INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XXV OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 959 Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Notification to Simferopol City
Council (inserted in Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of
the International Expert Group: February 26 Criminal Case (2017)
Annex 960 Human Rights Information Centre, Crimean Tatar Media in Crimea:
Situation in 2014 – 2016 (10 April 2017)
Annex 961 Crimean Human Rights Group, Unsanctioned Freedom (May 2017)
Annex 962 Human Rights Watch, Online and on All Fronts: Russia’s Assaults on
Freedom of Expression (July 2017)
Annex 963 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Crimea 2015 (last visited 25
September 2017)
Annex 964 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies
(14 November 2017)
Annex 965 Crimean Human Rights Group, Statement on Unlawful Searches and
Detainments of Crimean Tatar National Movement Activists and Veterans
in Crimea (24 November 2017)
Annex 966 Human Rights Watch, Another Day, Another Tragedy in Crimea (27
November 2017)
Annex 967 Crimea Human Rights Group, Hate Speech in the Media Landscape of
Crimea (2018)
Annex 968 Crimean Human Rights Group, Memorandum: Discrimination of Crimean
Residents for Non-Possession of Russian Documents Issued Unlawfully
by Russia in Crimea (2018)
Annex 969 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Security Officers Conducted Regular
Searches in the Houses of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea (23 January
2018)
Annex 970 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in
the Occupied Crimea in 2017 (presentation)(2 February 2018)
Annex 971 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in
the Occupied Crimea over January 2018 (presentation) (15 February
2018)
Annex 972 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Crimea 2016 (last visited 8 March
2018)
Annex 973 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Crimean Tatar Businessman &
Philanthropist Seized and New FSB Offensive in Russian-Occupied Crimea
(3 May 2018)
- ii -
Annex 974 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Crimean Tatars:
Russian Repression Continues with Arrest of Crimean Businessman (8
May 2018)
Annex 975 Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights in the Context of Automatic
Naturalization in Crimea (June 2018)
Annex 976 Sergey Zayets (Regional Center for Human Rights) et al., The Fear
Peninsula: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in
Crimea (2015)
Annex 977 Freedom of the Press 2017, Freedom house (6 June 2018), accessed at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/ukraine
Annex 978 Human Rights Watch, Crimean Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric
Hospital (26 August 2016)
Annex 979 Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (18 October
1907)
Annex 980 European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950)
Annex 981 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with
Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (5 December 1994)
Annex 982 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine (31 May 1997)
Annex 983 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (7 December
2000)
Annex 984 Intentionally Omitted
Annex 985 Intentionally Omitted
Annex 986 Intentionally Omitted
Annex 987 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez-Rodríguez v.
Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988)
Annex 988 International Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998)
Annex 989 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana., Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial
Judgment (21 May 1999)
Annex 959
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Notification to Simferopol City Council (inserted in
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of the International Expert Group: February
26 Criminal Case (2017)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), Ukraine has provided only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full document with its submission.
SECTION 1. RECONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS
OF THE EVENTS OF 26 FEBRUARY 2014
1.1. General description and background of the events
On 26 February 2014, two rallies organized by the “Russian Unity” party and the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People were held outside the building of Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea in Simferopol. The “Russian Unity” party initiated a rally in order to “resist destabilization
of the situation, preserve and extend the authority of the Republic of Crimea”. The Mejlis initiated
a rally in order to “prevent the SC ARC from the adoption of decisions aimed at destabilizing
the situation in the autonomy”16.
The reason for holding two rallies at the same time near the building of the Supreme Council of
Crimea on 26 February 2014 was the decision of the Chairman of the SC ARC, Vladimir Konstantinov
about the conduct of an extraordinary session on that day17.
The rally announced by the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people at the walls of the SC ARC began
around 10:00. Participants of the rally of the “Russian Unity” party began to gather in the same place
before the announced time, namely from 9:00. During the confrontation of the rallyers, two people
perished and several rallyers were gravely and lightly injured.
The Extraordinary Session of the SC ARC did not take place on 26 February due to the lack of quorum.
Only 49 deputies out of 100 attended the session.
The rallies of 26 February were preceded by a series of events: peaceful actions of Evromaydan and
Avtomaydan against the actions of the existing authorities (since November 2013), violent dispersals
of protesters, administrative persecution of civil activists, adoption of “laws of 16 January”18 and
16 Quotations from official notifications about holding a rally of the party “Russian Unity” and the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people.
17 http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/2/25/deputaty-verhovnoi-rady-kryma-sobirajutsya-na-vneocherednujusessiju-
5818/
18 http://www.osce.org/odihr/111370?download=true
* translating page 98-99
Book Analit_Zvit1.indb 12 27.10.17 17:47
“RUSSIAN UNITY”
POLITICAL PARTY
To the Executive Committee
of the Simferopol City Council
Re: Organization of a mass event
Herewith the Simferopol city organization of the party “Russian Unity” notifies of a
rally to be held against destabilization of the situation, for preservation and extension of
powers of the Republic of Crimea.
Time and date of the event: 26.02.2014 from 13:00 to 20:00.
The expected number of participants of the event is 10000 - 15000 people.
Venue: the square in front of the Supreme Council of Crimea.
Organizer of the event – Chairperson of the Simferopol city organization of the party
“Russian Unity” M.S. Sheremet, contact phone number 52-27-57.
Head of the Simferopol city organization
of the party “Russian Unity” /signature/ M.S. Sheremet
Autonomous Republic of Crimea Tel.: (0652) 52-27-55
95006, Simferopol e-mail: [email protected]
Dolgorukovskaya St. 11/2
25.02.2014
Ref. No. 18
98
Book Analit_Zvit1.indb 98 27.10.17 17:47
MEJLIS
OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR
PEOPLE
To Simferopol City Council
95000, Simferopol,
Tolstoy St. 15
NOTIFICATION
of holding a rally
Herewith we notify Simferopol City Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
that on 26 February 2014 there will be a rally for the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and the prevention of taking by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea the decisions aimed to destabilize the situation in the autonomy.
The right to peaceful assembly (rally, march or demonstration, specify) is an essential
right of citizens according to arts. 8, 21, 22, 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine, art. 11 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Decision
of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine No. 4-rp/2001 of 19.04.01.
Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine reads: citizens have the right to assemble
peacefully, without weapon, and hold assemblies, rallies, marches and demonstrations,
of which the executive authorities or local self-government authorities are notified
in advance. The restriction on the exercise of this right can be imposed by the court
pursuant to the law and only in the interests of national security and public order in
order to prevent disorder or offences, to protect public health or rights and freedoms
of other people.
We draw your attention to the fact that the planned event has exclusively peaceful
nature and by no means can interfere with public order or rights and freedoms of other
people.
The rally will be held in front of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea.
Time of the rally is from 10:00 to 17:00.
The expected number of participants of the rally is up to 3000 people.
Contact phone number: (0652)-27-21-10.
Chairperson of the Mejlis
of the Crimean Tatar People,
Deputy of the Supreme Council
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea /signature/ Refat Chubarov
2, Shmidt St., Simferopol, 95017 Tel.: (00380652) 273 526
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine Fax: (00380652) 273 455
[email protected]
99
Book Analit_Zvit1.indb 99 27.10.17 17:47
Annex 960
Human Rights Information Centre, Crimean Tatar Media in Crimea: Situation in 2014 – 2016
(10 April 2017)
HUMAN RIGHTS
INFORMATION CENTRE
UKR RUS ENG
Search Submit
Crimean Tatar Media in Crimea: situation in 2014 – 2016
10 April 2017
Crimean Tatars – an indigenous people of the peninsula – started proactively
developing their media immediately after beginning their mass return to motherland
from the places of deportation carried out by Stalin. This return commenced at the
end of the 80s and continued throughout the 90s.
Despite some bureaucratic hindrances, by the time that the peninsula underwent
occupation by Russia in March 2014, Crimea had two socio-politically themed
Crimean Tatar newspapers in Crimean Tatar language (Qirim and Yeni Dunya), two
newspapers in Russian (Golos Kryma and Avdet), Crimean Tatar tele- and radiodepartments
with the State Television and Radio Company Krym that aired shows in
Crimean Tatar language, ATR TV-channel and Meydan radio station (part of the
Atlant-SV private holding) that ran shows in Crimean Tatar, Russian and Ukrainian
languages.
All newspapers, apart from Avdet received state aid in some format.
In addition, there was one full-scale news-agency, QHA that published materials in
Russian, Turkish and English, as well as private news-sites on the web:
Crimeantatars.org (Atlant-SV, functioning in Crimean Tatar and Russian), Qirim-
Vilayeti.org, Teraze.org.ua and Qirimtatar.org in Russian.
FIGHTING FOR THE PRINCIPLES
Throughout the rst months of the occupation of Crimea that was opposed by the
absolute majority of Crimean Tatars, all media of this native people continued
unbiased reporting of the events that were unfolding. Even the Crimean Tatar
department of State TV and Radio Company Krym (the channel was seized by the
Russians on 1 March 2014) tried to engage in unbiased reporting as much as
possible until the end of April 2014.
Yet, since end of April, the department was instructed not to allow footage of the
leader of the Crimean Tatar people, Mustafa Dzhemilev, head of the Medjlis of the
Crimean Tatar People, Refat Chubarov, as well as Medjlis members. An enforced
leave was initiated for the head of the department, Seitislam Kishveev (who had
been director of the department for many years), as well as editor-in-chief for newsprogramming,
Shevket Ganiev.
Kishveev conrmed imposition of “hard-core censorship”. “I cannot work under such
conditions, and so I have to go on leave”, - he noted. On 27 June, Kishveev was red.
He noted that he would not renew himself in this position. "It is not worthwhile
working with these authorities any more", - he noted, adding that only those loyal to
the occupants were welcome in the department.
It happened as predicted. The new director of the Crimean Tatar department, Seiran
Mambetov, red 7 staff members who had a multi-year track record, in September.
Those who remained on payroll were only his wife, Susanna Beitulaeva, and her coanchor,
Susanna Khalilova. As staff members reported, the terminations were
initiated by the new director general of the TV-channel, Yekaterina Kozyr. Mambetov
explained the rings by “professional inadequacy” of those who were given the
notice.
Until the end of 2014, the Yeni Dunya weekly dependent on budgetary allocations,
also tried to keep certain neutrality in their reports and pieces. At the same time, in
January 2015, the weekly underwent total censorship.
By that time, the Qirim-Vilayeti.org and Qirimtatar.org ceased functioning as well.
Out of the media outlets that were licensed by the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, Roskomnadzor, and
tried to retain neutrality in publications, if at all possible, were the Qirim and Golos
Kryma (New) newspapers.
UNDERMINING THE ATLANT-SV-HOLDING MEDIA OUTLETS
On 31 March 2015, the Meydan radio-station stopped airing its programmes,
followed by the ATR television channel the next day. This happened after
Roskomnadzor, denied them registration and right to air on the territory of Crimea.
The channel that in the non-stop mode objectively reported live on all stages of
occupation from the rst days of peninsula annexation, became target to attack of
the occupying authorities, law enforcers and “samooborona” [so-called self-defence
militia] combatants.
Throughout 2014, reporters of the channel were deprived the right of access to
many events, the editorial premises of the media outlets that belonged to the
ATR
holding were cut off internet supply, and at least on three occasions the camera
crews of ATR were attacked when they performed their professional duties.
Throughout 2015, the ATR reporters were continuously cut off from ocial events
and one premises search was conducted on 26 January that year, prior to complete
cessation of broadcasting. On 21 April, in Simferopol, the ocers of the
Investigative Committee organized a house search in the home of ATR cameraman,
Eskender Nebiev. He, himself, was arrested on suspected participation in the mass
unrest that emerged throughout the rallies of pro-Russian separatists and Crimean
Tatars on 26 February 2014 close to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Supreme
Council building.
On 19 March 2015, the head of the annexed Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, openly stated
that ATR would stop functioning on the occupied peninsula, since it raised “hope
that Crimea would return to Ukraine” and, also, “instigated people to action”.
On 17 June ATR re-launched its broadcasting from Kyiv .This enraged the authorities
of the republic. Re-launch of the broadcasting by ATR meant that the channel “would
work against Crimea and against Russia by defending the interests of its western
patrons” noted the then “Deputy Prime Minister”, Rouslan Balbek. The ocial
warned that Russian law enforcers would launch charges against journalists who
would “work to promote a negative image of the Russian Crimea”.
After this, on 12 October, the court sentenced Eskender Nebiev to 2 years and 6
months of a suspended sentence (probation).
On 2 November at about 6 a.m. the houses of ATR ex-director, Elzara Islyamova,
former deputy director, Liliya Budzhurova, Lenara Islyamova and Edem Islyamov (the
sister and father of the TV-channel owner, Lenur Islyamov) were subjected to a
search. A search was also organized in the Moscow apartment of Lenur Islyamov
himself. The warrant was issued under a criminal case against him. Yet, neither
open-access documents nor the court warrant indicated the criminal code article
that had been put in motion. The status of other individuals who had their properties
searched also remained unknown under the said criminal case.
On 9 December about 6 a.m. a second search was organized in the home of Elzara
Islyamova, and on 10 December the law enforcers searched the apartment of the
former ATR editor, Roman Spiridonov, and his parents.
In August 2016 Crimea faced blockage of the ATR TV-channel website.
On 26 February 2016, radio Meydan announced re-launch of its broadcasting from
Kyiv. On 28 June, it won the competition for the available 98 MHz frequency
organized by the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine in
Genichesk, Kherson oblast, where a sizeable Crimean Tatar community resides.
On 27 December 2016, it became known that the National Television and Radio
Broadcasting Council issued licenses to 4 radio-stations that would be able to
broadcast to the occupied Crimea. Amongst them was Meydan.
In December 2015, the media outlet 15 Minut, also belonging to the Atlant-SV
holding, re-launched its operations from Kyiv. Access to it is blocked from Crimea
starting 3 August 2016. The resource that was originally launched as an all-Crimean
one, re-focused on the Crimean Tatar audience.
The Crimeantatars.org website that stopped its operations on 31 March 2015 never
came back online again.
All in all, 10 Crimean media outlets, including Crimean Tatar ones, had to move to
mainland Ukraine after the occupation. The relocation was provoked by varied types
of persecution and limitations, and the media unable to continue operation on the
territory of the Crimean peninsula.
Crimean Tatar media that had relocated to mainland Ukraine have signicantly lost
steam on exclusive materials due to the absence of a reporter network in Crimea.
UNDERMINING THE QHA NEWS-AGENCY AND AVDET NEWSPAPER
On the day that ATR stopped its broadcasting, the editorial board of the Crimean
Tatar news agency QHA announced its relocation to Kyiv, as it was not able to
receive the Roskomnadzor license to work in the annexed Crimea.
Prior to this decision in May 2014, reporters of the
news agency found it impossible to join meetings
and other events organized by the occupying
authorities – for instance, journalists were denied
access to the events held in the Council of Ministers
of Crimea noting that the reporters were blacklisted
for “misreporting” on the referendum in Crimea.
On 9 August 2014, the owner of the agency, adviser
to the head of the Medjlis, Ismet Yuksel, was banned
from entry onto the peninsula for 5 years.
On 22 April 2015, director of the QHA news agency,
Gayana Yuksel, was summoned to the Centre for Countering Extremism (so-called
Centre “E”). She was faced with administrative charges for articles that had been
published in 2006 and 2009.
Starting from August 2016, access to the QHA website is blocked in Crimea.
On 1 April 2015, after having received a denial in registration from Roskomnadzor,
the weekly Avdet stopped being published to its former full capacity. It had to reduce
its print-run to 999 copies, as in accordance with the Russian law, unregistered
newspapers may be printed only if the number of copies in one issue is lower than
1000. Editor-in-chief of Avdet, Shevket Kaibullaiev, by that time had already received
4 warnings from Russian law enforcers regarding prohibition on engaging in
extremist activities.
The editorial premises that were located in the building of the Medjlis were
subjected to search on 16 September, and the next day the newspaper as well as
other organizations quartered in the building were given 24 hours to vacate the
oces.
Gayana Yuksel
The media outlet had to move to the oce of the regional Medjlis of Simferopol. Yet,
on 15 July 2016, Medjlis member who began working with the occupying authorities,
Teifuk Gafarov, who was then “deputy head” of the Simferopol city administration,
tampered with a lock on the oce door and, de facto, occupied the rooms.
ESTABLISHING NEW MEDIA IN CRIMEA
On 1 September 2015, the Millet television channel, created by the new authorities of
the republic, started its broadcasting. Its programming is issued in Crimean Tatar
and Russian languages. At the same time, the television and radio departments of
STRC Krym were closed.
There is no objective data regarding the ratings of this television channel. Yet,
conversations with different groups of the Crimean Tatar population suggest that it
is not popular.
On 20 November 2015, the authorities launched a Russian-language newspaper with
the Crimean Tatar name Mehraba that aims at the Crimean Tatar audience. The
paper is published on a weekly basis with a print run of 1000 copies.
On 13 February 2017, a new radio station was launched into action by the
authorities. It is a Crimean Tatar-language radio station called Vatan Sedasi. So far
the channel broadcasts only to Simferopol and Simferopol district, but it has
received frequencies to air in the largest cities of the peninsula.
ALTERNATIVE
Under omnipresent censorship and limited access to independent Crimean Tatar
media to work in Crimea, many Crimean Tatars started receiving information from
social networks, reading the posts made by the leaders of the Medjlis, human rights
defenders and civic activists.
Nonetheless, Russia tries to block this information channel as well. Thus, in
February 2015, the Russian social network “Odnoklassniki” blocked and then deleted
a popular group “Crimea and Crimean Tatars”. That online community had over 14.5
thousand subscribers.
In addition, as lawyer for a number of political prisoners Emil Kurbedinov, noted,
there are administrative cases launched against activists who are “videotaping
arrests, searches, detentions, court processes, taking interviews from the population
and lawyers for subsequent publication on the internet”. “We await repressions
against the said activists and “eld” reporters” – stated Kurbedinov.
AS A RESULT
The above-noted facts of systemic persecutions of the Crimean Tatar media have
led to a shrinking number of independent Crimean Tatar media outlets, as well as
the share of Crimean Tatar-language productions limiting the ability to receive
unbiased information about the events on the peninsula.
According to ocial data provided by Roskomnadzor, the peninsula has 30
registered outlets that operate in Crimean Tatar. Yet, detailed analysis of these
media showed that only 9 media outlets actually use Crimean Tatar language, and 5
out of them are journals and info-bulletins with religious content.
Apart from this, an experimental selective analysis of print materials in Russian and
Crimean Tatar languages in the Mehraba weekly demonstrated that only 1.7% of the
text was indeed in Crimean Tatar.
FORECAST
Keeping in mind the low professional capacities of the pro-authority Crimean Tatar
media, as well as evident propaganda and a small number of such media, the
demand for receiving alternative information within the Crimean Tatar community
will remain on the rise.
Tags: ATR media
This will foster development of independent media-projects irrespective of the legal
restrictions imposed on the territory of Crimea. Consequently, activity of such
media-projects will attract attention of law enforcers and lead to other rights
violations in reporting activities. Therefore, we may expect a negative impact on the
situation in the freedom of speech area and violations will continue to happen.
Human Rights Information Centre
Photo byATR and ua.krymr.com
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Annex 961
Crimean Human Rights Group, Unsanctioned Freedom (May 2017)
UNSANCTIONED FREEDOM
Analytical review on violation of right
to peaceful assembly in Crimea
(March 2014 – March 2017)
May
2017
Kyiv
Н55 Unsanctioned Freedom: Analytical review on violation of right to peaceful assembly in
Crimea (March 2014 – March 2017) / produced by A. Sedov, under the general editorship of
O. Skrypnyk and literary editorship of M. Budzar. — Kyiv, 2017. — 48 p.
ISBN 978-966-2544-27-5
The review has summed up outcomes of the consistent and comprehensive work of the Crimean
Human Rights Group on monitoring and documenting the facts of violating the freedom of peaceful assemblies
on the territory of Crimea after the occupation and unlawful annexation of the peninsula. The review
is made in line with the international human rights law standards, following the relevant documents. The review
includes also conclusions and recommendations for international organizations, authorities of Ukraine
and authorities of the Russian Federation.
УДК 342.729.03(477.75)(048.83)
Н55
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) is an initiative of Crimean human rights defenders and
journalists aimed at supporting the observance and defense of human rights in Crimea through attracting
a wide attention to the issues of human rights and international humanitarian law on the territory of the
Crimean Peninsula as well as searching and elaborating instruments for defending human rights in Crimea.
The CHRG activities are regulated, first of all by standards of fundamental human rights documents,
namely Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Helsinki Final Act, Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, etc.
The CHRG follows principles of fairness, accuracy and timeliness in preparing and distributing the
information. The CHRG team is composed of experts, human rights defenders and journalists from various
countries who have been participating in monitoring and documenting violations of human rights in Crimea
since February 2014. The CHRG pays a major attention to the human rights violations due to the unlawful
actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea.
The Crimean Human Rights Group appreciates a contribution of Mr. Aleksandr Burmagin, a media
lawyer, Human Rights Platform NGO expert, an expert of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission) of Council of Europe, a member of Independent Media Council, to the review
preparation.
The review publication has become possible thanks to the financial support of
the Embassy of the United Kingdom to Ukraine within the framework of Support to
Journalists and Human Rights Defenders in Crimea Project that is being implemented
by the Center for Human Rights Information together with the Crimean Human Rights
Group. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and may not
reflect the official position of the UK Government.
©The photo on the 1st page of the cover
is provided by Anton Naumlyuk
ISBN 978-966-2544-27-5 ©Crimean Human Rights Group
УДК 342.729.03(477.75)(048.83)
Н55
1
STATUTORY REGULATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
THAT ARE MOSTLY USED TO VIOLATE THE FREEDOM
OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES IN CRIMEA*
CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(RF CAO)1
Article 19. 3. Failure to follow a lawful order of a policeman, a military man, an officer of the federal
security service bodies, an officer of state guard service bodies, an officer of bodies authorized to
exercise the functions of control and supervision in the field of migration or an officer of the body of
institution of the criminal punishment system or an officer of the Russian Federation National Guard
troops.
Article 20. 2 Violation of the established procedure for arranging or conducting an assembly, a rally,
a demonstration, a procession or picket
Article 20. 28 Organization of activity of a non-government or religious association in which respect
a decision has been taken to suspend its activity
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RF CC)2
Article 205. 5 Organization of activity of a terrorist organization and participation in the activity
of such organization
Article 212 Mass riots
Article 318 Use of violence against a representative of the power
FEDERAL LAW ‘ON ASSEMBLIES, RALLIES, DEMONSTRATIONS,
PROCESSIONS AND PICKETING’, FZ54, OF 19 JUNE 20043
*Hereinafter these regulations are referred to in abbreviation.
1 http://www. consultant. ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34661/3262fd14537fe74196521d1f5da6bc9ae5508786/
2 http://www. consultant. ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/
3 http://www. consultant. ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_48103/
2
VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL
ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS IN CRIMEA
March 2014 – March 2017
Due to actions of local authorities and RF state bodies, since February 2014 many public activists,
human rights defenders, independent experts and journalists have been forced to leave the
peninsula due to the persecution. The Russian de-facto authorities on the territory of Crimea has
resulted into a large-scale rollback of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Crimean Human Rights
Group has documented numerous violations of freedom of assemblies and associations on the territory
of Crimea that are system-based and testify a deliberate policy of the Russian authorities focused
on rolling back fundamental rights and freedoms on the peninsula.
1 UNJUSTIFIED BANS AND RESTRICTIONS
ON PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES
Article 21, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR), and Article 11,
European Convention on Human Rights, states a right of peaceful assemblies that shall not be subject
to any restrictions other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of other4.
Before the occupation, numerous public events had been held rather freely in Crimea. They
were not restricted either by place or by political slogans of the protesters. Organizers had just to
notify the authorities in advance about the time and the place of such peaceful assembly.
When the Russian authorities established their control in Crimea, they started using any possibility
to prevent public events other than those that supported and welcomed acts of the Russian
governance. Public assembly restrictions are grounded by the RF laws that establish much more
restrictions of peaceful assembly freedom than the Ukrainian ones. First of all, this is a permission
on every public event issued in advance by municipal or district administration. The fact of applying
a permit system to authorize peaceful assemblies instead of notification one is an evidence of violating
the standards in the peaceful assembly freedom sphere.
Lack of legitimate determination in the Russian legal statutory regulations on the peaceful assemblies
entitles the representatives of authorities de facto to interpret them in their discretion, to
apply them on a case by case basis, restricting, without any grounds, these assemblies and permitting
others depending on whether the convictions of their organizers coincide with the views of
administration or contradict them.
1.1 RESTRICTIONS ON PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES DEDICATED TO MEMORIAL
DATES AND EVENT ANNIVERSARIES
On June 17th 2014 the City Council of Simferopol rejected a request of the Crimean Tatar People
Mejlis on holding a cultural public event dedicated to the Day of Crimean Tatar Flag in the city center
on 26 June 2014. The authorities grounded their rejection by the statement that ‘many people
assembling on the limited area that is not intended for placement of the number of participants
4 http://www. un. org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pactpol. shtml
3
additionally declared may create conditions for violating
the public order, rights and legally protected interests of
other citizens. 5 Such grounds for rejection do not meet
the criteria on assembly freedom restrictions in the
democratic society.
On June 18th the Simferopol City Council denied
‘no-objection’ for a motor rally route to the Crimean
Tatar Flag date suggested by the Mejlis. The city authorities
proposed to change this route, excluding the
central streets from it6. Such restriction deprived the
event organizers from the opportunity to achieve ‘sight
and sound’ of the target audience.
In August 2014 the authorities de facto forbad the
KARDASHLYK Crimean Tatar NGO to hold a mourning
rally dedicated to the European Day of Remembrance
for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism of August 23rd. The
reason for refusal — ‘too hot weather’ — does not meet
criteria of acceptable restrictions due to interests of national
or public safety, public order, protection of health
and the morals or rights and freedoms of others7.
On November 28th 2014 the Committee for Protection
of Crimean Tatar People Rights submitted a notification
to the Simferopol city administration on holding several
events dedicated to the International Human Rights
Day. Having been refused, the Committee addressed
the administration with the request on organizing a picket
against the restriction on the freedom of peaceful
assemblies. On December 9th 2014 the Committee representatives
received a refusal on holding the picket at
the place requested by the organization. The same day
the Committee coordinators addressed the Simferopol
city administration verbally and in writing, confirming
the Committee readiness to hold the picket at any place
in the city of Simferopol that would be approved. At
10.00pm the refusal for holding the picket was received.
On December 7th 2014 the Crimean Prosecutor’s Office
rendered a caveat to Mr. Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy
Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, on inadmissibility
of non-authorized rallies.
On February 5th 2015 the Bakhchisarai Town Council
received a request of Mr. Ilmi Umerov on holding a rally
‘to support unreasonably seized Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy
Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis’ on February 19th in
5 http://qha. com. ua/ru/politika/krimskim-tataram-zapretili-provodit-den-flaga-v-parke-treneva/137163/
6 http://ru. krymr. com/a/25426854. html
7 http://zn. ua/UKRAINE/krymskim-tataram-zapretili-pominat-zhertv-stalinizma-151149_. html
Denial of Simferopol City Council to issue ‘no
objection’ on holding a mourning rally dedicated to
the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of
Stalinism and Nazism by KARDASHLYK Crimean
Tatar NGO, 15 August 2014, Simferopol
4
Bakhchisarai. The rally was to be held at the central square of Bakhchisarai, with 250 to 300 people
present, from 11.00am to noon. However, Mr. Umerov was refused to hold the rally. The reason for
rejection was stated as incompliance of the request submitted with the provisions of Law FZ54. The
refusal was signed by acting as head of the Bakhchisarai Town administration Mr. V.A. Verkhovod8.
On May 8th 2015 the head of Simferopol City Administration office Mr. G. V. Aleksandrov denied
the request of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis on holding a mourning rally dedicated to the 71st anniversary
of the Crimean Tatar People Deportation on May 18th. The rejection was justified by the
statement that requests on holding the assemblies on May 18th 2015 at the places allowed for the
public assemblies had been submitted already9.
In addition to the rejection, the ‘Prosecutor’s Office’ of Crimea made a caution to several
Crimean Tatar activists on inadmissibility of holding public assemblies on May 18th 2015. For instance,
Mr. Nariman Djelial reported that the Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea rendered a caution
to the Mejlis on inadmissibility of public events on the Deportation Day of May 18th. On May 15th
Mr. Shevket Kaibullayev, a member of the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis, AVDET Newspaper editor-
in-chief, was called to the Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea where he was handed a caution on
inadmissibility of holding mourning events on May 18th by the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis representatives.
On May 15th Mr. Leonid Kuzmin, activist of the Ukrainian Cultural Center, received a caution
from the Prosecutor’s Office on responsibility for organizing the mourning assemblies on May
16th and May 18th. The caution was made verbally, with no documents in writing presented by the
Prosecutor’s Office staff.
In early June 2015 representatives of youth organizations that participated every year in organizing
the Crimean Tatar National Flag Day created an organizing committee to hold events
dedicated to this day. The Organizing Committee notified the city administration of Simferopol on
holding a public event dedicated to the Crimean Tatar Flag Day on June 26th 2015 in the Fontany
residential area of Simferopol. However, this notification was denied. The reason for refusal was
that other organizations had submitted the notifications and got ‘no objection’ on holding the
public events on June 26th. Since then the Organizing Committee had submitted twice the notification
with the event time and place changed, but the replies were identical to the first one. The
Organizing Committee was also denied on approving a motor rally.
On July 18th 2015 it became known that the local authorities of Bakhchisarai Town and the police
forbad the town Muslim community to hold a cultural event within the Uraza Bayram Festival.
The event was planned in the Khan Chaiyr residential area close to the mosque. Earlier this event
had been annually held close to this mosque. The authorities’ grounds to refuse were that a lot of
people came to this event. The refusal reason is not grounded since there is no evidence that this
cultural event threatens the safety and the public order10
On August 11th 2015 activists Veldar Shukurdjiyev and Irina Kopylova made photos with the
Ukrainian flag at the monument to Lenin on one of the squares of Simferopol and then were detained
by the police. The detention report referred to Article 20.2 of RF CAO though this article
regulates rallies, demonstrations, processions or picketing, while the process of taking photos
does not fall within the scope of the article. The actual reason for the detention as the activists
think, was their using the Ukrainian flag.
8 CHRG review for February 2015, annexes 10 and 11. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Crimea_Field_
Mission_Review_February_2015_RU. pdf
9 goo. gl/GIb1r5
10 http://gordonua. com/news/crimea/v-bahchisarae-policiya-ne-razreshila-musulmanam-otprazdnovat-uraza-bayram-90250. html
5
On August 18th 2015 the activists of the Ukrainian Cultural Center made a notification on
holding the events dedicated to the Independence Day of Ukraine in Simferopol including the
planned laying of flowers in front of the monument to Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko in Simferopol.
However, the Simferopol administration objected to this peaceful assembly and warned
that participants and organizers of the public event would face the consequences in case of violating
the Russian legislation standards11. The reason for rejection was stated as incompliance
with the notification submission timing set by the RF laws. The organizers were to submit the
notification at least 10 days prior to the event, i. e. 10 days before August 24th, while this was
done on August 18th. So the activists were rejected to hold the peaceful assembly due to the
formal grounds.
On August 22nd 2015 Mr. Veldar Shukurdjiyev, an activist of the Ukrainian Cultural Center, was
handed a ruling on inadmissibility to hold objected public events on August 23rd (Ukraine Flag Day)
and August 24th (Independence Day of Ukraine).
On January 22nd 2016 Mr. A.A. Katsala sent a notification to the Internal Policy Department of
Sevastopol City on holding a cultural and musical event — St Patrick’s Parade — on March 19th, 2016,
from 03.00pm to 04.00pm. But, having considered the notice of intent, the department denied the
procession on January 26th due to the emergency situation announced in the city of Sevastopol12.
On March 1st 2016 the activists of the Ukrainian Cultural Center were informed that the administration
of Simferopol City denied them to hold a public event by which the activists wanted to celebrate
the birthday of Taras Shevchenko on March 9th. In their reply addressed to Ms Aliona Popova,
the city authorities of Simferopol referred to the ordinance of Mr. Sergey Aksionov, the head of the
current Crimean government, dated November 22nd 2015 ‘On introducing the emergency situation
regime’ and ‘On restricting mass, public, cultural entertainment and other events’ as well as on
the minutes of meeting of the head office on eliminating the emergency situation consequences
that suspended temporarily organizing the public events starting from November 22nd 2015 till ‘a
special notice’13. The representative of the Ukrainian Cultural Center Mr. Leonid Kuz’min was, in
addition to this, called to the ‘Prosecutor’s Office of Simferopol City and handed a ‘caution on inadmissibility
of violating the laws on anti-extremist actions and laws on assemblies, rallies, demonstrations,
processions and picketing’14.
In 2017 Ms G.V. Aleksandrova, a representative of Simferopol administration, denied again
Mr. Leonid Kuz’min, activist of the Ukrainian Cultural Center, to hold a rally in front of the monument
to Taras Shevchenko on March 9th — the poet’s day of birth. Grounds for the refusal were not
stated, but the RF MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs) issued additionally ‘a caution on inadmissibility
of law violations’, referring to RF CC and RF CAO which violations would be imputed should the
‘objected rally’ be held. 15
The administration of Yalta Town denied the local residents to hold an event on May 3rd 2016 in
the settlement of Koreiz to celebrate the Crimean Tatar HIDIRLEZ Festival. The reason for refusal
was ‘lack of possibility to secure the safety’ that was grounded by the local authorities by a need
to secure the safety of the festival held in the SHAKHEREZADA Cultural and Entertainment Center.
11 CHRG Review for July — August 2015, Annex 7. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Crimean_
Human_Rights_Group_July_August_2015_ENG. pdf
12 CHRG Review for January 2016, Annex 4. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Crimean_Human_
Rights_Group_January_2016_Eng. pdf
13 CHRG Review for March 2016, Annex 3. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_March_2016-Eng. pdf
14 http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Predosterezhenie-Kuzminu. pdf
15 https://www. facebook. com/photo. php?fbid=10203082838467619
6
This event was organized by the local authorities so in the letter of refusal the Yalta authorities suggested
the Koreiz residents to visit this particular event instead of organizing their own16.
On May 4th 2016 Ms Sanie Ametova, a representative of the regional Crimean Tatar People Mejlis,
submitted a request on holding a rally on May 18th dedicated to the Memorial Day of Crimean Tatar
Deportation Victims. On May 13th 2016 the administration of Voinka Village of Krasnoperekopsk
District represented by Ms Ekaterina V. Maksimova, chairman of the village council and head of
administration, denied to permit the rally.
The reason for refusal was land improvement works to be carried by the local authorities on
the territory of the park where the event was planned. Therefore, the administration forbad any
public events there on May 18th, except laying the flowers to the memorial sign to the deportation
victims initiated by the local authorities17. On May 16th Ms Ametova, a rally organizer, filed an administrative
claim for actions of Ms E. Maksimova in the court. On May 17th Ms Olga V. Shevchenko,
‘judge of Krasnoperekopsk district court’, rejected the claim18. Having considered the appeal,
the ‘Supreme Court of Crimea’ remitted the case. On
October 4th Mr. Aleksandr Savchenko, ‘judge of Krasnoperekopsk
district court’, rejected again the Ametova’s
claim for the administration head19. On January
11th 2017 the ‘Supreme Court of Crimea’ confirmed the
claim rejection judgement.
The day before May 18th 2016 some educational establishments
of Crimea informed teachers and pupils
that it was forbidden to be absent at school on May 18th,
and the school administrations were obliged to report
the number and reasons of absence on May 18th, including
‘separately for the Crimean Tatar children’. 20
On August 23rd 2016 Mr. Mikhail Batrak, activist of
the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Crimea, was called
to the Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea. He was handed
a ‘caution on inadmissibility of violating RF Law
on anti-extremist actions and RF Law on assemblies,
rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing’.
The reason for issuing the caution was information on
a planned public event dedicated to Independence
Day of Ukraine that seemed to have been received
by the Prosecutor’s Office from the RF FSB (Federal
Security Bureau) 21.
16 CHRG Review for May 2016, Annex 11. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_May_2016-Eng. pdf
17 CHRG Review for May 2016, Annex 9. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_May_2016-Eng. pdf
18 https://krasnoperekopskiy--krm. sudrf. ru/modules. php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_
op=doc&number=223413547&delo_id=1540005&new=0&text_number=1
19 https://krasnoperekopskiy--krm. sudrf. ru/modules. php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_
op=doc&number=223414876&delo_id=1540005&new=0&text_number=1
20 CHRG Review for May 2016, Annex 10. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_May_2016-Eng. pdf
21 http://voicecrimea. com. ua/main/predstavnika-ukra%D1%97nskogo-kulturnogo-centru-v-krimu-vizvali-do-prokuraturi. html
Denial of Voinka Village administration to issue ‘no
objection’ on holding a public event at the memorial
sign to the Crimean Tatar Deportation Victims on May
18 2016. Document, 13 May 2016. Voinka
7
On October 25th 2016 the Sevastopol City Court legitimized a rejection of Sevastopol
Government on authorizing the organizers to hold a gay pride march on May 6th – 7th 2016.
The Government of Sevastopol grounds to reject were that the pride march was supposed to
be held on the streets and squares where children’s establishments and play grounds were
located.
The organizers appealed against the decision. However, ‘Leninsky District Council’ of Sevastopol
and ‘Sevastopol City Council’ found the refusal to hold the assembly legal. The court, justifying
the judgement, referred to Federal Law ‘On protecting children against the information adversely
affecting their health and development’. This law forbids ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual
relations among the non-adults’. So, invoking this law, the local authorities may block any public
event to support the LGBT community since there would be always probable for a non-adult to
appear ‘within the event space’. 22
1.2 RESTRICTIONS ON PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES CRITICIZING
THE ACTIONS OF AUTHORITIES
On August 25th 2014 a Sevastopol policeman forbad the ZASCHITIM SEVASTOPOL (‘Let’s
Defend Sevastopol’) NGO to hold an anti-corruption rally at Nakhimov Square. The policeman
informed that the rally would be considered unlawful because it obstructed a motor show.
In September 2014 the Simferopol authorities denied the SOBOL Russian Community to hold
rallies against the seizure of the KRYMAVTOTRANS Company property, at Lenin Square.
On April 15th 2017 activists of the DEFEND SEVASTOPOL public movement assembled at Nakhimov
Square for the public event ‘Pose a Question to Putin’ that was aimed at criticizing the
local authorities. Before the public event started, a person who introduced himself as Vladimir
Kolesnikov, an officer of Internal Policy Department of the Government, had demanded to stop the
event. He explained his demands by the fact that the rally had not been authorized. Mr. Vasiliy Fedorin,
the movement head, informed that the notification on holding the rally had been submitted
according to the established timing on April 5th, but no answer on ‘no-objection’ had been received
from the Sevastopol administration. The participants refused meeting the demand and continued
the assembly. Then the policemen detained three assembly organizers to draw up administrative
reports. This having been done, they were released. Earlier, on April 5th, the police demanded to
stop the similar public events held in another part of the city.
22 http://gs. sev. sudrf. ru/modules. php?name=press_dep&op=1&did=127
Detention of activists of the Defend
SEVASTOPOL public movement during the
the public event ‘Pose a Question to Putin’,
15 April , 2015. Nakhimovskaya Square.
Sevastopol. Photo: KRYM REALII
8
On April 24th 2015 the administration of Alushta Town denied the organizers to authorize and hold
the public event ‘Defend Native Town — Preserve Gardens and Parks’ to be held on April 26th, at 10.00
am in front of the town administration building. In addition, a lot of police and special police troops
as well as two special purpose trucks (prison buses) had appeared on the square in front of the town
administration several hours before the event. The organizers and participants came to the square but
due to the presence of the police called all to leave. Then, as reported by the witnesses, several people
including the activists with fly sheets dedicated to Victory Day were detained by the policemen.
On December 3rd 2015 the Simferopol administration denied the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis to
hold a picket on December 10th at the building of the Crimean Prosecutor’s Office, Sevastopolskaya
Street, Simferopol. It was planned to use the Crimean Tatar symbols for the picket that demanded to
release the political prisoners and to stop political persecutions23.
On December 11th 2015 the police detained picketers at the Belogorsk District Court of Crimea who
came out in support of Mr. Oleg Zubkov, owner of SKAZKA Yalta Zoo. The court found the activists
guilty pursuant to Article 20.2 of RF CAO — all picket participants were fined for RUR 20,000.00 each24.
On February 14th 2016 the city administration of Simferopol City forbad a picket against fouling
the Crimean villages with garbage. According to the rally organizers’ words, they were warned by
Simferopol police department on responsibility for holding the unauthorized public event though on
February 2nd the officials permitted the picket, having notified the organizers of a need to comply
with the public event holding regulations25.
On May 6, 2016 representatives of the Crimean Kozacks came to the public event protesting
against closing the Crimean Kozack Cadet Detachment in Simferopol. The event organizers submitted
a notification on the assembly but the no-objection was denied, referring to the other event to
be held on the same place and at the same time. However, since there were no other public events
at the same time and place coordinates, the assembly participants decided to held the planned one.
The policemen demanded to stop it since it had not been authorized by the city administration. The
organizer was informed in advance on drawing up an administrative offence report against him.
The event participants refused to depart, and justified their refusal stating that they did not break
the public order, did not obstruct the pedestrians to move or other public events to be held here.
However, the policemen started dispersing the event participants using the force. The video record
23 CHRG Review for December 2015, Annex 6. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Crimean-Human-
Rights-Group_December_2015_RU. pdf
24 http://ru. krymr. com/a/news/27422812. html
25 http://ru. krymr. com/a/news/27548868. html
Use of force of the RF police for
dispersing the Crimean Kozack protect
event, 6 May 6 2016. Simferopol.
Screenshot of the ARGUMENTY
NEDELI — KRYM video news agency
9
showed that minimum two event participants were detained and put into the prison bus, with force
and special means applied to one of them. 26
On June 4th 2016 a peaceful assembly against the development of the Central Embankment
started at 10.00am at the Central Embankment of the town of Alushta. The assembly participants
(about 50 people) used slogans ‘Power Neglects Opinion of Alushta Residents’, ‘ Embankment —
Property of People’, ‘Let’s Clear Embankment of Illegal Amusements’, etc. Mr. Pavel Stepanchenko,
member of the town council, came to meet with the assembly participants. The police started
blocking the assembly, and three people — assembly activists Mr. Leonid Litvinchuk, Mr. Ruslan
Marinkov and Mr. Pavel Stepanchenko, the council member, were detained. 27. Mr. Stepanchenko
spent about seven hours in the police station, and was released when the administrative offence
report had been drawn up. Other two participants were left in the police cell till the court passed the
judgement. On June 5th defence lawyer Mr. Andrey Loginov came to the police station to meet with
the activists, his clients. But the lawyer was not allowed to see the detained. The lawyer informed
that he was rejected because the police station front office was ‘technically unable’ to provide such
meetings. The lawyer was also said that he would be able to see his clients only at the court28. Such
acts of the policemen constitute a serious violation of right to defense.
On June 6th it became known that two detained assembly participants — Mr. Leonid Litvinchuk
and Mr. Ruslan Marinkov — were released from the police station. One more activist — Mr. Valentin
Lomov — informed that the policemen tried to make him accountable for the participation in the assembly
a month later, on July 4th. He informed the TVOYA GAZETA periodical about a call from the
authorizing office of the town police station which officers notified him about the questions they had
to him and asked him to come to the station. When he came it became clear that he was called to
draw up an administrative report for his defiance as it was said to the policemen’s demands during
the June 4th assembly. But Mr. Lomov stated that no policeman came to him during the June 4th assembly,
no demands were made, and no dialogue was started. He considers drawing up the report
against him unlawful since he did not commit the offence he is imputed. When the report was drawn
up Mr. Lomov was convoyed to the Alushta town court to get a judgement made upon the report
consideration. But no judge was present there since the work hours were over. The policeman asked
Mr. Lomov to return to the police station but he refused29.
Residents of Gurzuf submitted a request on holding a rally close to GUROVSKIYE KAMNI Beach
(they got to know that the RF authorities were planning to transfer this beach to the ARTEK Children’s
Center). But the local authorities denied to hold the rally in the settlement and authorized it in the town
of Yalta though Yalta is located 15km far from Gurzuf and the place authorized for the rally in Yalta —
a small public garden named after T. Shevchenko — is far from the town authorities location. Moreover,
with a high air temperature and substantial occupancy of the public transport as well as taking
into account that many of the Gurzuf residents who wanted to participate in the rally are retired age
people, it would be difficult for them to get to Yalta. Thus, the authorities de-facto violated severely the
freedom of peaceful assemblies and deprived the people of opportunity to hold the assembly within
the ‘sight and sound’ of the target audience, i. e. in Gurzuf. On June 26th the Gurzuf residents held the
rally, though in Yalta, at the place authorized by the authorities de-facto. During the assembly they also
voiced a complaint on violating the peaceful assembly freedom due to ban on the event in Gurzuf.30
26 https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=gdMIeM5EeFU
27 https://vk. com/video138152152_456239038?hash=6b8e8493e7535f90
28 http://www. tvoya-gazeta. com/news-alushta/4173-policejskij-bespredel-v-alushte-prodolzhaetsja-k-zaderzhannym-nedopuskajut-
advokata-video. html
29 https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=5l0vEi4VO8k
30 http://openbereg. ru/?p=6118
10
On July 2nd 2016 Simferopol activists, including Mr. Aleksey Shestakovich, came to the street
to hold a picket to support the Ukrainian political prisoners in the RF. When the picket started, the
police arrived including Mr. Konstantin Gapanovich, ‘police major, head of public order protection of
the RF MIA Simferopol City Department’. He demanded to show documents on the picket ‘no-objection’
by the city administration. The activists showed the document — a notification on holding
the public event addressed to the Simferopol City administration. However, Mr. Gapanovich stated
that this was not enough to hold the event since the activists were to receive a written answer with
the city administration ‘no-objection’ to the event, i. e. to have a permission. The police major also
informed that all public events were banned at that place since according to the Simferopol city
administration ordinance, public events were admitted only in four allowed places in the city. The
policemen demanded to stop the picket because they considered it ‘non-authorized’, and then convoyed
several activists to the police station to make written explanations31.
The event was a voluntary peaceful assembly, its participants were attracting the attention to
the destiny of the political prisoners. Its slogans and signs had no appeals to violence, hostility or
discrimination, it did not prevent the pedestrians to walk or the traffic to run, and its holding had
been notified. Therefore, the authorities de facto had no grounds to force the assembly to stop.
The authorities de-facto violated the principle of proportionality of peaceful assembly restrictions,
the presumption in favor of holding assemblies, and neglected the authorities duty to defend the
peaceful assembly freedom.
On November 2nd 2016 Mr. Aleksey Puchkov, Simferopol Prosecutor assistant, handed Crimean
activist Aleksey Shestakovich a further caution on inadmissibility of holding unauthorized rallies by
the anarchist organization32. The caution was issued due to the information of the MIA Anti Extremism
Center. According to Mr. Shestakovich’s words, this is the third caution of this kind. And he informed
that the information of the Anti-Extremism Center did not correspond to the reality and was
not verified with the facts.
On July 8th 2016 the activists of DEFEND SEVASTOPOL public movement notified the ‘Government’
of Sevastopol on holding the rally ‘Instructions of Sevastopolers to Candidates to the RF State
Duma Members’ on July 22nd, 06:00pm — 08:00pm at Nakhimov Square. 33. However, the same
day the rally organizers received an answer of Mr. Vladimir Tiunin, acting as head of the Sevastopol
internal policy department, that objected the public event place indicated by the activists. Mr. Tiunin
suggested the activists to hold the rally in another place and indicated three locations where the activists
would be permitted to hold the meeting (a site at the SOLDIER AND SAILOR Monument, Kapitanskaya
Street; Svobody Square (1 P. Korchagina Street); a site around the monument to St George
in the Pobedy Park). To achieve the public event targets it was necessary for the activists to hold
the rally specifically at Nakhimova Square, so on July 12th they filed an objection on the V. Tiunin’s
answer. In respond to the objection, Mr. Tiunin denied again to issue ‘no objection’ on holding the
public event at Nakhimova Square. He explained his restriction, stating that ‘a number of institutions
with a specific working regime including the Plenipotentiary Representative Office of President in
the Crimean Federal Area and the engineering department of the RF Black Sea Navy, are located
on Nakhimova Square, and in order to avoid any disruptions of their operations it is not recommended
to hold the public events in the close vicinity to them. ’
Since the refusal was not grounded, the activists came to Nakhimova Square on July 22nd in
order to hold the planned event. When they mounted an information stand with inscription ‘For
31 https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=a_f3DyAgWkg&feature=youtu. be
32 https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=k_7PJd_zC3k&feature=share
33 http://sevsps. com/2016/07/pravitelstvo-sevastopolya-opyat-ne-razreshilo-provedenie-mitinga-na-ploshhadi-naximova/
11
Resignation of Meniyalo. For Direct Voting for Governor’ they were approached by the police who
forbad the public event.
The activists appealed the restriction of the Sevastopol authorities de facto to hold the rally at
Nakhimova Square at Leninsky District Court of Sevastopol. Judge O. V. Prokhorchuk satisfied the
claim on declaring the decision on the public event restriction illegitimate34. But the activists did not
manage to hold the rally because the judge statement was made after July 22nd.
On August 20th 2016 the police and administration of Simferopol City did not allow to hold the
‘OBMANUTYI KRYM’ (Deceived Crimea) rally where the activists intended to express their claims
to the local authorities. The organizers wanted to hold the rally at Lenin Square but the city administration
restricted the rally place. The organizers transferred the rally to the Trade Unions Palace
of Culture that was notified to the local administration35. But, according to the words of Mr. Ilya Bolshedvorov,
chairman of CRIMEAN REPUBLICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITTEE NGO, the police
and representatives of the city administration who appeared when the event was starting, forbad it,
referring to the fact that the public event had been objected by the city authorities36.
Activists of Alushta town and Partenit settlement submitted a notification on holding a rally to
express their distrust to members of YEDINAYA ROSSIYA party in Alushta on September 3rd 2016.
The notification was submitted on August 24th. On August 25th Mr. Igor Sotov, head of Alushta town
administration, issued his ‘non-objection’ to the rally and appointed Mr. T. N. Garvriliuk to represent
the town authorities37.
However, the day before the rally, on September 2nd, Mr. Aleksey Nazimov, the event organizer,
found two documents in his entrance door split: notification of the town administration on forbidding
the earlier ‘non-objected’ event and a caution of the police town unit on inadmissibility of violating
the law on public events. The reason for restriction was that a public event of ‘MOLODAYA GVARDIA
YEDINOY ROSSII’ of Alushta would be hold at the same place at the time indicated by the organizers38.
The MOLODAYA GVARDIA event did
not occur though this became a reason for depriving
the Partenit activists from the possibility
to exercise the right to peaceful assemblies.
On December 12th in Simferopol at Lenina
Square the police detained activist Sergey
Akimov who was on the single-person picket,
and Mr. Ilia Bolshedvorov, who was photographing
the event.
‘’At 05.00 pm Sergey Vladimirovich Akimov,
due to the restriction on holding a group picket
‘For Russia, For Constitution’ came to Lenin
Square to hold a single-person picket. Five
minutes later he was detained by the police.
Police lieutenant colonel Nikitin explained the
detention in the straightforward way: ‘One is
34 http://sevnews. info/rus/view-news/Sud-reshil-chto-Vladimir-Tyunin-byl-ne-prav-Sevastopolcy-imeyut-pravo-sobiratsya-naploshadi-
Nahimova-i-vyskazyvat-svoyo-mnenie/27447
35 http://an-crimea. ru/page/news/142832
36 http://echo. msk. ru/news/1824114-echo. html
37 http://www. tvoya-gazeta. com/news-alushta/4268-v-partenite-alushta-sostoitsja-miting. html
38 http://www. tvoya-gazeta. com/news-alushta/4277-vlast-alushty-zapretila-razreshennyj-eju-zhe-miting-video. html
Activist Sergey Akimov after detention for holding a singleperson
picket. Dye on his hands after fingerprinting at the
police station. 7 February 2017. Simferopol. Photo from Ilia
Bolshedvorov Facebook page
12
standing with the picket sign, the other is recording a
video at a distance of less than 50m, you have been
seen together before’, — Ilya Bolshedvorov wrote at his
Facebook site. The video of detention was published at
‘Anticorruption. Crimea’ YouTube channel. 39 Both Crimeans
were taken to the police station where reports on
violating the picket regulations were drawn up against
them. On February 6th 2017 Mr. Bolshedvorov and Mr.
Akimov were detained again, under the same circumstances,
during the single-person picket ‘Stolen Simferopol
— Wall of Shame’40 In February 2017 activists Sergey
Akimov and Yuriy Belov were detained during the single-
person picket at the Prosecutor’s Office building. 41.
On November 23rd 2016 a group of citizens notified
the administration of Yevpatoria Town on intention to
hold a picket at the Yevpatoria RF MIA unit on November
26th. The notification declared the aim of the picket
as ‘to attract attention of the public to political repressions’
and indicated the number of participants — 10-15
people42. The Yevpatoria Town Administration restricted
the picket explaining that the chosen place was not on
the list of sites for public events43.
But the places allowed for the public events deprive
the activists from the possibility to achieve the target
audience, namely the MIA staff. Since the participation
in the objected picket results into an administrative punishment,
the organizers had to refuse the picket. On
November 26th the single-person picket that did not require
the administration ‘non-objection’ was hold at the
planned place next to the MIA unit building. The police
did not prevent the single-person event. 44
On March 17th 2017 the Sevastopol city authorities
objected holding the ‘Rally to Support a Demand to Investigate
Facts of Corruption of Highest State Officials of
Russia’ planned for March 26th 2017. The Department of
39 https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=ipMFfsnRqjA
40 https://www. facebook. com/ilya. bolshedvorov/
videos/1028193430619503/
41 https://www. facebook. com/ilya. bolshedvorov/
videos/1029362457169267/
42 CHRG Review for November 2016, Annex 2. — http://crimeahrg.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Crimean-Human-Rights-Group_
Nov_2016_ENG. pdf
43 CHRG Review for November 2016, Annex 3. — http://crimeahrg.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Crimean-Human-Rights-Group_
Nov_2016_ENG. pdf
44 https://www. facebook. com/aleksej. shestakovich/
posts/1255833564480008
Denial of Yevpatoria Town administration to issue
‘no-objection’ on holding a picket at the RF MIA
Yevpatoria department building to attract attention
of the public to political repressions. Document. 25
November 2016. Yevpatoria.
Activists detained in VERONA Café when planning the
single person pickets. Photo of Dmitriy Kisiyev made
in the police bus. 26 February 2017. Simferopol.
13
Public Communications of Sevastopol’ restricted the rally twice: close to the monument to St George
due to the pavement tiling replacement, and at Nakhimova Square due to the fact that the rally might
obstruct the movement of pedestrians 45.
On March 22nd 2017 the similar rally was also objected by the Simferopol administration. It referred
to the incompleteness of the submitted documents package. According to the words of activist
Dmitriy Kisiyev, the reason for objection was that only copy of Kisiyev’s passport was attached to
the notification on the rally though three organizers were mentioned in it46. Having been refused, 7
activists tried to organize a number of single-person pickets but were detained by the police when
they were meeting at the café47. Mr. Dmitriy Kisiyev was among the detained. On March 26th he
wrote that he was arrested for 10 days48. One of the detained — Mr. Aleksey Yefremov — informed
on March 2649 in the afternoon, that he was detained again by the plain-clothed people, and one of
them showed him an MIA identification card. He was told that he was being transported for examination.
Later he wrote that upon the court ruling he was fined for RUR 500.00 for violating Article
19.3 of RF CAO ‘Failure to follow a lawful order of a policeman’. Mr. Yefremov pointed out that the
same article was used to sentence Dmitriy Kisiyev for 10 days in prison.
1.3 DISCRIMINATION IN AUTHORIZING THE PUBLIC EVENTS
One of illustrations of the discrimination in issuing permits to hold public events is ANTIMAIDAN
assembly hold in Simferopol on February 21st 2015. The public event was aimed at supporting the
‘state sovereignty of Russia and political course of Vladimir Putin’. The event organizers were Crimean
branch of VELIKOYE OTECHESTVO Party, ANTIMAIDAN Movement and NIGHT WOLVES Russian
bikers. The event was held just in the center of the city, where streets Karla Marksa and Pushkina
cross. In addition, the Crimean authorities allowed the organizers to drive cars and bikes on the
pedestrian zone. Apart from this, the rally place was not on the list of those identified by the local
authorities for holding the public events in Simferopol.
1.4 OTHER CASES OF UNLAWFUL RESTRICTIONS OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
FREEDOM
On March 4th 2017 the headmaster and the local police officer interrupted a football march between
neighborhood teams. The headmaster did not want the match to be played on the school
stadium. According to the match participants, the reason for dispersal was a declaration that the
‘rally’ had not been authorized by the administration of Feodosiya 50.
A contest of drawings ‘My Mother is the Best’ was held on March 11th in the House of Culture of
the Crimean settlement of Oktiabrskoye, Krasnogvardeysk District. Mr. Vladimir Melnik, head of the
settlement, accused the contest organizers of holding an unauthorized rally and filed a report on
them to the RF MIA, stating that they had violated Article 20.2 of RF CAO. As Mr Melnik informed the
KRYMSKIY TELEGRAPH News Agency, he was outraged that the event had been hold without his
authorization and this was a principle for him to get the organizers punished51.
45 https://www. facebook. com/crimeahrg/posts/1870179933267639
46 http://ru. krymr. com/a/news/28383734. html
47 https://vk. com/wall64972578_10489
48 https://vk. com/wall412152752_156
49 https://vk. com/wall64972578_10513
50 https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=yU8WSu5SnqA
51 http://ktelegraf. com. ru/8973-iniciativa-nakazuema. html
14
2 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PERSECUTION OF PEACEFUL
ASSEMBLY ORGANIZERS AND PARTICIPANTS
2.1 CASE OF MAY 3RD
On May 3rd 2014 a peaceful assembly of Crimean Tatars to support Mr. Mustafa Djemilev, Member
of Parliament of Ukraine, Leader of the Crimean Tatar People that was not allowed by the
Russian border guards to enter Crimea, was held in Crimea (Armiansk). The assembly was participated
by several thousands of Crimean Tatars, and afterwards Prosecutor of Crimea Ms Natalia
Poklonskaya sent a resolution to the Investigation Committee and the RF FSB ‘to initiate a criminal
prosecution against the people guilty due to articles 212, 318 and 322 of RF CC (mass riots,
violence to an official representative and illegal crossing of the state border). No violence was
used by the participants during the peaceful assembly. In a week the event participants started
receiving requests for summons. As a result about 200 people were fined for amounts of RUR
10thou to 40thou according to articles 19.3 and 20.2 of RF CAO. This was followed with a wave of
searches in the house of ‘May 3rd peaceful assembly’ participants. Five participants were detained
from October 2014 to January 2015 within the criminal prosecution of the participants according
to Article 318 of RF CC:
■ Mr. Musa Abkerimov: was in the detention facility from October 14 2014 to December 11 2014.
On May 28 2015 he was given a 4 year and 4 month suspended sentence.
■ Mr. Rustam Abrurakhmanov: was in the detention facility form October 17 2014 to December
11 2014. He left to the non-occupied territory of Ukraine before the sentence.
■ Mr. Tair Smedliayev: was in the detention facility from October 22 2014 to December 11 2014.
On December 10 2015 he was given a 2-year suspended sentence.
■ Mr. Edem Ebulisov: was in the detention facility from November 25 2014 to December 17 2014.
On August 14 2015 he was sentenced to RUR 40,000.00 fine.
■ Mr. Edem Osmanov: was in the detention facility from January 20 2015 to February 2015.
On December 8 2015 he was given a year suspended sentence.
Representative of the RF law enforcement agencies blocked the road at the ‘administrative border’ of Crimea during the
assembly to support Mustafa Djemilev. 3 May 2014. Armiansk. Photo from the news.allcrimea.net. website.
15
2.2 CASE OF FEBRUARY 26TH
Persecution of the participants of
the peaceful assembly held on February
2014 in Simferopol raises a particular
concern. That day a rally to
support the status of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea organized by the
Crimean Tatar People Mejlis was held
in Simferopol at the Parliament of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
Several thousands of Crimeans who
protested against an extraordinary
session of the Supreme Council of
Crimea that was to adopt an unlawful
resolution on the referendum in
Crimea, participated in the event.
In January 2015 the RF Investigation Committee initiated a criminal case for organizing and participating
in the mass riots (Article 212 of RF CC). The first who was detained within this case on January
29th 2015 was Mr. Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy Chairman of the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis. He
was accused of organizing the mass riots (Article 212. 1 of RF CC). He has been still in the Detention
Facility No 1 of Simferopol, and the court hearings on his case are still going in.
Seven people more are accused of participating in the mass riots within the February 26th Case
(Article 212.2 of RF CC):
■ Mr. Eskender Kantemirov: was in the detention facility from February 7 2015 to April 6 2015.
As at May 2017, the court hearings are in progress.
■ Mr. Eskender Yemirvaliye: was in the detention facility from February 18 2015 to April 17 2015.
As at May 2017, the court hearings are in progress.
■ Mr. Taliat Yunusov: was in the detention facility from March 11 2015 to April 17 2015. On
December 28 2015 he was given a 3 year and 6 month suspended sentence by ‘Tsentralny
District Court’ of Simferopol City
■ Mr. Eskender Nebiyev: was in the detention facility from 22 April 2015 to 18 June 2015 and
October 9 2015 to October 12 2015. On October 12 2015 he was given a 2 year and 6 month
suspended sentence by ‘Tsentralny District Court’ of Simferopol City
■ Mr. Ali Asanov: was in the detention facility all the time from April 15 2015 to April 6 2017. As at
May 2017, the court hearings are in progress.
■ Mr. Mustafa Degermendji: was in the detention facility all the time from May 7 2015 to April 6
2017. As at May 2017, the court hearings are in progress.
■ Mr. Arsen Yunusov: is named in the case as accused. As at May 2017, the court hearings are
in progress.
All persons accused within the case are citizens of Ukraine, the peaceful assembly was held on
the territory of Ukraine, the participants of this peaceful assembly did not violate the Ukrainian law
standards. Russia has no grounds to apply the Russian jurisdiction to the events of February 26th
2014, and only Ukraine has a right to consider these actions in terms of legal offences.
Rally at the building of the Supreme Council of AR Crimea. 26 February
2014. Simferopol. Photo from GOSSOVET KRYMA website.
16
2.3 CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR THE PARTICIPATION
IN THE PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES IN KYIV
Participants of protests at Maidan in Kyiv held in January — February 2014 are being prosecuted
in Crimea.
On February 5th 2015 Mr. Aleksandr Kostenko was
arrested in Simferopol. He was tortured when he was
being detained and then interrogated. The ‘Prosecutor’s
Office’ of Crimea accused him of attacking an officer
of BERKUT MIA of Ukraine detachment during the
protests at Maidan Nezaleshnosti in Kyiv in February
2014 and found guilty of violating Article 115. 2. b of
RF CC (intentional infliction of light injury by reason of
political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred
or enmity, or by reason of hatred or enmity with
respect to some social group). After the search carried
with violations of the RF CC when the investigators announced
that they had found a tube at his home, he was
accused also of possession of weapon. On May 15 2015 ‘Kiyevsky District Court of ‘ sentenced
Mr. Kostenko to 4 years and 2 months in the standard regime penal colony. At the moment he is
serving the sentence given on the politically motivated criminal case in the penal colony No 5 in
the town of Kirovo-Chepetsk, Kirov Region, RF.
On May 15 2015 Mr. Andrey Kolomiyets was detained
in Kabardino-Balkaria (RF). Then he was transported
to Crimea where he was accused of violating
Article 105, Article 228, Article 30 RF CC (assault to murder).
He was accused that he seemed to have tossed
a bottle with incendiary mixture into the officers of the
BERKUT MIA of Ukraine detachment during the protests
at Maidan Nezaleshnosti in Kyiv. According to the information
of Mr. Kolomiyets and his defense lawyer, he was
tortured during the interrogation. On 10 June 2016 Andrey
Kolomiyets was sentenced to 10 years in the maximum
security penal colony. At the moment he is serving
the sentence given on the politically motivated criminal
case in the penal colony No 14 of Krasnodar, RF.
The RF law enforcement bodies have no legal grounds for such actions since these events were
on the territory of Kyiv (Ukraine). Mr. Kostenko and Mr. Kolomiyets are citizens of Ukraine as well as
BERKUT officers considered to be injured. Criminality and penality are determined by the criminal
law in force at the moment of competing a specific action. This case is regulated by the criminal law
of Ukraine. Article 12. 3 of RF Criminal Code states that foreign nationals and stateless persons who
do not reside permanently in the Russian Federation and who have committed crimes outside the
boundaries of the Russian Federation shall be brought to criminal liability under this Code in cases
where the crimes run against the interests of the Russian Federation or a citizen of the Russian Federation
or a stateless person permanently residing in the Russian Federation, and also in the cases
provided for by international agreements of the Russian Federation, and unless the foreign citizens
and stateless persons not residing permanently in the Russian Federation have been convicted in
Aleksandr Kostenko at the court session
Andrey Kolomiyets at the court session
17
a foreign state and are brought to criminal liability on the territory of the Russian Federation. Therefore,
actions that the RF law enforcement bodies incriminate to Mr. Kostenko and Mr. Kolomiyets are
not subject to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE PERSECUTION OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
PARTICIPANTS
On August 24 2014 GIBDD (State Traffic Safety Inspectorate) officers detained Mr. Viktor Neganov,
organizer of the Ukrainian rally in Sevastopol. He was unlawfully searched, his personal
belongings were exempted, and his car was searched without his presence. No reports were
made. Previously the Crimean authorities had declared that they would not draw up reports and
make accountable people for violation of the vehicle glass filming requirements within the transition
period (up to 1 January 2015). Mr. Neganov is the only person on the territory of Crimea who
was made accountable for this violation. The CHRG believes that the actual reason for stopping
his vehicle and drawing up reports on administrative offence was that on that day (Independence
Day of Ukraine) Mr. Neganov, with the national flag of Ukraine and wearing the scarf in
the colors of the national flag of Ukraine, laid flowers to the basement where the monument to
Hetman Sahaidachny had been before. Later, being threatened with criminal prosecution, Mr.
Neganov had to leave Crimea.
On March 30th 2015 the RF police detained seven students who planned to make a video to
support ATR TV channel. On April 1st 2015 Kiyevsky District Court of Simferopol City session
found one of the students — Mr. Aleksey Yefremov guilty according to Article 20.2.1 of RF CAO.
He was fined for RUR 20,000.00. In addition, the court found him guilty according to Article 19.3
of RF CAO (resistance to police) and fined for RUR 500.00 more. Mr. Yefremov himself denied
completely his guilt and insisted that he had not resisted detention.
On April 15th 2015 the Commission for Minor Citizen Cases and their Rights Defense of Simferopol
City found two under the legal age students detained together with Mr. Yefremov, guilty
according to Article 20.2.5 of RF CAO and issued a ruling on applying the administrative punishment
as fine amounting to RUR 10,000.00 to each of them52.
The court and the Commission members found the students guilty in ‘violating the established
procedure for conducting an assembly, a rally, a demonstration, a procession or picket’.
However the actions of students (an attempt to record a video to support the ATR Crimean Tatar
TV Channel) do not come within the definition of ‘meeting, rally, demonstration, procession or
picket’ as stated in Article 2 RF FZ ‘On meetings, rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing’.
Therefore, the situation occurred when the judge and commission members interpret arbitrarily
the Russian legal standards, bringing an administrative action against the people.
Several Crimean Tatars were brought to the administrative action because they hold a mourning
rally dedicated to the anniversary of the Crimean Tatar people deportation on May 18th 2015.
On May 19th 2015 law enforcement officers called the head of regional Mejlis of Krasnoperekopsk
district Ms Sanie Ametova on whom the administrative report on violating the procedure
of holding the public event had been drawn up, to the interrogation. Ms Ametova informed that
grounds for drawing up the report were use of self-made banners dedicated to the Memorial
Day of the Deportation Victims at the rally. The ‘Krasnoperekopsk District Court’ sentenced her
to a fine of RUR 1,000.
52 CFM Review for April 2015, Annex 17. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Crimea_Field_Mission_
Review_April_2015_RU. pdf
18
On June 26th 2015 imam of Dolinka village of Krasnoperekopsk District Yunus Nemetullayev
was also brought under the administrative action due to the participation in the same rally. The
‘Krasnoperekopsk District Court’ sentenced him to a fine of RUR 10,000. On November 26th
2015 the court cancelled its sentence.
On June 30th judge of ‘Krasnoperekopsk District Court’ Mr. O. V. Shevchenko heard a case
of administrative offence against Ms Zeinep Aidogan. On May 26 2015 the report was drawn
up against her that stated that she had organized and held a picket, without the notification of
the authorities, in the village of Voinka as well as demonstrated picket signs calling to return
the Crimean Tatar language the status of state one. Ms Aidogan did not agree with the report,
claiming that she had no intention to violate the laws. The ‘judge’ changed the qualification and
decided to make Ms Aidogan accountable not as organizer but as participant. The ‘court’ found
her guilty according to Article 20.2.5 of RF CAO and sentenced to the fine of RUR 10,000.
On May 18th 2015 the participants of motor rally dedicated to the Memorial Day of the Deportation
Victims were stopped at the Simferopol City exit by OMON (special police troops) and
GIBDD officers. The participants stated that the motor rally in terms of its organization was not
a public event. As a result administrative reports for creating a traffic accident situation were
drawn out against 8 participants.
A year later on May 18th 2016 motor rallies dedicated to the Memorial Day of Deportation
Victims were also held in several cities and towns of Crimea. The motor rallies did not create
traffic accident situations on the roads, did not obstruct the motor traffic. However, several participants
of such motor rallies were detained and held liable.
Mr. Eskender Ganiyev, 17 years’ old, was detained on the way to Bakhchisarai and drawn up a report
on administrative offence as well as recovery of fine for RUR 4,000, and then he was released.
In L’govskoye village of Kirov District four motor rally participants S. Kurukch, R. Yapalakhov,
U. Fakhriyev and E. Berberov were detained, with drawing up the reports according to Article
20. 2 of CAO. On May 19th ‘judge of Kirov District Court’ Roman Mikhailov found them guilty of
administrative offence according to Article 20.2.6.1 of RF CAO53. For each of them the ‘judge’
made a ruling on an administrative punishment of 20 mandatory work hours54.
Four Crimean Tatars were detained in Sudak: Abliakim Abliakimov, Seitmamut Seitumerov,
Enver Chavush and Alim Musliadinov. On May 18th 2016 they drove cars with the Crimean Tatar
53 https://kirovskiy--krm. sudrf. ru/modules. php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&H_date=19.05.2016
54 https://www. facebook. com/nariman. dzhelalov/posts/1107699962627196
Participants of the motor rally
dedicated to the deportation
victim memory who were
stopped by the RF MIA staff,
18 May 2016. Photo from
15minut.org website
19
symbols through Sudak and stopped at the monument to deportation victims in order to participate
in the ‘Light Candle’ Event. At the monument they were detained by the police and convoyed
to the police city station where reports were drawn up against them according to Article
20.2.2 of RF CAO. On June 7th ‘judge of Sudak City Court’ Yelena Kharaman issued an order to
terminate the proceedings on the administrative offence case against all four Crimean Tatars55.
On July 19th it became known that ‘acting as head of Sudak City MIA of Russia Department’
Dmitriy Krekov made a complaint on the decision to terminate the proceedings on the administrative
offence case against four Crimean Tatars56. ‘The Supreme Court of Crimea’ satisfied the
complaint of Dmitriy Krekov and remitted the case.
On October 27th the administrative case against four Crimean Tatars was reconsidered.
This time Alim Musliadinov, Abliakim Abliakimov, Enver Chavush, Seitmamut Seitumerov were
found guilty and sentenced to a fine of RUR 20,000 each57. In December the ‘Supreme Court of
Crimea’ reduced the fine amount to RUR 10,000.
On August 24th 2016 the Supreme Court of Crimea dismissed the appeal of Seiran Saliyev.
Earlier ‘Bakhchisarai District Court’ had sentenced him to fine of RUR 20,000 for ‘organizing an
unauthorized rally’ on May 12th 2016. On May 12th 2016 Mr. Seliyev announced by microphone
from the local mosque minaret that the FSB officers were searching the houses of Crimean Tatars.
This action was qualified as call to non-authorized rally58.
On December 6th 2016 ‘judge of Bakhchisarai District Court’ Marina I. Nikischenko sentenced
Mr. Enver Sherfiyev to a fine of RUR 15,000. He was accused of violating Article 20. 2. 6. 1 of
CAO for coming to SALACHIKE café in Bakchisarai on May 12th 2016 when the Muslims were
being arrested within the Hizb-Ut-TAHRIR case. Earlier the fines for the same ‘offences’ were
sentenced to Bakhchisarai residents: Marlen Asanov, Emin Belialov, Emil Belialov, Seiran Saliyev.
They were also fined for supporting their compatriots during the searches and detentions
of May 12th 2016. All previous sentences on fines were also made by ‘judge’ Nikischenko.
On February 21st 2017 the house of Marlen Mustafayev in the village of Kamenka was
searched. 10 people who came to record this were detained: Remzi Bekirov, Osman Arifmemetov,
Riza Izetov, Ruslan Suleymanov, Seran Murtazayev, Alim Karimov, Abliakim Abdurakhmanov,
Medjit Abdurakhmanov, Enver Tasinov, Valeriy Grigor’. The police officers announced that
all present violated the laws on public events. All detained were found guilty according to article
20.2 of RF CAO and sentenced to 5 days in custody.
55 https://sudak--krm. sudrf. ru/modules. php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&H_date=07.06.2016
56 CHRG Review for July 2016, Annex 1. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_July_2016-Eng. pdf
57 https://www. facebook. com/lenora. dyulber/videos/vb. 100001852246809/1244940598911003/?type=2&theater
58 http://qha. com. ua/ru/obschestvo/sud-ne-udovletvoril-apellyatsionnuyu-jalobu-seirana-salieva/164624/
20
3 OBSTRUCTION OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES WITH THE HELP OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND CRIMEAN SELF DEFENSE
PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION
Numerous facts of using the law enforcement agencies and Crimean Self Defense paramilitary
organization to disperse peaceful assemblies or obstruct them have been recorded in Crimea.
On March 3 2014, Mr Reshat Ametov was holding a single person picket against the occupation
of Crimea at the square in front of the building of the Council of Ministers of Crimea. There is an
open access video that shows how several people wearing camouflage took Mr Ametov away from
the square and forced him to sit in the car. The body of Mr Ametov was found on March 15 2014 in
the field close to Zemlianichnoye Village of Belogorsk District with marks of torture, head wrapped
with sticky tape, and feet in handcuffs. Persons who took Mr Ametov away from the square have
been identified but are qualified as witnesses in the criminal case. Up to date nobody has been
brought to responsibility for a brutal murder of the activist.
On May 18th 2014 to restrict the peaceful assembly — mourning events on the 70th anniversary
of the Crimean Tatar deportation — the central streets of Simferopol were blocked with the Russian
troops, law enforcement personnel, with military machinery used, too.
On August 24th 2014 (Independence Day of Ukraine) the law enforcement officers and representatives
of ‘Citizens in Arms’ cordoned off the monument to T. Shevchenko in Simferopol. On December
10th 2014, International Human Rights Day, central streets of Simferopol were cordoned off with
the law enforcement officers and representatives of ‘Citizens in Arms’. Journalists were forbidden to
take photo and video records.
On May 17th 2016 in Sevastopol a spontaneous assembly of protesting local entrepreneurs started
on Istoricheskyi boulevard. The protest became a reaction of small trading stand owners on the
attempt of the local authorities to move away one of the stands. A truck of the SEVAVTODOR state
unitary company loaded one of the stands on it but entrepreneurs — stand owners — blocked the
truck movement, demanding a court decision on the stand demolition59.
The situation lasted until the evening. Late at night there was an attempt of forced dispersal of
the entrepreneurs and release of truck with the stand on it. According to the words of entrepreneurs
and witnesses, these actions were performed by the police personnel, representatives of
local authorities and local self-defense. As a result it was decided to unload the stand from the truck
and return it to its previous place, then the entrepreneurs de-blocked the truck and it left Istoricheskyi
boulevard60.
59 http://sevastopol. su/news. php?id=87075
60 http://sevastopol. su/news. php?id=87104
21
4 APPLICATION OF RUSSIAN AND LOCAL LAWS TO RESTRICT
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLIES
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 21, and European Convention on
Human Rights, Article 11, admits restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly if they are imposed in
conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others. However, the Russian and local laws in Crimea contain some
substantial formal restrictions of the peaceful assembly freedom that are of no necessity in the democratic
society. In addition, the authorities de-facto take decisions on the total temporary ban of all
peaceful assemblies on the territory of Crimea.
4.1 RF REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THE FREEDOM
OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES
On July 21st 2014 Law FZ 258 ‘On amending certain laws of the Russian Federation in terms
of improving the legislation on public events’ that introduced criminal sanctions for repeated
violation of the procedure for arranging or conducting the public events, came into force in
the RF.
In October 2014 Article 9 of Federal Law ‘On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, processions
and picketing’ was amended. A public event shall not commence before 07:00am and
finish after 10:00pm of the current day, local time, except the public events dedicated to the
memorial dates of Russia, public cultural events. Therefore, one more restriction of the peaceful
assembly freedom forbidding peaceful assemblies after 10:00pm was introduced.
The freedom of associations including the territory of Crimea is threatened by Federal Law
‘On amending certain legal documents of the Russian Federation’ adopted by the State Duma
of the RF on May 19th 2015. The law was titled ‘Law on undesirable foreign and international
organizations’. The law provides for prohibiting activities of the organizations which, in the
judgement of the authorities, constitute a threat for the constitutional system, national defense
capability or security. The law introduces severe sanctions for its violations, up to imprisonment.
In addition, the law makes it possible to bring to a criminal responsibility for collaboration with
‘undesirable organizations’ or distribution the information about them. Many provisions of law
lack legal determination that enables its selective application.
Pursuant to this law, on July 7th 2015 the RF Federal Council published the ‘Patriotic Stop
List’ that included 12 organizations: Open Society Institute (Soros Fund), National Endowment
for Democracy, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Freedom House, Charles Stewart
Mott Foundation, Education for Democracy Foundation, East European Democratic Centre, the
Ukrainian World Congress, the Ukrainian World Coordinating Council, the Crimean Field Mission
on Human Rights. Afterwards the Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights stopped its activities
on the peninsula.
On March 9th 2016 the State Duma of RF approved amendments to Federal Law ‘On assemblies,
rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing’, and consequently, such actions as
motor rallies and stand installation were set equal to the public events. Moreover, according to
the law amendments, a form of public expression of opinion through installing fast mounted assembling/
disassembling structures at the picketed facility was defined as picketing. Therefore,
22
the legislation on assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing subject to the
authorization was extended to cover motor rallies and tent camps. In addition, notification is
required if a picket held by single man presumes using the fast mounted assembling/ disassembling
structure that obstructs the movement of pedestrians and vehicles61.
4.2 REGULATIONS OF AUTHORITIES DE-FACTO RESTRICTING FREEDOM
OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES
On May 16th 2014 ‘Prime Minister’ of Crimea Sergey Aksionov issued Edict No 2962 that prohibited
peaceful assemblies on the territory of Crimea till June 6th that year. Such wide restriction on peaceful
assemblies was justified by Mr Aksionov by ‘eliminating possible provocations of extremists who
are able to enter the territory of Republic of Crimea in order to prevent the obstruction of holiday
season in the Republic of Crimea’. The local authorities had no verifications for such threats.
The ban on peaceful assemblies was applied also to the mourning events of May 18th 2014 dedicated
to the 70th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar deportation. Earlier the Crimean Tatars had held
these events on annual basis.
On August 8th 2014 the ‘State Council of Republic of Crimea’ adopted Law ‘On securing the
conditions of exercising the rights of the Russian Federation citizens to hold assemblies, rallies,
demonstrations and picketing in the Republic of Crimea’ that restricted substantially the freedom
of peaceful assemblies in Crimea. The Law obliges to submit a notification in writing directly to the
local self-government body of municipal formation 15 days the earliest and 10 days the latest before
the public event day. Specifically assigned places to hold the peaceful assemblies are introduced
and shall be established by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, in line with the requirements
of Federal Law ‘‘On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing’.
On November 12th 2014 the ‘Council of Ministers of
Crimea’ issued resolution No 452 ‘On approving the list
of places for holding public events on the territory of the
Republic of Crimea’63, that indicates the places for holding
peaceful assemblies. For instance, in Simferopol (city with
400thou residents) the peaceful assemblies may be held
only in four places.
On July 4th 2016 the ‘Council of Ministers of Crimea’ —
by resolution no 31564 — reduced significantly a short
already list of places allowed for holding peaceful assemblies.
For instance, the list of places for public events in
Kerch went down from 15 to 3. For the whole Crimea the
total number of places for holding peaceful assemblies
decreased from 717 to 360. The resolution does not state
reasons for selecting these places, and does not include
61 http://www. garant. ru/hotlaw/federal/701246/
62 http://rk. gov. ru
63 http://rk. gov. ru
64 http://rk. gov. ru
Edict of Sergey Aksionov, ‘head of Republic of Crimea’ ‘On restrictions
for holding public events due to the events in the South and the East of
Ukraine’, document, 16 May 2014, Simferopol.
23
grounds for restricting the peaceful assemblies in other places of cities and towns. A substantial
limit on the number of places to hold peaceful assemblies violates the freedom of assemblies and
restricts considerably the possibilities for the Crimean residents to hold a peaceful assembly within
the ‘sight and sound’ of the audience they want to address.
On September 27th 2015 Mr G. Bakharev, head of Simferopol Administration, issued resolution
No 953 ‘On actions of response due to the situation created on the 26th September 2015’ on the
territory of Simferopol65. The resolution purpose is to restrict public and other events in the city. The
reason was an armed attack on the emergency health service substation on September 26th.
The resolution recommended the persons who had announced holding mass, public events that
were approved by the Administration of Simferopol City within the established procedure, to postpone
the date and time of their holding till a special instruction. The physical persons and legal entities
were recommended not to hold mass and public events on the territory of Simferopol starting
from September 27th and till the specific instruction. This resolution was for an indefinite period and
remained in force till the relevant ordinance of the administration head. On October 9th the restrictions
were cancelled by resolution No 107066.
On 22nd November 2015, due to announcing an emergency situation in Crimea because of electric
energy shutdown, a new moratorium on holding public events was introduced on the territory
of Simferopol. Mr G. Bakharev, head of Simferopol Administration, decided ‘to suspend temporarily
actions on holding mass, public, cultural and entertainment and other events’ on the territory of
Simferopol starting from November 22nd 2015 and till the specific instruction67. On March 7th 2016
the resolution was amended. Words ‘suspend temporarily’ and ‘restrict’ were replaced with ‘forbid’.
Only events held by the current authorities were excluded from the resolution scope68. Ban on holding
public events was cancelled on March 22nd 201669.
65 https://goo. gl/oYwVMK
66 http://simadm. ru/media/acts/2015/10/12/_1070_%D0%BE%D1%82_09. 10. 2015_. pdf
67 http://simadm. ru/media/acts/2015/11/22/_1347_%D0%BE%D1%82_22. 11. 2015. pdf
68 https://goo. gl/lUz58C
69 goo. gl/c27IWD
Resolution of Simferopol
City Administration ‘On
restricting mass, public,
cultural and entertainment
and other events on the
territory of ‘Simferopol
City Area of Republic
of Crimea’ municipal
formation’, 22 November
2015, document.
Simferopol
24
5 VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSOCIATIONS
ICCPR, Article 22, and European Convention on Human Rights, Article 11, establishes the right to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection
of the interests.
The freedom of associations is systematically violated on the territory of Crimea, first of all, regarding
the Crimean Tatar associations.
The property of numerous public associations that had been active on the territory of Crimea
earlier, was transferred, without their consent, to the disposal of other organizations. Among examples
are All-Ukrainian PROSVITA Society named after T. H. Shevchenko in Sevastopol, All-Ukrainian
Information and Cultural Center, Guest House for Writers named after A. P. Chekhov in Yalta, termination
of tenancy contract with the SOVET UCHITELEY (Council of Teachers) NGO for a building in
Bakhchisarai Town, where the district Crimean Tatar People Mejlis was located, termination of tenancy
contract for premises with CHATYR DAG Organization (Alushta).
On October 19th 2016 the police inspected a room of the YUSTI*S Scientific Society of Law Students
and Post-Graduate Students NGO. The organization provided a free-of-charge legal support
to the low income people. The inspection was performed by policemen Aleksey Fedorinin, Andrey
Savchenko and Yevgeniy Kryme, though they were not in the uniform. Mr Konstantin Sizarev, the
NGO founder, filed a complaint to the MIA on the police actions. In this complaint he pointed out
procedure violations, use of force to the organization members, and obstruction to the organization
activities70.
5.1 PERSECUTION OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE MEJLIS
On September 16th 2014, in Simferopol the representatives of ‘Crimean Self-defense’ and the police,
on the pretext of investigation, blocked the building where the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis was
located. The building is owned by ‘FOND KRYM’ (Crimea Foundation) Charity Organization (hereinafter
CO). On September 17th Mr Rize Shevkiyev, FOND KRYM Director General, was informed that
the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis, FOND KRYM CO and AVDET newspaper office should vacate the
premises within 24 hours. The Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea presented as one of the Russian laws
violations the fact that Mr M. Djemilev, citizen of Ukraine, that was sentenced to be an undesirable
person on the territory of Russia, was one of the organization founders. The same day the court of
Simferopol issued a decision that imposed a ban on the FOND KRYM Co to use its property at seven
addresses (including the building where the Mejlis was), froze the bank accounts and prohibited
opening new ones. On November 18th the court of Simferopol passed a judgement on imposing a
fine of RUR 4.5 mln on the FOND KRYM CO and a fine of RUR 350 thou on its Director Mr Riza Shevkiyev.
The judgement was grounded by repairs works carried in one of the organization premises
together with the Committee for Monument Protection. At the end of 2014 the Prosecutor’s Office
of Crimea prepared and sent a claim on withdrawing the Foundation property (building in Shmidta
Street) out of the Foundation ownership. On December 18th the department of Ministry of Justice of
RF in Crimea rejected the FOND KRYM CO application on registering as non-commercial organization.
The rejection was grounded by using two names in different documents: ‘charity organization’
and ‘public charity organization’. The second reason for rejection was stated as absence of indication
of the non-commercial organization operational territory in its name.
70 CHRG Review for November 2016, Annex 4. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Crimean-Human-
Rights-Group_Nov_2016_RU. pdf
25
On February 15th 2015, ‘Prosecutor of Crimea’ Ms Natalia Poklonskaya made an application
‘On imposing a ban on activities of public association according to the procedure and due to the
grounds stated by articles of Federal Law FZ-114 of 25 July 2002 ‘On anti-extremism actions’ to the
‘Supreme Court of Crimea’. Ms Poklonskaya requested to declare the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis
an extremist organization and to impose a ban on its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation.
On March 7th Mr Nariman Djelial, first deputy chairman of the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis,
informed that the defence team of the Mejlis ban case received the related documents on the claim.
On March 17th court proceedings on the case of declaring the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis an extremist
organization and banning its activities were started.
On April 12th 2016, Prosecutor of Crimea Ms Poklonskaya took a ‘decision on suspending the activities
of the public associations’ regarding the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis71. According to Poklonskaya’s
decision, activities of the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis were suspended until the ‘Supreme
Court of Crimea’ examined her application on the Mejlis ban.
The same day, based on the prosecutor’s decision, the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis was included
into the list of public and religious associations which activities were suspended due to their
extremist activities. The list was published at the website of the Ministry of Justice of RF72.
Thus, as early as on April 12th, before the court judgement to ban the Crimean Tatar People
Mejlis, substantial restrictions were imposed on the association and its members according to the
Russian laws. Having been written down into the RF MinJustice list, the Mejlis was forbidden to
continue its activities, distribute information on its activities and documents, and the access to the
official website was limited. The Mejlis members were imposed a restriction to work at educational
establishments, be engaged into private investigation and security business, they were not allowed
to hold public events with the Mejlis symbols and attributes. The Mejlis members were restricted to
be founders of a public or religious association or any other non-commercial organization on the
territory of Crimea.
On April 26th 2016 Ms Natalia Terentyeva, ‘judge of the Supreme Court of Crimea’ determined to
declare the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis an extremist organization and to forbid its activities on the
territory of the Russian Federation.
On September 26th 2016 several members of Crimean Tatar People Mejlis and Quriltai (Congress)
delegates were summoned for questioning to the Anti-Extremism Center of MIA in Simferopol.
71 CHRG Review for April 2016, Annex 4. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_April_2016-Eng. pdf
72 http://minjust. ru/nko/perechen_priostanovleni
Gunmen without identification
signs at the entrance to the
building where the Crimean Tatar
People Mejlis was located at that
moment, 16 September 2014,
Simferopol, Photo: from vestiukr.
com website
26
The MIA officers put questions regarding recent decisions of the Mejlis to suspend mandates of
certain Mejlis members.
On September 27th Mr Ali Khamzin, a Crimean Tatar People Mejlis member, after the questioning
in the Bakhchisarai District MIA department, with participation of the Anti-Extremism Center personnel,
was accused of violating Article 20.28.1 of RF CAO. The same day Ms Olga Morozko, ‘judge of
Bakhchisarai District Court’ sentenced Mr Khamzin to fine at a rate of RUR 1,000.
On September 28th Mr Aleksandr Skisov, ‘judge of Bakhchisarai District Court’, found Mr Ilmi
Unerov, deputy Mejlis chairman, guilty according to the same article — 20.28.1 of RF CAO — and
imposed a fine at a rate of RUR 750.
On September 29th the proceedings on the case ‘On imposing a ban on activities of the Crimean
Tatar People Mejlis public association’ according to the procedure and on the grounds specified by
Article 9 of RF Federal Law ‘On anti-extremism activities’ were held at the Supreme Court of Russian
Federation. At the session Mr Vladimir Chukhrin, Senior Prosecutor of Crimea, insisted that ‘the Mejlis
activities constitute a threat for the security of state and society’. The RF Supreme Court rejected
an appealing complaint of the defence team on the ‘Mejlis Ban Case and affirmed the decision of
the ‘Supreme Court of Crimea’ of April 26th 2016 on banning the Mejlis activities.
On September 30th, reports, according to Article 20.28.1 of RF CAO, were drawn up on six Crimean
Tatars (Emine Avamilev, Diliaver Akiyev, Mustafa Maushev, Bekir Mamut, Sadykh Tabakh,
Shevket Kaybullayev) at the Anti-Extremism Center in Bakhchisarai.
On October 4th the ‘Bakhchisarai District Court’ imposed fines on Bekir Mamut (RUR 750), Sadykh
Tabakh (RUR 750), Shevket Kaybullayev (RUR 500), for participation in the Mejlis meetings ‘as
public organization banned on the territory of the RF and Crimea’.
On October 14th the ‘Bakhchisarai District Court’ sentenced Ms Emine Avamileva, head of Mejlis
department for education, to imposition of fine at a rate of RUR 750. On October 20th Mr Adburaman
Egiz, a Mejlis member, was sentenced by the ‘court’ to a fine of RUR 750. On October 24th the
‘court’ imposed a RUR 500 fine on Mr Diliaver Akiyev73. According to Article 20.28.1 of RF CAO, the
‘Bakhchisarai District Court’ imposed a fine of RUR 750 on Mr Zeinur Yakubov on November 1st and
on Mr Mustafa Maushev on November 23rd74.
5.2 ‘HIZB-UT-TAHRIR’ CASE
Since February 2015 the Muslims imputed of membership in the Hizb-ut-Tahrir organization forbidden
in the RF have been persecuted in Crimea. They all are accused of violating Article 205. 5
of RF CC.
Totally 19 people were detained within the case.
4 people — in Sevastopol. These are Yuriy Primov, Rustem Vaitov, Ruslan Zeitullayev who were
detained on January 23rd 2015, and Feirat Saifullayev detained on April 2nd same year. They all were
first in the detention facility no 1 of Simferopol, then they were transported to the RF for hearings at
the North Caucasian Area Military Court in Rostov-na-Donu. On September 7th 2016 Yuriy Primov,
Rustem Vaitov and Feirat Saifullayev were given a five-year sentence. Mr Ruslan Zeitullayev was
given a seven year sentence but the Supreme Court of RF, upon the prosecutor’s request, remitted
73 CHRG Review for October 2016. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Crimean-Human-Rights-Group_
October_2016-ENG. pdf
74 https://bahchisarai--krm. sudrf. ru/modules. php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=doc&number=205282029&delo_
id=1500001&new=0&text_number=1
27
the case. After the re-consideration on April 26th 2017 the North Caucasian Area Military Court found
Mr Zeitullayev guilty in creating the Crimean Hizb-ut-Tahrir organization and gave him 12 year sentence
in the maximum security penal colony.
6 people — in Yalta. Emir Usein Kuku, Inver Bekirov, Muslim Aliyev, Vadim Siruk were detained
on February 11th 2016. Refat Alimov and Arsen Djepparov on April 18th same year. In January 2017
the accusation of Muslims detained in Yalta was topped up with Article 30. 1 and Article 278 of RF
CC (Attempt of violent upheaval).
4 people — in Bakhchisarai. These are Enver Mamutov, Rustem Abiltarov, Zevri Abseitov, Remzi
Memetov — all were detained on May 12th 2016.
5 people — in Simferopol. These are Teimur Abdullayev, Uzeir Abdullayev, Rustem Ismailov,
Aider Saledinov, Emil Djemadenov.
All 15 people detained in 2016 are in the detention facility No 1 of Simferopol. The cases are at
the prejudicial enquiry stage.
Yuriy Primov, Rustem Vaitov, Ruslan Zeitullayev, Ferat Saifullayev at the session of the North Caucasian Area Military Court in
Rostov-na-Donu, RF. Photo from KRYM REALII website
28
6 COMPULSION TO PARTICIPATE IN EVENTS AND ASSEMBLIES
There are cases recorded in Crimea when the local authorities de facto interfere rudely into the
freedom of peaceful assemblies, forcing the people to participate in the events organized by the
power.
On February 15th 2016 the department for education of Sevastopol City issued an order that
instructed the schools of Sevastopol City to ensure the presence of 10thou children at Nakhimova
Square for celebrating the Defender of Motherland Day. The order was enclosed with a schedule
of children participation in the celebration, where the time for presence ‘on- duty’ at the square for
pupils of each city school as well as quotas fixing the number of the pupils to be provided by each
school were indicated. Thus, according to the order of Sevastopol City department for education,
20 to 700 pupils of each school had to come to the square on February 22nd and spend there several
hours75.
On April 27th 2016 Mr A. Zh. Kurenkov, acting as head of department for education of the Simferopol
District of Crimea, issued order ‘On participating in the events dedicated to celebration of the
Hidirlez Crimean Tatar national holiday’. Mr Kurenkov instructed masters of 15 educational establishments
of the Simferopol District to participate obligatorily in the public events of the Simferopol
District administration on the occasion of the holiday76.
75 http://sevastopol. su/news. php?id=84716
76 CHRG Review for April 2016, Annex 5. — http://crimeahrg. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Crimean-Human-Rights-
Group_April_2016-Eng. pdf
29
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Freedom of assembly and the right to express one’s views through it are among the paramount
values in a democratic society. The essence of democracy is its capacity to resolve problems
through open debate. Sweeping measures of a preventive nature to suppress freedom of assembly
and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles —
however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities,
and however illegitimate the demands made may be — do a disservice to democracy and often
even endanger it.
In a democratic society based on the rule of law political ideas which challenge the existing order
and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity
of expression through the exercise of the right of assembly as well as by other lawful means (Assessment
of the European Court of Human Rights, Case Stankov and United Macedonian Organization
Ilinden v. Bulgaria, 2 October 2001).
The violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assemblies and associations being recorded
by the Crimean Human Rights Group for the last three years on the territory of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea (ARC) and City of Sevastopol annexed from Ukraine, and presented in the review,
testify a systematic and repressive nature of the Russian authorities’ actions regarding the internationally
developed standards in this sphere. Such conclusion can be easily made if the fundamental
international principles are compared with the practices applied widely today in the ARC and Sevastopol
City as well as if procedure and other standards are compared with the present-day reality
on the peninsula.
Pursuant to the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (edition 2, prepared by the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on the Freedom of Assembly
and by the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission), the following major guiding principles are stated:
■ The presumption in favour of holding assemblies
■ The state’s positive obligation to facilitate and protect peaceful assembly
■ Legality
■ Proportionality
■ Non-discrimination
■ Good administration
■ The liability of the regulatory authority
THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF HOLDING ASSEMBLIES
As a fundamental right, freedom of peaceful assembly should, insofar as possible,
be enjoyed without regulation. Anything not expressly forbidden by law should be
presumed to be permissible, and those wishing to assemble should not be required
to obtain permission to do so. A presumption in favour of this freedom should be
clearly and explicitly established in law (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice
Commission).
30
The assessment of recent amendments to the RF laws valid today on the ARC territory states
that the authorities practice the approaches that are precisely opposite to the abovementioned
principle. So when the ARC and Sevastopol City had been annexed in 2014, the following legislative
documents were adopted at the federal level:
■ Federal Law, RF No 258 FZ ‘On amending certain laws of the Russian Federation in terms of
improving the legislation on public events’ (21 July 2014)
■ Federal Law, RF No 292 ‘On amending Article 9 of Federal Law ‘On assemblies, rallies,
demonstrations, processions and picketing’ (9 October 2014)
The authorities implemented several ‘legislative initiatives’ directly in the ARC in 2014 and
2015, too. One should mention among them:
■ Law of Republic of Crimea No 56-ZRK ‘On securing the conditions of exercising the rights of
the Russian Federation citizens to hold assemblies, rallies, demonstrations and picketing in
the Republic of Crimea’(21 August 2014) that is almost identical to the RF Federal Law No 54-
FZ ‘On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations and picketing’ (4 July 2004);
■ Ordinance of Council of Ministers of Republic of Crimea no 452 ‘On approving the list of
places for holding public events on the territory of the Republic of Crimea’ (12 November
2014)
■ Resolution ‘On procedure for organizing and holding public events on the territory of
‘Simferopol City Area of Republic of Crimea’ municipal formation, public events on the
territory of the Simferopol City Municipality’ (28 January 2015) (from the report of the Human
Rights Assessment OSCE/ODIHR Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015)
Such legal and regulative documents have empowered the authorities with the following instruments,
in addition to existing ones already, for formal and selective restrictions:
■ Only Russian citizens may be organizers of public events
■ A request for permission to hold an assembly shall be placed 15 days the earliest and 10
days the latest before the planned event day
■ Additional place restrictions for public assemblies are in place (in Simferopol they may be
held only at four officially allowed locations)
■ Criminal punishment for physical persons in case of the repeated violation of the assembly
organizing rules
■ Ban for presence of children under 14 at the political assemblies has been introduced
■ Time for holding the authorized assemblies is restricted: from 07:00am to 10:00pm
How in fact these innovations are applied is perfectly demonstrated by this analytical review.
Bans due to hot weather, repairs works, a need to receive a permission (authorization procedure),
places for peaceful assemblies allocated in the outskirts — all this testifies that in fact the
presumption in favor of the authorities is in force in the ARC.
An obvious illustration to the absence of even slightest signs of compliance with the international
standard is Edict of Sergey Aksionov of May 16th 2014 (issued two days before the 70th
anniversary of the Crimean Tatar Deportation on the May 18th 2014) on imposing the ban on all
public events in Crimea up to 6 June 2014.
31
THE STATE’S POSITIVE OBLIGATION TO FACILITATE AND PROTECT
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
It is the primary responsibility of the state to put in place adequate mechanisms and
procedures to ensure that the freedom is practically enjoyed and not subject to undue
bureaucratic regulation. In particular, the state should always seek to facilitate and
protect public assemblies at the organizers’ preferred location and should also ensure
that efforts to disseminate information to publicize forthcoming assemblies are not
impeded. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission).
As the analytical review demonstrated, the ‘state’ exercising today the power on the peninsula
does everything the other way around. The locations for holding are selected by the authorities;
they issue (in most cases forbid) a permission to hold peaceful assemblies; people coming to the
event are regularly attacked by ‘john does’ who later remain anyway unidentified and are not
made liable. At the same time, to oppose holding the peaceful assemblies in a more efficient way,
the authorities use law enforcement and subordinate bodies: the prosecutor’s office — to disseminate
letters threatening with criminal sanctions among organizers or just related people or those
who have just an intention to express or have expressed already their position on participation in
the events; the police — to disperse the people who have come anyway; courts — to hold liable
those whom the police have detained. The facts presented in the review show that when the contents
of peaceful assembly are forbidden by the authorities or when the people or associations
(ethnic, sexual minorities, pro-Ukrainian organizations) planning to hold it are ‘forbidden’ by the
authorities — the event would not occur under any circumstances. All instruments to implement
‘the ban’ will be used: prosecutor’s office letters, a force dispersal, detentions and criminal or administrative
sanctions.
LEGALITY
Any restrictions imposed must have a formal basis in law and be in conformity with
the European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights
instruments. To this end, well-drafted legislation is vital in framing the discretion
afforded to the authorities. The law itself must be compatible with international
human rights standards and be sufficiently precise to enable an individual to assess
whether or not his or her conduct would be in breach of the law, as well as the
likely consequences of any such breaches. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice
Commission).
As abovementioned, since the moment of annexation, the RF jurisdiction has come in force on
the territory of peninsula. Moreover, it is after the annexation when a number of legislative innovations
were adopted at the federal and local levels that referred solely to additional restrictions on
exercising the right to peaceful assemblies and freedom of associations. On one hand, the RF legislation
which validity covers the territory of Crimea is the most formalized in this sphere today, on
the other, it is the most vague and ‘of poor quality’ in terms of the European Court of Human Rights
standards since many provisions afforded the authorities unframed discretion to choose grounds
for bans or interpret these or those events for the purpose of restriction.
One of convincing illustrations for this ‘quality’ of the Russian laws is definitions of the forms of
peaceful assemblies in Article 2 of Federal Law ‘On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, processions
and picketing’ http://www. consultant. ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_48103/
32
Let’s mention some of them:
‘Assembly means a joint presence of citizens in the specially allocated or adapted for the purpose
place to discuss together any socially significant issues’.
Such definition allows the authorities to disperse or persecute any unwelcome group of people
that assemble at any place. For instance, there are benches or seats, presence of 2 citizens sitting is
enough, what kind of issues are ‘socially significant’ will be defined by the authorities, too.
‘Picketing means a form of expressing publicly the opinions without moving and using sound
amplifying technical means and by one or more citizens using signs, banners and other visual
propaganda means as well as fast mounted assembling/ disassembling structures placed at the
picketed facility’ (edition of 2016).
Other propaganda means can be any object. To be subject to sanctions for an unauthorized rally,
in fact, it is enough to stop at the place defined by the authorities as ‘forbidden’. If you happen to be
holding a flag of this or other country in the hands, a poster then this is definitely the picket which
holding requires to pass the entire authorization procedure and to obtain a permission.
The entire legislative framework valid on the territory of the ARC in the sphere of peaceful assemblies
contains such defected standards starting from the definitions and finishing with procedure
aspects. The courts when considering issues and disputes related to imposing sanctions,
violating the holding procedure or breaching the rights to peaceful assemblies, take a side with ‘the
state agents’ — executive power.
PROPORTIONALITY
Any restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly must be proportional. The least
intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective being pursued by the authorities
should always be given preference. The principle of proportionality requires that
authorities do not routinely impose restrictions that would fundamentally alter the
character of an event, such as relocating assemblies to less central areas of a city.
A blanket application of legal restrictions tends to be over-inclusive and, thus, will
fail the proportionality test, because no consideration has been given to the specific
circumstances of the case. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission).
Proportionality is one more fundamental principle of exercising the right to peaceful assemblies
that is explicitly neglected by the authorities acting on the territory of the peninsula. For the period
of study cases when the authorities ‘detached’ the people from the locations where they would like
to express their opinion were recorded many times. Finally, the authorities started indicating specific
places where an assembly might be held in general. In 95% cases these are sites remote from the
public agencies, local self-governance, and busy areas of settlements. If you want to rally — please
but make you invisible and inaudible. This is more or less a concept implemented by the authorities
today on the territory of Crimea.
NON-DISCRIMINATION
Freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by everyone. In regulating
freedom of assembly the relevant authorities must not discriminate against any
individual or group on any grounds. The freedom to organize and participate in public
assemblies must be guaranteed to individuals, groups, unregistered associations,
legal entities and corporate bodies; to members of minority ethnic, national, sexual and
33
religious groups; to nationals and non-nationals (including stateless persons, refugees,
foreign nationals, asylum seekers, migrants and tourists); to children, women and men;
to law-enforcement personnel; and to persons without full legal capacity, including
persons with mental illnesses. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission).
Regarding this aspect, serious breaches of this fundamental principle on the ARC territory may be
stated, too. Starting with the laws — when a right to hold the assemblies is granted only to RF citizens
(Article 2. 1. 1 of Federal Law ‘On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations and picketing’) and restrictions
are implied for sexual minorities, non-registered associations — to their implementation practices —
in fact, a comprehensive ban has been introduced for pro-Ukrainian events, events of the Crimean
Tatar people, public events criticizing the current authorities, and LGBT community actions.
GOOD ADMINISTRATION
The public should be informed which body is responsible for taking decisions about
the regulation of freedom of assembly, and this must be clearly stated in law. The
regulatory authority should ensure that the general public has adequate access
to reliable information about its procedures and operation. Organizers of public
assemblies and those whose rights and freedoms will be directly affected by an
assembly should have the opportunity to make oral and written representations
directly to the regulatory authority. The regulatory process should enable the fair
and objective assessment of all available information. Any restrictions placed on an
assembly should be communicated promptly and in writing to the event organizer, with
an explanation of the reason for each restriction. Such decisions should be taken as
early as possible so that any appeal to an independent court can be completed before
the date provided in the notification for the assembly. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and
Venice Commission).
This may be the single principle that to certain extent is observed today at the ARC in the sphere
of peaceful assemblies, except the promptness of taking decision and communicating it to the
event organizers as well as fair assessment of all available information. It is true that where and
whom to address to obtain a permission in Crimea is known, and the people are communicated
in writing about the decisions, sometimes even in the cases when they did not plan to participate
or organize (a preventive intimidation by the prosecutor’s office bodies). Cases when a ban notice
was received just a few hours before the event start are numerous, cases when the administrative
bodies changed several times grounds for denial or, if a permission had been issued, informed a
day before the event that the decision had changed and now the organizers were rejected to hold
peaceful assemblies are not also exceptional.
THE LIABILITY OF THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The regulatory authorities must comply with their legal obligations and should be
accountable for any failure — procedural or substantive — to do so. Liability should
be gauged according to the relevant principles of administrative law and judicial
review concerning the misuse of public power. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice
Commission).
As the study performed, and other reports of human rights organizations (report of the Human
Rights Assessment OSCE/ODIHR Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) testify, liability on the ARC
territory exists only for those who want to organize and hold peaceful assemblies. There is no
34
judicial review over the administrative bodies as such. The executive power, applying a wide defected
legal relation regulation, use the afforded discretion for any and all restrictions that often
sound clearly absurd.
The grounds for the restrictions that you may find in the report:
■ Gathering of a lot of people on the limited territory that is assigned for location
■ Creation of conditions for breaching the public order, rights and legal interests of other
citizens
■ Too hot weather
■ Incompliance with the notification submission timing (absolute non-flexible rule of 10 days)
■ Lack of possibility to ensure the security measures
■ Works on the land improvement are carried by the local authorities on the territory of the
park where the event was planned
■ Gay pride parade in the streets and on the squares where children’s establishments and play
grounds are located
■ The rally will impede the motor show
■ The other event will take place at the same time and at the same place (sometimes this
turned out to be true, sometimes nobody held anything)
■ Ordinance of Simferopol City administration that public events may be held only at four
locations allowed in the city
■ a number of institutions with a specific working regime including the Plenipotentiary
Representative Office of President in the Crimean Federal Area and the engineering
department of the RF Black Sea Navy, are located on Nakhimova Square, and in order to
avoid any disruptions of their operations it is not recommended to hold the public events in
the close vicinity to them. ’
■ The place chosen is not on the list of locations allowed for the public events
All the abovementioned demonstrates that breach of basic and fundamental international
principles by the authorities in the ARC results into failure to comply with all other rules and
standards in force for exercising the right to peaceful assemblies and freedom of associations.
For instance, “Sight and sound”. Public assemblies are held to convey a message to a particular
target person, group or organization. Therefore, as a general rule, assemblies should be
facilitated within “sight and sound” of their target audience.
For instance, Spontaneous assemblies. Where legislation requires advance notification, the
law should explicitly provide for an exception from the requirement where giving advance notice
is impracticable. Such an exception would only apply in circumstances where the legally established
deadline cannot be met. The authorities should always protect and facilitate any spontaneous
assembly so long as it is peaceful in nature.
The situation with compliance in the ARC with rules and standards regulating the simultaneous
assemblies and counter-demonstrations is absolutely obvious.
Simultaneous assemblies. Where notification is provided for two or more unrelated assemblies
at the same place and time, each should be facilitated as best as possible. The prohibition
of a public assembly solely on the basis that it is due to take place at the same time and location
as another public assembly will likely be a disproportionate response where both can be
35
reasonably accommodated. The principle of non-discrimination requires, further, that assemblies
in comparable circumstances do not face differential levels of restriction.
Counter-demonstrations. Counter-demonstrations are a particular form of simultaneous assembly
in which the participants wish to express their disagreement with the views expressed at another
assembly. The right to counter-demonstrate does not extend to inhibiting the right of others
to demonstrate. Indeed, demonstrators should respect the rights of others to demonstrate as well.
Emphasis should be placed on the state’s duty to protect and facilitate each event where counter-
demonstrations are organized or occur, and the state should make available adequate policing
resources to facilitate such related simultaneous assemblies, to the extent possible, within “sight and
sound” of one another. (Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission).
It should be noted that such principles and approaches to exercise the right to freedom of
peaceful assemblies in most cases are based on the principles and approaches developed in the
practice of European Court of Human Rights which resolutions are binding for all countries, members
of Council of Europe.
So in terms of counter-demonstrations the ECHR, in its judgement for the CASE OF PLATTFORM
“ÄRZTE FÜR DAS LEBEN” v. AUSTRIA (1985), stated:
’32. A demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that
it is seeking to promote. The participants must, however, be able to hold the demonstration without
having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents; such a fear would
be liable to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas or interests from openly
expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues affecting the community. In a democracy the
right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate.
Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on
the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the
object and purpose of Article 11 (art. 11). Like Article 8 (art. 8), Article 11 (art. 11) sometimes requires positive
measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need be’.
The list of ECHR judgements that established standards in the field of the right to peaceful assemblies
and freedom of associations, may be found after the conclusions and recommendations.
One of the most popular grounds used by the authorities on the ARC territory to restrict the
peaceful assemblies and to ban the freedom of associations is ‘extremism prevention’, ‘ fight against
extremism’.
Regarding this, an approach developed in the Guidelines of OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission,
referring to the international legal instruments, may be applied.
Efforts to tackle terrorism or extremism and to enhance security must never be invoked to
justify arbitrary action that curtails the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms.
The actions free of any limits that prejudice exercising the fundamental human rights and freedoms
must not under any circumstances be justified by a need to take actions to fight the terrorism or
extremism or to strengthen the safety. The International Commission of Jurists 2004 Declaration on
Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism (the Berlin Declaration) 142
emphasized that “the odious nature of terrorist acts cannot serve as a basis or pretext for states to
disregard their international obligations, in particular in the protection of fundamental human rights”.
Similarly, both the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Protecting
Freedom of Expression and Information in Times of Crisis (2007)143 and the OSCE manual Countering
Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights (2007)144 caution against the imposition of undue restrictions
on the exercise of freedom of expression and assembly during crisis situations.
36
Criminal prosecution of the peaceful assembly participants as such is a non-proportional interference
of the authorities. But imposing administrative sanctions as fines is clearly opposite to the
standard that has been established in the ECHR judgement long ago: irrespective to the difficulties
the state may face to ensure the peaceful assembly, an individual shall not be subjected to a sanction
for participation in such a demonstration, so long as this person does not himself commit any
reprehensible act on such an occasion (CASE OF GALSTYAN v. ARMENIA, 15 November 2007).
The review of facts on restricting the freedom of peaceful assemblies and freedom of associations
made testifies systematic breaches of the international standards in this sphere both in terms
of law quality and its enforcement practices. The legislative regulation results into a factual rejection
of the authorities to ensure enjoyment of the fundamental human rights, while their actions are
repressive in nature. Since the moment of annexation of Crimea policies of ‘total bans’ on holding
peaceful assemblies and activities of associations that for any reasons are unwelcome for the authorities
acting on the peninsula, have been implemented.
37
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE AUTHORITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
1. To stop unjustified administrative and criminal persecutions of peaceful assembly participants
and organizers
2. To set free immediately the persons who were deprived of liberty due to their political,
religious and other beliefs, or due to exercising the freedom of speech and expression of
opinion, freedom of peaceful assemblies and associations or other rights guaranteed by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to rehabilitate them and reimburse them the damage
caused by the unlawful imprisonment, tortures or other unhuman and degraded ways of
treatment
3. To cancel all decisions taken on imposing penalties and other sanctions on the peaceful
assembly organizers and participants which adoption was a breach of international human
rights standards
4. To investigate the facts of politically motivated criminal and administrative persecution of
the peaceful assembly organizers and participants and make accountable the persons that
employed unlawfully violence to the peaceful assembly participants and issued unjustified
decisions on restricting the freedom of peaceful assemblies
5. To make the territory of Crimea accessible for international organizations, UN, OSCE,
EU, Council of Europe structures and independent representatives, representatives of
international human rights organizations and human rights organizations of Ukraine,
ombudsmen of the Parliament of Ukraine to monitor the observance of the right to freedom
of associations and other fundamental rights and freedoms as well as for journalists from
Ukraine and other countries and not to obstruct politically and in other way such missions and
visits.
6. To observe as the Occupying Power exercising the effective control rights guaranteed by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as meet the commitments under the international
humanitarian law
38
FOR THE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE:
1. To investigate the facts of breaching the freedom of peaceful assemblies and associations,
persecution of peaceful assembly participants and organizers, inflicting injury to them,
and make a legal assessment of such facts
2. To legitimize guarantees for defence and restoration of the rights violated on the
territory of Crimea due to the politically motivated persecution for expressing political,
ethnic, religious and other beliefs, participating in the peaceful assemblies and events of
nonviolent resistance to the Russian Federation actions including drafting and adopting
a law on protection of political prisoners and other persons who suffered due to the
unlawful actions and decisions of the Russian Federation as a result of the Crimean
Peninsula occupation and annexation
3. To monitor on regular basis breaches of the peaceful assembly freedom and other
fundamental human rights in Crimea with involvement of the human rights ombudsman of
the Parliament of Ukraine and in cooperation with the relevant human rights organizations
of Ukraine
4. Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, State TV abd
Radio Broadcasting Committee of Ukraine — to initiate and manage the work on creating
a media content to highlight the issues of breaching the human rights in Crimea including
the freedom of assemblies and associations as well as to communicate the information
on events and other nonviolent actions of the residents of Crimea to defend human rights
and internationally recognized borders of Ukraine to the Ukrainian and international
communities .
39
FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (INCLUDING THE UN,
EUROPEAN UNION, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, OSCE) AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS:
1. To keep on monitoring the situation in Crimea to document facts of breaching the right to
freedom of peaceful assemblies and associations as well as other fundamental rights on the
peninsula and to communicate them to the international human rights institutions
2. To hold reporting events in the relevant UN, EU, CoE, OSCE structures and within their
authorities on a regular basis to present findings of the monitoring of breaches of the human
rights and international humanitarian law standards in Crimea
3. To establish a multilateral monitoring group to monitor violations of the freedom of assemblies
and associations in Crimea
4. To initiate a discussion on preparing and holding the negotiations at the international level
dedicated to restoring the violated human rights in Crimea, to set free political prisoners
and to reintegrate Crimea as well as to re-establish a legitimate control of Ukraine over the
peninsula
5. To apply all possible international legal and diplomatic instruments to defend human rights
in Crimea, to set free political prisoners and to cease politically motivated persecution of
Crimean residents
6. To expand the existing sector sanctions and to introduce additional ones against the Russian
Federation due to the regular violations of the human rights in Crimea and failure to meet
international commitments in the sphere of human rights and international humanitarian law
7. To expand personal sanctions against the persons who are personally responsible for serious
human rights violations in Crimea
8. To respond promptly and publicly on the facts of serious or mass violations of human rights in
Crimea
40
ANNEX
PRACTICES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
REGARDING THE FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES AND
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATIONS
■ Acik v. Turkey (Application no. 31451/03, judgment of 13 January 2009)
■ Ahmed and Others v. United Kingdom (Application no. 22954/93, judgment of 2 September
1998)
■ Aldemir (Nurettin) and Others v. Turkey (Applications nos. 32124/02, 32126/02, 32129/02,
32132/02, 32133/02, 32137/02 and 32138/02, judgment of 18 December 2007)
■ Amann v. Switzerland [GC] (Application no. 27798/95, judgment of 16 February 2000)
■ Anderson v. United Kingdom (Application no. 33689/96, Commission admissibility decision of 27
October 1997);
■ Appleby v. United Kingdom (Application no. 44306/98, judgment of 6 May 2003)
■ A. R. M. Chappell v. United Kingdom (Application no. 12587/86, admissibility decision of 14 July
1987); (1987)
■ Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 8225/78, judgment of 28 May 1985);
■ Ashughyan v. Armenia (Application no. 33268/03, judgment of 17 July 2008)
■ Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(Application no. 74651/01, judgment of 15 January 2009)
■ Axen v. Germany (Application no. 8273/78, judgment of 8 December 1983); (1983)
■ Bączkowski and Others v. Poland (Application no. 1543/06; judgment of 3 May 2007)
■ Balcik and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 25/02, judgment of 29 November 2007)
■ Balkani (Zeleni) v. Bulgaria (Application no. 63778/00, judgment of 12 April 2007)
■ Barankevich v. Russia (Application no. 10519/03, Judgment of 26 July 2007)
■ Barraco v. France (Application no. 31684/05, judgment of 5 March 2009, in French only)
■ Bukta v. Hungary (Application 25691/04, judgment of 17 July 2007)
■ Castells v. Spain (Application no. 11798/85, judgment of 23 April 1992)
■ Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC] (Application nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, 28443/95,
judgment of 29 April 1999)
■ Cetinkaya v. Turkey (Application 75569/01, judgment of 27 June 2006, in French only)
■ Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (Application no. 28793/02, judgment of
14 February 2006)
■ Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (No. 2) (Application no. 25196/04, judgment of
2 February 2010)
■ Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v. United Kingdom (Application no. 8440/78,
Commission admissibility decision of 16 July 1980)
■ Christodoulidou v. Turkey (Application no. 16085/90, judgment of 22 September 2009)
■ Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey (Applications 15299/89 and 15300/89;
admissibility decision of 4 March 1991, Commission decision of 8 July 1993)
41
■ Chorherr v. Austria (Application no. 13308/87, judgment of 25 August 1993); (1993)
■ Cetinkaya v. Turkey (Application no. 75569/01, judgment of 27 June 2006)
■ Çiloğlu and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 73333/01, judgment of 6 March 2007, judgment in
French only)
■ Çiraklar v. Turkey (Application no. 19601/92, judgment of 28 October 1998)
■ Cisse v. France (Application no. 51346/99, judgment of 9 April 2002)
■ Cyprus case (1958-59) Yearbook ECHR
■ Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (Application no. 34503/97, judgment of 12 November 2008)
■ Djavit An v. Turkey (Application no. 20652/92, judgment of 20 February 2003)
■ Ekşi and Ocak v. Turkey (Application no. 44920/04, judgment of 23 February 2010)
■ Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey (Application no. 68959/01, judgment of 21 April 2009)
■ Ezelin v. France 14 EHRR 362 (Application no. 11800/85, judgment of 26 April 1991)
■ Foka v. Turkey (Application no. 28940/95, judgment of 24 June 2008)
■ Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey [GC] (Application no. 23885/94, judgment of
8 December 1999)
■ Friedl v. Austria (Application no. 15225/89, judgment of 31 January 1995)
■ G v. Federal Republic of Germany (Application no. 13079/87, admissibility decision of 6 March
1989); (1989)
■ Galstyan v. Armenia (Application no. 26986/03, judgment of 15 November 2007)
■ Garaudy v. France (Application no. 65831/01, admissibility decision of 24 June 2003, in French,
English translation)
■ Gasparyan v. Armenia (No. 1) (Application no. 35944/03, judgment of 13 January 2009)
■ Gasparyan v. Armenia (No. 2) (Application no. 22571/05, judgment of 16 June 2009)
■ Gillan and Quinton v. UK (Application no. 4158/05, judgment of 12 January 2010)
■ Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (Application nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78,
admissibility decision of 11 October 1979)
■ Gómez v. Spain (Application no. 4143/02, judgment of 16 November 2004)
■ Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (Application no. 23458/02, judgment of 25 August 2009)
■ Gülec v. Turkey (Application no. 21593/93, judgment of 27 July 1998)
■ Güneri and Others v. Turkey (Application nos. 42853/98, 43609/98, 44291/98, judgment of
12 July 2005, in French only)
■ Guenat v. Switzerland (Application no. 24722/94, admissibility decision of 10 April 1995)
■ Gustafsson v. Sweden [GC] (Application no. 15573/89, judgment of 24 April 1996; dismissal of
revision request 30 July 1998)
■ Guzzardi v. Italy (Application no. 7367/76, judgment of 6 November 1980); (1980) 3 EHRR 333
■ Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 16528/05, judgment of 10 July 2008)
■ Handyside v. United Kingdom (Application no. 5493/72, judgment of 7 December 1976)
■ Haas v. Netherlands (Application no. 36983/97, judgment of 13 January 2004)
■ Hashman and Harrup v. United Kingdom [GC] (Application no. 25594/94, judgment of 25
November 1999)
42
■ Herbecq and Another v. Belgium (Applications nos. 32200/96 and 32201/96, admissibility
decision of 14 January 1998)
■ Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (No. 1) (Application no. 33482/06, judgment of 31 March 2009)
■ Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (No. 2) (Application no. 45094/06, judgment of 31 March 2009)
■ Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (No. 3) (Application no. 45095/06, judgment of 31 March 2009)
■ Incal v. Turkey (Application no. 22678/93, judgment of 9 June 1998)
■ Ireland v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 5310/71, judgment of 18 January 1978)
■ Jordan v. United Kingdom (Application no. 24746/94, judgment of 4 May 2001)
■ Kaya v. Turkey (Application no. 22729/93, judgment of 19 February 1998)
■ Kandzhov v. Bulgaria (Application no. 68294/01, judgment of 6 November 2008)
■ Kelly and Others v. United Kingdom (Application no. 30054/96, judgment of 4 May 2001)
■ Kimlya and Others v. Russia (Applications nos. 76836/01 and 32782/03, judgment of 1 October
2009)
■ Kuolelis, Bartosevicius and Burokevicius v. Lithuania (Applications nos. 74357/01, 26764/02 and
27434/02, judgment of 19 February 2008)
■ Kuznetsov v Russia (Application no. 10877/04, judgment of 23 October 2008)
■ Lawless v. Ireland (Application no. 332/57, judgment of 1July 1961);
■ Leander v. Sweden (Application no. 9248/81, judgment of 26 March 1987; Series A no. 116
■ Lehideux and Isorni v. France [GC] (Application no. 24662/94, judgment of 23 September 1998)
■ Lucas v. UK (Application no. 39013/02, admissibility decision of 18 March 2003)
■ Makhmudov v. Russia (Application no. 35082/04, judgment of 26 July 2007)
■ Mammadov (Jalaloglu) v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 34445/04, judgment of 11 January 2007)
■ McCann and Others v. United Kingdom [GC] (Application no. 18984/91, judgment of
27 September 1995)
■ McKerr v. United Kingdom (Application no. 28883/95, judgment of 2001)
■ McShane v. United Kingdom (Application no. 43290/98, judgment of 28 May 2002)
■ Mkrtchyan v. Armenia (Application no. 6562/03, judgment of 11 January 2007)
■ Molnár v. Hungary (Application no. 10346/05, judgment of 7 October 2008)
■ Müller and Others v. Switzerland (Application no. 10737/84, judgment of 24 May 1988)
■ Muradova v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 22684/05, judgment of 2 April 2009)
■ Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC] (Application nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, judgment of
6 July 2005)
■ Nicol and Selvanayagam v. United Kingdom (Application no. 32213/96, admissibility decision, 11
January 2001)
■ Norris v. Ireland (Application no. 10581/83, judgment of 26 October 1988)
■ Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom (Application no. 13585/88, judgment of
26 November 1991)
■ Öllinger v. Austria (Application no. 76900/01, judgment of 29 June 2006)
■ Olymbiou v. Turkey (Application no. 16091/90, judgment of 27 October 2009)
43
■ Opuz v. Turkey (Application no. 33401/02, judgment of 9 June 2009)
■ Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (Application no. 13470/87, judgment of 20 September 1994)
■ Osman v. United Kingdom (Application no. 23452/94, judgment of 28 October 1998)
■ Oya Ataman v. Turkey (Application no. 74552/01, judgment of 5 December 2006)
■ Papi v. Turkey (Application no. 16094/90, judgment of 22 September 2009)
■ Patyi v. Hungary (Application no. 5529/05, judgment of 7 October 2008)
■ Perry v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 63737/00, judgment of 17 July 2003)
■ P. G and J. H. v. United Kingdom (Application no. 44787/98, judgment of 25 September 2001)
■ Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (Application no. 10126/82, judgment of 21 June 1988)
■ Protopapa v. Turkey (Application no. 16084/90, judgment of 24 February 2009)
■ Rai and Evans v. United Kingdom (Applications nos. 26258/07 and 26255/07, admissibility
decision of 17 November 2009)
■ Rai, Almond and “Negotiate Now” v. United Kingdom (Application no. 25522/94, admissibility
decision of 6 April 1995)
■ Rassemblement Jurassien & Unité Jurassienne v. Switzerland (Application no. 8191/78,
admissibility decision of 10 October 1979)
■ Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party)and Others v. Turkey [GC] (Application nos. 41340/98, 41342/98
and 41343/98, judgment of 13 February 2003)
■ Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC] (Application no. 25390/94, judgment of 20 May1999)
■ Rosca, Secareanu and Others v. Moldova (Applications nos. 25230/02, 25203/02, 27642/02,
25234/02 and 25235/02, judgment of 27 March 2008)
■ Rotaru v. Romania [GC] (Application no. 28341/95, judgment of 4 May 2000)
■ S v. Austria (Application 13812/88, admissibility decision of 3 December 1990)
■ S. and Marper v. United Kingdom (Applications nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, judgment of
4 December 2008)
■ Samüt Karabulut v. Turkey (Application no. 16999/04, judgment of 27 January 2009)
■ Saya and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 4327/02, judgment of 7 October 2008)
■ Sdružení Jihočeské Matky c. la République tchèque (Application no. 19101/03, judgment of
10 July 2006, in French only)
■ Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06,
judgment of 22 December 2009)
■ Shanaghan v. United Kingdom (Application no. 37715/97, judgment of 4 May 2001)
■ Simsek and Others v. Turkey (Applications nos. 35072/97 and 37194/97, judgment of
26 July 2005)
■ Solomou and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 36832/97, judgment of 24 June 2008)
■ Soulas v. France (Application no. 15948/03, judgment of 7 October 2008, in French only)
■ Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (Applications nos. 29221/95
and 29225/95, admissibility decision of 29 June 1998; judgment of 2 October 2001)
■ Steel and Others v. United Kingdom (Application no. 24838/94, judgment of 23 September 1998)
44
■ Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom (Application no. 68416/01, judgment of 15 February 2005)
■ Strati v. Turkey (Application no. 16082/90, judgment of 22 September 2009)
■ Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (Application no. 37374/05, judgment of 14 April 2009)
■ Thlimmenos v. Greece (Application no. 34369/97, judgment of 6 April 2000); (2000) 31 EHRR 15
■ Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (Application no. 13778/88, judgment of 25 June 1992)
■ Tsonev v. Bulgaria (Application no. 45963/99, judgment of 13 April 2006)
■ United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (Application no. 44079/98,
judgment of 20 October 2005)
■ United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (Application no. 59491/00,
judgment of 19 January 2006)
■ Vajnai v. Hungary (Application no. 33629/06, judgment of 8 July 2008)
■ Vrahimi v. Turkey (Application no. 16078/90, judgment of 22 September 2009)
■ Women and Waves v. Portugal (Application no. 31276/05, judgment of 3 February 2009)
■ X v. UK (Application no 5877/72, admissibility decision of 12 October 1973)
■ X and Y v. The Netherlands (Application no. 8978/80, judgment of 26 March 1985)
■ Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 7601/76; 7806/77, judgment
of 13 August 1981)
■ Zdanoka v. Latvia [GC] (Application no. 58278/00, judgment of 16 March 2006)
■ Ziliberberg v. Moldova (Application no. 61821/00, admissibility decision of 4 May 2004; judgment
of 1 February 2005) Communicated Cases before the European Court of Human Rights
■ Alekseyev (Nikolay Aleksandrovich) v. Russia (Applications nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and
14599/09, lodged on 29 January 2007, 14 February 2008 and 10 March 2009)
■ Dinc et Saygili v. Turkey (Application no. 17923/09, lodged on 9 March 2009, in French only)
■ Hmelevschi (Boris) and Moscalev (Vladimir) v. Moldova (Applications nos. 43546/05 and 844/06,
lodged on 1 and 8 December 2005)
■ Juma Mosque Congregation and Others v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 15405/04, lodged on 28
April 2004).
■ Mătăsaru v. Moldova (Application no. 44743/08, lodged on 22 August 2008)
■ Mătăsaru v. Moldova (Application no. 20253/09, lodged on 20 April 2009)
■ Mocanu (Sergiu) v. Moldova (Application no. 24163/09, lodged on 11 May 2009)
■ Popa (Radu) v. Moldova (Application no. 29837/09, lodged on 8 June 2009)
■ Primov and Others v. Russia (Application no. 17391/06 lodged on 30 May 2006)
■ Ryabinina (Yelena Zusyevna) v. Russia (Application no. 50271/06, lodged on 20 November 2006)
■ Stati and Marinescu v. Moldova (Application no. 19828/09, lodged on 16 April 2009)
■ Sultanov (Vidadi) v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 21672/05, lodged on 2 June 2005)
■ Zengin (Lütfiye) and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 36443/06, lodged on 14 August 2006)
The list of ECHR’ decisions is presented in the OSCE Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
Second edition.
45
CONTENTS
STATUTORY REGULATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION THAT ARE MOSTLY ..................................... 1
USED TO VIOLATE THE FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES IN CRIMEA
Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation (RF CAO) .................................................... 1
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (RF CC) .......................................................................................... 1
Federal Law ‘On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing’, .............................. 1
FZ54, of 19 June 2004
VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS ........................................2
IN CRIMEA (MARCH 2014 – MARCH 2017)
1. UNJUSTIFIED BANS AND RESTRICTIONS ON PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES ..................................................2
1.1 Restrictions on peaceful assemblies dedicated to memorial ...................................................................2
dates and event anniversaries
1.2 Restrictions on peaceful assemblies criticizing ........................................................................................... 7
the actions of authorities
1.3 Discrimination in authorizing the public events ..........................................................................................13
1.4 Other cases of unlawful restrictions of peaceful assembly freedom ....................................................13
2. POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PERSECUTION OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY .....................................................14
ORGANIZERS AND PARTICIPANTS
2.1 Case of May 3rd ..................................................................................................................................................14
2.2 Case of February 26th ..................................................................................................................................... 15
2.3 Criminal prosecution for the participation in the peaceful assemblies in Kyiv ................................... 16
2.4 Administrative persecution of peaceful assembly participants .............................................................17
3. OBSTRUCTION OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES WITH THE HELP OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ..................... 20
AGENCIES AND CRIMEAN SELF DEFENSE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION
4. APPLICATION OF RUSSIAN AND LOCAL LAWS TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLIES ............ 21
4.1 RF Regulations restricting the freedom of peaceful assemblies ........................................................... 21
4.2 Regulations of authorities de-facto restricting freedom of peaceful assemblies ............................ 22
5. VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSOCIATIONS .........................................................................24
5.1 Persecution of the Crimean Tatar People Mejlis .......................................................................................24
5.2 ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir’ Case ......................................................................................................................................... 26
6. COMPULSION TO PARTICIPATE IN EVENTS AND ASSEMBLIES ............................................................... 28
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 29
RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................................................................................37
For the authorities of the Russian Federation ............................................................................................37
For the authorities of Ukraine .........................................................................................................................38
For international organizations (including the UN, European Union, ...................................................39
Council of Europe, OSCE) and human rights organizations
ANNEX .................................................................................................................................................................................40
PRACTICES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS REGARDING ........................................ 40
THE FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATIONS
Annex 962
Human Rights Watch, Online and on All Fronts: Russia’s Assaults on Freedom of Expression
(July 2017)
Annex 963
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Crimea 2015 (last visited 25 September 2017)
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Annex 964
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies (14 November 2017)
Law enforcement officials during a search in Bakhchysarai, Crimea on January 26, 2017 @ 2017 Anton Naumlyik RFE/RL
简体中文 日本語
(Berlin) – Russian authorities in Crimea have intensified persecution of Crimean Tatars, under
various pretexts and with the apparent goal of completely silencing dissent on the peninsula,
Human Rights Watch said today. Crimean Tatars are a Muslim ethnic minority indigenous to the
Crimean Peninsula. Many openly oppose Russia’s occupation, which began in 2014.
“Russian authorities in Crimea have relentlessly persecuted Crimean Tatars for their vocal
opposition to Russia’s occupation since it began in 2014,” said Hugh Williamson, Europe and
Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “They have portrayed politically active Crimean
Tatars as extremists and terrorists, forced many into exile, and ensured that those who choose to
stay never feel safe to speak their mind.”
Since Russia’s occupation began, Russian authorities and their proxies have subjected members of
Crimean Tatar community and their supporters, including journalists, bloggers, activists, and others
to harassment, intimidation, threats, intrusive and unlawful searches of their homes, physical
attacks, and enforced disappearances. Complaints lodged with authorities are not investigated
effectively. Russia has banned Crimean Tatar media and organizations that criticized Russia’s
actions in Crimea, including disbanding and proscribing the Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar selfgoverning
highest executive body.
In October 2017, Human Rights Watch researchers in Crimea documented criminal prosecutions
for separatism against Crimean Tatars who had criticized Russia’s actions in Crimea, as well as new
and ongoing baseless terrorism-related prosecutions. Researchers also documented detention and
fines for Crimean Tatars who peacefully staged single-person pickets to protest the arrest and
prosecution of other Tatars. Under Russian law people who want to picket individually are not
required to seek official permission.
Since 2015, Russian authorities have arrested at least 26 people on charges of involvement with the
Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned as a terrorist organization in Russia since 2003 but not
proscribed in Ukraine, nor in most of Europe. They were arrested on charges of participating in or
organizing a terrorist group, solely for acts – often in private – of expression, assembly, opinion, or
religious and political belief that the Russian authorities claim constitute affiliation with Hizb ut-
Tahrir. They face from five years to life in prison. The arrests are consistent with Russia’s practice
of cracking down on Muslims who preach and study Islam outside official guidelines.
In several cases, Russian police and security services ill-treated people suspected or accused of
separatist, extremist, or terrorist activities and denied them due process. In one case, a former
detainee said security agents beat him and gave him electric shocks to coerce him to become an
informant.
In October, Russian authorities brought separatism charges against Suleiman Kadyrov, a Crimean
Tatar activist, for posting a comment on social media criticizing the occupation of Crimea. The
charges came several weeks after a Russian court convicted a Crimean Tatar leader, Ilmi Umerov,
on separatism charges stemming from a media interview in which he criticized Russian actions in
Crimea, and sentenced him to two years in prison.
In September, a Russian court in Crimea sentenced another prominent Crimean Tatar leader,
Akhtem Chiygoz, to eight years in prison on bogus charges of organizing “mass riots.”
On October 25, after negotiations between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and
President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Russian authorities allowed Chiygoz and Umerov to leave
Crimea for Turkey. On October 27, they arrived in Kyiv.
Under international law, the Russian Federation is an occupying power in Crimea as it exercises
effective control without the consent of the government of Ukraine, and there has been no legally
recognized transfer of sovereignty to Russia.
On September 25, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine released its
first report on the human rights situation in Crimea, concluding that it “has significantly
deteriorated under Russian occupation.”
Russian authorities, and their proxies, should immediately stop persecution of Crimean Tatars
including under the pretext of combating terrorism and extremism, cease all unjustified interference
with freedom of association and assembly in Crimea, and ensure prompt, effective, and impartial
investigations into all allegations of abuses perpetrated by law-enforcement against Crimean Tatars.
Russian and Ukrainian authorities should ensure unfettered access to Crimea for independent
human rights groups as well as humanitarian and intergovernmental organizations.
The UN Human Rights Office, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
and the Council of Europe should continue to document and publicly report on the human rights
situation in Crimea and urge Russian authorities to address both ongoing and past abuses. Russia’s
international partners, including the European Union and its member states, Turkey, and the US
should continue to call for the release of detained Crimean Tatar activists and for an end to the
harassment and arbitrary actions against the Crimean Tatar community.
“It is good news that Chiygoz and Umerov are no longer at risk, but it’s also outrageous that they
have had to go into exile to bring their ordeal to an end, and that others in Crimea remain
incarcerated,” Williamson said. “Russia’s international partners need to press the Kremlin and
Crimean authorities end the persecution of the Crimean Tatar community.”
Human Rights Watch researchers spoke with Crimean Tatar leaders and family members, lawyers,
journalists, and others in Crimea in late October in the cities of Simferopol, Krasnogvardeyskoe,
Belogorsk, and Yalta. Interviewees received no compensation and were fully informed of the
purpose of the interview and on how Human Rights Watch would use the information they
provided.
Prosecutions for Alleged Involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir
Since 2015, Russian authorities in Crimea have charged at least 26 people, most of them Crimean
Tatars, with participating in or organizing a terrorist group because of their alleged involvement in
Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Hizb ut-Tahrir, established in 1953, is an international Islamist movement that seeks to establish a
worldwide caliphate based on Sharia, but publicly denounces violence as a means to achieve its goal.
In 2003, Russia banned Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization. Hizb ut-Tahrir is not banned in
Ukraine or in most of Europe, but is in Germany, and several former Soviet republics, including
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as China, Egypt, and most Arab countries. The European Court
of Human Rights has held that bans on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Germany and Russia do not violate the
European Convention on Human Rights.
According to Sova Center, a prominent Russian think tank, as of February, 47 people were serving
prison terms in Russia for alleged involvement in the movement. In its 2016 report, Sova Center
highlighted Russian authorities’ and courts’ practice of charging and convicting people solely for
studying, distributing religious literature, or participating in discussions on religious topics linked to
Hizb ut-Tahrir.
In the past several years, Memorial Human Rights Center has designated 40 people sentenced for
involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir in Russia as political prisoners.
Prior to the occupation, although Ukrainian authorities did not ban Hizb ut Tahrir, in Crimea they
kept lists of suspected followers. Some of those Human Rights Watch interviewed believed the
Russian authorities used these lists to identify and prosecute Crimean Tatars for involvement in the
organization.
In 25 of the cases of arrests documented, the
terrorism-related charges were based solely on the
suspects’ alleged association with Hizb ut-Tahrir.
In no case was the suspect accused of
involvement in planning, carrying out, or
otherwise being an accessory to, any act of
violence.
Some of the detainees do not deny some level of
affiliation with Hizb-ut-Tahrir, but all deny any
involvement in a terrorist organization. Under Russian law, participation in a terrorist group (article
205.5, part 2 of the Russian Criminal Code) is punishable by a prison sentence of 5 to 10 years.
Punishment for organizing the activities of a terrorist group (part 1 of article 205.5) ranges from 15
years to life.
In all the cases documented, law enforcement agents searched suspects’ homes, confiscating
computer equipment, telephones, flash drives, and other data storage, and Islamic literature, then
detained them allegedly on suspicion of involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Activists and lawyers working on behalf of those detained told Human Rights Watch that most of
the evidence investigators presented consists of video or audio recordings of meetings in people’s
apartments at which people discussed interpretations of the Quran or their disagreements with
Russia’s actions in Crimea; possession of religious literature; and meetings, conversations, and other
actions allegedly aimed at recruiting new members.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that it had identified and eliminated Hizb ut-
Tahrir cells in Yalta, Bakhchisarai, Simferopol, and Sevastopol. In each town, authorities detained
on average four to six people, charging one person as a leader of a cell and the others as members.
Law enforcement search the house of a Crimean Tatar
activist in Stroganovka, Crimea, May 2017. 2017 RFE/RL
In addition to the cases documented, in August 2016, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, Akhmatzhon
Abdulaev, was arrested in Crimea. According to Crimea SOS, a Ukrainian rights group monitoring
the human rights situation in Crimea, authorities charged him with abetting terrorist activity and
participation in Hizb ut-Tahrir and he is in pretrial detention in Simferopol.
Bakhchysarai- October 11, 2017
On October 11, 2017, at about 6 a.m., FSB agents searched the homes of six Crimean Tatars in
Bakhchysarai, a city in central Crimea. They did not present a warrant.
After the searches, the authorities arrested Timur Ibragimov, Memet Belyalov, Server Zekeryayev,
Seyran Saliyev, Ernest Ametov, and Marlen (Suleyman) Asanov, all of whom a court sent to pretrial
custody for two months pending the investigation. Crimea SOS reported that Asanov was
eventually charged with allegedly organizing a Hizb-ut-Tahrir “terrorist” cell, and the other five
men, with alleged involvement in it. All deny the charges.
Zair Smedlyaev, a Crimean Tatar leader and a member of Kurultai, the elected council of the
Crimean Tatar community, who monitored the developments around the searches, told Human
Rights Watch that some of those subjected to the searches are devout Muslims and that all are also
outspoken critics of Russia’s occupation of Crimea.
Emil Kurbedinov, a lawyer representing Asanov, told Human Rights Watch that during Asanov’s
initial interrogation, the authorities claimed that he was involved in “anti-Russian” activities. On
October 25, the authorities formally charged him with organizing a “terrorist cell” in Bakhchysarai.
Authorities committed several procedural violations in the arrests and searches. Two lawyers told
Human Rights Watch that they were unable to observe the searches because security services and
riot police blocked off the area and denied them entry, even after they said they were there to
represent their clients. Kurbedinov said the authorities failed to present the necessary arrest and
other procedural documents in a timely manner.
Alexey Ladin, another lawyer representing one of the detainees, told media that during
interrogations, the security officials claimed the criminal charges were based on two audio
recordings of conversations between those arrested. He said the conversations concerned various
interpretations of the Quran and other religious topics, but none related to violence or any other
criminal activity.
Kurbedinov said that Asanov is a successful businessman and an active supporter of a group called
Crimea Solidarity. Created in 2016, the group includes Crimean Tatar activists, family members,
lawyers, and human rights defenders and supports Crimean Tatars persecuted by the authorities.
Kurbedinov said that Asanov on several occasions provided a venue for the group’s meetings.
Nizhnegorskiy
Renat Paralamov is a Crimean Tatar who worked as a trader at a local market in Nizhnegorskiy. In
September, security services detained him on suspicion of involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir and
allegedly tortured him to coerce him into becoming an informant. On September 13, 2017, a group
of masked men in Nizhnegorskiy searched the house where he lived with his family. They said that
they needed to search for “weapons and drugs.” During the search, they seized Paralamov’s laptop
and tablet, as well as his mother-in-law’s book on Islam.
After the search, the men put Paralamov in a van and drove off.
For more than 24 hours, his family and lawyer had no contact with him or information about his
whereabouts. Paralamov’s lawyer and a group of activists called and visited police and FSB
departments in Nizhnegorskiy and Simferopol asking about him, but got no answers as to his
whereabouts or even a confirmation of his arrest. On the morning of September 14, a policeman
told Paralamov’s family and friends, who had gathered outside a Nizhnegorskiy police station, that
the local FSB department had released Paralamov the day before, but that he “voluntarily” went
back to “provide further answers” to the authorities’ questions.
At around about 12:30 pm on September 14, Paralamov called his family from a bus station in
Simferopol. He said he had been badly beaten, and was shaken and unable to walk. Paralamov’s
family took him to a hospital in Simferopol to document his injuries, which included multiple
hematomas and bruises.
At the end of September, Paralamov managed to leave Crimea with his family. After he arrived in
Kyiv, he spent 15 days in a hospital to get treatment for his injuries.
During a news conference in Kyiv in early November, Paralamov described his detention and
torture. He said that after the FSB took him to the station, they put a bag over his head, put tape
over his mouth, and tortured him with electric shocks. They also punched him in the chest and hit
him on the back of his head. When he asked for a lawyer, an FSB agent punched him in the chest
and told him, “I’m your lawyer.”
Paralamov said the FSB agents asked him about his involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir and demanded
that he become an informant, attend Crimean Tatars’ gatherings, collect information, and pass it on
to the authorities. They also forced him to sign a document claiming that he left the FSB station in
Simferopol on September 13 and voluntarily returned to confess to involvement with Hizb ut-
Tahrir and that he voluntarily agreed to “cooperate” with the FSB.
Paralamov said that the next day, the authorities took him to a forest, where they made him repeat
his confession on camera. The authorities told Paralamov that if he cooperated, he would get a
three-year conditional sentence rather than real prison time and told him to not use a Crimean
lawyer but the lawyer that they would provide.
Yalta
On February 11, 2016, the FSB searched 11 homes of Crimean Tatars in Yalta and surrounding
towns. Edem Semedlyaev, a lawyer representing one of the suspects, said that law-enforcement
officials knocked down doors and broke windows in several houses.
Following house searches, the FSB detained 14 people. Ten were released the next day and four
were arrested: Emir-Usein Kuku, Enver Bekirov, and Vadim Siruk on suspicion of participating in
Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Muslim Aliev for allegedly organizing a local Hizb ut-Tahrir cell. All are also
charged under article 278 of the Russian Criminal Code for actions directed at the “violent takeover
of power”. Two months later, police in Yalta arrested two other men, Refat Alimov and Arsen
Dzhepparov, for alleged participation as well. All six have been in custody awaiting trial since their
arrest.
In October 2016, prison doctors, saying they were assessing the six detainees’ mental health
condition, questioned them about their religious practices and political views. Because all six refused
to answer, they were forcibly placed in a psychiatric hospital in November 2016 for three to four
weeks for evaluation. The authorities said they found no problems with the men’s mental health and
that they were therefore accountable for their actions.
Family members of one of those in custody, Aliev, told Human Rights Watch that at about 7 a.m.
on February 11, about 10 heavily armed and masked men came to search the house. The men did
not present a search warrant or any identification and refused Aliev’s request for a lawyer. They
forced Aliev, who did not resist, to lie on the floor face down in front of his wife and children and
told the family that they were looking for weapons and prohibited literature. They brought two
witnesses for the search. When Aliev’s wife asked if they could invite neighbors to witness the
search instead, the armed men refused.
The men behaved aggressively toward Aliev’s wife and children. One asked Aliev’s 12-year-old son:
“Who do you want to be when you grow up? Do you want to be like us and take down people like
your father?” One of the men picked up the Quran from the table and threw it on the floor. When
Aliev’s wife attempted to pick it up, the man kicked it away.
During the search, the authorities seized three bags of books, including children’s books, as well as
Aliev’s computer and cell phone. They eventually returned the books and the computer.
Emir-Usein Kuku, another of those in custody, is a human rights activist and a member of the
Contact Human Rights Group, founded in October 2014 to pressure Russian authorities in Crimea
to investigate abuses. Authorities briefly detained him in April 2015, questioned him in November
2015, and repeatedly attempted to recruit him as an informant, an offer which he refused and spoke
about publicly.
In September 2016, the prosecutor’s office in Crimea launched an investigation alleging that Kuku
was neglecting his parental duties. In October 2016, a local police inspector made several attempts
to meet with Kuku’s children, 5 and 9, while they were at school without adults present, and on one
occasion when he was able to, he asked Kuku’s 9-year-old son questions that implied his father was
neglecting his parental duties while in detention.
Dzhemil Temishev, a lawyer representing Dzhepparov, another of the six detainees, told Human
Rights Watch that between April and May 2016, prison administration refused to provide him with
necessary medical assistance for an ongoing health problem requiring surgery. After Temishev
repeatedly complained, Dzhepparov was eventually hospitalized and underwent surgery. In May
2017, Dzhepparov’s health deteriorated again but the authorities again refused to provide him with
needed medical treatment, Temishev said. Temishev also said that prison authorities placed
Dzepparov in solitary confinement twice for a total of 16 days under arbitrary pretexts, such as
refusing to shave his beard or not opening the cell door fast enough.
Bakhchysarai – May 2016
Four residents of Bakhchysarai were arrested on May 12, 2016, and charged with membership in
Hizb ut-Tahrir. They are Rustem Abiltarov, Zevri Abseitov, Remzi Memtov, and Enver Mamutov.
Police arrested all four following searches of five houses and a café in Bakhchysarai. Mamutov is
accused of organizing and leading a cell, and the rest, with involvement in it. A former Russian
prosecutor in Crimea stated that the detained men allegedly carried out “unconstitutional activity in
the form of the propaganda work among the population.” All four remain in custody, pending the
investigation.
Simferopol
In October 2016, police arrested Aider Saleidinov, Rustem Ismailov, Uzair Abdullayev, Teimur
Abdullaev, and Emil Dzhemadenov, after a wave of house searches in the city of Simferopol.
Abullayev was accused of organizing a Hizb ut-Tahrir cell, and the four others of participation in it.
All five have remained in custody, pending the investigation.
In December 2016, Saledinov, Ismailov, and Uzair Abdullaev said, FSB officers beat them while in
transit to investigative facilities. In February 2017, Saledinov and Ismailov were sent for psychiatric
evaluations at a hospital to determine the state of their mental health at the time of their alleged
criminal acts. Kurbedinov, the lawyer, said that Teimur Abdullaev was placed in an isolation ward in
March 2017 for writing a letter in Crimean Tatar language.
Sevastopol
In January 2015, police in Sevastopol arrested Ruslan Zeitullayev, Ferat Saifulaeyev, Rustem Vaitov,
and Nuri Primov. Zeitullayev was charged with organizing a Hizb ut-Tahrir cell, and the others with
participation.
On September 7, 2016, a military court in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, convicted all four men on
charges of participation in a terrorist organization and sentenced Vaitov, Primov, and Saifulayev to
five years in prison, and Zeitullayev to seven.
Following the prosecutor’s appeal that Zeitullayev should have been convicted for “organizing” not
just “participation in” a terrorist group, on December 27, Russia’s Supreme Court sent his case for
retrial. The prosecution asked for a more severe charge and sentence because it considered
Zeitullayev the leader of the Hizb ut-Tahrir group in Sevastopol.
At retrial, in April 2017, the court sentenced Zeitullayev to 12 years in a maximum-security prison
for organizing a terrorist group. The prosecutor's office again appealed the verdict, demanding an
18-year sentence. In July, Russia’s Supreme Court changed Zeitullayev’s prison sentence to 15 years.
The verdict, which Human Rights Watch reviewed, said that the case against him was built on
testimony by a secret witness; conversations with others about prosecutions against Hizb ut-Tahrir
members and criticism of the media; and the alleged possession of brochures, leaflets, and other
Hizb ut-Tahrir publications.
In September 2017, all four men were transferred to various regions of Russia to serve their prison
terms. Memorial Human Rights Center recognized them as political prisoners.
Separatism Prosecutions
On October 18, 2017, following a year-long investigation, Russia’s security services charged
Crimean Tatar activist Suleyman Kadyrov, 55, with separatism (article 280.1, part 2, of Russia’s
criminal code). Kadyrov is a former Mejlis member.
One of Kadyrov’s lawyers, Alexey Ladin, told Human Rights Watch that in April, Russia’s Federal
Financial Monitoring Service included him in its official list of “active terrorists and extremists.”
The criminal charges stem from comments Kadyrov made in March 2016 when he re-posted
another user’s Crimea-related video on his Facebook page. The comment said: “Suleyman Kadyrov
agrees! Crimea is Ukraine. Always has been, always will be. Many thanks to the author of the video!
I support it!”
Kadyrov is at liberty, awaiting trial.
Arrests for Single-Person Pickets
The Crimean authorities refuse Crimean Tatars’ requests to hold peaceful gatherings under arbitrary
pretexts and crack down on spontaneous protests. Between August and October 2017, authorities
detained dozens and fined at least 10 Crimean Tatars for exercising their right to protest peacefully.
They included people who held single-person pickets, including to protest the trials of Crimean
Tatar leaders and security service searches of Crimean Tatars’ homes.
On August 8, Simferopol police detained 76-year-old Sever Karametov, who was picketing in front
of the Crimea Supreme Court building in Simferopol to protest the trial of Akhtem Chiygoz. Three
police officers approached Karametov and ordered him to follow them. When he insisted on
remaining, they grabbed him and forcibly led him away. Karametov’s lawyer said he had been
diagnosed with advanced Parkinson’s disease. On August 9, a judge refused to order a medical exam
for Karametov, swiftly found him guilty of resisting police orders, and sentenced him to 10 days in
prison, which he served. The court also fined Karametov 10,000 rubles (approximately US$165.)
On October 11, authorities in Bakhchysarai detained nine activists who were recording the searches
of the homes of those suspected of involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir and live streaming them on
social media. Authorities charged them with participating in an unauthorized public gathering that
led to disrupting public order, a misdemeanor. A lawyer present when the men were detained told
the media that police struck several of the activists while transporting them to the police station.
In court hearings the same day, all nine were found guilty and fined for various amounts of up to
15,000 rubles (approximately US$261), for a total amount of 135,000 rubles (approximately
US$2,350).
On October 14, more than 100 Crimean Tatars
participated in single-person pickets at different
locations around Crimea, protesting the October
11 arrests. The protesters stood along Crimea’s
highways, holding up signs demanding an end to
the persecution of Crimean Tatars. According to
media reports, the police detained at least 49
people for conducting single-person pickets. In a
video statement uploaded to his Facebook page,
Rustem Kyamilev, a Crimean lawyer who
monitored the arrests, said that the police
pressured those detained to be fingerprinted and
denied them access to a lawyer. All were released
the same day without charge.
Human Rights Watch researcher Tanya Cooper
interviewing Zair Smedlyaev, Crimean Tatar leader in
Krasnogvardeyskoe, Crimea on October 24, 2017 2017
Yulia Gorbunova/Human Rights Watch
In the following days, most of the activists detained on October 14 were summoned to their local
police stations, Zair Smedlyaev told Human Rights Watch. The activists told Smedlyaev that during
questioning the police pressed them for details about those organizing the October 14 protests,
including asking who told them to participate in the protests and who prepared the signs for them.
Legal Framework
As an occupying power, Russia should respect, unless absolutely prevented from doing so,
Ukrainian laws that were in force in Crimea when it commenced its occupation. However, Russia
rejects its status as an occupying power and applies its federal laws to Crimea, including
criminalizing activity not previously criminalized on the peninsula. This notwithstanding, all relevant
human rights treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture, apply in Crimea and all
authorities, whether they are Russian or Crimean acting under Russian authority are bound by these
treaties.
Russia is bound to respect the rights of Crimean residents, including those of freedom of opinion,
expression, assembly and association, and religion, freedom from arbitrary detention and illtreatment
including torture, and rights to fair trial, due process, and privacy. The Russian actions
against Crimean Tatars that Human Rights Watch documented violate these rights and in total may
be considered to amount to a policy of persecution against Crimean Tatars.
While it may fall within Russia’s discretion to proscribe Hizb ut-Tahrir and designate it as a terrorist
organization, that does not give Russian authorities carte blanche to use the criminal law as a tool to
suppress non-violent opposition, criticism or protest. Any and all application of the criminal law
must comport with international standards on due process and focus on criminal conduct, not be
used to punish exercise of basic rights such as free speech, assembly, and opinion.
The evidence against the Crimean Tatars prosecuted is not that they engaged in, advocated, or aided
and abetted acts of violence. Rather the evidence presented against those accused of involvement in
a terrorist organization is primarily discussions during meetings, often in private apartments, on
interpretations of the Quran or Russia’s actions in Crimea, or possession of religious literature. The
prosecution on terrorism charges of Crimean Tatars for non-violent speech and, in particular, the
equating of speech with acts of terrorism or extremism, is an unjustified interference with freedom
of opinion, expression and religion.
Russia’s use of the ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir to go after and lock up Crimean Tatars who have not
engaged in criminal behavior, but who may oppose Russian occupation or are discussing their
religious and political beliefs, is not only a violation of freedom of association but is a misuse of the
criminal justice system for political ends. These actions are further compounded when the Russian
authorities deny people the right to peacefully protest rights violations, whether in a collective or as
individuals, and punish them for peaceful exercise of their right to protest.
Annex 965
Crimean Human Rights Group, Statement on Unlawful Searches and Detainments of Crimean
Tatar National Movement Activists and Veterans in Crimea (24 November 2017)
24 November 2017
Annex 966
Human Rights Watch, Another Day, Another Tragedy in Crimea (27 November 2017)
Annex 967
Crimea Human Rights Group, Hate Speech in the Media Landscape of Crimea (2018)
HATE SPEECH
IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE
OF CRIMEA
AN INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL
REPORT ON THE SPREAD OF HATE SPEECH
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CRIMEAN
PENINSULA (MARCH 2014 — JULY 2017)
Kyiv — 2018
Authors:
Oleksandr Burmahyn
Tetiana Pechonchyk
Iryna Sevoda
Olha Skrypnyk
Review:
Viacheslav Lykhachev
Translation:
Anastasiia Morenets
Proofreading:
Steve Doyle
Hate Speech in the Media Landscape of Crimea: An Information and Analytical Report on the
Spread of Hate Speech on the Territory of the Crimean Peninsula (March 2014 – July 2017) /
under the general editorship of I. Sedova and T. Pechonchyk. – Kyiv, 2018. — 40 p.
ISBN 978-966-8977-81-7
This publication presents the outcome of documenting and classifying facts on the use of hate speech on the
territory of the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol from April 2014 to July 2017.
This publication uses material from mass media that have been disseminated in the territory of Crimea since the
occupation of the peninsula by the Russian Federation, as well as information from open sources, including information
resources from the authorities of Ukraine, Russian Federation and Crimean de-facto authorities, Crimean Human Rights
Group and Human Rights Information Centre.
This publication is intended for the representatives of state authorities, educational and research institutions,
diplomatic missions, international, non-governmental and human rights organizations
Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) — is an organization of Crimean human rights defenders and journalists
aimed at promoting the observance and protection of human rights in Crimea by documenting the violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law on the territory of the Crimean peninsula as well as attracting wide attention to
these issues and searching for methods and elaborating instruments to defend human rights in Crimea. The CHRG team
is composed of experts, human rights defenders and journalists from various countries who have been participating in
monitoring and documenting the violations of human rights in Crimea since February 2014. The CHRG maintains a major
focus on the human rights violations resulting from the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea. The findings
of the CHRG monitoring and documenting of human rights violations are presented in monthly monitoring reviews on the
human rights situation in Crimea1, as well as in the issue-related CHRG reports and articles2.
Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC) — is a Ukrainian non-governmental organization which aims at promoting
human rights, rule of law, and the ideas of civil society in Ukraine. Since March 2014, together with the Russian and Crimean
human rights defenders, the organization has been taking part in the operation of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission
(CFM) – the only international human rights civic initiative that has been acting in Crimea on a continual basis. Once in
the so-called ‘patriotic stop-list’ of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, the CFM had to cease working in
Crimea for its monitors were at risk of prosecution. The HRIC continues monitoring the situation regarding freedom of
speech and expression in Crimea, as well as supporting local journalists and human rights defenders. The organization is
involved in awareness-raising and research activities and advocates the human rights issues in Crimea at the national and
international level.
UDC 32.019.5:323.266:327(477.75+47 0)
This publication was funded by the British Embassy in Ukraine as part of the project
implemented by Crimean Human Rights Group and Human Rights Information Centre. The
views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and may not coincide with the
official position of the UK Government.
UDC 32.019.5:323.266:327(477.75+47 0)
© Crimean Human Rights Group, 2018
© Human Rights Information
Centre, 2018
ISBN 978-966-8977-81-7
1 Monitoring reviews are available at: http://crimeahrg.org/category/monitor
2 Issue-related reports and articles are available at: http://crimeahrg.org/category/analytic
1
CONTENTS
LIST OF ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................................2
FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................3
METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................................6
Definition of Hate Speech ...............................................................................................................6
Object of Monitoring .......................................................................................................................6
Period of Monitoring ....................................................................................................................... 7
Key Words .......................................................................................................................................8
Types of Hate Speech .....................................................................................................................9
OVERVIEW OF HATE SPEECH LAWS ..................................................................................... 11
Definition of Hate Speech in International Laws and Regulations ................................................ 11
Practice of European Court of Human Rights as Regards Hate Speech .......................................12
Antisemitism, Islamophobia and Other Forms of ‘Ideological’ Intolerance .............................13
Racism, Migrantophobia ...........................................................................................................13
Homophobia .............................................................................................................................13
Hate Speech Laws in Ukraine ........................................................................................................13
Hate Speech Laws in Russian Federation .....................................................................................15
Ethical Standards of Journalism as Regards Hate Speech ............................................................16
OUTCOMES OF HATE SPEECH MONITORING IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA ......17
Hate Speech in Activity of Crimean Occupation Authorities ..........................................................17
Hate Speech on Air of Main Russian Channels Broadcasting in Crimea ......................................22
Hate Speech in Crimean Online Media ......................................................................................... 27
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................34
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................34
Recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 37
2 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ВAF Armed Forces
VCIOM Russian Public Opinion Research Center
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
AOC Administrative Offences Code
CJE Commission on Journalism Ethics
CHRG Crimean Human Rights Group
MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
UN United Nations
RC ‘Republic of Crimea’
RF Russian Federation
HRRC Human Rights Resource Center
CC Criminal Code
UOC-KP Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate
UHHRU Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
HRIC Human Rights Information Centre
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 3
Since the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
in March 2014, the situation with freedom of speech
and expression has dramatically changed for the worse on
the peninsula.
On-air broadcasting of Ukrainian TV channels and
radio stations on the peninsula’s territory stopped at the
very beginning of the occupation. Dozens of Crimean journalists
and editorial departments had to leave the peninsula
and move to mainland Ukraine, while some editorial
offices closed down as they could not reregister and continue
working under the Russian laws, and a lot of journalists
retired from business in fear of persecution.
Pursuant to Freedom House’s estimates, the degree
of media freedom in Crimea in 2014 became one of the
lowest in the world. The organization’s report1 gave the
peninsula 94 points out of 100 (the worst score possible),
so Crimea made the ‘worst of the worst’ territories list with
Russia’s score being 83.
The overwhelming majority of Crimean mass media
which left the occupied peninsula and went on with
their activity in mainland Ukraine remains blocked out in
Crimea just like the main Ukraine-wide media.
Thus, according to data from the Human Rights Information
Centre and Crimean Human Rights Group,
the web-sites of 30 mass media are still completely or
partially blocked on the territory of Crimea as of the
beginning of March 20182. These include the web-
1 See Freedom of the Press 2017 / Freedom House — URL:
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTP_2017_booklet_
FINAL_April28.pdf
2 The check was performed on March 1-3, 2018 in Simferopol,
Sevastopol, Bilohirsk, Yalta and Kerch. The resources to be checked
were selected given the earlier statements about the mass media
blocking, as well as by means of random checks of television
sites of information agencies highlighting Crimean
events: Crimea. Realities, Center of Journalistic Investigations,
Blackseanews.net, 15 Minutes, QHA, Crimea.
SOS, Events of Crimea, Sevastopol Meridian, as well as
Ukrainian-wide information and analytical publications:
Ukrayinska Pravda, European Pravda, Hromadske Radio,
UAinfo, Sled.net.ua, Glavnoe.ua Observer, RBC-Ukraine,
Ukrinform, DePo, Gordon, Information Resistance, Focus,
Censor.net. Furthermore, the web-sites of such TV
channels as Chernomorskaya TV and Radio Company,
ATR, Novyi Kanal, ICTV, 5 kanal, Espreso TV, UA: First and
STB3 have also been blocked.
The editorial departments of Ukrainian mass media
cannot act in Crimea legally. The journalists of Ukrainian
periodicals, even those who moved to mainland Ukraine
and those working in Crimea covertly, are subjected to
harsh persecution4, including criminal prosecution5.
The population of Crimea receives most of its information
from Russian publications and TV channels, as well
as from the Crimean mass media that showed loyalty to
channels and the most popular Ukrainian information and analytical
web-sites.
3 It should be noted that a part of these online media is blocked by
the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information
Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) — completely
or partially (for instance, Hromadske Radio, 15 Minutes, Censor.
net, RBC, Sled.net.ua etc.), while others cannot be accessed on
the territory of Crimea without any legal justification. The majority
of the abovementioned mass media is not blocked on the territory
of the Russian Federation.
4 Human Rights Defenders Claim About the Sweeping Purge of the
Media in Crimea / Human Rights Information Centre, April 09,
2015 — https://goo.gl/gGG3ti
5 Ukrainian Journalists Demand that the Russian Federation Should
Cease Criminal Proceedings Against Their Colleges / Crimean Human
Rights Group, October 27, 2016 — https://goo.gl/xZQKkE
FOREWORD
4 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
the occupation authorities and, therefore, were allowed to
work in Crimea openly.
With this in mind, hate speech manifestations in the
media landscape of Crimea were monitored on the websites
of the Crimean mass media whose editorial offices
are located on the peninsula’s territory, on the sites of
the so-called ‘authorities’ of Crimea, and on the air of the
top-rated television channels of the Russian Federation
broadcasting on the peninsula.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
defines hate speech as the idea covering all forms of expression
which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred
based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by
aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination
and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of
immigrant origin6.
It is worth noting that the problem of hate speech use
in the media scene of Crimea had existed long before the
peninsula was occupied by Russia. There were occasional
hate-speech-related scandals and conflicts in the region.
However, since the beginning of the occupation,
hate speech has been used in propaganda on an unprecedented
scale with hate rhetoric becoming increasingly
aggressive.
6 Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on ‘Hate Speech’ adopted on October 30, 1997 —
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Display-
DCTMContent?documentId=0900001680505d5b
It was already in February 2014 that the pro-Russian
mass media started calling Ukrainians fascists and bloodthirsty
Banderites7. Billboards with messages about
‘Ukrainian fascism’ began to appear on the streets of
Crimean cities, while public transport showed videos calling
on Crimeans to stand up to the ‘Banderites.’
Such statements have a rather wide range of use and
target mainly those Ukrainians who do not abide by the aggressive
actions of the Russian Federation. Since the armed
conflict between the RF and Ukraine started, these notions
became much more common, just like the mass accusations
of Ukrainians of ‘fascism’ and submission to the ‘fascist junta’
that had allegedly seized the power in the country. Such
deliberately misleading epithets were used to describe various
social groups of Ukrainians: volunteers, civic activists,
journalists, Euromaidan participants and supporters, population
of Western Ukraine, Ukrainian-speaking citizens in
general, advocates of the European integration of Ukraine
and others. A wide use of the abovementioned terms in various
contexts and projections created the general association
and image of a Ukrainian that incites hatred and fear.
Hate speech as an element of RF government propaganda
has become a real weapon intended to create a
long-term negative image of the enemy and mobilize its
active supporters of the seizure of Crimea. It yielded the
desired results — the Russian-leaning part of population
became radicalized fast and came down on the side of
7 Members or supporters of Stepan Bandera’s political movement
who was a Ukrainian political activist and a leader of the nationalist
and independence movement of Ukraine.
Billboards on the Streets of Crimean Cities on the Eve of the So-Called ‘Referendum’, March 2014
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 5
the Russian invaders. People with the opposite views
were beaten up, kidnapped and tortured. Such violence
was triggered by the Ukrainian language or the Flag of the
Crimean Tatar people.
Thus, Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar activist who initiated
a one-man protest against the occupation of Crimea,
was kidnapped by the ‘Crimean Self-Defense’ members
on the central square of Simferopol on March 03, 2014.
His body was found on March 15 with numerous marks of
torture, his head bound with duct-tape, a pair of handcuffs
beside him. The cause of death — a knife stab in the eye.
Two months later, the hate-filled Crimeans went to war
in the Ukrainian Donbass and later in Syria.
The intensity of hate speech use in the media landscape
of Crimea started gradually fading away as time
passed. At the same time, hate speech is still rather common:
it is used by the representatives of Crimean ‘authorities,’
politicians, local journalists and pro-Russian activists.
Hate rhetoric peaks during high-profile events, mostly related
to the armed conflict in Donbass as well as the activities
of the Crimean Tatar national movement.
The authors of this research set out to document, systematize
and demonstrate the scales of hate speech use
in Crimea (using several time periods as an example for
comparison) as well as reveal the main tendencies and
ways of rousing hatred amid the ongoing international
armed conflict on this territory.
We hope that the documented facts of hate speech
use will be subject to a proper legal evaluation at both national
and international levels, become the evidence base
in various legal proceedings and will be used to ramp up
international pressure on Russia as an occupant.
Funeral of Crimean Tatar Activist Reshat Ametov Who Became a Victim of Torture and Extralegal Execution, March 2014,
Crimea
6 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
The monitoring of hate speech use in the media
landscape of Crimea has been carried out by the monitors
and experts of the Crimean Human Rights Group
and the Human Rights Information Centre pursuant to
a set methodology based on the approaches of the
SOVA Center for Information and Analysis8 (Russian
Federation) as well as those of the Without Limits project
of the Social Action Center9 (Ukraine) with some
modifications.
Definition of Hate Speech
Despite the fact that hate speech is widespread in
many areas of public and private life, there is no one common
definition of what hate speech means exactly (for
more detail see Section: Overview of Hate Speech Laws).
Many definitions of hate speech are based on establishing
the fact of the incitement to hatred, humiliation or
discrimination on certain grounds in statements, with the
citation of such grounds, which makes such definitions
simple and practical.
For this reason the basic definition for the purpose of
this research is the definition used by the SOVA Center for
Information and Analysis10 with small changes:
8 See Hate Speech against Society: (Collection of Articles) / compiled
by: A. Verkhovsky. –
Moscow: Sova Center, 2007. — 259 p.: tables. (Scientific (Use Academic
in place of Scientific) Publication)
9 See Without Limits project of the Social Action Center: Hate
Speech and Mass Media: International Standards and Approaches.
Кyiv, 2015.
10 See, for instance: H. Kozhevnikova. Hate Speech: Typology of
Journalist’s Mistakes // Applied Conflictology for Journalists. Moscow,
2006. p. 95; H. Kozhevnikova. Applied Religious Studies for
Journalists. Moscow: ‘Human Rights,’ 2009. p.48.
‘Hate speech is any inappropriate statements about
ethnic, confessional or other social groups or communities,
or separate persons who represent such
communities.’
Object of Monitoring
We chose the sources to be monitored among those
that broadcast on the Crimean peninsula after its occupation
by the Russian Federation11, including the web-sites
of the main Crimean ‘authorities,’ top-rated Crimean mass
media with editorial offices located on the territory of
Crimea as well as major Russian TV channels broadcasting
in the media landscape of Crimea.
In particular, the objects of monitoring are as follows:
Web-sites of Crimean ‘Authorities’
1. ‘Government of the Republic of Crimea’12
2. ‘State Council of the Republic of Crimea’13
3. ‘Government of Sevastopol’14
4. ‘Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol’15
11 We did not monitor Crimean mass media that moved out of the
peninsula after its occupation by the Russian Federation and continue
working in mainland Ukraine (e.g. ATR channel, QHA information
agency, Center of Journalistic Investigations and others)
as these mass media are blocked in Crimea.
12 Web-site of the ‘Government of the Republic of Crimea.’ Available
at: http://rk.gov.ru/
13 Web-site of the ‘State Council of the Republic of Crimea.’ Available
at: http://crimea.gov.ru/
14 Web-site of the ‘Government of Sevastopol.’ Available at: https://
sevastopol.gov.ru
15 Web-site of the ‘Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol.’ Available at:
https://sevzakon.ru/
METHODOLOGY
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 7
5. ‘Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea’16
6. ‘Prosecutor’s Office of Sevastopol City’17
7. ‘Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea’18
8. ‘Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
for Sevastopol’19
Crimean Mass Media
Web-sites of TV channels:
9. First Crimean20
10. NTS Sevastopol21
Web-sites of newspapers:
11. Krymskaya Pravda [Crimean Truth]22
12. Slava Sevastopolia [Glory of Sevastopol]23
13. Krymskiye Izvestia [Crimean News]24
Online media:
14. Crimeainform25
15. RIA Crimea26
16. ForPost Sevastopol27
It is worth noting that Pervyi Krymskiy TV channel and
Krymskaya Pravda newspaper are funded from the budget
of the Republic of Crimea, and Krymskaya Pravda is virtually
controlled by the family of Konstantin Bakharev, the
State Duma Deputy from the Republic of Crimea (his father
Mikhail Bakharev is the editor-in-chief). The web-site
of RIA Crimea is a unit of the Russian governmental news
agency Rossiya Segodnya, while ForPost Sevastopol belongs
to Sergey Kazhanov, the ‘Deputy of the Legislative
Assembly of Sevastopol.’
Web-Sites of Russian TV Channels Broadcasting in
Crimea
We monitored the newscasts along with information
and analytical programs aired at night (prime time) on
16 Web-site of the ‘Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea.’
Available at: http://www.rkproc.ru/
17 Web-site of the ‘Prosecutor’s Office of Sevastopol City.’ Available
at: http://www.sevproc.ru/
18 Web-site of the ‘Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of
Crimea.’ Available at: https://82.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/
19 Web-site of the ‘Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Russia for Sevastopol.’ Available at: https://92.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/
20 Web-site of First Crimean. Available at: http://1tvcrimea.ru/
21 Web-site of NTS Sevastopol. Available at: http://nts-tv.com/
22 Web-site of Krymskaya Pravda. «Available at: http://c-pravda.ru/
23 Web-site of Slava Sevastopolia. Available at: https://slavasev.ru/
24 Web-site of Krymskiye Izvestia. Available at: http://crimiz.ru/
25 Web-site of Crimeainform. Available at: http://www.c-inform.info/
26 Web-site of RIA Crimea. Available at: http://crimea.ria.ru/
27 Web-site of ForPost Sevastopol. Available at: http://sevastopol.su/
three top-rated Russian TV channels broadcasting on the
Crimean peninsula.
17. Russia-128
18. NTV29
19. Channel One30
The monitoring established that the main examples
of hate speech in news programs of the abovementioned
channels are present in the form of oral statements of news
presenters, journalists or speakers in news editions whose
transcriptions are not publicly available. Such news items
are posted on the web-sites of TV companies as videos31.
Period of Monitoring
The monitoring covers the period from March 2014 to
July 2017.
To show the dynamics of hate speech use on the mentioned
media resources, we carried out a detailed monitoring,
studying all newscasts and materials during two
periods: from March 01, 2014 to September 31, 2014 and
from January 01, 2017 to July 31, 2017.
We searched using key words applied to different vulnerable
and discriminated-against groups (see the list of
key words below) the list of which was compiled at the
pilot stage of monitoring according to the results of a
preliminary study of various Crimean and Russian information
web-sites (those of authorities and mass media).
The search was performed through the search box of websites
and Google filters (by specific sites) using key words.
Furthermore, the monitors involved in the study
watched all evening newscasts on three TV channels
(Russia-1, NTV, Channel One) broadcasting in Crimea for six
months: March, April and May 2014 and March, April and
May 2017, as the main examples of hate speech exist in
the form of oral statements of news presenters, journalists
28 ‘Vesti’ newscasts aired on weekdays at 8 P.M. (Moscow time)
and ‘Vesti Nedeli’ weekly newscasts aired on Sunday at 8 P.M.
(Moscow time). We monitored the Russia-1 web-site (available at:
https://russia.tv/) and ‘Vesti’ web-site (available at: https://www.
vesti.ru/) where these news items were posted.
29 ‘Segonia’ newscasts aired on weekdays at 7 P.M. (Moscow time).
‘Central Television’ and ‘Summing up the Week with Irada Zeynalova’
news programs aired on weekends at 7 P.M. (Moscow
time). We monitored the NTV web-site where these news items
were posted (available at: http://www.ntv.ru/).
30 ‘Vremya’ newscasts aired every day except Sunday at 9 P.M.
(Moscow time). ‘Sunday Vremya’ newscasts aired on Sundays
at 9 P.M. (Moscow time). We monitored the Channel One website
where these news items were posted (available at: https://
www.1tv.ru/).
31 The monitors involved in the study watched all evening newscasts
on three TV channels for six months: March, April and May 2014
and March, April and May 2017.
8 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
or speakers in news items, and the transcriptions of
television programs are not publicly available.
Despite the fact that this method does not show the
whole picture of how widely hate speech is spread in the
media landscape of Crimea, it is efficient for processing a
vast amount of text material.
Key Words
The study demonstrated that hate speech in relation
to social and ethnical / national groups of people was expressed
on the web-sites of the mass media and ‘authorities’
of Crimea with the use of the following negatively
connoted lexemes:
Ukrainians32:
Banderites [Translator’s Note: members or supporters
of Stepan Bandera’s political movement], Bandar-logs,
militants, extremist elements, our little brothers [literally;
this phrase in Russian denotes pets] ‘wolves in sheep’s
clothing,’ redneck Nazis, Galician Nazis [Galicia is a historical
region in Central-Eastern Europe which now lies within
western Ukraine], Galicians, Westerners, Western Nazis,
punishers, Kyiv terrorists, crypto-Banderites, common
fence-sitters, Ukies [short and derogative for ‘Ukrainians’],
Ukiecitizens, Ukiegentlemen, puppets of the West, naziocrats,
the conscious and pseudo-educated, national
extremists, Nazi junta, Nazi punitive squads, Nazi punishers,
Nazis, savages, neonats [short for ‘neonationalists’],
neofascist threat, Hitlerites’ henchmen, radical nationalists,
Hitler’s henchmen, the conscious [used in a derogatory
sense], douchebagulators [derogative for ‘regulators’],
trident-headed, gang, Ukrainian arias, Ukranazians, Ukes
[another variant of ‘Ukies’], Ukienazi, ultranationalists, racists,
fascist scum, Little Russians [the Russian Empire gave
Ukraine a colonial name Little Russia in 18th century], neonazis,
Shukhevych’s followers [Roman Shukhevych was a
Ukrainian politician and military leader], Nazi collaborators,
traitors, Nazi henchman, Russophobes, ultras, extremists
Crimean Tatars:
Jihadists, punishers, Crimean Tatar radicals, radical
Islamists, Russophobes, extremists
Euromaidan supporters:
Euromaidananas, Kyiv travelling circus, Heroes
of Banderite Labor [derogative for ‘Heroes of Socialist
32 Ukrainians in different contexts figure as ethnic and political
subjects. In a number of cases, the line between Ukrainians
as ethnic community and Ukrainians as civic community is
blurred. Although in general it is allowed to criticize political
subjects (citizens of Ukraine) but the authors noticed that occasionally
citizenship ( just like ethnicity) was also used to stir
up hostility amid the international armed conflict between Russia
and Ukraine.
Labor,’ an honorary title of the Soviet Union given for
exceptional achievements in economy and culture],
maidanuts, maidanshchyky [literally ‘con artists’],
maidan-brained, extremist imposters, anti-Semites
Members and supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar People:
rabble rousers, mujahideen, bandits, fifth column
Muslims:
Islamists, Tatar Wahhabis
Members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Kyiv Patriarchate
(UOC-KP):
dissenters
Members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
(UGCC):
Uniates
Journalists and human rights defenders:
grant-eaters
Migrants:
gastarbeiters [from German — ‘migrant workers’]
Jehovah’s Witnesses:
sectarians
The study revealed the use of Ukrainian words in Russian
texts in a derogatory context with regard to Ukraine
and people living in it, for instance ‘ненька’ [nenka, literally
‘mother,’ short for ‘motherland’), незалежна [TN: nezalezhna,
literally ‘independent’], ‘цеевропа’ [TN: tseyevropa,
literally ‘is Europe’ — short for ‘Ukraine is Europe’].
We also registered the following descriptions of
Ukraine (with the projection on all its citizens): Ukrojunta,
bloody junta, cannibalistic junta, fascist junta.
Ukrainians’ actions and initiatives are described with
the following words:
vyshyvanka-dressed hysterics [vyshyvanka is a traditional
Ukrainian embroidered shirt], blue and yellow
chew, nazification, Banderization, Ukiecrap, Banderite
asswipe, Ukiehouse, rushnyk and vyshyvanka nuthouse
[rushnyk is a Ukrainian ritual embroidered cloth], undividedcountrism,
Ukrainian totalitarianism, fascism, nationalism,
terror.
It should be noted that when monitoring and assessing
the consequences of hate speech use, it is important
to take into account the ongoing international armed
conflict33 on the territory of Ukraine with regard to the
33 The Crimean events are qualified as an international armed conflict
within the meaning of UN Resolution 71/205 as of December
19, 2016 and UN Resolution 72/190 as of December 19, 2017 on the
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 9
occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Under
such circumstances, stirring up hatred promotes the continuation
of the conflict or even its escalation.
If we consider such lexicon in the context of the international
armed conflict between the RF and Ukraine, we
may see the tendency of creating an image of an enemy
and kindling hatred towards Ukrainians as an ethnic and
civic community,34 especially together with the false accusations
of Nazism35 and constant comparison of Ukrainians
with the Nazi criminals of World War II. In the context
of the armed conflict, such words as Nazis, junta, punishers,
Banderites and fascists in relation to Ukrainians
should be regarded as the expressions used as part of the
general policy to incite hatred and create an image of an
enemy as well as present Ukrainians as the followers of
the Nazi criminals of the Second World War.
The mass use of the expressions characterizing Ukraine
as a junta-occupied country and its citizens as Nazis toeing
the line of such junta allows the monitors to conclude that
such appraisals go beyond the limits of criticism acceptable
in a free democratic state and exemplify hate speech.
Types of Hate Speech
To evaluate the specific manifestations of hate speech
by its potential negative impact and severity of possible
situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as the Action Report
Based on Preliminary Investigation (2016) of the Prosecutor’s Office
of the International Criminal Court that established that the
situation in the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol equals to an
international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation. This international armed conflict started no later than
February 26, 2014 when the Russian Federation deployed its military
personnel to gain control of the parts of Ukraine’s territory
without the Ukrainian government’s consent. The law on international
armed conflicts is applicable to the period since March
18, 2014 to the extent the situation in the territory of Crimea and
Sevastopol equals to an ongoing occupation.
34 Such accusations and descriptions of Ukrainians as ‘Nazis,’ ‘junta’
etc., which are used to incite hatred, carry the consequences for
the ethnic community of Ukrainians in general as well, because
in many cases studied afterwards, it is impossible to say for sure
whether the civic or ethnic community of Ukrainians was the object
of hate speech use.
35 In particular, the monitoring revealed different variants of false
accusations of Ukrainians of Nazism and fascism projecting on
the whole nation, although the legislation of Ukraine condemns
the communistic and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes
and prohibits the propaganda of their symbols, establishment and
operation of political parties if their program goals or actions are
intended to promote war, rouse interethnic, racial or religious hatred
or advocate the communistic and/or national socialist (Nazi)
totalitarian regimes. Furthermore, the share of the Ukrainian
population supporting the nationalist political parties is relatively
small: during the parliamentary elections in 2014, only 4.7% of
electorate voted for the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union, and 1.8% —
for the Right Sector party, and this level of support of such parties
is significantly lower than that in other countries.
consequences, we used the classification of the SOVA
Center for Information and Analysis (Russian Federation)36.
In particular, the study classified hate speech by the
following types.
1. Harsh hate speech:
calls for violence (in relation to a specific situation
with the object of violence indicated; claiming violence
to be acceptable in articles, messages of
the mass media and so on, as well as in the form
of direct calls for violence towards a certain social
group);
direct incitement to discrimination, including in the
form of general slogans;
covert calls for violence and discrimination (propaganda
of ‘positive,’ historical or modern examples of violence
or discrimination; expressions like ‘It would be a
good idea to make…,’ ‘It is high time…’ etc.);
calls for not letting a certain ethnic or religious group
be established in a region (district, city etc.), for instance,
arguing the point that it is inadmissible to
build a mosque in an ‘Orthodox city.’
2. Medium hate speech:
justifying the historical cases of violence and discrimination
(expressions like ‘Turks killed Armenians in
self-defense in 1915’);
publications and statements that question generally
acknowledged historical facts of violence and
discrimination (for instance, diminishing the scale of
Holocaust or saying that ‘Crimean Tatars were exiled
because they took Hitler’s side’);
statements about the historical crimes of a certain
ethnic or religious group as such (things like ‘They
always resorted to violence only,’ ‘They always conspired
against us’);
statements about the criminal nature of a certain
ethnic or religious group (for instance, ‘They are all
thieves’);
reflections on the disproportionate preference given
to a certain ethnic or religious group in financial
terms, or to a representative office in authorities, media
etc.;
accusations of a certain ethnic, religious or social
group of producing a negative impact on society and
the state (‘dilution of national identity,’ ‘erosion of traditional
values’ etc.);
36 See, for instance: H. Kozhevnikova. Hate Speech after Kondopoga
Events — in the Collection of Articles: A. Verkhovsky (editor). Hate
Speech against Society. Moscow: Sova Center, 2007. p.12-13.
10 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
pointing out the connection of a certain social group
with political and government bodies to discriminate it;
accusing a group of attempts to seize power or territorial
expansion (literally, unlike calling for not letting
it be established in the region);
disclaiming the citizenship (that is mentioning citizens
as foreigners depending on their ethnic identification).
3. Soft hate speech:
creating a negative image of an ethnic, religious or social
group (not specific event-related accusations, but
conveyed in a wider sense with the help of time periods,
general content or intonation of a text or text fragment);
mentioning an ethnic, religious or social group or
its members in a humiliating or insulting context
(as well as in crime news or simply mentioning an
ethnonym);
statements about the inferiority (lack of culture, intellectual
abilities, incapacity for creative work) of
a certain ethnic, religious or social group as such
(something like ‘Street cleaning is their only trade’);
statements about the moral flaws of a certain ethnic or
religious group (‘The Jews are greedy,’ ‘The Gypsies
are deceitful’ — this type should be distinguished from
the statements about cultural or intellectual inferiority);
citing explicitly xenophobic statements and texts without
the commentary that defines the line between an
interviewee and an interviewer; similarly — providing
space in a newspaper for clearly xenophobic propaganda
without editorial commentary or other sort of
controversy.
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 11
Both Ukraine which Crimea belongs to and the Russian
Federation that occupied the Crimean peninsula are members
of such international organizations such as the UN,
OSCE and Council of Europe. A range of the norms of international
laws and national legislations of both countries
contain direct and indirect references intended to prevent
hate speech from spreading.
DEFINITION OF HATE SPEECH
IN INTERNATIONAL LAWS
AND REGULATIONS
Despite the fact that hate speech is widespread in
many spheres of public and private life, and there are a
lot of discussions about the possibility or impossibility to
legislatively regulate and prohibit it, as of today, there is
no one common definition of what all parties to the discussion
mean by hate speech.
There is no uniform standard of this term in Ukrainian
either: sometimes hate speech is translated as мова
ворожнечі, sometimes as мова ненависті, and other
times even differently.
You may find several common definitions of the hate
speech phenomenon in international practice below.
Paragraph 2, Article 20 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights37 (adopted by General Assembly
resolution 2200 А (XXI) as of December 16, 1966)
stipulates that any advocacy or national, racial or religious
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Available at:
http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pactpol.
shtml
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination38 (adopted by
General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) as of December 21,
1965) provides for the following:
‘States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one
colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify
or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement
to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end,
with due regard to the principles embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights
expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter
alia:
a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority
or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons of another colour
or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing
thereof;
b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations,
and also organized and all other propaganda
38 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/
decl_conv/conventions/raceconv.shtml
OVERVIEW OF HATE
SPEECH LAWS
12 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
activities, which promote and incite racial
discrimination, and shall recognize participation
in such organizations or activities as an offence
punishable by law;
с) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions,
national or local, to promote or incite racial
discrimination.’
Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on ‘Hate Speech’39 interprets
this term as the notion ‘…covering all forms of expression
which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia,
anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on
intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and
hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant
origin.’
Furthermore, in the context of this study, we should
take into consideration Principle 1 of the abovementioned
Recommendation:
‘The governments of the member states, public authorities
and public institutions at the national, regional
and local levels, as well as officials, have a
special responsibility to refrain from statements, in
particular to the media, which may reasonably be
understood as hate speech, or as speech likely to
produce the effect of legitimising, spreading or promoting
racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or
other forms of discrimination or hatred based on intolerance.
Such statements should be prohibited and
publicly disavowed whenever they occur.’
There are seven principles set forth in the Recommendation
that define the basic rules and obligations of the
member states of the Council of Europe to combat hate
speech, inter alia, they stipulate that it is necessary to take
into account when hate speech is disseminated through
the media. For instance, Principle 6 says that:
‘…national law and practice should distinguish clearly
between the responsibility of the author of expressions
of hate speech, on the one hand, and any
responsibility of the media and media professionals
contributing to their dissemination as part of their
mission to communicate information and ideas on
matters of public interest on the other hand.’
Another international document that should be mentioned
in the context of combating hate speech is the
39 Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on ‘Hate Speech.’ Available at: http://zakon5.rada.
gov.ua/laws/show/994_093
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime,
concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic
nature committed through computer systems
(Strasbourg, January 28, 2003)40.
Pursuant to article 2 of this Protocol, racist and xenophobic
material means ‘any written material, any image
or any other representation of ideas or theories, which
advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or
violence, against any individual or group of individuals,
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin,
as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these
factors.’
Furthermore, articles 3-7 of this Protocol describe in
detail the governments’ obligations with regard to the
criminalization of acts aimed at disseminating racist and
xenophobic materials through computer systems.
The OSCE’s recommendations41 contain the following
definition: ‘Forms of expression that are motivated by,
demonstrate or encourage hostility towards a group — or
a person because of their membership of that group —
are commonly referred to as ‘hate speech.’
PRACTICE OF EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AS REGARDS HATE SPEECH
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has considered
a fairly large number of cases concerning the
freedom of speech in the context of hate speech use and
dissemination.
.’..Tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all
human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic,
pluralistic society. That being so, as a matter
of principle it may be considered necessary in certain
democratic societies to sanction or even prevent
all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote
or justify hatred based on intolerance …, provided
that any ‘formalities,’ ‘conditions,’ ‘restrictions’ or
‘penalties’ imposed are proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued,’ the ECHR believes42.
At the same time, the Court finds that ‘Freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of
40 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning
the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature
committed through computer systems. Available at: http://zakon2.
rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_687
41 Preventing and responding to hate crimes. A resource guide for
NGOs in the OSCE region. Available at: http://www.osce.org/uk/
node/180336?download=true
42 Erbakan v. Turkey judgment of December 6, 2006, § 56.
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 13
[a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its
progress and for the development of every man. Subject
to paragraph 2 of Article 10 [of the European Convention
on Human Rights], it is applicable not only to ‘information’
or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector
of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism,
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
‘democratic society’43.’
The balance between the need to ensure freedom of
speech and, at the same time, prevent the dissemination
and entrenchment of hate speech has been established
by the European Court of Human Rights in the following
cases44.
Antisemitism, Islamophobia
and Other Forms of ‘Ideological’
Intolerance
Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (February 20, 2007): the applicant,
the owner and editor of a newspaper, was convicted
for ‘public incitement to hatred’ in his article about ZOG45.
Garaudy v. France (June 24, 2003): the book entitled
The Founding Myths of Modern Israel denied Holocaust.
Norwood v. United Kingdom (November 16, 2004):
the applicant had displayed in his window a poster supplied
by the British National Party representing the Twin
Towers in flame with the words ‘Islam out of Britain — Protect
the British People!’
Leroy v. France (October 2, 2008): the cartoonist was
convicted for publicly condoning terrorism following the
publication in a Basque weekly newspaper of a drawing
representing the attack on the Twin Towers with a slogan
‘We all dreamt of it... Hamas did it!’
Gündüz v. Turkey (November 13, 2003): the self-proclaimed
leader of an Islamist sect was sentenced to a
long-term imprisonment for saying that ‘Every child born
in a secular marriage is a bastard’ during a televised debate
broadcast.
Soulas and others v. France (June 10, 2008): the applicants
were convicted for publishing the book entitled
The Colonisation of Europe: Truthful Remarks About Immigration
and Islam.
43 Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine judgment of March 29, 2005,
§.40.
44 Here you may find the list of the most interesting examples of this
court’s judgments classified by certain types of hate speech.
45 ZOG stands for Zionist occupation government. In the anti-Semite
discourse, this abbreviation is used in some versions of the Jewish
conspiracy.
Racism, Migrantophobia
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands
(October 11, 1979): the applicant — the president of a
political party claiming that ‘Holland is for Dutchmen’ —
was convicted for possessing leaflets addressed to ‘White
Dutch people’ and calling on ‘white people’ to take over in
order to exile from the country ‘hundreds of thousands of
Surinamers, Turks and other undesired aliens...’
Jersild v. Denmark (September 23, 1994): the applicant,
a journalist, was convicted for making a documentary
about the ultra-right youth which openly expressed the
abusive and derogatory remarks about immigrants and
ethnic groups.
Homophobia
Vejdeland and others v. Sweden (February 9, 2012):
the applicant was convicted for distributing in an upper
secondary school approximately 100 leaflets saying that
homosexuality was a ‘deviant sexual proclivity,’ had ‘amorally
destructive effect on the substance of society’ and was
‘responsible for the development of HIV and AIDS.’
It is also worth noting that all the standards set forth
by the ECHR in its judgments are an inherent part of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and obligatory for every member state
of the Council of Europe. Moreover, in most countries, the
international laws are higher in the legislative hierarchy
than the national laws. And the international regulations
must be applied in case of discrepancies. Russia is not an
exception in this case.
The ECHR’s position with regard to hate speech is highlighted
in more detail in Issue No. 4 of Crimea Beyond Limits,
a thematic review by the Regional Centre for Human
Rights and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union46.
HATE SPEECH LAWS
IN UKRAINE
The legal framework for combating hate speech is laid
in the Constitution of Ukraine (articles 15, 21 and 24):
‘Social life in Ukraine shall be based on the principles
of political, economic and ideological diversity. No ideology
shall be recognized as mandatory by the State47.
46 Crimea Beyond Rules, Issue No. 4. Thematic review of the human
rights situation under occupation. Ukrainian Helsinki Human
Rights Union 2018. https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/4Kr_Ru_fin_18.12.2017.pdf
47 Article 15 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
14 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
- All people shall be free and equal in their dignity
and rights. Human rights and freedoms shall be inalienable
and inviolable48.
- Citizens shall have equal constitutional rights
and freedoms and shall be equal before the law.
There shall be no privileges or restrictions based
on race, skin colour, political, religious and other
beliefs, gender, ethnic and social origin, wealth
status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics49.’
As we pointed out earlier, the international laws and
regulations define hate speech as one of the forms of
discrimination. In 2012, Ukraine approved the Law of
Ukraine on Principles of Preventing and Combating
Discrimination50.
In accordance with article 1, clause 1, paragraph 2
thereof, discrimination is a ‘situation where an individual
and/or group of individuals because of their race,
skin color, political, religious or other beliefs, sex, age,
disability, ethnic or social origin, nationality, property
and marital status, place of residence, linguistic or other
characteristics that existed, exist and may be real or
assumed (hereinafter — certain characteristics), is limited
in any form in recognition, exercise or use of their
rights and freedoms established by this Law except
when such limitation has a legal, objectively reasonable
goal achieved in a proper manner.’
In addition, this law defines the term incitement to
discrimination — ‘directions, instructions or calls for
discrimination against an individual and/or group of individuals
on any grounds.’
As regards the mass media, we should take into account
the following norms of effective legislation which
may be referred to the combating of hate speech.
Print media in Ukraine shall not be used for propaganda
of war, violence and cruelty; incitement of
ethnic, national and religious hatred51.
Court shall terminate the print publication if paragraph
1 of article 3 hereof is violated (if the abovementioned
restriction is applicable)52.
It shall be prohibited to use broadcasting organizations
to agitate for launching a war or aggressive
actions or promote the idea of such, and/or incite to
48 Article 21 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
49 Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
50 Law of Ukraine on Principles of Preventing and Combating
Discrimination. Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/5207-17
51 Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine on Print Media (Press) in Ukraine.
52 Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine on Print Media (Press) in Ukraine.
national, racial or religious hatred; to promote the
idea of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of persons
on the grounds of their religious beliefs, ideology,
national or ethnic affiliation, physical or wealth
status or social origin53.
The National Council may bring action seeking revocation
of the broadcast license, where it is found
that orders to eliminate violations of the legislation
and license requirements have not been complied
with54.
Furthermore, the persons disseminating hate speech
may be criminally indicted.
Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Violation
of Citizens’ Equality Based on Their Race, Nationality,
Religious Preferences, Disability or on Other Grounds
provides for the following:
‘Willful actions inciting national, racial or religious
enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honor
and dignity, or the insult of citizens’ feelings in respect
to their religious convictions, and also any
direct or indirect restriction of rights, or granting
direct or indirect privileges to citizens based on
race, skin color, political, religious and other convictions,
sex, disability, ethnic and social origin,
wealth status, place of residence, linguistic or other
characteristics shall be punishable by a fine of
200 to 500 tax-free minimum incomes, or deprivation
of liberty for up to five years with or without
the deprivation of the right to occupy certain
positions or engage in certain activities for up to
three years.’
Article 300 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Import,
Creation or Distribution of Works Promoting Violence
and Cruelty, Racial, National or Religious Intolerance
and Discrimination stipulates the following:
‘Import into Ukraine for sale or distribution purposes,
or creation, storage, transportation or other
movement for the same purposes, or sale or distribution
of works that promote violence and cruelty,
racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination,
and also compelling others to participate
in creation of such works shall be punishable
by a fine up to 150 tax-free minimum incomes, or
arrest for up to six months, or deprivation of liberty
for up to three years.’
53 Article 6, clause 2 of the Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio
Broadcasting.
54 Article 37, clause 5 of the Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio
Broadcasting.
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 15
HATE SPEECH LAWS IN
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Constitution of the Russian Federation recognizes
ideological diversity. No ideology may be established
as state or obligatory one. Political diversity and multi-party
system is recognized in the Russian Federation. Public
associations are equal before the law. The creation and
activities of public associations whose purposes and actions
are aimed at a forced change of the fundamental
principles of the constitutional system and at violating the
integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining its security,
setting up armed units and instigating social, racial,
national and religious strife is prohibited55.
Moreover, the RF Constitution provides for the
following:
‘All people shall be equal before the law and court.
The State shall guarantee the equality of rights and
freedoms of man and citizen, regardless of sex,
race, nationality, language, origin, property and official
status, place of residence, religion, convictions,
membership of public associations, and also of other
circumstances. All forms of limitations of human
rights on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious
grounds shall be banned. Man and woman shall enjoy
equal rights and freedoms and have equal possibilities
to exercise them56.
Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas
and speech. The propaganda or agitation instigating
social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife
shall not be allowed. The propaganda of social, racial,
national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall
be banned. No one may be forced to express their
views and convictions or to reject them57.’
The Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Associations contains the following norms58.
Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession,
including the right to profess individually or corporately
with other persons any religion or not to profess
any, and to choose and change freely, and to hold and
disseminate religious and other convictions and to act in
accordance with them, as well as by creating religious associations,
are guaranteed within the Russian Federation.
Creation of privileges, restrictions, or any form of discrimination
on the basis of religious affiliation is not permit-
55 Article 13 of the RF Constitution.
56 Article 19 of the RF Constitution.
57 Article 29 of the RF Constitution.
58 Article 3 of the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations.
ted. Citizens of the Russian federation are equal before
the law in all areas of civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural life irrespective of religious affiliation and
religious adherence. Citizens of the Russian Federation
whose convictions or religious profession preclude performance
of military service have the right to substitute
alternative civic service for it. No one is obliged to provide
information about personal religious affiliation, nor
can be subjected to duress for determining religious affiliation
or confession or rejection of religious confession, or
for participation or nonparticipation in religious services,
or other religious rites and ceremonies or the activity of
religious associations or religious education. Enticement
of minors into religious associations is forbidden, as well
as the teaching of religion to minors against their will and
without the consent of their parents or guardians. Prohibition
of the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of conscience
and freedom of religious profession, including
actions accompanied by violence against the individual,
intentional offense to the sentiment of citizens with regard
to their religious affiliation, propaganda of religious
superiority, destruction or alienation of property or threat
thereof, is prohibited and is prosecuted in accordance
with federal law. The conduct of public ceremonies and
the distribution of texts and illustrations that offend religious
sentiments of citizens in the vicinity of objects of
religious veneration are prohibited.
The Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media,
which is common for all types of media, dictates the
following59:
No provision shall be made for the use of mass media
for purposes of committing criminally indictable deeds,
divulging information making up a state secret or any
other law-protective secret, disseminating materials
containing the public calls for terrorism or publicly condoning
terrorism, other extremist materials, including
those promoting pornography, violence and cruelty.
It shall be prohibited to use the journalist’s right to
disseminate information with an aim of defaming a
citizen or certain categories of citizens solely on account
of sex, age, race or nationality, language, religious
beliefs, profession, place of residence and
employment, as well as political convictions60.
The Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activity
widely used in the Russian Federation defines the notion
of extremist activity (extremist)61 and provides for the
procedure of closing mass media, religious or non-governmental
organizations if any of its norms are violated.
Very general and ambiguous definitions are often used
by the authorities to prosecute alternative points of view
59 Article 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media.
60 Article 51 of the Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media.
61 Article 1 of the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activity.
16 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
rather than to combat hate speech. Thus, according to the
Human Rights Information Centre, in Crimea, during four
years of occupation, this law had been mostly applied for
the purposes of politically motivated prosecutions.
Hate-speech-related criminal liability is provided for by
the following norms of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation:
Incitement to hatred and strife (Article 282 of the
RF CC);
Calls for extremist activity (Article 280 of the RF CC)
and separatism (Article 280.1 of the RF CC);
Condoning terrorism (Article 205.2 of the RF CC);
Nazism rehabilitation (Article 354.1 of the RF CC);
Offending the feelings of religious believers (Article
148, clause 1 of the RF CC);
Participation in a criminal community (Article 282.1
of the RF CC) or organization (Article 282.2 of the
RF CC).
Furthermore, there are several articles of the Administrative
Offences Code of the Russian Federation concerning
hate speech:
Dissemination of ‘extremist materials’ (Article 20.29
of the RF AOC);
Displaying prohibited symbols (Article 20.3 of the RF
AOC).
ETHICAL STANDARDS OF
JOURNALISM AS REGARDS
HATE SPEECH
Besides the legislation, hate speech is prohibited by
the professional ethical standards of journalism.
‘The journalist shall be aware of the danger of discrimination
being furthered by the media, and shall do
the utmost to avoid facilitating such discrimination based
on, among other things, race, sex, sexual orientation, language,
religion, political or other opinions, and national or
social origins62,’ states the IFJ Declaration of Principles on
the Conduct of Journalists adopted at the World Congress
of the International Federation of Journalists in Bordeaux
on April 25-28, 1954.
Similar norms and requirements may be seen at the
national level in professional standards regulating the activity
of mass media in both Ukraine and Russia.
62 Clause 7 of the IFJ Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of
Journalists / adopted at the World Congress of the International
Federation of Journalists in Bordeaux on April 25-28, 1954.
Thus, the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists dictates:
‘No one may be discriminated against because of
gender, language, race, religion or ethnic, social
origin or political preferences. This information may
be pointed out only if it is a necessary part of the
story63.’
The observance of this code in Ukraine is monitored by
the Commission on Journalism Ethics64 which considers the
ethical and professional conflicts arising between journalists
or between journalists and the society with regard to
the journalistic activity. The Commission regulates the work
of journalists and editorial teams and allows them to offer
the ways of solving conflicts based on the unified professional
standard: the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists.
Its main purpose is to promote the observance of professional
ethics standards by Ukrainian mass media and the
formation of the public request for high quality journalism.
The Russian Federation has similar standards. For example,
the Code of Professional Conduct of the Russian
Journalist says the following:
‘A journalist is fully aware of the danger of restrictions,
harassment and violence, which can be provoked
by their work. In carrying out their professional
duties, a journalist opposes extremism and restriction
of civil rights on any grounds, including gender, race,
language, religion, political or other opinion, as well
as social and national origin. A journalist respects the
honor and dignity of the people who become the objects
of their professional attention. They refrain from
any derogatory allusions or comments regarding
race, ethnicity, color, religion, social origin or gender,
as well as in relation to a physical disability or illness
of a person. They refrain from publishing such information,
except in cases when these circumstances
are directly related to the content of the published
article. A journalist is unconditionally obliged to avoid
offensive expressions which may harm the moral and
physical health of people65.’
The observance of this code in Russia is monitored by
the Public Board on Press Complaints66. It is an independent
civil society organization regulating and co-regulating
the activity of mass media. The Board considers the complaints
of the audience of mass media about the violations
of the journalist’s professional ethics and media ethics.
The first and foremost task of the Board is to resolve specific
media disputes extrajudicially.
63 Clause 15 of the Ethics Code of Ukrainian Journalists.
64 Commission’s web-site: http://cje.org.ua
65 Clause 5 of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Russian Journalist.
66 Board’s web-site: http://www.presscouncil.ru/
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 17
HATE SPEECH IN ACTIVITY
OF CRIMEAN OCCUPATION
AUTHORITIES
Hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea shows
itself in different ways. In addition to a constant use of
clichés inciting hatred in various mass media, such expressions
are published on the official web-sites of the
Crimean occupation authorities. The monitoring revealed
a wide range of the tendencies of stirring up hatred on
such resources.
We registered different types of soft hate speech on
the web-sties of the Crimean ‘authorities’ under study (see
the detailed list of web-sites in the Methodology section).
Thus, the soft form of hate speech was used in 59 out of 71
cases, medium form — in 12, harsh one — in one. The largest
number of the examples of incitement of hatred is on
the web-site of the ‘Government of the Republic of Crimea.’
For instance, the ‘Government of Crimea’ published
the article titled Ukrainian Nazism Became the Basis of
State Ideology of Ukraine — Sergey Aksyonov in the News
section of its web-site in June 2017, let us cite it:
‘Today these demons in human shape, these executioners
who shed the blood of thousands of
people — not only that of Poles, but also that of
Belarusians, Jews, Russians, Ukrainians — have
OUTCOMES OF HATE
SPEECH MONITORING IN
THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE
OF CRIMEA
‘State Council of the
Republic of Crimea’ 24 (34%)
‘Legislative Assembly of
Sevastopol’ 6 (8%)
‘Prosecutor’s Office of
the Republic of Crimea’ 2(3%)
‘Government of the
Republic of Crimea’ 38 (54%)
‘Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Russia for Sevastopol’ 1 (1%)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 – 31.09.2014; 01.01.2017 – 31.07.2017
Distribution of Hate Speech between Web-Sites of ‘State Authorities’ of Crimea
18 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
become the heroes of modern Ukraine. Their ideological
followers are spilling blood all over Donbass,
killing and sending dissentients to prison,
declaring blockades, committing acts of terrorism
against the population of Crimea67.’
This publication projects the Nazi crimes of World War
II on the citizens of Ukraine who are rhetorically linked to a
generally denounced object.
The web-site also contains other similar expressions of
Crimean politicians who are regularly quoted in the form
of interviews or news items.
Furthermore, there are also PDF-versions of several
Crimean budget-funded print media on the web-site.
The statements with hate speech published in Slava
Trudu and Selskiy Truzhenik sociopolitical newspapers
are available in PDF on the web-site of the Crimean
‘government.’
For example, Slava Trudu newspaper mentioned the
nationalities and ethnic origin of people in the context of
crime news:
‘There were few actual Crimean Tatars among
those in the Asker’s camp, but there were plenty
of individuals with the strange past from here and
there, including Islamists of Arab origin. They were
likely to be preparing provocations and the story
with saboteurs wasn’t probably supposed to be the
last one68.’
The Selskiy Truzhenik newspaper called Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar activists who participated in the protest
against the occupation of Crimea by the Crimean parliament
building on February 26, 2014 putschists, Mejlists
[TN: members of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People
which was outlawed by Russia and listed as an extremist
organization] and supporters of nationalists. The people
were accused of one-sided preplanned use of violence under
the guise of Banderite terror:
‘The supporters of Ukrainian nationalists use
stones, sticks, bottles, tear-gas and other far from
peaceful ‘arguments.’ It is obvious that such actions
are planned beforehand rather than spontaneous.
The confrontation reaches its climax when
the putschists’ advocates raise the ominous black
and red cloth symbolizing the Banderite terror and
‘Euromaidan’ mayhem and fires. Outrage-fue-
67 Publication Ukrainian Nazism Became the Basis of State Ideology
of Ukraine — Sergey Aksyonov. Available at: http://glava.rk.gov.
ru/rus/index.htm/news/367009.htm
68 Article Spiders in the Jar. Available at: http://bahch.rk.gov.ru/
file/bahchisarayskaya_rayonnaya_gazeta_laquoslava_truduraquo__
6_17022017.pdf
led Mejlists and their brothers-in-arms assault the
Crimean Parliament’s building69.’
On the web-site of the ‘Crimean government’ you may
also find the PDF-version of the book entitled Crimea:
History of Return.70 The book’s authors are Olga Kovitidi,
the First Member of the Federation Council of the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation from the executive
authority of the ‘Republic of Crimea,’ and Maksim Grigoriev,
the member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation,
PhD in Political Science. There are 17 examples of
hate speech in the book mainly aimed at Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars.
For instance, page 63 of this book has the following
statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea dated March 13, 2014:
‘The participants of an unconstitutional coup have
no moral right to judge about the legitimacy of the
Crimean referendum. Neonazies and their accomplices
have no moral right to impose their will on the
autonomy’s citizens — children and grandchildren of
the defeaters of fascism. The murderers who shed
the blood of Crimeans — the fighters of Berkut [TN:
special police force] and internal troops, as well as
peaceful citizens — have no moral right to step on
the sacred Crimean land.’
Page 339 of the said book contains the following
quotation of Vladimir Konstantinov, the ‘Chairman’ of the
Crimean ‘Parliament’:
‘Vladimir Konstantinov says that the situation in
Crimea is extremely tense. He explained that the
people are afraid that Right Sector will come to
Crimea after Maidan, and together with the militants
of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Crimean Tatar radicals they
will perpetrate a mass massacre and slaughter. Because
there were people who openly threatened to
decimate the Russian population in Crimea.’
Such expressions in the context of the political
repressions on the peninsula promote the incitement
of hatred towards Ukrainians, Crimean
Tatars and Muslims as the accusations of participating
in such organizations like Right Sector71
69 Article The First Calendar Day of the Contemporary History of
Crimea. Available at: http://simfmo.rk.gov.ru/file/laquoseljskiy_
trujenik_krimaraquo__8_ot_11_marta_2017_goda.pdf
70 Crimea: History of Return. Available at: http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/
krim_istoriya_vozvrascheniya.pdf
71 Right Sector is a Ukrainian political party and non-governmental
nationalist organization. It started as a civic movement having
united the activists of Ukrainian radical organizations, manly nationalist
and far-right ones. It was formed at the end of November
2013 when the revolution in Ukraine known as Euromaidan
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 19
or Hizb ut-Tahrir72 are used in Crimea since the occupation
as a pretext for systemic political persecutions of Ukrainians,
Crimean Tatars and Muslims regardless of their affiliation
with these organizations.
In particular, the false accusation of terrorism and affiliation
with Right Sector led to the arrest and conviction
of four citizens of Ukraine with a Ukrainian director Oleg
Sentsov being one of them. But the four convicted Crimeans
had nothing to do with Right Sector73. Reckoning all
pro-Ukrainian activists and Euromaidan participants in
Right Sector in a number of cases defocuses the scope of
this notion and views the whole civic community of Ukrainians
as radical nationalists.
Furthermore, the Russian Federation declared the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People an extremist organization
on April 26, 2016. Although the Order of the International
Court of Justice as of April 19, 201774 obliged the
Russian Federation to lift this ban, it was ignored75. The
members of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and
began. At the parliamentary elections in autumn 2014, the Right
Sector party won only 1.8% of votes and failed to make it into the
Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada). On November 17, 2014,
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in the lawsuit filed
by the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation declared
Right Sector an extremist organization and prohibited its
activity in Russia. The Crimean branch office of Right Sector was
announced in Russia a terrorist organization.
72 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Arabic: Party of Liberation) is a Sunni religious and
political organization founded in 1953 in Jerusalem by Taqiuddin
al-Nabhani, a sharia appeals court judge. One of the differences
from other Islamist organizations is that it rejects violence as a
means to an end in principle. It was declared a ‘terrorist organization’
in Russia, but its activity is allowed in Ukraine and other
countries. In 2016, a range of human rights groups, including Memorial
Human Rights Center, Civic Assistance Committee, SOVA
Center for Information and Analysis and Human Rights Institute,
in their joint application regarding the decision of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan to prolong the detention
of R. M. Lapytov, the leader of the Muslim Problem Research Center
human rights organization, who was accused of participating
in the activity of Hizb ut-Tahrir, pointed out that ‘this decision of
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is unlawful because
neither organizational documents, nor the practice of its activity
gives reasons to accuse it of calls for terrorism or terrorism itself,’
as well as noted that ‘not a single European country has declared
this party terrorist.’
73 Report Crimea: Ukrainian Identity Banned / p. 6-8 (Sentsov-Kolchenko
Case) / Crimean Human Rights Group 2016 — http://
crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Kryim-ukrainskaya-
identichnost-pod-zapretom_Ru_KPG.pdf
74 A full text of the Order of the International Court of Justice on the
claim Ukraine v. Russian Federation as of April 19, 2017 — https://
www.slideshare.net/tsnua/ss-75181569?ref=https://www.unian.
net/politics/1884196-isk-ukrainyi-protiv-rossii-opublikovan-polnyiy-
tekst-resheniya-suda-oon.html
75 The presentation of the Ukrainian delegation of the report of the
International Court of Justice / Permanent Mission of Ukraine
to the United Nations, October 26, 2017 — http://ukraineun.
org/press-center/407-vystup-delegatsiy-ukrayny-na-plenarnomu-
zasidanni-ga-oon-shchodo-zvitu-mizhnarodnogo-sudu-
oon/
regional Mejlises are subjected to politically motivated
prosecution. The Mejlis is the only legitimate and internationally
recognized self-government body of the Crimean
Tatar people, and that is why a negative image of the Mejlis
and its supporters which is being created on a large
scale is projected on all Crimean Tatar people.
Twenty five people have already been arrested and
taken into custody as of January 2018 with regard to the
case of Crimean Muslims for allegedly participating in Hizb
ut-Tahrir, although the accused Muslims denied their affiliation
with this organization. All proceedings initiated against
these Muslims have the sings of politically motivated prosecution,
particularly for religious beliefs. There has not been
a single case of terrorist threats, weapons or acts of violence
as part of criminal proceedings related to participation
in Hizb ut-Tahrir in Crimea. So the expression the militants
of Hizb ut-Tahrir which is often used in the media landscape
of Crimea is of deliberately misleading and negative nature.
Knowingly false accusations of the abovementioned
social groups of the intentions to ‘perpetrate a mass massacre
and slaughter’ are one of the elements of incitement
to hatred and creating the image of an enemy for pro-Russian
citizens of Crimea.
Hate speech is also present in official documents published
on the web-sites of the ‘Government of Crimea.’ For
instance, in the National Population Composition section
of the document entitled Municipal Program ‘Strengthening
the Russian Unity and Ethnocultural Development of
Peoples Living in the Territory of the Municipal Settlement
in the Urban District Feodosia of the Republic of Crimea
for 2016-2018,’ Ukrainians were insultingly called Little
Russians and Ukies76.
At the same time, it is worth pointing out that we did not
find examples of hate speech on the web-sites of the ‘Government
of Sevastopol,’ ‘Prosecutor’s Office of Sevastopol’
or the ‘Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea’
throughout the monitoring period, even though we performed
a search using all key words selected for monitoring.
The web-site of the ‘State Council of the Republic of
Crimea’ contained hate speech mainly in the statements
of Vladimir Konstantinov, the ‘Speaker of the Crimean
Parliament,’ for example:
‘This Victory Day is special for Crimeans: it coincides
with the seventieth anniversary of liberation of
Crimea from the German-Fascist occupants. And the
current generation of Crimeans celebrates this date
with dignity — we have managed to stop neo-Nazis
76 Document: Municipal Program ‘Strengthening the Russian Unity
and Ethnocultural Development of Peoples Living in the Territory
of the Municipal Settlement in the Urban District Feodosia of the
Republic of Crimea for 2016-2018.’ Available at: http://feo.rk.gov.
ru/file/Feodosija_MP_ukreplenie_edinstv.pdf
20 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
on the threshold of our home, we haven’t let them
in the peninsula’s territory. But the enemy hasn’t
been defeated yet. It tramples on the Ukrainian
land, shoots and burns the people who hold the
same views as we do in Odesa and Donbass. On the
eve of Victory Day, let’s swear to our veterans, to the
memory of those who died during the Great Patriotic
War, that we will do everything possible to swat the
enemy like a fly — just like our fathers and grandfathers
did it in 1945!’77
On the web-site of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol,
during the monitoring period, we observed examples
of hate speech in the expressions of local ‘deputies’
as well as in reprinted articles from different information
publications.
For instance, the web-site published an interview with
Sevastopol deputy Viacheslav Gorelov where he calls
Ukrainians maidanuts78.
‘At first maidanuts will deal with us, Russians and
the Russian-speaking population, and then they will
start Ukrainizing Crimean Tatars79.’
77 Congratulatory speech of Vladimir Konstantinov, the chairman
of the ‘State Council of the Republic of Crimea,’ on the occasion
of Victory Day / web-site of the ‘State Council of the Republic of
Crimea,’ 07.05.2014 — http://crimea.gov.ru/news/07_05_14
78 An insult to Ukrainians as supporters of Euromaidan which consists
of two elements: maidan (referring to the Maidan Nezalezhnosti
— the main square in Kyiv where the revolution known as
Euromaidan took place) and nuts, which is crazy.
79 Article 20th Day of Russian Spring in Sevastopol. Available at:
https://sevzakon.ru/view/pressa/1374/1375/1437/
Overall, we registered 71 cases of incitement to hatred,
with 70% concerning Ukrainians, on the web-sites of
the ‘Crimean authorities’ during the monitoring period.
It should also be noted that hate speech is widely used
by the representatives of the ‘Crimean Authorities’ de-facto
in social media. Let’s consider a couple of examples of
hate speech use by Zaur Smirnov, the former chairman of
the State Committee for International Relations and Deported
Citizens, and Andrey Kozenko, a ‘Duma member
from the Republic of Crimea.’
Examples of Hate Speech Used by Representatives of
‘Crimean Authorities’ in Social Media
Andrey Kozenko: Today’s series of terrorist attacks in Luhansk is
no different from those in Nice, London, Paris, Brussels and other
cities. If European politicians won’t officially acknowledge it,
it’ll mean that they treat people in Donbass as an afterthought.
The West must critically evaluate the attacks in Luhansk or admit
that it covers for the Ukrainian terrorists!
Migrants, Refugees 6 (9%)
Maidan Supporters 5 (7%)
Crimean Tatars 4 (6%)
Muslims 2 (3%)
Mejlis Supporters 2 (3%)
UOC-KP Members 1 (1%)
LGBT 1 (1%)
Ukrainians 50 (70%)
(ethnos/citizenship)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.09.2014; 01.01.2017 - 31.07.2017
Objects of Hate Speech on Web-Sites of ‘State Authorities’ of Crimea
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 21
The perpetrators haven’t been established yet, but there will be
a thorough and competent investigation. However, after a whole
range of — profane statements from Ukrainian politicians, I think
it’s obvious who’s behind it.
I talked on the phone to Igor Plotnitsky, the Head of the Luhansk
People’s Republic, and assured him that Russia is with Luhansk.
We console and support you.
Zaur Smirnov: If the same happened with the Ukrainian language
in Crimea or other regions of Russia, the Council of Europe
or other foreign policy agency would have already filed a
complaint, but when something like that happens in Ukraine —
it is the order of the day.
Nazi Darkness Absorbs Ukraine: Zaur Smirnov on the Closing
of Russian Schools in Kherson Oblast
Pretty soon there won’t be any Russian schools in Kherson
Oblast of Ukraine which borders with Russia. It was announced
in — Ukrainian mass media by Yevhen Krynytskyi, the Head of
the Department for Education, Science and Youth of the Kherson
Oblast State Administration.
A regular use of hate speech on the web-sites fully
funded from the budget is evidence of direct interest and
involvement of the occupant in creating controlled hatred
among the population of the Crimean peninsula.
The monitoring results show that hatred on such websites
is incited intentionally, methodically and on a large
scale. The citizens of Ukraine as well as migrants, Crimean
Tatars and Muslims are the main groups that hatred is incited
towards.
Creating a negative image of these social, ethnic/civic
and religious groups in people’s consciousness leads to
an escalation of the armed conflict following the occupation
of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the outbreak
of war in Donbass. Moreover, such actions adversely affect
the population of the peninsula with Ukrainians, Muslims
and Crimean Tatars being a great part of them.
At the same time, hate speech was used to create in
society an atmosphere of fear and hatred towards the ‘Enemies
of Russia.’ According to the monitoring results, the
people living in Crimea are made to believe that there is a
constant external threat towards Crimea with the help of
various means of propaganda.
The mass media and web-sites of the local de-facto
‘authorities’ acting in the territory of Crimea contain numerous
publications calling on Crimeans to ‘protect the
Russian Federation from enemies.’ Ukrainians, Muslims
and the population of Central Asia are the main enemies
on such web-sites.
For instance, Vladimir Konstantinov, the ‘Speaker of
the Crimean Parliament,’ made the following statement in
an interview for the NTV news channel: ‘They burn them
alive, they make fun of it, they make a political show and
hype about it. But we take it as a signal for mobilization.
The enemy hasn’t been defeated. There is only one thing
you can do with Nazism — destroy it. No dialogue is possible
with the Nazis80.’
This statement on NTV was presented without proper
commentary, which is the use of hate speech in a soft form.
Ukrainians were the object of hatred disguised as ‘Nazis’ as
the Crimean politicians constantly operate with false facts
that Nazism has become a part of the Ukrainian state ideology
and Ukrainians support and agree with it on a large scale.
Moreover, such calls are disseminated by not only Crimean
and Russian mass media, but the web-sites of different
parties as well. For example, in January 2014, the Russian
Bloc party posted on its web-site appeals for violence against
Ukrainians who were called Banderite scum in the publication.
Despite the fact that the web-site of the Russian Bloc
(the source of the statement) does not work anymore, this
text is still present on at least three other Crimean web-sites81.
Such actions lead to an increasing hostility towards
Ukrainians and a growing atmosphere of hatred and fear
among the peninsula’s population.
At the same time, Crimean media and web-sites of the
‘state authorities’ of Crimea regularly publish announcements
about the recruitment for volunteer military service
in the Russian Federation82. At the time of our study, at
least five such announcements were present on the website
of the ‘government’ of Crimea only. Such announcements
are posted regularly on the web-sties of local
administrations as well. Thus, on February 14, 2017, Sergey
Ardashev, the recruitment officer of the Military Registration
and Enlistment Office of the ‘Republic of Crimea,’ said
that more than 4000 Crimeans were enlisted in volunteer
military service during the period of occupation83.
80 Video: Segodnia newscast on NTV as of May 05, 2014. Available
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iycRjl5kZg
81 Publication: Russian Bloc Party Announce the Formation of
Self-Defense Squads and the Hunt for ‘Banderites.’ Available at:
http://sevastopol.su/node/51927
82 Announcement of the recruitment for volunteer military service on
the web-site of the ‘Government of Crimea.’ Available at: http://
krgv.rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=630221
83 Publication: About 4 Thousand People Have Been Enlisted in
Military Service in Crimea. RIA Crimea: http://crimea.ria.ru/society/
20170214/1109123060.html
22 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
On the web-sites controlled by the Ministry of Defence
of the Russian Federation, propaganda of war
and military service is interlaced with publications containing
hate speech. For instance, there is an article on
the web-site of the Zvezda TV channel of the Ministry
of Defense entitled ‘Western Factory of Lies: the USA
Made up Holodomor so that Ukrainians Become Russophobes84.’
The article’s author questions Holodomor,
a historical fact of the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
This is an example of hate speech use, particularly
‘publications and statements that question the generally
acknowledged historical facts of violence and discrimination.’
Such campaigns promoting the service in the Russian
army are regularly conducted in Crimea as well, including
among children and adolescents, with the support of
the ‘Ministry of Education’ of Crimea. Such propaganda is
mainly funded from the budgets of the Russian Federation
and Crimea85.
An aggressive propaganda of military service backed
by the incitement of hatred towards Ukrainians helps local
authorities recruit Crimeans more efficiently.
Such actions make the number of Crimeans who enter
the Russian army grow, which is a violation of international
humanitarian law and a military crime under the
Rome Statute.
The frequent and organized activities of the Russian
Federation in Crimea intended to create an image of
the enemy of Ukrainians have resulted in an intensified
military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which not
only impacts the situation inside Ukraine, but also generates
serious security threats for the whole region.
HATE SPEECH ON AIR OF
MAIN RUSSIAN CHANNELS
BROADCASTING IN CRIMEA
We found 479 examples of hate speech use on the
web-sites of Russian TV channels Russia-1, NTV and
Channel One during the monitoring period: 1 example
of harsh hate speech, 46 examples of medium hate
speech, and 432 examples of the soft form of hate
speech.
Hatred was incited towards the following groups in the
Russian newscasts during the monitoring period:
84 Publication: Western Factory of Lies: the USA Made up Holodomor
so that Ukrainians Become Russophobes. Available at: https://tvzvezda.
ru/news/qhistory/content/201702130902-661z.htm
85 Analytical Report: Human Rights Under Conditions of Militarization
in Crimea. Available at:http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/09/book-RU_A4.pdf
Nationality/ethnicity/
citizenship
324 examples
Religious groups 35 examples
Social groups 120 examples
The most frequent object of hate speech was the
groups of people who share the same nationality, ethnicity
and/or citizenship or residence in some specific
territory. Thus, our monitoring registered the use of hate
speech with regard to 36 such groups. Among these
groups, hate speech as regards Ukrainians (as an ethnos
and/or civic community of citizens) was observed in
57% of cases.
The largest number of examples of incitement to hatred
— 184 — concerned Ukrainians (based on citizenship
and/or ethnic origin).
For instance, the ‘Vremia’ newscast on Channel One
as of May 03, 201486 addressing the topic of the conflict
in eastern Ukraine, cited Valeriy Bolotov who was announced
a ‘people’s governor of Luhansk Oblast’: ‘We
will protect our land from neo-fascist occupants and
murderers.’ In his speech, Boltov called the citizens of
Luhansk Oblast the ‘people of Luhansk’ and presented
the rest of Ukrainians as ‘neo-fascist occupants and
murderers.’
Russian television propaganda forms the image of
Ukrainians as fascists, Nazis, ‘savages murdering their
fellow-citizens in a grisly manner.’ The armed conflict in
eastern Ukraine was called by the Russian news channels
in spring 2014 the punitive operation and Ukrainians participating
in it were viewed as punishers.
For example, the anchorman of ‘Vesti’ newscast on
Channel One as of May 11, 201487 described the events in
Mariupol the following way: ‘Kyiv punishers drowned the
main national holiday in blood.’
The identification of Ukrainians as punishers was especially
emphasized in spring 2014 when the war in Donbass
began. The expressions punishers and punitive operation
were used in the studied newscasts of the Russian channels
more than 200 times in May 2014 alone.
It is worth noting that these expressions have an
additional negative connotation, as after World War II
Soviet mass media, and later Ukrainian and Russian
mass media, had used the word punishers for many
86 ‘Vremia’ newscast as of May 03, 2014. Available at: https://www.
1tv.ru/news/issue/2014-05-03/21:00#10
87 ‘Vesti’ newscast as of May 11, 2014. Available at: https://russia.tv/
video/show/brand_id/5402/episode_id/986747/
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 23
French 3 (1%)
Ukrainians 184 (57%)
Americans 13 (4%) British 4 (1%)
Africans 3 (1%)
Iraqis 3 (1%)
Georgians 3; 1%
Dagestanis 3 (1%)
Arabs 4 (1%)
Other Groups 23 (7%)
Residents of CIS 6 (2%)
Residents of Central
Asia 34 (11%)
Caucasians 3 (1%)
Kirghiz People 7 (2%)
Germans 6 (2%)
Chinese People 3 (1%)
Russians 12 (4%)
Tajiks 4 (1%)
Uzbeks 5 ( 2%)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.05.2014; 01.03.2017 - 31.05.2017
Objects of Hate Speech on Russian TV Channels
Ethnicity/Nationality/Citizenship
North Koreans
Tunisians
Europeans
Albanians
Balts
Pygmies
Mexicans
Roma
Turks
Afghans
Ingush People
Iranis
Netherlanders
Irish People
Kosovo People
Libyans
Mosul Citizens
Poles
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.05.2014; 01.03.2017 - 31.05.2017
Other Groups (7%)
24 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
decades to describe the atrocities of SS battalions88
and other fascists fighting on Hitler’s side who were
subsequently convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal.
That is why drawing similar parallels creates in the
public conscience a strongly negative image of the
whole modern Ukrainian society, an image of the ‘enemy’
who needs to be mercilessly destroyed like Nazis
during World War II.
88 SS (short for German Schutzstaffel — Protection Squadron) —
paramilitary formations of the National Socialist German Workers’
Party (NSDAP). During 1933−1945, the SS ran the concentration
camps and extermination camps where millions of people died.
When highlighting the events in Odesa on May 02,
201489 and the armed conflict in Donbass, the Russian
channels show only one point of view. At the same time,
they often use such a form of hate speech as quoting
xenophobic statements without commentary. Such statements
sometimes contain direct calls for exterminating
Ukrainians and most of the times accuse Ukrainians of
criminality or inferiority.
89 Confrontation in Odesa between the supporters of Euromaidan
and pro-Russian activists on May 02, 2014 resulting in skirmishes
in the city center and the fire in the Trade Unions Building leaving
almost 50 people dead.
Hate Speech with Regard to Religious Groups
(Russian TV Channels)
Members of UOC-KP (3%)
Members of the Church
‘Embassy of God’ (6%)
Baptists
(14%)
Jehovah’s Witnesses
(14%)
Muslims
(63%)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.05.2014; 01.03.2017 - 31.05.2017
Hate speech with regard to social groups
(Russian TV Channels)
Women
(13%)
Journalists
(14%)
Civic Activists
(Including Maidan Supporters)
(36%)
Migrants, Refugees
(37%)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.05.2014; 01.03.2017 - 31.05.2017
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 25
For instance, ‘Vremia’ news cast on Channel One as
of May 03, 201490 had the following things said about the
events in Odesa: ‘We need to stop this fascism, they are
not humans, even fascists did not kill their fellow citizens.’
A similar quotation of an Odesa resident was given in ‘Vesti
Nedeli’ weekly news edition on Russia One dated May 18,
2014: ‘Beasts — they are inhuman monsters91.’ ‘Vremia’
newscast dated May 17, 2017 cited a Donetsk protester: ‘To
get rid of the brown plague92. They are savages93.’
In the general context of the studied news editions,
such utterances project not only on the people who
perpetrated those crimes in Odesa, but on all citizens
of Ukraine.
We also noticed that Russian channels accused all
Ukrainians of historical crimes which is a medium level of
hate speech.
For instance, Russian propaganda often calls Ukrainians
Banderites. Moreover, news anchors occasionally
mention the crimes committed by Stepan Bandera during
World War II. Everybody who fought on Bandera’s side
during the war are also called Banderites and, at the
same time, bloodthirsty criminals, fascists and punishers.
By doing so, they equate the citizens of modern Ukraine
as Banderites, putting such images in people’s minds.
Due to the use of such methods of propaganda, the
responsibility in the public consciousness for the crimes
of a certain group of people committed more than 70
years ago falls on the citizens of modern Ukraine and
Ukrainians as an ethnos. At the same time, the residents
of Crimea and uncontrolled Donbass are opposed to the
rest of Ukrainians, and thus their affiliation with Ukraine
is eliminated.
Crimeans are called Russians, and Donbass residents
— a separate nation which reportedly demands its
right to self-determination. It should be noted that, according
to the latest All-Ukrainian Population Census carried
out in 200194, there is no separate nation in this territory,
and the population mostly consists of ethnic Ukrainians
and Russians.
Hence, the Russian TV channels help incite hatred
towards Ukrainians not only in the consciousness of
Russians who are their main target audience, but also
90 ‘Vremia’ news edition as of May 03, 2014. Available at: http://
www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2014-05-03/21:00#4
91 ‘Vesti Nedeli’ weekly news edition as of May 18, 2014. Available
at: https://goo.gl/wh6n8y
92 Brown Plague is the established metaphoric expression in Russian
language for fascism.
93 ‘Vremia’ news edition as of May 17, 2014. Available at: https://
www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2014-05-17/21:00#6
94 All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001/ State Statistics
Committee of Ukraine http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/
general/nationality/
among the citizens of the separate territories of Ukraine
which are covered by the broadcasting of these mass
media. Such actions of the Russian agitators are another
way of escalating the conflict in eastern Ukraine and
legalizing the occupation of Crimea in the eyes of the
local population.
We also found statements in Crimean mass media
about Ukraine being ‘a Western part of Rus’ and that
‘Eastern Rus must save its brothers from the Ukrainian
occupation.’ For example, one such publication mentioned
ethnic Ukrainians exclusively in the humiliating
and insulting context (crypto-Banderites, potential
traitors)95. The author continued by addressing the Russians
living in Ukraine: ‘The war goes on, even if you
don’t see it all the time. Restoring the original Russian
boundaries is only a matter of time. Ukraine is doomed.
It is autumn 1942 on the war calendar.’
During the monitoring period, we also observed a lot
of references towards Ukrainians in a humiliating and insulting
context, including in news about crime.
It is noteworthy that the degree of hatred towards
Ukrainians in 2017 became significantly lower as compared
with 2014. The citizens of Ukraine were almost
never referred to as punishers and Banderites in the
news. At the same time, the residents of the uncontrolled
territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts are no longer
mentioned as a separate nation, and are rather called the
‘citizens of self-proclaimed republics.’
In 2017, the number of cases of hate speech use with
regard to Ukrainians reduced considerably when compared
with the same period in 2014 (spring 2014 — 146
examples of hate speech, spring 2017 — 38). Overall the
number of examples of incitement to hatred remained
about the same (234 in 2014 and 245 in 2017). In addition
to Ukrainians, in 2017, the Russian TV channels
stirred up hatred mainly towards the residents of Central
Asia, migrants and Muslims. It is notable that there
were no cases of hate speech used concerning the residents
of Central Asia and migrants in the television programs
under study in 2014.
Russian propaganda in 2017 paid a lot of attention
to the conflict in Syria and the situation in the Middle
East. Muslims and migrants from Central Asia were often
viewed as the main threat for people living in Russia
and Crimea.
For instance, the news anchor of ‘Vesti’ on April 05,
201796 used the following phrase: ‘A group of migrants
95 Do Not Require from Russia Ridiculous Actions and Meaningless
Sacrifices / ForPost. News of Sevastopol, February 13, 2017 —
http://sevastopol.su/node/128114
96 ‘Vesti’ newscast as of April 05, 2017. Available at: https://russia.
tv/video/show/brand_id/58500/episode_id/1488331/video_
id/1611325/
26 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
who recruited potential militants was detained in
Saint-Petersburg.’ Mentioning migrants in crime news this
way creates in the public perception an image of migrants
from Central Asia as potential terrorists and radical supporters
of the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL).
At the same time, the use of different types of hate
speech formed an image of Muslims who are also potential
terrorists because of their religion.
Hate speech with regard to these groups was used in
the medium and soft form. For instance, ‘Vesti’ news on
May 29, 201497 broadcast a story about the detention and
shooting of a ‘local gang’ which accentuated the religion
of suspects and their countrymen.
‘His fellow-citizens told him about the purest religion
that he needed to give his life for — but to take the lives
of other people was even better,’ the news anchor commented
on the detention of one of the gang members.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the
program’s authors, in violation of the presumption of
innocence, said that the detained was going to be a
suicide attacker and his fellow-citizens were terrorists’
accomplices. Such practice of public accusations of
people before court judgments is also very common in
the case of Crimeans who were subjected to politically
motivated persecutions. That is why calling some people
criminals on account of their religious beliefs (Islam)
is especially threatening for the residents of Crimea,
particularly the Crimean Tatar people who are predominantly
Muslims.
97 ‘Vesti’ newscast as of May 29, 2014. Available at: https://russia.tv/
video/show/brand_id/5402/episode_id/991276/
The residents of Central Asia were the objects of incitement
to hatred mainly in the form of references in the
humiliating or insulting context in crime news intended to
create an image of these people as potential terrorists.
For example, the anchorman of ‘Segodnia’ news edition
on NTV as of May 05, 201798 linked the detention of
terrorist suspects with the fact that they live in a certain
territory:
‘Six citizens of the republics of Central Asia were detained.
They came to Russia to work, but in the last two
years they have been recruiting Central-Asia-born individuals
for terrorist activities.’
Overall, within the monitoring period, we noted 34
examples of such hate speech relating to the residents of
Central Asia as a group of people living in this territory.
And their guilt of committing grave offences is claimed as
a proven fact already at the stage of their detention, that
is long before the court’s judgment.
The main danger of such incitement to hatred for
Crimeans is that most Crimean Tatars during deportation
lived in the territory of Central Asia and are Muslims. Some
of them are still citizens of the republics of Central Asia.
During the period of the occupation of Crimea, there was
a range of politically motivated criminal proceedings regarding
Muslims and Crimean Tatars. A mass use of hate
speech with regard to these groups leads to a more tolerant
attitude of society towards the prosecution of these
people on the part of the occupation authorities. This situation
enables security officials in Crimea to enhance repressions
against these discriminated groups.
98 ‘Segodnia’ newscast as of May 05, 2017 — http://www.ntv.ru/video/
1416193/
0
30
60
90
120
150 Ukrainians
Citizens of Other Countries/Regions
Muslims
Other Religious Groups
Euromaidan Supporters
Migrants, Refugees
Journalists
Women
Activists
2014 (234)
2017 (245)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.05.2014; 01.03.2017 - 31.05.2017
Objects of Hate Speech on Russian TV Channels
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 27
HATE SPEECH IN CRIMEAN
ONLINE MEDIA
While monitoring the web-sites of Crimean mass media
selected for the study, we revealed 168 examples of hate
speech with 58% of them accounting from only two sources:
the Sevastopol web-site ForPost which belongs to Kazhanov
Sergey, a ‘deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol’
99, and that of Crimeainform controlled by Maksim
Nikolayenko who ran as a candidate for the head of the occupation
administration of Simferopol in September 2017100.
94 registered examples of hate speech in Crimean online
media refer to the monitoring period of 2014, 74 —
to the period of 2017.
The main objects of hate speech were the groups of
people who shared the same ethnicity, nationality and/
or citizenship (130 examples) and social groups (26 examples).
Ukrainians as an ethnic and/or civic community
were the major objects of verbal attacks in one form or
another (123 examples).
Ukrainians appear in the materials of the abovementioned
mass media as fascists, Nazis, Banderites.
Ukraine is called a neo-Nazi state, and its authorities —
the military junta.
The authors of many examples of hate speech in the
studied sources are politicians of different levels, public
activists and experts quoted by publications, as well as
materials’ authors and editors themselves.
99 Kazhanov Sergey Petrovich. Available at: http://sevastopol.su/
node/111862
100 Simferopol Has Elected the Mayor. Available at: https://ria.ru/politics/
20170922/1505298751.html
Thus, for instance, ForPost wrote the following in
July 2014: ‘Sustaining huge casualties, the Ukrainian
junta is desperately trying to save the day and turn the
tables in the information war. Things that the pro-fascist
Kyiv administration protests so fiercely against are now
used as propaganda. Even ‘The Sacred War’ [one of the
most famous Soviet songs of the Second World War] song
which is so odious to them has been changed. Covered
in the American flag, the Ukrainian singer with crazy
eyes sings this song to the accompaniment of the photos
of maimed bodies of peaceful citizens of southeastern
Ukraine101.’
And in June 2017, Yuriy Portov, a reporter from the
Krymskiye Izvestia newspaper, asked a whole range of
chauvinistic questions and gave no less chauvinistic answers
to them himself: ‘Why do we care about this alien-
alien Ukraine, previously known as the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic? Did enemies or, as they say,
fraternal people live there before the demise of the Soviet
Union? And where did these people go when they
had suddenly become independent and self-sufficient?
It seems like the citizens of Ukraine that we know have
been replaced by con men, who pulled a stacked deck
out of their sleeve, being mere puppets rather than intelligent,
conscious and honest people,’ he wrote102.
All abovementioned examples refer to different types
of soft hate speech, like 92% of all examples found by
the monitors.
101 Article: Fascist Scum Uses ‘The Sacred War’ song to Boost the
Morale of Ukrainian Punishers. Available at: http://sevastopol.
su/news/fashistskaya-nechist-ispolzuet-pesnyu-svyashchennaya-
voyna-dlya-podderzhaniya-boevogo-duha
102 Love and Hatred: Feel the Difference. Available at: http://new.
crimiz.ru/rubriki/85-politika/4791-lyubov-i-nenavist-pochuvstvujte-
raznitsu
RIA Crimea 22 (15%) First Crimean 12 (8%)
Crimeainform 34 (23%)
NTS Sevastopol 19 (13%)
Krymskiye Izvestia 9 (6%)
ForPost 51 (35%)
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.09.2014; 01.01.2017 - 31.07.2017
Distribution of Hate Speech between Web-Sites of Crimean Mass Media
28 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
At the same time, almost all examples of medium and
harsh hate speech have been observed in only two editions
— Krymskaya Pravda daily newspaper which literally
belongs to the family of Bakharev Konstantin103, a Duma
deputy from the ‘Republic of Crimea,’ and the official
newspaper of the local ‘parliament’ — Krymskiye Izvestia.
Six of eleven medium hate speech examples were
found in Krymskaya Pravda, two — in Krymskiye Izvestia,
and the remaining ones in RIA Crimea, along with NTS
Sevastopol and ForPost with one example of hate speech
in each of them.
Thus, in June 2014, Krymskaya Pravda newspaper
called for smashing the fascist scum. ‘The leaders of New
Russia chosen by the people and militias stand up against
the Nazi junta that has seized power in former Ukraine.
<…> This is a war with fascism. Just like 70 years ago,
103 See: Faces of Russian Propaganda: Owners of Crimean Newspapers.
Available at: https://ru.krymr.com/a/27879631.html and
Bakharev Konstantin Mikhaylovich. Available at: http://zampolit.
com/dossier/bakharev-konstantin-mikhaylovich/
there is ‘civilized’ West behind the Nazi vermin. But just
like always the truth is on our side. And that means that
God is with us. We are proud of you, fellows. Smash the
fascist scum! <…> We want all of you dead, we want
every single one of you stone dead, bastards!’ the newspaper
wrote104.
In February 2017, Krymskaya Pravda published an interview
with Natalia Kiseleva, a pro-Russian political analyst,
who literally called for fighting with Crimeans who support
Ukraine: ‘Crimeans, those who could, wanted to and did
fight the Ukrainian neo-Nazism for 22 years during which
time Crimea had been separated from its ‘native’ country —
the so-called ‘nenka.’ We can’t afford to turn a blind eye to
the existence among us of the carriers of this ideology that
came from beyond Perekop [a city that existed before 1920
which formed a link between the Crimean peninsula and the
mainland] per se, but the people on the peninsula infected
with the neo-Nazi virus — it is not for nothing that they were
104 God is Right rather Than Might. Available at: http://c-pravda.ru/
newspapers/2014/06/06/ne-v-sile-bog-a-v-pravde
Crimean Tatars 7 (4%)
Muslims 5 (3%)
Jehovah’s witnesses
3 (2%)
Members of UOC-KP
3 (2%)
Members of Church
‘New Faith’ 2 (1%)
Mejlis Supporters
12 (7%)
Journalists
3 (2%)
Maidan Activists
10 (6%)
Human Rights
Defenders 1 (1%)
Ukrainians 123 (73%)
ethnos/citizenship
Monitoring period 01.03.2014 - 31.09.2014; 01.01.2017 - 31.07.2017
Оbjects of Hate Speech on Web-Sites of Crimean Mass Media
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 29
called ‘maidanuts.’ What do we usually do with sick people?
We treat them. Either therapeutically or surgically. In
the former case, we can do everything possible at various
fronts: informational, educational, awareness-raising… In
the latter case, law-enforcement agencies, as the expression
goes, have an open field for work.’
One of the publications of Krymskaya Pravda called
Ukrainians little brothers.105. It is worth noting that in Russian
this phrase usually denotes pets.
ABOUT OUR LITTLE BROTHERS
In the churches and monasteries of Simferopol and Crimean eparchy,
the faithful will pray for peace in Ukraine. The prayer will
start at noon on the 28th of July — the day of Christianization
of Rus.
Aside from Ukrainians in general, the main objects
of hate speech were also the following groups: the Mejlis
supporters (12 examples), Crimean Tatars (7 examples)
and Muslims (5 examples). These examples constitute 14%
of the total number. Taking into account the fact that almost
all supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People
and the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Crimea
are the representatives of the indigenous community106,
we may say that all these manifestations of hatred are
aimed mostly at Crimean Tatars. It is also notable that this
indicator gets significantly higher during some periods
when there are high-profile events mostly related to the
Russia-guided repressions against Crimean Tatars.
Most of the time, Crimean Tatars are depicted as radical
Islamists and extremists, and their representative body —
the Mejlis — as a terrorist and extremist organization.
For instance, in June 2014, ForPost published an indicative
article titled Kolomoiskyi, Yarosh and Dzhemilev
Intend to Shed Russian Blood All Over the Crimean Land.
This article, among other things, said the following: ‘Right
now ‘Tatar refugees’ are flowing into Dnipropetrovsk
from Western Ukraine. Trains from Kovel and Lviv come
at night. Militants from radical Islamist groups arrive at
guarded platforms. They fled Crimea three months ago,
on the eve of the referendum on reunion with Russia. They
have been training in Galician camps all this time. And
105 Publication in Krymskaya Pradva http://c-pravda.ru/newspapers/
2017/07/28/den-kreshheniya-rusi
106 Crimean Tatars had been demanding from Ukraine that they
should be given the status of indigenous people, and Ukraine
must restore the historical justice as well as their rights as a
nation that suffered the deportation out of Crimea arranged by
Stalin’s regime on May 18, 1944. After the occupation of Crimea
by Russia on March 20, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
approved the resolution which recognized Crimean Tatars as the
indigenous people.
now it’s time to fight. The new Punitive The Crimean Tatar
Special Battalion is their main striking force. Locals say
that the Islamists killed a few Azov fishermen — to intimidate
all those who approach the Russian shore on their
motor boats. And bring the Syrian nightmare to Crimea!
It is not for nothing that the Mejlis headed by Mustafa
Dzhemilev succeeded so much in recruiting young Tatars
to form the squads of mujahideen. Militants high on
drugs were speaking loudly on the phone and calling for
an ‘armed detachment.’ Although no detachment arrived,
the Islamic web-sites already started talking about the beginning
of the insurgency107.’
Given the tendencies revealed during the study, we
may assume that Crimean mass media fulfill their common
task of forming an image of an enemy of Ukrainians
and the Crimean Tatar people which in its overwhelming
majority did not recognize the occupation of the Crimean
peninsula.
These assumptions are partly confirmed by the number
of comments stirring up hatred which people leave not
only under the articles with hate speech, but also under
the materials without it.
Although we did not monitor the comments separately
as part of this study, their shallow analysis showed that
the tone of discussion on different platforms is set by the
so-called ‘professional trolls’ using a range of one and
the same accounts. And hate speech in such comments
is used in much harsher forms than in articles themselves.
A series of niche Crimean online media systematically
uses hate speech in their publications and impacts
rather considerably the radically-minded segment of the
pro-Russian population.
These are the Crimean information web-sites Novoross
[New Russian] (novoross.info) with one of its founders Yuriy
Pershykov, the former Deputy Minister of Information Policy of
the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and a current
member of the Board of the ‘Crimean Branch’ of the Union of
Journalists of Russia, as well as Unbowed Crimea (freetavrida.
org) and the online newspaper Crimean Echo (c-eho.info).
These resources use hate speech the most often.
For the sake of illustration, let’s consider the headlines
and leads108 of the materials published during the first
week of September 2017:
107 Kolomoiskyi, Yarosh and Dzhemilev Intend to Shed Russian
Blood All Over the Crimean Land. Available at: http://sevastopol.
su/news/kolomoyskiy-yarosh-i-dzhemilev-namereny-zalit-krymskuyu-
zemlyu-russkoy-krovyu
108 Lead — a summery or a ‘header’ of an article consisting of 3-5
lines (three sentences max) that formulates a problem and a conclusion.
The opening paragraph of an article, an informative fragment
that attracts the reader’s attention to the given material. The
main criterion of a lead is its compactness which makes it possible
for a reader to understand what an author of an article/material
wants to inform them about.
30 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
‘Simferopol Evicts the ‘Filareterians’ [supporters
of Patriarch Filaret] Because They Refused to Register
under Russian Law. Russian law-enforcement
bodies evict the sectarians of the Ukrainian nationalist
group Kyiv Patriarchate from their rented
quarters in Simferopol’ (Novoross, September
01, 2017).
‘Lutuhyne has Celebrated the Third Anniversary of
Liberation from the Ukrainian Invaders’ (Novoross,
September 02, 2017).’
‘The Ukrainian aggressors Have Not Yet Withdrawn
Heavy Weaponry from Donbass’ (Novoross,
September 03, 2017).
‘The Donetsk Gauleiter Demands That the “Representative
Offices” of Ukrainian Nazis Should Be
Established in LPR and DPR,’ ‘Shifting the Blame:
the Head of the Ukrainian Gestapo Accused
the Russian Intelligence Agencies of “Organizing
Terrorist Attacks in Ukraine,” ‘The Ministry of Defense
of the LPR Informed about Another Crime of
Drunk ‘Warriors of Light’ [this is how Ukrainians
were called in the song by Lyapis Trubetskoy of
the same title devoted to the Euromaidan protesters]
/ ‘Ukrainian punishers in Donbass Who Are
Pompously Called by the Propaganda of the Kyiv
Regime ‘Warriors of Light’ Continue Committing
Crimes against the Peaceful Population of Donbass..,’
‘The Kyiv Regime Has Become the Guise
of Maidan for the European Audience Hiding Its
Savage Grin — the Political Analyst’ (Novoross,
September 04, 2017).
‘How Long Are We Going to Feed You? The Driver
Pushed the Punisher’s Widow out of the Bus
in Kyiv,’ ‘Amnesty for ATO Cutthroats Will Unlikely
Promote a Resolution of the Donbass Conflict’
(Novoross, September 05, 2017).
‘Kill a Fanatic Fascist.’ The Posters of the Great
Patriotic War are Relevant Today as Well’ (Novoross,
September 06, 2017).
‘The Occupants Ukrainize the Captured Regions
of Donetsk Oblast’ (Novoross, September 07,
2017).
Novoross used hate speech in headlines and leads
of 20 articles only in one week in September 2017. This
web-site also often applies various illustrational tools
to promote hatred.
Hate speech is similarly used on the pages of another
online newspaper Unbowed Crimea:
‘The Speaker of the Seimas of Lithuania Supported
the Blockade of Crimea. The Henichesk District
Authorities Demonstrated at the Chonhar Telecommunications
Tower to Viktoras Pranckietis, the
Speaker of the Seimas of Lithuania, Who Visited
and Supported the Mejlis Extremists Who Have Arranged
the Blockade of Crimea’ (Unbowed Crimea,
September 03, 2017).
‘Another Banderite Has Left Crimea. Leonid Kuzmin,
One of the Main Activists of the ‘Ukrainian Cultural
Center,’ Is No Longer in Crimea,’ ‘Banderite Authorities
Continue Torturing Journalist Vasyl Muravytskyi’
(Unbowed Crimea, September 04, 2017).
‘Two First Grade Students in Henichesk Refused to
Study in Ukie Language. The Parents are Dead Set
Against the Imposition of Banderite ideology on Their
Children’ (Unbowed Crimea, September 06, 2017).
The illustration on Novoross.Info showing a swastika against
the Ukrainian flag
The illustration on Novoross.Info
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 31
Ukraine and Ukrainians are the main object of hatred
on these resources. Although the preliminary monitoring
showed that Crimean Tatars and their representative body
Mejlis, as well as Muslims, are also very often subjected to
hate speech.
It is worth noting that these resources started using hate
speech long before the occupation of Crimea by Russia.
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars were the main objects of
hate speech attacks at that time. These online media used
the harshest forms of hate speech, including calls for violence
and repression. However, after the occupation of the
peninsula, the number of hate speech examples increased
significantly and the rhetoric became even more strident.
Thus, for instance, back in 2010, Novoross.info published
a comment of Yuriy Pershykov who argued against
naming a school in Partenit109 the name of Abdul Teifuk, a
Crimean Tatar hero of World War II, as well as practically
approved of the fact that Crimean Tatars should not be allowed
to live in this settlement.
‘Koideshler is an organization established by Ibraim
Voiennyi to obtain land on the south coast of Crimea. This
organization has repeatedly tried to enter Partenit, but it
hasn’t managed to because of the resistance on the part
of the local Orthodox community. There are no Crimean
Tatars there today. Yes, the Soviet law gives the Hero of
the Soviet Union the right to have his bust installed in the
territory he once lived in. Nevertheless, I think there is no
point in naming a school after Teifuk in Partenit because
the school is Russian,’ Pershykov claimed at that time110.
In May 2014, the web-site published a statement from
the militants of the so-called Self-Defense of Crimea that
went to the South-East of Ukraine to combat, as the resource
wrote, the junta. ‘We are not in the prisoner-taking
business, we are in the killing-junta business… We are
going to help the people of the South-East and destroy
everything on our way,’ went the statement111.
It also posted a statement from Aleksei Chaly, the ‘people’s
mayor’ of Sevastopol: ‘Of course, I welcome the idea
of Russia bringing its troops into Ukraine. I’m not only supporting
the idea, I’m exasperated that Russia hasn’t done
109 An urban-type settlement on the south coast of Crimea. It is situated
15 km south-west from Alushta and 59 km south-east from
Simferopol.
110 Coordinator of Youth Cossack Movement: Koideshler Tries to Position
Itself As a Legitimate Organization on the South Coast of
Crimea by Suggesting That a School in Partenit Should Be Named
after Teifuk. Available at: http://www.novoross.info/economics/
2479-koordinator-molodezhnogo-dvizheniya-kazakov-predlagaya-
pridat-partenitskoj-shkole-imya-tejfuka-kojdeshler-pytaetsya-
pozicionirovat-sebya-na-yubk.html
111 Crimean Militiamen Threatened Junta to Send Two Battalions to
Kramatorsk and Shoot to Kill. Available at: http://www.novoross.
info/people/25678-krymskie-opolchency-prigrozili-hunte-vydvinutsya-
dvumya-batalonami-na-kramatorsk-i-bit-na-porazhenie-
video.html
it yet. We need to eliminate the hot spot. We also need to
protect our brotherly people who are begging for our help
for the umpteenth time. I hope that the President of Russia
makes up his mind to do so. I really-really hope so. And
our troops are sure to march on the streets of Donetsk,
Kharkiv, Odesa and Luhansk with the Victory Parade. Without
a doubt. And out veterans will have no fear to walk
outside wearing St. George Ribbons and other insignias
and medals. Those that they earned protecting our lives,
our country. Those that the Banderites, this scum that we
should have wiped off the face of the Earth a long time
ago, forbid them to wear. Rubbish needs to be removed112.’
In October 2016, Novoross claimed that ‘a great disaster
may happen because of the Crimean authorities’
flirtation with the Mejlists.’ The web-site informed that
approximately 200 Crimean Tatars fight for the ISIL, that
‘Crimean Tatars raped a Russian girl’ and held a range of
other demands against the representatives of the indigenous
community of Crimea. ‘Only an open, clear and tough
attitude of the Head of the Republic and Crimean authorities
will not let a great disaster happen at our friendly,
multinational Crimean home,’ the web-site summed up113.
Calls for different reprisals may be found on the Crimean
Echo web-site.
Thus, on May 1, 2014, the resource published a statement
from Vladimir Konstantinov, the Chairman of the
Parliament of the ‘Republic of Crimea,’ who threatened
Ukraine with mass casualties: ‘One person killed in Donbass
will cost them ten people on their side. This is the
law of war. It will be their last attack. These people are
112 Aleksei Chaly Called for Brining in Troops into Ukraine: ‘Banderites
are Scum That We Should Have Wiped off the Face of the
Earth a Long Time Ago. Available at: http://www.novoross.info/
politiks/25698-aleksey-chalyy-prizval-k-vvodu-voysk-na-ukrainubanderovschina-
nechist-kotoruyu-uzhe-davno-nado-steret-s-licazemli.
html
113 The Shadow of the ISIL: Crimea on the Threshold of a Great Disaster.
Available at: http://www.novoross.info/krim/33290-ten-igilakrym-
na-poroge-bolshoy-bedy.html
The Illustration on Crimean Echo web site depicting a
‘bloodthirsty Ukrainian’ with a knife against the swastika
background
32 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
insane — these who have taken over in Kyiv. We, the Russians,
will have to end this Nazi mayhem sooner or later.
We’ll have to come together and end it so that they don’t
disgrace the Russian world before the whole world114.’
In February 2015, Crimean Echo informed that the
protesters in Yalta, taking into account that ‘there is a war
against Russia today,’ ‘called for fighting against the ‘fifth
column,’ Western-minded influence agents, for the sovereign
economy and our own path of development115.’
In November 2015, highlighting another public meeting
in Yalta, Crimean Echo claimed that the protesters ‘…call
on the Russian authorities to make every effort to protect
the Russian population from discrimination and physical
violence in Ukraine and the Baltic states.’ ‘It is also necessary
to draw the focus of law-enforcement bodies toward
the active propaganda of Russophobia via the Ukrainian
online media, Ukrainian libraries in Russia’s territory or
through the so-called national and cultural societies (like
the Prosvita Society and others),’ the edition wrote116.
Crimean Echo also described its vision of the solution
of the so-called Crimean Tatar problem, having pointed
out, inter alia, the following: ‘The only way to solve this
problem seems to be ceasing the concession and peace
offering policy as regards the ‘chosen ones’ in prejudice
of others. In this case, we mean the legalization of the
land squatting, construction of cult institutions in any convenient
territories, priority in the provision of housing on
ethnic grounds, quotas for employment and civil service,
invitation of migrants from Central Asia and Turkey for
permanent residency in Crimea aimed at changing the
ethnic composition etc117.’
114 These Streets Haven’t Seen a March Like This. Available at: http://
old.kr-eho.info/index.php?name=News&op=printpage&sid=12029
115 Yalta against Maidan in Russia. Available at: http://old.kr-eho.info/
index.php?name=News&op=article&sid=13459
116 Relevant As Never Before. Available at: http://c-eho.info/tochkana-
karte/yalta/item/1791-aktualno-kak-nikogda
117 It Is High Time We Ask Ourselves: How Are We Going to Live in Our
In February 2016, Crimean Echo published an interview
with Viktor Kharabuga, the pro-Russian political analyst who
literally called on the security officials to deal with the supporters
of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People: ‘This threat
does exist in Crimea today; there was an ethnic conflict; we
saw its apotheosis, its climax in February 2014 at the building
of the Supreme Council of Crimea. And it almost escalated
into a hot stage… Let’s put it this way: at least three thousand
activists were brought by Refat Chubarov and Mustafa
Dzhemilev. If it weren’t for this gunpowder, a match would
have nothing to light. And these people, this ‘gunpowder,’
are still here, so is the problem. Saying that they have no supporters
and that the Mejlists have only two or three people
as a back-up would be wrong: they do have supporters, and
the number of them is pretty large. I’m not trying to say that
they prevail, but they do exist and are supported by a certain
number of people. Today, everything depends on the authorities,
on the law enforcement agencies118.’
After a while, Crimean Echo called for removing all
members of the opposition from Russia. ‘We don’t need to
send them to prison. Let it be. But we may give them a
cold shoulder though. Let them live among their brothers
and friends who will welcome them as political refugees
with open arms. Crimea once rose to the occasion and
managed to get rid of such terrorists as Chubarov, Iliasov
and senile Dzhemilev…,’ Igor Noskov, the author, wrote119.
A little later, Noskov called for kicking out of Crimea
all supporters of Ukraine: ‘I personally, and all my friends
and people that I know, want that all potential Ukrainian
militants living in Crimea and who are waiting for the
signal to begin terrorist actions be exiled from Crimea
to prevent bloodshed. Natalia Poklonskaya, the honored
Crimea? Available at: http://c-eho.info/diskussiya/item/1861-prishlo-
vremya-sprosit-sebya-kak-budem-zhit-dalshe-v-nashem-krymu
118 If There Is Indeed a Threat to Peace in Crimea, it Does Not Come
from Crimean Tatars Who Are Citizens of Russia. Available at:
http://c-eho.info/intervyu/item/2123-esli-ugroza-miru-v-krymu-iest-
to-ona-iskhodit-ne-ot-krymskikh-tatar-grazhdan-rossii
119 Aliens. Available at: http://c-eho.info/diskussiya/item/2439-chuzhie
The cartoon depicting Euromaidan protesters as fascists with
the Right Sector’s flag and Nazi swastika on their back
The cartoon depicting Ukrainians as bloodthirsty pirates and
Nazis whom Crimea tries to save itself from in a lifeboat
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 33
Prosecutor of Crimea, forced out terrorists Chubarov and
Dzhemilev [leaders of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People]
— and Crimea is still fine, nothing bad happed to it.
The most trigger-happy American President has not atom-
bombed Crimea before, he is unlikely to do it now because
of several dozens of exiled Banderites. If Yankees
love criminals so much, let them give shelter to them120.’
Moreover, such publications use a range of cartoons
and other graphic images containing hate speech in their
visual content. They use the fascist and pirate symbols,
as well as the pictures of weapons, evils spirits and death
when creating an image of Ukrainians121.
120 Yes, We Are Russkies! And We Are Proud of It. Available at:
http://c-eho.info/znat-i-pomnit/item/2554-da-my-moskali-i-etimgordimsya
121 Below you may find the images from the web-sites of Russkaya
Pravda [Russian Truth], Zaria Novorossii [Dawn of New Russia] and
other newspapers.
122 Molotov cocktails were used by the Euromaidan protesters in the
clashes with security forces during the revolution in Kyiv in winter
2013-2014.
123 The activists used these objects to protect themselves from the attacks
of security forces during the revolution in Kyiv in winter 2013-2014.
The cartoon depicting a Ukrainian in the humiliating and
insulting context: with a piece of salo [cured slabs of fatback
or pork belly] in his mouth and a bottle of vodka in his
pocket. There is a chain with coat of arms of Ukraine on his
neck and a rifle behind his back. The slogan above says
‘Ukraine Is Europe’
The cartoon depicting Ukrainians as Nazis. A tire and a stick
are additional attributes123 referring to Euromaidan
The cartoon depicting Euromaidan protesters as evil spirits.
The devil wears a Ukrainian-flag-coloured coat with a
burning tire, a Molotov cocktail and a bat before him. Beside
him – the characters representing the European Court and
the USA holding angel’s wings and a halo over Ukraine
The cartoon depicting a fascist swastika over the dome of
Ukrainian Parliament – Verkhovna Rada
The cartoon depicting a Ukrainian as a Nazi with swastika
behind his back. He holds a Molotov cocktail122 and the
Ukrainian flag
34 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
Conclusions
In connection with the armed occupation of Crimea
and the beginning of the military conflict in Eastern
Ukraine, there has been a splash of hate speech use
in the media landscape of Crimea, mostly against the
citizens of Ukraine. Amid the fast-paced events, the
mass media of the Russian Federation and Crimea were
making covert attempts to legalize the peninsula’s occupation
process and the armed conflict in Donbass in
people’s minds. At the same time, Ukrainian channels
were blocked in the territory of Crimea, and local journalists
and editorial offices critically highlighting the
occupation of Crimea were subjected to numerous attacks
and various types of obstruction of their activity,
which eventually forced them to leave Crimea and
move to mainland Ukraine.
The problem of hate speech use in the media
landscape of Crimea had existed long before the
occupation of the peninsula by Russia. However, since
the very first days of invasion, the propaganda has
started using hate speech on an unprecedented scale
accompanied by the ever aggressive hostile rhetoric.
During this period, hate speech continued to be
applied to the supporters and participants of Euromaidan
as a separate group of people advocating the European
integration and taking part in protests all over Ukraine
in winter 2013-2014. The Russian propaganda
mentioned these people most of the time in relation
to different crimes. The Euromaidan supporters and
Ukrainians in general were called fascists, neo-Nazis,
junta’s accomplices, Nazis’ henchmen, Banderites,
punishers etc. Speculations on the historical memory
and tragedy of the Second World War intensified the
effect and aggravated the international strife between
Ukrainians and Russians, stirred up hatred between the
participants of the armed conflict in Donbass, as well
as escalated the atmosphere of discord between the
residents of Crimea and people living in mainland Ukraine.
On the whole, hate speech in the media landscape
of Crimea shows itself in different ways. In addition to a
constant use of clichés inciting hatred in various mass
media, such expressions are published on the official websites
of the Crimean occupation authorities.
The monitoring of hate speech in the media landscape
of Crimea was carried out using examples of three main
sources: (1) on the air of top-rated television channels of
the Russian Federation broadcasting in Crimea, (2) on the
web-sites of the main occupation authorities of Crimea and
(3) on the web-sites of the most popular Crimean mass
media who got the opportunity to work in Crimea legally
and whose editorial offices are located on the peninsula.
In particular, the monitoring group studied the content
of the web-sites of the following occupation authorities:
the ‘Government of the Republic of Crimea,’ ‘State Council
of the Republic of Crimea,’ ‘Government of Sevastopol,’
‘Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol,’ ‘Prosecutor’s Office
of the Republic of Crimea,’ ‘Prosecutor’s Office of Sevastopol,’
‘Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of
Crimea’ and the ‘Department of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Russia for Sevastopol.’ Furthermore, we also
analyzed the materials on the web-sites of the Crimean
mass media, including local TV channels (First Crimean,
NTS Sevastopol), newspapers (Krymskaya Pravda,
Slava Sevastopolia, Krymskiye Izvestia) and online media
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 35
(Crimeainform, RIA Crimea, ForPost Sevastopol). We also
monitored the newscasts and information and analytical
programs aired at night (prime time) on three top-rated
Russian TV channels broadcasting on the Crimean peninsula
(Russia-1, NTV and Channel One).
The monitoring covers two periods: spring — autumn
2014 and the first half of 2017.
We have registered a total of 718 examples of
incitement to hate, predominantly in the soft form, on the
studied resources. Medium hate speech was used in 8% of
cases. Harsh hate speech constitutes less than 1% of the
overall number of examples.
The study established several ethnic, religious and
social groups that hatred was incited towards in the
media landscape of Crimea. These are Ukrainians (as an
ethnos and/or civic community), Crimean Tatars, members
and supporters of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People,
Euromaidan activists, Muslims and migrants. Most of
the time the mass media stirred up hatred towards
the national/ethnic groups and those living in certain
territories. Overall, there are 36 such groups. Ukrainians
(as an ethnos and/or civic community) living in the
government-controlled territories were the main object of
hate speech among these groups.
The studied web-sites of the Crimean ‘authorities’
used hate speech mainly with respect to the groups based
on their citizenship or residence in a certain territory,
as well as migrants, Euromaidan supporters, LGBT
community, members and supporters of the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People.
Overall, we found 71 examples of incitement to
hatred on the web-sites of the occupation authorities
of Crimea. The soft form of hate speech was used in 58
cases, medium form — in 12 and harsh one — in one. The
largest number of the examples of incitement to hatred
was registered on the web-site of the ‘Government of the
Republic of Crimea.’
Within the monitoring period, the evening newscasts
of the TV channels broadcasting in Crimea (Russia-1, NTV
and Channel One) used hate speech at least 479 times: 1
example of harsh hate speech, 46 examples of medium
hate speech and 432 of soft one.
During the monitoring period, the Russian news
programs stirred up hatred mainly towards the national
and ethnic groups and groups united by citizenship (324
examples), which is 68% of the total number. Hate speech
was applied to 36 such groups. Hate speech with regard
to religious groups was used 35 times, and 120 times —
regarding different social groups.
The largest number of examples of incitement to
hatred in the newscasts of three Russian TV channels
broadcasting in Crimea concerned Ukrainians (based
on citizenship and/or ethnic origin) — 184 cases or 43%
of the overall number.
For instance, in 2014, Russian propaganda often
called Ukrainians Banderites. Moreover, news anchors
occasionally mentioned the crimes committed by Stepan
Bandera, a Ukrainian political actor, ideologist and theorist
of Ukrainian nationalism, during World War II. Everybody
who fought on Bandera’s side during the war were also
called Banderites and, at the same time, fascists and
punishers. This way, the citizens of modern Ukraine are
made equal with these images in the public perception.
Crimeans are called Russians, and Donbass
residents — a separate nation which reportedly demands
its right to self-determination, although there is no
separate nation in this territory, and the population mostly
consists of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians.
Hence, the Russian TV channels help incite hatred
towards Ukrainians not only in the consciousness of
Russians who are their main target audience, but also
among the citizens of the separate territories of Ukraine
which are covered by the broadcasting of these mass media.
While monitoring the web-sites of the Crimean mass
media, we revealed 168 examples of hate speech with the
majority of them on the Sevastopol web-site ForPost (51
examples) which belongs to Kazhanov Sergey, a deputy of
the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol, and that of Crimeainform
(34 examples) owned by Maksim Nikolayenko
who ran as a candidate for the head of the occupation administration
of Simferopol in September 2017.
The groups of people who share ethnicity, nationality
and/or citizenship (130 examples) and social groups (26
examples) were subjected to hate speech most of the
time. Ukrainians as an ethnic and/or civic community were
the major objects of verbal attacks (123 examples).
Hate speech was used in the form of quotations of
different politicians, public activists and experts. But
in a number of cases, the journalists of the studied
publications were the ones to stir up hatred.
Besides Ukrainians in general, the main objects of hate
speech were also the following groups: the members and
supporters of the Mejlis Tatar People (12 examples), Crimean
Tatars (7 examples) and Muslims (5 examples). These
examples constitute 14% of the total number. Taking into
account the fact that almost all supporters of the Mejlis of
the Crimean Tatar People and the overwhelming majority of
Muslims in Crimea are the representatives of the indigenous
community, we may say that all these manifestations of
hatred are aimed mostly at Crimean Tatars.
Crimean Tatars are mainly depicted as radical
Islamists and extremists, and their representative body —
the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People — as a terrorist and
extremist organization.
36 HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA
Given the tendencies revealed during the study,
we may assume that the Crimean mass media fulfill
their common task of forming an image of an enemy of
Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatar people which in its
overwhelming majority did not recognize the occupation
of the Crimean peninsula.
The intensity of hate speech use in the media
landscape of Crimea started gradually fading away as
time passed. At the same time, hate speech is still rather
common: it is used by the representatives of Crimean
‘authorities,’ politicians, local journalists and pro-Russian
activists. Hate rhetoric peaks during high-profile events
mostly related to the armed conflict in Donbass as well
as the activities of the Crimean Tatar national movement.
At the same time, the degree of controlled hatred
towards Ukrainians in the media landscape of Crimea and
the Russian Federation in 2017 became significantly lower
as compared with 2014. The fighting in Donbass also got
less intense in 2017 (as compared with 2014-2015). The
main objects of hate speech in this period differ from
those established in the first period of monitoring.
During all this time, the Russian and Crimean
information landscape continues legalizing the
occupation and justifying the prosecution of Crimeans
for not agreeing with the Russian aggression. In 2017, the
Crimean and Russian mass media focused a lot on the
threat of terrorism, highlighting the military actions in Syria
against the militants of the ISIL and other terrorist groups
in the Middle East. In the newscasts and other programs,
these threats are constantly projected on the situation
in the Russian Federation and Crimea. In addition to
Ukrainians, the main objects of hate speech in 2017 were
the residents of the Central Asia and migrants.
Keeping high anxiety and hatred levels in Crimea
through the mass media, Russia forms the platform for
creating, if necessary, a controlled civil conflict. Moreover,
hate speech was used to form in the occupied territory the
public support of the Russian policy as regards Ukraine
and all dissidents in Crimea.
A mass use of hate speech in the media landscape of
Crimea is a grave violation of national and international
laws and journalistic standards.
At the same time, Russian hate speech laws are
actively applied to the citizens of Ukraine in Crimea
as well as with a view to pressure public activists.
Incitement of hatred towards Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars
and Muslims inside Crimea leads to a destabilized
situation and creates the environment for hatred-based
crimes124.
124 Publication: A Crimean Has Been Savagely Beat up in Crimea for
Wearing Ukrainian Symbols – http://crimeahrg.org/kryimchaninazhestoko-
izbili-v-kryimu-za-ukrainskuyu-simvoliku/
Controlled hatred is used to legalize in the public
perception the repressions of activists and those
discontented with the authorities’ actions. The effect
of hatred-inciting publications is multiplied by the stiff
restrictions of the free speech on the peninsula125.
A total clean-up of alternative points of view in the
media landscape of Crimea and the Russian Federation
enables the mass media to enhance its impact on
the society by stirring up hatred towards the ethnic,
religious and social groups who do not trust the
occupation authorities.
Frequent use of hate speech on the air of TV
channels and on web-sites partially or fully owned by
the representatives of the occupation government is
the evidence of direct interest of the Russian Federation
in such actions. Such an interest is also manifested by
the fact that the mass media quote in their publications
people’s deputies, politicians, various officials and the
President of the Russian Federation126.
At the same time, mass media, state-owned as well,
cite xenophobic statements without any commentary
condemning such actions. Hate speech is used even in
laws and regulations, texts with hate speech are constantly
posted on the official web-sites of the occupation authorities
of the peninsula. As the monitoring demonstrated, in
all these cases Ukrainians are the main objects of hate
mongering based on both their citizenship and ethnic origin.
Taking into consideration the fact that the Russian
Federation is engaged in an armed conflict with Ukraine,
we may conclude that all the abovementioned examples
of incitement to hatred towards Ukrainians with the use
of state resources represent one of the tools of warfare.
The study showed that hatred in the Russian mass media
towards Ukrainians is imposed on a large scale not only
in the territory of occupied Crimea, but across Russia
as well. This information may be proven by the recent
studies conducted by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center.
Opinion polls published by this Center confirm that the
attitude of Russians towards Ukrainians became much
worse since the beginning of the armed conflict127. In
December 2017, 29% of those polled called Ukraine the
enemy of Russia, while there were zero such answers in
October 2012128.
125 Crimea Beyond Rules, Issue No. 4. Thematic review of the human
rights situation under occupation. — Issue No. 4 — Informational
Occupation. Available at: https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/4Kr_Ru_fin_18.12.2017.pdf
126 Publication: They Have Chosen Two Jews and One Ukrainian:
Putin Told Us About His Friends Who Were Put under Sanctions —
http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/984616/
127 Publication: Attitude towards Countries. Yuri Levada Analytical
Center, February 12, 2018 https://www.levada.ru/2018/02/12/otnoshenie-
k-stranam/
128 Publication: Russia’s Enemies. Yuri Levada Analytical Center, January
10, 2018 https://www.levada.ru/2018/01/10/vragi-rossii/
INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REPORT 37
Such actions amid the armed conflict constitute
a threat to the citizens of Ukraine who are always the
objects of hate speech on the part of the aggressor.
Recommendations
Hate speech in the media landscape of Crimea, in
our opinion, directly impacts the degree of aggression in
the society. We may say that one of the consequences of
hate speech being common in Crimea is the attacks at
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars as well as vandalism of
the objects of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national and
Muslim religious infrastructure.
Ukrainian society, just like the Ukrainian government,
practically cannot influence the developments in
occupied Crimea. Nevertheless, we cannot afford
ourselves to steer clear from the situation, especially in
the areas with serious violations.
We recommend the legitimate bodies of the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
to consider the sharpest statements to see if there are
any elements of the crimes referred to in Article 161 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine. Initiating criminal proceedings
in connection with the most outrageous cases may
be a clear signal from the Ukrainian government that
incitement of hatred by mass media and de-facto
authorities of the occupied peninsula is not only frowned
upon, but legally prosecuted as well.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
may take into account the hate speech situation in the
media landscape of Crimea to enhance the international
pressure on Russia as an occupant.
In particular, we think that the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination should take into
the consideration the situation in the media landscape
of Crimea when analyzing the observance by Russia
of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The fact that hate
speech is systematically used on the air of Russian TV
channels broadcasting in Crimea and in the mass media
controlled by the occupation authorities, officially as
well, just like a large-scale use of hate speech by the
representatives of the de-facto Crimean authorities,
may serve as an argument in the proceedings on the
merits as part of the case ‘Ukraine vs. Russia’ in the
International Court of Justice as regards Russia’s
violation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Given the dangerous consequences, we call on the
field-specific international organizations, such as the
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (ODIHR OSCE), to treat the problem of hate
speech dissemination through the mass media on the
occupied peninsula with the utmost seriousness.
We demand that the government of the Russian
Federation and occupation authorities in Crimea
stop using hate speech, including oral and written
statements or speeches, publications on web-sites
or other resources of the occupation authorities in
Crimea, as well as take all the necessary measures to
prevent hatred and discrimination-driven crimes which
may come as a result of hate speech use with regard to
the mentioned vulnerable groups.
The individuals guilty of inciting to hatred, calling
for discrimination and encouraging violence with the
help of administrative, financial and other resources
of the Russian and occupation authorities must be held
accountable and punished accordingly.
As an occupant, Russia must observe in Crimea the
norms of international humanitarian law and international
human rights law and comply with the obligation to
protect the civilian population from any acts of violence
or intimidation and insults that are often present in hate
speech; and not allow discrimination of civil population
in Crimea based on race, religion or political convictions.
In addition, we request the journalistic community
of the Russian Federation to critically consider the
incitement of hatred in the Russian mass media in the
context of the armed conflict between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea.
HATE SPEECH IN THE MEDIA
LANDSCAPE OF CRIMEA:
An Information and Analytical Report on the Spread of
Hate Speech on the Territory of the Crimean Peninsula
(March 2014 – July 2017)
Authors: Oleksandr Burmahyn, Tetiana Pechonchyk
Iryna Sevoda, Olha Skrypnyk
Review: Viacheslav Lykhachev
Translation: Anastasiia Morenets
Proofreading: Steve Doyle
Annex 968
Crimean Human Rights Group, Memorandum: Discrimination of Crimean Residents for Non-
Possession of Russian Documents Issued Unlawfully by Russia in Crimea (2018)
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) is an initiative of Crimean human rights defenders
and journalists aimed at supporting the observance and defense of human rights in Crimea
through attracting a wide attention to the issues of human rights and international
humanitarian law on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula as well as searching and
elaborating instruments for defending human rights in Crimea.
The CHRG follows principles of fairness, accuracy and timeliness in preparing and distributing
the information. The CHRG team is composed of experts, human rights defenders and
journalists from various countries who have been participating in monitoring and
documenting violations of human rights in Crimea since February 2014. The CHRG pays a
major attention to the human rights violations due to the unlawful actions of the Russian
Federation in Crimea.
Annex 969
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Security Officers Conducted Regular Searches in the Houses of
the Crimean Tatars in Crimea (23 January 2018)
Annex 970
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in the Occupied Crimea in
2017 (presentation)(2 February 2018)
Analysis of violations of human rights in the occupied
Crimea in 2017 (presentation)
ctrcenter.org/en/analytics/90-analysis-of-violations-of-human-rights-in-the-occupied-crimea-in-2017-presentation
Home / Analitics / Analysis of violations of human rights in the occupied Crimea in 2017
(presentation)
2 February 2018
1/15
2/15
3/15
4/15
5/15
6/15
7/15
8/15
9/15
10/15
11/15
12/15
13/15
14/15
15/15
Annex 971
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in the Occupied Crimea
over January 2018 (presentation) (15 February 2018)
Annex 972
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Crimea 2016 (last visited 8 March 2018)
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Annex 973
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Crimean Tatar Businessman & Philanthropist Seized
and New FSB Offensive in Russian-Occupied Crimea (3 May 2018)
Annex 974
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Crimean Tatars: Russian Repression
Continues with Arrest of Crimean Businessman (8 May 2018)
Annex 975
Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights in the Context of Automatic Naturalization in
Crimea (June 2018)
224 West 57th Street, New York, New York, 10019, United States | TEL +1-212-548-0600 | FAX +1-212-548-4662 | [email protected]
JUNE 2018
This report by lawyers of the Open Society Justice Initiative examines in depth
the implications for the population of the Crimean peninsula of the imposition
of Russian citizenship that followed Russia’s seizure of the territory from
Ukraine in 2014.
Human Rights in the Context of
Automatic Naturalization in Crimea
REPORT
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 2
Jewish communities under Reich Citizenship Law in the 1930s and 1940s.......................................... 6
Kenyan Asians ...................................................................................................................................... 6
Saddam Hussein’s Decree 666 strips Feyli Kurds of nationality in 1980 ............................................ 7
Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, stripping ethnic groups of nationality ........................................... 7
Black Mauritanians, denationalization and Arabization in the 1980s and early 1990s ....................... 8
Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic ................................................................. 8
Imposed citizenship and forced assimilation ........................................................................................ 9
Germanization in Nazi occupied territory
Ethnic Koreans in Japan
Imposition of the Russian Federation’s legal system .......................................................................... 12
Specific groups subject to targeted abuse under occupation .............................................................. 13
Automatic naturalization and its implementation ............................................................................... 19
Categories of legal status created by the automatic naturalization laws ........................................... 23
Widespread condemnation of automatic citizenship ........................................................................... 28
Ukrainian and Russian current positions on dual nationality and the legal effect of automatic
naturalization ...................................................................................................................................... 30
Legal and human consequences of imposition of nationality, the opt out procedure and residence
status ................................................................................................................................................... 31
International humanitarian law .......................................................................................................... 43
Different meanings of the term “national” under international law .................................................. 44
The right to exist ................................................................................................................................. 45
Discrimination and group membership .............................................................................................. 45
Application to the situation in Crimea ................................................................................................ 46
Discriminatory .................................................................................................................................... 48
Involuntary .......................................................................................................................................... 50
Lack of due process............................................................................................................................. 52
No legitimate purpose and disproportionate ...................................................................................... 53
Denial of freedom of movement and forcible transfers as a result of occupation and automatic
naturalization ...................................................................................................................................... 54
Anti-extremism laws resulting in stigmatization, harassment and ill-treatment ................................. 57
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 3
Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic,
Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kuri and Others v. Slovenia,
Institute on Human Rights and Development in Africa and Open Society Justice
Initiative (on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) v. Kenya
Nubian Community in Kenya v. Kenya
People v. Cote d’Ivoire
Buenov. Dominican Republic
Anudo v. Tanzania,
Huseynov v. Azerbaijan,
1 Rogers Brubaker, in his seminal work Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (1992), memorably described
citizenship as “internally inclusive” and “externally exclusive” (p. 21). Unless otherwise specified in this document, the terms
“citizenship” and “nationality” are generally used as legal terms that are considered interchangeable in international law.
For more information on the Open Society Justice Initiative’s mission and activities, see back cover.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 4
imposition
Treaty on
Accession
mass
2 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless 35 (2014), available at:
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf.
3 See World Bank, Identification for Development (ID4D) Global Dataset, available at:
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/identification-development-global-dataset.
4 See James Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20
Ethics & International Affairs 321-347 (2006).
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Stateless Minorities and their Search for Citizenship (2017),
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/stateless-minorities/.
6 Throughout this report, we will refer to the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
collectively, as “Crimea.”
7 See Marc Morjé Howard, The Politics of Citizenship In Europe 50 (2009) (“The historical experience of individual countries
in terms of both their past experiences as colonial power and onset of democracies correspond quite closely to their
historical citizenship policies.”).
8 See paras. 72-83 below for a detailed description of relevant provisions.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 5
A. The ethnically discriminatory character of automatic naturalization in Crimea
B.Automatic naturalization in Crimea as a violation of the right to a nationality
C.The collateral consequences of automatic naturalization in furtherance of ethnic
cleansing in Crimea
9 The notion that different grounds of discrimination combine and overlap in various ways to produce a compound form of
discrimination has been recognized as a component of international law. See, e.g. Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, General Comment No. 3 Article 6: Women and girls with disabilities (2016); Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 28 the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2,
(2010); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 25 article 4
paragraph 1 - Temporary special measures, para. X (2004); and Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
General Recommendation No. 25 on gender related dimensions of racial discrimination (2000).
10 See, e.g., Laura van Waas, Fighting Statelessness and Discriminatory Nationality Laws in Europe, 14 European Journal of
Migration and Law 243, 244 (2010) (“At both global and regional levels, [] international standards have come to impose
significant restrictions on the freedom of states to regulate access to nationality in accordance with their own sovereign
interests.”); Peter J. Spiro, New International Law of Citizenship, 105 American Journal of International Law 694, 697-98
(2011) (States are not free to disregard the otherwise lawful establishment of the bond of nationality between an individual
and a state, as Russia has done with respect to Ukrainian nationality within occupied Crimea).
11 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 460-81 (1951).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 6
e.g.
12 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), para. 5 (16 January
2017), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/166/19314.pdf.
13 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (2016), describes a seven-stage “reimperialization policy” enacted
by Russia, within which Russia’s citizenship policies toward a widening population of “compatriots” in other states
including Ukraine, figures prominently as a tool among several used to reassert territorial domination in the post-Soviet
space. (“Some of the seven stages of this reimperialization trajectory can overlap, occur simultaneously, or occur in a
slightly different order. The general trajectory, however, moves from co-optation of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers to
territorial expansion under the guise of compatriot or minority protection, all under the veil of a blitz of information
warfare.”).
14 See The Reich Citizenship Law (15 September 1935) and the First Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law (14 November
1935), German History in Documents and Images, available at http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1523;
Case No. 11, U.S. v. Ernst von Weizsäcker (the Ministries Case), U.S. Military Tribunal IV, N.M.T., Vol. XIV, p. 471 (1948-1949)
(“The Jews of Germany were first deprived of the rights of citizenship. They were then deprived of the right to teach, to
practice professions, to obtain education, to engage in business enterprises; they were forbidden to marry except among
themselves and those of their own religion; they were subject to arrest and confinement in concentration camps, to
beatings, mutilation and torture; their property was confiscated; they were herded into ghettos; they were forced to
emigrate and to buy leave to do so; they were deported to the East, where they worked to exhaustion and death; they
became slave labourers; and finally over six million were murdered.”), cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000), available at
http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40276c634.html.
15 Reich Citizenship Law of 15 September 1935, Article 2, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, available at
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007903.
16 See The Reich Citizenship Law (15 September 1935) and the First Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law (14 November
1935), German History in Documents and Images, available at http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1523.
17 See Reich Citizenship Law, First Regulation, 14 November 1935, Articles 2 and 5, Jewish Virtual Library, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-reich-citizenship-law-first-regulation.
18 See United States Holocaust Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia: Nuremberg Laws,
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007902.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 7
19 See Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain 158 (2000); see also
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Information on the treatment of the Asian community in Kenya (1 June 1991),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab1518.html.
20 See Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain 158 (2000).
21 See Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asians of East and Central
Africa, p. 222-225 (1989).
22 Ibid.
23 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Iraq: Faili Kurds (October
2014), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a056c397.html.
24 Refugees International, The Faili Kurds of Iraq: Thirty Years Without Nationality (2 April 2010), available at
https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/faili-kurds-iraq-thirty-years-without-nationality.
25 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Iraq: Faili Kurds (October
2014), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a056c397.html.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 8
26 Jose Maria Arraiza and Olivier Vonk, Report on Citizenship Law: Myanmar, EUDO Citizenship, p. 6-11 (October 2017),
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/48284.
27 See Human Rights Watch, Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution (May 2000), available at
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm.
28 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Final Report: Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of
Rakhine, p. 29 (August 2017), available at http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf.
29 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent expert on minority issues, Gay McDougall, para. 59, UN Doc.
A/HRC/7/23 (28 February 2008).
30 Ibid.
31 UNHCR, Refugee Status, Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, and Statelessness within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, p. 23-24 (October 2014) available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/543525834.html.
32 See Laura M. Bingham and Julia Harrington, Never-Ending Story: The African Commission Evolving Through Practice in
Malawi Africa Association et al. v. Mauritania, 1 HR&ILD 7 (2013); Open Society Foundations, IHRDA v. Mauritania,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litigation/ihrda-v-mauritania (updated 1 April 2009).
33 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania Comm. Nos.
54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), para. 125, available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/27th/comunications/54.91-61.91-96.93-98.93-164.97_196.97-
210.98/achpr27_54.91_61.91_96.93_98.93_164.97_196.97_210.98_eng.pdf; See also Open Society Foundations (OSF),
Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study (January 2016), available at
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/citizenship-law-africa-third-edition-20160129.pdf.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 9
per se
Indigenous peoples in the United States
jus soli
34 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary observations on the IACHR’s visit to the Dominican Republic:
December 2 to 6, 2013, p. 6-11 (6 December 2013), available at
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/actividades/visitas/2013RD/Preliminary-Observations-DR-2013.pdf;
Refugee Studies Centre, Forced Migration Review No. 32 - No legal identity. Few rights. Hidden from society. Forgotten.
Stateless, p. 25 (April 2010), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c6cefb02.html.
35 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, para
76 (31 December 2015), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/DominicanRepublic-2015.pdf; see also Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 28 August 2014.
36 Ibid. at para. 298.
37 Ibid. at para. 318.
38 See Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic
Event (1999) cited in J. Khaulani Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood 18 (2008); see also Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups 125
(2004); Lauren Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washington: Essays on Sex and Citizenship, (1997) cited in Audra
Simpson, Mohawk interruptus: Political life across the borders of settler states 18 (2014); “Assimilation of Native Americans
most clearly began with the Carlisle Indian School which was established in 1879. From this point on, Indians began to be
formed in the image of the ‘white American citizen,’ largely because, as Stacy Camp argues, a group’s ability to be granted
citizenship depended almost completely upon their ability to dissolve into Anglo-American culture.” “How Assimilation
Can Lead to Citizenship,” History 90.01: Topics in Digital History, Dartmouth (31 October 2016), available at
https://journeys.dartmouth.edu/censushistory/2016/10/31/rough-draft-assimilation-and-citizenship-among-nativeamericans/
(internal citations omitted).
39 Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of
Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 Harvard Blackletter Law Journal 107 (1999).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 10
Minority groups in interwar Europe
Germanization in Nazi occupied territory
40 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016). The Tuaua decision relies on
U.S. case law on citizenship in U.S. territories that employs racialized classifications and has therefore been sharply
criticized.
41 Anna Mejknecht, “Minority Protection System Between World War I and World War II,” Oxford Public International Law,
para. 19 (October 2010), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e848; Harris
Mylonas, The Politics of Nation Building 7 (2012); Alexander Orakhelashvili (Ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and
History of International Law 487 (2011).
42 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 272 n. 10 (1968).
43 See Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, United States
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, paras. 44, 50 (October 1946-April 1949), available at
https://archive.org/stream/TrialsOfWarCriminalsBeforeTheNurembergMilitaryTribunalsUnderControlCouncil/Trials%20of
%20war%20criminals%20before%20the%20Nuremberg%20Military%20Tribunals%20under%20Control%20Council%20law
%20no.%2010.%20-%20Nuremberg,%20October%201946-%20April,%201949%20Volume%2012_djvu.txt; see Rogers
Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups 118 (2004); Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany 165-168
(1992).
44 Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, United States Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, paras. 40 (October 1946-April 1949).
45 Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Head of the Civil Government to Alsace during the Occupation, and Six Others,
Permanent Military Tribunal at Strasbourg (23 April-3 May 1946) and Court of Appeal (24 July 1946).
46 Weizsaecker and Other (Ministries Trial), United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, p. 357-358 (14 April 1949).
47 See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 45, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1907).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 11
Ethnic Koreans in Japan
Western Sahara
Frente Popular
para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro
48 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan: Koreans (2008),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cfd41.html.
49 Minority Rights Group International, State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2014 - Case study: The
disturbing rise of hate speech against Koreans in Japan (3 July 2014), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53ba8db85.html.
50 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Japan: Koreans (2008),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cfd41.html.
51 Ibid.
52 UN Human Rights Council, Summary: Universal Periodic Review, Japan, para. 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/14/JPN/3 (20
July 2012); Kanako Takahara, “Koreans Here Inclined to Assimilate to Dodge Racism,” Japan Times (6 August 2005),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/08/06/national/koreans-here-inclined-to-assimilate-to-dodge-racism/.
53 Elspeth Guild, Cristina Gortázar Rotaeche and Dora Kostakopoulou, The Reconceptualization of European Union
Citizenship 160-161 (2014) cited in European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Sahrawi citizenship/nationality in Western
Sahara, Morocco and Algeria, p. 4 (16 November 2015), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/577cc8684.html; see also
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 12
Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of
Crimea to the Russian FederationTreaty on Accession
Treaty on Accession
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Protracted Sahrawi displacement: Challenges and opportunities beyond encampment, Refugee
Studies Centre (May 2011), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e03287b2.html.
54 See UNHCR, Expert Meeting: The Concept of Statelessness under International Law, Summary Conclusions, Prato, Italy,
para. 25 (27-28 May 2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/statelessness/4cb2fe326/expert-meetingconcept-
stateless-persons-under-international-law-summary.html (raising the obligations of third states where purported
statehood may come about through violations of jus cogens norms, including the prohibition on the use of force).
55 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, International Criminal Court, para. 84 (4
December 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
56 Ibid. at para. 86.
57 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
paras. 5, 26, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
58 Ibid. at para. 73.
59 Ibid. at para. 43.
60 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Articles 4, 27, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (1949); see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, paras. 151-52 (Mar. 24, 2000)
(construing the nationality of a civilian population under the Convention so as to afford broad protection, as opposed to
applying a strict reading of nationality laws at play).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 13
Those who remained in Crimea have had automatic Russian
61 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 73, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
62 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe by Ambassador
Gerard Stoudmann on his human rights visit to Crimea, para. 16 (11 April 2016), available at https://rm.coe.int/168064211f.
63 Ibid. at para. 17.
64 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 77, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) (Articles 64, 65, 67, and 70 of the Geneva Convention IV and
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
65 See paras. 50-52. The Mejlis is a self-governing, “representative and executive body of the Crimean Tatar people.” Official
Website of the Crimean Tatar People, General information about Mejlis, http://qtmm.org/en/general-information-aboutmejlis.
66 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 77, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
67 Written statement submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples, p. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/NGO/97 (Feb. 23, 2015).
68 Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The situation of
national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 7 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 14
citizenship forced upon them
Russian authorities’ actions
Crimean Tatars
69 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), para. 5 (16 January
2017), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/166/19314.pdf.
70 Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli, National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals, 61 Europe-Asia
Studies 1, 4-5 (2010).
71 See All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001, National Structure of Population in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/.
72 Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The situation of
national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 7 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf.
73 The Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), Member Profile: Crimean Tatars, p. 10 (October 2017),
available at http://unpo.org/downloads/2380.pdf.
74 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire 101 (2016).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 15
75 The Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), Member Profile: Crimean Tatars, p. 5 (October 2017),
available at http://unpo.org/downloads/2380.pdf.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire 101 (2016) (internal citations omitted).
80 Encyclopedia Britannica, Tatar People, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tatar.
81 Ibid.
82 The Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), Member Profile: Crimean Tatars, p. 7 (October 2017),
available at http://unpo.org/downloads/2380.pdf.
83 Ibid.
84 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 12, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 16
Ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian national identity in Crimea
Presumed
because of
85 See The Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), Member Profile: Crimean Tatars, p. 8 (October 2017),
available at http://unpo.org/downloads/2380.pdf.
86 Mykola Riabchuk, Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why is Ukraine Trapped between East and West?” in Ukraine, The EU
and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations 83-84 (2016).
87 Jane I. Dawson, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea,” 30(4) Communist and Post-Communist Studies 427-444
(1997).
88 Azar Gat with Alexander Yakobson, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism 179
(2013).
89 “In the nineteenth century the Ukrainian nation faced aggressive Russification policies from Moscow, including closure of
its main institution of higher learning, the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, suppression of its culture, prohibition from publishing
books and teaching in Ukrainian, and even banning of building churches in the Ukrainian Baroque style.” Agnia Grigas,
Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire 101 (2016).
90 Richard Pipes, “Reflections on the Nationality Problems in the Soviet Union,” in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan
(eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience 457 (1975).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 17
Ethnic
both
Russkii mir
91 Ibid. at p. 461.
92 Mykola Riabchuk, Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why is Ukraine Trapped between East and West?” in Ukraine, The EU
and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations 83-84 (2016).
93 Ibid. (“the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit where Putin told then President George W. Bush that Ukrainians are not a
‘people’ and when he made his first territorial claims on what he later termed ‘NewRussia’, or Novorossia (southern and
eastern Ukraine).”)
94 Jane I. Dawson, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea,” 30(4) Communist and Post-Communist Studies 427-444
(1997).
95 Mykola Riabchuk, Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why is Ukraine Trapped between East and West?” in Ukraine, The EU
and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations 83-84 (2016).
96 Mykola Riabchuk, Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why is Ukraine Trapped between East and West?” in Ukraine, The EU and
Russia: History, Culture and International Relations 83-84 (2016).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 18
Language rights.
Religious institutions and Ukrainian national identity.
97 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, para. 13, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/CRP.1 (March 15, 2018).
98 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
periodic reports of the Russian Federation, para. 20, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24, (20 September 2017).
99 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) (Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures Order), para. 106(1)(b) (19 April 2017), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/
166/19394.pdf.
100 Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism 222 (2013).
101 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 137, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
102 Ibid. at para 145.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 19
Cultural institutions and symbols.
Vyshyvanka
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, para. 23(f),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (28 April 2015).
107 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 17, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
108 Ibid. at para 184.
109 Ibid. at para 185.
110 Ibid. at para 169.
111 Ibid. at 169.
112 Ibid.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 20
Treaty on Accession
de facto
opt out
Treaty on Accession
Treaty on Accession
113 Ibid. at para 55.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.; The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 37 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-thehuman-
rights-assessment-mission-on-crimea?download=true.
116 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine:
Human Rights and Minority Rights Situation, p. 117 (May 12, 2014), available at
https://www.osce.org/odihr/118476?download=true.
117 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 37 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true; OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, para. 55, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 21
The “opt out” process
118 See Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules:
Thematic review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
119 See Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, p. 29 (2014), available at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/russia1114web.pdf.
120 Ibid. at p. 27.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Sergei Zayets, Enforced citizenship in Crimea, European Human Rights Bulletin p. 5 (Winter 2017), available at
http://ehrac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EHRAC-Winter-2017-WEB.pdf (“RCHR data indicates a large number of
people in Crimea, and those who left the peninsula, did not submit declarations of their intention not to acquire Russian
citizenship and did not apply for Russian passports. According to Russian law, they are also regarded as citizens of the
Russian Federation despite their lack of documents.” Ibid. at n. 5),
125 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 59, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
126 Ibid. at para. 56.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 22
Russian
127 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 15 May 2014, para. 127 (15 May 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf; The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 38 (17
September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rights-assessment-mission-oncrimea?
download=true.
128 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 58, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017); The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities
(HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 38 (17 September 2015), available
at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rights-assessment-mission-on-crimea?download=true.
129 See The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 38 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-thehuman-
rights-assessment-mission-on-crimea?download=true; see also OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine 15 May 2014, para. 127 (15 May 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf.
130 See The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 39 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-thehuman-
rights-assessment-mission-on-crimea?download=true; see also Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights,
Report of Nils Muižnieks following his Mission in Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea from 7 To 12 September 2014, para. 48 (27 October
2014), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/102_muiznieksreport_/102_muiznieksreport_en.p
df.
131 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, p. 29-30 (2014), available at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/russia1114web.pdf.
132 Ibid. at p. 29.
133 Ibid. at p. 30.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 23
Those who formally rejected Russian citizenship and became “foreigners”
134 Ibid (“On April 11, Russia’s Federal Migration Service in Crimea officially confirmed on its Facebook page that Crimea
residents with Ukrainian citizenship could declare their wish to retain Ukrainian citizenship at Russia’s consulates and
embassies worldwide. However, the same statement also acknowledged problems with applications possibly not arriving to
the FMS due to postal services’ glitches and encouraged people to apply in person in Crimea.”)
135 Ibid.
136 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 15 May 2014, para. 127 (15 May 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf; The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 38 (17
September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rights-assessment-mission-oncrimea?
download=true.
137 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 46-7 (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
138 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 56, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 24
Crimean residents who did not meet the legal criteria for citizenship and became
“foreigners”
139 Ibid. at para. 61.
140 Ibid. at para. 62.
141 Ibid. at para. 68.
142 Ibid. at para. 70.
143 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 40 (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
144 Sergei Zayets, Enforced citizenship in Crimea, European Human Rights Bulletin p. 5 (Winter 2017), available at
http://ehrac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EHRAC-Winter-2017-WEB.pdf.
145 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 55, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
146 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, p. 31 (2014), available at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/russia1114web.pdf.
147 Sergei Zayets, Enforced citizenship in Crimea, European Human Rights Bulletin p. 5 (Winter 2017), available at
http://ehrac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EHRAC-Winter-2017-WEB.pdf.
148 Ibid.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 25
Civil servants and other employees forced to renounce Ukrainian citizenship or lose
their jobs
Treaty on Accession
149 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 64, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid. at para. 65.
153 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 37 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true.
154 Ibid. at para. 42.
155 Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR), Citizenship, Land and Nationalization of Property in
Occupied Crimea: Rights Deficit, p. 5-6 (3 June 3, 2015), available at http://dhrp.org.ua/en/blog-publications/794-20150702-
en-publication.
156 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 67, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
157 Ibid. at para. 71 (citing Article 11 of the Law of the Republic of Crimea “On State Civil Service of the Republic of Crimea”
(29 May 2014).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 26
Groups who due to specific personal circumstances were unable to reject Russian
citizenship
.
158 Ibid. at para. 72.
159 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 54, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (1949).
160 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 202 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true.
161 Ibid. at para. 41; Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of Nils Muižnieks following his Mission in
Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea from 7 To 12 September 2014, para. 41 (27 October 2014), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/102_muiznieksreport_/102_muiznieksreport_en.p
df.
162 Public Statement by Serhiy Starenkyi, “There are conditions for the inmates transfer from the Crimea. But the sentenced
persons are held there on the legal grounds,” State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine (April 3, 2014),
http://www.kvs.gov.ua/peniten/control/main/en/publish/article/715893.
163 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 34 (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
164 Written statement submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples, p. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/NGO/97 (Feb. 23, 2015).
165 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 45-6 (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
166 Ibid. at. Para 46.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 27
Residence registration and residence permits for “foreigners”
167 Ombudsperson of the Russian Federation, Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation in
2014, at 95-96 (7 May 2015) available at
http://eng.ombudsmanrf.org/www/upload/files/prezent/doklad_eng_Sample_view.pdf.
168 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 115, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights
(RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review:
Russian Federation, para. 13 (2017), available at https://www.uprinfo.
org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
172 According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, there were 4,323 children with parental care. The Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015),
para. 41 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rights-assessment-mission-oncrimea?
download=true.
173 Sergei Zayets, Enforced citizenship in Crimea, European Human Rights Bulletin p. 5 (Winter 2017), available at
http://ehrac.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EHRAC-Winter-2017-WEB.pdf.
174 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights
(RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review:
Russian Federation, para. 33 (2017), available at https://www.uprinfo.
org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
175 See, e.g., Bolat v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 October 2006, at paras. 64-70; Tatishvili v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 22
February 2007, at paras 44-54.
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176 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
periodic reports of the Russian Federation, para. 30, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24, (20 September 2017). See also Council
of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1277 (2002) on honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian
Federation, para. 8(xii), 23 April 2002.
177 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 44 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true.
178 Ibid.
179 See Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules:
Thematic review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 14 (2017),
available at https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf (“In Russia, residence
registration is far more important that in Ukraine. The absence of such registration at the place of actual residence
generates a number of significant difficulties for citizens.”).
180 UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
Ukraine, G.A. Res. 72/190, p. 2 (19 December 2017).
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181 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 220, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
182 Ibid. at para. 57.
183 See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, para.
23, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (28 April 2015) (“The Committee, having due regard for General Assembly resolution
68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, is concerned about reported violations of the Covenant in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which are under the effective control of the State party.”).
184 Ibid. at para. 23(c).
185 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
periodic reports of the Russian Federation, para. 20, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24, (20 September 2017).
186 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of Nils Muižnieks following his Mission in Kyiv, Moscow and
Crimea from 7 To 12 September 2014, para. 47 (27 October 2014), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/102_muiznieksreport_/102_muiznieksreport_en.p
df.
187 Ibid. at para. 47 n. 40.
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voluntarily
188 Halya Coynash, “Poroshenko law could strip huge numbers of Ukrainians of their citizenship,” Kharkiv Human Rights
Protection Group (16 March 2017), http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1489593082.
189 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 21 (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf (citing Article 5 of the Law of
Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of nationals and on the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory
of Ukraine”).
190 Halya Coynash, “Poroshenko law could strip huge numbers of Ukrainians of their citizenship,” Kharkiv Human Rights
Protection Group (16 March 2017), http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1489593082.
191 Ibid.
192 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) p. 22 (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
193 See Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The
situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 25 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf; see also The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 44 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true.
194 Knott dates the first policy to 1999, but Grigas discusses how the idea of compatriot outreach is much older. See Eleanor
Knott, Quasi-citizenship as a Category of Practice: Analyzing engagement with Russia’s Compatriot policy in Crimea, 21
Citizenship Studies 116, 118 (2016).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 31
195 Ibid. at p. 118.
196 Ibid. at p. 119.
197 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire 77 et seq. (2016).
198 Eleanor Knott, Quasi-citizenship as a Category of Practice: Analyzing engagement with Russia’s Compatriot policy in
Crimea, 21 Citizenship Studies 116, 120 (2016).
199 Ibid. at p. 117.
200 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire 91-92 (2016).
201 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 14 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true.
202 Ibid.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 32
Infringement of freedom of movement and forcible demographic shifts in Crimea
203 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights
(RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review:
Russian Federation, para. 22 (2017), available at https://www.uprinfo.
org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
204 Ibid.
205 All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001, National Structure of Population in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/.
206 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 48, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
207 Ibid. at 49 (In 2001, there were as an additional 13,602 Tatars. In the Russian census, “the Tatars - a group culturally
affiliated with the Volga Tatars and the Crimean Tatars - whose numbers rose from 13,602 to 44,996.”).
208 Gwendolyn Sasse, “What is the public mood like in Crimea?” Carnegie Europe (6 November 2017),
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74635.
209 See OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol, para. 126, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
210 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 46, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (1949)
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.
211 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 65, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
212 Ibid. at para. 126.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Written statement submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples, p. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/NGO/97 (Feb. 23, 2015).
216 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 67, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
217 Ibid. (citing the Judgment of the Supreme court of the Republic of Crimea, No. 12-401/2016, 17 November 2016, available at
http://sudact.ru/regular/doc/Q9mwes1Qfjb/).
218 Ibid.
219 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, International Criminal Court, para. 101 (4
December 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
220 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
paras. 14, 118 UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017); see also Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 2198 (2018) on humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine, para. 7, 23 January 2018.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 34
221 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2) (a) (vii), 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
222 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 116-17, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) (according to OHCHR, “one Ukrainian NGO claimed on 31 May
2016 that 2,200 prisoners had been transferred from Crimea to the Russian Federation.”).
223 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights
(RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review:
Russian Federation, para. 26 (2017), available at https://www.uprinfo.
org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
224 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 116, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
225 Ibid. at para 117.
226 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, para. 23(d),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (28 April 2015).
227 See e.g., Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2198 (2018) on humanitarian consequences of the war in
Ukraine, para. 7, 23 January 2018.
228 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, International Criminal Court, para. 79 (4
December 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf; OHCHR,
Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, para. 52,
UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
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Military conscription
229 OHCHR, Compilation on the Russian Federation for Universal Periodic Review, para. 83, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/30/RUS/2
(19 March 2018).
230 UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
Ukraine, G.A. Res. 72/190, para. 3(e) (19 December 2017); UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, G.A. Res. 71/205, para. 2(c) (1 February 2016).
231 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2198 (2018) on humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine,
para. 7, 23 January 2018.
232 Ibid. at para. 10.8.
233 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 45, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1907) (“It is forbidden to compel the
inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.”); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 51, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949) (“The Occupying Power may
not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing
voluntary enlistment is permitted.”).
234 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2) (a)(vii), 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 36
Treaty on Accession
235 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 120, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
236 Ibid. Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, International Criminal Court, para. 99
(4 December 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
237 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018, para. 129 (19 March 2018),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraineNov2017-Feb2018_EN.pdf (according to
OHCHR, each received a criminal fine of 25,000 RUB each (approximately 430 USD)).
238 Ibid.
239 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, International Criminal Court, para. 99 (4
December 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
240 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 121, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
241 Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia (unofficial translation),
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Accession_of_the_Republic_of_Crimea_to_Russia.
242 See OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol, para. 120, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) (according to Article 7 of the Treaty of Accession
between the Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation (18 March 2014)).
243 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights
(RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review:
Russian Federation, para. 55 (2017), available at https://www.uprinfo.
org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
244 Ibid.
245 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 120, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
246 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, International Criminal Court, para. 146 (14
November 2016), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
247 Ibid. at para. 176.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 37
de facto
Application of Russia’s anti-extremism laws
identifying or identified
perceived or actual
248 Ibid.
249 E.g., The “stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord;” “propaganda of…superiority…of persons on the basis of
their…ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation;” and “violation of…lawful interests in connection with a person's social,
racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion.”
See Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation,
Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, para. 29 (20 June 2012); see generally SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, The Structure of
Russian Anti-Extremist Legislation (November 2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/201/201011/20101129_3_10sova_en.pdf.
250 Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation,
Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, paras. 11, 31-45 (20 June 2012).
251 Ibid. at para. 74.
252 “‘Extremism’ is an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or changing violently the
constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security…” (emphasis added) Shanghai
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Article 1.1.3., 15 June 2001.
253 Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation,
Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, para. 31 (20 June 2012).
254 E.g., Human Rights Committee: “The Committee remains concerned that the vague and open-ended definition of
‘extremist activity’ in the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity does not require any element of violence or hatred
to be present and that no clear and precise criteria on how materials may be classified as extremist are provided in the law.”
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, para. 20, U.N.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 38
Federal List of
Extremist Materials.
Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (28 April 2015); The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was concerned that
the Federal Law on Combatting Extremist Activity might have been arbitrarily used to curb freedom of expression,
including political dissent, as well as freedom of religion, due to a vague and open-ended definition of extremist activity. See
OHCHR, “Item 2: Annual Report and Oral Update to the 34th session of the Human Rights Council” (8 March 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21316&LangID=E.
255 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 106, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) (citing the Annual Report of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Russian Federation for 2014, Moscow p. 99 (2015).
256 Peter Roudik, “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,” Library of Congress (30 November 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php.
257 Under Article 17.7 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation.
258 “[W]illful failure to satisfy the demands of the prosecutor” which results in the imposition of administrative fines for
“citizens” and legal entities. Organizations are issued warnings by the Federal Registration Service and media outlets are
issued warnings by the Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technologies and Communications (Roskomnadzor).
The local prosecutor’s offices can issue warnings to both. See Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on
Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation, Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, para. 53 (20 June 2012); see also Peter
Roudik, “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,” Library of Congress (30 November 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php.
259 Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation,
Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, para. 55 (20 June 2012) (stating that “Article 6 of the Extremism Law lacks clarity and it does appear
that an administrative offence is committed where a warning is not obeyed even though no extremist activity has been
engaged in. It thus recommends to reformulate the Law to make it clear that prosecution will only be brought…if that
person has engaged in extremist activity and has committed a criminal act and not for the mere failure to comply with the
warning.”
260 Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation,
Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, para. 76 (20 June 2012).
261 Article 13: “The dissemination of extremist materials and also the production or storage of such materials with the aim of
dissemination shall be prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation…A federal list of extremist materials shall be
posted on the "Internet" worldwide computer network on the site of the federal state registration authority.” Federal Law
No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 "On combating extremist activity" (as amended on 27 July 2006, 10 May and 24 July 2007 and 29
April 2008) (unofficial translation), Council of Europe, available at
http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/3707/file/RF_law_combating_extremist_activity_2002_am20
08_en.pdf.
262 Peter Roudik, “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,” Library of Congress (30 November 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php.
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263 Venice Commission, Opinion 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation,
Doc. CDL-AD(2012)016, para. 49 (20 June 2012).The Commission further noted that it “is aware from official sources that the
court decision is systematically based on prior expert review of the material under consideration and may be appealed
against in court. It nonetheless considers that, in the absence of clear criteria in the Law, too wide a margin of appreciation
and subjectivity is left both in terms of the assessment of the material and in relation to the corresponding judicial
procedure.”
264 Peter Roudik, “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,” Library of Congress (30 November 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php.
265 (“Federal List of Extremist Materials”), Ministry of Justice of the
Russian Federation, http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials (last accessed 31 May 2018).
266 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Inventing Extremists: The Impact of Russian Anti-
Extremism Policies on Freedom of Religion or Belief, p. 4 (January 2018), available at
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Inventing%20Extremists.pdf.
267 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Russia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, U.S. State
Department (28 July 2014), available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222473.pdf.
268 (“Criminal Code of the Russian Federation”), World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=467352.
269 Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The situation of
national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 28 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf.
270 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, para. 21,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (28 April 2015).
271 Peter Roudik, “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,” Library of Congress (30 November 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php.
272 Ibid.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 40
Criminal and administrative provisions used to target ‘extremists’, including by searches
and raids at religious sites such as mosques
Internet filtering legislation for “extremist content.”
Federal List of Extremist Materials
Federal List
Banning of Mejlis as an extremist organization
273 It significantly expands the scope of Russian criminal procedure law, tightens penalties for crimes related to terrorism
and extremism, reduces the age of criminal responsibility for these crimes, expands the rights of investigative bodies by
limiting the role of courts and the rights of accused, and introduces new crimes into the Criminal Code.
274 Resulting in individuals found guilty of committing extremism-related criminal and administrative offenses due to
publication and distribution. Peter Roudik, “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,” Library of Congress (30
November 2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php (citing Geraldine Fagan, “Russia: Muslims
Rush to Challenge Koran “Extremism” Ruling,” Forum 18 (27 September 2013),
http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1879).
275 Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The situation of
national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 28 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf; Human Rights
Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea,(2014), available at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/russia1114web.pdf.
276 SOVA Center (COBA), CrimeaSOS, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), ADC Memorial, Racism,
Discrimination and fight against “extremism” in contemporary Russia. Alternative Report on the Implementation of the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, p. 12 (2017), available at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT_CERD_NGO_RUS_28206_E.pdf.
277 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 188, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
278 Ibid. at para. 190.
279 ARTICLE 19, Mass Media Defence Centre, OVD-Info, PEN International, Roskomsvoboda, and the SOVA Center, Joint
submission to the Universal Periodic Review of the Russian Federation, p. 13 (9 April 2018), available at
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Russia-3rd-UPR-Updated-Submission-090418-FINAL.pdf. (In
September 2016, Ilmi Umerov was convicted under Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code.)
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 41
Limitations on free press, expression and association.
280 The Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), Member Profile: Crimean Tatars, p. 8 (October 2017),
available at http://unpo.org/downloads/2380.pdf.
281 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) (Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures Order), paras. 36, 93 (19 April 2017), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/
166/19394.pdf.
282 Ibid. at para. 106(1) (a).
283 UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
Ukraine, G.A. Res. 72/190, para. 3(j) (19 December 2017); UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, G.A. Res. 71/205, para. 2(g) (1 February 2016).
284 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
periodic reports of the Russian Federation, para. 19, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24, (20 September 2017); Council of
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2198 (2018) on humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine, para. 10.4, 23
January 2018.
285 For instance, the editor of Avdet, the Mejlis’ newspaper, received several warnings that materials contained extremist
content, “such as use of the terms ‘annexation’, and ‘temporary occupation’ of Crimea.” Likewise, ATR, the Crimean Tatars’
television channel was warned “against disseminating false rumours about repression on ethnic and religious grounds and
promoting extremism.” Both media outlets were denied re-registration by the Russian Federation, shutting down their
operations in Crimea. OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol, para. 156, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017); see also Crimean Human Rights Group
(CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights (RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki
Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Russian Federation, para. 66 (2017),
available at https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-
_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
286 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 92, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017);
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 42
Harassment, ill-treatment, surveillance and intimidation.
incommunicado
287 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2017, para. 139 (12 September 2017),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf. In 2017, A Crimean Tatar was
sentenced to prison for a year and three months for statements he had posted on Facebook in 2016 “mentioning the
‘oppression’ of the Crimean Tatars” and “referring to Crimea being ‘occupied’ and ‘annexed’.” For instance, Emil
Kurbedinov, one of the lawyers of the two deputy chairpersons of the Mejlis who were arrested for organizing protests,
found guilty in 2017 of “public distribution of extremist materials,” for reposting an article on social media about a 2013
public meeting of supporters of a banned and sentenced to 10 days in prison. Human Rights Watch, “Crimea: Defense
Lawyers Harassed” (30 January 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/30/crimea-defense-lawyers-harassed.
288 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe by Ambassador
Gerard Stoudmann on his human rights visit to Crimea, para. 44 (11 April 2016), available at https://rm.coe.int/168064211f;
OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 140, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
289 SOVA Center (COBA), CrimeaSOS, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), ADC Memorial, Racism,
Discrimination and fight against “extremism” in contemporary Russia. Alternative Report on the Implementation of the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, p. 16-18 (2017), available at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT_CERD_NGO_RUS_28206_E.pdf.
290 See OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol, para. 107, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
291 Ibid. at para. 92.
292 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights
(RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review:
Russian Federation, para. 9 (2017), available at https://www.uprinfo.
org/sites/default/files/document/russie_federation_de/session_30_-_mai_2018/js2_upr30_rus_e_main.pdf.
293 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018, para. 202 (19 March 2018),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraineNov2017-Feb2018_EN.pdf.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 43
A. The ethnically discriminatory character of automatic naturalization in Crimea
B.Automatic naturalization in Crimea as a violation of the right to a nationality
C.The collateral consequences of automatic naturalization in furtherance of ethnic
cleansing in Crimea
travaux
294 Patrick Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 180 (2016).
295 “It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.” Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Article 45, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1907).
296 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 118, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 44
national identity
right to nationality
because of
297 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 2(4), 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
(1945) (setting out the fundamental principle of respect for territorial integrity in international relations); Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G A. Res. 2625, U N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); UN General Assembly, Territorial integrity of
Ukraine, G.A. Res. 68/262(1 April 2014); UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, G.A. Res. 71/205 (1 February 2016). The Russian Federation is party to the 1907
Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. In 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court determined that Crimea was under
the occupation of the Russian Federation. See Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016,
International Criminal Court, para. 155-58 (14 November 2016), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otprep-
PE_ENG.pdf.
298 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 38, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017);
299 European Court of Human Rights, Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment of 22 December 2009, at para.
43.
300 See above, “Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law,” paras. 17-19.
301 See above, “Black Mauritanians, denationalization and Arabization,” para. 20.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 45
302 Tina Kempin Reuter, Dealing with Claims of Ethnic Minorities in International Law, 24 Connecticut Journal of
International Law 201, 206 (2009).
303 Nathan Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 29 (1980) (referencing
Av.C.3v.SR.1304, p. 2v.3).
304 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Decision on follow-up to the declaration on the prevention of
genocide: indicators of patterns of systematic and massive racial discrimination, paras. 2, 4, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/67/1 (2005).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 46
against
Nikolova v. CEZ
on grounds of
to nullify any law or practice which has
the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.
national identity
305 See above, “Jewish communities under Reich Citizenship Law,” paras. 13-14.
306 Court of Justice of the European Union, CHEZ v. Nikolova, Case C-83/14, Judgment, para. 59.
307 Ibid. para. 56.
308 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 14, on article 1, paragraph 1, of the
Convention, para. 114 (1993).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 47
ethnic minorities
I am not a serf to be flung, together with land,
into citizenship
309 UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
Ukraine, G.A. Res. 72/190 (19 December 2017).
310 Halya Coynash, “Russian Farce,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (11 July 2014),
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1405030257 (emphasis added).
311 See, e.g., Laura van Waas, Fighting Statelessness and Discriminatory Nationality Laws in Europe, 14 European Journal of
Migration and Law 243, 244 (2012) (“At both global and regional levels, [] international standards have come to impose
significant restrictions on the freedom of states to regulate access to nationality in accordance with their own sovereign
interests.”); Peter J. Spiro, New International Law of Citizenship, 105 American Journal of International Law 694, 697-98
(2011) (States are not free to disregard the otherwise lawful establishment of the bond of nationality between an individual
and a state, as Russia has done with respect to Ukrainian nationality within occupied Crimea.).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 48
Nottebohm
312 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15, 8 December 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (1948) (That provision states
that “everyone has the right to a nationality” and (Article 15(2)) “deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.”); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 24, 16 December 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171
(1967); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 5(d)(iii), 7 March 1966,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1996); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 9, 18
December 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1980); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 7 and 8, 20 November 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (1989); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 20, 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.123 (1970); African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 6, 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (1982). See generally Human Rights
Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34
(14 December 2009); UNHCR, Expert Meeting - Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness
resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality ("Tunis Conclusions") (March 2014), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/533a754b4.html.
313 See generally Human Rights Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of
nationality, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34 (14 December 2009); UNHCR, Expert Meeting - Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness
Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality ("Tunis Conclusions") (March
2014), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/533a754b4.html.
314 See, e.g., Bronwen Manby, Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study, Open Society Foundations (OSF), 43 (January
2016), available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/citizenship-law-africa-third-edition-
20160129.pdf (“[A] retrospective finding that a person was not a national and was issued nationality documents in error, or
arbitrary application of rules relating to loss by operation of law, are equally subject to rules prohibiting arbitrary
deprivation of nationality”).
315 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights and Arbitrary Denial of Nationality, para. 1, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/36 (11 April 1997); UN Human Rights Council Res. 13/2, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality,
at para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/2 (14 April 2010).
316 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article 9, 30 August 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (1961).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 49
all
those to whom the laws are applicable
Nikolova v.
CEZ
indiscriminate
317 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 27, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (1949).
318 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
periodic reports of the Russian Federation, para. 20, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24, (20 September 2017).
319 See above, paras. 26-27.
320 See paras. 120-124, above, and accompanying notes.
321 See European Court of Human Rights, Thlimmenos v. Greece, Application No. 34369/97, Judgment of 6 April 2000, at
para. 47.
322 See above, “Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic,” paras. 21-23.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 50
Nottebohm
overextending
D.H. and others v. Czech Republic
D.H.
323 Peter J. Spiro, Citizenship Overreach, 38 Michigan Journal of International Law 167, 172 (2017).
324 Ibid. at 173.
325 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law 110 (2d ed. 1979).
326 D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, ECtHR [GC], Grand Chamber Judgment of 13 November 2007, at paras. 202-03
(parents of Roma children required to choose between denying consent to special schooling and ordinary schools where
their children would be ostracized).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 51
Treaty on Accession
327 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, p. 80-1,
OEA/Ser/L/V/II.40 Doc 10 (11 February 1977).
328 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union & CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
review of the human rights situation under occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) (2017), available at
https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf.
329 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 34 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true.
330 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation, para. 23(c),
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (28 April 2015).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 52
331 Ibid. Article 8(4). See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 Article 17 (The right to respect of privacy,
family, home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation) (1988)
and Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27 Freedom of movement (Art.12) (1999) (the prohibition on
arbitrary interference requires all state actions to be reasonable under the particular circumstances and respect the
principle of proportionality); Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, Articles 5, 7(3), 12, Explanatory
Report, 6 November 1997, 2135 U.N.T.S. 213 (1997); Human Rights Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Human rights
and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, paras. 25-27, 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34 (14 December 2009).
332 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the
Succession of States, p. 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.l (Part 2) (1999).
333 UNHCR, Expert Meeting - Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss
and Deprivation of Nationality ("Tunis Conclusions"), paras. 25-26 (March 2014), available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/533a754b4.html.
334 See Eric L. Muller, Japanese American Cases–A Bigger Disaster Than We Realized, 49 Howard Law Journal 417, 455 (2006).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 53
Abo v. Clark
per se
Kuric v. Slovenia
335 Abo v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 806, 812 (N.D. Cal. 1948), rev’d in part on other grounds, McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766, 770 (9th
Cir. 1951). Nearly all renunciations were ultimately invalidated. See Eric L. Muller, Japanese American Cases–A Bigger
Disaster Than We Realized, 49 Howard Law Journal 417, 457 (2006) (92% of the 5409 applications for restoration of
citizenship were successful). The total number of renunciations at Tule Lake was around 6,000. Ibid. at 454.
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 54
336 Kuri and others v. Slovenia, ECtHR [GC], Grand Chamber Judgment of 26 June 2012, Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Vuini.
337 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, Judgment of 8
September 2005, para 180.
338 See, e.g., Walter Kemp, “Where are the borders? National identity and national security,” in Blood and Borders, Kemp et
al., eds. (2011).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 55
sedentarize
Draft Articles on expulsion of aliens
339 See Patrick Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 337-38
(2016).
340 Ibid. at 338.
341 Ibid. at 338-39.
342 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2198 (2018) on humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine,
para. 7, 23 January 2018.
343 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 126, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017);
344 UN General Assembly, Expulsion of aliens: Texts and titles of the draft articles adopted by the Drafting Committee on
second reading, International Law Commission Sixty-sixth Session, A/CN.4/L.797 (24 May 2012).
345 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 12(4), 16 December 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 56
Stewart v. Canada
346 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27 Freedom of movement (Art.12) (1999).
347 UN Human Rights Committee, Stewart v Canada, Merits, Communication No 538/1993, 1 November 1996, para 12.3-12.5.
348 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 67, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017).
349 See paras. 102-103 (prisoners unable to reject Russian citizenship).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 57
350 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1754 (2010) on the fight against extremism: achievements,
deficiencies and failures, para. 13.2, 5 October 2010.
351 CERD Committee, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/57/18, 2002, at p.
106.
352 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against noncitizens,
para. 20 (2004).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 58
353 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on Chile regarding the application of
anti-terrorism legislation to members of the Maphuche community engaged in protests, para. 15, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/CHL/CO/15-18 (7 September 2009).
354 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 177 (17 September 2015), available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/report-of-the-human-rightsassessment-
mission-on-crimea?download=true (referencing Articles 64, 67 and 70 of the Geneva Convention (IV))
355 Rule 104. Respect for Convictions and Religious Practices, ICRC Database Customary IHL, https://ihldatabases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule104.
356 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
para. 77, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017);
Written statement submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples, p. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/NGO/97 (Feb. 23, 2015).
357 Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The situation of
national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 27 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf.
358 Ibid. at 4.
359 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
periodic reports of the Russian Federation, para. 11, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24, (20 September 2017).
360 See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Articles 64, 65, 67 and 70, 12
August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 15, 16 December 1966, 99
U.N.T.S. 171 (1967).
REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AUTOMATIC NATURALIZATION IN CRIMEA 59
The Open Society Justice Initiative uses law to protect and empower people around the world.
Through litigation, advocacy, research, and technical assistance, the Justice Initiative promotes
human rights and builds legal capacity for open societies. Our staff is based in Abuja, Brussels,
Budapest, The Hague, London, Mexico City, New York, Paris, Santo Domingo, and Washington, D.C.
361 Natalia Shapovalova, European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, The situation of
national minorities in Crimea following its annexation, p. 28 (2016), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf.
Annex 976
Sergey Zayets (Regional Center for Human Rights) et al., The Fear Peninsula: Chronicle of
Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea (2015)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), Ukraine has provided only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine
has provided two certified copies of the full document with its submission.
THE PENINSULA OF FEAR:
CHRONICLE OF OCCUPATION AND
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
9 789662 403114
ISBN 978-966-2403-11-4
THE PENINSULA
OF FEAR:
CHRONICLE OF
OCCUPATION
AND VIOLATION
OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN
CRIMEA
This publication presents a
summary of factual documentation
of international law violation
emanating from the occupation
of the autonomous Republic of
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
(Ukraine) by the Russian Federation
military forces as well as of the
human rights violations during
February 2014 – February 2016.
The publication is intended for
the representatives of human
rights organizations, civil activists,
diplomatic missions, state
authorities, as well as educational
and research institutions.
COMPOSITE AUTHORS:
Sergiy Zayets
Regional Center for Human Rights
Olexandra Matviychuk
Center for Civil Liberties
Tetiana Pechonchyk
Human Rights Information Center
Darya Svyrydova
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
Olga Skrypnyk
Crimean Human Rights Group
THE PENINSULA OF FEAR: CHRONICLE OF OCCUPATION AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
УДК 341.223.1+342.7.03](477.75)’’2014/2016’’=111
ББК 67.9(4Укр-6Крм)412
Composite authors:
Sergiy Zayets (Regional Center for Human Rights),
Olexandra Matviychuk (Center for Civil Liberties),
Tetiana Pechonchyk (Human Rights Information Center),
Darya Svyrydova (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union),
Olga Skrypnyk (Crimean Human Rights Group).
The publication contains photographs from public sources, offi cial websites
of the state authorities of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the occupation
authorities, Crimean Field Mission for Human Rights, Crimean Human Rights
Group, the online edition Crimea.Realities / Radio Svoboda and other media,
court cases materials.
‘The Peninsula of Fear : Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights
in Crimea’ / Under the general editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk.
Second edition, revised and corrected. – Kyiv: KBC, 2016. – 136 p.
ISBN 978-966-2403-11-4
This publication presents a summary of factual documentation of international law violation
emanating from the occupation of the autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol (Ukraine) by the Russian Federation military forces as well as of the human
rights violations during February 2014 – February 2016. The publication is intended for the
representatives of human rights organizations, civil activists, diplomatic missions, state
authorities, as well as educational and research institutions.
УДК 341.223.1+342.7.03](477.75)’’2014/2016’’=111
ББК 67.9(4Укр-6Крм)412
ISBN 978-966-2403-11-4 © S. Zayets, O. Matviychuk, T. Pechonchyk,
D. Svyrydova, O. Skrypnyk, 2016
3
Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PART 1. The Occupation of Crimea: Chronicle of Seizure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PART 2. International Legal Aspect of the Occupation of ARC and the City of
Sevastopol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Overview of the Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1. International Legal Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2. Regulatory Legal Acts of Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3. Regulatory Legal Acts of the Authorities of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and Self-Proclaimed Authorities of the Crimean Peninsula . . . . . 28
2.4. Regulatory Legal Acts of the Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5. International and national structures Regarding the Status
of Human Rights in the Crimea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
PART 3. The Aftermaths of the Occupation: A Political Repressions System. . . . . . . . 37
3.1. Characteristics of Repressions in Crimea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2. The ‘Risk Groups’ in the Political Repressions System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3. Prosecution of the Real or Alleged Supporters of the State Sovereignty
of Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4. Prosecution of Non-Violent Exercise of the Freedom of Thought,
Conscience and Religion, Freedom of Expression and Information,
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association and Other Rights
and Liberties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5. Repressions Against the Crimean Tatar People as a Systemic Organized
Opposition to the Occupation Regime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6. Repressions Against any Forms of an Independent Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4
PART 4. A Year After: Main Violations of Human Rights in Crimea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1. The First Victims of the Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2. Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea . . . 58
Abducted persons, which were found. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Abductions and Disappearances of Individuals, whose Location
is Currently Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3. Criminal Prosecutions for Political Reasons, Unlawful Arrests
and Searches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4. Forced Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5. Violation of the Right to the Freedom of Movement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.6. Persecution of the Crimean Tatar Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.7. Displacement of the Civilian Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.8. Persecution of Dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.9. Pressure on Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.10. Bans on Rallies and Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.11. Religion Under the Government’s Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.12. Crimean Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.13. Victims of the ‘Russian Justice’ in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM PART 3
45
3.4. Prosecution of Non-Violent Exercise of the
Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion,
Freedom of Expression and Information, Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly and Association and Other
Rights and Liberties
“The personnel of the ATR TV channel lawfully working in Crimea [...] became
persona non-grata not only for the offi cial authorities but also for “peers”.
Recently, the two Crimean Tatar cultural institutions warned us about the
impossibility of fi lming. They referred to a letter from the Ministry of Internal
Policy and Information of the RC, where it was recommended not to allow
the journalists enter their territory [...] And can we breathe at home? If it
goes on, we will be denied the medical care in outpatient clinics, not sold the
goods in grocery stores, asked out of public transport, obliged to wear the
Yellow star and tattooed with the camp number on our hands”.
Deputy Director General of ATR TV channel Lily Bujurova.
Steering the course to the rapid establishment of an authoritarian regime, the
self-proclaimed Crimean authorities began regarding the basic fundamental rights
and freedoms as a threat to the consolidation and the existence of the occupation
regime. This puts in danger anyone nonviolently exercising the inalienable and inviolable
human rights, such as:
• Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (the pogrom at the church of
the Kyiv Patriarchate in the village of Perevalnoye in Simferopol district on July
1, 2014, followed by a refusal by the police to register a crime incident report,
the kidnapping of father Bogdan Kostetsky in Yalta on September 2, 2014; a
statement, in January 2016, of the Archbishop of Simferopol and Crimea of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate Clement about the dispossession
by occupation authorities of premises due to the alleged fi nancial debt, the case
of the Crimean Muslims, according to which Nuri Primov, Ruslan Zeytullaev,
Ferat Sayfullaev, Rustem Vaitov, Emir-Usein Kyky, Enver Bekirov, Muslim Aliyev
and Vadim Siruk were detained);
• Freedom of expression (the seizure of the editorial offi ce of the Center for
Investigative Journalism by the representatives of the so-called ‘Crimean selfdefense’
in June 2014 with the requirement to present the registration documents
and the lease contract; soon after the incident, the landlord demanded the
termination of the lease contract; persecution of journalists of the Crimean Tatar
PART 3 THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM
46
TV channel ATR, the case of Vladimir Balukh, who was sentenced to 320 hours
of compulsory work for planting the Ukrainian fl ag on the roof his house in
February 201617);
• Freedom of peaceful assembly (administrative prosecution of doctor Sergey
Dub for taking part in a peaceful demonstration on the occasion of the Ukrainian
National Flag Day on August 23, 2014, administrative prosecution of the Crimean
Tatars Saniye Ametova and Yunus Nemetullaev for organization of fl owers laying
on May 18, 201518, members of the Ukrainian Cultural Centre Veldar Shukurdzhiev
and Leonid Kuzmin for the events of March 9, 2015 and October 14, 2015);
• Freedom of association (criminal prosecution of the coordinator of the
Committee on the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People for operating ‘an
unregistered organization’, fi led complaint of the so-called Crimean Prosecutor
Natalia Poklonskaya on the recognition of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars an
extremist organization19, oppression in December 2015 of one of the oldest
non-governmental organizations the League of Crimean Tatar Women, led by
Safi nar, the wife of the leader of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev in
December 201520).
For the unlawful restriction of the fundamental rights and freedoms, the occupation
authorities use the repressive legislation of the Russian Federation. At the same
time, while in Russia, as a rule, this legislation is used selectively against certain individuals,
the Crimean authorities use a deliberate policy of the total prohibition to
the individuals disloyal to the authorities of the non-violent exercise of the freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion, freedom of expression and information, freedom
of peaceful assembly and association, and of other rights and liberties.
In this way, the characteristic of the ‘February 26th case’ under which several people
were arrested, including the Mejlis Deputy Chairman Akhtem Chiygoz, on allegations
of organizing riots and participating in them (a peaceful assembly that took
place on February 26, 2014) by the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner for Human
Rights Valeriya Lutkovska is also applicable to the general situation with ensuring
the fundamental human rights and freedoms in Crimea:
“This is a legal surrealism, I cannot fi nd another name for it, because
this man had the right to peaceful assembly on the Ukrainian territory
17 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/71522.html
18 http://avdet.org/node/12617
19 http://investigator.org.ua/news/174184/
20 http://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-regions/1937220-okkupantyi-vyidvoryayut-iz-ofi sa-ligu-kryimskotatarskihjenschin.
html
THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM PART 3
47
in accordance with the
Ukrainian law. At present,
there is no special
law regulating the issues
of peaceful assembly, but
we have a direct constitutional
norm, and this
man could freely exercise
his right to peaceful assembly.
This is absolutely
unobjectionable. In fact,
he is now locked up, and
this morning his home
was searched because
he exercised his right under
the Ukrainian Constitution. This, in my opinion, is an indicator of how
the occupying authorities disrespect the law, both Ukrainian national and
international21.”
The Russian lawyer Nikolay Polozov provided similar assessment of methods of persecution
selected by the occupation authorities:
“Riots in Russia are the already tried political process; it took place within the
“Bolotnaya Square case”. Now the same technology is transferred to Crimea
[...] if in other political cases the judges, prosecutors and investigators are
only a mechanism, in this case there is a direct personal interest of both the
judges and prosecutors, headed by Poklonskaya, which need to prove their
loyalty to the Motherland, to prove to Kremlin that they are really good new
Russians [...] The events took place in the territory of Ukraine, but Russia
judges for some reason. In view of the law – it is an absolute absurdity” 22
Special attention should be paid to the discrimination based on such grounds as nationality,
language, religion, political or other views, national origin, and ethnicity,
which is now common in all spheres of public life. Any of these prohibited grounds
(real or alleged) automatically limits the exercise of a person’s social and economic
rights. For instance, there is documented evidence of people without Russian passports
being denied medical treatment, re-registration of private property, employment,
even at a private enterprise etc.23
21 http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/30115-es-valeriya-lutkovska-aresht-vo-golovi-medzhlisukrimskotatarskogo-
narodu/
22 http://news.liga.net/news/politics/8753614-advokat_nazval_delo_chiygoza_zakazom_kremlya.htm
23 Based on the data of the Committee on the Rights of the Crimean Tatar people
Pictured: Searches in the Kholmovka village on
February 11, 2016
PART 3 THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM
48
3.5. Repressions Against the Crimean Tatar People
as a Systemic Organized Opposition to the
Occupation Regime
“Simply put, the occupation authorities currently prohibit the right of the
Crimean Tatars to speak with their voice. Due to the fact that today the
occupation authorities are disposing of Mejlis, which is an elected by the
Crimean Tatars national authority in accordance with the international
law, some experts said that Russia is preparing for worse actions towards
the Crimean Tatars”.
Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars24
Crimean Tatars are a systematically organized community with their own self-government
bodies having regional nuclei all over Crimea. They openly sabotaged both
the quasi-referendum on March 16, 2014, and the illegal elections on September 14,
2014. To overcome the non-violent resistance, the occupation authorities launched
a campaign to build the image of the ‘enemy from within’ and to prosecute Crimean
Tatars using both legal and extra-legal mechanisms.
“With the arrival of Russia to Crimea, the repressions against the Crimean
Tatars started ... The repressions against the Crimean Tatars with
an active pro-Ukrainian position never ended since March 2014. These
repressions are manifested in the form of abductions and murders of
activists, mass raids, arrests, and fines for participation in protests. In
this way, due to the repressions, about 10,000 out of 300,000 of the
(Crimean Tatar, – author) population were forced to leave the territory
of Crimea and are in the mainland Ukraine as of today,” (February
2015, – author), says one of the coordinators of the Committee on
the Rights of the Crimean Tatar people and a member of the Mejlis,
Abmedzhit Suleymanov.
Following are the examples of individual cases of repressions against the Crimean
Tatar people giving a general idea of the diversity of the methods used and the conscious
choice by the occupation authorities of such illegal policies:
• Illegal bans on entry to the territory of Crimea of the leaders and activists of
the Crimean Tatar people (including Mustafa Dzhemilev, Refat Chubarov, Sinaver
Kadyrov, Ismet Yuksel etc.);
24 http://censor.net.ua/n374710
THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM PART 3
49
• Criminal prosecution of peaceful demonstration participants in connection
with the ban on entry to the Crimea of the leader of the Crimean Tatar people
Mustafa Dzhemilev on May 3, 2014 Tahir Smedlyaev, Edem Osmanov, Rustam
Abdurakhmanov, Edem Ebulisov, Musa Abkerimov, who were found guilty of
using violence against a representative of authorities and punished by a fi ne or
conditional punishment25;
• Criminal prosecution for participation in the peaceful meeting on February 26,
2014 of the Crimean Tatar TV channel cameraman Eskender Nebiev, Deputy
Chairman of the Mejlis Akhtem Chiygoz and other Crimean Tatars Talyat Yunusov,
Ali Asanov, Mustafa Degeremendzhy;
• Automatic ban on all public events on the eve of the prayer commemoration
dedicated to the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars by a decree
of the self-proclaimed head of Crimea, ban on celebration of the Muslim holiday
Eid al-Fitr in July 2015;
• So-called ‘preventive conversations’ with the members of Mejlis, Crimean Tatar
activists, and ordinary representatives of the Crimean Tatar people;
• Searches and seizures in the Crimean Tatar cafes, private homes, Muslim schools
(madrassas), places of worship (mosques), in the premises of Avdet newspaper,
Crimea Charity Fund, the mosque of the Islamic Cultural Centre26, the editorial
offi ce of the Crimean Tatar newspaper Yani Dyunya27, in the building of the Mejlis
and houses the regional chairmen of the Mejlis by law enforcement agencies
and the representatives of the so-called ‘Crimean self-defense’;
• Court judgment on fi nding the director of a madrassa guilty of possessing
extremist materials delivered on August 27, 2014 in the Dzhankoy district
of Crimea, sentencing of Mustafa Yagyaev, mosque Imam in Crimea, for two
conditional years of prison term in July 2015 for openly opposing the Russia
occupation of the peninsula28;
• Court judgment on the eviction of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people,
Crimea Charity Fund and Avdet newspaper from their building, seizure of the
organizations’ accounts and the ban on ‘exercising ownership powers with
respect to the use and disposal of the property belonging to them’;
25 http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27415938.html
26 http://obozrevatel.com/crime/18360-repressii-v-kryimu-okkupantyi-podbrosili-v-mechet-zapreschennuyuliteraturu.
htm
27 http://investigator.org.ua/news/160650/
28 http://ru.tsn.ua/bbc/imam-poluchil-dva-goda-uslovno-z-za-kritiki-anneksii-kryma-453631.html
PART 3 THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM
50
• Compiling the liquidation lists of Crimean Tatars who should ‘either leave or
disappear’;
• Abduction of Crimean Tatars by unknown persons and the representatives of the
so-called ‘Crimean self-defense’ (Islyam Dzheparov, Dzhevdet Islyamov, Eskender
Apselyamov and others);
• Forcible takeover on January 26, 2015 of the only Crimean Tatar TV channel
ATR, earlier accused of extremism, on the charges that the channel ‘stubbornly
disseminates the idea of possible repressions on ethnic and religious grounds,
promotes anti-Russian sentiments in society, deliberately fuels distrust in the
government and its actions among Crimean Tatars, and constitutes an indirect
threat of extremist activity’.
A logical outcome of the pressure on the Crimean Tatars is the preparation by the
self-proclaimed Prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya of the ‘resolution on organization
activity ban’ under Article 9 of the Federal Law On Combating Extremist Activity29.
The legal basis for such action was ‘the requests of the Crimean Tatar organizations
and movements’ in the annexed peninsula30. According to the Russian legislation,
the fi nal decision should be taken by the occupation court. However, it is quite easy
to predict this decision.
The ban on the activity of the Mejlis on the basis of the Russian Law on Combating
Extremist Activity entails a trail of negative eff ects, from absolute prohibition of the
use of symbols of the Mejlis, which is actually the Crimean Tatar fl ag, criminal liability
for facilitating the work of the organization and its fi nancing, the prohibition
of dissemination of the organization’s materials and to the prosecution of Mejlis
members and their supporters.
“The ban on Mejlis as an extremist organization, which, however, had not
killed even a mosquito, means that all these people, all Crimean Tatars are
under the threat of criminal prosecution, even in case of complete inactivity,
simply based on the fact of any relationship to the Mejlis. And what relationship
– it will be decided by specifi c enforcers: all conditions for mass
repression for ethnic descent have been created in Crimea ...The gate of
the invisible Crimean Tatar ghetto is slamming” – said the journalist Aider
Muzhdabaev31
29 http://www.unian.ua/society/1265607-okupanti-vruchili-zastupniku-glavi-medjlisu-dokument-propripinennya-
diyalnosti-organizatsiji.html
30 http://15minut.org/article/dokument-na-osnovanii-kotorogo-zapretyat-deyatelnost-medzhlisafoto-
2016-02-15-18-33-18
31 http://fakty.ua/212722-muzhdabaev-ob-iske-pro-zapret-medzhlisa-vorota-nevidimogo-krymskotatarskogogetto-
zahlopyvayutsya
THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM PART 3
51
Concurrently with the propaganda campaign, a hostile information background
is created, when the Crimean Tatar people are indirectly blamed for all problems
of the social life of the Crimean peninsula, whereby the image of the ‘enemy from
within’ is created in the eyes of the population. In this connection, the cases of graffi
ti being drawn on the walls of private homes and places of worship of the Crimean
Tatar people have become frequent, for example, with the following content: ‘Tatars
get out of Crimea’32.
“Crimean Tatars are the natives of the peninsula. Due to speaking openly
against the occupation of Crimea, they are now the most vulnerable group.
De facto, the Crimean authorities have launched a systemic discrimination
against Crimean Tatars on racial, ethnic, and religious grounds. The
scale and nature of the repressions have become a threat to the lives and
security of Crimean Tatars. They include a series of abductions and disappearances,
gangster attacks on the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian civil society
representatives, large-scale searches of homes, mosques, madrassas,
libraries, and schools. Without exaggeration, with respect to Crimea and
Crimean Tatars once again, in the 21st century, the doctrine of the Russian
Empire, ‘Crimea without Crimean Tatars’, is being used and has been
adopted for implementation by a UN member state, the Russian Federation,”
said the Chairman of the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov.
3.6. Repressions Against any Forms of an Independent
Civil Society
The occupation authorities perceive the existence of any uncontrollable public institutions
in any area of public life as a direct threat. Just a few of them are listed
below:
• Culture sector. Invitations for ‘preventive conversations’ with the management
of Karman Art Center, which started in July 2014, were a vivid example. Karman
Art Center is probably the only Crimean community center of contemporary
culture, arts, and non-formal education. As a formal basis for such interest from
the FSB, the case of the confi ned theater director Oleg Sentsov was used. It is
impossible to identify the number of people from the cultural and other walks
of life that were interrogated by the FSB in this case that is targeted at searching
for potential members of the mythical ‘terrorist organization’ and are potentially
under the threat of arrest for political reasons. Due to the real threat to her
32 http://old.kpunews.com/krim_topic7_9614.htm
PART 3 THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM
52
personal freedom, health and even life, the head of Karman Art Center, director
Galina Dzhikayeva, had to leave Crimea;
• Professional employment. Civil servants, teachers, doctors and other professions
whose representatives belong to the professional groups or initiatives not
controlled by the authorities and/or have not received Russian passports. In
particular, Euromaidan SOS public initiative has documented evidence and a
scanned document on the renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship signed by a court
employee who, according to her, was forced to sign it and send it to the President
of Ukraine by the court management under the threat of losing her job;
• Education sector. Occupying authorities continue to implement total control
over the education system, the management of educational institutions, the
curriculum, and the choice of academic disciplines. Anything that goes beyond
the imposed concept of the ‘Russian World’ is ruthlessly rooted out. A good
example is the repression against the staff of the only Ukrainian gymnasium in
Simferopol33. The director of the educational institution was forced to quit by
the threats of the so-called ‘Crimean self-defense’ and the pressure from the
City Council back in April 2014. Currently, the gymnasium has been completely
reoriented to exercise Russian language of instruction. For the last 6 months
33 Prior to the annexation, Crimea had 7 schools with the Ukrainian language of instruction, 15 schools with the
Crimean Tatar language of instruction and nearly 600 schools with the Russian language of instruction.
Pictured: The so-called Prosecutor N. Poklonskaya, on February 15, 2016, handing a copy of
the claim to Nariman Dzhelyalov on the prohibition of activity of the Mejlis
of the Crimean Tatars
THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM PART 3
53
in 2014, according to offi cial data only, the number of pupils in the Ukrainianmedium
classes has been decreased by six times34. This picture is complemented
by the facts of the demonstrative destruction of Ukrainian books and textbooks
in front of students35 by school management.
The situation in Crimea as seen by designer Liza Bogutskaya from Simferopol:36
September 4, 2014 – “Just came back from a school meeting [...] The class
has 14 people. Most parents protested against the absence of the Ukrainian
language and literature. They were outraged by the fact that their children
cannot learn the state language of Crimea. As a result, we decided
to write a collective petition on adding the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
languages to the curriculum. I took the responsibility.”
September 16, 2014: “Crimea is overwhelmed with repressions. I blame
them directly on the election results [...] My dear Crimeans. Those who feel
that the repressive machine can be after you. Please hide your devices in a
safe place. I’m asking you to buy at a market an old laptop and to use it to
access the Internet. If they take it away, you won’t regret it. All your memory
cards, cameras, navigators, recorders need to be in safe places... Only now I
have realized that I could have saved my computers, phones, and media.”
September 24, 2014: “After my departure from Crimea, journalists from
Hromadske TV came to Simferopol. I saw this video for the fi rst time today.
This fi lm is not about me. This fi lm is about broken lives, the tragedies that
came to every family. My husband, a Ukrainian, is holding back tears as he
talks about our separation. Yesterday my friend, a Crimean Tatar, left from
Simferopol to Lviv with her sister. Their mother cried at the train station, as if
saying goodbye for good. My other friends, a family, Russians, husband and
wife, are leaving next week, leaving their children and grandchildren in Simferopol.
Rails lie ahead of them, with rows of trees on the sides. Then a long
drive to nowhere. Another friend, a Jew, is closing his business. And selling
the house. He leaves the day after tomorrow. This is the tragedy of all his life.”
[…]
February 23, 2015: “AGGRESSION! This is the main sign of the Russian
presence in Crimea. Crimeans have never been so hostile to each other.
They never raised the issues of national and territorial allegiance. The issue
of citizenship has never been a priority. But today, hearts and minds are
possessed by quiet hatred.”
34 The offi cial response of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea regarding the number of educational
institutions and the children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar language media dated December
24, 2014 No. 18357/01-27 by the request of the RF President’s Council for Development of Civic Institutions and
Human Rights.
35 Based on the data of the Committee on the Rights of the Crimean Tatar people
36 Published on her Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/liza.bogutskaya
PART 3 THE AFTERMATHS OF THE OCCUPATION: A POLITICAL REPRESSIONS SYSTEM
54
The self-proclaimed Crimean authorities deliberately implement the policy of destroying
any uncontrolled public institutions, regardless of whether they are taking
part in the non-violent resistance to the occupation regime or are simply doing
their specifi c business.
Conclusions
The Russian Federation, acting through the self-proclaimed Crimean authorities,
started political repressions against the civil society that are carried out using both
legal and extra-legal mechanisms. These repressions are based on a clear political
motive: a) consolidation and retention of the power of the occupying authorities in
Crimea; b) involuntary discontinuation of public activities by civil society representatives
having a point of view that diff ers from that of the authorities.
It should be noted that repressions in the Russian Federation in general do not
have a total character and are used selectively against specifi c individuals. However,
in Crimea the occupation authorities are actively using all the tools tried and
tested in the law and practice of the Russian Federation to suppress any alternative
point of view for the complete elimination of the independent civil society in
the peninsula.
There is also an established opinion that in the peninsula the strict authoritarian
models for further use in Russia in the
event of mass dissatisfaction with the
actions of the authorities are being
tried.
For the time being, in the peninsula
there are no eff ective mechanisms
of protection against the political repressions
of the civil society actors
organized by the occupation authorities.
As a result, people involved in
public activities not controlled by the
authorities and/or having, actually or
allegedly, a point of view that is diff erent
from the pro-government one are
faced with the choice: either to leave
Crimea or to stop any public activity
and keep silent.
Pictured: Conditionally sentenced to 3 years
and 6 months of imprisonment
under the February 26th case
Talyat Yunusov
55
PART 4
A Year A er:
Main Violations
of Human Rights
in Crimea1
1
4.1. The First Victims of the Occupation
Active operations in Crimea deployed by the Russian Federation
in March and early April 2014 resulted in at least three deaths. Two
years later, none of these cases have been properly investigated and
the murderers have not been brought to justice.
Reshat Ametov
Reshat Ametov, a 39-year-old Crimean
Tatar, was the fi rst person to disappear
on the peninsula. He was last seen on
March 3, 2014 at a pro-Ukrainian rally in
the center of Simferopol, in front of the
Council of Ministers of Crimea on Lenin
square, where he stood in a one-man
picket against the occupation of Crimea
by Russia.
Some video recordings show people dressed in camoufl age uniforms
taking the activist away in an unknown direction2.
1 This section has been prepared by Tetiana Pechonchyk (Human Rights Information
Center), Olga Skrypnyk (Crimea Human Rights Group), Sergiy Zayets (Regional Center for
Human Rights), and Darya Svyrydova (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union).
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11S2Vhkr-bc
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
56
One of Ametov’s relatives said in the comment to the Human Rights Watch organization
that Reshat was well-known among the Crimean Tatars, he often addressed
the authorities on local problems, and he regularly commented on political aff airs
on his Facebook page.
Ametov’s body with traces of violent death was found 10 days later in the village of
Zemlyanichnoye in Belogorsk district. The death was caused by a knife stab into the eye.
‘The body was terribly disfi gured. He had knife wounds and bruises everywhere.
One eye was missing. He had a plastic bag on his head.’
Ametov’s wife Zarina, in her interview for Der Spiegel newspaper, September
2014.
At the beginning of April 2014, the Investigation Committee of the Investigation
Department of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Crimea opened a criminal
investigation of the murder of Reshat Ametov. However, in 2015 the case was suspended:
the investigators failed to identify the persons involved in the crime.
“It was suspended on the grounds that the alleged killer is taking part in the
war. But, sorry, the killer is not one person. There have been at least fi ve-six
people. All of this is a fairy tale, a pack of lies. In the video everything is clear
and the faces are visible”.
Zarina Ametova, in the interview for QHA, February 16, 2016
In February 2016, the investigation into the killing was resumed in Crimea.
Reshat Ametov had three children; at the time of his death, the youngest was
2.5 months old.
Sergey Kokurin
36-year-old warrant offi cer Sergey Kokurin died on
March 18, 2014 in Simferopol during the storming of
the 13th Photogrammetric Center of the Main Directorate
of Operational Support of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.
According to the forensic examination, the Ukrainian
military was killed by two 5.45 calibre bullets a Kalashnikov
assault rifl e, on an upward trajectory (Sergey was
in the tower).
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
57
According to the military who were guarding the photogrammetric center, for three
days before the attack the entire area around the military unit had been controlled
by ‘the Crimean self-defense’ and the Russian military. The tower where the warrant
offi cer Kokurin was killed and Ukrainian offi cers were wounded was under the fi re
from below, as evidenced by the bullet holes in the sheeting of the tower.
The Ministry of the Interior of the Crimea reported that the Ukrainian military man
was shot by an ‘unknown sniper’, who allegedly was shooting at the representatives
of ‘the Crimean self-defense’ too.
‘According to preliminary reports, the shots were going in two directions from one place.
An unknown sniper from the window of a building under construction located in close
proximity to the military unit shot at the representatives of the ‘self-defense’, who were
checking the unfi nished building after a report on the presence of armed men there,
and he shot in the direction of a Ukrainian military unit located nearby.’
From the statement of the Interior Ministry of the Crimea, Ukrinform, March 18,
2014.
The deceased Sergey Kokurin had a 4-year-old son, and his wife was expecting their
second child.
Stanislav Karachevsky
The murder occured on April 6, 2014 in the
village Novofedorovka in Crimea, in a hostel
of the Ukrainian military personnel who
served at the Saki base; the military were
leaving for the mainland Ukraine.
That evening, Major Stanislav Karachevsky,
32, helped Captain Artem Yarmolenko pack
things, as they were getting ready to be
moved to mainland Ukraine.
He was going home with another friend.
They passed the checkpoint of the military
unit, where the armed invaders of Russia kept watch.
According to witnesses, the military quarreled ‘on the basis of personal animosity’.
The Russians were armed, the Ukrainian military were not. Stanislav Karachevsky
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
58
tried to run away and hide in the hostel, but was caught and shot with one bullet
in the torso and one in the head. Captain Yarmolenko managed to hide in a room.
‘I was also preparing to move when I heard some clapping sounds like
shots. I went out to see stun grenades thrown inside the hostel. Russian
military were running through the corridors with grenades. ‘What are they
doing here?’ our men shouted. ‘What’s the matter?’ The Russians did not
respond and went on storming the hostel. Then I heard shots.’
Soldier Andrey (as his relatives still live in the Crimea, he asked not to mention
his surname) in an interview to the Facts newspaper, March 2014.
The murder charge under Art. 105 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
was brought against Evgeny Zaytsev, a Russian sergeant.
The case was considered in the Crimean garrison military court by the judge Rizvan
Zubairov, who previously worked in the Grozny garrison military court of the Russian
Federation.
According to the Crimean Field Mission, on March 13, 2015 the sentence was
imposed within this criminal case under Article 105 ‘Murder’. According to S. Karachevsky’s
brother-in-law, the Russian Sergeant Evgeny Zaytsev was conditionally
sentenced to two years in prison for the murder of the Ukrainian Major. The defendant
Evgeny Zaytsev has not been placed in custody during the investigation and the
trial, continuing to perform military service in the same mode as before the murder
of S. Karachevsky.
Stanislav Karachevsky is survived by his wife and two children.
4.2. Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the
Occupation of Crimea
The seizure of Crimea by the Russian Federation was accompanied by abductions
and tortures of pro-Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists, volunteers helping the
Ukrainian army as well as journalists, photographers, workers of culture and art who
openly spoke against the occupation of Crimea or documented the events taking
place on the peninsula. However, some ordinary people have been mistaken for the
alleged “representatives of radical organizations’.
The body of one of the abductees (Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar) was later found
with the signs of tortures. Another several individuals (Ivan Bondarets, Vladislav
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
59
Vashchuk, Vasily Chernysh, pro-Ukrainian activists) are still not found. Some of the
abductees managed to escape. They told about interrogations, humiliation, tortures,
and inhuman treatment they went through. Two years after, none of these
cases have been investigated by the so-called Crimean authorities, nobody has
been punished. Moreover, forced disappearances in the Crimean peninsula still
continued in 2015.
Abducted persons, which were found
Andrey Shchekun and Anatoly Kovalsky
On March 9, 2014, a birth anniversary of famous Ukrainian writer Taras Shevchenko,
‘the Crimean self-defense’ of Simferopol abducted two Ukrainian activists, Andrey
Shchekun and Anatoly Kovalsky.
Andrey Shchekun is one of the leaders of ‘Euromaidan-Crimea’ movement and the
head of Crimean Center for Business and Cultural Partnership ‘Ukrainian House’. He
was involved in promotion of Ukrainian culture in Crimea, helped to open Ukrainian
schools, represented the interests of Ukrainian community, openly supported the
independence of Ukraine, organized demonstrations in the support of Euromaidan
movement.
Anatoly Kovalsky is an economist, scientist, and civic leader.
‘On March 9, a meeting in honor of Taras Shevchenko’s birthday in addition
to a rally against the March 16 referendum on Russia’s annexation
of Crimea was planned to take place. We received a small package from
Kyiv with the Ukrainian national symbols, such as ribbons and fl ags... Anatoly
Kovalsky and Crimean activist Andrey Shchekun went to the railway
station to meet the package. Shchekun came on board, while my father
remained on the platform. Shchekun was apparently recognized by his
stubble. A large group of guys burst into the car, and the activist was literally
pushed out from the car to the platform, my father was surrounded
too. They were beaten, not so as to hurt physically, but rather in order to
humiliate.’
From the interview of Sergey, Anatoly Kovalsky’s son, to the Human
Rights Information Center on March 9, 2014.
The activists were taken somewhere near Chongar and kept in basements in inhuman
conditions. They were held by the representatives of ‘Crimean liberation army’
organized by Igor Strelkov (Girkin), a terrorist and retired FSB offi cer.
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
60
Andrey Shchekun was regularly severely tortured.
‘They stripped me naked, put me on a chair, tortured with electric current,
and beat on my shoulders. When I fell, they kicked me in the chest, hitting
like they were obviously professionals... I was interrogated in turn by
FSB and the guards. I was suspected to have contacts with Right Sector,
though ‘Euromaidan-Crimea’ was not connected with this organization.
They asked about our fi nancial resources, but we were fi nanced by ourselves.
FSB offi cers suspected that I attempted to disrupt the ‘referendum’
planned on March 16, so they tried to fi nd out on which electoral precincts
I intended to do this. FSB were less cruel, but the guards completely took
it out on us: in the morning, they used to come to the ward and to shoot
at people from airguns, laughing idiotically. Once they shot through my
hands.’
From the interview of Andrey Shchekun to the Center for Journalist Investigations
and ‘Fakty i Kommentarii’ newspaper, February 27, 2015.
The Crimean Archbishop Kliment
tried to negotiate for release of Andrey
Shchekun and Anatoly Kovalsky.
On March 20, 2014, the activists
were released on the Crimean border
as a result of an exchange. Andrey
Shchekun was immediately directed
to a hospital in the Kherson region.
After his release, Anatoly Kovalsky
said that he preserved the hope of
freedom due to Ukrainian songs he
sang while captive.
Pictured: Andrey Shchekun Pictured: Anatoly Kovalsky
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
61
Yury Shevchenko
Yuri Shevchenko, a young man from
Pavlohrad in Dnipropetrovsk region
who was not an activist and was
not interested in politics, happened
to be put in the same basement
previously shared by Shckekun and
Kovalsky. He was visiting his friend in
Simferopol but was detained on the
Simferopol railway station because
he was taken for ‘an activist of some
radical organization’.
‘These people were very aggressive. When I asked whether they were the
militiamen, they simply twisted my arms behind my back, handcuff ed
me, and threw me in a car, on the fl oor between front and rear seats. They
yelled, ‘You jerk, moron, came here to rain on our parade’. Then a man on
a front seat drew out a knife and threatened to cut me in pieces right here.
And he cut a piece of my ear … .’
From Yury Shevchenko’s interview to the Belarusian edition ‘Novy Chas’,
March 22, 2014.
According to Yury, he was brought to the unknown place, thrown out on the street,
severely beaten right on the pavement, and then handed over to another group. If
the former by description, was similar to so-called ‘Crimean self-defense’, the latter
was dressed in ‘Russian birch’ uniform; they were masked men with radiosets and
machine guns. Some of them said, ‘Shoot his f…ing legs.’ And Yury was shot in both
legs; the bullets were extracted in Kherson, more than a week later.
Andrey Shchekun and Yury Shevchenko in the
hospital a er their release
In the Crimean capture, Yury Shevchenko had a piece of ear cut and his legs shot through.
Photo by: novychas.info
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
62
Yury was dragged into some room, thrown face down on the fl oor, where he laid in
a pool of his own blood, and then stripped to his underpants and tied to a chair with
tape so that it was impossible to move.
Then Shevchenko was brought to the rest of the hostages. Here they were all blindfolded,
they were not even taken out to the toilet and had to ‘soil themselves’ for
several days. Yury says that he ‘was still lucky’ though. Because of his severe wounds
he was not bothered in particular, and even was allowed to sleep on a mattress,
while the others huddled either on the fl oor or on the chairs.
Aleksandra Ryazantseva, Ekaterina Butko, Elena Maksimenko, Oles Kromplyas,
Evgeny Rakhno
On March 9, 2014, at Armyansk checkpoint near the entrance to Crimea from the
Kherson region, the unidentifi ed armed men detained two cars with AutoMaidan
activists Alexandra Ryazantseva and Ekaterina Butko, journalist Elena Maksimenko,
photographer Oles Kromplyas and their driver Evgeny Rakhno.
After the Ukrainian fl ag was found in the trunk, the girls were put on their knees,
searched, during which a tattoo dedicated to the Heavenly Hundred was noticed on
Alexandra Ryazantseva’s hand.
‘They wanted to cut off my hand, they cut off my hair. They began to drag women
by hair, beat Katya Butko with a buttstock, they told us, ‘Run in the fi eld, and
we’ll shoot at you; those who are lucky will be wounded, the rest killed.’
From Alexandra Ryazantseva’s speech in Ukrainian Crisis Media Center,
March 18, 2014.
After several hours of abuse, the detained activists and journalists thrown into the
basement of the traffi c police station. The same evening, the prisoners were transferred
near Sevastopol. They were held on the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in
solitary confi nement and interrogated about the actions organized by AutoMaidan,
their fi nancing and the Members of the Parliament supporting them.
‘The group comprised men from “Berkut” riot police, the most angry, they
attacked us and yelled at us. One of their alleged chiefs, obeyed by others,
came up to me. He held a big knife, saying, ‘I collect ears. Which do you prefer
to have cut off , left or right?’ Then he cut off both of my running shoes
tongues. After that, he ordered to the others to put all our documents in the
package and burn them. And he threatened to rape us fi rst and then shoot.’
From the interview with Ekaterina Butko, Ukrainian Pravda. Life,
March 20, 2014.
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
63
They were released on March 11, 2014. The girls said they survived by a miracle and
owed their salvation to the activists who raised the alarm. They said that, when releasing
them, the captors tried to make an impression that the situation in Crimea
was stable and calm.
Aleksey Gritsenko, Natalia Lukyanchenko and
Sergey Suprun
On the night of 13-14 March 2014, the AutoMaidan
activists Aleksey Gritsenko, Natalia Lukyanchenko
and Sergey Suprun were abducted. Aleksey is the son
of Anatoly Gritsenko, Member of the Parliament of
Ukraine.
The activists on two AutoMaidan cars carried humanitarian
aid for Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea. The aid consisted
of food, socks, underwear, electric torches, cigarettes,
etc.
Before the abduction, the unidentifi ed people
chased the AutoMaidan activists by car and opened
fi re. Then the volunteers were taken to the recruit-
Aleksandra Ryazantseva and Ekaterina Butko
Aleksey Gritsenko
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
64
ment offi ce in Simferopol. As a result of negotiations several days after the abduction,
on March 20, they were released near Chongar.
‘In our car there was also a guy with his legs shot. Then, he was taken to
a hospital because his wounds began to fester. After that, the guys were
tortured and interrogated for several days. And fortunately, that night we
fi nally were taken away.’
From Aleksey Gritsenko’s interview to UNN agency on March 20, 2014
Yury Gruzinov and Yaroslav Pilunsky
Yury Gruzinov and Yaroslav Pilunsky were abducted on March 16, 2014 the day of
so-called ‘referendum’ in Simferopol.
Yury Gruzinov is a cameraman, a Russian citizen who fi lmed the events of Maidan
and was wounded by a law enforcement offi cer on Grushevsky street in Kyiv. Yaroslav
Pilunsky is a well-known Ukrainian cameraman. Both were the members of the
Babylon 13 Cinematographers Association which fi lmed the protests at the Maidan
Nezalezhnosty in Kyiv, the Crimean events, and then the eastern Ukraine hostilities.
They were asked to come to one of the election polling stations from where they
were abducted.
‘The self-defense perceived us to be very suspicious. Besides, we had no accreditation.
They applied force and pulled us in the street and loaded us separately
into separate vehicles. Then we saw weapons. There were 10-12 men.
Eventually, we were taken to the headquarters.’
From the interview with Yaroslav Pilunsky, TSN, March 22, 2014
After the talk, the cameramen were about
to be released, but the captors learned
that Yaroslav’s father was Leonid Pilunsky,
the VR ARC deputy who opposed the
referendum.
The cameramen of the Creative Association
‘Babylon 13’ were placed in diff erent
rooms without windows. For several days,
they were held captives in Chongar; Yury
Gruzinov was tortured and repeatedly
beaten.
Pictured: Yury Gruzinov and Yaroslav
Pilunsky
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
65
They were released on March 20, 2014 near Chongar as a result of negotiations of
the Ukrainian side with the local self-proclaimed authorities and the RF leadership.
During the active occupation of Crimean peninsula by Russia, many other individuals
were abducted. The exact number of missing persons, abductees, victims of
tortures and abusive treatment remains unknown. Nobody has been brought to
justice for these serious crimes.
Abductions and Disappearances of Individuals,
whose Location is Currently Unknown
Since March 2014, numerous people disappeared in Crimea. As evidenced, at least
9 individuals have been violently abducted (see below).
As some of the abducted people were Crimean Tatars, and the reports of their disappearance
have lately become more frequent, and the investigative actions of the
authorities are not believed to be eff ective, the Crimean Tatar community of the
peninsula is experiencing an increasing distrust towards the local authorities, which
is extended to the Russian authorities in general.
Following the talks between the relatives of the missing Dzhepparov, Islyamov and
Zinetdinov, Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov and the representatives of the Investigative
Committee of the Crimea in 2014 established a ‘contact group’ to facilitate
the investigation of the disappearances.
A serious problem is the possible involvement of the so-called ‘Crimean self-defense’
in some of these episodes. As the authorities are often said to be involved in
the kidnappings, and the actual perpetrators of crimes are never found and brought
to justice, the people of Crimea suppose that the government either is directly involved
in the crimes or covers them. The situation is exacerbated by the proposals
of the Crimean authorities to release the ‘people’s militia of Crimea from criminal
and administrative liability by recognizing their actions as ‘committed in an emergency
situation’.
A case which stands out, is the recent disappearance Аleksander Kostenko’s father.
Aleksander Kostenko is charged by the Crimean investigating authorities for alleged
involvement in the Maidan events. The relatives of the missing person and
Kostenko’s lawyer believe that the disappearance may be explained by the pressure
on arrested Alexandr Kostenko, who had previously reported regular beatings,
threats, and abuse.
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
66
Cases with evidence of forced abduction
One of the most high-profi le cases is the kidnapping and subsequent killing of
Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar, taken on 3 March at the central square of Simferopol
by unidentifi ed men in camoufl age uniforms (see the previous section).
Apart from Reshat Ametov’s case, several cases with identifi ed evidence of forced
disappearance have been recorded since March 2014.
Ivan Bondarets and Valery Vashchuk
Two Euromaidan activists, Ivan
Bondarets (born in 1990) and
Valery Vashchuk (born in 1985)
disappeared in early March 2014
in Simferopol.
The last time they got in contact
with their relatives was on March
7, at about 7:30. Vashchuk called
his sister and said that he and
Bondartsev had arrived in Simferopol, and complained about documents checking
and personal search at the station, he also said that “the coordinator would come
for them”, and then they would decide whether to stay in Crimea or return to Kyiv, to
Maidan. Valery also told his sister that they came on to the platform with unfolded
Ukrainian fl ag in their hands.
Neither of them got in touch with anyone after that. Both activists were members
of pro-Ukrainian movements. For two years already there is no information on their
whereabouts.
Both have young children in Rivne.
Vasily Chernysh
Vasily Chernysh (born in 1978), a resident of
Sevastopol, also disappeared in March 2014.
According to his relatives, he had earlier been a
member of the Security Department of Ukraine,
and participated in AutoMaidan movement.
He was a Ternopil-native, and in Sevastopol he
spoke Ukrainian.
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
67
People lost touch with him on March 15, 2014. The day before the ‘referendum’ on
the status of the Crimea he wrote his last Facebook post, and since then he has never
been seen or heard from.
‘Vasily Chernysh has disappeared, and there is indirect evidence that he
may be no longer alive ... Vasily was very bright, bold, and helpful person.
He and Sergey Hadzhynov helped me in Sevastopol to go around all police
stations and detention facilities to fi nd Katya and Shura ...’
Alexey Gritsenko, one of the AutoMaidan leaders, Facebook, March 3,
2015.
One of the Automaidan leaders Alexey said that during Euromaidan protests Vasily
was in Kyiv and then returned to Sevastopol, where he had an apartment. According
to the activist, they found out that Chernysh was taken from his apartment by
the police.
“The police came and took him with them. We found out through his
neighbor” that he was taken off .
Alexey Gritsenko, one of Automaidan leaders, in an interview for
‘Crimea. Realities’, November 6, 2015.
One of those who actively joined the search for Chernysh in the spring of 2014 was
the fi lm director Oleg Sentsov, who was later arrested by the FSS and charged with
terrorism.
Timur Shaymardanov, Seyran Zinedinov
At the end of May, 2014, two Crimean Tatars, members of the Ukrainian House organization,
were reported missing in Simferopol – the 34-year-old businessman
Timur Shaymardanov and the 33-yearold
hauler Seyran Zinedinov. They were
close associates, participated in demonstrations
against annexation of Crimea
and helped the Ukrainian military during
the blockage of their military units
by the ‘self-defense’ and ‘little green
men’.
According to Timur Shaymardanov, Leonid
Korzh, one of the activists of the
Ukrainian House, disappeared on May
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
68
22, 2014. On May 26, Timur Shaymardanov himself did not come home, and none
of his relatives or friends has seen him since then. He left the house in the morning.
At dinnertime, Timur was to pick up the child from school, but did not do so
and the contact with him had been lost since then.
Seyran Zinedinov was one of the coordinators in the search for the missing activists.
On May 30 he met Shaymardanov’s wife and told her that he had reason to believe
that both activists had been abducted by the ‘Crimean self-defense’. After this meeting
Seyran Zinedine did not return home.
According to Seyran Zinedinov’s relatives, there is a recording from the video surveillance
camera at the gas station where the activist was last seen before the abduction.
The recording shows a car stopping near the fi lling station and near the
activist (the distance does not allow telling the number and the make of the vehicle),
and the man was forced into the car. The relatives of the abducted person have
received no information about him or the results of the investigation since they
fi led their application to the police.
After Seyran’s disappearance his relatives found out from the mobile operator
the location of his phone, which was turned on several times after his disappearance.
His mobile phone was connected to the network from the recreation
and retreat center Dolphin, which is near Evpatoriya. When this became known,
Zinedinov’s friends tried to get there, but they were not allowed inside by the
guards.
Shaymardanov’s phones were turned on several times after his disappearance; his
family also tried to fi nd out from the operator the exact location where they got online.
However, they got no reply.
On July 31, 2014, the Prosecutor’s Offi ce of the Republic of Crimea reported, in response
to the request of the Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, that criminal
cases for murder were launched on the facts of the disappearance of Zinedinov and
Shaymardanov.
During the 113th session of the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva in March
2015 the Russian delegation stated that the investigation in Crimea was considering
several versions in the cases of disappearances of Timur Shaymardanov and
Seyran Zinedinov, the disappearance due to their commercial activities or voluntary
departure from Crimea. In both cases, the investigation does not consider the versions
of the violent nature of their disappearance and involvement of the ‘Crimean
self-defense’, which was declared by the witnesses. In this regard, the eff ectiveness
of investigation of these abductions raises doubts.
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
69
In November 2015, Shaymardanov’s family lawyer Emil Kurbedinov reported that
the Russian investigation has taken a number of investigative measures, but so far
there has been no result.
“There are no suspects. Almost all the Russian institutions were applied to;
requests were sent to all the morgues and police stations. The video from
the gas station, which depicts the car into which Shaymardanov could
have gotten had been investigated”.
From an interview with the lawyer of the Shaymardanov’s family Emil
Kurbedinov for ‘Crimea.Realities’, November 4, 2015.
Due to the inaction of the Ukrainian and Russian investigating authorities in respect
to the disappearance of Timur Shaymardanov, the human rights activists fi led
a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights against Ukraine and Russia.
According to Darya Sviridova, Lawyer of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights
Union, the complaint was fi led as the Crimean law enforcement offi cials refused
to give the aff ected party the case materials, and the Ukrainian law enforcement
offi cers did not conduct any investigation.
At the same time the case on the disappearance of Seyran Zinedinov was suspended
by the Russian investigative authorities. The representative of the victim, the
Crimean lawyer Alexander Lesovoy said that he did not try to appeal against the
suspension of the investigation, since Zinedinov’s relative have discontinued contact
with him.
With regard to information about the disappearance of Leonid Korzh, he was found,
and, according to Larisa Shaymardanova, he was not abducted.
Islyam Dzhepparov, Dzhevdet Islyamov
On September 27, 2014, the 18-year-old Islyam Dzhepparov and his 23-year-old
cousin Dzhevdet Islyamov were kidnapped in the village of Sara-Su near Belogorsk.
The young men were last seen on the road in the evening, not far from the shop
‘Kysmet’ (40th km of the Simferopol – Kerch highway): unknown people in black uniforms
fi rst searched the guys, and then pushed them in a blue Volkswagen Transporter
minibus with tinted glasses (registration number 755, region 82) and left in
the direction of Feodosia.
Dzhepparov’s father Abdurashid immediately reported to the police about kidnapping
of the son, but, according to him, law enforcement authorities were negligent
in searching the young people.
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70
A criminal case under the article
‘kidnapping committed
by a group of persons with
prior intention,’ was instituted
after Dzhepparov and Islyamov’s
disappearance.
Another disappearance of
the Crimean Tatars stirred
up the public. A few days
after the incident, near the
Abdureshit Dzhepparov’s
house in Sary-Su of Belogorsk
district a rally was
held. On the same day, the Head of Crimea Sergey Aksenov met with Abdureshit
Dzhepparov and the people that accompanied him. According to the activist,
the authorities assured that “the case would be brought to an end”. Two days later,
Aksenov arrived at Belogorsk to communicate with the resentful public. Following
the meeting, it was decided to establish the Crimean Human Rights Contact
Group, which, in addition to Dzhepparov, included lawyers, social activists and
relatives of the missing people.
More than a year passed since then, however, neither Russian nor Ukrainian law
enforcement agencies achieved any results in the search for the missing persons.
In addition, according to Abdurashid Dzhepparov, the law enforcement offi cials,
while investigating the cases, put pressure on the victims and witnesses.
“They held us until after midnight, interrogated about Islam, its various
branches, radicalism – as if I understood anything in it. I know that the
investigators need to collect information, but they should understand me
as a father – after all, my son is missing!”
From an interview with the father of Islyam Dzhepparov Abdurashid
for Deutsche Welle, November 2014.
According to Deutsche Welle, Dzhepparov’s eldest son Abdullah disappeared in
Syria in 2012. Perhaps he took part in military operations for the opposition together
with Dzhevdet Islyamov there. Later, Dzhevdet came back home, but Abdullah
did not.
The investigating authorities of the Crimea are checking the facts of Dzhevdet
Islyamov’s participation in the military operations on the side of the opposition in
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
71
the Syrian Republic and the possible connection between the said circumstance
and the incident.
Mukhtar Arislanov
On August 27, 2015, a resident of the Fountains
district of Simferopol Mukhtar Arislanov was
abducted. According to his wife, he went shopping
and never returned home.
According to Nurfi e Karakash, sister of Abducted
Narislanov the locals saw a few people
dressed in police uniforms putting Mukhtar
Arislanov get into the Mercedes Vito minibus.
After that, some of these people also got into
the minibus, and some to LadaPriora and drove
away in the direction of Simferopol.
The 45-year-old Mukhtar Arislanov worked as a PT teacher in one of the schools in
Simferopol district. He was a judo coach. The telephone connection with him was
lost in the afternoon of the same day.
The relatives went to the police, fi led fi le a missing person report; the police said
that they had nothing to do with the disappearance of Mustafa Arislanov. The Field
Human Rights Center reported that the investigation authorities put psychological
pressure on Arislanov’s wife in order to force her to withdraw the application on the
abduction.
As reported on the website of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
on the Republic of Crimea, a criminal case on the grounds of an off ense under
Part 1 of Art. 105 of the Criminal Code of the RF (murder) was opened.
Cases with no signs of forced disappearance
There are several more cases which give no reasons to suggest abduction, and
some of these cases are under investigation, but distrust to the investigation in
respect of the previous episodes (including, in particular, the murder of Reshat
Ametov taken away from the central square of Simferopol by unidentifi ed men
in camoufl age uniforms on March 3) give rise to a variety of versions, including
the involvement of law enforcement agencies or paramilitary forces in all these
episodes.
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
72
Edem Asanov
On September 29, 2014, the 25-year-old Edem Asanov
disappeared on his way to work from Saki to Yevpatoria.
According to Asanov’s sister Feride, he left his house
in Saki at 8:30 to catch the bus to Yevpatoria, where he
worked as a rescuer at a spa resort.
He was found hung up in an abandoned holiday center
in Yevpatoria on October 6. There was a suicide note
near Asanov’s body saying that he had a disease that
allegedly made him commit suicide. The relatives of the
dead fi rst said that Asanov could not commit a suicide,
but then urged journalists not to look for political implications
of his death.
Right after Asanov’s disappearance, it became known that a person with the same
surname appeared in the case of ‘Oleg Sentsov’s group’ which was allegedly preparing
acts of terrorism on the peninsula. It turned out later that it was Asanov’s
namesake with a diff erent patronymic.
‘There is a version that Asanov had the same surname as the person in
Sentsov’s case, and, allegedly, he was kidnapped incidentally. But when
they (kidnappers) found out that it was a diff erent person, they organized
a suicide to hide the crime. The relatives behave very strangely in this story.
If we say that it was a suicide and that everything was transparent why
were not we provided a death certifi cate? It gives rise to suspicion.’
From the interview of the Vice-Chairman of the Crimean Field Mission
for Human Rights Olga Skripnik to the GORDON, February 2015.
The Crimean Field Mission noted that the relatives set
Asanov’s funeral for an earlier date so there was no possibility
to establish traces of violence on his body.
Eskender Apselyamov
Eskender Apselyamov, 23, went missing on October 3,
2014, in Simferopol. Around 17.30 he went out from the
rented apartment in Trubachenko street in Simferopol
to work in a bakery (a 15-minute walk from home), but
never turned up at work. He was last seen in a shop near
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
73
his work where he bought cigarettes. Apselyamov’s phone turned on for 15–20
minutes in the evening on the day of his disappearance, but he discarded all calls.
Apselyamov’s relatives went to all hospitals, police stations, and mortuaries of Simferopol
after his disappearance, but he could not be found anywhere. According to
the relatives of the Crimean Tatar, he was fond of football and did not participate in
the political life of the peninsula at all.
There is still no information on the missing Apselyamov on the web site of the
Crimean Investigation Committee. Eskender’s mother Aishe Apselyamova said that
a criminal case for disappearance of her son was launched (she does not know under
which article), and the parents periodically meet the investigator.
‘I call him by phone and ask whether there is any news. Unfortunately,
there is no news.’
From an interview with Eskender’s mother, Aishe Apselyamova, for the
GORDON, February 2015.
Fedor Kostenko
On March 4, 2015, friends and family lost touch with Fedor Kostenko, father of Euromaidan
activist Alexander Kostenko arrested in Crimea.
Before his disappearance he had arrived in Kyiv to talk to the press about the arrest
of his son but was forced to rush back to Crimea after his second son phoned him to
say that the FSS had searched their apartment once again.
On March 3, he phoned and said that he entered Crimea, and then the contact with
him was lost. To date, his whereabouts remain unknown.
According to the Crimean Field Mission, Fedor Kostenko’s wife fi led an application
to the police about his disappearance. The document also states that on March 2
and 3 “near our apartment there were suspicious people, who obviously watched the
entrance and the apartment at the door and from the car”. The application states that
the presence of such “observers” can be confi rmed by the neighbors.
Fedor Kostenko’s son Alexander, a former Crimean policeman, has been charged
with deliberate infl iction of bodily harm on the grounds of ideological hatred, in
January 2014 on the Maidan in Kyiv, against the fi ghters of Berkut riot police unit
sent to Kyiv from Crimea (par. b of Part 2 of Art. 115 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation). He was beaten and tortured with electric current, and then
forced to write a confession. Kostenko was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months in
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
74
prison. Later, the Supreme Court of Crimea reduced the term of imprisonment to
3 years and 11 months.
The relatives of the missing person and Kostenko’s lawyer believe that the disappearance
of the detainee’s father may be related to the pressure upon his son who
had previously reported regular beatings, threats, and abuse.
4.3. Criminal Prosecutions for Political Reasons,
Unlawful Arrests and Searches
The Russian laws on extremism, and terrorism are used in Crimea for the purposes
of exercising pressure on the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists. Using Russian
law as a means of protection for themselves, the FSS, prosecutors, and the police
conducted more than a hundred illegal searches in the homes of the Crimean Tatars,
Euromaidan activists, and journalists, as well as in mosques, madrassah, temples,
editorial offi cers of TV channels and print media. The ‘Crimean self-defense’
often takes part in such searches, usually by surrounding the house under search
and not allowing in any lawyers, as well as by taking away personal belongings.
A more severe manifestation is unreasonable arrests and imprisonments; the
Crimea now has political prisoners. Criminal proceedings have been initiated even
in respect of the events that had occurred before the establishment of Russian control
over the Crimea or for the events that had taken place in Kyiv.
‘The Case of May, 3’
The charge: The use of violence endangering the lives or health of the persons
against a representative of authorities (part 2, Art. 318 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation), punishment: Imprisonment of up to ten years, illegal crossing
the state border of the Russian Federation (Art. 322 of the Criminal Code), punishment:
From a fi ne to imprisonment for up to six years.
The arrested persons: On October 16, 2014, Musa Apkerimov was arrested, followed
by Rustam Abdurakhmanov on October 17, 2014, Tahir Smedlyaev on October 22,
2014, Edem Ebulisov on November 25, 2014, Edem Osmanov on January 20, 2015.
Mustafa Dzhemilev, a well-known ativist and the leader of the Crimean Tatar People
was banned entry to Crimea on Marh 3, 2014. In response, the Crimean Tatars
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
75
came to the town of Armyansk, the entry point to Crimea, to support their leader
and express their protest against the ban. The meeting was attended by several
thousand Crimean Tatars, after which Natalia Poklonskaya, the prosecutor of the
Crimea, sent a resolution to the Investigation Committee and the FSS in order to
‘institute criminal proceedings against the persons responsible for the gathering,
under Articles 212, 318, and 322 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation’,
i.e., riots, acts of violence against a representative of authority, and illegal crossing
of the state border. The prosecutor’s offi ce and the court, which issued an
order for the arrest of fi ve people involved, did not even take into account the fact
that on 3 May the border of the Russian Federation in the Crimea had not been
equipped yet. The participants of the rally could not illegally cross the Russian
border because the border crossings and the border itself appeared only in June.
A week later, the protesters began to receive subpoenas, and subsequently
about 200 people were fined in the amount of RUB 10,000 to 40,000 for administrative
articles on ‘unauthorized meeting’ (20.2 of the Administrative Code of
the Russian Federation) and disobedience to the police (19.3 of the Administrative
Code). This was followed by a wake of raids on the homes of the participants
of the peaceful assembly of May 3 under the pretext of searching for weapons,
Pictured: Motor highway in Armyansk, Mustafa Dzhemilev attempts to enter Crimea with
the support of Crimean Tatars
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
76
drugs, and forbidden extremist materials. In October, 4 Crimean Tatars were arrested:
Musa Apkerimov, Rustam Abdurakhmanov, Tahir Smedlyaev, and Edem
Ebulisov. On January 20, 2015, Eden Osmanov was arrested, the son of Mustafa
Osmanov, the activist of Crimean Tatar national movement and the participant
of Euromaidan in Kyiv.
Later all the fi ve people were released from custody on bail. It is known that subsequently,
four of them were found guilty under Art. 318 of the Criminal Code of
the RF ‘The use of violence against a representative of authority’ and sentenced
to various punishments: Musa Abkerimov – to 4 years and 4 months of conditional
imprisonment, Edem Ebulisov – to a fi ne of 40,000 rubles, Edem Osmanov – to
one year of conditional imprisonment, Tahir Smedlyaev – to 2 years of conditional
imprisonment.
‘The Case of February, 26’
The charge: Organization of and participation in the riots (Art. 212 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation), punishment: Imprisonment of three to fi fteen
years; causing death by negligence (Art. 109 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation), punishment: Imprisonment of up to two years.
The arrested persons: Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy chairman of the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people, was arrested on January 29, 2015, followed by Eskender Kantemirov
on February 7, 2015, Eskender Emirvaliev on February 18, 2015, and Talyat
Yunusov on March 11, 2015, and
also Eskender Nebiev, Mustafa
Degermendzhi, Ali Asanov and
Arsen Yunusov.
On February 26, 2014, a rally
organized by the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people in support
of Ukraine’s sovereignty and
the status of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea was held in
Simferopol (the capital of the
Crimea) near the Parliament
of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea. The event was attended
by several thousands of
Crimeans.
Pictured: Akhtem Chiygoz, the Deputy Head of the
Crimean Tatar People Mejlis
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
77
On March 21, 2014, Russia adopted the law of the Russian Federation No. 6-FKZ on
the inclusion of the Crimea into the Russian Federation. The law itself came into
force on 1 April, 2014, so Russia recognizes its jurisdiction in the Crimea from that
day. Despite this, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation began to
institute criminal proceedings for the events that occurred before April 1, and are
not in the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, according to Article 70
of Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 on protection of civilians during war, an
occupying power shall not arrest, prosecute or convict protected persons for acts
committed or opinions expressed before the occupation or during a temporary interruption
thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war.
In January 2015, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation instituted
criminal proceedings for organizing of and participating in the riots on February
26, 2014. It is under this case that Akhtem Chiygoz, the deputy chairman of the
Mejlis, was arrested and remains in custody. His house was searched. As a part of
this case, FSB searched the premises of the Crimean Tatar channel ATR and removed
the video recordings of the events of February 26. The investigators believe that
two people died by accident during these events (one of them died from a heart
attack). Three more Crimean Tatars were arrested and more than 150 people were
questioned. The investigators intimidated the arrested Eskender Emirvaliev to give
false testimony against Akhtem Chiygoz, but he refused to do that. Ahtem Chiygoz
himself did not plea guilty and is sure that the charges are made up and have political
reasons.
Under this case Talyat Yunusov was found guilty under Part 2 of Art. 212 of the Criminal
Code of the RF (participation in mass riots, accompanied by violence and destruction
of property) and sentenced to three and a half years of conditional imprisonment.
Eksender Nebiev was found guilty of participation in mass riots under Part
2 of Art. 212 of the Criminal Code of the RF and sentenced to two and a half years
of conditional imprisonment with two years’ probation. Currently, six more persons
are under investigation – Akhtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzhi, Ali Asanov, Eskander
Emirvaliev, Eskander Kantemirov, Arsen Yunusov.
In February 2016, the Court of Crimea decided to return the case for further pre-trial
investigation.
‘The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’
The charge: Establishment of a terrorist organization and participation in the activities
of such organization (Art. 205.5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation),
punishment: Up to life imprisonment.
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
78
The arrested persons: Ruslan Zeytullaev, Nuri Primov, and Rustem Vaitov were arrested
on January 23.
In Ukraine, Hizb ut-Tahrir exists as a political Islamic movement involved in religious,
political, and educational activities. Some followers of this movement lived
in Crimea. Hizb ut-Tahrir members have not been involved in any terrorist activity.
However, Russia is the only country where Hizb ut-Tahrir has been recognized as a
terrorist organization, and its participants are pursued criminally.
The use of Russian legislation in the Crimea led to the arrest of three Crimean Tatars
for alleged ‘establishment of a terrorist organization and participation in the
activities of this organization’. In particular, they are accused of the activities of Hizb
ut-Tahrir. The court ruled on their detention for 2 months. But now, according to the
Russian laws, one of the detainees may be sentenced between 15 and 20 years of
imprisonment, or a life sentence, for organizing the activities, while the other two
may be jailed for 5 to 10 years for taking part in such activities.
Relatives and friends claim that the detainees were not involved in any terrorist activities
and were just Muslims. There is no conclusive evidence of the fact that the
detainees belonged to Hizb ut-Tahrir, and many believe that this is an act of intimidation
of the Crimean Tatars.
On February 16, Sevastopol City Court upheld its decision on the detention of one
of the arrested, Ruslan Zeytullaev. He intends to appeal against the decision. His
lawyer said that the hearing was conducted in the absence of the arrested person
and his lawyer, which is a gross violation. The terms of detention of the four defendants
are constantly extended.
To date, the sentences had not been imposed.
In 2016, the persecution of the alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir reached a new level.
Thus, on February 11, 2016, there was a series of searches in the homes of Muslims in
Yalta, Alushta and Bakhchisaray district. It is known that 13 Muslims were detained
after these searches: Muslim Aliev, Enver Bekirov, Shamil Ilyasov, Emir-Usein Kyky, Nariman
Mamedinov, Damir Minadirov, Aider Moskovsky and his son, Rustem Osmanov,
Vadim Siruk, Bakhtiyar Topuz, Arsen Khalilov, Muslim Mazmanov. With respect to the
four persons detained as a result of searches (Enver Bakirov, Vadim Siruk, Muslim Aliev
and Emir-Usein Kyky) the Simferopol court passed a decision on the detention for 2
months until April 8. They are accused of the so-called “terrorist articles” – participation
in a terrorist community or its organization, namely, the alleged participation in
the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir. On February 12 and 18, 2016 there were also searches
in the homes of Muslims on suspicion of participation in Hizb ut-Tahrir.
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
79
‘Kostenko’s Case’
The charge: Intentional infl iction of bodily harm
on the grounds of political, ideological, racial, ethnic
or religious hatred or enmity or hatred or hostility
toward a social group (part 2, Art. 115 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), punishment:
Up to two years in prison.
The person arrested: Alexander Kostenko was arrested
on February 5, 2105.
The Kostenko’s case is unprecedented. He is accused
of involvement in the events that took place
as early as in February 2014, and, what is more, not
even in the Crimea but in Kyiv. Kostenko himself is
a Euromaidan activist.
Alexander Kostenko was arrested on February 5 in Simferopol, but he was not taken
to the police station until the following day. He claims that the FSB had spent the
night torturing him to get his confession.
Investigators believe that Kostenko, ‘with a sense of ideological hatred and hostility
to the employees of the Department of the Ministry of the Interior’, threw ‘10x10x12
cm stones (paving stones)’ aiming them at warrant offi cer V.V. Polienko, who was
standing in the cordon. The investigators insist that this led to injuries of an employee
of the Crimean Berkut Unit ‘in the form of a large hematoma in the middle and
lower thirds of the left shoulder’. It remains unknown how the investigators from
Simferopol were able to investigate the events that had taken place in Kyiv a year
earlier.
Other activists who were on Maidan in Kyiv with Kostenko argued that Kostenko
could not throw the stones because at that time was not on the street but in a building
where he helped the wounded.
Kostenko wrote an open letter in which he reported being regularly tortured. Kostenko’s
lawyer also confi rms that the arrested people were tortured. Bare wires
were pushed under his nails, and he was tortured with electric current. He has
noticeable bruises on his body, his arm and fi ngers have been broken. Kostenko
is now subject to tortures in the pre-trial detention center, he is being forced to
refuse the services of his attorney and give evidence against other Ukrainian activists
of Euromaidan.
Pictured: Alexander Kostenko
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
80
The apartments of other activists who were familiar with Alexander Kostenko have
been searched within the framework of this criminal case. The prosecution was represented
by the Crimean Prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya.
In May, Alexander Kostenko was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months in a penal colony;
he was found guilty of violating par. b of Part 2 of Article 115 (intentional infl iction
of bodily harm) and Part 1 of Article 222 (illegal possession of fi rearms) of the
Criminal Code of the RF. On August 26, the Crimean Supreme Court changed the
sentence to 3 years and 11 months cumulatively.
In the fall of 2015, Alexander Kostenko was taken out of Crimea and currently he is
in the penal colony #5 in Kirovo-Chepetsk, Kirov region, Russian Federation.
‘Vladimir Balukh’s case’
The charge: insulting a representative of authority (Article 319 of the Criminal Code
of the RF).
In November 2013, Vladimir Balukh planted a Ukrainian fl ag on the roof of his wife’s
house, which he did not remove after the occupation of the peninsula. Vladimir Balukh
was detained for the fi rst time in July 2014. The police did not allow him to the
meeting of residents of Serebryanka village with the Chairman of the “State Council”
of Crimea, Vladimir Konstantinov. The police arrested him for “failure to comply
with the legitimate demands of the police”. Later, at the end of April 2015, the house
where Vladimir Balukh lived with his partner in Serebryanka village was searched by
the police together with the FSS offi cers, during which they took the fl ag of Ukraine
off the roof of the house. The reason for the search
was a statement about the theft of tractor spare
parts in Chernyshevo village, located 30 km away
from the place of the search, and application to
the police from an unknown person stating that
Balukh allegedly was selling the tractor spare
parts. At the time of the search Balukh was out,
and the search report was not drawn up.
On November 14, 2015, the house of the Balukh’s
partner was searched again. The reason for
the search this time was a criminal case on a car
theft in the nearby Razdolnoe village. The main
witness in the case on spare parts theft, and in
Pictured: Vladimir Balukh the case on car theft was the same person, which
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
81
indicated Balukh as
a suspect. However,
Balukh had never met
this person before.
Vladimir Balukh said
that after the search
started, the police offi
cers took him outside,
put him in the car
and beat, as well as insulted
him on account
of his ethnic descent.
However, the police
offi cers had not been
held accountable for
such actions; instead
the local court found Balukh guilty of disobedience to a police offi cer and imposed
a penalty in the form of administrative detention for ten days. The activist spent
10 days in detention, repeatedly requested medical treatment, but was repetedly
denied. In addition, during the Balukh’s detention, the Razdolnensky department
of the Investigative Committee of Russia on November 18, 2015, opened a criminal
case against him. Balukh was charged with committing a crime of “publicly insulting
a representative of authority during the performance of relevant duties”. The
criminal case was investigated for two days and submitted to the Razdolnenskiy
district Prosecutor.
On February 5, 2016, the court found Vladimir Balukh, a Ukrainian, guilty under Art.
319 of the Criminal Code of the RF “insulting a representative of authority” and sentenced
him to 320 hours of compulsory labor.
4.4. Forced Citizenship
According to the data provided by the Offi ce for National Statistics of Ukraine in the
statistical digest ‘Population of Ukraine’3, as of January 1, 2013, the total population
of ARC and Sevastopol amounted ca. 2,350,000. The Federal Constitutional Law of
RF No. 6 provides the granting of automatic Russian citizenship for all Ukrainian
citizens who were domiciled and registered in Crimea at the moment of adoption
of this law. Therefore, the inhabitants of Crimea, in fact, got a double citizenship
3 http://ukrstat.org/uk/druk/publicat/Arhiv_u/13/Arch_nnas_zb.htm
Pictured: Sentenced to the 320 hours of compulsory labor
Vladimir Balukh at one of the hearings in the
Razdolnenskiy court
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
82
from the point of view of the occupying country. Meanwhile, the laws of RF provide
for possible criminal responsibility for concealment of the second citizenship (for
Crimeans, this provision of the RF law will come into eff ect on January 1, 20164).
After this date all Ukrainian citizens domiciled and registered in Crimea will have to
make notifi cations about their Ukrainian citizenship. The concealment of the information
about citizenship may entail criminal responsibility (Article 330-2 of the RF
Criminal Code – punishable by a fi ne of up to 200,000 rubles or in the amount of an
annual income of the convicted person, or up to 400 hours of compulsory work).
The citizens who fail to make such notifi cations in a due time or provide incomplete
or knowingly false information, are subject to administrative fi ne in the amount of
500 to 1,000 rubles.
There are grounds to believe that this provision can be extended to the internally
displaced persons, which currently reside in the mainland Ukraine. According to
various estimates the number of the internally displaced persons from Crimea and
Sevastopol amounts to 15 – 30 thousand people.
Importantly, the procedure for submission of such an application envisages
having a passport of the citizen of the Russian Federation. Therefore, those
who did not submit an application for renunciation of citizenship of the Russian
Federation/retention of the Ukrainian citizenship (see below), and did not
obtain a Russian passport, would not be able to submit such an application.
The recognition of the inhabitants of the peninsula as Russian citizens was automatic,
without considering each case separately. In fact, the Russian government can
claim that all those whose place of residence was registered in Crimea and Sevastopol
are Russian citizens – regardless of whether such persons actually resided in
the territory of the peninsula.
The ‘automatic citizenship’ could be avoided only by fi ling personal application on
the intention to retain Ukrainian citizenship before April 18, 2014 only in 4 offi ces
for all Crimea (including Sevastopol), after standing in one line with those who
wanted to receive a Russian passport. Although formally the period for fi ling such
an application should have been one month (from March 18 to April 18, 2014), in
fact, the procedure for acceptance of such applications was introduced on April 1
(the date of entry into force of the law On the accession of Crimea). In mid-April
2014, the additional offi ces for registration of refusals from Russian citizenship were
open (while, according to the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), the number
of the offi ces accepting documents on the RF passport was about 250). The actual
term for fi ling such applications was about three weeks. Moreover, these were not
the offi ces specifi cally designed for processing such applications, they accepted
4 http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/06/grajdanstvo-dok.html
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
83
the applications for refusal of citizenship of the Russian Federation/retention of the
Ukrainian citizenship together with applications for issuance of passports of Russian
citizens, which constituted an additional obstacle.
In total, according to the data presented by the head of the Russian FMS regional
department in Crimea, this option was used by 3,500 people. There were documented
cases when the people willing to fi le the application just had no time to do this.
In addition, these applications could not be fi led by the people who were abroad,
ill, etc. After fi ling such refusal, the citizens of Ukraine, in fact, became foreigners in
Crimea for the RF authorities who are in a position to limit the period of their stay in
Crimea, expulse them or even deny them the entry to their own places of residence.
Having the Russian passport is a prerequisite for the realization of a signifi cant number
of rights by Crimean residents. Namely, getting all kinds of social benefi ts, obtaining
a driver’s license, vehicle registration, work at certain positions (civil service,
budgetary institutions), obtaining of land lots, free medical care, and re-registration
of ownership rights. Civil servants of all levels are widely reported to be coerced to
denounce their Ukrainian citizenship, as well as to hand over their Ukrainian passports
to the heads of institutions where they work.
Thus, the system is created that forces Crimeans to acknowledge Russian citizenship.
On December 29, 2014, the changes5 were introduced to the Article 4 of the
Federal Constitutional Law # 6, according to which the Crimean residents are able
to abandon the second ‘foreign citizenship’ by fi ling an application and the foreign
passport to the corresponding authorities of the RF. The provisions of the law are
formulated in such a manner that a person residing in the RF shall be considered as
not having the citizenship of another country. This regulation cannot apply to other
countries. In this way, the Russian authorities are trying to deprive the Crimeans
of Ukrainian citizenship, ‘bypassing’ the law of Ukraine and international standards,
according to which this is possible only upon personal appeal of a citizen to the
relevant Ukrainian authorities.
Especially vulnerable is the position of orphans and children in the care or custody
of state authorities. According to the offi cial data as per August 1, 2014, there were
4,228 such children in Crimea. Administrations of all Crimean institutions started to
collaborate with the Russian authorities. The children are, in fact, denied the right to
choose their citizenship (the RF passport is provided on reaching 14 years of age).
Separate category is presented by Ukraininan citizens who permanently resided in
Crimea before the occupation, but were not registered there. Such persons became
5 http://www.rg.ru/2014/12/31/krym-dok.html
PART 4 A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA
84
foreigners in Crimea. In order to obtain a residence permit or the RF passport, they
were forced to prove the fact of their residence in Crimea through court actions.
Not only a recourse to the court is associated with considerable costs, but it also
cannot guarantee the obtaining of Russian citizenship or residence permit to these
people. Even upon the availability of the court’s decision on establishing the fact of
residence in Crimea or Sevastopol, the decision to issue the passport of the citizen
of the Russian Federation /residence permit shall be adopted on the basis of a thorough
check of all the circumstances of the case by offi cials of the Federal Migration
Service.
The Russian authorities use the fact of ‘automatic citizenship’ for the criminal prosecution
of pro-Ukrainian activists. The most widely known examples are the cases of
Oleg Sentsov and Aleksander Kolchenko, who were detained and taken to Moscow,
where they are currently in the detention center. Both are citizens of Ukraine, and
lived in Crimea at the time of the occupation. They did nothing to obtain the RF
citizenship, and do not recognize the fact of obtaining this citizenship. However,
the criminal proceedings against them are held as against the citizens of the RF; the
Consul of Ukraine is not allowed to meet with them. The refusal of preservation of
the Ukrainian citizenship is contrary to the laws of the Russian Federation, the legislation
of Ukraine and international acts.
At the same time, the Russian Federation manipulates the fact of acquisition of ‘automatic
citizenship’, e.g., for the actual expulsion of undesirable persons from the
territory of the peninsula. Thus, regardless of the recognition by the Russian Federation
of all Crimeans as its citizens, Sinaver Kadyrov was forcibly deported from
Crimea. The so-called Supreme Court of Crimea noted in its decision that there was
no evidence that S. Kadyrov was a Russian citizen, and accordingly the court did not
recognize his ‘automatic citizenship’. Such court decision indicates the lack of independence
of the court (in fact, they make political decisions), and the non-compliance
of the law on citizenship to the requirements of stability and justice, the focus
on security and the protection of fundamental rights which are the basic principles
of the law-governed state and the rule of law in the modern world.
The European Convention on Nationality, ratifi ed by Ukraine, and signed, but not
ratifi ed by the Russian Federation, defi nes the “nationality” as a legal bond between
a person and a state without specifying the ethnic origin of a person. In addition,
according to the position of the International Court of Justice in a decision (Nottebohm
case), nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment,
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.
Such ‘automatic’ obtaining of Russian citizenship by citizens of Ukraine in Crimea
cannot be considered as legal, since the internal Russian procedures related to this
A YEAR AFTER: MAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA PART 4
85
do not comply with the applicable international conventions, customary international
law, and the principles of laws on citizenship.
In fact, Russia has not only occupied a part of the territory of Ukraine, but also took
control over the majority of the population of this territory, depriving it of the freedom
of choice. Such actions represent a terrible precedent of arbitrary determination
of man’s fate by an aggressive state. Such actions of the occupation authorities
create serious legal issues; complicate the return of the Crimean peninsula under
Ukraine’s control as it is much easier to declare the granting of citizenship to the nationals
of another country than to overcome the consequences of the lawlessness.
4.5. Violation of the Right to the Freedom of
Movement6
The right to the freedom of movement is the right to move freely throughout the
territory of own country, as well as the right to choose a place of residence, the right
to leave and freely return to own country. This right is an international standard
and is protected by Article 2 of Protocol No.4 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 49 of the Convention for the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (IV Geneva Convention)
prohibits, regardless of the motives, to carry out forced individual or mass displacement
or deportation of civilians from the occupied territory both to the territory of
the occupying state and to the territory of any other state, regardless of whether it
is occupied or not.
The violation of the right to the freedom of movement leads to breaking the social,
economic, family, cultural and other relations between the people, entails information
isolation of the peninsula, when the people are fully inUuenced by the Russian
propaganda and cannot get hold of an alternative point of view on the events in
Ukraine and the world. The creation of such a situation meets the interests of the
occupying authorities and allows to instill a climate of fear and make the residents
of the peninsula feel hopeless.
The violation of the freedom of movement greatly increases a person’s vulnerability
before the state, when it becomes clear that there is no place to escape to. The vio-
6 A more detailed study on the violation of the right to the freedom of movement under occupation can be found
in the thematic review Crimea Without Rules// http://crimeahumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Crimea_Beyond_Rules_RU._Issue_1.pdf
Annex 977
Freedom of the Press 2017, FREEDOM HOUSE (6 June 2018), accessed at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/ukraine
Freedom House
Ukrayinska PravdaMyrotvorets
Myrotvorets
Ukrayinska Pravda
Ukrainian Week
Ukrainska Pravda
Myrotvorets
Segodnya
jeansa
jeansa
Freedom of the Press
Annex 978
Human Rights Watch, Crimean Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric Hospital (26 August 2016)
Annex 979
Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (18 October 1907)
Annex 980
European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950)
European
Convention
on Human
Rights
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11
and 14
supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4,
6, 7, 12 and 13
3
The text of the Convention is presented as amended by the
provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS no. 194) as from its entry into
force on 1 June 2010. The text of the Convention had previously
been amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 3
(ETS no. 45), which entered into force on 21 September 1970,
of Protocol No. 5 (ETS no. 55), which entered into force
on 20 December 1971, and of Protocol No. 8 (ETS no. 118),
which entered into force on 1 January 1990, and comprised also
the text of Protocol No. 2 (ETS no. 44) which, in accordance with
Article 5 § 3 thereof, had been an integral part of the Convention
since its entry into force on 21 September 1970. All provisions
which had been amended or added by these Protocols were
replaced by Protocol No. 11 (ETS no. 155), as from the date
of its entry into force on 1 November 1998. As from that date,
Protocol No. 9 (ETS no. 140), which entered into force
on 1 October 1994, was repealed and Protocol No. 10
(ETS no. 146) lost its purpose.
The current state of signatures and ratifications of the Convention
and its Protocols as well as the complete list of declarations and
reservations are available at www.conventions.coe.int.
Only the English and French versions of the Convention are authentic.
European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg cedex
www.echr.coe.int
CONTENTS
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ............................................5
Protocol ......................................................................31
Protocol No. 4.............................................................34
Protocol No. 6.............................................................38
Protocol No. 7.............................................................42
Protocol No. 12...........................................................48
Protocol No. 13...........................................................52
5
Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
Rome, 4.XI.1950
THE GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY HERETO, being members of the Council
of Europe,
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
10th December 1948;
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal
and effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein
declared;
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement
of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods
by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further
realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and
are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and
observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend;
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries
which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first
steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated
in the Universal Declaration,
Have agreed as follows:
6 7
ARTICLE 1
Obligation to respect Human Rights
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.
SECTION I
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
ARTICLE 2
Right to life
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of
a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which
this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape
of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot
or insurrection.
ARTICLE 3
Prohibition of torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
ARTICLE 4
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term “forced or compulsory
labour” shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of
detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5
of this Convention or during conditional release from
such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of
conscientious objectors in countries where they are
recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory
military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity
threatening the life or well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic
obligations.
ARTICLE 5
Right to liberty and security
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a
competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance
with the lawful order of a court or in order to
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
8 9
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for
the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed
an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary
to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after
having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose
of educational supervision or his lawful detention for
the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a
person against whom action is being taken with a view
to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a
language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and
of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of
his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release
ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention
in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.
ARTICLE 6
Right to a fair trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests
of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so
require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay
for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests
of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.
10 11
ARTICLE 7
No punishment without law
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence under national or international law at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was
committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of
law recognised by civilised nations.
ARTICLE 8
Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
ARTICLE 9
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety,
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ARTICLE 10
Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
ARTICLE 11
Freedom of assembly and association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
to freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
12 13
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
ARTICLE 12
Right to marry
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and
to found a family, according to the national laws governing the
exercise of this right.
ARTICLE 13
Right to an effective remedy
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity.
ARTICLE 14
Prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.
ARTICLE 15
Derogation in time of emergency
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4
(paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of
derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and
the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to
operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being
fully executed.
ARTICLE 16
Restrictions on political activity of aliens
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing
the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the
political activity of aliens.
ARTICLE 17
Prohibition of abuse of rights
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
14 15
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the Convention.
ARTICLE 18
Limitation on use of restrictions on rights
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights
and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than
those for which they have been prescribed.
SECTION II
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ARTICLE 19
Establishment of the Court
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by
the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols
thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights,
hereinafter referred to as “the Court”. It shall function on a
permanent basis.
ARTICLE 20
Number of judges
The Court shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the
High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 21
Criteria for office
1. The judges shall be of high moral character and must either
possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial
office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence.
2. The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity.
3. During their term of office the judges shall not engage in
any activity which is incompatible with their independence,
impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office; all questions
arising from the application of this paragraph shall be decided by
the Court.
ARTICLE 22
Election of judges
The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with
respect to each High Contracting Party by a majority of votes cast
from a list of three candidates nominated by the High Contracting
Party.
ARTICLE 23
Terms of office and dismissal
1. The judges shall be elected for a period of nine years. They
may not be re-elected.
2. The terms of office of judges shall expire when they reach the
age of 70.
3. The judges shall hold office until replaced. They shall,
however, continue to deal with such cases as they already have
under consideration.
16 17
4. No judge may be dismissed from office unless the other
judges decide by a majority of two-thirds that that judge has
ceased to fulfil the required conditions.
ARTICLE 24
Registry and rapporteurs
1. The Court shall have a Registry, the functions and organisation
of which shall be laid down in the rules of the Court.
2. When sitting in a single-judge formation, the Court shall be
assisted by rapporteurs who shall function under the authority
of the President of the Court. They shall form part of the Court’s
Registry.
ARTICLE 25
Plenary Court
The plenary Court shall
(a) elect its President and one or two Vice-Presidents for a
period of three years; they may be re-elected;
(b) set up Chambers, constituted for a fixed period of time;
(c) elect the Presidents of the Chambers of the Court; they
may be re-elected;
(d) adopt the rules of the Court;
(e) elect the Registrar and one or more Deputy Registrars;
(f) make any request under Article 26, paragraph 2.
ARTICLE 26
Single-judge formation, Committees, Chambers
and Grand Chamber
1. To consider cases brought before it, the Court shall sit in
a single-judge formation, in committees of three judges, in
Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen
judges. The Court’s Chambers shall set up committees for a fixed
period of time.
2. At the request of the plenary Court, the Committee of Ministers
may, by a unanimous decision and for a fixed period, reduce to
five the number of judges of the Chambers.
3. When sitting as a single judge, a judge shall not examine
any application against the High Contracting Party in respect of
which that judge has been elected.
4. There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and
the Grand Chamber the judge elected in respect of the High
Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge is
unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from
a list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in the capacity of
judge.
5. The Grand Chamber shall also include the President of the
Court, the Vice-Presidents, the Presidents of the Chambers and
other judges chosen in accordance with the rules of the Court.
When a case is referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43,
no judge from the Chamber which rendered the judgment shall
sit in the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President
of the Chamber and the judge who sat in respect of the High
Contracting Party concerned.
ARTICLE 27
Competence of single judges
1. A single judge may declare inadmissible or strike out of the
Court’s list of cases an application submitted under Article 34,
where such a decision can be taken without further examination.
2. The decision shall be final.
18 19
3. If the single judge does not declare an application inadmissible
or strike it out, that judge shall forward it to a committee or to a
Chamber for further examination.
ARTICLE 28
Competence of Committees
1. In respect of an application submitted under Article 34, a
committee may, by a unanimous vote,
(a) declare it inadmissible or strike it out of its list of cases,
where such decision can be taken without further
examination; or
(b) declare it admissible and render at the same time a
judgment on the merits, if the underlying question in the
case, concerning the interpretation or the application of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, is already the
subject of well-established case-law of the Court.
2. Decisions and judgments under paragraph 1 shall be final.
3. If the judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party
concerned is not a member of the committee, the committee may
at any stage of the proceedings invite that judge to take the place
of one of the members of the committee, having regard to all
relevant factors, including whether that Party has contested the
application of the procedure under paragraph 1.(b).
ARTICLE 29
Decisions by Chambers on admissibility and merits
1. If no decision is taken under Article 27 or 28, or no judgment
rendered under Article 28, a Chamber shall decide on the
admissibility and merits of individual applications submitted under
Article 34. The decision on admissibility may be taken separately.
2. A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of
inter-State applications submitted under Article 33. The decision
on admissibility shall be taken separately unless the Court, in
exceptional cases, decides otherwise.
ARTICLE 30
Relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber
Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious
question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before
the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment
previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any
time before it has rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction
in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the parties to the
case objects.
ARTICLE 31
Powers of the Grand Chamber
The Grand Chamber shall
(a) determine applications submitted either under Article
33 or Article 34 when a Chamber has relinquished
jurisdiction under Article 30 or when the case has been
referred to it under Article 43;
(b) decide on issues referred to the Court by the Committee
of Ministers in accordance with Article 46, paragraph 4;
and
(c) consider requests for advisory opinions submitted under
Article 47.
20 21
ARTICLE 32
Jurisdiction of the Court
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention
and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in
Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47.
2. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the Court shall decide.
ARTICLE 33
Inter-State cases
Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged
breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols
thereto by another High Contracting Party.
ARTICLE 34
Individual applications
The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of
the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The
High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right.
ARTICLE 35
Admissibility criteria
1. The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
2. The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under
Article 34 that
(a) is anonymous; or
(b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already been
examined by the Court or has already been submitted
to another procedure of international investigation or
settlement and contains no relevant new information.
3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual
application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:
(a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded,
or an abuse of the right of individual application; or
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage,
unless respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an
examination of the application on the merits and provided
that no case may be rejected on this ground which has
not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
4. The Court shall reject any application which it considers
inadmissible under this Article. It may do so at any stage of the
proceedings.
ARTICLE 36
Third party intervention
1. In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a
High Contracting Party one of whose nationals is an applicant
shall have the right to submit written comments and to take part in
hearings.
2. The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper
administration of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which
is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who
22 23
is not the applicant to submit written comments or take part in
hearings.
3. In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, the
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights may submit
written comments and take part in hearings.
ARTICLE 37
Striking out applications
1. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to
strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances
lead to the conclusion that
(a) the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or
(b) the matter has been resolved; or
(c) for any other reason established by the Court, it is no
longer justified to continue the examination of the
application.
However, the Court shall continue the examination of the
application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention
and the Protocols thereto so requires.
2. The Court may decide to restore an application to its list of
cases if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course.
ARTICLE 38
Examination of the case
The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives
of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the
effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned
shall furnish all necessary facilities.
ARTICLE 39
Friendly settlements
1. At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may place itself
at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a
friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for human
rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.
2. Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1 shall be
confidential.
3. If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the
case out of its list by means of a decision which shall be confined
to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached.
4. This decision shall be transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers, which shall supervise the execution of the terms of the
friendly settlement as set out in the decision.
ARTICLE 40
Public hearings and access to documents
1. Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in exceptional
circumstances decides otherwise.
2. Documents deposited with the Registrar shall be accessible to
the public unless the President of the Court decides otherwise.
ARTICLE 41
Just satisfaction
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention
or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party.
24 25
ARTICLE 42
Judgments of Chambers
Judgments of Chambers shall become final in accordance with the
provisions of Article 44, paragraph 2.
ARTICLE 43
Referral to the Grand Chamber
1. Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment
of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases,
request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.
2. A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept
the request if the case raises a serious question affecting the
interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.
3. If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber shall
decide the case by means of a judgment.
ARTICLE 44
Final judgments
1. The judgment of the Grand Chamber shall be final.
2. The judgment of a Chamber shall become final
(a) when the parties declare that they will not request that the
case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or
(b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of
the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested;
or
(c) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request
to refer under Article 43.
3. The final judgment shall be published.
ARTICLE 45
Reasons for judgments and decisions
1. Reasons shall be given for judgments as well as for decisions
declaring applications admissible or inadmissible.
2. If a judgment does not represent, in whole or in part, the
unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to
deliver a separate opinion.
ARTICLE 46
Binding force and execution of judgments
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.
3. If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision
of the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of
interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court
for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral decision
shall require a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives
entitled to sit on the committee.
4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High
Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to
which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party
and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the
representatives entitled to sit on the committee, refer to the Court
the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation
under paragraph1.
5. If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall
refer the case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration
of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no violation of
26 27
paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers,
which shall close its examination of the case.
ARTICLE 47
Advisory opinions
1. The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers,
give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the
interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto.
2. Such opinions shall not deal with any question relating to
the content or scope of the rights or freedoms defined in Section I
of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, or with any other
question which the Court or the Committee of Ministers might have
to consider in consequence of any such proceedings as could be
instituted in accordance with the Convention.
3. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to request an
advisory opinion of the Court shall require a majority vote of the
representatives entitled to sit on the committee.
ARTICLE 48
Advisory jurisdiction of the Court
The Court shall decide whether a request for an advisory opinion
submitted by the Committee of Ministers is within its competence
as defined in Article 47.
ARTICLE 49
Reasons for advisory opinions
1. Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions of the Court.
2. If the advisory opinion does not represent, in whole or in
part, the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be
entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
3. Advisory opinions of the Court shall be communicated to the
Committee of Ministers.
ARTICLE 50
Expenditure on the Court
The expenditure on the Court shall be borne by the Council of
Europe.
ARTICLE 51
Privileges and immunities of judges
The judges shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions,
to the privileges and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the
Statute of the Council of Europe and in the agreements made
thereunder.
SECTION III
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 52
Inquiries by the Secretary General
On receipt of a request from the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe any High Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation
of the manner in which its internal law ensures the effective
implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention.
ARTICLE 53
Safeguard for existing human rights
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental
28 29
freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
party.
ARTICLE 54
Powers of the Committee of Ministers
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the powers conferred
on the Committee of Ministers by the Statute of the Council of
Europe.
ARTICLE 55
Exclusion of other means of dispute settlement
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special
agreement, they will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or
declarations in force between them for the purpose of submitting,
by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or
application of this Convention to a means of settlement other than
those provided for in this Convention.
ARTICLE 56
Territorial application
1. Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any time
thereafter declare by notification addressed to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe that the present Convention
shall, subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or any of
the territories for whose international relations it is responsible.
2. The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories
named in the notification as from the thirtieth day after the receipt
of this notification by the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe.
3. The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such
territories with due regard, however, to local requirements.
4. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time thereafter declare on
behalf of one or more of the territories to which the declaration
relates that it accepts the competence of the Court to receive
applications from individuals, non-governmental organisations or
groups of individuals as provided by Article 34 of the Convention.
ARTICLE 57
Reservations
1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when
depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in
respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent
that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with
the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be
permitted under this Article.
2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief
statement of the law concerned.
ARTICLE 58
Denunciation
1. A High Contracting Party may denounce the present
Convention only after the expiry of five years from the date on
which it became a party to it and after six months’ notice contained
in a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, who shall inform the other High Contracting Parties.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing
the High Contracting Party concerned from its obligations under
this Convention in respect of any act which, being capable
of constituting a violation of such obligations, may have been
30 31
performed by it before the date at which the denunciation became
effective.
3. Any High Contracting Party which shall cease to be a
member of the Council of Europe shall cease to be a Party to this
Convention under the same conditions.
4. The Convention may be denounced in accordance with
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs in respect of any
territory to which it has been declared to extend under the terms
of Article 56.
ARTICLE 59
Signature and ratification
1. This Convention shall be open to the signature of the members
of the Council of Europe. It shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2. The European Union may accede to this Convention.
3. The present Convention shall come into force after the deposit
of ten instruments of ratification.
4. As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the
Convention shall come into force at the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification.
5. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all
the members of the Council of Europe of the entry into force of the
Convention, the names of the High Contracting Parties who have
ratified it, and the deposit of all instruments of ratification which
may be effected subsequently.
DONE AT ROME THIS 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1950, in English and French,
both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall
remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The
Secretary General shall transmit certified copies to each of the
signatories.
Protocol
to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
Paris, 20.III.1952
THE GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY HERETO, being members of the Council
of Europe,
Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement
of certain rights and freedoms other than those already included
in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950
(hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”),
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Protection of property
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties.
32 33
ARTICLE 2
Right to education
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
philosophical convictions.
ARTICLE 3
Right to free elections
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature.
ARTICLE 4
Territorial application
Any High Contracting Party may at the time of signature or
ratification or at any time thereafter communicate to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe a declaration stating the extent
to which it undertakes that the provisions of the present Protocol
shall apply to such of the territories for the international relations
of which it is responsible as are named therein.
Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a
declaration in virtue of the preceding paragraph may from time to
time communicate a further declaration modifying the terms of any
former declaration or terminating the application of the provisions
of this Protocol in respect of any territory.
A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall be
deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 56 of the Convention.
ARTICLE 5
Relationship to the Convention
As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions of
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Protocol shall be regarded as
additional Articles to the Convention and all the provisions of the
Convention shall apply accordingly.
ARTICLE 6
Signature and ratification
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the members of the
Council of Europe, who are the signatories of the Convention;
it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratification
of the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit of
ten instruments of ratification. As regards any signatory ratifying
subsequently, the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of the
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe, who will notify all members of
the names of those who have ratified.
DONE AT PARIS ON THE 20TH DAY OF MARCH 1952, in English and
French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which
shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe.
The Secretary General shall transmit certified copies to each of the
signatory governments.
34 35
Protocol No. 4
to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
securing certain rights and freedoms
other than those already included
in the Convention
and in the First Protocol thereto
Strasbourg, 16.IX.1963
THE GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY HERETO, being members of the Council
of Europe,
Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement of
certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in
Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th November 1950
(hereinafter referred to as the “Convention”) and in Articles 1
to 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention, signed at Paris
on 20th March 1952,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Prohibition of imprisonment for debt
No one shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the ground of
inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
ARTICLE 2
Freedom of movement
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in
particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law
and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.
ARTICLE 3
Prohibition of expulsion of nationals
1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual
or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which
he is a national.
2. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of
the State of which he is a national.
ARTICLE 4
Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens
Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.
36 37
ARTICLE 5
Territorial application
1. Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of signature or
ratification of this Protocol, or at any time thereafter, communicate
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a declaration
stating the extent to which it undertakes that the provisions of this
Protocol shall apply to such of the territories for the international
relations of which it is responsible as are named therein.
2. Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a
declaration in virtue of the preceding paragraph may, from time
to time, communicate a further declaration modifying the terms
of any former declaration or terminating the application of the
provisions of this Protocol in respect of any territory.
3. A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall be
deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 56 of the Convention.
4. The territory of any State to which this Protocol applies by
virtue of ratification or acceptance by that State, and each territory
to which this Protocol is applied by virtue of a declaration by that
State under this Article, shall be treated as separate territories for
the purpose of the references in Articles 2 and 3 to the territory of
a State.
5. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with
paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article may at any time thereafter declare
on behalf of one or more of the territories to which the declaration
relates that it accepts the competence of the Court to receive
applications from individuals, non-governmental organisations or
groups of individuals as provided in Article 34 of the Convention
in respect of all or any of Articles 1 to 4 of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 6
Relationship to the Convention
As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions of
Articles 1 to 5 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional
Articles to the Convention, and all the provisions of the Convention
shall apply accordingly.
ARTICLE 7
Signature and ratification
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature by the members of
the Council of Europe who are the signatories of the Convention;
it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratification
of the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit of
five instruments of ratification. As regards any signatory ratifying
subsequently, the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of the
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, who will notify all
members of the names of those who have ratified.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto,
have signed this Protocol.
DONE AT STRASBOURG, THIS 16TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 1963, in English
and in French, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single
copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council
of Europe. The Secretary General shall transmit certified copies to
each of the signatory states.
38 39
Protocol No. 6
to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
concerning the Abolition
of the Death Penalty
Strasbourg, 28.IV.1983
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, signatory
to this Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome
on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”),
Considering that the evolution that has occurred in several member
States of the Council of Europe expresses a general tendency in
favour of abolition of the death penalty;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Abolition of the death penalty
The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned
to such penalty or executed.
ARTICLE 2
Death penalty in time of war
A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in
respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of
war; such penalty shall be applied only in the instances laid down
in the law and in accordance with its provisions. The State shall
communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
the relevant provisions of that law.
ARTICLE 3
Prohibition of derogations
No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be made
under Article 15 of the Convention.
ARTICLE 4
Prohibition of reservations
No reservation may be made under Article 57 of the Convention
in respect of the provisions of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 5
Territorial application
1. Any State may at the time of signature or when depositing
its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, specify the
territory or territories to which this Protocol shall apply.
2. Any State may at any later date, by a declaration addressed
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the
application of this Protocol to any other territory specified in the
declaration. In respect of such territory the Protocol shall enter into
40 41
force on the first day of the month following the date of receipt of
such declaration by the Secretary General.
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs
may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration, be
withdrawn by a notification addressed to the Secretary General.
The withdrawal shall become effective on the first day of the
month following the date of receipt of such notification by the
Secretary General.
ARTICLE 6
Relationship to the Convention
As between the States Parties the provisions of Articles 1 to 5
of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional Articles to the
Convention and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply
accordingly.
ARTICLE 7
Signature and ratification
The Protocol shall be open for signature by the member States of
the Council of Europe, signatories to the Convention. It shall be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. A member State
of the Council of Europe may not ratify, accept or approve this
Protocol unless it has, simultaneously or previously, ratified the
Convention. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval
shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe.
ARTICLE 8
Entry into force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the month
following the date on which five member States of the Council of
Europe have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol
in accordance with the provisions of Article 7.
2. In respect of any member State which subsequently expresses
its consent to be bound by it, the Protocol shall enter into force on
the first day of the month following the date of the deposit of the
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.
ARTICLE 9
Depositary functions
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the
member States of the Council of:
(a) any signature;
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval;
(c) any date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance
with Articles 5 and 8;
(d) any other act, notification or communication relating to
this Protocol.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto,
have signed this Protocol.
DONE AT STRASBOURG, THIS 28TH DAY OF APRIL 1983, in English and in
French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which
shall be deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The
Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified
copies to each member State of the Council of Europe.
42 43
Protocol No. 7
to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
Strasbourg, 22.XI.1984
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, signatory hereto,
Being resolved to take further steps to ensure the collective
enforcement of certain rights and freedoms by means of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Convention”),
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens
1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not
be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached
in accordance with law and shall be allowed:
(a) to submit reasons against his expulsion,
(b) to have his case reviewed, and
(c) to be represented for these purposes before the competent
authority or a person or persons designated by that
authority.
2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights
under paragraph 1.(a), (b) and (c) of this Article, when such
expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is
grounded on reasons of national security.
ARTICLE 2
Right of appeal in criminal matters
1. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall
have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a
higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on
which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.
2. This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences
of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which
the person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest
tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against acquittal.
ARTICLE 3
Compensation for wrongful conviction
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a
criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been
reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or
newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a
miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as
a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to the
law or the practice of the State concerned, unless it is proved that
the nondisclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly
attributable to him.
ARTICLE 4
Right not to be tried or punished twice
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in
criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for
an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or
44 45
convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that
State.
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent
the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal
procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or
newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect
in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the
case.
3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under
Article 15 of the Convention.
ARTICLE 5
Equality between spouses
Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a
private law character between them, and in their relations with
their children, as to marriage, during marriage and in the event
of its dissolution. This Article shall not prevent States from taking
such measures as are necessary in the interests of the children.
ARTICLE 6
Territorial application
1. Any State may at the time of signature or when depositing
its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, specify the
territory or territories to which the Protocol shall apply and State
the extent to which it undertakes that the provisions of this Protocol
shall apply to such territory or territories.
2. Any State may at any later date, by a declaration addressed
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the
application of this Protocol to any other territory specified in the
declaration. In respect of such territory the Protocol shall enter
into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of
a period of two months after the date of receipt by the Secretary
General of such declaration.
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs
may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration,
be withdrawn or modified by a notification addressed to the
Secretary General. The withdrawal or modification shall become
effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of a
period of two months after the date of receipt of such notification
by the Secretary General.
4. A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall be
deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 56 of the Convention.
5. The territory of any State to which this Protocol applies by
virtue of ratification, acceptance or approval by that State, and
each territory to which this Protocol is applied by virtue of a
declaration by that State under this Article, may be treated as
separate territories for the purpose of the reference in Article 1 to
the territory of a State.
6. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance
with paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article may at any time
thereafter declare on behalf of one or more of the territories
to which the declaration relates that it accepts the competence
of the Court to receive applications from individuals, nongovernmental
organisations or groups of individuals as
provided in Article 34 of the Convention in respect of Articles 1
to 5 of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 7
Relationship to the Convention
As between the States Parties, the provisions of Article 1 to 6
of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional Articles to the
46 47
Convention, and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply
accordingly.
ARTICLE 8
Signature and ratification
This Protocol shall be open for signature by member States of the
Council of Europe which have signed the Convention. It is subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval. A member State of the
Council of Europe may not ratify, accept or approve this Protocol
without previously or simultaneously ratifying the Convention.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 9
Entry into force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of two months after
the date on which seven member States of the Council of Europe
have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol in
accordance with the provisions of Article 8.
2. In respect of any member State which subsequently expresses
its consent to be bound by it, the Protocol shall enter into force
on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period
of two months after the date of the deposit of the instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval.
ARTICLE 10
Depositary functions
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the
member States of the Council of Europe of:
(a) any signature;
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval;
(c) any date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance
with Articles 6 and 9;
(d) any other act, notification or declaration relating to this
Protocol.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto,
have signed this Protocol.
DONE AT STRASBOURG, THIS 22ND DAY OF NOVEMBER 1984, in English
and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy
which shall be deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe.
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit
certified copies to each member State of the Council of Europe.
48 49
Protocol No. 12
to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
Rome, 4.XI.2000
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, signatory hereto,
Having regard to the fundamental principle according to which
all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal
protection of the law;
Being resolved to take further steps to promote the equality of all
persons through the collective enforcement of a general prohibition
of discrimination by means of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome
on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”);
Reaffirming that the principle of nondiscrimination does not
prevent States Parties from taking measures in order to promote
full and effective equality, provided that there is an objective and
reasonable justification for those measures,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
General prohibition of discrimination
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority
on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.
ARTICLE 2
Territorial application
1. Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing
its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, specify the
territory or territories to which this Protocol shall apply.
2. Any State may at any later date, by a declaration addressed
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the
application of this Protocol to any other territory specified in the
declaration. In respect of such territory the Protocol shall enter into
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a
period of three months after the date of receipt by the Secretary
General of such declaration.
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs
may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration,
be withdrawn or modified by a notification addressed to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The withdrawal or
modification shall become effective on the first day of the month
following the expiration of a period of three months after the date
of receipt of such notification by the Secretary General.
4. A declaration made in accordance with this Article shall be
deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 56 of the Convention.
5. Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with
paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article may at any time thereafter declare
on behalf of one or more of the territories to which the declaration
relates that it accepts the competence of the Court to receive
applications from individuals, non-governmental organisations or
50 51
groups of individuals as provided by Article 34 of the Convention
in respect of Article 1 of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 3
Relationship to the Convention
As between the States Parties, the provisions of Articles 1
and 2 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional Articles
to the Convention, and all the provisions of the Convention shall
apply accordingly.
ARTICLE 4
Signature and ratification
This Protocol shall be open for signature by member States of the
Council of Europe which have signed the Convention. It is subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval. A member State of the
Council of Europe may not ratify, accept or approve this Protocol
without previously or simultaneously ratifying the Convention.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 5
Entry into force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of three months after
the date on which ten member States of the Council of Europe
have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol in
accordance with the provisions of Article 4.
2. In respect of any member State which subsequently expresses
its consent to be bound by it, the Protocol shall enter into force
on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period
of three months after the date of the deposit of the instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval.
ARTICLE 6
Depositary functions
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the
member States of the Council of Europe of:
(a) any signature;
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval;
(c) any date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance
with Articles 2 and 5;
(d) any other act, notification or communication relating to
this Protocol.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto,
have signed this Protocol.
DONE AT ROME, THIS 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2000, in English and in
French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which
shall be deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The
Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified
copies to each member State of the Council of Europe.
52 53
Protocol No. 13
to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
concerning the abolition of the death
penalty in all circumstances
Vilnius, 3.V.2002
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, signatory hereto,
Convinced that everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a
democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is
essential for the protection of this right and for the full recognition
of the inherent dignity of all human beings;
Wishing to strengthen the protection of the right to life guaranteed
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950
(hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”);
Noting that Protocol No. 6 to the Convention, concerning
the Abolition of the Death Penalty, signed at Strasbourg
on 28 April 1983, does not exclude the death penalty in respect
of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war;
Being resolved to take the final step in order to abolish the death
penalty in all circumstances,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Abolition of the death penalty
The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned
to such penalty or executed.
ARTICLE 2
Prohibition of derogations
No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be made
under Article 15 of the Convention.
ARTICLE 3
Prohibition of reservations
No reservation may be made under Article 57 of the Convention
in respect of the provisions of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 4
Territorial application
1. Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing
its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, specify the
territory or territories to which this Protocol shall apply.
2. Any State may at any later date, by a declaration addressed
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the
application of this Protocol to any other territory specified in the
declaration. In respect of such territory the Protocol shall enter into
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a
period of three months after the date of receipt by the Secretary
General of such declaration.
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs
may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration,
54 55
be withdrawn or modified by a notification addressed to the
Secretary General. The withdrawal or modification shall become
effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of a
period of three months after the date of receipt of such notification
by the Secretary General.
ARTICLE 5
Relationship to the Convention
As between the States Parties the provisions of Articles 1 to 4
of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional Articles to the
Convention, and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply
accordingly.
ARTICLE 6
Signature and ratification
This Protocol shall be open for signature by member States of the
Council of Europe which have signed the Convention. It is subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval. A member State of the
Council of Europe may not ratify, accept or approve this Protocol
without previously or simultaneously ratifying the Convention.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
ARTICLE 7
Entry into force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of three months after
the date on which ten member States of the Council of Europe
have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol in
accordance with the provisions of Article 6.
2. In respect of any member State which subsequently expresses
its consent to be bound by it, the Protocol shall enter into force
on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period
of three months after the date of the deposit of the instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval.
ARTICLE 8
Depositary functions
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the
member States of the Council of Europe of:
(a) any signature;
(b) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval;
(c) any date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance
with Articles 4 and 7;
(d) any other act, notification or communication relating to
this Protocol.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto,
have signed this Protocol.
DONE AT VILNIUS, THIS 3RD DAY OF MAY 2002, in English and in French,
both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be
deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary
General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to
each member State of the Council of Europe.
European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg cedex
Design: © ECHR - Photo: © Shutterstock
www.echr.coe.int
ENG
Annex 981
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (5 December 1994)
1
Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Budapest, 5 December 1994
The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State,
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons
from its territory within a specified period of time,
Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold
War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces.
Confirm the following:
1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in
accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence
and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine,
and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in selfdefense
or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in
accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic
coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the
rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
4. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate
United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a nonnuclear-
weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a
threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
5. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm, in the case of the Ukraine, their
commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party
2
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an
attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or
their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
6. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland will consult in the event a situation arises which
raises a question concerning these commitments.
This Memorandum will become applicable upon signature.
Signed in four copies having equal validity in the English, Russian and Ukrainian
languages.
Annex 982
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Russian Federation and
Ukraine (31 May 1997)
No. 52240*
____
Ukraine
and
Russian Federation
Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation. Kiev, 31 May 1997
Entry into force: 1 April 1999, in accordance with article 39
Authentic texts: Russian and Ukrainian
Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations: Ukraine, 2 October 2014
*No UNTS volume number has yet been determined for this record. The Text(s) reproduced below, if attached, are the
authentic texts of the agreement /action attachment as submitted for registration and publication to the Secretariat.
For ease of reference they were sequentially paginated. Translations, if attached, are not final and are provided for
information only.
Ukraine
et
Fédération de Russie
Traité d'amitié, de coopération et de partenariat entre l'Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie.
Kiev, 31 mai 1997
Entrée en vigueur : 1er avril 1999, conformément à l'article 39
Textes authentiques : russe et ukrainien
Enregistrement auprès du Secrétariat des Nations Unies : Ukraine, 2 octobre 2014
*Le numéro de volume RTNU n'a pas encore été établi pour ce dossier. Les textes reproduits ci-dessous, s'ils sont
disponibles, sont les textes authentiques de l'accord/pièce jointe d'action tel que soumises pour l’enregistrement et
publication au Secrétariat. Pour référence, ils ont été présentés sous forme de la pagination consécutive. Les
traductions, s'ils sont inclus, ne sont pas en form finale et sont fournies uniquement à titre d'information.
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[TRANSLATION – TRADUCTION]
TREATY ON FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the "High Contracting Parties",
Based on the historically close ties and relations of friendship and cooperation between the
peoples of Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
Noting that the Treaty between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR of 19 November 1990
fostered the development of good-neighbor relations between the two States,
Reaffirming their obligations proceeding from the provisions of the Agreement between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Further Development of Inter-state Legal Relations,
which was signed at Dagomys on 23 June 1992,
Considering that the strengthening of friendly relations, good-neighborliness and mutually
beneficial cooperation corresponds to the vital interests of their peoples and serves the cause of
peace and international security,
Endeavouring to endow those relations with a new quality and to strengthen their legal basis,
Filled with the determination to ensure the irrevocability and continuation of democratic
processes in both States,
Taking into account the agreements reached within the framework of the Commonwealth of
Independent States,
Reaffirming their commitment to the norms of international law, above all, to the goals and
principles of the United Nations Charter and honouring the obligations assumed within the
framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
As friendly, equal and sovereign States, the High Contracting Parties shall base their relations
on mutual respect and trust, strategic partnership and cooperation.
Article 2
In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the obligations of the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the High Contracting Parties
shall honour each other's territorial integrity and shall acknowledge the inviolability of the borders
existing between them.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties shall structure their relations with each other on the principles
of mutual respect; sovereign equality; territorial integrity; inviolability of borders; peaceful
settlement of disputes; non-use of force or the threat of force, including economic or other means
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of pressure; the right of peoples to freely choose their own destiny; non-intervention in internal
affairs; observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; cooperation between states; and
good-faith performance of international obligations undertaken, as well as other universally
recognized norms of international law.
Article 4
The High Contracting Parties are proceeding from the premise that good- neighborliness and
cooperation between them are important factors for increasing stability and security in Europe and
in the rest of the world. They shall maintain close cooperation for purposes of strengthening
international peace and security. They shall take the requisite measures to facilitate the process of
universal disarmament and the creation and strengthening of a system of collective security in
Europe, as well as the strengthening of the peacekeeping role of the UN and the increased
effectiveness of regional mechanisms of security.
Article 5
The High Contracting Parties shall hold regular consultations in order to deepen the bilateral
relations and exchange views on multifaceted problems of mutual interest. When necessary, they
shall coordinate their positions to effect agreed-upon actions.
For those purposes, by agreement of the Parties, regular high-level meetings shall be held.
The ministers of foreign affairs of the Parties shall meet at least twice a year.
Working meetings between representatives of other ministries and departments of the Parties
shall be held, as necessary, to discuss issues of mutual interest.
The Parties may create permanent or provisional mixed commissions to resolve certain issues
in various areas.
Article 6
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from participating in or supporting any
actions whatsoever that are directed against the other High Contracting Party and shall obligate
itself not to enter into any agreement with third countries that is directed against the other Party.
Nor shall either of the Parties allow its territory to be used to the detriment of the security of the
other Party.
Article 7
In the event that a situation arises that, in the opinion of one of the High Contracting Parties,
creates a threat to peace, violates the peace, or affects the interests of its national security,
sovereignty, or territorial integrity, it may propose to the other High Contracting Party the
immediate conduct of relevant consultations. The Parties shall exchange information and, if
necessary, take agreed-upon or joint measures to resolve the situation.
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Article 8
The High Contracting Parties shall develop their relations in the sphere of military and
military-technical cooperation and the provision of State security, as well as in cooperation on
border issues, customs, and export and immigration control, on the basis of separate agreements.
Article 9
The High Contracting Parties, reaffirming their resolve to travel the path of reducing armed
forces and armaments, shall facilitate, shall facilitate the disarmament process and shall cooperate
in the matter of unwavering performance of agreements in the area of reducing armed forces and
armaments, including nuclear weapons.
Article 10
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall guarantee the citizens of the other Party rights and
freedoms on the same basis and to the same extent as it does its own citizens, except in cases
established by the domestic law of the Parties or their international treaties.
Each of the Parties shall protect, in the established manner, the rights of its citizens residing in
the territory of the other Party, in accordance with the obligations arising from the instruments of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and from other generally recognized
principles and norms of international law and accords reached within the framework of the
Commonwealth of Independent States to which they are a party.
Article 11
The High Contracting Parties shall, in their own territories, take the requisite measures,
including the adoption of relevant legislative acts, to prevent and suppress any actions that
constitute violence or incitement to violence against individuals or groups of citizens that is based
on national, racial, ethnic or religious intolerance.
Article 12
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and
religious identify of national minorities in their territory and shall create conditions that encourage
such identify
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall guarantee the right of persons belonging to a
national minority, individually or together with other persons belonging to the national minority,
to freely express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity and
maintain and develop their culture without being subjected to any attempts to assimilate them
against their will.
The High Contracting Parties shall guarantee the right of individuals who belong to national
minorities to fully and effectively exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms without
any discrimination and with full equality under the law.
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The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the creation of equal opportunities and conditions
for learning the Ukrainian language in the Russian Federation and the Russian language in
Ukraine and for training teachers to lecture in those languages at educational institutions and shall
provide equal State support for those purposes.
The High Contracting Parties shall enter into cooperation agreements in those matters.
Article 13
The High Contracting Parties shall develop economic cooperation on the basis of equal rights
and mutual benefit and shall refrain from any actions that could cause economic harm to the other.
To that end, recognizing the need for the gradual formation and development of a common
economic space through the creation of conditions for the free movement of goods, services,
capital and workforce, the Parties shall take effective measures to coordinate strategies for
implementing economic reforms, for deepening economic integration on the basis of mutual
benefit, and for harmonizing business law.
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure the broad exchange of economic information, as
well as access to it by enterprises, entrepreneurs, and researchers of both Parties.
The Parties shall endeavour to coordinate their financial, monetary, budgetary, foreignexchange,
pricing, tax, and trade and economic policies, as well as customs policy, to create equal
opportunities and guarantees for economic entities and shall facilitate the formation and
development of direct economic and trade relations on all levels and specialization and
cooperation between technologically linked industries, enterprises, associations, corporations,
banks and commodity producers and consumers.
The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the preservation and expansion, on a mutually
beneficial basis, of production-related and scientific-technical cooperation between industrial
enterprises in the development and production of state-of-the-art science-intensive products,
including products for defense needs.
Article 14
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure favourable conditions for direct trade and other
economic relations and cooperation at the level of administrative-territorial entities, in accordance
with prevailing national law, while focusing special attention on the development of the economic
ties between border regions.
Article 15
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure favourable conditions for economic, financial and
legal conditions for entrepreneurial and other economic activities of enterprises and organizations
of the other Party, including the promotion and mutual protection of their investments. The Parties
shall encourage various forms of cooperation and direct ties between economic entities of both
States, regardless of the form of ownership.
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Article 16
The High Contracting Parties shall interact with the United Nations and other international
organizations, including economic and financial organizations, and shall support each other in
terms of admission to international organizations and accession to agreements and conventions in
which one of the Parties is not a participant.
Article 17
The High Contracting Parties shall expand cooperation in the sphere of transportation and
shall guarantee freedom of transit of persons, freight, and vehicles through each other's territory, in
accordance with the generally recognized norms of international law.
The conveyance of freight and passengers by rail, air, maritime, river and automobile
transport between the two Parties and via transit across their territories, including operations
through seaports, river ports and airports and via rail and automobile networks, as well as
operations via communication links, major pipelines and electrical networks on the territory of the
other Party, shall be performed in the manner and under the terms stipulated by separate
agreements.
Article 18
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the conduct of searches and emergency rescue
operations, as well as in the investigation of transportation accidents.
Article 19
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure compliance with the legal framework associated
with State property and the property of legal entities and individuals of one High Contracting
Parties that is located in the territory of the other High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the
law of the latter Party, unless otherwise specified by agreement of the Parties.
The Parties shall proceed from the notion that property-relations issues that affect their
interests shall be governed by separate agreements.
Article 20
The High Contracting Parties shall devote particular attention to the development of
cooperation in ensuring the functioning of national fuel-and-energy complexes, transportation
systems, and communication-and-information systems, facilitating the conservation, efficient use,
and development of the complexes and individuals systems that have come about in those areas.
Article 21
On the basis of separate agreements, the High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the
research and use of outer space and in the joint production and development of aerospace
technology, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with international law.
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The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the preservation and development of the cooperative
ties that have been formed between aerospace enterprises.
Article 22
The High Contracting Parties shall provide mutual assistance in responding to accidents
related to emergency situations on communication links, major pipelines, energy systems,
transportation routes and other facilities that are of mutual interest to the Parties.
The rules for interaction in the performance of emergency response and reconstruction work
shall be defined in separate agreements.
Article 23
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the fields of education, science and
technology and in the development of research, encouraging direct ties between their research
organizations and the implementation of joint programmes and projects, particularly in the field of
advanced technologies. Questions involving the use of the results of joint research achieved in the
course of the cooperation shall be agreed upon on a case-by-case basis by means of separate
agreements.
The Parties shall act in concert in the training of personnel and shall encourage the exchange
of specialists, scientists, graduate students, interns, and undergraduates. They shall recognize the
equivalence of each other's academic credentials, degrees, and titles and shall enter into a separate
agreement on that matter.
The Parties shall exchange scientific-technical information and shall cooperate in matters
involving protection of copyright and associated rights and other types of intellectual property in
accordance with national law and the international obligations of their countries in that area.
Article 24
The High Contracting Parties shall develop cooperation in the fields of culture, literature, art,
the mass media, tourism and sports.
The Parties shall act in concert to preserve, restore and use their historical and cultural
heritages.
The Parties shall, in every possible way, facilitate the strengthening and broadening of the
creative exchange and interaction between collectives, organizations
and associations of figures engaged in literature and the arts, cinematography, publishing,
and archive-keeping of their countries; celebrating traditional days national culture and conducting
art festivals and exhibitions and tours of art collectives and soloists, exchanging delegations of
cultural figures and specialists at the national, regional, and local levels, and organizing national
cultural centres in the territory of their States
The Parties shall provide State support of the development and implementation of joint
programmes for the revival and expansion of the tourist industry, the development of promising
new recreation areas and the preservation, restoration and effective use of cultural-historical and
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religious monuments and sites. The strengthening of contacts between sports organizations and
clubs and the joint conduct of inter-state sports events shall be encouraged in every way.
The Parties shall jointly develop and implement mutually beneficial programmes for the
development of the material-technical base of television and radio, including satellite
broadcasting, and shall ensure, on a parity basis, the organization of Russian- language television
and radio broadcasts in Ukraine and Ukrainian-language broadcasts in Russia.
The Parties shall facilitate the development of contacts between individuals, political parties
and public movements, trade unions, religious organizations and associations, and health, athletic,
tourist and other associations and unions
All the issues addressed in this article shall be the subjects of separate agreements.
Article 25
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the areas of environmental protection and
improvement, transborder pollution prevention, efficient and resource- conserving land use and
the response to natural and man-made disasters and shall facilitate coordinated actions in those
areas at the regional and global levels, with an eye to creating a comprehensive system of
international environmental safety.
The Parties shall proceed from the premise that the questions of environmental protection and
environmental safety, including the protection and use of the ecosystems and resources of the
Dnepr River and other transborder waterways and actions associated with environmental
emergencies, are to be covered by separate agreements.
Article 26
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the response to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant accident and shall enter into a separate agreement on that issue.
Article 27
The High Contracting Parties shall develop cooperation in the field of social protection,
including the social security of citizens. The Parties shall enter into special agreements with an eye
to addressing the issues of labour relations, employment, social protection, compensation for
losses caused by disabling or other injuries incurred in the workplace, social security for citizens
of one Party who work or have an employment history in the territory of the other Party, and other
issues m that field that require negotiated solutions.
The Parties shall ensure the free and timely transfer of pensions, benefits, child support, funds
consisting of compensation for losses caused by disabling or other injuries incurred in the
workplace, and other social payments to the citizens of one Party who reside permanently or
temporarily in the territory of the other Party.
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Article 28
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in matters involving the restoration of the rights
of deported persons, in accordance with the arrangements made within the framework of the CIS
on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
Article 29
The High Contracting Parties, as Black Sea states, are also prepared to further develop
comprehensive cooperation in saving and preserving the natural environment of the Azov—Black
Sea Basin, to conduct maritime and climatology research, to utilize the recreational potential and
natural resources of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov and to develop maritime shipping and use sea
lanes, seaports and maritime facilities.
Article 30
The High Contracting Parties recognize the importance of preserving a technologically
unified system for Ukraine and the Russian Federation for the collection, processing,
dissemination and use of hydrometeorological information and data on the state of the
environment to safeguard the interests of the populace and the national economy and shall
facilitate in every way possible the development of cooperation in the field of hydrometeorology
and environmental monitoring.
Article 31
The High Contracting Parties shall devote particular attention to developing mutually
beneficial cooperation in the field of health care and improvement of health- and-epidemiological
conditions, the production of medicinal preparations and medical equipment, and the training of
highly skilled personnel for the treatment facilities of the Parties.
Article 32
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the addressing problems involving the
regulation of migration processes, including measures to forestall and prevent illegal migration
from third countries, for which a separate agreement shall be entered into.
Article 33
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in combating crime, above all, organized crime;
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including criminal acts endangering maritime
shipping, civil aviation, and other types of transport; and illegal trade in radioactive materials,
arms, narcotics and psychotropic substances, and contraband, including the smuggling across the
border of objects that are of cultural, historical, or artistic value.
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Article 34
The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the legal sphere on the basis of separate
agreements.
Article 35
The High Contracting Parties shall develop contacts and cooperation between the parliaments
and parliamentarians of both States.
Article 36
This Treaty shall not prejudice the rights or obligations of the High Contracting Parties that
arise from other international treaties to which they are a party.
Article 37
Disputes involving the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be settled through
consultation and negotiations between the High Contracting Parties
Article 38
The High Contracting Parties shall enter into other agreements with each other that are
necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, as well as agreements in fields
that are of mutual interest
Article 39
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day of the
exchange of ratification instruments
On the day of the entry into force of this Treaty, the Treaty between the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of 19 November 1990
shall cease to be in force.
Article 40
This Treaty shall be concluded for a period of 10 years. It shall then be automatically renewed
for successive 10-year periods if neither of the High Contracting Parties declares its wish to
terminate it to the other High Contracting Parties by way of written notification at least six months
before the expiry of the current 10-year period.
Article 41
This Treaty shall be subject to registration with the United Nations Secretariat in accordance
with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
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DONE at Kiev on 31 May 1997 in two copies, each in the Ukrainian and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
For Ukraine:
For The Russian Federation:
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[TRANSLATION – TRADUCTION]
TRAITÉ D’AMITIÉ, DE COOPÉRATION ET DE PARTENARIAT ENTRE
L’UKRAINE ET LA FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE
L’Ukraine et la Fédération de Russie, ci-après dénommées Hautes Parties contractantes,
Se fondant sur les liens historiques étroits et les relations d’amitié et de coopération qui
unissent les peuples de l’Ukraine et de la Fédération de Russie,
Notant que le Traité entre la République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine et de la République
socialiste fédérative soviétique de Russie du 19 novembre 1990 a favorisé le développement de
relations de bon voisinage entre les deux États,
Réaffirmant les obligations qu’elles ont assumées en vertu de l’Accord entre l’Ukraine et la
Fédération de Russie relatif au développement des relations entre les deux États, signé à Dagomys
le 23 juin 1992,
Estimant que le renforcement de leurs relations d’amitié, de bon voisinage et de collaboration
mutuellement profitable répond aux intérêts essentiels de leurs peuples et sert la cause de la paix et
de la sécurité internationales,
Désireuses de donner une qualité nouvelle à ces relations et d’en consolider les fondements
juridiques,
Déterminées à garantir le caractère irréversible et dynamique des processus démocratiques en
marche dans les deux pays,
Tenant compte des accords conclus dans le cadre de la Communauté d’États indépendants,
Réaffirmant leur attachement aux normes du droit international, en premier lieu aux buts et
principes énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies, et se conformant aux obligations assumées
dans le cadre de l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe,
Sont convenues de ce qui suit :
Article premier
Les Hautes Parties contractantes, États amis, égaux en droits et souverains, fondent leurs
relations sur le respect et la confiance mutuels, le partenariat et la coopération stratégiques.
Article 2
Les Hautes Parties contractantes, conformément aux dispositions de la Charte des Nations
Unies et de l’Acte final de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, respectent
mutuellement leur intégrité territoriale et confirment l’inviolabilité de leurs frontières communes.
Article 3
Les Hautes Parties contractantes fondent leurs relations mutuelles sur les principes du respect
réciproque, de l’égalité souveraine, de l’intégrité territoriale, de l’inviolabilité des frontières, du
règlement pacifique des différends, du non-recours à l’emploi ou à la menace de la force, y
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compris aux moyens de pression économiques et autres, du droit des peuples à disposer librement
de leur sort, de la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures, du respect des droits de l’homme et
des libertés fondamentales, de la coopération entre les États, de l’accomplissement en toute bonne
foi des obligations internationales assumées, et des autres normes généralement reconnues du droit
international.
Article 4
Les Hautes Parties contractantes prennent pour prémisse que leurs relations de bon voisinage
et de coopération sont des facteurs importants pour le renforcement de la stabilité et de la sécurité
en Europe et dans le monde. Elles collaborent étroitement dans le but de renforcer la paix et la
sécurité internationales. Elles font le nécessaire pour favoriser le processus de désarmement
général, la mise en place et la consolidation d’un système de sécurité collective en Europe, le
renforcement du rôle de paix de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et l’amélioration de l’efficacité
des mécanismes régionaux de sécurité.
Article 5
Les Hautes Parties contractantes procèdent régulièrement à des consultations afin
d’approfondir encore leurs relations bilatérales et d’échanger des vues sur les problèmes
multilatéraux présentant un intérêt réciproque. En cas de nécessité, elles coordonnent leurs
positions en vue de mener une action concertée.
À cette fin, les Parties, selon qu’elles en auront décidé en coordination, tiennent régulièrement
des réunions au sommet. Leurs ministres des affaires étrangères se réunissent au moins deux fois
l’an.
Des réunions de travail entre représentants d’autres ministères et départements des Parties
sont organisées selon que de besoin aux fins d’examen des questions présentant un intérêt
réciproque.
Les Parties peuvent constituer à titre permanent ou temporaire des commissions conjointes
chargées de régler des questions déterminées relevant de divers domaines.
Article 6
Chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes s’abstient de participer à toute action dirigée contre
l’autre Partie ou de soutenir une telle action, et s’engage à ne conclure avec des pays tiers aucun
accord dirigé contre l’autre Partie. En outre, aucune des Parties contractantes ne permet que son
territoire soit utilisé au détriment de la sécurité de l’autre Partie.
Article 7
En cas de situation constituant de l’avis de l’une des Hautes Parties contractantes une menace
contre la paix ou une rupture de la paix, ou portant atteinte aux intérêts de sa sécurité, de sa
souveraineté nationale et de son intégrité territoriale, cette Partie peut s’adresser à l’autre Haute
Partie contractante en lui proposant de procéder d’urgence aux consultations appropriées. Les
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Parties échangent les informations voulues et prennent au besoin des mesures concertées ou
conjointes en vue de maîtriser ladite situation.
Article 8
Les Hautes Parties contractantes développent par des accords distincts leurs relations de
coopération visant les questions militaires et les techniques militaires, la sécurité d’État, les
questions frontalières et douanières, et le contrôle des exportations et de l’immigration.
Article 9
Les Hautes Parties contractantes, se réaffirmant déterminées à progresser vers une réduction
des forces armées et des armements, contribueront au processus de désarmement et oeuvreront de
concert pour le strict respect des accords conclus en matière de réduction des forces armées et des
armements, notamment nucléaires.
Article 10
Chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes garantit aux ressortissants de l’autre Partie des
droits et libertés équivalents dans leurs fondements et leur portée à ceux qu’elle garantit à ses
propres ressortissants, sauf dans les cas visés par la législation nationale des Parties ou les accords
internationaux auxquels elles sont parties.
Chacune des Parties défend selon les modalités fixées les droits de ses ressortissants résidant
sur le territoire de l’autre Partie, conformément aux obligations découlant des documents de
l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, des autres principes et normes
généralement reconnus du droit international, et des accords conclus dans le cadre de la
Communauté d’États indépendants auxquels elles sont parties.
Article 11
Les Hautes Parties contractantes font le nécessaire sur leur territoire, notamment en adoptant
la législation voulue, pour prévenir et réprimer tout acte constituant une incitation à la violence ou
un acte de violence dirigé contre un individu ou un groupe de personnes qui serait motivé par
l’intolérance nationale, raciale, ethnique ou religieuse.
Article 12
Les Hautes Parties contractantes assurent la défense des particularismes ethniques, culturels,
linguistiques et religieux des minorités nationales sur leur territoire, et créent des conditions
propres à les encourager.
Chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes garantit aux personnes appartenant à une minorité
nationale le droit de manifester, de préserver et de développer librement, à titre individuel ou avec
d’autres personnes appartenant à une minorité nationale, leurs particularismes ethniques, culturels,
linguistiques ou religieux, ainsi que de soutenir et développer leur culture, sans être soumises à
aucune tentative d’assimilation contre leur gré.
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Les Hautes Parties contractantes garantissent le droit des personnes appartenant à une
minorité nationale d’exercer pleinement et effectivement leurs droits de l’homme et leurs libertés
fondamentales, et d’en jouir sans aucune discrimination et dans des conditions de pleine égalité
devant la loi.
Les Hautes Parties contractantes aideront à créer des possibilités et des conditions égales pour
l’apprentissage de la langue ukrainienne en Fédération de Russie et de la langue russe en Ukraine
et pour la formation des maîtres chargés d’enseigner ces langues dans les établissements
d’enseignement, et fourniront à ces fins un soutien équivalent de l’État.
Des accords de coopération sur ces questions seront conclus entre les Hautes Parties
contractantes.
Article 13
Les Hautes Parties contractantes développent dans l’égalité de droits une coopération
mutuellement profitable dans le domaine économique; elles s’abstiennent de toute action
susceptible de causer à l’autre Partie un préjudice économique. À cette fin, conscientes de la
nécessité de constituer et de développer progressivement un espace économique commun en
créant des conditions permettant la libre circulation des marchandises, des services, des capitaux et
de la main-d’oeuvre, les Parties prennent des mesures efficaces pour coordonner leur stratégie de
réforme économique, pour faire progresser l’intégration économique mutuellement profitable et
pour harmoniser leur législation économique.
Les Hautes Parties contractantes assureront un large échange d’informations économiques et
en garantiront l’accès aux firmes, aux entrepreneurs et aux scientifiques des deux Parties.
Les Parties s’efforceront de coordonner leurs politiques en ce qui concerne les finances, la
monnaie et le crédit, le budget, les devises, les investissements, les prix, la fiscalité, l’économie et
les échanges ainsi que les douanes, et d’offrir des possibilités et des garanties égales aux agents
économiques; elles favoriseront la constitution et le développement de relations économiques et
commerciales directes à tous les niveaux, ainsi que la spécialisation et la coopération entre les
secteurs de production, les entreprises, les groupes, les sociétés, les banques, les producteurs et les
consommateurs liés par des rapports technologiques.
Les Hautes Parties contractantes favoriseront entre les industries le maintien et le
développement d’une coopération mutuellement profitable en matière de production, de science et
de technologie pour la mise au point et la fabrication de produits de pointe, y compris pour les
besoins de la défense.
Article 14
Les Hautes Parties contractantes créeront des conditions favorables aux relations et à la
coopération économiques directes d’ordre commercial et autres à l’échelon des divisions
territoriales administratives, conformément aux législations nationales en vigueur, en s’attachant
particulièrement au développement des relations économiques dans les régions frontalières.
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Article 15
Les Hautes Parties contractantes assurent des conditions économiques, financières et
juridiques favorables aux activités d’entrepreneur et autres activités économiques des firmes et
organismes de l’autre Partie, notamment en stimulant et protégeant réciproquement leurs
investissements. Les Parties encourageront la coopération et les relations directes sous différentes
formes entre les agents économiques de l’un et de l’autre État, quel que soit le mode de propriété.
Article 16
Les Hautes Parties contractantes, dans leurs rapports au sein de l’Organisation des Nations
Unies et d’autres organisations internationales, notamment économiques et financières,
s’entraident pour l’admission dans les organisations internationales et l’adhésion aux accords et
conventions auxquels l’une d’entre elles n’est pas partie.
Article 17
Les Hautes Parties contractantes élargissent leur coopération dans le domaine des transports;
elles garantissent la liberté de transit sur leur territoire respectif des personnes, des marchandises
et des moyens de transport conformément aux normes généralement reconnues du droit
international.
Des accords distincts régissent les modalités et les conditions applicables aux transports
ferroviaires, aériens, maritimes, fluviaux et automobiles de marchandises et de passagers entre les
deux Parties, et au passage en transit sur les territoires respectifs de celles-ci, y compris aux
opérations empruntant les ports maritimes et fluviaux, les aéroports, les réseaux ferrés et
automobiles, les moyens de communication et les grands réseaux, de pipelines et électriques,
implantés sur le territoire de l’autre Partie.
Article 18
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopèrent pour les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage,
ainsi que pour les enquêtes sur les accidents de transport.
Article 19
Les Hautes Parties contractantes assurent le respect du droit applicable aux biens publics, aux
biens des personnes morales et des ressortissants de l’une d’entre elles se trouvant sur le territoire
de l’autre, conformément à la législation de cette dernière, sauf disposition contraire convenue par
accord entre les Parties.
Les questions concernant les relations de propriété susceptibles de porter atteinte aux intérêts
des Parties sont soumises à des accords distincts.
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Article 20
Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’attachent spécialement au développement de leur
coopération concernant le fonctionnement des installations nationales dans les secteurs des
combustibles, de l’énergie, des transports, des communications et de l’informatique, en favorisant
la préservation, la mise en valeur et le développement durable des réseaux et systèmes mis en
place dans ces secteurs.
Article 21
Des accords distincts régissent la coopération entre les Hautes Parties contractantes en ce qui
concerne l’exploration et les utilisations de l’espace, ainsi que la fabrication et le développement
conjoints des technologies spatiales, dans le respect de l’égalité en droits, de l’avantage mutuel et
du droit international. Les Hautes Parties contractantes favorisent le maintien et le développement
des relations de coopération établies entre entreprises des industries spatiales.
Article 22
Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’entraident pour l’élimination des pannes résultant
d’accidents touchant des moyens de communication, des grands réseaux de pipelines, des réseaux
énergétiques, des voies de communication et d’autres équipements présentant un intérêt réciproque
pour les deux Parties.
Les modalités d’entraide pour les travaux de réparation et de remise en état font l’objet
d’accords distincts.
Article 23
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopèrent en matière d’éducation, de science et de technique,
ainsi qu’en vue du développement de la recherche, en encourageant entre leurs établissements de
recherche scientifique l’établissement de relations directes et la réalisation de programmes et de
travaux conjoints, dans les technologies de pointe en particulier. Les modalités d’utilisation des
résultats de recherches conjointes obtenus en coopération seront arrêtées au cas par cas par le biais
d’accords distincts.
Les Parties s’entraident en matière de formation en encourageant les échanges de spécialistes,
de scientifiques, de jeunes chercheurs, de stagiaires et d’étudiants. Elles reconnaissent
mutuellement les équivalences de diplômes, certificats de fin d’études, grades et titres
universitaires, qui feront l’objet d’un accord distinct.
Les Parties procèdent à des échanges d’informations scientifiques et techniques, et coopèrent
à la défense des droits d’auteur et droits connexes et des autres types de propriété intellectuelle,
conformément à la législation nationale et aux obligations internationales assumées à cet égard par
l’un et l’autre pays.
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Article 24
Les Hautes Parties contractantes développent leur coopération culturelle, littéraire, artistique,
médiatique, touristique et sportive.
Les Parties s’entraident pour la conservation, la restauration et la mise en valeur du
patrimoine historique et culturel.
Les Parties font en sorte de renforcer et d’élargir les échanges et interactions créatifs entre les
groupes, les organisations et les fédérations d’écrivains et d’artistes, de cinéastes, d’éditeurs et
d’archivistes des deux pays, et d’encourager la célébration des fêtes traditionnelles dans les
minorités nationales, l’organisation de festivals et d’expositions d’art, de tournées de troupes et de
solistes, les échanges de délégations culturelles et de spécialistes à l’échelon national, régional et
local, ainsi que la mise en place de centres culturels nationaux sur le territoire des deux pays.
Les Parties assurent une aide de l’État pour la définition et l’exécution de programmes
conjoints de relance et de développement du tourisme, la mise en valeur à long terme de nouvelles
zones de loisirs, la sauvegarde, la restauration et l’utilisation rationnelle de bâtiments et sites
culturels, historiques et religieux. Elles encouragent activement le resserrement des liens entre
organisations et clubs sportifs, ainsi que l’organisation de manifestations sportives conjointes entre
les deux pays.
Les Parties définissent et exécutent en commun des programmes mutuellement profitables de
développement des équipements de télévision et de radiodiffusion, notamment de transmission par
satellites, et assurent sur une base paritaire l’organisation d’émissions de radio et de télévision en
langue russe en Ukraine, et en langue ukrainienne en Russie.
Les Parties favorisent le développement de rapports entre les particuliers, les partis politiques
et les mouvements sociaux, les syndicats, les organisations et associations religieuses, et les
associations et fédérations sanitaires, sportives, touristiques et autres.
L’ensemble des questions visées au présent article fera l’objet d’accords distincts.
Article 25
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopèrent pour protéger l’environnement et en améliorer la
situation, prévenir la pollution transfrontière, assurer une mise en valeur rationnelle et sans
gaspillage des ressources naturelles, et éliminer les conséquences des accidents écologiques
naturels et anthropiques, et favorisent à cet égard l’action concertée à l’échelon régional et
mondial, en visant l’instauration d’un grand système international de sûreté écologique.
Les questions concernant la protection de l’environnement et la prévention des risques
écologiques, notamment celles qui touchent la sauvegarde et l’utilisation des écosystèmes et des
ressources du Dnepr et des autres cours d’eau transfrontières, ainsi que les mesures à prendre en
cas d’accident écologique, feront l’objet d’accords distincts.
Article 26
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopèrent en vue d’éliminer les séquelles de l’accident de la
centrale nucléaire de Tchernobyl, et concluront à cette fin un accord distinct.
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Article 27
Les Hautes Parties contractantes développent leur coopération en matière de protection
sociale, et notamment de sécurité sociale. Elles concluront des accords spéciaux visant les
relations professionnelles, l’emploi, la protection sociale, l’indemnisation des mutilés et invalides
du travail, la sécurité sociale des ressortissants de l’un des deux pays qui travaillent ou ont
travaillé sur le territoire de l’autre, ainsi que les autres questions relevant de ce domaine et
appelant des solutions concertées.
Les Parties garantiront la possibilité de virer en toute liberté et sans délai les retraites, les
prestations, les pensions, les indemnités de mutilé ou d’invalide, et les autres transferts sociaux
versés aux ressortissants de l’un des deux pays résidant sur le territoire de l’autre à titre permanent
ou temporaire.
Article 28
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopéreront au sujet des questions relatives au rétablissement
des droits des peuples déplacés, conformément aux accords conclus dans le cadre de la
Communauté d’États indépendants, aux niveaux bilatéral et multilatéral.
Article 29
Les Hautes Parties contractantes, en tant qu’États riverains de la mer Noire, sont prêtes à
renforcer encore la coopération multilatérale concernant la sauvegarde et la protection de
l’environnement du bassin de la mer d’Azov et de la mer Noire, à effectuer des recherches marines
et climatologiques, à mettre en valeur le potentiel touristique et les ressources naturelles de ces
deux mers, à développer la navigation et à exploiter les communications, les ports et les
installations maritimes.
Article 30
Les Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissent qu’il est important pour l’Ukraine et la
Fédération de Russie d’uniformiser sur le plan technique le système de rassemblement, de
traitement, de diffusion et d’utilisation des informations et données hydrométéorologiques sur
l’état de l’environnement, dans l’intérêt de la population et de l’économie nationale, et
s’attacheront de concert, par tous les moyens, à développer la coopération dans le domaine de
l’hydrométéorologie et de la surveillance de l’environnement.
Article 31
Les Hautes Parties contractantes attachent une importance particulière au développement de la
coopération mutuellement profitable dans le domaine de la santé publique, ainsi qu’en vue
d’améliorer la situation en matière sanitaire et épidémiologique, de fabriquer des produits
pharmaceutiques et du matériel médical et de former du personnel hautement qualifié pour les
établissements de santé des deux Parties.
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Article 32
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopéreront au règlement des problèmes concernant la
réglementation des processus migratoires, notamment à l’aide de mesures visant à prévenir et à
interdire les migrations illégales en provenance de pays tiers, en concluant à cette fin un accord
distinct.
Article 33
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopéreront à la lutte contre la criminalité, avant tout contre
la criminalité organisée, le terrorisme sous toutes ses formes et manifestations, y compris les actes
criminels visant la sécurité de la navigation maritime, de l’aviation civile et des autres modes de
transport, le trafic de matières radioactives, d’armes, de stupéfiants et de substances psychotropes,
et la contrebande, y compris l’exportation clandestine d’objets ayant une valeur culturelle,
historique et artistique.
Article 34
Les Hautes Parties contractantes coopéreront dans le domaine juridique sur la base d’accords
distincts.
Article 35
Les Hautes Parties contractantes encouragent le développement des contacts et de la
coopération entre les Parlements et les députés des deux États.
Article 36
Le présent Traité ne porte pas atteinte aux droits et obligations des Hautes Parties
contractantes découlant d’autres accords internationaux auxquels elles sont parties.
Article 37
Les différends concernant l’interprétation et l’amendement des dispositions du présent Traité
seront réglés par voie de consultation et de négociation entre les Hautes Parties contractantes.
Article 38
Les Hautes Parties contractantes concluront entre elles d’autres accords nécessaires pour la
mise en oeuvre des dispositions du présent Traité, ainsi que des accords dans les domaines
présentant un intérêt commun.
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Article 39
Le présent Traité est soumis à ratification et entrera en vigueur à la date de l’échange des
instruments de ratification.
Le Traité entre la République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine et la République socialiste
fédérative soviétique de Russie en date du 19 novembre 1990 cessera de prendre effet à compter
de la date d’entrée en vigueur du présent Traité.
Article 40
Le présent Traité est conclu pour une période de 10 ans. Il sera par la suite automatiquement
prorogé pour une autre période de 10 ans à moins que l’une des Hautes Parties contractantes ne
notifie à l’autre Partie contractante par écrit, six mois au moins avant l’expiration de la période de
10 ans, son intention d’y mettre fin.
Article 41
Le présent Traité est soumis à enregistrement au Secrétariat de l’Organisation des Nations
Unies, conformément à l’Article 102 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
FAIT à Kiev, le 31 mai 1997, en deux exemplaires, en langues ukrainienne et russe, les deux
textes faisant également foi
Pour l’Ukraine :
Pour la Fédération de Russie :
Annex 983
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (7 December 2000)
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2000/C 364/01)
18.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/1
PROCLAMACIN SOLEMNE
HJTIDELIG PROKLAMATION
FEIERLICHE PROKLAMATION
—`˝˙ˆ˚˙ ˜`˚˙˛˙
SOLEMN PROCLAMATION
PROCLAMATION SOLENNELLE
FORGRA SOLLNTA
PROCLAMAZIONE SOLENNE
PLECHTIGE AFKONDIGING
PROCLAMA˙ˆO SOLENE
JUHLALLINEN JULISTUS
HGTIDLIG PROKLAMATION
18.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/3
El Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo y la Comisin proclaman solemnemente en tanto que Carta de los
Derechos Fundamentales de la Unin Europea el texto que figura a continuacin.
Europa-Parlamentet, Rdet og Kommissionen proklamerer hłjtideligt den tekst, der fłlger nedenfor, som
Den Europiske Unions charter om grundlggende rettigheder.
Das Europische Parlament, der Rat und die Kommission proklamieren feierlich den nachstehenden Text
als Charta der Grundrechte der Europischen Union.
¯ıæøÆoeOE ˚غØ,
ı ºØ OEÆØ ¯Ø æ ØÆOE æı Æ ªıæØOE, ø æ ¨ ºØø
˜ØOEÆØø ø ¯ıæøÆoeOE ‚ø , OE ı ÆOEºıŁ.
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission solemnly proclaim the text below as the
Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.
Le Parlement europØen, le Conseil et la Commission proclament solennellement en tant que Charte des
droits fondamentaux de l’Union europØenne le texte repris ci-aprŁs.
Forgraonn Parlaimint na hEorpa, an Chomhairle agus an Coimisioen go solloenta an tØacs thos mar an
Chairt um Chearta Bunoesacha den Aontas Eorpach.
Il Parlamento europeo, il Consiglio e la Commissione proclamano solennemente quale Carta dei diritti
fondamentali dell’Unione europea il testo riportato in appresso.
Het Europees Parlement, de Raad en de Commissie kondigen plechtig als Handvest van de grondrechten
van de Europese Unie de hierna opgenomen tekst af.
O Parlamento Europeu, o Conselho e a Comissªo proclamam solenemente, enquanto Carta dos Direitos
Fundamentais da Uniªo Europeia, o texto a seguir transcrito.
Euroopan parlamentti, neuvosto ja komissio juhlallisesti julistavat jljempn esitetyn tekstin Euroopan
unionin perusoikeuskirjaksi.
Europaparlamentet, rdet och kommissionen tillknnager hgtidligt denna text ssom stadga om de
grundlggande rttigheterna i Europeiska unionen.
18.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/5
Hecho en Niza, el siete de diciembre del aæo dos mil.
Udfrdiget i Nice den syvende december to tusind.
Geschehen zu Nizza am siebten Dezember zweitausend.
‚ªØ ˝OEÆØÆ, Ø ˜OE æı غØ.
Done at Nice on the seventh day of December in the year two thousand.
Fait Nice, le sept dØcembre deux mille.
Arna dhØanamh i Nice, an seachtoe lÆ de Nollaig sa bhliain dhÆ mhle.
Fatto a Nizza, add sette dicembre duemila.
Gedaan te Nice, de zevende december tweeduizend.
Feito em Nice, em sete de Dezembro de dois mil.
Tehty Nizzassa seitsemnten pivn joulukuuta vuonna kaksituhatta.
Som skedde i Nice den sjunde december tjugohundra.
C 364/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
Por el Parlamento Europeo
For Europa-Parlamentet
F
r das Europische Parlament
ˆØÆ ¯ıæøÆoeOE ˚غØ
For the European Parliament
Pour le Parlement europØen
Thar ceann Pharlaimint na hEorpa
Per il Parlamento europeo
Voor het Europees Parlement
Pelo Parlamento Europeu
Euroopan parlamentin puolesta
Fr Europaparlamentet
Por el Consejo de la Unin Europea
For Rdet for Den Europiske Union
F
r den Rat der Europischen Union
ˆØÆ
ı ºØ ¯ıæøÆoeOE ‚ø
For the Council of the European Union
Pour le Conseil de l’Union europØenne
Thar ceann Chomhairle an Aontais Eorpaigh
Per il Consiglio dell’Unione europea
Voor de Raad van de Europese Unie
Pelo Conselho da Uniªo Europeia
Euroopan unionin neuvoston puolesta
Fr Europeiska unionens rd
Por la Comisin Europea
For Europa-kommissionen
F
r die Europische Kommission
ˆØÆ ¯ıæøÆoeOE ¯Ø æ
For the European Commission
Pour la Commission europØenne
Thar ceann an Choimisioein Eorpaigh
Per la Commissione europea
Voor de Europese Commissie
Pela Comissªo Europeia
Euroopan komission puolesta
Fr Europeiska kommissionen
18.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/7
PREAMBLE
The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful
future based on common values.
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of
human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule
of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union
and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.
The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while
respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the
national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national,
regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free
movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment.
To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in
society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more
visible in a Charter.
This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Community and the Union and
the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and
international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community
Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.
Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human
community and to future generations.
The Union therefore recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out hereafter.
C 364/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
CHAPTER I
DIGNITY
Article 1
Human dignity
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.
Article 2
Right to life
1. Everyone has the right to life.
2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.
Article 3
Right to the integrity of the person
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.
2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular:
the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures laid down by
law,
the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons,
the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain,
the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
Article 4
Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 5
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. Trafficking in human beings is prohibited.
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CHAPTER II
FREEDOMS
Article 6
Right to liberty and security
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
Article 7
Respect for private and family life
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.
Article 8
Protection of personal data
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.
Article 9
Right to marry and right to found a family
The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national
laws governing the exercise of these rights.
Article 10
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom
to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in
private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing
the exercise of this right.
C 364/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
Article 11
Freedom of expression and information
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers.
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.
Article 12
Freedom of assembly and of association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels,
in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and
to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.
2. Political parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the
Union.
Article 13
Freedom of the arts and sciences
The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.
Article 14
Right to education
1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training.
2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education.
3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles and
the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their
religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national
laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.
Article 15
Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work
1. Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation.
2. Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of
establishment and to provide services in any Member State.
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3. Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are
entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.
Article 16
Freedom to conduct a business
The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices
is recognised.
Article 17
Right to property
1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in
the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good
time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general
interest.
2. Intellectual property shall be protected.
Article 18
Right to asylum
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28
July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with
the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Article 19
Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition
1. Collective expulsions are prohibited.
2. No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or
she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
C 364/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
CHAPTER III
EQUALITY
Article 20
Equality before the law
Everyone is equal before the law.
Article 21
Non-discrimination
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority,
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the
Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.
Article 22
Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity
The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.
Article 23
Equality between men and women
Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.
The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for
specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.
Article 24
The rights of the child
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They
may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern
them in accordance with their age and maturity.
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the
child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.
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3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct
contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.
Article 25
The rights of the elderly
The Union recognises and respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence
and to participate in social and cultural life.
Article 26
Integration of persons with disabilities
The Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures
designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the
life of the community.
C 364/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
CHAPTER IV
SOLIDARITY
Article 27
Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking
Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation
in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Community law and national
laws and practices.
Article 28
Right of collective bargaining and action
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and
national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate
levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including
strike action.
Article 29
Right of access to placement services
Everyone has the right of access to a free placement service.
Article 30
Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal
Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Community
law and national laws and practices.
Article 31
Fair and just working conditions
1. Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and
dignity.
2. Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest
periods and to an annual period of paid leave.
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Article 32
Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work
The employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment may not be
lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable
to young people and except for limited derogations.
Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected
against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral
or social development or to interfere with their education.
Article 33
Family and professional life
1. The family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection.
2. To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal
for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave
following the birth or adoption of a child.
Article 34
Social security and social assistance
1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services
providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and
in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and
national laws and practices.
2. Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security
benefits and social advantages in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices.
3. In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to
social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient
resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices.
Article 35
Health care
Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical
treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human
health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and
activities.
C 364/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
Article 36
Access to services of general economic interest
The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in
national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community, in
order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union.
Article 37
Environmental protection
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must
be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable
development.
Article 38
Consumer protection
Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection.
18.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/17
CHAPTER V
CITIZENS’ RIGHTS
Article 39
Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament
1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the
European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as
nationals of that State.
2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and
secret ballot.
Article 40
Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections
Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the
Member State in which he or she resides under the same conditions as nationals of that State.
Article 41
Right to good administration
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a
reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union.
2. This right includes:
the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her
adversely is taken;
the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of
confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;
the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
3. Every person has the right to have the Community make good any damage caused by its institutions
or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general principles
common to the laws of the Member States.
4. Every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the Treaties and
must have an answer in the same language.
C 364/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
Article 42
Right of access to documents
Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a
Member State, has a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.
Article 43
Ombudsman
Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a
Member State has the right to refer to the Ombudsman of the Union cases of maladministration in the
activities of the Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance acting in their judicial role.
Article 44
Right to petition
Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a
Member State has the right to petition the European Parliament.
Article 45
Freedom of movement and of residence
1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States.
2. Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaty establishing
the European Community, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member
State.
Article 46
Diplomatic and consular protection
Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which
he or she is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that Member State.
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CHAPTER VI
JUSTICE
Article 47
Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an
effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised,
defended and represented.
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary
to ensure effective access to justice.
Article 48
Presumption of innocence and right of defence
1. Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
2. Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed.
Article 49
Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute a criminal offence under national law or international law at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time the
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law
provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles recognised
by the community of nations.
3. The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.
Article 50
Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he
or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.
C 364/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
CHAPTER VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 51
Scope
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due
regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application
thereof in accordance with their respective powers.
2. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or
modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.
Article 52
Scope of guaranteed rights
1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of
proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
2. Rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community Treaties or the Treaty on
European Union shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.
3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law
providing more extensive protection.
Article 53
Level of protection
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international
law and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member
States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.
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Article 54
Prohibition of abuse of rights
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for herein.
C 364/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 18.12.2000
Annex 984
Intentionally Omitted
Annex 985
Intentionally Omitted
Annex 986
Intentionally Omitted
Annex 987
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (29 July
1988)
Annex 988
International Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2
September 1998)
Annex 989
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana., Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment (21 May 1999)
Volume XXV - Annexes 959-989