here 1quote fromtheJudgment:

"that,for thepurpose of measuringthebreadthofthe temtorial sea, it is the low-water

mark as opposed to the high-watermark, orthe mean between the two tides, which
has generallybeen adoptedin thepracticeof states"12.

I2~isheries(UnitedKingdomv. Nonvay),I.C.J.Reports1951,p. 128.As regards the second of these two distinct operations,1 should signal that my leamed friends,

Professors Quéneudecand Salmon, will be addressing you later on the factors which the Court

should take into accountin delimitingthe maritimeboundarybetween Qatar andBahrain.

14. Sothe questionof whichislands, islets and rocksin the Hawar Islands wouldhave been

properly consideredas lying within the three-miletemtorial sea appertainingto Qatar in the late

1930smust inprinciplebe determinedby a line of three nauticalmiles drawn from the low-water

mark along the relevant coastline ofthe mainland of Qatar, and this is the line that 1 have just

shownyouon the screen; this hasveryrecentlybeen confirmedin the secondaward of the Arbitral

Tribunal of 17December 1999, in the Eritreamemen Arbitration, where it is stated (in

paragraph 133 of the Award):

"The 'normal' baselineof the temtorial sea as stated in Article 5 of the [UN]
Convention [on theLaw of the Sea]-and this again accords with long practice and

withthe well establishedcustomaryrule of the law of the sea - is 'thelow-waterline
along the Coastas marked on large scale charts officially recognisedby the coastal
State"'.

15.1should add that Britainwas particularlyill-infonned, in the period between 1936 and

1939, about the distance which separated the Hawar Islandsfrom the mainland of Qatar. No

Britishofficia1in the Gulfhad evervisited theislands,apartfromPrideauxin 1909,althoughLoch,

as Political Agent in Bahrain, had flown over them in 1934 when taking part in the RAF

reconnaissanceof Qatar, to which Mr. Shankardass had referredin his earlier presentation. Map

No. 5 oppositepage 50of the Memorialof Qatar [show: copy(itemNo. 29)injudges'folders]is

particularly rewardingin this context [demonstrate]. Before explaining why it is rewarding, 1

must clariQ one point. In its commentaryto Annex20 of its Supplemental Documents,Bahrain

accusesQatar of having prepared,asMapNo. 5,amap supposedlybased on Sheet 3 of theBahrain

map of the Hawar Islands in the 1:50,000 series, published in 1997- please note the date;

Bahrain accordingly claims that QatarMap No. 5 is inaccurate. This charge, 1 have to Say,is

demonstrably false. Qatar couldnot have used a map publishedonly in 1997to construct its Map

No. 5 which was submittedto the Court as early as 30 September 1996, with theQatar Memorial.

It obviously usedan earlier version of the same map, namely, Edition 2 of the Bahrain 1:50,000

map series,Sheet 3 (Hawar Islands),publishedin 1986. Thedifferencebetweenthe two mapsis in

anyevent marginalifthe Membersofthe Courtbear inmind thatthe lettersALWMon the BahrainMapNo. 20 (b), in the Supplemental Documents,are explainedin the legendas meaningApparent

LowWater Mark.

16. If1may revert to the QatarMap No. 5, this map shows that, at low tide, a distance of

only 250metres separates Hadd ad Dib, atthe end of the spit on the main Hawar Island, fromthe
4
apparent low-watermark off the mainlandCoast; similardistances separatepoints on the apparent

low-water markoff Suwad al Janubiyahto the south and south-east of this island from pointson

the correspondinglow-water mark off the mainland. The two distances of 150metres shown on

themap on the screenin fiont of you maynot be entirelyaccurate if the apparentlow-watermarks

shown on Edition4 of the Bahrain map of the Hawar Islandsin the 1:50,000series - this is the

one thatwas publishedin 1997- are themselves correctlydepicted, which Qataris not at present

in a position tojudge. Assumingthat they are correctly depicted,the differencesare in anyevent

rather small. In the case of the first measurement, taken due south of SuwadJanubyyah,

[demonstrate]the distance between theclosest correspondingpoints on the apparent low-water

markwidens to approximately200 metresfiom 150metres,an increase of only 50 metres. To the

south-eastof SuwadJanubiyahthe variationis more noticeable. However, it need hardlybe added

that Qatar couldhave easily chosen anothernearby position from whichto demonstratethe close

proximity of the islands to the mainland,if it had been awarethat Bahrain was about to publish a

new edition of its:50,000SeriesMapofthe Hawar Islandsin 1997 [demonstrate].Youwillnow

seehighlightedonthe screen an areawhereeventhe amendedapparentlow-watermarkinthis area

shows a channel of only 350 metres at lowtide. That is why Qatar considers that the difference

betweenthe twoeditionsof the samemapis onlymarginal.

17.The Courtwill in any event recallthat, in his keyletter of 22 April 1939,to the Political

Resident, Weightmanreported that "at low Springsit is possible (as 1am informedthough1have

not verified thisby experiment) to wade fiom the Qatar mainland to a certain pointon the main

Hawar Island in about three feet of water"I3. There can be no question about the very close

proximity of Suwadal Janubiyah to the mainland of Qatar at certain points, and from %

'3~ernorial QatarAnn.111.1V 95,7,p.497 ap. 501.Suwadal Janubiyahit should be possible to proceed dry-shod (or relatively dry-shod)to the main

Hawar Islandat verylow tide.

18.But theBritish authoritiesin the Gulfin 1938-1939 wereblind to,or at leastignorant of,

the realities of the geographical situationwith which they were confronted. They seemed to be

relying solely on the misleading statements in Lorimer and the 1916HandbookofArabia to the

effect that the main Hawar Island lies west of the point of Rasburuk and about 5miles from it.

These statementsare not in themselves inaccurate; but they do convey a thoroughly misleading

impressionwhen itis realized thatthe nearest ofthe larger Hawar Islands to themainlandof Qatar

is Suwadal Janubiyah and not the main Hawar Island (JaziratHawar). This can be seen clearly

fromthe rnapwhich 1now showto the Court, thisrnapbeing based, noton the earlier Bahrainrnap

to which 1referred,but on BahrainChart No. 5005, publishedin 1987. This rnap canbe found in

Appendix 5to theQatar Reply [showmapentitled"Distancefrom Qatar'smainlandto selected

islands" in Reply of Qatar Vol. 61. It will be seen on the screen that, paralleling the results

obtained fiom the use of Edition 2 of the 1:50,000Bahrain rnap series of the Hawar Islands, the

distance from Ras Abruq to the low-water mark off Suwadal Janubiyah is approxirnately

1,300metres - thatis to say,considerably short of 1nauticalmile. But this is not eventhe nearest

point on the mainland of Qatar to Suwad alJanubiyah: two points- here and here - lie,

according to this map, within 150metres of Suwadal Janubiyah at low tide. It will also be seen

from the rnapthat, at low tide, Suwadal Janubiyah becomeseffectivelyjoined to JaziratHawar at

one point [show]. The misleading impression conveyedby the description of the main Hawar

Island in Lorimeris reinforced when it is appreciatedthat only a distanceof 250metres separates

the southernmosttip of JaziratHawar(at Hadd adDib) fiom the mainlandof Qatar at lowtide and

that only a distanceof approximately 1,200metres separates Jazirat Hawar from the mainland of

Qatar at lowtide atthe point nowindicated [show].

19. Had the officiais in the India Office in London realized in 1939 how close to the

mainland of Qatar the Hawar Islands lay, it is questionable whether theywould have been so

enthusiastic in supporting Bahrain'sclaim of sovereignty over them. Hemingway of the India

Office at any rateseems to have had a glimmer of the significanceof the three-milelimit of the

territorial sea as regards the appurtenance of islandslying whollyor partly withinthat limit, since,in his manuscript minuteof 12May 1939,herefersto the factthat "the islandsare separatedby ...

five miles (morethanthree)of shallowwater from the mainland ..."14.Why refer to "morethan

three" unless you are aware that a three-mile limit is highly significant? But, of course,

Hemingway was thoroughly misledas to the positionon the ground since,in fact,the vast majority s

of the Hawar Islands lie within what was, in the 1930s, the outer limit of the territorial sea

appertaining to the mainland of Qatar drawn at a distance of three nautical miles from the

low-watermark alongthat Coast.

Title to islandslocated withintheterritorial seaof a State

20. Mr. President, 1 turn now to the legal principles which govemtitle to islands located

within the territorial sea of a State or other territorial entity. Qatar has gone into this at

considerablelength in Chapter 4 of its Reply,particularly Section2. One starts from consideration

of the question whether the coastal Statehas sovereignty over thetemtorial sea appertaining toit,

subject of course to a right of passage for vessels of other States, whether that right of passageis

characterizedas "innocent passage"or as "transitpassage". In Qatar's submission - and1assume

that the Court will entirely agree with this- the short and decisive answer to this question is

"Yes". Article 2, paragraph 1,of the UnitedNations Conventionon the Law of the Sea of 1982is

quite specificin statingthat the sovereigntyof a coastal Stateextends,beyondits land temtory and

intemal waters,and, in the case of an archipelagicState, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacentbelt

of sea, described as the territorial sea. Note that it is the "sovereignty" of a coastal Statewhich

extends to its temtorial sea; and that this sovereigntyextends also to the bed and subsoilof the

territorial sea. Note further that Article 121,paragraph 1, of the 1982 Conventionprovides that

every islandis entitledto its owntemtorial sea,anisland being definedas "a naturallyformedarea

of land, surroundedby water, whichis abovewaterat high tide".

21. As the territorialseaof a Stateis subjectto the sovereigntyofthat State,it follows,inthe

submission of Qatar, that any island, islet or indeed low tide elevation located whollyor partly
L
within the temtorial sea of that State is also subject to its sovereignty. This seems to be an

ineluctable consequence of the rules stated in Article 2 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention

'4~emorialof QatarAnn.111.203, ol.8p.13.which, Qatar would submit,can be taken as expressing the positionunder customaryinternational

law.

22. How then do we applythese principlesto the particularcase of the Hawar Islands? Qatar

has alreadydemonstratedthat the territorial integrityof Qatar as apoliticalentity encompassed,by

the end ofthe nineteenth centuryat the latest,the entirepeninsula together withany islandslocated

within a three-mile belt of territorial sea appertaining to the peninsula. At this time, and indeed

between 1936and 1939,both Qatar and Bahrain adhered to a three-mile lirnit for the breadth of

their respectivetemtorialseas. Had the Britishauthoritiesin the Gulf and indeedin Londonbeen

fully aware in early 1939that the great majorityof the 17islandsin the Hawar group identifiedin

Bahrain's"preliminary statement" of29 May 1938,fell whollyor partly within a three-mile limitif

it were drawnfrom Qatar's mainlandcoast at low tide (that is to Say12out ofthe 17islands),they

would surely not have decided that the islands belonged to Bahrain. Assurning that al1these

islandshad beenattributedby Britain to Qatarby virtue of their undoubtedlocation,in wholeor in

part, within a three-mile limit drawn from Qatar'smainland coast (thereby applying therelevant

principle of the inter-temporallaw, which the Court will of course recognize), each one of them

would havebeen recognizedashaving its ownthree-mile belt oftemtorial sea. It goes of course

without saying that, if a 12-mile territorial sea drawn from Qatar'smainland coast were to be

applied,it would naturallyencompass al1the HawarIslandsto whichQatarhas made reference.

Theprincipleof proximity

23. Now, Mr. President,Members of the Court, we have so far looked at the problem fiom

the point ofview of currentinternationallawwhileacknowledgingthe applicabilityof the principle

of inter-temporal law whereby a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law

contemporary with it. So we have to look at the principles of internationallaw relating to title to

islands located withina three-mile limit of the temtorial sea ashose principles had developedin

the period between 1936 and1939. Here it is important to be precise in the articulation of the

relevant principles. This appliesin particular,in the submissionof Qatar, to the use of the word

"proximity". Proximity assuch, when appliedto islands, is not a root of title except, and 1 Sayexcept, in the case of islandslocated,wholly orpartly,withinthe territorial sea appertainingto the

mainlandcoast of a Stateor otherterritorial entity.

24. It is, in Qatar'ssubmission,essentialto bear thisexceptionin mindwhen consideringthe

state of international lawast existedin the late 1930s. At this point in time,international lawyers
k

had available to themthe guidancecontainedin the importantAward of JudgeHuber in the Island

of Palmas arbitration. For our purposes,the key passagein this Award is the followingand 1 am

sorryto Saythat 1 have tocite it in full:

"Although States have in certain circumstances maintained that islands

relatively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical
situation,it is impossibleto show the existenceof a rule of positive internationallaw
to the effect that islands situatedoutside temtorial waters should belong to a State
from the mere factthat its temtory forms the terrafirma (nearest continentor island
of considerable size)"15

Now, the Court would surely note that this negative propositionapplies only to islands situated

outsideterritorialwaters; it doesnot applyto islandssituatedwithintemtorial waters.

25. Indeed,it is here,in relationto islands situatedcloseto the territoryof a Statebutside

the territorial sea appertainingto the mainland coast of that State at any particular time, that the

principle of proximity has a significantrole to play. The principle arguably hadits origin in the

so-called "portico doctrine" whichwas developed in the mid-nineteenth centq as a means of

attributing sovereigntyover small islands andislets imrnediatelyoff a coastbut falling within the

attraction of the mainland. The "portico doctrine" itselfcan be said to have been based on the

judgment of Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell) in the case of TheAnnain 1805, details of

which have been given at paragraph4.40 of the Reply of Qatar. Sir William Scott in giving

judgment in TheAnna, drew attention to the dangers to thesecurity of the United States which

would unquestionably arise if the islands in question were not acknowledgedto appertainto the

United States; and the Court will undoubtedly recallthat the raison d'être of the notion of the

territorial sea was the perceived need to protect thefundamentalsecurity interests of the coastal

State, and that is a consideration which still applies today. Buildingupon Sir William Scott's

judgment in TheAnna,later generationsof internationallawyers developed the"porticodoctrine";

and, as the Court willbe aware fromthe content ofparagraphs 4.40to 4.50 of the Qatar Reply, the

15~ounter-~emoriaolfQataAnn.11.67,Vol.2,p. 371."portico doctrine" provided a means of resolving some quite serious disputes which arosein the

nineteenth century as regards the outer limit of the territorial sea of a State or colony having a

fiinge or outer carapace of rocks, islets or islands. The "portico doctrine", combined with the

principle of naturaland physical unityof island groups, has,much more recently,been referred to

with approval by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemencase in paragraphs460 to 463 of its

first Awardof 9 October 1998.

26. The Court will note that noreferenceis madeto the "porticodoctrine"by Weightmanor

indeed by other oEcials in London in 1939 when seeking to come to a final decision on the

conflicting claims of Qatar and Bahrain to the HawarIslands. Strangely, however, thereis no

evidence that any of the legal advisers in the Foreign Office were consultedat this time on the

merits of the dispute,as opposed tothe proceduresbywhich it shouldbe resolved.

27. Qataraccordingly invokesthe authority ofthe "porticodoctrine" consideredin the light

of the authoritative pronouncementsby Fitzmaurice,Waldock, Gide1and JudgeLevi Cameiro, to

which reference is made at paragraphs4.22 to 4.26 of the Qatar Reply, to sustain its title to the

entire collectivity of the Hawar Islands. That collectivity includesthose islands which may lie

marginallyoutsidea three-milelimit drawnfromthe low-watermark on Qatar'smainlandcoastbut

well withinwhat is now (in the year 2000) the outer limit of Qatar's12mile temtorial sea, drawn

fromthat low-watermark.

28. The positivecase for Qatar's sovereignty over the Hawar Islands accordingly takes into

account the fact that the great majority of the islands are physically located within a three-mile

limit drawn fromthe low-water markon Qatar's mainlandcoast and therefore are tobe considered

as an integral part of Qatar'sterritory. For this reason alone they must surely be considered to

appertain to Qatar. The remaining islands in the Hawar group which 1 have identified, are, in

Qatar's submission, tobe considered equally to appertainto Qatar by virtue of the principle of

proximity as properly understood. That pnnciple embracesthe principle of natural and physical

unity of island groups as recently endorsed, subject to certain necessary qualifications,by the

Arbitral Tribunal's Award of 9 October1998, in the Eritredemen case. Indeed, the Arbitral

Tribunalinthatcasehad this to Sayin its firstAwardof 9 October1998: "Thereis a strongpresumptionthat islandswithinthe twelve-milecoastal belt
willbelongto the coastal state, unless thereisfull'-establish ease to the contrary
(as, forexample,inthe caseofthe Channel~slands)."'~

1sthe Courtsatisfied - can it be satisfi-d that Bahrain had,by 193611937a hlly-established

case for sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslands? Qataris clearthat the answercan onlybe "No",and

Qatar intendsto demonstratethisinits furtherpresentations. t

Other historical evidence

29.Butthereis other evidenceof a historical nature which supports atar'stitletothe Hawar

Islands,and to which 1wouldnow wishto refer. Thereis first of al1the evidencewhich one can

derive from the entries in Lorimer'sGazetteer of the Persian Gu& Oman and Central Arabia,

originally published in 1908 and 1915. It is of course well known that the entry in Lorimer

covering themain Hawar Island (Jazirat Hawar) and some other islandsand islets in the Hawar

group,notably Ajirah,Rubadhand Suwad,appearsinthegeographicaland statisticalvolume ofthe

publicationunderthe heading"WestSideof Qatar". The entry for JaziraH t awarreadsas follows:

"About 10mileslong, northand south,and roughly parallelto the Qatarcoast.
There areno wells, but there is a cistem to hold rainwater builtby the Dawasirof
Zallaqin Bahrain,who havehousesat two placesonthe island anduse theminwinter
as shootingboxes. Fishermenalso frequentHawar."

The separateentriesfor Ajirah,Rubadhand Suwadal1declarethat these islands lack fiesh water;

andJananIsland,which alsohas aseparateentry,is statedtobe "waterless". But,ofcourse,al1the

other entriesappearing in thispublicationunderthe heading"WestSide of Qatar" relateto capes,

bedouin camping places, towers, desertedvillages and hills, on the mainland of Qatar. The

Bahrainiargumentthat thispassage fromLonmer,whichwasmoreor less copiedintheHandbook

ofArabia of 1916issuedby theBritishAdmiralty,is simplypresenting ageographicalfact,is weak

andunconvincing. The factis that, as Mr. Shankardasshas alreadyshownus this moming, in his

presentationon the limitedextentof Bahrain,the Hawar Islands areviewed as being an integral

part of the west side of Qatar and ashaving no connectionwith Bahrain; andthis conclusionis

stronglyreinforced when it is realizedthat no reference atal1is madeto the HawarIslandsin the 1

article on the Bahrain Principality(as distinct from the article on Bahrain Island) which also

I6~wardp,ara.474.appearsin ~orimer". 1have causedto be put in yourfoldersthis moming, Mr.President,Members

of the Court, as itemNo. 31, the articleon the BahrainPrincipalitywhich appearsinLorimer. It is

prefaced by a note which States: "The article on the Bahrain Principality may be consulted in

regard to al1matters not dealt with above which concemBahrain Island." A footnote to the title

"BahrainPrincipality" explains:

"Thisleadingarticleonthe Bahrain principalityand the minorarticleson places
in the sarneare founded chieflyupon systematicand careful investigationsmade on
the spot duringthe years 1904-1905 ... The inquiry properwas begun by the writer
on tour in Bahrain early in 1905; but it was canied out chiefly by Lieutenant
C. H.Gabriel, I.A.,whopersonally travelled overthe greaterpart of the islandsandby
CaptainF.B. Prideaux, PoliticalAgent in Bahrain,who suppliedvery full information

regardingal1places inhisjuri~diction."'~

Thus, this article on the BahrainPrincipality in Lorimer'sGazetteer embodies al1the information

available to the most knowledgeableBritish authorities on the Gulf between the years 1904to

1907. It willbe recalledthatLorimerdescribes"thepresentsheikhdomof Bahrain"(as of 1905)as

consistingof:

"the archipelago formedby the Bahrain, Muharraq,Umm Na'asan, Sitrah and Nabi
Salih islandsand by a nurnberof lesser isletsand rocks which are enurneratedin the
articles upon the island... Connectedwith the sovereignty of Bahrain, or possibly
appertaining to the Shaikh as hereditary persona1property, are certain ill-defmed
rights upon the mainlandof Qatar, at present(1905) under discussion. Whatever the
nature or extent of theserightsour attentionwill beconfined, in the present article,to

the undisputedinsularpossessionsof the ~haikh."'~

30. Now, the reference to "certain ill-defmed rightsupon the mainland of Qatar" must be

taken as a reference tothe Sheikhof Bahrain'sclaimedrights in or in relation to Zubarah. So one

would assumethat if, as Bahrainasserts, membersofthe Dowasir tnbe had beenoccupying atleast

the main HawarIslandon behalfofthe SheikhofBahrain sincebefore 1800,andif, as Bahrainalso

claims,the authorityof Sheikh Jassimbin Thanididnot extendto the westCoast- of the mainlandof

Qatar at this time, that is to Say1908,the HawarIslands would certainly be included amongthe

"undisputed insular possessions" ofthe Sheikhof Bahrainto which Lorimerrefers. But of course

Lorimer makes no mention whatsoever of the HawarIslands in this article on the Bahrain

Principality. Under the heading "Populationand tribes" he lists the islands of the Principal-ty

"~emorial ofQatar,Ann.11., ol3,p.87.

"lbid.
Iglbia d.,88.Bahrain, Muharraq,UmmNa'asan,Nabi Salihand Sitrah - withtheir main towns and population

divided into Sunni andShiah townspeople and Sunniand Shiah villagers. Lorimer even includes

"UmmNa'asan" in these lists, although giving a "Nil" retum under this head for towns,

townspeople, villages and villagers. This is presurnably because, at least at this tirne,
'r

Umm Na'asanwas uninhabited. So one would surely anticipate that,if the Bahrainiversion of the

history of the HawarIslands were accurate, therewould beat least a mentionof thernin Lorirner's

article on the Bahrain Principality. After al1Bahrain can hardly contend that the Hawar Islands

were excluded from thisdescriptionbecausethe Sheikh'spossessionofthem at thistime was being

disputed by the Ruler of Qatar, since, as my colleague Ms Pilkington has already explained

yesterday,the Bahrainiversion of history falsely seeksto relegate the Al-Thani chiefs of Qatar at

this timeto mere pearlmerchants in Doha.

31.Qatardoesnot dispute the fact thatPndeauxmade a visitto the main HawarIslandin the

second half of March 1909, as is proved by his manuscript letter to SirPercy Cox of

20 March 1909 and hismore official despatch to the PoliticalResidentof 4 April 1909~'. But, of

course, Qatar does not accept the interpretation which Bahrain seeks toput on these two letters as

Mr. Shankardasswill show in his future presentationon Bahrain's allegedeffectivitésprior to 1936.

Indeed, Qatar is quite convinced that Prideaux'sletter to the Political Resident of 4 Apnl 1909

offersno evidencewhatsoever to support a claim to theHawarIslandsby the Rulerof Bahrain for

the detailed reasonswhich will be spelt outto the Courtby Mr.Shankardass.

32. Above and beyond the well-nigh decisive consideration that,in 1939,the great majority

of the Hawar Islandswere located wholly or partially within a three-mile limit drawn from the

low-water mark on the mainland coast of Qatar, is other evidence. Thisincludes the evidence to

which Mr. Shankardasswill draw attentionin a laterpresentationand which demonstratesthat the

Ruler of Bahrain never asserted title to the islands until 1936and, in particular, did not assert title

to them in 1909when virtually invited todo soby thethen Bntish Political Agent, Prideaux.

33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Mr. Shankardasshas already addressed you this

moming on the limited extent of Bahrain as a political entity,drawing inter alia on Iranian and

- p

2%femoriaol Qata r,nns.111.a1ndII5.3Vol.6,pp.233and 245.Turkish sources. The Court will recall that that presentation covered inter alia specific

documentary evidence of official British recognition in the year 1933, in the context of the

beginning of the oil concession negotiationscoveringBahrain'sso-called "unallottedarea",that the

Hawar Islandsbelonged to Qatarand not to Bahrain. 1wouldask the Courtto pay closeattention

to thisclearand compellingevidence,whichdoesnotappearto have been lookedat by either Loch

or Fowle in 1936 when Belgrave first advanced a claim by the Ruler of Bahrain to the Hawar

Islands. Itis of course true that Loch,in his letterto the Political Resident,Fowle, of 6 May 1936,

qualifiedhisview that therewas "real substance"in the Bahrainclaim to Hawarby sayingthat this

was "subjectto any past correspondencewhichis not availabletome". Lochindeedmay have had

a hazy recollectionof his own exchangesof lettersandtelegrarnswith the Colonial Officeand the

India Office in London in the months of July and August1933, when he, Loch, was Acting

Political Resident in Bushire in the temporary absence of Fowle; this would explain why the

earlier correspondence wasnot available to him in 1936- because it was in Bushire and not in

Bahrain.

34. This evidence, dating fiom 1933, of officia1British recognitionthat the Hawar Islands

appertained toQatar and not to Bahrainis furtherbuttressedby events in 1934. Thiswas the year

in whichthe RAFwished to cany out an aerial reconnaissanceofQatarin anticipationof a possible

British guaranteeto the Ruler of Qatar against a serious and unprovoked attack against his land

territories from, it would seem, Saudi Arabia. The reconnaissance was duly carried out on

9 May 1934,after permission forthe overfiightof his territory hadbeen sought and received fiom

the Ruler of Qatar,butnotfrom theRulerof Bahrain.

35.The significanceof thisreconnaissanceis that theBritish authorities sought and obtained

permissionfiom the Ruler of Qatarfor an overfiightof Qatariterritory, includingthemainHawar

Island. Theydid not seek, and they did not evenconsiderseeking, any such permission fromthe

Ruler of Bahrain. Their conduct is consistent only with the conclusion that, at this tirne, they

acknowledgedthe Ruler of Qatar to have sovereigntyover the Hawar Islands. Loch specifically

draws attentionin his report on the reconnaissance tothe care taken to ensure that the RAFflying

boats undertakingthis reconnaissancedid not overfly Zakhnuniyah. It is therefore inconceivablethat he wouldnot have taken the sameprecaution with respect to Hawarif he had beenconvinced

atthistime, in 1934,that Hawarwas underthe sovereigntyof Bahrain.

36. There is in addition- and Mr. Shankardass has already pointed this outin his earlier

presentationthis moming - the evidence to be gleaned fromthe wording of the oil concession

which the Rulerof Qatar grantedto the Anglo-PersianOil Company (APOC)in 1935. The Court

will recall that,by Article 1of this Concession,APOC was given the sole right "throughout the

principality of Qatr,to explore, to prospect, to drill for and toctand to shipand to export and

the right to refine and sel1petroleum and natural gases ..." under certain defined conditions.

Article2 of the ConcessionAgreementgrantedthe Companythe right to operatein any part of the

State of Qatar,with certain exceptionsrelating to religious landsand buildings. Ithen went on to

declare that: "The State of Qatr means the whole area overwhich the Shaikhrules and which is

marked on the north of the line drawnon the rnap attached to this ~~reement."~' 1apologize for

showingthe Courtagain the rnap whichthey would alreadyhave seen this moming, but 1think it

would just be helpfulifwe couldshowit again for afewminutes.

[Show rnap attached to the Qatar Concession Agreement at Memorial of Qatar, Vol.6,

p. 529.1

37. As the Court will see, this map, which is now shown on the screen, and to which

Mr. Shankardasshas already referred,is a fairly simplesketchrnap which does not show much in

the way of geographicaldetail. But it does showJaziratHawar(indicatedby an arrow) and Rabad

Ash Sharqiyah(alsoindicatedby anarrow),twoof theHawarIslands,aswell as,apparently,Janan

island. TheCourtwill notethat the signatures ofthe Ruler andof Mr. Mylles,representingAPOC,

are affixedon the rnap behveenBahrainIsland and the HawarIslandsand this is obviously a clear

attemptto differentiateBahrainIslandfrom the Qatar peninsula,includingthe Hawar Islands. The

argumentput forwardby certain British officials in the 1930s,that the presence ofBahrain Island

on this sketchrnapnegativesany implication tobe drawn fromit that the HawarIslands belong to

Qatar is accordingly thoroughlyweak and indeed wholly unconvincing. Thesketch rnap clearly

showsthose HawarIslandswhich itidentifiesas appertainingtoQatar and as being separatedfrom

*'~emonalof QatarAnn. 111.9, ol.6p. 507.BahrainIsland. There canbe no questionbut thatthe Qatar oil concession signedon 17May 1935

was intendedto apply to the Hawar Islandsas wellas to the whole ofthe peninsulaof Qatarto the

northofthe line drawnonthe map attachedto the Agreement(butobviouslythe concession didnot

apply to BahrainIsland).

38. Finally, theCourt willalso wish to be reminded that Rende1of the Foreign Office(who

laterbecame Sir GeorgeRendel)gave expressionat the end of 1937to his strong doubts about the

"provisional decision"of the British Govemmentin 1936 that Hawarshould be regarded, on the

evidence then available,as appertainingto Bahrain. Rende1was veryfarniliarwith the Gulfregion,

andin a minuteof 30December 1937,to which attentionhas alreadybeen drawn,he expresseshis

regret that thendia Officewent so far as they seemto have donein allottingthe HawarIslands to

Bahrain. Rende1points out that the Hawar Islands are obviously,fi-omthe geographicalpoint of

view, apart of Qatar,andcommentsthat interests,as well as geography,oughtto have led theIndia

Office toallocatethem to Qatar. Rendel'scomment,in this minute composed atthe end of 1937,is

as cogent todayas when it was first expressed; andno real answer tothe point which he makes is

forthcoming fiom the BritishArchivesor indeed from anywhereelse.

39. Mr.President,Membersof the Court,1would concludeby sumrnarizingQatar's positive

casefor sovereignty overtheHawar Islandsin the followingterms. Qatar claimsan originaltitle to

the HawarIslands on the groundthat the greatmajority of them lie within a three-milelimit drawn

fromthe low-watermarkon Qatar's mainlandcoast, and the remainderon the basis ofthe principle

ofproximityas properly understood; andontwo furthergrounds whichsupport andsustainQatar's

claim of title:

(1) that the historical evidence, including therevealing history of the oil concessions, some of

whichwill be reviewed at a later stagebyMr. Shankardass,fullysubstantiatesQatar's claimof

titleto the Hawar Islands; and

(2) that the map evidence which Qatar producedwith its Reply overwhelminglyconfirms, as a

matterof general repute,the temtorial integrityof Qatar and the sovereigntyof its Ruler over

the islands.

40. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, this concludes my presentation thismoming. 1

thankyou al1very muchforthe carefùl attentionwhich you havepaidto my remarks and,as 1havealready drawn attention briefly to the other historical evidence upon which Qatar's title tothe

HawarIslands is based, 1wouldask you, Mr.President,if you wouldbe good enough next to give

the floor tor. Bundywhowillnow review the map evidencewhichso strikinglyconfirmsQatar's

case,but as1note that thetime is now aboutfiveminutes to oneo'clock,you may care, in fact, to h

let Mr.Bundytake the floor tomorrowmoming.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou very much, Sir Ian. La séancede la Cour est levée. Nous

reprendronsdemain à 10heures.

L'audienceestlevée à 13heures.

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Tuesday 30 May 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Links