Pleadings, Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on March 7th, 8th and 9th and April 11th, 1949, the President, M. Basdevant, presiding

,COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
-

MVIÉMOIREP,LAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS

RÉPARATION DES DOMMAGES
SUBIS AU SERVICE

DES NATIONS UNIES

AVICONSULTATDU II AVRI1949. SgANCE PUBLTQUE TENUE LE 7 MARS 1949,A rr FEETJRES

Yrésefzts MM. BASDEVANP Tr,ésiden; GUEKRERO ,ice-Prészdent;
ALVAREZF , ARELA H,ACKWORTW I.,WIARSK ZI, KICIC,r VISSCHER,
sir ARNOLUMCNAIR , .KLAESTADB , ADAIVI PACHA , M. KRYLOV,
READ, KSU MO, AZEVEDO,Jzqes ,+M. HAF~IBR GOrgier.

PrLsefftségabmend :
M.Ivan KERNOS ,ccrEtairegkndraladjoint, repr6sentant du Secrétaire
généraldes Nations Unics.
$1.A. FELLE Dir,cteur principal dtr Département juridiclue, comme
conseil.

Les refiré.rentandsesGol~varncntentssuivants:
France : M. Charles CHAUMONT pr,ofesseur de droit international
public k la Faculté de droit, Nancy ; jurisconsulte au ministère des
Affaires etranghres.

Royaumc-Uni : Mr. G. G. FITZMAURIC con,eiller juridique adjoiiit
du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
Belgique: S. Exc. M. Gcorges ~ÇAECKENBEECK, D. C. L., envoyk
extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire.

Le PRESTDENT o,vrant l'audience, prononce les paroles suivante:
En ouvrant cette audience, je ticns L rendre hommage 5 cclui qui,
petidantles trois annees qui vienilerit de s'écouler,a occlefauteuil
présidentiel,M.le PrésidentGuerrero. Lorsque la Cour appela à diriger
ses travaux celui qui, jusqu'i1s veille et pendant une durCe excep-
tionneIle imposéepar les terribles Evénements qui ont bouIevers6 le
monde, avait présidé In Cour permanente de Justice internationale,
la Cour internntioriak de Justice s'assurait l'appud'une expérience
hors de pair. Z'événemcnt ri'a pas d&u son attente. Pendant sa
présiclence,coïncidant avec une période d'organisation, le Président
Guerrero a apporté a laCour, avec son entier dévouementet saglande
bienveillance,le témoignage direct des méthodes et pratiques de la
Cour p~rrnanente. Rien n'a mieiix contribué au maintien dc la canti-
ntriti: entre ces deux juridictions.

Trois ans se sont 6coulés.Les dispositions iiotreStatut ont appel6
1'Assembléegknéraledes Nations Unies et le Conseil de Sécurrté ?i
proceder a des électionspour cinq si?ges. Nos çoliéguessortants ont
reçu la confiatice des Nations Unics ct ils ont &tkréélus.Ayant apprécié
leur science et i'indhpendance dc leur jagcrncnt, nous nous félicitons
de les çonscrver parmi nous et dc voir confirmer par leur choix la
continuité de la COLIT. YEAR 1949.

PUBLIC SITTING HELD ON MARCH 7th, 1949, AT 11 A.M.

present : Preside.rztI~ASDEVA ;NvTice-President GUERKEK ;OJudges
ALVAREZ ,ABELA,HACKWORT WHI, IAKSICIZ,ORICI~,DE VISSCHER,
Sir ARNOLD MCNAIR,KLAESTAD,RHDAWI PASHA, KRYLOV,READ,
Hsu Mo, AZEVED ONegistrar HAMBRO.

Also 9resent:
M. Ivan KERNO, Assistant Secretary-General, representing the
Çecrctary-Geiieralof the United Nations.

Rlr. A. FELLER, Principal Director of the Legal Department, as
Counsel.
2'herefiresentativofthe JollomivzGoverwrnela is

France : M. Charles CEIAUAION PTrfessor of Public International
Law at the Faculty of Law, Nancy, Lcgal hdviser to tlie Miniçtry
for Foreign Affairs.
United Kingdom : Mr. G. 6. ~~TZ!~AURICE, Second Legal Adviser
to the Foreign Office.

Belgium: H.E. M. Georges KAECKENBEED C.C.,L., EnvciyExtra-
ordinary ancl fifinister Plenipotentiary.
The PRESIDEN Tpened the meeting with the following words :

In opening thismceting, I should lilce to pay a tribute to Bresident
Guerrcro, who for tlic yastthree years has occupied the presidential
chair. In callingupon someone to guide its labours, who on the eve
of the terrible evcnts \ilhiclx convulsed the world, and for their wholc,
exccptionally long durstion, had presided over the Permanent Court
of International Justicethe International Courtof Justice was ensuring
to itself the support of ari unrivallcd experience. In the event,
expectations have not been diçappointed. During the term of his
prcsidency, coinciding as it did wita pesiodof organizstion, President
Guerrero has brought to the service of the Court a tvholc-hearted-
devotion and a large mmeasusc of good-will, togcther with firçt-hand
evidence of the methods and practice of the Permanent Court.
Notking has better contributed to maintaining continuity betmeen
the two trihunals.
Three years have gone by. By thc terrnsofaur Statute, thc Wilited
Nations Assernbly and the Security Council have gone about elections
to five seats. Our retiring colleagues inspired the confidenceof the
United Nations and werc re-elected. 1iVe appreciated their ski11and
their indepcndent judgment, and therefore we congatulatc ourselves
on keeping them in our rnidst and thus confirming the Court's çontinuity. Trois ans s'étant Ccoul&s,la Cour a dii de nouveau élirun Prkident.
Celui qu'elle a choisi est conscient de 1'1-ionneurque, par la confiance
qu'ils lui ont manifestée,sescullégueslui ont fait. En face d'une tlchc
d'une inestimable gratideur, il trouve, pour l'entreprendre, un ccncoii-
ragemcnt precieux clans la pensée qu'il pourra faire appel aux cotiscils
&claires de celui qu'il a le plaisir et l'honneur clc voir siéger auprl?s
de lui comme Vice-Président. 11sait que l'appui qu'il escoinpie ainsi
ne lui manquera pas. 1
Dans le discours qu'il prononçait le 16 janvier 1925, le Président
Max Huber énonqnit que la Cour, en raison clesa fonction judiciaire,
doit s'élever au-dessus de la m&léeoh s'affrontent les itit6rGts et les
passions cles Iiornmes, des partis, des classes, des nationct des races.
Ceux qiii parlent devant elle, ayantla responsabilitC dc Incause qii'ih
cléfendent, ckierchetit à 13 convaincre et ils s'efforcent de parlerurz
langage qu'elle cst préparée i cornpreildre. Ainsi, malgré toutcs Ics
divergences, mxlgré toutes les contradictions du temps present, ce !i
quoi l'on s'attache clevant cctte Cour et clails sonsein, c'estce qui
rcstc commun entre lcs hommes, ce qui, dans In.vie sociale, prend
la forme des règles du droit et entraîne le sentiment que le respect
est ciii .k celles-ci.
Ainsi la Cour, par la vertu m&me de son institution, retient et
cultive dcs clonnMs comrnuncs l'humanité tout entière. On lui
demande de contribuer k la paix en réglant les différends qui lui sont
soumis, Peut-&tre y contribuera-t-elle pIus encore en faisant ccpropos
sentir aux hommes cc qui, malgré tout, les unit.

Le PrCsident indique qucla Cour se réunit aujourci'hui pour entendre
les exposés oraux qui seront présentés dans 1':iffaire relative k la
réparation des dommages subis au scrvice des Nations Unies.
Il prie le Greffier de donner lecture de la RésoIution datée du
3 décembre 1-348,par laquelle l'Assemblée généraledes Nations Unies
a dbçidC de dcmancler à la Cour un avis consu1t;itif à ce sujet.
Le GREEFIE Ryant donné lectirrc de cette Rbsolution, lePK~SIDENT
rappelIe que la rcquste pour avis a fait l'objet des notifications d'usage.
Elle a été, conforrnérnent l'article66 du Statut, cotnrnuniquée
tous les gouvernemcnts. des Membres des Nations Unies, jugés suscep-
tibles, par la Cour, de fournir des renseignements sur la question. Le
délai de la procédure écrite a &té fixe par une ordonnance datee du
LI décembre 1948. La Cour a reçu, par ordre de dates, des observatiuris
$crites des Gouvernements, de l'Inde, de la Chine, de 1s France, des
Etats-Unis d'Arnkrique et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne ct
d'Irlande du Nord.

En outre, la Cour a décide de tenir, A partir du 7 mars 1949 -
c'est-&-direde ce jour -, des audiences au cours desquelles seraicnt
entendus des exposés oraux. La France, le Royaunie-Uni et laBelgique
ont fait savoir qu'un exposé oral serait présenti: en leur nom. Lcs
représentants désignés dans cette affairc ont étE: pour la France,
M. Charles Chaumont, professeur A la Faculte de droit de Nancy,
jurisconsulte au ministere des Affaires étrangéres ; pour le Royaume-
Uni, M. G. G. Fitzmaurice, deuxi6me conseilIer juridique du Foreiga
Ofice; pour la Belgique, S. Exc. M. Georges Krieckenbeeck, envoyé
extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire de S. hl. lcRoi des Belges,
cliefdu Servicc des Conférences de la Paix et clc l'Organisation inter- SITT~NGOF MARCH 7th, 1949 46
Three years having passed, it fell to the Court oncc inore to elect
n President. Thc one they have chosen is co~îscioiis of the hotiour
donc to Eiim by his. collcagues in thus manifesting their confidence
in him. In face of atask of inestimable magnitude, he draws invaluablc

encouragement from the tkought that he can cal1 upon the er-ilightened
ccrunscl of one whom hc has the pleasurc and the honour of secing
beside llim as Vice-Preçident. He knows that the support on which
he thus relies will not be found wanting.
In a speech on January 16th, 192j, President Max Huber stated
tkat on account of its judicial function the Court should rise above
the clash of mcn's interests and men's passioiis-above those of party,
of class, of nation and of race. Thosc ~vlio speak before the Court
know that they hoId responsibilityfor the cause they are defending,
and therefore, intlieir endeavour to convince the tribunal, use every
effort to speak a language it will undcsstand. Thuç, in spite of al1
the divergences, the contradictions of the present age, that to which
we çling beîore this Court and within its coiinsels is somethiilg wliich
remains cornmon to al1 men, sornething which in the life of society
takeç the form of the ~ule of law and i~zducesthe sentiment uf the
respect duc to it.
Thus, thro~igh itsvery being the Court retains and cultivates ideas
comnion to the mhole of hurnanity. It is asked of tlie Court that it
should contribute to peace by deciding the disputes submitted to it.
Perhaps it will make a yet greatcr contribution by inculcating a
knowledge of tEiat which, after au, unitcs mankind.

ï'he Prcsidet~t stated that the Court was met tllatday in order to
hear the oral statements presented in the case concerning reparation
for injuries suffered. in the service of the United Nations,
He requeçted the Registrar to read aloud the Resolution dated
December 3rd, rgqS, by ~vhich thc General Assembly of the United
Natio~is decided to ask of the Court an advisory opinion on thissubject.
The KEG~STRA hRving read doud the Resolution, the PRESIDENT

recalled that the request for an opinion had bcen notified as was
customary. III conformity with Article 66 of the Statute,it had been
cornmunicated to al1 the governments ofthose Members of the United
Nations which the Court dcerned likely to furnidi information on the
question. Thc time-limit for the written psoccdure had been fixed
by an Order dated December 11th~ 1948.III order of date,the Court
had received written obsen7ations £rom the Governrnents of India,
Cliina, France, tlicU.S.A. and the United Kingdorn of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.
Furthermore, the Court had decided to hold sittiilgs as from
March 7th, 1949, i.e., on that very clay, in the course of which oral
statements would be heard. France, the United Kingdorn and Belgiuni
had intirnatedthat they would each present an oral statement. The
representatives appointed for this purpose were the following : for
France, M. Cbarles Chaumont, Profcssor of Public I~lternational Law
at the Faculty of Law, Nancy, Legal Adviser to the Ministry for
Foreign Aifairs ;for the United Kingdom, Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice,
Second Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office; for Eelgium : H.E.
M. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, U.C.L., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiüty of H.M. the King of the Belgians, Head of the Divisionnationale au ministère des Affaires gtrangeres, membre de la. Cour
~>crmanente d'Arbitrage.
Le Secretaire génkral des Nations Uriies s'est fait reprkentcr par
RI. Ivan Kcrno, Secrétaire génkral adjoint cl-iargédu Di.psrtcmcnL
juridique, qui est accompagné de M. A. FelIcr, directeur principal de
cc Département, en qualité de conseil.
Lc Président constate laprkenre devant la Cour des repr&sentants
*desEtats susrnentionnds ainsique de ceIui du Secrétaire géniral des
Nations Unies. Il annonce qu'il ddonncra en premier lieu la parole à
M. Ivan Kerrîo, représentaiit du Secrétairegénéral des Nations Unies,
et ensuite, conformément à l'arrangement intervenu à cet égard, aux
représentants de la Belgique, de la Francc et di1 Royaume-Uni.

11. Ivan KEKNO prononcc l'exposé reproduit eri anncxe'.

(L'audience, interrompue k 13 heures, est rcprise 5 16 heurcs.)

Le YR~SIDEN donne la parole-& M. KERNO, qui reprend et termine
son exposé (annexe Z). '

Le PKÉSIDENT constate que la Cour vient d'entendre un exposC
tr8s complet, très détaillé,dc ce qui a trait A l'élaboratiori de la
qtrestion poséc i la Cour et, d'autre part, de la connaissance qu'a
chacunc des Parties de la demande d'avis. Ceç indications soi~t très
prkcieuses, mais, pour éviter des discours quiseraient, en partie, super-
flus, le Président voudrait inviter les orateurs qui vont prendre la
parole à ne revenir sur ces indications d'ordre historique ou sur ccttc
interprétation du sens mérnede la demande d'avis que dans la mesure
où cela leur paraîtrait indispensable afin de marquer l'orientation
suivre, à leur avis, pour donner réponse aux questioris posées Ala Cour.
Ildonne la parole à M. Eeller, directeur principal du Ilépartelnent
juridique du Secrétariat des Nations Unies.

M. PELLER présente I'exposS reproduit en aiincxe 5,dont la suite,
interrompue par la cldture de l'audience, est rcnvoyec parle Président
au mardi 8 mars, a IO heures 30.

L'aiidicnce est levée à 18 h. 35.

Le Prisident de la Coiir,
(Signe')BAS DEVANT.

Le Greffier de la Cour,
(Sig~é)E. HAMBIZO.

2Vorr pD. 63 J> N ,.
3 v u 70'", SITTING OF MAKCH 7th, 1949
47
for Peace Conferences and International Organization at the lfinistry
for Foreign Affairs, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations hacl appointed as his
representative M. Ivan ICerno, Assistant Secretary-Gerieral, in charge
of thc Legal Department, accompanied by Rlr. A. Felier, Principal
Director of that Department, as Counsel.
The President noted the presence before tlie Court of the represen-
tativcs of the above-mentioned States, as also the presence of the
representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He
announcecl that he would first cal1upon If.Ivan Kerno, representative
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to speak, and then,
as agreed, upon the representatives of Belgium, France and the Unitecl
Icingdom.

M. IVANKERNOmade the statement as annesed '.
(The Court adjourned from I p.m. to 4 p.in.)

The PRESIDENT caUedupon M.KEKNO,who continued and completecl
his statement as annexed 2.

The PRESIDEXT stated that the Court had listelied to an cxtrtmcly
complcte and cletailed statenient of the background of the question
before it, as also of thc cognizance of the opinion possessed by each
of the Parties. 'This information was most valuable, but in order to
avoid any discourse not strictly nccessary, thc Presidcnt would suggest
that speakers should not go over this historical ground or interpret
the actual serise of the reqiiest for an opinion, escept where absolutely
necessary in order to inclicatc the direction they considered their
answers should follow.

He called upon Alr. Feller, Principal Director of the Legal Depart-
ment of the Secretrtriat of the United Nations, to speak.
Mr. FELLERmade thc statement as annesecl 3,to be concluded, by
.order of the Prcsidcnt, at thc ncst sitting of the Court, to be held
on Tucsday, March Sth, at 10.30 a.m. .

Tlic Court rose at 6.3jp.m.

(Sigfzed)BASDEVANT,
President.

(.SigizedE. HA~IBRO,
Registrar.

2S-e pp. 50 el sqq.
,, .. 63 ,. ,,.
a ,, 70 ,, .. SÉANCES DES 8 ET 9 MARS 1949
qS

Présents : [Voir séance du 7 mars.]

Le PRÉSIDENT,ouvrant l'audience, donne la parole à M. Feller.

RI. FELLERreprend son exposé, qu'il termine (annexe l).

(L'audience est interrompue de midi 30 à 15 11.30.)

Le PRÉSIDENTdonne successivement la parole à AI. Georges KAE-
CKENBEECIC et k M. le professeur Charles CHAUMONT q,ui présentent
les exposésreproduits en annexe a.

Le PRÉSIDENT annonce que la Cour entendra le g mars, a IO h. 30,
le représentant du Royaume-Uni.

L'audience est levée A 18 h. 50.

SÉANCE PUBLIQUE TENUE LE 9 MARS 1949,A IO H. 30

Présents :[Voir séance du 7 mars.]

Le PRÉSIDENTo ,.uvrant l'audience, donne la parole au représentant
du Royaume-Uni.
M. FITZMAURICp Erésente les observationi reproduites en annexe

(L'audience, interrompue 5.12 h. 40, est reprise h 15 h. 30.)

RI. FIT~MAURICr Eeprend et poursuit son exposé, qu'il termine 4.

Le PRÉSIDENTconstate que la Cour a entendu les exposés qui lui,
avaient étéannoncés.
Il remercie, au nom de la Cour, le Secrétaire général des Nations
Unies et les trois Gouvernenielits qui se sont fait représenter d'avoir
bien voulii participer aus débats oraux en cette affaire.

Les questions très importantes soumises à la Cour par la présente
demande d'avis consultatif ont un caractère nouveau et particulière-
ment grave pour la vie mêmede l'Organisation des .Nations Unies.
Elles ont été traitkes avec beaucoup de science et une grande vigueur

d'esprit. La Cour tirera grand profit de ce qu'elle a entendu. C'est
pourquoi, en son nom, après avoir remercié le Secrétaire généralet
les Gouvernements, le Président remercie les représentants qui se
sont fait entendre.

lVoir pp. 80 etsqq.
3 n u 94 etsqq.et 102 etsqq.
D D 110ef sqq.
4 Ji D 122. u. SITTINGS OF MARCH 8th AND gth, 1949 48

PUBLIC SITTLNG HELD ON MARCH Sth, 1949, AT 10 ".M.

Present : [See sitting of March 7th.l

The PRESIDENT cleclareclthe sitting open ancl askecl Mr. Feller to
address the Court.
(See annex l.)
Mr. FELLEKcontinued and concluded his speech.
(The Court adjourned from 12.30 p.m. till 3.30 p.ni.)

The PRESIDENT called on M. Georges KAECKENBEEa Cnd Professor
Charles CHAUMONT in, succession, Yoaddress the Court. They made
the statements reproduced in the annex 2.

The PHESIDENT announced that the Court woulcl hear the United
Kingclom representative at 10.30 a.m. on March 9th.

'I'lieCourt rose at 6.50 p.ni.
[Signatures.]

PUBLIC SITTING HELD ON MARCH gth, 1949, AT 10.30 A.M.

Present: [See sitting of Atarch 7th.l
The PRESIDENT declared the sitting open and calleclon the represen-
tative of the Unitecl Kingdom to address the Court.

Atr. FITZMAURICm Eade the statement which is reproduced in the
alinex .

(The Court adjournecl from 12.40 p.m. to 3.30 p.m.)
Rlr. FITZMAURIC continued ancl concluded his statement. (Annes '.)

The PRESIDENT observecl that the Court had now heard the state-
rncnts of which noticc hacl bcen given to it.
On belialf of thc Court, he tliankecl the Secretary-General of tlic
Unitcd Nations and the three Governments \vho Iiad sent reprcscn-
tatives for having been so good as to take part in the oral discussion
of the case.
The very important questions referred to the Court in the prcsent
request for an advisory opinion were of a new character and wcre
of p?rticularly grave importance for the very existence of the Unitcd
Nations Organization. They had been examined with remarkable
talent and with great intellectual force. The Court woulclbe greatly

helped from the arguments that it had heard. Therefore, having
thanked the Secretary-Gencral ancl the Governmcnts, he now clcsired,
in the nanie of the Court, to thank the representativcs wlio had
addressed it.

l Sec pp. 80et sqq.
, ,, 94 et sqq. an102 elsqq.
2 ,, ,, iroetsqq:
,, ,, 122 ,,, P . ÇÉAXCE DU II AVRIL 1949
49
Il prononce la cldture de la procédure orale dans l'affaire.
L'audience est levée à 17 heures IO.

SÉANCE PUBLIQUE XENUE LE II AVK1L 19'19 , IO H. 30

Présen.ts:les membres de la Cour mentionnés au procès-verbal cle
la séance clu 7 mars ; les représentants des Gouvernements suivants :
Belgique : S. Esc. M. Georges KAECKENBEECK m,inistre plénipoten-
tiaire; France: S. Exc. M. J. RIVIÈRE, ambassadeur de France à
La Haye ; Royaz~nteU- lz: M.B. E. F. GAGE,conseiller de l'ambassade
du Royaume-Uni A La Haye.
Le PRÉSIDENT,ouvrant l'audience, annonce que la Cour se réunit
aujourd'hui pour prononcer l'avis qui lui a étédemandépar l'Assemblée
généraledes Nations Unies, au sujet des dommages subis au service
des Nations Unies. Il prie le Greffier de donner lecture de cette
Résolution.

Le GREFFIERayant procédé A cette lecture, le PRÉSIDENTrappelle
que, conformément à l'article 67 du Statut, le Secrétaire généraldes
Nations Unies et les représentants. des États qui ont pris part aux
débats oraux dans la présente affaire, savoir : la Belgique, la France
et le Royaume-Uni, ont étédûment prévenus.

Il indique qu'il va maintenant donner lecture de l'avis de la Cour,
dans le texte français, qui estégalement un texte original, mais c'est
le texte anglais qui fait foil.
Après la lecture de l'avis, le Président prie le. Greffier .de donner
lecture du dispositif de l'avis dans le texte anglais.
Le GREFFIERayant lu ce dispositif, le PR~~SIDENT signale que
M. Winiarski, juge, déclare qu'à son regret il n'est pas a mêmede
se rallierà la répoilse donnée par la Cour à la question 1 b). D'une
manière générale, il partage les vues esprimées dans l'opinion dis-
sidente du juge Hackworth. MRI. Alvarez et Azevedo, juges, tout en
souscrivant à l'avis de la Cour, se prévalent du droit que leur confère
l'article 57 du Statut et joignent audit avis les esposés de leur opinion
individuelle. RI. Hackworth, Badawi Pacha et M. Krylov, juges,
déclarant ne pas pouvoir se rallier i~l'avis de la Cour et se prévalant
du droit que leur confère l'article 57 du Statut, joignent audit avis
les esposés de leur opinion dissidente.

Il signale en outre que MM. les juges Alvarez, Azevedo, Hackworth,
BadaIvi Pacha et M. Krylov' l'ont informé qu'ils ne désiraient pas
donner lecture de leurs opinions individuelles ou dissidentes, jointes
en annexes au prdsent avis.

Le PRÉSIDENTprononce la clôture de l'audience.
L'audience est levée A II heures 15.
[Signatures.]

l Voir Pilblications de la Coztr, Recueil des A~Sêconst<llnlifset Ordon-
nances. Avis consultatzf TI6avril1949. ANNEXES AUX PROCRS-VERBAUX

ANNEXES TU THE MINUTES.

1. - EXPOSE. DU Dr lVAN KERNO
(KEPRESENTAN DT SECKGTAI RÉNERAL DES NATIONS UNIES)

AUX SEANCE PUBLIQUES DU 7 MARS 1949 ,ATIN ET APRES-MIDI.

[Séance $ubl*iqu~dzt 7 mars 1949, mntin.]

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Membres de InCour, ilg a moins
d'un an que la Cour a, pour la premikre fois, consacréune audience &
une dernandc d'avis consultatifJ'aicu leplaisir de venir àcctte audience
en qualit6 de représentant du Secrétaire général. Au moment de me
présenter à nouveau devant vous, permettez-moi de vous faire part,
une fois de plus, del'-émotion profonde et sinch que je ressens en
prenant la parole devant le plus haut tribunal international du monde.
C'est un grand honneur personne1 que dc pouvoir 1-i:lrticiaux débats
de cette Cour.
L'ctuwe que rwus avez accomplie durant l'anneequi vient de s'écouler,
au cours de laquelle la Courspresque acfievi sapremière vande.affaire
contentieuse et formulé son, premier avis consultatifa et6 une source
de grande satisfactionOn ne saurait exagdrer l'irnportancque prksente
le recours i votre haute juridictio~z pour régler les difiCrenet pour
recueillir des avis consultatifs stoutes les qucstiçlnç ddroit, si l'on
veut que se développe un ordre juridique international efficacct bien
ordonné.
L'annie passée la Cour rn'a autorisé à luiprgsenter un exposd oral
conforrnkment d. l'article 66 de son Statut,A la suite de la demande
d'avis constiltatif qului avait ét6adressee par l'hçsemhléc génbrale,
sur I'interprét,atiode l'articl4 de la Charte rclstif i l'admission de
nouveaux Membres dans l'Organisation desNatlons Unies. Cette annee
encore, jc suis ici devant vous, A titrede sepréseritant di1 Secrktaire
général,et si la Courrne le permet, jc présenterai uexposé oralayant
trait A la dematiclc d'avis consultatifde l'Assemblée géneralc sur la
question de la réparation des d~nlmagcs subis au 2;ervicedes Nations
Unies.
'Toutefois,sur un point au moins ma position actuclledifière profon-
clémentde celle que j'avais arioptée I'annéc dernière.
Dans la déclarationqu'il avait faite l'bpoque, leSecrCtairegént4raI
s'est contentéde prksenter laquestion telle qu'elle a Cvoluédevant des
organes des Nations Unies, sous l'angle des seuls faits historiques, sans
offrir lui-méme une analyse ou une discussion juridique du prob1Cnlc
posé. Le Secrétaire général,l'année dernikren'a désiréexprimer aucune
opinion en faveur de telle ou telle intcrprktationde l'article 4de la
Cliarte, et il n'a pas estiméCten mesure de le faire.L'exposéprésenté
alors avait pour seul objet de donner A la Cour un tableau sommaire
et objectif dc 1'6volution de laquestion devant Ics différentsorgancs
des Nations Unics, et j'aiétéextrEmement heureux de l'accueilsifavo-
rable que vous avez réservkdors .hmes modestes efforts. Cependant, dans les débats actuels il me faudra nécessairement me
présenterdansun double rôle. Comme dans le débatde l'annéedernière,
le Secrétaire général estime qu'illui appartient, en sa qualité de plus
haut fonctionnaire de l'organisation des Nations Unies, de présenter à
cette Cour un résuméobjectif des débats de l'Assembléegénéraleelle-
mêmeet de sa SisièmeCommission,rbsuméqui précisera lescirconstances
dans lescluellesI'hssen~bléegénérale aétéamenge Ademander un avis
consultatif relatià l'affaire actuelle. Cet exposé historique aiira ainsi
poMais le Secrétaire général participe aussi,j'allais presque dire qu'il
est partie,àla procédureactuelle, qui présente pour lui un intérêtessen-
tiel. C'est pourquoi il a jugéopportun de définirnettement son attitude
à l'égard des questions juridiques ue pose le problème considéré,et
avec votre permission, Monsieur le $ résident, dans la troisittme partie
de notre exposé, nous allons vous présenter notre.point clc vue. Nous
allons vous dire que, dans notre opinion, à San-Francisco les auteurs
de la Charte ont crééune organisation internationale qui possède une
personnalité internationale propre, personnalité internationale irnpli-
quant certains droits essentiels de caractère international, et parmi
ces droits essentiels, notamment celui de protéger les fonctionnaires
de l'Organisation quand ils subissent un dommage dans l'exercice de
leurs fonctions au nom de l'organisation.
Nous allons donc vous demander de vouloir bien répondre affirmati-
vement aux deus élémentsdc la première question. En ce qui concerne
la deuxièmequestion, nous demanderons également àcette Courd'éclair-
cir certainspoints et d'aider ainsi les pourparlers que leSecrétaire général
devra engager à l'avenir dansdes cas concrets avec l'État dont la victime
aura été le ressortissant.
La question actuelle, Monsieur le président, a étéàl'origine inscrite
à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générals eur l'initiative du Secrétaire
générallui-même.
Déjà,dans le mémorandum qu'il a présentépour expliquer les motifs
pour lesquels on a demandé l'inscription de cette question à l'ordre du
jour de l'Assemblée, leSecrétaire général aconstaté, et je viens de le
mentionner il y a quclques instants, que dans son opinion l'organisa-
internationale en réparation des dommages subis par un agent de 1'0rga-
nisation dans l'exercice de ses fonctions. dans des conditions oui
engagent la responsabilité d'un État. Le secrétaire généralest, de plis,
fermement convaincu que cette capacité est indis~ensable si l'on veut
que l'organisation puisse atteindre-ses buts et exercer efficacement ses
fonctions. Un avis de la Cour reconnaissant cette capacité serait, pour
l'organisation des Nations Unies, d'une haute valeur dans tous les
cas où elle sera appelée à protéger ses agents dans l'exercice de leurs
fonctions.
Dans la partie de l'exposéque je présenterai moi-même,je retracerai
d'abord l'historique de l'affaire et je procéderai ensuiàeune analyse
des questions formulées par l'Assembléegénérale.Dans le développe-
ment historique, prernihre partie de mon exposé, je m'attacherai à
présenter un aperçu aussi objectif que possible des débats de la Sixihme
Cominission de manière à donner àla Cour une idée précisede l'origine
et de l'évolution des questions sur lesquelles on lui demande de donner
aujourd'hui son avis. Je n'entrerai cependant pas dans le détail clecesdiscussions et je ne procéderai pasà des citations des testes précisdes
déclarations faites par les différentsdélégi~s.ar, en somme, il ne s'agit
que de onze séances de la Sixième Commission, et les membres de la
Cour trouveront facilement dans les procès-verbaux de ces séances tel
ou tel passage qui pourrait les intéresser plus particulièreriient. Mon
aperçu se bornera donc à mettre en lumière aussi clairement et aussi
objectivement que po;sible tout d'abord les différentsprojets de résolu-
tions et amendements qui ont étéintroduits par différentesdélégations
au cours des discussions de la Commissionjuridique,t ensuite je parlerai
des décisions mêmes de la Sisième Commission et de l'Assemblée.
Le texte de ces deus questions a étéétabli de propos délibéréet avec
le plus grand soin, après mûre réflexion.C'est pourquoi je crois qu'il
sera peut-être utile de donner, clans la deuxième partie de mon exposé,
une analyse détaillée de ce teste, parce que chaque mot a sa signifi-
cation. C'est, comme je viens de le mentionner, après des discussions
prolongéesen séances publiques et en marge des séances, entre diffé-
rentes délégationset les représentants du Secrétaire général,que le libellé
de cette question a étéétabli.La Cour me permettra donc de lui présenter,
dans la deuxième partie de mon esposé, quelques commentaires sur
le sens des questions posées.
Enfin, une troisième partie de notre esposi: sera présentéepar
RI.A. H. Feller, qui m'a accompagné5 titre de conseiller et qui précisera
la position du Secrétaire général à l'égard des problèmes juridiques
qui se posent.

PREMIÈRE PARTIE : EWOSÉ'HISTORIQUE

Monsieur le Président, je commence donc la première partie, la partie
historique de mon exposé.
Ce fut, vous le savez, au cours de la session de I?aris, exactementà
la 16gmeSéance plénièreq , ue l'Assemblée générale a décidéde poser à
la Cour les deus questions dont il s'agit et dont le texte exact vient
d'êtrelu au début de cette séancepar M. le Greffier de la Cour.
La proposition .préconisant que l'Assemblée généraledemande à
la Cour un avis consultatif, a étéprésentée à l'origine par le représen-
tant de la Belgique ail sein de la Sixième Coininision. Le teste de la
Résolution de l'Assemblée,qui incorpore en définitiveles qiiestions que
je viens de mentionner, est un texte desynthèse, élaborépar de nombreux
représentants, et notamment par les représentants de la Belgique, de
la Colombie, de la France, de la Grèce,de l'Iran, du Royaume-Uni, de
la Syrie, de l'Uruguay et du Venezuela.
A. EXPOSÉ RELATIF A DES CAS PARTICULIERS ET AUX IIESURES PRISES
PAR LE SECRÉTAIR EÉNÉR~L.

Avant de commenter les débats (le la Sixième Commission, peut-être
sera-t-il utile de donnerà la Cour un exposé bref des cas particuliers
et des mesures prises par le Secrétaire généralqui ont motivé l'intro-
duction de cette question devant l'Assembléegénérale.
Cette question des réparations pour dommages subis par des agents
des Nations Unies s'est posCe àla suite de la série d'incidents trab'q
qui ont eu lieu en Palestine, du mois de mai au mois de septembre de
l'année dernière. Ces événements dCplorables, dont le principal a été,
le 17 septembre 1948,le meurtre du comte Bernadotte, médiateur desontioprofondément ému le monde entier.elui deIlsncontribuentcolonmontrert,

l'urgence des questions dont la Cour est aujo~iï-d'hiiisaisie et l'iinportnncc
yu'eIlesrevCtcnt clu point de vue pratique.
Dans son discours à la séance d'ouverture de la Trnisiérne Session
de l'Assemblée générale,le Secrétaire ginCral, pal-lant de la mort du
cornte Bernadotte et du colonel Sérot, a dit :
u La mort de ces deux hommes d'honneur exige qu'il soit fait
justice des responsables. Elle soulève A nouvcau, et de façon plus
urgente que jarnais encore, la question des dispositions à prendre
par lcs Nations Unies pour assurer al'avenir à leurs repre'sentants,
dans toute la mesure fiumainement possible, une protection maxi-
mum dans l'accomplissement de leurs devoirs dans les zones dange-
reuses. ))

La qucstion cles séparations pour dommages subis nu service des
Nations Unies a été ir-iscrite, commejel'ai déjà mentionné, l'ordre
du jour de la Troisihme Session de l'Assembléegénérale,à la demande
du Secrétaire gbnbal. A la 142mC Séance de l'Assemblée, tenue le
24 septembre 1948, cette question a étérenvoyde à la Sixikme Cornn~is-
sion, c'est-à-dire la Conzmission juridique, sur la recommrti~dation du
Bureau de I'AssernblCe.Toutes ces dkcisions prClinllnaii-esde procédure,
je tiensi le mentionner, ont été prises à l'unanimitk.
Dans le mémorandum qu'il a pri.senté h l'Assemblée générale,le
Secrétaire général a retracé I'histariqiie des cas particuliers.Les cas
ont étéexposés tr&s brievernent pour servir de base à la prisentation
de certaines questions de bit, de politique k suivre et de procédure
qui, de l'avis du Secrétaire génkral,devaient etre préciséespar 1'Assem-
hlée ginhale. J,e Secrétaire général a pri.sumé que l'Assembléegénéralc
ne serait pas K desireuse de jouer elle-rn&tnele r61e de commission
d'enquete ou de tribunal judiciaire, ayant en ces matikres Lsétablir les
faits ou k déterminer les responsabilités dans des cas particuliers x.Il
a estimé que ces questions, ((en ce qiiiconcerne les cas particuliers,
devraient êtrerégl&esd'autre façon, soit par le moyen d~ négociations
directes entre l'organe compétent des Nations Unies et I'ktat oii I'aiito-
rité intéressks, soitpar un tribunal d'arbitrage 3.
J+csquestions qui ont &teposéesrila Cour n'entraînent pas la dbtcr-
mi~iationde la ~espomabilité de telou tel Etat dans tel ou tel cas parti-
culier. Je ne désire aucuncinent faire naître de la confusion eiz exami-
nant, dans le détail, les diverscas gui se sont produits. Néanrnoins, il
sera, jecrois, utile à laCour que je rappelle en quelques mots la serie
des dvéneinents, tels que le Secrétaire genéral lesa exprrsés devant
I'Assembl&e, daris son mérnorandilm du 7 octobre 1948.

((La séried'incidents a commencépar l'assassinat de M. Thomas
Wasson, consul généraldes Etats-Unis a JQusaiem, membre de la
mission de tr&ve des Nations Unies, tu6 par un tireur isole, le
23 mai 1948 ,lors qu'il regagnait son domicile aprés une séancede
la Commission. 11est mort le lendemain matin.

Le 6 juillet rg48, le commandant René de Labanikre et le
commandant dc Canchy, deux officiers français, observateursdcs
Nations Unies, sont tomb6 victimes d'une explosion devant une
barricade juive dans ta région de Nazareth. Le commandant de Labarrih a ététu&et le commandant de Canchy blessd. Des soldats
juifs qui sctrouvaient sur les licux ont déclaré que les observateurs
avaient dtéatteiiltspd~ l'explosion de mines. Selon lecommandant
de Canchy, les explosions pciivent avoir été le fait de grellacles
plutet que de inines et, à sori avis, son compagnon et lui-meme
semblent avoir et6 victirnes d'une attaque délibirée de lapart de
soldats juifs.
Le 13 juillet1948, un convoi qui faisait mouvement sous les

auspices des Nations Unies, a sertrde cible i un tir de mousqueterie
au voisinage du mont Sc~pus. L'unc dcs jeeps du convoi était
conduite par Ole Helge Bakke, inernbre dti Secrétariat dcs Nations
Unies, servant en l'alestine comme garde des Nations Unies. Bakke
a kt& tué sur le coup par une balle de fusil.Le généralde brigade
Lash, de la Légion arabe, a fait connaître au rnécliateur que la
conclusion laquelle avaient abouti les travaux cl'une commission
d'enquête, était que Bakke avait kt6 tu6 par un soldat arabe,
surexcité par le feu ennemi.
Le 28 aoiit1948, deux observateurs français, le lieutenant-colonel
Joseph Queru et le capitaine Pierre Jeanne1 ont atterri sur l'akro-
drornede Gaza, dans un sectetiroccupépar l'armke Cgypticnne.Alors
qu'ilsquittaient leur appareil, les deux observatcurs ont ktk attaqués
par des irréguliersd'Arahic saoudite kqui 1'arnii.c égyptienne avait

coi~fiélagarde de l'aérodrome et ont &tétués et dépouillés.
Le 17 septembre 1948,le comte FoIke Beriiaclotte, médiateur des
Nations Unies en Palestine, et le colonel Skrot, officierfrançais,
observateur des Nations Unies, o~it Ctétucs coups de feu alors
qu'ilstraversaient en voiture un quartier de Jerusalem tenu par
les Juifs.L'attentat a étécommis par plusieurs hommes revêtus
d'uniformes du type de ceux de l'armée israélienne. Les assaillants
n'oiitpas étk appréhendés, mais les conditions de l'attentat otit
amené des rcprksentants des Nations Unics et des Gouvernements
RiIembresà présumer qu'ils appartenaient au groupe Stern, bande
d'irréguliers juifs quopére cctte époque L Jérusalem.

En plus de ces cas de morts et de blessures, de nombreux autres
cas de coups de feu tiréscontre les fonctionnaires des Nations
Unies se sont produits cn Palestine. Le derriier est survenu le
22 septembre 1948, alors qu'un convoi placE sous les auspices des
Natioi-1sUnies et accompagné d'observateurs des Nations Unies,
a essuyé le feu de trois hommes vêtusd'uniforines arabes, et iden-
tifiépar lechef d1&tat-major du médiateur cninme dépendant des
forces arabes de Transjordanie. Aucun des fonctionnaires des
Nations Unies n'a.&tétozické,mais quatre autres personnes qui se
trouvaient dans le convoi ont éti tuées. 1)

Le Secrétaire généraa légaiemen rendu compte, dans son mémorandum,
des mesures qu'il a prises a la suite deces incidents. Voici, en quelques
mots, en quoi ont consistéces mesures : premièrement, entretiens avec
les autorités détenant lepouvoir dans lesterritoires où les agents des
Nations Unies avaient et6tués au sujet de la protection des inttSr?ts de
l'organisation et, deuxiemement, paiement d'indemnités aux ayantsdroit, et paiement des frais médicaux, des frais d'hospitalisation, des
frais cl'obsèqueset des autres frais du mêmeordre.
Enfin, dans son n~émoranclum,le Secrétaire générala souiniç, ii
l'examen de 1'Assemblée générale,Ics trois questions suivantes :
1) De l'avis de I'Assernbléegénérale, un État peut-il être tenu
responsable envers les Nations Unies de la mort cl'un clcleurs agents ou
des dommages qu'il a subis?
2) Quelle devrait êtrela ligne deconduite à adopter en ce qui concerne
les réparations ou I'hraluation des dommages-intérêtsqui peuvent être
réclamés ?
3) Quelle devrait Ctrc la procédure à suime pour la présent-ationdes

demandes de réparation et pour leur règlement ?
En ce qui concerne la première question, le Secrétairegénéral a déclaré
qu'il étaitconvaincu quel'organisation des Nations Unies, ayant capacité
de conclure avec les États des accorcls internationaux, a également
capacité endroit international pour présenter une dcmancleen réparation
à un Ltat, que cct État soit, ou non, Membre des Nations Unies.
En ce qui concerne la ligne de conduite générale à adopter en matière
de réparations, le mémorandum énuméraitquatre formes de réparations
possibles, que j'indique brièvement : le prompt et juste châtiment des
coupables, ainsi que des mesures propres à assurer, àl'avenir, la protec-
tion dcs agents des Nations Unies contre tous dommages, le rembourse-
ment des dépenses engagéesdirectement par l'organisation des Nations
Unies, le paiement cl'inclcinnitéà la personne objet du dommage ou Asa
fan~ille, et enfin la possibilité cle demander des dommages-intérêts
exemplaires.
Quant A la troisièmequestion, le Secrétaire générala émisl'avis qu'en
sa qualité de plus haut fonctionnaire de l'organisation en vertu de
l'article 97 de la Charte, il devrait êtrele représentant qualifié pour
intenter les actions en réparation.

B. Dh~tl-rS 1)E L'.~SSE~~BLÉE GÉNÉRALE E.1. DE LA SISI~MECONMIS-
SION.

Les questions poséespar Ic mémorandum du Secrétaire généralont
fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi au cours dcs onze s6ances que la
SixièmeCommission de1'Assemùlée généralea tenues du 20 au 27novem-
--e- -27--
Les débats de la Commission ont commencé par des explications
préliminaires des représentants du Secrétaire général concernant le
mémorandum qu'il avait soumis à l'Assemblée. Une discussiongdnérale
s'est ensuite engagéeque les membres de la Cour pourront étudier dans
la documentation que nous avons soumise. Comme je l'ai déjà indiqué
au début de mon exposé,je n'entrerai pas dans le détail de ces débats.
Je vais examiner tout d'abord les différents projets de résolutions
présentéset ensuite les décisions successivement prises par la Sixième
Commission.

I. Projets de résol.ritiwisexamiqzés :

En ce qui concerne les $rejets de résolz~tionso ,n peut les réunir en
trois groupes différents. En effet, trois principaux modes d'action ont
étépréconiséset soumis à l'examen de la Sixième Commission.56 ESPOSÉ DE 11.KERNO (NATIOXS UNIES) - 7 IIIqg
a) Propositions tendantà ceqzcel'Assembléegénérale confèreifft~nédia-
tenze~ztertains potrvoirsau Secrétairegénéral.

Le premier groupe des projets de résolutionsdont je parlerai a trait
5 cles propositions qui tendaienà ce que l'Assemblée généralceonf5rc
immédiatementcertains pouvoirs au SecrétairegénéralA. insinotamment,
le projet de résolution présentpar la délégationdc l'Égypte proposait
d'autoriser le Secrétaire généraà présenter toute demande pertinente
au gouvernement de jure ou de facto responsable, en vue d'obtenir la
réparation dueà la victime ouà ses ayants droit (Document A/C.61279).
Lc représentant de la France a proposé(Docum-nt A/C. 61282)que
la demande soit présentée «cn consultation avec 1'Etat dont la victime
est un ressortissant». Un des amendements (Docuincnt A/C. 61284)
que l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques a présentése,t que
la délégationdc l'Égypte a accepté, prévoyaitque le Secrétaire général
devait esercer le recours devant les tribunaux nationaux compétents.
Un autre amendement présentépar l'Union des Républiques socialistes
soviétiquesaurait obligé lSecrétairegénéral à obtenir le consentement
de l'État dont l'agent victime du dommage est un ressortissant, avant
de pouvoir intenter une action cn réparation.
Un projet de résolution proposépar la délégationdc l'Uruguay était
d'un caractère un peu différent.Aux termes de ce projet de résolution,
1'Asscmblécgénéraleaurait approuvé les mesures déjà prises par le
Secrétaire généraelt l'aurait autoriàaccorder une réparationcomplètc
aux agents des Nations Unies ayant subi des dommages. La « répara-
tion complète » seraià déterminer « d'accord avec les règlestechniques
les mieux éprouvées,appliquées en la matière danç lcs pays les plus
avancés eten tenant compte des conditions ct sacrificesspéciaux qu'im-
plique le service des Nations Unies ».Cettc proposition de l'Uruguay
n'offrait cependant aucune réponse préciseaux questions poséespar le
Secrétaire généraalu sujet de la réparation due par l'État responsable
(Document A/C. 61281e ,t Rev. I et2).

b) Profiositions tendanh ceque l'Assembléeénéralreenvoielaquestion
h la Com~nissio~zdu droit international.
La deuxième procédure proposée par la Sixième Commission pour
résoudrele problhme consistait à renvoyer la questionà la Commission
du droit international en lui demandant de rédigerun projet de conven-
tion internationale.
Cette suggestion a étéprésentéepar quelques représentants qui
estimaient qu'aux termes des principes du droit international erivigueur,
l'organisation des Nations Unies n'avait pas capacité pour exercer un
recours sur le plan international. Selon eux, pour conférer cedroit à
l'organisation des Nations Unies, il fallait rédigerune convention. Cette
proposition a étéincorporéedans un projet de résolutionprésentépar
la délégation dela Syrie, qui recommandait que la question fût renvoyée
à la Commissiondu droit international (Document A/C.61276).Le repré-
sentant de la France a présentéun amendement àce projet de résolution,
demandant que la Commission du droit international entreprit son
étude en se conformant à l'avis consultatif qui aura étédonnépar la
Cour internationale de Justice (Document A/C. 61278). c) Propositions tendant à ce que l'Assemblée générald eentande à la
Coziri~zternationalede Justice un avis consultatif.

La troisième procédure proposép ear l'egroupe dereprésentants le plus
nombreux consistait à s'adresserà la Courinternationale de Justice pour
lui présenterles qiiestions juridiques que soulève le problèmedes décla-
rations et lui demander un avis consultatif. A la 112me Séancede la
Sixième Commissionun avant-projet d'une question à soumettre à
la Cour a étéprésentépar le représentant de la Belgique. Sous sa forme
initiale, ce texte était ainsi rédigé(Document AIC. 61SR. 112,p. 13) :

« Au cas où,dans l'exercicede sesfonctions, un agent des Nations
Unies subit un dommage dans des conditions qui engagent la
responsabilité de l'État, l'organisation des Nations Unies est-elle
habilitéeà exercer un droit de protection, concurremment ou non
avec l'État dont la victime est ressortissant et à négocier avec
le gouvernement de jure ou de facto responsable, en vue d'obtenir
la réparation due à la victime ou à ses ayants droit? 1)

Dcs amendements ont étéproposés à ce texte par les délégationsde
la France (Document A/C. 6/277), du Royaume-Uni (Document A/C.
61280 et 283), ensuite de la France et de l'Iran conjointement (Docu-
ment A/C. 6/285), du Venezuela (Document AIC. 61292)et de la Grèce
(Document A/C. 61293).
Vu le nombre considérabledc ces amendements, le représentant de la
Colombie a introduit.une proposition tendant à former un sous-comité
chargé d'élaborerun texte de synthèse (Document A/C. 61286).Cette
proposition colombienne n'a pas étéadoptéede manière formelle, mais,
aprèsdes échangesde vues approfondis, en séancespubliques et en marge
clesséances,un texte commun qui tenait compte des diverses proposi-
tions successives a étérédigéet soumis à la Commission par les repré-
sentants de la Belgique, de la Colombie, de la France, de la Grèce,de
l'Iran, di1 lioyaume-Uni, de la Syrie, de l'Uruguay et du Venezuela
(Document A/C. 61294).
Le nouveau texte contenait donc les vues communes des délégations
qui, ou bien avaient présenté des amendementsau projet de résolution
initialde la 13elgique,ou bien avaient prisune part importantàla discus-
sion dela question.Il est même à noter que l'on trouve parmi sesauteurs
des représentants qui avaient préconisé,21 l'origine, des modes d'action
tout à fait différents (la Syrieet l'Uruguay).
Le nouveau projet conjoint de résolution apportait plusieurs modi-
fications et adjonctions au teste de la proposition initiale de la Belgique.
J'en mentionnerai brièvement les plus importantes. La formule <qualité
pour exercer un droit de protection n a étémodifiée comme suit :
« qualité pour présenter une réclamation internationale ». Après les
mots «the United Nations », on a ajouté,dans le texte anglais, les mots
« as an Organization »,pour faire clairement entendre que la question
a traità la capacité juridique des Nations Unies en tant qu'organisation
et non à celle de ses Membres en tant qu'États particuliers. Le texte
français comportait déjà, dans sa forme primitive, l'espression«l'Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies » et ne nécessitait, par conséquent, aucune
altération. Mais on a fortement insisté sur le fait que les deux textes
avaient la même signification,c'est-à-dire que la formule françaisea l'organisation des Nations Unies » était la reproduction exacte des
mots anglais « the United Nations as an Organization P.
On a,d'autre part, ajouté au passage relatif aux réparations duespour
dommages causés à la victime, une mention concernant celles dues
dommages causésaux Nations Unies. Le représentant des États- Ynis
a enfinproposéde supprimer, danscette partie clela question, la mention
relative aux réparations pour dommages causés à la victime, mais cette
prUne deuxième question aeptétérédigée pour fairesuite à la question
initiale de la délégationbelge,.Dans cette deuxièmequestion on deman-
dait à la Cour, au cas où elle répondrait affirmativement au sujet de la
capacitéde l'Organisation des Nations Unies de présenter une demande
en réparation pour dommages causés à la victime ouà ses ayants droit,
de donner son avis consultatif sur la manière de concilier l'action de
l'organisation avec les droits quepourrait posséderl'État dont la victime
est ressortissant.'
On a égalementajouté au teste de la résolutionun préambule com-
poséde deux considérants. C'étaientles délégationsde la France et de
l'Iran qui avaient proposé,lorsde la préparation du nouveau texte, que
le considérant qui figurait dans le projet de résolutionde'Égypte'fût
incorporédans la proposition belge afin u il n'y ait aucun doute sur
la capacité de l'organisation des Nations;'nies d'intenter une action
en réparation. Le nouveau teste leur a donné une entière satisfaction
et reproduit le considérant égyptien avec quelques changements de
pure forme.
On a enfin insérédans leprojet de résolutionuh paragraphe final par
lequel on charge le Secrétaire généralde préparerà la lumière de l'avis
consultatif que formulera la Cour, des propositions qui seront soumises
à l'Assemblée généralleors de sa Quatrième Session en septembre 1949.
2. Décisionsde la Sixiènze Commission :

J'en viensmaintenant aux décisionsde LaSixzigne Cortznzission.

si diversesàla SixièmeCommission et on a soumis tant de propositions
différentes,que la Commission a décidé, A sa 118me Séance,de mettre
aux voix une question préliminairede principe.En vue de mettre un peu
d'ordre clans les débats, on a proposéque la Commission se prononçât
tout d'abord sur la question de savoir siie considéraitque l'Assemblée
pouvait prendre une décision immédiatesur les problèmes juridiques.
mis en jeu. Par27 voix contre 6 et 7 abstentions, la Commissiona décidé
qu'elle ne pouvait pas se prononcer immédiatententsur le problème
juridique d~la capacitéde l'Organisation des Nations Unies de présenter
contre un btat une demande en réparation de dommages subis par ses.
agents dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions.
Ce vote a mis en lumière lefait qu'une grande majorité des membres.
de la Commission désiraient consulter la Cour avant de prendre une
décisionquant au fond. En mêmetemps, il est apparu très clairement,
d'après la forme même sous laquelle la question a étésuccessivement
posée,que la Commission n'avait aucunement l'intention, par ce vote,.
de mettre en doute la capacité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de
prksenter une demande en réparation. En effet, le président dela SixikmeCommission avait propos6 tout d'abord que laCommission se prononqat
sur ceproblème de la capacite lui-même,mais la Commission s'est refusée
k suivre cette suggestion, de nombreux représentants s'btant expressé-

ment elevks contre la mise aux voixde la queçtion préliminaire sous cette
forme. Certains membres de la Commission ont tenu meme à préciser
qu'ils seraient parfaitement disposés à voter affirmativement, au cours
de l'Açsembl&e,sur la question de la capacitk internationale de l'organisa-
tion des Nations Tildes, mais qu'ils préféreraientquand meme entendre
aupa~avant l'opinion autoriske de la Cour internationale de Justice.

b) Projet de yésolzction#résenté par la déIigdios de L'Égypte.
La Commission s'est ensuite prononcée sur le projet de r6solution '
de l'Égypte, incorporant les amendements soumis par la délégation
cle l'Union des ICépubliques sociali5tes soviétiques que la délégation
égyptienne avait acceptés. La Commission n'étaït pas ai1 moment du
vote en possession du texte écritde la version définitivede la résolution,
mais l'alinéa pertinentdu dispositifde cette proposition dans sa dernière
version écrite, vous le tronverezdans le document AIL.61284. Cet alinéa
est le suivant :

((L'Assemblée généralea~itorise le Secrétaire général, au cas où
un agent des Nations Unies subit, dans l'exercice de sa mission,
un clornmage corporel dans des conditions engageant la responsa-
bilitéd'un État, d'aprks les principes reconnus du droit des gens,
3.présenter, sous réserve de l'accord de l'État dont 1s victime est
le ressortisçant, toute demande pertinente au gouvernement de jure
ou de factoresponsable, en exerçant un recours devant les tribunaux
nationaux compétents, en vue d'obtenir le remboursement des
frais encourus par E'Organlsaticindes Nations Unies en raison des
vq-sernents effectués A l'agent de l'Organisation ayant subi un
dommage corporel ou A scs ayants droit. ii

Cependant,immédiatement avant le vote, lereprksentant de 1'U.R. S.S.
a faitremarquer que le texte anglaisdu document que je viens de citer
(Document AIC. 61284)ne représentait pas fidèlement l'original russe,
introduit en langue russe. Tl a demandé, par conçequent, et la Cornmis-
sion l'aadmis par un vote à la majorité apres une assez longue discus-
sion, que la finde la proposition soit modifiéedans le texte anglais, de
la rnanibre suivante :

Au lieu de II...to make any pertinent application to the responsible
de jure os de facto governtnent by taking action in the
responsihle national courts ...n,
lire u ..., to rnakeany pertinent dernand to the responsible
de jure or de factogovernment and also to Mc suit in
the appropriate national courts.:. n.

Ce projet de résolution égyptien avec les amendements soviétiques
a @tércpoussé par 26 voix contre g et 7 abstentions (Document AJC.
6/SR. 120, p. 5). On remarquera que le rksultat de ce scrutin a été
presque exactement le m&meque celui du scrutin surla question préli-
minaire de principe.En fait, la premikre décision de laCoinmission, la
décision de principe, laissait prdvoIcrejet de laproposition égyptienne,
la Commission ayant estimé, pour différentes raisons, qu'ellpréfdrait 60 EXPOSE DE M. KERNO (NATIONS UNIES) - 7 11149
ne pas se prononcer immgdiatement sur le fond de la question. Ce vote

négatif s'expliqtieainsi' en grande partie par la d6cision preliminaire
de p~incipe. Mais il y avait une autre raisoli q~~iavait aussi son impor-
taiice dans I'opinion de certaines dglégations. Le projet de risolution
égyptien leur paraissait trop étroit ct trop rigide.La proposition égyp-
tienne, telle qu'elle avaiété ainendée, apportait en effetdes restrictions
sérieusesà l'autorisation qu'aurait reçue le Secrétaire ghéral.Sa comp6
tence aurait été r) soumise k l'assentiment de l'État dont la victime
est le ressortissant,2) limitée A une demande de remboursement des
frais cncourus par l'Organisation elle-merne. En oiitre, jusqu'à I'accep-
tation de la derniLre modification soviétique immédiatelnent avant le
'vote, le Secrktaire généraln'aurait étéautorisé à intervenir. qu'auprès
des tribiinaux nationaux dc 1'État responsable.
Ainsi que je viens dc le mentionner et que lc reprhsentant du SecrS-
taire générall'a fait remarquer au sein de la Commission imrnédiate-
ment après Ic vote, lerejet de la proposition égyptiennf ne constitue
en aucune façon une décision négative sur la question de savoir si
l'Organisation des Mations Unies a ou n'a pas le drcride prgsenter, sur
le plan international, une demande en réparation. La très grande majo-
rite de laCommission et notamment Icsreprésentants du Royaume-Uni,
de laBelgique, du Brdsii, de PaGrèce, de l'Australie, des Pays-Bas, du
Luxenibourg, de la Colombie, des États-unis, ciuCanada, de l'Uruguay
et de la Suede, se sont d'ailleurs déclarés expressémentd'accord avcc
le point de vue du représentant du Sccrétaite général.

c) Projets de résolatiofisprésmtésPpnr lesiîéLigg.t.tias da Syrie et &
L'Cirztgu~y.

Ely avait ensuitc le projet de résolution de Ia Syrie etde l'Uruguay.
Comme il apparaissait clairement après ces deux premiers votes que
je viens de mentionner que l'opinion généralc dc 1;Commission était
favorable .5une constiltation de la COLIinternationali:rleJustice, aucune
décision n'a étéprise au sujet des projets de rPsolutions syrien et
uruguayen. A la 124mc Séance de la Sixième Comriiisçion, le représen-
tant de la Syrie a retiré ça proposition, tout en réservant pour sun .
Gouvernement le droit de présenter toutes observi~tions qu'il jugerait
nécessaires plus tard. Le représentant cleI'Urugwagrn'a pas non plus
insisté pour que Ic projet de résolution ir'il avaitprésentéfût mis
aux voir. Ces deux represcntants ont d'alilcurs activement participe
par la suite à l'élaboration d'un texte combiné de synthèse de la.
propasition de la Belgique (Document AIC. 61294).

d) Projet derbolz~tioizfirésenlpar Icdéligationde la BaEgiqzts.
J'cn vicns maintenant au projet dc rksolution belge.
Ag>ré; le rejet de la propositron egyytienne et n13ri.sque les autres
yropnsiitions eurent ét4 retirées,ilne restaitque la proposition tendant
à renvoycr la q~icstion A la Cour pour avis consultalifsur les questions
juricliques misesen jeu. Plusieiirs arguments ont &témis en avant, tant
pour que coiltre la proposition, mais l'opinion généi-al tait nettement
en faveur d'une consultation de la Cour iriternationale.On peut g~osso
do grouper en deus catégories les représentants qui yr6coi~isaient le
recours k la Cour :premièrement, ceux qui avaient expriméla co~lviction
quc l'Organisation des Nations Unies a bien le droit de prbscntcr une
rtclamation sur le plan international, mais qui peiisaient qu'un avis EXPOS EE M. KERNO (x-~TIONU SNIES) - 7 III49 61

autorisé de la Cour renforcerait la position de l'organisation quantà
l'exercice de ce droit (par exemple:États-Unis, Pays-Bas, Chili, Iran,
Brésil, Venezuela, Colombie et Afghanistan), et deuxièmement, ceux
qui avaient exprimé quelques doutes soit au sujet de la capacité de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies de présenter une telle demande, soit
au sujet de l'exercice de certains aspects decette capacité et qui, en
conséquence,désiraient un avis autorisé de la Cour afin de dissiper ces
doutes (Royaume-Uni, Australie, Turquie, Équateur).
Le représentant de la Belgique, qui avait le premier présenté la
proposition suggérant de consulter la Cour, a expliquéque sa délégation
désir d'éviter une longue discussion sur des questions de doctrine, le
questions sur lesquelles il pourrait s'avérerdifficiled'aràiun accord
rapide à la Sixième Commission, et ensuite l'espoir d'établir une base
solide pour la protection des agents des Nations Unies, sur le plan
international (Document A/C. G/SR. 115, p. 3). D'autres représentants
ont soulignéqu'un avis de la Cour donnerait un grand poids à toute
action que l'organisation des Nations Unies pourrait être amenée à
preiiclre. Certains représentants ont aussi estimé que, vil la stipulation
du paragraphe premier de l'article 96 de la Charte des Nations Unies,
l'Assembléegénéraleserait bien inspiréecledemander, à titre de ligne de
conduite générale,un avis a la Cour toutes les fois qu'elle se trouverait
devant des problèmes jiiridiqties importants et compliqués qu'il ne
serait pas opportun de trancher sans êtresoutenu par l'avis d'un corps
de juristes particulièrement qualifiés.
D'autre part, les représentants qui préféraient employer d'autres
méthodes pour examiner la question, ont émiscertains doutes et soulevé
certaines objections au sujet de la demande d'avis consultatif adressée
à la Cour. Ces représentants peuvent êtreclasséseux aussi en deux
grands groupes :premièrement certains d'entre eux étaient absolument
convaincus que l'Organisation des Nations Unies avait la capacité
requise pour présenter une réclamation internationale et, pour cette
raison, ils soutenaient qu'il était inutile de demander l'avis de la Cour
(France, U. R. S. S., Ggypte). Quelques-uns de ces représentants crai-
gnaient mêmeque le fait de demander un avis puisse êtreinterprété
comme jetant des doutes sur cette capacité.D'autres déléguépsensaient
qu'il n'existe aucun droit en vertu des principes du droit international
réclamation, et que l'élaboration d'une convention était la meilleure
méthode pour permettre d'établirce droit (Syrie, Grèce, Suéde,Pérou).
Un membre de la Commission a estiméque la question Ctait tout àfait .
simple et pouvait facilement êtrerégléedirectement et immédiatement
par l'Assemblée générale (voir la déclaration du représentant de
1'U.R. S. S., Document A/C. G/SR. 114, p. 2).D'autre part, un autre
membre de la Commission a soutenu qu'en l'absence d'un précédent
reconnu, une réponseaffirmative pourrait donner naissance à une série
de questions subsidiaires qu'il serait difficile de résoudre (Grèce,
Document A/C. G/SK. 112, pp. 17-19).
Je voudrais enfin attirer l'attention sur deus autres points importants.
Contrairement àce qui s'était passéau cours du débat sur l'admission
de nouveaux Alembres qui a eu lieu à la Deuxiéme Session de 1'Assem-
bléegénérale,on n'a, au cours des présentes discussions de la Sixième
Commission,jamais mis en doute la compétence de cette Cour dedonnerun avis coilsultatif sur cette question. D'un autre côté, quelsque soient
les divers arguments qu'on a fait valoir en ce qui concerne l'opportunité
de demander un avis consultatif, la Commission a étéunanime à recon-
naître que les Nations Unics devaient êtrehabilitées à présenter des
réclamations sur le plan international.
Aprks avoir ainsi discutéla question pendant une semaine, la Sixième
Commission a pris sa décision définitive à sa 124me Séance, le
26 novembre 1948. A cette séance, leteste final contenant la demande
d'avis consultatif a étémis aux voix et a étéadoptépar 34 voix contre
5 et une abstention.

3. Décisionde L'Assemblée gbnérde.
Nous venons maintenant à la décisionde l'Assemblée générale elle-
même.

Le rapport contenant le texte du projet de résollition élaborépar la
teur de la Sixième Commission,enté à à'Ala 16gmo Séance plénière,lepor-
3 décembre 1948..Après une brève discussion, un vote à main Jevée
est intervenu et la résolution a ét6adoptée à l1un;inimitépar 53 voix
sans aucune abstention. Puis-je faire ressortir une fois de plus qu'en
dépitdes opinions différentesexprimées'lorsdes discussionsà la Sixième
Commission, les questions actuellement soumises à la Cour ont été
adoptées par un vote unanime de l'Assemblée général ?e
J'approche maintenant de la conclusion de la première partie de ma
déclaration, dans laquelle j'ai passéen revue les débats de l'Assemblée
généraleet de la SixièmeCommission. Je n'ai pas eu l'intention, danscet
exposé,de suggérerque les diverses opinioris expriméesdevraient néces-
sairement êtreprises en considération par la Cour lors de l'étude des
questionsparticulières ausujet desquelles l'Assembléegénéralea demandé
un avis consultatif. J'ai plutôt eu l'intention de fournirCour un bref
résumédes propositions et des décisionsqui constituent l'historique des
questions particulières quela Courva étudieret qui situent ces questions
dans leur vraie perspective.
Je me suis permis, Monsieur le Président, de faire ces dernières
remarques, car je connais bien la doctrine constante de cette Cour- et
aussi de la Cour permanente - concernant l'importance plus ou moins
grandequ'il convient d'attacher auxtravaux prkparatoires et concernant
le rôle que doit jouer la méthode historique d'interprétation. J'ai eu
l'honneur de participer personnellement à plusieurs de ces débatset j'ai
étéheureus de trouver à ce sujet un passage significatif, toutà fait
récemment, dans l'avis de cette Cour concernant l'admission des nou-
veaux Membres. Quoi qu'il en soit, je suis sûr que dans tous les cas, la
Cour voudra êtreenpossession de tous les élémentset de toutes les consi-
dérations qui ont décidé l'-4ssembléeà demander le présent avis. C'est
dans ce but que la première partie de mon exposé a étéconsacrée à
l'historique des débats et des décisionsde Paris.
Avant de passer à la deuxikme partie, je dois cependant mentionner
encore un point que je crois important.
L'exposéhistorique de cette ,question ne serait, en effet, pas complet
sans un examen attentif de l'ensemble du texte - en anglais je dirais
the co~ztex- dont les questions posées à la Cour forment une partie.
Ce texte complet, on le trouve dans la Résolution de l'Assemblée du3 décembre. II contient, il ne faut pas l'oublier,un prkambule ainsi
conp :

a 1,'Assemblée générale, considérant que la série d'incidents
tragiques affectant ces derniers temps des agents des Nations
Unies dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions soulève, d'une façon plus
urgente que jamais, la question des dispositions A prendre par
les Nations Unies pour assurer Al'avenir A leursagents une protec-
tion maximum et la réparation des dommages subis, considerant
comme hautement souhaitable que le Secrétaire génkral puisse,
sans conteste, agir de la manière la plus efficace en vue d'obtenir
toute reparation clue...n
Ce préambuleest suivi d'un dispositifqui coinporte, en premier lieu,
la décision de soumettre deux questions 3. la Cour pour avis consultatif
et de plus, en second lieu, des instructions pour le Secrétaire général
afin que, A la lumière de l'avis de la Cour, il.prkpare des propositions
pour la prochaine session ordinaire de l'Assemblée.
Si l'on çonsid$re cette Risolution dans son ensemble, les éléments
suivants s'en détachent distinctement. L'Assembléeavait la préoccupa-
tion de prendre des dispositions pour que les Nations Unies puissent, à
l'avenir, s'assiirerque les dommages subis entraineront reparation;
elle désiraitque cette question fût régléed'extrêmeurgence etelle esti-
mait qu'il &tait hautement dtsirable que le Secrétaire général fût à
mbmc d'agir sans conteste avec une efficacité certaine afin d'obtenir
toute réparation due; c'est pour cette raison qu'elle a décidéde sou-
mettre cette question k la Cour.
Ainsi, il est clairque la demande d'avis consultatif est une étape
importante dansle déroulement de I'action que l'Assemblée envisage
pour assurer aux agents des Nations Unies la protection la plus complète.
Certes, il y a eu quelques divergences de vucs sur des questions de
doctrines ou de théories juridiques parmi les representants siigeant à
la Sixième Commission, mais dans son desir fondanlental d'assurer cette
protection efficace et d'obtenir réparation, l'Assemblée s'exprime en

des termes qui ne laisscnt aucun doute. L'avis de la Cour, s'il est affir-
matif, fournira une base juridique solide pour que ce désirfondatriental
de I'Assembléepuisse se realiser((sans conteste ))et K de la manihre
la plus efficace a.

SECOND PART: ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

Having completcd tliis morning the histoncal part of our statement,
I should now llke to diçcussthe meaning of the specific questions before
the Court. It is our purpase here to analyse for the assistance of the
Court the two questions presented to it by the General Assembly, for
tliepurpase of determining their scope and lirnits.
At this tirne, althqugh the text of these two questions lias been read
this rnorning by the Registrar of the Court, 1 think it may be useful
to repeat them again in order that tliistcxt should be guite fresh in
our memory :
"1. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circurnstances involv-
ing the responsibilityof a State, has the United Nations, as an64 ST.4TTEMENT BY M. KERNO (UNITED NATIOXS) - 7 111 49
Organization, tlie capacity to bring an international claim against
tlze responsiblde juïa or defactogovernrnent with a view to obtain-
in$ the repardtion due inrespect of the danlage caused (a} to the
United Nations, (B) tu tlievictim or to persons entjtIed through
hirn ?

II. In the event of an afiirrnative reply on point 1 (b),how is
action by the United Nations to be seconciled with sucharights as
may be possessed by the State of wlzich the victim is a national 7"
Two general remarks may be in order before embarking on a detailed
analÿsis of these questions. In the frst place, it isobvious ftom the

face of the questions that they are "legal" qsiestions and are tkerefore
drawn up fully in accordance with the provisions of Article 65, para-
graph I, of tlieStatute af the Court. En this respect rnay I mention
that the Assembly itself has classified in its Resolution tl-testwo ques-
tions as legaI questions.
Tliere iç in the rcport of Committee 6 to thc full-4ssembly, which
constitutes a part of the documentation submitted trithe Court, an error
in the English text. The English text says only "the follorving two
qucstions" ; the French text says : "les deux cl~~estionsjuridiques
sriivantcs". 13ut the rapporteur of Committee 6 in the full meeting of
thc Asscmbly corrected this errar and stated that, the French text being
corrcct, tlie English tevt consequently sholild read : "the following two
legal questions". If you will look atthe official copies which the Secre-
tary-Geneml has transmitted ta the Court, you will find not only in
the Frcnch but dso in the English text the correct phrase "thc iwo
following legal questions".
Thc sccond prelimiilary remark is as Eollows: it isto bc noted that
the qtiestions asked are abstrnct and getleral questions. They have
no reference to the specific incidents which were referrcd to by the
Çecretary-General in liis report to the Assembly, and tvhicll were
describcd in the first part of our statement, nor to any specitic claims
which thc United Nations rnay present to individual States.
After thesc two pr~lirnin~tryrenlarks I believe that it nlay be helpful
to the Court to analyse the significant phrases aiid elemeilts of the
qucstions presented.
Tlie first phrase \hich rieeds consideration in the first of the ques-
tions is "art a~egatO/the United Natfolzs". Thesr words are intended
to comprise al1persons acting on behalf ofthe United Nations or any of
its orgam. These persons include oficials and employees of the Çecre-
tariat, observers detailcd by Member Governments for service under
orders of the Utiitccl Nations, Members ofthe United Nations Cornmis-
sions or Committces, or persoilç wha are themselves organs of theUnited
Naiions. While there is no expianation of the rnerining of this phrase
"an &genty'in the records of the Committee discussions, it is noteworthy
that the incidents ~vhich impellcd the Çeçretary-General to bring this
matter hefore the General Açsembly involved persons having different
relationships to the United Nations. Thus Count Bernadotte wüs
hirnself an orgatz-a sttlisidiarorgan-of the United Nations (the Uiiited
Nations Mecliator for Palestine), appointed by thc General Assernbly ;
several of the perçons involvcd in other ir~cidents rvere observers who
rvere detailcd by national govcrnrnents for servicc witk the hlediator
and witIz the Truce Commission, which was a subsjdiary body, not ofthe Assembly, but of the Security Council. One of the pcrsons involved
was a member of the General Secretariat of the United Nations. Thc
word "agent" \vas used by the Secretary-General in his memorandum
to the Assembly for this deliberate purpose of comprising tlicse various
types of individuals. It is important to note that the common elemeilt
behalf of the United Nations and not on behalf of any individual Member.
In fact, ail of the persons here referred to received some compensation
from the United Nations for their activities, either salaryor PL? diem ;
al1of them acted under ordcrs of an organ of the United Nations, either
the General Assembly, the Security Council, or one of its subordinate
body, or thc Secretary-General. Even if no compensation were paicl,
howcver, al1pcrsons who are clcarly actingon behalf of the Organization
should be consiclereclas comprisecl within the category of agents. So,
for instance, ive inay imagine that the Security Council decides to set
up a smail sub-committee in order to enquire into some matters, and
this sub-coinmittee is composed of thrcc, four or five members of the
Security Council. If these persons are physically injured while perform-
ing thcir duties, even if they do not receive any compensation, any
salary, or any per dieln from the United Nations, they are to be com-
prised in this category of agents because they are acting officially on
behalf of the Organization of the United Nations.
Thc phrase "in llze $erfonnn~zceof Izis duties"is inteiided to restrict
the questioii so as to coinprise only injuries suffered while the individual
is perforniing duties on behalf of the United Nations. Shc question
therefore does iiot cover any situation in which the individual suffers
injury while engaged on private affairs or while performing duties which
are not part of his resporisibility to the United Nations. The signi-
ficance of this restriction resides in the fact that the Court is not cailed
upon to consicler whether thc United Nations possessesa right vis-à-vis
a State for injuries suffered to its agents gcnerally, in the samc sense
that a Statc possesses a right of protection for its nationals gencrally.
The injiired indiviclual must not only be an agent of the United N t'ons ;
it must also be shown that the ini-ry-was suffered "in the performance
of his duties".
Tlie phrase "sz~fleringighj~~yn circzt~?~stanitezsvokviltgtJ~erespotasibility
importance"hhavinp regard to the task of the Court in this mattcr.dcraThe
Court doesnot need to deal with the question as to ~vlietherany particular
State lias res~onsibilitv in anv of tlic circumstances here involved. The
question for'the COU& impGes as a preinise that a State does have
responsibilitÿ because of the circumstanccs in which the injury was
sufferecl. There is thus no need for the Court to concern itself with
such questions as denial of justice, exhaustion of local remedies, and
various other cluestions of the same character lvhich were discussed in
the Sisth Committee. The question, in effect, is, assuming that a State
is responsible for the injury, does the United Nations have the capacity
to bring an international claim ?
It shoulclbe noted that the Sisth Committee deliberately drafted the
question so that this premise should be made clear. In the memorandum
presented originally by the Secretary-General, the question was asked
in a somewhat different fashion, thus: "whether, in the view of the
General Assembly, a State may have a responsibility as against the United Nations for injury to,or death of, an agent oftheUnited Nations".
The deliberation with which the Committee adoptecl a diffcrent formula-
tion of the question was brought out by the remark of the delegate of
Venezuela whothouglit that the first question in the Secretary-General's
memorandum was so worded as to emphasize the factor of the State's
responsibility, while,in his opinion, the emphasis should be laid on the
question as to whether the United Nations was cntitled to claim rcpara-
tion. The question of the responsibility of the State on whose temtory
thc injury was incurred was also interesting, but it \vas of secondary
importance, as it woidd in any case be settled wlien the claim was under
discussion. In that respcct, he preferred the wording of the question
submitted by the representative of Belgiuxn, because it started from
the premise that the responsibility of the State concerned had already
been establislicd (Document A/C. 6/SK. 114, p. 4).
The phrase "the Utza'ted Natiolzs,as an Orga?tizaliott"is intended to
xnake it quite clear that the question aslted of the Court involves the
capacity of the United Nations as such, and not the capacity of any
individual klember acting througli the Organization. 1touched on this
question of the terminology of the English and French versions in the
first part of my statemcnt, but ma); 1 say here in parenthesis tliat this
terminology was discussed very much at San 1;rancisco wlien the
Conference liad to decide what should bc tlie official title of the new
international organization? There were several delegatcs, and 1
remeinber that I personally was among tliem as the representative of
my State of origin, to propose that the name should not be simply the
"United Nations", but the "Organization of the Uxiited Nations". even
in the English text, precisely in order tliat there should be no possibility
of confusion between the United Nations as an Organization and the
United Nations who are the Members of the Organization. But then
the Confercnce decided on the title of the "United Nations" chiefly
should be simply "The United Nations". delegatThe Conference decided tole
do so, chiefly to honour the memory of President I~ooseveltwho was
one of the initiators of the Charter, and who, diiring tlie \var, first
employcd the title of "United Nations". Therefore the name was
"The United Nations" ;but you \vil1see, if you read the Charter, that in
the French text the words ''l'Organisation des Nations Unies" are
employed more often tlian in the English text. Nevcrtlieless, according
to the Charter itself, the English words "United Nations" define the
Organization as such. In Our case, however, in order to be quite
clear, as 1 explained, the words "as an Organization" were added after
the words "United Nations" in the English text.
May 1 add that in our view the Court does not have to deal with the
question which was raised in the memorandum of the Secrctary-
General as to who may present such a claim in the namc and on behalf
of the United Nations ? \nile this question was discussed in the Sixth
Committee, it is clear that it is a question interna1to the United Nations
Organization and need iiot concern the Court in this proceeding.
The phrase "tlzecapacityto bringa.ltitztevlzatiolzacllaim" is, in effect,
the heart of the question asked of the Court. While the question of
the capacity of the United Nations to act as a legal person inthe national
' courts of Rlember States cvillbe referred to hereafter in Our argument.
that question is xiotan issue before the Court. It will be recalled that STATEMENT BY M. KEKNO (UHITED NATIONS) - 7 III49 67
a proposal that the Unitcd Nations should proceed through national
courts was not adopted by the Sixth Cornmittee or the Generai
Assembly. The Gerieral Assemblÿ was coricerned llese with receiving
the advice of the Court as to the capacity of the United Nations to act
on the international rather than national plane. We interpret the
word "brilzg" to mean to present the claim, to press for its çeltlement,

and to accept settlemcnt through international machinery. In the
first analysiç this maçkinery would 11edirect ilegotiation with thegovern-
ment of the State conçerned, and further proceedings rnight involve
such arbitral and judicial procedtiresas rnigkt be open to the Parties
or on which they might agree. The Court is thus asked to cansider
whether the United Nations is empowereclulider the rules of international
law to claim against a Çtate through internatioiial machinery reparation
for an injury forwhich the State isresponsible under rulesof international
law. In short, we have here thc direct issue of thc interriational
personality. of the United Nations.
'I'hcphrase "aga.i?zstlze ~es$o?zsiblde jure or de facto govermerzt"
rnakes it çlear that the Court Is not required to concerri itsclf with
whether or not responsibilitj~ exists in the rcspondent government.
As has already been pointed out,this is tkcpremise on which the ques-
tion has becn asked of the Court. Nor need the Court concern itself
with the distinction which may exist between a de jure or de facto
governmen'c.
There was rnuch discussion before the Sixth Conirnittee with regard
to the ki~idof rcparation which might be claimed by the United Nations.
That question içnot now before thc Court. However, some considera-
tiori needs to be given to the phrase "mitk nview toobtainingthe:repnra-
£iondzte irz rcspact of $12dumag~ cuzssed". It rr?ouIdappear from the
wording of this phrase that the General Assembly had mainly in view
the question of pecuniary reparation, çince it sefets to the "damage
caused". This is alsoborne out by the fact that most of the discussion
in the Sixth Coinmittee revolved around the question of pecunlav
injuries and the arnount of compensation which should be yaid. The
Secretary-General isof the opinion, hovever, that the question rnay be
properly interpreted su as to comprehend reparation in forms other
tlian moncy, designed to insure against repetition of the injury, such
as, for example, the irnprovement of the system of protection of United
Nations agents and otlier steps which miglzt be taken by their govern-
rnentç to prevent the recumnce of the events, including appropriate

punishment of thc offenders. It is not necessary for the Court to enter
into a disctrssionof the particukar type of reparation which ~night be
due to the United Nations, but we do wisk to point out that ii is not
necessuy for the Court so to restrict its opinion that it would coves
only pecuniary reparation.
The first question asked by the Genesal Assembly ends with the
phrase "cnfrsed {a)to bAe United Nations, (b) tothe vicbim or ta#ersuns
entitled throughhint". She division of thi-, phrase into two separate
parts was made by the Gencral Asçernbly with very great deliberation,
and the Sixth Cornmittee attachcd very great importance to tkis divi-
sion. The Court nili note from the record of the debate that, while
many rnembers were certain that the United Nations had the capacity
tu clairn fur darnages caused to itçelf, some delegations were doubtful
as to whether the United Nations had capacity to daim for the damageç68 STATEF~IEKT BY M. KERNQ (U-SITED NATIONS) - 7 III49
caused to the agent. Thc Cornmittee, therefore, put both aspects to
this Court for itç advlce.
The darnage "to th6 Urtited Aratimas" ~wuld, inour view, include at
least the direct cost to tlze United Nations by rezon of the injury as,
for example, payrnent made to the victim or to thc person entitled
through l~irn, cost for hospitalizstion or funeral espenscs paid by the
United Nations, premiums on insurance policies taken out by the Unitèd
Nations for the benefit of the irijuredagent. This cost rnight also
include necessary espenditures incurrcd in replacing a valtiable agent,
such as the expense of training someone to take his place. Damage to

the United Nations might also comprise the loss c)fsecurity by other
personnel in the area, leading to the ncccssitj? of alemanding that the
responsible State take measures to prevent recurrence of the injury.
It was also suggested inthe Sixth Cornmittec tliat damage to the United
Nations rnight consiçt of the loss of senrice of valuable agents. How-
ever, it inot necessary, inour vie\%.,forthiç Court to cuncern itself witla
the precise element of reparation which ,the United Nations rnight
demand. That question, it would seem to us, would properly be dealt
with in thenegotiations between the United Nations and tlie responsible
Çtate In cach case. It is, however, necessary forthe Court to distinguish
clearly between the datnage to the United Nations and thc damqe to
the victim, or to yersnns entitled through llim, because of the division
of tliese tivo clernents madc in the question askcd of the Court.
The damage "to the uictim, ov Io$ersolas entitledtl~ro.uglIzim", will
obviously comprise such elements as loss of propt:rty, loss of Iifeor
corporeal injury. Tt rnight alsci, under certain circumstances, include
the clarnage caused by suffcring ancl perliaps even loss of reptrtation or
dignitÿ. However, it should be emphasized again that we do not believe
it necessary for the Court in this proceeding to enter jnto the propriety
af the clairn for any particular elemenof rlatnagecaused to the individual.
As lias been çaid before, one of the çliief reasons for the separation
of,the twu elements at tlie end of tlic first question asked nfthe Court
\vas the beliefof some of the delegates on the Sixth Cornmittee tliat the
capacity of the United Nations to bring an international claim was
more doubtful wlicn the daim was brought on behalf of the victim or
the perçons entitled throvgh him than when the claim was brought
for darnage causcd ta the United Nations. During the discussion, much
reference was made to the conflict betsveen thc slght of the United
Nations to present a daim and the right ofthe State of wliiclithe victim
was a.national. It \vas the possibilityof such a conflictwhich led the
Assembly to ask the second question. The referencc in the second
question to "actiorrtiy the U~iited Arations" obviously means the bring-
ing by the United Nations of an international claim for reparation in
respect of the darnage caused to the victim, or tIie persons entitled
through hirn.
TIie phrase "tobe rccofzcibd with sztchrightswlziclzway bt:$ossmsed hi
th State ofwhich theviclim a'a natzo~al" raiscsa number ofpoints which
require consideration. This phraçe would seem to include two elements :
on thc one band the legal relatiunship between the claim of the United
Nations and the claim ofthe State,and on the otker hand the practical
measures which canbc taken to reconçile both clairns.
It is not necessaryfor the Court, inour view, to consider wliich Inay
be the right possessed by the State of urhich the victim is a natiorial. STATEhIENT BY M. KEHNO (UKITED NATIONS) - 7 ILI 49 69
It is assumed inthe question asked of the Court thatthe State may have
such right, and the question is only how action by the United Nations
may he reconciled with these riglits. There is, however, one special
situatiotl as was pointed out in the Sixth Cornmittee. This is tlie ques-
tion which arisesas to the right ofthe United Nations in the event that
the victim is a national of the respondent State, that is toSay, the
State dleged to be responsible for the injury. It would appear to us
that the Court may pruperly conccrn itself with this hypothetical point,
if itsa desires, since, if the victwere a national of arespondent State,

the question of reconciliationof action bg the United Nations with the
rights ofthat State would imply an ansrver to the question as to whether
tlie United Nations may present aclaim at ail under such circurnstances.
Mr. E'residcnt, before coiicluding this portion-the second pnrtion-
of our statement, 3:should like to dwell for a moment on the great
importance of ihe questions put before the Court. In the firstplace,
the issue here involves the international pcrsonality of the UnitNdations.
For many pars scholars have discussed the personality of international
organizalions. Now a ptecise question on this major issue has been
presented to the highcst international judicial body. Your answer tci
the question may Involve thc most important conscqucnces for the
development of international organizatian. In the second place, the
issue isa serioiisone for the ability of the United Nations to protect its
agents and thuç to lncrease its effectiveness for ciitrying out the tasks
entrusted to it by the Charter. In this respect it may be noted tliat
Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter has provided as one of the
fundamental principIes of tIzc Organization that ail blernbers shall give
tothe United Nations every assistar~ce in any action it takes in accor-
dance with the Charter, and, furthermore, the Organization within the
purview of Article2, paragraph 6,is toensure that States which arenet
rnembers shnll act in accordance with the yrinciples of the Cfiartcr so
far as may 'te nccessary for the maintenance of international peace and
seçurity. Lastly, therc arc involved here principles of the higlïcst
importance for the future development of international law. You will
be concerilecl here with an cnquiry as to whether and how the rules of
international law can be adapted to meet a new situation arisii~gout of
the groivtli of new instrumcntalitics for the çonduct of internatioiial
affairs.
It isnot too much to Say that your opinion will be a liistoric rnarker
in the development of the system of law ofwliich you are the highest
exponent. 2.-ÇTATEMENT BY Mr. FELLER
(COUNSEL FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIOKS)

AT THE PUBLIC SITTING5 OF MARCH 7th AXD gth, 1949.

THIRD PART : STATEMENT OP LAW.

May itplease the Court : in his opening statement Dr. Kerno pointed
out that the Secretary-General conceives it to be liis duty in this case,
not only toyresent the Court witk information regarding the questions
before it,but also to take a definite position on tlieçe questions. The
Secretary-Gencral thetefore reçpectfully subrnits to the Court that the
first question asked by'the General Assembly should be answered in the
afirrnative. I rnigkt sumrnarize onr argument for th& position very
briefiyas follows :

First : that the United Nat ions possesses international juridical
personality conferred upon it by the States wlzichcreated it ;that
incidental to such personality the United Nations passesses the
procedural capacity to present an international claim ; and that as
a consequence of its personality the United Nations possesses
certain substantive rights under intertiational law.

Second : that among these substantive rights posçessed by the United
Nations is the rightof protection of its agents from urilawful injury
while engaged in its service. ,
Thircl: thst by vistue of the foregoing the Uiiited Nations rnay bbring
ariinternational clairn against the responsible de or de facto
governmcnt with a view to obtaining the repcwation due in respect
of damage caused either to the Unitcd Nations, or to the victirn or
to persons entitled through him.

I. Thc UnilladNations possesses an i~zternationalizaridtcnlpersonality,

We contend that the States, which are both the subjects and creators
of international Iaw, intended to and did in factcreate in the United
Nations a personality of internatiorial law.
It will berecalled that when the Charter of the United Nations was
uriclerdiscussion at the San Francisco Conference, Ehe question arose as
to whcthzr the Charter shoulcl contain a specificprovision regarding the
international personality of tlie Organizatiori. The Legal Cornmittee
of the Conference believed that such a provision n,oulcl be superRuous,
and the report of Cornmittee IV12, approved by Commission 4, states
that the international perjonality of the Organization was, in effect, -
"to be determinecl implicitly from the provisions of the Charter as a
whole". Wc submit that the provisions of the Charter as a whole make
it clcar heyond doubt that the Organization of the United Nations
possesseç an international juridical personality. ÇTATEEiiIENT l3Y Mr. FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 7 III 49 71
This conclusion results from the general aims and purposes of the
Organization, from the express powers which the Charter confers on the
Organization to act in the international field and from specificprovisions
of the Charter relating to the capacity, privileges and immunities of the
Organization.

The proviçions of thc Cliarter taken together indicate uneguivocdlly
that thc Organization ca1Ied the United Nations was set up by its
illembers as anentity. The Charter is of course in para series of under-
takings by the Members to conduct themselves in accordance with certain
standards, but numerous provisio~is of the Charter spccifically confcr
onthe Organization of the United Nations as such, or on one of its organs,
specificpower and authority. These provisions, which are so numerous
that it is hardly possible to cite tkem without niaking a catalogue of
most of the articles in the Charter, show that the Mcmbers desired to
create a collective entity which would act on their behaif, andnot ~nerely
n meeting place or forum in which the individual Members could have
thc opporttinity of statingwhat action each of them would take separa-
tely.- The very excellent anltlysis of this point at page 2of the United
Kingdom's writtcn Statement (Distr. 49/45) inakes unneceçsary further
demonstration of this intention to cretitc an entity. As that statement
well putç it,thc language of the Chsrtcr "is difficult to reconcile with
any ather view but that the framers of the Charter regarded the Organ-
ization as yossessing an international capacity of its own, separate and
distinct from that of itç individual Members or of the plurality of its
hicmbers".
In addition this entity, the United Nations, \vas endorved with
specific capacity to exercise functions and unclertake rights and obliga-
tions on a parity with similar functions, rights and obligations exercised
or poçsessed by States which are reçognized personalities under inter-
national law. The most striking example isArticle 43,wliich empowers
the Security Council to enter into agreements with Member States or
groups of hlembers regarding the arrned forces, assistancc and facilities
to be made available to the Security Council for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security. It is hardIy necessary
to say thnt such agreements are agreemerits which would be binding
uncler international law, in thesame way as arc treatiesbetween States,
and it is ofinterest to note that Article 43 concliideç by provicling that
these agreemeiits "shall be subject to ratification by the signatoryStates
in accordance wi th their constitutioiial processes".
The Unitcd Nations ha5 authority tu enter into other international
agreements. Thus, bÿ virtue of AtticlcIûj, it isa Party to the Conveii-
tion on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which bindç
the Unitecl Nations as an Organization, on the one part, and each of its
Members individually, on the other part. Thc United Nations has
entered into international agrecrnents with individual States. Fut
exarnple, the agreement between the United Nations and the United
States of Ameriça regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
and the Interirn Arrangement on the Privilegeç and Immunities of the
United Nations wliich was cbncluded with Switzerland. As the Court
knows, under Article 63 of the Charter, the United Nations cnters into
agreements with the Specialized Agencies.
Inaddition to itsexpress capacity toenter into international agree-

ments, the Charter confers an the United Nations as an Organization STATEMEUT BY Mr. PEI-LER (UN~TED NATIONS) - 7 Y1149
72
orhcr express functions which imply the possession of international
personality. The Security Council is authorizcd to make certain
decisions with regard to international peace and sccurity, and these
decisions are, by Article 25, binding upon the Menibers of the United
Nations. Under Article 42 the Security Council rnay itselftake action
by arrned force to niaintain or reçtore intcrnationat peace or security.
Moreover, Article 81 provides that the Orgarlization itself may bc
designated as the administering authority of a trust territory.
As the Court is awase, the only express reference to the legal capaçity
of the United Nations in the Charter is Article 104, whicll provides
that : "The Organization shaIl enjoy in the territory of each of its
Members such legalcapacity as rnay be necessary forthe cscrcise of Its
fzinctions and the fulfilrnent of its purposes." lt was s~iggested in the

Sixth Cornmittee that tlie intent of this Article was to give the United
Nations le@ capacity only under the municipal laws of its Members, and
this because of its reference to "intlieterritory ofeack of its Members".
It is of course clear that the Article confers st least this capacity on
tlie United Nations, but we submit itjs equally clear that the Article
does not mean that the United Nations has only such domestic legal
capacity and not capacity under international law. In our view this
Article can properly be interpreted to require recognition by the
Members in each of their territoriesboth of capacity under interd
law and of capacity under interriaiional law. This derives fr~m the
Iangunge which provides that the legd capacity shall be such as "may
be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of ~ts
purposes". Certain of these functions, for example, the capacity to
sue in a private latv contract,or to possess land, require a legal capacity
under municipal law. On tlie otha hand, the express functions of the
United Nations ta enter into international agreenients and to adrninister
territory req~iirelegal capacity under international larv. The recognition
of international capacity may thus be said to be properly, and even
necessarily, comprehended within the obligation irnposed by this
Article. However, we wish to make it clearthat we do not rest our
case on this intcrpretation alnne since, inour view, even if Article ro4
were nnt in the Charter, the United Nations woiild possess international
juridical personality by virtue of the provisions of clzeCharter taken as
a wliole.
There are still other indicia of international juridical pcrsonality
present bot11 in the Charter and in the practice of States. Undet
Article 105 the United Nations enjoys in the territory of each of its
Members such privilcges and immunities as are necessary for tlie fiilfil-
ment of its purposes, and certain privileges and imrnunities are aIso
conferrcd on representativeç of the Members of the United Nations and
on officids of the Organization.
The Convention on the Privilegcs and Imrntinities of the United
Nations, rvhich I referred to eariier, provides in its firstsection that
"The United Nations shallposscsç juridical personality", and then goes
on to specify the privilegcsand immunities of the Organization. Under
this same Convention the United Nations ma?; issuc Llazssez+nsserto its
officiaiwhiçh are to be recognized and accepted as valid travel documents
by itç Members.
The Headquarters Agreement between thc United Nations and the
United States has some significantpsovisionç in this connexion. Under 1
STATEMENTBYMr. FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) -7 111 49 73
Section 8 of thisAgreement the United Nations isgiven "power to make
reglations, operative within the headquarters district,which may
supersede the la~vsand regiilations of tlie United States, for the purpose
of establishing therein conditions in al1 respects necessary for the full
' execution of its functions. No Federal, State or local law or regulation
of the United States which is inconsistent with a regulation of the
United Nations authorizec1 by this Section shsll, to the extent ofsuch
inconsistency, be appIicable within the headquarters district." The
Agreement also provides thatthe lzeadquarters district shallbe inviolable
and that no oficial ofthe United States shallenter the district to perform

any officia1dutieç thcrein excepwith the consent of and undcr conditions
agrecd to by the Secretary-General (Section g). The principle of
inviolabilityof the prernises is also recognized in the Arrangement
befrlreenthe United Natii~nçand Suitzerland regarding the Ariana Site,
and in the Arrangerncnt between the United Natians and France
regarding the Palais de Chaillot in1948. These are rights whicll would
hasdly be granted to a mere private corporation, but only to a legal
permnality under international law.
Wndes the regulations regarding the registration of trcaties by virtue
of Article roe of the Charter adopted by the Generd Assembly, agee-
ments entered into by the United Nations with States and other
international organizations are trreatedas international agreements and
made subject to fîling and recording. Nii~ncrous Membes States
maintain permanentmissions at the scat of the Organlzation, and this
practice, soclosely akin to the traditional right of legation exercised by
States, has been approved by resolution ofthe General Asçembly. Under
the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States,
certain of the rnembers of tliesemissions are cntitled to the same
psivilcges and imrnunities as the United States accords to diplornatic
envovs accreditcd to it. It may bc remembered in passing that the
United Nations has a Bagand an emblem recognized by Member States,
and is considering the establishment of its own postal service.
It isinstructive to note the differences in this regard betwecn the
Cliarterof the United Nations aiid the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Thc Charter, as has heen said, refers over and over again to the United
Nations ns an entity. The Lovenarit, on the othcr hand, makeç only
rare references to the League as such ; the centreof gravity, so tospeak,
Isin the Mernbers and not in the League. For cxarnple, nowherc in the
Covenant is the Lcague called "an organizntion", nor is there aily pro-
vision simiIarto that of Article 104 (although the League did, of course,

eiijoy inviolability of its premises). Contrast also Article 10 ol the .
Covenant, in which the hfcmbers of the League undertakc to protect al1
Mernbcrsagaiizstaggression, and the Council isonly authorized to "advise
upon the means by which this obligation shall befulfilled";contrasi this
withChapter ViSof the Charterin whickithe Security Councilis empowered
to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breacli of the
peace, or act of aggression, and may itself decide what rneasures shall
be taken. Neverthcless, as the Court will recall, the rnajority opinion
among writers was tlzat the League oi Nations did possess international
legaà personality. (For example, such writers as Oppenheim, P. E.
Corbett, Schïicking and Wehberg, Rougier, Fauclillle.)
From the sum ofal1the provisions of thc Charter and the other texts
tve have cited there emerges a collective entity ; endowed with the
6 STA'I'EMENT BY Mr. FELLEB (UNITED NATIO.NS) - 7 III49
74
capacity to enter into intcrnatiorialagreements ;with the authority
to adrninistcr territory,including the rightsand obligations which would
arise therefrom ; with the extraordinary power incertain circumstances
to make decisions binding upon States ; witk authority to enforce certain
of itsdecisions by the use of armed force against Statcs ; and with express
recognition of lcgal capacity in the territory of Member Statcs and of
the privilegeç and imrnunities necessary for the fulfilmcntof itspurposes.
These functions and rights do not make ofthe Uni tcd Nations a super-
State, aor indeeclcven a State,but they are certain ndyiciaof an inter-
national juridical personality. To deny the existence of such a personal-
ity in the United Nations would entail a conclusion that only States
may under any cor~ceivabIecircumstances possess international personal-
ity. Only a very srna11minority of reputable writers of international
law would support so extreme a statemcnt.
To kold thiswould be tantamount to IzoIding tliat the States which
are bot11the subjects and çreators of iaternatioiial Iaw do not possess

the power, by their own free will and agreement, to crestc a new inter-
nationaI personality. There is no ruleofinternational law whic11imposes
such a restriction on the freedon~ of the States. Jn the Charter ofthe
Unitecl Nations and in the praçtice of intercourse amongst them, they
have in fact created such an international personality in the United
Nations.
This international personality is recognized not only by the Itember
States but by the non-member States as well, and we wwld say it is
now f~unded upo~z a general rule of international law. The Charter
hacl been adhercd to by the ovcrwhelrning numbet of States of the world
and there are grounds for saying that it is not to be coi~sidered as a
IBXspecialis for the Members alone but as having been made law by and
for the entireinternational cornmunity. Tliere is, however, no neceçsity
here for deterrnining zvhethcr a noiz-member Sta-te is bourid by any
specific provision of the Charter ; it is enough to say that the entire
internatiorial co~nrnunity has recognized the capacity of the Organiza-
tion which thc Charter created. This recognition appears in the fact
that every ktiown Strxte iri the worId which possesses cai~trol over its
foreign relations, witk the exception of Spain (which is specifically
dcbarred frorn rnernbcrship) and several of the diminutive States sucli
as Monaco and Anclorra, and Switzerland, has applied for memberskip.
It should also be notecl that Switzerland, altlio~igh a non-member
State wkich has ~iot applied for membership, has exprcssly recognized
in itsagreement with the United Nations "the international personalit y
. and legal capacity of thc United Nations".

(a) Th U~iied Natiolas lzm the$rocedwraL ca#acity to bringan i~ztev-
national clnim.
As we have just shown, the international per~oilalityof the United
Watiotzs is firmly estabTished in internationa1 law, not only by the
Charter provisions as a whole, but also by Statc psactice on the part
of those Rlember and non-member States. I shoulclnow like to dernon-
strate that this personülity carries with it the capacity necessary for
tliefulfilment of its purposes and the exercise of itsfunctions frorn a
proceclural standpoint. The Organization clearly has the right to
negotiate with States and has in fact exercised this right continuously
since itsorigin. Ithas communiçated with States on abasis of equality, STATEMENT BY Mr. FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 7 III49 75
and has protested to Statcs the violation of its rights. In this con-
nexion it is significant that it was the United Nations, and not the
Stateç of which theofficialwere nationals, which protested the injuries
suffered by United Nations agents in Palestine. The right of the United
Nations to enter into agreements either with a large group of States or
rvith a particular State has already ticen pointed out. Thesc rights of
coinmunication, negotiation and agrecment have been exercised not
only in relations with Member Stateç but alsoin relations with non-

mernber States.
1 The Organization Ilas the capacity to participate in arbitral
proceedings with a State when the question of itsrightsor obligations
is concerned. Provision for such arbitration rvilibe found in treaties
and agreements in force, asfor instance Scction 21 of the Headquarters
Agreement betwcen the United Nations and the United States, and
Section 27 of the Interim Arrangement between the United Nations
and Switzerland.
Although by Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice the United Nations may not be a party in a case before this
Court, its otgans, under Article 96 of the Charter of theUnited Nations,
rnay reqiiest advisory opinions, and its representativcs nlay appear
beforc the Court as is evidencedby the fact we arehere to-day. Advisory
procedure may be made to yield thc same resultsas a judgmeilt in a
contentious procecding by an agreement in advance to ~iccept the
advisory opinion as binding. Mernbers of the Court will recognize
that an agreement of this kincl is incorporated into Section JO ofthe
Convention on the Privileges and Irnrnunities of the Unitcd Nations.
Section 30 isas follaws :
"AI1 differences arising out of the interpretation or application
of the present Convention shall be refersed to the International
Court ofJustice unless in any case it is agreed bythe parties to have
recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference ariçeç
between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the
other, a requcst shall be made for an advisory opinion on any

Iegal question involved in accordance with Article 96of the Charter
atzdArticle 65 of the Statrite UTthe Court. The opinion given by
the Court shall be accepted as decisivc bg the parties."
It should thercfore be clcar that the United Nations has, and in
some instances is exercising, the same procedural rights by which a
State brings an international daim ngainst anotllcr State. These rights
of negotiation, diplornatic i~iterposition, agreement, arbitration and,
in a modified form, judicial settlement, areopen to the Unitcd Nations
under positive international law as it exists to-clay' The fact that for
the exercisc of the right to arbitrate or to submit a case for juclicial
settlemcnt a specisl agreement or compromi bsetween the United Nations
and the clefendant State might be necessary, in no way derogates from
the Iegal cspacity possessed by the United Nations in positive law.
In, thabsence of an obligation under the optional clause ofArticle 36,
or of an obligation in some other trcaty or convention in force, çuch a
special agreement or corPnpronaiis s nccessary for the exercise of this
right by a sovereign State. On the other hand, the right to negotia-
tion and diplornatic interposition ~vhichthe United Nations is, and has
been, exercising, may be exercised irnrnediately. STATENIENT BY Mt-. FELLER (UNITED ~ATJOSS) - 7 III 49
76
(h) Tlze United ~Vatio~t sossesse szcbstantivcrightsaklaii?i~itematio,omal
law.

The essence of legal personality is the capacity 1.0enihy legal riglits
and assume legai obligations. It follows tlzat since the United Nations
is apersonality ofinternational law, it lzasthe capncity to enjoy inter-
national legal rights. The international legal personality which we cal1
a State enjoys certain riglits iinder general or customary international
law, in coilimon with otlier States, such as sovereignty, equality, etc.,
and otherrights which it acqnires by viriue of treaties with other States.
The international legal personality caIIed tlie United Nations sirnilarlp
enjoys rights deriving both from gencral international law and
conventional international law. Thesc rights of the United Nat ions
are not necessarily the same as those of States, although the11 rnay in
certain circumstances be the same or sirnilar.
The lcgal rights rvhich a State erijoÿs by virtue of ciistornary law
arethose whicli are necessary and proper for the exercise of tlie functions
of aState. Obviousty, there are certain of these rights, asfor example,
sovereignty, which are not necessary and proper for the exercise of the
functions of the international yersonality called the United Nations.
On the otlierhand, there are certain other rights whicli States possess
which must also be possessed by thc United Nations ifit isto exercise
the functions conferred on it. A few examples will sufice.
When the United Nations enters into an international agreement
witliCL State,it is entitled to the right that the contracting State will
fulfil thobligations of the agreement in accordance with the riile Pacta
szk.semada, which is indeed the fulldamental principle of international
law.
If the United Nations were to becorne the administering authority of
a trust territory, itwould seem obvious that its ads in the exercise of
this function rvould be entitled to the same recognilion under the rules
of international law as rvould those of a State whicli acted as an
adrninistering authorit y of a tnistterritory.
-. Let us 'cak enother case, A striking instance would bc the case
whete the Security Council foiind it necessary to employ an international .
arrned forcc under Chapter VII. It would be must extracirdinary to
say that this forcecould not rely an the protection of the gerieral i-ules
of warfare establislledby international law.
Conventions and agreements relating to the United Nations have
expressly recognized that sulesof general international la?; rnay govern
certain aspects of the Organization's activities. For instance, in the
Arrangement on Privileges and rmmunïtles of the United Nations and
Switzerland, the recognition of tlie personality and Iegal capacity of
the United Nations which 1 have dready cited is followed by the provi-
sion that the Organization "according to the rules of international Iaw"
rnay not be sued before the Swiss courts without its express consent.
Section sg of the Convention on tlze Privileges and ltnmunities of the
United Wations accords to the Sccretary-General and Assistant Secrctaries-
General the privileges and immunities accorded to diplornatic envoys

"in acc~rdance with intcrilatio~ial law".
In essence, our position at this point is that the United Sations,
in addltion to its riglits under the Cliader or express international
agreement, posçesses those substantive rights of general internationd
larv whlch are necessary and proper for thc exercise of its functions. We are aware that this position may have an appearance of novelty and
perhaps boldness,but it is novel only becausethe problem of the practical
implications of the personality of an international organization arises
herefor the first time. Miesubmit that this viewiswholly in accordance
with the needs of the modern international community, and with the
progressive development of tlie international legal order.

2. The riglztof tlte UTaitedNations for the $rotectiovzof its agents.
It is not necessary in this proceeding to explore the whole catalogue
of tlie substantive rights whicli the United Nations may enjoy under
international law. The esscntial point in our contention before the
Court now is that the United Nations unquestionably has the right to
insist, undcr international law, vis-à-vis a State, whether that State be
a Rfember or a non-member, that its agents be given the protection
nccessary for the performance of the functions of the Organization. It
is elementary that States possess a right to receive protection for their
diplomatic and consular officialsby the territorial sovereign. Freedom
from interference with this right to protection either through acts of
violence by State officials, through failurc to provide protection from
illegal acts of individuals, or through other delicts of a like orsimilar
nature is indispensable to enable officialsto carry out their functions.
A riglit to special protection for those persons occupying officia1
positions isuniversally recognized in international law. An inviolabiiity
of the pcrson has been said to be tlie first riglit of diplomatic represen-
tatives.

Cours de 11Acad6miedc Droit international (1926, II), Vol. 12,l des
pp. 124-125 ;Article 17, of the Harvard Research Draft Convention .
on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, and comment thereto,
pp. 90-97 ; Hachorth, Digest of Imter9wtio.italLaw, Vol. IV,
pp. 507-510 ; Hyde, Intertzational Law (2nd Rev. Ed., 1915)~
Vol. 2, p. 1249 ; Anzilotti, La Hespmzsabilitéinternatimzaledes
États riraisolzdes Domiizagessouflertsfia7 des Étra?zgers,13, Revue
généralede Droit international public (1906), p. 15 ; De Visscher,
La Responsabilité desÉtats,2, Bibliotheca Visseriana (1g24),p. 102 ;
Whiteman, Dancages I7cterqaatio~zLnal w, Vol. 1, p. 366 ; and
cases cited by the above aiithorities.]

It is the only right recognized by general international law for consuls
and minor officialsof foreign governments wlio are not accorded diplo-
matic privileges and immunities proper.
[Article15 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Legal
Position and Functions of Consuls, and comment thereon ;
Hackworth, Digest of Il~ternatimzalLaw, Vol. IV, pp. 708-716 ;
Hall's I~zter.rzatio~zL alw (Pearce Higgins' 8th Ed.), 372, 375 ;
Borchard, Tlze DifiloltzaticProtectiott of Citizelts Abroad (1915)~
pp. 216, 223 ;Hvde, I.tzterwztio?zaL law (194j), Vol. 2, p. 1327 ;
Bustamante, DerechoI?zterTaacio~P zazliblico(1938),Toma 1, p. 388.3

The Vice-President of this Court, M. Guerrero, as rapporteur of the
Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law, stated in his report : "It was obviously not the intention ofthe international community
that the representative character of an individual should render
liim immiine from ordinary misadventure.
Nevertheless, States have undertaken to .exercise greater
vigilance over tlicse persons than they do over private individuals.
They are also bound to take special steps to forestail any assault
against tlie persons of forcign representatives and to display
particular energy in piirsuing the criminals and ensuring the
proper course of justice." (League of Nations, C.196. M.70 1927.
v, p. 96.)

The same opinion was espressecl in the comment to Article 17 of the
Harvard Research Draft on Diplomatic Privileges and Imnlunities,
and in the comment to Article IO of tlie Harvard Research Draft on
Kesponsibility of States.
The reasons which underlie the right of a State to require protection
for itsofficials,apply with equal force in the case of the United Nations.
The Member States have established an international organization,
endowed as we have seen with international personality and authorized
to carry out functions of high significance to international pcace and
security. These functions must be carried out by agents ~110, as
esperiencc shows, and sometimes tragically shows, must often exercise The
thcir dutics in troubled areas in various parts of the globe.
agents implics as a CO-relativea duty on the territorial sovereign toh
fumish them with protection appropriate to the circumstanceç, to
enable these functions to bc properly cserciscd. ,
The existence of suc11a duty of protection for the representativcs
of an international body on a parity ~ith the duty to protect a national
representative was strikingly illustrated in the opinion given by the
Cominittee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of Nations
in connesion with the 'I'clliqiase (which will be discusscd in detail
liereafter). It will bc recallecl that General Tellini was assassinated in
Greece while serving on a border commission appointed by the
Conference of Ambassadors. In answer to the question "in what
circumstances and to what estent is the responsibility of a State involved
by the commission of a political crime in its territory", the Committee
answerccl in part : "The recognized public character of a foreigner and
the circumstances in which he is present in its territory entail iipon
the State a corrcsponding duty of special vigilance on Iiis behaif"
(L. of N. O.J., 1924, p. 324).
In the Convention on Privileges and Immunities the officials of tlie
United Nations are espressly accorded immunity from legal process
for acts performed in their official capacity, and arc granted other
privileges and immunities closely analogous to diplomatic privileges
and immunities. Sincc the right to protection against illegal acts is so
firrnly established in international law, it was not neccssary expressly
to mention it in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, which
was primarily designed to fiirnish immunity from legal acts of govern-
ment. It is a necessary right of the Organization wliich is derived
directly from princi les of international law, and is also assurcd by
Article 105 of the &arter. As was pointcd out by the Prcparatory
Commission : "Under Article 105 of the Cliarter, the obligation of al1 STATEMENT BY &Ir. FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 7 III 49
79
Members to accord to the United Nations, its officials and the repre-
sentatives of its Nembers ail privileges and iminunities necessary for
tlie acconiplishment of its purposes, operates froin the cominginto force
of the Charter, and is therefore applicable even before the Generai
Assembly has made tlic recommendations or proposed tlie Conventions
referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 105." (Report of the Preparatory
Commission of the United Nations, PC/ZO, 23 December, 1945, p. 6.)
The Report of Committee IV12 at San Francisco, after indicating
that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" indicate in a generai
purposes of the Organization, and the free functioning of its organs and
to the independent exercise of the functions and duties of its officials,
continues :

"It would moreover have been impossible to establish a list
valid for al1the Member States and taking account of the special
situation in whicli some of them might find themselves by reason
of the activities of the Organization or of its organs on their
territory. But if there is one certain principle it is that no Member
State may liinder in any way the working of the Organization or
take any measures the effect of which might be to increase its
burdens, financial or other."
The illegal interference with the officialsof the United Nations either
by agents of a State, or by private individuals with the complicity of
the State, or because of failure of the State to afford protection, hinders
in the worst imaginable way the working of the Organization and
prevcnts the independent esercise of the functions and duties of its
officials. The duty to provide protection is clearly included within
the obligations imposed on AfemberStates by Article 105, and aiso by
paragrapli 6 of Article 2, which requires that "al1 Membcrs shall give
the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance
with the present Charter".
It is not within the scope of the present question to discuss particular
injuries that have occurred. But it may be pointed out that
responsibility of a State toward the United Nations might also arise
from violation of an espress or an implicd agreement at tlie time that
or a violation of an agreement for the movement of a yarticular convoynt,
might aiso under certain circumstances rcsult in responsibility.
The duty which the State lias to protcct United Nations agents is, of
course, a duty owed to the Organization. Mihere special protection is
accordcd to an individual because of his officia1status, it is accorded to
him not as an individual but as a representative of a State or as a
representative of an international organization. The privileges and
irnmunities which are enumerated in the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations are "grantecl to officialsin the interest
of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves" (Article V, Section 20). This may also be said to be the
correct rule for other privileges granted to officials by general inter-
national law and by Article 105of the Charter.
The duty to afford protection to United Nations agents in the course
of their duties rests not only on the provisionsof the Charter or on special
arrangements with individual States, but is, as we have alreadyindicated, a rule of general international law. It is, therefore, binding
alike on Member and non-member States.

[Public sitting of March Sth, 1949, nzor9zing.l

3. The United Nations may bring an i~~tenzatimaacllaim for rzparatiom
due.in respsct of dmnzagescazlsedto tlze UqzitedjVntiolzsas ala Organ-
izatiolafor the violatio?tof its inter~îationrlights.

May it please the Court.
At the previous sitting we demonstratecl that the United Nations
possesses international jiiridical personality and tliat it has procedural
capacity to bring an international claim ; also that it possesses certain
rights under international law, including the right to insist on the
protection of its agents. It follows,we submit, that the United Nations
maj7 bring an international claim for reparation due in respect of
damages caused to it as an Organization for the violation of its inter-
national right of protection of its agents.
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Clzorz6wcase
pointed out that violation of an internationalright entails a dutyto make
reparation for the clamage suffered thereby. The Court, as you will
remember, said that "it is a principle of international law that the
breach of agreement involves an obligation to make reparation in an
adequate form. Keparation therefore is an indispensable complement
of a failure to apply a convention, and tliere is no necessity for this to bc
stated in the convention itself."(Judgmcnt No. 8, Ser. A., No. g, p. 21.)
This principle that the breacl-iof an agreement involves an obligation .
to makereparation isnot only wellestablished in customary international
law, but is also, of course, a general principle of law rccognized in the
lcgal systems of al1 civilized nations. Elaborate citation is obviously
unnecessary, and 1 need only refer to Article 1382 of the French Civil
Code, whicli provides : "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à
autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le
rCparer."
The only objection which has been made to the application of this
principle to the instant situation is that there is no case on record in
whicli an international organization brought such ;i.laim. This objec-
tion was most succinctly stated by 31. Spiropoulos, representative of
Greeceon the Sixth Committee, who stated : "In his opinion, by virtuè
of the esisting principles in force, if an alien suffered injury, only the
State of which lie was a national liad the right to take action on his
behalf, and that right directly derived from the fact of liis nationality.
It was an established principle of international law that an injury to
an alien constituted an injury to this State of which he was a national.
"To establish whether the United Nations has the same right, it was
necessary to find out if there was any rule of la\v providing for such a
right for the United Nations. In the memorandum of the Secretary-
General, it was stated that to the best knowledgc of the Secretariat, no
situation esactly similar to the present cases had ever arisen. Therc
was, therefore, no custom or usage which might be used as a basis for ST.4TEhlENT BY ?dr.FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 11149 81
deciding tliat the United Nations had that right." (Document A/C.

61SR. 112, p. 16.)
While tliere was considerable disagreement witli this view in the
Sixth Cornmittee, it is important both for thiç case and Tor the genetal
development of international law that this objection be dealt with.
International law hx often been stated tcrbe a primitive and incam-
plete systenz. Nevertheless, its entire development has shown that
it isa legal order, capable of growth and of adaptation to the changing
needs of the States and of the international community. 1 have the
highest respect for the scholatsliip and intellectual capacities of
M. Spircipoulos, but imust be poiiltedout that the prinçiple which heput
foré11would condemn international law to a sratic existence, composed
of rules which the swift march of events would soon render obsolete,
and which could only be channgedby the conclusion of new international
agreements. Such n pririciple would reduce the judicial processofinter-
national tribunals, such as this Court, to a mere mechanical listing of
precedents and conventional stipulations. The history of international
tribunals clearly refutes any such static and mechanistic conception.
A noteworthy instance is the case of the Easlera Exteucsio~,
Azutralasia anfi China Telegraph Cowzfia~aL y,imited,which wûs decidcd
in 1923 by the British-American Arbitral Tribunal iin@ the Coi~vcntion
of 18th August, rgro. Discussing the contention that there was no rule
of international law on the question of the right of the belligerent to
cut ncutral submarine cables, the Tribunal said that, even assuming
that there was no spccific rule of international law governing the case
of cuttfng of cables by belligerents, it could rzot be said tl~at there was
no principle of international law applicable. The 'L'ribunalthen said :
"International larv, as well adomestic law, rnay not contain, and gen-
erally does not contain, exprcss rules decisive of particular cases ; but the

function of jurisprucler~cis to resolse tbc conflicof opposirigriglitsand
intercsts by applying, in defnurt of nny specific provision of lnw, the
corollaries of general principles, anso to find-exactly as in the mathe-
matical sciences-the solution of the problem. This is the method
of jurisprudeizce. It is thc method by which law has been gradually
evolved in every cotrntry reçulting in the definition and settlernent of
legal relations as well betwcen Sttitcs as betwecn privatc individuals."
(Nieisen's Report, pp. 73-81.)
In answer to the question : "ln what manner do international tribunals
proceed whcn coilfronted with noveE situations. in the course of tkieir
judicial activity ?", Professor Lariterpaçht has listed these ways (The
Irmctio~z O/ LLCT iO the Interaatiorzal Commztna'ly,p. IIX) :

"(a) They rnay proceed eitlier by analogl, with ipecific rules of
interriational law oby recourse to general principlesof international
law.
(b) They may npply general principles of law, notably of private law.

(c) They may bridge the gap by an even more conspicuous recourse
to creative judicial activity, aiming at solving the controversy
by shaping a legal rule through the process of jwdiciril reconcil'a-
tionof conflicting Iegalclaims entitled to protection $17 law.
(4 They rnay accornplish the same task by a consideration of the
larger needs of the international community,"82 STATEMXNT BY hZr,FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 III49

There is present here tlzemost ample and proper opportunity for the
application of these principles.
First : There is the rule of international law that a State is entitleé
to bring an international daim for unlawful injury to one of its oficials
or nationals. We shall discuss this nile at length later. At this point
it issufficient to state that the general principles underlying this rule
apply equally to the case of a claim by the United Nations.
Second : This case arises out of a new situation presented by the
growth of international organization, in which the necds of tlie inter-
national coniinunity require that a step fornard be taken for the
protection of the agents of the community.
Third: The legal consequençes deriving from the provisions of the
Charter, the juridical perçonality of the United Nations, and its rights
under international law, lcad imsistibly to the conclusion that ithss the:
right to bring such a claim.
Itis, of course, true tliat these has been no case precisely identical

with the situation envisaged by the present question ; but it needs tobe
pointed out that the view that an international organizatfon lias;the
right to dernand reparation for an injury to itç agcnts is by no means
a novel one. Refarence has already been made to the TelLini case,
involving thc assassination of the Italian representative on a border
commission appainted by the Cariference of Ambassadors.
The arrogant rnethods adopted by the Mussolini Government towards
Greece in this case, and the dispropnrtionate indemnity exacted, can
hardly cornrnend themselves to the Mernbers of the Unitcd Nations.
It is, however, significant that the Italian Government stated that the
assassination involvcd the violation not only of its right, but also ofthe
right ofthe Conference of Ambassadors. The Lonfereiice itself demanded
that reparation should be paid to the Italian Government and also tliat
apoIogies should be made to the tIlree Allied Powers whnse delegateç
were on the Delimitation Commission. Such apologies were duly made.
Ttiç of intcrcst that Professor Clyde Eagleton, shortly afterthe event,
wrote : "The assumptioi~ by the Conference of Ambassadors ofjurisdic-
tion when General 'Telliniwas rniirdered, would seem to bc an assertion
of the responsitiilityof a State to an organ ofthe interriational com-
munity." (The Responsibility of the State for theProtection of Foreigrt
Q$ïciwls, 19Amer. Jourrialof Int. Law, p. 314.) This was said in192 j.
The Court will also note the precedents relating to Upper Silesia and the
Commission of the Danube, whose citation weowe to the Frcnch Govern-
ment In its written staternent to this Court.
As we have said before, the question before the Court does not involve
a cletermination of the reparaf ion due in the actual instances where
injury hns occurred. Zt mq be useful, horvever, to indicate briefly
some of the ways in which the United Nations as an Organization rnay
be damaged by an injury to its agentand to point out methods ofrepara-
tian that are sanctioned by international 'lawin respect tosuch injury.
Tn the first place, injury to an agent of the United Nations may
result indirect financial loçsto the Organization itself. TllcSecretary-
General in hismemorandum stibmitted to the General hssembly stated
in,respect to claims of tbis nature :
"The next itcm which it would appear that the United Nations
is clearly entitled tclaim, is reparation for the direct costincurred
by the United Nations, such as medical services, funeral expenseç,84 STiiTEalEFT BY Mr. EELLEK (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 II149
would include tlze loss of irreplaceahle personnel and thc increased
difficnlties ivhich gnvernment pr~vokea attacks or lack of reasonable
protection against illegal acts of private incli\~iduaiwould place in
the way of the proper esercise of the duties of the United Nations'
agents. '
The Secretary-General in his rnemoraridum to the General Assernbly
ptit it thiway :

"It iç clear that the United Nations çhould be entitied to claim
as the first item of reparations, prompt and adeq~tate pnilishment
of the offenders and the taking of such measures as will protect
agents of the United Nations against future injilries." (Document
il/67 p.?5 ;seealço staternent by Mr. Feller, AlC.GISK. 113, p. 4.)

Itwould appsar to be obvious that the very basis ofthe tule regarding
reparations for injuries ~ould justify a daim that tlic respondent State
tske appropriate stepç to prevcnt repetition.
1rnight say parenthetically that in the memornrzdurn of the Secretary-
General to tlicSixth Comrnittec, reference \vas alsornacleto the question
of exemplary or punitive damnges, and in that mcrnorandum attention
was çalledto the case of thI'Î~ ALone, in which the Court will remember
that the Commissioners apyointed by Canada and the United States
recornrnended that "the United States ought forrnally to acknorvledge
the illegaIity of itsact, and to apologize to His Majesty's Canadian
Guvernment thcrefor ; and, furthcr, that as a material arnend in respect
of the wrong the United States should pay the surn of 25,000 dollarç
to Ris hlajesty's Canadian Govcrnment". (U.S. Dept. ofState Arbitration
Series, No. 2 (1-71,193r-rg~j.)
Now the Secretary-General made no recomrnendation with regard to
the inclusion of such an item in a claim for reparation, and it wouId
appear to be the gcneral view of the representativeç who discussed this
aspect of the question in the Sixth Committcc that such dainages should
not be açked for. For thcçe ressons we do ncit believe it necessary to
take the time of the Court for a discusçion of this pointof exempiiary or
punitive damages.
In surnrnary, it may bc said that for thc reasons which we have
advanced we believe that thc Co~rrtshotild state affirmatively that the
Uiiitecl Nationsmay bring a claim for reparationç against a responsible
de +are or defactogovernment for damages suffered Irythe Organization
itself.

T~ZE Unitcd .Nationznzay briq n cZlaim/orreplaratiorzwiik r~specdo
4.damages si~geuedby itsngelztsor persuns elztitl~dtb172cgIhem.

We now corne to tlze aspect of the question beefre the Court rvhich
received much attention in the Sixth Cornmittee : rnay the United
Nations bring a clairn for reparations wiih respect to darnages suffered
by its agents or persons entitled through them ? That is point (b) of
the first question asked by the General Asscmbly. Tt is aur contention
that this question sizouldbe answered in tIîaffirmative.
Where a daim is brought by a State for inj~iryto one of its nationals
against another State, the most usual and the most important mcasurc
of repxation is the damage suffered by the individual. T11cPermanent
Court of Intemtiond Justice, in the ClzorzdwFaclovy case put it inthis fasbion-and 1 beg the indulgence of the Court if 1 read tliis, since
we consider it of consideral~le importance :

"lt is a principle of international laiv that the reparation of
a wrong may consist in an indcmnitv corresponding to the damage
which the nationals of tbe injured State have suffered as a result
of the act which iscontrary to internationa1 law. This is even the
inost usuai form of reparation.. .. The reparation diie by one State
to another does not however change its character hy reason of
thc fact that it takeç the fom of an ilidemnit!; fus the caIculation
of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken as a
measure. The rules of law governing the reparation are tlierules
of internatiorzal law in forcbetween the two States concerned, and
not the law governing relations between the State which kas
committed a wrongful act and the individual who lias suffered
damage. Riglzts or intercsts of an individual the violation of
whiçh rights causes damage are always in a different plane to rights
belonging to a State, \vhich rights mav also be infringed by tliesame
act. The damage suffered by an indiviclual is never therefore
identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it
can only afford a convenient =ale for the calculation of the repars-
tion due to the State." (Series A., No. r7, pp. 27-28.}

In anotlier case, that of the M~~vrowzmdis Palesti~e Co~wessims,thc
Permanent Court again gave authoritative expression to the principle
by which a State brings a claim for an injury to its nationals. The
Court thcrc stated:

"It is an eIcmentary principIe of international law that a State
is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary
to international law committed bÿ another Stare, from wlzom tliey
havc been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary
cliannels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to dil>lornatic action or international judicial proceedings
on his behaif, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its
sights to ensure, in tlie persons of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law." (Series A., No. 2, p. 12.)

We need not linger too long in considering the fundarnental basis of
tliis rightof protection, In ariothcr place (in a book on Tha Mexicaa
Claim Co~lzwission)1, pointed out that the principle 'kprrings from a
prirnitivc feeling of clannishness, tlie necessity of protectii~ a rnernber
of the clan and of avenging hirn when Iîe is injured". The classic
statement by Vattel, rvhich iç well known to this Court, isperbaps an
expression of tliis idea(See Vattel, l'laeLaw of Natiolzs, text of 1758,
3rd ed., 1916, p. 136.)
The development of the law of protection of nationals over the past
century has led modern writers to re-stateits fundarnental postulate in
the terrns of "the interest in rnaintaining a reasonable freedom ofinter-
national intercourse". As one recent writer, Mr. Frederick Dunn, in
his book The Yrotectio? 4t NatZn?znls(at p. r),has put it, this brünchof
internationa1 larv "isultiinatcly cancerned with the possibility of main-
taining aunified economic and social order for the conduct of international
trade ancl intercourse among independent political units of diverse
\ STATEBIENT BY Bir.FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 III49 87

that the United Nations have a legal right to protect them andto redress
injurics sufferecl by them in the performance of their functions.
The United Nations' agents wlio have gone to an area as representa-
tives of the Organization cannot be expected to look to their govern~nents
for the necessary protection. Gooernments may be reliictant to cngage
in international controversy becausc of injuries to their citizens in such
circumstances. Even wlien there is no oreanization with primary
rcsponsibility for their protcction, States have olten declined to press
a claim for an injury to their nationals. Professor Jessup has recently
written :

"Instances in which tlie Departinent of State [of the United
States] has declined to press diploinatic representation on behaif
of importunatc claimants are frequent and have often been due,
not to the demcrits of the claims, but to some overriding policy
of fostering friendly relations. The Foreign Offices of small States
maj7 hcsitate to antagonize a powcrful rieighbour by pressing
against it tlic claim of one of its nationals." (A Aloder9t Law of
ATatioves, 948 ,. 98.)

In most instances governmcnts may well prefer to let the United
Nations handle the case. This lias already been shown to be true in
respect of the injuries suffered bythe Unitecl Nations' agents in Palestine.
Moreover, thc officialsof the United Nations in the performance of their
duties may cven bc exposed tothe displeasure of tlieir own governments.
It therefore does not seem appropriate that they should have to rely
solely on their own govemments for protection against injuries done to
them in violation of international law. In their capacity as agents of
the United Nations they ought to be protected principally by the

international organization which tliey scrve. .
Not only should an agent be able to look to the Organization for
protection for Iiis own sake, but such protection is also necessary if
the individual is to carry out the functions which have been assigned
to him by the Organization. The necessity of furnishing such protec-
tion has been recognizecl, and the United Nations itself sent guards with
the United Nations' Mission to Palestine. The United Xations has also
made representations to the territorial sovereigns in order to rcquest
special protection in certain instances. If, notwithstanding these
efforts to secure protcction, an agent is injured in circumstanccs involv-
ing tlie responsibility of a State, it logically follows that the Organiza-
tion has the right to claim reparation for an injury which has occurred
from the violation of the obligations of the State.
The right of the United Nations to make this claim need not rest
solely on the analogy of nationality. In a claim arising from an injury
to a private individual, nationality is the only nesus between tlic private
individual and his government, but if the individual is abroad not as
a private citizen but as an officia1of his government, there is another

Iink upon wliich the right to protection mag be based. Although in
most instances both nationality and agency CO-exist,and the latter is
often submerged in the former, a careful analysis of cases involving
reclamation for injuries suffered by persons in tlie service of governments
reveals that a principle distinct from tliat of nationality is involved in
thc latter instance, the principle of special protection of an officia1
representative. 88 ÇTATERIENT BY Mr. FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 II149

Professor Jessup has emphasized this distinction as follows :
"Various situations in the liistory of international claims reveal
that in addition to the riglits of its nationals a State has, in its
relations with other States, certain rights which appertain to it
in its collective or corporate capacity. The typical cases are those
in which injury is donc to an official of the State, particularly a
consular or diplomatic official. The recognition accorded to their
special status in traditional international law is extended because
of their representative character and not because of their status
as individuals, although a supplementary claiin may lie for the
injiiry to the individual as sucti." (A Modem Law of~Vatimzs,
1948, pp. 118-119.)
This point is further illustrated by cases in which a State has made
a clairn on behalf of persons who are not its nationals but wlio stand in
some other relation to it, for exainple, alien searnen, inhabitants of
mandated temtories, and other protégés,and cases of consulswho have
a nationality different from tliat of the State wliich they represent.
Thcse are al1 cases in whicli the ne.yus is not nationality, but some
other basis on which the protection of the State may be invoked. So
here, although the ncxus of nationality may be missing, the basis for
invoking tlic protection of the United Nations is present.
If an officia1of the United Nations is arrested in violation of the
rights of the Organization, the United Nations will make representations
to the government to secure his relcase. If necessary, as 1have said,
it will address a rcquest for piotection. As alreacly pointed out, the
proper functioning of missions of the United Nations requires that the
Organization will assume primary responsibility for insisting upon the
protection of its agents. The responsibility cannot be left solely to the
. government of a State of which the agent is a national.
That government, in many cases, has no control over the individual
in question so far as his services to thc United Nations arc concerned.
conditions of peril to which he has beeii esposed.beenThe government of
the territory in which thc agcnt functions willlook to the United Nations
itself to see that the agent comports himself properly, ancl the agent,
in turn, tvill expect the United Nations to makc thc arrangements for
his proper treatment with the territorial govcrnnicnt. Under these
circumstances, the right of protection of thc national government may in
most instances wither away to a mere juridical fiction, and the agent be
left without protection unless the United Nations has the right to insist
on it.
We have relied here on two significant analogies : one, thc analogy
of the right of protection which a State exercises over its nationals, and
the other the special right of protection which a State may claim for its
officiaisin foreign countries. In connexion with the analogy of protec-
tion of nationals, we wish to make it clear that we are not pressing
it to the estent that thc United Nations would, in aii circumstances,
stand in the samerclationship to its agents as a Statc does to its national.
The question before the Court limits the issue to reparations for the
injuries incurred "in the service of the United Nations". It is therefore
unnccessary for us to argue whether the United Nations might present a
claim for injuries incurred while the agent was not engaged in his officia1duties. It can be said here that the Secretary-General has nevcr
consiclcreclthat such a claim niight be made.
We are also well aware of the important part played by the rules
of denial of justice and of csl-iaustionof local remedies in the subject of
claims by States for injuries to their nationals. As Dr. Kcrno has
pointed out, thcse issues do not come into consideration here, because
the question submitted by the Asscinbly assumes, as a premise, that the
State is responsible. In the discussioii of any individual claim which
the Unitcd Nations might present, therc would be room for considerat'ion
as to whether these rules of denial of justice and exhaustion of local
remedies arc applicable.
It should bc emphasized that we consider the analogy of special
protection of officiaisfar more important to this case than the analogy
ofprotection ofnationals. The latter analogy served mainly to illuminate
the reasons for our contention and to show the procedure by whicli the
right of special protection of United Nations' agents may bc vindicated.
In this sense, however, it has considerable importance, because it shows
the well-established rule that although the injury committed against the
individual national is under international law an injury to the State,
the measure of reparations to be recovered by the State is the (lainage
to thc individual.
This is what the Permanent Court of International Justice referred
to as "tlie most usual form of reparation" and "a convenient scale for
the calculation of the reparation due to the State".
Here lies tlic answer to the doubt expressed in the written statement
of tlie United States to this Court (p. 22). With your permission 1
propose to spend a few moments analyzing this point of thc United
States' statement. It is said that: "The basis of an international claim
is, in theory, an injury or loss suffereclby the State of which the claimant
is a national." Tliat is quite true, and at the same time the basis of
the claim here is an injury or loss suffcred by the United Nations of
which thc injured individual is an agent.
The statement then goes on to say that : "For that reason it wouid
is a'national to present the claimotottlic governinent ofthecState causing
the injury or loss." But, for an esactly analogous reason, namely the
injury or loss suffered by the United Nations, it would be appropriate
for the Unitcd Nations to present the claim to the governmcnt of the
responsible State.
Finally, the United States' statement concludes that nevcitheless if
the victim or the perçons cntitled through Iiim are stateless, and have
no government to make claims on their bclialf, "no reason is perceived
why the United Nations shoiild not have capacity to intervene to
support the claim of the stateless inclivicliial".
1 suggest, with al1 due respect, that this conclusion demonstrates
the fallacy of the view taken on this point in the United States' state-
ment. Either tlie United Nations has the capacity to present a claim
for injury to its agent, or it does not. If it has not the capacity, how
can it receive tliat capacity by thc mere fortuitous circumstance that
the injured agent happens to be stateless ? The only relevance of the
fact of statelcssness woiild be tliat no claim by a State of nationality
would need to be reconciled with the claim of the Unitcd Nations.

7 This fallacy arises, 1 imagine, from the notion that our contention
involvcs a sort of substitution of the United Nations for the Statc of
nationality as pare?zspatria of thc agent. Tliat, ho\vever, is clcfinitely
not Ourvicw. We emphasize again that where the right of a State has
bcen violated, the reason for tlie assessinent of reparations based on the
damage to the injure$ individual is, in thc words ofthc Permanent Court,
because it afforcls"a convenient scale for the calculation of the repara-
tion due to the State".
So here, we submit that whcre the right of the United Nations to
require protection of its agents has been violated, that the same "con-
venient scalc for the calculation of the reparation" should be used.
The application hcre of the usual rule would enable thc full rcparation
placing on the State of nationality the burden of going forward with a
separate claim, and inconveniencing the responclent State with a second
proceeding in which the facts would have to bc proved all over again.
The only factual reason for departing from the usual rule would be the
possibility of conflict between the United Nations and the State of
nationality. This point we shall consider later in connexion with the
second question asked by the General Assembly.
1 no\v come to our final subrnission on tlie first question bcfore the
Court. The United Nations has an international juridical personality,
possessing,undcr international law, the right to insist on the protection
of its agents in the course of their duties, together with thc procedural
capacity to vindicate this right on the international plane.Established
rules of international law, the interests of the international community,
and the strongest practical necessities lead, we rccpectfully submit, to
an affirmative answer to the first question asked by the General As-
sembly.

B. SECOND QUESTION.

Kethe State of whichthe victinzisUninational.onswith rights possessed by .

1 come now to the second question upon whicli the General Assembly
lias asked the advice of the Court. This question presents both procc-
dura1 and doctrinal aspects.
In most instances, as has already been pointed out, it is believed
that the Statc of which the victim is a national willprefer that the
United Nations should bring a claim. For examplc, the representative
of Sweden on the Sixth Committee said that "the impression made in
my country by the death in the service of the United Nations of one of
and others of its kind, Sweden thought it entirely natural that measures
should be taken by the United Nations against the authorities who
exercised power in the territory in ivhich the crime \sras committed.
Sweden did not, for the moment at least, intend to takc direct action.
Shat attitude should not be interpreted to mean that Sweden considered
there was no doubt asto the legal competence of the United Nations to
take such action." (Document A/C.6/SR. 115, p.IO.)
It is the intention of the Secretary-General, as a matter of policy,
and subject to any further instructions by the General Assembly, to
approach the States of which the victims are nationals with a ÇTATEMENI? Bv Mr. F'ELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 III49 gf
~
view toward reaching an agreement as to the method of bringing the
claim and the allocation of reparations. 1stated on behalf of theSecre-
tary-General at the 112th Meeting of the Sixth Cornmittee :"It is obvious
that two paralle1 clairns sliould nobe made, one by the United Nations
and the ather by theState ofwhich the victim wasa national. However,
in order to abviate tlzat, the United Nations might consult with the
State concerned and corne to some agreement with regard to the alloca-
tion of reparations." (Document AIC.61SR. 112, p. IO.)
Itmay be of assistance to the Court iI review very brieffy tlic prece-
dents in the matter of confficting claims.
Conflicting rightofdifferent States toassertclai~nsforthe same injury
have ariçen incases of clualnationality. Where the individual injured
has the nation:tlity of both the chimant and the defendant States, the
principle is well established that no internationaclaim may be made on
behalf of a privnte individual. This is the well-known rule of the
Cmzcvarocnm. (Scott, Hague Court Reports, 1916,p. 284.)
[See also U.S. (Telleçh claim) a. Austria and Hungary, Tripartite
CIaims Comm., Dec. and Ops., 1929, p. 71 ; Great Britain (Alexander
clairn) a. US., Hale's Report 5374, 13. 15; Italy (Milianiclaim) v.
Venezuela, Ralston and Doyle, Venezuclan Arbitrationç of 1903 p,. 754;
Great Britain (Oldenbourg claim) a.Mexico,nec. and Ops. of Çornm.,
193.~p. 97 ; and Hackwotth. Digest, pp. 352-377.1
Where the individual injured has the nationality ofa claimant State
and of a third State, the conflicting righthave been settled in several
different wayç. The most çatisfactory method of such settlement would
appear tobe by agreement betrueen the tmo States ofwhich the individual
is a national. Tn some cases tribunaIs which Iiave kad to pasç on the
question of dual nationality have çought to resolve the question of
confiictingrights by "examining in which of the two countries existed
the elements in Iaw and in fact essential in viewof creating an effective
link of nationality ancl not simply a thcoretica1 one". Case of Baron
de Born u. Serb-Croat-Slovene State, 6 T.A.M.1927, 499 (see Ralston,
Stvfiplmwrbtfo the Law and lnrocedureof 1.iaternata'onTl~ibunals,p. 8r).
The most usual solutionseems to Iiave been, however, for thetribunal
'before which the daim was first asçested to permit recovery. In the
Salem daim involving the.United States and Egypt, in wliich 1believe
Judge Badawi Pasha was a mernber of the tribunal, it wasdeclarecl in
effect that a dispute as to citizensliip rnay not be taken advantage of by
a third Power not a party to the difference. Thc tribunal stated that
"in a case ofdual nationality a third Power iç nat entitled to contest the
claim of one of the two Powers whose national is intereçted in the case
by referring to the nationality of the other Power". p.S. Dept. of
State Arbitration Series No. 4 (61, p. 42.)
Nielsen has summarized the situation as follows :

"Tlie status with respect to athird country of a person liaving a
dual nationality presents an interesting question. Wliile neither
of the two countries whose laws conflict can claim the aIlegiance
of such a person to the exclusion of the other, the principle governing
a caseof that kind isnot applicable tothe case ofa person who may
have a dual allegiance,but who is not a national of a respondent
government against whidi a claim is presented. And it would
çcem therefore that witl~ respect to the acts of a third State.each of the two nations maÿ exercise thc right of protection through
dipl~matic channels or judicid methods." (NieIçen, Inlentalio?zal
1.~4e~i$ppliedto Hcclawzations,p. 14.)
The çame position was taken in tllc rcplics of Soutli Alriça, Austi-cilia
anclGreat Britain to the questionnaire on the Responsibilitp of Statcs for
darliage cüused in their territorv to the person or property of foreigners

by rlle Cornmittee of Experts of the League ofNations.
Theçe principres tvhicli have bccri followed in the case of dual
nationnlity where private individuals have becn injured, arenot entirely
reIevant whcrc the victim is not irî the positioof a privntc citizen but in
the position of ail official.As an oficinI, either of a foreign govcrnment
or of tlie United Nations, he is entitled to special protection whicl-ihe
cannot claim as a. national of his own Statc. The primary ncxus in
these instances is tlint of service and not of nationnlity. Under these
circuinstariccs, the right to make the clairn in the firstiiistance would
appear to rest witli thc Statc or with the oganization of rvhich he isarî
agent. This applies wfth pnrticular strength t5 off~cialsof the Unitcd
Natioiîs who have prirnary respunsibility to the Orgariization, and
who are in a pozition of independencc so far as States arc concerncd.
'The right of thc State to makca daim would not be lust, but it appears
that it woiild rernnin dormant unless the United Nations decided tiot to
press the clain ltself.
Our analysis, therefore, leads to the coridusion that, cxccpt where the
injurcd agent is a national of thc sespondent State, the claim of thc
Unitcd Nations would have priority over the clainl of the Statc of bvhich
the officia1isa national. We do not, horvever, take a definitestand in
favour of this conclusiori, since as a.matlcr of ~iolicy tlie Seçretary-
General would undertake to work out the relativc rights of the United
Nxtions and Çtate by agreement with the Statc.
There remailis to bc considered the situation in which the injured
United Nations agent is a national of the respondent State. This
problcnz was rinseci in the Sisth Cornmittee by the representatives of
IZgypt and the United States.
The Court \vil1 recall from the Iiecord that the representative of*
Egypt wondercd what wnuld bc the position if the Unitecl Nations
preçented a clah against thc Governrncnt of Egypt in order to ençurc
that an Egyptian national injiircd intlie service of the Uriited Nations

received proper darnages. The Egyptian Covernment, hc said, might
conccivably reply that thc person in question was one of its owi~izationals
and that the decision rcsted entirely with it. (Document AIC. 61SR.
1~2, p. g.1
T'-lerepresentative of the United States said :
"The caçes in which the victim hsd clual nationality liad givcn
rise to some dificulty, but the question had been settled at the time
of the Canevaro case, ancl it was now an acceytcd principle of
international law that no State coiild present a daim on behalf of
oneof its nationals who WBS, 5t thetime, a naticin9 of the responclent
State. ln such cases the cIaimant Statc could not clairn damages
on behalf of the victim but it could clsitn damages if it had itself
sustained any injury." (Doctiment AIC. 61S12.112, p. II .)

At the tiine of these diçcussions 1, as rcprcsenting the Secretarÿ-
Genei-al, stated that '"éhe point raised by tlie representative of Egypt STATEMENT DY Blr.FELLER (UNITED NATIONS) - 8 III 49 93

concerning the possibility that the victim rnight be a national of the
State froin \vhicli the Unitecl Nations wished to claim reparations, was
very coinples ancl \vould reqiiire somc study before any satisfactory
answer could be given". (Docun~ent A/C. 6/SR. 112, p. TO.) The
question has now receivecl a well-reasoned response in thc written state-
ment of tlie United I<ingdoni. That statement points out tliat the
obligation of klembers to afford assistance and protection to United
Nations missions operating in their territory relates equally to any
member of the mission wlio is one of their own nationals, and is not in
any way diminislied or cancelled by reason of the fact of such nationality.
The United I<ingclom statement thcn goes on to say :

"The duty is one oweclto tlie 01-ganization rissuch, independently
of any consideration as to the nationalitjr of the inclividual
members of the mission, or in other cases of thc nationalitj~ of the
particular servant eniployed. If so, however, then clearly the State
concernecl cannot, or ought not to be pcrrnitted to plead the nation-
ality of the injured party as a defence to any international claim
which inay be brought on liis behalf by the Organization."

(Pp. 41-42.)
We fully agree with this answer and urge that for these reasons the
doctrine of the Ca~zevarocase lias no application here. At the same time,
we desire to make it clear that the Secretary-General woiild consicler
the presentation of a claim against the State of the victim's nationality
as a niatter of delicacy and woulcl most carefully meigh al1 relevant

consiclerations before proceeding fiirther.

CONCLUSION.

Rlr. President, yesterday you invited us iiot only to give reasons for .
our points of view but also to suggest to the Court the appropriate
answers to the questions asked by the General Assernbly. With al1
due deference we suggest that the following answers should be 5'en.
To the first question our answer would be tliis : In the event of an
c~gciitof tlie United Nations in the perforinance of Iiis diities suffering
injury in circu~nstaiices involviiig the responsibility of tlic State, tlie
United Nations as an Organizatioii has capacity to bring an inter-
national claim against the responsible dc jzwe or de factogovernillent

with a vicw to obtaining reparation due in respect of damage causecl
either tothe Unitecl Nations, or to tlie victim or perçons entitlecl througlz
him, or to both.
To tlie second question ou answer would be this : \?ihile in legal
theory the United Nations may proceed to bring a claim with a view
to obtaiiiing the reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the
victim or persons eiititled t1irougl.i him, irrespective of such rigllts as
. may be possessed by the State of whicli tlie victin~ is a national, it is to
be presumed tliat the United Nations would proceed in so far as possible
in agreement with the State concerned.

Mr. President, may 1 tliank the Court for the attention witli whicli

you have followed Our argument. 3. - EXPOSÉ DE RI. KAECKENBEECK
(REPRÉSENTANT DU GOUVERNEZIENT .BELGE)

A LA SÉANCE PUBLIQUE DU 8 MARS 1949, APRÈS-AIXDI.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, mon premier désir et
mon premier devoir, en me présentant devant vous, est de m'acquitter
d'une agréablemission: celle de transmettre à la Cour les hommages
respectueux du Gouvernement belge, que j'ai llhonneur de représenter.
Je crois ensuite utile de préciserque le Gouvernement belge, n'ayant
en l'occurrence aucun intérêtparticulier à défendre, n'intervient ici
que comme ami de la Cour, soucieux de contribuer au cléveloppement
du droit et de l'organisation internationale.
Ma mission est double. Elle consiste tout d'aborCLexpliquer briéve-
ment pour quels motifs la délégationbelge à YAssembléegénéraledes
Nations Unies a proposéde demander un avis consultatif sur la question
qui vous est soumise.J'esquisserai ensuite le point devuede mon Gouver-
nement en ce qui concerne la capacité juridique internationale de
l'organisation des Nations Unies.
1.En proposant àl'Assembléegénéraldees Nations Unies de demander

belge était mue avant tout par le souci d'assurera l'action éventuellen
des Nations Unies une base juridique qui soit incontestde, élaboréedans
le calme et la sérénitéet exprimée avec la précision et les nuances

désirables.
d'interprétation impliqués pourraient être traités par la Cour d'une
manière plus Iiomogéne,plus fouilléeet plus précisequ'ils ne pourraient
l'êtrepar les représentants de cinquante-huit États réunisen Assemblée.
Car nous souhaitons, danscette matière, où peuvent intervenir beaucoup
de considérations diverses, qu'un choix judicieux soit fait parmi les
arguments possibles et qu'une terminologie et une méthode soient
indiquées avec autorité sans autres préoccupations que celles d'assurer
une bonne justice et de se conformer une saine logique juridique.
Au sujet de la solution qu'il conviendrait cle donner au problème
soulevépar le SecrCtaire général à la suite d'incidents tragiques qu'il
est péniblede rappeler, l'Assembléeentretenait moins de doutes qu'au
sujet des interprétations et des constructions juridiques susceptibles de
l'étayer.11est remarquable, en effet, qu'aucune vois dissidente ne se
soit élevée,êmeen commission, contre la description du but poursuivi
telle qu'elle est contenue dans les deux considérantsqui introduisent le
libelléde la question poséeà la Cour. Je les ci:e

« Considérant que la série d'incidents tragiques arrivés ces
derniers temps aux agents des Nations Unies dans l'exercice de
leurs fonctions soulève, et d'une façon plus urgente que jamais,
la question des dispositions prendre par les Nations Unies pour
assurerà l'avenir à leurs agents une protection maximum et la
réparation des dommages subis ; Considérant comme hautement souhaitable que le Secrétaire
généralpuisse, sans conteste, agir cle la mani6re la plus efficace en
vue d'obtenir toute réparation due. ))

Le désir unanime, exprimé dans les deus considérants que je viens
de lire, de doter l'organisation des Nations Unies de moyens efficaces
pour assurer la protection de ses agents et obtenir toute réparation due,
nous tenions à ce qu'il puisse se réaliser à l'abri de contestations,
d'équivoques juridiques, de procédures douteuses. Et c'est pourquoi
nous avons proposéque la cluestion juridique fut avant tout soumise à
la Cour.
L'objet est donc de préciserl'étendue de la capacité juridique inter-
nationale de l'organisation des Nations Unies et lanature des procédures
que la Charte et le droit international mettent A sa disposition pour la
poursuite des buts précités.
Plus l'avis de la Cour sera constructif, mieux il répondra auxvŒux de
ceux qui l'ont demandé.
II. La question soumise a la Cour implique l'hypothèse qu'un agent
des Nations Unies a subi, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, un d2mmage
dans des conditions de nature à engager la responsabilité diun btat. La
Cour n'est pas priée de déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles la
responsabilité d'un État peut êtreengagée. L'Assembléedes Nations
Unies est manifestement partie de l'idéeque cette question doit, dans
chaque cas, êtrerésolueconformément aux principes du droit interna-
tional.
L'hypothèse ci-dessus étant préciséel,a question posée à la Cour vise
essentiellement la capacité juridique de l'organisation des Nations

Unies comme telle pour présenter une «réclamation internationale ))
(a?% i~zlernationalclaiwz) en vue d'obtenir réparation d'un dommage.
La Charte ne contient pas de dispositions stipulant spécialementcette
capacité. Ne contient-elle rien qui s'oppose à la reconnaissance de cette
capacité ? Cela soulève immédiatement un point d'interprétation de
,l'article 104 de la Charte. Cet article stipule que((l'organisation jouit,
sur le territoire de chacun de ses Membres, de la capacité juridique qui
lui est nécessairepour exercer ses fonctions et atteindre ses buts D.
Les mots « sur le territoire de chacun de ses Membres )ont-ils, dans
cet article, un sens restrictif dont l'effet serait, somme toute, d'exclure
toute capacité juridique internationale et, en particulier, de limiter
ailx procédureset instances nationales tout droit de recours de lJOrgani-
sation des Nations Unies ?
Une telle interprétation doit, à notre avis, êtrerejetée. Elle n'est
commandée par aucune considération décisivede langue ou de logique.
Elle se trouve, d'autre ,part, en contradiction avec les nécessitésfonc-
tionnelles auxquelles se réfère précisémenlta disposition.
Le rapport du Sous-ComitéIV, 2. A, de San-Francisco, sur le statut
juridique de l'organisation (Doc. 803) confirme d'ailleurs que le texte
de l'article104 ne procède pas d'une telle intention restrictive. ((Cette
disposition est »,dit-il,« conçue en termes très généraux.Elle se bor.iae
à rappeler l'obligation incombant à tout État hlembrc de faire en sorte
,que, sur son territoire, l'organisation jouisse d'un statut juridique lui
permettant d'exercer ses attributions. » Et le rapport ajoute un peu
plus loin :« Quant à la question de la personnalité juridique internatio-
nale, le Sous-Comitéa jugészcperflzld'en faire l'objet d'un texte: Ellesera, en effet, i.tgt@licitenzeagtléepar l'ensemble des dispositions de la
Charte. ))
Voici la raison d'êtrede ces deus dernières phrases :A San-Francisco,
la délégationbelge s'était souvenue de ce que la qualité de sujet de
droit international avait étéautrefois contestée à la SociétéclesNations.

Il en était résultédes difficultés pratiques qui s'étaient manifestées
surtout dans la vie administrative de la Société. Toutefois,dans la suite,
la tendance dominante de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence fut d'en
admettre l'existence. C'est cette dernihre évolutiori que la clélégation
belge à San-Francisco eût voulu consacrer en mettant fin à toute possi-
bilité de controverse. A cet effet, elle proposa d'insérerdans la Charte
une disposition reconnaissant espressément que « l'organisation pos-
sède'la personnalité internationale avec les droits qui en découlent ».
(U. N. C. 1. O., Vol. 3, p. 243.)
Les questions soulevéespar cette proposition furent discutéesen comité
(Doc. 554). Elles laissent clairement apparaître la crainte d'accréditer
la notion .d'un super-État, en raison sans doute d'une tcndancc à
confondre les notions de personnalité juridique internationale et d'État.
Une telle confusion est pourtant erronée. Il est vrai que les États ont
une personnalité juridique internationale. Nais il n'en résiiltenullement
que toute personnalité juridique internationale soit un État. A notre
avis, l'Organisation des Nations Unies n'a nullement la nature d'un
État ni d'un super-État, mais elle possède la personnalité juridique
internationale.
Quoi qu'il en soit, ces questions furent renvoyéespour étudeet compte
rendu au Sous-Comité IV, 2. -4, et c'est ce Sous-Comitéqui, dans le
rapport que j'ai cité plus liaut (Doc. 803), jugea superflue linsertion
d'un texte concernant la personnalité juridique internationale de l'Orga-
nisation, puisque celle-ci est implicitement régléepar l'ensemble des
dispositions de la Charte. Il en résulteque le teste de l'article104 n'était
pas rédigéen vue cl'éliminerla personnalité juridique internationale de
l'Organisation et, partant, sa capacité juridique internationale, et que
le rejet de la proposition belge ne constitue pas non plus un argument
en faveur de l'interprétation restrictive de l'article 104
11en résulte, d'autre part, que c'est d'implications cles dispositions
de la Charte que doit se dkgage- la 1)ersonnalité internationale dc
l'O. N. U.
En premier lieu, il'n'y a aucun doute que l'Organisation clesNations
Unies n étC:conçue comme une entité distincte (voir U. N. C. 1.O.,
Doc. 933). Le langage de la Charte en témoigne co~lstaminent. Prenez
comme exemple l'article 2 : L'Orgn~isatio~d zes Nations Unies et ses
Membres, dans la poursuite des buts énoncés à l'article1, dotve?ttngir
confornlén~entaux principes suivants : » (ce qui implique bien qu'à
c6téde l'action et des obligations des États Mcmbres, il y a l'action
et les obligations de l'organisation comme telle). Sans entreprendre
l'énumération des principesénoncés, qu'il me soit pcrmis de relever que,
tandis que plusieurs d'entre eux commencent par les mots: ((Lcs
Membres dc l'organisation ....», le numéro 6 dit : ((LJOrga?zisatio~z
fait en sorte que les Ltats qui ne sont pas membres des Nations Unies
agissent conforinérncnt à ces principes dans la mesure nécessaire au
maintien cie la pais et de la sécurité internationales )),ce qui indique
clairement & nouveau quc l'Organisation comme telle, distincte de seshlembres, peut avoir certaines obligations d'agir et cela, dans le cas
présent, sur le plan international.
Et lorsclue le no 5 stipule que : « Les klembres de l'organisation
donnent d celle-cpleine assistance dans toute.action entreprise $ar elle,
conformément aux dispositions de la Charte ... », il prouve encore
qu'h côté des obligations cles Membres vis-i-vis cles autres Membres,
ily a des obligations des l\Iembres vis-à-vis de l'Organisation elle-même,
et, partant, des droits de l'Organisation vis-à-vis de ses Meinbies.
Lorsque l'article 57 parle de relier les Institutions spécialisées à
l'organisation, lorsque l'article .5S stipule que l'organisation fait des
recommandations et l'article 59 que l'Organisation provoque des

négociations, que l'article 75 prévoit que l'Organisation établira, sous
sortnntorité,un régimeinternational de tutelle, et que les articles83 et 85
parlent des « fonctions de l'organisation )),on se rend compte que
l'organisation constitue bien une entité j.la fois sujet et objet d'obliga-
tions internationales, et donc sujet de droits, et même.détentrice
d'autorité internationale.
Ajoutons que l'organisation agit par le truchement d'organes qui
prennent leurs résolutions a la majorité simple ou qualifiéedes voix, et
que, dans certains cas, les décisions d'un organe ne comprenant que
quelques Membres sont obligatoires pour tous les hlenibres (article 25).
Iln'y a donc pas de difficulté à montrer que l'existence de la person-
nalité juridique internationale de l'O. N. U. est bien impliqiiéedans une
série de dispositions de la Charte, comme le fait prCvoir la dernière
phrase du rapport du Sous-Cornité IV, 2. A.
La meilleure confirmation s'en trouve dans la pratique. L'Organisation,

comme teile, conclut des conventions internationales avec ses Membres
et avec des États non-membres. Cela serait-il possible si elle n'avait pas
de personnalité juridique internationale, c'est-à-dire si elle n'était pas
sujet de droits sur le plan international ?Sans parler de l'article 43 de la
Charte, qui reste inappliqué, l'organisation a fait avec les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique une convention clénornmée Hendp~nrters Agreemefzt ; eile
a fait avec la Suisse, qui n'est pas membre des Nations Unies, un accord
sur le siègeà Genève ; elle a fait avec les États Membres une convention
relative aux privilèges et immunitks des Nations Unies.
L'accord avec la Suisse revêt un intérêtspécialdu fait que les rapports
de cc pays avec l'organisation des Nations Unies ne résultent pas des
stipulations clc la Charte mais uniquement du droit international. Or,
la section 1 de l'articler de cet accord est, de tous, le teste le plus révé-
lateur, parce que le plus précis,sur le point qui nous occupe. Je le cite :

« Le Conseil fédéral suisse recor~f~a it pcrso~nditéirtteri.tatiowaie
et la capacité juridique de l'organisation des Xations Unies ....))
La Convention sur les privilèges et immunités qui, dans son article I,
stipule,sans qualification, que ((l'organisation desNations Unies possèdc

la personnalité jiiridique »et ajoute : ((Elle a la capacitéa) de contracter,
6) d'acquérir et de vendre des biens mobiliers et immobiliers, c)d'ester
en justice »,cette convention, dis-je,est conçue comme une convention
entre l'organisation, d'une part, et chacun des Membres des Nations
Unies, d'autre part. Cela ressort du mécanisme prévupour sa conclusion :
approbation par une résolution de l'i\ssemblée généraleet adhésion de
chacun des Membres et, plus clairement encore, de la section 3j de
l'article final qui stipule que : « La présente Convention restera en vigueur elatreL'O~gutzisatio~t
des Nations Unies et tout Membrequi aura déposé soninstrument
d'adhésion », etc.

De plus, la section 36 prévoit que « le Secrétaire généralpourra
conclure, avec un ou plusieurs Membres, des accords additionnels.. ..1)
lesquels doiyent, dans chaque cas, êtresoumis à l'approbation de 1'Assem-
blée générale.
L'économiede cette dernière disposition rappelle celle de la Résolu-
tion de l'Assembléedu 13 février 1946, autorisant le Secrétairegénéral
à négocieravec les États-Unis les arrangements rendus nécessairespar
l'établissement dusiègepermanent de l'organisation des Nations Unies
aux États-Unis d'Amérique.
L'alinéa 4 de cette Résolution s'exprimait comme suit :
11 ((Tout accord conclu à la suite de ces négociations .... avec les
autorités compétentes des États-unis, sera subordonné à l'appro-
bation de l'Assemblée génkrale avant d'être sigqzé nt6 ?to?ndes
Nations Ulzies. s

Et, en fait, le préambulede 1a.Conventionqui est envigueur énonceque :

ccL'Organisation des Nations Unies et les États-unis d'Amérique,
Désireux de conclure un accord ....
Ont désigné à cet effet comme leurs reprcscntants :
L'Organisation des Nations Unies : îrygve LIE, Secrétaire
général,et
Les États-Unis d'Amérique : George C. MARSHALLS ,ecrétaire
d'État,
Qui sont convenus de ce qui suit :....1)
Messieurs, l'ensemble des faits 'rappelés ne laisse pas, à mon avis,
de doute sur la personnalité juridique internationale de l'organisation
des Nations Unies. Ni lelangage de l'article 104, ni le rejet dla proposi-
tion belge à San-Francisco n'ont exclu cette personnalité, ni amoindri
la capacité juridique internationale des Nations Unies.
Si l'organisation peut conclure des conventions internationales,
posséder des droits et des obligations d'ordre international, elle a un
intérêt incontestable à posséderles moyens de faire déterminer ces droits
et obligations et de les défendre.Et si des dommages lui sont indûment
causés,prétendra-t-on qu'il n'est nécessaireni à son [onctionnement, ni à
la réalisation de ses buts, qu'elle possèdele moyen d'obtenir réparation ?
Une fois que la personnalité internationale est hors de doute, le reste
suit facilement. L'étendue de la capacité juridique internationale de
l'organisation résulte des dispositions de la Cliarte, soit expressément,
soit implicitement, en vertu du principe, applicable ici, que fonction
implique capacité - principe d'ailleurs reconnu par lesarticles 104et105
et se trouvant à la base mêmedes deux dernières plirases du rapport
du Sous-ComitéIV, 2. A, de San-Francisco.
Si tel est le cas, la question de savoir si l'organisation des Nations
Unies possède, dans l'hypoth6se prévue par la demande d'avis, la
capacité de présenter une « réclamation internationale »,c'est-à-dire
une réclamation comme un État en présente normalement à un autre
en vue d'obtenir rkparation d'un dommage, revient Acelle de savoir si
cette capacité lui est nécessaire pour exercer ses fonctions et atteindre
ses buts. Or, sur ce point, il me semble que l'Assemblée générala e déjàexprimé un avis unanime clans les deux considérants que j'ai citCs et
qui précèdentle libelléde sa demande d'avis consultatif.
D'ailleurs, ne serait-il pas étrange de donner à l'Organisation des
droits et un patrimoine, tout en lui déniant la possibilité d'obtenir
réparation d'un dommage injustement infligé ?
Pour obtenir satisfaction, la procédure à adopter semble devoir être
sensiblement la mêmeque ccllc généralementsuivie entre Etats. Elle
peut notamment donner lieu soit B une transaction, soit à une décision
arbitrale. Et, 3.cet égard,la personnalité juridique internationale étant
I-iprsde doute, on ne voit vraiment pas pourquoi un tribunal arbitral ne
pourrait pas résoudreun différendentre l'Organisation et un gtat, tout
commc il le ferait entre deus États ou mêmeentre un État et un parti-
culier. Le droit de l'organisation d'ester en justice, stipulé sans qualifi-
cation à l'articleI de la Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, ne
fait icipoint de doute. Toutefois,n cequi concerne la Cour internationale
de Justice, la situation est particulière.
La Cour, on le sait, est un organe des Nations Unies. Le Statut de la
Cour forme partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies. Conformé-
ment à l'article 96, l'organisation peut, par son Assembléegénéraleou
par son Conseil de Sécurité,clemanclcr LLla Cour un avis consultatif sur
toute question juridique. C'est de cette manière, cxprcssément prévue
par la Cliarte, que l'Organisation pcut faire usage de son plus haut
organe judiciaire.
Est-ce la seule manibre ?
Il est pour le moins douteux que l'organisation puisse, à l'instar des
États Membres, ester devant la Cour comme partic à un litige et faire la
déclaration pr6vue à l'article 36, aliné2, du Statut. C'est, en tout cas,
un point sur lequel la Cour devra se prononcer : l'article 34, alinéa1,
du Statut de la Cour a-t-il pour effet d'empêcherl'organisation des
Nations Unics de se présenter devant la Cour parce qu'elle n'est pas un
État ? Ou bicn, cet article exclut-il simplement les individus et les
organisations de caractère non étatique sans viser pour,cela l'organisa-
tion des Nations Unies, qui est une entité composée d'Etats ? Sur cette
question de savoir si l'organisation des Nations Unies peut ou ne peut
pas se présenter devant la Cour en matière contentieuse, alors qu'elle
peut indubitablement le faire en matibrc consultative, il n'entre pas clans
ma mission de prendre parti.
Je me bornerai à rappeler les moyens ausquels les Nations Unics ont,
jusqu'à présent, convenu de recourir. Je cite tout d'abord la section 21
de l'article 8 clc l'Accord entre l'organisation des Nations Unies et les
États-Unis clJAmérique,relatif au siègedes Nations Unies :
((a) Tout différend entre l'Organisation dcs Nations Unies et
les États-unis au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application du
présent Accord ou de tout accord additionnel sera, s'il n'est pas
réglépar voie de négociations ou par tout autre mode de règlement
agréép~rles Parties, soumis aux fins de décision définitive un
tribunal composé de trois arbitres, dont l'un sera dési né par le
Secrétairegknéral,l'autre par le Secrétaire d'État des ftats-Unis,
et Ictroisième choisipar les deus autres, ou,à défautd'accord entre
eus sur ce choix, par le l'résident de la Cour internationale de
Justice.
b) Le Secrétairegénéral oules États-unis pourront prier I'Assem-
bléegénérale dedemander à la Cour internationale de Justice un100 ESPOSÉ DE M. KAECICENBEECK (BELGIQUE) - S III 49
avis consultatif sur toute question juridique qui viendrait à &tre
soulevée au cours de ladite procédure. En attendant l'avis de la
Cour, les deux Parties seconforineroiità une décisionintérimairedu
tribunal arbitral. Par la suite, celui-ci rendra iirie décisiondéfinitive
en tenant compte de l'avis de la Cour. 1)

La Convention sur les privilèges et immunitésprévoit, à la section 30
cle son article S, une rnétliode de règlement quelque peu différente.
Je cite':
« Toute contestation portant sur l'application ou I'interpréta-
tion de la présente Convention sera portée devant la Cour interna-
tionale de Justice à moins que, dans un cas donné, les Parties ne
conviennent d'avoir recours à un autre niode de règlement. Si un
différendsurgit entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies, d'une part,
et un Membre, d'autre part, un avis consultatif sur tout point de
droit soulevésera demandéen conformitéde l'article 96de la Charte
et del'article 65du Statut de la Cour. L'avis de la Cour seraaccepté
par les Parties comme décisif. ))

L'accord provisoire entre ie Conseil fédéralsuisse et le Secrétaire
général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies stipule ce qui suit à sa
section 27 :
<(Toute contestatioii entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et
le Conseil fédéral suisse,portant sur l'interprétation ou l'apylica-
tion du présent Accord provisoire ou de tout accord additionnel et
qui n'aura pas étérégléepar voie cle négociation, sera soumise à
la décision d'un collègede trois arbitres; le premier sera noininé
par le Conseil fédéralsuisse, le second par le Secrétaire général
de l'organisation des Nations Unies et un surarbitre par le Président
de la Cour internationale de Justice ; à moins que, dans un cas
donné, lesParties ne conviennent d'avoir recours à uri autre mode
de règlement. 1)

Dans chacun de ces cas, il semble bien clue l'on soit parti de I'iclée
que l'organisation des Nations Unies ne pouvait pas se présenter devant
la Cour comme partie àun litige ct ne pouvait faire usage devant la Cour
c111dce la procédure consultative. On a donc chercl16 à toilrnerla diffi-
culté, dans le cas de la Convention générale,en rendant convention-
nellement l'avis de la Cour décisifentre les Parties et, dans le cas de la
Convention dii sikgeen insérant laprocéclureconsultritive de la Cour dans
une procédure arbitrale. Dans l'accord avec la Suisse, on s'est coiitenté
du recours à un collègede trois arbitres.
Passons maintenant au point I b), c'est-à-dire à la uestion de savoir
si, toujours clans IJhypothèse prévue, la qualité de llÔrganisation pour
présenter une réclamation internationale s'étend au cas où la récla-
mation vise à obtenir la réparation des dommages causés, non à l'Orga-
nisation mCme,mais àl'agent victime ou à ses ayants droit.
Nous ne voyons pas d'objection à admettre cette extension. Les
agents des Watioiis Unies doivent pouvoir compter sur l'aide et la
protection de l'Organisation. Dans une large mesure, ils doivent, clans
l'exercice de leurs fonctions internationales, faire abstraction de leurs
sympatliies nationales et des intérêtsparticuliers du pays de leur allé-
geance. Comme le stipulel'article IOO de la Charte, ils doivent s'abstenir
de tout acte incompatible avec leur situation de fonctionnaires inter-
nationaux et ne seront responsables qu'envers l'Organisation. D'autre EXPOS DE M. KAECKENREECIC (BEI~CIQUE) - 8 III49 IOI

part, chaque Membre de l'Organisation doit respecter le caractère
international de leurs fonctions. Le lien qui unit les fonctionnaires ct
agents del'organisation i cette Orgariisation dépasse donc considérable-
ment les liens qui iiiiissent normalement employeurs et employés. 11
csiste ou il doit exister une sorte d'allégeanceà l'égardde I'Organis t'
ct, pour celui qui la cloit, un affaiblissement de certains aspects au moins
des liens nationaux en résultc. Ces considérations portent i croire que
l'extension peut se justifier juriclicluement, tandis qu'en fait l'Assemblée
généralea montré par les considérants de sa demande d'avis qu'elle
jugeait l'extensioii clésirable.
Bien entendu, admettre la qualité de l'organisation pour présenter,
clans un cas où un agent des Nations Unies a subi, dans l'exercice de ses
fonctions, un domyage dans les conditions de nature à engager la
responsabilité d'i~nYhtat,une réclamation internationale en.vue d'obtenir
la réparation du clomniage causé la victime ou à ses ayants droit ne
l~réjudicie pas la facultk d'un État, reconnue en droit international,
d'agir de In.sorte en faveur d'un ressortissant. Ily a toutefois lieu de

remarquer qu'il s':~git, dans le chef de l'État, d'un droit et non d'une
obligation, que l'btat décide discrétionnairement s'il veut agir ou non
en faveur d'iln ressortissant et que, clans un cas où les liens d'allégeance
ont étéaffaiblis par suite de la création d'un lien spécial en faveur de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies, il est parfaitement concevable que
1'Btat préférene pas intervenir. De plus, il importe de tenir compte du
nombre croissant d'apatrides, de personnes déplacées, d'esilés, de cas
de nationalité dcuteuse après les bouleversements de la dernière gucrre.
N'est-il pasELcraindre que, clans de pareils cas, la protection nationale
s'avère illusoire ?
En toute occurrence, il y a lieu de croire que, claiis la très grande
majorité des cas, l'Organisation et l'État n'auraient aucune difficultéà
se inettre d'accord pour éviter une double intervention, et, dans les cas
exceptionnels où cet accord ii'esisterait pas, il mc semble que l'instance
saisie de la question pourrait, sans difficulté, déciderà laquelle des deus
réclamations il y a lieu de faire droit sur la base d'une comparaison de
l'importance des liens respectifs et conformément aus principes en
usage en cas de réclamations relatives à des personnes ayant deus
~iationalités.
Pour me résumer, il y a lieu,!Lmon avis, de répondre affirmativement
aux questions I raet 1 h).
L'Organisation des Nations Unies possède la personnalité juridique
internationale, ce clui d'ailleurs ne lui confère pas le caractiire d'un
super-État.
L'Organisation des Nations Unies peut ester devant un tribunal
arbitral. Il semble,toutefois, qu'en ce qui concerile la C0u.rinternationale
deJustice, seulela procédure consultative soit accessible à1'Organisatioii.
Je ne formule toutefois pas.de conclusion sur ce point au nom de mon
Gouvernement.
En ce ui concerne la question 2, à défaut d'accord entre l'Organisa-

tion et1'itat dont la victime est ressortissant,on pourrait, semble-t-il,
s'inspirernzz~lntiwzcttu~zdisles principes en usage dans les cas où deus
Btats se prévalent clela nationalité d'un individu :,us fins d'une réclama-
tion.
Je remercie la Cour de son attention. 4. - ESPOST~:DE M. CHAUMONT
(REPK~~SENTANT DU COUVERNEAlENT FIIANÇAIÇ)

A LA S~ANCE PUBLIQUE DU 8 MARS 1949, APRÈS-MIDI.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, le Gouvernement français,
que j'ai l'honneur de représenter devant la Cour, a voulu marquer, en
formulant quelques observations au sujet de la demande d'avis dont
cileest saisie, tout a la fois sa préoccupationconstante de voir développer
et affirmer des règlesde droit dans la vie internationale et l'importance
qu'il attache à l'intervention de la plus I-iautejuridiction existant dans
le monde.
Sans doute, la France a-t-elle étéintéresséedirectement, comme
quelques autres nations, dans les douloureus événementsqui sont à
l'origine de l'affaire dont la Cour doit connaîtreEt si elle ne demande
rien ici pour elle-même,tout au moins son représentant se doit-il de
saluer rcspectueusernent la mémoire de ceus qui ont servi l'Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies et son idéaljusqu'au suprêniesacrifice. Ce n'est
pas le lieu d'insister sur laconnaissance qui leur estdue ;mais n'est-ce
pas.leur êtrefidèlesque d'assurer plus fermement, pour l'avenir, l'insti-
tution pour laquelle ils ont donné leur vie ?
La demande d'avis présentéepar l'Assembléedes Nations Unies à
la Cour comporte deus questions qu'il importe d'csaminer successive-
ment. La seconde apparaît en effet comme subsidiaire, la Cour n'ayant à
en délibérerque dans l'hypothèse où sa réponse la première serait
affirmative.
Voici les observations du Gouvernement français sur l'une et l'autre
questions.

1. J'estime inutile de relire la première question poséB la Cour. La
qualitédel'Organisation des Nations Unies pour présenter dans certaines
circonstances une « réclamation internationale ))contre un État, tel
cst le problème en discussion.
Cette formule ((la réclamation internationale »est à la fois précise
et souple. Elle est précise en ce qu'ellc désigne, sans doute possible,
une procédure se plaçant sur le plan du droit international. Elie écarte
du problème soumis à.la Cour toute procédure qui s'inscrirait dans le
cadre du droit interne et mettrait en jeu la responsabilité de l'État
suivant ce droit interne. Unc telle manière de procéderest concevable.
Ce n'est pas celle qui est ici en~ployée.
Par contre, aucune forme particulière ne s'attache A la notion de
réclamation internationale. C'est une demande susceptible cl'etreprésen-
tée suivant des procédures diverses. En général,elle émaned'un État,
traditionnel sujet de droits dans l'ordre international. L'Assemblée
désiresavoir si elle pourrait émaner aussi de l'organisation des Nations
Unies. Le problbme de la ((qualité » de l'organisation des Nations
Unies, c'est le problème de sa capacité pour agir dans certaines circons-
tances, ou pour parler plus exactement, de l'étendue de sa compétence.
L'hypothèse mêmedans laquelle la compétence de l'organisation des
Nations Unies est en discussion a éténettement préciséepar lJAsscmblée EXPOS DEE BI. CHAUMONT (FRANGE) - 8 TI149 163

nu lcrîdemain des douloureiis événemerîtsausqtiels il akt6 fait plus haut
:illiision : un agentdes Nations Utzics a subi, dans l'csercice de ses
forictiotiç, un darnrnagc, dans des cor-iditions de nature i cngager la
responsabilité d'UnIi'tat, etc'cst b l'cgard du goiivernemeiit de celui-ci
que 13 réclamation doit Gtre prksenti.e.
Il s'agit d'examiner si, dans cettc situation, la dcmande clerbparation
peut étrc formée sur le pIan international par l'organisation interna-
tionale.
Ilest bien connir,et la jurisprudence ce la Cour permanente deJustice
internationale l'a souvent rappelé, que la responsabilitk internationale
implique la violation d'une règledu droit des gens et que seul le sujet
du droit des gens intéressepeut former une réclamati.011internationale.
C'est la le sens du mot M qualité remployé dans la demande d'avis.
Dcux questions dhslors doivent etre examinées, qui sont toutes deux
impliqukes dans cette notion de qualitk.
Prerni&re question : Des rhgles spéciales obligent-elles les l?tats
l'égard des agents des Nations Unies dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions ?
Dcuxikme question : L'Organisation peut-elle en réclamer elle-même
le respect ?

a) Et d'abord, dasrégl~s s$éciaEesoblz'gelzt-elles gtats d I'igar dds

&gBl.bts6s NNrorzs U~%ie sans .?'txercicdB kurs joactio?$s?
D'après les règles traditionnelles, un dommage subi par un individu
qui a son origine dans une violation du droit cles gens, permet à 1'Etat
national de présenter une réclamation contre lJEtat coupable. Ce faisant,
l'fitat national exerce lprotection diplomatique au profit de son ressor-
tissant, l'égard duquel il posséde une compÉtence pcrsonnellc.
L'Etat, en prenant faitct cause pour l'aindes siens, suivant la formule
donnée par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans l'affaire
Mavrommatis, 11fait valoir son droit proprc, lc droit qu'il a de faire
respecter dans la personne de.ses ressortissants, le droit internationa1).
Ides règlesde droit international qu'un État doit rcspccter à l'égard
des etrangers ont été rikfiniepar les conventions et par la coutume
internationales.
Ides procédéspar lesqiiels I'Etat liaticinal petitfairevaloir soi, droit
sont lesprocédés générauxdu droit desgens : réclamatioii diplomatique,
'demande d'arbitrage, recours ,ila juridiction internationale.
Mais il est certain quc la responsabilité internationale d'lin gtat
nhpparaît pas seulement dans le cas où iil a violé les rhgles toucl?ant
la condition cics étrangers. La responsabiliti: intcrnationale de I'Etat
apparait çliaqilefois qu'une rkgle quelconque de clroit international
est méconnue S. l'encontre d'un autre gouvcrncment. Notammcnt, la
reçponsabilitk intcrnationale apparaît lorsque ~'Etat mkconnait son
obligation de respecter un service public etranger, C'est ainsi, par
exemple, qu'elleest engagéesi la protection prescrite par Icdroit-inter-
national au profit des services diplorziatiqiieset consulaires n'est pas
assurée. La personne d'un agent diplomatique doit faire I'objet d'une
vigilancc spécialede la part des autoritCsde l'Étatq~i le reçoit.Si cette
vigilance fait défalit, s'en rksulte un dommage, l'htat dont le service
diplomatique est en cause peut former une skclarnation internationale.

Et il en cst ainsi m&me siIa victime de l'acte dommageable n'est pas
son national, ce qui peut arriver pratiquement s'agissailt d'un consul.
Ainsi ledon~mage subi par un individu peut, raison dc ses fonctions,provoqirer tine réclamation internationale d'un gtat qui n'est pas son

I?tat nationd. La situation vis& pnrla demande d'avis n'est pas sans
analugie avec cette hypoth&se.
De quoi s'agit-il cn effet ?D'iiii agcrît des Nations UniCs,datis l'exercice
dc ses foriçtions,c'est-à-dire d'un individu se trouvant sur le territoire
d'un etnt étranger dans des conditions qui sont très différentes des
conditions dans IcsqiielleLin particuIier peut s'y trouver.
Les conditions mathrielles, d'abord, sont très sptciales. L'agent des
Nations Unies agit pour le compte de l'Organisation internationale.
Or, celle-ci n'intcnricntIc plus Souvent que dans les cas de crise, lorsque
se rericontrent une situation politique particuliéremcnt difficile,des
troubles graves. Loin de s'éloigner des lieux dc danger, l'agent des .
Nations Unies doit y 6tre prdsent. II peut, par son attitude et par sa
mission, exciter la hainc de certains déments de la pop111ation. II se
trouve donc exposé k des dangers spkciaux que ni: connaissent pas lcs
simples particuliers,qu'ils se doivent d'eviter, car s'ils subissaient uri
dommage, pour les avoir encourus, la responsabilité de I'Etat de séjour
n'existerait probablement pas.
&fais surtout la situation juridique de I'agetitdes Nations Unies est
aussi trb spéciale. 11agit pour le compte de I'Organisation internatio-
nale. Il estsous la dépetidance de celle-ci. II cnreçoit des ordrcs ct, sui-
vant l'article ~oo de la Charte, il n'est responsable qu'envers elle et
ne peut obéir A des directives de son propr-e goti-ireri~ernent.Ses fonc-
tions ont un caractere exclusivement international.
Ilest donc lie il'Organisation pnr un lien particulier, celuide la for-ic-
tion, celui de la participation au service public.
Par ailleurs, il est tenu dans i'açcomplissetnent de son devoir de
n'accepter aucune instruction du gouvernement dt: son État d'nrigir~e,
et celui-ciest tenu de ne pas l'influencer dans $2 tache.
Comment imaginer dés lors qpe ce soit 1'Etat national qui puisse
connaître et discuter dc l'activitk de son rcssortissaiit en prkscntant une
réclamation interriationale ?
11faut donc constater que la sitiintion existant ici est profrindhent
diffkrente, sous tous ses aspects, de la situation d'un individu, simple
particulier, se trouvant en territoire étranger.
Quelles peuvent Btre alors lcs obli ations de l'État où s'exerce l'acti-
vit6 d'un agent des Nations Unies .
Les termes dc la demande d'avis impliquent la conviction de 1'Assem-
blée qu'il a des ob1ig;~tionsspéciales.
C'est ce qu'exprimait dkjk un cornite de juristes daris un avis dont
le Conseil de la Société des Nations prit acte le 13, mars 1924 au sujet
du meurtre du généralTellini, yrksident de la Commisçion de délimi-
tation de la frontière gréco-albanaise nommée par la Conférence cics
Ambassadeurs : ((Le caracthe public reconnu que revêt l'étranoer,

les ciiconstanccs dans lerquellcs ilse trouve sur le territoire de i'lftat
entraînent pour celui-ci un clcvoir de vigilancc spéciali son égard. e
Examinons tout d'abord la sitization des Gtats Riembres des Nations
Unies.
Les Membres de l'Organisation, qui doivent lui donner rrpleineassis-
tance iidans toute action entreprise par elle, sont tenus de respecter
le service public international, comme ils doivent respecter le servicc
public d'un État Ctrangcr, ci ceci composte des obligations particuliéres
de protection en vue d'assurer la continuif& du service. La nécessité deprotéger et faciliter le fonctionnement des Nations Unies est à la base
cles r&glessur les immunités et la convention spéciale en fixe certains
élémentsimportants clans le but d'assurer l'indépenclancede leiirs servi-
ces. Mais il estévident qu'elle n'épuisepas la matière et que l'obligation
de protéger la personne existe comme pour les diplomates étrangers.
En second lieu, et en ce qui concerne les États non membres, le
problème peut apparaître, à première vue, comme plus délicat, quoique
l'article2, paragrap$e 6, de la Charte déclare que l'organisation fait
en sorte que les litats qui ne sont pas membres des Nations Unies

agissent conformément à ces principes », c'est-&-dire à ceux qui domi-
nent l'action de l'organisation.
Mais il faut remarquer que, sauf dans l'hypothèse où les agents
internationaux feraient partie d'une force internationale de coercition
à l'encontre d'un Etat non membre, ces agents se trouvent sur le terri-
toire de cet État avec le consentement de son gouvernement, que celui-ci
soit de jzireou de facto. En provoquant ou en acceptant sa présence,
l'autorité quelle qu'elle soit qui exerce le pouvoir effectif là où l'agent
international remplit sa mission, s'oblige à assurer le respect de sa
fonction.
Dans ces conditions, qui peut agir sur le plan international si ces
obligations sont méconnues ? C'est là la deuxième question fondamen-
tale qu'il nous faut examiner maintenant.

b) L'Organisatiotzdes Nations Unies fieut-elle former elle-même zme
réclantationinternutio~zale ?
En général,ce sont les États qui réclament lorsque, le droit interna-
tional étant violé, leurs ressortissaiits subissent des dommages. Mais
nous venons de voir que des règles spéciales existent pour protéger
les agents internationaux. Qui pourra mettre en Œuvre ces r6gles
spéciales?
Il convient de relever que, dans la pratique internationale, lorsque
plusieurs Gtats ont assumé une tâche en commun, désignédes agents
d'exécution, la protection de ceux-ci a généralement étéassurée par
les États agissant de concert et non par les divers Etats nationaux agis-
sant isolément. Cette action spontanée, qu'aucun te$e n'a organisée,

a étéacceptée et par les États nationaux et par les btats auxquels elle
s'adressait.
Lorsque le Concert européen a procédéà des actes de police, les
autorités qui agissaient pour son compte n'ont jamais hésité à prendre
les mesures nécessaires pour protéger les agents internationaux. En
général,ces autorités internationales ont agi seules, sans que l'État
national prétendit exercer sa protection.
Ainsi, lors des affaires de Crète, à une époque où, suivant la formule
de Gabriel Hanotaux parlant au Parlement français; le Concert européen
était (le seul tribunal et la seule autorité devant laquelle tout le monde
pouvait et devait s'incliner ))les amiraus des Puissances qui avaient la
charge d'assurer la protection de l'île et la responsabilité de l'ordre au
nom du Concert européen ont créé,par une ordonnance du 31 août 1897,
une commission militaire internationale pour juger les ((offenses de
toute nature commises au préjudice des officiers et des soldats interna-

tionaux ».
Quelques années plus tard, en 1905, les insurgés attaquant les troupes
internationales, les consiils des Puissances devaient,par une proclamation
Scommune des 17/30 juillet 1905, rétablir cette cominission internationale
de justice militaire. Par conséquent, ce n'était pas chaque gouvernement
qui assiirait la sécuritéde ses propres contingents, mais une action
concertée était entreprise au profit des troupes expressément qualifiées
« troupes internationales 1).
Lorsque des incidents se sont produits, notamment un incident entre
poste français et poste turc àLa Canée,auquel fait allusion une dépêche
de Gabriel Hanotaus du 18 avril 1898 ls ont étéesaininés en commun
par les représentants des Puissances qui ont décidé en commun des
mesures à prendre. Par conséquent, l'action de l'État national était
remplacée par l'action collective des États qui avaient pris en charge
la question de la Crète.
observations écrites, l'exemple le plus frappant d'une action gouverne-
mentale pour la protection d'un agent internationalest incontestablement
l'action entreprise, par la Conférencedes Ainbassadeurs en 1923, aprés
l'assassinat des membres italiens de la Commission de délimitation des .
frontières gréco-albanaises. La Conférence des Ambassadeurs n'a pas
hésité à présenter elle-mêmela réclamation contre le Gouvernement
grec. Sans doute, parallèlement le Gouvernement italien prétendait-il
aussi faire valoir son droità la protection diplomatique. Mais il convient
de souligner que le Gouvernement grec n'a soulevé aucune objection
juridique contre l'action de la Conférenceet qu'il en a reconnu la validité
en des termes particulièrement nets.
Le Gouvernement italien avait lui-inêmefait la distinction entre
les réparations qu'il demandait pour le dommage causéii lÉtat italien
et les sanctions iip.rendre par la Conférencedes Ainbassadeurs pour le
fait que la délégation italienneassassinéefaisait partie d'une conlmission
qui était mandataire de la Conférence.
Enfin, les débats au Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations, saisi par le
Gouvernement grec de la question de l'occupation de Corfou par le
Gouvernement italien, font ressortir que les États Membres du Conseil
considérent que la Conférencecles Ambassadeurs était atteinte par le
meurtre des officiers italiens. Ainsi, non seulement les États intéressés
au différend,mais les agents des Puissances membres de la Conférence
des Ambassadeurs et le Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations ont accepté
sans hésiterla compétencede l'organisation internationale pour assurer
la protection de ses agents.
Voilz'idonc un certain nombre de précédents. Je pense que ces
précédents nouspermettent d'affirmer que si, en l'absence de tout teste
sur ie droit pour un organe collectif d'agir par voie de réclam t' a ion
internationale, on a admis sans cl,iscussionla possibilité pour lui de
protéger ses agents, .si a aucun moment on ne relhve d'opposition des
États tiers, soit de l'État dont la victime a laationalité, soit de l'État
auquel la réclamation est présentée, à plus forte raison doit-on recon-
naître à l'organisation des Nations Unies la même compétence.
En effet, en ce qui touche l'organisation des Nations Unies, il n'est
pas douteux qu'on, a voulu lui attribuer une persorinalité juridique au
sens propre du mot. Sans doute, la Charte se contente-t-elle de parler,
dans l'article104, de ((la capacité juridique dont lJOrganisatioii jouit
sur le temtoire de chacun de ses Membres pour exercer ses fonctions
et atteindre ses buts )). Mais l'article 105 donne à l'organisation, comme telle, des privilèges
et immunités qui ne se concevraient pas si on ne lui reconnaissait pas
une personnalité juridique distincte. Il faut constater que, clans la
pratique, les États n'ont pas hésité à tirer de cette notion de person-

nalité juridique de l'Organisation toutes ses conséquences sans se
restreindre à des effet,s de pur droit interne.
La Convention sur les immunités et privilèges des agents des Nations
Unies en est la preuve. Cette Convention est passéeentre l'Organisation
et les États Membres. Elle prévoit dans sa section 30 le mode de règle-
ment des différends qui peuvent surgir entre l'organisation et un État
Membre. Ainsi, l'Assemblée des Nations Unies qui a établi le teste,
comme les États signataires, considèrent-ils que la personnalité de
l'organisation produit ses effets, non seulement l'intérieur des États,
sur le plan du droit interne, mais sur le plan international. Dans ces
conditions (etsans insister davantage sur ces citations de textes qui ont
déjà étédéveloppées par les orateurs précédents), il n'apparaît pas
contestable qu$ l'organisation puisse présenter une réclamation inter-
nationale à un btat responsable d'un dommage causéà l'un de ses agents.
Au surplus, telle a étéla procédure suivie lors des événements récents
qui sont à l'origine de la demande d'avis A la Cour. Le Gouvernement
égyptien notamment, dans sa réponse au Médiateur au sujet de la mort

d'observateurs français en Palestine, n'a pas contesté la compétence
d'un représentant des Nations Unies pour présenter une réclamation
et s'est contenté de contester au fond l'existence de sa responsabilité.
Les procédés par lesquels l'organisation des Nations Unies peut
présenter cette réclamation internationale sont ceus du droit inter-
national. A notre avis, aucun argument contraire ne pourrait êtretiré
du fait que l'article34 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice
réserve l'accès de la Cour aux États.
Si la juridiction de la Cour constitue un progrès considérable dans
la mise en jeu de la responsabilité internationale, il ne faut pas oublier
que c'est un procédérelativement récent, que c'est encore un procédé
exceptionnel. Le droit de présenter des réclamations, qui a étCreconnu
par exemple à la Commission européenne du Danube, n'impliquait pas
pour elle, pas plus que pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies, sur la
base de l'article34, accès A la Cour.
Par conséquent, la réclamation internationale est possible et l'article
doit êtreinterprété restrictivement.
Au surplus, si une difficulté juridique surgitA propos d'une réclama-
tion de cet ordre, l'Organisation a toujours la faculté de demander à
la Cour un avis consultatif susceptible de l'éclairer pleinement sur les

problèmes de droit.
Les obsen~ations précédentes couvrent ainsi les deux objets possibles
de réclamation prévus dans la demande d'avis : les dommages causés
aux Nations Unies et les dommages causés aux victimes ou à leurs
ayants droit.
En ce qui concerne les dommages causés aux Nations Unies, aucune
discussion n'est possible. Quant au point de savoir si une réclamation
internationale peut tendre directement A la réparation d'un dommage à
la victime ou à ses ayants droit, en principe, l'individu n'apparaît pas
directement clans les réclamations internationales. La Cour permanente
de Justice internationale s'est longuement expliquée sur ce point dans
son Arrêtno 13, et elle a indiqué nettement que le dommage subi parl'individu nc peut que fournir une mesure convenable clc la réparation

due à l'État. Ces mêmesprincipes doivent, j.notre avis, s'appliquer à
la réclamation formulée par les Nations Uriies polir assurer la protec-
tion du servicc public international.
Telle paru.itEirln based'zt,nerépoqzsaefir)jtnlivd la $renzièreqq~estion
posée cila Cozrv.

II.Par la deuxième question, on demande A la Cour comment l'action
de l'organisation doit se concilier avec les droits que l'État, dont la
victime est ressortissant, pourrait posséder.
Il résulte des précédents développements que les domnlages subis
par un agent des Nations Unies du fait d'un Éta.t peuvent poser un
double problème de responsabilité. D'une part, l'agent peut êtreconsidéré
en sa qualité d'étranger et les règles sur le traitement des étrangers et la
protection due aux étrangers ont pu êtreviolées. D'autre part, l'agent
peut être considérésous l'aspect de sa fonction internationale et les
règlessur lerespect du service public international ont pu ktre méconnues.
Dans le premier cas, l'État national est compétent pour agir par
l'exercice de la protection diplomatique, et il peut seul le Paire. Dans le
second, c'est l'organisation internationale qui peut seule protéger le

service public international.
Ainsi, un mêmedommage peut provoquer des réclamations émanant
dedeux autorités distinctes ; deus compétences internationales sont donc
susceptibles de jouer touchant le mêmefait. Cette situation n'est pas
sans précédent,et on peut rappeler que la Cour perrrianente d'Arbitrage,
dans l'affaire des déserteurs de Casablanca, s'est trouvée également en
présenced'un concours de compétences touchant les mêmesindividiis,
les déserteurs allemands de la Légion étrangére.
La Cour permanente d'Arbitrage a indiqué qu'il n'y avait pas de
règles de droit permettant d'établir d'une façon absolue et pour toutes
les circonstances laquelle de ces compétences devait l'emporter sur
l'autre.
11semble que dans la question soumise à la Cour le problème puisse
êtreenvisagk de la mêmemanière : il n'y a pas de règle de droit qui
détermine a priori que la compétence de l'État national doit l'emporter
sur la compétence de l'organisation internationale ou réciproquement.
Dans ces conditions, la conciliation entre ces droits ne peut se faire
que par un accord amiable entre l'État national et l'Organisation inter-
nationale. Il faut cependant relever que pratiquement la responsabilité
existera plus souvent !L l'égard de l'Organisation internatioiiale qu'a
l'égard de l'État national, car la règle de protection d'un agent public
international est incontestablement plus stricte que la règle de protec-
tion due à un simple étranger, et les exigences de la ,primaut6 du service

international ne doivent pas êtreperdues de vue.
C'est ce qui a étéindiqué par le Comité de juristes consulté en 1924
à propos de l'affaire que j'ai déjà citée du meurtre du généralTellini.
Dans cet avis, « le caractère public reconnu a l'agent étranger,cles
circonstances dans lesqueiles il se troiive sur le territoire de l'btat
entraînent pour celui-ci un devoir de vigilance spéci;ilà son égard ».
Par ailleurs, il est évident que le concours de compétence ne doit pas
entraîner un cumul d'indemnités au profit des victimes.
Sous résenle de ces observations, qui montrent que le problème doit
surtout se régler sur le plan pratique et que la tâche d'un tel règlementincombera au Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies et à l'Assemblée
générale, aucune règle précise de droit n'existe actuellement sur la
conciliation des droits de l'État national et des Nations Unies.

III. Afonsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, je résumerai en
quelques propositions les observations que j'ai présentées dans cet
exposé au nom du Gouvernement français. Elles sont les suivantes :

Sur la première question :l'organisation des Nations Unies a qualité
pour présenter une réclamation internationale contre l'État considéré
comme responsable selon le droit international. Cette qualité lui permet
de poursuivre sa réclamation par les procédures en usage dans la
sociétéinternationale. Cette réclamation porte sur la réparation des
en la personne des agents des Nations Unies.nale, soit directement, soit

Sur la deuxième question :en l'absence d'une règle positive de droit
international, l'action des Nations Unies se concilie avec les droits de
l'État national clela victime, par le fait que ceux-ci n'ont pas la même
cause juridique et nc peuvent nuire à l'autonomie de l'intervention cles
Nations Unies.

Monsieur lePrésident, Messieursles Juges, permettez-moi en terminant
de remercier la Cour de l'attention bienveillante avec laquelle elle a
suivi mon exposé. 5.-STATEMENT BY Mr. FITZMAURICE
(REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOBI GOVERNMENT)

AT THE PUBLIC SITTINGS OF BIARCH gth, 1949.

[Public sitting of Marcltgtl~, 1949,ntortzi~zg.]

Rfr. President and Members of the Court, before 1 embark on the
legal part of my statement, 1 should like to make three preliminary
observations.

The first is to esprcss my personal sense of privilege at having the
honour to appcar before so eminent a tribunal-an honour of which 1
can assure the Court 1 am very vividly sensible.
Secondly, 1 wish to stress the importance which the Government of
the United Kingdom attaches to the question now before the Court.
This question may, at first sight, appear to be a relatively niinor one,
that is to say, as compared with a number of the other questions which
have engaged the attention of the Court and of its illustrious predecessor
the Permanent Court of International Justice. But this is not really
so, for in addition to the moral and persona1 problems raised by it, the
question also involves two legal or quasi-legal issues of the highest
importance. The first ofthese is that of the international legal statu'
of the United Nations Organization, because, as 1shall suggest to the
Court in the coursc of my argument, it is scarcely possible to answer
the questions put to the Court \vithout reaching some preliminary con-
clusion on thc subject of the international legal status and personality
of the Organization. .
The second important issue wliicli 1 have in mind as being involved
in the preseiit case, is that of the independence of thc United Nations

Organization, by which 1mean the necessity for tlic Organization and
its officiais, in carrying out the work of the Organization, to bc independ-
ent of al1 considerations or influences based on or rirising from nation-
ality. This issue is crucial to the whole conception of the United Nations,
and any question which involves or mav affect it accordingly merits ,
the most carcfui consideration.
My final prcliminary observation is tliis.It is quite true, as previous
speakers have said, that in referring this matter to the Court the Assem-
bly hoped that the Court might be able to give what 1will term a favour-
able answer to the questions ut to the Court. At the same time it was,
of course, appreciated that t e issues are legal ones on which the Court
may take quite another view. Even if this should be the case, it will
still be helpful to the Assenibly to Iiavc the Court's opinion since the
Assembly will then be able to consider wliat special steps can be taken
to endow the Organization with the requisite personality and cayacities,
if the Court should consider that the'organization does not at present
possess thcin.

1 now turn to my legal argument, and here 1 find myself in tliis

difficulty, that a grcat deal of wliat there is to be said has alrcady STATEhIENT BY Mr.FITZMAURICE(UNITEDI<INGDO~I -) g II149 III

been said very effectively by previous speakers. On the other hand,
my approach to the subject is a little different, for reasons which 1
shall esplain to the Court. As the Court knows, tlie Government of
the United Kingdom has already, in the form of its written statement,
given a full and systematic espression of its views on the subject-matter
of the present request for an advisorjr opinion, believing that the some-
wliat novel nature of the problem called forthe presentation of a relatively
comprehensive written statement previoiis to the oral proceedings. It
\vould be as unnecessary as it would be wearisome to the Court inerely
to recapitulate in detail the argumentation already contained in this
written statement, and what 1 propose to do is to offer a niimber of
additional observations, in the nature more of a commentary than of
a systemafic treatment of the subject. 1 will ask that this commentary
he regarded as additional to and not in any way as replacing the United
Kingdom's wvritten statement.
Mr. President.and Alembers of the Court, it is in one sense regrettable
that the Court has not had before it someone to argue that the United
1
Nations does nol possess the capacities which we are discussing.
cannot supply that particular deficiency, but perhaps 1can do the nest
best thing. It often happens that when a probleni is dificult or novel,
as 1 think the present one is, the best method of approach to it is the
negative rather than the positive one. In order to ascertain what a
tliing is, it is sometimes very useful to begin by enquiring what it is not,
aiid in order to decide what esactly is covered or iiivolved by a certain
question, it may be well to determine first what is not irivolved by that
question. The United Kingdom Government attaches importance to
this method of approach in the present case, because the comparative
novelty of the problem, and the difficulty of foreseeing in advance al1
of its possible implications, makes it particularly desirable that the
correct conclusions should not only be reached, but that they should be
reached on the right grounds. It is natural, in a good cause, to advocate
certain ideas, but it is less easy to foresee where those same ideas may
lead if applied in a wider field. In its written statement, the United
Kingdom Government indicated what it regarded as the correct conclu-
sionson the preseiit questions, and also thc grounds on which it considered
that these conclusioiis should be reached. In the present oral statemcnt
it will be at least in part my object to disciiss what are the grounds on

which,. in the submission of the United Kingdom Government, tliese
same conclusions ought preferably r~otto be reached.
When the present problem was being discussed in the General
Assembly of the United Nations, there was a very general tendency,
natural in view of the novelty of the question, to misunderstand,
or at any rate not in al1 respects to appreciate its exact nature-a
tendency from whicli, 1 hasten to add, the delegation of the United
Kingdom was no freer than any other-and it is indeed only after a
good deal of reflection that it has proved possible to arrive at what
seems a just appreciation of these issueS. There \vas, for instance,
in the General Assenibly, a disposition to conclude tliat if the United
Nations Organization could be shown to be a juristic entity or to have
legal personality of some kind, it must automatically follow tliat it
had capacity to make an intentdiorcal claim, a conclusion which 1
think everyone would now agree does not follow at 'all. Similarly,
the fact that a State can sometimes makean international claim Inrespect of injuries to persons who are not its nationals, for instaiice, if
they are in its service, was thought, and 1think is stiU thought by some,
to point of itselto the conclusion that the Unitcd Nations Organization
could equally make international claims on behalf of its servants in
respect not only of the loss causcd to itsclf, but also in respect of the
damage done to the servant. This, equally, is a conclusion which, as 1
hope to show, either does not follow from these particular premises, or
else, in so far as it may be correct, can ne~~ertlielessonly properly be
arrived at aftcr a numbcr of other questions have first been satisfactorily
answered.
Further-and this is very important for the purposes of the present
enquiry-the very term "international clai~n" contained in the first
of the two questions addressed to the Court, Iias seemed to be liable to
misinterprctation. It Iias apparently sometimes bcen thought tliat any
claim against a government, other than a claim on the part of one of its
oiïn nationals or corporate national entities, must be an international
claini, whether thc claimant be a foreign govenonzent ,r merely a foreign

incli\;iclualor corporation. NOW, ifclaims by indivicliials or corporations
against a foreign govcrnment can be called "international claims", they
can be so only in a purely popular or descriptive sense, as being claims
the parties to wvliichbelong to different countries. In tlie submission
of the United Kingdom Government they are, however, not international
claims at al1in the teclinical sense of the term, as it is to be understood
(as a term of art) under and for tlie purposes of international law. The
United Kingdom Government considers that, for an international claim
to esist, tliere are two essential clements,botlzof tvliicpnzcs te present,
namely, first, that the claim must be macle under international law and
not merely uncler the domestic law of one of the parties ; and secondly,
that the claiin must bc brought by, and must bc made against, parties
both of whom are international persons. It will be seen that, on this
basis, it would be quite possible even for a claim brought by one Statc
against another not to be an international claim, if it \vas a claim
brought under the domestic law of the defcndant State and not under
international law. This might occur in the type of case in which, for
instance, one government leases premises in another country, which
belong to the government of that country, the lease bcing an orclinary
lease made iinder the local law. Any dispute concerning tlic interpreta-
tion or esecution of tliat lease would equdly fa11to be decided according
to the local law, so far as the purely legal issues were concerncd, aiid
iniglit well be the subject of proccedings in the local courts, given the

necessary voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of tliose courts. To
al1 this international law would have nothing to say. Uefore an iq~ter-
sznlio?znclaim can esist, there must be, to adopt a phrase employed by
Hatchek (Oz~tlineof T~ztertzatio)zaLlaw, p. 274):
"a transgression against international law, and not merely against
a national leg,zlréginie".

Even clearer is the necessity for the second of the two main elements
of an international claiin, as already defined, namely that it shoulcl be
brought by and against entities 110thor all of which arc international
and not merely domestic perçons-which have international personality
and are subject to international law. In the opinion of the United
Kingdom Government, a claim brought by, for instance, an ordinary STATEMENT BY hlr.FITZh,lAURICE(UNITED KIWGDO~I) - g III49 II3

pnvate company or corporation against a foreign government is not, as
such, and cannot be, an international claim at all, in the teclinical sense.
It may become one, if thc claim of the company or corporation is taken
up and cspoused by thc government of the country of which the company
is a national, but in that cvent the claim will lie between the two govern-
ments, both of whom are international pcrsons.
In support of the vicw that an international claim is essentially both
a claim undcr international law, and onc which lies between two or more
international persons, I will cite a passage from the judgmcnt of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavro?tzmaîiscase
(Series A., No. 2). Thc Court said, at page 12 of its judgment :

"It is true tliat the dispute was at first between a private pers,on
and a State-i.e. between hl. Mavrommatis and Great Britain.
Subsequently the Greek Governincnt took up the case. The dis-
pute tlien entered upon a new phase; it m~teredtlzedonzaiqrof idtzter-
.>aationaLlawand becamc a dispute betweelttwoStates."
In other words, it was only when it became a dispute between two
States, i.e. two international persons, that it entered the clomain of

international law, that is to say it became an international claim. The
judginent of the Permanent Court in the Clzorz&uF ~actorjrcase (Series
A./13.,No. 17) will also be found to support this view. At page 28 of
the report it is stated that
"The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules of inter-
national law in force between tlie two States concerned, and not
the law governing relations between the State whicli has committecl
a wrongful act and the individual \vho has suffered daniage."

If the views 1 have been espressing are correct, they will serve to
sliow why, in tlie opinion of the United Kingdom Government, an
affirmative conclusion on the first of the two questions put to the Court,
namcly as to the capacity of the United Nations Organization to bring
an international claini, could not correctly bc arrived at inerely by
demonstrating that tlie Organization is a juristic cntit); or tliat it has
legal personality of some kind. Sirnilarly, it is not enough to show that,
froni a procedural point of view, the Organization is able to Iiave deal-
ings, to enter into negotiations, with States and governments ; for
that, afterall, is something which ordinary private persons and entities
can eqiially do. They often clcalor negotiate with foreign governmcnts,

but that does not make tliem international persons, and their dealings
and negotiations are on the domestic ancl not on the international plane.
It is therefore necessary to go furthcr than al1 this, and to show that
the Organization has a particular kind of legal personality, namely
international legal personality.
It is for these reasons that the United Kirigdom Government considers
the question of the international personality of the Unitecl Nations to
be of fundamental, indcecl of crucial importance in connexion with the
questions upon which tlie Court is asked to advise. Unless international
pcrsonality of some kind esists, it is difficult to see a?zybasis upon wliicli
it can be held that the Organization has the capacity to inake an intcr-
national claim in the proper and strict sensc of that term. If, on the
other hand, such international personality does exist, then, although it
does not follow that the capacity of the Organization to bring an inter-national claim is in al1 respects the samc, or as extensive, as that of a
Statc, nevertheless the indispensable foundation is there, on the basis
of which it can be held there is capacity of some sort, and on which the

question can be esamined as to what esactly that capacity consists of.
Holding these views, the United Kingdom Govcrnment devoted an
appreciable part of its witten statemeiit to attempting to establisli
the international personality of the Unitecl Nations Organization. 1 clo
not proposc to recapitulate thesc arguments on the present occasion,
but 1will briefly summarize them. First, it was suggested that, although
sovereign States inay be the natural and normal possessors of intcr-
national personality, they are not neccssarily the only ones, and that
international practice has established, and international authority has
recognized, the existence of other entities ~vhichhave such personaiity.
In paragraph 7 of the United Kingdom's \vrittcn statenient a number
of possible examples of such entities was given and discussed. Con-
sequently, it was submitted that there is no neccssiiry iclentity between
international persons and States, and thercfore no a +riorz reason why
international organizations, such as the United Nations Organization,
should not be rcgarded as being international persons. Secondly, it
was suggested that any entity which, as sucli, can be shown to have
international rights and obligations must be an iritcrnational person,

since only international persons can have international rights and obliga-
tions ; and it was suggested, further, that the United Nations Organiza- .
tion can duly be shown, undcr the Charter and other related international
instruments, to have international rights and obligations. Another,
and perhaps more picturcsque method of expressing thcse ideas, \vould
be to Saythat once it has been establislied that there is no inherent reasoil
why entities other than States should not be invested with international
personality, there is equally no reason why such an international person
sliould not be set up or created by.the use of the appropriate rneans.
This is the view apparently suggested in a recent work on international
law.by Georg Scliwarzenberger, in jvhich (Volunle 1, p. 35), after refer-
ring to Statesas inembers of the legal system constit~~teclby international
law, he goes on to say :

"As the full meinbers of this legal systein are entitled to erilnrgc
their circle by the adinission of new full members, they are eclually
competent to create, by the esercise 'and modilication of tlieir
recognition, Izewtypes and diferent classesof ijztornationnl $ersolz....
[whose] personality and status entirely depend on the attitude
talien towards them by the esisting subjects of international law."
In bricf, so far as the Unitcd Nations is concerned, there would, on

this vicw, be nothing to prevent the creation of a new international
person by means of the Charter, recognized as such by the parties to
the Charter, but of a type and class clifferent from that of a State ;
and it would then become a matter of determining whether, on its
laiiguage and true interpretation, the Charter did CIOthis or not.
1 may perhaps also ciraw the attention of the Court (although the
argument is of a minor character) to an interesting suggestion in
Hatchck's Oz~tline of I~ztermtimal Law asto the Iiistorical reasons why
the Papacy, even during the pcriod whcn it was not tcrritorially a
State, \vas recognized as having international personality ; and these
rcasons, though on constitutional rather tlian historical grounds, could STATEBIENT BY Mr. FTTZMBURIGE (UNITED K~NC;UORI ) g III49 115

apply, ~datis nzztladis, to the case of international organizations sucli
as the United Nations. 14Tritirigbefore the date of the Lateran Tseaty,
the author of this work says (p. 56) :
"Since.. ..international law does not allow any one State to control
the Pope in his character as head of the Catholic Church, he has to
be put in a position of international independcnce, that is, even
though he is not the head of a Statc ...he lias tn he made an inde-
pendent subject of international law."
By parity of reasoning it miglit be argued that since na one State can
control an organization siich as tlie United Nations, it rnust be deenîcd

to have its oivn separate international personality.

At this 1 fecl it nccessary to digress a littlc from the main
course of my statemcnt, in order to make clear sornething whiclï was not
fully brought out in the written statement of the United Kingdom but
wlzich is necessary for the purposes of my argument, namely that, just
as claims made by private perçons or juristic entities caiinot, as such,
be international claitns, so also, in the opinion of the United Kingdom
Government, isit incorrect to regard indivuals, or privatc companics,
corporations or other such associations, asbeing suhjects of international
law or as having any direct international rights or obligations. They
may incleed be olrijects of international law-for instance international
law prescribes certain rules for the treatrnent of foreigners by al1 coun-
tries-while international treaticsmay even prescribe certain rules for
the treatrnent hy countries of theis own nationals, such astrcatieç about
rninarities or human rights. Again, private individuals and entities
inay, Eryreason of a rule of international iaw, or of a treaty provision,
become the recipients of benefitsor he subjected to certain liahilitie;
but in al1 those cases this oçcurs indirectly and at second remove,
through the medium or agency of aÇtate or government or other inter-
national person whiçh is a party to the treaty or a subject of the rule
of international law cnncerned, and through whom alone the benefit
or liability can be made available or be enforcecl. Tktis, to cite again
the rules af international 1aw as to the treattnctit of foreigners, the
foreigner may get tlic Iielzefitof tliis trcatment, but the internatiolari-
riglit tocl&t itbelongs solely to his government. Tt isa right under
international law for the government to Clain1 certain ti-eatment for its
nationals, and the corresponding international duty is one owed to tlic
foreigncr's government, not directly to the foreigner himself. It can
onIy be ~wed dircctly to the foreigner himself if the international lanr
rule in question is also made, or becomes, part of the local law of the
country concerned; but then, as between the local governmcnt and
the foreigner, it is a dutÿ owed under domestic and not under inter-
national law. As was statcd by the Permanent Coiirt of International
Justice ia the Cho~zdz~ F,actorycas8 (SeriesA./B., No. 17,p. 28), "Rights
or interests of an individual ...are alwaÿs in a different plane fro~n

rights or interests belonging to a State." These principleç also find
expression in the Advisory Opinion nf the Permanent Court in the
case of the Dawzig Kailway O#îcilals (Series B., No. 15),when the
Court said (p. 17) :
"It rnay be readil y admittecl that, accorcling toa well established
principle of international law - ... an international agreement116 STATEMEUT BY Mr. FlTZMtlUHICE (UNITEU KING DO^ -!) gII149
cannot, as such, creatc direct rights and obligations for private
individuals."

Similarly, in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, tIze
general rules of international law do not create direct riglits and obliga-
tions for individuals.
Mr. Presiclent and Membcrs of the Court, this theme is one whicli it
would takc timc tu dcvelop fully, and as it is only incidental to rny
main purposc I will not go jnto it ftirther here. Neverthelcss T felt
obligecl to mention tlie point becanse it forrns an esscntial partof ~ny
ai-gumcnt : seeing that, on the one hand it seems impossible to dcny
tliat entities which, as entities, are genuinely and Jirectly posscssed of
international rights and obligations, are internatiotial persons, wliilc
on the other hand it seernsequally lrnpossibie to admit, in any significant
sense or in any ordinary acceptation of the terin, the international
personality of individuals or of private entities or associations.

1 now revert to the main course of rny argument. As 1 said earlier,
thc Urlitecl Kingdom Govcrnrneilt haç endeavoured in its writtcn state-
ment to givc positive reasons for the view that the United Nations, as
ail Organization, is possessed of interrzational rights and dttties and of
intert~ational personality. Thesc rcasons are faunded mainly on the
language and effect of the Charter, and on the inteiitions to be inferred
or.presumecl from the Charter. In this connexion, Ishoulcl like to stress
the importance rvhich thc Government of the United Kingdom attaches
to the principle that the constitutive instrumeiit settinguyan organiza-
tion, and containing itscorzstitiition, rnust be the primary sourceof any
conclusions as t Q tliestatus, capacities and powers of the organizatioi~
It woiild, in the opinion of the United Kingdotn Govern-
concerneci.
ment, be as darzgerous as it would be uiisound to ascribeto international
organizations, a status,capacities or powers not provided for or to be
inferred from their constitutive instruments, except in so far as may
result from clearly applicable, universal, and recognizcd principles of
general law. In thisconnexion, 1 should like to refvr to two arguinents
which have been suggestecl in rcgard to the status and capacities of the
Unitcc1Natiotw, which the Government of the United Kingdom considers
should be viewecl with somc rcserve.
Fisst, there isa.suggestion in onc of tlie written statements furnishecl
to the Court that the correct principlc to be adoyted iii this matter is
the following, namcly, tliat the United Nations Organization should
i$so factobe regardecl as cntitled to perform any juristrc actnot actually
contrary to the principlesand purposes .othe Charter. Ifthis isintendcd
to suggest that, it having once been decided that the Organization is
properly to be regarded as possessing a givcn form of legal personality,
it should thenbe deemed autornatically to possess al1 such powers and
capacities as wouId normally be possessed by Iegal personaliticsof the
snrne class;,so Iongas these would not be contrary to the Charter, then
the United Kingdom Government would find itself broadly in agreement
with siich a view. On the other hand, the preliminai-y questioil whethcr
tlie Organization possesses legal personality at all, and if so of whnt
kind, cannot, in the opiilioiz of the United Kingdom Government, be
answered iri the affirmative inerely on tlie ground that the possession
of such personality ~vouldnot be actually inconsistent with any provi-
sion of the Charter. Such personality must either he specifically pro- STATEMEWTRY Mr. FITZMAURICE (UNITED KINGDOM) - g III49 II7

vided for in the constitutive instrument, or be a'necessafy or legitimnte
inferencc from its provisions and from the powers and duties of the
Organization as therein set out. In bricf, it is not the case tliat inter-
national organizations can do anythiiig whicli tlicir constitutive instru-
ments do not actuaiiy forbicl them to do. That ~vould bc a most
clangerous doctrine, the lirnits of which could iiot be foreseen. On the
contrary, tlic correct position is that,rivzafacie,international organiza-
tions only havc such capacities and powers as their constitutivc instru-
ment gives them, or must be presumed to have intendcd them to have
if they are to carry out their functions and fulfil their purposes as set
out in thc instrument concerned ; together witli such powers and capaci-

tics as ~vould, under gcneral and universally rccognized principles of
law, be ascribable to any cntity of thc class or category creatcd by that
instrument.
Nest, whcn it comes to determining which articles of the Charter can
most appropriately be cited in support of the view that the Organization
lias international legal pcrsonality, the Government of the United
Kingdom fully shares the views which have been espressed by
M. Kaeckenbeeck, on behalf of the Governinent of Belgium, as regards
Article 104 of the Charter, which is sometiines cited as cstablishing or
supporting the international legal pcrsonality of the Organization. It
is difficult in thisonncsion not to contrast Article 104 of thc Charter
with such a provision as Article Sg of thc Havana Charter of the Inter-
national Trading Organization. Article Sg of the Havana Charter is
specifically entitled "International Legal Status of the Organization"
and, in addition, itdoes not contain the limiting words "in the territory

of each of itç Members", which appear in Article 104 of the Charter, but,
on the contrary; it provicles quite gcnerally that the International
Trading Organization "shall have legal personality and shall enjoy such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions".
The contrast is the more marked in that the next article of the Havana
Charter, Article go, is specifically headed "Status of the Organization
in the Territory of Meinbers" and proceeds to deal witli tlzatparticular
matter on very much the same lines as Articles 104 and 105 of the
United Nations Charter.
Thus, there is ground for thinking tliat Article 104 of the Charter
and, conseqiientially, Article 1, Section 1, of the General Convention
on the Privileges and Immunitics of the United Nations, made under
and for the purposes of Article 104 of thc Charter (see the Preamble to
the Convention), do not specifically covcr or deal \vitIl the international
personality of the Organization. On the other hand, as was suggested
in the United Kingdom written statcment, too mucli importance should
not be attached to the fact that later instruments, drafted in the light

of greater espcrience, have dealt specifically with something not covered,
or anyhow not dealt witli in terms by tlic Charter, and it would certainly
be a curious result if the International TradinOrganization, for instance,
possessed an international status denied to the United Nations. There-
fore, the fact that Article 104 of the Charter does not deal with inter-
national legai status as such, should not be held to rule out the posses-
sion of international peisonality by the Organization if such personality
appears to be established by, or to result from, the other provisions of
the Charter. This view was most vi\riclly illustrated by M. Kaecken-
beeck on behalf of Belgiuin in his citations from the minutes of the San118 STATEhlENT RY Mr. FITZAIAURICE (UNITED KINGDOM) - 9 III49

1;rancisco Conference. The çame view is also endorsed by an interesting
and illurninating commeritary on Article 104 of tlie Charter made in
the report of the Chairman of the United States delegation to the San
17ranciscoConlercnce. It appears in Departinent of Statc Publication
No. 349, Conference Series 71. This passage reads as follows :

"This article, i.e. 104, does not deal with what is callecl the
'international personality' of the Organization. The Cosmittee
which discussed this matter was ansious to avoid anji implication
that the United Nations \vil1 be in any sense 'a super-State'. So
far as the power to enter into agreements with States is concerned,
the answer is givcn by Article 43 which provides that the Sccurity
Council is to be a party to the agreements concerning the availabil-
ity of armed forces. International practice, while limitcd, sup-
ports the idea of such a body being a partjr to agreements. No
other issue of 'international personality' requires mention in the
Charter. Practice will bring about the evolution of appropriate
rules so far as necessary."

If tlie view suggested by this citation is correct, it seeins to follow
that Article 104 is neutral on tlie question of the international person-
ality of the Organization. It does not establish t.his personality, but
neither need it be regafded by any process of negative implication as
ruling it out. It would, therefore, be proper and legitimate to infer
such personality from any other provisions of the Charter whicli lent
themselves to such an inference. In paragraphs 9-11 of its written
statement, the Government of the United Kingdom lias referred in
detail to tliose articles of the Charter which it relies on as establishing
the international personality of the. Organization. These provisions

constantly refer to the Organization as an cntity separate and distinct
from the various Jlember Statesor even the sum of the Rlember States,
and appear to endow the Organization with a separate personality of
its own. These articles also provide in terms for duties owed by the
Alember States not ilztev se or to each other, but specifically to the
Organization as such ; and in this connexion 1 would ask the Court to
pay particular attention to such provisions as Article 2, paragraph 5,
of the Charter, and to Article 56. Other provisions of the Charter
invest the Organization witli rights and :duties which are essentially
international in character. Thus, we have an Organization wliich (a)
has a pcrsonalitjr separate and distinct from that of its Members or the
sum of its Members, and (b) has international rights and duties. The
sum of al1 tliese things is international personalitjr, since, according to
tlie premises adoptcd for the purposes of the present argument, only
international persons can have international riglits and obligations,
whilc any entitjr wliich does have direct international rights and obliga-
tions n~ust be an international person.

May 1 be permitted, however, to urge some caution as to attaching
too much significance to the mere abilityof the United Nations Organiza-
tion to enter into agreements with States and governments. After all,
private persons and entities cari, and often do, the same thing, and with
foreign governments. What is really significant is i-iot the mere fact
that the Organization enters and can enter into such agreements, but
that the agreements themselves, in their form and nature, are essentially
international in character. STATEMENT ~k arr.FITZhlAiJRIGE (UNITED KINGDOM -) g lil49 ?Tg

Article 105 of the Charter is also significant, as I tliink Profcsçor
Cliaiirnoirt pointecl out on bchalf of lirnnce. It provides that " Tlze
Orga~aiznliojzsl~all enjoy in thc territory of cach of its Mernbers such
rwivileges and imrnunities as are necessary for the iulhlmeiit of its
purposes" and that the reprcsentativeç of the Membcrs of the United
Nations and officials of the Organization are sirnilarly to cnjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent cxercise
of theirfunctionsin connexion with the Organization. The lastparagrnph
of Article 105 sayç that thc General Assernbly rnay make recommenda-

tions or propose conventions for the purpose ofgiving dctailed effect to
these provisions, and this is accordingly done by the General Unitcd
Ifatioris Convention on Privileges and Trnmunities, which provides for
extensive imrnunities and privileges for the Organization, its officials,
and representatives af the Members of the United Nations. Now while
it niay not follow tliat, beçause an cntity is an international person, it
and its servants, etc., must necessarily be invested with privileges and
immunities of a diplornatic or quasi-diplornatic character, the conversc
does seem to hold good, that the possession of international personality
is an esscntial prc-condition of the enjoyment of such privileges or
imrnunities. Even if itis not possible to put it qtiite as definitely as
that, it can safcly be said tlint the enjoyment of these privileges and
immunities, which are by Article 105 given dircctly to the Organization
as such, points to, and is evidence of, the possession of international
personality on the part of the Organizatiori, and that it would bc
difficult to reconcile the enjoyment of these privil~ges and imrnunities
witli a position accorcling tu which the entity enjoying them was not

possesscd of any international legal status or persoiiality a? all.
Mr. President, and Members of the Court, that concludes my observa-
tions on the question of internat ional legal status and pcrsonali tyof the
Organization. For the purposes ,of the semainder of my argument 1
shal1 assume thc existence of this personality, witkout which, in the
submission of theUnited Kingclom Eovernment, the Orgariisation cannot
have any legal cnpacity to make an international clairn at all, ivhatever
it may be able to do in the clomestic spheres of its respective Mernbcr
States.

The next question, which we now corne to, is liow Par the capacity
of the Orgmizntion to make a claim extencls, and what cloesits cal~acity
in this respcct include. Sirice the Organization, whatever iiiternational
y-iessonalityitmay have, is not a State (a l~ointwhicfî the United King-
dom Govert~ment bvishcsto stress) it cannot autornatically or ipso façlo
possess the same capacities iii regard to rnaking intcriiational claiins
as States do. 'I'licOrgai~ization Inay ii~deed posscsç certain analogous
capacities, but, if so, they must derive and be deduced from its own
pa~ ticular kinclof international personalitlr,as capacities inherent in,
or as reasonably necessary attributes of, suc11personality, and cannot
conçist of mere automatic extensions to thc Organization of the capaci-
tics possessed by States. For this reason, the Government of thc
United Kingdom feels that the apparent similarities betweeri the position
of the Organization and that of a State-sudl as that the Organizatiotî
has a flag, rnay run a postal service, has missions accrcdited to it, etc.-
rnay hc rnisleading, and that it is bettcr, itithe present connexion, to120 SThTEhTENT BY Mr. FLTZhlAUHlCE (UNITED KINGDOM) - 9 III49
rely on considerations a€ prinçiple rather than on fnctunl crimpitrisons
of this kind.
Now, relying thus on principle, thcre would seem ta be little difficulty
in regnrding tlze Organization, given that it is an internatioiinl person,
as being necessarily possesseclof the.myacity to make the kind of intcs-
national cIai11contcmpIated by point (a) in tlze first of the two questions
addressed to the Court, namely a daim for reparatioiidue in respect
of damage caused to the Organization itself, because it would seem to
be a necessary and self-evident legal attribute of any juristic elitity to

have the capacity to make claims in respect of damage done disectly
to itself ; and if the juristic entity concerneci has international legal
status as an international person, such capacity woilld necessarily relate
to making an international claim under international larv in respect of
such damage.
This category of damage to the Organization would aypear to be
capablc, for present purposes. of subdivision intu two main classes.
The first ofthese would consist of tlie fundamental los5 tothe Organiza-
tion itself, resulting from the injuryto or death ofits servant, indepen-
dentIy of atiy question of cotnpensation for tllat servant himsclf or his
dependents. For instance, he may be irreplaceable, with resultit~g
material or moral injurÿ to the work of the Organization. Or the
Organization willhave lost the time and expenditure invalved in his
training, or in other ways connected with the post he fiUedor the func-
tion he performed. Or perhaps he can only be replaced at additional
cost, and so on.
In the other claçs would corne the cost of compensating thc injured
party or kis dependents out of Unitcd Nations funds. The Government
of th? United Kingdom considers that, where such comyensntion is
contractuallÿ due as a matter of legal obligation, as part of the injured
yarty's terms or conditions of ernployrnent, it can properly be classed
as a loçs caused to the Organization itself in coriçequencc of the injury,
ancI that it can properly be claimed by the Organization uncler that
hcad, ta the extent to which the payments in question are reasonabIe
payrnents by way of compensation having regard to all tlie relevant
circumstances such asthe status of the employee, the work he was doing,
the nature of the injury, ctc.
It will thusbe seen, if this view iç accepted, thatifthe Osganization
invariably cnterccl into contractual obligations to compensate its
ernployecs or their dependents in case of death or injury suffercd in the
course of duty, the question put to the Court in point (ti) of the first
maiil question addressed to it would ncver, in practice, arise. However,
it cannot be xssumed that suc11contractual obligations will necessarily
be entered into in every case, or that the preseizt general policy of the
Organization to include terms of this kind in its contracts with its
employees will aIways be maintained in the future. It is,therefore,
necessary to consider rvhether tlie international perçonality of the
Organization givcs it the capacity iiot merely to claim as reparation
due to itself the reirnhurçementofcompensation which it.has becn obliged
to pay by contract to the injured party or his dependents, but also,in
case of need, to claim this compensation directly on behalf of tliosc
concen~ed. In citlier words, cari the Organization mske a claim not
rnerely in respectof the loss caused to itself, but also on behalf of the
itîjured servant andin respect of thc dainnge causcd To hirn ? . . STATEMENT BY Mr.FITZRlAURLCE (UNITED KINGDOM) - 9 11149 122

The United Kingdom Government considers that the question wliich
has just been asked shnuld be answcred in the affirmative, but it aIso
considers that it is important to be clear as to the grounds on which
such an affirmative answer should be given. 1 hope, therefore, that
the Court will bcar with me if I devote a little time to considering the
position of States when making claims es behaIf of individrials, as this .
has a distinct bearing on the question under discussion. The truth
is that there ihere a definite difficulty w'l~ichought not to be rninimized
. or brushed aside, arising from tlie factthat, where States arc concerned,
the relaf ionskipof nationality between the claimant Stateand the injured
individual is the nortnal basiç on wliicli claims made directly on behalf
ofsuch individuals, and inrespect of the loss or damage caused to thern,
are usually put fornard. Tt is quite trile that States rnaybe erititled,
where for instance the injured pxty was in their service, to make clairnç
even whete theperson çoncerned iç not tlieir nationd (for instance where
States employ foreigners in their government, clipIomatic or consular

services, as they sometimes do) ; but in that case the State iç clairning
on its own behalf, noton behalf of the individual, and it claims inrespect
of the damage done to itself through ille loss of its servant and not in
respcct of the damage done to him. Now, Afr. President and Members
of the Court, it is, of course, also truc that dl clairns made by a State
in respect of injuries to indiviciuds, cvcn where the individual is their
national and the claim is made on hls behdf, are, in the formal sense,
claims made on behalf of the State, because, according to the accepted
theory of this matter, where an individual is injured in circumstances
involving the responsibility of the Statc by wliom or in whose territory
the injiiry was comtnitted, his own State iç lieldto have susiaineci an
international wrong in the person of its national, and is, on tliat basis,
entitled to make a claim. (See the Maorommatis case, SeriesA., No. 2,
p. 17.) It is, however, none the less clear that in tliis type of case
(i.e. that of an injury to an individual not in the service of Iiis State}
although the intcrnationai tvrong is to the State, the acttraI injmy or
damage to the Çtntc isindirect or, as it wcre, figurative. That this is
so is recognized by the fact that, in such case, thc measure of damages
is not so much the loss or damage caused tothc Statc itsclf, which might
often be negligiblc, but that causcd to the victim or his dependerlts,
which is likely risiially to be considerable. (See the Cho~zdw Fasiory
case, Series A./B., No. 17, p. 27.1
Moreover, tkese damages, if and when they are recovered ùy the
government to whom they are formally due, are in practice always
paid over to the individual or his clependents by that government, and
are not sirnply pocketcd or retained bjr the government.
Now (and hese I corne to the point to which the foregoing remarks
arc intended to lead) altkiough in the forma1 sense it is, açcurdingly,
always theStatewhich, on the international plane, is the party wronged,
there are nevertheless several possible bases on which the State rnay be
entitled tomake its claim in respect of a breach ofinternationa1 law. Tlie
victirn rnay have been in its service though iiot one of its nationals, or
he inay have been one of its nationals-or both factorsrnay be prescrit.
ln each case, however (and leaving aside, for the rnomcnt, the special
cases which may arise out of breaches of treatieç), there must be a legal
nexus ur connexion between the State and the individual concerncd-
either the relationship of rnaster and servant, or that of nationality, or

9122 STATERlENT BY Mr.FITZMAURICE (UNITED KINGDOM) - g TI149
both-and in each case the basis of damages is different. In particular,
where the sole connexion is that of master alid servant, the State can
only claim in respect of the direct clamage to itself resulting from the
lqss of or injury to its servantany claim on behalf of thc servant himself
-that is, in respecof the Ioss or damagc sufferecl by Iiim or hisdepeiid-
ent-must, according to traditional praçticc and doctrine, bc made by
his national Çtate ; though if the State ernploying him were under a

contractual liability to compensate hirn or his dependents, it could
include the compensation tlius paid tinder the head of los3caused to
itself, but formaily it would stilremain a claim for loss to the State
itselfand nat, as such, aclaim on behalf of the individual. The matter
rnay be clearer if considered from the standpoint of the dcfendant State.
'IYherethe sole basis of a daim between States is that the injured indi-
vidual was in the service of the ciaimant State, the defendant State
could properly refuse to pay, in consequeilce of a clairn made by that
clairnant State, any damages in respect of the injury done to the indi-
vidual personally, and could require the damages to be lirnited to the
service losscaused to the claimant State itself,sincc no citherrelationship
would exist between the chimant State and the individua1 giving legal
cause for any othcr claim. In brief, the defendant State could refuse
to entertain any claim inrespect of the damage to the individual himself,
unlesç that claim were put forward by the individiial's national State.
(These remarks are intended to apply to çlaimç in respect oi breaches
of the generz~lrules of international larv. Breaches of treaty may give
rise to specialconsiderations to which I shall refer later.)

[Rcblic sitting of Murchgth, 1949, ajfenzaon.]

Mr. President and Mernbers of the Court, when the Court rosc this
rnor17ing 1was arguing tlzatwhen a State rnakes a claim against another
State on behdf of an individual, it can, apart from certain special treaty
cases, only do so if that individual is its national, and that if the indivi-
dual is rnerely its servant or employee, the Çtate csn only claim on
behaIf of itsclfand not on behalf of the individua4. The relcvance of
this in the case of international claims made by thc United Nations
Organization will, 1 believe, be at once apparent. It has been sug-
gested-it certainly was suggested in the discussions in the Gencral
Assembly-tlmt becawe States can sornetirnes make daims in cases
where damage has been done to persons not their nationalç (in partic-
tilar if thc injured person was in their service) therejore thc criterion
of nationality is irrelevant, and the United N-tions can make direct
claims on behalf of its servants in respect ofthe darnage caused to thcm
as individuals. That is the argument ;but if what 1 have said earlier
is correct, it wilbe seen at once that thisreasoning isincorrect. Itis,
of course, quite true, as we have seen, that States can make claims on
behalf of persons not their national5 but who are in their service. But
in that case, as 1 hope I have shown, the claim should properly be
3irnited to the loss or injury caused to the State itself. It should ~iot
include a clairn in respect of thé damage done to the individual or his
dependents. Consequently, on the analogy of State practice, the
simple relatiunship of master and servant between the United Nations
Organization and its ernployees would not, of ibself, do more than STATEMENT BY &Ir.FITZMAURICE (UNITED KINGDOM) - 9 III49 123

enablc the Organization to make a claim in respect of the loss caused
to itself by the injury to its servant ; and this relationship would not,
per se,enable the Organization to make a claim on behalf of the injured
party or his dependents. Where a State is legally entitled to make a
claim on behalf of the victim himseif and in respect of the damage
caused to him, it is becausc of the existence of a special relationship
between them, namely, nationality, and it would seem, on thc same
reasoning, that if the United Nations Organization is to be able to make
a similar claim, it must equally be because of the existence of some spe-
cial relationship of an analogous character betwccn it and its servants,
over and abovc the ordinary relationship of master and servant, be-
cause, as we have seen, the mere relationship of master and servant
would not of itself enable the Organization to do more than claim in
respect of its own losscs.

hloreover (and this is perhaps the crucial point), except in the case
of stateless servants of the Organization, there is, and continues to be,
an cntity which, whether it chooses to do so or not, can make a claim
on behalf of perçons injured in the course of their service witli the
United Nations, namely, their own national State. Here, Mr. President
and Members of the Court, 1think we reach the heart of the difficulty.
We have to find a basis, other than the mere rclationship of master and
servant per se,which wiii enable us to conclude that the Organization
lias the capacity to make a direct claim on behalf of the individual
concerned, not only dcspite the absence of any nationality link between
him and the Organization, but even in spite of the prcsence of that very
link between him and another international entity, his own national
State, which is perfectly cntitled to make the claim, and whose right
to do so continues to exist and to be valid.

In its written statement thc United Kingdom Government has
suggested that the requisite basis may be found in Article IOO of the
Charter which creates a spccial relationship of i?zternationalallegiance
between the Organization and its servants. This, it is suggested, does
forge between the Organization and its servants a link going beyond
the ordinary relationship of mastcr and servant, and which may provide
the necessary basis for claims made by the Organization on behalf of
the servants themselvcs in respect of the damage done to them.
If we follow tlic argument out, 1 think we sliall see how this cornes
about. This special allegiance partially displaces the normal allegiance
owed by individuals to thcir national State, and, in dl matters affecting
tlie United Nations, replaces it by an allegiance duc exclusively to the
Organization. Tlius, where the servant concerned suffers injury in the
course of doing tlie work of tlic Organization, in respect of which his
aiiegiance is owed solely to tlie Organization, and even, if necessary,
as against his own national State, it seems not only an appropriate,
but even a necessary conscquence of this position, that thc Organization
should be regarded as having tlie capacity to make a claim in respect of

the loss ordamage caused to him or his dependents.
Indced, one might go further and say that the effect of Article IOO of
the Charter is that the Members of the United Nations can be regarded
as having implicitly recognized that such capacity must exist if the
Organization is to be in a position adeqiiately to carry out its functions.
The point may be illustrated by considering the case of a United Nations
servant who 1srequired in the course of his work to do something wliich 124 STATEbfENT RY Mr. FITZMAURICE (UNITED KIKGDOM) - 3 III 49

his own national State disapproves of or considers to be contrary to its
own interests. If lie suffers injury in the course of doing this, it is then
very possible that his national State will refuse to make any claim on
his behaif,or will, at anyrate,not feel called upon to do so. Consequcntly,
unless the Organization itself be regardcd as Iiaving the capacity to
make claims on behalf of these perçons, and in respect of thc loss or
damage caused to them, there will exist a lack of adequate protection,
a position which may be prejudicial to the good functioning of the
Organization, because if United Nations servants feel that they cannot
look to the Organization for protection if they suffer injury in carrying
out their duties, and that they must look, if at al], to their own national
State for protection, tlieir ailegianceisliable, to that estent, to be divided,

and tlie work of the Organization to suffer in consequence. This is
precisely the situation which it was thc intention of Article IOO of the
Charter to guard against, and the Rlembers of the United Nations must
be considered as having recognized this fact. To put the matter in
another way, the capacity of the Organization to inake a direct clairn
on behalf of its servants in respect of injuries suffcred by them in the
course of performing tlieir duties, is really the necessary complement
to or, as it wcrc, the opposite facet of the exclusive allegiance owed by
them to the Organization ; for you cannot ask a nian to be faithful
solcly to an international organization in doing his work and even as
against his own national State, and yet espect Iiim to remain solely
dependent on tliat State for protection in case lie suffers injury in the
course of doing this same work-espccially when, as l'rofessor Chaumont
pointed out, he may be placed in especial danger by the very nature of
this work. Suc11a positiori would be obviouslÿ contrary to thc principle

enshrincd in the Charter, and clearly inherent in the vcry conception of
theUnitedNations, thatthe Organization andits servantsshould function
inclependently of al1considerations of nationality : bccause, if they ozbglit
to do so, then they must also be e?zabledto do so, tliat is to Say the
Organization must have such capacities as are necessary to bring tliis
about, or, if you prefer it, must not lack capacities in the absence of
which tliis independence may be prejudiced.
Tliere is a further ground, Mr. President and Members of thc Court,
on the basis of which it can be helcl tliat tlie United Nations Organiza-
tion has a right to make a direct claini on belialf of its servants, despite
the absence of the usual relationship of nationality bctwccn tlie claiming
entity and the injured individual. It is recognized tliat Statcs can inake
claims, irrespective of the nationality of the persoii concernecl, where
they possess a clircct treaty right to do so (as might be the casc, for
instance, under a treaty containing clauscs for the protection of
rninorities) or in any other case where the claim arises out of the breach
of a treaty to which tlic claimant State is a party. Thus we have thc
principle that where an international person has an international duty

owcd to it, by reason of a treaty, it is entitled to make an intcrnational
clam in respect of any breach of that duty. If tlierefore Members of
the United Nations owe a duty to the Organization, as an international
person, in respect of its servants, the Organization, as an international
person, is entitled to make a claim in respect of any breaches of that
duty. (Sec the Chorzdw Fmtory cnse, Series A./B., No. 17, p. 21.)
NOWit is clear froin Article 105 of the Charter, which was citecl carlier,
and €rom the General Convention on the Privilegcs and Immunities of STATEbIENT BY Mr. FITZMAURICE (UNITED KINGDOM) - 9 III49 125

the United Nations, made under it, that the RiIember States of the
Organization are under an obligation to extend in their territories to
servants of the Organization al1 such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the performance of their functions. Furtlier, in the case
of those Members which have ratified the Privileges and Immunities
Convention, there is an obligation to extend to servants of the Organiza-
tion a number of particular and specified privileges, immunities and
protections. It seems a necessary complement or implied consequence
of this, that the Member State concerned will not itself be guilty of
inflicting injury on a United Nations servant, or of permitting the
existence of conditions in its territory (so far as it can by al1due diligence
prevent them) wliich miglit result in such injury being inflicted. These

obligations, expressecl or implied, which arise directly or indirectly out
of the Charter, are essentially obligations towards the Organization as
a whole. They are not cluties owed directly to the national State of the
victim; or, if they are owed to it, they are owed toit not in its individual
capacity, but in its capacity as a illember of the Organization, and
they are not any more especially owed to the national State than to
any otlier Member of tlie Organization. It seerns to follow, therefore,
that the Organization, as the international person to whom tliese
obligations are owecl,is entitled to make a claim in respect oftlie breach
of them, and in respect not only of the loss caused to itself, but also in
respect of the loss or damage caused to tlie victiin or his dependents.
Furthemore, it would seem not only that the Organization is entitled
to do this, but also that, in so far asthe claiin is based on a failure by a
RiIemberState to estend to servants of the Organization the protection

due under the Charter or any related instrument, the Organization is the
only, or at any rate tlie appropriate and proper party to make the claim.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, this brings me to the last
part of my argument, and to the second of the two main questions
addressed to tlie Court, narnely how the claim of the Organization is
to be reconciled with any claim which the national State of the victim
may be entitled to put fonvard. But before 1 discuss this, 1 ought
perhaps to say a worcl on one case in which it lias been suggested that
the right of the Organization to make a claim on behalf of its servant
is manifest-namely wliere lie is stateless. On this subject 1 entirely
agree with the opinion which has been expressecl here by Mr. Feller,
representing the Secretariat, and 1 should not mention the matter again
if it were not for the fact that in its written statement theUnited King-
dom Government suggestecl a.view which it now desires to modify. It
is quite tme that, where the United Nations employee concerned is
stateless, a claim bythe Organization may be facilitateby reason of the
fact that there is no possibility of a clash with any national State also
entitled to claim. But statelessness does not, of itself, create any special

link between the Organization and its officials, and it is unnecessary
to have recourse to any argument founded on statelessness, since state-
less officials of the Organization are in esactly the same position as any
other of its officials, in that they are equally Unitecl Nations servants
who, uncler Article roo of the Charter, owe a special allegiance to the
Organization. Indeed, although the position of the Organization in
making a claim on behalf of a stateless employee may seem clearer on
account of the absence of any possible competing claim, it is, in fact,
1 believe, weaker, not stronger, because the very statelessness of the126 STATEMENT BY Mr. FITZMAURICE (UNITED KINGDOM) - g III49

indiviclualprecludes the possibility of a conflict of allegiance, such as
we have seen might arise if servants of the Organization were obliged
to look to their national States rather than to the Organization for
protection in respect of injuries caused to them in the course of their
work. Consequently, the reasons for holding that the Organization
must have the necessary capacity to claim are, if anything, somewhat
less strong in the case of stateless indivicluals than in the case of
United Nations servants who have a nationality. The Government
of the United Kingdom desires on further reflection to modify in the
foregoing scnsc the suggestion made in the footnote numbered IO to
paragraph 18ofits witten statement to the effectthat the caseisstronger
where the employce is stateless.
1 now come to the last section of my statement and to the final
question before the Court, namely that of reconciling the claim of the
United Nations with that of tlie national State, and on this question
1 can permit myself to be relatively brief, partly because llr. Feller
has already dealt with it very fully and 1 agree with most of wlzat he
said, and partly because, although the question is put to the Court as
if it were a new one, it is in fact, in the siibmission of the United King-
dom Government, not a new one-or at any rate it presents no new
problem of principle. As was pointed out in the written statement
of the United Kingdom, the existence of clual,even of multiple, national-
ity, has always made it possible for more than one State to be entitled
to put fonvard a claim in respect of one andthe same injury to one and
the same individual. \Vhatever rules and principles are properly ap-
plicable to reconciling such claims woulcl,speaking generally, and with
two important exccptions whicli 1 shall discuss presently, be equally
applicable to the case of rcconciling the claim of the United Nations
with that of the national State of the victim. In its written statement,
the United Kingdom has suggested what somc of these rules and prin-
ciples are, and their main object, of course, while not denying the riglit
of both claimants to make a claim, is to avoid the payment of double
damages by the defendant State. If thc Court considers that the two
sets of claims are rcconcilable on some suc11general basis as has been
suggested in the United Kingdom's witten statement, the details of
the application on this basis as between Members of the Organization,
out, if the Court so desires, by the Organization itself, for adoption byed
MemberStates,as isindeeclimplied by the finalparagraph of the General
Assembly'sResolution ofDccember 3rd last, which imtructs the Secret-
ary-Generd to prepare proposals in the light of the Court's advisorj~
opinion, when given, and to submit these proposals to the Assembly
at its next regidar session. The Court wül, however, remember that
the problem of reconciling conflicting claims only ;irises in regard to
point (6) in the first of the questions put to the Court, anifthat point
is answered in the affirmative. It has nothing whatever to do with
point (a). In other words, there is no question of conflict between the
right of the Organization to claim in respect of the damage done to
itself by reason of the injury to its servant, and the right of the national
State of that servant to claim on bchdf of the servant-just as there
is no conflict in the casc of a claim by two States wliere the injured
person is a national of one of them but in the service of the other, STATEMENT BV Mr. FITZMAURICE (UNITED KINGDOBI) - 9 III49 127

because the basis of the two claims is different. Conflictcan only arise
where both international entities concerned are claiming on the same
basis ;that is, for present purposes, not in respect of the direct damage
suffered by themselves as entities, but on behalf of the individual and
in respect of the damage cloneto him. Consequently, the fact that the
victim is in the service of the United Nations will not, of itself, avoid
the possibility of conflict with the riglit of his national State, if the
Organization is seeking to claim on the victim's behalf as well as on
its own.
1 have referred to two important csceptions to the general principle
suggested, that, whatever rules apply for reconciling a duality of national
claims, should be regarded as broadly applicable to reconciling dual
claims by the Organization and by the national Statc of the victim.
\Yhere two Statesboth have a claim against a third State in respect of
an individual who is a national of cach of the claimant States, both
claims have, generally speaking, equal status and priority, although,
as was suggested in the written statement of tlic United Kingdom,
claimant States is entitled to recover all, or the major part, of the
amounts due. It is much less certain that the same cquality of status
esists, or ouglit to esist, between the claim of the Unitcd Nations and
the claim of the national State. The claim of the national State cannot,
of course, be ousted or ovemdden ; but there arc grounds for thinking
that it should defer to that of the United Nations, which slioidd be given
priority or preference. In the first place, assuming, as we must, that
the United Nations Organization is an international person, that it has
capacity to make a claim on behalf of its servants and in respect of the
damage done to them as well as the damage done to itself, and further
that the claim arises (as it will) out of injuries done to the individual in
the course of performing his functions as a United Nations servant, in
respect of which he owesan exclusive duty to the Organization, it would
seem that the Organization is the natural and proper party to makc
the claim and that it should be regardcd as tlic one primarily entitled
to do so. Secondly, the Court will remember that, in so far asthe basis
of the claim is the failure of the defendant State to afford to the victim
thc protection due under, or in consequenceof the Chartcr or an17related
instrument, it may well be that the Organization is thc olzly party
entitled to claim on that particular basis, as it is certainly the natural
party to do so. Thirdly, as several speakers have pointed out, there
are grounds for tliinking that the majority of national States, at any
rate those who are Members of the Organization, would, in the case of
injuries inflicted on United Nations servants in the course of performing
their duties, very mucli prefer that the Organization should make the
claim, if it is cntitled to do so-in short the feeling would be that, in
cases of this kind, the wrong done was primarily a wrong to the Organ-
ization as a whole, and as such, and only secondarily a wrong to the
victim's national State. By this, Mr. President and hlembers of the
Court, 1 have in mind that, in those cases, it is not only the national
State of the victim which is \irronged ; it is in a sense all the Aiembers
of the United Nations, .and tlierefore it is very appropriate that, acting
on behalf of al1those Mcmbers,the Organization should make the clairn
rather than oneparticular Memberofthe United Nations which,although
it may have suffered a separate wrong because the individual is128 STATEMENT BY Mr. FITZMAURICE (UNITED KLNGDOM) - g III49

its national, is also a participant in the general United Nations system,
and suffers, in tlzntrespect, no greater wrong than any other Member
of that system. Now, even if the Court were to consider that it was not
possible to regard these principlcs as amounting yet to established legal
rules, it is to be hoped and, 1think, expected, that the practice of States
will establish in due course a rule in favour of the priority of the claim
of the United Nations in this type of case. The claim of the national
State would not, of course, be ousted or destroyed. Thus, if the Organ-
ization faileclto make any claim in respect of the loss or damage done to
the victim, the case being one in which he did not receive any compen-
sation from the Organization itself-r if in such a case the Organization
made a claim but was not successful in recovering any damages, the
national State would be free to take any action that seemed to it to
be useful and appropriate.
The other exception to the general applicability in these cases of the
principles governing duality of claims, relates to the very important
subject of injuries inflicted on a United Nations servant by his own
national State, or in circumstances entailing the responsibility of that
Statc. This is one of the most important aspects, if not in a sense the
most important, of the questions put to the Court, since it affords a
test, in the most cnicial form, of the principles enshrincd in the Charter
and inhercnt in the whole conception of the Oi-ganization, of the
independence of the United Nations and its servants from al1considera-
tions of nationality.
at the hands of one of them, it is the accepted rulc, save in exceptional
cases, for instance where there exists a special treaty right, that the
other national Statc cannot make a claim in rcspcct of the injury to the
individual, though if, for instance, the individual was in its service, that
State can claim for any direct injury to itself. It is unnecessary for me
to tell the Court that the principlc involved is that, subject to the treaty
exception just referred to, you cani-iot ~nake an international claim
against a State on behalf of one of its own nationds, such an issue being
for settlement between the government of that State anditsown national,
on the basis of the law and constitution of the State concerned. Tliis
position isassisted by the doctrine of what iscailed "master nationality",
in those cascs where thc individual was actuaily present at the time of
thc injury in the territory of the responsible State, when his local nation-
ality for the time being prevails over al1 others.
It is clear that if a similar rule were hcld to operate by analogy, as
regards clairns by the United Nations where the injury to its servants
Iiad been inflicted by their own national Statc, or in circumstances
entailing the responsibility of that State, an important breach would
be made in the principle of the independence of the Organization and
its servants from al1 considerations of nationality ; for this case is not
only liable, but in a sense very likely to arise-the possibility and pro-
bability of it doing so being inherent in the character and work of the
Organization. Suppose, for instance, that the United Nations decides
to send a commission of enquiry, or it may be a boundary commission,
or a commission to establish a truce or to observe and report on certain
facts and conditions :it may be essential for the proper functioning of
that commission that one or more of its members should have first-
hand knowledgeoflocalconditions, andthis may wellentai1the necessityof having a national of the country as a member of the commission.
Nothing could be more important, or more necessary for the proper
carrying out of thc work of the Organization, than that, in such a case,
the Organization should be possessed of rights on behalf of the individual
conccrned, evcn as against his own government. In this connexion,
Mr. President and Rlembers of the Court, 1 had been going to cite a
passage £rom the concluding paragraph of the United Kingclom's
writtcn statement, but as Alr. Feller did me the honour to cite this
passage in his own speech, 1 will not cite it again but 1 will only
ask the Court to bc kind enough to pay particular attention to the
observations contained in it.
There is a further argument leading to the same conclusion. It is
admittecl that where a treaty right csists, parties to the treaty are
entitled to intervene in case of a breach of the treaty, and even, in
appropriate cases, to make a claim, although the individual concerned
is not only not one of their own nationals, but is actually a national of

the State which has committed the breach of treaty. Treaties contain-
ing minority clauses or provisions safeguarding the human rights of the
population of a country, are outstanding examples of this class of trcaty.
If the treaty is broken, the other parties to it have the right to protest,
possibly to intervenc, possibly to claim, although the injured party may
not bc fheir national, and may even be a national of the State whicli
ha:; brolcen the treaty, because the claim is founded, in lnw, not on
coiisiderntionsrelating to the individual, but on the breach of the treaty.
-4ccordirig to this principlc, therefore, aclaim by the United Nations
would bi: legally valid if it was based on a breach of the obligation of
Membcr States, arising'uncler or in conscquence of the Charter or related
instruments, to afford due protection to United Nations servants engaged
on United Nations work or missions (an obligation which comports no
exception on account of the local nationality of the United Nations
servant concernccl) ; by which 1 mcan, Mr. Presiclcnt and Members of
the Court, that the obligations contained in Article 105 of the Charter
and in the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities, and the
implied obligations which result £rom those written obligations, arc
quite general and therc is no exception written into or implied £rom them
concerning the case whcre the individual servant happens to be a national
of the State which commits the injury. Such a claim, therefore, on the

part of the Organization would be good, irrespective of any consider t'on
of nationality, sincc it would be by way of enforccment of a trcaty right
owned by the Organization as such, or at any rate in respect of a brcach
of an obligation clue to itby treaty, and covering the nationals of the
defendant Statc if they are United Nations servants.
Mr. President and Alembers of the Court, 1 have now finished my
arguments and 1 must state my conclusion, first thanking the Court
for the attention given me in the presentation of a case which, however
clearly 1have tried to put it, is necessarily full of difficultie1.should
perhaps add tliat, in al1 this,1 have purposely avoided going into the
question of the position of the United Nations Organization vis-à-vis
non-member States. The whole case for the international personality
and capacity of the Organization is so closely bound up with the Charter
and its related instruments that it is obviously applicable primarily
to Members of,the Organization. Certain of the arguments making up
this case would, however, be equally applicable to any non-member130 STATEMENT BY hlr.FI1'ZMAURICB (UNITED I<INGDORI) - g III 49
State who could be held, in one way or another, to have recognized
the international personality of the Unitcd Nations and its capacities
under the Charter. Others of these arguments, in particular those
founded on the obligations of Member States towards the Organization
under the Charter or its related instruments, would not, as such, be
applicable to non-member States, because they are not parties to the
Charter, and therefore cannot have any direct obligations to the
Organization under it.
1 conclucletlien, as follows, that for the reasons which have been
given in my oral statement here, and for those contained in the United
Kingdom's xvritten statement' (except in so far as they are modified
by the present oral statement), the Government of theUnited Kingdom
considers that the first of the tivo questions put to thc Court should,
as a matter of law, be answered in the affirmative as regards both its

point (a)and its point (b; and thatthe answer to the second question is
that the claims of the Unitcd Nations and of the national State of tlie
victim shoiild be reconciled on broadly the same basis as is applicable
to claims by Statesboth or al1of whose nationalities the injured party
possesses, ivith thc two exceptions already noticecl in favour, first, of
the priority of a claim of the United Nations over that of the victims
of a national State, and secondly, of the right of the Organization to
claim even wlien its servant is a national of the State responsible for
the injury.
1 thank the Court.