Uncorrected
CR 98/11
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LA HAYE THE HAGUE
ANNEE 1998
Audience publique
tenuelejeudi 11juin 1998à IO heures, au Palaii de la Pak,
sous laprésidencedeM. Schwebel,président
en l'affairede la Compétence en maeepêcheries(Espagne c Canada)
COMPTERENDU
YEAR 1998
Publicsitting
held on Thursday11 June 1998,ut 10.0am, ut the PeacePalace,
PresidentSchwebelpresiding
in the caseconcerningFisheriesJurisdiction (Spainv. Canada)
VERBATIMRECORDPrésents: M. Schwebel,président
M. Weeramantry v,ice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek,juges
MM. Lalonde
TorresBemardez,jugesad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina,reffierPresent: President Schwebel
Vice-President Weeramantry
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Judges ad hoc Lalonde
TorresBerniirdezLe Gouvernementde I'Espagneest représenté par :
M. José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, chefdu servicejuridique international duministèredes
affaires étrangèresd'Espagne, professeurde droit internatiànl'universitéComplutense de
Madrid,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur dedroit internationàl'universitéPanthéon-Assas (PariII),
M. Keith Highet, conseil en droit international,vice-présidentdu comitéjuridique interaméricain
de l'organisation des Etats américains,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotons, professeur de droit internationàll'universitéautonome de
Madrid,
M. Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez, professeur de droit internatioàal'universitéComplutense
v
de Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Félix Valdés Valentin-Gamazom , inistre-conseillerde l'ambassade d'Espagneaux Pays-Bas,
comme coagent;
M. Carlos Dominguez Diaz, secrétaired'ambassade,sous-directeur généraalux organisations
internationales de gestion de pêcheriesau ministère del'agricultureet des pêcheries
d'Espagne,
M. Juan JoséSanz Aparicio, secrétaired'ambassade,membre du servicejuridique international
du ministère des affaires étrangèrs'Espagne,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernementdu Canada est représenté par :
S. Exc.M. Philippe Kirsch, c.r., ambassadeuretjurisconsulte, ministèredes affaires étrangères
et du commerce international,
comme agent et avocat;
M. Blair Hankey, avocat généradl élégué, ministèdres affaires étrangèreset du commerce
international,
comme agent adjoint et avocat;
M. L. Alan Willis, c.r., ministère delajustice,
comme conseilprincipal et avocat;The Government of Spain isrepresented by:
Mr. José Antonio PastorRidruejo, Head, Department of International Legal Affairs,Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Spain, Professor of InternationalLaw at the ComplutenseUniversity of
Madrid,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of InternationalLaw, University of Paris II
(Panthéon-Assas),
Mr. Keith Highet, Counsellor in International Law, Vice-Chairman,Inter-AmericanJuridical
Cornmittee, Organizationof American States,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brot6ns, Professor of InternationalLaw, Autonomous Universityof
Madrid,
Mr. Luis Ignacio SanchezRodriguez,Professor of International Law, ComplutenseUniversity of
Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Félix Valdés Valentin-Gamazo,Minister-Counsellor,Embassy of Spain to the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Carlos Dominguez Diaz, Embassy Secretary, Assistant Director-General for International
Fisheries Management Organizations, Ministryof Agriculture andFisheries of Spain,
Mr. Juan José Sanz Aparicio, Embassy Secretary, Department ofInternationalLegal Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain,
The Government of Canada isrepresented by:
His Excellency Philippe Kirsch,Q.C., Ambassador and Legal Adviser to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
as Agent and Advocate;
Mr. Blair Hankey, Associate General Counsel, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade,
as Depuîy Agent and Advocate;
Mr. L. Alan Willis, Q.C., Department of Justice,
as Senior Counsel and Advocate; -6-
M. Prosper Weil, professeur éméritede l'universitéde Paris,
comme conseilet avocat;
M. Paul Fauteux, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
M. John F. G. Hannaford, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
Mme Louise de La Fayette, Universitéde Southampton,
Mme Ruth Ozols Barr, ministèrede lajustice,
Mme Isabelle Poupart, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
Mme Laurie Wright, ministèrede lajustice,
commeconseils;
M. Malcolm Rowe,Gouvernement de Terre-Neuveet du Labrador,
M. Earl Wiseman, ministèredes pêcheset des océans,
commeconseillers;
Mme Manon Lamirande, ministère de la justice,
Mme Marilyn Langstaff, ministèredes affaires étrangères etdu commerce international,
Mme Annemarie Manuge, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
M. Robert McVicar, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
Mme Lynn Pettit, ministèredes affaires étrangères etdu commerce international,
comme agentsadministratifs. -7-
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, Universityof Paris,
as CounselandAdvocale;
Mr. Paul Fauteux, Department of Foreign Affairsand International Trade,
Mr. John F. G. Hannaford, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Ms Louise de La Fayette, University of Southampton,
Ms Ruth Ozols Barr, Department of Justice,
Ms Isabelle Poupart, Department of Foreign Affairsand International Trade,
Ms Laurie Wright, Departmentof Justice,
as Counsel;
Mr. Malcolm Rowe, Governmentof Newfoundland andLabrador,
Mr. Earl Wiseman, Department of Fisheriesand Oceans,
as Advisers;
Ms Manon Lamirande, Department of Justice,
Ms Marilyn Langstaff, Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade,
Ms Annemarie Manuge, Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade,
Mr. Robert McVicar, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Ms Lynn Pettit, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
as AdministrativeOfJiccers. -8-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. 1 cal1 upon the distinguished Agent of Canada,
Ambassador Kirsch.
M. KIRSCH :
1. Monsieur le président,Madame,Messieurs de la Cour, c'estun grand honneurpour moi
de représenterle Canada devant la Cour internationale de Justice.
Introduction
2. En se présentantdevant la Cour, le Canada tient àréitérerses engagements passésen
faveur du règlementpacifique des différendset sa déférence l'égardde la Cour internationalede
Justice. Si le Canada conteste aujourd'huila compétencede laCour, il ne remet en cause ni son .J
autorité,ni la confiance qu'illui a toujours témoignée.Conformément audroit international, le
Canada a simplement choisi la négociationcomme mode privilégié de règlementpour certains
différends.
3. Ces différends,le Canada les a exclusde la compétenceau moyen d'une réserve.11s'agit
des((différendsauxquelspourraientdonner lieu les.mesuresde gestionet de conservationadoptées
par le Canada pour les navires pêchantdans la zone de réglementationde I'OPANO, ...et
l'exécutionde ces mesures))(contre-mémoire du Canada, annexe 2). En anglais, ((disputesarising
out of or concerningconservation and managementmeasures ...and the enforcementof such
measures)). W
4. A ce stade, laCour est donc appeléàexaminer laquestion desa propre compétence. Et,
à cet égard,je voudrais faire deux observationspréliminaires.
5.En premier lieu,je note avecregretque les plaidoiriesespagnolesdes deuxderniersjours,
ont portéessentiellement sur le fond de l'affaire. M. Highet évoquait hier avec délicatessela
nécessitéde fairequelques incursionslimitéessur le fond pourdéterminerla portée d'une réserve.
Soit,mais l'Espagnene s'estpas limitéeà quelques incursions. Dansses plaidoiries, souscouvert
de traiter la compétence,les dissertationssur le fond ont étéla règle. Je n'insistepas. Nous
sommeshabitués,mais cette démarchen'enest pas moins contraireaux ordonnancesde la Cour. -9 -
J'invite celle-àien tenir compte lorsqu'ils'agirapour elle de départagerles éléments pertiàents
sa décisionsur la compétenceet ceux qui ne le sont pas.
6. En second lieu, je ne peux que déplorer lesexcès qui ont marqué lesplaidoiries
espagnoles. Nous aurons I'occasionde revenir sur certains d'entre eux,notammentà propos des
événements quise sont réellement passés à l'occasion de l'arraisonnement de l'Estai. Nous
regrettons d'autantplus ces intempérancesqu'ilest vrai que l'Espagneest un pays ami. Le Canada
attache une grande importanceà cette amitié,comme il attache une grande importanceà la réelle
harmonie qui règne à nouveau dans nosrelations.
Rappel des Faits
7. Cela dit, je passerai trèsrapidement sur les quelques faits pertiàla question de la .
compétencedela Cour, qui sont bien connus. Le 10mai 1994,le Canada a déposé une nouvelle
déclaration d'acceptatiode la compétence dela Cour qui comporte la réservequej'ai citée. Le
mêmejour,le Gouvernementdu Canada présentaitau Parlement le projet de loi C-29. Ce texte,
qui modifiait la loi sur la protection des pêchescôtières, a étéadopté sanschangement par le
Parlement le 12mai 1994. Les modalités d'application dceette loi ont été définiepseu aprèsdans
un règlement,qui, lui-mêmea , étémodifiéle 3 mars 1995demanière à soumettreà la législation
les naviresespagnols et portugais. Le 9 mars, le navire de pêche espagnolEstai était inspetté
saisi, et son capitaine arrêté, pour avoir contràvla loi et aux règlements. Voilàles faits qui
ont amené l'Espagne à déposer une requête introductived'instance au Greffe de la Cour
le 28 mars 1995.
8.Normalement,je m'en tiendrais làsur le plandes faits. La réserve se sufàielle-même.
Mais lesilencede l'Espagnesur certainesquestionspourtantévidentesm'amène à ajouterquelques
éléments qui,je l'espère,seront utilàsla Cour.
9. Au début deson discours introductif d'avant-hier, l'agent de l'Espagne s'etterrogé
longuement sur les raisons des mesures prises parle Canada et exécuténotamment à l'encontre
de l'Estai.Il n'avaitpourtant paà chercher bien loin. La réponsese trouve dans la crise de la
conservationdes ressources halieutiquesqui sévissaitalors dansAtlantiquedu Nord-Ouest. Il est - IO-
d'ailleurs remarquable que l'Espagnen'en ait dit mot, ni dans ses écrits,ni oralement. Cette
question est traitéeen détail auxparagraphes à327 du contre-mémoiredu Canada et je ne la
rappelleque pour une raison uniqueremettre laCour dans le contexte quia entourél'adoptionde
la loiC-29 et le dépôtde la réserve,alorsque l'Espagnese permet, contretoute évidence,de mettre
en question les objectifs que poursuivait mon pays. L'Espagne affirme que la crise de la
conservation des ressources n'étaitqu'unrétexte»aux mesures prises par le Canada. Elle est
pourtant bienplacéepour savoirque pourbeaucoup,en Amérique duNordcommeen Europe, cette
crise a été une réalité crueL.a surpêchechroniqueet les autres pratiques de pêcheespagnoles
ont laissé une profondeamertume des deux côtésde l'Atlantique.
#
10. La crise de la conservation des années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix a été
catastrophique. Les pêcheriesde l'Atlantiquedu Nord-Ouest, dont l'abondanceet la richesse
semblaientconstituer une manne inépuisable, étaient menacéedeisparition. Des communautés
entières perdaient ainsi leurs moyens de subsistance traditionnels et faisaiànun avenir
extrêmementsombre.
11.Nous reconnaissons d'emblée queles responsabilitésde cette crise sont partagées. Les
pratiques depêchede bien des pays y ont contribué. Le Canaa fait sa part d'erreurs. Nous les
avons reconnues et essayons de les corriger.
12.Quoi qu'ilen soit, il fallaitagir et l'urgencedu a donné lieà uncertain nombre
d'initiatives nationales, régionales etinternationales. Poursa part, le Canada a commencépar -
adopter,dans sa zone depêchede 200 milles, une série demesuresde gestion et de conservation,
notamment plusieurs moratoires draconiens, pour assurer la survie des stocks de poissons qui y
étaient menacés.
13.Dans ce contexte,il me faut dire un motde la questiondes stockschevauchants(cequ'on
appelleen anglais lesraddling stocks)que l'Espagnen'a faitqu'effleureralors qu'elle estau cŒur
du problème. Par définition,les stocks chevauchantsse déplacententre la zone de pêche de 200
milles de1'Etatcôtier et la zone qui luiest adjacente. L'Etatcôtier peut bieàpl'intérieur
des 200 milles toutes les mesures possibles, elles ne pourront àuelles seuleà assurer la
conservation des stocks chevauchants. Pour êtreefficaces, les mesures de 1'Etatcôtier doivent -11 -
nécessairements'accompagnerde mesures qui s'appliquentau-delà de cette zone. Si lespêcheurs
attendent simplementque le poisson se trouve en haute mer pour lecapturer, les mesuresde'Etat
côtier ne serventà rien et la survie de l'espèce dans sonensemble est menacée.
14.C'estce qui explique que le Canada se soit mià la recherchede solutionsàlong terme.
Comme on le sait, il s'estfait'instigateurd'unaccord multilatéralsur la pêcheen haute mer qui
mettrait en place un régime internationalefficace de gestion et de conservation des stocks de
poissons chevauchants et grands migrateurs, accord d'ailleurs adoptépar les Nations Unies en
août 1995 (accord des Nations Unies relatifà l'application dela partie XI de la convention des
Nations Unies sur ledroit de la mer du0décembre 1982c , oncernantlaconservationet la gestion
des stocks chevauchantset grands migrateurs, doc. NU A/CONF. 164/37,8 septembre 1995).
15.De la mêmefaçon, le Canada a intensifiéses efforts au sein de I'OPANO(organisation
des pêchesde l'Atlantiquedu 'Nord-Ouest)en vue de l'élaborationde règlesspécifiquespour les
stocks chevauchants dans la zone de réglementationde cette organisation, donc au-delà des 200
milles. Conformément à la convention de l'OPANO, le Canada a fait adopter des mesures
compatibles avec les siennes propres, en tant qufEtatcôtier, pour mettre àla surpêche.
16. A l'époque,beaucoup de stocks chevauchants, la morue et la plie, par exemple, étaient
déjà décimés. Restailte fiétandu Groenland, mais il connaissait un déclinrapide que le Canada
observait avec grande inquietude. Pour lui épargnerun sort similaireà celui des autres stocks
chevauchantsde la côteest, le Canada s'estdonctourné versI'OPANO. Ses efforts, on le sait, se
sont heurtésà un certain nombre d'obstacles. Il est inutile d'yrevenir ici; notre contre-mémoire
relate tous les détails nécessaires paragraphes 32 à 44.
17.En bref, le Canada n'a pas réussà faireobserver les décisionsde I'OPANOqui auraient
pu assurer la conservationde l'espèce.Devant lasurpêchequi sepoursuivait,il a, en 1994et 1995,
pris les mesures quej'ai décritesau débutde mon exposé.
18.L'objectifdu Canada n'avaitrien àvoiravec un désird'étendre les zones maritimessous
sajuridiction, commese plaîtà lerépéterl'Espagne.Dans toute cette affaire,la position du Canada
a été entièrement dominée pa lrs impératifsde gestion et de conservation, lestermes mêmesque - 12 -
l'on retrouve dans la réserve. Voilà ce que je souhaitais rappelerà la Cour en évoquant ces
événements.
L'importance du consentement
19. Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs dela Cour, l'argumentationque le Canada
vous présenterarepose sur un principe essentiel, la condition sine quanon de la compétence,à
savoir le consentement des Etats. La Cour l'a encore rappeléen 1995 : «l'un des principes
fondamentauxdeson Statutestqu'ellene peuttrancherundifférend entredesEtatssansque ceux-ci
aient consentià sajuridiction))(Timororiental (Portugalc. Australie),arrêt, C.I..ecueil1995,
p. 101,par. 26). Ce passageest l'écho d'unejurisprudence constante datants premiersprononcés w
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationalequi affirmait, dès 1924,que sa compétence«ne
saurait subsisteren dehors des limitesdans lesquelles[le]consentementa étdonné))(Concessions
MavrommatisenPalestine,arrêtno2, 1924,C.P.J.I.série A no2, p. 16).
20. La nécessitédu consentement procède naturellementdu principe du libre choix des
moyens en matièrede règlement pacifiquedes différends, commedes attributs mêmesde la
souverainetéétatique.Jene m'attarderaipas. Jeme contenterai de rappeler iciceque disaitla Cour
dans son arrêt dansl'affairedesActivitésmilitaires et paramilitair:s
«Lesdéclarationsd'acceptationde lajuridiction obligatoirede laCour sont des
engagements facultatifs, de caractère unilatéral,que les Etats ont toute libertéde
souscrireou de ne pas souscrire. L'Etatest libre en outre soit de faire une déclaration
sans conditionet sans limite de durée, soitde l'assortir deconditionsou de réserves.))
(Activités militairesetparamilitaires auNicaragua et contrecelui-ci (Nicaraguac.
Etats-Unis d'Amériquec ),ompétenceetrecevabilité, arrêC.I.J.Recueil1984,p. 418,
par. 59.)
21. Monsieur le président,si un Etat est libre de ne pas accepter du tout la compétence de
laCour, à plus forte raison est-illibrede n'acceptercettecompétencequ'àl'intéride limitesdont
la définitionlui incombe.
22. Le Canada accepte la compétencede la Cour depuis ses origines. II a assorti son
acceptation de certaines réserves,comme beaucoup d'autresEtats déclarants, compris l'Espagne.
La possibilitéd'émettredes réserves estla pierre angulaire de la clause facultative. C'est ellequi
a encouragéune acceptation large de la compétence dela Cour de la part d'uncertain nombre - 13-
d'Etats,parce qu'elleleur permettait de choisirun autre mode de règlementpour certains types de
différends.Et donc, un respect scrupuleuxdesprincipes qui régissentl'émissionet l'interprétation
des réservesn'estpas seulement bénéfique à l'ensembledu systèmede la clause facultative, il est
essentielà son acceptationpar lesEtats. Autrementdit, il faut que les Etats puissent compter sur
les règlesdujeu. Pour s'épanouir, pouprrospéreret même pourmaintenir sa place, le systèmede
la clause facultative doit continuerinspireraux Etats la plus grandeconfiance. Pour notre part,
cette confiance, nous la plaçons enla Cour.
23. Dans l'affairequi est devantvous, leconsentementdu Canada àlacompétencede la Cour
n'existe pas. Letexte de la réserve exprime sansaucune ambiguïté sa volonté de soustraire à la
compétencede la Cour les différendsauxquelspourraient donner lieu les mesuresde gestion et de
conservation.
24. Je conclus sur ce point en rappelantle principe général quisous-tend la nécessitédu
consentement. Il est bien simple: la Cour tire son autoritéde la volonté des Etats. Face à
l'Espagnequi l'inviteà ne pas respecter celle du Canada, il revientà la Cour de réaffirmerles
principes qui fondent sa compétenceet de mettre un terme aux tentatives espagnoles d'y passer
outre.
Résumé du corps de l'argumentation
25. Monsieur le président, Madame,Messieursde la Cour, unefois établieI'importancedu
consentement,leresteest unequestion d'interprétatiode laréservecanadiennetelle qu'elles'inscrit
dans la déclarationd'acceptation.
26. A première vue,il n'y a pas grande différence entrel'Espagneet le Canada sur les
principes à appliquer. Nous sommes tous d'accord : les réserves font partie intégrantedes
déclarations d'acceptationde compétence;les déclarations constituentdes actes unilatérauxsui
generies lesdoiventêtreinterprétéesd'um neanièrenaturelleetraisonnabledefaçon àdonnerplein
effetà l'intentionde1'Etatdéclarant;et leur interprétationt treconforme au principede la bonne
foi. - 14-
27. Cette belle harmonie connaît quand même ses limites. Parce qu'elln e'apas le choix,
l'Espagneaccepte du bout des lèvresque les critèresd'interprétationne sont en soi «ni restrictifs
ni expansifs))(mémoirede l'Espagne,p. 67, par. 37). Mais dans la mêmefoulée, ellenous dit et
redit qu'il fautdonner aux réserves«la portéela plus limitée permisepar leur interprétation)).Ce
qui ressort de ce clair-obscur juridique, dont on chercherait en vain le fondement, c'est qu'en
pratique,I'Espagnefaittout cequ'ellepeut pour appliquer à laréserve canadienneune interprétation
aussi restrictiveque possible. Le problème,c'est qu'elle partd'unefausseprémisse.Elle suppose,
on l'abien entendudans lesdeuxderniersjours, que lareconnaissancede lacompétencedela Cour
est larèglegénérale et quetoute limitationest uneexception. Or, Monsieurleprésident,lesystème
1iJ
auquel ont souscrit les Etats membresde la Communautéinternationalene fonctionnepas du tout
de cette façon. Ce n'est pastout de direque déclarationetréservesformentun instrumentjuridique
unique. 11faut en tirer la conclusionlogique :il n'ya aucune raisond'appliqueraux réservesune
interprétationrestrictive. Pour établirla portéede l'instrument d'acceptationde la compétence de
laCour, on le sait, il suffitde lire letexte de manière raisonnableet naturelle,eu égàrl'intention
de 1'Etatdéclarant(Anglo-IranianOilCo., arrêt,C.I.J:Recueil1952,p. 104). La Cour seraappelée
à déceler cetteintention en se fondant tant sur le texte de la réserveque sur les circonstances
entourant son dépôt.
28. Il est vrai que dans certains cas, l'intentionapparente de 1'Etatdéclarant et le sens
ordinaire des mots qui forment le texte de la réservene pointent pas dansla même direction.Le '*17
processus d'interprétation est alors délicat. Maiisl ne présenteaucune difficultélorsque la lettre
de la réserveet l'intentionde lrEtatdéclarantne font qu'un,comme c'estle cas ici.
29. Je rappelle d'abordla lettre de la réserve. La déclaration d'acceptatidu Canadaexclut
de la compétencedela Cour les ((différendsauxquelspourraient donnerlieules mesuresde gestion
et de conservationadoptéespar le Canadapour les navires pêchand tans la zone de réglementation
de I'OPANO ..et l'exécution(I'enforcement)de telles mesures)). Ces termes couvrentde toute
évidencelesmesures de gestionet de conservationadoptéespar le Canadaen raison de la crise de
conservation des ressources halieutiques que j'ai évoquées plus haut,à,savoir la loi C-29 et les
règlementsqui en découlent. Ces termes couvrentégalement l'exécution dcees mesures dont lasaisie du navire espagnol Estai a étél'une des manifestations. Mes collègues, MM. Hankey
et Willis, donneront davantage d'explicationssur chacune de ces questions.
30. Je passe à I'intentionde I'Etatdéclarant. On nousa dit que I'intentiondevait exister au
moment du dépôtde la réserve. Noussommesbien d'accord,etje citerai d'abordle communiqué
de presse émispar le Canada le 10 mai 1994,jour de l'introductiondu projet de loi C-29 au
Parlement et du dépôtde la nouvelle déclaration renfermant la réserve :
((Aujourd'hui,leCanadaa modifiéson acceptationde la compétenceobligatoire
de la Cour internationale de Justice à La Haye afin d'empêcher toute situation qui
pourrait anéantir leseffortsdu Canadapour protégersesstocks.)) (Contre-mémoiredu
Canada, par. 107.)
Ecoutons aussi le ministre des affaires étrangères,le 12mai, lors du débatsur le projet de loi au
Sénat : «Afin de protéger l'intégrité de cetlto ei [donc la loi C-291 nous avons présentéune
réserve ..auprèsde laCour internationaledeJustice))(contre-mémoireduCanada,par 109). Il est
vraiment difficile d'imaginerque l'intentiondu Canada ait pu s'exprimer d'une façonplus limpide.
31.Troisièmeet dernière citation,quej'invite la Cour à écouter attentivement :
«Attendu que le but de la réserveétaitclairement lié à l'application de cette
législation,la seule conclusion appropriée est que l'intention du Gouvernement
canadien à l'époqueoù ila adoptélaréserveétaid teseprémunircontreune récusation
judiciaire contreletype de «mesuresdegestion et deconservation))ou ((exécution))e
telles mesures...)) (Mémoire del'Espagne,p. 95, par. 107.)
Cette citation, Monsieur le président,est tirée du mémoireespagnol. La Cour appréciera le
contraste entre la clarté de cetteadmission et les remises en question de l'intention du Canada
auxquelles l'Espagnea cru bon de se livrer au cours des deux derniersjours.
32. L'Espagnea raison de dire que le Canada aurait pu formuler sa réservede façon
différente. Le Canadaavait toute libertéde soustraire à la compétencede la Cour toutes espèces
de différendsj,usqu'àretirer sadéclarationd'acceptationdans sonensemble. Mais làn'étaitpas son
intention. Le Canada entendait bien rédigersa réservede la façon dont il l'a fait et la voir
s'appliquer exactementau typede différendauquel a donné lieula saisie de l'Estai. C'estla seule
conclusion raisonnable à laquellepeut menerl'examen dutexte de la réserveet des circonstances
ayant entouréson dépôt. - 16-
33. Tout cela, l'Espagnele saittrèsbien. Aussi a-t-elle cherchà noyer l'évidencedans une
séried'argumentsde toutes sortes, dans l'espoir de créerune situation aussi confuse et aussi
compliquéeque possible. Cettevolonté délibérée de semle arconfusion,nous l'avonsdécouverte
dans les écrits espagnols,nous l'avonsretrouvée dansles plaidoiries des deux derniersjours :
invocationderèglesd'interprétationquin'existentquedansl'imaginationespagnole;restrictionsqui
ne correspondent ni au texte de la réserve, ni à l'intention du Canada, au-delà de toute
vraisemblanceet de toute logique;argumentsqui dénaturentla réserve au point dela transformer
en une réserve toute différenteq,u'imagine ou souhaite l'Espagne.
34. Je passerai sous silence Humpty Dumpty, le cheval de Caligula et, naturellement, la
d
charrue et les boeufs dont on ne sait toujours pas, aprèsdeuxjours de plaidoiries espagnoles, qui
finalement passe avant.
35. Ainsi, àforce de contorsionset de distractions, l'Espagneespère-t-elleamener laCour à
sepencher sur une sériede questions sansrapport avec la présenteaffaire et à perdre de vue, petit
à petit, la questionfondamentale : la réservecanadienne exclut-elle lacompétencede la Cour en
l'espèce ?
36. Mes collègues se chargeront de démonter les multiples rouages - souvent
contradictoires- de la mécaniqueintellectuellemise en place par l'Espagne. Je me contenterai à
ce stade de dégagerquelques exemplestirés des argumentsprésentés par nos collèguesespagnols.
37. Premierexemple :nulne contesteque lazone au-delà des200millesappelledesmesures J
de gestion et de conservationtout aussi bien que la zone des 200 milles. Comme elle ne peut le
nier,l'Espagnelivreun procèsd'intentionau Canada en espérantévacuelreproblème :la loi C-29
ne serait pas une mesure de gestion et de conservation, mais le reflet de la volontédu Canada
d'étendre sajuridictionau-delà des 200milles. Elle ne viserait donc pas vraimentlaprotectiondes
ressources. Monsieur le président,cet argument ne tient pas la route. D'abord,au moment des
débatsparlementaires, le ministre responsablea été trèsclair quant au but de lanouvelleloi :«Je
lerépète,il ne s'agit pasaujourd'huid'étendre notrecompétence,mais bien de mettreen place un
régimede conservation.)) (Débatde la Chambre des communes, 11 mai 1994, mémoire de
l'Espagne,annexes, vol. 1,annexe 15, p. 4216.) - 17-
38. Jetons maintenantun coup d'oeil à la loi elle-même.Son but est définien son article 5
de façon toutà fait explicit:elle viseà «permettre au Canada deprendre les mesures d'urgence
nécessairespourmettre un terme à la destruction [des stockschevauchants]et les reconstituertout
en poursuivant sesefforts sur le plan international en vue de trouverune solution au problème de
l'exploitationinduepar les bateauxde pêcheétrangers)) (Loid su Canada, 1994,ch. 14, mémoire
de l'Espagne, annexes, vol. :I,annexe 14, art. 5.1). Et que fait la loi? Elle permet au
gouvernement dedésigner des stocks de poissonschevauchants,des classes de bateaux étrangers
et lesmesuresdegestionetde conservationpources stockschevauchantsqui doiventêtreobservées
par les personnes setrouvantà bord des bateaux désignés.Commentl'Espagnepeut-elle affirmer
qu'il ne s'agitpas là de gestion et de conservat?onOui, la loi canadiennes'appliqueau-delà des
200 milles. C'est ce que commandentles impératifsde laconservation. Ellen'en reste pas moins
une mesure de gestion et de conservation au sens de la réserve. Comment pourrait-il en être
autrement quand le but de la loi est de protégerun stock de poissons qui par nature ignore les
frontières?
39. L'expression«mesures de gestion et de conservation))a étéretenue par le législateuret
par les rédacteursde la réserveparce qu'elle englobe touteslesmesures visanà la protection eà
laréglementationdes pêcheriesq , u'elles s'appliqueàl'intérieurou au-delà des200 milles. Sion
leur enlèveleurportéegéographique,les mesures prises par leCanada n'ont plus aucun sens et la
réserveest dépourvuede toute utilité pratique.
40. Deuxièmeexemple : l'Espagnerépète àl'envi que laréservene visepas l'objetprincipal
du différend,à savoir la question de ce qu'elle appelle le «titre international))du Canada pour
l'exercicede sajuridictionà l'encontre des navires étrangersen haute mer.
41. Monsieur le président,il saute aux yeux que cet «objetprincipal))est une question de
fond, pas de compétence.C'est précisément àce genre de questionque la réservefait barrage. La
réserve porte sur lesmesures de gestion et de conservationqui seraient prises par le Canada dans
la zone de réglementationde I'OPANO,donc dans une partie de lahaute mer. Commentpeut-on
êtreplus clair? Cet argument se désintègre aussitôt quel'ony touche. C'est vraimentbeaucoup
de bruit pour rien. - 18 -
42. Troisièmeexemple :lesmesurescanadiennesdegestionetdeconservationquementionne
la réservene comprennent, dit l'Espagne,que celles qui sont permises par le droit international.
Cette interprétation dénaturcomplètementla réserve. L'application de la réserve dépend de la
réuniondesélémento sbjectifsqu'elleprécise,et nonde principesjuridiques dontellenefait aucune
mention. Qu'ellesoit fondéeounon endroit international,unemesuredegestionet deconservation
demeure une mesure. Encore une fois, la question de savoir si elle est licite ou illicite est une
question de fond. Si la Coursuivait l'Espagnesur ce terrain, elle ne pourrait trancher la question
de sa compétencequ'aprèss'être prononcée au préalab sluer le fond de l'affaiàel'encontre de
l'objectif mêmede la réserve.
43. L'interprétationespagnole mène à une impasse :si les mesures étaientjugéesillégales, rl
la réservene s'appliqueraitpas et la Cour serait compétente pourconnaîtrede l'affaire,mais elle se
seraitdéjàprononcéesur lefond; silesmesuresétaientjugéeslégales,laréserves'appliquerait, mais
la Cour, encore là, se seraitdéjàprononcéesur le fond, cettefois sur une affaire pour laquelleelle
n'avaitpas compétence.Peut-onimaginerun résultatplus absurdeet plus manifestementcontraire
à l'intentionde I'Etatauteur de la réserv?
44. Quatrièmeet dernierexemple :selon l'Espagne,la réservecanadienne ne pourrait faire
échec à la compétencede laCour car la présenteaffairene porte pas uniquement surdes questions
relativesà la gestion eà la conservation. Elle mettrait égalementen cause, dit-elle,des principes
fondamentaux du droit international, parexemple celui de la libertéde la haute mer et celui du I
non-recours à la force dans les relations entre Etats. Les questions touchant au respect de ces
principes ne seraient pas couvertespar la réserve, ditl'Espagne.
45. Avantd'apporterune réponsegénérale àcet argument,je voudraisouvriruneparenthèse
sur la questionde l'usage de laforce, dontl'Espagne faittant de cas. J'observeraid'abordque les
mesures d'exécution quo i nt été appliquées l'Estai n'ont strictement riànvoir avec le recours
à la force dans les relations entre Etats dont il est questiondans la Charte des Nations Unies. Ce
dontnous parlonsici, ce sontdes moyensd'exécutionde mesures degestionet de conservation qui
sonttout à faitclassiques dans la pratiquedes Etats. Mescollèguesyreviendront. Je ne m'étends
pas. - 19-
46. Mais ilme fautaussi - etje regrettede devoirlefaire- dénoncerlafaçonéhontée dont
l'Espagne exagèreles faits se rapportant à l'incident de l'Estai. Pourquoi le fait-el?e De toute
évidence,afin de dépeindreune situationsi dramatiqueque la Cour en oubliera que nous sommes
bel et bien en présencede simples mesures degestion et de conservation. Nous avons écouté nos
collègues espagnolset leurs conseils parler de menaces à la vie humaine qui ne se sontjamais
produites, brandirle spectre d'un bombardementou d'untorpillage dans un univers hypothétique,
voire même de l'exécution d cuapitaineetde l'équipage.Il fautvraimentque l'Espagne soit àcourt
d'arguments sérieuxpour se lancer dans de pareilles fictions.
47. Heureusement, lesévénementr séels,tels qu'ilsse sont passés, sont sans proportion avec
cette dramatisation. Non seulement l'arraisonnement de l'Estai s'est déroulé sansertes de vie ou
lésions corporellesgraves,mais personne n'a subi la moindreégratignure.Forcément,puisquele
bateau n'a jamais étéla cible de quoi que ce soit. Tout ce qui a étiré,c'est un coup de semonce
à l'avant du bateau. La raison en est bien simple : les règlements applicablesne permettent
l'utilisation de la force qu'en dernierressort, et de la façon la plus limitéepossible.
48. Revenons à la question plus généraledes.principesfondamentauxdu droit international.
Ce que la réserveexclut de la compétence de la Cour, ce sont«les différendsauxquelspourraient
donner lieu les mesures degestion et de conservation)).La réserveexclut les différendsdéfinis par
leur objet :ceux qui trouvent leur origine dans une mesure de gestion ou deconservation ou, de
manièreplus large encore,ceux qui ont une relation avecunetelle mesure. Lesdifférendsexclus
ne sont en aucune façondéfinisparlanaturedesnormes dont laviolationest alléguéepar l'unedes
Parties. Peu importe le caractèreou laportéede ces normes.
49. Qu'elles appartiennentau droit conventionnel ou au droit coutumier, qu'elles soient
générales ou spécifiques,mineures ou fondamentales,rien de cela n'ala moindre importance ici.
Il est bien évidentqu'undifférendqui estexclude la compétencede la Courpar son objet principal
peut toucher par ailleurs un certain nombre d'objetsou de domaines de droit différents. Cela se
produit très souvent et celane change rien au résultat: le différend demeureexclu. - 20-
50.Monsieur leprésident,Madame,Messieursde laCour,ce qui frappedansl'ensembledes
arguments de l'Espagne, c'est à quel point ils déforment la réalité. J'en relèverai trois 1
manifestations.
51. Déformationdu texte, d'abord : l'Espagne assortit la réservede restrictions que l'on y
cherche en vain. Ce que l'Espagnedemande à la Cour, en réalité, n'est passi ledifférend entre
dans le champ de la réserveformuléepar le Canada, mais s'il appartient à une autre catégorie,
celle-là choisie par'Espagne. La réserve à multiples restrictions imaginéepar l'Espagnen'existe
pas; celle qui laisserait de grands vides où elle ne s'appliqueraitpas, n'existepas non plus. Libre
à l'Espagnede laisser aller son imagination. Maisla Cour,elle, doit simplementdéterminersi les
d
mesures prises par le Canadaentrent dans le cadre de la réserve,telle qu'ellea été formuléear le
Canada.
52. Déformationde I'intentiondu Canada,ensuite : l'Espagnea beau rappeler de temps en
temps lanécessitéd'interpréter tour téserveen lui donnantun «effet utile)),elle le àavide. Les
exemplesd'«effetsutiles))hypothétiquesqu'elle nous aprésentés hien re sont vraimentpas sérieux.
Il est impossibleque leCanadaaitjamais eu I'intentiondeprésenteruneréserveaussi dénuéed'effet
pratique que celle que veut fabriquer 1'Espagne.Le Canadavoulait soustraire a la compétence de
la Cour les différends qu'il a définsomme il le voulait dans sa réserve. Les ajouts artificielsde
l'Espagneont nécessairementpour effet de fmstrer I'intentiondu Canada.
53.Déformationduprocessusjudiciaire,enfin : l'argumentespagnol,qui sedéroulesurfond W
de condamnation incendiairedu Canada et de présomption à priori d'acteillicite, ne cesse de
postuler ce qui doitêtreprouvéet qui, par définition,ne saurait êtreprouvé,ni mêmedébattuau
stade de la procédureconsacré exclusivement à la question de lacompétencedela Cour. Ce que
l'Espagne demande à la Cour, c'est de,sauter l'étapepréliminairede la déterminationde sa
compétenceetde se prononcer surle fond, c'est-à-dire defaire ce que la réservevise précisément
à éviter.
54. En réalité,Monsieur le président,tout cela peut probablement se ramener a une seule
observation. Les arguments à multiples facettes présentépar l'Espagne rappellentces jeux de
miroirs où l'on voit, multiplià l'infini, le mêmeobjet. Sous toutes sortes d'angles, l'Espagne - 21 -
répètesanscesse le même argument :laréservene s'appliqueraitque sila licéitéinternationaledes
mesures prises par le Canada était d'avancedémontrée. Et donc, à tout coup, la Cour devrait
contourner la réserve pour se penchersur le fond.
55. Monsieur le président,la réservedu Canada est là précisément pour soustraire à la
compétence de laCour le fond du différend. Les termes de la réserve sontparfaitement clairs,
l'intentiondu Canada l'est tout autant. Le litige qui est devant vous est exclude la compétencede
la Cour.
La questionde la disparitionou de la persistancedu différend
56. Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs de la Cour, il me fautà présentdire un mot
de la questionde la disparitionou de la persistancedu différend. Ce quel'agentet les conseils de
l'Espagneen ont dit, et l'importance démesurée qu'illsui ont accordéedans leurs plaidoiries, me
donne à penserqu'ils se sont vraimentmépris surla position du Canada. Je doisa la Cour la mise
au point suivante.
57.L'objectionque leCanadaa soulevéedans salettre du 21avril 1995seréfêru eniquement
à la compétencede la Cour à la lumière de la réservedont il a accompagnésa déclaration
d'acceptation. Ellene se réfêre àrien d'autre.
58. Au cours d'une réunionque le présidentde la Cour a tenue avec les représentants des
Parties le 27 avril 1995,il a éconvenu qu'il serait statué séparément,avant toutperocéduresur
le fond, sur la question de la compétencedela Cour en l'espèce. Ala suite de cette réunion,une
ordonnance du président de la Couren date du 2 mai 1995 confirma cet accord.
59. Il ressort de la combinaisonde la lettre du Canada du 21 avril, de l'accordréalisé entre
les Parties le 27 avril et de l'ordonnancedu président dela Cour du 2 mai 1995, qui se réfàrla
lettre eà l'accord précités, qua question àlaquelleest consacréela présenteprocédure est celle
de la compétencede la Cour pour connaître du différendcompte tenu de la réserve canadienne.
Que le différend ait étéréglé, comme le croit le Canada, ou qu'il persiste, commele soutient
l'Espagne,est indifférentaux fins de la présente procédure. -22 -
60. Quant à I'évolutiondu différenddepuis le dépôtde larequêteespagnole,leCanadas'est
bornéà ((attirerl'attention dela Cour))sur certains événements.«Attirer l'attentionde la Cour)),
ce sont là très exactement les termes employéspar le Canada dans le dernier chapitre de son
contre-mémoire(contre-mémoiredu Canada, par. 204). Ces événements sonttous les efforts que
le Canada a fait non seulement pour régler les problèmesbilatéraux qui l'avaient opposé à
l'Espagneetà l'Unioneuropéenne,mais aussi pourfavoriserlarecherche desolutionsàlongterme
telles que l'accord des Nations Unies sur les stocks chevauchants et grands migrateurs que
j'évoquais audébutde mon exposé. Le succèsrencontrépar cesefforts de négociations,confirmé
par une améliorationnotable des relationscanado-espagnolesen matièrede pêches, permettait,
notresens,de regarder ledifférendcommeréglé et les conclusionsde l'Espagne commesansobjet. *
Il est stupéfiant, dansces conditions,que l'Espagne aitl'audace de reprocherau Canadade ne pas
avoir tentéde régler pacifiquementle différend.
61.LeCanadaestconscientdesdifficultésjuridiquesquesoulève à diverségardsleproblème
de l'incidence surla compétencede la Cour de faits et d'événementsaffectant la persistance du
différendentre le dépôtde la requêteet lejugement de la Cour. Le Canadaconnaît les solutions
jurisprudentielles nuancéesapportéesàce problèmepar la Cour, ainsi que la diversité despoints
de vue desjuges qui ont rattachédesopinionsaux arrêtsen cause. Le Canadaa estiméqu'iln'était
pas utile dans le contexte de la présente procée'entrer dansune discussionsur la question de
savoir si la persistance du différenddoit être regardée cene question préliminairàcelle de
la compétence, ous'analyse comme une question de compétence,ou doit êtreconçue comme une
question de recevabilité,ou relèvedu fond. C'est très délibérémeentten toute connaissancede
causeque le Canada a limitéson objectionàla question de la compétencede laCour au regard de
la réserve.
62. Le Canada a cru de son devoir d'informer la Cour des faits postérieursau dépôtde la
requête.Il n'apas entendu,et il n'entend pasaujourd'hui,fonderson objectiona compétencede
la Cour sur autre chose que la réserve. C'est sur ceproblème,et sur nul autre, que la Cour est
appelée àstatuer.Conclusion
63. Monsieur le président,Madame, Messieurs de la Cour, en 1994, conformémentau
principe du libre choix des moyens de règlementdes différends,le Canada a estimé quela voie
judiciaire n'étaitpas la plus appropriée pour régler les différends auxquels pourraient doeuleir
lesmesuresde gestionet deconservationdesressourceshalieutiques dans l'AtlantiqueNord-Ouest.
Il a donc soustrait ces différendsde la compétence de la Cour,en toute conformité avecle droit
international.
64. Plutôtque de déposerune nouvelle déclaration le10mai 1994, leCanada auraitpu tout
aussi bien retirer son acceptation de la compétence obligatoire dela Cour. Il ne l'apas fait.
Pourquoi ? Parce que depuis maintenant près de soixante-dixans, le Canada a placésa confiance
en cette Cour et en sa devancière.Les termes de la nouvelle déclaration sont clairs et précis. La
réserve soustrait la compétencede la Cour une catégoriebien définie de différends à, laquelle
appartient précisémentle différend à l'origine de la présente affaire. Le Canada demande
aujourd'huià la Cour d'honorer les termes de cette réserve.
65. Monsieur le président, Madame,Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie beaucoupde
votre bienveillante attention, etje vous prie, Monsieur le président, de donner la pàrl'agent
adjoint du Canada, Monsieur Blair Hankey.
The PRESIDENT: 1thank the Agent of Canada and cal1upon Mr. Hankey.
Mr. HANKEY:
Introduction
1. Mr. President, distinguishedMembersof the Court. It is a great honour for me to again
represent the Government of Canada before this Court, the supreme judicial organ of the
international community.
2. My task today is to speakto you aboutthe meaning and effect of Canada's declaration of
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. Spain has based this case on a calculated misreading of
Canada'sdeclaration. Thismisreadingin turn isfoundedon a systematicdistortionofthe principles
of interpretation. -24 -
3. To determine the correct meaning and effect of the Canadian declaration, we must first
establishthe properrules goveming consent tojurisdiction andthe interpretation ofoptionalclause
O
declarations. 1shall outline seven key points regarding these rules and the relevantjurisprudence
of the Court. Next, we must consider the text of the declaration to determine the categories of
disputes it covers. This will involve an examinationof each phrasein the text of the reservation
invokedby Canada. Finally, 1shall applythe reservation to the facts of this case to determineor
ratherto demonstrate that the matters complainedof by Spain fall squarely withinthe wordingof
the Canadian reservation.
A. The Principle of Consentand Interpretationof Optional ClauseDeclarations
Introduction
4. 1shall begin, Sir,bydiscussingthe generalprinciplesregardingconsenttojurisdiction and
the interpretation ofoptional clause reservations. The points 1wish to make are the following:
First, consent to jurisdiction can never be presumed. It mustbe irrefutablyestablished.
Second,reservationsare an integralpartof an optionalclausedeclarationthat serveto define
the extent of the jurisdiction that has been accepted.
Third,whilethe generalprinciplesontreaty interpretationareausefulguide,there arespecial
considerationsderived fromthe nature ofdeclarationsasunilateral actsand fromthe rule that States
are free to choose to what extent they acceptthe Court's compulsoryjurisdiction.
w
Fourth, the basic rule of interpretationis that declarations must be read in a natural and
reasonableway, giving full effect to the intention of the declarant State.
Fifth, because declarations are unilateral acts, the intention of the declaring State is of
particular importance. That intentionisto be discernedobjectivelyfromthe text, inthe lightofthe
circumstances atthe time of its adoption.
Sixth, a generic term covers not only the specific situation originally envisaged by the
declaring State, but alsoanything falling within its füllest meaning.
Seventh and finally, the fundamental principles of good faith and effectiveness govem the
interpretationof optional clause reservations. 1. Jurisdiction Can Never Be Presumed
5. Mr. President, the goalof interpretationof anoptionalclause declarationis to determine
whether consent has been given. Spain contends that Canada has the burden of provingthat this
Court is withoutjurisdiction (Spanish Memorial,p. 57,paras. 26, 28; p. 67, para. 37). It claims
that the mere existence of an optional clause reservation creates a presumption in favour of
jurisdiction, where areservationis obviouslyapplicable(ibid, p. 57, para. 27). Inhis presentation,
mycolleague,Professor RemiroBrotons,also contendsthatthe pointof departure(pointdedépart)
is the effectivenessof the declaration,whichmust not be "suffocated"(étouffer)by the reservation
(CR 9819,pp. 57-58,paras. 10-1 1). 1submit, sir, thatthese propositions cannotbe sustained from
your jurisprudence.
6. States have an unfettered freedomto participate or not in the optionalclause system. In
the case conceming Military and Paramilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua, the Courtheld
that declarationsofacceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdictionwere,"facultative,unilateralengagements
that States are absolutely free to make or not to make" (I.C.J.Reports 1984, p. 418, para. 59).
Because the submission to the jurisdiction of the Court is purely voluntary, it follows that
jurisdiction can never be presumed; it must be clearlyestablishedto the satisfaction ofthe Court.
(See Aerial Incident of 27 JUS 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), I.C.J. Reports 1959,p. 142.)
7. Becauseconsentcan never bepresumed, there simply isno "burdenof proof' on theparty
contestingjurisdiction. In fact,there isnofixed burdenof proofon eitherparty. In the Border and
Transborder ArmedActionscase, the Court reaffirmed the principledating backto the daysof the
Permanent Court that it had to considerwhether "the force of argumentsmilitating in favour of
Ljurisdiction]is preponderant", and to "ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties
exists to confer jurisdiction upon it" (Factory at ChorzOw,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 32, as
quoted in Border and Transborder ArmedActions, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 76, para. 16). In his
separate opinion in that case, Judge Oda stated that "Whenconsidering thejurisdiction of the . ..
Court .. .1take as my pointof departurethe conviction that the Court'sjurisprudencemust rest
on the free will of sovereign States, clearly and categorically expressed, to grant the Courtthe
competence to settle the dispute in question" (ibid, p. 109,para. 44). - 26 -
8. On this issue, Fitzmaurice has stated that what is required is "strictproof of consent" -
Fitzmaurice who is cited many times during the lasttwo days with great approval by Ourworthy
adversaries. He wrote again: "jurisdiction ought at the very least not to be assumed in cases in
which there is room for any serious doubt as to whether consent was given, and whether it covers
the dispute .. ."(Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, Vol. II,986,p. 514). InthecaseconcemingCertain Norwegian Loans,Judge Lauterpacht
said: "the Court will not uphold itsjurisdiction unlessthe intention to confer it has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt" - "beyond reasonable doubt": it's a very strong standard -
(I.C.J. Reports1957, p. 58, emphasis added). 1note my leamed colleague Professor Dupuy aiso
*
refers with approvalto Judge Fitzmaurice (CR 98/10,p. 45, para. 20) and to the Norwegian Loans
case (ibid., p. 39, para. 5). In the Genocide case, the Court followed a long line of precedents,
including theRights ofMinorities in UpperSilesia andthe Cor- Channelcases (P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 15,p. 24; I.C.J. Reports1947-1948, p. 15), in emphasizing the need for an "unequivocal
indication" of a "voluntary and indisputable" acceptance of jurisdiction (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports1993,
p. 342, para. 34).
9. In the case of optional clause declarations, therefore, the limits of acceptance by both
parties, must clearly, indisputablyand unequivocallyadmit the jurisdiction of the Court in the
specific dispute brought before it. In other words, as1said at the beginning, consent tojurisdiction W
can never be presumed. It must be irrefutably established.
2. Reservations AreIntegral Partsof Optional ClauseDeclarationsand Serve to Define the
Scope of Acceptanceof the Jurisdictionof the Court
10. Now Sir, 1come to my second point, that reservations are an integral part of optional
clause declarations that serve to define the extent of the jurisdiction that has been accepted.
Reservationsto optional clause declarations are not separate legal acts; they are integral parts of
the declarations that define the scope of acceptance of the Court'sjurisdiction. 11. Optionalclausereservationsaremanifestationsoftheabsolute freedomof Statestoaccept
or to limit compulsoryjurisdiction. In order to promote a greater number of acceptances of
compulsoryjurisdiction, the practiceof makingresewations was approved and indeed encouraged
by the League of Nations. When the Statute of the present Court was drafted in 1946, it was
decided that a provision on resewations was unnecessary, because the practice of making
reservations had become thoroughly established(Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the
International Court, 1920-1996of Justice, Vol. II, 1997, at Jurisdiction, pp. 767-768).
12. This right to limit the scope of a State's acceptanceof jurisdiction derives from the
principle of free choice of means and the requirement of consent. As explained by President
Jiménezde Aréchaga:"The so-caliedreservationstothe optionalclause arebasedon [theprinciple]
'inplus stat minusn'.If any party tothe Statute is allowed to remain totally apart from the system
oftheoptionalclause,thenapartymustbe permittedto acceptonlypartially the Court'sjurisdiction
by subordinating its acceptance to certain conditions or limitations" (Jiménezde Aréchaga,
"International Law in the Past Third of a Century", Recueildes cours, 1978,Vol. 159, p. 154).
Similarly,inhisopinionintheAnglo-IranianOilCompanycase,Sir Arnold McNairnotedthat,and
1 quote, "The machinery provided . .. is that of 'contracting-in'not of 'contracting out'.A State,
being fiee either to make a declaration or not, is entitled, if it decides to make one, to limit the
scopeof its Declarationin any way it chooses,subjectalwaysto reciprocity" (I.C.J. Reports 1952,
p. 116).
13. Thus,reservationsare essential,integralparts of optionalclause declarations. Yesterday
Professor Remiro Brotons affected to agree with this dictum. However, he then proceeded to
contradict it, by focusing exclusivelyon the positive aspect of the declaration and ignoringthe
limiting effect of the reservation. But the teaching of the Court is clear: a declaration, including
its reservations, isn indivisiblewhole that defines the scope ofjurisdiction. In the Aegean Sea
case, the Courtreferredto: "the close and necessarylinkthatalways exists betweenajurisdictional
clauseandthereservationsto it" (I.C.J. Reports 1978,p. 33,para. 79). Thefunctionof reservations
is to outline the limits,to determinethe preciseextent of the voluntary acceptanceofjurisdiction. - 28 -
Jurisdictionthereforedependsona determinationthatthe subject-matterofthe dispute isnot within
the scope of any limiting reservation appearing in the declarations of either party.
14. Because an optional clause declaration, including itsresewations, is a single legal
instrument,itmustbe construedinaccordancewithaconsistentsetof interpretativeprinciples. Full
effect must be given both to the acceptance ofjurisdiction in a declarationand to the resewations
limiting that acceptance.
3. Special Rules of Interpretation Derive from theFact that Optional Clause Declarations are
Sui Generi Usnilateral Acts
15.Mr. President, my third point is that whilethe general rules on treaty interpretationare
1
a useful guide,there are special considerationsderivedfiom the natureofdeclarations asunilateral
acts and from the rule that States are free to choose to what extent they accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.
16. As explained yesterday by Professor Dupuy with great eloquence and persuasiveness
(CR 98/10, p. 39, para. 5; p.41, para. IO),optionalclause declarationsare suigeneris, unilateral
acts. Unliketreaties, they are not the product of bilateralor multilateralnegotiation. Theydo not
embodythe wills or intentions of several States, but are the product of one will and one intention
only. That is why it is the intention of the declarant State that is crucial to interpretation. Of
course, 1do not suggestthat a State can argue for a meaningor interpretationthat is quitecontrary
to the plain meaning of the words it has used in its declaration, but1do suggest that where the
words used are consistentwith a State'sintention- an intention madeclear fiom the surrounding
circumstances - then any good faith interpretationmust allowthat declaration and that intention
to take effect.
17.In his intervention,Professor Dupuy painstakingly demonstratedthat declarationshave
a conventionalor a contractual aspect (CR 98/10, pp. 39-46). However, Spain also suggests an
analogybetweenreservationsin declarationsandreservationsto treaties(Spanish Mernorial,p. 60,
para. 32). 1 submit, Sir, that such an analogy is entirely unfounded. Although the word
reservations is commonly applied both to limitations in an optional clause declaration and to -29 -
derogations from a treaty commitrnent,this common terminologyin fact is misleading. Because
declarationsare suigeneris, and reservationsform an integralpart of declarations,reservationsto
optional clause declarations are also sui generis; they are not analogous to treaty reservations.
Treatyreservationsare derogationsfroman agreedtext, sotheremaybe an argumentfor restrictive
interpretationof such reservations. Moreover, they mustconformto certain rules to be effective,
theymust be acceptedby the otherparties. Reservationsto declarations,however,arean altogether
different species: they form an integralpart of the text; they may exclude any category ofdispute
at the will of the declarant; and they take effect against other parties without their consent.
18. For these reasons, the rules governing the interpretation of treaty reservations are not
directly relevant to the interpretation of reservations to optional clause declarations
(James Crawford, "The Legal Effect ofAutomaticReservationsto the Jurisdictionof International
Court", (1979) 50 BYBIL77-79). This flows necessarily from the differing nature of the two
instruments- treaties versus optional clause declarations - in which the reservations appear.
4. Optional ClauseDeclarationsMust Be interpretedin a "Natural and ReasonableWay",
Giving Full Effect to the Intentionof the DeclaringState
19. Myfourthpoint, Mr. President,concernsthebasicruleof interpretationofoptionalclause
declarations. It isthat declarationsmustbe read in a naturaland reasonableway, givingfull effect
to the intentionof the declarant State.
20. Although optional clausedeclarationsare not treaties,they are, as my learned colleague
Professor Dupuypointed outyesterday (CR 98/10,p. 40, para. 7),analogousto treatiesinthatthey
create a "network of engagements" arnong al1 States making such declarations (Military and
ParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaraguaI ,.C.J. Reports1984,p. 418,para. 60). The Court,
therefore, has appliedthe rules of interpretationto certain aspects ofthe interpretationof optional
clausedeclarations. However, becauseof the specialunilateralcharacter of such declarations,the
Court has applied other principles as well, as /exspecialis.
21. In effect, through its jurisprudence the Court has established particular rules for the
interpretation of optional clause declarations. The general rule governing the interpretation of
internationallegalinstruments is that the text must beinterpretedin good faith in accordancewith - 30 -
the ordinary meaning of the words, in their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of
the instrument. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
travauxpréparatoiresand the surrounding circumstances,to confirm the meaning resultingfrom
the application of the general rule, or to determine the meaning where the text is obscure or
ambiguous.
22. The fundamentalprinciples governingthe interpretation ofoptional clause declarations
were enunciatedbythe Court intwo importantcases: theAnglo-IranianOil Companycaseand the
AegeanSea ContinentalShelfcase. Thesecaseswill illustratemy fourthpoint, as well asmy fifih
point and sixth point. The fifth point is that, because declarationsare unilateralacts, the intention
of thedeclaring Stateis of particular importance. That intentionisto be discemedobjectivelyfrom r.
the text, in the light of the circumstancesat the time of its adoption. And my sixth point is that a
genericterm coversnot only the specific situationoriginally envisagedby the declaringState, but
also anything faliing within its fullest meaning.
(a) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (ünited Kingdom v. Iran)
23. In theAnglo-Iraniancase, the Court heldthat- and 1believe Spain has citedthis same
quotation yesterday,- "It must seek the interpretation whichis in harmony with a natural and
reasonableway of reading the text, havingdue regard to the intention ofthe Governmentof Iran
atthetime when itacceptedthecompulsoryjurisdiction ofthe Court"(I.C.J. Reports 1952,p. 104).
w
The Court noted further - and this is extremely important- that the "Declaration must be
interpreted as it stands, having regard to the words actually used(ibid.p. 105).
24. Inthatcase, Britainhad disputedtheIranian interpretationofthetext of Iran'sdeclaration
on the basis of a grammatical ambiguity. After exarniningal1the surrounding circumstances,the
Court adoptedthe interpretationthat it consideredto be consistentwith the Government ofIran at
the time of makingthe declaration. This intention was ascertainedin the light of Iranianpolicy,
the Iranian policy of ending the régime of"capitulations" and related treaties. It was clearto the
Courtthat in 1930Iran had intendedto conferjurisdiction only with respectto treaties subsequent
to the ratification of the declaration. This intention was corroboratedby thems of a law passedby Iran in 1931 approving the declaration. The Court referred to this law as "a decisive
confirmation of the intention of the Govemment of Iran" (ibid., p. 107). It concludedthat the
Iranian declaration covered only treaties subsequentto its adoption and that it therefore excluded
jurisdiction in that case.
25. TheJudgmentnoted thatthe "Declarationisnot atreatytext resultingfromnegotiations",
but rather: "theresult of unilateral drafting" (ibid.,. 105). TheCourt consideredthat the broad
principles of treatyinterpretation should be applied with due regard for the special character of
optional clause declarations, and in particular their unilateral formulation. Due to the unilateral
origin of the text, the intention ofthe declarant Statehas a special role to play in the process of
interpretation.
26. Commenting on the Anglo-Iranian decision,Sir Gerald Fitzmauricewrote that
"theCourt,while in generalapplyingordinaryprinciplesoftreaty interpretation,seems
to have felt that thevoluntary and unilateralcharacter of these declarations putthem
in a specialposition in which it was necessaryto have particularregardto the known,
apparent or probable intentions of the State making the declaration,particularlywith
referenceto any conditionsor limitationswhichthat Statehad placedonthe extent of
the obligation itwas assuming" (Fitzmaurice,op. cit., p. 503).
27. In the case of a negotiated instrument, itis often difficult to identifi a single intention,
as each State involved might have a different objective. However, in the case of a unilateral
declaration, there is only a single intention, and that intention, as objectively determined, will
elucidate or - as in the present case - confirmthe plain and ordinary meaning of the words.
(b) Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v.Turkey)
28. Sir, 1now come to theAegean Sea ContinentalShelfcase. It is interestingto note that
whileSpain doesmakereferenceto theAnglo-Iraniancase, itvirtually ignorestheAegean Sea case
(only one reference at CR 98/10,p. 45, para. 18). Mr. President, this is understandable,because
this Court'sJudgment in Aegean Sea effectively underminesthe Spanish case on interpretation.
29. InAegeanSea, Greece soughtto havethe continentalshelf betweenitself and Turkey in
the Aegean Seadelimited by the Court. The main title ofjurisdiction assertedby Greece was the
1928General Actfor the Pacific SettlementofInternational Disputes. In orderto establishthat the - 32 -
Parties had consented to jurisdiction, Greece had to overcome the Turkish objection based on
reciprocity, invokingthe Greek reservation excluding"disputesrelating tothe territorial status of
Greece" (AegeanSeaContinentalShelfI ,.C.J. Reports1978, p. 15,paras. 8,3536; p. 17,para. 39).
30. Claiming that the reservationwas not applicable, Greece advanced several arguments.
In the first argument, basedon a grammatical arnbiguity,Greece claimedthat the reservation with
respectto territorialstatuswas partofaresewation conceming domesticjurisdiction. However,the
Court concludedthat Greece had intendedto makea separateresewation on questionsof territorial
status. Thus, as in the Anglo-Iraniancase, the initial grammatical interpretation was directly
supported by the original intention ofthe State concemed.
31. Greecethen claimedthatwhen it hadadheredto the GeneralAct in 1931,it had intended r,
thewords "territorialstatus"to haveaspecialmeaningrelatingtotheterritorialsettlementsresulting
from the conclusion of the First World War. Moreover, the reservation could not cover the
delimitationof the continental shelf,as territorial status did not relate to delimitation. The Court
however reached its own determinationof the meanings of the word "territorial status" by
examiningthe political and diplomaticcontext in order to ascertain the intentionof Greece at the
time it made the reservation. It decidedthat the words "territorialstatus"were to be construed as
a genericterm covering the broadestpossible range of disputesthat could beencompassed within
the phrases suchas "territorialdisputes","territorialintegrity","territorialquestions"and "existing
frontiers"(ibid., pp. 31-32, paras. 76-77). W
32. Finally, Greece argued that the reservation could not be construed as covering the
continental shelf, because the concept of the continental shelf was unknown when it made its
reservation. The Courthowever considered that,as a genericterm, "territorial status" had a very
wide scope indeed, provided onlythat the,matter soughtto be included withinthe reservation was
somehow related toterritorial status. And it took an equally broadview of the meaning of the
phrase "relatington. The Court obsewed that:
"The questionfor decisionis whetherthe presentcase is one 'relatingto the territorial
statusof Greece',not whetherthe rights indisputeare legallyto be consideredas 'territorial'
rights; and a dispute regardingentitlementto and delimitation ofareas of continental shelf
tendsby itsverynatureto beonerelating toterritorialstatus"(AegeanSeaContinentalShelf,
I.C.J. Reports1978, p. 36, para. 86). - 33 -
33. Thus, the interpretation of the reservation by the Court included Greece'soriginal
motivationin makingthe reservation, but also encompasseda broadermeaningthan was warranted
bytheterms actuallyused. Farfrommakingtherather restrictiveviewof the reservation advocated
by Greece,the Court gave full effectto the generic meaning ofthe words, to allowthe rese~ation
toencompassanysubject-matterthatcouldreasonablybedirectlyor indirectly"relatedto"theterms
used in the reservation.
34. 1submit,Mr. President,thattherearethree lessonsto belearnedfromthesecases,lessons
correspondingto myfourth,fifthandsixthpoints. First, fromAnglo-Iranian, we leamthat optional
clausedeclarationsmust be read in a natural andreasonableway, taking into accountthe intention
of the declarant State.
35. Second,Anglo-Iranian and Aegean Sea both show that in interpreting rese~ations in
unilateral declarations,the Court considersthe intention ofthe declarant State to be of particular
importance. The intention soughtis not the subjective "psychological"intention ofthe drafters.
It is the intention of the State at the time of making the reservation, as "objectified"or expressed
inthe wording ofthe text, andas determinedby an examinationof the historicalcircumstancesand
policiesof the Stateconcemed. The universalcharacterof this principle in the world's majorlegal
systems is evidenced in the fact that in his separateopinion, in the Aegean Sea case, Judge Tarazi
relied both onIslamic law andon the French Civil Code to establish the importance of intention
relative to the "literal meaning of the words and phrases actually used" (I.C.J. Reports 1978,
pp. 57-58).
36. The thirdlesson isthat a genericterm usedin an optionalclause declarationcovers more
than the specific situationoriginallyenvisagedby the declarant State in making its reservation; a
genericterm will coveranythingrelatedto itsfullestmeaning andwill excluderelated mattersfrom
thejurisdiction of the Court.
Mr. President, do you wish me to break here, or shall 1continue?
The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. We may break here.
TheCourt adjournedfrom 11.20 to 11.35 a.m. - 34 -
The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. Mr. Hankey.
Mr. HANKEY: Thankyou, Sir. Just as we reached the coffee break 1had completedmy
sixth point summarizing the principles and interpretation of the jurisdiction and the relevant
jurisprudence of the Court.
5. InterpretationShouldGivea RealandSubstantiveEffecttothe ObjectandPurposeofthe
Declaration and its Resewations
37. Now, Mr. President, 1 now come to my seventh and final point. The interpretation of
optionalclausedeclarationsmustrespectthefundamentalprinciplesof good faith and effectiveness.
These principles operate to give a real and substantive effect to the object and purpose of the
'*4
declaration, including,of course, its resewations.
38. It is axiomatic that a declaration must be interpretedto achieve its intended end. The
principle of effectiveness expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat has been
associatedbythe InternationalLaw Commissionwith the principle of good faithand with theneed
to respecttheobjectand purposeof an instrument (YearbookoftheInternational Law Commission,
1966, Vol. II, p. 219). The effectiveness doctrine prohibits any attempt to produce an effect
contrary to that intended by the declarant State. That doctrine in and of itself is sufficient to
counter the Spanish attempt to eviscerate the Canadian declaration and empty itof any practical
meaning.
1
39. Effectivenessmeansreal and nottoken effectiveness. As the Court stated in the Temple.
case, the declaration is to be read "without any preconceptions of an a priori kind in order to
determine whatis its real meaning and effectif the Declaration is read as a whole and in the light
of its known purpose, which has never been in doubt" (Temple of Preah Vihear,
I.C.J. Reports 1961,p. 32). Theapplicationofthis pronouncementtothe presentcase mustbefatal
to Spain's position,ecause Spain hasknownfrom thevery beginningand has acknowledgedin its
pleadings (Memorialof Spain,p. 76,para. 55; pp. 94-96,paras. 107-110)that Canada intended its
declaration toexclude the 1994legislation, andeverything done under it from the jurisdiction of
the Court. Duringthe past two days we have listened with great patience to one after another of - 35 -
Spain'scounsel arguing that the alleged incompetence of Canada'slegal drafters - who, 1might
add,arepart of our delegation heretoday beforethis distinguished Court- thattheir incompetence
defeated Ourknown purpose which, in the words of the TempleJudgment, "has never been in
doubt".
40. This concludes, Sir,the initial part of my presentation1 trust that it is now evidentthat
the Spanish contentions regarding the interpretation of optional clause declarations do not
correspond to well-established principles and practice. Canada, on the other hand, relies on
establishedprinciples and on the precedents pronounced by this very Court and its distinguished
predecessor.
B. The Meaning and Effect of the New Reservation to the Canadian Declaration
Introduction
Mr. President,distinguishedJudges, 1now cometo the second part of my presentation: the
meahingand effect of the new reservation to Canada's declaration. Spainhas invokedas the title
ofjurisdiction in this case the optional clause declarationmade by Canadaon 10May 1994. The
issue in these proceedings is simply whether the Canadian declaration confersjurisdiction on the
Court in view of the reservation set out in paragraph 2(4. The Canadianreservation is found at
Tab 5 in your folders. It applies to, and 1quote
"disputesarising after the present declaration with regard to situations or facts
subsequentto this declaration, other than . ..
(4 disputesarisingoutof or conceming conservation and managementmeasurestaken
by Canada with respectto vessels fishing in the NAFO RegulatoryArea [ . . 1,and
the enforcement of such measures" (emphasis added).
It isdifficult to imagine an exclusion ofjurisdiction more exactly or carefüllyaimed at the "facts
or situations"of the kind that have given rise to this litigation.
42. The wordsthat followthe introductoryphrasedefinethe subject-matterof the reservation
as "conservation and managementmeasurestaken by Canada with respectto vessels fishing in the
NAFO Regulatory Area . . . and the enforcement of such measures". The measures must be
conservation and managementmeasures. Theymust be takenby Canada. Theymustbe taken with - 36 -
respectto vesselsfishingintheNAFO RegulatoryArea. Theenforcementofsuchmeasuresis also
covered by the reservation. Both themeasures and their enforcementare excluded fiom the
jurisdiction of the Court. There are absolutely no qualifiers or limitations. Within its generally
defined sphere, the reservation encompasseseverything and anything, everything and anything,
reiatedto conservationandmanagementmeasurestaken byCanadaintheNAFO RegulatoryArea.
43. Mr. President,1shall first explainthe meaning of the reservationby proceedingthrough
the text phrase by phrase in the order in which the words appear. 1will then demonstrate the
intention of Canada in making the reservation. This 1 will do by examining the historical
circumstancesandpolicycontext inwhichCanadareviseditsdeclarationinMay 1994. 1inviteyou
now to tum to Tab 6 in your folders to follow the text of the reservation.
1. The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Words
(a) "Disputes"
44. An importantpreliminarypointisthat boththedeclarationandthereservationapplyonly
to "disputes". It is axiomaticthat the Courtwill have jurisdiction onlyif there is an active,gal
disputebetweenthe parties. This is clearfiom Article 36, paragraph2, ofthe Statuteof the Court,
it is clear from the context ofthenadiandeclaration and it is clearfromthejurisprudence ofthe
Court (see Counter-Memorial,paras. 205-208).
(6) "ArisingOut of or Concerning"
45. The introductory phrase "arising out of or concerning" establishes the scope of the
exclusions of jurisdiction. The most striking feature of the phrase is its breadth. The term
"measures" can raise any number of ancillary issues including: first, the right to take such
measures, or to use Spain'sterminology "titre"; second, the factual need for them; third, their
appropriatenessin the lightof that need; andfourth, the methodsof theirenforcement. A question
about any one of these issues clearly arises out of or concernsthe measure under consideration.
By including in our reservation,the term "arising out of or conceming" Canada made absolutely
clear that al1 questions concerning its conservation and management measures are beyondthe
jurisdiction of the Court. Efforts by ourfiiends on the Spanishside to separate out questions of -37 -
title and enforcement,asthoughtheywere somehowquitedistinctfromtheterm "measure"and can
thus form the basis of distinctdisputes, are transparently strategies to evade the comprehensive
language Canada has used. As we said in OurCounter-Memorial,but it bearsrepetition,the words
"arising out of or conceming" signal an intention to capturethe subject-matter in al1its aspects;
and to include both the core and anything directly or indirectly associated with it (para. 88).
"Arising out or' refers to the origins of the dispute, while "conceming"refers to the object of the
dispute. Both terms are subsumed in the French phrase "auxquelspourraient donner lieu". This
French phraseandthe English word"conceming"conveythe sarnemeaningas the phrase "relating
to" in the Greek reservation constmed by the Court in theAegean Sea case. These terms plainly
indicate that the reservation covers anythingdirectly or indirectlyrelating to the subject-matterof
the reservation. The phrase "arising out of' underscores Canada's intentionto cast as wide a net
as language will permit.
(c) "ConservationandManagementMeasures"
46. The next phrase, Sir, is "conservationand management measures". A conservationand
management measure is a measure taken for the purpose of the conservation and management of
fishery resources. According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the meanings of the word
"measure" include, "legislativeenactment" and "suitable action (as in to take measures to ensure
that)". Thisisexactlywhatthis caseconcems: a legislativeenactment andsuitablemeasurestaken
to implement it.
47. In fact, the word "measures"is about as broad and elastic a term as one could imagine.
It includes al1kinds of actions taken to achieve an end or goal. The Spanish Memorialquotes
Webster'sDictionary definition of measure as, "an act, step or proceeding designed for the
accomplishment of an object" (pp. 80-81, para. 70). In other words, itrefers to actions that are
taken deliberately,with a definite person in mind. It certainly covers al1acts of a State taken in
pursuit of a national policy,whetherthey be physical, economic,administrativeor legislative. The
Spanish Memorialsays quite rightly that it is "an abstract term" (in French, "un mot abstrait"), - 38 -
which means that it is a generic term (p. 80, para. 70). In other words,the word "measures"may
cover an unlimited range of actions that falls within the general definition.
48. Contrary to what Our Spanish colleagues have alleged, the phrase "conservationand
management" coversthe whole range of measures taken by States with respect to the living
resourcesof the sea. It coversboththe protection ofthe resource,or "conservation"per se, and the
"management"of the fishery. In many cases these two terms overlap. The use of the two terms
incombination conveysa clear intentionto coverthe broadest possiblerange of measures,fromthe
mosttraditionalregulatory controlsto measuresthat haveyet to be tried or even conceived. There
are no limitations implied by this phrase, otherthan the obvious requirement that the measure
should be addressed to the fishery andto its rational exploitation.
49. It is precisely because of its comprehensiveness that the term "conservation and
management measures"has been used in innumerable internationalinstruments suchas the 1958
GeneyaConvention ontheHigh SeaFisheries,the 1982 UnitedNationsConventiononthe Lawof
theSea,the 1995 UnitedNations Straddling StocksAgreemen t heUnitedNationsAgreementfor
the Zmplementation of the Provisions ofthe United Nations Convention on theLawof the Sea of
December10, 1982, Relatingto theConservationandManagementofStraddlingFishStocks and
HighlyMigratoryFish Stocks)and the 1993FA0 ComplianceAgreement(Agreementto Promote
CompliancewithInternational Conservation andManagement Measuresby FishingVesselsonthe
HighSeas). What is included is anything related to the conservationand managementof fishery
resources, such as legislative, regulatory and administrativemeasures, providing for, inter alia:
The determination of the speciesthat may be caught and those that may notbe caught,
includingthe absolute prohibition ofthe fishing of certain species;
the fixing ofcatch quotas, whetherin relationto particular stocksor catchesby particular
vessels over a specified periodof time;
fish size limits;
the regulation of the seasons and areas of fishing;
the regulation of the types of gear that may be used;and
regulations concerning the vessels permitted to fish. - 39 -
50. The conservationand management measuresin the 1994legislationand the regulations
were not at al1unusual; they are the same type of conservationand management rneasuresused
by Canada withinits own waters, appliedbyNAFO member Statesin the NAFORegulatory Area,
and found in various international fisheries agreements. In its Memorial, Spain admits that the
Canadianmeasuresare the sametype of "conservation and management measures"as those found
in international conventions (p. 84, para. 75). However, it argues that the measures taken by
Canadawere not "conservationand management measures",becausethey were applied to an area
beyondthe 200-mile zone. Al1of Spain's counselhavemadethisthe Ieitmotifoftheir submissions.
And there are two answers to this, and they are related.
51. First, in orderto establisha definition, one mustdistinguishwhat isessentialto theterm
being defined from that which is merely incidental. The essential aspect of "conservation and
managementmeasures"isthatthey aredesignedto controla fisheryandto preserveand protectthe
stocks from diminution or depietion. What matters is the subject-matter, the function and the
purposeof the measures. The geographicalarea wherethese measures apply will,of course,Vary.
Inotherwords,contrarytothe Spanishcontention,the locationofthe measuresisirrelevanttotheir
essential nature as conservation and management measures. A measure to control fishing is a
conservation and management measure,no matter where it is applied or enforced.
52. Second, Spain impliesthat the expressionis limited towhat has been done in the past in
response to past problems. But this is a distortion ofthe concept of a generic category. As we
noted in OurCounter-Memorial, a generic category is never limited to the known examples it
contains (para. 91). A measure is a fisheries or conservation measure if it is an "act, step or
proceeding" - tousethewordsfrom Webster'sdictionary citedinthe SpanishMemorial - anact,
step or proceedingtaken for purposes of the conservation andmanagementof fisheries. Whether
it fits in an existing pattern of State practice and law in a rapidly evolving field such as fishery
management,is frankly, irrelevant. New measureswill always be devised to solvenew problems,
and suchmeasureswill beencompassedwithinthe scopeoftheterm "conservationand management
measures" if they fa11within the general definitions of that term. It is the subject-matter of the
measures that is decisive, not their novelty. To deny this truth would not only be to deny logic, - 40 -
it would rejectthe clearholding of this Courtwith respectto generic categoriesin theAegean Sea
case. The decision intheAegean Sea casesettlesthe question: generic languageisto be constmed
generaliy, it extends even to matters that could not have been contemplatedwhen the reservation
was made, which, of course, is not the case here (I.C.J. Reports 1978,pp. 32-33, paras. 77-78).A
fortiori, the language applies where the whole purpose of the legislationwas to protect straddling
stocksjust beyond the 200-mile limit.
53. Spain has impliedthat the word "measure"cannotcover a legislativeenactment suchas
Bill C-29(SpanishMemorial, Annexes,Vol. 1,Ann. 14). Aswe have seen,the ordinarydictionary
definitionof the word "measure"includes"legislativeenactrnent"as one of its principal meanings.
*
Moreover,this usage i~ic<q,ted internationallyin a broad range of legal instruments. The word
"measure"is used in innumerable international conventions toencompassstatutes,regulations,and
administrative actions. Forexample, Articles 61 and 62 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
use the expressions "conservationandmanagement measures" and "conservationand management
lawsandregulations"almost interchangeably.Thecontextleavesnodoubtthat "measures"includes
legislative measures in either statutory or regulatory form.
(d) "Takenby Canada"
54. Moving to the next phrase, Mr. President, the reservation is limited to measures "taken
by Canada",restricting its scopeto measurestaken bythe declarantState. It isclearthatthe phrase
"taken by Canada" refers to enforcement measures, as well as to conservation and management
measures. In its Memorial, Spain suggeststhat the reservationcould have beenintendedto cover
enforcementactions taken by flag Statesagainst their ownvessels (p. 93, para. 102). Frankly,the
very ideais absurd. Who else but Canadawould wish toenforceCanadianconservation measures?
Who else butCanadawouldarrestvessels atsea under its legislation? The phrase "byCanada"was
omitted the second time simply to avoid redundancy.
(e) "WahRespect to Vessek Fishing "
55. Moving to the next phrase, Sir,the target of the measures in the reservation is "vessels
fishing" inthe NAFO RegulatoryArea. There is no limitationon the categoriesof fishing vessels - 41 -
to which the reservationapplies. It applies to any vessel fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area,
whether it is statelessor duly registered, whetherit is registered in a NAFO State or a non-NAFO
State, whetherit isregistered inan "openegistry"or in one ofthe principal maritime powers. Any
suggestionto the contrarywould contradictthe plain meaning of the words. Spain suggests that
in order for the reservationto cover al1vessels registered in any State,the reservation wouldhave
to includethe word "all". Again, this is a distortionof plain languageand a perversion ofthe rules
of grammar. It is clear that if the noun "vessels"is unqualifiedby any limitingword or phrase, it
necessarily referstol1vessels and to any vessels. What else could it mean? To what in fact does
an unqualified noun refer? The answer is elementary: to anything falling within the general
definitionof that noun,or in Ourcase,to any fishing vessel. No other logical meaningis possible.
fl "Inthe NAFO Regulatory Area ..."
56. Thus far,we haveestablishedthatthe reservationcoversanythingrelatedto conservation
and management measurestaken by Canada with respect to any and al1vessels fishing. The next
question is where? Not anywhere, as is sometimes implied by Spain, but in one specific,
well-defined geographical area: the NAFO Regulatory Area. Because the conservation and
management measuresset out in the 1994 legislation apply to the NAFO Regulatory Area, the
reservation was drafted in exactly the same terms. And thus it refers to "vessels fishing in the
NAFO Regulatory Area,as defined in the Convention onFutureMultilateralCo-operationinthe
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1978", usually referred to as the NAFO Convention (Spanish
Memorial, Annexes,Ann. 21). TheNAFOConventionappliesto a defined "ConventionArea"that
covers much of the Northwest Atlantic, includingthe Grand Banks of Newfoundland,where the
continentalshelf extendswell beyondthe 200-mile limit. The Convention Area lyingoutsidethe
200-mile limit on the high seas is calledthe NAFO Regulatory Area (Art. 1). This area is shown
on the right-handside of the map included in your folders at Tab 7. There is no disagreement
between the Parties that the seizure of the Estai occurred in the NAFO Regulatory Area. - 42 -
(g) ''Andthe Enforcement of Such Measures"
57. Finally, Sir, 1come to the phrase "and the enforcementof such measures". Spain has
devoted a great deal of time, effort and imagination1 might Say,to a deliberateattempt to distort
the meaning of "enforcement". In Canada'sview, the word "enforcement" shouldbe given its
ordinarymeaning inrelation to fisheriesmanagementand conservationmeasures. That is, it refers
to measures such as those necessary to effect the boarding and inspection of vessels at sea,
including coercive measures if the boarding is resisted; arrest if there is evidence of a major
infringement; inspection in port; and prosecution, if the evidence so warrants, al1 under due
process of law. My colleagues, Mr. Willis and Professor Weil will address this matter later, but
1wish to make at this time just three points.
58. First, we are here clearly not dealingwith the use of force in internationalrelations as
referred to in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. We are dealing with the use
of reasonable forceby fisheries protectionofficers forthe solepurposeof arrestinga fishingvesse1
suspectedof violations of conservationand management measures. Second,the use of somekind
of coercion is an inherent and necessarypart of the enforcementof any law, whether on land orat
sea. Obviously the word "enforcement"is derived from and relatedto the English word "force".
It is normal and customary practice everywherein the enforcementof al1kinds of laws for peace
officers or policemento use coercive measuresto effect an arrest. Thetypes of measures used by
Canada are not at al1unusual.
59. Third, if the use of force is not specifically excluded, it must be included in any
reasonableand logicaldefinitionof theword"enforcement". Thisisthe clearteachingof the Court
in its recent Judgment intheOil Platjormscase(Judgmentof 12December 1996,para. 2l), where
it recognizedthat in interpretinga provisionin an instrument reliedon for compulsoryjurisdiction,
the absence of a reference to the use of force in the text of the instrument did notean that an
incident involving the use of forcewas excludedfiom jurisdiction. Althoughin Ourcase the type
of force used was very, very different,thesame principle applies. The fact that the word "force"
was not included in the reservationdoes not mean that such measuresare excludedfiom the scope -43 -
of the reservation. This isal1the more so, in that "enforcement"in this case would havebeen
impossible without the use of some coercivemeasures.
Conclusion
60. As we said in Our Counter-Memorial- but it bears repetition - the Canadian
reservation is both precise in its delineation of the subject-matter, and comprehensivein its
exclusion of everything related to thatubject-matterfrom thejurisdiction of the Court (paras. 86
and 115). The languageis simpleand the meaningis clear. Taking intoaccountthe interpretation
of al1the individual words and phrases of the Canadian reservation, the reservation as a whole
clearlycoversanythingdirectlyor indirectlyrelatedto laws,regulationsand administrativeactions
conceming fisheriesjurisdiction, management andconservation, taken by Canada, with respect to
al1vesseisfishing intheNAFO RegulatoryArea, and to the enforcementby Canada ofthosesarne
conservation and management measures.
2. The Plain Meaning is Confirmed by the Intention Evident in the Surrounding
Circumstances
61. Mr. President,distinguishedJudges, thisinterpretationof theCanadianreservationderived
fi-omthe plain meaning of the words is confirmed by the intention evident in the surrounding
circumstances. As we have seen, in cases such as Anglo-Iranian and Aegean Sea, the Court
carefullyexploredthehistorical circumstancesinwhich thedeclarationwasoriginallymadeinorder
to determinethe intentionof the declarant State. In both cases, a grammaticalambiguityallowed
one party to argue that the reservation meant something different from the meaning discernedby
the Courtonan initialreading, butinboth cases,the intention derivedromhistoricalcircumstances
confirmed the meaning apparent in the text.
62. There is no such ambiguity in the present case, but the circumstances do provide
confirmationof the only "naturaland reasonableway of readingthe text", to use the wordsof the
Anglo-Iranian Judgment(Anglo-IranianOilCompany.,1C.J. Reports 1952,p. 104). AstheAgent
has already stated, Bill C-29 was introduced intotheHouse of Commons on 10May 1994. That
very same day, Canada withdrew its existing declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction and -44 -
substitutedthe new declaration, whichof course, includedthe reservation setout inparagraph 2 (4.
The solepurpose of withdrawing the old reservation and substitutinga new one wasto add the new
reservation in paragraph 2 (4. Theaddition ofthe reservationwas thus timed to coincide precisely
with the introduction of the legislation.
63. The exact coincidence in timing of Bill C-29 and the new declaration demonstratesthat
the reservation was deliberately designed to exclude Bill C-29 and everything done in or in
connection with it from judicial settlement. Canada took great care to ensure that the new
reservation was in place on the very day of its introduction into the legislation, before its passage
through Parliament and before any regulations were passed or enforced.
64. On the day on which Bill C-29 was introduced, and on which the new declaration was iilr
deposited,the Government of Canadaissued asinglepressreleaseexplaining both initiatives. After
reviewing the legislation,the press release States: "Canadahas today arnended itsacceptanceof the
compulsory jurisdiction ofthe International CourtofJusticeinTheHagueto preclude anychallenge
which might undermine Canada's ability to protect the stocks" (Counter-Memorial, Annexes,
Ann. 35). The stated objective clearly covers the entire matter of Bill C-29, which was designed
to protect the straddling stocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area.
65. Further confirmation of the intention of the Canadian Government and of the meaning
of the reservation is found in the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Canadian
Parliament on 12 May. In response to a question posed during the Senate debate, the Minister W
explained that "to protect the integrity of this legislation, we registered a reservation to the
International Court of Justice, explaining that this reservation would of course be temporary and
would apply only during such time as we felt was necessary to take retaliatory action against those
engaged in overfrshing" (Spanish Memorial, Annexes, Vol. 1,Ann. 16).
66. It is clear that the purpose of the reservation was, as the Minister put it, to protect "the
integrity of this legislation", whichn only mean the Statute itself, together with its regulations
andtheenforcementactions which itauthorizes. Thereservationcoversthe sarnerange ofmeasures
as the legislation itself, which includes al1 vessels in al1 forrns of fîsheries conservation and - 45 -
management in the NAFO Regulatory Area, with none of the imaginative restrictions conjured up
by Ourworthy adversaries.
67. In the Anglo-Iraniancase, the Court looked to the law passed by the Iranian Parliament
to approve the declaration of assistance inorderto ascertainthe Iranian intentionsasto its meaning.
TheCourtreferred to this evidenceas being"decisive" (I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 107). IntheAegean
Sea case, the Court referred to an explanation of the reservation given by the Greek Government
to its nationalegislature in an exposé des motifasccompanying the Bill authorizing ratification, as
putting the intention of that govemment "beyond doubt" (I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 27, para. 66). In
thepresentcase,the officialpress releaseandministerialstatementson the reservation have exactly
the sarne relevance and probative value.
68. The pressrelease andthe oralstatementto questionsbythe Foreign Ministerare identical
in substance. Both make perfectly clear that the purpose of the new reservation in the Canadian
declaration was to protect the 1994 legislation and the actions taken pursuant to it from being
contested before this Court. Neither statement leaves the slightest doubt about the intention of
Canada, which in any event is equally clear from the text of the reservation itself.
69. In this case, the Court does not have to choose between different principles of
interpretation. There is no contradiction between the stated intention and the plain languageof the
text. There is nothing in factto interpret; the Court has only to apply the simple and unambiguous
language of Canada'sreservation.
C. Application of the Reservation tothe Present Case
Introduction
70. Mr. President, distinguished Judges, 1now cometo the final part of my presentation. In
the first part,reviewed the requirement of consent and the principles of interpretation of optional
clause declarations. In the second, 1appliedthose principles to the interpretation of the Canadian
declaration of 10 May 1994. In this third part, 1 shall apply the reservation to the facts of the
present case. - 46 -
71. To determinewhether the disputefalls within theCanadian reservation,we have firstto
identiS,the relevant facts (AegeanSea ContinentalShe&I.C.J. Reports 1978,p. 34, para. 81). It
is far fromclear fromthe sometimescontradictorySpanishpleadings what exactly Spain considers
this case to be about. But whatever Spain claims that it is - the arrest of the Estai, the 1994
legislationor the application of the legislationto Spain in the regulations of 3 March 1995,or al1
three - they are al1unequivocally covered by the reservation.
1. The Facts Relevantto Jurisdiction
72. The first point to note about the Canadian reservation, Mr. President,is that it refersto
afactualcategory. It excludesfromtheCourt'sjurisdictioneverythingfallingwithina definedclass
.irlr
of fact situations, narnely: anything directly or indirectly related to fisheries conservation and
management measures taken by Canada against vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area.
. Conservationand managementmeasures haveas their subject-matterthe regulation andprotection
of fisheries. A simplereading of the Canadian legislationconfirmsthat it concernsthe regulation
and protection of fisheries, and that it isplainly a conservation and management measurein the
senseofthe reservation.This can leadto onlyone conclusion: anydisputeinvolvingthis legislation
or actionstaken underit falls withinthe factualambitof Canada's reservationandthereforeoutside
the jurisdiction of the Court.
73. As explainedby the Agent, the backgroundto the legislationwas the fisheries crisisof
"w
the early 1990s. Canada had facedthe successivecollapseof one after anotherof the commercial
fishstocksoff its AtlanticCoast. By 1994,almost al1the valuablegroundfishstockswhich straddle
the outer limit of Canada's200-mile zone, were under moratorium,that is to Say,under absolute
prohibition fromfishing. Faced with a conservation crisis, and unfortunately unable to persuade
al1Statesinvolvedto controltheir vessels,the CanadianGovernmentfelt compelledto take special
measures to conserve the fisheries. On 10 May 1994, it introduced intoParliament Bill C-29,
containing amendmentsto the Coastal Fisheries ProtectionAct,establishingfisheriesconservation
measures for foreibn vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area. Further details of specific
restrictions on fishing, aswell as the specific fish stocks affected andthe vessels covered, were - 47 -
prescribedin regulationsadoptedtwo weeks lateron 25 May (SpanishMemorial,Annexes,Vol. 1,
Ann. 17).
74. Theseregulationswerefurther amendedin 1995to address the imminentthreat posedby
SpanishandPortuguesevesselstoGreenlandhalibut(SpanishMemorial,Annexes,Vol. 1,Ann. 19).
Greenland halibut was the last commercially viable straddling stock of any significant sizein the
Northwest Atlantic. DespiteNAFO'sdecisionto allocate 3,400 tonnesof Greenlandhalibutto the
EuropeanUnion for 1995,the EU unilaterally adopted itsown quota of 18,630tonnes, more than
five times higherthan the quota allocatedto the EU by NAFO. Since diplomatic approacheshad
failed to prevent this unilateral EU action, Canada felt compelledto take emergency actions to
prevent the overfishing of Greenland halibut by Spain and Portugal. In an amendment to the
regulations implementingthe 1994legislation, the names of Spain and Portugalwere added to a
new table of countries subject to a prohibition on fishing Greenland halibut, as well as to such
NAFO measures as limitationson fish size and on the mesh size of nets.
75. Spain and Portugal werethe only countriesnamed in the new regulations, becausethey
were the only EU countries fishing for Greenland halibut and because they had a history of
overfishing and of breachingNAFO rules (Counter-Memorial, paras. 33-34).
76. DespiteCanada'scontinuedeffortsto addressthe conservationcrisis inCO-operation with
al1States concemed,it had becomeclear that Spanishand Portuguese vesselswere preparedto far
exceed even the quotas allocated by NAFO. In fact, by early March, they had exceeded their
NAFO quotafor thewhole of 1995 - that isto Say,by the beginningof March, theyhad exceeded
their NAFO quotas for the whole of 1995. Canada therefore felt compelled to enforce its
conservationand managementmeasures against Spanishvesselsin the NAFO RegulatoryArea. 1
must Say1was surprisedto hear my friend, Keith Highet,assertthat Canadaprovidedno wamings
conceming the applicationof its measures to Spanish and Portuguese vessels (CR 98/10, p. 18).
In fact, Mr. Highet,messages were broadcast to the NAFO Regulatory Areain various languages,
includingSpanishandPortuguese,providing directnotice of the 3 March 1995amendmentsto the
Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations (Canadian Counter-Mernorial,p. 21, fn. 72). 1refer you
to Annex 32 to Canada'sCounter-Memorialwhereyouwill end thetext of this announcement. On - 48-
9 March 1995,Canadianfisheriesprotectionofficersboardedand seized the Spanishfishingvessel
Estai, in accordancewith the CoastalFisheries ProtectionAct and its regulations. The masterand
thevesselwere subsequentlycharged withoffencesunderthe regulation,including, "fishingfor, or
catching and retaining Greenland halibut" (Regulations ofarch 1995, Spanish Memorial,
Annexes,Vol. 1,Ann. 19,p. 307).
2. The Facts of this Case Fa11Squarelywithinthe CanadianResewation
77. Mr. President, distinguished Judges, the facts are clear; the law is clear; and the
application of the law to the facts is equally clear. Everything complained of by Spain falls
squarelywithin the Canadian reservation. First, the entire purpose and only subject-matterof the
-
legislationis a responseto theconservationcrisisof theNorthwestAtlantic. Therecan be nodoubt
that the Canadian legislation itself is a "conservationand management measure", and, as such, it
fallswithinthe termsof thenadianreservation. Similarly,there can benodoubtthat anydispute
concerningthe legislation also falls within the terms of the legislation.
78. Second, it is equally clear that the regulations of 3 March 1995, which applied the
legislation to Spain and Portugal, were a conservation and management measure. The
subject-matterofthose measureswas the conservationofthe rapidly dwindlingstockof Greenland
halibut,in the words of the legislation, "topreventdestruction of this stock". Whetherany
of this was urgently neededor not, whether it was warrantedin the circumstancesor not, whether
*
it was lawfulunder international lawor not, none of these issues is now beforethe Court. Rather,
what is before the Court is whether what Spain complains of is covered by the Canadian
reservation. This, in turn, depends on whether the measures Canada took were for fisheries
conservationand management. Incontestably,they were. A prohibitionon fishinga definedstock
in a defined area is inherently a conservation and management measureIts character as a
conservation and management measure does not logically depend on how urgently it may be
needed, onwhether or not it was warranted under internationallaw and whether itwas warranted
in the circumstances.hese are questions for the merThis Court is not now consideringthe
merits, but rather jurisdiction, based on Canada's declaration and reseThe transparent -49 -
intention of Canada's reservation was to prevent the adjudication of such questions because they
were more appropriate for negotiation. 1 submit, Mr. President and distinguished Judges, that the
Court is bound to give effect to that intention andto refrain from an examination of the merits.
79. Finally, it is clearthat the boarding and seizure of the Estai on 9 March 1995,including
al1the related prior and subsequentacts,were measurestakenbyCanadato enforcethe conservation
and managementmeasures in the legislation and regulations. Accordingly,there can be no doubt
that the enforcement measures taken against the Estai also faIl squarely within the terms of the
Canadian reservation. Any claimconcemingtheseenforcementmeasuresistherefore excludedfrom
the Court'sjurisdiction.
80. The seizure of the Estai for fishing a straddling stock pursuant to the provisions of the
1994 legislation is precisely what was envisaged in paragraph 2 (4 of the Canadian declaration.
In contrasttoAegeanSea, this is not a casewherethe "situationsor facts"are at some remove from
those that initially motivated the filing of the reservation. What has happened here is exactly the
type of situation that was anticipated when the reservation was filed. As stated in the Canadian
Counter-Memorial, there is virtually an exact coincidence between what was foreseen and what
happened - between the motive, the intention and language of the reservation and the actions
complained of by Spain (para. 100).
Conclusion
81. Mr. President,distinguished Membersof the Court,the outcome inthis case must bethat
the Court is withoutjurisdiction. There can be no other result where the reservation is clear in its
text, where the declarant's intention is ampiy demonstrated and accords with the clear meaning of
thetext, andwherethe litigationarises inrelationto the specificissuethat promptedthe reservation:
namely the legislation of May 1994and its subsequent implementation in March 1995. That the
issue is the very thing contemplated by the reservation has to be conclusive againstjurisdiction.
Any other result would be incompatible with the requirementthat there be consent and that it must
be real. - 50 -
82. Mr. President, distinguished Judges,1thank you for your patience and attention, and
request that you invite my colleague, Mr. Willis, to address the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Hankey. 1cal1upon Mr. Willis.
Mr. WILLIS: Mr. President, distinguished Judges. For me, as for any jurist, it is a great
honour and a privilegeto appear before the International Court of Justice. 1amgenuinely grateful
for the opportunity, and1hope to dojustice to the responsibility my govemment has given to me.
1.You have just heard Mr. Hankey on the Canadian interpretation of the reservation in the
declaration. My topic is the Spanish interpretation. There shouldhave beenvery littleto Say. The
resewation is plain, short and simple: barely five lines of text on a clearly-defined topic. Our *
opponents have, however, taxed their imaginations and have proposed not one but a variety of
interpretations,l1of which contradict the natural meaning of the text and the intention disclosed
by the circumstances.
2. Thismoming, Mr. President, 1willdealwith someofthe specificinterpretations that Spain
has proposed. First, and most important, Spain's restrictive interpretation of the expression
"conservationand management measures". Secondly, its restrictive interpretation of the expression
"enforcement". And finally, the Spanish suggestion that the word "vessels"was intended to refer
only to "pirate" or stateless vessels, contrary to the plain meaning of the language and to al1the
evidence.
3. In addition to these specific questions, however, 1 will also discuss two implicit but
nevertheless fundamental themes that lie behindthe various Spanishinterpretations. One isthat the
Canadian reservation should be given the most restrictive conceivable interpretation. The second
implicit theme, which 1will deal with at the end of my presentation tomorrow, is that one way or
another the Canadian reservation must be deprived of any practical effect. These two implicit .
themes, of course, go together because the whole point on the attempt to cut down on the meaning
of the words is simplyto ensure that the Canadian resewation fails to achieve its intended effect. - 51 -
1. Restrictive Interpretation
(a) General
1begin with the first of these two implicitthemes, restrictive interpretation.
4. Spain of course does not admit to a strategy of restrictive interpretation. This week
ProfessorRemiro Brotons expresslydisavowed a restrictive approach. He said, correctly,that the
criteriaforinterpretationareneitherrestrictivenorexpansive(CR 9819,p. 57,para. 8). The Spanish
Memorial cited the excellent passage fiom the dissent of Judge Read in the Anglo-Iranian
case - that declarations "should be construed in such a manner as to give effect to the intention
of the State, as indicated by the words used; and not by a restrictive interpretation, designed to
thwart the intention ofthe State in exercising this sovereign power" (SpanishMemorial, para. 37;
Anglo-IranianOil Co. (UnitedKingdomv. Iran),I.C.J.Reports 1952, pp. 143-144).
5. Soattimes the parties appearsuperficiallyto be in agreementonthe basic approach. But,
Mr. President, theory is one thing and practice is another. And in practice, the facts speak for
themselves: the specific interpretationsSpain has proposedare about as restrictive as the human
mind could conceive. And even atthe level of theory, or doctrine,the Spanishargumentsare shot
through with contradictions. The Spanish Memorial said that reservations are subject to a
presumptionthat in making reservationsa State intends to restrict the Court's jurisdiction "in the
most limited form permitted" by the rules of interpretation(Spanish Memorial, paras. 7, 42, 71).
AndProfessorRemiroBrotons saidessentiallythe samethingthis week (CR 9819,p. 58,para. 11).
So in reality the Spanish commitment to restrictive interpretation is about as clear as it could
possibly be.
6. Mr. President, there are no presumptionsthat apply to the interpretation of reservations.
There can benopresumptions,becausethe Iawrequiresstrictproofofconsent; and therequirement
of strictproof meansthat presumptionshave noroleto play. TheCourtmust be satisfiedthat there
is in thewell-knownphrase, a "voluntaryand indisputableacceptance"of itsjurisdiction in every
case (Applicationof the Conventionon thePreventionandPunishmentofthe Crimeof Genocide
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),Order of 13 September1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 342,
para. 34). Mr. Hankey has reviewed the principles of jurisdiction and the principles of - 52 -
interpretation. At every step of the way these principles contradict the Spanish argument that
reservationsare to be interpreted"in the most limited form permitted".
7. At the heart of the Spanishargument is the ideathat optionalclause resewations are to be
interpretedrestrictively as exceptionsto a rule. But this would implythat consenttojurisdiction
is theule, to which resewations are exceptions (CR 98/10, p. 15, para.34). Mr. President, there
is nosuch rule. If anything the rule is the contrary - thatjurisdiction does not exist, unless and
until it is accepted. And acceptancedependsupon the wholeof a State'sdeclaration,includingthe
reservations.
8. AsMr. Hankeyhasjust explained,thedeclarationinitsentirety isa singlelegalinstrument
w
witha singleintention,a singleexpressionof legalwillthat definesandlimitsthejurisdiction. The
Aegean Sea decision confirmsthis: it refers to the "close and necessarylink that always exists
between a jurisdictional clause and reservations to it" (AegeanSea ContinentalShelJIJudgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 33, para. 79). Every part of the declaration hasexactlythe sarne status as
everyother part,asa free exerciseof sovereigntywherebyjurisdiction isboth conferredand limited.
It would therefore be wrong in principle to place the grant ofjurisdiction on a higherfooting than
the limitations, or to interpretthe one more broadly than the other.
9. ProfessorRemiro Bretonsappearedto concedethepoint - hesaidthatthedeclarationand
the reservation are al1 part of the same document and indeed accused Canada - without
demonstration- of treating the reservation as a separateinstrument (CR9819,p. 56,paras. 5,6). W
But the concession he made tums out to be empty, because a moment later we were told that a
grantofjurisdiction is the principleand the resewation isthe exception(CR 9819,p. 58, para. 11).
So one is forced to ask: what exactly is Spain's position? If there is to be no restrictive
interpretation,why do resewations have to be interpreted "in the most limited form permitted"?
C
And if declarations and resewations are al1part of a single act, why is one the principle and the
other the exception?
10. The Spanish Memorial and Professor Remiro Brotons this week, invoked the contra
proferentem doctrine, fiom the law of contracts, but failed to point out that this was argued
unsuccessfully, and therefore implicitly rejected, in the Anglo-Iranian case (Spanish Memorial, -53 -
para. 36; CR 9819,pp. 14-15,paras. 32-33). The contraproferentemdoctrineproperlyrelates to
contractual matters and was applied as such in BrazilianLoans. It also depends on the existence
of an arnbiguity, which Spain asserts but fails to demonstrate. And finally, it would produce
unreasonable resultswhere the reciprocity aspect of the optional clause comes into play.
11. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice consideredwhether the principle might have some relevance in
the context ofjurisdictional clauses, but he concludedthat "it overlooksthe fact that States would
not be subjectto internationaljurisdiction atl1but for their own consent" (TheLawandPractice
of theInternationalCourt ofJustice, Vol. II (1986), p. 514). And that, 1suggest,hits the nail on
the head and demonstratesthat any attemptto interpretthe wordsnarrowly would be wrong, even
if it respected thebounds of grammatical meaning.
12. This is why Judge Jennings in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America), Meritsp ,ointed out that, becauseno State is
required to grant its consent under the optional clause, and relatively few have done so, "any
reservationqualiQing suchaconsentespeciallydemandscautionandrespect"(I.C.J.Reports 1986,
p. 529).
13. There may be a temptation to think that reservations are an undesirablefeature of the
optional clause system, and should therefore be narrowly interpreted. Implicit or explicit, this
would bethe wrong approach. Reservationsmake a positive contribution. They allow States to
participate when they might otherwise consider an unlimited acceptance of jurisdiction to be
incompatiblewith their essential sovereign interests. The flexibility that reservationsprovide is
essentialto awidespreadacceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction underthe optionalclause. But they
makethis positivecontributiononly if giventheir full intendedeffect, not grudginglyrestricted to
something less than the natural meaning of the words, and the intention disclosed by the
circumstances.
14. If the restrictive approachtaken by Spain were everadopted,the practicalresults would
be unfortunate. States would be led to draft reservations in more sweeping terms than the
circumstancesactuallyrequire, simplyas an insurance policyagainst interpretationsthat attemptto
give as little meaning to the words as possible. Some States might withdraw their consents - 54 -
altogether. This iswhy the establishedapproachof the Courtas demonstrated inAnglo-Iranianand
Aegean Sea is sound both in law and in its practical effect, and why it should be maintained.
15. We heard very little this week about the theory of "anti-statutory interpretation" in the
Spanish Memorial,and 1willtherefore notrevisit the issuetoday. But ProfessorDupuydiddevelop
anargumentthatthe Canadian interpretationissomehowincompatiblewithArticle 36,paragraph 6,
of the Statute, the fundamental provision that empowers the Court to adjudicate upon its own
jurisdiction (la compétencede la compétence)(CR 98/10, pp. 51-53, paras. 33-36).
16. Professor Dupuy aswe understoodhim, took issuewith our positionthat an interpretation
that respectsthe languageofthe text andthe intention ofthe declaring Statecannot be anti-statutory
(CR 98/10, p. 52, para. 34). He said this was a "radical" position, that would turn the reservation .(iiI
into an "automaticreservation", a self-judgingreservation, inconsistentwiththe power of the Court
under Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute.
17. Mr. President, the Canadian approach can hardly be "radical". It happens to be the
position ofthe Court as expressed inboth Anglo-Iranian OilandAegeanSea. When theCourt gave
effect to the natural meaning of the text and the intention of itsthor at the time when it filedthe
reservation, it was hardly abdicating its function under Article 36, paragraph 6. On the contrary
it was exercisingthat function. How thejudicially accepted and orthodox principles that Canada
has advocated could be called radical, or inconsistent with Article 36, paragraph 6, remains a
mystery.
2. The Spanish Interpretations
TheCommonTheme: That the Measureswere not Conservation andManagement Measures
18.1 said, Mr. President, that Spain has proposed a variety of interpretations. But there is
one theme that dominates, and necessarily so. Spain has attempted to establishthat the measures
taken by Canada which gave rise to this case were not conservation and management measures
,
within the meaning of the Canadian reservation.
19. Itis obviousthat Spain would have to succeed on this point in order to establish a basis
for jurisdiction. In order to show that there is a consent to jurisdiction under the Canadian - 55 -
declaration, Spain would have to demonstrate that the legislative, regulatory and enforcement
measures Canadatook in 1994and 1995were not conservationand management measuresas that
term is used in the reservation. If Spain cannot prevail on this point, the Court cannot have
jurisdiction,becausethe measureswere clearly taken by Canadawith respect to vessels fishing in
the NAFO RegulatoryArea, asthe reservation provides; and itwas these measuresthat triggered
the dispute. Mr. President, 1suggestthat this is a battle that Spaincannot win, becausethe record
showsthat the measures were exactlywhat was contemplatedby the reservation,and because the
language of thereservation is clear.
20. 1invitethe Courttojoin me in a close lookat the terms of the Canadian legislation and
regulations. It will be apparent thatthese are conservation and management measures in every
conceivable respect.
21. 1beginwith the legislationintroducedas Bill C-29 in 1994,which 1will simplyrefer to
as "the legislation". This is a set of amendmentsto the CoastalFisheries ProtectionAct, dealing
specificallywiththe issue of straddlingstocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area, illustratedat Tab 7.
Let me review the key terms, which Mr. Hankey has introduced. "NAFO",as the Court knows,
standsfor theNorthwestAtlanticFisheriesOrganization,which isthe treaty organizationset up for
the express purpose of promoting "the conservation and optimum utilization of the fisheries
resources of the Northwest Atlantic" (Spanish Mernorial,Ann. 21, Preamble). TheNAFO treaty
appliesto a defined"ConventionArea"which covers muchoftheNorthwest Atlantic,includingthe
Grand Banks of Newfoundland where the dispute arose (Art. 1). The treaty also defines a
"Regulatory Area", which is the portion of the Convention Area lying outside and beyond the
200-mile limit, on the high seas (Art. 2).
22. It is this NAFO Regulatory Area to which the legislation of 1994 and the regulations
made under that legislation apply. It is also the area to which the Canadian reservation applies.
The "straddling stocks" referred to in the legislation are of course the stocks that overlap the
200-mile limit. Greenlandhalibut isone of them,cod is another. They areal1specieswhose range
extends beyond 200miles becauseof the very broadcontinentalshelf offthis part ofthe Canadian - 56 -
23. With that as background, 1would ask the Court to consider the terms of the legislation.
The purpose is set out in Section 5.1, which is reproducedat Tab 8. That purpose is to take urgent
action "toprevent further destruction"ofthestraddling stocksofthe Grand BanksofNewfoundland,
I
and to permit the rebuilding of these resources while continuing to seek international solutionsto
the conservation problem. Al1this is found inthe concludingwords of Section 5.1. The preceding
paragraphs of that section focus on the conservation crisis in greater detail, stating that the
straddlingstocksare threatenedwith extinction; that there is an urgent need for al1fishing vessels
to comply with sound conservation and management measures; and that some foreign fishing
vessels are fishingstraddling stocks in the NAFO RegulatoryArea in a manner that underminesthe
effectiveness of such conservation and management measures.
24. So much for the object and purpose of the legislation. According to its terms it is
conservation and management, and nothing else. It is precisely what is described in and intended
by the reservation.
25. 1turn next to the substance of the legislation, paraphrasingthe technical terms. Three
things have to be prescribed by regulations. First, the classes of fishing vessels to which the
legislation will apply. Second, the straddling stocks concemed. Third, the detailed conservation
and management measures to be applied, such as quotas or the size limits of fish. Section 5.2then
takes effect to prohibit persons on the designated foreign vessels from fishing for the designated
straddling stocks in violation of the detailed conservation and management measures as set out in 'tir
the regulations.
26. Theregulations obviously derive al1their legal force from the legislation. It is Section 6
of the legislation that authorizesthe necessary regulations, and the wording is highly instructive.
The regulations are to be made in order to ensurethat foreign fishingvessels do not "engage in any
activity that undermines the effectiveness of measures ... that are taken. under the NAFO t
Convention",or "any other measures for the conservation and management of a straddling stock".
5
27. This, Mr. President, is the heart of the legislative scheme. The terms are clear. The
substance and subject-matter of the legislation - like the purpose - is conservation and
management. And because a legislative measure is obviously a measure, it -57 -
follows - inescapably- thatthe legislationisa conservationandmanagementmeasure,taken by
Canada, with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area. To suggest that the
legislationis not covered squarelyby the reservationis simplyto denyany meaningwhatsoeverto
the words of the reservation.
28. The rest of the legislation deals with enforcement, which is also specifically expressly
covered by the reservation. There are detailed provisions on enforcement personnel, boardings,
inspections, searches and seizures,judicial search warrants, arrests; use of lawfûl force; and on
the preservation ofevidence. As with the caseof anyregulatorylegislation,there are penalties for
violations. There is also a section on the application of CriminalLaw, which is strictly limitedto
caseswhere offencesarecommittedinthecourseof enforcingthis legislation,the CoastalFisheries
Protection Act - again, therefore, a provision that is directly linked to the enforcement of
conservation and managementmeasures. Each and every one of these provisions, Mr. President,
relates to the enforcement of conservationand management measures with respect to the NAFO
RegulatoryArea and they are accordinglycovered by the reservation. 1will corne later to Spain's
arguments with respect to Bill C-8 which Spain filed this week.
29. The Spanish Memorialquoted the words of the CanadianMinister in the parliamentary
debates - "thisis not an extensionofjurisdiction", he said "this is a conservation régimethat we
areintroducingtoday" (Spanish Memorial,para. 173. Thelegislationhadno purposebutto address
the fisheriescrisisof theNorthwest Atlanticandthe collapseof the stocks. It defies both logicand
imagination to suggest that such an initiative could be anything other.than a conservation and
management measure.
30. 1 turn next to the regulations made under this legislation- first, the initial set of
regulations passed soon after the legislation wasadopted in 1994, andthen the 1995arnendments
that extended the application of the legislationto Spain and precipitatedthe dispute.
31. It is elementary in Canadian legislation, as in many legalsystems, that regulations are
simplylegal instrumentsfor canying outthe general directivesof statutorylegislation,and al1their
legal force is derived from the legislation. If the legislation is concerned exclusively with - 58 -
conservationand management measures- whichwe believe is clear - the same must logically
be true of the regulations.
32. And so it is. The initial regulationsunder this legislation were passed in May 1994.
They appear at Annex 17to the Spanish Memorial. They were made applicable only to vessels
without nationality, and to vessels registered in certain open registry States because of the
"re-flagging"problem - the practice of switchinga vessel to an open registry in order to avoid
NAFO restrictions. The regulations identify therelevant straddling stocks, including Greenland
halibut, and impose a prohibition on fishing for the designated stocks in the NAFO Regulatory
Area.
33. This was patently a conservation and management measure. Its only function was to w
protect the designated stocks fiom unregulatedover-fishing. Annex 17of the SpanishMemorial
includes an explanatory statement called a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,which in
Canadian legislative practice accompaniesany federal regulation, butdoes not actually form part
of it. This explanatory document sets out the purpose of the prohibition on fishing for the
designatedstraddlingstocks. It explainsunderthe heading "BenefitsandCosts" thatthe measures
are required to prevent the commercial extinctionof fragile fish stocks. The introductionto the
explanatory statement also states that the primarythreat to the recovery ofthese stocks,as of the
spring of 1994,was posed by vessels without nationality as well as vessels operatingunder "flags
of convenience"that are not subject to the NAFO Convention.
34. The remainder of this initial set of regulationsnder the 1994legislation is concerned
with enforcement - the enforcementof conservationand management measures,bothwithin and
beyond the 200-mile limit. The amendmentsprovide for the use of force as a last resort, when
nothing else will get the vessel to stop. They also provide for a series of waming shots at a safe
*
distanceto give the vessel a reasonableopportunityto comply,and forthe use of the international
signals L, SQ1 and SQ3 prior to boarding or to the use of warning shots. These signals, as the b
regulationsindicate,aretaken fiom the InternationalCode of Signals,whichhas beenapprovedand
adopted by the International Maritime Organization. -59 -
35. Thesemeasures plainlydeal with enforcementin the strictestand mosttraditional sense.
Internationalconventionsbearthis out - includingthe 1995UnitedNations StraddlingStocksand
Highly Migratory Species Agreement - the New York Agreement - cited by Spain (Spanish
Memorial, para. 80; UN Doc. AICONF. 164137,8 September 1995, adopted 4 August 1995).
Article 22, paragraph 1 @ of the agreement specifically contemplatesthe use of reasonable force
where inspectors areobstructed in the execution of their duties. Professor Sanchez Rodriguez
mentioned Article 73 of the 1982Law of the Sea Convention (CR 9819,p. 36, para. 18), which
does not expressly refer to force; but it does refer to the arrest of foreign vessels; and it is
commonknowledge- and common sense - that arrests at sea of foreignvesselsare not always
voluntaryand potentiallyrequire a use of force. It is also common knowledgeand common sense
that any kind of law enforcementagainst unwilling parties may sometimes involvea use of force.
The use of waming shots at a safe distance is a well-known international practice, designed to
minimizerisksto the safetyof lifeat sea. That iswhy the procedureisreflectedinthe International
Code of Signals,as Signal SQ3, to which the regulations refer. And Spain overlookssomething
that is fundamental, but that is spelled out inal1the documents - the whole purpose of these
provisions is to Iimitandrestrict the use of force, not to encourage i- to make sure that force
is usedonlyas a last resort, when nothingelse will do. The RegulatoryImpactAnalysis in Spanish
Annex 17,makes that absolutely clear.
36. We were surprised to hear Professor Sanchez Rodriguez Saythat the use of force can
neverbe interpretedasbeingthe enforcementof conservationand managementmeasures(CR 9819,
p. 27, para. 6). He offeredno reasons. The statement is contrary to internationalconventions, in
particular Article 22, paragraph 1 @, of the United Nations Straddling Stocks Agreement - the
New York Agreement. It is also contrary to common sense and practical experience,because
foreignfishingvesselswill notinvariablycomplyand CO-operate.Thereare obviouslylimitsto the
use of force by law enforcement authorities - it must not be excessive force, it must be
proportionate,and so on. But there is no evidence the limits were exceeded here - al1that was
involvedwere warning shots at a safe distance, intended only to allow a boarding, not shot at the - 60 -
ship, and only afrer resistance had been encountereand, Mr. President, even if there were
evidence of excessive force, thatld be an issue for the merits, notjurisdiction.
.
37. 1emphasize that the appropriatenessor legitimacy ofthese provisions is not, cannotbe,
the issue at this stage.t would be an issue for the merits. What counts for present purposes
isthat al1this is enforcernent; it isthe enforcernentof conservationandmanagementmeasures,and
accordingly it is covered by the reservation.
38. The regulationshavejust describedwere arnended on3 March 1995to apply to Spain
and Portugal (Spanish Mernorial, Ann. 19). The amendmentof coursewas the direct result of the
dispute over the Greenland halibut quotas voted into effect by NAFO for the year 1995. The
appropriateness of the quotas adopted by NAFO is notrelevant to the issue ofjurisdBution. w
what is bothrelevant and indisputableis thattheNAFO quotaswereconservationand management
measures, as that expression is used in Section 5.1 of the 1994n legislation.
39. The amended regulations of March 1995 listed Spainand Portugal as States whose
vessels would be subject to this legislation, and added a series of prescribed conservation and
management measures for those vessels. The measure at the heart of this case wasa prohibition
on fishing for Greenland halibut in the NAFO RegulatoryArea for the remainder ofthe year
prohibitionbecause, as Mr. Hankeysaid,the 1995quota for the EuropeanUnionhad already been
caughtat that point in time,gelyby Spain. In addition,the regulations imposeda restriction on
the mesh size of nets, so that undersized fishcannot be caught, as well as size limits for c-rtain
species of fish -both,1 may Say, among the most traditional of al1 conservation measures.
Finally,the regulations includea provisiononthe maintenanceof fishing logsanda prohibition on
removinggear frornthe water after a boarding signal hasbeen given,bothwith theobvious purpose
of facilitating enforcement.
40. These conservationand management measures, whoseenforcementgaverise to this case,
L
are found in Table V of the Regulations, which is in your materials today at Tab 9. It takes no
more than a glance to see that these are the most standard,typical conservationand management
measuresone could imagine. 1would invitethe Court to comparethem with the illustrative listof
fisheries measures in the exclusive economiczone set out in Articleagraph4, of the 1982 -61 -
Law of the Sea Convention. The list includesthe speciesthat may be caught,the areas that may
be fished, gear types, fish sizes, quotas, seasons andso on. Or one may look simply at the Table
of Contentsof the Conservation and Enforcement MeasuresofNAFOat Annex 10of the Canadian
Counter-Memorial - this covers such matters as quotas, prohibitions on fishing, gear and size
limits. In substance, in content, the Canadianconservationand managementmeasuresthat arethe
object of this dispute are exactly the sarne. The onlydifference,1repeat, is wherethese measures
were applied by Canada - the NAFO area, which is so precisely designatedin the reservation.
41. One can agreeor disagree with thesemeasures, whichare largelybasedon the measures
adopted by NAFO. But it cannot be plausibly disputed that they were conservation and
management measures. The explanatory statement or "Regulatory Impact Analysis" that
accompanied the regulations, and which is also found in Annex 19 of the Spanish Annexes,
describes the amendment as essential to deter overfishing of stocks threatened with extinction.
Mr..President, 1have aboutone minute before1finish this point, if 1may go on. The Regulatory
Impact Analysis statement at Annex 19 of the Spanish Annexes describes the wamings on the
biological state of Greenland halibut given as early as 1989, and the unilateral quota set by the
European Union at a level more than five times that established by NAFO. The object of the
measures is as plain as thesubject-matter. It is conservation and management.
42. It is self-evident,Mr. President, that it was the enforcement ofese conservation and
management measures that gave rise to this case. In fact, the pleadings of both sides make that
clear. The conclusion that the dispute is indeed within the four corners of the reservation is
therefore compelling - in fact, irrefutable.
Mr. President, that would be a convenient point at whichto break until tomorrow, if that
pleases the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. The Court will now rise and resume Sittingin
these proceedings tomorrow at 10 a.m.
TheCourt rose al1 p.m.
Public sitting held on Thursday 11 June, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding