INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
I' PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS
AMBATIELOS CASE
(GREECE v. UNITED KINGDOM)
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTIC.
- MÉMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS
-AFFAIRE AMBAT1,ELOS
(GRÈCE C.ROYAUME-UNI),411 rights reserved by the
International Court of Justice
TOUS droits réservks par la
Cour internationale de Juçticc This volume should 'be as:ted
"T.C.JPleadhgs, AmbatCase(Greece v, United Kii~zgdanz)"
Leprésent volume doit ktre cite comme suit :
rC.7J. M&tnoires, AjJaire Am(Grècc.Royazr,we-fii)
1NOde vente :6 1 AMBATIELOS CASE
(GREECEv.UNITED KINGDOM)
AFFAIRE AMBATLELOS
(GRÈCE c. ROYAURIE-UNI) INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS
AMBATIELOS CASE
(GREECE v.UNITEn KINGDOM)
JUBGMENTsOPJUT-YISt1gj2, AND M.~gth, 1953 COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
ITEMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS
AFFAIRE AMBATIELOS
(GRECE C.ROYAUME-UNI)
.%RRÊDES ICJUILLE1952ET 19MAI1953 SECTION B
'
ORAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
THE MERITS: OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATE
1 PUBLIC SITTINGS
.
held athePeace PaLac~,The Hague, frow Mazgrdto.3oth,
andMay rgth, 1953, the Vice-PresM.~lzterrero,
actinasPresiderzt
l SECTION 3
PLAIDOIRIES CONCERNANT LE FOND :
OBLIGATION D'ARBITRAGE
1.
SEANCES PUBLIQUES
tanueau PalaisdeIaPaix,La Haye,da 23 au 30marsel
leIgwai 1953,sousla #rkidefdeeM, Gzterrero,
VicB-P~ész'daisad oncliorz de Présidelzt MINUTES OF THE SITSINGS HELD FROM
MARCH agrd TU goth AND MAY 19th~ l 1953
1
YEAR 1953,
FIRST PUBLIC SI'1'TING(23 rIr53, 4 #.m.)
Present: Vice-President GUERRERO,Acting President ; Preside+it
Sir Arnold MCNALR;J.lcdges ALVAREZ, BASDEVANTH , ACKWOKTH,
WI ~TIARSKI,KLAESTA BDADAWIR ,EAD,HSU bf0,CARNEIRA O, MAND-
UGON ; Profe~sorJean SPIROPOULO JÇ,dgead hoc; liegistar HAMRRD.
For the United Kingdom of GreatBritaz'nand NortlaeraIreland:
Mr. V. J. Evnns, Assistant Legal~dvisér of the Foreign Office,
as Agent;
assisiad b,as Colinse:
Mr. G. G. Fn~zar~unIce,C.M.G., Second ~e~al Adviser tothe Foreign
Office;
Mr. J. E.S. Fanrca r~,D.SL., Mernber of the EnglishBar ;
Mr. D. I-IN .JOHNSON, AssistantLegal Adviser, Foreign Office.
For ilneRoyal HellenicGoverwnant : 1
l
M. B. VERGEIIS C,hargéd'affairesad interimof Greece,
as Ddfidy-Agent ;
assistedby,as Coansel :
Prafcssor HenriRo~ia, of the Universitqf Bruzsels, former President 1
of theBelgian Senate.
Mr. C. John COLOMI~Q S,G..EL.D. ' 1
1
In opening the sitting, the VICE-PRESIUENT ,cting Presidentin this
case, stated thatthe Court was asscnibled to examirîe, in its second
phase, the dispute which had arisenbetween Greece and the United
Kingdom of GreatBritain and Nortlzern Ircland coricerning the*claim
submitted by the HellenicGovernment forrdparationfordamage alleg~d
to have beeirsuflered in tlic United Kingdoby hl. Ambatielosone of
its natiorials. Sroceediin this casewere instituteby an Application
by tlie Hellenic Government,filedinIhc Registry on April gth,1951.
On February gtlz,19j2,the Government of thc United Kingdom, in
itsLounter-Mernorial, submitted, itî particulathat the Court lacked
jurisdiction ithe case. I
I PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SEANCES TENUES
l DU 23 AU 30 MARS ET LE 19 MAI 1953
Prézerit: M. GUERHEHO Vi,ce-Prisidefaisanfonctionde Présiden;
sir A~NOLD MCNAIR, Prisideiz; MM. AI.VAREZB , ASDEVANH TA, CK-
WORTH, \$TINIARSKIKLAESTAD B,AUA\VR ~,EAD,HSU MO, CARNLIRO,
A~biti~n-U~on.,juges;M. Jean SPIROP~)ULO itS,tad hoc;M.HA~IHRO,
Grefier.
Prwenls également
I
Pour le Royatm~-Uni de Grmide-Bretapfietd'Irlande duNout :
BI. V. J. EVANS ,onseiller juridiqadjoint du Grcign Office,
en qualildd'agen;t
M. G. G. FITZMAURI CCEM, .G.deuxikme jurisconsulte du Foreign
1 Ofice;
M.J. H. S. PA&~ETT, D. S.C., membre du Barreau anglais ;
M. D. H. N. JOHNSON, juriscoiisulte adjointForeign Oflice.
Pour le Gouv~rncmentroyalde Grèce:
I
M. E. VERGHIS c,argk cldlaffira. .ide Grèce,
ew qualité d'agent adjoi;t
assis dt, comme conseils:
M. le profcsscur HenrROLIN, de l'Université {le Bruxelles, ancien
l'résidendu Sénat belg;
M. C. John Co~o>~nos Q,. C., LL. D.
Le VICE-PH ES ID EfNai.s^ant foiictioil de Préouvrel'audience et
déclare quela Cotir sremit pour examiner, darissaseco~ide phase, le
difftirend qui a surgi entre la Grèet le Koyaume-Uni de Grande-
Bretagne. etd'Irlande duNord à l'occasion delademande prksentée
par le Gouvernement hellkniqueen vue d'obtenir réparationpour
certainsdommages qu'aurait subis un de ses ressortissanM. Amba-
tielosau Royaiime-Uni. Cetre affaira étéintroduite par une requête
du Gouvernernent hcllkniclue, dépostieau Greffg avril IgjI.
Le g février 1952,le Gouvernement du Koyautnc-Uni a,dans son
contre-mémoire, excipétiotamment de l'incompélenccde laCour pour
connaître de l'affaire.345 SITTING OF llARCH 23kd, 1953
On July rst, I952,the Court delivercd judgment on tlic objection to
itç jusisdiction.It found that it lacked jprisdiction to decide on the
merits of thc Ambatieloç claim, but that it had jurisdiction to decide
whether tlze Uriited Kingdom wcre under an obligation to submit to
arbitration-in accordance with the declaration which accompanied the
'Ireatgrconcluded between Greece and the Unitcd Kingdom in 1926-
the difference as to the validity of the Arnbatielos daim, in so far aç
this claim \vas basedon the Treaty of 1886.
11pursuance of that judgment, the Court, bÿ an Order of July 18th,
1952, had fixecl the tirne-lirnits for the filinof the Royal Hellenic
Government's Reply and of the United Kingdom's Rejoinder.
Thrce Memhers of the Court were not present on the Bench.
MM. ZoritiC and Golunsky had informed the President of the Court that
their state of health yrevented them from taking part in the present
case.Furthermore, Sir Benegal Rau, who was indiçposed, was unable to
take part in the proceedings that afternoon.
The Acting Pi-esident further pointed out that the Greek GovernMent,
not having a judge of itsown nationality on this Bcnch, had availed
itselfof theright conferred on itby Article 31 of the Statute, and had
ckosen as judge ad hc Profesçor Spiropoulos, who had already sat on
the Bench in the firspliase of thecase, on winch occasion he had made
the deçlaration prescribed by Article zo ofthe Statute.
Thc Parties were represented :
,
l
The Royal Hellenic Government by : ,
Mr. E. VERGHIS C,hargé d'affaires ad inierim of Gscece at The1-Iagua,
as Uepzcty-Agcnl;
assistecl by : I
l'rofessorHenri ROLINo ,fthe University of Brussels, former P2esident
of the Bclgian Senate,
The Kight Hanourable Sir Frank SOSKICE Q,.C., M.F.,former Attor-
ney-Gcneral of the United Kingdom, 1
Mr. C. John COLOMEOS Q.C., LL.D., i
as Cou,tsel. I
The Government of theUni tecl Kingdom of Grcat Rritain and Northern
Ireland by :
Mr. V. J. EVANS, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office,
as Agant; I
assisted by
Mr. G. G. F~~zhfnunrce,C.M.G., Second Legal Adviser tothe Foreign
Office,
Mr. J. E. S.FAWCETT D,.S.C.,Rlember of the English Bar,
Mr. D. II. N. JOHNSON, Assistant Legal: Adviser, Foreign Office,
as Counsel. I
The Acting t'resident noted that the Agents and Counsel of the
Parties were present in Court, and lie çalled on the Agent ofthe King-
dom of Greece.
I l
SEANCE DU 2J MARS 1.953 345
Le I~Fjuillet1952 laCour a rendu son arrét sur l'exception d'incom-
pétence. EHc a jugé qu'elle n'est pas compétente pour statuer sur le
fond de la réclamation Ambatielos, qu'elle est cornpetente pour ddcider
si le Royaume-Uni est tenu de soumettre a l'arbitrage- conformkment
A ladéclaration qui accompagnait le traité conclu entre la Grke et le
Royaume-Uni en 1926 - le diffkrendrelatif à la validité de la reclama-
tion Ambatieloç en tant qttccette rkclamation est fondée sur le traité
dc 1886.
A la suite de cetarrêt, par ordonnance du 1.8 juillerg52, la Cour a
fixéles délaispour le dépbt de la réplique du Gouvernement raya1 de
Grèce et de la dupliyuc du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
Trois membres de la Cour n'ont pas pris siance. MM. ZoriEik et
Golunsky ont faitsavoir au Président de la Cour que leur étatde sant6
ne leur permettait pas de prendre part à la présente affaire. D'autre
part, sir Benegal Rau, inclisposéii'est pas enmesure d'assisterA cette
audience.
Le Vice-Président faisant fonction de psisident rappelle en outreque
le Gouvernement hellénique, ne comptant pas au sein de la Cour un
jugc dc sa nationalité, s'est prévalu du droique lui confkre l'article 31
du Statut ct a désigné comme juge ad hoc M. le professeur Spiropoulos,
lequel a dé18si& dans la premiére phase de la présente affairau cours
de laquelle ila fait la déclaration prévue par l'article 20 du Statut.
Les Partiessont représentkes :
Le Gouvernement lieliéiiiquepar :
M. E. VERGHE ch,argéd'affaires a.i.de Grhce i La Haye,
comme agmt adjoizt;
et,comme conseils, par :
hl.le professeur Henri Ro~rn, de l'université de Bruxelles,,ancien
Président du Sénat belge,
le TrésHonorable Sir Frank SOSKICE Q,.C., M. P., ancien Attorney-
Gevzeraldu Royaume-Uni, et
M. C. Jokiil Cor.omos, Ji)C.,LI,. D.
Le Gouvernernent du Royaumc-Uni de Grande-Bretagne ct d'Irlande
du Nord est représeiltépar :
M.V. J. EVAKS, jurisconsulte adjoint du Foreign Office,
comme agent,
el, comme consssilspar :
MM.G. G. FITZVAURIC C.F,. G.,deuxikme jurisconsulte du Foreign
Office,
J. E. S. FAWCETD T.,S. C.membre du Barreau anglais, et
D. 1-1.N. Jonnson;, jurisconsulte adjointdu Foreign Office.
Le Vice-Président faisant fonction de Président constate la présence
devant la Cour de RIM. les agents ainsi que de leurs conseils, edonne
la parole aM. l'agent duRoyaume de Gréce. M. I~EAGHI aÇsked that Professor Rolin .be allawed to open the case
on b~half of the Greek Government.
The ACTIKG FRESIDENcT alled on Professor Kolin.
Professor ROLIN began the speecli reproduced inthe annex l.
(The Court rose at j.50 p-m.) , L
[Signalwcs .]
I
1
SECOND PUBLIC SITi+ING (24 in 53, 10.30am.}
Pïesarz:![See sitting of March 23rd.I i
The ACTING PRESIDENT called on 13rofessorRolin.
Professor KOLIN concludeclthe speedi reproduced in theannex
The ACTINP GRESIDENT announcerl thst the next sitting of the Court
would take place on Marc1125th at 11 a.m.
(The Court rosc at 12.15p.rn.1 !
I [Signatures.]
l
THIRD PUBLIC SITTING (25 III53, rr.q a.m.)
Present : [Seesitting ofMarch z3rd.I l
ln opening the sitting,the ACTING PRESIDEXT stated that thcCourt
liad Eneard witli grief the news of the death of H.hT. Queen Mary. It
joinecl sincerely inthe mourning of the Royal Farniljr and of al1 the
people ol the Commonwealth. Througl~out her long life, a life of dignity
and great~iess, fiFlewith so rnany joys andlsotrows, the Sovcreign who
had justpassed away had won the respect and admiration of the whole
worlcl. l
The Court desired to express its condolences to theBritish representa-
tives before the Court and açked thcm totransmit these condolenccs to
their Government. 1t also wished to express its feelingsof affectionate
sympathy to the President of the Court, Sir -4.riioMcNair.
The AGENT OF THE U-JITED KINGDOM GOVBKNMEN onT,eliali of his
Government, wished to thank the Court for its kind expression of
sympathy. Rcr Majesty was held in the highest esteem and affection
by the Britishpeople, and her lossurould be greatley niourned by them
and by hcr friei~dsthtoughout the world. He would pass the Court's
message of syrnpathy to hiç Governrnent.
The DEPUTY-AGEN OF THE ROYAT H, ELLENIC GOVEKNME stated,
On behalf ofhis Government, that he ivished toassociate in the feelings
of sympüthy which hacl been expressed by the President.
The ACTING PHESIDENrT equested the Assistant Agent of the Hellenic
Government to produce the texts of the Iprovisions of the Teaties
Seepp. 351-362.
' ,, .. 362-376. I
l SEANCE DSES 24 ET 25 31ARS 1953 346
M. VERCHIÇ dcmnncle que le professeur Rolin soit autorise àprendre
la.parole en premier auriom du Gouvernement hellénique.
Le VICE-PK~ SIDENT faisant fonction de Président donne la parole au
professeur Rolin.
Le professeur ROLIN commence la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe l.
(L'audience est levée à r7 h. jo.)
[Siglaafzc~as.]
DEUXIÈME SCANCE PUBLIQUE (24 IIIj3, IO h. 30.)
Yrksents : [Voirséancedu 23 mars.]
Le VICE-PRESIDEN Tisant fonction de Président donne.la parole au
professeur Rolin.
Le professeur KOL~N termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe a.
Le VICE-PHESIDENa Tnnonce que la prochaineseance de la Cour aura
lieu Ic mardi 25 mars à IIheures.
(L'audience est levke & 12h. 15.)
[SignalailrsJ
TROTSIÈR~IE SÉANCE PUBLIQUE (2j III53, Ir k. rj.)
Prisents : [Voir séancedu 23 mars.]
En ouvrant l'audience,le \IICE-PRESIDEKT iaisatzt fonction de Prési-
dent diclare que la Cour a appris avec douleur la nouvellede la mort de
S. M. la Reine Mary. Elle prcnd une part profonde au dcuil dcla famille
royale et de tous les peuples dit Commonwealth. Dans sa longue vie,
toute de dignitk ctde grandeur, et aucours de laquelle s'étaient succédk
tant de joies etdc doulewrs, la souveraine qui vient des'éteindre avait
su acquérir lerespect et l'admiration du monde enticr.
La Cour, exprimant ses condoléaices aiixrcprkscntant britanniques
qui se trouvent aujourd'hui devant elle, les prie de bien vouloir les
transmettre à leur Gouvernement. Elle exprime kgalement son affcctiieuse
sympathie ;ison Président, sir Arnold McNair.
L'AGENT DU GOUVI.;KNEM DU~ROYAUME-UNtIient, au nom de son
Gouvcrnernent, à remercier la Cour clc cc témoignage de sympathie. Sa
Majesté jouissait de la plus haute estime et de l'affection du peuple
britannique ; ça perte sera vivemetlt ressentiepar celui-ci comme par
les amis qu'elle avait à travers le monde. Il ne manquera pas de trrins-
mettre à son Gouvcrnernent le message de condol&anccs de la Cour.
L'AGENT ADJO~NT DU GOUVERNEMEN HELL~NTQUE déclare s'associer,
au nom de son Gouvernement, aux sentiments dc sympathie expiimks
par le Prbsident.
1,e VICE-PRESIDEK aisant fonction de Président priel'agent adjoiilt
du Gouvernement hellénique de faire cunilaître lcs testes des disposi-
1 Voir pp. 351-362.
\ 0 367-376.betweeiz the United Kingdotn on the one hand and Spain, Denmark and
Sweden on the other, on which the Hellenic Government had relicd in
its argument in respect of most-favoured-nation treatment, as well as
thc provisions of any treatiesoimore recent datc ruliich it mightregard
as relevant to this issue.
'I'heActing Prcçident called upon ~ouiiskl for the United Kingdom
Governrnent.
Mr. Ci. G. FITZ~~AUR began the speecli,reproduced in the annex l.
(The Court adjourned from r2.4j to 4 p.m.)
Mr. FITZMAUKI C~nfinued the speech reproduced in the annex
ï'he ACTINGPKESIDEN Ttated tkat the nest sitting of the Court
would he held on hlarch 26th at 4 p.m.
{The Court rose at 6.05 p.m.) I
[SS'ignat~~es.]
F0URT.H PUBLIC SITTING (~S,~II 53, 4-15 #.m.)
Preseat: [See sitting of March ~3rd.Also yresent Sir Frank SOSKICE,
Counsel ofthe HcLZenicGoe1eramnt.J
The ACTING PRESIDENT caIled on ~ounsil for the United Kingdom
Govcrnment.
Rlr.G.G.FITZMAUR coCitinued thespeech reproduced inthe annex a.
1
(The Court rase at 6.40 p.m. )
[Sig~zafzkres.]
1
FIFTH PUBLIC SITTING (27 II[ 53,10.30 a.m.)
Present: [See sitting of Rlarc26th.l l
The ACTING PRESIDENT called upon ~oundel for the United Kingdom
Governmcnt., I
Mr. J. E. S. FAWCET Tegan anci concluded thc speech reproduced
in the aiinex4.
The ACTTXG PIIEÇIDEN Talled upon theAgent of the United Kingdom
Government.
ML. V. J. EVANS~tated that l-iIiad been asked by liisGovernment
to convey tothe Court and to the Deputy-Agent ofthe Hellenic Govern-
ment apprcciatioi~ of ttieir expressions of syrnpathy on tlie death of
1-IerMajesty Queen Mary. I
!
Seepp. 377-386. l
, ., 386-399.
399-417 1
3, ,, 418-433- 1 Voir pp. 377-386.
1 8 386-399.
3 "' 399-417.
m O 418-433 The ,~CTING PRESIDENT stated that the' Court WOU^ Ilext sit on
Saturday, Marck 28tl1, at ro.30 a.rn.,and would devote tlie morning
and a£ternoot~ sittingta the hearing of the oral reply on behalf of the
Royal EIellenic Governmetit.
1-Ierequested the representatives of the Parties, in their oral reply
and rejoinder, to present tlieir final caiiclusions oto confirm the con-
clusions alrcady presented in the pleadir-igs.
l
(The Court rose at 1p-m.) I
l [Sigrzalures.]
1
STXTH PUBLIC SITTING (28 ri1 53, 10.30 am.)
I
Preisent: [See sitting of March z6tk.l
The ACTING PRESTDENT çalleclon Couns'el for the Royal IIellenic
Govcrnrnent.
SirFrank Sos~rcz bcgan the speech seproduced in thc annes '.
{The Court adjourned from 12.50 to 4 p.rn.1
Sir Frank Sosnrc~ concluded the speecl~reproduced in the annex
The ACTIMG PBESIDENa Tskecl Counsel for the Helleiric Government
whether he confirmed the conclusions presented in the Greek reply.
SirFrank SOSKICE replied inthe affirmative.
1
(The Court rose at 6.55 pm.)
[Sipntures.]
I
SEVEN'TH PU131,IL SITTING (JQ III 53, Ia @.m.)
Pvsseltt : [Seesittirig of March 26tl1, with the exceptiof&Ir.JOHNSON,
Professor ROLIN and Sir Frank SOSKICE a,bsent.]
The ACTINGPRESIDENT called on ~ounsel for thc United Kingdorn
Goverr-irnent.
Mr. G. G. FITZNAUKIC mEade thc speech reproduced in the anncs 3.
('TheCourt adjourned from 12.40 to 4 p-rnj)
MI- ,. E. S. FAWCETm ~ade the speech ;eproduced in the annex 4.
The AGENT OF THE UNITEDKINGDOM GOVERNME N Tde the speech
reprodut:ed in tlie nnnex 5,at the end ofwhic11kiestated thc final Con-
clusionsof the United Kingdom Governmcnt.
1
1Sec pp. 434-448.
,, ,, 445-468. 1
,. ,, 469-453 1
,, ,,486-494. 1
,, ,, 495-502. I Le VICE-PK~SIDEN fTisant fonction de Président déclare que la Cour
siégera lc samcdi28 mars à IO heurcs30 et consacrera lcsaudiences du
matin etde liapr+s-midi à entendre la répliqiic orapréçentke atinom
du Gouvernement hellénique.
Tl prie Ics représentantsdes Parties d'énoncer dans leur réplique et
cluplique oralcs leurs conclusions finales, ou de confirmer les conclusions
qui figurent dans les Scritures.
(L'audieiice est levge13 heures.)
[Sigjzatzcres.]
SIXIÈME SEANCE PUBLIQUE (28 III53, IO h. 30.)
Présents: [Voir séancedu 26 mars.]
Le VICE-YR~SIDENfT aisant fonction de Président donne la parole au
conseil du Gouvernement hellénique.
Sir Frank SOSKICE coinmence l'exposé reproduit en annexe '.
(L'audience, suspendueL 12 h. jo,est reprise à16 heures.)
SirFrank Sos~rce termine l'exposéreproduit en anncxe a.
Le VICE-PRI?SIDENfT aisant fonction de Président demailde au conseil
du Gouvernement helléilique s'il confirme les conclusions soumises dans
la réplique hel1énique.
SirFrank SOSKICE répond dans l'affirmative.
(L'audiencecst lcvée2 18 11.j~.)
[Signrctu~es.]
SEPTIEME SSANCE PUBLIQUE (30 III 53, 10 h.)
Prisents: [Voir séance du 26 mars, A l'exception de MM. JOHNSON,
1201- etNsir Frank Sossc~c~a,bsents.]
Le VICE-PR~SIDENf ~aisant fonction de Prisidendonne la parole au
.coriseil du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
hl. G. G. F~TZMAUHI prorionce la plaidoirie reproduiten annexe ".
(L'audience,suspendue 12 h. 40,est reprise à16heures.)
X. J. E.S. FAWCETT prononce l'exposéreproduit en annexe
E'AGENT DU GOUVERNEMEN DT ROYAUME-Up NrIononce la plaidoirie
reproduite en annexe, à la fin de laquelle il énonce les conclusions finales
du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni 6.
1 Voir pp434-448
B B 448-468
B 1 469-485.
n B 486-494.
1 1)495-502349 SITTING OP MAY Igth,'1953
The ,~CTING PRESIDEKa Tsked the ~~enk of the Parties to rernain
at the disposal of the Court and declared tmheoral proceedings dosecl.
(The Court rose at 6-20 p.m.) I1
[Signatures.J
EIGHTH PUBLIC SITTING ()g v 53,4 +.m.)
Preseiat: Vice-Presiiient GUERRERQ ~diw~ Pvesident ; P~esident
Sir Arnold MC-~~A IRJ~dgcs ALVAREZ B,ASDEVANT H,ACKWORTH,
WINIARSKI,KLAHSTAD,RADAWI,REA~, HSU MO, . CARNEIRO,
Sir BENEGALKAU, ARMAND-UGOP Nofessor Jean SPIROP~UL~S,
Judge ad hoc ; RegistrarHAMBRO. 1
Also @?sent : I
Forthe Urtited fimgdom O/ GreatBritana a?zd Northern Ircland :
Mr. Tl.J. EYAXSA , ssistant LegalAdviser to the Foreign Office,
1
as Agent. I
i
For the Royal Hellesic Goverwnela:t
His Exceiiency N. G. LELY, Envoy ~ktraordinar~ and Minister
Plcnipotcntiary of Greece,
as Age~a ;t
M. E. VERGHIS,Secretary,
as Defiuty-dgmt.
The VICE-PRESIDE ANcTig President in the caseopened the sittiizg
and stated that the Court had met for the reading of its Judpent in
the Ambatielos case (Merits :Obligation to arbitrate) between the King-
dom of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Brltain and Northern
Ireland. Proceedings in thiscase were instituted on April gth, IgjT, by
an Application of the Hellcnic Government. ,
In accorclance with Article 58 of the Statute, due notice had been
given to the Age~itsof the Parties that the Judgment would be rcad in
open Court at the present public sitting. Hc noted that the Agents
were present in Court; an officia1copy of the Jiidgment would be
handcd to them during the present sitting.
The Court had decided, in accordance with Article 39 of the Statute,
that the English textof the Judpent should be the authoritative text.
He woulcl, however, read the French text.
The Vice-Presiclent, Acting President,read:the Judgment l.
He asked the Registrar to read the operative clause of the Judgment
in English. 1
Sce Court'spublicatio:sReportsofJudgments, AdvisoryO$iaa'o~and Orders
rg5~p,p.10-24. 1
! SEANÇE DU Ig MAI 1953
l 349
Le VICE-"~'KÉSI?EN faisant fonctionde Président prie les agents des
Parties di:resterà la dispositiode la Cous et prononce laclbture des
débats oraux.
(L'audienceest levéeà 18 h.20.)
[Sigaatufes.]
RU~TIÈME SÉANCE PUBLTQUE (19 v 53& 16 k.)
Priselzis M. GUERRERV Oi,e-Prisidelafaisantfonctiode Présidfin;
Sir Arnold~~CN.~I PR,ésidenl;MM.ALVAREB Z, SDEVAN HTACKWORTH,
WINIAKÇKIK , LAESTAD B,ADAW I,EADH , SUMO,CARNEIH SO, BENE-
GAL RAU,M. ARMAND-UGO jNges; M. Jean SPIRO~OULO jt,sad hoc ;
M.HAMBRO G,refic'ev.
&ga~emslz ~résent:
I
1 POW EBRoyazkme-Unide Grande-Bretagne etd'lrian dueNord :
M. V. J. EVANS, conseillerjuridiqueadjoint du Foreign Office,
erzyzcalid'age~tt.
Pourb Gouvernemtintroyal deGrèce
I
S.Exc. M. N. G. L~LYc ,nvoyé extraordiilairet ministre plénipoten-
tiaire dGsice,
en qualitd'lagel;t
M.E. VERGRIS ,ecrétaire,
e+quaCitéd'agemtadjoi~~t.
En ouvrant la séance,M. GUERRERO Vice-lrsrésidentfaisant fonction
de PsCsiclcndeclare que laCour s'est rkunie pour le prononcé de I1arr&t
qu'ellva rendre dans l'affaire Ambatieloç (Fond : Obligation d'arbitrage)
entrele Royaume de Grke et le Koyaumc-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et .
d'Irlande du Nord. Cettc instance avait étéintroduite l9 avril IgjI
parrequêtedu Gouvernement hellénique. Il rappeIleque,confomkment
$,l%rticle58 du Statut, les agents des deux Parties ont kt& dûment
prévenus qu'il serait donné lecture de lJarrau cours de la prksente
audience publique. JI constatque ces agents sont prgsents et indique
qu'une expédition oficielle de l'arrêt leur sera remise aucours de
l'audience.*
Ilsignale que lCour a décide,conformément à l'artic39 du Statut,
que letexte anglais de l'arrêt ferait foi, ajoutant, toque c'estdu
texte françaique lectureva êtredonnke.
Le Vice-président, faisant fonction dePrésident,donne lecture de
l'arrt'.
Le Vice-Président faisant fonctide Présidentprie ensuitle Greffier
de donner lecture du dispositde1'arri.t dans le texte anglais.
1 Voir publications de la Caur : Racussd des Arrdts, Avis etOrdon-llalifs350 SITTING OF MAY ~gth, 1953
'I'heREGISTRA rRad the relevarit clause iizEilglish.
The VICE-lJ~~s~~~~A ~c,tinPresident, stated that SirArnold McNair,
Presidt:rrtJudges Basdcvant, dilacstad and Read, availing themsclves
of the right conierred an them by Articlc 57of the Statute, appcnded to
the Judgment the joint çtatcmcnt of thcir dissentir~gopinion'.
The authors of tlzijoint diçscnting apinio~zhad inforrnsd thc Acting
Preçident that tkieydid not wiçliit to be read in Court.
The Vice-President ,Acting Presideiit, closed the sitting.
(Tlie Court rose at4.35 p.m.)
I [Sigrcatures .
I Le GREFFIER iit Ie dispositen anglais.
Le VICE-PRESIDENfT aisant fonction de Président indique que sir
Arnold McNair, Président, MM. Rasdevant, Klaeçtad et Read, se prkva-
lnnt du droit que leur conf&rcl'article 57 di1Statut,ont joint à llarr&t
l'exposécommun de leuropinion dissidente l.
Idesauteurs de cette opinion dissidente collective ont informé le
Président en fonctionqu'ilsne disirent pas quelecture en soitdonnée ici.
~ Le Vice-Président faisant fonctionde Président iévela séance.
(L'audiericeestlevée 16 1135.3
[Signatures.]
'Iliid., pp. 25-35. ANNEX TOTHE MINUTES
ANNEXE AUX PBOCÈS-VERBAUX
1, PLAlDOIRIE DE M. LE PROFESSEUR HENRI l2OLIN
(CONSEIL nu GOUVERNEMENT HELLÉNIQUE)
AUX S~A~TCES PUBLIQUES DES 23 ET 24 MARS 1953
[Séance PztbLigzc~,tt2mars 1953 a,près-midi]
Je veux d'abord dire quelques mots pour exprimer les regrets de
M. Lély,qui estretenu à l'&ranger par la maladie et quise trouve ainsi
ernpechéde contiiluer à suivre l'affaire qu'il avait initike. Je dois kgale-
ment exprimer des regrets que jeprie31.i'agcnt du Gouvernement bri-
tannique de bien vouloir transmettre à sir Eric Beckett ; il avait kté
adversaire dans la première instaiice de cette affaire et avait défendu les
intéretsdu Gouvernement britanirique avec l'autorité et la compétence
quc la Cour apu fréquetnment apprécier. Son état de sant6a kt&skieuse-
ment kbranlk, maisje suis suque je n'exprime pas seulement mes senti-
ments mais ceux de la Cour en souhaitant très vivement qu'il soit en
mcsure procllainernent de reprendre integralement ses fonctions, Je me
réjouis,du reste,de le voir remplacé à cette barre par mon coll&gue et
ami, M. Fitzrnaurice.
Je n'ai pas besoin de dire qu'en ce qui concerne les membrcs de la
Cour que la maladie retient kgalement éloign&s,et spécidcment
M. ZoriCiC,qui avait participé à la dklibération du preremicrarrforme
également des VEUX pour eur complet rktablissernent.
Et, enfin, jedois excuser sir Frank Soskice, quidevaitEtreici aujour-
d'hui, quia étkretenu àla dernière minute, et ne nous rejoindra que dans
quelques jours.Tlm'a demandé de Jeremplacer un peu au pied levépour
présenter cette première plaidoiriC'est cequi m'a amcnéàdemander A
la Cour de bien vouloir retarder jusqu'à cet après-inidi le momenpour
moi de prendre la parole.
Messieurs, la Cour a présente à la memoire l'origine de ce procèssur
lequel je ne vais pasrn'éteildre:la mésaventured'un ressortissant hellé-
nique,M. Ambatielos, qui,ayant achetéw Gouvernemcnt britanniqueneuf
navires en constnictiari et vcrséun acompte d2.000.000de livressterling
n'a. reçu les premiers navires clu'avcc un retard important qui, vu la
baisse du prix du fret, I'empêclde réaliseson programme et au bout de
peu de temps, n'ayant pu payer lesolde du pris, le laissansles navires
et sans l'argent.
Une procédure judiciaire introduite par luia échoué dans des condi-
tions que le Gouvernement hellénique juge peu régulières, et le recours
introduit par M.Arnbatielos en vue d'obtcnir la skparation du préjudice
subi n'ayant pas abouti, le Gouverilement hellénique, aprés une tri.3
longue négociation diplomatique, a cru devoir, au mois d'avril ~yjr,
introduire une requêteà la Cour internati~nalede Justice.
Les faits,&Ieçsicurs,se situenen 1glg(1gz3. A cette époque, il existe
entre laGrèce et le Koyaurne-Uni un traite de commerce et dc naviga-
tion qui estdu io a-gri18% et qui avait étéaccompagiiéd'un protocole
du nzêrne jour, prévoyant une procédure arbitrale pour la solut~oiides
différendsrelatifs a l'interprétatieta l'applicatiori dudit traité. A vrai dire,ce traité se trouvait déjhdénoncédepuis 19x9, mais, tout
en étant dknonck, il étaitmaintenu pravisoiremeiit en vigueur de l'accord
des pzrties et faisait l'objet d'une négociation pour sa revision, qui
aboutit au mois de juillet rgzS . e traité de r886 fut remplacé à ce
moment par un traité nouveau qui reproduisit presque intégralement un
certain nombre de ses dispositions, qui en ajouta d'autres, et le mêmejour
une déclaration - cette foison qualifia le clocumcnt deu déclaration a-
accompagna le traité. Cette déclaration n'avait pas le même objetque le
precédent protocole ; la clause juridictionnqlle &tait 7926 incluse dans
le traité elledécidait que tous lesdifférends reIatif2 son interprétation
seraicnt soumis à l'arbitrage comme précédemment dans le traité de
1886,inais que l'organe arbitral serait la Cour internationale de Justice,
tandis que la déclaration - pour l'instant ilcstinutile de vous rappeler
les termes que jc vous lirai tantbt- tandis que la déclaration s'appli-
quGt aux diffdrcnds relatifs au traiti de 1886 et decidait qu'ils demeure-
raient soumis à 1s procédure arbitrale decrite dans ce trait6 de 1886.
La Grèce appuya la demande qu'elle in'troduisit en 1951 dcvant la
Cour 2~ la fois sur les dispositions de fondu traité de1886 et sur celles
d~1traité de Igz6,considkant que, du moment que 1es.dispositions invo-
quées n'avaient pas étémodifiées,il importait peu que le differcnd soit
antérieur au traite de 1926 puisque la ~nêpe rkgle avait étemaintenue
comme clcvant s'appliquer aux relations entre les parties. Les agents,
porte-parole du Gouvernement hellknique, défeildirent donc notamment
devant laCour - au mois de mai dernier - la tliksque pour l'applica-
tion de la çlaue compromissoire il n'y avait pas lieu d'avoir égardà la
date des faits ou à ladate de la réclamation qui avait &té introduite,et
qu'on pouvait considérer comme relatifs à un traitéde 1926les différends
qui étaient nnt&15eurs,absolument comme en droitinterne l'on considère
cornrnc pouvant êtresoumis une procédureou Ades tribunaux nouveaux
crééspar unc loi nouvelle desdifférendsanterieurs à cette loi, du moment
que les rkgles de fond que cette procédure ou cettc juridiction nouvelle
doit contrôler existaient aritérieurement ~t 21-aient effectivement kt6
enfreintes. Cette rétroactisrit&de la loi de, cornpCtence nous paraissait
&treune théorie que l'on pouvait tentcr de voir consacrer en clroit inter-
natioilal. Je recorinais que sur ce point la Cour ne nous a pas suivis
et qu'elle a prkcise clans son arrêt qu'elle avait à se prononcer sur la
cornpé tence éventuelle de Ia juridiction arbitrale exclusivement pour
les difiererids en tant que fondessur le traité de~886.
Jc crois, Mesçieurs de la Cour, que la prerniire tâche qui m'incombe
est d'essayer de définir aussi clairement que possible l'objet ainsi
assigni:A la prkçente instance. A mon avis, dans l'arrêt que vous avez
rendu le ICI julllet 1952,la Cour a estimé nicessaire, - et je crois i
bon di-oit bien que la chose ne nous soit pas appame ni a l'une nià
l'autre dcs parties tr$s clairement au cotirs de nos débats du mois
de inai, - qu'ily avait à distinguer dans cette affaire, enrkaIit6,trois
instances ou tout au inoins trois questions dont rlous deties vous
saisir successiveinent.L'unc qui était la question dc votre compétence
A vous Cour internationale dc Justice pour appricier le différend entre
le Gouverriement britannique et le Gauver,nernent hellénique, différend
qui ne se conforidait pas avec la réclamation Arnbatielos, diffirend qui
portait. sur cc que j'appellerai par un motsun peu hardi i'arbitrabiliti:
de cette réclam;ition, c'est-à-dire l'obligatioé~rentuellcdu Koyaume-
Uni de recourir à l'arbitrage. Première question : ia Cour ktait-clle PLAIDOIRIE DE RI. ROLIN (GRECE -) 23 II153 353
cornpéteilte pour en décider? Ueuxikme question : le Gouvernement
grec était-il fonde 5 prhtendre que ce différend était arbitral ? Puis,
tout L fait derniere qucstion : la récIarnation Ambatielos était-elle
fondée 7
Comme je vous le disais lorsque nous avions plaide, nous ar'ns un
peu sammaircment demandé L la Cour, au cas où elle se déclarerait
compétente, d'inviter les parties 2 conclure au forid, et quand nous
pariions de fond, nous pensions que le fond serait lefond de la récla-
mation Ambaticlos et que votrc déclaration de cornpetence statuerait
en rkalité et viderait à la foisla question de votre cornpetence et celle
de la compktcnce de la juridiction arbitrale, ce qui évidemment sant
deux questions différentes.
La Cour a donc limite l'objet de la prkente instance dans le dispositif
de son arrkt dans les terrnes suivaiits: clle s'est déclaréecornpetente
((pour décider si le Royaume-Uni est tenu de soumettre 5 l'arbitrage,
conformEment a la déclari-itiode 1926, le différend rclatifA la validité
de la réclamation Ambatielos en tant que cette reclamation est foi~dée
sur le traité de 1886 ii,Je crois, hfessieurs,que, cette question qui
est donc dc notre commun accord la seule question sur laquelle vous
deviez vous prononcer aujourd'hui, vous donnerez une réponse affir-
mative, et les raisons qui m'incitent a vous exprimer cette confiance .
fcront l'objet dc la deuxième partie de ma plaidoirie. Riais avant cela,
je voudrais rechercher avec vous ce que coinporte tr+s exactemelit
cette dbcision et sur quels points va pouvoir porter votre contrble,
lorsque vous aurez i apprécier l'obligatiolî du Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni de soumettre k l'arbitrage.
Comme le dit le mémoire de duplique britaiîniquc, cela conduit en
grande partie rechercher la signification correcte à donner au mot
11fondée iilorsque vous dites en tant que cette réclamation est rrfondke ii
surle trait&de 1886.Suivant la thèse britannique, laquelle est développée
dans la première partie du mémoire de duplique, le Gouvernement
hellhiclue qui, assurémeilt, a l'obligation de faire la démonstration
de l'obligation du Gouvernement britannique de soumettre le diffkrend
j. l'arbitr<age, doit, pour pouvoir aboutir et obtenir de la Cour une
rép.polisaeffirmative, faire la démonstration que la r~clamation Ambatielos
trouve effectivement dans lcç dispositions du traite de 1586 sur laquelle
elle s'appuie un fondement rCel, légitime, qu'clle cst non seulement
jodée, mais tout au moins en droit bien fondLe sur le traité de 1886.
C'est ce que notamment le Gour:ernernent brîtanilique prdtend tirer
des mots nen tant quc cette réclamation cst fondée sur le traité clc
1886 fi.
Dans l'opinion individuelle qui accompagne votrc arrgt, M. le juge
Spiropoulos a de son côté exprimé l'opinion qu'en crnployailt ces mots :
((en tant que cette réclaniation est fondée sur Ic traité de 1886 n, la
Cour semblait - à tort du reste sclon lui - imposer Ala partie deman-
deresse, com~ne le suutient le Gouvernement britannique aujourd'hui,
le devoir d'établir le fondement effectif quc Ia rkclamation Ambatielos
,
trouvait dans le traitb. Je crois, Messieurs, que cette interprétation
est inexacte et qu'en redit6 les mots Lest fond& iisur le traite de
1586 lorçqu'on lit le reste dc I1arr&tn'ont manifest~ment pas la portée
qu'on prétend leur attribuer aujourd'hui.
En rialite, comme je vous l'indiquais tantcit, le Gouvernement hcllé-
nique, tout aii long de In procédure écrite,dans la yremiere phase, avait PLAIDOIRIE DE M. ROT.IN (GRECE) - 23 III53
354
estirni: pouvoir s'appuyer non seulement sur la déclaration de 1926et le
traité de1886, rnnis sur le traitde 1936 luCrneme, sur sa clause compro-
missoire et sur scs clauses substantielles. II avait cru que, du rnornent
que des règles substantielles avaient étéreprises en 1926 au trait6 de
1886, la Cour allait etre compktente directement pour statuer leur kven-
tuelle violation ct donc sur le fond de la rkclamntion Ambatielos. Or, la
Cour, dans la première partie de son dispositif écastc cette pr&tention.
Elle declare qu'elle n'est pas competentc directement pour statuer sur
le fond de la réclamation drnbatielos, laquellc relkveéventuellement de
la procédure arbitrale prkvue en 1886, et ce nécessairement dans les
limites de la partie de la rédamation fondée sur le traité de1886. Elle
rejette donc comme sans pertinence cette espécede tableau de compa-
raison que nous avions cru pouvoir drcsser dans notrc procédure écrite
entre les articles1, X, XTI, XV, paragraphe 3, du traite cle 1886et des
dispositions correspondantes du traité dc1926. La Cour nous répond :
je ne veux pas connaître des dispositions {plusou moins semblables du
traitkde 1926, je suis simplement compétente pour dkcider si la procé-
dure arbitrale du protocole de 1886 va devoir s'appliquer, étant entendu
que la réclamation dans l'affirmativese limitera aux violations desdispo-
sitions siibstantiellede ce traité de1886.
Jc crois, Tllessieurs,que cette interprktation n'esten rieil contredite
par un extrait des attendus de l'arret que cite le mémoire britannique
(p.4 de l'arrêt):
{En conskquence, la Cour est comp,ktente pour connaître de tout
différend relatifA l'interprétation ou 5 l'application dc la décla-
ration,ct, dans un cas approprié, pour dire qu'il devrait y avoir
soumission A une commission arbitrale. Cependant, tout différend
quant k la validité des réclamations en cause devra, ainsi qu'il cst
prevu dans la déclaration elle-meme, êtresoumis 2i.la commission.
Il peut sernhler à première vue qu'il existe iciune possibilité de
coi-iflitentre une décisiode la Cour déciarant qu'il y a obligation
de soumettre un cliffCrerlà uiie commission arbitraleet unedecision
éventuelle de la conzmission. En rkallté, il ii'ypas de possibilité
de ce genre.
La Cour aura 5 juger s'iy a un diffhrend entre les Partiesau scns
de la déclaration dc 1926.
Si elle ai-rive d la conclusiqu'un fel diferend existe,la commis-
sion arbitrale aura à se prononcer sur le fond du différendn
Or, le fond du différend dont il est qtrestiori. ici comme devant &tre
soumis à la corrimission arbitrale, c'eassurémentIa validité'de la rkcla-
mation Arnbatielos, laquelle suppose à toute évidencela vérification par
la commission des moyens non seulement de fait mais des moyens de
droit invoqués dans la réclamatioii Ambatielos.
Bous voici donc arrivés dans mon examen à une premiZre conclusion
qui peut, je pense, Ctre rksumée comme suit : c'cst quc pour décider
si la réclamation Ambatielos doit ctre soumise i la prockdure arbitrale,
il n'ya pas licii pour la Cour de vérifierd'embléel'exactitude dc I'inter-
prétation donnte ailx dispositions du traite de 1886 par le Gouverne-
ment helléniqtic.Si elle le faisait, ellesc mettrait en contradiction
avec la premikre partie de son dispositif qui a dit qu'elle ne veut pas'
connliltredu fond, car llinterpr&tation des dispositions, c'estdu fond ;
et elie se mettrait également cn contradiction avec cettc partie de PLAIDOIRrE DE RT.ROLIN (EBÈCE) - 23 III 53
355
ses attendus suivant laquelle c'est la commission arbitrale qui aura
à se prononcer sur le fond du diffërend.
S'eilsuit-il, llilessieurs,que la Cour tenue dans la prcrniéreprésente
instance, dans la présente instance, cette deuxième instance, de se
contenter de la simplc vtkificatien du fait que des dispositions du traité
de 1886 sont invoquées par le Gouvernement hellénique? Nous ne
songeons pas à le soutcnir. Supposez, Messieurs, que le Gouvernement
hellénique n'ait pas eu A sa disposition un traité de commerce et de
navigation, ni une dkclaratiun riciproque des deux gouvernements
acceptant In compétence obligatoire de la Cour, que dans l'arsenal
des traités le liant au Royaume-Uni il n'ait trouvd qu'un traité collectif
relatif9 la propriété industrielle ou A la protection de la baleine, et
que pour appuyer une rkclamation portant sur le traitement infligé
à un de ses ressortissants,il ait invoqué la clause compromissoire
figurant dans pareil traité, bien que, de façon eclatante, manifeste,
il n'ait aucun rapport quelconque avec l'objet de la réclamation.
Pareille exigence, inspirke uniquement par le souci de trouver un prétoire
afin de pouvoir s'y rkpandre avec amertume sur l'injustice prétendu-
ment infligée à un ressortissant, pourrait-elle aboutir ?
Je pense, Rlessicurs, que personne, ni à la Cour ni sur le banc du
Gouvernemeiit hellénique, ne songerait à soutenir qu'en pareil cas,
simplement parcc qiie le Gouvernement heilénique a trouvé une dispo-
sition compromissoire - et bien qu'il ait, contre tonte kvidence et
contre tout bon sens, Mabli, prétendu établir, un lien manifestement
inexistant entre ses griefs et le traité qu'il invoque -, personne ne
songerait à dire qu'en ce cas neanmoins, simplement sur le vu de la
clause compromissuire de ce traité et sans contrbler en aucune façon,
même rl prerniere lecture, lc lien de relation existant entre le traité
invoqué et I'objct du différend, la Cour devrait ordonner que l'on ait
recours à la procédure arbitrale.
J'ajoute, Messieurs, que si meme nous avions kt& tentés de soutenir
unc thèse semblable, la chosc nous eût étéimpossible en l'espèce, car
si la Cour avait estime devoir s'en tenir a la présentation formelle
de la demande, eh bien, en l'espèce,la Cour ne nous aurait certainement
, pas demandé de nous réunir pour discuter de cette obligation d'arbi-
trage ; il lui aurait sufde constater que dans la requéte du Goriverne-
ment hellénique ilktait fait mention d'un traité de 1885 prévoyant
Ia procédure arbitrale, pour sans aucun examen des faits ordonner
que la procédure arbitrale soitd~clenchke, sauf i la çornrnissioa arbitrale
à apprécier ultérieurement l'effetsur sa compétence et sur ses pouvoirs.
Mcssicurs, il y a pourtant une question qui se pose, et sinous accep-
tons que nécessairement il y a, pour la Cour, actuellement obligation
de vérificr la pertinence des titres juridiques invoques - et le mot
pertinence j'ai eu plaisir a le rctrouvcr également, mais je crois par
inadvertance, sous la plume de l'agent du Gouvernement britannique
(au par. 24 de sa duplique) -, si nous reconnaissons quc l'on peut
et que Von doit vérifier la relation véritable existant entre les faits
dénoncés etles moycns juridiques, la relation existant entre les moyens
de fait et lesmoyens de droit et non pas l'exactitude des moyens de
droit, à la réflexion, nous nous sommes rendu compte qu'il y avait,
m&mc dans cette appréciation de la relation, iy avait cles degrés.Ces
degrks, il nous paraîtindispensable rl la Cour dc les distingues
aujourd'hui. Ce rapport entre les dispositions du traité invoquees etles faits dénoncés,on peut l'aborder de trois façons, soit en vue du
mi nimurnde vérification de la connexité nécessaire pour apprécier
l'obligation d'arbitrage, soit au point cle vue de la compétence de la
commission arbitrale, soit au point de vue de l'adjudication ou du
rejet de la réclamation.
Me voici dont: amené à proposer A la Cour une noiivelle distinction,
et je m'en excuse. Elle peut paraître subtile; je la crois tout à
fait exacte, encore que nous rayons aperçue tardivement, mais c'est
en relisant les nombreuses opinions individuelles accompagnant l'arrkt
que nous nous sommes rendu compte qu'un certain nombre de juges
de la Cour avaient étk attentifs à cet aspect de la question, soit du
reste qu'ik en aient déduit des conclusions favorables a la cornpeténce
de la Cour, soit qu'ils en aient déduit des conséquences dkfavorables,
ce qui est une tout autre question. La Cour a paru se préoccuper dans
l'exercice de la,compétence dérivant de la déclaration de 1926 de ne
pas empiéter sur la compétence de la commission arbitrale. Or, la
comnlission arbitrale, normalement, trouve dans sa cornpetence notam-
ment la cornpetence pour juger elle-même de sa compétence. C'est
la, je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire, c'est un point entikement acquis
en droit des gens :il l'&taitantérieurement aux conventions de La Haye.
Tl a étéreproduit dans les deux conventions de La Haye de 1899 et
de rgo7. L'article 48 de la premiere, l'articl73 de la deuxihrne prkvoient
que le tribunal est airtoriséà détermincs sa compétence en interprétant
le compromis, ainsi que les autres traités qui peuvent être invoqués
dans la matiere en appliquant les regles de droit international. 1
Comme je vous le disais, %gessieurs,cette question a kt& soulignée I
par plusieurs d'entre vous, dans les avis qui accompagnent I'arrgt du
rcr juilletM. Klaestad, dans son opinion dissidente (p. 831,indique que
selon un principe reconnu, un tribunal international a le pouvoir de
décider sur sa propre compétence et qu'il appartiendrait à la corn- 1
mission arbitrale elle-même de décider si elle est compktei~te pour
connaître d'un diff6rcndqui lui estsoumis, seule une disposition exprcssc
et ciriircpouvant empecher la commission' d'exercer cette compétence,
W. le juge Hsu Mo (p. 86) exprimait de son cdté sa dificulté à admettre
que les parties aient, divisé en deux phases successives le règlerncnt
du diffkend portant sur des réclamations fondées sur le traité de 1886. '
M. le juge ZoriFiC (p. 78-79) exposait le dilemme dans Ics termes
suivants : I
((Ou bien la Cour est compktente pour intcrprkter et appliquer
la dixlaration, ou elle ne l'est pas. Si elle l'est, elle ne peut se
borner à exercer seulement une partic de sa compétence et en
rester Ii. Ida Cour devrait, au contraire, statuer tout au moins
siirla question de savoir si les conditions de la déclaration ont
ktéremplies - ce,quiest une question dc fond -, c'est-à-direnotam-
ment, si la reclamation a étéforrnulke et présentéeconformément
la cliclaration, si le Gouvernement hellknique n'est pas forclos
A raison de son retard àprésenter la réclamation (question d'ailleur.
que l'arrst a dijà dicidéej ii - dit-il - ;u s'ils'agit d'une récla-
mation fondée sur le traité de 1886: et ainsi de suite. Ce n'est
que si laCour &tait convaincue que lesconditions de la déclaration
sont vraiment remplies qu'elle pourfait, éventuellement, déférer '
l'affaire 3. la commission d'arbitrage prCvue, comme arbitrage
spécial,afin de statuer sur laseule validité de la réclamation.
I PLAI11OIHlE DE BI. ROL1-i (GRÈÇE) - 23 111 53 357
Or, selon la déclaration, ce n'est pas seulement sur la validité
des réclamations que les commissions d'arbitrage doivent statuer.
Bicn au contraire, tout examen des coilditions de l'applicabilité
de la déclaration appartient à la cornpktence exclusivde es com-
missions d'arbitrage prévues datls le protocole de 1886. Ce sont
ces commissions et elles seules qui doivent statuer : quant a.la
validité de telles réclamations u, elles doivent donc, elles. avant
d'entreprendre l'examen de la validité, s'assurer que Ics réclama-
tions sont vraiment tteilese que la déclaration le prévoit ...ii
Je crois, Messieurs, qu'en réalitéle problhme qui était ainsi dénoncé
est un problknie réel mais qu'il ktait plus aisément soluble que les
opinions que je vier~sde lire ne paraissaient Ie redouter, et je crois
que, sans avoir repris intégralement le problème, M. le juge Spiropoulos
indiquait clairement dans son ayis où en &tait la clef, lorsqu'il montrait,
à la page j6, que rlorsqu'un Etat s'est liépar une clause d'arbitrage
obligatoire - et le protocole de 1886 en est un exemple-, iln'existepour
cet Etat, en principe, aucun moyen de décliner une offre de recourir
l'arbitrage. Ce n'est que dans le cas tout à fait exceptionnel où l'in-
vitation de recourir à l'arbitrage constituerait un abns manifeste de
1'Etat requérant que le recours à l'arbitrage ne serait pas obligatoire.
Pareil abus existerait, par exemple, si, sans l'existence d'un diffërend
réel, l'une des parties demandait la constitution du tribunal arbitral.
En effet, en pareil cas, on est obligh de reconnaître a la partie adverse
le &oit de refuser la désignation de son arbitre. Pareille hypotki&se,
si alléguee, pourrait naturellemelit faire l'objet d'un examen de la
part de la Cour lorsquc celle-ci sc prononcera sur le bien-fondé de la
dernalade du Gouvernerne~ît hellknique en question.
Ainsi, M. Spiropoulos nous propose - et aujourd'hui je crois que
cela nous vient tout à fait CLpoint - une distinction, que je crois
lumineuse, entre l'obligation de recourir il'arbitrage et la cornpetence
du tribunal arbitral. Un Gtat qui a souscrit une convention d'arbitrage
ne peut pas se refuser d'aller devant le tribunal arbitral uniquement
parce qu'il en coiiteste la compétence, car, en principe, c'est le tribunal
arbitr'd qui va lui-m&me juger de cette compktence. C'est seulement
dans le cas oh ily a abusmanifcstc, danslecas où dc façon éclatante,
flagrante, il n'y a pas de question qui puisse hoilnii.ternent êtreenvisag6e
le tribunal arbitral, c'est dans ce cas seulement que l'État peut
dire: non! je n'irai pas à l'arbitrage, parce qu'en réalité,en l'espkce,
iln'y a mêmepas de contestatioil de compétence sérieuse, il est mani-
feste, il est flagrant que c'est par un véritable abus que l'on pretend
m'imposer cette procédure. Et dans ce cas aussi, l'autorité invitée 3.
se prononcer sur l'obligation de donner effet à la clausc eompromissoire
rejettera la demande.
La distinction que je vous proyosc et que je crois trouver suggCr6e
dans lesavis dont je vous ai donné lecture n'est pas seulement exacte,
je la crois kgdement pratique, car elle indique à la Cour de façon fort
claire cette dhmarcation que nouscherchions entre sa compéteilce actuelIe
et celle de la juridiction arbitrale éventuelle. Illiepeut pas y avoir de
conflit, en pareil cas, entre la compétence de la Cour, exercte en vertu de
l'arrêtdii ~crjuillet,et la cornpktcnce qui C.ventue1lcrncntreviendrait à
la juridiction arbitrale,y compris la compétence de sa cornpktence, car
la compétence de la Cour, celle qu'elle exerce aujourd'hui, est un contrale PLAKDOIRTE DE M. RDLIN (GRECE) - 23 III53
33s
différent dc celui que lajuridiction arbitrale exerceraitsur sa compétence,
c'est un contrblc préalable au fonctionrîcment de la justice arbitrale ;
il portc cxclusivcmet~t sur l'obligation des parties dc donner ?ila clause
çompromissoire un comrnencement d'effct, 'et réserrc entièrcrnent leur
délégationde co~npktencc etles exceptioris qu'ilsferaicnt6vcntuellement
valoir devant la juridiction arbitrale. Or, ils sont tenus de souscrire à ce
cominencement d'effet du mornent que la demaride présentéek la requ&te
d'une des parties, comme le dit du reste la déclaration de 1926, setrouve
prCscnt ie dans des conditions serieuses qui n'en pernîet tent pas immé-
diatement lercjct.
Je voudrais sigmler encorc A laCour que ce genre d'examen, auquel
je l'invite quant à la pertinence des r~c1,unations helléniques, n'est pas
du tout aussi exceptionnel qu'ilpourrait sembler L premMrc vue ct qu'il
rappelle directenient unc situation frkqucntc cn droit internc. A propos
de l'arbitrage, j'ni sous lcs ycux, Nlcssicurs, un traité que je crois clas-
sique, bien qu'il soit belge, de rnon confrhre ct coll>icAllrcd Bernarcl
sur wl'arbitrage volontaire eridroit privé)),dans lequel, ktudiant la doctrine
et la jiirisprudence tant française que belge, l'auteur ciplique (na 294)
((que It:sarbitrcs ne peuvent statuer sur des questions que pour autant
que l'existence et la vnliditk du cornpromis ne soient pas contestees ct
que la regdaritg de leur nomination ile soit pas discutée. S'iy avait dis-
cussioiz à cet égard, les arbitres seraient sans pouvoir pour statuer. En
effet, les arbitresne tiennent leur pouvoir que d'une désigriation réguIiére,
leur existence dtpcnd de la conve~ztion dcs partics ; cn cas d'absence ou
de nullitéde cettc convention, il n'y a pas de juridiction arbitrale. Si
I'cxistcnce ou la validit& du compromis est contestée, c'est ln validité
de ln juridiction dcs arbitrcs qui cst mise eiz question, et on ne peut
admettre qu'ils se créent Lm titre à eux-mêmes, enstatuant sur la ques-
tion de savoir s'ilsexistent ou non en qualitéd'arbitres. Diverses décisioi~s
relhvent le cas notamment où l'on conteste l'existence ou la validité de
la con\.ention contestée contenant la. clause comprumissoire, la nullité
de cette convention en raison du fait qu'elle est entachée de do1 ou de
fraude, la caducité de cette convention 3, etc.
Je sais bien, Messieurs, que, en droit des gens, la. situation n'est pas
identique et que la doctrine et la jnrisprudei~ce ne distii-iguent pas dans
le pou\*oir des ai-bitres de statuer comme juges de leur compétence, s'il
s'agit seillement de l'interprétation du compromis on églernent de la
\;aliditci du compromis. Mais cn réalité,Messieiirs, lajurisprudence inter-
national~ ~irksentc sur cc point cctte singularité, c'est quc, comme les
arbitres tienncnt trCsgcnbratcmcnt en réalitelleurexistence du cornpromis,
l'existence clcspouvoirs des arbitres, l'existence de I'obiigntion arbitrale
nc sont pas miscs cn question. Il n'y aque la limite des pouvoirs, il n'ya
que l'iriterprétntion du compromis qui va &tre contestée, et je n'ai pas
souvenance que des cours aient étéconsultt5es quarit à l'obligation cle
constituer le tribunal arbitral.
Et pourtant, inèrne en droit internatiorial, il existc aujourd'Iiui une
situation qui cst asscz scmblable à celle à laquelle jeviens de faire allu-
sion. Il csiste trn certain nombre de conveiltiunç dans lesquelles on a
adrnis la juridiction arbitrale comme juridiction coinpétente, mais où,
pour composer la juridictioii arbitrale,l'on a prévu qu'il scrait faiappel
à certaines autorités, notamrncn t au Président de ln Cour internationale
de Justicc. Ou, jc VOUS pose Irq.uestion, Messieurs, lorsque le Président
de la Cour ii-iterilütionale de Justice est saisi d'une demaiide constituer,360 PLAIDOIHIE DE RI. ROLIW (GRECE) - 23 III 53
si la demande qui lui est soumise entre vkritablement dans sa corn- 4
pétence i elle. Ainsi, Messieurs, dans ma penske, la tiche qui incombe
aujourcl'I-iui à la Cour dans la presente instance est d'apprécier si les
griefs formulés par le Royaume-Uni contre le recours L la procidure
arbitrale sont tellement manifestement sans fondement, qu'ily aurait
abus à prétendre imposer au Royaume-Uni de se préter au dtclen-
chernent de la procédure ou si au contraire ils apparaissent comme
suffisamment sérieux pour que, sous réserve cle la dkcision finale de
la conimission de la juridiction arbitrale relativement à sa compétence,
la Cour estime qu'il y a lieu, pour le Royaume-Uni, de se plier à la
procédure arbi twle. Si, NIessieurs, la Cour conqait sa mission actuelle
Comme je vicns de le définir, je serais surpris que M. l'agent du Gouver-
nement britannique insistât et prétendit vraiment que, m&me ainsi
comprise, il est possiblc pour lui de combattre la thèsc que lajuridiction
arbitrale doit en I'espSce &tre consultée.
Ceci c-t, Mcssieurs, je veux rencontrer la deuxiéme conception que
l'on peut se hiire de l'objet de l'instance actuelle, conception suivant
laquelle la Cour se prononcerait, dans la présente instance, sur la
compétence de la juridiction arbitrale, et je desire montrer à la Cour
- je le ferai bri$vemeilt - que même dans ce cas-ci, contrairement
à ce que prétend l'agent du Gouveriiement britannique, la Cour doit
se limitcr h vérifierla conncxité du traité clc 1886 et ne peut pas vérifier
à cc stade de la prockclure l'exactitude de l'interpritation que nous
en donrians.
Ma tldse, Messieurs, me paraît commandée par le texte et la décla-
ration de 1926 el du protocole de 1886.
La déclaration dc 1926 &tait rédigke comme suit :
((Le traité cle commerce et de navigation en date d'aujourd'hui
ne portc pas prkjudice aux réclamations faites au nom de pasti-
culicrs qui sont basées sur les dispositions du traité de commerce
anglo-grcc de 1886 i,maiç clle continue : (et que tous diffërcnds
qui peuvent s'élcver entre nos deux gouvernements, quant a la
validite de ces r6clamations, doivent, à la demande de l'un des
gouvernements, etre soumis à IhrbiTrage, conformément aux
dispositions du protocole du IO novembre 7886 annexk audit
traite.ii I
Un diffkrend, 5fcssieurs, quant?iTa ~lidlté, c'est 2 la fois un differend
qui porte sur la vérification des moyens de droit et de fait.Les uns et les
autres ont trait au fondement, àla validité de la réclamation. Les uns et
les autrcs sont d6férksà In juridiction arbit~ale. Et dans ces çoi~ditiot~s,
d'aprés la déclaration elle-meme, uiî difiérendquant àla validité, sansqu'il
y ait distinction entre le droit ctle fait,doit ktreréservéàla jiiridiction
arbitrale. J'nttiredu reste votre attention sur deux petits mots modestes
de ce texte,deux mots qui passeraient volontiers inaperçus mais qui me
paraissent essentiels, ce sont les mots ((quanti à i)un clifferend(quant à
la validitk 3, et en anglais ((as totlzevalzddy iiCecisemble bien indiquer
qu'il suffitqu'il y ait un lien sérieux bien entendu critre la basejuridique
donnée à la demande et les faits dénoncds, pour que la commission
arbitrale doivc se déclarer compéteiite. 1
Et celadevient encore plus clair,Messieurs, lorsque rious nous référons,
au textc du protocole de 1886 où il est prhu que K toutes questions
qui peuvcnt s'élever nzi ssjejede I'interprkta,tion ou de l'ex6ciition duprésent trait6ou lcs çonséqucnces de toute vioIation de ce traité seront
soumises, quand les moyens de Ics ~Cgler directement seront épiiisés,
à la décision de cornmissions d'arbitrage )iAinsi, Messieurs, il dcvient
tout à fait clair quc, pour que la juridiction arbitrale soit compétente,
il suffitquc le différend portt: sur l'interprétatioii du traité, mais en
aucunc façon que I'interl-irktationdu traité ait étéreconnue fondke.
Bien entendu, Messieurs, cela implique pour Ia Cour un examen
sans aucun doutc plus approfondi de la con~icxitéque l'examen a $riori
que je supposais devoir Ctrc tant& celui auquel se bornerait la Cour,
cette szc~zntaria cog$zitii laquelle faisait allusion M. Anzilotti; c'cst
l'examen que frkquemmcnt vous avez appel6 dans vos arrêts l'examen
Prim facze, lequel tout de mkrne nc va pas jusqu'a crnpiétcr sur le
fond et en préjuger.
Je crois avoir trouvé dans une ancienne décision de la Cour, l'avis
consultatif no 4 relatif aux décrets tunisiens de nationalité, page 26,
une bonne définition de ce que comporte cet examcn sommaire, relati-
vement sommaire, pnur le distinguer de l'examen extrernernent som-
maire que j'avais en vue tantôt. Lx Cour permanente s'exprimait
comme suit :
rr11 est également vrai que le seul fait que l'une des parties
invoque dcs engagemerits d'ordre internatioiial pour -contester la
com~~tcnnçcexclusive de l'antre partie ne suffit pas pour écarter
l'ap~~licationdu paragraphe 8.))
Ceque la Cour dit à propos de la comp~tence exclusive estassurément
vrai en ce qui concerne la co~npdtcncc tout court, c'est un point sur
lequel je suis d'accord avec mes collCgues britanniques - des beur;
cbtés de la barre - ; c'est qu'ilne sufht pas que nous invoquions un
engagement d'ordre international, mêmeAanqué d'une clause com-
promissoire, pour que la Cour doive se déclarer compétente.
((Mais, continue la Cour, dés que lcs titres invoqués sont de
nature à perniettte la conclusion provisoire qui peut avoir une
importance juridique pour le différend soumis au conseil et que
la question de savoir si un Etat est compétent pour prendre telle
ou telle mesure se trouve subordonnée A l'appréci~~tionde la
validité et à l'interprétation de ces titres, la disposition du para-
graphe 8 de l'article XV ccssc d'ktre appIicable et l'on sort du
domaine exclusif de 1'Etat pour entrer dans le domaine régi par
le droit international. i)
Il s~~ffiRfessieurs, de paraphraser cette disposition pour sc rendrc
compte que, du moment qu'il apparaît que la compétence se trouvc
subordcinnée i l'appreciation de la validité et de l'iiiterprétation d'un
titre invoqué par un Etat et pour lequel ily a compktence de la juridic-
tion arbitrale, cette juridiction arbitrale doit être déclaréecompétente.
AU surplus, Messieurs, je suis d'autant plus en droit de me montrer
surpris des cxigcnccs forrnulkcs 5 cet kgard par le Gouvernement britan-
nique que nous nous sommes trouvés dans une situation identique eux
et moi ily a peu de mois - sauf que nous occupions des positions inverses
- dans le diffirend qui fut porté récemment devant la Cour, le différend
anglo-iranien. A ce rnoment-lh, c'&tait le Goilvernement britannique
qui defendait la compétence déla COLIL ,tpour la justifier, il soulignait
.dans la procédure écrite(par. g de l'annexe z au rnbmoire) que les traitésY52 PL4IDOIRIE 13E hl. ROLIN ([;HECE -) 24 III53
qu'il mentionnait etaient ceux à l'application desquels se rapportaient
les çitu;itioris oufaitsd'oh dtait né le différend. Le mat anglais etait
rthav~reluttorzii,et il était suivi dans le texte des mots français ront
traitiipour bien montrer qu'il ii'incombait pas au demandeur de démon-
trer que Id demande trouvait, dès à prescrit,un fondement rkel dans les
traités qu'elle invoquait pour quc la Cour puisse sedéclarer cornpktcnte.
De menie, les représentants britanniques employèrent tout au lotig de
leur démonstration l'expression prima: facie pour indiquer l'examen
auquel ln Cour devait se livrer, examen auquel, en l'cspècc, laCour ne
dut pas se livrer, puisqu'elle retint d'autres moyens pour écarter sa
compétence. Et moi-même,Messieurs, lorsque je répondais au Gouver-
nement britannique, je ne songeais pas 5 dire que le Gouverncmcnt
britannique dcvait faire la preuve d&sà présent, pour quc la Cour se
reconnaisse compEtentc, de l'exactitude de l'interprétation qu'il prkteii-
dait donner aux traitks ; je Inc plaçais également sur le point de vue du
;brima fucie,jeprétendais, quant à moi, comme conseil du Gouvernement
iranien, que les traités que l'on invoquait étaient sans fiertina?zceavec
I'objet de la demande.
C'cst encore, Messieurs, ln position q~ic jeprends aujourd'hui, lorsque
je pretcnds démontrer que, pour qt~c la Cour se déclare compétente, il
suffitque la Cour constate la pertinence, la connexité des dispositions du
trait6 dc 7886 avec l'objet de la rkclamation ri\mbatielos. Certes, comme
voiis leverrez demain, j'ittli aussi loindans la démonstration dii hien-
fonde de notre argumentation juridiclue queIa Cour me le permettra.
Mais cette limifation que je lui demande d'observer dans l'cxarnen du
foiid est vraiment, à mon avis, la seule façon concevable pour établir
ce ~nitii~iiilmde démarcation cntrc la fonction de la juridiction arbitrale
et la'fonictioti de cette cour decontrble que plusieurs d'entre vous ont
reconnu désirable. Si vous vous prononccz sur la compétence de la
commission arbitrale, vous aurez atteint l'extréme limite de ce à quoi
vous pilissiez actucllcment ambitionner, sans aller jusqu'i ernpiiter
sur oii amputer la compétencc dc la juridiction arbitrale puur statuer
sur le fond du difiérend, en décidant que l'interprétation donnCc par
leGouverricmcnt helléniqueaux dispositions du traitéde 1886 est fondée
ou clu'clle n'est pas fond&.
Je rnrr:éserve clemain, Monsieur lc Prisident, si la Cour m'y autorise,
d'aborder et de terminer très aisement, en une audience, la démonstrn-
tion de cette connexité.
[Sea?zcefiz4blignedu 24 mars 1953, mcdt.i?a]
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs dc la Corn, dails la séanced'hier
apri.5-midi, je rne suis efforcé d'examiner la portke de cette mission
que vous aviez accepte de dtcider si le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni
étaittellu d'aller àl'arbitrage. C'essous le bénéficede ces considérations
que j'examinerai aujourd'liui les raisons que le Gouvernement hellénique
croitpouvoir invoquer pour amener la Cour à répondre de façon positive
A la question qui lui est posée.
M. l'agent du Gouvernement britanizicpe dit que le Gouvernement
hellénique avait la chargc de la preuve, et ila ii~contestablamcnt raison.
Lc Gouvernement hellénique, qui vous demailde de dkcider que le
Royaume-Uni est tenu de recourir 5 l'arbitoge, a assurkrnent le devoir PLAIDOIRIE DE RI.ROLIN (GRECE -) 24 Il1 53 363
de démontrcr qu'il-en est effectivemerit ainsi. Et la chose est acceptke
d'autant plus aisément par lui qu'il considère que cette charge est en
l'espèce fort ltgtre.
Dc quoi se plaint-il ? De plusieurs choses.
Il'abord, en fait. La réclamatioii a pour base un certain riombre
cl'allégations qui sont, du rcste, pour la plupart, reconnnissons-le,
contestkcs par le Gouvei-nement bnt'uiniquc. T,e Gouvernemerit hellb-
nique affirme que l'un de ses ressortissants rivait fait l'achat,ce qui
n'est pas dénie,d'un grand nombre de navires, que des délaisde livraison
avaient étéconvenus - ce qui est dhié -, que, tandis que son resçor-
tissant exigeait en vain le respect des délaisclelii~rais~net ne l'obtenait
pas, les navires ayant kt6 livrés pour une partic trCs tardivement, il
se trouva dans I'impossibilitC.dc payer le solde du pris ct qu'il fut
poursuivi avcc rigueiir et intransigeance par le vendeur en retard qui
réussit iiI'exéctiter sur les navires qui avaicnt étélivres.
Le Gouvernemcnt britannique, d'aprés la plainte du Gouverilement
hellénique, avait, dans ses dossiers administratifs, la preuve que des
délais de livraison nïnicnt étéprévus; alors que lc procCs était pendant
et qu'on lui demandait dc fournir, de contribuer ;il'administration de
ln preuve, en livrant it la justice les pièces essentiellesqui ktaient en
sa possession, il s'en est abstenu et les demandes faites 5 cc sujet au
tribunal ont kt6 repoussées par celui-ci.
D'autrc part, lin témoin essentiel SC trouvait avoir étécite par le
Gouvernerncnt britantiiqiie, en sorte qtic lc ressortissant hellénique ne
Ic cita pas, c'est leiarncii? major Laing. Et puis il se fitque, l'ayant
cité,lc Gouvernemeilt britannique s'abstint de le faire entendre, tandis
que le plaignant hell~iiique, plus exactement le demandeur reconven-
tionnel, ne l'ayant pas fait citer ne pouvait pas lefaire entendre. Ayant
ensuite demandé de porivoir allcr en appel afin de produire des écrits
qu'il s'ctait procrirés pour pnrcr 5 la carence du défendeur et afin de
faire entendre ce témoin, cet appcl lui fut refusé. Le Gouvernenîent
helléiliyue, dans son méinoire, a affirrnkque cette attitude du Gouver-
nement britannique était une attitudc contraire à la praticliie britan-
nique etqtic Ics dkcisiorisjudiciaires ktaicnt contrairesla.jurisprudence.
Voilà le fait,
Et alors le clroit.
Le Gouvcrr~cment heI1knique prkterid que ces faits constituent des
violations d'une sériede dispositions du trait6 de rSSG, et ilcite quatre
dispositioi~s.
L'article premier du traité, qui assure aux ressortissants helléniques
la jouissance des rnkrnes droits cn matière de commerce ct de navigation
quc ceux qui sont ou pcuvcnt &ire accordés aux nationaux.
L'articleXII du traité, qui garantit aux sujcts des parties contrac-
taiites de ne pas etrc soumis en ce qui conccrne leurs personnes et
leurs biens i des tases généralesou localcs, à des impOts ou obligations,
de quelque nature qu'ils soient, autres ou plus lourds que ceux qui
peuvent &tre imposks aux natioiraux. Le mémoire britannique signale
à cet égard; à juste titrc, que le inot (oblig,itions))qui figure dans le
texte ofhiel anglais, ct vraisemblablement dans lc texte helléniquc,
ne figure pas dans la traduction fran~aise qui apparut dece traité dans
la publication de Louis Renault et dont s'est inspiré le Greffe lorsqu'il
a rcprocluit la traduction. Il y a donc lieu 5-ce point de combler cette
lacune inatérielle. Je signale 5 la Cour que, dans certains documents-
?164 PLAlUOIRIE UE M. ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 24 III53
produits par lc Gouvcrnçment hellknique, on a reproduit la meme
traductiori et que le mêmemot (obligations M, qui est esseiltiel, aéti.
omis.
Le Gouvernement helléiliqueinvoque l'article X du trait&, quigarantit
aux ressortissantsde chaque pays en toutc rnatihre relative au corilmerce
OLT k la navigation, les priviléges, faveurs, irnmunltb et, en général, le
traitement des ikangers les plus favorisés.
Et, cntin, l'articlXV, paragraphe 3, qui garantit aux ressortissants
de chaque pays sur le territoire de l'autre le libre acds aux trihunaux
pour 1;t poursuite et la défense de leurs droits sans autres conditions
restrictives ou taxes que celles qu'elle impose &leurs sujets.
Suivant le Gou-\~errieiiienthellénique, .M. AmbaticEos n'a pas joui du
traitement garanti par le traité. Dans ses relations avec l'aclministrt*on
britanriique, iln'a pas et6 traité avec le /air$lay et iln'a pas bénéficié
çlu ttaitctnen ciont les nationaux britanniques crzgeneral et les étrangers
les plus faicorisésjouisseiit.
Et le Gouverriement hellénique invoque 'Acet égard, à la faveur de
l'articreX que j'ai lu tantAt, outre le bénéficedirect du traité, le bénifice
indirect du traité, à savoir ce qu'il trouve dans des traités assurkmcnt
déjA anciens, mais toujours en vigueur, avec le Danemark et ln Suèdc,
remontant à 1660, 1670, 16j4 et 1661, un dcvoir aux gouvernements
de se conformer a l'équité et à la justice, et m&me suivant l'un des
traites, au comraon righb.
Jugé d'aprhs cescritbres, iI ne paraitpas dotitetix que M. Arnbatielos
est en droit de si:plaindre et leGouvernement hellénique dèslors égale-
ment.
Le Gouvernement hellénique considkre s~t.cialernent que la procedure
suivie devant les tribunaux ne correspondlpas à cette notion de l'asti-
cle XV, paragraphe 3, du libre acckç,interprétésuivant son sens veritable
qui n'est pas seulement l'accès matériel aiux tribunaux, mais l'accb ,
dans clesconditions assurailt la dkfense ; selon lui, on a impose 5
M. Arribatielos des conditions restricti~es,~lorsqu'on lui a fait assumer
seul la charge de la preuve, sans pouvoir compter sur cette contribution
à l'administration de la. preuve qu'en Angleterre, que dans moi1 pays ct
dans la plupart des pays, l'on doit attendre des plaideurs de bonnc
foi meme lorsquiils sont dkfendeurç. I
Est-ce que, IvJessieurs,cette manière de voir est fondée? Est-ce que
les articles 1, X, XII, XV, paragraphe 3, doivent Gtreinterprétéscomme
nous le faisons ? Est-cequ'ilsont cette etendue ?Est-ce q~i'kles supposer
établis les faits que nous invoquons constituent des violations desdites
dispositions ? Suivant cc que je vous ai expliqué hier, ce seraA la juri-
diction arbitrale d'en décider. Mais est-ce que la question que je pose,
est-ce que les faits que jpviens de vous expqser sont relatifsaux disposi-
tions du traitéinvoquces, est-cequeIe s oyeqs de droit que j'aidévelopp6s
devant vouç posent une question d'interprétation et d'application du
traite ? Ou bien est-ce que, prima fncie, ilest permis d'ecarter ces dis-
positions çomrnc sans pcrtinencc ! Je crois, Messicurç, que la rkponse
a cette question est fort simple, qu'elle doit nous ctrc favorable, le
Goilvernement hellénique ayant amplement1démontré quel'affaire pour
laquelle il demande le rec~urs à la procédurearbitral€ est une affaire
relative A I'interprktation et i l'applicatioq du traité de 1886 et que,
dèslors,c'estA bon droit qu'il clernandequeleGouvernement du Royaume-
Uni soit tenu de recourir à l'arbitrage. 1
l
I
I
I
I PLAIDOIRIE DE M. ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 24 III53 365
s'aurais pu m'arrêter ici ,si nous n'avions pas reçu communication
de la part du Gouvernement britannique d'un mémoiretrès intéressant,
très soigné, dans lequel le Gouvernement britannique formule ses
objections à la thèse du Gouvernement hellénique de son obligation de
recourir à l'arbitrage. Ces objections sont essentiellement au nombre
de trois.
Premièrement : suivant le Gouvernement britannique, mêmesi les
faits alléguéspar le Gouvernement hellénique étaient vrais - ce qui
est évidemment contesté par lui - ils ne constitueraient pas une viola-
tion par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni du traité de 1SS6,parce que
celui-ci ne peut pas êtreinterprétéde cette façon et ne s'applique pas à
lamatière. Par conséquent, la réclamation Ambatielos n'est pas (fondée ))
sur ce traité ainsi que l'exige la déclaration de 1926 et elle doit, dès
lors, êtreécartée: il n'y a pas obligation d'arbitrage.
Deuxiéme objection : le réclamant originaire, RI. Ambatielos, n'a
pas épuisé les voies de recours devant les tribunaux anglais et, par
conséquent, le Gouvernement hellénique n'est pas justifié à demander
que les faitsdont il se plaint soient soumis au contrôle d'une juridiction
internationale.
Troisième objection : dans la poursuite de l'affaire Ambatielos -
je reprends les termes du mémoire - «le Gouvernement hellénique est
responsable de retards si considérables et nuisibles à la conduite de
l'affaire qu'au stade actuel le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ne devrait
pas êtreContraint de le soumettre à l'arbitrage 1).-
Je vais examiner ces trois objections et commencer par les deux der-
nières, qui sont les plus simples et qui me retiendront le moinslongtemps.
'l'out d'abord, ce non-épuisement des voies de recours internes. La
Cour, Messieurs, appréciera s'il convient qu'elle examine ce moyen
à ce stade-ci de la procédure, ou si elle doit le laisser à la juridiction
arbitrale. Si elle envisage sa mission comme une mission pré-arbitrale,
une mission de contrôle du recours, de l'obligation de recours, je crois
qu'elle devra nécessairement écarter provisoirement ce moyen.
Mais j'ai reconnu qu'il pouvait en être autrement et que la Cour
pouvait se faire une autre conception de sa tâche actuelle ; si elle consi-
dère qu'elle doit apprécier la compétence de la juridiction arbitrale, il
est possible, Messieurs, qu'elle considère également dans ce cas qu'elle
doit de même se substituer à la juridiction arbitrale pour apprécier
toutes les fins de non recevoir, exceptions dilatoires, et, d'une façon
générale,les objections préliminairesqui pourraient êtresoulevéesdevant
la juridiction arbitrale. Or, je suis de ceux,, Messieurs, qui considèrent
que le moyen de non-épuisement des voies de recours internes fait
partie des objections préliminaires et des objections dilatoires. Je crois
donc qu'il est possible que la Cour soit amenéeàexaminer dansla présente
instance ce moyen du non-épuisement des +oies de recours internes et
il est, dans ces conditions, prudent de notre part que nous nous expli-
quions brièvement à ce sujet.
Je m'einpresse de dire qu'il va de soi que le principe invoqué n'est
-pascontesté - c'est une régleactuellement bien acquise que quand un
gouvernement intervient en vertu de son droit de protection en faveur
d'un de ses ressortissants, il ne peut le faire que si le ressortissant, dispo-
sant ou ayant disposéde moyens de redressement fournis par l'organisa-
tion interne du pays qu'il accuse, a épuisé ces voiesde recours internes.
Mais, Messieurs, bien entendu, et sans que je doive fatiguer la Cour de366 PLAIDOIRIE DE RI.ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 24 III53
citations àcet égard, encore cela suppose-t-il que ces voies soient réelles,
et qu'elles puissent êtreutiliséesde façon efficace, que ce ne soient pas
des voies purement apparentes et devant nécessairement conduire à
des décisionsd'incompétenceou d'irrecevabilité. Or, Messieurs, en l'es-
pèce,il n'est pascontestéque AI.Ambatielos s'est adresséaux tribunaux
anglais. A vrai dire, il n'en a pas pris l'initiative, il a agi par voie recon-
ventionnelle, mais il a soumis ses griefs aux tribunaux anglais. Il n'est
pas contesté qu'après avoir perdu devant le tribunal de premier degré
il s'est adressà la Cour d'appel pour demander l'autorisation d'appeler,
qui lui aétérefusée.Aussi le reproche qui lui est fait est-il actuellement
de ne pas s'êtreadressé àla Chambre des Lords pour obtenir une réfor-
mation éventuellede la décisionprise par le juge d'appel, de lui refuser
l'appel, de ne pas l'entendre.
Messieurs, vous avez déjàentendu à cet égard,dans le bref échange
de vues.qulil y a eu à ce sujet au cours des premières plaidoiries, vous
avez entendu sir Hartley Shawcross - que je regrette de ne pas avoir
à mes côtés, ayant étéretenu par d'autres devoirs en Angleterre et,
comme vous le savez, il sera remplacé,dans peu de jours, par sir Frank
Soskice.Sir Hartley s'exprimait comme suit, à la page303 desplaidoiries:
«Il est inexact que la Cour suprême d'Angleterre pouvait autoriser
Ambatielos à produire ses preuves additionnelles. La décision de la
Cour d'appel avait trait à une question de procédure entrant dans la
compétcncc discrétionnaire de la Cour d'appcl, dont la Chambre des
Lords ne pouvait réformer la décision. ))
Aujourd Iiui le Gouvernement britannique revient à la charge à ce
sujet, et, dans son mémoire,paragraphes 55 et 56, il fait état de deux
décisio~~squi auraient étérendues par des juridictions britanniques,
la dernière par la Chambre des Lords en 1952.
La Cour comprendra que, n'étant pas familier avec le droit et la
procédure britanniques, je préfhre entendre d'abord à cet égard
M. Fitzmaurice, auquel, sansaucun doute, avec son expériencebeaucoup
plus considérable que la mienne, qui est inexistante, sir Frank Soskice
éventuellement répondra, laissant à M. Fitzmaurice Ic soin de répliquer
en dernier ressort.
Je crois, dans ces conditions, pouvoir m'en tenirà ces brbves explica-
tions en ce qui concerne Ic premier moyen de non-épuisement des voies
de recours internes.
La mêmequestion préalable se pose en ce qui concerne le moyen de
prescription, avec cette différence que la Cour s'est déjà exprimée à
ce sujet dans sa décisionpréparatoire du Icr juillet dernier et qu'elle
y a consacrél'alinéasuivant (p. 39) :((pour ce qui est de l'argument
présentédans le contre-mémoire selon lequel le Gouvernement hellé-
nique serait forclos,àraison de son retard àsoumettre la présente récla-
mation, la Cour estime qu'il yqa la une question à traiter avec le fond
et non pas au stade actuel ».bvidemmcnt, Messieurs, nous nc sommes
plus à ce qui était «le stade actuel »,le Ierjuillet 1952; nous sommes
au stade suivant, mais lorsque la Cour déclarait que le moyen de pres-
cription devait être traitéavec le fond, la Cour entendait-elle par là
le fond du différendportant sur l'arbitrabilité de la réclamation Amba-
tielos ou bien la Cour entendait-elle par là le fond de la réclamatioil
Ambatielos? Dans le premier cas, c'est elle-mêmequi devra, cette
fois-ci, examiner la question de prescription. Dans le deuxième cas, auI
PLAIDOIRIE DE M. ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 24 III J 357
contraire, c'est la juridiction arbitraqui auta à examiner la question
de presuiption.
I Dans le doute, Messieurs, je l'examine.
Le Gouvernement britannique renvoie dans sa duplique aux expli-
cations qu'il a dkjà données a cet egard aux paragraphes 104 i 108
du contre-mémoire qui était soumis &la Cour dailslaprécédente instance.
Nous nous y sommes référée st nous avons constaté que le Gouvernement
britannique y faisait surtout une longue narration de l'échange de
notes qui avait eu lieuentre les deux gouvernements depuis les faits de
I~ZO/I~Z~. 11 y est relatk que la prernikre réclamation dataidu 3 aoîrt
1933 ,oit plus de dix ans après lesévénements,et qu'un nouveau délai
de cinq ans s'était Ccoiilkavant que, le21 novembre 1939, le ministre
de Grke se soit expressément, pour la première fois, prévalu d'une
violation du traitéde 1886. Après quoi, le Gouvernement britannique,
dans le paragraphe 108, cxprime l'avis qu'il serai- lh,il y a un mot
qui m'a impressionné parce que je nele connaissaispas, lemot (lincon-
scionables - qu'il était contraire à la conscience de permettre au
Gou\~rnement hellénique de poursuivre l'affaire dans ces conditions.
C'estune appréciation assez subjective.Ce que le Gouvernement britan-
nique devait nous indiquer, c'est quelles étaient les autoritks juridiques
sur lesquelles ibasait ses appréciations de sa conscience.
En ce qui conccrne l'exposédes faits,j'aurajsbeauc~up de choses ii
dire : onscsouviendra que la première note heilenique n'espas de 1933,
qu'elle est de1925 ;que c'est en192j que Icministrc de Grhce iT,ondreç
transmettait un premier m&rnorandum sur cette affaire Ambatielos sur
laquelleil attirait l'attentiodu Foreign Ofice, demandant avec insis-
tance quecette affaire soit revue. Assurément, ce n'était pas une rCcla-
mation indiquant tous les moyens de fait et dedroicomme on enréclame
quand une requkte est prksentécàla Cour, mais 3csjuridictions arbitrales
et la Cour elle-même ont déjà apprécié qu'en matière diplomatique il
est fréquent qu'une réclamation soit pour lapremière fois prksentéesous
cette forme extrêmement modéréeet résesvee oh E'on se borne A faire
appel au sentiment d'équitéet d'arnitik de l'ztat auquel on s'adi-csse.
Messieurs, je n'insistpas sur la questiondc fait parce que j'attends
que le Gouvernement britannique nous démontre - à supposer meme
que 1925 ne soitpas rctenu comme la date d'une réclamation diploma-
tique et que cette réclamation date de 1933 et qu'il n'aitpas eu d'autre
note en 1934 et 1936 et 1940 -, j'attends que le Gotivernement britan-
nique nous démontre où il puise cette sbglede prescription dbcennale
dont il parait vouloir demander 2 laCour de fa?re application à l'espèce.
Il cite, Messieurs, assurement deux petites décisiansarbitralqui admet-
tent le principe de prcscription, sans qu'il soit possible de voir quel
était lc dklai aprhs lequel la juridiction arbitrale avaitaccepté cette
prescription, mais nous avons de notre &té, dans le mémoire que nous
avons présenti: à la Cour dans cette affaire tout au début de l'introduc-
tion, nous avons, à la gage roo, énumétkun grand nombre de sentenccs
arbitrales remontant de 1386 A 1902, à 1927 et,Rlessieursdans lesquelles
il avait &téfréquemment déclaréque, comme le disait la notice de
MM. de la Pradelle et Politis,vinoutrente anspassésdans l'abstention ne
permettent pas en droit international d'écarter la demande.Il ne nous
a rien étkrépondu à ce sujet,et, dansces conditions, j'attendsavec un
entier scepticisme que leGouvernementbritannique veuille bien prhciser
sa manière de voir.368 PLAIDOIRIE DE RI. ROLIN (C~RÈCE) - 24 III 53
Je relkve du reste que vraiscmblablcment il n'alui-meme qu'une
confiancelimitée dans le moyen, puisque l'on ychercherait en vain le mot
rrprescriptionn quiparait pourtant leterme technique et que le Gouvcrne-
ment britannique se borne A intituler le moyen : le retard abusif de la
part du Gouvernement hellbniqtie à poursuivre sa réclamation. II faut
pourtant, hlessieurs,avoir le cour~agedc désigner par son nom lemoyen
auquel an a recours ; ce moyen, c'est assurément la prescription, ce
serait une prescription décennale et cette fois, c'est bienau Gouverne- *
ment britannique Afaire la preuve tout d'abord en droit que cette pres-
cription dkcennale existe réellement en droit des gens positif ,avant de
vous en demander l'application.
J'esamine maintenant, b!iessieurs,la troisième ct principale objection
du Gouvernement britannique, celle qui vise la compétence proprement
dite de la comnlission arbitrale et qiii dknie cette cornpCtence pour le
rnotif que lesfaits dénoncésn'entreraient pas dans lacatégorie de ceux
réglementés au interdits par le traité 1886 et qu'à les supposer démon-
trés ces faitsne constitueraient pas des violations de ces clispositions.
. Ici je confesse mon embarras. Jusqu'où vais-je devoir aller dans
Z'analpe du traité de 1886 et lYnterpr&tation de ses dispositions
pour rencontrer l'argumentation de mes contradicteurs britanqiques ?
Jusqu'oii vais-je pouvoir aller, sans que M. le Président de la Cour,
que nous savons être un gardien vigilant des limites dudébat, m'adresse
lereproclle d'empiétersurle fond ?L'avenir, Messieurs, va m'en instruire.
Les tout premiers arguments se rapportent aux articles 1 et X du
traité.
Lc premier argument,contenu dans les paragraphes 27 à 29du mernoire
en réplique - tout au moins dans l'ordre logique, me paralt-il devoir
êtreconsidéré commepremier -, est que lorsqu'on lit les articles inter-
calaires, les articles Il BIX, l'on constate que,bien que clansles ternes
de I'articlc premier et dans les termes dc l'articleX il soit question du
commerce et de la navigation, le mot (commerce ine veut pas designer
les opératioils commerciales en général, mais uniquement les opérations
d'&changede pays à pays et sans doute spéAialermcntet nkcessairement,
puisqu'il s'agit ri'uneIle et d'une presqu'île, les opérations d'échange
maritime, d'où l'on conclut que l'opération d'achat de navires effectuée
en Grande-Bretagne par Ambatielos ne serait pas une opération de
cominerce au sens du traité de 1556.
Meçsicurs,je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que cette construction est
extraordinairement hasardeme, que le terme commescc n a un sens
bien clair en lui-meme, que dans les articlesI et X ils'ajoute au mot
navigatiorî r+rl:r'on ne peut arguer du fait que d'autres articles suivants
ont trait exclusivement à la navigation et pas au commerce pour en
limiterIa portéeàl'extrêmeet cçinsidkrer que l'achat de navires construits
sur territciire britanniquet quiconstitue la première opération à laquelle
songera n'imposte quel armateur désireiix'de se livrer ati commerce
maritime, doit etre exclu de son application. Vraiment, TvIessieurs,
considCrcr qu'un traité decommerce et de navigation afait abstraction
de cette première ct essentielle opération, c'est interpréter letraité A
la fois contre le sens des termes et contre I'esprit cle ses dispositions.
DeuxiEme argument, que je trouve dans leparagraphe 24 du mémoire
en duplique, c'cst que les dispositions du traité relatives au cornmcrce
ne seraient pas d'application en l'espèce,parce quenous nous plaindrions,
dans l'affaire Anibatielos, de violations des obligations de droit privé PLAIDOIRIE DE M. ROT,IN (GKEC E) 24 11153 369
que IEGouvernement britannique aurait contractécs comme un comrncr-
çant privéfaisant un acte privé dc vente de navircs et non pas un acte de
gouvernement. Ils'agit, dit letexte, d'obligations contractkes Al'occasion
d'un contrat de vente conclu par le ministére de la Marine marchande
en qualité de commerçant privé, rrfirzvéiaeaderii.Je ne pcux pas admet-
tre ce raisonnement. Assurément, nous ne prétendons pas, comme
l'a cru A tort le Gouvernement britannique, que les obligations dérivant
du traité de 1886 ont pour effet d'imposer au Gouvernement britannique
le respect de tout contrat commercial conclu entre riégociants des deux
pays en vertu du droit interne. En l'espèce,il nes'agit pas d'un contrat
conclu entre nbgociants de deux pays, ils'agitd'un contrat conclu entre
négociants d'un pays et lesautorités de l'autre pays, et si, d'une façon
gknérale, nous pouvons 11ousattendre, en vertu du trait4 ce que les
autorités britanniques assurent le respect des interets commerciaux
hellkniques eii Angleterre et que ces autorités ~~tilis~ntà cet égard les
compétences de droit public, qui leur sont attribuees en vertu de la
législation britannique, nous pouvons attendre aussi et a forfior; de
ces autorités, l~rsqu'elles sont elles-memes parties 3.un contrat, qu'elles
donnent l'exemple à Ieurs compatriotes d'une exécution intégrale et
de bonne foi du contrat ou clel'acceptation des sanctions qu'une inob-
servation doit entraîner.
11y a, hfeçsieurs, dans la jurisprudence arbitrale de,nombreux exem-
ples dc décisions où fut admise la responsabilité d'Htats pour fautes
contractuelles commises par des aiitorités publiques dans l'exécution
de contrats privés, fautes grossières, fautes lourdes, fautes de nature d
causer des dommages k un ressortissant. Dés lors,comme l'articleI
et l'articleXII garantissaient le traitement national et le traiteincntde
la nation laplus favoris& en ce qui concerne le respect des droits des
commerçants helléniques en Angletcrre, nous sommes en droit de faire
entrer dans le cadre dc ces obligations l'exécution d'un contrat cornmer-
cial conclu par lcs autorités publiques.
Troisième argument, développk ailparagraphe 29, alinéa 3, de la
diiplique : les aticlcs1et X du traite qui emploient le terme Crcomnier-
cial))ne peuvent, suivant le Gouvernement britannique, mernc au cas
oii l'on donnerait au commerce le sens Icplus large, permettre d'inclure
dans le mot tcommerce Y les incidents rclatifs à i'administratiaii de la
justice. Assiirément, le Gotivcrnement britannique a raison : le rnot
((comrncrcc )est par sa nature inconciliable avec l'administration de la
justice, mais ce que nQU.5 soutenoils, cc n'est pas que le commerce com-
prend l'administration de ln justice ;ce que nous soutenons, c'est que
lesdvoiis qiii sont garantis en matière commerciale comprennent notarn-
ment et éminemment les droits relatifs à la protection judiciaire du
conlinerce, qu'il en cst ainsi eii ce qui concerne le traitement national
et qu'il en est ainsi également et a fortiori en ce qui concerne lc traite-
ment de Ja nation la plus favorisée visée dans l'article XII, ct cela est
d'autant plus important pour la cailse que, comme nous Ihavons vu,
dcs traités conclus par d'autres ktats comportent la promessc d'un
traitenicnt basé sus lecommorrrzght et que nous sommes en droit de
considérerque pas cornmonr.igght il faut considérer les principes généraux
du droit, de même que IJCquité, ce gui est également décisif pour
l'apprkciation de la cause.
J'arrive, Messieurs, au quatriéme argument développé au paragra-
phe 31 de la duplique. Si Icstrois premiers se rapportaient aux-articles 137O PLAIDOIRIE DE M. ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 24 III 53
et X, le quatriéme se rapporte b I'article'XII, aux termes duquel les
sujets de chaque partie contractante qui se conformeront aux lois du
pays ne seront pas soumis, en ce qui concerne leurs personnes ou biens,
en ce qui concerne leur passeport, ni en ce qui concerne leur commerce
ou industrie, à des taxes générales ou locales, ou2 des irnpBts ou & des
obligations de quelque nature qu'elles soierît, autres on plus lourdesque
celles qui sont ou peuvent &tre imposées aux nationaux. Le Gouver-
nement britannique nous fait la même objection qu'en ce qui concerne
les articlesTet X. Le mot (commerce n neis'applique pas, ne comprend
pas le traitement en justice, ctlc mot u commerce idoit être interprété
restrictivement. Messieurs, l'objection est partictilièrernent faibIe en
ce qui concerne l'article XI1, car dans son analyse généraledu traité,
le Gouvernement britannique a reconnu que si les articles I A X s'appli-
quaient plusspécialement au commerce et à!la navigation,lesarticlesXI
et suivants visaient l'ktablissement, c'est-à-dire les conditions d'admis-
sion et le statut des ressortissants.Le fait est que l'article XIT, tréç
clairement, visenon seulement le commerce et l'industrie, mais vise le
traitement des sujetsen ce qui conçcrne leurs personnes ou biens ou leurs
passeports, aussi bien qu'en cc qui concern? le commerce et l'industrie.
C'estdonc d'une façon tout à fait généralegue lestatut de l'articleXII
est garanti aux personnes helléniques.
Alors on nous dit aussi, Messieurs, que le mot robligations ii,qui
frgure et sur lcquel nous nous appuyons, 1% prescription que les ressor-
tissants étrangers ne peuvent gtre soumis X des obligations différentes ;
que ces obligations sont nécessairement des obligations du m&me genre,
de m&inc nature que les taxes ou irnpbts, il s'agirait donc d'obligations
fiscales, obligations ejusdem generis dit le mémoire britannique. Encore
une fois ce serait admissible, peut-etre, sile mot e obligations3 n'était
pas accompagne des mots crde quelqtic nature qu'elles soient iiM Obli-
gations de quclque nature qu'elles soient,n interdit de concevoir les
applications conme étant cxcltisivernent les obligations fiscales.
Je crois que dans ccs conditions ckst donc bon ,droit que nous
déduisons de l'articlXII l'obligation pourles deux Etats d'accorder
A leurs sujets réciproques dcs sitiiations juridiqueidentiques à celledc
leurs nationaux, de ne les assujettir A aucune obligation particulière.
Parmi les obligations qui sont ainsiinterdites sc trouvent les situations
défavorables en justice, qtie ces situations résultent de dispositions
législatives ou d'une attitude de l'administration ou d'une décision
judiciaire. En sorte que, suivant natis, M. iArnbatielos, en se trouvant
placé devant l'iinpossibilitk d'extraire des archives britanniques les
piéces essentiellesde nature à établir le bien-fondé de ses griefs, a été
soumis à des obligations contraires au ts+té.
A ce sujet je dois également signaler à l'attention de la Cour ce qui
semble bien être un commencement tout; au moins cl'admission du
bien-fondé de la rhclamation hellénique sur, ce point. 'Jele trouve dans
l'échange de notes qui figure dkjh dans le, nibmoire hellknique. Dans
une note du 3 août 1933 (annexe R 3, p.'731, je lis :
a Il fut admis auprodç que des dossier étaientgardes au ministère
du Shi++i~g dans lesquels des détails du contrat discuté par le
Shi#ping CoritrolCtaient contenus. ;
Mais lorsque h'i.Ambatielos demanda la production de ces
dossiers,le privilège de laCouronne fut, invoqué et ils nefurent pas
produits.)) ,
I Le Gouvernement britannique peut devoir répondre à cela avec un
certain retard : le7 novembre 1934, dans une annexe S 4, pagc rzr, il
indique :
(rPareille réclamation nc pourrait Ctre faite xéguli&rernentque
si le Gouvernement hellknlque était en mesure de montrer qu'il y
a une obligation pour les gouvernements, lorsque engagés dans un
pro& devant leurs propres tribunaux, de produire les minutes
écrites dans les départements gouvernementaux intéressks et en
particulierquc telle estlapratique du Gouvernement greclui-meme. il
A quoi le Gouvernement kcllbnique a.répondu, le z janvier 1936,
annexe R 5, page go :
((J'ai l'honneur d'affirmer (1 beg to state) que mon gouverne-
ment est dans l'obligation de divulguer tout fait relevant lors-
qu'ilest engagé dans un procès. 1)
' Je me trouve donc, Messieurs, devant une position officiellquisemble
avoir étéprise de bonne foi par l'administration britannique mais qui,
en yrkence des renseignements dont il faisait lui-m&me dépendre son
attitude ultérieure, aurait di3 raisonnablement l'%ener à reconnaître
le bien-fondé de la réclamation Ambatielos, tout au moins en tant qu'elle
se f~ndait sur la t.no discoveryiide certains documents figurant dans les
archives britanniques.
J'en arrive maintenant, Messieurs, au cinquième argument développk
aux paragraphes 32 et 40 de la duplique, qui a trait,lui, il'articleXV,
paragraphe 3, du traité auquel le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas
cesséd'accorder une attention pxticulihre. Aux termes de cet articleXV,
paragraphe 3, lessujets de chacune des parties contractantes dans les
domaines et possessions de l'autre, auront (Elibreaccésaux tribunaux
pour Is poursuite et ladbfense de leurs droits sans autres conditions
restrictives ou taxes que cellesqu'elles imposent àleurssujets 1).
Bien entendu, le Gouvernement britannique s'efforce de démontrer
que cette fois encore cette disposition ne nous fournit pas de hase juri-
dique solide pour la réclamation Ambatielos, k supposer que lesfaits
alléguks soient établis.IInous dit à cesujet, dansle mémoire en rCpEique,
que cette disposition prevoit seulement le libre accés devant les tribu-
naux. Or, nous dit-il, vous avez eu le libr accCs devant les tribunaux.
C'est Ik,je crois, une interprktation inadmissible de ce texte qui le
vide à peu prPs de toute porthe réelle, car le libre acch est mentionné
comme ne devant être accompagné d'aucune restriction ou taxes que
cellesimposéesaux sujets nationaux, et cesrestrictions interditespeuvent
êtrede nature diverse, elles peuvent survenir soit au cours du procks,
soit avant ;elles peuvent avoir étéinstaurées par la loi ou bien elles
peuvent êtrele fait des tribunaux ou de l'administration sicelle-ciest
partie au prock ou, meme comme ce fut le cas en l'esphce, elles peuvent
rksulter Ala fois de l'actiondu pouvoir exécutif et du pouvoir judiciaire.
Nous sommes donc en droit d'invoquer l'article XV, paragraphe 3,
comme les autres, comme base des faits que nous dknonçons.
Aussi bien le Gouvernement britannique ne s'étend pas sur son argu-
ment juridique, et je ne puisconsidérer que comme un aveu de faiblesse
le fait que, dans son mernoire en duplique, il s'efforce de persuader la
Cour qu'en fait nous n'aurions à nous plaindre de rien. Et il explique
qu'iletait loisible M. Ambatielos a l'audience devant letribunal anglais PLAIDOIRIE DE RI.ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 24 111 53
3T2
de l'Amirauté de citer tout témoin, de produire tout document +que lui-
même ou sesconsei1lersauraient jugébon. tIl ressort clairement, dit-on, de
sa propre déclaration sous serment (aiinexe 3 au contre-memoire versé
ail dossier de la Couren tant que partie du compte rendu d'audience de
1sCour d'appel britannique, audience citéeau paragraphe IO du rndmoire
hellénique)quele demandeur connaissait l'existence desIettresaux mains
du major Laing. Il n'a pris aucune mesure pour obtenir ces lettres par
la proctdure judiciaire qui lui était offerteni pour citer 5 comparaître
le major Laing ou sir Joseph hIcLay. Ses conseillers juridiques avaient
sans doute de bonnes raisons pour s'abstenir de prendre des mesures de
cet effet au mornent approprié devant le tribunal de l'Amirauté. Mais
011 ne saurait prétendre que sa liberté d'accks aux tribunaux pour prk-
senter son affaire aitété entravée par le Gouvernemerit du Royaume-
Uni, ni par le tribunal de l'Amirauté, ni par les règles de procédurc
applicables. 11a choiside ne pas invoquer cette preuve au moment voulu
de la procédure. Si c'est làune entrave à la liberté d'acds, c'est une
libertéqu'il s'est refuséeà lui-même, i
Messieurs, sile Gouvernement britannique avait raison, assurement
ce grief la en tout cas viendrait à disparaître, et c'est un de nos griefs
principaux. Maisles affirmations du Gouvernement britannique prouvent
tout simplement que lesagents qui ont rédigé cemémoire, sur base peut-
étre dc l'impression qu'ils tiraient des piécesreproduites dans la procé-
dure écrite, n'ont pas une connaissance complète de l'intégralitéde la
prockdure qui s'cstpoursuivie devant le tribunal. Nous n'avons pas
jusqu'ici répondu 3.l'argumentation qui figure Acet égarddans le premier
mémoire en réponse. Mais nous n'aurons pas de peine, lorsque le moment
sera venu, A faire la démonstration du fait queRI.Ambatielos a officielle-
ment dernandk la production du dossier,et 'que cette production lui a
étérefusée; que M. Ambatielos s'est ensuitc adressé aux juges pour
l'obtenir ; que Justicc Hill aconstaté que le Gouvernemerit britannique
maintenait son refus ; que Justice Hill s'est déclarkimpuissant obtenir
une modification de cette attitude, bien que, suivarit certaines pratiques
juridiques, ilauraitpu l'ordonner ou du moins exiger certaineç garanties
quant au maintien du refus oppoçk par l'administration ; que d'autre
part, en ce qui concerne le témoin major Laing, cornme je vous l'ai dit,
assurément il étaitloisibleA M. Ambatielos de le citer, mais que s'ilne
l'a pashit, c'est parce que cc ternoin l'était d&~iequ'on peut se deman-
der s'il l'avait kt&de bonne foi étant donne que la partie citante ile l'a
pas fait intcrroger et que sacitation n'a eu d'autre effet que de prendre
l'autre partie ctle juge par surprise devant l'absence d'uri témoignage
important, qui piirait vraiment peu dquitable. Et je rnentionnc pour
niimoirf: la clifficillqui s'est produite lorsque M. Ambatielos, ayant
dans ces conditions perdu dewant Ie premier juge, se vit refuser l'appel.
Nous sommes donc contraires en fait, Messieurs. Je pourrais faire la
reuve de l'exactitudede ma rectification dans l'analyse de la procédure
&rt longue qui est publike dans les comptes ieiidus jiiridiques anglais ;
mais je crois vraiment devoir renoncer à faire pour l'instant la pleine
lumi&resur ce point devant la Cour, car je me deniande vraiment cequi
resterait à examincr par la juridictiori arbitrale lorsqu'elle devrait
apprkcier lefond, sinous devions nous Engager dans cettevoie.
Il me reste;idire un mot d'une circonstance qui semble avoir sérieuse-
ment préoccupé mes adversaires: c'est l'opinion déjh &mise par un
des merribres de lxCour le Ierjuillet1952 ,uivant Iaq~iellele Gouverne- PLAIïlOTRIE I3E hl. HOLIN (GRECE) - 24 IIIj3 373
ment britannique avait déjà, tout au moins dans une large mesure,
marqué son accord sur notre interprktation du trait6 de 1886, tout air
moins eii tant qu'elle devrait conduire a l'admission de la compétence
de la commissiot~ arbitrale. Dans l'opinion individuelle de M. Levi Car-
nciso, le Gouvcrt~cment britannique a en' effet lu ce qui suit (p. 49 de
l'arrêt):
(Dans le cas actuel, la reconnaissance du fait que la réclamation
est fondke sur le traité dc 1886 decoule mêmedes déclarations des
Parties.
Dans le contre-mémoire (no II),après le rksumédti raisonnement
hcllétiiqueque j'ai déjà transcrit,l'agent du Gouvernement britan-
nique a déclaréque ce raisonnement devrait être rejet6 polir les
raisons suivantes : u a) la déclaration ne fait pas,pastie di1 traité
ccde ~gzGet l'article 29 dii trait6 ne saurait par conséquent s'y
l u appliquer ; bJ la dtclaration était envisagée comme applicable
a uniquement aux réclamations présentéesavant la date de sa signa-
((ture, le16 juillet1926 s.
Le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas repousse le raisonnement
parce que la rtclamation n'était pas basée sur le traité de 1886,
quoiqii'il niât lc déni de justice et l'inégalité de traitement. Au
contraire, ila admis que la rkclamation &tait, $rima facie, fondée
sur le traité de 1886.
Sa conclusion premike ktait que la Cour
rrn'est pas cornp@tentepour connaîtrc d'une demande du Gouver-
{rnement hellinique teiidant b ce qii'cllc ordonne au Goiivcrncment
rcdu Royaumc-Uni de dkférer A l'arbitrage ilne réclamation du
((Gouvernement hellénique fondée sur l'article XV OLE tout autre
(carticle du trait6 de 1886 B.
Par la suite, pendant les débats oraux devant la Cour, la recon-
naissance de ce fait est devenue trks évidente. Le conseil britnntlique
a posé, dans la séancc du ïj mai, les conditions qu'il considkait
nkccssaireç pour admettre la compétence de la Cour : I) que la
déclaration fît partie du traité de 1926 ; 2) que la réclamation
hellénique fût, en mgme temps, (fondée sur lc traité de 1886 11et
couverte par la dbclaration. 11a clzerchéà démontrer que la déclara-
tion nc faisait pas partic dzi traité de 1926 et qu'elle ne couvrait
pas la réclamation ;tnais il n'a pas dit un mot pour affirmer que la
réclamation n'était pas bas& sur Je traite de 1886.
Pour terminer, Ic conseil hellénique a dit :
rr.... m&me nos adversaires étaient d'accord pour estimer que
(rparmi nos bases juridiques il y en avait uile au moins dont ils
(rreconnaissaient la pertinence : c'était l'articlXV, paragraphe 3,
« d~i traite de 1886 ....ii.
Je crois qu'il fallait reconnaîtrece fait. Lacompétence de la Cour
découle de ce que le différend est encadré dans la déclaration de
1926 : la rkclarnation estrcfondée 1sur 1c traité de 1886. ii
Je crois, fi'iessicars,que dans la penske de l'auteur du cctte opinion,
il n'ktait pasdouteux que bien entenctu le Gouvernement britannique
n'avait pas souscrit intégralement a notre intcrprLtation des diverses
dispositions du traité, mais qu'il avait, au cours dc notre premihre
passe d'armeç, adr~~istout au rnoins la pertinence du traité cornme base
de la récIamation Ambatielos et consideré qu'il ne pouvait pas trouver PLAIDOIRIE DE M. HOLIN (GAÈCE) - 24 III53
374
clans I'analpe de notre argumentation juridique des raisons suffisantes
pour inviter la Cour A rejeterde ce chef la kicrnande de recours &l'arbi-
trage.
Messieurs, le rnémo ire britannique s'explique assez longuerneilt sur
les déclarations relevées par M. Carneiro dans la procédure écrite et
dans Ics plaidoiïies, et je ne vais pasm'attarder fort longtemps sur ce
point parce que je vais donner tout de suite A nos adversaires une
satisfaction majeure. Je ne consid$re pas que leGouvernement britan-
nique puisse etre déclaréaujourd'hui forclos du droit de contester sous
la forme qu'il l'entend, de la manière qu'il l'entend, qu'iy a un rapport
de pertinence eritre lesdispositions du traite dc 1886 que nous avons
allégukes et les faits que nous avons dénoncés.
Mais, ceci dit,je crois pourtant devoir, 3 mon tour, souligner qu'il
y a eu et qu'il y aencore, de lapart des rcpréseiltants du Gouvernement
britannique, tout au moins en ce qui concerne certaines disp~sitions
du trait&, une hésitation et une titnidité qui m'apparaissent comme
décisiveslorsque vous avez à apprécier non pas Icbien-fondé dc nos
interprétatioirs, mais la pertinence des dispositions que nous invoquons
pour apprécier 1iicornpktence de la commissioii arbitrale. Dans la plai-
doirie de mon très estimé ami et contradicteur, sir Eric 13cckett,je lis
A la page 289 :((Je peux voir, très vaguement, comment le Gouvernement
grec essaie de lacer Yaffaire Ambatielos sous l'article XTr,paragraphe 3,
du traité de I 86. Mais je ne vois pas comment il pourrait le faire en
ce qui concerne le traité de 1926.a
X la page 291, je lis ((Si c'était le cas que la Grèce etait erimesure
d'invoquer d'autres dispositions 'dutraitéde, 1886 en pluç de l'articlXV,
paragraphe 3, l'effcten serait seulement d'étendre les bases de récla-
mations des bases de réclamations qu'elle aurait compétence, que
la Cour aurait compétence d'examiner dans l'hypothèsc où, contraire-
ment A ma prktention, la Cour trouverait qu'ellcaurait juridiction
pour examirier Ie moins du monde les infractions alléguées au traité
de 18%~ ii
Ily avait donc, Messieurs, uil traitement privilégie, plus favorable,
en ce qui concerne l'article XV, paragraphe 3, et c'est ce qui m'avait
conduit à le souligner, comme le signale hg. Lévi Carneiro, dans la
dernihre partic de ma plaidoirie (p. 339) et ce sans m'attirer aucune
interruptioiiou rectification cl'ela part de mon contradicteur. Je disais :
crMessieurs, je pelisc qu'en l'espécevous ne devez pas joindre l'incident
au fond, parce qu'il m'a semblé, parce que m&me nos advcrsnires étaierit
d'accord pour estimer que parmi nos bases juridiques il y en avait une
au moins dont 11s reconnaissaient la pertinence. C'&tait l'articleXV,
paragraphe 3, clu traité de 1886, et que cela suffit, mon sens, pour
que irouç vous déclariez compétents. ))
Encore dans le dernier mémoire en duplique que nous avons reçu,
je relève que leGouvernement britanniques fait utledifférence entre le
paragraphe 3 de l'article XV du traite et les autres lorsqu'au para-
gaphe 32 il &met l'avisque cette disposition,l'articlXV, paragraphe 2,
est la seule du traité de 1886 aqu'on pourrait a larigueur considérer
cornme se rapportant d'une façon quelcoiique a la réclamation Arnba-
tielos)).Après quoi, bien entendu, il s'efforcede démontrer que notre
interpretation n'est pas fondée. En sorte, Messieurs, que s'il est vrai
qu'il suffit d'ktablir àce stade-ci dc la prbcédure que la réclamation
Ambatielos se rapporte A une disposition du traité de 1886,j'aurais PLAIDOIRIE DE BI. ROLIN (GRECE -J 24 III5 J
375
Ie droit d'estimer que cette concession de la part de reprisentantç bri-
tanniques doit emporter votre décision.
Telles sont,lessietirslesexplications que j'ai cru devoir vous donner
à l'appui de notre mimoire, pour vous persuades que la question par
vous poséede savoir si le Royaume-Uni est tenu de soumettre A l'arbi-
trage, confom&rnent i la déclaration de 1926, le différend relatif à la
réclamation Ambatielos en tant que cette reclamation est fondée sur
la base du traité de 1886, doit recevoir une réponse affirmative.
Suivant nous, le Royaume-Uni esttenu de recourir à l'arbitrage parce
que même s'il entend contester la compétence de la juridiction arbitrale,
il ne pouvait pas, sans manquer Ason engagement, dkcider unilatérale-
ment de la légitimité de ces exceptions d'incompétence et se refuser
A les soumettre a la juridiction arbitrale eue-merne.
Le Royaume-Uni est cncore tenu yarcc qu'à l'examen ces exceptions
d'incompétence on ces autres objections prélirniiiaires s'avkrcnt égale-
ment non fondées,parce qu'on ne peut pas contester que la reclamation
Ambatielos prksente un lien r6el avec le traitede 1886, qu'elb soulkve
des questions d'interprktation et d'application qui sonttr&sexactement
cellespour lesquclles la procedure d'arbitraa &téprévue par leprotocole
de 1886et maintenue par la dkclaration de 1926.
Je pense que, bien entendu, la rdponse afinnative que nous vous
demandons de donner k cette question d'obligation de recours à
l'arbitragene préjuge pas de ladkcision finalequiinterviendra de la part
de la juridiction arbitrale quaatla validitk dela réclamation Ambatielos,
pas plus en ce qui concerne l'interprétation du traité de 1886 qu'en ce
ui concerne la prcuve des faits quinéceççairemcnt vont demeurer hors
4e votre cantrble actuel.
Meme, Messieurs, s'il devait en etrc autrement et que, contre mon
attente, vous estimiez devoir vous prononcer, de façon définitive,en ce
qui concerne l'interprétation du traité de 1886, encore ai-je confiance
que lesexplications que je vous ai données suffiront pour vous amener
à la conclusion que notre interprétation estfondée.
Bien entendu, même cela, même si vousen arriviezla, cene seraitpas
encore le gaindu proces, l'adjudication de notre demande, caril esterait
pluçieiirspoints de fait à vérifierA savoir qu'ily a eu stipulation de
délais pour la lix~aison de navires, que M. Ambatielos a vainement
sollicitéla production, que 1'Amirautk lui a refusé la production des
pikces qui étaienten sa possession dans des conditions qui sont irrégu-
li&res,que M. Ambatielos s'est vainement adressé au tribunal, que le
refus du trihunal aurait pu gtre accompagné dc certaines prbcautions
auxquelles le trihunal n'a pas eu recours contrairement à certaines
traditionsbritaniiiyues,que, en ce qui concerne la Cour d'appel, ila été
plus fréquemment jugé qu'ily avait lieu de permettre l'appel dans les
circonstances OS se trouvaitM. Arnbatieloset que, déslors, lGouyrne-
ment hellénique est fondé dans sa demande.
Sur ces points, cependant, nous reconnaissons que vous avez lu et
entendu plus d'explications de la part du Gouvernement britannique
que de la ndtre.
Nos adversaires ont tenu, dans leur premier mémoire, et je rends
hommage à ce souci, àne pas vous donner l'impression qu'en dbniant
d'abord lx compétence de la Cour et aujourd'hui la compétence de la
commission arbitraleils entendaientse déroberà la ilécessitde répondre PLATI3OIHlE DE M. ROLIN (GRECE -) 24 III53
376
au fond parce qii'ilconnaissaient l'impuissance ou l'indigence de leur
argumentation.
Je n'aipas besoinde vous dire que la Cour commettrait une singulière
impnidence si ellvoulaitse former mCme une premiéreimpression quant
à la justice de notre cause d'après la lecture d'une documentation et
d'unc discussion qui a kt6 sur ce point nbcessairement, et spécialement
de notre part, tout 2 fait incompléte.
Audiatacr et alter&pars.
En attendant, nous ne pouvons qu'opposer aux protestations debon
droit de 1'Etat dkfendeur l'affirmation du Gouvernement demandeur
que la cause qu'il défend est'juste.
J'ai legrand espoirque nous ne devrons pas attendre bcaucoup plus
longtemps pour vous en faire la démonstration.
Nous en sommes encore aux technicalitks, mais, comme le disait lord
Halsbury dans un arret de 1936 qui se trouve mentionné dans notre
mémoire, lapage 20,n ilserait dksastreux pour l'administrationde 1a
justice s'ilouvait &tresupposi! qu'Lraison de quelques technicrilités la
vériti:réellcpuisse êtreécartée D.Une heurc viendra de jetcr lalurnihre
sur la veritéréelle. Nous l'attendonset l'espérons avec confiance.on the r856 'Jreaty ; in what sensedo we understand the term "based" ;
and what effect ought to be given to the requirernent that the claim
must bc based on the Tseaty ?
Secoridly, assuming, as 1 shall try to show, that the requircment of
bcing based on the 1886 Treaty must involve at leas#that the Treaty
or somi: provision of it relates, or contains provisions relating, to the
same category or classof subject-matter to which the Ambatielos claim
relates, we shall go on to enquire whether this is, in fact, the case, or
whether, un the contrary, the Ambatielos daim relates to sornething
of quite a different order from what the Treaty relates to.
Thirdly, there will arise another and very important question, which
is this. IlTe shall contend, aiid indeed we think it evidcnt, that the
Ambatielos clairn isessentiallya claim of miscarriage or dcnial of justice,
or else a daim rclating to State responsibility, based on the general
principleç of international law ; whereas the 1886 Treaty is an ordinary
treaty of commerce, establisIlment aiid naYigation which could never
normnlly constitiite tlie foundatiun of sudi a claim, and, in our vicw,
the direct language of which does not assist the case of our opponents.
Can it rievertheless be said that tlic claim, although deriving from the
general principles of international lnw, has a foundation in thc Treaty
because it can be argued that the Treaty incorporates the general
principles of international law concerning the administration of justice
and the responsilriilityof States, or because it could be argued that the
Treaty refers to and incorporates provisions of other applicable treaties
which would cover the Ambatielos claim ? We do not think the 'rxeaty
incorporates eithcr general international lad or other treaties, but that
will be the third question.
Fourthly, therc arises in our view a question which, wliile rclated
to the ~irevious ones, involves a distinct issue, and whicll 1 will state
like this: supposing our distinguished adversaries could show that the
1886 Treaty is not wholly irreIevant to the Ambatielos claim, that some
of its provisions might have a bearing on that claim and that parts of
the Srezity deal with rnatterç of the same class or order as those which
arise on the Ambaticlos claim. We do not think that that is so, but
supposii~g it were so, would that be sufficient to establiçh that the
claim was "based on the Treaty? In our view itwould not. Mre submit
that our adversarieç must go further than this. TIaeymust show that
there issome provision of thc Treaty which would be violated if the
facts they allege in relation to the claim of Mr. Ambatielos are true.
They do not, at this stage, have to çhow that those facts actually are
correct, forthat would be a question of the merits. But they must show
that, ifthese allegations werecorrect, a brcach of the Treaty would be
irivolved. Otherwise the daim cannot be based on the 'Lreaty, for, if
the position is that although al1the facts ofalgiven claim are establiçhed,
those facts wouId still not involve a breach of a particular treaty, then,
although the claini may have some other basis-for instance, the gcneral
rules of international law or somc other treab-it cannot bc based on
that particular treaty. Of course, we emphatically deny that the alle-
gationç of factwbich are made in the Ambatielos daim are correct.
\Ve are merely considenng whether, even if they were, this clairn would
be based on the 1886 Treaty. 'l'hcfourth question will tkierefore be :
which provision of the 18% Treaty would be vi~lated if Mr. Arnùatielos
had, in fact,received the treatment the Hellenic Governrnent say ke did ? OR4L ARGUMENT OF MT, FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-25 III53
381
Govemment decIined to arbitrate the case, the Helienic Government
did not so muck as çuggest that any treaty obligation to arbitrate
existed. No mention of the 1856 Treaty was in fact made until r939.
Mr. President, we feel justified in queçtioning, again 1 willsay not
the good fait!?, but the seriousness of the resent contentions of the
Hcllenic Government about the relevance O Pthc r886 Treaty, because
of the gradual and çpasrnodic way in which these contentions have
emerged. It isnot merely that the Hellenir, Government never mentioned
the 1886 Treaty at dl tintil1939, but that even then they originally
only specifiedArticle XV, paragraph 3 (the clausc ahout free access) as
being relevant. In the Greck Rilemorial they equally only referred to
ArticleXV, pafagraph 3, npart from an oblique and perfunctory mention
of ArticleX. Articles 1, X and XII werc mcntioned together alrnost for
the firçttime in the ReUenic Government's Observations and Conclu-
sions on the question of competencc, and thcn for a differentpurpose,
namely, totry and establish a correspondence and a continuity between
the later1926 Commercial Treaty and the earlier one of1886.
Now what is the esplanation of al1this, for it iç notifthese Articles
only came into existence successively and at differerit tirnes. On the
çontrary, they a91existcd together from tlic start. 13ut the Hellenic
1 Government not only took some fifteen ÿears tu discover the supposed
relevance of thc Treaty ;ittook another twelve or thirteen years to dis-
coves that Articles 1, X and XII as well as Article X!r. paragraph 3,
existed. The ex~lanation is,1 suggest, a very simple one. The real truth
isthat it was not antil thc judpent of the Court on the question of
çompetcnce, and the Court's finding tliat it had jurisdiction to determine
whether the Unitcd Kingdom ought to submit the claim to arhitration
(1quote) "in$0 far as this claim is based on the Treatof 1886"-it was
not until then, and until the tcms of the Court's finding forced the
Hellcnic Goverilment to consider seriously what valid grounds they
reallvhad for sqing that the claim waç based on the Treaty, that they
put forward fuilyin their written Kcply the contentions thcy'now relg
on. Realizing that Article XV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty did not llelp
them because ML. Ambatielos obviously had full and free acccsç to the
English courts on the same terrnç as British subjects, they then and for
the first time in this particular conncction cited Articles X, and XII:
as also covering the claim. ?tToreover,they rvent furthcr, and realizing
that thesc Articles equaliy had Little no direct relevanceto the claim,
and that itçtruc bais, if any, lay in the field of geileral international
law, they then tried tobring this field also into the orbit of the Treaty,
by arguing that theTreaty incorposated the general niks of international
law about denial of justice and State responsibility, or else incorporated
other treatics.
This last factor 1shighly suggestive, because,ifrnembers of the Court
will look again at tlie diplornatic correspondenceof the 1930's, in par-
ticular for instance the Hellenic Govcrnment's note of January znd,
1.936,which isAnnex R 5 in thc Greek hlernorial, they will see, and T
think they rvdl be çtruck by the fact that, at that tirne,the Helleriic
Govemment were arguing their case wholly and exclusively and very
forcefuiiyon the basis of the general rules of international law about
the responsibility of States.No liint of the possible relevance of any
treaty was given. Yet the Treaty of 1886 wasnot a document that lay
buned and undiscovered al1 this time and only emerged into the light ORAL ARGUMENT OF. hfr.FITZRZAURICE (u.K.)-25 III53
384
We reject thewhole of thisargument as incorrect, and evcn irrelerrant.
because it overlooks-indeed it alrnost deliberately ignores-wllat is
obvioiisiy thecardinal point involved ; for, 'whether or not iisThe func-
tion of the Court to interpret the 1886 Treaty (amatter 1 shall come to
in a moment), itcertainly isthe function of the Court to interpret the
Declaration of 1926.1 would go further and respectfully çuggeçt that it
is the inescapable duty of the Court to interpret and apply the Declara-
tion of 1926. For consider what happened in the previous phase of the
present proceedings. That phase turned wholly on whether the r926
Declaration !vas past of the 1926 Treaty or not. Ifit was, thcn itcame
within the scope of Article29 of that Treaty, which provided (1 quote)
. that "any dispute tliat may aRse ....asto tlie proper interpretation or
application of any of the provisions of the present Treaty shall ...be
referred to arbitratiorz",and then it went On to provide that the Court
slzould be the arbitral tribunal for that purpose. PVeLI t follows neces-
sarily that,ifthe Declaration of 1926is part ofthe 1926 Treaty (asthe
Court found t tiat it was),any dispute concerning its interprctation or
application (and there is such a dispute) is a matter for the Cnwt to
deternzine, and not for the Arbitral Commission contemplateci by the
1856 Treaty.
Now, as regards tlze question whether the Court can interyret the
1886 Treaty, we cansider that question to te Inrgely irrelevant, because,
even ifit were adrnitted that the Court cannot interpret that Treaty
diredly, it canand must do so as part of it~~function of interpreting and
applying the 1926 Declaration, and T3ay stress on the word "apply",
for what does tlze Deçlaration Say ? It says that any differences whidi
may arise between thc two Govcrnrnents as to the validity of daims
based onthe r88S Treaty shall be referredto arbitration. Since, thercfore,
the obligation to referto arhitrationexiçts solely with respect to "claims
based on the 18% Treaty", it must be the function of the Court to inter-
pret the 1856 Treaty for the purpose of determining whether a giveri
claim isbased on it anciistherefore aclaim to wtiichthe 1926 Declaration
applies. If the Court cannot do this, if it 'cannot intcrpret the 1856
Treaty, then it cannot interpret-still less appl~r-tlie Declaration of
1926. In the present procccdings the Court must ap ly the Declaration-
that is, imust say rvhethcr the obligation ta a! itrateexiçts. Ta do
this it mustii~telpret it and tdo that it must interpretthe 1886 ï'reaty.
That, we believe,isthe situation ina nutshell.
Mr. Prcsident, I have seldom come acrosç a better example of trying
to have matters both ways, as wc say in England, tlzan the argument
whiclz is now being advanced by our adversaries on this point. In the
previoiis phase of thiscase we argued that the 1926 Declaration was
not a part of the Treaty of 1926. Our adversaries argued strenuously
that it was, and the Court agrced with them. HLI n~ow that the logicaE
consequences are rnanifesting thernselves, our adversaries do not like
them. Nous in effect they aresaying that, slthough the Court has found
that the Dedaratiorz is part of the Treaty of ~926, and thcrefore falls
under Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926, ço thatany disputes concerning
its intcrpretatioliand application are to be determined by the Court,
yet al1the same ~iow they say the Court cannot interpret the Declaration
of 1926 becauçe that would involve interprcting the r886 Treaty. This
view would stultify the whole findingof thc Court in the prerrious phase ORL ARGUMENT OF MT. FITZRlAURICE (u.K.)-2j III53 385
of this case and render itrneaningless-for it would prevent the Court
frorn propesly applying the Declaration.
Our adversaries must accept the çonsequenccs of the argument which
they themselves put forward, and one of those consequences we suggest
iç that the Cotirt must be entitled (and is indeed in Our view bound)
to interpret the Treaty of 1886 for the purpose, and as part of the pro-
cess, of interpreting and applying the1526 Declaration. For this purpose
we think that the Court must go into the question whether the: claim
is hased on the 1886 Treaty, as a substantive issue.
May 1, at the risk of some, but not much, repetition bring out the
point 1 am txying to make by relerrjng to certain observations made
in the psevious phase by Judge Spiropoulos. He drew attention to the
distinction which we agree normally exists between the obligation to
set up an arbitral tribunal, to constitute it, and the question of its
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case conccrned, which, as Judge
Spiropoulos pointed out, is usiially a matter for the arbitral tribunal
itsePf to determine. He therefore suggested that,if the Court ivere to
enter on the question wliether the Arnbatielos claim was based on the
Treaty of 1886, it would in effect be assuming a function which should
properly belong to the Arbitration Commission, since this gtiestion was
really a question of the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Now we are far from suggesting that it is for the Court here to decide
eaery qtrestion appertaining to the jurisdiction ofany eventual arbitral
tribunal. We do not suggest it. 15'hat we do siy, and 1 ask the Court
to take particular note of this, what we do say, isthat the Court must
decide al1 such questions itself inso fur as they involveor arertecsssary
for, ilate~9~din.ganda$plyi?agthe 1926 Declaratioa; for the interpreta-
tion and application of that Declaration is, according to the Court's
own decision, a matter fox the Court as part of the interpretation and
application of thc 1926 Txeaty. Having so decidecl, it follows inescap-
ably, we think, that, if one of the Parties contends thatthe Ambatielos
clairnbas nothing to do with the 1886 Trcaty and is not based on it,
this is a matter affecting the interpretation and application of the1926
Declaration wliich the Court must determine, and tliat for this purpose
at any rate, thc Court is, in thiscase, subçtituted for the Commission,
to decide a mattes that might otherwise ordinarily ùe for the Corn-
mission.
Now, in point offact, the United Kingdom had put forward, in the
seventh and last of its arguments in the previous procccdings, preciselg
the contention that the Ambatidos clairn was not based on ille Treaty
of 1886 and that, in consecluence, no obligation to refer ito arbitration
existed under thc Declaration of 1926. This argument, which is quoted
verbatini on pagc 45 of thc Court's judgment, was that the Ambatielos
daim was foundcd on the general prinçiples of international law with
regard to the treatment of foreigners in courts of justice, and that as
the 1886 Treaty conta~ncd no provision incorporating those pinciples,
a breach of them (if thcre was one)was not a breach of thc Treaty of
1886, and the daim was not therefore based on the Treaty. That was
the seventh of the arguments rvhich we put forward in the previous
phase of the proceedings. Now the Court found expressly,and I think
JiIembers of the Court will find the reference on the same page 4j, at
the bottom, the Court found expressly that the point there raised by
us inour sevent11argument had not yet beeriargued fiillyby the Parties, ORAI, ARGUMENT OF Mr. EITZMAURICE (u.K.)-25 III 53
387
changes it from a positive to a negative conception. The difference
between the two idens involved is well illustrated by the very examplc
that Me. Kolin himself gave, namely, the Alzglo-Iranian Oil case. He
accused us-or charged us-\vit11 having arped that case on thc basis
that it sufficed if certain treatieswere related to or had a connection
tr-iththe matter in dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran. This
is quite true. WC did ;but why ? For the very simple and adequate
reason that the Iranian Declaration, attached to its signature of the
Optional Clause, on which the bvlioleissue deperided, spoke (1 quote)
of : "situations ou ....faitsayant ....trait& l'application des traites ou
conventions acceptés par la Perse..... "Ayant trait" means
reference to". In the present case tlie relevant term used in theha192t
Declaration is iiot "ayarzt tïait", but "fondée sur" (based on), a very
different-a totally differcnt-çonceplion.
The Helleniç Government therefore are not onEÿ asking the Court
to carry out a purely forma1 aiid not a judicial r61e, but alço to read
the 2926 Declasation as if it said "clairns relattogthe Treaty of 1886",
instead of "clairns based on" that Treaty. We maintain that the notion
of "based on" is substantially different from the notion of "related to".
It iç a positive and afirrnative notion. PL claim is, in our view, onIy
based on a trcaty if it is grounded in it, and not if the position merely
is tliat the elaiin is not manifestl%O£ based on the Treaty (sans perti-
~ZG~ZG~).
Now Me. Rolin admitted, as 1 understood hirn, that tlic burden of
yroof in this matter does lie with the Hellenic Governrnent. Rut in
purporting to admit that-that it waç for the Hcllenic Governmcnt to
discliarge the burdeti of proof involved in showing that this daim is
based on the 1886 Treaty -although they admit that, our adversaries
l~avc, in fact, sought to evadc that burden of proof-that isto say,
they have sought to evade it in the present proceedings-cither by
contending that the question isreally one for the Arbitral Commission
to determinc, or else by giving a special interpretation to the phrase
based an the 1856 Treatÿ, so as to bring it about, as Me. Rolin snid
yesterday, that this burdcn is a "very Jight" one. In our view thnt
burden of proof cannot be discharged mercly by showing a negative,
namely, that this c22m is not manifestly ~nrelated to the Treaty of 1886.
It reqriircs the derrionstratioi~ sfpositive, namely, that the clnirn has
its concrete basiç, or at any rate, a definite basis, in the Treaty.The
Hellcnic Governrnent, if I corscctly understood hle. Rolin, do not say
that the term "based on" is to be understood in a purely forma1 sense,
as involving, not the substaritive facl of bcing based on, but the rnereljr
procedural act of putting fonn~arda claim on a certain basis, whcther it
really has that basis or not. They do not adopt that extreme and, so
we would think, quite untenablc position. But, we suggest, if they do
not, then it must follow inescapably that tlie conception of a claim
being based on a certain treaty involves that it has a definite and
çubstantivc foundation in that trcaty. We sajr that it must and does
involve this, and that, in order to decide wkether that foundation
exists, it is necessary-indeed, indispensable-to go into the treaty
and to interpret it.
May 1 just sumrnarize my arqrncnt ori this point before passing
on. In our view, tlie task of the Court in the present proceedinp is a
substantiïe and juclicialtask., Iis a task not rnerely of interpretationbut of application. It constitutes for the Court and for the purposeç
of the present psoceedingç an issue of rnerits or substance, so far as
the Court is concerned in the course of the present proceedings. These
proceedings are not preliminary proceedings about jurisdiction. The
Court has decided thst it has jurisdiction to hear and determine a
certain issue.Now itmut hear and detemine that issue,and the issue
in question is whether a certain claim is based on a certain treaty : it
is not whether the clairn iç not obviously unrelated to the treaty-
which in our view isquite a difierent matter-and here equally lies the
distinction between the present proceedings and those concerning the
interim rneaçures in the Arlgh-Iraniafi caçe,which Me. Rolin cited. That
was a purely prelirninary issue involving urgent measures of a conserv-
atory character without which the whole of the future proceedingç in
the case might have been rendered useIess and abortive. In such a case,
it was entirely proper for the Court to decree interin1 rneasures on the
basis that, althoiigh ihad not yet decided findly that it had jurisdiction,
it \vas not clear that it had not got jurisdiction-because, failing an
order for interim measures, any subsequcrit finding of the Court that
it Iaad jurisdiction might itself have been stultified and rendered, in
practice, inoperative. Now none of this applies to the present case.
Not only are the circurnstances wholZy different, but the issue involved
in these proceedings is not for this Court a prelimiiiary issue. It is,for
this Court, a substantive issue of intepretation : iç or Isnot the claim
based on the Treaty oi ,1886 ? If "bascd on" means something more,
as we think, than it merely being said by our adversaries tkat the daim
is based on the Treaty, tlien the Court must enquire : is itso based 7
(and must for that purpose interpret the Treaty). But, to corne back
to the point frorn which 1 started, in doing this,it isreally the Declara-
tion of 1926 which the Court will be interpreting and applying, and
it has already found that it is its right an3 duty to do that, because
the Declaration is part of the Treaty of I 26 and in interpreting-as
I think .the Caurt must da-the Treaty of 1386, the Caurt will be doing
that for the purpose of carrying out its function of interpreting and
applying the 2926 Declaration. Mr. President, in putting forward this
we are not of course suggcsting that the Court inustclecidewhether the
claim is valid or not, that is to Say, mell founded iii thï'reaty, forthat
would be a matter of the ultimate rnerits, and here 1 must reject
Me. Rolin's charge that we were asking the Court to consider rlotonly
whether the daim was "fondéesur le traité" but "bien fondéesur le traité".
We do rlot suggest that theCourt must çonsider whetlier the claim is "bien
fondée", but whnt we Say is that it must at least consider wl~ether the
clairn is "fondée", and that, if for that puvose it merely adopted
Me. Rolin's criterion of not being wholly unrelated (sans pertinence),
the Court would not only not be determining whether the claim had
a true and szibstantive foundation in r11e Treaty, but would also indi-
rectly be pving a very wide and dangeraus extension to thc whole
notion of what constitutes consent to the reference of disputes to arbi-
tration.
Mr. Presidcnt, 1 ilow pass on to the next stage oi 'my argument,
namely, whether the subject-matter of the Ambatielos claim isof the
same dass or orcler as tliat covered by some provision of the Trcaty of
1886. Now I think it is obvious that ifone contcnds, as our advcrsaries
do contend, that a country is obliged t6 lsubrnit a given dispute to ORAL ARGUMENT OF MT. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-25 III53
389
arbitration undes the provisions of a pasticular treaty, one is thereby
saying that the trcaty relates to the siibject-matter of the dispute-
that is to say that the treaty at least deals with rnatters of the same
classor order as those which constitutc the subject-matter of thedispute.
That is a proposition from which I would have thought no one would
dissent.
Now if that is so, the question posed here is clcarly one of classifi-
cation a,d 1 need Iiardly remind the Court how important questions
of classification are in the theory and practice of international claims;
especially when it is a qucstion of determining u+at the basis or foun-
dation of the claim iç-for, unless the claim is correctly classified, unIess
it is assigned to thc right category, it will be impossible to determine
correctlv what its basis is. or whether ibasis is avdid one.
Now we contend that the suggestion that the Arnbatielos clairn is
based on the Treaty of 1386 involves a serious error of clasçification-
infact a double error, becauçe it involves not only assigning the clairn-
or the subject-mattcs of the claim-to a class or category to which it
does not belong, but it also involves interpreting the Treaty as covering
or relating to a class or category of subject whicki is outside its scope
according to the natiiral and ordinasy meaning of langiiage.
1 have suggested-and wc argued in our written Kejoinder-that
the class or category to which the Ambatielos daim properly bclongs is
that of adaim based on the general principles of international law relative
to the treatrnent of foreigners in the matter of tlzeadministration of
justice.But in view of some of the arguments aclvanced by oiir adver-
saries, and in particularby Me.Rolin in his extremely able speech yester-
day, 1 would like to analyze tlie position just a little further.
In its origin, the Arnbatielos claim consisted of a cornplaint of an
alleged breach of a contract made betwcen Mr. Arnbatielos and the
United Kingdom Ministry of Shipping. Now, it is surely çlear that
this supposed breach of contract, even if ithad occurred, could nat
have given nçe in itself to an international claim, becattse the govern-
ment of a country canr~ot hc in a more onerous position in respect of
an ordinary çontract of salc than aprivate party would be, and here 1
must cmpliaticaliy contest the proposition put Eorward by Me. Rolin
yesterday that a government as paxty to wliatI rnay term a private law
contract iç under some sfisczeobligation of good faith. Al1 parties to a
contract are iinder an obligation to act in good faith. But there is no
pnnciple of law that 1 know of which imposes any special obligation or
responsibility on a government, and in its capacity '2strader or contrac-
tor it cannot be ina worse or more onerous position than its own citizens.
Now, if Mr. Arnbatielos, inçtead of biiying his shiys from a department
of the United Kingdom Government, had bought them from a private
United Kingdom shipotvner or shipbziilder, and if this yrivate party
had failed to deliver the ships, or othenuise broken the contract, tbat
clearly would not have given risein itsclf to any international clah on
the intergovernrnental Icvel, nor would it have entitled the Hellenic
Government to intervene. Mr. Ambatielos, in accordance with well-
known principles of international law, would kavc had his rernedy in the
United Kingdorn courts, and only if lie had exhausted lzis remedies
there, and had suffered a clear denial of justice,as tliat term is under-
stood in international law, would the international rcsponsibility of the ORAL ARGUMENT OF hlr.FETZMAURLCE (u.K.)-25 ITL53
390
United Kingdom as a State have been involvcd, or the Hellcnic
Governmcnt have bcen entitled to prefer a clailn on behalf of
Mr. Ainbatieloç.
Now the fact thatthc other party to Mr. Ambntielos's contract was the
United Kingdom RIinistry of Shipping makes no fiindamental difference
whatever to that basic position. Even if (which of course we do not
admit) ther'e wasa breach of this contract, tliatcould not of itself give
rise to an international claim, but only, in the first place, toa right of
actiorion the part of Mr. Ambatielos In the English courts. If,of course,
English law had not afforded hlr. Ambatielos the poçsibility of any
rcmedy in the courts against the hfinistry of Shipping, then a direct
rigkt of intervention on the part ofthe Hellenic Government would have
existed. Rut that waç not the case. Thc ordiilary rernedies nfforded by
English law wert: availablc in full to hlr. Arnbatielos, andin regard to
his cornplaint, for instance, that certain material evjdence was not
produced, tie knew that tliis evidence existed, and a11tI~cnornlalproce-
dura1 methods of çompelling its production, which iriider our law are
very cornplete and rignrous, al1these existed and were available to him.
Therefcirc the position was essentiallyas if his contract hnd been with a
privatc party, namely, tliat only if he exhaustcd his lepl rernedies,
including, may 1 say, kis procedural remedies, and suffered a denial of
justice nnder the applicable principles of international law, cotild there
be any question of an international clairn on his behalf by his Gavern-
ment.
Now we of course deny that Mr. Ambahielos did suffer a denial of
justice, or that he cven exhausted lkislegal remcdies. Still morc do we
deny t1iat he exhauçted his procedural remcdies. 1 am not going into
tliat question because that is a question of the rnerits, but 1 merely
mention, in 1-iewof the fact that my friend,Me. Rolin yesterday did go
at some consider:iblc lengthinto what really wcre rnerits,E simply men-
tion tlzc fact that it~oirr viMr. Ambatielos !vasvery far froin cxhnust-
ing his procedurd reiriedics and facilitics açcorded to him by English
law. But that is beside thc point in these irhmediate proceedings. Now
3 have given this descriptionof the position simply in order to dernoil-
strate that Mr. Ambatielos's claim is essentially a clüim of denial of
justice,founded and based on tl-ie ordinary prinçiples of int ernatioiîal
law yespecting the trcatment of foreigners alid the resp~nsibility of
States in regard tn those matters ;that that is its correct category is a
mattet of classification ; and that neitlzer the 'I'reatof 1885 iior arly
otl-ier trczity tias anytlitogdo with it as regards itsaçtual substance.
As regards its essential fouildation and substance, the 1886 Treaty
simply docs not enter irrto &Ir.Arnbatielos's claim at all. This is easily
seen by posing the question : would an international claim, sirnplyas a
clnim, exist on behalf of Mr. tilmbatielos, if tTreaty of 1886had never
been entered iritn ! The answer of coursc is "Yes". If Mr. Arnbatielos's
clairn iç valid at allwould be just asvalid if the1886 Treaty had Iievcr
existecl, because it is based an tl-ie general principlesof international
law. Tiis can also be seen by asking whetker Mr. An~batielos, on the
facts he alleges,~vould have haci a basis of daim iil1870, or in 1880,
before ever the Treaty was entcred into. What rnagical change occurred
in 1886 to give hirn a hasis of claim hnever previously had ?The answer
is really, "None". He had no other or bette? clairn on the conclusion of
the Treaty of a556 than he would have hacl before. He w~uld have had ORAL ARGUMENT OF Mr. FITZMAURlCE (u.K.)-zs III53 39T
just asgood a bas& of clairn in1570 or 1880 as now, bccauçe that basis is
international law.
It follows, then, that, so faas tlie essence ofMr. Ambatielos's claim
goes, so far as his substantive rights are concerned, ancl tliose of kis
Government on his behalf, Mr. Ambatielos has absolutcly no need of
the 1886 Treaty and never did have any need of it. That 'L'reatycornes
into the matter solely on thc question of Mi-. Ambatielos's remedy. It
cornes in solelyon the question of compulsary arbitration. But the obli-
@ion to submit to arbitration itself only ariseif the claim isbased on
the Treaty, and it iç obvious that the essential basis of the claim isnol
the Treaty but the general pririciples of international law, because, as
we have seen, the daim (so faras valid at all) would still existeven if
there werc 110 Treaty.
-Ifon thc other hand, we enquire tvlicther the daim would still exist
if the Treaty existed, but if there were no general rules of international
law about denial of justice or the treatrnentofforeigners or State respon-
sibility-if WC can imagine that position-we shall see at once that
Mr. Ambatielos's claïm would pretty well disappear, for WC should search
in vain in thc Treaty for any provision which, according to its direct
language and the iiatural and ordinary rneaning of its tems in the
context of a treaty of commerce and navigation, would have any real
relation to RilrAmbatielos's claim. It is only against the background
of the general principles of international law, and indeed by importing
those principles into the Treaty, that the latter couid be made even to
seem to have any conncction with the claim.
Now 1 shall discuss lates whether the Treaty does incorporate the
general principlcs of international law on ~vhichMr. Ambatielos's daim
is based. My present object kas simply been to demonstrate-and Ihope
I may have convinccd the Court-that, aç a rnatter uf fundarnental
classification,$Ir.Ambatielos's clairn does not bclong to the catcgory
of trenty claims at all, but to the category of general international law
claims.
Itis with these considerations In ~nind, and on the basis of this classi-
fication of the Ambatielos claim, that E suggcst we should approach
the second of the fundamental questions 1 defined earlier, namely,
~vhether thc 1886 Treaty relates to the same cPass or order of rnatter as
the claim, and whether there is any real connection between the Trcaty
and the clairn, çuch as would make it possible tu say that the claim
might be based on the Treaty.
This connection rnt~st, as 1 said cadier, be real and subçtantivc, not
artificial-that is to Say, not purcly fomcll or verbal : and 1.have sug-
gested that the connection which our adversaries put forward on the
basis of their argument is,in fact, a purelÿ verbal one and that it
involves an ersor of classification.
Now the cardinal fallacyin our adversaries' argument, and the way
in which they seek tu establish what is really a purely verbal and artifr-
cial connection between the Treaty and tkc claim, is this. They Say,
in effcct, thüt the litigation between Mr. Arnbatielos and thc United
Kingdom Ministry was a commercial rnatter because it was about a
commercial matter-because it conccrned a commercial contract.
Therefore the litigationwas a matter of commerce and, if it was a
matter of cornmerce, tfren tlieprovisions of the 1886 Treaty, which
waç a trcaty of commerce, are relevant to it.That is their argument, as ORAL ARGUMENT OF Mf. FITZMAURTCE (u.K.)-25 TT153
392
we understand it, or something very near it. We Say that this kind of
connection is a purely verbal one, a sort of conjunng trick, a constnict
devoici of al1real substance, that should not be pennitted to lead tu the
result that an arbitration clausc is broughf into play- and conipulsory
jurisdiction is founded wherc none ~eally exists.
We çay that ;Llitigation, and a clairn in respect of what occurred
during orin consequence of a litigation,isnever a matter of commerce,
but isn rnatter of the administration of justice. A litigationmay be
about a commercial rnatter but isnot itself a commercial rnatter. The
fallacy involved In the contention of our adirersaries can easily be seen
by taking ait illustration. Suppose, for instance, that a diplomatic
courier travelling on an oficial journey was arrested and his diplomatic
baggagewas searched. No one would doubt that tlzat would bc a breach
of the ordiiiary rules of general international law reprding diplornatic
privileges and inimunities. At any rate, no one would doubt that, if
there was a claim in respect of that matter, that clairn would be based
on the gencral principles of international ilaw concerning diplomatic
priiiileges and irnmunities. It would obviouily be immaterial what the
mode of travel was and the fact tliathe courier was, for instance, travel-
lingby air wouId not in itselfbe any ground forsaying that the provi-
sions of a civil aviation convention providing for air traffic rights was
relevait to lis claim. Two essentially different orders of subject would
be invoYvedand the connection between the two would be purely artifi-
cial and accident;iI-namely, that the courier happened to be travelling
by air on the occasion when he was arreçted in amannier contrary to the
ordinary rules of international law. WelE, now, we suggest that the
process involved in the argument of our adversaries in the present case
is alrnost precisely similar to this, and we contend that thereis no more
real or substantive connection betweeil the provisions of an ordinary
com~ncrcial treaty and the general principles of international law con-
cerning the administration of justice and the treatmeilt of foreigners
than there is ùetween an ordinary civil aviation convention or any other
convention about passage or transit and the general principles of inter-
national law relative to the right of a diplomatic courier to traveunhin-
dered and unmolested. To usc the arbitration clauses of such treaties
ar conventions to found compulsory jurisdiction in disputes that really
turn on the general principles of international law which are involved,
isan abuse of the real purpose of those clauses and of the intentions of
the parties in entering into thern.
Now the illustration 1 have given not only bnngs into relief the
process that is being ernployed by our adversaries in the present case, it
also shows Izoiveasy it is, iyuu do,not Iook below the surface, if you
read terms only according to thcir literal and superficial rneaning, to
produce the appearance of some kind of a surface connection between
the language of a treaty or convention and allmost anything. The Court
will see at once tkat the connections which it is sought to establish by
this kind of proces are purely verbal or apparent, not substantive. In
order to show that Iam not exaggerating, rflny I refes to one of our
adversaries' arguments, which dernonstrates the process very vividly,
togetlier with the fallacy involved.
The argument in question \vil1 be found on page 306 of.îhc oral argu-
ments in the previous proceedings and also in paragaph 12 of the
Relleriir Gor7ernnicnt's writtcn "Mémoireea réfiliq~e".By Article X
I ORAL ARGUMENT OF RIT.FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-25 11153 393
. of the 1886 Trcaty, the Contracting Parties granted each other rnost-
favoured-nation treatment "in al1rnatters of commerce and navigation".
On that basis, in the passages .I have mentioned, Our adversaries have
argi~ed that the 1886 Treaty must include (I quotc) : "al1 dificultieç
arising out of commercial transactions, such as litigation resulting
from commercial contracts". And from this they argue that the Treaty
gives most-favoured-nation treatment in di matters relating to commer-
cial litigation. This deduction iç, we submit, qtrite illegitimate. The
fallacy involved iç of precisely the same order as tliatofthe courier and
the transit by air. The courier was entitled to certainrightiton the basis
of the law relating to diplornatiprivilegesand immunities. 13s particular
mode of travel wnsirrelcvant. In the sameway, private pcrsons,including
foreigners, are entitled to certain rights in the rnattcr of the conductof
litigation, inthe mattcr of the administration of justice, in the matter
of their treatment bcfore the courts. It makes no diifercncc what the
.s~ibject-mwtterof the litigationis, urhether itjs a commercial contract,
a divorce case or anything else. &Ir. Ambatielos would, according to
general international Iaw principles, have been entitledto certain treat-
ment in regard to any litigation he was engaged in in tlîe English courts,
whether it concerned a commercial contract, thc ownersliip of land, an
action for negligence, divorce proceeciings, or a criminal rnatter. But
this right did not spring from the Treaty of 1886 ; even as regards
commercial matters it did not spring from that Treaty, but from tlie
general principles of international law. To argue that, because thc
Treaiy conferred certain rights in matters of commerce, the rights
wliich an individual may enjoy inregard to liiigafion about commerce
spring from the Treaty, is a complete laon seqZt~k~.Rights relative to
litigation, rights relative to the administration of justice, are rights
relative to acertain fi~ocessthat is to say,litigation,or the administra-
tion of justicc.They are not rights relative to the subject-matter of the
litigation. Theÿ would exist whatever the siibject-matter was. A righi
relative to a certain subject-matter, for instancc commerce, conferred
by a particulsr trcaty,might he given effect toby virtue of the treaty,
but the pyocessby which such a commercial right would be given effect
to would bc essentially non commercial, would be a matter appertaining
to litigationas such, to litigation or the administrationof justice gcner-
ally, asa self-contained category. This process would not of itself be a
rnatter of commerce and would neither have anything dircctly to do with
the trenty, nor spring from it.
1wouldcal1attention ta anothcr fact.Lf the contention of the Hellenic
Government about the effect of the 1886 Treaty were correct, it would
lead to the curious and, 1 suggcst, surely absurd reçult that Greek
citizens in the English courts and British subjets before the Greek
courts, wauld be in a better position when the subject-rnatter of the
litigation was commercial than when itwas not. But that is surely
ridiculous and incorrect, for the principles that apply to the processes
of justice as regards foreigners are exactly the sarne whatever thc
subject-mattcr of the litigationmay be, and they spring from general
international law. This is a very material point because yesterday
Me. Rolin seemed to admit that the notion of comrncrce does not cover
the administration of justice, if 1 understood him correctly ; at any
rate at one pointhe secmcd to admit that. But he said ikat the existence
of commercial rights must include the protection of those rightsby the OR.4L ARGUMENT OF MT. FlTZYAUIiICE (u.K.)-2j 11153 395
matters not covered by general international law rules. Onlÿ express
language could sufficc to displace this presumption. Geileralities are
not enough, nor are forced and artificial constructions. This is easiIy
seen by applying thc following simple test. Would any jurist, would any
responsible jurist advising his govcrnrncnt have been satisfied with the
type of generalities and with relying on the typcof artihcialand strange
co~istructions that our adversaries have advanced in the prescnt case
if thcy Iiad rvanted to be certain of covering in a treaty siich matters
as the administration of justice and the treatment of foreigners before
thc courts ? Would any ~esponsihle jurist drawing up a treaty in which
he wished to includc, or in respect ofwhich he wanted it to be certain
that it covered such matters as thc treatment of foreigners before the
courts, woulcl liehave donc it in the tcms of an ordinary treaty of
commerce and navigation ? Surely the answer is "no", he Would not,
and that I think cstahlishes a very strong presumption against any
interpretation of such a tscatÿ of commerce alid navigation as might
bring about that result.
l Mr. President, 1 corne to the actual tems of these four Articlcs on
which our adversaries have based their contention. 1 do not propose
ta submit thcm to any detailed analysis. A very full and careful study
of those provisions was carried out in the United Kingdom Rejoinder
(1wouId refer in particular to yaragraphs 26-32, and, again, to para-
graphs 41-50) and in addition to tliat mÿ friend and colleague
Mr. Fawcett will have something to Say about the details of thosc provi-
sions whcn we dcal with our fourth basic question, but for my present
pusposes it will stifficeif1 simply read rapidly through the four main
Articles, and ask the Court to consider whether it can really be said
that, according to the normal use of language, the actual tems of thcse
Articles have anythirîg to do with the real essence of the Ambatielos
claim. And nftcr that 1 shall come to my third main question, time
permitting this evening, namely, whether, if the Treaty does not have
any direct connection with the Ambaticlos daim, as vie maintain that
it does not, it can neverthelcss be said to have an indirect connection
by process of reierence or incorporation eithcr of generd ruleç of inter-
national law or of the provisions of other treaties.
Now thc first article relied on by our adversaries is Article I, and
that reads :
"l'here shall be between the dominions and possessions of the
two Righ Contracting Parties rcciyrocalfrecdom of commerce and
navigation. The suhjects of each of the two parties shall have
liberty frccly to corne, with their shipsand cargoes, to al1 places,
ports, and rivers in the dominions md possessions of the other te
which native subjects generally are or may be permitted to corne,
and shall enjoy respectively thc samc rights, privileges, liberties,
favours, immunities, and cxcmptions in rnatters of commerce and
navigation which are or may be enjoycd by native subjects, without
having to pay any tax or impost greatcr than those paid by the
same, and thcÿ shall he subject to the laws and regulations in
force."
The final words are significant. But itis in any case obvious that
this Articleis simply an ordinary provision for the freedom of commerce
and navigation betwen tu70 cwntries, in particular, as we pointed396 oR.41,ARGUMENT OF MT. FLTZMAURTCE (u.K.)-2j III 53
out in our Rejoinder, regarding the movement of shipç and goods
between the two countries. It really envisages Irade,and it certainly
has nothing to do with questions of Litigation or general rights relating
to the administration of justice or the treatment of foreigners before
the courts. All that this Article really gives, we suggest, is a right to
commercial acthity, to engage in certain kinds of activities.Lt is not
a guiiarantee eitlier osuccess in those activities or of imrnunity from
the incidents of engaging in them. I shall qave more to sa~rabout that
presently.
New the next article is Article X, which reads as follows :
"The Coritracting Parties agree th&, in al1 matters rclating to
commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour, or irnmunitÿ
whatever ivhich eithcr Contracting Party has actually granted or
may licreafter gant to the subjects or citizenç of any other State
shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the subjects
or citizens of the other Çontracting Party ; it being their intention
that the trade and navigation of cach country shall be placed,
in al1 respects, by the other on the footing of the rnost favoured
nation."
'I'hisithe ortiinary common form moçt-fairoiired-nation clause found
in nearly every commercial treaty, giving most-favoured-nation rigIlts
in matters not of the administration of justice or of the treatrnent of
foreigners, but in matterç of commerce and navigation. In itself, therefore,
it obviousljr has nothing to do with the Ambatielos claim. 1 shall deal
presently with the question whether this Article corild he said to cover
the Arnbatielos daim by a process of refcrence or incorporation of the
generaE ruleç of international law os of the provisions of other tseaties.
Theii next wt. have Article XII, which rends LW follows :
"The subjects of each of the Contracting Parties wha shall
conform thcmsclvcs to the laws of the country :
r.Shall have full liberty, with thcir families, to cntcr, travel,
or reside in any part'of the dominions ,a~îdpossessions of the otlier
Çontracting Party. I
2. They shall be permitteri to hire or posçess the houses, manu-
factories, warchouses, sliops, and prernises wliidi m;iy be necessav
for them.
3. They may carry on their commerce either in person or by
any agents wham they Tay think fitto employ.
4. Tlzcystlall notbe subject in respect oftheir persons ar property,
or in respect of passports, nor in respect of their commerce or
industry, ta any taxes, whether gerieral or local, or to impostç or
obligations of any kind whatever other or greater than those which
are or may be imposed upon native subjects."
Now here again, in Our view, it is quite impossible ta sec anÿ reaçon-
able or normal connection between the subject-matter of the Ambatieloç
daim, narnely, treatment before the courts) and such matters as entry,
trarrel, residence, permission to hire or possess houses, shops, premises,
to carry on business and to ernploy agents, or the provision that nation-
als of the other country ara not to be swbject to grcatet taxes, imposts
or obligations than arc nativc subjccts inrcspect of passports, commerce
or industry. Now Me. Kolin's constructio?, may 1 say this, perhaps, we deny that he exhausted his procedura1 rerncdics. 1am not going
into that question bccause it is a question of rnerits, but 1 rnerely
mention it in view of the fact that my friend, Me. Rolin, yeçterday
did go at some considerable length into what were merits. I simply
mention the factthat, in our view, RiIr.Arnbatielns was vcry far
fsom exhausting his procedural rernedies and facilitics accordeci
to him by English law, but that isbesidethe point in these immediate
proceedings."
Weii, now, in saying that,1 did not, of course, mean to imply that the
question whether or not &Ir.Ambatielos had cxhausted his legal reme-
dies was a question which was bcside the point, as such, inthese imme-
diate proceedings. Indeed, 1 agree with what Me. Rolin said on Tuesday
rnorning, narnely, that the objection ofnon-exhaustion oflegal remedies
isin the nature of a preliminary objection, which the Court rnight-and,
indeed, should-examine in these proceedings. And Me. Rolin rictilally
invited me to çubmit my observations on this qucstion, to which
Sir Frank Soskice-who, 1am very pleascd to sec,is hcreto-day-would
rcply. Thst, my colieague, Mr. Fawcett, will do to-morrow. Meanwhile,
al1 1want to say by tvay of persona1 cxplanation is thnt what 1 meant
yesterday was sirnply this : that 1 regarded certain details of fact in
connectian with this question, for instance, çuch facts as whether
Mr, Anibatielos wasor wa not obstructed from producing cvidcncc andthe
question tvhether the United Kingdom did or did not siibpocna Major
Laing, and the further questions why Mr. Ambatielos did not himself
cal1 this witncss aiid why he did not even apply for any order for dis-
CQVeryof the documents he wanted. 1 rnerely rneant thridl those were
questions offact in the case, which E wiil not touch on because in rny
view they, as questions of fact, reallÿ appertain ta the merits of the
casc. 'But,of course, in so far as the questiori of non-cxhaustion ofIegal
rcmedies in regard to thoçe facts goes, my position is that thst is a
rnatter which the Court can go irltoand sbould go into on the present
occasiori. I
Then rnay 1 mention one more point arising from yesterday's proceed-
ings. -1-heCourt asked Our adversaries to pfoduce the texts of certain
old sevcrlteenth century treaties which they had uted in their written
pleadings, and the Court also asked our adversaries to produce any
other alid latcr sirnilai-treaties. Wenow, the Court II0doubt was there
refemng to the possibility of the existence of other sirnihr treaties
because our advessaties, rather chatacteristically1 think, had, in their
uririttepleadings, implied the existence of agreat rnass of such treaties,
or at ariy rate the poçsibiiïtof the existence of a considerablc number
of tlzem. For instance,1see this in paragraph 3 of the Hellenic"Ohs~mu-
tz'onsetCo~ckio~zs" on the question of cornpetence ; they said :
"Le moment n'est pas venu d'examiner de façon approfondie
les diverstr;iitis conclus par le Royaume-Uni, dont, par applica-
tion des dispositions relatives A la clause de la nation la plus
favorisée,la Grke est fondée A réclamer le bénéfice.Bornons-nous
à signalerqu'un trait6 avec l'Espagne datant de r467 ...."
and so on, and then they cited the older seventeenth century treaties.
Eut the implicationisthat there are "diverstruités"and that the moment
has not yet corne to examine them in a "yanike approfo~die". Weil, ORAL ARGUMEXT OF Mr. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-26 III 53 4OI
apparently that moment kas never yet corne, even up to the present
date, because in theirsubsequent pleadirîg, their "Mémoire en réplique",
thcre was nothing more said about those treaties exçept a bare allusion
to thern, and,of courçc, Me. Rolin said ~iothingaboutthem again,beyond
a bare allusion :anclT imagine it is foral1those reasons which the Court
has asked our adversnries to name these treaties, if they exist.And my
object issimply, aç itwere, to reserveour position in case ouradversaries
should procluce a number of further treatiesnow which they may say
will be relevant, and ifso,1know thc Court will appreuate that we shall
naturaIly require tirncto examine them and, if necessary, an opportunity
to expreçs our views about them, if that occurs.
Noru, Mr. Presidet~t and Members of the Court, Iwill begin what1 have
to say on the third of the main questions which 1 rnentioned yesterday,
and that is realIy the whole question of the most-fawoured-nation
position, and, of course, includirlg in that tliese older seventeenth
century treaties.
It being clear, as we think, that the provisions of the 1886 Treaty
relied upon by our adversaries have, as far as the direct language of
the provisions of that Trcaty goes, no reicrence to or conneciion with
thc Arnbatielos claim at all,it remains to be coilsidercd whether the
provisions of the 1586Treaty cover the lllmbaticfos claim byany proceçç
of incorporation of, or reference to, either thgencral principlesof inter-
national law or the tems of otker treaties. 1 particularly noticed that
Me. Rdin had little or iiothing to say about this in his speech. But,
since liedid nnt withdraw the contentions about it put fonvard in the
Greek written pleading, 1 feel1 must deal with it. For instance, a
glance at paragraphs 8 to 13 of the Hellenic Government's rvritten
Keply show3 that our adversaries do,apparently, rely on thccontention
that the rnost-favoured-nation rights conferred by the Treaty of 1886
are of such a character as in effect to give to Greek iiationalsa right
to the enjoyment of the treatment required by the gerieralprinciples
of international law respecting the administration of justice-although,
sincc Greek nationals already enjoy this right in the United Kingdom
by virtue of international law itself, one cannot help wondering why
it should have been necesstiry tocover the matter by a most-favoured-
riation clause in a commercial treaty. Howevcr, this is tlie argument
wliich we miist now proceed to examine.
Mr. President, Mernbers of the Court, thcre is really only one short,
simple and all-sufficient answer to this argument. To begin with, thcre
is onIy one relevant most-favoured-nation clause in the 'ïreaty of 1886
relevant to this question-namely, Article X-and that 1 will read
very rapidIy again to refresh the mind of the Court. Jt says :
"The Contracting Parties agree that in al1 rnatters relating to
cornmerce and navigation-in all ~~atfms relating to commerca
and ~duu2gntion-arîy privilege, favour, or immunity whatever
ivhich either High Contracting Party has actually ganted or may
liercafter grant to the subjects or citizensofany other State shall
be extended iinmediately and unconditionally to the subjects or
citizens of the other Contracting Party ; it being their intention
that the tsade and navigation of each country shdl he placed,
in dl respects, by the other on the footing of the most favoured
nation", ORAI, ARGUMENT OF MT. FiïZRlAURECE (~.~.)-26 III53
403
can attract or imply the gencrat piinciples of international law, a point
I shall discuss in n moment, it cnn, as 1 think we saw a little tirne ago,
only do so in respect of those principles ofinternational law whic1.ihauc
reference to the subject-matter of the particular most-favoured-natio~i
clause concerned. Shercfore, a most-favoured-~lation clause about
cornmercc and navigation (if it attractedsny general rulcs of inter-
national law at all) could only attract tlie genet-al mlesofintcrrlational
larv regarding commerce and navigation, if there should be any. But
what is in question in the present case-what is involvecl in theclaim
of Mr. Ambatielos-is not the gencral rules of international law con-
cerning commerce and navigation : it ithcgcneral niles of international
lnw corîcerning the administration of justice and the treatment of
forclgncrs hefnre the courts. But, secondly, thcrc is another and equally
fatal objcctiotl to our adversaries' theory. is this : we thinkthat rnost-
favoured-nation clauses do not in yrinciple and indced cannot of tliem-
sdves include or attract the general rulcs of international law at all.
It is neither their normal purpose to do so nor are tl-ieyframed in such
a. way astu accomplish it. I suggest to theCotirtthat the true purpose
of the rnost-favoured-nation clausc is to attract rights granted to
another cnuntry as a rnatter offairour and rlot ac ; rnattcr of inherent
obligation. A most-favourcd-nation clause betweeir two countries (cal1
tliem A and B) praduces no cffcct asbetween thcm until one of them
pnts somc favow or advantagc to a third country, C. That iswhat
most-fnuozkved-nation treatment implics. Norv if B (in niy example)
merely promiscd C to treat the subjects of C in accorclance with inter-
national law, that wouId be no favozcrat all, and therefore would not
constitute a grant tn which the rnost-favoured-nation clause could
attach itself. 13erhaps 1 miglit go through that exarnple again. WC
have a most-favourcd-nation clause ina treaty between two countries,
A and 13. That clause can only corne into upcrntion when one of those
countries graiits to anotlicr country treatment which is a faeiour,so
that ifone of those countries gants to a third country treatment which
is only the ordinary treatment requircd by international law, that
does not constitute a ~ILVOUY and thereforc tlic most-favoured-nation
clausc of the basic treaty bctwccn the two countries, A and 13, will
not have any operation hecauçe therc will he no favozcrgranted to
another country to be attracted by that clause. Now, in the article by
M. Visser, already referred to, this principle statcd in the following
passrigcs taken frorn pages 79 and 84 of the volume (1quote) :
"....il s'ensuit...que la clausc a l'intention dc garantir à l'ayailt
droit des avantages dont celiii-ci ne jouit pas en vertu de son
1'1ro~redroit ou de scs propres traités, mais qui ont étéaccordés
à des tiers.
...la clause ... cornportc le droit ci'ttre traite k 1'Cgzldes tiers ;
Etfiilque lc droit puissc cntrer en vigueur, il est donc nécessaire
que quelque @riviJBg fit kt& accordé à un autrc".
Perliaps I might translate that. lt says :
"It follows that thc purpose of the most-favourcd-nation clausc
is toguarantee to tlic intercsted party benefits which that party
doeç riot etijoy either by inherent or by treaty rights, but which
had been grantecl to third parties, The clause involves the right ORAL ARGUMEiVT OF MT. FITXMAURIC17 (u.K.)-26 III 53 405
of international law applicable to the Arnbatielos clliim, but that it
also incorporates by reference and by means of the most-fairoured-
nation clame the provisioiis of certain older Treaties of the seventeenth
century, namely, certain Treaties between the United Kingdom and
Spain, Sweden and Denmark respeçtiveiy madc in the pcriod 1650
to 1670 and still in forcc. \Te were intereçted and perhaps a little
amusecl ta learn that ouï- adversaries, whilc citing thesc Treaties and
relying, as apparently an important part of their case, on certain
provisions of tkem, had never furnished tlie Court witli any copies
of thc relewnt provisions and the Caurt hnd to ask for them. Our
adversnrics have never even set out these provisions in tlieir written
pleadings. Well, perhaps we cal1 assist our friends hecause we have
al1 these Treaties here, and J shall presently quolc some passages
from them verbatim. Now the argument of our adversaries in regard
to tliese Treaties which they Eiavc never rcally properly developed,
but which, if 1rnay venture to do so, 1will, as it were, statefor them,
isfirst that the most-favourcd-natioii clnusc ofthe 1886 Treaty, narneIy
Article X, gave Greek subjects and citizensa right to the treatment
granted to Spanish, Swcdish and Danish nationals under three older
'freaties. 1think they cited fivc older Treaties, but actually of those
five 'i'reaties twpairs are almost identical. Inthe case of both Sureden
and Denrnark Treaties wlzich were made during tlie period ktiowii in
England as the "Commonwealth", bctween the reigns of Charles I
and Cliarles II, were re-madc when, on the deatk of Oliver Cromlvell,
Charles II was restored to tlic Englisk thsoile. Those Treaties were
then re-made in almost identical terms with very srnall variations
and, therefore, for,211practical purposes tlierc areonly three Treaties
with Sweden, Denmark and Spain.
Well rioiv, the argurnen t iç, first,that the most-favoured-nation
clause of tlie 188h Treaty gives to Grcek nationals the same rights
as are given to Swediçh, Danish and Spanish nationals under thesc
older Treaties, and, secondly, tEiat the rights contained in the alder
Treaties included a right to treatrnent according to the general prin-
ciples of international law, either at large,so to speak, or at any rate
as regards thc administratiorî of justice. That is how 1 understand
the argument of ozir adversaries on these older 'creatieç. They say
that Greek nationals have the right to the benefit of those Treaties
and that those 'Jqreatiesaccord ccrtain general ititernational law rights,
or rights concerning the administration ofjustice. Well, letus examine
this argument. To it we oppose two objections both of which, we
think, are conclusivc. The first objection derives from the point 1
have already made so emphaticnlly and with which the Court wiil
certainIy be fnmiliar, that the rnost-favourcd-nation clause of the
1886Treaty only relates to commerce md navigation and, therefare,
, can only attaact the provisions of other treaties, in so far as these
provisions also relate to commerce and navigation. And 1 shall hope
to show presently that the provisions of the oIder 'S~aties cited by
our adversaries have, as faras that goes, no relevance at al1 to the
subject-matter of the Ambatielos claim. They may of course deal with
commerce and navigation, in fact they do, but loi- that very reasori
thcy have no relcvance to the Ambatielos claim which, in our view,
iç not a matter of commerce and navigation. Ncxt, assuming for a
moment that they did have some relevance to the claim, it;would, in406 ORAL AIIGUMENT OF MT. PITZMAURI (uEK.}-26 11153
our view, stillrernai~ivery difficult,ifnot impossible, to regard tliern
as being included by reference amongst the rights conferred by thc
'Treaty of 1886. 'The wording rclied upon ,by our adversarics in thcse
older 'Treaties, which T shall analyze irîa momcnt and present in its
proper context, consists of certain vergrgeneral plirases about treatment
in accordancc with "commoii right", conforming in certain matters
to "justicc and cquity", acting "in friendship and affection" and
sirnilar cxl-ircssions, and iis, wc subrnit, according to any normal
or reasonable iisc oi language, irnpossiblc to regarda clause conferring
rnost-favonred-nation rights in matters of com~nerçe and navigation
as attracting yhrascology of that kind in othcr treaties. The most
that these oldor Trcaties could do in relation to thc l'seaty of 1886
wcluIdbc to entitle Greck citizensin ttic United Kirigdorn to treatmerît
in accordancc with cornmon xight,eq~iity,justicc, love and friendship
and so on, in matters of cornmercc and navigation, but, according to
the argument we put forward, we always corne back to the snmc
point : trcatment in the cairrts is]lota mattcr of commcrce and navi-
gation, but of thc admiilistration of justicc generally. May 1 put tlic
sarne point in anotlzer way. Assume that under thcsc oIder Treütieç
Spanish, Swedjsli and Banish nationFz1sin the United Kingdorn arc
entitlerl tthc benefit of thegeneral niles ofinternational law regardirîg
thc administration of justice, assume thnt such isthe cffect of thcse
Treatieç, though 1 hope to show prcscntly thst itis iii fact wry far
from bcing the cffcfcçtof thcm. Nevcrtheless, suppose it to be so-in
what wny is thc benefit of such treatment, trearmcnt in rcspect of
the administration of jiistiçegencrally, attracted in favour of Greek
citizcns by a provision giving them most-favoured-natioi1 rights about
the wholly different subject of commcrce and navigation 7We s~ibmit,
Mr. Prcsident, that, evcn if these older Tresties have the eîfect
contcntled for hy our adversaries, even if they do relate and rcfer to
the ge~leral ~rinciplcs of intcrnationa1 law about the administratirin
of justice,that is not a.rnatter which would bc attracted by a most-
favour~d-riaiioii clause on commerce and navigation.
The second olijection to o~ir adversaries' theory about tliese oldcr
Treaties is tliat, whcn one examinestheir ictual tcxts, it is clcarthat
thcy have no real reIevance to thc Ambaticlos claim-that isto say
to a clairn :tllout treatmerintlie courts-even if they could be regardcd
,asincorporated by referencc in the 1886 Treaty. Howevcr, before T
cxaminc the texts, I want to draw attention to certain lcgnl considc-
rations of a general character as to tlie way in which provisions of
old treatics such as these çhould be aliproached.
Mr. President, our adversaries have at varioiis times reproached us
for objecting to tEieir invocationof other freaties-that is to Say of
treaties othcr than Anglo-Grcck treatics-on thc ground that we did
the çame tfiing inthe Arrzglo-Ircc~w'OnilCor~t~5a? czse. Rut, of course,
the truth is, we have no objection of principle to the invocation of
other trcnlies, provided they are relevant. WC have no objection to
the proçess as such ; al1WC say isthat y011cnnnot propcrly, by means
of a treaty clause on oncsubject, invake or attractdauscs on a difictcnt
siibjecf: in anotl~er trcaty. Equally we say8that thc clauses pu seek
to irivoke or attract miist be clatises which relatc to the matter in
liand. Now the Court itseIf endorsed this view in the Anglo-I~arzian
case, The particular issuein tliat case, so£a.ars thispoint goes,was ORAL ARGUMEXT OF Mr. I~ITZMrZURICR (LF.K.)-26 II153 407
whcther the rnost-favourcd-nation clauses of certain Anglo-lratiian
Tscaties of 18j7 and 1903 attracteçl the provisions of a. Dsnish-Zrnnian
Treaty of 1934,so as to givc tl-ieCourt jmisdiction in the case, and thc
Court found as follows. It said (1 quotc from p. rio of the Report) :
"The Coiirt needs only observc that the niost-favourcd-nation
clause in the Treaties of 1857 anrl rgo3 bctwccn Iran and the
United Kingdom had no relation whatcver tojiinsdictional matters
l>ctweeil th two Govcrnments."
That was the view of the Court. Sir Arnold McNair, wlio votcd witli
the rnajority, said equally, in rcspcct of the Danish-Iranian Treaty of
1934(p. r22 of the Rcport) :
"...thc Uilited Kingdom, bcforc it crin hase iis c1:iini oil tlic
Trmo-Dnnish Treaty, mi~st establis11 a cotincction with it.,.".
Judge Hackwnrth also,tliough disscnting on the jriclgment asa wholc,
ngrccd with thc Coilst on the priiiciplc hcre involvcd, or so it çeerns
to lis.He said (p. 139) :
i
"1 readily agrcc witlithc mnjority tliat the most-f:ivoiiscd-nation
provisions of the carlier trctlticailcl thc provisions of tlie later
trcntics are interrelatcdand must be considcred together in order
that bencfits under thc latter may be claitncd."
~owkvcr, our adversnrics alscirernind uç that in the An@-Traninri
case we not only invokcd treaties otlicr than Anglo-Iranian trcaties,
I-iut thatWC did so for thc cxpress pusposc of showing that, by reason
of most-favotircd-nation claiiscs occurring in certain treaties I~ctween
Iran and the Unitcd Kingdom, Iran was l-ioundto treat British subjccts
in accordance with thc generül principles and practices ofinternational
law, as provided in Sran's treaties with a numl~cr of other coiintries.
Our answer is as follows.
First of al!, therelevant trcaty claiiscs iii thc Angln-Iraniafi case
were cluite diffcrently wordcd from thc trcaty provisions in the prcsent
case and had quite a differciit effectMay 1 remind the Court what
whidzwoweiçlairned in that casc, Articlco4 of the Danish-IranianeilTrcatyf
of 1934, That said :
"The nationals of each of ttie High ContracLing Parties shnll,
in tlie tcrritory of tlzc other, he rcccived and trcatcd, as regards
their persuns and property, in accordance with the principlcs and
practiçe of ordinary international law."
Now that was nrî express and positive rcfcrcncc to trcntmcilt in
üccordance with gctîeral international lxw of the, most dcfinite and
uncquivoc;il clîaractcr. We maintain that, in thc present case, such a
reference is ilowlierc to he found, either in thc 1886 Treaty or in any
of the other treaties or claiises cited by our advcrsnries. NIvloreovcr,
and this is important 1 thii~k, in the Iranian casc there was a special
Teason for thc inclusion in treaties l-ictwceii Iran and other countrics
of clauses embodying a right to treatmcnt according to generül inter-
national law, bccaiise I am conscious ofthc fact that it has been part
of rny argument tliat that is not a normal proccss. But therc was a
special senson for it in the Iraniancase, whidk was tliis:that, at aboutJsubrnit that, in any case,SL~G~ an argument on the part of our adver-
saries would be superficial and would take no accouilt of changes in the
situation and iil legal coiiceyts which have occurred sincc tlre seventeenth
ccntury.
And here wc cncouilter anothcr aspect of the inter-temporal law
which was also stated by AI. Hubcr in tlie Islw~of Paim-ma cnsc, rianiely,
the principlc thut facts wl-iichconierred a legnl right at one period may
not necesçtlrily do so nt a later period, liccausc of changes in the Icgal
positioil that have oççurred çiiicc.
Now, if we apply tliat principlc to the present case, what do we
find ? Suppose, for tlie sake of argument, tliat sonle clairse of onc of
these sevcntcentli century Trcatics can be read as conferring a riglit
to certain treatmei~t in the courts, whicti is now a general international
Inri?rigkt. But that would mean that, precisely because the treaty right
iil clnestionistci-day a general international law riglit, its treaty basis,
thoiigh not fornially destroyed, is riolonger the real foundation oi tlie
right. It has been çupcrscded, and, so to speak, cngulfed, and rendered
superfluous by the emergence of general rulcs of international law that
take itspIacc, that include jtalid, indeed, go far heyond it, so that
the right now depends on and sesults frorn those sules ratlzer than the
treaty. These sevet~tecnth century T~eatics arc, of course, still inforce
as treaties.But thc operütive effectof many ofthe individual provisions
of thosc Treatics is spent, becausc tliey have been supersedcd, overtaken,
cauglil:uy, rendered unnecessary, by tlie ernergence of gcncral niles
of intcrnational law on thc subjects of those provisions dealt with,
which now constitute thc rcal basis of the rights and obligations existing
between the parties otithis matter.
Well, iiow, wliat is the yractical resultof tliis The prüctical result,
applying the principlc of the inter-temporal larv,seems to us as follows.
If the AmbatieTos claim had ariserl in tlie period 16jo-1670, or there-
abouts, and if there had tlicn existed a suitablc most-favout-ed-nation
provision in an Anglo-Greek treaty (and hy tliatI do not mean a most-
favourcd-nation provision about commerce and navigation only), Grcace
rnight have hccri able to daim at that time the henefit of suçh clauscs
in the Treaties between the United Kingdot-n arid other countrics a,s
might confer some right concerning (or coveririg) tlie treatment of
foreigners in the courts, because at that dallesuch a right would have
constituted a favour or specisl advantage granted to thosc cotintries
ovcr and above what waç required by generd iaiternational law, and
thereforc s righr that could be attractcd by a suitable most-favot~red-
nation clause, apyropristely frrtmed so as to relate to the subject of
treatmcnt of ioreigners in the courts. But that is no longer thc case
to-day. Siights cd thiç kiiid,even if originally conferred by treaty, are
now ttie subjeçt of gcrîcral intcrnational larv obligations. 'rl~ey are no
longer treaty favours or ad hoc advantagcs, unless the circvmstances
arc vcry exceptional, and they can ne longer be attracted by ~niost-
füvoured-nation clauscs. If we gave sucii rights to certain countries by
the sevcnteentli ceritury Sreaties-and 1 sliallgo into the questiori
in a moment whether we did-but if weclid, the present position would
be that we should in any caçe be obliged to give them those rightç by
virtue of geiieral international Law,even if the Treaties were no longer
iri force,for the rights in question no longer depend on the Treaties :
:111dif tlieyno longer depend 011the Trcaties, they cannot he attractcclby moçt-favoured-nation clnuscs iiiothcr trmties, forthey are no longer ,
a rnatter offavour but of inherent ol>ligation. A position in which these
rights were ad hoc favours capable of beiilg attracted by most-favourcd-
nation clauses has been suyerseded by a position in which they have
bccome inherent general intcrnatinnal Pan. iigkitsto which the wl~olc
conception of most-favoured-nation treatment is alien and inapplicnl~le.
For thcse reasons wc submit to thc Court that, cvcn if the seven-
teeilth century 'hcaties confer the sort of riglit w11iclotiradversaries
contend they do, the clauses in question no longer have any relevance
as such, becnuse thcir opcrative cffcct hasbccn swallo~ved up in general
rules af international law to wlïicl~ the most-icivonred-ilütion clause
of the 1886 Treaty, on wlïicli our adversaries rely, 11s no application.
Mr. Fresident, let us now take a look at the clailses in question of
thc older Treaties aiid see what they really amount to, and hcrc tnay
1 bc pcrmittcd to rnakr, the point that the way oiir adversarics liavc
dcalt witli thc rnattcr of tllcscoldcr 'I'reaticis, may. I say, tÿpical oi
their whole htlndling of this case, and of their-l rnrglit almost say-
frivolous attitude to the issues involved. Me. Rolin hardly refcrrcd to
tliesc Treaties at al1 beyond the usual mention and daim in respect
of the term "cornrnon rjght". He ccrtainly presented na argument about
thern-no reasoned argument, that is. He simply assumed their appli-
cability withaut citing them. Similarly in the Greek written pleadings,
altho~igh considerahle reliance iç placed on thesc Treaties, there is
practically no reasoned argumcnt abolit thein. Not once are tlieir
provisions quotcd ilîfull.On the other hand, words and phrases suc11
as "cornrnon right", "jiisticc and cqiiity" and so on, are taken out of
their context and ~nadc thc basis of a supposed connection between
the Ambatielos claim and the Treaty of 1886,by means of ai1involved
process of referencc. It is,as I have said, typical-a sort of trick, a
magician's illusion. Ordinary words and phrases are takcn out of their
contcxt and subjected to a process of metamorphosis that cntirely
changes thcir rcal rneaning and effect.Well, Ict ils now acttially look
at somc of thc provisions of thcsc 'I'rcaties.
We may note at oncc that sorne of tliem, in particnlar the first one
or two articles of each Treaty (which are arnongst those cited by our
advcrsaries), belong to what is known as the collective covenant type
of provision-that is to say, the respective Hcds of State or Govern-
mcnts give undertakings not only for thcmselvcs but on bchalf of tfîeir
subjects and citizeiis, the latter being in a sense also parties to thc
Treaty. This type uf provision is now cornpletely out of date. Now it is
in these Articles tlîathe phrnses occur about "love and amity", "friend-
ship and affection", "goodwill and rcspect" and so on, on whick (arnongst
others) our adversaries rely. Wel now, 1will not wcary tlie Court with
rcading ail these provisioils, but 1 will read one of tl~crn to illustrate
the kind of thing that is involved. The phraseology diffcrs slightly with
cacb Trcaty and various expressions aTe employcd, but the phrases
ernployed in eaçh are fundarnentally the same, and 1 will begin with
selecting, as typical, Article 1 of the Anglo-Danish Trcnty of Fcbru-
ary 13th, 1660. Wcll now, this says :
"It is covenanted, accorded, and concluded that there be a
sinccrc, truc, and perfect irictldship, peace, and alliance for ever,
hetweeil both the ICings, their heirs :incl successors, kingdorns,
proviiices, and priilcipalities, subjects arid vassals, ol what con-412 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BIR. FITZMAURTCE (u.K.)-26 III53
dition,dignity, and degree soevcr, as well those who now are, as
~vhohereafter sl.ialbe,both by land and sea, in rivers, fresh waters,
and everywherc ; so as they neither do wrong one to the other,
nor the one cause any damage or harrn to the kingdoms, provinces,
subjectç, and vassals of the other, nor as much as in them lies
suffer or consent that the Iike be donc by otlzer persons ; but that
they adhere each to othcr in sincere amity and love, and that the
one prornofe tu his uttermost the advantage and commodity of
the other, and of each ottier's subjects respectiveIy as his own ;
but that they hiilder and prevent ench other's losscand destruction,
bot11 by fact, counsels, and al1 their power."
Well now, we submit, Mr. 13resident, that the sort of phrase you
fiild in this clause, about "sincere, trueand perfect friendship", or the
adhcrence of the parties to each other in "sinccre amity and love"
(and equally tlze phrases about "friendship and affectioi~" and "goodwill
and respect" in tlie similar clauseof the 0th Treaties) cannot properly
be construed as importing the general principles of intcrnational law,
or rules or obligations about the treatment of foreignerç before the
courts. Ive submit thnt they are rnucIz too vague and general. Tiiese
expressions are not, in our view, couched in the language of precise
obligation at all. They are morc in tlie ilaturc of general expressions
of frieridship andgoodwill, suc11as habitually occurred iil older treaties
and cannot properly be given a more stringent interpretation. The
truth is chat tkese provisions of the collective covenant type have no
real rclationship either to psesent-day conditions or to suc11a treaty
as thc Anglo-Greek Sreaty of r886.
1will now tiirri tthe second group af clauses cited by our adversaries,
said to contain a provision about behaviour in confomity with "justice
and equity". But what do we in fact find ? 1tuill cite astypical of this
claçs oEprovision Articlc V of the hgla-Swedish Treaty of April xrth,
1654. That says tlzis :
"No merchants, captains, and masters of ships, marines, nor
any persons, ships, goods, or merchandise, belonging to either
confederate, shall upon any public or private account, bÿ virtue
of any edict general or special, within any the lands, havcns,
sea-roads, coasts, or dominions of the other, for any public servicc
or expeditian of warEor any other cause,rnuch lessfor any private
lise, be seized, ernbarked, arrested, fozced by viGence, or be any
way molestecl or injured :Provided only such ar-rests, as are coi?-
formable to justice and equity, be not hereby prohibited, so bt
itthey are made according to the ordinary course of law, and not
granted upon private affection or partiality; but are requisite for
the administration of right and justice."
So the Court $vil1 see there that the words "justice and equity" are
relaterlto the arrcstc;, that is say, the seizures, e~nbarkations, arrests,
forccd by violence, molestation and injury. That is the connection in
whicli those tenns "justice and equity" are tised, ancl it seems to us
cIear that this type of clause has nothing rvhatsoever to do, even
remotely, with such a case as that of Mr. Ambatielos. It liasto do with
arrestç, seizures, physical injuries, and other violent actions, quitel CiKAL ARGURIENT OF RIT. IIITZMAWRICE (u.K.)-26 III53 423
rlifferentfrom the brcach of contract or denial of justice whidi
Mr, Arnbatielos claims to have suffcred from.
Finallv, we corne to the third type of provision, contaiilingtlzfamous
plirase about "cornmon right", on which our adversaries chiefly and
so greatly rely, and that occurs aç Article III of the Anglo-Spanislz
Treaty of Peacc and Friendship of May z3rd, 1667.Let uç reüd this
Article in order to sce ivhat exactly is the context %.hichthe expression
"common riglit" occurs. It says :
"That (it startswith a "that") the said Kings of Great Britain
and Spain shall take cnrc tliat their respective people and subjects
from henceforward do abstain from al1 force, violence or wrong ;
and if any injury shall be doiie by either of the said Kitlgs,or by
the people or subjects uf either of them, to the people or subjects
l ofthe other, against the articlesof this alliance, oagainst common
right, there shallnot therefore be giveliletters ofreprisal, marque,
or couriter-marque, by any of the canfederates, until such timc
as justiceis sought and followed in the ordinary course of law."
FVell,that is half way through the Article, and pausing there T.would
draw attention to the fact that this provision does iiot in any case
opcrate "iintil such tirnas justiceis sought and foUowed in the ordinary
course of law". This clearly implies the exhanstion of any legal remedies
that may exist, and 1 would remind the Court that it ispart of the Unitcd
KirîgdoM contentioi~ that &Ir. Ambatielos did not exhaust his lcgal
setnedies in this case.Lf not, then this provision of the Anglo-Spanish
Trcaty of 1667 would not in any case be applicable. However, the provi-
sion in question continues as followç :
l "But if justice be clenied or delayed, then the King, mhose
people or inhabitants have received harm, shall ask it of the
otlier, by whorn (as is said) the justice shall have been denied
or delayed, or of the commissioners that shallbe by the oiie King
or the other appointed to reccive and hear such demands, to the
eiid thst dl such differences rnay be comyounded in friendship,
or according to Iarv. But if therc should be yet a delay, or justice
l shou2cl not be done, aor satisfaction given ivithin sis rnonths
aftcr having the same so dernanded, then may be given letters
of reprisal, marque, or counter-marque."
Suçh are the tems of this Articlc 111 of the Atiglo-Spanish Treaty
of y667 and, ML. Prcsident, ivesuhmit that its language is such as to
render it conlpletcly iriapplicable to the claitn of Mr. Ambatielos iil
any sl-iape ur forni. First,the circurnstances wkich it envisages tirc
utterly rernote from those of to-day, and are quite unrelated to thosc
contemplated by ttie Anglo-Greek Trcaty of 1886 which is said by
our adversaries to attract and incorporate this provision of the 1'667
Treaty. SecondLy, the real ohject of this provision was to define the
conditions in which letters of marque, counter-marque a~îd repnsals
could legitimately be employed for the redress of wrongs or gricvanceç
-an afchaic notion, 1 am glad to say, that canncit he imported into
a inodern treaty. Thirdly, the case conte~~iplated by thc Article, the
type of illegalityto which it applics is iil thc nature of forcc, violeilce
and other wrongs ancl injuries ejusdemgane~is. Taken in their cotitext,
these conceptions have littleor nothing to do with the allegations
i ORAL ARGUBIENT OF MT. FITZIIIAURICI7 (u.K.)-26 II153
414
of breach of contract, or of failure ùy the Crown to producc certain
evidence, and scion, whidi fonn the subject-matter of MT.Ambatieloç's
claim.
And therefore, Mr. President, we can only submit to the Court
that it would be incorrect and inequitable to allow provisions of this
kind, iramecl to meet a totally different state of afhirç, and now obso-
lescent and superseded by gcneral rules of international law, tu bc
utilized in order to found compulsory jiirisdictioi~ by a process of
supposed incorporation by reference, in a moderii treaty of commerce
and navigation. Therc is,we submit, a complete abserice of any real
rclationshiy between the provisions I have read out and analyzed
and the Treaty {if1886. Interpreted in their context and with reference
to the period in wfiich thcy were drawn up, these Treaties do not
have the meaning and effect attributed to them bÿ ous adversaries.
Furthermore, if thcy did have this rneaning and effect, the most-
favoured-nation clause ofthe 1886 'I'reatylimiteci asit is to commerce
and navigation, could not attract or incorporate these provisions of
the older Treaties.
Lc VICE-PKÉSIDEN fTisant fonction clePrésident : 'Jevaisdemander
à l'agent du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni un renseignemerit : on
m'a informé que la dilégation britannique finirait sa plaidoiriedans la
matinée des audiences de demain. Je voudrais m'assurer, n'est-ce pas,
si c'estcomme cela, si votre intention est de finir dans la matinée de
demain, parce quc, autrement, s'ilvous manquait un peu dc temps,
013pourrait encore continuer quelques minutes.
Mr. FIT~MAUR~C : Mr. President, if you would be kind enougli to
grant me a few niore minutes, 1 could finish completely my own section
of our argument and Mr. Fawcett would then be able to finishthe
concluding section ofour argument to-morrow morning.
Le VICE-Prdsru~n~ faisant fonction de Président: Je vous prie de
continuer, M. Fitzrnaurice.
Rlr. FIT~AIAURI :CEb. Presiclent,E have iii fact finislied already the
substaritive part of thc argument whick 1 wanted to address to the
Court, and 1 have now dealt with the first tfiree questions which we
regarded as furidamental. T wilI not recapitulnte them now because
we shalI do that in our final speech, but the Court will rememher that
there was a fourth question with which Mr. Fawcctt willdeal to-rnorrow,
and the essence of that foürth question waç this : that assuming, con-
trat-y to thc argument which I have endeavoured to present to thc
Court, there is some-or the Court thinks there is sorne-relationship
between the subject-tnatter of the Ambatielos claim aild the classof
matter which is in the Treaty, nevertheless, in our view, that would
not suf'ficta establish that the daim iç based on the Treaty. As 1
said at the beginning of rny remarkç, we thiilk that, in addition, it
w~uld lx neçeçsary to show that,ifthe facts allegedby Mr. Ambatielos
were correct, there would be some provision of the Treaty whic11would
be violated, and wliat Mr. Fawcett \nll do to-morrow is to conçider
the facts-[lot whether they are correct, which is obviously a matter
of the rnerits-biit,assuming that the facts are correct,he will consider
wtietlier there iany provision of the Treûty ~vhichcould be violated. ORAL ARGUMENT OF MT. FITZMAURTCE (u.K.)-26 III53 41 j
But now, in conncctiot~ with th~t, there arises one other matter of
consiclerable importance to which 1 would like to draw the special
attention of the Court myself. If our adversaries were correct in their
contention that the 1886 Treaty, either directly or by rcfcrence, incor-
porated the generai principles of international law regarding denial
of justicenncl treatment of foreigncrs before the courts, then it would
£ollowlogically tliat we on our side ought,as part of this fourth question
on wliich Mr. Fawcett will address you-we ought, as part of this
question, to argue tkiat, even if the facts alleged by htr. Ambatielos
as to 1v11atoccurred before the English courts were correct, these facts
would not suffice to establish a denial of justice, athat term is under-
stood ininternationai law, and it ispart of our case that, even if the
alIeged facts were correct, not only would no breach of tlie Treaty
occur-no direct breach-but also, evcn if the Treaty incorporatcd the
encra1 principles of interiiational laabout the treatment of foreig-ners
wl~ich,of course, we deny), it would be our argument that those iacts
were insufficient to establish that such a brcach of general internationa1
law Iisd occurred and tkerefore that there was really nothing to go to
an arbitral commission.
Now, Mr. President, itisobvious that, if we were to attempt to argue
that matter before you on thc yrcsent occasion, it would take us very
far afield.It would mean going into the whole of the law relating to
clenial of justice and the treatment of foreigners before the courts.
WC should have to point out, for instance, that even if Mr. Ambatielos
were correct in saying that the Bnglish courts came toa wrong decision,
or failed to take account of certain evidence-wllich, of course, Ive
deny-but, even if he were correct, this would still not suffice to
establish a denial of justice as that terni is understood in international
law. \$Teshauld havc to point out that merc errors or miscalculations
in the application of the law on the part of the courts, or mere irregti-
laritiesof procedure, are not enough and that there must be something
in the nature of actual dishonesty or poss incornpetence or deliberate
fraud. We should have to point out, if we were obliged to argue this
rnatter, that, within certain lirnits, each country is entitled to have its
own legal system and rules of evidence and procedure, and that, pro-
vided a certain basic standard of justice exiçts and is applied, forcipers
bcfore the courts must take things as they find thern and cannot clairn
special treatment, so long as they receive the same treatment as a
native of the country would Iinvc received in like circumstances.
And 1 am not going on, 1 am coming to an end-but we should
have to point out that a litigant cannot cornplain that ccrtain evidence
has not becn prodriced, or certain witnesses have not been called,
when he himself has made no attempt to procure the production of
that evidcnce or to cal1 those ~viinesses, and has not availeà kimself
of the procedural rights and facilities which the law @es him. We
should have to point out that it isno pxt of the duty of one litigant
to assist his adversary In cstablishing his case. Al1 these principles,
and others 1 have not mentioned and am not going to mention, are
familiar and well-estaldished principles of international law which are
fully applicableto the case of ML. Amhatielos, or rather, which would
be fully applicable. Tl-iese pnnçiples, in our view, would completely
disl~oseof that claim, if itwere argued on the basis of the general
principles ofinternational law. ORAL ARGUBlENT OF MT. FITZRlAUHICE (u.R.)-26 III 53
416
Weli, now, it is there, Mr. President, that we find ourselves in a
certain dificulty, and we would requeçt the assistance, or at any. rate
the special consideration, of the Court. The imrnediate issue in the
present procecdings is whether the Ambatieloç claini is baçed on the
Treaty of 1886. M%en we Say: "No, itis not, becaus t is based on
the general principles of international law", our adversanes then reply
that the Trcaty incorporates the general principles of international
law. Now, our difficulty is thxt we do not know at this mornerit, and
we cannot kiiow at present, whether the Court will accept that argu-
ment. We hope very much that the Court will not accept the argument
that the Treaty of 1886 in any way incorporates the gcneral principles
of international law, because it seems to us to involvea wliolly distorted
view of what is the effect of asimple and ordinarg treaty of commerce
and navigation, ;md it rirould seem to us to be an extrernely dangcrous
interpretation ol the ordinary provisions of a treaty af commerce
and navigation. If the Court does accept our argument, then, of course,
no further diffici~lties will arise ; but if, on the othhmd, the Court
should hold that the Treaty of 1886 incorporates the general pnnciples
of international law about denial of justice and arelateci matters, then
it would obviously become very material-and, indeed, a cardinal
question in the case-whether, even if ali these complaints made by
Mr. An~batielos were correct, there would have been any breach of
the applicabIe rules and principles of international law : and we should
really want to argue that as part of Our fourth fundamental question,
to which we are now çorning. We should want to argue that, even
if al1 that hlr. Ambatielos alleges to have occurrcd is correct, there
would still be no deriial of justice as understood in international law.
But, as Ihave S-d, that would takc us into a new and vergr extensive
field, ariitwould obviously very much proIong the present proceedings.
Well, sudi is our quandary, and in the circumstances, th the permis-
sion of the Court, what we propose to do isthis :we propose for the
present to confine our argument on ous fourth question to the simple
mue wliether, even if the factatleged by MT. Ambatielos were cor~ect,
anydirect breach of any specific provision of tfie1886 Treaty as such,
and on itsdirect and actual language, wzvoulchiave been established.
Ln doing that, in iirnitirig ourselinsthis way, we draw formal attention
to the Eactthüt if,peramfiossibilewehope, it should be heldby the Court
that the Treatityincorporates the gerleral rules of interriational law about
denia1 ofjiistice and related matters, then therc will arisea question
which \vil1 not yet have been argued, namely, that, even if al1 tfiat
Mr. Ambatielos said is correct, any denialof justicewould have occuned.
Tt would be necessary ta consider, not only tvhether the facts alleged by
Mr.Asnbatielos arecorrect, but even, ifcorrect,thcy establishany breach
of international law. Now that would have to be considered and arped
at a later stage orduring a fiirther phase of thepresent proceedings, or
befare an eventual arbitral commission, and we rnust therefore formally
reserve tlie righttodo,that. We therefore ask the Court to give specific
clirectionsabout this matter either in its Judgrnent or by an inter-
locutory Order, if theoccasion arises. Of course, as 1 have said, it will
only be nccessary to do this ifthe Court considers that this Treaty of
Commerce and Navigatiori does incorporate the gcneral rules of interna-
tional Lawabout denial of justice and similar matters. Ure thiilk there
is eveq reason why the Caurt sliould notgive sudi a dangerous extension ORAL ARGUMENT OF Mr. PITZMAURLCE (u.K.)-26 III53 417
to ordinary provisions about trade, sliipping, residence, taxes,and su
on, and we very much hope itwilli~ot.
Witk t11éscexplanâtions, and with tlii'ç forma1 rcscrvation, 1 will
ask tny learnerl friend and colleague, Mr. Fawcett, to conclude our
statement to-rnorrow by addressing the Court on tlze fourth of om
fundamental qiiestions, limite8 in th~vay1 have describecl. 3. ORAL ARGUMENT OF Mr. FAWCETT
(COUNSEL FOR THE GOVEKNMEKT OF THE UNLTED KINGDOM)
AT THE PUBLIC SITTING OF MARCH 27th, 1953, NURNING
MT. President and Members of the Court:
ln dealing with the fourth question,1 will, i1 may, begin by sliortly
reminding the Court of the main elements ofthe Hellenic Governrrent's
clairn as itisset out in their pleadings,as this will be helpful in the
discussion that [ shall try to put before the Lorirt. First, there is the
alleged breach by the Crown of the Contraet of Sale of July 1919
(Greek Mernorial, paragraphs 8 and 22. Greek notes (Annex K 3),
(Anne. R 4) and (Annex K5)) and alsoof the provisioiis of thc mortgage
deeds executed inNovember 1920 (Grcck Keply, yaragraphs $5). Then
corne three issues which are connected with the proceedings in the
Englislt courtsin 1922 and ng23. There is first the assertion that the
decision of Mr. Justicc Hill in the Admiralty Court was contrary to
the weight of the evidence brought hefore him (Greek %ternorial, p'va-
aph 8). Secondly, that by reason of the conduct of the casc by the
go:ownTs advisers, certain material evidence was withheld frorn tlie
Court (Greek Memorial, paragraphs 12 to 17), and third, that the
English Court of Appeal's refusa1of the claimant's application to cal1
new evidcnce or1appeal was contrary to precedent and the practice
of the Court of Appeal (Greek Mcmorial, paragraphs 18 and 19).
I must emphasize that we are not, at this stage, wisliito raise any
consideration for our decision on the ultirnate merits 02 the case.
The United King Bom Gavernmcnt, of course, denics cach and al1 of
the four dlegations that 1 havc just summarized. We have always
denicd them and we shall, ifnecessary, and at a laterstage,show them
to be false. BuaTthe presentstage the truth or falsity of thcse allcgations
is not in issue.For the purpose of our present argument and solely
fox that argument, we shall assume them to be true.
The substance of the fourth question was set out in the United
Kingdom Rejoinder at paragraph 13,and 1respectfully refer the Court
to that paragraph, where we say that the Hellenic Eovernment must,
in aur submission, estahlish tlzat the alleged façts would, if true, con-
çtitute abreach of certain specified provisions of th1886 Lreaty. IVe
are now famjliar with the fact that it isupon Articles T,X, XII and
XV of the 1886 'I'reaty wkich the Hcllenic Government relies, and
Mr. Fitzmaurice has already dealt with the issue of rnost-favoured-
nation treatrnentwhich falls within the scope oArticlc X.She question
which remainç js whetlier the Hellenic Government has discharged,
in respect of thc other three Articles, thburden of proof which they
have fianklÿ accepted that the daim is based on onc or more of them.
Now, what have the Hcllenic Gevernment said about Article I ?
Tliey cited itfor the firsttime in April 1952, in their "Observatz'ons
a~d Conclui;ions".It was briefly referreto by Sir Rartley Shawcross
andMe. Kolin at lastyear's hearings, butit isonly inthe Greek Reply,
and in Me. Rolin's speech on TuesaZay,that we find a vague and insub-
stantjal attempt-but still an attempt-to interpret it ancl toayply
itto the present case.It is said-and 1refer to theGrcek Reply, pasa- "There are many examples, Mr. President, of States havirig
been brought before arbitral tribunal3 in respect of faililre to
carry out obligations binding upon public authnrities by virtue
of private contracts, failtire which has at times becn gross arîd
seriousand such as tu cause clamage to a national ; it is ithese
cil-cumstances, Mr. Preçident, that we subrnlt that since Articles I
and XII guarantee national treatment and rnost-favoured-nation
treatment with regard to the respecting of the rights of Greek
business mcn in England, we are entitled to include within this
category the carrying out of a commercial contract."
1 think that "ArticleXIE" there rnay bea typing error for "ArticleX".
Now what dot:s this mean-failure to fulfil obligationwhich caused
damage to a national ? Now that caimot surely refer to s national
bringilig a clairn against his government in an international tribunal.
What 1:take Me. Rolin to mean is that thcre arecases under municipal
law of a national bringing a daim against his government. That may
be : he has n~t cited any of these many examples, and it rnay well
be that srinlicn is entitled to national treatrnent in that sense. But
it iç not sufficient simply ttosay : "We relon Article 1,or Article XIT,
because af the existence at this practice under municipal law." Hc
must show, or aileast atterngt to show, a failure to grant that national
treatment to ML. Ambatielos. The question which the Hellenic Goocrn-
ment so studiously avoids, whether Rtr.Arnbnticlos received lcss tl-iaii
national treatment in respect of his contract, still waits for an ariswei-.
Now rvhatdo we say that Article1 means ?
Fjrst we have a genesal sentence, which reads :
"There shall be hctween the dominions and possessions of the
two High Contracting Partics reciyrocal frccdom of commerce
and navigation."
There then follow a number of dctailed provisions rvhich cxtcnd over
the succceding articles. Now Artide 1 clocsnot providc for commercial
equality bctiveen British and Greek nationals without somc restriction .
of tlie çuhject-matterThe term "commercc" inthat first sentence rniist,
as we havc said in paragraphs 27-30 of ouy Rejoinder, be iinderstoocl
in the tightof the Treaty as a whole and particularly Articles I to IX.
Further, it mzist be noticed that Article 1 provides for frcedom of
commerce and navigation betmen British and Greek territaries. hrti-
cles 1 ta TX deal essentially with the movement of goods and ships
hetween tlie two countries. This factor of rnovemeilt is stressed in a
definition of the analogous notion of inter-State commerce by thc
United States Supreme Court, that is,commerce hetween and crossing
the froritierof the States cornposing the Union. This definition appears
in the case of laterizationaETexlBook Co@a?zy v. Pigg (217 United
States Reports, p. 106).There the Supreme Court said :
"Importation into onc State from another is thc indispeilsable
ciment, the test,of inter-State commerce ; and every ncgotiation,
trade and dealing hetween citizens of differeilt Statcs which con-
templates and causes such importation, rvhethcr it be of goods,
personç or i~iformation, iç3.transaction of inter-Çtate commerce."
' But even if "commerce" be giveii a wider interpretation iiz A~ticle1
than we contend, the meaning of the whole expression "frecdom of commerce" is not greatly affectcd, for what the first sentence of Article1
grants and protects is the ~igIztto engagc in commerce, the right to
tradc ; it does riotgi~arantee tlic performance by the parties of par-
ticiilar contiacts. Non-performance of a. commercial contract cannot
t3e an interference with the lreedom of commerce, even though tlie
party which fails to pcrform its contract is the Crown. What Article I
says-of commerçial contracts entered into by a Greek iiationnl is that
tic sliall have the same right or c~pacity to cilter into contract under
the law of England rtsa British natiurial-no more, no less. Article 1
of the Sreaty protects thnt right, but it does ilot yrotect the trader
. frum the normal consequences ilrider tfic local law of his cornmercis1
activities. He ha5 the bencfit of the Sreaty, hilt, having cxercised it
and entered into an Englisli contract, he is subject to thc obligations
niid limited to siich remedicç as Bnglish law provides. As'the Article
itselfsays in its last sentence "hc issubject to the laws and scgiilations
in force".
In thc Oscav chi ri?^casc (P.C.I.J.,Series AIE, No. 63, p. 84), the
Coiirt said :
"Preeclom of trade, as established by the Convention of
St.-Germain, consists in the '~igI~t-in yrinciple unrestricted-tu
engage in any cominercial activi ty,"
ailcl tlic Court will be atvarc, of course, that the language of that Conven-
tion wns much \vider thari that which has to be considercd here.
Now, 1 vcrîture to rernind the Court ofthe first allegation.Tt is that
the Cro~vnwas in breacll of thc Contract of Sale of Julv rgrg, anci of
the provisions of the mortgage deeds executcd in 1920. Now, if thesc
breacties werc proved, they could not constittttcviolatioris of ArticleI
of the 1886 Treaty, when properly coiistrued, for the following rcasonç.
ITirst,, the alleged breaches 01 contract and of the mortgngc deeds
carmot of themselves hc violations of that Article for the reasons 1
have already explaincd, and for tlie rcasoti that the Contract of Salc
itnd thc mortgage deeds wcrc creüted under and governed wtiolljr by
English law. Th,e obligations of the Crown under the Treaty are and
~nust be kept wholly distinct fronl Its obligations as a partgrto a private
l~rvcontract :there iç ria provisionof the Treaty relating to commercial
coi-itrnctç by tfieCrown, and the fact that the Crown wa~ a party to
thc instmi~ient does not bring an alleged brcach of tlic coiltract by tlie
Lrorvn under tl-ic 'I'reaty any rnorc than if the parties were private
personç. To argile that it does is to postulate an absiirdity : that the
terrns of thc Treaty are incorporated by implication irrto every commer-
cial contract Irietweeithc Crown and a Greelcnatiantll. Evcn ifthey wre,
thc Greek national still coiilcinot obtain better t1i;in national treatnicnt.
My second point is that thcse allcgcd breaclzes do not involvc any
interference \vit11 the freedom of rnoveinemit of gonds or pcrsons 01.
shipping as u~oulclhc rcquired for n hreach of Article 1.Mr. Ambatielos
ernployed Iiis own agents in London to purchase the skiips and he freely
negotiated the contract of July 1919. What frecdom waç iniringed?
Again, ifT niay go back to the definitioii1 quoted from the decision of
the United States Supi-emeCourt, there was no importation orrnovement
of goods or skips hetweeil British and Gi-eek tcrritories here and no
transaction whidi coiitenîpiated it. Tkcre was a contract for the sale
of ships then iiilder construction in Çhangliai and HongKong ; threeof422 ORAL ARGUMENT OF &Ir.PAWCETT (u.Ic.)-~~ III 53
the ships were imt in British territory at dl and it waç not part of the
contract that any of the ships were to be rnoved to Greece. They were
to trade, and did trade, free of trading restrictions, iothcr parts of the
world. On no possible mcaning ofwords or constxuction of the Article
can the first allegation be made to yieId a breach of it.As tt~the other
three allegations, those connected dth the proceedings in the English
courts, Me. Kolin aclrnits that the terrn "commerce" cannot include
the incidents of the administration of justice ; but he goes on to say
on page Ij of the translation of hisspeech :
"-4rticlesI ancl X of the Treaty which use tlic term 'commcrcial'
cannot, even if commerce is given the broadest sense, inclucle within
thc rneaning of commerce the incidence of the adrninistratioii of
justice. Of course, the United Kingdom is right. The word 'corn-
rnerce' is naturally sornctl~ing apart from the administration of
justice, but what we contend is not that comrnerce includes the
administration of justice, but that the rights wiiich are guarailteed
in commercial matters must clearly ancl particularly include riglits
to the protection of the courts, rights relating to the protection of
cornmerce by the courts."
But what can tliisright oE protection be, other than thc rigkt of
access to the courts covesed by Articlc XV ? It is because they cannot
rely sqiiarejly on tlie provisionofArticle XV that the Hellenic Govern-
ne ntstrive, by fhis obstinate error of classification, to bring denial of
justice under Article 1.
Now let uslook at ArticleXII. We are façed Iiere with the same lack
of explmation by the Hellenic Government of how their allegations
show a breacli of this Article.We find the Article cited for the hrst tirne
in April last year, in the Observations and Conclusi~ns of th? Helleriic
Government, and there are some passing references toit in paragraphs S
and 14 of thc Greek Reply, where it is inextricably confused with thc
other ArticIes relicd on.At laçt, onTuesday, Me. Rolin addreçsed Iiirnself
to the Article and based upon the terrn "obligation", ta be found in
paragsaph 4, a bolcl and ingenions, but 1 am sorry to say, untei-iable
argument ~vhich Mr. Fitzmauricc lias already showil to he entirely
Ialse arid misleading. The Hellenic Governmcnt does not, I think,
nttempl to base itself upon any othcr part of Article XII except thst
word "obligation", so EwilI again here only add two remarks beforc
consig~iingthis Article, I hope, to oblivion. First,Me, Kolin, if1 under-
stand him rightly, appearsto be saying that the referenccsto "commerce"
iii ArticleXII are a refutation of Our intcrpretation of that term in
Articles I to X. But the opposite is the case ; Article XII confirms our
interpretation, for Articles1 to X protect the trader in the rnovement of
ships and goods into the ports and harbours and his dealings with thcrn
thcre (and is itnot significantthat the entry of a vesse1at Southampton
waç the only illustration of Article I which occurred to Sir Hartley
Shawcrosç on page 307 of Iiisspeech ?).Article XII proteçts the trader
in liicommercial or industrialactivities rvithin thc country : paragmph 3
of the Article shows tliat he may, for example, have a shipping office
in London, and thc addition of "industsr" in paragraph 4 iç significant.
Wliy was it necessary if "commerce" liasthe large rneanirig üttributed
Scc Freiicl'texton p. 369. ORAL ARGUNEH'F OF MT. FAWCETT (~.~.)-27 III 53 423
to it by the Hellenic Government, covering any commercial activity
and a11its auxiliary processes ?
My second ~emark is simply to correct what 1 tliink may he a mis-
understanding of our argument by Ale. RoIin. He says on page 15 ' of
his speech that we try to limit thc term "obligations" to "fiscal obliga-
tions" by applying the cjusdem generis rule. But this is not how we
apply the rule here, as paragraph 45 of our Kejoinder shows. \VE are
saying here wliat wesay of al1the conditions,restrictions and obligations
referred to in theTrenty. They are conditions,and so on, kaving general
application ui-ider the local law.They are generic concepts, not tcrrns
used to descrjbc particular acts and particular incidents.
T now corne to Article XV. This was firstinvoked in the note of
Novemher 1939 (Greck Memonal, pagc 96), wherc it is çaid that the
alleged disregard, in Mr. Ambatielos's case, of the riiles of procedure
iii thEnglish courts as tofulldiscovery of docuineiitsand the admission
of fresh evidence irifringed his rigfits of defence contrary to ArtiXV.
Again, in paragraph S of the Greek Reply, itis said that Article XV
~iarantees national trcatment in regard to access to the courts "in
an entircly general waÿ" (1quote these words). Now wliatever Articlc XV
says or rneans, it is not cntirely general,It is on tlie face of it quite
clearly limited. What is general is the argument in paragraphs 16-18
of the Greek Reply, for it is quite impossible to see whether or not
Article XV is heing pleaded :thecases cited in paragrapl~ r8refer soleIy
to breaches of international law and paragral-ih 17 seems to rest on
(1 quote) : "the provisions of international law guaranteeing the treat-
mcnt of foreigners". This kind of obscurity and ~7aguenesscharacterizes
al1 the Greek Pleadings in the case on tlic cnicial issues.Ifwc turi1
for enlightcnmeiit to Me. Rolin's speech,we find an interpretation of
free access, wliich1 shall qiiote ina moment ; but he goes on in tlzat
passage, I am sorry to Say, to enter into the n~erits: he not only sets
out a izumber of facts alleged by tlic Rellenic Government as to the
production of witnesscs and documents in the Admiralty Court-and
this he is of course ftilly cntitled to (10-but he gives an incornplete
account of aur answers to these allegations of füct and then siiggests,
or tends to suggest, that the supposed inadequacy of our answer is
an argtirnent in favour of the applicability ofArticle XV. Now to this
entry into the merits we muçt take objection, but wc do not wish to
engage with Me. Rolin in a dispute about them hcre. But what is
Me. Rolin's interpretation of "free access" ? As usual it is wide-an
elaborate gIoss on what is really a perfectly simple concept. Re Sap:
"The fretacccss referred tois one which rnust be unaccompanied
by restrictions or taxes beyond those imposed on native subjects,
and these prohibited restrictions may be of different kinds :they
rnay intervene in the course of the proceedings, or before the
proceeding ; they may be restrictions imposed by law or they
may result from acts of court: orof thc government-if the latter
is ayarty to the proceedings ; or,as in tlie present case, frorn both
at once, from the actsof the exccutive authority and of thejudicial
authority. We are therefore entitlcd to invoke Article XV, para-
graph 3, as we invoked the other provisions as a basis for the actç
we cornplain of."
l Sce French tcxt on p. 370.424 ORAL ARGUMENT .OFRIT.FAWCETT (u.K.)-z~ III 53
Again, and this is alone concIusive against the applicability of Arti-
cle XV, thcre isnot an atom of proof, indeed no attempt even to prove,
that any conditîori or restriction was inlposed on hlr. Ambatielos other
than those irnposed on British national5 litigating inthe Engliçh courts.
In the latter part 05 the passage I havc qiioted, we hear nothing of
national treatment ; nothi~ig of discrimination against Mr. Ambatielos.
What werc tliese restrictions imposed on &Ir. Ambatielos-prohibited
because they were not imposed on British subjects ? How were they
imposed, aild wkat authorjties imposed them? You, Members of the
Court, and we are Ieft to giiess. Unless one of thefour main sllegations
show that, if the facts alleged were tme-a prohibited restriction was
imposecl on Mr. Arnbatielos-the claim cannot be based on Article XV.
1-Iow,Mr. President, arc we to interyret Article XV, yaragraph 3 ?
1 will, if I may, juçt read il: to you :
"TIie subjects of each of the two Contracting Parties in the
cEominions and possesslo~s of the other sha'L1I-iave free access to
the courts of justice for the prosecution and defence of their
rights, without ot'tiercanditions, restrictions or taxes beyond
. those imposed on native subjects, and shall like thern be at liberty
to employ in a11 causes their advocates, attorncys or agents,
from among the persons admitted to the exercise of tliose profes-
sions according to the laws of the country."
The rneanirig of "access" is, 1 hope to sliow, plain ; but tliere issomc
difficulty in construing the word "frce", though there Gan he little
doubt about what is ,the right answer, alid I tliink the difkulty is
perhaps largely a verbal one. The difficulty is this :.that it may, on
the one hand, be said thüt the paragraph establishe'; thc principle
of free access to the courts and that the reference to other conditions,
restrictions or taxcs is an addi.tiona1 safeguard for subjects of the
Contracting Parties ; or on the other hnnd it may be said tbat the
clause "withoiit other conditions, restrictions or taxes beyond thosc
imposed on native subjects" in fact explains and givcs its proper
meaning to the word "free". Tn other svords, on tliis second inter-
pretation, we woulcl read it thus : "access rnust be free, that isto Say,
without sny of the conditions or restrictions specified". Now of these
twa iriterl-iretation1 think the first would bc alrnost self-contradictory,
for the phrase "other.conditions", etc., irnpliesthat actes is already
çul)jectto svme conditions, as it rnust be, narnely those itnposcd on
natioilüls, and if that is so access to the courts cannot bc absolutely
free. The word "frcc" tlierefore cailnot be read in ari absolute sense,
but mwt be read according to the second interpretation as meaniiig
tliataccess to the courts for an alien must be as free as for a native
subject-that is to say, hisaccess may not be subjected to conditions,
restrictions or taxes not imposed on native subjects. There are a
nurnber of repotted cases in wlzich thiçview of free accesç was adopted.
They dcalt with the question of thc scope of thc free access clause
and whethei ithad wide in~plications ; for example, whether if ilnplied
imrntinity for a foi-cignet fi-om the normal obligation to give security
for casts. My hrvt case isfrom the Anlzzsal Digest of PabLic Inter-
nationai Law Casas, 1919-1922, Casc No. 170. There, ilrticle 277 of
the 'rreaty of Versailleswüs under iritei-pi-etation. This provided that
subjects and citizeris ofthe Allied and Associated Powers sh~uld have OKALARGUMENT OF MR. FAWÇETT (u.K.}-27 III 53
425
(1 quote) "fsee accessto Gerrnan courts". Iilterpretiilg this, thGcrrnan
Reichsgericht in civil matters, in a decisi011 gven oiî March ~Stli,
1922, said (1 quote) :
"-fie precise temç of Article 277 referring to free access to
the Germari courts do not admit of an extensive interpretation."
1 Again, in the'same Digest, rgzg-1930, Case .o. 162 concerning the
intcrpretation of the free accessclause, Article TV of the Uiiited Ring-
dom-Austrian 1reaty oi 1924. The Amtrian Supreme Court in civil
rnatters held there that tlacordcr to deposit security for costs could
not be reprded as a limitation of the frec access to the courts of
justice. Again, the Çourt of Appeal of Karlsruhe, interpreting the
free acccss clause of a Gerrnan-Yugoslav Tredty, held, in a decision
on January 14th, r93r, that frcedorn from seçurity for costs wtas a
special privilege .wl~ichrnust: be expressly stipulstecl-that is taken
from the Digest of 1931and 1932, Case No. 143. 1 would also draw
attention to a similar frnding of the SW~SS Federal Tribunal given on
July rzth, 1934, Case 726 iri the Digest for 1433 and 1934, in the
coursc of which itsaid that the plairitiffs iii the case could iiot rely
on (1:quotc) :
"....the so-callecl free acçess clause of the Sruiss-United States
Treaty of 1850 w11icl.ihas a precise and limited meailing".
These cases show that the free açcess clause rneanç no more than it
says and that it:cannot properly be interyreted as conferring wider,
more general or more extensive rigfits or indeedany special rights in
regard to the treatment of the person concer~ied before the courts,
once he is given ëccess to them. If the clause dues ncit evelz confer
on forcigners exemption frorn the obligation to give security for costs,
which tnight well be regardcd as being in a selise arr irnpediment to
freedom of access, itobviously can confer rio express rights as to the
coricluctof the litigation,tlze bcEiaviour of the Court, the evidence
tu be procluced, or the actions of thc other party to the litigation.
These are rights going wholly beyond the scope of an access clause.
These rights are derived frarn tIie local law-they çannot depend
upon Article XV or indeed upon the Treaty at dl.
The Treaty grants free access and this the clairnant had, and there
is really alrnost a touch of cynlcism in suggesting that a defendant
has been dcnicd frrie access. But his substantive rights were a ~natter
exclusively of English larv. Now this iizterpretation of Article XV,
paragraph 3, is strongly supported by a decision of the United States
Supremc Court, Maioram v. Baltimore and Ohio Rail~oad Com,$any
(~gd), 213, Unitcd States Reports, page 265, and if you \vilhear with
me, Mr. Presidcnt,1will lay this case before the Court as compendioiislÿ
as I can. In this case the plaintiff's husband had been killed whilc
travelling on one of the defendant company's trains in the State of
Pennsylvania. Suits for damages for death, brought by a relative of
the deceaed, were allowed by an Act of the State legslature af April
1851~ but the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania had held
thatnon-resident aliens,cven though they were relatives of the deceased,
could not sue undcr thc Act. Now thls interprctstion of an Act ofa
State legiçlatureby the Supreme Coiirt of thcStatc was binding upon
the United States Çuyreme Court. The plaintiff tl~erefore relied for426 OEAI. ARGUMENT 01;MT. 17AWCBTT (u.K.)-27 11153
her appeal to tlic Supreme Court, and below, upon the United States-
Italy Treaty of 1871, and particularly ArticIe 23, which I will read.
Article 23 said :
"The citizens of eitker party shdl have free acces to the courts
ofjustice, in order to maintain and defcnd their own rights, without
any other conditions, restrictions or taxeshan such as are imposed
upon the natives ...."
1 will read no further, because the remaindcs of the Article gave certain
anciliary ~ights to litigants, rather sirnilar to the Article with which
we are delzling, but itwill be seen at once that that Articlc was really
aIrnost identical with Articlc XV. Now the plaintiff argued ttiat the
rule of law in the State of Pennsylvania, which excluded her as a non-
resident alien from bringing suit under the Act of 1851, constitutcd
a denial of free access under Article 23 of the fieaty. But the United
States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the argument, and Mr. Jus-
tice Moody, grring the judggment of the Court, said :
"This Article does net dehe substantive riglits, but leaves thern
tobe ascertained by the law governing the courts and administered
and enforced by thern."
That is the end of the quotation from tllis judgment.
The widow had a right ofaccess and exercised it up to the Suprerne
Caurt, but her daim was unenforceable under the local law. In short,
she had no right of action and she conld not be giveii one by the Treaty.
Thc Treaty did give her the right to have the question whether she
had a riglit of action detemined, but no more. Such was the interprc-
tation of the Treaty language by the Supreme Court of the Urlited
States, and it is, in our respectful submission, correct, ask the Court
to consider its full effect. The State Court of Pennsylvania had ruled ~
that relatives of the deceaçe.d, who were nori-resident aliens, cauld not
sue for damages for the death. On the face of it, this might seem to be
a denial of access, even a denial of justice, and this iç exactlwliat the
plsintiff argued. But observe that çhc dld have the right to asguc it;
she had access to the courts rightup tothe Supreme Court to determine
this very question whether the Treaty overrode tlic local law of Penn-
sylvania. The Supreme Court is saying ineffect that "free access"under
the Treaty had been satisfied by allowing her to go to the courts to
have lier rights under the local law deterrnined : but if the local law
says she has no rights in the matter, that is not a denial of free access.
This case affords anothet striking confinnation of the limited inter-
pretatian which the courts have placeci upon the free access clauscs
in treaties, and also of the fact that there is a cIear distinction to be
made ancl maintained between treaty rights which are general in char-
açter and particular rights arising under the local law. A meaning must
not he given to a treaty clause suchas Article XV, 3, which can override
the locallaw, if a fair and effective meaning cnn be found for it, which
isconsistent witk the local law. This interpretation takes furtlier strengt-tfi
from the fact that Article XV is based on ilational treatment. Greek
nationals are sot to have special privileges, a special rkgime: they are
to be governed like nationals by Englisli law. The HeHenic Government
have, of coursc, made its three allegations, but they do not allege thtlt
what was dorie in the courts was done because Mr, Ambatielos was DRAL ARGUMENT OF MT. FAWCETT (u.K.)-27 II1 53
427
an alien, and without thiç the allegations must,. iiiour subrnissian,
fail whoHyto be based on Article XV.
Tu sunl up what 1 have çaid about the atternpt of the Hellenic
Government to base the claim on Articles 1, XII and XV of the 1886
'rreaty, I will say this: it has not discharged the burden of proof it
accepted-in fact, in some respects it has made 110 serious attempt
to do so. On al1 the Articles the pIeading iç imprecise and obscure.
Me.Rolin, with his peat ability, haç woven some very skilful arabesques,
in which he hopeç weshall become entangled, but on the issue of national
treatment under al1three Articles-1, XII and XV-we have from the
Hcllenic Government silence. By dark allusions and half-statements
tkey hope to create an atmosphereof guilt around the United Kingdom ;
they hope the Court will say, even if it cannot see clearly through the
circumambient srnoke of the Greek pleadings : "Thcre must be fire
here-let us order arbitration." But we believe that the Court will not
be diverted fronl its task of the interpretation of the Treaty and that
it will, in giving its decision, look for the coherent and adequatc inter-
yretation of tlie Articles upon which the Hellenic Government says
it relies.
Mr. President, Members of the Court. Me. Rolin has invited us to
addreçs you on the issue of the exhaustion of local reniedies. He raised
the question in his spccch whether jt iç proper tcr deal with this issue
at this stage and he takes the view-if 1 understand hirn rightly-
that it is propes to go into it,and he has, in fact, as 1 say, invited us
to do 30. We agree that it is inorder and, for our part, for the following
reason :that the international responsibility of a State is not to be
taken as engaged in a mattcr such as this which arnounts, on tlzeGreek
case, substantially to a plea of denial of justice, unless and until the
claimant has eshausted alihis local rcmedies up to the highest court.
This plea has always heen on our pleadings-and 1 wauld refer the
Court to Our Countex-Mernorial, paragraphs 77-79, and our Rejoinder,
paragraphs 54-$-and with your perrnissiotî, Mr. I'resident, 1 will
now try to ded with it. But 1 shall not attcmpt to go into any exami-
nation of the merits, the ultirnate merits, ofthe case. 1 shallproceed
now, aç we have already done, in arguing that the daim was not based
on the 1886 Trcaty. I sliall take the four aliegationsI set out and I
çhall assume, simply for the purposes of the argument, that they are
tme in fact. Now tve say that Mr. Amhatielos had effective remedies
çtilavailable to him in the English courts for thc injury he says that
he suffercd,and that liedid not exhaiist those remedies. In other words,
we say that thcrc were certain issues of law raised before this Court
which werc substantially decided in the Adrniralty Court and the
Court of Appeal and which were apyealable to thc House of Lords
and that successful appcal to the House of Lords woulcl have led to
an ultimate reversal of the Adrniralty Court's decision. Now I will
recali that the decision of the Admiralty Court was given in January
1923. Mr. Arnbatielos entered an appeal against it, but pe~îdingthat
appeal he applied to the Court of Appeal for an order dlowing hirn
to adduce the so-called "new" evidence at the hcaring of his appcal.
The Coirrt of Appcal refused this application and Mr. Ambatielos did
not procccd with his appeal from the Admiralty Coirrt. We have then
two sets of factç to consider: first,that he did not pursuc his appeal
from the Admiralty Court ta tlie Court of Aypeal, and second, that hc ORAL AKGUMENT 01:fillr. I;AWCELT(~.~.)-27 III53
428
did not appeal to the highest court, the House of Lords, agaiiist the
Court of Appeal's refuçal of his application to adduce i?ew evidence.
Now it is plah that in respect of the second allegation, that is, tliat
Mr. Jiistice Hill'sdecision in thc Admiralty Court was contrary to
the weight of the evidence before him, there was in fact no cxliaustion
of the local re~nedies available to the claimant, £or no appeal was
brought from the decision of the Admiralty Court and such an appeal
would inevitably have raiscd the issues set out in the firçt allegation
-of bseachcs by the Crown of certain obligations arising iinder English
law. The appeal from the Admiralty Court's decision, wkich was in
fact lodged, was never pursued, and the Hellenic Eavernment has bccrî
at great pains,110thin the diplornatic correspondence and in its plead-
ings, to show why that appeal was not pursued. 13ut it îs moçt
important to notice that this allcgation, that the Admiralty Court's
decision waç against the weight of the evidence, has nothing whatever
to do with the third allegation that materid evidence was withhcld
frorn the Court, for what the second allegation aniouiits to is this:
tliat the evlderice that was before the Court-and that excludes
ex hypothesi the evidence which the Hellenic Govemrnent says \vas
suppressed by the Crown-was byitself so much in favour of Mr.Amba-
tielos tkat the Court was wrong in face of itin reaching a deçisicrn
against. him. Now, if this were true (and we are,for the purpoçe of thc
argument, to suppose that it was tnie),appeal cozcldand should have
been braught againçt the Admiralty's Court's decision rtsitstood, and
no claim can be made to this Court in respect of it, failing suchappeal.
The Helienic Govemrnent has argued that no appeal wns brougkt to
the Court of Apped againçt the Admiralty Court's decisiori, because
such appeal waç rendered useless by the Court of Appeal's refusal to
bear new evidence. But this argument, as 1 have shown, isfallacious
on this allegation, bccause the Hellenic Government's case oi~ that
allegatian is that, even without the new evideiice, a decisiorî in
Mr. Ambatielos's favour should have been reached in the Admiralty
Coiirt.Le second allegation cannot, therefore, in our submission, show
a breach of the Treaty or a denial of justice, even if itwere true, for 1
itis barred by tlie rule asto thc cxhaustion oilocal rernedies.
If we now turn to the remaining allegations, we firzd tlzat'tlifirst
allegation of breaches by the Crown of its obligations under English
law, and the third allegation, that by rcason of the conduct of the case
by the Çrown, rnaterial evidence was withheld from the Adrniralty
Court, are, asfar as concerns the exhaustion of local remeclies, covered
by the foiirth allegation, that the Court of Apyeal, in refiising the
clairnalit's application tobring new evidence, acted against precedent
and its own yrevious practice. This last allegation covers the otkers iri
this seiise, that, if the Court ofAppeal had decided to admit the new
evidence, or, alternatively, if the claimant had appealed successfully
tu the I-Iouse of Lords against the Court of Appeal's refusal, then tIic
obstacles which the clairnant and the Hellenic Govcrnment say were
put iniiis way i11gettting justice itlie Englislzcourts would have been
removed.
Now let me just read a paragrapli from the Hellenic Government"~
note ofthc 30th May 1934 : that is on page 76 of the Greck Mernorial.
In this note to the British Governrnent, the writer says: QR.%LARGUMENT Of MuIT.FAWCETT (u.K.)-z~ III53 429
"My Governmeiît (that is, the Hellenic Government) considers
that ifit can now be proved tllat in fact there was a contract to
deliver the ships on dates certain, then therc lias heen a substantial
miscarsiagc of justice which justifies the present claim, not only
a5 a matter of international law, but also on grounds of natural
justice and equity.If the real factsarc, and .ican now Beproved"-
and 1 ask the Court tu mark those words-"that fixed dates were
given to Mr. Arnbstielos as a matter of contract, that he b~ught
the ships at the price named because of that undertaking and
would not have so bougkt them rvithout it, then surely he has
suffcred a wrong which ought to be righted and for which his
Government, injured in his person, is hoth entitled and bound to
ohtain redress."
Iwill nat weary tlie Court with reading the paragraylis which follow,
but they show clcarly that when the Hellenic Government say they
can now prove the real facts, they are referring to the famozis Laing-
Maclay letters. They say that those letters prave thek case. Now that
in itselfis s complete answer to a suggestion we heard at length from
Me. Rolin, that the Crown suppressed highly material, officiaisfiles.
Here, the Hellenic Government says, our case is proved by these two
letters and, of course, these two letters-and posçibly thc tcsfimony
of their writers-was the only evidence applied for before the Court
of Appeal. 1 do not want tosay more about those references of Me. Rolin
ta the offificfiles, but I think that this demonstrates that that isa
cornpletely ernpty charge. MT. Ambatielos applied to put thcsc two
letters in eviderice to the Court of -4ppeal and that application was
refused. Now, it is quite plain upon the paragraph I have read that in
the HelIclîic Government's view those letters were vital-they proved
their case. Ithis new evidence, they say, could have been brought before
the Court of Appeal, at the hearing of the Claimant's appeal from the
Admiralty Court's decision-and I would remind the Court that al1
appeals to the English Court of Appeal are by way of re-lzearing-then
his case would have bceri transformed. Without it there had been a
substantial miscarriage of justice, but they argue that, in the light of
this so-called "ncw" evidence, it would have become manifest to the
Court of Appcal that the Contract of Sale didprovide for fixed delivery
dates, as the Clairnant maintained, and the Court of Appeal must have
reversed the decision of the Admiralty Court on that question. To bring
about this result, it was therefote essential for the Claimant to appeal
to the Rouse of Lords against the sefusal of the Court of Appeal to
adtnit the so-called "new" evidcnce.
Now, Mr. President, before I coine to the Hellenic Government's
explanation of ali thiç, I would like to say shortly once more whnt
the position was. The hdrniralty Court had given a decision ngainst
Mr. Ambatielos Qn the issue of the breach of Contract of Sale by the
Crown and the alleged breach of the mortgage decds. It had also dealt
with other issues,but those are not matenal at the moment.
Now the Hellcnic Govemrnent's case is that tliesc two letters to
whiçh 1 have referred, and perhaps the testimony of theirwriters, was
vital, inthat it would have proved that the Admiralty Court's decision
on these two points were wrong. The fact that they did not have-and
this is theicase-access to those lctters or that testimony at the trial,meant that they must get them in on appeal if they were to reverse
the Admisalty Court's decision. The Court af Appeal refused that ;
thereforetippeal on the rneritç wasin their vicw useless. We say that
from that refusal of the application of the Court of Appeal to admit
that so-calied "ncw" evidence, they could have appealed to the highest
court, the House of Lorcls.
Now they answer this in a numher of ways. They suggest that appeal
to the House of Lords on apoint of procedure was not permitted under
English practice, or that the House of Lords would not interfere with
what arasan exercise ofdiscretion by the Court of Appeal. Alternatively,
they Say,appeal ma havc been possible, but itwould have been futile.
Thus, on page 73 or the Greek Mernorial, we find it said :
"Mr. Ambatielos could not, under English law and practice,
have taken any appeal from the refusal of the Court of Appeal
to admit the new evidence."
Again, at page 303 of his speech, Sir Rartley Shawcross said :
"It was said byrny leamed friend that Mr. Arnbatielos had not.
exhausted all his legal remedies before the municipal courts of
England, that he rnight have appeded stlll furthcr, to the House
of Lords,and thatthat supreme Court of Appeal rnight havc allowed
him tocal1 thiçadditional evidence. But that really isnot so. The
decisior1of rhe: Court of Appeal in England was in relationto a
matter of proceduse and it involved the cxercise of n discretion by
thc Court of Appeal which thc House of Lords would not upset."
Now I wauld ask the Court to observe tliat Sir Nartley Shawcross's
words were somewhat guarded, for he says wl~atis,in effect, his opinion
that the House of Lords would not havc upset the decision of the Court
of Appeal : he does not say, and in our s~ihtnission could not say, that
the House of Lords could not upset. that decision. There might have
been many reaçons why the House of Lords would not have upset it,
and, of course, on our case, they would not, but tfiat is not the point
hexe. Biit1 willstateOurrensons quité sliortly in answer to thcse vanous
ways in wliich the Hellenic Govern~nent çays that no further appeal
was possible.
First, thcre is the statutory basis of apyeal to the House of Lords
to which we have referred in our Counter-hlemorial, paragraph 78, and
1 will just, ifI may, read that again.
''As regcardsthe dccisionof the Court of Appeal refusing tu admit
new witnesses, no reason appcars wtiy the Claimaiit should not
have appealed again to the highest Court, the House of Lords.
Thc Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, Section 3, provides :
'Subject as in thisAct rnentioncd, an appeal sliall Lie tthe
House of Lords £romany order of judgment of any of the Courts
following, that is to say (1) of Her hfajesty's Courts of Appeal
i~iEngland ....'
This right isnot qualifiedin thc Act itçelf, Fiirther, iwrts not
necessary in such a casein 1923 to obtain lerivefor appeal to the
Hoiisc of Lords, nor was this decision ofthe Court of Appeal in the
cias of deciçions by tliat Court declarcd to be final by statute." ORAL ARGUAIENT OF Bfi.17AWCETT (u.K.)-z~ 11153
431
That is what we said in our Counter-Mernorial.
And our second point is that the refusal of the Court of Appeal of
Mr. Ambatielos's application to cal1 new evidence was a decision or
order on a procedural matter-that, I think, we must concede. But
there was judicial. precedent foradecision on questions of the admission
of new evidence and, indeed, it is the whole of the HeZlenic Govern-
ment's case that it was precisely a deviation from its previous practice
and preccdent that rendered the Court of Appeal's decisirin wrong.
There was judicial precedent on the question and so,in so far a~ it
was an excsciseof discretion,it was a jiidicial discretionand whether
it was exercised judicially must be a question of law.
My third point is that the Houe of T,ords has itself declared that
it Iscompetent to hear appeals in procedural matters, and I will refer
there to the case of Blair v. Haycock CrableCo., 19x7, reported in
34 Timcç Law Kcports at page 39. The House of Lords did express
tkere the view, and 1 think for obvious reasonç, that appeals in proce-
dural matters should be regarded as exceptional, and, 1may add, the
fact that appeal on such matters must be long and costly and does
not decide the substance of a case, makes itsexceptional character clear.
1 need hardly say that that decisiop is binding not only on the other
courts of England but on the House of Lords itself.1 will now turn
to the sccond part of the test of the çuffiuency of local remcdies. The
first part T hope 1 have established ; that appeal was available. The
second part of the rule 1 believe 1 shall state correctly when 1 Say
that recourse to a higher court canonly be regarded as futile where
these are appealable points of law but they are obviously insuficient
to reverse the decision of the Court below. Now the test in the present
case is Zhis.It having been shown that there waç a point of Iaw upon
which the Claimant might have appealed and could have appealed
from the Court of Appeal to tlie House of Lords, would it have been
sufficiciltto hring abolit a reversa1 of the decision oiithe merits in
the Adrniralty Court ? In other words, if the House of Lords had on
appeal reversed the order of the Court of Appeal and directed that
the $0-called new evidencc be admittcd, could that have reçulted in
a rcversal of the Admiralty Court's decision 7 It isplainly not enough
to stlow that appeal to the House of Lords wx futile mercly because
it was not likely to succeed. lt miglit have been unlikely to succeed
for one of two reasons : either becausc the so-called new evidence
was not in fact of such a nature as to make any important difference
to thc deciçionof the English courts in the case, or because the evidencc
was not in fact new at al1but had already been prescnted in substance
to the Admiralty Court. New, 1 shallnot açk the Court here to consider
which of these is the proper reason for thinking, as we think and
apparently the Claimant thought, that appeal to the House of Lords
would have failed, for this would be to enter unduly into the merits
of the case. But ivhat I stress and what 1 ask the Court to hold is
that insuficiency or futility of appeal tothe House of Lords for either
of these rcasons is not insufficiency within the meaning of the rule
that a Claimant is not rcquired to exhaust local remedies whcre those
arc insufficient or futile.1 need hardly add that the Crown cannot
be hcld internationally responsible because Mr. Ambatielos was reluctant
or unable ta meet the çosts of further appeal. Let us apply then the
trzietest to the facts alleged in the Rellenic Govcrnment's pleadings.432 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BIT. FAiYCETT (u.K.)-27 III53
The Hellenic Government's case is that the so-called new evidence
which the Court of Appeal refuse to admit was vital to the CIairnarit's
case ; and it is said that it was for tliisreason that tlle Claimant did
not pursue his iipyeal from the Adrniralty Court. It was, ttiey say,
evidencc such that, if brought before tlie Court, it woiild alrnost
certainly xesrilt in a revcssal of the Adtniraltÿ Court's decision. Now
this so-called nerv evidence, namely, thc letters exchangeci betweetî
Major Laing aiid Sir 'Joseph Maclay, were not iri the possession or
control. of the Crowri but in the Claimant's hands at the time of his
application to tlic Court of Appcal ; tlierefore, even if we assumc to
be correct the Hcllenic Governmcnt's allegation that the Crown was
instrumental iri preventing these letters from king laid before the
Adrniralty Court, thcre was nothing, either in the form of Crowri
privilcge or any othcr supposed right of the Crown, to prevent the
Court of Appeal or subseyuently, on appeal, the House of Lords, from
ordcring the production of those lctters. If thiç was so,then this was
a case for appeal to the Housc of Lords falliiîg exactly withiri the
exceptiaiial cascs to which 1 have referred. If the Hellenic Govern-
ment's allegations are correct, tlien upon their own showing-and 1
hoye that 1 have not relied on any statemctlt or allegation which is
not to be found at some place in the Hellenic Governmcnt's pleadings
-the Clairnant tias failecto eshaust his Iocal remedics. He failed to
have recourse to the highest court on a point whiclt was appealable
and wlzich, upon the Hellenic Government's showiiîg, was substantial
and indeed conclusive. Wlrat the Hcllenic Governmerit are, therefore,
in effect trllng to do isto substitute appeal to this Court for appeal
that shotlld and çould have been brought in the English courts thirty
years ago.
Now, with your permission, Mr. President, 1 would like to put a
yuestiort to Sir Frank Soskice. The Hellerîiç Gor-ernmerit's case, as
T have tried tu show, and I liope fiiirly, is that tlCourt of Appeal's
decision >VAS against precedent, it was against itsprcvinus yractice
on these questions of the admiçsiori of new evidence. It was either
a lepl errur or it was a wrongful exercise of judicial discrction ; it
may be put foward in a number of waÿs. Now what wc would like
to ask Sir Frank Soskice is tliis : are the Hellenic Governmerit really
saying that if the Court oi Appeal in Erigland had been guilty of
either legal error or a wroiig exetcise of judicial discretioii, are they
really sayirig that Mr. Ambatielos could not have appealed to the
House of Lords or that, if he hsd appealed, the Housc of Lords rvould
not have heard it ?
Mr. President, we ask the Court to hold that the Claimalit failed
to exhaust the local remedies available to hiin in England in 1923
and tohold that that failure bars the Helleilic Government'scIairnhere.
1 willnow turn briefly to an equitable corisideration which catlnot
1 think be exclucled from this case. That isthe delay in the reference
of the claim to this Court and its manner. The present reference to
the Court rcsts wholly 011the 1886 Treaty. The Hellenic Governrncnt
waited sixteen years without refeming to the Treaty at all, thouglz it
was, of course, well known to it ; and over twenty-fauc years before
bringing the Trcaty issue to the Court. We concedc that there is 110
procedural limitation of actions beforc thisCourt under internatiotial
1ar-vor itsstntute. Nor do wc say that after some particiilnr lapseof time, say twelity or thitty years, a clnim here is barred. But there
are cases, of which the present 'case isonc, in whidl the Court should
refuse to grant relief on grounds of delay, and-what is more-abuse
of ProcesS.
The reaçon why the is no fixed ruleof prescription in internation?
law kas been explained in Pomcroy, Lecttires onI?zternationalLaw zrz
Tim~ ofPtace (r8S6),pages 126-129, in the following way. Tlie riotion
of prescription in private law rests upon the presence of "requisite
judicial means and instruments for asserting a claim*' and failure to
usc theçe causes prescription to operate: there is no such rule in
international law sincc there is no cornpulsory judicial process and
war is the only remedy. This principle no longer can apply after the
cstablishmei~t of an International Court with cornpulsory juriçdiclipn.
Many ofthe older authorities on this matter relate to the presentation
of diplonlatic claims and not to judicial settlcment. Further, there
have becn cases of voluntary references of cases to arbitration where
tlze plea of prescription has obviously been waived. I believe that
neither this Court nor its predecessor have had to consider the question
of delay and abuse of process in reference of a matter to tkern. We
therefore ask the Court to make a mling on it as a matter prim
z~~~essio~~is.
The principle which in our subrnisçion the Court sliould apply here
is statedin Wharton Diges III, page 972, where he says :
"While international proceedings for redreçs are not bound by
thc letter of specific statuteof limitation, they are subject to the
same presumptions, as to payment or abandonment, as those on
which statutes of limitation are based. A government cannot any
more rightfully press against a foreigner or State a claim which
tlie party holding declined to press when the evidence was fresh
than it can permit such claims to he the subject of perpctual litiga-
tion among its citizens."
In our submission, the delay of the Hellenic Government in referring
the claim riilder the1886 Treaty to tliis Court raises a presumptionnot
only of defence for the United Kingdom but co~nplete lackof seriousness
in the clairnA .sMe. Rolin claimcd on Monday, the 1886 Treaty was in
full effect in 1923 and the Hellenic Government wcre of course aware of
it. The fact that they did not havc recourse to it in the first placeor
indeed at any time during the diplornatic exchanges of notes until1939
demonstrates, in our snbmission, that the Hellenic Government never
scriously supposed that aily clah could bc based on the 1886 Treaty,
but they oilly rcsorted to it as a tortuous procedural device forgetting
the clairn before tliis Court. The diplornatic notearealso marked by an
inconsistency and shifting of ground wlienever particular arguments
were decisively met by tlle United Kingdom Government. Again, the
delay prevents this Court or any arbitral tribunal that may be set up
from doing justice since the principal witnesses are dead whom the
tribunal could and should have heard give evidence which is said to be
vital to the merits of the Hellenic Government's case.
In fact, the delay and laçk of seriousness are sucIi as to make the
present refercnçe an abusc of the Court's prncess, luid we ask the Court,
which is not a temporary international arbitral body but a permanent
and Iong-established court of law, to observe the genesal rule i~lerest
rei public& ztisitfi& Iiiiwîa. 4, REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE
(COUNSEL FOR THE HELLENIC GOVERNMEUT)
AT THE PUBLIC SITTING OF MAHCH 28tl1, 1953
hilrPreçident and Members of the Court :
Aftcr acomparatively lengthy hearing a£ what isreallya preliminary
issue, it quite ohviously behoves çounsel to pay specjal attentron to
what yciu ÿesterday said,Mr. President, when jrou expressed the wish
that we should confine ourselves now to our final concliisionsItis always
the vice. of an advocate to be tempted to repeat what has been said
before, and 1 110\5~in making the reply on behalf of the Gseek Govern-
ment, will do Iny best to avoid nere repetition. With issues as subt1e as
those ~whidi at present occupy tlie Court, it is not alwayeasy toavoid
travcrsing some of the ground which lias already been covered.
Mr.President atid Members of the Court, right at the very outsetof the
debate upon which the Court isat present engaged, there is, in the
subrnission which 1 present to you, somcthing fundamental to your
decision. UJe have spent several days arguing matters wlîich, if thc
submission wkiich 1 now desise to rnakc and which Mc. Rolin has made
alrcady is correct,are irrelevant at the present stage.ML. Fitzmaurice
and ML. Faivcett have addreççed argumenis to yoti whick no doubt
will be xnostimportant when and if an arbitrator is callcd upon to deal
witli tbis matter, but in the submission that 1makc, those matters at
this stage are wholly irrelevant and do not toiiçtupon tlie matter with
which the Court is at the moment concerned.
Now, Mr. President and Members of the Court, wkat Es that funda-
mental matter ? 'That fundamental mntter is what Is the meaning tu
be attrihuted to thc word "based". May 1 saj7 atonce what 1 subrnit is
the meariing urhich the Court ought to attribute to that word ? In my
submission, the word " based" means "invoked". After all, what is the
Court now dealing with ? 1 would be grateftil if the Court woulrl be so
kind as to turn topage 65 of the Greek Mernorial, where the Declaration
upon which the wl~olematter hinges is set out. It içrny desire at this
stage in the outset of rny address to invitc the Court to look very
closely at the actiial wording of theDeclaration to the Treaty of 1926,
because it is upon the actilal wording thatthe question which you now
have to deçide depends. May 1, at the nsk of trespassing upon your
tirnc,aslryou to look very closely at that wording, It is at the bottom
of page Eij :
"It Is welEunderçtood that the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion bctween Great Britain and Greece of to-day" date does not
prejudiceH-rroxv, does not prejudice what ?-"does not prejudice
claillas"-that isto say, pretensions, arguments, siibrnissionç-"on
behalf of private persons based oii thc provisions of ttlc Anglo-
Greek Commercial Tteaty of ~856. .." May 1 pause there, at that firsthalf of the Declaration. You arc here
considering claimç. What is there contemplated is that one governrnerit
has advanced a cldm ; it has sdid, for certain reasons : "1, the Greek
Governmcnt, am entitled to certain relief against you, the United King-
dom Government." Nothing has yel been established, one is not talking
about a proved case ;we are still at the time when one govesnment
avers thatit is entitled to certainrelieand the othcr government denies
that itçarguments are correct orthat it is entitleto that relief.
Now that isfundamental. When you ask of a clairn, on what is it
based, in what sense can you use the word "based" ? There isonly one
sense in which a claim canbe "based" on provisions ofa treaty. It Is
bascd on the provisions of a tscaty because those who prefer tlie clairn,
who advance the claim, and support it with argument, or desire to
support itwith argument, say : "We ~elyupon certain specificprovisions
of the treaty inorder to support our clnim." When they, in other words,
invoke certain specific provisionsof a tî-eaty, theyare then basing theis
clairn upon the treaty. Of course, if you arc talhng of an established
right,and you çayof a person, his right to enter a particular building
is based upon a particular provision of a statute or a treaty, of course,
then you are usingthe word "based" in a somewhat different sense. You
are then saying the particular provision of the treaty or the statute
does, on its true construction, entitle the person in whom the nght 1s
vested to enter, if 1 may use that example, a particular building, but
when you are not talking of an eçtablished right, when you are in the
earlicr stagesirnyly talking of a claim, you then must perforee use thc
word "based" in a different sense-namely, in the sense of "invoke".
A judge, or an arbitrator, or anybody, has two persons in dispute before
him. Hc looks to one and says : "Are you prcferring a claim ?" and the
answer is "Yes", and he asks that person : "On what do you base your
claim 7 ",andthe claimant will then answer : "1 base it on such and such
a sectionof a particular statute." The judge willthetî turn to his adver-
sary and Say :"Do you defend the daim ?", and tlîe answer is "Yes",
and thc judge will thcn say to the adversary :"On what do you base
your defence 7" The adversary may Say : "1 base my defence on the
same section, which 1 say does not justify the claim."The claimant and
the adversary are both, in thoçe circumstances, basing, the one his
claim and the other his defence, on the sarne section of the statute,
whicli each of them sayshas a different meaning. Either the claimant is
right or the defender iç right : they çannot both be right. Ultimately,
it willbe decided cvhich is right, but throughout ihc whole pesiod, when
one is advancing his clairn and the other is disputing that claim, both
the clairnant and the defender are respectively basing their daim and
their dcfence upon a particulas section-say, the sarne section-of a
statute.
Here we look at the wording of the lIec2aratiun and we find that it
contemplates that one government, a pasty to the Treaty, has preferred
a claim. It contemplates, presumably equaiiy, that the other govern-
ment disputes the claim, but the government which prefers the claim
iç obviously preferring it in reliance upon some provision of the Treaty,
It iç then basing its claim on that provision. The govemment which
disputes the claim will point to that, or some other provision of the
Treaty, and will say :"Upon the interpretation that we put upon the
Treaty, the clairn does iiotarise." Both governments cannot be right,436 REPLY OP SIR T;R.WK SOSICICE (GREECE)-28 11133
but each government, that which prefers the cliiim and that which
disputcs the claim, are both, while they are so doing, basing, the one
its clairnand the other itç defence, on certain articlesof thc Treaty.
Thereiure, Il!iPresident and Members of the Court, Tdo advance
this as a proposj tion whichis fundamental to the issue which you have
to try, thatwhen one speaks of "basing a claim", one is sirnplytalking
about the formtilation of theclaim. You base your claim vpon Article X
of the Treaty of 1886 in that you rely upon that Article inforrnulating
your claim, and it is in that sense, and only in thnt sense, in my sub-
mission to the Court, that the word "based" isused.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, Twant to make ivhat may seem
sornewhat of a kiardy excursion fnr a moment or so in inviting the
Court, and particularly Judge Spiropoulos, to look at the Greek text
of the Treaty. I do not know whether you have before you the Trcaty
of Commerce and Navigation of 1926 ; itis published a5 what we cal1
a Command Paper 2790 of 1927. May 1 just quote one or two words,
bccause 1 am aclvised by those of my Greek speaking supporters who
have looked more closely at these words, that they emphasize the point
that 1 am trying to make. Tt iseasier when one Io~ks at the Greek text
to ascertain that you are using the word "based" in thc scnse for which
I contend, namely, "invoke", "formulate your claim upon the basis of".
If Judge Spiropoulos will forgive my accent, the relcvant words are:
Now I am advised by those wfio speak Greek as their own language- .
and no doubt Judge Spiropoulos will form his own view about this-
that when you talk about a~airrio~isthat is to say, "reqiiests",
"clairns","arguments", being Burr~Zo~Cva sn a treaty, you lire in
terms and perfectly clearly referring to the situatioil in whidi one
of the contesting Parties says : Z have an haai~r~oi; 1 have a
claim. You then ask kim ; on what pcrmi{m, on whaf do you relyin
formulating your clairn, and he then says: 1 relg, for example, on
Article X of the Treaty. Now 1 do not know whether Judge Spiro-
poulos will feel that that argument is an argument which commends
itself tohim, but 1 do put it before the Court that if it is clea, as I
subrnit it is clear in the English language, that "daim" and "based"
are used in the sense fowhich 1 contend, it iseven more clcar when one
finds in the Greek text the çharacter of the claim asit were emphasized
by the use of the wosd drtairfio~i"reguests", and that the word
$uoizupivar,indicates "rely on" or "formulate on the basis of". Now 1
advance an argument of that sort with irepidation becausc 1 am
referring to the nuance to be put on words iil a langtiage otker than
my own, and I leave the argument there, but Tam advised that that
isthe conclusion which should bi -rawn from the precise wordiiig used
in the Greek text of the Treaty.
MT. President and Memhers of the Court, supposing 1 am right in
what 1 have said as to the opening words of the Declaration, let us
now look to the words wkich follow those opening words in the Decla-
ration.I siibmit they prccisely support what I have just said, what I
have just advanced as the true interpretation of the opening words.
The Declaration goes Qn:438 REPLP OF SIR FRAXR SOSKICE (GREEGE)-28 III 53
"Any cantroversies which inay arise respectingthe interpretation,
or the exectition of the present Treaty, or the consecluences of any
violation thereof, shall he submitted ....to the decision ofcommis-
sions of arbitration."
Just look at the opening words which 1 have quoted, any controversies
which may arise respecting the interprctation, contror7erçiesin other
words in which one person alleges that an article of the Trcaty means
one thing and his opponent alleges that it rneans sometliing elçe. It
is precisely those controversies which it is conteniplatccl are to go to
a~bitration, controvcrsies in other words as to the interpretation,contro-
versies also as to the execution and consequences of a violation.Biit
the words to whicli Iattach iinyortance for the purpose ofmy submisçion
are the words "crintroversies as to the interpretation". In other words,
when yoriare asking what disputes does the 1886 Trcaty contemplate
are to be arhitrated upon, thosc disputes includc disputes as to what
the 1886 Trcaty means. Thosc disputes are preserved inviolate by the
Declaration inthe 1926 Treaty. In ottier words, the 1926 Treaty Declara-
tion in tcnns contemplates that you wiU have one %oveniment ptttting
one meaning on the 1886 Treaty and another Government dcnying that
meaning, and it is precisely that controvcrsy which it is çpnternplated
under the Declaration to the 1926 Treaty that is to be referred to
arbitration, and 1 do pray this in aid and support of what is absoIutely
fundamental ,to niy çubrnission, that my opponent's argument has
proceeded upon awrong reading of the Declaration to the Treaty of 1926.
Mr. Presideiit and Merqbers of the Court, I would ask you now to be
ço good asto glance ritone or two passages in'thc 3udgmeni of the Court
of July last year. On page 44 af the, opinion of fhe Court, the Court
decidecl tlzis-2nd 1 quote :
"The Court would decide whether there is a difference betwcen
the Parties \sithin the ~neaning of the Declaration of 1926.
Skould the Court find that there is suc11a difference, tlie Comrnis-
sion of Arbitration wouId decide on the merits of the clifference."
Now, 1 respectfull submit that tliat is preciselyin accord with what ,
I have just been su$mitting to thc Court. The Court's deciçion ir that
it will àecide, having jurisdictio~~,whcther there is a diffcrence betweeri
the Parties within the meaning of the Declnration of 1926. What does
that mean ? It means that yoii, ta-day, will clccidewhether there exists
between the Parties rival contentions as ta what the 1886 Treaty rneans,
and tlierefore, these being çuch a difference, there is adifference within
the rneaning of the r926 Declaration. Tt is foryou now to decide tliat
question and that qucstion only. That is what you have said in your
judpent that you regard as now your task to perform, and if I may,
with the very grerttestdeference to the Court, submit, that isprecisely
what the situatioii mat be, as it arisesas the result of your deciding
that you have julisdiction in your judgment of July last year.
1 simply ask you to say that obviously there is a"difference" within
the Declaration of 1926.If thercis,tken, asyou say in your own judgment,
it must be for the Commission of Arbitration to adjudicatc iipon the
merits of the diçpute-to say, in other words, which of tlie Parties is
nght and wliich of the Parties iç wrong-and the arbitrator, in making
up his mind as to whicli is right and wliidi is wrong, must ask himçelf RHPLY OF SIR FRANK SOÇKICE (GREHCE)-28 III53
40
deploycd in the sixth argument, which J have just cluoted from the
bottom of p e 44 of your jiidgment, that here is, within the Decla-
ration of 1~ a2daim based on tiic Treaty. It is a claim formulated
upon the Tceaty of 1886 : the objection that it wrtç only formulated
after 1926 you have rejected-it is therefore a claim formulatecl or
based witlzinthe rneaning of the Beclaration to tlie 1926 Treaty upon
the provisions of the rg26 Treaty. And 1 submit that that does lead,
without more, inevitably to the conclusions fqr which 1 contend.
Itrnay be açked: do you advance that argument without any quali-
fication at al1? Are you arguing, the Court rnay çay to me, that it is
enough that a-pcrson who is litigdnt before it says "1 rupon a clausc".
1s that an assertion which the Court cannot possibly go behind ? In ail-
swer to tkat,1 gay: "The Court has the right to restrainan abuse of its
own proceedings." If you had bcfore you a claimant who obviously was
trying to practisea fraud upon the Court, supposing you Ilad a clnimant
who, for purposes of blackmail or for sorne wholIy improper purpose,
untmthfully was saying to you, and as a inere pretence, "1 base rny
claim on Article X of the 1885 Treaty", if you thought that then,
acting in your inherent juridiction to say that, you ~eouldnot allow
your process to be abused, you could obviously say Co liim : "You
are nnt renlly basing your claim on Article X at dl ; what you are
saying is a mcre pretence ; your asertion that ÿou base your claim ..
on Article X isa pure fraud which you are trying to pmctisc upon us,
and WC will not refer what you say isyour claim to arbitration." The
Court then issaying, and rightly saying in a case like tliat : "You, the
litigant, rnay be asserting that you base your claim 011Article X, but
we do not beIieve you, you are not doing so at all, you are merely
pretending it isn sham, and you have some ulterior improper purpose-
for example, blackmail, as your object in asserting that you are basing
your claini on the Treaty." Now, that is a hundred rniles away from
this case. Me. Rolin dealt rvith tIlat point, he citecl irnm ivliat Judge
Carneiro had said,and may I again, at the risk of possiblygoing over
thc same ground, invite the Court to look at apassage in his judgment
which precisely representç tlie submission whidi I have just bcen
making. In hisiridividualopinion, he dealt with the matter on page 49.
IVhat Judge Cai-neiro said, and, if 1 rnay submit, said entirely rightly,
was this : "The invocation of these provisions of the Treaty seems to
be rclcvant ." In other words, the Parties are basing themselves on
that Srenty in the sense that tl-iey arcinvoking it. "Withotit pasçing l
on the factsstated in the Mernorial or recagnizing the correctness of
these allegations, it would not be possiblc tsay wtiether the invocation
of the clauses of the Treatof 1886 was justified." In other words, Judge
Carneiro is saying : "'l'heir invocation may be well-founded or not,
but that they are invoking the Treaty is the important and material
consideration." He goes on : "The Court cannwt do so at this stage of
the proceedings." 111other words, the Court cannot finally pronounce
upon the question whether the invocation of the articles is or inot
well-founded. "However, this invocation ~nust prima fuci~bc regarded
as acceptable, thatis both sufficient alid neccssary to enable the Court's
jzirisdiction to be asserted.'"
ML. President, Mernbers of thc Court, rnay 1, with great deference,
say that I entirely would adopt that language as part of rny argument,
it isprecisely what I am subrnitting to you. Now you will remcmber REPLI' OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 III53 441
that Me. Rolin, wheil he was addressii~g you, said "supposing a lirigant
asserts a plainly absurd claim". He gave the examplc of a litigant
relying on a treaty for the protection of wliales. '5uuposing a litigant
obviolusly ~serts as tlie basis of kis claim sornething wliich es facic
aild obr7iously conld have ilofhing wliatever to do with it, wcll tlïen
you inay be in the realm of an abuse of the process of the Court. You
may thcn say to the litigatît who relies on the tr~aty for the protection
of whales : 'You tell us that: you are bnsing your claim on that lrcaty
but you are perfectly obviously doing nothing of tlie sort. You have
same motive which impels you to açsert that you are basing your clairn
on the trcaty, but in fact you are not doiiigso, and if you tell us that
you arc doing so, you are virtudly abusing the process of the Court.' "
J'udgc Carnciro gocs on: "If the claini inanifestly tvent beyorîd the
terms of thc Trcaty of 1886, the Court woulci Iiave no jurisdiction."
He means no jurisdictionto refer the dispute to arbitration. 'l'henhe
1 snid : "For example, if the claim related to facts prior to the Treaty
of 1886,the Courtrs lack of jiirisdiction would have éobe at once admit-
ted." The invocation of thisTreaty would then even ;brima facis appeas
to be ill-founded. In fact, what haç to be decided is simply whether
the clailn is or inot admitted by tlieTreaty. That is to say, whcther
tlic Treaty cottld yossibly embrace the clairn.Now 1 respectfuliy would
submit that that is exactly the right test. If you say "1 am relyiiig
upon the Treaty of 1886" and in the same breath you say "the dacts
which underly my clairn took place in t8oo", eightjr-six years before
it,well obviously, thougll you may bc saying that you arc basing your
clairn on the Treaty of 1886, you are doing nothing of the sort, because
the Sreaty of 1885 could ilot by any conceivrtble stretch of language
apply to facts which took place in 1800 ; but short of that, it isfor
the Parties to decide whether they propose to base their clainl on the
Treaty of 1886. If they wrongly so base it, if they take a wrong view
as to the meaning of the Treaty of 1886, then the blood be on their
own heads, they rvill lose the arbitration, the arbitrator ivill clecide
against the~n, but tliey are still basing, forgoocl or \IItheir claim on
the Treaty of 1886.
Now, hfr. President and Members of the Court, what is the prime
sigilificance of that? I said that, if that view is riglit, al1 of the
arguments addressed to you by Our adversaries are beside the point,
and may 1 emphasize that 1 say "beside the point" i~th the greatest
deference to those arguments ; they were obvii.iwsly, as 1 have said,
catcful agunients, but they do not assist you because they are argu-
ments wliicki could be usefully addressed to the arbitrators but not
to you. May 1 try and precisely pin-point, thercforc, the difference
between oa~rview and our miuersaries' view. Our view is what I have
just stated. Now Mr. Fitzrnaurice and &Ir. Fawcett, both in their
arguments, made the point wliidi was fundamental to the view that
they were presenting, üild that point was this, they bath made the
point, they both çaid "in order to succeed in the present application
the Greek Governtnent has got to establish bcforc you, herc and now,
that if the fncts whidi they allege are correct, the Treaty of 1886
would apply", and tlzey would be entitled to their relief. Now thab
is what they çaid. The kernel of their argument was that if the facts
arc correct tlie Treaty rnust have been broken, that they repeated ;
both leariled Counsel put that in the forefront of their argument.to him under English law. Me, Rolin, in his speech tn you, indicated
that poçsibly as Iwas a little bit more familiar with English Iegal process
thari of necessity he was himself, he would deal only very briefly with
that particular aspect of the case. That question presents two different
problerns. First, what isthe true principle of internationallaw ; second,
how does that principle irnpinge upon the rircumstanceç of this case ?
The true principleof international law 1 believeto he hardly in dispute.,
You must use such methods as are open to you to obtain recourse in
the domestic Mbtine, but that does not involve your vainly having
recourse to a Court of Appeal when it is either certain, or reasanably
certain, or highly probable that yoiir appeal will not succecd. li you
find yoursclf in that situation, and ttiinkingto yourself that an appeal
rirould be highly unlikely to succeed, you do not resort ta appeal ; you
are entitled to say that in conformity with the relevant principle of
international law, you have cxhausted the remedies wliich you have
before the domestic courts.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, that principle 1 think
perl~aps waç moçt preciscly formulated in the casc which is known as
the Fimisfa Vessels case. 1 would refer you to page 16, paragaph IO,
of the Mernorial. You will there see that wehave set out the authoritieç
on which we propose ta rely in support of that principle. You will see
that we cite the finish Vcsselscase, and that we also cite the Undin
case, and 1 do not want to take up your time by re-reading that para-
graph in our Mernorial-it is on page 16,and it is paragraph 10; but L
thought that it might be of some assistance to the Court if 1 draw
the attention of the Court to the conclusions from thc Finnish case
whick were draivn by Judge De Visscher, and which were set out in
the 1935 volume of the Académiede Droit irtlerwational, Recueil des
Cours, in which there is a passage in a work of Judge De Visscher,
in whick he deals with the Finland case, the Finnish Sl~ips case, and
he ststcs the conclusions in international Law tliat he draws £rom
that case on this particular prohlem. The Court wi13remernber that the
casc concerned the requisitioning of certain shjps belonpng to Pinland
cturing the First World War. It wasassertcd by the Finnish Govcrnment
llzat those sliips kad been requisitionecl by the British Governrnent.
The British Governrnent dcnied that assertion of fact and aiieged that
tlie vcssels had been requlsitioned by the Russian Government, and
that was the issue of fact, and that being so the Finnish Government
sought redress before a special Admiralty Tribunal, the Admiralty
Transport Arbitration Board, and failed before that Tribunal. Now it
is perfectly trtie that the findinof fact af thatTribunal was under the
English law dcclaïed to be final, and the question arose as to whether
the Finnish Govcrnrnent shauld have appealed against that decision,
and wliether, not having appealed against it,it could not say that it
had resorted to al! methocls of recourse before trie English courts.May
1 quate a short passage from page 429 ofthe volume to which 1 just
xcferred ? The question whether the Finnisll Government had used aii
available rnethods of recourse before tlie Engliçh courts was referred
to a Swedish judge to decide, and M. de Visscher says:
"Cette question préliminaire de l'kpuisement des recours internes
fut soumise a l'aabitrage deM. AIgot Bagge, juge à la Cour supreme
de Suède.En substance, la décision de l'arbitre fut favorable A Ia KEPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 11153 447
that there was a mortgage of some ,1880 upon it. After the learncdjudge
hncl refused to give hcr relief otl the grounds whicli1 have indicatcd,
nnmely, that there was practically nothing in thc cstate, ftirthcr
cvidence came to light which would seem to establisli that the cottage
was worth some Lz,500. It might well have been thought tliat had
that further evidencc heen before the lcarned judgc, he rnight have
corne to a different vicw and might, had he known that the cottagc
was really worth Lz ,00, have grantecl her sornething out of the estate.
Thc case was appealed, vltimately to the Siipreme Court of Auçtralia,
and from the Supreme Court of Australi;~ ~t was appealcd to the Privy
Coiincil. The Privy Council affirmed the dccision of the learned jridgc.
Thc Privy Couilcil said that it would not allow the further evidcnce
to be adrnittcd and the further evidence not being ndniitted, therc was
no rcasoil to interfere with what the decision of the learned judge had
been on the evidence that he had before him. Now thnt 1 do refer to
in a littlemore detail,as indicating in practice the reluctance whick
our judges-judges in the United Kingdom-feel iii accedingto appli-
cations to interfere with a matter oi discretionon which they riiled in
the courts below. And 1 thought it might just have beeil of some
assistance ii 1cited from the report of the case wfiich isin ~gj2 2 Al1
England Reports a short paçsage in an earlier case deaiing with the
admission of evidence, and the passagethat 1 would desire to cite whick
waç cited in the oyiniori of thc Privy Council, is this :
"The appellantV-it Is atpage 818-"Tkc appellant h<w applied
for leave to adduce fresli erddence, but 1 am of opiriirin that it
riught not to be granteci.The application is for an indulgence. I-Ie
rnight have adduccd the evidence in thecourt bclow. That hc might
have çhaped his case betterin the court Relowis no ground for leave
to addticc fresh cvidence before the Court of Appeal. As it has
often been said, nothing is more dangerous thailto nllow fresh oral
evidence to he introduced after a case haisbeeii discussed in court."
Now, Mr. Presidcnt and Mernberç of the Court, the Privy Couiicil
wcrc approtling and acting upon that staternent of principle. Goinp
from that situation, therefore, to the çituatioii which confronted
Mr. Arnbatieloç when the Court of Appeal had refused to allow him to
introduce further cvidence that he had obtained, Iiow must thc matter
have seerned to his legal advisors at that time ?You have, inthe docu-
ments before ÿou, in tlie Anilex to the English Counter-Mernorial,
thc decision of the Court of Appeal, and it appears ml pagp 205 of that
document. I do ~iotwant to reaclit,although it is short,but I woulcl ask
the Court to be so kind as to study it,and the Court will there sce that
the Court of Appeal do deal with the matter as a matter of discretion :
they give their consideration to itand in the excrcise of tkeir discretion,
they fosm the view that they ought not to alloiv the fulthcr evidence to
be adduced.
In the light of the principle which 1 have cited from our English
jurisprudence, what real chance must there have seerneclto 'be to the
advisors of RiIr.Arnbatieloçof succeçsfully appealing to the House of
Lords from that judgrnent of the Court of Appeal ? It was a matter of
discretion. Lord Justice Bmkes cites a well-kr-iom passage from the
case of Nash v.h'oclzfardXzdralDistrict Cozclzciin tems very siinilarto
the citation tliatI made from the opinion of the Privy Council in the REPLY 01; SIR ITRAKK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 Ill j3
448
case of L~eder Y. Ellis,arid 1put itto the Court thatit must havc seemed
to those who wcre açlvising Mr. A~nbnticlos rvheii the Court of Appeal
~ejccted liisapplicatioil for perrnissiori to introduçe further evidence
that an appeal against that decision iil a matter of discretion to the
House of Lords would havc been virtiialij~ hopeless.
Mr. President and Mernbers of the Cuurt, it is said : "'l'ou should
have appealed from ille judgment of Mr. Justice Hill," The answer I
give is : that \vithouttlic further evideiice whidi ~ve say was wrong-
fully withheld, there would have been very littlc, if any, chance of
successfully nl-ipcalit~gfrom Mr. Justice Hill'sjudgment. Then, with
regard to the furthcr evidence, the Court of Appeal having refuçed to
allow that evidence to be given, therc wotlld have been very little,
if any, and 1 think 1 may go further and Say, no, chance of success-
fully appealing fronl tliatjudgment of the Court of Appeal. 1, therefore,
to sum up this particular part of my submi~ion, would say this :in the
circurnstances, there wnuld have been virtually no prospect of success-
fully appealing from either judgment. Applying, therefore, the principle
as enunciated in the I'jinniskshipping case,it carînot be said against Mr.
Ambatielos that lie oughtneverthelesç to have gone through what would
have been a: priori a.procedure doomed to failure,namely, appealing
against two judgrnents, wheii there was virturilly nu ground for clial-
lenging them at al1in the actual çircurnstances.
And tEiatthrowç out iiitoreliefatld makcs clear and highlights what is
a substantial ground of cornplaint that the Greek Government in theçe
proceedings haç against the United Kingdom Governnient, and tliat is :
llarringbroken this cot~tract,it isnotcontent to let the matter rest there,
but by failing fo produce vital evidence, it preverlted Mr, Ambatielos
from getting thc reliefto which he wss plainty, irrriy respectful subrnis-
sion, cntitled, befclre thcourts of tlieUnited Kingdom, wha, I respect-
fully submit, when their rcasonirig is examilied, had they had that
further evidence bcfore them, would uildoubtedly havc afforded him the
relief for whidi l-iecouiiter-clair~~citthc ~ictionbefore Mr. Justicc Hill.
'rhc secorid subject which 1 would like to clispoac of is the question
of delay. The Court will rernernber that 1 have jwt cotnpleted my
submissioil on the exliaustion of the domestic remedies, and 1 now want
to deal with the cognate subject of delay wkick w;ls a matter relied upon
by our adversaries. 1 would like, by way of introduction, to refer to a
passage on page 39 of your judgment, because, although there seemS
to have hem a littlc uncertaintyin tlieminds of those who have addressecl
the Court asto what was inteilded by thispassagc, 1 respectfully submit
to the Court that it isclear what thc Court had iil mincl. 011 page 3g
in your judpeiit of lastJuly, you said :
"As regards the reference in the Counter-Mernocial to theHelleijic
Government beirig precl~ided by lapseof time from submitting the
p~esent claim, the Court holds that this is apoint to be considcred
ivlththe merits and not at the prescritstage."
Tlie question is, what the Court mearit Toçonvey by the words: witli
the rnesits". Irvuuld respectfully sulirnit thnt those words werc nîeant REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 III53 451
Mr. Preçidcnt ancl Members of the Court, 1 would nevertlzelcss like
to make orTcor two observatioi~s on what in fact took placc. You liave
hearcl it said oii more than one occasion that the years rolled by and
tkie Greek Governrnent did notIiiag. In point of Fact, if you study the
notes that'psscd between the two Governmeiits, you will find that
that is very far indeed from the truth, and 1 must iil any event ask
the Court to be so good as to look again at the Mémoire and to take
note ofcertain page rcfcrences u~hich 1would likc to cal1to the attention
of the Court. In the annexes to aur Mémoire possibly the notes frorn
the Grcek Government to the British, and the British Governrnent's
replies have been set out in çlightly inconvenieiit form, andI apologize
that that should be the case. If you look at tlie many notes thatpassed,
you will fincl that thosewho put the Mernorial together first set out
al1 tkc rzotcs from the Greek to the British Government and then set
out al1 the replies from the British Government to the Greek Govern-
ment. It is therefore possibly not very easy to get a chronological view
of what took place, but if the Court would be so lrltid as to take ilote
of these page references they will get a better apprelieiision of what
really passed between the two Goverilments. 1 would surnrnarize what
passed between the two Governments in this way. The Greek Govern-
ment first took this mattcr up within a year or so aitcr thecase lzad
been tried before Mr. Justicc Hill in Tg25. They then asked in a purely
friendly way that the matter might be corlsidered by the British Govern-
ment because they, the Greek Governmcnt, felt that their national,
Mr. Ambatielos, had beeii extremely badly treated. That was a polite
beginning. They met with a blunt refusal. The matter tlzen did not
progress further, 1 agee, untiI 1933, but from rg33 onwards tlzerwas
a succession of Greek notes, al1 asking for a friendly arbitration. They
set out in great dctail tlie complaii~t that theGrcek Government was
making of the treatment meted out to Mr. Ambatielos, and rhey asked
that the British Government should agree upon a voluntary basis
that the Greek Govcrnment's grievance should be tried before sorne
friendly voluntary arbitral tribunal. Those notes came almost annually
from the Greek Government. There was absolutely no atternpt by the
British Governrnent to mcet tliat request. Each Greek note was met
by a long reply by the British Governmerlt eiidlng up in cach case
with a rnost categorical refusal to acceyt any voluntary arbitratioii
at all.
Now, Mr. President and Members of tlie Court, how far al1 thimay
be relevant 1 am not certain, but I havc to deal with it because itruas
t-elied upon against us, but the fact is,as ernerges from these notes,
that the Greek Governmeiit was saying year in and year out we: have
a grievance against you, the British Government;let us be sensible
and arbitrate it, let us set up somc kind of arbitral commission, and
bring it before that commission, atzd 1 would put it before the Court,
put the view before the Court, tliatthc replies ofthe British Govern-
ment were very unhelpful to what was a perfectly reasonable suggestion
made by the Greek Governmeiit, and so matters dragged on. This
annual, or almost annual, controversy went on through tlie ninetcen
hundred and thirties, untilat long inst the Greek Government becorning
convinced that if there was to bc an arbitration it was not going to
be an arbitratiori by consent,aç one might have hoped, but it would
be necessary to makc the British Government arbitrate. 'l'hen atlong MI-.President and Members of the Court, I becarnc more puzzled
as the argument progressed. I lookcd again at Mr. Fitzmaurice's speech :
1 think it woilld be hardly an exaggeration to saÿ that something like
the first seventeenpages of it was a constant rcpetition of the theme that
the psesentntion by the Greek Government of itsclaim, based on the
1886 Treaty, was tongue-twisting, mental gymnastics, verbal contor-
tionç, deliberatcobscurity and a number ofother similarly picturesque
and graphic expressions. And when 1 got to page 382, 1 found this
passage :
".... iour opinion, it adds up to this, that the contention that the
Arnbatielos clair in based on the 1886 Treaty is not a scrious one,
that it represents a view which has never bec11seriously entertained,
even by the Mellenic Government thernselvcs, and that it is sirnply
a stratagem or device ernployed for the ulterior purpose of trying
to compel arbitration where no real obligation to submit to arbitra-
tion exists".
1,representing the Greek Govesnmcnt, must try and resist,1 know,
tlie temptation to be drawn into matters which have prccisely nothing
to do with the question atpresent before the Court. Idetus asurne that
al1those graphic descriptions areaccurate descriptions of the argument
which my dients advance, based on Articles 1, X, Xi1 and XV of the
1886 Treaty. Cct usassume that that is al1 correct. Wliat in the world
haç it gcrt to do with the short point that this Court is at present con-
cerned with, namely, the question whethcr a clairn has asisen which
is based on that Treaty ?Rut, of course, apyearing for the Ereek Govern-
~ncnt,which has been the victim and object of thcseslightly vituperative
descriptions ofits case,what am 3. to do ?One coursc might be todismiss
them with contempt ; another course iç, perhaps,topoint out that if our
argurncnt, based on the 1886 'Sreaty, represents a process of mental
gymnastics, we, after ail, have a vergrrespectable precedent in the British
argument in the Anglo-Iranian case."We are putting fonvard precisely
the samc argument as the British Government did in the Anglo-Iranian
case. Mr. Fitzmaurice, when he was addressing yoii, said (1 think 1
rcmcmber his words correctly) that we reproachcd him for putting for-
ward that argument. Hc really must disabusc his mind of that : we do
not "reproach" hirn-this is a court of law. The British Government,
in thc Anglo-Iranian case, was trying to Eind a lcgal way of establishing
hcforc a court of law that thcre was jurisdictio~~in the court to try the
grievance of which the British Government complained: so exactly
arc we. The Greek Government is doing precisely the same as the British
Government. 1 feel sure that &Ir. Fitzmaurjcc will not contend before
you that there is any copyright in the argument, and what it was right
for hiç clientsto contend, it must necessarily be rwong for rny clients
to contend. He did offer a few observations to t~ to dispel grounds for
a reproach which he wxongly conceivcd had heen ievelled against hirn,
and hc said itwas quitc different when the British Government wanted
tu advancc this argument. Rut 1 would like you to look at rvhat the
British Governrnent said. I would be grateful if you would take the
record of the judgment in the Anglo-Iranian case : the reference 1 would
like to givc you is on page 108 of this Court'sjudgment in the Anglo-
Irania case.This Court was trjringthe following issuettien:the Iranian
Government had made a neclaration in 1932, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of disputes touching upon treaties, but the
British Government felt, or feared, and this Courtactually held, thatthat
neclaration by the Trnnian Governmcnt on its true construction only
related to treaties entercd into after the Declarati~n was made in 1932,
Mr. k'itzmaurice's ctients, yerfectly propcrly, an1 certairilCIOnot criti-
cize them in the slightest bit for it-on the coi~trary, 1applnud them-
faced with that legaldifficulty, thought ts tliernselvcs : well, Iiow could
they get round it-and the way that they thpught they would get round
it was to rely uyicina freaty of 1857 which coritained a rnost-favoured-
nation clause, just in exactlthe same way as the Greek Government rely
on most-iavoured-~îation clause in a trcaty dated 1586 ,nd the British
Governmeizt, relying on that most-favotired-hation clause in that Trcsty
of 1857, said : oh, in Tg34the Iranian Goveniment eritered into a trcnty
witl? Denmark, Article 1V of which contained the promise thatmsuhjects
of each governmerit would be treated açcording to the practice and
printiples of international law. So, said the$-perfectly properly said-
we can get round this legal difficulwith whidi we are confronted and we
can say : after all, that treaty with the Uanish Governmctit was entcred
into by the Iranian Government aftcr 1932, namely, in 1934 ,o tl-iawe
can saÿ that therc was, within the mcaning of the Declnration, a dispute
between the Rritish and the Jsanian Covernnicnt, toiiching iipon a
treaty entered into after 1932, narnely, touci-iing iipQnthe 1934 'rrl'reaty
between thc Iranian Government aizd the Danisli Governinen t. Well,
now, that waç ;in argument. 1 do not know-ruould iîfr. Fitzniaurice
ça11that "toilgue-twistirig" and "mental gyrnnastics" ? 1s that mental
gyrnnastics ? It js more elaborate as atl argument than the argument
that we are presenting : it really does b~rdera little on thc burlesque if
the British Govei-nnient, having put that argument forward themselves
in 1952, iri1gj3, throirgh their Iegal reprcsentatives, think it proper to
load thc Greek Gnvernmcnt vitf finearly scventeen pages,1 will not say
of solid invective, but dilutecl invective atany rate, for really following
the highly respectablepreccdent set by the 'British Government them-
selveç one year before. I look again at this passage, the passage wliich
I citcd, Compte rmdzt ofWednesday, page 382 : "it is simplya strrttagem
or device employed for the ulterior purpose ?f tryiiig to comyel arbitra-
tion where no rr:aI obligation to submit to arbitration existç". Well,
there isa Latiil tag:119utatnomine de tefabul nurrahr. 1wonder tvhethcr
Mr. Fiti:maiirice lvouldlike tosubstitutc in the passage that he has used
his own clients for mp clicnts, and1 am qiiite certain that tlie answer
is, and tlw proper and right nriswer that he wottlcl give : of course, he
would net, because the British Goverriment were yerfectly cntitled
to use that argument, it was not a stratagem or device or1their part,
it wa.5a legal submission to a legal court of law.Eut just as itw~s not
a stratagem or device on the part of the Britiçli Government, so is the
argument which we now propound not a stratagem or dcvice on the part
of the Greek Govcrnrnent. The Greck Government dcsires its grievance
to be tried, and desiring its gricvance to be tried and finding itself
in the prescnce of acourt of Iaw, asks itself is there any legal grotind
uyon which it can base its request in exactly the sanie way as the British
Government, faced with a similar situation last ÿear, sought on tlie
same lines in asking whether it could find a way of legally prescnting
its request that its grievai-ice should be trjed as against the Trnnian
Governmcnt ? REPLI' OF SIR FRANK SOSKICbI (GREECE)-28 IIIj3
455
I could not help retncmbering the argument that Mr. Fitzmauriçe
addrcssed to this Cotirt yesterday or the day bcfore, to thc effect tIiat
a inost-favoured-nation treatmeilt cotildnot absorb or incorporate ail
obligatioii to trcat subjccts of i~~iothercountry according to the priii-
ciples of international law. He expatiüted irpon that in some detail. S
wonder ~vhether, when hc waç yresciiting that argument to tliis Court,
it occurrcd to Iiirn that he was usirig his industry and ingenuity tu
destrov the argument whieh the British Governmei~t, his own clients,
had equaliy presented to thisCourt in 1952 on exactly the samc lines.
Mr. Presideiit, 1 clrnot want to take inore time on this particular
rnattcr, but 1 think 1 must Say this. My astoniçhment at thisline of
argumentation on the part of my adversaries really reached the summit
when we listened to Mr. Fawcett's argument. 1 tocik dowii, because
I tliought it was such a remarkable passage, what he read out, and he
read out, TIiursday, page 427, the following passage :
"....By dark allusions and hrilf-statements they hope to create"
-"theyu is tlie Grcek Government-"an atrnosphere of guilt
around tlie United Kingdom; tliey hope the Court will say, eveil
if it cannot sec clearly thruugh tlie circumambient srnolcc of
the Greck pleadirîgs : 'Thcre must be fire here-let us ordcr
arbitration.' ''
Mr. Presidcnt, Membcrs of thc Court, it occurrcd t~ mc to wondcr
whetkcr, wheii Rlr. Fawcett was composing that passage (and it rnust
have taken him some time), liewas under the impression that thisCourt
sat with a jury. 1should have thought that when he got here and found
that tliisCourt does not try cases with a jury, he might have thought
it right to put a pcri through that particular passage. 1 would like to
rnake a refcrence to Greek literature, the literature of rny own clicnts.
Aristaplianes, some 2000 years ago, wrotc a comeciy about Cloud Cuckoo
Land, and 1 could not help thinking to myself that conceivahly Mr.
Fawcett thought we were living for the time being iri Cloud Cuckoo
Land, alid it might be of some use if, inordcr to try tornake mv way
tlirough the "circuinambient smokc" wliich çhrouds Cloud Cuckoo Land,
if I just try to recall to Mr. Fawcctt something oi the reality of this
case. Whnt is the reality 7It is said tlia1am weaving "dat-kallusiriils"
to try toattribute blame to Rlr. Eawcett's clients. The plain, unvarnishecl
truth herc is that thc Greek Governmerît cornplain of the fact that
one of their nationals paidEr,Goo,ooo for nine ships, got no ships, got
nothing for Iiis money: E~OO,O oQ tOat £1,6oo,ooo was specifically
paid in orcler to ensure that the ships shouid be deiivered at a certain
time-half a million paunds-they were not delivered at that time ;
the British executive authorities tlictikept back evidence which
preventcd hfr. Ambatielos gettitig relief from the Rritiski courtsHc got
no relief but was ordered to pay some £350,000 instead, and now, al1
that having happened, what are we discuçsing to-day ? The Greek
Government waiits to get its grievance tried : the British Government
is mustering al1 the industry and the ability and the rescarch of the
Foreign Office to try to cstablish a preliminary technical objection to
prevent the Greek Government even getting before an arbitrator to
see whether they can establish their grievance. 6 reaily think that 1
ought to remind the Court and Mr. Fawcett, if he has forgotteiî iwliat
that Ictter, about which tkere iso much controversy, docs sayon page 32 REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE}-28 11153 457
or rclare to tlie subject of the present disputTliat is Mr. Fitzmaurice'ç
second argument, and I want to offer one or two coinmenti on tliat.
1 want to begin by reminding thc Court that we rely on Articles 1, X,
XII and XV of the 1886 'l'reaty, and that lias becn frequently stated.
Let us look at Article X. Article X ison page 50 of the Mernurial.
It is the article on which we reIy for the purpose of incorporating
the most-favoured-ilatioi1 provisions of other treaties entered inta by
the Unitcd Kingdom Government. The words which are relevant in
that Article are these :
"The Parties agrec tfiat jnow these are the relevant words]
iii al1 matters relatingto commerce and navigation",
the words arc "in all matters relating to commerce". Those lvords are
wide. Thlise words include not mereIy the core and kernel of commerce
itself, butthey cover al1words which, as itwere, descnbe those things
on the outside, the circumference of what may be described ascom-
merce itself. They are matters relating to comrnerct'matters wkich
have some connection with commerce-matters which touch com-
inerce-matters whiçh in some way are placed in relationship tu
immediately commercial transactions. It is a wide scope that thosc
words cover, and the question which tficCourt really has to investigate
is whcther it can be said that the gist ofthe Greek complaint cornes
within those wide words. Now 1 would respectfully say to Mr. Fitz-
maurice and Mr. Fawcett that they make a slight error in describing
the Grcek Government's claiin as simyly a clairnin respect of a legal
proceeding. It is not. The clairn is a claiwhiclicentres upon a series of
trüiisactions whlcl~ form one coherent wholc. What is the grievaiice of
the Greek Government 3 It begins with the breaking of the commercial
contract relatingto the purchase of tllc nirieskips. We say, beginning
with the history uut of which tIîematters of our cumplaint arise, that
the British Government entered into a commercial contract with Mr.
Ambatielos. 'I'hat contract contains certain incidents. The important
incident for this purpose was that the ships wcre to be delivered at
a. certain specified tirne, because Mr. Ambatielos wanted to take
advantagc ofthe high freight ratewhich appertained rvhen the coiitract
was eiltered into. We tlïen say 3s the next stage in that totality of
events that that contract wns broken because the ships were not
delivered rvithin the spccified time. If the matter had rested there,
of course hlr. Ambatielos could have gone to the British courts to
get redress. He tried to do so, but then lie found himself hilidered
and obstructed by what represents the next stage in this saine totality
and singlesequence of events, 11amelythe fact that the British Govern-
ment in effect (if 1 may summarize what took place) prevented him
from getting his relief, because it withheld from hirn and from the
Court evideiice which was essential to enable him' to get that relief,
presenting itself s case in conflict and contradictiori to that evidence
wkiich it possessed. We rely on the totalityof those events and alsoon
each of them individually. Now that isthe gist of it. It iscommercial
from beginning tO end. It centres upon a commercial contract and the
breach of it, and then anotlzer action xvittiholding the evidence closelg
intertwir-ied with what liad gone before, and it ieach of these things
and thc whole totality of those things which give rise to the com-
plaint which the Greek Government brings to-day. Now are those
not mattcrs relating to commerce 7If they do not relate to commerce,458 REPLy OF SIR FRAXK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 III53
what do they relate to ? Buying nine steamers, that is a commercial
transaction ; it is nothing else, The withliolding of evidence was the
withkolding of evidence directly relating to tkiat transaction. The
relief that Mr. Ambatielas wanted to get, was relief from the courts
for the breach of that same commercial transaction, and no other
reliefThe wliole thitlgbegan \vit11acornrnercial transaction ;itcontinucd
withiri thc ambit of a commercial transaction ; and it al1 hingcs upon
matters which relate to that commercial transaction and accordingly
whicli fall within tfie scope of tfie worcls "in al1rnatters relating to
commerce". Iilr. Fitzrnaurice, in his argument, said : what of the case
of a diplomatic representative rvho travels by air and wko is, 1 iorget
whether arrestecl,or searched, or somethidg of the sort. He said that
would be a case which clearly related to ~diplomatic privilege, and I
agree, and he then çaid : you could not Say sirnply because of the
fact that the couner or representative or whoever kiewas, was travelling
by air, that it w;ta case which related to air convei~tions. 1 also agree.
But what 1 Say about hiç example is this : if you want to draw a true
analogy between that exarnple and the present case,you should Say :
does the fact that the coiiricrwas travelling by air prevcnt yoii frorn
saying that liis complaint Mias a complaint relating to diplomatic
privilege-and of course it does not. And 30, here 1 Say, does the fact
that one of the incidents in this series of events was that my client
was obstructed in obtaining the relief he asked from a court, a com-
inercial court, prevent you from saying that his cornplaint is a com-
plaint which referç to commerce, and of course it does not. In
Mr. Fitzrnaurice's example, travelling by air did not prevent the gist
of the matter being looked at, and the gist of thematter in his exnrnple
was the interference with the diplomatic privilege of the couricr.
Equally in my case, the fact that proceedings in a court formed part
of the rnatters out of rvhiclzthe cornplaint arisesdoes not prevcnt you
from sang that what really is the matter in dispute is a commercial
matter, os ifI may borrow the words in Article X : "rnatters relating
to commerce". Tt is "matter5 rclating to 'commerce" lyvhichgive riçe
to tbis dispute. I thought possibly that 1 might point wkat 1 was
saying by makirig this assurnprion : in the actual case Mr. Ambatielos
wcnt to the ordinary courts, but supposing we had tl~issame contract
for the pmchase of ships and siipposing, as so many commercial crintracts
do and as this one dicl(asis in the experience of everybody), thc contract
for the sale of ships lzad contnined an ordiilaty asbitration clause;sup-
posing it had containcd a clausc which said :if thcre is a dispute between
the Parties as to anything arising out of this coiitract, it shalI be referred
to an arbitrntor,each Party shall appoint an arhitrator, and there
shall be an umpirc and so on-ln thc ordinary form in which one
has seen dozens and dozens of commercial contracts ; and supposing
precisely the same thing liad Iiappened aç did happen, but that you
substitute the arhitrator for the judge, 2nd supposing Mr. ,4mbatielos
-going before the arhitrator to ask for damages for breach of the
coiltract-foiind that he could not prove, Iiis case becausc some of
the materials he required in order to prove hiscase were not available
to him owing to a default on the part ofthe,other Party tothe contract.
Well, iiow, would anÿbody ever for a moment say t11at his gricvance
was not a gnevance in n matter relsting , to commerce-it would be
quite unarguable ; 1 would siibrnit to the Court that in those assumed460 REPJdlF OF SiH ITHANIi SOSKICE (GREECE}-28 IIIj3
a) si elleest erroriieA un point tel q-$'aucu~ zribunal convenable-
ment constitué n'aurait pu hannetement arriver à une decision
de ce genre ;
b) sielle est due 5la corruption ;
cl si elleest due & une pression cxcrcée par les organcs exécutifs
du gouvernement ;
dJ si ellc est provoquée par une procédure assez defeçtuei~sc pour
exclure tout espoir raisonnable de décision kquitable."
That was the British formulation. It occurred ta rnc, for esanzple,
to contrast thc formulation by the then Czecl~oslovakiail Governnlent.
1 do not want to read it all, but simply to cite the seiitençe whicli
introduces quitt: a new conception to the coiiceptions forrnulated by
the British Go~~enirnent. Arnongçt the other principles statecl by the
CzecIloslovakian Goverilment, they sriid:
"Il ne coi~viendrait pas d'exiger clu'on accordat aux étrangers
l'assistance judiciaire sans se préoccuper sila rCciprucité est ou
non assurée."
Therefore the Czechoslovakian Government' was introducing the concept
of reciprocity ; that does not find its place iii the forrniilntiori by the
British Governxnent. 1 simply mention those as examples to show
that the princil>lcç of international law relating to treatmeiit hefore
courts is not identical as formulated by al1 countries. Tliere are
differences. Shese is a certain irnprecision ~eccssaiily about itbecause
the principles of international law are constantly being evohed, con-
stantly ~e-stated and woven into a single coinprehensive legal system.
Therefore, first I say International law has certain elernents of uncer-
such asorle finds in the article whicht 1just citedy:coincide, with mwords
"Each P:irty sliall in al1 causes andcontroversies now pending
or hereafter to commence, cause justice and right to be speedily
administered to the subjects and peoples of the other Party."
Therefore 1would subrnit to the Court that'Mr. Fitzinaurice's argument
iç not well founded to the effect that a most-favoured-nation clause
cannot incorporate provisions such as those in Article 16, becausc,
as it were, thegr are already ingrcifted into international law by the
geiieral principkes of interriational law, and most-favoured-nation
provisions only incorporate what can be regarded as a privilege conferred
on the niost-favonred-nation subjects. Therefore I would, in reply
to that argument of Mr. Fitzrnaurice, namely, the third in the list,
say that even if lieis riglzt in sayitithatonljr thoçe provisions in other
treatieç lvhiçh relate to commerce are incorporated, we are here in
presence of a con-nnercial issue, aiid thesefore the argument does not
affect me. Secondly, L say in answer to his submission that most-
favoured-nation treatics only incorporate what could be regarded as
a privilcge and thcrcfore cannot incorporate the provisions of inter-
national law, that international law is of itsclf uiicertain and does not
necessarily coincide wiih the provisions contaitzecl iri çpecific treatieç
hetween thc United Kingdom and othcr countries rirhichhave heen REPLY OF STR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-2 8LIj3 461
entered into in the past, such as, for csatnple, the Treaty of Peace
and Commerce with Denmark of 1660.
It isgettiiig near 6 o'ciockand 1 wonder whether possibly you would
all~w rne to açk the Court this-I am not farnow from the end of my
argument, if the Court would be so very kind as to giveme:a little longer
than its norrnal hours T think 1 could very comfortably finish. 1 would
Se very grateful if the Court could seeits way to do that, and 1 hope
that I am not trespassitig upon the iildulgence the Court gave me in
sittingon Saturday afternoon, but I think half an hour would comfor-
tably see me through the end of my argument, possibly a few more
minutes after that.
Le VICE-PRÉSIDENfT aisant fonction de Président : Nous vous écoutons
volontiers. '
Sir Frank SOSKIC EThank you very much indeed, thank you. It
is very kind of you.
Mr. President and Mernbers of the Court, on page405of his argument
Mr. Fitzrnaurice makes an analysis of some of the treaties on whicli we
relied,and the time has corne, I think, when 1 should put before the
Court the letter xvhich we Iiave procluced setting out the relevant
extracts of the treaties on whic1-1we rely. May 1 add this, that if the
Court desires s convenient method of examining those treatieç, they
are to be found collected in a document, ina volume, called"The Hund-
Book of Commercial Treuties ZieheenGreat Britain and ForeignPwwrs",
published by Ris Majesty's Stationery Office, rg12,official copy revised
in 1922. If 1may just indicate thevolume, that is the blue volume,and
al1the treaties are there set outin convenient form, and we have, in the
letter that we have prepared fur the use of the Court, put in the page
refereiices in this blue book to the various treaties on wliicli we rely for
the purpose of establishing our case on Article X of the 1586 Treaty.
1thiiik the Court, I think each Member of the Court has before it a
copy of this letterI do not know whether you have, Mi- President.
Le VICE-P~SIDENT faisant foilction de PrksidentLa lettre est arrivée
seulement il y a une demi-heure k peu près ;on est en train de faire lc
nécessaire pour en faire Ia distribution.
Sir Frank SOSKLCE 1: am sorry that we cauçed inconvenience, Mr.
President, and 1should have letyou have it earlierMay I justt'tierefore
make sorne brief cornments on the letter. We set out in the letter a
number of treaties, trcaties~4th Denmark, treaties with Spain, treaties
with Srveden, treaties with Peru, Costa Rica, Japan and Bolivia. Twarit
to say this with regard to, for example, a first treaty. The first treaty
to be found 011page 245is called a Treaty of Peace and Commerce with
Denmark, it contains Article 16, to wlîich your attention has been called,
each Party sharing al1 causes and controversies now dependant or
hereafter to commence cause justice and nght to be speedily administered
to the subjects and peopleof the other Party, according to the laws atid
statutes of each country witliouttediouç and unnecessary detays and
charges. Now, Mr. President and Members of the Court, what 1 want
to say with regard to that içthis : Article 16fiiîdits place ina treaty
which is called a"Treaty of Peace and Commerce". Those who frarned
tliatTreaty obviously regardeci it asappropriate that a treaty of peace
and cornmerce should include an article suchas Article 16 dealing witli
31 REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 III j3 463
of events which rnake up the matters of which we cornplain, been
unfairly dealt with. I am sjrnply stating the legal proposition, and 1
am entitled to say that Article X of the 1886 Treaty reqaires the
British Government to do juçtice and right to Mr. Ambatielos, a Greek
subject, in respect of the rnatters of which wc cornplain. Now that is
not tongue twisting, and it isnot rneant for gymnastics, it is asimple
proposition as the argument advanced by the British Government in
the Iranian inil case was equallya simpIe proposition, and 1 rcspectfully
submit that 1 am entitled to rely upon it. I just want to make this
observation. It is argued by MT. Fitzrnaurice that Article X of the
1886Treaty docs not incorporate anything other than the commercial
provisions of the Treaties entered into by Great Britain. Looking at
this Treaty hctwcen Denmark headed as it isa "Treaty of Peace and
Commerce", lvhich proviçionç does Mr. Fitzmaurice say are not com-
mercial provisions. Does he say that Article 16,,on which I rely,
is not a commercial provision, it is atlarticle which thoçe who framed
that commercial treaty put intoit, acommercial treaty ?Quite obviously,
in my subrnission, ArticleX attraçts Article16 of the Danish contract:,
the Danish Treaty.
Mr. President and Mernbers of tlze Court, for rny observations I
have selected simply the rirst treaty in that list, becausc Article 16
of the Denmark Treaty is quite sufficient to my purpose. I do not
think that I uiould be assisting the Courtby going through and making
similar observations with regard to the other treaties contained in
the list. The argument with regard to them is the same. You get
similar language, you get an undertaking to prevent wrong to the
subjects of the other country-for examyle, in the .Treaty of Peace
and Friendship with Spain, dated May 23rd, 1667. Going right tlirough
the treaties, one finds a number of phrases that can be prayed in aid
by my clicnts for tlie purpose of advancing their argument that a
flagrant wrong done to their subject, Mr. Ambatielos, by the congeries
of events to which 1 have drawi~ attention, conflicts with the wording
of a number of these treaties, and any of the provisions in ariy of
these treaties, the words of wh:icli arc infringed by the treatment
rneted out to Mr. Ambatielos, can be prayed in aid by my clients and
any single one of thern is enough.
1 want to make two short comments. You will see on page 2 a
treatÿ descnbed as the Treaty of Peace and Pi-iendship-not com-
merce-with Spain, May z3rd, 1667. The industry of those advising
me has unenrthed, however, a very early copy of that particulai-
treaty with Spain : the çopy isdatcd 1686 and appears in a volume
which will be made availabIe to the Court, headed "Several treatics
of Peace and Commerce concluded betwecn the late King of blessed
memory deceased and other Princes and States", and what 1 desired
to cal1 attention to was, for the sake of üccuracy and cornpletion,
that in that volume tlie Treaty with Spain of 1667 iç set out and in
that volume it is described as "Articles of Peace, Commerce and
,411iance"-commerce, of course, being the word on which 1 found.
Itis quite artificial1 submit, to argue, as Mr. Fitzmaurice argues,
that an articlc sudi as Arîicle X of the 'ïreaty of 1886, inasmuch as
it only relates to commercial matters, does not include the whole of
these commercial trcatics, including in those commercial treaties
articles like Article 16 of the Danish Trelty, which are designecl REPLI' OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 11153
465
have said as a judicial expression of opinion in favour of thc view
for which 1 am ccintending. namely, that through the medium of
Article X, I can rely ripon the provisions, for example, of Article 16
ofthe Danish Treaty of 1660. What Judgc McNair said on page rzz
of the record of the judgment ofthe Court and of the individual opinions
of some of the learned judges, was thiç:
"Unquestionably, if the jurisdiction of the Court jn this case
had already heen established and if the Court was now dealing
with the merits, the United Kingdom would be entitled to invoke
against Iran the most-favoured-nation clause, Article 9 of the
Angla-Persian Treaty of 1857, for tlze purpose of clairning the
benefit of the provisions of the Irano-Danish Treaty of ~934 as
to the treatment of foreign nationals and Zheir property."
Now, 1 submit that the iearned judge is saying in tems what I am
submittlng to-day-saying exactly what 1 am submitting-and Judge
Hackworth, on page 139, says, in my submission, precisely the same
thing :
"1 readily agree with the majijority that the most-favoured-
nation provisions of the earlier treaties, and the provisions of the
later treaties are inter-rclated and rnust be considered together
in order that benefits under the latter may be claimed."
The Court did not decide against the British Government on the
ground that you could not relate the Danish Treaty to the1857 Treaty :
on the contrary, so far as Members of the Court dealt with that par-
ticular problcm, they iniimated, broadly speaking, that tl~eirview was
that you could, iri the passages which I have just quoted, but the
British Governmcnt failed,as 1 have said, because it was held against
them that the Declaration of 1932by the lranian Governrnent did
not ~elate to treaties entered into before that tirne, and the 18Treaty
was a treaty entered into before that tirne. Tliat was the sole reason
wkÿ the British Govemment failed in its argument, and if 1 may just
say tkis, that was what the Court was saying on page Iro, to wliich
Mr. Fitzmaurice also calls attention. Although I wjil not cite the actual
words, itwas only thalthat the Court was saying, namely that the British
Governmeiit could not pray in aid a treaty in 1934sirnply and solely
hecause, for the purpose of the Declaration of 1932, the relevant treaty
wns the r857 Treaty whicli was cntered iiltbefore the 1932 Declar ation
was made by the Iranian Government.
And now, hfr. President and Members of the Court, I desire to offer
a feu; observations on RiIr.Fawcett's conclucling argument on what
Mr. Eitzmaurice described as his fourth argument, the argument, in
other words, fundamental to the British case, that the Greek Govcrn-
ment cannot siicceed in obtaining arbitration unless it can show that
ifthe facts it alleges are true, the treaty provisions of t1886 Tseaty
are broken. My observations will be brief. On page 420 of theCornfile
rendu of the 27th March, he cited an American case, The Ifiterrtat%o.nd
Textbook Com$any v. Pigg. In the course of that case it was
stated that movernent was essential. But what for ? What tlie Court
was there considering was inter-Statecommerce, and 1 underline the
words "inter-State", and the learned j~idgewho dealt with that case
çaid :"If yon are asking whether commerce, can be said to be inter-State commerce, movement between one 'State and at~other iç tlie
distinpishiiig feature of it,"So be it. That does not touch this case:
We are dcaling with commerce, not inter-Statc commerce, and may
1.venture to pve this example. In Londorz we liave a very extensive
market indiamonds. It is carried onby Hatton Garden diarnond dealers,
of whorn the world has probably heard. The dealers in diamonds.go
to a caféor Lyons' teashop, 1 think in Hattoti Garden, sornewhere off
Halborn, and they sit on each sidofthe table and they dealin diamonds,
and they hnnd cIiarnonds one to the other açross a narrow tea-table.
Are they not engagcd in commerce 71s that not commerce ?But where
is the movement there ? 1 suppose there is movement just of t!ie dia-
rnonds across the tea-table from one dealer's pocket to another, but
reaily here there was after al1going to be movenient a£nine stearnships
from Hong Kong and otlier shipyards to Great Britainor to some other
destination, so that it does not rcally advance the inaiter very much
to.say that movement was essential. There was rnovement in plenty
here, if movement iswhat is required.
Mr. Fawcett hased an argument on Article 1 ; Article 1 appears
in t1ze.Hellenic Government's Mernorial at page 48. May 1 çay simply
what Say with regard to Article 1:'there is no mystery about our
arpinent ; it .iç sirnpltliis : yau, the British Governmcnt, so we say
(perhaps wrongly-but that is what our case is)-yqu, the British
Government, by breaking your agreement :with Mr. Ambatielos and
theii preventing hirn from obtaining access to the information he
required to oétain redress from the courts, treated him badly and
unfairly. That is not the 'treatrnent whicl~you mete out to your own
subjects. Now the answer that Mr. Fawcett may desire to make is :
that is the treatment which we mete out to our own subjects. I hope
that is not the ansinrerthat he will ~make,because I am sure it is not
true. In any case it willbe for the arbitratok to decide, but thatis the
case that we makc : the treatment that he got was not the treatment
which was meted out to British subjects-peoplc who were resident
in the United Kingdom. He \vas treated iunfairly and shabbily by
reference to the standards that they can expect and do in point of
fact see observed in treatment of Britisli subjects. That is the short
case on that. It may be a case tEiat we can tstablish ;it may not be
a çase which we can establisl~, but surely lit for the arbitrator io
decide, an. there is no rnystery about what the casc is, and no arp-
ment can bc based upon it in rny subrnission, upon tlie wording of
Article 1, whick clearly does require that foreigners, Greeks, sliall
enjoy the same riglits, privilcges, liberties,favourç, immunities and
exemptions in matters of commerce as British çubjects, and tIiatis
al1 that we say that Mr. AmbatieIos should have got and that iç what
we say ke did not get.
We found our argument dso on Article XV, sub-paragraph 3, of
the Treaty of 1856, and Mr. Fawcett had somc observations to offer
with ®ard to that Article. He cited from a German and s Çwiss
decision as to the meaning of the Free Access CIausc in articles of
this type. 1 would sirnpIy say that really 'his citation did not very
~nucll advance matters. One citation waç, 1 think, to the effect that
such an ariiclc lzas a preciserneaning, and4 thc other citation was to
the effect that jt sliould not bc given an extensive meaning. Let it
be so, 1 want to give it a precise and not ab extensive meaning. And REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE (GREECE)-28 XII53 467
the meaning that 1 want to $ive it is this :if,by withholding infor-
mation from a litigant which in cornmon justice and £aimess you
should rnake available to him, you harnper him in the presentation
of his case with the resuIt that he loses it, in my submksion, within
the rneming of Article XV, you have not ailowed hirn free access.
He bas had access to the courts, but his acceçs haç been hampered
and impeded by the action of the executive authorities of the British
Govemment. Now that is the case. Mr. Fawcett cited MQioraao's case
in the United States. That was the case, the Court will rcrnember,
in which a non-resident alien sought damages in respect of the death
of her husband. Çhe litigated the case, but it w+ found and it was
held that she, as a non-resident dien, was not entitled to the relief
for which she claimed.Itwa held that the statutory provision depriving.
her of reliedid not prevent her from having free access tu the courts,
whiçh she had in fact had, in that she. had been able to argue her
çase asking for relief. That was not a çase in which çomebody had *
abstracted from her information which she would require to put before
the court. That case doeç not, in rny submission, affect this matter
one way or the othcr. If you want to draw an analogy between that
çase and the prksent case, you must assume that the lady desired
to use certain evidence, or was in ignorance of evidence, which, had
shc known of it, die would have wanted to use, that that evidence
was evidence such that ifshe had it availableshecould have established
her clairn to relief, and that the Party whose conduct is complained
of kept that evidence from her and advancecl an argument in support
of his own resistance to her claim before the court which was incon-
sistent with what that evidence would have dernonstrated. If there
had been that circumstance in the case, 1 venture to submit that thc
learned jtidgcs of the Çupreme Court would have detennined the
Maiwano case in a different sense and would have said : no doubt
it is true that the lady had free access to the courts in so far as she
was. entitled to go tl~ere and plead her cause, but she did not have
free acccss in this respect that the authority whose conduct is com-
plained of kept away from her evidence that she required in order
satisfactorilyto bc able to plead her cause, and that is the gistof the '
çomplaint here.
Mr. President, those arc the short observations tkat 1 would make
on Mr. Fawcett's argument. That bnngs me very close to the end of
the argument that I desire to address to you,and it brings me entirely
to the end of the detailed subrnissions that 1 desire to make on the
general arguments advancecî ~vhich I have ventured to charactcrize
as irrelevant tto the real issue which it ibefore you to decide to-day.
I will add just a few more woxds when this particular part of my
address has been translated.
ML. President and Members of the Court, it simply rernains for
me to thank the Court very coràially for allowing me to address it
till seven o'ciock on a Saturday evening, particularly in that rny
address has çonsisted very lafgely of argument which 1 myself have
described as wholly irrelevant. The whole point really here is the
point with which 1 began : what is this daim based upon ? And I
end with that point, and in my submission redly the whole of this
case could be decided in about twenty minutes' consideration. This
is obviouçly witlzout doubt a claim based upon the treaty provisions468 REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKTCE (GREECE)-28 111 53
of the 1886 Trcaty. A difference has arisen with regard to that claim,
The Decltuation of 1926 beyand any shadow of doubt requires that
that clajm sllould be refend to xbitration. Shat jsnot a matter
of discretian-it is a matter of right, and 1 would respectfully ask
the Court to say that I ought to have the relief for which 1 ask.Cer-
tainly, at a later date, the arbitrator can, and indeecl willbe in duty
bound to, go into a11the matters that have been canvassed before
you this week. Really the tvhole kernel and core of this case centres
upon the short point what does theDeclaation mean which is appended
to the Treaty of 1926 ? It requires clairnsbaçed-that is to Say for-
mulated in rcliance-upon articlesof the 1886 Treaty, in the event
of a difference arising,to be referred to arbitration. That is al1 ask,
and 1 respectfully submit that there has been no answer given to
rebut my claim to havc that rnatter disposed of by the arbitration
proceedings for urhicl~1 ask,
Le VICE-PR~SIUENT ,aisant fonction de Président : Je voudrais
~011s demander si vous confirmez lesconclusions que vous avez présentées
dans votre réplique- parce que je voudrais vous demander de prbsenter
les conclusions finales ou bien de confirmer celleque vous avez prksen-
tées au moment de la procédure écrite.
Sir Frank SOSKI~ E Mr. President, the answer is that 1 desire to
confirm the conclusions that we filed. '47O REJOINDER OF MT. FITZYAURICE ;(u.K.)-~o III53
Treaty-that iç, for a claimant sirnply to say that his daim iç based
on the Treatÿ and that therctore the arbitral commission muçt be set
up. Well, of course, invariably, when faccdt with that proposition, tlie
ansrver has to br,that this process of invocation must be subject to
some limitation ; and the limitation admitted, and indeed suggested,
hy our adversaries is that the Court is entitled to prevent an abuse
of its own process and, therefore, if a claimant puts forward as Fieing
based on, a certain treaty a clairn which obvioiisly is wh~lly unrelated
to it, a claim which involves a fraud upon the Court ar some ulterior
motive, suçh as Irilackmail(1 think this waç the example which Sir
Frank Soskice gave), then clearly the Court miist reject the plea that
the claim is based in the way' that the claimant says it is.
The hrst observation 1 would make about this is that itplaces on
a subjective footing and turns into n matterlof appreciation and degree
what ought really to be capable of objective detemination on a scientific
lepl basis. At 'exactlÿ what point, for instance,, does the plea tliat a
claim kas a certain basis becorne so preposterauç that a Court must
reject it ? What is meant by the word "obvious" ? When does a clairn
have an obviouslY improper. motive? And wliat are the tests to bc
applied ? Everything wauld seem to depcpd kery much on general
iiipression and, so we suggest;a. quite impossible degi-ec of uricertainty
would be introduced into the whole matter. t ,,,
However, adopting for present yurposes thk tests and siiggestions put
fonvard by Sir Frank Soskice, 1 !vas particularly struçkhy the fact that,
after adrnitting that the Court had the right' to prevent an abuse of its
process and that it muçt reject anything vexatious in the nature of a
fiction, ,oa claim ~vhichonly involvcd a pretension of being bascd iii
the rnanner aIleged, Sir Fraiik Soskice addecl, as if itwere self-evident,
"but, of course, this case is xoo miles from that". Mr. President, we
maintain that this case is not only not ~oorniles,.it is not even xoo cmç.
from the criteriori which Sir Frank Soskicel put forward. In fact, we
maintain that the description which Sir Frank Soskice gave of the type
of case tliat ought to be rejected, even on. the view which he himçelf
put forward, exactly fitsthe present case and could scarcely have been
more apt. In our earlier statement, we gave the Court in some detail our
reasons for putting fonvard this view, and I'willnot repeat them now.
But 1will Saythat there could Iiardly be a clearer case of claim origi-
nally put fonvard on the basis of the general pririciples of international
law beirig subçeqiiently placed deliberately 'on a cornpletely artificial
treaty basis, in order to found an obligation' to subrnit to cornpulsory
jurisdiction, and Ihus to circurnvent or obsiure the very cvident fact
that if the clairn is put on its proper brisis,(no such obligation exists,
or ever did exist.
I do not belie~~e,Mr. President, that anyone who dispassionately
considers this case, whatever his view as to tlie merits may be, can
doubt tliatwe are here confronted with wha? iç eçsentially a iïctitious
and, so to speak, rnanufactured, basis of clairnlThis,WC think, is brought
out even more clearly-and here'isthe second point 1 wanted to mention
in the present immediate connection-by the fact which has stmck
me, at any rate, al1 through thcse proceedings as 1 have listened to
Me. Rolin and Sir Frank Soçkice,-tliat whenever they touched upon the
merits of thecase (and they did touch vpoil the merits quite considerably),
virtually al1 mention of the Treaty of 1886 yanislied from their arp- REJOINDER OF hW. PITZMAURICE (u.K.)-30 IIIj3 471
~nents ; and also the further fact that when they did try and argue their
complaint on the basis of it being a brcach of the Treaty, an extra-
ordinay element of artificiality and unnaturalness was at once apparent,
wnereas on the footing of the generaI principles of international Jaw, therc
is no difficulty about at least stating Mr. Ambatielos's clairn and thc
nature ofhis cornplailit.
We heard, for instance, the other day from Sir Frank Soskice what
was the real kernel of the Greek complaint. It was the alleged action
of certain 33ritish Government officials in, as it was said, withholding
certain vital evidetice iil the caçe uhen Mr. Arnbatielos was before the
English courts. We say that that has obviously, and on the face of it,
no more to do with the 1886Treaty than if that Treaty were in factthe
famous WIlaling Convention which we have heard so much about.
Indeed, if it hadonly happened that one of the shipssold to Mr. Ambatie-
los had happened tobe a whaling ilessel, 1do not doubt that our adver-
saries would have rnanaged to cite this Whaling Convention in support
of that claim and that citation would have had very little, ifany, morc
relevance to the matter than the 1886 Treaty ha.
IL the cornplaint stated by Sir Frank Soskice constitutes,in fact,
the ,essence of the Ambatielos claim-and that is what he çays-then,
the qucstion it obviously raises, apart from a nurnber of matters of
interna1 English law and procedure, is the applicability of certain
principles of international law concerning the treatment of foreigners
before the courts. Well, now, we shall deal later with the way in which
the history of the case shows its prcscnt basis to be fictitiousand, we
think, abusive, but at any rate, these are the reasons why we maintain
that, even if the criterion put forward by the Hellenic Government
in this case and so ably argued by their advocates, Me. Rolin and
Sir Frank Soskice, isthe correct one-even on tllat basistheir contention
should fail, because we have here what, according to the principle
which they themçelves admit, of not allowing a basis of claim which
would in the circumstances be an abuse of tlie process of the tribunal
concerned, we say that wc have here just such a basis ofclaim.
Now, of course,Mr. President and hfernbers of the Court, we do not
in fact agree.with the view put forward by our adversaries as to tvhat
is the true meaning of the term "based" in the Declaration of 1926.
and as to what is th'efunction ofthe Court in the present proceedings.
'The Court's function, according to Sir Frank Soskice, is merely t6
verify, by what would apparently be a sort of process of superficial
inspection of the clairn,tliat the clairnant does in fact purport to base
his claim on the r886 Treaty, and that this basis of claim is not
obvrously ridiculous ; and if the Court does so verify, then the matter
becomes almost automatically and as of course a matter for the arbi-
trati~n commission, which muçt thereupon be set up.
The effect of this view, we think, would be to deprive the Court of
any real judicial task in these proceedings, whereas in fact the Court
derives itçauthority in the preçent proceedings frorn Article XXIX of
the Treaty of 1926, and under that Article it is the function of thc
Court to interpret the Deciaration of 1926 and to çay how it shouId
be applied. In so faras the interpretation and application of the 1926
Declaration involves detennining whetker a claim is based on the 1886
Treaty, the Court 11as the function of interpreting the latter Treaty:
and should do so, beçause it is necessary iii order to interpret andapply thc Declaration. And the fuiiction of the Court in interpreting
and applying the Declaration is esseiitiallyh judicial one.It constitutes
for dhe Court a substantive task which, in Our submission, must go
heyond mere verification and contral.
The United lCingdom Governrncnt coitends that, since the sole
1egit.imate purpose of any commission set up uilder tlie .Protoc01
attached to the 1886 Treaty, and its sole sphere of campetcncc, would
be to hear and determine disputes or claims concerning the inter-
pretation or execution of that Treaty, the commission should not, in
al1 the circurnstances of this case, be set yp unlesç it is affirrnatively
clear that the claim which is being set up to consider is a claim
genuinely based on the Treaty and not one which reaIly relates to
something else. A finding in this sençe should really be, we think, a
condition precedent ofthe commission being set up at all.
IR short, in our submission, the Court should satisfy itself that
the commission, ifit were set up, would not be called upon to go into
a clairn, the rcal basis of which lies outside the Treaty and whose
connection with the Treaty, if it exists at all, is at the most forrnal
and superficial, not substantid.
If the Court did not do this, itseenis to ils that it would realiy be
'giving the 1926 Declaration a lower status than the other provisions
of the 1926 Trcnty, of,which it has found the lïeclaration to be a part.
lt would be distinpshing the Dcclaratiori from the other provisions
of the Treaty as one which the Court isnot obliged fully to interpret
in order to apply it, but can apply in a certain manner (that is by
setting up the commission os deciding that the parties should do so)
after what 1 have temed a merely administrative inspection and
not an examination or juclicial investigation of the claimant Govem-
ment's allegation that this claim is based on the Treaty-because in
fact nothing more than an inspection is necessary in order to venfy
what cveryone connected with these proceedings has always known,
that the claimant, although he was certainly not doing so in the 1920's
or even in the rg30'çE is now jnvoking thc 1886 Treaty. The whde
question is, is it enough merely to invoke ? We hope the Court will
feel that at this stagc of the case, and especially in view of its history,
and of the trernendous contrast between the basis of clah put forward
in the 1930's and that now put fonuard, he hopc thc Court will fed
that this 1sa case amongst al1 other cases in ~vivhiçh mere invocation
and formulation jsnot enough ; that the claimant should be rcquired
to establish affimatively that his pretension of having a trcaty basis
is justifiedI and that otherwise itwould not be nght to require the
United Kingdom to submit to arbitration ,on wliat might be, and in
otir view is, a purcly fictitious basis of claim.
Mr. Prcsident, hefore I go on to the next part of inÿ argument,
might 1 rnake some observations of a general character whiclz cIoseIy
concern many of the aspects ofthis case ? Our adversasies have accused
us ofseeking to evade arbitration on a technicality. I would first point,
out that this constitutes in çome sense an admission on their part
that they are thcmselves seeking to takc us to arbitration oii a tech-
nicality. Certainly a technicality is involved iii this case, but that
technicality is the supposed application of the 1886 Treaty to this
claim. I Ms. President, 1 now pass to the next stage of my argument, and
here 1 shall deal with Sir Frank Soskice's argument about the allegedly
commercial character of Mr. Ambatielos'ç claim.
The Wniterl Kingdom Govcrnrnent contends that, in order to
diçcharge its burdeil of proof in this case, tvhich the .claimants have
admittccl to esist, and to show tliat the clairn is bascd on the 1886
Treatÿ, the claimnnt Government must at least establish that thc
Treaty deals with the same class or order of subject-matter to which
the claini relates. The general view put fonvasd by the claimants, that
such a rclationsliip exists because the Treaty is a commercial treaty
and the claim of Mr. ArnbatieIos haclits orign in acommercial coiitract
and in a breach of tliat contract, involveç In our view a grriss ersor
.of classification as I explained in my previous statement, and a
noticeable confusion of terms and legal concepts, ineluding a confusion
between the factual origin of the cIairn and its legal foundation. The
facts out of which the claim has arisen may have started with an
alleged breach of contract, but what the clairn actually relates to is
the treatnlent supposed to have been receivcd by Mr. Arnbatielos in
proceedings before the English courts and, so fas as concerns the legal
issues which a claim of this charncter raises, it is irrelevant whether
the proceedings concern a breach of contract, or an action for negli-
gcnce or atiy other form of legal proceeding.
In order to demorlstrate the truc cl~aractei-of tlie Hellenic Govern-
ment's daim out of their QWn rnouths as it rvere,the United Kingdom
Government woulcl particularly ask Members of tllc Court to re-read
in BX&?ISO the Rellenic Government's note of January znd, 193j, which
is Annex R 5 to the Greek Mernorial. This is a particularly able state-
ment of the Greek case, exclusively fram the point of view of general
international law, and Membcrs of the Court wiU find in ita very &il-
ful exposition of the prinçiples of international law involved. Every
one of tlie allegations of fact made by Mi-. Ambatielos in the course
of the present proceerlings are contained i? that nate, but instead of
being related to the 'Creaty of 1886 and instead of invoking clauses
of that Treaty, they are related whoEly an8 exclusively and in detail
to general principles of international law about the administration of
justice which are alone involved,.It is difficult to believe that anyone
can read this particular note and still entertain any doubt as to the
true foundatioil of the Ambatielos clairn frop a legal point of view, or
as to thc artificial and spurious nature qf its supposed' connection
with the 1886 Treaty.
The United Kingdom Government contends that the claimant's
arguments confuse both the existence of certain rigkits and the process
by which those rights are carried out, and also confuses the rights
which the clairnarit may havc had under thc Treaty and the rights which
may arise in conçequence of his exerciscoihis treaty i-ights. That sounds
rathcr complicated, but 1 shalI retu~n to it in connection with some of
Sir Frank Soskice's remarks, and I think it willthen becorne entirely
clear. 1
In any case, if the coi~tentioriçof the claimant Govern~ncnt were
correct, if a rightto engage in commercial activity (wliirk is what the
Treaty essentinllÿ gives)of itséIfentailed thcwide and almrist unlimited
consequences which they contend for, and cbvered the range ofsubject-
matter suggested, then why did it not sufice tu have a treaty simply
1 REJQINDER OF MT. FITZBlAURICE (u.K.)-30 IIIj3 475
conferring on the subjçcts and .citizens of the High Contracting Partics
the right to engage in commercial activities in each other's territories 7
According to Sir Frank Soskice's interpretation ofArticle 1,for instance,
according tu his view of the rneailing, and still more of theimplications,
of the phra5e "matters relating to commerce and navigation", almost
everything would be inclucled, and one çould think of the most ludicrous ,
examples that might be covered by such means. Perhaps 1 might attempt
to give the Court my idea of the kind of case that rnigllt be covered on
that interpretation of Article 1.Well, suppose forinstance that there iç a
Greek lady who is an inhabitant of the United Kingdom, and she gocs
out one n~oriling to do het morning shopping, and while slle is in her
greengrocers, and is engaged in buying something, which, may I ask
Members of the Court to note, would be a cominercial transaction,
through the negligcnce of the shopkeeper she isin some way injured,
and in consequence of that she brings legdl proceedings, and in the course
of those legal proceedings she says that important evidence iswithheld.
Well, I do not know if it woiild çeem to filembers-of the Court that a
daim about that could by any possibility or stretçh of imagination be
regarded as a clah baçed on the 1886 Treaty, yct 1 would ask the Court
to note that although the factsare trivialand ludicrous, in essence tliey
are precisely parallel to the facts of the present case-with one excep-
tion-and 1 want to draw attention to that exception. The exception is
that in the present case the commercial transaction was not between two
private iiidividuals,as it was in the example that I gave, but between a
private Greçk national and a governmcnt, and I venture to suggest that
it is thratfact, that is the point,that is'the reaI essence in inany ways
of the contention which is king put before the Court in this case, that
because the other party to a commercial transaction is the Government,
because of that, then a breach of the contract is in itself a breach of the
Treaty.
Now, Mr. President, we entirely reject that point of view. 1 went into
the rnatter very fullyin my previous statement, and 1 pointed out that
ü government as a party to a contractcannot be in a worse position than
a private person, and just as, in a contract between private perçons, if
there is a breach of tEiat contract, what happens next is that the parties
have their remedies in the courts, and only if there is a denial of justice
in consequence of the attarnpt to prosecute those remedies, does an inter-
national claim arise, so equally is it where the other party to the con-
tract isthe government. The government has every bit as great a right
as a private citizen to require thnt \dien a dispute arises between itself
and a private party, under its own interna1 Isw, the meritç of tliat dispute
hall firstof all be tesfed in itsown courts (and that is a fundamental
principle whicll Is applied throughout tlie world), and that only if the
proceedings in its own courts result in a clenial of justice is there an
rnternational claim, and therefore we maintain that the fact that the
government iç a party to the contract cannot entai1 that the breach
of contract, if it occurred, was itsela breach of a treaty, any more than
in the example which I gave. And of course the subsequent proceedings
are before the courts, and the basis ofa clairn then isthat something has
happened in the courts which ought not to have happened, but that is
not a rnatter on the basis of the treaty at al1; it then becomes a matter
for the application 01 the principles of international law about th? REJOIEDER OF MT. F1TZMAURIC.E '(u.K.)-30 IIIj3
478
and, of course, it is quite illegitimate ta presume-to draw an inference
-from the mere fact that Mr. Arnbatieloç was treated in a certain
way, if I.iewas, fhat the reason for that treatment was the fact that
he was a foreigner. Çuch a presumption is wholly and absolutely
unwarranted, anri if that iç the basis of the Hellcnic Government's
claim, It is essential for tliem to procluce some concrete evidence
beyond mere prcsurnption and inference that there was some forrn
of definite differential treatment. Well, nowj not a shadow of evidence
to that effect kas been produced. Not a shadow of evidence has been
produced that he was subjected to any conditions, restrictions or
regulations of any kind not equally applicable ta British subjects,
or that his alleged uniair treatment waç in any way attributable to
his not being a British subject, or that any element of discrimination
on gounds of nationality came into the matter at all. This 1s rnost
material, because three of the articles of lthe Treaty on which our
adversaries have principally relied in the piesent connection, namely,
Articles 1, XII and XV, give national treatment and ilot one whit
more, Well, naw, what, for instance, were the taxes, impostç, obli-
gations,and so under Article XII which were irnposed on the claimant
but not on British subjects 7 There sirnplgr,were rzot any.
Again, as regards Articlc XV, paragra 113, we find this statement
on page 466 of thetrançcript of Sir Frank !oskice's speech. After saying
that he wanted to gve this provision a precise and not an extensive
meaning, he said that the meaning he wanted to give it was this
(1 quote) : l
"If, by withholding information from a litigant whick in cornmon
justice and fainiess you shoiild make avaiIable to him, you hamper
hirn in the presentation of his case, with thc result that he loses
it, in rny siibmission, within the rneqning of Article XV, you
have not allowed him free access. He has had access to the courts
r but his access has been hampered and irnpedcd by the action
of the executive authorities of the Bsitisli Government. Now
that isthe case."
Well, ifthat is not an extensive meaning of the notion of free access,
1wodd like toaçk what is.Moreover, these observations of Sir Frank
Soskice's exhibit al1 the usual fallacies, alid are a good example of
the tendenc of our adversaries to quote provisions in part without
giving the f1.11text. Sir Frank Soskice says that by reason of the
alleged witlihoidlng of evidence, Rgr. Arnbatielos was not given free
access, in the sense of completely free access, but Article XV, para-
graph 3, does not speak of free acceçs in the çense of "free withoul
lirnit".It speaks of free access not subjeçt to any conditions or restric-
tions not equally irnposed on native subjects. Tnorder to make good
his point, Sir Frank Soskice would have had to sliow that the alleged
withholding of evidence was sornething which was done to Mr. Amba-
tielos but which would not have been doné inlike circurnstances to
a British subject. Only on that basis, if at ail, could he bnng himself
witliin the terrns of Articlc XV, yaragraph 3, and of that there is
not one scintillaof elidence. Furthermore, the withholding of evidence
çould nofconstitute in itseif a coildition or restriction on access. It
rnight be a wrongful act if the withholding was improper, but not
one which the Treaty renders wrnngful; an/ in any case, a wroilgful REJOINDER OF MT. FITZYAURICE (u.K.)-30 III53 4779
act ad hoc iç a ivholly different conception Eroln wliat is obviously
rneant by a condition or restriction undcr Article XV, paragraplr 3,
Fiilally, the whole idea that failure to produce certain evidence in
the corirsc of proceedings before thc courts constitutes a restriction
'on access is a misconception of the idea of access, and contrary to
the whole trend of the authorities on the subject of what is involved
by free access. The effcct of this conception is to cxtend a simple and
well-understood notion, the notion of access, into sometlzing thc exact
limits and bearing of which would bc quitc indetermillate and certainly
very wide.
Mi-. Fresident, rnight I make clear one point which did not corne
out quite clearly in the most cxcellent translation which bas just been
givcn 7 What 1 süid in the prcvious section of my statetnent was that,
i.it was possible to bring the casc of MT. Ambittielos within the free
access clause at all, itcould only he done if it could bc showiz that
he had not received the sarnc trcatme~it as a British national would
have donc, and if evidence to that effect was produçed. Of course, as
Iwent on to say, it is not Our view chat the case can be brought within
the freeaccess clause, because iri our view thc frce access clause meanç
çirnply access to the courts, and çannot possibly bc read as covering
ailthe various things that rnay happen in thc coursc of litigation after
the individual concernecl has lzad his free access.
Well now Mr. President, itappears to us that on andysis Mr. Arnba-
tielos'sclajrnreally isthat, dthorigh he had access, he did have access
on the same terms as nationals, yet the subsequent treatrnent he received
was unfair, unjust and inequitable. But, of course, wc say that that
is a matter whicll does not raise any issue on the Treaty but does raise
issues under ~veii-knownptinciples of generaI international law, and
itis the same with the older treaties. Even asçuming for tllc moment
that the provisions of thesc treaties cited by our adversaries cnn be
attracted by a most-favourcd-nation clause on commerce and navigation,
a study of them ivill show that tliey really confer eithno more thnn the
free access to the courtwhicl~ thc r8S6 Treaty confers,or, alternativcly,
that they only confer a right to the henefit of the ordinary processes
of justice on thesame terrns as nationals. Thegr confer no special rights
on foreigners but merely placc thcm on the sarne footing as nationals.
Since 'Mr. Ambatielos has, beyoiid vague statements and degations,
produced no eviderice of discrimination against hitn as a foreigner, it
al1 necessarilycornes back to the sarne point. His claim js infact that
the treatment he received was so incquitable as to amount to s denial
of justice under international law. Alternatively, it may be s plea that
the procedure of the English courts is so defective as not to measure
up to the minimum standard of law and justice rcquired hy interna-
tional law. Those may well be his contentions, but, if they are, they
are pure general international. law contentions, and the basis of the
claim isthat of a pure general international lawclaim, and the supposed
basisin the Treaty of 1886 isreally non-existent and patently fictitious.
In order to illustrate that,1 corne to a point tu which I attach grest
importance. I mentioned it in rny previous speech, and 1 did so
in order to draw attention to some of the absurd results which the
Hellenic contention, if it waç valid, would lcad to. 1 gave an example
a short time xgo, but now rnay 1 give another, which 1 did refer to in
my carlier statement, One rcsult which the Hellenic contention would , In so far,on tlieother hand, as thcsc pro'visiorisin tlic oldcr treaties
are ilot commercial in character andare alleged by our advcrsaries to
involve treatment in accordance with generallinternational law principles,
thcy cannot in principle be attracted by a rnost-favoured-nation clause,
and in any case çould nat bc attracted by a mwt-favoured-nation clause
such as ArticleX ofthe Trcaty oi 1886, which dealssolely with commerce
and navigatiotz.
We thereforeçay that, even if itbe held that thc treaties cited in the
preseentcase guafantee, as our adversarics have suggested, treatment
"in accordance witk the principles and praçticeofordinary international
law" and even if it be held that such treatment could be attracted by
a most-favoured-natioii clause, if drafted in sufficiently wide tems,
suçh as Article IX of the Angla-Iranian Tceaty of 1857 which 1 citcd
the other day, yet it still does not fellow 'that all the rights granted
under tlie treatiesbctween tlzeUnited Kirigdom and the other countries
in the present case can be attracted by a most-favoured-nation clause
drafted in the much more lirnited rnanner of Article X of the Treaty of
1886 ;and we say that these rights iii the other treaties could it~fact
only be attracted by Article X in so far as theg relate to mattess of
comrncrce, and that in so far: as they relaie to niatters of commerce,
they do not relate to the claim of MT. Ambatielos, to its real essence.
Now on this point, aEtha~ighSir Frank Soskice,T.think, misinterpreted
our position eritirely, we have, or wc think wdIiave, the clearest authority
of the Court itself iii tAqEo-Iranian casc.1We there, iT might venture
to'remind the Court, advanced the proposition tliat since it nlight be
the case that countries whiclt 1zacEtreaties witli lran subseqiieilt to
1932 cuuld invoke the Iraninn Dcclaration acceyting the Optional
Clause, and since it miglzt also be tlie case tliat countries which had
treaties with Iran prior to 1932 çould not invoke this Dcclaration, the
former couutries might be considered to bei iii a privileged position as
cornparcd xvith the latter countries ;and on that hasis, we argiied that
Deiimark's positioii from the jurisdictional point of vielv-she beii~g
one of the countries+that had thc later tre,aties (and I ernphasize her
position from the jurisdictional po~ritofview)-might be in aprivileged
positioti aconiyarcd ~vitli.the United Kingdom, which only had a treaty
anterior to 1932,so that the United Kingdom would not be in the position
of the moçt favoured iiatioii, despite its most-favoured-ilation clause
with Iranin the Treaty of 1857 ; and as part of this propositionWC did
rely on Article TX of the1857 Treaty, under whicli Iran grants inost-
favoured-nation treatlnent to the subjectp and commerce-but the
subjects geirerally as weIl as the commerce-of the Uriited Ringdom.
But now the Court rejected our argument, preciselJ? on tlic ground that
a most-favoinred-nation clause concerning the treatrnent of subjects
and commerce did not cover jurisdictional patters (that içto say such
matters werc not mattess not relating to the treatrnent ofsubjects and
commerce), and therefore itis quite plain,: so itseerns to us,on the
authority of the Courtitself,and thisis our present proposition in whicli
we tkiink WC arc following the Court, that apost-favoured-nation clause
on one subject çannot attract the benefits of other treaties relating to
ather subjects, for in the AngLo-lraniavt case the Court found that
rnost-favoured-nation clauses relating to subjects and commerce could
11ot attract riglits ofa jurisdictional character under other treaties.
Tn so far,therefore, as the treaties betweej the Uriited Kingdorn and REJOINDER OF ML. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-30 III53 483
the other counfries cited in this case relate to matters other than com-
merce, we submit that tkey cannot be attracted by Article X of the
Treaty of 1886, which pnts most-farroured-nation treatment only
in matters relating totrade, commerce and navigation.
Before S corne to the final conclusion of my statement which I want
to put before the Court, may 1 say a word about the actual provisions
of çome of these older treaties.
A new batclz of them has been cited ata very Iate stage of this case,
when it is dificult for us ta comment on them in detail without uiiduly
prolonging ilie proceedings,but I willSay a little, tkough only a very
little.
First, as Sir Frank Soskice was good enough to tell the Court on
Saturday, we have been in communication with London and have had
the originals of these treaties in the Public Record Office inspected.
We shall in due course furnish the Court with photostats of these
originals. In no case, so we are told, do tlie keadings of the differeiit
articles,rvhich apparently appear in the British Handboolc of Com-
mcscial Treaties in the rgIz editioc, figurein the originals. Nor do
they figure in subsequent editions of the IIandbook of Commercial
Treaties, such asthe 1924 and 1930editiotzs which we have here.
Similarly,we are unaware at present whether the titles of these treaties,
ascited in the paper whicfi was drawn up on behalf of the claimant
Government, appear in the originals or not, but that, of course, we
shall verify,and it will appear from the phatnstatic copies which we
shall submit to the Court. In any case we submit to the Court that
headings of an editorial character introduced into a particularedition,
it may be by someone really with no higher status or legal knowledge
than a printer's assistant, can have no significance. Now, the point
is that some of these headings are dehitely rnisleading in regard to
some of the provisions quoted. For instance, ArticIc r, paragraph 6,
of the Treaty of Japan of Ign, yhich is headed "Administration of
Justice", is sirnply an ordinary clause for free accon the same condi-
tions as nationals in tems very like, and almost identical with, Arti-
cle XV, paragraph 3, of the 1886Treaty. The sarne applies to Article 7
ofThee BolivianfTreatyofof91911, we suggest, iscompletely irrelcvanl.
It merely definesthe circumstances in which diplornatic intervention
can take place. If the individuals concernecl have legal remedies in
the courts, diplornatic intervention iç prohibitcd, in effect, untii such
remedies have been exkausted. But if there is evidence of a denial of
justice, or other violation of international law, then intervention is
pemissible. But this provision in noway creates any rlghtsas to denial
of justice orasto international law: it merely refers to therIt simply
regulates the procesç by which certain existing international law rights
cm be protecteE dt.doesnot create those sights as such and therefore
no sucli rights could be, by virtue oa treaty like the Boiivian Treaty,
attracted under a rnost-favoured-nation clause in another treaty.
Generally, theprovisions of theother treaties quoted, such as Arti16e
of the Danish Treaty of 1660A ,rticle 24 of the Danish Treaty of 1670,
Article 8 of the Swedish Treaty ofr654 ,rticle 6 of the Swedish Treaty
of 1661, confer no more than a right to the bcnefit of the ordinary
processes of justice according to tlze lawsand usages of the country,
i.e. national treatment. 1 find here a volume conveniently left for me l
484 REJOINDER OF Air.FITZMAURIÇE~ (u.H.)-30 IIIj3
4
by Sir Frank Soskice in svhichthe Treatÿ with Denmark of 1670 figures,
and Article 24 says : I
"Botli Parties shall cause justice and equity to be admi~iistered
to the subjects and people of each other according to the laws
, and skitutes of either country." 1
And that, in our view, takcn in the context and inselatioii to the period
in which this provision was drawn up, simaly means the benefit of the
ordinary processes of the laws and procedure of the country on the
same tems as nationals.And on that basis, even if these provisions
could be regarded as incorporated by reference into the Treaty of 1886,
under the most-favoured-nation provision Gealing with commerce and
navigatioi-i, they would still not touch the seal essence ofMr. Ambatielos'ç
complaint, as it was expressed by Sir Frank Soskice il1 the passages
I quoted. Mr. Ambatielos's complaint, as have snid su irequeiltly(1
am sure the Court must be almost tired of hearing it), is that the pro-
cesses of the Court were inherently defective or, alternatively,that they
were so employed and adrninistered as to result in a denial of justice.
It cannot be rnaintained that ke was deniea access or not allowed to
use these processes, and in tkis connection, although lwehavc refraiiied
far more studiousiy than our adversaries have from going jt~tuthe merits,
we have ventured to point out tliat Mr. dmbatielos did fail to avail
himself of tlie variouç processes afforded by English procedure for
compelling the production of documents or the calling of witnesses,
whiçh might have procured hirn tlie evidence lie says was irnproperly
withheld. On the. ùasis of the real essencofhis cornplaint, it is apparent
that lie in fact received al1 that the older treaties rnight specifically
have conferred upon hirn,even if they weie relevant, and were to be
regarded as incorporated in the 1886 Treaty. His complaint relates
te something which iç iiot covered by those trcaties, nor by the 1886
Treaty, but wliich is covered by the general'principles of international
law on wliich liis clairn is really based.
And in conclusion, before I corne to the final rernarks I want to
make, I would venture to rernind the Court of ny arg~meiit that the
provisions of thesc older treatics muçt, in, any case, be read in the
light of the circnrnstances which existed when thcy were entered into
and of the developments in general international law which have
taken place slnce. 1 do not think the Decla~ations cited by OUT adver-
saries in some sense rc-affirming these treatieç as such, affect my
argument, for we have Iicvcr suggested thnt the treaties as suck are
not stili in force.Ire,have only said that certain particular provisions
of tliem arc, by reason of the considerationk 1 have mentioned, spent
or obsalesçent or, in practice, inoperative.
&Ir.President and Mernbers of the Court! before I step down from
the rostrum and give placc, either this marning or this afternoon, to
my collectgucMs. Fawcctt, 1 would lilce to' make one or two off-the-
record reniarks to the Court-althougli, of course, 1 fully realize that
in this Court no rernarks are off the record.
E would like just to try and pinpoint for thc Court what it isthat
the United Kingdom is reaHy trjring to say,to the Court in this case.
What we are trying to Say is that the Court has hefore it oti the
present occasion an eçsentialiy fictitious b+iç of claim, and that, In
the view of the United Kingdom-or rather, if 1 may so put it, theUriitcd ICiilgdom requests the Court, in those circumstances, not to
find that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to submit that
claini on that basis to arbitratiori. And 1 venture to think that the
basis of clairn put forward is not only fictitious,but a peçuliarly
vexatious and dangerous one, because the effect of it would be to
expose countries to attack in respect of the processes of their courts
and of the gcneral administration of justice in their countries through
the mcdium of ordinq commercial trcatieç. Now, al1 coiintries have
a nataral reluctance to hnvc discussed in an international court, and
to havc ventilated there, wllat goes on in theircourts, and as to the
result and outcorne of particulas cases. That reluctancc is not in any
way discreditable-it is natural-and it applies equally whether the
country concerned haç a highly developed syçtem of law of procedure
or whether it has a less highly devclopcd system. The reluctance in
qucstion is quasi ziniversnl.
Now, as rcgards the present daim, lvc liarre studiously avoided
going into the merits on the present occasion, exsept to the extent
that we were literally compelled to do so by certain observations of
our adversaries, but if the Court will-as I hope it will-look again
at parapaphs 17-76 of our original Counter-Mernorial, J bclieve that
they will see that the United Kingdom Government, not being, as
it conceiveà, under any obligation to arbitrate thjs claim-they will
see urhy the United Kingdom Covemrnent was unwilling to do so,
because itseemed clear that the case was one which was fundarnentally
dcvoid of merits. And 1 think the Court will ah understand the reason
why the Unitcd Ringdom Government, not being under an obligation
to arbitrate, as it thoiight, and no sucli obligation bcing at the time
suggested, either on the basis of the 1886 'I'xeatyor on any other
hasiç, felt justified in refusing to submit the claim voluntarily to
arbitration whcn, after the lapw of a very considerable number of
years, that rcquest was made.
Rut, Mx. Prcsident, however reluctant we inight have been, we
should naturally have gone to arbitration if we had been under an
obli&tion to do so. We did not think rve were and we do not think
we are now. We hope that the Court will find that the present bais
of claim is inadeqiiate aild in al1the circurnstances of t11icase, having
regard to its history, suspect as to its genuineness. And we hope the
Court will find that the United Kingdom should not be asked to
arbitrate the daim un that basis.
And, nomr, rnay 1 state in one sentence what seems to us to be the
fallûcy, the fiction involved in the wliole basis of clairn put forward.
by the Hellenic Governrnent in this case. The fallacÿ is simply this :
that the administration of justice isa matter of commerce and navi-
lation ; we say it is not, and that it never cm be, and we hope the
kourt in itsjudgment will give effect to that principle.
I thank the Court very muck for the patience with which they
have listened to us. REJOINDER OF hlr. FXWCETT (u.K.)-30 III53 487
thiç kind are of a persuasive atithority and very worthy of the Court's
consideration.
Now I will turn to tlie questiori ofthe exliaustion of local remedies.
The Court will remernber that Mc. &lin gave it as his opinion that
this is amatter for consideration by the Court at this stage, and with
this view the United Kingdom Govcrnmeilt entirely agrees. and 1
it would mean that tlze United Kingdom rnight be subjected to annot so,
oxder for arbitration even before the claimant liad begun to seek a
rernedy, through the processes available to him in the Englisli courts,
and this coula not reasonably be said to have been the intcntion of .
the Treaty. I hope to deal with this quite shortly, and 1 çhall try to
show the Court that there is no question of English law that they
have to decide here. The parties, as 1 think 1 can show, are reaUy
agreed about what the position is undes English law on the material
part of the case, ai17 1 shall try to say what that position is. 1 shall
also ç110wthat tliere Es,as a fact before this Court, the non-exhaustion
of local rernedies by Mr. Ambatielos. 1 Say "as a fact" because the
legal consequenccs are, of course, a çeparate question, and 1 shall
açk the Court to consider what the efiect of that fact is on the present
claim as a question of international law.
1:do not think it isin dispute that Rlr. Ambatielos did iiot appeal to
the House of Lords against the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing
his application to cal1 additional evidencc and that he lodged, but did
not pursue, an appeal from the Ahiralty Court to the Court of Appeal.
1 have now to deal with Sir FrankSoskice's arguments on thcm points,
and put forward Our own in answer.
Let mc start, then, with the question of Mr. Ambatielos's right of
appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Rouse of Lords.
Sir Frarik Soskice pointed out that in deciding rifhether to admit new
evidence the Court of Appeal waç exercising a discretion. He then
went on-1 am referring to pages 445 to 447 of hiçspeech-:
Ian appellate court is very slow indccd-and reluctant-to interfere
with tlze decision on a mntter of discretion of the court below".
I
With that ive agree.
I Sir Frank Soskice continues
"1 am not arguing before you that an appcllate court willnmer
interfereon a rnatter of discrction ripon which the judge below
has decided, but broadly speaking an appellale court wi11 not
interfere unless itis pcrfectly clear that the jtidge in the court
bclow, in exercising hiç discretion, proceeded to exercisc Iiisdis-
cretion upon some mistakcn priiiciple of lalv",
I and he goes on
"It is perfectly true that in Edam v. BarClam,the House of
Lords did say that thcre is an overriding discretion in an appellatc
court, even on a matter of diçcretion on whick thc judge below
decided to interfere, if tlie general requirements of justice so require.
It isinpractice-and 1do not know whether this submission would
comrnend itself to Judge McNair and whether it would coincide
with his experience-ver? difficult, if the court below lias proceeded upon principles of ldw as to which criticism can not bc directcd,
to satisfya co~rrt of apped or tlie House of Lords that they aught
to interfere."
Now, 1wilE,if I may, read thc two passages frorn the dccision in the
House of Lords in Evams v. Bartlam to wllicb Sir Frank Soskice, 1
think, is rcfening. Lord Atkin çaid :
"While the appellate court in the exercise of itsappellate power
is no doubt entirely justified in saying that norrnally it will not
interfere tvith the exercise of the judges' discretion except on
grounds of law, yet if it sees that on, other gro~inds the decision
will result in injusticebeing done, it has both the power and the
duty to remedy it."Lord Wright çaid : "It is clear that the Court
of Appeal should not interfere with the discretion of the judge
acting within his jurisdiction unleçs the Court is clearly satisfied
that he was wrong, but the Court is not entitled sirnply to say
that, ifthe judge had jurisdiction and had al1 the facts before him,
the Court of Appeal cannot review his ordcr unIess hc is shown to
havc applied a wrong one. The Court must, if necessary, examine
ailew tlzerelevant facts and circurnst+ces in order to exercise bx
way of review a discretion which rnay,reverse or Vary the order.
Now, that YS what thc House of Lords said, and 1 tkink Sir Frank
Soskice was very accurately surnmasizing iton Satiirday, and 1 think
the mle can be çhortly stated in this way, where the lower court is exer-
cising adiscretion in corningto its decision, and it exercises this discretion
on a mistaken principle of Zaw, then that exercise of discretion is wrong,
and the appellate courts will intervene.
I think it isquite clcar frorn Evans v. bartlam tliat al1 thisclpplics
to appeals from the Court of Appeai to the Hnuçc ofLords, and 1 think
Sir Frank Soskice was ço reading it.
That ir the principle of the English law dpplicable to the case before
us. The appellate courts, ii~cluding the Housc of Lords, are sIorv and
reluctant to intcrfere with a discretionary decision of thc lower court,
unless it was exercisecl upon a mistaken pnnciple of law. 1 think 1
cm say that both Partics here are agreed that that is the correct yrinciple
of English law. I
Mr. President, corning to tht; case hcfor-eus, zvliat Sir Frnnk Soskice
said, if 1 underçtood him rightly, and what, indecd, Sir Hartley Shaw-
cross was saying at page 303 of his specch 1st year-though, of course,
he of necessity was dealing witk this l-inintlvery briefly-was not that
the House of Lords could wot havc overruled the decision ofthe Court
of Appeal in this case, but only that it would have been very difficult
to persuade the Rouse of Lords tcr interfere. T think, to be quite fair
to Sir Frank So'skice, that he did say that there would have becn no
cllance of the House of Lords interfering., In athcr words, both Sir
Frank Soskice and Sir Hartlcy Sha~vcrosç,and ttiere cnn be few Iiiglier
authorities to address the Court on this point, arc both agreed that
the House af Lords was campetent to hcar an appeal fr~m the Court
of Appeal's decision in this case. Eut they say, in eîfect, that the
House of Lords would not liave upset the Comt of Appeal's decision,
os, in Sir Rank Soskice's language, there wovld Iiave bcen 11nchance
of the House of Lords interfering.
I REJOIWDER OF 311rFAWCETT (u.K.)-30 III53 4g1
those cited in the Greek Memorial, in paragaphs 73 arid74 of the Caunter-
Memorial, and I do not wiçk to weary the Court with them now. But
1 think the Court wjll see immediatcly that it iç fachere with a cornplete
contradiction in the HelIenic Government's position. The Hellenic
Government, in itç&!iemorial,ssaying that the Court of Appeal's decision
was contrary to the precedents and usual practice of the Court : by its
Counsel itis saying here that appeal to the Housc of Lords would have
failed for preciscly the opposite reason-that the Court of Appeal had
exercised itç discretion in accordance withprinciple.
Now wtiat is the consequence of tliis I woiild put it this way :The
Court must resolvc that contradiction in one of two ways-eitl-ier it
rnust hold, on the <murnption tkat the plea in the Greek Mcrnorial
(and that is the fourtli allegation imy summary) istrue md justified-
tkat is,that the Court of Appeal did act on a mistaken principle of
law ; then it isplain, on the principle of English law on which we are
al1agreed as regards appeal to the Hoiise of Lords, that Mr. Ambatielos
could, and should, have appealed. Or, the Court muçt, in my submission.
hold that that plea and thc fourth allegation have been in effect with-
drawn by Sir Frank Soskice, who has corne to tellthe Court that the
Court of Appeal followed prececlent, and it is fortliatreason that appeal
to the House of Lords would have had no cllance of succeçs, and it is
for that reason that this remedy which we say he had was ineffective.
Mr. Presidcnt, if 1 inay I will refer briefly here to the question of
Mr. Ambatielos's appeal to the Court of Aypeal against the decision
af the Admiralty Court; andSir Frank Soçkice saidof that 011page 445
of his speech :
"lliithout the cvidence which we say the British exeçutive,
not judicial, authorities wrongfull~r withheld from the Court and
from us, there would have bccn very Littlechatteeindeed of inducing
the Court of Appeal to take a different view on thc facts fram
that reached by Mr. Justice Hiil after aprolanged enquiry lasting
for the period that I indicatecl",
ancl again on page 448$lie says :
"Without the furtlier evidcilce which we say was wrongfully
withheld, there would have been very little, if any, chance of
successfully appealing from Mr. Justicc Hill's judgment."
Now this is an assessrnent ofthe Claimant's cllance of successful appeal
without the additions1 evidence which hc sougl-it the right to produce
on the liearing of his appeal, which has 1 tl-iinthree consequences, '
It is, sa it seems to us, an admission that Mi- Justice Hill'sjudgment
on tlie evidence hefore him was unexccptionable, and I have already,
I Iiope, convinced the Court that the sccond allegation, that he decidecl
against the weight of the evidence before hirn, cannot xeally stand
now in tlie I-Ielleniç Government's claimin face of the failure toappeal
againçt it.
The second çonsequence is that, if RiIr.Ambatielos had been able t@
produce the additional evidence, Sir Frank Soskice gave it as his
opinion that the Court of Appea'l (1 quote) :
".... would undoubtedly have afforded him the relief for which
he counter-clairneci in the action before Mr. Justice Hill". cases where recourse is futile because on fomd groundç there is
no remedy or*no further remedy, for examplc where there is no
appealable point of law in the judgment, but also in caçeç where
on the merits of the claim recoursc isobviously futilefor exarnpIe
where thexe may be appealable points of law, but they are obviously
insufficientto reverse the decision of the Court at first instance."
And I think, Mr. President, that the words "rneritç of the claim there
quite clearly mean the rnerits of the appeal.EwouId respectfully submït
that Judge Bagge iç there saying two things as far as concerns the
present case, and 1 submit that he is laying dom the true test :If
th~re is an appealablc point of law, which we have here, and if appeal,
if successful, would bring about a reversal of the decision of the lower
court, then the rule as to thc cxhaustion of local rernedim applies, and
until that appeal haç been exhausted no international daim can be
brought. In thecase before us, Tthink it is not diçputed that the House
of Lords was competent to hear the appeal, and ML.Ambatielos did
not bring the apped, and our adversaries have not contested our state-
ment that had appeal been brought to the House of Lords and been
successful, a reversa1 of the Admiralty Courk's decision would have
been brought about, and 1 think the passage 1 quoted from Sir Frank
Soskicc's speech, in relation to appealto the Admiralty Court, confirms
it. Now, on the Hellenic Government's view, the Court of Appeal had
excluded evidence vital to their case in circumstances which showed
clearly that they have either violatedome rule ofprocedure or had gone
against the precedence, in other words tliey had acted on a mistaken
principle of law. There is plainly, on any natiiral meaning of words,
an appealable point of law.
As to the second point, the appeal, if successful, must bring about
a revcssal of the decision of the lower court, and 1 will not weary the
Court with repetition, but 1think itplain thatthe whole case is confined
solely to the L&g-Maclay letters,wliich were not produced. That was
the allegcdly vital evidence which the Courtof Appeal refused to admit,
and1think I can faidy say tthat it must folIow, on the Hellenic Govern-
ment's case, that, had the letters been admitted, a reversal of the
Admiralty's Court's decision would have been the result.
And now, Mr. Presidet~t and Members of the Court, before 1 finish,
under English law, and then 1 summarywillwstate four short propositionsn
showing the way in which we believc the Court should apply thc
accepted niles as to exhaustion of local remedies ta this case. We Say
that, having regard to the position inEnglish law,and to the facts of the
case, there are really only two alternatives: either tkc Greek Mernorial
must be acccptcd, and it must follow that the appeal wouId have
had a cllance of çuccess, and in that event the claimant cannot be held
Dohave exhausted his local rcrnedies, or it must bc held with regard
to Sir Frank Soskice's statement of the position, that there was an
effective remedy, that is to say, there was an effcctivc remedy witkin
the meming of Judge Bagge's rule which 1 quuted. There waç an
effective remedy for the further season that, the essenct of the case
on thc exhaustion of local remedies being the refusal of the Court of
Appert1to admit the Laing-Maclay Ietters and tcstimony, at that stage
the alleged withholding of cvidetîce hy the Crown was no longer oper-
33ative, for the Laing-Maclay letters and ttstimony were, of course, at
that stage in the control of Mr. Arnbatielos. Now, Mr. President, lask
the Court to fmndthat ML.Ambatielos &d no1exhaust the local rernedies
available, and 1 go on to state the four propositions. We state first,
andin general, that the Hellenic Government isnot entitled to have
its daim on behalf of Mr. Ambatielos refened to international arbi-
tration under the 1926 Declaration in view ofthe fact tllat Mr. Ambatielos
dicl not exhaust his local rernedies. Secon:, if there was a breach of
the 'Treaty in respect of the Hellenic Government's first allegation,
that is, breaches of English law obligations by the Crown, then in so
far as the daim is being brought in the terrnsof the 1926 Declaration,
on behaIf of a privatc pesson, Mr. Ambatielos, it is not arbitrabic ai
this time in view of the fact that he did not/exhaust kis local rernedies.
Third, there can bc no breach of the Treaty at all, and therefore no
daim based on the Treaty, within the mealning of the Declaration, in
respect of allegations arnounting either to a ,denial of access or denial
of justice until local rernedieshave been exhausted such asa right of
appeal. The have not been exhausted andlthere is therefore no claim.
Fourth. i?it is said that the Hellenic Goyernrnent is entitled to rely
on an earlier treaty, and the Court so holds, by operation of Article X,
and that earlier treaty is held to embody ieither the general ruleç of
international law or provisions relating to'the administration of justice,
or to the grant of justice and right, or çi+lar provisions, then there
cm egually be no breadz of those niles or provisions and therefore
no daim based on the Treaty, since Mr. ~4batielos has not exhausted
the semedies available to him, remedies wlzich, as 1 should point out
tu the Court, are in certsin caseç expr'esslyprovided for hy the treaties
as requiring exhaustion before the trcaty apphes. The Unitcd Kingdom
Government therefore askç the Court to ko\d that the non-exhaustion
of local remedies by ML.Ambatielos is a substantive gound for refusing
an order for arbitration in this case. 1
1have sought to avoid going into the merits throughout this arp-
ment. I have tried to put it entirely othe b%sisof the Hellenic Govern-
ment's case as we find it in the pleadings, but there is no effective
remedy within the meaning of the rule upon their case, and that in.
our view is sufficient at this stage to bar anlorder for arbitration. But,
remedyrseon the merits, that is, thc ultirpate rnerlts beenofo the case,
because, as we say, Rfr. Ambatielos had no case at all. It may well
be that the rerncdy ive describe was not effective, but of course that
is not relevant at this stage. That is rny argument Mr. President, and
1 thalik the Court for the patient hesring it (AGENT OF THE GOYERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM)
.4TTHE PUBLIC SITTING OF MARCH 30th, 1953, AFTERWOON
Mr. President, RIembers of the Court :
Iwish first to say something in reply to the rernarks made the othcr
day by Sir Frank Snskice on the question of the delay in bringing the
present proceedings. Then 1 shall give the Court a very brief summary
of the United Kingdom's arguments in the case and, iastly, 1shall
present the Court \vit11Our final conclusions.
Now, Sir Frank Sosklce submitted that the question of delay was
not relevant to the present proccedings. As ta this, let me say that,
in our submission, it is a question which the Court should consider
in these proceedings because it goes directly to the questioii whetker .
the United Kingdom should submit the Ambatielos claim to arbitration,
and we believe that wl~enthe Court, inits judgment on the Freliminary
Objection, said that tlie question of delay waç a point to be considered
with the merits, they referred to the merits of the Hellenic Govern-
ment's application, which gives rise to the present proceedings, and
that therefore they consider that the point should be taken into'
account now.
, Mr. President, wc think that Sir-Frank Çoskice misunderstood Our
argument and our attitnde on this question of delay. Ive admit that~
there has not yet been established any absalute rule of prescription
under which, after a fixed period of time, thc right to commence
proceedings bbeforethis Court is barred. What we lzave contended-
and it is,we think, a legitimate contention-is tliat delay,unless it
canbe Zully justified tand after al1 it does take somcthirzg to account
satisfactorily fora delay of nearly thirty years), that delay is a factor
which the Court is entitled to take into account in deciditlgwhether
the claim isonc in respect of rvhich the Unitecl Kingdom Governmcnt
should be required to subrnit to arbitration. It is a matter of equity.
May I refer the Court to yaragraph 108 of the United Ringdom
Counter-Memonal and ta the two statements there of the principles
which we subrnit to be applicable.
The Umpire in the Gsnti~ztcase whidî jsreported in Ralston's reports
on the Veneznelan arbitrations, 1903, said :
, "Tlie principle of prescription finds its foundation in the highest
quit y. The avoidance of possible injustice to the defendant, the
claimarit havir~ghncl ample time to bring his action, and therefore
if hehas lost havingonly his own negligence to accuse."
Again, the Commissioner in the WilZiams case, which is reported
in Moore's HistoricaE Dig~st ofJnter.nalio~zaAlrbitrathns, to which the
I United States has been a Party, said :
"The causeless withholding of a claim against a Statc until,
Jnthe natural order of things, the witnesscs to the transaction are
dead, voucheri lost, and thereby thc means of defense essentially HEJOINUER OF Mi'. EVA-iS (~.K.)-~o III53
4gS l
curtailed, is in effect an impairment 'of the right to defend. The
public la~vIn such cases wliere the facts constituting the clairn are
disputes and disputable, presumes a defense."
Now, it isour submission that the Courtishould take these pinciples
into consideration in decidiiig whether the United Kingdom aught to
submit to arbitration in the prescnt case. ,
Now Sir Frank Çoskice had agond deal to say about the respective
moral positions of the two Governments, and he was quite indignant
about thiç, and lie suggested thatifthe poçifionsof the two Governments
were compared it was not the Rellenic ~o+ment which came badly
out of the matter. Rfr. President and Members oftlie Court, we contest
this view. Our adversaries habitiially speakbf a delay of some ten years,
such as that which occurred betweeii the finBing ofthe courts in England
and the first occasion i1933 on which the Il~llenic Government proposed
arbitration as if it were nothing at ail, but in fact it was a very consider-
able peiiod, and the lapse af time was already then in 1933 such as to
prejudice tlie United ICingdom's position. This fact was pointed out in
paragraph 5 of the United Kingdom notc of Novernber th, 1934, wbich
is tobe found as Annex S 4 to the Greek Fernorial. 1want to read that
paragraph, but before 1 do so 1should like {o remind the Court that the
representationç made by the Hellenic Government in 192 j did not
amount to a legalclaim against the United Kingdom Government, but
were only a ~quest to the United ~in~do+ Government, as Sir Frank
Soskice put Itto considcr the matter on a purely friendly basis.Indeed,
it was said in the memorandum which was annexed to the note whicll
the Greek Government presented to the United Kingdom Government
on that occasion, that the finajudgment of a Hritish court unappealed
against closes the transaction frorn s legalgoint of view. That was the
attitude which the Hellenic Government took in 1925,ancl their represen-
tations to the United Kingdom Government,on tliat occasion were much
more in the nature of a request for an ex gratia payment than a legal
claim. Now, these were the considerations iwhich the United Kingdom
Government brought to the attention of the Hellenic Government in
r933 on thk question of delay.1 read parapaph 5of the United ILingdorn's
note : ,
"Although the events in this case t~ok place between the years
rgr9 and 1922, it was not iintil more khan ten years later that the
Greek Government took any steps resembling th? presentation of a
clalm against His Majesty's Governm~nt. While the matcrial now
at the disposal of His Majesty's Governmcnt is sufficientto enable
them to deal with the contentions raised in yournotc so far asthey
contain nothing new, two results of th? delay are that the records
in their possession areless complete than they would have been if
the matter had been raised within a rea~onable tirne afterthe events
in question, and that some of the pFrsons possessing first hand
knowledge of tlie facts arno longer ajive. Such results are in sucli
circumçtances inevitable, and it iç because this is ço that interna-
tionallaw and practice regard avoidablc delay in presenting clairns
as constitutinga bar to their succeçsful~presentation."
Now we maintain. Mr. President, tha/ these were in tlicrnselves
reasons which justified the United Kingdom in 1933 and 1934in their
,refusal of which thc claimants have so rnuch cornplained to arbitrate
the case voluntarily. The lape of mother seventeen or eighteen years
before the Hellenic Government took any active steps to bnng the
matter before this Court has not made the position my better, and
it is already clearthat, ifthe case were to go eventually to an arbitral
tribunal, it would have to be argued and decided almost entirely on
the basis of historical matter and paper evidence, since hardly any
persons who were concerned with the transactions in 1921 would stiU
be available to give actual testirnony, though some of that testimony
would be very important, partirularly for the United Kingdom.
Surely, ML. Prcsidcnt and Members of the Court, if we are talking
of moral obligations, there iç an obligation in equity on a country
whose position is that it 11% a claim in respect of wl~ich it allegesa
serious violation of a Treaty (this is now the Greek position), and
particularly a Teaty which contains a clause for compulsory arbi-
tration-surely there is an obligation on a country in this position
to makc mention of the Treaty at some date earlier than fifteen ycarç
from the timc when the claim first arose, and equally to mention the
suppoçed obligation to arbitrate at least when, or soon after,a request
'or voluntary arbitration isdefiriitely refuçed.
Purthemore, we maintain that the conduct of the Hellenic Govern-
ment in bringing this case tothe Court on a wholIy artificial constniction
of a Treaty twenty-fïve years after this could hst have been donc,
amounts to an abuse of the procesç of thisCourt. When my colleague,
Mr. Fawcett, suggested that the Court should ço find, primceimpres-
sionis, he was not, as Sir Frank Soskice argued, asking the Court ta
fly in the fncc of precedent and of tlie law, but to take account of
the comparatively ncw situation which has been created in the field
of international law by the establishment of an International Court
of Justice in permanent session,and he was siiggesting that the Court
as a permanent institution might establisha practice and jurisprudence
of its own in the matter of delay as an abuse of the Court's grocess,
However, this matter of delay has another and equally important
aspect which 1 might cal1 the evidential aspect, of which Sir Frank
Soskice rook littlc account. We noticed that Sir Frank Soskice tried
to cxplain away al1 the delcys involved in this case on the b,asis that
the Hellenic Government, actuated by feelings of friendliness towards
the United Kingdom Government, \vas anxious to give tlreUnited
Kingdom Government every possibility of arbitrating on a voluntary
basis. We are natvrélly glad, Mr. President, to think that this was
so. At the same tirne,jt is dificult to avoid the feeling tliat there
was mother and simplcr explanation of this attitude af the Hellenic
Government, namcly, that no genuine tresty basis existcd and the
Hellenic Government knew it. Of course, we do not suggest that a
government is not entitled to seek compulsory arbitration by such
legal rnethods as may be open to it.The whole question here is :are
the methods legal, thatiçto say, is therc anything elçe but a pretence
of a treaty bais ? And we suggest that the history of this matter and
the remarkable delay by the Hcllenic Government in invoking the
Txeaty affords the strongest possible evidence that there is not.
In brief, our argument in this respect is one which goes disectly
to the question whether the contention that the daim is in fact based
on the Treaty can be regardecl as a scriouç one. I can perhaps hest REJOlNDER OF Mï. EVANS (u.K.)-~o III53
499
6.-In rnaintaining that tlîe Ambatielos claim is "ixised on the
Treaty of 1886" ,he HeElenic Government agrees that this expression
means more than "said to be baçed on the Treaty of 1886". but
contends tliat the claim is "based on the Treaty of 1886" if certain
provisions of that Trcaty (narnely, Articles 1, X, XII and XV) are
invoked in support of the claim and those provisions are not obviously
unrelated to the claim.
7.-This contention is wrong in principle, in the subrnission of the
United Kingdom Government, since it would allow a.claitnant govern-
ment to allegei that a treaty had been broken without being obligecl
to state £acts tending toestablish the breach. It is in efiectan unjusti-
fiable attempt Do shift thc burden of proof.
8.-The Hellenic contention is also wrong in relation to the present
case since-so the United Kingdom Government contends-the Amha-
tielos daim could only be "based on the Treaty of 1886" if it is a claini
the substantive foundation of which lies in the Treaty, that is to say :
(a) ifthe claim came within the scope of tlie Tteaty ; '
(b) assurning the facts alleged by the Heilenic Governrnent to be
trtie,a violstio~of the Treaty would have occumd ;
(c)'local rernedies had bcen exhausted.
9.-The Hellenic Government has failed to discharge the burden of
proof accepted by it since:
- (a) cven if the Hellenic Governmei~t's interpretation of thc expres-
sion "based on the Treaty of 1886", as stated in point 6, is
correct, there is an obvious lack of connexity betwen the
Treaty provisions invoked by them and the Amhaticlos claim,
in that :
(i) rights are clairned as treaty rights which are on tlie face
of thcm either rights under tfîcgencral principles of inter-
national law or rights arisingunder English laur ;
(ii) no fact is allegedby the Hellenic Govemment whidz, even
if true, would establish that MT. Ambatielos did riot receive
national trcatment within the meaning of Articles 1, XII
and XV of the Trcaty of 1856 ;
(iii) the articles of othes trcatics or tlie general principles of
international law, invoked by the Hellenic Govenimen t
through Article X af the Treaty of 1886 either
z. cannot properly be regarded as incorporated in the
Treaty becausc:
Article X refcrs onIy to corntnerce and navigation, and
a most-favoured-nation clause cannot ordinarîly attract
geileral principles of international lat;or
2. if they, that is, the articles of the other treaties or the
general principles of international laus invoked by the
Heilenic Government, cm properly be regarded as incor-
porated in the Treaty, they do not cover this daim ;or
3. if they can properly be regarded as incosporated in the
Treaty and do covcr the claim, they cannot psopesly
be invoked because of thc fact that Mr. Arnbatielos did
iiot exhaust his local rernedies. KEJOINDER OF MT. EVANS (u.K.)-30 III 53
502
(c) undue delay and abuse of the pr&xss of the Cmit in that,
a1thoioug.reference of the dispute to the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court has been continuously possible since
the 10th Decernber 1926, no sucW rreference took place until
the 9th April 1951. 1
l
Accordingly, the United Kingdorn ~oveknment prays tlie Court
l
To adjudge <anddeclare
i
That the United Kingdorn Government ?s riot obligcd to submit to
arbitration, inaccordance ~4th the Declarafion of 1926, the difference
as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim.
I
Thank you, Mr. President. I
Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from March 23th to 30th and on May 19th, 1953, the Vice-President, M. Guerrero, acting as President