Written statement of the United States of America

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REQUEST BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION
“LEGAL CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM THE POLICIES
AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, INCLUDING EAST
JERUSALEM”
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JULY 25, 2023

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 2
CHAPTER II – THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO RESOLVE
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT............................................................................ 6
A. The Development of the Established Framework for Negotiations ................................ 7
B. The United Nations Has Not Wavered in Its Support for Resolution of the Conflict on
the Basis of the Longstanding Negotiating Framework ......................................................... 9
C. The Parties Have Maintained This Negotiating Framework ........................................ 11
D. The General Assembly’s Endorsement of the Negotiating Framework in the Referral
Resolution............................................................................................................................. 14
CHAPTER III – COMPELLING REASONS SUPPORT THE COURT ADDRESSING THE
REFERRAL QUESTIONS WITHIN THE ESTABLISHED FRAMEWORK ....................... 16
A. The Court’s Respect for the Role of the Security Council and General Assembly in
Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Established Negotiating Framework in
Construction of a Wall Remains Appropriate ...................................................................... 18
B. Going Beyond the Established Negotiating Framework Would Risk Impinging Upon
the Principle of Consent ....................................................................................................... 23
CHAPTER IV – THE REFERRAL INVITES EXAMINATION OF THE ESTABLISHED
FRAMEWORK ON THE BASIS OF ASSUMPTIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ....................................................................................................... 27
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION: A JUST AND LASTING PEACE REQUIRES DIRECT
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ...................................................................... 30

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 In its Order dated February 3, 2023, the Court invited, inter alia, Member States of the
United Nations to submit written statements on the questions referred to the Court by the U.N.
General Assembly in its resolution 77/247 of December 30, 2022. The United States
appreciates the opportunity to submit this Statement presenting its observations on those
questions to assist the Court’s consideration of the General Assembly’s request.
1.2 The United States has supported the pursuit of a final negotiated settlement to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for decades, serving as a participant, facilitator, or witness of
initiatives that include most prominently the Madrid Conference of 1991; the Oslo Accords;
the Middle East Quartet; and the 2000 Camp David Summit, the 2007 Annapolis Conference,
and other U.S.-sponsored direct negotiations, most recently in 2013-2014. This year at Aqaba,
Jordan and Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, the United States participated in discussions held in a
format intended to foster de-escalation and enhance direct dialogue between Israeli and
Palestinian officials. Informed by this unique role, the United States voted against resolution
77/247 out of concern that the referral risks driving the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
further away from the objective of a negotiated two-State solution – an objective enshrined in
numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as well as in the
aforementioned initiatives and the agreements between the parties.1
1.3 The United States is deeply concerned over the deterioration in trust between the parties
in recent years and the periods of increased violence. In February 2023, the Security Council
issued a Presidential Statement, joined by the United States, expressing strong opposition to
unilateral measures by either side that impede peace, calling on all parties to
observe calm and restraint, and to refrain from provocative actions, incitement
and inflammatory rhetoric, with the aim, inter alia, of de-escalating the situation
on the ground, rebuilding trust and confidence, demonstrating through policies
1 U.N. GAOR, 77th Sess., 56th plen. Mtg., at 3-6, U.N. Doc. A/77/PV.56 (Resumption 1) (Dec. 30, 2022); see
also Andrew Weinstein, United States Mission to the United Nations, General Statement on the UN General
Assembly Fourth Committee Resolutions on Israeli-Palestinian Issues (Nov. 11, 2022), available at
https://usun.usmission.gov/general-statement-on-the-un-general-assembly-fourth-committee-resolutions-onisraeli-
palestinian-issues/ (last visited July 17, 2023); Ambassador Richard Mills, United States Mission to the
United Nations, Remarks at the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee Meeting on Israeli Practices and
Settlement Activities (Nov. 10, 2022), available at usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-the-un-general-assemblysfourth-
committee-meeting-on-israeli-practices-and-settlement-activities/ (last visited July 17, 2023). (The
official records of the Fourth Committee meetings on these dates are not yet available.)
3
and actions a genuine commitment to the two-State solution, and creating the
conditions necessary for promoting peace.2
Events in the ensuing months have only highlighted the importance of that focus on deescalation
as a necessary first step.
1.4 As this Court has recognized, the tragic situation in the Middle East “can be brought to
an end only through implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions,
in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).”3 Since resolution 242 was adopted in
1967, the foundation for negotiation to achieve a comprehensive, just and durable end to the
conflict has been the principle of “land for peace.”4 This foundational precept recognizes that
achieving peace and security in the region is contingent on two interdependent elements: both
the withdrawal of forces from occupied territory and the end to conflict and respect and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every
State in the area, and the right of each State to live in peace within secure and recognized
borders. Neither element is alone sufficient to establish a comprehensive, just and lasting
peace; neither can be achieved without the other. It is on this organizational “land for peace”
basis, reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 338,5 that the pursuit of a negotiated peace has
rested for the last half century. During this time, it has been the basis for historic agreements
that include the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace, and the Oslo
Accords in which the Israelis and Palestinians notably committed themselves, inter alia, to
negotiating resolution of the conflict between them, and to creating the first interim Palestinian
self-governance authority. It remains true to this day that only through such negotiations can
the comprehensive, just and lasting peace first envisioned by the United Nations be established,
one in which two States exist side-by-side and Israelis and Palestinians enjoy equal measures
of freedom, security, and prosperity.
1.5 While there is reason at this time for concern that the conditions necessary for peace,
or the negotiations to achieve it, are not present, the United States remains committed to
2 U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2023/1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2023/1
(Feb. 20, 2023) [Dossier No. 1400].
3 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [hereinafter
Construction of a Wall], Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 200-01, ¶¶ 162-63.
4 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 73/89, Comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/89
(Dec. 18, 2018) [Dossier No. 592]; S.C. Res. 2334, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2334 (Dec. 23, 2016) [Dossier No.
1372]; S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967) [Dossier No. 1245] (US Annex 1).
5 S.C. Res. 338, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973) (US Annex 2).
4
preserving that pathway for Israelis and Palestinians. As such, the United States’ immediate
focus is de-escalation, the resumption of productive contacts between Israeli and Palestinian
officials, and avoiding the risk of foreclosing a negotiated two-State solution based upon and
consistent with the framework first created in the Security Council resolutions mentioned
above and continually endorsed in both Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.6
The United States continues to engage in efforts to create more propitious conditions for a
negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and urges other members of the
international community to redouble efforts to do the same. These efforts include the recent
Aqaba and Sharm El Sheikh meetings, involving the United States joining with Egyptian,
Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestinian representatives to foster efforts to de-escalate tensions,
discourage unilateral actions that take the parties further from peace, and reinforce the parties’
commitment to their prior agreements.7
1.6 The United States submits that it is through such efforts that the conditions can be
established to achieve a negotiated two-State solution that leads to peace and security for both
sides, and to the full realization of Palestinian self-determination. As discussed below, the
referral resolution itself recognizes the need to advance meaningful negotiations aimed at
achieving a peace agreement to this end. The Security Council and General Assembly, in
accordance with their respective functions under the U.N. Charter, have played longstanding
roles advocating that this conflict be addressed through a negotiating framework. Accordingly,
the questions referred should be understood as a request for advice aimed at facilitating the
General Assembly’s proper role and function within the United Nations for promoting a
negotiated resolution to the conflict. It is essential that the Court’s opinion advance that
objective.
6 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Secretary Blinken’s Call with Israeli Foreign Minister Cohen (June 27, 2023),
available at https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-israeli-foreign-minister-cohen-2/ (last visited
July 17, 2023); Antony Blinken, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the 2023 American Israel Public Affairs Committee
Policy Summit (June 5, 2023), available at https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-2023-
american-israel-public-affairs-committee-policy-summit/ (last visited July 17, 2023); Sec’y of State, Remarks at
Press Availability (Jan. 31, 2023), available at https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-pressavailability-
28/#:~:text=Upon%20arriving%20in%20Israel%2C%20I,a%20synagogue%20in%20Neve%20Yaakov (last
visited July 17, 2023); Weinstein, supra note 1.
7 Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh [hereinafter Sharm Communique] (Mar. 19,
2023), available at https://www.state.gov/joint-communique-from-the-march-19-meeting-in-sharm-el-sheikh/
(last visited July 17, 2023); Aqaba Joint Communique [hereinafter Aqaba Communique] (Feb. 26, 2023), available
at https://www.state.gov/aqaba-joint-communique/ (last visited July 17, 2023).
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1.7 This Statement begins in Chapter II by describing the framework initially set forth by
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, endorsed by the General Assembly, recognized by
the Court in Construction of a Wall, and adopted by the State of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (“PLO”) in their own agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
1.8 Drawing from principles the Court has recognized as fundamental to the integrity of its
advisory function and its role as a principal organ of the United Nations, Chapter III then
identifies compelling reasons for the Court to exercise its discretion to address the referral
questions within that established negotiating framework. The fact that the questions referred
invite the Court to opine on matters at the heart of the conflict, address alleged actions of only
one party and assert conclusions of international law, and were inserted into resolution 77/247
at a very late stage with minimal consultation among UN Member States further warrants such
an approach.
1.9 Next, Chapter IV identifies assumptions in the second referred question that disregard
settled principles of international law. To the extent the second referred question could be
construed as asking the Court to declare that the Israeli occupation has been rendered unlawful
or void, the Court should decline that invitation on the basis that such an assessment is not
supported by international law.
1.10 Finally, Chapter V concludes the Statement by respectfully requesting that the Court
proceed with caution, not disturb the fundamental “land for peace” principle underlying the
established framework for Israeli-Palestinian peace and security, and consider in its advice
how best to advance the objective of facilitating the General Assembly’s proper role and
function in promoting a negotiated resolution to the conflict.
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CHAPTER II
THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO RESOLVE THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
2.1 Throughout the tumultuous and often violent history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the United Nations has been consistent in its support for the proposition that a comprehensive,
just and lasting peace must be the result of direct negotiations between the parties to the
conflict, not one imposed from outside or by one party. This principle is at the center of
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and has been reiterated in resolutions of the Security
Council and General Assembly ever since, including the resolution referring the questions at
issue in this proceeding. Likewise, the Israelis and Palestinians themselves adopted this
principle in entering into the Declaration of Principles and other agreements known
collectively as the “Oslo Accords” in the 1990s. Of particular note, the parties specifically
articulated their agreement to negotiate the “permanent status issues” central to resolving their
dispute, including Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, borders, and other issues.8
Despite tragic periods of violence, unilateral actions by both sides, and allegations by each side
of the other failing to adhere to its commitments, neither the parties, nor the General Assembly,
nor the Security Council have abandoned the central precept that direct negotiation on the basis
of “land for peace” is the path to comprehensive, just and lasting peace and security.
2.2 The United States respectfully submits that the Court’s consideration of the questions
presented by the General Assembly needs to take place within this context. To aid the Court’s
consideration, this Chapter describes the context of the negotiating framework through which
the referred questions should be understood. Section A describes the negotiating framework
itself, which has its roots in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and was further defined
and memorialized in the bilateral agreements between the Israelis and Palestinians. Section B
demonstrates the continuing commitment of the United Nations to this same negotiating
framework. Section C describes the parties’ efforts within this negotiating framework in recent
years. Finally, Section D, describes the process by which the referral resolution in this
proceeding was adopted and how it too endorses the established negotiating framework.
8 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, pmbl., art.1, U.N. Doc. A/48/486-S/26560
(Sept. 13, 1993) [Dossier No. 1302] (US Annex 4); see also infra Chapter II.A, C.
7
A. The Development of the Established Framework for Negotiations
2.3 The established framework for a negotiated resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
was developed over a series of decades, beginning with Security Council resolutions adopted
in response to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, then further defined and adopted by the
Israelis and Palestinians in their own agreements with each other, particularly the Oslo
Accords. Over this period, the core precept has been that negotiation on the basis of the “land
for peace” principle is the path to achieving comprehensive, just and lasting peace and security
in the Middle East.
2.4 The foundation for this framework is set forth in Security Council resolution 242
(1967). In this resolution, the Security Council
Affirm[ed] that . . . the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East . . . should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict; [and]
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force.9
It is these interdependent elements that define the concept of “land for peace.” In this
resolution the Security Council went on to request designation of a Special Representative to
“promote agreement” and to “assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles” of the resolution.10
2.5 Then in resolution 338 (1973), the Security Council reiterated its call for
implementation of these provisions and further called for the immediate commencement of
negotiations “aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”11
9 S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967) [Dossier No. 1245] (US Annex 1).
10 Id. ¶ 3.
11 S.C. Res. 338, ¶¶ 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973) (US Annex 2). More specifically, the Security
Council
2. Call[ed] upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the
implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; [and]
3. Decide[d] that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and
durable peace in the Middle East.
8
2.6 These resolutions have served as the cornerstone upon which the pursuit of a
comprehensive negotiated peace between Israel and its neighboring States, and Israel and the
Palestinians, has rested. Israel and Egypt relied on the principle of “land for peace” in
concluding their 1979 Treaty of Peace, as did Jordan and Israel in coming to their own peace
agreement in 1994.12 In 1991, at the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, convened by
the United States and the Soviet Union, Israelis, Jordanians, Lebanese, Syrians, and notably
Palestinians joined together for the first time, along with others, with the common objective of
pursuing comprehensive peace through direct negotiations on the basis of this same
paradigm.13
2.7 Then in 1993 the Oslo Accords extended these successes. The PLO recognized the
State of Israel, and the Israelis recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian
people.14 They then further committed themselves, in the first of the Oslo Accords, the
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“Declaration of
Principles”) signed in Washington D.C., to achieving a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement” through the agreed political process, to recognizing “their mutual legitimate and
political rights,” to negotiations to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority
for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period, and to
negotiations on permanent status that would be based on and lead to implementation of
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.15 That is, they adopted in their agreements with
each other the “land for peace” negotiating paradigm first articulated in those resolutions.
2.8 More specifically, the Declaration of Principles set out a framework for Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations and began the process of building Palestinian self-governance
institutions. It confirmed that the parties’ mutual objective was to find a negotiated solution
to permanent status issues between them that “will lead to the implementation of Security
Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).”16 It identified that these “permanent status”
12 See Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Isr.-Jordan, Oct. 26,
1994, 2042 U.N.T.S. 351; Treaty of Peace, Egypt-Isr., Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115.
13 See G.A. Res. 47/64 (D), Question of Palestine, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/64D (Dec. 11, 1992) [Dossier No. 406];
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Question of Palestine, The Situation in the Middle East,
¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/46/623-S/23204 (Nov. 8, 1991) [Dossier No. 524].
14 Exchange of Letters between Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, and Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman,
concerning Israel-PLO Recognition (Sept. 9, 1993), available at https://www.un.org/unispal/document/autoinsert-
205528/ (last visited July 17, 2023) (US Annex 3).
15 Declaration of Principles, supra note 8, pmbl., art. I.
16 Id. art. I.
9
negotiations are intended to encompass issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements,
security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other
issues of common interest.17 And, it described a procedure for Palestinian elections “as a
significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people and their just requirements,” while setting out the beginnings of the
framework for how powers and responsibilities would be allocated in the transitional period
between the interim Palestinian governance and the Israeli military government and Civil
Administration.18
2.9 In the second of the Oslo Accords, the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the “Interim Agreement”), the parties reaffirmed “that the
negotiations on the permanent status . . . will lead to the implementation of Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.”19
2.10 The Interim Agreement sets out detailed agreements reached between the parties on the
allocation of responsibilities and jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza pending a negotiated
solution, establishing, for example, different jurisdictional arrangements between the Israeli
military government and its Civil Administration and the Palestinian interim entity (now
referred to as the Palestinian Authority) with respect to Areas A, B and C of the West Bank,
as well as allocating responsibilities for security between them.20 And, as described in section
C below, while the vision in the Oslo Accords that a final negotiation would be concluded
within a definite time period was not achieved, the Oslo Accords continue to serve as the frame
of reference for the interim allocation of authorities between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority and to inform Israeli-Palestinian relations and negotiations. This has remained true
even in times of great stress.
B. The United Nations Has Not Wavered in Its Support for Resolution of the Conflict
on the Basis of the Longstanding Negotiating Framework
2.11 Even when conditions for negotiation on permanent status issues have been challenged
by periods of violence, unilateral actions, and distrust, the United Nations has continued its
unwavering support for the established framework as the basis upon which to achieve a two-
17 Id. art. V.
18 Id. arts. III, V, VI.
19 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/51/889-
S/1997/357 (Sept. 28, 1995) [Dossier No. 1306] (US Annex 5).
20 See generally id.
10
State solution and bring the dispute to an end. In 2008, expressing its support for direct
negotiations at the Annapolis Conference, the Security Council noted in its resolution 1850
(2008) the “irreversibility of the bilateral negotiations” and that it “supports the parties’ agreed
principles for the bilateral negotiating process and their determined efforts to reach their goal
of concluding a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues.”21 Again in 2016, the Security
Council urged the
intensification and acceleration of international and regional diplomatic efforts
and support aimed at achieving, without delay a comprehensive, just and lasting
peace in the Middle East on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions,
the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle of land for peace, the
Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet Roadmap and an end to the Israeli
occupation that began in 1967.22
The Council also “[c]onfirm[ed] its determination to support the parties throughout the
negotiations and in the implementation of an agreement.”23
2.12 Just this year, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement reiterating that:
The Security Council reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the vision of the
two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side
by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with
international law and relevant UN resolutions.24
2.13 And the General Assembly, the body seeking the Court’s advice, has likewise
continued to consistently and robustly underscore the need for the parties to comply with their
agreements with each other and to negotiate a final resolution to the conflict on the basis of the
established framework, including the principle of “land for peace.”25
21 S.C. Res. 1850, pmbl., ¶¶ 1- 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1850 (Dec. 16, 2008) [Dossier No. 1354]; see also, e.g., S.C.
Res. 1515, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003) [Dossier No. 1337]; S.C. Res. 1397, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1397 (Mar. 12, 2002) [Dossier No. 1316].
22 S.C. Res. 2334, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2334 (Dec. 23, 2016) [Dossier No. 1372].
23 Id. ¶ 10.
24 U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2023/1, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2023/1 (Feb. 20, 2023) [Dossier No. 1400].
25 See, e.g., Dossier Nos. 252-72 (“The Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over
their natural resources”); 353-81 (“The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination”); 403 & 405
(“International Peace Conference on the Middle East”); 406-409 (“Question of Palestine”); 490-516 (”Peaceful
settlement of the question of Palestine”); 811-36 (“Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”); see also, e.g., G.A. Res. 77/30,
Assistance to the Palestinian people, U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/30 (Dec. 8, 2022).
11
2.14 Indeed, in the weeks prior to the referral resolution, the General Assembly, in its
recurring resolution entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,” urged
renewed and coordinated efforts by the international community aimed at
restoring a political horizon and advancing and accelerating the conclusion of a
peace treaty to achieve without delay an end to the Israeli occupation that began
in 1967 by resolving all outstanding issues, including all final status issues,
without exception, for a just, lasting and peaceful settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, in accordance with the internationally recognized basis of
the two-State solution, and of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for the realization of a
comprehensive peace in the Middle East.26
2.15 In that resolution, specifically on resolving the conflict, the General Assembly went on
to reiterate its call for a comprehensive peace “on the basis of the relevant United Nations
resolutions . . . the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle of land for peace . . . and
reaffirm[ed] . . . its unwavering support . . . for the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine,
living side by side in peace and security.”27
2.16 As further discussed in Section D, in the very resolution placing these questions before
the Court, the General Assembly once again took the opportunity to reiterate its support for a
solution to the conflict, leading to two States living side by side in peace and security, on the
basis of the longstanding negotiating framework.
C. The Parties Have Maintained This Negotiating Framework
2.17 With the support of the United Nations and the facilitation of the United States and
others, since the Oslo Accords the parties have repeatedly come to the bargaining table to
negotiate their future and they have recognized the continuing need for direct negotiations on
the basis of the established framework.28 Notwithstanding a lack of progress in recent years,
26 G.A. Res. 77/25, Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/25 (Nov. 30,
2022) [Dossier No. 516]; see also G.A. Res. 73/89, Comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/89 (Dec. 6, 2018) [Dossier No. 592] (“Reiterates its call for the achievement, without delay,
of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of the relevant United Nations
resolutions, including Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016, the Madrid terms of
reference, including the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map, and an
end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967, including of East Jerusalem, and reaffirms in this regard its
unwavering support, in accordance with international law, for the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine, living
side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders.”).
27 G.A. Res. 77/25, Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/25 (Nov. 30, 2022)
[Dossier No. 516] (emphasis added).
28 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1850, ¶¶ 1-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1850 (Dec. 16, 2008) [Dossier No. 1354] (expressing its
support for the Annapolis Conference direct negotiations); S.C. Res. 1515, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov.
19, 2003) [Dossier No. 1337] (endorsing the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict); S.C. Res. 1397, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (Mar. 12, 2002) [Dossier
12
the parties have reaffirmed their commitment to their prior agreements adopting the “land for
peace” negotiating framework. For example, on December 20, 2019, the Israeli Attorney
General published a memorandum in relation to the question of the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) in the “Situation in the State of Palestine,” asserting that
UN Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) . . . form the terms
of reference for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (because they have been
accepted as such by the parties) [and] Israel also considers that the tragedy of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be resolved by direct dialogue between
the parties that is sensitive to the needs and aspirations of Israelis and
Palestinians alike.29
2.18 In their 2020 submissions to the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber, the Palestinians likewise
identified a continued commitment to the Oslo Accords and the established negotiating
framework, submitting a statement that
reaffirm[ed] our commitment to a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
based on the two-state solution . . . through negotiations held under international
auspices (the International Quartet plus) and through an international peace
conference, on the basis of the UN resolutions and international law.30
2.19 And as noted, in February of this year, Palestinians and Israelis came together in Aqaba,
Jordan with the United States, Egypt and Jordan for de-escalation talks, where they “affirmed
No. 1316] (expressing support for efforts to resume the peace process); U.N. Secretary-General, Peaceful
settlement of the question of Palestine, ¶¶ 7-12, U.N. Doc. A/69/371-S/2014/650 (Sept. 4, 2014) [Dossier No.
547] (describing the resumption of final status negotiations in July 2013 and continuing into 2014 with the support
of the United States); U.N. Secretary-General, Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, ¶¶ 8, 11-15, U.N.
Doc. A/68/363-S/2013/524 (Sept. 4, 2013) [Dossier No. 546] (describing efforts by the United States to
commence the 2013 resumption of final status negotiations); U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Unalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People, Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People, U.N. Doc. A/63/35, ¶¶ 5, 19-20, 93 (Oct. 6, 2008) (prepared by Paul Badji) [Dossier No.469]
(describing the 2007 resumption in permanent status negotiations between the parties at the Annapolis
Conference); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in the Middle East, Question
of Palestine, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/55/639-S/2000/1113 (Nov. 22, 2000) [Dossier No. 533] (describing the historic
negotiations at the Camp David Summit); Annapolis Conference Joint Understanding and Statements by Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and Pres. Mahmoud Abbas (Nov. 27, 2007), available at
https://peacemaker.un.org/node/457 (last visited July 17, 2023); Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace
Summit at Camp David by U.S. Pres. William J. Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Palestinian Authority
Chairman Yasser Arafat (July 25, 2000), available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22698.htm (last visited
July 17, 2023).
29 The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So-Called “Situation in Palestine,” Attorney
General (Dec. 20, 2019), available at https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/20-12-2019/en/Memorandum-
Attorney-General.pdf (last visited July 17, 2023).
30 Situation in the State of Palestine, ICC-01/18, The State of Palestine’s response to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
Order requesting additional information, Annex A, 3 (June 4, 2020), available at https://www.icccpi.
int/sites/default/files/RelatedRecords/CR2020_02278.PDF (last visited July 17, 2023).
13
their commitment to all previous agreements between them, and to work towards a just and
lasting peace.”31
2.20 The next month, in March 2023, they, alongside the United States and others, met in
Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, further articulating in a Joint Communique their unwavering
commitment to all previous agreements between them.32 The parties reiterated “their
agreement to address all outstanding issues through direct dialogue.”33 Most importantly, the
parties affirmed their commitment to creating the conditions for resolving the conflict through
direct negotiations, stating they
are looking forward to cooperating with a view to consolidating the basis for
direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, towards achieving
comprehensive, just and lasting peace, and promote cooperation and
coexistence between all people of the Middle East.34
2.21 As such, the Israeli and Palestinian sides, as recently as this year and notwithstanding
the current levels of violence and mistrust, have acknowledged the continued relevance of their
prior agreements. The parties have also continued to maintain contacts that reinforce the
principles to which they agreed.35 These agreements and efforts are founded on the “land for
peace” principle for negotiations to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, first
articulated, and continually supported, by the United Nations.
31 Aqaba Communique, supra note 7.
32 Sharm Communique, supra note 7.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 The Sharm El Sheikh and Aqaba format de-escalation talks are part of a continuing succession of contacts –
public or behind-the-scenes – between senior Israeli and Palestinian leaders. While these discussions have largely
promoted de-escalation, that objective is a critical part of setting the conditions for negotiations to resolve
permanent status issues and arrive at an eventual two-State solution. Such contacts have continued across Israeli
administrations. See, e.g., Emmanuel Fabian & Lazar Berman, “Herzog calls Abbas to urge fight against terror,
condemn settler violence,” The Times of Israel, June 27, 2023, available at
https://www.timesofisrael.com/herzog-calls-abbas-to-condemn-settler-violence-gallant-pledges-to-combat-riots/
(last visited July 17, 2023) (June 2023 Herzog-Abbas and Gallant-Hussein Al Sheikh Calls (6/27)); Barak Ravid,
“Scoop: Israelis and Palestinians have been holding secret talks for weeks,” Axios, February 20, 2023, available
at https://www.axios.com/2023/02/20/israelis-palestinians-secret-talks-west-bank (last visited July 17, 2023)
(reporting suggesting broader Hussein Al-Sheikh and Tzachi Hanegbi calls/meetings); Times of Israel Staff,
“Gantz meets PA’s Abbas to discuss security coordination ahead of Biden visit,” The Times of Israel, July 8, 2022,
available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-meets-pas-abbas-to-discuss-security-coordination-ahead-ofbiden-
visit/ (last visited July 17, 2023) (Gantz/Abbas meeting during previous government); Andrew Carey &
Kareem Khadder, “Israeli and Palestinian leaders speak by phone for the first time in years,” CNN, July 8, 2022,
available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/middleeast/lapid-abbas-phone-call-intl/index.html (last visited
July 17, 2023) (Lapid/Abbas call during previous government).
14
D. The General Assembly’s Endorsement of the Negotiating Framework in the
Referral Resolution
2.22 Against this backdrop, on December 30, 2022, the General Assembly adopted
resolution 77/247 by an affirmative vote of only eighty-seven of its Member States.36 Though
the resolution is otherwise largely identical to the most recent in a long line of General
Assembly resolutions with the same title, it lost the support of sixty Member States from its
prior iteration, resolution 75/98 (2020),37 when its text was amended to include a request for
an advisory opinion from this Court on two questions:
(a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel
of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its
prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory
occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic
composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from
its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures?
(b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to . . . above affect the
legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that arise
for all States and the United Nations from this status? 38
2.23 As discussed in Chapter III, Member States voiced concern that this referral would
damage the prospect of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the future – a result dissonant with
the General Assembly’s consistent and continued support for a resolution of the dispute
through negotiations.
2.24 Resolution 77/247 itself reiterates the fundamental proposition that negotiation to
resolve the permanent status issues, through the established framework, is the only path to
resolving the conflict. It notes the urgent need to
restore a political horizon for advancing and accelerating meaningful
negotiations aimed at the achievement of a peace agreement that will bring a
complete end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and the resolution of
36 U.N. GAOR, 77th Sess., 56th plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/77/PV.56 (Resumption 1) (Dec. 30, 2022). Over half
the membership of the General Assembly, 106 States, either voted against, abstained, or were not present when
the resolution passed.
37 G.A. Res. 75/98, Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, U.N. Doc. A/RES/75/98 (Dec. 10, 2020) [Dossier No. 835]; U.N.
GAOR, 75th Sess., 41st plen. Mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/75/PV.41 (Dec. 10, 2020).
38 See Dossier Nos. 811-836 (“Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”).
15
all core final status issues, without exception, leading to a peaceful, just, lasting
and comprehensive solution to the question of Palestine,39
2.25 It likewise stresses
the need for full compliance with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements reached
within the context of the Middle East peace process, including Sharm el-Sheikh
understandings, and the implementation of the Quartet roadmap to a permanent
two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,40
2.26 Further, the provisions of the referral specify that the Court should render its advisory
opinion in consideration of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General
Assembly, and the Court’s opinion in Construction of a Wall, all of which affirm the
established negotiating framework.41
2.27 Thus, the referral resolution invokes and endorses this framework for a negotiated
peace, including achievement of a permanent two-State solution, and the questions referred
need to be considered within this context. The Court’s deliberations should also be informed
by the long-standing and ongoing view of the General Assembly and the Security Council,
which the parties have relied on in their dialogue: that only through negotiations can the
conflict be resolved comprehensively, including all permanent status issues such as borders
and security arrangements.
39 G.A. Res. 77/247, Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/247 (Dec. 30, 2022) [Dossier No. 3].
40 Id.
41 The referral resolution also asks the Court to give due consideration to relevant resolutions of the Human Rights
Council (“HRC”). The HRC, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly comprised of 47 UN Member States,
has an important mandate for the promotion and protection of human rights around the world. It is, however, the
General Assembly and Security Council that have the overall responsibility within the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, the Human Rights Council likewise, including
resolution on the “Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,” has “reaffirm[ed] the need to achieve a
just, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in conformity with international law
and other internationally agreed parameters, including all relevant United Nations resolutions.” See, e.g., Human
Rights Council Res. 49/28, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/49/28 (Apr. 1, 2022) [Dossier No. 1589] (emphasis
added).
16
CHAPTER III
COMPELLING REASONS SUPPORT THE COURT ADDRESSING THE
REFERRAL QUESTIONS WITHIN THE ESTABLISHED FRAMEWORK
3.1 The United States submits that there are compelling reasons for the Court to address
the questions referred by the General Assembly within the established framework for the
parties to negotiate a resolution to the permanent status issues at the heart of their dispute such
as borders and security arrangements. These reasons stem from two interrelated
considerations: first, the important role the United Nations continues to play in efforts to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including through the numerous Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions calling for a negotiated settlement; and second, the degree to
which the questions referred engage the principle of consent to judicial settlement in a dispute
concerning territory and for which there is an established framework for addressing disputed
issues through a negotiating process. That the questions are framed to encompass and draw
legal conclusions about the acts of only one party to the dispute also suggests that caution is
warranted.
3.2 It is well established that the Court has “the duty to satisfy itself, each time it is seized
of a request for an opinion, as to the propriety of the exercise of its judicial function.”42 Both
the Court and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have recognized
inherent limitations to advisory jurisdiction stemming from the Court’s judicial character.43
Those considerations, which the Court has said may lead it to decline to issue an opinion, have
also informed whether the Court addresses the questions posed in their entirety or limits the
scope of its response.44 The Court has also acknowledged the need for it to consider the “origin
42 Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 157, ¶ 45; see also Legal Consequences of the
Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 [hereinafter Chagos], Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 2019, p. 113, ¶ 64; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo [hereinafter Kosovo], Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 416, ¶ 31; id., pp. 415, 417,
¶¶ 29, 33 (noting that the Court’s “discretion whether or not to respond to a request for an advisory opinion exists
so as to protect the integrity of the Court’s judicial function and its nature as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations”).
43 See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12, ¶ 23; Interpretation of Peace Treaties,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 65, 71; Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 5, p. 29. The Court has explained, for example, that there would be “compelling reasons” to decline
to give an advisory opinion where it “would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not
obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent.” Western Sahara, Advisory
Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. at 25, ¶ 33; see also infra note 66.
44 In responding to the request for advice, the Court retains discretion to broaden, interpret, or reformulate the
question(s) posed, including to identify the applicable and existing principles and rules. Kosovo, Advisory
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. at 423, ¶ 50 (noting that the Court may reframe the scope and meaning of the questions
17
and scope of the dispute” in evaluating the propriety of exercising its advisory jurisdiction, in
particular with respect to confirming that the Court’s opinion would assist the General
Assembly in “the proper exercise of its function.”45 To remain faithful to its judicial character,
the Court has determined that it must first ascertain the meaning and full implications of the
question in the light of the actual framework of fact and law in which it falls for consideration.46
3.3 This Chapter discusses how these important considerations identified by the Court
should lead it to address the referral request in a manner that respects the established
framework discussed in Chapter II.
3.4 Section A explains why, in the present case, the Court should follow the approach it
took to the General Assembly’s previous request for advice relating to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict in Construction of a Wall to avoid disturbing the established negotiating framework.
Section B then details how the questions referred in this proceeding implicate the principle of
consent to judicial settlement to a far greater extent than in Construction of a Wall, by inviting
the Court to address issues that form the very subject matter of the dispute and address matters
the Security Council and General Assembly have repeatedly recognized must be resolved
through direct negotiations between the parties.
presented by the referral resolution where: (1) the question was not adequately formulated, (2) the Court
determined on the basis of its examination of the background to the request that the request did not reflect the
“legal questions really in issue,” or (3) the question asked was unclear or vague). The Court has repeatedly
exercised this discretion when called upon by the facts of a case, or the substance or text of a referral resolution.
See, e.g., Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 348, ¶ 46 (Court clarifying vague or ambiguous referral question); Interpretation
of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt [hereinafter 1951 Agreement], Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 87-89, ¶¶ 34-36 (referral question did not correspond to the “true legal question” under
consideration); Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV),
Advisory Opinion, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 16 (I), pp. 14-16 (referral question did not accurately state the
question on which the Court’s opinion was being sought); see also Chagos, Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Donoghue, 2019 I.C.J. at 266, ¶ 22 (“The Court could have chosen, in the exercise of its discretion, to
provide a more limited response to the Request (possibly reformulating the Request in order to do so). Such a
response would have provided legal guidance to the General Assembly without undermining the integrity of the
Court’s judicial function.”).
45 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. at 26-27, ¶¶ 39, 42; see Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24, ¶ 32 (determining that issuance of an advisory opinion
was not to assist the Security Council in peacefully resolving a dispute between States, but to gain legal advice on
the “consequences and implications of these decisions”).
46 1951 Agreement, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. at 76, ¶ 10.
18
A. The Court’s Respect for the Role of the Security Council and General Assembly
in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Established Negotiating
Framework in Construction of a Wall Remains Appropriate
3.5 The relationship between the Court and the other principal organs of the United Nations
has been described as one of “coordination and functional cooperation in the attainment of the
common goals of the Organization.”47 In this regard, in exercising both its contentious and
advisory jurisdiction, the Court has been mindful of the respective competencies of the
principal political organs in matters of international peace and security.48 As Judge Azevedo
stated in Interpretation of Peace Treaties:
[T]he Court, which has been raised to the status of a principal organ, and thus
more closely geared into the mechanism of the [United Nations Organization],
must do its utmost to co-operate with the other organs with a view to attaining
the aims and principles that have been set forth.49
3.6 In exercising its advisory jurisdiction, the Court has appropriately recognized that its
function is to assist the relevant UN organs in carrying out their tasks,50 while respecting the
responsibilities and decisions of the Security Council and General Assembly in matters of
peace and security and taking care to avoid a result that could undermine or render those
decisions inconsequential.51 It follows that in addressing the questions referred in resolution
47 V. Gowlland-Debbas & M. Forteau, Art. 7 UN Charter, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE – A COMMENTARY 135, p. 146 (A. Zimmermann et al., eds., 3rd ed. 2019).
48 See infra ¶ 3.10.
49 Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Azevedo, 1950 I.C.J. at 79, 82; see also 1
MALCOLM N. SHAW, ROSENNE’S LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2015, pp. 110-111
(5th ed. 2016):
. . . in general it cannot be doubted that the mutual relations of the principal organs should be
based upon a general theory of co-operation between them in the pursuit of the aims of the
Organization (subject to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security).
This approach opens the way to a functional conception of the task of the Court in its
capacity of a principal organ of the United Nations. According to this, subject to overriding
considerations of law (including judicial propriety), the Court, in exercising its judicial function
or decision a dispute (Statute, Article 38, paragraph 1) or rendering an advisory opinion
(Charter, Article 96 and Statute, Article 65, paragraph 1) must co-operate in the attainment of
the aims of the Organization and strive to give effect to the decisions of other principal organs,
and not achieve results which would render them inconsequential.
50 See, e.g., Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. at 403, ¶ 421; Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. at 159, ¶ 50; Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1989, pp. 177, 188-89, ¶ 31; Reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 15, 19.
51 See, e.g., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
Declaration of Judge Ni, pp. 20, 22; id. at 22 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
19
77/247, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to scope any opinion in a manner that
does not negate or undermine the established framework the Security Council and General
Assembly have decided is the best and only path to a durable peace. In this regard, the Court’s
approach in Construction of a Wall is instructive.
3.7 In Construction of a Wall, the Court considered the propriety of advising the General
Assembly on aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict arising out of a discrete act, Israel’s
construction of a separation barrier. The Court was careful to note that the question asked by
the General Assembly was “confined to the legal consequences of the construction of the
wall,”52 and the Court took care not to undermine the established negotiating framework
created and supported by Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. The Court
avoided rendering an opinion that would have appeared to dictate the outcome of the final
status issues that the parties agreed to negotiate, examining only “other issues to the extent that
they might be necessary for its consideration of the question put to it,” and noting that the
broader conflict “can be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith of all
relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).”53
3.8 In those proceedings, the Court carefully considered the role of the United Nations in
addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, it considered whether the referral
question was properly before it in light of Security Council resolution 1515 (2003), a then
recently passed resolution endorsing a specific plan for achieving a negotiated resolution to the
conflict based on the established negotiating framework. It cited the responsibilities of the
United Nations in questions relating to international peace and security, and explained that,
“[w]ithin the institutional framework of the Organization, this responsibility has been
manifested by the adoption of many Security Council and General Assembly resolutions”54
related to the conflict.
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 392, 434, ¶ 95)
(stating that the Court’s reference in Military and Paramilitary Activities to “complementary functions should not
be overlooked” and discussing how the functions of the political and judicial principal organs may address
different aspects of the same matter "[b]ut these functions may be correlated with each other. What would be
required between the two is co-ordination and co-operation, not competition or mutual exclusion.”); see also 1
SHAW, supra note 49 at 111; Gowlland-Debbas & Forteau, supra note 47, at 147.
52 Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 160, ¶ 54.
53 Id. at 200-01, ¶ 162 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 159, ¶ 49.
20
3.9 The Court specifically recognized that “[t]he ‘Roadmap’ approved by Security Council
resolution 1515 (2003) represent[ed] the most recent of efforts to initiate negotiations to this
end,”55 and drew to the General Assembly’s attention
the need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as
possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the
outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side
by side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in
the region.56
3.10 This recognition of the responsibilities of these other principal organs of the United
Nations concerning the conflict is consistent with the Court’s identification in other contexts
of the need for caution in dealing with questions related to the particular areas of competence
of the different bodies within the United Nations.57 The case for such an approach is even
more compelling with respect to the questions now before the Court.
3.11 In Construction of a Wall, the Court recognized that it was through Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions that the United Nations has defined its interest in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Those same resolutions, many of which to this day continue to be adopted
annually or biannually by the General Assembly – including the very resolution requesting this
advisory opinion, time and again endorse the proposition that this dispute can only be resolved
through negotiation on the basis of the principle of “land for peace” first established in Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338, and within the established framework. They emphasize “the
need for full compliance with” the established framework for the parties to the conflict to
55 Id. at 201, ¶ 162.
56 Id. at 200-01, ¶ 162; see also id. ¶ 161 (taking the opportunity to “emphasize the urgent necessity for the United
Nations as a whole to redouble its efforts to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to pose a threat
to international peace and security, to a speedy conclusion, thereby establishing a just and lasting peace in the
region.”).
57 “In assessing the propriety of rendering an advisory opinion in any given case, consideration must be given to
the particular responsibilities accorded to the Court within the architecture of the United Nations Charter.”
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Sepulveda-Amor, 2010 I.C.J. at 492-93, ¶¶ 8-9 (Court’s
own responsibilities on maintenance of international peace and security guides it in how to apply resolutions); see
also Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skotnikov, 2010 I.C.J. at 517-18, ¶ 8 (quoting
Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 8, p. 37 (“It is an established principle that the right to
giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify
or suppress it”)); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports
1992, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 145 ("[I]t is as a rule not the Court's role to exercise
appellate jurisdiction in respect of decisions taken by the Security Council in the fulfilment of its fundamental
mission of maintaining international peace and security").
21
resolve their disputes.58 The shaping and continuing support in these resolutions of the
established framework as the means to resolve permanent status issues, including borders and
security arrangements, are critical not only for identifying the United Nations’ interest in this
matter, but also for understanding the referral itself and the appropriate scope for the Court’s
consideration.59
3.12 The Court in Construction of a Wall ultimately concluded that it was unclear what
influence the Court’s opinion in that proceeding might have on negotiations, including those
called for under Security Council resolution 1515, and accordingly did not regard negotiations
as a compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.60 The same is far from true here,
where the referral questions posed are fundamentally different in nature and scope. In contrast
to the narrow question confronting the Court in Construction of a Wall, the questions presented
in these proceedings have potentially far-reaching implications for issues at the very center of
negotiations. Some championing the referral have gone so far as to state that before the Court
is “the entire question of Palestine” – effectively suggesting the Court opine definitively on all
aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.61
3.13 There is no denying that the questions here could invite sweeping advice, absent careful
consideration and respect for the framework endorsed by the Security Council and General
Assembly and adopted by the parties to the dispute. The first question asks the Court about
the legal consequences from three broad categories of alleged acts: (1) “violation by Israel of
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination”; (2) Israel’s “prolonged occupation,
settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967”; and (3) “related
discriminatory legislation and measures.” The second question asks the Court to weigh in on
the “legal status” of the Israeli occupation, in toto, including with respect to the legal
consequences for the United Nations and States. Collectively, these questions – with their
conclusory and one-sided framing – could easily be construed as seeking an opinion on the
58 G.A. Res. 77/247, Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/247 (Dec. 30, 2022) [Dossier No. 3].
59 See Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, 2004 I.C.J. at 265, ¶ 14
(“[T]he Court . . . should focus its task on offering its objective findings of law to the extent necessary and useful
to the requesting organ, the General Assembly, in carrying out its functions relating to this question, rather than
adjudicating on the subject-matter of the dispute between the parties concerned.”).
60 Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 160, ¶ 53.
61 Permanent Observer Briefs Palestinian Rights Committee on Situation in Occupied Territory Situation,
Submissions Guidelines for Opinion Case to the World Court, U.N. Doc. GA/PAL/1452 (May 3, 2023), available
at https://press.un.org/en/2023/gapal1452.doc.htm (last visited July 17, 2023).
22
very issues the General Assembly and Security Council have continually reinforced must be
resolved through direct negotiations between the parties.
3.14 But again, General Assembly resolution 77/247 reaffirms “the need for full compliance
with” the established framework for the parties to the conflict to resolve their dispute. The
referral therefore places the Court in the unenviable position of having to consider how to
address the potentially far-reaching questions without disturbing the established negotiating
framework the General Assembly itself invoked in seeking this advisory opinion.
3.15 That the referral questions themselves may suggest the Court is invited to consider
advising beyond this framework was cause for concern even as the General Assembly
considered them. As noted in Chapter II, sixty fewer UN Member States voted in favor of
resolution 77/247 as compared to its previous iteration without the referral, resolution 75/98.62
In the Fourth Committee and at the General Assembly plenary, States expressed concerns that
the request for an advisory opinion would not facilitate, but rather would impede, resolution
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and would not serve the aim of bringing the parties back to
dialogue.63 Some noted that there was insufficient notice that the advisory opinion request had
been added to the resolution and that there was inadequate consultation and discussion.64 The
United States thus is but one of a number of Member States that expressed reservations with
the referral aspect of the resolution and, particularly, its potential negative impact on the
prospect of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the future.
62 See supra ¶¶ 2.22-2.23.
63 U.N. GAOR, 77th Sess., 56th plen. Mtg., at 3-6, U.N. Doc. A/77/PV.56 (Resumption 1) (Dec. 30, 2022)
(statements of Mongolia, Romania and the United Kingdom); U.S. Statements before the Fourth Committee, supra
note 1; see also United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Fourth Committee, Concluding Its Work,
Approves Six Draft Resolutions, Including Request for ICJ Opinion on Israeli Occupation, U.N. Doc.
GA/SPD/771 (Nov. 11, 2022), available at https://press.un.org/en/2022/gaspd771.doc.htm (last visited July 17,
2023)(summarizing statements of Australia, Israel, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Uruguay). (The
official Fourth Committee meeting records for these dates are not yet available.)
64 See e.g., Journal of the United Nations, Statement of France, on behalf of the European Union, 77th Sess., 26th
plen. Mtg. of the UNGA Fourth Committee (Nov. 11, 2022), available at https://journal.un.org/en/newyork/
meeting/officials/f7d34375-ae42-43fa-cd84-08da63695862/2022-11-11/statementsid (last visited July 17,
2023) (emphasizing that “requests for advisory opinions from the ICJ should be thoroughly discussed and
consulted with the UN membership”); Ambassador Mills, supra note 1. Even States that voted in favor of the
resolution noted the decision to seek an advisory opinion was not thoroughly considered. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR,
77th Sess., 56th plen. Mtg., at 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/77/PV.56 (Resumption 1) (Dec. 30, 2022) (statement of Malta
emphasizing that the request for an advisory opinion “would have benefited from further discussion and
consultations with the wider United Nations Membership;” and statement of Portugal noting “reasonable
procedural doubts” about the paragraph seeking an advisory opinion and that “there should have been more indepth
consultations.”).
23
3.16 The Court’s approach to the question in Construction of a Wall is instructive for
informing the Court in its approach to the questions referred by resolution 77/247.65 The Court
there addressed whether certain violations of international law had occurred and the legal
consequences of such violations, such as that Israel was under an obligation to end the conduct
giving rise to identified violations. In doing so, however, the Court navigated a course that did
not prejudge or interfere with the existing framework for negotiations and its “land for peace”
principle. The Court here should again give special consideration to the functions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly in addressing the conflict and take care to calibrate
its advice to preserve the established framework and avoid prejudicing the ability of the parties
to negotiate within it matters at the heart of the dispute, such as borders and security
arrangements.
3.17 If the Court strays from this approach, there is substantial risk that, rather than
facilitating the work of the United Nations to return the parties to negotiations and full respect
for the established framework, the Court’s advice could prejudge or inadvertently suggest to
the parties that there is no utility to negotiations on the interdependent elements of the land for
peace principle that the Security Council and General Assembly have so long endorsed and
encouraged. Such an opinion would be contrary to, rather than considerate of, relevant UN
resolutions and the work of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and thus would
not assist the General Assembly in the proper exercise of its functions.
B. Going Beyond the Established Negotiating Framework Would Risk Impinging
Upon the Principle of Consent
3.18 The Court has long maintained that there would be “compelling reasons” to decline to
give an advisory opinion where it “would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a
State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its
consent.”66 In Construction of a Wall, the Court rejected the contention that its opinion on the
65 Of note in this regard, the Court reached conclusions in that proceeding on the legal consequences of settlement
activity, actions that alter the demographic composition, character and status of the Occupied Palestinian
Territories – including East Jerusalem, and policies and practices that hinder the exercise of the Palestinian right
to self-determination. The Court urged an end to all such violations it identified, and, as relevant, reparations. See
Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 184, 201-02, ¶¶ 120-22, 163.
66 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. at 25, ¶ 33; see also Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. at 136, ¶ 14; id., Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, at 265, ¶ 13 (stressing that even if the General
Assembly’s request is not intended to bring before the Court a legal dispute, it remains the case that rendering a
response to a request would be incompatible with the Court’s judicial function if doing so would be “tantamount
to adjudicating on the very subject-matter of the underlying concrete bilateral dispute”); Case of Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943, Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32; Status of Eastern
Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, pp. 28-29.
24
narrower question in that proceeding would have that effect. The Court supported this position
by pointing to the responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to international
peace and security, a responsibility that “has been manifested by the adoption of many Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions” related to Middle East Peace.67
3.19 Here in contrast, the referral questions are framed to implicate a wide range of issues
that go to the disputes at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the status of the
territory in question.68 Yet not only has there been no consent to judicial settlement of these
matters by the Court, but also the referral questions invite the Court to opine on the alleged
actions of only one party to the dispute, without also opining on the acts or omissions of the
Palestinian Authority, Palestine Liberation Organization or other entities.69 Moreover, as
stated already, both the Security Council and General Assembly have continued to maintain
that, for there to be an enduring peace, the permanent status issues encompassed in the dispute
must be resolved through direct negotiations.
3.20 As discussed above, the Court found in Construction of a Wall that the effect of its
opinion on the negotiating framework was too unclear to regard as a compelling factor in
considering the discretion and propriety aspects of its advisory jurisdiction. Such a finding is
not plausible here where the questions presented invite an opinion that is substantially
equivalent to adjudicating on the very subject matter of those negotiations. An opinion by the
Court that would seemingly or effectively resolve a permanent status issue, set aside the
parties’ agreed interim allocations of authority and responsibility, or advise that a legal
consequence of Israel’s actions is that it is required to withdraw from the occupied territories
without the comprehensive, just and lasting peace envisioned as a result of “land for peace”,
could contravene and significantly risk supplanting the established framework. It could harm
67 Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 158-59, ¶ 49.
68 Moreover, unlike the question posed in Construction of a Wall, here the referral questions are drafted to establish
the very conclusions about which they inquire. As the Court explained in Kosovo, where a matter remains
contested and is capable of affecting the answer to the legal question posed to the Court, “[i]t would be
incompatible with the proper exercise of the judicial function for the Court to treat that matter as having been
determined by the General Assembly.” Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. at 424, ¶ 52. Both of the questions
at issue in the present proceedings implicate this principle. G.A. Res. 77/247, Israeli practices affecting the human
rights of the Palestinian people in Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, ¶ 18(a), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/77/247 (Dec. 30, 2022) [Dossier No. 3] (referring to the “ongoing violation” by Israel of the Palestinians’
right to self-determination, characterizing Israel as engaging in various measures “aimed at altering” final status
issues such as Jerusalem, and stipulating that Israel has adopted “discriminatory legislation and measures”); id. at
¶ 18(b) (asking Court to opine on the legal status of the occupation and legal consequences on the basis of the
assumed factual predicates in the first question).
69 Cf. Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 200, ¶ 162 (noting that “[i]llegal actions and
unilateral decisions have been taken on all sides.”).
25
the parties’ ability to negotiate a settlement to their dispute, including by inadvertently
complicating efforts to de-escalate rising tensions in the West Bank, such as meetings in the
fledgling Aqaba-Sharm El Sheikh format, entrenching the parties in their positions, and driving
them further apart. It could also encourage elements on either side to engage in actions that
further harm, rather than advance, the prospect of a just and lasting negotiated peace.
3.21 That the Court should consider how to avoid impinging on the very subject matter of
the underlying dispute further follows from the Court’s advisory opinion in Western Sahara.
There, the Court noted that advising the General Assembly on the question of settlement of
Morocco’s rights over the Western Sahara at the time of colonization would not affect the
rights of Spain as the administering power.70 The Court also noted as relevant the fact that the
General Assembly was not seeking the Court’s advice in order to, “on the basis of the Court’s
opinion, exercise its powers and functions for the peaceful settlement of that dispute or
controversy.”71
3.22 Responding to the referral questions here by providing advice that, as a practical matter,
obviates the means prescribed by the Security Council and recognized by the General
Assembly to resolve the dispute – direct negotiations – would place the Court in the role of a
dispute resolution mechanism rather than adviser. While this is a role the Court is necessarily
tasked with in the context of contentious proceedings premised on the parties’ consent, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that its advisory jurisdiction is distinct and not the appropriate
means of resolving a dispute between parties.72 The Court should continue to be mindful of
this distinction and decline the invitation of those who would seek to avoid or undermine direct
negotiations by asking the Court to decide on the issues that the parties and the Security
Council and General Assembly have identified as forming the heart of the dispute and that can
only be resolved through such negotiations. It is vital that, every effort be made to preserve
70 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. at 27, ¶ 42.
71 Id. at pp. 26-27, ¶ 39; see also Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins,
2004 I.C.J. at 210, ¶¶ 12-13.
72 See Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, 2010 I.C.J. at 503, ¶ 15 (“It is essential
for the Court to ensure, in performing its advisory function, that it is not exploited in favour of one specifically
political strategy or another . . . .”); Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins,
2004 I.C.J. at 210, ¶¶ 12-13; see also Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. at 27, ¶ 42 (lack of consent
a less significant factor in favor of discretionary refusal where legal position was not deemed to be compromised
by Court’s opinion); Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. at 72 (where the request for an advisory
opinion concerned the procedure for dispute resolution but not the merits of the underlying disputes, “the legal
position of the parties to these disputes cannot be in any way compromised by the answers that the Court may
give”).
26
the established framework and create the conditions for a return of the parties to direct
negotiations where they can resolve all permanent status issues. It is also vital that the parties
be encouraged to refrain from unilateral actions at cross purposes with such a return.
27
CHAPTER IV
THE REFERRAL INVITES EXAMINATION OF THE ESTABLISHED
FRAMEWORK ON THE BASIS OF ASSUMPTIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
4.1 As noted, to fulfill its duties, the Court “must first ascertain the meaning and full
implications of the question in the light of the actual framework of fact and law in which it
falls for consideration.”73
4.2 The second referred question rests on a faulty premise. It asks the Court to opine on
how the policies, practices and alleged violations referred to in the first question, including
Israel’s prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of occupied territory “affect the legal
status of the occupation.” The straightforward answer is the legal status of the occupation
under international humanitarian law results from the fact of occupation alone. The legal status
of a belligerent occupation under international humanitarian law does not change if the
occupation is prolonged or if alleged violations of international humanitarian law or other
international law have been committed by the Occupying Power.74
4.3 Under customary international law, as reflected in Article 42 of the Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (“Hague IV Regulations”), territory is considered occupied
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.75 The occupation extends
only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.76 The
fact of occupation is the basis for the Occupying Power to exercise authority, including through
a security presence, over the occupied territory and for the application of a framework of legal
rights and duties to which the Occupying Power is bound.77 Although belligerent occupation
73 1951 Agreement, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. at 76, ¶10.
74 States must adhere to the jus in bello—including the law of belligerent occupation— regardless of whether a
State may be considered the aggressor or whether the initial resort to force was lawful under the jus ad bellum. In
an occupation resulting from aggression, the fact of occupation continues to be recognized under the jus in bello
and the rights and duties of the Occupying Power continue to apply.
75 Hague IV Regulations, art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 CTS 277; Construction of a Wall, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 167, ¶ 78; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 229-30, ¶ 172.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 230, ¶ 173 (“In order to reach a conclusion as to whether a State, the military forces of which are
present on the territory of another State as a result of an intervention, is an ‘occupying Power’ in the meaning of
the term as understood in the jus in bello, the Court must examine whether there is sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the said authority was in fact established and exercised by the intervening State in the areas in
question.”)
28
is temporary in nature, international humanitarian law continues to apply for however long an
occupation exists in fact.78
4.4 In Construction of a Wall, the Court opined that Israel had violated particular
prohibitions under international humanitarian law applicable to Occupying Powers and
accordingly that Israel must cease such violations and provide compensation for them.79 At
the same time, the Court recognized that Israel’s status as an Occupying Power had continued
for many years and affirmed the applicability of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Fourth Geneva Convention”) to the territory
occupied by Israel since 1967.80
4.5 The Security Council and General Assembly have declared that any actions to change
the status of occupied territory are null and void and do not affect the continued application of
the Fourth Geneva Convention.81 Occupation law also makes clear that protected persons in
occupied territory remain subject to the protections of that law, regardless of any purported
legal changes introduced by the Occupying Power, until the occupation ceases.82
4.6 As it did in Construction of a Wall, should the Court address the second question, it
should reaffirm that occupation law continues to apply based on the fact of occupation. As the
78 Experts convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross were not able to identify any limits imposed
by international humanitarian law on the duration of an occupation. See TRISTAN FERRARO, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING: OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN TERRITORY
72, (Mar. 2012) (“[T]he participants agreed that IHL did not set any limits to the time span of an occupation. It
was therefore recognized that nothing under IHL would prevent occupying powers from embarking on a longterm
occupation and that occupation law would continue to provide the legal framework applicable.”)
79 E.g., Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 184, 189, 198, ¶¶ 120, 132, 153.
80 Id. at 167, 177, ¶¶ 78, 101.
81 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 478, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980) [Dossier No. 1274] (“Determines that all
legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or
purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent “basic law” on
Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith.”); G.A. Res. 36/120 E, Question of Palestine, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/120 E (Dec. 10, 1981) [Dossier No. 389]; see also G.A. Res. ES-11/4, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/ES-11/4 (Oct. 12, 2022) (“Declares that the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation with regard to the
illegal so-called referendums held from 23 to 27 September 2022 in parts of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and
Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine that, in part, are or have been under the temporary military control of the Russian
Federation, and the subsequent attempted illegal annexation of these regions, have no validity under international
law and do not form the basis for any alteration of the status of these regions of Ukraine.”); S.C. Res. 670, ¶ 13,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (Sept. 25, 1990) (”Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, applies to Kuwait and that, as a High Contracting Party to
the Convention, Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in
respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave
breaches.”); S.C. Res. 662, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990) (“Decides that annexation of Kuwait by
Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void.”).
82 See Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 185-87, ¶ 126 (citing Fourth Geneva Convention,
art. 47).
29
Occupying Power, Israel has important rights and obligations under international humanitarian
law that continue to apply regardless of alleged violations of international humanitarian law or
other international law.83 Thus, to the extent the second question could be construed as asking
the Court to declare that the Israeli occupation has been rendered unlawful or void, the Court
should decline that invitation on the basis that such an assessment is not supported by
international law.
83 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 2005 I.C.J. at 157,
¶ 58 (“In their interrelationship the rules on occupation form an important part of the jus in bello or international
humanitarian law. The main purpose of that law is to protect persons caught up in conflict, even if it does take
into account the interests of the belligerent parties. It does not differentiate between belligerents. In particular,
no distinction is made in the jus in bello between an occupation resulting from a lawful use of force and one which
is the result of aggression. The latter issue is decided by application of the jus ad bellum, the law on the use of
force, which attributes responsibility for the commission of the acts of which the occupation is the result.”).
30
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: A JUST AND LASTING PEACE REQUIRES DIRECT
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
5.1 It remains vital that every effort be made to create the conditions for a return of the
parties to direct negotiations where they can address the permanent status issues central to
realizing the goal of two States living side-by-side in peace and security. As recognized by
the Security Council, the General Assembly, this Court, and the parties themselves, only
through such negotiation within the established framework based on the “land for peace”
principle can a comprehensive, just and lasting resolution to the conflict be achieved. As such,
and in light of the current context, it is urgent that steps are taken by the United Nations, its
Member States, and the parties to create such conditions. It is likewise critical that the Court’s
opinion here serves this objective and does not inadvertently undermine the established
framework, consistent with the interests and proper functions of the Security Council and
General Assembly and the fundamental principle of consent to judicial settlement.
5.2 That direct permanent status negotiations between the parties are not currently
occurring does not mean that a negotiated two-State solution is no longer viable. While
escalated violence and deep mistrust may hinder progress, practical steps can still be taken to
create the requisite conditions for a return to the negotiations needed to achieve peace, security,
and the full realization of Palestinian self-determination. As the General Assembly stressed in
its December 2022 resolution “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,” there is a
need to urgently exert collective efforts to launch credible negotiations on all
final status issues in the Middle East peace process . . . and calls once more for
the intensification of efforts by the parties, including through meaningful
negotiations, with the support of the international community, towards the
conclusion of a final just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement . . .84
5.3 Such efforts include, but are not limited to, the meetings in the Aqaba-Sharm El Sheikh
format that began earlier this year, aimed at de-escalation and reinvigorating political dialogue
between the parties. With the support of the United States and regional partners Egypt and
Jordan, the Israelis and Palestinians recommitted themselves to their prior agreements and
affirmed their interest in “consolidating the basis for direct negotiations between the
Palestinians and Israelis, towards achieving comprehensive, just and lasting peace.”85 While
84 G.A. Res. 77/25, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/25 (Nov. 30, 2022) [Dossier No. 516].
85 Sharm Communique, supra note 7.
31
the United States is mindful of the concerns that informed the General Assembly’s decision to
submit its request to the Court, such meetings and dialogue demonstrate the continued
relevance of a negotiated solution and can be built upon by the international community to lay
the groundwork for a return to negotiations, as the Security Council and General Assembly
have urged. The parties have also continued, despite difficulties and overt differences, to
maintain contacts that reinforce principles to which they agreed in the Oslo Accords, especially
on security cooperation.86
5.4 To make progress, however, it is also essential that the parties abide by their
commitments and agreements and cease unilateral actions that do nothing but exacerbate
tensions, hinder the prospect of a two-State solution, and drive them further from peace. These
unilateral actions include advancement of settlements, the pursuit of statehood objectives
outside of negotiations, demolition of homes, and the incitement to or glorification of acts of
violence.87 When the Israelis and Palestinians pursue such unilateral measures instead of
negotiation in the established framework, violence and mistrust rise and serve neither of their
interests. Nor does it serve the purposes of the framework continuously supported by the
Security Council and General Assembly. Instead, the parties must pursue direct negotiation,
as only through negotiations under the established framework can they achieve a durable peace
that gives rise to an independent and viable Palestinian State living safely and securely
alongside Israel, with both populations enjoying equal measures of freedom and prosperity.
As the Court observed in Construction of a Wall, there is an “urgent necessity for the United
Nations as a whole to redouble its efforts to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict . . . to a speedy
conclusion, thereby establishing a just and lasting peace in the region.”88 The Court’s opinion
here should reinforce this exhortation, which remains no less true today.
5.5 While the Court has previously provided an advisory opinion on a discrete aspect of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the expansive yet one-sided and conclusory questions presented
86 See supra note 35.
87 The General Assembly recently called upon
both parties to act responsibly and in compliance with international law and their previous
agreements and obligations, in both their policies and actions, in order to, with the support of
the Quartet and other interested parties, urgently reverse negative trends, including all measures
taken on the ground that are contrary to international law, and create the conditions necessary
for a credible political horizon and the advancement of peace efforts.
G.A. Res. 77/25, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/25 (Nov. 30, 2022) [Dossier No. 516]; see also id. ¶ 7 (“[s]tresses the
need, in particular, for an immediate halt to all settlement activities, land confiscation and home demolitions”).
88 Construction of a Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 200, ¶ 161.
32
here could be understood to invite the Court to resolve the very permanent status issues that
the parties agreed to negotiate in the Oslo Accords, and to draw legal conclusions that strike at
the heart of the interdependent “land for peace” principle that is the foundation of the
established negotiating framework continually endorsed and supported by the United Nations.
5.6 The Court, to preserve the integrity of its judicial function, should exercise its discretion
to render its opinion with due respect for the responsibilities both the Security Council and
General Assembly have exercised in addressing this conflict through a negotiating framework,
and consistent with the principle of consent. It is imperative for the Court to ensure that its
opinion, even if addressing legal consequences of alleged violations of international law, is
tailored to preserve the parties’ ability to negotiate peace and a two-State solution consistent
with the established framework stemming from Security Council resolutions 242 and 338,
continually supported by the General Assembly and adopted in the agreements of the parties.89
If the Court were to identify any concerns with its ability to address the questions referred
within the established negotiating framework, it is essential that the Court exercise its
discretion to opine on matters such that it does not imperil that framework.
5.7 The United States respectfully urges the Court to proceed with caution in weighing its
response to the General Assembly’s request. Were the Court to issue an opinion that
encompasses “the entire Question of Palestine,”90 as some have suggested, or that prejudices
or seemingly decides permanent status issues reserved for negotiations, such as borders and
security arrangements, this would not advance the objectives of the established negotiating
framework, help develop the conditions for a negotiated peace, or ultimately serve the interests
and functions of the United Nations. Accordingly, the referral questions should be understood
as a request for advice aimed at facilitating the General Assembly’s proper role and function
in promoting a negotiated resolution to the conflict within the established framework. The
Court’s opinion should advance that objective.91
89 See G.A. Res. 77/25, Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/77/25 (Nov. 30,
2022) [Dossier No. 516].
90 Meetings Coverage, U.N. G.A. Comm. on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 411th Mtg.,
Permanent Observer Briefs Palestinian Rights Committee on Situation in Occupied Territory Situation,
Submissions Guidelines for Opinion Case to the World Court, U.N. Doc. GA/PAL/1452 (May 3, 2023), available
at https://press.un.org/en/2023/gapal1452.doc.htm (last visited July 27, 2023).
91 See Chagos, Advisory Opinion, Declaration of Judge Tomka, 2019 I.C.J. at 148, 150, ¶ 6 (“If one can accept
this course of action, one must also exercise caution not to go further than what is strictly necessary and useful
for the requesting organ.”).

July 25, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
Richard C. Visek
Acting Legal Adviser
United States Department of State

CERTIFICATION
I, Richard C. Visek, representative of the United States of America, hereby certify that the
copies of this statement and all documents annexed to it are true copies of the originals.
Acting Legal Adviser
United States Department of State
July 25, 2023

1
List of Annexes Accompanying the Written Statement
of the United States of America
July 25, 2023
ANNEX DESCRIPTION
1 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967) [Dossier No. 1245]
2 S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973)
3 Exchange of Letters between Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, and Yasser
Arafat, PLO Chairman, concerning Israel-PLO Recognition (Sept. 9, 1993)
4 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, A/48/486-
S/26560 (Sept. 13, 1993) [Dossier No. 1302]
5 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
A/51/889-S/1997/357 (Sept. 28, 1995) [Dossier No. 1306]

ANNEX 1

Annex 1
Decisions
At its 1373rd meeting, on 9 November 1967, the
Council decided to invite the representatives of
the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan to participate
, without vote, in the discussion of the item
entitled " The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated
7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President
of the Security Council ( S/8226) ".11
At its 1375th meeting, on 13 November 1967 , the
Council decided to in vite the rep rese ntativ e of Syria
to participate, without vote , in the di sc u ssion of th e
question.
Resolution 242 (1967)
of 22 November 1967
Th e S ecurity Council ,
Expressing its continuing concern with the gravl'
situatibn in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmis sibility of the acquisition
of territory by war and th e need to work for a just
and lasting peace in which every State in th e area can
live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
accept ance of the Charter of the United Nations have
undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,
l. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles
requires the esta bli shment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East which should include the application
of both th e following principles:
( i ) \Vithdra\val of Israel armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termin ation of all cl aims or states of belligerency
and respect for and ac knowledgement of
the sovereignty, territori a l integrity and political
independ ence of every State in the area and
their right to liv e in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts
of force;
2. Affirms furth er the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of naviga tion through
international waterways in the area;
( b) For achieving a ju st settlement of the refugee
problem;
( c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
political independence of every State in the • area ,
11 Ibid.
8
Decisions
A sa 1373• seance, le 9 novembre 1967, le Conseil
a decide d'inviter Je s representants de la Republique
arabe unie, d'Israel et de la Jordanie a participer, sans
droit de vote, a la discussion de la question intitule e
''La situation au Moyen-Orient : Lettre, en date du
7 novembre 1967, adressee au President du Conseil de
sec urite par le representant permanent de la Republique
arabe unie ( S/822611 ) ".
A sa 137Se seance, le 13 novembre 1967, le Conseil
a decide d'inviter le representant de la Syrie a participer,
sans droit de vote, a la discussion de la question.
Resolution 242 (1967)
du 22 novembre 1967
Le Conscil d e scezt rit c,
Exprimant !'inquie tude que co ntinue de lui causer
ia grave situation au Moyen-Orient,
Soulignant l'inadmissibilite de !'acquisition de territoir
e par la guerre et la necessite d'ceuvrer pour une
paix juste et durable permettan.t a chaqu e Etat de la
region de vivre en sec urite, ,
Soulignant c11 outre que tous Jes Etats Membres, en
acceptant la Charle des Nations Unies, ont contracte
!'engage ment d'agir conformement a !'Article 2 de la
Charte,
1. A ffirme que l'accomplissement de s principes de
la Charte exige l'in s taurati on d'une paix juste et durab
le au Moyen-Orient qui devrait comprendre !'application
des deu x principes s uivants :
i ) Retrait des forces a rmees israeliennes des territoi
res occupes !ors du recent conflit ;
ii ) Ce ss ation de toutes assertions de belligerance ou
de tous etats de helligerance et respect et recon na
issance de la souve rainete, de l'integrite tt:rritoriale
et de l'ind epe ndance politiqu e de chaqu e
Etat de la r egio n et de leur droit de vivre en
paix a l'i11t e1 ieur de frontieres sures et reconnues
a l'abri de menaces ou d'actes de force;
2. Affinnc en outre la neces site
a. ) De garantir la licerte de navigation sur les voies
d'eau internatio n ales de la region;
b) De reali ser llll j uste reglement du probleme des
refugies;
c) De garantir l'invi olabilite territoriale et l'indepen<
lance politique de chaque Etat de la region, par
11 I bid .
Annex 1
through measures including the establishment of demilitarized
zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a
Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East
to establish and maintain contacts with the States
concerned in order to promote agreement and assist
efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement
in accordance with the provisions and principles in
this resolution ;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the progress of the efforts of
the Special Representative as sooa as possible.
Adopted unanimously at the
1382nd meeting.
Decision
On 8 December 1967, the following statement which
reflected the view of the members of the Council was
circulated by the President as a Security Council document
( S/8289) :12
"As regards document S /8053 / Add.3, 12 brought to
the attention of the Security Council, the members,
recalling the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting
on 9 July 1967, recognize the necessity of the enlargement
by the Secretary-General of the number of
observers in the Suez Canal zone and the provision
of additional technical material and means of transportation."
THE CYPRUS QUESTION13
Decision
At its 1362nd meeting, on 19 June 1%7, the Council
decided to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey
and Greece to participate, without vote, in the discussion
of the item entitled "Letter dated 26 December
1%3 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus
addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/5488) :14 report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/7%9)".111
12 Ibid.
13 Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted
in 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
14 S~ Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth
Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963.
111 Jbid., Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May
and lune 1967.
9
des mesures comprenant la creation de zones demilitarisees;
3. Prie le Secretaire general de designer Utt representant
special pour se rendre au Moyen-Orient afin
d'y etablir et d'y maintenir des rapports avec les Etats
interesses en vue de favoriser un accord et de seconder
Jes efforts tendant a aboutir a un reglement pacifique
et accepte, conformement aux dispositions et aux principes
de la presente resolution;
4. Prie le Secretaire general de presenter aussitot
que possible au Conseil de securite un rapport d'activite
sur les efforts CU representant special.
Adoptee a l'unanimite a la
13826 seance.
Decision
Le 8 decembre 1967, le President a fait distribuer,
en tant que document du Conseil ( S/828912
), la declaration
ci-apres qui refletait l'avis des membres du
Conseil :
"En ce qui concerne le document S/8053/ Add.312
,
soumis a !'attention du Conseil de securite, Jes membres
de celui--ci, rappelant le consensus intervenu a
sa 1366• seance, le 9 juillet 1%7, reconnaissent la
necessite de l'accroissement, par le Secretaire general,
du nombre des observateurs clans le secteur du canal
de Suez et de la mise a la disposition de ceux-{:i de
materiel technique et de moyens de transport supplementaires."
LA QUESTION DE CHYPRE13
Decision
A sa 1362" seance, le 19 juin 1967, le Conseil a
decide d'inviter les representant de Ohypre, de la Turquie
et de la Grece a participer, sans droit de vote. a la discussion de la question intitulee "Lettre, en date
du 26 decembre ~963, adressee au President du Conseit
de securite par le representant permanent de Chypre
(S/548814 ) : rapport du Secretaire general sur l'Operation
des Nations Unies a Chypre (S/7969111)".
12 Ibid.
18 Question ayant fait l'obiet de resolutions ou decisions de
la part du Conseii en 1963, 1964, 1965 et 1966.
14 Voir Documents officiels du Conseil de securite, disliuitieme
annee, Supplement d'octobre, 1t0T1embre et decembre
1963.
111 Jbid., vingt-deurieme annee, Supplement d'avril, mai et
juin 1967.
ANNEX 2

Annex 2
Resolution 338 (1973)
of 22 October 1973
The Security Council
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to
cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately,
no laiter than 12 hours after the moment of
the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now
occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned ,to start immediately
after the cease-fire the implementaition of Security
Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with
the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties
concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at
establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle
East.
Adopted at the 1747Jh meet.
ing by 14 votes to ,wne21
-i7 One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

ANNEX 3

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Annex 3
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Annex 3
ANNEX 4

UNITED NATIONS A S
General Assembly
Security Council
Annex 4
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 10
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION
Distr.
GENERAL
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year
Letter dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent Representatives
of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
As co-sponsors of the peace process launched at Madrid in October 1991 and
witnesses to the signing at Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993 of the
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, including its
Annexes, and its Agreed Minutes, by the Government of the State of Israel and
the Palestine Liberation Organization, we have the honour to enclose the above
document (see annex).
We would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its
attachment circulated as an official document of the forty-eighth session of the
General Assembly, under agenda item 10, and of the Security Council.
(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations of the
United States of America
93-54838 (E) 121093
(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations of
the Russian Federation
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Letter dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General
I have the honour to enclose the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment
Arrangements, including its Annexes, and its Agreed Minutes, signed
at Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993 by the Government of the State of
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and witnessed by the United
States of America and the Russian Federation (see annex).
I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment
circulated as an official document of the forty-eighth session of the General
Assembly, under agenda item 10, and of the Security Council.
(Signed) Gad YAACOBI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
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Letter dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General
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I have the honour to enclose the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment
Arrangements, including its Annexes, and its Agreed Minutes, signed
at Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993 by the Government of the State of
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and witnessed by the United
States of America and the Russian Federation (see annex).
I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment
circulated as an official document of the forty-eighth session of the General
Assembly, under agenda item 10, and of the Security Council.
(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations
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ANNEX
Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements
The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the JordanianPalestinian
delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian
Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put
an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual
legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and
mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.
Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:
Article I
AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle
East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the
Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional
period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is understood that
the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and
that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).
Article II
FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this
Declaration of Principles.
Article III
ELECTIONS
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may
govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general
political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and
international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public
order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the
elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of
holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of
this Declaration of Principles.
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3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step
toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and
their just requirements.
Article IV
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory,
except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial
unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.
Article V
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not
later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the
Government of Israel and the Palestinian people's representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues,
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders,
relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common
interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations
should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim
period.
Article VI
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority
from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the
authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This
transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of
the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles
and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to
promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will
be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and
culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. The Palestinian
side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon.
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Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the
transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
Article VII
INTERIM AGREEMENT
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the
interim period (the 11 Interim Agreement 11 ).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of
the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and
responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil
Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the
Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with
Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon
the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the
powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI
above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its
inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian
Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development
Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental
Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration
Authority and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim
Agreement, that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be
dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
Article VIII
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the
Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a
strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for
defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall
security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and
public order.
Article IX
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim
Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
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2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in
force in remaining spheres.
Article X
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of
Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon
the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint IsraeliPalestinian
Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues
requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
Article XI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development
of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this
Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee
will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner
the programmes identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.
Article XII
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to
participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between
the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand,
and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote
cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a
Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of
admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967,
together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other
matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.
Article XIII
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later
than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military
forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to
withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle
that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
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3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented
commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal
security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
Article XIV
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in
the protocol attached as Annex II.
Article XV
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this
Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the
interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison
Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a
mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the
interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon
the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration
Committee.
Article XVI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMMES
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate
instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programmes and other
programmes, including special programmes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as
indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.
Article XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its
signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes
pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
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DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September 1993.
For the Government of Israel: For the PLO:
(Signed) Shimon PERES (Signed) Mahmud ABBAS
Witnessed By:
The United States of America The Russian Federation
(Signed) Warren CHRISTOPHER (Signed) Andrei V. KOZYREV
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ANNEX I
Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate
in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the
following issues:
(a) The system of elections;
(b) The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and
their personal composition;
(c) Rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed
arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing
a broadcasting and television station.
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on
4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the
election process owing to practical reasons.
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ANNEX II
Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of
entry into force of this Declaration of Principles an agreement on the
withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli
military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with
the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be
completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this
agreement.
3. The above agreement will include, among other things:
(a) Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the
Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian
representatives;
(b) Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in
these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign
relations and other mutually agreed matters;
(c) Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order
by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally
and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by
Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from
abroad should be trained as police and police officers;
(d) A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon;
(e) Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and
Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes;
(f) An economic development and stabilization programme including the
establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment and
financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate
jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support
these aims;
(g) Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between
the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
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4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both
parties regarding passages:
(a) Gaza - Egypt;
(b) Jericho - Jordan.
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of
the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration
of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending
the inauguration of the Council.
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and
Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.
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ANNEX III
Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation
in Economic and Development Programmes
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing
Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the
following:
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1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Programme
prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of
cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each
party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for
implementation in and beyond the interim period.
2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity
Development Programme, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the
production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.
3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development
Programme, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial
purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage
further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Programme may also
provide for the construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza
Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.
4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and
Action Programme for the encouragement of international investment in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a
Palestinian Development Bank.
5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a
Programme, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port
Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications
lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other
countries. In addition, this Programme will provide for carrying out the
necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.
6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion
Programmes, which will encourage local, regional and interregional trade, as
well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and
in Israel, mutual access to these zones and cooperation in other areas related
to trade and commerce.
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development
Programmes, which will provide for the establishment of joint IsraeliPalestinian
Industrial Research and Development Centres, will promote
Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in
the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and sciencebased
industries.
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8. A Programme for cooperation in, and regulation of, labour relations and
cooperation in social welfare issues.
9. A Human Resource Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint
Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint
vocational training centres, research institutes and data banks.
10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated
measures in this sphere.
11. A Programme for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of
communications and media.
12. Any other programmes of mutual interest.
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ANNEX IV
Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation
concerning Regional Development Programmes
1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace
efforts in promoting a Development Programme for the region, including the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the Group of Seven. The parties
will request the Group of Seven to seek the participation in this Programme of
other interested States, such as members of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, regional Arab States and institutions, as well as
members of the private sector.
2. The Development Programme will consist of two elements:
(a) An Economic Development Programme for the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip;
(b) A Regional Economic Development Programme.
A. The Economic Development Programme for the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip will consist of the following elements:
(1) A Social Rehabilitation Programme, including a Housing and
Construction Programme;
(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan;
(3) An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity,
transportation and communications, etc.);
(4) A Human Resources Plan;
(5) Other programmes.
B. The Regional Economic Development Programme may consist of the
following elements:
(1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first
step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step;
(2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for
coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area;
(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal;
(4) Regional desalinization and other water development projects;
(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a
coordinated regional effort for the prevention of
desertification;
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(6) Interconnection of electricity grids;
(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and
industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources;
(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications
Development Plan;
(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres.
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups and will
coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage
inter-sessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies,
within the various multilateral working groups.
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Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to
the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be
subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these
Agreed Minutes below.
B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS
Article IV
It is understood that:
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory,
except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations:
Jerusalem, settlements, military locations and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers,
responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.
Article VI (2)
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the
authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and
responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the
Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture,
health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities
agreed upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not
be affected.
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing
budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed
upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments
required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct
taxation office.
4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and
Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed
plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the
above understandings.
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Article VII (2)
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and
cooperation.
Article VII (5)
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from
exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
Article VIII
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for
cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also
agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian
police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim
Agreement.
Article X
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of
Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of
the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian
Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal
number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach
decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and
experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and
place or places of its meetings.
ANNEX II
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will
continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and
public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians
may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.
DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September 1993.
For the Government of Israel: For the PLO:
(Signed) Shimon PERES (Signed) Mahmud ABBAS
Witnessed By:
The United States of America The Russian Federation
(Signed) Warren CHRISTOPHER (Signed) Andrei V. KOZYREV
ANNEX 5

UNITED
NATIONS AS
• General Assembly
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 10
SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION
Letter dated 27 December 1995 from the Permanent Representatives
of the Russian Federation and the United states of America to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
As co-sponsors of the peace process launched at Madrid in October 1991, and
witnesses to the signing at Washington, o.c., on 28 September 1995, of the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, by
the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, we have the
honour to enclose the above document (see annex).
We would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its
attachment circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under
agenda item 10, and of the Security Council.
(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States of
America to the United Nations
230797
(Signed) Sergey v. LAVROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations
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Letter dated 28 December 1995 from the Peni.anent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the secretary-General
I have the honour to enclose the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed at Washington, D.c., on
28 September 1995, by the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization and witnessed by the United States of America, the
Russian Federation, Egypt, Jordan, Norway and the European Union (see annex).
I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment:
circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda
item 10, and of the Security Council.
(Signed) Gad YAACOBI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations
/ ...
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Letter dated 19 December 1995 from the Permanent Observer
of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General
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I have the honour to enclose the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed at Washington, o.c., on
28 September 1995, by the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization and witnessed by the United States of America, the
Russian Federation, Egypt, Jordan, Norway and the European Union (see annex).
I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its attachment
circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda
item 10, and of the Security Council.
(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIOWA
Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the United Nations

ANNEX
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the west Bank
and the Gaza strip*
Washington. o.c .• 28 September 1995
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* The original annexes to the Agreement, including the maps, have been
placed in the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, and are available
for consultation by interested Member States.
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PREAMBLE
INDEX
-····-··················································································
CHAP'fEB J • THE CQJTNCTJ,
8
ARTICLE I Transfer of A.uthority ....................................................... 10
ARTICLE II Elections ................................................................... ,......... 11
ARTICLE ID Structure of the Palestinian Council................................ 11
ARTICLE IV Size of the Council ......................... ~.................................. 12
ARTICLE V The Executive Authority of the Council.......................... 13
ARTICLE VI Other Committees of the Council.................................... 13
ARTICLE VlI Open Government............................................................ 14
ARTICLE 'VIII Judicial Review ................................................................ 14
ARTICLE 1X Powers and Responsibilities of the Council..................... 14
CflAP'J:EB 2 ~ BEPEELPYMENI AND SEOIBIJY ARRANGEMElU:S.
ARTICLE X Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces......................... 16
..AR.TICLE D Land ...................................................................................................................... ._................. 16
..AR.TICLE XII Arrangements for Security and Pu~lic Order .......... ... 18
..AR.TICLE .xm Security' ............................... -······-···••4!' ...................... - ..................... ~ ........ ,,....... 18
ARTICLE XIV The Palestinian Police··----············---····· .................. - 20
AR.TICLE ..XV .Prevention of Hostile Acts .................................... --............... 20
ARTICLE XVI Confidence Building Measures........................................ 21
C'ffAfiB 3 - J,EGAJ, AFFAIRS
ARTICLE .XVU: Jurisdiction .................................................... _ .. ................................................ _....... 21
ARTICLE xvm Legislative Powers of the Council .............. ~..................... 23
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ARTICLE XIX Human Rights and the Rule of Law................................ 24
ARTICLE XX Rights, Liabilities and Obligations.................................. 24
ARTICLE XXI Settlement of Differences and Disputes........................... 25
CHAPTER 4 • CQQPEBAIJQN •
ARTICLE XXIl Relations between Israel and the Council ....................... 26
ARTICLE XX1Il Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and
Responsibilities .............................. •.................................. 26
ARTICLE XXIV Economic Relations.......................................................... 27
ARTICLE XXV Cooperation Programs..................................................... 27
ARTICLE XXVI The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee............ 27
ARTICLE XXVII Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt.......... 28
ARTICLE XXV1Il Missing Persons................................................................ 28
CflA,PllB 5: MJSCEJ,I,A,NEQJJS fBQYISJQNS
ARTICLE XXIX Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 29
.ARTICLE XXX Passages............................................................................ 29
ARTICLE XXXI Final Clauses ... ................................................................. 29
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The Government of the State of Israef and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the
Palestinian people;
PREAJ.\'IBLE
WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at
Madrid in October 1991;
REAFFIR.lVIING their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation
and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security,
while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreted political
process;
RECOGNIZING that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as
well as the new relationship established between the two Parties
as described above, are irreversible, and the determination of the
two Parties to maintain. sustain and continue the peace process;
RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the
current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to
establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e.
the elected Council (hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian
Council"), and the elected Ra' ees of the Executive Authority,
for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
for a transitional period not exceeding .five years frotn the date
of signing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
(hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994,
leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338;
R.EAFFIRi'\rl.IN G their understanding that the interim self-government
arrangements contained in this Agreement are_ an integral part of
the whole peace process, that the negotiations on the permanent
status, that will start as soon as possible but not later than May
4, 1996, will lead to the implementation of Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the Interim Agreement shall
settle all the issues of the interim period and that no such issues
will be deferred to the agenda of the permanent status
negotiations;
REAFFIRIVIING their adherence to the mutual recogmuon and commitments
expressed in the letters dated September 9, 199'3, signed by and
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DESIROUS
ex:changed between the Prime Minister of Israel and the
Chairman of the PLO;
of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements signed at Washington, DC on
September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto
(hereinafter "the DOP") and in particular Article m and Acnex I
concerning the holding of direct, free and general political
elections for the Council and the Ra' ees of the Executive
Authority in order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank,
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip may democratically elect
accountable representatives;
RECOGNIZIN'G that these elections will constitute a significant interim
preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will
provide a democratic basi~ for the establishment of Palestinian
institutions;
REAFFIRMING their mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this
Agreement, immediately, efficiently and effectively against acts
or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether
committed by Palestinians or Israelis;
FOLLOWING the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory
Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Erez on
August 29, 1994 (hereinafter "the Preparatory Transfer
Agreement"); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers
and Responsibilities signed at Cairo on August 27, 1995
(hereinafter "the Further Transfer Protocol"); which three
agreements will be superseded by this Agreement;
HEREBY AGREE as follows:
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CHAPTER I -THE COUNCIL
ARTICLE I
Transfer of Authoritv
1. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement
from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council
in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and
responsibilities not so transferred. •
2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities
tra.asferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority
established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. which shall also
have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by the Council in this
regard. Accordingly, the term "Council" throughout this Agreement shall,
pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian
Authority.
3. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the
Palestinian Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter "the
Palestinian Police") shall be accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this
Agreement and in the Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security
Arrangements attached as Annex I to this Agreement (hereinafter "Am1ex f') ..
4. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and
respollSlbilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol
Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex m to this Agreement (hereinafter
"Annex Ill").
S. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Admimstration in the West Bank
will be ~lved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The
withdrawal of the .military government shall not prevent it from exercising the
powers ~d. responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
6. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereittafter "the
CAC''), Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and
• the other for the West Bank, and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank
shall be estabJis)ied in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil
affairs betwCEm the Council and Israe~ as detailed in Annex m. e
7. The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra'ees and its Executive
Authority and other committees, shall be located in areas under P·alestinian
territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
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ARTICLE II
Elections
1. In order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may
govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general
political elections will be held for the Council and the Ra' ees of the Ex:ecutive
Authority of the Council in accordance with the provisions set out in the
Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex: II to this Agreement
(hereinafter "Annex II").
2. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the
realization of the legitimate rights · of the Palestinian people and their just
requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of
Palestinian institutions.
3. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in
accordance with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of
Annex II (Election Arrangements concerning Jerusalem).
4. The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority
. immediately following the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest
practicable date following the redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with
Annex: I, and consistent with the requirements of the election timetable as
provided in Annex II, the Election law and the Election Regulations, as defined
in Article I of Annex: II.
ARTICLE ID
Structure of the Palestinian Council
1. The Palestinian. Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council
constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be
elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip
for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the DOP.
2. The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in
accordance with Articles Vll and IX of the DOP. The Council shall carry out and
be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities
transferred to it under this Agreement. The exercise of legislative powers shall be
in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agreement (Legislative Powers of the
Council).
3. The Council and the Ra' ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be
directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank,
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the provisions of this
/ ...
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Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, which shall not be contrary to
the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The Council and the Ra' ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be
elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the
Gaza-Jericho Agreement'on May 4, 1994.
S. Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its
members a Speaker. The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council,
adrnioiSf:er the Council and its committees, decide on the agenda of eac.h meeting,
and lay before the Council proposals for voting and declare their results.
6. The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVII of this
Agreement (Jurisdiction).
7. The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance
"Nith this Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim SelfGovernment
Authority, which Law shall be adopted by the Council. The Basic
Law and any regulations made under it shall not be contrary to the provisions of
this Agreement. •
8. The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for tb.e offices,
services and departments transferred to it and may establish, within its
jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of
its responsibilities.
9. The Speaker will present for· the Council's approval proposed internal
procedures that will regulate, among other things, the decision-making pr(?cesses
of the Council. ..
ARTICLE IV
Size of the Council
The Palestinian Council shall be composed of 82 representatives and the Ra' c:es of the
Executive Authority, who will !:e directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian
people of the West Bank. Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. •
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ARTICLE V
The Executive Authoritj· of the Council
1. The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of
the Council, formed in accordance with.· paragraph 4 below (hereinafter "the
Executive Authority").
2. The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the
Council and will exercise it on behalf of the Council. It shall determine its own
internal procedures and decision making pr.ocesses.
3. The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority
immediately upon their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes.
4. a. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall be an ex officio member of the
Executive Authority.
b. All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in
subparagraph c. below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and
proposed to the Council by the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority and
approved by the Council.
c. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some
persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership
of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to
exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such
appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council.
d. Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address
in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council.
ARTICLE VI
Other Committees of the Council
l . The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings of the
Council and to assist in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority.
2. Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the
general framework of the organization and structure of the Council.
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ARTICLE VII
Open Government
l
i ·
1. All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive
Authority, shall be open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or
the relevant committee on the grouhds of security, or commercial or personal
confidentiality.
2. Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive
Authority shall be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be
invited to such meetings to address specific issues on an ad hoe basis.
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Review
Any person or organization affected by any act or decision of the Ra' ees of the
Executive Authority of the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who
believes that such act or decision exceeds the authority of the Ra' ees or of such
member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the relevant
Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or decision.
ARTICLE IX
Powers and Responsibilities of the Council
1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its
jurisdiction, . have legislative powers as set out in Article XVIII of this
Agreement, as well as executive powers.
2. The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within
its jonsdiction under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be
reached between the two Parties during the interim period. It shall include the
power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies and to supervise their
3.
• implementiition, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in approved
legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of
Palestinian self-government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and
conclude contracts, and the power to keep and administer registers and records
of the population; and issue certificates, licenses and documents.
The Palestinian Council's executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement. / ...
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4. The Palestinian Council may adopt all nece~sary measures in order to enforce the
law and any of its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts
and tribunals.
5. a. In accordance with the DOP, the·· Council will not have powers and
responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the
establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign
missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or
the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular
staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct
negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations
for the benefit of the Council in the following cases only:
( 1) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex V of this
Agreement;
(2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing
arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Council ;
(J) agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional
development plans detailed in Annex IV of the DOP or in agreements
entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations;· and
(4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements.
c. Dealings between the Council and representatives of foreign states and
international organizations, as well as the establishment in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip of representative offices other than those described in
subparagraph 5. a above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements
referred to in subparagraph 5.b above, shall not be considered foreign
relations.
6. Subject to the prov1s1ons of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its
jurisdiction, have an independent judicial system composed of independent
Palestinian courts and tribunals.
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CHAPTER 2 - REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS
ARTICLE X
Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces
1. The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated
areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets - as
set out in Annex I, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian
elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections.
2. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will
commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually
implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public
order anri internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be completed within 18
months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in Articles XI
(Land) and XIII (Security), below and in Annex I.
3. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public
order and internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with
Article XIII (Security) below and Annex I.
4. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their
internal security and public order.
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" includes Israel Police
and other Israeli security forces.
ARTICLE XI
1. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit,
the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues
that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the
ju~s~iction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed
Wtthio 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Counci~ as specified
below:
a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al
W aqf land, will come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first
phase of redeploymei:it. / · · ·
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b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in
Areas A and B, set out in Annex III,, will be transferred to and assumed by
the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
c. In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the
Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out
in Annex III.
d. The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military
locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in
three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the
inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the
date of the inauguration of the Council.
e. During the further redeployment phases to be completed within l 8 months
from the date of the inauguration of the Council, powers and
responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to
Palestinianjurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory,
except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status
negofr1tions.
f. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above
will be determined in the further redeployment phases, within the specified
time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the
inauguration of the Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status
negotiations.
3. For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion of the first phase of
the further redeployments:
a. "Area A" mear.s the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in
brown on attached map No. 1 ;
b. "Area B" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in
yellow on attached map No. 1, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in
Appendix 6 to Annex I; and
c. "Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which,
except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent stat'l.ls
negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction m
accordance with this Agreement.
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ARTICLE XII
Arrangements for Sqsurity and Public Order
1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, th~ Council shall establish a strong police force
as set out in Article XIV below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility
for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the
Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the
sea and from the air, · as weU as the responsibility for overall secmity of Israelis
and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public
order, and will have all the powers to talce the steps necessary to meet this
responsibility.
2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in
Annex I.
3. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes
(hereinafter "the JSC"), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees
(hereinafter "RSCs") and Joint District Coordination Offices (hereinafter
"DCOs"), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be
reviewed at the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual
agreement of the Parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I.
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "the Settlements" means, in the West Bank -
the settlements in Area C; and in the Gaza Strip - the Gush Katif and Erez
settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on
attached map No. 2.
ARTICLE XIII
Security
I . Tfie Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces
2.
• in each district, as set out in Appendix l to Annex I, assume the powers and
resp.o nsibilities for internal security and public order in Area A in that district .
a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area
B. Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume
responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the
overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis
and confronting the-threat of terrorism. I •. . __________________________ ,_
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b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public
order for Palestinians and shall be d~ployed in order to accommodate the
Palestinian needs and requirements iri the following manner:
(1) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in
towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and
as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the
establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.
(2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order
incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.
(3) fhe Palei~inian Pc!ice shall operate·freely in populated places where
police stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(l)
above.
(4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B
outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will
be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the
relevant DCO, three months after the completion of redeployment
from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian
policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns
and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian
tr~ffic will take place after notifying the DCO.
(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation
through the relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including
the number of policemen, as well as the type and number of weapons
and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include details of
arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through
appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to
the area of the planned operation, including the destination and
routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for returning
to the police station or post. •
The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its
response, following a request for movement of policemen in
accordance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within
one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.
(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct
joint security activities on the main roads as set out in Annex l.
(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the namesof
the policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers
of weapons, with respect to each police station and post in t¥ea B. / ...
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(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security
• responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be
carried out in three phasesi• each to take place after an inteival of six
months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of th~
Council, exc·ept for the issues of permanent status negotiations and
of Israel's overall responsibili!y for Israelis and borders.
(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six
months of the completion of the first phase of redeployment.
ARTICLE XIV
The Palestini.an Police
J. The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure,
deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions
regarding its equipment and operation, as well as rules of conduct. are set out in
Annex I.
2. The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will
be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions
of this Agreement.
3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed
forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police
described in Annex I, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization,
group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall ma.nufacture, sell,
acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza
Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related
equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.
ARTICLE XV
Prevention of Hostile Acts
I . Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent a<:ts of terrorism,
crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under
the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures
against offenders. •
2. Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex I. / ...
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ARTICLE XVI
Confidence Buildirig Measures
With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the
implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good
faith, and in order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between
the two peoples, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as
detailed herewith:
I. Israel will release or turn over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and
prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of
release of these prisoners and detainees will take place on the signing of this
Agreement and the second stage will take place prior to the date of the elections.
There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. Detainees and
prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release
of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to
their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2. Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be
subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate
ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure
their protection.
3. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is
approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article
are applicable, will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September
13, 1993.
CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL AFFAIRS
ARTICLE XVII
Jurisdiction
L In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West
Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for:
a. issueJ that wi!l be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations:
b.
Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees,
borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and
powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council. I • •• .
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2. Accordingly, the authority of the Council encompasses all matters that fall within
its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows:
a. The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip
territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area
___ shown on map No. 2, art_~ West Bank territory, except for Area C which,
• • except for the issues that wilt be negotiated in the -permanent· status
negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in
three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be
completed 18 .months after the inauguration of the Coundl. At this time,
the jurisdi~~_on of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip
territory, except for the issues that ·mu ·be negotiated in the permanent
status negotiations. •
Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
b. The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and
responsibilities transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or
in any future agreements that may be reached between the Parties during
the interim period._
c. The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all
persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.
d. • Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional
jurisdiction in Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex III.
3. The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers
and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.
4. a. Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that
are not under ·the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and
responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.
' .
b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary
legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance
with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's
applicaote·legislation over Israelis in personam.
5. Tbe exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space
shall be in accordance with the provisions -of this Agreement.
6. Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements.
detailed in the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as, Annex IV to this
Agreement (hereinafter "Annex IV") shall be observed. Israel and the Council / ...•
may negotiate further legal arrangements.
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7. Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal
and civil matters through a legal committe_e (hereinafter "the Legal Committee"),
hereby established. •
8. The Council's jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza
Strip territory, except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status
negotiations, through a series of redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The
first phase of the redeployment of Israeli military forces will cover populated
areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets, as set out in
Annex I - and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e.
22 days before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military
forces to specified military locations will commence immediately upon the
inauguration of the Council and will be effected in three phases, each to take
place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than eighteen
months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
ARTICLE XVIII
Legislative Powers of the Council
l. For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary
legislation, incbding basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.
2. The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of
this Agreement, to adopt legislation.
3. While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a
whole, the Ra' ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the
following legislative powers:
4.
a. the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the
Council;
b. the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and
c. the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to
any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary
legislation adopted by the Council. •
a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws
or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is
otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or
of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during
the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio. I •..
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b. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate
legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the
provisions of this paragraph.
5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.
6. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of
the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committe(: any legislation
regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to
discuss issues arising from such legislation. The Legal Committee will consider
the legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity.
-ARTICLE x1x·
Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and r~sponsibilities pursuant to this
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human
rights and the rule of law.
1. a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ARTICLE XX
Rights, Liabilities and Obligations
The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military
government and its civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex
III, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard
to acts or omissions which occurred prior to such transfer. Israel will cease
to bear any .financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the
Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own
functioning.
Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the
Council.
Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding
pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against
Israel in this regard.
Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will
notify the Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and
raise an~ arguments on its behalf.
In the event that an a_ward is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in
respect of such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the
full amount of the award. / ...
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f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a
claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted
beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with
willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear financial responsibility.
2. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs l .d through l .f aoove, each
side may take the necessary measures, including promulgation of
legislation, in order to ensure that such claims by Palestinians, including
pending claims in which the hearing of evidence has not yet begun, are
brought only before Palestinian courts or tribunals in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, and are not brought before or heard by Israeli courts or
tribunals.
b. Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal
subsequent to the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above,
the Council shall defend it and, in accordance with subparagraph I .a above,
in the event that an award is made for t~e plaintiff, shall pay the amount of
the award.
c. The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all
materials and information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or
tribunals to hear such claims as referred to in subparagraph b. above, and,
when necessary, for the provision of legal assistance by Israel to the
Council in defending such claims.
3. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations
of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this
Agreement.
4. The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and
obligations of the Palestinian Authority.
S. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israelis" also includes Israeli statutory
agencies and corporations registered in Israel.
ARTICLEXXI
Settlement of Differences and Disputes
Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the
appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this
Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such
difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation
mechanism, namely: / ...
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l. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any
related agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the
Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which C"!lllOt be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism
• of conciliation to ~e ~greed betw~en-the Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to • submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim
period, • winch cannot. be settled through -conciliation. To· this end, upon the
agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.
..,
3.
CHAPTER 4 .. COOPERATION
ARTICLE XXII
Relations bet\\ een Israel and the Council
Israel and the Council shall seek to fqster mutual underst~di~g _ and tolerance
and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda,
against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of
expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any
organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
Israel and the Counci\ will ensure that their respective educational systems
car.tribute t0 the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace
in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that
coulci adver~ely affect the process of reconciliation.
Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the
Council shall cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both
sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic
substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related
to vehicles. •
ARTICLE XXIII
Coooerafo1n with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and
responsibilities, the two sides will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security
powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, and the
transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex
III.
/ ...
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ARTICLE XXIV
Economic Relations
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The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic
Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the
Supplement to the Protocol on Economic Relations, all attached as Annex V, and will
be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.
ARTICLEXXV
Cooperation Programs
I . The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation
between them. Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI.
2. A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of
this cooperation is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI.
ARTICLE XXVI
The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
I . The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall
ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues
requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from
each Party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary.
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the
frequency and pl~ce or places of its meetings.
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.
S. The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer
the implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter "the Monitoring and Steering
Committee"). It will function as follows:
a. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor
the implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the
cooperation and fostering the peaceful relations between the two sides.
b. '!"he M~nitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the
various joint committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC,
the Legal Committee, the Joint Economic Committer ~nd the Stan~jp~ / •• ~
t ~ 1 •
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Cooperation Committe~)' ·concerni~g . t-he •• ongoing implementation of the
Agreement, and will re£~!:1,~~-the L~~s~nCommittee ..
c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of
the various committees mentioned above.
d. The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its
rules of procedures,· including the frequency and places of its meetings.
ARTICLE XXVII
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt
I . Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the
Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison
and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the
Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and
Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these
arrangements a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced
its deliberations.
2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of
admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967,
together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.
3. The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common
concern.
ARTICLE XXVIII
Missing Persons
l . Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary
assistance in the conduct of searches for missing persons and bodies of persons
which have not been recovered, as well as by providing information about
missing persons.
2. The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to
locate and to return to Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the
bodies of soldiers which have not been recovered.
I . ..
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CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
ARTICLE XXIX
Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip are set out in Annex I.
ARTICLEXXX
Passages
Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to
and from Egypt and Jordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set
out in Annex I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6
ARTICLE XXXI
Final Clauses
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building
Measures), the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer
Protocol will be superseded by this Agreement.
The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and
shali assume all the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority
under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the
Further Transfer Protocol.
The two sides .shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement.
Permanent status negotiations will commence a·s soon as possible, but not later
than May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations
shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security
arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other
issues of common interest.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the
negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP.
Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement,
to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.
I .••
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7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status
negotiations.
8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial
unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
9. The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of
the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve
the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the
letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister
of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.
l O. Pursuant to Annex I, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the
permanent checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area
( except those related to the access road leading from Mousa Alami to the
Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the first phase of
redeployment.
I I . Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the
Palestinian Authority on the condition thctt they remain in the Jericho Area for
the 1emainder of their sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of the first phase ofredeployment.
12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and withm1t derogating from
the commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the
Prime Minister of Israel and the Ch~rman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993
and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply between them the provisions contained
in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.
13. a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps
attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof
; - ~L
b. The Parties ag1ee that the maps attached to the Gaza-:Jericho Agreement
as:
a. map No. 1 (The Gaza ·strip)~ an exact copy of which is attached to
this Agreement as map No. 2 (in this Agreement "map No. 2");
b. map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Polie,e in the Gaza Strip), an
exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in
. this Agreem.ent '"map No. 5"); and
c. map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is
attached to th_is Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement "map
No. 8"}; / ...
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are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this
Agreement.
14. While the Jeftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of
the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area's transfer to the territorial
jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase
of the further redeployment phases.
Done at Washington DC, this 28th day of September, 1995.
(Signed) Yitzhak RABIN
(Signed) Shimon PERES
For the Government of the
State of Israel
(Signed) William J. CLINTON
(Signed) Warren CHRISTOPHER
The United States of America
(Signed) Amre MOUSSA
The Arab Republic of Egypt
(Signed) Bj0rn Tore GODAL
The Kingdom of Norway
(Signed) Yasser ARAFAT
For the PLO
Witnessed by:
(Signed) Andrei v. KOZYREV
The Russian Federation
(Signed) Hussein IBN TALAL
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
(Signed) Felipe GONZALEZ
The European Union