INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XXII OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 800 P.S.N. v Denmark, Communication No.36/2006, CERD/C/71/D/36/2006
(2007)
Annex 801 CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Article 9 of the Convention, United States of America,
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 2008)
Annex 802 Turkey, Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the
Convention, Combined Fourth to Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties
Due in 2013, CERD/C/TUR/4-6 (17 April 2014)
Annex 803 Kenya, Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the
Convention, Fifth to Seventh Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in
2014, CERD/C/KEN/5-7 (28 January 2016)
Annex 804 CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Russian
Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September 2017)
Annex 805 OSCE HCNM, The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea,
Ukraine: Needs Assessment (August 2013)
Annex 806 OSCE, Report by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (28
November 2013 to 23 May 2014)
Annex 807 OSCE, OSCE Representative Warns of Further Threats to Media
Pluralism in Luhansk and Crimea, Notes Threats to Media Workers (11
July 2014)
Annex 808 OCSE, OSCE Representative Condemns Steps Aimed at Full Silencing of
Chernomorskaya TV in Crimea (4 August 2014)
Annex 809 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)
Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (11 September
2014)
Annex 810 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of
Assembly in Crimea Occupied by the Russian Federation,
Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (16–17 April 2015),
PC.SHDM.NGO/14/15 (17 April 2015)
Annex 811 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Thematic Report:
Freedom of Movement across the Administrative Boundary Line with
Crimea (19 June 2015)
Annex 812 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of
the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17
September 2015)
Annex 813 United States Mission to the OSCE, Ongoing Violations of International
Law and Defiance of OSCE Principles and Commitments by the Russian
Federation in Ukraine (26 May 2016)
Annex 814 EU Statement on “Russia’s Ongoing Aggression against Ukraine and
Illegal Occupation of Crimea”, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1106,
PC.DEL/945/16 (24 June 2016)
Annex 815 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Press Release:
Parliamentary Assembly Human Rights Chair Calls for Release of
Crimean Tatar Leader Umerov (27 August 2016)
Annex 816 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission), Opinion on the Federal Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June
2004 On Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing
of the Russian Federation (adopted 16-17 March 2012)
Annex 817 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission), Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law on
Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation, CDLAD(
2012)016 (20 June 2012)
Annex 818 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission), Opinion on Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012
of the Russian Federation Amending Federal Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June
2004 on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches
Annex 819 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), Opinion on “Whether the Decision Taken by the
Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to
Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territor
Annex 820 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on
Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the
Council of Europe, Recent Developments in Ukraine: Threats to the
Functioning of Democratic Institutions (8 April 2014)
Annex 821 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recent Developments
in Ukraine: Threats to the Functioning of Democratic Institutions,
Resolution 1988 (2014) (9 April 2014)
Annex 822 Council of Europe, Report by Nils Muiᓆnieks Following His Mission in
Kyiv, Moscow, and Crimea from 7 to 12 September 2014 (27 October
2014)
Annex 823 Council of Europe Media Freedom Alert, Harassment of Journalists
Natalya Kokorina and Anna Andrievska in Crimea, Ukraine by Russian
Officials (2 April 2015)
Annex 824 Council of Europe, Thematic Commentary No. 4, The Scope of
Application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (adopted on 27 May 2016)
Annex 825 Council of Europe, Report of 11 April 2016
Annex 826 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations
on the Ukrainian Territories Outside the Control of the Ukrainian
Authorities (26 September 2016)
Annex 827 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000
Annex 828 European Commission, Statement, Joint Statement by President of the
European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European
Commission José Manuel Barroso on Crimea (Brussels, 16 March 2014)
Annex 829 European Parliament Policy Department Study, The Situation of
National Minorities in Crimea Following Its Annexation by Russia (April
2016)
Annex 830 European Parliament Resolution of 12 May 2016 on the Crimean Tatars,
2016 O.J. C 76/27
Annex 831 International Criminal Court, Preliminary Examination: Ukraine,
accessed at https://www.icccpi.int/ukraine
Annex 832 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser.
A) No. 2 (1982)
Annex 833 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 4413 to Ukraine (25 April 2016)
Annex 834 Letter from ATR Holdings to Federal Service for Communications,
Information, Technologies, and Mass Communications, dated 12
February 2014
Annex 835 Letter from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation to Mr.
Lenur Islyamov of ATR Television Channel, dated 16 May 2014
Annex 800
P.S.N. v Denmark, Communication No.36/2006, CERD/C/71/D/36/2006 (2007)
Submitted by
Alleged victim
State party
Date of communication
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Meeting
Adopts
(page 36).
(page 37).
How many are there of those who believe that they have a right to rape
Danish girls?
Are you saying that it is ok according to the Koran to rape Danish girls?
How many Danish girls get raped by Muslims?
Yes, but if it more or less appears from the Koran that rape is ok, then one
would presumably be able to bring forth substantially more examples.
In the chapter that you have now removed, you wrote that our laws forbid us
to kill them. Is that what you would like the most?
B.J. v Denmark
prima facie
Ms. Frevert’s website
Ms. Frevert’s book
Statements made by Ms. Frevert in the newspaper “Politiken” on 30 September 2005
all
Quereshi v. Denmark
ratione materiae
ratione materiae
Annex 801
CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the
Convention, United States of America, CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 2008)
Parents Involved in Community Schools
MeredithJefferson County Board of Education
Brown Board of Education
lex specialis
Hoffman Plastics Compound, Inc. . NLRB Ledbetter Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co.Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. Coke
Annex 802
Turkey, Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Combined
Fourth to Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013, CERD/C/TUR/4-6 (17 April
2014)
Paragraphs Page
The draft Law on Anti-Discrimination and Equality includes provisions dealing with both
direct and indirect discrimination.
Differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status
To give effect to the undertaking to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination
against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that public authorities and
public institutions act in conformity with this obligation
To give effect to the undertaking to prohibit and bring to an end racial discrimination by
any persons, groups, or organizations
To review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial
discrimination
To encourage, where appropriate, non-governmental organizations and institutions that
combat racial discrimination and foster mutual understanding
Turkey has relevant legislation in place as presented above under article 4, heading 1.
Types of judgments in relation to the accused
Article Year
Number
of accusations
Number
of judgments
rendered under
this article
Number
of persons
convicted
Number
of persons
acquitted Other
Total
number
of accused
The Constitution safeguards the right to health and the right to social security.
“Supporting Gender Equality in Education Project” will be launched by the Ministry of
National Education in 2014
Measures taken to prevent racial hatred and prejudice in sports and activities organized
for promoting intercultural dialogue among the youth
Measures taken to encourage and facilitate access to the media
Minorities have their own media outlets.
Information on refugees and asylum seekers as well as the Roma was provided earlier.
Types of judgments in relation to the accused
Article Year
Number
of accusations
Number
of judgments
rendered under
this article
Number
of persons
convicted
Number
of persons
acquitted Other
Total
number
of accused
Types of judgments in relation to the accused
Article Year
Number
of accusations
Number
of judgments
rendered under
this article
Number
of persons
convicted
Number
of persons
acquitted Other
Total
number
of accused
Legislative and administrative measures taken in the field of education to combat
discrimination and steps taken to review textbooks and promote human rights issues in
school curricula
Measures taken for training of law enforcement officials in the field of human rights and
non-discrimination
2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 Total
2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 Total
Actions taken to combat racial prejudices, to promote respect for cultural diversity and
tolerance, for example in the area of artistic creation
The linguistic policies adopted and implemented by the State Party
Annex 803
Kenya, Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Fifth to Seventh
Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2014, CERD/C/KEN/5-7 (28 January 2016)
*1601048*
Page
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , it’s 5
This Periodic Report is divided into three parts. Part I is the Report’s introduction.
stakeholders’ consultations and one day validation meeting were
core of the State’s normative and institutional framework. It establishes
and a Judiciary including the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court and Magistrates’
(Raila Odinga & 2 others v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3
others (2013) eKLR)
Kenya’s understanding of the meaning of discrimination on ethnic grounds is guided
At the same time, Kenya’s approach to the subject of racial and ethnic
Coalition for Reform and
Democracy and Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v. Republic of Kenya
(Petition No. 628 and Petition No. 630 of 2014)
because this would violate the country’s international obligations.
John Kabui Mwai and 3 Others v. Kenya National Examination Council and 2 Others
(2011) eKLR
representation of Kenya’s diverse
Commission’s overall mandate is to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good
a study undertaken by the NCIC indicated that to date only 18 of Kenya’s
Independent
Policing Oversight Authority & Another v. Attorney General & 660 others (2014) eKLR
Hersi
Hassan Gutale and Another v. Attorney General and Another (2013) eKLR
Registrar of Persons to consider the petitioners’ application for newgene
inter alia
petitioners’ citizenship. The petitioners held Kenyan birth certificates, and had Kenyan
Rose Wangui Mambo & 2 Others v. Limuru Country Club & 17 others
(2014) eKLR
VMK v. CUEA (2013) eKLR
The NCIC has prepared a document known as “a Framework and Checklist for
’s Laws and
Policies” to guide all agencies as they monitor policies, laws and regulations which create
composition of Kenya’s population. To
Ethnic Group
Population (2009 Census)
Number in the
Civil Service
Share of Civil
Service Jobs (%)
Population/Job
Numbers Share (%) Share Variance
Ethnic Group
Population (2009 Census)
Number in the
Civil Service
Share of Civil
Service Jobs (%)
Population/Job
Numbers Share (%) Share Variance
Source
CRA facilitates the process of determining the basis of revenue sharing among Kenya’s 47
County received the lion’s share of the alloc
Institute for Social Accountability & Another v. National Assembly & 4
Others (2015) eKLR
Organisations. One of the Government’s duties in this regard is to provide an enabling
Vision 2030, Kenya’s development blueprint, recognises that no society can
Vision
experienced during Kenya’s colonis
“”
“ ”
inter alia
—
–
inter alia
—
Chirau Ali Mwakwere v. Robert M. Mabera & 4 Others (2012) eKLR
56.
R v. Moses Kuria (CMCC No. 904
of 2014)R v. Allan Wadi (Criminal Case No. 1 of 2015).
Jamia Mosque Committee v. The Kenya Times
Sunday Times“”
Daily
Nation
“”“”
rraigned before courts of law. Kenya’s security forces have on occasion
50 cases. The Commission’s approach elicited apologies even from politicians.
inter alia
years’ imprisonment or a fine of USD 33
The State has also established a number of laws to ensure the country’s security
Alex J Wagunya v. Attorney General (2013) eKLR
Gitobu Imanyara &
2 Others v. Attorney General & 2 Others (2013) eKLR
the country in terms of the Elections. The country’s Parliament and County Assemblies are
highest ever in the country’s history. Similarly, Kenya’s Parliament now includes at least
Kituo cha Sheria v. Interim Independent Electoral Commission & 2 Others (2013) eKLR
the High Court determined that the right to vote is a fundamental right and part of Kenya’s
strategy of responding to the positive Constitutional approach to citizens’ resident outside
pillars of Kenya’s Foreign Policy, seeks to mainstream the Kenyan Diaspora into the
Vision
economy and critical factor in the achievement of the country’s overarching vision of a
undermined land use by certain communities. One of the Policy’s priority a
t to inherit their parents’
Zipporah Gaiti v. Samson Rukunga (2011) eKLR
the High Court held that the marital status of a deceased’s daughter is not a basis to deny
her right to inherit her deceased father’s esta Monica Jesang Katam v. Jackson
Chepkwony & Another(2011) eKLR
women’s access
… shall be qualified to the extent strictly necessary for the application of Muslim
law before the Kadhis’ courts, to persons who profess the Muslim religion, in
In addition, Article 170 of the Constitution establishes the Kadhis’ Courts whose
Muslim religion and submit to the jurisdiction of the Kadhis’ courts. The question of both
parties submitting to the jurisdiction of the Kadhis’ Court is important because
party where he or she feels that submitting to the Kadhis’ Court jurisdiction may undermine
r children’s rights have been
Republic v. The Head Teacher, Kenya High School and Another Ex-parte
SMY (a minor suing through her mother and next friend A B) (2012) eKLR
s’ decision refusing the applicant and
hijab
Constitutional rights. In finding that the applicant’s rights under Article 27 of the
determined that the respondents’ limitation of
the applicant’s right to outwardly manifest her religion by wearing a hijab
Seventh Day Adventist Church (East Africa) Limited v. the Minister for Education
(Petition No. 431 of 2012)
Nicky
Njuguna and 3 Others (2013) eKLR
Satrose Ayuma and 11 Others v. Registered Trustees of the Kenya
Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme and 3 Others (2013) eKLR
’
Vision
Despite the Government’s
–
P.A.O. & 2
others v. Attorney General (2012) eKLR
as the vanguard for the State’s renewed initiative to ensure universal social security
–
–
inter
alia,
Under Medium Term Plan II, the State’s policy priorities include actualising the
“
”
–
the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of the person’s choice. A
Kenya’s various communities perform distinct rites of pa
es prosecutable in pursuance of the Convention’s
Commissions’ powers include compensation and other remedies.
Court upheld KNCHR’s contentions that capping the number of refugees in the country to a
amicus curiaeSeventh Day
Adventist Church (East Africa) Limited v. the Minister for Education (Petition No. 431 of
2012)
National Gender and Equality Commission v.
the Independent Boundaries and Electoral Commission, Petition 147 of 2013 (unreported)
against racial discrimination. The NCIC has been established as Kenya’s specific statutory
“
”
“
”
communities from Kenya’s northern region which undertake inter
Muigai v. John Bosco Mina Kariuki &
Jerioth Wangechi Muigai (2014) eKLR
Vision
Establishing institutional arrangements for Kenya’s national human rights institution,
Many of the TJRC’s recommendations are already being implemented. This is especially
Commission on Human and Peoples’
an Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights contained in
Communication No. 276/2003 (Centre for Minority Rights Development on Behalf of
Endorois Welfare Council v. Republic of Kenya).
Communication No. Com/002/2009: Institute for Human Rights and
Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative on Behalf of Children
of Nubian Descent in Kenya v. the Government of Kenya. inter
alia
Turkana County received the lion’s share of the allocation with USD 3,074,305, followed
Alex J Wagunya v. Attorney General (2013) eKLR
Ali Mwakwere v. Robert M. Mabera and 4 others (2012) eKLR
Centre for Minority Rights Development on Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Republic
of Kenya
Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) and Kenya National Commission on Human
Rights v. Republic of Kenya
Gitobu Imanyara & 2 Others v. Attorney General & 2 Others (2013) eKLR
Hersi Hassan Gutale and Another v. Attorney General and Another (2013) eKLR
Independent Policing Oversight Authority & another v. Attorney General & 660 others
(2014) eKLR
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice
Initiative on Behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v. the Government of Kenya
Institute for Social Accountability & Another v. National Assembly & 4 Others (2015)
eKLR
John Kabui Mwai and 3 Others v. Kenya National Examination Council and 2 Others
(2011) eKLR
Kituo cha Sheria v. Interim Independent Electoral Commission & 2 Others (2013) eKLR
Monica Jesang Katam v. Jackson Chepkwony & Another (2011) eKLR
Muigai v. John Bosco Mina Kariuki & Jerioth Wangechi Muigai (2014) eKLR
Nicky Njuguna and 3 Others (2013) eKLR
P.A.O. & 2 others v. Attorney General (2012) eKLR
R v. Allan Wadi
Republic v. Moses Kuria
Republic v. The Head Teacher, Kenya High School and Another Ex-parte SMY (a minor
suing through her mother and next friend A B) (2012) eKLR
Rose Wangui Mambo & 2 Others v. Limuru Country Club & 17 others (2014) eKLR
Salim Awadh Salim and 10 Others v. Commissioner of Police and 3 Others (2013) eKLR
Satrose Ayuma and 11 Others v. Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff
Retirement Benefits Scheme and 3 Others (2013) eKLR
Seventh Day Adventist Church (East Africa) Limited v. the Minister for Education
Zipporah Gaiti v. Samson Rukunga (2011 eKLR)
Annex 804
CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the
Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Russian Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September 2017)
Application of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
Annex 805
OSCE HCNM, The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs
Assessment (August 2013)
August 2013
August 2013
The integration
of formerly deported people
in Crimea, Ukraine
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Annex 806
OSCE, Report by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (28 November 2013 to 23
May 2014)
Dunja Mijatovi
“Media Freedom under siegein Ukraine”
This report is a comprehensive overview of the activities, interventions and an assessment of the
situation in Ukraine between 28 November 2013 and 23 May 2014 by the OSCE Representative on
Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovi.
5 KanalTVi
for Gongadze’
Journalists’ safety must be guaranteed at all times and those responsible for the crimes against
First phase
November, Vlad Puchich, Chief Editor of “20 Minutes” newspaper, was attacked and
––
–
––
Ukrainskii Tizhden’, Max Levin ––
––
–Independent Journalist Union, Denis Dan’ko and Dmitriy Volkov –
–––
––
–––
––
–––
based newspaper “Dorozhnyi
Kontrol”, was attacked by two assailants at her home and also suffered injuries.
Second phase
–
Tizhden’ news portals respectively, and their driver Eugene Rakhno, were stopped by
“Svoboda”, including some members of Verkhovna Rada, stormed t
Russian television series. During the protest, the office’s doors and windows were damaged and
Sloviansk. Ruslan Kukharchuk, a journalist with the Novomedia journalists’ association, was also
by armed individuals in uniform and its staff was told to leave town (the newspaper’s office had
• Stop manipulating media; stop information and psychological wars;
• ensure media plurality and free media as an antidote to pr
• refrain from introducing new restrictions; existing laws can deal with extreme propaganda;
• invest in media literacy for citizens to make informed choices; and
• reform state media into genuine public service broadcasting.
de facto
Tabula TV channel’s journalists by l
of Kakulia’s
Len’yara Abibulayeva were also detained with Radziwinowicz and released after interrogation.
Russia Today’s Arabic news crew, Anna Knishenko, Elderra Khaled and Konstantin Bolshakov who
together senior representatives of journalist’s associations from Ukraine and the Russian Federation
to discuss journalist’s role in easing tensions, improving communication and preventing
Journalists’ safety in Ukraine must be ensured, says OSCE media freedom
Journalists’
journalists’ safety in Eastern Ukraine
Attacks on journalists must stop, say journalists’ unions at meeting with OSCE
Annex 807
OSCE, OSCE Representative Warns of Further Threats to Media Pluralism in Luhansk and
Crimea, Notes Threats to Media Workers (11 July 2014)
OSCE representative warns of further threats to media
pluralism in Luhansk and Crimea, notes threats to
media workers
VIENNA 11 July 2014
VIENNA, 11 July 2014 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatovi
today warned about actions that could further limit media freedom and media pluralism
in Luhansk and Crimea.
“I am deeply concerned about the continuous attacks of the separatist forces against
television channels in Luhansk and Crimea. These actions eectively endanger the safety
of journalists and violates the right of people to freely receive information,” Mijatovi said.
On 9 July the sta of Luganskoye Kabelnoe Televideniye (LKT) was forced to leave the
channel’s building by a group of armed separatists. The transmission of LKT was replaced
by broadcasts of Russian 5 Kanal. On 4 July separatists seized the oce of the Luhansk
Regional State Television and Radio Company and broadcasting was suspended as a
result of the attack.
Mijatovi also noted reports about the exclusion of the biggest independent broadcaster
on the Crimean peninsula, Chernomorskaya TV, from several cable networks in Crimea.
According to reports, Chernomorskaya TV and a number of other Ukrainian television
channels, were taken o leading cable networks in Crimea on June 28.
“The unilateral decision to stop retransmission of Chernomorskaya TV can further curb
media freedom and limit media pluralism, not least since the channel is known for its
balanced and objective reporting,” Mijatovi said. “I strongly encourage those responsible
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovi,
delivering her regular report to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 28
November 2013. (OSCE/Micky Kroell)
for broadcasting regulations on the Crimean peninsula to immediately look into this
matter.”
At the beginning of March the terrestrial broadcasting of the channel was cut and
replaced with Russian channel Rossiya 24 (see //www.osce.org/fom/115983 and
//www.osce.org/fom/116240).
Further, Mijatovi noted with deep concern reports about death threats against a group of
Ukrainian journalists and owners of media outlets by the so-called ‘Russian Liberation
Front’ on 10 July. She said her oce will monitor these incidents closely.
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57
OSCE participating States. She provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression
and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments.
Learn more atwww.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and onfacebook.com/osce.rfom.
Jennifer Adams
Oce of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
Wallnerstrasse 6
1010 Vienna
Austria
Oce: +43 1 51436 6813
Mobile: +43 676 301 2910
Fax: +43 1 514 36 6802
[email protected]
Contacts
Annex 808
OCSE, OSCE Representative Condemns Steps Aimed at Full Silencing of Chernomorskaya TV in
Crimea (4 August 2014)
OSCE representative condemns steps aimed at full
silencing of Chernomorskaya TV in Crimea
VIENNA 4 August 2014
VIENNA, 4 August 2014 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatovi
today condemned the seizure of the property of the Chernomorskaya company, the
largest independent broadcaster on the Crimean peninsula.
“Continuing attempts to put pressure on the independent media in Crimea which provide
space for critical voices is a clear sign of censorship and cannot be tolerated under any
circumstances,” Mijatovi said. “This creates an atmosphere of fear in which independent
journalism cannot exist.”
On 1 August representatives of the Russian federal baili service, accompanied by selfdefence
militants, seized Chernomorskaya’s property in Simferopol, citing debts owed to
the Broadcasting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. All employees were
banned from entering the channel’s premises.
Mijatovi said that while arresting the Chernomorskaya’s property, the bailis also seized
the equipment of the Information and Press Centre, a hub for independent media in the
region, as well as property of the Crimean Centre for Investigative Journalism, which
rented oce space there.
“I again call on those responsible in the Crimean peninsula to refrain from steps that
further endanger media freedom and seriously limit media pluralism,” Mijatovi said.
Chernomorskaya’s terrestrial broadcasting was cut o in early March and replaced with
the channel Rossiya 24 (//www.osce.org/fom/116240). At the end of June, the channel was
also taken o major cable networks in Crimea, along with a number of Ukrainian channels
(//www.osce.org/fom/121169).
Jennifer Adams
Oce of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
Wallnerstrasse 6
1010 Vienna
Austria
Oce: +43 1 51436 6813
Mobile: +43 676 301 2910
Fax: +43 1 514 36 6802
[email protected]
Contacts
Annex 809
OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (11 September 2014)
Annex 810
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Assembly in Crimea
Occupied by the Russian Federation, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (16–17 April
2015), PC.SHDM.NGO/14/15 (17 April 2015)
«The last eight months actual Crimean authorities
restricted the freedom of speech and the freedom of assembly and intimidated and persecuted
those who were opposing Russia's actions in Crimea2".
"Taking into account the continuing events in many cities of the southeastern
Ukraine, resulting in injured and killed civilians, in order to eliminate possible
provocations performed by extremists, who are able to enter the territory of Republic of Crimea,
to avoid disruption of the holiday season in the Republic of Crimea, we prohibit any mass events
in the Republic of Crimea until June 6, 2014".
"In the park named after K.A. Trenov
there are playgrounds and attractions currently functioning, especially popular during the
school holidays; classes, competitions, exhibitions and other events involving hundreds of
children are held here, the School of Music is enrolling students on the 2014-2015 academic
year (listening)... gathering of a large number of people in a limited area, not intended for extra
number of participants, can create conditions that would disturb public order, the rights and
legitimate interests of the others".
“It is the jurisprudential surrealism – I can’t think of a different
name for it, because people had the right to participate in peaceful assemblies on Ukrainian
territory according to the law. At the moment there is no particular law that would regulate the
freedom of assembly, but there is a direct constitutional provision giving each person the right to
take part in peaceful assemblies. It is absolutely certain. Actually, these people have been
arrested and their houses have been searched, because they used their constitutional right
according to Ukrainian law. This is a clear indicator of how the occupying authority treats the
law and by the law I mean both, international and Ukrainian.”6
«In one of the cases documented by the Human Rights Watch in
March, there were signs of the involvement of self-defense to kidnapping and death through
violence of Reshat Akhmetov.”
"Both Andriy’s hand are shot by traumatic rubber guns”
"These horrific kidnapping and evidence of torture
in Crimea necessarily require a thorough investigation," - said Hugh Williamson, a
representative of Human Rights Watch, - "for a few weeks unidentified armed groups had free
rein on the Crimean peninsula without explicit legal authority or accountability, and this
resulted in a dangerous situation, arbitrary detention, kidnapping and torture.
“The persecution of those who attempted to peacefully meet Mustafa Dzhemilev in Armyansk or
the ones who protested the prohibition of Dzhemilev’s entrance to Crimea, became the first
evidence of the government’s intent to restrict the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in
Crimea. Until the recent occupation of the peninsula by Russia, such restrictions did not exist.”
“Crimean Tatar people on
the threshold of 2015” 12
“did not have an opportunity to hold an
independent investigation on the events of May 3 and assess compliance of administrative
charges and fines in the particular situation. Eventually the self proclaimed authorities used
these events to justify mass searches, warnings and other measures in relations to Crimean Tatar
groups and individuals. No additional specific grounds for such measures were cited y the self
proclaimed authorities. Considering the scale and intensity and also the vagueness of charges,
these measures were likely used as a means of pressure on the representatives of the Crimean
Tatar community, who are opposed to the occupation of Crimea and therefore are against
Russia.”13
... among the current criminal investigations there are files
concerning the illegal actions of three coordinators of one of unregistered organizations
«This incident [Kostenko’s case], like the case of the Deputy Head of Majlis, is tied to «March
Referendum» and transition to the Russian Federation Laws. It obviously contradicts Article
15(1) of ICCPR «No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed»
Annex 811
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Thematic Report: Freedom of Movement
across the Administrative Boundary Line with Crimea (19 June 2015)
Annex 812
OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015)
2.1.1 Right to hold opinions without interference.........................................................
2.1.2 Freedom of access to information........................................................................
2.1.3 Freedom of the media ..........................................................................................
2.2.1 Regulatory restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly ...................................
2.2.2 Restrictions imposed prior to assemblies ............................................................
2.2.3 Sanctions and penalties imposed after assemblies ..............................................
2.3.1 Restrictions imposed by de facto authorities in Crimea ......................................
2.3.2 Restrictions imposed by Ukrainian authorities....................................................
2.3.3 Demographics of populations impacted by restrictions ......................................
4.1.1 Self-governing organizations of Crimean Tatars ................................................
4.1.2 Religious organizations of Crimean Tatars .........................................................
4.1.3 Situation around disputed informal settlements ..................................................
4.1.4 Impact of restrictions on public assemblies organized by Crimean Tatar
community .....................................................................................................................
4.3.1 General context ....................................................................................................
4.3.2 Education in and of the Ukrainian language .......................................................
4.3.3 Education in and of the Crimean Tatar language ...............................................
de facto
de facto
see
see
see also
inter alia
de facto
de facto
de facto
Seeet seq
de
facto
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and
and
de facto
See,
To Russian Federation authorities and the de facto authorities in Crimea:
•
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See
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See and
See also
General Comment No 20: Non-Discrimination in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 2, para. 2)
See and
de facto
See
See also
See
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraineand
Problems with a citizenship in Crimea
see
See
Report of the Human Rights Commissioner of the Republic of Crimea 2014
See, Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the
Russian Federation in 2014
See
See, Annual report of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights of
Ukraine on the observance and protection of human rights and citizens in Ukraine
See,
See also, Moscow Times
See,
See,
KrymInform
Rights in Retreat
Seeand
seeGeneral Comment No. 17: Article 24
de facto
de facto
General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work
See
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de facto
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de facto
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de
facto
See
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Cyprus v. Turkey
de facto
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de facto
Case of Loizidou v. Turkey
See also
See:
de facto
de facto
see
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Human Rights in Ukraine – 2014
See
and
Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria
de facto
de facto
See
See also,
See
andReport on the human rights situation in
Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2015
See also
One Year On: Violations of the Rights to Freedom of Expression,
Assembly and Association in Crimea
See
One Year On
inter alia
de facto
inter alia
The Fear Peninsula: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea
See,
Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
One Year On
See
See also,
See
andReport on
the human rights situation in Ukraine
Moscow Times
de facto
Inter alia
Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief
Communities
See
Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea
See
Brief Review of the
Situation in Crimea and
See
de facto
de facto
Case of Ismayilov v Azerbaijan
See
de facto
de facto inter alia
and
Report to the UN Human Rights Council (Best practices that promote and protect the rights
to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association)
SeeGuidelines on Political Party Regulation
See
Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and
expression
de facto
2.1.1 Right to hold opinions without interference
de facto
as amended
by
The Fear Peninsula
see also
de facto
2.1.2 Freedom of access to information
Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea
SeeSee also
See
See Report
by Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, following his mission in Kyiv,
Moscow and Crimea, from 7 to 12 September 2014
de facto
de facto
de facto
2.1.3 Freedom of the media
de facto
See also
de facto
de facto
See
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
2.2.1 Regulatory restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly
de facto
See
The Fear Peninsula One
Year OnBrief
Review of the Situation in Crimea
Human rights in Ukraine 2014: Human rights
organizations’ report
et seq.
de facto
Human rights in
Ukraine 2014: Human rights organizations’ report
One Year OnThe Fear Peninsula
see
2.2.2 Restrictions imposed prior to assemblies
De facto
three days
emphasis added
See
Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria
de facto
2.2.3 Sanctions and penalties imposed after assemblies
de facto
See Patrick
Coleman v. Australia
Ezelin v. FranceIncal v. Turkey
See The Fear Peninsula
See
The Fear Peninsula
Berkut
Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea
de facto
See
and
See et seq
de facto
de facto
see
See
See
2.3.1 Restrictions imposed by de facto authorities in Crimea
de facto
de facto
see
See
de
facto
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2.3.2 Restrictions imposed by Ukrainian authorities
See
See
de facto
de facto
2.3.3 Demographics of populations impacted by restrictions
de facto
de facto
de facto
see
see
de facto
De facto
inter alia
de facto
See
See,
de facto
de facto
See
see
See
de
facto
de facto
See
General Comment No. 13: The right to
education (Article 13 ICESCR)
de facto
de facto
de facto
See
See
‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea
De facto
The Situation of the Crimean Tatars since the
Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
see also
‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea
See
also
See
see
also‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily
Occupied Crimea
De facto
de facto
Dumka Crimean Word Word of
Sevastopol
‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied
CrimeaSee
also
‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied
CrimeaSee
‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea
‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea
The Situation of the Crimean Tatars since the
Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
See
de facto
‘Annexed’ Education
in Temporarily Occupied Crimea
de
facto
See,
See Human rights in Ukraine 2014:
Human rights organizations’ report
See
See
inter alia
General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant)
de facto
See
de facto
see
See also
See
See
See,
de facto
See, e.g.,
See,
de facto
de facto
de facto
See
and General Comment No 20: Non-
Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 2, para. 2)
SeeGeneral Comment No. 13: The right to
education (Article 13)See also
General Comment No.14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12)
4.1.1 Self-governing organizations of Crimean Tatars
de facto
de facto
de facto
de
facto
de facto
The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment
see
See
de facto
personae non grata
de facto
de
facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
Avdet
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
Rights in Retreat
de facto
de facto
de facto
Security and Human
Rights
de facto
de facto
4.1.2 Religious organizations of Crimean Tatars
de facto
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment
See
Security and Human Rights
de facto
Tavrichseskiy Muftiyat,
de facto
de facto
de facto
4.1.3 Situation around disputed informal settlements
de facto
de facto
de facto
Sebat
4.1.4 Impact of restrictions on public assemblies organized by Crimean Tatar
community
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
Ridna Hata,
Krymskaya svetlitsa
See See also
See See also
de facto
de facto
de
facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
4.3.1 General context
de facto
de facto
The Integration of
Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs assessmentinter alia
The
Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment
de facto
The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs
Assessment
«Annexed» Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea
de facto
de facto
de facto
The Integration of Formerly
Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment
4.3.2 Education in and of the Ukrainian language
de facto
The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea,
Ukraine: Needs Assessment
4.3.3 Education in and of the Crimean Tatar language
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
de facto
Annex 813
United States Mission to the OSCE, Ongoing Violations of International Law and Defiance of
OSCE Principles and Commitments by the Russian Federation in Ukraine (26 May 2016)
Annex 814
EU Statement on “Russia’s Ongoing Aggression against Ukraine and Illegal Occupation of
Crimea”, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1106, PC.DEL/945/16 (24 June 2016)
The Candidate Countries the FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA*, MONTENEGRO* and
ALBANIA*, the Country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and Potential Candidate
BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA, and the EFTA countries ICELAND and NORWAY, members of the
European Economic Area, as well as UKRAINE, the REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA, GEORGIA and SAN
MARINO align themselves with this statement.
* The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the
Stabilisation and Association Process.
Annex 815
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Press Release: Parliamentary Assembly
Human Rights Chair Calls for Release of Crimean Tatar Leader Umerov (27 August 2016)
Annex 816
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on the Federal Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 On Assemblies, Meetings,
Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing of the Russian Federation (adopted 16-17 March 2012)
This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy.
www.venice.coe.int
the right of peaceful assembly enshrined in Article 11 is a fundamental right in a
democratic society and, like the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, one of the
foundations of such a society (…). As has been stated many times in the Court's judgments,
not only is democracy a fundamental feature of the European public order but the Convention
was designed to promote and maintain the ideals and values of a democratic society.
Democracy, the Court has stressed, is the only political model contemplated in the Convention
and the only one compatible with it. By virtue of the wording of the second paragraph of Article
11 (…), the only necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of the rights enshrined
in those Articles is one that may claim to spring from a “democratic society” (...). The right to
freedom of assembly covers both private meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares as
well as static meetings and public processions; in addition, it can be exercised by individuals
participants of the assembly and by those organising it (…). States must refrain from applying
arbitrary measures capable of interfering with the right to assemble peacefully. (…)
deliver to the organiser…, within three
days from receipt of the notice on holding the public event …a well-motivated proposal to alter
the place and/or time of holding the public event and also suggestions that the
promoter…remedy any discordances, if any, between the goals, forms and other conditions for
holding the public event specified in the notice and the requirements of [the] law.
discordances, if any, between the goals, forms and other conditions for
holding the public event specified in the notice and the requirements of [the] law”
any
other such reason
compelling
de facto
law which confers a discretion must
indicate the scope of that discretion”, the impossibility of attaining absolute
certainty in the framing of laws”.
Bukta v. Hungary
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Annex 817
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian
Federation, CDL-AD(2012)016 (20 June 2012)
This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy.
www.venice.coe.int
]he Law on fighting extremist activity (the Extremism law) continues to raise concern. It was adopted in 2002, but
over the last years it has allegedly been increasingly used by the authorities to harass NGOs, journalists, human
rights groups, and, in particular some religious groups. We were approached by the representatives of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses who presented us with a number of documented cases of disruption of religious meetings and other forms
"[an]
individual, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value[r]ecognition, observance
and protection of rights and freedoms of individual and citizen shall be an obligation of the
state"
of harassment. Criticism about the law stems mainly from the vague definition of key words such as extremism,
terrorism and social groups, thus giving enforcement authorities broad latitude in determining which organisations,
individuals, and activities are covered by the law”.
”
no one shall be subject to coercion which
would impair his freedom to adopt a religion or belief of his choice
“in the interests of the national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary
in the interests of the national security, or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others
An individual, his rights
and freedoms, shall be the supreme valuer]ecognition, observance and
protection of rights and freedoms of individual and citizen shall be an obligation of the state
the rights and freedoms of individual and citizen shall be recognised
and guaranteed according to the generally accepted principles and rules of international law
and according to the…Constitution be
inalienable and belong to every person from birth t]he exercise of rights and
freedoms of individual and citizen shall not infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other
persons
Chassagnou and Others v France
e]very person shall have the right to freedom of association,
including the right to establish trade unions to protect his interests. Free activity of public
associations shall be guaranteed
"[c]itizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to meet
peacefully, without arms, and to organise discussions, meetings and demonstrations, as well as
processions and pickets
“[t]he universallyrecognised
norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian
Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement
of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the
international agreement shall be applied
an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through
the use of violence or changing violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent
encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purposes, of illegal
armed formations and participation in them, criminally prosecuted in conformity with the
national laws of the Parties
a) “Extremist actions”
1. forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the
integrity of the Russian Federation;
2. public justification of terrorism and other terrorist activity;
3. stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord;
4. propaganda of the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis
of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
5. violation of human and civil rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with
a person's social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
6. obstruction of the exercise by citizens of their electoral rights and rights to participate in
a referendum or violation of voting secrecy, combined with violence or threat of the use thereof;
7. obstruction of the lawful activities of state authorities, local authorities, electoral
commissions, public and religious associations or other organisations, combined with violence
or threat of the use thereof;
8. committing of crimes with the motives set out in indent "f" ["e" in the original Russian] of
paragraph 1 of article 63 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
9. propaganda and public show of nazi emblems or symbols or of emblems or symbols
similar to nazi emblems or symbols to the point of confusion between the two;
10. public calls inciting the carrying out of the aforementioned actions or mass
dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage thereof
with the aim of mass dissemination;
11. public, knowingly false accusation of an individual holding state office of the Russian
Federation or state office of a Russian Federation constituent entity of having committed
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria
Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom
Larissis and Others v. GreeceReportsHashman and
Harrup v. the United Kingdom Rotaru v. Romania
Maestri v. Italy
Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland
Kruslin Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo u. Shtekel
actions mentioned in the present Article and that constitute offences while discharging their
official duties;
12. organisation and preparation of the aforementioned actions and also incitement of
others to commit them;
13. funding of the aforementioned actions or any assistance for their organisation,
preparation and carrying out, including by providing training, printing and material/technical
support, telephony or other types of communications links or information services;
forcible
, “It should be noted that “the forcible
changing of the foundations of the constitutional order and the violation of the unity of the
Russian Federation” the lawmaker is speaking about forcible and violent changes. In other
words the means of changing the constitutional order which are provided for in the legislation
should not be treated as extremist activities (extremism). Besides, resorting to such means
which are not directly mentioned in this law but which do not involve violence must not be
considered as extremism. We suppose that it is very important because the expression of a
different point of view on the one hand and the forcible changing of the foundations of the
constitutional order on the other are quite distinct”.
Guidelines on political party regulation by OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission,
-: “[…] where allowed at all, prohibition and dissolution are applicable only
in extreme cases including the following : threat to the existence and/or sovereignty of the state, threat to the basic
“stirring up
of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord”)
democratic order, violence which threatens the territorial integrity of the state, inciting of ethnic, social, or religious
hatred, and the use or threat of violence.[…] Even where such reasons for prohibition or dissolution are listed in
legislation it is important to note that prohibition must meet the strict standards for legality and proportionality
discussed above in order to be justified”; see also Batasuna v. Spain
a public justification of terrorism means a
public declaration of acceptance of the ideology and practices of terrorism as right and in need of support and
imitation
a]ctions aimed at the incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as
abasement of dignity of a person or a group of persons on the basis of sex, race, nationality, language, origin,
attitude to religion, as well as affiliation to any social group, if these acts have been committed in public or with
the use of mass media
stirring up of social, racial,
ethnic or religious discord”
ideological, political, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity" and prohibits
"participation in an extremist community
In distinction from violent crimes against
life and health, provided for by chapter 16 of CCRF, committed in accordance with motives of political,
ideological, racial, national, or religious enmity or strife or with motives of hatred or strife with regard to any social
group, force used in the commission of a crime provided for by article 282 of CCRF is not only an expression of
hatred with regard to a specific victim but is also intended to achieve a special goal—incitement of enmity or strife
in other people (which, for example, might be demonstrated by the use of force in public places in the presence
of strangers with regard to a victim--or victims--on the basis of membership in a particular race or nationality,
accompanied by racist or nationalistic statements)
General Comment n° 22: The right to Freedom of Thou ght, Conscience and
Religion
violent
public, knowingly false accusation of an individual holding state office of
the Russian Federation or state office of a Russian Federation constituent entity of having
committed actions mentioned in the present Article and that constitute offences while
discharging their official duties”
p}olitical figures should not enjoy greater protection of their reputation and other rights than
other individuals, and thus more severe sanctions should not be pronounced under domestic
law against the media where the latter criticise political figures
Lingens v. Austria
Thoma v. Luxembourg,
b) “Extremist materials”
“extremist materials” “documents
intended for publication or information on other media calling for extremist activity to be carried
out or substantiating or justifying the necessity of carrying out such activity, including works by
leaders of the National Socialist worker party of Germany, the Fascist party of Italy, publications
substantiating or justifying ethnic and/or racial superiority or justifying the practice of committing
war crimes or other crimes aimed at the full or partial destruction of any ethnic, social, racial,
national or religious group”.
c) “Extremist organisation”
a public or religious association or other
Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey,
; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98,
organisation in respect of which and on grounds provided for in the present Federal law, a court
has made a ruling having entered into legal force that it be wound up or its activity be banned in
connection with the carrying out of extremist activity
per se
sufficient and
previously confirmed information on unlawful acts in preparation presenting the characteristics
of extremist activity
to the effect that their activity is inadmissible and that there are concrete
grounds for giving a warningin the event of failure to comply
with the demands set out in the warning, the individual issued with that warning may be
prosecuted under the established procedure
Wilful failure to satisfy the
demands of a prosecutor resulting from his authority established by federal law, as well as the
lawful demands of an investigator, an inquirer or an official carrying out proceedings related to
an administrative offence shall entail the imposition of an administrative fine on citizens ... and
on legal entities ...
“[a]
warning is pronounced if there are no sufficient grounds for criminal prosecution that is if
there is no crime proper and before the actions which may later be considered extremist
have been committed. Should there exist sufficient grounds for prosecution different steps
are to be taken.
under the procedure established by the
present Federal law
,
t]he termination of an NGO or, in the case of a foreign NGO, the withdrawal of its approval to operate
there is a very strong argument for confining prosecution services to the powers
of criminal prosecution and not giving them the sort of general supervisory powers which were
commonly found in “prokuratura” type systems
other than those which are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of
should only be ordered by a court
, -
Report on European Standards as regards the independence of the judicial system: Part II The Prosecution
service
Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee of Minister of the Council of Europe on the Role of Public
Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System here public prosecutors are entitled to take
measures which cause an interference in the fundamental rights and freedoms of the suspect, judicial control
over such measures must be possible”.
Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski v. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
JudgmentTebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan,
Korneenko et al. v. Belarus
Belyatsky et al. v. Belarus
the rights and freedoms of others
Any
restriction of the right to freedom of association must according to Article 11.2 of the ECHR be
prescribed by law and it is required that the rule containing the limitation be general in its effect,
that it be sufficiently known and the extent of the limitation be sufficiently clear.35 A restriction
that is too general in nature is not permissible due to the principle of proportionality.36 The
Gorzelik and Others v. Poland
Opinion on the compatibility with universal human rights standards of an official
warning addressed by the Ministry of Justice of Belarus to the Belarusian Helsinki Committee
Opinion on the compatibility with universal human rights standards of article 193-
1 of the criminal code on the rights of non-registered associations of the Republic of Belarus
Opinion on the compatibility with human rights standards of the legislation on non-governmental
organisations of the Republic of Azerbaijan
See, e.g., ECtRH, Sunday Times v. UKno. 6538/74Silver et al
v. UK, no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75
no. 8691/79Groppera Radio AG
no. 10890/84Autronic AG v. Switzerlandno.
12726/87
The International Journal of Notfor-
Profit Law
restriction must furthermore pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic
society.”
agents provocateurs.
inter alia
Chassagnou and Others v. France
OSCE/ODIHR - Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
while ensuring the strictest respect for human rights and the rule of law
Annex 818
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012 of the Russian Federation Amending Federal
Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches
This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy.
www.venice.coe.int
.
REF (2012)028 hereinafter “the amendments of June 2012”
REF (2012)028, hereinafter “the amendments
of June 2012”; see also CDL
rations, marches and picketing (“the Assembly Act”)
e Commission’s deep conviction that the
During the process of amending the Russian Assembly Law, a paper was posted on the Duma’s website under
he title “Analytical Review. Individual Norms in Foreign Legislation regarding a Responsibility for
Regulations in the Conduct of Mass Events” ( , 2012,
“risks of an overbroad use of discretionary powers in order to
them as far as possible”: the Commission’s firm belief that
“presumption in favour of holding assemblies”, “proportionality” and “nondiscrimination”
It is recommended that the presumption in favour of holding assemblies and the
principles of proportionality and non-discrimination be expressly included in the
Assembly Law
the regime of prior notification under Article 5.5, 7 and 12 Assembly Act should be
revised; the co-operation between the organisers and the authorities in Article 12
Assembly Act should be settled on a voluntary basis respecting the assemblies’
autonomy and without depriving the organisers of the right to hold an assembly on the
ground of a failure to agree on any changes to the format of an assembly or to comply
with the timeframe for notification of the public event; the power of the executive
authorities to alter the format of a public event should be expressly limited to cases
where there are compelling reasons to do so (Article 11.2 ECHR), with due respect for
the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination and the presumption in favour of
assemblies.
the right to appeal decisions before a court (Article 19 Assembly Act) is welcomed; it
should be provided that a court decision will be delivered before the planned date of the
assembly, for instance via the availability of court injunctions;
spontaneous assemblies and urgent assemblies as well as simultaneous and counter
demonstrations should be allowed as long as they are peaceful and do not pose direct
threats of violence or serious danger to public safety;
the grounds for restrictions of assemblies should be narrowed to allow application of the
principle of proportionality in order to bring them in line with Article 11.2 ECHR and
reasons for suspension and termination of assemblies should be limited to public safety
or a danger of imminent violence;
the obligations of the organisers in Article 5.4 Assembly Act should be reduced; their
responsibility to uphold public order should be restricted to the exercise of due care;
the blanket restrictions on the time and places of public events should be narrowed.
Commission’s recommendations.
"
" http://iam.duma.g
conclusions that “there is
basis of strictly formal notification” and that “the demands of legislation in developed democratic countries are
police”.
in
abstracto
and picketing (“the Assembly Act”)
The Court’s analysis does not therefore address or propo
demonstrations, marches and picketing (“the Assembly Act”) should be addressed so that the
the Constitutional Court and it is hoped that the Venice Commission’s Opinion
ECtHR’s) of the Constitutional court’s
“...the right of freedom of peaceful assembly is not subject to any restricti
ts and freedoms of others.”
“...
ful assembly...”
in relation to “citizens”
. This reference to “citizens” is repeated throughout the
A.
The judgment of the Constitutional Court finds this provision “not contrary to the Russian
Federation Constitution”. It observes in its judgment (
troduced by this provision of the law do not “encroach upon the very essence of
relating to the organisation and holding of a public event...”
assembly including playing the role of “organiser” as provided for in the 20
Constitution “to organise discussions, meetings and demonstrations, as well as processions
and pickets”.
and irrespective of the gravity of such breaches, represents, in the Commission’s view, a
rights and freedoms are possible “only to the extent needed for the purposes of protecting the
ensuring the defence of the nation and security of the state.”
(“the aforementioned prohibition may be
imposed only in a case where a repeat administrative prosecution of that person for the
corresponding administrative infringement has occurred within a period for which administrative
punishment is applicable for an administrative infringement previously committed by them and
has resulted in the imposing of administrative punishment, and only for the period during which
the person in question is considered to be subject to administrative punishment”) does
assembly including playing the role of “organiser” as provided for in the
the public event, and under Article 5 para. 4.3 he or she has to “ensure compliance with the
result of the agreement reached with the authorities”. New paragraph
Assembly Act requires the organiser specifically “to take measures to prevent the number of
or risks to damage the property”.7 which refers to the “holding
ublic event”.
number of participants entails the organiser’s administrative responsibility “only if it is
persons”. The wording of new
the Court found that the organiser’s possible
and that the organiser must be “directly at fault” for the anticipate
exceeded and that “irremediable doubt as to their guilt must be interpreted in their favour”. The
organiser’s
the right of peaceful assembly mirrors the state’s duty to facilitate and protect such events. This
uding through the use of masks, means of disguise or other items “specially intended to
make them more difficult to identify”.
OSCE/ODIHR have previously expressed the view that “the wearing of a mask for expressive
”In the Commission’s view, a blanket ban on wearing any kind of
“united by a single concept and overall organisation”
––
“...are intended to prevent abuses of the right not to notify the public authorities of the holding of
l coming together of actions of individual pickets”.
problematic because it enables the authorities to delay the organisers’ campaigning
The Constitutional Court found that this rule was “not tantamount to establishing a procedure
stitution” and “did not exceed the discretionary powers defined by the ...Constitution”.
“Permitting prior promotion of a public event following agreement with the corresponding
–
–
–
”
In the Commission’s opinion,
“
discretion must be exercised with due respect for the essential principles of “presumption in
favour of holding assemblies”, “proportionality” and “nondiscrimination”.
assembly law must aim at reducing them as far as possible.”
mination must be carried out “within the shortest possible time ... i.e. before the planned
P of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 2 April 2009).”
ion of “
” for public events to be designated by the public (local) authorities. As a rule
determining the specially designated places, the Assembly Act specifies that they must “provide
”
“designation by the authorities of assembly locat
with the very concept of the right to peaceful assemble as a fundamental freedom”
–
become the “natural” venues for public events, while other venues, possibly “within sight and
sound” of the target of the public event, become an exception which needs a special
burden nor notice will weigh against the organiser’s claim that the public event must be
As concerns the “prohibited locations”, the Commission refers to its previous criticism on
need to be conducted in certain specific areas in order to attract attention (“Apelwirkung”, as it
entities’ to establish specially designated sites
Commission accepted a list of designated places to the extent that “The list referred to in paragraph VI contains
prohibited as the list cannot be exhaustive” (CDL
–
r the essential principles of “presumption
in favour of holding assemblies”, “proportionality” and “nondiscrimination”.
B.
ffic or to citizens’
The Venice Commission welcomes this aspect of the Constitutional Court’s judgment
o
o
o and thus require “
justification” (Rai and Evans, cit.);
o
Commission have argued that “the imposition of sanctions (such as prosecution) after an event
assembly”.They have added that “as with prior restraints, the principle of proportionality also
or the imposition of minor sanctions where the offence concerned is of a minor nature.”
their failures have “caused
damage …t
consequences”. Damage to property is quite a broad term and
distinction. As far as damage to human health” is concerned, community work may be an
As concerns the new offence (Article 20.2.2, “Organisation of a mass si
presence and/or movement of citizens in public places resulting in a breach of public order”)
events which do not have as an object “to exercise the fre
cultural life of the country and also issues of foreign policy” (see the definition of
–
n of, but also “public calls for” and
“participation in a mass simultaneous presence or movement of citizens”
ny “damage to
f pedestrians or traffic or to citizens’ access to
dwellings or transport or social infrastructure facilities”
It is recommended to limit, in paragraph 6 of Article 5, the organiser’s responsibility for
the authorities’ agreement;
public events should take place ‘as a rule’;
Annex 819
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on “Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territor
This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy.
www.venice.coe.int
“W
OR RESTORING CRIMEA’S 1992 CONSTITUTION IS COMPATIBLE
PRINCIPLES”
I. Introduction
Jagland, asked the Venice Commission to provide an opinion on “whether the decision
Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is compatible with constitutional principles”.
adopted a Resolution “On the allCrimean referendum”. According to the Resolution, the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea is “calling and holding of republican (local) referendums
Autonomous Republic of Crimea”.
3 “
(local) referendum” belongs to the powers of the Supreme Rada”. These provisions are
kraine according to which the “organising and
”
Ukraine, “the territorial structure of
development of regions (…)”. Under Article 134 Ukraine, “the
Constitution of Ukraine”. The Autonomous Re
, “
Ministers of Ukraine”. A corresponding provision is included in
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea: “Th
of Ukraine and Ukrainian laws.” An act
II. Alternative 1: Unification with Russia
“The sovereignty of Ukraine extends throughout its entire territory.
Ukraine is a unitary state.
The territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable.”
Already in its study on “Self constitutional law” (CDL
(2000)002), the Venice Commission noted that “Affirmation of the indivisibility of the state
plainly implies outlawing of secession…”
to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as an “inseparable constituent part of Ukraine”. As
competence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to “organi
referendums”.
“Issues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian
referendum.”
“The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended, if the amendments foresee the
abolition or restriction of human and citizens' rights and freedoms, or if they are
oriented toward the liquidation of the independence or violation of the territorial
indivisibility of Ukraine.”
secession. In its Report on “A general legal
political conflicts in Europe” (CDL
“The principle of territorial integrity commands very widespread recognition - whether
express or tacit - in constitutional law. On the other hand, constitutional law just as
comprehensively rules out secession or the redrawing of borders. This should come
as no surprise since that branch of law is the very foundation of the state, which
might be deprived of one of its constituent parts if such possibilities were provided
for.”
Report on “Self
constitutional law” quoted above, the Venice Commission concludes that self
III. Alternative 2 – Return to the 1992 Constitution
which is worded as follows: “The Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of
and Ukrainian laws.” The compatibility of the 1992 Constitution with the Constitution of
IV.Compatibility of the referendum with European constitutional principles
, such as those established by the Venice Commission’s C
“11. Any referendum must be organised in full conformity with internationally
recognised standards. A consideration of these standards must begin with an
examination of European standards. …
12. The internationally recognised fundamental principles of electoral law, as
expressed for example in Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and Article 25
ICCPR, have to be respected, including universal, equal, free and secret suffrage.
For a referendum to give full effect to these principles, it must be conducted in
accordance with legislation and the administrative rules that ensure the following
principles:
- the authorities must provide objective information;
- the public media have to be neutral, in particular in news coverage;
- the authorities must not influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided
campaigning;
- the use of public funds by the authorities for campaigning purposes must be
restricted“
res (at I.3.1.c) that “
or a blank vote.”
The use of referendums must comply with the legal system as a whole, and especially
the procedural rules. In particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution or a
statute in conformity with the Constitution does not provide for them, for example where
the text submitted to a referendum is a matter for Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction.
24) that “the issue at stake is possibly the most important decision that a political community
may take by democratic means: its independence. Hence, the matter requires the broadest
possible commitment of the citizens to the resolution of the issue.”
V. Conclusions
Annex 820
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe, Recent Developments in Ukraine:
Threats to the Functioning of Democratic Institutions (8 April 2014)
08 pril 2014
Committee on the onouring of Oligations and Commitments emer States of the Council of Europe
onitoring Committee
Corapporteurs: s ailis REPS Estonia lliance of ierals and Democrats for Europe and s arietta de
POURUNDN Seden roup of the European Peoples Part
he onitoring Committee deepl regrets the dramatic eents on aidan i from 18 to 20 Feruar 2014
that led to the death of oer 100 protesters and 17 police officers and strongl condemns the unacceptale
use of snipers and lie ammunition against protesters the Urainian authorities at that time. ll fatalities
and all human rights auses that occurred in relation to the Euromaidan protests need to e full inestigated
and the perpetrators including those in the line of command rought to ustice. here can e no impunit for
human rights auses irrespectie of ho committed them
he committee considers that the ne political enironment folloing the eents on aidan eteen 18 and
21 Feruar and the resulting change of poer has opened a indo of opportunit for Uraines democratic
deelopment. n that respect constitutional reform and the adoption of a ne unified election code should e
the immediate priorit for the Urainian authorities. n addition farreaching udicial reform and
decentralisation of goernment including the strengthening of local and regional authorities should e
considered.
he committee regrets that the democratic changes and political deelopments in Uraine hae een
oershadoed the deelopments in Crimea and strongl condemns the Russian militar aggression and
suseuent anneation of Crimea hich is in clear iolation of international la including the United Nations
Charter the OSCE elsini ct and the Statute and asic principles of the Council of Europe.
t reaffirms its strong support for the independence soereignt and territorial integrit of Uraine and
epresses its great concern aout the uildup of large numers of Russian militar troops along the order
ith Uraine hich are detrimental to the alread tense situation in the countr.
1. Reference to committee: Reference 402 of 7 pril 2014.
http://assembly.coe.int
F 67075 Strasourg Cede assemlcoe.int el: 33 3 88 41 2000 Fa: 33 3 88 41 2733
. Draft resolution......................................................................................................................................... 3
. Eplanator memorandum s Reps and s de Pouraiundin corapporteurs.............................. 6
1. ntroduction.......................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Euromaidan eents ............................................................................................................................. 7
3. he 21 Feruar agreement................................................................................................................
4. he Euromaidan moement...............................................................................................................10
5. egitimac and elections.................................................................................................................... 11
6. Constitutional and political reform...................................................................................................... 12
7. ntercommunit relations and protection of minorities........................................................................ 13
8. uman rights iolations and inestigations........................................................................................ 15
. he illegal anneation of Crimea the Russian Federation ............................................................ 16
10. Concluding remars......................................................................................................................... 18
ppendi 1 21 Feruar 2014 agreement................................................................................................21
ppendi 2 Report of the disor Committee on the Frameor Conention for the Protection of
National inorities ad hoc isit to Uraine 2126 arch 2014.....................................................................23
2
1. he Parliamentar sseml deepl regrets the dramatic eents on aidan i from 18 to 20
Feruar 2014 that led to the death of oer 100 protesters and 17 police officers. t considers and regrets that
the unprecedented escalation of iolence as largel the result of the increasingl hardhanded approach of
the authorities including the socalled antiterrorist action to rea up the Euromaidan protests force
contrar to all adice gien national and international interlocutors including the sseml in its
Resolution 174 2014 on the functioning of democratic institutions in Uraine.
2. he sseml strongl condemns the use of snipers and lie ammunition against protesters the
Urainian authorities at that time. Such actions are unacceptale. ll fatalities and all human rights auses
that occurred in relation to the Euromaidan protests need to e full inestigated and the perpetrators
including those in the line of command rought to ustice. here can e no impunit for human rights auses
irrespectie of ho committed them. t the same time it is important that these inestigations are impartial
and free from political motiation or an desire for retriution. he should tae place transparentl and in full
accordance ith the reuirements of rticle 6 of the European Conention on uman Rights ES No. 5. he
adisor committee proposed the Council of Europe could pla an important role in helping the authorities
to ensure that these conditions are met.
3. he erhona Rada plaed an important and constructie role in resoling the crisis hen in unit
and consensus it managed the change of poer and implementation of the main proisions of the 21
Feruar 2014 agreement in line ith the oerall tenets of the agreement and ith due consideration for
constitutional principles. he sseml therefore full recognises the legitimac of the ne authorities in i
and the legalit of their decisions. t regrets attempts to uestion the legitimac of the ne authorities hich
can onl sere to destailise the countr.
4. he sseml considers that the ne political enironment folloing the eents on aidan eteen 18
and 21 Feruar and the resulting change of poer has opened a indo of opportunit for Uraines
democratic deelopment. t is no important to use this indo of opportunit to estalish a genuinel
democratic and inclusie sstem of goernance that ill guarantee and strengthen the unit of the countr.
5. he sseml taes note of the 2004 constitutional amendments that hae een reenacted the
erhona Rada ith a constitutional maorit. he sseml recalls and reiterates its concerns ith regard to
these constitutional amendments as epressed in arious sseml resolutions adopted hen these
amendments ere first in force. Further constitutional reform is therefore urgentl necessar. he sseml
urges the erhona Rada to use its uniue unit at this moment to adopt ithout further dela the
constitutional amendments necessar to estalish a etter alance of poer eteen President and
egislature and to ring the Constitution full into line ith Council of Europe standards and principles. n that
respect the sseml elcomes the clearl epressed commitment of all political forces in Uraine to adopt
such constitutional amendments in first reading efore the net presidential election taes place and in final
reading at the start of the net session of the erhona Rada in Septemer 2014. n ie of the short period
of time aailale the sseml calls upon the erhona Rada to mae full use of the alread eisting
opinions of the European Commission for Democrac through a enice Commission on preious drafts
and concepts for constitutional reform in Uraine.
6. here can e no uestion aout the legitimac of the erhona Rada hich as elected in 2012 in
elections that ere osered the sseml. t the same time the sseml recognises that as
a result of the recent political deelopments including the disarra of the Part of Regions seeral groups of
people in Uraine fear that the are not or not ell represented in the erhona Rada and therefore at the
leel of the central goernment. n order to ensure the fullest possile representatiit of the erhona Rada
hich ill enefit the unit and stailit of the countr preterm parliamentar elections should e organised
as soon as is technicall and politicall feasile.
7. he net parliamentar elections should e conducted on the asis of a ne unified election code and a
regional proportional election sstem as repeatedl recommended the sseml and the enice
Commission. n order to aoid an unnecessar delas in the adoption of such an election code the
sseml recommends that the erhona Rada deelop a unified election code ased on the draft that as
prepared the liuchos oring group in hich all political forces participated and hich enefited from
the epertise of the enice Commission.
2. Draft resolution adopted the committee on 8 pril 2014.
3
8. hile constitutional reform and the adoption of a ne unified election code should e the immediate
priorit for the Urainian authorities farreaching udicial reform and decentralisation of goernment including
the strengthening of local and regional authorities should also e urgentl considered and implemented.
. Regrettal recent eents hae increased the eastest diide in the countr and led to unease among
the population of oth parts of the countr. n the ie of the sseml the diide is mostl of political origin
despite the clear historical and cultural differences eteen the east and the est of Uraine. t recommends
therefore that the authorities deelop a comprehensie and inclusie strateg to strengthen local and regional
authorities and to decentralise goernment. Such a decentralisation strateg should e ased on the
principles of a strong unitar State ith an effectie sstem of central goernance ith delegated
responsiilities and poers to the regions. he sseml strongl oects to an notion of a federalisation of
Uraine as this ould sustantiall eaen the unit and stailit of the countr.
10. he lac of independence of the udiciar and the structural deficiencies in the udicial sstem hae
een longstanding concerns of the sseml. Farreaching udicial reforms should no e promptl
implemented. he sseml reiterates its recommendations made in preious resolutions hich remain alid.
he sseml underscores that constitutional amendments are necessar to estalish a udicial sstem that is
full in line ith European standards.
11. he sseml taes note of the conclusions the disor Committee of the Frameor Conention
for the Protection of National inorities that isited Uraine from 21 to 26 arch 2014. he sseml
elcomes the fact that there is no immediate threat to the enoment of minorit rights in the current situation
in Uraine. t the same time it calls on the authorities to e proactie in adopting all possile measures that
could strengthen the unit of the countr and to refrain from an discourse or actions that are diisie and that
could undermine or e instrumental in undermining the national unit of the countr. n this contet the
sseml regrets the decision the erhona Rada to cancel the a on the State language een if this
decision as neer enacted or implemented.
12. he sseml epresses its concern aout the increasing numer of credile reports of iolations of the
human rights of the ethnic Urainian and Crimean atar minorities in Crimea including access to their homes
folloing its anneation Russia. t calls upon the Russian authorities to ensure that these iolations are
immediatel halted and all perpetrators prosecuted. n addition international human rights monitors from the
Organiation for Securit and Cooperation in Europe OSCE should e gien full access to the region.
13. he freuent and unsustantiated reports of minorit rights iolations in Uraine as ell as the negatie
portraal of the ne goernment in i certain national and international media hae had a negatie
impact on interethnic relations in Uraine and ultimatel on the unit and stailit of the countr. e call on all
media to refrain from such unsustantiated reports and to coer the deelopments in the countr and its
regions impartiall and factuall. e call upon the authorities to refrain from an censorship of the media.
14. he sseml regrets that the democratic changes and political deelopments in Uraine hae een
oershadoed the deelopments in Crimea. he sseml strongl condemns the Russian militar
aggression and suseuent anneation of Crimea hich is in clear iolation of international la including the
United Nations Charter the OSCE elsini ct and the Statute and asic principles of the Council of Europe.
15. n the ie of the sseml none of the arguments used the Russian Federation to ustif its actions
hold true to facts and eidence. here as no ultraright ing taeoer of the central goernment in i nor
as there an imminent threat to the rights of the ethnic Russian minorit in the countr including or
especiall in Crimea. ien that neither secessionism nor integration ith the Russian Federation as
prealent on the political agenda of the Crimean population or idel supported prior to Russian militar
interention the sseml considers that the drie for secession and integration into the Russian Federation
as instigated and incited the Russian authorities under the coer of a militar interention.
16. he socalled referendum that as organised in Crimea on 16 arch 2014 as unconstitutional oth
under the Crimean and Urainian Constitutions. n addition its reported turnout and results are implausile.
he outcome of this referendum and the illegal anneation of Crimea the Russian Federation therefore
hae no legal effect and are not recognised the Council of Europe. he sseml reaffirms its strong
support for the independence soereignt and territorial integrit of Uraine.
17. he sseml epresses its great concern aout the uildup of large numers of Russian militar
troops along the order ith Uraine hich could e an indication that the Russian Federation is considering
further unprooed militar aggression against Uraine hich is unacceptale.
4
18. ien the ris of destailisation and the deterioration of the securit regime of the hole region
further Russian militar aggression against Uraine the sseml recommends that the signatories of the
udapest greement as ell as other releant European States eplore the possiilit for tangile securit
agreements to ensure Uraines independence soereignt and territorial integrit.
5
1. On 30 anuar 2014 the sseml adopted in a deate under urgent procedure Resolution 174
2014 on the functioning of democratic institutions in Uraine.
2. n this resolution the sseml epressed its deep concern aout the political crisis that erupted
folloing the decision the Urainian authorities to suspend the procedure for the signing of an association
agreement eteen Uraine and the European Union. he sseml as especiall concerned and regretted
the rutalit and ecessie and disproportionate use of force the police forces against the protesters in the
demonstrations that folloed the decision the goernment. t considered that the attempts of the authorities
to forcefull rea up these socalled Euromaidan protests onl escalated the political crisis and galanised
the protesters. he sseml in er clear terms therefore called on the authorities to refrain from an
attempt to forcefull rea up the Euromaidan protest or from an action that could further escalate the crisis.
Similarl the sseml called upon the protesters to refrain from an actions prooing iolent reactions from
the police.
3. t the same time the sseml as etremel concerned aout the credile reports of human rights
iolations police and securit forces or persons under their control against persons inoled in the
Euromaidan protests. t ased the authorities to ensure that such iolations e rought to an immediate halt
and that all reports of human rights iolations e credil inestigated.
4. n the contet of the deelopments that too place after the adoption of the resolution it is important to
note that the sseml highlighted the fact that the decision the authorities in i not to sign the
association agreement as also taen as the result of hea pressure from the Russian authorities including
threats of economic and political sanctions contrar to diplomatic norms and oligations and accession
commitments. n that contet the sseml eplicitl reminded the Russian Federation of its oligations as a
Council of Europe memer State.
5. Folloing the adoption of Resolution 174 2014 e traelled to i for a factfinding isit from 17 to
21 Feruar 2014. his isit coincided ith the dramatic eents on aidan hen the iolent attempts the
authorities to rea up the Euromaidan protests resulted in oer 80 fatalities.3 s a result of our presence
including on the aidan itself e ere ale to see firsthand ho the eents unfolded on the ground.
During the isit e ere ale to maintain comprehensie and freuent contacts ith all sides in the conflict
authorities opposition ciil societ and protesters through hich e gained a good oersight of the
deelopments. e ish to than the erhona Rada and the ead of the Council of Europe Office in i
and his staff for all the assistance gien to our delegation especiall in such difficult circumstances.
6. Sadl the eents on aidan in i ere soon oertaen the deelopments in Crimea as a result of
Russias militar interention that cumulated into the illegal anneation of Crimea the Russian Federation.
7. n reaction to the eents in i as ell as the deelopments in Crimea the onitoring Committee at
its meeting in St ulians alta on 28 Feruar 2014 decided to reuest a deate under urgent procedure
on Recent deelopments in Uraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions during the pril part
session of the sseml. On 6 arch 2014 the ureau of the sseml decided to recommend to the
sseml to hold this deate during the pril partsession and to refer it to the onitoring Committee for
report.
8. n order to stud the conseuences of Russias anneation of Crimea as ell as the political
deelopments folloing the eents on aidan the Presidential Committee and the corapporteurs of the
sseml for Uraine ent to the countr from 21 to 25 arch 2014. n addition to meetings ith the
authorities in i the delegation met ith regional authorities and ciil societ groups including ethnic
organisations in Donets and i.
3. here is confusion around the eact numer of fatalities although all sources agree the eceed a hundred. he
Urainian authorities initiall announced that approimatel 88 people died including 17 policemen as a result of the
iolence on aidan eteen 18 and 20 Feruar 2014 and that seeral hundred people ere inured man of them
remaining in a critical condition. Reportedl since then at least 16 people hae died from the inuries receied during the
clashes from 18 to 20 Feruar. n addition persons died in the period from 22 anuar hen the first person died to
17 Feruar 2014 ringing the total numer of fatalities of the Euromaidan protest to at least 110120. ien that a
numer of the inured are still in a critical condition it is possile that this numer ill increase.
6
. Folloing the repeal the erhona Rada on 28 anuar 2014 of the socalled antiprotests las
the negotiations eteen the authorities and the opposition united on Euromaidan gained ne intensit.
hese negotiations focused on the possiilit of reintroducing parts of the 2004 amendments to the
Constitution that had een declared inalid in 2010 a Constitutional Court decision. hese amendments
proide for a greater euilirium in the diision of poers eteen parliament and President than the 16
Constitution that as in force at that time. n addition these proisions mae the goernment accountale to
the parliament instead of to the President hich ould pae the a for a possile unit goernment
consisting of memers of oth the opposition and ruling maorit. Reportedl authorities and opposition had
come to an agreement on the principle of the need for changes to the Constitution although again reportedl
not on the eact details and the procedure needed to enact them. he plenar session of the erhona Rada
of 18 Feruar 2014 as set to discuss constitutional reform on the asis of opposition proposals to reenact
the 2004 constitutional amendments.
10. detailed outline and discussion of the eact seuence of eents on and around aidan during the
period of 18 to 21 Feruar 2014 is eond the scope of this report. e ill limit ourseles to the e
moments and an oerall assessment of the deelopments during that ee.
11. large peaceful protest march to the erhona Rada as planned and announced for 18 Feruar
2014 hen the Rada as slated to discuss opposition proposals for changes to the Constitution. oeer on
the morning of 18 Feruar erhona Rada Speaer Ra announced that he refused to register the draft
ills on constitutional changes prepared the opposition ostensil on technical grounds. Folloing this
decision the protest rall to the erhona Rada turned iolent. ho started the iolence is unclear and is a
point of contention eteen the authorities at that time and the protesters ith the then authorities laming
the protesters. he protesters from their side lamed the outrea of iolence on
hired the authorities.
12. hoeer started the iolence it is clear in the ords of one diplomat e met that the authorities ere
ell prepared for this eentualit and soon the eents entered into an escalating spiral of iolence. Police
forces ere using lie ammunition and police snipers ere targeting protesters from antage points on roofs
of uildings ith ruer ullets and stun grenades. Protesters fought ac ith oloto coctails homemade
eplosies and small arms. oreoer protesters stormed the headuarters of the Part of Regions and
occupied it for seeral hours. the afternoon of 18 Feruar 2014 hen the demonstrators ere pushed
ac to aidan at least fie protesters had lost their lies.
13. ate in the afternoon the authorities announced that the ould start an antiterrorist operation on
aidan and gae the protesters till 18:00 that da to leae the suare. hat same night the authorities shut
don Channel 55 a teleision channel supporting the protests reportedl ithout a proper legal asis in
order to preent roadcasting of the eents on aidan to the Urainian population. Despite seeral urgent
calls to the authorities from Urainian personalities and the international communit including our
rapporteurs urging them not to attempt to clear the suare and to aoid further loodshed the authorities
started at 20:00 that da a fullfledged attac on aidan ith the stated intention of clearing the suare. he
increasingl rutal clashes eteen police and protesters continued all night. Despite that the police as onl
ale to clear part of aidan. the eginning of the morning of 1 Feruar 2014 26 persons had lost their
lies 10 of them policemen.
14. n emergenc meeting eteen President anuoich and opposition leaders r rseni atsenu
of atishchna or the Fatherland Part r itali litso of UDR and r Oleh ahno of Sooda
too place during the night of 18 to 1 Feruar 2014. hile this meeting failed to reach concrete agreements
on ho to stop the standoff it led to a drop of intensit in the clashes from the morning of 1 Feruar that
as mostl maintained during that da. Still four persons lost their lies during the clashes on 1 Feruar
to of them reportedl eing shot .
15. During the afternoon of 1 Feruar 2014 an informal truce had een declared eteen protesters and
police. hile direct clashes temporaril stopped the police continued to fire stun grenades and to use ater
cannons against the protesters encampment all night. s during the preious night protesters from inside
4. n this report e use aidan to denote ndependence Suare in i the geographical space in hich the protests
ere taing place Euromaidan is used to denote the protest moement itself.
5. ith the eception of Channel 5 all other national roadcasters are oned usiness interests considered to e
close to the authorities at that time.
7
and outside i continued to oin the crod on aidan. here are different estimations of the numer of
protesters on aidan on the morning of 20 Feruar ut most estimates seem to agree that at least 30 000
protesters ere present at that time.
16. During the morning of 20 Feruar 2014 the police suddenl ithdre from the suare. Protesters
uicl moed in to recoer aidan Suare and started to push the police toards the arricades surrounding
aidan that had preiousl een the unofficial line of contact eteen police and protesters. he clashes that
ensued shoed a leel of rutalit not seen during preious das ith police and special forces opening fire
ith automatic eapons and special forces sniper teams starting to pic out protesters as ell as emergenc
medical personnel one one. the end of that da a staggering numer of oer 60 protesters had lost
their lies most of them sniper fire. midafternoon the clashes uietened hen increasing numers of
memers of the ruling maorit ere defecting from the Part of Regions and goernment and the Foreign
inisters of France erman and Poland arried in i.
17. During the afternoon of 20 Feruar 2014 a meeting too place eteen President anuoich and the
Foreign inisters of France erman and Poland representing the European Union in order to mediate a
solution to the rapidl escalating situation. his meeting folloed a decision the European Union to impose
a isa an and freee of the assets of the people responsile for the iolence and human rights auses in
Uraine. Folloing a meeting ith opposition leaders an agreement eteen the opposition and authorities
as announced on 21 Feruar 2014.
18. he political deelopments folloing the aidan clashes ill e discussed elo. t the same time a
numer of aspects regarding the eents of that ee should e highlighted.
1. he increasingl escalating spiral of iolence as largel the result of the hardhanded approach of the
authorities including their decision to rea up the Euromaidan protests force contrar to all adice gien
national and international interlocutors. e underscore that this is not to sa that protesters ear no
responsiilit for some of the eents that occurred during that ee. oeer during that ee seeral
opportunities came up for the authorities to deescalate the crisis and stop the iolence ut none of them
ere taen despite adice to the contrar from man different sides. Regrettal instead action as often
taen that as sure to further escalate the tensions. s a result the clear impression as created a position
confirmed seeral interlocutors that the presidential administration as delieratel tring to escalate the
protests to such an etent that it ould ustif the declaration of a state of emergenc and the deploment of
the arm to rea up the protests. he increasing numer of arm ehicles in i the end of that ee
seems to support this ie.
20. hile the escalation of iolence seems to hae een supported the President and his inner circle
this as not the case for the ran and file of his Part of Regions. s noted in our preious report6 the Part
of Regions as diided oer oth the causes for and handling of the Euromaidan protests and considerale
pressure as deploed to eep potential dissidents in the fold. oeer the increasing iolence and rutalit
during the ee of 17 to 21 Feruar 2014 culminating in the deploment of snipers seemed to hae een
the reaing point. earl hursda 20 Feruar 2014 the main financial interests reportedl ithdre their
support from the President as eidenced the fact that man of the teleision stations under their control
hich until then had aoided coering the protests or had een roadcasting mostl the goernments ie of
them started to coer the iolent eents nonstop and largel impartiall. his as folloed the
resignation of large numers of e personalities and Ps from the Part of Regions. Frida morning 21
Feruar 2014 hen President anuoich as still discussing ith the Foreign inisters of erman
France and Poland it as alread clear including to President anuoich himself that the President had
lost the support of his part and as actiel disoned them. n our ie this as a e reason for his
sudden departure/escape from i on the Frida eening. Proal een more than statements a numer
of Euromaidan factions that the ould not accept the part of the European Union agreement that alloed
President anuoich to remain in poer despite popular lore to the contrar.
21. here has een considerale speculation in the media some reportedl instigated for political
purposes regarding the snipers that ere used on aidan. llegations hae een made that the snipers ere
in realit proocateurs from the side of the protesters. oeer this is contradicted official statements
acnoledging that orders to use lie ammunition ere gien as ell as considerale footage renoned
media outlets that sho special forces sniper teams firing at the protesters. n addition e ourseles
itnessed sniper teams eing armed in the grounds of the presidential administration uilding. e can
therefore categoricall and authoritatiel state that there is no dout that sniper teams ere deploed and
6. Doc. 13405.
8
ith full consent of the authorities. t the same time it should e acnoledged that the spiralling iolence
had led to calls for protesters to arm themseles. ndeed a small numer of protesters armed ith hunting
rifles and small arms captured from police officers ere itnessed on aidan including our rapporteurs.
22. here hae een persistent allegations aout Russias inolement in the eents on aidan from 18 to
21 Feruar 2014 including of inolement of Russian personnel in the police and special forces operations
on aidan. n official inestigation into possile Russian inolement in these eents has een launched
the Urainian authorities. ithout ishing to mae a udgment on the merits of these allegations e note that
Russia on no occasion used its considerale influence on the authorities at that time to deescalate the
tensions and iolence. On the contrar on numerous occasions the Urainian authorities ere ehorted
highleel Russian officials to rea don the protests force. n this respect the deplorale statement on
20 Feruar 2014 Russian Prime inister edede that the Urainian authorities should stop alloing
themseles to e used as a doormat the protesters as utterl inappropriate and irresponsile at est.
23. translation of the tet of the agreement of 21 Feruar 2014 eteen the authorities and opposition
that as roered the European Union can e found in ppendi 1 to this report.
24. Some forces hae suggested that this agreement as neer implemented due to the unepected flight
of President anuoich immediatel folloing the signing of the agreement. n our ie a careful
assessment shos that the agreement has to a large etent een implemented if not to the letter then at least
to the spirit of the agreement.
25. President anuoich had signed the agreement as President on ehalf of his administration. oeer
as mentioned the time he signed this agreement it as clear to him that he had lost the support of and
control oer his part and administration. e therefore decided to flee i and later the countr.
26. Despite the unepected flight of President anuoich oth the opposition and ruling maorit in the
erhona Rada agreed to reenact the 2004 amendments to the Urainian Constitution agreed on an earl
presidential election and formed a ne goernment on the asis of a consensus in the erhona Rada.7
hese ere all issues that ere part of the agreement. he onl maor change as the impeachment of
President anuoich. n line ith legal and constitutional reuirements the implementation of the 21
Feruar agreement depended on the President to sign the different decisions into la after the ere
adopted the erhona Rada. is flight therefore impeded the implementation of the agreement and in the
tense situation at that time put the stailit of the countr at ris. herefore the erhona Rada decided in
near consensus ith onl to otes against to impeach the President. n line ith constitutional proisions
the ne Speaer of the erhona Rada leander urchino8 ecame acting President of the countr ith
all the legal poers to implement the agreement and goern the countr in tandem ith the erhona Rada
and the nel appointed goernment.
27. he agreement also stipulated that the protest encampment on aidan ould e cleared and the
arricades remoed to unloc the roads. his part of the agreement as not implemented. Folloing the
sudden change of poer aidan turned into an memorial for those that had fallen on aidan and
ecame a ralling point for the population to demand respect for the nations soereignt during the militar
inasion and suseuent anneation of Crimea Russia. n addition it has ecome a tourist attraction in the
capital. he ongoing presence of the encampments on aidan hich are totall peaceful are idel
accepted all political forces and cannot e considered prolematic. Regrettal until 1 pril 2014 the Right
Sector continued to occup a limited numer of uildings hich reportedl stopped after the police
surrounded their headuarters in the Dniepro otel and demanded the leae and disarm.
28. he 21 Feruar 2014 agreement foresa the disarming of all armed ciil groups. his as onl
partiall implemented. he ne authorities originall decided to set up oint patrols of police and selfdefence
groups to restore pulic trust in the police and securit forces. oeer according to the authorities some of
the groups started to engage in criminal actiities and criminal gangs started disguise themseles as self
defence groups. meeting ith the selfdefence forces and the inister of the nterior as conened here
7. he agreement had called for a goernment of national unit. oeer folloing the departure of the President and
the full reelations of hat had happened in the ee efore the agreement as signed the ruling maorit epressed its
ish not to tae part in the ne goernment ut full supported its estalishment in the erhona Rada. his is clearl in
line ith the spirit of the agreement.
8. Former Speaer Ra resigned on the morning of Saturda 22 Feruar 2014 citing health reasons.
. aidan selfdefence groups as ell as titushi.
the former ere told to disarm. Practicall all groups complied ut the Rights Sector regrettal refused. ll
oint patrols eteen police and protesters ith the eception of aidan itself ere discontinued. e strongl
elcome the pulic statements of the inister of the nterior that there ill not e an impunit for criminal
acts committed memers of selfdefence groups. he seriousness of the authorities in this respect as
underscored their decision to issue an arrest arrant for Right Sector leader Olesandr uch ho as
shot hen he resisted arrest and opened fire on the police officers sent to arrest him. On 1 pril 2014 after a
shooting on aidan that inoled a memer of the Right Sector the police surrounded their maeshift
headuarters in the Dniepro otel in i and forced them to disarm and leae the uilding. On that same
da the erhona Rada adopted a decision to immediatel disarm all illegall armed groups in Uraine. n
addition to the Right Sector this decision also coers a numer of armed proRussian groups that are actie
in the countr mostl in the East. e elcome the decision of the authorities to disarm all these groups
hose eistence hampers the stailit and unit of the countr.
2. hile not part of the agreement on 22 Feruar 2014 the parliament decided ith consensus to
release s ulia imosheno from prison.
30. here hae een idespread speculations aout the nature of the Euromaidan moement. llegations
hae een made that the Euromaidan protest moement as in essence an etremist fascist and antiSemitic
moement. his position as especiall promoted in the Russian media in hat seems to hae een a
reflection of the official ie of the Russian oernment.
31. e hae descried the origin and suseuent deelopment of the Euromaidan moement in detail in
our preious report.10 Euromaidan originall started as a protest against President anuoichs decision to
cancel the signature of the association agreement ith the European Union. t soon transformed itself into a
general protest moement against the authorits perceied corruption and mismanagement and indeed a
protest moement against the political class as such. his antiestalishment undertone as the main reason
that the political opposition parties could not claim full control oer the Euromaidan moement and had to
negotiate their position ith the other ciil organisations and moements that made up Euromaidan.
32. n addition to eing antipolitical estalishment Euromaidan also had a decidedl nationalistic or
patriotic asis. Considerale support of Euromaidan as the result of the fact that the cancellation of the
association agreement as seen to e the result of Russian pressure and an infringement of Uraines
soereignt. his as a much stronger motie for the protests than the support for closer association ith the
European Union as such. his as also clear from the considerale numer of Russian speaers from the
east that oined the protests in i and protesters that pulicl argued against oining either the European
Union or the Eurasian Union.
33. Euromaidan as made up of indiiduals and groups representing a er ide range of political
opinions. t inoled ciil moements from all sides of the political spectrum and from oth east and est of
the countr. hese moements and parties also contained radical groups from oth sides of the political
spectrum. Radical righting and ultranationalist groups ere indeed part of the Euromaidan moement. he
most isile of these groups as the socalled Right Sector due to its prominence in the aidan selfdefence
groups. oeer despite their notoriet the made up onl a small part of the Euromaidan moement and it
ould therefore e incorrect to ualif the Euromaidan moement as such as etremist righting or ultra
nationalist.
34. Righting groups some originating from footall supporter organisations formed the core of the so
called selfdefence groups hich sprang up in reaction to the attempts to rea up the protest force in
Decemer 2013. oeer midanuar the protest moement had een radicalised to such an etent that
memers of the selfdefence groups came from all political sides although righting and nationalist groups
continued to e dominant in leadership positions in these groups.
35. he Right Sector or is a collectie of ultranationalist groups that as formed in the earl
das of the aidan moement and it plaed an important role in the deelopments on aidan. he Right
Sector originall refused to disarm after the change of poers and some of its memers hae een implicated
in criminal gang actiities folloing the aidan eents. One of the leaders of the Right Sector Olesandr
ucho as illed Urainian police forces after he opened fire hen the tried to arrest him in a ton in
estern Uraine. Folloing his death protests ere organised in front of the erhona Rada the Right
10. Doc. 13405.
10
Sector hich demanded the resignation of the inister of the nterior rsen ao hich the latter refused
to do. n a sign that the moderate maorit of the Euromaidan forces ere distancing themseles from the
Right Sector Speaer and acting President urchno condemned on 28 arch 2014 the Right Sectors
destailising actions. n addition as mentioned aoe on 1 pril 2014 the parliament oted to disarm all
illegall armed groups in Uraine including the Right Sector.
36. t has een alleged that the Euromaidan moement as essentiall antiSemitic in nature. nti
Semitism is a concern in most of the former Soiet Union geographical area and not onl in Uraine.
oeer the Urainian eish Congress as ell as the Chief Rai of Uraine has made on seeral
occasions pulic statements that Euromaidan as not more nor less antiSemitic than the rest of Uraine
and that seeral eish organisations ere actiel inoled in the protests. t should e noted that the anti
Semitic nature also seems to e elied the fact that some of the leaders of Euromaidan reportedl
including current Prime inister rseni atsenu are eish or of eish descent. he alleged antiSemitic
nature of Euromaidan has een used as one of the arguments Russia to ustif its militar operations and
suseuent anneation of the Crimea and Seastopol regions. n that contet it should e noted that all
eish organisations in Uraine including in Crimea hae epressed their support for the soereignt and
territorial integrit of Uraine and hae denounced the Russian anneation of Crimea and Seastopol.11
37. nother group that is often mentioned to ustif claims that Euromaidan as an etremist moement is
Sooda. ogether ith UDR and atishchna Sooda is one of the three parliamentar political parties
that ere part of the Euromaidan moement. Sooda is a nationalist or patriotic righting part. Sooda
has een associated ith a numer of uestionale statements including its leader Oleh ahno.
oeer under the leadership of the latter the part has formall dissociated itself from its etremist origins
and has ecome a mainstream political force in Uraine. n recent meetings after the aidan eents Sooda
leaders informed us aout the ish of Sooda to reach out more to the east12 of Uraine and to ecome a
centrist ut staunchl nationalist part. hile Sooda is a nationalist and righting part classifing it as
fascist or etremist ould e an incorrect eaggeration and not contriute to a proper understanding of the
political enironment in Uraine.
38. uestions hae een raised mainl the Russian authorities ith regard to the impeachment
process of former President anuoich. Reportedl this as mostl in order to challenge the legitimac of
the ne authorities in i and the legalit of their decisions in order to destailise the democratic institutions
in Uraine. Nearl all Council of Europe memer States as ell as the 7 memer States hae recognised
the legitimac of the ne Urainian oernment. an interlocutors and legal eperts hae pointed to the fact
that the act of impeachment and indeed all the decisions to implement the 21 Feruar agreement ere
taen ith a constitutional tothirds maorit and most of them consensus. he impeachment decision
seems therefore to hae een in line ith the spirit of the constitutional proisions although the procedure
itself left a lot to e desired. here is no uestion aout the legitimac of the erhona Rada hich as
elected in 2012 and hose composition did not change as a result of the eents of Feruar 2014. here can
therefore e no uestion ith regard to the legitimac of the ne authorities and their decisions. he
legitimac of the goernment ill e further strengthened the upcoming presidential election hich ill
tae place on 25 a 2014.
3. hile there can e no uestion aout the legitimac of the current parliament the Euromaidan as
largel an antipolitical estalishment moement that reflected the lac of pulic trust in the political
estalishment of the countr. he current ruling maorit can therefore not claim to full represent the
Euromaidan moement. t the same time the Ps that resigned from the Part of Regions hae formed to
ne parties13 hile the leftoer Part of Regions is in the process of reestalishing its part structures. s a
result of the disarra in the Part of Regions part of the Russianspeaing population in the east of the
countr hich as the support ase for the Part of Regions fear that their interests are not or onl partl
represented in the erhona Rada.
11. he Crimean peninsula of Uraine consists of the utonomous Repulic of Crimea and the Cit ith Special Status of
Seastopol. For reit e ill use the term Crimea in the remainder of this report.
12. hile Soodas strongest support is in the est of the countr it also otained considerale support in the east of
the countr indicating that it has increasing national appeal.
13. t should e noted that the Part of Regions and these to groups together still hold the maorit in the erhona
Rada.
11
40. n the current political and social contet ith a considerale eternal threat to the unit of the countr
it is important to ensure that the erhona Rada genuinel represents all of the people of Uraine. t is
therefore important that the presidential elections are folloed parliamentar elections as soon as
practicall and politicall feasile.14
41. he reenactment of the 2004 amendments to the Urainian Constitution as a central part of the
21 Feruar agreement. hese amendments prescrie a more inclusie diision of poer and more
comprehensie democratic safeguards in situations here there is tension or conflict eteen the President
and the erhona Rada or here the erhona Rada is diided. oeer in a situation here the
President can count on the support of the constitutional maorit in the Rada the effect of the constitutional
proisions is not er different.
42. n the light of the aoe the issue of hether these amendments ere enacted correctl ill change
little ith regard to the current situation. oeer for the record hen in i in Feruar 2014 seeral
constitutional eperts informed us that the Constitution could e reenacted a tothirds maorit in
parliament using the same argumentation that alloed the Court in 2010 to cancel the enactment of the 2004
amendments. So either the reenactment is legal or if not then the suspension of these amendments in 2010
as illegal. herefore the 2004 amendments ould e alid hicheer a ou loo at it.15
43. t should e noted that the 2004 amendments to the Constitution ere criticised oth the European
Commission for Democrac through a enice Commission and the sseml hen the ere in force.16
n 2004 these amendments added further deficiencies to an alread deficient 16 Constitution. he diision
of poer eteen the parliament President and goernment as defined the 2004 Constitution lacs clarit
and as a source of tension and conflict during the ushcheno administration. Under these amendments
the presidenc still remains a poerful post and conflicts eteen the different ranches of poer can easil
paralse the eecutie hich as eident eteen 2004 and 2010. n addition the 2004 Constitution codifies
the principle of an imperatie mandate and cemented the stle oersight function of the
Prosecutor eneral in the Constitution. he deficiencies that hae een reintroduced ill hinder the
implementation of the reforms that hae een initiated and adopted in close cooperation ith the Council of
Europe. he recentl adopted Criminal Procedure Code and the draft la on the Prosecutor eneral are in all
lielihood unconstitutional under the 2004 Constitution.
44. t is therefore of the utmost importance that further constitutional reform is implemented and
amendments to the Constitution are adopted that ring it full into line ith Council of Europe standards.17
his should e the main priorit for the erhona Rada at the moment especiall gien its current internal
unit. Until no most legal reforms hae een ased on a fault foundation as the Constitution as hindering
reforms. Constitutional reform should therefore e implemented ithout an further dela efore an factions
and indiidual Ps might e tempted to fall ac into the old hait of putting limited selfinterest efore the
common good as unfortunatel as often itnessed during the last decade. e therefore elcome the
assurances the Speaer of the erhona Rada that the constitutional amendments ill e adopted in first
reading efore the presidential election on 25 a 2014 and in final reading in line ith constitutional
proisions during the net sitting of the erhona Rada in Septemer this ear.
45. ien the short period of time to draft the constitutional amendments e urge the erhona Rada to
mae good use of the or preiousl done ith regard to constitutional reform and especiall the opinions of
the enice Commission on the different drafts and concepts for amendments to the Urainian Constitution
that ere deeloped oer the last fe ears.
14. he preterm elections should not stand in the a of the implementation of urgentl needed reforms. n addition in
order to ensure that all parts of Uraine ill feel represented in the ne conocation of the erhona Rada it is important
that the Part of Regions and splitoffs are gien sufficient time to reestalish themseles.
15. he main legal argument as that the Constitutional Court did not declare the 2004 amendments unconstitutional ut
onl their enactment as that too place efore the Constitutional Courts opinion as receied. s there as no tothirds
maorit in 2010 to reenact them at that time the Constitution reerted ac to the 16 ersion. No the parliament has
the tothirds maorit needed to enact the 2004 amendments. he fact that the Constitutional Court decided in 2010 on
the 2004 amendments ould indicate that there are no time limits for the adoption and enactment of constitutional
amendments.
16. See documents CDD2005015 CDD2010044 and Doc. 10058 Resolution 1364 2004 Doc.
10676 Resolution 1466 2005 Doc. 12357 and Resolution 1755 2010.
17. s in preious reports e maintain the position that constitutional reform should e implemented adopting
amendments to the current Constitution and not adopting a totall ne Constitution from scratch.
12
46. Electoral reform is another priorit issue. n order to ensure that the erhona Rada is full
representatie of Urainian societ it is important that parliamentar elections are organised soon and are
ased on a ne unified election code. e urge that this code introduce the regional proportional election
sstem as recommended for some time the sseml and the enice Commission lest the sstemic
prolems that hae plagued the diision of poers and functioning of the erhona Rada e perpetuated.
he adoption of such a ne election code is far less prolematic than it ma seem. n 2010 a ne unified
election code as drafted the socalled liuchos oring group of the erhona Rada. ll parties
participated in the drafting of this code hich too place in close cooperation ith the enice Commission.
Regrettal this draft as remoed from the agenda the Part of Regions after the 2010 Constitutional
Court decision reinstating the 16 Constitution. oeer it could e adopted uite uicl and could count
on the support of most if not all political forces in the countr.
47. Constitutional and electoral reform should hae asolute priorit as practicall all other reforms that are
needed for the countr are ased on them. his priorit is recognised oth the Urainian authorities as ell
as other international partners. Other reforms are important and their preparations should continue ut the
should not e alloed to deflect focus from the speed implementation of constitutional and electoral reform.
48. o other e reforms that need to e addressed promptl after the constitutional and electoral reform
are finalised are udicial reform and decentralisation of goernment and strengthening of local and regional
authorities.
4. he lac of independence of the udiciar and the structural deficiencies in the udicial sstem hae
een longstanding concerns of the sseml and ere discussed in detail in preious reports.18 udicial
reform should e implemented ithout an unnecessar delas and our recommendations made in preious
reports and resolutions adopted the sseml are still full alid. oeer as highlighted on preious
occasions a successful reform of the udiciar is dependent on constitutional reform eing implemented first.
50. he eents folloing aidan hae increased the eastest diide in the countr and led to unease
among the population in oth sides of the countr. s e ill argue elo despite the clear historical and
cultural differences eteen the east and the est of Uraine the diide is mostl of political maing.
herefore the est manner to counteract this diide is to strengthen local and regional authorities and to
decentralise goernment. decentralisation strateg and polic should therefore e drafted as a matter of
priorit. oeer gien the sensitiit of this issue and its potential impact on intercommunit relations it is
important that such decentralisation strateg is adopted a parliament that is seen as full representatie of
Urainian societ. e therefore recommend that it e adopted onl after the net parliamentar elections.
51. e ish to underscore that decentralisation does not eual the federalisation of Uraine hich ould
seerel damage the unit of the countr and is onl faoured Russia ostensil for ulterior moties.
52. oth constitutional reform and electoral reform are areas in hich the sseml has considerale
eperience and epertise and could therefore e areas for the concrete assistance of the
sseml.
53. he political crisis in Uraine that started in Noemer 2013 rought the eastest diide in Uraine to
the foreground again. hile support for President anuoich as more pronounced in the east and support
for the Euromaidan moement more prealent in the est it is important to underscore that there as large
participation and support from oth eastern and estern Uraine for the Euromaidan protests.
54. hile the recent political crisis has eacerated the eastest diide it should e noted that this
diision had een largel asent from the political agenda in recent ears and the etent of this diide in realit
seems less than is often reported the media. t the same time it is clear that tensions and mistrust are
er near the surface especiall after the recent eents and can e easil misused or made to flare up.
55. detailed discussion of the historical origins and eolement of the eastest diide in Uraine is
eond the scope of this report. hile there are clear and distinct historical and cultural differences eteen
the to sides the diide is mainl ethnolinguistic and to a large etent political in maing.
18. See Doc. 12814.
13
56. t is important to mae a differentiation eteen the numer of ethic Urainians and ethnic Russians
and the distriution of the use of the Russian and Urainian languages in Uraine. ccording to the 2001
census ethnic Urainians mae up around 78 of the population hile ethnic Russians amount to around
17. he percentage of ethnic Russians in the est and centre of the countr is eteen 1.2 to hile
in the east and south ethnic Russians mae up eteen 14 and 40 of the population. he Crimea is the
onl region of Uraine here ethnic Russians are in the maorit ith 58.
57. ccording to the same census Russian is the natie language of approimatel 30 of the population
and Urainian around 67. gain the use of Urainian is much more prealent in the est and centre here
for 81 to 7 of the population Urainian is the natie language and Russian the natie language for 1 to
10. n the east and south Urainian is the natie language for 24 to 70 and Russian the natie
language for 25 to 75 of the population. gain the eception is Crimea here Russian is the natie
language of 77 of the population 0 in Seastopol.
58. t should e noted that the use of the Russian language in Uraine is larger than the percentage of
persons ho spea it as a natie language. numer of polls hae een conducted that sho that 40 to
50 of the population consider Russian to e their main language of communication. his percentage is
much higher in uran centres including in the centre of the countr here Russian is the language of
communication for the maorit of the population. he eception is the est of the countr here Urainian is
far the language used the maorit of the population including in uran centres.
5. hese ethnolinguistic differences eteen east and est also hae a distinct political component ith
parties that are considered to e in faour of closer relations ith Russia more popular in the East and parties
that faour a closer integration ith estern Europe more popular in the est. he Part of Regions hich is
historicall considered the part that represented the interests of the Russophone part of the population has
its strongest support ase in the eastern part of the countr hile the parties traditionall considered to e
closest to the interest of ethnic Urainians and the Urainianspeaing part of the population such as
Sooda and atishchna hae their strongest supportase in the estern part of Uraine. t the same
time it is important not to oerestimate these political differences. n the 2012 parliamentar elections the
Part of Regions led the proportional races in the eastern and southern olasts ith 40 to 60 of the ote
ut atishchna/United opposition still gained eteen the 10 and 20 of the ote in these regions ith
the eception of Donets olast here it onl gained 6. Similarl atishchna/United Opposition led the
proportional races in the estern and central olasts ith 30 to 40 ut the Part of Regions still gained 4
to 20 in these Olasts and een led the race in aarpatsa olast ith 30 of the otes. Sooda hich is
considered a Urainian nationalist or patriotic part onl led in i olast ith 38 of the ote. t had an
aerage support of 17 in the estern olasts ut still gained eteen 4 and 10 and in the central
southern and eastern olasts ith the eception of the olasts of Donets and uhans as ell as Crimea
here it onl gained around 2 of the ote.
60. t is important to note that hardl an radical proRussian political parties eist that faour integration
ith Russia. n the 2012 parliamentar elections the onl prointegrationist part as the Russian loc hich
gained 0.31 of the ote hile in the Crimean elections in 2010 the prointegration part Russian Unit of
Serge sono onl scored 4.2 of the ote. n addition during the isit to Donets on 23 arch 2014
despite the tense political situation and eautiful eather onl around 1 500 persons shoed up at a
preiousl announced demonstration in faour of the integration of the Donas region ith Russia. his
underscores the er lo leel of support of secessionist or integrationist ideas and moements in Uraine.
61. n this contet the collapse of the Part of Regions is of serious concern. s mentioned the Part of
Regions had its strongest support ase in the east of the countr. Folloing the eents on aidan of 18 to 20
Feruar 2014 8 Ps resigned from the Part of Regions. he later formed to ne parties the Economic
Deelopment Part and the Soereign European Uraine Part hich do not et hae ellestalished
part structures. he remainder of the Part of Regions is reestalishing and reorganising itself. s a result
as e noted hen in Donets man people in the east currentl fear that their interest are not or not
correctl represented in the erhona Rada and at the leel of the central goernment in i. For the unit
of the countr it is therefore essential that such representation is reestalished uicl and that parliamentar
elections tae place as soon as feasile. t the same time it is important to gie sufficient time efore the
elections for the different political parties including the Part of Regions and its splitoffs to reestalish their
part structures in all parts of the countr. n the meantime alternatie channels for communication and
consultation need to e estalished eteen the central authorities and olasts in the east and south of the
countr.
14
62. n the current tense situation it is important that all sides refrain from actions and discourse that could
further eacerate the eastest diide. Reportedl a multitude of la initiaties hae een taled in the
erhona Rada. an of these initiaties seem to e primaril aimed at satisfing the epectations of one
group or another that participated in the protests. e urge the Rada not to adopt an initiaties that are
contentious or diisie and that could undermine the unit of the countr. hile man of these initiaties are
unliel to e implemented one initiatie een if neer implemented had a disruptie impact on the national
unit of the countr.
63. On 25 Feruar 2014 the erhona Rada adopted a la to cancel the a on the State anguage
commonl called the language la. he language la in its first draft had intended to mae Russian the
second national language in Uraine on a par ith Urainian. his proision as later deleted and not
included in the language la that as adopted the erhona Rada ut it resulted in the la eing oth
notorious and contested among the Urainian pulic. he adoption of the la to cancel the language la as
therefore highl smolic1 and construed as an attac on the Russianspeaing minorit hose rights ould
e eaened.
64. t is important to note that the la to cancel the language la as neer signed into force the
President. he language la and all its proisions therefore hae remained continuousl in force. oreoer
een if the cancellation had een enforced its effects ould hae een limited especiall in Crimea. he
protection of minorities and the use of their languages are guaranteed and regulated in the Constitution the
a on inorities as ell as the Ratification a of the European Charter for Regional or inorit anguages
ES No. 148. he language la does not alter this. he language la is an implementing la that loered to
10 the threshold for the use of minorit languages in pulic affairs and for receiing a full education in a
minorit language. ien that Russian is spoen more than 50 of the population in Crimea their rights
ere not sustantiall affected the adoption of the language la neither ould the e its ithdraal.
hat notithstanding the adoption of the la to cancel the language la sent a rong message especiall to
the east of the countr and as a ig mistae the erhona Rada.
65. he Russian ethnic minorit is ell integrated in Urainian societ and the cohaitation of the Russian
and Urainian language groups is largel unprolematic although tensions sometimes arise. Folloing
allegations Russia of discrimination of ethnic Russians the Committee of inisters of the Council of
Europe decided to reuest the disor Committee of the Frameor Conention for the Protection of
National inorities to mae an isit to Uraine. his isit too place from 21 to 26 arch 2014.
Regrettal due to the anneation of Crimea the Russian Federation the adisor group as not in a
position to isit Crimea. he report of the disor Committee is in ppendi 2 to this report.
66. n its report the disor Committee concluded that there as no immediate threat to the enoment of
minorit rights in Uraine ith the eception of Crimea here the disor Committee epressed its great
concerns aout the reported threats to the safel and rights of the Crimean atar and Urainian minorities. n
addition the disor Committee epressed its concerns aout the negatie impact on interethnic relations in
the Uraine of media coerage some national and international media including freuent unsustantiated
reports of minorit rights iolations in Uraine.
67. During our isit to Donets seeral interlocutors also pointed at the importance of the socioeconomic
factors on the unit of the countr and the importance of ensuring economic deelopment in the east.
orsening socioeconomic conditions could mae Russia an attractie option for certain parts of the
population liing in the RussianUrainian order regions especiall gien the considerale economic
resources inested in the Russian regions ordering Uraine the Russian authorities.
68. ll human rights iolations committed in relation to the Euromaidan protests should e inestigated and
the perpetrators rought to ustice. here can especiall e no impunit for human rights iolations police
and securit forces. Police and securit forces hich hae a legal mandate for the use of force should e
held to higher standards hen in function than normal citiens.
6. t the same time it is important that these inestigations are impartial and free from political motiation
or an desire for retriution. he adisor committee proposed the Council of Europe could pla a e role
in ensuring not onl that all iolations are properl inestigated the authorities ut also that these
1. Reportedl the la as proposed to placate the more radical aidan forces after it as clear that the ould not e
gien e positions in the ne goernment.
15
inestigations tae place in accordance ith European norms and the reuirements under rticle 6 of the
European Conention on uman Rights ES No. 5. e elcome that the authorities and opposition hae
no appointed their representaties on this panel enaling it to start its or in the er near future.
70. he European Court of uman Rights has started looing into the complaints filed ith it in relation to
the ongoing protests. On 3 Feruar 2014 the Court communicated the application
pplication No. 078/14 to the Urainian authorities and ased it to sumit its oserations. his case deals
ith a complaint a participant in the protests that he as eaten up the police and illegall arrested.
71. Folloing the oint isit ith the Presidential Committee e met ith the Prosecutor eneral and his
deputies. e informed us that all fatalities policemen and demonstrators are eing inestigated as
homicides irrespectie of ho ma e responsile for the deaths. he inestigations are complicated as the
do not onl concern protesters and laenforcement officials ut also .
72. On 3 pril 2014 the inister of the nterior rsen ao announced that the inestigations had
identified the special police forces snipers that shot the Euromaidan protesters on 20 Feruar 2014. On the
same da the head of the Urainian Secret Serice announced that the authorities had proof that Russian
Federal Securit Serice operaties had een inoled in planning the operations against the protesters on
aidan.
73. he deelopments in Crimea cumulating in the illegal anneation of this region the Russian
Federation has dominated and oershadoed the political deelopments in Uraine. s mentioned hile the
political crisis that ensued after Noemer 2013 has eacerated the eastest diide it should e noted that
this diision had een largel asent from the political agenda in recent ears and the etent of this diide has
een less than is sometimes erroneousl reported the media.
74. he Crimea has a special status in Uraine as an utonomous Repulic hile Seastopol is a cit ith
a special status under Urainian la. he Crimea the utonomous Repulic of Crimea and the Cit of
Seastopol is the onl region of Uraine here ethnic Russians are in the maorit 58 of the population.
he total population is approimatel 1. million inhaitants. Ethnic Urainians mae up 24 and Crimean
atars ho ere originall deported Stalin mae up 12 of the population. he Crimea historicall
Russian as transferred to Uraine in 154 reportedl hrushche although this is disputed.20 n return
for Crimea Russia receied aganrog and other land areas.
75. e isited Crimea oth Simferopol and Seastopol in Septemer 2011. hile nearl all interlocutors
including the Speaer of the Crimean erhona Rada and the Deput Prime inister ere decidedl pro
Russian independence or integration ith Russia as not on the political agenda and onl supported
some small radical proRussian groups. n the ords of the Crimean leadership at that time the oerall
position as that it as more adantageous to e special in Uraine than to e normal in Russia.
76. mmediatel folloing the change of poer in i seeral prominent memers of the State Duma and
Council of the Federation of Russia including memers of our sseml isited Crimea and made
statements there as ell as in osco epressing the clear support of the Russian authorities for an
attempts Crimea to change its relationship ith the rest of Uraine or possile reuests to oin the Russian
Federation. his together ith numerous other issues including the lo leel of support for secession
epressed during the isit of the corapporteurs in Septemer 2011 gies credence to reports seeral
interlocutors that the drie for secession and integration into the Russian Federation as largel instigated
and incited the Russian authorities.
77. On 26 Feruar 2014 the Crimean atars organised a large proUrainian demonstration. his
demonstration clashed ith a proRussian counter rall. he causes of the iolence are disputed the
to sides.
78. On 28 Feruar 2014 Russian militar troops occupied strategic points all oer Crimea including the
regional goernment uildings the Crimean Parliament and transport hus such as the airport and locaded
Urainian militar ases. hile the soldiers did not ear militar insignia hich is in contraention to
international la the militar hardare and eaponr used hich are unaailale to ciilians and the
20. Others sa the decision to transfer Crimea as made aleno.
16
discipline and apparent militar eperience in eidence are clear proof that these ere Russian militar
forces. his as confirmed in numerous press interies as ell as posterior statements leading
Russian politicians.
7. n this contet it should e noted that the presence of Russian troops in Crimea is goerned the
ase agreement eteen Russia and Uraine. his agreement allos Russia up to 25 000 militar personal in
Crimea. oeer their moements are strictl delimited and defined. he should remain in their ases of
deploment and can onl e moed outside their ases ith the eplicit agreement of the Urainian
authorities hich the did and do not hae.
80. hile occupied militar forces reportedl Russian the Crimean Parliament conened in a closed
etraordinar session and dismissed the goernment. t elected Serge sono as the ne Crimean Prime
inister. he proceedings and ote too place ehind closed doors and are idel uestioned and regarded
as circumspect. r sono is the leader of the radical proRussian part Russian Unit. n the 2010
regional elections his part gained onl 4 of the otes in the elections to the Crimean erhona Rada.
81. On 1 arch 2014 the Council of the Federation of the Russian Parliament authorised President Putin
to use militar force in Crimea hich as condemned the international communit. n the meantime there
ere attempts Russian forces to entice Urainian militar attalions to defect and sitch sides. oeer
these attempts ere largel unsuccessful. On 6 arch 2014 the Crimean Parliament decided to organise a
referendum on 16 arch on hether Crimea should oin the Russian Federation. n response the Urainian
Prosecutor indicted the Crimean leadership for illegal secession and high treason.
82. he referendum in Crimea as illegal under the Urainian as ell as Crimean Constitution and
iolated international standards and norms according to the opinion of the enice Commission on this issue.
21 s a result its conduct and outcome are illegal and hae no legal asis. n addition the reported outcome
is highl uestionale. ccording to reports the turnout as 82 and 6 oted in faour of oining the
Russian Federation. oeer Russians account for onl 54 of the population around 12 are Crimean
artars and 24 ethnic Urainians and these groups had announced a ocott of the referendum as had
some Russian groups. he comination of an 82 turnout and a 6 ote in faour of anneation is therefore
implausile.2223
83. On 28 Feruar 2014 a draft Federal Constitutional a on mending the Federal Constitutional a
on the Procedure of dmission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a Ne Suect ithin the Russian
Federation as introduced in the Russian State Duma. his la aimed to mae it possile to accept ne
suects of the Russian Federation on the asis of a referendum in the region that ass to oin the Federation
ithout the consent of the State to hich it elongs. he eplanation accompaning this la clearl refers to
the eents in Crimea. ccording to the draft opinion of the enice Commission24 on this la reuested the
Secretar eneral of the Council of Europe the draft la is not compatile ith international la. t iolates in
particular the principles of territorial integrit national soereignt noninterention in the internal affairs of
another state and pacta sunt seranda. he la as ithdran from the agenda of the State Duma as the
legal aenue of declaring independence Crimea folloed a reuest for integration in the Russian
Federation as chosen.
84. On 17 arch 2014 the Crimean Parliament declared that it seceded from Uraine and as a ne
independent nation. t the same time and in that capacit it made a reuest to oin the Russian Federation
passing in this manner the Russian constitutional reuirement that the countr to hom it pertained should
e in agreement.
85. On the same da President Putin informed the Russian Parliament that such a reuest had een made
and called for a session on 18 arch during hich the treat hich Crimea and Seastopol oined the
Russian Federation as to ne entities as signed. On 1 arch this treat as accepted the Russian
Constitutional Court. he treat as ratified the State Duma on 20 arch and the Council of the
Federation on 21 arch after hich the illegal anneation of Crimea the Russian Federation as a fact.
21. CDD2014002.
22. Some interlocutors e met during our isit in arch reported that the turnout of the referendum as closer to
3540 less than the reported 82.
23. During our isit to Uraine interlocutors ith etensie contacts in Crimea claimed that in realit the turnout of the
referendum as closer to 3040. e hae no possiilit to independentl erif these claims.
24. CDD2014004.
17
Folloing the anneation Russian troops occupied the militar ases of Uraine that are situated in Crimea
and confiscated its na ships and airplanes. he Urainian authorities estimate that the alue of militar
assets confiscated the Russian Federation eceeds US20 illion.
86. here are fears that the Russian interention in Uraine ill not stop ith Crimea. n seeral statements
President Putin has announced that Russia ill protect the interests of the Russian minorit also elsehere in
the territor of Uraine. he Donas area hich is home to most of Uraines arms industr as ell as the
Odessa region are potentiall at ris of Russian militar interention and occupation. he occupation of the
Odessa region ould ring Uraines access to the lac Sea full under Russian control and ould proide
Russia ith a direct land corridor to ransnistria hich is under Russian control. n this contet it
should e noted that on 17 Feruar 2014 the authorities in iraspol announced that the ould
soon mae a formal reuest to oin the Russian Federation as a ne entit.
87. On 24 arch the Supreme llied Commander of NO eneral reedloe announced that Russia
had amassed around 30 000 soldiers including logistical and support units on the orders ith Uraine and
that this proided Russia ith enough militar capailit to inade eastern Uraine and to create a land ridge
to ransnistria. Russian authorities hae claimed that these troops are participating in militar eercises.
oeer this has een countered NO officials as ell as other militar specialists ho hae noted that
the troops do not seem to e engaged in an form of eercise and that in addition the maeup of the militar
force is er unusual for a militar eercise. e ish to add that een if this ere indeed a militar eercise
the isdom of organising a militar eercise of this scale close to the orders to Uraine in the tense and
nerous present enironment should e uestioned at est. he Russian authorities announced that the had
reduced their militar strength on the Russian order hoeer this as contradicted NO
officials.
88. he unprooed militar aggression Russia against Uraine and the occupation/anneation of
Crimea is in clear iolation of international la including the United Nations Charter the Organiation for
Securit and Cooperation in Europe OSCE elsini ct and the Statute and asic principles of the Council
of Europe. n addition it iolates at least to accession commitments namel to refuse the notion of a special
interest ones and the commitments to resole international disputes peacefull according to international la.
he possil also iolate Russias commitment to fulfil its oligations under the Conentional rmed Forces
CFE agreement. heir action also iolates seeral ilateral agreements most importantl the 14 udapest
greement signed the United ingdom the United States Russia and Uraine in hich Russia pledged to
respect and protect Uraines internationall recognised orders to refrain from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrit of Uraine and to refrain from an economic coercion to affect political decision
maing in i.
8. On 13 arch 2014 the Urainian authorities lodged an interState case against the Russian Federation
ith the European Court of uman Rights under rticle 33 of the Conention. On the same da considering
that the situation in Crimea gae rise to a continuing ris of serious iolations of the Conention the Court
granted an interim measure under rticle 3 of its Rules of Court and called upon oth Contracting Parties
concerned to refrain from taing an measures in particular militar actions hich might entail reaches of
the Conention rights of the ciilian population including putting their life and health at ris and to compl ith
their engagements under the Conention.25
0. he ne political enironment folloing the eents on aidan eteen 18 and 21 Feruar 2014 and
the resulting change of poer hae opened a ne indo of opportunit for Uraines democratic
deelopment. t is no important that a democratic inclusie sstem of goernance of the countr is
estalished that ill guarantee the unit of the countr.
1. hese democratic deelopments should e ased upon constitutional reform that should e
implemented ithout an further dela and on preterm presidential elections to ensure the fullest possile
democratic legitimac of the ne authorities. hat should then e folloed hen technicall and politicall
feasile preterm parliamentar elections to ensure that all regions of the countr feel represented in the
central goernment. Constitutional and electoral reform are areas in hich the sseml has considerale
epertise that could e offered to the erhona Rada.
25. ECR 0732014. n its decision of 3 pril 2014 the Committee of inisters of the Council of Europe called upon
oth parties to compl ithout dela ith this interim measure.
18
2. he parliamentar elections should e ased on a ne unified election code. e urge the erhona
Rada to adopt a unified election code on the asis of the draft that as prepared the liuchos oring
group in order to aoid an unnecessar delas in the adoption of such an election code.
3. hile the adoption of constitutional reform and a ne unified election code should e the main priorities
for the Urainian authorities farreaching udicial reform and decentralisation of goernment including
strengthening of local and regional authorities should also e urgentl considered and implemented the
authorities. he decentralisation of goernment could especiall help to strengthen the countr. Such a
decentralisation strateg should e ased on a strong unitar State ith an effectie and efficient central
sstem of goernance. he federalisation of Uraine as sometimes proposed some parties for seemingl
ulterior moties should e aoided as this ould conersel eaen the unit of the countr.
4. ll human rights iolations committed in relation to the Euromaidan protests should e full and
impartiall inestigated and the perpetrators rought to ustice. here can e no impunit for human rights
iolations irrespectie of ho committed them.
5. e elcome the conclusion the disor Committee of the Frameor Conention for the
Protection of National inorities that isited Uraine from 21 to 26 arch that there is no immediate threat to
the enoment of minorit rights in the current situation in Uraine. his confirms our impressions during the
isit ith the Presidential Committee to Uraine from 21 to 25 arch 2014. t the same time e call on the
authorities to e proactie and to adopt all possile measures to strengthen the unit of the countr and to
refrain from an discourse or actions that are diisie and that could undermine or e instrumental in
undermining the national unit of the countr.
6. e epress our concern aout the increasing numer of reports credile organisations confirmed
the disor Committee aout the increasing numer of iolations of the human rights of the ethnic
Urainian and Crimean atar minorities in Crimea. e call on the Russian authorities as the poer in
control of the region to ensure that these iolations are immediatel rought to an end and all
perpetrators prosecuted.
7. e regret that the democratic changes and political deelopments n Uraine hae een
oershadoed the deelopments in Crimea. he Russian militar aggression and suseuent anneation/
occupation of Crimea is in clear iolation of international la including the United Nations Charter the OSCE
elsini ct and the Statute and asic principles of the Council of Europe. Russias iolation of the Statute of
the Council of Europe and its accession commitments and oligations as ell as the conseuences that
these should hae is the suect of another report under consideration the sseml. oeer from the
perspectie of corapporteurs of the monitoring procedure e can clearl sa that none of the arguments used
the Russian Federation to ustif its actions hold true. here as no ultraright ing taeoer of the central
goernment in i nor as there an imminent threat to the rights of the ethnic Russian minorit in the
countr including or especiall in Crimea here the are in the maorit. n addition neither secessionism
nor integration ith the Russian Federation as prealent on the political agenda of the Crimean population
prior to Russian militar interention nor could these issues count on the support of more than a small
percentage of the population. he drie for secession and integration into the Russian Federation as
instigated and incited the Russian authorities and mostl implemented Russian militar forces ith the
assistance of some small ciil organisations aligned ith it. he referendum as neither legal nor as e
outlined as its outcome plausile. n short it as a classic case of unprooed militar aggression resulting
in the anneation/occupation of the territor of a neighouring countr. Clear signals need to e gien to aoid
further aggression and militar action gien the uildup of Russian troops on the Urainian orders.
8. ll the Urainian political forces that e met epressed their disappointment that none of the other
signatories of the udapest greement had stood the securit guarantees the had gien Uraine in return
for it giing up its nuclear arsenal. Some of them een ent as far as suggesting that Uraine should
reconsider its nonnuclear status if securit guarantees continue not to e honoured. e naturall strongl
adise against such a moe hich ould e detrimental to the securit of the region as a hole. oeer to
aoid the destailisation of the region as a hole further militar action e ould suggest that the
signatories of the udapest agreement as ell as other releant European States eplore tangile securit
agreements to ensure Uraines independence soereignt and territorial integrit.
. t the moment of finalising this eplanator memorandum e regrettal hae to report that the
situation in Uraine is not calming don. On the contrar proRussian protesters stormed regional
goernment uildings in Donets and hari on 6 pril and toda 7 pril occupied the State Securit
Serice uildings in Donets and uhans reportedl roing the armour of the eapons present in
uhans. he Urainian authorities hae lamed Russia for instigating these seiures. n a separate
1
deelopment a Urainian Naal officer as illed a Russian soldier in Crimea and another one eaten and
detained Russian troops. Needless to sa that these deelopments greatl ris destailising the alread
tense situation in Uraine.
20
1. ithin 48 hours of the signing of this agreement a special la ill e adopted signed and promulgated
hich ill restore the Constitution of 2004 including amendments passed until no. Signatories declare their
intention to create a coalition and form a national unit goernment ithin 10 das thereafter.
2. Constitutional reform alancing the poers of the President the goernment and parliament ill start
immediatel and e completed in Septemer 2014.
3. Presidential elections ill e held as soon as the ne Constitution is adopted ut no later than Decemer
2014. Ne electoral las ill e passed and a ne Central Election Commission ill e formed on the asis
of proportionalit and in accordance ith the OSCE enice commission rules.
4. nestigation into recent acts of iolence ill e conducted under oint monitoring from the authorities the
opposition and the Council of Europe.
5. he authorities ill not impose a state of emergenc. he authorities and the opposition ill refrain from the
use of iolence. he Parliament ill adopt the 3rd amnest coering the same range of illegal action as 17th
Feruar 2014 la.
oth Parties ill undertae serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and illages ithdraing
form administratie and pulic uildings and unlocing streets cit pars and suares.
llegal eapons should e handed oer to the inistr of nterior odies ithin 24 hours of the special la
referred to in point 1 hereof coming into force. fter the aforementioned period all cases of illegal carring
and storage of eapons ill fall under the la of Uraine. he forces of authorities and of the opposition ill
step ac from confrontational posture. he oernment ill use la enforcement forces eclusiel for the
phsical protection of pulic uildings.
6. he foreign inisters of France erman Poland and the Special Representatie of the President of the
Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all iolence and confrontation.
i 21 Feruar 2014
itor anuoch
itali licho UDR
Oleh ahnio Sooda
rseni atseniu atishchna
Foreign inister
21
Foreign inister
Foreign inister
Special Eno
22
C201446
2 pril 201426
116 eeting 2 pril 2014
1 eneral uestions
1.8 Situation in Uraine
Report of the disor Committee on the Frameor Conention for the Protection of National inorities d
hoc isit to Uraine 2126 arch 2014
1. his report of the disor Committee on the Frameor Conention for the Protection of National
inorities is prepared in response to the decision of 14 arch 2014 of the Committee of inisters instructing
the disor Committee to reie in light of recent deelopments the situation of national minorities in
Uraine and report on its findings as soon as possile C/Del/Dec2014114/1.7. n line ith this decision
a delegation of the disor Committee traelled to Uraine from 21 to 26 arch 2014. ien the ad hoc
nature of this reuest the report is not ased on a comprehensie assessment of the implementation of the
Frameor Conention in Uraine. Rather it reflects the findings of the disor Committee as regards the
situation pertaining to minorit rights folloing meetings ith representaties of the fghan rmenian eri
ulgarian Crimean atar agau eorgian ungarian eish araim aah eghin oldoan
Polish Roma Romanian Russian ai and Ue communities in Uraine. hese meetings too place in
Odessa hari and i minorit representaties in estern Uraine ere contacted phone and the
delegation met Crimean atar representaties in oth Odessa and i.
2. his report is adopted in the contet of fundamental structural reform processes that are ongoing in
Uraine including ith regard to its Constitution Electoral a and local selfgoernment arrangements.
hese all hae a ital impact on the enoment of rights of persons elonging to national minorities as citiens
of Uraine. he report is also adopted ahead of presidential elections on 25 a 2014 and parliamentar
elections to e possil conducted in autumn 2014.
3. he disor Committee is grateful to the representaties of minorit associations ciil societ
international organisations and the authorities ho agreed to meet the delegation at short notice. ien the
particular focus of this report not all concerns that ere shared are reflected ut onl those that are of direct
releance to recent deelopments. he disor Committee loos forard hoeer to conducting a
comprehensie assessment in the course of the upcoming fourth ccle of monitoring under the Frameor
Conention.
4. ccording to representaties of all minorities ith hom meetings too place the leel of implementation of
minorit rights has not changed in 2014. Recent eents hae had no repercussions on the etent of schooling
in minorit languages or the possiilit to use minorit languages or regional languages in official contacts ith
authorities. hile these eents hae created uncertaint and there is considerale fear among minorit
populations aout possile militar conflict folloing deelopments in Crimea the disor Committee
osered generall stale conditions and no sense of lalessness. ost minorit representaties reported
that their dail life is continuing as efore and that the hae no specific concerns ith regard to the
enoment of their minorit rights in the current contet. hile apprehensie aout the oerall situation in the
countr the epressed their support for Urainian soereignt and territorial integrit and coneed their
epectations in the ne authorities to strengthen minorit rights protection frameors in line ith European
alues in particular as regards respect for human and minorit rights.
5. he disor Committee is concerned hoeer aout the negatie impact of some media coerage at
national and international leel on interethnic relations in Uraine. he regular and ased on the
delegations assessment freuentl unsustantiated media reports of ongoing human and minorit rights
26. his document has een classified restricted until eamination the Committee of inisters.
23
iolations in Uraine raise tension and fears among the population that are not conducie to calming the
oerall enironment and are particularl unhelpful in the current preelection contet. his situation reuires
the immediate attention of national and international actors to aoid further escalation.
6. here are grae and immediate concerns regarding the safet and access to rights of persons elonging to
the Crimean atars. he oerall securit situation in Crimea is reportedl er tense ith armed ut
unidentifiale paramilitar groups manning a ariet of checpoints here the stop residents and chec
their identit and elongings. he disor Committee points to ciil societ reports of idnappings
intimidation and illtreatment in connection ith these socalled selfdefence groups hich constitute an
immediate ostacle to the freedom of moement of Crimean residents including persons elonging to
national minorities. ien the open resistance to eents unfolding in Crimea demonstrated Crimean atar
leaders and the fact that most Crimean atars ocotted the referendum called for the local authorities on
16 arch persons elonging to the Crimean atars are eposed to particular ris. ccording to
representaties some 5 000 persons predominantl Crimean atars and mainl omen and children hae
left the peninsula for mainland Uraine in recent ees.
7. n addition there is great uncertaint and fear among Crimean atars regarding their future.
Representaties epressed their full commitment to Urainian territorial integrit ut pointed to the practical
necessit for residents of Crimea to cooperate ith the local authorities in dail life particularl hen it comes
to issues related to propert or the performance of pulic duties legal professionals. ide parts of the
Crimean atar population are afraid that the ma e forced to leae the territor a fear felt all the more
intensel as Crimean atars hae tice suffered from deportations in the past in 1783 and in 144. he
disor Committee is further deepl concerned aout the safet and enoment of cultural education and
language rights of all national minorities in Crimea including in particular the numericall smaller ones such as
the araim and rimcha as ell as persons elonging to the Urainian communit ho are in a minorit
situation in Crimea.
8. numer of legislatie drafts concerning Crimea are under consideration in the erhona Rada in i
including the a on the Status and Rights of Formerl Deported Persons a la for the ratification of O
Conention 16 on the Rights of ndigenous Peoples and a a on Occupied erritories. hile elcoming
the concern and attention paid to the situation of the Crimean atars and the adoption after man ears of
discussions of a declaration on 20 arch 2014 to recognise the Crimean atars as indigenous people the
disor Committee is concerned that the a on Occupied erritories ma seerel penalise all those ho
are forced circumstances to cooperate ith the authorities ho are in effectie control including
accepting Russian citienship to maintain their properties.
. ccording to representaties of the eish communit there has een no increase in antiSemitism in
Uraine in recent months and there is no fear of such deelopments ithin the roader eish communit.
Reports of a surge in hate crime against memers of the eish communit and snagogues hae pulicl
een denounced as propaganda eish representaties themseles ho epressed including toards the
delegation of the disor Committee their confidence in the authorities in i. he disor Committee is
hoeer concerned that these unerified media reports of hate crimes against persons elonging to the
eish communit ma further raise tensions and there in fact prooe such attacs.
10. he disor Committee osered a ariet of ies among the Russian minorit ranging from full
support for the Urainian authorities and the ie that minorit rights including language rights are sufficientl
estalished to the liening of the current situation related to language rights to genocide of the Russian
people. he disor Committee is concerned that the natural diersit of opinions and geopolitical
iepoints eisting ithin the Russian minorit ma e instrumentalised in the current climate and ma gie
rise to additional tension including intraethnic friction. ien the amplification the media in particular of
radical ies among the minorit some representaties epressed serious concerns aout eing affiliated
ith these ies ased on their ethnic and linguistic identit. hile there hae een to date no reports of
limitations or perceied threats to the use of Russian language in estern parts of Uraine the disor
Committee considers it crucial for the authorities to ensure that the use of all minorit languages continues to
e actiel encouraged throughout Uraine.
11. Persons elonging to the aah and rmenian minorities reported concerns ithin their communities that
their loalt to Uraine ma e called into uestion folloing reports in the media aout statements issued
the oernments of rmenia and aahstan in support of the Russian Federation. he disor Committee
24
also notes the particularl comple situation for persons elonging to the eghin minorit gien that the
originate from the territor of the Russian Federation and fear losing contact ith their families and communit
in Dagestan.
12. part from the aoe concerns the disor Committee did not encounter an particular threat to or
immediate concern for access to rights including language rights of persons elonging to national minorities
in Uraine. Representaties of most minorities reported no deterioration in access to rights ut rather
epectations that their situation ma in fact improe. here are hopes ithin the Polish minorit for instance
that an ne language legislation ill etend safeguards also to languages of smaller and dispersed
minorities. Representaties of the oldoan and agau minorities agreed that support for their languages
must e increased ut considered that the first priorit of the authorities should e to promote the socio
economic conditions of persons elonging to national minorities particularl in the regions. he Roma
minorit hose representaties epressed deep disappointment ith the oernment Strateg for the
ntegration of Roma adopted in arch 2013 and the er limited attention that has een paid to their urgent
concerns thus far is hopeful that Uraine ma indeed oin the Roma Decade in the coming months.
13. he disor Committee is hoeer concerned aout reports of nationalist aggression against Roma
settlements in the recent past. hile hate crime against persons elonging to the Roma minorit in Uraine
has een regularl reported oer the last ears and interlocutors of the delegation indicated that attitudes of
la enforcement toards Roma had not deteriorated in 2014 the disor Committee considers it crucial that
particular attention is paid the authorities to preent further such attacs in the current contet.
14. ccording to representaties of all minorities ith hom meetings ere arranged and in line ith
monitoring conducted the inistr of Education in 2013 the ugust 2012 a on the Principles of State
anguage Polic had no practical impact on the numer of minorit language schools or the use of languages
in official contacts. Nonetheless the call the erhona Rada to arogate the la on 23 Feruar 2014
created significant apprehension among parts of the Russian ungarian and Romanian minorities hose
languages are considered regional languages in some of Uraines 27 regions as a result of the a. he
disor Committee notes that this a remains in force toda folloing the decision of the cting President
on 27 Feruar 2014 to eto its arogation. t further notes that the a has een controersial from its
adoption as a numer of critical concerns from minorit communities as ell as from international eperts
including the enice Commission had not een taen into account.
15. n its third Opinion on the implementation of the Frameor Conention in Uraine adopted in arch
2012 the disor Committee considered that the a then in its draft stage could promote monolingualism
the larger minorities and eopardise the use of Urainian as the official language and main tool of
communication and that it did not foresee sufficient safeguards for the languages of numericall smaller
minorities such as the araim and rimcha hose languages are indeed threatened. ost interlocutors of
the disor Committee in arch 2014 attested to the asence of an special measures to protect and
promote the languages of numericall smaller minorities in particular those ithout a instate. Ecept for the
Russian ungarian and Romanian minorities representaties of most other minorit groups descried the
la as a political instrument to appease and manage the claims of Russian speaers ithout giing Russian
official language status rather than an effort to address the needs and epectations of all including
numericall smaller minorities.
16. n addition the disor Committee considered in its third Opinion that the anguage a could further
polarise societ around the issue of language and that much more comprehensie consultations ith
representaties of all minorities should hae een conducted prior to its adoption. his assessment remains
een more alid no in particular gien the er strong demands epressed representaties of the
Russian minorit. he disor Committee considers it ital that the authorities do not adopt an hast
amendments to language legislation at a moment hen the are liel to hae destailising effects. he
should instead ensure that comprehensie consultations gie effectie opportunities to minorit
representaties to participate in the drafting process. hile representaties of the Romanian and ungarian
minorities are reportedl inoled as eperts in the current oring group tased to reie the language
legislation Russian minorit representaties consider that the are not adeuatel represented in the oring
25
group. he disor Committee considers the genuine representation of the important concerns of different
minorities including the numericall smaller ones in the oring group as a precondition for an credile
discussion of future language legislation.
17. he disor Committee refers to its assessment of the education situation in its third Opinion as no
changes in the numer of or practices in minorit language schools hae een reported. eaching in the
official language remains insufficient in a numer of minorit language schools. he incentie to learn
Urainian has reportedl further diminished as a result of the current language legislation particularl in
regions here minorit languages hae een recognised as regional languages. oreoer representaties of
the Romanian minorit continue to e concerned aout the limited aailailit of suital trained teachers ho
are ale to teach in Romanian hich raises roader concerns aout access to ualit education for this
communit.
18. he disor Committee elcomes the commitment epressed the inistr of Education to reassure
minorit communities that their minorit language education ill continue to e aailale. t also elcomes
assurances that despite the current austerit and the limited udget no cuts ill e made in the printing and
distriution of tetoos in minorit languages including for the Crimean atar and Urainian language
schools located in Crimea.
1. he participation of persons elonging to national minorities in pulic as ell as in socioeconomic life of
Uraine as considered insufficient the disor Committee in 2012 and remains so. n the current
contet particular efforts must e made to ensure that minorit representaties are informed of ongoing
deelopments including in the legislatie and constitutional field and are gien effectie means to participate.
he collapse of the Part of Regions has further diminished opportunities for persons elonging to the
Russian minorit to e effectiel represented in political decisionmaing particularl in the East. Urgent
efforts must e made to create alternatie channels of participation for the Russian minorit to aoid further
isolation and radicalisation. t is of regret to the disor Committee in this respect that representaties of the
Russian minorit in hari declined the seeral initations for a meeting. Confidenceuilding measures are
immediatel needed to ease tensions and promote an enironment in hich minorit protection legislation and
frameors can e negotiated ith effectie participation of minorit representaties. Efforts of some political
figures including the Prime inister to address the population in the Russian language and to reconfirm
Uraines commitments toards its minorit populations are elcome first steps in this regard.
20. he disor Committee osered no immediate threat to the enoment of minorit rights in the current
situation in mainland Uraine. t epresses urgent concerns hoeer for the safet and access to rights of
minorit populations in Crimea in particular the Crimean atars numericall smaller minorities as ell as
persons elonging to the Urainian communit ho are in a minorit situation in Crimea. here is an urgent
need for an international presence to monitor the eoling situation on the ground in Crimea including as
regards ongoing institutional arrangements led the local authorities hich hae a direct impact on the
enoment of rights of persons elonging to national minorities. n addition it is ital that an a on Occupied
erritories that is discussed in the erhona Rada in i full taes the concerns of Crimean residents into
account and does not penalise those ho are forced to cooperate ith the authorities in effectie control.
21. ith the present language legislation remaining in force there is no immediate necessit to adopt
amendments. oreoer doing so could create considerale further tension in the current contet. he
disor Committee urges the authorities to refrain from moing too hastil in this field and to engage in a
comprehensie and effectie consultation process ith representaties of all minorities efore taing an
further steps. n addition an reie of the language legislation should e undertaen ithin a roader and
longterm engagement concerning the reie and implementation of minorit rights related policies. Such
engagement should also dra upon the epertise aailale in the Council of Europe and the OSCE igh
Commissioner on National inorities. he disor Committee loos forard to continuing its constructie co
operation ith the OSCE as ell as the United Nations structures on the ground in Uraine for this purpose.
22. Despite the support for and trust in the authorities epressed most minorit representaties there is an
urgent need for the central and regional authorities to engage in more direct and structured dialogue and
confidenceuilding measures ith minorit populations throughout Uraine. Functioning channels must e
26
estalished ithout dela to ensure that all minorit populations in Uraine are dul informed of and can
effectiel participate in the ongoing reform processes concerning important legislatie frameors directl
affecting their concerns.
23. t is further crucial that targeted measures are taen to promote responsile ournalism curtail the
propagation of preudice and stereotpes ased on ethnic and linguistic identit and limit the negatie effects
of some media reporting on interethnic relations in Uraine.
27
Annex 821
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recent Developments in Ukraine: Threats to
the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, Resolution 1988 (2014) (9 April 2014)
Final ersion
Parliamentar sseml
1. he Parliamentar sseml deepl regrets the dramatic eents in i aidan from 18 to 20
Feruar 2014 that led to the death of oer 100 protesters and 17 police officers. t considers that the
unprecedented escalation of iolence as regrettal largel the result of the increasingl hardhanded
approach of the authorities including the socalled antiterrorist action to rea up the Euromaidan protests
force contrar to all adice gien national and international interlocutors including the sseml in its
Resolution 174 2014 on the functioning of democratic institutions in Uraine.
2. he sseml strongl condemns the use of snipers and lie ammunition against protesters the
Urainian authorities at that time. Such actions are unacceptale. ll fatalities and all human rights auses
that occurred in relation to the Euromaidan protests need to e full inestigated and the perpetrators
including those in the line of command rought to ustice. here can e no impunit for human rights auses
irrespectie of ho committed them. t the same time it is important that these inestigations are impartial
and free from political motiation or an desire for retriution. he should tae place transparentl and in full
accordance ith the reuirements of rticle 6 of the European Conention on uman Rights ES No. 5. he
adisor committee proposed the Council of Europe could pla an important role in helping the authorities
to ensure that these conditions are met.
3. he erhona Rada plaed an important and constructie role in resoling the crisis hen ith unit
and consensus it managed the change of poer and implementation of the main proisions of the 21
Feruar 2014 agreement in line ith the oerall tenets of the agreement and ith due consideration for
constitutional principles. he sseml therefore full recognises the legitimac of the ne authorities in i
and the legalit of their decisions. t regrets attempts to uestion the legitimac of the ne authorities hich
can onl sere to destailise the countr.
4. he sseml considers that the ne political enironment folloing the eents on aidan eteen 18
and 21 Feruar and the resulting change of poer has opened a indo of opportunit for Uraines
democratic deelopment. t is no important to use this indo of opportunit to estalish a genuinel
democratic and inclusie sstem of goernance that ill guarantee and strengthen the unit of the countr. n
order to full restore the rule of la the sseml calls for the immediate disarmament of all illegall armed
persons and groups in Uraine and for continuous action the authorities to protect Urainian citiens
against the endemic corruption in the hole countr.
5. he sseml taes note of the 2004 constitutional amendments that hae een reenacted the
erhona Rada ith a constitutional maorit. he sseml recalls and reiterates its concerns ith regard to
these constitutional amendments as epressed in arious sseml resolutions adopted hen these
amendments ere first in force. Further constitutional reform is therefore urgentl necessar. he sseml
urges the erhona Rada to use its uniue unit at this moment to adopt ithout further dela the
constitutional amendments necessar to estalish a etter alance of poer eteen the president and the
1. on pril 2014 15th Sitting see Doc. 13482 report of the Committee on the onouring of
Oligations and Commitments emer States of the Council of Europe onitoring Committee corapporteurs:
s ailis Reps and s arietta de Pouraiundin. on pril 2014 15th Sitting.
http://assembly.coe.int
F 67075 Strasourg Cede assemlcoe.int el: 33 3 88 41 2000 Fa: 33 3 88 41 2733
legislature and to ring the constitution full into line ith Council of Europe standards and principles. n that
respect the sseml elcomes the clearl epressed commitment of all political forces in Uraine to adopt
such constitutional amendments in first reading efore the net presidential election taes place and in final
reading hen the net session of the erhona Rada egins in Septemer 2014. n ie of the short period
of time aailale the sseml calls upon the erhona Rada to mae full use of the alread eisting
opinions of the European Commission for Democrac through a enice Commission on preious drafts
and concepts for constitutional reform in Uraine.
6. here can e no uestion aout the legitimac of the erhona Rada hich as elected in 2012 in
elections that ere osered the sseml. t the same time the sseml recognises that as
a result of the recent political deelopments including the disarra of the Part of Regions seeral groups of
people in Uraine fear that the are not or not ell represented in the erhona Rada and therefore at the
leel of central goernment. n order to ensure the fullest possile representatieness of the erhona Rada
hich ill enefit the unit and stailit of the countr preterm parliamentar elections should e organised
as soon as is technicall and politicall feasile.
7. he net parliamentar elections should e conducted on the asis of a ne unified election code and a
regional proportional election sstem as repeatedl recommended the sseml and the enice
Commission. n order to aoid an unnecessar delas in the adoption of such an election code the
sseml recommends that the erhona Rada deelop a unified election code ased on the draft that as
prepared the liuchos oring group in hich all political forces participated and hich enefited from
the epertise of the enice Commission.
8. hile constitutional reform and the adoption of a ne unified election code should e the immediate
priorit for the Urainian authorities farreaching udicial reform and the decentralisation of goernment
including the strengthening of local and regional authorities should also e urgentl considered and
implemented.
. Regrettal recent eents hae increased the eastest diide in the countr and led to unease
among the population of oth parts of the countr. n the ie of the sseml the diide is mostl of political
origin despite the clear historical and cultural differences eteen the east and the est of Uraine. he
sseml recommends therefore that the authorities deelop a comprehensie and inclusie strateg to
strengthen local and regional authorities and to decentralise goernment. Such a decentralisation strateg
should e ased on the principles of a strong unitar State ith an effectie sstem of central goernance ith
delegated responsiilities and poers to the local and regional communities. he sseml strongl oects to
an notion of a federalisation of Uraine and an outside pressures to pursue federalisation in future as this
ould sustantiall eaen the unit and stailit of the countr.
10. he lac of independence of the udiciar and the structural deficiencies in the udicial sstem hae
een longstanding concerns of the sseml. Farreaching udicial reforms should no e promptl
implemented. he sseml reiterates its recommendations made in preious resolutions hich remain alid.
t stresses that constitutional amendments are necessar to estalish a udicial sstem that is full in line ith
European standards.
11. he sseml taes note of the conclusions the disor Committee of the Frameor Conention
for the Protection of National inorities that isited Uraine from 21 to 26 arch 2014. t elcomes the fact
that there is no immediate threat to the enoment of minorit rights in the current situation in Uraine. t the
same time it calls on the authorities to e proactie in adopting all possile measures that could strengthen
the unit of the countr and to refrain from an discourse or actions that are diisie and that could undermine
or e instrumental in undermining the national unit of the countr. n this contet the sseml regrets
the decision the erhona Rada to cancel the a on the Principles of State anguage Polic een if this
decision has neer een enacted or implemented.
12. he sseml epresses its concern aout the increasing numer of credile reports of iolations of the
human rights of the ethnic Urainian and Crimean atar minorities in Crimea including dening access to
their homes folloing its anneation Russia. t calls upon the Russian authorities to ensure that these
iolations are immediatel halted and all perpetrators prosecuted. he report of the disor Committee of the
Frameor Conention for the Protection of National inorities folloing its isit to Uraine from 21 to 26
arch 2014 points out that people elonging to the Crimean atar minorit are eposed to particular riss in
Crimea. here is a groing fear and uncertaint among Crimean atars ho hae suffered from deportations
in the past. he concerns regarding their safet and access to rights including the enoment of cultural
2
language education and propert rights hae to e dul addressed. n addition international human rights
monitors from the Organiation for Securit and Cooperation in Europe OSCE should e gien full access
to the region.
13. he freuent and unsustantiated reports of minorit rights iolations in Uraine as ell as the negatie
portraal of the ne goernment in i certain national and international media hae had a negatie
impact on interethnic relations in Uraine and ultimatel on the unit and stailit of the countr. he
sseml calls on all media to refrain from such unsustantiated reports and to coer the deelopments in the
countr and its regions impartiall and factuall. t also calls upon the authorities in Uraine to reconsider the
decision to stop the roadcasting of some teleision channels in the countr and to refrain from an
censorship of the media.
14. he sseml regrets that the democratic changes and political deelopments in Uraine hae een
oershadoed the deelopments in Crimea. he sseml strongl condemns the authorisation of the
Parliament of the Russian Federation to use militar force in Uraine the Russian militar aggression and the
suseuent anneation of Crimea hich is in clear iolation of international la including the Charter of the
United Nations the elsini Final ct of the OSCE and the Statute and asic principles of the Council of
Europe.
15. n the ie of the sseml none of the arguments used the Russian Federation to ustif its actions
hold true to facts and eidence. here as no ultraright ing taeoer of the central goernment in i nor
as there an imminent threat to the rights of the ethnic Russian minorit in the countr including or
especiall in Crimea. ien that neither secessionism nor integration ith the Russian Federation as
prealent on the political agenda of the Crimean population or idel supported prior to Russian militar
interention the sseml considers that the drie for secession and integration into the Russian Federation
as instigated and incited the Russian authorities under the coer of a militar interention.
16. he socalled referendum that as organised in Crimea on 16 arch 2014 as unconstitutional under
oth the Crimean and Urainian Constitutions. n addition its reported turnout and results are implausile. he
outcome of this referendum and the illegal anneation of Crimea the Russian Federation therefore hae no
legal effect and are not recognised the Council of Europe. he sseml reaffirms its strong support for the
independence soereignt and territorial integrit of Uraine. n connection ith the denunciation the
Russian Federation of the agreements concluded ith Uraine in 17 on the lac Sea Fleet deploment in
Crimea the sseml calls on Russia to ithdra its troops from Crimea immediatel.
17. he sseml epresses its great concern aout the uildup of large numers of Russian militar
troops along the order ith Uraine hich could e an indication that the Russian Federation is considering
further unprooed militar aggression against Uraine hich is unacceptale.
18. ien the ris of destailisation and the deterioration of the securit regime of the hole region
further Russian militar aggression against Uraine the sseml recommends that the signatories of the
udapest greement as ell as other releant European States eplore the possiilit for tangile securit
agreements to ensure Uraines independence soereignt and territorial integrit.
3
Annex 822
Council of Europe, Report by Nils Muinieks Following His Mission in Kyiv, Moscow, and
Crimea from 7 to 12 September 2014 (27 October 2014)
Strasbourg, 27 October 2014 CommDH(2014)19
English only
REPORT
BY NILS MUIŽNIEKS
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
FOLLOWING HIS MISSION IN KYIV, MOSCOW
AND CRIMEA
FROM 7 TO 12 SEPTEMBER 2014
CommDH(2014)19
2
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 3
1 Kyiv (7-8 September 2014) ....................................................................................................................... 3
2 Moscow (9 September 2014) ................................................................................................................... 4
3 Crimea (10-11 September 2014) ............................................................................................................... 4
3.1 Human rights situation in Crimea .............................................................................................................5
3.1.1 Accountability for serious human rights violations ............................................................................5
3.2 Situation of minorities ..............................................................................................................................7
3.3 Media situation.........................................................................................................................................9
3.4 Status of “Self-defence” forces (Samooborona) .....................................................................................10
3.5 Situation of human rights defenders and human rights structures .......................................................12
3.6 Citizenship-related issues .......................................................................................................................13
3.7 Other issues ............................................................................................................................................15
3.8 Access of international humanitarian and human rights organisations .................................................15
CommDH(2014)19
3
INTRODUCTION
1. Commissioner Nils Muižnieks and his delegation carried out a mission to Kyiv, Moscow and
Crimea1 from 7 to 12 September 2014.2 The present report represents an overview of the
issues which have been discussed during his mission.
2. The Commissioner would like to thank the authorities of Ukraine and the Russian Federation
for their co-operation and efforts to ensure that his mission was carried out in full compliance
with his mandate. In particular, he would like to express his gratitude to the Permanent
Representations of both countries to the Council ofEurope, as well as the respective Ministries
of Foreign Affairs for facilitating this mission. The Commissioner would also like to thank the
Council of Europe Offices in Kyiv and Moscow for their valuable help and assistance provided in
the course of this mission. More generally, the Commissioner would like to thank all of his
interlocutors for their valuable contributions and willingness to share their views on human
rights issues.
1 KYIV (7-8 SEPTEMBER 2014)
3. In Kyiv, the Commissioner had meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pavlo Klimkin;
the Deputy Minister of Justice, Ms Inna Yemelianova;3 the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Human Rights (Ombudsperson), Ms Valeria Lutkovska, as well as representatives of civil society
organisations, including those representing the interests of persons displaced from Crimea.
4. Issues discussed included the situation of displaced persons in Ukraine;4 judicial and police
reforms; the need to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations, in particular
those which have occurred since December 2013, as well as the importance of combating
impunity as part of the reconciliation process.
5. The Commissioner welcomed the ceasefire agreement signed in Minsk on 5 September 2014
as an important step towards improving the humanitarian situation in the east of Ukraine.
However, he expressed concern to his official interlocutors about the provision related to the
adoption of an amnesty law. He received assurances that the relevant legislation will be
compliant with international human rights standards, which require that those responsible for
serious human rights violations be brought to justice.
6. The Commissioner also had an in-depth discussion with various interlocutors as to the best
ways of ensuring a more systematic approach towards working on human rights issues in
1 The mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights was aimed at fostering the effective enjoyment of human
rights. It cannot be interpreted as recognising either the authorities that exercise de facto jurisdiction or any
altered status of the territory in question.
2 The Commissioner was accompanied by Ms Isil Gachet, Director of his Office, Ms Bojana Urumova, Deputy to
the Director, and two Advisers, Ms Olena Petsun (Kyiv and Moscow only) and Mr Vahagn Muradyan.
3 Ms Yemelianova has since resigned from the function of Deputy Minister of Justice.
4 According to figures provided by UNHCR, the number of displaced persons in Ukraine as of 16 October 2014
was 417 246, including 398 467 from the east and 18 779 from Crimea. See also in this regard the letter the
Commissioner sent to the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Mr Arseniy Yatsenyuk, on 27 June 2014 (published 17 July
2014), in which the Commissioner outlined his main concerns regarding displaced persons in the country and
made recommendations aimed at improving their situation.
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Ukraine. To this end, he encouraged his interlocutors to consider the development of a
national human rights action plan in order to better address the most pertinent issues.
2 MOSCOW (9 SEPTEMBER 2014)
7. In Moscow, the Commissioner had meetings with Mr Alexander Konovalov, Minister of Justice;
Mr Aleksey Meshkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ms Ella Pamfilova, Commissioner for
Human Rights of the Russian Federation (Ombudsperson); Mr Leonid Slutsky, member of the
State Duma and Vice-Chairperson of the delegation of the Russian Federation to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; and various civil society organisations. The
Commissioner also met a delegation of Amnesty International, headed by its Secretary
General, Mr Salil Shetty.
8. The issues the Commissioner discussed in Moscow included the situation of human rights
defenders in the light of the implementation of the legislation on non-commercial
organisations (“Law on foreign agents”); on-going reforms in the penitentiary and judicial
systems; as well as certain aspects of the implementation of the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights. With the Commissioner for Human Rights, the discussion was focused
on possible ways and potential areas for co-operation in the future.
9. The Commissioner noted with concern the increasingly challenging environment in which
human rights defenders carry out their work in the Russian Federation. The recently-adopted
amendments introducing changes to the legislation on non-commercial organisations
pertaining to registration as a “foreign agent”5 did not address the main concerns of the
Commissioner, as expressed in his Opinion on the legislation of the Russian Federation on noncommercial
organisations in light of Council of Europe standards. The Commissioner expressed
his readiness to continue discussions with the authorities on this and other relevant issues.
3 CRIMEA (10-11 SEPTEMBER 2014)
10. In Simferopol, the Commissioner had a joint meeting with Mr Oleg Belaventsev, representative
of the President of the Russian Federation in the region, Mr Sergei Aksionov, the current leader
of the region, Mr Vladimir Konstantinov, speaker of the local legislative body, Ms Natalya
Poklonskaya, in charge of the prosecutorial authorities, as well as Mr Iskander Bilialov and Mr
Remzi Ilyasov, members of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars. He also had an exchange of views with
the local Ombudsperson, Ms Lyudmila Lubina. Furthermore, he held discussions in Simferopol
and Bakhchisaray with representatives of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars, including Mr Akhtem
Chiygoz, Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, and met several representatives of civil society,
lawyers, journalists, and religious leaders.
11. Issues raised by the Commissioner in his discussions in Simferopol and Bakhchisaray covered
the following: accountability for serious human rights violations, including efforts to combat
5 On 23 May 2014, the State Duma adopted new amendments to the legislation in question allowing the
Ministry of Justice to register non-commercial organisations in the Registry of the non-commercial
organisations performing functions of a foreign agent without their consent (previous legislation provided that
the organisations concerned should themselves apply to be registered if they correspond to the criteria
specified in the law). On 28 May 2014 the Council of Federation endorsed those amendments, and on 4 June
2014 they were signed into law by the President of the Russian Federation. As of 17 October 2014, 15
organisations were listed in the above-mentioned Registry (http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx).
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impunity; status of “self-defence” forces; conditions of detention and the possible transfer for
humanitarian reasons of persons who are currently imprisoned in the region (both sentenced
and remand); national and other minorities; nationality-related issues; and the situation of
human rights defenders. Issues relating to Crimea were also addressed during the
Commissioner’s meetings with the Ombudspersons and civil society representatives in Kyiv
and Moscow.
3.1HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CRIMEA
3.1.1ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
12. The Commissioner for Human Rights received reports from international organisations and
human rights groups about cases of deaths and disappearances under suspicious
circumstances which occurred after February 2014 in Crimea.6 During his stay in Simferopol,
the Commissioner had an opportunity to discuss those matters with lawyers and civil society
representatives and subsequently raised five specific cases (two deaths and three cases of
missing persons) at his meeting with the local leadership.7
13. One of the above-mentioned cases involves Reshat Ametov, who was reportedly last seen at a
protest on the main square in Simferopol on 3 March 2014. He was allegedly then led away by
three men in military-style jackets, and footage of the incident was shown on the Crimean
Tatar television channel ATR. His body - reportedly bearing signs of ill-treatment - was found
on 16 March 2014 at a locality 67 km east of Simferopol, in the village of Zemlyanichne
(Bilohirsk district).8 The circumstances of Mr Ametov’s disappearance and death have not been
clarified to date. The local prosecutorial authorities informed the Commissioner that the
investigation was still ongoing and that 300 expert examinations had been carried out. The
Commissioner considers that all relevant video recordings purportedly showing Mr Ametov
being taken from the site of the 3 March protest should be subject to an expert analysis.
Further, steps should be taken to identify the three men shown in those videos, and to
question them.
14. Another case concerned a 16-year old student, Mark Ivanyuk, who died under unclear
circumstances on the highway Chernomorskoe-Olenevka on 21 April 2014. While the
leadership in the region released information that the death was due to a hit-and-run car
6 OSCE/HCNM and OSCE/ODIHR, Ukraine, Human Rights Assessment Mission: Report on the Human Rights and
Minority Rights Situation, March-April 2014, http://www.osce.org/odihr/118476?download=true,UN OHCHR
Reports on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/ENACARegion/Pages/UAIndex.aspx, Reports by the Crimean Field Mission
on Human Rights, http://crimeahr.org/ru/standpoint. The Crimean Human Rights Field Mission is a joint
initiative of several human rights organisations from Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
7 A case not raised by the Commissioner during his stay in Simferopol, but which has been referenced in reports
by OHCHR and the Crimean Field Mission, is that of Vasyl Chernysh, a resident of Sevastopol and Avtomaidan
activist who went missing on 15 March 2014. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 September 2014, §178,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHR_sixth_report_on_Ukraine.pdf, as well as Krymskaya
polevaya missia po pravam cheloveka, Kratky obzor situatsii po Krymu, June 2014, page 5, and July-August
2014, page 6 (http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/crimea_field_mission_report_june_2014.pdf and
http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_iyul-avgust_2014.pdf).
8 Cf. in this regard Human Rights Watch (18 March 2014) Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed,
www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed.
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accident,9 certain media reported that the person’s mother had alleged police involvement in
his death.10 When the Commissioner raised the case, Ms Poklonskaya indicated that the local
prosecutorial authorities were not aware of it.
15. The Commissioner also enquired about the cases of three local civil society activists, Leonid
Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov, and Seiran Zinedinov, who went missing at the end of May 2014
(respectively, since 22, 26, and 30 May). Mr Shaimardanov and Mr Zinedinov are included in
the publicised list of missing persons.11 According to information provided by the prosecutorial
authorities in a letter dated 31 July 2014 addressed to the Crimean Human Rights Field
Mission, criminal proceedings have been opened in connection with the disappearances of Mr
Shaimardanov and Mr Zinedinov, while the disappearance of Mr Korzh has not been confirmed
and additional verifications in this regard have been ordered.12 After the mission, the
Commissioner became aware of reports about the abduction by uniformed men of Islyam
Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov on 27 September 2014 near the Simferopol – Feodosia
highway.13 The men were placed in a minibus and taken in an unknown direction, and criminal
proceedings have been opened in relation to their abduction.14
16. A contact group on missing persons had its first meeting on 14 October 2014 with the leader of
the region, Mr Aksionov, and investigative authorities. The contact group includes victim
representatives and its coordinator, Mr Mammet Mambetov, is a Crimean activist. According
to a press release issued by the contact group following the aforementioned meeting, the
representative of the investigating authorities, Mr Bogdan Frantsishko, had indicated that
criminal proceedings into the premeditated murders of Mr Shaimardanov and M Zinedinov had
been initiated. Further, criminal proceedings had been initiated into the abduction of Mr
Dzhepparov and Mr Islyamov.15
17. During his meeting with the regional decision-makers, the Commissioner highlighted the need
to ensure prompt, effective and adequate investigations into all cases of serious human rights
violations, while emphasising that those cases which fall under Articles 2 and 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights should be treated as a priority. All investigations
should be conducted in compliance with the principles established in the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights. One of the most important of these elements is
independence: it is a very basic principle that those involved in the operational conduct of an
investigation should be independent from those who may be implicated. Furthermore,
investigations must be thorough and all reasonable steps must be taken to secure evidence
concerning the incidents in question, including identifying and interviewing the alleged
suspects and eyewitnesses, and victims (in cases of possible Article 3 violations), seizing
9 Cf. in this regard http://82.mvd.ru/news/item/2167514/.
10 http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/society/mat-pogibshego-v-krymu-16-letnego-parnya-moego-syna-ubili-izza-
ukrainskogo-yazyka-516091.html
11 See http://82.mvd.ru/citizens/Rozisk/rubric/1/?page=1, last accessed 9 October 2014.
12 See http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_iyul-avgust_2014.pdf
(Appendix I).
13 Human Rights Watch, (7 October 2014) Crimea: Enforced Disappearances, Crimean Tatars, Other Pro-Ukraine
Figures Among the Missing, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/07/crimea-enforced-disappearances
14 “Po faktu propazhi dvukh chelovek v Belogorske organizovano ugolovnoe rassledovanie”, 29 September 2014,
http://rkproc.ru/news/po-faktu-propazhi-dvuh-chelovek-v-belogorske-organizovano-ugolovnoe-rassledovanie.
See also “V Krimy vozbuzhdeno ugolovnoe delo po faktu pokhishchenia dvukh zhitelei goroda Belogorska”, 30
September 2014, http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/detail.php?news=10544.
15 Press reliz Kontaktnoy gruppy po poisku pokhishchennykh lyudey v Respublike Krym, 14 October 2014.
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instruments or weapons which may have been used in perpetrating the violation, and
gathering forensic evidence, including through medical expertise and autopsy where
applicable. The investigation must be comprehensive and seek to shed light on all significant
events and circumstances related to the case. The investigation must also be conducted in a
prompt and reasonably expeditious manner, without unjustifiable delays. In addition, there
should be sufficient public scrutiny of the investigation, and in all cases, the victim or the
victim’s survivor(s) must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard
their interest.
18. A person’s disappearance is a grave violation of human rights. The deleterious effects of such a
tragedy are far-reaching. Disappearances have a profound effect on the whole of society,
starting with the individual’s close family and friends, all of whom suffer from not knowing and
from a sense that their plight is being ignored. This lack of knowledge can cast those concerned
in a state of perpetual distress, depriving them of the possibility to lead a normal life.16
Therefore, the truth should be established and the relatives of the victims must receive a
satisfactory and convincing explanation about the fate of their loved ones.
19. The Commissioner noted with concern that at least some of the above-mentioned cases
involved activists who – according to various reports – have openly expressed critical views of
the events unfolding in the region after February 2014.17 It is also worrisome that there have
been allegations of implication of members of the “self-defence” forces in these violations (cf.
the section on “Self-Defence forces”). There is an urgent need to carry out effective
investigation into all allegations about abuses by the police and other auxiliary forces that have
been operating in the region since February 2014.
3.2SITUATION OF MINORITIES
20. The situation of ethnic minorities was the main topic of the previous Commissioner’s visit to
the region which took place in November 2011, and a follow-up letter to the Prime Minister of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Mr Anatolii Mohyliov.18 Within the framework of the
current mission the Commissioner paid particular attention to the situation of the Crimean
Tatar community and ethnic Ukrainians residing on the peninsula.
21. The Commissioner received reports about a number of searches - carried out by armed and
masked members of the security forces - in Muslim religious institutions, as well as businesses
and private homes belonging to members of the Crimean Tatar community. The purpose of
those actions was to search for prohibited items, including weapons and “extremist literature”.
By the time of the Commissioner’s visit, such searches had been carried out in 8 out of 10
16The European Court of Human Rights has frequently found violations of Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights in respect of families of disappeared persons, due to the emotional distress and suffering they
experience as a result of their relative’s disappearance.
17 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights , Report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine, 15 June 2014, §288,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15June2014.pdf, Krymskaya polevaya missia
po pravam cheloveka, Kratky obzor situatsii po Krymu (June 2014), p.5
http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/crimea_field_mission_report_june_2014.pdf.
18 Letter from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights to Mr Anatolii Mohyliov, Prime Minister of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CommDH(2012)11&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackC
olorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864
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religious schools (madrasas) belonging to the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Crimea
(Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musulman Kryma). There were also reports that “informative talks”
had been carried out with scores of persons in order to check whether they adhered to
“undesirable” or “non-traditional” forms of Islam. The perception among various
representatives of the Crimean Tatar community was that the above-mentioned actions were
intrusive and performed with an intent to intimidate them. Moreover, Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev,
one of the key leaders of the Crimean Tatar community and former Chairman of the Mejlis,19
and Refat Chubarov, the current Chairman of the Mejlis have respectively been barred since 22
April and 5 July 2014 from entering the territory of Crimea.
22. During his meeting with the regional leadership on 11 September 2014, the Commissioner
expressed the opinion that the above-mentioned searches and checks were disproportionate
and excessive, and that care should be taken to avoid any further actions which selectively
target members of the Crimean Tatar community in the name of fighting extremism. In
response, the authorities indicated that they would engage with representatives of the
Crimean Tatar community with a view to resolving the problem. However, on 18 September
2014, after the Commissioner’s return from the mission, he was informed that the building of
the Crimean Tatar Mejlis in Simferopol - which he had visited - was seized by security forces
and that the employees of the organisations located in the building were evicted, reportedly
on the basis of a court order.
23. The local leaders also informed the Commissioner about certain steps they have been taking
with regard to promoting the economic and social rights of the Crimean Tatar community,
aimed at resolving some of their long-standing issues of concern. They specifically referred to
initiatives such as a “land amnesty” and efforts to address housing problems. In addition, they
maintained that the status of the Crimean Tatar language and the possibility to observe
religious holidays were better protected.
24. The Commissioner also looked into the situation of ethnic Ukrainians residing on the peninsula.
In the wake of the events of February-March this year, some of them decided to leave the
region because they no longer felt secure, while others preferred to refrain from openly stating
and/or manifesting their views.
25. The Commissioner took note of the allegations about attempts to gain control over churches
owned by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and apply pressure upon
priests serving in the Crimean diocese. One such incident was reported on 1 June 2014 when
uniformed men, said to be Cossacks and members of the “self-defence” forces, entered a local
church in the village of Perevalne proclaiming that they were seizing it with the intention of
transferring it to the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate.20 According to the local head of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, archbishop Kliment, six out of fifteen
churches belonging to that religious denomination were no longer under the control of the
Kyiv Patriarchate. The Commissioner raised the matter with the local leaders and urged them
to enter into a dialogue with the representative of that church with a view to resolving the
foregoing issues. The Commissioner’s interlocutors promised to organise such a meeting.
19 On 20 August 2014, the President of Ukraine, Mr Petro Poroshenko, signed a decree whereby Mr Dzhemilev
was appointed as Commissioner of the President on the Affairs of Crimean Tatars.
20 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights , Report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine, 15 June 2014, §315,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15June2014.pdf
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26. The Commissioner is of the opinion that multiculturalism is a unique feature and asset of this
territory and should be nurtured and preserved, including through the media, as well as in
schools and public institutions.21 Despite the changing legal framework, the three languages -
Russian, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian – continue to be used as languages of communication.
However, the Commissioner received reports that the use of Ukrainian language in the schools
has been diminishing. Apparently, the only Ukrainian-language gymnasium in Simferopol has
been transformed into a school where in some classes education will continue to be provided
in Ukrainian, while in other classes Russian will become the language of instruction. Whether
this was done on the basis of the requests received from the parents of the schoolchildren has
been a matter of some dispute. Moreover, whether parents can make language choices free of
pressure has also been questioned.22
27. The Commissioner encouraged his interlocutors to do their utmost to nurture the linguistic
diversity of this region and to provide the necessary means for all young persons to have
access to quality education in different languages. The use of the bilingual and multilingual
methodologies in the educational processes should be encouraged.
28. It is essential to create a sense of security for the Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians and
everyone else who has been rendered more vulnerable by the changed circumstances in the
region. It is important to continuously and consistently send an unambiguous message of “zero
tolerance” of violence and any kind of discriminatory practices, as well as to pay special
attention to the need to protect human rights and uphold the rule of law in any circumstances.
Minorities should enjoy secure conditions enabling them to practice their religion in public or
private, receive education in their languages and openly manifest their views without fear and
intimidation. It is of paramount importance to refrain from any further measures which may
worsen their situation. Failure to do so may lead to new cases of displacement from the
region.
3.3MEDIA SITUATION
29. The Commissioner has received reports that certain of the Internet media resources and other
media outlets which did not support the turn of events in the region since February have either
relocated or closed down. Some media outlets and journalists have reportedly come under
pressure due to the changing institutional and legal framework which has resulted in the
application of more restrictive rules related to media work.
30. The Commissioner received information about two main “waves” of attacks against journalists:
in March 2014, around the time of the “referendum”,23 and in 15-19 May 2014, around the
commemoration day of the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars (18 May). One case involved a
21Cf. also the letter from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights to Mr Anatolii Mohyliov, Prime
Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Index=no&command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIm
age=2175019&SecMode=1&DocId=1859320&Usage=2
22 Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, July-August 2014, p. 30
http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_iyul-avgust_2014.pdf
23 At their 1196th meeting on 2-3 April 2014, the CoE Committee of Ministers adopted a decision, whereby
“[t]he Deputies […] stressed that the illegal referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014 and the subsequent illegal annexation by the Russian Federation cannot
form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimean and the city of
Sevastopol […]”
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local journalist, Osman Pashaev, who was detained and physically assaulted by members of
“self-defence” forces on 18 May 2014 in Simferopol and subsequently left Crimea.24 The
Commissioner had an opportunity to meet with some of the affected journalists who shared
with him their accounts of being intimidated or assaulted by members of the “self-defence”
forces.
31. In Simferopol, the Commissioner received confirmation of reports that media outlets had
received warnings and/or were undergoing checks with regard to their alleged involvement in
“extremist” activities.25 Those journalists who were covering the march of Crimean Tatars on 3
May 2014 to the Armyansk checkpoint to meet the leader of Crimean Tatar community, Mr
Mustafa Dzhemilev, were notably affected by these measures. Despite such actions, the
Crimean Tatar television channel ATR continued to be broadcast at the time of the
Commissioner’s stay in the region. However, subsequently (24 September 2014), its general
director received a letter from officials charged with combating extremism motivated by the
channel’s change in content. In particular, the letter specified that the channel “persistently
instils the perception about possible repression based on ethnic or religious grounds, fosters
the formation of anti-Russian views, deliberately foments distrust among Crimean Tatars
towards the authorities and their actions, which indirectly carries with it the threat of
extremist activity”.26
32. A few days before the Commissioner’s arrival in Simferopol, the apartment of a popular
blogger, Elizaveta Bohutska, had been searched and she had reportedly been questioned in
connection to the 3 May rally (see previous paragraph) and in relation to her media reports
critical of the policies of the current power-holders in the region.27 Following those incidents,
she decided to relocate from Crimea. The local leadership confirmed they were aware of this
particular case, but had no intention to take any action on the matter.
33. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the press performs a vital
role of “public watchdog” in a democratic society.28 The Court has emphasised that “freedom
of the press and other news media affords the public one of the best means of discovering and
forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders.”29
3.4STATUS OF “SELF-DEFENCE” FORCES (SAMOOBORONA)
34. The legal status and functions of the Crimean “Self-Defence” (Samooborona Kryma) – auxiliary
forces which have been playing a visible role in the events of February-March 2014 and
thereafter - were also among the issues raised by the Commissioner with his interlocutors in
24 “Pamfilova: zaderzhanie zhurnalista v Krimu – narushenie prav cheloveka,”Ria Novosti, 19 May 2014,
http://ria.ru/society/20140519/1008461921.html, see also “Osman Pashaev leaves Crimea”, Kharkiv Human
Rights Protection Group, 20 May 2014, http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1400529448
25 It may also be noted that during the week following the Commissioner’s mission, the OSCE Representative on
Freedom of the Media expressed concern about “a pattern of hostile behavior towards members of the media”
via a press release issued in Vienna on 19 September 2014 and entitled “Pressure on Tatar media in Crimea
must stop”: http://www.osce.org/fom/123790
26 See Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, September 2014,
Appendix 2, http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/obzor_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_sentyabr_2014.pdf
27 See also OSCE Representative condemns continued intimidation of free voices in Crimea, Vienna 9 September
2014, http://www.osce.org/fom/123314
28 See Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 26 November 1991, §59 (b) and Jersild v.
Denmark, judgement of 23 September 1994, §35.
29 Cf. for example Oberschlick v Austria, judgement of 23 May 1991, §58.
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the region. As was mentioned in previous sections, the Commissioner received numerous
reports that those forces have apparently been engaged in performing certain quasi-police
functions and that, on a number of occasions, members of those forces have reportedly been
implicated in cases of serious human rights violations, including abductions, arbitrary
detention, ill-treatment and attacks against journalists. One of the many cases communicated
to the Commissioner involved two activists, Andriy Schekun and Anatoly Kovalsky, who were
detained and allegedly ill-treated by those forces on 9 March 2014. After spending eleven days
detained in an unknown location, they were transferred to the territory under control of the
Ukrainian government.30
35. During his mission, the Commissioner heard several accounts about abuses committed by
members of these units in relation to those expressing critical views about the events
unfolding in the region, including journalists, representatives of ethnic minorities and other
vulnerable groups. He was also informed about their alleged involvement in the seizure and
“nationalisation” of private enterprises. One such case occurred during the Commissioner’s
mission and was effectively acknowledged by the local leadership, who indicated that the
interference was made due to unlawful actions by the company in question.
36. In June this year the local legislative body, in an apparently retroactive manner, endorsed a
proposal to “legalise” those forces through an act31 which provided them with a rather wide
range of functions, but included only a limited number of checks and appropriate safeguards.
Furthermore, the Commissioner was informed that there were two legislative initiatives – one
introduced locally32 and another one pending in the State Duma33 – which provides for
immunity from prosecution for actions committed by members of those forces after February
2014.
37. During his encounter with the local leaders and the ombudsperson, the Commissioner raised a
number of concerns related to the accountability of the above-mentioned forces. In this
context, the Commissioner urged all those responsible to effectively investigate and prosecute
all alleged cases of human rights violations committed by members of “self-defence” forces.
He reiterated his principled position on this issue – as supported by the ECtHR jurisprudence
and other international standards - that amnesties should not be applied for serious human
rights violations (in particular cases covered by Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights). The obligation to protect the right to life and take effective action against
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment must be upheld in all
circumstances.
38. In a recent judgement, the ECtHR noted that there was a growing tendency in international law
“to see amnesties for serious human rights violations as unacceptable because they are
30 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured, (25 March 2014),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ukraine-activists-detained-and-beaten-one-tortured
31 http://www.rada.crimea.ua/textdoc/ru/6/act/22z.pdf
32 http://www.rada.crimea.ua/law-draft-card/4038
33 Lower house of the Federal Assembly (Parliament) of the Russian Federation. See
http://asozd2c.duma.gov.ru/addwork/scans.nsf/ID/16740DBDDF67CCDF43257D650048D45D/$FILE/613379-
6.PDF?OpenElement.
CommDH(2014)19
12
incompatible with the unanimously recognised obligation of States to prosecute and punish
grave breaches of fundamental human rights”.34
39. The concerns of the Commissioner about amnesty for members of “self-defence” forces in
cases of serious violations were shared by the local ombudsperson. The current leader of the
region, Mr Aksionov, stated during the meeting with the Commissioner that any violations - if
they were indeed committed by the members of these forces – would be thoroughly
investigated and those responsible brought to justice.
40. In the Commissioner’s opinion, the above-mentioned auxiliary forces should be disbanded.
Those who have not been implicated in cases of human rights violations may - if they wish so -
be integrated into the local police force after undergoing comprehensive professional training,
including on the European and international standards concerning protection of human rights
by police.
3.5SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS STRUCTURES
41. On 5 March 2014, a group of human rights defenders from Ukraine, the Russian Federation
and Crimea established the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, with a view to ensuring the
continued monitoring of the human rights situation on the ground.35 The mission acts from a
politically neutral position and pays particular attention to interethnic and interreligious
relations, as well as the actions of public authorities and their representatives. Since its
creation, the mission has been issuing reports regularly and has come to represent a key
source of information about human rights developments in Crimea. During his stay in the
region, the Commissioner had an opportunity to meet with several activists working with the
Crimean Human Rights Field Mission and other local civil society organisations who provided
him with their insights into the complex environment in which they have to operate and the
challenges that they encounter. In the course of discussions with various interlocutors
throughout the mission, the Commissioner emphasised the need to promote safe and
favourable conditions for the work of human rights NGOs. An open and meaningful dialogue
between the authorities and civil society would certainly contribute to promoting better
understanding and reconciliation among the different groups of people residing in Crimea.
42. The Commissioner received certain reports about instances of intimidation and harassment
against human rights activists.36 Such episodes - if they are not condemned unequivocally -
may foster negative stereotypes and prejudices towards human rights defenders in general.
They can also lead to concrete difficulties and obstacles for the effective conduct of human
34 See Marguš v. Croatia (Grand Chamber judgement of 27 May 2014). In that case, the Court also noted that
“even if it were to be accepted that amnesties are possible where there are some particular circumstances,
such as a reconciliation process and/or a form of compensation to the victims, the amnesty granted to the
applicant in the instant case would still not be acceptable since there is nothing to indicate that there were any
such circumstances.” In that judgement the Court declared inadmissible the complaint under Article 4 of
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention regarding the applicant’s right not to be tried or punished twice in relation to
crimes committed during the war in Croatia in the 1990s which were amnestied pursuant to a General Amnesty
Law. The applicant, a former commander of the Croatian army, had been convicted of war crimes against
civilians committed in 1991.
35 The Crimean Human Rights Field Mission receives support from the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) as well as from the Centre for Citizens’ Freedoms in Ukraine.
36 As an illustration, two human rights defenders working for the Crimean HR Field Mission (a Ukrainian
national and a Russian national) were taken off the train and questioned by the Russian border officials on 12
September 2014 in Bryansk while they were travelling to Kyiv.
CommDH(2014)19
13
rights work. The Commissioner would like to reiterate the principle that when individuals –
together with others or alone – speak out for human rights or work for them with other
means, they should be free to do so without being subjected to pressure. He would like to pay
tribute to the human rights organisations working in the region for their commitment to
fulfilling their mission, despite the challenges and risks involved.
43. In addition to his discussions with human rights organisations, the Commissioner had a fruitful
exchange of views and an opportunity to share his concerns with the local ombudsperson,37
Ms Lyudmila Lubina. He would like to underline that human rights structures can play a key
role in promoting awareness of European and international human rights standards and norms
and ensuring that people living in the region are able to enjoy them fully in practice. The
effectiveness of such institutions is in many respects linked to the degree of independence
they are able to enjoy and to the attitude of the local authorities to the institution of
ombudsperson as such. The authorities should respect their integrity and independence, thus
enabling them to perform their duties properly and effectively.
3.6CITIZENSHIP-RELATED ISSUES
44. During his mission, some of the Commissioner’s interlocutors drew his attention to various
aspects of the on-going process of issuance of Russian passports (commonly referred to as
“passportisation”) and shared their concerns as to how the choices made by various individuals
may eventually affect their access to and enjoyment of a number of human rights.
45. The Russian Federation stipulated in its legislation38 that all permanent residents on the
territory of Crimea, unless they explicitly refuse Russian citizenship, will become citizens of the
Russian Federation one month after the date on which, according to the Russian Federation,
Crimea was incorporated into its territory. Ukraine does not recognise “forced automatic
admission” into Russian citizenship by Crimean residents and does not consider it a ground for
deprivation of Ukrainian citizenship.39
46. The Commissioner received several reports suggesting that the wish of the person concerned
was not always taken into account throughout the above-mentioned process. It is difficult to
establish at present in how many cases persons have “automatically” become Russian citizens,
i.e. since they did not refuse Russian citizenship within the allocated period of time. In at least
some of these cases there are reasons to believe that the affected persons did not have an
effective possibility to exercise their choices (see below). The Commissioner was also made
aware of some cases of persons who reportedly wished to acquire Russian citizenship but were
not in a position to do so due to certain “eligibility” criteria (lack of proof of permanent
residence has frequently been invoked in such cases).
47. In the Commissioner’s view, people should have a choice in matters relating to their
citizenship. The consent of the person concerned should be the paramount consideration in
37The office of the local ombudsperson was established on 25 June this year. Until April 2014, a representative
office of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights was functioning in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea.
38 Russian Federation Constitutional Law “On admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and
establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities of the Republic of Crimea and the city
of federal level Sevastopol”, dated 21 March 2014, Article 4.
39 Law of Ukraine "On legal guarantees of people's rights and freedoms on the temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine", Article 5.4.
CommDH(2014)19
14
this regard, and this consent should be active and clearly stated. Whereas States have
obligations related to the prevention and reduction of statelessness, such obligations could
hardly be invoked in the cases referred to above since the persons concerned were not
stateless.40
48. Another issue of concern raised by the Commissioner’s interlocutors relates to the effective
possibility to express one’s wishes. The period granted for initiating a procedure to refuse
Russian citizenship was very short (one month, expiring on 18 April 2014). Moreover,
instructions from the relevant migration service as to the exact procedure to follow were only
available as of 1 April 2014. Furthermore, information about the places where the relevant
application should be submitted was only available after 4 April; from 4 to 9 April only two
such places, in Sevastopol and in Simferopol, were functioning; as of 10 April, a total of nine
localities had been made available. Finally, additional requirements were introduced during
the process, such as the necessity to make an application in person, or that both parents were
required for the application of a child.41
49. Certain persons in closed institutions might have experienced difficulties with expressing their
consent. This in particular applies to those imprisoned on remand or serving a sentence,42 as
well as people in other closed institutions (geriatric institutions, hospitals and psychoneurological
clinics, orphanages, etc.) Concerning prisoners, the Commissioner received
information that they had been “consulted” as to their preference, but no details were
provided as to the exact procedure followed.
50. Persons who find themselves in the situation described above should also have all the
necessary information enabling them to make an informed choice. In other words, they should
be fully informed and have a clear understanding of all possible legal consequences attached
to one option or the other.43 While individuals who initiated a procedure for refusing Russian
citizenship were asked to sign a document stating they were fully aware of the legal
consequences of their decision, it would appear that a whole range of important issues related
to their future status has not been clarified to date. First and foremost, questions have been
raised as to whether these individuals will “automatically” acquire permanent resident status
or not, and to what extent this will affect their social and economic rights, access to
employment, and similar issues.
51. For certain groups of individuals – such as civil servants – the decision not to accept Russian
citizenship meant the loss of their current employment. The Commissioner also received
40 Even in cases involving granting of citizenship to a stateless person, such an act cannot be carried out against
the wishes of an adult (the situation of stateless children is treated in a more nuanced way, since the principle
of “the best interests of the child” should also apply). Otherwise this could be qualified as an interference with
the person’s private and family life, since the acquisition of citizenship may also entail certain obligations, such
as military service.
41 Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 15 May 2014, §127.
42 This also applies to the case of the Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov and others who were detained in
connection with the charges invoked against him. While he maintains that he is a citizen of Ukraine, the Russian
authorities consider him as a Russian citizen on the basis of the argument that he did not explicitly refuse
Russian citizenship.
43 The European Court of Human Rights requires that any legal norm should be both accessible and foreseeable
as to its effects.
CommDH(2014)19
15
reports suggesting that public sector employees (e.g. teaching staff in universities and other
educational institutions) were also “advised” to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship.
3.7OTHER ISSUES
52. Several of the Commissioner’s interlocutors in Kyiv, Moscow and Simferopol drew his attention
to the poor conditions of detention in the penitentiary establishments in the region. The local
ombudsperson expressed particular concerns over the lack of food and medical supplies and
overcrowding in places of detention. The observations and recommendations made by the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT)44 following its delegation’s visit, inter alia, to the temporary detention
facilities in Alushta, Simferopol and Yalta and the pre-trial detention establishment (SIZO) in
Simferopol remain relevant in this regard.
3.8ACCESS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ORGANISATIONS
53. There appears to be an issue with regard to free and unhindered access of international
organisations and missions to the region, including those whose mandate is to provide
independent and impartial monitoring of the human rights situation. Some of these obstacles
stem from the relevant legislative framework, others from its practical implementation; still
others arise from what appears to be an arbitrary or selective application of the rules by the
relevant executing bodies. Except for the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,
representatives of other international institutions, including UN OHCHR, have not been able to
secure access of their monitors to the region after March 2014.45
54. On 15 April 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted a law "On legal
guarantees of people's rights and freedoms on the temporarily occupied territories of
Ukraine." While it contains no restrictions on the freedom of movement for Ukrainian citizens
to/from Crimea, the law provides for restrictions on the freedom of movement of foreigners
and stateless persons. According to Article 10.2 of the law, these categories of visitors should
obtain a special permit to enter/leave the territory of the peninsula through specific entry
points (along the boundary line between the Crimean peninsula and Kherson oblast). The
procedure for obtaining special permits is to be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers
(Government of Ukraine). At the same time, Article 5 of the law reiterates the State’s
obligation to undertake all the necessary measures to guarantee rights and freedoms of the
persons residing on the territory of the peninsula. At the time of drafting this report, the
procedure for entry into the region was still under elaboration. In his discussions with the
official interlocutors in Kyiv, the Commissioner emphasised that it was of utmost importance
to ensure that the procedure in question be formulated in a way that would facilitate the work
of humanitarian organisations and international human rights monitors and missions in the
region.
55. During his exchange of views in Moscow with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Commissioner formed the impression that the Russian authorities consider that the access
route via Moscow represents the best option under the current circumstances. Apart from the
requirement to obtain a Russian visa, the Commissioner does not have information suggesting
that the legislation which is effectively (de facto) applied in the region imposes any additional
44 CPT/Inf (2014) 15, report published by CPT following its visit to Ukraine from 9 to 21 October 2013.
45 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does have access to Crimea.
CommDH(2014)19
16
or separate rules or procedures on foreign citizens and/or stateless persons wishing to enter
the region by land from the north.
56. The Commissioner wishes to stress that the question of access to the region should not be
politicised: free and unconditional access of international humanitarian and human rights
organisations to the peninsula (from all directions and at all times) and effective international
monitoring, in particular of minority rights, is of key value in the present situation and will
undoubtedly contribute to strengthening a climate of respect and co-operation between
various ethnic communities and other minority groups residing in the region. This position is
shared by several of the Commissioner’s interlocutors who have noted that the present
mechanisms for the monitoring of the human rights situation on the ground were not
sufficient. International human rights monitors could effectively operate in coordination with
the local human rights defenders and relevant human rights structures and should be
encouraged rather than prevented from exercising their respective mandates in the region.
Annex 823
Council of Europe Media Freedom Alert, Harassment of Journalists Natalya Kokorina and Anna
Andrievska in Crimea, Ukraine by Russian Officials (2 April 2015)
7/1/2016 Media freedom alerts
http://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/all-alerts/-/soj/alert/12102379 1/2
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Harassment of Journalists Natalya
Kokorina and Anna Andrievska in
Crimea, Ukraine by Russian
Ocials
Date of entry : 02 Apr 2015
Country : Ukraine
Category : C. Harassment and intimidation of journalists
Source of threat : State
Submitted by : EFJ/IFJ
Alert level : Level 1
On 6 March 2015, agents from the FSB, the Russian secret services, searched the homes of
parents of journalists Natalya Kokorina and Anna Andrievska in the Crimea peninsula,
according to reports. On the same day, Ms Kokorina was detained and initially refused
access to her lawyer. She was nally freed after six hours of detention for which no reason
was given.
A computer belonging to the father of Anna Andrievska was taken away. Anna, a board
member of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine (IMTUU), has been charged
with anti-state activities. The charges are based on an article published in December 2014,
which authorities claimed “aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation”. If found guilty, she faces up to ve years in prison.
The two journalists worked for the news portal of the Crimean Centre for Investigative
Journalism. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia last year, the center, initially based in
Simferopol, was forced to relocate to Kiev after its sta was subjected to attacks,
harassment and legal restrictions by the authorities. Andrievska moved to Kiev in early May
2014 but her family stayed in Crimea.
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Annex 824
Council of Europe, Thematic Commentary No. 4, The Scope of Application of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (adopted on 27 May 2016)
Thematic commentary No. 4
The scope of application
of the Framework Convention
for the Protection
of National Minorities
The Framework Convention:
a key tool to managing diversity
through minority rights
Adopted on 27 May 2016
Thematic commentary No. 4
The scope of application
of the Framework Convention
for the Protection
of National Minorities
The Framework Convention:
a key tool to managing diversity
through minority rights
Council of Europe
French edition:
Convention-cadre : un outil essentiel pour gérer
la diversité au moyen des droits des minorités
The opinions expressed in this work are the
responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy of the Council of Europe.
All requests concerning the reproduction or
translation of all or part of the document should
be addressed to the Directorate of Communication
(F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex or [email protected]).
All other correspondence concerning this
publication should be addressed to the secretariat
of the Council of Europe Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities
[email protected]
www.coe.int/minorities.
Cover photo: Council of Europe
Cover and layout: Documents and Publications
Production Department (SPDP), Council of Europe
© Council of Europe, September 2016
Printed at the Council of Europe
Ź Page 3
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
PART I – INTRODUCTION 6
PART II – THE RIGHT TO FREE SELF-IDENTIFICATION 8
1. General considerations 8
2. Free self-identification in the context of census and other general data collection processes 9
PART III – APPROACHES TAKEN BY STATES PARTIES TO THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION
OF THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 11
1. Declarations and reservations at the time of ratification 11
2. Criteria applied by states parties 12
PART IV – CONTEXT-SPECIFIC ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE APPROACH DEVELOPED
BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 16
1. Fundamental principles 16
2. Practice 17
PART V – FRAMEWORK CONVENTION RIGHTS APPLYING TO ALL PERSONS 19
1. Protection against discrimination – Article 6 19
2. Education and the media as tools for integration – Articles 6(1) and 12 20
PART VI – MINORITY RIGHTS WITH A BROAD SCOPE OF APPLICATION 22
1. Equality – Article 4 22
2. Culture – Article 5 23
3. Association and religion – Articles 7 and 8 23
4. Media – Article 9 23
5. Language – Articles 10(1), 10(3), 11(1) and 11(2) 24
6. Education – Articles 12(3), 14(1) and 14(3) 24
7. Participation – Article 15 25
PART VII – MINORITY RIGHTS WITH A SPECIFIC SCOPE OF APPLICATION 27
PART VIII – CONCLUSIONS 29
Ź Page 5
Executive summary
Diversity has been an integral part and a major asset of European societies for centuries. It remains an
essential feature of contemporary societies. The purpose of the Commentary is to consolidate the
manner in which the Advisory Committee has interpreted, over the years, the scope of application of
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157), bearing in mind specific
societal, economic and demographic developments.
The Commentary shows that, since 1995, the Framework Convention has been and continues to be a key tool
for states to accommodate increasing pluralism through minority protection in a way that carefully balances
broader societal concerns with individual rights. It supports states parties in managing diversity by creating
appropriate societal conditions that allow for the expression and acknowledgement of difference, for equal
access to rights and resources despite difference and for social interaction and inclusion across difference.
The Framework Convention is based on the principle that the protection of national minorities is essential
to stability, democratic security and peace. Its main purpose is to prevent interethnic tensions and to promote
dialogue in open and inclusive societies. Accordingly, the Commentary underlines that the Framework
Convention addresses society as a whole and not just individuals or specific groups. Rather than asking “who”
should be protected, it asks “what” is required to manage diversity most effectively through the protection
of minority rights. It is for this reason that the Convention does not contain a definition of the term “person
belonging to a national minority”.
The Framework Convention was deliberately conceived as a living instrument. Its interpretation must be
adjusted regularly to ensure that minority rights can be enjoyed effectively in societies that are affected
by constant transformation, including through mobility and migration. The right to free self-identification
is central to minority protection, including multiple and situational affiliations. It must not be disregarded
through imposed categorisation based on predetermined characteristics. Individuals self-identify and form
communities through a variety of evolving shared practices and through the common exercise of rights.
Societal changes also have an impact on identity perceptions of individuals and of communities and thereby
on the applicability of minority rights.
Among the broad range of rights contained in the Framework Convention, some explicitly apply to all individuals
in the territory of the state, while the application of others may be linked to specific conditions. When
examining the implementation of the Framework Convention by states parties, the Advisory Committee has
therefore consistently encouraged the authorities to be inclusive and context specific and to consider, on an
article-by-article basis, which rights should be made available to whom in order to ensure the most effective
implementation of the Framework Convention based on facts rather than status.
The Commentary concludes that access to minority rights can only be ensured in a society where dialogue,
understanding and cultural diversity are viewed as sources of enrichment rather than of division.
Ź Page 6
Part I
Introduction
1. This Commentary is intended to provide guidance to states parties to the Framework Convention, to
persons belonging to national minorities, to international organisations and to civil society and academia
regarding the ongoing debate on the scope of application of the Framework Convention. It is based on a close
comparative and analytical reading of the Opinions adopted by the Advisory Committee throughout four
cycles of monitoring in the states parties since 1998,1 and builds on three previous thematic commentaries
that were adopted by the Advisory Committee: on education in 2006;2 on effective participation in public life
in 2008;3 and on language rights in 2012.4 Valuable input has also been collected from national minority and
civil society representatives,5 academics and other interlocutors, including during broader consultations held
in the final stages of the drafting process.
2. Minority rights are granted at the individual level to each person belonging to a national minority. It is
further specified in Article 3(2) of the Framework Convention that minority rights are “exercised individually
and in community with others”. In fact, a number of rights only make sense if exercised in community with
others, and the enjoyment of some rights presupposes the presence of or even formal association with others.
Minority rights therefore have an individual, a social and a collective dimension. Despite the fact that a
number of international instruments make reference to minority cultures, languages or traditions, and some
common understanding exists as to what the term ‘minority’ entails, there has never been a universally shared
definition.6 In line with this tradition, the Framework Convention does not contain a definition of the term
‘national minority’ or of the phrase ‘person belonging to a national minority’. As a result, the question of who is
to be recognised as a right holder under the Framework Convention has, since its adoption, been the subject
of extended debate at international and national, academic and political levels.
3. It is the goal of the Framework Convention to ensure that the space for diversity and for being “different”
in society is protected and affirmed, thereby promoting the integration and cohesion of societies.7 Broader
questions relating to the integration of societies have therefore always featured in the monitoring work of the
Advisory Committee, sometimes resulting in disapproval by the respective state party.8 Indeed, as a result of
the increased diversity of European societies in recent years, increased attention has been paid by a number
of actors to the imperative of forming inclusive and integrated societies where diversity is respected and
preserved.9 With that in mind and in order to clarify both the personal and substantive reach of its work, the
Advisory Committee considers it appropriate to devote its Fourth Thematic Commentary to the Framework
Convention’s scope of application.
1. The Commentary makes references to first, second, third or fourth cycle, country-specific Opinions where findings of particular
relevance to the scope of application were made. These references are illustrative only.
2. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC) First Commentary on
Education under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ACFC/25DOC(2006)002, 2 March 2006, www.
coe.int/minorities.
3. See ACFC Second Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and
Economic Life and in Public Affairs, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, 27 February 2008, www.coe.int/minorities.
4. See ACFC Third Commentary on the Language Rights of Persons belonging to National Minorities under the Framework Convention,
ACFC/44DOC(2012)001, 24 May 2012, www.coe.int/minorities.
5. The term “minority representative” throughout the text does not contain a legal notion; it refers to advocates or spokespersons
who have come forward to share their views.
6. See travaux préparatoires, various attempts in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and, in particular, the
Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
7. See the Preamble of the Framework Convention: “[…] Considering that the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is
necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment for each society […]”.
8. See, inter alia, First Opinion on Denmark and Government Comments on the First Opinion on Denmark, and First Opinion on
Germany and Government Comments on the First Opinion on Germany.
9. The increased preoccupation with integration-related issues is, for instance, reflected in the work of the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM) (see Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies November 2012) as well as in the fact
that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has included integration policies in the four topics common
to all member states in its fifth round country reports.
Introduction Ź Page 7
4. The adoption of the Framework Convention in 1995, in the aftermath of violent conflicts in Europe, as the
only legally binding international instrument on the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, firmly
anchored the protection of minority rights within the universal set of multilaterally recognised human rights.
Minority rights, according to Article 1 of the Framework Convention, form part of the international human
rights protection system, which is based on the premise that everyone is born free and equal in dignity and
rights.10 The purpose of embracing minority rights as an integral part of human rights was not to challenge
the notion of equality among all individuals, but to advance it further by establishing a set of specific rights
for persons belonging to national minorities to ensure that they are enabled to participate fully and equally
in society while being protected from assimilation. Importantly, persons belonging to national minorities
require guarantees to enable them: (i) to express difference and to have that difference recognised; (ii) to gain
equal access to resources and rights despite difference; and (iii) to engage in social interaction on the basis of
respect and understanding across difference.
5. The superficial conclusion is sometimes made that the application of the Framework Convention, given
the absence of a definition of national minority, is in practice left solely to the discretion of states parties.
This interpretation, however, is incorrect. It runs counter to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda. The purpose of this Commentary is to make it clear that
the absence of a definition in the Framework Convention is indeed not only intentional but also necessary to
ensure that the specific societal, including economic and demographic, circumstances of states parties are
duly taken into account when establishing the applicability of minority rights. The Framework Convention was
deliberately conceived as a living instrument whose interpretation must evolve and be adjusted regularly to
new societal challenges. Multiple identities and increasing mobility, for instance, have become regular features
of European societies. However, such features must not limit access to minority rights. This approach is fully
in line with the principle of dynamic interpretation developed by the European Court of Human Rights with
respect to the European Convention on Human Rights.
6. While the Framework Convention binds states parties from its entry into force within the domestic jurisdiction,
its framework character nevertheless requires additional legal instruments at domestic level to make it
fully operational. In many states, definitions of rights holders have been established in domestic legislation to
give effect to the provisions laid down in the Framework Convention. The Advisory Committee has consistently
acknowledged that states parties have a margin of appreciation in this context, but has also noted that this
margin must be exercised in accordance with the general rules of international law contained in Articles 31 to 33
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular it must be exercised in line with the obligation to
interpret a treaty in good faith and in the light of its object and purpose. In the case of the Framework Convention,
its fundamental principles set out in the Preamble remind states parties to seek maximum expression of the
spirit of friendly relations and co-operation in all of their actions pertaining to minority protection. Moreover,
its Article 2 underlines the essential character of the principles of good faith, good neighbourly relations and
non-interference in another state’s internal affairs to ensure that the many diverse interests that are affected in
the implementation of the Framework Convention can be reconciled by states parties.11
7. When examining the approaches taken by states parties with regard to the scope of application of the
Framework Convention, the Advisory Committee has therefore consistently encouraged the authorities to
be inclusive and context specific and to consider on an article-by-article basis which rights should be made
available to whom. Such an approach not only ensures the most effective implementation of the Framework
Convention based on fact rather than status, but it also promotes a societal climate of dialogue and understanding,
where cultural diversity is viewed as a source of enrichment rather than division.
8. This Commentary begins with an analysis of the right to free self-identification of persons belonging
to national minorities as a cornerstone of minority rights (Part II). It thereafter discusses the various practices
developed by states parties to define the beneficiaries of minority rights according to personal and other
criteria (Part III). Part IV explains the open and contextual approach that has been applied by the Advisory
Committee throughout its monitoring activities in line with the basic principles contained in Articles 3-6 of
the Framework Convention. Based on the article-by-article approach developed by the Advisory Committee
from its inception, Parts V-VII present an analysis of the scope of application of the various rights contained
in the Framework Convention. While some articles explicitly address all persons in the territory of the state
party (Part V), there are some minority rights with a broad scope of application that, given their nature, must
apply to all national minorities (Part VI), while there are other minority rights where states parties may require
specific preconditions for their enjoyment (Part VII).
10. See Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
11. See also the Framework Convention’s Explanatory Report, paragraph 32: “This article provides a set of principles governing the
application of the Framework Convention. […] The principles mentioned in this provision are of a general nature but do have
particular relevance to the field covered by the Framework Convention”.
Ź Page 8
Part II
The right to free self-identification
1. General considerations
9. The right to free self-identification contained in Article 3 of the Framework Convention is a cornerstone
of minority rights.12 The Advisory Committee has consistently underlined the centrality of this provision. “Free”
implies, in this context, the individually established and informed decision to avail oneself of the protection of
the Framework Convention. Article 3 is thus necessarily applicable to everyone, as every person must have the
right to identify freely as a member of a specific group, or to choose not to do so. The Framework Convention’s
Explanatory Report points out, however, that the choice of the individual is not to be arbitrary but must be
linked to some objective criteria.13
10. The Advisory Committee has intentionally refrained from interpreting what such objective criteria may
be, as it is clear from the wording of the Explanatory Report that they must only be reviewed vis-à-vis the individual’s
subjective choice. Thus, objective criteria do not constitute elements of a definition. Self-identification
begins with the free decision of the individual which, if no justification exists to the contrary, is to be the basis
of any personal identification.14 In the view of the Advisory Committee, a person’s free self-identification may
only be questioned in rare cases, such as when it is not based on good faith. Identification with a national
minority that is motivated solely by the wish to gain particular advantages or benefits, for instance, may run
counter to the principles and purposes of the Framework Convention, in particular if such action diminishes
the intended benefits and rights available to persons belonging to national minorities.
11. While the official recording of a self-identification may, in some cases, require the evidence of objective
criteria,15 a minority identity must not be externally imposed. The Advisory Committee has criticised the mandatory
recording of ethnicity in identity documents or in internal records of administrative entities, including
the police and health care facilities, as contrary to the right to free self-identification.16 Moreover, it has considered
that free self-identification implies the right to choose on a situational basis when to self-identify as
a person belonging to a national minority and when not to do so.17
12. In practice, this means that each person belonging to a national minority may freely decide to claim specific
rights contained in the Framework Convention, while under certain circumstances or with respect to certain
spheres of rights, he or she may choose not to exercise these rights.18 Such individual decisions must, however,
not result in disadvantages for other individuals identifying with the same minority by precluding them from
claiming their minority rights. In this context, the Advisory Committee has reiterated its view that any numerical
thresholds established as a precondition for the applicability of certain minority rights must be interpreted
flexibly (see also paragraph 82). Otherwise, an indirect obligation to self-identify would be placed on persons
belonging to national minorities in order to ensure that access to a specific right is maintained. At the same time,
the individual decision to identify or not to identify with a particular minority must be respected by others who
affiliate themselves with the same group and who equally must not exert pressure one way or the other.
12. According to Article 3(1), “Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not
to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to
that choice.”
13. According to para. 35, Article 3(1) “does not imply a right for an individual to choose arbitrarily to belong to any national minority.
The individual’s subjective choice is inseparably linked to objective criteria relevant to the person’s identity.”
14. See also General Recommendation VIII of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1990).
15. See also Ciubotaru v. Moldova (application no. 27138/04), Judgment of 27 April 2010, where the European Court of Human Rights
acknowledged the right of a government to require the existence of objective evidence of a claimed identity.
16. See Fourth Opinion on the Czech Republic, First Opinion on Germany, Third Opinion on Ireland, First and Third Opinions on the
Russian Federation and First and Second Opinions on Ukraine.
17. Persons belonging to national minorities may for instance choose to have their name officially recognised in a minority language
but in parallel not use their minority language in contact with local administrative authorities. See also Third Thematic Commentary
(footnote 4), especially paragraphs 16-18.
18. Persons belonging to national minorities may for instance take an informed decision to enrol their children in mainstream schools
without suffering any disadvantages in terms of access to other minority rights as a result, and without such a decision having an
impact on the general availability of minority language education to other members of the same group.
The right to free self-identification Ź Page 9
13. The right to free self-identification also extends to multiple affiliations. In fact, the Framework Convention
implicitly acknowledges multiple affiliations by promoting the preservation of minority identities in parallel
to successful and effective integration in broader public life. Persons belonging to national minorities should
never be obliged to choose between preserving their minority identity or claiming the majority culture, as
both options must be fully available to them.19 This implies that practices by which an individual affiliates
with a particular minority should not be seen as exclusive, as he or she may simultaneously identify with
other minorities or with the majority.20 In some instances, such a choice may be the consequence of previous
assimilation processes into the majority or into another dominant minority. However, this must not be used
as an argument against the rights of persons belonging to national minorities to self-identify freely and to
claim minority protection.
14. The Advisory Committee has further called on states parties to ensure that all persons and groups who
may benefit from the Framework Convention are made aware and enabled to avail themselves of the right to
self-identify freely in order to access the rights contained in the Framework Convention. This is the case when
the choice of affiliating with a minority is not made difficult in practice and when it is assured that the choice
is made free of fear of resulting disadvantages or of loss in social prestige.
2. Free self-identification in the context of census and
other general data collection processes
15. In countries where data on national, ethnic or religious affiliation are collected in the context of broader
population census exercises, such exercises must be organised and conducted in line with internationally
recognised principles, including personal data protection standards.21 It follows further from the right to
free self-identification that any participation in data collection exercises related to ethnic background must
be voluntary. In particular, there must be no automatic inference from a particular indication (for example
language use) to another indication (for instance religion, ethnicity) and no assumption of certain linguistic,
religious or ethnic affiliations is to be made based on a person’s name or other characteristics.22
16. The right to free self-identification applies in each data collection exercise separately. This means that
persons belonging to national minorities must not be required always to self-identify in the same manner. Lists
of possible responses to identity-related questions should be open not closed, and the opportunity to express
multiple affiliations should be provided explicitly. Given the importance attached in some states parties to the
size of a minority population for access to minority rights, multiple affiliations must also not only be recorded
but also adequately processed, analysed and displayed. These considerations on the collection, processing
and reporting of data must also be applied to other situations (for example school enrolment) that can imply
self-identification.
17. In situations where the enjoyment of particular minority rights is linked to numerical thresholds,23 the
right to free self-identification further requires that persons belonging to national minorities are informed
of the importance attached by the authorities to census and other data collection exercises. The Advisory
Committee has therefore systematically encouraged states parties to make all information on the methodology
and aim of data collection available in the languages of national minorities, and to include persons belonging
to national minorities in the organisation and operation of such processes, particularly in areas where national
minorities are settled in substantial numbers.24
19. See also First and Third Thematic Commentaries (footnotes 2 and 4).
20. This may for instance occur in mixed families where several languages are spoken on an equal basis.
21. In the context of population census exercises, the Advisory Committee has encouraged states parties to adhere to the EUROSTAT/
UN recommendations for the organisation of population and housing censuses. See Conference of European Statisticians
Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing, prepared in co-operation with the Statistical Office of the
European Communities (EUROSTAT) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, paragraph 426: “respondents
should be free to indicate more than one ethnic affiliation or a combination of ethnic affiliations if they wish so”, paragraph 431:
“Questions will generally refer to one language only. Multiple languages may be required for the mother tongue and main languages
of minority groups”. See, for example, Fourth Opinion on Cyprus, Third Opinions on Estonia and Romania.
22. See, for example, consecutive Opinions on Italy and the United Kingdom.
23. The opening of minority language schools or the official use of minority languages at local level, for instance, may be linked to
the actual number of persons belonging to national minorities (see also Part VII).
24. See, for example, Third Opinion on Hungary and Second Opinion on Slovenia.
Page 10 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
18. At the same time, the Advisory Committee has cautioned states parties against exclusively relying on
official statistics and figures, as these, for a variety of reasons, may not fully reflect reality.25 Results should be
reassessed periodically and analysed flexibly, in close consultation with minority representatives. Authorities
should also further avail themselves of other sources of information, including the general labour force and
other surveys, as well as independent qualitative and quantitative research available on issues pertaining to
the access to rights of persons belonging to national minorities.
25. Due to a history of past disadvantage, discrimination or even persecution based on ethnic origin, some persons belonging to
national minorities are still unwilling to indicate their ethnic background to any official entity. Misperceptions about the use or
apparent dangers inherent in census exercises are sometimes disseminated among minority communities for political purposes
with the very aim of preventing them from being counted in high numbers.
Ź Page 11
Part III
Approaches taken by states
parties to the scope of application
of the Framework Convention
1. Declarations and reservations at the time of ratification
19. The Framework Convention is open for signature by member states of the Council of Europe and, in
principle, also by other states.26 There are currently 39 states parties to the Framework Convention, all of them
member states of the Council of Europe. The last ratification took place in 2006 when Montenegro became a
party to the Convention.27 In addition to the 39 states parties, where the implementation of the Framework
Convention is monitored by the Advisory Committee, Kosovo* is subject to a specific monitoring arrangement
in conformity with the 2004 Agreement between the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
(UNMIK) and the Council of Europe.
20. Eight Council of Europe member states are not parties to the Framework Convention. Belgium, Greece,
Iceland and Luxembourg have signed the Framework Convention and have therefore committed themselves
to act in line with the objectives and purpose of the Framework Convention,28 while Andorra, France, Monaco
and Turkey have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.
21. The Advisory Committee considers that the implementation of the rights contained in the Framework
Convention, given its objectives of managing diversity through the effective protection of minority rights,29
and promoting balanced approaches to the sometimes conflicting goals of individual rights protection and
the safeguarding of broader state interests, is beneficial to all societies. It notes that any reasoning provided in
the 1990s for not ratifying the Framework Convention must be regularly reassessed as societies have substantially
changed since then. Similarly, the argument that no national minorities exist in the country may well no
longer reflect contemporary realities. For the same reason, the Advisory Committee also regularly invites states
parties that have not yet done so to ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML,
ETS No. 148). While placing the emphasis on the obligation of the state to protect and promote regional or
minority languages as part of cultural heritage, rather than granting individual rights to the speakers of these
languages, the Charter represents a unique international instrument in this field and plays a complementary
role to the Framework Convention.30
22. According to Article 27 of the Framework Convention, non-member states of the Council of Europe may
ratify the Framework Convention upon invitation by the Committee of Ministers. The Explanatory Report makes
it clear that Article 27 refers to participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE). The Advisory Committee agrees that the Framework Convention could indeed be particularly relevant
in some OSCE participating states, such as Central Asian states, due to the broad diversity of their societies.
It further notes that some interest in this regard has already been expressed. In line with its general principle
of dynamic interpretation, it considers however that the Explanatory Report should not be understood as
preventing other states that co-operate with the Council of Europe in a variety of ways, including as observer
states, from becoming a party to the Framework Convention.
26. See the wording of Article 27 of the Framework Convention.
27. Following the declaration of independence on 3 June 2006, the Framework Convention was ratified on 6 June 2006.
* All reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text shall be understood in full compliance
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
28. See Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
29. See Explanatory Report, paragraph 28.
30. See also Third Thematic Commentary (footnote 4), paragraph 11.
Page 12 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
23. States parties to the Framework Convention have developed various approaches to establish the beneficiaries
of the rights contained in the Framework Convention. In 18 cases, declarations and reservations were
deposited at the time of ratification or signature, clarifying to whom the rights contained in the Framework
Convention are to be applied or how certain provisions are to be interpreted.31 The declarations typically either
establish a general definition with specific criteria that must be met,32 list explicitly which groups are to be
covered,33 or state that there are no national minorities present in the territory.34 Reservations at the time of
signature or ratification were declared in two cases.35
24. The Advisory Committee has systematically reviewed the effects of these declarations and reservations
on persons belonging to national minorities and on their access to rights. Given that, in many cases, the declarations
date back to the late 1990s, and taking into account the substantially changed conditions in states
parties since then, their pertinence should be reviewed at regular intervals by the states parties concerned to
ensure that the approach to the scope of application accurately reflects the present-day societal context.
25. Other states parties have incorporated statements into the first state report or have adopted national
legislation containing references to the groups of persons who are to be considered as belonging to national
minorities. These definitions, again, are usually formulated as delimitations to the scope of application, either
by explicitly naming specific groups of beneficiaries, or by enlisting the preconditions that must be met in
order for individuals to become eligible to benefit from the Framework Convention.36
26. According to Article 26 of the Framework Convention, the Committee of Ministers is to be assisted by
the Advisory Committee in evaluating the adequacy of the measures taken to give effect to the principles set
out in the Framework Convention. In doing so, the Advisory Committee has reviewed the measures taken by
states parties with respect to the scope of application in the same way as any other measure aimed at implementing
the Framework Convention. In particular, the Advisory Committee has considered it to be its duty
to assess whether the approach taken to the scope of application is in good faith and does not constitute a
source of arbitrary or unjustified distinction among communities with regard to access to rights.37 In its work,
it has thus assessed the various approaches and delimitations established by states parties in order for the
Framework Convention to become applicable, which are often based on the elements below.
2. Criteria applied by states parties
a. Formal recognition
27. The formal recognition of a national minority as such is required in a number of states parties in order for
persons belonging to these groups to access minority rights. The Advisory Committee has consistently criticised
such an approach as per se exclusionary and not in line with the principles contained in the Framework
Convention. While some states parties have explicitly acknowledged the impracticality of relying on a formal
recognition for the application of minority rights,38 a number of other states have, on a de facto basis, disregarded
a requirement for formal recognition, thereby broadening the scope of application of the Framework
Convention in practice.39 Such developments have always been welcomed by the Advisory Committee and
understood as efforts to correct the shortcomings that arise from applying formal criteria that are either too
rigid or no longer reflect the actual situation. This further reaffirms that the Framework Convention is not
suited for static definitions or criteria.
31. See Full List of Reservations and Declarations for Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157)
www.coe.int/en/web/dlapil/treaty-office.
32. See the declarations by Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland and Switzerland.
33. See the declarations by Albania, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
34. See the declarations by Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and San Marino. Some states declared that they viewed the ratification of
the Framework Convention as an act of solidarity with the objectives of the Convention. See First State Reports submitted by
Liechtenstein and by Malta.
35. Belgium declared that the Framework Convention should apply without prejudice to the constitutional provisions and principles
and the legislative rules governing the use of languages, and that the notion of national minority would be defined at national
level. Malta reserved the right not to be bound in some respects by the provisions of Article 15.
36. See First State Reports submitted by Armenia, Bulgaria and Hungary.
37. References to this duty can be found in all First Opinions of the Advisory Committee.
38. See First State Report submitted by Finland, stating that “the existence of minorities does not depend on a declaration by the
Government but on the factual situation in the country”.
39. Roma have, for instance, been included under the protection offered by the Framework Convention in Cyprus, despite not officially
being recognised as national minorities. See Second State Report submitted by Cyprus. Finland has applied guarantees provided
to “Old Russians” as well as to newer Russian-speaking arrivals. See Third Opinion on Finland.
Approaches taken by states parties to the scope of application of the Framework Convention Ź Page 13
28. The Advisory Committee has further observed that the de facto inclusion of beneficiaries under the protection
of the Framework Convention or of certain of its articles often forms part of an evolutionary process
that eventually may lead to formal recognition. Beginning with the free self-identification of individuals who
are acknowledged by society as forming a distinct – albeit equally valued – minority, access to rights is then
granted to promote and preserve the practices by which the group defines itself, leading in some cases to
the inclusion of the minority in formal mechanisms of national minority protection.40 Thus, official recognition
as a national minority or the granting of a specific status, do not constitute the beginning of the process of
minority rights protection, nor are they essential for the application of the Framework Convention or of specific
articles of it. Recognition as a national minority has a declaratory rather than a constitutive character. Access
to minority rights should therefore not depend on formal recognition.
b. Citizenship
29. A recurrent precondition used by states parties is the requirement that a person belonging to a national
minority must be a citizen in order to benefit from the protection of the Framework Convention. The Advisory
Committee has pointed out in this regard that the inclusion of the citizenship requirement may have a restrictive
and discriminatory effect, given that it is often the members of particularly disadvantaged groups and
minorities, including those who have suffered or been displaced as a result of conflict, who face difficulties in
obtaining citizenship and are therefore affected by this restriction.
30. In a number of regions in Europe, persons belonging to national minorities have lost their citizenship
or even become stateless due to the creation of new states, despite having long-lasting ties to their places
of residence. The Advisory Committee has consistently underlined the specific challenges faced by persons
belonging to national minorities who are de jure or de facto stateless and has drawn attention in this context
to the right of each person to a nationality in line with the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166).41
Indeed, it should be considered for each right separately whether there are legitimate grounds to differentiate
its application based on citizenship.42 The Advisory Committee has always welcomed instances in which
states parties have extended minority rights to non-citizens, thereby in practice disregarding an officially still
existing precondition of citizenship.43 In some instances, it has explicitly recommended the more consistent
application of minority rights to “non-citizens”.44
c. Length of residency
31. In their definitions of national minorities, a number of states parties refer to the length of residency of a
particular group in the territory of the state.45 Attempts at creating time limits in definitions such as “prior to the
20th century”,46 or “approximately 100 years”,47 have been used in this context. Less absolute concepts that are
subject to interpretation have also been developed, including the notion of “traditional residence”, “traditional
minorities” or the term “autochthonous national minorities”.48 In some cases the notion of “long-lasting ties
to a particular region” is applied, including with regard to non-residents who express a willingness to return
to this region and to benefit from the protection of the Framework Convention.49 The Advisory Committee
considers that it follows by implication from the fact that only Articles 10(2), 11(3) and 14(2) of the Framework
Convention establish specific guarantees in areas traditionally inhabited by persons belonging to national
minorities, that the length of residency in the country is not to be considered a determining factor for the
40. In the Czech Republic and Finland, for instance, immigrant groups such as Somalis and Vietnamese are also represented in cultural
consultation mechanisms and receive state support for their activities.
41. See in particular Article 4 of the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166).
42. See also the Venice Commission Report on Non-citizens and Minority Rights (CDL-AD(2007)001) adopted at its 69th plenary session
(Venice, 15-16 December 2006), comprehensively analysing international and European standards and practice as regards the
relevance of citizenship and other criteria for defining beneficiaries of minority rights, and calling for a nuanced approach to the
citizenship criterion for the applicability of minority rights, depending on the specific right in question.
43. See Third Opinion on the Czech Republic, for instance.
44. See Second Opinion on Latvia.
45. See, inter alia, Austria, Denmark, Germany and Hungary. The request for access to minority rights by the Polish minority in Austria,
for instance, has been rejected based on the argument that there has not been uninterrupted and “traditional” residence. See
Fourth State Report of Austria.
46. See, for instance, First State Report of Sweden.
47. See, for instance, First State Report of Austria.
48. At the time of depositing the instrument of ratification, Slovenia declared, for instance, that it would consider as national minorities
“the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian National Minorities”, and that “the Framework Convention shall apply also to the
members of the Roma community, who live in the Republic of Slovenia.”
49. See, for instance, Second Opinion on Georgia, welcoming the government’s open approach towards Meshketians and Ossetians
who were deported or displaced by conflict.
Page 14 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
applicability of the Framework Convention as a whole (see also Part VII).50 It has further consistently held that
any temporal restrictions should be regarded flexibly and that distinctions in the treatment of otherwise similar
groups based solely on the length of their residency in the territory can be unjust.51
d. Territoriality
32. A number of states parties have also applied territorial criteria for the identification of rights holders under
the Framework Convention, establishing that minority rights may only be enjoyed within specific areas. The
Advisory Committee has argued that flexibility should be applied and that persons belonging to a national
minority who live outside such areas should not be disproportionately disadvantaged.52 In particular the fact
that only some rights (that is Articles 10(2), 11(3) and 14(2)) allow for territorial limitations implies again that
the applicability of other rights should not in principle be restricted to certain regions. The Advisory Committee
has indicated on a number of occasions that this approach is in line with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties which determines that a treaty is binding in respect of the state party’s entire territory
unless a different intention is ascertained. In addition, territorial limitations may constitute an a priori exclusion
of persons belonging to national minorities from the scope of application which is incompatible with the
principles contained in the Framework Convention.53
33. The Advisory Committee has further criticised situations in which imposed differentiations between members
of a group based on territorial features lead to the weakening of a group and, as a result, to the reduced
access to rights for persons belonging to that national minority.54 It has in particular argued that demographic
changes over time must be taken into account.55 Increased mobility in many countries has resulted in a high
number of persons belonging to national minorities moving from areas of their traditional settlement to other
regions that offer more favourable economic conditions or educational opportunities, such as industrialised areas
or urban centres.56 While residence in a specific area might thus be conducive to the more effective enjoyment
of some minority rights, it must not result in the arbitrary denial of the enjoyment of all minority rights.57
e. Substantial numbers
34. Also linked to the territorial criteria is the notion of “in substantial numbers”, as found in Articles 10(2) and
14(3) and in Article 11(3) (see also Part VII). As with other criteria contained in these articles, various interpretations
by states parties have been made. In some cases, the term ‘compact settlement’ has been used to define
the specific rights holders.58 While acknowledging that it may be more problematic to ensure access to some
minority rights for persons belonging to national minorities who live dispersed throughout the country, the
Advisory Committee has pointed out repeatedly that their recognition as national minorities and their access
to minority rights in general must not be impeded through the use of numerical criteria. It has expressed its
deep concern, for instance, when Roma59 have been excluded altogether from the scope of application of the
Framework Convention and thereby entirely denied protection as a national minority, because of the fact that
they live territorially dispersed and not settled in substantial numbers anywhere in the country.60
f. Support by “kin-states”
35. A number of states parties define the term ‘national minorities’ as those groups who have a link with a
“kin-state”, classifying those without such link as ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘ethno-linguistic groups’. The Advisory
Committee considers that the question whether support is or is not available from another state cannot be
50. The length of residency within the state is irrelevant in terms of the applicability of minority rights arising under Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See General Comment of the UN Human Rights Committee No. 23(50),
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add5/26 April 1994.
51. See Third Opinion on Austria. See also Fourth Opinion on Denmark, where Roma are not recognised as national minorities with
the argument that they “have no historical or long-term and unbroken association with Denmark”.
52. For instance, Third Opinion on the Slovak Republic.
53. See, for instance, First Opinion on Denmark and First Opinion on Italy.
54. See Second Opinion on Austria with regard to the differentiation between Burgenland Croats and Croats.
55. See, for instance, Fourth Opinion on the Slovak Republic.
56. See Third Opinions on Finland and Germany.
57. See, for instance, consecutive Opinions on Denmark, Italy and Portugal.
58. See, inter alia, First State Reports submitted by Austria, Azerbaijan and Germany.
59. The term “Roma and Travellers” is used at the Council of Europe to encompass the wide diversity of the groups covered by the work
of the Council of Europe in this field: on the one hand a) Roma, Sinti/Manush, Calé, Kaale, Romanichals, Boyash/Rudari; b) Balkan
Egyptians (Egyptians and Ashkali); c) Eastern groups (Dom, Lom and Abdal); and, on the other hand, groups such as Travellers,
Yenish, and the populations designated under the administrative term “Gens du voyage”, as well as persons who identify themselves
as Gypsies.
60. See First Opinion on the Netherlands.
Approaches taken by states parties to the scope of application of the Framework Convention Ź Page 15
used as a relevant point of differentiation with respect to recognition or access to rights. While not favouring
any particular terminology, it has criticised cases when different categories lead to the formation of hierarchies
and different “categories” of minorities, as this may result in unjustified distinctions with respect to applicable
rights.61
36. The Advisory Committee has welcomed bilateral agreements to facilitate cross-border relations and
co-operation, for instance regarding the supply of textbooks and exchanges of teachers for the benefit of
high-quality education in minority language schools. However, it has disapproved of agreements that outsource
such fundamental aspects of minority protection to another state.62 It follows from the international
law principle of state sovereignty that states hold the single jurisdiction over their territory and population, a
jurisdiction that can be restricted only within the limits of international law. Overall, the responsibility to protect
minority rights, as part of general human rights, lies primarily with the state where the minority resides.63
While the Advisory Committee interprets Article 17 to imply that states parties must not interfere with the
enjoyment of benefits from other countries, they must not rely on them instead of striving themselves for the
realisation of minority rights.
g. Specific identity markers and ascribed categories
37. In a variety of states parties, the understanding of the term ‘national minority’ is linked to specific characteristics
that are often considered as emblematic for identity and for differentiating the minority from the
majority, including language, religion, culture, ethnic background, specific traditions or visible features. These
markers are often based on common perceptions that are shared within society, by members of the majority
and minorities alike. Nevertheless, employing such externally defined markers entails the danger of including
or excluding individuals against their will.64 The Advisory Committee reiterates its position that a person’s
identification must be based on free self-identification, unless there is a valid justification for not doing so
(see paragraph 10).
38. Moreover, caution must be applied in the use of externally defined markers, as they are often based
on presumptions. The categorisation of the minority as a static and homogeneous group may reinforce stereotypes
and does not pay adequate attention to the broad diversity and intersectionality that exists within
minorities, as within all groups (see also paragraph 40). In some states parties, legislation makes reference
to other externally imposed criteria, such as “ethnic minority threatened by social exclusion” or “citizens in a
vulnerable socio-economic situation”,65 while in others, an affiliation with a particular national minority may
be presumed based on names.66 The Advisory Committee considers such practices of association of persons
with a specific group based, without consent, on presumptions such as names, language, or visible features,
as incompatible with Article 3(1) and the right to free self-identification (see also paragraph 15).67
61. See, for instance, Second and Third Opinions on Albania and First Opinion on Poland.
62. See Second Opinion on Albania and First Opinion on Germany.
63. See also OSCE HCNM Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations, June 2008.
64. The Advisory Committee considered, for instance, that the over-reliance on the “racial group” criterion applied in the United
Kingdom might, despite its wide application, result in a priori exclusions of groups that have legitimate claims. See Third Opinion
on the United Kingdom.
65. See, inter alia, Third Opinion on Bulgaria.
66. See, inter alia, First Opinion on Italy.
67. See Third Thematic Commentary (footnote 4).
Ź Page 16
Part IV
Context-specific article-byarticle
approach developed
by the Advisory Committee
1. Fundamental principles
39. The Framework Convention contains a catalogue of rights in different spheres of public life, ranging
from individual freedoms, to media, language and education rights and the right to effective participation.
Given their different nature, the scope of application of the various rights must be adjusted accordingly: the
right to manifest one’s religion, for instance, as also stipulated in Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, must be extended to all persons belonging to national minorities, while the right to display a
minority language on topographical signs may, for legitimate reasons, be made available only under certain
preconditions. Depending on the nature of the minority rights contained therein, the scope of application of
the Framework Convention must therefore be established separately for each article, which is why, from its
first monitoring cycle, the Advisory Committee has referred to its article-by-article approach.68 Overall, the
implementation of the Framework Convention must always be based on the fundamental principles contained
in its Articles 3-6, which are interlinked and which must inform the interpretation of the instrument as a whole.
40. National minorities within one country typically vary in number and size, and they may live compactly
or be more or less dispersed throughout the territory. It is also important to consider the diversity that exists
within minorities as in any population group, including on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, political beliefs or access to economic resources. Accordingly, the priorities of minority communities
and the individual priorities of persons belonging to these communities often diverge. For some persons
belonging to minorities, the main priorities are equality and integration; for others, it may be the quest for a
protected space to maintain and promote their minority identity. These priorities may further change over time,
depending on the context, the political climate and socio-economic conditions. It is the Advisory Committee’s
view that the diversity within and among national minorities must be acknowledged and respected in the
implementation of all minority rights, regardless of their specific nature.
41. With respect to the obligation of states parties to promote the conditions for the preservation and development
of national minority cultures, this also implies that the term ‘minority culture’ must not be interpreted
in a static, unitary or limiting sense. It is each person belonging to a national minority who, in line with the right
to free self-identification, decides how he or she will practise the minority culture or identity. Accordingly, not
only is the right to preserve traditions protected but also the right to develop a minority culture in line with
broader societal evolution, and to form contemporary expressions of minority identity.
42. Equality considerations are essential for the promotion of all minority rights, not only with respect to
relations between national minorities and the majority but also, importantly, regarding relations between the
various minorities. In the view of the Advisory Committee, the general equality principle is called into question
when altogether different principles or disproportionately different protection mechanisms are applied to the
various minorities, or when separate government bodies are responsible for the protection and promotion
of their respective rights.69 While efforts to promote equal opportunities for all persons belonging to national
minorities must be tailored to the specific needs and situations of the various groups in order to be effective,
the basic approaches and rights standards that are applied must be equal.
68. See all First Opinions of the Advisory Committee.
69. In a variety of states, the protection of the rights of Roma is considered to be a socio-economic and sometimes even a security
issue. As a result, protection and promotion measures are frequently co-ordinated separately from those related to other minority
groups which may result in the application of different standards. While the Advisory Committee values the specific attention that
is paid to the particular socio-economic disadvantages that many Roma face, it considers that these measures must be additional
to other minority rights’ protection measures, such as those related to the preservation of Roma cultures, languages and traditions.
Context-specific article-by-article approach developed by the Advisory Committee Ź Page 17
43. Full equality cannot be effectively achieved when diversity as such is perceived negatively or when
only certain forms of diversity are accepted and tolerated. The Advisory Committee has repeatedly criticised
situations where hierarchies are created among the various minorities and existing inequalities are reinforced
through uneven attention and support.70 In addition, an environment in which diversity is viewed as “alien”
or “imported” and rather disconnected from mainstream society does not offer the appropriate conditions
for the expression, preservation and development of minority cultures. Article 6 therefore calls for deliberate
efforts to foster a climate of mutual respect, understanding and co-operation where persons belonging to
national minorities are recognised as integral elements of society, who effectively enjoy equal access to rights
and resources, while being provided with opportunities for social interaction and inclusion across difference.
Given its purpose, as established by the Preamble, of promoting broader societal peace and stability through
the enhancement of minority rights, the Framework Convention has an immediate relevance for the whole
society.
44. The Advisory Committee’s established position is that integration is a process of give-and-take and
affects society as a whole. Efforts cannot therefore be expected only from persons belonging to minority communities,
but they must also be made by members of the majority population.71 This is particularly relevant
in distinguishing successful integration from forced assimilation, which is explicitly prohibited in Article 5(2)
of the Framework Convention. While assimilation forces persons belonging to a minority to relinquish their
specific characteristics to blend into a society that is dominated by the majority, integration requires both the
majority and the minorities to mutually adapt and change through an ongoing negotiation and accommodation
process.
45. In the view of the Advisory Committee, the above fundamental principles of the Framework Convention
contained in Articles 3-6 must be considered in the interpretation of all further articles in order to ensure that
the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are effectively enjoyed.
2. Practice
46. In line with its article-by-article approach, the Advisory Committee has repeatedly considered the
application of the Framework Convention to persons who do not belong to national minorities but live in a
similar situation. Persons belonging to the majority population who live in areas that are mainly inhabited by
minority communities, for instance, have been considered in the context of the education rights under the
Framework Convention.
47. The Advisory Committee has emphasised in this context that the same protective measures that are applied
in minority-language schools, such as the requirement of fewer pupils per class, should also apply to state
schools that teach in the official language in otherwise minority-language dominated areas.72 Furthermore, the
Advisory Committee has considered that other groups which enjoy special protection but are not recognised
as national minorities may, in addition, benefit from the protection of the Framework Convention.73 In some
contexts, it has also noted that extending the protection of the Framework Convention on a case-by-case basis
to persons belonging to the constituent peoples who live in a minority situation could provide an additional
tool for promoting their access to rights and addressing the issues they are faced with, without implying a
weakening of their status. Indeed, the applicability of minority rights to them is considered by the Advisory
Committee as fully in line with the objective and aim of the Framework Convention.74
48. In addition, the Advisory Committee has emphasised that the protection offered by the Framework
Convention also extends to persons belonging to indigenous peoples without this having an effect on their
status as members of indigenous peoples. Specific rights may be applicable to them, whether or not they are
formally recognised as a national minority, and without implying recognition as a national minority.75 This means
that individuals are free to avail themselves, beyond the rights they hold as members of indigenous groups,
70. See, for instance, Third Opinion on Romania and Second Opinion on Georgia.
71. See, for instance, Third Opinion on Estonia. See also Third Thematic Commentary (footnote 4).
72. See Third Opinions on Estonia and Lithuania.
73. See, for instance, Fourth Opinion on Spain with respect to speakers of Catalan, Basque and Galician, namely languages with co-official
or protected status. The Advisory Committee found here that language rights can particularly benefit speakers of languages
who live outside the designated areas.
74. See Third Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
75. The Norwegian Sami Parliament stated, for instance, that the Sami did not wish to be considered a national minority as they wished
to maintain their status as an indigenous people. The Advisory Committee, however, considered that both protection schemes are
not exclusive and may provide parallel benefits to individuals of the group. See First and consecutive Opinions on Norway. See
also consecutive Opinions on Denmark, Finland, the Russian Federation and Sweden.
Page 18 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
of the protection under the Framework Convention, or to refuse to do so. This has been particularly relevant
with respect to the rights contained in Article 5 of the Framework Convention where the Advisory Committee
has held that the protection from assimilation also implies that affected individuals must be supported in their
efforts to adjust their traditional practices to contemporary challenges, or to engage in economic activities in
order to be able to preserve their culture.76
49. As regards disputed territories or regions of states parties to the Framework Convention that are de facto
outside the control of the authorities, the Advisory Committee observes that the applicability of the rights
contained in the Framework Convention is not altered as a result of the change in de facto authority. On the
contrary, the rights of persons belonging to national minorities remain in force and often gain a particular
urgency in times of conflict.77 International access and the continuation of regular monitoring activities,
however, are deeply affected if not entirely stalled by such territorial disputes. The Advisory Committee has
repeatedly called on all parties to take a constructive approach in line with the general principles of international
law and of the Framework Convention, with a view to safeguarding the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities as an integral part of universally applicable human rights throughout the territories of all
states parties to the Framework Convention.78
76. See, for instance, Third Opinion on the Russian Federation.
77. See also the Advisory Committee ad hoc report on the situation of national minorities in Ukraine, April 2014.
78. See the Advisory Committee Open Statement on the situation of national minorities in Crimea, May 2014, at http://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168069faed.
Ź Page 19
Part V
Framework Convention rights
applying to all persons
50. A number of articles of the Framework Convention apply to all persons on the territory of states parties,
including those not belonging to national minorities, either explicitly or by implication through their specific
link with provisions that are applicable to all.
1. Protection against discrimination – Article 6
51. Article 6 of the Framework Convention explicitly applies to “all persons” living in the territory of states
parties. Its protection extends into two areas: firstly, effective measures must be taken to promote mutual
respect, understanding and co-operation among all persons irrespective of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or
religious identities. Secondly, all persons must be protected against discrimination based on those aspects of
their identities.
52. The Advisory Committee has consistently underlined this broad application of Article 6 as the lack of
respect for or ill-treatment of migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and/or other individuals who are, for whatever
reason, considered to be different from the majority population, may prompt a general environment of fear.
This may entice persons belonging to minorities to strive for conformity rather than for the active enjoyment
of their rights. Based on Article 6, the Advisory Committee has also evaluated the implementation of the
Framework Convention in states parties where, according to the authorities, no persons belonging to national
minorities reside.79 This has allowed the Advisory Committee to engage in comprehensive discussions with
state authorities on “measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policies”.80
a. Promotion of mutual respect and intercultural dialogue
53. Some states parties have argued against the relevance of societal cohesion and broader concepts of
tolerance and respect for diversity in the protection of national minorities. The Advisory Committee has
consistently held, however, that an exclusive view that separates the issue of traditional minority protection
from broader questions surrounding the integration of society does not do justice to the aim and purpose of
the Framework Convention but rather hinders the enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national
minorities.81 In fact, the promotion of tolerance and openness towards diversity in society is essential not only
for the development and implementation of successful integration strategies, but it is also a central precondition
for persons belonging to national minorities to self-identify as such without hesitation and proactively
claim the rights contained in the Framework Convention.
54. Openness and tolerance in society can only be genuine if they are not limited to certain predefined groups
but embrace everyone. The Advisory Committee therefore considers questions surrounding the formulation
and implementation of effective integration strategies as one of its important concerns. Integration strategies
are being developed in many European states today, chiefly in order to address the situation of often large
communities of immigrants, some second and third generation, who share linguistic and cultural practices
and backgrounds, and who often live in the country as citizens, whether naturalised or by birth.82 It is essential
that all segments of society, majorities and minorities alike, are addressed in order for integration strategies to
effectively facilitate the formation of societal structures where diversity and respect for difference are acknowledged
and encouraged as normal, through recognition, mutual accommodation and active engagement on
all sides.83
79. See, for instance, Fourth Opinion on Liechtenstein or Third Opinion on Malta.
80. See Article 5(2) of the Framework Convention.
81. Broader concerns related to the integration of society and effective mechanisms regarding protection from discrimination have
also consistently been raised in Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ resolutions on the implementation of the Framework
Convention, such as, inter alia, in the Fourth Resolution on Denmark, the Third Resolution on Estonia, the Fourth Resolution on
Germany, and the Third Resolution on Malta.
82. See consecutive Opinions on Liechtenstein, for example.
83. The OSCE HCNM has taken a similar approach. The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, adopted in 2012, define
integration as a process that requires all members of society to accept and create a shared sense of belonging to a given state and
common public institutions. See the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, OSCE HCNM, November 2012.
Page 20 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
b. Protection from hostility and hate crime
55. Article 6(2) contains the obligation of states parties to protect all persons against violence and discrimination
on ethnic grounds, in other words not only persons belonging to national minorities. Minorities
cannot thrive in a society in which diversity is not tolerated or even serves as a pretext for hate crimes and
discrimination. This is why it is vital that all states parties strive to apply and achieve the aims of Article 6 of
the Framework Convention fully, even those states parties that have explicitly declared that they have only
ratified the Framework Convention out of solidarity.
56. The Advisory Committee considers that ethnically based violence must be recognised as an especially
nefarious form of violence that concerns and threatens society as a whole, and must thus be resolutely opposed
and prevented. In order to address hate crime in a comprehensive manner, criminal codes must contain
appropriate provisions that criminalise hate speech, threats and violence based on ethnic grounds as well as
public incitement to violence and hatred. In addition, racial motivation must be considered an aggravating
circumstance of any offence and law enforcement agents should be appropriately trained to ensure that racially
or ethnically motivated attacks and discrimination are identified and recorded, as well as duly investigated
and punished through targeted, specialised and prompt action.
57. Fear of discrimination or even violent attack may discourage persons belonging to national minorities from
enjoying their right to free self-identification. The downplaying of ethnically based violence as “hooliganism” or
the usual wrongdoings of youth can lead to perceptions of tacit approval of such actions by law enforcement
agents and thereby dramatically weaken efforts to promote respect and dialogue among different groups. In
order to protect individuals from such attacks, it is therefore of equal importance that any such incidents are
promptly and unequivocally condemned by senior public figures and community leaders at all levels, and
that appropriate messages are communicated to the public through the media and government information
channels.
58. The Advisory Committee refers in this context to other bodies with the specific mandate and expertise
to address issues related to racial discrimination and protection from hate crime.84 It notes in particular the
role of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in assessing the applicability and
effectiveness of anti-discrimination tools and mechanisms, whose monitoring work and reports are central
for a systematic interpretation of the Framework Convention in an evolving society.85 It is the goal of the
Framework Convention to affirm differences in cohesive and integrated societies. Striving for de facto equality
in the context of the Framework Convention requires adequate and effective strategies to support different
identities, including the effective protection from discrimination that is based on any of these differences. In
addition, the right to be effectively protected from discriminatory threats or violence contained in Article 6(2)
plays an important role in complementing the enjoyment of a number of rights contained in the Framework
Convention, in particular those related to political freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, by obliging
states parties effectively to sanction any undue interferences or attempts at its limitation.
2. Education and the media as tools for integration – Articles 6(1) and 12
59. Article 6(1) explicitly refers to education, culture and the media as particular fields of importance to the
objective of promoting tolerance and intercultural dialogue. In addition, the special significance of education
for the integration of society and for the promotion of respect for diversity is reflected in Article 12 of the
Framework Convention. Article 12(1) provides that education and research should foster knowledge of the
history, cultures, languages and religions of the minorities and of the majority, thereby clearly addressing society
as a whole.86 In addition, Article 12(2) calls for the development of intercultural exchanges and competencies
through the facilitation of “contacts among students and teachers of different communities”. Adequate information
on the composition of society, including national and other minorities, must form part of the public
curriculum and of textbooks and education materials used in all schools throughout the territories of states
parties, not only to promote intercultural understanding and respect among all students, but also to raise the
prestige and self-awareness of persons belonging to numerically smaller or disadvantaged groups.
84. See in particular the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the OSCE/ODIHR hate crime reporting initiative.
85. See in particular in this context ECRI General Policy Recommendation (GPR) No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech, adopted on 8
December 2015. This GPR builds on the findings and recommendations published by ECRI during its fifth monitoring cycle, providing
additional guidance to member states.
86. A similar provision is also contained in Article 7(3) of the ECRML, calling on states to promote, by appropriate measures, mutual
understanding between all the linguistic groups of the country.
Framework Convention rights applying to all persons Ź Page 21
60. Education materials featuring content on minorities must further be prepared in close consultation with
representatives of the respective groups and must not be limited to stereotyped images. Moreover, adequate
professional development opportunities and training must therefore be available to all teachers to prepare
them for the handling of linguistically and culturally diverse environments.87 With respect to the teaching of
history throughout states parties, critical thinking and the accommodation of multiple perspectives must be
promoted in all efforts.
61. The work of the Advisory Committee is based on the recognition and appreciation of the benefits of
intercultural dialogue and multilingualism to promote tolerance and respect for diversity in societies. Language
and cultural policies must therefore ensure that all languages and cultures that exist in society are visibly
and audibly present in the public domain, so that everybody is aware of the diverse character of society and
recognises himself or herself as an integral part of it.
62. The Advisory Committee has therefore consistently encouraged language policies that promote the use
of different languages in public places and in the media in order to create respect for lesser-used languages and
enhance their visibility and prestige. Overall, inclusive language policies should cater for the needs of everybody
based on their different characteristics and needs, including persons belonging to national minorities living
outside their traditional areas of settlement, immigrants and “non-citizens”.88 In view of the overarching aim
of establishing integrated societies that are respectful of their diversities, the Advisory Committee has also
encouraged measures that promote the knowledge and the use of minority languages by persons belonging
to majority communities.
63. Article 6(1) of the Framework Convention also underlines the role of the media as a tool for the promotion
of intercultural understanding and a sense of solidarity in society. Given the immediate amplification of
messages and values, the Advisory Committee has consistently called on states parties to ensure that public
broadcasters take their responsibilities seriously and promote respect for diversity and ethical journalism
in all their programmes. Efforts in states parties to promote ethical standards among journalists and media
professionals, and to promote media literacy in society more generally, must include minority representatives.
Furthermore, it is important for the formation of an open and pluralist media environment that issues of concern
and interest to minority communities generally are given weight in the broader public media debate
and that persons belonging to such minorities are portrayed as integral members of society, be it in the role
of journalists, presenters and/or interviewees.
87. See, inter alia, Third Opinion on Estonia, Second Opinion on Georgia, Third Opinion on Kosovo and Fourth Opinion on the Slovak
Republic.
88. See Third Thematic Commentary (footnote 4), paragraph 53.
Ź Page 22
Part VI
Minority rights with a broad
scope of application
64. The Framework Convention’s Explanatory Report refers to minority rights being exercised “in community
with others”, pointing to the fact that communities are formed around a variety of shared practices and
the common exercise of rights. The practices by which persons seek to identify themselves are dynamic and
evolving, built on what people have in common rather than on differences. They include transmitted knowledge
or shared memories that may not always be actively demonstrated. As such, they may vary in intensity
and scope, depending on the circumstances. They may evolve over time and they may also be performed
from a distance. Given its task to monitor the effective implementation of rights contained in the Framework
Convention, the Advisory Committee has primarily been concerned with access to rights and only secondarily
with questions surrounding status. Indeed, it considers formal recognition of national minorities an act of a
declaratory rather than a constitutive nature (see paragraph 28). In order to ensure that minority rights are
not arbitrarily withheld from persons belonging to national minorities who should be protected under the
Framework Convention, the Advisory Committee has consistently employed a broad scope of application
with respect to the rights contained in the Framework Convention and has commended states parties which
do the same. In particular it considers that the following articles of the Framework Convention, given their
nature, have a broad scope of application, also including under their protection therefore persons belonging
to national minorities who are not recognised as such by the respective state party.
1. Equality – Article 4
65. All persons belonging to national minorities, irrespective of their status or recognition, must be guaranteed
the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law. This general principle of human rights
contained in Article 4(1) has not been contested by states parties. The Advisory Committee has repeatedly
emphasised the gender dimension in this context, drawing the attention of states parties to the phenomenon
of multiple discrimination, as frequently experienced by women belonging to national minorities.89 Article
4(2) further calls for special measures to overcome structural disadvantages between the minority and the
majority in all spheres. These must be developed and implemented in close consultation with those affected
and due account must be taken of the specific conditions of the persons concerned in their design.
66. The Advisory Committee has consistently encouraged states parties to base their equality promotion
policy instruments or special measures on comprehensive data related to the situation and access to rights
of persons belonging to national minorities, also taking into account the various manifestations of multiple
discrimination that may be experienced, including those arising from factors that are unrelated to the national
minority background such as age, gender, sexual orientation and lifestyle markers. Moreover, particular attention
must be paid to members of the most disadvantaged segments of society, that is those who have been
disempowered economically, socially or geographically, due to their size or because of past experiences of
conflict. In this context of special and targeted measures for the promotion of effective equality, the Advisory
Committee has consistently emphasised the importance of regularly collecting reliable and disaggregated
equality data related to the number and situation of persons belonging to national minorities. It has, however,
cautioned states parties against the over-reliance on statistics and encouraged the authorities also to
avail themselves of independent research, in particular when carried out by persons belonging to national
minorities themselves, in order to assess and comprehensively address the particular shortcomings faced by
persons belonging to national minorities (see also paragraph 18).
89. See, inter alia, Third Opinions on Azerbaijan and Finland.
Minority rights with a broad scope of application Ź Page 23
2. Culture – Article 5
67. Article 5 of the Framework Convention and the obligation of states parties to promote the conditions for
the preservation and development of national minority cultures and identities are best served if the scope of
application is interpreted widely. The article’s aim is to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities do
not assimilate but are enabled to maintain and develop their distinct identities and to actively enjoy minority
rights. The Advisory Committee has welcomed the availability of assistance schemes not only to recognised
national minorities but also to other groups who would otherwise not be able to maintain their distinct features.
90 All support measures must be tailored to the specific needs and situations of the various groups, to
ensure that the cultural differences that are regarded as specific to each group are affirmed and protected.
This may often require targeted efforts by the authorities to revitalise essential elements of the minority culture,
without which the expression of some aspects of that identity may not be possible.91 Numerically larger
minorities whose cultures are well represented will usually not experience the same reliance on government
support as numerically smaller groups or dispersed national minorities which may be struggling to preserve
their distinct characteristics and resist assimilation.92 While it is often the cultural associations that are the
recipients of funds, the Advisory Committee considers that all national minority representatives, including
those not formally linked with such associations or those representing different views, must be consulted and
provided with effective opportunities to obtain funding for the preservation of their identities and cultures.
3. Association and religion – Articles 7 and 8
68. The rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, thought and conscience,
as well as the right to hold and manifest a religion or belief, as stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 of the Framework
Convention, are based on corresponding articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Explanatory
Report underlines explicitly that they apply to every person, whether belonging to a national minority or
not, but that they are considered of such specific importance to persons belonging to national minorities
that they were deemed to merit special attention.93 The Advisory Committee has therefore interpreted their
scope of application in the broadest sense, in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
It has in particular expressed its deep concern when the overall working conditions for non-governmental
organisations engaged in the protection of minority rights have been made difficult, as their role in promoting
the awareness and understanding of human and minority rights standards in society is crucial and must be
supported rather than hindered.94 The Advisory Committee has further held that any measures taken by the
authorities to restrict the freedom of assembly or the freedom of expression, which necessarily includes the
freedom to express criticism of the government or diverging opinions, can have a direct, negative impact on
the enjoyment of rights contained in the Framework Convention as they are likely to deter persons belonging
to national minorities, like other members of society, from exercising their rights and to create an intimidating
environment that is not conducive to the implementation of minority rights and human rights generally. In this
context, the Advisory Committee has also underlined that persons belonging to national minorities should not
be banned from forming political parties in order to formulate and better pursue their interests and rights,95
or from registering religious organisations in order to manifest their beliefs in community with others.96
4. Media – Article 9
69. Article 9 and the media-related rights contained in the Framework Convention have a particular significance
for the protection and promotion of minority rights. The availability of print, broadcast and electronic media in
minority languages has very specific emblematic value for national minorities, in particular for the numerically
smaller ones. Through them, persons belonging to national minorities not only gain access to information,
but minority-language media also raise the visibility and prestige of the minority language as an active tool
of communication. In particular, these media can play a significant role for persons belonging to national
90. See Third Opinions on the Czech Republic and Finland.
91. See Third Opinion on Finland, welcoming the specific efforts of the authorities to revitalise the Sami culture through “language
nests” and other similar activities.
92. See, however, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) General Recommendation No. 32 underlining the
distinction between permanent rights (such as those contained in Article 5 of the Framework Convention) and the additional and
temporary benefits of special measures as provided for in Article 4(2).
93. See paragraphs 51 and 54 of the Explanatory Report.
94. See Third Opinions on Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation.
95. See Third Opinion on Bulgaria, Second Opinion on Georgia and Third Opinion on the Russian Federation.
96. See Third Opinions on Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation.
Page 24 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
minorities who are dispersed for, among other reasons, increased mobility, as they allow for communication
and contact over distances. This, in turn, can encourage persons belonging to national minorities to enjoy
their rights more actively. The active participation of members of national minority communities in a pluralist
media environment may further require targeted training and awareness-raising activities, including in the
use of electronic and social media.97 In this respect, the Advisory Committee has stressed that the possibility
to participate actively in the media and to receive and impart information of interest to persons belonging
to national minorities, presupposes access to relevant infrastructure such as high-speed Internet throughout
the country, including in remote areas which are often inhabited by national minority communities.
70. The marginalisation of minority identities in the local media, including through the exclusive use of
minority languages only for certain programmes, often about folklore, traditional costumes, food and habits,
may contribute to the stereotyping of minorities as separate entities and does not promote their respect and
prestige in society.98 In addition, the division of media audiences according to linguistic backgrounds may
enhance the formation of separated and mutually exclusive public spheres. Support for media in national
minority languages must therefore be accompanied by targeted steps towards the training of journalists
and other media professionals to promote their awareness of and sensitivity towards the specific needs and
concerns of diverse groups in society. Moreover, it is important to ensure that minority representatives effectively
participate in relevant decision-making processes as well as in media supervisory bodies. The more
minority representatives take part in shaping their image in the public media, the more the negative effects
of “misrecognition” and stereotyping can be reduced.99
5. Language – Articles 10(1), 10(3), 11(1) and 11(2)
71. The right to use one’s language in public and in private, contained in Article 10(1) of the Framework
Convention, the right to use one’s personal name in the minority language and to have it officially recognised
(Article 11(1)), and the right to put up signs of a private nature in minority languages (Article 11(2)) carry
a particular weight for the personal identity, dignity and self-awareness of persons belonging to national
minorities.100 The Advisory Committee considers that, as such, they must be applicable to everyone and any
restrictions must be carefully reviewed to ensure that they do not infringe upon the personal dignity and
privacy of the individual.101 States may adopt laws aimed at strengthening and protecting the state language.
This legitimate aim, however, must be pursued in a manner that is in line with the rights contained in Articles
10 and 11 and other relevant provisions of the Framework Convention and its general spirit of encouraging
tolerance and mutual understanding within society. Laws and other measures that are aimed at promoting
the state or official languages must not, in particular, infringe on the private sphere of a person but must be
implemented in a way that respects the identities and the linguistic needs present in society.
72. Article 10(3), similarly to Articles 7 and 8, reflects the individual human right of being promptly informed
in a known language, if necessary through an interpreter, of the reasons for an arrest and of the nature and
cause of any accusation. According to the Explanatory Report, the provision, which is based on guarantees
contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, does not go beyond those safeguards.
Thus, it does not imply a right to legal process and trial in one’s minority language and applies to all
persons belonging to national minorities.
6. Education – Articles 12(3), 14(1) and 14(3)
73. According to Article 12(3), equal opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons belonging
to national minorities must be promoted.102 Given the particular link to Article 4 and the general principle
of equality, the Advisory Committee has consistently encouraged a broad and inclusive approach, referring
also to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee has
strongly condemned all instances of segregated education and has urged states parties to take all necessary
97. See Fourth Opinion on Cyprus.
98. See also Second Opinion on Georgia.
99. See also Third Opinion on Croatia.
100.For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the Advisory Committee’s findings on access to language rights of persons belonging
to national minorities, reference is made to its Third Thematic Commentary (footnote 4).
101.See also Communication No. 1621/2007 Leonid Raihman v. Latvia, made public by decision of the Human Rights Committee UN
Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1621/2007 (2010), finding a violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR with respect to the unilateral change of the
author’s name by the state party.
102.For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the Advisory Committee’s findings on access to education rights of persons
belonging to national minorities, reference is made to its First Thematic Commentary (footnote 2).
Minority rights with a broad scope of application Ź Page 25
measures to ensure equal access to integrated education for all children.103 In addition, Article 14(1) makes
provision for the right to learn one’s minority language, while Article 14(3) stresses the right to learn or be
taught in the official language or languages.
74. The Advisory Committee has repeatedly expressed its view that both opportunities to learn a minority
language and adequate opportunities to learn the official languages are applicable to all persons belonging to
national minorities and must be available in parallel.104 It has generally pointed to the substantial research that
suggests noticeable benefits of first language learning for the learning of other languages, including official
languages, and has expressed its general preference for bilingual and multilingual approaches in education
that are equipped to accommodate more than one language in integrated classrooms. While consistently
acknowledging the importance of language for the integration of a diverse society, the Advisory Committee has
reiterated its standpoint that pressure and conditionality are generally inappropriate tools for the promotion
of integration, and that the relevant strategies meant to promote skills in the official language must not rely
disproportionately on efforts to be made by persons belonging to national minorities.105
7. Participation – Article 15
75. Undue exclusions from the right to effective participation in public life can result in significant obstacles
to the enjoyment of a variety of minority rights.106 Public life in this context does not only extend to public
affairs and decision making but is equally important with respect to economic and social life.107 The Advisory
Committee has therefore consistently underlined the importance of an inclusive approach to the application
of Article 15, as effective participation is often a precondition to gaining access to the rights contained in
the Framework Convention. Consultation mechanisms and advisory bodies on issues pertaining to minority
rights protection that are intended to enhance, for instance, discussion and dialogue among different groups
in society, should be open to all, including groups that are not recognised as national minorities but might
have expressed an interest in the protection of the Framework Convention.
76. The availability of effective platforms for the discussion of relevant concerns with such groups may not
only promote trust among minority communities, but it may also serve to facilitate open and flexible solutions
to issues that prevent access to rights, and may thereby promote societal cohesion and stability. In its
discussions of Article 15 of the Framework Convention, the Advisory Committee has also further applied a
broad scope of application with respect to the comprehensiveness of the matters on which representatives of
national minorities should be consulted. These should not be limited to questions related to the preservation
of national minority cultures or the allocation of funding, but should include all issues of broader concern to
society, including national minority communities.108
77. Due to the centrality of effective participation of national minorities in public life, particular attention
must be paid to ensure that the views and concerns within the various minority communities are adequately
taken into account. National minority communities, as is the case in any community, are diverse and their
members often hold divergent views. This means that the diversity within the minorities, including women
and young people, as well as their various needs and concerns, must be effectively represented in all relevant
decision making.
78. Controversies may arise between factions among or within minorities and it is the responsibility of the
state authorities to seek flexible solutions that can accommodate them, ensuring that they are all enabled to
participate effectively. It is therefore essential for governments to have standards and procedures available
to put in place suitable arrangements for the promotion of the effective participation of persons belonging
to minorities, in consultation with those concerned. In addition, these arrangements must be sufficiently
flexible to allow for renegotiations when conditions or priorities change. In a number of states parties, the
granting of different forms of self-governance or autonomy (territorial and non-territorial) is used at regional
103. See, inter alia, Third Opinion on Bulgaria, Third and Fourth Opinions on the Czech Republic and Third and Fourth Opinions on the
Slovak Republic.
104. Different modules may be applied depending on the size of the group wishing to learn the minority language.
105. See, for instance, Second Opinion on Latvia and Fourth Opinion on Liechtenstein.
106. For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the Advisory Committee’s findings on the effective participation of persons
belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, as contained in Article 15, reference is
made to its Second Thematic Commentary (footnote 3).
107. The term ‘economic and social life’ covers a wide range of issues, from access to adequate housing, health care and social protection
(social insurance and social benefits), to social welfare services and access to the public and private labour market, as well as access
to business and other self-employment opportunities, which are closely linked to property rights and privatisation processes. See
Second Thematic Commentary (footnote 3), paragraphs 23ff.
108. See Third Opinion on Estonia and on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
Page 26 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
level, to varying degrees, in order to protect further and more thoroughly and to promote the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities. These instruments are fully in line with the international law principle
of territorial integrity and can be a useful tool to promote the enjoyment of minority rights, particularly with
respect to the preservation and development of minority identities and cultures.109
109. See also OSCE HCNM Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory
Note, September 1999.
Ź Page 27
Part VII
Minority rights with a specific
scope of application
79. Given the particular financial and administrative commitment required in order to give effect to some
language rights contained in the Framework Convention, states parties may establish special conditions for their
enjoyment.110 The right to use a minority language in relations with local administrative authorities (Article 10(2)),
the right to have topographical indications and signposts also displayed in the minority language (Article 11(3)),
and the right to learn minority languages or receive instruction in minority languages (Article 14(2)) therefore
have a specific scope of application, in that their availability may be limited to certain areas where persons
belonging to national minorities reside traditionally (see also paragraph 31) and/or in substantial numbers
(see also paragraph 34). In accordance with the express wording of the Framework Convention, the right to
use a minority language with local authorities must be guaranteed either in areas where national minorities
are settled in substantial numbers or in areas that are traditionally inhabited by national minorities; one of
the two alternatives suffices. However, an accumulation of these two criteria, namely traditional settlement
and substantial numbers, may be required for the implementation of the right to display topographical signposts
in minority languages. Overall, the Advisory Committee has repeatedly encouraged states parties also
to promote the enjoyment of the rights contained in Articles 10(2), 11(3) and 14(2) in situations where the
conditions are not formally met but where implementation would serve to promote an open society, where
multilingualism is encouraged as a reflection of diversity.111
80. Given the particular significance of language for the expression and preservation of minority identity,
as well as for promoting access to rights and social interaction,112 the Advisory Committee has consistently
recommended a flexible and context-specific approach with respect to these conditions and in particular
with respect to numerical thresholds. It has purposefully refrained from proposing an acceptable threshold
for the applicability of minority rights because it considers that the specific context, history and conditions in
the state party must be considered on a case-by-case basis and in consultation with the concerned minority
representatives.
81. It is important to underline that any threshold must be applied in a flexible manner so that situations
are avoided where a negligible decrease in the minority population or the decision of some persons belonging
to national minorities no longer to avail themselves of a specific right, alter the accessibility of the right
because a predetermined threshold is no longer met. States parties are explicitly obliged to refrain from any
measures, including territorial reforms, which alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by
persons belonging to national minorities and aim to restrict access to minority rights.113 It is therefore essential
that the specific impact on national minorities and the use of minority languages is taken into account in close
consultation with national minority representatives when reviewing administrative borders, as the creation
of larger self-government units may indeed result in certain thresholds no longer being met.
82. In the view of the Advisory Committee, increased population mobility in all states requires a careful and
flexible approach with respect to numerical or territorial delimitations to the enjoyment of minority rights.
This is particularly the case with respect to persons belonging to numerically smaller minorities for whom
the use of their minority language in official communications may have a distinct emblematic value. Overall,
the Advisory Committee has consistently held that numerical thresholds should be considered indicative and
should be flexibly used,114 as regular consultations with the national minority representatives concerned are
more apt to promote the enjoyment of minority rights than fixed thresholds. Attention must further be paid
to ensure that multiple affiliations are not used as a pretext to lower the numerical size of national minorities.
Any self-identification as a person belonging to a national minority must be recorded and processed as such,
also when part of a multiple affiliation (see also paragraph 16).
110. See also Explanatory Report, paragraph 64.
111. See, inter alia, Third Opinion on Finland, Second Opinion on Latvia and Third Opinion on Lithuania.
112. See also Third Thematic Commentary (footnote 4).
113. See Article 16 of the Framework Convention.
114. Flexibility in this context may mean, for instance, that it is decided on a case-by-case basis whether the number of learners is
sufficient to open a class in the specific context and what the modalities of teaching may entail. See Third Opinion on Finland.
Page 28 Ź The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights
83. The right to learn the minority language or receive instruction in it (Article 14(2)) may also be made available
only in certain areas where persons belonging to national minorities reside traditionally or in substantial
numbers. In addition, this right also presupposes demand for such education. It is essential therefore to ensure
that parents are adequately made aware of the possibility contained in Article 14(2) to have instruction in the
minority language, as well as of the benefits attached to first language education for the learning of other
languages. State obligations to ensure opportunities for minority-language education contained in Article
14(2) are further limited to “as far as possible”, which again indicates that the resources of the state party must
be taken into account.115 Yet, the Advisory Committee has encouraged states parties also to extend the ability
to access education in and of minority languages to persons belonging to national minorities who live in
capitals or other urban centres, including through making contemporary and online learning tools available
as such provision does not always have to be cost-intensive.116
115. See Explanatory Report, paragraph 75.
116. See Second and Third Opinions on Austria and Second and Third Opinions on Finland.
Ź Page 29
Part VIII
Conclusions
84. The common understanding of the protection of national minorities and what it entails has changed
over the two decades since the adoption of the Framework Convention in 1995. At that time the concept of
minority rights was mainly associated with the preservation of minority identities and with their protection from
assimilation during partially violent state-formation and nation-building processes. Since then, the increased
global and regional mobility of populations has transformed the demographic profile of European societies,
and attention has shifted to the challenge of forming integrated and inclusive societies where diversity is
acknowledged and welcomed as their integral feature. The present-day European context is further marked
by migratory movements of an unprecedented scale which, coupled with the effects of recurrent economic
crises and with growing security concerns, are destabilising societies and altering the manner in which minority
rights are perceived in society and by policy makers.117
85. The Framework Convention was deliberately designed as a living instrument that is neither constrained
by static definitions, nor by the question of who should be considered as a national minority or who should
not. Rather, its interpretation must evolve and be adjusted to the prevailing societal context to ensure effective
implementation. Adopted as a result of the courage and commitment shown by state leaders in the 1990s to
prevent further interethnic violence through the promotion of individual rights and in the spirit of dialogue
and solidarity, it is based on the understanding that minority identities are not exclusive. Persons belonging
to national minorities must be allowed both to preserve their identities and to participate effectively in public
life as an integral part of society. The Framework Convention therefore lays out a catalogue of rights that are
of particular importance in order to maintain and encourage diversity while also promoting integration and
social interaction.
86. While in some cases increasing diversity is embraced and conceived as a resource for societal development,
in other cases there are references to the dangers of diversity and the threat to an asserted cultural homogeneity
of the nation state. The latter perspectives disregard the fact that linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity
has been an integral part and an asset of European society over centuries. Moreover, they lay the foundations
for two increasing trends that are of deep concern to the Advisory Committee. Firstly, hate speech and racist,
xenophobic and extremist discourse, which is on the rise throughout Europe, often directed at anybody who
is perceived as “different”, including persons belonging to national minorities. Secondly, a deepening polarisation
along ethnic and linguistic, and at times religious lines, which has in some countries been cemented
in parallel education systems that deepen divisions over generations.
87. The Framework Convention was designed as a tool for states to manage diversity in a way that carefully
balances broader societal concerns, such as cohesion and democratic stability, with the protection of individual
rights. As such, it is of particular relevance today when courage and commitment are again needed to meet
the contemporary societal challenges, such as intensifying polarisation, the continued exclusion of some
minorities, and the resultant threat of radicalisation in many European countries. Europe today must again
meet urgent societal challenges that undermine stability, democratic security and peace. Courage and commitment
are again needed to overcome the existing divisions through the enhancement of the principles on
which the Council of Europe was founded, including the effective protection of minority rights. The Framework
Convention is a powerful tool to assist states to address these challenges and create stable and sustainable
societies where difference is expressed and affirmed, where equal access to rights and resources is facilitated
despite difference, and where social interaction and constant dialogue is promoted and encouraged across
difference.
117. See also the Tenth Activity Report of the Advisory Committee, covering the period from 1 June 2014 to 31 May 2016.
The Council of Europe is the continent’s
leading human rights organisation.
It comprises 47 member states, 28 of which
are members of the European Union.
All Council of Europe member states have signed up to
the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty designed
to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
The European Court of Human Rights oversees
the implementation of the Convention in the member states.
ENG
PREMS 131016
www.coe.int
Annex 825
Council of Europe, Report of 11 April 2016
Information Documents
SG/Inf(2016)15 rev
11 April 2016
————————————
Please find appended the Report presented to me by Ambassador Gérard
Stoudmann on his human rights visit to Crimea
(25-31 January 2016)
————————————
1
In a decision taken during their 1225th meeting on 15 April 2015 (Item 1.8, paragraph 5) the Ministers’
Deputies expressed their “serious concern regarding the continued deterioration of the human rights
situation in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea; underlined once again the need to secure respect for all
human rights, including for persons belonging to national minorities, in particular the Crimean Tatars,
and to ensure that the relevant human rights bodies of the Council of Europe can carry out their
monitoring activities unimpeded; to this end”. In this respect, they invited the Secretary General to
“hold political consultations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine in order to propose viable
solutions”.
The Secretary General, after consultations with the two Governments, managed to send the first
human rights delegation to Crimea following a period of 18 months during which no international
organisations were present on the Peninsula. The delegation was headed by Ambassador Gérard
Stoudmann, a prominent Swiss diplomat. The delegation, after having stayed for 7 days in Crimea and
having had more than 50 meetings with representatives of civil society, minorities, religious
communities and media, prepared a report.
This report does not deal with any issue related to the status of Crimea. The Council of Europe fully
respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine as repeatedly expressed by its Committee of Ministers.
2
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following consultations with the governments of Ukraine, as well as the Russian Federation, Secretary
General Thorbjørn Jagland announced on 20 January 2016 to the Ministers’ Deputies that he was
sending a Human Rights delegation to Crimea, having taken into account the various calls from the
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and from individual member States for the
Council of Europe to review the human rights situation in Crimea. The delegation’s objective was to
assess the Human Rights and Rule of Law situation of the 2.5 million people who live on the Peninsula
and are covered by the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as to make relevant
recommendations. The delegation was bound by the relevant decisions of the Committee of Ministers
of the CoE relating to Crimea, and was not to deal with any issue related to the status of Crimea.
The delegation was led by a Swiss diplomat, Ambassador Gerard Stoudmann, accompanied by three
members of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. It left for Kyiv on 23 January and arrived in
Simferopol on 25 January after having visited Moscow. It left Crimea for Moscow on 31 January. The
Head of Delegation visited Kyiv again on 8 February.
During its stay in Crimea, it met without obstacles with numerous representatives of civil society,
NGOs, religious communities, national minorities (in particular the Crimean Tatars), media, as well as
local authorities in Simferopol, Yalta, Bakhchisaray and Sebastopol. In particular, there were meetings
with the Crimean Tatar community expressing critical and dissenting views. They were held privately, in
locations chosen by the interlocutors or the delegation. It also visited Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
classes in two schools. The Head of the delegation was allowed, at his specific request, to visit
Mr Akhtem Chiygoz, Vice Chairman of the “Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People” at his place of
detention.
The following report contains the main points that were raised, notably the issues related to standards
and commitments enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR” or “the
Convention”), as well as recommendations and proposals for possible rapid action, for the attention of
the Secretary General. Among the issues that required rapid action, the transfer of 16 Ukrainian
citizens in prison in Crimea, requesting their transfer to another prison in Ukraine-controlled territory
was raised by the delegation at the request of Ukrainian authorities, with a view to facilitating this
transfer on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, also at the request of the Ukrainian side, the issue of
persons currently in pre-trial detention elsewhere in Ukraine but whose criminal files remained in
Crimea in 2014 was raised with a view to ensuring the transfer of those files.
Issues that have been raised regularly and which are directly relevant to certain ECHR provisions, such
as Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment), Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and Article 6 (right to fair trial) relate in particular
to alleged abuses by law enforcement officers, such as when conducting searches. The disappearance
of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar opponents was also raised.
The searches (at times without warrant) and the behaviour of some law enforcement officers, (in some
cases with clear indications of disproportionate use of force), as well as intimidation and threats of
4
abduction, combined with the fact that many interlocutors indicated that any complaint against such
behaviour was “useless”, are indicative of the existing tensions.
Regarding the the delegation asked for information on cases concerning It noted that there are no major divergences between the sources on the number of
particularly problematic cases – which vary Many of the suspect cases mentioned date back to 2014. According
to the prosecutor, there is It is important
that independent, diligent and transparent investigations are carried out and that ongoing
developments and conclusions are presented publicly to instil confidence and to avoid further
rumours; families and the public in general should be informed regularly on the state of the
investigations, including through the reactivation of the Contact Group created to this effect.
Today, the perception of the delegation is that the cases of repression, as severe as they may be, seem
more targeted against individual opponents, whether they are Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians or others,
rather than reflecting a collective repression policy against the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group.
However, in this sensitive context, It should be noted in this
context that Today some
members of the Mejlis are sitting in senior local positions, while others are in exile or in prison – a
clear indication of a split within the Crimean Tatar leadership. the building of a mosque in
Simferopol and the continuation of the Crimean Tatar curricula in schools.
Finally, many of the recurring issues that came out of the meetings with civil society representatives
did not always have a direct link with relevant articles of the ECHR. They are related to complaints
It appears that the law on extremism is applied and extensively interpreted as a basis for such
operations. They seem to target mostly Crimean Tatars, often with links to family members or friends
in exile, as they are considered by the local authorities as the biggest threat of extremism and dissent
towards the present order. In this context, the creation in the Kherson region (to the North of the
Peninsula) of a paramilitary unit known as the “Tatar battalion” (which is however allegedly not only
recruiting Crimean Tatars, but is open to all Muslim volunteers), is regularly mentioned: on the one
hand, the threat of violent action by this group is referred to as a reason for the application of the law
on extremism, for searches and other operations; on the other hand, some of the Crimean Tatar
interlocutors of the delegation expressed the fear that the use of violence by this group would turn
part of the population against the Crimean Tatars and lead to a deterioration of the interethnic
relations on the Peninsula.
disappearances, a total of 21
persons.
from 10 to 15 individuals, both Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians, 5 of them found dead.
one case of murder under investigation, one person has been found alive
and all other cases are still under investigation. To be noted, 2 most recent cases (2016) were solved at
the time of the departure of the delegation and had apparently no political connotation.
the procedure aiming at declaring “the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people” an “extremist organisation”, should it lead to a court decision on a ban, would indicate a new
level of repression targeting the Crimean Tatar community as a whole.
the Court in Simferopol has already postponed the procedure several times.
Additionally, the ban of the Mejlis would appear
to contradict some of the policy measures adopted up to now, such as the recognition of the Crimean
Tatar as an official language, the rehabilitation of deported Crimean Tatars,
. The Mejlis is an important traditional
and social structure of the Tatar community. Its qualification as an extremist organisation would
considerably increase the risk of further alienation of the Crimean Tatar community and of isolating it
from the rest of the population living in the Peninsula.
5
about inefficient bureaucracy, widespread corruption, the effect of the blockade (in particular on water
and energy supplies), the effect of sanctions on prices, trade, travel and communications. They
reflected at times an emotionally loaded atmosphere and frustration.
Conclusions
The present situation significantly affects the population of Crimea in many ways. This report is an
attempt at presenting some of the issues related to the application of the European Convention on
Human Rights, as requested under the delegation's mandate. It is only through the establishment of a
regular access to the Peninsula, under the authority of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
that some issues could be addressed in a more comprehensive manner.
Therefore, the main overriding conclusion of this report is the need to re-open the Peninsula for the
Council of Europe monitoring structures and other relevant international mechanisms, and to identify
viable solutions, allowing for their effective functioning under the present circumstances. It is also
important to allow for contacts with and access to civil society and their representatives in Crimea, in
particular through facilitation of travel procedures.
It is indeed neither normal, nor acceptable, that a population of 2.5 million people should be kept
beyond the reach of the human rights mechanisms established to protect all Europeans. In this
context, many interlocutors, in particular from the Crimean Tatar community, expressed the hope that
the visit of this delegation would not be a one-off visit and that the Council of Europe monitoring
structures would soon be allowed back.
6
I. Introductory remarks
1. In accordance with the mandate given by the Secretary General, the present report does not
deal with any issue related to the status of Crimea. In addition, the present report does not
interfere with the pending applications before the European Court of Human Rights against
the Russian Federation and Ukraine (including inter-State cases)1, the supervision of the
Court’s judgments related to Crimea by the Committee of Ministers in the framework of its
functions under Article 46 of the Convention, nor the Council of Europe programmes and
projects in Ukraine, or the work of the International Advisory Panel2.
2. The delegation spent seven days in Crimea, carrying out more than 50 meetings. It operated in
full independence, including with respect to the possibility of holding meetings originally not
included in the preliminary negotiated programme. It met representatives from all sectors in
Crimea and held meetings in several cities, including Simferopol, Yalta, Sebastopol and
Bakhchisaray. Ambassador Stoudmann was also able to visit Mr Akhtem Chiygoz, Vice
Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, who is detained in Simferopol pending his
trial. Before the visit to Crimea, Ambassador Stoudmann visited both Kyiv and Moscow. In Kyiv
on 23 January, he had meetings with Mr Pavlo Klimkin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ms Valeriya Lutkovska, the Ombudsperson of Ukraine, as well as with representatives of the
Crimean Tatar minority Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev and with NGOs. On 25
January, Ambassador Stoudmann had meetings in Moscow with Deputy Foreign Minister and
Secretary of State Grigory Karasin and Ombudsperson Ella Pamfilova. Upon the delegation’s
return, Ambassador Stoudmann had meetings in Kyiv and Moscow.
II. Law Enforcement
3. An issue regularly brought to the attention of the Council of Europe’s team concerns the
conduct of some law enforcement officers. It would appear that searches, arrests and identity
controls would be in many cases carried out without respecting the necessary legal safeguards
and in some cases with clear indication of disproportionate use of force (including in the
presence of children), based on the provisions regarding the fight against extremism and
terrorism. Although in some cases discussed by the delegation, law enforcement authorities
carried out their duties correctly, concurring elements seem to indicate the existence of
misconduct by law enforcement officers in the exercise of their functions, leading to a
consequent degree of mistrust of part of the population towards the law enforcement
authorities. This can also explain the fact that complaints about such alleged violations are
often not formally submitted to the competent authorities.
1 There are currently three inter-State applications lodged by Ukraine against Russia: For more information see
the press release: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-5187816-6420666.
2 The International Advisory Panel was constituted by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to oversee
that the investigations into the violent incidents which took place in Ukraine from 30 November 2013
onwards met all the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights.
7
4. The delegation can confirm the 2011 findings and recommendations of the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)3 about the need to intensify efforts to put a
stop to racist or racially discriminatory misconduct by the police and to investigate any
allegations of misconduct by law enforcement officials towards persons coming within ECRI’s
mandate.
5. Concerning allegations of ill-treatment and torture, there is at least one pending case before
the North Caucasus District Military Court concerning allegations against members of the FSB
during the detention and interrogations of a Ukrainian citizen, Mr Oleksandr Kostenko. It
would be important to ensure effective investigations of this and of other reported cases of illtreatment4
and, where appropriate, impartial judicial proceedings.
“Self-defence forces”
6. A separate aspect of the issue concerns the so-called “self-defence forces”. The delegation
was informed by the regional leadership that they had been disbanded and transformed into
two separate security companies, one armed and the other without weapons. However it has
not been possible to fully clarify their current legal status and functions nor the allegations
about their involvement in enforced disappearances and other violations, and the state of
investigations on such cases. Legislative initiatives proposing immunity from prosecution
(“amnesty law”) for actions committed by the “self-defence forces” after February 2014 have
not been pursued; an issue raised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
during his visit in 2014.5 However, the delegation noted that members of the unarmed
security company created after the “self-defence forces” were disbanded still use militarytype
uniforms and insignia, which can create confusion as to their actual status and powers.
Recommendations:
To ensure that effective investigations are carried out in alleged cases of ill-treatment and
other human rights violations by law enforcement forces and by former “self-defence forces”.
To ensure that law enforcement authorities always carry out their functions in accordance with
applicable law and that appropriate safeguards protecting the rights of individuals involved in
law enforcement operations are fully respected.
It is important that initiatives are taken to provide training to law enforcement authorities
about applicable internal and international human rights standards, and to recommend
3 ECRI 4th report on Ukraine, adopted on 9 December 2011, paragraphs 164, 166 and 168. See also ECRI
Conclusions on the Implementation of the Recommendations in respect of Ukraine subject to interim follow-up,
paragraph 3.
4 Such as, for instance: Andriy Shekun and Anatoly Kovalsky, allegedly abducted by “self-defence forces” and
brought first to a police station and then to a secret place, where they would have been detained (and one of
them tortured) for 11 days; Gennadiy Afanasiev, involved in the case of Oleg Sentsov and Alexander Kolchenko,
who withdrew his testimony declaring he had testified under torture.
5 See the report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, document CommDH(2014)19, paras.
36-40.
8
particular attention in the exercise of their functions when dealing with minorities, in order to
avoid any perception of discrimination based on ethnic, religious or other grounds.
To avoid that members of security companies wear uniforms that could lead to confusing them
with law enforcement or military personnel.
III. Disappearances
7. Rights6.
The delegation’s interlocutors were convinced that, in certain cases, the disappeared
had been killed.
8. In light of the seriousness of the allegations, it is essential to ensure effective investigations –
especially in cases where persons had been abducted or subsequently found dead – and to
inform their families and the general public. A Contact Group for the families of disappeared
persons was set up in October 2014, but it has not met since April 2015, while disappearances
have continued to occur. The prosecutor has been cooperative in providing information to the
delegation on a number of cases7, and recognised the need to increase transparency about
the state of investigations. The prosecutor declared a readiness to take steps in this respect,
for instance through regular press briefings.
Recommendations:
Investigations in cases of alleged abductions and disappearances must be effective and in
accordance with the relevant standards of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the
Convention”), with particular regard to the requisites of adequacy, thoroughness, impartiality,
independence, promptness and public scrutiny.
It is vital to provide appropriate information to the families of alleged victims and to the
general public.
6 See the report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, document CommDH(2014)19, pp.
5-7.
7 Information was provided upon request regarding: Reshat Ametov,
found dead on 15 March 2014, with signs of
ill-treatment; found dead on 21 April 2014 as a result of a road accident; and Seyran Zinedinov, disappeared on 26 and 30 May 2014; Leonid Korzh
(whose disappearance was announced
on 28 May 2014 in connection with those of Mr Shaymardanov and Mr Zinedinov ) still living in Crimea today
and – according to information provided by the prosecutor – denying having been victim of unlawful acts;
and allegedly abducted on 27 September 2014; disappeared and subsequently found hanged on 5 October 2014. Other cases where further information is
expected include: and disappeared on 7 March 2014; disappeared on 15 March 2014; disappeared on 3 October 2014; father
of Oleksandr, disappeared on 3 March 2015 on his way from Kyiv to Crimea; Mukhiddin, killed on 26 July
2015; Mukhtar Arislanov, 45, allegedly abducted in a minibus on 27 August 2015; Memet Selimov and Osman
Ibragimov, disappeared and then found dead on 29 August 2015; Arlen Terikhov and Ruslan Ganiev,
disappeared
on 15 December 2015 in Kerch. The cases of two minor Crimean Tatar girls
disappeared in early 2016 was also
solved by the time of departure of the delegation.
Suspicious cases of disappearances brought to the attention of the delegation concern a
relatively limited number of persons (between 10 and 15, both Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians), a large part of which occurred in 2014, although this remains a highly sensitive
issue as already stressed in the report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Mark Ivanyuk, Timur Shaymardanov
Izlyam Dzhepparov Dzhavdet Islyamov, Edem Asanov,
Ivan Bondarets Vladislav Vashchuk, Vasyl Chernish,
Eskender Apselyamov, Fyodor Kostenko,
Kachok Mukhiddin
9
It is important to re-activate the Contact Group for the families of disappeared persons as a
confidence-building measure.
IV. The Judiciary
9. In the short time available, the delegation was not able to make a comprehensive and detailed
assessment of the current functioning of the judiciary in Crimea. It was mentioned during the
meetings that information on the Convention case-law is offered via trainings, and that the
European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) case-law is published and disseminated.
Further, the modernisation of court rooms was noted.
10. However, the delegation received information on allegations of important shortcomings in the
functioning of the local criminal justice, including of persisting corruption. In this context, the
delegation received reports on alleged discrepancies with respect to arrest or pre-trial
detention and noted in particular the allegations of applicants’ representatives that arrest
and/or pre-trial detention lacked legal basis and that pre-trial detention was often prolonged
without justification. Those matters fall under the Convention (Article 5-right to liberty and
security). It is worth recalling in this respect that in older judgments concerning Crimea the
Court had found violations of that provision of the Convention.
11. The prosecutor noted that these Convention requirements are taken into account by law
enforcement officials. However, from discussions in various meetings, the delegation
observed that the pertinent Convention standards as interpreted by the Court are not, in
some instances, well understood by all sides.
12. This wide range of information led the delegation to observe a strong feeling of mistrust in the
application of justice, and not only amongst members of the opposition. This lack of
confidence hampers the possibility to lodge complaints and seek reparation for alleged human
rights violations. Despite some positive measures, such as those mentioned above, the
delegation believes that much more needs to be done to ensure that the Convention
requirements regarding the right to a fair trial are enshrined among the judiciary but also in
the society in general.
13. It should be noted that during the meeting between the Head of the delegation and
Mr Akthem Chiygoz, Vice Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (meeting
referred to in detail below under “the penitentiary establishments”), Mr Chiygoz requested
that his trial be public and monitored by the Council of Europe.
14. At the request of the Ombudsperson of Ukraine, the issue of persons currently in pre-trial
detention elsewhere in Ukraine but whose criminal files remained in Crimea in 2014 was
raised with a view to ensuring the transfer of those files, thus allowing access to the criminal
files.
10
15. In addition, the delegation noted two specific issues with implications on the effective
functioning of the Judiciary:
The adaptation of legislation after March 2014 and its impact on rights and freedoms
16. According to information given by the prosecutor, The prosecutor indicated that the public is informed of the enactment of new
acts via a weekly television programme. Given however the proliferation of new laws, it is not
clear for the delegation whether those information measures are adequate.
17. The delegation noted the general perception in the society that legislation became more
restrictive and had an impact on fundamental rights and freedoms (see below notably under
Freedom of expression, Freedom of association and assembly).
18. The delegation heard several accounts that The latter is more generally seen as a longstanding problem. The delegation was
informed about positive measures adopted to tackle corruption, including the creation of anticorruption
committees. The delegation was also informed of specific cases of corruption that
led to dismissals and/or charges against officials. Despite the efforts deployed, which were
acknowledged by several interlocutors, results would still be below the public’s expectations.
Whilst the delegation perceives the importance of the matter, it is not within its mandate to
further explore the issue. The same goes for questions of citizenship and the related issue
concerning residence permits; also outside the scope of the mandate.
The legal basis for criminal proceedings
19. The delegation noted that, in certain instances, persons have been convicted or indicted on
the basis of legislation introduced after March 2014 for facts which occurred before that date.
Two cases in particular were brought to the delegation’s attention. The case of
Mr - sentenced in May 2015 to 4 years and 2 months for “intentional
infliction of bodily harm” for having hit a Ukrainian policeman in Kyiv with a stone on
18 February 2014, and for “illegal possession of firearms”, and the case currently pending
involving six people, among others Mr in connection with the events which
occurred in Simferopol on 26 February 2014.
20. The issue of indictments and convictions on the basis of laws which did not exist in Crimea at
the time of the events (which amounts to retroactively applying a new legislation) or applied
to facts occurred in Kyiv, was addressed at the meeting with the prosecutor. 1557 legal acts have been enacted since
March 2014.
the re-registration process imposed in many
sectors (e.g. business, associations, property, media, identity documents, license plates, etc.)
had an impact on the related rights and freedoms, and also created new opportunities for
corruption.
Oleksandr Kostenko
r Akthem Chiygoz,
The prosecutor
underlined the absolute need not to leave the crimes unpunished and further noted that the
indictments were subsequent to the lodging of applications by the families of the victims.
Subject to further analysis and verification of the specific legal provisions, the delegation
observes that these indictments or convictions might raise concerns as to their compatibility
11
as interpreted by the Court. It appears that a review of these cases needs to be
considered.
21. The prosecutor informed the delegation that 118 offences were decriminalised after March
2014 in line with the applicable legislation, and that a review of sanctions was carried out,
which led to the reduction of sanctions and to the release of 2783 inmates out of 3142
between March 2014 and January 2016. The prosecutor indicated that this measure could also
prevent overcrowding in prisons.
Recommendations:
Cases where the legal basis for indictment/conviction appears based on a retroactive
application of the legislation should be reviewed.
V. Penitentiary Establishments
22. The situation regarding the conditions of detention in penitentiary establishments in Crimea
had in the past been examined by the Court8 and the CPT9. In its last visit to the Peninsula
(2013), the CPT underlined a number of areas of concern regarding the material conditions in
the Simferopol pre-trial establishment-SIZO.
23. Although short-term measures focusing on the improvement of food and health care were
reported to the delegation, the local authorities acknowledged that there is still a need for
substantive work in this area in order to bring the material conditions of detention in the local
penitentiary establishments up to international standards. To this end, the construction of two
new detention centres was noted.
24. A number of technical and specific questions fall within the CPT’s expertise and mandate, and
require more time for their consideration.
25. During the visit, Mr Stoudmann was also allowed to visit Mr who is detained
in Simferopol pending his trial. During that meeting, in addition to his other requests (see
under Judiciary, p.7), treatment. However, no civil doctor had
accepted to examine him despite the agreement of prison authorities. In addition, while
acknowledging that he received regular visits by family members, he expressed the wish that it
be made possible to receive a visit by his elderly mother who suffers from mobility problems.
8 For instance in Dvoynykh (App. No. 72277/01) of 12 October 2006 (regarding conditions of detention the
Simferopol pre-trial establishment-SIZO); Yakovenko (App. No. 15825/06) of 25 October 2007 regarding the
Sevastopol Temporary Detention Isolator- ITT.
9 Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine from 9 to 21 October 2013, doc. CPT/Inf (2014)15;
see in particular Appendix I List of CPT Recommendations, comments and requests for information.
Akthem Chiygoz,
with the principle of legality, also in the sense of Article 7 (No punishment without law) of the
Convention,
Mr Chiygoz challenged the lawfulness of his arrest. Mr Chiygoz did not
make complaints about his treatment by the penitentiary administration or ill-treatment in
prison, but mentioned health problems having led him to request to be examined by a civil
doctor in order to get appropriate medication and
12
Both requests have been transmitted to the prosecutor who noted that she would personally
follow up on the matter. This attitude of refusal by “ordinary civilians” (in this instance, civil
doctors) to intervene in politically delicate cases is, however, an element that contributes to
corroborate the allegations about a climate of intimidation and of isolation of those who are
perceived as opponents. Additionally, the issue of Mr Chiygoz’s health should also be
examined from a humanitarian perspective.
26. The case of 16 Ukrainian citizens10 convicted before March 2014 and serving their sentence in
Crimea was raised, as they formally requested their transfer to another prison in Ukraine. This
issue was raised originally in December 2015 by the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin
with Secretary General Jagland, requesting him to help in securing this transfer. The issue was
thus discussed by the delegation with interlocutors at all levels, in particular with the
Ombudsperson in Kyiv, with a view to the identification of a suitable solution on a
humanitarian basis.
Recommendations:
All interested parties should find a viable solution to guarantee CoE monitoring bodies’ access
to the places of detention in the Peninsula.
To encourage the training of law enforcement officials (judges and prosecutors) as well as of
lawyers regarding the ECHR requirements pertaining to arrest and pre-trial detention.
VI. Crimean Tatars and other minorities
27. General difficulties and concerns affecting the rights of minorities – and notably Crimean
Tatars – had already been largely identified in previous reports of Council of Europe
monitoring structures11, and have been confirmed by many interlocutors of the delegation,
including Crimean Tatars in Kyiv.
28. In the context of the current crisis, the allegations of abuses by law enforcement authorities
on the one side and the accusations of religious-based radicalisation on the other contributed
to create a situation in which Crimean Tatars are particularly exposed to violations and
restrictions of their rights and freedoms. Today, the repression seems more targeted towards
those perceived as opponents and/or those close to them, rather than reflecting a systematic
policy against the Crimean Tatars as a minority, which does not exclude cases of
discriminations as reported below.
10 Originally, 22 convicts reportedly filed petitions requesting their transfer. However, it was explained to the
delegation that the situation now concerns only 16 of them.
11 See, in particular: the report of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities following its ad hoc visit to Ukraine (21-26 March 2014); the Committee of Ministers’
resolution CM/ResCMN(2013)8 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities by Ukraine (adopted on 18 December 2013); the Third Opinion on Ukraine by the Advisory
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities adopted on 22 March 2012;
the 4th ECRI report on Ukraine, adopted on 9 December 2011.
e
13
29. Indeed, This is the
case, for instance, of – which would have according
to some interlocutors disproportionally affected small business owned by Crimean Tatars - and
for With respect to the latter, a procedure of
regularisation of property rights for land occupied by Crimean Tatars after their return in
Crimea had been set up prior to March 2014, and the delegation had been informed that
those who had not completed such procedures by then are now experiencing difficulties.
Clarifications were obtained from the local authorities on these two particular issues, which
nevertheless need to be further examined (see recommendation below).
30. Note was taken of a number of measures recently adopted aiming to address some concerns
of the Crimean Tatar community, combining with more concrete
action, such as the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars (which also implies an increase in pensions
of ex-deported people), the recognition of Crimean Tatar as an official language, the building
of a mosque in Simferopol, the continuation of the Crimean Tatar curricula in schools. The
adoption of these measures is positively perceived by the concerned population.
31. At the same time, another part of the Crimean Tatar minority sees itself as the deliberate
target of discrimination and human rights violations and consider such measures ineffective or
irrelevant. Most allegations of disappearances and of violations committed by law
enforcement authorities indeed concern Crimean Tatars (see above).
Representation of Crimean Tatars / freedom of assembly issues
32. These allegations were however nuanced by other
33. It should be noted that, 34. a number of measures adopted after March 2014 are perceived by the interested
persons as having a discriminatory effect - directly or indirectly – on Crimean Tatars.
procedures for re-registration of business
the recognition of land property rights.
“symbolic” recognition
representatives of the Crimean Tatar community who argued that past restrictions in 2014
were linked to the specific political context at the time.
due to the boycott of the September 2014 local elections by part of
the community, the number of Crimean Tatars elected drastically diminished, from around
1290 before the elections to only 138.
Several interlocutors also reported difficulty for the Crimean Tatar community in obtaining
authorisations to hold rallies.
In addition, the delegation learned after its visit that the prosecutor requested, on the basis of
the law on countering extremist activity, that the “Mejlis” (the permanent executive body of
the “Kurultay” – the traditional Crimean Tatar assembly) be declared as an extremist
organisation and be banned, which would undoubtedly have consequences for all Mejlis
members, should this decision be taken by the Court (it should be noted that the Court has
already postponed the procedure several times). Such a decision would indicate a new level of
repression targeting this time the Crimean Tatar community as a whole.
14
35. One should bear in mind the importance of the “Mejlis” for the Crimean Tatar people, as
underlined by many different sources; and therefore the risk that such a negative decision
would further alienate the Crimean Tatar community, as well as the importance of maintaining
traditional organs to ensure their representation.
36. Moreover, in the context of the current crisis, some of the most prominent members of the
“Mejlis” left Crimea and have been charged and others such as Mr Chiygoz are detained, while
others occupy important official positions in Crimea. Against this background, the growing
tensions and divisions within the Crimean Tatar community are obvious.
37. The delegation also took note of the information (confirmed by both sides), on the creation
and training of a paramilitary group in the Kherson region to the North of the Peninsula – “the
Tatar battalion”, open both to Crimean Tatars and other Muslim volunteers. There is
increasing fear within the Crimean Tatar community living in Crimea that, should this group be
in the future involved in violent action against Crimea, this would fuel anti-Tatar sentiments,
deepen the divisions within the community, and lead to the adoption of even more severe
measures, in particular based on the law against extremism, limiting the exercise by Crimean
Tatars of their rights. The situation is in any event very tense and could lead to serious security
implications.
Freedom of expression / media
38. The delegation noted that Crimean Tatars are generally free to display flags and Crimean Tatar
symbols in public. Public buildings visited by the delegation continue to carry inscriptions in
Tatar alongside other official languages.
39. However, regarding the Crimean Tatar media, the delegation also took note of concerns about
a reduction in media diversity, as illustrated by the case of “ATR TV.” An online daily
newspaper (previously printed), continued to operate at the time of the visit.12
40. On 1 April 2015, private Crimean Tatar ATR TV was taken off the air along with the children’s
TV channel “Lale” and radio station “Meydan”, all belonging to the same group.13 Whatever
by the Crimean
Tatar community.
12 The Crimean Tatar newspaper “Advet” reportedly turned into an online newspaper only after it faced
difficulties in the re-registration process. Reportedly, it also received warnings on the basis of the legislation
against extremism.
13 Headed by Lenur Islamov, one of the main Crimean Tatar leaders now outside Crimea.
3 was the administrative process leading to the shutting down of ATR (the re-registration
process seems to have played a role in this case), the delegation took in any event note of the
attachment towards ATR TV and of the sense of loss and frustration caused by its shutting
down – which can therefore be considered as having significantly reduced media diversity in
Crimea. This sentiment of frustration was probably one the main reasons which led to the
establishment of the new public Crimean Tatar TV “Millet TV” – re-hiring part of former ATR
staff and which had just started operating at the time of the visit. It remains therefore to be
seen whether “Millet” will be considered as a representative media outlet
15
Other minorities
41. The delegation had the opportunity to meet with representatives of most of other minorities
living in Crimea (Armenians, Germans, Greeks, Italians, Jewish, Karaites, Krimchak) on various
occasions – but it did not have the opportunity to meet with Roma representatives. They
reported no deterioration in access to their rights but rather expectations that their situation
may in fact improve (e.g. restitution of religious property to the Karaites, rehabilitation decree
regarding the Crimean Italians). They deplored the effect of their current isolation on the
possibility of travel and exchanges with countries of origin, including with respect to family
reunion when part of a family lives abroad and/or with respect to possible financial support.
Recommendations:
To find a viable solution for access to the territory of Crimea to the competent Council of
Europe structures, and other international institutions dealing with minority issues.
The newly created public Crimean Tatar TV “Millet” programmes and approach should
respond to the needs and expectations of the whole Crimean Tatar community, so as to be
perceived as a representative channel, truly contributing to media diversity.
To refrain from taking measures that may have a detrimental effect on the representation of
the Crimean Tatar community, or have a directly or indirectly discriminatory effect.
The procedure for regularisation of land of Crimean Tatars should be completed smoothly and
all legal and practical obstacles should be overcome.
To identify viable ways to facilitate contact between members of a minority and their country
of origin.
VII. Freedom of Religion
42. After the 2014 referendum, legal organisations of religious communities (as other legal
entities) were required to re-register in order to continue exercising their organisational
activities. Most representatives of religious communities, including those sitting in the Council
of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, indicated that re-registration did not cause
major difficulties. However a sharp reduction in the number of registered religious
organisations was noted – from over 1400 to a number variable between 250 and 400
according to the sources. Reportedly, many of them were not active.
43. Two Muslim holidays have now been recognised as public holidays in Crimea, and the
construction of a central mosque in Simferopol has been announced. Representatives of
smaller religious communities, such as the Karaites, welcomed recent efforts for the
restitution of religious property and attention paid to the particular significance of religious
buildings and monuments for their cultural and religious identity.
44. This notwithstanding, the delegation noted the particular attention of law enforcement
authorities as regards Islam, particularly in connection with the application of the legislation
against extremism. Reportedly, many of the religious organisations that have ceased to exist
were Muslim organisations allegedly funded from abroad. The search for prohibited extremist
16
literature (as well as for weapons and proof of connections with extremist and terrorist
groups) has been one of the main reasons given for repeated interventions of law
enforcement authorities in mosques, madrassas and private homes of Muslims, in most cases
Crimean Tatars. According to the Chief Mufti of Crimea and the Mufti of Sebastopol, this has
led religious authorities to replace their religious literature with religious publications from
Russia.
45. This issue should be considered also in light of the requirements under Article 9 of the
Convention (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) as interpreted by the Court.
46. Ambassador Stoudmann met Archbishop Clement in Kyiv, representing the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, who declared that there are 250 believers
remaining in Crimea and complained about difficulties with regard to the full use and access to
their administrative buildings in Simferopol.
Recommendations:
Favourable and secure conditions for the practice of all religions must be guaranteed.
VIII. Freedom of expression and media freedom
47. During its visit, many interlocutors confirmed to the delegation the restrictive effect of the
application of the new legislation (since March 2014) to media outlets and journalists in
Crimea. There are also concerns that stricter requirements, interpretation of the legislative
framework or administrative bias led to a reduction of media diversity. This impression of
limited media diversity emerged clearly from a meeting of the delegation with local media
representatives.
Freedom of expression
48. The delegation took note of allegations of restrictions to freedom of expression under the
argument of “extremist contents”, including through the monitoring of social media. Several
interlocutors underlined the risk faced under the applicable law (e.g. the legislation against
extremist and/or separatists statements) by activists and/or bloggers who express their
objection to the March 2014 referendum and to its outcome. The same interlocutors insisted
on the climate of intimidation by law enforcement officials, threats to individual journalists,
and the practice of addressing warnings to individuals over the content they publish online,
based on the legislation against extremism. These concerns were raised with the prosecutor.
This issue should be looked at in light of the level of protection afforded by the Court to a
pluralistic public debate, journalistic freedom and the protection of journalistic sources14. Any
interference with freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention should comply
with the requirements set in Article 10 §2 as interpreted by the Court.
14 See judgments Castells (App. No. 11798/85, 23 April 1992), Roemen and Schmit (App. No. 51772/99, 25
February 2003) and Ernst & Others (App. No. 33400/96, 15 July 2003).
17
Media freedom
49. The delegation received information that, apart from ATR TV and its affiliated outlets (see
under the “Crimean Tatars and other minorities”), most media outlets completed the reregistration
process after March 2014.15 However, beside the Crimean Tatar media, it was also
confirmed that several Ukrainian newspapers ceased their activities after March 2014,
reportedly for financial and/or other reasons. There are indications however that a limited
access to dedicated Ukrainian media is possible in some regions or through satellite TV. The
situation regarding both Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media confirms a reduction in media
diversity after March 2014. In this context, the launch of a new Crimean Tatar media – “Millet
TV” – should be considered as recognition of the needs and expectations of the Crimean Tatar
community. Still, an in-depth analysis of the media situation would require more time and
expertise on a case-by-case basis, looking in particular at the re-registration process.
50. Based on discussions with representatives of media and civil society, the delegation had an
overall impression that local Crimean media are rather hesitant to dig into sensitive issues –
political or not. Some civil society representatives shared the view that it is easier to attract
the attention of media in Moscow than that of local media on issues of high sensitivity. In the
same vein, some civil society representatives expressed concerns that access to air time with
the local public TV/Radio company (e.g. for advocacy purposes) is rather limited in Crimea.
Increased exchanges and contact of local journalists with international journalists could help in
strengthening the role of local media as a “public watchdog”16.
Recommendations:
An easier access for foreign journalists to Crimea would be very important.
Programmes and approach of the newly created public Crimean Tatar TV “Millet” should
respond to the needs and expectations of the whole Crimean Tatar community, so as to be
perceived as a representative channel, truly contributing to media diversity.
IX. Freedom of association and assembly
51. Like other entities, Crimean NGOs had to re-register after March 2014. According to figures
provided during the visit there would be 2,833 registered non-profit organisations in Crimea.
Many are still in the process of re-registration, and 331 NGOs were denied registration in
2015. It was explained that the decrease in the numbers was partly due to the fact that the
applicable legislation is particularly complicated and administratively demanding (as
confirmed by NGOs met by the delegation, especially in order to comply with the “Foreign
Agents” provisions), and partly to the fact that a large number of previously registered NGOs
15 According to local authorities, 207 medias that were already registered in Crimea prior to March 2014
successfully managed to re-register after March 2014.
16 According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the press performs a vital role of “public
watchdog” in a democratic society. The Court has emphasised that “freedom of the press and other news media
affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of
political leaders.”
18
were reportedly not active. NGO representatives complained about the difficulty to maintain
and/or develop contacts with their counterparts abroad due to communication and travel
restrictions.
52. Based on preliminary information, the delegation is under the impression that the
re-registration process had a shrinking effect on the Crimean civil society sector, and that the
Crimean NGOs seem to be rather weak and still uncertain about how to operate under the
current conditions. One of the meetings organised with NGOs – at the office of the Crimean
ombudsman - left the delegation with serious doubts about the independence of many of
them. At the same time, the delegation was told by re-registered associations and NGOs active
in the social field (for instance supporting elderly people, people with disabilities, etc.) that
they now have access to greater opportunities for public financial support for their activities.
53. groups17. It was reported that in the second half of
2015 alone around 1000 mass rallies took place, that 4 public areas in Simferopol are allocated
Recommendations:
Registration of associations should be granted in a non-discriminatory manner and without
unjustified obstacles.
Authorisation of rallies and other public gatherings should be granted in a
non-discriminatory manner and without unjustified obstacles.
It would be important to identify viable ways of facilitating contacts between Crimean civil
society actors and civil society actors from outside Crimea.
17 For instance, the delegation heard allegations that rallies organised and/or attended by pro-Ukraine protesters
usually lead to administrative sanctions. Law enforcement authorities are reportedly particularly zealous,
notably when Ukrainian symbols are displayed.
The delegation also raised the issue of restrictions on freedom of assembly targeting
opposition activists and/or Crimean Tatar for the holding of rallies, and that authorisations are granted in accordance with the applicable
legislation. However, these figures do not allow for concerns to be eluded about arbitrary or
politically-oriented decisions in the treatment of requests to hold rallies, and possibly in the
related sanctions. The delegation notes in this context that it is essential that any interference
with the right to association be in conformity with Article 11 para. 2 of the Convention
(freedom of assembly and association) as interpreted by the Court.
19
X. Education
54. The question of the right to receive education in and of minority languages in Crimea had
already been addressed by Council of Europe monitoring structures in the past18. As regards
schooling in Crimean Tatar language, the delegation did not identify evident signs of a
deterioration of the situation. Although some uncertainty on the provided figures persists,19
the delegation found that the number of classes providing teaching in Crimean Tatar may have
diminished, but not to a significantly worrying extent, at least for the current academic year.
The same is true as regards, for instance, newly trained teachers and the availability of
textbooks which have been adapted and re-edited in Tatar language in 2015.
55. For schooling in Ukrainian language, the delegation can, on the contrary, confirm that the
number of schools and classes providing teaching in Ukrainian language has sensibly
diminished compared to 2013. This is, according to local authorities, the result of a free choice
of parents who now prefer to pursue the education of children in Russian. It was not in a
position to verify allegations about the inadequacy of information of parents, pressures not to
choose Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar as schooling languages and unjustified refusals.
56. An important change in the legal framework is that Article 10 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Crimea, adopted on 11 April 2014, recognises Crimean Tatar, Russian and
Ukrainian as official languages. The delegation visited “model” schools where renovation had
been recently carried out, and received concurrent information that investments are being
carried out throughout Crimea to renovate and build new schools.
Recommendations:
To facilitate the full information of parents about possible choices for main languages of
schooling.
XI. Humanitarian issues
57. During the visit the humanitarian situation in Crimea was addressed by many interlocutors, in
particular as a result of the blockade of the Peninsula. Several civil society interlocutors in
Crimea indicated to the delegation that the situation had worsened for citizens as a result of
the successive blockades (water, food and electricity). Based on preliminary findings, there are
reasons to believe that these blockades had and/or still have a non-negligible impact on living
18 See in particular the concerns expressed in the Committee of Ministers Resolution CM/ResCMN(2013)8 on the
implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Ukraine, adopted on
18 December 2013, which recommended inter alia to “provide clear legal guarantees for the right to receive
education in and of minority languages and regularly monitor their effective implementation; increase and
diversify opportunities to study in minority languages at university level; increase efforts to provide minority
language institutions with adequate supplies of quality textbooks and strengthen opportunities for the training
of minority language teachers; adopt clear law provisions in order to ensure the use of minority languages for
access to higher education”.
19 The delegation received information by local authorities that demand of classes providing teaching in Crimean
Tatar is further decreasing, but the same local authorities also confirmed that this would not lead to the
suppression of further schools or classes.
20
conditions in Crimea. The main concern in that regard is related to the “water blockade” (see
below). The blockades notably had a negative impact on prices, and were depicted as a form
of collective punishment. While the electricity blockade still has a negative impact, notably on
hospitals (e.g. for new born babies or intensive care patients), allegations of victims directly
linked to electricity shortages were not confirmed. The delegation also took note of concerns
expressed by several interlocutors with regard to restrictions to freedom of movement along
the crossing points, notably resulting from excessively tight crossing regulations imposed by
both sides, and by the lack of adequate documentation.
Water blockade
58. The Peninsula has experienced water shortages after the Ukrainian authorities decided, in
May 2014, to shut off the supply of water from the Dnieper River via the North Crimean Canal.
It was mentioned to the delegation that the water blockade had important negative effects on
agricultural activities due to the lack of irrigation, in particular for rice culture. According to
different sources, residents were also directly affected in their daily life by the reduction of
water supply – which would still affect some areas. Moreover, it was reported to the
delegation that alternative solutions – relying on artesian wells – may have contributed to a
salinization of underground reserves, and ecological concerns were raised. The delegation is
not in a position to draw any conclusion on the matter, which should be examined by experts.
Recommendations:
A technical assessment visit from international experts would clarify the impact of the water
blockade.
Annex 826
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations on the Ukrainian Territories Outside the
Control of the Ukrainian Authorities (26 September 2016)
o
26 September 2016
ea remedie for ma ri ioaio o e raiia
erriorie oide e oro of e raiia aoriie
eor
Committee on egal ffairs and uman Rights
Rapporteur: Ms Marieluise EC, ermany, lliance of iberals and Democrats for Europe
The Committee on egal ffairs and uman Rights is deeply worried about the human rights situation in
Crimea and in the self-proclaimed peoples republics of Donets and uhans DPR and PR and the
lac of legal remedies for ictims.
The DPR and PR, established, supported and effectiely controlled by the Russian Federation, do not
enjoy any legitimacy under Urainian or international law. This applies to all their institutions, including the
courts established by the de facto authorities.
Under international law, the Russian Federation, which eercises control oer these territories, is
responsible for the protection of their population. Regarding Crimea, Russian military presence and effectie
control hae been officially acnowledged by the Russian authorities. Regarding the DPR and the PR,
effectie control is based on the well-documented crucial role of Russian military personnel in taing oer and
maintaining control of these regions, and on the complete dependence of the DPR and PR on Russia in
logistical, financial and administratie terms.
oth in Crimea and in the conflict one in the Donbas region, serious human rights iolations hae occurred.
The committee finds that free and fair elections are not possible in these regions as long as the climate of
insecurity, intimidation and impunity and the lac of freedom of epression and information preail.
1. Reference to committee: Doc.13700, Reference 4108 of 30 anuary 2015 and Doc.13728, Reference 4124 of
24 pril 2015.
http://assembly.coe.int
F - 67075 Strasbourg Cede [email protected] Tel: 33 3 88 41 2000 Fa: 33 3 88 41 2733
Coe ae
. Draft resolution......................................................................................................................................... 3
. Eplanatory memorandum by Ms Marieluise ec, rapporteur.................................................................6
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 6
2. The human rights situation in the Urainian territories outside the control of the Urainian authorities
.................................................................................................................................................................7
2.1. The human rights situation in Crimea...........................................................................................7
2.2. The human rights situation in the DPR and PR...................................................................10
3. hich legal remedies for ictims of human rights iolations on the Urainian territories outside the
control of the Urainian authorities.......................................................................................................16
3.1. pplication to the European Court of uman Rights..................................................................16
3.2. Reference to the International Criminal Court............................................................................ 21
4. The amnesty clause under the Mins II greement an obstacle to accountability.........................22
5. Conclusions....................................................................................................................................... 23
5.1. Regarding the human rights situation in Crimea........................................................................ 23
5.2. Regarding the human rights situation in the PR and DPR...................................................23
5.3. Regarding the implementation of the Mins greements: lin between ceasefire and elections
..........................................................................................................................................................24
5.4. Regarding legal remedies.......................................................................................................... 25
2
raf reoio
1. The Parliamentary ssembly is deeply worried about the human rights situation in Crimea and in the
self-proclaimed peoples republics of Donets and uhans DPR and PR.
2. It reaffirms its position that the anneation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the military
interention by Russian forces in eastern Uraine iolate international law and the principles upheld by the
Council of Europe, as stated in ssembly Resolution 2112 2016, Resolution 2063 2015, Resolution 1990
2014 and Resolution 1988 2014.
3. The DPR and PR, established, supported and effectiely controlled by the Russian Federation, do
not enjoy any legitimacy under Urainian or international law. This applies to all their institutions, including
the courts established by the authorities.
4. Under international law, the Russian Federation, which eercises control oer these territories,
is responsible for the protection of their population. Russia must therefore guarantee the human rights of all
inhabitants of Crimea and of the DPR and PR.
5. Regarding Crimea, Russian military presence and effectie control hae been officially acnowledged
by the Russian authorities. Regarding the DPR and the PR, effectie control is based on the welldocumented
crucial role of Russian military personnel in taing oer and maintaining control of these regions,
against the determined resistance of the legitimate Urainian authorities and on the complete dependence of
the DPR and PR on Russia in logistical, financial and administratie terms.
6. oth in Crimea and in the conflict one in the Donbas region, serious human rights iolations hae
occurred, and are still occurring, as documented by numerous reports of, , the Council of Europes
Commissioner for uman Rights, the United Nations uman Rights Monitoring Mission for Uraine, the
Special Monitoring Mission to Uraine of the Office for Democratic Institutions and uman Rights of the
Organiation for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE/ODIR, as well as leading Urainian and
international non-goernmental human rights organisations. These iolations include etrajudicial illings,
enforced disappearances, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, unlawful detentions and
disproportionate restrictions of the freedom of epression and information.
7. Victims of human rights iolations hae no effectie internal legal remedies at their disposal:
7.1. as far as the residents of the DPR and PR are concerned, local courts lac legitimacy,
independence and professionalism the Urainian courts in the neighbouring goernment-controlled
areas to which jurisdiction for the non-controlled areas was transferred by Uraine are difficult to reach,
cannot access files left behind in the DPR and PR and cannot ensure the eecution of their
judgments in these territories
7.2. as far as the residents of Crimea are concerned, the climate of intimidation also affects the
independence of the courts and, in particular, the willingness of the police and the prosecution serice
to hold to account perpetrators of crimes against perceied or actual Urainian loyalists.
8. In Crimea, Urainians in general, and Crimean Tatars in particular, hae been seerely intimidated by
the aboe-mentioned human rights iolations and the fact that they remain largely unpunished. Many were
forced to leae Crimea. In parallel, all inhabitants of Crimea hae been placed under immense pressure to
obtain Russian passports and renounce their Urainian nationality in order to hae access to health care,
housing and other essential serices. The Crimean Tatars, following the dissolution of the Mejlis and its local
branches, hae lost their traditional democratic representation. Tatar media and the Tatars Muslim religious
practice were also targeted. The cumulatie effect of these repressie measures is a threat to the Tatar
communitys ery eistence as a distinct ethnic, cultural and religious group.
9. In the conflict one in the Donbas region, the ciilian population as well as a large number of
combatants suffered iolations of their rights to life and physical integrity and to the free enjoyment of
property, by war crimes and crimes against humanity including the indiscriminate or een intentional shelling
of ciilian areas, sometimes prooed by the stationing of weapons in close proimity.
10. Numerous inhabitants of the conflict one in the Donbas, on both sides of the contact line, still suffer on
a daily basis from numerous iolations of the ceasefire agreed in Mins. These iolations are documented
daily by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Uraine, despite the restrictions on access imposed mainly
by the authorities of the DPR and PR. The inhabitants also suffer from the preailing climate of
2. Draft resolution adopted unanimously by the committee on 6 September 2016.
3
impunity and general lawlessness due to the absence of legitimate, functioning State institutions, and in
particular of access to justice in line with rticle 6 of the European Conention on uman Rights ETS No. 5.
They also endure seere social hardship worsened by restrictie measures imposed by the Urainian
authorities regarding pension and social assistance payments. Finally, persons displaced from the DPR and
PR face epropriation of the properties they left behind due to the unlawful re-registration reuirements
imposed by the authorities.
11. The Urainian authorities hae begun prosecuting alleged perpetrators of war crimes and other human
rights iolations on the side of pro-goernment forces. ut they hae not yet granted international obserers
access to all places of detention, in particular those run by the Security Serice of Uraine SU.
12. The Mins greements include amnesty clauses for the participants in the armed conflict in the Donbas
region. The ssembly recalls that under international law, such clauses cannot justify impunity for the
perpetrators of serious human rights iolations.
13. Regarding the elections foreseen in the Mins greements, the ssembly considers that as long as the
present situation in the DPR and PR, characterised by a climate of insecurity, intimidation and impunity
and a lac of freedom of epression and information, preails, free and fair elections as guaranteed by rticle
3 of the Protocol to the European Conention on uman Rights ETS No. 9 are not possible in these
regions.
14. The ssembly regrets that neither the Russian Federation nor Uraine hae ratified the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court ICC, whilst noting that Uraine has accepted the ICCs
jurisdiction for the conflict one in the Donbas region in its declarations of 17 pril 2014 and 8 September
2015 under rticle 12.3 of the Rome Statute. The ssembly welcomes the changes to the Constitution of
Uraine, finally adopted by the Urainian Parliament, by which the ratification of the Rome Statute will be
possible. t the same time, the ssembly is concerned that these changes will come into effect only in three
years time, and not as soon as possible, as was recommended by the ssembly.
15. The ssembly is deeply worried about the lac of progress in the international inestigation into the
downing of flight M17 in Donbas.
16. The ssembly therefore urges:
16.1. the competent authorities, both in Uraine and in the Russian Federation, to:
16.1.1. effectiely inestigate all cases of serious human rights iolations allegedly committed
in all areas under their effectie control
16.1.2. prosecute their perpetrators, thereby also discouraging any such iolations in future
16.1.3. compensate their ictims to the etent possible
16.1.4. accede to the Rome Statute of the ICC
16.1.5. fully implement the Mins greements
16.2. the Russian authorities to:
16.2.1. end their repressie actions against people loyal to the Urainian authorities in all areas
under their effectie control, including Crimea in particular, to restore the historical rights of the
Crimean Tatar community and to enable the re-establishment of the rule of law in the whole of
eastern Uraine
16.2.2. meanwhile, ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of all inhabitants of the
DRP and the PR and the fulfilment of their basic needs, and eercise their influence with the
authorities to this end
16.2.3. facilitate the independent monitoring of the human rights situation in all Urainian
territories under their effectie control, including Crimea
16.3. the Urainian authorities to mae easier, as far as is in their power, the daily life of the
inhabitants of the territories outside of their control and of the displaced persons from these areas by
reducing administratie burdens in access to pensions and social allowances and by facilitating the
inhabitants access to justice by adeuately euipping and staffing the courts in goernment-controlled
areas to which jurisdiction for the non-controlled areas has been transferred
4
16.4. the international community to continue focusing on the human rights and humanitarian situation
of the people liing in the territories of Uraine not under the control of the Urainian authorities and
refrain from placing demands on Uraine the fulfilment of which would cement the unlawful status uo
16.5. the ICC to eercise its jurisdiction regarding the conflict one in the Donbas region to the etent
that is legally possible following the declarations filed by Uraine.
17. The ssembly resoles to continue obsering the human rights situation in the conflict one in the
Donbas region and in Crimea as a matter of priority.
5
Eaaor memoradm arieie e raorer
rodio
1. Due to the anneation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the hybrid war in the Donbas region,
which led to the proclamation of the so-called peoples republics of Donets DPR and ugans PR,
Uraine lost effectie control oer substantial parts of its territory. The ssembly has strongly condemned both
the anneation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the Russian military interention in the Donbas
region as iolations of international law and of the fundamental alues of the Council of Europe.3 hilst I fully
share this point of iew, the focus of my mandate as rapporteur is to loo into the human rights situation of the
people liing in these regions, with a iew to identifying legal remedies for their plight. ut in order to be fully
objectie and to aoid giing in to the temptation of simply blaming both sides, it is useful to recall who is the
aggressor and who is the ictim of the aggression. In such a situation, euidistance is in reality a form of
uneual treatment. This said, Uraines ictim status does not gie this country a licence to iolate human
rights. To the contrary, as Ms ristna elienoa and I learnt during our joint isit to the Donbas region earlier
this year: the brae people still liing in the conflict one and the wonderful ciil society actiists deoted to
helping them as well as those displaced by the conflict rightly hae high epectations is--is the Urainian
authorities these must set the right eample, to the ery best of their abilities.
2. In this report, I will thus deal with the human rights situation in Crimea and the DPR and PR and
with the legal remedies aailable to ictims of human rights iolations including measures to preent such
iolations in the future. uman rights also include the right to free and fair elections protected in rticle 3 of
the Protocol to the European Conention on uman Rights ETS No. 9.
3. s regards the facts, I rely in the first place on my own fact-finding actiities, including the joint
information isit with Ms elienoa as the ssemblys rapporteur and the eperience gained in doens of
isits to the conflict one oer the last years as a member of the erman undestag and the hearings with
eminent eperts before our committee during the ssemblys anuary, pril and une 2016 part-sessions.
4. In addition, I rely on the remarably comprehensie and coherent reports published since the beginning
of the conflicts by representaties of the Council of Europe, other international bodies and numerous nongo
ernmental organisations NOs, including:
the Council of Europe Commissioner for uman Rights, and the special representatie of the Secretary
eneral, mbassador rard Stoudmann
the uman Rights Monitoring Mission in Uraine of the United Nations Office of the igh Commissioner
for uman Rights OCR RMMU
the Special Monitoring Mission to Uraine of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCE SMM, as well as the OSCEs Office for Democratic Institutions and uman Rights OSCE/
ODIR and igh Commissioner on National Minorities CNM
numerous reports presented by international and national NOs, including mnesty International I,
uman Rights atch R, International Crisis roup IC, Open Dialogue Foundation ODF, the
Open Russia Foundation, the iy Center for Ciil iberties, the iy International Partnership for
uman Rights, the Crimean uman Rights roup, the Coalition ustice for Peace in Donbas, the
hari uman Rights roup, and numerous grass-roots groups whose representaties we met in
Mariupol and Dnipro.
5. s regards the legal analysis, I base myself first and foremost on the European Conention on uman
Rights ETS No. 5, the Conention as interpreted by the European Court of uman Rights the Court.
6. To conclude, I will mae some suggestions as summed up in the draft resolution as to how the
ictims of the human rights iolations in the regions coered by my mandate may obtain redress and how their
situation may be improed in future.
3. Resolution 2112 2016 Resolution 2063 2015, Resolution 1990 2014 and Resolution 1988 2014. In this contet,
the repeated isits by ssembly members to Crimea and the DPR and PR on the initation of the authorities
are unacceptable most recently by a French delegation headed by Mr Mariani, see https://www.rt.com/news/354024-
french-lawmaers-isit-crimea/ and the fully justified criticism in www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/07/31/le-
oyage-de-parlementaires-francais-en-crimee-condamne-par-l-uraine_1469594.
6
e ma ri iaio i e raiia erriorie oide e oro of e raiia
aoriie
7. s I was not able to trael to Crimea, I am relying mostly on the reports by the Council of Europes
Commissioner for uman Rights, Mr Niels Muinies, and the special representatie of the Secretary
eneral, mbassador rard Stoudmann,4 as well as reports from other international organisations in
particular, the OCRs RMMU and from NOs. Very importantly, Mr Mustafa Dhemile, former
chairperson of the Mejlis and currently a member of the Verhona Rada and of the Urainian delegation with
the Parliamentary ssembly, gae an impressie description of the situation in his homeland at our committee
meeting on 21 une 2016.
8. The Council of Europes Commissioner for uman Rights published a report on 27 October 2014 on
the human rights situation in Crimea following isits to yi, Moscow and Crimea from 7 to 12 September
2014.5 The Commissioner insisted that all inestigations should be conducted in compliance with the
principles established in the case law of the European Court of uman Rights and stressed the need for
accountability for serious human rights iolations. e flagged a number of indiidual cases including:
the disappearance and death of a protester, Mr Reshat meto, whose abduction on 3 March 2014
was shown on the Crimean Tatar teleision channel TR
the suspect death of 16-year old Mar Ianyu on 21 pril 2014
the cases of three local ciil society actiists, eonid orh, Timur Shaimardano and Seiran inedino,
who went missing between 22 and 30 May 2014
the abduction by uniformed men of MM. Islyam Dhepparo and Dhedet Islyamo on 27 September
2014.
9. Mr Muinies also refers to the alleged implication in acts of iolence of the so-called Samo-oborona
Self-Defence units, whose status and functions remain unclear, and to acts of intimidation against Crimean
Tatars and ethnic Urainians who had criticised the recent political deelopments.6 In pril 2015, the
Commissioner made a public statement in defence of the Crimean Tatar TR teleision channel and
reiterated his point of iew that minorities in Crimea should be able to freely practise their religion, receie
education in their languages and manifest their iews without fear.7
10. The isit by mbassador Stoudmann, mandated by the Secretary eneral of the Council of Europe,
gae rise to some controersy. number of Urainian, and in particular Tatar representaties found the report
biased in faour of the Russian side.8 The report, published before the outlawing of the Mejlis as an etremist
organisation, considered that the cases of repression, as seere as they may be, seem more targeted
against indiidual opponents, whether they are Crimean Tatars, Urainians or others, rather than reflecting a
collectie repression policy against the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group.9
11. ut the report also stated that a ban on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people as an etremist
organisation which has indeed been imposed in the meantime would indicate a new leel of repression
targeting the Crimean Tatar community as a whole.
12. Very importantly, Mr Stoudmann concluded that the situation is such that it is neither normal, nor
acceptable, that a population of 2.5 million people should be ept beyond the reach of the human rights
mechanisms established to protect all Europeans. I cannot but agree with this statement.
4. S/Inf201615 re dated 11 pril 2016, Report to the Secretary eneral of the Council of Europe by mbassador
rard Stoudmann on his human rights isit to Crimea 25-31 anuary 2016 hereafter: Stoudmann report.
5. Document CommD201419 dated 27 October 2014.
6. See also statement on 12 September 2014, uman rights abuses in Crimea need to be addressed, mission to yi,
Moscow and Simferopol.
7. Commissioner Muinies calls for unhindered broadcasting of TR TV, statement of 2 pril 2015.
8. See, for eample, hat the special mission of the Council of Europe didnt notice in occupied Crimea, Euromaidan
Press, 30 May 2016.
9. Stoudmann report, op. cit., p. 4.
7
13. The RMMU,10 which was preented from opening an office on the territory of Crimea by the
authorities, has freuently reported on acts of intimidation against members of pro-Urainian population
groups, including national and religious minorities such as the Crimean Tatars. In its une 2015 report, it
stresses the tightening of the control of the media, including the denial of re-registration under Russian law
and the subseuent closure of at least seen media outlets using the Crimean Tartar language. Reregistration
reuirements hae also jeopardised freedom of religion. The RMMU has also flagged the
dramatic situation of ulnerable groups, such as people with a drug addiction depried of life-saing
substitution therapy.11 In its December 2015 report, the RMMU also points out the iolation of the right to
citienship:
14. In its most recent 14th report published in une 2016,13 the RMMU highlights the continuing climate
of intimidation fostered by the failure to inestigate the illings and disappearances in 2014/15 and in
particular the continuing harassment of the Tatar minority iolent searches and seiures, mass arrests,
transfer of Crimean detainees to Russian prisons, opening of a new teleision channel Millet broadcasting
in the Tatar language with the declared aim of countering anti-Russian propaganda.14
15. t the reuest of the European Parliaments Subcommittee on uman Rights, the European
Parliaments Directorate-eneral for Eternal Policies prepared a study on The situation of national minorities
in Crimea following its anneation by Russia,15 which concentrates on the situation of national minorities in
Crimea and describes numerous human rights iolations targeted specifically at minorities, including the rights
to life, liberty, security and physical integrity and property, the freedom of assembly, epression, association,
religion, freedom of moement, and education and cultural rights of minorities.
16. Regarding the situation in Crimea, the monthly monitoring reports by the Crimea Field Mission on
uman Rights set up in March 2014 by a group of NOs including the Urainian elsini uman Rights
Union, the outh uman Rights Moement and the uman Rights Centre lmenda with the support of the
United Nations Deelopment Program UNDP and of the Ministry of Foreign ffairs of Denmar appear to be
the most serious and reliable non-goernmental source of information.16 The Crimea Field Missions monthly
reports proide useful information on the progress of indiidual cases and on trends deeloping oer time. The
Field Mission also proides detailed information on threats to freedom of epression in Crimea, including
media freedom, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion since the anneation. s an eample of the ind
of cases followed up by the Field Mission, its May 2015 report17 noted that a practice has eoled in Crimea
whereby pro-Urainian actiists residing in Crimea are prosecuted for acts committed prior to the
establishment of control of the Russian Federation, or for participation in eents that too place outside of
Crimea for eample in other Urainian cities, which, in the opinion of the Crimean authorities, threatened the
established order of power. This also applies to the Case of 26 February, where criminal proceedings under
rticle 212 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation organising and participating in mass disorders
10. See paragraphs 24-34 below.
11. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February-5 May 2015, p. 6, paragraph 19.
12. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 ugust-15 Noember 2015, p. 4, paragraph 15.
13. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February-5 May 2015.
14. Ibid., p. 46, paragraph 194.
15. www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/droi/supporting-analyses.html.
16. ll reports of the Field Mission and of the Crimea uman Rights roup since pril 2014 the most recent coering
une 2016 are aailable at: http://crimeahr.org leading international human rights groups hae also published in-depth
reports on the human rights situation in Crimea, see mnesty International, Uraine: One year on: Violations of the rights
to freedom of epression, assembly and association in Crimea, 18 March 2015, Inde number: EUR 50/1129/2015
uman Rights atch, Rights in retreat: abuses in Crimea, 17 Noember 2014 and Russia: independent group targeted
oer Crimea, 23 une 2015.
17. Dated 24 une 2015, aailable at: http://crimeahr.org/en/.
8
were opened against the Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis, Mr htem Chiygo, and four other actiists
MM. li sano, Esender Nebie, Esender antemiro and Esender Emiralie.18 The May 2015 report
proides disturbing details about the arrest and torture of the pro-Urainian actiist Olesandr osteno, who
was conicted by a court in Simferopol on the basis of confessions allegedly obtained under torture, and
following a flawed trial presenting numerous characteristics pointing to its political motiation.19 The May 2016
report relates a new case of disappearance of a Tatar actiist, namely the abduction, on 24 May 2016, of
Erwin Ibragimo. In its latest report coering une 2016, the NO roup cites public statements by the
Crimean chief prosecutor which cast doubt on the effectieness of the inestigation into Mr Ibragimos
disappearance. In addition to the monthly reports, the Crimea uman Rights roup publishes thematic
reports. One such report published in February 2016 presents numerous instances of politically motiated
persecution and discrimination on the ground of pro-Urainian iews Crimea: Urainian identity banned.
The most recent thematic report, dated une 2016, on The ictims of enforced disappearance in Crimea as a
result of the illegal establishment of the Russian Federation control 2014-2016 proides detailed
descriptions of the circumstances of these disappearances and analyses the obstacles in the path of effectie
inestigation including at best unclear relations between the Crimean self-defence forces suspected of
inolement in these crimes and the de facto Crimean law-enforcement authorities.
17. Other detailed reiews of specific human rights issues under the occupation are proided by a group of
Urainian epert analysts CROT, regarding in particular the right to liberty of moement and freedom to
choose residence and the right to property, including nationalisation of property companies, institutions and
organisations State-owned and owned by trade unions, priate enterprises preention of disposition of
priate property in case of non-registration of real property in accordance with the Russian procedure
demolition of constructions not authorised by the authorities eample: demolition of a 16-storied
building at Cape Crystal in Seastopol difficulties while remoing priate property from the occupied territory
to mainland Uraine and ice ersa and mandatory re-registration in accordance with Russian law of all legal
entities registered on the territory of Crimea and Seastopol with denial in some cases and nationalisation of
the property.20
18. eading international human rights groups hae also published in-depth reports on the human rights
situation in Crimea, including mnesty International and uman Rights atch.21 The most comprehensie
factual documentation of human rights iolations in Crimea, coering the period between February 2014 and
February 2016, can be found in the report by a coalition of Urainian NOs entitled The Peninsula of Fear:
Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of uman Rights in Crimea.22 ast but not least, the Memorial nti-
Discrimination Centre dedicated a detailed report to the iolation of the rights of lesbian, gay, biseual and
transgender T people in Crimea and the Donbas region.23 ased on doens of eyewitness reports, it
describes the persecution of seual and gender minorities and the atmosphere of fear, secrecy and insecurity
created by openly homophobic armed people, decrees and regulations passed by local authorities under the
influence of Russian laws restricting the rights of minorities and prohibiting propaganda of non-traditional
seual orientations.
18. uman Rights Field Mission report May 2015 note 16 aboe, p. 3.
19. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
20. Crimea beyond rules. Thematic reiew of the human rights situation under occupation, Issue No. 2, Right to
property, http://crimeahumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Crimea_eyond_Rules_EN._Issue_2.pdf.
21. mnesty International, Uraine: One year on: Violations of the rights to freedom of epression, assembly and
association in Crimea, op. cit. uman Rights atch, Rights in retreat: abuses in Crimea, op. cit. Russia: independent
group targeted oer Crimea, op. cit. and Uraine: Fear, Repression in Crimea, rapid rights deterioration in 2 years of
Russian rule, 18 March 2016.
22. Sergiy ayets Regional Center for uman Rights, Oleandra Matiychu Center for Ciil iberties, Tetiana
Pechonchy uman Rights Information Centre, Darya Syrydoa Urainian elsini uman Rights Union and Olga
Srypny Crimean uman Rights roup: http://helsini.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_oo_EN.pdf.
23. Memorial nti-discrimination Centre, Violations of the rights of T people in Crimea and Donbass: The problem of
homophobia in territories not under Urainian control, une 2016: http://hro.rightsinrussia.info/hro-org/lgbtrights-10.
9
19. From 30 Noember to 5 December 2014, the Commissioner isited yi and the eastern regions of
Uraine, including two towns urahoe and rasnoarmiys situated close to the then frontline. The
Commissioner stated that
20. The Commissioner referred to information on hundreds of cases of unlawful illings, abductions and
enforced disappearances, as well as torture and ill-treatment and insisted on the need for accountability of
those responsible no matter which side of the conflict they are on. e also pointed out the plight of the
500 000 internally displaced persons IDPs and the hardships suffered by the persons residing in the
territories outside the control of the Urainian authorities, in particular ulnerable groups such as the elderly,
persons with disabilities and persons liing in penal or psychiatric institutions.25
21. From 29 une to 3 uly 2015, the Commissioner undertoo another isit to Uraine, including some
regions in eastern Uraine outside the control of the Urainian authorities Donets. is statement following
the isit focuses mainly on humanitarian issues, including access to humanitarian aid for residents and their
freedom of moement across the diiding line and buffer one.26
22. The Commissioners most recent isit to the conflict region in the Donbas too place from 21 to 25
March 2016. brief isit to Donets City, including a meeting with a senior staff member of the Ombudsman
of the DPR, was facilitated by the United Nations RMMU. In his report dated 11 uly 2016,27 the
Commissioner presented the results of interiews with more than a doen people who had been
depried of their liberty on both sides of the contact line. e found their detailed accounts of torture and illtreatment
particularly conincing in that they were striingly consistent, haing regard to the fact that the
people were interiewed indiidually. Regarding unacnowledged detention, the Commissioner noted that
seeral interiewees detained in goernment-controlled areas claimed that they were held incommunicado
and/or in unacnowledged places of detention for at least part of the time of their detention. Those who had
been depried of their liberty in non-goernment controlled areas were held in basements of administratie
buildings used by arious local structures performing military and security-related functions, as well as by
armed groups. The Commissioner noted that his reuest to isit places of detention in Donets was refused
by the de facto authorities, who did not allow any such isits by international monitors as they were not
foreseen by local legislation. e also noted that the Urainian authorities generally granted such access. ut
regarding certain alleged places of detention run by the Security Serice of Uraine SU, he had receied
information from a number of interlocutors on suspicious moements of detainees ahead of an anticipated
international monitoring isit.28 Commissioner Muinies also called the reintroduction of the death penalty in
the non-goernment controlled areas a regrettable step bacwards, which must be reersed.29 ast but not
least, the Commissioners report also recalls the difficult social and administratie situation of the inhabitants
of the conflict one.
23. In an interiew dated 26 uly 2016, Commissioner Muinies epressed his disappointment that during
his isit to Donets City, he did not hae the leel of access that he had anticipated to representaties of the
de facto authorities and to places of special interest from a human rights perspectie.
24. Statement dated 8 December 2014, Conflict in eastern Uraine has dire impact on human rights.
25. See also Nils Muinies, Eastern Uraine: the humanity behind the headlines, in: Open Democracy, 17 December
2014.
26. Statement on Eastern Uraine: freedom of moement is ital to preenting isolation and faouring reintegration,
4 uly 2015.
27. CommD201627.
28. t paragraph 25 the Commissioners report also refers to a statement of 25 May 2016 by the UN Subcommittee on
the Preention of Torture complaining about the denial of access to places in seeral parts of the country where it
suspected people were detained by the SU.
29. See Eecutie Summary, 2nd paragraph and paragraphs 13 and 14.
10
24. In March 2014, the OCR deployed a strong human rights monitoring mission in Uraine RMMU
with offices in yi, i, Odessa, Donets and hari.30 The mission, totalling about 35 obserers initially
headed by Mr rmen arutunyan,31 has been tased with reporting on the human rights situation and
proiding support to the oernment of Uraine in the promotion and protection of human rights.
25. The RMMU has so far published 14 human rights monitoring reports,32 the most recent one in une
2016 coering the period between 16 February 2016 and 15 May 2016. These regular reports are aluable
resources in that they proide releant details, which may enable the identification of the ictims and
suspected perpetrators of serious human rights iolations, including arbitrary illings for eample of captured
soldiers, torture, idnappings, and the indiscriminate shelling of ciilians. The mission clearly performs its job
neutrally and independently, on the basis of its international mandate. This is particularly aluable in the
preailing climate of mutual distrust between the Urainian authorities on the one hand and the leadership of
the self-proclaimed peoples republics of Donets and uhans and the Russian authorities on the other,
which is fuelled by freuent iolations of the ceasefire and an ongoing propaganda war.
26. The findings of the OCR mission are indeed deastating. Regarding human rights iolations by the
armed groups pro-Russian separatists, the RMMU made the following findings, :
27. RMMU reports also candidly obsere how the professionalisation of the armed groups fighting in
eastern Uraine has become more and more openly acnowledged and self-eident:
30. See Concept Note, UN human rights monitoring in Uraine. The planned office in Simferopol, in Crimea, could not be
opened because the de facto authorities would not receie the mission nor guarantee its security see UN-ssistant
Secretary-eneral for uman Rights Ian Simonoic Press Conference in ie, Uraine, 14 March 2014.
31. On 23 une 2015, Mr arutunyan was elected as judge of the European Court of uman Rights on behalf of
rmenia.
32. www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENCRegion/Pages/UReports.asp.
33. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 15 uly 2014, p. 3, paragraph 5.
34. Statement to the Security Council by Ian imonoi, ssistant Secretary-eneral for uman Rights, meeting on
Uraine, 24 October 2014: www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspNewsID15212angIDE
35. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February to 15 May 2015, p. 3, paragraph 4.
36. OCR Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 15 uly 2014, paragraph 8 Report on the human rights
situation in Uraine, 17 ugust 2014, paragraph 2 rmed groups are now professionally euipped and appear to benefit
from a steady supply of sophisticated weapons and ammunition, enabling them to shoot down Urainian military aircraft
such as helicopters, fighter jets and transport planes OCR, Report on the human rights situation, 16 September
2014, paragraph 3: rmed groups of the self-proclaimed Donets peoples republic and uhans peoples republic were
bolstered by an increasing number of foreign fighters, including citiens of the Russian Federation. On 27 ugust, the socalled
prime minister of the Donets peoples republic, leander aharcheno, stated on Russian State teleision that
3 000-4 000 Russians were fighting alongside the armed groups, including former or sering Russian soldiers, on leae
from their posts. see also p. 7, paragraph 21 OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine,16 February to
15 May 2015, p. 4, paragraph 6.
11
28. etween the beginning of hostilities in mid-pril 2014 and 15 May 2016, at least 9 371 people were
documented as illed and 21 532 as wounded, and hundreds of people remain missing. The RMMU
considers this as a conseratie estimate. The oerall trend of lower leels of ciilian casualties since the
September 2015 ceasefire continued. Neertheless, the RMMU recorded 113 new conflict-related casualties
in eastern Uraine between February and May 2016 14 illed and 99 injured.38 The RMMU receied new
reports on illings, torture and ill-treatment as well as unlawful arrests, forced labour, looting, ransom
demands and etortion of funds on the territories controlled by the armed groups. The persecution and
intimidation of persons suspected of supporting the central authorities remained widespread. The population
of the territories controlled by the armed groups is increasingly isolated from the rest of Uraine since the
oernment of Uraine decided to temporarily relocate State institutions from these territories and to stop
allocations of funds and disbursements of social payments to institutions and indiiduals. Obiously, the most
ulnerable population groups pensioners, families with children, persons in institutional care suffer the most.
ast but not least, the inhabitants of the peoples republics suffer from the permit system introduced by a
Temporary Order of the Security Serice of Uraine SU on 21 anuary 2015, which limits freedom of
moement across the contact line. ccording to the OCR mission, the system continues to gie rise to
intolerable delays and corrupt practices though a hotline for complaints established by the eaduarters of
the nti-Terrorist Operation seems to hae brought some relief39. Four ciilians were illed and eight others
wounded on 27 pril 2016 by the shelling at night of a checpoint in the illage of Olenia on the road
between Mariupol and Donets City. The OSCE crater analysis indicates the responsibility of the Urainian
armed forces.40 For RMMU, this is a star illustration of the impact of the limitations on freedom of
moement, which hae compelled ciilians to spend prolonged periods eposed to the iolence and riss of
ongoing hostilities near the contact line.
29. Earlier reports by the RMMU proide detailed accounts of other specific iolations of human rights and
international humanitarian law by the separatist fighters, such as:
the rocet attacs on 24 anuary 2015 on the maret place in the goernment-controlled city of
Mariupol, illing at least 31 people and wounding 112, and on 13 anuary 2015 on a bus at a Urainian
checpoint near the oernment controlled town of Volnoaha, illing 13 ciilians and wounding 1841
the use of human shields, by locating military assets in, and conducting attacs from, densely populated
areas, thereby putting the ciilian population at ris42
the shelling of ciilians trying to leae the conflict areas including an attac on 18 ugust 2014 on a
column of ehicles with ciilians eacuating from uhans, allegedly by armed groups, between the
settlements of Noositlia and hryashchuate, illing at least 17 persons.43 ccording to the
RMMU, reports suggest that some incidents of shelling coincided with the eacuation of ciilians
and may hae been targeted to preent it44
the deliberate illing of soldiers who had surrendered or were trying to do so45 and the ill-treatment of
captured sericemen46
the introduction of the death penalty by the peoples republics of Donets47 and uhans48
37. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 ugust to 15 Noember 2015, p. 5, paragraph 22.
38. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February to 15 May 2016, paragraphs 3, 23 and note
23, 24 and 26.
39. Ibid., paragraph 88.
40. Ibid., paragraph 20.
41. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015, p. 4, paragraph 6,
and p. 7, paragraphs 24 and 25.
42. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 17 ugust 2014, p. 3, paragraph 4 Report 16 September
2014, p. 3, paragraph 4 and p. 7, paragraph 24.
43. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 September 2014, p. 7, paragraph 24 see also Report
17 ugust 2014, p. 3, paragraph 4: rmed groups hae continued to preent residents from leaing, including through
harassment at checpoints where residents report being robbed, and firing at ehicles coneying fleeing ciilians.
44. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015, p. 8, paragraph 29.
12
the iolation of the election rights of the residents of the peoples republics of Donets and uhans,
who were preented by the armed groups from participating in the national presidential and
parliamentary elections in May and October 201449 and subjected to the so-called referendum on selfrule
on 11 May 2014 and the so-called elections on 2 Noember 2014 organised by the armed
groups in iolation of the Urainian Constitution and of the most basic international standards.50
30. The RMMU obsered the further strengthening of parallel goernance structures of the Donets
Peoples Republic and the uhans Peoples Republic, with their own legislatie framewors, including
parallel systems of law enforcement and administration of justice police, prosecutors and courts, in
iolation of the Constitution of Uraine and in contraention of the spirit of the Mins greements. The most
recent report published in une 2016 states that the OCR is concerned that the deelopment of parallel
structures of administration of justice leads to systematic abuses of the rights of persons depried of their
liberty by the armed groups and issuance of decisions which contraene human rights norms.51
31. The RMMU recalls that the officials of the DPR and the PR are responsible and shall be held
accountable for human rights abuses committed on territories under their control. This particularly applies to
people bearing direct command responsibility for the actions of perpetrators.52
32. The RMMU does not fail to report also on alleged iolations of international humanitarian and human
rights law by Urainian forces, in particular the SU and certain olunteer battalions, in the form of
disproportionate or indiscriminate shelling of populated areas,53 abductions of ciilians for prisoner echange
purposes,54 arbitrary arrests, secret detentions and ill-treatment of prisoners.55 The RMMU is right in
insisting that the perpetrators of such abuses must be held to account in the same way as the separatist
fighters.56 In its most recent report, RMMU relates allegations of oer 20 cases of arbitrary and
incommunicado detention as well as torture. detention centre run by the Urainian Security Serice SU in
hari is suspected of being used for such abuses.57 The SU has so far refused access to international
monitors, as hae the de facto authorities of the PR and DPR.58 The RMMU notes that arbitrary
detention, torture and ill-treatment remain deeply entrenched practices.59
33. Regarding accountability, the RMMU notes the efforts of the Urainian authorities to bring
perpetrators from their own rans to justice. etween March 2014 and February 2016, the Office of the
Military Prosecutor reportedly inestigated 726 crimes committed by members of the armed forces including
11 illings, 12 cases of torture and 27 of arbitrary depriation of liberty. total of 622 persons were charged
45. Ibid., p. 9, paragraph 32 referring to incidents at rasnyi Partyan on 24 anuary 2014, documented by ideo
footage made by the armed groups themseles, and to the bodies of eecuted Urainian soldiers found at Donets airport
with their hands tied with white electrical cable see also OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine,
16 February to 15 May 2015, pp. 8-9, paragraphs 31-32, with details on the case of the summarily eecuted Urainian
sericeman Ihor ranoytsyi, including specific allegations against the commander of the Sparta battalion.
46. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015, p. 10, paragraph
33, referring to an incident on 22 anuary. 2015, when a doen Urainian sericemen captured at Donets airport were
forced to march through the streets of Donets, seeral of them haing been assaulted by an armed group commander
and by onlooers.
47. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 September 2014, paragraph 9 establishment of military
tribunals to implement death sentences to be applied in cases of aggraated murder.
48. elarus and Uraine rebels eep death penalty alie, , 17 pril 2015.
49. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 15 December 2014, p. 7, paragraph 25.
50. Ibid., p. 3, paragraph 3, and p. 4, paragraph 11.
51. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February to 15 May 2016, paragraph 66.
52. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 ugust to 15 Noember 2015, p. 3, paragraph 6.
53. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine,1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015, p. 7, paragraph 25
shelling of a trolley bus and public transport stop in Donets on 22 anuary 2015 illing 13 ciilians and wounding 12 and
shelling of the town of orlia held by the armed groups on 29 anuary 2015 illing eight and wounding 19 ciilians.
54. For eample, OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February to 15 May 2015, p. 13,
paragraph 53 referring to a person from the oernment-controlled town of Sloians who was reported to hae been
echanged three times.
55. Ibid., pp. 10-12, paragraphs 40-49.
56. For eample, OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 15 une 2015, p. 3, paragraph 5, p. 5,
paragraph 13 Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 17 ugust 2014, p. 3 paragraph 4 Report on the human
rights situation in Uraine, 16 September 2014, p. 3, paragraph 4, p. 5, paragraph 10, p. 7, paragraph 24.
57. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February to 15 May 2016, paragraphs 30-34 and 58-59.
58. t its une 2016 meeting, the committee inited its Chairperson to reuest information from the CPT on this issue.
59. OCR, Report on the human rights situation in Uraine, 16 February to 5 May, paragraph 29.
13
and 381 of them prosecuted. So far, 272 persons hae been judged.60 ut the OCR remains concerned
about the administration of justice by the Urainian authorities, in particular towards persons accused of
inolement with the armed groups:
34. The OCR also notes that the armed groups hae also taen some steps to prosecute perpetrators
from their own rans. The Office of the Prosecutor eneral of the PR reportedly stated that criminal cases
against members of two armed groups headed by atman and Serhii sohoro were submitted to the
military court of the PR.
35. The OSCEs Special Monitoring Mission to Uraine SMM, currently headed by mbassador Erturul
paan Turey, was established on 21 March 2014 by OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117. The
decision tased the SMM to, , establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports
of incidents, including those concerning alleged iolations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments
as well as to monitor and support respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities.62 The SMM is an unarmed, ciilian mission, present on the ground
around the cloc in all regions of Uraine, with the eception of Crimea. Its main tass are to obsere and
report in an impartial and objectie way on the situation in Uraine and to facilitate dialogue among all parties
to the crisis. The mandate of the Mission coers the entire territory of Uraine, including Crimea. The
Missions ead Office is in yi, where Ms elienoa and I had a ery constructie meeting with
mbassador paan. The SMMs monitoring teams wor in 10 of the biggest cities of Uraine: Chernitsi,
Dnepropetros, Donets, Iano-Franis, hari, herson, yi, uhans, i and Odessa. bout 350
monitors currently wor in the Donets and uhans regions.
36. The SMM produces daily reports63 summed up in weely reports64 proiding ery detailed information
on facts obsered, including ceasefire iolations with details on the number and nature of shootings,
detonations, and their liely origin and responsibility, damage assessment including assessment of the liely
origin of the grenade or missile strie, through crater analysis, superision of the sites to which certain
weapons systems were withdrawn in line with the Mins I and II ceasefire agreements, documentation of
border crossings, etc. The SMM also reports on incidents in which the monitors were refused access to
certain sites or were unable to access such sites due to unresoled security and safety issues. ccording to
the SMM, the majority of these incidents are the responsibility of the armed groups.On 26 uly 2015, an
OSCE monitoring patrol came under targeted machine gun, mortar and grenade fire leading to serious injury
of one of the monitors.65
37. I hae read a large number of these reports, which are impressie in terms of their objectiity, neutrality
and detail. It is regrettable that they hae receied so little attention in the political arena in Europe. In light of
these reports, it is ery difficult not to despair, gien that iolations of the ceasefire agreements still occur on a
daily basis. It is also ery regrettable that due to its limited mandate, the SMM is at times een preented from
reporting facts it actually obsered, such as transports oer the border between Russia and Uraine.
38. The SMM also produces thematic reports.66 The most recent such report on ccess to ustice and the
Conflict in Uraine 22 December 2015 studies the implications of the relocation of all judicial, prosecution
and administratie serices from non-goernment- to goernment-controlled areas. It describes constraints on
access to effectie and fair judicial serices caused by a combination of actions taen by the self-proclaimed
peoples republics, and the relocation of goernment serices motiated by the loss of goernment control
60. Ibid., paragraph 55.
61. Ibid., paragraph 57.
62. OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117 Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Uraine,
PC.DEC/1117, 21 March 2014 see in particular the fact sheet.
63. www.osce.org/uraine-smm/daily-updates.
64. Not in the public domain made aailable to OSCE member States goernments.
65. Statement by Deputy Chief Monitor leander ug, Direct iolence committed against OSCE monitors, one monitor
hospitalised, 30 uly 2015.
66. www.osce.org/uraine-smm/156571 See for eample the reports on ender Dimensions of SMMs Monitoring: One
ear of Progress 22 une 2015 on Freedom of moement across the administratie boundary line with Crimea
19 une 2015, on Protection of Ciilians and their Freedom of Moement in the Donets and uhans Regions 13 May
2015 and on Findings on Formerly State-Financed Institutions in the Donets and uhans Regions 30 March 2015.
14
oer certain areas. The report states that access to justice remains seerely limited due to the absence of
legitimate justice serices in non-goernment-controlled areas, the loss of case files, restrictions on freedom
of moement and the difficulty of giing notice of proceedings in these areas. The SMM also points out that
the relocated administration of justice faces challenges such as resource constraints, difficulties in the
reconstitution of case files, and in particular the inability to enforce judgments in the areas outside of the
control of the Urainian authorities. The report also scrutinises unlawful detentions both in goernment- and
non-goernment-controlled areas. The process of court relocation and the deelopment of parallel justice
systems has also led to the arbitrary depriation of liberty of persons on both sides of the contact line. In
goernment-controlled areas, the loss of files for cases relating to the DPR- and PR-controlled areas
preents conicted persons from lodging an appeal, and pre-trial detention periods are prolonged as
prosecutors attempt to rebuild case files. In DPR- and PR-controlled areas, people depried of their liberty
are subject to newly established parallel courts which are non-transparent and raise fair trial concerns and
judicial decisions by the relocated courts to acuit or otherwise release a person detained in the nongo
ernment-controlled areas cannot be eecuted. In sum, the report demonstrates the inability both of the
Urainian authorities and of the self-proclaimed peoples republics of Donets and uhans to guarantee
access to justice.67
39. eading international human rights groups such as mnesty International and uman Rights atch
hae published seeral in-depth reports on human rights iolations during the ongoing conflict in eastern
Uraine, which confirm and further underpin the findings of the OCR and OSCE obseration missions.
ocal human rights groups also maintain a steady flow of reports, including shorter articles and statements,
which contribute to eeping the ictims plight in the public conscience.68 mnesty International has mostly
concentrated on core human rights iolations such as murder, enforced disappearance and torture.69
uman Rights atch has chosen to focus mainly on alleged iolations of international humanitarian law, such
as attacs with unguided rocets on populated areas70 and the use of cluster munitions, allegedly by both
sides of the conflict,71 and finally the failure to grant access to medical care to ciilians.72 In a joint report with
the arard aw uman Rights Program, uman Rights atch generally uestions the legality of eplosie
weapons in populated areas and calls for a mutual agreement to curb their use.73
40. In uly 2016, mnesty International and uman Rights atch published a joint report74 presenting 18
cases of enforced disappearance in the conflict one in eastern Uraine 9 allegedly committed by the
Urainian authorities, in particular the SU, and 9 by the de facto authorities of the DPR and PR. The
report, based on interiews with numerous witnesses, family members and officials, does not claim to coer
all releant cases, or that the number of such cases is the same on both sides.75 ut it documents a pattern of
abuse which may well be lined indirectly to the Mins greement clauses on prisoner echange: people are
apparently arrested as currency for echange. This would be a highly unlawful form of hostage taing,
which must be stamped out.
67. OSCE SMM to Uraine report on ccess to ustice and the Conflict in Uraine, 22 December 2015, pp. 4-5.
68. nother report by the hitherto unnown Foundation for the Study of Democracy and the Russian Public Council for
International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy on ar crimes of the armed forces and security forces of Uraine: torture
of the Donbass region residents, published in Russian and English in Noember 2014, is written in such a polemic tone
that it may rather fall into the category of propaganda war.
69. Eastern Uraine conflict: Summary illings, misrecorded and misreported, 20 October 2014 Uraine: reaing
odies: Torture and Summary illings in Eastern Uraine, 22 May 2015, Inde number: EUR 50/1683/2015.
70. Uraine: Rising Ciilian Death Toll, Unlawful Unguided Rocet ttacs on Populated reas, 3 February 2015.
71. Uraine: idespread Use of Cluster Munitions, oernment Responsible for Cluster ttacs on Donets,
20 October 2014. Uraine: More Ciilians illed in Cluster Munition ttacs, oth Sides ae Used idely anned
eapon, 19 March 2015.
72. Uraine: Ciilians Struggle to et Medical Care, ll Sides Should Ensure Deliery of id to Ciilians in Rebel-eld
reas, 13 March 2015.
73. Ciilian arm from Eplosie eapons: greement Needed to Curb Use in Towns, Cities, 19 une 2015.
74. ou Dont Eist rbitrary Detentions, Enforced Disappearances, and Torture in Eastern Uraine, 21 uly 2016,
aailable at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/21/you-dont-eist/arbitrary-detentions-enforced-disappearances-andtorture-
eastern.
75. The selection by the R/I of these cases was based on their ability to document them in the most reliable way.
15
41. report by the International Crisis roup Uraine: the ine dated 18 uly 201676 describes, in
particular, the dramatic situation of the still substantial ciilian population liing along the line of contact. They
suffer freuent casualties and lie in a state of permanent fear, which has serious health conseuences.
Ciilians are still endangered by the practice, obsered on both sides, of stationing heay weaponry in
densely populated areas.
42. report by a group of Urainian NOs named ustice in eile77 highlights problems concerning the
administration of justice on both sides of the contact line similar to those described in the aboe-mentioned
thematic report by the OSCE, with a special focus on the functioning of the eiled courts in the goernmentcontrolled
parts of the Donets and uhans oblasts to which jurisdiction for cases in the non-goernment
controlled areas has been transferred.
43. ast but not least, the Memorial nti-discrimination Centre, in its une 2016 report on Violations of
the rights of T people in Crimea and Donbass: The problem of homophobia in territories not under
Urainian control gies a dramatic account of the deteriorating situation of seual minorities in the selfproclaimed
peoples republics.78
i ea remedie for iim of ma ri ioaio o e raiia erriorie oide e
oro of e raiia aoriie
44. mong the legal remedies aailable to the ictims themseles, the possibility of an application to the
European Court of uman Rights is of paramount importance, in particular in the situation where the courts
established by the de facto authorities lac legitimacy and are still underdeeloped as in the DPR and
PR and/or unliely to proide a fair hearing to persons alleging to be ictims of human rights iolations
caused by the actions of the same authorities. The International Criminal Court ICC may also hae a role to
play after the two declarations by Uraine which effectiely grant the ICC jurisdiction for all international
crimes committed on Urainian territory since 21 Noember 2013.
45. oth Uraine and the Russian Federation are States Parties to the European Conention on uman
Rights.79 ny person who considers that his or her rights under the Conention hae been iolated may
submit an application to the European Court of uman Rights, after the ehaustion of aailable domestic
remedies rticle 3.1.
46. Under the Courts case law deeloped with regard to the situation in the northern part of Cyprus80 in the
Transnistria region of the Republic of Moldoa,81 and, most recently, in the Nagorno-arabah region of
erbaijan,82 residents of a region in one State Party that is under the control of another State Party
may lodge an application both against the State to whom the territory in which he or she resides belongs
and the State which eercises control. The Court found the northern part of Cyprus to be
controlled by Turey, Transnistria by Russia, and the Nagorno-arabah region by rmenia. Similar cases
emanating from South Ossetia and bhaia, the breaaway regions of eorgia supported by Russia, hae
been brought before the Court, but at the end of uly 2016, they had not yet been decided.
76. Uraine: the ine, Paul uinn-udge https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/uraine/
uraine-line.
77. ustice in eile Obserance of the right to a fair trial in the east of Uraine, including the territory that is temporarily
not controlled by the Urainian goernment, Center for Ciil iberties and Coalition of Public Organiations and Initiaties
ustice for Peace in Donbas, anuary 2016.
78. http://adcmemorial.org/www/publications/iolation-of-lgbti-rights-in-crimea-and-donbass-the-problem-of-homophobiain-
territories-beyond-uraine-s-controllangen.
79. oth States hae also ratified the International Coenant on Ciil and Political Rights ICCPR as well as its First
Optional Protocol allowing for indiidual communications to the uman Rights Committee. ut for reasons of space and
competence, I intend to focus mainly on remedies aailable under the European Conention on uman Rights.
80. See , pplication No. 25781/94, judgments rand Chamber of 10 May 2001 merits and 12 May
2014 just satisfaction.
81. See , pplication No. 48787/99, judgment of 8 uly 2004 rand Chamber.
82. See , pplication No. 13216/05, judgment of 16 une 2015 rand Chamber.
16
47. This is true also for the numerous applications brought before the Court by inhabitants of Crimea and of
the conflict one in the Donbas.83 I was informed by the Registry of the Court that by mid-une 2016, the
Court had receied seeral thousand indiidual applications related to the eents in Crimea prior to and after
the anneation of the peninsula by Russia, including ones not directly relating to the conflict but reuiring
eamination of the issue of jurisdiction. The applications concern a wide range of issues right to life,
prohibition of torture, right to liberty, right to fair trial, right to priate life, freedom of epression, right to
effectie remedy, protection of property, etc.
48. More than 3 400 complaints hae been introduced against Uraine and Russia in relation to the conflict
situation, some of them against only one or the other. 420 applications were introduced against Russia,
Uraine and the United ingdom the latter on the ground that the United ingdom, being party to the 1994
udapest Memorandum and a guarantor of Uraines security and soereignty, failed to tae necessary steps
in order to proide assistance to Uraine as a ictim of aggression.
49. More than 250 applications hae been lodged by soldiers and/or their relaties in connection with the
abduction and subseuent captiity of sericemen/women in the course of military action. In those cases, the
applicants also allege unlawful detention, ill-treatment in the course of detention, poor conditions of detention,
as well as forced labour. More than 3 500 applications hae been introduced by ciilians who mainly complain
about their property being damaged in the course of military actiity in the region. The majority of applicants
also complain about the lac of access to a court, iolations of the right to respect for priate lie, freedom of
epression, and about the impossibility to receie a pension. In 150 cases, the complaints lodged by ictims
or their relaties relate to illings, injuries, torture or enforced disappearances by separatist fighters or in the
course of military actiity.
50. In my iew, the Courts case law deeloped with regard to northern Cyprus, Transnistria and Nagorno-
arabah allowing ictims of human rights iolations occurring in these regions to file applications also
against Turey, Russia and rmenia due to the effectie control they eercise oer these regions could also
apply to Crimea and the DPR and PR.84
51. s summed up by Professor uius ildhaber, a former President of the Court:
52. In the case of Crimea, actual, effectie control by the Russian Federation is not actually denied by
Russia. Control is clearly eercised by Russian armed forces, een though the fact that the little green men
without insignia who too control of strategic points during the creeping anneation were Russian
sericemen was officially denied86 until President Putin publicly conceded their inolement in Noember
2014.87 There is also no doubt that the de facto authorities in Crimea are subordinate to the Russian
Federation. They are in fact considered as part and parcel of the Russian State structures by the Russian
authorities themseles.
83. On 28 uly 2016, the Court declared an application against Uraine and Russia by persons who claimed their houses
were destroyed because of the conflict as inadmissible, for lac of eidence. The applicants had submitted only their
passports and photographs of destroyed houses, but not eidence of their ownership of these houses nor any
eplanations why such eidence was not submitted see the Courts press release: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press
i003-5449480-6831542#itemid:003-5449480-6831542.
84. See uius ildhaber, former President of the European Court of uman Rights, Crimea, Eastern Uraine and
international law, 2016 in erman.
85. uius ildhaber, Crimea, Eastern Uraine and International aw, in .
Una isin desde dentro, p. 394 with further references, including to the Courts judgments in ,
and
.
86. Initially, President Putin reportedly stated that the men in green were not Russian sericemen, but groups of local
militia who had seied their weapons from the Urainian army ittle green men or Russian inaders, C News,
11 March 2014.
87. See , 18 Noember 2014, p. 1 in May 2015, a monument to the polite men who too part in the operation in
Crimea was uneiled in elogors, see www.rferl.org/content/russia-monument-polite-people-crimea-inasion/
27000320.html.
17
53. In the case of the conflict one in the Donbas, some chronological differentiation may be necessary.
During the actual military conflict, effectie control was literally fought oer between the Urainian forces
and the pro-Russian armed groups, and their respectie ones of control shifted eery day. In order to
establish jurisdiction of Russia, potential applicants to the Court will need to establish not only that the armed
groups were in fact controlled by Russia, but also that they were in control of the locus delicti where the
alleged iolation too place at the time when it too place.
54. Regarding the former issue, the parallel with the run-up to the anneation of Crimea speas for a strong
role of sering Russian military personnel in these armed groups. This form of hybrid warfare by unmared
soldiers was apparently used by Russia for the first time in the 1992 Transnistrian conflict.88 n inestigatie
report on the military inolement of Russia in the conflict in eastern Uraine and Crimea Putin.The ar89,
initiated by oris Nemtso before his assassination and completed by Ilya ashin and others, was presented
by Mr Vladimir ara-Mura during our committee meeting in anuary 2016.90 This report and another
referenced by Mr ara-Mura n inasion by any other name: the remlins dirty war in Uraine91 proides
strong elements of proof for the presence of Russian soldiers and their decisie role during the fighting in the
Donbas. Their actie inolement also led to numerous casualties among them, many of which hae been
documented by the Committee of Soldiers Mothers92 and other ciil society actiists collecting and erifying
information on cargo 200 a codename for the transport of body bags with dead soldiers, in particular by
the use of social media despite aggressie attempts by the authorities to eep this information secret.93
Russian soldiers were also taen prisoner by Urainian forces.94 During our fact-finding isit, at the townhall
meeting in Mariupol, we also heard the detailed testimony of a Urainian military pastor, a surior of the
battle of Iloais, and who spoe ery conincingly about the Russian prisoners his unit had taen. Their
presence among the Urainian soldiers caught in the green corridor through which they were meant to
withdraw did not stop the prisoners fellow soldiers on the other side from shelling them at close range. Senior
separatist leaders boasted of the participation of numerous Russian soldiers in the conflict, though they went
on to claim that these were olunteers, who were in fact on holiday.95 Ironically, Russian army regulations
cited by the Nemtso report96 reuire soldiers to obtain prior permission for any holiday abroad and epressly
forbid any participation in combat during their holidays. In any case, the two reports presented by Mr ara-
Mura show that at the most critical time, entire military units were deployed to eastern Uraine from Russia
97 and artillery attacs against Urainian positions sector D were launched from Russian territory, across
the border.98 The initial rollbac by the Urainian forces of the rebellion during the spring and early summer
of 2014 was brought to a standstill following the professionalisation of the armed groups, which was also
reported by the RMMU,99 in particularly as of ugust 2014. The Urainian forces situation became more
and more untenable which forced Uraine to accept the disadantageous terms of the two ceasefire
agreements broered in Mins. Such decisie military power could clearly not be mustered by mere local
militias who stole some weapons from Urainian arsenals. Uraine simply did not hae some of the modern,
sophisticated weapons used by the armed groups, which had neer been eported before for eample, a
88. eff ahn, Russias use of hybrid warfare as a tool of foreign policy in the near abroad.
89. Putin. The ar about the inolement of Russia in the Eastern Uraine conflict and in the Crimea, oris Nemtso/
Ilya ashin, 12 May 2015.
90. Full tet of the statement by Vladimir V. ara-Mura, Coordinator of Open Russia and Deputy eader of the Peoples
Freedom Party Moscow, Russia aailable from the Committee secretariat.
91. n inasion by any other name: the remlins dirty war in Uraine, Institute of Modern Russia/The Interpreter.
92. See Mothers compiled a list of 400 Russian soldiers illed and wounded in Uraine see also ,
19 anuary 2015, They were neer there, Russias silence for families of troops illed in Uraine.
93. See Inasion by any other name, op. cit., pp. 45-78, presenting numerous ery specific facts and testimonies
, 7 March 2016, Oer 2000 Russian fighters illed in Uraine: Presidents spoesman see also Russia May
ae Inadertently Posted Its Casualties In Uraine: 2 000 Deaths, 3 200 Disabled, 25 ugust 2015 the author bases
himself on the budget made aailable for compensating the families of illed and disabled soldiers.
94. See, for eample, Russian sericemen captured in Uraine conicted of terror offenses, , 18 pril
2016 many more eamples are proided in the two reports referenced by Mr ara-Mura.
95. Statements by leander aharcheno, prime minister of the DPR and former DPR defence minister Igor irin
aa Strelo, uoted in Putin. The ar, op. cit., pp. 17 and 53.
96. Putin. The ar, op. cit., p. 18.
97. See, for eample, n inasion b any other name, op. cit., p. 40 with reference to the testimony of a wounded
Russian tan gunner interiewed by and Putin.The ar, op. cit., p. 18 nine Russian soldiers detained
by Urainian forces on 24 ugust 2015 the Russian Defense Ministry stated that their presence on Urainian territory 20
m from the border was due to them haing lost their way on a training eercise.
98. n inasion by any other name, op. cit., pp. 22-25 see also here did the shells come from Inestigation of
cross-border attacs in eastern Uraine, prepared by International Partnership for uman Rights, Norwegian elsini
Committee and Urainian elsini uman Rights Union, 2016.
99. See paragraph 27 aboe.
18
recently modernised ersion of the T72 main battle tan T72 3100 and the Tornado multiple rocet
launcher system. s Mr ara-Mura pointed out in anuary, the Russian oernment itself acnowledged the
presence of the Tornado system when its representatie signed a protocol to the Mins greement that
referred to its withdrawal from the line of contact.
55. For the purposes of the legal analysis regarding the Courts jurisdiction, it is irreleant whether this
military power was brought to bear by Russia through the open deployment of military forces or by hybrid
warfare using olunteers or soldiers on holiday, euipped with modern, high-powered military hardware.
senior separatist commander admitted himself that the massie support proided by Russia was decisie, that
the militia units were subordinate to acationers and that the Russian delieries were ital for them.101
Such eplicitly acnowledged dependency generates effectie control. I would therefore not hesitate to
attribute effectie control oer the armed groups, and conseuently oer the areas controlled by these groups,
to Russia.
56. This dependency continues despite the reduced intensity of the fighting following the ceasefire and the
reported withdrawal of part of the Russian soldiers on leae from Urainian territory. This is true as long as a
possible new rollbac attempt by Urainian oernment forces is effectiely deterred by the threat of
another interention, which is clearly implicit in the military build-up recently obsered on the Russian side of
the border.102 hilst the immediate, acute dependency of the armed groups on military support in the form of
olunteers, weapons and ammunition is somewhat reduced, the progressie establishment of the parallel
structures obsered by, , the RMMU,103 fulfilled the second alternatie deeloped by the Courts
case law for the justification of effectie control, namely control through a subordinate local administration. s
is the case with military presence, the eistence of a subordinate local administration is a matter of fact, which
must be determined by the Court in light of all aailable eidence. There can be no doubt that the DPR and
PR are wholly dependent on Russia. During our fact-finding isit, Ms elienoa and I came across so
many elements in support of this dependency that we spoe of creeping hybrid anneation of these regions
by Russia.104 These elements include the economic dependence of the de facto authorities, shown for
eample by the deliery from Russia of basic goods labelled humanitarian assistance, deliered in large
conoys of trucs remoed from any control by Uraine. leander hodaosy, secretary of the security
council of the DPR, announced in September 2015 that the humanitarian conoys represent only a tiny
fraction of Russians financial assistance and that in fact some 70 of the DPRs budget comes from
Russia.105 Een the power grid has reportedly been re-oriented towards proision of electricity from Russia.
106 The Russian rouble has become the currency most in use in the DPR and PR, and ey officials of the
de facto authorities are Russian citiens.107 e were told that salaries of DPR and PR officials are paid
by Russia, and een the history boos used in the peoples republic schools are from Russia and present
history accordingly. erman media report gies details of the financial arrangements made and een
identifies specific chains of command from different ministries in Moscow to their counterparts in the
peoples republics, at ice-ministerial leel.108 The parallels to the situation of the de facto authorities in
northern Cyprus, Transnistria and Nagorno-arabah are obious.
57. s to the applications lodged also against the United ingdom as one of the guarantee powers under
the 1994 udapest Memorandum on Security ssurances,109 I am rather more sceptical. I do consider the
iolation, by Russia as one of the guarantee powers, of Uraines territorial integrity, which Russia, the United
States and the United ingdom had solemnly guaranteed in return for Uraine giing up the nuclear arsenal
100. n inasion by another name, op. cit., pp. 25-26, 29 and 31 one of these tans was een captured by Urainian
forces, at Iloais.
101. See statements referred to in note 95 see also the IC report Uraine: the ine, note 76, which stresses the
decisie role of Russia p. 1.
102. See IC report note 76, p. 1.
103. See paragraph 30 aboe.
104. See joint statement by Ms elienoa and myself at the end of our fact-finding isit to Uraine on 8 pril 2016: http:/
website-pace.net.
105. Interiew with . hodaosy of 8 September 2015, cited by Mr ara-Mura in his presentation before the
committee in anuary 2016 tet aailable on reuest from the Secretariat.
106. Russian power eeps ugans lights on for the holidays a pro-separatist website uoting local leaders.
107. See Putin. The ar, op. cit., pp. 51-55, with numerous eamples.
108. ow Russia finances the Urainian rebel territories, , 16 anuary 2016 the IC report note 76 also sees
Russia as the sole source of military, economic and other assistance to the two entities.
109. www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/
p32484.
19
inherited from the Soiet Union, as a sad iolation of the international rule of law. The idea of somehow
maing the udapest Memorandum justiciable is an attractie one and in criminal law, a failure to act
despite a legal duty to preent a iolation of a legally protected interest can indeed be the legal euialent of
an actie iolation of that interest. ut the European Conention on uman Rights is not a criminal law-type
instrument for punishing States. It is an agreement among States to protect the rights of the persons under
their jurisdiction. The inhabitants of the conflict one were only indirectly affected by the failure of the
signatories of the udapest Memorandum to stop the aggression or to refrain from one. It will be difficult for
the applicants to establish that the United ingdom not only had a legal duty to interene against Russia
despite the danger of a major war but also somehow eercised effectie
control oer the conflict one by merely failing to interene in the conflict.
58. In order to determine at which point in time ictims of human rights iolations can successfully seie the
European Court of uman Rights, it will be necessary to eamine the effectieness of any legal remedies
aailable within the States Parties concerned. ccording to the Courts case law, domestic remedies need
eceptionally not be ehausted if they are ineffectie or if it would be too dangerous or not feasible for other
reasons for ictims to first apply to local courts.110
59. oth in Crimea and in the DPR and PR, the de facto authorities hae set up or maintained
courts of their own, whilst the Urainian authorities hae delocalised justice by moing entire courts out of
the non-controlled areas and/or attributing jurisdiction to eisting courts in neighbouring, goernmentcontrolled
regions. Victims of human rights iolations are in a dilemma: if they address themseles to the
legitimate delocalised courts, they may well obtain a judgment in their faour despite the administratie
difficulties described in paragraph 38 aboe, but it will not be eecuted by the de facto authorities on their
territory. If they seie the courts set up by the de facto authorities, they are unliely to hae the benefit of a
fair hearing, especially if their complaint is related to the conseuences of occupation or anneation. Similarly,
Russian courts would be unliely to accept jurisdiction oer such cases, or proide relief.111 I would therefore
tend to consider that the ictims of alleged human rights iolations by the de facto authorities should be
spared haing to address themseles to the courts run by these authorities.
60. Such a solution would also be the most consistent with the non-recognition of the anneation of Crimea
and of the unilateral secession by the DPR and PR from Uraine in international law. dmittedly, the
International Court of ustice held in its 1971 disory Opinion on Namibia112 that not all acts by the South
frican de facto authorities are oid, in particular not those faouring the rights of the population. In the words
of the IC,
61. The European Court of uman Rights, in its judgment,113 referred to the ICs
opinion when it recognised the Immoable Property Commission, established by the authorities in
northern Cyprus, as an effectie domestic remedy which ree-Cypriot applicants, who had been displaced
by the Turish interention in 1974 and suffered iolations of their property rights, had to ehaust before taing
their case to Strasbourg. The Court, which understandably wants to aoid creating a legal acuum and being
forced to act as a court of first instance in a large number of cases, pragmatically states that allowing the
respondent State to correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an indirect legitimisation of a regime
unlawful under international law.114
110. See the summary of the Courts case law in the judgment, op. cit., paragraphs 115 and 116.
111. The Strasbourg Court came to a similar conclusion in the judgment op. cit., at paragraphs 117-120 in the
case of erbaijani citiens displaced from the Nagorno-arabah region, who were not reuired to first bring their cases
before the courts set up by the de facto authorities or before an rmenian court.
112. egal conseuences for States of the continued presence of south frica in Namibia south-west frica
notwithstanding security council resolution 276 1970, disory Opinion of 21 une 1971, Official summary.
113. , pplications Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04,
19993/04 and 21819/04, dmissibility decision dated 1 March 2010 rand Chamber.
114. Ibid., paragraph 96.
20
62. This report is not the appropriate place to participate in the discussion whether the Courts
judgment was too pragmatic at the epense of legal principle and whether decisions of the Immoable
Property Commission, empowered to substitute restitution by monetary compensation, can be compared to
the registration of births or marriages.115 The Court relies on the passage of time since 1974, whilst
the anneation and occupation of Urainian territories go bac only three years. Especially where alleged
human rights iolations are lined directly to the occupation and unlawful anneation, the Court would
therefore be perfectly free to distinguish such cases from the precedent as it did in its
judgment see paragraph 46 aboe.
63. Uraine signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2000, but has not yet ratified it,
following a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2001 finding ratification to be in conflict with the Constitution. I
was told during my meetings at the Verhona Rada in pril 2016 that a modification of the Constitution to
enable ratification of the Rome Statute would be part of the pacage of constitutional reforms under
preparation, though further delays were possible. ut Uraine has made two declarations under rticle 12.3 of
the Rome Statute, which enables a State not Party to the Rome Statute to accept the eercise of jurisdiction
by the ICC.116 The first declaration eplicitly coers alleged crimes committed between 21 Noember 2013
and 22 February 2014. On 8 September 2015, Uraine made another declaration etending the acceptance of
the ICCs jurisdiction indefinitely.117 This means that the ICC now has jurisdiction oer the period of the most
iolent combats between the separatist fighters and the Urainian forces, without limitation in time and
without being limited to the alleged perpetrators all on the pro-Russian side named in the declaration.118
64. On 25 pril 2014, the ICCs Office of the Prosecutor launched a preliminary eamination of the
situation in Uraine, which was initially focused on alleged crimes against humanity in the contet of the
Maidan protests, which are outside of my rapporteur mandate. Following the second declaration under
rticle 12.3, the Office etended the scope of the preliminary eamination to include any alleged international
crimes committed on the territory of Uraine from 20 February 2014 onwards. In its most recent Report on
Preliminary Eaminations ctiities,119 the Office of the Prosecutor indicated that it had carried out three
missions to Uraine to hold meetings with the Urainian authorities and representaties of ciil society and
announced that it would continue to gather information from reliable sources in order to conduct a thorough
factual and legal analysis of alleged crimes committed across Uraine, including in Crimea and the Donbas, to
determine whether the criteria established by the Rome Statute for the opening of an inestigation are met.
120
65. mong the international crimes listed in the Rome Statute, the most releant ones would be the war
crimes under rticle 8. Some alleged human rights iolations could also fulfil the definition of a crime against
humanity under rticle 7. The Elements of Crimes reproduced from the records of the ssembly of States
Parties of the ICC list the criteria for criminal liability under these proisions in a self-eplanatory way.121
hether hybrid warfare of the ind described aboe would fulfil the elements of the newly defined crime of
aggression is an issue that would warrant a separate report in any case, neither Russia nor Uraine are
Parties to the Rome Statute, let alone the amendments adopted in ampala in 2010.
115. Elena atselli Prouai, The Right of Displaced Persons to Property and to Return ome after Demopoulos,
2014, 144, pp. 701-732.
116. ICC press release, 17 pril 2014, Uraine accepts ICC jurisdiction oer alleged crimes committed between
21 Noember 2013 and 22 February 2014.
117. ICC press release, 8 September 2015, Uraine accepts ICC jurisdiction oer alleged crimes committed since 20
February 2014.
118. leander ills, Old Crimes, New States and the Temporal urisdiction of the International Criminal Court,
2014 see also Valentyna Polunina, etween Interests and Values Uraines Contingent
cceptance of International Criminal ustice, International Nuremberg Principles cademy, 2016. Ms Polunina eamines
the political bacground of the two declarations, which may reflect failure to fully comprehend the complementary
character of international criminal justice and respond to the deep distrust of the Urainian population in the countrys own
judicial system.
119. Dated 12 Noember 2015: https://www.icc-cpi.int/uraine.
120. Ibid., paragraph 110.
121. https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-6D-40EC-D7-45F9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf
see also the report on Co-operation with the International Criminal Court: towards a concrete and epanded commitment,
Doc. 14136 rapporteur: Mr lain Destehe, elgium, DE.
21
66. I do not consider it as part of my mandate to subsume my factual findings under the releant articles of
the Rome Statute. This will be the tas of the ICC, in due course. ut it is important to stress already now that
indiscriminate attacs, such as the rocet attac on the maret in Mariupol on 24 anuary 2015122 can under
certain circumstances gie rise to prosecution as international crimes or war crimes. The same can of course
be true for any indiscriminate or disproportionate attacs committed by the Urainian forces inoled in the
operations termed anti-terrorist by the authorities in yi.
67. There can be no doubt that a situation of armed conflict eisted during the period of intense fighting in
eastern Uraine until the conclusion of the Mins II ceasefire agreement and een far beyond. Despite the
ceasefire agreement, which was neer really fully respected, the threat of a further military escalation is still
ery real. Military action by both sides will therefore hae to be assessed in light of the principles of
international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of distinction between combatants and noncombatants
, proportionality between the epected military gain and the collateral damage to ciilians and
precaution reasonable care taen to minimise unaoidable and proportionate collateral damage. Military
action iolating any of these principles, for eample indiscriminate artillery attacs against residential areas,
but also the use of human shields by placing weapons and other liely targets in the midst of ciilians, can
ualify as war crimes, which gie rise to the indiidual criminal responsibility of fighters and their commanders.
e ame ae der e i reeme a oae o aoaii
68. The Mins II greement, signed on 12 February 2015 after dramatic negotiations inoling the erman
Chancellor, the French, Russian and Urainian Presidents as well as representaties of the European Union,
the OSCE and indirectly of the two self-proclaimed peoples republics, includes an amnesty clause to
ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in
connection with the eents that too place in certain areas of the Donets and uhans regions of Uraine.
123
69. ien the dramatic circumstances in which the agreement was concluded, it is obious that some
issues reuire clarification and interpretation.124 This includes the amnesty clause, which gae rise to some
worries soon after the agreement was published in particular in the Netherlands, where it was feared that
the perpetrators of the downing of flight M17 could be coered by the amnesty.125 For the interpretation of
the Mins II amnesty clause, recent deelopments and trends in international and international human rights
law must be taen into account, which faour accountability for serious human rights iolations and abhor
impunity.126 ny clause that proides an eception from the rule of accountability for perpetrators of serious
human rights iolations must be interpreted restrictiely. This should eclude persons from the scope of the
amnesty clause who committed or ordered murder, torture or war crimes, in particular those reaching the
threshold of international crimes coered by the Rome Statute. The amnesty clause would still remain
applicable by shielding those who instigated the armed rebellion and those who participated in the fighting in
accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law from the criminal responsibility they
would normally incur for high treason and the illings and destruction caused by taing up arms against their
goernment. ut it would not gie impunity to those who committed serious crimes on the occasion of the
conflict. Such impunity would constitute a serious obstacle to reconciliation and peace.
70. s regards the possible role of the ICC, similar arguments are liely to come into play. Unjustified
amnesties for perpetrators of international crimes are een considered to positiely underpin the ICCs
subsidiary competence in that they show that the authorities of the State concerned are either unwilling or
unable to prosecute the perpetrators themseles.127
122. See paragraph 29.
123. Full tet of the Mins greement aailable at: www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/pacage-of-measures-for-theimplementation-
of-the-mins-agreements/.
124. See, for eample, usta ressel, The Mins II agreement the long game, European Council on Foreign
Relations, 13 February 2015 Neil MacFaruhar, Uraines latest peace plan inspires hope and doubt,,
2 February 2015.
125. See, for eample, astily signed Mins agreement forgot the perpetrators of M17 erman Chancellor Merel is
uoted as saying that in her understanding there was no obligation that the amnesty include eeryone.
126. See, for eample, Impunity and the rule of law, OCR, 2011, and Mary riffin, Ending the impunity of perpetrators
of human rights atrocities, a major challenge for international law in the 21st century,
, 30 une 2000 Eradicating impunity for serious human rights iolations, uidelines and reference tets, Council of
Europe, Strasbourg, 2011 see also OCR Report on the uman Rights Situation in Uraine, 1 December 2014 to 15
February 2015, p. 3, paragraph 4 and p. 7, paragraph 22: Regarding the proision on amnesty for those inoled in the
conflict, OCR reiterates the long-standing position of the United Nations that amnesty must not be granted for
international crimes, including gross iolations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
22
71. It would appear that the Russian side also interprets the amnesty clause in the Mins II greement
restrictiely, as shown by the prosecution of Urainian helicopter pilot Nadiia Sacheno for allegedly being
inoled in the illing, in the combat one, of two Russian journalists. ccording to statements by the Russian
authorities, the amnesty clause did not apply to her. One argument put forward by the prosecution is that the
amnesty proision in the Mins greement applied only to persons in the Donbas region, whilst
Ms Sacheno was now in Russia.128 This argument would condemn all fighters to stay in the conflict one,
or else they would lose the benefit of the amnesty. statement by Russian Foreign Minister aro on the
Sacheno case also shows the narrow iew taen by Russia regarding the amnesty clause:
72. This interpretation seems somewhat surprising to me: once a court of law finds a person not guilty,
there is hardly any need for an amnesty.
Coio
73. In sum, it can be safely said in light of all the reports by intergoernmental as well as non-goernmental
obserers that the situation of Crimea is characterised by a climate of intimidation fostered by a number of
high-profile illings, abductions and beatings that hae remained ominously unpunished. The referendum on
reunification with Russia was clearly affected by this climate of intimidation to the point that I would consider
this ote as a iolation of the right to free and fair elections.130 ctual or presumed Urainian loyalists are
subject to different forms of intimidation and harassment. The entire population is pressured into obtaining
Russian passports in order to secure access to such basic serices as health care and housing. The Crimean
Tatars, in particular, hae been subjected to a number of repressie measures targeting their historical selfgo
ernment bodies and cultural and media institutions dissolution of the Mejlis and its local branches closure
of the Tatar teleision channel TR, prosecution of political and cultural leaders of the Tatar community on
treason, espionage or etremism charges. Numerous Tatars hae therefore felt obliged to leae their
homeland, and others dare not uphold their historic traditions to such an etent that the ery eistence of the
Crimean Tatar community as a distinct ethnic and cultural group is threatened.
74. The picture of the human rights situation in the DPR and PR painted by the reports summed up
aboe taen together is rather depressing. This picture has been confirmed by the impressions Ms elienoa
and I collected during our fact-finding isit to the Donbas and by the eperts who testified before our
committee in anuary, pril and une 2016. I find it eually depressing that these powerful reports, based on
long-term, professional monitoring by hundreds of neutral obserers duly mandated by the international
community hae had such little impact on estern public opinion and policies. Do we not want to now what
is going on so that we can continue to do nothing or net to nothing to stop it
75. It is undeniable that numerous human rights iolations too place during the most iolent phase of the
conflict, up until the Mins II greement, in February 2015, and that such iolations continued and are still
continuing after the ceasefire agreement.
127. See, for eample, The Peace and ustice Initiatie, mnesties and the ICC www.jstor.org/stable/25659262
se1#page_scan_tab_contents.
128. Catherine Fitpatric, Interpreting the Mins greement Regarding mnesty and Release of Prisoners, aro:
Sacheno may be granted amnesty after going on trial see also Sacheno amnesty depends on stated article of
Criminal Code in final charge justice minister Ms Sacheno insists that she was captured by separatist fighters on
Urainian territory and then abducted to Russia, whereas the Russian authorities claim that she crossed the border
oluntarily.
129. Cited in http://tass.ru/en/russia/791032.
130. See uius ildhaber note 85, p. 386: the former President of the European Court of uman Rights points out that
the official results 83 participation, 97 in faour of accession to Russia are uite implausible. Crimea was inhabited
by some 58-59 ethnic Russians, 24-25 Urainians and 12-13 Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars had called for a
boycott of the plebiscite, and certainly not all Urainians had opted for an accession to Russia. Members of Putins uman
Rights Council communicated much more credible figures, i.e. that some 30-50 had taen part in the ote, and out of
these, some 50-60 had opted to accede to Russia roughly 22 of the potential oters.
23
76. First of all, there is still heay loss of life and property due to shelling, especially in some well-nown
hotspots around the line of contact.131 Despite the restrictions on their moement imposed on the OSCE
obserers imposed mostly by the armed groups of the so-called peoples republics the OSCE SMM has
documented numerous ceasefire iolations where the crater analysis shows that the shelling originated in
rebel-controlled areas. s a result, ciilians are eposed to dangers to life and limb, especially those still liing
near the line of contact and those who must spend many hours at the checpoints waiting to cross into or out
of the peoples republics.
77. Secondly, acts of repression and intimidation such as etrajudicial illings, unlawful arrests,
incommunicado and/or unacnowledged detentions, torture and ill-treatment as well as the taing of hostages
still occur. hilst less numerous than during the most iolent phase of the conflict, such iolations are
encouraged by the preailing climate of impunity. I am dismayed by the well-documented cases presented by
mnesty International and uman Rights atch showing that such crimes hae also been committed by
representaties of the Urainian authorities, in particular the SU. It is paramount that Uraine sets an
eample by inestigating any such allegations and prosecuting the perpetrators, in line with rticles 2 and 3 of
the European Conention on uman Rights as interpreted by the Court. The temporary derogation made by
Uraine under rticle 15 of the Conention does not concern the rights to life and protection from torture
guaranteed by rticles 2 and 3. s a first step, both sides should establish lists of all places of detention and
open them up to inspection by national and international monitors. Monitors must also be gien swift access to
places that are merely suspected of holding, or haing held detainees.
78. Thirdly, the inhabitants of the DPR and PR hae serious social and administratie problems, which
must urgently be resoled in a pragmatic way. It is legitimate that the Urainian authorities tae precautions in
order to aoid fraud including the collection of pensions and other social payments both from the
authorities and from Uraine and the illicit recuperation of funds transferred to the peoples republics by the
authorities. ut the necessary checs must be carried out in such a way as to aoid blocing ital
payments for etended periods of time. hen we raised these issues with representaties of the Verhona
Rada in pril, we were told that the releant laws had already been adopted and that their proper
implementation by the competent ministries was under way. The most recent reports by international monitors
indicate that important issues hae still not been resoled. For the sae of a durable solution of the conflict, it
must be ensured that the inhabitants of the non-goernment-controlled areas and of the grey one are not
made to feel abandoned by their goernment. e noticed during our isit in pril that such feelings still
preailed. It must also be recalled that the authorities and their Russian handlers are responsible,
under international law, for the safety and welfare of the population in the territories under their
control. They are under a duty to proide basic infrastructures, commodities and serices, including food,
housing and health serices. This also means that they must refrain from epropriating inhabitants and
displaced persons by creating re-registration reuirements for property which can only be fulfilled by the
inhabitants subjecting themseles to unlawful rules and by displaced persons eposing themseles to the
riss inoled in returning to the regions under the control of the authorities.
79. ast but not least, lac of access to justice is a serious problem for the inhabitants of the DPR and
PR as well as some persons liing in the goernment-controlled areas. Uraine has delocalised courts
situated in the areas oer which the goernment has lost control, and/or the jurisdiction for cases concerning
these areas has been attributed to eisting courts in neighbouring, goernment-controlled areas. ut many
case files were lost in the sometimes chaotic moe, or are now inaccessible. ccess to the delocalised courts
is difficult for residents of the peoples republics, whereas the judicial serices offered by the newly
established parallel structures in the DPR and PR are not only illegitimate, but also lacing
professionalism and independence. The resulting problems are particularly difficult to resole without a return
to the rule of law upheld by the legitimate authorities. Meanwhile, the Urainian authorities should do what is
in their power in order to enable the delocalised courts to function properly, by proiding adeuate staff and
other resources.
80. The Mins greements clearly hae the merit of considerably reducing the loss of life, both among
combatants and ciilians. ut the ceasefire has neer been fully implemented. The OSCE obserers note
numerous iolations, but they are unable to do anything about them. The local population is well aware of their
131. In particular, according to the SMMs reports, the icinity of diia and asynutaa, the northern outsirts of
Donets City, orlia, Shyroyne east of Mariupol, Stanytsia uhansa ridge area see, for eample, the OSCE SMM
eely Report dated 20 uly 2016 and its Daily Report 181/2016 dated 1 ugust 2016.
24
inability to act. During our townhall meeting in Mariupol with local citiens and grass-roots actiists, we heard
numerous complaints about nightly artillery shelling terrorising the population, in particular in the so-called
grey one on both sides of the contact line. Our uestion regarding possible help from the OSCE obserers
was greeted with bitter laughter. One of the locals said: They are not allowed to leae their accommodation at
night, as the other side nows full well, and when they turn up in the morning, the damage is done and the
obserers can only mae sure that our side does not return fire. The Mins greements, as they stand, hae
not resoled the conflict, at best they hae froen it. s there is nothing better in sight, their implementation by
both sides is necessary. ut it is not sufficient: without the restoration of the legitimate, lawful authorities there
can be no rule of law, nor any effectie protection of human rights in this region. This reuires re-establishing
the full control of Uraine oer its border with the Russian Federation and holding truly free and fair regional
elections as foreseen by the Mins greement. ut the conditions for such elections hae yet to be created.
They reuire proper security, during the campaign and during the election itself. This condition is far from
fulfilled, as is shown, for eample, by the fact that the OSCE was unable to proide security een for a short
isit of our small delegation to the peoples republics. Free and fair elections also reuire freedom of speech
and information, including access to the media both for the pro-Urainian and the pro-Russian side. It is
hard to see how this can be achieed without the prior establishment of law and order by Uraine under
strong international superision to aoid any intimidation or retaliation the other way round. The ery fact that
such a solution can realistically only be achieed in agreement with Russia and not against Russia is,
incidentally, a clear indication of who really pulls the strings in this conflict, on the pro-Russian side.
81. s I see it, the best aailable legal remedies proided to ictims of alleged human rights iolations both
in the territory of Uraine outside the control of the Urainian authorities e.g. in Crimea and in the so-called
peoples republics of Donets and uhans are those proided by the European Conention on uman
Rights. ien the effectie control of the Russian Federation based on the numerous indications presented
aboe paragraphs 52-56, whether admitted by Russia as in the case of Crimea or not as in the DPR and
PR, ictims of alleged human rights iolations should be able to mae applications both against Russia
under the Courts case law attaching jurisdiction to effectie control, eercised either directly, through a
military presence, or indirectly, through a dependent local administration and against Uraine, to whose
territory these regions belong under international law.
82. I hae also argued that in cases lined to the anneation of Crimea or the action of the de facto
authorities of the DPR and PR, the alleged ictims should not be obliged to first ehaust such internal
remedies as the courts run by the de facto authorities. These cannot be considered as effectie remedies
in that they lac the necessary degree of independence and/or professionalism.
83. Concerning the accountability of indiidual perpetrators and their commanders, it is first and foremost
up to the law-enforcement authorities both in Uraine and in Russia to fully and swiftly inestigate alleged
crimes and prosecute the perpetrators robustly, without regard to their allegiance in the conflict. hilst the
Urainian side has made some progress, it must do more, in particular regarding unlawful detentions and
torture allegedly committed by members of the SU. ll official and alleged unofficial places of detention must
urgently be made accessible to national and international monitors.
84. The International Criminal Court potentially has an important role to play since Uraine has accepted its
jurisdiction for all international crimes committed on the territory of Uraine since 21 Noember 2013. hilst
the progress of the preliminary eamination launched by the ICCs Office of the Prosecutor seems to be
rather limited so far, the potential scope is considerable, in particular as regards the conflict in the Donbas.
85. ast but not least, accountability for serious human rights iolations or international crimes should not
be hampered by the amnesty clauses in the Mins greements, which must be interpreted in such a way as to
eclude perpetrators of serious crimes committed on the occasion of the conflict. Such a narrow interpretation
of the amnesty clauses is also supported by statements from senior representaties of the Russian
authorities. In my iew, true reconciliation and lasting peace reuire justice for the ictims of the conflict.
25
Annex 827
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000
L 180/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19.7.2000
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/43/EC
of 29 June 2000
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic
origin
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community and in particular Article 13 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee (3),
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the
Regions (4),
Whereas:
(1) The Treaty on European Union marks a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe.
(2) In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European
Union, the European Union is founded on the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States, and should
respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
as general principles of Community Law.
(3) The right to equality before the law and protection
against discrimination for all persons constitutes a
universal right recognised by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women, the International Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the United
Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States
are signatories.
(4) It is important to respect such fundamental rights and
freedoms, including the right to freedom of association.
It is also important, in the context of the access to and
provision of goods and services, to respect the protection
of private and family life and transactions carried
out in this context.
(5) The European Parliament has adopted a number of
Resolutions on the fight against racism in the European
Union.
(6) The European Union rejects theories which attempt to
determine the existence of separate human races. The
use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Directive does not
imply an acceptance of such theories.
(7) The European Council in Tampere, on 15 and 16
October 1999, invited the Commission to come forward
as soon as possible with proposals implementing Article
13 of the EC Treaty as regards the fight against racism
and xenophobia.
(8) The Employment Guidelines 2000 agreed by the European
Council in Helsinki, on 10 and 11 December
1999, stress the need to foster conditions for a socially
inclusive labour market by formulating a coherent set of
policies aimed at combating discrimination against
groups such as ethnic minorities.
(9) Discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin may
undermine the achievement of the objectives of the EC
Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of
employment and of social protection, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, economic and
social cohesion and solidarity. It may also undermine the
objective of developing the European Union as an area
of freedom, security and justice.
(10) The Commission presented a communication on racism,
xenophobia and anti-Semitism in December 1995.
(11) The Council adopted on 15 July 1996 Joint Action
(96/443/JHA) concerning action to combat racism and
xenophobia (5) under which the Member States undertake
to ensure effective judicial cooperation in respect of
offences based on racist or xenophobic behaviour.
(12) To ensure the development of democratic and tolerant
societies which allow the participation of all persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, specific action in
the field of discrimination based on racial or ethnic
origin should go beyond access to employed and selfemployed
activities and cover areas such as education,
social protection including social security and healthcare,
social advantages and access to and supply of
goods and services.
(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
(2) Opinion delivered on 18.5.2000 (not yet published in the Official
Journal).
(3) Opinion delivered on 12.4.2000 (not yet published in the Official
Journal).
(4) Opinion delivered on 31.5.2000 (not yet published in the Official
Journal). (5) OJ L 185, 24.7.1996, p. 5.
19.7.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 180/23
(13) To this end, any direct or indirect discrimination based
on racial or ethnic origin as regards the areas covered by
this Directive should be prohibited throughout the
Community. This prohibition of discrimination should
also apply to nationals of third countries, but does not
cover differences of treatment based on nationality and
is without prejudice to provisions governing the entry
and residence of third-country nationals and their access
to employment and to occupation.
(14) In implementing the principle of equal treatment irrespective
of racial or ethnic origin, the Community should,
in accordance with Article 3(2) of the EC Treaty, aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between
men and women, especially since women are often the
victims of multiple discrimination.
(15) The appreciation of the facts from which it may be
inferred that there has been direct or indirect discrimination
is a matter for national judicial or other
competent bodies, in accordance with rules of national
law or practice. Such rules may provide in particular for
indirect discrimination to be established by any means
including on the basis of statistical evidence.
(16) It is important to protect all natural persons against
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin.
Member States should also provide, where appropriate
and in accordance with their national traditions and
practice, protection for legal persons where they suffer
discrimination on grounds of the racial or ethnic origin
of their members.
(17) The prohibition of discrimination should be without
prejudice to the maintenance or adoption of measures
intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages
suffered by a group of persons of a particular racial or
ethnic origin, and such measures may permit organisations
of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin
where their main object is the promotion of the special
needs of those persons.
(18) In very limited circumstances, a difference of treatment
may be justified where a characteristic related to racial
or ethnic origin constitutes a genuine and determining
occupational requirement, when the objective is legitimate
and the requirement is proportionate. Such
circumstances should be included in the information
provided by the Member States to the Commission.
(19) Persons who have been subject to discrimination based
on racial and ethnic origin should have adequate means
of legal protection. To provide a more effective level of
protection, associations or legal entities should also be
empowered to engage, as the Member States so determine,
either on behalf or in support of any victim, in
proceedings, without prejudice to national rules of
procedure concerning representation and defence before
the courts.
(20) The effective implementation of the principle of equality
requires adequate judicial protection against victimisation.
(21) The rules on the burden of proof must be adapted when
there is a prima facie case of discrimination and, for the
principle of equal treatment to be applied effectively, the
burden of proof must shift back to the respondent when
evidence of such discrimination is brought.
(22) Member States need not apply the rules on the burden
of proof to proceedings in which it is for the court or
other competent body to investigate the facts of the
case. The procedures thus referred to are those in which
the plaintiff is not required to prove the facts, which it is
for the court or competent body to investigate.
(23) Member States should promote dialogue between the
social partners and with non-governmental organisations
to address different forms of discrimination and
to combat them.
(24) Protection against discrimination based on racial or
ethnic origin would itself be strengthened by the existence
of a body or bodies in each Member State, with
competence to analyse the problems involved, to study
possible solutions and to provide concrete assistance for
the victims.
(25) This Directive lays down minimum requirements, thus
giving the Member States the option of introducing or
maintaining more favourable provisions. The implementation
of this Directive should not serve to justify
any regression in relation to the situation which already
prevails in each Member State.
(26) Member States should provide for effective, proportionate
and dissuasive sanctions in case of breaches of
the obligations under this Directive.
(27) The Member States may entrust management and
labour, at their joint request, with the implementation of
this Directive as regards provisions falling within the
scope of collective agreements, provided that the
Member States take all the necessary steps to ensure that
they can at all times guarantee the results imposed by
this Directive.
(28) In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty,
the objective of this Directive, namely ensuring a
common high level of protection against discrimination
in all the Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of
the scale and impact of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community. This Directive does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those
objectives,
L 180/24 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19.7.2000
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Purpose
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a framework for
combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic
origin, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States
the principle of equal treatment.
Article 2
Concept of discrimination
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal
treatment shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one
person is treated less favourably than another is, has been
or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds
of racial or ethnic origin;
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would
put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular
disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a
legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate and necessary.
3. Harassment shall be deemed to be discrimination within
the meaning of paragraph 1, when an unwanted conduct
related to racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose
or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.
In this context, the concept of harassment may be
defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of
the Member States.
4. An instruction to discriminate against persons on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin shall be deemed to be
discrimination within the meaning of paragraph 1.
Article 3
Scope
1. Within the limits of the powers conferred upon the
Community, this Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards
both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in
relation to:
(a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment
and to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment
conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all
levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion;
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance,
vocational training, advanced vocational training and
retraining, including practical work experience;
(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals
and pay;
(d) membership of and involvement in an organisation of
workers or employers, or any organisation whose members
carry on a particular profession, including the benefits
provided for by such organisations;
(e) social protection, including social security and healthcare;
(f) social advantages;
(g) education;
(h) access to and supply of goods and services which are
available to the public, including housing.
2. This Directive does not cover difference of treatment
based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and
conditions relating to the entry into and residence of thirdcountry
nationals and stateless persons on the territory of
Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the
legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons
concerned.
Article 4
Genuine and determining occupational requirements
Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may
provide that a difference of treatment which is based on a
characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin shall not constitute
discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided
that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.
Article 5
Positive action
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle
of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from
maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or
compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin.
Article 6
Minimum requirements
1. Member States may introduce or maintain provisions
which are more favourable to the protection of the principle of
equal treatment than those laid down in this Directive.
2. The implementation of this Directive shall under no
circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of
protection against discrimination already afforded by Member
States in the fields covered by this Directive.
19.7.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 180/25
CHAPTER II
REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT
Article 7
Defence of rights
1. Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative
procedures, including where they deem it appropriate
conciliation procedures, for the enforcement of obligations
under this Directive are available to all persons who consider
themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal
treatment to them, even after the relationship in which the
discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended.
2. Member States shall ensure that associations, organisations
or other legal entities, which have, in accordance with
the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest
in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are complied
with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the
complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or
administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations
under this Directive.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to national
rules relating to time limits for bringing actions as regards the
principle of equality of treatment.
Article 8
Burden of proof
1. Member States shall take such measures as are necessary,
in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure
that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because
the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them
establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts
from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or
indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove
that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Member States from introducing
rules of evidence which are more favourable to plaintiffs.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to criminal procedures.
4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also apply to any proceedings
brought in accordance with Article 7(2).
5. Member States need not apply paragraph 1 to proceedings
in which it is for the court or competent body to investigate
the facts of the case.
Article 9
Victimisation
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems
such measures as are necessary to protect individuals from any
adverse treatment or adverse consequence as a reaction to a
complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance
with the principle of equal treatment.
Article 10
Dissemination of information
Member States shall take care that the provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive, together with the relevant provisions
already in force, are brought to the attention of the persons
concerned by all appropriate means throughout their territory.
Article 11
Social dialogue
1. Member States shall, in accordance with national traditions
and practice, take adequate measures to promote the
social dialogue between the two sides of industry with a view
to fostering equal treatment, including through the monitoring
of workplace practices, collective agreements, codes of conduct,
research or exchange of experiences and good practices.
2. Where consistent with national traditions and practice,
Member States shall encourage the two sides of the industry
without prejudice to their autonomy to conclude, at the appropriate
level, agreements laying down anti-discrimination rules
in the fields referred to in Article 3 which fall within the scope
of collective bargaining. These agreements shall respect the
minimum requirements laid down by this Directive and the
relevant national implementing measures.
Article 12
Dialogue with non-governmental organisations
Member States shall encourage dialogue with appropriate nongovernmental
organisations which have, in accordance with
their national law and practice, a legitimate interest in contributing
to the fight against discrimination on grounds of racial
and ethnic origin with a view to promoting the principle of
equal treatment.
CHAPTER III
BODIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF EQUAL TREATMENT
Article 13
1. Member States shall designate a body or bodies for the
promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination
on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies
may form part of agencies charged at national level with the
defence of human rights or the safeguard of individuals' rights.
2. Member States shall ensure that the competences of these
bodies include:
— without prejudice to the right of victims and of associations,
organisations or other legal entities referred to in
Article 7(2), providing independent assistance to victims of
discrimination in pursuing their complaints about discrimination,
— conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination,
— publishing independent reports and making recommendations
on any issue relating to such discrimination.
L 180/26 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19.7.2000
CHAPTER IV
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 14
Compliance
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions
contrary to the principle of equal treatment are abolished;
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment
which are included in individual or collective contracts or
agreements, internal rules of undertakings, rules governing
profit-making or non-profit-making associations, and rules
governing the independent professions and workers' and
employers' organisations, are or may be declared, null and
void or are amended.
Article 15
Sanctions
Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable
to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant
to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure
that they are applied. The sanctions, which may comprise the
payment of compensation to the victim, must be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall notify
those provisions to the Commission by 19 July 2003 at the
latest and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent
amendment affecting them.
Article 16
Implementation
Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by
19 July 2003 or may entrust management and labour, at their
joint request, with the implementation of this Directive as
regards provisions falling within the scope of collective agreements.
In such cases, Member States shall ensure that by 19
July 2003, management and labour introduce the necessary
measures by agreement, Member States being required to take
any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a
position to guarantee the results imposed by this Directive.
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain
a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a
reference on the occasion of their official publication. The
methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the
Member States.
Article 17
Report
1. Member States shall communicate to the Commission by
19 July 2005, and every five years thereafter, all the information
necessary for the Commission to draw up a report to the
European Parliament and the Council on the application of this
Directive.
2. The Commission's report shall take into account, as
appropriate, the views of the European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia, as well as the viewpoints of the social
partners and relevant non-governmental organisations. In
accordance with the principle of gender mainstreaming, this
report shall, inter alia, provide an assessment of the impact of
the measures taken on women and men. In the light of the
information received, this report shall include, if necessary,
proposals to revise and update this Directive.
Article 18
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication
in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Article 19
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Luxembourg, 29 June 2000.
For the Council
The President
M. ARCANJO
Annex 828
European Commission, Statement, Joint Statement by President of the European Council
Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso on
Crimea (Brussels, 16 March 2014)
STATEMENT/14/71
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
STATEMENT
Brussels, 16 March 2014
Joint statement by President of the European Council
Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European
Commission José Manuel Barroso on Crimea
Brussels, 16 March 2014 – As stated by all 28 EU Heads of State or Government on 6
March 2014, the European Union considers the holding of the referendum on the future
status of the territory of Ukraine as contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution and
international law. The referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not be
recognised.
The solution to the crisis in Ukraine must be based on the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine, in the framework of the Ukrainian Constitution as well as
the strict adherence to international standards. Only working together through diplomatic
processes, including direct discussions between the Governments of Ukraine and Russia,
can we find a solution to the crisis. The European Union has a special responsibility for
peace, stability and prosperity on the European continent and will continue pursuing these
objectives using all available channels.
We reiterate the strong condemnation of the unprovoked violation of Ukraine's sovereignty
and territorial integrity and call on Russia to withdraw its armed forces to their pre-crisis
numbers and the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with relevant
agreements.
In advancing these goals, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will evaluate the situation
tomorrow in Brussels and decide on additional measures in line with the declaration of the
Heads of State and Government of the EU of 6 March.
Contacts :
Pia AHRENKILDE HANSEN: + 32 (0) 498 95 3070
Helen KEARNS: + 32 (0) 498 98 76 38
For the public: Europe Direct by phone 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 or by e-mail
Annex 829
European Parliament Policy Department Study, The Situation of National Minorities in Crimea
Following Its Annexation by Russia (April 2016)
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT
STUDY
The situation of national minorities
in Crimea following its annexation by
Russia
ABSTRACT
National minorities in Crimea have been subject to systematic violations of their
rights since the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March 2014.
Documented violations have occurred in the areas of freedom of expression,
conscience, and religion; the right to peaceful assembly and association; freedom of
the media and access to information; the right to a fair trial and effective remedy; the
right to education in one’s native language; and linguistic and cultural rights. The de
facto authorities in Crimea have neglected to investigate cases of grave violations of
the rights to life, liberty, security, and physical integrity. The response of the
international community has been limited. While Western countries pursue nonrecognition
policies towards Crimea, international sanctions introduced in response
to the occupation of Crimea are weak, and there have been no measures taken to
address the international humanitarian law and human rights violations in Crimea.
Limited support is available to human rights organisations focused on or working in
Crimea, and human rights monitors still cannot gain access to Crimea. The European
Union, and the European Parliament, in particular, should actively advocate for the
establishment of an international human rights monitoring presence in occupied
Crimea. Tailor-made support programmes should be offered to Ukrainian
government agencies and civil society working towards the protection of the rights of
Ukrainian citizens in Crimea. The European Parliament should continue raising the
issue of human rights violations in Crimea and monitor individual cases. Furthermore,
the Council of the European Union should consider imposing sanctions for the
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in occupied Crimea.
EP/EXPO/B/DROI/FWC/2013-08/LOT1/05 EN
April 2016 - PE 578.003 © European Union, 2016
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
This paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Human Rights
English-language manuscript was completed on 13 April 2016.
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Author(s): Natalia SHAPOVALOVA, CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Poland,
Olga BURLYUK, Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University, in association with Policy Association for an Open Society,
Czech Republic
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ISBN: 978-92-823-9164-8 (pdf) ISBN: 978-92-823-9165-5 (paper)
doi:10.2861/981109 (pdf) doi:10.2861/203157 (paper)
Catalogue number: QA-02-16-391-EN-N (pdf) Catalogue number: QA-02-16-391-EN-C (paper)
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
Table of contents
Executive summary 4
List of abbreviations 6
1 Introduction 7
2 Overview of available sources of information 9
3 The situation of national minorities following the annexation 12
3.1 Grave human rights violations targeted at minorities: the rights to life, liberty,
security, and physical integrity 14
3.2 Violations of the freedom of assembly targeted at minorities 16
3.3 Violations of the freedoms of expression and the media targeted at minorities 18
3.4 Violations of the freedom of movement of minorities 18
3.5 Violations of the freedom of association targeted at minorities 19
3.6 Targeting the Mejlis as a self-governing body of Crimean Tatars 20
3.7 Violations of freedom of religion targeted at minorities 21
3.8 Violations of the right to education and cultural rights targeted at minorities 22
3.9 Property rights of the Crimean repatriates 24
4 Overview of relevant legislative acts of the Russian Federation and the
de facto authorities 25
5 Applicability of relevant international legal norms and standards to the
de jure and de facto authorities 30
6 Actions taken by the international community to improve the situation of
minorities in Crimea 34
6.1 Non-recognition policy and sanctions against the occupier 35
6.2 International law enforcement and human rights protection mechanisms 37
7 The implementation of relevant EU policies, frameworks, programmes, and
guidelines 38
8 Conclusions and recommendations regarding possible EU policy measures 40
Annex 1 Crimean political prisoners 44
Annex 2 Key legislative acts of the Russian Federation and the de facto
authorities relevant for the rights of national minorities in Crimea 47
Annex 3 International sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea by Russia 49
References 51
3
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Executive summary
This study examines the situation of national minorities in Crimea since its illegal annexation by Russia on
18 March 2014 up to the time of the writing of this report in March 2016. It focuses on the systematic
violations of the rights of persons belonging to the two largest minority groups in the occupied
peninsula – Crimean Tatars, who are also indigenous to Crimea, and Ukrainians, who became a de facto
minority following Crimea’s annexation. Such violations have occurred in the areas of freedom of
expression, conscience, and religion; the right to peaceful assembly and association; freedom of the
media and access to information; the right to a fair trial and effective remedy; the right to education in
one’s native language; and linguistic and cultural rights. Russian legislation on extremism and terrorism
and on criminal code provisions has been applied extensively by the de facto authorities in Crimea in
order to silence the dissent of the Crimeans who opposed its annexation and to target non-Russian
religious and ethnic groups, especially Crimean Muslims, most of whom are Crimean Tatars. There are
also cases of grave violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and physical integrity of minority group
representatives that have not been investigated by the de facto authorities. Against the worsening
backdrop of human rights violations in occupied Crimea, the de facto authorities have further aggravated
inter-ethnic relations by using intolerant and hateful language, including through mass media, and by
labelling minority representatives and groups as ‘loyal’ or ‘disloyal’.
As an occupying power, Russia is responsible for the implementation of international humanitarian law
and for respecting the human rights of Crimean residents. Furthermore, even though Ukraine does not
have effective control over Crimea, it is still obliged to use all available legal and diplomatic means to
protect the rights of its citizens in the occupied territory.
This study also examines the response of the international community, including the European Union, to
the human rights situation in occupied Crimea. Major international security and human rights
institutions, many to which Russia is a party, were unable to convince Russia to cease its illegal
annexation of Crimea or to respect international laws of occupation. While Western countries pursue
non-recognition policies towards Crimea, international sanctions introduced in relation to the occupation
of Crimea are weak, and there have been no restrictive measures introduced in response to the violations
of international humanitarian and human rights law in occupied Crimea. The international community
has also been unable to secure the presence of international human rights organisations in Crimea.
Support to human rights organisations working on and in Crimea remains extremely limited.
In this regard, a number of recommendations for the European Union and, specifically, the European
Parliament, are made, namely:
to advocate for and establish an international human rights monitoring presence in occupied
Crimea. Meanwhile, the European Union should encourage the government of Ukraine to ease the
rules of entry to the peninsula for foreigners to allow access for representatives of international
human rights non-governmental organisations and journalists;
to strengthen sanctions against Russia for the occupation of Crimea and to link these sanctions to
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in occupied Crimea to comply with
the European Union's own commitments set out in the Treaty on Functioning of the European
Union and relevant European Union guidelines;
to continuously raise the issue of the illegal annexation at all international fora and meetings with
Russian representatives and to demand Russia’s compliance with international humanitarian law
and international human rights law and the de-occupation of Crimea;
4
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
to introduce tailor-made programmes to support Ukrainian government agencies and civil society
in devising effective policies towards the occupied territory and population and effective strategies
towards a peaceful de-occupation, and to provide support to media outlets broadcasting in Crimea
and organisations representing the indigenous people of Crimea; and
to encourage the government of Ukraine to improve its domestic policies towards internally
displaced people, especially Crimean Tatars, ensuring their right to preserve their language and
culture on mainland Ukraine, and to adopt international standards on the rights of indigenous
peoples and develop national legislation on the rights of Crimean Tatars in Ukraine.
Any efforts of the European Union and the international community to address the violations of human
rights and the worsening situation of minorities in occupied Crimea should also take into account the
pressing need to reform and strengthen the relevant international and regional human rights and
security institutions, which have failed to adequately respond to Russia's acts of aggression towards
Ukraine and its illegal occupation of Crimea. The European Parliament could also play a role in this effort
by encouraging debate on these issues.
5
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
List of abbreviations
ABL Administrative Boundary Line
CoE Council of Europe
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
ECHR European Court on Human Rights
ECRI European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
EEAS European External Action Service
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
FSB Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE
ICC International Criminal Court
IcSP Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IHRL International Human Rights Law
NGO Non-governmental organisation
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCE SMM Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE to Ukraine
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNDP United National Development Programme
USA United States of America
6
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
1 Introduction
Historically, Crimea is a multicultural, multi-ethnic region. According to the Ukrainian Population Census
of 2001, Russians comprised the majority (58.5 %) of persons in Crimea, followed by Ukrainians (24.4 %),
Crimean Tatars (12.1 %), Belarusians (1.5 %), Tatars (0.5 %), Armenians (0.4 %), Jews, Poles, Moldovans,
Azeris (0.2 % each), and other ethnic groups; altogether, representing over 125 nationalities in the two
million people that populated Crimea.1 Despite the wide use of the Russian language, Crimea is a multilingual
society in which Russian was considered the native language by 76 % of its inhabitants, Crimean
Tatar by 11 %, and Ukrainian by 10 % in 2001.2 The region is also diverse in terms of religious beliefs and
denominations. According to data from Ukraine's Ministry of Culture, among the 1 409 registered
religious communities present in Crimea as of January 2014, 42.7 % represented Christian Orthodoxy,
29 %—Islam, 20 %—Protestantism, 1.6 %—Catholicism, 0.9 %—Judaism, and 5.6 %—other religions.3
The annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014 was justified by Russia and the de facto authorities as a
move to protect the Russian and Russian-speaking populations from the ‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, anti-
Semites, and Russophobes’ who ‘seized power in Ukraine’ and to return to Russia what ‘was and has
always been an integral part of the country’.4 The annexation has dramatically changed the legislative
framework de facto applied in Crimea, including that which regulates human rights and fundamental
freedoms, but also the situation of its ethnic groups. While a minority in Ukraine, Russians have
strengthened their position in Crimea after the annexation. Ukrainians, in contrast, have turned into a de
facto minority and their rights, especially linguistic, were affected almost immediately, despite the fact
that the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Crimea’, approved on 11 April 2014 by the de facto authorities,
declared Ukrainian, together with Russian and Crimean Tatar, as the state languages on the local level.
Crimean Tatars have found themselves in an unsafe position because, in addition to being a minority,
they are indigenous people of Crimea, with no kin-state to seek protection from.5 They have strong
memories of the forcible deportation of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea by the Soviet Union and of the
earlier Russian colonisation of Crimea. The Russian annexation of Crimea has evoked fears among
Crimean Tatars of new persecutions, forced assimilation, or forced emigration. While the de facto
authorities and the government of Russia have made a number of declarations that the rights of the
minorities on the peninsula would be protected, including the Russian President's decree on the
1 All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001, National Structure of Population in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/. By early 2014, the share of the Crimean Tatar population
was likely higher than in the census data, given that there was a continuous return of Crimean Tatars from Central Asia between
2001 and 2014 and a relatively high birth rate in the Crimean Tatar community, as compared to the negative indicators for the
Russian and Ukrainian populations. See N. Useinov, ‘Crimea: from annexation to annexation, or how history has come full circle’,
in K. Bachmann & I. Lyubashenko, eds., The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention: Ukraine's complex transition,
Series: Studies in Political Transition - Vol. 4, Peter Lang: Frankfurt am Main, 2014.
2 All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001, Share of population by native language, Autonomous Republic of Crimea (% of all
population). Retrieved from http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/ on 1 March 2016. In October 2014, the occupying power
conducted a population census, according to which the share of Russians increased to 67.9 %, the share of Ukrainians decreased
to 15.6 %, the share of Crimean Tatars dropped to 10.5 %, and the share of Tatars was 2 %. However, the occupying authorities
may have manipulated the data in order to legitimise the annexation of Crimea as a region with a population of over two thirds
ethnic Russians. Given the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in Crimea, ethnic minorities may also have been unwilling to
reveal their true ethnicity or may have boycotted the census.
3 Institute for Religious Freedom, Religious map of Crimea – infographics, 8 April 2014,
http://www.irf.in.ua/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=407:1&catid=36:com&Itemid=55
4 President of Russia, Obraschenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Address of the President of the Russian Federation],
18 March 2014. Retrieved from http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 on 1 March 2016.
5 See also A. Osipov, ‘What Do the Crimean Tatars Face in Crimea?’, European Centre for Minority Issues Brief 32, April 2014.
7
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
rehabilitation of the peoples deported from Crimea in 1944,6 ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who
support Ukraine's territorial integrity and oppose the change of the status of Crimea have found
themselves in an extremely vulnerable position. According the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, over
21 000 Crimeans have fled to mainland Ukraine.7 However, the real number of displaced persons is
believed to be much higher.8 Moreover, of those displaced, according to Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the
Mejlis (the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatar people), about half are Crimean Tatars.9
Since the first days of the military occupation in Crimea, pro-Ukraine Crimeans, especially Crimean Tatars,
have been targeted by the de facto authorities, Crimean ‘self-defence’, and other paramilitary groups
through various restrictive measures and human rights abuses, including forced disappearances,
murders, unlawful searches, interrogations, seizures and arrests, intimidation, and entry bans on political
leaders. The de facto authorities have also enacted a wide ban on independent media, including Crimean
Tatar outlets, and imposed restrictions on civil, social, and cultural rights.
This study aims to analyse the situation of the national minorities in Crimea since its annexation by Russia
(March 2014-March 2016) as well as the policies and practices adopted by the de facto authorities, and to
evaluate the response of the international community, including the European Union (EU), to the human
rights violations in the occupied peninsula.
This study draws on numerous reports from international intergovernmental organisations and nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs) that assess the human rights situation in Crimea since its annexation.
These reports will be examined in the next section as the principal sources of data and analysis on the
situation of the national minorities in Crimea. The reports are complemented by recent accounts from the
media, as well as by interviews and informal discussions with representatives of human rights
organisations, think tanks, and international organisations, and by participant observation at a number of
events on the human rights situation in Crimea during February through early March 2016 in Kyiv.
The remainder of this report is divided into seven sections. The next section examines the available
sources of information on the human rights situation in Crimea. Section 3 provides an overview of the
situation of national minorities in Crimea and the major violations of their rights from the annexation in
March 2014 to the time of the writing of this report in March 2016. Section 4 outlines the de facto
legislative framework affecting the rights of minorities in Crimea, including the application of Russian
legislation and the relevant acts passed by the de facto authorities. Section 5 reviews the international
legal norms and standards relevant to the situation of the occupation of Crimea. Section 6 discusses the
actions taken by the international community to improve the situation of these minority groups and to
ensure the application of international law. Section 7 evaluates the actions taken by the EU. The report
concludes with recommendations for future policy measures.
6 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21 aprelia 2014 No 268 [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from
21 April 2014 No 268], Rossiyskaya Gazeta No 6363, 23 April 2014. Retrieved from http://www.rg.ru/2014/04/21/reabilitaciya-sitedok.
html on 1 March 2016.
7 State Emergency Service of Ukraine, Vid pochatku roku regionalnymy shtabamy DSNS zareyestrovano ponad 7 tysiach
vnutrishnio peremishchenyh osib [Since the beginning of the year regional offices of the SES have registered over 7 thousand
internally displaced persons], 5 February 2016 http://www.mns.gov.ua/news/45731.html?PrintVersion
8 UNIAN, ‘Chubarov: Okupirovannyi Krym pokinuli okolo 35 tysiach chelovek, polovina kotoryh – krymskie tatary’ [‘Chubarov:
Occupied Crimea is left by about 35 thousand people, half of which are Crimean Tatars‘], UNIAN, 17 February 2016,
http://www.unian.net/politics/1268050-chubarov-okkupirovannyiy-kryim-pokinuli-okolo-35-tyisyach-chelovek-polovinakotoryih-
kryimskie-tataryi.html
9 UNIAN, ‘Chubarov: Okupirovannyi Krym pokinuli okolo 35 tysiach chelovek, polovina kotoryh – krymskie tatary’ [‘Chubarov:
Occupied Crimea is left by about 35 thousand people, half of which are Crimean Tatars‘], UNIAN, 17 February 2016,
http://www.unian.net/politics/1268050-chubarov-okkupirovannyiy-kryim-pokinuli-okolo-35-tyisyach-chelovek-polovinakotoryih-
kryimskie-tataryi.html
8
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
2 Overview of available sources of information
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, regarded as illegal by the vast majority of the international
community, including the EU and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) through its Resolution
68/262 of 27 March 2014, the human rights situation in Crimea has been the focus of many reports from
international intergovernmental organisations, international human rights NGOs, Ukrainian and Russian
human rights groups, and ombudspersons. These reports, as a rule, include overviews of the situation of
the national minorities in Crimea.
Among these reports, several provide a greater focus on the situation of the minorities in Crimea. The
report of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Special Rapporteur on
Minority Issues Rita Izsák, based on her mission to Ukraine in early April 2014, analysed the situation of
national minorities in Ukraine along with the policy framework for the protection of their rights. Though
the Special Rapporteur was not allowed to enter Crimea, she was able to meet with representatives of the
national minorities, including the Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, as ‘de facto minorities in some
localities including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’.10 The report raised concerns over the situation
of minority groups, including religious communities, in Crimea in the immediate aftermath of the
annexation and called for further international presence and monitoring. At the Council of Europe (CoE),
the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
issued an ad hoc report based on their visit to Ukraine during 21-26 March 2014.11 The Advisory
Committee did not travel to Crimea, but instead met with representatives of the minority groups in
Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa. The report expressed concerns over ‘the safety and access to rights of minority
populations in Crimea’, in particular, the Crimean Tatars, numerically smaller minorities such as the
Karaim and the Krimchak, and persons belonging to the Ukrainian community ‘who are in a minority
situation in Crimea’.12 Another CoE report delivered by the Commissioner for Human Rights Nils
Muižnieks upon his visits to Kyiv, Moscow, and Crimea in September 2014 also reviewed the main
violations of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the context of the human rights situation in
Crimea.13
The most extensive reports on minority rights in Crimea were prepared by the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) within the
human rights assessment mission conducted jointly with the Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR). The first report of the ODIHR and the HCNM provided an assessment of the
human rights situation in Ukraine in the spring of 2014 and featured specific sections on Crimea in the
context of human rights and, in particular, the situation of minorities. The findings of the Crimea sections
were based on visits conducted separately by ODIHR and HCNM delegations to Crimea in March and April
2014. While the ODIHR delegation raised concerns over the situation of the pro-Maidan activists, the
Ukrainian military, and Crimean Tatars as communities opposed to the annexation, the HCNM delegation
noted:
Ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who espouse pro-Ukrainian views on the status of
Crimea or manifest a will to uphold their identity, especially their religious, cultural or
10 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Rita Izsák, Report Addendum Mission to
Ukraine (7-14 April 2014), Distr. General 27 January 2015.
11 Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Ad hoc Report
on the situation of national minorities in Ukraine adopted 1 April 2014, Public ACFC (2014) 001.
12 Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Ad hoc Report
on the situation of national minorities in Ukraine adopted 1 April 2014, Public ACFC (2014) 001.
13 Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Report Following His Mission in Kyiv, Moscow, and
Crimea from 7-12 September 2014, Strasbourg, 27 October 2014.
9
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
linguistic rights, appear increasingly vulnerable, and are in urgent need of protection – an
obligation borne first and foremost by the authorities exercising de facto control in Crimea.14
Centring on the human rights situation in Crimea, the second ODIHR and HCNM report of September
2015 is the most recent report issued by an international organisation that explicitly focused on the rights
of minorities in the occupied peninsula. However, this time, the OSCE human rights assessment mission
was not allowed access to Crimea and, thus, the report is based on interviews conducted on mainland
Ukraine as well as on remote interviews with contacts in Crimea. The report emphasised ‘a particularly
vulnerable position’ of the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians ‘who openly supported the territorial integrity
of Ukraine and did not support the de facto authorities,’ and noted the shrinking space for maintaining
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar identity in Crimea.15
The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine conducts continuous monitoring of the human
rights situation in Crimea, though the mission is denied access to Crimea by the de facto authorities. The
results of this monitoring have been published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), first as monthly reports and since 2015, as quarterly reports. The reports contain a
separate section that provides an overview of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in
Crimea, paying special attention to the rights of indigenous people.16
International NGOs, such as Amnesty International,17 Human Rights Watch,18 the Atlantic
Council/Freedom House,19 and the Ukrainian-American human rights group Razom20 have produced
reports focusing specifically on human rights abuses in Crimea. Regular monitoring of the human rights
situation in Crimea was conducted by the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, a coalition of Ukrainian
and Russian human rights groups, which monitored violations of international humanitarian law (IHL)
and international human rights law (IHRL) in Crimea between March 2014 and June 2015. These reports
covered, inter alia, inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations and the situation of minorities in Crimea.21
Supported by the Turkish authorities, in June 2015, an unofficial delegation led by Professor Zafer Üskül
published a report on the situation of Crimean Tatars following Crimea’s annexation by Russia, which was
based on their four-day visit to Crimea in April 2015.22 The report noted ‘a serious decline in the exercise
of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to assembly and demonstration, and the freedom
14 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights & High Commissioner on National Minorities, Human Rights
Assessment Mission in Ukraine. Human Rights and Minority Rights Situation. ODIHR HRAM: 6 March-1 April 2014. HCNM HRAM:
8 March-17 April 2014, the Hague/Warsaw, 12 May 2014, 79 p.
15 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights & High Commissioner on National Minorities, Report of the Human
Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015), the Hague/Warsaw, 17 September 2015, p. 7-8.
16 OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine are available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/UAReports.aspx
17 Amnesty International, One Year On: Violations of the Rights to Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association in Crimea,
March 2015, p. 26.
18 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, November 2014, p. 45.
19 A. Klymenko, Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States
and Freedom House, March 2015, p. 23; Freedom House, 'Crimea', [in] Freedom in the World 2015, available at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/crimea
20 I. Bilych et al., Human Rights on Occupied Territory: Case of Crimea, New York: Razom, 2015,
http://razomforukraine.org/crimeareport
21 The Crimean Field Mission monitoring reports for the period between March 2014 and June 2015 are available in Russian and
English at http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/category/monitoring/
22 The Turkish delegation first visited Kyiv, then from Kyiv travelled to Moscow and from there to Crimea. See S. Erkuş, ‘Turkish
delegation chooses Russia’s way in Crimea’, Hurriyet Daily News, 29 April 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkishdelegation-
chooses-russias-way-in-crimea.aspx?pageID=238&nID=81738&NewsCatID=510
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The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
of expression’ and ‘a systematic policy of suppression and intimidation’ pursued by the de facto
authorities.23
Experts of the Eurasian Jewish Congress, an organisation uniting Jewish communities and organisations
from post-Soviet (but not only) countries, produce monthly chronicles of anti-Semitism and xenophobia
in Ukraine, including in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Based on these chronicles, a special report
entitled 'Two years of repressions: the rights of national minorities in Crimea, 2014-2015' was issued, and
assessed the human rights situation in the occupied region as ‘catastrophic’.24
There are also numerous reports produced by Ukrainian NGOs, such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Human
Rights Union,25 the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research,26 and coalitions of human rights
groups.27 The Kyiv-based Crimea Human Rights group stepped up the work of the Crimean Human Rights
Field Mission by publishing reports from July 2015 onwards.28 The Centre for Civil Liberties and
Euromaidan-SOS issue monthly ‘Chronicles of the Occupation’ covering politically motivated human
rights violations.29 Crimea-SOS, a Ukrainian NGO, runs an interactive map of human rights violations in
Crimea based on information available in open sources. The map has a separate section entitled
‘Repressions against Crimean Tatars’.30
As for the Ukrainian authorities, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights
(ombudsperson) discussed the situation in Crimea in the 2014 annual report.31 The 2014 annual report
produced by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation features a section
entitled ‘Crimea: despite the difficulties of the transition period’.32 It focused on the restoration of rights
of Crimean Tatars and inter-ethnic relations mainly by describing the steps conducted by ‘the authorities
in Crimea’ to improve the situation of Crimean Tatar people.
The most fundamental and persistent challenge for independent monitoring and reporting on human
rights in Crimea is the lack of access to the peninsula since the annexation. International
23 Z. Üskül et al., The Situation of the Crimean Tatars Since the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Report prepared
based on information obtained during interviews conducted by an unofficial Turkish Delegation in Crimea on 27-30 April 2015,
5 June 2015. Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292906164_The_Situation_of_the_Crimean_Tatars_since_the_Annexation_of_Crime
a_by_the_Russian_Federation on 1 March 2016.
24 V. Likhachev, Dva goda repressiy: prava natsionalnyh menshinstv v Krymu, 2014-2015. Ksenofobia, narushenia prav
natsionalnykh menshinstv, religioznye presledovania i repressii v otnoshenii nezavisimogo krymskotatarskogo dvizhenia [Two
years of repressions: the rights of national minorities in Crimea. Xenophobia, violations of national minority rights, religious
persecutions and repressions against independent Crimea Tatar movement], Report. Retrieved from
http://eajc.org/data//file/Qirim_under_the_Occupation.pdf on 1 March 2016.
25 O. Martynenko, Y. Zakharov, Human Rights in Ukraine - 2014. Human rights report of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights
Group, Kharkiv: LLC “Publishing Human Rights”, 2015. p. 324.
26 Y. Tyshchenko, ed., Hromadianstvo, zemlia, ‘natsionalizatsiya vlasnosti’ v umovah okupatsiyi Krymu: deficyt prav [Citizenship,
land, ‘nationalisation of property’ under the occupation of Crimea: The rights deficit], Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Independent
Political Research, 2015; Y. Tyshchenko, O. Smyrnov, eds, ‘Anneksovana’ osvita v tymchasovo okupovanomu Krymu [‘Annexed’
education in the temporary occupied Crimea], Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research, 2015.
27 For example, T. Pechonchyk, ed., The Fear Peninsula: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea, Kyiv,
2015, 77 p.
28 The Crimea Human Rights Group reports are available at http://crimeahrg.org/category/monitor/
29 The website of the Centre for Civil Liberties http://ccl.org.ua/ is temporarily unavailable, but their monthly digests are available
at http://www.prostir.ua/category/library/?filter-type=novyny_po_rehionah&filter-value=krym
30 The map and data on violations are available at http://crimeamap.krymsos.com/ru/list.html
31 Schorichna dopovid Upovnovazhenoho Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukraiiny z prav liudyny pro stan doderzhannia ta zahystu prav i
svobod liudyny i hromadianyna [Annual report of Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of
respect and protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms], Kyiv, 2015, p. 552.
32 Doklad Upolnomochennogo po pravam cheloveka v Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi za 2014 god [Report of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in the Russian Federation for 2014], Moscow, 2015.
11
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
intergovernmental organisations and international NGOs have access to the peninsula for human rights
monitoring regularly denied or impeded. Since the mission of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights
Nils Muižnieks to Crimea in September 2014 until late January 2016, when the delegation sent by the CoE
Secretary General and led by Gérard Stoudmann visited Crimea, no international organisations were able
to visit the peninsula.
Impediments to access of international organisations to Crimea are related to its disputed status. If the
international organisations are invited by the government of Ukraine to monitor the human rights
situation in Crimea, the Russian occupying authorities block access (as it occurred in the case of the UN
Human Rights Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine). Even if this
obstacle could be overcome, the government of Ukraine could not ensure security of an international
delegation on territory that it does not control. Furthermore, if monitors from international NGOs
attempt to enter Crimea in a personal capacity, without disclosing the true purpose of their visit, they
may face significant security risks during their stay. Thus, cooperation with Russia is necessary in order to
obtain third-party access to occupied Crimea; however, as the occupying power, Russia does not
recognise that human rights are violated in Crimea, nor do they recognise a need for independent
monitoring.
Moreover, given the restrictive climate for civic activism in Crimea, the monitoring and documentation of
human rights violations by local activists constitutes a major risk, as these activists could be arrested (a
member of the human rights contact group Emir-Usein Kuku was jailed for two months on 11 February
2015 after previous detentions) or deported. A number of prominent Crimean human rights
organisations have ceased activities or relocated to mainland Ukraine. The above-mentioned Russian-
Ukrainian Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, which was one of few groups present on the ground in
2014 and the first half of 2015, was forced to terminate its work due to persecution by Russian authorities
and the restrictive conditions of entry to the peninsula imposed by Ukrainian authorities.33 The Crimea
Human Rights Group, the organisation that assumed the activities of the Russian-Ukrainian Crimean
Human Rights Field Mission following the termination of its work, conducts its monitoring in complete
secrecy through a network of local activists.34 Another Kyiv-based group that was interviewed decided to
end its monitoring of education rights due to risks to their informants: fearful of persecution, Crimean
teachers would refuse any contacts with this organisation.35 A human rights group representative stated
that there is only awareness of the documented human rights violations; many Crimeans are simply too
scared to report what has happened to them.36 Thus, the real scale and scope of the human rights
violations in Crimea is unknown.
3 The situation of national minorities following the annexation
The situation of the minorities in Crimea should be considered, first and foremost, in the broader context
of the human rights situation on the occupied peninsula. Since the occupation and annexation of Crimea
by Russia, fundamental human rights and freedoms have been severely restricted. On the one hand, the
more restrictive (as compared to that of Ukraine) legislation regulating political and civil rights of Russia
has been extended to Crimea to curtail the fundamental freedoms of assembly, expression, association,
access to information, and religion. This has had a negative impact on the rights of all residents in Crimea,
especially those who oppose or resist the occupation. As one interviewee in Kyiv noted, the path towards
33 Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, Statement about reformatting activities of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission,
9 September 2015. Retrieved from http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/en/statement-about-reformatting-activities-of-the-crimeanhuman-
rights-field-mission/ on 1 March 2016.
34 Interview with a civil society group member, Kyiv, 11 February 2016.
35 Interview with a civil society group member, Kyiv, 18 February 2016.
36 Interview with a civil society group member, Kyiv, 17 February 2016.
12
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
the full suppression of fundamental rights and political and civic freedoms, which Russia has been
following for two decades, has been implemented in Crimea over the course of one year.37 On the other
hand, the de facto authorities of Crimea have applied the new rules in a manner that is particularly
restrictive and repressive towards certain groups, namely human rights and civil society organisations,
journalists, activists, and representatives of non-Russian ethnic groups, as well as the Russians who have
opposed the annexation. Compared to ethnic Ukrainians, the largest de facto minority on the peninsula,
Crimean Tatars are better organised and consolidated and are more visible (as they can be distinguished
physically); this has made them particularly vulnerable to discrimination and violations of their collective
and individual rights by the de facto authorities as well as by the Crimean ‘self-defence’ and other
paramilitary groups in Crimea. As far as ethnic Ukrainians are concerned, they become victims of
discrimination and political persecution when they explicitly express pro-Ukraine views or their Ukrainian
identity (speaking in the Ukrainian language, celebrating Ukrainian holidays, or wearing symbols of
Ukraine). Some human rights defenders speak of systematic repressions against the ‘political Ukrainians’
among Crimeans, referring to civic rather than ethnic identity and identification with the Ukrainian state.
As the ODIHR and HCNM joint 2015 report concluded:
As a result of the annexation, the changes in government and the legal framework being
applied in Crimea have dramatically impacted the enjoyment of the full spectrum of human
rights and fundamental freedoms by residents there, particularly of those residents who were
opposed to the annexation, were unable to reject forced Russian citizenship, and/or did not
seek to acquire Russian passports.
Fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, movement, expression and access to
information have all been restricted in some fashion – whether through formal measures, or
through the sporadic targeting of individuals or communities representing opposing views,
voices or socio-political structures.38
Against the backdrop of a general deterioration in the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Crimea, the de facto authorities have adopted more restrictive policies towards national
minorities than those that existed in Ukraine. These restrictions have been felt first by ethnic Ukrainians,
Crimean Tatars, and other smaller ethnic and religious groups on the peninsula (such as the Karaims,
Krimchaks, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, non-Russian Orthodox Church believers, and Muslim
communities). These restrictions can also be viewed in the context of attempts by the de facto authorities
to silence dissent and to suppress disloyal ethnic groups, and to justify the ‘self-determination’ of Crimea
as a ‘historically Russian land’. Some long-standing Russian policies, especially those towards religious
minorities, such as non-Russian Orthodox Christian churches or Muslim groups (in the context of the
North Caucasus insurgency), have been transferred to Crimea. The situation of minority groups in
Russian-occupied Crimea has been summarised in the following statement by the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors, based on the results of the 2015 monitoring mission:
We found in Crimea that those Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who openly supported the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, refused Russian citizenship, or did not support the de facto
authorities were in a particularly vulnerable position. Since the annexation of Crimea, the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities have been subjected to increasing pressure on
and control of the peaceful expression of both their culture and their political views.39
37 Interview with a civil society group member, Kyiv, 17 February 2016.
38 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 7.
39 The OSCE ODIHR and HCNM joint report identifies widespread human rights violations, discrimination, and legal irregularities
in Crimea, Kyiv, 17 September 2015. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/182526 on 1 March 2016.
13
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
It must be mentioned that whereas the most noticeable and grave violations of the rights of Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians as well as certain religious groups are documented and reported, there is a lack of
reliable information about the situation of other smaller minority groups, including those groups
previously deported on ethnic grounds. This lack of information may imply that they are either not
specifically persecuted, or not sufficiently numerous and organised to be heard by those who monitor
and report on human rights violations in Crimea. While it is beyond the limits of this study to resolve this
lack of knowledge regarding the situation of other minorities, there is a pressing need to bridge this gap,
including through international human rights monitoring on the ground in Crimea, in order to make a
complete and comprehensive assessment of the situation of all minority groups, inter-ethnic relations,
and the risks of an ethno-political conflict in annexed Crimea.40
3.1 Grave human rights violations targeted at minorities: the rights to
life, liberty, security, and physical integrity
The most serious human rights violations to which minority groups have become especially vulnerable
involve the rights to life, security, liberty, and physical integrity. Since the annexation of Crimea by
Russia, numerous cases of disappearances have been reported. Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar
leader, Member of Parliament of Ukraine, and Commissioner of the President of Ukraine on Crimean Tatar
People’s Affairs, said in December 2015 that since the beginning of the occupation, 20 Crimean Tatars
have disappeared.41 However, the exact number of disappeared Crimeans is unknown. The most recent
cases include the disappearances of Marcel Aliautdinov (February 2016), Ernest Ablyazimov (January
2016), and Ruslan Ganiev and his friend Arlen Terekhov (in December 2015).42 It is worth noting that the
de facto authorities endeavour to present the disappearances of Crimean Tatars as an intentional exodus
to serve in extremist religious groups or to fight in Syria (as was the case regarding the disappearance of
16-year-old Elvina Razakova; however, she was later found by her relatives). Other similar cases include:
Muhtar Arislanov, abducted by uniformed men on 29 August 2015;43 Fyodor Kostenko, father of an
arrested Euromaidan activist, who disappeared on 4 March 2015 upon his return to Crimea after speaking
to the press in Kyiv about his son's case;44 Eskender Apselyamov who went missing in October 2014;45
Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov, who were abducted on 27 September 2014 by unknown
men in military uniform;46 and Leonid Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov, and Seiran Zinedinov, all members of
pro-Ukraine civil society groups, disappeared in May 2014.47
Moreover, two people who had disappeared were found dead: Edem Asanov (September 2014)48 and
Belial Belialov (October 2014).49 Those responsible for the disappearances and deaths of these persons, as
40 The media covering Crimea increasingly reports incidents of societal discrimination and hate speech that may fuel inter-ethnic
tensions; however, there is a need for a systematic documentation of such cases. This issue definitely deserves further
investigation.
41 Ukrainska Pravda, ‘Z pochatku okupatsii Krymy znykly vzhe 20 krymskyh tatar – Dzhemilev’ [’20 Crimean Tatars are already
missing since the start of the occupation – Dzhemilev’], Ukrainska Pravda, 24 December 2015,
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/24/7093547/
42 Data retrieved from Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map of Human Rights Violations, http://crimeamap.krymsos.com/ru/list.html on
1 March 2016.
43 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine - 16 August to 15 November 2015.
44 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 49.
45 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 51; Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
46 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine - 16 August to 15 November 2015.
47 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine - 16 May to 15 August 2015; Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
48 Regarding Edem Asanov, he may have been abducted due to the resemblance of his name to another person who was
allegedly connected to the case of Oleg Sentsov, who was accused of terrorism and sentenced to 20 years in prison. See
T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 50.
49 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 15 November 2014.
14
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
well as of Reshat Ametov, who was abducted and found dead in early March 2014, and those responsible
for the murders of Ukrainian military officer Stanislav Karachevsky (6 April 2014) and Ukrainian teenager
Mark Ivaniuk (20 April 2014), have not been brought to justice.50 All of the abductions involved uniformed
military men, allegedly, the Crimean ‘self-defence’.51
According to the Centre for Civil Liberties, which is leading the public campaign ‘Let My People Go!’, of
the 25 Ukrainian citizens who have been illegally arrested by the Russian authorities and have faced
politically motivated charges based on the Russian Criminal Code, 18 are Crimeans (see Annex 1).52 Six
were illegally transferred to Russia (including Oleg Sentsov, Oleksandr Kolchenko, Oleksiy Chyrniy, and
Gennadiy Afanasiev, who were convicted as ‘Crimean terrorists’). Twelve Crimeans have been unlawfully
placed in Crimean prisons and tried as Russian citizens (including the Mejlis Deputy Chairman Ahtem
Chiygoz and other Crimean Tatars arrested in the ‘Case of 26 February’, Crimean Tatar Muslims arrested in
the ‘Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir’, and Yuriy Ilchenko, who is facing 20 years in prison for publishing an article on
his website opposing Russia's annexation and the war in Donbas).53
The Case of 26 February
In January 2015, Ahtem Chiygoz, Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, was arrested
along with six other Crimean Tatars. They were accused of the organisation of or participation in mass riots
according to the Russian Criminal Code. The case concerns the events of 26 February of 2014, when two
opposite rallies – one pro-Ukrainian and one pro-Russian – took place in front of the building of the Crimean
Supreme Council. Violating the norms of international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Convention
of 1949, as well as the Russian Criminal Code, the de facto authorities retroactively applied Russian legislation
to events that occurred before the occupation. Only the Crimean Tatars who rallied to support Crimea within
Ukraine were prosecuted. Out of the nine persons accused in this case, Ahtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzi,
and Ali Asanov remain imprisoned. Arsen Yunusov, Eskender Kantemirov, and Eskender Emirvaliev were
released under personal surety. At the end of 2015, Eskender Nebiev and Talyat Yunusov were sentenced to two
and a half and to three and a half year suspended sentences, respectively. This case is widely seen as another
instance of political repression against the Mejlis and Crimean Tatars. Nikolay Polozov, Chiygoz's attorney, is
afraid that given the intention of the de facto authorities to outlaw the Mejlis as an extremist organisation,
Chiygoz could face new criminal charges in addition to the current accusation of the organisation of mass
riots.54
In the case of Oleksandr Kostenko, a Crimean Euromaidan activist who was arrested on 5 February 2015
and sentenced to three years and 11 months in prison on the territory of Russia for the alleged infliction
of bodily harm to a riot police officer from Crimea during the protests of 2013-2014, the de facto
authorities applied the Russian criminal code to the events taking place in Kyiv and involving only
Ukrainian citizens, thus violating international law and Russian legislation. The de facto authorities also
opened a criminal case against Kostenko's brother, Yevgeniy, and attempted to place him in a psychiatric
facility.55
50 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 15 November 2014.
51 Ibid; Muižnieks, op. cit.
52 T. Urbanskaya, ‘Uzniki sovesti: zachem Kremlu zalozhniki iz Ukrainy’ [‘Prisoners of conscience: why the Kremlin needs hostages
from Ukraine’], UNIAN, 24 March 2016, http://www.unian.net/politics/1299675-uzniki-sovesti-zachem-kremlyu-zalojniki-izukrainyi.
html; Let My People Go! campaign Facebook page
https://www.facebook.com/letmypeoplegoukraine
53 Centre for Civil Liberties and E-SOS, Let my People Go! Ukrainian prisoners in Russia. Information leaflet, 2015; Let My People
Go! Facebook page.
54 Skype intervention by Nikolay Polozov at the press conference organised by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and
Human Rights Information Centre, Kyiv: Interfax, 26 February 2016.
55 Crimea Human Rights Group, Crimean Human Rights Situation Review, December 2015, p. 7.
15
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Whereas no independent group has access to the detention facilities in Crimea, there have been reports
of the torture of several Crimean political prisoners, including Sentsov, Kolchenko, Afanasiev, Chyrniy,
Kostenko, and Ilchenko,56 and extremely poor conditions of detention.57 In December 2015, there was a
report of the torture of a Crimean Tatar by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB)
after he had refused to cooperate.58
Detentions, searches, and interrogations targeting Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian activists have
become a regular practice in Crimea. As of November 2015, the de facto authorities have launched
unlawful searches and interrogations in the houses and offices of the organisers of the Crimea Blockade,
which was a civic action occurring on the territory of mainland Ukraine. The organisers were: Lilia
Budzhurova, ex-chief editor of ATR, a Crimean Tatar TV channel, Elzara Islyamova, ex-director of ATR,
Refat Chubarov, Mejlis Chairman, and Lenur Islyamov, businessman and owner of ATR. A criminal case
has been opened against them (the ‘Case of the Crimea Blockade’). Pressure was also exerted on the
organisers by other means. In November, the licence of Just Bank, owned by Islyamov, was cancelled.
CinCityTrans, a company owned by Lenur Islyamov's father, was fined in November and further searched
by the de facto authorities in January 2016. In December 2015, a Crimean court seized the property of
Lenur Islyamov. The de facto prosecutor of Crimea, Natalia Poklonskaya, said that his property may be
nationalised to compensate for the harm caused by the blockade.59
Prominent political and civil society leaders are not the only targets. Media and human rights groups
reported a series of house searches in the districts populated by Crimean Tatars in the autumn of 2015
and winter of 2016.60 For example, on 28 December 2015, FSB officers and Crimean Cossacks interrogated
Crimean Tatars living in Dolynka, an ethnically mixed village, because a Ukrainian flag had been painted
on a bus stop nearby, and then photographed all houses that were displaying Crimean Tatar flags.61 The
OHCHR reported that the apparent intention behind the raid was to intimidate local Crimean Tatars.62
3.2 Violations of the freedom of assembly targeted at minorities
The ODIHR and HCNM joint report has stated that ‘some residents seeking to assemble and express
dissenting political opinions or non-Russian cultural identities have had their civil and political rights
heavily restricted by multiple new regulations, including their freedoms of peaceful assembly, expression,
and movement in particular’.63 These restrictions mainly concern the assemblies and expressions
attempted by Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. The de facto authorities routinely deny human rights
groups and opposition political groups, such as the Mejlis, the right to hold public assemblies on days
important for their national identity, such as Deportation Day or the Day of the Crimean Tatar flag.
Participants in such public gatherings, even if these gatherings are not mass events, are penalised. Public
assemblies organised by pro-Russian organisations do not face any reported restrictions64 if they are not
openly critical of the de facto authorities.
56 A. Osavlyuk, P. Brodyk, and M. Lysenko, 28 zalozhnikov Kremlia [The 28 Hostages of the Kremlin], Kyiv: E-SOS, Open Dialogue
Foundation, Let my people go! Centre for Civil Liberties, January 2016.
57 15minut, ‘Advocat: Zaderzhannyh krymskich tatar soderzhat v nevynosimyh usloviyah’ [‘Attorney: Detained Crimean Tatars are
kept in unbearable conditions’], 15minut, 29 February 2016, http://15minut.org/news/158082-advokat-zaderzhannyh-krymskihtatar-
soderzhat-v-nevynosimyh-usloviyah
58 Crimea Human Rights Group, Crimean Human Rights Situation Review, December 2015, p. 4.
59 Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
60 Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
61 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2015 - 15 February 2016.
62 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2015 - 15 February 2016.
63 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 41.
64 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 53.
16
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
The Case of 3 May
One of the most notorious cases where not only the freedom of assembly but also other rights, such as the right
to a fair trial, have been violated by the de facto authorities is the ‘Case of 3 May'. The de facto authorities used
the provisions of the Russian Criminal Code to prosecute members of the Crimean Tatar community who came
to greet Mustafa Dzhemilev during his attempt to enter the peninsula from mainland Ukraine on 3 May 2014.
Around 200 Crimean Tatars were fined and five were arrested under accusations of participating in an
unauthorised gathering, riots and acts of violence against a representative of authority, and the illegal
crossing of ‘the state border of the Russian Federation’.65 Of the five arrested, four Crimean Tatars, Musa
Abkerimov, Eden Osmanov, Rustem Abdurahmanov, and Tair Smedliaev, were sentenced to several years in
prison (suspended), and Edem Ebulisov was sentenced to paying a fine of 40 000 RUB (about 500 EUR).66
On 16 May 2014, two days before the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the de
facto authorities banned all public assemblies in Crimea for 18 days. In 2015, the de facto authorities also
banned or significantly restricted peaceful assembly for civic organisations or groups wishing to
commemorate the 71st anniversary of the deportation. On 18 May 2015, 60 participants of a car rally
commemorating Deportation Day were detained and delivered to the police.67 The statement of de
facto leader Sergey Aksenov sheds some light on why Crimean Tatar public assemblies are banned in
Crimea: ‘During 20 years, [Crimean Tatar] events were used to blackmail the authorities in order to show
the strength and say that Tatars are ready for everything. And, after each demonstration, the authorities
would accede to their demands. [...] The crowd of Crimean Tatars, especially youth, behaved
provocatively, went with Crimean Tatar flags and, no doubt, tried to humiliate the Russians’.68
Attempts at peaceful assembly and the public expression of pro-Ukraine views through waving Ukrainian
flags or displaying Ukrainian identity, such as gathering in Ukrainian national embroidered shirts,69
commemorating the birthday of Ukrainian poet and writer Taras Shevchenko70, or mourning the death of
Ukrainian musician Andriy Kuzmenko,71 are punished by detention, interrogation, or administrative
penalties, such as fines, compulsory labour, or dismissal from public jobs. To discourage peaceful
assembly, the de facto authorities have also threatened Ukrainian activists with the application of legal
norms on extremism. On 24 June 2015, several days before Ukraine’s Constitution Day, Leonid Kuzmin
from the Ukrainian Cultural Centre received a letter from the Prosecutor’s Office warning him against
holding an unauthorised public assembly and to refrain from extremist activity.72
65 See T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p.51-52; Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
66 I. Putilov, '“Delo 3 maya”: chetyre sroka za vstrechu s Dzemilevym' ['“The Case of 3 May”: four sentences for a meeting with
Dzemilev'], Krym.Realii, 11 December 2015, http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/27421680.html
67 Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
68 O. Gerasimenko, A. Galustyan, ‘”Ni u kogo net chetkogo plana deistviy”, govorit ispolniayuschiy obiazanosti glavy Kryma Sergey
Aksenov’ [‘”Nobody has a clear plan of action”, says the interim chief of Crimea Sergey Aksenov’], Kommersant, 22 September
2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2569810
69 Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (May 2015), p. 7. Retrieved from
http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Crimea_Field_Mission_Review_May_2015_ENG.pdf on 1 March
2016.
70 Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (March 2015), p. 10. Retrieved from
http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Crimea_Field_Mission_Report_March_2015_ENG.pdf on 1 March
2016.
71 Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (February 2015), p. 14. Retrieved from
http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Crimea_Field_Mission_Report_February_2015_Eng.pdf on 1 March
2016.
72 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 55.
17
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
3.3 Violations of the freedoms of expression and the media targeted at
minorities
From the very first days of the occupation, the de facto authorities have shut down the broadcasting of
Ukrainian television stations in Crimea and launched attacks against independent journalists and
local television and radio stations airing dissenting voices. Chernomorskaya television and radio station,
which belonged to a Ukrainian politician, the Centre of Independent Journalists, key Crimean Tatar
television station ATR, Mejlis newspaper Avdet, and the Crimean News Agency (QHA) were targeted both
by the ‘self-defence’ and the de facto authorities through attacks against journalists, intimidation,
searches and property seizures, arrests, and close-downs. After the annexation of Crimea, the de facto
authorities used Russian legal norms on extremism and separatism to prosecute independent media,
journalists, bloggers, and even ordinary residents posting on social networks. The de facto authorities
further limited the freedom of expression and access to information by ordering the re-registration of
media outlets. As a result, in 2015, only 232 media outlets were authorized under Russian law to work in
Crimea, as compared to the approximately 3 000 media outlets previously registered under Ukrainian
regulations.73 By denying registration to such popular Crimean Tatar media outlets as ATR and Lale
television channels, Meydan and Lider radio stations, the QHA news agency, Avdet newspaper, and the
Internet site 15minut, the de facto authorities have not only ‘restricted media freedom and access to
information, but also deprived the Crimean Tatar community of a vital instrument to maintain and
revitalize its identity’.74
Ukrainians of Crimea can only watch Ukrainian channels via satellite. There is one 13-minute television
programme in Ukrainian shown twice a week on the state-run Crimean television. The only Ukrainian
language newspaper, 'Krymska Svitlytsia', funded by the government of Ukraine, was closed.75
3.4 Violations of the freedom of movement of minorities
The de facto authorities have enacted policies and commenced activities aimed at suppressing and
politically prosecuting Crimean Tatars who resist Russian occupation and, in particular, Mejlis members.
In April 2014, Russia's FSB banned the entry of Mustafa Dzhemilev, the first Chairman of the Mejlis and a
member of the Ukrainian Parliament, to Crimea until 19 April 2019. On 5 July 2014, a five-year entry ban
was also issued to the current Mejlis Chairman, Refat Chubarov. By preventing Crimean Tatar leaders from
entering Crimea, the de facto authorities are repressing these organisations and their members in
Crimea. Subsequently, the Advisor to the Mejlis Chairman on relations with Turkey, Ismet Yuksel, an
ethnic Crimean Tatar and Turkish national permanently residing and having business in Crimea, was
expelled from the occupied peninsula. Additionally, in March 2016, three Crimean Tatars received a fiveyear
entry ban to Crimea.76
In January 2015, three members of the Committee on the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People, Eskender
Bariev, Sinaver Kadyrov, and Akmedzhit Suleimanov, were detained when returning to Crimea from
mainland Ukraine.77 The Committee has been active in advising Crimean Tatars on the protection of their
rights and attempts to organise peaceful assemblies, including on International Human Rights Day,
73 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 34.
74 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 7.
75 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 90.
76 Krym.Realii, ‘Trem krymskim tataram iz Hersonskoi oblasti zapretili vyezd v Krym na 5 let’ [‘Three Crimean Tatars from Kherson
region were banned to entry Crimea for 5 years’], Krym.Realii, 22 March 2016, http://ru.krymr.com/archive/newsru/
20160322/16898/16898.html?id=27628205
77 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 76.
18
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
which has been refused by the de facto authorities on multiple occasions.78 Sinaver Kadyrov was
deported from Crimea based on a court order, while the other two activists fear returning to the
peninsula because of criminal cases opened against them on charges of separatism.79 These violations of
freedom of movement accompany other human rights violations, such as the right to property, the right
to respect for family life, and discrimination.80
3.5 Violations of the freedom of association targeted at minorities
In September 2014, the de facto authorities organised searches, seized property, and evicted the
charitable organisation the ‘Crimea Foundation’ from its premises in Simferopol. The Crimea
Foundation is an assembly of Crimean Tatar people and is funded by the Crimean Tatar Kurultai, a
general assembly of Crimean Tatar people. The organisation was also denied registration by the de
facto authorities. The eviction also affected the central office of the Mejlis and the Mejlis weekly
newspaper Avdet, which were headquartered in the same building. Furthermore, members of the
Ukrainian Cultural Centre are regularly detained and interrogated.
When asked about the prospects for cooperation with the Mejlis in an interview in September 2014, de
facto leader of Crimea Sergey Aksenov first denied that such an organisation existed and then said that it
has little authority, having only ‘support of 15-20 % of Crimea Tatars’.81 While the de facto authorities
have attempted to silence Crimean Tatars who oppose Crimea’s annexation, they have also encouraged
the establishment of parallel organisations that represent minorities who are loyal to the de facto
authorities. Examples of such organisations are Kyryym, an initiative of former Mejlis member and de
facto Deputy Speaker of the Crimean Parliament Remzi Ilyasov; Kyryym Birligi, chaired by former Chief of
Henichesk rayon administration and Party of Regions member Seitumer Nemitullaev; and the Association
of Crimean Tatar Businessmen, chaired by the son of Seitumer Nemitullaev, Rustem Nemitullaev.
In the case of other minority groups, the de facto authorities have adopted a policy of promoting loyal
NGOs and stimulating the establishment of ‘regional national-cultural autonomies’.82 Such
‘autonomies’ are eligible to receive public funding to develop their culture, language, and education,
according to the Russian law ‘On National-Culture Autonomy’ of 17 June 1996. Loyal minority leaders are
also co-opted into public bodies (e.g. the chairmen of the Regional National-Cultural Autonomies of
Greeks and Germans in Crimea are members of the de facto parliament; the Chairman of the National-
Cultural Autonomy of Bulgarians in Crimea is a member of the Civic Chamber of Crimea and the Civic
Chamber of Russia; the Chairman of the Regional National-Cultural Autonomy of Azeris is a member of
the scientific council on law making and the de facto Chairman of the State Council of Crimea). By using
loyal minority organisations in ‘public diplomacy’, Russia attempts to show to their kin states and the
world that Crimea, under Russian rule, pursues a friendly policy towards national minorities. However,
such a policy of creating internal divisions among minority groups and dividing minority groups into
‘loyal’ and ‘disloyal’ threatens to increase inter-ethnic tensions in occupied Crimea. This issue deserves
further investigation, which, however, is difficult given the lack of reliable information on the situation of
smaller minority groups in occupied Crimea.
78 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 54.
79 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015.
80 S. Zaets et al., The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence. Crimea Beyond Rules. Issue 1, Kyiv: Regional
Centre of Human Rights, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, and CHROT, 2015, p. 10.
81 O. Gerasimenko, A. Galustyan, op. cit.
82 The list of 'regional national-cultural autonomies' in Crimea is available at the website of de facto State Committee on Interethnic
Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea http://gkmn.rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=616539
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
3.6 Targeting the Mejlis as a self-governing body of Crimean Tatars
The de facto authorities have adopted a policy of persecution of the Mejlis as a representative and
executive body consisting of 33 members elected by the Kurultai, a general assembly of the Crimean
Tatar people. However, while there is no direct ban on the participation of Crimean Tatars in public life,
they are only allowed to participate if they support the policies of the de facto authorities. There are three
members of Crimean Tatar ethnicity out of 75 total members in the de facto parliament: all entered
through the United Russia party list, including Vice-Speaker Remzi Ilyasov. The de facto Vice-Prime
Minister is also a Crimean Tatar, as well as the Chairman of the de facto State Committee on
Nationalities.83
The Mejlis and its members were the first to resist the military occupation of Crimea and, since the early
days of annexation by Russia, have faced numerous instances of persecution and repression. Initially,
pressure was exerted on Mejlis leaders. As early as late April-early May 2014, the de facto Prosecutor of
Crimea, Natalia Poklonskaya, issued warnings to Rize Shavkiev, Mejlis member and Chairman of the
‘Crimea Foundation’, and Mejlis Chairman, Refat Chubarov, threatening to ban the Mejlis for extremist
activity.84 Further repression against the Mejlis was enacted through the above-mentioned entry bans to
Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov. The de facto authorities also attempted to exert pressure on
Mustafa Dzhemilev through the detention of and criminal charges against his son Haiser, who was
arrested and charged with the murder of a man who worked for his family in May 2013.85 Despite the fact
that Haiser was a Ukrainian citizen and did not accept his forced Russian citizenship, the de facto
authorities transferred him to a prison in Russia where he was tried and sentenced by a Russian court
according to Russian law. First Ukraine, and later Dzhemilev, appealed to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) against Russia. The ECHR ruled to free Haiser Dzhemilev as an interim measure, but this
decision was not accepted by Russia. However, his sentence was subsequently revised by the Russian
court.86
Pressure increased when the de facto authorities began persecuting Mejlis leaders who remained in
Crimea (the Case of 26 February, searches and seizures of Mejlis property) and leaders of regional Mejlis,
as the body has associations across Crimea. In 2015, a de facto court in Simferopol issued decisions to
arrest Mustafa Dzhemilev (January) and Refat Chubarov (October).87 Since November 2015, house
searches of regional Mejlis chairmen and members in Crimea have become a regular occurrence.
The ODIHR and HCNM joint 2015 report concluded:
Being deprived of resources and with its leaders in exile, detention or under constant
pressure, the Mejlis is blocked from fully performing its functions as a representative and selfgoverning
body of Crimean Tatars on the territory of Crimea. Its capacity to reach out to the
community and solve the daily problems of the Crimean Tatars is significantly constrained by
the actions of the de facto authorities.88
83 Kommersant, 'Krymskotatarskoye ego' ['Crimean Tatar ego'], Kommersant, 23 March 2015,
http://kommersant.ru/projects/crimeantatars
84 V. Likhachev, op. cit., p. 6 - 8.
85 A. Klymenko, op. cit., p. 13.
86 Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
87 Tsentr zhurnalistskih issledovanii, ‘V Krymy sud zaochno arestoval lidera krymskik tatar Mustafu Dzemileva’ [‘A Crimean court
has arrested in absentia Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev’], Tsentr zhurnalistskih issledovanii, 20 January 2016,
http://investigator.org.ua/news/172316/
88 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 86-87.
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The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
On 15 February 2016, de facto Prosecutor Poklonskaya appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia to ban
the Mejlis as an extremist organisation. Human rights defenders are afraid that once the Mejlis is
banned, any Crimean Tatar can face imprisonment for extremism, as the Mejlis has structures across the
territory of Crimea and many people participate in elections of Mejlis members through the Kurultai.
Given that the Mejlis is not a registered organisation with fixed membership, any Crimean Tatar who has
ever participated in the public life of his or her community could face persecution.
NB: Upon the completion of this study, a major development occurred which should be reported here
briefly given its grave impact on the situation of Crimean Tatars. On 18 April 2016, the Ministry of Justice
of the Russian Federation put the Mejlis on the list of extremist organisations based on the decision of the
de facto prosecutor of Crimea of 13 April 2016 to ban activities of the Mejlis pending a court decision. On
26 April 2016, the so-called Supreme Court of Crimea ruled to recognise the Mejlis as an extremist
organisation and ban its activities.
3.7 Violations of freedom of religion targeted at minorities
Since Russia’s occupation of Crimea, representatives of religious communities other than the Russian
Orthodox Church have been targets of attacks by the ‘self-defence’ and other aggressive groups and
discriminative policies of the de facto authorities. Before the occupation, there were over 1 400
registered religious communities in Crimea, with an additional 674 operating informally (mostly Muslim
communities);89 however, by January 2016, only 365 were re-registered in line with the demands of the
de facto authorities.90 Moreover, only Russian citizens have the right to register religious organisations,
which excludes those who refused to take the forced Russian citizenship. Religious communities to which
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians typically belong, such as Islamic groups, the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, have faced restrictions and
repression.
Priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
were intimidated, abducted, interrogated, and accused of extremist activity. As a result, many have
left Crimea. Church buildings were seized and destroyed, property inside the churches was damaged,
parishes were forced underground, and parishioners are fearful to practice or speak of their religion. The
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate has lost half of its church buildings since the annexation
and a Crimean court ruled to confiscate its cathedral in Simferopol.91 Only one priest from the Ukrainian
Greek Catholic Church has remained in Crimea.92 As Ukrainian citizens, priests are not allowed to stay in
Crimea over 90 days. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has attempted to register with the de facto
authorities; however, the registration has yet to be granted.93
89 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 64.
90 OHCHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016.
91 Krym.Realii, ‘Ukrainskaya cerkov poteriala polovinu pomescheniy v Krymu za vremya anneksiyi – arkhiyepiskop Klement’ ['The
Ukrainian church has lost half of its buildings since the annexation – Archbishop Klement'], Krym.Realii, 28 January 2016,
http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27517102.html; Ukrainska Pravda, ‘V UPC KP vidbyrayut prymischennia soboru v centri
Simferopolya’ [‘The UOC KP is being stripped of its cathedral in the centre of Simferopol’], Ukrainska Pravda, 28 January 2016,
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/01/28/7097102/
92 Y. Stepankovska, ‘Yak ukrainskym cerkvam u Krymu vdaetsia zalyshatysia ukrainskymy’ [‘How the Ukrainian churches in Crimea
manage to remain Ukrainian’], Crimea-SOS, 14 January 2016, http://krymsos.com/news/yak-ukrayinskim-tserkvam-u-krimuvdayetsya-
zalishatisya-ukrayinskimi/
93 Y. Stepankovska, ‘Yak ukrainskym cerkvam u Krymu vdaetsia zalyshatysia ukrainskymy’ [‘How the Ukrainian churches in Crimea
manage to remain Ukrainian’], Crimea-SOS, 14 January 2016, http://krymsos.com/news/yak-ukrayinskim-tserkvam-u-krimuvdayetsya-
zalishatisya-ukrayinskimi/
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Mosques and Muslim schools (madrassas) have been searched, property has been confiscated, and
teachers and staff have been interrogated. Many of these searches took place in mosques and madrassas
that belong to the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea (DUMK).94 Incidents of vandalism have
also been reported.
The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir
Representatives of the Islamic movement Hizb ut-Tahrir are in a particularly vulnerable situation. While this
movement exists legally in Ukraine (as well as in many European countries), and is involved in religious,
political, and educational activities, it is outlawed in Russia as a terrorist organisation. Since early 2015, four
Crimean Tatars: Ruslan Zeytullaev, Nuri Primov, Rustem Vaitov, and Ferat Saifullaev, remain under arrest for
the alleged ‘establishment of a terrorist organisation and participation in the activities of this organisation’.95
On 11 February 2016, 14 people, mainly Crimean Tatars, were detained and their houses were searched. Of
these people, four, Emir-Usein Kuku, a member of a human rights contact group, Enver Bekirov, Muslim Aliev,
and Vadym Siruk were placed under arrest for two months, and, according to de facto Prosecutor
Poklonskaya, are accused of creating the terrorist group ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’.96 Given that Hizb ut-Tahrir is not
registered and does not have a fixed membership, human rights activists warn that any Crimean, in particular,
any Crimean Tatar, can potentially be charged with belonging to this movement and convicted of terrorism.
Moreover, there is a long list of Muslim religious literature, previously legal in Ukraine, that is now outlawed in
Russia and anyone possessing it can be accused of extremism.97
The de facto authorities have promoted the establishment of alternative Muslim groups, such as the
Muftiyat of Taurida, in order to divide the Muslim believers in Crimea, most of whom are Crimean Tatars,
and to seize control of Crimean mosques (for example, the Dzhuma-Dzhami mosque in Yevpatoria was
illegally seized).98 The main goal of such restrictive policies towards religious organisations is seemingly
to suppress dissent, including by Crimean Tatars. As the ODIHR and HCNM joint report states, the de facto
authorities have softened their approach towards the DUMK after its leader Mufti Emirali Ablaev, a
member of the Mejlis, refrained from direct criticism of the authorities exercising de facto control over
Crimea.99
3.8 Violations of the right to education and cultural rights targeted at
minorities
Minority groups have been restricted in their right to education in their native language. As the
ODIHR and HCNM joint 2015 report concluded:
In schools throughout Crimea, native-language education and language studies in the
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages were widely reduced or eliminated, and parents
reportedly have been discouraged from requesting such classes be made available – both to
the detriment of those communities’ enjoyment of their cultural and language rights. Books
in the Ukrainian language, on Ukrainian topics, and by Ukrainian authors were reportedly
removed from schools and public libraries.100
94 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 87.
95 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 54; Crimea-SOS, Interactive Map.
96 I. Putilov, ‘Nova sprava “Hizb ut-Tahrir”: chogo dobyvaetsia FSB u Krymu?’ [‘The new case “Hizb ut-Tahrir”: What does FSB in
Crimea attempt to achieve?’], Krym.Realii, 13 February 2016,
http://ua.krymr.com/content/article/27550228.html
97 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 65.
98 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 65.
99 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 88.
100 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 69.
22
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
Ethnic Ukrainians have been particularly limited in their right to education in their native language. There
has been a significant decrease in the number of students who receive their secondary education in
Ukrainian. As of September 2015, out of the seven schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction
that existed in Crimea before the annexation, none remain. Only 20 schools offer classes with Ukrainian
as a language of instruction.101 In the 2014-2015 school year, 1 990 students (or 1.2 %) were enrolled in
classes with education in Ukrainian. Before the annexation, this share equalled 8.2 %, or 12 649
students.102 No first grade classes with Ukrainian as a language of instruction were opened in the 2015-
2016 school year.103 Ukrainian as a language of instruction was also completely removed from universitylevel
education.104
The faculty of Ukrainian philology was closed at Taurida State University, and most of the academic staff
was fired. Ukrainian language teachers in schools were either fired or were forced to re-train as Russian
literature and language teachers.105 As the authors of a monitoring report on education in annexed
Crimea stated, the de facto authorities promoted ‘an atmosphere of intolerance towards everything
Ukrainian and any expression of “Ukrainian-ness” (Ukrainian identity) that influenced the choice of
language of instruction by pupils. According to parents, most felt unsafe and did not submit relevant
demands at education institutions’.106
Ukrainian theatres, museums, and libraries have been closed or renamed. Activists of the Ukrainian
Culture Centre, including the Director of its library, were intimidated, detained, or interrogated on various
occasions.
Whereas Crimean Tatars had difficulties exercising their right to education in their native language even
before 2014, the situation has deteriorated since the annexation. The number of schools in which the
Crimean Tatar language is taught as a subject or is used as a language of instruction has not changed.
The number of students who receive their education in the Crimean Tatar language, however, has
dropped by 12 % (from 5 551 in the 2013-2014 school year to 4 895 in the 2014-2015 school year).107
Furthermore, the number of hours dedicated to the Crimean Tatar language as a subject has decreased
significantly. In the senior classes of secondary schools, Crimean Tatar is not taught as a subject.108
Seemingly, this is due to the implementation of Russia's education policy, according to which, native
languages are not offered in senior-level classes.109 Additionally, training for teachers of the Crimean
Tatar language and literature is no longer offered by Crimean universities.110
101 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 96.
102 Y. Tyshchenko, O. Smyrnov, op. cit., p. 6-7; OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 70.
103 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 91.
104 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 98.
105 Y. Tyshchenko, O. Smyrnov, op. cit., p. 7.
106 Y. Tyshchenko, O. Smyrnov, op. cit., p. 7. See also OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 97.
107 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 70.
108 Y. Tyshchenko, O. Smyrnov, op. cit., p. 8.
109 Interview with a civil society group representative, Kyiv, 18 February 2016.
110 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 99.
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
3.9 Property rights of the Crimean repatriates
The problems Crimean Tatars have experienced in exercising their right to land as a deported people
have not been fully solved by the Ukrainian government and, at present, persist. Given that the Ukrainian
authorities had not introduced a system of providing land to returning Crimean Tatars, many have seized
plots of land and erected houses or other immovable property. The right to land was one of the most
contentious issues in Crimea before its annexation. The de facto authorities promised to solve this issue
by legalising the land seized by Crimean Tatar repatriates. In 2015, the de facto authorities adopted a law
that enabled Russian citizens of Crimea who illegally built property on a seized plot of land to acquire this
land as their property.111 However, there are numerous obstacles to the implementation of this law, and
the process of legalisation advances slowly.112 Moreover, there have been cases of the destruction of the
immovable property built by Crimean Tatars on seized land plots. The de facto authorities had requested
authorisation from the Russian State Duma to destroy such property without requiring a court
decision.113 This provoked protests by Crimeans. In January 2015, Seidament Gemedzi, the leader of
‘Sebat’, an NGO providing assistance on land issues, was arrested. In March 2015, the First Deputy
Chairman of the Mejlis, Nariman Dzelial, reported an attempt of the de facto authorities to destroy six
buildings and a market in Sudak, all belonging to Crimean Tatars, including to the Chairman of the Sudak
regional Mejlis.114
Generally, violations of economic and social rights in Crimea are related to the imposition of Russian
citizenship on Ukrainian citizens in Crimea. Without Russian citizenship, Crimeans are denied access to
education, healthcare, social benefits, right to work, and the full enjoyment of property rights.
To summarise, the discrimination and persecution of Crimean residents is based on multiple grounds,
such as religion, political views, and belonging to an ethnic group. Expressions of political opinion that
contradict the ‘official policy’ and the expression of non-Russian culture and non-Russian national,
religious, or language identity are restricted in Crimea. Three important trends affecting the situation of
minorities and the future of inter-ethnic relations in occupied Crimea raise concerns. First, the situation of
minority groups in Crimea seems to be moving from bad to worse. In February 2016, there was a spike in
violations of the rights of minorities, especially of Crimean Tatars, and a potential ban of the Mejlis will
likely initiate a new broader wave of repressions. Second, having analysed statistical data from the open
registers of the de facto authorities, Ukrainian human rights defenders warn of a transfer of the civilian
population from Russia to Crimea, which is a major breach of international humanitarian law.115 Third, in
addition to the discriminatory policies of the de facto authorities, pro-Russian mass media and public
officials in Crimea systematically employ hate speech and incite inter-ethnic enmity towards Ukrainians
111 No 66-ZRK/2015 of 15 January 2015 ‘On provision of the land plots which are in state or municipal property and on certain
issues of land relations’, available at http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/66z.pdf. See more Y. Tyshchenko, op. cit., p. 21.
112 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 89.
113 H. Karamanoglu, ’L’gotniki v Krymu trebuyut zemli’ [‘Persons with social benefits demand land in Crimea’], Krym.Realii,
21 October 2015, http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/27317963.html
114 Krym.Realii, ‘Snosit doma krymskih tatar v Sudake priehali okolo sotni vooruzhennyh silovikov – Dzhelial’ [‘Nearly a hundred of
armed security men arrived to demolish buildings of Crimean Tatars in Sudak’], Krym.Realii, 23 March 2016,
http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27630899.html
115 Regional Centre of Human Rights, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and CHROT, Peremeshchenie grazhdanskoho
naselenia Rossiyskoy Federatsii na okupirovannuyu territoriu Ukrainy. Krym bez pravil. Spetsialnyi vypusk [The displacement of
the civilian population of the Russian Federation to the occupied territory of Ukraine. Crimea beyond rules. Special Issue], Kyiv:
2015.
24
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
and Ukraine, which ‘causes serious threats to the life and health of Ukrainian activists or persons openly
expressing their Ukrainian identity’.116
4 Overview of relevant legislative acts of the Russian
Federation and the de facto authorities
Russia has extended its legal framework to occupied Crimea following its annexation. Russian Criminal
Code norms have become de facto applicable to Crimea and significantly affect civil and political rights in
Crimea, especially the rights of those individuals who oppose the annexation, the free media, NGOs, and
religious minorities. By applying Russian legislative norms on extremism and terrorism, the de facto
authorities violate the rights of people belonging to minorities in Crimea and create a climate of
intolerance towards Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. The de facto Crimean parliament, the ‘State Council’,
may also adopt legislative acts on Crimea that affect the rights of minorities on the occupied peninsula.
This section reviews the most significant norms deriving from the legislative acts of Russia and those
passed by the de facto authorities of Crimea that have affected or potentially affect the situation of
minorities in occupied Crimea (see also Annex 2 for a summary).
1. Forced citizenship: After annexing Crimea, Russia granted Russian citizenship to all Ukrainian citizens
in Crimea, including minority group representatives, and strongly discouraged the option to refuse it.117
In June 2014, Russia introduced criminal responsibility for failing to disclose a second citizenship (in force
since 1 January 2016 for Crimean residents) by amending the federal law of 31 May 2002 No 62-FZ 'On
citizenship of the Russian Federation’. The law equally violates the rights of those Crimean residents
who had been forced to take Russian passports in order to be able to legally reside in Crimea (to have the
rights to work, education, pensions, and medical care, among others), but who have wished to preserve
their Ukrainian citizenship, and those Crimean residents who have taken Russian passports voluntarily,
but were not able to denounce their Ukrainian citizenship.
2. Criminal prosecution of events prior to the annexation: The Russian federal law of 5 May 2014 No
91-FZ ‘On the Application of Regulations of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and the
Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation in the Territories of the Republic of Crimea and
the Federal City of Sevastopol’ enabled the prosecution of acts performed in Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol before 18 March 2014, according to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code of
the Russian Federation (Article 2). The de facto authorities have applied this law to persecute pro-
Ukrainian activists and leaders of the Crimean Tatar community in occupied Crimea.118 In violation of the
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949
(Article 70), which prohibits the arrest, prosecution, or conviction by the occupying power for acts
committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary interruption thereof,
with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war, the de facto authorities used this norm to
bring Ahtem Chiygoz and other Crimean Tatars to trial in the ‘Case of 26 February’ for the events that
occurred in Crimea on 26 February 2014.
3. Freedom of association: The laws regulating the activity of NGOs (the federal law of 12 January 1996
No 7-FZ 'On non-commercial organisations', the federal law of 19 May 1995 No 82-FZ 'On public
116 Crimea Human Rights Group, Krym: ukrainskaya identichnost pod zapretom. Analiticheskii doklad o politicheski
motivirovannyh presledovaniah i discriminatsii po priznaku proukrainskih ubezhedenii [Crimea: Ukrainian identity under the
ban. Analytical report about politically motivated persecutions in Crimea and discrimination on the basis of pro-Ukrainian views],
Kiev, 2016.
117 For detailed restrictions introduced by Russia, see OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine - 15 May 2014,
p.28.
118 T. Pechonchyk, op. cit., p. 17.
25
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
associations', the Code of Administrative Offences, and the Criminal Code), including the
amendments adopted since July 2012, widely known as the laws on ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesired
organisations’, restrict freedom of association. Any Crimean NGO that receives foreign funding and
pursues political activity is affected. As a result, most human rights, environmental, media, and other civil
society organisations operating in Crimea before the annexation have made the decision to cease
activities.119 In May 2014, Russia adopted legislative amendments widely known as the ‘law on undesired
organisations’, according to which foreign NGOs that threaten national security may be banned, money
transfers may be blocked, and criminal responsibility for participation in such organisation has been
introduced.120
According to an OSCE report, ‘no more than 5 to 10 per cent of the NGOs, media and religious
organisations previously registered under Ukrainian law have successfully re-registered with Crimean de
facto authorities. In some cases, those re-registration processes appeared to be used to administratively
exclude pro-Ukrainian organisations and media, and have quite literally decimated the breadth and
diversity of civil society space, while simultaneously chilling dissent’.121
Given the recent anti-Turkish turn in Russia's foreign policy, Crimean Tatars receiving support from
Turkish organisations or even Turkish cultural organisations supporting educational activities have also
been affected. Moreover, Turkish citizens have been banned from employment in Russia from January
2016, which may create constraints for Crimean Tatar organisations as well.122 One result of this policy is
that the de facto authorities have fired all teachers in the Turkish lyceum for gifted children in Tankove, in
the Bakhchisaray region, and have burnt Turkish books. The school has effectively ceased to function.
4. Freedom of assembly: The de facto authorities use the norms of the federal law of 19 June 2004 No
54-FZ ‘On Meetings, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches, and Pickets’ and the relevant articles of the
Code of Administrative Offences to violate the rights of peaceful assembly in Crimea. According to
Russian legislation, organisers of public meetings must receive authorisation from authorities. Fines from
RUB 300 000 (approximately EUR 3 900) to RUB 600 000 (EUR 7 800) and compulsory labour are envisaged
for violations of the law. The law can be applied to events occurring up to one year previously. In July
2014, amendments to the law were adopted to introduce criminal responsibility for repeated violations
of the order of organising or conducting of mass events (fines ranging RUB 600 000 to RUB 1 000 000,
compulsory labour, and imprisonment for up to five years).123
In addition, on 8 August 2014, the de facto State Council of Crimea adopted law 56-ZRК ‘On Ensuring
the Conditions for the Exercise of the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Hold Meetings,
Rallies, Demonstrations, and Pickets in the Republic of Crimea’ (amended on 16 September 2015).
This act restricts the time period during which a written request should be submitted to the local
authorities and the areas where the right to assembly can be exercised.124 The legislation of Russia and
119 Moscow Helsinki Group, V Krymu pole grazhdanskogo obschestva I SMI prakticheski polnostiu zachischeno. Interview s
Andreyem Yurovym [In Crimea, the space for civil society and mass media has been nearly completely destroyed. Interview with
Andrey Yurov], 21 March 2015, http://mhg-main.org/v-krymu-pole-grazhdanskogo-obshchestva-i-smi-prakticheski-polnostyuzachishcheno.
See also OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 37.
120 Moscow Helsinki Group, Monitoring primenenia novogo zakonodatelstva v Rossijskoi Federatsii [Monitoring of the application
of the new legislation in the Russian Federation], Moscow: 2015, p. 9. Retrieved from http://mhgmain.
org/sites/default/files/files/monitoring-zakonodatelstvo-08-2015.pdf on 1 March 2016.
121 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 40.
122 On 28 November 2014, the President of Russia signed a decree ‘On measures to ensure the national security of the Russian
Federation and the protection of Russian citizens from criminal and other unlawful activities and the application of special
economic measures against the Republic of Turkey’.
123 Moscow Helsinki Group, Monitoring, p. 21.
124 Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (July-August 2014), p. 8-9. Retrieved from
26
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
the de facto State Council of Crimea are used to prohibit the peaceful assembly of Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians under distinct pretexts on such days as the commemoration of the Day of Deportation of
Crimean Tatars, Crimean Tatar Flag Day, Ukraine's Flag Day and Independence Day, Taras Shevchenko's
birthday, Human Rights Day, and the European Day of Remembrance for victims of Stalinism and
Nazism.125 These laws were also used by the de facto courts of Crimea to persecute Crimean Tatars who
travelled to greet Mustafa Dzhemilev during his attempt to enter Crimea on 3 May 2014 (the Case of
3 May).
5. Legalisation of the Crimean ‘self-defence’, which is allegedly responsible for serious human
rights abuses: On 11 June 2014, the de facto State Council of Crimea passed law No 22-ZRK ‘On the
People’s Militia – Narodnaya Druzhyna’, which was further amended on 11 December 2014. This law
established a people's militia to support public authorities and law enforcement agencies to ensure
public order. It is widely viewed as the legalisation of the ‘self-defence’ units that played an instrumental
role in the occupation of Crimea and were allegedly responsible for serious human rights abuses,
including forced disappearances, illegal detention, ill treatment, torture, and murder. According to the
initial version of the law, members of the militia were authorised to check identity documents, detain
lawbreakers, and, if other measures were exhausted and if the lawbreakers refused to abide by militia
instructions or resisted, to use physical force against them. The amendments of December 2014 reduce
these rights to assisting police in performing their duties to ensure public order, though they may still
apply physical force, according to Russia's federal law No 44-FZ of 2 April 2014 ‘On participation of
citizens in the protection of public order’. Seemingly, the ‘self-defence’ is financially supported by the
authorities (as a public enterprise).126 As Human Rights Watch reports, while the people's militia is
authorized to act only in conjunction with law enforcement agencies, ‘they appear to be operating
autonomously and regularly harass, question, and sometimes beat people without the presence of
police’.127 In July 2014, de facto Prime Minister of Crimea Sergey Aksenov introduced a draft law
proposing granting amnesty to all members of the ‘self-defence’ units for the period between February
and April 2014;128 however, this law has yet to be passed by the de facto parliament. A similar law is
pending in Russia’s State Duma, which proposes amnesty for members of the self-defence units for the
period between February 2014 and January 2015.129
6. Extremism and terrorism: The de facto authorities of Crimea have extensively applied Russian
legislation on terrorism and extremist activity to prosecute those who oppose the annexation, including
the Crimean Tatar community and pro-Ukraine activists. According to information from the de facto
Prosecutor of Crimea, in 2015, 12 criminal cases ‘on the criminal responsibility of persons affiliated with
http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/crimea_field_mission_report_july-august_2014_eng.pdf on 1 March
2016.
125 Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (July-August 2014), p. 8-9. Retrieved from
http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/crimea_field_mission_report_july-august_2014_eng.pdf on 1 March
2016.
126 V. Nikiforov, ‘Krymskaya samooborona zaputalas v statuse’ [‘Crimea self-defence is confused about its status’], Kommersant,
20 February 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2673147
127 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat, p. 20-21.
128 ‘The draft of the law of the Republic of Crimea “On the prevention of prosecution of persons for acts committed in order to
protect public order and interests of the Republic of Crimea”’, http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/6/project/1664.pdf
129 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat, p. 2. See also the appeal of the ‘State Council of Crimea’ to the State Duma of the
Russian Federation of 30 September 2014.
http://asozd2c.duma.gov.ru/addwork/scans.nsf/ID/16740DBDDF67CCDF43257D650048D45D/$FILE/613379-
6.PDF?OpenElement
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
nationalist or extremist organisations or pursuing their ideology’ were opened.130 These cases include the
Case of Kostenko, the Case of the Crimea Blockade, and the Case of 26 February (‘on the illegal armed
group created by Mejlis members’), among others.
The work of media professionals and independent media outlets, including the Crimean Tatar newspaper
Avdet and the ATR television station, was restricted or totally impeded due to the application of the
Russian federal law of 25 July 2002 No 114-FZ ‘On Combating Extremist Activities’ by the de facto
authorities. A Ukrainian flag with the words ‘Crimea is Ukraine’ and ‘annexation’ or ‘occupation’ are
recognised as ‘extremist symbols’ and ‘extremist rhetoric’ by the de facto authorities. The de facto
authorities also monitor social media ‘for propaganda of extremism and terrorism’. In 2014, the Criminal
Code of Russia was amended to introduce such crimes as public incitement to extremist activity via the
Internet, which is punished by compulsory labour up to five years and may be accompanied by a ban to
occupy certain positions or pursue certain activities or incarceration for up to five years. Russian
legislation also enables the de facto authorities to shut down media if it repeatedly publishes ‘extremist’
content; this also includes blogs with over 3 000 readers.
The Federal List of Extremist Materials introduced by the federal law ‘On Combating Extremist Activities’
has particularly affected the situation of Crimean Tatars. The list currently includes over 3 200
publications, audio and video materials, images, and Internet resources, including, for example, books on
the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine and Islamic literature.131 According to Alexander Verkhovsky, the
Director of the Russian NGO SOVA Center, which conducts research on nationalism and racism,
approximately 25 % of the items on the list pertaining to Islamic literature are widely used by the Islamic
community and include no extremist content.132 According to Human Rights Watch, enforcement of this
law in Crimea ‘has had a discriminatory impact on Crimean Tatars who are Muslims’ and ‘violates
international law on the protection of freedom of expression, as well as the obligations of Russia as an
occupying power’.133 Indeed, mosques, madrassas, and the homes of Crimean Tatars are frequently
searched for extremist items. The federal law of 6 March 2006 No 35-FZ ‘On Combating Terrorism’ and
the relevant articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation have been used in cases against eight
people – seven Crimean Tatars and one ethnic Ukrainian – who are accused of the organisation of and
participation in the ‘terrorist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir’.
7. Separatism: On 28 December 2013, before the annexation of Crimea, the Russian Criminal Code was
amended to include such crimes as public incitement to actions violating the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation, which carries a fine of up to RUB 300 000 (approximately EUR 3 900), compulsory
labour up to 300 hours, or imprisonment up to three years (Article 280.1). If such incitement is conducted
via the media or the Internet, the punishment increases to compulsory labour up to 480 hours or five
years in prison. On 21 July 2014, Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code was further amended (federal law No
274-FZ) to introduce more severe punishments and a ban to occupy certain positions or to pursue certain
activities. As a result, publicly acknowledging that ‘Crimea is Ukraine’ or calling the de facto authorities in
Crimea ‘occupying authorities’ may lead to four to five years in jail.
8. Access to education: The federal law of 5 May 2014 No 84-FZ ‘On the peculiarities of the legal
regulation of relations in the sphere of education in connection with the Admission of the Republic
130 De facto Prosecutor's Office of the ‘Republic of Crimea’, ‘Prokuratura v 2015 godu napravila v organy sledstvia 12 materialov
dla vozbuzhdenia ugolovnyh del ekstremistskoi napravlenosti’ [‘In 2015, the Prosecutor's Office passed 12 materials for opening
criminal cases on extremist-related crimes to the investigation bodies’], 27 January 2016, http://rkproc.ru/ru/news/prokuratura-v-
2015-godu-napravila-v-organy-sledstviya-12-materialov-dlya-vozbuzhdeniya
131 The list can be found at http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials
132 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat, p. 18.
133 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat, p. 19.
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The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Establishment of New Constituent Entities within
the Russian Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol – and on the
Introduction of Changes to the Federal Law “On Education in the Russian Federation”’ integrated
the system of education of Crimea into that of Russia. The education institutions of Crimea were to
function according to Russian education standards and programmes. Access to education has been
allegedly used by the de facto authorities as a tool to compel citizens to obtain Russian passports as
children and students without Russian citizenship or permanent residency status are not eligible for
education in public institutions – both secondary schools and public universities.134
The ‘Constitution of the Republic of Crimea’ adopted by the de facto State Council of Crimea on 11 April
2014 as the basic law of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation rules that the ‘state languages of
the Republic of Crimea are Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar’. The law ‘On Education in the Republic
of Crimea’ of 17 June 2015, adopted by the de facto legislative body of Crimea, stipulates that Russian
citizens residing in Crimea are entitled to receive ‘pre-school, primary general, and basic general
education in their native languages, including Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar, and the right to
learn their native language within the possibilities provided by the system of education in the manner
established by the legislation on education. The exercise of these rights is ensured through
establishment of a sufficient number of education organisations, classes and groups, and the conditions
for their functioning’.135 This law entered into force on 1 January 2016. However, current practice largely
contradicts the norms of this law, given that native-language education and language studies in
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar have been drastically reduced across occupied Crimea.136
9. Rights of minorities: Initially after the annexation, the de facto authorities attempted to demonstrate
that they respected the rights of minorities, especially of Crimean Tatars, by declaring their intention to
solve pressing economic issues, in hopes of lessening minority resistance to the occupation. However,
these declarations have scarcely been put into practice.
On 21 April 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decree No 268 ‘On Measures of
Rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state
support to their revival and development’. Commenting on the decree, Putin emphasised that
Crimean Tatar people had suffered the most of all and stated that this decree would be the basis for
systematic measures towards the cultural, political, and economic rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars,
including the regulation of land property issues.137 Crimean Tatar representatives, including Mustafa
Dzhemilev, were critical of the decree, as the decree focused on cultural rights and equated Crimean
Tatars to other national minorities, instead of treating them as an indigenous people.138
Following Putin's decree, on 4 June 2014, the de facto State Council of Crimea passed in its first reading
the draft law ‘On certain guarantees of rights of peoples who were deported in an extra-judicial way on
the basis of nationality from the Autonomous Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic in 1941-1944’. The draft
law promised many social benefits to the repatriates, such as compensation of transportation expenses
for their return to Crimea, compensation of expenses for completing the construction of houses,
provisions for accommodation, provisions for land plots to build homes, and other measures.139 Similarly,
on 30 July 2014, the draft law ‘On the regulation of issues of the self-occupation of land’, which envisaged
134 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 69-70.
135 The text can be found at http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_252464.pdf
136 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 70.
137 Ria Novosti, ‘Putin: ukaz o rehabilitatsii krymskih tatar – osnova dlia razvitia’ [‘Putin: Decree on the rehabilitation of Crimean
Tatars is the basis for development’], Ria Novosti, 16 May 2014, http://ria.ru/politics/20140516/1008042615.html
138 Kommersant, 'Krymskotatarskoye ego'.
139 The text can be found at http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/6/act/2203.pdf
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
the legalisation of all self-occupied land plots by 2017, was passed in its first reading.140 On 20 June 2015,
the de facto State Council passed in its first reading the draft law ‘On measures of social support to
victims of political repressions’, which offers further social benefits to individuals, including those who
had been deported.141 However, this draft legislation has yet to be adopted and seems to have been
dropped.
Among the legislative acts that have been adopted and are relevant to the situation of minorities is the
law ‘On holidays and historic dates in the Republic of Crimea’ of 24 December 2014, which provides
minorities with the right to celebrate their religious and national holidays. The law ‘On the adoption,
publishing and entering into force and deposit of laws of the Republic of Crimea’ of 11 June 2014
envisages that laws shall be published in each of the state languages of Crimea; however, the website of
the de facto State Council where laws are published electronically is only available in Russian. The law ‘On
crime prevention in the Republic of Crimea’ of 8 August 2014, Article 18(3), envisages measures to
prevent inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea, including by creating a culture of tolerance and support for the
development of the languages and cultures of the people of Crimea. However, classes on patriotism and
studies on extremist legislation are taught in Crimean schools instead.142
On 25 June 2014, the de facto State Council of Crimea by its decree No 2254-6/14 ruled to ask the Russian
government to include the smaller groups of indigenous peoples of Crimea, namely the Karaims
(numbering 850 people, according to the information provided in the decree) and Krimchaks (numbering
380 people, according to the Register of Indigenous People of the Russian Federation), in line with the
federal law ‘On Guarantees of the rights of small indigenous people of the Russian Federation’ which
‘would allow the promotion of retaining religion, authentic ethnic culture, and historic heritage’.143 The
de facto authorities also approved a list of historical geographic names, mainly Crimean Tatar, that had
been changed during Soviet times and which are to be used in parallel with their current names.144
5 Applicability of relevant international legal norms and
standards to the de jure and de facto authorities
The occupation of Crimea since the end of February 2014145 constitutes a grave violation of Ukraine's
territorial integrity and is an act of aggression as defined by UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of
14 December 1974. Russia violated the principles of international law that prohibit the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state as enshrined in the
Charter of the UN (Article 2(4)). Russia’s occupation also violates the principle of non-interference in
internal affairs and the principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, as enshrined in the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1 August
1975; the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) of 5 December 1994; the Ukraine-
Russia Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 31 May 1997; and the Alma-Ata
Declaration of 21 December 1991.146
140 The text can be found at http://www.crimea.gov.ru/draft/4067
141 The text can be found at http://www.crimea.gov.ru/draft/4649
142 Interview with a civil society representative, Kyiv, 18 February 2016.
143 The Russian register of indigenous people only includes those whose population is less than 50 000.
144 TASS, ‘V Krymy naselennym punktam vozvraschaut izmenennye pri sovetskoi vlasti nazvania’ [‘Crimean municipalities are
given back the names which were changed during the Soviet times’], TASS, 8 February 2016, http://tass.ru/obschestvo/2649277
145 The Ukrainian government recognises 20 February 2015 as the start of Russian aggression in Crimea. Russia also indirectly
recognised 20 February 2014 as the first day of its military intervention in Crimea by issuing medals of the Ministry of Defence
‘For the Return of Crimea: 20.02.2014-18.03.2014’.
146 Resolution adopted by the UNGA on 27 March 2014 68/262 ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’.
30
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
For the purposes of international law, illegally annexed territories are considered occupied. Thus, the
illegal annexation of Crimea, which occurred on 18 March 2014, is a continuation of the occupation that
began in February 2014.147 Territory that is controlled by a foreign power is regarded as occupied
regardless of whether the occupation has met a violent resistance and whether a state of war was
declared.148
In the case of occupation, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies: specifically, the land regulations
of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (relating to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in the Time of War) of 12 August 1949, and the Additional Protocol I (relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts) of 8 June 1977.149 For example, IHL norms stipulate
that the population cannot be transferred from the occupied territory; thus, deportations are violations of
IHL (Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Additionally, the occupying power cannot transfer its
civilian population into the occupied territory; private property shall be respected; and the occupying
power shall provide food, medical supplies, and healthcare to the population, and education to the
children on the occupied territory regardless of their citizenship (Articles 50, 55, and 56). Resistance to an
unlawful occupation is lawful. The occupying power cannot prosecute civilians for crimes occurring
before the occupation (Article 70) and the penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force,
except when they constitute a threat to the security of the occupying power or an obstacle to the
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 64). No derogations can be made from IHL. Despite
the fact that Russia refuses to admit the de jure application of the IHL rules of occupation, as it insists on
the legality of the annexation of Crimea, IHL remains applicable.
The occupying power bears legal responsibility for the occupied territory, including respect for and
protection of all human rights. Russia is also responsible for preventing and taking action against human
rights abuses by local authorities and forces acting as its proxies.150
Russia as the occupying power has to comply with its own human rights obligations in occupied Crimea
and with the human rights obligations of the occupied territory – that is, binding commitments taken by
the lawful sovereign Ukraine.151 These international human rights obligations include compliance with
international and regional human rights treaties and other instruments to which Russia is a party,
including the International Bill on Human Rights (the Universal Declaration; the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the two Optional Protocols; and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Culture Rights and its Optional Protocol); the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol; the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
its three Optional Protocols; and other international conventions, as well as obligations taken under
membership in the CoE (first of all, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
147 P. Wrange, S. Helaoui, Occupation/Annexation of a Territory: Respect for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
and Consistent EU Policy. Study of the European Parliament. Brussels, 25 June 2015, p. 8.
148 P. Wrange, S. Helaoui, Occupation/Annexation of a Territory: Respect for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
and Consistent EU Policy. Study of the European Parliament. Brussels, 25 June 2015, p. 14. See also OSCE, Report of the Human
Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p. 17.
149 P. Wrange, S. Helaoui, Occupation/Annexation of a Territory: Respect for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
and Consistent EU Policy. Study of the European Parliament. Brussels, 25 June 2015, p.15.
150 See also Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers: Russia, Ukraine, and International Humanitarian and Human Rights
Law, 21 March 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/21/questions-and-answers-russia-ukraine-and-internationalhumanitarian-
and-human-rights
151 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p.18.
31
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Fundamental Freedoms), the Helsinki Final Act, and the OSCE human dimension commitments that are
politically binding.152
Human rights may be limited by the occupying power, especially in the situation of armed conflict, when
its security may be threatened or control is fluid; however, some rights are non-derogable in line with
international conventions (such as the right to be free from torture and any inhumane and degrading
treatment or punishment, the right to life, the right to be free from slavery or servitude, the right to
protection from retroactive application of penal laws, and right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion).153 In the context of an illegal annexation where Russia is in full control of Crimea, it has an
obligation to respect and protect human rights.
Both Ukraine and Russia are parties to the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities; thus, the provisions of this convention are legally binding for Russia in Crimea. Compliance
with the Framework Convention is subject to monitoring by the Advisory Committee on the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The Russian state report (as well as the Ukrainian
state report) on the status of the implementation of this Convention under the fourth monitoring cycle
has been overdue since 2014.
Ukraine is also a party to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Russia signed the
Charter in 2001, but did not ratify this CoE convention. Therefore, whereas Russia has no obligation to
comply with its provisions on its territory, it must comply with it on the territory of Crimea.
Crimean Tatars (as well as Karaims and Krimchaks) are indigenous people whose rights shall be protected
in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, which sets minimum
standards of protection. However, this document is non-binding;154 hence, the path towards protecting
the rights of indigenous people in occupied Crimea is through the norms of other binding conventions.
Shortly after the annexation, on 20 March 2014, Ukraine's parliament adopted a resolution on the
guarantees of the rights of Crimean Tatar people in the Ukrainian state, in which it recognised Crimean
Tatars as indigenous people possessing the right to self-determination within the state of Ukraine and
the Kurultai and the Mejlis as their representative and executive bodies, respectively. The parliament
called on the government of Ukraine to join the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
which it did in May 2014.
There are numerous challenges to compelling Russia's compliance with its obligations as the occupying
power in Crimea, from its refusal to recognise itself as such and up to the limited mechanisms of
enforcement available under international law. In fact, many international human rights commitments
are not respected by Russia on its own territory. Over 10 000 applications against Russia are pending
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).155 Furthermore, to avoid compliance with ECHR
rulings, in December 2015, Russian authorities passed amendments to the law on the Constitutional
Court allowing the court to legalise the non-implementation of ECHR decisions.156 This act stipulates the
supremacy of domestic law; accordingly, any international convention can be overruled by the Russian
Constitution. In February 2016, the Ministry of Justice of Russia asked the Constitutional Court to rule on
152 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p.18.
153 OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, p.15.
154 Both Ukraine and Russia abstained during its vote, which may be interpreted as their disinterest in endorsing the rights of
indigenous peoples.
155 European Court on Human Rights, ‘Russia’, Press Country Profile, Update in January 2016,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Russia_ENG.pdf
156 V. Hamraev, A. Pushkarskaya, ‘Yevropeyski sud Rossii ne ukaz. Gosduma reshila, kak ne ispolniat yego reshenia’ [‘The European
Court has no authority over Russia. State Duma decided how to not implement its decisions], Kommersant, 5 December 2015,
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2870960
32
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
whether it may choose not to implement the decisions of the ECHR.157 Observers believe that this step
may signal Russia's intention to avoid the responsibilities of compliance with its international
commitments and exit the CoE.158 In fact, Russian authorities threatened withdrawal from the CoE in 2016
after the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) voted in favour of continuing the suspension of the Russian
delegation's voting rights, a sanction introduced in response to its annexation of Crimea and its activities
in eastern Ukraine in April 2014. The Russian Parliament did not send its delegation to participate in the
2016 ordinary session of the PACE.
The government of Ukraine derogated in whole from certain human rights obligations to Crimean
residents, deferring to the responsibility of Russia as an occupying power in effective control of the
peninsula.159 Despite the fact that Ukraine does not have effective control over Crimea, it is still obliged to
use all legal and diplomatic means available to guarantee the rights of its citizens in the occupied
territory, as stipulated by the ECHR in cases concerning Moldova in Transnistria.160 Ukrainian human
rights defenders argue that Ukraine must intensify investigations of the crimes committed against its
citizens on the territory of Crimea during the occupation and make better use of the available
international mechanisms for protection. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyse how the current
measures put in place by Ukraine towards Crimea, including the derogation from human rights
obligations, the rules on crossing the administrative boundary line with Crimea, and others, affect the
human rights of Ukrainian citizens in occupied Crimea and what steps Ukraine should take to protect its
citizens in the region. These important issues deserve further investigation in a separate study.
In order to compel Russia to comply with its human rights obligations in Crimea, Ukraine lodged two
inter-state applications to the ECHR: Ukraine v. Russia (no. 20958/14) on 13 March 2014, and Ukraine v.
Russia (no. 42410/15) on 27 August 2015 for numerous violations of the European Convention on Human
Rights in the territories of Ukraine where Russia exercises effective control. Moreover, there are also an
unknown percentage of individual applications, out of the total number of over 1 400, concerning events
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (most of which relate to the situation in eastern Ukraine; there are no
statistics on what percentage of these are lodged against Russia, Ukraine, or both).161
Though Ukraine has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which tries
individuals accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, over the alleged
157 A. Pushkarskaya, ‘Reshenia ESPCh- ni v zhizn. V Konstitutsionnyi sud postupilo pervoe obraschenie Minyusta’ [‘ECHR decisions
are not to put in force. The Constitutional Court receives the first Ministry of Justice request’], Kommersant, 2 February 2016,
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2906219. Upon the completion of this report, on 19 April 2016, the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation ruled it 'impossible' to implement the decision of the ECHR in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia
(2013). See http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=3281
158 M. Bushuev, M. Ostaptschuk, 'Russia to ignore international courts', Deutsche Welle, 17 December 2015,
http://www.dw.com/en/russia-to-ignore-international-courts/a-18923829; UNIAN, 'Kremlin strategy: Russia may have long
plotted quitting Council of Europe', UNIAN, 5 February 2016; A. Arbatov, A. Kolesnikov, 'Does Russia Need the Council of Europe?
Carnegie.ru Commentary, 4 February 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/04/does-russia-need-council-of-europe
159 Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy ‘Pro Zayavu Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainey “Pro Vidstup Ukrainy vid okremyh zoboviazan,
vyznachenyh Mizhnarodnym Paktom pro hromadianski I politychni prava ta Konventsieu pro zahyst prav ludyny i
osnovopolozhnyh svobod”’ [‘Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine “On derogation from certain obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms”’] No 462-VIII of 21 May 2015. It should be noted that some of the rights envisaged by the derogations are nonderogable
as defined by the UN Human Rights Committee (such as the right to a fair trial) or still obliged under international
humanitarian law (such as the right to effective remedy).
160 In ECHR judgments of 19 October 2012 in Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia and of 8 July 2004 in Ilascu and others v.
Moldova and Russia. See OHCHR, Note on the derogation of the Government of Ukraine from certain obligations under
international human rights treaties to which Ukraine is a party, 2 March 2016.
161 European Court of Human Rights, ‘European Court of Human Rights communicates to Russia new inter-State case concerning
events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’, Press Release, ECHR 296 (2015), 1 October 2015.
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
crimes committed on Ukraine's territory from 20 February 2014 onwards, crimes of aggression may fall
under the jurisdiction of the ICC only after January 2017, subject to a decision to be taken then by
participating states. Thus, even if there is a potential case for Ukraine at the ICC, it is likely to focus on the
investigation of the crimes committed in eastern Ukraine rather than in Crimea.
6 Actions taken by the international community to improve
the situation of minorities in Crimea
Despite the fact that by occupying and illegally annexing Crimea, Russia broke many fundamental
provisions of international law and dealt a major blow to post-WWII international and European security,
the international community was unable to respond to this breach in a way that would compel Russia to
change its behaviour and enforce compliance. Neither the UN Security Council, nor the OSCE, of which
Russia is a member, appeared capable of dealing with Russia's military aggression towards Ukraine, just
as they were not able to deal with similar earlier crises, though of a more limited scope, such as the war
between Russia and Georgia in 2008.
The UN Security Council was unable to adopt any act condemning Russia's aggression due to Russia's
veto. The only response that the UN produced was the non-binding UNGA resolution of 27 March 2014
68/262 on Ukraine's territorial integrity, which declares the referendum of 16 March 2014 as ‘having no
validity, [and it] cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol’. While it was supported by 100 UN members and opposed by only 11
members (Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe), the vote also showed a major schism within the international community, as 58 UN
members, mainly South American, African, and Asian states, abstained from providing an unequivocal
assessment of Russia's actions in Crimea.
Similarly, the only agreement that OSCE participant states could reach in response to the illegal
annexation of Crimea was to deploy an unarmed Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (OSCE SMM) on
21 March 2014 with the aim of reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability, and security, and to
monitor and support the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments. One of the OSCE SMM
tasks is to monitor and support the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
rights of persons belonging to national minorities.162 However, the principal geographical focus of the
mission’s activity moved to the two eastern regions of Ukraine, where armed conflict is ongoing. Russia
effectively blocked access of the mission to Crimea, arguing that ‘the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol
have become an integral part of the Russian Federation’ and, thus, could not be covered by a mission
with a mandate on Ukraine.163
162 OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No 1117 Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 991st Plenary
Meeting, 21 March 2014, http://www.osce.org/pc/116747?download=true
163 OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No 1117 Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 991st Plenary
Meeting, 21 March 2014, http://www.osce.org/pc/116747?download=true
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The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
6.1 Non-recognition policy and sanctions against the occupier
Following the UNGA Resolution 68/262, part of the international community is pursuing a policy of nonrecognition
of the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. The EU as a bloc has adopted a nonrecognition
policy as decided by the European Council on 20 March 2014.164 As part of this policy, the EU
has imposed restrictions on economic exchanges with the occupied territory. These restrictions include
an import ban on goods originating from Crimea (unless they have Ukrainian certificates); an investment
ban; a ban on providing tourism services (European cruise ships may only call at ports of the Crimean
peninsula in case of emergency); an export ban on goods and technology for the transport,
telecommunications, and energy sectors and the exploration of oil, gas, and mineral resources; and a
prohibition on technical assistance, brokering, construction, or engineering services related to
infrastructure in the mentioned sectors.165 On 19 June 2015, the Council extended these measures to
23 June 2016. Similarly, in December 2014, the United States of America (USA) imposed a trade and
investment ban on Crimea and prohibited financial transactions with Crimea (later limited only to those
for commercial purposes).166 The consulates of EU countries (e.g. Poland) in Crimea were closed and the
states implementing a non-recognition policy do not recognise Russian passports issued in Crimea.
In response to the events in Crimea, on 6 March 2014, the USA was the first to introduce an asset freeze
and entry ban against persons involved in the occupation. Similar measures were adopted by Canada.
The EU also introduced restrictive measures against the persons and entities involved in actions
against Ukraine's territorial integrity on 17 March 2014. Subsequently, the EU's asset freezing and travel
ban list grew to 149 persons and 37 entities. Of these, over 60 are Russian or Crimean politicians,
members of the military, or officials who were added to the list because of their role in the occupation of
Crimea, 13 are entities in Crimea that were ‘nationalised’ by the de facto authorities, and one is a Russian
state airline flying directly to Crimea. These measures have been extended to 15 September 2016.
The sanctions against Russia also included diplomatic measures, such as the cancellation of high-level
meetings with Russian authorities (the G8 summit, the EU-Russia summit, the suspension of negotiations
on the new EU-Russia agreement and visa liberalisation talks, the suspension of Russia's accession to the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy Agency, the
suspension of loans by the European Investment Bank, and the suspension of cooperation programmes,
except on cross-border and civil society). As the events in Ukraine evolved, including Russia's intervention
in eastern Ukraine, international sanctions were expanded in July-September 2014 and new restrictive
164 European Council, Conclusions of 20-21 March 2014, Brussels, 21 March 2014
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf. On 20 March 2014, the European Council
declared not to recognise the illegal referendum in Crimea, considered it in clear violation of the Ukrainian Constitution, and
condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea/Sevastopol to Russia, committing not to recognise it.
165 Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of
Crimea and Sevastopol (OJ L 183, 24.6.2014, p. 9), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0692-
20141220&qid=1444987014323&from=EN
166 The President of the USA, Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting
Certain Transactions With Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine_eo4.pdf; Office of Foreign Assets Control, Executive Order 13685 of December
19, 2014 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Crimea Region of
Ukraine, General License Nj. 6 Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Authorized, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/eo13685_gl_6.pdf
35
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
measures were added by the EU, the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, and Norway (see Annex
3).167
On 31 July 2014, shortly after Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down in eastern Ukraine, the EU
imposed sanctions targeting Russia as a state, which were further reinforced in September 2014. The
sanctions included bans on the trade of financial instruments and on loans to five state-owned banks,
three energy companies, and three defence companies; a trade embargo on arms; an export ban on dualuse
goods for military use in Russia or by Russian military users; and a ban on the export of certain
energy-related equipment, technology and services, and certain products and services for deep sea oil
exploration.168 These ‘economic’ sanctions, as they have been called by the EU, are linked to the
implementation of the Minsk accord on the ceasefire in Donbas and have been subsequently prolonged
to remain in force until 31 July 2016.
The US sanctions include measures against people, entities, and companies, including non-recognised
institutions in Crimea, as well as sectoral economic measures (financial sanctions against Russian entities,
including Russian banks, energy and defence companies, restrictions on military and dual-use technology,
and an export ban on technology for deep oil and gas exploration).169
Turkey, which has a large Crimean Tatar diaspora, condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea, but did
not introduce sanctions against Russia related to the occupation. The government sent an unofficial
delegation led by Professor Zafer Üskül on 27-30 April 2015 that produced a critical report on the human
rights violations of the Crimean Tatar population following the illegal annexation.170 The Turkish
President delivered the report to the Russian President at the European Games in Baku in June 2015.
There are diverse views on the effectiveness and impact of the sanctions against Russia. One view
maintains that sanctions have been counterproductive because they have led to a consolidation of the
elite in Russia.171 According to another view, though sanctions did not reverse the annexation of Crimea
or push Russia to withdraw from eastern Ukraine, they raised the cost of ‘Crimea’s absorption’, making
the occupied region the most dependent on federal budget transfers from Russia.172
Many civil society representatives in Ukraine, including those interviewed for this study, view the
economic sanctions that were introduced by the international community, and specifically the EU, in
reaction to the events in Donbas as the most effective mechanism of forcing Russia to change its
behaviour towards Ukraine. However, they express concerns that if the ‘Donbas’ sanctions were to be
eventually lifted, the ‘Crimean’ sanctions would be too weak to force Russia to revisit its behaviour,
comply with international law, and end its occupation of Crimea.
167 For comparison of sanctions by international actors see J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, and S. Secrieru, Sanctions and Russia, Warsaw:
PISM, 2015.
168 European Union, ‘EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis’, European Union Newsroom,
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm
169 The US Department of the Treasury, ‘Ukraine/Russia-related Sanctions’, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/
sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx
170 Anadolu Post, ‘Report shows Russian violation of Crimean Tatars’ rights’, Anadolu Post, 16 June 2015,
http://aa.com.tr/en/world/report-shows-russian-violation-of-crimean-tatars-rights/36012
171 R. Connolly, ‘The impact of EU economic sanctions on Russia’, in Dreyer, I., & Luengo-Cabrera, L., eds., On target? EU sanctions
as security policy tools, ISSUE Report 25, September 2015, Paris: EUISS, p. 29-38.
172 S. Secrieru, ‘Have EU Sanctions Changed Russia's Behaviour in Ukraine’, [in] Dreyer, I., & Luengo-Cabrera, op. cit., p. 39-48.
36
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
6.2 International law enforcement and human rights protection
mechanisms
Although the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia is routinely condemned by the EU, the USA, and
allied countries, as well as at international fora, such as the parliamentary delegations of the international
organisations to which Russia is a member (the CoE and the OSCE), there is little action taken in practice
to force Russia as the occupying power to adhere to its international obligations and respect the rights of
the civilian population, including that of the national minorities. The available mechanisms at the UNlevel
include the UN Human Rights Council and the Universal Periodic Review as an instrument of peer
pressure, as well as various monitoring and advisory bodies for compliance with UN human rights
treaties. At the CoE, the ECHR is the strongest enforcement mechanism, also available for individuals,
whereas monitoring and advisory mechanisms for the promotion of compliance exist within the CoE and
the OSCE. However, effective enforcement ultimately depends on the good will of a complying state.
As mentioned above, the OSCE SMM does not monitor the human rights situation in Crimea, despite the
fact that its mandate covers the entire territory of Ukraine. The closest the mission has approached
Crimea is the office in Kherson that monitors the situation at three crossing points on the Administrative
Boundary Line (ABL) between Crimea and the Kherson region.173
The OSCE ODIHR and the High Commissioner on National Minorities published two reports covering
the human rights situation in Crimea, including that of national minorities, described previously. The
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted two resolutions (of 1 July 2014 and of 8 July 2015) condemning
Russia's actions and expressing support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity, and
territorial integrity and also attempted to act as a forum for dialogue by hosting meetings between
Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians.
The CoE is the only international organisation whose delegation recently accessed Crimea. The mission,
led by Swiss diplomat Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, visited Crimea on 25-31 January 2016 to assess
the human rights and rule of law situation. They held over 50 meetings on the peninsula, including with
the imprisoned Mejlis Deputy Chairman Ahtem Chiygoz, as well as conducted meetings in mainland
Ukraine. The mission is expected to prepare a report with recommendations in a number of key areas
within the CoE mandate. This was the second time that the CoE was allowed into the annexed peninsula
since Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks’ visit of September 2014.
Declaring that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was ‘in clear contradiction with the Statute of the Council of
Europe’ and Russia's accession commitments, since April 2014, the PACE has suspended the voting rights
of the Russian delegation, as well as its right to be represented in the Assembly’s leading bodies and its
right to participate in election observation missions.174 Through its resolutions, the PACE regularly calls
on Russia ‘to reverse its illegal annexation of Crimea’ and refers to the situation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in occupied Crimea in its resolutions.175
173 See OSCE SMM, Thematic Report: Freedom of movement across the administrative boundary line with Crimea, 19 June 2015,
http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/165691?download=true
174 PACE, Resolution 1990 (2014) ‘Reconsideration on substantive grounds of the previously ratified credentials of the Russian
delegation’ adopted by the Assembly on 10 April 2014.
175 See, for example, PACE, Resolution 2067 (2015) ‘Missing persons during the conflict in Ukraine’ adopted by the Assembly on
25 June 2015.
37
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
The International Advisory Panel, proposed by the CoE Secretary General to oversee the investigations
conducted by the Ukrainian authorities of the violent incidents in Ukraine from 30 November 2013
onwards, produced reports related to the Maidan violence of 2013-2014 and the Odessa violence of May
2014, but not on the Crimean events. The CoE Office in Kyiv is conducting a project on the human rights
protection of internally displaced people in Ukraine.
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), a CoE body tasked with assisting
Member States in combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance,
adopted its conclusions on Ukraine in March 2015; however, they did not discuss Crimea.176 The last
country report on Russia was issued before the occupation.
The activities of the UN, and in particular, the ad hoc report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues of 2014, and the regular reports covering the situation in
Crimea produced by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, which does not have access to
the peninsula, have already been mentioned in Section 2. The UN Development Programme (UNDP)
office in Ukraine was the first and only international agency that responded promptly to the human
rights situation in occupied Crimea by coordinating and administering donor support (chiefly from
Denmark's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to civil society initiatives such as the Crimean Human Rights Field
Mission, and for the provision of legal aid, rights monitoring and awareness raising, trainings for human
rights activists and journalists, and other projects of Ukrainian NGOs working on and/or in Crimea, all of
which have been mentioned previously in this study. Within the project entitled ‘Democratisation,
Human Rights and Civil Society Development’, the UNDP, together with Denmark, supported the Office
of the Ukrainian Ombudsperson and assisted in organising an international conference on human rights
in Crimea on 31 March 2015 in Kyiv.
7 The implementation of relevant EU policies, frameworks,
programmes, and guidelines
Although the EU has strongly condemned the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
by an act of aggression from Russia from the start of crisis in Crimea and has expressed non-recognition
of its subsequent annexation and introduced a system of restrictive measures,177 not much has been
done in practice to effectively respond to the Russian occupation of Crimea. The suspension of high-level
meetings with Russian officials and personal sanctions against Crimean and low-level Russian politicians
fell short of pushing Russia to revisit its plans for Crimea. Proposals to send an EU fact-finding mission to
Ukraine did not find enough support in the Council; consequently, the EU supported the OSCE
monitoring mission instead.
The EU's strategy was to focus on strengthening Ukraine through assistance on reforms rather than
dealing with conflict settlement directly. In April 2014, the EU agreed to send a Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to advise Ukraine on security sector reform. Ukrainian civil society
representatives, including those interviewed for this study, complained that the mandate of the mission
was too narrow and did not deal with conflict issues; thus, they viewed the EU as failing to provide an
adequate response to the armed conflict and occupation of Ukraine. France and Germany led diplomatic
peace efforts over the conflicts in eastern Ukraine, while Crimea quickly fell off the radar. Many EU
176 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI Conclusions on the Implementation of the Recommendations in
respect of Ukraine Subject to Interim Follow-Up. Adopted On 19 March 2015. Published On 9 June 2015,
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Ukraine/UKR-IFU-IV-2015-25-ENG.pdf
177 See Council conclusions on Ukraine, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 3 March 2014; Council conclusions on Ukraine,
Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 17 March 2014; Council Conclusions on Ukraine approved by European Council,
20 March 2014.
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The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
Member States, including Poland and the Baltic states, were dissatisfied with such developments, and
Bulgaria’s Prime Minister publicly criticised the leaders of Germany and France for de facto accepting
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.178 The implementation of the Minsk accords overshadowed any discussion
on the status of Crimea.
The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia is routinely mentioned in public statements and speeches
made by EU representatives, including the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy Federica Mogherini. However, apart from the EU delegation in Kyiv, public statements by
Brussels-based high-level EU officials specifically addressing the situation in occupied Crimea and the
rights of its residents and directed at the occupying power Russia remain rare, especially since the active
military phase of the occupation has ended.179
The European Parliament (EP) has been the most outspoken EU institution on the issue of the
occupation of Crimea, adopting resolutions on Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Eastern Partnership,
the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin, and, most recently, on the human rights situation in
Crimea, in particular with regard to Crimean Tatars. The EP resolution of 4 February 2016 is of special
importance as it explicitly acknowledges Crimean Tatars as ‘indigenous people of Crimea’ and raises
awareness of the critical situation regarding human rights on the illegally annexed peninsula and of
Russia's responsibility as an occupying power to ensure the safety of the population as a whole and to
show respect for the rights of the indigenous Crimean Tatars and all minority groups.180 This resolution
was much welcomed by Crimean Tatar representatives, the Ukrainian government, and civil society.
The EU has guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL, which can be implemented by means of
political dialogue with third countries, public statements and démarches on specific conflicts, sanctions,
crisis management operations, and cooperation with other international organisations.181 Examining the
effectiveness of the implementation of these guidelines in the case of Russia's occupation of Crimea
remains outside the scope of this study; however, it seems that their full potential has yet to be realised.
For example, these guidelines envisage restrictive measures against state and non-state actors as an
effective means of promoting compliance with IHL; yet, the sanctions introduced by the EU do not reflect
the ongoing violations of IHL in occupied Crimea (or, for that matter, in eastern Ukraine). In addition, the
EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) sets out a number of objectives to ensure a
comprehensive human rights approach to conflicts and crises. They include an evaluation of the
implementation of the EU guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL by 2016. It is also envisaged that
by 2017, a system for the mandatory reporting of grave violations of IHRL and IHL by staff in EU
delegations and CSDP missions will be established. It is important that the implementation of these
measures also extends to Crimea.
All EU cooperation programmes on the territory of Crimea have been terminated, including those
with civil society organisations. However, the EU could have deployed emergency funding under the
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EDIHR) to assist human rights defenders
working in and on Crimea who face risks (e.g. imprisonment, detentions). Nevertheless, the EIDHR has yet
178 V. Zhelev ‘Bulgarian PM criticises France and Germany for accepting Crimea annexation’, EUObserver, 2 April 2015,
https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128238
179 They include, for example, statements on the reported holding of local “elections” in Crimea, Brussels, 15 September 2014, or
statements by High Representative/Vice-President Mogherini on the sentencing by a Russian court of Ukrainian citizens
O. Sentsov and O. Kolchenko, Brussels, 25 August 2015.
180 European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the human rights situation in Crimea, in particular of the Crimean
Tatars (2016/2556(RSP)).
181 Updated EU guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), 2009/C 303/06, published in the
Official Journal of the European Union on 15 December 2009.
39
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
to be used to support human rights activities in or on Crimea.182 Additionally, the Instrument contributing
to Stability and Peace (IcSP) has not been used to finance projects related to Crimea, either, although it
funded the OSCE SMM and a project by the International Organisation for Migration that supported
displaced and conflict-affected people. The EU also financially supports the UN Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine that, being denied access to the occupied region, monitors the human rights situation
in Crimea from Kyiv.
There have been routine complaints among Ukrainian human rights groups that there is no universal
funding available to support their work in and on Crimea, and that much of this work has been
conducted on a volunteer basis. While small grants, including those provided by the embassies of EU
Member States, can be applied for, it is still extremely difficult to ensure the sustainability of human rights
work. One of the leading groups monitoring the human rights situation in Crimea raised concerns that
their time and resources were primarily spent seeking funds and writing grant reports instead of
conducting international advocacy and raising awareness on the issues of occupation. Many complained
that European and other international organisations providing support to Ukraine perceive Crimea as
‘too political’ an issue to deal with and are not eager to fund civil society projects on Crimean issues, apart
from providing support to internally displaced people.
8 Conclusions and recommendations regarding possible EU
policy measures
Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its residents have
been violated, including the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, the freedom of
movement, and the right to a fair trial and effective remedy. The most vulnerable groups have been those
who opposed the annexation, including journalists, civil society activists, and representatives of national
minorities. The most active segments of Crimean civil society have experienced abduction, detention,
interrogation, and intimidation, and many have left the peninsula or were forcefully deported or banned
from entering, as in the case of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. Minority groups in occupied
Crimea, especially Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, have faced systematic violations of their political, civic,
and cultural rights as those associated with the ‘enemy’ state of Ukraine. While persecution and
discrimination in Crimea is complex and based on multiple grounds, most prominently religion, political
position, and identity, Crimean Tatars often see their rights violated as both Muslims and opponents of
the occupation. Even politically inactive Crimean Tatars or those who do not belong to the Russianbanned
Islamic movements (such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir) may face searches, interrogation, intimidation, and
arrest. Furthermore, Ukrainians in Crimea are not free to express or demonstrate their identity, because
any identification with Ukraine is seen as opposition to the occupation and may be punished.
The Russian legislative framework that has been de facto applied in Crimea since the annexation
significantly restricts the political and civil rights of Crimeans. The de facto authorities broadly apply
Russian legislation on extremism and terrorism to suppress dissenting voices and to silence the
opponents of the annexation. Furthermore, in violation of IHL and the basic principles of law, Russian
criminal laws have been used in Crimea retroactively to persecute civil society activists and Mejlis
members.
While serious violations of the rights of the two largest minority groups in Crimea, Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians, are regularly reported and documented, information on the situation of other ethnic
minorities in Crimea is scarce. At the same time, there are reports that the de facto authorities pursue
182 Interview by email with a representative of the EU delegation to Ukraine, 1 March 2015.
40
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
practices of divide and rule towards minority communities by splitting them into loyal and disloyal
groups. These issues certainly deserve further attention.
The language of intolerance and hatred towards Ukraine and Ukrainians is widespread in pro-Russian
media and in the discourse of public officials in Crimea. This may aggravate inter-ethnic relations and
conflicts on the occupied peninsula. In this respect, there is a pressing need to ensure regular and
unbiased monitoring of the human rights situation in Crimea through an international presence.
The international community and the EU have taken a range of actions in response to the annexation by
adopting a non-recognition policy and imposing restrictive measures; however, these actions have failed
to reverse or improve the situation thus far. Unfortunately, the situation of the minorities in Crimea,
especially that of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people, is deteriorating. The attempt of the de facto
authorities to ban the Mejlis, if enacted, has the potential to affect every Crimean Tatar. These
developments require the international community and the EU to revise and strengthen its response.
Any efforts of the EU and the democratic international community to improve the situation of the
national minorities in Crimea should deal with its root cause — namely, Russia's illegal occupation of the
peninsula.
The following steps should be considered by the EU:
1. The Council of the EU, Member States, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should
work with the UN, the OSCE, and the CoE to ensure a continuous international presence in
Crimea to monitor compliance with IHL and IHRL. A mission with an ad hoc mandate could be
considered, and a compromise solution acceptable for Ukraine and Russia should be reached, with
Russia being ultimately responsible for providing access to Crimea and ensuring the security of
international monitors. An international presence in Crimea would allow for the monitoring of the
situation of all minority groups and inter-ethnic relations and may also have a constraining effect on
the de facto authorities. The EP, following its resolution of 4 February 2016 in which it called on
Russia and the de facto authorities in Crimea ‘to grant unimpeded access to Crimea for international
institutions and independent experts from the OSCE, the United Nations, and the CoE, as well as for
any human rights NGOs or news media outlets that wish to visit, assess, and report on the situation
in Crimea’, may be able to facilitate discussion on the type of international monitoring mechanism
that can be established in Crimea. The EP may also be able to support this effort by inviting relevant
stakeholders and experts to thematic EP hearings.
2. As the first step towards an international human rights presence on the peninsula, the EU, through
the Council of the EU and the EEAS, should encourage the government of Ukraine to ease
restrictions on the travel of foreigners to Crimea from mainland Ukraine in order to facilitate
access for representatives of international human rights NGOs, the media, and official EU
delegations (including the EP).
3. EU Member States should impose additional sanctions that would be linked explicitly to
ongoing violations of IHL and IHRL in Crimea in order to comply with their own commitments
set out in the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union and relevant EU guidelines. The Council
and the EEAS should institute a review of such ‘Crimean’ sanctions in response to the developments
on the ground (such as the attempted ban on the Mejlis and the imprisonment and persecution of
the representatives of the national minorities and anyone else who raises their voice against the de
facto authorities). Such sanctions would send a strong signal to Russia that Crimea is not ‘a case
closed’, contrary to the Russian leadership’s beliefs, and it will not be overshadowed by the events
in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, the EU and its allies should continue and reinforce existing
economic sanctions against Russia, which is viewed as the most effective means to compel Russia
to change its behaviour in Ukraine.
41
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
4. The EU and its Member States should continuously raise the issue of the illegal annexation of
Crimea at all international fora and meetings with Russian representatives and demand deoccupation.
Discussion on the status of Crimea should not be decoupled from ongoing talks on the
status of certain districts in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.
5. The EP should ensure that the issue of Crimea remains high on its agenda and the agendas of
other EU institutions. The EP should also continue raising awareness of individual cases of human
rights violations in occupied Crimea. To this end, the EP’s committees (in particular, the
Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET)) could
organise regular sessions to review the situation in Crimea. Inviting experts and human rights
activists from the field would provide first-hand knowledge of the situation in Crimea and, at the
same time, would serve as a way to endorse their activities.
6. EU Member States, the EEAS, and the European Commission should introduce tailor-made
programmes to support initiatives to promote de-occupation. There is a need to think
innovatively and carefully about how to support dissidents and the victims of human rights
violations, as well as how to support societal integration in Crimea without creating substantial risks
for Crimean residents. Independent media outlets focused on Crimea and available in Crimea via
satellite, radio, and the Internet should be supported in order to mitigate the negative
consequences of the restrictions on the media and to ensure the cultural and linguistic rights of the
minorities and indigenous people.
7. The EU should envisage special funding for civil society initiatives in Ukraine and for the
organisations representing the indigenous people of Crimea and working on Crimean human rights
issues, including monitoring of human rights violations, providing legal support to victims of these
violations, and providing domestic and international advocacy and awareness raising. By the midterm
review in 2017, the EEAS and the European Commission should create a special funding
envelope for civil society projects on Crimea within the EDIHR and the IcSP. In addition, there
should be a better use of the European Endowment for Democracy, which can provide quick and
flexible funding to non-registered groups and individuals.
8. The EU should consider providing support for dialogue within Ukraine on how to engage with
occupied Crimea and assistance to both government agencies and civil society organisations in
Ukraine to develop effective policies towards the occupied territory, the protection of Ukrainian
citizens in Crimea, and strategies for the peaceful restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.
9. The EEAS, EU member states and the EP should express vocal support to the Mejlis, condemn its
ban, continuously remind Russia to respect its international obligations to respect human rights in
occupied Crimea, including the rights of minorities, and devise solutions on how to support Mejlis
activities while in exile.
10. In search of appropriate and creative solutions, the EEAS and the Commission should draw
comparisons from the existing practices of supporting civil society actors in hostile
environments and occupied territories. A thorough reflection in the form of a learning exercise
and exchange of best practices on how to enforce a coherent approach to the protection of human
rights in occupied territories/non-recognised entities may be needed.
11. EU Member States and the EEAS should recommend that Ukraine’s government improve its
domestic policies and use all available legal and diplomatic measures to protect the rights of its
citizens in Crimea. The EU should also recommend the government of Ukraine to improve its
policies supporting displaced populations, especially Crimean Tatars, and to ensure their right to
preserve their language and culture while living on mainland Ukraine. As a first step, the EU should
encourage the government of Ukraine to sign and ratify the International Labour Convention on
42
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries No 169 as a legally binding
international instrument specifically dedicated to indigenous peoples and to adopt national
legislation on the rights of indigenous people. The EP should use its cooperation with the
parliament of Ukraine through the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee to promote
such legislation. The EU should encourage the government of Ukraine to play an active role in the
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and cooperate with the UN Special
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people.
The above-mentioned steps may help to mitigate the risks of the human rights violations in occupied
Crimea and to raise the issue of Crimea on European and international agendas. Nevertheless, it should
not be forgotten that the deteriorating human rights situation in Crimea is a result of a failure of the
international community to effectively deal with Russia’s act of aggression towards Ukraine and the
subsequent occupation of Ukraine's territory. Therefore, any efforts of EU institutions and Member States
to address the issue of human rights in occupied Crimea should also take into account a pressing need to
reform and strengthen the relevant international and regional human rights and security
institutions, so that they are better equipped to deal with such crises in the future. The EP could support
this effort by encouraging debate on these issues.
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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Annex 1 Crimean political prisoners
Name Case Sentence/Outcome Current place of
incarceration
1 Gennadiy
Afanasiev
The Case of the Crimean Terrorists
pro-Ukraine activists arrested in
May 2014 in Crimea
accused of participating in a
terrorist group
forced Russian citizenship and
transferred to Moscow for trial
Sentenced to 7 years
in prison plus 1.5
years of limitation of
liberty
Mikun, the Komi
Republic, Russia
(After an appeal,
a Russian court
ordered the
transfer of
Gennadiy to
closer to Crimea
because,
according to
Russian law, he
has to serve his
sentence in either
his place of
residence or
where the verdict
was issued.)
2 Oleksiy Chyrniy Sentenced to 7 years
in prison
Magadan oblast,
Russia
3 Oleksandr
Kolchenko
Sentenced to 20
years in prison
Kopeysk,
Chelyabinsk
oblast, Russia
4 Oleg Sentsov Sentenced to 10
years in prison
Yakutsk, the
Sakha Republic,
Russia
5 Oleksandr
Kostenko
The Case of Oleksandr Kostenko
Euromaidan activist arrested in
February 2015 in Simferopol
accused of infliction of bodily
harm to a riot police officer from
Crimea in Kyiv in February 2014
Russian legislation was
retroactively applied to this
incidence that occurred on
mainland Ukraine and involved
two Ukrainian citizens
Oleksandr's father, Fyodor,
disappeared in Crimea in March
Sentenced to 3 years
and 11 months in
prison
Kirov oblast,
Russia
44
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
2015
Oleksandr's brother, Yevgeniy, is
facing criminal charges for
‘undermining the authority of the
judicial branch and humiliating
Judge V.A. Mozhelianskyy’
6 Haiser
Dzhemilev
The Case of Haiser Dzhemilev
son of Mustafa Dzhemilev
arrested and tried in Crimea for
homicide committed in Ukraine in
May 2013 (occurring before the
occupation)
in April 2014, his file was reopened
by the de facto authorities
in September 2014, he was
transferred to Krasnodar Krai,
Russia for trial
the Russian court retroactively
applied Russian legislation against
a citizen of Ukraine for a crime
that he had already been tried and
sentenced for in Ukraine
in July 2014, the ECHR ruled to
ensure Haiser's right to liberty
Sentenced to 5 years
in prison; the term
was later reduced to
3.5 years
Astrakhan, Russia
7 Yuriy Ilchenko The Case of Yuriy Ilchenko
blogger, arrested in July 2015 in
Sevastopol
accused of extremist activity
Pre-trial detention,
pending trial
Crimea
8 Ali Asanov The Case of 26 February
Ahtem Chiygoz, Deputy Chairman
of the Mejlis was arrested in
January 2015 along with six other
Crimean Tatars and accused of the
organisation of mass riots
Ali Asanov was arrested in April
Ongoing trial Crimea
9 Ahtem Chiygoz
45
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
10 Mustafa
Degermendzi
2015 and Mustafa Degermendzi
was arrested in May 2015 and
accused of participation in mass
riots
Russian legislation was
retroactively applied to this
alleged crime that occurred on the
territory of Ukraine before the
annexation and involving citizens
of Ukraine
a further three Crimean Tatars
tried in this case were released
under personal surety and
another two received suspended
sentences
11 Ferat Saifullaev The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir
Crimean Muslims, arrested in
Crimea on 23 January and
2 February 2015
accused of the establishment of
the terrorist organisation ‘Hizb ut-
Tahrir’ and participation in its
activities
Pre-trial detention Crimea
12 Nuri Primov
13 Rustem Vaitov
14 Ruslan
Zeytullaev
15 Muslim Aliev The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir-2
Arrested on 11 February 2016
accused of creating the terrorist
group ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’
Pre-trial detention Crimea
16 Enver Bekirov
17 Emir-Usein
Kuku
18 Vadym Siruk
Source: Authors' compilation based on A. Osavlyuk, P. Brodyk, and M. Lysenko, op.cit.; Let My People Go! Facebook page and media
reports.
46
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
Annex 2 Key legislative acts of the Russian Federation and the
de facto authorities relevant for the rights of national
minorities in Crimea
Act Main issues
The federal constitutional law of the Russian Federation of
21 March 2014 No 6-FKZ ‘On Admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within
the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities of the
Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance
Sevastopol’
Integration of Crimea into the
political and legal space of the
Russian Federation; forced Russian
citizenship on Crimean residents;
only Russian citizens are entitled to
be public servants
The federal law of 31 May 2002 No 62-FZ ‘On citizenship of
the Russian Federation’ (with amendments of 4 July 2014)
Criminal responsibility for not
disclosing a second citizenship
The federal law of 5 May 2014 No 91-FZ ‘On Application of
Regulations of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
and the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation
in the Territories of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal
City of Sevastopol’
Retroactive application of the
Russian Criminal Code and the
Criminal Procedure Code to the acts
performed in Crimea before 18
March 2014
The Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian
Federation
Widely applied to limit the civil and
political rights of Crimeans
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
The Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation
Widely applied to limit civil and
political rights of Crimeans
The federal law of 12 January 1996 No 7-FZ ‘On noncommercial
organisations’;
The federal law of 19 May 1995 No 82-FZ ‘On public
associations’
Restriction of the freedom of
association and expression
The federal law of 19 June 2004 No 54-FZ ‘On Meetings,
Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches, and Pickets’;
The law of the Republic of Crimea of 8 August 2014 56-ZRК
‘On Ensuring the Conditions for Exercise of the Right of
Citizens of the Russian Federation to Hold Meetings, Rallies,
Demonstrations, and Pickets in the Republic of Crimea’ (with
amendments of 16 September 2015)
Restriction of the freedom of
assembly and expression
The federal law of 2 April 2014 No 44-FZ ‘On participation of
citizens in protection of public order’;
Reliance on paramilitary groups in
restricting civil and political rights in
47
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
The law of 11 June 2014 No 22-ZRK ‘On People’s Militia –
Narodnaya Druzhyna’ (with amendments of 11 December
2014)
Crimea; encouraging the impunity
of paramilitary groups for human
rights abuses
The federal law of 6 March 2006 No 35-FZ ‘On Combatting
Terrorism’
Restriction of the freedom of
expression and civil and political
rights
The federal law of 25 July 2002 No 114-FZ ‘On Combating
Extremist Activities’, including the Federal List of Extremist
Materials
Restriction of the freedom of
expression, thought, conscience,
and religion, and civil and political
rights, persecution of the Mejlis
The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 11 April 2014 Established Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian as state languages
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 21 April
2014 No 268 ‘On Measures of the Rehabilitation of Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and
state support to their revival and development’
Political guidance on introducing
the guarantees of the rights of
deported ethnic groups, including
Crimean Tatars
The federal law of 30 April 1999 No 82-FZ ‘On Guarantees of
the rights of small indigenous peoples of the Russian
Federation’;
Decree of the State Council of Crimea of 25 June 2014 No
2254-6/14 ‘Request on the inclusion into the Single Register
of small indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation of
Crimean Karaims and Krimchaks’
Establishing the rights of small
indigenous peoples (under 50 000),
including economic, social, and
cultural
The federal law of 5 May 2014 No 84-FZ ‘On peculiarities of
legal regulation of relations in the sphere of education in
connection with the Admission of the Republic of Crimea
into the Russian Federation and the Establishment of New
Constituent Entities within the Russian Federation – the
Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol and on
the Introduction of Changes to the Federal Law “On
Education in the Russian Federation”’
Integration of the system of
education of Crimea into that of
Russia; restrictions of the right to
education of non-Russian citizens
and limitations of the right to
education in their native language
for minority groups
The law of the Republic of Crimea 17 June 2015 No 131-ZRK
‘On Education in the Republic of Crimea’
The right to education in Ukrainian
and Russian at pre-school, primary
general, and basic general
education levels
Source: authors' compilation.
48
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
Annex 3 International sanctions related to the annexation of
Crimea by Russia
Sender Types
EU Entry ban and asset freeze against separatists and Russian officials
Asset freeze against Crimean entities
Investment ban on Crimea
Import ban on goods from Crimea
Export ban on goods and services in the sectors of transport,
telecommunications, energy, and the exploitation of oil, gas, or mineral
resources
Ban on tourism services in Crimea and the docking of cruise ships in Crimean
ports
Suspension of cooperation programmes, including loans of the European
Investment Bank
Suspension of talks on the new agreement and visa liberalisation
Suspension of bilateral summits
USA Entry ban and asset freeze against separatists and Russian officials
Asset freeze against Crimean entities and some Russian entities (Bank ‘Rossiya’)
Ban on financial, trade, and other commercial transactions with Crimea
Suspension of bilateral talks and cooperation programmes
Restrictions on military and dual-use technology
Canada Entry ban and asset freeze against separatists and Russian officials
Asset freeze against Crimean entities
Investment ban on Crimea
Imports and exports ban on Crimea goods
Ban on tourism services in Crimea and the docking of cruise ships in Crimean
ports
Australia Entry ban and asset freeze against separatists and Russian officials
Imports ban from Crimea
Export ban on goods, services, and commercial activity in the sectors of
transport, telecommunications, energy, and the exploitation of oil, gas, or
mineral resources
49
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Norway Entry ban and asset freeze against separatists and Russian officials
Asset freeze against Crimea entities
Investment ban on Crimea
Import ban on goods from Crimea
Export ban on goods, services, and commercial activity in the sectors of
transport, telecommunications, energy, and the exploitation of oil, gas, or
mineral resources
Ban on tourism services in Crimea and the docking of cruise ships in Crimean
ports
Switzerland Entry ban and asset freeze against separatists and Russian officials
Asset freeze against Crimean entities
Suspension of free trade talks
Suspension of military cooperation
Imports ban from Crimea (for transactions after 27 August 2014)
Investment and financing ban in the sectors of transport, telecommunications,
energy, and exploitation of oil, gas, or mineral resources
Export ban on certain key goods used in the extraction of oil and gas (for
transactions after 27 August 2014)
Japan Suspension of new cooperation plans
Asset freeze against separatists and two Crimean entities
Restrictions on imports from Crimea
New Zealand Entry ban against separatists
Suspension of free trade talks
CoE Suspension of voting rights of the Russian delegation in the PACE
NATO Suspension of cooperation
EBRD Suspension of new projects in Russia
G8 Suspension of membership
Source: authors' compilation.
50
The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia
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http://krymsos.com/news/yak-ukrayinskim-tserkvam-u-krimu-vdayetsya-zalishatisya-ukrayinskimi/
TASS, ‘V Krymy naselennym punktam vozvraschaut izmenennye pri sovetskoi vlasti nazvania’ [‘Crimean
municipalities are given back the names which were changed during the Soviet times’], TASS, 8 February
2016, http://tass.ru/obschestvo/2649277
The US Department of the Treasury, ‘Ukraine/Russia-related Sanctions’,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx
Tsentr zhurnalistskih issledovanii, ‘V Krymy sud zaochno arestoval lidera krymskih tatar Mustafu
Dzemileva’ [‘A Crimean court has arrested in absentia Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev’], Tsentr
zhurnalistskih issledovanii, 20 January 2016, http://investigator.org.ua/news/172316/
55
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Tyshchenko, Y., ed., Hromadianstvo, zemlia, ‘natsionalizatsiya vlasnosti’ v umovah okupatsiyi Krymu: deficyt
prav [Citizenship, land, ‘nationalisation of property’ under the occupation of Crimea: The rights deficit],
Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research, 2015.
Tyshchenko, Y., Smyrnov, O., eds., ‘Anneksovana’ osvita v tymchasovo okupovanomu Krymu [‘Annexed’
education in the temporarily occupied Crimea], Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research,
2015.
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Schorichna dopovid Upovnovazhenoho
Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukraiiny z prav liudyny pro stan doderzhannia ta zahystu prav i svobod liudyny i
hromadianyna [Annual report of Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation
of respect and protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms], Kyiv, 2015, p. 552.
Ukrainska Pravda, ‘V UPC KP vidbyrayut prymischennia soboru v centri Simferopolya’ [‘The UOC KP is
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UN General Assembly, Resolution 68/262 ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’ adopted on 27 March 2014.
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56
Annex 830
European Parliament Resolution of 12 May 2016 on the Crimean Tatars, 2016 O.J. C 76/27
European Parliament
2014-2019
TEXTS ADOPTED
P8_TA(2016)0218
Crimean Tatars
European Parliament resolution of 12 May 2016 on the Crimean Tatars
(2016/2692(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Eastern Partnership (EaP), Ukraine and the
Russian Federation,
– having regard to the reports of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea
conducted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM),
– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
– having regard to the European Council decisions of 21 March, 27 June and 16 July 2014
imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation as a follow-up to the illegal annexation of
Crimea,
– having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 entitled
‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’,
– having regard to the Freedom House report ‘Freedom in the World 2016’, which assesses
the state of political and civic freedoms in illegally annexed Crimea as ‘not free’,
– having regard to the ruling of the so-called Crimean Supreme Court of 26 April 2016,
which found the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People to be an extremist organisation and
banned its activity in the Crimean peninsula,
– having regard to the statements of the spokesperson for the Vice-President of the
Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
(VP/HR) of 14 April 2016 on suspension of Mejlis activities of the Crimean Tatars and of
26 April 2016 on the decision of the ‘Supreme Court’ of Crimea to ban Mejlis activities,
– having regard to the statement of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of
Europe of 26 April 2016 urging a reversal of the ban on the Mejlis, and to the statement of
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe of 26 April 2016 that the ban of Mejlis
risked targeting the Crimean Tatar community as a whole,
– having regard to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 and the Minsk Memorandum of
19 September 2014 on the implementation of a 12-point peace plan,
– having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Russian Federation has illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol and is
therefore an occupying state which has violated international law, including the UN
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine;
B. whereas the European Union and the international community have repeatedly voiced
their concern over the situation of human rights in the occupied territories and the
systematic persecution of those who do not recognise the new authorities; whereas these
so-called authorities have targeted the indigenous community of Crimean Tatars, a
majority of whom oppose the Russian takeover of the peninsula and boycotted the
so-called referendum on 16 March 2014; whereas Crimean Tatar institutions and
organisations are increasingly branded as ‘extremists’ and prominent members of the
Crimean Tatar community are, or risk, being arrested as ‘terrorists’; whereas the abuses
against Tatars include abduction, forced disappearance, violence, torture and extrajudicial
killings that the de facto authorities have failed to investigate and prosecute, as well as
systemic legal problems over property rights and registration;
C. whereas Crimean Tatar leaders, including Mustafa Dzhemilev and Rafat Chubarov, have
previously been banned from entering Crimea, and are now allowed to do so but under
threat of arrest – thus sharing the same fate as numerous other members of the Mejlis and
Crimean Tatar activists and displaced people; whereas more than 20 000 Crimean Tatars
have had to leave occupied Crimea and move to mainland Ukraine, according to data
provided by the Government of Ukraine;
D. whereas the leader of the Crimean Tatar people, Mustafa Dzhemilev, who earlier spent
15 years in Soviet prisons, has published a list of 14 Crimean Tatars who are political
prisoners of the so-called Russian authorities of Crimea, including Ahtem Çiygoz, the
First Deputy Chair of the Mejlis, who is being detained in Simferopol pending trial; calls
for particular attention to the state of his health and underlines the importance of his trial
being public and being monitored by the Council of Europe and other international
organisations;
E. whereas the Russian Federation has been restricting access to Crimea for the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN and the Council of Europe, not to
mention human rights NGOs and independent journalists; whereas the lack of access
makes human rights monitoring and reporting in Crimea very difficult;
F. whereas the entire population of Crimean Tatars, an indigenous people of Crimea, was
forcibly deported to other parts of the then USSR in 1944, with no right to return until
1989; whereas on 12 November 2015 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a
resolution in which it recognised the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 as
genocide and established 18 May as a Day of Remembrance;
G. whereas on 26 April 2016 the so-called Supreme Court of Crimea ruled in favour of a
request by the so-called Prosecutor-General of Crimea, Natalia Poklonskaya, accusing the
Mejlis, which had been the representative body of the Crimean Tatars since its
establishment in 1991 and had enjoyed full legal status since May 1999, of extremism,
terrorism, human rights violations, illegal actions and acts of sabotage against the
authorities;
H. whereas the Mejlis has now been declared an extremist organisation and included in the
Russian Justice Ministry’s list of NGOs whose activities must be suspended; whereas the
activities of the Mejlis have consequently been banned in Crimea and in Russia; whereas
this ban could apply to more than 2 500 members of 250 village and town mejlises in
Crimea;
I. whereas the decision of the so-called Prosecutor-General and so-called Supreme Court of
Crimea are intrinsic parts of the policy of repression and intimidation on the part of the
Russian Federation, which is punishing this minority for its loyalty towards the Ukrainian
state during the illegal annexation of the peninsula two years ago;
J. whereas there is a clear breach of international humanitarian law (including the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional
Protocol I thereto of 1977), under which an occupying power cannot prosecute civilians
for crimes occurring before the occupation and the penal laws of the occupied territory
shall remain in force;
1. Strongly condemns the decision of the so-called Supreme Court of Crimea to ban the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, and demands its immediate reversal; considers this
decision to constitute systemic and targeted persecution of the Crimean Tatars, and to be a
politically motivated action aimed at further intimidating the legitimate representatives of
the Tatar community; stresses the importance of this democratically elected
decision-making body representing the Crimean Tatar people;
2. Points out that the ban on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, which is the legitimate
and recognised representative body of the indigenous people of Crimea, will provide
fertile ground for stigmatising the Crimean Tatars, further discriminating against them and
violating their human rights and basic civil liberties, and is an attempt to expel them from
Crimea, which is their historical motherland; is concerned that the branding of the Mejlis
as an extremist organisation may lead to additional charges in accordance with provisions
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
3. Recalls that the banning of the Mejlis means that it will be prohibited from convening,
publishing its views in the mass media, holding public events or using bank accounts;
calls for the EU to provide financial support for the activities of the Mejlis while it is in
exile; calls for increased financing for human rights organisations working on behalf of
Crimea;
4. Recalls the sad second anniversary of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by
the Russian Federation on 20 February 2014; recalls its severe condemnation of that act,
which was in breach of international law; expresses its strong commitment to the policy of
non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea and to the sanctions imposed in the
aftermath thereof, and calls for consideration to be given to extending the list of people
targeted by EU sanctions in relation to the banning of the Mejlis; calls on all Member
States to adhere strictly to that list; regrets the visits to Crimea – organised without the
consent of the Ukrainian authorities – by some politicians from EU Member States,
including members of their national parliaments and of the European Parliament, and calls
on parliamentarians to refrain from such visits in the future;
5. Reconfirms its full commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and
territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and its free and
sovereign choice to pursue a European path; calls on all parties to immediately pursue
peaceful reintegration of the occupied Crimean peninsula into the Ukrainian legal order
through political dialogue and in full compliance with international law; believes that the
restoration of Ukrainian control over the peninsula is fundamental for the reestablishment
of cooperative relations with the Russian Federation, including the suspension of
Crimea-related sanctions;
6. Condemns the severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful
assembly, including at traditional commemorative events such as the anniversary of the
deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin’s totalitarian Soviet Union regime and at
cultural gatherings of the Crimean Tatars;
7. Condemns restrictions on free media in Crimea, in particular the withdrawal of the licence
of the largest Crimean Tatar television channel, ATR; calls for the reopening of that
channel and of the children’s television channel Lale and the radio station Meydan;
considers that these acts deprive the Crimean Tatar people of a vital instrument for
maintaining their cultural and linguistic identity; notes the establishment of the new
station TV Millet, and calls for its full editorial independence to be ensured;
8. Strongly regrets the systematic restrictions on freedom of expression on the pretext of
extremism, and the monitoring of social media with the aim of identifying activists who
do not recognise the new order and who criticise the validity of the ‘referendum’ held on
16 March 2014; recalls that a hundred UN General Assembly member states took the
same stance with the adoption of resolution 68/262;
9. Recalls that the indigenous Crimean Tatar people have suffered historic injustices which
led to their massive deportation by Soviet authorities and to the dispossession of their
lands and resources; regrets the fact that discriminatory policies applied by the so-called
authorities are preventing the return of these properties and resources, or are being used as
an instrument to buy support;
10. Urges the Russian Federation, which under international humanitarian law bears ultimate
responsibility as the occupying state in Crimea, to uphold the legal order in Crimea and
protect citizens from arbitrary judicial or administrative measures and rulings, thus
fulfilling its own commitments as a member of the Council of Europe, and to conduct
independent international investigations of any violations of international law or human
rights committed by the occupying forces and the so-called local authorities; calls for the
reactivation of the contact group for the families of disappeared persons;
11. Calls for permanent and unimpeded access to Crimea for the relevant international human
rights bodies, with the aim of monitoring the human rights situation;
12. Welcomes the Ukrainian initiative to establish an international negotiation mechanism in
the ‘Geneva Plus’ format for the re-establishment of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea,
which should include direct engagement by the EU; calls on the Russian Federation to
start negotiations with Ukraine and other parties on the de-occupation of Crimea, to lift
trade and energy embargos and to revoke the state of emergency in Crimea;
13. Calls for the preservation of the historical and traditional multicultural environment of
Crimea and for full respect for Ukrainian, Tatar and other minority languages and
distinctive cultures; condemns legal pressure on Crimean Tatar cultural and educational
organisations, including those dealing with Crimean Tatar children;
14. Calls on the Russian Federation to investigate all cases of torture of prisoners illegally
apprehended in Crimea, including Ahtem Çiygoz, the First Deputy Chair of the Mejlis,
Mustafa Degermendzhi and Ali Asanov, who were arrested in Crimea by the so-called
local authorities for their peaceful protest against the occupation, and to guarantee their
safe return to Ukraine; reiterates its call for the release of Oleg Sentsov and
Oleksandr Kolchenko; urges the Russian Federation to end the politically motivated
prosecution of dissidents and civic activists; condemns their subsequent transfer to the
Russian Federation and the forcible attribution of Russian citizenship; calls on the Russian
Federation to cooperate closely with the Council of Europe and the OSCE in the
abovementioned cases;
15. Calls on the European External Action Service and the Council to strengthen pressure on
the Russian Federation to allow international organisations access to Crimea for the
purpose of monitoring the human rights situation in view of the ongoing gross violations
of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the peninsula, and of establishing
permanent international monitoring and convention-based mechanisms; stresses that any
international presence on the ground should be well coordinated, agreed with Ukraine and
supported by the major international human rights organisations;
16. Reiterates its grave concern regarding the situation of LGBTI people in Crimea, which has
substantially worsened following the Russian annexation;
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the
Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the
President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the Council of Europe, the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the President, Government and
Parliament of the Russian Federation, and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.
Annex 831
International Criminal Court, Preliminary Examination: Ukraine, accessed at https://www.icccpi.
int/ukraine
Annex 832
The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982)
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The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75),
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, September 24, 1982, Inter-Am . Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982).
Requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Present:
Carlos Roberto Reina, President
Pedro Nikken, Vice President
Huntley Eugene Munroe, Judge
Máximo Cisneros, Judge
Rodolfo E. Piza E., Judge
Thomas Buergenthal, Judge
Also present:
Charles Moyer, Secretary
Manuel Ventura, Deputy Secretary
THE COURT, composed as above, gives the following Advisory Opinion:
1. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ( hereinafter cited as " the Commission " ), by a cable
dated June 28, 1982, requested an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
2. By notes dated July 2, 1982, the Secretary, in accordance with a decision of the Court acting pursuant to
Article 52 of its Rules of Procedure, requested observations of all of the Member States of the Organization of
American States as well as, through the Secretary General, of all of the organs referred to in Chapter X of the
Charter of the OAS.
3. The President of the Court fixed August 23, 1982 as the time-limit for the submission of written observations
or other relevant documents.
4. Responses to the Secretary's request were received from the following states: Costa Rica, Mexico, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines and the United States of America. In addition, the following OAS organs responded:
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the Permanent Council, the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the General Secretariat. The majority of the
responses included substantive observations on the issues raised in the advisory opinion.
5. Furthermore, the following organizations offered their points of view on the request as amici curiae: the
International Human Rights Law Group and the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights of the University of
Cincinnati College of Law.
6. The Court, meeting in its Sixth Regular Session, set a public hearing for Monday, September 20, 1982 to
receive the oral arguments that the Member States and the organs of the OAS might wish to give regarding the
request for the advisory opinion.
7. In the course of the public hearing, oral arguments were addressed to the Court by the following
representatives:
For the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Delegate and President
For Costa Rica:
Manuel Freer Jimenez, Adviser and Procurador of the Republic.
8. The Commission submitted the following question to the Court:
"From what moment is a state deemed to have become a party to the American Convention on Human
Rights when it ratifies or adheres to the Convention with one or more reservations; from the date of the
deposit of instrument of ratification or adherence or upon the termination of the period specified in Article
20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?"
9. The Commission notes that its request calls for the interpretation of Articles 74 and 75 of the American
Convention on Human Rights ( hereinafter cited as " the Convention " ). It submits, in this connection, that the
issue presented to the Court falls within the Commission's sphere of competence, as that phrase is used in Article
64 of the Convention. To substantiate this contention, the Commission points to the power vested in it by
Articles 33, 41 ( f ), and 44 through 51 of the Convention as well as in Articles 1, 19 and 20 of the Statute of the
Commission. The Commission emphasizes that in order to be able to exercise its functions, it must distinguish
between States that are parties to the Convention and those that are not.
10. Articles 74 and 75 of the Convention read as follows:
"Article 74.-
1. This Convention shall be open for signature and ratification by or adherence of any member state
of the Organization of American States.
2. Ratification of or adherence to this Convention shall be made by the deposit of an instrument of
ratification or adherence with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. As
soon as eleven states have deposited their instruments of ratification or adherence, the Convention
shall enter into force. With respect to any state that ratifies or adheres thereafter, the Convention
shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or adherence.
3. The Secretary General shall inform all member states of the Organization of the entry into force
of the Convention.
Article 75.-
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This Convention shall be subject to reservations only in conformity with the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969."
11. In addressing the request of the Commission, the Court must resolve a number of preliminary issues bearing
on it. One of them has to do with the question whether the Court is at all competent to hear this request,
considering that the Secretary General of the OAS has been assigned depositary functions relating to this
Convention ( see Arts. 74, 76, 78, 79 and 81 ), and considering further that, in the practice of the OAS, disputes
concerning ratification of treaties, their entry into force, reservations attached to them, etc., have been dealt with
traditionally through consultation between the Secretary General and the Member States. ( See " Standards on
Reservations to Inter-American Multilateral Treaties, " OAS/AG/RES. 102 ( III-0/73 ). See also, M.G. Monroy
Cabra, Derecho de los Tratados at 58-72 ( Bogota, Colombia, 1978 ); J.M. Ruda, " Reservations to Treaties, "
146 Recueil des Cours 95, at 128 ( 1973 ). )
12. The Court has no doubt whatsoever that it is competent to render the advisory opinion requested by the
Commission. Article 64 of the Convention is clear and explicit in empowering the Court to render advisory
opinions " regarding the interpretation of this Convention, " which is precisely what the Commission's request
seeks to obtain. Moreover, Article 2 ( 2 ) of the Statute of the Court, which was approved by the General
Assembly of the OAS at the Ninth Regular Session in October 1979, declares that the Court's " advisory
jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Article 64 of the Convention. "
13. It must be emphasized also that, unlike other treaties of which the Secretary General of the OAS is the
depositary, the Convention establishes a formal judicial supervisory process for the adjudication of disputes
arising under that instrument and for its interpretation. The Court's competence in this regard finds expression
not only in the language of Articles 62, 63, 64, 67 and 68, but also in Article 33 ( b ), which confers on the Court
" competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to
this Convention. " This competence is reinforced by Article 1 of the Court's Statute, which declares that the
Court is an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the American
Convention on Human Rights. It is thus readily apparent that the Court has competence to render an
authoritative interpretation of all provisions of the Convention, including those relating to its entry into force,
and that the Court is the most appropriate body to do so.
14. It must be determined next whether the Commission has standing to request the particular advisory opinion it
has asked the Court to render. In this regard, the Court notes that the Convention, in conferring the right to
request advisory opinions, distinguishes between Member States of the OAS and organs of the Organization.
Under Article 64 all OAS Member States, whether or not they have ratified the Convention, have standing to
seek an advisory opinion " regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states. " OAS organs enjoy the same right, but only " within their
spheres of competence. " Thus, while OAS Member States have an absolute right to seek advisory opinions,
OAS organs may do so only within the limits of their competence. The right of OAS organs to seek advisory
opinions is restricted consequently to issues in which such entities have a legitimate institutional interest. While
it is initially for each organ to decide whether the request falls within its spheres of competence, the question is,
ultimately, one for this Court to determine by reference to the OAS Charter and the constitutive instrument and
legal practice of the particular organ.
15. With reference to the instant request, the Court notes, first, that the Commission is one of the organs listed in
Chapter X of the OAS Charter ( OAS Charter, Art. 51( e ) ). Moreover, the powers conferred on the Commission
qua organ of the OAS are spelled out in Article 112 of the OAS Charter, which reads as follows:
"There shall be an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall be to
promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the
Organization in these matters.
An Inter-American Convention on Human Rights shall determine the structure, competence, and
procedure of this Commission, as well as those of other organs responsible for these matters."
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Finally, Articles 33, 41 and 44 through 51 of the Convention, and Articles 1, 19 and 20 of the Statute of the
Commission confer upon it extensive powers. The Commission's competence to exercise these powers depends,
in part, on a prior determination whether it is dealing with a State which either has or has not ratified the
Convention. Article 112 of the OAS Charter, Article 41 of the Convention, and Articles 1, 18 and 20 of its
Statute empower the Commission " to promote the observance and defense of human rights " and to serve " as a
consultative organ of the Organization in this matter. " The Commission exercises these powers in relation to all
OAS Member States, whether or not they have ratified the Convention; it has even more specific and more
extensive powers in relation to the States Parties to the Convention. ( Convention, Arts. 33, 41( f ) and 44-51;
Statute of the Commission, Art. 19. )
16. It is obvious, therefore, that the Commission has a legitimate institutional interest in a question, such as the
one that it presented, which relates to the entry into force of the Convention. The Court accordingly holds that
the requested advisory opinion falls within the Commission's sphere of competence. Furthermore, given the
broad powers relating to the promotion and observance of human rights which Article 112 of the OAS Charter
confers on the Commission, the Court observes that, unlike some other OAS organs, the Commission enjoys, as
a practical matter, an absolute right to request advisory opinions within the framework of Article 64 ( 1 ) of the
Convention.
17. Having resolved these preliminary issues, the Court is now in a position to address the specific question
submitted to it by the Commission, which wishes to know when the Convention is deemed to enter into force for
a State that ratifies or adheres to the Convention with a reservation.
18. In answering this question, the Court notes that two provisions of the Convention provide a starting point for
its inquiry. The first is Article 74( 2 ), which reads as follows:
"Ratification of or adherence to this Convention shall be made by the deposit of an instrument of
ratification or adherence with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. As soon as
eleven states have deposited their instruments of ratification or adherence, the Convention shall enter into
force. With respect to any state that ratifies or adheres thereafter, the Convention shall enter into force on
the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or adherence."
The second provision is Article 75. It declares that:
"This Convention shall be subject to reservations only in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969."
19. The language of Article 74( 2 ) is silent on the issue whether it applies exclusively to ratifications and
adherences which contain no reservations or whether it also applies to those with reservations. Furthermore,
whether and to what extent Article 75 helps to resolve the question before the Court can be answered only
following an analysis of that stipulation as well as of other relevant provisions of the Convention in their context
and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention ( Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
hereinafter cited as " Vienna Convention, " Art. 31 ) and, where necessary, by reference to its drafting history. (
Vienna Convention, Art. 32. ) Moreover, given the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention, the Court
must also examine the relevant provisions of that instrument.
20. The reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention raises almost as many questions as it answers. The
provisions of that instrument dealing with reservations provide for the application of different rules to different
categories of treaties. It must be determined, therefore, how the Convention is to be classified for purposes of the
here relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention, keeping in mind the language of Article 75 and the purpose it
was designed to serve.
21. The provisions of the Vienna Convention that bear on the question presented by the Commission read as
follows:
"Article 19.- Formulation of reservations
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A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless:
a ) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
b ) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in
question, may be made; or
c ) in cases not falling under subparagraphs ( a ) and ( b ), the reservation is incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty.
Article 20.- Acceptance of an objection to reservations
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the
other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of a
treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition
of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the
parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise
provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides.
a ) acceptance of another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State a
party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force for those
States;
b ) an objection of another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into
force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is
definitely expressed by the objecting State;
c ) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is
effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.
5. For the purpose of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is
considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by
the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which
it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later."
22. Turning first to Article 19, the Court concludes that the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention was
intended to be a reference to paragraph ( c ) of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention. Paragraphs ( a ) and ( b )
are inapplicable on their face since the Convention does not prohibit reservations and since it does not specify
the permissible reservations. It follows that Article 75 must be deemed to permit States to ratify or adhere to the
Convention with whatever reservations they wish to make, provided only that such reservations are not "
incompatible with the object and purpose " of the Convention.
23. The foregoing interpretation of Article 75 is confirmed by the preparatory work of the Convention, which
indicates that its drafters wished to provide for a flexible reservations policy. As is well known, the Convention
was adopted at the Specialized Inter-American Conference on Human Rights, which met in San José, Costa
Rica, from November 7 to 22, 1969. ( The proceedings and documents of this Conference are contained in
Conferencia Especializada Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos, San José, Costa Rica, 7-22 de noviembre
de 1969, Actas y Documentos, OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.2, Washington, D.C. 1973 ( hereinafter cited as " Actas y
Documentos " ). ) The San Jose Conference had before it, as its basic working document, the Draft Inter6/
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American Convention on Human Rights, prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ( The
Spanish text of the draft is reproduced in Actas y Documentos at 13; the English text can be found in 1968 Inter-
American Yearbook on Human Rights at 389 ( 1973 ). ) Article 67 of this text dealt with reservations and read as
follows:
"1. Any State Party, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of or adherence to this
Convention, may make a reservation if a constitutional provision in force in its territory should be contrary
to any provision of this Convention. Every reservation should be accompanied by the text of the
constitutional provision referred to.
2. A provision that has been the subject of a reservation shall not be in force between the reserving state
and other States Parties. In order for the reservation to have this effect, it shall not be necessary for the
other States Parties to accept it."
24. Already in their preliminary comments on the Draft Convention, a number of governments found Draft
Article 67 too restrictive. The clearest articulation of this view can be found in the following statement
submitted by the Government of Argentina;
"Article 67, paragraph 1. The system of reservations established in this Article is based exclusively on the
existence of contrary constitutional provisions of the State making the reservation, and is not acceptable,
since it restricts the sovereign power of the States to make the reservations.
It is accordingly suggested, as more desirable, to have a broader formula similar to that contained in
Article 86 of the draft prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurists, according to which there is a
right to make a reservation if a constitutional or legal provision in force in the State concerned is contrary
to a provision of the Convention.
Article 67, paragraph 2. The elimination of this paragraph is suggested since it departs from the system
provided for in the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties recently prepared in Vienna ( United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, April 22 to May 24, 1968 ). In the proposed Article 67, " acceptance "
is eliminated as an element of the system and it is proposed that the reservation operate between the "
reserving State and the other States Parties " from the very time it is formulated.
It does not appear wise to make innovations in this difficult subject when a worldwide conference has
prepared a different system and, moreover, one that is more suited to international practice and
jurisprudence. ( Actas y Documentos at 48. )"
25. Similar views were expressed by other Governments, either in their official comments or in their
interventions at the Conference. Like Argentina, a number of States also sought to amend Draft Article 67 by
adding the words " and legal " after " constitutional. " This effort, which would have significantly liberalized the
right to make reservations, obtained the approval of the Working Group of Committee II of the San Jose
Conference, but was defeated subsequently in Committee II because it was deemed to conflict with Article 1 ( 2
) of the Draft Convention, now Article 2 of the Convention. ( Actas y Documentos at 365-66 and 379. ) The
earlier attempt by the U.S. Delegation to substitute a reference to the Vienna Convention for the disputed
provision failed in the Working Group ( Actas y Documentos at 379 ) but succeeded at the third plenary meeting
of the Conference, where the present text of Article 75 was adopted on the motion of Uruguay. ( Actas y
Documentos at 459. ) In short, it is impossible to read the drafting history of the Convention without recognizing
that the primary purpose of the reference to the Vienna Convention in Article 75 was to provide for a system that
would be very liberal in permitting States to adhere to the Convention with reservations.
26. Having concluded that States ratifying or adhering to the Convention may do so with any reservations that
are not incompatible with its object and purpose, the Court must now determine which provisions of Article 20
of the Vienna Convention apply to reservations made to the Convention. The result of this inquiry will of
necessity also provide the answer to the question posed by the Commission. This is so because, if under the
Vienna Convention reservations to the Convention are not deemed to require acceptance by the other States
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Parties, then for the here relevant purposes Article 74 of the Convention applies and a State ratifying or adhering
to it with or without a reservation is deemed to be a State Party as of the date of the deposit of the instrument of
ratification or adherence. ( Vienna Convention, Art. 20 ( 1 ). ) On the other hand, if acceptance of the reservation
is required under the Vienna Convention, a reserving State would be deemed to become a State Party only on the
date when at least one other State Party has accepted the reservation either expressly or by implication. ( Vienna
Convention, Arts. 20 ( 4 )( c ) and 20 ( 5 ). )
27. In the opinion of the Court, only paragraph 1 or paragraph 4 of Article 20 of the Vienna Convention can be
deemed to be relevant in applying Articles 74 and 75 of the Convention. Paragraph 2 of Article 20 is
inapplicable, inter alia, because the object and purpose of the Convention is not the exchange of reciprocal rights
between a limited number of States, but the protection of the human rights of all individual human beings within
the Americas, irrespective of their nationality. Moreover, the Convention is not the constituent instrument of an
international organization. Therefore, Article 20 ( 3 ) is inapplicable.
28. In deciding whether the Convention envisages the application of paragraph 1 or paragraph 4 of Article 20 of
the Vienna Convention, the Court notes that the principles enunciated in Article 20 ( 4 ) reflect the needs of
traditional multilateral international agreements which have as their object the reciprocal exchange, for the
mutual benefit of the States Parties, of bargained for rights and obligations. In this context, and given the vastly
increased number of States comprising the international community today, the system established by Article 20 (
4 ) makes considerable sense. It permits States to ratify many multilateral treaties and to do so with the
reservations they deem necessary; it enables the other contracting States to accept or reject the reservations and
to determine whether they wish to enter into treaty relations with the reserving State; and it provides that as soon
as at least one other State Party has accepted the reservation, the treaty enters into force with respect to the
reserving State.
29. The Court must emphasize, however, that modern human rights treaties in general, and the American
Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the
reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against the State
of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be
deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various
obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction. The distinct
character of these treaties has been recognized, inter alia, by the European Commission on Human Rights, when
it declared
"that the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the European Convention are
essentially of an objective character, being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual
human beings from infringements by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and
reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves. ( Austria vs Italy, Application No. 788/60, 4
European Yearbook of Human Rights 116, at 140 ( 1961 ). )"
The European Commission, relying on the preamble to the European Convention emphasized, furthermore,
"that the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to concede to each
other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national interests but to realize the
aims and ideals of the Council of Europe...and to establish a common public order of the free democracies
of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideas, freedom and
the rule of law. ( Ibid. at 138. )"
30. Similar views about the nature of modern humanitarian treaties have been enunciated by the International
Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide ( 1951 I.C.J. 15 ). They find expression also in the Vienna Convention itself, particularly
in Article 60 ( 5 ). ( See generally E. Schwelb, " The Law of Treaties and Human Rights, " 16 Archiv des
Volkerrechts 1 ( 1973 ), reprinted in Toward World Order and Human Dignity at 262 ( W.M. Reisman & B.
Weston, eds. 1976 ). )
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31. These views about the distinct character of humanitarian treaties and the consequences to be drawn
therefrom apply with even greater force to the American Convention whose first two preambular paragraphs
read as follows:
"Reaffirming their intention to consolidate in this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic
institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man;
Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state,
but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore justify international
protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the
domestic law of the American states."
32. It must be emphasized also that the Convention, unlike other international human rights treaties, including
the European Convention, confers on private parties the right to file a petition with the Commission against any
State as soon as it has ratified the Convention. ( Convention, Art. 44. ) By contrast, before one State may
institute proceedings against another State, each of them must have accepted the Commission's jurisdiction to
deal with inter-State communications. ( Convention, Art. 45. ) This structure indicates the overriding importance
the Convention attaches to the commitments of the States Parties vis-a-vis individuals, which can be readily
implemented without the intervention of any other State.
33. Viewed in this light and considering that the Convention was designed to protect the basic rights of
individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, against States of their own nationality or any other
State Party, the Convention must be seen for what in reality it is; a multilateral legal instrument or framework
enabling States to make binding unilateral commitments not to violate the human rights of individuals within
their jurisdiction.
34. In this context, it would be manifestly unreasonable to conclude that the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna
Convention compels the application of the legal regime established by Article 20 ( 4 ), which makes the entry
into force of a ratification with a reservation dependent upon its acceptance by another State. A treaty which
attaches such great importance to the protection of the individual that it makes the right of individual petition
mandatory as of the moment of ratification, can hardly be deemed to have intended to delay the treaty's entry
into force until at least one other State is prepared to accept the reserving State as a party. Given the institutional
and normative framework of the Convention, no useful purpose would be served by such a delay.
35. Accordingly, for the purpose of the present analysis, the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention
makes sense only if it is understood as an express authorization designed to enable States to make whatever
reservations they deem appropriate, provided the reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty. As such, they can be said to be governed by Article 20 ( 1 ) of the Vienna Convention and,
consequently, do not require acceptance by any other State Party.
36. The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 20 ( 1 ), in speaking of " a reservation expressly authorized
by a treaty, " is not by its terms limited to specific reservations. A treaty may expressly authorize one or more
specific reservations or reservations in general. If it does the latter, which is what the Court has concluded to be
true of the Convention, the resultant reservations, having been thus expressly authorized, need not be treated
differently from expressly authorized specific reservations. The Court wishes to emphasize, in this connection,
that unlike Article 19 ( b ), which refers to " special reservations, " Article 20 ( 1 ) contains no such restrictive
language, and therefore permits the interpretation of Article 75 of the Convention adopted in this opinion.
37. Having concluded that reservations expressly authorized by Article 75, that is, reservations compatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention, do not require acceptance by the States Parties, the Court is of the
opinion that the instruments of ratification or adherence containing them enter into force, pursuant to Article 74,
as of the moment of their deposit.
38. The States Parties have a legitimate interest, of course, in barring reservations incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention. They are free to assert that interest through the adjudicatory and advisory
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machinery established by the Convention. They have no interest in delaying the entry into force of the
Convention and with it the protection that treaty is designed to offer individuals in relation to States ratifying or
adhering to the Convention with reservations.
39. Since the instant case concerns only questions bearing on the entry into force of the Convention, the Court
does not deem it necessary to deal with other issues that might arise in the future in connection with the
interpretation and application of Article 75 of the Convention and which, in turn, might require the Court to
examine the provisions of the Vienna Convention applicable to reservations not treated in this opinion.
40. For these reasons, with regard to the interpretation of Articles 74 and 75 of the American Convention on
Human Rights concerning the effective date of the entry into force of the Convention in relation to a State which
ratifies or adheres to it with one or more reservations,
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION
"By unanimous vote, that the Convention enters into force for a State which ratifies or adheres to it with or
without a reservation on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or adherence.
Done in English and Spanish, the English text being authentic, at the seat of the Court in San Jose, Costa
Rica, this 24th day of September, 1982."
CARLOS ROBERTO REINA
PRESIDENT
PEDRO NIKKEN
HUNTLEY EUGENE MUNROE
MAXIMO CISNEROS
RODOLFO E. PIZA E.
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL
CHARLES MOYER
SECRETARY
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Annex 833
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 4413 to Ukraine (25 April 2016)
No. 4413-H/дснг
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its compliments to the
Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and in response to the diplomatic note of the MFA No. 72/22-
194/510-839 of April 5, 2016, has the honour to inform the following.
The Russian Side confirms its position, expressed by the Ukrainian [Russian] Side in the
notes No. 14279/2дснг of October 16, 2014, No. 15642/2дснг of November 27, 2014, No.
17004/2дснг of December 8, 2014, No. 2697-н/дспч of March 11, 2015, No. 3962-н/дспч of
April 1, 2015, No. 4192-н/дспч of April 6, 2015, No. 8761-н/дспч of July 9, 2015, No. 11812-
н/дспч of September 28, 2015, specifically with the reference to the above-mentioned note of
September 28, 2015, reminds once again to the Ukrainian Side that unilateral interpretation by
the Ukrainian Side of the consultations between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations
concerning issues related to the International Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination is inconsistent with the generally recognized international practice.
The Russian Side also urges the Ukrainian Side to provide to the Russian Side more
specific information and refrain from vague summaries, including references to “and others,”
“other activities,” etc.
This approach does not contribute to constructive and good faith considerations of the
issues that may be relevant to the protection of fundamental rights and legitimate interests of
persons, entitled to the protection under the International Convention on Elimination of all forms
of Racial Discrimination.
The Russian Federation reaffirms its commitment to rigorous implementation of the
provisions of the 1965 International Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination and emphasizes its readiness to continue consultations with the Ukrainian Side
concerning issues related to the application of the Convention with a view to the preeminent
protection of the rights and legitimate interests of persons, entitled to the protection under the
Convention. Due to the fact that the subject discussion of the issues concerning application of
the Convention requires participation of the interagency delegation as well as taking into account
of earlier planned international events relating to human rights topics, the Russian Side suggests
to the Ukrainian Side to hold the consultations on May 31, 2016, in Minsk, the Belarus Republic.
The Russian Side referencing to the previously held consultations in April 8, 2015, on
Minsk, the Belarus Republic, and in lights of issues raised by the Ukrainian Side in its diplomatic
note #72/22-194/510-839 of April 5, 2016, believes that the agenda for the upcoming
consultations could be the following:
- the general framework of interpretation and application of the 1965 International
Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, including a potential exchange
of good practice for the highest level of protection of rights and legitimate interests of persons
entitled to the protection under the Convention;
- issues of human rights protection of individuals belonging to national minorities,
specifically focusing on those living in the Crimean Peninsula, under the Convention during
1992-2013;
- compliance by the Russian Federation and Ukraine with their obligations under the
Convention;
- exchange of information regarding the acts which have taken or may have taken place
in the territory of the Russian Federation or Ukraine and which may be described by the Parities
as acts of racial discrimination as defined in the Convention;
- exchange of information regarding certain events which are related to compliance with
the obligations by Ukraine and the Russian Federation under the Convention and were discussed
during the consultation on April 8, 2015.
The Russian Side confirms its readiness to provide additional information in response to
the Ukrainian Side questions and expects to hear from the Ukrainian Side responses to the
information provided by the Russian Side during the consultations on April 8, 2016, in Minsk,
the Belarus Republic, concerning certain facts related to Ukraine’s obligations under the
Convention. A part of these facts was provided to the Ukrainian Side in the note No. 8761-
н/дгпч of July 9, 2015.
The Ministry notes that the abovementioned shall be without prejudice to the position of
the Russian Side concerning statements and claims of the Ukrainian Side, raised in the
diplomatic correspondence and to the question on whether the issues raised falls under
provisions of the Convention.
The Ministry avails of this opportunity to renew to the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow its
assurances of its highest consideration.
April 25, 2016
Annex 834
Letter from ATR Holdings to Federal Service for Communications, Information, Technologies,
and Mass Communications, dated 12 February 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
[Stamp: ROSKOMNADZOR
Feb 12, 2015
Date of receipt of document]
TK ATLANT-SV LLC
14 Ul. Mamedi Emir-Useina
Simferopol, Republic of Crimea 295049
(+38 0652) 55555-1
[email protected], www.atr.ua
Volkov, V.R.
[illegible]
ATR [logo]
Date 2/12/2015
No. 35
in resp. to No.
of
Deputy Head
Federal Service for
Communications, Information
Technologies, and Mass
Communications
(ROSKOMNADZOR)
Ksenzov, M/YU.
Dear Maxim Yuryevich,
In a January 28, 2015 telephone call beforehand, an appointment was made with you for February
12, 2015 for 5 pm, in the building of the Federal Service for Communications, Information Technologies,
and Mass Communications, for General Director E.R. Islyamova and the head of the legal support
division, E.E. Gaffarov, who represent the interests of such Republic of Crimea television-and-radio
broadcasters as Atlant-SV LLC Television Channel (ATR T Television Channel and Meydan Radio
Channel), TSENTR LLC Television and Radio Company (Lider [Leader] Radio Channel), and LYALYE
LLC Children’s Television Channel (the television channel “Lyalye” in translation from Crimean Tatar is
“Tulip”).
On February 10, 2015, at 6:08 pm, a telephone call from telephone number +74959876800 came
to the telephone of the head of the legal support division, E.E. Gaffarov, and the caller said they were
calling from the reception desk of the deputy head of ROSKOMNADZOR, A.Yu. Ksenzov, and the
message being relayed was that, because of your heavy workload, the appointment with the above-named
individuals, as well as with all who had appointments for the time slot of 5–7 pm on February 12, 2015,
was being postponed indefinitely.
At that appointment, we had planned on speaking with you about the difficulties we had
encountered in registering those television-and-radio broadcasters in the legal field of the Russian
Federation as mass media outlets and with regard to allowing the applications of Atlant-SV LLC
Television Channel (Meydan Radio Channel) and TSENTR LLC Television and Radio Company (Leader
Radio Channel to participate in competitions Nos. 1, 5, 9, 16, and 22, which were scheduled by
Roskomnadzor for February 25, 2015.
Thus, after completion of the re-registration of the above-named television-and-radio
broadcasters under Russian Federation law and our numerous assurances in the territorial offices of
Roskomnadzor of our intentions to broadcast and subsequently use the television-and-radio frequencies
occupied, and with the receipt of Notice Nos. 2153/91 and 2154/91 of the possibility of the issuance of
licenses to perform communication services for purposes of broadcasting, we, from October 2014 to the
present day have filed on repeated occasions, and continue to file, applications, with the relevant
documents attached, for registering as mass media outlets, which applications, for whatever reasons, are
being returned without consideration.
I would like to note that the overall goal of the aforementioned television-and-radio broadcasters,
which have, in their years of broadcasting in the Republic of Crimea and beyond its borders, enjoyed
well-deserved authority and respect, has always been, is, and will be their work as mass media to
strengthen interethnic and interfaith harmony and peace in Crimea and to develop good-neighborly and
tolerant relations both among the residents and with guests of the Republic of Crimea, regardless of their
ethnic, religious, racial, sexual, social, language, or other affiliation.
On the basis of the above, we petition you to provide assistance in registering Atlant-SV LLC
Television Channel (ATR T Television Channel and Meydan Radio Channel), TSENTR LLC Television
and Radio Company (Leader Radio Channel), and LYALYE LLC Children’s Television Channel (Lyalye
Television Channel) as mass media outlets, and we ask that Atlant-SV LLC Television Channel (Meydan
Radio Channel) and TSENTR LLC Television and Radio Company (Leader Radio Channel) be allowed
to participate in the competitions Nos. 1, 5, 9, 16, and 22 or that the competitions be cancelled.
Respectfully,
General Director
[Signature] E.R. Islyamova
Prepared by Gaffarov E.E.
+79788333778
Annex 835
Letter from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation to Mr. Lenur Islyamov of ATR
Television Channel, dated 16 May 2014
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
21, Sevastopolskaya Street, Simferopol,
295015
No. 27-271-14 of May 16, 2014
Attn: Mr. Lenur Emedovich Islyamov,
founder of Atlant-SV Television Company
LLC (ATR TV Channel, ATR T)
NOTICE
about inadmissibility of violations of the
law on countering of extremist activity
and the law on the mass media
On May 3, 2014, an unauthorized meeting was staged at the Armyansk (Turetskiy
Val) state border crossing point of the Russian Federation and in the territory adjacent to it.
The meeting was staged to welcome Ukrainian Parliament Member M.A. Dzhemilev by
some 1,500 ethnic Crimean Tatars and was accompanied by the use of violence against
representatives of the authorities, illegal crossing of the state border of the Russian
Federation, and other unlawful activity.
Representatives of Atlant-SV Television Company LLC (ATR TV Channel, ATR T) were
filming the events unfolding at the site of this criminal activity that had the potential to
incite public disturbances. As a result, the TV channel aired video footage of the
unauthorized meeting, during which individual meeting participants were heard making
statements that incited criminal (including extremist) activity. Such actions of the mass
media outlet (which covers a wide audience) involving public broadcasting of statements
that incited ethnic strife and other forms of conflicts may exhibit attributes of extremist
activity under Article 1 of the Federal Law on Countering of Extremist Activity. This Federal
Law prohibits the distribution of extremist materials via the mass media and forbids
extremist activity on the part of the mass media.
No. AB 003347
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea
No. ISORG-27-271-14
Moreover, under Part 1 of Article 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Mass Media ,
it is prohibited to use the mass media for the commission of acts that carry a criminal
penalty, distribute extremist or other related materials.
In preparing their programming and subsequently airing their broadcasts, the mass media
must disregard the repeated statements of an extremist nature on the part of M.A.
Dzhemilev and other individuals to the effect that there is no alternative way other than to
liberate Crimea from representatives of the Russian ethnic group, that the Mejlis supports
people who shout anti-occupation slogans during events and manifest aggression toward
the flag of the Russian Federation.
Moreover, according to Republic of Crimea Council of Ministers Resolution No. 332-r of April
22, 2014 On Activities to Commemorate the Memorial Day of Victims of Deportation from
Crimea (with the relevant appendices), L.E. Islyamov is not only a member (deputy
chairman) of the Organizing Committee tasked with preparing and holding said activities
but is also the only person tasked with monitoring the implementation of this resolution.
And yet he permitted entertainment and mourning events to take place in the immediate
vicinity, which could provoke conflicts between participants or other unauthorized public
events. For example, a concert of the Russian band Kipelov has been organized under the
auspices of the ATR television channel on May 17 of this year beginning at 6 p.m. at the
Crimean Academic Ukrainian Musical Theater (Lenin Square, Simferopol). Meanwhile, the
Organizing Committee on Preparation and Staging of Events to Commemorate the
Memorial Day of Victims of Deportation from Crimea scheduled (with the participation of
L.E. Islyamov) a mournful youth event called Light a Fire in Your Heart on the same day in
Lenin Square, Simferopol. A mournful event of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People is
scheduled for May 17, 2014 between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m. to be attended by at least 5,000
- 6,000 people.
These actions, specifically the organization of a rock concert to be attended by a large
number of fans of different beliefs along with the staging of mournful events to
commemorate the 70th anniversary of deportation from Crimea can potentially become a
provocation resulting in public disturbances, manifestations of extremism, endangering the
lives and health of citizens, and bringing about other adverse consequences.
Events in neighboring regions of southeastern Ukraine as well as numerous statements
issued by Mejlis leaders indicate a potential spike in the crime rate, continued
destabilization of inter-ethnic relations, and possible provocations on that day.
Note that prosecutorial agencies are receiving petitions from citizens who fear that
inter-ethnic relations might take a turn for the worse and call for appropriate measures to
contain the situation.
In light of the foregoing and guided by Articles 22, 25.1 of the Federal Law on the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation , Article 6 of the Federal Law on Countering of
Extremist Activity , with a view to preventing violations of the law,
I HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE
the founder of the Atlant-SV Television Company LLC (ATR TV Channel, ATR T), Lenur
Edemovich Islyamov, about the inadmissibility of extremist activity, violations of the
Federal Law on Countering of Extremist Activity , and the Law of the Russian Federation on
the Mass Media.
If the requirements presented in this notice are not complied with, the offender may be
prosecuted in the manner prescribed by law.
Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea
Senior Councilor of Justice [Signature] N.V. Poklonskaya
I have been put on notice: __________________________________________
Volume XXII - Annexes 800-835