Public sitting held on Thursday 11 June, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding

Document Number
096-19980611-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
1998/11
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Uncorrected

CR 98/11

Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice

LA HAYE THE HAGUE

ANNEE 1998

Audience publique

tenuelejeudi 11juin 1998à IO heures, au Palaii de la Pak,

sous laprésidencedeM. Schwebel,président

en l'affairede la Compétence en maeepêcheries(Espagne c Canada)

COMPTERENDU

YEAR 1998

Publicsitting

held on Thursday11 June 1998,ut 10.0am, ut the PeacePalace,

PresidentSchwebelpresiding

in the caseconcerningFisheriesJurisdiction (Spainv. Canada)

VERBATIMRECORDPrésents: M. Schwebel,président
M. Weeramantry v,ice-président
MM. Oda

Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer

Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans

Rezek,juges
MM. Lalonde
TorresBemardez,jugesad hoc

M. Valencia-Ospina,reffierPresent: President Schwebel
Vice-President Weeramantry

Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi

Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans

Rezek
Judges ad hoc Lalonde
TorresBerniirdezLe Gouvernementde I'Espagneest représenté par :

M. José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, chefdu servicejuridique international duministèredes
affaires étrangèresd'Espagne, professeurde droit internatiànl'universitéComplutense de

Madrid,

comme agent et conseil;

M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur dedroit internationàl'universitéPanthéon-Assas (PariII),

M. Keith Highet, conseil en droit international,vice-présidentdu comitéjuridique interaméricain

de l'organisation des Etats américains,

M. Antonio Remiro Brotons, professeur de droit internationàll'universitéautonome de
Madrid,

M. Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez, professeur de droit internatioàal'universitéComplutense
v
de Madrid,

comme conseils et avocats;

M. Félix Valdés Valentin-Gamazom , inistre-conseillerde l'ambassade d'Espagneaux Pays-Bas,

comme coagent;

M. Carlos Dominguez Diaz, secrétaired'ambassade,sous-directeur généraalux organisations
internationales de gestion de pêcheriesau ministère del'agricultureet des pêcheries
d'Espagne,

M. Juan JoséSanz Aparicio, secrétaired'ambassade,membre du servicejuridique international

du ministère des affaires étrangèrs'Espagne,

comme conseillers.

Le Gouvernementdu Canada est représenté par :

S. Exc.M. Philippe Kirsch, c.r., ambassadeuretjurisconsulte, ministèredes affaires étrangères
et du commerce international,

comme agent et avocat;

M. Blair Hankey, avocat généradl élégué, ministèdres affaires étrangèreset du commerce

international,

comme agent adjoint et avocat;

M. L. Alan Willis, c.r., ministère delajustice,

comme conseilprincipal et avocat;The Government of Spain isrepresented by:

Mr. José Antonio PastorRidruejo, Head, Department of International Legal Affairs,Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Spain, Professor of InternationalLaw at the ComplutenseUniversity of
Madrid,

as Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of InternationalLaw, University of Paris II
(Panthéon-Assas),

Mr. Keith Highet, Counsellor in International Law, Vice-Chairman,Inter-AmericanJuridical
Cornmittee, Organizationof American States,

Mr. Antonio Remiro Brot6ns, Professor of InternationalLaw, Autonomous Universityof
Madrid,

Mr. Luis Ignacio SanchezRodriguez,Professor of International Law, ComplutenseUniversity of
Madrid,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Félix Valdés Valentin-Gamazo,Minister-Counsellor,Embassy of Spain to the Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr. Carlos Dominguez Diaz, Embassy Secretary, Assistant Director-General for International
Fisheries Management Organizations, Ministryof Agriculture andFisheries of Spain,

Mr. Juan José Sanz Aparicio, Embassy Secretary, Department ofInternationalLegal Affairs,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain,

The Government of Canada isrepresented by:

His Excellency Philippe Kirsch,Q.C., Ambassador and Legal Adviser to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade,

as Agent and Advocate;

Mr. Blair Hankey, Associate General Counsel, Department of Foreign Affairs and International

Trade,

as Depuîy Agent and Advocate;

Mr. L. Alan Willis, Q.C., Department of Justice,

as Senior Counsel and Advocate; -6-

M. Prosper Weil, professeur éméritede l'universitéde Paris,

comme conseilet avocat;

M. Paul Fauteux, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,

M. John F. G. Hannaford, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,

Mme Louise de La Fayette, Universitéde Southampton,

Mme Ruth Ozols Barr, ministèrede lajustice,

Mme Isabelle Poupart, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,

Mme Laurie Wright, ministèrede lajustice,

commeconseils;

M. Malcolm Rowe,Gouvernement de Terre-Neuveet du Labrador,

M. Earl Wiseman, ministèredes pêcheset des océans,

commeconseillers;

Mme Manon Lamirande, ministère de la justice,

Mme Marilyn Langstaff, ministèredes affaires étrangères etdu commerce international,

Mme Annemarie Manuge, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,

M. Robert McVicar, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,

Mme Lynn Pettit, ministèredes affaires étrangères etdu commerce international,

comme agentsadministratifs. -7-

Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, Universityof Paris,

as CounselandAdvocale;

Mr. Paul Fauteux, Department of Foreign Affairsand International Trade,

Mr. John F. G. Hannaford, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,

Ms Louise de La Fayette, University of Southampton,

Ms Ruth Ozols Barr, Department of Justice,

Ms Isabelle Poupart, Department of Foreign Affairsand International Trade,

Ms Laurie Wright, Departmentof Justice,

as Counsel;

Mr. Malcolm Rowe, Governmentof Newfoundland andLabrador,

Mr. Earl Wiseman, Department of Fisheriesand Oceans,

as Advisers;

Ms Manon Lamirande, Department of Justice,

Ms Marilyn Langstaff, Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade,

Ms Annemarie Manuge, Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade,

Mr. Robert McVicar, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,

Ms Lynn Pettit, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,

as AdministrativeOfJiccers. -8-

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. 1 cal1 upon the distinguished Agent of Canada,

Ambassador Kirsch.

M. KIRSCH :

1. Monsieur le président,Madame,Messieurs de la Cour, c'estun grand honneurpour moi

de représenterle Canada devant la Cour internationale de Justice.

Introduction

2. En se présentantdevant la Cour, le Canada tient àréitérerses engagements passésen

faveur du règlementpacifique des différendset sa déférence l'égardde la Cour internationalede

Justice. Si le Canada conteste aujourd'huila compétencede laCour, il ne remet en cause ni son .J

autorité,ni la confiance qu'illui a toujours témoignée.Conformément audroit international, le

Canada a simplement choisi la négociationcomme mode privilégié de règlementpour certains

différends.

3. Ces différends,le Canada les a exclusde la compétenceau moyen d'une réserve.11s'agit

des((différendsauxquelspourraientdonner lieu les.mesuresde gestionet de conservationadoptées

par le Canada pour les navires pêchantdans la zone de réglementationde I'OPANO, ...et

l'exécutionde ces mesures))(contre-mémoire du Canada, annexe 2). En anglais, ((disputesarising

out of or concerningconservation and managementmeasures ...and the enforcementof such

measures)). W

4. A ce stade, laCour est donc appeléàexaminer laquestion desa propre compétence. Et,

à cet égard,je voudrais faire deux observationspréliminaires.

5.En premier lieu,je note avecregretque les plaidoiriesespagnolesdes deuxderniersjours,

ont portéessentiellement sur le fond de l'affaire. M. Highet évoquait hier avec délicatessela

nécessitéde fairequelques incursionslimitéessur le fond pourdéterminerla portée d'une réserve.

Soit,mais l'Espagnene s'estpas limitéeà quelques incursions. Dansses plaidoiries, souscouvert

de traiter la compétence,les dissertationssur le fond ont étéla règle. Je n'insistepas. Nous

sommeshabitués,mais cette démarchen'enest pas moins contraireaux ordonnancesde la Cour. -9 -

J'invite celle-àien tenir compte lorsqu'ils'agirapour elle de départagerles éléments pertiàents

sa décisionsur la compétenceet ceux qui ne le sont pas.

6. En second lieu, je ne peux que déplorer lesexcès qui ont marqué lesplaidoiries

espagnoles. Nous aurons I'occasionde revenir sur certains d'entre eux,notammentà propos des

événements quise sont réellement passés à l'occasion de l'arraisonnement de l'Estai. Nous

regrettons d'autantplus ces intempérancesqu'ilest vrai que l'Espagneest un pays ami. Le Canada

attache une grande importanceà cette amitié,comme il attache une grande importanceà la réelle

harmonie qui règne à nouveau dans nosrelations.

Rappel des Faits

7. Cela dit, je passerai trèsrapidement sur les quelques faits pertiàla question de la .

compétencedela Cour, qui sont bien connus. Le 10mai 1994,le Canada a déposé une nouvelle

déclaration d'acceptatiode la compétence dela Cour qui comporte la réservequej'ai citée. Le

mêmejour,le Gouvernementdu Canada présentaitau Parlement le projet de loi C-29. Ce texte,

qui modifiait la loi sur la protection des pêchescôtières, a étéadopté sanschangement par le

Parlement le 12mai 1994. Les modalités d'application dceette loi ont été définiepseu aprèsdans

un règlement,qui, lui-mêmea , étémodifiéle 3 mars 1995demanière à soumettreà la législation

les naviresespagnols et portugais. Le 9 mars, le navire de pêche espagnolEstai était inspetté

saisi, et son capitaine arrêté, pour avoir contràvla loi et aux règlements. Voilàles faits qui

ont amené l'Espagne à déposer une requête introductived'instance au Greffe de la Cour

le 28 mars 1995.

8.Normalement,je m'en tiendrais làsur le plandes faits. La réserve se sufàielle-même.

Mais lesilencede l'Espagnesur certainesquestionspourtantévidentesm'amène à ajouterquelques

éléments qui,je l'espère,seront utilàsla Cour.

9. Au début deson discours introductif d'avant-hier, l'agent de l'Espagne s'etterrogé

longuement sur les raisons des mesures prises parle Canada et exécuténotamment à l'encontre

de l'Estai.Il n'avaitpourtant paà chercher bien loin. La réponsese trouve dans la crise de la

conservationdes ressources halieutiquesqui sévissaitalors dansAtlantiquedu Nord-Ouest. Il est - IO-

d'ailleurs remarquable que l'Espagnen'en ait dit mot, ni dans ses écrits,ni oralement. Cette

question est traitéeen détail auxparagraphes à327 du contre-mémoiredu Canada et je ne la

rappelleque pour une raison uniqueremettre laCour dans le contexte quia entourél'adoptionde

la loiC-29 et le dépôtde la réserve,alorsque l'Espagnese permet, contretoute évidence,de mettre

en question les objectifs que poursuivait mon pays. L'Espagne affirme que la crise de la

conservation des ressources n'étaitqu'unrétexte»aux mesures prises par le Canada. Elle est

pourtant bienplacéepour savoirque pourbeaucoup,en Amérique duNordcommeen Europe, cette

crise a été une réalité crueL.a surpêchechroniqueet les autres pratiques de pêcheespagnoles

ont laissé une profondeamertume des deux côtésde l'Atlantique.
#
10. La crise de la conservation des années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix a été

catastrophique. Les pêcheriesde l'Atlantiquedu Nord-Ouest, dont l'abondanceet la richesse

semblaientconstituer une manne inépuisable, étaient menacéedeisparition. Des communautés

entières perdaient ainsi leurs moyens de subsistance traditionnels et faisaiànun avenir

extrêmementsombre.

11.Nous reconnaissons d'emblée queles responsabilitésde cette crise sont partagées. Les

pratiques depêchede bien des pays y ont contribué. Le Canaa fait sa part d'erreurs. Nous les
avons reconnues et essayons de les corriger.

12.Quoi qu'ilen soit, il fallaitagir et l'urgencedu a donné lieà uncertain nombre

d'initiatives nationales, régionales etinternationales. Poursa part, le Canada a commencépar -

adopter,dans sa zone depêchede 200 milles, une série demesuresde gestion et de conservation,

notamment plusieurs moratoires draconiens, pour assurer la survie des stocks de poissons qui y

étaient menacés.

13.Dans ce contexte,il me faut dire un motde la questiondes stockschevauchants(cequ'on

appelleen anglais lesraddling stocks)que l'Espagnen'a faitqu'effleureralors qu'elle estau cŒur

du problème. Par définition,les stocks chevauchantsse déplacententre la zone de pêche de 200

milles de1'Etatcôtier et la zone qui luiest adjacente. L'Etatcôtier peut bieàpl'intérieur

des 200 milles toutes les mesures possibles, elles ne pourront àuelles seuleà assurer la

conservation des stocks chevauchants. Pour êtreefficaces, les mesures de 1'Etatcôtier doivent -11 -

nécessairements'accompagnerde mesures qui s'appliquentau-delà de cette zone. Si lespêcheurs

attendent simplementque le poisson se trouve en haute mer pour lecapturer, les mesuresde'Etat

côtier ne serventà rien et la survie de l'espèce dans sonensemble est menacée.

14.C'estce qui explique que le Canada se soit mià la recherchede solutionsàlong terme.

Comme on le sait, il s'estfait'instigateurd'unaccord multilatéralsur la pêcheen haute mer qui

mettrait en place un régime internationalefficace de gestion et de conservation des stocks de

poissons chevauchants et grands migrateurs, accord d'ailleurs adoptépar les Nations Unies en

août 1995 (accord des Nations Unies relatifà l'application dela partie XI de la convention des

Nations Unies sur ledroit de la mer du0décembre 1982c , oncernantlaconservationet la gestion

des stocks chevauchantset grands migrateurs, doc. NU A/CONF. 164/37,8 septembre 1995).

15.De la mêmefaçon, le Canada a intensifiéses efforts au sein de I'OPANO(organisation

des pêchesde l'Atlantiquedu 'Nord-Ouest)en vue de l'élaborationde règlesspécifiquespour les

stocks chevauchants dans la zone de réglementationde cette organisation, donc au-delà des 200

milles. Conformément à la convention de l'OPANO, le Canada a fait adopter des mesures

compatibles avec les siennes propres, en tant qufEtatcôtier, pour mettre àla surpêche.

16. A l'époque,beaucoup de stocks chevauchants, la morue et la plie, par exemple, étaient

déjà décimés. Restailte fiétandu Groenland, mais il connaissait un déclinrapide que le Canada

observait avec grande inquietude. Pour lui épargnerun sort similaireà celui des autres stocks

chevauchantsde la côteest, le Canada s'estdonctourné versI'OPANO. Ses efforts, on le sait, se

sont heurtésà un certain nombre d'obstacles. Il est inutile d'yrevenir ici; notre contre-mémoire

relate tous les détails nécessaires paragraphes 32 à 44.

17.En bref, le Canada n'a pas réussà faireobserver les décisionsde I'OPANOqui auraient

pu assurer la conservationde l'espèce.Devant lasurpêchequi sepoursuivait,il a, en 1994et 1995,

pris les mesures quej'ai décritesau débutde mon exposé.

18.L'objectifdu Canada n'avaitrien àvoiravec un désird'étendre les zones maritimessous

sajuridiction, commese plaîtà lerépéterl'Espagne.Dans toute cette affaire,la position du Canada

a été entièrement dominée pa lrs impératifsde gestion et de conservation, lestermes mêmesque - 12 -

l'on retrouve dans la réserve. Voilà ce que je souhaitais rappelerà la Cour en évoquant ces

événements.

L'importance du consentement

19. Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs dela Cour, l'argumentationque le Canada

vous présenterarepose sur un principe essentiel, la condition sine quanon de la compétence,à

savoir le consentement des Etats. La Cour l'a encore rappeléen 1995 : «l'un des principes

fondamentauxdeson Statutestqu'ellene peuttrancherundifférend entredesEtatssansque ceux-ci

aient consentià sajuridiction))(Timororiental (Portugalc. Australie),arrêt, C.I..ecueil1995,

p. 101,par. 26). Ce passageest l'écho d'unejurisprudence constante datants premiersprononcés w

de la Cour permanente de Justice internationalequi affirmait, dès 1924,que sa compétence«ne

saurait subsisteren dehors des limitesdans lesquelles[le]consentementa étdonné))(Concessions

MavrommatisenPalestine,arrêtno2, 1924,C.P.J.I.série A no2, p. 16).

20. La nécessitédu consentement procède naturellementdu principe du libre choix des

moyens en matièrede règlement pacifiquedes différends, commedes attributs mêmesde la

souverainetéétatique.Jene m'attarderaipas. Jeme contenterai de rappeler iciceque disaitla Cour

dans son arrêt dansl'affairedesActivitésmilitaires et paramilitair:s

«Lesdéclarationsd'acceptationde lajuridiction obligatoirede laCour sont des
engagements facultatifs, de caractère unilatéral,que les Etats ont toute libertéde

souscrireou de ne pas souscrire. L'Etatest libre en outre soit de faire une déclaration
sans conditionet sans limite de durée, soitde l'assortir deconditionsou de réserves.))
(Activités militairesetparamilitaires auNicaragua et contrecelui-ci (Nicaraguac.
Etats-Unis d'Amériquec ),ompétenceetrecevabilité, arrêC.I.J.Recueil1984,p. 418,
par. 59.)

21. Monsieur le président,si un Etat est libre de ne pas accepter du tout la compétence de

laCour, à plus forte raison est-illibrede n'acceptercettecompétencequ'àl'intéride limitesdont

la définitionlui incombe.

22. Le Canada accepte la compétencede la Cour depuis ses origines. II a assorti son

acceptation de certaines réserves,comme beaucoup d'autresEtats déclarants, compris l'Espagne.

La possibilitéd'émettredes réserves estla pierre angulaire de la clause facultative. C'est ellequi

a encouragéune acceptation large de la compétence dela Cour de la part d'uncertain nombre - 13-

d'Etats,parce qu'elleleur permettait de choisirun autre mode de règlementpour certains types de

différends.Et donc, un respect scrupuleuxdesprincipes qui régissentl'émissionet l'interprétation

des réservesn'estpas seulement bénéfique à l'ensembledu systèmede la clause facultative, il est

essentielà son acceptationpar lesEtats. Autrementdit, il faut que les Etats puissent compter sur

les règlesdujeu. Pour s'épanouir, pouprrospéreret même pourmaintenir sa place, le systèmede

la clause facultative doit continuerinspireraux Etats la plus grandeconfiance. Pour notre part,

cette confiance, nous la plaçons enla Cour.

23. Dans l'affairequi est devantvous, leconsentementdu Canada àlacompétencede la Cour

n'existe pas. Letexte de la réserve exprime sansaucune ambiguïté sa volonté de soustraire à la

compétencede la Cour les différendsauxquelspourraient donner lieu les mesuresde gestion et de

conservation.

24. Je conclus sur ce point en rappelantle principe général quisous-tend la nécessitédu

consentement. Il est bien simple: la Cour tire son autoritéde la volonté des Etats. Face à

l'Espagnequi l'inviteà ne pas respecter celle du Canada, il revientà la Cour de réaffirmerles

principes qui fondent sa compétenceet de mettre un terme aux tentatives espagnoles d'y passer

outre.

Résumé du corps de l'argumentation

25. Monsieur le président, Madame,Messieursde la Cour, unefois établieI'importancedu

consentement,leresteest unequestion d'interprétatiode laréservecanadiennetelle qu'elles'inscrit

dans la déclarationd'acceptation.

26. A première vue,il n'y a pas grande différence entrel'Espagneet le Canada sur les

principes à appliquer. Nous sommes tous d'accord : les réserves font partie intégrantedes

déclarations d'acceptationde compétence;les déclarations constituentdes actes unilatérauxsui

generies lesdoiventêtreinterprétéesd'um neanièrenaturelleetraisonnabledefaçon àdonnerplein

effetà l'intentionde1'Etatdéclarant;et leur interprétationt treconforme au principede la bonne

foi. - 14-

27. Cette belle harmonie connaît quand même ses limites. Parce qu'elln e'apas le choix,

l'Espagneaccepte du bout des lèvresque les critèresd'interprétationne sont en soi «ni restrictifs

ni expansifs))(mémoirede l'Espagne,p. 67, par. 37). Mais dans la mêmefoulée, ellenous dit et

redit qu'il fautdonner aux réserves«la portéela plus limitée permisepar leur interprétation)).Ce

qui ressort de ce clair-obscur juridique, dont on chercherait en vain le fondement, c'est qu'en

pratique,I'Espagnefaittout cequ'ellepeut pour appliquer à laréserve canadienneune interprétation

aussi restrictiveque possible. Le problème,c'est qu'elle partd'unefausseprémisse.Elle suppose,

on l'abien entendudans lesdeuxderniersjours, que lareconnaissancede lacompétencedela Cour

est larèglegénérale et quetoute limitationest uneexception. Or, Monsieurleprésident,lesystème
1iJ
auquel ont souscrit les Etats membresde la Communautéinternationalene fonctionnepas du tout

de cette façon. Ce n'est pastout de direque déclarationetréservesformentun instrumentjuridique

unique. 11faut en tirer la conclusionlogique :il n'ya aucune raisond'appliqueraux réservesune

interprétationrestrictive. Pour établirla portéede l'instrument d'acceptationde la compétence de

laCour, on le sait, il suffitde lire letexte de manière raisonnableet naturelle,eu égàrl'intention

de 1'Etatdéclarant(Anglo-IranianOilCo., arrêt,C.I.J:Recueil1952,p. 104). La Cour seraappelée

à déceler cetteintention en se fondant tant sur le texte de la réserveque sur les circonstances

entourant son dépôt.

28. Il est vrai que dans certains cas, l'intentionapparente de 1'Etatdéclarant et le sens

ordinaire des mots qui forment le texte de la réservene pointent pas dansla même direction.Le '*17

processus d'interprétation est alors délicat. Maiisl ne présenteaucune difficultélorsque la lettre

de la réserveet l'intentionde lrEtatdéclarantne font qu'un,comme c'estle cas ici.

29. Je rappelle d'abordla lettre de la réserve. La déclaration d'acceptatidu Canadaexclut

de la compétencedela Cour les ((différendsauxquelspourraient donnerlieules mesuresde gestion

et de conservationadoptéespar le Canadapour les navires pêchand tans la zone de réglementation

de I'OPANO ..et l'exécution(I'enforcement)de telles mesures)). Ces termes couvrentde toute

évidencelesmesures de gestionet de conservationadoptéespar le Canadaen raison de la crise de

conservation des ressources halieutiques que j'ai évoquées plus haut,à,savoir la loi C-29 et les

règlementsqui en découlent. Ces termes couvrentégalement l'exécution dcees mesures dont lasaisie du navire espagnol Estai a étél'une des manifestations. Mes collègues, MM. Hankey

et Willis, donneront davantage d'explicationssur chacune de ces questions.

30. Je passe à I'intentionde I'Etatdéclarant. On nousa dit que I'intentiondevait exister au

moment du dépôtde la réserve. Noussommesbien d'accord,etje citerai d'abordle communiqué

de presse émispar le Canada le 10 mai 1994,jour de l'introductiondu projet de loi C-29 au

Parlement et du dépôtde la nouvelle déclaration renfermant la réserve :

((Aujourd'hui,leCanadaa modifiéson acceptationde la compétenceobligatoire
de la Cour internationale de Justice à La Haye afin d'empêcher toute situation qui
pourrait anéantir leseffortsdu Canadapour protégersesstocks.)) (Contre-mémoiredu
Canada, par. 107.)

Ecoutons aussi le ministre des affaires étrangères,le 12mai, lors du débatsur le projet de loi au

Sénat : «Afin de protéger l'intégrité de cetlto ei [donc la loi C-291 nous avons présentéune

réserve ..auprèsde laCour internationaledeJustice))(contre-mémoireduCanada,par 109). Il est

vraiment difficile d'imaginerque l'intentiondu Canada ait pu s'exprimer d'une façonplus limpide.

31.Troisièmeet dernière citation,quej'invite la Cour à écouter attentivement :

«Attendu que le but de la réserveétaitclairement lié à l'application de cette
législation,la seule conclusion appropriée est que l'intention du Gouvernement
canadien à l'époqueoù ila adoptélaréserveétaid teseprémunircontreune récusation

judiciaire contreletype de «mesuresdegestion et deconservation))ou ((exécution))e
telles mesures...)) (Mémoire del'Espagne,p. 95, par. 107.)

Cette citation, Monsieur le président,est tirée du mémoireespagnol. La Cour appréciera le

contraste entre la clarté de cetteadmission et les remises en question de l'intention du Canada

auxquelles l'Espagnea cru bon de se livrer au cours des deux derniersjours.

32. L'Espagnea raison de dire que le Canada aurait pu formuler sa réservede façon

différente. Le Canadaavait toute libertéde soustraire à la compétencede la Cour toutes espèces

de différendsj,usqu'àretirer sadéclarationd'acceptationdans sonensemble. Mais làn'étaitpas son

intention. Le Canada entendait bien rédigersa réservede la façon dont il l'a fait et la voir

s'appliquer exactementau typede différendauquel a donné lieula saisie de l'Estai. C'estla seule

conclusion raisonnable à laquellepeut menerl'examen dutexte de la réserveet des circonstances

ayant entouréson dépôt. - 16-

33. Tout cela, l'Espagnele saittrèsbien. Aussi a-t-elle cherchà noyer l'évidencedans une

séried'argumentsde toutes sortes, dans l'espoir de créerune situation aussi confuse et aussi

compliquéeque possible. Cettevolonté délibérée de semle arconfusion,nous l'avonsdécouverte

dans les écrits espagnols,nous l'avonsretrouvée dansles plaidoiries des deux derniersjours :

invocationderèglesd'interprétationquin'existentquedansl'imaginationespagnole;restrictionsqui

ne correspondent ni au texte de la réserve, ni à l'intention du Canada, au-delà de toute

vraisemblanceet de toute logique;argumentsqui dénaturentla réserve au point dela transformer

en une réserve toute différenteq,u'imagine ou souhaite l'Espagne.

34. Je passerai sous silence Humpty Dumpty, le cheval de Caligula et, naturellement, la

d
charrue et les boeufs dont on ne sait toujours pas, aprèsdeuxjours de plaidoiries espagnoles, qui

finalement passe avant.

35. Ainsi, àforce de contorsionset de distractions, l'Espagneespère-t-elleamener laCour à

sepencher sur une sériede questions sansrapport avec la présenteaffaire et à perdre de vue, petit

à petit, la questionfondamentale : la réservecanadienne exclut-elle lacompétencede la Cour en

l'espèce ?

36. Mes collègues se chargeront de démonter les multiples rouages - souvent

contradictoires- de la mécaniqueintellectuellemise en place par l'Espagne. Je me contenterai à

ce stade de dégagerquelques exemplestirés des argumentsprésentés par nos collèguesespagnols.

37. Premierexemple :nulne contesteque lazone au-delà des200millesappelledesmesures J

de gestion et de conservationtout aussi bien que la zone des 200 milles. Comme elle ne peut le

nier,l'Espagnelivreun procèsd'intentionau Canada en espérantévacuelreproblème :la loi C-29

ne serait pas une mesure de gestion et de conservation, mais le reflet de la volontédu Canada

d'étendre sajuridictionau-delà des 200milles. Elle ne viserait donc pas vraimentlaprotectiondes

ressources. Monsieur le président,cet argument ne tient pas la route. D'abord,au moment des

débatsparlementaires, le ministre responsablea été trèsclair quant au but de lanouvelleloi :«Je

lerépète,il ne s'agit pasaujourd'huid'étendre notrecompétence,mais bien de mettreen place un

régimede conservation.)) (Débatde la Chambre des communes, 11 mai 1994, mémoire de

l'Espagne,annexes, vol. 1,annexe 15, p. 4216.) - 17-

38. Jetons maintenantun coup d'oeil à la loi elle-même.Son but est définien son article 5

de façon toutà fait explicit:elle viseà «permettre au Canada deprendre les mesures d'urgence

nécessairespourmettre un terme à la destruction [des stockschevauchants]et les reconstituertout

en poursuivant sesefforts sur le plan international en vue de trouverune solution au problème de

l'exploitationinduepar les bateauxde pêcheétrangers)) (Loid su Canada, 1994,ch. 14, mémoire

de l'Espagne, annexes, vol. :I,annexe 14, art. 5.1). Et que fait la loi? Elle permet au

gouvernement dedésigner des stocks de poissonschevauchants,des classes de bateaux étrangers

et lesmesuresdegestionetde conservationpources stockschevauchantsqui doiventêtreobservées

par les personnes setrouvantà bord des bateaux désignés.Commentl'Espagnepeut-elle affirmer

qu'il ne s'agitpas là de gestion et de conservat?onOui, la loi canadiennes'appliqueau-delà des

200 milles. C'est ce que commandentles impératifsde laconservation. Ellen'en reste pas moins

une mesure de gestion et de conservation au sens de la réserve. Comment pourrait-il en être

autrement quand le but de la loi est de protégerun stock de poissons qui par nature ignore les

frontières?

39. L'expression«mesures de gestion et de conservation))a étéretenue par le législateuret

par les rédacteursde la réserveparce qu'elle englobe touteslesmesures visanà la protection eà

laréglementationdes pêcheriesq , u'elles s'appliqueàl'intérieurou au-delà des200 milles. Sion

leur enlèveleurportéegéographique,les mesures prises par leCanada n'ont plus aucun sens et la

réserveest dépourvuede toute utilité pratique.

40. Deuxièmeexemple : l'Espagnerépète àl'envi que laréservene visepas l'objetprincipal

du différend,à savoir la question de ce qu'elle appelle le «titre international))du Canada pour

l'exercicede sajuridictionà l'encontre des navires étrangersen haute mer.

41. Monsieur le président,il saute aux yeux que cet «objetprincipal))est une question de

fond, pas de compétence.C'est précisément àce genre de questionque la réservefait barrage. La

réserve porte sur lesmesures de gestion et de conservationqui seraient prises par le Canada dans

la zone de réglementationde I'OPANO,donc dans une partie de lahaute mer. Commentpeut-on

êtreplus clair? Cet argument se désintègre aussitôt quel'ony touche. C'est vraimentbeaucoup

de bruit pour rien. - 18 -

42. Troisièmeexemple :lesmesurescanadiennesdegestionetdeconservationquementionne

la réservene comprennent, dit l'Espagne,que celles qui sont permises par le droit international.

Cette interprétation dénaturcomplètementla réserve. L'application de la réserve dépend de la

réuniondesélémento sbjectifsqu'elleprécise,et nonde principesjuridiques dontellenefait aucune

mention. Qu'ellesoit fondéeounon endroit international,unemesuredegestionet deconservation

demeure une mesure. Encore une fois, la question de savoir si elle est licite ou illicite est une

question de fond. Si la Coursuivait l'Espagnesur ce terrain, elle ne pourrait trancher la question

de sa compétencequ'aprèss'être prononcée au préalab sluer le fond de l'affaiàel'encontre de

l'objectif mêmede la réserve.

43. L'interprétationespagnole mène à une impasse :si les mesures étaientjugéesillégales, rl

la réservene s'appliqueraitpas et la Cour serait compétente pourconnaîtrede l'affaire,mais elle se

seraitdéjàprononcéesur lefond; silesmesuresétaientjugéeslégales,laréserves'appliquerait, mais

la Cour, encore là, se seraitdéjàprononcéesur le fond, cettefois sur une affaire pour laquelleelle

n'avaitpas compétence.Peut-onimaginerun résultatplus absurdeet plus manifestementcontraire

à l'intentionde I'Etatauteur de la réserv?

44. Quatrièmeet dernierexemple :selon l'Espagne,la réservecanadienne ne pourrait faire

échec à la compétencede laCour car la présenteaffairene porte pas uniquement surdes questions

relativesà la gestion eà la conservation. Elle mettrait égalementen cause, dit-elle,des principes

fondamentaux du droit international, parexemple celui de la libertéde la haute mer et celui du I

non-recours à la force dans les relations entre Etats. Les questions touchant au respect de ces

principes ne seraient pas couvertespar la réserve, ditl'Espagne.

45. Avantd'apporterune réponsegénérale àcet argument,je voudraisouvriruneparenthèse

sur la questionde l'usage de laforce, dontl'Espagne faittant de cas. J'observeraid'abordque les

mesures d'exécution quo i nt été appliquées l'Estai n'ont strictement riànvoir avec le recours

à la force dans les relations entre Etats dont il est questiondans la Charte des Nations Unies. Ce

dontnous parlonsici, ce sontdes moyensd'exécutionde mesures degestionet de conservation qui

sonttout à faitclassiques dans la pratiquedes Etats. Mescollèguesyreviendront. Je ne m'étends

pas. - 19-

46. Mais ilme fautaussi - etje regrettede devoirlefaire- dénoncerlafaçonéhontée dont

l'Espagne exagèreles faits se rapportant à l'incident de l'Estai. Pourquoi le fait-el?e De toute

évidence,afin de dépeindreune situationsi dramatiqueque la Cour en oubliera que nous sommes

bel et bien en présencede simples mesures degestion et de conservation. Nous avons écouté nos

collègues espagnolset leurs conseils parler de menaces à la vie humaine qui ne se sontjamais

produites, brandirle spectre d'un bombardementou d'untorpillage dans un univers hypothétique,

voire même de l'exécution d cuapitaineetde l'équipage.Il fautvraimentque l'Espagne soit àcourt

d'arguments sérieuxpour se lancer dans de pareilles fictions.

47. Heureusement, lesévénementr séels,tels qu'ilsse sont passés, sont sans proportion avec

cette dramatisation. Non seulement l'arraisonnement de l'Estai s'est déroulé sansertes de vie ou

lésions corporellesgraves,mais personne n'a subi la moindreégratignure.Forcément,puisquele

bateau n'a jamais étéla cible de quoi que ce soit. Tout ce qui a étiré,c'est un coup de semonce

à l'avant du bateau. La raison en est bien simple : les règlements applicablesne permettent

l'utilisation de la force qu'en dernierressort, et de la façon la plus limitéepossible.

48. Revenons à la question plus généraledes.principesfondamentauxdu droit international.

Ce que la réserveexclut de la compétence de la Cour, ce sont«les différendsauxquelspourraient

donner lieu les mesures degestion et de conservation)).La réserveexclut les différendsdéfinis par

leur objet :ceux qui trouvent leur origine dans une mesure de gestion ou deconservation ou, de

manièreplus large encore,ceux qui ont une relation avecunetelle mesure. Lesdifférendsexclus

ne sont en aucune façondéfinisparlanaturedesnormes dont laviolationest alléguéepar l'unedes

Parties. Peu importe le caractèreou laportéede ces normes.

49. Qu'elles appartiennentau droit conventionnel ou au droit coutumier, qu'elles soient

générales ou spécifiques,mineures ou fondamentales,rien de cela n'ala moindre importance ici.

Il est bien évidentqu'undifférendqui estexclude la compétencede la Courpar son objet principal

peut toucher par ailleurs un certain nombre d'objetsou de domaines de droit différents. Cela se

produit très souvent et celane change rien au résultat: le différend demeureexclu. - 20-

50.Monsieur leprésident,Madame,Messieursde laCour,ce qui frappedansl'ensembledes

arguments de l'Espagne, c'est à quel point ils déforment la réalité. J'en relèverai trois 1

manifestations.

51. Déformationdu texte, d'abord : l'Espagne assortit la réservede restrictions que l'on y

cherche en vain. Ce que l'Espagnedemande à la Cour, en réalité, n'est passi ledifférend entre

dans le champ de la réserveformuléepar le Canada, mais s'il appartient à une autre catégorie,

celle-là choisie par'Espagne. La réserve à multiples restrictions imaginéepar l'Espagnen'existe

pas; celle qui laisserait de grands vides où elle ne s'appliqueraitpas, n'existepas non plus. Libre

à l'Espagnede laisser aller son imagination. Maisla Cour,elle, doit simplementdéterminersi les

d
mesures prises par le Canadaentrent dans le cadre de la réserve,telle qu'ellea été formuléear le

Canada.

52. Déformationde I'intentiondu Canada,ensuite : l'Espagnea beau rappeler de temps en

temps lanécessitéd'interpréter tour téserveen lui donnantun «effet utile)),elle le àavide. Les

exemplesd'«effetsutiles))hypothétiquesqu'elle nous aprésentés hien re sont vraimentpas sérieux.

Il est impossibleque leCanadaaitjamais eu I'intentiondeprésenteruneréserveaussi dénuéed'effet

pratique que celle que veut fabriquer 1'Espagne.Le Canadavoulait soustraire a la compétence de

la Cour les différends qu'il a définsomme il le voulait dans sa réserve. Les ajouts artificielsde

l'Espagneont nécessairementpour effet de fmstrer I'intentiondu Canada.

53.Déformationduprocessusjudiciaire,enfin : l'argumentespagnol,qui sedéroulesurfond W

de condamnation incendiairedu Canada et de présomption à priori d'acteillicite, ne cesse de

postuler ce qui doitêtreprouvéet qui, par définition,ne saurait êtreprouvé,ni mêmedébattuau

stade de la procédureconsacré exclusivement à la question de lacompétencedela Cour. Ce que

l'Espagne demande à la Cour, c'est de,sauter l'étapepréliminairede la déterminationde sa

compétenceetde se prononcer surle fond, c'est-à-dire defaire ce que la réservevise précisément

à éviter.

54. En réalité,Monsieur le président,tout cela peut probablement se ramener a une seule

observation. Les arguments à multiples facettes présentépar l'Espagne rappellentces jeux de

miroirs où l'on voit, multiplià l'infini, le mêmeobjet. Sous toutes sortes d'angles, l'Espagne - 21 -

répètesanscesse le même argument :laréservene s'appliqueraitque sila licéitéinternationaledes

mesures prises par le Canada était d'avancedémontrée. Et donc, à tout coup, la Cour devrait

contourner la réserve pour se penchersur le fond.

55. Monsieur le président,la réservedu Canada est là précisément pour soustraire à la

compétence de laCour le fond du différend. Les termes de la réserve sontparfaitement clairs,

l'intentiondu Canada l'est tout autant. Le litige qui est devant vous est exclude la compétencede

la Cour.

La questionde la disparitionou de la persistancedu différend

56. Monsieur le président, Madame, Messieurs de la Cour, il me fautà présentdire un mot

de la questionde la disparitionou de la persistancedu différend. Ce quel'agentet les conseils de

l'Espagneen ont dit, et l'importance démesurée qu'illsui ont accordéedans leurs plaidoiries, me

donne à penserqu'ils se sont vraimentmépris surla position du Canada. Je doisa la Cour la mise

au point suivante.

57.L'objectionque leCanadaa soulevéedans salettre du 21avril 1995seréfêru eniquement

à la compétencede la Cour à la lumière de la réservedont il a accompagnésa déclaration

d'acceptation. Ellene se réfêre àrien d'autre.

58. Au cours d'une réunionque le présidentde la Cour a tenue avec les représentants des

Parties le 27 avril 1995,il a éconvenu qu'il serait statué séparément,avant toutperocéduresur

le fond, sur la question de la compétencedela Cour en l'espèce. Ala suite de cette réunion,une

ordonnance du président de la Couren date du 2 mai 1995 confirma cet accord.

59. Il ressort de la combinaisonde la lettre du Canada du 21 avril, de l'accordréalisé entre

les Parties le 27 avril et de l'ordonnancedu président dela Cour du 2 mai 1995, qui se réfàrla

lettre eà l'accord précités, qua question àlaquelleest consacréela présenteprocédure est celle

de la compétencede la Cour pour connaître du différendcompte tenu de la réserve canadienne.

Que le différend ait étéréglé, comme le croit le Canada, ou qu'il persiste, commele soutient

l'Espagne,est indifférentaux fins de la présente procédure. -22 -

60. Quant à I'évolutiondu différenddepuis le dépôtde larequêteespagnole,leCanadas'est

bornéà ((attirerl'attention dela Cour))sur certains événements.«Attirer l'attentionde la Cour)),

ce sont là très exactement les termes employéspar le Canada dans le dernier chapitre de son

contre-mémoire(contre-mémoiredu Canada, par. 204). Ces événements sonttous les efforts que

le Canada a fait non seulement pour régler les problèmesbilatéraux qui l'avaient opposé à

l'Espagneetà l'Unioneuropéenne,mais aussi pourfavoriserlarecherche desolutionsàlongterme

telles que l'accord des Nations Unies sur les stocks chevauchants et grands migrateurs que

j'évoquais audébutde mon exposé. Le succèsrencontrépar cesefforts de négociations,confirmé

par une améliorationnotable des relationscanado-espagnolesen matièrede pêches, permettait,

notresens,de regarder ledifférendcommeréglé et les conclusionsde l'Espagne commesansobjet. *

Il est stupéfiant, dansces conditions,que l'Espagne aitl'audace de reprocherau Canadade ne pas

avoir tentéde régler pacifiquementle différend.

61.LeCanadaestconscientdesdifficultésjuridiquesquesoulève à diverségardsleproblème

de l'incidence surla compétencede la Cour de faits et d'événementsaffectant la persistance du

différendentre le dépôtde la requêteet lejugement de la Cour. Le Canadaconnaît les solutions

jurisprudentielles nuancéesapportéesàce problèmepar la Cour, ainsi que la diversité despoints

de vue desjuges qui ont rattachédesopinionsaux arrêtsen cause. Le Canadaa estiméqu'iln'était

pas utile dans le contexte de la présente procée'entrer dansune discussionsur la question de

savoir si la persistance du différenddoit être regardée cene question préliminairàcelle de

la compétence, ous'analyse comme une question de compétence,ou doit êtreconçue comme une

question de recevabilité,ou relèvedu fond. C'est très délibérémeentten toute connaissancede

causeque le Canada a limitéson objectionàla question de la compétencede laCour au regard de

la réserve.

62. Le Canada a cru de son devoir d'informer la Cour des faits postérieursau dépôtde la

requête.Il n'apas entendu,et il n'entend pasaujourd'hui,fonderson objectiona compétencede

la Cour sur autre chose que la réserve. C'est sur ceproblème,et sur nul autre, que la Cour est

appelée àstatuer.Conclusion

63. Monsieur le président,Madame, Messieurs de la Cour, en 1994, conformémentau

principe du libre choix des moyens de règlementdes différends,le Canada a estimé quela voie

judiciaire n'étaitpas la plus appropriée pour régler les différends auxquels pourraient doeuleir

lesmesuresde gestionet deconservationdesressourceshalieutiques dans l'AtlantiqueNord-Ouest.

Il a donc soustrait ces différendsde la compétence de la Cour,en toute conformité avecle droit

international.

64. Plutôtque de déposerune nouvelle déclaration le10mai 1994, leCanada auraitpu tout

aussi bien retirer son acceptation de la compétence obligatoire dela Cour. Il ne l'apas fait.

Pourquoi ? Parce que depuis maintenant près de soixante-dixans, le Canada a placésa confiance

en cette Cour et en sa devancière.Les termes de la nouvelle déclaration sont clairs et précis. La

réserve soustrait la compétencede la Cour une catégoriebien définie de différends à, laquelle

appartient précisémentle différend à l'origine de la présente affaire. Le Canada demande

aujourd'huià la Cour d'honorer les termes de cette réserve.

65. Monsieur le président, Madame,Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie beaucoupde

votre bienveillante attention, etje vous prie, Monsieur le président, de donner la pàrl'agent

adjoint du Canada, Monsieur Blair Hankey.

The PRESIDENT: 1thank the Agent of Canada and cal1upon Mr. Hankey.

Mr. HANKEY:

Introduction

1. Mr. President, distinguishedMembersof the Court. It is a great honour for me to again

represent the Government of Canada before this Court, the supreme judicial organ of the

international community.

2. My task today is to speakto you aboutthe meaning and effect of Canada's declaration of

acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. Spain has based this case on a calculated misreading of

Canada'sdeclaration. Thismisreadingin turn isfoundedon a systematicdistortionofthe principles

of interpretation. -24 -

3. To determine the correct meaning and effect of the Canadian declaration, we must first

establishthe properrules goveming consent tojurisdiction andthe interpretation ofoptionalclause
O
declarations. 1shall outline seven key points regarding these rules and the relevantjurisprudence

of the Court. Next, we must consider the text of the declaration to determine the categories of

disputes it covers. This will involve an examinationof each phrasein the text of the reservation

invokedby Canada. Finally, 1shall applythe reservation to the facts of this case to determineor

ratherto demonstrate that the matters complainedof by Spain fall squarely withinthe wordingof

the Canadian reservation.

A. The Principle of Consentand Interpretationof Optional ClauseDeclarations

Introduction

4. 1shall begin, Sir,bydiscussingthe generalprinciplesregardingconsenttojurisdiction and

the interpretation ofoptional clause reservations. The points 1wish to make are the following:

First, consent to jurisdiction can never be presumed. It mustbe irrefutablyestablished.

Second,reservationsare an integralpartof an optionalclausedeclarationthat serveto define

the extent of the jurisdiction that has been accepted.

Third,whilethe generalprinciplesontreaty interpretationareausefulguide,there arespecial

considerationsderived fromthe nature ofdeclarationsasunilateral actsand fromthe rule that States

are free to choose to what extent they acceptthe Court's compulsoryjurisdiction.
w
Fourth, the basic rule of interpretationis that declarations must be read in a natural and

reasonableway, giving full effect to the intention of the declarant State.

Fifth, because declarations are unilateral acts, the intention of the declaring State is of

particular importance. That intentionisto be discernedobjectivelyfromthe text, inthe lightofthe

circumstances atthe time of its adoption.

Sixth, a generic term covers not only the specific situation originally envisaged by the

declaring State, but alsoanything falling within its füllest meaning.

Seventh and finally, the fundamental principles of good faith and effectiveness govem the

interpretationof optional clause reservations. 1. Jurisdiction Can Never Be Presumed

5. Mr. President, the goalof interpretationof anoptionalclause declarationis to determine

whether consent has been given. Spain contends that Canada has the burden of provingthat this

Court is withoutjurisdiction (Spanish Memorial,p. 57,paras. 26, 28; p. 67, para. 37). It claims

that the mere existence of an optional clause reservation creates a presumption in favour of

jurisdiction, where areservationis obviouslyapplicable(ibid, p. 57, para. 27). Inhis presentation,

mycolleague,Professor RemiroBrotons,also contendsthatthe pointof departure(pointdedépart)

is the effectivenessof the declaration,whichmust not be "suffocated"(étouffer)by the reservation

(CR 9819,pp. 57-58,paras. 10-1 1). 1submit, sir, thatthese propositions cannotbe sustained from

your jurisprudence.

6. States have an unfettered freedomto participate or not in the optionalclause system. In

the case conceming Military and Paramilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua, the Courtheld

that declarationsofacceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdictionwere,"facultative,unilateralengagements

that States are absolutely free to make or not to make" (I.C.J.Reports 1984, p. 418, para. 59).

Because the submission to the jurisdiction of the Court is purely voluntary, it follows that

jurisdiction can never be presumed; it must be clearlyestablishedto the satisfaction ofthe Court.

(See Aerial Incident of 27 JUS 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), I.C.J. Reports 1959,p. 142.)

7. Becauseconsentcan never bepresumed, there simply isno "burdenof proof' on theparty

contestingjurisdiction. In fact,there isnofixed burdenof proofon eitherparty. In the Border and

Transborder ArmedActionscase, the Court reaffirmed the principledating backto the daysof the

Permanent Court that it had to considerwhether "the force of argumentsmilitating in favour of

Ljurisdiction]is preponderant", and to "ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties

exists to confer jurisdiction upon it" (Factory at ChorzOw,P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 32, as

quoted in Border and Transborder ArmedActions, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 76, para. 16). In his

separate opinion in that case, Judge Oda stated that "Whenconsidering thejurisdiction of the . ..

Court .. .1take as my pointof departurethe conviction that the Court'sjurisprudencemust rest

on the free will of sovereign States, clearly and categorically expressed, to grant the Courtthe

competence to settle the dispute in question" (ibid, p. 109,para. 44). - 26 -

8. On this issue, Fitzmaurice has stated that what is required is "strictproof of consent" -

Fitzmaurice who is cited many times during the lasttwo days with great approval by Ourworthy

adversaries. He wrote again: "jurisdiction ought at the very least not to be assumed in cases in

which there is room for any serious doubt as to whether consent was given, and whether it covers

the dispute .. ."(Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of

Justice, Vol. II,986,p. 514). InthecaseconcemingCertain Norwegian Loans,Judge Lauterpacht

said: "the Court will not uphold itsjurisdiction unlessthe intention to confer it has been proved

beyond reasonable doubt" - "beyond reasonable doubt": it's a very strong standard -

(I.C.J. Reports1957, p. 58, emphasis added). 1note my leamed colleague Professor Dupuy aiso
*
refers with approvalto Judge Fitzmaurice (CR 98/10,p. 45, para. 20) and to the Norwegian Loans

case (ibid., p. 39, para. 5). In the Genocide case, the Court followed a long line of precedents,

including theRights ofMinorities in UpperSilesia andthe Cor- Channelcases (P.C.I.J., Series A,

No. 15,p. 24; I.C.J. Reports1947-1948, p. 15), in emphasizing the need for an "unequivocal

indication" of a "voluntary and indisputable" acceptance of jurisdiction (Application of the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports1993,

p. 342, para. 34).

9. In the case of optional clause declarations, therefore, the limits of acceptance by both

parties, must clearly, indisputablyand unequivocallyadmit the jurisdiction of the Court in the

specific dispute brought before it. In other words, as1said at the beginning, consent tojurisdiction W

can never be presumed. It must be irrefutably established.

2. Reservations AreIntegral Partsof Optional ClauseDeclarationsand Serve to Define the
Scope of Acceptanceof the Jurisdictionof the Court

10. Now Sir, 1come to my second point, that reservations are an integral part of optional

clause declarations that serve to define the extent of the jurisdiction that has been accepted.

Reservationsto optional clause declarations are not separate legal acts; they are integral parts of

the declarations that define the scope of acceptance of the Court'sjurisdiction. 11. Optionalclausereservationsaremanifestationsoftheabsolute freedomof Statestoaccept

or to limit compulsoryjurisdiction. In order to promote a greater number of acceptances of

compulsoryjurisdiction, the practiceof makingresewations was approved and indeed encouraged

by the League of Nations. When the Statute of the present Court was drafted in 1946, it was

decided that a provision on resewations was unnecessary, because the practice of making

reservations had become thoroughly established(Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the

International Court, 1920-1996of Justice, Vol. II, 1997, at Jurisdiction, pp. 767-768).

12. This right to limit the scope of a State's acceptanceof jurisdiction derives from the

principle of free choice of means and the requirement of consent. As explained by President

Jiménezde Aréchaga:"The so-caliedreservationstothe optionalclause arebasedon [theprinciple]

'inplus stat minusn'.If any party tothe Statute is allowed to remain totally apart from the system

oftheoptionalclause,thenapartymustbe permittedto acceptonlypartially the Court'sjurisdiction

by subordinating its acceptance to certain conditions or limitations" (Jiménezde Aréchaga,

"International Law in the Past Third of a Century", Recueildes cours, 1978,Vol. 159, p. 154).

Similarly,inhisopinionintheAnglo-IranianOilCompanycase,Sir Arnold McNairnotedthat,and

1 quote, "The machinery provided . .. is that of 'contracting-in'not of 'contracting out'.A State,

being fiee either to make a declaration or not, is entitled, if it decides to make one, to limit the

scopeof its Declarationin any way it chooses,subjectalwaysto reciprocity" (I.C.J. Reports 1952,

p. 116).

13. Thus,reservationsare essential,integralparts of optionalclause declarations. Yesterday

Professor Remiro Brotons affected to agree with this dictum. However, he then proceeded to

contradict it, by focusing exclusivelyon the positive aspect of the declaration and ignoringthe

limiting effect of the reservation. But the teaching of the Court is clear: a declaration, including

its reservations, isn indivisiblewhole that defines the scope ofjurisdiction. In the Aegean Sea

case, the Courtreferredto: "the close and necessarylinkthatalways exists betweenajurisdictional

clauseandthereservationsto it" (I.C.J. Reports 1978,p. 33,para. 79). Thefunctionof reservations

is to outline the limits,to determinethe preciseextent of the voluntary acceptanceofjurisdiction. - 28 -

Jurisdictionthereforedependsona determinationthatthe subject-matterofthe dispute isnot within

the scope of any limiting reservation appearing in the declarations of either party.

14. Because an optional clause declaration, including itsresewations, is a single legal

instrument,itmustbe construedinaccordancewithaconsistentsetof interpretativeprinciples. Full

effect must be given both to the acceptance ofjurisdiction in a declarationand to the resewations

limiting that acceptance.

3. Special Rules of Interpretation Derive from theFact that Optional Clause Declarations are
Sui Generi Usnilateral Acts

15.Mr. President, my third point is that whilethe general rules on treaty interpretationare
1
a useful guide,there are special considerationsderivedfiom the natureofdeclarations asunilateral

acts and from the rule that States are free to choose to what extent they accept the compulsory

jurisdiction of the Court.

16. As explained yesterday by Professor Dupuy with great eloquence and persuasiveness

(CR 98/10, p. 39, para. 5; p.41, para. IO),optionalclause declarationsare suigeneris, unilateral

acts. Unliketreaties, they are not the product of bilateralor multilateralnegotiation. Theydo not

embodythe wills or intentions of several States, but are the product of one will and one intention

only. That is why it is the intention of the declarant State that is crucial to interpretation. Of

course, 1do not suggestthat a State can argue for a meaningor interpretationthat is quitecontrary

to the plain meaning of the words it has used in its declaration, but1do suggest that where the

words used are consistentwith a State'sintention- an intention madeclear fiom the surrounding

circumstances - then any good faith interpretationmust allowthat declaration and that intention

to take effect.

17.In his intervention,Professor Dupuy painstakingly demonstratedthat declarationshave

a conventionalor a contractual aspect (CR 98/10, pp. 39-46). However, Spain also suggests an

analogybetweenreservationsin declarationsandreservationsto treaties(Spanish Mernorial,p. 60,

para. 32). 1 submit, Sir, that such an analogy is entirely unfounded. Although the word

reservations is commonly applied both to limitations in an optional clause declaration and to -29 -

derogations from a treaty commitrnent,this common terminologyin fact is misleading. Because

declarationsare suigeneris, and reservationsform an integralpart of declarations,reservationsto

optional clause declarations are also sui generis; they are not analogous to treaty reservations.

Treatyreservationsare derogationsfroman agreedtext, sotheremaybe an argumentfor restrictive

interpretationof such reservations. Moreover, they mustconformto certain rules to be effective,

theymust be acceptedby the otherparties. Reservationsto declarations,however,arean altogether

different species: they form an integralpart of the text; they may exclude any category ofdispute

at the will of the declarant; and they take effect against other parties without their consent.

18. For these reasons, the rules governing the interpretation of treaty reservations are not

directly relevant to the interpretation of reservations to optional clause declarations

(James Crawford, "The Legal Effect ofAutomaticReservationsto the Jurisdictionof International

Court", (1979) 50 BYBIL77-79). This flows necessarily from the differing nature of the two

instruments- treaties versus optional clause declarations - in which the reservations appear.

4. Optional ClauseDeclarationsMust Be interpretedin a "Natural and ReasonableWay",
Giving Full Effect to the Intentionof the DeclaringState

19. Myfourthpoint, Mr. President,concernsthebasicruleof interpretationofoptionalclause

declarations. It isthat declarationsmustbe read in a naturaland reasonableway, givingfull effect

to the intentionof the declarant State.

20. Although optional clausedeclarationsare not treaties,they are, as my learned colleague

Professor Dupuypointed outyesterday (CR 98/10,p. 40, para. 7),analogousto treatiesinthatthey

create a "network of engagements" arnong al1 States making such declarations (Military and

ParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaraguaI ,.C.J. Reports1984,p. 418,para. 60). The Court,

therefore, has appliedthe rules of interpretationto certain aspects ofthe interpretationof optional

clausedeclarations. However, becauseof the specialunilateralcharacter of such declarations,the

Court has applied other principles as well, as /exspecialis.

21. In effect, through its jurisprudence the Court has established particular rules for the

interpretation of optional clause declarations. The general rule governing the interpretation of

internationallegalinstruments is that the text must beinterpretedin good faith in accordancewith - 30 -

the ordinary meaning of the words, in their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of

the instrument. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the

travauxpréparatoiresand the surrounding circumstances,to confirm the meaning resultingfrom

the application of the general rule, or to determine the meaning where the text is obscure or

ambiguous.

22. The fundamentalprinciples governingthe interpretation ofoptional clause declarations

were enunciatedbythe Court intwo importantcases: theAnglo-IranianOil Companycaseand the

AegeanSea ContinentalShelfcase. Thesecaseswill illustratemy fourthpoint, as well asmy fifih

point and sixth point. The fifth point is that, because declarationsare unilateralacts, the intention

of thedeclaring Stateis of particular importance. That intentionisto be discemedobjectivelyfrom r.

the text, in the light of the circumstancesat the time of its adoption. And my sixth point is that a

genericterm coversnot only the specific situationoriginally envisagedby the declaringState, but

also anything faliing within its fullest meaning.

(a) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (ünited Kingdom v. Iran)

23. In theAnglo-Iraniancase, the Court heldthat- and 1believe Spain has citedthis same

quotation yesterday,- "It must seek the interpretation whichis in harmony with a natural and

reasonableway of reading the text, havingdue regard to the intention ofthe Governmentof Iran

atthetime when itacceptedthecompulsoryjurisdiction ofthe Court"(I.C.J. Reports 1952,p. 104).
w
The Court noted further - and this is extremely important- that the "Declaration must be

interpreted as it stands, having regard to the words actually used(ibid.p. 105).

24. Inthatcase, Britainhad disputedtheIranian interpretationofthetext of Iran'sdeclaration

on the basis of a grammatical ambiguity. After exarniningal1the surrounding circumstances,the

Court adoptedthe interpretationthat it consideredto be consistentwith the Government ofIran at

the time of makingthe declaration. This intention was ascertainedin the light of Iranianpolicy,

the Iranian policy of ending the régime of"capitulations" and related treaties. It was clearto the

Courtthat in 1930Iran had intendedto conferjurisdiction only with respectto treaties subsequent

to the ratification of the declaration. This intention was corroboratedby thems of a law passedby Iran in 1931 approving the declaration. The Court referred to this law as "a decisive

confirmation of the intention of the Govemment of Iran" (ibid., p. 107). It concludedthat the

Iranian declaration covered only treaties subsequentto its adoption and that it therefore excluded

jurisdiction in that case.

25. TheJudgmentnoted thatthe "Declarationisnot atreatytext resultingfromnegotiations",

but rather: "theresult of unilateral drafting" (ibid.,. 105). TheCourt consideredthat the broad

principles of treatyinterpretation should be applied with due regard for the special character of

optional clause declarations, and in particular their unilateral formulation. Due to the unilateral

origin of the text, the intention ofthe declarant Statehas a special role to play in the process of

interpretation.

26. Commenting on the Anglo-Iranian decision,Sir Gerald Fitzmauricewrote that

"theCourt,while in generalapplyingordinaryprinciplesoftreaty interpretation,seems
to have felt that thevoluntary and unilateralcharacter of these declarations putthem
in a specialposition in which it was necessaryto have particularregardto the known,
apparent or probable intentions of the State making the declaration,particularlywith

referenceto any conditionsor limitationswhichthat Statehad placedonthe extent of
the obligation itwas assuming" (Fitzmaurice,op. cit., p. 503).

27. In the case of a negotiated instrument, itis often difficult to identifi a single intention,

as each State involved might have a different objective. However, in the case of a unilateral

declaration, there is only a single intention, and that intention, as objectively determined, will

elucidate or - as in the present case - confirmthe plain and ordinary meaning of the words.

(b) Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v.Turkey)

28. Sir, 1now come to theAegean Sea ContinentalShelfcase. It is interestingto note that

whileSpain doesmakereferenceto theAnglo-Iraniancase, itvirtually ignorestheAegean Sea case

(only one reference at CR 98/10,p. 45, para. 18). Mr. President, this is understandable,because

this Court'sJudgment in Aegean Sea effectively underminesthe Spanish case on interpretation.

29. InAegeanSea, Greece soughtto havethe continentalshelf betweenitself and Turkey in

the Aegean Seadelimited by the Court. The main title ofjurisdiction assertedby Greece was the

1928General Actfor the Pacific SettlementofInternational Disputes. In orderto establishthat the - 32 -

Parties had consented to jurisdiction, Greece had to overcome the Turkish objection based on

reciprocity, invokingthe Greek reservation excluding"disputesrelating tothe territorial status of

Greece" (AegeanSeaContinentalShelfI ,.C.J. Reports1978, p. 15,paras. 8,3536; p. 17,para. 39).

30. Claiming that the reservationwas not applicable, Greece advanced several arguments.

In the first argument, basedon a grammatical arnbiguity,Greece claimedthat the reservation with

respectto territorialstatuswas partofaresewation conceming domesticjurisdiction. However,the

Court concludedthat Greece had intendedto makea separateresewation on questionsof territorial

status. Thus, as in the Anglo-Iraniancase, the initial grammatical interpretation was directly

supported by the original intention ofthe State concemed.

31. Greecethen claimedthatwhen it hadadheredto the GeneralAct in 1931,it had intended r,

thewords "territorialstatus"to haveaspecialmeaningrelatingtotheterritorialsettlementsresulting

from the conclusion of the First World War. Moreover, the reservation could not cover the

delimitationof the continental shelf,as territorial status did not relate to delimitation. The Court

however reached its own determinationof the meanings of the word "territorial status" by

examiningthe political and diplomaticcontext in order to ascertain the intentionof Greece at the

time it made the reservation. It decidedthat the words "territorialstatus"were to be construed as

a genericterm covering the broadestpossible range of disputesthat could beencompassed within

the phrases suchas "territorialdisputes","territorialintegrity","territorialquestions"and "existing

frontiers"(ibid., pp. 31-32, paras. 76-77). W

32. Finally, Greece argued that the reservation could not be construed as covering the

continental shelf, because the concept of the continental shelf was unknown when it made its

reservation. The Courthowever considered that,as a genericterm, "territorial status" had a very

wide scope indeed, provided onlythat the,matter soughtto be included withinthe reservation was

somehow related toterritorial status. And it took an equally broadview of the meaning of the

phrase "relatington. The Court obsewed that:

"The questionfor decisionis whetherthe presentcase is one 'relatingto the territorial
statusof Greece',not whetherthe rights indisputeare legallyto be consideredas 'territorial'
rights; and a dispute regardingentitlementto and delimitation ofareas of continental shelf
tendsby itsverynatureto beonerelating toterritorialstatus"(AegeanSeaContinentalShelf,

I.C.J. Reports1978, p. 36, para. 86). - 33 -

33. Thus, the interpretation of the reservation by the Court included Greece'soriginal

motivationin makingthe reservation, but also encompasseda broadermeaningthan was warranted

bytheterms actuallyused. Farfrommakingtherather restrictiveviewof the reservation advocated

by Greece,the Court gave full effectto the generic meaning ofthe words, to allowthe rese~ation

toencompassanysubject-matterthatcouldreasonablybedirectlyor indirectly"relatedto"theterms

used in the reservation.

34. 1submit,Mr. President,thattherearethree lessonsto belearnedfromthesecases,lessons

correspondingto myfourth,fifthandsixthpoints. First, fromAnglo-Iranian, we leamthat optional

clausedeclarationsmust be read in a natural andreasonableway, taking into accountthe intention

of the declarant State.

35. Second,Anglo-Iranian and Aegean Sea both show that in interpreting rese~ations in

unilateral declarations,the Court considersthe intention ofthe declarant State to be of particular

importance. The intention soughtis not the subjective "psychological"intention ofthe drafters.

It is the intention of the State at the time of making the reservation, as "objectified"or expressed

inthe wording ofthe text, andas determinedby an examinationof the historicalcircumstancesand

policiesof the Stateconcemed. The universalcharacterof this principle in the world's majorlegal

systems is evidenced in the fact that in his separateopinion, in the Aegean Sea case, Judge Tarazi

relied both onIslamic law andon the French Civil Code to establish the importance of intention

relative to the "literal meaning of the words and phrases actually used" (I.C.J. Reports 1978,

pp. 57-58).

36. The thirdlesson isthat a genericterm usedin an optionalclause declarationcovers more

than the specific situationoriginallyenvisagedby the declarant State in making its reservation; a

genericterm will coveranythingrelatedto itsfullestmeaning andwill excluderelated mattersfrom

thejurisdiction of the Court.

Mr. President, do you wish me to break here, or shall 1continue?

The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. We may break here.

TheCourt adjournedfrom 11.20 to 11.35 a.m. - 34 -

The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. Mr. Hankey.

Mr. HANKEY: Thankyou, Sir. Just as we reached the coffee break 1had completedmy

sixth point summarizing the principles and interpretation of the jurisdiction and the relevant

jurisprudence of the Court.

5. InterpretationShouldGivea RealandSubstantiveEffecttothe ObjectandPurposeofthe
Declaration and its Resewations

37. Now, Mr. President, 1 now come to my seventh and final point. The interpretation of

optionalclausedeclarationsmustrespectthefundamentalprinciplesof good faith and effectiveness.

These principles operate to give a real and substantive effect to the object and purpose of the
'*4
declaration, including,of course, its resewations.

38. It is axiomatic that a declaration must be interpretedto achieve its intended end. The

principle of effectiveness expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat has been

associatedbythe InternationalLaw Commissionwith the principle of good faithand with theneed

to respecttheobjectand purposeof an instrument (YearbookoftheInternational Law Commission,

1966, Vol. II, p. 219). The effectiveness doctrine prohibits any attempt to produce an effect

contrary to that intended by the declarant State. That doctrine in and of itself is sufficient to

counter the Spanish attempt to eviscerate the Canadian declaration and empty itof any practical

meaning.
1
39. Effectivenessmeansreal and nottoken effectiveness. As the Court stated in the Temple.

case, the declaration is to be read "without any preconceptions of an a priori kind in order to

determine whatis its real meaning and effectif the Declaration is read as a whole and in the light

of its known purpose, which has never been in doubt" (Temple of Preah Vihear,

I.C.J. Reports 1961,p. 32). Theapplicationofthis pronouncementtothe presentcase mustbefatal

to Spain's position,ecause Spain hasknownfrom thevery beginningand has acknowledgedin its

pleadings (Memorialof Spain,p. 76,para. 55; pp. 94-96,paras. 107-110)that Canada intended its

declaration toexclude the 1994legislation, andeverything done under it from the jurisdiction of

the Court. Duringthe past two days we have listened with great patience to one after another of - 35 -

Spain'scounsel arguing that the alleged incompetence of Canada'slegal drafters - who, 1might

add,arepart of our delegation heretoday beforethis distinguished Court- thattheir incompetence

defeated Ourknown purpose which, in the words of the TempleJudgment, "has never been in

doubt".

40. This concludes, Sir,the initial part of my presentation1 trust that it is now evidentthat

the Spanish contentions regarding the interpretation of optional clause declarations do not

correspond to well-established principles and practice. Canada, on the other hand, relies on

establishedprinciples and on the precedents pronounced by this very Court and its distinguished

predecessor.

B. The Meaning and Effect of the New Reservation to the Canadian Declaration

Introduction

Mr. President,distinguishedJudges, 1now cometo the second part of my presentation: the

meahingand effect of the new reservation to Canada's declaration. Spainhas invokedas the title

ofjurisdiction in this case the optional clause declarationmade by Canadaon 10May 1994. The

issue in these proceedings is simply whether the Canadian declaration confersjurisdiction on the

Court in view of the reservation set out in paragraph 2(4. The Canadianreservation is found at

Tab 5 in your folders. It applies to, and 1quote

"disputesarising after the present declaration with regard to situations or facts
subsequentto this declaration, other than . ..

(4 disputesarisingoutof or conceming conservation and managementmeasurestaken
by Canada with respectto vessels fishing in the NAFO RegulatoryArea [ . . 1,and
the enforcement of such measures" (emphasis added).

It isdifficult to imagine an exclusion ofjurisdiction more exactly or carefüllyaimed at the "facts

or situations"of the kind that have given rise to this litigation.

42. The wordsthat followthe introductoryphrasedefinethe subject-matterof the reservation

as "conservation and managementmeasurestaken by Canada with respectto vessels fishing in the

NAFO Regulatory Area . . . and the enforcement of such measures". The measures must be

conservation and managementmeasures. Theymust be takenby Canada. Theymustbe taken with - 36 -

respectto vesselsfishingintheNAFO RegulatoryArea. Theenforcementofsuchmeasuresis also

covered by the reservation. Both themeasures and their enforcementare excluded fiom the

jurisdiction of the Court. There are absolutely no qualifiers or limitations. Within its generally

defined sphere, the reservation encompasseseverything and anything, everything and anything,

reiatedto conservationandmanagementmeasurestaken byCanadaintheNAFO RegulatoryArea.

43. Mr. President,1shall first explainthe meaning of the reservationby proceedingthrough

the text phrase by phrase in the order in which the words appear. 1will then demonstrate the

intention of Canada in making the reservation. This 1 will do by examining the historical

circumstancesandpolicycontext inwhichCanadareviseditsdeclarationinMay 1994. 1inviteyou

now to tum to Tab 6 in your folders to follow the text of the reservation.

1. The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Words

(a) "Disputes"

44. An importantpreliminarypointisthat boththedeclarationandthereservationapplyonly

to "disputes". It is axiomaticthat the Courtwill have jurisdiction onlyif there is an active,gal

disputebetweenthe parties. This is clearfiom Article 36, paragraph2, ofthe Statuteof the Court,

it is clear from the context ofthenadiandeclaration and it is clearfromthejurisprudence ofthe

Court (see Counter-Memorial,paras. 205-208).

(6) "ArisingOut of or Concerning"

45. The introductory phrase "arising out of or concerning" establishes the scope of the

exclusions of jurisdiction. The most striking feature of the phrase is its breadth. The term

"measures" can raise any number of ancillary issues including: first, the right to take such

measures, or to use Spain'sterminology "titre"; second, the factual need for them; third, their

appropriatenessin the lightof that need; andfourth, the methodsof theirenforcement. A question

about any one of these issues clearly arises out of or concernsthe measure under consideration.

By including in our reservation,the term "arising out of or conceming" Canada made absolutely

clear that al1 questions concerning its conservation and management measures are beyondthe

jurisdiction of the Court. Efforts by ourfiiends on the Spanishside to separate out questions of -37 -

title and enforcement,asthoughtheywere somehowquitedistinctfromtheterm "measure"and can

thus form the basis of distinctdisputes, are transparently strategies to evade the comprehensive

language Canada has used. As we said in OurCounter-Memorial,but it bearsrepetition,the words

"arising out of or conceming" signal an intention to capturethe subject-matter in al1its aspects;

and to include both the core and anything directly or indirectly associated with it (para. 88).

"Arising out or' refers to the origins of the dispute, while "conceming"refers to the object of the

dispute. Both terms are subsumed in the French phrase "auxquelspourraient donner lieu". This

French phraseandthe English word"conceming"conveythe sarnemeaningas the phrase "relating

to" in the Greek reservation constmed by the Court in theAegean Sea case. These terms plainly

indicate that the reservation covers anythingdirectly or indirectlyrelating to the subject-matterof

the reservation. The phrase "arising out of' underscores Canada's intentionto cast as wide a net

as language will permit.

(c) "ConservationandManagementMeasures"

46. The next phrase, Sir, is "conservationand management measures". A conservationand

management measure is a measure taken for the purpose of the conservation and management of

fishery resources. According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the meanings of the word

"measure" include, "legislativeenactment" and "suitable action (as in to take measures to ensure

that)". Thisisexactlywhatthis caseconcems: a legislativeenactment andsuitablemeasurestaken

to implement it.

47. In fact, the word "measures"is about as broad and elastic a term as one could imagine.

It includes al1kinds of actions taken to achieve an end or goal. The Spanish Memorialquotes

Webster'sDictionary definition of measure as, "an act, step or proceeding designed for the

accomplishment of an object" (pp. 80-81, para. 70). In other words, itrefers to actions that are

taken deliberately,with a definite person in mind. It certainly covers al1acts of a State taken in

pursuit of a national policy,whetherthey be physical, economic,administrativeor legislative. The

Spanish Memorialsays quite rightly that it is "an abstract term" (in French, "un mot abstrait"), - 38 -

which means that it is a generic term (p. 80, para. 70). In other words,the word "measures"may

cover an unlimited range of actions that falls within the general definition.

48. Contrary to what Our Spanish colleagues have alleged, the phrase "conservationand

management" coversthe whole range of measures taken by States with respect to the living

resourcesof the sea. It coversboththe protection ofthe resource,or "conservation"per se, and the

"management"of the fishery. In many cases these two terms overlap. The use of the two terms

incombination conveysa clear intentionto coverthe broadest possiblerange of measures,fromthe

mosttraditionalregulatory controlsto measuresthat haveyet to be tried or even conceived. There

are no limitations implied by this phrase, otherthan the obvious requirement that the measure

should be addressed to the fishery andto its rational exploitation.

49. It is precisely because of its comprehensiveness that the term "conservation and

management measures"has been used in innumerable internationalinstruments suchas the 1958

GeneyaConvention ontheHigh SeaFisheries,the 1982 UnitedNationsConventiononthe Lawof

theSea,the 1995 UnitedNations Straddling StocksAgreemen t heUnitedNationsAgreementfor

the Zmplementation of the Provisions ofthe United Nations Convention on theLawof the Sea of

December10, 1982, Relatingto theConservationandManagementofStraddlingFishStocks and

HighlyMigratoryFish Stocks)and the 1993FA0 ComplianceAgreement(Agreementto Promote

CompliancewithInternational Conservation andManagement Measuresby FishingVesselsonthe

HighSeas). What is included is anything related to the conservationand managementof fishery

resources, such as legislative, regulatory and administrativemeasures, providing for, inter alia:

The determination of the speciesthat may be caught and those that may notbe caught,

includingthe absolute prohibition ofthe fishing of certain species;

the fixing ofcatch quotas, whetherin relationto particular stocksor catchesby particular
vessels over a specified periodof time;

fish size limits;

the regulation of the seasons and areas of fishing;

the regulation of the types of gear that may be used;and

regulations concerning the vessels permitted to fish. - 39 -

50. The conservationand management measuresin the 1994legislationand the regulations

were not at al1unusual; they are the same type of conservationand management rneasuresused

by Canada withinits own waters, appliedbyNAFO member Statesin the NAFORegulatory Area,

and found in various international fisheries agreements. In its Memorial, Spain admits that the

Canadianmeasuresare the sametype of "conservation and management measures"as those found

in international conventions (p. 84, para. 75). However, it argues that the measures taken by

Canadawere not "conservationand management measures",becausethey were applied to an area

beyondthe 200-mile zone. Al1of Spain's counselhavemadethisthe Ieitmotifoftheir submissions.

And there are two answers to this, and they are related.

51. First, in orderto establisha definition, one mustdistinguishwhat isessentialto theterm

being defined from that which is merely incidental. The essential aspect of "conservation and

managementmeasures"isthatthey aredesignedto controla fisheryandto preserveand protectthe

stocks from diminution or depietion. What matters is the subject-matter, the function and the

purposeof the measures. The geographicalarea wherethese measures apply will,of course,Vary.

Inotherwords,contrarytothe Spanishcontention,the locationofthe measuresisirrelevanttotheir

essential nature as conservation and management measures. A measure to control fishing is a

conservation and management measure,no matter where it is applied or enforced.

52. Second, Spain impliesthat the expressionis limited towhat has been done in the past in

response to past problems. But this is a distortion ofthe concept of a generic category. As we

noted in OurCounter-Memorial, a generic category is never limited to the known examples it

contains (para. 91). A measure is a fisheries or conservation measure if it is an "act, step or

proceeding" - tousethewordsfrom Webster'sdictionary citedinthe SpanishMemorial - anact,

step or proceedingtaken for purposes of the conservation andmanagementof fisheries. Whether

it fits in an existing pattern of State practice and law in a rapidly evolving field such as fishery

management,is frankly, irrelevant. New measureswill always be devised to solvenew problems,

and suchmeasureswill beencompassedwithinthe scopeoftheterm "conservationand management

measures" if they fa11within the general definitions of that term. It is the subject-matter of the

measures that is decisive, not their novelty. To deny this truth would not only be to deny logic, - 40 -

it would rejectthe clearholding of this Courtwith respectto generic categoriesin theAegean Sea

case. The decision intheAegean Sea casesettlesthe question: generic languageisto be constmed

generaliy, it extends even to matters that could not have been contemplatedwhen the reservation

was made, which, of course, is not the case here (I.C.J. Reports 1978,pp. 32-33, paras. 77-78).A

fortiori, the language applies where the whole purpose of the legislationwas to protect straddling

stocksjust beyond the 200-mile limit.

53. Spain has impliedthat the word "measure"cannotcover a legislativeenactment suchas

Bill C-29(SpanishMemorial, Annexes,Vol. 1,Ann. 14). Aswe have seen,the ordinarydictionary

definitionof the word "measure"includes"legislativeenactrnent"as one of its principal meanings.

*
Moreover,this usage i~ic<q,ted internationallyin a broad range of legal instruments. The word

"measure"is used in innumerable international conventions toencompassstatutes,regulations,and

administrative actions. Forexample, Articles 61 and 62 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention

use the expressions "conservationandmanagement measures" and "conservationand management

lawsandregulations"almost interchangeably.Thecontextleavesnodoubtthat "measures"includes

legislative measures in either statutory or regulatory form.

(d) "Takenby Canada"

54. Moving to the next phrase, Mr. President, the reservation is limited to measures "taken

by Canada",restricting its scopeto measurestaken bythe declarantState. It isclearthatthe phrase

"taken by Canada" refers to enforcement measures, as well as to conservation and management

measures. In its Memorial, Spain suggeststhat the reservationcould have beenintendedto cover

enforcementactions taken by flag Statesagainst their ownvessels (p. 93, para. 102). Frankly,the

very ideais absurd. Who else but Canadawould wish toenforceCanadianconservation measures?

Who else butCanadawouldarrestvessels atsea under its legislation? The phrase "byCanada"was

omitted the second time simply to avoid redundancy.

(e) "WahRespect to Vessek Fishing "

55. Moving to the next phrase, Sir,the target of the measures in the reservation is "vessels

fishing" inthe NAFO RegulatoryArea. There is no limitationon the categoriesof fishing vessels - 41 -

to which the reservationapplies. It applies to any vessel fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area,

whether it is statelessor duly registered, whetherit is registered in a NAFO State or a non-NAFO

State, whetherit isregistered inan "openegistry"or in one ofthe principal maritime powers. Any

suggestionto the contrarywould contradictthe plain meaning of the words. Spain suggests that

in order for the reservationto cover al1vessels registered in any State,the reservation wouldhave

to includethe word "all". Again, this is a distortionof plain languageand a perversion ofthe rules

of grammar. It is clear that if the noun "vessels"is unqualifiedby any limitingword or phrase, it

necessarily referstol1vessels and to any vessels. What else could it mean? To what in fact does

an unqualified noun refer? The answer is elementary: to anything falling within the general

definitionof that noun,or in Ourcase,to any fishing vessel. No other logical meaningis possible.

fl "Inthe NAFO Regulatory Area ..."

56. Thus far,we haveestablishedthatthe reservationcoversanythingrelatedto conservation

and management measurestaken by Canada with respect to any and al1vessels fishing. The next

question is where? Not anywhere, as is sometimes implied by Spain, but in one specific,

well-defined geographical area: the NAFO Regulatory Area. Because the conservation and

management measuresset out in the 1994 legislation apply to the NAFO Regulatory Area, the

reservation was drafted in exactly the same terms. And thus it refers to "vessels fishing in the

NAFO Regulatory Area,as defined in the Convention onFutureMultilateralCo-operationinthe

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1978", usually referred to as the NAFO Convention (Spanish

Memorial, Annexes,Ann. 21). TheNAFOConventionappliesto a defined "ConventionArea"that

covers much of the Northwest Atlantic, includingthe Grand Banks of Newfoundland,where the

continentalshelf extendswell beyondthe 200-mile limit. The Convention Area lyingoutsidethe

200-mile limit on the high seas is calledthe NAFO Regulatory Area (Art. 1). This area is shown

on the right-handside of the map included in your folders at Tab 7. There is no disagreement

between the Parties that the seizure of the Estai occurred in the NAFO Regulatory Area. - 42 -

(g) ''Andthe Enforcement of Such Measures"

57. Finally, Sir, 1come to the phrase "and the enforcementof such measures". Spain has

devoted a great deal of time, effort and imagination1 might Say,to a deliberateattempt to distort

the meaning of "enforcement". In Canada'sview, the word "enforcement" shouldbe given its

ordinarymeaning inrelation to fisheriesmanagementand conservationmeasures. That is, it refers

to measures such as those necessary to effect the boarding and inspection of vessels at sea,

including coercive measures if the boarding is resisted; arrest if there is evidence of a major

infringement; inspection in port; and prosecution, if the evidence so warrants, al1 under due

process of law. My colleagues, Mr. Willis and Professor Weil will address this matter later, but

1wish to make at this time just three points.

58. First, we are here clearly not dealingwith the use of force in internationalrelations as

referred to in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. We are dealing with the use

of reasonable forceby fisheries protectionofficers forthe solepurposeof arrestinga fishingvesse1

suspectedof violations of conservationand management measures. Second,the use of somekind

of coercion is an inherent and necessarypart of the enforcementof any law, whether on land orat

sea. Obviously the word "enforcement"is derived from and relatedto the English word "force".

It is normal and customary practice everywherein the enforcementof al1kinds of laws for peace

officers or policemento use coercive measuresto effect an arrest. Thetypes of measures used by

Canada are not at al1unusual.

59. Third, if the use of force is not specifically excluded, it must be included in any

reasonableand logicaldefinitionof theword"enforcement". Thisisthe clearteachingof the Court

in its recent Judgment intheOil Platjormscase(Judgmentof 12December 1996,para. 2l), where

it recognizedthat in interpretinga provisionin an instrument reliedon for compulsoryjurisdiction,

the absence of a reference to the use of force in the text of the instrument did notean that an

incident involving the use of forcewas excludedfiom jurisdiction. Althoughin Ourcase the type

of force used was very, very different,thesame principle applies. The fact that the word "force"

was not included in the reservationdoes not mean that such measuresare excludedfiom the scope -43 -

of the reservation. This isal1the more so, in that "enforcement"in this case would havebeen

impossible without the use of some coercivemeasures.

Conclusion

60. As we said in Our Counter-Memorial- but it bears repetition - the Canadian

reservation is both precise in its delineation of the subject-matter, and comprehensivein its

exclusion of everything related to thatubject-matterfrom thejurisdiction of the Court (paras. 86

and 115). The languageis simpleand the meaningis clear. Taking intoaccountthe interpretation

of al1the individual words and phrases of the Canadian reservation, the reservation as a whole

clearlycoversanythingdirectlyor indirectlyrelatedto laws,regulationsand administrativeactions

conceming fisheriesjurisdiction, management andconservation, taken by Canada, with respect to

al1vesseisfishing intheNAFO RegulatoryArea, and to the enforcementby Canada ofthosesarne

conservation and management measures.

2. The Plain Meaning is Confirmed by the Intention Evident in the Surrounding
Circumstances

61. Mr. President,distinguishedJudges, thisinterpretationof theCanadianreservationderived

fi-omthe plain meaning of the words is confirmed by the intention evident in the surrounding

circumstances. As we have seen, in cases such as Anglo-Iranian and Aegean Sea, the Court

carefullyexploredthehistorical circumstancesinwhich thedeclarationwasoriginallymadeinorder

to determinethe intentionof the declarant State. In both cases, a grammaticalambiguityallowed

one party to argue that the reservation meant something different from the meaning discernedby

the Courtonan initialreading, butinboth cases,the intention derivedromhistoricalcircumstances

confirmed the meaning apparent in the text.

62. There is no such ambiguity in the present case, but the circumstances do provide

confirmationof the only "naturaland reasonableway of readingthe text", to use the wordsof the

Anglo-Iranian Judgment(Anglo-IranianOilCompany.,1C.J. Reports 1952,p. 104). AstheAgent

has already stated, Bill C-29 was introduced intotheHouse of Commons on 10May 1994. That

very same day, Canada withdrew its existing declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction and -44 -

substitutedthe new declaration, whichof course, includedthe reservation setout inparagraph 2 (4.

The solepurpose of withdrawing the old reservation and substitutinga new one wasto add the new

reservation in paragraph 2 (4. Theaddition ofthe reservationwas thus timed to coincide precisely

with the introduction of the legislation.

63. The exact coincidence in timing of Bill C-29 and the new declaration demonstratesthat

the reservation was deliberately designed to exclude Bill C-29 and everything done in or in

connection with it from judicial settlement. Canada took great care to ensure that the new

reservation was in place on the very day of its introduction into the legislation, before its passage

through Parliament and before any regulations were passed or enforced.

64. On the day on which Bill C-29 was introduced, and on which the new declaration was iilr

deposited,the Government of Canadaissued asinglepressreleaseexplaining both initiatives. After

reviewing the legislation,the press release States: "Canadahas today arnended itsacceptanceof the

compulsory jurisdiction ofthe International CourtofJusticeinTheHagueto preclude anychallenge

which might undermine Canada's ability to protect the stocks" (Counter-Memorial, Annexes,

Ann. 35). The stated objective clearly covers the entire matter of Bill C-29, which was designed

to protect the straddling stocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area.

65. Further confirmation of the intention of the Canadian Government and of the meaning

of the reservation is found in the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Canadian

Parliament on 12 May. In response to a question posed during the Senate debate, the Minister W

explained that "to protect the integrity of this legislation, we registered a reservation to the

International Court of Justice, explaining that this reservation would of course be temporary and

would apply only during such time as we felt was necessary to take retaliatory action against those

engaged in overfrshing" (Spanish Memorial, Annexes, Vol. 1,Ann. 16).

66. It is clear that the purpose of the reservation was, as the Minister put it, to protect "the

integrity of this legislation", whichn only mean the Statute itself, together with its regulations

andtheenforcementactions which itauthorizes. Thereservationcoversthe sarnerange ofmeasures

as the legislation itself, which includes al1 vessels in al1 forrns of fîsheries conservation and - 45 -

management in the NAFO Regulatory Area, with none of the imaginative restrictions conjured up

by Ourworthy adversaries.

67. In the Anglo-Iraniancase, the Court looked to the law passed by the Iranian Parliament

to approve the declaration of assistance inorderto ascertainthe Iranian intentionsasto its meaning.

TheCourtreferred to this evidenceas being"decisive" (I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 107). IntheAegean

Sea case, the Court referred to an explanation of the reservation given by the Greek Government

to its nationalegislature in an exposé des motifasccompanying the Bill authorizing ratification, as

putting the intention of that govemment "beyond doubt" (I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 27, para. 66). In

thepresentcase,the officialpress releaseandministerialstatementson the reservation have exactly

the sarne relevance and probative value.

68. The pressrelease andthe oralstatementto questionsbythe Foreign Ministerare identical

in substance. Both make perfectly clear that the purpose of the new reservation in the Canadian

declaration was to protect the 1994 legislation and the actions taken pursuant to it from being

contested before this Court. Neither statement leaves the slightest doubt about the intention of

Canada, which in any event is equally clear from the text of the reservation itself.

69. In this case, the Court does not have to choose between different principles of

interpretation. There is no contradiction between the stated intention and the plain languageof the

text. There is nothing in factto interpret; the Court has only to apply the simple and unambiguous

language of Canada'sreservation.

C. Application of the Reservation tothe Present Case

Introduction

70. Mr. President, distinguished Judges, 1now cometo the final part of my presentation. In

the first part,reviewed the requirement of consent and the principles of interpretation of optional

clause declarations. In the second, 1appliedthose principles to the interpretation of the Canadian

declaration of 10 May 1994. In this third part, 1 shall apply the reservation to the facts of the

present case. - 46 -

71. To determinewhether the disputefalls within theCanadian reservation,we have firstto

identiS,the relevant facts (AegeanSea ContinentalShe&I.C.J. Reports 1978,p. 34, para. 81). It

is far fromclear fromthe sometimescontradictorySpanishpleadings what exactly Spain considers

this case to be about. But whatever Spain claims that it is - the arrest of the Estai, the 1994

legislationor the application of the legislationto Spain in the regulations of 3 March 1995,or al1

three - they are al1unequivocally covered by the reservation.

1. The Facts Relevantto Jurisdiction

72. The first point to note about the Canadian reservation, Mr. President,is that it refersto

afactualcategory. It excludesfromtheCourt'sjurisdictioneverythingfallingwithina definedclass
.irlr
of fact situations, narnely: anything directly or indirectly related to fisheries conservation and

management measures taken by Canada against vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area.

. Conservationand managementmeasures haveas their subject-matterthe regulation andprotection

of fisheries. A simplereading of the Canadian legislationconfirmsthat it concernsthe regulation

and protection of fisheries, and that it isplainly a conservation and management measurein the

senseofthe reservation.This can leadto onlyone conclusion: anydisputeinvolvingthis legislation

or actionstaken underit falls withinthe factualambitof Canada's reservationandthereforeoutside

the jurisdiction of the Court.

73. As explainedby the Agent, the backgroundto the legislationwas the fisheries crisisof
"w
the early 1990s. Canada had facedthe successivecollapseof one after anotherof the commercial

fishstocksoff its AtlanticCoast. By 1994,almost al1the valuablegroundfishstockswhich straddle

the outer limit of Canada's200-mile zone, were under moratorium,that is to Say,under absolute

prohibition fromfishing. Faced with a conservation crisis, and unfortunately unable to persuade

al1Statesinvolvedto controltheir vessels,the CanadianGovernmentfelt compelledto take special

measures to conserve the fisheries. On 10 May 1994, it introduced intoParliament Bill C-29,

containing amendmentsto the Coastal Fisheries ProtectionAct,establishingfisheriesconservation

measures for foreibn vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area. Further details of specific

restrictions on fishing, aswell as the specific fish stocks affected andthe vessels covered, were - 47 -

prescribedin regulationsadoptedtwo weeks lateron 25 May (SpanishMemorial,Annexes,Vol. 1,

Ann. 17).

74. Theseregulationswerefurther amendedin 1995to address the imminentthreat posedby

SpanishandPortuguesevesselstoGreenlandhalibut(SpanishMemorial,Annexes,Vol. 1,Ann. 19).

Greenland halibut was the last commercially viable straddling stock of any significant sizein the

Northwest Atlantic. DespiteNAFO'sdecisionto allocate 3,400 tonnesof Greenlandhalibutto the

EuropeanUnion for 1995,the EU unilaterally adopted itsown quota of 18,630tonnes, more than

five times higherthan the quota allocatedto the EU by NAFO. Since diplomatic approacheshad

failed to prevent this unilateral EU action, Canada felt compelledto take emergency actions to

prevent the overfishing of Greenland halibut by Spain and Portugal. In an amendment to the

regulations implementingthe 1994legislation, the names of Spain and Portugalwere added to a

new table of countries subject to a prohibition on fishing Greenland halibut, as well as to such

NAFO measures as limitationson fish size and on the mesh size of nets.

75. Spain and Portugal werethe only countriesnamed in the new regulations, becausethey

were the only EU countries fishing for Greenland halibut and because they had a history of

overfishing and of breachingNAFO rules (Counter-Memorial, paras. 33-34).

76. DespiteCanada'scontinuedeffortsto addressthe conservationcrisis inCO-operation with

al1States concemed,it had becomeclear that Spanishand Portuguese vesselswere preparedto far

exceed even the quotas allocated by NAFO. In fact, by early March, they had exceeded their

NAFO quotafor thewhole of 1995 - that isto Say,by the beginningof March, theyhad exceeded

their NAFO quotas for the whole of 1995. Canada therefore felt compelled to enforce its

conservationand managementmeasures against Spanishvesselsin the NAFO RegulatoryArea. 1

must Say1was surprisedto hear my friend, Keith Highet,assertthat Canadaprovidedno wamings

conceming the applicationof its measures to Spanish and Portuguese vessels (CR 98/10, p. 18).

In fact, Mr. Highet,messages were broadcast to the NAFO Regulatory Areain various languages,

includingSpanishandPortuguese,providing directnotice of the 3 March 1995amendmentsto the

Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations (Canadian Counter-Mernorial,p. 21, fn. 72). 1refer you

to Annex 32 to Canada'sCounter-Memorialwhereyouwill end thetext of this announcement. On - 48-
9 March 1995,Canadianfisheriesprotectionofficersboardedand seized the Spanishfishingvessel

Estai, in accordancewith the CoastalFisheries ProtectionAct and its regulations. The masterand

thevesselwere subsequentlycharged withoffencesunderthe regulation,including, "fishingfor, or

catching and retaining Greenland halibut" (Regulations ofarch 1995, Spanish Memorial,

Annexes,Vol. 1,Ann. 19,p. 307).

2. The Facts of this Case Fa11Squarelywithinthe CanadianResewation
77. Mr. President, distinguished Judges, the facts are clear; the law is clear; and the

application of the law to the facts is equally clear. Everything complained of by Spain falls

squarelywithin the Canadian reservation. First, the entire purpose and only subject-matterof the
-
legislationis a responseto theconservationcrisisof theNorthwestAtlantic. Therecan be nodoubt

that the Canadian legislation itself is a "conservationand management measure", and, as such, it

fallswithinthe termsof thenadianreservation. Similarly,there can benodoubtthat anydispute

concerningthe legislation also falls within the terms of the legislation.
78. Second, it is equally clear that the regulations of 3 March 1995, which applied the

legislation to Spain and Portugal, were a conservation and management measure. The

subject-matterofthose measureswas the conservationofthe rapidly dwindlingstockof Greenland

halibut,in the words of the legislation, "topreventdestruction of this stock". Whetherany

of this was urgently neededor not, whether it was warrantedin the circumstancesor not, whether
*
it was lawfulunder international lawor not, none of these issues is now beforethe Court. Rather,

what is before the Court is whether what Spain complains of is covered by the Canadian
reservation. This, in turn, depends on whether the measures Canada took were for fisheries

conservationand management. Incontestably,they were. A prohibitionon fishinga definedstock

in a defined area is inherently a conservation and management measureIts character as a

conservation and management measure does not logically depend on how urgently it may be

needed, onwhether or not it was warranted under internationallaw and whether itwas warranted

in the circumstances.hese are questions for the merThis Court is not now consideringthe

merits, but rather jurisdiction, based on Canada's declaration and reseThe transparent -49 -

intention of Canada's reservation was to prevent the adjudication of such questions because they

were more appropriate for negotiation. 1 submit, Mr. President and distinguished Judges, that the

Court is bound to give effect to that intention andto refrain from an examination of the merits.

79. Finally, it is clearthat the boarding and seizure of the Estai on 9 March 1995,including

al1the related prior and subsequentacts,were measurestakenbyCanadato enforcethe conservation

and managementmeasures in the legislation and regulations. Accordingly,there can be no doubt

that the enforcement measures taken against the Estai also faIl squarely within the terms of the

Canadian reservation. Any claimconcemingtheseenforcementmeasuresistherefore excludedfrom

the Court'sjurisdiction.

80. The seizure of the Estai for fishing a straddling stock pursuant to the provisions of the

1994 legislation is precisely what was envisaged in paragraph 2 (4 of the Canadian declaration.

In contrasttoAegeanSea, this is not a casewherethe "situationsor facts"are at some remove from

those that initially motivated the filing of the reservation. What has happened here is exactly the

type of situation that was anticipated when the reservation was filed. As stated in the Canadian

Counter-Memorial, there is virtually an exact coincidence between what was foreseen and what

happened - between the motive, the intention and language of the reservation and the actions

complained of by Spain (para. 100).

Conclusion

81. Mr. President,distinguished Membersof the Court,the outcome inthis case must bethat

the Court is withoutjurisdiction. There can be no other result where the reservation is clear in its

text, where the declarant's intention is ampiy demonstrated and accords with the clear meaning of

thetext, andwherethe litigationarises inrelationto the specificissuethat promptedthe reservation:

namely the legislation of May 1994and its subsequent implementation in March 1995. That the

issue is the very thing contemplated by the reservation has to be conclusive againstjurisdiction.

Any other result would be incompatible with the requirementthat there be consent and that it must

be real. - 50 -

82. Mr. President, distinguished Judges,1thank you for your patience and attention, and

request that you invite my colleague, Mr. Willis, to address the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Hankey. 1cal1upon Mr. Willis.

Mr. WILLIS: Mr. President, distinguished Judges. For me, as for any jurist, it is a great

honour and a privilegeto appear before the International Court of Justice. 1amgenuinely grateful

for the opportunity, and1hope to dojustice to the responsibility my govemment has given to me.

1.You have just heard Mr. Hankey on the Canadian interpretation of the reservation in the

declaration. My topic is the Spanish interpretation. There shouldhave beenvery littleto Say. The

resewation is plain, short and simple: barely five lines of text on a clearly-defined topic. Our *

opponents have, however, taxed their imaginations and have proposed not one but a variety of

interpretations,l1of which contradict the natural meaning of the text and the intention disclosed

by the circumstances.

2. Thismoming, Mr. President, 1willdealwith someofthe specificinterpretations that Spain

has proposed. First, and most important, Spain's restrictive interpretation of the expression

"conservationand management measures". Secondly, its restrictive interpretation of the expression

"enforcement". And finally, the Spanish suggestion that the word "vessels"was intended to refer

only to "pirate" or stateless vessels, contrary to the plain meaning of the language and to al1the

evidence.

3. In addition to these specific questions, however, 1 will also discuss two implicit but

nevertheless fundamental themes that lie behindthe various Spanishinterpretations. One isthat the

Canadian reservation should be given the most restrictive conceivable interpretation. The second

implicit theme, which 1will deal with at the end of my presentation tomorrow, is that one way or

another the Canadian reservation must be deprived of any practical effect. These two implicit .

themes, of course, go together because the whole point on the attempt to cut down on the meaning

of the words is simplyto ensure that the Canadian resewation fails to achieve its intended effect. - 51 -

1. Restrictive Interpretation

(a) General

1begin with the first of these two implicitthemes, restrictive interpretation.

4. Spain of course does not admit to a strategy of restrictive interpretation. This week

ProfessorRemiro Brotons expresslydisavowed a restrictive approach. He said, correctly,that the

criteriaforinterpretationareneitherrestrictivenorexpansive(CR 9819,p. 57,para. 8). The Spanish

Memorial cited the excellent passage fiom the dissent of Judge Read in the Anglo-Iranian

case - that declarations "should be construed in such a manner as to give effect to the intention

of the State, as indicated by the words used; and not by a restrictive interpretation, designed to

thwart the intention ofthe State in exercising this sovereign power" (SpanishMemorial, para. 37;

Anglo-IranianOil Co. (UnitedKingdomv. Iran),I.C.J.Reports 1952, pp. 143-144).

5. Soattimes the parties appearsuperficiallyto be in agreementonthe basic approach. But,

Mr. President, theory is one thing and practice is another. And in practice, the facts speak for

themselves: the specific interpretationsSpain has proposedare about as restrictive as the human

mind could conceive. And even atthe level of theory, or doctrine,the Spanishargumentsare shot

through with contradictions. The Spanish Memorial said that reservations are subject to a

presumptionthat in making reservationsa State intends to restrict the Court's jurisdiction "in the

most limited form permitted" by the rules of interpretation(Spanish Memorial, paras. 7, 42, 71).

AndProfessorRemiroBrotons saidessentiallythe samethingthis week (CR 9819,p. 58,para. 11).

So in reality the Spanish commitment to restrictive interpretation is about as clear as it could

possibly be.

6. Mr. President, there are no presumptionsthat apply to the interpretation of reservations.

There can benopresumptions,becausethe Iawrequiresstrictproofofconsent; and therequirement

of strictproof meansthat presumptionshave noroleto play. TheCourtmust be satisfiedthat there

is in thewell-knownphrase, a "voluntaryand indisputableacceptance"of itsjurisdiction in every

case (Applicationof the Conventionon thePreventionandPunishmentofthe Crimeof Genocide

(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),Order of 13 September1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 342,

para. 34). Mr. Hankey has reviewed the principles of jurisdiction and the principles of - 52 -

interpretation. At every step of the way these principles contradict the Spanish argument that

reservationsare to be interpreted"in the most limited form permitted".

7. At the heart of the Spanishargument is the ideathat optionalclause resewations are to be

interpretedrestrictively as exceptionsto a rule. But this would implythat consenttojurisdiction

is theule, to which resewations are exceptions (CR 98/10, p. 15, para.34). Mr. President, there

is nosuch rule. If anything the rule is the contrary - thatjurisdiction does not exist, unless and

until it is accepted. And acceptancedependsupon the wholeof a State'sdeclaration,includingthe

reservations.

8. AsMr. Hankeyhasjust explained,thedeclarationinitsentirety isa singlelegalinstrument
w
witha singleintention,a singleexpressionof legalwillthat definesandlimitsthejurisdiction. The

Aegean Sea decision confirmsthis: it refers to the "close and necessarylink that always exists

between a jurisdictional clause and reservations to it" (AegeanSea ContinentalShelJIJudgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 33, para. 79). Every part of the declaration hasexactlythe sarne status as

everyother part,asa free exerciseof sovereigntywherebyjurisdiction isboth conferredand limited.

It would therefore be wrong in principle to place the grant ofjurisdiction on a higherfooting than

the limitations, or to interpretthe one more broadly than the other.

9. ProfessorRemiro Bretonsappearedto concedethepoint - hesaidthatthedeclarationand

the reservation are al1 part of the same document and indeed accused Canada - without

demonstration- of treating the reservation as a separateinstrument (CR9819,p. 56,paras. 5,6). W

But the concession he made tums out to be empty, because a moment later we were told that a

grantofjurisdiction is the principleand the resewation isthe exception(CR 9819,p. 58, para. 11).

So one is forced to ask: what exactly is Spain's position? If there is to be no restrictive

interpretation,why do resewations have to be interpreted "in the most limited form permitted"?

C
And if declarations and resewations are al1part of a single act, why is one the principle and the

other the exception?

10. The Spanish Memorial and Professor Remiro Brotons this week, invoked the contra

proferentem doctrine, fiom the law of contracts, but failed to point out that this was argued

unsuccessfully, and therefore implicitly rejected, in the Anglo-Iranian case (Spanish Memorial, -53 -

para. 36; CR 9819,pp. 14-15,paras. 32-33). The contraproferentemdoctrineproperlyrelates to

contractual matters and was applied as such in BrazilianLoans. It also depends on the existence

of an arnbiguity, which Spain asserts but fails to demonstrate. And finally, it would produce

unreasonable resultswhere the reciprocity aspect of the optional clause comes into play.

11. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice consideredwhether the principle might have some relevance in

the context ofjurisdictional clauses, but he concludedthat "it overlooksthe fact that States would

not be subjectto internationaljurisdiction atl1but for their own consent" (TheLawandPractice

of theInternationalCourt ofJustice, Vol. II (1986), p. 514). And that, 1suggest,hits the nail on

the head and demonstratesthat any attemptto interpretthe wordsnarrowly would be wrong, even

if it respected thebounds of grammatical meaning.

12. This is why Judge Jennings in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America), Meritsp ,ointed out that, becauseno State is

required to grant its consent under the optional clause, and relatively few have done so, "any

reservationqualiQing suchaconsentespeciallydemandscautionandrespect"(I.C.J.Reports 1986,

p. 529).

13. There may be a temptation to think that reservations are an undesirablefeature of the

optional clause system, and should therefore be narrowly interpreted. Implicit or explicit, this

would bethe wrong approach. Reservationsmake a positive contribution. They allow States to

participate when they might otherwise consider an unlimited acceptance of jurisdiction to be

incompatiblewith their essential sovereign interests. The flexibility that reservationsprovide is

essentialto awidespreadacceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction underthe optionalclause. But they

makethis positivecontributiononly if giventheir full intendedeffect, not grudginglyrestricted to

something less than the natural meaning of the words, and the intention disclosed by the

circumstances.

14. If the restrictive approachtaken by Spain were everadopted,the practicalresults would

be unfortunate. States would be led to draft reservations in more sweeping terms than the

circumstancesactuallyrequire, simplyas an insurance policyagainst interpretationsthat attemptto

give as little meaning to the words as possible. Some States might withdraw their consents - 54 -

altogether. This iswhy the establishedapproachof the Courtas demonstrated inAnglo-Iranianand

Aegean Sea is sound both in law and in its practical effect, and why it should be maintained.

15. We heard very little this week about the theory of "anti-statutory interpretation" in the

Spanish Memorial,and 1willtherefore notrevisit the issuetoday. But ProfessorDupuydiddevelop

anargumentthatthe Canadian interpretationissomehowincompatiblewithArticle 36,paragraph 6,

of the Statute, the fundamental provision that empowers the Court to adjudicate upon its own

jurisdiction (la compétencede la compétence)(CR 98/10, pp. 51-53, paras. 33-36).

16. Professor Dupuy aswe understoodhim, took issuewith our positionthat an interpretation

that respectsthe languageofthe text andthe intention ofthe declaring Statecannot be anti-statutory

(CR 98/10, p. 52, para. 34). He said this was a "radical" position, that would turn the reservation .(iiI

into an "automaticreservation", a self-judgingreservation, inconsistentwiththe power of the Court

under Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute.

17. Mr. President, the Canadian approach can hardly be "radical". It happens to be the

position ofthe Court as expressed inboth Anglo-Iranian OilandAegeanSea. When theCourt gave

effect to the natural meaning of the text and the intention of itsthor at the time when it filedthe

reservation, it was hardly abdicating its function under Article 36, paragraph 6. On the contrary

it was exercisingthat function. How thejudicially accepted and orthodox principles that Canada

has advocated could be called radical, or inconsistent with Article 36, paragraph 6, remains a

mystery.

2. The Spanish Interpretations

TheCommonTheme: That the Measureswere not Conservation andManagement Measures

18.1 said, Mr. President, that Spain has proposed a variety of interpretations. But there is

one theme that dominates, and necessarily so. Spain has attempted to establishthat the measures

taken by Canada which gave rise to this case were not conservation and management measures
,
within the meaning of the Canadian reservation.

19. Itis obviousthat Spain would have to succeed on this point in order to establish a basis

for jurisdiction. In order to show that there is a consent to jurisdiction under the Canadian - 55 -

declaration, Spain would have to demonstrate that the legislative, regulatory and enforcement

measures Canadatook in 1994and 1995were not conservationand management measuresas that

term is used in the reservation. If Spain cannot prevail on this point, the Court cannot have

jurisdiction,becausethe measureswere clearly taken by Canadawith respect to vessels fishing in

the NAFO RegulatoryArea, asthe reservation provides; and itwas these measuresthat triggered

the dispute. Mr. President, 1suggestthat this is a battle that Spaincannot win, becausethe record

showsthat the measures were exactlywhat was contemplatedby the reservation,and because the

language of thereservation is clear.

20. 1invitethe Courttojoin me in a close lookat the terms of the Canadian legislation and

regulations. It will be apparent thatthese are conservation and management measures in every

conceivable respect.

21. 1beginwith the legislationintroducedas Bill C-29 in 1994,which 1will simplyrefer to

as "the legislation". This is a set of amendmentsto the CoastalFisheries ProtectionAct, dealing

specificallywiththe issue of straddlingstocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area, illustratedat Tab 7.

Let me review the key terms, which Mr. Hankey has introduced. "NAFO",as the Court knows,

standsfor theNorthwestAtlanticFisheriesOrganization,which isthe treaty organizationset up for

the express purpose of promoting "the conservation and optimum utilization of the fisheries

resources of the Northwest Atlantic" (Spanish Mernorial,Ann. 21, Preamble). TheNAFO treaty

appliesto a defined"ConventionArea"which covers muchoftheNorthwest Atlantic,includingthe

Grand Banks of Newfoundland where the dispute arose (Art. 1). The treaty also defines a

"Regulatory Area", which is the portion of the Convention Area lying outside and beyond the

200-mile limit, on the high seas (Art. 2).

22. It is this NAFO Regulatory Area to which the legislation of 1994 and the regulations

made under that legislation apply. It is also the area to which the Canadian reservation applies.

The "straddling stocks" referred to in the legislation are of course the stocks that overlap the

200-mile limit. Greenlandhalibut isone of them,cod is another. They areal1specieswhose range

extends beyond 200miles becauseof the very broadcontinentalshelf offthis part ofthe Canadian - 56 -

23. With that as background, 1would ask the Court to consider the terms of the legislation.

The purpose is set out in Section 5.1, which is reproducedat Tab 8. That purpose is to take urgent

action "toprevent further destruction"ofthestraddling stocksofthe Grand BanksofNewfoundland,

I
and to permit the rebuilding of these resources while continuing to seek international solutionsto

the conservation problem. Al1this is found inthe concludingwords of Section 5.1. The preceding

paragraphs of that section focus on the conservation crisis in greater detail, stating that the

straddlingstocksare threatenedwith extinction; that there is an urgent need for al1fishing vessels

to comply with sound conservation and management measures; and that some foreign fishing

vessels are fishingstraddling stocks in the NAFO RegulatoryArea in a manner that underminesthe

effectiveness of such conservation and management measures.

24. So much for the object and purpose of the legislation. According to its terms it is

conservation and management, and nothing else. It is precisely what is described in and intended

by the reservation.

25. 1turn next to the substance of the legislation, paraphrasingthe technical terms. Three

things have to be prescribed by regulations. First, the classes of fishing vessels to which the

legislation will apply. Second, the straddling stocks concemed. Third, the detailed conservation

and management measures to be applied, such as quotas or the size limits of fish. Section 5.2then

takes effect to prohibit persons on the designated foreign vessels from fishing for the designated

straddling stocks in violation of the detailed conservation and management measures as set out in 'tir

the regulations.

26. Theregulations obviously derive al1their legal force from the legislation. It is Section 6

of the legislation that authorizesthe necessary regulations, and the wording is highly instructive.

The regulations are to be made in order to ensurethat foreign fishingvessels do not "engage in any

activity that undermines the effectiveness of measures ... that are taken. under the NAFO t

Convention",or "any other measures for the conservation and management of a straddling stock".
5

27. This, Mr. President, is the heart of the legislative scheme. The terms are clear. The

substance and subject-matter of the legislation - like the purpose - is conservation and

management. And because a legislative measure is obviously a measure, it -57 -

follows - inescapably- thatthe legislationisa conservationandmanagementmeasure,taken by

Canada, with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area. To suggest that the

legislationis not covered squarelyby the reservationis simplyto denyany meaningwhatsoeverto

the words of the reservation.

28. The rest of the legislation deals with enforcement, which is also specifically expressly

covered by the reservation. There are detailed provisions on enforcement personnel, boardings,

inspections, searches and seizures,judicial search warrants, arrests; use of lawfûl force; and on

the preservation ofevidence. As with the caseof anyregulatorylegislation,there are penalties for

violations. There is also a section on the application of CriminalLaw, which is strictly limitedto

caseswhere offencesarecommittedinthecourseof enforcingthis legislation,the CoastalFisheries

Protection Act - again, therefore, a provision that is directly linked to the enforcement of

conservation and managementmeasures. Each and every one of these provisions, Mr. President,

relates to the enforcement of conservationand management measures with respect to the NAFO

RegulatoryArea and they are accordinglycovered by the reservation. 1will corne later to Spain's

arguments with respect to Bill C-8 which Spain filed this week.

29. The Spanish Memorialquoted the words of the CanadianMinister in the parliamentary

debates - "thisis not an extensionofjurisdiction", he said "this is a conservation régimethat we

areintroducingtoday" (Spanish Memorial,para. 173. Thelegislationhadno purposebutto address

the fisheriescrisisof theNorthwest Atlanticandthe collapseof the stocks. It defies both logicand

imagination to suggest that such an initiative could be anything other.than a conservation and

management measure.

30. 1 turn next to the regulations made under this legislation- first, the initial set of

regulations passed soon after the legislation wasadopted in 1994, andthen the 1995arnendments

that extended the application of the legislationto Spain and precipitatedthe dispute.

31. It is elementary in Canadian legislation, as in many legalsystems, that regulations are

simplylegal instrumentsfor canying outthe general directivesof statutorylegislation,and al1their

legal force is derived from the legislation. If the legislation is concerned exclusively with - 58 -

conservationand management measures- whichwe believe is clear - the same must logically

be true of the regulations.

32. And so it is. The initial regulationsunder this legislation were passed in May 1994.

They appear at Annex 17to the Spanish Memorial. They were made applicable only to vessels

without nationality, and to vessels registered in certain open registry States because of the

"re-flagging"problem - the practice of switchinga vessel to an open registry in order to avoid

NAFO restrictions. The regulations identify therelevant straddling stocks, including Greenland

halibut, and impose a prohibition on fishing for the designated stocks in the NAFO Regulatory

Area.

33. This was patently a conservation and management measure. Its only function was to w

protect the designated stocks fiom unregulatedover-fishing. Annex 17of the SpanishMemorial

includes an explanatory statement called a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,which in

Canadian legislative practice accompaniesany federal regulation, butdoes not actually form part

of it. This explanatory document sets out the purpose of the prohibition on fishing for the

designatedstraddlingstocks. It explainsunderthe heading "BenefitsandCosts" thatthe measures

are required to prevent the commercial extinctionof fragile fish stocks. The introductionto the

explanatory statement also states that the primarythreat to the recovery ofthese stocks,as of the

spring of 1994,was posed by vessels without nationality as well as vessels operatingunder "flags

of convenience"that are not subject to the NAFO Convention.

34. The remainder of this initial set of regulationsnder the 1994legislation is concerned

with enforcement - the enforcementof conservationand management measures,bothwithin and

beyond the 200-mile limit. The amendmentsprovide for the use of force as a last resort, when

nothing else will get the vessel to stop. They also provide for a series of waming shots at a safe
*
distanceto give the vessel a reasonableopportunityto comply,and forthe use of the international

signals L, SQ1 and SQ3 prior to boarding or to the use of warning shots. These signals, as the b

regulationsindicate,aretaken fiom the InternationalCode of Signals,whichhas beenapprovedand

adopted by the International Maritime Organization. -59 -

35. Thesemeasures plainlydeal with enforcementin the strictestand mosttraditional sense.

Internationalconventionsbearthis out - includingthe 1995UnitedNations StraddlingStocksand

Highly Migratory Species Agreement - the New York Agreement - cited by Spain (Spanish

Memorial, para. 80; UN Doc. AICONF. 164137,8 September 1995, adopted 4 August 1995).

Article 22, paragraph 1 @ of the agreement specifically contemplatesthe use of reasonable force

where inspectors areobstructed in the execution of their duties. Professor Sanchez Rodriguez

mentioned Article 73 of the 1982Law of the Sea Convention (CR 9819,p. 36, para. 18), which

does not expressly refer to force; but it does refer to the arrest of foreign vessels; and it is

commonknowledge- and common sense - that arrests at sea of foreignvesselsare not always

voluntaryand potentiallyrequire a use of force. It is also common knowledgeand common sense

that any kind of law enforcementagainst unwilling parties may sometimes involvea use of force.

The use of waming shots at a safe distance is a well-known international practice, designed to

minimizerisksto the safetyof lifeat sea. That iswhy the procedureisreflectedinthe International

Code of Signals,as Signal SQ3, to which the regulations refer. And Spain overlookssomething

that is fundamental, but that is spelled out inal1the documents - the whole purpose of these

provisions is to Iimitandrestrict the use of force, not to encourage i- to make sure that force

is usedonlyas a last resort, when nothingelse will do. The RegulatoryImpactAnalysis in Spanish

Annex 17,makes that absolutely clear.

36. We were surprised to hear Professor Sanchez Rodriguez Saythat the use of force can

neverbe interpretedasbeingthe enforcementof conservationand managementmeasures(CR 9819,

p. 27, para. 6). He offeredno reasons. The statement is contrary to internationalconventions, in

particular Article 22, paragraph 1 @, of the United Nations Straddling Stocks Agreement - the

New York Agreement. It is also contrary to common sense and practical experience,because

foreignfishingvesselswill notinvariablycomplyand CO-operate.Thereare obviouslylimitsto the

use of force by law enforcement authorities - it must not be excessive force, it must be

proportionate,and so on. But there is no evidence the limits were exceeded here - al1that was

involvedwere warning shots at a safe distance, intended only to allow a boarding, not shot at the - 60 -
ship, and only afrer resistance had been encountereand, Mr. President, even if there were

evidence of excessive force, thatld be an issue for the merits, notjurisdiction.
.
37. 1emphasize that the appropriatenessor legitimacy ofthese provisions is not, cannotbe,

the issue at this stage.t would be an issue for the merits. What counts for present purposes

isthat al1this is enforcernent; it isthe enforcernentof conservationandmanagementmeasures,and

accordingly it is covered by the reservation.

38. The regulationshavejust describedwere arnended on3 March 1995to apply to Spain
and Portugal (Spanish Mernorial, Ann. 19). The amendmentof coursewas the direct result of the

dispute over the Greenland halibut quotas voted into effect by NAFO for the year 1995. The

appropriateness of the quotas adopted by NAFO is notrelevant to the issue ofjurisdBution. w

what is bothrelevant and indisputableis thattheNAFO quotaswereconservationand management

measures, as that expression is used in Section 5.1 of the 1994n legislation.

39. The amended regulations of March 1995 listed Spainand Portugal as States whose
vessels would be subject to this legislation, and added a series of prescribed conservation and

management measures for those vessels. The measure at the heart of this case wasa prohibition

on fishing for Greenland halibut in the NAFO RegulatoryArea for the remainder ofthe year

prohibitionbecause, as Mr. Hankeysaid,the 1995quota for the EuropeanUnionhad already been

caughtat that point in time,gelyby Spain. In addition,the regulations imposeda restriction on

the mesh size of nets, so that undersized fishcannot be caught, as well as size limits for c-rtain

species of fish -both,1 may Say, among the most traditional of al1 conservation measures.

Finally,the regulations includea provisiononthe maintenanceof fishing logsanda prohibition on
removinggear frornthe water after a boarding signal hasbeen given,bothwith theobvious purpose

of facilitating enforcement.

40. These conservationand management measures, whoseenforcementgaverise to this case,
L
are found in Table V of the Regulations, which is in your materials today at Tab 9. It takes no

more than a glance to see that these are the most standard,typical conservationand management

measuresone could imagine. 1would invitethe Court to comparethem with the illustrative listof
fisheries measures in the exclusive economiczone set out in Articleagraph4, of the 1982 -61 -

Law of the Sea Convention. The list includesthe speciesthat may be caught,the areas that may

be fished, gear types, fish sizes, quotas, seasons andso on. Or one may look simply at the Table

of Contentsof the Conservation and Enforcement MeasuresofNAFOat Annex 10of the Canadian

Counter-Memorial - this covers such matters as quotas, prohibitions on fishing, gear and size

limits. In substance, in content, the Canadianconservationand managementmeasuresthat arethe

object of this dispute are exactly the sarne. The onlydifference,1repeat, is wherethese measures

were applied by Canada - the NAFO area, which is so precisely designatedin the reservation.

41. One can agreeor disagree with thesemeasures, whichare largelybasedon the measures

adopted by NAFO. But it cannot be plausibly disputed that they were conservation and

management measures. The explanatory statement or "Regulatory Impact Analysis" that

accompanied the regulations, and which is also found in Annex 19 of the Spanish Annexes,

describes the amendment as essential to deter overfishing of stocks threatened with extinction.

Mr..President, 1have aboutone minute before1finish this point, if 1may go on. The Regulatory

Impact Analysis statement at Annex 19 of the Spanish Annexes describes the wamings on the

biological state of Greenland halibut given as early as 1989, and the unilateral quota set by the

European Union at a level more than five times that established by NAFO. The object of the

measures is as plain as thesubject-matter. It is conservation and management.

42. It is self-evident,Mr. President, that it was the enforcement ofese conservation and

management measures that gave rise to this case. In fact, the pleadings of both sides make that

clear. The conclusion that the dispute is indeed within the four corners of the reservation is

therefore compelling - in fact, irrefutable.

Mr. President, that would be a convenient point at whichto break until tomorrow, if that

pleases the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. The Court will now rise and resume Sittingin

these proceedings tomorrow at 10 a.m.

TheCourt rose al1 p.m.

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Thursday 11 June, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding

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