Non-Corrigé
1 ARCHIVES 1 Uncorrected
InternationalCourt
Cour internationale of Justice
de Justice
LA HAYE THEHAGUE
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 199à10 heures, au Palais de CaPaUc,
sous la présidencede M. Schwebel,président
en l'affaire de CaCompétenceen matière depêcheries (Espagnec.Canada)
COMPTERENDU
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 17 June 19am, at the Peace Palace,
President Schwebelpresiding
in the case concerninges Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)
VERBATIMRECORDPrésents: M. Schwebel,président
M. Weeramantryv ,ice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek,juges
MM. Lalonde
TorresBernirdez,juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, reffierPresent: President Schwebel
Vice-President Weeramantry
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra- ranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Judgesad hoc Lalonde
TorresBernkdez
Registrar Valencia-OspinaLe Gouvernementde l'Espagneest représenté par :
M. JoséAntonio Pastor Ridruejo,chef du servicejuridique internationaldu ministèredes
affaires étrangèresd'Espagne,professeur de droit internatioàal'universitéComplutense de
Madrid,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit internationàll'universitéPanthéon-Assas (Paris II),
M. Keith Highet, conseil en droit international, vice-président du couridique interaméricain
de l'Organisationdes Etats américains,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotons, professeur dedroit internationala l'universitéautonome de
Madrid,
M. Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez, professeurde droit internationaàl'universitéComplutense
de Madrid, *
comme conseilset avocats;
M. Félix Valdés Valentin-Gamazo,ministre-conseiller de l'ambassade d'Espagneaux Pays-Bas,
comme coagent;
M. Carlos Dominguez Diaz, secrétaired'ambassade, sous-directeur généra alx organisations
internationalesde gestion de pêcheriesau ministèrede l'agricultureet des pêcheries
d'Espagne,
M. Juan JoséSanzAparicio, secrétaire d'ambassade,membredu servicejuridique international
du ministère des affaires étrangèrs'Espagne,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernementdu Canada est représentépar :
S. Exc. M. Philippe Kirsch, c,r., ambassadeur et jurisconsulte, ministère des affairesétrangères
et du commerce international,
comme agent et avocat;
M. Blair Hankey, avocat général délégu méi,nistère desaffaires étrangères etdu commerce
international,
comme agent adjoint et avocat;
M. L. Alan Willis, c.r., ministère delajustice,
comme conseilprincipal et avocat;The Governmentof Spain isrepresented by:
Mr. José Antonio PastorRidruejo, Head, Department of International Legal Affairs, Ministry of
ForeignAffairs of Spain,Professor of InternationalLaw atthe Complutense University of
Madrid,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of International Law, Universiiy of Paris II
(PanthéonA- ssas),
Mr. KeithHighet, Counsellorin International Law, Vice-Chairman, Inter-American Juridical
Committee, Organization of American States,
Mr. AntonioRemiro Brotons, Professor of International Law, Autonomous University of
Madrid,
Mr. Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez, Professor of International Law, Complutense Universityof
Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Félix Valdés Valentin-Gamazo,Minister-Counsellor,Embassy of Spain to the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Carlos Dominguez Diaz, Embassy Secretary, Assistant Director-General for International
Fisheries Management Organizations, Ministryof Agricultureand Fisheries of Spain,
Mr. Juan José Sanz Aparicio, Embassy Secretary, Department of InternationalLegal Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain,
as Advisers.
The Government ofCanada isrepresented by:
His ExcellencyPhilippe Kirsch, Q.C., Ambassador and Legal Adviser to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
as Agent and Advocate;
Mr. Blair Hankey, Associate General Counsel, Department of Foreign Affairsand International
Trade,
as Depuîy Agent and Advocate;
Mr. L. Alan Willis, Q.C., Department of Justice,
as Senior Counsel andAdvocate; -6-
M. Prosper Weil, professeurémérite del'universitéde Paris,
commeconseil et avocat;
Mme Louise de La Fayette, Universitéde Southampton,
M. Paul Fauteux, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
M. John F. G. Hannaford, ministère des affairesétrangèreset du commerce international,
Mme Ruth Ozols Barr, ministèrede lajustice,
Mme Isabelle Poupart, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerceinternational,
Mme Laurie Wright, ministèrede la justice,
commeconseils;
M. Malcolm Rowe, c.r., Gouvernementde Terre-Neuve et du Labrador,
M. Earl Wiseman, ministèredes pêcheset des océans,
commeconseillers;
Mme Manon Lamirande, ministèrede lajustice,
Mme Marilyn Langstaff, ministère des affairesétrangèreset du commerce international,
Mme.Annemarie Manuge, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international,
M. Robert McVicar, ministère des affaires étrangèst du commerce international,
Mme Lynn Pettit, ministèredes affaires étrangères.etdu commerce international,
comme agents administratifs. - 7-
Mr. Prosper Weil, ProfessorEmeritus,University of Paris,
as CounselandAdvocate;
Ms Louise de La Fayette, University of Southampton,
Mr. Paul Fauteux, Department:of Foreign Affairsand International Trade,
Mr. John F.G. Hannaford, Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade,
Ms Ruth Ozols Barr, Department of Justice,
Ms Isabelle Poupart, Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade,
Ms Laurie Wright, Department of Justice,
as Counsel;
Mr. Malcolm Rowe, Q.C., Govemment of Newfoundland and Labrador,
Mr. Earl Wiseman, Department of Fisheries and Oceans,
as Advisers;
Ms Manon Lamirande, Department of Justice,
Ms Marilyn Langstaff, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Ms Annemarie Manuge, Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade,
Mr. Robert McVicar, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Ms Lynn Pettit, Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade,
as AdministrativeOfJicers. -8-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. 1cal1on the Deputy Agent for Canada.
Mr. HANKEY:
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of theCourt, in opening Canada's reply in this
second roundof oral argument,wish to place on the record Canada's apologyfor the absenceof
its Agent, Ambassador Philippe Kirsch.or reasons which have been explained to you,
Mr. President, he has had toave The Hagueunexpectedly on businessfor the UnitedNations.
2. Let me begin briefly byrepeating what AmbassadorKirsch said last week. Thiscase is
about Canada'sresewation. The issue, at this stage, is simply whether,he terms of that
resewation, as part of Canada'sDeclarationof 10May 1994,the Courthasjurisdiction111, w
p. 8, paras. 3-4). The Court itself in its Order of 2 May 1995 directed the Parties to confine
themselves to that issue in these proceedings. The Order, in tum reflected an agreement between
the Partiesreachedat ameetingoftheoAgents withPresident Bedjaouion 27 Aprilofthatyear.
3. Accordingly, questions of admissibility, including the exhaustion of local remedies, of
mootness - that is, whetherthe dispute has been se-tland, of the locus standi of Spain to
bring this case:hose questions are not in issue at this stage. Canada therefore has taken no
position on those questions.
4. Last week we heard Counsel for Spain pose the question: "Why are we al1 here?"
-
(CR 98/10, p. 16). It may have been goodtheatre, but, as a question, it was extremely naive. The
question ought properly to have beenaddressedto Spain's ownlawyers,rather than to the Court.
5. The answer - the honest answer-is that we are here for a very simple and obvious
reason. That reason is that, faced with the clear language of Canada'sreservation excludingthe
.
jurisdiction of the Court inthis dispute, Spain hasgoneto truly extraordinarylengths to avoidthat
clear language,and to evadethat clearconclusion. Thecontradictionsandconfusion introducedby
Spain aretruly astonishing.
6. In the first round we were told that the 1994 legislation was not a conservation and
managementmeasure. Wewere told that the seizure of theai was not enforcement (CR 9819, -9-
p. 16,para. 7,etpassim). Wewere told thatthis presentdisputeis about "title",orjurisdiction, and
not about conservationandmanagement (CR 9819, p.12,para.2 etpassim throughout the Spanish
pleadings up to CR 98113,p. 65). We were even told that the seizure of the Estai violated the
United Nations Charter (CR 98/10, pp. 51-56, paras. 33-37;CR 98/13, pp. 60-64, paras. 21-28).
7. In fact Spain's arguments - though they take various forms - al1arnount to one rather
simple proposition. This is that Canada's reservation can only cover lawful measures of
conservationand management, and IawJirIacts of enforcement.
8. That is the purpose of the emphasis on title. It attempts to persuade the Court that
Canada'sreservation doesnotcoverthe questionof Canada'sright - its legalright - to takesuch
measures. That is the purpose of Spain's argumentthat measures taken on the high seas, beyond
200 miles, cannot be "conservationand managementmeasures". Why? Because they would not
be lawful. That is the purposebehind Spain's attackon Canada's enforcementpowers, describing
them as unlawful because in violation of the prohibition of the use of force under the United
Nations Charter. And thatis the purpose behind Spain'sattempts to showthat the techniques of
conservationand managementare not those authorized bytreaties. Spain'sconclusion is that they
are unlawful,and therefore not covered by the reservation.
9. The several variations on this one, simple theme were fully coveredby Mr. Willis last
week (CR 98/12, pp. 11-17). 1won'tattempt to restate his arguments, buthis conclusion is worth
repetition. Spain'ssimple, singletheme is patently wrong!
10.It is wrong because it invites the Court to decideon the legaliq of the measures taken
byCanadaasa preliminary,jurisdictional decision; in otherwords: the meritsprecedejurisdiction.
And, in addition, itmakes the reservation meaningless - for measures in the NAFO Regulatory
Area must, by definition, be beyond 200 miles. And itmakes nonsense of the reservation: for it
would make unlawfül measures subject to the Court'sjurisdiction, and exclude only lawfül
measures. - 10-
11.Now it is true that throughout the oral proceedings, Spain has put forwardmany new
arguments. So many in fact that Canada has been forced to choose betweense that merit an
answer and those that do not. 1make nocomplaint aboutthis. But the Court shouldnot take as
an admission or acquiescence, Canada'ssilence with respect to any of Spanisharguments.
We have seen before how, in the first round, Spain'sargumentshavechanged quiteradicallyfiom
what was intheir Memorial. Now theyhave changedyet again. It does,of course,makeit difficult
to join issue, when theissues keep changing,but let me take one or the new argumentsto
be found in Spain'ssecondround.
12.There is this new reference to "nullity"which figured not atpain's Memorialor
*
in the first round of oral pleadings (CR 98/13, p. 37, para. 8). Now Mr. Highet argues that
Canada'sreservation is to be regarded as a "nullity". Now myunderstandingis that a State'sact
is a nullity when it is not merely illegal, but illegal by reference to a rule of law so
fundamental, so peremptory,that it is not only illegal but voidio.
13.Now by referenceto what fundamental, peremptorynorm is the Canadianreservationa
nullity? Spain,las,doesnot tell us. WhatSpaindoestell us is howCanadaought to have drafted
its reservation, inerto achieve its object, its purpose, which of courseSpain knows very well
what it is. Mr. President,can you really avoida nullity simply bythe way you draft,by a different
choice of words? 1very much doubt it. My impression is that this isjust one more form of the-
same old allegation: that Canada hasactedunlawfully. Mycolleague Mr. Willis, will addressthis
latest Spanish innovation.
14.It isrue that Spainhas invokedArticle 2, paragraph 4, of theUnited Nations Charterto
challenge Canada's enforcementon the high seas of its legislation. And Canada agrees that the
Charter'sprohibition of the use of forceticle 2, paragraph 4 is a peremptorynorm. But
the argument is defectivefor atast two reasons. - 11-
15.First, Article 2,paragraph 4, doesnotprohibitlawenforcementby States. As Mr. Willis
will demonstrate,the degreeof coercion authorizedunder Canada'slaw is well withinthe limits of
general State practice.
16.Second,even if Spainwere correctinmaintainingthat Canada's measuresofenforcement
are excessive, and therefore illegal, that would be surely an issue for the merits. It would be a
challenge to Canada's actual conduct in arresting the Estai. It has nothing to do with the
interpretation of Canada'sreservation. For enforcement would still be "enforcement"under the
terrrs of the reservation, whether lawfil or not.
17.In fact there is only one point at which Spain'sullity arguments are addresseddirectly
to the reservation. This is when ProfessorDupuyargues (CR 98/13, pp. 56-57, paras. 12-15)that
the Canadianreservation is a nullity because it contravenesArticle 36, paragraph6, of the Court's
Statute. The argument is based essentially on Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's attack on so-called
"automaticreservations" in the Norwegian Loans case.
18. Now, Mr. President, 1am by nomeans sure that the Court as a whole would share this
view of the incompatibility of "self-judging" or "automatic" reservations with Article 36,
paragraph 6. But, be that as it may, the whole Spanish argument on this point ismisconceived.
19.Canada doesnot Say"Theseare conservation and management measures- becausewe
Say so." We do not define "conservation and management measures" simply by reference to
Canadian law. We readily concede to the Court the power to decide whether the Canadian
measuresareconservationand management measures- by referenceto general practice. Andwe
can also concede the Court'spower to decide whether the Canadian enforcement actions are
"enforcement" actions - also by reference to general practice. That is why, in Our written
pleadings and in Ouroral arguments,we go to great lengths to show that the Canadian measures
are exactly what internationalpractice understands by "conservationand managementmeasures".
The only special feature aboutthe Canadian measures is that they apply beyond 200miles. But, - 12-
Sir, that goes to legality, to merits. They are nonetheless "measures" withinthe meaning of the
Canadian resewation.
20. Then, as another "new" argument,Mr. Highet tells us that Spain has three other claims
that have nothingto do with the Esta(i CR 98/13,pp. 49-50, paras. 67-70). These are the claims
that Canada has unlawfully asserted jurisdictionover the high seas; that Canada has unlawfully
used force; and that Canada has violated Spain'ssovereignty on the high seas.
21. Frankly, Mr. President, 1 have great difficulty in following the relevance of al1this.
Canada'sresewation is not limitedtothe EstaiT .hesethree "other"claims invokedby Spainprove
absolutelynothing. They are al1claimswhich arise out of, or concern,the 1994legislation andits
rr
enforcement. The legislation andthe regulations issued under it are "measures" covered by the
resewation. Sojust what is Spain's point? 1see no substanceto it whatsoever.
22. It is becauseof argumentsofthis kind,Mr. President,that we are here to answer Spain's
question. But, sincewe are here, letme redirectthe argumentto the real issue. What isthe proper
interpretation of Canada'sresewation and, as applied to the facts of this case, does it exclude
jurisdiction? So let me turn to that.
1. The Interpretation of Canada'sReservation
(a)Rules of; and approachto, interpretation
w
23. Mr. President, 1 need Say very little about the rules governing the interpretation of
optionalclausedeclarations. As theCourtwillhavenoted intheoral argumentof ProfessorRemiro
Brotons (CR 9819,pp. 54-59, paras. 1-15)therewas a good deal of agreement with theprinciples
1outlined myself on Thursday, during the first round (CR98111, pp.24-35, paras. 4-39).
24. Butthere remainsone importantdifference. Despite Spain's apparentacceptance ofthe 1i
unity of the declaration and the resewation, and despite its denial that it proposes a restrictive
interpretation ofresewations (see CR 9819,p. 57, para. 8), Spain in fact does the exact opposite.
For the essence of Spain's approach to interpretation liesinwo propositions. - 13 -
25. First, that the purpose of a declaration under Article 36, paragraph2, is to confer
jurisdiction on the Court, and this should begiven full effect.
26. Second, that a reservation shouldbe viewed as an exception, or derogation, from this
primary purpose, and thus requires a restrictive interpretation.
27. In the words of Professor Brotons "ilfaut donner auxréserveslaportéela plus limitée
permise par leur interprétation .. ."(CR 9819,p. 58, para. 11).
28. Now, Mr. President, that is wrong. As 1explained in the first round(CR 98111,p. 28,
para. 14), if the declaration, including any reservations, is a unity, the same principles of
interpretationapply to the whole of it. Youcan't be "liberal"as regards the declaration,andthen
"restrictive" as regards the reservation. The whole declaration,including the reservation,mustbe
treated as one. And ifthere is an overridingprinciple - andthere is - it is that the words used
must show real consenttojurisdiction. You cannot start fromapresumption ofjurisdiction based
on the fact that a declarationhas been made,and treat reservationsas derogationsfrom consent,to
be given a restricted interpretation,as Spain continues to insist.
(b)Application of the reservation to thepresent dispute
29. Mr. President, distinguished judges, 1want, now, toaddress what seems to be the core
of this dispute. What, exactly, does the Canadian reservation cover?
30. It may helpthe Courtto visualizea mirrorimageoftheCanadianreservation,to consider
the wording of the Canadian reservation,not as a reservation from jurisdiction, butas a grant of
jurisdiction. In other words, supposeCanadahad conferredjurisdiction inthe sameterms as in its
reservation: what would havebeen the extent of the jurisdiction granted?
31. Letmebegin withthe centralphrase: "disputesarisingout of or concerningconservation
andmanagementmeasures .. .".Logically,as 1saidlastThursday(CR 98111,p. 36,para. 45),one
would think that coveredfour elements. - 14 -
32. First, the right or "title"to take suchmeasures. 1cannot believethat a dispute overthat
question wouldnot bea dispute "arising outof or conceming" such measures. In otherwords,had
i
Canada usedthe samewords ina Special Agreementor compromissoryclausetogrant jurisdiction,
to the Court, Spain would certainlyhave argued that the conservation covered any dispute over
Canada's right - "titre" to use the word Spain uses - to take the measures. And, on that
hypothesis, Spain would be right. For if a State undertakes any form of conduct, including a
legislative measure,a dispute overthe right ofthe Stateunder internationallaw to act in that way
is patently a dispute "arising out ofor concerning"that conduct.
33. Second,theneed forsuchmeasures.Thiswouldrequireproof - largelyscientific- that
.
a genuineneed forconservationexisted. It isobviousthatany disputeover such matterswouldfa11
within a grant ofjurisdiction over "conservation andmanagement measures".
34. Third, the demonstrationthat the actual conservation and management measurestaken
were appropriateto meet that need,another matter requiringscientificproof. Again, it is apparent
that any dispute over such questions would be a dispute "arising out of or conceming" those
measures.
35. Fourth, the enforcement or execution of such measures. In my submission this fourth
issuewouldinvolve,not onlythequestionwhetherthemeansof enforcementused wereappropriate
to enforcethe particularmeasure,but, inaddition,whetherthemeasureswereexcessiveorunlawful. Ir
Thus, a dispute over any act of enforcementor execution would rightlybe regarded as a dispute
"arisingout of' the State'sacts. In short,1amsayingthat the phrase "arisingout of or conceming"
would embrace a dispute over enforcementeven without the last phrase of Canada'sreservation,
which expressly covers the "enforcement ofsuch measures".
36. Now if agrant ofjurisdiction in the terms used by Canadawould include al1those four
elements - as it clearly would - it necessarily followsthat an exclusion of jurisdiction - a
reservation - would equally cover al1four elements. - 15 -
37. The wording means one thing. You can'talter the meaning of the words according to
whetherthey wereused ina grant or areservation. Thus, 1repeat,the naturalmeaning of thewords
wouldcover al1four elements: disputes overlegality,disputesover scientific need, disputes over
the appropriateness of the measures, and disputes overtheir enforcement.
38. Now, clearly that is not Spain's view. First, as1have pointed out, Spain says that the
issue of title("titre'? is not included. So any dispute over a State's legal right to take such
measures - adisputewhichcould involvereferenceto someofthebasicprinciplesoflawcovering
coastal State jurisdiction - is excluded. The conclusion is astonishing! Just think of it,
Mr. President! If this were a grant of jurisdiction, the Court would be competent to hear the
basically scientific disputes over whether a conservation need existed, and whether Canada's
measureswere appropriate - those are the second and third issues- but the Court would have
nocompetenceto deal withthefirst andprimary issue of whether Canadahad a le.ga1right totake
suchmeasures.
39. 1can imaginethe Court'sreactionto that. If this were a grant ofjurisdiction, surelythe
Courtwould say it was competent to considerany dispute overthe right, the "title" of Canadato
adoptsuch measures. By the sarne token, because this is a reservation and not a grant, the issue
of Canada'slegal right, or title, must be excluded fromthe jurisdiction.
40. It was ProfessorWeil who, in the first round, explainedthat, if a court has competence
overa defined subject-matter,it necessarily has competence overtheprinciplesand rulesof lawthat
governit (CR 98/12, p. 41,para. 38). Spain'sreply,in the wordsof Mr. Highet (CR 98/13,p. 43,
para. 36), is that Canada ignores the distinction between(a) legal principles; and (3) substantive
legal rules. Mr. President, 1 am baffled. What exactly is this distinction we are said to have
forgotten? It really is no answer at al1to the argument by Professor Weil.
41. Mr. President,itis also clearthat SpainregardsCanada'senforcementof itsconservation
andmanagementmeasuresas falling outsidethe reservation,despitethe express words of the final
phrase- "and the enforcement of suchmeasures". - 16-
42. The Courtwill forgiveme if 1am less clearaboutwhySpaindoesnot regardthe relevant
provisions of the 1994 legislation or the actual steps used to arrest the Estai as enforcement
*
measures.
43. On oneview Spainseemsto be saying that the measures authorizedby the legislationor
used in relation to the Estai, were not "enforcement"because they were not "lawful". Now that
reallyisan extraordinaryargument. Imagineagrant ofjurisdiction, allowingthe Courtto dealonly
with disputes over lawfil measures. What could be the dispute? Or imagine a reservation
excluding the Court's jurisdiction over lawfil measures of enforcement, but leaving it with
jurisdiction overunlawfil measures. Theabsurdity of both results suggeststhat Spain'sargument '1'
is unsound. The sensible interpretation is that enforcement means just that. Whether that
"enforcement" is lawfulor unlawful is a different issue. And, if the Courttakesjurisdiction, itcan
decide it, but if "enforcement"is excluded from the Court'sjurisdiction, it cannot.
44. Now the other view is that Spain's argumentis that the "enforcement" authorizedby
Bill C-29,and usedagainsttheEstai, cannotbe true enforcementbecausethe measuresinvolvethe
use of force and therefore cannot be described as "enforcement" in any real sense as the term is
understood in international practice. Thiswas the argument made by Mr. Highet (CR98/10,
pp. 17-20).
45. Mr. President,I'm not sure that this argumentis really any differentfrom the argument .J
that "enforcement"means "lawful enforcement". In any event, as my colleague Mr. Willis will
show, Canada's techniquesof enforcement are really quite standard, and similar to those used by
many States for the protection and conservation of their fisheries. Spainmay not like them, but
they are "enforcement" measuresnonetheless.
f
46. Mr. Highet's argument (CR 98/10,p. 18)thatthe use of forceonthe highseascan never
be the enforcementof a conservationor managementmeasure showsboth a lack of understanding
and confusion. - 17 -
47. It lacksunderstandingbecauseitignoresthe factthat it is commonpracticeforthefishery
protection vessels of Statesto require vesselsto stop and be boarded under the threat that, if they
refuse, forcewill be used. To Saythat suchvessels ceaseto enforceconservation and management
measures the moment they threaten or use force is simply unreal. Thefact of the matter is that
getting a vessel to stop, and be boarded, at sea is no easy matter. It is for this reason that many
States entrust fisheries protection to their navalvessels, or to armed patrol vessels.The threat of
force is ofien the only means of stoppinga vessel.
48. In the case of the Estai, this was not ahelpless, innocent row boat. This was a large,
powerful vessel, of almost65 metres, which hadinthe past violated NAFOregulations and which
was refusingto stop inorderto permit boardingand inspectionfor violating Canada's conservation
and management measures. In the circumstances, the threat of force used to compel it to
stop - warning shots fired ahead of the Estai - was not at al1excessive.
49.1know Mr. Highetinvited the Courtto postulatethat the Estai might havebeen bombed
or torpedoed (CR 98/10, pp. 19-20). But no one bombed or torpedoed the Estai. If the Court
recalls what actually happened,the methods ofcoercionused by Canadianvessels were eminently
reasonable. They were typical of routine "enforcement"against a vessel of this type.
50. Certainly a dispute may arise over whether the force was justified, or necessary, or
excessive. And the use of force may, in some cases, be held to be illegal. But then the proper
conclusion is that it was an unlawfulconservation measure. Mr.Highet's argument that it was
never enforcement at al1is quite different, and clearly wrong. It is contradicted by the routine
practice of States in armingtheir fishery protection vessels.
51. The argument isconfused inthe sense that it focuseson the fact that the arrest occurred
on the high seas. Evidently, Spain regardsthe seinire of the Estai as illegal on that basis alone,
with or without the use of force. But again,that would be an argumentfor Spain to make onthe
merits. The argument would be that, because it took place on the high seas, the arrest was an
unlawfil act of enforcement. But Spain, and Mr. Highet, would have the Court believe that, - 18-
because unlawfi tl,arrestcould notbe enforcement. Inshortthey claim that "enforcement"can
only mean "lawful enforcement".
52. Mr. President, this is quite unrealistic. "Enforcement"is what it is: depends on the
nature and purpose of the action taken. Whether it is lawful or unlawful is quite a different issue:
and it is an issue ofmerits.
2. Spain's arguments not only invite the Court to proceed to the merits, but they are
essentially unsound
53. TheweaknessofSpain'sargumentdoesnot lie solelyinthe factthat they invitethe Court
to decide issues of merits as a preliminaryto deciding on jurisdiction. The arguments have the w'
additional weakness that they are unsound.
54. Take Spain's initialargumentthatthe measures authorizedbythe 1994legislationarenot
conservation and management measures. My colleague,Mr. Willis, demonstrated last weekthat
the argument is manifestlyunsound (CR 98111,pp. 54-61). Thetems of the Statutemake it clear
that its essential purpose is "conservation and management". The substance is typical of
conservationand management legislation: the vessels it applies to, the fish stocks it protects, the
conservation measures authorized. And, finally, it deals with enforcement. Mr. President, it is
difficult to imagine a legislative measurethat is more obviouslya measure of conservationand
management.
55. To say that this cannot be so,because the legislation applies beyond 200 miles- and
this is Spain'sargument- is clearly unsound. Localityis irrelevantto the nature ofthe measures.
The measures are what they are. One looks to their nature or, subject-matter,their function, and
their intended purpose. And by those criteria the measures are clearly "conservation and
management measures". The only purpose behind Spain's objectionthat they apply beyond
200 mile; is to challengetheir legality. And that, as 1have said, Mr. President, is an issue of
merits. - 19-
56. So, too, with the Spanish argumentthat the enforcementauthorizedcannot be regarded
as true enforcement, covered by the reservation. Spain'sonly argument is that the enforcement
authorized involved the use of force. As we have shown, the argument is groundless. Article 2,
paragraph 4,of the United Nations Charter has absolutelyno relevance. The suggestionthat, in
State practice andthe general usage of international law,"enforcement"of conservation measures
can never involve the use of force is simply wrong. The only possible relevance of Spain's
argumentwould be, at the merits stage, if Spainwished to argue the use of force was excessive,
or unlawfulbecause it occurred beyond 200 miles.
57. This proceedingis aboutjurisdiction, notthe meritsofthe case. Nonetheless, sincethese
hearings are publicizedin the world-at-large, let medigress for a moment to correct some of the
more obviousmissstatementsof factmade by Spain. These are not matters relatingtojurisdiction,
but they do cal1 for reply. Al1 of these are instances dealt with clearly in Canada's
Counter-Memorialand documents before the Court.
58. On Monday, Professor Sanchez Rodriguez askedhow, since Minister Tobin said Spain
was fishinglegally intheNAFO RegulatoryArea in 1994,Canadacould now assertthat Spainhad
suddenly transformeditselfintoadangerouspredatorandpirateStatein 1995(CR 98/13,pp. 17-18,
para. 5).
59. The answer is set out in part in the RegulatoryImpact StatementAnalysis publishedby
Canada at the time that Spain and Portugal were added to the Regulations in March 1995. The
relevant quote which appears in both Spain'sand Canada's writtenpleadings reads as follows:
"The primarythreat tothe recovery ofGreenland halibutstocks is . ..posedby
vessels of Spainand Portugal, which, unless stopped,will fish significantlyover the
EU quota of 3400 tonnes. As an additional and significant problem, Spanishand
Portuguesevesselshave,startingin1994,signzjicantlyincreasedtherateat whichthey
areviolatingNAFOregulations ... The [Canadian]regulationsare essentialnowto
deteroverfishingof groundfishstocksby Spanishand Portuguese vessels." (Emphasis
added.)
Sothatwascontemporaneouswiththe additionof SpainandPortugalto the liston 19 March 1995. - 20 -
60. Apparently, not content to leave this matter with a rhetorical question,
Professor Sanchez Rodriquezwent onto Sayinhis presentationthat, "l'Espaa toujoursrespecté
les limitesde capturejuridiquement établies dans le systèmeNO"(CR 98/13, p. 20, para. 6).
61. As noted at paragraph 24 and outlined in more detail in Annex 12 of Canada's
Counter-Memorial,on closeto fi@ occasionsthe European UnioneitherignoredtheNAFOquotas
or set quotas for itself unilaterally that were higher than those set by NAFO. This resulted in
overfishing and depletion of straddling stocks.
62. There is yet afurther error. Professor SanchezRodriquez has suggested that Canada
admits that only 10 per cent of the stock of Greenlandibut is found outsidethe 200-mile limit
w
(CR 98/13, p. 19). The purposeof this "information"is to suggestthat, if90 per cent of the stock
was found insideCanada's 200-milezone, the collapse of the stock could scarcely be blamed on
Spainfor fishingthe 10 per centutside. Mr.President,thevery leastwe can expect isthat Spain's
counsel quote the documents accurately, and do not misinform the Court. Canada's
Counter-Memorial,at pages 10and 11, makesit absolutelyclearthat it is 10per cent ofthe Grand
Banks, not the stock, that lies outside the 200-mile limit. Moreover,since this is a "straddling"
stock,onethatmigratesinsideand outsidethe200 miles, itsdepletiononeithersideofthe200-mile
limitdepletes the entire stock.
63. It may be doubted whether Spain really misunderstandsthe position. If Spain really V
believed it fished only 10per cent of the stock,why then, why was a quota of 69 per cent of the
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) set by the European Union for Spain and Portugal in 1995?
Sixty-nine per cent, that is not anywhere close to 10 per cent!
64. In addition, there were the chronic problems of under-reporting of catches and
*
misreportingof speciesto hidefurther overfishingand depletionof straddlingstocks. Forexample,
contraryto Professor Dupuy'sassertion (CR 98/10, p. 50, para. 3l), the Estai itself was fined by - 21 -
Spainforsimilaroffencesin 1994(CanadianCounter-Memorial,Ann. 20). Theseproblems of lack
of control flaredup dramaticallyduring the fa11of 1994and early 1995. (Seeparagraph 34 and
Annexes 20 to 23 of the Counter-Memorialfor more detail.)
65. In 1995,when Greenlandhalibutwasthe onlymajor straddling groundfishstock stillleft
to fish,andwhenCanadahadtakenthe most stringentconservation and managementmeasureswith
respect to its own fleets, Spain revertedto its bad old overfishing ways. Throughthe European
Union,a unilateralquota manytimes higher - fivetimeshigher in fact - thanthat set byNAFO
was established, andonce more, Spain failedto control overfishing by its vessels.
66. As the Agent for Canada stated last Thursday, Canada has recognized its share of
responsibilityfor the Northwest Atlantic conservation crisis (CR 98111, p. 10,para. 11). Canada
has taken and continues to take the most stringent conservationand management measures with
respect to Ourvessels to protec,tand allow rebuildingof the stocks.
67. What is disappointingandtruly astonishingisthat Spainto this dayrefusesto acceptthat
itoverfishedfor manyyears andthat its actionswere a major contributionto the decline of several
straddlingstocks. It is as if the Spanish Government,likethe Bourbons, "n'ontrien oublié,ni rien
appris", or, in English, "have forgotten nothingand leamed nothing."
68. Mr. President, we are not at the merits stage. The only question,now, is whether the
1994legislation,together with its regulations,and the arrest of the Estai, were "conservation and
managementmeasures"and their "enforcement"withinthe meaningof Canada'sreservation. And
that they clearly were.
3. Article79, paragraph7, of the Rules of Court: "exclusivelypreliminarycharacter"
69. Mr. President, distinguishedJudges,1nowtum now tomyfinalpoint. Although itmakes
no formal submissionto this effect, Spain has argued thatthe issuesbeforethe Court do not have
an exclusivelypreliminary character,and that the Court should thereforeexercise its power under
Article 79, paragraph 7, of its Rules to order that the arguments onjurisdiction and the merits be
heardtogether (CR 98113, p. 12,para. 13;p. 41,para. 27; pp. 57-58,paras. 14-15). As the basisforthis argument,Spainclaimsthat a considerationof the meritsis necessaryto determinewhether
the measures taken by Canadawere truly "conservationand managementmeasures".
70. In Canada's view, Sir, the question of the application of its reservation is clearly
preliminary. The Court already has before it al1the material it needs to make a determination on
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court said so itself in its Order of 8 May 1996, whenit rejected Spain's
request for a second round of written pleadings, holding that it was sufficientlyinformed of the
contentionsofthe Parties onthe facts and the lawwith respecttojurisdiction; that was the Court's
holding.
71. Sincethe changein its Rules in 1978-1979,the Court has in fact veryrarely determined
I
that any objectionto jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminarycharacter. Al1three
cases in which it has joined preliminary objections to the merits were very different from the
present case. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the objection based upon the
Vandenbergreservation required a determination of which States would be affected by the
Judgment. Logically, this could not beknown until the main lines of the decisionon merits were
clear. Our own case is verydifferent. In the Lockerbie cases,the Court held that the arguments
of the two Respondents had the character of a defence on the merits. In fact the question on the
merits - the relationship betweenthe Montreal Convention andthe SecurityCouncil resolutions
andthe effectof the latteruponthe former - was exactlythe sarnequestionasthe questionon the V
third preliminaryobjection. Again, Ourcase is clearly very different. In the Cameroon v. Nigeria
case, the issue on the eighth preliminary objection was whether the maritime boundarybetween
Cameroon andNigeria would affect the rights of other States. This objection didnot possess an
exclusivelypreliminary character,because third States, whose rights or claims might be affected,
4
hadat this stage madeno attemptto intemene andmake theirclaims known,andthe boundaryhad
to be deliberatedupon bythe Courtbefore it couldbe knownwhether ornottherights of suchthird
States would be affected. Once again, Ourcase is very different. - 23 -
72. In Ourcase,there arenothird Statespotentiallyaffected, sothe decisionsinMilitary and
Paramilitary Activitiesand in Cameroon v. Nigeria are not relevant. Furthermore,the questions
onjurisdiction andthe questionson the meritsare quitedistinct, sothe decisionsinLockerbie have
no relevance.
73. Mr.President,the Judgment in Oil Platformsmakes clearthat in orderto avoid goingto
the merits unnecessarily,the Court shouldfully examinethe issue ofjurisdiction at the preliminary
phase. This is in accordancewith Article 79, paragraph6, of the Rules, which States that:
"Inorderto enabletheCourttodetermineitsjurisdiction atthepreliminarystage
of the proceedings,theCourt,whenever necessary,may requestthe partiesto argueal1
questions of law and fact, and to adduce al1evidence, which bear on the issue."
74. Canada believes that the Court already has before it an abundance of fact and law
regardingthe generaldefinitionsof "conservationand management measures" and"enforcement",
as well assufficient informationon the facts and law related to this case to determinethat al1the
measures takenbyCanadaandal1the matters - legalandfactual - complained ofby Spainarose
from or concemed conservation and management measuresand their enforcement.
75. In conclusion, Sir,inurview, Canada'sobjectionpossesses anexclusivelypreliminary
characterandthe Court already hasbefore it al1the argumentson fact and lawand al1the evidence
it requires to determine whetheror not it does havejurisdiction in this case.
76. Mr. President, distinguished Members of theCourt, that isl11 haveto Sayat this stage.
Could 1ask you to cal1on my colleague, Professor Weil?
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Hankey. 1cal1on Professor Weil.
M. WEIL : Monsieur le président,Madame, Messieurs lesjuges,
1. Au moment où cette procédure oraleapproche de sa fin, je ne peux m'empêcher de
constaterqu'unefoisde plus lathèsede nos adversairesa été modifiée.Une fois de plus,nos amis
espagnolsnous condamnent à un tir sur cible flottante. Nous venons en effet d'assisterluàdla
dernièreétaped'une opération de prestidigitation qui s'estdérouléen trois étapes. -24 -
2. Dans un premiertemps, l'Espagnes'estattachée à l'interprétation motour motde chacun
des termesde la réservede manière à montrer que notreaffaire n'estpas couverte par la réserve.
i
On discutait du sens du mot «mesures»;on soutenaitque les mesures,c'étaitla loi et non pas les
règlements;on s'attachaitau mot «navires»dont on disait qu'ilne visait que les bateauxapatrides
et leurs équivalents. On prenait soin cependant de souligner que ce n'est pas la validitéde la
réserveque l'on contestait mais seulement «une certaine interprétation decelle-ci))(mémoirede
l'Espagne,p. 68-69, par. 38-39).
3. Dans un secondtemps, plus précisémena tu cours du premiertour des plaidoiries orales,
nous avons assisté à une premièremétamorphose.On nous a expliquéque l'affaire n'avait rien à I
voir avecla protection des poissons et avait toàtvoir avec le titre du Canada sur la haute mer et .
avec le recours à la force. Nous étionstout simplement,nous a-t-on dit,en dehors du champ de
la réserve. C'est cettethèse fondéesur la substitutionde la nature et de l'importancedes normes
applicablesà l'objetdu différend,pierre angulaire de laréserve,queje me suis efforcéd'analyser
et de dénoncer dansma précédente plaidoirie.
4. Et voici maintenant la troisièmeétape,plus spectaculaireencore. Aprèsavoirdénaturé la
réservesousprétextedel'interpréter,aprèsl'avoi mrisedecôtéen la court-circuitant, l'Espagnevient
tout simplement de la faire disparaître. Laréserve canadienne,nous a-t-on dit, n'aaucun champ
d'application,il n'ya rien auquel elle puisse s'appliquer,elle n'exclut riende la compétence dela w
Cour, elle n'a aucune réalitéobjective, elle est une pure et simple nullité. Voici en effet ce que
nous avonsentendu avant-hier
«the Canadian reservation ispro tanto a nulliS... The Canadianreservation has no
objectiverealityorvalidity underinternationallaw...[It]excludesnothing,sinceitcan
applyto nothing.)) (CR 98/13,p. 37, par. 8 et p. 48, par. 61.)
Apparemmentl'Espagnea penséquelameilleuremanière de franchirlabarrière delaréserve
canadienneétaittout simplementd'ennier l'existenceet de suggérer à la Cour de faire comme si
elle n'existaitpas. - 25 -
5. C'estbien àune opérationde prestidigitationque ces mutations successives font penser:
la colombe devient foulard, età la fin, hop, lechapeau est vid!
6. Tout ceci, Monsieurle président,me paraît assez regrettable. Le demandeur a le devoir
de placer le défendeuren face de thèsesjuridiques bien définies. Jouer,comme le font nos
adversaires,de la polyvalencedes thèses etde l'ambiguïtdes argumentationsn'estpas compatible
avec les exigences d'uneprocédurejudiciaire internationale. Ce ne serait encore rien àichaque
stade de l'évolution,la thèsenouvelle remplaçaitla thèseprécédente.Mais non, elles coexistent,
se superposent et s'entrecroisent l'infini.
*
7. Cette remarque faite, le moment me semble venu de revenir à l'essentielà la simplicité
de la véritéjuridique, débarrasséde toutes les scories argumentaires.uckto basics en quelque
sorte. Le problème auquel laCour doit apporterune réponse seramène à deuxquestions : Quelle
réserve ? Quel différend ? En adoptantcette approche,je croisrépondreau souhait exprimépar
M. Highet de voir le Canada établirpositivement l'incompétence de la Cour (CR 98/13, p. 36,
par. 4), ainsi qu'auxpréoccupationsde mon amiPierre Dupuy de confronter l'objetde la réserve
à celui de la requête(ibid., p. 55, par. 8).
Quelle réserve ?
8. Et tout d'abord,quelle réserv? Le critère dela réserve- la ligne de partage entre ce
qui relève dela compétence dela Cour et ce qui n'enrelèvepas - c'est l'objet dudifférend. Ce
critèrenefait aucuneplace àdesconsidérationsétrangère sl'objetdudifférend. Commej'aiessayé
de le montrer dans ma précédente plaidoirie, lorsquela Cour est incompétentepour connaître d'un
différend parce quecelui-ci se rapporte à des mesures de gestion et de conservation ou à leur
exécution,elleestautomatiquementetnécessairementincompétentepour s perononcersurlesrègles
de droit applicables ou sur leur violation alléguée.Je ne reviendrais sur ce point. - 26 -
9. Cetteobservationn'épuise toutefoispas le débat. Lesrédacteursde laréservecanadienne,
quiconnaissaientle concept et leterme d'«objetdu différend)e )mployépar l'article40 du Statutde
laCour et par l'article38, paragraphe 1,du Règlement,auraientpu exclurede la compétence de la
Courles différends ayantpour objet desmesuresde gestionet de conservation,etc. Dans ce cas-là,
seuls auraient étéexclus de la compétencede la Courles différendsayant directementpour objet
des mesures de gestion et de conservation. Mais ce n'est pasce qu'ilsont fait. Ils ont eu recours
à une expression différente. En excluant de la compétencede la Cour les ((différendsauxquels
pourraient donnerlieu les mesures de gestion et de conservation))(disputes arising out of or
concerning conservationand managementmeasures),le Canada a conféré à sa réserveun champ
I
d'applicationpluslarge ques'ils'étaitréféréaux((différendsayantpourob djeestmesures de gestion
et de conservation)). La volontéde définirles différends soustraits à la compétencede la Cour de
manièregénériquee,t non pas spécifique,est illustrée par ladouble formulede la yersion anglaise
(arisingout ofor concerning)qui éclairela formule unitaire de la version française :((différends
auxquels pourraient donner lieu». Les deux versions faisant foi l'uneet l'autre,elles s'éclairent
mutuellement.
10. Une formule générique de ce genre figure dans nombre de déclarations facultatives,et
n'estpas le fmitdu hasard. Au fil des déclarationspubliéesdans l'Annuairede la Cour, on relève
maintes expressionstout aussi volontairement génériques : ((disputesrelating to or connected J
with ...disputes concerning ...disputes withregard to matters which ...disputes concerningany
question relatingto or arisingoutof...,disputesarisingoutof...,disputesarising under ...disputes
with regard to ...,différends relatifsà des questions qui ..» (j'ai citéles versions originales des
déclarations,sans les traductions du Greffe).
11. Que ces expressions soient plus larges que l'expression : ((différendayant pour objet)),
celaest illustré demanièredécisive parl'affaire duPlateau continentalde lamerEgée, à laquelle
ilfautune foisdeplus revenir. Saisied'unerequêtetendant à la délimitationduplateau continental
entre la Grèceet la Turquie, et en présenced'une réserve excluant les ((différend asyant trait au - 27-
statut territorial de la Grèce))((disputesrelating to the territorial status of Greece)), la Cour a
indiqué que
«la questionàtrancher ...n'estpas de savoirsi lesdroitssur leplateau continentalsont
des droits territoriaux ou s'ilssont compris dans l'expression((statutterritor...)La
vraie question à trancher est de savoir si le différenda trait [relates dans le texte
anglais faisant foi de l'arrêt]u statut territorial de la Grèce.)) (Les mots a trait en
français et relates en anglais sonten italiquesdans le texte de l'arrêt;.I.J. Recueil
1978, p. 34, par. 81.)
La vraie question est de savoir, a expliquéla Cour un peu plus loin,
«si le différenda ((traitau statut territorial de la Grèce»et non de savoir si les droits
contestés doivent êtredu point de vue juridique considéréscomme des droits
«territoriaux»»(op. cit., p. 36, par. 86).
En conséquence,a estiméla Cour, alors même qu'undifférendportant sur la délimitationdu
plateau continental ne peut êtreregardé,il ne le peut pas, comme ayant pour objet des droits
territoriaux, parce que le plateau continental ne fait pas partie du territoire deatcôtier, il doit
néanmoinsêtreconsidéré comme ayanttrait à des droitsterritoriaux,parce que les droits de I'Etat
riverain sur le plateau continentaldériventde la souverainetéde 1'Etatsur son territoire.
12. 11est incontestable, on le voit, qu'en soustrayant à la compétence dela Cour les
((différendsauxquelspourraientdonner lieu» (arisingout ofor concerning) desmesuresde gestion
et de conservation, la réserve canadiennes'est référée à un concept plus large que celui de
((différendayantpour objet des mesures de gestion et de conservation)). Le texte est clair, et
l'intentionqui se trouve derrièrece texte ne l'estpas moins, à savoir :pour êtrecouvert par la
réserve, il n'estpas nécessaireque le différendait pour objet direct, spécifiqueet exclusif des
mesures de gestion et de conservation; ilsuffit qu'ilait étoccasionnépar de telles mesures, qu'il
soit en relation avec de telles mesures.
13.Je noteenpassant queleprofesseur Sinchez Rodriguezm'aaccuséd'avoir«habilement»,
par une (ambiguïtécalculée»,gardéun «silence scrupuleux»(toutes ces expressionssont de lui)
sur leterme «exécution» (CR98/13,p. 15-16,par. 3)et de n'avoirparlé engénéraq lue de mesures
de gestionet de conservation. Jevoudrais immédiatementlerassurer, en même tempsque laCour. - 28 -
Sij'ai parlé la semainedernière, et sije contiàuparler aujourd'hui,de mesures degestion et de
conservation, sans ajouterà chaque fois «ou de leur exécution)),c'est uniquement par souci de
brièveté. Derrièreceraccourci, il n'ya ni ambiguïté,ni calcul,ni stratagème. Qu'ilsoit donc bien
entenduque lorsqueje parle de mesures de gestionet de conservation,je me réfèen même temps
à l'exécutionde ces mesures.
14.Monsieurleprésident,unefoisacquisque, pour être soustraià lacompétencede laCour,
il faut et il suffit quele différend aiàdes mesures de gestion et de conservation,le problème
est réglet l'incompétencede laCourétablie,tantilparaîtévidentque le différend soumislaCour
par larequêteespagnoleatrait, serapporteàdesmesurescanadiennesde gestionetdeconservation.
1
S'il faut pousser la réflexion plus loin, c'est parce que l'Espagne, dans sa recherche d'une
échappatoire,aentreprisuneopérationdedisqualificationdesmesurescanadiennes. Cetteopération
tend àdénier aux mesurescanadiennes- loi C-29,règlementsd'application,exécutionde la loi et
des règlementsvis-à-vis de l'Estai- la qualité demesures de gestion et de conservationsur un
double plan.
15.Rationemateriae- sije puisemployercette expression- soutientlapartieadverse,les
mesures canadiennesne peuvent pas recevoirle label de mesures de gestion et de conservation.
Nous avons montré,tout au long de nos plaidoiries,à quel point cette vue est erronée. Comme
vient de le rappeler M. Hankey et comme M. Willis le démontreraplus en détail, les mesures -w#
canadiennes sont de celles qui sont classiquement et couramment prévuespar les conventions
internationaleset leslégislationsnationalespour la protectiondes ressources halieutiquesdans les
zones sous juridiction nationale. On nous a reprochéd'invoquer à cet égard l'article73 de la
convention de 1982et de faire mine d'oublier quece texte définit lespouvoirs de 1'Etatcôtiàr
l'intérieurde la zone de 200 milles alors que dans notre affaire il s'agit de mesures appsnquéee
haute mer. C'estlà, Monsieur le président,confondre leontenudes mesures avec lelieude leur
mise enoeuvre. Ceque nous voulions montreren nous référan t ce texte, c'était simplemtue,
par leur contenu, par leur nature, les mesures critiquées étaientde celles qui peuvent - 29 -
raisonnablement êtreregardéescomme des mesures de gestion et de conservation. Je dis
«raisonnablement» parceque ceci n'estde toute évidencepas le cas des hypothèsesextrêmesdont
la Partie adverse a continué faire usage. Dois-jerappeler que, dans un passage souvent cité,la
Couradéclaré quedanstouslesdomaines «ledroitinternationalexige uneapplication raisonnable))
(Barcelona Traction, C.I.J.Recueil 1970, p. 48, par 93)? Quant à déterminersi une mesure de
gestionet de conservation licitel'intérieurdelazone des200 milles l'estégalementdans la haute
mer, c'estlà une tout autre question. Lanature d'une mesureest une chose,sa licéitéen fonction
de son lieu d'applicationen est une autre. Nos adversaires ont confondu les deux notions.
16.Les motifs derrièrecette confusion ne sont pas difficileà déceler. N'ayantsans doute
pas uneconfiancetrèsgrande dans ladisqualificationdesmesures canadiennesentant que mesures
de gestion et de conservation sur le plan de leur contenu, nos adversaires ont soutenu que les
mesures canadiennes ne peuvent pas entout étatde cause - c'est-à-dire indépendammenm t ême
de leur contenu - être qualifieesde mesures de gestion etde conservation en raisonde leur lieu
d'applicationratione loci, si je puis dire. Les Etats côtiers, ont-ils résur tous les tons, ne
peuvent prendre aucune mesure degestion et de conservation en haute mer, au-delà de la limite
extérieurede leur zone des200 milles. Il n'existetout simplement,ont-ilsaffirmé,aucune mesure
de gestionet de conservationen haute mer. Detelles mesures,ont-ils énoncé, «donot and cannot
exisb (CR 98/10, p. 7), sont une «non-existent rubric» et «do not exist in international law»
(CR 98/13, p. 38, par. 12). Parler de mesure de gestion et de conservation, utiliser le mot de
mesurede gestion et de conservationau-delàdes200 milles, ont-ils proclamé,est un non-sens,une
contradiction dans les termes (CR 98/10, p. 17).
17.Nous avonsmontré,mes collègueset moi-mêmeq , ue la notion demesures de gestionet
de conservationest neutreen ce sens qu'elleest indépendante dulieu où ces mesures s'appliquent.
Une mesure donnéegarde la même nature, qu'elle s'exerc deans une zone dejuridiction nationale
ou en haute mer. La question desavoir si elle est licite ou non est une autre question, c'estune
question de fond. - 30 -
18.Monsieur le président, selonses propres termes, laréservecanadiennevise les mesures
de gestion et de conservation prises par le Canada pour les navires pêchant«dans la zone de
réglementationde I'OPANO, telle que définie dans la convention sur la future coopération
multilatéraledansles pêchesde l'AtlantiqueduNord-Ouest)). Et commentcetteconventiondéfinit-
elle la zone de réglementationde I'OPANO ? Dans son article II, paragraphe 2, nous lisons très
exactementce qui suit :«La zone ci-aprèsappelée((zonede réglementation))désignlea partie de
la zone de la convention qui s'étend au-dedes régionsdans lesquellesles Etats côtiers exercent
leur juridiction en matière depêche.))(Annexe 21, mémoire de l'Espagnep ,. 323.)
19. Selon ses propres termes, la réserves'appliquedonc à la zone de réglementationde
*
I'OPANO, doncen hautemer. Ceci est illustrégraphiquementsurlacarte qui figuresousl'onglet7
du dossier remisà la Cour. L'argument de l'Espagne selon lequel parlere mesures degestion et
de conservation est un non-sens parce que de telles mesures «do not and cannot exisb),cet
argument, Monsieur le président,Madame,Messieurs lesjuges, s'effondrecommeun château de
cartes parce qu'ilrésoutla question par laquestion. C'estpour échappercette constatationtoute
simple, qui condamne sans appel leur tentative d'échapper la réserve,que nos adversaires sont
allés dansleursdernières plaidoiriesla limiteextrêmedu négationnismejuridique.Il n'existepas
de réserve excluant des mesuresde gestion et de conservation canadiennes dans la zone de
réglementationde I'OPANO,il n'enexiste pas, dit àprésentl'Espagne,il n'enn'existe pas,parce w
qu'il ne peutpasy en avoiret qu'ilne doit pasy en avoir. La réserveconclut l'Espagneest réputée
non écrite,elle est nulle et non avenue.
20. Quantà l'accusation,répétéaevecinsistanceparlesconseilsde l'Espagneetreprisejusque
dans ses conclusions finales, selon laquelle le Canada préteàdla maîtrise de la définitiondes
mesures qu'il entend protéger par la réserveet cherche ainsià priver la Cour de son pouvoir
souveraind'appréciationde sa propre compétence j, nem'yattarderaipas :M. Willisreprendrace
point en détail. Permettez-moisimplementde dire que laréservecanadiennen'arien d'uneréserve
automatiquepar laquelle le Canada prétendraitimposer ses vues à la Cour. La situationest très - 31 -
simple, l'Espagnea exposéses vues sur le sens et la portéede la réserve;le Canadaa exposéles
siennes. La Cour trancheradans laplénitudedesonpouvoir envertude l'article36,paragraphe 6,
de son Statut. Rien de plus, rien demoins.
Quel différend?
21. J'enarrive ainsi, Monsieur le présidentà ma seconde question. Quel différend ?
Nos adversaires ont revendiqué lundi«le droit et le privilège))de définir librementet
discrétionnairementl'objet dudifférend. L'agent de l'Espagnea déclaré ce qui suit:
«Dans une procédure devant la Cour, ce n'est pas 1'Etat défendeur, en
l'occurrence le Canada, qui définitI'objet du différend. C'est le demandeur, en
l'occurrencel'Espagne,qui a ce droit et ce privilège.)) (CR 98/13,p. 8, par. 1.)
22. Le professeur Sanchez Rodriguez a répété cette affirmation:
((c'estle demandeur qui fixe l'objet [du différend]même sicela ne plaît pas au
défendeur;mais il n'appartientjamais à ce dernierde remplacerle demandeurdans la
définitionde I'objetdu différend.L'objetest celuidécritpar l'Espagne..» (CR 98/13,
p. 15,par. 2.)
Et c'esten vertu de cette prérogative auto-proclamée que l'agentet les conseils de l'Espagne ont
décidé que l'objetdu différend,c'est«le défautde titre du Canadapour agir en haute mer...Voilà
l'objetdu différend)),a déclarél'agentde l'Espagne (CR 98/13,p. 8, par.1)- et cettedéfinition,
ont-ils laisséentendre, fait droit et s'imposela Cour.
23. Cette approche, Monsieur le président,est inacceptable. La Cour a poséleprincipe que
c'est essentiellement dans les conclusions du demandeur «qu'il fautrechercher l'expressiondes
demandes sur lesquelles la Cour doit statuer)) (Droit de passage sur territoire indien,
C.Z.J.Recueil 1960, p. 27). Mais si le demandeur est maître de ses conclusions, et si ces
conclusions déterminentla nature de la demande, l'objet du différendq,uant à lui, est déterminé
objectivementpar la Cour elle-même. C'est à la Cour qu'il appartient- dit-on dans les arrêts sur
lesEssais nucléaires- «d'analyserde façonprécisela demandeque [I'Etatrequérant] luiadresse
dans sa requête))e,t «c'est par rapport à la requêteque la Cour doit examiner la nature ..du
différendportédevant elle)) (Essais nucléaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 260, par. 24 et p. 463,par. 24). L'objet du différendse détermineobjectivement sur la base de la demande de 1'Etat
requérant,mais c'està la Cour qu'il appartientde déterminercequ'ellea appeléla «vraie question
soumise à la Cour))(Nottebohm,C.I.J.Recueil1955, p. 16), le «véritable problèmeen cause))
(EssaisnucléairesC, .I.J. Recueil 1974,p. 262,par. 29etp. 466, par.30). L'Espagneestainsi prise,
je lenoteau passage,enflagrantdélitdupéché qu'elle reproch si injustementauCanada : lepéché
d'atteinte au pouvoir de la Cour d'appréciersa propre compétenceau titre de l'article 36,
paragraphe6, du Statut.
24. Quelle est donc, dans la présente affaire, la «vraie question))soumise Cour par la
requêteespagnole ? Je viens de le dire, c'eàtla Cour qu'ilappartient de la déterminer. Et, w
conformément à sajurisprudence, elle le fera objectivementsur la baseet au vu des conclusionsde
la requête,utrementdit de la «natureprécise delademande)),theprecise natureoftheclaim,pour
reprendre le vocabulaire de l'article 38de son Règlement.
25. Les conclusions de la requête espagnole demandent à la Cour de déclarerque la
législationcanadienne,dansla mesureoùelles'appliqueenhautemer, «estinopposableau royaume
d'Espagne». L'agentet les conseils de l'Espagneont souligné quesi l'Espagnedemande que la
Iégislatiocanadienneluisoitdéclarée inopposable,c'estparceque cette Iégislatet sonexécution
constituent,à ses yeux, des actes internationalement illicites qui engagentla responsabilité
internationaleduCanadaenvers l'Espagneen qualitéd'Etatlésé. 'agentet lesconseilsde l'Espagne w
ont étéà ce sujet d'uneclarté parfai:el'Espagnedemande que la Cour déclare quela Iégislation
canadienneet son exécution sontdes faits internationalement illicitesengageant la responsabilité
internationaledu Canada envers l'Espagne. L'agentde l'Espagnea déclaré en toute lettr:
«Les lois canadiennes ..constituent des faits illicites internationau...
[Ll'applicationde la Iégislation canadienaux navires de pêcheespagnols en haute
merconstitueunfaitilliciteinternational,engageantlaresponsabilitéduCanadaenvers
l'Espagne.» (CR 9819,p. 19-20, par.9.)
Nos contradicteurs se sont abondamment référé aux concepts et termes de responsabilité
internationale, de faits illicites internationaux, d'EtatIésé, etc.(CR 98/9, p. 31, par. 12; p. 32,
par. 15; p.20, par. 9; p. 40, par. 2; p. 46, par. 20; p. 47, par 22; p. 49, par. 27; p. 51, Par. 32; - 33-
CR 98/10, p. 27). Ce que l'Espagne demande àla Cour par lapremièrede ses conclusions, c'est
unedéclaration judiciaired'illicéit. emanièreplusprécise,laloi C-29 constitue,selon l'Espagne,
un fait illicite continuau sens où l'entendl'article41 du projet d'articlessur la responsabilité des
Etats adoptépar la Commission du droit international en 1996 (CR 9819,p. 20, par. 9; p. 37,
par. 19).
26. L'Espagne, nous a-t-on expliqun,e secontentecependantpas de demander àla Courune
simple((déclarationjudiciaire sur la conditiondélictueusede la législationet desactes du Canada))
(CR 9819,p. 51, par. 32). Elle demandecertes que la violation par le Canadade ses obligations
internationalesfasse l'objetde ce qu'ellea appeléune ((déclarationréparatoire))(CR 9819,p. 12,
par. 2),mais àcejugement de caractèredéclaratoireelle demande àla Courd'ajouterunjugement
«à caractèreplus normatif))(CR 9819, p.51, par. 32; voir aussi CR 98110, p.35). Elle demande
à laCourdetirer lesconséquencesdeladéclarationd'illicéitédemandée C.esconséquences,l'agent
et les conseils de l'Espagneles ont décritesde manièresdiverses en recourant aux concepts et au
vocabulaireduprojetd'articlesde laCommissiondudroit international. Ilsont parléde satisfaction
judiciaire, de cessation, d'assurances et garanties de non-répétition,de réparation du préjudice
d'ordremoral et d'ordrematériel(CR 9819,p. 12, par. 2; p. 20, par. 9; p. 32,par.p. 40, par. 2;
p. 41, par 4; p 46, par. 20; p..47, par.22; p. 49, par.27; p. 50, par. 30; p. 51, par. 32).
27. Tout est clairà présent. La demande espagnole est une demande en responsabilité
internationale du Canada en raison de la prétendueviolation par le Canada des obligations
internationalesquilui incombenten vertudes principeset règlesdu droit internationalgénéral.La
((véritablequestion)) laquelle la Cour est inviàéapporter une réponse, le ((véritaeroblème))
sur lequel la Courest invitée parla requêespagnole à statuer, c'est de déterminersiles mesures
canadienneset leurexécution - loi C-29,règlements,actionvis-à-visde l'Est-aiconstituent,ou
ne constituent pas, des faits internationalement illicites susceptibles d'engager laresponsabilité
internationale du Canada envers l'Espagne. Et la réponse à cette question, la Cour n'a pas
compétencepour la donner, et ce problème, laCour n'apas compétencepour en connaître, parce -34 -
que la réserve canadienne exclutde sa compétenceles différends auxquelspourraientdonner lieu
les mesures litigieuses. Je tienàle répéterm, êmesi la réserve excluait, demanièreplus étroite,
lesdifférendsayantpour objet - c'est-à-direayantdirectementet exclusivementpourobjet - des
mesures de gestion et de conservationet leur exécution,le différend entreraitdéjàdans le champ
d'applicationdela réserve. A plus forte raison le différend entre-t-il dans lechampd'application
de la réserve dès lors quecelle-ci exclut, de manièrelarge et génériquel,es différendsauxquels
pourraient donnerlieu (arisingout or concerning)des mesures de gestion et de conservationou
leur exécution.
28. Monsieur le président,la question de savoirsi le Canada a, ou n'a pas,untitre pour agir
en haute mer à l'encontredenaviresbattantpavillon espagnol; la questionde savoirsi lalégislation
canadienne prévoit,ou non, un usage licite de la force; la question de savoir si dansl'incidentde
l'Estailes autorités canadiennesont fait, ou n'ont pasfait, un usage licitede la force; la question
de savoirsi la loi canadienneC-29constitue,ouneconstituepas, un délit contenuausensdu projet
d'articles dela Commission du droit international;la question, en un mot, de savoir si leCanada
a commis, ou n'a pas commis, des actes internationalement illicites, susceptibles d'engager sa
responsabilité internationaleenvers l'Espagne :ces questions-là, Monsieur le président,la Cour
aurait àles examiner si elle était compétentpeour se prononcer sur la requête del'Espagne. Mais
n'étant pascompétentepourseprononcersur la requête de l'Espagne,ellen'estpascompétente pour
se prononcer sur les problèmes de fond que cette requêtesoulève : titre, usage de la force,
juridiction pénale,etc.
29. La conclusion s'impose avecla force de l'évidence.La Cour n'apas compétencepour se
prononcer sur les conclusions de l'Espagne. La Courn'apas compétencepour se prononcersur la
licéité internationalet l'inopposabilità l'Espagnede la loi du 12mai 1994et de sesrèglements
d'application. La Cour n'a pas compétencepour se prononcer sur la licéitéinternationale du
comportementdu Canada dans l'incidentde l'Estai. La Cour n'apas compétencepourordonner la
cessation et la non-répétition des «actesdénoncés))pal r'Espagne. La Cour n'apas compétence - 35 -
pour condamnerle Canada àune réparation.En un mot,je le répète,la Cour n'apas compétence
pour statuer sur aucune des trois conclusionsde la requêtede l'Espagne.
30. Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieurs lesjuges,j'achève icimes observations. Je
vous remercie de votre patienceet vous redis l'honneuretle plaisir quej'ai eusrendre la parole
devant vous. Et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, après l'intervalle, de donnerla parole à
M. Alan Willis. Je vous prie aussi d'excuserle retard quej'ai pris a terminer mon exposé.
The PRESIDENT : Thank you, ProfessorWeil. The Court will rise for fifteen minutes.
TheCourt adjourned from 11.25to 11.40 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Mr. Willis, please.
Mr. WILLIS: Mr. President, distinguishedJudges,
1. The Reservationis Validand Therefore Must beGivena Useful Effect
1. 1begin, Mr. President,with themostremarkabledevelopmentinthe second round. 1refer
to Mr. Highet'scontentionthatthe reservationis for al1practicalpurposesa nullity, indeed "alegal
solecism of historic proportions"(CR 98/13,p. 37, para. 8; p. 38, para. 14). It need begiven no
useful effectbecause, he said, "one cannotmake something effective that is, in law, ineffective"
(CR 98/13, p. 38, para. 13).
2. The Court will recall how Spainreaches this position. For Spain there is no suchthing
as a conservation and managementmeasure on the high seas. Spain says, therefore, that the
Canadianreservation "excludesnothing, sinceit can applyto nothing"(CR 98/15, p. 48, para.61).
3. The notion that theCanadian reservation applies to nothing and is totally ineffective,
whatever the circumstances, represents a dramatic change of position. The Spanish Mernorial
concededthe validity of the reservation (paras. 38-39). It also concededthe need to give a useful
effect to the reservation,anddevoted nolessthan 13 pagesto that very issue(paras. 124-162). Al1 -36 -
that has now been abandoned in favour of a far more radical position- that the reservation is a
nullity with no effect whatsoever.
4. It is a changeof position, but at the sametime it shouldoccasion little surprise. Spanish
counselhave simply taken the basic elements of the Spanish case to their logical conclusion. If
conservationand management measuresbydefinitioncannotapplyto the high seas,then indeedthe
reservationwould becomea nullity that could neverhave anyeffect. The conclusionis implicitin
the premises of the Spanish argument.
5. What Spain has failed to recognize, however,is that its conclusionis nothing more than
a reductio ad absurdum, demonstratingconclusivelythat the whole argument from start to finish
isflatlywrong. If the essentialpostulatesof the Spanishcase lead inevitably.tothe conclusion that
the reservation can never apply, and meant absolutely nothing from the day of its adoption,
somethingmust be fundamentallywrong with the whole argument. In short,if the conclusionis
logicallyabsurd, then the premises of the argument simplyhave to be wrong.
6. And itshouldbe obviouswhat is wrong. One only ends upinthis logical impasseonthe
basis of the astonishingpropositionthat there is no such thing as a conservationand management
measure onthe high seas- even for the purposesof this reservation. Becausethe conclusion to
which al1this leads is patently absurd, the reasoning hasto be wrong.
7. 1have been speaking so far in terms of common sense and logic. Not surprisingly,the
Spanishargument that the reservation can never apply to anything is condemned by elementary
legal principles as well. In the terms of the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties, it is an
interpretation that is "manifestly unreasonable or absurd" (Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,UN Doc. AICONF.39/27 (1969)). Quiteobviously itcontradictsthe object, purposeand
intentionof the reservation. Equallyobviouslyit rules out anyeffect, usefulor not. This,in short,
is not interpretation in good faith.
8. It is not hard to see how Spain gets so far off the track. Its interpretation confuses the
definitionwith the right. It confuseswhether something hasthe characteristicsof a conservation - 37 -
and management measure with the issue of whether the measure was based on a proper right or
title. These are two separate and distinct issues. Spain of course denies this. They Saythat the
existence of a right or title is an essential definitional characteristic of a measure. But,
Mr. President, 1submitthis cannot be so for at leastthree reasons. First, as a matter of ordinary
language,conservationandmanagement measuresis a purely factualcategory - a measure is not
simply a legal concept; it is, as Spain said, any "act, step or proceeding" (Spanish Memorial,
para. 70). Second, the interpretation requires a wholesale importation of the merits into the
jurisdictional phase, andthus defeats the basic purpose of the reservation. And third, it turns the
principalconclusion of the Spanish argument - that Canada actedwithout legalright - into the
essential premise of its argument onjurisdiction.
9. Let me recapitulateby saying that Spain sees the key to the reservation in the notion of
title, which is simply a different way of saying that the measures are not conservation and
management measures because Canada had no right to take them. This approach is unsound
because it confuses definitions and rights- the nature of the measures with the rightto take the
measures - and it is demonstrablywrong because it ends up with a manifestly unreasonable or
absurd result.
10.There was some discussion again on Monday about different ways of drafting the
reservation, and in particular the drafting of Canada's1970 reservation (CR 98/13, p. 9, para. 3;
p. 34, paras. 36-37; p. 49, para. 64). But it shouldbe obvious that no possible form of words
wouldhavesatisfied Spain. No form of words would havegot aroundits false premisethat Canada
has no title, and if there is notitle the measures cannot be measures,the rights claimed couldnot
be rights, thejurisdiction exercised couldnot bejurisdiction. Spain'sfalse premise is a catch 22,
it is a blackhole that is designedto nulliQ any exclusionofjurisdiction relatingto the high seas.
And 1 come back to my point about the wording Canada chose: that it is functional, concrete,
specificand deadly accurate - and aboveal1it is infinitely betterthan the sweepingexclusionsof
jurisdiction that Spain seemsto prefer. - 38 -
11.1 note,ashasthe DeputyAgent,thatMr. Highethasidentifiedthree new so-calledclaims
on behalf of Spain (CR98/13, pp. 49-50, paras. 67-70). But they al1arise out of the Canadian
legislation and regulations respecting conservation and management measures in the NAFO
Regulatory Area,and their subsequent enforcement against Spanish vessels.
12.Mr. President,changingthe labels willget Spainnowherewhenthe underlyingreality is
still what is described in the reservation. Calling it an extension ofjurisdiction, or a violation of
high seas freedomschanges nothing, when the measuresare still exactlywhat is referred to in the
text ofthe reservation. One canrefer to the title as a 'Iprius"or a 'Ipréalabl,ut again it changes
nothing, because an exclusion of jurisdiction with respectto a measure not only includes but is
J
above al1an exclusion ofdisputes about the legal right to take those measures (CR 98/10, p. 12,
para. 26; CR 98/13, p. 9, paras. 3-4; p. 33, para. 34). Here, as elsewhere, Spain assumes that
giving the subject-matterof the dispute a new and somewhatgrander label will take it out of the
reservation. But it will not - not so longasthe measuresremainwhatthey are, conservationand
management measures taken and enforced by Canadawith respectto vessels fishing in the NAFO
Regulatory Area.
2. Canada has Never Treated the Reservation as "Automatic" or Self-Judging
13.Last week and again on Monday, Spain conjured up the spectre of an automatic,
self-judging reservationinconsistent with the Court'ssovereignpowerto adjudicate upon its own '*I
jurisdiction, pursuantto Article 6, paragraph6, of the Statute(CR 98/10, pp. 51-53,paras. 33-36;
CR 98/13, pp. 58-60,paras. 16-20). This, Mr. President, is a false issue and a diversion because
it rests upon a fundamentalmisrepresentation ofthe Canadian position. Spain has knocked over
a straw man of its own invention.
14.The thrust of the argument was that Canada was attempting to determine uniIaterally,
through its own domestic legislation, what is and what is not a conservation and management
measure. Professor Dupuy saidthat on the Canadianview, anythingdeJned as a conservationand
management measure by Canada in its legislation would inevitably come within the terms of the -39 -
reservation,and give Canadaabsolute dominion overthejurisdiction of the Court,contraryto the
Statute.
15. There isone basicproblemwiththis argument. It is untrue. There is nohintof any such
position in the Canadianarguments. We have never suggested thatanything Canadaor Canadian
legislation unilaterally defines as a conservation and management measure is ipso facto a
conservationandmanagement measurefor the purposes of the reservation. We did notinclude in
the text of the reservation the words "in the opinion of Canada", or "as defined by Canadian
legislation". And, we have never suggestedthat the reservation shouldbe interpretedas if those
words were there.
16. Last week myown pleading wassubstantially devotedto a detailed examinationof the
substantive terms of the relevantCanadian legislation and regulations. The whole point was to
satis@the Court that when the actual contentof al1these measures isconsidered,they iireclearly
conservation and management measuresin terms of their subject-matter,purpose, and function.
That entire demonstrationwouldhavebeenpointless, indeed,self-contradictory,ifCanada'sposition
was that the mere designation of something as a conservation and management measure by
Canadian legislation automaticallybrings it within the reservation.
True, there is a unity of purposebetweenthe legislationandthe reservation - they are both
concerned with conservation and management in the NAFO Regulatory Area, and clearly the
reservation was intendedto coverthe legislation andeverythingdoneunderthe legislation. Butthat
falls far short of the extravagantposition imputedto Canada by Professor Dupuy.
18. Mr. Highet put the sarne argument in slightly different terms. His contentionwas that
the "heart of Canada's defence"is an appeal to subjectivity in the interpretation of reservations
(CR 98/13, pp. 44-45,para. 45; p. 48,para. 61). Specifically,hispoint seemedto bethat Canada's
approachwas wrong because it placedthe emphasis in identifyingconservation and management
measures on the end soughtby Canada, not on the means we used. 19.But again,Mr. President,this was not Ourposition. Last week 1saidthe legislationand
regulations were conservation and management measures in the light of their subject-matter,
finction and purpose (CR 98/12, pp. 17-18, paras. 80-83). The objective is important, but the
subject-matter and fùnction are even more so. There is nothing inherently subjective about this
approach. Spain's arguments again are aimed at positions that Canada has never adopted.
20. We thought we had laid this issue to rest in paragraph 62 of the Canadian
Counter-Memorial. Our position, as we stated it there,is that what counts is the declaring State's
intention when the declaration wmfiled, and that such intention must be objective&determined
It is for the Court to interpret the
through the text and al1 the surrounding circumstances. J
reservation. That has always been Ourposition. There is accordingly no genuine issue under
Article 36, paragraph 6, to be consideredin this proceeding.
3. The Measures are "Conservationand ManagementMeasures"
21. The Court is now familiar with the Canadian conservation and management measures
whoseenforcementtriggeredthisdispute. 1saidlastweektheywerethemostordinay conservation
and managementmeasuresthat couldbe imagined (CR98/12,p. 14,para. 66). Theonlythingthat
makes them different is the fact that they were applied by Canada to a zone just beyond the
200-mile limit, the NAFO Regulatory Area.
w
22. The Courtwill recall the seven specificmeasuresappliedto Spanishvessels by Table V
of the Canadian regulations(Tab 9 of the materialprovidedto the Court by Canada last week). It
was the first measure on the list, the prohibition on fishing Greenland halibut,that led to the
dispute. And in paragraph 75 of its Memorial, Spain made an important admission about the
character of this measure. In translation,the relevant passage reads,"Theren be no doubt that
the prohibitionconcerning,forexample,the fishing of Greenland halibutis a 'measure'constituting
a 'conservationandmanagementmeasure'."A remarkableadmission; and a conclusiveadmission.
True, in the followingparagraph Spain qualifies its concession by saying that conservation and
management measures can only be consideredas such when taken in the areas where the coastal - 41 -
State hasjurisdiction. But that of course is simply one more wayof stating the central fallacy of
the Spanishcase that the reservation does not apply because Canada acted illegally,which on the
one hand is a statement about the merits, not jurisdiction, and on the other leadsto the logical
impasse of a reservation that can never apply to anything at all.
23. 1referred last week to Article 62, paragraph 4, of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
(UN Doc. AICONF. 621122and Corr. 1to 11(1982); CR 98111, pp. 60-61,para. 40). This is a
list, but only an illustrative list, of conservation measures and other coastal State laws and
regulations pertaining to fisheries. It applies to the exclusiveeconomic zone, and 1cite it onlyto
show what such measures are generally understoodto mean in terms of substanceand content,as
opposed to where they apply geographically. Measures "determiningthe species which may be
caught" are referred to in paragraph(b) of this paragraph. Measures relating to "areas of fishing"
are referredto in paragraph (c). Both provisionsdescribe the subject-matter of the measure that
gave rise to this case: it was a prohibition on fishing a species- Greenland halibut - in a
specified area- NAFO Divisions 3L, 3M, 3N and 30. The other six items in Table V of the
Canadian Regulations, as well, are al1 clearly covered in the list of Article 62,
paragraph 4 - paragraph (c) on gear specifications,paragraph(4 on the permissiblesizesof fish,
paragraph (e)on informationand statistics,which is what Ourfishing log requirementis al1about,
and paragraph fi)on enforcementprocedures.
24. International conventions show that conservation and management measures like these
also apply to the high seas. The 1995 United Nations Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory
Species Convention is merely the latest of a long line of such instruments, and it uses the
expression "conservation and management measures" throughout - and of course the whole
subject-matterof the Convention is the high seas.
25.consider, as 1 suggested last week, the list of NAFO measures set out in Canadian
Annex 10- measures that also apply to the high seas. Theyare, through and through, the very
same kind of measures as the conservation and management measures Canada applied to theSpanish fleet - species and area closures, gear specifications,size limits of fish, enforcement
procedures, etc. On Monday, Professor Remiro Brotons said the whole reservation should be
i
interpreted on the basis of the NAFO Convention(CR 98/13, pp. 32-33, paras. 30-33). This is
clearly wrong, because the reservation singles out one and onlyone element ofthis Convention,
which is the definition of the "RegulatoryArea". It provides no basis for importing the entire
Convention intothe text of the reservation - but it is unclearwhere the point could lead in any
event, sincethe character,subject-matterandpurposeof theCanadianmeasuresisexactlythe same
as that of the NAFO measures?
26.1opena parenthesishere. Spanishcounselhave suggestedOurmeasureshaveto be based
ril
on the NAFOmeasures, andthat ours were not. We could simplyrespondthat this a nonsequitur
and irrelevant,because it makes no difference to jurisdiction. That would be a complete and a
correct answer. But in the interests ofclarity, 1must add that Spain is quitewrong on this. The
reason, and the only reason, we imposed a prohibition on fishing Greenland halibut from
3 March 1995for the remainder of the year is that the European quota adopted by NAFO had
already been caught, and infact overfishedby that date. Spainquestions this, by confusing the
quota set by NAFO and the quota set unilaterallyby the EuropeanUnion (CR 98/13, pp. 17-18,
para. 5). By 3 March 1995,Canada had estimatedthat Spanishvessels had caught well over the
NAFO quotaof 3400 tons - an estimate later confirmedby EUstatements as well as the fishing W
statisticsfor 1995as published by NAFO(Northwest AtlanticFisheries Organization,Provisional
Nominal Catches for 1995, NAFO SC Working Paper 97/12; Canadian Counter-Memorial,
Ann. 31). Sothe suggestionthat the Canadian conservationand management measures were not
directly relatedto the NAFOmeasures is plainly wrong. Butmore important,Mr. President - it
is irrelevantto the issue ofjurisdiction.
27. Thebonapdes and conservationobjective of the measurescan hardly bein doubt. The
NAFO Scientific Council had issued warnings on the state of the stock (Canadian
Counter-Memorial, paras. 33-35). NAFO had called for action - in fact, had taken action -43 -
(Canadian Counter-Memorial, paras. 37-38). It ispublic knowledgethattheconservation crisis led
tothe virtual closure of an entire industry, historicallythe leading industryof Atlantic Canada. The
crisis was only too real. And as the Agent for Canada said last week, the ecological devastation
and the human impact on both sides of the Atlantic is a continuing tragedy (CR 98111, pp. 9-10,
paras. 9-10).
28. Mr. President, where does al1 this lead us? The measures are conservation and
management measures as obviously as carrots arevegetables, and Greenland halibut are fish. The
Spanish argument does not deny that, in form and substance, the Canadian measures are typical
conservation and management measures. It is therefore driven to a completely untenable
position - the position that there is no such thingas a conservation and management measure
beyond 200 miles; with the further consequencethat the reservation isa contradiction intermsthat
applies to nothing at al].
4. The Methodsof Enforcement
29. 1explained lastweek thatthe Canadian legislation and practice on the use of lawful force
is designed to ensure that force is used only as a last resort; that the purpose of the legislation is
to restrict the use of force, not to encourage it; and that force likely to lead to death or serious
injury can onlybe used under Canadian law if necessary to protecthuman life(CR 98/12, pp. 9-10,
paras. 47-50). But Spain has retumed to the issue, and 1must address it once again.
30. One can only wonder what the word "enforcement"could possibly mean, inthis context,
if it does not include a potential use of force. This is the very essence of law enforcement in
situations where suspected offenders will not CO-operate,and where they do everything in their
power to evade arrest - as did the Estai.
31. 1will not go back to Mr. Highet's parade of horrors, the torpedoes, the bombs, and the
summary executions. 1will simply remind the Court that al1this is as remote from the terms of
Ourlaws as it could possibly be. And as remote from the facts. In order to avoid any possible
controversy about this,1draw the Court'sattentiontothe facts as alleged in the Spanish Memorial. -44 -
Paragraph 13of the SpanishMemorial makes it clear that the Estai would not allowthe Canadian
authorities to board voluntarily. It refers to successive attempts-successive attempts- at
boarding. Only then were warning shots fired, in accordance with the Canadian Regulations
i
(Spanish Memorial,Ann. 17). Contrary to what was said last week, no one fired at the vessel.
Warning shots by their nature are warnings- they are shots in the vicinity but not at the vessel,
and under the Canadian Regulationsthey have to be "at a safe distance".
32. Any forciblearrest of an unwillingvessel or party impliesa possible use of force. This
is purecommon sense. If the crew ofthe vessel thinks it can get away, andif they are knowingly
in violation of the law,they willy to escape as fast as they possibly can. Especially in the case
*
of a distant-water fishing vessel from another continent. So enforcement without a potential .
recourse to coercion is inconceivabl- it may even be an oxymoron.
33. Article 73 of the 1982Law of the Sea Convention appliesto the exclusive economic
zone,not the NAFO RegulatoryArea, but itis highly informative about whatenforcementagainst
distant-watervesselsnormally entails (op.cit.). It refersto boardings, inspections,arrests,judicial
proceedings, and the detention of vessels. It isrly not assumedthat al1this will be voluntary
and CO-operative.Very few fishing vessels will voluntarily be arrested and detained by foreign
authorities. And because voluntary compliancecannot invariablybe expected, the use of some
degree of force must be contemplated where there is active resistance, or attempted flight or w
evasion. And Article 22, paragraph 1 fl of the New York Agreement on StraddlingStocksand
Highly Migratory Species, refers more explicitly to the use of reasonable force and confirmsthe
point- that enforcementagainstforeign, distant-watervessels necessarily involves,on occasion,
the threat or use of coercive measuresN Doc. AIConf. 164137(1995)).
34. The Canadian legislationand regulationson the use of force are based on the Bill C-29
amendments, but there is one important difference. Theseprovisions apply tothe 200-mile zone,
evento territorial waters, andnott to theNAFO RegulatoryArea. Canadasimplyusesthe same - 45 -
rules and proceduresfor the specialcase of the NAFO RegulatoryArea as we do for the exclusive
economic zone and territorial waters. Thereis nothing exceptional.
35. It is Sections 19-19.5of OurRegulations- in Spanish Annex 17- that prescribe the
detailed procedures on enforcement - the use of force only as a last resort, the requirement of
warningshots, the useof signal SQl. And itis highly significantMr. President,that when Canada
enacted the procedures in OurRegulations, in May 1994,not one State objectedto them. There
were no protests. In particular,the protest note of the European Union and its member States of
10 June 1994, Annex 18 of the Spanish Memorial, sets out a long list of complaints about
Bill C-29; but strikingly, andsignificantly,it makes no reference whatsoeverto the provision on
the use of disabling force. By implicationthey recognizedthat the provisionwas consistentwith
accepted international practice.
36. The common sense necessity of force in law enforcement is clear. The terms of the
relevantinternationalconventionsarealso clear. Thereisreally no needto go further. But1 would
like to reassure the Court that Canada is in step with State practice. The publicly available
legislation of many coastal States provides for the use of some force. A recent article published
bythe Second LegalAdvisertotheUKForeignand CommonwealthOfficeexaminesStatepractice
internationally and affirms that "Boarding is effected as atter of right on the part of the duly
authorizedfisheriesofficerand ifnecessarysuchofficersmayuse reasonableforceto carryouttheir
duties in the face of obstruction" (Anderson, "Investigation, Detentionand Release of Foreign
Vessels under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and Other International
Agreements" (1996) 11 Intl.J. of Marineand CoastalLaw 165 at pp. 170-171)
37. The reality is thatanadian practices are very moderate in comparison with those of
many other States. The Chroniquedesfaits internationauxin the RevueGénérale is a rich source
of information on the incidents that mise from time to time in the enforcement of fisheries
legislation (e.gRGDIP, Vol. 93, 1989, p. 150; Vol. 96, 1992, p. 643; Vol. 98, 1994,p. 202;
Vol. 99, 1996,p. 415). There have been violence and deaths. There havebeen sinkings. 1do not - 46 -
Saywe shouldmeasure what is appropriateby the standardofthe most unfortunate incidents. But
1do suggestthat if internationalpractice is the yardstick, the Canadian practices and legislation
easily passmuster. Theyare carefullydesignedto avoid violence and to preservethe safetyof life
at sea.
38. But let me distinguish whatis relevanton this issuefrom what is irrelevant. What is not
relevant at thejurisdiction stage is any assessmentof whetherthe Canadianactionswere excessive
or disproportionate or consistent with international law.There can be no question of a judicial
review or ajudicial approval ofthe Canadianenforcementlegislation or actions at this stage. Al1
that, as 1 said in the first round, would be the very issue on which the meritw sould focus
'Irir
(CR 98111,p. 60, para. 37).
39. Whatis relevant,onthe otherhand, isthe naturalway of readingtheword "enforcement"
in the contextof the purposeand intentionof this resewation. 1submit itmust, at the least,extend
to the rathermoderate enforcement proceduresset out in the Canadian legislationand used against
Spanish vesselsin 1995. Any lesser form of enforcementwould mean the foreign vessels would
simply ignortehe law enforcement authorities. They would treat them with derision, andgo on
fishing to their heart's content. And both parties have recognized that the intention of the
reservation was to protect the integrity of the legislation- Bill (2-29. It must follow, at a
minimum,that the word "enforcement"in the resewation must cover the enforcement procedures W
in Bill C-29- the enforcement procedures,in other, words used in this very case.
40. Spain argued that the legislation was somehow an extension of Canada's penal
jurisdiction. But is Spain suggesting that there should be no penalties for violations of the
conservation and management measures? That the legislation should allow the measures to be
flouted with impunity? Mr. President, any regulatory legislation has to include offences and
penalties. 1was clearlyunabletopersuadeProfessor Shchez RodriguezthatBill C-8,which isnot
fisheries legislation but general police legislation, hasan entirely humanitarianand commendable
purpose. 1remind the Court that the portionof Bill C-8 actually dealing with fisheries legislation -47 -
never entered into force. For the remainderof Bill C-8, 1can only ask the Court to look at the
legislation. It says,first, that forceelyto cause death or serious injury is notjustified unless it
is necessary forself-presewationor the preservation ofany other person - in brief, self-defence.
And in the case of an arrest,such force cannot beused againsta fleeing suspect except to protect
other persons from imminent:or future death or serious injury. Mr. President, we make no
apologies for this legislation.
5. The Reservation Was Intended to Cover Al1Vessels
41. 1 turn finally to the issue of Canada'sintentions. Spain persists in asserting there is a
"divorce"betweenCanada'soriginalintentionand the useofthe legislationagainst Spanishvessels
in 1995(CR 98/10, p.47, para. 24). Spainsaysthe original intentionwas to apply the legislation
onlyto stateless andflag of convenience vessels; that this limitationn somehowbe readintothe
reservation; and that Spain somehowhad a legitimate expectation that it would never be made
subjectto the legislation(CR 98/10, pp. 50-51,paras. 30-31). Spanishcounselreferred once again
to the discussionsof "pirate vessels" in Parliament- discussions, incidentally,on the legislation
and not the reservation - and he even raised the issue of the good faith of Minister Tobin, the
Ministerof FisheriesandOceans (CR 98/15,p. 59, para. 17; CR 98/10, pp. 48-51, paras. 25-31).
42. Without evidence, Mr. President, and without justification. The Court will remember
what the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans said to Parliament during the debates on
Bill C-29 - that any vesse1of any nationfishing at variancewith good conservation rules could
besubjecttothe legislationandtherearenoexceptions (HouseofCommonsDebates, 11 May 1994,
p. 4216, SpanishMemorial,Ann. 15). This,Mr. President,was atthe verytime, almostto theday,
whenthe reservation was filed. Senator Pettendescribed statelessvessels asthe3rst target- but
not,clearly, the onlypossibletargetof the legislation(Debatesofthe Senate, 12May 1994,p. 458,
Spanish Memorial, Ann. 16). In the pressrelease of 10May 1994,the day ofthe reservation,the
Minister of Foreign Affairs said and 1 quote, that "stateless and flag of convenience vessels
currentZy constitute the major threat" (Canadian Counter-Memorial, Ann. 35). "Currently", - 48 -
Mr. President, means at that time, not forever, not indefinitely. It also impliesthe situation could
changeand would be kept under review. The restrictive intentionSpainimputesto Canada, atthe
time the reservation wasfiled, is a pure fiction, a figment of the fertile imaginationof the Spanish
team.
43. Butthen, Spainasks, how do we explainwhy Minister Tobinsaid that underthe NAFO
system, we board, inspect, issue citations, but leavethetual prosecutions up to the flag States
(Spanish Memorial, para. 88; CR 98/10, pp. 48-49, para. 26)? And how do we explain why
Minister Tobin, inthesesarne 1994debates, saidthat Spainand Portugallive withinNAFO quotas
andparticipate fullyintheNAFO organization(SpanishMemorial,para. 117; CR 9811 0, pp. 48-49,
1
para. 26)? Mr. President,this has al1been explainedin paragraphs 24to 27 and 158to 160ofthe
CanadianCounter-Memorial. The Minister spokewithapproval of Spainin May 1994becausethe
Spanish fleet was then respecting the rules, and as a result fisheries relations betweenthe parties
were very much improved. But no one in Canada had forgotten the years of confrontation and
destructiveoverfishing. Therewas neverany guaranteethat the 1994détentewouldlast,and infact
it endedwhen the Greenlandhalibut crisis explodednot long after. Thisis why Ministers ensured,
in 1994,that the legislationhad to cover any vesselfi-omany nation, andthat the reservationalso
had to cover any vessel from any nation. And so they do.
44. In these same debates, as paragraph 159 of Our Counter-Memorial explains, U
Minister Tobin saidveryclearlythat he hopedandhe believte hdttheNAFO self-policingsystem
wouldcontinue to work. But he conveyedno assuranceand he made nocommitrnent. Inthe very
sameintervention 1 havejust referredto, he alsovowedto stopoverfishingby agreementif possible
but and - 1 quote - "by unilateral action if unilateral action is necessary" (Canadian
Counter-Memorial,para. 160). So where, precisely,is the divorce between intention andreality?
45. Mr. President,there is no such divorce. Canada'sintentionsnever changed. As Spain
well knows. Spain and the member States of the European Union knew, in May 1994, that the
legislation could be used against them; and they reacted accordingly. The Note Verbale of -49 -
10 June 1994is a strongly worded condemnationof the Canadian legislation(Spanish Memorial,
Ann. 18). Thiswas no academicissue of principlefor Spain andthe EuropeanUnion. They knew
full well, whenthe legislationwas passedand the reservationfiledin 1994,fromthe very terms of
those documents, that the legislationcould be appliedto them - that in the words of the Minister
in May 1994,that it couldbe applied to the vessels of any nation fishing at variance with good
conservation rules.
Mr. President, distinguished Judges. 1have reached my conclusion. 1am grateful for the
opportunityto have taken the podium onceagainon behalf of my Govemment. 1thank the Court
for its courteous attention,and1request the Courtto invite the Deputy Agent to the podium.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Willis. 1 cal1 on the Deputy Agent of Canada,
Mr. Hankey.
Mr. HANKEY:
1. Mr. President, distinguishedJudges, on behalf of the Government of Canada, 1wish to
thank you for your careful consideration of the issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
2. Over the past week youhave heardnumerous creative argumentsfrom our colleagueson
the Spanish side; argumentsseekingto distortthe text of Canada'sdeclarationof acceptanceofthe
Court's compulsoryjurisdiction; argumentsdirectedat subvertingCanada'sintentionatthe timethe
declaration was filed; and, ultimately, arguments intended to circumvent Canada's reservation,
which is central to these proceedings. By these means, Spain has sought through sophistryand
evasion to avoidthe one obvious conclusion: that this casis outsidethejurisdiction ofthe Court.
3. Whilewe can and docredit Spainwith considerableimagination,we must not mistake the
products of their ingenuityfor undisputed facts,good law and soundpolicy. As both Canada and
Spain have assertedthroughoutthese hearings, theconsent of Statesis a fundamentalprecondition
to the Court'sjurisdiction. Inrder for the Courtto havejurisdiction over a casethe States parties
must unquestionablyhaveconsentedto thatjurisdiction. But,in its 1994declarationacceptingthe - 50 -
Court'scompulsoryjurisdiction, Canada has excluded its consent over cases, likethis, arisingout
oforconcemingconservationand managementmeasurestakenagainstvesselsfishingintheNAFO
Regulatory Area andthe enforcement of such measures.
4
4. Mr. President,1needhardly remindthe Court that Statesare free to choosethe meansby
which they will settle their disputes. The Charter of the United Nations lists the options:
negotiation; mediation; conciliation; arbitration;orjudicial settlement.1are equallyavailable
to Stateswhen disputes arise. Yet no onemethodispreferredor required. A number of States,like
Canada, have chosenout of respect for the Court to submit to its compulsoryjurisdiction a broad
range of disputes that we consider amenableto judicial settlement. Canada has also, however,
w
exercisedits sovereignright tosettle sometypesof disputesthroughothermeans. Foremostarnong
this latter category, for the purposes of this case, are those disputes involving situations or facts
arising out of or concemingconservationandmanagement measurestaken against vessels fishing
in the NAFO Regulatory Area and the enforcement of such measures. Canada has chosen to
address such disputes throughnegotiation and international agreement.
5. And 1hasten to add that we have pursued these matters with considerablesuccess. The
Canada-European Union Agreement of 20 April 1995, which was the product of negotiations
following the events of March of that year, contained stringent conservation, management and
enforcementmeasuresapplicableto the Northwest Atlantic. The acceptanceof these measuresby *i,
al1NAFO parties in September 1995 further strengthened their effectiveness in the defence of
conservation. Multilaterally,and in realizationof another Canadian initiative, 1995also saw the
conclusion of the United Nations StraddlingStocks Convention. This Treaty when in force,will
also greatly improvethe conservation ofthe world'sshared fisheries resources.
6. Canada has thus chosen to settle differences conceming conservation and management
measures through negotiation, which was the manner it deemed most eficacious in the
circumstances. Its recognizedintention in sodoing is,of course,iticalto the interpretationofour
optional clause declarationand thus to the Court'sjurisdiction. - 51-
7. Canada amended its declaration accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on
10 May 1994,exactly the same day it introducedinto Parliament an Act to Amend the Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act, Bill C-29. The intimate link betweenthese two instruments wasand is
absolutelytransparent. Both ministerial statementsand the Governmentpressrelease announcing
these two initiatives made it perfectly clear that the conservation and management measuresto
which the declaration referredwere none otherthan the Act itselfand the measurestaken under it.
8. Spain has alleged that Canada has engaged in some form of auto-interpretation of its
reservation, seeking to impose on the text a later intention that was not there- hence Spain's
curiousreferenceto automatic reservations. Nothing could be further from thetruth. We have not
argued for some unusual esoteric interpretation. We have argued for an interpretation according
to the plain,ordinary meaning of the words to give $dl eflect to Canada's objective intention.
Throughout these proceedings,Canada has relied on contemporaneousevidence ofits intention at
the time the declaration was filed. We have no needfor creativeexpost facto rationalizations. In
the words of the TempleJudgment, which 1cited last week, Ourpurpose in adoptingthe legislation
"has never been in doubt" (CR 98111, p. 34, para. 39).
9. Intention,Sir, isthetouchstoneforinterpretingoptionalclause declarations. In somecases
before the Court, States' intentionshave been vague or tangential. But here, in the present
proceedings,the facts areas clearasthey couldbe. Canada intendedto excludefrom its acceptance
of the Court'sjurisdiction any disputesconcerningthe 1994arnendmentsto the Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act, its regulations or its enforcement. Andthis is precisely what we did.
10.Interpreting Canada'sreservation requires that we answer a simple question: werethe
measures taken by Canada and enforcedagainstthe Spanishfishingvesse1Estai, conservationand
management measures? If the answer is yes, the Court is withoutjurisdiction.
11.As we have shownthroughout Ourpleadings, the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and
Regulations, pursuant to which the Estai was boarded, arrestedand charged, are unquestionably
conservation and management measures, directed at the protection of fisheries. Al1 of Spain'srhetoricalfireworks cannotobscure that fact. Accordingly,the applicationof Canada's reservation
to the present case is inescapable.
12. In its efforts to lead the Court away fiom the plain meaning and purpose of Canada's
declaration, Spain has invented numerous interpretive methods. My colleagues have carefully 4
addressed these various techniques and there is no reason for me to revisit them now. 1 will,
however, note, with regret, that the aim of Spain'scase has been one of dissimulation. Whether
advocating,in effect,arestrictive interpretationoftionalclausereservationsor imposing specific
definitionson genericterms, Spain hasconsistentlysoughtto avoid the plain meaningof the words
actually used in Canada'sreservation. Simply readingthe text of this reservation in a natural and
*
reasonable way, and giving effect to its words and to Canada'sknown intention would not suit
Spain's purpose, for this reading could only lead to the conclusion that the Court is without
jurisdiction. Instead Spainhas soughtto createcomplication and confusionto obscurethe absence
of Canada'sconsent to jurisdiction in this case.
13. Through its various interpretivetheories and factual inventions, Spain is thus seeking
nothing iess than to undermine the principleof consent. Canada hasmanifestly not consented to
the adjudication of this sort of dispute. Its lack of consent is equally evident fiom the text of the
reservation and fiom Canada's transparent intentionat the time the 1994 declaration was filed.
Indeed, Spain has evenadmitted that Canada's intention wasto excludethis sort of case fromthe W
Court'sjurisdiction (Spanish Memorial,p. 76, para. 55; pp. 94-96,paras. 107-110). Yet, despite
that admission, Spain'scounsel have insisted that Canada's reservationshould be construed as
narrowly as possible; that because of the incompetence of Canada'slegal drafiers the words
contained in the text do not mean what they Say; and that Canada'smeasures should be assumed
to be illegal, and thus, ipsofacto, within thejurisdiction of the Court. The variations on Spain's
theme are infinite, but the theme remainsthe sarne: the Court shouldassumejurisdiction in spite
of Canada's lackof consent. - 53 -
14. If upheld by the Court,the resultof Spain'sreasoning wouldbe significant,not only for
Canada, but for al1 members of the international communitythat have chosen to declare their
acceptance of the Court'scompulsoryjurisdiction under the optional clause. That is why Canada
agrees with Mr. Highet when he calls this a "big little case". It would become bigger still if, as
Mr. Highet wishes, it were to stand for the proposition that jurisdiction can be assumed by the
Court, despite the clear text of a reservationand the equally clear intention of a State to exclude
jurisdiction.
15. Mr. President,thejurisprudence ofthis Courtanditsdistinguishedpredecessor,however,
teaches us otherwise. This is a "big little case" because it is an opportunity for the Court to
unambiguously reaffirm the jurisdictional principles that have guided over three-quarters of a
century of itsjudicial practice. WhereSpainproposes to underminethe consent of States,Canada
asks only that the requirement for consentbe respected.
Conclusion
16.Mr. President, distinguishedJudges, in good faith andwith full confidence in the Court,
Canada likea number of other States, has accepted the Court'scompulsoryjurisdiction subjectto
a small number of clearly defined reservations. As even Spain would agree, reservations form a
criticalpart ofthe optionalclausesystembyencouragingStatesto participatein itto the extentthey
can. Thejurisprudence oftheCourthasdeveloped soundandreasonableprinciplesof interpretation
intended to give full and fair effect to the intention of States as expressed in optional clause
declarations, including in particular their reservations.
17.If accepted, Spain'sapproachwouldchange profoundlythe mannerinwhich the optional
clause system hnctions. As Sir Gerald Fitzmauricehas observed,nothing underminesconfidence
in internationaltribunals "soquickly andcompletely as the feeling that internationaltribunalsmay
assumejurisdiction in cases not really covered bythe intendedscope of the consents" (Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, TheLaw and Practice of the International Court ofJustice, Vol. II (1986), p. 514). - 54 -
18. Sir, Canadaasks for nothing more than an interpretationof its declarationthat respects
the clear language and intendedscope of the reservationset out in paragraphn the basis i
of this reservation, 1 formally reiterate, on behalf of the Government of Canada, the following
submission, which1shall read in English and in French:
May itplease theCourtto adjudgeanddeclarethatthe Court hasnojurisdictionto adjudicate
upon the applicationfiled by Spain on March 1995.
Plaise àla Courdire etjuger qu'ellen'est pas compétpour statuersur larequêtedéposée
par l'Espagnele28 mars 1995.
19.Monsieur le Président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour,je vous remercie de votre
\Ilr
attention et patience.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Mr. Hankey. The Court takes note of the final submissions
that you have read out on behalf of Canada, as it didpresented by the distinguishedAgent
of Spain. This bringsus to the end of the hearings on preliminaryobjections. 1wish to thank the
Agents,counsel andadvocatesof bothPartiesfor theiry ablearguments,aswellasthe courtesy
theyhave shownthroughout these proceedings. In accordancewiththe usual prac1would ask
theAgents of bothParties to remain at the disposa1of the Court for any informationwhich
it might need. And subject to this,now declare closed the oral proceedings on the Court's
-
competence to entertain the case concerning FisheriesJurisdiction(Spainv. Canada).
The Court will nowwithdrawto deliberate. TheAgentsof the Partieswill benotified in due
courseof the datewhen the Court will give its Judgment. There being no other matters before
today,the Court will now rise.
TheCourt rose at 12.40p.m.
Public sitting held on Wednesday 17 June, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding