INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XII OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 435 Resolution No. 1656-6 /14 (27 February 2014)
Annex 436 Rosfinmonitoring Functions, Federal Financial Monitoring Service (19
September 2017)
Annex 437 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report (2016)
Annex 438 Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, No. 1 of 9 February 2012, “On Some Aspects of Judicial
Practice Relating to Criminal Cases on Crimes of Terrorist Nature,”
Annex 439 Powers of the Russian Minister of Defense, Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation (19 January 2011)
Annex 440 Federal Law “On Combatting Terrorism” (6 March 2006)
Annex 441 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Captives Describe Brutal Beatings (5
May 2014)
Annex 442 Eliot Higgins, Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing
of MH17, bell¿ngcat (17 July 2014)
Annex 443 Eliot Higgins, Identifying the Location of the MH17 Linked Missile
Launcher from One Photograph, bell¿ngcat (18 July 2014)
Annex 444 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians
(Aug. 28, 2014)
Annex 445 Magnitsky, Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside
Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops, BELL¿NGCAT (8 September
2014)
Annex 446 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A
Bellingcat Investigation, BELL¿NGCAT (8 November 2014)
Annex 447 International Crisis Group, Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter,
Europe Report No. 235 (18 December 2014)
Annex 448 The Atlantic Council, Hiding in Plain Sight (2015)
Annex 449 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: More Civilians Killed in Cluster
Munition Attacks (19 March 2015)
Annex 450 James Miller, Pierre Vaux, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick & Michael Weiss, An
Invasion By Any Other Name (September 2015)
Annex 451 Daniel Romein, MH17 Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd
Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, bell¿ngcat (23 February 2016)
Annex 452 Bellingcat Investigation Team, The Lost Digit: Buk 3x2, bell¿ngcat (3
May 2016)
Annex 453 Bellingcat Investigation Team, New Google Earth Satellite Update
Confirms Presence of Buk in Eastern Ukraine, bell¿ngcat (22 June 2016)
Annex 454 International Partnership for Human Rights, Attacks on Civilian
Infrastructure in Eastern Ukraine (2017)
Annex 435
Resolution No. 1656-6 /14 (27 February 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
Annex 436
Rosfinmonitoring Functions, Federal Financial Monitoring Service (19 September 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
9/18/2017 Rosfinmonitoring functions
http://www.fedsfm.ru/en/about/rosfinmonitoring-powers 1/2
Tuesday, September 19, 2017 Rus
Legal Basis International cooperation News Financial Security Magazine Contacts
Pursuant to the Regulations on the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, approved by Presidential
Decree No. 808 dated June 13, 2012, the functions of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service are as
follows:
• • submit draft versions of federal laws, presidential and government acts and other documents
concerning its activities to the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian
Federation for consideration;
• issue regulations concerning its activities;
• laws;
• verify the information on transactions with monetary funds or other assets, including by request of
additional customer transaction data from organizations and entities carrying out transactions with
monetary funds or other assets in accordance with the established procedure, as well as information
about account (deposit) activity of credit institutions' customers;
• identify indicators of potential money laundering and terrorist financing activity in transactions with
monetary funds or other assets;
• exercise control over transactions with monetary funds or other assets in accordance with applicable
Russian laws and regulations;
• receive, including in response to requests, from the federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power
of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local government bodies and the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation the information concerning its activities, except for private personal data;
• assess the threats to national security posed by money laundering and terrorist financing and submit
the annual report on such threats and measures to neutralize them to the President of the Russian
Federation;
• keep a record of organizations carrying out transactions with monetary funds or other assets without
having a designated oversight body in the main field of activities;
• • prepare and implement measures aimed at the prevention of violations of Russia's legislation governing
the combating of money laundering and terrorist financing;
• coordinate activities of the federal bodies of executive power in areas within its purview;
• work closely with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on the issues within its purview;
• • purview;
• regulations;
• create a unified information system to cover the designated field of its activities;
• create and maintain the federal database and ensure the methodological unity and coordinated
functioning of the information systems existing in the areas of its activity;
• ensure an adequate storage and protection mode for data constituting a state, service, banking, tax,
commercial or communication secret, as well as any other confidential information obtained in the course
of its activities;
Rosfinmonitoring management and structure
Rosfinmonitoring functions
Activity reports
The International Training and Methodology
Center for Financial Monitoring
Home / About Rosfinmonitoring / Rosfinmonitoring functions
Rosfinmonitoring functions
monitor legal entities’ and individuals’ compliance with Russia's anti-money laundering and terrorist
financing legislation, and prosecution of violators;
collect, process and analyze data on transactions with monetary funds or other assets that are subject
to monitoring in accordance with applicable Russian state and federal laws
suspend transactions with monetary funds or other assets in accordance with applicable Russian laws
and regulations;
cooperate and share information on matters within its purview with competent authorities of foreign
countries in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation or based on the principles of
reciprocity;
engage on behalf of the Russian Federation in cooperation with international organizations, public
authorities, businesses and private individuals of foreign states on matters within its purview
disseminate information to law enforcement authorities based on sufficient grounds to suspect the
transactions (deals) of being linked to legalization (laundering) of criminally gained proceeds or terrorism
financing, as well as make disclosures at requests of law enforcement authorities in accordance with
applicable federal laws and regulations
9/18/2017 Rosfinmonitoring functions
http://www.fedsfm.ru/en/about/rosfinmonitoring-powers 2/2
• participate in the development and implementation of international cooperation programs, as well as in
• engage, including on a contractual basis, in the prescribed manner and in strict compliance with the law
governing the protection of state or other secrets the services of scientists, experts, research institutes
and other organizations to conduct expert examinations, develop training programs and teaching
manuals, software and information applications and create information systems in the field of financial
monitoring;
• place in the prescribed manner orders and conclude state procurement contracts for the supply of
goods, performance of work and provision of services in areas within its purview, as well as to research
contracts and other types of civil contracts;
• • ensure timely and proper processing of citizens' requests, effective decision-making and provision of
timely feedback;
• provide mobilization training to Rosfinmonitoring's staff;
• conduct civil defense drills involving Rosfinmonitoring's staff;
• provide vocational, retraining and advanced training and internship opportunities for Rosfinmonitoring's
federal civil servants;
• • exercise other powers in areas within its purview.
About Rosfinmonitoring
Rosfinmonitoring management and structure
Rosfinmonitoring functions
Activity reports
The International Training and Methodology
Center for Financial Monitoring
Legal Basis
International cooperation
Action Plan to enhance transparency and
prevent misuse of companies and other legal
entities
Bilateral Cooperation
Multilateral Cooperation
International standards
News
Contacts
Useful links
the preparation and conclusion of international, including interagency, treaties and agreements governing
matters within its purview;
carry out the functions of a chief steward and recipient of budgetary funds allocated in the federal
budget for the needs of Rosfinmonitoring;
carry out in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation the work on compiling, storing,
recording and using Rosfinmonitoring's archival documents;
Annex 437
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report (2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 3
CONTENTS
4
6
10
12
16
20
26
35
38
41
OPENING REMARKS
PART 1.
RUSSIA'S PREPARATIONS FOR THE 4TH ROUND
OF FATF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS.
IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES
PART 2.
STATE POLICY AND LEGAL REGULATION
PART 3.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
PART 4.
KEY RISKS
Chapter 4.1
Financial Sector-Related Risks
Chapter 4.2
Corruption
Chapter 4.3
Counter terrorism financing
Chapter 4.4
Inter-Agency Prevention and Disruption Tools
PART 5.
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING. ROSFINMONITORING
ACTIVITY SUPPORT
4 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
OPENING REMARKS
Dear reader,
As we begin our traditional review of
Rosfinmonitoring's performance, it is worth pointing
out that on November 1, 2016 Russia’s financial
intelligence unit – and, by extension, the country's
national AML/CTF system – celebrated its 15th
anniversary.
Following its inclusion on the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) blacklist in June 2000, our country
has gone all the way from being labelled as a
“failure” for its anti-money laundering efforts to
recognition of its AML/CTF system as one of the
most progressive in the world. We have become
a full-fledged member of the key AML/CTF
organizations including the FATF, MONEYVAL,
Egmont Group, EAG and Council of Heads of CIS
member states. Rosfinmonitoring is connected
via secure on-line communication network –
which is used to speed up the resolution of issues
related to the conduct of international financial
investigations – to over 100 financial intelligence
units around the world.
V. PUTIN:
Yu. Chikhanchin – Director of Rosfinmonitoring,
EAG Chairman
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 5
Since the adoption of the framework AML/CTF law
(Federal Law No. 115-FZ “On Combating Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing”), Russia has
succeeded in creating a legislative framework that
meets all modern international requirements (over
50 laws).
Over these years, Russia has become a leading
force behind international efforts to fight financing
of terrorism, and especially ISIL.
In the supervisory sphere, Rosfinmonitoring has
gone far beyond the initial task of involving reporting
entities in AML/CTF efforts and explaining to them
the specifics of mandatory requirements. Over the
past period, the list of high-risk activities subject to
AML/CTF regulation has been significantly expanded.
The work to monitor compliance with the AML/CTF
legislation is carried out today in close cooperation
with law enforcement, control and supervisory
authorities, as well as with financial institutions.
The past few years have seen significant changes in
the country's financial sector, achieved through the
implementation of targeted measures designed to
cleanse the national banking sector of large-scale
illicit and criminal schemes. These measures helped
Russia to migrate the risk of misappropriation of
public funds and terrorist financing, as well as allowed
it to take control of the cash flows of enterprises that
are of strategic importance for the country's defence
industry complex and its national security.
The introduction of modern IT solutions had a major
impact on the format of information exchange
with organizations and the effectiveness of data
processing, boosting not only the quantity of
submitted reports but also their quality.
Since its establishment, Rosfinmonitoring has
drastically changed the mode of its interaction with
law enforcement and other special task forces.
15 years ago, our financial investigations were
primarily based on law enforcement agencies'
source information on economic crimes. Today,
however, the “opposite direction” functions
well: from the detection by Rosfinmonitoring of
questionable financial transactions to the criminal.
The past 15 years have also seen changes in the
mix of functions exercised by the agency, which
currently holds the status of the National Centre
for Assessing AML/CTF Threats to National
Security.
As part of its efforts to promote financial
literacy, Rosfinmonitoring has set up an effective
international network that was used to train
several thousand AML/CTF experts not only for
Russia but also other countries.
In 2018, Russia's AML/CTF system will undergo
yet another round of evaluations. Although,
until recently, it was more about technical
compliance – whether the country adopted
the relevant laws, built relationship between
various AML/CTF system participants, etc. – this
time round we must prove the effectiveness of
what has been done over the past 15 years.
The FATF will assess Russia not only in terms
of Rosfinmonitoring's performance, but also as
regards the effectiveness of each and every
component of the national AML/CTF system,
ranging from financial institutions reporting
suspicious transactions to the judiciary ordering
confiscations of criminal proceeds. This is our
common priority for 2017.
Yury Chikhanchin
6 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
RUSSIA'S PREPARATIONS FOR THE 4TH ROUND
OF FATF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS
1
The main purpose of the national AML/CTF system
is to protect the financial system and the economy
as a whole against the threat of money laundering
and the financing of terrorism and proliferation,
thereby strengthening the financial sector integrity
and contributing to safety and security.
Presidential Order No. 31-rp of March 2, 2016
established an Inter-Agency Committee tasked
with preparing the Russian Federation for the 4th
round of FATF mutual evaluations. The Committee
is made up of deputy ministers, deputy heads of
state bodies and organizations.
On May 31, 2016 the Inter-Agency Committee
approved the Plan for the Preparation of the Russian
Federation for the 4th round of FATF
mutual evaluations. In line with
this plan, the Committee drafted
a Report on the self-assessment
of technical compliance with the
FATF Recommendations and
effectiveness of the AML/CTF
system based on 11 Immediate
Outcomes of the FATF
Methodology. Among those taking
part in design of this report
were experts from government bodies, research
institutions and international organizations. The
report was sent to the country's government bodies
and organizations for use in the preparation for the
FATF evaluations.
AML/CTF
The Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness
of the AML/CTF Systems, 2013
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 7
“ETP
R”
8 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
The Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of the AML/CTF
Systems, 2013
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 9
Rosfinmonitoring took part in the assessment
activities conducted by the IMF/World Bank
mission under the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP). On July 13, 2016 the IMF posted
on its official website a Report on the outcomes
of its assessment of the Russian financial sector.
International experts expressed a positive view
of the country's AML/CTF system, highlighting
Rosfinmonitoring's key role in improving the
effectiveness of the AML/CTF regime.
At the same time, Russia was urged to do more
to further improve the system, in particular, to
complete the national ML/TF risk assessment and
boost the effectiveness of financial institutions'
customer due diligence procedures with respect
to beneficial owners and public officials, as
well as to ensure that the sanctions applied are
commensurate with the severity of detected
violations.
MITIGATION
10 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
Presidential Decree No. 103 dated March 8, 2016
expanded the list of Rosfinmonitoring's functions to
include, inter alia, the following:
• development of state policy and regulatory
framework for combating the financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
• development and implementation
of measures aimed at preventing, identifying
and suppressing illegal financial transactions,
as well as measures to neutralize threats to
national security arising from transactions with
funds and other assets;
• conducting a regular national risk assessment
(NRA) of transactions carried out for ML/TF
purposes, as well as the drafting and approval
of guidelines for its implementation.
In 2016, Russia enacted 10 federal laws, 2 presidential
decrees, 1 presidential executive order, 4 government
resolutions and 2 government executive orders that fall
within the scope of Rosfinmonitoring's responsibility.
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
Federal Law No. 191-FZ of June 23, 2016 "On
Amendments to Article 5 of the Federal Law 'On
Banks and Banking Activities' and Article 7 of the
Federal Law 'On Combating Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing'" allows credit institutions, in the
absence of ML/TF risks and with sufficient customer
knowledge, to open in some cases accounts for legal
entities without the presence of such legal entities'
representatives. It also modifies the list of information
required for the identification of legal entities.
Federal Law No. 215-FZ of June 23, 2016 "On
Amendments to the Federal Law 'On Combating
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing' and
the Code of Administrative Offences" broadens the
scope of application of the AML/CTF law and requires
legal entities to have access to, store and provide details
of their beneficial owners to competent government
authorities, including Rosfinmonitoring, upon request.
In addition, the document establishes administrative
liability for violation of these requirements.
STATE POLICY AND LEGAL REGULATION
2
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 11
Federal Law No. 263-FZ of 3 July 2016 "On
Amendments to Articles 7 and 7.3 of the
Federal Law 'On Combating Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing'" allows individuals to
purchase and sell foreign cash in the amount not
exceeding RUR 40,000 without identification; or
in the amount not exceeding RUR 100,000, with a
simplified identification procedure.
REGULATION OF THE FIGHT AGAINST
FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
PROLIFERATION
Federal Law No. 374-FZ of 6 July 2016 "On
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation Regarding the Application
of Additional Measures to Combat Terrorism
and Protect Public Safety" expands the list of
grounds for the inclusion and removal of persons
on/from the list of organizations and individuals
known to be involved in extremist or terrorist
activities. In addition, the document modifies the
definition of terrorist financing to cover individual
terrorists.
Federal Law No. 375-FZ of 6 July 2016 "On
Amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation
Regarding the Application of Additional
Measures to Combat Terrorism and Protect
Public Safety" modifies the definition of terrorist
financing to bring it in line with the FATF Standards.
In addition, Rosfinmonitoring prepared a draft
federal law "On Amendments to the Federal Law
'On Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing", which calls for the implementation of
the revised FATF Recommendations that cover fight
against the financing of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction into the national law.
12 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
3
The work carried out in this area was based on the
following priorities:
• identification and mitigation of external threats
to the stability of Russia's financial system;
• maintaining Russia's leadership position in the
international anti-money laundering
community.
FATF
At the FATF, Russia's initiatives were primarily
aimed at cutting off funding for international terrorist
organizations, in particular ISIL, that pose a global
threat to the international community.
The successful revision of Recommendation 5
(Criminalization of Terrorist Financing) allowed the
inclusion in the FATF Standards of the language
designed to ensure comprehensive implementation
of UN Security Council Resolutions 2199 and 2253 –
which ban any trade with ISIL in Syrian and Iraqi oil –
and the freezing of ISIL funds and other financial and
economic assets.
Rosfinmonitoring succeeded in putting on the FATF
agenda a proposal calling on all countries to share
any new information on ISIL funding sources and
successful experiences in detecting and cutting off
funding for this terrorist organization.
With participation of Rosfinmonitoring experts, the
FATF conducted a study of the terrorist financing risk
indicators for the private sector. The report on this
study was approved by the FATF Plenary as one of
the response measures to the threat posed by ISIL.
The study laid the foundation for the subsequent
development of a unified approach to mitigation of
risks faced by, in particular, major banks and financial
institutions.
The FATF Plenary endorsed the Russian initiative
to conduct a study into the financing of terrorist
recruitment. The study is expected to be completed
in October 2017.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 13
EAG AND COUNCIL OF HEADS OF CIS
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS
The EAG, a FATF-style regional body, and Council
of Heads of CIS FIUs continue to play a major role
in mitigating ML/TF risks and threats in Central Asia.
By conducting regular EAG-based activities aimed
at strengthening information exchange between
financial intelligence units and providing technical
assistance to EAG member states in setting up
legislative frameworks, Russia succeeded in building
a so-called 'financial security belt' in the region and
in improving effectiveness of our country's ML/TF
efforts.
Russia's participation in the EAG activities contributes
to establishment of cooperation in the Eurasian
region, by creating conditions that hamper the inflow
of “dirty” money into our economy and forming new
alliances in the AML/CTF sector.
The EAG, using Rosfinmonitoring's expert potential,
conducted a study into the “Use of Companies
Registered in Offshore Jurisdictions to Redistribute
and Launder Criminal Proceeds”. The study was
initiated by Russia jointly with other EAG member
states.
One of the key outcomes of CHFIU-based cooperation
in 2016 was a report by the Council Chairman and
Director of Rosfinmonitoring Yu. Chikchanchin
at a meeting of the UN Counter-Terrorism
Committee on December 15, 2016 (New York,
USA) on the efforts undertaken by the Council to
detect terrorists and their accomplices operating
in Eurasia. The report was based on the CHFIU
members' information related to their participation in
the operation “Barrier”.
OPERATION "BARRIER"
The CIS members' efforts to identify terrorists
fighting for ISIL in Syria and Iraq proved their
effectiveness in terms of the monitoring of
transactions:
• in areas of increased terrorist activity and
bordering war zones (Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq,
Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey);
• by individuals placed on the CIS wanted list
for terrorism and extremism (CIS ATC);
• with use of identity documents of Syrian and
Iraqi nationals seized by ISIL.
The cooperation established between all
transaction’s participants greatly contributes to
the prevention of terrorist acts and undermining
of terrorists' financial and logistics infrastructure.
BRICS
The BRICS AML/CTF Council began its work in 2014.
This international forum is used for regular meetings
between the heads of BRICS delegations to the FATF,
with Russia playing a coordinating role.
14 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
The BRICS AML/CTF Council met three times in
2016 to discuss harmonization of the member
states' approaches to the sector-specific issues of
international importance.
At present, the BRICS AML/CTF Council's agenda
includes the following items:
• creation of a closed information exchange
network for use by FIUs;
• establishment of an international mechanism for
the confiscation, sharing and recovery of criminal
assets;
• consolidation of the BRICS countries' efforts in
training AML/CTF personnel.
COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN FIUs
The agreements concluded with, as well
Rosfinmonitoring's participation in the activities of, the
Egmont Group allowed the agency and Russian law
enforcement authorities to regularly obtain information
about persons of interest. In total, Rosfinmonitoring
received in 2016 approx. 2500 reports to its requests
sent to foreign financial intelligence units.
Rosfinmonitoring's cooperation with its foreign
counterparts facilitated the conduct of successful
financial investigations in key areas, including
those related to the embezzlement of public funds.
Among the Russian FIU's major achievements in
2016 was the launch of the international project to
detect, amid cross-border money transfers to
high-risk jurisdictions, transactions channelling
funds to money laundering centres specialized in
redistribution and laundering of criminal proceeds.
A preliminary review undertaken by Rosfinmonitoring
revealed that criminal proceeds often flow through
specific geographical and financial channels, while
the choice of transactions used depends on the
specifics of each given country. Naturally, criminals
give preference to the countries with a weak AML
regime and inadequate criminalization of offences
involving illicit proceeds.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 15
This initiative, along with the existing domestic
mechanisms for identifying beneficial owners and
improving the practice of confiscation, should further
contribute to the decriminalization of the economy
through improved transparency.
A proposal to launch an operation focused on detecting
money laundering centres serving customers from
multiple jurisdictions was endorsed by the FATF, EAG
and CIS CHFIU.
WORKING GROUP OF FIUs OF RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SYRIAN REPUBLIC, IRAQI
REPUBLIC AND IRANIAN REPUBLIC
To address the challenges of detecting and cutting
off ISIL funding channels, the FIUs of Russia, Iran,
Iraq and Syria established a working group tasked
with coordinating actions and working out common
guidelines and approaches to the fight against terrorist
financing, as well as with identifying the countries
acting as the source, intermediaries and beneficiaries
of terrorist financing.
In 2016, this working group initiated a series of
comprehensive actions as part of a joint operation
aimed, inter alia, at the following:
• identification of terrorist hotspots and traveling
routes used by foreign terrorist fighters, including
terrorist funding channels;
• identification, as well as receipt of information
from, credit institutions involved in the provision
of banking services to individuals and legal
entities, including from the countries participating
in the operation.
16 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
KEY RISKS
4
S
National ML/TF Risk Assessment. FATF Guidelines, 2013
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 17
FATF Recommendation 1 sets out key principles
of a risk assessment. First, countries should
“identify, assess and understand” their ML/TF risks.
Second, countries should designate an authority
or mechanism to coordinate actions to assess
risks”. A risk assessment serves as the basis for the
application of a risk-based approach.
The goal of a risk-based approach is to ensure that
the AML/CTF measures adopted are commensurate
with the “risks identified”, as well as to enable efficient
allocation of resources.
The following key concepts are used in the guidance
in the context of a national ML/TF risk assessment:
• risk can be seen as a function of three factors:
“threat”, “vulnerability” and “consequence”;
• threat is a person or group of people, object
or activity with the potential to cause harm, for
example, to the state, society, economy, etc.
In the ML/TF context this includes criminals,
terrorist groups and their facilitators, their funds, as
well as past, present and future ML/TF activities;
• vulnerability, as used in a risk assessment,
comprises those things that can be exploited by a
threat or that may support or facilitate its activities;
• consequence refers to the impact or harm
that ML/TF may cause. It includes the effect
of the underlying criminal and terrorist activity
on financial systems and institutions, as well
as on the economy in general. Consequences
also affect society, specific groups of people,
business environment, national or international
interests, as well as the reputation and
attractiveness of the country's financial sector.
Common risks recognized by the international
community:
• corruption and embezzlement;
• "professional" money laundering;
• international terrorism;
• illegal drug trafficking;
• piracy;
• human trafficking;
• arms trafficking;
• cybercrime.
As part of its responsibilities as the national
centre for the assessment of threats to national
security arising from money laundering, terrorist
financing and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, Rosfinmonitoring conducted in
2016 risk monitoring activities and passed on their
findings to the Russian President, law enforcement
and other public authorities for the development
and adoption of measures to mitigate them.
Meanwhile, the Russian President put the
emphasis on application of a comprehensive
approach, which first involves the use of
preventive and regulatory measures, followed by,
if the problem still exists, a suppressive action.
This approach became a veritable Russian
“know-how” since, in their assessment of the
AML/CTF system's viability, most countries tend
to be guided by statistical data and effectiveness
of law enforcement agencies.
18 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
Whereas it is obvious that predicate offencesfocused
preventive measures are even more
important for reducing national risks than a
suppressive action taken post factum.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 19
20 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
FINANCIAL SECTOR-RELATED RISKS
4.1
Rosfinmonitoring's key objectives in the financial
sector are:
• to improve effectiveness of financial institutions
as reporting entities and their compliance
with the law and cooperation with the Bank
of Russia;
• to combat money laundering in the financial
sector.
In accordance with the FATF Standards, the
effectiveness of the AML/CTF system is largely
determined by the quality of supervision and
monitoring conducted in respect of financial
institutions and their beneficial owners, as well as by
the level of their compliance with legal regulations
and application of measures designed to prevent
clients from engaging in illegal activities, including
illicit capital siphoning and encashment.
The effectiveness of a financial institution as an
element of the AML/CTF system is determined by its
compliance with the AML/CTF law, ability to mitigate
the risk of involvement in dubious transactions and
illicit schemes, and its non-involvement in criminal
activity.
The key tasks facing FIU's supervisory unit are: to
improve regulatory compliance as a basis for better
transparency in the activities of financial institutions
and mitigating ML/TF risks, and to minimize their
involvement in illicit activities.
A more frequent use of preventive measures
allowed Rosfinmonitoring to reduce the number
of inspections by 10% and increase compliance
by 8%. The total volume of cash flowing through
law-abiding credit institutions has increased more
than 5 times in recent years.
The existing Russian system of interaction with
financial institutions is based on a risk-oriented
approach, and as such it is different from the
AML/CTF systems of other countries. In Russia,
credit and financial institutions are required by law to
report all high-risk transactions to Rosfinmonitoring,
whereas in other countries the focus is clearly on
suspicious activity of clients.
Therefore, Rosfinmonitoring is able to monitor
the full range of financial activity in the country
practically in real time: dynamics, problem areas,
financial institutions and sectors.
The number of STRs submitted to Rosfinmonitoring
in 2016 increased 1.6-fold. In the reporting period,
Rosfinmonitoring launched a pilot CTF project that
provides for a radically different level of cooperation
with financial institutions: beyond the mere
submission of STRs to include the description of the
complex picture of the suspicious client's financial
behaviour.
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
Despite the measures undertaken by the Bank of
Russia in respect of institutions engaged in dubious
financial activities, as well as the overall reduction in
their number, some of them continue to offer illicit
services.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 21
Despite the overall declining trend, the volume
of capital withdrawn from the country remains
significant. The key trends affecting the “shadow”
services relating to the siphoning off capital
overseas are:
• use of professional securities market
participants;
• active involvement of judicial and
executive instruments in giving the
appearance of legitimacy to transactions;
• siphoning off capital overseas under the guise
of foreign trade transactions, payment
of dividends and non-commodity sales.
Dubious funds are primarily sent through credit
institutions engaged in illicit activities.
When it comes to illicit encashment services, the
following trends prevail:
• moving funds from traditional large financial
centres to regions and branches of major banks;
• declining volumes of cash transactions carried
out by legal entities, as well as the increased
use of individuals' bank cards to generate cash
flow, including corporate and VIP cards;
• continued functioning of illicit encashment
schemes in the traditional non-banking
sectors: credit and consumer cooperatives
and microfinance organizations, including the
identification of new ones (notaries).
Rosfinmonitoring is involved in on-going work with
the Central Bank and credit institutions to focus
on new typologies of high-risk transactions to
tackle the constant modification of “transit” and
“encashment” schemes. In 2016, Rosfinmonitoring
jointly with the Bank of Russia continued drafting
guidelines designed to focus reporting entities'
attention on certain types of transactions, a
process that resulted in a significant increase
in the effectiveness of internal controls in
organizations and, accordingly, in the quality of
their STRs.
Further changes to the current classifier of the
indicators of unusual transactions will provide a
better structure of the incoming information flow
and a more efficient use of transaction data for
analytical purposes.
22 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
ILLICIT ASSET WITHDRAWAL IN BANKING
SECTOR
Asset stripping, namely, deliberate bankruptcy, was the
main problem in the banking sector in 2016. It should
be noted that this trend is typical for both small banks
and institutions from the top 100 list. The most popular
asset withdrawal methods involve the following:
• issuance of deliberately non-performing loans;
• assignment of the right of claim and replacement
of the bank's liquid assets with non-marketable
securities;
• acquisition of non-marketable securities and sale
of the bank-owned real estate at low prices.
Investigators also uncovered evidence of the bank
management's involvement in criminal wrongdoing
and “cooking the books”.
In order to promptly identify signs of asset stripping
in the banking sector, Rosfinmonitoring organized
information sharing with the Bank of Russia, law
enforcement agencies and the General Prosecutor's
Office.
Future active efforts to minimize this risk will be
directed at:
• building a transparent and effective cooperation
mechanism for recovery of stolen assets
to Russia;
• improving, especially in the early stages, the
mechanisms for detecting and responding to the
signs of asset withdrawal in the banking sector;
• promoting cooperation with the Bank of Russia
and law enforcement agencies.
The mega-regulator and other supervisory bodies
continued to apply a risk-based approach in 2016 in
cases involving the lack of compliance and organizations'
involvement in dubious transactions. Of the total number
of banks featuring in risk bulletins submitted to the Bank
of Russia, 55 institutions, including 35 for failure
to comply with the AML/CTF law and involvement in
dubious transactions, were stripped of their license.
NON-CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
Microfinance organizations and credit and
consumer cooperatives
In 2016, the risk of these organizations' involvement
in illicit cash turnover was high. First of all, this is due
to the specifics of their activities and the possibility
of legally attracting funding from legal entities for
subsequent redistribution among individuals. Instances
of such organizations' involvement in illicit encashment
schemes were recorded almost in every region.
2016 saw a rise in the popularity of large-scale illicit
schemes involving re-registration of a large number
of affiliated MFOs and their migration to other Russian
regions.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 23
Insurance
The situation in the insurance sector underwent
significant changes in 2016, caused by the
removal of firms that do not meet the requirements
set by the Bank of Russia. In total, 104 insurance
companies and insurance brokers lost their
license during that year, with the number of active
firms estimated at 381 as of December 2016.
The main reasons for the license loss cited by
the Bank of Russia were failure to comply with its
instructions, non-reporting, non-compliance with
financial stability requirements, etc.
The total value of dubious transactions involving
false reporting, real estate transactions,
replacement of liquid assets with non-liquid ones
and the use of reinsurance to siphon off funds
overseas identified by Rosfinmonitoring in 2016
totalled RUR 17.7 billion. In each of these cases,
a risk bulletin was sent to the Central Bank.
Notably, a number of insurance companies were
involved in illicit encashment transactions in the
real sector of the economy, especially in the
construction sector.
Postal services operators
Illicit encashment transactions in the postal
services sector are actively countered by joint
efforts with Roskomnadzor. The volume of such
transactions carried out though the Russian Post
fell almost 10 times last year (from RUR 59
billion to RUR 6 billion).
The joint measures adopted by Roskomnadzor,
the Bank of Russia and the Russian Post helped to
reduce the level of risk in this sector.
The precious metals and precious stones sector
Traders in precious metals, precious stones,
jewellery, a large number of whom are small and
micro businesses with a limited turnover, are in the
focus of special attention. Risk bulletins were sent
to the Assay Chamber in respect of more than
500 legal entities from the jewellery industry
for violation of the AML/CTF law.
Rosfinmonitoring and the Russian State Assay
Chamber intend to continue the use of new forms
of information exchange, especially such modern
communication tools as “Personal Accounts” of
entities on Rosfinmonitoring website.
Risks of involvement in the shadow
economy and criminalization of new types
of financial institutions, social institutions
and professions
One of the key areas of Rosfinmonitoring's
supervisory activity involves exercising due
diligence on, as well as monitoring and
regulating the activities of, financial institutions
and designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs) to ensure compliance
with the AML/CTF requirements. Supervision and
monitoring help to mitigate ML/TF risks in the
financial and other sectors through:
• prevention of criminals and their affiliates
from having a significant or majority
interest in, or exercising management
functions in, financial institutions and DNFBPs
by virtue, among others, of beneficial
ownership;
• financial institutions and DNFBPs adequately
apply AML/CTF preventive measures
commensurate with their risks, and report
suspicious transactions.
Supervisors, meanwhile, provide financial
institutions and DNFBPs with adequate feedback
and guidance on compliance with AML/CTF
requirements.
Working in this area, Rosfinmonitoring
strengthened cooperation in 2016 with the
Federal Chamber of Notaries and the Federal
Chamber of Advocates in improving compliance
by notaries and lawyers with AML/CTF
legislation in preparation for the forthcoming
FATF evaluation in 2018.
PROHIBITIVE MEASURES
The number of customers denied service by banks
continued to rise in 2016.
In total for 2016, banks reported 700,000 service
denials affecting approx. 350,000 customers,
up 2.8- and 2.6-fold respectively year over year.
24 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
The application by banks of prohibitive measures
prevented laundering of about RUR 300 billion of
dubious origin.
2017 saw the launch of a mechanism for communicating
the list of such individuals to financial institutions. This will
allow the country to significantly reduce the number of
suspicious transactions and individuals carrying them out.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Compliance Council
In order to improve the quality of reports submitted
by financial institutions and involve the expert
community in addressing these challenges,
Rosfinmonitoring established in 2016 Compliance
Council, made up of heads of compliance
departments and senior AML/CTF personnel of
financial institutions from among the most active
participants in the AML/CTF system.
The Council is tasked with sharing best practices
in identifying indicators of unlawful behaviour and
their integration into “risk profiles”. This approach is
designed to take internal controls to a different level,
since it allows us to more accurately assess the level
of suspiciousness of financial behaviour. This will
improve the quality of transaction data received by
Rosfinmonitoring and its analysis.
In 2016, 12 banks participated in a pilot project to test
the new approaches in practice.
The Compliance Council's plans for 2017 include:
• improving the quality of reports submitted to
Rosfinmonitoring by reporting entities;
• improving the flexibility of the system for
detecting suspicious transactions based on a risk
assessment;
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 25
• introducing effective mechanisms for assessing
and improving risk awareness by the private
sector.
Remote supervision
Another project aimed at boosting compliance – the
so-called Personal Account – allows credit and noncredit
institutions to look at themselves through the
supervisor's eyes, understand what the supervisor
is guided by in its assessment of a given legal entity
and find out what measures they should take to avoid
being placed in the high-risk category.
The number of businesses (individual entrepreneurs)
opting for voluntary cooperation with supervisory
authorities increased 1.7-fold in 2016.
With a view to disseminating Rosfinmonitoring's
positive experience, the scope of the voluntary
cooperation mechanism was expanded to cover the
sectors supervised by the Russian Assay Chamber
and Roskomnadzor.
Among the priorities of Rosfinmonitoring's engagement
with the financial sector in 2017 are as follows:
• enhancing coverage of financial institutions by the
AML/CTF system;
• strengthening compliance of financial
institutions through the use of remote
monitoring tools;
• improving the quality of reports.
26 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
CORRUPTION
4.2
In 2016, Rosfinmonitoring paid special attention to
corruption risks that pose a threat to the Russian
economy and its financial system. The FATF defines
corruption as the use of public office for private gain.
Among the corruption risks recognized by the
international community are:
• transactions carried out by politically exposed
persons (PEPs) and their affiliates related to
the purchase of high-value assets;
• use of illicit financial schemes for
embezzlement of public funds;
• use of foreign legal entities and arrangements
to launder corruption proceeds;
• entering into contracts with entities whose
owners or directors are figureheads;
• use of offshore jurisdictions in illicit
schemes aimed at embezzling public
funds and siphoning off corruption
proceeds;
• conclusion of government contracts between
affiliated parties.
Specific Risk Factors in Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption. FATF Typologies Report. 2012
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 27
28 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
Rosfinmonitoring's corruption materials were used to initiate about 380 criminal cases, 130 of which have
already been referred to the court, resulting in more than 90 convictions.
In total, Rosfinmonitoring referred to the Interior
Ministry, Federal Security Service, the Prosecutor's
Office and the Investigative Committee approx. 3500
corruption materials last year.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
There are several factors that contribute to the
corruption vulnerability of the public procurement
sector. Firstly, the sheer number of public
procurement projects means that some of the
allocated funds may simply disappear. Secondly, the
specific nature of these contracts makes it difficult to
ascertain whether the price paid by the government
for the goods or services provided is real or inflated
through corruption. And thirdly, the opaque nature of
the public procurement sector in many countries and
high competition tend to create conditions conducive
to all sorts of backroom dealings and collusion.
Public procurement remains a key sector of the
Russian economy due to its past history, which
means that it is also one of Rosfinmonitoring's priority
areas.
One of Rosfinmonitoring's key priorities as a
participant in the inter-agency monitoring system
is to ensure the prudent and proper use of defence
procurement spending. Rosfinmonitoring's
approach, implemented jointly with the country's
Defence Ministry, Prosecutor General's Office,
Federal Anti-Monopoly Service and Federal Tax
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 29
Service, helps to prevent the embezzlement of
public funds at the crime planning stage, as well
as being fully in line with Russia's broader strategy
in this area.
Notably, all defence procurement funding is
dispersed exclusively through dedicated accounts
opened with nine authorized banks that meet
the criteria set in Federal Law No. 275-FZ of 29
December 2012 “On Defence Procurement”
(hereinafter, Federal Law No. 275-FZ), an approach
designed to maintain the process of defence
procurement allocation as transparent as possible.
Federal Law No. 275-FZ, with a view to enabling
defence contractors to cover other expenses not
included in the list of authorized transactions, but
related to their current activities (rent payments,
payment for security services, fuel and other
overheads), sets the monthly auxiliary expenditure
threshold at no more than RUR 3 million. The volume
of these transactions stood at approx. 10% of the
total defence expenditure for 2016.
In 2016, Rosfinmonitoring worked to minimize
"traditional" risks faced by the defence
industry related to:
• use of shell companies to siphon off
funds;
• placement of funds in deposit
accounts that often results in missed
deadlines;
• use of funds allocated under a defence
procurement contract to pay for items/
services not related to the performance
of the said contract;
• provision of loans to affiliated
individuals.
This, in turn, helped to lessen the negative
economic impact and mitigate corruption risks.
30 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
Unfortunately, “traditional” manipulations are replaced
by more sophisticated schemes for embezzlement of
public funds:
• artificial overpayment of taxes (especially VAT
and income tax);
• opening of two or more dedicated accounts
in support of a single transaction to enable the
expenditure of more than RUR 3 million per
month;
• transfer of funds in excess of the statutory rate
of profit (more than 50% of the contract price)
to other accounts under the pretext of closing
the account after the performance of the
contract;
• transfer of funds to contractors as
compensation for the costs incurred in
connection with the stockpiling of goods
needed for the performance of a defence
contract.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 31
The emergence of new typologies compelled
Rosfinmonitoring to adjust its approaches to
monitoring. Rosfinmonitoring continued to work in
2016 on the prevention of high-risk schemes and
submission of risk bulletins to the relevant agencies
and authorized banks to take preventive and
adequate measures to the risks identified.
Rosfinmonitoring's work, carried out jointly with other
participants in the inter-agency monitoring system as
well as prosecutors and law enforcement agencies,
helped to prevent the embezzlement of public funds
totalling RUR 5 billion and the recovery of about
RUR 400 million.
A new monitoring mechanism, set up jointly with the
authorized banks, proved to be effective in preventing
the misappropriation of public procurement funds
totalling RUR 19 billion.
Another important line of Rosfinmonitoring's
work pertains to the involvement of general
contractors in the monitoring of defence
procurement-related expenditure. To this end,
Rosfinmonitoring established cooperation with
such holding companies as United Shipbuilding
Corporation, United Aircraft Corporation, state
corporation Roskosmos and state corporation
Rostech, including in establishing common
treasury departments in state-owned
corporations and companies.
Further work aimed at addressing complex challenges
in this area will needed to be carried out in 2017.
32 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
A list of other corruption-prone industries
includes:
• natural resources extraction;
• healthcare;
• large infrastructure projects;
• privatization;
• development and other types of aid.
Rosfinmonitoring's goal is to prevent the
misappropriation and misuse of public funds,
as well as to facilitate the decriminalization
and promote transparency of the real sector
of economy, taking into account the identified
money laundering risks.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 33
“”
“”
34 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
Much of Rosfinmonitoring's attention in 2016 was
devoted to the federal special programs, including
FIFA World Cup 2018, FIFA Confederation Cup 2017,
“Social and Economic Development of the Republic
of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol until 2020”,
the state program for the development of perinatal
centres of the Russian Federation, etc.
The construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge was
the focus of Rosfinmonitoring's attention in 2016.
Involvement of self-regulatory organizations
from the construction industry in illicit schemes
Rosfinmonitoring uncovered evidence of wide-spread
involvement of self-regulatory organizations in illicit
schemes. This situation is especially typical for the
construction industry.
Rosfinmonitoring is currently conducting
verification activities. Information about the
identified scheme participants was passed on to
law enforcement.
Other risks
Rosfinmonitoring finds particularly disturbing
the deliberate involvement of Russian judicial
institutions in giving appearance of legitimacy to
illicit cash flows. Multiple cases of involvement of
both arbitration and general jurisdiction courts were
recorded.
These schemes create reputational risks for
the Russian judicial system, including at the
international level. To remedy the situation, it is
necessary to improve the process for the review of
such claims and conduct of judicial proceedings.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 35
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
4.3
Responding to the evolving domestic situation,
Rosfinmonitoring built its counter-terrorist
financing strategy 2016 with account for the
following threats:
• existence in Russia of active foreign terrorist
cells;
• availability of infrastructure used to provide
material support for terrorists and facilitate
their movement;
• existence of a wide network of supporters who
use financial institutions and instruments to
make one-off and regular donations.
A list of international threats includes:
• participation of Russian nationals in ISIL
activities;
• close links between international radical
propaganda elements and combat terrorist cells;
• use of Russia as a transit territory by
foreign nationals involved in the financing of
international terrorist organizations.
Measures undertaken by Rosfinmonitoring helped
to identify about 3500 individuals suspected of
being linked to ISIL.
The findings of financial investigations enabled the
detection of foreign terrorist fighters financing typologies
and uncover large-scale fundraising schemes.
The List of entities and individuals known to
be involved in extremist and terrorist activities
(hereinafter, the “List”) remains an effective tool
for automatically blocking access to the financial
system for individuals and organizations.
36 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
In 2016 the List was expanded further through the
addition of:
• 19 foreign nationals and 1 foreign legal entity
to the international section;
• 12 legal entities and 2213 individuals to the
national section.
Financial institutions froze a total of RUR 24 million.
In order to improve the system of suppressing
terrorists' financial activity in 2016 Rosfinmonitoring
fine-tuned the work of the Inter-Agency Committee
for Combating the Financing of Terrorism, a new
extrajudicial blocking mechanism established by
Presidential Decree No. 562 dated November 18,
2015. The Committee's decisions have so far led
to the extrajudicial blocking of assets belonging
to 104 individuals involved in terrorist activities
totalling RUR 4 million.
DETECTION
SUPPRESSION
Committee
PREVENTION
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 37
FUNDRAISING
USE OF FUNDS
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
38 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
INTER-AGENCY PREVENTION
AND SUPPRESSION TOOLS
4.4
The Inter-Agency Committee for Combating Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (IAC) has been
operating at Rosfinmonitoring since 2005.
IAC and its structures
The Advisory Board and working groups are an
effective mechanism that enables Rosfinmonitoring
to engage not only with public authorities but also
with other national AML/CTF system participants
from the business community and academia.
A list of other effective tools also includes the Inter-
Agency Working Group on Combating Illicit
Financial Transactions (IAWG), established by
the Presidential Decree in 2012 and for which
Rosfinmonitoring provides information and analytical
support. The IAWG allows to take quick AML/CTF
prevention and suppression action, enabling close
collaboration of all AML/CTF system participants.
The IAWG conducts regular monitoring of enforcement
practice and inter-agency coordination efforts
aimed at combating illegal financial transactions and
suppression of illicit financial schemes.
The work of the regional inter-agency working groups,
tasked with the timely identification at the local level and
mitigation of risks and threats associated with illegal
business activities and illicit financial transactions, as
well as with making forecasts and taking preventive
action, was also deemed effective in 2016.
Rosfinmonitoring actively participated in the work
of the State Anti-Drug Committee, the National
Anti-Terrorism Committee, the Interagency
Committee, the Russian Security Council and the
Presidential Anti-Corruption Council in 2016.
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 39
“”
IAWG
IAWG
EXPERT GROUP
REGIONAL IAWGs
IN FEDERAL DISTRICTS
IAC
40 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
Response
REGULATION
DETECTION
PREVENTION
SUPRESSION
Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report 41
Among the mechanisms used to achieve this goal
were contests to fill job openings, building a talent
pool, redeployment of staff and use of incentives.
To celebrate Rosfinmonitoring's 15th anniversary, 42
Rosfinmonitoring employees were presented with
various state awards, diplomas and gratitude letters
from the Russian President and government. The
cooperation between Rosfinmonitoring employees
and AML/CTF system participants was marked through
the presentation of 338 departmental awards.
A total of 96 students from the universities
participating in the network AML/CTF Institute
underwent internship in the structural subdivisions
of the central office in 2016.
Building a talent pool and facilitating professional
development of employees is a priority area of
Rosfinmonitoring HR efforts. In 2016, trainings were
provided:
• under state-sponsored programs,
• at the facilities of the International Training and
Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring
(ITMCFM),
• in the framework of AML/CTF workshops,
• in the framework of distant learning.
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING
AND METHODOLOGY CENTRE
FOR FINANCIAL MONITORING
The International Training and Methodology Centre
for Financial Monitoring, founded by Rosfinmonitoring
after the Russian Government’s decree in 2005,
has been transformed into the basic training hub
for Eurasia. Since its establishment, the centre's
training courses have been attended by over 10,000
students, including 2,500 from abroad.
One of the ITMCFM's key tasks involves AML/CTF
trainings for participants in the national AML/CTF
system from among representatives of government
agencies and the private sector. Among the key
PERSONNEL TRAINING.
ROSFINMONITORING'S ACTIVITIES
5
42 Rosfinmonitoring Activity Public Report
features of the 2016 training schedule were the
activities dedicated to the preparation of personnel
for the next round of mutual evaluations, including
through:
• raising awareness and enabling practical
application of the FATF Recommendations;
• discussing the issues related to the
fight against terrorist and extremist
financing;
• clarifying the latest legislative changes;
• exploring new approaches to the conduct
of a national risk assessment;
• strengthening inter-agency cooperation
and collaboration.
Employees of Russian government agencies
(Rosfinmonitoring, Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry,
FSS, FDCS, FCS, Investigative Committee, Bank of
Russia, Assay Chamber, Roskomnadzor and FTS)
attended more than 20 trainings. The number of
Russian individuals attending ITMCFM courses that
year stood at over 2200.
NETWORK AML/CTF INSTITUTE
The network AML/CTF Institute is a major
international scientific and educational centre
specializing in the training of personnel for the
national AML/CTF systems of Russia and its
partners.
Today, the network AML/CTF Institute comprises
over 20 institutions of higher education from
Russia, EAG and BRICS.
997 Russian and 125 foreign students enrolled
at the universities participating in the network
AML/CTF Institute in 2016. In 2016, several new
countries – Azerbaijan, Brazil, Moldova, Mongolia
and Syria – joined the project.
Also in 2016, with a view to facilitating the
enrolment of foreign students at the universities of
the network AML/CTF Institute and strengthening
international cooperation in the fight against
ML/TF, cooperation agreements for the training
of AML/CTF personnel were signed with the FIUs
of Abkhazia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan and South Ossetia.
In addition, one of the most important directions of
the network AML/CTF Institute's work in 2016 was
the integration of education and science and the
promotion of a scientific direction in the AML/CTF
sector. To this end, scientific centres and schools
were established in universities.
One important area of Rosfinmonitoring's work in
2016 was the integration of information technology
as a means of boosting work efficiency and
facilitating infrastructure development.
Annex 438
Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, No. 1 of 9 February
2012, “On Some Aspects of Judicial Practice Relating to Criminal Cases on Crimes of Terrorist
Nature,”
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
1
RESOLUTION
BY THE PLENUM OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Moscow city February 9, 2012
On Some Aspects of Judicial Practice Relating to Criminal Cases
on Crimes of Terrorist Nature
(as amended by the Plenum’s Resolution
dated November 3, 2016)
Terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and to the progress
of friendly relations between States, endangers territorial integrity of States, their
political, economic and social stability, as well as the enjoyment of fundamental
human and civil rights and freedoms, including the right to life.
The international community, being aware of the danger of terrorism and
seeking to develop effective measures to prevent it, has adopted a number of
instruments, which include the United Nations Conventions (for example, the
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism), the Shanghai Convention on
Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, the Council of Europe Convention
on the Prevention of Terrorism, etc.
The international instruments state that terrorism may not be justified under any
circumstances on the grounds of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature, and that the perpetrators of acts of terrorism and other
crimes provided for in the mentioned Conventions
2
should be held accountable under the law and should be punished according to the
gravity of the crimes committed. At the same time, measures to prevent or suppress
such crimes should be taken with observance of the rule of law and democratic values,
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as other provisions of international
law.
In the Russian Federation, the legal framework for combating terrorism is the
Constitution of the Russian Federation, the generally recognized principles and
provisions of international law, the international treaties of the Russian Federation,
Federal Law dated July 25, 2002 No. 114-FZ "On Combating Extremist Activity",
Federal Law of March 6, 2006 No. 35-FZ "On Combating Terrorism" and other
statutory instruments aimed at countering terrorism.
In order to support the countering of terrorism by criminal law and with a view
to fulfilling international commitments, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
(RF CC) establishes liability for the commission of crimes provided for in its Articles
205, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 206, 208, 211, 220, 221, 277, 278, 279, 360 and
361.
Given the issues faced by courts while adjudicating on criminal cases relating to
acts of terrorism (Article 205 of the RF CC), assistance to terrorist activities (article
2051 of the RF CC), public calls for terrorist activities or public justification of
terrorism (Article 2052 of the RF CC), training for the purposes of terrorist activities
(Article 2053 of the RF CC), organization of a terrorist association and participation
in it (Article 2054 of the RF CC), organization of operation of a terrorist organization
and participation in the activities of such an organization (Article 2055 of the RF CC),
organization of an illegal armed formation or participation in it (Article 208 of the RF
CC), and also with the aim of ensuring the unity of judicial practice, the Plenum of
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, being guided by Article 126 of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation,
hereby decrees:
1. Attention of courts should be drawn to the fact that the purpose of
destabilizing the operation of public authorities or international organizations or
affecting their decision-making is a mandatory sign of an act of terrorism (Article 205
of the RF CC).
When making a conclusion about the orientation of the perpetrator's intent
towards destabilization of operation of public authorities or international
organizations, all of the circumstances of the act should be taken into account, in
particular, the time, place, method, situation, tools and means by which the crime is
committed, the nature and extent of the consequences that have occurred or are
alleged, as well as the perpetrator’s behavior prior to and after the crime.
3
The purpose of affecting the decision-making by public authorities or
international organizations may be indicated by inducement of relevant actors to
commit certain actions or to abstain from action, and also by the nature of demands
declared by participants in the crime.
2. Commission of explosion, arson or other similar acts entails criminal liability
under Article 205 of the RF CC in cases where it is established that the nature of
these actions was frightening to the population and they created the danger of human
death, significant damage to property or other grave consequences.
Actions frightening to the population should be understood as actions which by
their nature can make people fear for their lives and health, safety of relatives, safety
of property, etc.
The threat of human death, significant damage to property or onset of other
grave consequences should be real, and this is determined in each particular case
taking into account the place, time, tools, means, and method of committing a crime
and other circumstances of the case (information about the number of people present
in the area of explosion, the power and the lethality of the explosive device used,
etc.).
3. Other actions frightening to the population and creating the threat of human
death, or significant damage to property or the occurrence of other grave
consequences mentioned in Article 205 of the RF CC should be understood as actions
with the consequences comparable to an explosion or arson, for example,
organization of accidents at vital infrastructure facilities; destruction of transport
communications; contamination of drinking water sources and food products;
spreading of disease-causing microbes capable of causing an epidemic or epizootic;
radioactive, chemical, biological (bacteriological) and other contamination of the
area; armed attack on populated localities, shelling of houses, schools, hospitals,
administrative buildings, deployment sites (locations) of military personnel or
officers of law enforcement agencies; capture and (or) destruction of buildings,
railway stations, ports, cultural or religious buildings.
4. A threat of explosion, arson or other actions frightening to the population and
creating the threat of human death, or significant damage to property or the
occurrence of other grave consequences (Part 1, Article 205 of the RF CC), can be
manifested in various ways (for example, oral statement, publication in the press,
distribution using radio, television or other media, as well as information and
telecommunication networks).
5. The crime provided for by Part 1, Article 205 of the RF CC committed by a
person through explosion, arson or actions frightening to the population and creating
the threat of human death, or significant damage to property or the occurrence of
other grave consequences, should be recognized as completed at the moment when
the mentioned actions are committed.
4
6. When qualifying an act of terrorism under cl. “a” of part 2, Article 205 of the
RF CC, it should be taken into account that an organized group should be understood
as a stable group of two or more persons who united in advance for the purpose of
committing one or more crimes. An organized group may be regarded stable if it
exists for a long period, its members repeatedly commit crimes, they are technically
equipped, their roles are distributed, preparations even for one crime take certain time,
and there are also other circumstances indicative of an organized group (e.g. special
training of an organized group members.)
If it is found that an act of terrorism is committed by an organized group, actions
of each member thereof who took part in the preparation or commission of this crime,
irrespective of his/her actual role, should be qualified under the relevant part of
Article 205 of the RF CC without reference to Article 33 of the RF CC.
7. A conclusion about whether the damage is significant (cl. "B", part 2, Article
205 of the RF CC) should be based on the value of the destroyed property or the costs
of repairing the damaged property and the importance of this property for the victim,
for example, depending on the type of the victim’s occupation or financial position,
or the financial and business status of a legal entity which owned or otherwise
possessed the destroyed or damaged property.
Significant property damage caused by an act of terrorism is qualified under cl.
"B" of part 2, Article 205 of the RF CC and does not require any additional
qualification under Article 167 of the RF CC.
8. Other grave consequences in the context of cl. "B" of part 2, Article 205 of
the RF CC may include, in particular, causing serious harm to health of at least one
person, or harm of average severity to health of two and more persons, and also
disorganization of operation of public authorities and local self-government bodies;
long-term disruption of an enterprise’s (enterprises’) and (or) institution’s
(institutions’) operation, irrespective of their departmental affiliation, ownership form,
legal incorporation form; significant deterioration of environmental situation (e.g.
land degradation, pollution of surface and inland water, atmosphere, marine
environment, and other negative changes to the environment preventing its
preservation and lawful use, when a long time and large material costs are required to
eliminate the consequences thereof.)
For making a conclusion about whether the operation of an enterprise or an
institution has been disrupted for a long time, courts should take into account specific
circumstances of the case, as well as the specifics of its operation, total time for
which the operation was disrupted, the amount of damages caused, etc.
9. If an act of terrorism intentionally caused death of a person (or two or more
persons), the act is covered by cl. "b", part 3 of Article 205 of the RF CC and does
not require any additional qualification under Article 105 of RF CC.
5
10. If an act of terrorism is committed using illegally acquired or stored
nuclear materials and radioactive substances, as well as illegally acquired, stored or
manufactured firearms, ammunition, explosives or explosive devices, the acts of a
person shall be qualified by the totality of the committed crimes which are provided
for by Article 205 of the RF CC and accordingly, Article 221, 222, 2221, 223, 2231, or
226 of the RF CC.
11. Courts should keep in mind that an infringement on the life and health of
another person by making an explosion, arson or other actions of this nature
committed on the grounds of revenge or personal hostile relations and not pursuing
the goal of destabilizing the activities of public authorities or international
organizations or affecting their decision-making, shall not constitute a crime under
Article 205 of the RF CC, and shall be qualified under relevant articles of the Special
Chapter of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
12. In the event that a person commits an infringement on the life of a state or
public figure or a person administering justice or carrying out a pre-trial investigation,
or a law enforcement officer by committing an explosion, arson or other actions of
such nature in order to destabilize the operation of public authorities or international
organizations or affecting their decision-making, the crime should be qualified under
Article 205 of the RF CC.
When an infringement on the life of a state or public figure, although committed
in the manner aforesaid, intends at terminating his/her state or political activity or
revenging for such activities, the crime should be qualified under Article 277 of the
RF CC.
An infringement on the life of a person administering justice or carrying out a
pre-trial investigation, or a law enforcement officer committed by explosion, arson or
other acts of this nature in order to prevent his/her legitimate activities or revenge for
such activities should be qualified respectively under Article 295 of the RF CC or
Article 317 of the RF CC.
13. Actions by members of a terrorist association, terrorist organization, illegal
armed formation who committed an act of terrorism should be qualified by the
totality of the committed crimes which are provided for by Article 205 of the RF CC
and accordingly, under Article 2054, 2055, 208 of the RF CC.
14. Courts should understand criminal cases on the crimes provided for under
Article 2051 of the RF CC which are committed by inducement, by recruiting or
otherwise by involving a person in the commission of at least one of the crimes listed
under part 1 of Article 2051 of the RF CC, in particular, as deliberate actions aimed at
involving a certain person (a group of persons) in the commission of one or more of
the said crimes,
6
for example, by persuasion, bribery, threat, persuasion, requests, proposals (including
those made through posting of materials in various media and their distribution
through information and telecommunications networks), and also by the use of
physical influence or by searching for persons and involving them in the commission
of at least one of these crimes.
Inducement, recruiting or otherwise involving a person in the commission of at
least one of the crimes specified under part 1 of Article 205 of the RF CC should be
regarded as a completed crime from the moment when these actions are performed,
irrespective of whether the person involved has committed a respective crime of a
terrorist nature.
15. The armament referred to in part 1 of Article 2051 of the RF CC should be
understood as supply of the persons involved in terrorist activities with weapons,
ammunition, explosives and explosive devices, radioactive substances, nuclear
materials, military equipment, etc. for the purpose of committing at least one of the
crimes specified under this Article.
Training of persons for the purpose of committing crimes referred to in part 1 of
Article 205 of the RF CC shall be understood as teaching the rules of handling
weapons, ammunition, explosive devices, radioactive substances, nuclear materials,
military equipment, communications equipment, rules of warfare, as well as providing
of respecting guidelines, holding of training, shooting, drills, etc.
16.The financing of terrorism, along with rendering of financial services, should
also be understood as the provision or collection not only of money (in cash or
non-cash form), but also of material assets (for example, items of uniforms, equipment,
means of communication, medicines, residential or non-residential premises, vehicles)
being aware that they are intended to finance the organization, preparation or
commission of at least one of the crimes provided for by Articles 205, 2051, 2052, 2053,
2054, 2055, 206, 208, 211, 220, 221, 277 ,278, 279 and 360 of the RF CC, or to finance
or otherwise provide material support to a person for the purpose of committing at
least one of these crimes, or to support an organized group, an illegal armed formation,
a criminal association (criminal organization) which are created or being created for
the commission of at least one of the specified crimes (for example, systematic
deductions or a one-time contribution to the general fund, purchase of real estate or
payment of its rent, provision of money intended for bribing officials).
17. Persons using their official position (part 2 of Article 2051 of the RF CC),
should be understood as officials as well as civil servants and employees of local
self-government bodies who are not classified as officials, as well as persons who on
the full-time or temporary basis or under special authority perform organizational
administration or business administration functions in a commercial organization,
irrespective of the form of ownership, or in a non-profit organization which is not a
public or municipal institution.
7
The use of an official position for committing the crimes under article 2051 of
the RF CC should be understood not only as the deliberate use by such persons of
their official powers, but also as exercising influence on other persons to the extent of
the weight and authority of the position held for the purpose of encouraging them to
commit the acts aimed at assistance to terrorist activities.
171. Courts should keep in mind that liability for aiding and abetting under part 3
of Article 2051 of the RF CC arises when this occurred during the commission of at
least one of the crimes provided for in Article 205, part 3 of Article 206, and part 1 of
Article 208 of the RF CC. The said aiding and abetting is covered by part 3 of Article
2051 of the RF CC and does not require any additional qualification under Article 205,
part 3 of Article 206 or part 1 of Article 208 of the RF CC.
Criminal liability for aiding and abetting in an act of terrorism, hostage-taking or
organization of an illegal armed formation committed by a member of an organized
group which performed such crimes shall arise under a respective article of the
Special Chapter of the RF CC and does not require the qualification under part 3 of
Article 2051 of the RF CC.
172. Courts should bear in mind that part 4 of Article 2051 of the RF CC
establishes the liability for actions aimed at organizing the commission or managing
the commission of at least one of the crimes provided for by Articles 205, 2053, parts
3 and 4 of Article 206, part 4 of Article 211 of the RF CC, and equally for organizing
of financing of terrorism. At the same time, financing of terrorism does not require
any additional qualification under Articles 205, 2053, parts 3 and 4 of Article 206,
part 4 of Article 211 of the RF CC, and equally under parts 1 and 2 of Article 2051 of
the RF CC.
Actions of organizing the commission or managing the commission of another
crime having a terrorist nature, including the organization of commission of other
types of assistance to terrorist activity shall be qualified under the relevant article of
the Special Chapter of the RF CC with reference to part 3 of Article 33 of the RF CC,
except when such actions are made by a member of an organized group.
18. Public calls for terrorist activity under Article 2052 of the RF CC should be
understood as any form of appeal (for example, oral, written, or with the use of
technical means) addressed to other persons with the aim of encouraging them to
terrorist activities, i.e., to commission of crimes provided for under Articles 205-206,
208, 211, 220, 221, 277, 278, 279, 360, 361 of the RF CC.
According to Note 1 to Article 2052 of the RF CC, public justification of
terrorism should be understood as a public statement acknowledging that the ideology
and practice of terrorism is appropriate, worthy of support and imitation. In this
context, the ideology and practice of terrorism should be understood as the ideology
of violence and the practice of influencing the decision-making of public authorities,
local self-government bodies or
8
international organizations which involve frightening of the population and (or) other
forms of illegal, violent actions (cl. 1 of Article 3 of the Federal Law "on Combating
Terrorism").
19. Courts should make a conclusion on whether calls for terrorist activities or
justification of terrorism (Article 2052 of the RF CC) are public taking into account
the place, method, situation and other circumstances of the case (for example,
addressing a group of persons in public places, at meetings, rallies, demonstrations,
distribution of leaflets, hanging of posters, distribution of appeals by mass mailing of
messages to mobile subscribers, etc.).
20. Public calls for terrorist activities (part 1 of Article 2052 of the RF CC)
should be regarded as a completed crime upon the moment of public proclamation
(distribution) of at least one call irrespective of whether the call succeeded in
encouraging other citizens to terrorist activities or not.
Public justification of terrorism shall constitute the corpus delicti of a completed
crime upon the moment a person makes a public statement declaring that the ideology
and practice of terrorism are appropriate and worthy of support and imitation.
21. Making a conclusion on the use of the mass media, electronic or information
and telecommunication networks, including the Internet, for the purpose of public
calls to terrorist activities or public justification of terrorism (part 2 of Article 2052 of
the RF CC), it is necessary to take account of the provisions of the Russian
Federation Law dated December 27, 1991 No. 2124-I "On the Mass Media" and
Federal Law dated July 27, 2006 No. 149-FZ "On Information, Information
Technologies and Information Protection".
Crimes under part 2 of Article 2052 of the RF CC involving the use of the mass
media should be regarded as completed upon the moment of distribution of the mass
media products (e.g., sales, handing out of a printed periodical, audio - or
video-recorded program, start of broadcast of a TV- or radio program, demonstration
of a newsreel program, provision of access to a network periodical).
211. In case of public calls for terrorist activities or public justification of
terrorism by the mass mailing of messages to mobile communication subscribers or
by using electronic or information-telecommunication networks, including the
Internet network, the crime should be regarded as completed upon the moment when
such a call is published in the mentioned networks (for example, on websites, forums
or blogs), or when respective messages are sent to other persons.
22. If public calls for terrorist activities or public justification of terrorism is
made with the use of online media (websites in the Internet information and
telecommunications network,
9
registered as a mass medium in the prescribed manner), these acts should be qualified
under part 2 of Article 2052 of the RF CC as the act committed with the use the mass
media. If the mentioned acts are committed using websites in the Internet information
and telecommunication network which are not registered as the mass media in the
prescribed manner, these acts should be qualified under part 2 of Article 2052 of the
RF CC as the act committed with use of electronic or information and
telecommunication networks, including the Internet.
221. The crime under Article 2053 of the RF CC should be understood as the
case when a person is being trained to commit an act of terrorism or to commit any of
the crimes provided for by Articles 2051, 206, 208, 211, 277, 278, 279, 360 and 361
of the RF CC. Such training may involve the acquisition of necessary knowledge,
practical skills and abilities in the course of physical and psychological training, or by
studying the methods to commit the specified crimes, the rules of using weapons,
explosive devices, explosive, poisonous and other substances and things which are
dangerous to the persons around. Training may also involve other perpetrator’s
actions directly related to his/her training for terrorist activities.
The crime shall be regarded as completed as soon as the actions are
commenced with the aim of acquiring the appropriate knowledge, skills and abilities
for subsequent terrorist activities or the commission of at least one of the mentioned
crimes of a terrorist nature, irrespective of whether the person has acquired the
necessary knowledge, skills and abilities or not.
If, along with the training, a person performs other actions aimed at creating
the conditions for the commission of a particular grave crime or specifically grave
crime of a terrorist or other nature, these actions should be additionally qualified as
preparation for this crime.
222. Part 1 of Article 2054 of the RF CC provides that a terrorist association
shall be a stable group of persons who united in advance with the aim of carrying out
terrorist activities, or for preparing or committing one or more crimes specified under
Articles 2051, 2052, 206, 208, 211, 220, 221, 277, 278, 279, 360 and 361 of the RF
CC, or other crimes for the purpose of promoting, justifying and supporting terrorism.
An organized group may be recognized as a terrorist association without the
need for a preliminary court decision about liquidation of the organization due to
terrorist activities.
223. The crime under part 1 of Article 2054 of the RF CC shall be recognized as
completed on the moment when a terrorist association is formed in fact, i.e. after two
or more persons unite into a stable group
10
for the purpose of terrorist activities or for the preparation or commission of one or
more of the crimes under Articles 2051, 2052, 206, 208, 211, 220, 221, 277, 278, 279,
360 and 361 of the RF CC, or other crimes with the aim of promoting, justifying and
supporting terrorism.
The fact that such a purpose exists may be indicated, inter alia, by deliberate
acts made by these persons with the aim of creating conditions for the terrorist
activities or for the said crimes, or by acts evidencing the readiness of a terrorist
association to implement its criminal intentions, irrespective of whether the members
of such an association have committed the planned crime. The readiness of a terrorist
association to terrorist activities or to commission of such crimes may be evidenced,
for example, by an agreement reached by its members on the assistance to terrorist
activities, public justification of terrorism, etc.
224. Management of a terrorist association, its part or structural units
comprising such an association should be understood as management functions
performed with regard to a terrorist association, its part or structural units, as well as
its individual members while committing specific crimes of a terrorist nature and also
while ensuring the association’s operation.
Such management may be recognized, in particular, in case when general plans
of a terrorist association’s operation are worked out, and also in case of preparations
for the commission of specific crimes of a terrorist nature, in case of commission of
other actions aimed at achieving the goals set for a terrorist association or for the
units comprising it at the moment when such units have been created (this may be, for
example, assignment of roles to members of the association, organization of logistics,
working out of the ways of committing crimes, security measures taken in respect of
the terrorist association members).
225. Participation in a terrorist association should be understood as a person’s
joining of such an association with the intention of participating in terrorist activities
or in the preparations for or in the commission of one or several of the crimes
provided for under Articles 2051, 2052, 206, 208, 211, 220, 221, 277, 278, 279, 360
and 361 of the RF CC, or other crimes for the purposes of terrorism propaganda,
justification and support, and also participation in the preparations for the
commission of these crimes or in the commission of such crimes, and also when a
person fulfills functional duties to ensure the operation of a terrorist community
(furnishing of information, documentation, etc.).
The crime of a person’s participation in a terrorist association shall be
recognized as completed upon the moment this persons joins such an association with
the intention of participating in terrorist activities or in the preparations for or in the
commission of one or several of the crimes provided for
11
under Articles 2051, 2052, 206, 208, 211, 220, 221, 277, 278, 279, 360 and 361 of the
RF CC, or other crimes for the purposes of terrorism propaganda, justification and
support.
When a member of a terrorist association commits a specific crime, his or her
actions should be qualified by the totality of the crimes.
226. Article 2055 of the RF CC imposes liability for organizing the operation of a
terrorist organization (part 1) and for participating in the operation of such an
organization (part 2).
Courts should bear in mind that subject to Article 24 of the Federal Law "On
Combating Terrorism", the federal executive authority responsible for security
maintains a unified federal list of organizations recognized as terrorist organizations
in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation and this list is subject to
official publication.
A person may be held criminally liable for the crimes specified under Article
2055 of the RF CC if they are committed after the official publication of information
stating that a respective organization has been recognized as a terrorist organization
and its operation is prohibited in the territory of the Russian Federation by a court
decision.
227. Criminal liability under part 1 of Article 2055 of the RF CC arises for the
organization of operation of a terrorist organization meaning the actions of an
organizational nature aimed at continuing or resuming illegal activities of a
prohibited organization (for example, convening meetings, organizing marches, using
of bank accounts, unless this is not related to the liquidation procedure).
Participation in the operation of a terrorist organization should be understood as
a person’s commission of intentional actions relating to the continuation or
resumption of this organization’s operation (interviews to promote the activities of a
prohibited organization, direct participation in the organizational activities held, etc.).
When the organizer (leader) or a member of a terrorist organization commits a
specific crime, his/her actions should be qualified by the totality of crimes specified
under part 1 or part 2 of Article 2055 of the RF CC and the relevant article of the
Special Chapter of the RF CC.
If the person who organized the operation of an organization recognized as a
terrorist organization under the laws of the Russian Federation took part in the
operation of this organization, his/her acts shall not require any additional
qualification under part 2 of Article 2055 of the RF CC.
23. Courts should bear in mind that given cl. 2 of Article 3 of the Federal Law
"On Combating Terrorism", organization of an illegal armed formation with the aim
of committing an act of terrorism,
12
and equally participation in such a structure shall be recognized as terrorist activities.
An illegal armed formation referred to in Article 208 of the RF CC should be
understood as an association, detachment, squad or any other armed group which is
not provided for by the Federal Law and is created to implement certain tasks (for
example, to commit acts of terrorism, make a violent change of the foundations of the
constitutional system or breach the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation).
Armament as a mandatory feature of an illegal formation implies that its
members have any type of firearms or other weapons, ammunition and explosive
devices, including those of “do-it-yourself” origin, as well as military equipment. At
the same time, illegal acquisition, storage, use, transfer of nuclear materials and
radioactive substances; acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, carrying or
manufacturing of firearms and their main parts, ammunition, explosives and
explosive devices should be qualified, respectively, under articles 221, 222, 2221, 223,
2231 or 226 of the RF CC.
24. Establishment of an illegal armed formation (part 1 of Article 208 of the RF
CC ) shall be recognized as a completed crime upon the moment when this formation
is created in fact, i.e., upon the moment when several persons unite into a group and
at least some of them acquire weapons, ammunition, explosive devices, and military
equipment.
25. Management of an illegal armed formation (Article 208 of the RF CC) shall
be understood as the exercise of managerial functions in respect of an association,
detachment, squad or another group, as well as in respect of its individual members
with a view to ensuring the operation of an illegal armed formation.
Such management may be manifested, inter alia, by approval of general
operation plans of an illegal armed formation, or by other actions aimed at achieving
the objectives set by such a formation (for example, assignment of functions to
members of an illegal armed formation, organization of logistics, taking of security
measures in respect of members thereof).
26. Financing of an illegal armed formation (part 1 of Article 208 of the RF CC)
should be understood as the provision or collection of money or financial services
being aware that they are intended for ensuring the operation of an association, group,
squad or another group.
In cases where a person contributes to terrorist activities by financing an illegal
armed formation, his/her actions shall be covered by part 1 of Article 208 of the RF
SS and no additional qualification under part 1 of Article 2051 of the RF CC
recognizing the financing of terrorism shall be required.
27. Courts should be made aware that criminal liability under part 2 of Article
208 of the RF CC for participation in an illegal armed formation arises in cases,
13
when members of this formation are aware of its illegal nature and their belonging to
it but act with the aim of achieving its objectives.
Participation in an illegal armed formation exists in cases when a person joins
such a formation (for example, by taking an oath, giving a written note or oral
consent, receiving uniform, weapons), or performs functional duties to ensure the
operation of such a formation (training of its members; construction of temporary
residential facilities, various structures and enclosing structures; cooking; subsistence
activities in places when an illegal armed formation is located, etc.).
The crime of a person’s participation in an illegal armed formation shall be
recognized as completed upon the moment when specific actions are made to ensure
the operation of an illegal armed formation.
28. When a member of an illegal armed formation commits a specific crime,
his/her actions should be qualified by the totality of crimes provided for under part 2
of Article 208 of the RF CC and the relevant article of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation (for example, Article 205, 2051, 2052 or 206 of the RF CC).
29. If individual members of illegal armed formations have united into a stable
armed group (gang) with the aim of attacking citizens or organizations, or into a
terrorist association, manage such a group (gang) or a terrorist association, and also
participate in the attacks or crimes of a terrorist nature committed by them, such acts
shall be qualified by the totality of crimes under Articles 208 and 209 or 2054 of the
RF CC.
30. Participation in an illegal armed formation shall be recognized as
terminated voluntary (a note to Article 208 of the RF CC) when a person terminates
his/her participation in such a formation of his/her own free will while having an
objective opportunity to continue such participation.
Persons who have surrendered their weapons should be understood as members
of illegal armed formations who have surrendered the weapons available to them to
public authorities or have notified the latter about the places where weapons are kept.
A member of an illegal armed formation who, by virtue of his or her duties,
does not possess a weapon, may be exempted from criminal liability on the grounds
that he or she has voluntarily ceased to participate in an illegal armed formation and
has reported this to public authorities.
301. In case of persons found guilty of crimes under articles 205, 2051, 2052,
2053, 2054, 2055, 206, 208, 277, 278, 279 and 361 of the RF CC, the court, subject to
cl. "a", "b", "c" of part 1, Article 1041 of the RF CC should decide on the seizure of
money, valuables and other assets obtained as a result of these crimes, and any
income from such assets, money, valuables and other assets into which these assets
and respective income were partially or
14
completely transformed; money, valuables and other assets which are used or
intended for financing terrorism, extremist activities, an organized group, illegal
armed formation, or criminal association (criminal organization).
Based on the provisions of cl. "d" of part 1, Article 1041 of the RF CC and part 3
of Article 81 of the RF Code of Criminal Procedure a court may make a decision to
seize the tools, equipment, or other means by which a crime was committed and
which are owned by the defendant.
302. If a judge considers a criminal case against a member of a terrorist
organization in the absence of circumstances referred to in Articles 61 and 63 of the
RF Code of Criminal Procedure, this shall not prevent the same judge from
considering a criminal case against other members of the same terrorist organization.
31. While considering criminal cases involving crimes of a terrorist nature,
courts should establish the circumstances which contributed to the commission of
these crimes, and also should establish the violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms,
as well as other violations of law committed during a pre-trial investigation or during
consideration of the criminal case by a lower court. According to part 4, Article 29 of
the RF Code of Criminal Procedure, the organizations and officials concerned should
be made aware of the discovered facts of violated law by issuing special court rulings
and decrees.
Chairman of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation VLebedev
Plenum Secretary, Judge
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
V.V. Doroshkov
Annex 439
Powers of the Russian Minister of Defense, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (19
January 2011)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
1
Powers of the Russian Minister of Defense
Publication start date: January 19, 2011 23:00:00
The Minister shall:
[ . . . ]
(16) manage strategic deployment and use of the Armed Forces in the prescribed manner pursuant to a
decision of the President of the Russian Federation;
(19) make decisions on the formation, organization, and deployment of military units and divisions all
the way up to and including a regiment, and also to deploy and redeploy military units and divisions all
the way up to and including a regiment within the territories made available to the Russian Ministry of
Defense, and outside such territories – with approval from the executive authorities of the constituent
entities of the Russian Federation or local government agencies;
[ . . . ]
(34) establishes the procedure for approving plans for research and development to be performed by
enterprises and research organizations under the Russian Ministry of Defense;
(35) follows established procedures for equipping (procuring, using) new and updated versions of
armaments and military hardware, and decommissions (halts procurement or use of) outdated
versions;
(36) establishes the procedure for decommissioning armaments, military hardware, and other materials
within the Armed Forces and for removing Navy ships or vessels from the Navy or transferring them
from one class to another, in accordance with Russian Federation law;
(37) arranges for measures to increase the quality and reliability of armaments and military hardware;
(38) establishes the classification and creates standards for the creation, accumulation, and
consumption of armaments, military hardware, and other materials;
[ . . . ]
Annex 440
Federal Law “On Combatting Terrorism” (6 March 2006)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document with its submission. The
translated passages are highlighted in the original-language document. Ukraine has omitted
from translation those portions of the document that are not materially relied upon in its
Memorial, but stands ready to provide additional translations should the Court so require.
FEDERAL LAW OF 6 MARCH 2006 ON COUNTERACTION TO TERRORISM
Article 3. Basic Concepts
The following basic concepts are used in this Federal Law:
1) terrorism shall mean the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a
decision by public authorities, local self-government bodies or international organizations connected with
frightening the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions;
2) terrorist activity shall mean the activity including the following:
arranging, planning, preparing, financing and implementing an act of terrorism;
b) instigation of an act of terrorism;
c) establishment of an unlawful armed unit, criminal association (criminal organization) or an organized
group for implementation of an act of terrorism, as well as participation in such structure;
d) recruiting, arming, training and using terrorists;
e) informational or other assistance to planning, preparing or implementing an act of terrorism;
f) popularization of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information urging terrorist activities,
substantiating or justifying the necessity of the exercise of such activity;
3) terrorist act shall mean making an explosion, arson or other actions connected with frightening the
population and posing the danger of loss of life, of causing considerable damage to property or other
especially grave consequences, for the purpose of destabilizing the operation of public authorities or
international organizations, or influence upon adoption of decisions by them, as well as the threat of
committing the said actions for the same purpose (as amended by the Federal Law of May 5, 2014 No.
130-FZ - Collected Acts of the Russian Federation, 2014, No. 19, p. 2335);
4) counteraction to terrorism shall mean the activity of public authorities and local self-government
bodies, as well as their individuals and legal entities (as amended by the Federal Law of July 23, 2013
No. 208-FZ - Collected Acts of the Russian Federation, 2013, No. 30, p. 4041):
) prevention of terrorism, including the detection and subsequent removal of the reasons and conditions
conducive to committing acts of terrorism (prevention of terrorism);
b) detection, prevention, suppression, disclosure and investigation of an act of terrorism (struggle against
terrorism);
c) reduction to minimum and (or) liquidation of terrorist manifestations;
5) antiterrorist operation shall mean a complex set of special, operational-combat, army and other
measures accompanied by the use of military equipment, armaments and special facilities
which are aimed at suppressing an act of terrorism, neutralizing terrorists, ensuring security
of natural persons, organizations and institutions, as well as at reducing to minimum the
consequences of an act of terrorism;
6) anti-terrorism security of the facility (site) shall mean the condition which ensures the protection of
a building, a structure, a construction or other facility, or a place where many persons stay at a time and
which prevents the implementation of an act of terrorism. In this context, the place where many persons
stay at a time shall be understood as the common-use territory of a settlement or urban district, or a
specially designated area outside of their limits, or a common-use area in a building, a structure, a
construction or any other facility capable of accommodating, under certain conditions, more than fifty
persons at a time. (Clause 6 has been introduced by the Federal Law dated July 23, 2013 No. 208-FZ -
Collected Acts of the Russian Federation, 2013, No. 30, p. 4041).
Annex 441
Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Captives Describe Brutal Beatings (5 May 2014)
Annex 442
Eliot Higgins, Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17, bell¿ngcat (17
July 2014)
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/ 1/14
Case Studies (Https://Www.Bellingcat.Com/Category/Resources/Case-Studies/) MH17 (Https://Www.Bellingcat.Com/Tag/Mh17/)
July 17, 2014 By Eliot Higgins (https://www.bellingcat.com/author/eliothiggins/)
Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17
Shortly after reports of flight MH17 being shot down in Ukraine began emerging, the following video was posted online, claiming to show a
Buk missile launcher travelling through Snizhne (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snizhne), a rebel held town
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28309034) near the Russian border.
Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014
The original video was quickly deleted from YouTube for unknown reasons, but one lesson to learn earlier on with any video of interest is to
immediately download it. Avariety tools are available to do this, including Keepvid (http://keepvid.com/), which I used in this instance.
(https://www.bellingcat.com)
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
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The obvious question is whether or not this is actually Snizhne, so the first thing to do is see if there’s any obvious landmarks in the video.
In this case, the road is a dual-carriageway with trees in the middle, and looking at satellite images from Snizhne it seems quite unusual. I
shared the video with my Twitter followers, asking if anyone could find the area (crowd-sourcing these things can be useful), and quickly
several people pointed to an area south of the center of Snizhne
(http://old.wikimapia.org/#lat=48.011463&lon=38.7633437&z=18&l=0&m=b)
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/ 3/14
(https://bellingcat.com/wpcontent/
uploads/2014/07/bukmap1.jpg)
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
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The road appeared to share the same layout, with the trees in the middle, and had the slight turn visible in the video. Based off this, it
seemed the camera would have to be north of the road, facing south. Aside from the road layout, something else stood out in the video, the
height of the camera. It was clear the camera was positioned much higher than the buildings to the south, suggesting it was either on a hill
or on top of a tall building. To test this, I used the ground-level view option in Google Earth, and positioned the cursor on the road, facing
north, towards the camera
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bukmap2.jpg)
It seemed the only hills in the area were far in the distance, and by examining the map I was able to see apartment buildings to the north of
the road
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
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(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bukmap3.jpg)
Based on that I now had the approximate position of the camera, and I was able to identify other features I would expect to see from that
vantage point. First, three trees positioned to the north of the bend in the road
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/ 6/14
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
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(https://bellingcat.com/wpcontent/
uploads/2014/07/bukmap4 jpg)
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/ 8/14
content/uploads/2014/07/bukmap4.jpg)
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/bukmap5.jpg)
South of the bend it’s possible to identify two junctions on the road, points 1 and 2, with one tree visible between the junction on both the
video and map. At point 3 the red roof of a house is also visible in both the video and satellite map
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
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(https://bellingcat.com/wpcontent/
uploads/2014/07/bukmap6.jpg)
5/30/2018 bellingcat - Geolocating the Missile Launcher Linked to the Downing of MH17 - bellingcat
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Based on this information it seems likely that this is the correct location of what’s claimed to by the Buk missile launcher, heading south
away from Snizhne. Based on initial information about the location of the crash site, it appears this location was around 10-15km of the
crash site.
(https://www.bellingcat.com/author/eliothiggins/)
Eliot Higgins is the founder of Bellingcat and the Brown Moses Blog. Eliot focuses on the weapons used in the conflict in
Syria, and open source investigation tools and techniques.
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12 Comments
Baskakov Dmitriy - June 2, 2015 (https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-ofmh17/
comment-page-2/#comment-18679)
What I want to say, it still looks weak. First — in order to completely verify the location, you have to go to Snizhne and take a photo from
there.
Second (and the main point)… How do you know it’s Buk missile launcher? The video resolution isn’t big enough to clearly see what type of
military vehicle it is.
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Stevie - February 24, 2016 (https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/07/17/geolocating-the-missile-launcher-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/commentpage-
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Annex 443
Eliot Higgins, Identifying the Location of the MH17 Linked Missile Launcher from One
Photograph, bell¿ngcat (18 July 2014)
Annex 444
Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians (Aug. 28, 2014)
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 1/27
(Berlin) – Russian-backed insurgent forces in eastern
Ukraine are arbitrarily detaining civilians and subjecting
them to torture, degrading treatment, and forced labor.
They also have detained civilians for use as hostages.
Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians
Dire Concern for Safety of Captives
August , :PM EDT Available In English Français Русский Українська
LAUNCH GALLERY
The basement of the security services building used by pro-Russia separatists
as a detention place is seen in Sloviansk on July 6, 2014. © 2014 Reuters
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 2/27
Beginning in April 2014, armed fighters supporting the
self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and
Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) have captured hundreds
of civilians, targeting presumed critics, including
journalists, pro-Ukrainian political activists, religious
activists, and in some cases their family members.
“Pro-Russian insurgents are regularly committing
horrendous crimes,” said Hugh Williamson, Europe and
Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “There are
solid grounds to be seriously concerned about the safety
and well-being of anyone held by insurgent forces in
eastern Ukraine.”
In August Human Rights Watch researchers in eastern
Ukraine documented 20 cases in which rebel fighters had
captured civilians, and interviewed 12 people who said
their captors had beaten, kicked, stabbed, or lacerated
them, burned them with cigarettes, or subjected them to
mock executions. At least six were used as hostages either
for ransom or to exchange with captured insurgents held
by Ukrainian authorities. Another is apparently awaiting
exchange.
Three people whose cases Human Rights Watch
documented remain in captivity in Donetsk.
Former detainees told Human Rights Watch that
insurgents held them at various bases in Donetsk,
Sloviansk, and Makyivka, including in security services
(SBU) buildings, local administration buildings, and other
buildings. On August 17, Human Rights Watch researchers
witnessed a DPR representative at the Donetsk SBU
building read a list of 55 detainees to a large group of local
residents who gathered there hoping to find their missing
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 3/27
relatives. Local people confirmed to Human Rights Watch
researchers that insurgents read out a list of civilian
detainees every evening.
Human Rights Watch also examined lists of captives
maintained by Sloviansk insurgents, which human rights
lawyers found in the SBU building after Ukrainian forces
took control of the city. The lawyers matched some of the
names on the list to people whose cases Human Rights
Watch documented.
Human Rights Watch is also concerned by evidence of
extra-judicial executions, and other civilian deaths in
custody. For example, Human Rights Watch came into
possession of three death sentences against civilians
apparently issued by the Sloviansk insurgents’ summary
war tribunal. Two were marked “executed.”
Human Rights Watch has not independently verified
whether those named in the death sentences were in fact
executed, but in July the Internet news media site
Buzzfeed and two other foreign reporters found similar
execution orders in Sloviansk and had them
“corroborated by sources including a man who stood
‘trial.’” One former captive interviewed by Human Rights
Watch in August said he witnessed the interrogation of a
man whose dead body with marks of torture was found
several days later.
Human Rights Watch could not establish the exact
number of civilian captives insurgents have held in eastern
Ukraine since April. A July 15 report by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
cited a Ukrainian Interior Ministry figure of 717 people,
including civilians and members of Ukrainian forces,
“abducted by armed groups in eastern Ukraine” between
mid-April and mid-July.
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
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At the end of August the Center for Freeing Prisoners, a
nongovernmental group run by former Ukrainian military
officers negotiating for release of hostages, published a list
of 501 people whose release they are trying to secure. At
least 129 were identified as civilians.
A psychologist in Dniepropetrovsk who worked with
several people who had been tortured during rebel
captivity described them to Human Rights Watch as
“distressed,” “deeply traumatized,” and “extremely
frightened.” One, he said, was covered with bruises from
severe beatings, “stared into space, would not talk or react
to verbal stimulation, and although he had no prior
psychiatric condition, required immediate psychiatric
hospitalization.” A human rights lawyer in Kiev who took
on the cases of six former captives told Human Rights
Watch that all of her clients had been beaten in captivity
and that some alleged they were tortured with electric
shocks, cut with knives, and burned with cigarettes.
Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and article
4.2 of Additional Protocol II, which govern noninternational
armed conflicts, ban taking hostages and
abducting civilians. As a party to the conflict rebels may
detain enemy soldiers or persons on security grounds,
subject to due process. But Human Rights Watch found
that rebel forces are vastly exceeding this authority,
essentially abducting civilians they perceive as critics and
using some as “bargaining chips,” as one of the former
leaders of the self-proclaimed DPR said publicly.
Torture and cruel or degrading treatment of people in
custody is absolutely prohibited under international
human rights and humanitarian law, and states have an
obligation to prosecute those responsible.
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
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“Self-proclaimed authorities in eastern Ukraineshould
immediately free anyone held arbitrarily, put an end to
arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, hostage-taking,
and torture of detainees, and treat anyone in custody –
civilians and military alike – humanely and with dignity,”
Williamson said. “Russia should use its influence with
insurgent forces in eastern Ukraine to stop these blatant
violations and ensure that those responsible are brought
to justice.”
Ongoing Detentions
Human Rights Watch documented cases of an artist, a
political activist, and a presumed critic of the Donetsk
People’s Republic (DPR), who remain in captivity by
insurgents in Donetsk region.
Serhiy Zakharov
On August 6, 2014, insurgents detained Serhiy Zakharov,
47, an artist from Donetsk. At this writing, Zakharov
remains in captivity in the SBU building as punishment for
his caricatures of insurgent leaders.
In July Zakharov created an anonymous art group,
Murzilka, which published online and as part of public
installations in central Donetsk various caricatures of Igor
Girkin, the former DPR defense chief, and other DPR
fighters. Zakharov’s brother, Andriy, told Human Rights
Watch that on August 6 a group of armed insurgents broke
into Zakharov’s house, searched the house and garage, put
Zakharov and some of his belongings into their vehicle,
and drove off. Zakharov’s relatives learned what happened
from neighbors who witnessed the detention. Several days
later, DPR representatives confirmed to Zakharov’s family
that they were holding him in the SBU building and that an
“investigation” into his “unlawful actions” was under way.
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
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Andriy Zakharov told Human Rights Watch:
On August 17 Zakharov was temporarily released and DPR
representatives told him to return to the SBU building the
next day to pick up his identification documents and other
belongings. The next day Zakharov went to a hospital for a
medical examination of his injuries from beatings in
captivity, including x-rays that revealed rib fractures, and
then returned to the SBU building. A friend watched him
enter the building and waited outside for him until late
evening. The guards refused to answer his questions about
Zakharov. Later that week, Zakharov’s relatives received
information from DPR representatives that he was being
held in the SBU building to serve “30 days’ detention as
punishment for his actions.”
Dmytro Potekhin
On August 7, DPR fighters in Donetsk detained a
prominent pro-Ukraine activist, Dmytro Potekhin, 37, who
had arrived the day before apparently to see how the city
was affected by the armed conflict. Family members said
the DPR leadership has accused Potekhin of spying and
Murzilka became pretty popular on Facebook, and journalists
would reach out to Serhiy for interview requests…. He actually
gave an interview the day before the DPR came for him. On the
evening of August 6, [neighbors said] armed men arrived in a
minibus and surrounded his house, as if they were after a
dangerous criminal…. The house was totally torn apart as a
result of their search. They took away Serhiy’s computer and
other electronics, all his drawings, and stuff. Though they did
not say how long they’d be holding him, what exactly they were
accusing him of, and what his punishment would be.
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
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that he remains a hostage. The insurgents are apparently
negotiating with the Ukrainian authorities over his
possible exchange for captured rebels.
Potekhin’s family learned of his detention on August 12
when an unidentified person contacted them through
social media, claiming he had been held with Potekhin at
the insurgent base at the Izolyatsiya plant in Donetsk. The
person told Potekhin’s relatives that the insurgents
accused Potekhin of being a spy but did not beat him.
During the next two weeks, several other sources told
Potekhin’s family that he was at the Izolyatsiya plant, that
his captors did not torture him, and that negotiations
regarding his exchange were under way.
On August 25 Potekhin’s parents told Human Rights
Watch that they thought they recognized him among the
Ukrainian prisoners paraded by insurgents in the center
of Donetsk on August 24.
Mykola Mykolaiv (not his real name)
On August 16, insurgents in Donetsk detained Mykola
Mykolaiv, 54. On August 17 his wife, Anna (not her real
name), received confirmation that he was held in the SBU
building but could not get any information about the
reason for his detention.
Anna told Human Rights Watch that when she returned to
their apartment late in the evening of August 16, it was
“literally turned upside down” and that her husband was
gone. Next-door neighbors told her that earlier that
evening several armed men entered the apartment,
searched it, forced Mykolaiv into their vehicle along with
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 8/27
some of the family’s belongings, and drove off. When Anna
examined the apartment she realized that her husband’s
documents, phone, laptop, and some cash were missing.
The next day, Anna heard her husband’s name read among
54 other names on the SBU list of detainees. The DPR
representative who read the list told Anna that he did not
know what Mykolaiv was accused of and how long he
would be in detention.
Anna said:
Mykolaiv apparently remains at the SBU.
Taking Relatives of Presumed Critics Hostage
Activists from Donetsk and Luhansk regions seeking
release of captives told Human Rights Watch that in
recent months they had documented several cases in
which insurgents captured or threatened parents of pro-
Ukrainian activists or journalists who had fled the region
for security reasons in order to force their children to
return and give themselves up. Human Rights Watch
documented one such case in the Donetsk region.
He did not participate in any rallies or anything. Maybe it’s
because he said some critical things about the DPR on his
VKontakte [social network] account…. On the other hand, I’m
even more frightened they would accuse him of being a spy. He
always rides his bicycle to work and they [the DPR] think
informers for Ukrainian forces do this to take a close look at
different sites. We have some unfriendly neighbors who could
have reported him to the DPR, simply out of spite…. [The DPR]
don’t answer my questions except by saying that they are still
“working on it.”
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 9/27
Iryna and Valeriy Ischenko
On August 9, 2014, armed men in Donetsk raided the
apartment of Iryna Ischenko and her husband, Valeriy,
forced the couple into a car, and drove away with them.
They were held until August 19, for the most part at the
Izolyatsiya base in Donetsk, and then released but without
their identity documents. Insurgents appeared to have
targeted the couple because their daughter, Viktoria, who
had left Donetsk two months earlier, had worked for a
Ukrainian-language media portal.
Viktoria Ischenko told Human Rights Watch that on
August 9 her mother called her at 3:40 p.m. and said that
people claiming to be from the DPR had just knocked on
their door, demanding to talk about her. After her mother
refused to let them in, they left, threatening to return and
break down the door. The daughter tried unsuccessfully to
reach her parents for several hours. Later that day, the
couple’s next- door neighbors described to Viktoria what
had happened. She said:
Viktoria worked at the Ukrainian-language media portal
Ngo.donetsk.ua, which stopped operating in the summer
of 2014. In 2013 she participated in a workshop on
information technology sponsored by the United States
The neighbors [told me they] heard some noise, looked out,
and saw that the door to my parents’ apartment was open. They
stepped inside and saw two men in civilian clothes and an
armed man in fatigues tearing the place apart. The men chased
[the neighbors] away, but my mother managed to say, “This is
happening because my daughter is a journalist.” The DPR
people spent a total of four hours in the apartment. At 8 p.m.,
they [DPR representatives] led my parents down the stairs and
carried out their computer and some other devices.
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embassy in Ukraine. She said that on the day her parents
were detained, armed insurgents visited the parents of
another pro-Ukraine activist who had also left Donetsk
several months earlier. They threatened to hold the
activist’s parents hostage until she returned to Donetsk
and gave herself up to the DPR. A man called the young
woman, claimed he was a DPR representative, and told her
to return to Donetsk if she wanted her parent to be safe.
They have not been harmed.
Torture of Activists Captured by Insurgents
Since April 2014 Human Rights Watch has documented
over two dozen of cases of insurgents torturing political
activists they detained in Donetsk, Sloviansk, Makyivka,
and Luhansk. While in eastern Ukraine in August, Human
Rights Watch researchers documented several more.
Dmytro Kluger, Viktor Levchuk, and Olha Klimenko
In mid-May insurgents detained three pro-Ukraine
activists in Donetsk, held them in captivity for six days,
tortured them, and used them for forced labor.
Dmytro Kluger, 35, said that police stopped his car on May
22 at about noon as he and fellow activists Viktor Levchuk
and Olha Klimenko were leaving Donetsk. Police called the
DPR authorities and a group of armed insurgents promptly
arrived and took all three to the SBU building in Donetsk.
Armed men in fatigues searched all three, put Kluger and
Levchuk into a small basement cell together, and put
Klimenko into a separate cell. The captors pulled Kluger’s
cap over his eyes and wrapped tape around it.
After an hour, men took Levchuk away for questioning.
Two hours later they took Kluger to the second floor.
Kluger was able to make out three interrogators wearing
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military fatigues. Two other men stood behind him and
delivered kicks and punches. He said another five people
were observing the proceedings:
Kluger said that the next day, the guards gave him fatigues
to wear instead of his bloodied clothes and took him to the
SBU yard where he saw another eight detainees, including
Ruslan Kudryavtsev, an election commission chair from
Donetsk. The insurgents split the prisoners into two
groups. They dispatched the first group to fill bags with
sand at checkpoints and tasked the second one with
stripping the plastic covering off copper wire. Kluger was
in the second group. He said that while the detainees
worked, crouched over the rolls of wiring, the guards kept
kicking and punching them on the back, arms, and legs,
yelling that they were too slow, that they were “killers
deployed by the Kiev junta.” In the evening, the guards
took Kluger back to the basement, kicking him and saying
that he had two hours to sleep before his next
interrogation.
They [interrogators] asked me if I was involved with
Euromaidan. They also wanted to know if I worked for one of
the election commissions [for the May 25 Ukrainian
presidential elections]. I admitted to being on an election
commission and they started screaming, “How much do they
pay you? What do you do for them?” Those who stood behind
me beat me for giving snide replies or thinking too much before
answering their questions. They punched me on the head, on
the liver, in the solar plexus. One of them put his gun to my
head and pulled the trigger. The gun wasn’t loaded, but I did
not know that. The beating went on for some 40 minutes....
Then, a guy with a cover name, Cherep [Skull], took me back to
the basement and said he’d tear my liver out if I didn’t get the
chair of my election commission to come to them…. Their
interrogations were all about breaking you.
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That evening Kluger tried unsuccessfully to slit his wrist
using a key he had managed to hide from his captors. Later
that evening he tried to strangle himself with his shoelace.
He fainted and came to a while later, after his captors had
poured water over him.
The next day, insurgents took him and Levchuk, who had
suffered a dislocated shoulder during his interrogation the
night before, to an emergency room in Donetsk. Both were
covered in bruises. A doctor treated Levchuk’s shoulder,
diagnosed Kluger with a concussion, and urged the
insurgents to leave them both in the hospital. The
insurgents said they would “provide the necessary
treatment” themselves and took the men back to the SBU.
For the next three days, the insurgents left Kluger to
recover in his cell.
On May 26, insurgents forced Kluger to come out and
work again. The following evening, guards took Kluger into
a room where an insurgent commander with the code
name Kerch, who said he was a native of Crimea, was
already talking to Levchuk, Klimenko, and Kudryavtsev.
Kerch said they were free to go, indicating they had been
“exchanged” for captured insurgents, apparently along
with several captured members of the Ukrainian forces. All
three were released immediately.
On May 30 Kluger filed a complaint with the Ukrainian
security services in Kiev for the purposes of future
prosecution of those responsible for torturing him and had
a medical examination that revealed a basal skull fracture,
a perforated eardrum, an acute ear infection, and multiple
hematomas.
Yevheniya Zakrevskaya, Levchuk’s lawyer, told Human
Rights Watch that in addition to a dislocated shoulder,
Levchuk suffered head traumas, multiple bruises on his
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face and neck, facial skin damage, and a cigarette burn on
his hand. Kluger said that insurgents beat Klimenko less
severely than the men but nonetheless repeatedly hit her
on the head and slapped her so hard during one
interrogation that she fell off the chair onto the concrete
floor and suffered multiple bruises.
Anna Guz and Fedir Menshakov
At the end of May insurgents detained pro-Ukraine
activists Anna Guz, 30, and her partner, Fedir Menshakov,
28, and held them hostage for five days at a police building
in Makyivka, in Donetsk region. Both were tortured and
released in a prisoner exchange with Ukrainian
government authorities.
Guz told Human Rights Watch that at about 8 a.m. on May
27, she and Menshakov were awakened by loud knocks on
their apartment door in Donetsk and men yelling that they
were from the DPR. When Guz opened the door, she saw
seven armed men in military fatigues. They said that Guz
and Menshakov were under arrest, threatened them with
Kalashnikov assault rifles, searched the apartment, and
took their laptop, camera, cell phones, credit cards, and
pro-Ukraine leaflets. They also tore a Ukrainian flag off the
wall yelling, “You know that Ukrainian flags have been
banned on DPR territory after May 11 [the DPR
referendum]!” They then tied the flag around Guz’s head,
covering her eyes, blindfolded Menshakov, marched both
activists down the stairs, pushed them into a vehicle, and
drove off.
When the car stopped, the armed men led them into a
damp basement. After a short while, they took Guz to
another room, sat her down on a box, and untied the
blindfold. Guz saw two women and two men, all in
military fatigues. Another camouflage-clad man with a
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knife ran into the room and threw himself at Guz
screaming, “I’ll kill you, I’ll cut you to pieces! You’ll eat
that Ukrainian flag of yours!” He slapped her hard on the
face, causing her to bleed. For the next two hours, the man
tortured Guz, beating her, poking her with his knife,
piercing her skin, and cutting her face, hands, arms, and
neck:
Because Guz was bleeding heavily, the guards asked a
nurse on the premises to clean and dress her lacerations.
She also secretly gave Guz a shot of anesthetic. Her
captors then forced her to wash the floors in the hall, even
though her hands were still bleeding through the
dressings, and then to clean the inside of a car in which
bodies of killed insurgents had been brought to the base.
When Guz was washing the car, she told Human Rights
Watch, the base commander arrived and, indicating Guz’s
condition, berated the insurgents. “Why did you do this?
Are you nuts? She is up for exchange – what would they
He was yelling non-stop and waving his knife close to my face….
He was hitting me on the knees with handcuffs, then poked me
with his knife on one knee, pushed the knife in by half an inch,
and turned it. He did the same to my other knee. He would run
out and then come back and torture me again. He threatened
me with gang rape. The whole thing continued for some two
hours and the other four were just watching, like in a theater….
Finally, he says, “Bow your head. It’s time to kill you!” and
slashed me on the back of my neck. So, my neck is bleeding, my
hands and arms are all cut up and bleeding – the lacerations are
deep – and he drags me to another room on the first floor with
some armed people in it. Those people actually asked me
questions – in which events I took part, what kind of activism I
was involved in. They said that if I wanted to live I had to trick
other activists and journalists into coming to them.
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think about our treatment of prisoners?!” The next day,
her torturer took her to a hospital to treat her right index
finger, which was injured and would not stop bleeding.
While leaving the yard, Guz saw a sign on the gate that
read, “Makyivka Police Organized Crime Department.”
At Makyivka’s central hospital, a doctor treated her
wounds and gave her a large dose of antibiotics. Guz spent
the rest of her captivity in a room with her partner, who
was also badly beaten. On the sixth day, they, along with
one other captive, were exchanged for three captured
insurgents held by Ukraine government forces and set
free.
Two-and-a-half months after Guz’s release, the scars on
her hands and arms were still plainly visible. She and
Menshakov both lodged complaints with the Ukrainian
security services for the purposes of future prosecution of
those responsible.
Detentions and Cruel and Degrading Treatment of
Journalists
Since April 2014, numerous journalists, both Ukrainian and
foreign, have experienced physical violence, detention,
harassment, intimidation, and death threats from
insurgent forces, according to media reports and
information Human Rights Watch collected from the
journalists, including 12 cases based on first-hand
interviews. In some cases the violence against journalists
has amounted to what appears to be cruel and degrading
treatment. Three of these cases are described below.
Serhiy Lefter
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In mid-April, insurgent forces who controlled Sloviansk
held Serhiy Lefter, a 24-year-old Ukrainian freelance
journalist, captive for 17 days, beating and threatening him
repeatedly.
At about 7 p.m. on April 15, Lefter, on assignment in the
center of Sloviansk, was talking on his cell phone when
two men approached, one masked and both armed with
guns, and asked why Lefter was talking on the phone.
When Lefter responded that he was a journalist, the men
took him to the city council building, where several
insurgents interrogated him, searched his backpack, and
demanded his laptop password. They accused him of being
a spy, of gathering data about firing positions, and of
involvement with the far-right Ukrainian nationalist
group, Right Sector. One of the men in charge told Lefter
they would take him hostage.
Lefter spent the night there. The next day, Vyacheslav
Ponomarev, then the self-proclaimed people’s mayor of
Sloviansk, ordered him to be taken to the SBU building.
When Ponomarev himself arrived at the SBU, he accused
Lefter of being a spy and punched him in the jaw.
Lefter said that on his third or fourth day in captivity, the
insurgents interrogated him from about 11 p.m. to 3 or 4
a.m. Judging from other voices he could hear, he estimated
that four to five other people were being questioned in the
same room. When Lefter told the insurgents that he was a
journalist, a man hit him on the right side of his face
several times, dislodging his lower left front tooth and
causing hematomas and massive swelling. Someone
pushed Lefter to the floor and kicked him in the solar
plexus, knocking the wind out of him.
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The interrogators dragged Lefter across the floor and at
one point burned his right hand with a cigarette. Human
Rights Watch, interviewing him four months later,
photographed a small, circular scar from the burn. Lefter
said that those questioned in the same room included Yuri
Popravka, whose body with marks of torture was found in
Sloviansk on April 19, together with the body of Vladimir
Rybak, a pro-Kiev politician. He said that during his
interrogation, he could hear the other captives screaming:
On April 26 or 27 the guards found out that one of the
detainees had managed to sneak out a letter. They
questioned Lefter and his cellmates, Artem Deinega and
Vitaliy Kovalchuk, all night and beat Lefter on the legs
with a truncheon. On May 2 at about 1 p.m., the insurgents
told Lefter he was free and released him.
Simon Ostrovsky, VICE
On April 21, armed insurgents captured a VICE News
reporter,Simon Ostrovsky, in Sloviansk and held him for
three days, beating him repeatedly. Ostrovsky told Human
Rights Watch that this was related to his documentary
series, Russian Roulette, in Ukraine and the “inconvenient
questions” he kept asking at news conferences of the selfproclaimed
authorities in Sloviansk.
They would beat information out of them to get answers to
how did they get here and which checkpoints did they come
through. I could hear kicking and punching. I heard a few
people being burned with cigarettes. I also heard them threaten
to cut off sex organs. I could hear them taking someone’s pants
down. They threatened me with it too. One of the prisoners
seemed to be totally covered in tape, and it seemed that when
they cut the tape they were cutting the detainee, because I
heard him scream.
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Ostrovsky and four other journalists were stopped in their
car on April 21 at an insurgent checkpoint close to their
hotel in Sloviansk. An insurgent shined a flashlight in
Ostrovsky’s face, compared it to a photograph, and yelled,
“I got him, I got him, it’s him!”
Armed men pulled the journalists from the car and
searched, threatened, and questioned them about their
work. They let the other four go but took Ostrovsky to the
Sloviansk SBU building. A group of men in military
fatigues led him to a courtyard behind the building,
blindfolded him, searched him once again, took away all of
his belongings, and tied his hands behind his back. Then
they led him down to the basement and threw him on the
floor.
A group of men came into the room and beat him, kicking
and punching him in the ribs and smacking him on the
head and ears. The beating continued intermittently from
approximately 1:30 a.m. until daylight, he said. When he
was not being beaten he was left blindfolded, sitting in the
corner of a filthy basement room with damp walls and
water dripping from the ceiling.
The next day, the insurgents put other detainees in the
same room, at one point there were as many as eight.
Among them were a Ukrainian journalist and his driver, a
member of the local legislature, a local resident captured
for attempting to set up a web camera across the street
from the SBU building, and a Euromaidan activist whom
insurgents accused of being associated with the Right
Sector and who suffered a very bad beating in captivity.
Some had already spent more than two weeks in captivity
and based on their own experiences, warned Ostrovsky
that he should expect a “real” interrogation during which
he would probably be severely beaten.
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At one point, a man took Ostrovsky, blindfolded, to
another room. Several men asked him for his computer
password, beat him on the arm with a truncheon when he
refused to provide it, and asked whether he worked for the
CIA, the FBI, or the Kiev government, and whether he was
a spy for the Right Sector. This interrogation continued for
about ten minutes, after which the men left Ostrovsky
alone in the room for the night.
Ostrovsky’s hands were bound for his first two days in
captivity; the beatings stopped after a day and a half.
He said his first night in captivity was the roughest:
Throughout Ostrovsky’s captivity, DPR representatives
made contradictory statements to the press regarding
Ostrovsky’s fate and whereabouts. At about 5 p.m. an
insurgent gave Ostrovsky his belongings and told him that
he was free to go.
Pavel Kanygin, Novaya Gazeta
Pavel Kanygin, special correspondentfor the Russian
independent outlet Novaya Gazeta spent around 12 hours
in insurgent captivity from May 11 to 12 in Donetsk region.
He was reporting on the May 11 unofficial referendum on
the independence ofthe self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s
Republic. Before his abduction, Kanygin published a series
It is an initiation procedure which involves violence. That first
night they want to terrify you so that you are cooperative. They
want to make sure you sit when they tell you, look down on the
floor, do everything they tell you to do. They want to break
your resolve to resist, to punish you, to teach you a lesson.
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of comments on social media describing, among other
things, the persecution of officials who did not support the
referendum.
Kanygin said he was in a café in Artyomovsk with Stefan
Scholl, a correspondent for the German newspaper
Südwest Presse, when four men approached them at about 9
p.m., demanding that Kanygin explain his coverage of the
referendum. They took both men to the town’s main
square, where a mob of armed insurgents and local
residents had already gathered. Armed insurgents
surrounded Kanygin, accusing him of being a spy and
demanding that he disclose his ties to the Right Sector, the
SBU, or the CIA. When Scholl tried to intervene, they
threatened to shoot him on the spot.
Unarmed people pushed Kanygin to the ground and
started kicking and punching him, but an armed insurgent
ordered them to stop, saying they would take Kanygin to
Sloviansk to “figure things out in the SBU basement.” The
man, whom people called “Bashnya” (Tower) or
“Leonidych” (apparently, his patronymic), twisted
Kanygin’s arms, pushed him into a car, and told him to sit
still and keep his head on his knees. When Kanygin asked
the man what they wanted, “Bashnya” elbowed him in the
jaw, breaking a tooth. On the way, “Bashnya” and the
driver discussed where to take Kanygin, contemplating
whether to exchange him “for some of our boys” or to kill
him in the woods.
Eventually they brought Kanygin to an insurgent base in
Volodarka, near Sloviansk. Several armed men led Kanygin
into a tent, took his laptop and his backpack, and ordered
him to strip. The insurgents asked Kanygin for the
passwords to his cellphone and laptop and hit him in the
face when he refused. When one of the armed men
grabbed Kanygin and threatened to break his finger, the
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journalist gave his password. The insurgents logged in and
went through Kanygin’s files and photographs, asking him
questions.
Kanygin told Human Rights Watch he heard insurgents
bragging on the phone about “catching a good target for
exchange” and getting instructions. Then they threw him
on the floor of a vehicle and drove to another camp with
insurgents from Horlivka. This group was under orders to
transfer Kanygin to Sloviansk. However, they eventually
took all the cash Kanygin had, 39,000 rubles (US$1,130)
and allowed him to call Scholl, who offered to give all the
cash he could pull together, nearly $1,000. They told
Kanygin the money was “not ransom but your
contribution to our war.”
Scholl told Human Rights Watch that at 2 a.m. he received
a call from Kanygin asking him to pay the insurgents for
his release. Kanygin’s captors met with Scholl at his hotel
in Artyomovsk and took the cash from him. Scholl
expected Kanygin to be handed over right away, but
instead the insurgents drove Kanygin to Horlivka,
switched cars, apparently drugged him, and finally took
him to Hotel Liverpul in Donetsk.
Kanygin told Human Rights Watch:
I actually don’t remember what happened after Horlivka. They
made me drink some mineral water … and 15 minutes later I
just nodded off in the car. When I came to I was on a bed in a
hotel room, fully dressed, and a clerk was shaking me awake
saying it was already noon. He said two men brought me into
the hotel lobby in the early morning and asked for a room. He
said I was walking between them as they held on to me and
looked a bit strange…. It was more like a coma than normal
sleep. I suspect they put something in that water.
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Detention and Torture of Religious Activists
Armed insurgents have also captured, held, and tortured
active members of non-Russian Orthodox religious groups.
In its July 15, 2014 report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine, the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights noted that “a Protestant pastor and his wife
were abducted and held in Druzhkivka (Donetsk region)”
by insurgent forces.
Also in July Anton Heraschenko, an advisor to Ukraine’s
interior minister, stated that a mass grave found in
Sloviansk contained the bodies of four members of the
Church of the Transfiguration: Albert and Ruvim Pavenko
(sons of the church’s pastor), as well as two deacons,
Viktor Brodarsky and Volodymyr Velichko. On July 8,
insurgents had broken into the church during services and
abducted the four.
Serhiy Kosyak
Human Rights Watch spoke with an evangelical pastor
from Donetsk, Serhiy Kosyak, who described how
insurgent forces had detained and tortured him and other
religious activists.
I called my editor. It’s clear that I was released so soon only
because Scholl had gotten in touch with my colleagues, and
then some high-level Russian officials intervened on my behalf.
The Horlivka men decided to make some fast money and
simply took whatever cash [we] had. A few hours after I came
to, a DPR rep … called me to apologize for the
“misunderstanding” … and promised that my computer, phone,
and money would be returned to me. But this never happened.
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Beginning in March Kosyak coordinated daily ecumenical
“prayer marathons for peace and unity” in the center of
Donetsk. He said that from April through August,
insurgents had taken 12 of the participants captive, held
them at bases in Donetsk, Makyivka, and other towns for
periods ranging from several hours to several weeks, beat
and threatened them, and subjected at least three to mock
executions. At least four were released for ransom and one
remains disappeared. The others, to the best of Kosyak’s
knowledge, were freed without payment. Kosyak had
spoken directly with all of those freed following their
release.
Insurgents seized Kosyak himself on May 24. That day,
when Kosyak went to the “prayer marathon,” he saw that
the prayer tent had been destroyed and went to the city
administration building to consult with acquaintances in
the DPR about it. Another DPR representative jumped on
him, yelling to others, “This man is a troublemaker! He
says that DPR is sinful, that God disapproves of
separatism! He’s with Right Sector!” Several people then
severely beat Kosyak, eventually throwing him into a room
on the eighth or the ninth floor and threatening to take
him to the SBU basement in Sloviansk. A short time later,
two former members of Kosyak’s church entered the
room, said he was “harmless,” and convinced the others to
let him go. Kosyak said:
On August 17, when Kosyak was away, armed DPR
representatives forced their way into Kosyak’s home in
Donetsk looking for him. They searched the house
I spent four hours there. They beat me with truncheons and
hammers. I had a split lip, and my left arm was fractured. My
left side was all back and blue.
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thoroughly, found nothing except family belongings and
religious literature, and left.
Kosyak also told Human Rights Watch that insurgents on
August 3 had abducted another of his congregationists,
Yevheniy Frantsuk, held him in a trench for three weeks,
and released him on August 23. Kosyak said Frantsuk had
not been tortured.
Alexander Khomchenko
Kosyak also gave a detailed account of how armed
insurgents detained and tortured Alexander Khomchenko,
a member of his church and deputy coordinator of the
“prayer marathon,” and detained two participants, Valeriy
Yakubenko and Roksolana Shvaika.
On August 8 Khomchenko was coordinating the daily
prayer session while Kosyak was away. The session began
at 6 p.m. in the city center, as usual. Several armed
insurgents approached the group at about 6:30 p.m., said
they were from the DPR, and asked who was in charge.
Khomchenko said he was, and the insurgents detained
him, Yakubenko, and Shvaika and took them to the SBU
building. There, it appeared that the insurgents mistook
Khomchenko for Kosyak. When bringing in the three
detainees one of the captors yelled to the insurgents in the
building, “We got Kosyak!”
The insurgents interrogated their captives for three hours
at the SBU, together and separately. They soon released
Shvaika, berating her for getting involved with a “sect,”
and transferred the two men to an insurgent base at the
conscription office in Makyivka. The insurgents released
Yakubenko the next day.
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They held and tortured Khomchenko for three days, then
released him. Khomchenko had volunteered as a driver to
evacuate people from areas affected by the armed conflict,
and when he was detained he had several receipts from gas
stations across Donetsk region. The receipts made the
insurgents suspect he was a spy for the Ukrainian forces.
Kosyak said:
Human Rights Watch examined a photograph of
Khomchenko taken two weeks after his release from
captivity. His entire upper body was still extensively
bruised.
After the detention of Khomchenko, Yakubenko, and
Shvaika, the prayer marathon participants stopped
conducting public sessions, convening them instead in
secret places.
They started beating Sasha [short for Alexander] in Makyivka….
Sasha told me they also would watch while they would force
some prisoners to beat other prisoners. If they thought the
kicks and punches weren’t strong enough they would then beat
the slackers. Sasha’s body was all black and blue, and his face
was beaten to pulp. During his three days in Makiyvka they
staged his execution three times. Twice they shot above his
head. And the third time, they shot at him at point-blank range,
but the gun was not loaded. He is now recovering from his
injuries.
3/9/2018 Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 26/27
March , | Dispatches
German Judge Takes Stand Against Xenophobic
Violence
March , | Dispatches
Region / Country Europe/Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine
MORE READING
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https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/ukraine-rebel-forces-detain-torture-civilians 27/27
Ukraine Should Drop Law That Hampers
Activists’ Work
February ,
Germany: Flawed Social Media Law
NetzDG is Wrong Response to Online Abuse
January ,
Armenia: Little Protection, Aid for Domestic
Violence Survivors
New Law Should Enhance Safety, Services, Justice
REPORTS
Annex 445
Magnitsky, Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by
Russian Troops, BELL¿NGCAT (8 September 2014)
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
UK & Europe (Https://Www.Bellingcat.Com/Category/News/Uk-And-Europe/)
MH17 (Https://Www.Bellingcat.Com/Tag/Mh17/) Russia (Https://Www.Bellingcat.Com/Tag/Russia/)
Ukraine (Https://Www.Bellingcat.Com/Tag/Ukraine/)
September 8, 2014 By Magnitsky (https://www.bellingcat.com/author/magnitsky/)
Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17,
Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops
New evidence has been found that shows the Buk missile system that was used to shoot down MH17 on
the 17th of July came from Russia, and was most likely operated by Russian soldiers. Using videos posted
by locals in Russia’s Belgorod region back in June it has been possible to identify the Buk missile
launcher seen in Ukraine on July 17th as part of a convoy of Buk missile launchers. It has also been
possible to identify the Russian brigade the Buk is likely to have belonged to, and who may have operated
the Buk missile launcher when it was in Ukraine.
The Buk launcher can be identified because of a numberoffeatures, including white markingson the left
side side of its chassis, and what looks like the traces of a number that has been painted over. Here is a
comparison of the Buk seen in previously unpublicised video taken in Russia on the 23rd of June with a
well known image from Paris Match, which shows a Buk in Donetsk at 9am on July the 17th.
(https://www.bellingcat.com)
On
veh
mot
Bel
mod
(ht
buk
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/1.jpg)
The
mat
Lef
fro
Rus
(ht
lis
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/1.1.jpg)
Numerous earlier studies of vehicles inside Ukraine has shown it has been standard practice for Russian
forces to paint over the number (http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/65075.html)s
(http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/65075.html) on their vehicles before sending them into the
Ukraine. In the Paris Match image, much of the remaining number has now been painted over. However, it
isstill possible to see the top curve of what was a “2” and the other two white marks. It’s important to
note that these markings are in exactly the same positions on the Buk in both images.
Here is a comparison of the Paris Match picture with an image of the same Buk in a convoy of Russian
military vehicles in Alexeyevka, a town around 70 miles from Staryy Oskol, on the 24th of June.
On
wak
(ht
rig
upl
(ht
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2.png)
The above image also shows the matching marks on the left side of the Buk. It’s also possible toconfirm
that this is thesame Buk by looking at the other side of the vehicle. The Buk seen moving back to the
Russian border on the 17th has a white patch on the armoured skirt of its right side. This patch is also
visible in a video filmed around Staryy Oskol in Russia, which was uploaded on the 23rd of June.
The
(ht
lis
mar
(ht
Buk
[So
lis
Top
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/3.jpg)
The videos of the convoy of Russian vehicles in June shows a number of Buks are part of the convoy.
However, keeping track of the one with with the markings that match those seen in Ukraine in July is
simple, as only three Buks in the column do not have railings on the back of their turrets.
Here is an image to illustrate what these railing look like, and what the Buk looks like without them; the
top image is one of the systems seen in the Alexeyevka video, on the bottom is an image of the Buk that
is suspected of being used to shoot down MH17, filmed in Staryy Oskol.
[So
Bot
(ht
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/4.jpg)
Out of the Buk launchers in the column filmed in Russia in late June, three are without railings on back of
the turret. Two out of these three have identification numbers on the side; number 231 and 232. Buk
number 231 can be ruled out as the Buk in the July videos and photos has completely different markings
on its right side and does not have a patch of white on its right skirt.
Tru
Jun
(ht
[So
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/51.jpg)
The below images show that the Buk that was filmed in Luhansk after the attack does not have the
railings on the back of its turret.
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png)
On
24t
t=1
Ser
Kur
(ht
z=p
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
The Buk that had been seen in the Staryy Oskol area in June has marks on both sides that match those
seen on the Buk before and after the attack on July 17th. Just like the Buk linked tothe attack on MH17, it
does not have railings on the back of its turret, and the back section of its turret is also a dark colour that
matches what we can see in the photograph in Torez. The vehicle is also distinctive, for instance, it is the
only one to have that distinct set of markings out of the entire column of vehicles that was seen in late
June.
Furthermore, the fact that it was heading towards the Ukranian border in the weeks prior to the attack on
the airliner means that it is possible to conclude that the Bukseen in Russiawas the Buk that was
smuggled into Ukraine and used to shoot down MH17.
It’s also possible to determine which Russian unit the Buk is likely to belong to by examining the vehicles
in the column. The videos of the convoy travelling to Ukraine show that the vehicles have area code “50”
on their registration plates, which indicates
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle_registration_plates_of_Russia#Regional_codes) that they belong to
the Moscovskiy Voenniy Okrug
(https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%
(MVO) or the Moscow Military District.
Thearea code “50” is visible on the registration plates of the vehicles in a video taken in the Krasneyskiy
area on the morning of the 24th of June.
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/7.jpg)
The dashcam recording appears to have a time/date stamp error and reads “2011.01.01”. This is clearly
wrongfor numerous reasons, including the summer weather in the video is radically different from the
The
can
sid
z=p
A S
Ale
(ht
lis
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
Staryy Oskol area in wintertime (http://tupikru.blogspot.nl/2012/12/blog-post_13.html) and the exact
same vehicles are visible in multiple videos; see the white minibus here (http://youtu.be/5TIVzgj7884?
t=3m45s), here (http://youtu.be/aLtzYEHolmg?t=3m13s) and here
(http://vk.com/video13319404_168999975) at 0:54.
A resident of Staryy Oskol also confirmed that the registration numbers on the vehicles in the convoy had
the “50” code. The user rokerrson posted on instagram on the 23rd of June:
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.jpg)
This evening, a column of military hardware passed through our city, which included, mobile
RLS [radar], ZRK [air defense missile system] Buk (if correctly identified), a bunch of tented
Urals and other vehicles, generally around 80-100 units in total, including a field kitchen and
refueling trucks. Presumably, these are troops of the CVO [Central Military District] on
exercises and they moved in the direction of the Ukrainian border with the Belgorod region.
Later, the poster added the following: “correction with the CVO… vehicles with Moscow numbers (50
rus)”.
The Moscow Military District has two anti-aircraft missile brigades that are specially outfitted with Buk
systems (http://ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php?topic=423.0;wap2). These are the 5th Zrbr “Buk”, which is
based in Shuya and the 53rd Zrbr “Buk” which is based in Kursk. The 5th brigade can be ruled out
because according to multiple (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/5-
%D1%8F_%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D1%80%D0%B0%
sources (http://ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php?topic=423.0;wap2) it has been moved out of the Moscow
Kra
che
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Iva
on
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loc
(ht
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
Military District and into the Western Military District, and is now head-quartered in St Petersburg,
where it uses the “43” area code (http://cs305312.vk.me/u155194290/148022808/w_6a4c91a5.jpg) on
its vehicles.
As Kursk is relatively close to Staryy Oskol it makes sense that the convoy was comprised of the 53rd
brigade and departed from its base at V/Ch (Military Unit) 32406. This is also confirmed by the earliest
video of the convoy (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TIVzgj7884), taken during in the morning or
afternoon of the 23rd June, which shows the vehicles driving away from Kursk and in the direction of
Kharkiv. It is therefore likely that the Buk belongs to the 53rd brigade from Kursk.
Moreover, it also appearsthe 53rd “Buk” brigade not only uses the “50” area code on their registration
plates, but their troops have uploaded pictures of some of the same vehicles that can been seen in the
videos taken around Staryy Oskol. Here are two photos of a the same truck, the first image is from the
video in the Krasneyskiy area and the second was uploaded by Ivan Krasnoproshin who serves in the 53rd
brigade.
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.jpg)
Here are pictures of a Buk Snow Drift Radar unit. The first was uploaded by Kranoproshin in 2013 and
the second is from the video of the convoy in Alexeyevka.
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/10.jpg)
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/11.jpg)
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/12.jpg)
The following picture shows Krasnoproshin at the headquarters of military unit 32406, note the missiles
in background which are displayed for show on the parade ground.
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/13.jpg)
The following image shows the parade ground of the 53rd brigade from above, the same missiles
arevisible on the south side of the parade ground.
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/15.jpg)
The following is a satellite view of the 53rd brigade’s vehicle park
(http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=51.702450&lon=36.300700&z=18):
(https://bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/14.jpg)
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
2F%2Fwww.bellingcat.com%2Fnews%2Fuk-andwned-
flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops%2F)
.bellingcat.com%2Fnews%2Fuk-and-europe%2F2014%2F09%2F08%2Fimages-showsian-
+MH17%2C+Inside+Russia%2C+Controlled+by+Russian+Troops+via+%40bellingcat)
ww.bellingcat.com%2Fnews%2Fuk-and-europe%2F2014%2F09%2F08%2Fimagesby-
russian-troops%2F&t=Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside
ht MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian
2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-
This image suggests that the large number of vehicles seen in the column in June probably came from
the 53rd brigade. The brigade itself is part of the Russian Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona (PVO), or Anti-
Aircraft Defense troops. As a unit specially supplied and trained to use the Buk, the 53rd brigade had
both the ability and the means to shoot down MH17 on July the 17th.
The Buk that was seen leaving the suspected area of the missile launch on the 17th of July most likely
belonged to and was manned by Russian troops from the 53rd Kursk Brigade. The new information
presented in this article adds to the existing evidence that the Russian government bears responsibility
for the tragedy.
(https://www.bellingcat.com/author/magnitsky/)
Iggy Ostanin is a freelance Russian journalist who does
investigative research on the Ukrainian conflict. He tweets
under @magnitsky and can be contacted at
[email protected]
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196 Comments
Dima - November 14, 2014 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-3035)
“1st chanel” (Russia TV channel ) has the picture of MiG-jet near MH17
http://www.1tv.ru/news/leontiev/271824 (http://www.1tv.ru/news/leontiev/271824)
clay - May 20, 2015 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flightmh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-16319)
:-)))))))
Ivan - December 18, 2014 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-4937)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHJxTxLo9zA&feature=youtu.be (https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=bHJxTxLo9zA&feature=youtu.be)
The video with English subtitles that proves of shooting down Boeing 777 MH17 Malaysia Airlines by
missile system BUK-М1 from Russia
David - January 11, 2015 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-7178)
You know that this video contains a list of fake information?
For example the rocket image of Torez with a clear blue sky? The weather was cloudy at the day (e.g.
according to OSCE report)! That video proofs nothing as that the created sticked together a list a fake
evidences. The “intercepted” phone calls are already proven to be misarranged also.
Please don’t believe this shit.
Dodge - April 29, 2015 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-14804)
the sky was cloudy on one side and cloudless on the other it depended on the position of the viewer.
Intercepted phone calls where not proved fake. A little thinking and counting 1+1 plus all the
information available and the picture of who was behind this shit is pretty clear, unless you are
working for rus.gov.
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
Reply (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/?replytocom=76116#respond)
Reply (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/?replytocom=5540#respond)
Reply (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/?replytocom=13898#respond)
Reply (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flightmh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/?replytocom=13906#respond)
Reply (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/?replytocom=103461#respond)
denis cashcov - June 19, 2016 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-thatdowned-
flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-76116)
Yes…Bellingcat’s whole theory has been debunked now.
https://hectorreban.wordpress.com/2016/06/08/problems-of-the-track-a-trail-narrative-areview/
comment-page-1/#comment-222
(https://hectorreban.wordpress.com/2016/06/08/problems-of-the-track-a-trail-narrative-areview/
comment-page-1/#comment-222)
Ivan - December 24, 2014 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-5540)
http://ivanpravda.blogspot.com/2014/12/malaysia-mh17-flight-shot-down-by.html
(http://ivanpravda.blogspot.com/2014/12/malaysia-mh17-flight-shot-down-by.html)
Malaysia MH17 flight shot down by missile: launch place, warhead contact with target and sounds
spreading investigation
Bob Brown - April 18, 2015 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downedflight-
mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-13898)
Bellingcat – Caught Up, and Out in Yet Another MH17 Falsification..??
http://thetruthspeaker.co/2015/04/15/bellingcat-caught-up-and-out-in-yet-another-mh17-falsification/
(http://thetruthspeaker.co/2015/04/15/bellingcat-caught-up-and-out-in-yet-another-mh17-falsification/)
It’s so important that we check our facts
bellingcatadmin - April 18, 2015 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-thatdowned-
flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-13906)
Except Bellingcat never claimed Krasnoproshin was serving 2014. We used his photographs to show
vehicles from the 53rd Brigade were in the June 2014 convoy, it’s Correctiv that claimed he served in
2014, so this is just Graham Phillips trying to attack Bellingcat using someone else’s errors. As you say,
it’s so important we check our facts.
Яков - January 7, 2017 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flightmh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-103461)
Bellingcat please tell me the exact coordinates of the column with the “Buk” on June 23, 2014 Stary
Oskol. I can not find the gas station on video
6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
Reply (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/?replytocom=115111#respond)
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Daniel - April 13, 2017 (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flightmh17-
inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/comment-page-9/#comment-115111)
Aparato Aprendiz (agitação dentre 30), em cima de 1942, em relação a respectivo
categoria arbitrário provoca Acesso desde Acompanhamento ao Descendentes (SAM),
determinado coletividade comiseração gabinete da correção, que funcionava com maneira
afim a certo programa penitenciário contudo bacia sua instrução correcional-repressiva.
http://cgi2.Mediamix.ne.jp/~t7741/bbs/bbs.cgi?list=thread
(http://cgi2.Mediamix.ne.jp/~t7741/bbs/bbs.cgi?list=thread)
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6/6/2018 bellingcat - Images Show the Buk that Downed Flight MH17, Inside Russia, Controlled by Russian Troops - bellingcat
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/09/08/images-show-the-buk-that-downed-flight-mh17-inside-russia-controlled-by-russian-troops/
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Annex 446
Bellingcat Investigation Team, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,
BELL¿NGCAT (8 November 2014)
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Annex 447
International Crisis Group, Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter, Europe Report No. 235 (18
December 2014)
Eastern Ukraine:
A Dangerous Winter
Europe Report N°235 | 18 December 2014
International Crisis Group
Headquarters
Avenue Louise 149
1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 502 90 38
Fax: +32 2 502 50 38
[email protected]
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i
Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
II. From Ilovaisk to Minsk .................................................................................................... 2
III. Reaction to the Minsk Agreement .................................................................................... 5
A. Donetsk ...................................................................................................................... 5
B. Kyiv ............................................................................................................................ 7
C. The Other Minsk Negotiator ...................................................................................... 8
IV. Donetsk: A Suitcase without a Handle ............................................................................. 10
A. Diverging Interests: A Growing Gap between Donetsk and Moscow ....................... 10
B. Russian Military Assistance ....................................................................................... 12
C. Discord among the Militias ........................................................................................ 14
D. Russian Troops in Donetsk: The Holiday Makers ..................................................... 14
V. Winter ............................................................................................................................... 16
A. Humanitarian Crisis .................................................................................................. 16
B. Military Scenarios ...................................................................................................... 18
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 20
APPENDICES
A. Map of Ukraine ................................................................................................................. 21
International Crisis Group
Europe Report N°235 18 December 2014
Executive Summary
Winter in Ukraine is injecting further uncertainty into an already volatile conflict.
Concerns are increasing about the strong risk of a humanitarian crisis in the southeastern
separatist-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. The separatists have a rudimentary
administrative structure, few competent administrators, ill-trained militias and
little in the way of a long-term strategy. They will be hard pressed to survive the winter
without major Russian aid – financial, humanitarian or military. Ukraine, meanwhile,
is dragging its feet on implementing reforms to address its manifold economic
problems. Both Kyiv and the separatists are under pressure from their war lobbies.
The near-term risk of further hostilities is high. There is an urgent need to halt the
conflict, separate the troops, deploy substantially larger numbers of international
monitors across the warzone and the Russian-Ukrainian border, as well as take immediate
steps to assist civilians on both sides.
The separatists are clearly aware of their vulnerability, both in terms of security –
their militias are a bewildering array of uncoordinated and poorly led military units
– and in political terms – their inability to provide basic services for the population
could seriously undermine their support base. They also admit an ambiguous relationship
with Russia. They say that Moscow will intervene to avert major military or
humanitarian catastrophes, but has no plans to recognise the separatist entities or
provide major development or reconstruction aid. And they say that while Russia is
playing a long game for the control of Ukraine, they are trying to stay alive for the
next six months.
Renewed hostilities could take a number of forms. A Ukrainian offensive would
almost certainly trigger a Russian military response, as Russian forces showed when
in August 2014 they inflicted a devastating defeat on Ukrainian troops in Ilovaisk,
near Donetsk city, stopping their hitherto successful offensive. The geographical status
quo has prevailed since then. A ceasefire brokered in September has been largely
ignored. A powerful group within the separatist leadership feels that they will not
survive without more land, and clearly wants to resume offensive operations, in the
belief that this would also bring in the Russians. Separatists are hoping for another
“Russian Spring” – their term for Moscow-encouraged and fomented seizures of power
in other south-eastern oblasts. And, should weather conditions impede resupply
of Crimea by sea this winter, Moscow may intervene to open up a land route from
the Russian border through Ukrainian territory. Either move would undoubtedly be
viewed by the EU, U.S. and other supporters of Ukraine as a major escalation and
lead to further sanctions.
EU and U.S. sanctions may well have deterred a further Russian advance along
the Black Sea coast after Ilovaisk, and seem at the moment to be deterring any substantial
separatist advance beyond the current frontline. They have also added to the
pain of Russia’s economic downturn. The EU’s tough line on sanctions surprised
Moscow, which assumed that consensus in Brussels would quickly disintegrate. But
there is little sign that either the U.S. or the EU have thought about ways to de-escalate
when the need finally arises. Russia is following a similar improvisatory path. It underestimated
the implications of annexing Crimea or intervening in eastern Ukraine.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page ii
It protects the entities from Ukrainian attack, but seems reluctant to do much more
than that.
Improvisation needs to be replaced by communication between all sides. This would
help defuse tensions, perhaps prepare the ground for consultations between the
main warring parties, and allow all sides to concentrate on humanitarian assistance
in the coming winter. Russia could confirm that it has no plans to recognise the separatists.
It could reject the idea, often floated in Kyiv, of a major Russian offensive in
the spring. Kyiv could similarly promise to refrain from offensive military operations
during this period. It could spell out publicly and clearly to the people of the east
what political solution it has in mind for their areas after the war, and offer a clear
assurance that it will, with Western assistance, help rebuild the east. Such an approach
by all sides would not only help Ukraine weather a dangerous winter, but also allow
it to emerge in the spring with hope for the future.
This report concentrates largely on one of the lesser known aspects of the crisis –
the thinking and capacity of the separatist leadership, their relationship with Moscow
and their views of the future. It does not present an overall analysis of the U.S., European
Union and member states’ policies on the crisis.
Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter
Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page iii
Recommendations
To stabilise the security situation in the east and start
building confidence on all sides
To the Ukrainian government and separatist leaders:
1. Open channels of communications on humanitarian, economic and social issues
to reinforce efforts to achieve a political solution.
To Russia:
2. Declare that Ukrainian predictions of a Russian or separatist offensive in coming
months are baseless; spell out the exact nature of its political relationship to the
separatist areas of the east, in particular that Moscow has no plans to recognise
their independence.
3. Propose negotiations with Kyiv to resupply Crimea by land during the winter,
using the 2003 agreement with Russia and Lithuania as a precedent; and offer
wholehearted support for a significant increase in the number of monitors on the
ground in the south east.
To Ukraine:
4. Announce that it will refrain from offensive military actions in the south east
during winter.
5. Agree to facilitate the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance, if needed,
to the separatist-held areas.
6. Consult with the international community on ways to lessen the impact for noncombatants
in Donetsk and Luhansk of presidential decree 875/2014, which
declares illegal any bodies established by the separatists on the basis of their 2
November elections, and removes all Ukrainian government institutions from
separatist areas.
7. Reach out to the east, particularly Ukrainian citizens in separatist-controlled areas,
and stress its abiding concern about their well-being; and address accusations
that Ukrainian troops have shelled urban areas in Donetsk and elsewhere, and
announce an open and transparent inquiry into such claims.
To Russia, the EU, U.S., Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and other international actors involved in the peace
process:
8. Move urgently to demilitarise the conflict by substantially increasing monitors
on the ground, both to separate the forces and closely observe the Ukrainian-
Russian border; and declare the Donetsk airport neutral territory under international
supervision.
9. Draw up contingency plans for major emergency relief operations in Donetsk
and Luhansk if the situation continues to deteriorate.
10. Urge separatist and Ukrainian leaders back to the negotiating table.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page iv
11. Continue to urge the Poroshenko administration to reach out to the population
of the separatist-controlled areas.
To the EU, U.S. and other parties engaged in the peace process:
12. Review sanctions policy to create incentives for Russia to de-escalate, and move
away from a sanctions policy that is open-ended and does not identify trigger
events specific enough to allow for their gradual removal.
13. Declare a willingness to make significant financial support available for the speedy
restoration of Donetsk and Luhansk once a solution to the conflict has been found.
Kyiv/Brussels, 18 December 2014
International Crisis Group
Europe Report N°235 18 December 2014
Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter
I. Introduction
In late February 2014, after months of mass protests on Kyiv’s Independence Square
– Maidan Nezaleznosti, which gave its name to the movement –, President Viktor
Yanukovych fled the country with Russian assistance.1 A power vacuum quickly developed
in eastern Ukraine, his home base. Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions disintegrated,
followed soon by the politicised and highly corrupt security structures. The
vacuum was filled by demonstrators calling for closer relations with Moscow, or even
absorption by their northern neighbour. Crimea’s swift declaration of independence
from Ukraine and subsequent reincorporation into the Russian Federation led activists
in the south-eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, and their supporters in
Russia, to believe that they could repeat the scenario in eastern Ukraine. Instead this
triggered eight months of war, during which at least 5,000 people, and probably
more, have died.
While most south-eastern oblasts resisted and ultimately suppressed pro-Russian
demonstrations, protesters, rarely more than a few thousand, seized government
buildings, barracks and security force arsenals throughout Donetsk and Luhansk. By
May, most of the two oblasts were in separatist hands. Soon after his election in late
May, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko launched a major military operation –
officially known as an Anti-Terror Operation (ATO) in the east. By the summer, the
separatist Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) had lost much of the land it had seized,
and had concentrated its forces in and around Donetsk city. Its counterpart in
Luhansk was even further reduced.2
Research was conducted in Brussels, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk city and oblast
and Moscow.
1 Speaking at the annual Valdai conference, Putin admitted that he had helped Yanukovych flee,
first to Crimea and then to Russia. See http://kremlin.ru/news/46860, 24 October 2014. He noted
that he urged Yanukovych to stay in the capital and not to withdraw riot police from Kyiv. “Yanukovych
said: ‘yes, I understand’ Putin recalled. He then left [the capital] and ordered all forces of
public order removed from Kyiv. Great guy ( )”. Ibid.
2 The Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, widely known by their Russian initials DNR and
LNR, are not recognised by any country. Similarly, no country recognised the results of the 2 November
legislative and presidential elections. Russia expressed respect for the vote, but was careful
not to say it recognised the result. Moscow makes it clear Donetsk and Luhansk are part of Ukraine,
and stresses that Kyiv must bear the burden of supporting them financially, including the eventual
cost of reconstruction. For purposes of simplicity, the entities are referred to in this report by their
self-proclaimed titles, DNR and LNR.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 2
II. From Ilovaisk to Minsk
August 2014 was one of the bloodiest months of the war. Donetsk city was shelled
frequently, its population dropped from just under a million to around 600,000,3
and Ukrainian troops were on the offensive across much of the DNR-controlled territory.
In the middle of that month, officials in Moscow watched the successful Ukrainian
offensive with concern. The operation was going “a little too far”.4 At the end of
July, separatist leaders in Donetsk warned Moscow that they could not hold out for
more than a few weeks without major Russian military assistance.5 Fears of a total
separatist defeat, which Russian specialists have likened to the 1995 destruction of
the Serbian enclave of Krajina, triggered a major Russian military response.
The Russian offensive was preceded by the abrupt removal of two key Russian figures
who had played a decisive role in the early days of the DNR.6 The personnel
changes coincided with an infusion of Russian weaponry, and almost certainly Russian
troops. Igor Strelkov, the main military leader of the separatist uprising, hinted
strongly at this in a message to his supporters in September. When he left the east,
he recalled, “Donetsk and the whole of the DNR armed forces were surrounded” and
fighting for existence. But only a few people in Donetsk knew that “literally in the
next few days, the enemy would be dealt a crushing defeat”.7
This came in Ilovaisk, a railway junction town half an hour’s drive to the east of
Donetsk city and about 50km from the Russian border. The Ukrainian capture of
Ilovaisk would have closed the noose around Donetsk city, cutting it off from most
resupply routes. Fighting had been going on there for weeks. On 23 August, a large
combined force of Ukrainian volunteer battalions and regular army was deployed in
and around the town. The volunteer battalions were largely so-called second echelon
units, intended to round up DNR militia stragglers and restore order rather than engage
in conventional warfare. The next day the Ukrainian forces came under intense
artillery and mortar fire, often guided by drones and delivered by modern weaponry
that far surpassed their own equipment.8 More attackers cut off their retreat. “We
were waiting for you”, a Russian soldier later told a Ukrainian prisoner.9 The bombardment
inflicted heavy casualties.
3 Figures provided by the Donetsk city council. Crisis Group interview, 13 October 2014.
4 Crisis Group telephone interview, Moscow-based official who specialises in Russian policy to
Ukraine and other former Soviet states, mid-August 2014. For further background, see Crisis Group
Europe Report N°231, Ukraine: Running out of Time, 14 May 2014.
5 Crisis Group interview, senior official, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
6 On 7 August, the entity’s prime minister, Alexander Borodai, before the war a Moscow-based political
commentator close to radical nationalist media and movements, was replaced by Alexander
Zakharchenko. The following week Igor Strelkov, the pre-eminent military leader of the separatist
uprising – an ardent supporter of direct and massive Russian intervention, of the creation of Novorossia,
a state carved out of seven Ukrainian oblasts, and a frequent critic of Moscow for not
providing enough aid – left for Russia without explanation or farewell. Many DNR military commanders
were shocked by Strelkov’s departure, and remain loyal to him, while he continues to lobby
his supporters in the east to take a hard, aggressive line.
7 [Address by Strelkov], vk.com/gubarev, 11 September 2014.
8 Crisis Group interview, officer, Mirotvorets battalion, Kyiv, 18 September 2014. The Ukrainians
deployed three drones, which were quickly shot down. Two of the three newly trained drone controllers
were killed during the retreat. Crisis Group interview, Dnipropetrovsk, 26 September 2014.
9 Crisis Group interview, Kyiv, 18 September 2014.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 3
On 29 August, Vladimir Putin took the unusual step of appealing publicly to the
“Novorossia militia” to provide safe passage for the survivors, a sign that the Kremlin
was watching the operations closely.10 The Ukrainian troops suffered many more
losses when Russian tanks and armour strafed them as they retreated through the
corridor.11 Putin claimed that this was because the Ukrainian forces had used the
pause in combat to regroup and resupply. “This causes mistrust”, he said on TV.12
DNR and Russian officials insist that only local militias were involved in the
fighting, while Ukrainian troop and commanders say they were hit by elite Russian
units with advanced weaponry. Ukrainians taken prisoner during the battle recount
conversations with Russian airborne troops stationed in the Russian cities of Pskov
and Kostroma, as well as soldiers from a motorised infantry brigade based in Shatoi,
Chechnya.13 Several senior Ukrainian officers retreated with wounded Russian troops
in their vehicles, a fact that eased their passage out of the Russian military encirclement.
14 Ilovaisk inhabitants also later recalled that the fighting in their town had
been between Russian and Ukrainian regular forces.15 Chechnya-based Russian
troops told a prisoner that they had been required to sign demobilisation forms before
being deployed in Ukraine. They added that they expected to be attached to
DNR forces along with all their equipment.16
Ukrainian officials admit to just over 100 killed on the operation. Those involved
in the fighting, as well as at least one regional governor, say the real death toll is at
least 1,000, and probably more.17
The Ilovaisk defeat demoralised the Ukrainian leadership. A leader in the southeastern
oblast of Dnipropetrovsk voiced a widely-held view that the defeat left the
rest of the east and south at the mercy of the DNR and its allies.18 A Ukrainian general
intimately acquainted with the Ilovaisk operation was blunt, “we could have
10 “ ” [“President
Putin appealed to the Novorossia Militia”], 29 August 2014, http://kremlin.ru/news/46506.
11 Crisis Group interviews, journalist and junior battalion officer who survived the retreat, Kyiv, 18
September 2014; ranking Ukrainian army officer, eastern Ukraine, late September 2014.
12 “Interview with Vladimir Putin”, Russian TV Channel 1, www.1tv.ru/news/polit/266628, 31 August
2014. There are other versions of the rationale for the attack on retreating troops. These include the
allegation that the ranking Ukrainian commander was unwilling to abandon heavy weaponry during
the retreat. Whatever the reason, the corridor was a traumatic and scarring experience for the
survivors.
13 Crisis Group interviews, journalist and junior battalion officer who survived the retreat, Kyiv, 18
September 2014. A ranking Ukrainian officer involved in the fighting cited the same Russian units.
Crisis Group interview, eastern Ukraine, late September 2014.
14 Crisis Group interview, ranking Ukrainian military officer, eastern Ukraine, late September 2014.
Videos also showed modern Russian military equipment on the battlefield.
15 Crisis Group interviews, Ilovaisk, 14 October 2014.
16 Crisis Group interview, 18 September 2014. In late August, Ukrainian forces captured ten Russian
airborne troops just south of Ilovaisk. Russian military authorities claimed the men had crossed the
border by accident. The men said they were from Kostroma. See “Relatives of airborne troops arrested
in Ukraine have gathered in Kostroma”, 26 August 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/v_
kostrome_sobralis_rodstvenniki_zaderzhannyh_v_ukraine_desantnikov-374566.
17 The higher figure is cited by a number of observers, including a security adviser to a senior
Ukrainian politician. Crisis Group interview, Kyiv, 30 September 2014. The number of missing in
action or taken prisoner has not been established. In a visit to Ilovaisk on 14 October, DNR thenpremier
Zakharchenko said that prisoners of war included 98 members of the Donbas volunteer
battalion. These would not be exchanged, he said, but would be made to work in the city and possibly
local mines. Crisis Group observation, Ilovaisk, 14 October 2014.
18 Crisis Group interview, Dnipropetrovsk, 25 September 2014.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 4
handled the separatists, but we can’t fight the Russian army”. This is the end of the
war, and President Poroshenko understood this, he added.19 The defeat also left the
Ukrainian military short of weaponry. A month after Ilovaisk, a Ukrainian general
and influential politician described a visit to a military sales exhibition in Kyiv.
Asked what they were looking for, the politician laughed. “Everything”, he said.20
Ilovaisk was far from a total victory for the separatists, however. The DNR militias
wanted to push on and take back the land they had lost in recent months. Instead,
said a senior DNR politician: “The Russians told us ‘stop!’ Our troops were
to go no further”. The politician said he disagreed with the order. “But we cannot
refuse: we are dependent on those who help us”.21 The Russian troops also went no
further. Officials working on Minsk talks noted around the same time with some
surprise that separatist leaders were suddenly more amenable to negotiations.22
The 5 September negotiations in Minsk resulted in the declaration of a ceasefire
and an agreement to separate the warring parties.23 A particularly controversial
clause at the time was Ukraine’s agreement to classify the separatist areas for a limited
period as zones with special status. The wording was reportedly written by a
senior Putin adviser, Vladislav Surkov, and was deliberately kept “creatively obscure”
in its details, an international participant in the negotiations remarked.24 Political
sources in Kyiv later said that Russia had threatened to resume and extend its military
offensive if the idea was not incorporated into the agreement. A Ukrainian deputy
premier later claimed that the passage of a law on special status had forestalled a
“full-scale offensive”.25
19 Crisis Group interview, ranking Ukrainian army officer, eastern Ukraine, September 2014.
20 Crisis Group interview, eastern Ukraine, 25 September 2014. Six weeks later, speaking in Donetsk,
a top separatist leader said that the Ukrainians were firing prohibited ammunition like cluster
bombs “because they don’t have anything else left”. Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November
2014.
21 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
22 Crisis Group interview, senior diplomat, Kyiv, 22 September 2014.
23 The negotiations were held under the auspices of a Contact Group composed of Ukraine, Russia
and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Separatist leaders from both
Donetsk and Luhansk were also present. The two separatist representatives signed the final memorandum,
but the document did not identify their geographical affiliation or their political positions
in two separatist regions. The OSCE published the protocol, but only in Russian See: www.osce.org/
home/123257. The Ukrainian government posted an English-language version on its website: http://
mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/27596-protocolon-the-results-of-consultations-ofthe-
trilateral-contact-group-minsk-05092014. On 19 September, the Group agreed on a memorandum
outlining measures to stabilise the ceasefire. See, in Russian, www.osce.org/home/123806.
24 Crisis Group interview, senior diplomat, 22 September 2014. For more on Surkov, see Section
III.C.
25 “ : ”
[“Vladimir Groysman: Laws on the Donbas stopped a full-scale offensive”], Ukrainskaya Pravda,
24 November 2014.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 5
III. Reaction to the Minsk Agreement
The Ukrainian and separatist leaders who signed the Minsk ceasefire protocol found
themselves accused of many of the same sins by their political establishments. Volunteer
battalion commanders in Kyiv spoke of treason and hinted at a coup; militia
commanders in the east did the same. The signatories were accused of selling out
their revolutions; some suggested that they had done a deal, most likely for corrupt
purposes. Most importantly, many leaders in both camps claimed that Minsk had
damaged their side’s chances of survival. Ukrainian political leaders predicted a Russian
or separatist offensive in the south east sometime in winter or early spring. The
separatists warned that they controlled too little territory to be viable. Given this
mood, it is no surprise that the ceasefire never really happened. Well over 1,000 people
have probably been killed since the agreement came into force on 6 September.26
A. Donetsk
The Minsk ceasefire agreement brought out into the open the sharp divisions within
the separatist leadership, both political and military. More pragmatic leaders stressed
the need for peace as a precondition to building a functional state that would aim for
a slow and roundabout incorporation into Vladimir Putin’s Russian world, through
membership in Russian-created bodies such as the Customs Union. This, a senior
government figure conceded, would be an extremely difficult task.27
They were opposed by a powerful group of political and military leaders who
viewed the situation as much more urgent and requiring forceful military action. The
fundamental difference between the two camps lies in the future of the Novorossia
project. While the DNR and LNR often refer to themselves generically as Novorossia,
to most separatists, particularly the militias, the name means something much larger:
a new state torn out of Ukraine that would encompass most of the south east of
the country and the Black Sea coast as far as Moldova – a state with substantial agricultural,
marine and industrial potential.28 The Minsk agreement leaves the separatists
with a tiny fraction of this – roughly about 40 per cent of Donetsk oblast and
a much smaller proportion of Luhansk. Many separatist leaders, including a number
of senior military commanders who are still in contact with Igor Strelkov, feel their
current territory is not viable. They see the Minsk process as a disturbing tilt by the
Kremlin away from the greater Novorossia and the radical nationalist line that they
and their Russian nationalist allies espouse.29
26 International organisations estimate over 700 deaths, but base these on official figures, which
they consider to be drastically underestimated.
27 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 14 October 2014.
28 The term was first raised post-Crimea annexation by Vladimir Putin in a lengthy phone-in on
Russian TV on 17 April 2014. See kremlin.ru/news/20796.
29 The Russian nationalists in question include Alexander Dugin, Alexander Prokhanov – both formerly
strong supporters of Putin who have at times claimed to be close to him – and probably Sergey
Glazyev, an adviser to the president. Dugin and Prokhanov expressed disappointment with
what they saw as Putin’s abandonment of the radical nationalist cause. Dugin was particularly eloquent:
“In my view Putin is not a person but a concept, the bearer of a certain function. This figure
has two sides, sun and moon, solar and lunar. The Sun Putin is the person who reincorporates Crimea,
visits Orthodox elders, stands for the Russian people, the Putin we want. There is a lunar
Putin – his shadow, which compromises, thinks of natural gas, betrays the children of Slavyansk.
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They lashed out at the agreement and its signatories. Pavel Gubarev, a leading
hardline separatist and proponent of a greater Novorossia, wrote that when he saw
the Minsk document, “we wanted to spit on this ‘peace’”.30 One of the most influential
commanders, Alexei Mozgovoy, asked an interviewer “how could anyone sign an
agreement which leaves us in the backyard of our own land? … The passivity and
weak character of the representatives who signed all this have brought us to this lamentable
result”.31 “Within our current borders, we have very modest prospects”, said
another prominent proponent of greater Novorossia. He implicitly criticised both
Moscow and his own colleagues for the current state of affairs. “Moscow often takes
decisions for us”, he noted.32
Radically inclined leaders and commanders suggest the pragmatists, mostly current
political leaders in the DNR, are motivated in part by corruption. “Novorossia
does not suit the present DNR leadership”, said a militant, making it clear the leaders
had financial interests in the current situation in Donetsk.33 Mozgovoy alleged that
much Russian aid disappears before it reaches the troops.34 Strelkov, the former military
commander, has made similar claims. Supporters of a fast push to create a greater
Novorossia say it would put vastly more resources into the separatists’ hands and
make their cause more attractive in the eyes of the Russian leadership. Waiting, they
say, could prove fatal, since the DNR’s limited support on the ground could decline
further as its ability to provide basic services during the winter weakens.35
Senior militia commanders, urged on from Moscow by Strelkov, tried intermittently
in September and October to call a military council to discuss the situation.
The expectation was that most commanders would support the idea of creating a
greater Novorossia as soon as possible. The DNR leadership expressed concern about
the planned council and other signs of dissent. The dissidents, a top leader said, “are
neither insignificant nor a minority”.36 The leadership was eventually able to head
off the council meeting, though deep signs of discord on this and related matters
regularly surface.
Many ordinary people in Donetsk appear increasingly to have little love for either
side and simply want their privations to end. For this reason most expressed optimism
about the Minsk agreement, even though they received little hard information
about the peace talks from the highly politicised media on both sides. Most residents
obtain their news through the partisan Russian and separatist media. Ukrainian outlets,
harder to access in the east, are mostly no less biased. People say they minimise
interactions with DNR officialdom whenever possible, unsure how its representatives,
This Putin is much less remarkable”. See “ ” [“The Lunar
Putin fired me from MGU”], www.gazeta.ru/social/2014/07/01/6093433.shtml, 1 July 2014.
30 See Pavel Gubarev’s Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/pgubarev/posts/941335609226518,
posted on 7 September. Rather confusingly, separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk sometimes refer to
the area under their control as Novorossia.
31 : ,
[“Alexey Mozgovoy: An assault on Kharkov is not just possible but necessary”], Rusvesna.su news
site, 15 October 2014, http://rusvesna.su/news/1413322782.
32 Crisis Group interviews, senior government, security and military officials, Donetsk, October-
November 2014. See also, inter alia, :
, , op. cit.
33 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
34 [“An assault on Kharkov is not just possible but necessary”], op. cit.
35 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
36 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 7
at best inexperienced and arbitrary in their behaviour, will respond. Many stay because
they have nowhere else to go, or because they have deep family roots in the area. A lot,
however, move in and out of Donetsk as much as possible, depending on the military
situation or for other needs, such as medical care or attempts to register for pensions
in one of the Ukrainian-government held areas. Thus the population of Donetsk,
which had dropped to 600,000 in August, was well over 700,000 by October.37
B. Kyiv
The Ukrainian leadership faced a similar backlash. Many Ukrainian political leaders
and activists were deeply critical both of the ceasefire and of Poroshenko’s secretive
approach to negotiations.38 They described Minsk as a temporary pause that would
allow the rebels to rest, train and resupply, and complained that extending special
status to separatist-occupied areas amounted to tacit recognition. They predicted a
major separatist offensive, in the spring or even before, through the southern and
eastern oblasts from Kharkov and on through Odessa to the Moldovan border. “Poroshenko
has lost the war …. We have to hope that Putin does not have enough brains
to realise how weak we are”, said a major politician and businessman with national
ambitions. “Destabilisation of the rest of the east and south has already begun”, and
“the Russians have a strong fifth column working there”, he added, singling out two
prominent local politicians in Kharkov. Regional governors in most of the vulnerable
oblasts have done little to shore up their internal security. The country will look very
different by the spring, he concluded ominously.39
Many share this pessimism. “We have allowed Putin to impose a significant part
of his agenda on us”, said an adviser to a coalition leader.40 “Poroshenko has sanctioned
the creation of terrorist republics. It is only a question of time before Putin
moves further – at the very least with the land bridge linking Crimea and mainland
Ukraine”.41 A land bridge would provide a means to resupply Crimea, especially in the
winter, when bad weather hampers the peninsula’s resupply by sea. It would most
likely stretch from the Russian border through the occupied town of Novoazovsk and
the major Ukrainian-controlled port of Mariupol, and then south and east to the Crimean
peninsula. “The Russians want Mariupol at any price”, said a ranking Ukrainian
commander in the east.42
Poroshenko also faced fierce criticism from the military, particularly the volunteer
battalions that had been fighting in the east. They had already complained of the
government’s failure to equip them properly, to provide battlefield support or medical
evacuation, and at the regular military commanders who abandoned them when
the situation became dire.43 After the Minsk agreement, some officers openly threat-
37 Figures provided by the Donetsk city council. Crisis Group interview, 13 October 2014.
38 Crisis Group interview, parliamentary candidate, Kyiv, 9 October 2014.
39 Crisis Group interview, eastern Ukraine, September 2014.
40 Crisis Group interview, Kyiv, 1 October 2014.
41 Crisis Group interview, Kyiv, 30 September 2014.
42 Crisis Group interview, eastern Ukraine, September 2014.
43 Such complaints are a common feature of most conversations with volunteer veterans. Crisis
Group interviews, officer of one battalion, 16 September 2014; journalist who was caught up in the
fighting, 18 September 2014; and officer of the Mirotvorets battalion, 18 September 2014. Two of
the three had been in the battle for Ilovaisk, the third had seen combat elsewhere in Donetsk oblast.
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Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 8
ened to “turn their guns against the traitors in Kyiv”.44 Many troops voiced such feelings
in Ilovaisk during the fighting, said a participant in the battle. “Of course”, he
added, “most of those who said that did not come out alive”, as they had been in the
thick of the fighting.45
No officer or unit has so far tried to carry out these threats, and the government
publicly plays down the allegations. However, at least one prominent politician, Andriy
Parubiy, the former secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, has
travelled regularly to the front to address the soldiers’ complaints.46 Some demonstrations
by soldiers have been reported in Kyiv and elsewhere.
The suddenness and secrecy of the Minsk agreement added to growing doubts
about Poroshenko harboured by members of the political elite, particularly former
Maidan democracy activists. The agreement sparked speculation that he had done a
behind-the-scenes deal with Vladimir Putin. Many observers spoke of their “constant”
telephone conversations, fuelling suspicion that Poroshenko was running a
“parallel negotiating track” with the Russian president, one in which “Putin was the
dominant partner”.47 The law on special status – though only symbolically important
– was passed by the parliament in one closed evening session.48
Growing frustration with Poroshenko may have contributed to his setback in the
26 October parliamentary elections,49
C. The Other Minsk Negotiator
Senior Western diplomats say that Vladislav Surkov, a long-time political strategist
and ideological adviser to President Putin, advised both sides in Minsk. DNR leaders
confirm this. Senior DNR officials say Surkov kept their negotiators on a tight
rein. They were basically told “just sign the document”, said one. For Poroshenko
he probably drafted the crucial point in the agreement – the temporary “special status”
for the DNR and LNR within Ukraine.
44 Crisis Group interview, battalion officer based in the east, Kyiv, September 2014. He said he
shared these sentiments.
45 Crisis Group interview, Kyiv, 18 September 2014. One of the two generals commanding the
Ilovaisk operation allegedly left the battlefield when combat intensified. Three battalion commanders
have called for the general to be put on trial. “Battalion commanders demand Litvin be put on
trial for Ilovaisk”, Anews.com website, 10 September 2014.
46 Crisis Group interview, security adviser to a senior politician, Kyiv, 30 September 2014.
47 Crisis Group interviews, TV executive, Kyiv, 9 September 2014; government official, Kyiv, 3 October
2014; security official, Kyiv, October 2014.
48 Separatist leaders say Poroshenko is probably the only leader in Kyiv who would be open to an
agreement, but most say they would never deal with someone they hold responsible for thousands
of deaths in the east. Crisis Group interview, senior DNR leader, Donetsk, 16 November 2014. Senior
Western diplomats agree that Poroshenko is more flexible than the other Ukrainian leaders.
“Petro is a natural deal maker”, said one. Crisis Group interview, November 2014.
49 The Poroshenko popular vote slipped slightly behind another block led by outgoing Prime Minister
Arseniy Yatsenyuk, whom separatists view as radically opposed to any agreement. Ultimately,
however, the president’s bloc emerged as the largest grouping in the new parliament.The president
then lost time with several weeks of wrangling over parliamentary alliance and cabinet seats.
50 The information was first published in Elisabeth Pond, “The end of deterrence?”, IP Journal,
German Council on Foreign Relations, 23 September 2014. Senior Western diplomats closely following
the Minsk process confirmed Surkov’s role in the special status debate. Crisis Group interviews,
Kyiv, 1-2 October 2014. DNR officials and Russian sources subsequently also confirmed this.
51 Crisis Group interviews, senior DNR political leaders, Donetsk, mid-November 2014.
52 Crisis Group interview, senior Western diplomat, Kyiv, 1 October 2014.
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The Minsk agreement seems to have marked a change in the Kremlin’s overseers
for Donetsk and Luhansk. Previously, the main drivers of Moscow’s Ukraine policy,
had been Sergei Glazyev, Putin’s adviser for regional economic policy, and Dmitry
Rogozin, Russian deputy premier for military affairs, a former ambassador to NATO.53
Both are closely connected to radical nationalist circles. Some relatively more pragmatic
DNR leaders were happy to see them go. “These people played a very negative
role by bringing Strelkov into the conflict, the security officer said”. 54 “Surkov is now
our main kurator [overseer, handler]”, he added, noting that Surkov had prepared
much of the Minsk package of agreements. A Russian observer said, however, that
the Russian military and intelligence services would have their own kurator.55
Surkov is the Kremlin’s point person for the Caucasus and some other parts of
Russia’s near-abroad. When political tensions spilled onto the street in Abkhazia earlier
this year, he flew there to calm passions. More recently, he has emerged as the
spokesman and probable architect of a new considerably tighter political, military
and security relationship with Abkhazia.56 In Donetsk he has garnered mixed reviews.
Some welcomed a handler less ideological than Rogozin or Glazyev, and expressed
respect for what they described as his tough management style and sharp legal mind.57
Supporters of greater Novorossia view him as anathema. From Moscow, Strelkov
denounced the “Surkov-Lavrov-Zurabov” group who was nudging Putin away from
the hardline DNR position. “How much longer can Surkov openly deceive VVP [Vladimir
Putin], presenting his virtual successes as real accomplishments? And how long
can the president be confident that Surkov and Company are still under his control?”58
53 Other DNR officials refused to comment on the roles played by Rogozin and Glazyev, but did
note that they also consulted economic advisers working under Russian first deputy premier, Igor
Shuvalov.
54 Crisis Group interview, senior DNR officer, Donetsk, October 2014. Glazyev was born in the eastern
Ukrainian region of Zaporozhia.
55 Crisis Group interview, Moscow, 25 November 2014.
56 -
[Draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the Abkhazia Republic on alliance and
integration], at http://apsnypress.info/docs/13258.html.
57 Crisis Group interview, top DNR official, 16 November 2014.
58 Strelkov’s statement was published on one of the most active separatist blogs, 20 September.
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2014/09/20. Sergey Lavrov is foreign minister, and Mikhail
Zurabov is the Russian ambassador to Kyiv and Russia’s representative at the Minsk talks.
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IV. Donetsk: A Suitcase without a Handle
A. Diverging Interests: A Growing Gap between Donetsk and Moscow
Few of the current separatist leaders knew where they were going when they seized
power. Some hoped for immediate absorption into Russia. Others aimed at a broad
degree of autonomy that would limit Kyiv’s authority in the region to the absolute
minimum. A few were veterans of a Donetsk separatist movement that emerged in
2005 and aimed for federal status within Ukraine. Some supported the Eurasianist
ideas of the historian and ethnographer Lev Gumilev, a strong influence on radical
Russian nationalists.59 Many were opportunists. “Plenty of people wanted power. I
think a lot of them had seen the Party of Regions leaders become very rich, and they
wanted to do the same”, said a senior security figure. “Certainly no one expected a
war with thousands dead”.60
They are still improvising. The top leadership, which includes Zakharchenko,
speaker of parliament Andrei Purgin and his deputy Denis Pushilin, rarely seem to
work from offices, communicate by cell phones, and often meet in hotel cafés. They
admit that they have few people with administrative experience necessary to run a
city like Donetsk. They are not sure how much financial assistance they will receive
from Moscow. “If there is a total humanitarian catastrophe, Russia will help”, said a
top leader. “Less than that, we’ll see”.61 The leadership is in private also frank about
the degree of public support. Certain categories, they say, – middle class, business,
those with a higher education or university students – are not strong supporters.62
Their support is deeper among pensioners, workers and in smaller towns and villages.
The Russian leadership views us “like a suitcase without a handle”, said a senior
security official, “useless, but you can’t bring yourself to throw it away”.63 Other senior
officials agree that Russia views them largely as a “burden”.64
The ease of Crimea’s absorption generated a powerful wave of euphoria throughout
the Russian political leadership. Russian politicians say that the operation was
largely improvised. “I can say with absolute certainty that there was no preplanning
for the reunion of Crimea. During the Ukrainian crisis the opportunity, I would even
say the necessity, presented itself and Russia took advantage of it”, a former premier
and head of external intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov, said in October 2014.
When Crimea became part of Russia on 18 March, Putin quickly shifted his attention
to south-eastern Ukraine. First he referred to Ukraine’s south-east oblasts as
“historically Russian”, and then a month later to Novorossia – the oblasts of Khar-
59 Gumilev’s ideas remain highly controversial. Putin is an admirer. At the opening of the Lev Gumilev
Eurasian National University in Astana, in October 2000, Putin paid tribute to Gumilev’s
“centuries-old idea of the commonality and interconnectedness of the nations inhabiting the immense
expanses of Eurasia: from the Baltics and the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean”. See http://
kremlin.ru/transcripts/21625.
60 Crisis Group interview, senior security official, Donetsk, 14 October 2014.
61 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November 2014.
62 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
63 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 14 October 2014.
64 Crisis Group interview, 13 October 2014.
65 Yevgeny Primakov interview with a Lithuanian website, Delfi.lt. ,
[“The possibility arose and Russia took advantage of it”], 15 October
2014. Western and Russian observers say there were obviously standard contingency plans
in place for military intervention in Crimea.
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kov, Luhansk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa – “which were not part of Ukraine in
Tsarist times”. Separatist leaders saw a powerful signal of support. The Kremlin’s
mood was understandable. Putin’s polling ratings, always extremely high, had after
Crimea reached the level of “almost total unity – a situation that is exceedingly rare
in sociological research”, said one of Russia’s top pollsters, Lev Gudkov. Igor
Strelkov, who played a key role in Crimea and then turned to eastern Ukraine in early
April, recalled that in his early days in Donetsk, “we in no way expected such a long
war, so many civilian casualties. After Crimea we were in a state of euphoria”.
Kremlin enthusiasm seemed to wane in May, several separatist officials believe.
By then it was clear that separatism was unlikely to expand to the other south-eastern
oblasts, and greater Novorossia would probably not materialise without direct Russian
intervention. When separatist leaders announced a referendum on “state independence”
for 11 May, several DNR leaders recalled, Putin asked them to postpone
the vote in order to create the “necessary conditions” for a dialogue with Kyiv. “Putin
had obviously received a very good analytical paper on the subject. They told him
that the Donbas is not Crimea – it will not drop on your lap like a ripe apple”, said
one; “Putin felt there were other ways to advance the question”, said another. “We
had no experience, no funding”.70
The separatists refused, to Moscow’s surprise, and the referendum went ahead.71
Most thought they were voting for incorporation into Russia.72 Looking back, it was
then that some DNR leaders and activists began to realise that their struggle would
be longer and more complicated than they imagined, and that they would have to
survive independently from Russia.73 Moscow describes the separatist entities as
part of Ukraine, and a problem therefore to be solved by Ukraine itself. After the
Minsk agreement, Russian officials made it clear they held Kyiv responsible for
rebuilding the war-damaged east. They warned the separatists that annexation of
Crimea meant the eastern entities should not expect generous financial aid.74 When
Donetsk and Luhansk held presidential and legislative elections on 2 November,
Russia expressed its “respect” for the outcome, but carefully avoided recognising
66 “ ”, [“A direct line with Vladimir Putin”], 17 April 2014.
www.kremlin.ru/news/20796. Novorossia was originally an administrative area created during the
reign of Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century.
67 Most senior DNR officials and activists interviewed in October and November said this.
68 Lev Gudkov, Pro et Contra journal, “ ” [“Putin’s totalitarian
recidivism”], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May-August 2014. Gudkov is one of the
relatively few remaining public critics of the president’s policies.
69 Strelkov radio interview, 6 November 2014, http://govoritmoskva.ru/interviews/265.
70 Crisis Group interviews, senior DNR leaders, Donetsk, 14 October and 16 November 2014.
Putin’s statement can be found on http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/20973.
71 The next day, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied commenting on the refusal. “We need additional
information”, he reportedly said. “These are new data”. “
- ” [“The Kremlin is not yet commenting on
south-east Ukraine’s refusal to postpone the referendum”], News.w.com website, 8 May 2014, http://
news-w.com/63316-7180/n/63315-50657/.
72 Crisis Group interview, top DNR leader, Donetsk, 14 October 2014. Other officials interviewed
subsequently said the same thing.
73 Crisis Group interview, top DNR leader, Donetsk, 14 October 2014. “I think it was about then that
we started to irritate the Kremlin”, another official remarked. Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 15
November 2014.
74 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 13 October 2014.
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them.75 “Moscow does not really know what to do with us”, said a DNR politician.
“They certainly do not want to recognise us, they will not let us join the Russian Federation,
but they are providing military support. It’s a little strange”.76
Senior DNR leaders speak of a growing gap between them and Moscow. “Our
interests converge about 60 per cent of the time”, said one. “The gap is not in our
favour”.77 Russians paint a similar picture. “The Kremlin controls them [DNR and
LNR] 60-70 per cent of the time on political issues”, and “about 30 per cent in military
matters”, said a former presidential adviser.78
On major issues like the Minsk agreement, the separatists were barely consulted.
Russian observers say the Kremlin is frustrated by their refusal to understand that
Poroshenko is their best chance of a settlement.79 One of the key differences in viewpoint
is that while the enclaves are fighting for survival, looking no further than next
spring, the Russians are playing a long game, a senior DNR official said, ten to twenty
years ahead. “Ukraine is their soft underbelly: Moscow can never allow it to fall into
enemy hands. They will take it back eventually”.
B. Russian Military Assistance
Russian military assistance has been intermittently generous, separatist militia members
say.80 The “voentorg” tap – slang for Russian military aid in all forms, derived
from the name of Soviet-era military department stores – was turned on and off,
based perhaps on Russia’s level of satisfaction with the separatist leadership, or possibly
to maintain a veneer of deniability. Russia has provided substantial amounts of
heavy weaponry. The clearest sign of Russian assistance was the group of 1,200
fighters who returned last August after four months of training in Russia.81
Aid seems to at times be distributed on the basis of political loyalty. Zakharchenko’s
own military force, the Oplot (Stronghold) battalion, is extremely well-equipped;
so is the Vostok (East) brigade, which many officials say is supported by the Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB).82 By contrast more unruly units such as Alexei Mozgovoy’s
Prizrak (Ghost) brigade complained in November they had not even received
food. Russian troops have intervened when Moscow felt the separatist enclaves were
faced with mortal danger, but the Russian military has done nothing to turn the dis-
75 “ “” “” ”
[“Do not equate respect and recognition for the DNR LNR elections, Kremlin urges”], Interfax News
Service, 7 November 2014, www.interfax.ru/world/405935.
76 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 14 October 2014.
77 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November 2014. The official nonetheless described the
Kremlin strategy as “very smart”.
78 Crisis Group interview, Moscow, 20 November 2014.
79 Crisis Group interview, Moscow, 25 November 2014. A ranking DNR official confirmed that talks
were completely out of the question. “We will not talk to him after he has killed 4,000 of our people”.
Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November 2014.
80 Crisis Group interviews, Ilovaisk, 14 October 2014.
81 Speech by Zakharchenko at DNR session, video, Youtube, 15 August 2014, www.youtube.com/
watch?v=BjAvnUa1Wak.
82 “ ” [“Much about that which is important”], Rusvesna news website, 4 October
2014, http://rusvesna.su/recent_opinions/1412429274. Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 15 December
2014. Dissident militiamen allege that Oplot is also funded by former leaders of Yanukovych’s
Party of the Regions. See Chervonets interview at http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/
1845960.html. Officials in Donetsk frequently voice the suspicion that Vostok receives a considerable
amount of support from Donetsk steel magnate Rinat Akhmetov.
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parate militia forces into a real army. The result is a bewildering multiplicity of
units: Cossacks; an Orthodox Christian unit, now in schism; military groups with
names like Sparta or Somalia, and many others known only by the name of their
commanders. Should the situation deteriorate further, such groups could turn into
a network of well-armed criminal groups or bandits, operating on both sides of the
border.83 Russia and Ukraine need to make contingency plans for any mass collapse
of discipline within the militias.
Russian military advisers attached to militia units would have been welcome,
several DNR leaders said. But other than a few volunteers, there were none. DNR
military officials complain in particular of a dearth of trained and experienced officers.
“We have maybe a handful of good officers in the militia: hardly any Ukrainian
army veterans came forward to fight for their land”, said a militia officer. “Mostly we
have nutjobs”.84 Strelkov praised one militia battalion commander known by his radio
call-sign of Motorola. He is a good soldier, and “a fine commander up to the level of
platoon”. By his own admission Strelkov has never commanded more than 150 men.85
Strelkov is a good example of the Russian strategy. The most senior Russian officer
to work on the ground, Strelkov turned out to be a major headache for separatist
leaders and Moscow.86 A former colonel in the Federal Security Service (better known
by its Russian initials FSB), with several tours in Chechnya and stints as a volunteer
fighting in Bosnia and Transnistria in the 1990s, he is a cranky monarchist and admirer
of the anti-communist White movement during the Russian Civil War. He is
adored by radical nationalists in Moscow and some key DNR and LNR military commanders,
but now increasingly described by the current DNR leadership as a deeply
negative influence on the separatist revolt, who toward the end of his brief stay was
“insubordinate”.87
After involvement in Crimea in March, he arrived in Donetsk with about 50 men,
seizing Slavyansk in northern Donetsk oblast on 12 April and several nearby towns
soon after.88 A senior DNR security officer says that Strelkov’s arrival marked the
83 In mid-November DNR officials said they would purge the militia of “asocial and marginal elements”
and attempt to create a single command structure. So far there has been no indication of
major changes in either personnel or command. Some non-Ukrainian volunteers who were allegedly
involved in serious criminality were reportedly sent home around the same time. Crisis Group
interview, separatist leader, 11 November 2014.
84 Crisis Group interview, Ilovaisk, 14 October 2014. The Russian term used was .
85 Strelkov interview, 1 December 2014, http://rusvesna.su/recent_opinions/1417451815. In the
latest sign of Strelkov’s disgrace in official Russian circles, his reference in the interview to his FSB
rank, full colonel, was removed before it was published in Russia. See www.rferl.org/content/ukrainestrelkov-
fsb-ties-russian-media/26721902.html [proper cite].
86 Ostensibly, Strelkov is a volunteer, and indeed has a track record of fighting for what he would
describe as Slavic causes in Bosnia and elsewhere. Russian, DNR and Western sources interviewed
by Crisis Group all say, however, that he has links to the presidential administration in Moscow –
probably somewhat attenuated now by his disputes with the Russian leadership over the future
strategy in the east. He retains good relations with radical nationalist movements in Russia.
87 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November 2014.
88 The first military incident involving Strelkov’s fighters was reported on 13 April, when they
ambushed Ukrainian state security officers, killing one. “
– ” [“One of the separatist leaders
on the Ukrainian State Security recordings is a pro-Kremlin PR-man”], Ukrainian Pravda, 14
April 2014, www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/14/7022426/?attempt=1.
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transition from demonstrations and building seizures to violence and disorder.89
Other leaders say his abrupt withdrawal from Slavyansk in early July precipitated a
military crisis that almost destroyed the separatist movement. The official quoted
above claimed that Strelkov, who had become increasingly strident in his criticism of
Moscow’s failure to intervene, subsequently planned to withdraw most of the troops
defending Donetsk to the Russian border, so as to precipitate a Russian intervention.
Another senior official would neither confirm nor deny this claim, but agreed with
the highly negative characterisation of Strelkov’s role.90
C. Discord among the Militias
Even after his recall to Moscow Strelkov has continued to inject discord into political
and military debates in the separatist enclaves. Several key separatist units are either
deeply critical of the civilian leadership, in particular DNR President Zakharchenko,
or involved in what seem like political feuds with other major commanders. In mid-
October a member of one of the main militia groups fighting at Donetsk airport
launched an exceptionally scathing attack on Zakharchenko and his associates. In a
video interview the fighter, who goes by his call sign Chervonets, accused the DNR
leadership of excessive indulgence in alcohol, claimed that former members of Yanukovych’s
party were funding the separatists, and warned that military dissatisfaction
with the political leadership is “off the scale”. Militiamen had signed up to fight for
Novorossia, not the current tiny piece of land, he added. He ended with a call for
Strelkov’s return to lead the armed struggle. His interview was quickly removed from
DNR sites, and he was later reportedly arrested by Donetsk authorities.91
In November Sergei Petrovsky, a militia commander better known by his call sign,
Grumpy, who is said to be a retired colonel in Russian military intelligence (GRU),
lashed out at Alexander Khodakovsky, the Vostok brigade’s commander and the newly
appointed chief of the National Security Council. He accused Khodakovsky and his
troops of widespread involvement in organised crime and incompetent leadership,
among other failings.92 The attack seemed to be another sign that high-level infighting
continues within the DNR leadership. Petrovsky was formerly Strelkov’s deputy.
D. Russian Troops in Donetsk: The Holiday Makers
Few DNR officials confirm the presence of Russian troops but even fewer deny it. A
senior official admitted that Russia has provided substantial amounts of weapons,
regular military support and some training. But he argued that the Russian military
role is more nuanced than Ukraine and the West believe. Like other leaders, he feels
that Russia will not let DNR and LNR completely fail, but only intervenes militarily
in crisis situations. “Serious Russian involvement in our armed struggle has only
taken place when we were faced with an imminent threat to our survival”, he said.93
89 Noting Strelkov’s close links to radical nationalists, the official remarked, “I don’t think he was a
Putin project. If anything he was a problem for him”. Crisis Group interview, senior DNR officer,
Donetsk, October 2014.
90 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November 2014.
91 The video can be viewed on http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1845960.html.
92 “Interview with General Petrovsky”, Strelkov’s website, Icorpus, 30 November 2014, http://icorpus.
ru/intervyu-s-generalom-petrovskim.
93 Crisis Group interview, senior DNR officer, Donetsk, October 2014.
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Other officials maintain that the largest numbers of Russian regular troops, mostly
airborne, were deployed in Donetsk oblast during the Ilovaisk operation. They arrived
in mid-August and were usually known, half in jest, as the “holiday makers” – a reference
to then-Prime Minister Zakharchenko’s claim that several thousand Russian
servicemen had spontaneously gone to Donetsk in their vacation time to fight alongside
separatists, bringing all their equipment with them. The holiday makers were
regular troops who had been ordered to remove personal insignia and identification
marks, and had in some cases been required to hand over their mobile phones before
being deployed to Donetsk.94
A separatist military official who said he had for a time liaised with the Russian
military estimated their strength as that of roughly one brigade, probably 3,500-
4,000.95 He claimed that a Russian force of this size could routinely be deployed in
Donetsk oblast with very little advance notice. Other officials mentioned the presence
of Russian advisers, both from the military and state security.96 There is considerable
agreement that the standard of militia training and leadership is substantially
lower than the Russian regulars, and that most militia units are no match even
for the hastily trained Ukrainian army. Most fighting around the key city of Mariupol
in the days following Ilovaisk was carried out by Russian troops, Strelkov later observed.
Once they were withdrawn from the area, the Mariupol front became “shaky”,
he added.97
Separatist leaders publicly play down Russian involvement. Privately, with the
local population, they stress the degree of Russian military engagement. A university
professor and strong supporter of greater Novorossia described to political science
students the “impressive build-up” of Russian troops in Rostov oblast, just on the
other side of the border. He noted with a smile that the troops often crossed into
“contiguous states” by “roundabout routes” to exert pressure on Kyiv.98
94 Crisis Group interviews, Ukrainians taken prisoner during the Ilovaisk operation, 18 September
2014.
95 Crisis Group interview, eastern Ukraine, November 2014.
96 Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 14 November 2014. A Ukrainian visitor to Snezhnoe, a town
close to the Russian border that seems to be a military staging area, says that the local militia commander
does not deny the presence of Russian troops in the area. Crisis Group interview, Donetsk,
14 November 2014.
97 Interview with a right-wing weekly, Zavtra.ru, 20 November 2014.” ?” [“Who
are you Rifleman?”], Zavtra, 20 November 2014. In the interview, Strelkov refers to the troops as
“holiday makers”.
98 Crisis Group observation, 13 November 2014.
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V. Winter
A. Humanitarian Crisis
The first sign of winter weather brought fragmentary but disturbing reports of a decline
in living conditions for many residents of Donetsk and Luhansk. In late November,
Alexei Mozgovoy, a senior commander in Luhansk warned that the food situation
near his home base in Luhansk was “catastrophic”. Around the same time one of
the separatists’ main websites, Rusvesna, claimed that eighteen people in one village
had died of starvation.99 A recent visitor to the Luhansk towns of Pervomaysk and
Stakhanovsk reported lines of pensioners and disabled, who had not received pensions
for the last six months, waiting to receive a quarter of a loaf of bread each.100
Most banks are not working, salaries, pensions and social benefits have not been
paid for months.101
Elsewhere pensioners, single mothers and other vulnerable categories have received
occasional payments from the separatist authorities. In early December, monthly
pensions of about $60 were paid out, along with child benefits of half that amount in
parts of Donetsk city.102 There is no indication, however, that such payments will be
more than sporadic. International health-care workers on the ground reported mortality
was already increasing in the most vulnerable institutions on both sides of the
line, such as mental hospitals.103 “The situation is getting bad fast. We are facing a
very serious humanitarian situation,” said a senior international official.”104
Another senior aid official was even more graphic: “Many people in rebel-held
areas have little or no cash at all. No cash [means] no food. The banking system is
not working properly, pensions are not paid, people who have re-registered out of
rebel-held areas to get their pensions are facing “spot checks” [from security officials]
to establish their real location of residence. People who have cash must decide between
food, medicine or fuel. Health care is under severe strain”.105 Several key international
organisations say a 14 November presidential decree is seriously complicating
any response to the humanitarian situation. The decree declares illegal any bodies
99 “ 18 , ” [“In one village
eighteen people died of starvation. They simply had no food”], Rusvesna, 24 November 2014, http://
rusvesna.su/news/1416771535.
100 Crisis Group email correspondence, Donetsk resident, 1 December 2014.
101 Crisis Group email correspondence, Donetsk resident, 5 December 2014. Miners in one part of
Donetsk city, Makiyevka, received a symbolic payment for the first time in months in early November.
Médecins sans frontières (MSF) reports that most medical staff in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts
have not been paid for months. “Ukraine: People ‘don’t know what the next months hold’”, MSF,
1 December 2014. Even before the onset of cold weather Donetsk municipal officials had warned
that at least 12,000 windows have been broken during the fighting. Given the city’s centralised
heating system, any apartments with broken windows would be seriously affected by the cold.
102 DNR.today, official DNR newspaper, 7 December 2014.
103 International officials were informed by the staff of one such institution close to the front line in
Donetsk oblast that five had died in October, and twenty in November. The team was unable to ascertain
causes of death, but noted disastrous hygiene, poor nutrition and a drastically reduced number
of trained personnel. Crisis Group email correspondence, Donetsk, December.
104 Crisis Group email correspondence, senior international official, Kyiv, 8 December 2014.
105 Crisis Group email correspondence, Stephane Prevost, head of mission, MSF Ukraine, 8 December
2014.
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established by the separatists on the basis of their 2 November elections. It also calls
for the evacuation of all state institutions, staff, equipment and documentation.106
This means, an aid worker notes, increased difficulties for the purchases of medicines:
“pharmaceutical companies can no longer sell drugs if the destination hospital
has been ‘evacuated’”. And aid organisations cannot donate medicine or equipment
to illegal entities, and have increasing difficulty paying their staff.107
Separatist leaders recognise their lack of territory and trained human resources,
their poorly organised and undisciplined militias, and realise that their main patron
may and often does have other priorities. But they cling fiercely to the belief that
Ukraine can at any moment implode under the pressure of economic collapse and public
anger at the excesses of the “Fascists” and “Nazis” who, they assert, are waging a
reign of terror across the country.
Kyiv is indeed in the grip of a major economic crisis. Its foreign currency reserves
are down to $10 billion, enough to buy about six weeks of imports. Its gross domestic
product (GDP) will decline by about 7 per cent in 2014. Coal production is slumped
by 66% largely because mines are flooded, as a result of power cuts and war. Steel
production is down by about one third.108 Its leaders have recently warned of looming
default. But there is a substantial difference between its situation and that of the
separatist entities. It has the considerable benefit, however, of support from the International
Monetary Fund, the U.S. and the EU, among other major international
players. This support will not be endless. The separatist-controlled east, on the other
hand, can only look to Moscow.
Though some UN aid is distributed to the temporarily displaced or those who are
living in bomb shelters in separatist areas, the most visible source of assistance
comes from the convoys of trucks emblazoned with the name of Rinat Akhmetov, the
region’s leading industrialist. At least nine Russian humanitarian convoys have delivered
over 10,000 tonnes of food, humanitarian aid and building materials, according
to Russian official sources.109 Some of these convoys have functioned outside the
control of international monitors and Ukrainian officials. Doubts are frequently expressed
about the nature and amount of the equipment brought in; a senior international
official believes that the trucks have on a number of occasions carried back into
Russia heavy machinery from the regions’ industrial plants.110
The speed with which signs of hardship are emerging will put pressure on both
the separatists and Russia. If they do not receive aid, the separatists may be inclined
to consider an all-or-nothing offensive, to try to seize land or pull the Russians deeper
into the war. Moscow, on the other hand, is just realising the depth of its economic
106 875/2014 [Decree of the President of Ukraine Number
875/2014], available on the president’s website, http://president.gov.ua, in Ukrainian. The decree
also rescinds the law on special status for Donetsk and Luhansk.
107 Crisis Group email correspondence, Stephane Prevost, head of mission, MSF Ukraine, 8 December
2014.
108 Crisis Group email correspondence, Anders Aslund, senior fellow, Peterson Institute, Washington
DC, 7 December 2014. Aslund has advised previous Russian and Ukrainian leaders. Commenting
on the situation in the east, he stated “the Ukrainian government must make sure not to spend
any money [on the separatist areas], neither in the form of pensions, public services nor energy subsidies,
given that it does not control the territory, its banking system or receive any tax revenues from
that territory. Occupied Donbas can bleed Ukraine to death. That must not happen”.
109 See for example “Russian humanitarian convoys returns home after delivering relief aid to western
Ukraine”, Itar-Tass news agency, 30 November 2014, http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/764396.
110 Crisis Group interview, senior diplomat, Kyiv, 22 September 2014.
Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter
Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 18
problems. It may be hard pressed to find money for the separatists even if it decides
to change its policy.
The Ukrainian government should urgently consult with international organisations
on the wording and intent of Decree 875/2014. It should take steps to facilitate
the provision of assistance to the separatist-held areas, and should encourage increased
international assistance to them. Isolation of the east would not only exacerbate
the crisis: it would also deepen the east’s alienation from Kyiv. This should be
another way for the Kyiv government to reach out to the people of the east and reiterate
that they are still viewed citizens of Ukraine.
B. Military Scenarios
Russian spring. Separatist circles have been talking about a second “Russian
spring” for months. Seizing in particular on a series of so-far relatively minor incidents,
including small explosions in Kharkov and Odessa, they have outlined a picture
of imminent separatist revolts there and elsewhere, capitalising on economic
hardship during the winter. Some say their militias would cross into the rebellious
oblasts to support their fellow revolutionaries. While separatists claim to have considerable
support in Kharkov, other south-eastern oblasts have taken serious steps
to shore up their security. Dnipropetrovsk’s billionaire governor, for example, has
funded the creation of several volunteer battalions, not to mention the local production
of drones. This scenario would either presuppose total insubordination on the
part of the separatists – something that could not be ruled out if the situation in Donetsk
and Luhansk deteriorates sufficiently – or Russian support.
Desperation. Should the humanitarian situation develop into a crisis, many separatist
leaders will probably be tempted to make a wild grab for more territory – to
prove they are still a powerful force, to improve their long-time viability, and perhaps
to force Moscow to become more involved militarily.
Novorossia. After Ilovaisk, grave concern was voiced in Kyiv at the danger of a
Russian spring offensive in 2015 – a burst down the coast, probably spearheaded by
Russian troops posing as local militias. This would in essence create the greater Novorossia.
Most analysts, including Russian specialists, agree that such an action would
take the confrontation to new and very dangerous heights. So far Russia has not offered
an opinion on this. A statement that it has no such plans to do so, and would
not look kindly on any other forces attempting this, could gain Moscow considerable
credibility, and perhaps even defuse the situation enough to allow exploratory talks
on de-escalation.
Land bridge. Harsh weather conditions often impede Crimea’s resupply by sea in
the winter. Should the situation on the peninsula deteriorate this winter, Russia may
feel obliged to open up a land route. Separatist leaders in Donetsk are increasingly
confident this will happen.111 Once again there is a way that Russian could transform
military threat into a diplomatic and public relations advantage. Moscow could propose
the opening of talks with Ukraine to permit such a resupply route, under close
111 For example a senior leader outlined a detailed “minimalist” strategy of Russian armour and special
forces securing key junctions and similar strategic points along the route, rather than large-scale
occupation. Their confidence is founded on hope that a major Russian intervention would result in
increased interest by Moscow in their plight. Crisis Group interview, Donetsk, 16 November 2014.
Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter
Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 19
international supervision if desired. It is possible that feelings are too raw, especially
in Kyiv to try this. But there is a precedent: Russia and Lithuania signed in 2003 an
agreement to allow Russian goods and passengers to transit Lithuania en route to its
enclave of Kaliningrad.
Total war. A Ukrainian offensive cannot be ruled out. In August, a top ranking
Ukrainian officer was convinced that his troops could not yet take on the Russian
troops who would almost certainly be deployed if Ukraine launched another offensive
on the separatist “people’s republics”. President Poroshenko sounds more confident.
He recently said he was “prepared for total war”, and that he was “not afraid
of war with Russian troops”.112 A Ukrainian offensive could also prove disastrous for
everyone. A statement by Kyiv repudiating any such plans would substantially defuse
the situation.
112 “Poroshenko says Ukraine ready for ‘total war’”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website, 17
November 2014. The original interview published in the German weekly Bild.
Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter
Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 20
VI. Conclusion
The situation in the east of Ukraine is often described as a still fluid conflict that could
evolve into a long-term frozen one. In most frozen conflicts, however, there is enough
stability for the state to function. But the entities huddling unhappily on small parcels
of land in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are not functioning. Russia would have
to invest much more into the DNR and LNR to get them to that point, and it may no
longer have the money to do so. A deterioration of conditions in the separatist areas
will probably strengthen the hand of those commanders and politicians who feel war
is the only answer.
It is obviously not in the international community’s interest for that to happen.
Emergency aid should be considered immediately. A clear statement by Kyiv on this
would be helpful as the winter tightens its grip. The one advantage of winter, however,
is that it slows down military operations. All sides need to take advantage of
this lull to clarify their basic positions on all key issues, political and military. They
could attempt to initiate a modicum of cooperation to address any humanitarian
problems that could well arise this winter. And Kyiv could communicate to the population
of the east that it still views the inhabitants of Donetsk and Luhansk, who will
feel the brunt of any hardships, as full citizens of Ukraine.
Finally the EU, U.S. and other international players involved in the crisis should
start planning now for a long and possibly cold relationship with Russia. They too
could at least try to use any winter lull to open a free-wheeling discussion with Moscow
on differences, suspicions, reproaches – and perhaps even areas of cooperation.
Kyiv/Brussels, 18 December 2014
Eastern Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter
Crisis Group Europe Report N°235, 18 December 2014 Page 21
Appendix A: Map of Ukraine
Annex 448
The Atlantic Council, Hiding in Plain Sight (2015)
Putin's War in Ukraine
HIDING IN
PLAIN SIGHT
© 2015 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief
quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:
Atlantic Council
1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
ISBN: 978-1-61977-996-9
Cover photo credit: Reuters/Marko Djurica. Pro-Russian rebels stand on top of a burnt-out Ukrainian personnel carrier near the
village of Novokaterinovka in eastern Ukraine, September 24, 2014.
This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are
solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they
necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.
May 2015
By Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins,
Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT REPORT TEAM
Maksymilian Czuperski
Special Assistant to the President, Atlantic Council
John Herbst
Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council and former US Ambassador
to Ukraine
Eliot Higgins
Founder, Bellingcat and Visiting Research Associate, Department of War Studies,
King’s College London
Alina Polyakova
Associate Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President, Programs and Strategy, Atlantic Council
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword.................................................................................................................................................................1
Executive Summary..........................................................................................................................................3
Background: A Kremlin-Made War..........................................................................................................4
Russian Denial of Facts...................................................................................................................................7
Using Digital Forensics to Expose Russia’s War in Ukraine.......................................................8
A Steady Flow of Arms and Military Equipment
from Russia to Eastern Ukraine..................................................................................................................8
Border Camps: Preparing for Combat....................................................................................................13
Russian Troops in Ukraine.............................................................................................................................15
Cargo 200: Hiding Russia’s Dead..............................................................................................................17
Cross-Border Shelling......................................................................................................................................18
Policy Recommendations..............................................................................................................................20
Casebook................................................................................................................................................................21
Section 1. Russian Military Equipment in Use in Ukraine..................................................................21
Section 2. Russian Training Camps on Ukraine’s Border.................................................................23
Section 3. Russian Soldiers in Ukraine....................................................................................................25
Section 4. Russian Cross-Border Artillery Attacks on Ukraine.....................................................28
Appendix................................................................................................................................................................32
control over Ukraine.i1
-
tives, and public relations consultants began to organize a so-called separatist movement to oppose the Ukrainian government
by force. With an interim government in Kyiv, this Kremlin-directed operation took control of government buildings and
began a successful counter-offensive in June, the Kremlin sent in more sophisticated arms and more soldiers, some from the
times cohesive Russian army units, there would be no rebellion, no war, and no occupation of territories in eastern Ukraine.
March 2015.
The evidence that this is a Kremlin-directed war is overwhelming. The initial leaders of the so-called separatists were primarily
Russian citizens, many of whom served in Russian intelligence services. Following the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17
over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, a Dutch government investigation of the crash pointed to a Russian-produced surfaceto-
air missile system (Buk) as the cause of the downing. Prodigious amounts of Russian-made military equipment have been
-
century, secret wars can only be fought for so long. It is time for this one to end.
stand and implement comprehensive policies that will deter Mr. Putin.
war in Ukraine threatens this vision and the international order.
overall conclusions. We urge European and North American governments and parliaments to use this clear evidence to inform
a clear policy aimed at deterring Russia in its reckless and brutal actions.
Individuals listed below support this report’s overall conclusions, but are not responsible for the contents of this report, and there-
Madeleine Albright**
Former US Secretary of State
Carl Bildt**^
Former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden
Nicholas Burns**
Harvard University, Former US Under Secretary of State and Former US Ambassador to NATO
Ukraine: Situation Report No. 37 as of 24 April 2015,
PREFACE
Eugene Czolij
President of the Ukrainian World Congress
Paula J. Dobriansky**
Former US Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Mircea Geoana
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg
Former Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany
Stephen Hadley**
Former US Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Michael Hayden**
Former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency
Jon Huntsman, Jr.**^
Chairman of the Atlantic Council
Adrian Karatnycky
Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council
Mikhail Kasyanov
Former Prime Minister of Russia
Garry Kasparov
Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation
Zalmay Khalilzad**
Former US Ambassador to the United Nations
Bernard-Henri Lévy
French Philosopher and Author
Jan Lodal**
Former US Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
Michael McFaul
Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution Professor, Department of Political
Science Stanford University
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Former Secretary General of NATO
Marshall of the Sejm of Poland
Oksana Syroyid
Guy Verhofstadt
of Belgium
Melanne Verveer**
** Atlantic Council Board of Directors
**^ International Advisory Board Member
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
FOREWORD
Europe whole, free, and at peace in which Russia enjoys its peaceful place. In fact, many in our community aspired to
not only a strategic partnership with Russia, but envisioned an alliance between Russia and NATO contributing to in-
vision and threaten the international order established at the end of the Cold War.
The Atlantic Council responded to this challenge in February 2014 by launching the Ukraine in Europe Initiative, with
-
likely to coalesce around an effective strategy to support Ukraine and deter Mr. Putin. This report,
Putin’s War in Ukraine
Putin. To reveal the full extent of Russian military intervention in Ukraine, the Atlantic Council has produced this study,
using publicly available information and rigorous analysis.
Courageous Ukrainians and frontline diplomats inspired this effort. This report is a result of the leadership and vision
-
mer US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst; the dedication and tenacity of Associate Director of the Ukraine in Europe
Initiative Dr. Alina Polyakova and social media savvy Special Assistant Maksymilian Czuperski; and the ingenuity of
our key partner in this endeavor, Eliot Higgins of Bellingcat. The information documented in this report draws on open
source data using innovative socialmedia forensics and geolocation and is informed by team visits Ambassador Herbst
Ukraine, including George Chopivsky and the Chopivsky Family Foundation, Ambassador Julie Finley, Frontera Resourc-
-
family.
Only after the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, steps from the Kremlin, did the Council team learn about his efforts to
-
Mr. Putin led his nation into war against a peaceful neighbor and lied about it. Review and share the facts via #PutinAtWar.
Frederick Kempe
President and CEO
Atlantic Council
Damon Wilson
Programs and Strategy
Atlantic Council
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Russia is at war with Ukraine. Russian citizens and soldiers
and indisputable. Drawing upon open source information
that is “hiding in plain sight,” this report provides irrefutable
evidence of direct Russian military involvement in eastern
Ukraine.
This report is the result of an Atlantic Council Working Group
launched to examine direct Russian military involvement in
Ukraine. Discussions in March 2015 with senior Ukrainian
-
•
troops and camp buildups along the Ukrainian border.
• Russian training camps stationed along the
war in Ukraine. These camps are the staging ground
for Russian military equipment transported into
Ukraine, soon to join the separatist arsenal, and for
Russian soldiers mobilized across Russia to cross
into Ukraine.
• Commanders order Russian soldiers to conceal the
identifying features of military vehicles, remove
insignia from uniforms, and travel across the border
to join separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
• A variety of Russian manufactured arms and
munitions not used by the Ukrainian military have
appeared in the hands of separatists, including shoulder
launched surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS),
various types of rocket launchers, anti-tank guided
missiles, landmines, and various small arms.
• During key offensives, Russian forces in Ukraine have
received cover from Russian territory. A combination
of satellite data, crater analysis, and open source
in Russia, not in the separatist controlled areas of
Ukraine.
-
gression, Western political leaders should speak clearly about
-
Putin has used each lull in combat, now under the cover
strengthens the capacity and arsenal of the forces in eastern
Ukraine, the Kremlin is building its case that forces engaged
1
Group recommends that Western governments:
• devote substantially more intelligence assets to un-
• employ new digital forensic methods and geolocation
analysis to collect intelligence that is releasable
to the public to complement covert and technical
intelligence collection;
• make public, to the maximum extent possible,
the presence of Russian troops and equipment in
in Ukraine, while protecting intelligence methods as
needed;
• share intelligence regarding Russian plans against
and Russian forces in and near Ukraine through vetted
channels with the Ukrainian government;
•
against Ukraine;
• increase funding for, and mobilize private investment
in, Russian-language independent programs and
media that broadcast into Russian-speaking areas to
• dedicate more intelligence assets to and analysis
neighbors and European nations (including other
post-Soviet states and NATO and EU nations); and
• draw on these insights to inform policy decisions
(such as extending, not curtailing, sanctions) and to
formulate a more comprehensive transatlantic strat-
New Atlanticist (blog), Atlantic
Council, November 12, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
new-atlanticist/putin-s-project-sparta.
4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
BACKGROUND:
A KREMLIN-MADE WAR
In the winter of 2014, the Maidan revolution in Kyiv
Ukraine. As Ukrainians struggled to build a new, democratically
elected government, mysterious “little green
Ukraine. To local residents and independent observers, the
origins of the “little green men” were far from mysterious;
their unmarked Russian military uniforms, Russian regional
accents, and Russian-made weapons gave them away at
was not recognized by international observers, the Kremlin
denied its involvement in the “Ukrainian crisis.” But in
public statements in Moscow one year after the annexation,
Russian troops carried out the Crimean operation.2 The
violation of the Budapest Memorandum that promised
territorial integrity to Ukraine, did not coalesce around a
strong response. Crimea, now formally part of the Russian
Federation, was lost to the “little green men” from day one.
2 “Putin in Film on Crimea: US Masterminds Behind Ukraine Coup,
Helped Train Radicals,” Russia Today, March 15, 2015, http://rt.com/
news/240921-us-masterminds-ukraine-putin/.
interim leaders were attempting to reestablish authority
in Kyiv, presented the new Ukrainian government and the
international community with a fait accompli.
-
peared in the guise of local “separatists.” While the Kremlin
and its sprawling media apparatus maintains that the turmoil
in the Donbas is a civil war, Russian leadership was evident
from the beginning. For example, the proclaimed President
was Aleksander Borodai, a Russian political consultant from
Moscow, and his Defense Minister was Igor Girkin, a Federal
Security Service (FSB) Colonel also known as “Strelkov.”3
Buying into its own propaganda, the Kremlin believed
that providing leadership, money, and weapons would
be enough to spark a local rebellion against Kyiv in the
Donbas. But the locals did not rise to the task: numerous
intercepts from Girkin-Strelkov made clear that he asked
Moscow to send more and more “volunteers” to sustain
Russians Take Top Rebel Posts in East Ukraine,” Reuters, July 27, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/27/us-ukraine-crisis-rebels-
insight-idUSKBN0FW07020140727.
Russian Federation on March 18, 2014. Photo source: www.kremlin.ru.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
the rebellion.4 The fact that Russian-supplied “volunteers”
manned the original demonstrations led to some amusing
moments, such as on April 7, 2014, when they seized the
opera theater in downtown Kharkiv, proclaiming that they
had liberated the city hall.5
the provisional government in Kyiv was slow to react to the
-
er forces moved westward to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. On
May 25, 2014, Ukraine held a presidential election to replace
presidential election, the Kremlin-supported authorities in
-
tored referendums on May 11, after which they declared
oblasts, or districts.6 The Kremlin took the opportunity of the
referendum vote to increase its intervention in Ukraine: in
and amassed troops along the border.7
Poroshenko mustered the military capacity to defend itself
against the Kremlin-run campaign in the east and from
mid-June began to take back territory, including Slovyansk
and Kramatorsk. Moscow responded to the Ukrainian
counteroffensive by sending in ever more sophisticated
artillery, tanks, and anti-aircraft missiles, including the Buk
surface-to-air missile system that was used from Russian-
controlled territory in Ukraine to shoot down Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) by mistake on July 17, 2014.
role in this tragedy.8
The downing of MH17 compelled Western media and
involvement in starting and fomenting the war in eastern
Ukraine. In response to the MH17 tragedy, the transatlantic
community imposed strong economic sanctions on Russia.
While these sanctions have taken a considerable toll on the
Russian economy, they have not deterred Russia from continuing
to supply troops and weapons to eastern Ukraine.
The supply of more and more sophisticated weapons did
of Possible Defeat,” Daily Beast, July 25, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2014/07/25/putin-s-number-one-gunman-inukraine-
warns-him-of-possible-defeat.html.
5 Echo of Moscow, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1295362-echo/
(in Russian).
BBC News, May 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
27360146.
http://www.
rferl.org/content/vostok-battalion-a-powerful-new-player-in-easternukraine/
25404785.html.
-
voy,” Bellingcat, May 13, 2015, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/
uk-and-europe/2015/05/13/tracking-the-trailers-investigation-
of-mh17-buks-russian-convoy/.
-
vance. By mid-August, Kyiv was on the verge of encircling
At that point, the Kremlin decided to send in approximately
four thousand regular army troops.9 In a couple of weeks
Ukrainian forces and forced a retreat.
This sharp Russian escalation prompted additional sectoral
sanctions from the European Union (EU) and gave impe-
representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian governments,
separatist leaders, and a representative of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).10 Despite
-
ons into eastern Ukraine and conducted a military operation
to seize Donetsk Airport from Ukrainian forces. They
achieved that objective in December.
resupply of heavy equipment from Russia in December,
Russian-led forces renewed offensive action aimed at
prompted a new round of EU diplomacy, which led to a
by France and Germany. The terms of the second agreement
were much more favorable to Moscow than to Kyiv,
kilometers of additional Ukrainian territory.
February 15, and Debaltseve was taken on February 18.
lull to bring in more arms. Starting in late April 2015,
once more.
to the most conservative estimates, the war has killed six
thousand Ukrainians and Russians.11 As of March 2015, experts
estimate that approximately twelve thousand Russian
military personnel were present in eastern Ukraine,12 and
New York Times, August 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/europe/ukraine-con-
.
10
Ukraine, Mikhail Zubarov, separatist leaders Alexander Zakharchenko
and Igor Plotnitsky, and OSCE representative and Swiss diplomat Heidi
Tagliavini.
11 Mstyslav Chernov, “Misery, Tuberculosis in Prisons of War-Torn East
Ukraine,” Associated Press, April 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/2015/04/08/world/europe/ap-eu-ukraine-tuberculo-
.
12 Sabine Siebold and Caroline Copley, “Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in
Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander,” Reuters, March 3, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/us-ukraine-russia-sol-
.
6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
in camps along the Ukrainian13border.14
The Russian government must go to increasingly great
its own population.15 After all, acknowledging the devastating
Russian casualties in eastern Ukraine would mean acknowledging
that Russia is at war.
13 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, April 16, 2015,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49261.
14 Jeremy Bender, “Former NATO Commander: A New Russian Offensive in
Business Insider, April 7, 2015,
http://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-offensive-in-ukraine-isimminent-
2015-4.
15
Troops Killed in Ukraine,” Guardian, January 19, 2015,
-
lence-for-families-troops-killed-in-ukraine.
Concealing Kremlin involvement means concealing Russian
deaths. But as the casualties continue to climb, keeping up the
-
ment. Those who die in eastern Ukraine are not celebrated as
heroes, but rather shipped home in body bags by night. Funerals
take place in remote areas of the country in the hopes
-
East is not through economic sanctions alone; Putin can
blame economic pain on the West and avoid the real issue.
The West needs to reveal the lies that Putin is telling his own
cards: once that card falls, the whole house will crumble.
Annual live broadcast program Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, April 16, 2015.
Photo source: www.kremlin.ru.
“I can tell you outright and
unequivocally that there are
no Russian troops in Ukraine.”13
VLADIMIR PUTIN
President, Russian Federation
April 16, 2015
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
RUSSIAN DENIAL OF
FACTS
The Russian government and military have repeatedly denied
involvement in Ukraine. In August 2014, Russian Defense
Ministry spokesman General Major Igor Konashenkov said
Ukraine “has no relation to reality,” claiming that Russian
army units that had passed from Russia into Ukraine were on
“tactical training exercises.”16 In November 2014, Konashenkov
said the Kremlin had “already stopped paying attention
Commander Europe, General Philip Breedlove, on Russian
accusing Breedlove of spreading anti-Russian “hot air.”17
At a press conference in Budapest, Putin described separatist
forces as “people who were yesterday working down in the
get too obsessed about these things.”18
images reportedly showing the movement of Russian troops
as “just images from computer games,” that more “recent
accusations are no different,” and that “no evidence of an
invasion has been presented.”19 The Russian Foreign Ministry
has also described US accusations of Russian involvement in
Ukraine as a US administration “smear campaign” and has
rejected what it claims are “unfounded public insinuations”
spread by the US State Department “on a daily basis.”20 In
16 Ibid.
17 Gabriela Baczynska and Tsvetelia Tsolova, “Russia Denies NATO Accusations
over Troops in Ukraine,” Reuters, November 12, 2014, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-defence-minis-
18 Fiona Hill, “This Is What Putin Really Wants,” Brookings, February 24,
2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/24-whatputin-
really-wants-hill.
19 “Remarks and Answers to Questions from the Media by Foreign Minis-
Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif,
Moscow, 29 August 2014,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, August 29, 2014,
-
460059b785!OpenDocument.
20
2014, http://news.yahoo.com/russia-accuses-us-smear-campaign-overukraine-
161007782.html.
want to. So before demanding from us that we stop doing
something, please present proof that we have done it.”21
“. . . before demanding from us
that we stop doing something,
please present proof that we
have done it.”
SERGEI LAVROV
Foreign Minister, Russian Federation
military forces, weapons, and citizens were active in Ukraine
during the annexation of Crimea in February and March of
2014 and at every step of the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine.
A year after the annexation of Crimea, Putin publicly admitted
that the annexation by Russian military forces was planned
well in advance.22
group of “mine workers” and “farmers,” as Putin asserts. They
are regular Russian soldiers, readied for combat at improvised
base camps alongside the Russian-Ukrainian border,
supported by the cover of cross-border artillery shelling.
Overwhelming proof of each of these forms of Russian
open source information and in-depth digital analysis of the
evidence.
21 Gabriela Baczynska, “Russia Says No Proof It Sent Troops, Arms to East
Ukraine,” Reuters, January 21, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
.
22
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226.
8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
USING DIGITAL
FORENSICS TO
EXPOSE RUSSIA’S
WAR IN UKRAINE
While the Kremlin continues to deny the role of regular Rus-
and Ukrainian and Russian civilians on both sides of the war
are posting photographs and videos of convoys, equipment,
and themselves on the Internet. Satellite imagery captures
the movement of Russian troops and camp buildup along the
Ukrainian border. These pieces of evidence create an unde-
-
ment in Ukraine.
Digital forensic techniques involve verifying the locations
of where videos and photographs were taken in a process
known as “geolocating.”23 Geolocation differs from “geotagging,”
which is the automated process of adding geographical
videos. Only a fraction of photographs and videos recorded
on smartphones, digital cameras, and tablets that are posted
online contain an embedded “geotag” of their location.
Geolocation techniques, however, allow an investigator to
an embedded geotag. Using photographs posted on various
social media sites, in combination with satellite imagery and
“street view” images from services such as Google Earth and
the coordinates of where photographs were taken.24 Geolocation
is thus a powerful and effective tool for tracking individuals
and the images they produce.25
The geolocation methodology used in this report combines
multiple sources of open domain information to track the
movement of soldiers, vehicles, and cross-border shelling
from Russia to Ukraine. All the sources used in this report are
publically available to anyone with access to the Internet, and
the techniques used are documented throughout. The aspect
of Russian involvement in Ukraine with the widest breadth of
open source information is the movement of heavy military
equipment across the border, with hundreds of videos and
photographs uploaded by ordinary Russians and Ukrainians
who have witnessed direct Russian support of the hostilities
in eastern Ukraine.
23 Many devices with network capability (smartphones, tablets, and computers)
use global-positioning software (GPS) for popular applications
user takes a photograph or a video, the device assigns a GPS determined
location to it, a “geotag.” When these media images are then uploaded to
social media and other platforms, the geotag remains embedded in the
24
Russia.
25 Other organizations that frequently use geolocation in their work include
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Storyful.
A STEADY FLOW OF
ARMS AND MILITARY
EQUIPMENT FROM
RUSSIA TO EASTERN
UKRAINE
Russian supplies, including heavy weapons such as tanks,
armored personnel carriers, artillery, and advanced anti-aircraft
systems, including the Buk surface-to-air missile system
(NATO designator SA-11/17) that shot down Malaysia Airlines
Flight 17 in July 2014.26
The map on the right illustrates two cases where the same
-
cation to pinpoint the location of each vehicle from multiple
sources shows that the vehicles are crossing from Russia to
27
2S19 Msta-S is a self-propelled 152 mm howitzer system,
which is deployed by both Ukraine and Russia. In July 2014,
a military convoy in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, heading west.28
-
ellite and ground imagery available through a Russian online
Novoazovsk in Ukraine, again heading west.29 In both these
videos, a particular unit can be seen with a number of
white paint blotch on the turret, discoloration in the same
spots, and a unique, hand-painted rail cargo marking. Taken
together, these features strongly suggest that the same unit
is present in both videos, and that the unit would have been
transferred across the border.
through Staraya Stanitsa, Russia in August 2014.30 The
-
lite imagery and the unique landmarks visible in the
lavina
26 Eliot Higgins et al.,
(2014), https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/Origin-of-the-Separatists-Buk-A-Bellingcat-Investigation1.
pdf.
27
article/2015/03/10/us-ukraine-crisis-congress-hearing-idUSKBN-
0M61UB20150310.
28https://www.you-
.
29 “Ukraine Rebels Advance towards Mariupol,” Al Jazeera English, September
2014, . This video is
no longer viewable in the United States.
30https://www.youtube.com/
Tracking equipment from Russia to Ukraine
Coordinates: (clockwise from top left corner): 48.311252, 38.288002;
48.350068, 40.272248; 47.262757, 39.660493; 47.1275441, 38.0892229.
Map source: Google Earth.
: Bellingcat.31
31
T-72B3 MODERNIZED MAIN BATTLE TANK
Entered service in Russia 201332
system, among other improvements.
Photo source: WikiCommons.33
KAMAZ-43269 “DOZOR”
Entered service in Russia 2009
Armored reconnaissance and communications vehicle.34
Photo source: RusGuns.com.35
PANTSIR-S1 (SA-22) ANTI-AIR SYSTEM
Entered service in Russia 2012
Modern air defense system, equipped with two dual 30mm
autocannons and twelve surface-to-air missiles.
Photo source: KBP. 36
2B26 GRAD LAUNCHER ON KAMAZ
CHASSIS
Entered service in Russia 2012
Modernized version of the Grad multiple launch rocket sys-
Photo source: WikiMedia.37
32
Military Balance Blog, IISS, April 17, 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/
blogsections/2014-3bea/april-7347/russia-deployslatest-
tank-fa72.
33 WikiCommons, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/com-
34 NIISSU, http://www.niissu.ru/2013-05-27-12-43-20/dozor.html (in
Russian).
35 Rus-Guns.com, http://bit.ly/1bihz8n (in Russian).
36 KBP, http://bit.ly/1FG2jxB.
37 WikiMedia, http://bit.ly/1I2aTWK.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
associated with the pro-Russian separatists posted a video
the town. In the video, a BMP-2 with the same painted text
is visible, along with other features of the unit, like a painted
green area and physical damages, which makes it possible to
link the two videos together.38 These two sightings demonstrate
that the unit in question moved across the border from
Russia to Ukraine.
Through systematic analysis of material from within the open
source domain, it is possible to determine the movements of
equipment that is not used by Ukrainian armed forces across
the border from Russia to Ukraine. Examples of this equipment
include (see the case book for more information on this
equipment):
• T-72B3 main battle tank;
• Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) anti-air system;
• KamAZ-43269, “Dozor” variant; and
• KamAZ-5350, nicknamed “Grad-K.”
Using geolocation methods, each piece of equipment can be
pinpointed to its exact location coordinates using a combination
of sources. This includes using satellite imagery of
the area and matching it with landmarks visible in the media
images.
A variety of Russian manufactured arms and munitions not used
by the Ukrainian military have appeared in the hands of separat-
38https://www.youtube.com/
ists groups, including shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles
(MANPADS), various types of rocket launchers, anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs), landmines, and various small arms.39
Some of these arms have been captured by the Ukrainian
government, including weapons used exclusively by Russian
special forces. This physical evidence was on public display in
Kyiv in February and March of 2015.40
equipment has been provided to separatists by the Russian
government, it is clear that a wide variety of vehicles and
in use in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, thousands of trained
Russian military forces have been operating and using Russian
military equipment.41 Not only are these pieces of military
equipment transferred from Russia to Ukraine, they are
also used by Russians, as in the case of the T-72B tanks used
by members of the 5th Tank Battalion who departed from the
Kuzminsky border camp in Russia in mid-February of 2015 to
engage in the Battle of Debaltseve.42
39 Jonathan Ferguson and N.R. Jenzen-Jones, -
(Australia:
Armament Research Services (ARES), November 18, 2014), http://
armamentresearch.com/Uploads/Research%20Report%20No.%203%20
-%20Raising%20Red%20Flags.pdf.
40-
cased in New Kyiv Exhibition,” Ukraine Today, February 21, 2015, http://
uatoday.tv/politics/russian-army-s-military-equipment-captured-byukrainian-
forces-showcased-in-new-kyiv-exhibition-410910.html.
41 Igor Sutyagin, “Russian Forces in Ukraine,” RUSI, March 2015, https://
42 Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We Brought Ourselves to
and What Could Happen,” op cit.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 13
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
BORDER CAMPS:
PREPARING FOR
COMBAT
Several Russian training camps stationed along the Ukrainian
plain view for anyone with access to Google Earth or Google
Maps. These camps are the gathering points for Russian
military equipment transported into Ukraine, soon to join the
separatist arsenal, and for Russian soldiers mobilized from
the far reaches of the country to cross into Ukraine.
Satellite images show the rapid establishment and expansion of
those training sites just days after the annexation of Crimea. A
with Ukraine shortly after the beginning of the war in Donbas.
Most of them are in the Rostov and Belgorod oblasts, with clear
passage into separatist-held territory. They house thousands
of Russian soldiers and pieces of military equipment, including
equipment and arms that later appear in Ukraine. From these
camps, hundreds of Russian troops have travelled in large
convoys into eastern Ukraine. In addition to the satellite images,
details of Russian troop deployments on the Ukrainian border
can be gleaned from accounts of Russian soldiers who were
injured or killed in Donbas and their families.43
Some of these camps served as staging points for cross-border
artillery attacks against Ukrainian forces in the summer of 2014.
staged fewer than two kilometers from a Russian training camp,
which is fewer than four kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
covert war in Ukraine.44
Example: Kuzminsky Camp
The Kuzminisky camp was established only forty-six kilometers
from the Ukrainian border and did not exist before 2014.
This camp became the site for hundreds of military vehicles,
including tanks from the 5th Tank Brigade from Ulan-Ude. The
Ulan-Ude tank brigade is stationed in Siberia and was deployed
to the Kuzminsky camp in October and November of 2014.45
43 Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We Brought Ourselves to
and What Could Happen,” op cit.
44 Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We Brought Ourselves
Crimea Speak,” Meduza, March 16, 2015, https://meduza.io/en/fea-
-
June 20, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/06/228103.
htm#UKRAINE.
45 Irakly Komakhidze, “News of Deployment the 5th Tank Brigade of the
Russian Eastern Military District to the Ukrainian Border,” BurkoNews,
November 30, 2014, https://burkonews.info/news-deployment-5th-tankbrigade-
russian-eastern-military-district-ukrainian-border/.
Photo: The Kuzminsky camp in September 2014, with dozens of
trucks and military vehicles lined up. In the satellite photos, similar
formations of vehicles can be seen throughout the camp, though the
positions of the vehicles were not constant throughout the fall and
winter months of 2014 to 2015.
Source: Instagram of Denis Porublev.46
Coordinates: 47.387850, 39.230453.
Photo: The Kuzminsky camp at sunset, captured by soldier Mikhail
Krylov. In this photo, dozens of tents, military vehicles, trucks, and
fuel tanks are visible.
Source47
Coordinates: 47.411287, 39.231931.
46 Instagram, https://instagram.com/p/sMuPTjrKZ1/ (archived: https://
archive.is/2irvo).
47-
archive.is/bvOKd).
14 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
One of the tank operators deployed to this base on active duty
was Bato Dambayev, who fought in Debaltseve with other
members of his brigade after departing from the Kuzminskiy
48 The contributions
of Dambayev and other Russian soldiers who were
stationed at the Kuzminsky camp were key in the Ukrainian
48 Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We Brought Ourselves to
and What Could Happen,” op cit.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 15
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN
UKRAINE
On March 2, 2015, US Army Europe Commander Ben Hodges
estimated that twelve thousand Russian soldiers, including
“military advisers, weapons operators, and combat troops”
are active in eastern Ukraine.49
There have been hundreds, likely thousands, of Russian
citizens who have voluntarily crossed the border into Ukraine
50
What the Russian government denies is that regular Russian
However, the presence of Russian soldiers on Ukrainian
territory has become undeniable following the steady stream
A series of exposé reports from local Russian news outlets,
and a number of cases in which Russian soldiers accidentally
that the regular Russian military is active in Ukraine.51
Both Western and Russian journalists have uncovered the
troubling details of active Russian soldiers who have died or
suffered serious injuries in Ukraine.52 These reports include
not only eyewitness accounts and photographs of Russian
soldiers in Ukraine, but also interviews with the grief-strick-
“local separatists” in eastern Ukraine.53
49 Sabine Siebold and Caroline Copley, “Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in
Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander,” Reuters, March 3, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/us-ukraine-russia-sol-
.
50 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russians Find Few Barriers to Joining Ukraine Battle,”
New York Times, June 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/
. Some examples include: Novorossia, http://
novorossia.su/join (in Russian); Antimaidan.info, http://antimaydan.
(in Russian); Newsli.ru, http://www.newsli.ru/news/ussr/politika/11091
(in
Russian).
51 RBK, http://top.rbc.ru/politics/02/10/2014/542c0dcfcbb20f5d-
06c1d87a (in Russian); Kommersant, http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2671088http://tvrain.ru/soldat/ (in Russian),
Pskovaya Guberniya,
php (in Russian); Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We
Brought Ourselves to and What Could Happen,” op cit.
52
Fighting in Ukraine,” Vice, March 31, 2015, https://news.vice.com/article/
ukraine.
53
Troops Killed in Ukraine,” Guardian, January 19, 2015, http://www.
killed-in-ukraine; Sam Masters, “Ukraine Crisis: Russian Mothers of Killed
Independent, August 31, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/ukraine-crisis-russian-mothers-of-killed-and-captured-soldiers-ask-
http://www.
rferl.org/content/russia-son-killed-ukraine-mother-grieves/26651995.html.
Russian soldiers enter Ukraine from nearby border camps. As
described in numerous interviews with Russian soldiers who
have fought in Ukraine, commanders will order soldiers to
conceal the identifying features of military vehicles, remove
to join separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.54 There are also
reports of Russian soldiers quitting the Russian army out of
co55
“. . . Russian soldiers are fighting
and dying in large numbers in
eastern Ukraine.”
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
Deputy Secretary General, NATO56
Despite an orchestrated campaign from the Russian govern-
-
tive journalism by independent Russian and Western media
outlets:
• In mid-August, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division
of Pskov lost a number of its young soldiers in
Ukraine.57
• Eleven deaths from the 18th Motorized Infantry
August 9 and 13, two in Ukraine and nine during
supposed “exercises.”58
• A Russian tank operator from the 5th Tank Brigade
of Ulan-Ude was located in a burn recovery unit in
against Ukrainian soldiers in Debaltseve.59
• Nine soldiers who quit the Kantemirovskaya division
were mentioned in an exchange of letters between
group based in Moscow.60
54 “Russian Soldiers Quit over Ukraine,” Reuters, May 10, 2015, http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3075397/Russian-soldiers-quit-
Ukraine.html.
55 Ibid.
March 5, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31747754.
57 Slon, http://slon.ru/fast/russia/v-pskove-proshli-zakrytye-pokhorony-mest-
(in Russian).
58http://tvrain.ru/articles/sovet_po_pravam_cheloveka_peredal_dozh-
(in
Russian).
59 Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We Brought Ourselves to
and What Could Happen,” op cit.
60 “Russian Soldiers Quit over Ukraine,” Reuters, May 10, 2015, http://www.
html.
16 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
These soldiers were not simply volunteers, but active duty
the case book for methodology, additional information, and
examples).
Soldier Profile 1. Bato Dambayev
37th Motorized Infantry Brigade
Shortly after the signing of the Minsk II agreements, what
appeared to be separatist forces routed the Ukrainian army
and took the city of Debaltseve, a key central location linking
61 These forces
contained some separatist soldiers, but the reason for the
overpowering victory was a combination of enlisted Russian
soldiers and their heavy machinery, including the 5th Tank
Brigade from Ulan-Ude, Buryatia62 and the 37th Motorized
Infantry Brigade from Kyakhta, Buryatia.
Bato Dambayev is one soldier from the 37th Motorized Infantry
Brigade and returned home to Buryatia after participating
camp near the Russian city of Kuzminka, just like Dorzhi
Batomunkuyev, the Buryat soldier of the 5th Tank Brigade
who gave a now infamous interview with the Russian independent
newspaper Novaya Gazeta detailing his involvement
in Debaltseve.63
mentioned that contract soldiers from Kyakhta joined him
64
37th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Dambayev photographed
himself65 with a Siberian Husky puppy at the Kuzminsky
camp.66 Additionally, he traveled to the nearby city of Taganrog
with other soldiers during his free time, while deployed
near the base.67 However, they did not stay too long in these
camps, as they eventually departed for Ukraine in February to
deal a decisive defeat to the Ukrainian forces near Debaltseve.
Journalists in Debaltseve noticed large concentrations of
soldiers identifying as Buryats in Debaltseve in mid-Febru-
68
Numerous photographs were taken of these soldiers with a
61 Neil Buckley, Roman Olearchyk, and Courtney Weaver, “Fierce Battle for
Debaltseve Ends in Ukraine Withdrawal” , February 18,
2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/470b14da-b785-11e4-981d-00144feab7de.
html.
62 Kostyuchenko, “We Were Fully Aware of What We Brought Ourselves to
and What Could Happen,” op. cit.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65-
(archived: https://
archive.is/KRbF2); http://cs624031.vk.me/v624031519/21313/zIUT-
3vRAyws.jpg (archived: https://archive.is/Xm7Om).
66
husky5.jpg; -
loads/2015/03/husky3.jpg;
wp-content/uploads/2015/03/husky2.jpg;
netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/husky1.jpg.
67-
(archived: https://
archive.is/PHKbR
68 Kommersant, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2671088 (in Russian).
Photo: Bato with a Siberian husky puppy at the Kuzminsky Camp,
mid-February. Numerous other members of the 5th Tank Brigade
and 37th Motorized Infantry also photographed themselves with
these puppies, which lived at the Kuzminsky camp over the winter of
2014 to 2015.69
Source70
Coordinates: 47.407863, 39.228522.
tank and gear on, claiming to be from Buryatia, often near
71
The Russian soldier deleted the photograph shortly after
posting it. But other Internet users made numerous archived
copies72 and took screenshots of the image, and Google cached
73
two-year-old son in Buryatia. On March 31, the soldier reposted
a story from Russian news outlet Lenta.ru that reports
on how Buryat soldiers serving in the Russian military fought
in the battle of Debaltseve.74
69
netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/husky5.jpg; https://
-
com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/husky1.jpg.
70-
archive.is/KRbF2) and http://cs624031.vk.me/v624031519/21313/
zIUT3vRAyws.jpg (archived: https://archive.is/Xm7Om).
71 Twitter, .
72https://pp.vk.me/c621930/
https://archive.is/D0Zgv, https://
archive.is/Xkqwo, and https://archive.is/OlUO2. Note that he used to use
the pseudonym “David,” but has since changed it to his real name, Bato.
73-
-
-
-
-
(archived: ).
74 (archived: https://ar-
).
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 17
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
CARGO 200: HIDING
RUSSIA’S DEAD
Russian soldiers like Tumanov, who were killed after crossing
designation “Cargo 200,” indicating that the soldiers were
killed in action.75
often lie by claiming that these soldiers died during exercises
at training camps near the Ukrainian border.
involvement in eastern Ukraine from Russian citizens.
According to a comprehensive list published by the nongovernmental
organization Open Russia, at least 273 Russian
soldiers, including both conscripts and mercenaries (kontrak-
75-
ber 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30039004.
tniki76 A report
by Boris Nemtsov, a prominent Putin critic and former First
on Russian involvement in the war in Ukraine was published
posthumously on May 12, 2015, and put the number of deceased
Russian soldiers at 220.77
76 Open Russia, https://openrussia.org/post/view/1772/ (in Russian). The
list of names was originally published on December 22, 2014. The most
recent update to this list was completed on April 1, 2015.
77 Open Russia, (in
Russian).
Photo
Russian soldiers fought in mid-February.
Source
Coordinates: 48.308729, 38.300529 (camera pointing northwest).
18 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
CROSS-BORDER
SHELLING
During key offensives, Russian forces in Ukraine have received
cover from shelling from Russian territory. In the
summer of 2014, the Ukrainian Border Service and the National
Security and Defense Council reported more than 120
artillery attacks from Russia.78 Despite Russian government
denials, with a combination of satellite data, crater analysis,
and open source materials, one can establish that many of
these attacks originated in Russia and not in the separatist
controlled areas of Ukraine.
Using satellite map imagery of craters left behind by artillery
shells in Ukraine, it is possible to determine attack trajectories
and origins.79 From satellite imagery, researchers located
on a crater-by-crater basis.
The satellite images from eastern Ukraine show two main
types of craters, low-angle fuse quick craters (with distinctive
“side spray” areas projecting diagonally from a central crater)
and high-angle shell craters (triangular-shaped craters that
80
High-angle shell craters81
78 The Ukrainian government reports were collected by Bellingcat in a
database: -
.
79 Pablo Gutierrez, Paul Torpey, and Bellingcat, “How Digital Detectives Say
They Proved Ukraine Attacks Came from Russia,” Guardian, February 17,
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/17/ukraine-russia-
crossborder-attacks-satellite-evidence.
80 GlobalSecurity.org, “Appendix J: Crater Analysis and Reporting,” http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-50/Appj.
81 GlobalSecurity.org, “Appendix J: Crater Analysis and Reporting,” http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-50/Appj.
The research team then created templates for both types
of craters and used these to mark and measure the angle of
craters visible on Google Earth satellite map imagery. The
to identify launch sites.
Source: Google Earth/Digital Globe.
High-angle shell craters (e.g., mortars, high-angle Multiple Rocket
Source: Google Earth/Digital Globe.
Example: The Gukovo Launch Site
Gukovo, Russia is one such launch site. On July 14, 2014, consistent
accounts emerged in both Ukrainian and pro-Russian
media outlets that clashes took place in the vicinity of a mine
called “Dolzhanskaya-Capital,” close to the Ukrainian town of
Panchenkove.82
near the Dolzhanskaya-Capital mine outside of the Panchenkove
village. The trajectories calculated based on the shape of
the craters revealed that there were six separate attacks from
82 DTEK, http://www.dtek.com/ru/media-centre/press-releases/details/
v-dtek-sverdlovantratsit-v-rezuljtate-boevikh-dejstvij-obestocheni-
dve-shakhtoplosshadki (in Russian); DTEK, http://web.archive.
org/web/20150210143935/http://www.dtek.com/ru/media-centre/
press-releases/details/v-dtek-sverdlovantratsit-v-rezuljtate-boevikh-de-
Russian);
shtml (in Russian).
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 19
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
Photo
Source: Google Earth/Digital Globe.
the Russian Federation and one near Chervonopartyzansk,
Ukraine, which is close to the border.
-
the vicinity of Gukovo, Russia. Four videos containing geotags
the launch of rockets, and two of these videos showed burning
after the launch of the rockets.
-
within the territory of Russia.
Following the attacks, a Russian journalist visited Gukovo
satellite imagery analysis.83 The journalist also visited the
launch site and discovered clear signs of military activity,
including large numbers of red endcaps from 122 mm artillery
rockets. This type of end-cap is used by Russian 9M22U,
9M22S, 9M43, and 9M522 122 mm rockets in the BM-21 Grad
and Tornado multiple rocket launchers.
Cross-border attacks served as cover for the renewed military
incursion in the summer of 2014. Attacks originating in
border towns like Gukovo allowed Russian forces operating
Ukrainian military was making headway. On the verge of
defeat, Russian forces turned the tide to recapture a large
amount of territory, including Slovyansk and Donetsk (see the
casebook for additional examples and methodology).
83 Slon, -
sy-1137926.xhtml (in Russian).
20 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
In April of 2014, the Kremlin launched a hybrid war in
Moscow political consultant Aleksandr Borodai as Pres-
Girkin-Strelkov as Defense Minister. The Kremlin provided
its control of the Russian media, the Kremlin also launched
a massive disinformation campaign to persuade the Russian
of a civil war.
On the whole, Moscow has enjoyed success in setting the
media typically refer to the separatists in Ukraine as if they
of the Kremlin. When the Ukrainian government or even
Western governments discuss the presence of Russian weapons
or soldiers in the east, the media present their statements
and then the Russian denial as if they were of equal value,
that their troops were involved in the seizure of Crimea until
commemorating the Crimean operation.84
Western leaders often contribute to this problem. Many exhibited
a lack of clarity in their own words, avoiding referenc-
separatists as if they were independent Ukrainian actors. Furthermore,
Western governments have been slow to recognize
foreign policy. Moscow is seeking to overturn the peace
settlement that ended the Cold War, and it has conducted
wars against two of its neighbors, Georgia in 2008 and
Ukraine today, to achieve that objective.
84
, March 15, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/
world/europe/la-fg-russia-putin-crimea-20150315-story.html.
As a result of the failure to appraise the nature of the threat,
major Western governments are not devoting the necessary
resources, including intelligence assets, to the war in Ukraine.
With this in mind, the Working Group recommends that
Western governments:
• devote substantially more intelligence assets to
• employ new digital forensic methods to complement
traditional covert, technical, and open source methods;
• make public, to the maximum extent possible,
the presence of Russian troops and equipment in
in Ukraine, while protecting intelligence methods as
needed;
• share intelligence regarding Russian plans against
and Russian forces in and near Ukraine through
vetted channels with the Ukrainian government;
•
against Ukraine;
• increase funding for, and mobilize private investment
in, Russian-language independent programs and
media that broadcast into Russian speaking areas to
• dedicate more intelligence assets to and analysis
neighbors and European nations (including other
post-Soviet states and NATO and EU nations); and
• draw on these insights to inform policy decisions
(such as extending, not curtailing, sanctions) and to
formulate a more comprehensive transatlantic
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 21
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
CASEBOOK
Section 1. Russian Military Equipment
in Use in Ukraine
Social media is a critical source of information regarding
movements of military equipment in Ukraine and in the vicinity
of the Ukrainian border with Russia. The sources include
both international services like Instagram, as well as regional
Most often, the material is submitted by ordinary people who
encounter military equipment and share pictures out of general
interest. Supporters of the separatists and the Russian
Federation have also launched their own propaganda news
channels on social media, which yield valuable information
on the equipment used.
T-72B3 Tanks
T-72B3 sightings have been registered in Ukraine since the
fall of 2014, but some of the clearest footage of the tanks has
come from pro-Russian separatist supporter and British blogger
Graham Phillips. His video, from the time of the Debaltseve
offensive, contains some of the clearest evidence of these
modernized main battle tanks in Ukraine.85 The self-reported
description of the video makes reference to Debaltseve, and
geolocation yields a strong possible match in the village of
Sanzharivka, ten kilometers north of Debaltseve.
Dozor Armored Vehicles
Several sightings of the Dozor armored reconnaissance and
communications vehicles have also been collected from both
sources supporting the separatists and from videos uploaded
by locals. Several of the sightings can be geolocated to the
the town of Krasnodon near the border with Russia. The base
vehicle KamAZ-43269 (with designation BPM-97), among
others, is used by the Russian Border Guard and has been exported
to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but the Dozor86 variant
equipped for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and
is not known to have been exported.87 Dozor vehicles with sim-
been operated by the 4th Military Base in South Ossetia.88
85-
86 “New Photograph Shows Russia Still Supplying Militants with Military
Hardware,” UNIAN, January 4, 2015, http://www.unian.info/
society/1028814-new-photograph-shows-russia-still-supplying-
militants-with-military-hardware.html.
87 NIISSU, http://www.niissu.ru/2013-05-27-12-43-20/dozor.html (in
Russian).
88-
(in Russian).
Pantsir-S1 Air Defense System
The distinctive-looking Pantsir-S1 close range air defense
system has been captured on pictures and video in early 2015
89 Rostov
-
cial media content has also revealed that these systems have
been deployed in the vicinity of Ukraine.90 Russian soldiers
posting pictures of the systems on their social media accounts
have corroborated this assessment.
Grad-K Rocket System
Another example of uniquely Russian equipment is a modernized
Grad multiple launch rocket system on a KamAZ-5350
-
porting the separatists posted a video in January 2015, show-
91 After the
while a vehicle exits the formation. When the camera is raised
again, a Grad-K system can be seen driving out of the area,
volleys. The video can be reliably geolocated to the Kirovskyi
district in Donetsk, using the buildings, landmarks, and visi-
at an apparent commercial property in the immediate vicinity
of residential areas.
http://
www.janes.com/article/48685/russian-tos-1-and-pantsyr-s1-systemsreported-
in-east-ukraine.
90 EchoSec and Yomapic are tools used for locating geotagged content.
22 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 23
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
Section 2. Russian Training Camps on
Ukraine’s Border
Starting in 2014, the Russian military began rapidly constructing
massive training camps only a few kilometers from
the Ukrainian border. This fact is supported by before and
after satellite imagery comparisons and by hundreds of pho-
-
ment of such camps and shows that they serve as launching
near the Russian border towns of Kuybyshevo and Pavlovka,
staged artillery attacks from Russian to Ukrainian territory,
while a third near the town of Kuzminka housed hundreds of
Russian soldiers before they fought in key battles in Ukraine.
This camp was established only forty-six kilometers from the
Ukrainian border and did not exist before 2014. Ever since, it
has become the site for hundreds of military vehicles, including
tanks from the 5th Tank Brigade from Ulan-Ude, Siberia,
which was deployed to the site in October and November of
Debaltseve.
Case 1: Pavlovka Camp
Coordinates: 47.939519, 39.846468
The Pavlovka training camp was established only two kilometers
from the Ukrainian border and became the site for
dozens of military vehicles. Satellite images from April 2013
show that this base did not exist then but was built up following
the Euromaidan protests.
Photo: Pavlovka Camp.
Source
border with Ukraine,” posted on June 18, 2014.
Coordinates: 47.936203, 39.834042, facing east toward the Pavlovka
Camp.92
92-
te, OK.ru, and Instagram. He deleted the photograph off of some of these
The caption on OK.ru was “At the border with Ukraine,” while on Instagram
The 7th Airborne Division Unit 54801 was deployed to the
Pavlovka base in June 2014. Photographs uploaded by an ac-
this battalion, among others, were at the Pavlovka base in the
summer, at the same time as the rapid expansion of the base.
The Grad launchers that conducted artillery strikes against
Ukrainian positions in July 2014 were located approximately
one kilometer west of the Pavlovka training camp.
Case 2. Kuybyshevo Camp
Coordinates: 47.815116, 38.867638
This camp was established only three kilometers from the
Ukrainian border and became the staging site for numerous
artillery attacks. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis,
this base has grown from nothing to a large base with active
-
ers that conducted the July 2014 artillery strikes against
Ukrainian territory were just west of the town of Kuybyshevo.
A Russian soldier given the pseudonym “Arkady” told the
independent Russian news outlet Meduza about his time in
the Russian military in 2014, including a trip to the camps
outside of Kuybyshevo, where he delivered shells to an artil-
93
Russkoye and Kuybyshevo, and the town Kamensk-Shakh-
the ammunition and the artillerymen immediately loaded
-
tillery shells in the direction of Ukraine. Additionally, many
soldiers from the 291st Artillery Brigade photographed
-
tween Kuybyshevo and the Ukrainian border in the summer
of 2014.94 The dates and location of these artillery attacks
near Kuybyshevo align very closely to the dates (July 21 to
26, 2014) and locations (south and west of Kuybyshevo in the
Rostov oblast) of artillery attacks revealed by the US State
Department on July 27, 2014.95
Russian) and archived link https://archive.is/XOxCO (in Russian). Discussions
of the image he posted on Instagram, which incorrectly geotagged his
location as Ukraine, can be found at http://evilmilker.livejournal.com/9385.
-
ters East Ukraine,” http://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/2ak-
93
during the Annexation of Crimea Speak,” Meduza, March 16, 2015, https://
meduza.io/en/feature/2015/03/16/i-serve-the-russian-federation.
94-
95 “Satellite Images Show Russia Firing Into Ukraine: U.S. Government,”
NBC News, staff writer, and Tim Stelloh, Associated Press, July 27, 2014,
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-plane-crash/satellite-imag-
24 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 25
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
Section 3. Russian Soldiers in Ukraine
The Russian military is sending its soldiers across the border
to mix with Russian-instigated separatist forces in Ukraine.
Once in eastern Ukraine, these soldiers are no longer considered
Russian; rather they are told to refer to themselves
as “local defense forces,” aiding the separatist soldiers with
additional manpower and Russian equipment. In addition
to Bato Dambayev, two more soldiers, Anton Tumanov and
process of how Russian soldiers train in “exercises” near
against Ukrainian soldiers.
Soldier Profile 2. Anton Tumanov
Russian 18th Motorized Brigade, Unit 27777
Tumanov was sent to Ukraine while on active duty in the
Russian military in August 2014. He perished on August
13, 2014, in Snezhnoe, Ukraine after crossing the border on
August 11, 2014.
Life before the War
Prior to joining the Russian military, Anton frequently voiced
his concerns about the state of the local economy in his
hometown of Kozmodemyansk, Russia. He saw no alternative
to joining the military, even knowing the danger of being sent
Where can you work here in Kozmodemyansk? There are
recalls. “He told me the army wouldn’t be sent to Ukraine.
96
His mother did not want him to join the army, but Anton went
nonetheless.97
Training for Combat
commanders gave the order on August 11, 2014: turn in your
phones, take off identifying features from your uniform, mask
the unique markers on military equipment, and cross into
Ukraine. Those who refused were “insulted and threatened
by the commanders.”98 The twenty-year-old entered Ukraine
with over a thousand others and a large column of military
equipment, and his smaller group arrived in Snezhnoe late on
August 12, 2014.
96 Novaya Gazeta,
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
Photo
before he left for service.99
Source
Coordinates: 56.3453311, 46.5708947 (estimated).
Photo: Tumanov on the grounds of his camp near the Ukraine border
before his deployment to Ukraine.
Source100
Coordinates: 48.320520, 40.099180.
99 Chernova told Novaya Gazeta and Anton talked to her in late July, in which
Ukraine. See http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/65075.html (in Russian).
-
(archived: https://
archive.is/qOaZM).
26 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
Photo: Snezhnoe, Ukraine. August 13, 2014. The last known picture
of the group before the deadly shelling. Robert Artyunyan (second
from right) and Anton Tumanov (far right) died on August 13. Rolan
Ramazanov, the soldier in the middle, shared this image online on
August, 26, 2014.101
Source: Novaya Gazeta.102
Coordinates: 48.058296, 38.757780 (estimated).103
Photo
hundred miles east of Moscow, Russia.
Source.104
101 The exact location of this photograph is unknown, but it was taken
an artillery strike killed Anton. See Novaya Gazeta, http://www.novayagaze-
.
102 Novaya Gazeta, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/storage
.
103 Ibid.
,
December 27, 2014, http://telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
russia/11314817/Secret-dead-of-Russias-undeclared-war.html.
Deployment to and Death in Snezhnoe
Anton Tumanov and his fellow unit member Robert Artyunyan
place where, twenty-seven days earlier, the Buk system that
likely shot down MH17 was spotted hours before the crash.
Numerous eyewitnesses on August 13 report seeing a convoy
BTR-80 (an armored vehicle) and men with “white bands”105
on their arms and legs. Not coincidentally, Tumanov and his
fellow soldiers were photographed with white bands and a
BTR-80a in Snezhnoe. Only hours after the photograph was
taken, local social media reports and videos described how
the Khimmash factory was hit by an artillery strike from the
Ukrainian military.106 This strike killed Tumanov and Artyunyan.
Rolan Ramazanov, a Russian soldier from unit 27777
(pictured in middle of photograph) who survived the attack,
described it to Reuters:
I was in the BTR. The hatches were open, and as a result—
and Anton were about two-three steps from the BTR [that
the Krasnodar Krai to recover from his injury.107
Along with Artyunyan, Tumanov died on August 13, 2014 in
Snezhnoe. He is buried in his hometown of Kozmodemyansk,
Russia, over a thousand kilometers from Snezhnoe, Ukraine.
-
ed in the report and elsewhere, Tumanov died
“carrying out responsibilities of military service at a point of
temporary deployment of military unit 27777.”108
Soldier Profile 3. Leonid Kichatkin
Russian 76th Airborne Division, Unit 74268
commanders in the Russian military. The authorities went to
great lengths to cover up his death.
Before Ukraine
Troops. He lived with his wife, Oksana, and children in Pskov,
where he was stationed for his military service. In late July
2014, Ukraine was close to defeating separatist forces as it
retook territory, but the separatists were seemingly miraculously
reinvigorated. In mid-August, Oksana would speak to
her husband for the last time, as he and other Russian soldiers
were ordered into Ukraine where they quickly stopped
the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
105 Twitter, https://twitter.com/Dbnmjr/status/499578362428686336 (in
Russian); https://archive.is/8XwoH (archived).
-
2Fe412e83adad6110ba6https://vk.com/vid-
107 Reuters, http://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUKBN0H719A20140912
(in Russian).
108 Ibid.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 27
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
“Lost” Paratroopers
Dozens of the 76th Airborne Troop soldiers out of Pskov
stopped contacting their loved ones between August 15 and
17, 2014. This halt in communications coincides with or
precedes a number of mysterious events surrounding this
brigade, including Putin granting an award for the “successful
completion of military missions”109
battle involving the paratroopers near the Ukrainian town of
Georgievka.110 Particularly noteworthy was an ominous post
111
Mysterious Funerals
were alive and well, secret funerals were held for paratroopers
in Pskov starting on August 24, 2014.112-
A number of journalists, including a member of the Pskov
regional assembly, attended the event, where over one hundred
mourners paid their respects to Kichatkin.113 His grave
marker stated that he died on August 19, three days before
114
Cover-Up
over the circumstances of his death, a grieving family, and a
-
ed from this point. Reporters from both Novaya Gazeta and
Echo of Moscow spoke with not only Oksana Kichatkina, but
impersonating the slain soldier.
Novaya Gazeta spoke to a woman claiming to be Oksana
Kichatkina on August 24. She claimed that her husband was
-
-
takte page was “hacked.” The conversation with the Echo of
Moscow reporter went by the same script.115
father and uncle came to the funeral, along with Aleksandr
116
http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/
(in Russian).
110 Unian, http://www.unian.net/politics/953679-voennyiy-jurnalist-pokazal-
zahvachennuyu-na-donbasse-rossiyskuyu-bmd-2-fotoreportaj.html
(in Russian).
111
and
png (in Russian).
112 Novaya Gazeta, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/64975.html (in
Russian).
-
ing in Ukraine,” Reuters, August 28, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2014/08/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-graves-idUKKB-
.
(in Russian).
115 Echo of Moscow, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/otstavnih/1387356-echo/ (in
Russian).
116 Ibid.
Photo
Source
Coordinates: 57.8129077, 28.3446515.
Photo
-
Source
Coordinates: 54.060218, 27.294158.
Photo
Source: Novaya Gazeta/Nina Petlyanova.
28 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
Methodology
Satellite imagery with a panchromatic resolution of up to 0.5
meters from eastern Ukraine and its border regions with Russia
was examined for visible signs of artillery attacks in reported
were analyzed and geolocated. In addition to video footage,
other open source information was gathered and analyzed.
In examining each area, the research team created a novel analysis
method based on internationally-recognized “on-the-ground”
120 The
trajectory of the projectile is determined by a variety of factors,
such as the type and hardness of the impacted ground, wind
direction and speed, and the type of projectile. The researchers
adopted a simple linear trajectory in the analysis, but the actual
trajectory may vary due to the aforementioned factors.
120 Gutierrez, Torpey, and Bellingcat, “How Digital Detectives Say They
Proved Ukraine Attacks Came from Russia,” op cit.
Since his funeral on August 25, there have been no indications
that Kichatkin is alive. On August 26, reporters from
various Russian independent journalism outlets visited the
Pskov graves of Kichatkin and Osipov. Shortly after arriving, a
group of young men chased the journalists away, threw rocks
at them, and later slashed their tires.117
Section 4. Russian Cross-Border
Artillery Attacks on Ukraine
Ukrainian armed forces positioned near the Russian-
summer of 2014. Between July 9 and September 5, 2014, the
Ukrainian Border Service and the National Security and Defense
Council reported more than 120 artillery attacks from
-
lery attacks on Ukraine originated from Russian territory.118
The pressure of sustained artillery attacks through early August
led Ukrainian armed forces to lose control of hundreds of kilometers
of border territory.119 Satellite images of eastern Ukraine
from July, August, and September of 2014 have enabled the
their origin, and compare them with local sources.
(in Russian).
118 For collected reports see https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Fx-
119 Russia Today,
Russian); http://web.archive.org/web/20150210142502/http://russian.
rt.com/article/43677 (archived).
1.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 29
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
Example 1. The Amvrosiivka Attack, July 14,
2014
Coordinates: 47.764550, 38.513236.
Source: Google Earth/Digital Globe.
In a July 14, 2014 summary of the “anti-terrorist operation,”
Ukrainian media reported that an attack took place on positions
of the Ukrainian armed forces in the vicinity of Amvrosiivka.
121 It was suspected that the origin of this attack was
the territory of Russia.122
Satellite imagery from July 16, 2014, shows a correspond-
-
servable direction of each of the 330 craters in this crater
craters was calculated and determined to be 193.97°, i.e.,
from the south-south west (180° being due south).
Burn marks are visible at this location on satellite map
imagery from July 16, 2014 which is on Russian territory
and approximately 750 meters from the border near the
121 “Anti-Terrorist Operation: Summary for July 14, 2014,” InformNapalm,
July 15, 2014, https://en.informnapalm.org/anti-terrorist-operation-summary-
for-july-14-2014/, http://web.archive.org/web/20150210142924/.
122 Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/v.parasyuk/
posts/675221185878989 (in Ukrainian) ().
HI HIDI DI D NG N PL PLAI AI AIN SI S GH GHT: T: Pu Puti ti t n’ n s Wa W r n Ukr kr krai ai aine ne
Russian village of Seleznev at the coordinates 47.63709,
38.469355.
at 47.76455, 38.513236. Satellite imagery from July 16
indicates a launch site coinciding in time with the report
of the attacks at 47.63709, 38.469355.
Based on the markings at the launch site of the attack,
it was possible to determine the type of multiple rocket
launcher used (the BM-21 Grad/Tornado) and its position
in relation to the damage done to the launch site.
The launch site north of Seleznev is showing clear burn
marks from multiple rocket launches and track marks
from the movement of vehicles in the area.
Burn marks at the site were used to determine the likely
trajectory of the attack, and this matched the trajectory
determined by the crater analysis.
2. 4.
3.
ground near Seleznev, and the position and size of multiple rocket launchers used during the attack based on the position of track marks at the launch site.
Source: Satellite image from Google Earth/Digital Globe.
1.
4.
3.
2.
30 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
: Ukraine: Battle aftermath litters after Sverdlovsk militia
pummels 72nd Motorized Brigade.
Source
Example 2. The Sverdlovsk Attack
Coordinates: 47.993078, 39.644672.
Source: Google Earth/Digital Globe.
On July 28, 2014, the Russian news agency Ruptly published
after Sverdlovsk militia pummels 72nd Motorized Brigade.”123
Several abandoned and damaged armored vehicles are visible
in this video. The video description names day of the attack
(Friday):
Ukrainian Army BMP-2, MT-LB and rocket launchers were
left abandoned near Sverdlovsk on Saturday, after the
-
124
suffered by the Ukrainian army in both hardware and
personnel after the Kyiv troops were hit by the 12mm [sic]
mortar shells.
Since the video was released on July 28, 2014 (Monday) and
the description states that the attack occurred on the previous
Friday, this places the date of the attack on July 25, 2014.
72nd Motorized Brigade,” Ruptly, July 28, 2014, https://www.youtube.
.
Using the video footage, it was possible to identify the loca-
of Khmelnytskyi, south of Sverdlovsk.
: Comparison shot from Ruptly video and the August 15, 2014.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 31
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
: Result of the crater analysis at the village Khmelnytskyi,
south of Sverdlovsk.
Source: Satellite image from Google Earth/Digital Globe.
By analyzing the satellite imagery of the area it was possible
to identify 209 craters. Using crater analysis, it was possible
to determine three primary attack trajectories.
The trajectories of nine craters point directly east (green
line). Two other trajectories (red and cyan lines) originate
in a southeasterly direction. All three trajectories clearly
positions are directly connected to the military camp of the
close to Malyy.
HI HIDI DI D NG PL PLAI AI A N SI SIGH GH GHT: T: Pu Puti ti t n’ n’s Wa Ukr kr krai ai aine ne
32 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
APPENDIX
Discussions in Ukraine, March 27 to
April 3 and April 24 to April 27, 2015
activists shared a concern about possible future Russian military
actions in eastern Ukraine. There was general consensus
among interlocutors that the Kremlin was using the Minsk II
-
gic location remains indisputable, concern for new aggression
in the territories near Debaltseve seems greater.
The Situation in the East
including shelling of Ukrainian positions along the line of
contact, have been documented regularly by the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors.
Atlantic Council Ukraine Working Group members examined
-
the need for more humanitarian assistance. The internal
traveling from other Ukrainian regions, deliver basic aid, food,
and supplies to the civilian population. Administrators noted
that the most vulnerable groups, particularly the elderly, who
had not been able to leave the separatist-controlled zone
were living in unbearable conditions without electricity, heat,
and clean water. Water shortages are expected to worsen as
temperatures increase in the summer.
disinformation, which is broadcast on television and radio
in the eastern regions. They expressed the need for additional
technical assistance and support for developing local
-
in the government-designated Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)
territories may make individuals susceptible to pro-Russian
messaging and disinformation.
the discovery of numerous storage bunkers scattered across
and communication instruments put in place by pro-Russian
forces to ensure steady supplies for partisan activities
conducted by pro-Russian agents beyond the contact-line on
Ukrainian territory.
The National Security Situation
Defense shared physical evidence of Russian military pres-
media forensic teams inside Ukraine, as well as the Atlantic
a great deal of interest in using open source for intelligence
gathering. Civil society groups using similar techniques emphasized
the need for technical training.
Donbas came close to thirty-six thousand along the line of
contact, including an estimated eight to ten thousand Russian
regular troops among them. According to Ukrainian intelligence
services, an estimated eight to fourteen airborne and
mechanized battalion tactical groups, each with a battalion
tactical group comprising six hundred to eight hundred
territory.
military hardware and equipment, including T-64 and T-72
tanks as well as armored personnel carriers, continues. It
currently in use.
-
and targeting purposes, but lack not only the adequate tools
-
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 33
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: Putin’s War in Ukraine
List of individuals met in Kyiv and
Luhansk
• Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, Chief Monitor, Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
• Roman Burko, Head Editor, InformNapalm Investigative
Journalist Group
• Bruce Donahue, Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy
in Ukraine
•
Administration
• Hana Hopko, Member of Parliament, Head of the Foreign
Affairs Committee in the parliament of Ukraine
• Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Member of Parliament,
First Deputy Chairperson of the Committee, Foreign
Affairs Committee in the parliament of Ukraine
• Anna Kovalenko, Adviser to the Minister of Information,
Ministry of Information of Ukraine
• Hennadii Moskal,
Administration
•
Ukraine (SBU)
•
Ukraine (SBU)
• Colonel Oleksandr Nozdrachov, Head, Civil-Military
Cooperation (CIMIC), Armed Forces of Ukraine
• Andriy Parubiy, former Secretary of the National
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
•
Section, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Armed
Forces of Ukraine
• Geoffrey Pyatt, US Ambassador to Ukraine
• Olena Tregub, Adviser to the Minister of the Economy,
Ministry of the Economy of Ukraine
• Dmytro Tymchuk, Member of Parliament, Committee
on National Security and Defense in the parliament
of Ukraine
• Svitlana Zalishchuk, Member of Parliament of
Ukraine
CHAIRMAN
*Jon M. Huntsman, Jr.
CHAIRMAN,
INTERNATIONAL
ADVISORY BOARD
Brent Scowcroft
PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Frederick Kempe
EXECUTIVE VICE
CHAIRS
*Adrienne Arsht
*Stephen J. Hadley
VICE CHAIRS
*Robert J. Abernethy
*Richard Edelman
*C. Boyden Gray
*John Studzinski
TREASURER
*Brian C. McK. Henderson
SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe
DIRECTORS
Stephane Abrial
Odeh Aburdene
Peter Ackerman
Timothy D. Adams
John Allen
Michael Andersson
Michael Ansari
Elizabeth F. Bagley
Peter Bass
Francis Bouchard
Myron Brilliant
Esther Brimmer
*R. Nicholas Burns
William J. Burns
*Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey
James E. Cartwright
John E. Chapoton
Ahmed Charai
Sandra Charles
George Chopivsky
Wesley K. Clark
David W. Craig
*Ralph D. Crosby, Jr.
Nelson Cunningham
Ivo H. Daalder
Gregory R. Dahlberg
*Paula J. Dobriansky
Christopher J. Dodd
Conrado Dornier
Patrick J. Durkin
Thomas J. Edelman
Thomas J. Egan, Jr.
*Stuart E. Eizenstat
Thomas R. Eldridge
Julie Finley
Alan H. Fleischmann
Michèle Flournoy
*Ronald M. Freeman
*Robert S. Gelbard
Thomas Glocer
*Sherri W. Goodman
Mikael Hagström
Ian Hague
John D. Harris, II
Frank Haun
Annette Heuser
*Karl Hopkins
Robert Hormats
Robert E. Hunter
Wolfgang Ischinger
Reuben Jeffery, III
Robert Jeffrey
George A. Joulwan
Stephen R. Kappes
Maria Pica Karp
Francis J. Kelly, Jr.
Zalmay M. Khalilzad
Robert M. Kimmitt
Henry A. Kissinger
Franklin D. Kramer
Izzat Majeed
Wendy W. Makins
Mian M. Mansha
William E. Mayer
Allan McArtor
Eric D.K. Melby
Franklin C. Miller
James N. Miller
*Judith A. Miller
*George E. Moose
Georgette Mosbacher
Steve C. Nicandros
Thomas R. Nides
Franco Nuschese
Joseph S. Nye
Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg
Ahmet Oren
*Ana Palacio
Carlos Pascual
Thomas R. Pickering
Daniel B. Poneman
Daniel M. Price
*Andrew Prozes
*Kirk A. Radke
Teresa M. Ressel
Charles O. Rossotti
Stanley O. Roth
Robert Rowland
Harry Sachinis
William O. Schmieder
John P. Schmitz
Brent Scowcroft
Alan J. Spence
James Stavridis
Richard J.A. Steele
*Paula Stern
Robert J. Stevens
John S. Tanner
*Ellen O. Tauscher
Karen Tramontano
Clyde C. Tuggle
Paul Twomey
Charles F. Wald
Jay Walker
Michael F. Walsh
Mark R. Warner
David A. Wilson
Maciej Witucki
Dov S. Zakheim
HONORARY
DIRECTORS
David C. Acheson
Madeleine K. Albright
James A. Baker, III
Harold Brown
Frank C. Carlucci, III
Robert M. Gates
Michael G. Mullen
William J. Perry
Condoleezza Rice
George P. Shultz
John W. Warner
William H. Webster
Members
List as of May 15, 2015
Atlantic Council Board of Directors
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Annex 449
Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: More Civilians Killed in Cluster Munition Attacks (19 March
2015)
Annex 450
James Miller, Pierre Vaux, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick & Michael Weiss, An Invasion By Any Other
Name (September 2015)
An Invasion
by Any Other
Name:
The Kremlin’s
Dirty War
in Ukraine
By James Miller, Pierre Vaux,
Catherine A. Fitzpatrick,
and Michael Weiss
The Institute of Modern Russia (IMR) is a public policy think-tank
that strives to establish an intellectual framework for building a
democratic Russia governed by rule of law. IMR promotes social,
economic, and institutional development in Russia through research,
analysis, advocacy and outreach. Our goal is to advance Russia's
integration into the community of democracies and to improve its
cooperation on the global stage.
of the Open Russia movement. IMR is a federal tax-exempt Section
501(c)(3) public charity, incorporated in New Jersey.
The Interpreter is a daily online journal dedicated primarily to
translating media from the Russian press and blogosphere into
English and reporting on events inside Russia and in countries
directly impacted by Russia’s foreign policy.
Conceived as a kind of “Inopressa in reverse,” The Interpreter aspires
to dismantle the language barrier that separates journalists, Russia
analysts, policymakers, diplomats and interested laymen in the
English-speaking world from the debates, scandals, intrigues and
political developments taking place in the Russian Federation.
3
CONTENTS
Foreword ....................................................................................4
Overview and Methodology .............................................5
Executive Summary ..............................................................6
Introduction ...........................................................................10
Ivan Get Your Gun: Evidence of Russian Military
Equipment in Ukraine ........................................................12
First Stages of War in Eastern Ukraine .........................12
The First Battle of Donetsk International Airport ......13
The First Appearance of “Separatist” Tanks ................14
T-64 Battle Tanks Arrive ..................................................16
Moscow Deploys Advanced Anti-Aircraft
Systems to Protect Assets in Ukraine ...........................17
Sophisticated Surface-to-Air Missile Systems Appear
on the Streets of Lugansk and Russian Troops
Build on the Border .........................................................18
Russian Military Shells Ukraine from Russia ................22
The T-72 Main Battle Tank in Separatist Hands ..........25
Ukraine Advances in the West, Russia Attacks
from the East ....................................................................27
The Russian Invasion of Lugansk ...................................32
for Donetsk Airport .........................................................35
The Battle for Debaltsevo ..............................................36
The Southern Front: The Summer of 2015 .................41
“Cargo 200”—Russian Soldiers Killed
in Action in Ukraine ............................................................45
First Battle at the Donetsk Airport, May 2014 ...........45
The Battles of August 2014 ............................................46
Separatists’ Admission of Russian Presence ...............48
The Curious Case of Leonid Kichatkin ..........................48
Secret Funerals for the 76th ...........................................49
The Missing Paratrooper Company ..............................50
The St. Petersburg Soldiers’ Mothers and
the Missing Soldiers from the North Caucasus ...........51
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers
of Stavropol Territory ......................................................53
Kostroma POWs, KIA, and MIA,
and the First Demonstrations ........................................53
...........................56
...........................57
Meeting of Defense Ministry and
Soldiers’ Mothers .............................................................57
Activists’ Interview with Reuters ...................................58
Muted Public Response ..................................................59
Arrest of Stavropol Soldiers’ Mothers Leader
Ludmila Bogatenkova .....................................................60
Reprisals Against Journalists .........................................60
Assault of TV Rain Producer ..........................................60
Attack on BBC Crew ........................................................61
Attack on Lev Shlosberg .................................................61
Russia Tries a “Limited Hangout” on News
of Soldiers Killed ..............................................................62
Putin Issues Awards to Army Units for “Heroism
and Bravery in Combat” ..................................................62
Putin’s Decree Banning Disclosure
of Casualties During “Special Operations” ..................63
The Limits of Mining Social Media for Cases of
Russian Soldiers Killed in Ukraine .................................64
..............65
Reports on Twitter ...........................................................66
...............67
List Maintained by Open Russia of Russian Soldiers
...........................................67
............68
Latest Lists of Russian Soldiers Killed and Missing ....69
Putin.War ...........................................................................70
OSCE Reports of Cargo 200 ...........................................71
Reports of Mass Burials of Russian Soldiers ...............72
Wounded Russian Soldiers .............................................73
How Many Russian Soldiers Have Been
Killed in Ukraine? ..............................................................77
Conclusion ...............................................................................79
Appendix ..................................................................................80
4
Since February 2014, Russian president Vladimir
Putin has been conducting a war against Ukraine.
troops whom he later acknowledged as his soldiers. He
then began a hybrid war in Ukraine’s east, which he
still denies waging.
If Putin is going to continue his war policy toward
Ukraine, it is very much in his interest to maintain this
air of deniability. This helps him deal with the two
major problems that his own policies have created.
European Union has imposed on him for aggression in
was the end of Putin’s aggression, the EU was slow
to react to Moscow’s aggression in the Donbass. The
EU ignored the fact that Kremlin agents such as FSB
Battalion to Ukraine in late May and T-64 tanks and
advanced anti-aircraft weapons in June and July, the
EU still declined to notice and to impose serious,
sectoral sanctions. Those sanctions only came after a
Russian-supplied Buk anti-aircraft system shot down
MH17, a commercial airliner carrying nearly 200
Dutch passengers.
The second problem Putin faces is the strong
opposition of the Russian public to the use of Russian
troops in the war. Numerous polls by the Levada
this sentiment clear. Putin is afraid that his popularity
and support might suffer if it becomes clear that he has
to Putin’s aggressive designs, Kremlin efforts to hide
its hand in the war with Ukraine would not be very
-
gence would spread the word that the “civil war” in the
Donbass was manufactured in Moscow. But such has
used to a historically unprecedented period of peace
and prosperity, and many there do not want to wake
up to the dangers brewing on their eastern borders.
to engage in possible military engagements after the
spectacular failures of American interventions in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Libya, labors under the delusion that
the Ukraine crisis is a European or regional crisis—as
if a rampaging major nuclear power can be effectively
managed by the EU!
Distracted by the less critical security challenges of
powers have not devoted enough intelligence resources
to Moscow’s excellent adventure in Ukraine. And even
when they have the intelligence capability, they have
even as Russian troops crushed Ukrainian forces at
chose not to refer to Moscow’s action as an “invasion.”
Instead, it chose an old weasel word from the vocabulary
of President Nixon, who described an American
American reluctance to devote the necessary
intelligence to Kremlin aggression in Ukraine and to
speak frankly about it is a problem, yet in Europe the
problem is worse. So when the Obama administration
winter spoke of the introduction of major Russian
-
States was exaggerating developments.
In this environment, the work of independent
researchers has become extremely important. If the
danger, private individuals and institutions need to pick
up the challenge.
One such institution is The Interpreter, which has
been covering Moscow’s war on Ukraine doggedly and
in detail since the start. This report—An Invasion by
Any Other Name: The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine,
many months of work.
The authors do not hide their intention. In this
report, they aim to provide a “thorough, focused
account of Russia’s dirty war in the Donbass.” Nor
do they shrink from drawing important analytical
conclusions. They correctly state that “were it not for
the heavy injection of Russian weapons and Russian
soldiers, the separatists would have been militarily
defeated in Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operation toward
the end of the summer of 2014.”
The report provides a meticulous and near-exhaustive
account of:
• The Russian equipment that has appeared in the
hands of the separatists since the hybrid war in the
Foreword
-
cially and militarily backing the “separatist”
war in east Ukraine and has in fact invaded its neighbor.
This report aims to offer a thorough forensic
accounting of Russia’s dirty war in the Donbass in two
come from Russia; and second, by examining all
available evidence on Russian military casualties and
fatalities suffered in Ukraine.
Based on the analysis contained here, it is the view
of the present writers that, were it not for the heavy
injection of Russian weapons and Russian soldiers into
east Ukraine, the separatists would have been militarily
defeated by Ukraine’s “Anti-Terrorist Operation”
Instead, Russian materiel and manpower have kept
more than a year with the purpose of steadily expanding
the borders of the self-declared “Donetsk and Lugansk
-
ber 2014 and the so-called “Minsk II” agreement signed
in February 2015.
The Interpreter
by the Institute of Modern Russia, has covered, in
real time, developments in Ukraine for more than 550
straight days, starting just before the height of the
Euromaidan Revolution. Nearly every battle and data
point dealing with Russian interference in the Donbass
has been documented.
A Note on Sources and Methodology
Many of the citations in this article link to heavily
researched reporting and analysis conducted by The
Interpreter in its previous work; these citations link
to their own source material. In cases in which The
Interpreter has conducted original reporting or translation,
has combined multiple sources to cover a story, or
report will point toward our original work.
Perhaps no single report to date has been more
valuable in understanding the scope of Russian military
involvement in Ukraine than a report published in
November 2014 by the weapons and munitions spe-
document represents the most comprehensive catalog of
ARES designated certain weapons, vehicles, and
that the Ukrainian military did not use or possess at the
armored vehicles, small arms, anti-aircraft systems and
other weapons and military equipment that are today
in the hands of “separatists” and must have come from
“external parties,” likely Russia.
This report seeks to go beyond the scope of ARES’s
initial investigation by placing the appearance of Russian
military equipment in the context of the broader
5
Donbass began
• The presence of Russian commanders and soldiers
in Ukraine
• The introduction of regular Russian forces
The efforts by relatives, nongovernmental organi-
information about those deaths
The repressive measures taken by Russian authorities
to prevent that from happening
label writers for The Interpreter as partisan in their
reporting on Ukraine, their work has in fact been meticulous.
They judiciously weigh the evidence before
making claims about any of the questions of study.
They are quick to point out when the evidence regarding
the presence of Russian equipment or soldiers is
overwhelming or merely circumstantial. They have
also brushed aside some claims—such as the recent
evidence suggesting that over 2,000 Russian soldiers
have died in Ukraine—when they do not believe them
provide here in convenient form persuasive information
about the extent of Moscow’s aggression in
Ukraine. This document will play an important role in
John E. Herbst
Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center,
Atlantic Council
Overview
6
Russian Military Equipment in
Ukraine
• In March 2014, Russian soldiers spread out across
government claimed that these armed militants
were local activists, not Russian soldiers, despite
considerable evidence to the contrary. Months later,
Russian president Vladimir Putin admitted that these
individuals had in fact been Russian soldiers.
militants began to capture police stations and government
buildings in various towns and cities across
the Donbass region of southeastern Ukraine.
• Some of the militants operated with elite precision
reminiscent of special forces units in conducting
raids on police stations. Several important command-
ultra-nationalists who had direct ties to the Russian
military and the Russian president.
• The Russian military has been building up its
presence on Ukraine’s border, starting before the
day. Russian soldiers on the border both constitute
a threat of outright invasion and also provide a
jumping-off point from which Russian soldiers and
armor can cross into Ukraine in smaller numbers.
• In late May 2014, as the Ukrainian military operation
to retake the Donbass was gaining speed, a group of
militants calling themselves the Vostok Battalion, a
name that harkens back to an infamous and now-disbanded
Russian Spetsnaz
attacks of unprecedented scale in and around Donetsk,
in what would become the western capital of
-
combat the “junta” in Kiev.
• On May 26, the day after Petro Poroshenko was
elected president of Ukraine, the largest battle in
Ukraine to date took place when the Vostok Battalion
led an attack against Donetsk Airport. Ukrainian
forces counterattacked with jets and helicopters, kill-
journalists soon discovered that some of these men
were “former” members of the 45th Special Purpose
Spetsnaz unit.
Days later the Vostok Battalion evicted the separatist
leaders from their headquarters in Donetsk as the
Ukraine.
“separatist” tanks, a convoy of T-64s, were spotted
moving from the easternmost territory controlled by
the west. NATO soon released satellite images from
-
bed trucks just over the border, and an analysis of the
vehicles’ paint scheme indicated that they were not
captured Ukrainian military tanks. The conclusion
was that either the tanks were given to the separatists
by the Russian military or Russian soldiers were
actually driving the vehicles.
• In the following weeks more tanks were spotted
across eastern Ukraine, and the Ukrainian government
warned that Russian military forces were building
on the border. By June 16, the Ukrainian military
had reported that there were more than 40,000
Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders and 15,000 to
20,000 militants in the Donbass, approximately half
of whom were from the Russian Federation.
• The following week, the Ukrainian military continued
to make military gains in the west while reporting
a reversal in fortune along the Russian border in
Executive Summary
7
the east, where Russian-backed forces were increasing
their attacks and even capturing border crossings.
• Throughout May, a number of Ukrainian helicopters
air defense systems, more commonly known as
government also reported capturing a number of
these systems, and an analysis by at least one arms
group suggests that some of these weapons originated
from the Russian military.
• In early July, a series of much more sophisticated
anti-aircraft vehicles began to appear in the Donbass.
These included the Strela-10, a relatively fast-moving
armored, tracked vehicle equipped with formi-
gun. There is no record of the Ukrainian military
ever losing any of these vehicles to Russian-backed
operate a sophisticated weapons system of this type.
Once again, these weapons also did not share the
Ukrainian military’s paint scheme and all identifying
marks had been removed.
Ukrainian aircraft began to be shot down by the
the Buk, a long-range anti-aircraft missile system
that evidence overwhelmingly suggests was responsible
for the shooting down of the civilian airliner
Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17.
• By the end of August, Ukraine had stopped using its
from inside Russian territory that show outgoing
MH17 was shot down. The next day news reports
emerged of heavy Ukrainian military casualties.
Some Ukrainian soldiers actually crossed the border
into Russia to receive medical treatment in the same
• The soldiers hit by this storm of rockets were
positioned in an area known as Sector D. The
Ukrainian military had been advancing into this area
in May, but by June 4, the Russian-backed forces
had captured new positions. The Ukrainian military
of land. Those positions were shelled from Russia
as early as July 11, and by August 8, the Ukrainians
had withdrawn and surrendered large sections of
the border to the Russian-backed forces, effectively
giving the Russian military complete control of over
100 kilometers of Ukraine’s southeastern border.
• Throughout July and August, large infusions of new
weapons and soldiers crossed the border to join the
• One such weapon transported across the border
was the T-72 main battle tank. Not only had the
Ukrainian military never used this tank in the
in eastern Ukraine were never possessed by the
versions of a tank that Russia never exported. The
in the hands of the infamous Vostok Battalion
mentioned earlier, and the tanks were later spotted at
key battles across eastern Ukraine, including those
in Sector D and Ilovaisk, which were major turning
points in the war.
• By late July, just before the arrival of the T-72s, large
convoys consisting of a mix of Strela-10s, T-64s,
and columns of armored vehicles had regularly been
seen moving on key highways between Lugansk and
Donetsk, the two separatist capitals, and on or near
the frontlines of combat. The United States warned
that large columns of Russian armor had crossed the
border. Ukrainian forces were losing ground rapidly.
• In early August, despite retaking territory near both
separatist capitals, the Ukrainian military position at
Ilovaisk, southeast of Donetsk between the separatist
capital and the Russian border, had become unexpectedly
encircled by the growing and ever-more
the Ukrainians dispatched more troops to attempt
to break the siege, they quickly found themselves
equipped with BTR-82A armored personnel carriers
that were only put into service in the Russian
military in 2013, played a key role in closing the trap
on the Ukrainian troops.
• By August 24, Russian troops were pouring across
the border, Ukrainian military casualties were rising
8
at a staggering pace, and evidence suggests that
Russian military units were at the vanguard of every
part of the battles that were occurring. Ten Russian
military paratroopers were even captured on the
Sector D, the Russian military launched an assault
Sea between the Russian border and the key port
city of Mariupol, which had been retaken by the
Ukrainian military earlier in the summer. This period
became popularly known as the “Russian Invasion,”
after the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started
to use the Twitter hashtag #RussiaInvadedUkraine
over the next week, and with Russian troops poised
to launch an assault on Mariupol, Poroshenko negoti-
Russian military forces continued to shore up their
positions in the Donbass; in November Russia
supplied them with new military hardware like the
1RL232 “Leopard” and the 1RL239 “Lynx” groundscan
radar systems, and by January the BPM-97
vehicle, weapons only used by the Russian military,
had appeared in the hands of forces as well.
• Russian-backed forces worked to consolidate their
victories by proceeding to shell various Ukrainian
military positions every day. Of particular interest to
the Russian-backed separatists was Donetsk Airport,
a strategically important position at the northwest
corner of their capital city, and the site of perhaps
their most humiliating defeat the prior May. The
for their stalwart defense of the position, came under
increasingly heavy artillery, rocket, sniper, smallarms,
and tank attack.
• In January 2015, cut off from resupply chains and
under increasing pressure from Russian-backed
Debaltsevo, on the road between Donetsk and Lugansk.
Anti-Kiev militants, led by elite soldiers using
Russian tanks and weaponry, such as T-72 models
only used by the Russian military, led the assault on
Debaltsevo, surrounding a large number of Ukrainian
the Ukrainians managed to withdraw from the “kettle”
in February 2015.
• Satellite photos, information uploaded to Russian
Special Monitoring Mission, analysis of open-source
information, and warnings from the Ukrainian and
Russian military is digging in, building forward
operating bases between Mariupol and Donetsk,
and turning temporary staging areas on the Russian
side of the border into permanent installations for
invasion preparations.
• At the end of August 2015, Ukraine was seeing
its most violent period since February, and there
explode.
Cargo 200: Calculating Russia’s
War Dead
the return of the bodies of those killed in combat
Afghanistan.
-
ing Russia’s covert war on Ukraine, appeared in late
Ekho Moskvy blogger covered
went to try to reclaim her husband’s body for burial.
• Since then, Novaya GazetaVedomosti,
Pskovskaya Guberniya, Gordonua, InformNapalm
and other independent Russian and Ukrainian
news sites have been tracking reports of Russian
members of the military killed in action.
• In August 2014, Ukrainian bloggers reported that
Russian IDs and logbooks that revealed Russians
-
9
Airborne Troops, known as the VDV. The names of
the men in the logbooks were traced through social
media; some were found to be dead, some taken
prisoner, and some still alive.
three paratroopers from Pskov, they were attacked
and chased away. Lev Shlosberg, a deputy of the
-
sion was missing from their barracks during the inva-
the 76th’s servicemen in the Donbass, which led to a
brutal attack by unknown assailants near his home in
• The Soldiers’ Mothers of St. Petersburg, a group
that has long defended the rights of soldiers and
Dagestan, who were reportedly killed in Ukraine.
The Soldiers’ Mothers attempted to get answers from
the Russian Defense Ministry on these soldiers’ fates
one point, but shortly afterward they were designed
“foreign agents,” even though they had stopped
accepting foreign grants some years prior. They also
tried to work through their members on the Presi-
these and other cases, but in vain.
on social media reports of a soldier from Astrakhan
who was killed in Ukraine. Their equipment was
continued to raise their loved ones’ cases were threatened
with the loss of their deceased family member’s
pensions, and even the loss of their own.
• In May 2015, Putin passed a decree banning the
disclosure of deaths during “special operations”—
meaning the undeclared war in Ukraine. The decree
followed the report of two intrepid Russian bloggers,
Ruslan Leviev and Vadim Korovin, who tracked the
found their graves.
• Putin’s “hybrid” war against Ukraine has been
accompanied by a war on Russian civil society using
some of the same methods of anonymous physical
attacks, threats and intimidation, attempts at cooptation
and outright disinformation.
• In May 2015, colleagues of slain opposition leader
Boris Nemtsov assembled notes he had been
working on at the time of his assassination along
with additional research and published a report
titled Putin.War, which contains information about
Russian contract soldiers, including some from
Ivanovo and Kostroma, killed in Ukraine. But both
relatives and servicemen then went silent, fearful of
retaliation after Nemtsov’s murder.
• The assassination of Nemtsov has proven the
200”: the soldiers, their families, and the provincial
reporters who have tracked them have all been
silenced.
founded by Elena Vasilieva have attempted to verify
these reports. The Interpreter has reviewed these lists
of soldiers’ deaths. In addition, there are about 800
cases of missing soldiers.
• A recent sensational story based on text from an
obscure website that was subsequently removed
claimed that 2,000 families had received compensation
for Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. But the
bloggers Leviev and Korovin, as well as The Interpreter
staff, determined that the story had been faked
is likely high given that 2,000 Ukrainian combatants
are estimated to have been killed, and they have died
in larger numbers than the 10,000 Russian troops
who have invaded their country.
mounting and continues to embarrass the Kremlin.
The extent to which the government has gone to
silence the reporting of such deaths in the social
• So far, by deploying mainly young provincial men
from across Russia’s vast expanses and sending the
wounded to scattered clinics all across the country,
Russian authorities have ensured little attention to
the war losses in Russia.
In the aftermath of Ukraine’s Euromaidan
Revolution, Russia’s military bases on the
green men” took over government buildings, set
up road checkpoints, and surrounded Ukrainian
military installations. There was little doubt even
at the time that these men were Russian soldiers.
Videos show their vehicles exiting Russian military
bases; some of the weapons carried were
only used by the Russian military; and some of
the occupiers even told journalists that they were
Russian soldiers. Yet Russia initially insisted
that these “little green men” were in fact local
residents, part of a legitimate anti-Kiev uprising
prompted by the “fascist coup” that had toppled
the government of former Ukrainian president
Viktor Yanukovych.
Russian president Vladimir Putin only admitted
months later—after those same soldiers
oversaw the illegal and rigged “referendum” to
were members of the Russian military.
new “little green men” captured police stations
and government buildings in special forces–style
raids across eastern Ukraine. These seemingly
elite insurgents distributed the weapons taken
from police armories to small crowds of waiting
supporters before they disappeared, leaving the
newly armed rabble in charge of the earliest
iteration of the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk
“people’s republics,” breakaway provinces
abutting Ukraine’s border with Russia. Also
telling was the composition of the “separatist”
-
percentage of the separatist leadership. Many of
ties to the Russian military and intelligence
establishments. Again, Putin denied the presence
of any Russian soldiers in the Donbass, or the
territory encompassing southeastern Ukraine;
any Russian Federation nationals there were
simply “volunteers,” he insisted.
were differences between this operation and
evidence suggested that the Russian military was
deeply involved—and was in fact the catalyst for
the separatist movement—hard proof of Russian
military involvement was initially hard to come
by. For this operation, one of classic maskirovka
was more careful to ensure that it could preserve
plausible deniability.
This quickly changed in the summer of 2014.
By this time the interim Ukrainian government
in Kiev had shown itself to be stable and inter-
the so-called “Anti-Terrorist Operation”—the
defensive campaign against the separatists,
which was launched in early April—succeeded
by at least stalling the advance of separatism.
In mid-April, the Ukrainian military began
its siege of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, two
the Ukrainian air force was hammering away at
separatist forces in these cities and elsewhere
across the Donbass. By late May, despite Russian
commentators’ predictions, the separatists
had not received an outpouring of local support.
Polls showed that even the idea of separatism
had little support, even in eastern Ukraine1—a
situation that sparked frustration back in Russia.2
As Ukrainian presidential elections approached,
it seemed increasingly likely3 that they would
yield a new leader who would be adamant about
using Ukraine’s armed forces to engage the sep-
scenario did not unfold in the Donbass.4
1 The Interpreter, April 12,
2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/few-in-ukraine-including-in-the-east-support-separatism-or-joining-russia-poll-shows/.
2 The Interpreter, July 29, 2014, http://www.
3
4 Deutsche Welle, August 5, 2014, http://www.
dw.com/en/poroshenko-no-negotiations-with-separatists/a-17619764.
10
Introduction
The faster the rebels ceded terrain to Kiev,
military support for them. By August, evidence
suggests that the vast majority of tanks, artillery,
equipment in separatist hands had been directly
supplied by the Russian military—and that
Russian troops were leading the attack in key
combat areas.
200”—Moscow’s euphemism for the corpses
of their soldiers killed in action—began return-
Donetsk Airport in May 2014, as reported by an
Ekho Moskvy blogger who discovered the story;
a Novaya Gazeta journalist later recounted the
hundreds of accounts of Russian soldiers killed
in the war in Ukraine have surfaced on social
media, despite strenuous efforts by the Russian
government to suppress all the news, using a
mixture of payoffs and threats against bereaved
relatives.
or politician who has tried to investigate and
suffered reprisals ranging from intimidation to
physical attacks to jail time to loss of employment.
Putin has passed a law making it a crime
to discuss those killed during “special opera-
only be safely covered from outside of Russia.
A close examination of direct Russian military
involvement in Ukraine, and of the context within
which the intervention is taking place, makes
it clear that the Russian government is directly
and disunite Ukraine. There would be no war in
the Donbass without Moscow.
11
First Stages of War
in Eastern Ukraine
In an opening salvo that eventually led to the
green men”—armed men of unknown origin or
-
ment buildings and police stations in key areas of the
Donetsk and Lugansk regions. These incidents, which
stretched over a period of weeks, followed similar
patterns. A relatively small team of militants would
descend on the buildings, seemingly unannounced,
and, typically in a matter of minutes, and with impressive
skill and coordination, would gain control
these raids were then distributed to crowds that had
grown outside, and control was quickly turned over
what was called the “Novorossiya,” or “new Russia,”
project—that is, the imperialist aspiration to found an
ethnic Russian country on territory currently consisting
of parts of Moldova and Ukraine.
At the time, there was great debate about what role,
if any, the Russian military and intelligence agencies
had played in this process. Many of the leaders of this
Bes,”
assumed command of his troops, he even told them
that he was a lieutenant colonel in the Russian army.
-
that men who become “reserve servicemen” technically
are not retired, and that while usually “reserved” is
operationally the same as “retired,” in rare cases these
soldiers can be called back into action. The military
-
tions with important armories in towns that are major
crossroads on the Ukrainian highway system has also
intelligence operation.
Furthermore, the separatists were receiving direct
-
former vice chairman of the Russian State Duma
Democratic Party of Russia; Aleksandr Barkashov, the
-
ment; and Aleksandr Dugin, an advisor to Putin and
the chief proponent of “Eurasianism,” a theory that
the geographical expanse between Europe and Asia, of
which Russia is the “heartland,” ought to be the con-
-
eral geopolitics. Indisputably, the Russian government
was supporting the separatist movement politically
Eyebrows were also raised at the frequent appearance
of the Vostok Battalion, a group of seemingly
elite separatist combatants, on the frontlines
of Ukraine’s earliest battles. There are many clues
that suggest that this battalion is a Russian Spetsnaz
special forces group that was disbanded in 2008; this
-
ers, played a key role in the past 15 years in both
“volunteers” to Ukraine to stand up to the “junta” in
Kiev if the Ukrainian military continued its “punitive
operations” in the Donbass. Shortly afterward, men
on Ukraine’s frontlines, but were seen leading the separatists’
largest assaults and taking over the headquarters
of the separatist leadership in Donetsk.1
-
cant force on Ukraine’s borders. These forces, which
12
Ivan Get Your Gun:
Evidence of Russian Military
Equipment in Ukraine
are currently within striking distance of Ukraine’s
southern borders, pose two very real threats to the
Ukrainian government.
First, these large columns of troops could easily
overwhelm Ukraine’s defenders if a traditional invasion
was ordered by the Kremlin. So far, this threat
period of time last August popularly known as the
“Russian invasion.” However, because these forces
grow and shrink at regular intervals consistent with
Russian troop transfers, the threat of direct invasion is
not a constant.
Second, however, the presence of a Russian force
number of Russian troops, armor, and equipment
time to time directly witnessed this phenomenon. The
Ukrainian government also routinely reports that Rus-
Still, from the start of the separatist movement in
there was no hard evidence that linked the Russian
military to the separatist movement in eastern
Ukraine. There was, however, a large and convincing
body of circumstantial evidence that the separatist
-
ported, and perhaps even created by the Kremlin and
its supporters.
Hard evidence of Russian military involvement,
however, would soon make headlines in the Russian
press in the form of reports of bodies returning across
the border.
The First Battle of Donetsk
International Airport
election since Yanukovych violated the compromise
-
called a legitimate election, with more than 60 percent
voter turnout,2 Petro Poroshenko, a confectionary magnate
and former Ukrainian foreign minister who had
run on a platform of restoring peace to the Donbass,
through military operations if necessary, won by a
very large margin and in every region of the country
where polls operated.3 At the same time, the Ukrainian
the heated rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin and the
large amount of Russian troops building on Ukraine’s
border, there might have been optimism that Ukraine
-
ary’s Euromaidan Revolution.
The next morning, however, on May 26, a key symbol
of eastern Ukrainian modernity, the recently reno-
was attacked and its terminals captured by members
of the Vostok Battalion.4
followed was unprecedented.
By the following morning, May 27, more than 30
counterattacked with paratroopers, Su-25 ground-at-
5
journalists soon determined that at least two of the
deceased men were “former” members of the 45th
proving that Russian Spetsnaz were operating in
Ukraine.6
Just one day before the attack on the airport,
members of the Vostok Battalion attended a rally in
Donetsk, where they told reporters that they were
Kadyrovtsy
1
The Interpreter, June 24, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/provocations-proxies-and-plausibledeniability/.
2 Euronews, May 27, 2014, http://www.euronews.com/2014/05/27/oscedeclares-
ukraine-presidential-election-legitimate/.
3 “Extraordinary Elections for the President of Ukraine,” Telegraf, May 27, 2014, http://telegraf.com.ua/ukraina/politika/1300294-
4 The Interpreter, May 26, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraineliveblog-
day-98-poroshenko-wins-majority-of-votes/.
5 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 99: Renewed Fighting Around Donetsk Following Airport Assault,” The Interpreter, May 27, 2014, http://www.
6 The Interpreter, June 19, 2014, http://www.
13
and Russian interests.7 And just days earlier, at the
Semyon Semyonchenko, then commander of the
Ukrainian Donbass Battalion, a volunteer group loyal
to the new government in Kiev, took to Facebook to
ask for reinforcements after his troops were ambushed
in Karlovka, northwest of Donetsk, by a separatist
group using snipers and armed with a BTR-armored
vehicle. According to a report by Semyonchenko,
the Ukrainian force was clearly both surprised and
outmatched: “I’m certain that the terrorists knew the
route of our movement in advance,” he wrote, “since
such a concentration of separatists isn’t usually seen at
8
by Semyonchenko as the Vostok Battalion.
On May 28, the Ukrainian government shot down
a Russian-manufactured Orlan-10 drone.9 The next
Donetsk Regional Administration building, which
had been used as a headquarters for the separatists.
-
and other guns, they dismantled the barricades that
had been in place around the building, and set up their
own, complete with a sign that read “Donbass only with
Russia!” That same day, a Ukrainian military convoy
was attacked in nearby Slavyansk, and an assault was
10
In Slavyansk, the self-proclaimed “people’s mayor”
-
ers who were in control of the city—and who had kid-
-
different “non-Slavic” group operating in this area.11
the Vostok Battalion taking charge on the Donetsk
front, many reached the same conclusion: the Russian
military was assuming control of operations in eastern
Ukraine.
The First Appearance of
“Separatist” Tanks
Ukraine, Russian-backed separatists were in possession
of various armored vehicles. Some of the armor
was captured as these forces attacked military bases
or engaged the Ukrainian military in combat. Others
were captured from military stockpiles and were
restored to working order. The rest came from select
units of Ukrainian soldiers who either defected or
simply surrendered their vehicles.
-
troduction of tanks to the ranks of the Russian-backed
militants starting in mid-June. Main Battle Tanks
Russia of supplying heavy weaponry to the separatist
-
ing statement came from the Ukrainian government.
Ukrainian Interior Minister Arseniy Avakov told
reporters that three T-72 MBTs had crossed the Rus-
The Interpreter had been
geolocated to various towns across eastern Ukraine.12
a statement saying that they believed them to be
were painted was not consistent with that used by the
Ukrainian military, and the vehicles were stripped of
-
border on June 6. Another satellite image from June
11, one day before the tanks appeared in Ukraine,
showed three tanks loaded onto transporters on the
Russian side of the border.13 The following day, June
7 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 99,” The Interpreter.
8 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 95: Another Deadly Ambush Near Donetsk,” The Interpreter, May 23, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-95-another-deadly-ambush-near-donetsk/#2847.
9 The Interpreter, May 30, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-102-has-the-vostok-battalion-taken-charge-in-donetsk/.
10 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 101: Helicopter Shot Down Over Slavyansk,” The Interpreter, May 29, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-101-helicopter-shot-down-over-slavyansk/#2935.
11 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 102,” The Interpreter.
12 “T-64s Appear Between June 12 and June 18,” The Interpreter, https://pressimus.com/Interpreter_Mag/press/9301.
13
14, 2014, http://aco.nato.int/statement-on-russian-main-battle-tanks.aspx.
14
launchers and other military vehicles crossed the [Russian]
border.”14
Before June 12, there was no evidence that tanks
Politikus.ru, which had previously spread disinformation
about the Ukraine crisis, reported on June 9,
report did not offer any details of how these vehicles
place in “the suburbs of Lugansk.”15 There is no other
record of any battle or military operation that corresponds
with the Politikus.ru report, leading to the conclusion
that it was a piece of disinformation planted in
sudden appearance of the T-64s.16
A similar deception was perpetrated a month later
to explain the presence of a Buk anti-aircraft missile
in east Ukraine just before the notorious downing
of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in July. The Buk
is a large, distinctive, and powerful weapon, and its
to draw unwanted attention. On June 29, a little over
-
da, the Russian state television network run by the
defense ministry, reported that the Russian-backed
event. Neither the Ukrainian media, nor pro-separatist
media outlets inside Ukraine, nor social media reports,
nor the Ukrainian government made any mention of
the capture of a Buk. In other words, it appears that
this also may have been a cover story planted by the
Russian Ministry of Defense to explain the presence
of a Buk in separatist hands.17
Oleg Naumenko, a member of Ukraine’s presidential
administration, which is responsible for commu-
Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces, told us during
research for this report that “it is very unlikely that the
the Ukrainian military at this time.” Ukraine admits
that weapons were captured from its arsenal—just not
this particular one.
By June 16, Ukrainian military casualties were
mounting and the Ukrainian government was warning
that an alarming number of Russian troops, armor,
and other weapons were building on its border. At his
76th Pskov Air Assault Division were deploying to
a new base in Millerovo, just 20 kilometers from
Ukraine. Parubiy stated that 16,000 Russian troops
were now positioned inside Russia within striking dis-
another 3,500 positioned in Transnistria, the breakaway
province in northern Moldova on Ukraine’s
southwestern border.
-
loaded to social networks that showed large columns
of Russian military vehicles parked or moving down
Russian highways and roads in the general direction
of the Ukrainian border. Parubiy also estimated that
territory held by the “militants,” around half of whom
-
the Russian Spetsnaz.18
By June 18, the Ukrainian military was reporting
a town north of the city of Lugansk, the Ukrainian
Defense Ministry reported that 15 Ukrainian servicemen
had been killed in battle, and many more
rendered inoperable. Video emerged showing a T-64B
tank captured either at the close of the Schastye battle
or before it.19 The paint on that tank was very different
14 The Interpreter, June 13, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-116-major-government-operation-in-mariupol/.
15 Politikus, June 9, 2014, http://politikus.ru/
16 The Interpreter, June 12, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-115-separatist-forces-using-tanks-in-the-east/#3055.
17 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 150: Malaysian Passenger Jet Shot Down Over Ukraine,” The Interpreter, July 17, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-150-ukrainian-troops-describe-grad-rocket-attack-from-russia/#3384.
18 The Interpreter, June 16, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-119-russia-cuts-gas-deliveries-to-ukraine/#3096.
19 The Interpreter, June 17, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
The
Interpreter,
15
from that on the three tanks discussed earlier, and an
analysis carried out by bloggers indicated it belonged
the Lviv region in western Ukraine. The vehicle’s
sights had been shot out, apparently by a sniper.20
any Ukrainian battle tanks were captured by Russian-
backed forces, but it happened four days after
evidence strongly suggests were in fact supplied by
the Russian military.
claimed that two T-72 MBTs had crossed into the Donetsk
region from Russia—tanks that were not used by
the Ukrainian military.21
the war. The same day, Poroshenko proposed a path
toward a permanent peace, which would start with a
22 Soon, however, the number of
exponentially.
T-64 Battle Tanks Arrive
By late June, multiple T-64s, which evidence suggests
were a combination of tanks captured from the
Ukrainian military and tanks supplied directly by Rus-
But tanks were still a rare sight—although that was
about to change.
On June 20, a large number of T-64s were spotted
on various roads in territory controlled by the Rus-
via a road leading toward the Russian border].23 An
analysis of these vehicles shows that they were missing
unit markings and were painted in a different cam-
military.24
-
Ukraine’s southeastern border in the Rostov region of
Russia, and the nearby Ukrainian border checkpoint
25 At a U.S.
Jennifer Psaki told reporters that the United States was
border.26
On June 20, military prospects looked stark.
Ukraine’s ATO was retaking territory in the western
theater, but Kiev was rapidly losing control of its
borders. Facing a new injection of Russian equipment,
15-point roadmap to peace. The plan called for the
weapons by illegal combatants, who would receive
Russia border, which would allow Russian troops and
mercenaries to retreat; and initial steps toward the
establishment of more autonomous local government
in the Donbass.27
Though the ATO’s formerly rapid advance came to
a halt, no peace came to Ukraine. Just four days later,
on June 24, the Ukrainian military reported that it had
earlier, which became a major hub in the movement
of Russian soldiers and armored vehicles across the
border. A Ukrainian military helicopter was also shot
down near Slavyansk.28
Notwithstanding heavy losses and the loss of
ground in areas including the border, the ATO contin-
near Slavyansk, the Ukrainian military claimed that
it had captured two T-64 tanks. According to ATO
spokesperson Andriy Lysenko, both tanks were Russian
in origin.29
Despite Ukrainian advances in most areas, armored
vehicles and tanks—and soon advanced anti-aircraft
20 The Interpreter, https://pressimus.com/Interpreter_Mag/stream/1827.
21 UNIAN, June 18, 2014, http://www.unian.net/
politics/930087-terroristyi-peregnali-k-donetsku-dva-rossiyskih-tanka-t-72-spiker-snbo.html.
22 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 121,” The Interpreter.
23 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 123: Russian Tanks Advance Through Ukraine,” The Interpreter, June 20, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-123-for-diplomats-and-doubters-a-ministers-picture-of-a-russian-tank/.
24 The Interpreter, https://pressimus.com/Interpreter_Mag/press/9558.
25 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 123,” The Interpreter.
26
htm#UKRAINE.
27 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 123,” The Interpreter.
28 The Interpreter, June 24, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-127-ukrainian-control-over-border-weakening/.
16
-
ing frequency. On June 30, the Wall Street Journal
reported that sightings of large convoys of heavy tanks
and armored vehicles moving toward the frontlines
had become common.30 If the separatists were not
winning large battles in which they could capture
Ukrainian materiel, then where were they getting their
T-64s would go from rare to commonplace to ubiquitous.
By mid-August, nearly every video of military
report would contain frequent sightings of these tanks.
Oleg Naumenko, a member of Ukraine’s presidential
administration, explained to us that the T-64 is the
main battle tank used by the Ukrainian military, given
that the Malyshev factory, located in Kharkiv, produces
this model; full-cycle production of T-64s, including
its various elements, is carried out in Ukraine; and
Naumenko also told us that it appeared that the
that were “de-preserved at Russian military bases
and moved across the border to aid Russia-backed
militants,” or that some of the earliest tanks that had
arrived were Ukrainian but had been captured in
T-64s were initially spotted. As Naumenko explained,
both towns where these tanks were spotted early in
Ukrainians, what’s the point of moving them from
likely that they were spotted on the half-way [point]
from Russia to the frontline.”
Moscow Deploys Advanced
Anti-Aircraft Systems to Protect
Assets in Ukraine
Starting in mid- to late May it became clear to Moscow
that its efforts in eastern Ukraine were not enough
establishing pseudo-independent “republics” in southeastern
Ukraine, perhaps with the ultimate intention of
peninsula. The Ukrainian military was ramping up the
ATO and retaking territory; elections were moving
ahead with little controversy; the international community
was questioning the legitimacy of the separatists,
not the government in Kiev; and widespread
support for the separatist movement was failing to
quickly, Ukraine could regain control of the Donbass.
It was during this period that direct Russian military
support for the separatists escalated.
But if the Kremlin was going to send its own tanks,
advanced weaponry, and even soldiers into Ukraine, it
would need to protect them from an obvious vulnerability—
air attack. The May 26 battle at Donetsk
Airport, Ukrainian airstrikes against targets in and
sorties demonstrated the effectiveness of Ukrainian air
power. But Russia could hardly dispatch its own air
force, lest its plausible deniability of interfering in the
country go up in smoke. The only alternative was to
-
vehicle-borne systems.
Starting in May, Ukrainian military aircraft began
slower moving than cargo planes or attack jets. MAN-
all played roles in the downing of these aircraft.
Some of the MANPADS that the Russian-backed
from Russian military stockpiles. As Armaments
has noted:
Soviet-era 9K38 Igla MANPADS... are the most
common model in the Ukrainian government
arsenal, and appear to be the most common
MANPADS in the hands of pro-Russian
separatists. ARES has previously documented
29 The Interpreter, June 27,
base/#3206.
30 Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/
52702304344504580000620269860354.html.
17
the 9K38 system, which was recovered from
forces. Photos of the crate show paperwork
indicating that it was previously stockpiled in
a Russian military facility in Yeysk, Russia, with
inventory markings indicating it was in storage
there as recently as 12 April 2014.
Another MANPADS seen in use with separatist
forces is the Soviet 9K32 Strela-2... This legacy
system is no longer in active service with the
Ukrainian military, and is an early generation
system, with only a limited capability to
engage Ukrainian Air Force aircraft. Both 9K38
Igla and 9K32 Strela-2 MANPADS are known
to have been in the Ukrainian government
arsenal, and previous reports indicate that
some stocks of MANPADS went missing early
MANPADS have been captured from pro-Rus-
‘thunder’) is a Polish-designed MANPADS
drawing its design cues from the Soviet 9K38
missiles were largely identical to the 9K38,
the system has continued to be improved
pictured in Ukraine [have been seen]... The
Russian-made 9P516 gripstock, designed for
the 9K38. Markings on the missile launch tube
indicate it was produced in 2007. One of the
-
in 2007. Russian forces are known to have
captured some of these.31
MANPADS are easier to hide and transport than
vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft systems, so it is hard
to conclude when these weapons were added to
the separatists’ arsenal. It is certainly plausible, for
instance, that at least some of the 9K38 Igla systems
Ukrainian military positions and stockpiles and were
other times.
However, soon the separatist arsenal would swell
with the addition of large and sophisticated anti-aircraft
weapons that are much harder to obscure, and the
provenance of which is less easily explainable.
Sophisticated Surface-to-Air
Missile Systems Appear on the
Streets of Lugansk and Russian
Troops Build on the Border
On July 1, 2014, Poroshenko announced the end of
extension of the original truce by another three days,
way. As far as the Ukrainian government was concerned,
the separatists represented an illegal insurgency,
and if they were unwilling to sue for peace, then it
another solution to the crisis. Furthermore, there was
serious concern that the Russian military was taking
the separatist positions.32
The decision made sense. The reality was that the
Russian military was ramping up its support of the
on the other hand, although it was quickly winning
victories in areas where it was on the offensive, was
rapidly losing territory where it was on the defensive—
at the border. The common belief presented by
military analysts such as Dmytro Tymchuk, a former
member of Ukraine’s military and a well-known military
analyst close to the Poroshenko government, was
that the Ukrainian military could retake most or all of
the country rapidly if it pressed the advance. The truce
was only weakening the country.33
After consulting with his national security team
and military advisors, Poroshenko announced that the
-
diately sprang into action. By the end of the day on
armor near both Lugansk and Donetsk. On the western
31
Ukraine
32 The Interpreter, July 1, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-134-poroshenko-vows-to-attack-and-defend-our-land/#3227.
33 New York Times, July 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
18
front, the ATO’s sights appear to have been locked
on Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, northwest of Donetsk.
Ukrainian troops pushed the assault.
But there was already a feeling of foreboding. The
Russian government was making unusually heated
-
cated that it viewed the renewed ATO as completely
unacceptable. Furthermore, Andrei Babitsky, a
journalist for Radio Svoboda
into the civilian populace of the city if Ukraine were
to try to capture it: “Kiev has two opportunities,” the
to the reaction of the world community, which will be
sharply negative due to the massive loss of the civilian
population. The second will provoke opposition inside
the country. No matter what Poroshenko chooses, this
war will become his grave.”34
By the morning of July 2, 2014, the Ukrainian gov-
and broader wave of the ATO, which had attacked
over 100 separatist positions in a single day. Poroshenko
also sent a signal that he was willing to negotiate a
the return of the control of the border from Russia
would be prerequisites for any deal. Meanwhile, the
Ukrainian Border Service was warning that new Russian
troops and armored vehicles had been spotted at
the border and a new anti-aircraft system was discovered
on the streets of Lugansk, one that would be an
omen of things to come—the 9K35 Strela-10.35
34 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 134,” The Interpreter.
35 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 135: New Ukraine Offensive Yielding Results,” The Interpreter, July 2, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-135-new-ukraine-offensive-yielding-results.
9K35 Strela-10 surfaceto-
air missile system on
parade during Victory Day
celebrations in separatist-held
Lugansk on May 9, 2015.
Photo: Taras Dudnik / TASS
19
missile launcher mounted to the top of the chassis of
the MT-LB tracked armored vehicle. It is capable of
operating either alone, without the integration of a sophisticated
radar network, or in conjunction with other
anti-aircraft and radar systems. It is also designed
kilometers per hour- and typically equipped with a
7.62-millimeter caliber machine gun, the Strela-10 is
ideal for armed convoy travel in combat.
As ARES noted, the presence of the Strela-10 in the
-
ous improvement in their capability to engage aircraft.
Their greater range and capability has contributed to
the loss of several aircraft in Ukraine.”36 Additionally,
the Ukrainian and Russian militaries both carry
the Strela-10 in their arsenals, and Russian-backed
Ukrainians. However, there is evidence that this system,
which appeared in early July, had been imported
from Russia.
Video of Strela-10 indicates that it was part of a
large military convoy that passed through Lugansk on
July 2. The road on which the convoy was traveling
is well known to Ukraine watchers because just two
weeks later, on July 17, the Buk anti-aircraft system
that almost certainly shot down MH17 was spotted
moving in the opposite direction—back toward the
Russian border—minus one missile from its launcher.
The road on which it was seen lies through territory
on to Krasnodon and multiple border crossings.37
The vehicles in the convoy spotted on July 2, and
another convoy containing a Strela-10 that was spotted
on July 5,38
scheme that has come to be associated with many
of the armored vehicles used by the Russian-backed
-
tem.
Oleg Naumenko also expressed doubt that any
Strela-10 weapons systems were captured from the
Ukrainian military. As he told us, the “Ukrainian
Army has such guns, but it is very unlikely that Rus-
servicemen. [The] Ukrainian Army was on the offensive
and it would be illogical to have Strela-10 in the
vanguard. On the other hand, militants were interested
in having Strela-10 as the means of air defense against
Ukrainian military aviation. As you remember, a number
of Ukrainian airplanes were taken down by the
militants last summer.”
Furthermore, Naumenko said, the idea that Rus-
state-of-the-art weaponry without the technical assistance,
if not leadership, of professional soldiers simply
beggars belief.
“It’s evident that Russian troops remain in eastern
Ukraine and play the leading role in coordinating and
directing militant actions,” he observed. “Back then,
these were mainly Russian intelligence and Special
-
gically important areas with a lightning speed and then
act behind the militants.”
Soon after, observers such as ARES noted the
appearance of surface-to-air missile systems like the
most well-known and tragic incident involving the
use of an SAM is the downing of a civilian commercial
plane, MH17, by yet another model anti-aircraft
system, the Buk.39
The following Ukrainian aircraft were shot down in
summer 2014:
May—four aircraft, all helicopters
May 2: Two Mil Mi-24P Hind attack helicopters
were shot down by MANPADS near Slavyansk on
the same day a Mil Mi-8MT transport helicopter was
40
June 6: An Antonov-30 aerial cartography aircraft
was shot down near Drobyshevo, north of Slavyansk
and to the northwest of Donetsk. Video footage
36 Raising Red Flags, 76.
37 The Interpreter, https://pressimus.com/interpreter_mag/
stream/1798.
38 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 143: Ukraine Prepares to Move on Donetsk,” The Interpreter, July 10, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-143-ukraine-prepares-to-move-on-donetsk/#3314.
39 Daily Beast, July 17, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2015/07/17/how-we-know-russia-shot-down-mh17.html.
40
20
a heat-seeking weapon, likely a MANPADS, as the
source of the attack.41
June 14: An Ilyushin 76MD strategic air-lifter
Lugansk, killing 40 soldiers and 9 crewmembers.
Initial reports from the Ukrainian military indicate
that three “stinger-like” heat-seeking missiles took
down the aircraft as it began its descent into Lugansk
Airport.42
Ukrainian government, the aircraft was hit by an 9K39
it tried to land.43
civilian airliner
July 14: An Antonov An-26 transport aircraft
southeastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian government says
the time that it was hit by a missile.44 The maximum
range for an Igla is 3,500 meters, with other MANPADS
having similar ranges. The Ukrainian military
spokesperson Andriy Lysenko said that the missile
that hit the An-26 was either a more sophisticated
“the An-26 was struck by other, more powerful weapons,
probably from Russian territory.” One theory he
from a Pantsir-S1, a truck-mounted advanced medium-
range anti-aircraft system that is also equipped
with heavy anti-aircraft artillery, making it an effective
weapon for operation near the frontlines.45 The Pantsir
entered Russian service in 2007 and has never been
exported to Ukraine. There are two geolocatable sightings
of Pantsirs in Ukraine: a photo, taken in January
201546 in separatist-held Makeyevka, east of Donetsk,
47
Another theory quickly emerged when a pro-Kremlin
Russian news outlet, Vzglyad.ru, wrote that the An-26
48 The Buk is the same
missile that shot down MH17 just three days later.
down near the Russian border close to Amvrosiyivka,
southeast of Ilovaisk. In a detailed report released on
July 18, the Ukrainian government claimed that this
Russian side of the border. “To destroy the target, the
command of the Russian Air Force ordered the pilot
medium range Infra Red homing air-to-air missile,”
said ATO spokesperson Andriy Lysenko. “This type
of missile cannot be detected by the Su-25’s SPO-15
radiation warning receiver, and neither can it be detected
by satellite surveillance systems or post-launch
surveillance systems.”49
MH17 was shot down. An overwhelming body of
evidence compiled by our team and published in The
Interpreter and the Daily Beast indicate that a Buk
anti-aircraft missile in the hands of Russian-backed
-
took it for a Ukrainian military transport plane. Strong
evidence suggests that the weapon traveled from
Russia the morning of the incident, and video footage
from after the incident shows a Buk missing a missile
in Lugansk on the road that leads to the Russian border.
For details, read our comprehensive report on the
Daily Beast.50
July 23: Two Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft were shot down
over Shakhtarsk, east of Donetsk. An aide for Alexander
Borodai, leader of the Russian-backed separatists,
claimed that these jets were both shot down by shoul-
military told reporters that both jets were shot down
41 The Interpreter, June 6, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
42
43
44
45 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 147: Ukrainian Forces Retake Several Villages Around Lugansk,” The Interpreter, July 14, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-147-ukrainian-forces-retake-several-villages-around-lugansk/#3334.
46
47
48 The Interpreter, July 27, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/evidence-of-separatists-possession-of-buk-system-before-downing-of-mh17/.
49
50
21
meters.51
at 5,200 feet. The source of the discrepancy is not
clear; perhaps both altitudes are correct, since there
were two planes shot down. Both altitudes given by
the Ukrainian military are too high for MANPADS to
have been involved—a more sophisticated anti-aircraft
weapons system would have been required.52
down near Yenakievo, northeast of Donetsk. The
aircraft exploded in mid-air.53 Video footage shows a
-
porting this theory. According to Ukrainska Pravda,
the Ukrainian military said that the probable culprit
was a Buk, the same missile that shot down MH17.54
infrared heat-seeking technology to target an aircraft’s
engines, a Buk uses a radar-proximity fuse that explodes
when it is close to the aircraft, ripping the aircraft
apart. Yenakievo is between the MH17 crash site
the disputed eastern edge of the self-declared Donetsk
People’s Republic.
down, this time near Lugansk.
August 20: A Sukhoi Su-24M bomber was shot
down near Lugansk.
August 29: A Sukhoi Su-25M1 was shot down near
Starbeshevo, southeast of Donetsk. The Ukrainian
military said that a Russian anti-aircraft missile was
responsible. A video of the wreckage taken by the
Russian TV outlet Lifenews, which has close ties
to the Russian military and intelligence apparatus,
shows debris from the plane scattered across a fairly
large area and suggests that the plane crashed near a
of destroyed tanks and armored vehicles.55 Pictures
posted on another website also reportedly show the
wreckage.56 To our knowledge, this wreckage has not
put forth by separatists that four Su-25s were shot
down that day.57
Several other aircraft were damaged in the summer
of 2014 but did not crash, and still others were
destroyed while on the ground. In particular, on July
2, 2014, an Su-24M bomber was damaged when one
by MANPADS, but the aircraft managed to return to
base.58
By the end of August, the Ukrainian military had
effectively grounded its aircraft because of an inability
to counter enemy deterrence efforts.
Russian Military Shells Ukraine
from Russia
One of the most compelling and earliest pieces
of evidence that the Russian military was directly
that Ukrainian troops were being shelled from positions
inside the Russian Federation.
On July 16, 2014, one day before MH17 was shot
down, a series of videos emerged that claimed to show
rockets, which have a maximum range of 20 kilometers,
are known to be fairly inaccurate, effective at
blanketing an area with artillery shells but incapable
-
sian residents of the Rostov region just on the other
side of the border. By triangulating different camera
angles, The Interpreter was able to conclusively deter-
positions inside Russian territory.59
The next day, video emerged of 15 injured
Ukrainian soldiers from the 72nd Border Brigade be-
51
52
com/2014/07/23/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html.
53
54 The Interpreter, August 7, 2014, http://
www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-171-barricades-burn-once-again-as-authorities-try-to-clear-maidan/#3694.
55 “Burned Tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the Fields Near the APU Starobeshevo—Exclusive Footage,” Lifenews.ru, September 3,
2014, http://lifenews.ru/news/139701.
56 “Downed in Starobeshevo August 29 Su-25M1,” Militarizm
57
58
22
ing treated in a hospital in Russia—in the same town
60 Furthermore, the
position where these soldiers were hit by the rockets
matches the estimated trajectory of the rockets captured
by video taken the day before.61
This was not only unmistakable evidence of
a sign of continued escalation. For weeks our team
had been warning that despite the relative absence of
media coverage, the Russian military was ramping up
to explode. Little, of course, did we know that the
next day a civilian airliner would be shot down and
Ukraine would once again be front-page international
news.
The prime targets of the July attacks were
Ukrainian forces in a narrow strip of land along the
border with Russia known as Sector D.62 After June
4, 2014, when Russian-backed forces took control of
Sverdlovsk, in the Lugansk region, Ukrainian control
D ran from this area along approximately 120 kilometers
of the border of both the Lugansk and the Donetsk
regions.
the north and the west, and the intervention of Russian
artillery on the other side of the border, the defenders
of Sector D were left devastated, leading to the collapse
of the pocket and the abandonment of the border.
One of the earliest and deadliest incidents of
cross-border shelling took place on July 11.63 That
night, a Ukrainian military camp near the village of
59 Foreign Policy, July 17, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.
60 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 150,” The Interpreter.
61 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 150,” The Interpreter.
62 Pierre Vaux, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Russian Border, Leaving 100 Kilometers Open to Invasion,” Daily Beast, August 12, 2014,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/12/ukrainian-troops-retreat-from-russian-border-leaving-100-kilometers-defenselessagainst-
invasion.html.
63 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 144: 30 Ukrainian Soldiers Killed Near Russia’s Border,” The Interpreter, July 11, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-144-30-ukrainian-soldiers-killed-near-russias-border/#3318.
Russian T-72BM tank near
Makeyevka, just east of
Donetsk, on August 23, 2014.
Photo: Sergei Grits / AP Photo
23
152-millimeter artillery.
Brigade, wrote that prior to the attack the base was
regarded as a safe location, a place for soldiers to rest
and reload away from the frontline to the north. He
described the attack as follows:
Caught by surprise. Mike arrived at 4:15 and
literally 10 minutes after they stopped, huge
blasts rolled out across the whole perimeter
“wild boars.” And, after all that, the ammo
began spewing up for 4–6 hours, and shrapnel
-
ple (who survived) lay under their vehicles...
site had never been shelled before, and the
people who lived there, due to the circumstances,
had simply let their guard down... And
this was not a battle outside Zelyonopolye,
as the media reported[;] this was prepared
in advance, a precisely rehearsed, massive
and successful artillery bombardment of our
soldiers’ base on [the] borders of the Lugansk
region from the Russian side. In other words,
a knife in the back, cowardly and treacherous,
knowing that we would not respond, destroying
a host of lads and even more scorched
vehicles. Most have developed psychological
64
Twenty-three Ukrainian soldiers were killed,65
satellite images taken on August 4, 2014, clearly show
craters, wreckage, and scorched earth at the site of the
-
imagery reveals more than 50 possible launch sites
Sector D, even calculating possible trajectories for the
-
gle satellite images.66
only a portion of the total number of actual attacks,
the scale of the cross-border shelling last summer is
64 The Interpreter, July 16, 2015, http://
65 Ukrainska Pravda, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/07/11/7031672/.
66 Map
Investigations, updated July 16, 2015, http://mapinvestigation.blogspot.co.uk/.
Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces in Sector D in July 2014,
24
clearly immense.
This intervention would have a decisive effect on
the course of the war. After 22 days of being pounded
with artillery from all sides in the shrinking pocket of
their way back to the west to link up with troops advancing
from the strategic heights of Saur-Mogila on
August 6,67 suffering heavy losses along the way.
Over 100 kilometers of the border with Russia
now lay outside Ukrainian control, allowing Russian
forces to cross the frontier with neither resistance nor
scrutiny.
The T-72 Main Battle Tank in
Separatist Hands
At the start of the ATO, the Ukrainian military
made the decision to keep T-72 MBTs in reserve west
of Kiev, near Lviv. Oleg Naumenko of Ukraine’s
presidential administration explained this decision to
The Interpreter:
T-72 tanks were designed and are still produced
by the state-owned UralVagonZavod
been the most widely serially produced battle
tank in the Soviet Union. It is worth mentioning
that UralVagonZavod was included in the
U.S. sanctions list as one of the key enterprises
in Russia’s military-industrial complex and
due to explicit support of the company’s top
management of the Kremlin’s expansionist
policy in Ukraine.68
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine
inherited around 1,000 T-72B tanks. However,
the new government opted to use T-64
tanks as the main battle tank of the Ukrainian
Army. There were several reasons for such a
decision:
• Ukraine has a powerful Malyshev factory in
Kharkiv that produces T-64s.
• Ukraine has a full-cycle production of T-64s
[in place], producing bodies, gun turrets, cannons,
transmissions, reactive armor and other
elements of the tank.
Meanwhile, T-72Bs were gradually replaced
with other models. They were either transported
to military preservation warehouses or
reequipped to be exported elsewhere. Over
the 23-year period of Ukrainian independence,
most Ukrainian T-72 tanks were sold abroad.
At the beginning of the Anti-Terrorist Operation
in April 2014, Ukraine possessed between
200 and 300 T-72B tanks.
Naumenko’s statement corresponds to observations
by a number of reporters and military experts.
An ARES report, published in November 2014,69
notes that no Ukrainian T-72 was ever documented as
having taken part in the ATO. In the last few months,
controlled by the Ukrainian government between Mariupol
and Donetsk, widely considered to be a major
Naumenko explains:
Due to intense military action in the east of
the country, some of [the] T-72[s] were put
back in service. We should bear in mind that
the process of de-preservation takes a lot
of time because it is necessary to conduct
-
quirements. Currently, [the] Ukrainian armed
50 T-72B tanks, which were transferred since
late 2014. Nevertheless, [the] T-64 model
dominant tank in the Ukrainian Army. On the
other hand, leaders of the so-called “DPR” and
new T-72 battle tanks supplied by Russia. Their
Ukrainian armed forces does not stand up to
criticism. Firstly, there is no information about
captured Ukrainian T-72s. Secondly, Russia-
backed militants started to get new T-72s
in the summer of 2014 when the Ukrainian
Army did not have a single combat-ready T-72.
Thirdly, the so-called “DPR” and “LPR” use
-
67 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 172: Ukrainian Forces Break Out of Encirclement but Leave Border Vulnerable,” The Interpreter, August 8, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-172-ukrainian-forces-break-out-of-encirclement-but-leave-border-vulnerable.
68
69 Raising Red Flags.
25
tion Armed Forces since 2012. Ukraine never
Ukrainian armed forces operate such tanks.
These comments also match the assessment of
many arms experts. As ARES noted, some of the T-72s
Model 1989 and the T-72B3—are not used by Ukraine
and were never exported by the Russian military.
Therefore, these vehicles can only have come from
Russia—but not lawfully, as Russia does not export
the T-72 Model 1989 to foreign countries. Moreover,
as ARES noted:
The T-72BA and T-72B3 variants have also
been employed by separatists, with the
presence of the T-72B3 being particularly
noteworthy. With Kontakt-5 ERA, an upgraded
modern thermal sight, the T-72B3 represents
the latest T-72 model in Russian service. It
was introduced in 2013, and is not known to
have been exported. One video uploaded by
separatists shows a T-72B3 they claim to have
Such an example may illustrate the frequency
with which materiel appears to change
Igor Sutyagin, a senior research fellow at the
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), has also
are in service in the Ukrainian military.70
crossing.71 On August 18, the Vostok Battalion was
documented as possessing a T-72 tank in Yasinovataya,
north of Donetsk.72 Ukrainian colonel Evgeniy
Sidorenko, head of tank forces for Sector B of the
weapon, in Ilovaisk. He personally worked to repair
cauldron, which caught so many Ukrainian soldiers in
a death trap.73
However, one video uploaded on August 26, at
the height of the “Russian Invasion,” discussed later,
perhaps deserves the most attention. Released as
journalists issued reports of Russian military convoys
this video showed a large and powerful convoy in
Sverdlovsk, headed toward Lugansk. The convoy
included:74
• Four amphibious auxiliary vehicles, two equipped
• Four T-72 battle tanks—three T-72B1s and one
T-72BM or B3, the latter of which is exclusively
used by the Russian military
-
that have been spotted, with nearly exactly the
same tarps, on both sides of the border75
• A 9K35 Strela-10 anti-aircraft missile system
while few T-72s had thus far been documented, four
were spotted within the same convoy. Second, one
of them was of a T-72 variant that could not have
come from the Ukrainian military, with the only
other supplier that makes any sense being Russian.
Third, the inclusion of multiple types of vehicles,
including anti-aircraft weapons, may indicate that this
to protect itself from air strikes as it traveled to the
frontlines. SAM systems are usually placed toward
the front or rear of convoys, with a gap behind them to
allow other vehicles to stay clear of missile exhaust. In
Strela and the following BMP-2.
Soon afterward, the presence of the T-72 on the
than the exception, as did sightings of the Strela-10,
70 Raising Red Flags.
71 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 164: Rada Rejects Yatsenyuk Resignation,” The Interpreter, July 31, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-164-rada-rejects-yatsenyuk-resignation/#3608.
72 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 182: Russian Aid to Enter Ukraine with Kiev’s Approval,” The Interpreter, August 18, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-182-russian-aid-to-enter-ukraine-with-kievs-approval/#3851.
73 BurkoNews, September 14, 2014,
https://burkonews.info/story-colonel-evgeniy-sidorenko-broke-ilovaisk-russian-t-72-tank/.
74 The Interpreter, August 26, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-190-russian-paratroopers-captured-in-ukraine/#3968.
75 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 182,” The Interpreter.
26
T-64s, and other Russian armored vehicles that were
once rarely documented.
Ukraine Advances in the West,
Russia Attacks from the East
On July 27, Ukrainian forces made strategically
hub in the east of the Donetsk region, and moving
south into Shakhtyorsk, around 50 kilometers east of
Donetsk. The capture of Debaltsevo seriously disrupted
the steady stream of Russian armor, which had
been moving into Donetsk from the border town of
Krasnodon along the M-04 highway via Lugansk and
Debaltsevo.
An alternative highway route76 from Lugansk to
Donetsk lay to the south, running via Krasny Luch and
this supply line, all evidence suggests that Russia took
decisive action, sending armored forces to prevent
the fall of Shakhtyorsk. Video footage, shot that very
same day, on July 27, shows a large mixed column,
consisting of Strela-10 SAMs, BMP-2s, armored
personnel carriers, artillery, and buses carrying troops,
moving through Rovenki77 and Krasny Luch.78
28,79
footage look like paramilitaries in ragtag uniforms,
one soldier stands out. He is equipped with modern
combat gear very much akin to that worn by the “little
weapon that only entered Russian military service in
2013. The U.S. Department of Defense announced in
a statement released on July 2880 that a column of over
100 Russian military vehicles had been seen moving
into Ukraine.
Russia’s military intervention in Shakhtyorsk
severe casualties. On the evening of July 31, at least
21 Ukrainian soldiers were killed and several captured
in an ambush near the town.81
By August 2, it was clear that Ukrainian attempts to
stop the movement of Russian forces toward Donetsk
by the route south of Debaltsevo had failed, as a large
82
kilometers northwest of Shakhtyorsk.
Several days later, Ukrainian forces began an attempt
to push into this belt of separatist-held territory
from the other side, mounting an unsuccessful assault
on the town of Ilovaisk, southwest of Shakhtyorsk.
-
mous settlement on August 19,83 but in the intervening
-
retaking suburbs84 of both85 separatist “capitals,” it had
been forced to withdraw from Sector D on August 6,
leaving a vast swathe of the border open to Russian
invasion.86
76 The Interpreter, July 27, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
77
78
79
80
Article/602959.
81 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 165: 21 Ukrainian Soldiers Reported Dead in Ambush in Shakhtyorsk,” The Interpreter, August 1, 2014, http://
www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-165-21-ukrainian-soldiers-reported-dead-in-ambush-in-shakhtyorsk/; “Ukraine Liveblog
Day 164: Rada Rejects Yatsenyuk Resignation,” The Interpreter, July 31, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-164-
rada-rejects-yatsenyuk-resignation/#3616.
82 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 166: Ukraine’s Borders Are Attacked Overnight,” The Interpreter, August 2, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-166-ukraines-borders-are-attacked-overnight/#3638.
83 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 183: Ukraine Fights to Retake Ilovaisk,” The Interpreter, August 19, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
84 The Interpreter, August 7, 2014, http://
www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-171-barricades-burn-once-again-as-authorities-try-to-clear-maidan/#3689.
85 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 180: The Battle for Lugansk Begins,” The Interpreter, August 16, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraineliveblog-
day-180-the-battle-for-lugansk-begins/#3831.
86 Pierre Vaux, “Ukrainian Troops Retreat from Russian Border, Leaving 100 Kilometers Open to Invasion,” Daily Beast, August 12, 2014,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/12/ukrainian-troops-retreat-from-russian-border-leaving-100-kilometers-defenselessagainst-
invasion.html.
27
entered Russian service in 2013 and have never,
according to RUSI’s military expert Igor, been in the
87
-
were entering a trap.
As Ukrainian troops, led by the Donbass volunteer
-
slawsky88—and wounding four, including the Donbass
Battalion’s commander, Semyon Semyonchenko.
The death toll grew the next day, as Ukraine reported
enemy reinforcements entering the town from
the north. Meanwhile, Russian-backed forces pressed
against Ukrainian positions on Saur-Mogila to the
east,89 pouring in through the abandoned expanse of
Ilovaisk, recounted later that the government forces
lacked strength to defend their rear, with “nothing to
cover the Starobeshevo-Kuteynikova area.”90
By August 24, Sidorenko said, troops in Ilovaisk
Homchak, who was commanding the Ukrainian operation
in Ilovaisk, requested permission to withdraw, the
place. As pro-Russian forces moved in from the south-
were forced to withdraw. At around 4 p.m. that afternoon,
Sidorenko’s reconnaissance group moved south
along the road out of Ilovaisk toward Kuteynikova,
where Ukrainian troops had previously fought off an
attack. Judging by the vehicles Sidorenko claimed
to have seen destroyed, which included a BMD, an
forces, these soldiers were Russian paratroopers. Ten
Russian paratroopers were in fact captured within 24
2 kilometers southwest of Kuteynikova and halfway
87 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 180,” The Interpreter.
88 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 183: Ukraine Fights to Retake Ilovaisk,” The Interpreter, August 19, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
89 The Interpreter, August 20, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
90 BurkoNews.
Separatist paramilitary police
of Shakhtyorsk on July 28, 2014.
Photo: Zurab Dzhavakhadze / TASS
28
between Ilovaisk and the Russian border.91
These troops, from the 98th Airborne Division
based in Kostroma, were exhibited by the Ukrainian
government as proof of direct Russian military intervention
in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense
even admitted at the time that these men were active
members of the Russian armed forces but claimed, incredibly,
that they had become “lost” while patrolling
the border and wandered accidentally into Ukraine.92
Sidorenko described another battle later on the
night of August 24, during which a Russian T-72B3
was captured, as follows:
-
heavy artillery with the help of [unmanned
-
and transport, and soldiers died. Nevertheless,
our battle group with the help of a BMP
disabled a Russian tank. I was not a participant
to inspect the trophy. The tank crew left the
vehicle and ran away together with other
Russian armored vehicles.
I climbed into the tank and found that it [was]
which entered service in 2012. The main mod-
the commander and the gunner. The sights on
a small repair it was possible to use them,
although the thermal sight and gun vertical
was fully functional.
According to documents the tank belonged to
the military section of the Russian Federation No.
as Rashitov A.R., and the tank commander as Sergeant
and personally drove it to our position.
captured a T-72B3 thanks to a photograph93 taken
during the battle for the town by Maks Levin of the
Ukrainian news site Leviy Bereg.94
similar incident, would explain the origin of a T-72B3
showed to a Russian state television crew.95 The tank,
which was described as a trophy taken in battle with
the Ukrainians, bore the white stripes associated with
government forces operating in the Donbass, just like
the one photographed by Levin. As if to insinuate that
the separatists also took the cameramen inside the
tank to show them the French-manufactured Thales
T-72B3, which only entered Russian military service
in 2013 as part of the SOSNA-U thermal imaging
system described by Sidorenko. The T-72B3 has never
been exported outside of Russia.
Back in Ilovaisk, the situation was about to deteriorate
much further. On August 25, Ukrainian troops
were forced to withdraw from Starobeshevo, around
23 kilometers southeast of Ilovaisk, allowing the
Russians to encircle the town. After a battle outside
grenades to blow themselves up, along with 12 Russian
paratroopers, to avoid capture.96 During another
to have encountered dead and wounded soldiers from
Russia’s 31st Air Assault Brigade.
Russian troops moving to link up with Donetsk from
the southeast, Russia opened a new front, attacking the
coast, about 70 kilometers south of Starobeshevo.97
91 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 190,” The Interpreter.
92 TASS, August 26, 2014, http://tass.ru/en/world/746663.
93 http://i.lb.ua/024/19/5404c84f32948.jpeg.
94 LB.ua, September 1, 2014, http://society.lb.ua/life/2014/09/01/277952_ilovaysk_hronika_
vtechi.html.
95 The Interpreter, September
status-bill/#4270.
96 The Interpreter, August 29, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-193-putin-appeals-to-militia-of-novorossiya/#4021; Nolan Peterson, “How a Swedish Sniper Found
Daily Signal
97 The Interpreter, August 25, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukrainian-liveblog-day-189-is-there-a-russian-invasion/#3934.
29
That Russian forces, rather than the Kremlin’s sepa-
Sea, is clear not only from the vast distance between
this site and the remainder of the frontline—the attack
came from across the border—but also from sightings
of Russian personnel and military equipment in the
98 By August 26, Ukrainian forces
99
Russian troops began to spread southward from
Ilovaisk, with villagers in Kolosky, about 26 kilometers
south of the besieged town, telling Reuters report-
had arrived, along with 38 armored personnel carriers
and other military vehicles.100
resident of Kolosky, said that some of the men were
with villagers for homemade preserved fruits and vegetables.
He said the writing on the ration packs was
Russian, not Ukrainian, and added that the soldiers
had painted over identifying marks on their military
vehicles with white circles. Furthermore, he reported,
when residents approached their checkpoint and asked
if they were allowed to travel onto the next village,
“The people at the new checkpoint, they were polite
On the evening of August 26, Ukrainian forces
engaged a column of what they claimed were Russian
paratroopers moving on Ilovaisk. Photos of the aftermath
show dead soldiers, burnt out MT-LB armored
weapon exclusively used by Russian Spetsnaz units.101
On the following morning, Semyon Semyonchenko,
commander of the Donbass Battalion, warned that
-
possible. Instead, the Ukrainian command insisted that
reinforcements had arrived and that the situation was
under control. Semyonchenko dismissed this claim as
a lie.102
By this time, there were reports that Russian troops
had entered Amvrosievka, on the highway between
Ilovaisk and the Avilo-Uspenka border crossing. Furthermore,
the Ukrainian military claimed that a large
column, of around 100 armored vehicles was moving
south from Starobeshevo toward Telmanovo, a town
around 37 kilometers to the south, to take control of
-
nect the two fronts.103
-
ter account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine had sent a simple message—“#RussiaInvadedUkraine.”
That same day a Russian independent
news outlet ran the headline “From the Editors: Are
popularly known as the “Russian Invasion,” the period
when the Russian military most clearly intervened in
eastern Ukraine.104
On August 28, with ammunition running low,
the encirclement, which by then had become known
as the kotel
made it out that day in the captured T-72, accompanied
by two columns of soldiers. Despite an agreement
with the Russians to allow safe passage in exchange
for the release of captives, the evacuating soldiers
After traveling south for about 22 kilometers, Sidorenko’s
T-72 was knocked out, forcing the crew to move
-
ing 30 kilometers before reaching the Ukrainian lines.
-
out of Ilovaisk.105 Footage of the escape, broadcast
106 shows the
correspondent for Ukraine’s Leviy Bereg, reported that
at least one Ukrainian tank had been knocked out and
that he had been wounded when their car was shot up.
98 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 199: NATO, Divided, Meets to Discuss Ukraine,” The Interpreter, September 4, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-199-nato-divided-meets-to-discuss-ukraine/#4128.
99 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 190,” The Interpreter.
100
101
102 The Interpreter, August 27, 2014, http://www.
103 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 191,” The Interpreter.
104 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 191,” The Interpreter.
105 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 193,” The Interpreter.
106
30
On August 29, Putin made a public appeal to the
“militia of Novorossiya,” to establish a humanitarian
corridor, allowing Ukrainian troops to leave Ilovaisk
safely.107 The next day, despite Russian propaganda reports
to the contrary,108 Ukrainian soldiers, journalists,
corridor in effect, with reporter Ruslan Yarmolyuk of
the 2+2 television channel, writing:
This morning in accordance with the agree-
open outside Ilovaisk, the remainders of the
40th battalion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,
the 39th, the 28th and the remnants of the
51st brigade of Vladimir-Volynskaya went into
the corridor and were shelled by heavy artillery
and mortars. The Russian beasts swept
from the earth everything that went through
the corridor, both vehicles and personnel of
the Ukrainian army and part of the volunteer
battalions. None of them have gotten in touch
From yesterday’s reinforcement, which went
to Ilovaisk, made up of 30 vehicles, not a
single one got out; of 300 men, by preliminary
109
Battalion reported on Facebook “hundreds of bodies”
Their photos and videos from other breakout attempts
capture the horror of the Ilovaisk encirclement, from
which the last Ukrainian troops escaped on September
1.110
Reports from Novokaterinovka, a village just
southeast of Starobeshevo on the road to Komosomolskoye,
through which Ukrainian troops were
forced to withdraw, described devastation on August
30. One resident told reporters from the Associated
Press] that the Ukrainian troops had been about to
surrender when “they began to bomb them.” Photos
the body of a Ukrainian soldier hanging from a power
line.111
Along with the testimony of Ukrainian soldiers and
Russian prisoners, there is abundant photographic and
video evidence that Russian forces were deployed to
T-72B3 or BA tanks have been documented at three
different sites near Starobeshevo, including Novokaterinovka,
where Ukrainian troops engaged them as they
attempted to break out. As has also been noted previously,
neither the T-72B3 nor the T-72BA have been
T-72B3 was never exported by the Russian military.
Almost a year later, Anatoly Matios, Ukraine’s
the battle for Ilovaisk as 366 Ukrainian soldiers killed,
and 429 wounded. Bodies would continue to turn up
for months after the battle. Of the dead, 156 remain
112 Furthermore, hundreds of Ukrainian
soldiers were captured.113 According to Matios, the ten
-
kalnoye were returned to Russia in exchange for the
release of around 200 Ukrainian prisoners on August
30, 2014.114
physically abused them on camera. A year later, on
August 20, 2015, Matios said that 128 Ukrainian soldiers
remained in captivity, while the fate of another
158 remains unknown.115
By September 2, the news that Russian-backed
forces were in Telmanovo made it clear that Ukraine
had lost control of the highway between Donetsk and
retaking Komsomolskoye on August 30.116 Ukrainian
troops had abandoned Komsomolskoye, locals told
107 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 193,” The Interpreter.
108
109 The Interpreter, August 30, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-194-humanitarian-corridor-uncertain-for-evacuation-of-ukrainian-soldiers/.
110
111 “Ukrainian Troops Routed as Russia Talks Tough,” Associated Press, September 2, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/
article-2740449/Ukrainian-troops-routed-Russia-talks-tough.html.
112 “Matios Unveiled the Full List of Those Killed around Ilovaisk,” Pravda, September 6, 2014, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/
news/2015/08/20/7078407/.
113 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 194,” The Interpreter.
114 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 194,” The Interpreter.
115
http://novosti.dn.ua/details/257940/.
116 The Interpreter, September 2, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-197-ukraine-reportedly-loses-control-of-telmanovo-north-of-mariupol/#4086.
31
Kommersant’s Ilya Barabanov, on the evening of
September 1.
Ukraine had now lost control of the entire border
between the Donetsk region and the Russian Federation.
The Russian Invasion
of Lugansk
The situation was little better in the Lugansk
region. Ukrainian forces, aided by the natural barrier
of the Seversky Donets River, maintained control
of much of the north of the region, having retaken
Severodonetsk on July 22.117 As a result, the border
to the north of the river remains under Ukrainian
control to this day. However, direct Russian military
river crossing into the town of Krasnodon and across
the vacuum created after the fall of Sector D, defeated
Ukrainian forces to the south of Lugansk.
On July 9, days after Russian anti-aircraft systems
military stronghold of Lugansk Airport, located
around 15 kilometers south of the rebel-held region-
tanks. As at Donetsk Airport, the Ukrainian military
was able to repel the attackers using airstrikes.118
-
from the airport, Ukrainian troops held onto their
position and by August 14 were reported to be pushing
119 Two days later, Ukrainian
Lugansk.120
The Kremlin, unnerved by the possibility of
Ukraine retaking Lugansk, decided to act much more
decisively. On the evening of August 14, journalists
from the Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, and the New
Times witnessed armored vehicles headed to the border.
According to the Guardian
than 20 armored personnel carriers crossed the border
near the Russian town of Donetsk.121 At the time,
journalists from around the world had descended on
border. It seems that Russian forces, however, used a
more discreet route in an attempt to avoid detection.
After pausing by the side of the road until
nightfall, the convoy crossed into Ukrainian
territory, using a rough dirt track and clearly
crossing through a gap in a barbed wire fence
that demarcates the border. Armed men were
visible in the gloom by the border fence as
the column moved into Ukraine. Kiev has lost
control of its side of the border in this area.122
It soon became clear what the Russians were
doing. On August 18, a military convoy made up of
trucks, medical vehicles, artillery, and at least one
west through the town of Sukhodolsk, just 10 kilometers
from the Russian border. Having geolocated
the convoy, it was easy to use a route-planning tool
work out that it was possible for the vehicles to have
crossed the border at the village of Severny.123
-
ported in Sukhodolsk: claims of Russian tanks on the
streets of the town went as far back as July 12,124 but
the sighting of the BMD-2 was remarkable given that
identical vehicles had been photographed 10 kilometers
inside Russia on August 15, just three days before
they were spotted in Sukhodolsk. These vehicles,
,
-
117 The Interpreter, July 22, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-155-train-carrying-mh17-bodies-arrives-in-kharkiv-and-black-boxes-handed-over/.
118 The Interpreter, July 9, 2014, http://
119 New Times, August 15, 2014, http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/85685.
120 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 180: The Battle for Lugansk Begins,” The Interpreter, August 16, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraineliveblog-
day-180-the-battle-for-lugansk-begins/#3831.
121 Guardian, August 15, 2014, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/russian-military-vehicles-enter-ukraine-aid-convoy-stops-short-border.
122
123 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 182: Russian Aid to Enter Ukraine with Kiev’s Approval,” The Interpreter, August 18, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-182-russian-aid-to-enter-ukraine-with-kievs-approval/.
124 The Interpreter, July 12, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-145-russian-forces-penetrate-ukrainian-territory/#3321.
32
proached the border.125 The placement of the vehicles’
individual ID numbers and a triangular marking on
on the BMD-2s photographed on the Russian side
of the border.126 RUSI’s Sutyagin says that symbols
such as the triangles seen on the BMD-2s are “tactical
markings” unique to each Russian army brigade or
independent regiment. A list assembled by Ukraine’s
InformNapalm suggests that this particular symbol
127
One BMD-2 was then captured by Ukrainian troops
near Lutugino, to the west of Lugansk Airport, on
August 20.128 The correlation between this vehicle
and those photographed in Russia is striking. Once
placement of the ID number, which has been covered
or scratched over on the captured unit, is exactly the
same as those of the vehicles photographed by Reuters.
Documents found inside this BMD connected it
Air Assault Division from Pskov.
Russian artillery was now put to use against
within Russian territory, as reported by the Ukrainian
military on August 11,129 and from within, as demon-
125 The Interpreter, August 15, 2014, http://
www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-179-russian-build-up-continues-at-border-as-armour-enters-ukraine/#3808; see also Birgit
Virnich, Twitter, August 14, 2014, 11:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/birgitvirnich/status/500171567754530816.
126 Postimees, August 15, 2015, http://www.postimees.ee/galerii/39477/venemilitaarkolonn-
ukraina-piiri-lahistel.
127
128 The Interpreter, August 21, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-185-russian-airborne-forces-reportedly-captured-in-ukraine/#3889.
129 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 190,” The Interpreter.
Russian paratroopers wait with their BMD-2
customs control zone, around 30 kilometers from
the border with Ukraine. Note the triangular
symbol and placement of the unit numbers.
Photo: Pavel Golovkin / AP Photo
33
strated by satellite photos released by NATO that show
self-propelled guns moving near Krasnodon on August
130
-
sian tanks appeared in the Lugansk region. On August
26, a video was uploaded showing a column of tanks
and anti-aircraft systems on the move in Sverdlovsk,
southeast of Lugansk.131 Three of the tanks on the
video are T-72B1s, which were not in active Ukrainian
service but have been in the Ukrainian arsenal. One,
armor, that has not been exported outside Russia.132
By the end of August, Russian-backed forces were
closing in around Lugansk Airport. On August 30, the
Ukrainian military reported that government forces
had been pushed back from the village of Novosvetlovka,
around 11 kilometers northeast of the airport.133
Video footage shot after the battle shows extensive
devastation and at least two T-72BA tanks,134 one of
which had been almost completely torn in two.135
-
lite images taken that day that show smoke billowing
positions.
On September 1, Andriy Lysenko, then spokesman
for the Ukrainian National Security and Defense
-
drawn from Lugansk Airport and the nearby village
130
aco.nato.int/new-satellite-imagery-exposes-russian-combat-troops-inside-ukraine.aspx#prettyPhoto.
131 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 190,” The Interpreter.
132
europe-28961080.
133 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 194,” The Interpreter.
134 The Interpreter, August 27, 2015, 8:43, https://www.
135 “Destroyed T-72BA in Novosvetlovka—August, 2014,” The Interpreter, August 27, 2015, 1:54, https://www.youtube.com/
Fighting along the Bakhmutka highway in the Lugansk region
34
troops were pushed back to the north of the regional
a village just 1.5 kilometers north of the city.136 Likely
having achieved their military aims in the area, a large
back toward the border crossing near Severny, on
September 3.137
negotiated in Minsk, Marieluise Beck, a member of
parts of the Lugansk region still controlled by Kiev
from the government of the Lugansk region “in
exile,”138 that a Russian military engineering brigade
was at work building new power lines to cross the
lost control of the entire Lugansk region south of the
Seversky Donets River, bar a handful of settlements
toward the western end of the Bakhmutka highway
and the town of Lysychansk.
Russian-backed forces have maintained almost dai-
agreement and have even continued to make territorial
gains, pushing Ukrainian forces farther back along the
highway in two offensives—one in October 2014,139
and another in January of this year.140-
ers reported in January that it was Russian regulars
with tanks, rather than separatist paramilitaries, who
had mounted the second offensive on the Ukrainian
Around the time of these forces’ gains, reporters
from the Associated Press in Perevalsk saw large
quantities of military hardware, including “15 pris-
141
in Perevalsk, which lies only 25 kilometers from the
Bakhmutka highway. There is some evidence that this
142
the Second Battle for Donetsk
Airport
After the Minsk Protocol was signed on September
5, battle on many fronts quickly died down, but
-
lines, winning battles that were in progress when the
For instance, on September 6, members of the
pro-government Ukrainian Aidar Battalion claimed
that they were ambushed near Metallist, north of
Lugansk. Eleven Ukrainian soldiers were reportedly
killed. That same day, video showed a large column of
T-72BM tanks, Strela-10 mobile SAM launchers, and
other armored vehicles moving on the Ukrainian side
of the Russian border near Severny, a suspected Russian
border crossing. It is unclear if the vehicles were
returning to Russia or moving to reinforce separatist
lines elsewhere in Lugansk, but the video is another
clear sign of Russian military presence in the area.143
On September 8, however, it became clear that
military reported that its troops were surrounded
near Slavyanoserbsk, northwest of Lugansk, by what
ATO spokesperson Andriy Lysenko said were “4
T-72 tanks, 2 BMDs, 2 BMPs, 4 BTRs and around 70
T-72.144
The Ukrainian government continued to report
-
136 The Interpreter, September 6, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-201/#4169.
137
138 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 201,” The Interpreter.
139 The Interpreter, October 28, 2014, http://
www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-253-ukrainian-forces-evacuated-from-32nd-checkpoint-near-smile/#4760.
140 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 337: Ukrainian Mobilisation Begins; Shelling in Donetsk, Avdeyevka, Schastye,” The Interpreter, January 20,
avdeyevka-and-schastye/#6368.
141 “Russia, Ukraine Agree Pullback Line for Heavy Arms,” Associated Press, January 21, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/
article-2919642/Russian-FM-says-Ukraine-peace-talks-focus-frontline.html.
142 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 203: Poroshenko Heads to Mariupol,” The Interpreter, September 8, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-liveblog-day-203-poroshenko-heads-to-mariupol/#4195.
143 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 201,” The Interpreter.
144 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 203,” The Interpreter.
35
mor, tanks, and troops into eastern Ukraine throughout
was holding.
-
national Airport. Both a strategically and symbolically
airport is positioned on high ground on the northwest
corner of Donetsk. Ukrainian artillery positioned in
this area could easily target positions inside the city,
while Russian-supplied artillery could target a number
of Ukrainian military positions across the region.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian military had dealt the
defeat in May. Both sides, then, used the symbolism
of the airport to serve their needs. As the battle wore
on, the defenders and the attackers became legends to
their respective supporters.
The battle for the airport took over four months.
-
ers relentlessly pounded the position as Ukraine’s
The death toll continuously rose as the battle slowly
escalated. Soon, the road in and out of the airport had
become extremely dangerous, and it became very hard
for Ukraine to run supplies or troops in or out of their
-
ers, led by the Vostok Battalion, were attacking from
a city populated by civilians, not only were Ukrainian
artillery strikes less effective, but artillery strikes by
both sides caused civilian casualties.
Despite the Minsk agreement, by December the
airport and the surrounding Ukrainian positions were
under nearly constant attack. By the end of January,
or else managed to escape.145
The battle was an important catalyst for the ex-
battle, for instance, journalists spotted two new weapons
systems near Donetsk: the 1RL232 “Leopard”
and the 1RL239 “Lynx” ground-scan radar systems.
These radar vehicles enable the tracking of vehicle
movement beyond the line of sight and detect artillery
that has been launched. Not only are these tools
important for seeing where the enemy is moving, but
to knock out enemy positions. The Ukrainian military
possesses a small number of Leopards, but they have
never been documented near the frontlines, and there
captured them. The Lynx was never in the possession
of the Ukrainian military and so can only have come
from Russia. Experts warned that the addition of these
146
quickly spread beyond Donetsk as well. By January,
-
by suspected Russian military units, pushed to capture
even more territory.
The Battle for Debaltsevo
Airport, but it was during the battle for Debaltsevo
that the role of the Russian armed forces was most
transparent.
Tragically, many of the same circumstances seen in
Ilovaisk were repeated in Debaltsevo: encirclement,
government assurances of security, and fatal “humanitarian”
corridors. But the military operation to take
the town and its environs was conducted with the
borders. The Ukrainian salient in Debaltsevo had been
bombarded for months, but it was only in late January
that the Kremlin committed to conquering the town.147
“capital” of the so-called DNR was looking far more
secure, and the offensive on Debaltsevo was a natural
follow-up for the separatists in order to consolidate
control and carve out a viable territory in the east. As
discussed earlier, the Ukrainian liberation of Debaltsevo
had severed the main supply line through Lugansk
between Donetsk and the Russian border; the town is
also a major rail hub. Despite a tentative agreement
on artillery withdrawal following talks in Berlin, the
145 Foreign Policy, January 22, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/01/22/the-death-of-ukraines-cyborg-army-ukraine-russia-donetsk-airport-shelling/.
146 Foreign Policy, November 13, 2014,
147 Kyiv Post, January 23, 2015, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/
kyiv-post-plus/deadlier-deadlier-soldiers-cling-to-strategic-city-378172.html.
36
town would have to fall to the separatists before the
offensive could be brought to a halt.
There is evidence that Russian forces, even if in
limited numbers, were already supporting a separat-
BPM-97 Vystrel armored command vehicle, a type of
transport that has not been exported to Ukraine, can be
seen traveling in a convoy with at least one Strela-10
mobile SAM system.148
on January 12 in Krasnodon,149 traveling with at least
Russian armed forces. T-72B1 tanks seen in the Debaltsevo
footage have had their ID numbers concealed
and bear white square insignia.150 This emblem would
be seen repeatedly on armor deployed during the
battle for Debaltsevo and appears to have replaced the
white circle seen on Russian military vehicles during
the battle for Ilovaisk.
willing, in a few days we will seal the Debaltsevo
kotel.” Two days later, Russian-backed forces in-
Debaltsevo itself but also Ukrainian positions both
south and north of the town.151 Viktor Kovalenko, an
152 that
mobile communications in Debaltsevo began to go
down in late January, especially after the 28th, when
148
149 The Interpreter, January 12, 2015, http://www.
150 The Interpreter, February 6, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-354-humanitarian-corridor-out-of-Debaltsevo-announced/#6718.
151 “Ukraine Live Day 344: Heavy Fighting Reported Outside Debaltsevo and Near Lugansk,” The Interpreter, January 27, 2015, http://www.
152 Diary of a Ukraine Journalist, April 17, 2015, https://
viktorkovalenko.wordpress.com/2015/04/17/debaltseve-diary-no-mobile-communications/.
Remains of the Dolzhansky
border checkpoint in the Lugansk
region after it was attacked and
Photo: TASS
37
the battalion’s base in the town was attacked with
153 and in
the Donetsk region.154
mobile communications but also allows users to ana-
that a balcony he stood on to send SMS messages was
153 New York Times, April 2, 2014 , http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/
world/europe/instagram-catalogs-new-russian-weaponry.html.
154
August 2015,” August 16, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826.
38
If mobile signals were used to pinpoint targets for
Russian artillery, this was not a new approach. During
were frequently intercepted and used to direct attacks.
The most infamous example of this tactic was the as-
killed by missiles while making a call on a satellite
phone in 1996. Journalist Robert Young Pelton report-
within minutes of the caller hanging up.155
Mobile communications in Debaltsevo were also
hijacked by Russian forces in the area and used to
conduct psychological warfare. Kovalenko wrote:
Indeed, the terrorists had been taking control
of our cell phones for up to 5–10 minutes, in
order to deliver their propaganda messages.
Sure, the SMS texts were anonymous and
our positions. Many times our unit commanders
banned the use of cell phones in the battle
-
atives was so strong that they often ignored
the ban and tried to catch any signal as best
they could.156
One blanket text message, reported by
I’ve surrendered, they don’t shoot prisoners.
Better than dying.”157
By January 29, with incessant shelling and Rus-
south, the evacuation of civilians began. Reporter
David Patrikarakos said at the time that shelling was
so intense that it was “basically a constant noise.”158
The Debaltsevo kotel now began to contract. On
January 30, Russian-backed forces entered the town of
Uglegorsk, around 10 kilometers west of Debaltsevo.159
The next day they took Nikishino, to the southeast.160
Russian-backed forces had wiped out a Ukrainian
Debaltsevo.161 The video also made it clear that Rus-
based on a farm on the eastern edge of the town.
village of Logvinovo, on the highway between Debaltsevo
and Artyomovsk.162 This link with the remainder
of the Ukrainian front was essential for resupplying
forces in the salient. According to Ukrainian journalists,
Russian-backed forces had taken control of
the railway switching yard on the eastern outskirts of
Debaltsevo. Meanwhile, the separatists were boasting
of victories in Kalinovka, to the west of the town, and
Redkodub, to the southeast.
On this same day, three Ukrainian journalists described
reports from soldiers on the front that Russian
Su-25 jets had conducted air strikes near Novogrigoryevka,
a Ukrainian stronghold just north of the town.
-
ports at the time.163
of Russian air attacks on Ukrainian territory, it was the
It became clear the next day that Logvinovo had
fallen and that the highway link to Artyomovsk had
been severed.164 The only remaining passable routes
between Debaltsevo and the rest of the Ukrainian
frontlines were narrow country roads vulnerable to
ambush and shelling.
Ukrainian troops managed to hold out in Debaltsevo
for seven more days as the Russian-backed forces
tightened their encirclement, killing 19 soldiers in just
155 Robert Young Pelton, “Kill the Messenger,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/03/kill-the-messenger/.
156 Kovalenko, “Debaltsevo Diary.”
157
158 “Ukraine Live Day 346: Russian-Backed Forces Fight to Encircle Debaltsevo,” The Interpreter, January 29, 2015, http://www.
159 “Ukraine Live Day 347: At Least 11 Dead in Shelling Attacks,” The Interpreter, January 30, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-live-day-347-at-least-seven-dead-in-shelling-attacks/#6588.
160 “Ukraine Live Day 349: More Russian-Backed Separatist Victories Near Debaltsevo,” The Interpreter, February 1, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-349/#6621.
161 “Ukraine Live Day 352: Shell Strikes Hospital in Donetsk,” The Interpreter, February 4, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukrainelive-
day-352-shell-strikes-hospital-in-donetsk/#6675.
162 “Ukraine Live Day 357: Huge Blast in Donetsk Last Night,” The Interpreter, February 9, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukrainelive-
day-357-huge-blast-in-donetsk-last-night/#6749.
163 “Ukraine Live Day 357,” The Interpreter.
164 The Interpreter, February 10, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukrainelive-
day-358-Debaltsevo-cut-off-from-highway/#6760.
39
south of the town on February 11,165 the same day the
second Minsk agreement was signed. Regardless of
that agreement, Russian attacks on Debaltsevo continued
even after February 15, the date on which the
By February 17, Russian-backed forces had begun
entering Debaltsevo, with Ukrainian troops reported to
a crescendo.166 Kovalenko wrote that at one of the
40th Battalion’s strongholds, 92 Ukrainian soldiers
were encircled and forced to surrender.167
evacuate. Despite assurances that Ukrainian forces
would be allowed to leave safely, the retreating
artillery.168 The situation was further compounded by
the fact that the encircled forces did not have enough
operable vehicles left to carry all of their personnel in
a single trip. Armored columns therefore had to shuttle
back and forth between Artyomovsk and Debaltsevo
on February 18, suffering heavy casualties under the
169
On March 11, President Poroshenko announced
that 66 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and over
300 wounded.170 Meanwhile, Eduard Basurin, a
3,000 Ukrainian servicemen had died in the battle.171
Humanitarian Affairs dated February 27 stated that
“approximately 500, mostly civilian, corpses had been
found in houses and cellars in Debaltsevo.”172
Physical evidence of Russia’s military presence
abounds from this period. T-72BA and B3 tanks were
clearly deployed in considerable numbers. In one
video recorded near Debaltsevo on February 15 by
for the separatists, a whole column of T-72B3s can be
seen in clear detail.173 In a separate case, two T-72BMs
were recorded by freelance photographer Max
Avdeev during the closing section of the battle, near
Logvinovo.174 And after the occupation of Uglegorsk,
video emerged of a BMP-2 bearing the exact same
the Russian border town of Kamensk Shakhtinsky in
August 2014.175
One of the most compelling pieces of evidence
-
sian-Buryat tank gunner who was wounded during
the battle and later spoke to Novaya Gazeta’s Yelena
Kostyuchenko.176 Batomunkuyev, a contract soldier
serving in the 5th Independent Tank Brigade, based
in Ulan-Ude, said that he had crossed the border with
his unit on February 8, traveling to Donetsk. Batomunkuyev’s
unit, consisting of around 300 personnel
with 30 tanks, nine BMP-2s, three armored medical
vehicles, and 15 trucks, had painted over their tanks,
obscuring all numbers and insignia, before departing
165 The Interpreter, February 11, 2015,
166 “Ukraine Live Day 365: Russian-Backed Forces Entering Debaltsevo,” The Interpreter, February 17, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-live-day-365-russian-backed-forces-entering-Debaltsevo/#6862.
167 Diary of a Ukraine Journalist, May 10, 2015, https://
viktorkovalenko.wordpress.com/2015/05/10/debaltseve-diary-part-10-the-start-of-our-withdrawal/.
168
169 “Ukraine Live Day 366: Ukrainian Journalist Reports Retreat from Debaltsevo,” The Interpreter, February 18, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-366-ukrainian-journalist-reports-retreat-from-Debaltsevo/.
170 “Debaltsevo Ukraine Has Lost 66 Soldiers, More Than 300 Injured—Poroshenko,” Unian, March 11, 2015, http://www.unian.net/
politics/1054067-ukraina-v-Debaltsevo-poteryala-66-boytsov-bolee-300-poluchili-raneniya-poroshenko.html.
171 TASS, August 8, 2014,
172
173 The Interpreter, February
15, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-363-ukrainian-commander-reports-ultimatum-from-russian-backedseparatists/#
6845.
174 Buzzfeed, February
175 The Interpreter, February 7, 2015, http://www.
176 “Ukraine Live Day 378: Severely Injured Russian Soldier Describes Deployment to Ukraine,” The Interpreter, March 2, 2015, http://
www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-378-severely-injured-russian-soldier-describes-deployment-to-ukraine/#7227.
40
for Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the Associated Press’
Peter Leonard reported encountering another soldier
from Russia’s far east—Yakutia—manning a T-72B1
in Uglegorsk on February 18.177 On one of the last
days of the battle, while defending Logvinovo from a
Ukrainian counterattack, Batomunkuyev’s T-72B was
struck by a Ukrainian tank shell, igniting onboard am-
detail later in this report.
The Southern Front: The
Summer of 2015
Since the fall of Debaltsevo, the separatist-held
territories of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk
People’s Republics have existed in a relatively stable
the frontier in both regions: the Seversky Donets River
to the north of Lugansk, and the river Kalmius to the
south of Donetsk. Lines of communication between
separatist-held cities are now complete and safe from
Ukrainian attack. Skirmishes and attempts to break
through the lines have continued along the frontline,
especially in the stretch that lacks such barriers, from
the village of Krymskoye in the Lugansk region to the
town of Dokuchaevsk outside Donetsk.
these appear, for the most part, to be aimed either at
-
tions of the frontline near separatist-held population
past summer, which peaked in August with the daily
Looking along the demarcation line, there are
several areas where relatively small-scale advances
may be desirable to the Russians and separatists. In
where Russian-backed forces could be deployed to
push the Ukrainians back. These include the slim strip
of Ukrainian-held territory along the southern banks of
the Seversky Donets, toward the Bakhmutka highway;
territory on either side of the separatist-held town of
and western fringes of Donetsk.
However, expanding into the main swathe of land
behind this section of the front, stretching between
the Ukrainian settlements of Lysychansk to the east
and Konstantinovka to the west, would leave Rus-
of intact supply lines and far greater strategic depth.
Attacks along the north of the frontier are therefore
likely to be limited in their aims.
The ultimate target lies to the south—Mariupol.
whole of Donbass—and huge steelworks, Mariupol
accounted for 31–33 percent of the Donetsk region’s
total industrial output in 2013.178 The steel industry is
at the core of the Donbass’s economy, and Mariupol
alone made up more than 70 percent of total steel
production in that year. Additionally, 200 kilometers
The land between the two is sparsely populated, with
therefore the greatest obstacle to the achievement of
a contiguous Russian-controlled territory stretching
Finally, the symbolic value of Mariupol derives
partly from it having been taken over by separatist
militants for just over a month last summer. The city
was only brought back under government control
after two assaults.179 After the Ukrainian government
liberated the city, it became the administrative center
of the Donetsk region, standing in for separatist-held
Donetsk.180
177 Peter Leonard, Twitter feed, February 18, 2015, 5:01 a.m., https://twitter.com/Peter__Leonard/status/568032612645773312.
178 The Interpreter, September
meets/#4427.
179 The Interpreter, May 7, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-79-mariupol-city-council-building-back-in-separatist-hands/#2677; “Ukraine Liveblog Day 116:
The Interpreter, June 13, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-116-
major-government-operation-in-mariupol/#3065.
180 “Mariupol has become the temporary capital of the Donbass,” Zerkalo Nedeli
vremennoy-stolicey-donbassa-_.html.
41
Mariupol, an all-out assault from this direction alone
would almost certainly fail. Ukrainian forces have
had almost a year to fortify their positions and can
be resupplied from both the north and the west. Any
feasible operation to take Mariupol would require a
pincer move to the north in order to push Ukrainian
troops off the highway leading up to Donetsk. The
main population center on this highway is the town
of Volnovakha, around 45 kilometers outside Mariupol.
To the north of Volnovakha, Russian-backed
forces occupy a short section of the highway between
Donetsk and Dokuchaevsk. To the east, they hold
positions on the far bank of the Kalmius. Between the
river and the highway lies around 30 kilometers of
largely empty, rolling hills.
large quantities of armor in separatist-held territory
to the east of the Kalmius on a weekly, if not daily
been seen around the settlements of Komsomolskoye,
Front line along the river Kalmius south of Donetsk
42
quantities of military vehicles have also been observed
-
ware reported includes not only tanks and armored
personnel carriers, but also surface-to-air missile
systems, artillery, and electronic warfare equipment.
On July 4, the SMM made two particularly note-
layers near Komsomolskoye.181 This equipment could
well be used to ford the Kalmius in the event of an
offensive. The second, from the same area, was a 2S4
Tyulpan 240-millimeter mortar system. This weapon
is not used by Ukraine.
The SMM drones that have been conducting these
observations have frequently been subjected to jamming,
leading to the loss of one UAV on July 22.182
In one incident on May 28, the SMM appears to have
encountered Russian military personnel in the town of
In Petrivske (“[DNR]”-controlled, 38km southeast
of Donetsk) the SMM spoke to a young
man who said that the former local holiday
camp was currently occupied by an unknown
armed group. He could not specify for how
long this armed group had been stationed in
the village. In the village the SMM spoke to
two women, both wearing military uniforms,
with caps with Russian Federation Armed
Forces insignia. They said that they were from
Kramatorsk. During the conversation with the
two women a vehicle with Russian Federation
number plates stopped next to the OSCE vehicles
and two armed men, similarly dressed,
exited the car and ordered the women to
stop the conversation with the SMM. Behind
a tall fence inside the holiday camp, the SMM
183
Evidence of a large-scale deployment to the Kal-
themselves. By June, The Interpreter was able to establish,
using social media evidence, that an agricul-
vehicles, and at least one reconnaissance and assault
group.184 At the end of June, the Ukrainian Dnipro-1
Volunteer Battalion released their own drone footage
of a site south of Sontsevo, taken on two dates: May
20 and June 4.185
soldiers, at least two T-72 tanks, and several pieces
of engineering equipment in the woods around 12
kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian-held settlement,
number of dirt tracks and a tent among the trees was
emplacements for parking fuel tankers; and several
large tents. At least nine T-72s, a communications
vehicle, and an antitank gun can be seen. Furthermore,
the continued presence of engineering vehicles
the May footage. Igor Sutyagin at RUSI says that
construction of the camp indicates that it has been
built by professional military engineers according to
traditional Soviet-era designs. The use of reinforced
defensive positions, such as those used to shield fuel
tankers, is typical of forward operating bases used by
former Soviet armies.
On June 3, 2015, Russian-backed forces carried
out a major assault186 on the Ukrainian-held Marinka
suburb of Donetsk. This was the biggest attack to have
taken place since the fall of Debaltsevo, but the assault,
and several subsequent smaller attacks, failed.187
This attack appears to be connected to the Kalmius
theater of operations, as pushing Ukrainian troops
away from Marinka would put distance between the
181
July 2015,” July 6, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/170456.
182
July 2015,” July 23, 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/174226.
183
184 “Meet the Russian Fighters Building a Base Between Mariupol and Donetsk,” The Interpreter, June 17, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.
185 Pierre Vaux, “Drones Find Russian Base Inside Ukraine,” Daily Beast, June 30, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/30/
apparent-russian-base-found-in-ukraine.html.
186 “Ukraine Live Day 471: Russian-Backed Forces Launch Major Assault Near Donetsk,” The Interpreter, July 3, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-471-russian-backed-forces-launch-major-assaults-north-and-south-west-of-donetsk/.
187 The Interpreter, June 8, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-476-marinka-assaulted-this-morning-ukraine-says-attack-was-repelled/#8732.
43
Donetsk highway and those to the south on the highway
to Mariupol. As further evidence of this intent,
the northernmost Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk–
were attacked that same morning.
and artillery shelling along the northern section of
the front between Nikolaevka and Bogdanovka,
Russian-backed forces assaulted Ukrainian positions
near the village of Starognatovka.188 Ukrainian reports
supported by 10 tanks and 10 BMPs. However, after
189
Ukrainian troops succeeded in repelling the enemy
and went on the counteroffensive, advancing as far as
the separatist-held village of Novolaspa before withdrawing
back to their side of the demarcation line.190
the entire frontier, with daily use of MLRS and heavy
end of August brought relative calm to most of the
frontline.191 However on September 9, with sporadic
attacks and shelling continuing, Oleksandr Turchynov,
secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and De-
concentrate forces behind the frontline in preparation
for a possible offensive.192
188 Daily Beast, August 12, 2015, http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/12/ukraine-s-cold-war-gets-hot-as-combat-explodes-in-the-last-24-hours.html.
189 Andriy Tsaplienko, Facebook Timeline photo, August 9, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/photo.
190 “Ukraine Live Day 547: Sartana Death Toll Rises to 3,” The Interpreter, August 18, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveday-
547-sartana-death-toll-rises-to-3/#9572.
191
192 The Interpreter,
September 9, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-569-despite-only-4-attacks-last-night-turchynov-warns-possibilityof-
offensive-remains/#9863.
44
193
europe-31796226.
194 The Interpreter, www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-are-us-sanctions-having-animpact/#
1623.
195 The Interpreter, February 28, 2014, www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-11-
196 Ekho Moskvy, June 2, 2014, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/maryautomne/1332306-echo/; and “A
The Interpreter, June 19, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/a-russian-
appeared in Novaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy.
197 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-politkovskayas-murdererssentenced-
but-not-contractor/#1024.
198 Caucasian Knot, May 29,
2014, published in translation by The Interpreter
killed-in-battle-in-ukraine-have-been-delivered-to-the-republic/.
As we have seen, Russia’s military presence in
Ukraine became evident during the invasion of the
green men,” as they came to be known, tried to keep
overwhelming force, usually without a shot. Initially
it was suggested that only the existing quota of
of power. Ultimately, however, Putin himself conceded
that Spetsnaz had been sent there for the express
purpose of annexing the peninsula forcibly, ostensibly
in the name of the will of the ethnic Russians and
Russian-speaking peoples in the region.193
-
sian Federation Airborne Troops, based in Pskov, were
-
lated on social media.194 As The Interpreter reported,195
these troops had earlier been reported missing from
their barracks in Pskov by Lev Shlosberg, a deputy in
the Pskov regional legislature from the oppositional
Yabloko Party, who protested against the soldiers’
the Pskov region’s acting governor, Andrei Turchak.
Shlosberg later suffered a severe beating by unknown
assailants in Pskov because he continued to ask questions
regarding why some of the paratroopers of the
76th were missing and later turning up killed.
First Battle at the Donetsk
Airport, May 2014
Ukraine was done by freelance photojournalist Mariya
Turchenkova who published a blog post on the Ekho
Moskvy website in June 2014.196 She tracked reports of
-
gorsk, contending that, based on some social media
-
The Interpreter was
197
The regional publication Caucasian Knot said that
-
ing some relatives’ accounts that the dead were being
buried in local cemeteries and families were ordered
by authorities to keep silent. These soldiers were
Spetsnaz
the Soviet era and were later disbanded but reconstituted
for the war in Ukraine. The Vostok Battalion
in the Donbass is now headed by Aleksandr Khodakovsky,
a former commander of the Alpha special unit
198 No names of
soldiers were provided, however, and the information
Turchenkova also followed the story of Lyana, the
widow of Yevgeny Korolenko, a 47-year-old Soviet–
Afghan war veteran from Rostov who volunteered to
45
“Cargo 200”—Russian Soldiers
Killed in Action in Ukraine
the Donetsk Airport on May 26, 2014,199 which, as we
multiple deaths and, therefore, a turning point in the
war. Prior to this battle, the Russian-backed offensive
had involved detentions, kidnappings, torture,
and murder of some captives, as well as a number of
-
eastern Ukraine. Before May, there was not all-out
war in the country, and the Russian presence was not
so visible. Khodakovsky, who led not only the Vostok
Battalion but all Russian-backed forces at Donetsk
Airport, made an arrangement with Ukrainian troops
to retreat but was then ambushed.
Elena Kostyuchenko, a special correspondent for
the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, continued
the story begun by Turchenkova, reporting that at the
Russian–Ukrainian border crossing at Uspenka, three
cameras, ordered that mobile phones be turned off,
did not look inside the vehicle in which the men were
traveling nor receive any manifests; the passage was
not recorded. Yet inside the refrigerated compartment
of the vehicle there were 31 bodies—Russian militiamen
who had died in battle at the Donetsk Airport on
May 26.
Pictures published by Novaya Gazeta later showed
a clumsy sign on the truck that read Gruz-200
or ground of the bodies of soldiers killed in war. The
term was well known to generations of Russians from
the Soviet war in Afghanistan and subsequent wars in
had been revived, albeit surreptitiously, for an undeclared
Russian war in Ukraine.
strong indication of Russian involvement in a war that
Ukrainians. But while the bodies were sent to Russia,
and the facts of the story, as the dead were all from
were possible to determine when the caskets were
and Yury Abrosimov. Two more subsequently turned
up on social media networks: Aleksey Yurin and
Aleksandr Yefremov, who had previously served in the
reconnaissance regiment of the 45th Special Purpose
hunted through both civilian and military morgues,
bounced from one to another by various evasive
Korolenko, the Soviet–Afghan war veteran, was
an avid war gamer, Novaya Gazeta’s Kostyuchenko
most popular social network, VKontakte, called “Russian
Volunteers/Donbass” that had 10,000 subscribers;
later, he followed up on the contact within one of his
games.
Rostov Region was perfect for recruiting, Kostyuchenko
was told, as there are 68,000 veterans of
residing there. Lyana, Korolenko’s widow, also explained
another important element of her husband’s
him a notice saying that they were updating their
address lists and he should call them. Then the draft
board stated they would call back on Russian Army
hand out medals. They never called back, and Lyana
tell of contact with the draft board or local veterans’
societies that later led to volunteering for service in
the Donbass.
husband’s dead body on a grotesque LiveJournal blog
the dead Russian soldiers, many containing numbers
on their photographs. The blog has not been updated
since June 2014.200
The Battles of August 2014
Russian Presidential Administration announced a de-
of the command’s combat assignments and display by
the personnel staff of courage and heroism.”201 The
199 The Interpreter, June 19, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-weekpolitkovskayas-
murderers-sentenced-but-not-contractor/#1024.
200 Independent Information Tape, June 15, 2014, http://antikominfo.livejournal.com/353674.html.
201 The Interpreter, August 21, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-185-russian-airborne-forces-reportedly-captured-in-ukraine/#3892.
46
decree did not attract much attention that day, but it
did gain notice three days later, on August 21, when
Ukrainian forces captured a BMD-2 in Lutugino, in
Lugansk Region, and claimed it was Russian.202 Even
more questions were raised when Russian Defense
-
gion to hand out the awards.203
Many of the websites and projects that track reports
-
cated.204 Ukrainian journalists Roman Bochkala and
about the documents of Russian soldiers found in the
BMD-2.205 LiveJournal bloggers matched 15 names
in the documents to accounts on VKontakte.206 In
the following days, The Interpreter also accessed the
same accounts and watched in real time as they were
removed or had pictures deleted from them faster than
they could be archived.207
Russia’s independent press also began tracking
down news of missing, wounded, or killed soldiers,
facing intense denials from the Defense Ministry,
propagandists who claimed the investigators were
Photoshopping pictures, faking information, or in the
videotaped interrogations of them, activists were em-
missing soldiers who had supposedly been “sent for
training” by Russia.
Bochkala and Shvets claimed that the Ukrainian
24th Brigade of the Armed Forces and the “Storm”
-
ments. Shvets wrote that the documents included a
folder labeled with the name of Lt. Popov, the platoon
commander, as well as the duty roster, the evening
inspection logbook, and the journal of the decommissioned.
“The crew. . . well, let’s say they got lost on
the way,” he quipped. Bochkala added:
Light-blue berets and Rollton noodle briquettes
[a just-add-water soup, similar to
In the photographs are visible the combat
vehicle and a PKT machine gun displayed
with the name plate of a gunner, Private N. D.
Surnachev. This last name and initials are also
indicated in the evening inspection journal,
along with the names of other soldiers from
Ukraine. For example, from the passport of
N. S. Krygin it follows that he is from Pskov
Region, born in 1994. That tells us that Putin
has a problem with experienced recruits since
combat. Here is what the wife of one of the
servicemen from the Pskov Airborne Division
wrote me yesterday on Facebook: ‘Our husbands
were sent recently to Ukraine. As if for
training. They didn’t know where they were
being sent. Ever since there has not been any
phone call or greeting from them. We are
Among the items visible in the photos were credit
cards belonging to someone named Ilya Maksimov,
later found to be one of the paratroopers; a folder with
the name of Popov, Unit 74268’s platoon commander;
and the scope for an AK-74m Tyulpan. All seemed to
be clear indications of a Russian military presence.208
As the Odessa news site Dumskaya.net pointed
out,209 when a Russian soldier is drafted into the army,
his passport is taken from him and held by military
command on the army base, leaving him to carry
only his draft card. So the only way passports could
be found in a BMD-2 after a battle is if these soldiers
were contractors who formally resigned from the army
and became “volunteers.”
Vasily Sychev, a military expert contacted by
202 The Interpreter, August 21, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraineliveblog-
day-185-russian-airborne-forces-reportedly-captured-in-ukraine/#3889.
203 The Interpreter, August 24, 2014, http://www.
interpretermag.com/17850/#3921.
204 See “IFV from Russian Airborne Division,” The Interpreter
Soldiers MIA, KIA,” The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week/#4037.
205 “Russian Press and Social Media Mine VKontakte for Information on Russian Paratroopers,” The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.
206 “Russian Press and Social Media Mine VKontakte,” The Interpreter.
207 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.
com/17850/#3926.
208 Bochkala, https://www.facebook.com/bochkala/posts/789072054478519.
209 Dumskaya.net, August 21, 2014, http://dumskaya.
net/news/odesskie-dobrovolcy-prinyali-uchastie-v-unichtog-038431//4/.
47
reporters, questioned all the items, saying that the
Rollton brand of instant noodles was not part of
the dry rations issued to Russian soldiers and that a
nametag on a machine gun was odd, as usually these
weapons are signed out and the information recorded
at the base. Soldiers do not place such nameplates on
the weapons, Sychev claimed.
Russian blogger Viktor Kadochnikov was among
had not accessed their social media accounts after August
15 or 16; only one had logged in on August 17.210
Shortly thereafter, Russian journalist Aleksei
Amyotov reported on Twitter that he had found a man
going to Ulan-Ude, the capital of the Buryat Republic,
to bury his son, who he said was a paratrooper killed
near Donetsk.211
More recently, an archived copy of Nikolai
Surnachev’s VKontakte page shows pictures of him
posing with Russian army buddies wearing the telnyashka,
the striped t-shirt worn by paratroopers. The
archive shows a picture of him in military uniform on
March 24, 2015; this post, however, is missing from
the live version of his account.212 There is nothing in
his current set of posts that would indicate he ever
fought in Ukraine or indeed had an opinion on the
man with a picture of himself and a military comrade;
both are wearing the telnyashka and light-blue berets
customary among VDV soldiers, which suggests they
served together in the Airborne Troops.213 As of August
20, 2015, all posts before August 5, 2015, have
dead or alive. Perhaps his account is being maintained
by his girlfriend, who refreshed it on the anniversary
of his death.
Surnachev’s case is typical of many social media
accounts of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. But
while these accounts are helpful in providing clues,
they are not a substitute for journalistic spadework
Russian soldiers in Ukraine by contacting relatives,
friends, or the soldiers themselves.
Separatists’ Admission of
Russian Presence
The Russian military presence in Ukraine was
widely documented on social media, with numerous
videos of Russian convoys in Ukraine and soldiers
with Russian accents nonnative to the Donbass. Despite
this informal coverage on blogs and social media,
however, the rumor was not validated until August
28, 2014, when Russia’s state TV1 quoted a speech
self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic, that could
“I will say something even more candid: among us
leave not on the ocean beaches but among us, among
214
This notion of the “vacationers” took hold and became
a sarcastic meme for many bloggers describing
the war.
The Curious Case of Leonid
Kichatkin
Attempting to follow up on VKontakte clues can
be frustrating—and ultimately dangerous to reporters.
Anatoly Vorobey, a Russian-language blogger
based in Tel Aviv who blogs at avva.livejournal.
com, discovered just how unreliable social media can
be for investigating such cases.215 After posting the
published picture of the logbooks from the BMD-2
that included a listing for Leonid Kichatkin, age 30, a
senior sergeant in the unit, a notice outlined in red was
posted to Kichatkin’s VKontakte page that read: “Dear
Friends!!!!!!!!!! Lyona [Leonid] was killed funeral
bid farewell please come we will be glad to see you. If
Vorobey found earlier posts from Oksana on her
for news of Leonid, then that “life had stopped,” and
210
211 Aleksei Amyotov, Twitter feed, August 25, 2014, 12:09 a.m., https://twitter.com/Amyot/status/503801322584694784.
212 Archive of VKontakte account of Nikita Surnachev, https://archive.is/4E3oF.
213
214 TV1, August 28, 2014, http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/266444. The statement was cited widely by national and local media. See, e.g., Oleg
Kuryyer, September 2, 2014, http://www.
215 http://avva.livejournal.com/2800178.html#comments.
48
appeared to be unmistakable proof that Kichatkin was
among those killed at Lutugino.
By Sunday, August 24, however, Kichatkin’s page
on VKontakte, as well as his page on Odnoklassniki,
perhaps someone else who had assumed control over
we are now marking the baptism of our daughter.”
Ivan Vasyunin, a journalist from Russkaya Planeta,
posted a notice on Twitter that he had reached Oksana
and that the couple had asked people not to call.216
Secret Funerals for the 76th
Slon.ru’s Aleksei Ponomarev reported on August
25, 2014, that the funerals for the dead paratroopers
had been closed to the public.217 He was told by a
local eyewitness that about 100 people were present
at the service, conducted at a small cemetery near a
of the 76th Division. The funeral was under police
guard, and no outsiders were permitted to attend.
Military spokesmen denied the stories, even though
military wreaths were found on the graves. Lieutenant
Russian Airborne Forces, said that “everyone is alive
and well in our assault paratroopers division.” Major
Ministry also stated this information was “a false-
Russian BMD with documents of paratroopers killed
or captured.218
appear on social media, pro-Kremlin trolls said the images
had been Photoshopped, and a debate about the
authenticity of the news ensued. Hoping to get to the
bottom of the story, on August 25, Novaya Gazeta’s
Nina Petlyanova and Irina Tumanova, a reporter from
the St. Petersburg newspaper Fontaka.ru, traveled to
219
Initially, when Petlyanova called the Kichatkins,
Oksana Kichatkin once again insisted that her husband
Leonid was alive, and that his VKontakte page had
been hacked. Oksana gave the phone to a man who
said he was Leonid, was alive and well, and had not
gone anywhere because his wife was “pregnant, plus
there are three children.” He also offered to “sing a
song for you or dance for the video camera” to prove
his status as living.
near the 76th Division base, where they found a grave
bearing the name of Leonid Yuryevich Kichatkin
and dates of his life, September 30, 1984–August 19,
2014, as well as wreaths from military units. A major
standing near the grave told them that two soldiers had
just been buried, Kichatkin and another whose grave
read “Aleksandr Sergeyevich Osipov [December 15,
1993–August 20, 2014].” The major turned out to be
the father of Aleksandr Osipov. He was mourning his
216 Ivan Vasyunin, Twitter feed, August 24, 2014, 7:04 a.m., https://twitter.com/vasyunin/status/503543434628833280.
217 Slon.ru, August 25, 2014, http://slon.ru/fast/russia/v-
218 “Landing,” Novaya Gazeta
219 Novaya Gazeta
news/1686247.html.
Grave of Anton Savelev,
soldier of unit no. 54607
of the 16th Separate
Spetsnaz Brigade of the
GRU, killed in Ukraine.
Photo: Vadim Korovin,
Ruslan Leviev
49
son, whom he had sent off to war in Ukraine.
As is customary at Russian gravesides, the major
had a small table with bottles of vodka, bread, and
tomatoes for the wake. He and the journalists drank
to the memory of Aleksandr, and the major said: “He
wanted to be a hero. . . . Soldiers have a job to do.
Somebody has to pay their debt to the Motherland.”
He said that Aleksandr’s convoy had been caught be-
in Ukraine. He did not know how many had been
killed but said there were more to bury.
Near Kichatkin’s grave, the journalists also discovered
one of Kichatkin’s relatives, who said that
the family had held a brief service for Kichatkin, who
military duties.” That was all he knew. By then, the
telephone number Petlyanova had been calling, on
which Kichatkin’s wife and her supposed husband had
previously responded to queries, was disconnected.220
The pair returned the next day, August 26, to
investigate the other graves with Vladimir Romensky
of TV Rain and Ilya Vasyunin of the Russian news site
Russkaya Planeta; however, they were pushed back by
a group of local thugs whom they believed had been
directed by the authorities. They then met with other
reporters from Novaya Gazeta and Fontanka, attempted
another visit, and were attacked again, but Romen-
In one of these videos, which became emblematic
for the Russian media community of the thwarted
were shown caroming around a graveyard in a car as
hooded thugs in tracksuits threw rocks at the vehicle,
trying to break their windows, and wielded large
screws to try to puncture their tires.221 One reporter
made a frantic call to police to try to get the authorities
to intervene; another reporter attempted to get the
attackers to back off, saying that he and his colleagues
would leave the cemetery. Meanwhile, clearly seen in
the background of the video were fresh graves, heaped
Orthodox crosses and wreaths from the Russian Airborne
Division. As one YouTube commentator, Dmitry
Shchelokov, noted on TV Rain’s video posting:
This isn’t thugs hiding their face; this is Putin
showing his face. This is the essence of Putin’s
-
den faces, obvious intentions and obvious contractors
[to carry out the job]. Putin’s FSB sent
their thug stand-ins to prevent the journalists
-
troopers, killed in Ukraine, a small crime to
cover up the tracks of a bigger crime of Putin.
the incident to the war in Ukraine. But TV Rain also
reported that Sergei Kovalchenko, editor-in-chief of
the Telegraf wire service, was stopped at the cemetery
Fontanka also tweeted about the attack.222
On August 30, Petlyanova reported that Kichatkin’s
relatives were being threatened with the loss
loved ones if they spoke to the press.223 The division
commander stonewalled the reporters. Relatives of the
alleged slain said they had heard nothing from the men
since August 15 or 16; worse, they said, the 76th’s
commanders told them to keep quiet and not talk to
the press or anyone else.
The Missing Paratrooper
Company
Ultimately, an entire company of Pskov para-
Ukraine in August, Pskovskaya Guberniya and Slon.
ru reported on September 2.224 After these outlets
220 “Independent Russian Journalists Follow Up on Paratroopers’ Burials,” The Interpreter, August 30, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/
russia-this-week/.
221
222 Telegraf Agency,” TV Rain, August 26, 2014, http://tvrain.ru/news/v_
a.m., https://twitter.com/venera_galeeva/status/504283750084386816.
223 Novaya Gazeta, August 28, 2014, http://www.
224 The Interpreter, September 2, 2014, http://
Pskovskaya Guberniya, September 3–9, 2014, http://gubernia.pskovregion.org/number_706/00.php; Aleksei Ponomarev,
Slon.ru, September 2, 2014, http://slon.ru/fast/russia/
50
published the news of the three paratroopers’ funerals,
they were contacted by other paratroopers who
requested anonymity but gave them a tape of an interview
with soldiers in the company. The soldiers on the
tape claimed that only 10 men had survived out of 80,
and that as many as 140 could have died.
Lev Shlosberg, the Rostov regional deputy in the
Yabloko Party, told Russian blogger Oleg Kashin that
the families of the paratroopers were told to keep quiet
and threatened with the loss of state welfare if they
spoke out. Shlosberg said the causes of death were
listed variously as “explosion of a gas tank,” “heart
attack,” or “stroke,” and the places of death were not
indicated.225
To date, no one has been able to produce a list of all
-
happened to them remains an open question.
Meanwhile, reports began to trickle in concerning
funerals not only in Pskov Region but also in Bel-
Alekseyeva, the wife of 27-year-old Sgt. Ruslan Fyo-
-
ever, by that time, it was already known that at least
three other paratroopers from the 76th had been killed.
studied in the same military academy as her husband;
Kichatkin, with whom he had also served; and Aleksandr
Osipov, mentioned earlier, had also been killed.
Osipov, Korolenko, Fyodorov, and Kichatkin were all
considered to be the combat-ready company “in the
event of war,” Alekseyeva explained.226 Her testimony
seemingly corroborates what Ukrainian journalists Roman
Bochkala and Leonid Shvets had reported earlier.
The St. Petersburg Soldiers’
Mothers and the Missing Soldiers
from the North Caucasus
1990s, originally focused on the rampant abuse,
the Soldiers’ Mothers advised recruits on alternative
service to the draft and their right to refuse combat
service outside of Russia, as well as began looking
into reports of soldiers killed in Ukraine, though they
cases immediately, they might get answers from Rus-
was inaugurated.
The movement to uncover the deaths of Russian
soldiers in the Donbass has been particularly active in
two cities: St. Petersburg, where servicemen wounded
in Ukraine were allegedly brought to a military hospital
located there in August 2014; and Kostroma, the
forces in August 2014 also originated.
-
meant to investigate human rights abuses in Russia
-
-
tive, as its leader has been able to meet with President
only able to speak in a highly scripted fashion about
topics acceptable to Putin, such as children’s welfare.
Indeed, in his last meeting with Putin, Mikhail Fedo-
pressure Poroshenko to do more for displaced persons
and refugees, making no reference to the problem
place. Fedotov did not raise the credible reports that
Russia is backing the insurgents, and that Russia has
Using the legitimacy of their positions on this
of the St. Petersburg Soldiers’ Mothers, and Sergei
movement—sent an inquiry to the Russian Investiga-
a request to conduct an investigation into the circumstances
of the deaths of nine contract soldiers from
of whom are natives of Dagestan, a Muslim region in
-
Region on August 9 and 11.
225 “Visiting Shlosberg at the Hospital,” Oleg Kashin, September 2, 2014, http://kashin.guru/2014/09/02/lev-2/.
226
51
Meanwhile, regional Dagestan news site Chernovik
had been killed in Ukraine and, in an article on August
22, urged relatives to contact them with details.227
A paratrooper who requested anonymity told
Chernovik that the soldiers’ deployment was “voluntary-
forced,” as the saying goes in Russian, meaning
that while it was technically a voluntary choice,
soldiers were placed under much pressure to serve
in combat. The paratrooper said: “Those who refuse
to go, for example, are brought out on the parade
grounds and accused of cowardice and so on in front
of the line up. That is, they put mental pressure on
them.”
Chernovik further reported:
sources maintain, is like a “shuttle.” The armed
formation (is it legal?) enters the territory of
Ukraine, performs a combat assignment, then
leaves the territory of the country. In one such
operation, our countrymen fell under artillery
one from Atlanaul, a village in Buynaksk District
and another from the village of Shagada
in Khasavyurt District. Another from Buynaksk
(Khasavyurt District).
Chernovik claimed that two tank companies had
crossed the Russian–Ukrainian border, and contract
soldiers from the Russian navy, hailing from units
Ukraine.
In the comment section of the Chernovik article,
village of Aksay in Khasavyurt District; the village
-
basar District, where a funeral took place on August
who had been wounded in Ukraine was back in the
village. Other readers denied that such things could
happen and even denounced Chernovik for engaging
in “sabotage.” The news site, they insisted, should be
prosecuted.
However, there were rumors at this time that as
many as 400 contractors from Dagestan had been
killed in combat in Ukraine by August 2014. Bloggers
and regional press began to report this story, although
the Ukrainian news site UNN said the story originated
from Rasul Abu Asad, a resident of Khasavyurt in
Dagestan. UNN quoted Asad as saying on his Facebook
page: “You will never believe it. I wouldn’t
have believed it either, if someone else had told
me.”228 Asad then allegedly continued: “More than
400 contract Dagestani contract soldiers were killed
in Ukraine. 224 people were brought back a few days
ago to Dagestan. 200 of them are men who had served
in Shali and 70 in Khankala [Russian military bases].
On August 20, 2014, the LiveJournal blogger “Saracinua”
said exactly the same thing and offered the same
details, although he appeared to be a different person
from Asad.229 However, no link to Asad’s Facebook
page was provided by UNN, and The Interpreter was
LiveJournal and Facebook posts often contain material
from other bloggers without attribution—such is
the nature of social media, where copying and pasting
is the work of a moment. In this particular case, the
UNN did, however, check with Donetsk’s mufti
funerals were held there, he would know about them.
Ismagilov told the news site that no one had contacted
him about such cases and no bodies of Dagestanis had
been brought to his mosque, although he was aware
number too large, although he did add that possibly
the bodies were returned immediately to Dagestan and
funeral rites were conducted locally.230
227 Chernovik
228 UNN, August 19, 2015, http://www.unn.com.ua/ru/
229
com/1454475.html.
230
52
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers
of Stavropol Territory
On August 27, after publishing materials from the
St. Petersburg Soldier’s Mothers, the independent tele-
of Soldiers’ Mothers in Stavropol Territory had made a
list of 400 killed and wounded Russian soldiers.231
Ludmila Bogatenkova, leader of the Mothers of Prikomya,
a regional group that was part of the Stavropol
conscripts’ rights, told TV Rain that the list had been
made “from various sources in the armed forces which
that the killed and wounded servicemen were mainly
232 She
added that there were soldiers from other units, and
that the list was being constantly updated with new
additions. She did not mention the Dagestani soldiers,
but presumably they were included in her list if it was
that long. She did not publish the list of names and
units.
This news was subsequently picked up by the
233
by two Ukrainian bloggers
about 15 Pskov paratroopers had now snowballed
killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine, mainly from the
maskirovka
insurgency, because they had been spotted in the
Donbass at the onset of the war.234 On May 25, for in-
at a “Novorossiya” election rally in Donetsk.235 The
Interpreter
combatants.236
conceded that there were a few “volunteers” there,
adding that he would be happy to send 74,000 and go
237 There were
repeated reports of Interior Ministry battalions from
the fall of 2014 and up to the defeat of the Ukrainian
army in January 2014. In July 2015, Kadyrov claimed
Ukraine.238
Kostroma POWs, KIA, and MIA,
and the First Demonstrations
The reported deaths of Russian soldiers and the
return of their bodies to the Motherland seemed to
Ukraine, but each case was routinely questioned,
relatives silenced, and the allegations met with the
response that the subject in question was only a “volunteer”
and not under the command and control of the
Russian armed forces.
On August 26, when the Ukrainian Security Service
captured and that all had given testimony about their
original bases and units, the notion of “volunteers”
began to be dispelled.
of this report. There have been many thousands held
by Ukrainians—in some cases, separatists suspicious
of their supporters from Russia—and the process of
exchange is still underway in accordance with the col-
231
232
233
europe-28968526.
234 The Interpreter,
August 26, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-190-russian-paratroopers-captured-in-ukraine/#3971.
235 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 97: Polls Open with Elections Under Threat in East,” The Interpreter, May 25, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/ukraine-liveblog-day-97-polls-open-with-elections-under-threat-in-east/#2877.
236 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 180,” The Interpreter.
237 The Interpreter, June 6, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/14302/#0946.
238 The Interpreter, July 31, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.
com/russia-update-july-31-2015/#9322.
53
and highly visible capture of Russian soldiers marked
a turning point in the international community’s recognition
of Russian aggression against Ukraine.
On August 26, 2014, The Interpreter translated a
report from the leading Ukrainian news site Unian.
net about the detention of the 10 soldiers of the 331st
239
Elena Racheva of Novaya Gazeta
240 These soldiers, who were
detained in the Kiev pretrial detention prison, were
questioned by the SBU, and nine of them participated
burns and was transferred to a burn unit in St. Peters-
on August 23, then put on alert and marched into
that Russian armor would make an incursion into
Ukrainian territory.
uploaded by the SBU to YouTube, some of which
was translated by The Interpreter, a pattern emerged:
young Russian recruits who had been persuaded to
sign up as contractors near the end of their service
were not fully informed of what was happening and
either believed that they were patrolling the border or
At least, that was the story they told interrogators
while in captivity and under duress, so those circumstances
have to be taken into consideration.241
taken by the Russian-backed separatists. Nevertheless,
Kostroma remained a focus of attention, as a number
of paratroopers remained missing.
Racheva then got in touch with some of the parents
and wives of the soldiers, who did not want to
that their accounts coincided with some of the video-
confessions. According to these relatives, the soldiers
had been told they were going for training in Rostov
for two weeks but then suddenly were ordered to take
their winter kits as well. The wives were forbidden
to come to the base to see off their husbands. One of
them disobeyed and came anyway to bring her husband
some clothes. She said she saw a lot of military
vehicles, more than usual, before the entire regiment
departed.
The reporters also learned that the men had been
asked if they wanted to go on these “exercises,” and
some had refused. Forty were immediately discharged.
The rest were not told where they were going, but
were informed that their combat readiness would be
tested.
Racheva reported that one wife, “Elena,” said that
fact know the destination, but he had told her that the
soldiers had signed nondisclosure agreements and had
their cell phones taken from them so they could not
be geolocated. Elena received a text message from her
husband from the military transport train on August
21 that was sent using a cell phone he kept concealed.
It read: “Honey, we’re at the Taganrog-1 station,
In a subsequent call on August 22 he said his regiment
was setting up camp; on August 23, he called
again and said the soldiers had been told to remove
their nametags from their clothing and their telnyashki
draft cards had been taken away from them, he said.
In his last phone call, Artyom told Elena not to worry;
he would only be gone two or three days, during
which he would be unable to call. “Are you going to
said no, but she felt his voice was different from how
it normally was, and he asked to say goodbye to their
daughter. On August 24, he called her at 3:00 a.m. to
tell her that the regiment was 15 kilometers from the
Ukrainian border. It had been roused for an emergency
and was going on a 70-kilometer march. That was the
last time Elena ever heard from him.
Elena recalled that back in May, the whole regiment
had been ordered to get foreign passports or face dismissal,
indicating that recruits had been converted into
contractors who were allowed to bring their civilian
however, these passports were collected right before
239 “Ukraine Liveblog Day 190,” The Interpreter.
240
2014, The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week/#4031; Elena Racheva, “Look How Far Away Ukraine Is,” Novaya
Gazeta
241 The Interpreter, August 31, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/russia-this-week/#3949.
54
the move into Ukraine. She also recalled that back on
them that Ukrainians were shelling Russian Federation
territory and that they had to be prepared; when she
asked her husband if they were going to war, he said,
“Oh, no, it’s just training.”
Elena told Novaya Gazeta’s Racheva that there
were reports of as many as 250 killed out of some 300
her mother-in-law had not been able to locate him at
hospitals in Rostov.
who had served with Artyom and relatives of other
Aleksandr Khotulev read out a list of casualties: two
contract soldiers had died, and 10 had been wounded
and taken to Rostov hospitals. Nine had been detained
by the Ukrainians, and the tenth was in the emergency
room. The colonel said that the men had gone into
Ukrainian territory “by mistake” while “patrolling
the border, the commander angrily replied: “The order
came. Ask the Defense Ministry.”
Novaya
Gazeta how they had been reviled on Russian social
media and threatened that if they did not pick up
200”—that is, dead. The commander explained that
in due course.
since the outbreak of Russia’s war in Ukraine, rel-
still looking for their missing loved ones—about 30
in all—decided to stage a picket at the army base on
August 28, 2014.
One of the wives of a missing soldier received a
-
were located in various cities, and would return—but
it would take a while. The wife was ordered not to divulge
any information, not to report her husband as a
missing person, and not to attend any rallies. The other
wives were also threatened and warned that they could
-
could be jailed for divulging state secrets.
things worse for her husband, and that he would be
Elena. “Yes,” she was told.
The women decided to demonstrate anyway, but
Akhmerov clearly had no information but told them
that none of the wounded or bodies of those killed
were there, that there was no mobile connection to
any of the soldiers, and that they should be proud
of their husbands’ service to their country. He tried
husbands. As for wounds, they only have blisters.”
He further shooed away a journalist from France’s
the demonstration, saying that the reporter was only
“smearing Russia” and exploiting the women’s grief.
Some of the wives then turned on the AFP reporter,
urging him to leave. This followed a pattern typical for
Russia, where military families keep silent when they
are told that doing so might work out better for them.
But one wife, 26-year-old Valeriya Sokolova, did
talk to AFP.242
said, repeating reports that “several” soldiers had been
from Ukraine—this from the 300 originally deployed
in August to the border. She said her husband had
told her that the commanders had not said where
they would be deployed but that some would ride in
Later, 50 of the relatives, undeterred, gathered at
the paratroopers’ staff headquarters and told journalists
that they had last spoken to the men in the unit on
and refused to release any lists of dead or wounded.
The relatives were simply told the men were on
“planned exercises.”
killed in action had arrived in Kostroma, but the
names of the dead were not available. Ultimately, the
list of names of those killed in this operation was not
from more than “several” to as many as “250” could
not be validated.
242
come-clean-soldiers-ukraine-185525694.html.
55
in Russia
After not receiving any answers to their private
inquiries with military commanders, on August 26,
sent an appeal to the military investigation division of
-
inal investigative body of Russia. The appeal, which
contained a list of nine names of soldiers who were in
243
was also posted on the old website of the Presidential
Kremlin.
ru
the men from Dagestan, not their names. A copy was
additionally sent to TV Rain, which published a list of
the ranks, only with no names,244 as well as a separate
interview with Polyakova.245
and Army civic movement, said that he had received
been killed and had forwarded them to the Investiga-
then published the full text of the appeal, which contained
the list with names, on September 2, 2014.246
Prompted by the Soldiers’ Mothers’ inquiry, TV
harassment of both concerned relatives and groups
like the Soldiers’ Mothers, the channel and other independent
media began checking the information carefully
and publishing all the cases they could verify.
Often described as “the last independent TV station
in Russia,” TV Rain has long been persecuted for its
critical reporting and faced a major challenge in January
2014 over a viewer survey it ran about attitudes
toward the Siege of Leningrad.247 In this incident, TV
Rain hosts asked whether those surrounded by the
than starving to death. The survey triggered both real
Almost all cable operators ended up dropping the
station. TV Rain was then told that its lease at the
renovated Red Star factory would not be renewed.
The station was forced to move its operations into an
apartment.
missing soldiers with their unit names only,248 then
its own list on August 30, followed by the Soldiers’
Mothers list again with the full names on September
2. The station then updated the merged list until it
reached 34 names,249 with the last names being mainly
the paratroopers killed in August during the now-infamous
battle of Lutugino, where the BMD-2 was taken.
TV Rain stopped updating the list, possibly because
list remains online, however.
243 The Interpreter, August 26, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-demonstrators-against-war-in-ukraine-arrested/#4109.
244
peterburg-374580/.
245
president-sovet.ru/news/6875/. The list was as follows: 1. sanitation instructor, private; 2. scout, private; 3. scout, private; 4. group
commander, lieutenant; 5. senior scout, senior sergeant; 6. scout, grenade-thrower, private; 7. scout, sniper, private; 8. mine-layer, scout,
private; 9. division commander, junior sergeant.
246
Fyodorov, born 1981, group commander, lieutenant; 5. Arbi Umaltayevich Misirbayev, born 1978, senior scout, senior sergeant; 6. Ibragim
1967, division commander, junior sergeant.
247 “Prosecutor Launches Probe of TV Rain,” translation of article originally published by Lenta.ru on January 30, 2014, The Interpreter,
January 31, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/prosecutor-launches-probe-of-tv-rain/.
248
Banner Brigade—2 dead.
249 http://tvrain.ru/soldat/.
56
Blogger
On August 28, the well-known and controversial
Russian-language video blogger Anatoly Shariy,
-
rope, denounced the Soldiers’ Mothers story about
the Dagestani soldiers as fake. To discredit them, he
purported to have found police records and a criminal
history related to the group. He also made much of
Mothers of St. Petersburg by the National Endowment
for Democracy, a U.S. congressionally funded aid
reports of Russian grantees precisely because of harassment
by people such as Shariy; the information is
available in the Internet Archive, however.250
Shariy thus tried to associate the Soldiers’ Mothers
with the war in Iraq and the “liars” in the Bush administration.
Yet the Soldiers’ Mothers 2011 grant dealt
only with domestic affairs and was used for seminars
on legal issues related to the draft. Such activities are
still currently legal under Russia law, and carrying
them out with the support of a foreign grant was also
legal at the time. The law signed by Putin that im-
grants from abroad was only passed in 2013.
even-handed critic of both Russia and Ukraine. He
by Russia’s TV1, for example, which falsely accused
Ukrainian troops of crucifying a three-year-old boy
Slavyansk from the separatists. Yet most of Shariy’s
criticism is directed at Ukraine, and his method
often includes providing a welter of details and expert-
sounding commentary, delivered in the cynical
tone that attracts many viewers on YouTube.
however, he was revealed as an instrument of the
Kremlin’s interests, trying to smear the Soldiers’
Mothers as American agents even as they tried to uncover
information about Russians who had died serving
their country, albeit under dubious circumstances.
Shariy also never addressed the group’s legitimate
concerns about the Dagestani servicemen killed.
Moreover, on August 29, RIA Novosti reported that
the Ministry of Justice had registered the St. Petersburg
Soldiers’ Mothers as a “foreign agent,” although
grants from abroad.251 That reinforced the sense that
-
ed attack, especially given the appearance of other
attacks on social media.252
RIA Novosti said that the Soldiers’ Mothers had
provided no comment but revealed that Anatoly Artyukh—
a Russian Orthodox activist and aide to the conservative
St. Petersburg deputy Vitaly Milonov, known
for his anti-gay diatribes—had appealed to the FSB
Soldiers’ Mothers for “foreign agent” status. Artyukh
said the Soldiers’ Mothers were providing consultation
to “youths who wish to dodge the draft” and “deserters,”
as well as legal assistance, roundtables, and seminars
“for money from abroad”—all while failing to
Meeting of Defense Ministry and
Soldiers’ Mothers
-
ers appeal by TV Rain, coupled with activists’ repeated
requests, succeeded in getting the group a meeting
despite the fact that on August 29, they had been registered
as “foreign agents.”253 It appears that, although
Defense Ministry spokesmen in Moscow continued
to stonewall journalists on the issue of Russian troops
-
ures who also had the added prestige of membership
Nikolai Pankov and Ruslan Tsalkikov, deputy ministers
of defense, and Sergei Prigorov, director of the
Defense Ministry’s Department of Housing, agreed to
meet with the group of human rights advocates, which
250 See https://web.archive.org/web/20150720104843/http://www.ned.org/publications/annual-reports/2011-annual-report/eurasia/russia.
251
252 The Interpreter, http://www.
interpretermag.com/russia-this-week/#4035.
253 “Russian Defense Ministry Meets with Soldiers’ Mothers, Human Rights Advocates,” The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/
russia-this-week-demonstrators-against-war-in-ukraine-arrested/#4110.
57
included Mikhail Fedotov, chairman of the Presiden-
-
va, Irina Kirkora, and Sergei Krivenko.254
The meeting was cordial enough, but no progress
was made on getting answers to previous inquiries
about missing soldiers. Pankov noted the importance
as a mediator between the ministry and civil society,
and the Defense Ministry tried to placate concerns by
announcing a new mass campaign aimed at urging soldiers
to call their mothers. On August 31 and September
1, the ministry sent text messages to hundreds of
thousands of soldiers throughout Russia, reading, ”Re-
to equate the very real concerns of relatives of deceased
soldiers with the overwrought, if understandable,
panic of parents about not getting phone calls
from busy children. This macabre distraction failed to
gain attention in mainstream or social media outlets; if
it had, it might have been ridiculed.
Almost playfully, given the context in which the
-
sia, and not the systemic campaign of invention and
violation of soldiers’ rights in order to get the most
rapid response.
-
while proposed creating a joint working group with
of the alarming reports about dead or missing Russian
soldiers. Unsurprisingly, this initiative never got off
the ground.
Activists’ Interview with Reuters
On September 12, 2014, as attacks on critics esca-
and Maria Tsvetkova published an interview with
Krivenko and Polyakova.255
In speaking with Reuters, the activists were following
a template long used by Soviet-era dissidents, as
well as modern Russian human rights advocates. First,
had warned that it would “get worse for them” if they
eventually, local and national media. Finally, they tried
they took the cause to international press in order to
give it more resonance—and possibly stem the tide of
harassment by giving it publicity.
In the Reuters interview, Krivenko described the
case of Anton Tumanov, which had already been
covered by the Kyiv Post and was based on an account
given by his mother, Elena Tumanova, to Krivenko’s
254
255
2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/12/us-ukraine-crisis-russians-special-repor-idUSKBN0H70S920140912.
Russian soldier Anton Tumanov
in Rostov Region, July 19, 2014.
Photo: VKontakte
Death notice for Tumanov
sent to his mother by the
Russian Ministry of Defense.
Photo: Novaya Gazeta
58
“Medical documents said there were shrapnel
wounds. That is, he died from a loss of blood, but how
it happened and where were not indicated,” Krivenko
said. Tumanova could not be reached for comment,
as “Rolan”—was wounded in the same battle as Tumanov
and said that the latter had died in surgery after
being struck by shrapnel.
Muted Public Response
As Reuters commented, “The fact that Russian sol-
spread over the past few weeks. Though still limited,
such talk has powerful echoes of earlier Russian wars
256
In August and early September 2014, large opposition
antiwar rallies were held in Moscow and
in part spurred by reports of Russian soldiers being
killed,257-
er-up of their deaths were not a prominent part of the
demonstrations, as there was more focus on the more
than 3,000 Ukrainian civilians killed in the war by that
time.258
These rallies attracted mainly the Moscow or St.
the liberal intelligentsia and the opposition—in
256
257 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-rights-or-
Petersburg,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 29, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-antiwar-marches-ukraine/26597971.
html.
258
article/2014/09/09/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0H40M820140909.
Opposition demonstrators stage the
Peace March against the war in Ukraine.
Photo: Ilya Pitalev / TASS
59
other words, Russians who were not losing sons in a
hushed-up war in the Donbass. That group was mainly
composed of poor provincial families for whom military
service was often the only job in town, but other
some small rallies in Ekaterinburg and Barnaul, no
major protests were held in Russia’s provinces, and
to the Russian Defense Ministry or their meeting
in St. Petersburg, where the injured soldiers had been
brought and where the local wing of the Soldiers’
Mothers had been particularly outspoken,259 but they
were detained by police. One lone picketer also protested
the war near Red Square; pictures by independent
reporters posted to social media show him being
choked by police and shoved into a police van, an outcome
that may have deterred others from protesting.260
Another lone protester picketed in Yekaterinburg.261
Furthermore, the March 2015 rally to protest Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine—and a sagging economy
brought about in part by U.S. and European Union
sanctions against Russia—was tragically turned into a
and former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov, who
might be led into altering its course or have to confront
rising popular resentment about a costly act of
foreign adventurism—a grassroots revolt tantamount
to those that attended the United States’ wars in Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan—simply has not occurred
in Russia. Authorities there are very good at suppressing
dissent, and the independent media audience is
very small in a country where the vast majority of the
population still acquires its “news” from state-controlled
television.
Arrest of Stavropol Soldiers’
Mothers Leader Ludmila
Bogatenkova
Russian authorities were not content to silence
the media or wear them out with the demands of
fact-checking or counter-propaganda; they decided to
move against the most vocal of the activists pursuing
Soldiers’ Mothers quickly evaporated.
On October 18, 2014, Ludmila Bogatenkova, chair
of the Mothers of Prikumya, was brought before a
judge in Budyonnovsk on charges of fraud.262 An
ambulance was called to the courtroom during the
hearing, which was halted. Bogatenkova, now 74, is a
registered disabled person, and it is believed that she
became ill in court.
The next day, October 19, 2014, the hearing resumed,
and the court ordered her arrest pending trial
on fraud charges based on claims that she had taken
money from recruits with the promise of helping them
avoid the draft. The charges were not substantiated,
and later the man who gave evidence against her said
he had been asked by the FSB to support fake claims
against Bogatenkova as retaliation against her publi-
was released from pretrial detention after protests.
On July 1, 2015, a judge acquitted Bogatenkova on
one charge and reduced the severity of a second, issuing
a one-year suspended sentence before immediately
granting her amnesty.263 Even so, the sentence continues
to hang over her head as a deterrent to speaking
out and risking re-arrest.
Reprisals Against Journalists
All journalists who have attempted to investigate or
Russia have met with the severest reprisals, some-
attacks.
Assault of TV Rain Producer
On September 12, 10 days after TV Rain published
Mothers about servicemen reported to have been
killed in Ukraine, Ksenya Batanova, TV Rain’s chief
259
260 The Interpreter, September 6, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/
russia-this-week-demonstrators-against-war-in-ukraine-arrested/#4070.
261 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-thisweek-
demonstrators-against-war-in-ukraine-arrested/#4069.
262 The Interpreter, October 19, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-hundreds-of-russians-poisoned-25-dead-in-spice-drug-epidemic/#4662.
263
60
producer and anchor, was assaulted near her home by
in the face.264 She lost consciousness and was hos-
attack was similar to that suffered by Lev Shlosberg in
Pskov, and there was reason to wonder whether it was
reprisal for TV Rain’s attempt to report on the issue of
Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine; Batanova had recently
interviewed war photographer Viktoriya Ivleva
by RIA Novosti photographer Andrei Stenin, who was
this case—in Shlosberg’s case, for example, no valuables
were taken, whereas Batanova’s assailants took
jewelry and her cell phone—led TV Rain to refrain
from reporting the attack until September 14 and to
remain unsure that the beating was intended as reprisal
for their reporting.
Ultimately, TV Rain did not comment further on
whether they believed this attack was related to their
this date, the work on the list of soldiers killed slowed
down and eventually stopped altogether.
Attack on BBC Crew
-
berg, reported that he and his team were attacked
in Astrakhan while investigating reports of Russian
soldiers being killed near the border with Ukraine.265
At least three thugs grabbed their camera, smashed it,
and knocked a cameraman to the ground. The journalists
reported the attack but then were interrogated by
police for four hours; later they found that their equipment
had been tampered with, and the hard drives and
memory cards were wiped clean.
in past years in Russia, and even an assassination, this
foreign journalists were physically attacked in Russia.
Rosenberg reported that he and his crew were
attacked after interviewing Oksana, the sister of
who was killed after being recalled from leave and
on July 26, 2014, telling his family that he was headed
to Ukraine. He reportedly sounded fearful. On August
commissar that he had been killed by a Ukrainian
shell landing on Russian territory. Oksana said that the
commissar himself admitted that he did not believe
this story.
toward Astrakhan. Upon leaving her village, they were
IDs. The attack occurred shortly thereafter.
Attack on Lev Shlosberg
On August 29, 2014—the same day that the St.
Petersburg Soldiers’ Mothers were publicly branded
as “foreign agents”—Lev Shlosberg, a deputy in the
Pskov Region legislature from the opposition Yabloko
about 400 meters from his home.266 The attackers
appeared unaware that Shlosberg had arranged to meet
a friend outside his home and ran away when they
saw him coming. That person was able to summon an
-
sion, a fractured nose, and multiple bruises, the press
secretary of Yabloko reported.267
Shlosberg himself linked his attack to his work
in exposing the deaths of Pskov paratroopers.268 Not
only had he raised the issue as an opposition legislator,
but he had published material in the Pskovskaya
Guberniya, a local newspaper and website that he had
founded.
-
sued a statement condemning the attack and pledging
to take the investigation “under his personal supervision,”
but the attackers were never found.
Turchak, a conservative governor loyal to the ruling
264 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-further-reports-ofrussian-
paratroopers-killed-in-ukraine/#4258.
265 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29249642.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29249643
Investigating Soldiers’ Deaths in Ukraine,” The Interpreter, September 18, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-
213-bbc-team-attacked-in-russia-while-investigating-soldiers-deaths-in-ukraine/#4300.
266 The Interpreter, August 29, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week/#4038; and “Shlosberg Recovering, Links Attack to His Investigation of Paratroopers’
Deaths in Ukraine,” The Interpreter, August 29, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week/#4047.
267 See https://www.facebook.com/ig.yakovlev/posts/843905768953572.
268 “Shlosberg Recovering,”The Interpreter.
61
United Russia Party, had previously been the target of
Shlosberg’s criticism and had accused Shlosberg of
in Pskov Region.
Back in 2010, Oleg Kashin, a former Kommersant
journalist and blogger who suffered a serious assault
that left him in a coma with multiple broken limbs,
attack “because of his ties to the Kremlin.”269 That
hypothesis raised the question of whether Turchak
had ordered the attack on Shlosberg as well, and
suspicions increased when Kashin announced on his
website on September 7 that Russia’s Investigative
the attack who worked for the security department of a
company owned by Turchak’s family.270
Russia Tries a “Limited Hangout”
on News of Soldiers Killed
-
turs failed to stop the slow leakage of incriminating
evidence about Russia’s war, the Kremlin decided to
some of the truth in order
to dissuade further inquiries and prevent the outing of
the whole story.
In an August 28 report, TV1 quoted separatist
by acknowledging that they were dying in Ukraine,
too. On September 5, 2014, Russian state television
went even further toward acknowledging the Russian
military presence in Ukraine, airing a segment about
their own accord.271 The program sought to portray the
of home to help their fellow Russians abroad. Mikhail
to TV1 how “sad” it was “that we are losing young
people” but stated that he was proud that they had
-
really miss him. But for the rest of our lives we will be
proud of him.”
On September 10, all state TV channels featured
Putin’s visit to the Russian Orthodox church on
candle “for those who gave their lives for Novorossiya”
272—a vague allusion to the Russian soldiers who
died in Ukraine for the “Novorossiya” cause.
Taken together, these two instances indicate that the
Russian government was perhaps trying to “prepare
public opinion,” as propagandists say, especially in
the face of rising visible opposition discontent. On
a large antiwar march in which an estimated 26,000
people took part.273 Moscow authorities had issued
a permit to avoid the challenge of an unsanctioned
rally, but they sought to downplay it anyway. The
demonstration was covered only sparsely by state wire
services.
Putin Issues Awards to Army
Units for “Heroism and Bravery
in Combat”
On March 25, 2015, Putin issued the honorary
title of “guards” to three units: the 11th and 83rd
Regiment. The text of the citation stated: “For massive
heroism and bravery, determination and courage,
displayed by the personnel of the brigades in combat
actions in defense of the Fatherland and state interests
269 Oleg Kashin, “A Beating on My Beat,” New York Times, December 11, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/opinion/12Kashin.html
270
https://cpj.org/2015/09/russia-charges-three-suspects-over-2010-attack-on-.php.
271
Novy Region, September 5, 2014, http://nr2.com.ua/News/world_and_russia/Rossiyskaya-propaganda-prinyalas-lepit-geroev-
272 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/
russia-this-week-further-reports-of-russian-paratroopers-killed-in-ukraine/#4221.
273 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/
russia-this-week-rights-or-revanchism-russian-human-rights-commissioner-blasts-ukraine-baltic-states/.
62
account its merits in peace time.”
Although the place and time of these combat
actions were not indicated in the decrees, the question
was raised as to whether the units had fought in
Ukraine. This move by the Kremlin seemed to be another
example of an effort to stem the tide of concern
regarding killed or missing soldiers and appeared to
be calculated to stress the glory of a combat death in
service to the state.
Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied that the
honored units had fought in Ukraine and claimed that
their citations had been earned in the Soviet period or
Eurasian region, said that it had covered the presence
of these units in Ukraine in 2014, before the Donetsk
Airport and Debaltsevo battles were lost by the
Ukrainian armed forces.274
On January 20, 2015, InformNapalm blogger Irakly
-
Republic’s capital of Ulan-Ude.275 According to local
soldiers from Buryatiya who were in the 11th Separate
had been deployed in Rostov with paratroopers from
of a mixed division or battalion tactical group that
suffered heavy losses from Ukrainian artillery. In these
cases, as with other soldiers, the servicemen had been
discharged from the regular army and evidently then
signed contracts as volunteers.
This article also reported that soldiers in the 5th
Tank Brigade in Ulan-Ude, who had also been deployed
in mass numbers to Rostov, had rebelled and
torn up their contracts. “Not in a single unit in the
[Russian Federation] has such a massive refusal to
however, because no names of deceased soldiers are
given, nor are links to social media or news accounts
-
tomunkuyev, the severely burned Buryat tank gunner
from the 5th Brigade, mentioned no such protest in
his extensive interview with Novaya Gazeta’s Elena
Putin’s Decree Banning
Disclosure of Casualties During
“Special Operations”
On May 18, 2015, Putin signed a decree, published
making it a crime to disclose military casualties from
“special operations” during peacetime and classifying
such information as secret.276 Disclosure of informa-
seven years in prison. The intent of this law is clearly
to prevent reporting on Russian military casualties in
Ukraine.
The wonder was that Putin had not passed such
a decree earlier. In the week prior to its issuance, a
group of Russian bloggers reported in detail on three
Spetsnaz soldiers killed in Ukraine, which may
-
pealed the decree, arguing that Article 5 of the federal
-
cation of the losses of military personnel in peacetime,
and that Article 7 says that information about
emergencies and disasters threatening public safety
journalists, and activists joined the suit, including war
correspondents Arkady Babchenko, Timur Olevsky,
Pavel Kanygin, and Vladimir Voronov; environmental
-
berg; blogger Ruslan Leviev; and Svetlana Davydova,
a mother of seven who had been charged with treason
and arrested for informing the Ukrainian Embassy
that troops had left the barracks near her home in
were going to Ukraine. She was eventually released
and the charges against her dropped.277 On August 13,
274 “InformNapalm and Igor Sutyagin Report That Russian Army Units Honored by Putin Fought in Ukraine,” The Interpreter, March 30,
2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-march-30-2015/#7716.
275
ulan-ude-dostavyly-20-200-h.
276 The Interpreter, May 28,
2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-465-one-killed-one-injured-after-explosion-in-kiev/#8533.
277 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-all-the-strange-thingsgoing-
on-in-moscow/.
63
legal.278
Thus, with threats against relatives that they would
talking to the press; the physical attacks on provincial
politician Lev Shlosberg, and on TV and print
reporters from TV Rain, Novaya Gazeta
and others; the declaration of the St. Petersburg Soldiers’
Mothers as “foreign agents”; the assassination
of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov on the eve of a
major antiwar march; the ban on disclosure of military
casualties during “special operations,” punishable by
liberal lawyers and journalists trying to work within
suppressing dissent was complete. Every single cate-
had been harshly discouraged.
The Limits of Mining Social
Media for Cases of Russian
Soldiers Killed in Ukraine
One of the most common methods by which Russian
soldiers killed in Ukraine are found is by trawling
pro-separatist groups and forums on VKontakte,
the most popular Russian social network, and then
branching out to see the individual’s own account and
verify, and as is always the case on social media, the
capacity for deception or misunderstanding is great.
People in paramilitary or veterans’ groups who appear
in photos in uniform and with arms may be delivering
“humanitarian aid” to the Donbass but are not
necessarily combatants.279
name and a patronymic are often used, and sometimes
people post photos that do not depict their own experience,
but that of their friends. The geotagging feature
Ukraine, but it is not entirely accurate or reliable.
Some of the entries in lists of war dead have been
made on the basis of searches conducted on VKontakte
or other social media pages using names in
combination with the stock condolence phrases typical
in Russian culture, such as Skorbim, lyubim, pomnim
Tsartsvo emu
nebesnoye
Pust’ zemlya budet emu pukhom
and pictures, and the independent media, mainly based
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, can then attempt to
check the facts and give the news a wider audience,
it is local reporters, who in some cases know the
soldiers themselves or their families, who have turned
up the most validated cases, sometimes at great risk to
themselves, given their lack of the greater protections
afforded reporters in the capital. Local reporters have
some soldiers claimed deceased are still alive.
For example, when the Ukrainian journalist Roman
Bochkala reported on the captured BMD-2 in Lutugino,
he said that Nikolai Krygin, one of the soldiers
whose presence was indicated from a passport found
at the scene, was “born in 1994” and was typical of
the young, raw recruits thrown into the war. He was
also listed as having died in battle by the website
280 But a local news account said that
couldn’t have been that young; he was also reported to
be still alive.
Krygin’s page on VKontakte and pictures on his
wall281 seemed to indicate he was still alive, although
there have been cases in which family members have
accessed the accounts of those killed and continued
to post pictures. In the case of Krygin, however, he
was shown updating his account as of June 20, 2015,
striped sleeveless t-shirt and blue beret of the VDV, in
in March 2015.
A local Pskov news site said that he was in fact
alive,282 demonstrating that it was not a case of two
soldiers with the same name and displaying a picture
of his passport from the Ukrainian military experts’
278
news/20150813/274413316.html.
279 The Interpreter, January 7, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/russia-update-large-russian-military-staging-ground-detected-near-ukrainian-border/#6089.
280 “Nikolai Krygin,” Russian Soldiers and Mercenaries Killed, Captured, Missing, Seen in Ukraine
281 See http://vk.com/id34937361 and http://vk.com/wall80851728_1933.
282 “Missing Paratrooper Nikolai Krygin—Alive!” Kuryyer, September 9, 2014, http://www.province.ru/pskov/news/item/1347.
64
site inforesist.org, which had claimed in September
2014 that Krygin was among the Pskov paratroopers
who had invaded Ukraine in August 2014 and were
killed in battle.
The site reported that in September 2014, Krygin
remained on the list of those killed. A photo posted on
VKontakte on December 5, 2014, shows him in uni-
the comment “Punishment for a lost machine gun.”283
The appearance of one such mistaken report,
of those killed. Oleg Konstantinov, a journalist for
Kuryyer, a local news site in Pskov, on September 2,
in the cemetery in Vybuta were in fact buried,284 but
questions remained as he pursued the other cases.
A Kuryyer
closed caskets near a boiler room and some trash bins
in Pskov and was totally shocked. The newspaper sent
reporters out to look up and down the street, but they
saw nothing. They then contacted the company that
using social media, accounts on VKontakte and other
Russian social media are an important source of tips
on Russians killed in action in Ukraine and could be
used more than they have been by both regional and
international journalists. The price of attempting to go
attack on his camera crew while engaged in such an
Vice journalist Simon Ostrovsky,
a war correspondent from Ukraine, was kid-
People’s Republic; he was later released but then
denied a visa to Russia after he went to Vladivostok to
of Debaltsevo.285
As the independent media began to back off
cautious after the declaration of the St. Petersburg Soldiers’
Mothers as “foreign agents,” bloggers increased
their efforts to mine VKontakte and other Russian
social media for indications of soldiers who had been
killed.
A typical case was that of Sergei Vorobyev of the
286
in winter—and posts from various friends expressing
their condolences.287
“liberal” political views and describes his worldview
as “pagan.” He belonged to pro-separatist and military
VKontakte groups.
The most extensive account of Vorobyev’s death
comes from Nikolay Naumov, a man from Vorobyev’s
2015, that Vorobyev had gone to Ukraine accompany-
and was ultimately killed and buried in Ukraine. Vorobyev,
moreover, was apparently a veteran of the war
288
of a death than is often found, but still, no reporter has
with jail sentences and the harsh physical attacks
200 issue, bloggers rather than reporters have had to
continue this sort of search—and use methods that
be friends of the deceased or even their army buddies
phone numbers.
On May 19, 2015, TV Rain reported that two Russian
bloggers, Ruslan Leviev and Vadim Korovin, said
they had discovered three graves they believed belong
283
284 Kuryyer, September 2, 2014, http://www.province.ru/pskov/
285 Vice News
ukraine.
286 “Sergei Vorobyev,” Russian Soldiers and Mercenaries Killed, Captured, Missing, Seen in Ukraine
287 http://vk.com/wall-98866335_53.
288 http://vk.com/wall80851728_1933.
65
to Russian soldiers in the Spetsnaz
Russian military intelligence agency.289
Korovin tweeted that they had found the grave of a
21-year-old man with a lone wreath from the Russian
Defense Ministry on it and the inscription, “To a Defender
of the Fatherland from the Ministry of Defense
of the Russian Federation.”290
-
day. He added that these particular Spetsnaz
Aleksandrov and Yevgeny Yerofeyev, who had been
detained the previous day by Ukrainian forces.291
Korovin then explained that the graves were in different
locations, 900 kilometers apart but declined to
give their exact locations to prevent reprisals against
families.292
In a blog post explaining their research,293 Ruslan
sites. One of the graves was that of Anton Savelyev
at a photo that included his judo diploma, the blog-
pictures.
Leviev determined that Savelyev was from the
front of an obelisk listing the names of men who had
of the 16th Separate Spetsnaz
-
-
man’s video of a military parade that was also labeled
with the same number and name of the unit.
-
supov in Lugansk by tracking a distinctive tank with
shark’s teeth painted on the front that showed up in a
Russian convoy video in February 2015 and later in a
photo of a yard in Lugansk.
but there have been numerous reports that it was retired
and that a new symbol was created.294 The exact
status of this symbol with regard to the 16th Separate
Spetsnaz -
er two clues are compelling enough to establish that
Once the bloggers had a real name and a city, they
sifted through the dead soldiers’ lists of friends to
come up with someone who gave his or her phone
number and called them, claiming to be friends of the
deceased. They learned the location of the grave in a
town outside of Tambov and soon were able to take a
picture of it.
Eventually they established the identity of the
-
learned that scores of FSB agents had descended on
Kardapolov’s family and warned them not to talk to
the press, and that the family had also kept outsiders
away from the funeral.
Reports on Twitter
The blogger “Tom Breadley”—we cannot verify his
identity—has regularly made posts under the irreverent
phrase “Fresh Unfresh Russky” showing pictures
from VKontakte of Russian soldiers believed to have
been killed in the war in Ukraine.295 He is currently the
main regular blogger on this topic, consistently producing
posts at a time when most others have stopped.
Nothing more is known about his identity or location.
Breadley’s Twitter account, @tombreadley, has
289 The Interpreter, May 19, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-456-ukraine-to-allow-osce-and-icrc-access-to-captured-russian-soldiers/#8416; “Bloggers Found
rossijskih_sp-387563/.
290
291 Ruslan Leviev, Twitter feed, May 19, 2015, 9:35 p.m., https://twitter.com/RuslanLeviev/status/600520135070380032. See Pavel Kanygin,
Novaya Gazeta, June 15, 2015, published in translation by
The Interpreter, June 26, 2015.
292 Vadim Korovin, Twitter feed, May 19, 2015, 7:23 a.m., https://twitter.com/Pjatak/status/600562483900895232.
293
May 21, 2015, http://ruslanleviev.livejournal.com/36035.html.
294 The Interpreter, August 22, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-liveblog-day-186-russianaid-
convoy-enters-ukraine/#3918.
295 See @tombreadley on Twitter with the search terms in Russian, Svezhaya nesvezhaya rusnya.
66
which includes a few duplicate cases and some people
who are either ethnic Russians or Russian speakers
-
sinated on May 23, 2015. For Breadley, as for others
opposed to Moscow’s adventurism who use sarcasm
and parody in their coverage of the war, the Russian-
backed separatists are all essentially “Russians.”
Some of Breadley’s Twitter posts include pictures
and names only, with no link to VKontakte or other
reporters, who justify not showing their sources on
either relatives or the Russian authorities to remove
the accounts.
One way or another, some of the accounts Breadley
mentions have been removed after the soldiers’ deaths,
so his information cannot be checked. Even when the
that the soldier in question was reported as killed. Nevertheless,
this set of material is important for further re-
to match information to local media reports or contact
the relatives of the soldiers for substantiation.
The most recent case posted by Breadley, on Au-
who used that city’s name as his martial call sign.
the separatists.296 His last posts on VKontakte, still
accessible to date, were on July 24, when he wished
two comrades a happy birthday and then complained
that troops were required to withdraw three kilome-
believed that Russian soldiers had been betrayed by
the Kremlin leadership, which was not allowing them
that combat divisions were not needed, here,” he
wrote.
297
News from Russian
Another source for news about Russian soldiers
killed in Ukraine is the websites or social media
pages of ultranationalist groups in Russia. They
often provide the recruits for combat in Ukraine, and
assistance.
For example, Sergei Kurginyan, a Moscow theater
director and leader of the ultranationalist group Sut’
Vremeni
battle at the Donetsk Airport in January 2015, three of
his supporters—Russian paratroopers—were killed.298
Among them was Yevgeny Krasnoshein, a paratrooper
VKontakte account showed him serving in the Russian
paratroopers’ division in 2008-2009, and who evidently
was a volunteer.
Two others were Yevgeny Sergeyevich Belyakov,
Vladimirovich Yudin, whose nickname was “Bolgarin”
or “Bulgarian.”
List Maintained by Open Russia
Killed in Ukraine
In December 2014, Open Russia, the movement
founded by businessman and former political prisoner
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, published a list of 227 Rus-
by media or relatives’ accounts.299 This list, which
was sourced from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry,
was subsequently updated on March 5 to include 267
names.300
Many of the names on the list are already familiar
to journalists from independent Russian media,
including the cases of soldiers reported killed by The
Interpreter, such as Yevgeny Pushkarev, Anton Tumanov
of Mari El Republic, and the nine soldiers from
301
296 See http://vk.com/id123959274.
297
298 The Interpreter, January 22, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.
com/russia-update-january-22-2015/#6434.
299 The Interpreter is a project of the Institute for Modern Russia, funded by Pavel Khodorkovsky, the son of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
300 The Interpreter,
December 24, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-open-russia-releases-list-of-russian-combatants-killed-in-ukraine.
301 The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-thisweek-
putins-neo-imperialism-and-the-price-of-oil/#4701.
67
elsewhere, such as Sergei Markov, a native of Karelia,
whose death was reported by a local news site called
Vedkar.ru.
In an article accompanying the list, Ilya Barabanov,
a special correspondent for the business newspaper
Kommersant, which is increasingly tilting toward the
Kremlin, said that many of the names on the Ukrainian
Defense Ministry’s list were familiar to him. He noted
that many of the dates of death were “May 26,” the
which at least 31 soldiers were killed, and spread over
the second half of July until early September, when
occurred.
The Most Active Facebook
The Facebook group Gruz-200 iz Ukrainy v Rossiyu
2014, at a time when other such efforts were being
launched by bloggers and journalists.302 This was just
after Ukrainian forces captured a BMD-2 revealing
as of September 2, 2014, and to date has more than
30,000. It also has a separate page, as distinct from a
group, on Facebook.
from relatives and friends of soldiers killed in battle
but soon developed into a wide-ranging discussion
platform for criticism of the war in Ukraine.
The founder of the group is Elena Vasileva,303 an
environmental activist from Murmansk who had not
previously worked on military issues but became a
-
-
regional independent media eager to cover the topic,
but then these outlets stopped citing her because they
believed her claims were exaggerated and that she was
discrediting the cause of attempting to establish the
facts. Ukrainian media continued to publish interviews
with her.
In an interview with Radio Svoboda,304 the Russian-
language service of the U.S.-funded Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Vasileva said she had received
reports from people of “more than 2,000” Russian
members of the military killed in August 2014 alone
but acknowledged that it was impossible to produce a
deaths that took place earlier in the year but estimated
that at least 1,000 were killed before the Russian
invasion in August.
the reports, notably by Open Russia, amounted to
fewer than 300 deaths.
By September 2014, Vasileva was claiming there
were 3,500 Russian soldiers killed in the Ukrainian
war—a quarter of what the Soviet Union claimed were
305
the independent Russian news site Novy Region about
Vasileva’s work that was taken from her Facebook
page and gives an idea of how she compiled her numbers:
306
We are counting Cargo 200 after the 2,000
killed already published: 300 killed in Pobeda,
47 shot as they came out of Ilovaisk; 120 killed
the Pskov paratroopers (10 survived); 230 who
were killed in a convoy on the march under
-
302
303 The transliteration of her name used is the one she has chosen herself on Facebook.
304 http://www.
radiosvoboda.org/content/article/26563247.html.
305 The Interpreter, September 14, 2014, http://
www.interpretermag.com/3500-russian-soldiers-died-in-putins-war-in-ukraine-rights-activists-say/.
306 “In Ukraine, More Than 3,500 Russian Military Killed,” Novy Region, September 15, 2014, http://nr2.com.ua/News/world_and_russia/VUkraine-
pogiblo-bolee-35-tysyach-rossiyskih-voennyh-79981.html.
68
bodies thrown into a mine shaft. All together,
from various sources. And how many wounded
were not brought out in time and not
saved? Yes, I forgot, nearly 600 bodies were
thrown into the mine at Krasnokamensk…
As we know, while a taped interview of some para-
based in Pskov claimed that nearly the entire company—
70 or 80 people—was killed, only three were
that bodies were thrown down mine shafts might at
of coal-miners and their families, such events would
hardly go by without any mention on social media
somewhere.
In February 2015, while the Minsk talks were
underway, the Ukrainian Russian-language video
blogger Anatoly Shariy released several videos that
he implied came from contacts within the SBU that
supposedly supplied him with intercepts of Vasileva’s
cell phone and Skype calls.307
FSB handler, because she appeared to be reporting to
him on her contacts with both soldiers’ families and
disparagingly of soldiers’ relatives and spoke of cash
payments for her work and arranging payments of
suspicious, but it was also made up of snippets taken
out of context; frantic relatives in fact commonly pay
the combatants, not the intermediaries.
Also suspicious was Shariy’s past history of smearing
the St. Petersburg Soldiers’ Mothers at the same
-
The alleged SBU intercepts were widely distributed,
and this, coupled with Vasileva’s tendency to state
many conclude that an intelligence operation had been
the opposite—an intelligence operation to discredit a
person sincerely trying to get attention for a legitimate
her numbers were too high. Vasileva herself did not
answer the claims made about her and shrugged them
off as a “provocation,” of which she had faced many.
On August 19, 2015, Vasileva wrote a post for
her Facebook group on its anniversary, thanking the
30,199 administrators and participants.308 She oblique-
-
tions” and the enormous pressure put on her and other
administrators, noting that the Facebook group had
been closed four times, requiring the personal inter-
reopen it.
-
portant to note that of the many projects launched to
-
tion of the press or the need to cover other news. This
one was still standing.
Latest Lists of Russian Soldiers
Killed and Missing
an activist in the Zabyty Polk
uploaded to the Gruz-200 Facebook group a Micro-
soldiers and journalists. As of August 25, there were
1,447 names: 582 for whom basic information was
of death, and place of death; 39 for whom there was
incomplete information, such as “no. 571,” “call sign
Donetsk Airport”;309 and 857 for soldiers reported as
missing.
-
ble than the 5,000 given by Vasileva in the past year,
although it also did not represent the last word on the
subject. This list did have obvious problems, such as
the inclusion of at least one person who was later dis-
cited were many of the same ones reported by the
independent media and mined from VKontakte.
The Zabyty Polk
307
308
309 Gruz-200
69
from Ukraine may have ended up on this list, which
they say is currently being re-checked. They have also
added two new sections to their list recording the losses
at two large battles—39 Russian servicemen from
the 16th Separate Spetsnaz
servicemen from the 16th Separate Tank Brigade in
8, 2015. There was a total of 14 deaths in Debaltsevo
There was a great deal of incomplete information
on the large number of missing soldiers, such as an
hometown of Lipetsk. This list may also include some
were buried in Ukraine or whose funerals were hushed
up in Russia, or simply some people who did not want
to be found.
By their own admission, some of the Russians
Russian who received the surrendering Ukrainians at
Debaltsevo, for example, described the large debt that
he had to pay,310 and the list maintained by the SBU
criminal records.311
A website with a similar name registered in Ukraine
maintaining a list of cases of Russian soldiers reported
killed in Ukraine, along with lists of soldiers and
-
utors to this website have been more cautious about
including cases with incomplete information; their
list of those killed312 has a total of 570 with many of
the same names as on other lists. They did, however,
include Nikolai Krygin.
Unlike other groups maintaining lists, they have
tried to put a photo with each record, either of the
soldier himself taken while still alive in the service,
or of their dead bodies or graves. In the case of Ivan
Korlkov of Barnaul, for example, they showed a
picture of his army buddies carrying his casket. In
the case of Sergei Vorobyov, they showed comments
from social media with condolences indicating he had
died. In some cases, they have video tapes, such as for
Aleksei Karpenko of Pskov.
Like others who have made lists, they have also
put a VKontakte or other social media account where
possible, the name and number of the unit they served
in, their home town, and their birth and death dates,
and if available, something about how they died or in
which battle they died.
Putin.War
Right before he was assassinated, opposition leader
Boris Nemtsov was working on a report he had titled
Putin.War to include evidence he had found of the
Russian military presence in Ukraine and the cost
of the war to Russia.313 Nemtsov was a specialist on
Russia’s economy, and as with his report exposing
upkeep of the separatists and the provision of armor
314
Not long before he was killed, a group of soldiers
from Ivanovo who had fought in Ukraine and then not
received compensation had turned to him with their
complaints.
The last note Nemtsov made was scribbled on
a sticky note and contained information about the
paratroopers from Ivanovo; he was concerned that the
-
ted down some points to show a colleague. He wrote
that paratroopers from Ivanovo had appealed to him
regarding 17 of their fellow servicemen who had been
killed and whose families did not receive compensation
from the state. “But for now are afraid to talk,” he
noted.
Nemtsov’s murder only caused these soldiers and
310 The Interpreter, February 24, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/russia-update-february-24-2015/#7084.
311
Law, psb4ukr.org. The site says its purpose is to gather “information for law enforcement authorities and special services about pro-
Russian terrorists, separatists, mercenaries, war criminals, and murderers.”
312
313 Putin.War,
org/putin.war/.
314 The
Interpreter, May 28, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/assessing-putin-war-a-look-at-the-last-investigation-by-boris-nemtsov-and-hiscolleagues/.
70
their relatives to be further intimidated into silence
and a refusal to talk to the press; his colleagues
decided to use the information without attribution in
the report they assembled and issued posthumously, to
which they gave Nemtsov’s title Putin.War.
Other than the information about the silenced
Ivanovo paratroopers, the report does not contain
not known before Nemtsov’s death, but, as with his
report on Sochi, the point was to martial the evidence
compellingly and then use it to advocate for an end to
the war. Nemtsov was gunned down right beside the
Kremlin on February 27, 2015, two days before he and
other opposition leaders such as Aleksei Navalny were
to lead a march called “Spring” to protest the war in
Ukraine and the economic crisis unleashed in part by
others who had enabled the war against Ukraine.
The report contains cases covered by The Interpreter
and others, including that of the severely burned
Mari-El soldier Anton Tumanov.
Much attention related to Nemtov’s murder has
focused on his criticism of the “personal army” of
his discussion of the assassination of the Charlie
Hebdo journalists by terrorists; the arrest of suspects
related to some of Kadyrov’s top aides and relatives;
and the possible motive of Kadyrov, who had personally
threatened Nemtsov in the past, to arrange his as-
and independent press.
-
en involvement, the Kremlin leadership had motives
to silence Nemtsov. On January 27, 2015, a month
before he was killed, Nemtsov used his capacity as a
regional legislator to formally issue an inquiry to the
-
to Ukraine and the deaths of other servicemen in
without knowledge of their assignment; that they took
part in an aggressive war that had not been formally
declared; and that they were “volunteers” taking part
in the war as mercenaries, which violates Russian law,
Nemtsov believed that there was a clear-cut criminal
case to be launched.
The date of that inquiry—January 27—is the only
indirect indication that Nemtsov’s persistent inquiries
might have upset the Russian leadership enough to
target him, for example, with a bureaucratic imperative
of “within 30 days.” As opposition leader Aleksei
Navalny said after the murder,315 there may have been
a meeting in the Kremlin at which someone said that
“something must be done” about Nemtsov to put a
stop to his activity, and this could have been interpreted
in an extreme form—as an assassination.
Regardless of the true motivations, contractors,
and perpetrators of Nemtsov’s murder, the reality is
200 and was the most internationally known Russian
devastating blow to any forensic attempt to uncover
the truth about Russian war dead in Ukraine.
OSCE Reports of Cargo 200
The Special Monitoring Mission of the 57-member
was deployed to Ukraine by a consensus agreement to
-
ment, and its mandate was renewed after the second
Minsk agreement. The SMM produces daily reports
by monitors on the ground in southeastern Ukraine,
which have proven invaluable for validating reports
of the Russian military presence and the failure of
combined Russian-separatist forces to abide by the
the border from Russia and that the Russian-backed
separatists have not withdrawn their heavy artillery
as stipulated in the agreement, it has produced few
reports on Russians killed in Ukraine, because its
that includes Russia is to monitor what it sees, not
investigate what has been deliberately hidden.
crossing from Russia into Ukraine at the Donetsk
border checkpoint in the Rostov region.316 The monitors
said the vehicle returned to Russia several hours
later. The SMM did not inspect the vehicle. Notably,
315 The Interpreter, March 3, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/alexey-navalny-on-the-murder-of-boris-nemtsov/.
316
europe-30039004.
71
however, the border crossing on the Ukrainian side—
-
ists.
In Kiev, Ukrainian security spokesman Andriy Ly-
to the Rostov funeral service” had crossed the border,
alleging that the bodies of “Russian military men” had
been transported.
On August 6, 2015, Paul Picard, the head of the
SMM, reported that monitors had recorded vehicles
border checkpoints.317 He stated that “in a year, 21
vehicles with such labels have been spotted “on both
sides of the border.”
The only two checkpoints the SMM is able to
There are other legal and illegal checkpoints that may
have also been used to bring out the bodies of those
Russians killed in Ukraine.
Reports of Mass Burials of
Russian Soldiers
-
gle’s satellite photos had been updated and now
showed evidence of hundreds of fresh mass graves
in the main cemetery of Rostov, a city of more than
a million in the south of Russia, near the Ukrainian
border.318 The graves had signs with the initials “NM”
As we have seen, Rostov has served as a military
staging area for supplying the Russian-backed separatists
in the Donbass and for preparing Russian invasions
of Ukraine. In the past, it has also been a hub
for the military to manage the transport of wounded
soldiers and war dead.
in this cemetery, the second largest in the European
part of Russia, it seems unlikely that in the normal
course of events, hundreds of people could be buried
in a matter of days, and, in many cases, without date
of death or names.
The satellite pictures were published by Misan-
Battalion. That provenance discredited the evidence
for many.
-
tures taken by bloggers were in the Rostov cemetery,
more research would be required to establish whether
the graves contained Russian combatants from the war
in Ukraine.
Gazeta.ru, a Russian media site that is relatively
critical of the government but not particularly vocal on
war issues, sent a reporter, Andrei Koshik, to investigate
the story.319 He learned from a local historian that
this cemetery and that it was reasonable to expect that
soldiers from the current war in Ukraine would be buried
there as well. But he saw a wide variety of ages on
the signs, indicating that they were not all of combat
age, as originally claimed.
commander in the DNR, who said that Russian soldiers
who were killed were buried where they died if
their relatives could not be reached or in an emergency.
In Slavyansk in the summer of 2014, for example,
by Ukrainian forces, he said that soldiers were then
buried just under the name of their commanders—that
is, his people would be buried under the letter “M.”
mass burials were not a mass phenomenon, Melnikov
said. “I really doubt that they will make nameless
graves in Rostov,” said DNR commander Melnikov.
“If I wanted to hide bodies—and of course, we don’t
do that—then why not bury them in Donetsk and
The video blogger Erich Hartmann posted a video
on the graves made up of local radio and other interviews.
320 One source said that there were 150 graves,
and that a number of them were labeled “Biomaterials,”
that is, human body parts. It was not clear why
317 The
Interpreter
schastye-gorlovka-and-donetsk/#9394.
318 The Interpreter, March 30, 2015, http://www.
interpretermag.com/russia-update-march-30-2015/#7707.
319 The Interpreter,
April 2, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-april-2-2015/#7756.
320
72
these bodies were not incinerated, and bloggers picked
did not value the lives of soldiers who had fought
in Ukraine and instead reduced them to the status of
mere medical waste.
On June 5, 2015, the blogger Tom Breadley said on
No. 6 near Donetsk, many with the sign “Soldier No.
9,” which means their name was not known.321 But
other local media coverage said the graves were only
of local separatists.322
-
book user whose name was given as “Irina Mi,” but
no link was provided. She reported two rows of fresh
the sign “Soldier No. 9,” and said there were reports
of war dead being buried in other cemeteries in her
town. The cemeteries were surrounded by police, and
curiosity-seekers were kept out, with only relatives
allowed in, she said.
Wounded Russian Soldiers
were claims of wounded Russian soldiers returning
killed soldiers might be intimidated into silence and
even intrepid journalists might be deterred by brutal
physical attacks or threats, the injured soldiers themselves
were harder to silence, given their purported
scared into silence by threats of having their disability
pension or compensations halted, but a number spoke
out precisely because they were not eligible for these
compensations as “volunteers” and resented being
duped into deployment in combat by promises of
bonuses or compensation, if wounded or killed, that in
fact never came.
soldiers being brought to the Kirov Military Medical
Academy in St. Petersburg in August, and an account
armed forces in August being sent for emergency
treatment to a burn unit in St. Petersburg, none of
these soldiers talked to the mainstream media or discussed
their experiences on social media.
Ukrainian bloggers made the point that the Rus-
Ukraine were ending up severely wounded or killed,
leaving bereaved dependents behind, but after the
initial wave of protests in August and September 2014,
covered this topic, not only because reporters were
intimidated but because the wounded were scattered in
brought to the Kirov Medical Academy as reported, as
hospitals in these cities, Newsru.ua reported.323
This lack of attention for the wounded changed in
February 2015, after the battle of Debaltsevo and the
signing of the Minsk II agreement.
Most of the media coverage of the Ukrainian rout
at Debaltsevo focused on the great Ukrainian humiliation
and losses, as combined Russian–separatist forces
put Ukrainian forces in a “kettle” on three sides and
junctions and railroads of this strategic location.324
In his interview with Novaya Gazeta’s Elena
Buryat man, described his deployment to Ukraine in
extensive detail, providing ample evidence that Russian
contract soldiers were indeed deployed to battle
in Ukraine by their commanders.325
Batomunkuyev was originally deployed as part of
the 5th Separate Tank Brigade based in Ulan-Ude, the
capital of the Buryat Republic. He was drafted into the
Russian army on November 25, 2013, but then signed
a three-year military service contract that enabled him
to be deployed outside his region on June 2014.
321 Tom Breadley, Twitter feed, June 5, 2015, 1:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/tombreadley/status/606925019181162497.
322
323 “Russian Military Dumps the Bodies of Their Soldiers in the Tunnels of Mines,” newsru.ua, September 5, 2014, http://rus.newsru.ua/
ukraine/05sep2014/shahty.html.
324 See, for example, “Ukrainian Soldiers’ Retreat from Eastern Town Raises Doubt for Truce,” New York Times, February 18, 2015, http://
325 “Ukraine Live Day 378: Severely Injured Russian Soldier Describes Deployment to Ukraine,” The Interpreter, March 2, 2015, http://
knew-what-we-were-going-for-and-what-could-happen/.
73
Kostyuchenko reported that Batomunkuyev, a
his tank as he was defending Logvinovo, a village on
the highway between Debaltsevo and Artyomovsk.
In October 2014, with his conscript term due to last
another month, despite his service contract, Batomunkuyev
was sent, along with other kontraktniki
from two military units, to the Rostov region bordering
Ukraine to form a new tank battalion. Therefore,
his contract began in October, ahead of schedule.
Batomunkuyev told Kostyuchenko that he did not
formally resign from the military prior to his deployment
to Ukraine, a claim made by some other Russian
February that some Russian draftees were pressured
into signing contracts after being recruited into the
term was supposed to end November 27, and he was
never formally discharged. He also denied that he was
duped into going to training when he was really being
sent into combat.
DB: We were told that it was for training but
we knew where we were going. We all knew
where we were going. I was already prepared
morally and psychologically, that I’d have to
go to Ukraine.
Back in Ulan-Ude, we had painted over the
tanks. Right at the train. We painted over the
numbers, if someone had unit markings on
and chevrons when we got here, to the train-
left our passports at the army base, our army
card at the training ground.
And we had experienced guys in our battalion.
Some had already been a year or a bit more on
contract, some had been 20 years. They said:
don’t listen to the command, we’re going to
bomb the khokhly [pejorative term for Ukrainians].
If they even conduct exercises, even so
you will still be sent to bomb khokhly.
Really, a lot of echelons were traveling. Everyone
spent the night in our barracks. Before
Khabarovsk, from various cities, only from
the east. One after another, you know? Every
October.
While we went from Ulan-Ude to Matveyev
Kurgan, we saw so many cities. We travelled
for 10 days. The closer we got, the more
people welcomed us. They waved their hands,
they blessed us. We’re mainly all Buryats, see.
They were blessing us [i.e., Christians were
making the sign of the cross over Buddhists].
(He laughs, and starts bleeding again.)
And here, too, when we were moving around.
would bless us...The old ladies would cry.
EK: What training ground [were you located
at]?
grounds. Tent cities. Some would move in,
others would move out. We would meet the
previous echelons there. The Kantemir Brigade
from the Moscow suburbs came after us.
They have paratroopers there and one tank
company that is not so powerful. But our tank
battalion has 31 tanks. You can do something
serious with that.
-
images, which show a vast military site in the Rostov
region of Russia, about 50 kilometers from the border
2014, reveal a line of tents and vehicles stretching for
craters indicating military training maneuvers.326 The
-
and the Russian–Ukrainian border.
Kostyuchenko then established that recurring tales
entire story:
EK: Could you refuse?
326 The Interpreter, January 7, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-updatelargerussian-
military-staging-ground-detected-near-ukrainian-border/#6088. A blast at this camp was also reported on social media: “Ukraine
The Interpreter, April 28, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/
ukraine-live-day-435-huge-blast-at-russian-military-camp-used-for-invasion/.
74
DB: Of course you could. No one forced us.
There were some who refused back in Ulan-
Ude, when they felt they could smell smoke.
Thus Batomunkuyev made it clear not only that he
had volunteered for combat and knew what he was in
for, but that his welcome by local people gave him a
sense of the legitimacy of his mission. He was not a
protester, just a severely wounded warrior. His story
Kostyuchenko’s original article in Russian on Novaya
Gazeta’s site has received more than 1.8 million
views—a large amount for a beleaguered independent
site that has been threatened with closure as after
racking up two violations of Russia’s strict censorship
restrictions. The deluge of exposure included
results of Putin’s war, but was also accompanied by an
enormous amount of mockery and even hatred from
some on the Internet.
The extensive public attention and the subsequent
unearthing of previous articles about dead soldiers put
enormous pressure on both relatives and local media,
which accounts for what happened next. After Batomunkuyev
was transferred from Donetsk to a burn
unit in Ulan-Ude, his mother began to tell reporters
that his story had been made up.
On April 3, Sergei Basayev, a journalist from the
newspaper Novaya Buryatiya, decided to follow up
on Batomunkuyev’s fate and found he was being
his mother, Sesegma, had been complaining about the
lack of help from the Russian Defense Ministry.327
However, Basayev’s article was swiftly removed
from the site and even cut out of already-printed news-
Novaya Buryatiya, said he did not view the incident as
censorship, and Basayev did not complain at the time.
Radio Svoboda-
the case.328-
many aggressive comments from Ukrainians, and “the
situation grew out of control.” He told Radio Svoboda
that he didn’t want his newspaper, which had a print
circulation of 50,000, as well as an online version, to
get caught up in the “information war.”
Basayev said that he had wanted to get Batomunkuyev’s
mother’s permission to visit him, but she would
not allow it because he was in too serious a condition.
She then claimed the article had been fabricated. Supposedly,
Basayev said, there were other Buryats who
had fought in Ukraine, but he had not looked for them;
he was worried that Buryatiya would get a bad name
with these scandals.
-
ing in the war from Buryatiya, which he attributed to
the fact that it was a Buddhist republic where people
Buryatiya; because the republic is small, word would
in Ukraine as volunteers but said that he had not
heard of any except two who have become famous
on YouTube: Buryats with the call signs “Vakha” and
in Donetsk Region.
Russian-backed separatist media extensively
promoted Vakha, who also helped plant the Lugansk
-
nationalist” help for the separatist cause are in fact
just showing this one individual. Ukrainian media also
presence. There are few Buryats native to Ukraine.
Nevertheless, there was indisputable evidence of
-
think-tank, in conjunction with Bellingcat, the UK-
a report titled Hidden in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in
Ukraine,329 which documented the story of Bato Dambayev,
a Buryat tank operator from Ulan-Ude from
in Kyakhta, Buryat Republic, who fought alongside
soldiers in the 5th Tank Brigade in Debaltsevo. Dam-
330 camp as
in his interview with Novaya Gazeta
327 The Interpreter, April 8, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.
com/russia-update-april-8-2015/#7840.
328 “Storm at Novaya Buryatiya,” Svoboda.org, April 7, 2015, http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/26943338.html
329 Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine
330
75
As The Interpreter
at the camp, Dambayev posted a picture of himself
with a Siberian husky puppy to VKontakte, as did
his fellow servicemen. Later he deleted it, but copies
were saved by social media users. Bellingcat’s Aric
Toler was then able to compare a number of photos
on VKontakte, some of which were geotagged to the
331
Simon Ostrovsky, a war correspondent from Vice,
decided to follow up on the story of these Russian soldiers.
332 Ostrovsky traced the steps Dambayev purportedly
took, based on the Buryat’s social media posts,
had reported the appearance of non-European soldiers,
Russian soldiers had fought there—they distinguished
them from local separatists both by their accents in
Russian and their more polite behavior.
-
cow and Taganrog and even geolocated his position
atop a checkpoint in a town near Debaltsevo, where
he was wearing white bands on his arm and leg. It was
already known from the testimonies of other soldiers
that this indicated a practice of the Russian Army to
enable their soldiers to distinguish themselves from
other combatants.333 That appeared to clinch the fact
that Dambayev was deployed in Ukraine.
Ostrovsky then tracked the soldier back to Ulan-
Ude and got his phone number through his neighbors.
Dambayev refused to give an interview in person and
denied he was ever in Ukraine. He then deleted the
incriminating pictures on his VKontakte account.
For his trouble, as noted above, Ostrovsky was
then denied a press visa to Russia, although his work
validated the painstaking efforts of both local and
international bloggers who had mined the wealth of
prove they were deployed in Ukraine.
The widespread media attention brought to the
Buryat Republic caused a lot of controversy, however,
Ukraine was giving the whole republic a bad name.
Buryats are Buddhists by tradition and known for
no Russian soldiers in Ukraine. On July 14, 2015, a
regional news site Asiarussia.ru published a video of
young Buryat men and women explaining that they
contrary to their peaceful nature and that they were
being exploited by the “information war.”334
By that time, it was clear from the censorship of
Novaya Buryatiya and the curious back-tracking of
relatives of reporters that silence was the only way to
avoid threatened reprisals. And the great price to be
paid for any kind of investigative journalism was also
clear in Ulan-Ude: just the day before, on July 13,
2015, Yevgeny Khamagan, the editor of the Asiarussia.
ru himself was brutally beaten335 in much the same
way as Lev Shlosberg had been in Pskov, and TV
Rain’s chief producer Ksenya Batanova in Moscow.
In Khamagan’s case, he was attacked by unknown assailants
who fractured his neck, causing him to be hos-
from a coma to say that he remembered nothing about
the attack, but police claimed that he had fallen off a
garage roof while intoxicated. His friends who had
found him near his home, as well as the Yabloko Party,
protested this claim as they had evidence he was beaten
by assailants. Khamagan himself believes he was
targeted clandestinely by a police chief he had accused
-
gal alcohol sales through news kiosks.
331 “How These Adorable Puppies Exposed Russian Involvement in Ukraine,” Aric Toler, Bellingcat, March 11, 2015, https://www.bellingcat.
com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/03/11/vreditel-sobaka/.
332
checks-in-to-ukraine.
333 Kyiv Post, September 3, 2014, http://www.
kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/russian-soldier-dies-in-ukraine-because-there-was-no-other-job-363238.html,
translation of an article by Elena Racheva, “Drugoi raboty-to nyet,” published in Novaya Gazeta on September 1, 2014, http://www.
and a comment by a fellow soldier that the bands were changed to a different arm or leg every day to signal to other squads that they were
on the same side.
334 “Appeal by Putin’s Battle Buryats to the Frightened Residents of Ukraine,” Asiarussia.ru, July 14, 2015, http://asiarussia.ru/news/8295/.
The video was made by Set’ [Network], a production center in the Buryat Republic.
335 “Buryat Editor Yevgeny Khamagan, Opposition Activist Expecting Surgery for Broken Neck After Assault,” The Interpreter, Russia
Update, July 14, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-july-14-2015/#9126.
76
How Many Russian Soldiers Have
Been Killed in Ukraine?
of soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine because there
reports.
The independent media in Russia and Ukraine, as
to Ukraine, and Forgotten Regiment groups and some
the last year, all of them of varying lengths. From a
review of this material, The Interpreter concluded that
no more than 600 cases of Russian soldiers killed in
Ukraine are known, and even for this list, in which
full names and places and dates of death are available,
media in every case. Forgotten Regiment has also
and many of the entries have very little information,
Of course, given that according to former National
Security Secretary Andriy Parubiy, an estimated
7,000 to 10,000 Russian troops were deployed in
that the Ukrainian presidential administration has
now released a report estimating the “Russian occu-
additional 9,100-person “regular army” apparently
deployed in the Donbass, it is possible that more than
2,000, given that this number would be 20 percent
higher than the highest estimate of troops deployed in
the Donbass.336
Forbes reported
an article that had surfaced in an obscure Russian
online publication called Delovaya Zhizn’ Business
Life
Duma deputy claiming that 2,000 families had received
compensation for their family members killed
in Ukraine.337 The sensational part of the article was
subsequently removed and replaced with a paragraph
338 but a copy of the original
version can still be viewed at the Internet Archive; the
-
ticed.339
budget submitted for 2015–2017 and then under a subhead,
reports that 2,000 families had received compensation
for soldiers killed in Ukraine. The sourcing is
weak; no independent media in Russia have reported
on this comment, and there are no links to any budget
war deaths seems high, given other estimates of the
number of soldiers deployed in total, but the true num-
The problem in trying to substantiate the claim of
-
bers indicated in reports of the number of Russians
killed at the two biggest battles of the war so far—at
soldiers, himself a critic of the war in Ukraine, pronounced
the Delovaya Zhizn’ article a fake, merely de-
site.
The battle of Ilovaisk was the worst engagement
on August 7; continued through August 29, 2014,
when Ukrainian soldiers were encircled by combined
Russian and separatist forces and forced to retreat; and
culminated on September 1, when some Ukrainian
-
manders believed they were retreating under an agreement
announced by President Putin to withdraw after
leaving heavy artillery, many of them were in fact
gunned down as they departed in what was described
by some as a “massacre.”340
Soon after the event on September 14, 2014,
Ukrainian Defense Minister Valery Heletey announced
336 The Interpreter, August
28, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-557-ukraine-reports-109-attacks-over-past-day/#9758.
337 Forbes, August 25, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/paulroderickgregory/2015/08/25/kremlin-censors-rush-to-erase-inadvertent-release-of-russian-casualties-in-east-ukraine/.
338
339
340 Kyiv Post, September 3, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140907205716/
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/witnesses-tell-about-attacks-on-ukrainian-soldiers-trying-to-leave-ilovaisk-at-least-100-
killed-363204.html.
77
soldiers had been killed and 300 Russian soldiers.”341
A higher death total of Russians didn’t seem plausible,
given that it was the Russians who had “kettled” the
though a few Ukrainians broke out of the encirclement.
Defense Minister Heletey was forced to resign
on October 14, 2014, in part because of his responsibility
for the failure of military coordination during
the battle.
Unian.net then reported on August 5, 2015, that
new information on the combat deaths put the total
number of Ukrainians killed at 366—not 107, but not
other estimates as high as 1,000 either.342
The number of “300 Russians” appears to have
343
who said that his battalion together with the Donbass
battalion had destroyed “about 300 soldiers” and that
no one had picked up the bodies after the battle.
The claim, even if true, was never substantiated
with lists of names. Even Russian independent media
do not appear to have followed up on this story.
The initial surge of the Russian invasion in August
was reported from multiple sources as 1,200 troops
Anton Tumanova, above and in The Interpreter344
by September, there were as many as 7,000 Russian
troops reported in the offensive, according to
colleagues said that the number of Russian troops
was estimated to have increased from 3,000–5,000 to
7,000–10,000 over the course of a year.345
But the only other indication that so many Russians
could have been killed in August 2014 is the claim
by paratroopers that “almost an entire company was
Regarding Debaltsevo, Elena Vasileva was among
those who claimed that at least 39 were killed near
Yet the group she chairs, Forgotten Regiment, only
recorded 14 men who were said to have been killed at
Debaltsevo. This number remains to be researched.
39 incomplete reports, and 857 missing might suggest
in particular is extremely sketchy, often including only
-
fought with the Russian-backed separatists. It is also
possible that these individuals include Russian volunteers
who escaped criminal records or debts in Russia
and do not want to be located.
341 The Interpreter, September 15, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.
com/the-battle-of-ilovaisk-a-turning-point-in-russias-war-on-ukraine/.
342 “New Data on Victims Near Ilovaisk: 366 Ukrainian Soldiers Killed,” Unian.net, August 5, 2015, http://www.unian.info/war/1108315-
new-data-on-victims-near-ilovaisk-366-ukrainian-soldiers-killed.html.
343 “300 Dead Bodies of Russian Soldiers To This Day Still Lay Unburied Near Ilovaisk,” Censor.net, September 30, 2015, http://en.censor.
net.ua/news/304862/300_dead_bodies_of_russian_soldiers_still_rot_near_ilovaisk. Also http://www.ukrinform.ua/rus/news/tela_
pochti_300_ubitih_rossiyan_do_sih_por_legat_nepogrebennie_pod_ilovayskom_1670119.
344 “DNR Leader Says They Have Received 1,200 Troops, 30 Tanks and 120 Armoured Vehicles from Russia,” The Interpreter, August 16,
The Interpreter, August 17, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-minister-says-id-willbe-
required-to-access-internet/#3837.
345 The Interpreter, May 28, 2015, http://
www.interpretermag.com/assessing-putin-war-a-look-at-the-last-investigation-by-boris-nemtsov-and-his-colleagues/.
78
Russia has propagated the myth that an armed
insurgency erupted spontaneously in the Donbass
and that any Russian participation in the
effort to cleave territory away from Ukraine is “voluntary”
in nature. This strains credulity to the breaking
point, as there is ample evidence that weaponry that
does not exist in Ukraine’s arsenal has turned up on
’ possession at key
points in the war.
Moreover, there is evidence that Russia has been
quietly burying its war dead—and harassing or defaming
anyone in the country who attempts to investigate
these obsequies. If the fallen were “volunteers,” there
would be no need to designate their deaths “state
secrets,” even as Putin bestows honors upon them
without ever acknowledging the circumstances under
which they were killed.
All available evidence suggests that these Russian
by the Russian government under the cover of plausible
deniability. There is also compelling evidence
that the relatives of missing soldiers believe their sons
or husbands to have been killed in eastern Ukraine
and have been coerced into silence by the Russian
government.
Moscow’s military strategy over the past year
’s Anti-Terrorist Operation
was close to routing the separatists in the summer of
2014, Russia launched an outright invasion, injecting
new weaponry and military equipment into eastern
Ukraine, backed by mixed formations of Spetsnaz and
paratroopers, to perpetuate a war that continues to the
present day.
-
vantages of a guerrilla insurgency, underwritten by the
conventional hard power of their state sponsor. They
have embedded within the civilian populations of the
Donbass and hidden their materiel in urban settings,
violating international humanitarian law but deterring
a massive Ukrainian counterattack—all while receiving
a steady stream of resupplies of tanks and sophisticated
drone and ground-scan radar equipment, and
testing the boundaries of a barely enforced armistice
’s
military, such as in Marinka in July 2015, the separatists
and the Russian government have continued to
thus justifying further attacks by the separatists.
Meanwhile, the threat of a full-scale Russian
invasion looms in Kiev, as Russia has amassed tens of
thousand of troops at Ukraine’s eastern border under
the guise of conducting military “exercises.” Even
while Ukrainian casualties continue to mount, this
threat has forced the government of Petro Poroshenko
-
ment in a war of its own making but nonetheless
demands that war’s conclusion on terms of its own
choosing.
79
Conclusion
APRIL 26:
with infantry mounted, moving through Kulykove
-
ditionally, over the prior three days, the UAV had
of Shyrokyne.
MAY 6:
An SMM UAV—despite being jammed for 10 minutes
around a DPR-controlled village—spotted four
tanks in DPR-controlled territory and one tank in government-
controlled territory, all in or around villages
close to the contact line northeast of Mariupol.
MAY 7:
An SMM UAV spotted three tanks in government-
controlled territory and 30 tanks in DPR-controlled
territory, all in or around villages close to the
line of contact. Thirteen of these tanks were seen in
MAY 13:
-
observed seven MBTs.
MAY 14:
The SMM UAV, operating in a limited area north
conditions, observed one tank north of the govern-
-
-
ment-controlled, 50 km northeast of Mariupol, and
UAV also observed two burning houses in Shyrokyne
MAY 18:
The SMM UAV observed a total of seven tanks
-
imately 50 kilometers northeast of Mariupol. The
SMM UAV also observed one IFV, two military-type
trucks, and people in military uniforms in the same
area.
JUNE 1:
The SMM UAV observed a concentration in
DPR-controlled territory, 61 kilometers northeast and
30 kilometers east of Mariupol, of at least 10 MBTs of
unknown type.
JUNE 7:
An SMM UAV spotted a concentration of 40
-
Of particular note among the weapons observed by
SMM UAVs was a concentration at a railway station
was a concentration around DPR-controlled Oktyabr
two MBTs.
80
Appendix
OSCE UAV Sightings On Kalmius
JUNE 8:
nine MBTs in a residential area, one self-propelled
JUNE 9:
-
trucks, including two fuel trucks, 400 to 500 medium
to heavy artillery ammunition boxes, and a supply of
multiple-launch rocket systems. In DPR-controlled
-
JUNE 10:
-
concentration of military hardware, including, inter
alia-
hicle, nine military-type trucks, an anti-aircraft system
saw 32 military trucks.
JUNE 11:
In a number of locations in DPR-controlled areas
northeast of Mariupol, an SMM UAV spotted, inter
An SMM ground patrol observed an additional MBT in
the same general area.
JUNE 14:
JUNE 16:
In DPR-controlled areas, an SMM UAV detected
JUNE 18:
In DPR-controlled areas, an SMM UAV detect-
JUNE 19:
An SMM UAV detected a concentration of 10
-
-
JUNE 23:
In DPR-controlled areas northeast of Mariupol, the
SMM UAV observed one MBT, one mortar, and three
artillery pieces. In addition, in the area of Komso-
being loaded with ammunition, forming a convoy,
which proceeded to Vasylivka and farther to Michurine
-
81
JULY 1:
In DPR-controlled areas, the SMM UAV spotted
JULY 2:
ten MBTs during the night between 1 and 2 July.
During the day on July 2, an SMM ground patrol dispatched
to the same area did not hear or see any tanks,
heavy weapons, or armed personnel but notably, the
patrol had only limited access to that area. It observed
recent tracks from tracked vehicles on a dirt road,
which led to an area south of the village that appeared
to be a military training area.
JULY 4:
-
trolled areas east of Shyrokyne. Also in DPR-controlled
areas, two MBTs were observed near Michu-
also in the same sector; and a concentration of seven
JULY 7–8:
The SMM UAV observed concentrations of military
hardware in DPR-controlled areas close to the
military trucks in and around DPR-controlled Kom-
On July 7 and 8, the SMM UAV was subjected to
-
and Shyrokyne.
JULY 10:
SMM UAVs observed concentrations of military
hardware in and around DPR-controlled Komso-
military trucks.
JULY 11–12:
SMM UAVs observed concentrations of military
hardware in and around DPR-controlled Komso-
areas adjacent to Komsomolske, SMM UAVs also
observed an additional 16 military-type trucks, two
south of Komsomolske, in DPR-controlled Vesele
JULY 14:
SMM UAVs continued to observe concentrations
of military hardware in and around DPR-controlled
-
82
thermore, in DPR-controlled areas the UAVs spotted
JULY 16:
The SMM UAV detected a concentration of mili-
and more than 40 military-type trucks near DPR-con-
JULY 17:
SMM UAVs continued to observe concentrations of
military hardware in DPR-controlled areas: in Kom-
JULY 20:
The SMM UAVs observed the following in government-
controlled areas: 17 MBTs and several military
the SMM UAV was jammed.
JULY 21:
The SMM UAV observed a concentration of 11
JULY 22:
In DPR-controlled areas the SMM UAV detect-
were exposed to severe and intentional jamming of a
military origin that caused one aircraft to crash.
AUGUST 12:
on 22 July that caused the destruction of another SMM
unmanned aerial vehicle and its camera—an SMM
UAV experienced what the SMM assesses as severe
military-grade video signal and global positioning sys-
north, and west of government-controlled Mariupol
control over the vehicle were affected.
The SMM UAV did, however, observe shell
impacts in an area east of government-controlled
-
-
-
-
shelling.
AUGUST 13:
Although the SMM did not reach Starohnativka, its
UAVs spotted military hardware in various locations
in the general area: in and around DPR-controlled
a military-type truck; east of government-controlled
a military-type truck; in and around DPR-controlled
83
-
km southeast of Donetsk, 54 km northeast of Mariu-
AUGUST 15:
The SMM UAVs observed in DPR-controlled areas
-
AUGUST 19:
SMM UAVs spotted in DPR-controlled areas four
AUGUST 20:
In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the
SMM UAV observed in DPR-controlled areas the
following military equipment: seven MBTs and two
-
-
AUGUST 21:
The SMM—through the use of unmanned aerial
AUGUST 23:
appeared to be a concentration point of equipment and
truck with armed personnel wearing “Spartak” battalion
insignia.
84
James MillerThe Interpreter
and has reported for the website on Russia and
Ukraine since 2013. He is a contributor at Reuters, The
Daily Beast, Foreign Policy, Vice News, The Moscow
Times, and other publications. He is an expert on ver
ifying citizen journalism and has also covered events
in Syria and Iran since 2009.
Pierre VauxThe Interpreter
website since November 2013. He is a contributor at
The Daily Beast, Foreign Policy, and Left Foot Forward,
writing about the war in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s re
in London and graduated from Queen Mary Universi
ty of London with a BA in Russian in 2013.
Catherine A. Fitzpatrick
writer at The Interpreter, having joined the website
team in 2013, and is a contributor at The Daily Beast
and The Atlantic. Previously she was a writer for EurasiaNet,
specializing in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
and edited the publications “Media Matters” and
“(Un)Civil Societies” for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists,
and other NGOs. Fitzpatrick has translated more than
30 books from Russian into English, most notably the
memoirs of Russian leaders Boris Yeltsin, Eduard She
vardnadze, Alexander Yakovlev, and Vladimir Putin,
as well as newly released documents by Lenin, Stalin,
leaders, including Boris Nemtsov’s “Putin. War.”
Michael WeissThe Interpreter,
founded in May 2013 as a news and translation
service focusing on Russia and Ukraine. The website
diplomats, and policymakers from around the world,
with its articles cited by presidents, parliamentarians,
ambassadors, and supranational governing bodies.
He is also a senior editor at The Daily Beast
thor of the New York Times bestseller ISIS: Inside the
Army of Terror.
About the Authors
© The Institute of Modern Russia, Inc. 2015
Design: Alexey Katalkin
Maps: Olga Bolshchikova
Annex 451
Daniel Romein, MH17 Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade, bell¿ngcat (23 February 2016)
MH17 - Potential Suspects and Witnesses
from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
A bell¿ngcat Investigation
bell¿ngcat
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Section One: The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ...................................................................................3
Section Two: Mobilization of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ................................................... 9
The 23-25 June 2014 Buk Convoy Vehicles ............................................................................................. 10
The 19-21 July 2014 Buk Convoy Vehicles .................................................................................................. 15
The 16 August 2014 Missile Transport ........................................................................................................ 17
Deployment of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in the Summer of 2014 ....................... 20
Section Three: Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ...................................................... 23
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 23
2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2013 .................................................................................................... 26
3rd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 ....................................................................................................30
Recommissioning of the 3rd Battalion ..................................................................................................... 33
2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 .................................................................................................... 36
1st Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 .................................................................................................... 52
Section Four: Cadets at the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade ........................................................... 56
MATI Cadets ........................................................................................................................................................... 56
MIET Cadets............................................................................................................................................................60
Section Five: Commanders of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade .............................................. 63
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 63
Buk Unit Commanders of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 ............................................................................. 66
Commanders of the 1st and 3rd Battalions in 2014 ................................................................................ 82
Battery Commanders of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 ................................................................................ 83
Other Commanders in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014 ........................................ 90
Commander of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 ................................................................................................... 93
Commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014 ........................................................ 96
Air Defense and Supreme Commanders in 2014 ................................................................................ 102
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................................111
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................................... 113
1 bell¿ngcat
Introduction
In a previous report, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk,1 the Bellingcat investigation team described the
movements of a Buk-M1 missile launcher in Ukraine, which was filmed and photographed in Donetsk,
Zuhres, Torez, Snizhne, and Luhansk on 17 July 2014, the day Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) was
downed. That report provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that this particular Buk-M1 was
likely responsible for downing MH17 for two primary reasons: first, it was in range of MH17 shortly
before it was downed; second, a missile was missing from the Buk the morning following the
downing.
Origin of the Separatists’ Buk also described two separate military convoys filmed and photographed
in Russia from 23 to 25 June and from 19 to 21 July 2014. These convoys transported Buk-M1 missile
launchers along with numerous other types of military vehicles from an area near Kursk to an area
near the Russia-Ukraine border in the Rostov Oblast2. One Buk-M1 missile launcher in the 23-25
June 2014 convoy is particularly noteworthy, because it shares many common features with the Buk-
M1 that was located within firing range of MH17 and was filmed on 17 July 2014 driving toward the
center of an area that was assessed by the Dutch Safety Board to be the launch area of the Buk
missile that downed MH17 in Ukraine.3 An examination of the vehicles and license plates of the
military convoys in the summer of 2014 reveals that these convoys originated at a military base near
Kursk, just west of the village Marshala Zhukova, where the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
(military Unit 32406) is based. Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade posted images of
vehicles seen in the June and July 2014 convoys, as well as photographs of the June 2014 convoy
itself, on social media sites such as VKontakte4 (or VK, a popular Russian social network akin to
Facebook), Odnoklassniki5 (or OK, a Russian social media site more popular with older generations),
and Instagram. In addition to pictures of vehicles, some soldiers posted images of military certificates
showing the completion of what can be presumed to be a military exercise that took place between
22 June 2014 and 25 July 2014.
The present report conducts a deeper investigation into the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, its
organizational structure and placement in the Russian army, and the military vehicles involved in the
June and July 2014 Buk convoys. This report also describes the results of a thorough investigation of
soldiers and officers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade related to the convoys and/or other
military operations in the summer of 2014. If the Buk crew consisted of Russian soldiers and officers,
it is likely that some number of these soldiers and officers knew the crew members of the Buk missile
launcher involved in the MH17 tragedy, or were possibly crew members themselves. Additionally, this
report confirms that the certificates mentioned above belong to students of a technical university who
completed a training course at the base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade near Kursk. Some
officers can be exculpated from involvement in any of the Buk convoys because cadets from two
universities posted pictures of these officers in their photo albums at the base of the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade in the summer of 2014.
1 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation
2 An ‘oblast’ is a Russian administrative division similar to a ‘region’ or ‘province’
3 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34511973
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11928778/MH17-hit-by-Buk-missile-Ukraine-planecrash-
Russia-live.html
http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/10/17/dsb-launch-site
4 http://www.vk com
5 http://www.ok.ru
2 bell¿ngcat
An uncensored and more extensive version of this report was sent to the Joint Investigation Team in
December 2015. The real names and identities of all soldiers and officers have been shared with the
JIT in the uncensored version of this report. Most of the individuals in this report have been censored,
to varying degrees. Bellingcat has assigned three tiers of censorship to Russian soldiers and officers:
No censorship: prominent, public commanders in the Russian military. These individuals,
from the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade up to the Russian President,
have previously appeared in Russian media and in official documents. Their full names and
uncensored photographs appear in this report.
Partial censorship: officers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade are presented with
partial censorship, including their first name and the first letter of their surnames. The faces
of these officers are blurred.
Full censorship: soldiers (contract soldiers, conscripts, and cadets) are fully censored in this
report. Bellingcat has assigned each soldier a first-name pseudonym and blurred their faces.
3 bell¿ngcat
Section One: The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
Videos and photographs of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy reveal its approximate route from Kursk
to Millerovo. One video in particular shows the first location that the convoy was spotted6 near
Dolgoye, to the east of Kursk. The convoy likely originated from a military base near Kursk, given the
presence of military installations there. The part of road A144 (E38) between Podlesnyy and Dolgoye,
where the convoy was filmed for the first time, is very close to Marshala Zhukova, where there is a
nearby military base.7 Wikimapia shows that several military units are based at this location: units
32406, 35535, and 42699.8
Researching these unit numbers reveals that Unit 32406 corresponds with the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade (in Russian, 53-я зенитно-ракетная бригада) and Unit 35535 is the 448th Missile
Brigade (448-я ракетная бригада). Several sources also reveal that the Buk-M1 system9 belongs to
the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, while the 448th Missile Brigade operates Tochka-U.10
Unit 42699 refers to two different units, both of them likely disbanded a few years ago.
Military base of Units 32306 and 35535, to the west of Marshala Zhukova.
6 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0001-Kursk%3A-Buk-convoy-seen-from-a-car
7 http://www.google.nl/maps/@51.7159774,36.334901,5316m/data=!3m1!1e3
8 http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=51.707034&lon=36.309085&z=15&m=b
9 http://warfare.be/db/lang/rus/linkid/1690/catid/264/
see also: http://en.wikipedia org/wiki/Buk_missile_system
10 http://warfare.be/db/lang/rus/catid/239/linkid/2239/base/544/
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OTR-21 Tochka
4 bell¿ngcat
Until 2010, both the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and the 448th Missile Brigade (which were and
still are a part of the 20th Army) belonged to the Moscow Military District. On 20 September 2010,
the Moscow Military District was merged with the Leningrad Military District, the Northern Fleet, and
the Baltic Fleet to form the Western Military District.11
Structure and units of the Moscow Military District in 2010.12
In September 2010, the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade also became part of the 20th Army –
headquartered in Voronezh – just as the 448th Missile Brigade had done before September 2010.13
Like other anti-aircraft missile brigades, the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade consists of battalions
further divided into batteries (a military unit similar to a company) with several Buk-M1 anti-aircraft
units. In Russia, similar terms are used for certain military units as in English, but with some
confusing differences. For example, a battalion of an anti-aircraft missile brigade is a ‘divizion’
(дивизион), not the Russian word that sounds like battalion (батальон). However, the English
equivalent to division in Russian is called diviziya (дивизия), which is a much larger military unit.14
11 http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/okruga/west/history.htm
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western Military District
12 http://web.archive.org/web/20050309013355/http://www.kommersant.ru/k-vlast/get_page.asp?page_id=2005769-
22.htm
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow Military District
Image created by Noclador at Wiki Commons:
http://commons.wikimedia org/wiki/File:Russian_Ground_Forces_-_Moscow_Military_District_Structure.png
13 http://pvo-lenwo.ru/zapvo2008.doc
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20th Guards Army
14 http://www.nato.int/docu/other/ru/2005/050715/Database.pdf
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Батальон
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дивизион ПВО
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дивизия
5 bell¿ngcat
A complete Buk-M1 (and later generation Buk-M1-2) system consists of 11 vehicles: one command
vehicle or command post (9S470M1), one Snow Drift target acquisition radar or target detection
station (9S18M1 Kupol-M1; NATO designation Snow Drift), three transporter erector launchers (TEL)
or missile loaders (9A39M1), and six transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles or
missile launchers (9A310M1).15 Each battery typically consists of two Buk missile launchers and a Buk
missile loader. Each battalion is assigned a command vehicle and a Snow Drift radar vehicle.
Most videos and images from Russian social media of the 53rd Brigade show that vehicles in a Buk-
M1 system display three numbers on the side, beginning with a 1, 2, or 3. The last digit of a missile
launcher is 1 or 2, while the last digit of a missile loader is 3. These numbers serve as unit
designations. The first digit indicates the battalion to which the vehicle belongs, the second digit
indicates the battery, and the last digit indicates the specific Buk unit/vehicle. For example, a Buk
missile launcher numbered 312 belongs to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Battery, and is the second Buk missile
launcher in the system. The two exceptions are the command vehicle, numbered x00, and the Snow
Drift radar, numbered x01, where ‘x’ indicates the battalion to which these vehicles belong. Other air
defense brigades with Buk-M1 systems use this number structure as well, although usually with five
to six battalions (older images of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade show this brigade also used to
have at least five battalions).
Left: Buk-M1 missile launcher 132; middle: Buk-M1 missile launcher 231; right: Buk-M1 missile loader 313.
Other information provides the number of personnel necessary for each vehicle. These sources show
that the number of crew members needed to operate a complete Buk-M1 system are six command
vehicle operators, three radar vehicle operators, three missile loader operators, and four missile
launcher operators (usually two officers, one operator, and one driver).16 Another source mentions
three crew members and seven passengers for a BTR-80, an armored personnel carrier, visible on
several photographs and videos as support vehicle in battalions of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade.17
15 http://pvo.guns.ru/buk/buk.htm
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/bukm1/bukm1.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/bukm1 2/bukm1 2.shtml
http://www.niip.ru/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=16:-l-1-2r&catid=9:2011-07-06-06-33-50&Itemid=9
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buk_missile_system
16 http://vpk.name/news/114383_bez_sledov_i_svidetelei.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/buk/buk shtml
17 http://www.amz.ru/produktsiya/btr-80
http://wartools.ru/btr/btr-80
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BTR-80
6 bell¿ngcat
Based on several open sources mentioned above, the organizational structure of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade appears to be organized as follows:18
Organizational structure of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
18 A photograph uploaded by a 53rd Brigade soldier indicates that the 53rd Brigade replaced the Buk-M1 system by a Buk-M1-
2 system in or before 2010.
Combat Weapons Combat Weapons
Brigade 1st Battalion Crew No. 1st Battalion - 1st Battery Crew No.
Command post (CP) 9S470M1-2 6 100 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 111
Snow Drift radar (Kupol) 9S18M1-1 3 101 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 112
BTR 80 3 + 7 993 Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 113
Hardware Hardware System Combat Weapons
Car maintenance (MTO) 9V884M1 1st Battalion - 2nd Battery Crew No.
Workshop maintenance MTO-ATG-M1 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 121
Car repair and maintenance (MRTO) Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 122
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 123
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Combat Weapons
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles 1st Battalion - 3rd Battery Crew No.
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 131
Compressor station UKS - 400V-P4M Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 132
Mobile power PES - 100-T / 230-B / 400 A1RK1 Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 133
Combat Weapons Combat Weapons
2nd Battalion Crew No. 2nd Battalion - 1st Battery Crew No.
Command post (CP) 9S470M1-2 6 200 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 211
Snow Drift radar (Kupol) 9S18M1-1 3 201 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 212
BTR 80 3 + 7 Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 213
Hardware System Combat Weapons
Car maintenance (MTO) 9V884M1 2nd Battalion - 2nd Battery Crew No.
Workshop maintenance MTO-ATG-M1 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 221
Car repair and maintenance (MRTO) Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 222
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 223
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Combat Weapons
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles 2nd Battalion - 3rd Battery Crew No.
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 231
Compressor station UKS - 400V-P4M Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 232
Mobile power PES - 100-T / 230-B / 400 A1RK1 Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 233
Combat Weapons Combat Weapons
3rd Battalion Crew No. 3rd Battalion - 1st Battery Crew No.
Command post (CP) 9S470M1-2 6 300 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 311
Snow Drift radar (Kupol) 9S18M1-1 3 301 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 312
BTR 80 3 + 7 Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 313
Hardware System Combat Weapons
Car maintenance (MTO) 9V884M1 3rd Battalion - 2nd Battery Crew No.
Workshop maintenance MTO-ATG-M1 Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 321
Car repair and maintenance (MRTO) Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 322
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 323
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Combat Weapons
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles 3rd Battalion - 3rd Battery Crew No.
Transport machines for Missiles (TM) 9T243 8 Missiles Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 331
Compressor station UKS - 400V-P4M; Missile launcher with radar (TELAR) 9A310M1-2 4 332
Mobile power PES - 100-T / 230-B / 400 A1RK1 Missile launcher with crane (TEL) 9A39M1 3 333
Mobile
automated
control
and test
station
ACIS
9V930M-1
7 bell¿ngcat
To identify soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, the Bellingcat team used photos of
badges, patches, emblems, other symbols visible on the soldiers’ uniforms as well as flags and other
distinguishing objects in order to determine in which unit a soldier was or is currently serving. These
symbols are critical in differentiating soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade from soldiers in
other units (e.g., 448th Missile Brigade). The unit patch – visible on the right arm sleeve of the uniform
- is unique to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, displaying a cannon intersected diagonally by
three arrows, a medieval crown in the middle, and two flails on the side.19
Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade wearing a unique unit patch on the right arm.
The patch on the left arm is a general emblem of the Russian army.
Left: symbol of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (on a uniform and a clearer depiction found on a website).
Right: symbol of the Russian Armed Forces (on a uniform and a clearer depiction found on a website).20
19 http://ru-chevron.livejournal.com/33039.html (Near 24 on the second list)
20 http://www.promvishivka.ru/voennaya forma.html
8 bell¿ngcat
Left: a flag with the symbol of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
Middle and right: modern insignia of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
General air defense symbols and badges, left and middle left: flag and symbol21 of the PVO (ПВО), which stands for ‘Air
Defense’ (Противовоздушная оборона),22 with the phrase “we ourselves don’t fly and we won’t let others” (сами не летаем и
другим не даëм); middle right and right: badge of the Air Defense23 from a 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade commander and
large emblem of the Air Defense.24
21 http://geraldika.ru/symbols/12091
22 http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/ground/structure/vpvo.htm
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Противовоздушная оборона
23 http://www.voentorga.ru/catalog/znaki petlichnye/emblema znak petlichnaya petlitsa pvo nov obr zoloto plastikovaya 2102194
24 http://www.goldenkorona.ru/simv_vs_Russia_4_39.html
http://forum.guns.ru/forum_light_message/71/289756-m6508511.html
9 bell¿ngcat
Section Two: Mobilization of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
In two previous reports (Origin of the Separatists’ Buk25 and Tracking the Trailers: Investigation of
MH17 Buk’s Russian Convoy),26 the Bellingcat team described two separate convoys filmed and
photographed in Russia. The first convoy occurred from 23 to 25 June 2014 and the second from 19
to 21 July 2014. The routes of the convoys were partly similar – both convoys originated from the
military base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Marshala Zhukova – but the June 2014
convoy was last filmed on a road to Millerovo, while the July 2014 convoy was last filmed and
photographed on a road leading to an area southwest of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky.
Both convoys transported Buk-M1 missile launchers (among other military vehicles); however, the 23-
25 June 2014 convoy is particularly remarkable because it was transporting a Buk-M1 missile
launcher bearing a striking resemblance to the Buk-M1 missile launcher spotted in Ukraine on 17 July
2014, just a few hours before the downing of MH17. Origin of the Separatist’ Buk demonstrates the
link between the June and July 2014 Buk convoys and the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. It also
shows the link between a Buk-M1 missile launcher in the 23-25 June 2014 convoy and the Buk-M1
missile launcher connected to the downing of MH17 seen in Ukraine. Tracking the Trailers shows the
link between the June and July 2014 Buk convoys and two different transport units and thoroughly
details the routes and destinations of these convoys.
Left: likely route of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy; right: likely route of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy.
This section investigates the mobilization and deployment of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in
the summer of 2014, shows the relationship between the Buk-M1 vehicles and specific units in the
53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, and examines the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy with an attempt to
estimate the number of soldiers involved in that convoy.
25 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation
26 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/05/13/tracking-the-trailers-investigation-of-mh17-buks-russianconvoy
10 bell¿ngcat
The 23-25 June 2014 Buk Convoy Vehicles
As described in Section One, most of the Buk-M1 vehicles visible in the 23-25 June 2014 convoy have
numbers on the side serving as unit designation, where the first digit represents the battalion, the
second the battery, and the third the specific Buk unit. Each battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade has six missile launchers (TELAR), three missile loaders (TEL), one Snow Drift radar (Kupol-
M1), and one command vehicle. Most Buk-M1 vehicles in the June 2014 convoy have a unit
designation starting with 2, meaning these vehicles belong to the 2nd Battalion.
However, the unit designation of at least three Buk-M1 system vehicles do not start with 2. The Buk-
M1 missile launcher linked to the downing of MH17 is numbered 3x2 (where ‘x’ is a scuffed,
unreadable number), a Buk-M1 missile loader is numbered x23 (‘x’ again a scuffed, unreadable
number), and one Buk-M1 missile loader has no number at all. We know that Buk x23’s unit
designation is likely not 2, because videos of the 23-25 June 2014 convoy show another Buk-M1
missile loader numbered 223. However, a closer look at the first digit shows that likely a 2 has been
painted over a different number, possibly a 3. The vehicles with 3 as their first digit presumably
belong to the 3rd Battalion, although it is noteworthy that both vehicles show partly scuffed numbers,
because none of the other Buk unit vehicles of the June 2014 convoy had scuffed numbers. Thus, the
two vehicles’ unit designations had not been repainted for some time, possibly indicating that they
were not used in training missions for some time as well.
Left: unit designation of Buk 3x2; middle and right: unit designation of Buk x23, the image far
right shows most clear that likely a 2 has been painted over a different number, possibly a 3.
Videos of the June 2014 Buk convoy also show that it contains a complete Buk-M1 system, consisting
of six missile launchers, three missile loaders, one Snow Drift radar, and one command vehicle, as
described above. The missile launchers in the convoy had the following numbers: 211, 212, 221, 231,
232 and 3x2. Missile launcher 222 is absent, but it is compensated for by the missile launcher with a
partly scuffed number (3x2). There was only one numbered missile loader in the convoy (223), but the
missing missile loaders 213 and 233 were compensated for by the missile loader with a partly scuffed
number (x23) and the missile loader without a number. The Snow Drift radar is numbered 201 and
the command vehicle 200.
A video filmed in Alexeyevka shows nearly all of the Buk-M1 vehicles in the June 2014 Buk convoy,
where two parts of the convoy that were previously separated at some point merged back together
into a single convoy.27 The only vehicle belonging to the Buk-M1 system not in the video is the
command vehicle numbered 200; however, this vehicle is visible in a second video filmed from a
slightly different location, where it is seen making a U-turn and driving back in the direction from
which it originally came.28
27 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0020-Alexeyevka%3A-Buk-convoy-turning-and-merging-1
28 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0021-Alexeyevka%3A-Buk-convoy-turning-and-merging-2
11 bell¿ngcat
Left: Buk-M1 missile launcher 211; middle: Buk-M1 missile launcher 212; right: Buk-M1 missile loader x23 replacing 213.29
Left: Buk-M1 missile launcher 221; middle: Buk-M1 missile launcher 3x2 replacing 222; right: Buk-M1 missile loader 223.
Left: Buk-M1 missile launcher 231; middle: Buk-M1 missile launcher 232.
Right: Buk-M1 missile loader (unnumbered) replacing 233.30
Left: Buk-M1 command vehicle 200; right: Buk-M1 Snow Drift radar 201.
29 Buk missile loader x23 could also have been the replacement of Buk missile loader 233.
30 Buk missile loader (unnumbered) could also have been the replacement of Buk missile loader 213.
12 bell¿ngcat
As these videos show a complete Buk-M1 system and most Buk unit vehicles originated from the 2nd
Battalion of the 53rd Brigade, likely only soldiers and officers of the 2nd Battalion were involved in this
convoy. Therefore, it is important to know the number of soldiers involved in the convoy, as this
number might confirm that the convoy only transported vehicles, soldiers and officers of the 2nd
Battalion.
Beside the fact that these videos show a complete Buk-M1 system, the type and number of all of the
vehicles seen in videos of the June 2014 Buk convoy serve to indicate the likely number of individuals
involved in the convoy. In addition to eleven KamAZ 65225 trucks hauling the Buk-M1 vehicles,31
other trucks can be seen in the convoy: four KrAZ 255B trucks transporting missiles (seen as covered
cargo),32 five Ural 4320 trucks,33 one Ural 4320 truck with a crane, five Gaz-66 trucks,34 fourteen
KamAZ 5350 trucks,35 two ZIL 131 trucks,36 one UAZ 452 military ambulance,37 and one PAZ 3205
bus.38
Since the Buk-M1 vehicles were transported by a separate transport unit (the 147th Automobile
Battalion), as described in Tracking the Trailers, it is not likely that soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade were traveling as passengers in the KamAZ 65225 trucks. Information provided in
several sources referenced throughout this report state that most trucks have two extra seats in the
cabin; notable exceptions are the Gaz-66 truck and the UAZ 452 military ambulance – each having
just one extra seat – and the PAZ 3205 bus, which has seats in the bus behind the driver instead of
next to the driver. Apart from the PAZ 3205 bus, which has a single accordion door and is capable of
transporting a maximum of 28 seated passengers, there are just a few other vehicles able to
transport soldiers in the back of the vehicle, although it is not clear exactly how many. The Gaz-66
can transport 21 soldiers in the back, but from video evidence, we see just a few of those trucks with
open windows (one might expect more to be opened in June when 21 soldiers are inside). The two
videos that show the vehicles of the convoy most clearly were filmed in Alexeyevka (described on the
previous page) and near Raskhovets.39 These videos show passengers next to the drivers; no
passengers are visible in the eleven KamAZ 65225 trucks hauling the Buk-M1 system vehicles, but
one or two passengers are visible next to the drivers in the other vehicles of the convoy.
31 http://www.kamaz.ru/en/production/serial/tractor-units/kamaz-65225-43
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/КАМАЗ-65225
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamaz
32 http://autoinf org/car.php?car_id=581
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/КрАЗ-255Б
33 http://www.uralaz.ru
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Урал-4320
34 http://www.sever66.ru/podrazdel/podrazdel2
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ГАЗ-66
35 http://www.kamaz.ru/en/production/serial/high-sided-trucks/kamaz-5350-42
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/КАМАЗ 5350
36 http://www.primeportal.net/trucks/egor_kalmykov/zil-131
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ЗИЛ-131
37 http://www.uaz.ru
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/УАЗ-452
38 http://avto-russia.ru/autos/paz/paz_3205.html
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ПАЗ-3205
39 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0019-Raskhovets%3A-Buk-convoy-on-the-highway
13 bell¿ngcat
The table below presents an estimate of the number of people visible on the seats next to the drivers
in the videos of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy.
There are 44 drivers in the convoy, the same number of vehicles in the convoy minus a Ural 4320
truck connected to another truck. Based on the number of passengers visible next to the drivers and
in the bus, the estimated minimum number of soldiers transported by this convoy would be 59 (but
assuming that the PAZ 3205 bus was full). The estimated maximum number of soldiers transported
by the convoy would be 155, including the Gaz-66 and KamAZ 5350 trucks, assuming both contained
21 soldiers. The average estimated number of soldiers then would be 107. Additionally, including the
drivers of the trucks – apart from the drivers of the KamAZ 65225 trucks, who were not a part of the
53rd Brigade but the 147th Automobile Battalion yields 140 soldiers and soldier-drivers (33 added to
107).
Apart from these estimations, the Bellingcat team also found roughly 80 soldiers in the 2nd Battalion
of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade who served in 2014 (further described in Section Three). This
figure is consistent with approximately the same number of soldiers travelling in the 23-25 June 2014
Buk convoy.
Vehicle Type
Number of
Vehicles
Number of
Drivers
Maximum Number of
Passengers
Number of
Passengers
Visible
KamAZ truck 65225
(trailer with Buk
vehicles)
11 11 22 0
Ural 4320 truck
with KS-2573 crane
KrAZ 255B truck 4 4 8 3
GAZ-66 truck 5 5
10 + 21 (one vehicle can
transport 21 passengers
in the back)
0
ZIL 131 truck 2 2 4 0
Ural 4320 truck 5 5 10 2
Ural 4320 truck
connected to a KamAZ
5350 truck
1 0 0 0
UAZ 452 military
ambulance
1 1 1 1
PAZ 3205 bus 1 1 28 28 (full bus)
45 44 155 59
KamAZ 5350 truck (with
or without trailer)
14 14 28 + 21 (one vehicle can
transport 21 passengers
24
1 1 2 1
14 bell¿ngcat
One noteworthy video, uploaded 19 July 2014, shows a Buk missile loader that was seen in the 23-25
June 2014 with the unit designation x23 (‘x’ being a partially scuffed number).40 In this video, only Buk
x23 is visible, along with a police car (but no other Buk unit vehicles), driving through Kamensk-
Shakhtinksy in the direction of Donetsk, Russia. It is not known whether the video was also filmed on
19 July 2014 or earlier, but if it was filmed on 18 or 19 July 2014, it is quite remarkable that this Buk
missile loader was driving toward Donetsk, Russia, as it is the same area in which Buk 3x2 (which
very likely downed MH17) arrived from Ukraine on 18 July 2014, as indicated by the intercepted phone
calls published by the Joint Investigation Team.41
One could speculate that Buk missile loader x23 headed towards the border to unload the remaining
three missiles off of Buk 3x2. In the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy, the Buk missile launchers were not
loaded with missiles; instead, the missiles were stored on the same Buk missile loader x23. Since the
other Buk missile launchers of the 2nd Battalion were likely deployed in an area near Millerovo (as
described later in this section), and the Buk vehicles of the 1st Battalion were transported a few days
later through Kamensk-Shakhtinsky (also described later in this section). An alternative reason as to
why Buk missile loader x23 was driving through Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on or just before 19 July 2014
is not clear; apart from Buk 3x2 there were no other (known) Buk vehicles in the area at or just before
19 July 2014. Buk x23 is visible in the 19 July 2014 video transporting missiles, which might contradict
the speculation above that Buk x23 was sent to unload the remaining three missiles from Buk 3x2,
but a Buk missile loader can store eight missiles in total. Thus, the missile loader likely would have
been able to load additional missiles.42
Buk missile loader x23 driving through Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in the direction of Donetsk, Russia, uploaded 19 July 2014.
40 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0150-Kamensk-Shakhtinsky%3A-isolated-Buk-TEL
41 http://youtu.be/olQNpTxSnTo?t=436
42 http://pvo.guns.ru/buk/buk_14.htm
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/buk/buk shtml
15 bell¿ngcat
The 19-21 July 2014 Buk Convoy Vehicles
The 1st Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade transported all or nearly all of its Buk-M1
vehicles towards the Russia-Ukraine border from 19 to 21 July 2014. One video shows 10 Buk-M1
vehicles - one Buk short of a complete system. It is possible that the absent vehicle was present in
the convoy, but just not visible in any of the found videos. In the videos, most Buk-M1 vehicles are
covered with a tarp, except for three missile launchers (numbered 112, 121, and 122), which are
sometimes seen without a tarp.43
Since the unit designations of the three visible Buk-M1 missile launchers of this convoy all start with
number 1, it is a logical assumption to conclude that the other covered Buk-M1 vehicles have a unit
designation starting with 1 as well. Therefore, the videos of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy likely show
a nearly complete Buk-M1 system belonging to the 1st Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade.
While it may seem remarkable that this convoy was on its way to the border just two days after the
downing of MH17, there is no relation between this convoy and the downing. It is also noteworthy that
most of the vehicles were covered with tarps; not a single Buk was covered in the 23-25 June 2014
convoy. It is also unusual that not all of the Buk-M1 missile launchers were covered with a tarp, as it
might be expected that either all or none of the Buks would be covered.
Left: Buk missile launcher 112; right: Buk missile launcher 121.
Buk missile launcher 122.
43 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0201-Fedoseevka%3A-Buk-convoy-on-P189-road-2
http://bellingcat-vehicles silk.co/page/0204-Stary-Oskol%3A-Buk-convoy-in-the-center-before-traffic-light
http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0213-Kamensk-Shakhtisnky%3A-Buk-convoy-driving-to-the-border
16 bell¿ngcat
Satellite imagery from 18 July 2014 shows some vehicles just outside the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade base.44 These vehicles resemble the KamAZ trucks with trailers filmed hauling Buk vehicles
covered with tarps. It might seem odd to see these vehicles just outside of Marshala Zhukova, a small
village to the east of the military base where the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade is located.
However, the village Marshala Zhukova is mainly a military garrison with apartments for soldiers,
officers, and their families.45 Visible vehicle tracks lead across the road separating Marshala Zhukova
from the military base, and satellite imagery from 2015 shows that these tracks lead to the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade base. In the satellite imagery of 18 July 2014, exactly 10 vehicles are visible,
the same number of vehicles in the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy. However, some of the vehicles are not
on trailers and might be different vehicles that were not part of the convoy.
Left: Satellite imagery of 18 July 2014, showing seven vehicles that resemble the vehicles filmed in a convoy
of Buks covered by tarps on trailers hauled by KamAZ trucks and three other vehicles (in red circles);
Right: Zoomed part of the 18 July 2014 satellite imagery and comparison between one of the visible vehicles and an image of a
KamAZ truck hauling a trailer with a covered Buk (the image is a screenshot of one of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy videos);
the square on the left down side shows trails leading across the road.
44 http://www.google com/maps/@51.7182761,36.3278558,702m/data=!3m1!1e3
45 http://wikimapia.org/3557281/ru/Имени Маршала Жукова
17 bell¿ngcat
The 16 August 2014 Missile Transport
On 16 August 2014, Reuters published an article featuring two photographs of several military
vehicles transporting Buk-M1 missile containers.46 Neither the photographs nor the article reveal
whether the containers are filled with missiles or empty. According to the article, the images were
taken on 16 August 2014 on a road outside Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in the Rostov Oblast. The
Bellingcat team was able to verify that the photos were indeed taken near Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on
the M21 road southwest of the town.47 Due to the powerful zoom that the photographer was using,
the perspective of the photo is distorted, and therefore many of the landmarks and signs in the
photos appear much closer than they actually are.
Above: Reuters’ 16 August 2014 photograph of trucks transporting missile containers and a truck with a crane;
Below: M21 road visible on the photograph, near Kamensk-Shakhtinsky.
46 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/16/uk-ukraine-crisis-west-idUKKBN0GG06M20140816
47 http://www.google.com/maps/@48.280991,40.263288,3a,75y,321.5h,81.79t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sV91ue8jmEfKTGy76oVMp-
A!2e0!7i13312!8i6656
http://www.google.com/maps/@48.2926149,40.2505503,3a,90y,316.57h,82.6t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1slBpEOo5by1V7jd-dcHlHg!
2e0!7i13312!8i6656
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In addition to the location, Bellingcat was also able to confirm that these vehicles belong to the 53rd
Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade; two license plates on the vehicles visible in one of Reuters’ 16 August
2014 photographs match license plates of vehicles in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy. One of the
KrAZ 255B trucks transporting missiles has a license plate 8564 HC 50 and the Ural 4320 truck with
the KS-2573 crane has a license plate 0502 HC 50. Both vehicles were also part of the June 2014
Buk convoy.48 The license plate of the other KrAZ 255B truck, 8568 HC 50, matches the license plate
of a similar truck found in a 2012 album of a 53rd Brigade soldier.49
Left: KrAZ 255B truck with license 8564 HC 50 transporting missile containers from Reuters first 16 August 2014 picture;
Right: KrAZ 255B truck with license 8564 HC 50 probably transporting missiles covered under a tarp from the 23-25 June
2014 Buk convoy, video uploaded 24 June 2014.
Left: KrAZ 255B truck with license 8568 HC 50 transporting missile containers from Reuters’ second 16 August 2014 picture;
Right: KrAZ 255B truck with license 8568 HC 50, uploaded by a 53rd Brigade soldier, 19 December 2012.
48 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0019-Raskhovets%3A-Buk-convoy-on-the-highway
http://youtu.be/aLtzYEHolmg?t=76
http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0502-HC-50
49 http://archive.is/FffAK
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Left: Ural 4320 truck with KS-2573 crane with license plate 0502 HC 50 from one of Reuters’ 16 August 2014 photographs;
Right: Ural 4320 truck with KS-2573 crane with license plate 0502 HC 50 from the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy,
video uploaded 23 June 2014.
Bellingcat also established that the missiles transported were 9M38M1 missiles for a Buk-M1 or
Buk-M1-2 missile launcher.50 Almaz-Antey, the manufacturer of the Buk systems and missiles,
claims these missiles have not been in production since 1999 and that all 9M38M1 missiles were
passed on to international clients.51 The Bellingcat team, however, has found numerous recent
images and videos that clearly show 9M38M1 missiles, among them a video of the 23-25 June 2014
Buk convoy, where a Buk-M1 missile loader can be seen transporting this type of missile.52
Above and below: zoomed-in images of the containers with missiles from one of Reuters’ 16 August
2014 photographs shows the transport of 9M38M1 missiles for a Buk-M1 or Buk-M1-2 system.
50 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/06/03/evidence-the-russian-military-supplied-the-type-ofmissile-
used-to-shoot-down-mh17/
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/bukm1/bukm1.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/bukm1_2/bukm1_2.shtml
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buk missile system#Comparison
51 http://www.rt.com/news/264421-buk-missile-manufacturer-investigation/
http://www.almaz-antey.ru/about/press/news/1975.html
52 http://youtu.be/OJPxt7XrG6Q?t=77
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Deployment of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in the Summer of 2014
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, a previous Bellingcat report (Tracking the Trailers:
Investigation of MH17 Buk’s Russian Convoy)53 describes the routes and destinations of the June and
July 2014 Buk convoys. The 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy was last filmed on a road southeast of
Millerovo, about 4.5 kilometers from the center of the town.54 The video does not show whether the
convoy drives into the town (to do so, it has to turn right at the first crossing), or drives straight ahead,
in the direction of the Russia-Ukraine border. As Tracking the Trailers describes, there is a strong
possibility that the convoy went to the Millerovo military airbase. Satellite imagery of this airbase
shows military camps and an increase of military equipment during the summer of 2014, a decrease
in 2015, and most of the camps and equipment gone in the summer of 2015.55
Left: a part of Millerovo military airbase, 29 September 2014; right: the same area, 24 August 2015.
As Tracking the Trailers points out, the Buks in the June 2014 Buk convoy were likely meant for
deployment along the Russia-Ukraine border, therefore the Millerovo military airbase was likely not
the final destination. Photographs of Buk missile launchers geolocated near Kuybyshevo and
Voloshino, two towns close the Russia-Ukraine border (see Tracking the Trailers) support this theory.
Section Three shows photographs of 2nd Battalion soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in
a rural area, some of them geotagged to the west and southwest of Millerovo.
In the autumn of 2015, Google updated its satellite imagery for the rural area southwest of Millerovo.
Before that update, most of the area was covered by imagery from May 2014, but the updated
imagery of September 2014 revealed several remarkable details. An area with military vehicles is
visible between two parts of a small forest near a village named Duby.56 A close view into the imagery
reveals at least one vehicle that resembles a Buk missile launcher, as the visible vehicle seems to
have a rotated upper component. More military equipment is visible in the same area, as well as a
small military convoy.57
53 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/05/13/tracking-the-trailers-investigation-of-mh17-buks-russianconvoy
54 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0024-Millerovo%3A-Buk-convoy-on-a-rainy-day
55 http://www.google com/maps/@48.9490795,40.2963376,2987m/data=!3m1!1e3
56 http://www.google com/maps/@48.6359505,39.8861371,729m/data=!3m1!1e3
57 http://www.google com/maps/@48.6317768,39.9071954,748m/data=!3m1!1e3
http://www.google com/maps/@48.6593747,39.88974,377m/data=!3m1!1e3
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Left: military vehicles in an open area between two parts of a small forest near Duby (Rostov Oblast, Russia);
Right: four vehicles, possibly Buk missile launchers, one of which seems to have a rotated upper component.
Left: more military equipment near Duby; right: a small military convoy to the north of Duby.
It is worth noting that the location where a Ukrainian AN-26 was shot down and crashed on 14 July
2014 (near the village Davydo-Mykil's'ke, very close to the Russia-Ukraine border)58 is just 16
kilometers from the military camp near Duby. It is still unclear what kind of missile downed the AN-
26; one of the possibilities seemed to be a Buk missile. However, a recent study published in the
Dutch newspaper NRC claims that the AN-26 was downed by an air-to-air missile and not by a Buk
missile.59
Section Three shows that the 2nd Battalion was deployed in this area for about three months and
then returned to Kursk in mid-September 2014. The satellite imagery likely confirms the continued
presence of Buk missile launchers on 6 September 2014 and corresponds with the three months that
the 2nd Battalion was deployed in this area.
58 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28299334
http://www.google com/maps/@48.4975936,39.8291918,378m/data=!3m1!1e3
59 http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/11/14/waar-was-de-antonov-toen-de-rus-hem-raakte-1556170
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In addition, the destination of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy also is described in Tracking the
Trailers. That convoy was last filmed on 21 July 2014 on a road in a southern area of Kamensk-
Shakhtinsky, driving in the direction of the Russia-Ukraine border,60 and last photographed 21 July
2014 near Volchenskiy, to the southwest of Kamensk-Shakhtinksy.61
Buk missile loader x23 from the June 2014 Buk convoy was filmed on or just before 19 July 2014
being transported on the same road through the southern part of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky and going in
the same direction, as described earlier in this section. While the destination of Buk missile loader
x23 is not clear, the destination of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy is likely discernible, as the
photograph near Volchenskiy indicates that the road where the convoy was photographed leads to a
rural area with only small villages, including Anikin, Berezka, and Uglerodovskiy.62
Satellite imagery from 8 August 2014 shows a few military camps in fields near these villages, where
military vehicles are visible inside of pits.63 Satellite imagery from 22 August 2014 shows the vehicles
are all gone, but the pits are still there.
Left: military vehicles inside pits, 8 August 2014; right: empty pits, 22 August 2014.
The Buk vehicles are not visible on the satellite images from 8 August 2014 and likely were deployed
closer to the Russia-Ukraine border. As Section Three describes, the 1st Battalion was deployed for
about a month in the Rostov Oblast and left the area in mid-August, corresponding with the August
2014 satellite imagery. It remains unclear why the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade continued
transporting missile containers in the direction of this area on 16 August 2014.
60 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0213-Kamensk-Shakhtisnky%3A-Buk-convoy-driving-to-the-border
61 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0214-Kamensk-Shakhtinsky%3A-Buk-on-a-trailer
62 http://www.google com/maps/@48.1652878,40.0224236,11773m/data=!3m1!1e3
63 http://www.google com/maps/@48.1758464,40.0513883,3040m/data=!3m1!1e3
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Section Three: Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
Introduction
This section describes the results of a deep investigation into the battalions of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade and soldiers who served in these battalions in 2013 and 2014. The first part provides
an overview of soldiers of the 2nd Battalion in 2013, based on two attendance lists and the social
network connections among these soldiers on VK. The second part describes the 3rd Battalion in
2014, based on an attendance list and the soldiers’ VK connections. The third part gives an overview
of several soldiers of the 2nd Battalion in 2014, the first few of whom were found via a forum for
mothers and wives of soldiers. Some of these soldiers posted images of the 23-25 June 2014 convoy
and of locations near the Russia-Ukraine border on their VK profiles, while images found in albums of
soldiers of the 2nd battalion in 2013 and the 3rd Battalion in 2014 do not show any relation to the June
or July 2014 Buk convoys.
There is no direct evidence that soldiers or officers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade were part
of the crew of the Buk-M1 that likely downed MH17 on 17 July 2014; however, there are several
indications that a crew was transported together with this Buk-M1 from Russia across the border to
Ukraine. A video published by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) states (at 1:10) that there is
reliable information that at least one Buk-M1 missile launcher was transported with a crew from
Russia to Ukraine.64 An intercepted phone conversation between two separatists, ‘Khmuryi’ and
’Buryat,’ shown in the same video and partly in a video from the Joint Investigation Team65 makes
clear that the Buk came with a crew (at 2:02) to Donetsk and crossed the border between Russia and
Ukraine driving under its own power (at 2:16). It is possible that a separatist crew was added to the
Buk immediately after crossing the border into Ukraine and before driving to Donetsk, and that the
person who drove the Buk under its own power across the border went back to Russia after
delivering the Buk in Ukraine. This scenario, however, seems unlikely, mainly because a Buk missile
launcher is a very sophisticated and expensive weapon and it is very unlikely that Russia would turn it
over unsupervised to a group of separatists without having adequate training. According to a high
officer of the Russian Air Defense, training is not enough, as the crew also needs adequate
experience.66
Screenshots of videos from the SBU and the Joint Investigation Team
that show a Buk-M1 was delivered in Donetsk with a crew.
64 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVAOTWPmMM4
65 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olQNpTxSnTo
66 http://vpk.name/news/114383 bez sledov i svidetelei.html
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Screenshots of an SBU showing that the Buk-M1 crossed the border between Russia and Ukraine under its own power.
Additional information indicating that the crew came from Russia has been provided by journalists
with the Associated Press (AP)67 and an anonymous witness from Torez, interviewed by John
Sweeney from BBC Panorama.68
The AP article describes a meeting between AP journalists and the Buk-M1 and crew transported
through Snizhne on 17 July 2014. Parts of this article make clear that the uniform of one member of
the Buk-M1 crew was different than those of the separatists and that the accent of this man was
more typical of Russian citizens than Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine:
Snizhne, Ukraine (AP) — It was lunchtime when a tracked launcher with four SA-11 surface-toair
missiles rolled into town and parked on Karapetyan Street.
It had been a noisy day in this eastern Ukrainian town, residents recounted. Plenty of military
equipment was moving through. But still it was hard to miss the bulky missile system, also
known as a Buk M-1. It left deep tread marks in the asphalt as it rumbled by in a small convoy.
The vehicles stopped in front of journalists from The Associated Press. A man wearing
unfamiliar fatigues, speaking with a distinctive Russian accent, checked to make sure they
weren't filming. The convoy then moved on, destination unknown in the heart of eastern
Ukraine's pro-Russia rebellion.
AP journalists saw the Buk moving through town at 1:05 p.m. The vehicle, which carried four 18-
foot (5.5-meter) missiles, was in a convoy with two civilian cars.
The convoy stopped. A man in sand-colored camouflage without identifying insignia — different
from the green camouflage the rebels normally wear — approached the journalists. The man
wanted to make sure they had not recorded any images of the missile launcher. Satisfied that
they hadn't, the convoy moved on.
67 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/what-happened-day-flight-17-was-downed
68 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29109398
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A BBC article by John Sweeney mentions three eyewitnesses who saw the Buk missile launcher in
Snizhne on 17 July 2014, stating the Buk crew resembled Russian soldiers and spoke Russian with a
Moscow accent:
The eyewitness told the BBC that the crew struck him as Russian soldiers: “Well-disciplined,
unlike the rebels, and not wearing the standard Ukrainian camouflage uniform sported by
government and rebel troops alike.”
They had pure Russian accents. “They say the letter 'g' differently to us,” he said.
In eastern Ukraine, most people speak Russian but the BUK crew did not speak Russian with a
local accent.
His testimony was confirmed by a second eyewitness, who added that an officer in a military
jeep escorting the BUK spoke with a Muscovite accent.
The article contains a video that displays a reconstructed interview of one of the eyewitnesses in a car
with John Sweeney. The eyewitness says in the video that “A soldier spoke with a Moscow accent.”
The fact that the Buk crew spoke with a Russian or "Moscow” accent does not confirm that the crew
consisted of Russian soldiers and/or officers since many separatists and separatist leaders are
Russian citizens and speak Russian with a “Moscow” accent too. But taking into account Russia
would very likely not hand over such a sophisticated weapon to separatists untrained and
inexperienced with the Buk-M1 system, it is likely that the crew consisted or at least partially
consisted of Russian soldiers and/or officers.
This section describes several battalions and shows which soldiers took part in the 23-25 June 2014
Buk convoy. If the crew of the Buk that downed MH17 came from Russia, they very likely were
transported together with Buk 3x2 in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy and were most likely soldiers
of the 2nd Battalion. Thus, soldiers who were not in the 2nd Battalion and were not in the June 2014
Buk convoy very likely can be excluded from any involvement in the MH17 tragedy, unless the crew
consisted of reservists or soldiers and officers outside of the 53rd Brigade. Since operating a Buk
system requires fairly extensive training, conscript soldiers who started their military service late 2013
or early 2014 are very likely excluded from involvement in the tragedy. By narrowing down the scope
of the search, only a relatively small group of contract soldiers and reservists who were in service in
the 2nd Battalion in 2014 remain as potential suspects involved in the downing of MH17.
In addition to contract soldiers and/or reservists, the Buk crew also had two officers: one sergeant
and one lieutenant (as mentioned in Section One). Section Five describes Bellingcat’s investigation
into the officers of the 53rd Brigade and highlights the 2nd Battalion commanders in particular.
It should be noted that in the public version, all of the identities of the soldiers and officers are
censored because it might disturb the official police investigation should these identities be revealed.
Apart from that, the privacy of these soldiers and officers has to be respected in case there is no
relation between them and the MH17 tragedy or any other military activities in Ukraine.
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2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2013
Early into the MH17 investigation, a sergeant named Ivan Krasnoproshin was identified, and photos
he had published were used to help tie the convoy transporting Buk 3x2 to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade. Krasnoproshin deleted his VK profile soon after the publication of Bellingcat’s first
article about the involvement of the Russian army in the downing of MH17. Despite the connection
between Ivan Krasnoproshin and the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, it should be explicitly noted
that there is no evidence at all that Krasnoproshin was in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy, let alone
involved in the MH17 tragedy. Some of the photos he had uploaded revealed interesting information,
such as an attendance list – a good starting point for research. The attendance list shows a list of
names in the third column, a list of dates in first row, and markings indicating who was present on
which date. The attendance list shows the month of June, and a sentence at the top of the attendance
list in the first row (with the name ‘Krasnoproshin, I.A.’) makes clear that this attendance list is from
the year 2013 and was photographed on 13 or 14 June 2013. The attendance list also displays the
battalion that the soldiers were part of: “2nd Battalion” (“2 дивизиона”). Since a battalion consists of
many more soldiers than just fourteen, as written in the attendance list, this attendance list possibly
shows a battery within this battalion.
Attendance list of Krasnoproshin’s unit from June 2013.
The Bellingcat investigation team managed to find the profiles of 9 out of 14 soldiers whose names
are on this attendance list by searching VK and by a thorough examination of the contacts (friends)
list of each soldier. This revealed that most soldiers know at least five other soldiers, a strong
indication that the right profile was found. Uploaded photographs in the soldiers’ photo albums show
an exercise mission in a training field near Kapustin Yar – a small village to the east of Volgograd –
close to the border between Russia and Kazakhstan. These images, dating between March and July
2013, show numerous Buk missile launchers and a few loaders with numbers on the side similar to
those in the videos of the June 2014 Buk convoy. For example, one of those numbers is ‘211.’ As
mentioned in Section One, the first number is the battalion, the second number the battery, and the
third number the specific vehicle (Buk unit). The number of the battalion displayed on the Buk missile
launchers indeed matches the number of the battalion mentioned at the top of the attendance list.
Many soldiers have Buk missile launchers in their photo album starting with ‘21,’ an indication they
were in the 1st Battery.
27 bell¿ngcat
Via the soldiers’ VK connections, more soldiers of the same unit were found; these soldiers uploaded
photographs of Buk system units, displaying a number that starts with 2. One soldier uploaded many
photographs of military vehicles, as well as a picture with a different attendance list on 23 June 2013,
clearly stating his own name on that attendance list. It is probable that he moved from one battery to
another since he can be seen in many pictures together with soldiers of the preceding attendance list
(2nd Battalion, 1st Battery) and has some of the same pictures in his album as soldiers of the preceding
list. From this attendance list, almost all names are legible and nine out of twelve names could be
found on VK.
One photograph uploaded on 18 July 2013 by this soldier shows a Buk missile launcher with the
number 211 on the side and three soldiers (including himself) standing in front of the launcher. A
geotag shows the image was taken in the area of Kapustin Yar.
Picture of Buk missile launcher 211, photographed on a training field near Kapustin Yar, 18 July 2013.
More pictures show the relation between the June 2014 Buk convoy and this particular battery of the
53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. Apart from pictures of Buk missile launcher 211, images of Buk
missile launcher 212 are also in photo albums of these soldiers, another indication that the soldiers
were in the 2nd Battalion, 1st Battery of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
28 bell¿ngcat
Left: Buk missile launcher 212, uploaded 17 March 2013; right: a soldier operating the same vehicle, uploaded 11 May 2013.
Photographs uploaded by soldiers connected to those on the attendance lists show a Buk missile
launcher 221 and a Buk control unit 200. Thus, these soldiers apparently served in the same battalion,
but in a different battery.
Left: Buk missile launcher 221, uploaded 14 July 2013; right: Buk control unit 200, uploaded 26 September 2012.
29 bell¿ngcat
In addition to the connections between the soldiers on VK, many pictures found in photo albums of
the soldiers are a strong indication that these soldiers were in the same military unit: pictures where
the soldiers are together, often with their names written as a description under these pictures.
Left: a picture of five soldiers with their names tagged, uploaded 23 February 2015, the same picture was uploaded on 12 May
2013 by another soldier with the description “1-й зрбатр” (1st Battery).
Right: a picture of five other soldiers with their names tagged, uploaded 27 June 2013.
After examining many pictures of these soldiers, their faces become recognizable, making it possible
to identify several and often even all soldiers within a photograph:
Left: a picture of Ivan Krasnoproshin (middle) and four other soldiers, uploaded 12 May 2013.
Right: a picture inside Buk control unit 200 with three soldiers, uploaded 27 June 2013.
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3rd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014
The Bellingcat team found another attendance list, uploaded in August 2014, in a photo album of a
VK community of students from a technical university that carried out a traineeship and practical
exam at the base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (Section Five describes an investigation
into these students). The 3rd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade is specifically
mentioned at the top of this attendance list. Out of 22 soldiers on this list, 14 profiles on VK were
found and, again, the number of connections between the soldiers show these soldiers were in the
same military unit.
Left: the attendance list of a unit of the 3rd Battalion in 2014; right: a close up of the page with names.
As described in Section Two, videos and photographs of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy mainly
show vehicles of the 2nd Battalion; the few missing vehicles were replaced by two (likely) 3rd Battalion
vehicles and one vehicle without any unit designation. Since the convoy was clearly a complete Buk-
M1 system mainly consisting of 2nd Battalion Buk-M1 vehicles, it seems most likely that 3rd Battalion
soldiers were not involved in this convoy and the 2nd Battalion “borrowed” a few 3rd Battalion Buk
system vehicles. In addition, the estimated number of soldiers in the June 2014 convoy (around 100)
seems to equal the number of soldiers in a single battalion, as described in Section Two.
The 3rd Battalion vehicles visible in the videos of the June 2014 convoy look as if they were no longer
in regular service, with two vehicles having a degraded appearance. As evidenced by the social media
profiles and photo albums of 53rd Brigade members, it seems very likely that the Buk system vehicles
of the 3rd Battalion were not used in exercises near Kapustin Yar after 2011, giving the impression
that the 3rd Battalion was disbanded after 2011. A comment dated 24 June 2012 in an Odnoklassniki
group dedicated to the 53rd Brigade suggests that the 3rd Battalion may have been disbanded, but
other members of the group dispute this. In August 2013, someone who served at the 53rd Brigade in
2012-2013 wrote that the 3rd Battalion only had some officers, but no conscript soldiers, which
indicates the 3rd Battalion still existed in the 2012-2013 timeframe.
Another indication that the 3rd Battalion was not part of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy is that
photographs uploaded by soldiers of the 3rd Battalion in 2014 do not show any involvement in the
June 2014 convoy or participation in a training camp near the Russia-Ukraine border. Many soldiers
posted pictures of themselves at the base near Kursk in early and mid-July 2014. Those photographs
could have been taken earlier and uploaded later, but this does not seem very likely considering the
number of photographs at the base posted by 3rd Battalion soldiers in July 2014.
31 bell¿ngcat
Left: a soldier near a military ambulance on the base of the 53rd Brigade
near Kursk, geotagged Kurskiy rayon, uploaded 10 July 2014;
Right: a soldier on the base of the 53rd Brigade, uploaded 14 July 2014.
Left: a soldier at the base of the 53rd Brigade, geotagged Kurskiy rayon, uploaded 27 July 2014;
Right: a soldier at the base of the 53rd Brigade, uploaded 16 July 2014.
32 bell¿ngcat
Only two soldiers of the 3rd Battalion posted pictures of a Buk missile launcher; these were uploaded
November 2014 (likely taken much earlier, considering the weather conditions in the photo) and
March 2015. The soldiers in the previously mentioned attendance list were not the only ones
examined; among their connections are many more soldiers of the 3rd Battalion. None of the soldiers
posted any photographs of a convoy, training camp, or an area resembling the Rostov border area in
2014.
Left: four soldiers and a Buk missile launcher, uploaded by a soldier on 9 November 2014;
Right: a soldier sitting on a Buk missile launcher, uploaded 22 March 2015.
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Recommissioning of the 3rd Battalion
Evidence from 2015 shows that the 3rd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade was
restored in 2014. First, a photograph published by Censor.net, a Ukrainian news site, on 30 January
2015 showed a Buk missile launcher without a unit number.69 The article claims that the Buk missile
launcher visible on the picture is Buk 3x2 (the Buk related to the downing of MH17), but then
repainted and repaired. However, the Bellingcat investigation team came to the conclusion that there
is no evidence that this is the same Buk. The “repainted” Buk has different wheels than Buk 3x2, no
similar side skirt damage, and no other unique similarities. Another conclusion is that this Buk has
been photographed at the base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade70 and, after comparing the
area of the photograph with historical satellite images, it was taken between 27 July and 2 October
2014; by looking at the weather conditions in the photograph, it was likely in the summer.
Unfortunately, the photograph was removed from the soldier’s photo album before the upload date
could be established. Historical satellite imagery shows the number of military vehicles on 2 October
2014 was greater than on 27 July 2014, an indication that many of the Buk vehicles returned from the
border area.
Left: picture of a soldier in front of a Buk missile launcher without unit designation; right: geolocation of the photograph
at the base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (the Buk located on the red square, view lines in blue).
Comparison between Google Earth satellite imagery of 18 July and 2 October 2014 (vehicles
that returned to the base in red circles, location of vehicles missing in blue circles).
69 http://censor.net.ua/forum/753625/novye_podrobnosti_s_bukom_rf_posle_vyvozki_v_rossiyu_buk_perekrasili
70 http://postimg.org/image/80v6aqonx/
http://www.google.nl/maps/@51.7140849,36.3144433,332m/data=!3m1!1e3
34 bell¿ngcat
After the publication of the Censor.net article, the Bellingcat team found more photographs of
soldiers from the 3rd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade displaying Buk missile
launchers without unit designations.
Left: a Buk missile launcher without a unit number, uploaded 6 December 2014;
Right: two Buk missile launchers and two Buk missile loaders in a field, uploaded 11 March 2015.
Left: a soldier in front of a Buk missile launcher without a unit number, uploaded 5 April 2015;
Right: a group of soldiers sitting on a Buk missile launcher, uploaded 11 March 2015.
35 bell¿ngcat
Other photographs show soldiers wearing the helmets of the 3rd Battalion with the number 332,
some photographs of an officer wearing a helmet with the number 323, and a Buk missile launcher
without a unit number.
Left: a soldier with helmet 332; right: another soldier with helmet 332;
both inside Buk missile launchers; both pictures uploaded 14 March 2015.
Left: an officer wearing helmet 323 in front of a Buk missile loader;
Right: the same officer standing on a Buk missile launcher without a unit number.
However, the link between the unnumbered Buks and the numbers on the helmets these soldiers are
wearing in their pictures is not clear. There is no evidence the Buk vehicles without numbers are from
the 3rd Battalion since Buks of the 1st and/or 2nd Battalion could have had the numbers removed as
well, although the numbers on the helmets indicate that the vehicles are 3rd Battalion Buk units.
36 bell¿ngcat
2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014
In search of information about 53rd Brigade members who might have been involved in the 2014 Buk
convoys, the Bellingcat investigation team found a forum where mothers and wives of soldiers
communicate with each other about their soldiers. This forum contains a topic about Unit 32406, or
the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. A few of these women wrote that their son or husband went to
a training camp in the Rostov Oblast, near the Russian-Ukrainian border, and complained about the
fact that they are so difficult to reach since they were not allowed to use their mobile phones. Some
of the women described their son or husband as being in the 2nd Battalion and complained about the
lack of discipline. One mother reveals enough information about herself and her son to find them on
VK, and one wife mentioned the full name of her husband, which was removed soon after.
The conversation on the forum’s Unit 32406 topic starts on 6 June 2014 and mainly consists of
worried mothers and wives discussing their troubles in contacting their soldiers. One woman with the
nickname ‘Ivanka’ was still able to contact her son quite often and gave information about the
situation on the base to other women. Some highlights of the conversation and the information they
reveal are listed below:
A woman called ‘Simona’ starts with her soldier being in Unit 32406, in the 1st Battalion, 2nd
Battery.
‘Ivanka’ answers and says she has a son named Aleksey. and ‘Simona’ asks for the address of
the unit.
‘Ivanka’ again answers that Igor (apparently the soldier of ‘Simona’) is in the 2nd Battalion, 2nd
Battery (and her own son is in the 3rd Battery).
In later messages, it becomes clear ‘Simona’ is named Lara; it turns out both soldiers come
from Orenburg and they actually ended up in the same unit together.
Another woman joins the conversation and asks how the discipline is at the unit in Kursk, and
‘Ivanka’ answers that she does not know because her son started in Orenburg, went to the
unit in Kursk in June 2014, and, in the end of June, the 2nd Battalion was sent to the Rostov
region near the border of Ukraine.
It is mentioned that 280 soldiers are conducting exercises in the Rostov region and ‘Simona’
(Lara) says that her husband is serving in a unit of 100 soldiers.
Between 9 July and 4 August 2014, no messages were posted in the forum, or they had been
deleted soon after. Afterward, messages are posted by the women complaining that the
soldiers near the border have already been there for a long time and that they are difficult to
reach.
‘Simona’ (Lara) writes on 16 August 2014 that the 1st and 2nd Battalions are in the Rostov
region and that the 3rd Battalion will go to Kapustin Yar (a training area to the east of
Volgograd near the Kazakhstan border).
A woman who calls herself ‘Elena’ writes that her son is called Sergey; this name was deleted
soon after, but the profile was found on VK. She also writes that 26 soldiers were sent from
Orenburg to Kursk.
When ‘Elena’ is worried about her son, ‘Ivanka’ writes her VK profile on the forum and her
name seems to be Ivana and a second profile she has makes it clear that her real name is
Ivana S., and her son is named Aleksey S.
Through Ivana’s profile, the profile and real name of ‘Simona’ (Lara) can also be found. In
November 2014, she writes that the soldiers were at the border for three months.
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The same forum has a topic about the unit in Orenburg as well (Unit 33860), where posts can be
found from the same mothers, ‘Ivanka’ and ‘Simona.’ ‘Ivanka’ wrote on 23 June 2014 (the date the
June 2014 Buk convoy was first seen) that she accidently found out her son was sent to the Rostov
region near Ukraine instead of Kapustin Yar (as her son apparently mentioned before as destination),
and that her son was in an area near Millerovo at the border close to Luhansk a day later.
Simona’s first post about her husband being in Unit 32406 (53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade)
in the 1st Battalion, 2nd Battery, arrived on May 30th 2014.
Ivanka’s post on 23rd June 2014, where she writes she accidently found
out her son was sent to Rostov Oblast near the border of Ukraine.
Elena’s post about 26 soldiers having been sent from Orenburg to Kursk and her son named Sergey August 18th 2014.
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On his profile wall, Aleksey S. (the son of ‘Ivanka’) commented on a photo of himself that he was
serving on the border of Ukraine. A friend of Aleksey, who also was in the army, commented Aleksey
was near the border of Ukraine, and he himself close to China. His mother posted two pictures of her
son and other soldiers (one picture of him sitting next to another soldier in what looks like a bus) with
the text “on the road to the Rostov Oblast.”
Left: Aleksey writes “… I served in the army and even on the border with Ukraine…”, 28 August 2014.
A friend of Aleksey writes “…he is on the border with Ukraine, I am close to China…”, 3 August 2014.
Right: his mother posted pictures on his wall of her son and writes “on the road to the Rostov Oblast,” 28 June 2014.
Via Aleksey, another soldier named Vitaly was found. He posted photographs of the 23-25 June 2014
Buk convoy on his profile, one of which was published in Bellingcat’s Origin of the Separatists’ Buk
report, showing a Buk missile launcher on a trailer. This resulted in the removal of that picture, as well
as other pictures, and Vitaly changed his name on VK. However, all of the photographs were archived.
Another profile of the soldier was found on Odnoklassniki, where his name is still Vitaly. Some of the
photographs deleted from the VK account remained there. One of these pictures (uploaded 24 June
2014) shows the soldier sitting on a truck with the caption, “I am going to Rostov.” The image was
geolocated on the side of a road in a village called Varvarovka,71 which was on the route of the 23-25
June 2014 Buk convoy.
Left: picture of Buk missile launcher 231 found in Vitaly’s photo album on VK; right: a picture of Vitaly sitting on a truck
of the June convoy, uploaded 24 June 2014, with a subscript “I am going to Rostov,” geolocated in Varvarovka.
71 http://www.google com/maps/@50.381786,38.831029,3a,37.5y,144.06h,85.29t/data=!3m4!1e1!3m2!1s2LTcCG_XNj1vorGIo1w7Q!
2e0
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In addition to these pictures, which already prove that Vitaly took part in the June 2014 Buk convoy,
an image that was found on Aleksey’s profile wall can also be found in Vitaly’s album. In this
photograph, the two soldiers are sitting next to each other in what appears to be a bus. Behind them,
we see other soldiers, one of them sitting next to the window with his eyes closed. In one of the
uploaded videos of the June 2014 Buk convoy, a soldier can be seen sitting next to the window on the
same side of the bus and in the same position.72 The soldier in the video is also sleeping, wearing a
similar hat and t-shirt, and appears to be sitting behind a soldier that is taller than himself (in several
photographs, Vitaly seems quite tall) – another indication that Vitaly and Aleksey were indeed in the
bus taking part in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy.
Left: Vitaly and Aleksey sitting next to each other in a bus, picture uploaded 24 June 2014;
Right: a screenshot of the bus that was in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy.
A few more photographs were found in the photo albums of Vitaly and Aleksey, where other soldiers
are visible; these soldiers’ profiles have been found between their connections. One picture shows
another soldier sitting in the bus named Evgeny. Other pictures show him in a field on 31 July 2014
and together with Aleksey on 14 August 2014.
Left: Evgeny sleeps in the bus (25 June 2014); middle: in a field (31 July 2014); right: together with Aleksey. (14 August 2014).
72 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLtzYEHolmg&t=194
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More photographs of soldiers, connected directly or indirectly to Aleksey, Vitaly, or Evgeny, show
them in wooded areas or in fields in the summer of 2014. Since these soldiers are not only connected
to the soldiers mentioned above, but also to each other, they likely all belong to the same unit, the 2nd
Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
A father of one of these soldiers posted pictures with descriptions that make it clear that these
images were taken in the Rostov Oblast. One picture with the caption, “2014-граница” (2014-border),
uploaded 4 July 2014, shows his son Denis in front of a truck partly camouflaged by leaves. Another
picture in this album shows Denis standing in front of a road sign saying “Миллерово” (Millerovo) –
the last place the June 2014 Buk convoy was seen – but that picture was soon removed from his
album. After the first picture was published in the media,73 the whole profile was removed in June
2015 after someone in a forum posted the link to that profile.
Left: a picture with caption “2014-border” and Denis in front of a camouflaged truck, uploaded 4 July 2014;
Right: a picture of Denis standing in front of a road sign “Millerovo,” uploaded 4 July 2014.
Other photographs in the album show him taking an oath at the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
base along with a group of soldiers standing behind officers at the same occasion on 23 December
2013. After close examination of the group picture, another soldier, Vitaly, can be recognized.
Left: Denis taking the oath, 23 December 2013; right: group picture with Denis (green) and Vitaly (red), 23 December 2013.
73 http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/ausland/flug-mh-17/bericht-enthuellt-die-taeter-des-flugzeug-abschusses-
41362040
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These photographs show that a group of soldiers in the 2nd Battalion of 2014 started their military
service at the end of 2013, so these conscript soldiers were serving in the military for just half a year
before MH17 was downed. Since the operation of a Buk missile launcher needs a training for at least
half a year and a lot of experience in difficult circumstances (such as operating a Buk missile launcher
without a control unit and/or Snow Drift radar in a real war situation), it is very unlikely that these or
other conscript soldiers were involved in the downing of MH17. However, it might be possible that
these soldiers know which experienced soldiers (contracted soldiers or reservists) were part of the
Buk crew that downed MH17.
More photographs uploaded by soldiers of the 2nd Battalion in 2014 show their presence in the border
area. One soldier posted a photograph on Odnoklassniki with the description ”первый день на
границе” (first day at the border). One of his connections posted a photograph of himself in a field on
12 August 2014 and a link to one of the videos of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy, apparently aware
of the fact that videos of the June 2014 Buk convoy they took part in were posted online.
Left: a soldier posts on 13 July 2014 a photograph with the description “first day at the border”; right: another soldier posts a
photograph in a border area on 12 August 2014 and a link to a YouTube video of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy.
Many more photographs were found of soldiers in remote areas or unrecognizable fields, some of
them showing a path next to the fields and woods on the other side of the path. All of these images
raise the question of where the photographs were taken. The 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy was last
seen on its way to Millerovo and, for a long time, it was not clear where the soldiers and vehicles of
that convoy went afterward.
Many images of soldiers in an area southwest of Millerovo were found with Yomapic,74 a tool that
searches for geotagged images on VK and Instagram, mainly in the area around Duby, Elan,
Zelenovka, Chebotovka, and Mityakinskaya – a remote area in the Rostov Oblast close to the Russia-
Ukraine border.75 Another image geotagged near Voloshino,76 to the west of Millerovo, was also
found, showing a soldier sitting on a Buk missile launcher.
74 http://www.yomapic com
75 http://www.google com/maps/@48.6355003,39.8305748,22703m/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en
76 http://www.google com/maps/@48.9166953,39.9303009,11281m/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en
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Google Map of the area southwest of Millerovo (green circle) with Duby (red circle), Mityakinskaya (orange circle),
Chebotovka (purple circle), and Voloshino (blue circle).
In a previous Bellingcat report, Tracking the Trailers: Investigation of MH17 Buk’s Russian Convoy , 77
several drivers of military convoys posted images taken in the area of Mityakinskaya as well – an
indication that military equipment was transported close to the border with Ukraine.
A soldier named Roman, a member of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, posted a picture on 23
July 2014 geotagged in Chebotovka, a village in the Rostov Oblast to the southwest of Millerovo, close
to the Russian-Ukrainian border. Another soldier, Artur, of Unit 64055 or the 16th Separate Electronic
Warfare Brigade (another unit from Kursk),78 posted a picture of himself sitting on a truck in the area
of Duby on 16 July 2014, and another 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade soldier, Ruslan, posted a
picture of himself sitting on a Buk missile launcher on 4 July 2014 near Voloshino, to the west of
Millerovo.
77 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/05/13/tracking-the-trailers-investigation-of-mh17-buks-russianconvoy
78 http://warfare.be/db/lang/rus/catid/239/linkid/2223/base/1592/
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Left: Roman in Chebotovka on 23 July 2014; right: Artur near Duby on 16 July 2014.
Ruslan on a Buk missile launcher near Voloshino on 4 July 2014.
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Further investigation into the connections of the 2nd Battalion members reveals additional images of
the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy, photographs taken by soldier-drivers of the convoy, and their own
trucks. A soldier-driver named Pavel uploaded pictures of his own truck with the license plate ‘9115
AH 50’ (a truck that was also part of the June 2014 Buk convoy)79 on 25 June 2014, the day the convoy
was filmed in the area of Millerovo. Part of that convoy is visible in two other pictures. In one, a trailer
with what seems to be a Buk unit vehicle is visible in the distance. A post on his VK wall shows the
same three pictures with the text ”На границу” (to the border) and another wall post of 24 August
shows a rifle hanging on a tree and the text ”Что то из Ростова” (something from Rostov).
Left: post on Pavel’s wall with three pictures of the June 2014 Buk convoy;
Right: a zoom of a convoy picture where a Buk unit vehicle is visible on a trailer.
Left: picture taken of Pavel’s truck “9115 AH 50” of the June 2014 Buk convoy, uploaded 25 June 2014;
Right: truck “9115 AH 50” from a screenshot of a video of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy.
79 http://youtu.be/aLtzYEHolmg?t=135
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A soldier connected to Pavel named Dmitry is photographed standing by a truck near Alexeyevka
with a sign displaying the town name in the background; it is on the route of the June 2014 Buk
convoy. Another picture shows a truck with the license plate ‘9106 AH 50,’ another truck visible in the
June 2014 Buk convoy. Both pictures were uploaded 29 December 2014, but since Dmitry also
uploaded Pavel’s convoy pictures (in March 2015), the weather conditions in the photographs do not
match with those in winter, and given that one of the pictures shows a vehicle from the June 2014
Buk convoy, it is very likely that these pictures were taken in June 2014.
Left: picture taken of a truck of the June 2014 Buk convoy near Alexeyevka, uploaded by Dmitry;
Right: picture of truck “9106 AH 50,” another truck of the June 2014 Buk convoy, uploaded by Dmitry.
Another soldier, Marat, posted pictures of a part of the June 2014 Buk convoy and a vehicle with the
same license plate (9068 AH 50) seen in the June 2014 Buk convoy. He is connected to other soldiers
of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, but he also reacted to a post about the 2nd Battalion in a VK
community about Unit 32406 (53rd Brigade).
Left: Marat and three other soldiers on truck ‘9068 AH 50’;
Right: Marat and another soldier in front of a part of the June 2014 Buk convoy.
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A soldier who gives additional information about the June 2014 convoy is Ivan, a contract soldier since
2011 as pictures on his VK profile make clear. One of his connections is Vladimir, a contract soldier or
reservist whose VK profile provides his military background since 2010, including service with a unit
in Armenia. Vladimir posted some remarkable pictures of what seems to be a border area, uploaded
in October 2014, one of them showing Ivan and Vladimir together along with a leg of a soldier named
Anton, who is tagged in the photograph.
Ivan, Vladimir, and Anton, uploaded by Vladimir on VK, 27 October 2014.
Ivan’s VK profile provides no information about the June 2014 convoy, but posts on his Twitter
account reveal he did, in fact, take part in that convoy. On 20 June 2014, he posted a message saying
that he would be sent to the border. When someone else asked if he was going to the Rostov Oblast,
he responded on 24 June 2014, saying that they just passed Alexeyevka. The June 2014 Buk convoy
indeed moved through Alexeyevka on 24 June 2014.80 A Twitter and VK message on 11 August 2014
makes clear that he missed his girlfriend. On 20 October, he posted a message saying that he is back
on Twitter again and responded to a post from someone else saying that he was not there for a long
time, and that he could not use Twitter during his business trip. When the other person asked if it
was a long trip, he answered saying he was at the border with Ukraine for three months, which
corresponds with what was written in the forum of soldiers’ mothers and wives.
A Twitter post from 15 March 2013 indicates that Ivan trained in Kapustin Yar for two months, and
another post from 29 March 2013 shows Buk missile launchers in the snow in the Astrakhan region,
where Kapustin Yar is located.
80 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0020-Alexeyevka%3A-Buk-convoy-turning-and-merging-1
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Ivan’s Twitter post where he wrote that he was at the border with Ukraine for three months, 21 October 2014.
Ivan’s Twitter post of 29 March 2013 with images of Buk missile launchers 222, 232, and a third one
with an unreadable number in the Astrakhan region, Kapustin Yar training field.
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On 22 October 2014 Anton Korobkov-Zemlyansky, a journalist, media producer, TV/radio host and
member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (and clearly on the side of the pro-Russian
separatists in Ukraine), reacted to Ivan’s tweet saying he had been in the area near the border with
Ukraine for three months. When Anton asked on 22 October 2014 “How is it there?”, Ivan answered
on 23 October 2014, “It is terrible there….” Then Anton asked, “They’re shooting?” and Ivan answered,
“They are shooting))) I won’t say anything more… I don’t have the right).” And when Anton wrote “yes
correct ;),” Ivan responded on 23 October 2014 with “the only thing I can say is that on TV they do not
show everything… (and thank God!).”
Twitter conversation between Anton and Ivan about “shooting” near the border with Ukraine.
Apparently Ivan was aware of shooting near the border with Ukraine. It is not clear what type of
shooting he was referring to (e.g., gunfire, artillery fire, Grad missiles) or by whom (i.e., the pro-Russian
separatists, the Ukrainian army, or the Russian army). These messages do not prove that Ivan himself
was involved in the shooting or that he was in Ukraine, but they at minimum indicate that he was near
the conflict and therefore near the border.
Anton, whose leg was tagged in Vladimir’s photograph, was first believed by Bellingcat to be in the 1st
Battalion, because he uploaded a photograph on 6 January 2015 of himself inside a Buk missile
launcher wearing a helmet with the number 121. However, since he was tagged in a photograph that
likely was taken in the summer of 2014 together with Ivan and Vladimir, who were in the 2nd Battalion,
Anton likely moved to the 2nd Battalion later. Another photograph in his album, in which he can be
seen standing in a field, confirms he was in the 2nd Battalion in the summer of 2014, because one of
his connections who also was in the 2nd Battalion, named Sergey uploaded a photograph of the same
field on 10 September 2014. Sergey is connected to and photographed together with Pavel (see
earlier this Section).
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Left: Anton inside a Buk, wearing a 121 helmet, uploaded 6 January 2015; right: Anton , standing in a field,
uploaded 6 January 2015 (Anton deleted all his military images sometime in March/April 2015).
Left: Sergey in a field, uploaded 10 September 2014; right: Sergey, Pavel and other 2nd Battalion soldiers,
uploaded by Pavel on 12 September 2014 and Sergey on 18 February 2015.
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Other notable photographs were uploaded 8 August 2014 by another soldier of the 2nd Battalion. In
these photographs, vehicles likely from the June 2014 convoy can be seen camouflaged in a wooded
area.
Left: a truck with a camouflage net behind it in a wooded area;
Right: camouflaged trucks near a wood area. Both images were uploaded 8 August 2014.
Two more 2nd Battalion soldiers posted images of partly visible military vehicles in a rural area during
the summer of 2014. One photograph uploaded on 12 August 2014 shows a soldier sitting in front of
a Buk missile launcher. The other photograph shows a different soldier standing on top of an
unidentified military vehicle, uploaded 26 June 2014. Another photograph uploaded by this soldier on
26 June 2014 confirms he took part in the June 2014 convoy, as a monument near Stary Oskol is
visible, a town the convoy went through.
Left: a soldier sitting in front of a Buk missile launcher, 12 August 2014;
Right: another soldier standing on top of an unidentified military vehicle, 26 June 2014.
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The Bellingcat team found many more images of soldiers in uniforms and with military equipment in
a remote area or in the woods. Remarkably, many of these soldiers are photographed in uniforms
without the recognizable 53rd Brigade logo and without name badges. The badges that they are
wearing are not black and red like usual, but camouflaged in different shades of green to blend in
with the uniform.
A complete overview of all these soldiers would render this report too lengthy; the examples above
are the best, unambiguous examples of soldiers who were undoubtedly in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk
convoy. It should be noted that there is no direct evidence that any of these soldiers were involved in
the downing of MH17. However, there is a chance that some of these soldiers know which soldiers
and officers were part of the Buk crew of Buk 3x2, which was transported to Ukraine and very likely
responsible for the downing of MH17. Since the mission in Ukraine was likely a highly secret
operation, most of the soldiers – especially the conscript soldiers – probably have no idea who were
involved. Some of the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion who were in the June 2014 Buk convoy could
possibly have been involved, but this conclusion is mainly based on their military experience and their
long military history.
However, for some soldiers mentioned earlier this section (i.e., Ivan, Vladimir, and Anton) there is one
more reason why they may been involved in the MH17 tragedy. The photograph that Ivan uploaded in
2013 mainly shows Buk 222, an indication he might have been the operator of that Buk missile
launcher in 2013 or at least that he served in the 2nd Battery of the 2nd Battalion. Additionally, the
aforementioned soldiers are connected to another 2nd Battalion soldier, Dmitry, who explicitly
described himself as part of the 2nd Battery of the 2nd Battalion in May 2014. It is important to know
that these soldiers were in the 2nd Battery of the 2nd Battalion because Buk 222 was replaced in the
23-25 June 2014 convoy by Buk 3x2. Therefore, it is a possibility that the soldiers who usually were
connected with Buk 222 later operated Buk 3x2 on 17 July 2014. However, this is only a theory; there
is no evidence to support it. Section Five describes an officer who might have been in control of Buk
222 in 2014, and, based on the same logic, in control of Buk 3x2 in the summer of 2014.
It must be again clearly noted that for all of the aforementioned soldiers, there is no direct evidence
that they were part of the Buk crew that downed MH17.
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1st Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2014
In Section Two, the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy is described as containing three vehicles belonging to
the 1st Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (Buk missile launchers 112, 121, and 122).
Since the convoy shows a nearly complete Buk system, it is very likely that this convoy consisted
entirely of 1st Battalion vehicles, especially taking into account that the 2nd Battalion and some 3rd
Battalion vehicles had already been transported to the border three weeks before. This convoy left
just two days after the downing of MH17, which may explain why most of the vehicles were covered
with tarps.
In addition, the soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade were apparently
more careful with photographing and did not take or did not post images of the convoy on their VK
profiles. The Bellingcat team was not able to find photographs of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy,
taken by the soldiers or drivers themselves, but did uncover images of 1st Battalion soldiers, uploaded
in the summer of 2014, in which they can be seen posing in a field or with Buk vehicles from the 1st
Battalion.
One soldier uploaded a picture of himself standing in front of Buk 121, camouflaged by leaves, on 28
August 2014, more than a month after the convoy departed from Kursk.
A soldier with a 121 helmet in front of a camouflaged Buk unit vehicle, 28 August 2014.
Two soldiers could be identified as 53rd Brigade soldiers because of photographs of a BTR numbered
993, the same BTR visible in the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy. A short post by one of the soldier’s wife
on a 53rd Brigade community on Odnoklassniki makes clear that he was in the 1st Battalion of the 53rd
Brigade.
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Two soldiers in front of BTR 993, a vehicle that was part of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy,
photograph uploaded 22 June 2014.
Another soldier of the 1st Battalion provided additional information about the time spent in the border
area and the next destination after the Rostov Oblast. He wrote on the wall of his Odnoklassniki
profile that he was in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade on 8 June 2014 and that he was in the 1st
Battalion, 2nd Battery on 18 June 2014. He also divulged that “on the 10th he would leave for 2 months
for Kapustin Yar (Astrakhanskaya Oblast) after Rostov.” Given that he wrote this on 30 July 2014, his
reference to ‘the 10th’ is very likely in reference to 10 August 2014.
Post on the soldier’s Odnoklassniki wall about being in the 1st Battalion, 2nd Battery, 18 June 2014.
Post on the soldier’s wall where he wrote he would leave on the 10th for 2 months for Kapustin Yar after Rostov, 30 July 2014.
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Picture of the soldier in front of Buk missile launcher 132, uploaded 10 July 2014.
However, according to another post on his wall, they had already returned from Kapustin Yar on 10
September 2014, so they were there one month instead of two months.
Post on the soldier’s wall where he wrote, “Returning, I am now in Saratov,” 10 September 2014.
Picture of a group of soldiers, in front of the military base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,
with the caption, “command post, temporary replacement of the 2nd Battery,” uploaded 11 September 2014.
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Another soldier who very likely was in the 1st Battalion uploaded a photograph of himself sitting on a
BTR numbered 993, the same BTR that was in the 19-21 July 2014 convoy and displayed in the
photograph of two other soldiers, that was uploaded 22 June 2014. This photograph was uploaded on
13 July 2014, when the 2nd Battalion had already been in the Rostov Oblast for two weeks, and six
days before the 1st Battalion would depart for the Rostov Oblast as well.
In addition to the attendance list of 3rd Battalion soldiers, a photograph of an officer was found in the
photo album of students of a technical university (see Section Four). This officer, named Alexander,
was probably in the 1st Battalion as well, because he provided training to a cadet wearing a helmet
numbered 131 inside of a Buk missile launcher. Another possibility is that he was an officer who
specialized in training cadets, and a Buk missile launcher from the 1st Battalion was temporarily used
for training. Regardless, Alexander was likely not in the 2nd Battalion. Section Five describes the
results of a thorough investigation into commanders and officers of mainly the 2nd Battalion.
Left: a soldier sitting on BTR 993, which was part of the 19-21 July 2014 convoy (1st Battalion), uploaded 13 July 2014;
Right: Lieutenant Alexander N. inside of Buk missile launcher 131, as the number on the helmet of the cadet indicates,
photograph uploaded 3 August 2014, but taken earlier, as the 1st Battalion vehicles left the base on 19 July 2014 (Section Four
further shows that this photograph was taken earlier, in July 2014).
The identification of 1st Battalion soldiers might seem less important, as they were not part of the 23-
25 June 2014 Buk convoy that transported Buk 3x2. But it is important to rule these individuals out as
being culpable for the downing of MH17. Because these soldiers were part of the 19-21 July 2014 Buk
convoy that transported the 1st Battalion Buk vehicles, it can be established with certainty that they
were not involved in the MH17 tragedy.
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Section Four: Cadets at the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
MATI Cadets
During the first few months of Bellingcat’s investigation into the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, a
VK community was found of technical university students who participated in a training event at the
53rd Brigade’s base in the summer of 2014.
This technical university was originally called the Moscow Aviation Technology Institute (MATI); later,
the name Russian State Technical University (short for ‘Russian State Technological University,’
named after K.E. Tsiolkovsky) was added.81 This university primarily focuses on engineering and other
technical subjects, particularly those related to aerospace and aeronautics.
MATI also has an Institute of Military Training (Институт военной подготовки),82 which is tasked with
preparing its students for roles as officers and reserve officers in the Russian military. As we show
below, some students are selected to travel to Russian military bases with anti-aircraft systems and
spend approximately one month training on the systems and conducting military drills as a part of its
curriculum.
One of the web pages for the Institute of Military Training at MATI states that it prepares reserve
officers to become “detachment commanders of the self-propelled missile launcher (SDA) AAMS
Buk-M1” (начальник расчёта самоходной огневой установки (СОУ) ЗРК «БУК-М1»).83 With tragic
irony, the MATI website also boasts Boeing as a partner.84
MATI – mainly located in Moscow – consists of four branches: three in Moscow and one in Stupino,
about 100 kilometers south of Moscow.85 The VK community of MATI students who trained at the
53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade shows members who seem to live mostly in Moscow and Stupino.
It is unknown whether it was mostly cadets from the Stupino branch of MATI who traveled to Kursk
in 2014; however, this is most likely the case since the majority of the images were uploaded by
cadets from Stupino.
The images in the VK community were all uploaded in early August 2014, but it can be established
that MATI cadets were in Kursk in June and July 2014 based on images and posts from their own VK
profiles and some Instagram posts. The most obvious evidence that shows exactly when these cadets
trained at the 53rd Brigade are two images of certificates, uploaded 25 July 2014 by two different
cadets. These certificates note that “Training sessions took place from June 22 to July 25, 2014, at
military Unit 32406 for the position of detachment commander” (Учебные сборы прошел с 22 июня
по 25 июля 2014 года при войсковой части 32406 в должности начальника расчета). They also show
that the cadets were promoted to the rank of lieutenant and the certificates were signed by the
commander of military Unit 32406 (the 53rd Anti-Air Missile Brigade), Colonel S. Muchkaev, and the
head of the faculty of military training, Colonel A. Sagula.
81 http://eng.mati.ru
http://eng.mati.ru/index.php/university-history.html
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_State_Aviation_Technological_University
82 http://mati.ru/index.php/instituty/institut-voennogo-obucheniya
83 http://voenkaf.ru/fvo
84 http://eng.mati.ru/index.php/partners.html
85 http://mati.ru/index.php/o-mati
http://www.sfmati.ru
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One more interesting detail about the certificates is the code ‘вус-042800,’ where ‘вус’ stands for
“Военно-учётная специальность,” which translates to “military occupation specialty.” The whole code
refers to “вооруженных зенитными ракетными комплексами средней дальности,” which translates to
“medium range systems armed with anti-aircraft missiles.”86
Left: certificate posted by a MATI cadet, 25 July 2014; right: certificate posted by another MATI cadet, 25 July 2014.
Photographs uploaded to the VK community and individual cadets’ own albums illustrate the cadets’
month-long training endeavor at the base of the 53rd Brigade in great detail. Many photographs show
the cadets next to or inside Buk missile launchers; others show cadets performing shooting exercises,
taking an exam, eating lunch, playing games, etc.
Left: MATI cadets and an officer next to a Buk missile launcher, from the MATI VK community album, 3 August 2014;
Right: a MATI cadet next to an unnumbered Buk missile launcher, 17 July 2014.
86 http://www.ulstu.ru/main?cmd=file&object=11425
http://archive.is/FlUga
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Some of the photographs show vehicles such as the Buk missile launchers 132 and 122 and the BTR
80 (numbered 993) connected to the first battalion and visible in the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy.
Another notable vehicle is Buk Control Unit 300, that belongs to the 3rd Battalion, which was partially
disbanded in 2014. A photograph of two cadets wearing helmets with the number 300 is particularly
noteworthy, as both photographs provide evidence that most Buk unit vehicles of the 3rd Battalion
remained at the base of the 53rd Brigade during the summer of 2014.
Left: a MATI cadet, on the background Buk missile launcher 122 and Buk control unit 300; right: a MATI cadet in
front of BTR 80 with number 993. Both images uploaded 3 August 2014, but taken earlier in June or July 2014.
Left: a MATI cadet in front of Buk missile launcher 132, uploaded 12 July 2014;
Right: MATI cadets, wearing helmets with number 300, uploaded 17 July 2014.
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Closer examination of the MATI students’ photographs on the 2014 MATI Kursk VK community
reveals interesting details related to conscript soldiers and both of the 2014 Buk convoys. The first
photograph, already described in full detail in Section Three, shows an attendance list of conscript
soldiers belonging to the 3rd Battalion in 2014. The second and third photographs show some soldiers
covering a Buk missile launcher under a tarp. Further examination of these photographs shows these
soldiers have a badge with the symbol of the 53rd Brigade on their right sleeve, which is common for
soldiers of the 53rd Brigade, but not for MATI cadets, who would only wear the letter “K” (from the
Russian word “курсант,” which means “cadet”) on their sleeve. It is very possible the MATI cadets
witnessed first battalion soldiers putting tarps on Buk unit vehicles before they left on 19 July 2014. A
fourth remarkable photograph found in an album of one of the MATI cadets shows trucks and a 53rd
Brigade officer, recognizable by a few stars and a badge with the symbol of the brigade visible on his
uniform. In fact, that officer is a senior lieutenant named Alexander N., who is described in Section
Three (with regard to the 2014 first battalion) and who will be described in Section Five too. A MATI
cadet also photographed Alexander N. inside of Buk missile launcher 131 sitting next to another MATI
cadet. Since the MATI cadets were at the 53rd Brigade base from 22 June to 25 July 2014, these two
photographs provide evidence that Alexander N. was either in the 3rd Battalion in the summer of 2014
to train the MATI cadets or was in the 1st Battalion and left the base on 19 July 2014. That is, unless
both photographs were taken on 22 June or the morning of 23 June. It is quite remarkable that one of
the vehicles visible in the fourth photograph has a license plate that starts with 6757, sinc e one of the
23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy vehicles has license plate ’6757 AT 50,’87 very likely the same vehicle.
Therefore, either this vehicle just returned to the base of the 53rd Brigade, or this MATI cadet
witnessed the departure of the 2nd Battalion on 23 June 2014.
Left: 53rd Brigade soldiers covering a Buk missile launcher, from MATI VK community, taken in June or July 2014;
Right: Senior Lieutenant Alexander N. and some trucks, one of them having a license starting with ‘6757,’
photograph uploaded 12 January 2015, but taken in June or July 2014.
87 http://bellingcat-vehicles silk co/page/0019-Raskhovets%3A-Buk-convoy-on-the-highway
http://youtu.be/aLtzYEHolmg?t=146
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MIET Cadets
Another technical university, which is now called the National Research University of Electronic
Technology, but was originally called the Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology (MIET),88 also
has a military component as a part of its academic curriculum.89 This university is located in
Zelenograd, 40 kilometers northwest of Moscow. Similarly, MIET has its own cadets that conduct
training missions with active military units.
Some of these cadets traveled to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade’s base in the summer of 2014, which
becomes clear upon examination of photographs uploaded by cadets who are members of a VK
community dedicated to their visit of the 53rd Brigade in 2014. Given the upload dates on several
photos posted by MIET cadets, it appears the cadets visited the 53rd Brigade in July and August 2014.
The precise date that MIET cadets started their training with the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade is not
known; however, they took their oaths on July 19, 2014.90
“Taking the oath, 19 July 2014, Kursk,” photograph uploaded 24 August 2014 by a MIET cadet.
Because the MIET students visited during the summer of 2014, photographs and other information
from their trip also helps shed light on the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade’s summer mobilization,
since we can see personnel from the 53rd Brigade interacting with MIET cadets. The MIET website
depicts the insignia for its military program, which can be used to identify MIET cadets since they
wear this insignia on the right arm of their uniforms.
88 http://eng.miet.ru/content/e/10319
89 http://www.miet.ru/structure/s/270
http://vk.miet.ru
90 http://archive.is/9R406
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Left: MIET military insignia, as seen on the university’s website;91
Right: A MIET cadet wearing the unit patch (circled) on his uniform.
The majority of known MIET cadets who were at the 53rd Brigade base in the summer of 2014 did not
post many photos of the base, but a few of the photos that were posted reveal some additional
information. For example, Buk missile loader 333 is unlikely to have moved from the 53rd Brigade’s
base because it was photographed by a MIET cadet and uploaded to his social media account in
November 2014. It should be noted, however, that this photograph was taken much earlier than it was
uploaded, since MIET students were at the base in July and August 2014.
Buk missile loader 333 at the 53rd Brigade base, uploaded 6 November 2014, but taken in July or August 2014.
91 http://www.miet.ru/structure/s/270
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A photograph in the album of the same MIET cadet shows two officers, who can be identified as
Grigory M., a senior lieutenant, and Marat Y., a captain. These officers were very likely not in the 1st or
2nd Battalion, since they were at the base of the 53rd Brigade training MIET cadets in the summer of
2014.
Captain Marat Y. (left) and senior lieutenant Grigory M , uploaded 6 November 2014,
but the photograph was taken in July or August 2014.
The fact that the aforementioned officers stayed at the 53rd Brigade’s base near Kursk is important to
know, because only officers in the 1st and 2nd Battalions left the base with the June and July 2014 Buk
convoys.
The next section describes commanders of the 53 Brigade who were possibly involved in the June
and July 2014 Buk convoys.
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Section Five: Commanders of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
Introduction
The required number of crew members required to operate a Buk-M1 missile launcher is four, as
described in Section One. The crew consists of two officers: one detachment commander (начальник
расчета),92 who is a lieutenant (a commissioned officer) and a sergeant (a non-commissioned officer).
93 The two other crew members are an operator, who is a common soldier, and a driver, who is also a
soldier. Since the number of crew members operating the Buk missile launcher related to the
downing of MH17 is not known, it is difficult to determine whether the ranks of the crew members
were exactly as mentioned above. It could be that there were fewer crew members, but it is very
unlikely that the crew consisted of only one or two members, as operating a Buk missile launcher
with only one person is very difficult and requires more than one year of experience in operating the
system,94 as described in an interview with a high officer of the Air Defense of the Russian Army.
Also, if the missile launcher was manned with Russian soldiers, it is very unlikely that the crew had no
commissioned officer because a non-commissioned officer does not have the decision-making
authority to fire a missile. An intercepted phone conversation published in a Joint Investigation Team
(JIT) video makes it clear that the crew consisted of several members, since one of the members was
separated from his crew and was accidently left behind in Snizhne.95
Screenshot from the JIT video showing a conversation between two separatists about a crew member who lost his crew.
The lieutenant – the commissioned officer of the Buk missile launcher –makes the decision to fire a
missile; in the case of the downing of MH17, he would be more to blame than the operator who
pressed the button. The lieutenant, however, receives his instructions from the battery commander,
who would be a major or a captain. The battery commander receives instructions from the battalion
commander, a lieutenant colonel; the highest rank within the brigade is the brigade commander, a
colonel.96
92 http://recrut.mil.ru/career/conscription/post/position/info.htm?id=591@BasePost
93 http://army-vt.mitm.ru/zakon.files/ovp/charter/uvs/pril 3.htm
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Officer_(armed_forces)
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-commissioned_officer
94 http://vpk.name/news/114383 bez sledov i svidetelei.html
95 http://youtu.be/olQNpTxSnTo?t=332
96 http://www.hierarchystructure.com/russian-military-hierarchy
http://www.soldiering.ru/other/regulations/russia/vnutr/html05.php
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On 30 January 2015, the Ukrainian news site Censor.net published a photograph of a repainted Buk
missile launcher, as well as a list of names of commanders of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.97
These names were found in a VK community of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. The article
mentions that the previous commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, Aleksey Yuryevich
Zolotov, became Chief of Air Defense Forces; the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade in 2014 was Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev; and the surname of the commander of the 2nd
Battalion in 2014 was Agibalov. On 9 February 2015, Censor.net added the full name of this
commander, Artyom Agibalov, and the name of the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Roman Ivanovich
Gorlatykh.98 This information was found in another VK community about the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade.
These names do not only appear in VK communities; later in this section, we describe how they are
also mentioned on more official sources, such as television interviews, sbis.ru,99 which claims that the
information is obtained from official sources, and adm.rkursk.ru,100 the official site of administration
for the Kursk region. Posts in VK communities and in an Odnoklassniki group about the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade reveal many more names of officers, described in this section. It should be
noted that many officers were apparently no longer part of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in
2014; when asked on one of these online communities if, for example, a certain officer was still there,
soldiers often answered that the officer in question had moved to another unit.
The Bellingcat team has found many profiles of commanders and junior officers from the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade; some because their names were mentioned in VK communities or the
Odnoklassniki group, others because they are members of these groups themselves, and most via the
profiles of soldiers who were in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2013 and 2014 (see Section
Three). During the search process for soldiers of the 53rd Brigade, profiles were found of officers,
made recognizable by their uniforms. The uniforms of the Russian Army display, like military uniforms
of other countries, stars and stripes with the rank of the officer noted by the amount of stars and
stripes. The non-commissioned officers (sergeants and warrant officers) have no stripes, only stars;
the junior officers (lieutenants and captains) have one stripe and a set of stars; the senior officers
(majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) have two stripes and stars; and the supreme officers have a
decorated pattern and bigger, gold-colored stars.101 However, the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade
does not have supreme officers since the highest rank is a colonel; therefore, these types of shoulder
straps were not found on images of uniforms of officers from the 53rd Brigade. Apart from stars and
stripes, the officers have three types of uniforms with different looking shoulder straps: a parade
uniform (usually blue with yellow shoulder straps), an everyday uniform (green with green shoulder
straps, red stripes, and yellow stars), and a field uniform (camouflaged green, no shoulder straps, no
stripes, smaller grey stars). The difference between non-commissioned officers and junior officers can
be seen by the way the stars are ordered on the uniform.
97 http://censor.net.ua/forum/753625/novye_podrobnosti_s_bukom_rf_posle_vyvozki_v_rossiyu_buk_perekrasili
98 http://censor.net.ua/forum/755432/buk_pod_nomerom_322
99 http://www.sbis.ru/
100 http://adm.rkursk.ru
101 http://goup32441.narod.ru/files/ovu/forma/prikaz-1500.htm
http://21stcenturywarfare.forumotion com/t81-russian-army-ranks
http://www.rg.ru/2010/03/12/forma-dok.html
http://dic academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/156492
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_ranks_and_insignia_of_the_Russian_Federation
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Воинские звания в Вооружённых Силах Российской Федерации
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Army ranks and insignia of the Russian army (except navy) from the Russian version of the page on Wikipedia (information
confirmed with help of government sources, see footnotes): in the left column are soldiers (private and private first class), in the
middle column are sergeants (junior sergeant, sergeant, senior sergeant, master sergeant), and in the right are column warrant
officers (warrant officer, senior warrant officer). The ranks and insignia are above the shoulder straps for everyday uniforms,
under the shoulder straps for field uniforms.
Army ranks and insignia of the Russian army (except Navy) from the Russian version of the page on Wikipedia (information
confirmed with government sources, see footnotes): in the left column are junior officers (junior lieutenant, lieutenant, senior
lieutenant, captain), in the middle column are senior officers (major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel), and in the right column are
supreme officers (major general, lieutenant general, colonel general, army general and marshal of the Russian Federation). The
ranks and insignia are above the shoulder straps for every day uniforms, under the shoulder straps for field uniforms.
Shoulder straps of a lieutenant-colonel from a parade uniform (left), an everyday uniform (middle), and a field uniform.
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Buk Unit Commanders of the 2nd Battalion in 2014
The first officers the Bellingcat team found on VK are those connected to soldiers of the 2nd Battalion
who were in service in 2013 – the soldiers on the two attendance lists (see Section Two). Konstantin
M. was photographed together with soldiers of the 2nd Battalion in 2013 (see Section Three). A
photograph, uploaded 28 November 2014 on his own profile, shows that he was still a commander by
the end of 2014, and that he was then a senior lieutenant. Some of the soldiers he is connected to on
VK were in the 1st Battery and have uploaded photographs of Buk missile launcher 211, so it is likely
that he was a commander in the 1st Battery of the 2nd Battalion, at least in 2013.
In Konstantin’s saved photos album, a few photographs are dated 17 July 2014. In these photographs,
Konstantin M. is visible with his wife, another officer identified as Sergey P., who will be described
later this section, and another woman (Sergey P.’s wife). Since Konstantin M. was commander in the
2nd Battalion in 2014, it is very likely he took part in the June 2014 Buk convoy and was in the Rostov
Oblast in the summer of 2014. The 17 July 2014 photographs, however, seem not to be have taken in
the Rostov Oblast on or around July 17, 2014. This is because the officers are not wearing their
uniforms and Konstantin’s wife, who very likely also works for the 53rd Brigade, did not go to the
Rostov Oblast, as images she uploaded in her VK album on 26 June 2014 from Belgorod make clear.
Additionally, the clothes worn by the people in the photograph indicate that it is not summer, as the
temperature in Kursk on 17 July 2014 was around 30 degrees Celsius.102 It seems more likely that
photographs were taken in spring or autumn and uploaded on the day of the MH17 tragedy.
Left: Konstantin M , a senior lieutenant of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade, image uploaded 28 November 2014
and since deleted (Konstantin M. deleted all of his military photographs in January 2016).
Right: Sergey P , Sergey P.’s wife, Konstantin M. and Konstantin M.’s wife, uploaded 17 July 2014.
Via Konstantin M.’s profile and searching elsewhere on VK, other officers were found, including
Evgeny M., who describes himself as being in Unit 32406 (the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade) and
who categorizes eleven of his contacts as co-workers. On his profile, a photograph uploaded in 2012
of himself in uniform and his wife, makes it clear that he was a lieutenant at that time. While he does
not share information about himself being in the military in social media, photographs from his
connections make clear that he was an officer in the 2nd Battalion in July 2014. What is noteworthy is
that he is connected to a soldier of the 2nd Battery of the 2nd Battalion who was certainly in the 23-25
June 2014 Buk convoy and Rostov oblast in the summer of 2014 (see Section Three).
102 http://archive.is/jbEYz
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Evgeney M., a lieutenant of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade, image uploaded 18 June 2012.
Eleven ‘co-workers’ from Evgeny M.’s VK contacts list, four of them describe
themselves as being in Unit 32406 (the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade).
Most of the profiles of Evgeny’s eleven co-workers do not display any military activities in 2014, and,
from their photographs, it is not immediately clear whether they are or were in service with the 53rd
Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
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One co-worker’s profile (Stepa A.) does not display any military photographs at all. Via Evgeny’s
profile on Odnoklassniki, we find the same co-worker listed as ‘Stepan S. A.’; a photograph on his
mother’s profile shows he became a lieutenant in 2011. His connections, both on Odnoklassniki and
on VK, indicate that he is an officer in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. However, photographs
found on profiles of other officers made it clear that Stepan’s wedding was on or just before 20 July
2014, so he very likely was not in the 2nd Battalion and did not take part in the June 2014 Buk convoy.
The profile of another co-worker, Pavel S., does not give information about the unit he is in. Also Pavel
S.’s profile and his photographs do not show any connection to the 2nd Battalion, any other battalion
or Buk unit vehicles in general.
Igor S. uploaded images of himself in uniform in 2012 and 2013, showing the rank of lieutenant. His
profile picture on Odnoklassniki shows him and an unidentified soldier or officer sitting on a Buk unit
vehicle. That photograph was probably taken by another officer, Ivan B., to whom Igor S. was
connected both on VK and Odnoklassniki, because the same photograph was found on the
Odnoklassniki profile of Ivan B.
Left: Igor S., a lieutenant, image uploaded 22 June 2012; right: Igor S. (left side) and another
unidentified soldier/officer (right side), photograph uploaded by Ivan B., 14 April 2013.
Other photographs from Ivan’s album show that the Buk unit vehicle on which Igor S. is sitting might
be Buk missile loader 213, a vehicle visible in three images from Ivan’s album. Two remarkable
photographs on both Ivan’s VK and Odnoklassniki profile (uploaded 15 July 2014 but later removed
from his VK profile) show Ivan B. in uniform without insignia in a wooded area, an indication that he
might have been in the Rostov Oblast as well. He is connected with a few soldiers who were in the
Rostov Oblast in the summer of 2014. One photograph of Ivan in an officer’s uniform indicates that he
became an officer in 2013 or 2014, but his rank is unclear. Igor S. became a lieutenant in 2012 and
was likely the commander of Buk missile loader 213 in 2013. It is noteworthy that Buk missile loader
213 was not in the 23-25 June 2014 convoy and was replaced by a different Buk missile loader. Also
noteworthy is that Igor S.’s wife did a post on 21 July 2014 on her VK profile saying “He who has the
sun shining in his soul will be able to see the sun even in the gloomiest day…”, and that Igor S. gave a
like to this post, while he rarely responds to her posts with a ‘like’.
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Left: Buk missile loader 213, from Ivan B.’s Odnoklassniki profile, 23 March 2013; right: Ivan B , 15 July 2014.
Two other co-workers of Evegeny M., Alexander N. and Grigory M., both describe themselves as
being in Unit 32406, and have a military history dating as far back as 2008. Alexander N. became a
lieutenant in 2011, evidenced by photographs in which he was tagged and a photograph in his own
album; later, he became a senior lieutenant, as shown in a 2014 photograph, although the exact year
he was promoted is unknown. In Section Three, Alexander N. was described as an officer who was
probably in the 1st Battalion since he is visible on a 2014 photograph sitting inside Buk missile
launcher 131. In the photograph, he is next to a cadet who trained at the 53rd Brigade in the summer
of 2014, as described in Section Four. Grigory M. does not provide any images on his own profile
displaying his military rank, but images in an album on his and his wife’s shared profile show that he
was a lieutenant in 2010. Grigory’s album does not show any military pictures after 2013. As the
previous section made clear, he was still serving in 2014, but was not in the 2nd Battalion.
Left: Alexander N., lieutenant, 26 June 2011; right: Grigory M., lieutenant, 13 August 2010.
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One noteworthy co-worker of Evgeny M. is Sergey O., who has affiliated himself with the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk, Unit 32406, since 2011 and describes himself as a “Начальник
расчета СОУ” (“СОУ” stands for “Самоходная огневой установка,” or “Self-propelled missile
launcher”), meaning he is a detachment commander of a self-propelled missile launcher, a term often
used for a Buk missile launcher.103 A photograph uploaded on 18 September 2011 on his VK profile
shows that he was a lieutenant, and posts on his Odnoklassniki profile demonstrate that he became a
lieutenant in 2011 and a senior lieutenant in 2013.
Another photograph shows a Buk missile launcher from the 3rd Battalion, an indication he was in the
3rd Battalion in 2011. The photograph was uploaded in September 2011, but clearly taken much
earlier, since there is snow near Kapustin Yar where the photograph was probably taken. It is
possible, though, that this photograph is much older, when he was not yet in the 53rd Brigade. Before
2011, Sergey O. was a detachment commander in the 49th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Yelnya,
near Smolensk.
Left: Sergey O., 18 September 2011; right: A 3rd Battalion Buk missile launcher (right side), 18 September 2011.
A post on Sergey’s wall on his Odnoklassniki profile where he wrote on 24 June 2011 he became a lieutenant.
A post on Sergey’s wall on his Odnoklassniki profile where he wrote on 22 July 2013 he became a senior lieutenant.
103 http://pvo.guns.ru/buk/buk_13.htm
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/9А310
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What is notable about his Odnoklassniki profile is that he is very clearly siding with the pro -Russian
separatists in the eastern Ukraine conflict. On his wall are several likes of posts about ‘Novorossiya’
and ‘Anti-Maidan,’104 and about transport of military equipment to the Russia-Ukraine border (a ‘like’
posted on 18 July 2014, the day after MH17 was shot down). Two Odnoklassniki groups that he is a
member of are a group dedicated to the Luhansk Peoples’ Republic and a group that supports ‘Anti -
Maidan’.
One post from 16 August 2014 where he wrote “56th day of heat” suggests that there was a heat wave
in the surrounding area. Though it was quite hot near Luhansk and near the border on these days,105
it is more likely that he wrote this message because the 2nd Battalion was deployed 56 days at that
moment, or he referred to the number of days that military tension was going on in the area. 56 days
before 16 August 2014 was 22 June 2014, just one day before the June 2014 Buk convoy departed to
the Rostov Oblast days. Sergey O., as seen later in this section, was in the 2nd Battalion in 2014.
Left: a like of a video of a military transport to the Russia-Ukraine border, 18 July 2014; right: posts of 2014 that Sergey
removed from his Odnoklassniki profile; one post mentions the 56th day of heat on 16 August 2014.
A 28 July 2015 photograph showing five officers in front of an unnumbered Buk missile launcher
provides additional information. The officer wearing a helmet with the number 222 (likely indicating
that he was responsible for the Buk missile launcher numbered as such) is Sergey O., as evidenced in
photographs he uploaded on a new VK profile in October 2015.
104 Anti-Maidan protests arose in response to the proposed action of a European Union association agreement and the
subsequent Euromaidan protests, starting in November 2013. The Anti-Maidan movement supported the Yanukovych
government and Russia, while being opposed to the Euromaidan movement, the European Union, and the eventual
Poroshenko government.
105 http://archive.is/WVabB
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A photograph of five commanders standing in front of an unnumbered Buk missile launcher,
including one commander wearing a 222 helmet, 28 July 2015.
Left: Sergey O , 28 July 2015; right: Sergey O., 5 October 2015.
It is important to know who the commander was of Buk missile launcher 222 in 2014 because this
missile launcher was replaced by Buk missile launcher 3x2 in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy. It is
likely, but not certain, that the commander who would normally be responsible for Buk 222 was the
commander of its replacement, Buk 3x2, in the summer of 2014. However, this theory is not
supported by evidence; rather, it must be taken as a plausible hypothesis. Also, it must be noted that
a contract soldier (see Section Three about the 2nd Battalion of 2014) posted an image of Buk 222 on
Twitter in March 2013, possibly indicating that he was the operator of Buk 222 in 2013, but there is
no clear evidence supporting this theory either.
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The profiles of Vitaly K. and Evgeny G. do not give any information about the battalion they are in, and
only Vitaly’s profile shows he is a member of Unit 32406 (53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade).
Photographs uploaded in the albums of Vitaly and Evgeney G.’s wife make clear that both men were
lieutenants in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade as early as 2012/2013. As demonstrated later in
this section, both men were officers in the 2nd Battalion in 2013.
One photograph of Evgeny G. and his wife, uploaded 28 December 2014, was taken inside a building
of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, a location commonly seen in official military photographs.
This indicates that Evgeny G. was still an officer with the 53rd Brigade in 2014, but it is not certain he
was still in the 2nd Battalion in 2014.
Left: Evgeny G., sergeant, 26 May 2012; middle: Evgeny G., lieutenant, 23 June 2012;
Right: Evgeny G. inside a building of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, 28 December 2014.
Among other photographs from the same time, an October 2015 photograph of Vitaly K. shows he
became a senior lieutenant after March 2013, and shows how Vitaly K. made a 2015 trip to Volgograd
with other officers of the 53rd Brigade. The identity of one of these officers is still unclear, but two
other officers were Sergey O. (see earlier this section) and Vladimir P. (described later this section).
Both of these officers were in the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2013/2014, as shown later in
this section. The next subsection shows how additional officers made the Volgograd trip in October
2015, during training in nearby Kapustin Yar.
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Left: Vitaly K., lieutenant, 31 March 2013; middle: Vitaly K. with emblem of the Air Defense, 4 February 2015;
Right: unidentified officer (left) and Vitaly K. (right) in Volgograd, 19 October 2015.
Left: Vitaly K., senior lieutenant, 19 October 2015;
Right: Vladimir P , Sergey O., an unidentified officer and Vitaly K. in Volgograd, 19 October 2015.
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The profile of another officer was found, Sergey K., via profiles of some of the aforementioned
commanders. Sergey K., an officer who was in the 53rd Brigade but very likely not in the 2nd Battalion,
became a lieutenant in 2010 and later a senior lieutenant (exact time unknown). Two images in his
VK photo album – both uploaded in November 2014 – show him barbecuing in a wooded area with
other officers. Another photograph, uploaded 21 August 2014, shows a field and the comments under
this photograph explain that it was taken in the Astrakhan Oblast, the region where the Kapustin Yar
exercises are held. Section Three shows that the 1st Battalion left the Rostov Oblast and went to
Kapustin Yar on 10 August 2014; therefore, it is likely Sergey K. was in the 1st Battalion in the summer
of 2014.
Left: Sergey K., senior lieutenant (on the left side) with two other identified officers
(Ivan I. and Igor D ), barbecuing in a wooded area, 13 November 2014;
Right: Sergey K. comments on a photograph that it was taken in the Astrakhan Oblast, 21 August 2014.
Evgeny M.’s two remaining co-workers provided valuable information in the photo albums on their VK
and Odnoklassniki profiles. The first, Rafael A., has been a captain since 2014. This means he was not
a Buk unit officer, but rather a battery officer; he is further profiled in the next subsection about
battery officers.
Evgeny's last co-worker to be described is Vadim M. From photographs in albums both on his VK and
Odnoklassniki profiles, it becomes clear he has been in the army since at least 2008 and joined the
2nd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2010. His photo album on Odnoklassniki
shows many 2nd Battalion Buk unit vehicles, including Buk command vehicle 200, Buk Snow Drift
radar 201, and Buk missile launchers 211 and 221. In four photographs of missile launchers, a group of
soldiers and/or officers standing in front of the missile launchers is visible, and on three the soldiers
are tagged, revealing their names.
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Vadim M , senior lieutenant, 23 November 2014.
Another image from Vadim M.’s album shows some of his co-workers more clearly. In this
photograph, Konstantin M. and Sergey O. are clearly recognizable. A third officer, identified as Sergey
P., who is a connection of some of the aforementioned commanders, is also visible in the photograph.
He has been an officer since at least 2009, and later in this section evidence will establish that he
was also part of the 2nd Battalion in 2014.
Left: Konstantin M , Sergey O., Sergey P. and Vladimir P., 28 March 2013;
Right: photograph of Sergey P. from his own profile, 10 May 2015.
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The fourth officer is named Vladimir P., also a connection of aforementioned officers, who was clearly
recognizable in a family photograph and on a photograph of another Odnoklassniki profile.
Vladimir P., from his other Odnoklassniki profile.
Further circumstantial evidence that shows that Vladimir P. was in the June 23-25 convoy is from
posts from his wife. On 23 June 2014, she posted on her OK profile that she felt lonely, and on 17 July
2014, she posted a poem commonly shared by officers’ wives, about the difficulty of the
husband/officer being away from his family.
The first tagged image in Vadim M.’s album is dated 6 October 2010, which shows Vadim M. and
four other officers, three of whom are tagged as Sergey P., Sasha M. and Andrey P. The officer named
Sergey P. is the same officer in the previous image of four officers.
“Military officers,” with the following officers tagged: Vadim M. (second from left),
Sasha M. (middle), Andrey P. (second from right), and Sergey P. (right).
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The second tagged image is from 3 December 2011, in which Vadim M. and other soldiers or officers
are visible, including Aleksey K., Dmitry K., and Sergey O. (a different one than the one described
earlier in this section). The tags of the last two names did not link to their profiles, but the link to
Aleksey K.’s name reveals the profile of someone who was a major in 2008 (Aleksey K. is described in
the next subsection). The other two profiles were found via connections to commanders.
Vadim M. (second from left) in front of a Buk missile launcher, together with other officers,
tagged Aleksey K. (middle), Dmitry K. (second from right), and Sergey O. (right), 3 December 2011.
The third tagged image is from 15 September 2012, in which three officers are standing in front of
Buk missile launcher 221. The three tagged officers are Vadim M., Konstantin M. (see the beginning
of this subsection), and Aleksey K. (the major also tagged in the previous 2011 image. Three additional
officers are in this photograph: Evgeny M., Vladimir P. and Sergey O., who were apparently in the 2 nd
Battalion in September 2012. It is likely that of the five lieutenants (the sixth individual is a captain)
standing in front of Buk missile launcher 221, one of them was the commander of that missile
launcher.
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Buk missile launcher 221 and six officers: Evgeny M. (left), Vladimir P. (2nd from left), Sergey O. (3rd from left),
Vadim M. (3rd from right), Aleksey K. (2nd from right), and Konstantin M. (right).
A fourth image from 22 March 2013 shows Buk missile launcher 211 with six officers standing in front
of it. None of them are tagged, but four of the officers are identifiable as Evgeny G., Igor S., Vitaly K.
and Konstantin M. A fifth officer is likely Dmitry K. Because a woman with the surname K.
commented “Handsome!” under the image, an officer with surname K. might be visible in this image
as well, and might be the same officer as Dmitry K. in the previous image. The woman’s profile shows
a major who looks similar to the man sitting on his knees in the photograph below. Major Dmitry K.
will be described in the next subsection.
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Buk missile launcher 211 and six officers: Evgeny G. (left), unidentified officer (second from left), Igor S. (middle),
Vitaly K. (second from right), Konstantin M. (right), and major Dmitry K. (crouching).
Two now-deleted photographs show Vadim M. with a 201 helmet in front of and on a Buk unit
vehicle, which on a 2014 VK photograph is very likely a Buk Snow Drift radar. This is a strong
indication Vadim M. was a detachment commander of Buk Snow Drift radar 201 in 2014.
Left: Vadim M. with a 201 helmet on top of a vehicle similar to a Buk Snow Drift radar,
uploaded 26 February 2014 (image deleted as of 6 January 2016);
Right: Vadim M. with a 201 helmet in front of a Buk unit vehicle, uploaded on Instagram, but since deleted.
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Pavel K., a likely Buk unit commander of the 2nd Battalion in 2014, was discovered through common
connections of other 2nd Battalion commanders. His own social media profiles are restricted and/or
not updated since 2011, but photographs in his wife’s photo album show he was a senior lieutenant in
air defense at 22 February 2014 and in air defense since at least 2013. This is best seen in a
photograph of Pavel K. walking in between other air defense officers at the 70th Anniversary Parade
for the Victory in the Battle of Kursk.106 29 December 2014 and 30 December 2013 photographs
show him and his wife inside a building of the 53rd Brigade. Another 2013 photograph shows him
together with Vladimir P. and Evgeny G., and a 2016 photograph shows him together with Vladimir P.
A 9 May 2015 photograph, taken on Victory Day in Kursk, shows his wife and a child in front of a Buk
missile launcher, and a post on his wife’s profile of 18 July 2014 makes clear that she is an officer’s
wife and misses her husband, who was at that time likely serving far from home. Considering all of
these factors, it is very likely that Pavel K. was a Buk unit commander in the 2nd Battalion in 2014.
Additional evidence to this conclusion will be shown later in this section in the form of an October
2015 photograph.
Top: Pavel K , senior lieutenant in air defense, 22 February 2014; bottom: Pavel K. in a military parade in Kursk, 24 August 2013.
106 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFt1kmsQHmg
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Commanders of the 1st and 3rd Battalions in 2014
In addition to the 2nd Battalion, commanders from the 1st Battalion in 2014 have also been identified.
While the previous subsection on 2nd Battalion officers presented several individuals who may have
knowledge or direct connections regarding the MH17 tragedy, this subsection will present individuals
who likely have no connection to the tragedy, due to their lack of involvement in the 23-25 June 2014
Buk convoy. A 31 January 2014 post in an Odnoklassniki group mentions three names of officers in
the 1st Battalion, 3rd Battery: Alexander C., Sergey K., and Nikolay M. In the same discussion, another
officer, named Andrey Z., is mentioned; he is apparently in the 1st Battalion, 2nd Battery. A photograph
Sergey K. uploaded on VK makes clear that he was the commander of Buk missile launcher 131 in
2012. According to an official source, Nikolay M. was a battery officer in February 2014 and held the
rank of captain.
Left: Sergey K., commander of Buk 131, 8 July 2012; right: Alexander C., 20 March 2012.
This report’s introduction mentioned the name of a 3rd Battalion officer published by the Ukrainian
news site Censor.net. This officer is named Roman Ivanovich Gorlatykh; he was the commander of
the 3rd Battalion, according to Censor.net.107 A few posts on VK communities mention the same
name, one makes it clear that he was the officer of the 3rd Battery in the 3rd Battalion in 2013.
A post on a VK community reveals names of officers that who used to be in the 3rd Battalion,
including Alexander N. (see previous sections and subsection) and Evgeny S., a captain who has been
with the 53rd Brigade since 2004. Because the 3rd Battalion was partially disbanded some time
before 2014, it is not completely clear whether Alexander N. and Evgeny S. moved to another
battalion or stayed at the 3rd to train cadets and conscript soldiers, although Alexander N. was
photographed with a cadet in 2014.
107 http://censor.net.ua/forum/755432/buk pod nomerom 322
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Battery Commanders of the 2nd Battalion in 2014
The subsection about the Buk unit commanders of the 2nd Battalion describes two officers with
higher ranks who were very likely in the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade:
Captain Rafael A. and Major Aleksey K. Looking back to the previous subsections, Rafael A. was one
of the listed co-workers of Evgeny M. and Aleksey K. was visible in two of Vadim M.’s photographs.
Aleksey K. has been a major since at least 2008 according to photographs on his Odnoklassniki
profile and, according to his profile, was still serving in the 53rd Brigade in 2014. He is visible in two of
Vadim M.’s photographs from 2011 and 2012 (see previous subsection) in the company of 2nd
Battalion lieutenants of the 53rd Brigade. In one of these photographs, Aleksey K. poses with
lieutenants in front of Buk missile launcher 221, likely indicating that he was a commander of the 2nd
Battery in the 2nd Battalion in 2012. Earlier in this section, we mentioned that a battery officer has the
rank of captain or major. This does not necessarily mean that every captain or major is a battery
officer, but since Aleksey K. is visible in photographs together with Buk unit officers (lieutenants), it is
very likely that he was a battery commander in the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade in 2011 and 2012.
A 2014 VK community post about the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade also mentions the name of
Major Aleksey K., and another post, dated 11 December 2014, shows that Aleksey K. was still an
officer in the 2nd Battalion in 2014.
On his profile, he commented “что творят нелюди” (“see what these inhumans do”) on a since-deleted
video of an Antimaidan group (the same group Sergey O. was a member of).
Alexey K., major, photograph uploaded in 2008 (a military parade in Moscow).
A captain named Rafael A. provided more information on his VK and Odnoklassniki profiles. Both
profiles were removed shortly before 24 June 2015, but apparently the VK profile was just temporarily
disabled because it was back online in July 2015; the Odnoklassniki profile was not reactivated. These
profiles were removed shortly after Bild’s publication about an upcoming Bellingcat report.108
Unfortunately, only one image has been saved from Rafael A.’s now-deleted Odnoklassniki profile, but
that particular image yields important information.
108 http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/ausland/flug-mh-17/bericht-enthuellt-die-taeter-des-flugzeug-abschusses-
41362040,var=x,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html
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First, the wall posts and images from Rafael A.’s VK profile will be examined. Two notable wall posts
were made by Rafael A. on 16 September 2014 and 2 October 2014, where, in both cases, collections
of pictures are posted at once. The collection of pictures posted on 16 September shows photographs
that were obviously not taken in the same location or on the same date. Four photographs are
geotagged, with two of them in or near Kursk, one pointing to the exercise fields near Kapustin Yar in
the “Akhtubinskiy rayon,” and, strangely enough, one in Wisconsin in the United States, which clearly
is either a mistake or was deliberately changed. Clicking on the location shows a part of the Atlantic
Ocean near Africa, a location that corresponds with Google coordinates 0°00'00.0"N 0°00'00.0"E. At
the very least, it is clear that these photographs were not taken on the same day nor at the same
location. The uploaded images are ordered left to right, starting with officers standing near the train
station in Kursk and ending with Rafael A. inside a Buk unit vehicle wearing a helmet that is difficult
to read showing either a number 524 or 324 on the helmet.
Rafael A.’s wall post on his VK profile from 16 September 2014 with a series of images.
In the first image, Rafael A. is the second man from the left; besides the officer standing on the right
side, named Marat Y. (see Section Four), no other officers have been identified. The second image
shows Rafael A. with lieutenant Sergey O. (see previous subsection), who was very likely in the 2nd
Battalion in 2014. The same image was found in a 53rd Brigade Odnoklassniki group, uploaded on 21
July 2014. The third image shows Rafael A. with a major named I. L. (described further in this section)
in the Akhtubinskiy rayon. The fourth image shows Rafael A. in a wooded area; this photograph is
unlikely to have been taken in the area of the exercise fields near Kapustin Yar.
The fifth image, which was geotagged in Wisconsin, is a quite remarkable image because it shows
the three officers in previous photographs of the 2nd Battalion: Evgeny M. (left), Sergey O. (middle
left), Sergey P. (middle right), and Rafael A. (right).
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The one image that was saved from Rafael A.’s Odnoklassniki profile is this photograph depicting
these four officers, uploaded on 21 July 2014. The photograph could not have been taken in the
Kapustin Yar area because the 1st Battalion went there on 10 August 2014, the 2nd Battalion was in
the Rostov Oblast in the summer of 2014, and the 3rd Battalion stayed at the base in the summer of
2014. On 21 July 2014, the 1st Battalion arrived in an area southwest of Kamensk-Shakhtinksy, while
units of the 2nd Battalion were in an area to the west and southwest of Millerovo. Judging by the likely
location of the battalions, the presence of 2nd Battalion officers, the visible uniforms, and the upload
date of the photograph, this image indicates that Rafael A. was a captain in the 2nd Battalion in 2014.
However, unless Rafael A. moved from one battalion to another in July 2014 or the photographs in
Kapustin Yar were taken earlier – for example in May or June 2014 – this does not fully explain the
Kapustin Yar photographs.
Evgeny M. (left), Sergey O. (second from left), Sergey P. (second from right),
and Rafael A. (right), photograph uploaded 21 July 2014.
The sixth image of the 16 September 2014 collection on Rafael A.’s VK wall post shows Rafael A. and
other officers with unnumbered Buks in a big, empty field similar to the Kapustin Yar training fields.
The area visible in the image is not similar to the area of the Rostov Oblast where the 2nd Battalion
was deployed, which is more of a green, wooded area than the steppe around Kaputin Yar. Since
most of the Buks transported to the Rostov Oblast were numbered, this photograph was likely taken
near Kapustin Yar. The seventh and last image shows Rafael A. inside a Buk vehicle wearing a 324 or
524 helmet; numbers that do not correspond with any 53rd Brigade Buk vehicle in 2014.
It is unclear if the photographs uploaded by Rafael A. on 16 September 2014 were uploaded in
chronological order or if they were all taken in the same month or year. Another series of images was
uploaded by Rafael A. on 2 October 2014. These photographs – where we see officers barbecuing
and eating – were apparently taken on the same day, very likely sometime between 16 September
2014 and 2 October 2014. After 16 September 2014, all three battalions had returned to the base near
Kursk (the 1st Battalion returned 10 or 11 September 2014, the 2nd Battalion just before or on 12
September 2014 after almost three months in the Rostov Oblast, and the 3rd Battalion never left the
base of the 53rd Brigade).
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Rafael A.’s wall post on his VK profile from 2 October 2014 with a series of images.
The first image shows Rafael A. with an officer named Evgeny S., who used to be in the 3rd Battalion.
The second image shows Rafael A. sitting next to a captain named Alexander L; on the other side of
Rafael A. is Grigory M. (one of Evgeney M.’s co-workers from the previous subsection). The next
images show Sergey K. (a senior lieutenant, see previous subsection); comparing Sergey K.’s
barbecue photographs to these makes it clear that it is the same event. Since Sergey K. was very
likely in the 1st Battalion, it becomes clear these photographs were taken after 10 September 2014.
Major I. L. is visible again in two images, as is an officer named Ivan I, who is also visible on a 2012
photograph of 2nd Battalion officers and soldiers on Vadim M.’s OK profile (see previous subsection).
Besides the two wall posts comprising a series of photographs, Rafael A. posted an interesting
photograph on 1 March 2014, depicting himself and three other officers inside a building of the 53rd
Brigade. Among these officers is Major I. L. and a senior warrant officer, Igor D. The major on the left
has not yet been identified.
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Four officers inside a building of the 53rd Brigade, 1 March 2014: an unidentified major (left),
major I. L , captain Rafael A., and senior warrant officer Igor D.
In October 2015, Rafael A. posted new images on his VK profile of himself and other 53rd Brigade
officers, just as Vitaly K. did (see previous subsection). These images clarify that a part of the 53rd
Brigade returned to Kapustin Yar in the summer/autumn of 2015. Some of the officers in the
photographs are Sergey O., Vladimir P., Konstantin M., Pavel K. and Alexander C. Most of these
officers were in the 2nd Battalion in 2014, with the exception of Alexander C., who was in the 1st
Battalion in January 2014, but he apparently moved to the 2nd Battalion in 2014 or 2015.
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Left: Vladimir P. (left) and Rafael A. (right) in the Akthubinskiy rayon, 15 October 2015;
Right: Alexander C. (left), Konstantin M. (2nd from left), Rafael A. (3rd from left), Pavel K. (middle up),
an unidentified officer (3rd from right), Sergey O. (2nd from right), and an unidentified officer (right).
Left: Rafael A. (left), Sergey O. (middle), Vladimir P. (right), 23 October 2015.
Right: an unidentified officer (left), Rafael A. (2nd from left), Vladimir P. (2nd from right),
and Sergey O. (right), train station Kursk, 23 October 2015.
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The previous subsection described a major named Dmitry K., who is visible in several images
uploaded by Vadim M (see previous subsection). A 2013 photograph shows Buk 211 and six officers,
including Dmitry K. The profile of his wife, Elena K., the woman who gave a comment to the Buk 211
photograph, shows a photograph of major Dmitry K. Two other photographs from a social media
connection of Dmitry K. show two 2nd Battalion Buk unit commanders, Konstantin M. and Sergey P.,
with Dmitry K. While Dmitry K. was an officer of the 2nd Battalion in 2013, there is no direct evidence
indicating that he was still an officer in this battalion in 2014.
Left: major Dmitry K. and his wife; right: Dmitry K , Sergey P., and Konstantin M., 8 January 2013.
Left: major Dmitry K. on Vadim M.’s profile 23 March 2013 (the photograph was not archived);
Right: major Dmitry K., on Vadim M’s profile, 2 April 2013.
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Other Commanders in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014
One commander connected to several 2nd Battalion officers is Denis S., a major of the 53rd Brigade
who calls himself ‘Fedor’ on social media A closer examination of his profile reveals that he was not in
the 2nd Battalion in 2014. A photograph posted 4 July 2014 shows him in front of what is described in
a comment as his new car with a Kursk oblast region code on its license plate (46), but the
photograph could have been taken earlier. More concrete indications as to his whereabouts in June-
July 2014 are found in other posts, including a wall post on 25 June 2014 in which he writes he is in
Orenburg at the moment and a photo album, uploaded 10 July 2014, showing photographs from
Orenburg as well.
Left: Major Denis S. of the 53rd Brigade (with his wife); right: Denis S. in front of his car, 4 July 2014,
and Denis S.’s location on or around 25 June 2014, where he writes “в Оренбурге” (in Orenburg).
A photograph uploaded to a 53rd Brigade album of an Air Defense Odnoklassniki group shows Denis
S. in front of a 2014 week schedule or ‘plan’, where on the top of the columns the days of the week are
displayed, while the rows display the three battalions, divided into three batteries, but also a
command unit and some other units. Numbers are displayed in the second column, and a number 3
is apparently displayed for each battery for the amount of officers and the number 12 of total
personal, which means one (commissioned) officer for each Buk unit vehicle and four crew members
for each vehicle. This information corresponds with the number of crew members mentioned in
Section One.
Denis S. in front of a week schedule or ‘plan,’ image uploaded 20 September 2014.
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Ilmir K. is a commander who started in Orenburg and was already an officer in 2009; he later became
a captain and, in 2013, a major. His name is mentioned as a captain of command vehicle on an
information page about Unit 32406 (the 53rd Brigade); the page also describes that Ilmir K. has been
with the 53rd Brigade since at least 2010. He is a member of a 53rd Brigade group on Odnoklassniki
and is connected to several 2nd Battalion officers, but it is not clear if he was in the 2nd Battalion in
2014.
Left: Ilmir K., a major of the 53rd Brigade, 23 February 2015; right: Major Ilmir K. and his wife, 23 February 2014.
One of Ilmir K’s colleagues is a commander named Alexey V.; he is also a major, but it is unknown
when he received that rank. Photographs from 2013 show him as a major, and photos from 2011
show him as a member of the 53rd Brigade, evidenced by a photograph in his own album and a
photograph in Vadim M.’s album (see previous subsection). According to an official source, Alexey V.
is the head of a radar command post (Snow Drift radar), but it is not clear in which battalion. Since he
is visible in a 2011 photograph in Vadim M.’s album together with Vadim M. and another 2nd Battalion
officer, and he is connected on Odnoklassniki to a commander who used to be the commander of the
2nd Battalion, it is plausible he was in the 2nd Battalion, at least in 2011.
Left: Major Alexey V. and his wife, 5 January 2015;
Right: Major Alexey V. (2nd from left), Major Oleg C. (middle), and Major Denis S. (‘Fedor,’ second from right).
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One officer who was clearly in the 2nd Battalion, at least in 2013, is Anatoly K. While his profile does
not show his rank in the army, two photographs in his album where he is wearing a helmet with the
number 200 indicate that he is an officer with the Buk command vehicle 200. His age, which appears
to be 52 years old, is an indication that he is an officer, though it is not conclusive. Anatoly K.’s profile
does not show any military activity in 2014. It is noteworthy that he ‘liked’ some pro-Novorossiya
images in 2014 and that he replied to a comment posted on 25 December 2014 by a Ukrainian
woman under a photograph of his where he is wearing a 200 helmet: “If you take missiles to Ukraine,
you will be knocked out, number two hundred on the helmet. cargo 200” (“Якщо ти поставив ці
ракети на Украіну то вже тобі вибила цифра двохсотий на шоломі. груз 200”). Cargo 200 is the
Russian codename for a killed soldier returning from a warzone.109 While she writes in Ukrainian, he
answers in Russian, ironically: “I talked to her about beauty and she to me about politics” (“Я ей про
красату а она мне про политику”).
An officer named Anatoly K., rank unknown, wearing a helmet with the number 200, 16 February 2013.
The Bellingcat team found several more profiles of captains and majors with the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade, but it was not clear whether they were still in service in 2014, what battalion they
were connected with, or what their specific function within the brigade was.
109 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30039004
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cargo 200 (code name)
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Commander of the 2nd Battalion in 2014
In the introduction, a name of a possible 2014 2nd Battalion commander was mentioned: Artyom
Agibalov, whose name was in the Censor.net article and in two VK communities, along with a
commander named Alexey S.
According to posts in these communities, Artyom Agibalov was a lieutenant in the 1st Battalion in
2009 and was transferred to the 2nd Battery of the 2nd Battalion in 2010. He was an officer in the 2nd
Battalion on 23 May 2014, but it was not specified what type of officer he was nor whether he was a
battalion commander. If he was a lieutenant in 2009, he must have made rapid progress to become a
lieutenant colonel in 2014, so it is more likely that he was promoted to captain, maybe later even to
major, and was a battery commander in 2014. Hardly any information could be found about Artyom
Agibalov; social media profiles did not seem to fit. His name is mentioned on a team competition
sheet, but it is not even clear if this is the same person.
Alexey S., who was the 2nd Battalion commander of the 53rd Brigade, has a profile on Odnoklassniki,
but there is little information on it indicating that he was still a member of the 53rd Brigade.
According to posts on the aforementioned VK communities, he was in the 2nd Battalion in 2010, but
was no longer there in 2013. These posts, however, do not clarify whether he was transferred to
another battalion or if he left the 53rd Brigade altogether. A post in one of the above VK communities
(but in a different topic) says Alexey S. moved to a different military unit far away from Kursk. But, in
conflicting information, a post made on 9 May 2014 says he was at that year’s Victory Day parade and
introduced as a lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Battalion. It is possible the person who posted this
misunderstood the introduction because Alexey S. may have been introduced as a former
commander of the 2nd Battalion. Apart from that last post, no other indication was found to establish
that Alexey S. was still part of the 53rd Brigade in 2014.
Profile picture of Alexey S., uploaded July 2011.
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A photograph posted on Odnoklassniki in 2014 identifies Dmitry T., who was very likely the 2nd
Battalion commander of the 53rd Brigade in 2014. The photograph uploaded on 21 February 2014 by a
2nd Battalion soldier on Odnoklassniki shows a group of soldiers, several of whom can be identified as
2nd Battalion soldiers, and an officer. A comment under the photograph makes it clear that the officer
in the image is Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry T., commander of the 2nd Battalion. A post from 31 March
2014 on a VK community of the 53rd Brigade, previously mentioned in this section, notes that Dmitry
T. has been the commander since 2012. A post on a forum for soldiers’ mothers (see Section Three)110
made on 5 December 2014 says that the commander of the 2nd Battalion is Dmitry T.
Group photograph showing commander of the 2nd Battalion Dmitry T.
(the officer standing behind the table marked by a red circle), uploaded 21 February 2014.
Dmitry T., 39 years old and from Kursk, had profiles on Mail.ru and Odnoklassniki. It is clear that
these profiles do not belong to another individual who coincidently has the same name and lives in
Kursk, as the profiles are connected to multiple profiles of another 53rd Brigade officer. In January
2016, soon after the publication at NOS (Dutch news) about Bellingcat’s upcoming report, both
profiles were removed. Before the profile deletions, the surnames on the accounts were changed.111
110 http://prizyvnikmoy.ru
111 http://nos.nl/artikel/2078421-onderzoeksgroep-twintig-russen-in-beeld-voor-neerhalen-mh17.html
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Left: Dmitry T. and his wife, Mail.ru, 2011; middle: Dmitry T. in front of Korrenaya Hermitage
in Svoboda near Kursk, Mail.ru, 2012; 112 right: Dmitry T , on his Odnoklassniki profile.
One of Dmitry T.’s connections on both Mail.ru as Odnoklassniki is Denis ‘Fedor’ S. (see previous
subsection), who has added Dmitry T. as friend on both social media networks.
Left: Dmitry T. in Denis S.’s Mail.ru contact list; right: Dmitry T. in Denis S.’s Odnoklassniki contact list.
Bellingcat has come to the conclusion that Dmitry T. was very likely the commander of the 2nd
Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade between February and December 2014. He was
therefore responsible for the 2nd Battalion in July 2014 when MH17 was downed by, very likely, Buk
3x2, a missile launcher part of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. Despite the fact that Dmitry T.
likely stayed in the Rostov Oblast with the rest of the 2nd Battalion, he was the commander of the 2nd
Battalion and therefore of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy. Among all of the commanders in the 53rd
Brigade, Dmitry T. would be one of the officers most likely to know the identities of the crew of Buk
3x2, in the likely case that Russian soldiers were part of the Buk’s crew. If the Buk crew consisted of
Russian soldiers and officers, the crew may have been selected by Dmitry T. If the crew did not
consist of Russian soldiers and officers, Dmitry T. very likely has a shared responsibility with other
53rd Brigade officers in the MH17 tragedy due to his battalion’s transport of Buk 3x2 to the Russia -
Ukraine border and, likely, across the border.
112 http://www.kurskroot.com/korennaya_hermitage_home.html
http://www.panoramio.com/photo/59618608
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Commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014
The introduction mentions Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev (found by Censor.net) as the commander of
the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in 2014. Bellingcat also found Muchkaev in 2014 and
mentioned him in their first full report, Origin of the Separatist’s Buk.113 Two photographs of
certificates from cadets (students of a technical university) were included in the report. These
certificates were signed by “S. Muchkaev” and “A. Sagula.” Muchkaev is designated in writing as the
commander of Unit 32406, the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. The certificates were signed on or
before 25 July 2014, as both cadets uploaded them on their VK profiles on 25 July 2014. Section Four
describes the significance of these certificates and the activities these cadets participated in with the
53rd Brigade in full detail.
Two photographs of certificates from cadets included in the full report, Origin of the Separatist’s Buk.
Apart from an April 2014 post in a 53rd Brigade VK community (as mentioned in the introduction)
where Muchkaev is described as the brigade commander, two more posts in another 53rd Brigade VK
community make clear Muchkaev still was the brigade commander in July 2015. According to official
sources, Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev was indeed the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile
Brigade (Unit 32406) in 2014.114 After investigating websites for images and videos of the annual
military parade in Kursk, Muchkaev was found in two YouTube videos from 2014 115 and one
photograph from 2015. Four names are read aloud (at 4:30) in this video116: Alexander Vladinovich
Rodionov (commander of the 27th NBC-defense brigade, where NBC stands for Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical),117 Vladimir Alexandrovich Rodionov (military commissar of Kursk),118 Andrey
Viktorovich Avdeev (head of the Electronic Warfare Unit of the Western Military District),119 and
Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev (commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade).
113 http://www.bellingcat com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation
114 http://sbis.ru/contragents/4611010810/461101001#msid=s1427711196758
http://www.prima-inform.ru/cat/cc/fbu-voyskovaya-chast-32406-1094611000990-4611010810
115 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHJ1jnKsVH0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rkMnzuWNM50
116 http://youtu.be/pHJ1jnKsVH0?t=270
117 http://www.kpravda.ru/article/society/027263/
http://warfare.be/db/lang/rus/catid/321/linkid/2225/base/583/
118 http://www.dddkursk.ru/number/818/new/006811/
119 http://www.gikursk.ru/news/3414/
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After the names have been read aloud, four officers step forward to the Memorial Complex, and the
officer to the far left appears to wear a badge on his left sleeve worn by members of the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade. Later, when he turns, the medals on his uniform are visible, and, at the end of
the video, he is visible standing between other officers waiting for the parade.
Left: Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev with the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade emblem on his left sleeve;
Right: Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev standing on the left, his insignia visible.
The 53rd Brigade has only one supreme commander, a colonel, as described earlier in this section. In
addition to the unique badge that specifies the unit of a soldier or officer, the rank is also displayed on
the uniform, with stripes and stars on the shoulders. As described above, a colonel – a senior officer –
has two red vertical stripes and three stars.
The photograph of Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev shows the shoulder patch with the symbol of the
53rd Brigade, two stripes, and three stars on the uniform; the position of the medals and the yellow
rope on the uniform also match the uniform that Muchkaev wears in the 2014 Kursk parade video.
Colonel Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev, the officer in the middle, commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,
9 May 2015 (to his right possibly Colonel Yury G., the commander of Unit 35535, the 448th Missile Brigade).
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The Bellingcat team also found social media profiles of Sergey Muchkaev on Odnoklassniki and
Facebook. Photographs from his social media profiles confirm that the colonel visible in the
photograph above is indeed Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev. One photograph in particular from his
Odnoklassniki profile shows a striking similarity.
Left: Colonel Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev, 9 May 2015; right: Sergey Muchkaev on his Odnoklassniki profile.
Despite the fact the men in these photographs look identical and have the same name, this is no
absolute guarantee that the social media profiles of Sergey Muchkaev belong to the same man that
is Colonel of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. However, especially the Odnoklassniki profile
shows enough details to be certain that it is the same person.
His Odnoklassniki profile does not mention anything about the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,
instead he describes himself being in military unit 48422, which is the 1143th Anti-Aircraft Missile
Regiment in Nizhny Novgorod,120 a military unit that operates Tor-M1.121 His profile also gives the
information he used to be in military unit 30274, which is the 282th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in
Chebarkul, 122 the place that Muchkaev on his Odnoklassniki profile also describes as his town of
birth. A post on one of the 53rd Brigade VK communities where Muchkaev’s name was mentioned
before, says that Muchkaev was a senior lieutenant in a TOR-M1 unit in Chebarkul. The person who
posted this, is connected via Odnoklassniki to the profile of Sergey Muchkaev.
120 http://sbis.ru/contragents/5263031720/526301001
http://vk com/m48422
http://www.ok.ru/group/44453625790717
121 http://defense-update.com/products/t/tor.htm
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_missile_system
122 http://vk com/club11696588
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Personal information from Muchkaev’s Odnoklassniki profile, where his birth date is mentioned (22 December 1976), the
military units where he served: 30274 (from 1997 to 2004) and 48422 (from 2006 to 2008), but also about education he
completed at an Anti-Aircraft Missile Command Academy (from 2000 to 2007).
The patronym ‘Borisovich’, which means that the first name of his father is Boris, is not mentioned on
Muchkaev’s Odonoklasniki profile. A post and photograph on his mother’s profile confirm that his
father is named Boris Muchkaev.
His profile is not connected to profiles of other officers or soldiers of the 53rd Brigade, but one
noteworthy contact in his friends list (and to be more specific in his list of colleagues) is the father of
Aleksander Donets, who was the commander of the 53rd Brigade from 2005 until 2009.
In January 2016 the Ukrainian group InformNapalm123 also found Muchkaev’s profile after the
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published information on 24 December 2015 about the
Air Defense Forces, because of the 100-year anniversary of the Air Defense.124 This publication also
includes an overview of commanders of all anti-aircraft missile brigades, among them Colonel Sergey
Borisovich Muchkaev, who became the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in
2013.125 Within a few hours after InformNapalm’s publication, the Odnoklassniki and Facebook
profiles of Sergey Muchkaev were deleted.
123 http://www.informnapalm org
124 http://mil.ru/files/files/pvo100/
125 http://mil.ru/files/files/pvo100/page80289.html#rec3447023
http://archive.is/p3JnL
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Information about the history of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and a photograph of Colonel Sergey Borisovich
Muchkaev, from the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 24 December 2015.
Names of all commanders of the 53rd Brigade since 1967, where Colonel Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev is mentioned from 2013.
It is also noteworthy to mention the name Aleksey Yuryevich Zolotov, who had been commander of the 53rd Brigade from 2011
to 2013, and who will be described later in this section, since he promoted to a higher position in the army.
Also published on 24 December 2015 was an interview with Colonel Sergey Muchkaev, recorded by
two different television stations. Apart from two articles published by both stations,126 in which
Muchkaev’s name is mentioned, videos of an interview are available on youTube, in which Muchkaev
explains information about the exercises and system improvements within the brigade.127 The videos
also show another commander being interviewed, Andrey Kokhanov, apparently the head of the Air
Defense of the Western Military District. This officer talks about software to spot airplanes that has
been improved. Andrey Kokhanov will be described later this section.
126 http://gtrkkursk.ru/lenta-novostei/24122015085234 l.html
http://seyminfo.ru/pod-kurskom-proshli-raketno-strelkovie-ucheniya.html
127 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIfxcXg5-GU&t=69
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bmnQkEA92I&t=68
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Left: Colonel Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev, interview recorded by ‘Rossiya 1 Kursk’, video uploaded 24 December 2015;
Right: Colonel Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev, interview recorded by ‘Seym’, video uploaded 24 December 2015.
Sergey Muchkaev was the supreme commander of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 (and still is, as of this
report’s publication), and very likely the officer who decided to replace Buk 222 with Buk 3x2 (a 3rd
Battalion Buk) in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy of the 2nd Battalion. Because of his position,
Colonel Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev is one of the officers in the chain of command responsible for
the downing of MH17 in the case that Buk 3x2 downed MH17, as argued in previous Bellingcat
publications. Even if the Buk crew did not consist of Russian soldiers and officers, Muchkaev was
very likely responsible for the decision to send Buk 3x2 to the Russia-Ukraine border. However, he
was not the officer who initially decided to send a Buk missile launcher to Ukraine. That decis ion was
made at an even higher level: the level of the Air Defense in general, the Air Defense of the Western
Military District, or the Air Defense of the 20th Army of the Western Military District, since the 53rd
Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade is a part of that military unit (see Section One).
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Air Defense and Supreme Commanders in 2014
The decision to send a Buk missile launcher to Ukraine was certainly not made by the commander of
the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade because the 53rd Brigade has no other air defense systems
apart from the Buk system. That decision must have been made at a higher level of command, likely
the level of the Air Defense of the 20th Army, the Air Defense of the Western Military District or the
Air Defense in general. Other air defense brigades use other systems such as TOR-M1128 and Strela-
10,129 with the latter being unable to hit a target higher than five kilometers (Russia did use 9M333
missiles for Strela-10 in 2014 that do not go higher than five kilometers). However, TOR-M1 is able to
reach targets at a maximum height of 10 kilometers. The 49th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, located in
Yelyna near Smolensk, also uses the Buk-M1 system.
The decision to send a Buk missile launcher instead of another air defense system must have been
made at a higher level. Section One, described how the 53rd Brigade is part of the 20th (Guards) Army
that belongs to the Western Military District. In general, the Air Defense has a supreme commander,
but the 20th Army and the Western Military District have commanders of their air defense too.
The introduction mentions Aleksey Yuryevich Zolotov (found by Censor.net), the former commander
of the 53rd Brigade who, according to the article, became head of the air defense forces. Censor.net
based their conclusion on a 23 May 2014 post in a VK community that says Zolotov was promoted to
Chief of the Air Defense Forces. Official sources indeed mention him in October 2013 as commander
of the 53rd Brigade,130 and he can also be seen being interviewed in a 2012 YouTube video about the
53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade131 and in a YouTube video about air defense missile brigades in
general and the development of Buk-M2.132 A more recent official source from 17 February 2014
makes it clear that Colonel Aleksey Zolotov was promoted to Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the
20th Army sometime between October 2013 and February 2014.133 In the previous subsection, it is
described that Zolotov was Commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade until 2013, so he
likely became Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the 20th Army in 2013 as well.
Colonel Aleksey Yuryevich Zolotov, previous commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,
promoted to head of the Air Defense Forces of the 20th Army in 2013.
128 http://warfare.be/db/catid/264/linkid/1691/
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor missile system
129 http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/strela10m/strela10m.shtml
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K35_Strela-10
130 http://www.gikursk.ru/news/835/
http://adm.rkursk.ru/index.php?id=955&mat id=27237
131 http://youtu.be/dLb3Y2pBCYo?t=71
132 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITKXXogGb4s&t=586
133 http://adm.rkursk.ru/index.php?id=741&mat id=30636
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Other images and videos where Zolotov is visible, albeit from a distance, are photographs and videos
of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk, held on 23 August
2013, where Colonel Zolotov was one of the parade commanders (together with Major General
Alexander Lapin, commander of the 20th Army of the Western Military District at that time, see later
this subsection).134
Although Zolotov is difficult to recognize in these photographs and videos, in one video three stars on
the shoulder of his uniform are visible, confirming the person in the video is a Colonel.135 The same
video earlier shows this person making a short speech in front of another officer, probably Major
General Alexander Lapin.136 Another video uploaded on YouTube shows the same person standing in
a car with license ‘парад 02’ (‘parade 02’)137. Only one photograph from an album of this 2013
parade138 shows his face,139 but still from quite a distance, and it cannot be said with absolute
certainty it is the same person visible in the 2012 videos where Colonel Alexey Zolotov is interviewed.
A photograph of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk military parade,
23 August 2013, the officer visible standing in a jeep facing the camera likely is Colonel Alexey Zolotov.
It is not certain that the apparent decision to send a Buk missile launcher to Ukraine was made by
Zolotov, and if it was, the decision was certainly not made by Zolotov alone. This decision may have
been made at an even higher level, by the Commander of the 20th Army, the Commander of the Air
Defense of the Western Military District or the Commander of the Western Military District,
combined with the Commander of the Air Defense troops of the Ground Forces and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
134 http://regnum.ru/news/1698397.html
http://mil.ru/elections/news/more.htm?id=11826772
http://www.kp.ru/online/news/1518163
135 http://youtu.be/D1I48Rz0PY0?t=605
136 http://youtu.be/D1I48Rz0PY0?t=132
137 http://youtu.be/Y1p9My_rWOo?t=82
138 http://astrokursk.ru/fotografii-kurska/foto-reportazhi/2013/voennyy-parad-v-kurske-photo-1.html
139 http://archive.is/yXhWv
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A news article from 18 September 2013 says that the head of the 20th Army (officially called the 20th
Guards Combined Armed Forces) is Alexander Pavlovich Lapin, with the rank of major general.140 He
became head of the 20th Army on 2 April 2012141 and is the same person visible in the 70th anniversary
of the victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk video with Colonel Alexey Zolotov. However, an
official article on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense makes it clear that Lapin was
succeeded by Major General Alexander Yuryevich Chaiko on 8 July 2014.142 A photograph in the
article shows Chaiko on the left, Lieutenant General Viktor Astapov in the middle, and Alexander
Lapin on the right. Lapin was eventually promoted to lieutenant general and became head of the
Eastern Military District. Other sources confirm these changes in the Russian Army on 8 July 2014.143
Left: Major General Alexander Pavlovich Lapin, head of the 20th Army until 8 July 2014;
Right: Major General Alexander Yuryevich Chaiko, head of the 20th Army since 8 July 2014.
Succession of Lapin (right) by Chaiko (left) under supervision of Astapov (middle).
140 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/60047.html
141 http://mil.ru/elections/news/more.htm?id=11054402@egNews
142 http://function.mil.ru/news page/country/more.htm?id=11968356@egNews
http://okp.mil.ru/separated_commandant_regiment/honour_book/info.htm?id=11122663@SD_Employee
143 http://www.niann.ru/?id=456290
http://newsnn.ru/news/123282
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As mentioned earlier this section, published articles144 and uploaded videos on 24 December 2015145
showing an interview with Colonel Sergey Muchkaev also show an interview with Major general
Andrey Anatolyevich Kokhanov, head of the Air Defense of the Western Military District, as he is
described in an article on the Ministry of Defense website.146 Another article on this website, about
the history of Air Defense of the different military districts, describes him as a colonel and head of the
Air Defense and aviation of the Western Military District,147 thus he was likely promoted to major
general recently. It is unknown exactly when Kokhanov was promoted to this position and rank. In
December 2011, an official source148 mentions Major General Kirill Vladimirovich Makarov as head of
the Air Defense of the Western Military District. He became the deputy commander of the Aerospace
Defense Forces in February 2013.149 It is likely Kokhanov took the position of head of the Air Defense
and aviation of the Western Military District in 2013, but an official source to confirm this conclusion
has not been found.
Major general Andrey Anatolyevich Kokhanov, head of the Air Defense of the Western Military District, 24 December 2015.
Kokhanov’s profile on Odnoklassniki does not provide this information, but it displays his military
history since 1987 and an anti-aircraft missile regiment history since 1990. A photograph uploaded to
his profile shows several anti-aircraft missile brigade commanders, including Sergey Muchkaev.
Left: Andrey Anatolyevich Kokhanov, then still a colonel; right: Kokhanov (4th from left) on his OK profile with Muchkaev (left).
144 http://gtrkkursk.ru/lenta-novostei/24122015085234 l.html
http://seyminfo.ru/pod-kurskom-proshli-raketno-strelkovie-ucheniya.html
145 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIfxcXg5-GU&t=113
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bmnQkEA92I&t=39
146 http://function.mil.ru/news page/country/more.htm?id=12072297@egNews
147 http://mil.ru/files/files/pvo100/page80286.html
148 http://www.spmi.ru/node/3550
149 http://syria.mil.ru/news/more.htm?id=11654052@egNews
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Official sources state that the Commander of the Western Military District in 2014 was a man named
Anatoliy Alekseyevich Sidorov, who ascended to this position on 24 December 2012 and reached the
rank of colonel general on 20 February 2013.150 In November 2015 Sidorov was succeeded by Colonel
General Andrey Valeryevich Kartapolov, who had been chief of staff or deputy commander of the
Western Military District until June 2014.151 The position of chief of staff or deputy commander was
taken over by Lieutenant General Viktor Borisovich Astapov on 21 June 2014.152 This is the same
Viktor Astapov who presented Alexander Chaiko as the new Commander of the 20th Army on 8 July
2014. On 14 June 2015, he was placed on Ukraine’s list of criminals of war.153
Left: Anatoliy Alekseyevich Sidorov, Colonel general, Commander of the Western Military District in 2014;
Right: Viktor Borisovich Astapov, Lieutenant general, Deputy Commander of the Western Military District since 21 June 2014.
Despite these changes in the Russian army shortly before the MH17 tragedy, it remains unclear who
made the decision to send a Buk missile launcher to Ukraine, or when the decision was made. Since
Buk missile launcher 3x2 was part of the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy, the decision was likely made
before Viktor Astapov became chief of staff or deputy commander of the Western Military District
and very likely before Alexander Chaiko became head of the 20th Army, because Chaiko became head
of the 20th Army after a Buk missile launcher was already transported to the Rostov Oblast. These
changes to the staff of the Russian army are noteworthy, since they took place during the period
when Russia decided to play a more active role in the conflict in Ukraine.
Other officers who likely had an influence on the decision to send a Buk missile launcher to Ukraine
are the Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleg Leonydovych Salyukov,154
and the Commander of the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces since October 2010,155
Lieutenant General Alexander Petrovich Leonov,156 He took over this position from Major General
150 http://structure.mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=11670664@SD Employee
151 http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/okruga/west/head.htm
152 http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12006035@egNews
153 http://psb4ukr.org/criminal/astapov-viktor-borisovich/
154 http://structure.mil.ru/management/combatant_arms/more.htm?id=10336066@SD_Employee
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleg_Salyukov
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Ground_Forces
155 http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Войска противовоздушной обороны (Сухопутные войска)
156 http://army-staff.ru/vidy-vs-rf/sukhoputnye-vojska/vojska-pvo-sukhoputnykh-vojsk.html
http://old.redstar.ru/2010/12/25_12/1_02.html
http://www.rg.ru/2015/08/10/kompleks-site.html
http://function.mil.ru/news page/country/more.htm?id=12013129@egNews
http://vpk-news.ru/articles/24155
http://mil.ru/files/files/pvo100/page78744.html
see also: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Леонов, Александр Петрович
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Mikhail Kondratyevich Krush,157 who was interviewed by a Novorossiya news agency, which still
referred to him as head of the Air Defense Forces158 on 30 July 2014 regarding the MH17 tragedy.
With tragic irony, an interview with Leonov was aired on Russian state television on 17 July 2014 at
17:40 local time, just 20 minutes after MH17 was downed in Ukraine.159
Left: Colonel General Oleg Leonydovych Salyukov, Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces since May 2014;
Middle: Alexander Petrovich Leonov, Commander of the Air Defense troops of the Ground Forces since October 2010;
Right: Mikhail Kondratyevich Krush, Commander of the Air Defense troops of the Ground Forces until October 2010.
Finally, the decision to send military equipment from the Air Defense Forces in general was likely
made at an even higher level: the Russian Ministry of Defense. The staff of the management of the
Ministry of Defense consists of several generals and other staff members who no longer hold a
military rank.160
The officers with the highest positions in 2014 were First Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the
Army161 Arkady Viktotovich Bakhin (former head of the Western Military District)162, who either
resigned or was dismissed on 17 November 2015,163 Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy
Minister of Defense, General of the Army Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov,164 the Minister of Defense,
General of the Army Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu,165 and, of course, the President of the Russian
Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who serves as the supreme commander of the Russian
Armed Forces.166
157 http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/archive/general-mayor-mihail-krush-naznachen-nachal-nikom-voyskovoy-pvo-03-11-
2008-11-15-00/
158 http://novorus.info/news/events/25960-general-pvo-buk-ne-sbival-boing.html
159 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVR558v5DLQ
160 http://structure.mil.ru/management.htm
161 http://www.rg.ru/2012/05/28/vyplaty-dok.html
see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_of_the_army_(Russia)
162 http://structure.mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=10330380@SD_Employee
163 http://rushincrash.com/forces/army-force-structures/fired-first-deputy-defence-minister-arkady-bakhin
164 http://structure.mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee
165 http://structure.mil.ru/management/minister.htm?id=11445111@SD_Employee
166 http://structure.mil.ru/management/leader.htm?id=10330475@SD Employee
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Left: Arkady Viktotovich Bakhin, First Deputy Minister of Defense (until 17 November 2015);
Second from left: Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov, First Deputy Minister of Defense;
Second from right: Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, Minister of Defense;
Right: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces.
Although it is likely that the head officials of Ministry of Defense did not explicitly decide to send a
Buk missile launcher to Ukraine, the decision to send military equipment (with or without crew) from
the Air Defense Forces to Ukraine was likely made at a very high level and, therefore, the Russian
Ministry of Defense bears the main responsibility for the downing of MH17, in the likely case that
Russia’s Buk 3x2 missile launcher was the weapon used.
This responsibility is shared with separatist leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic and (to a lesser
extent) the Luhansk People’s Republic. The leaders of these self-proclaimed republics are outside of
the scope of this report, since they did not serve in the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade or (officially)
in the Russian army in 2014.
The Main Intelligence Directorate of Russian Armed Forces, GRU (formally now known as ‘Главное
управление’, or GU) was also implicated by the SBU wiretaps regarding the movements of the Buk
missile launcher. In its official sanctions, the EU specifically mentioned former GRU head Lieutenant
General Igor Sergun,167 who died suddenly in early January 2016168, as being responsible for activity of
GRU officers in eastern Ukraine. Another former GRU officer who was very likely involved in the
downing of MH17 is Sergey Nikolayevich Petrovsky, known as “Khmuryi”, who was recognized by
Ukraine on tapped phone conversations.169
The next pages show a hierarchical scheme of the command structure in the Russian army from the
President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense of Russia to the level of Buk unit
commanders in the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
167 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0433
168 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35226131
169 http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/07/18/sbu-intercept-of-terrorist-conversation-proves-they-had-buk-m-in-possession
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/01/russian-officer-recognized-on-tape-by-dutch-investigation-team-mh17
109 bell¿ngcat
110 bell¿ngcat
111 bell¿ngcat
Conclusions
The Bellingcat investigation team comes to the following conclusions:
In 2014, the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade consisted of three battalions, each of them
divided into three batteries. A complete Buk system of a battalion in the 53rd Brigade
consisted of six Buk missile launchers, three Buk missile loaders, one Snow Drift radar, and
one command vehicle. Each battery of the 53rd Brigade consisted of two Buk missile
launchers and one Buk missile loader.
The 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy transported Buk vehicles, other military vehicles, and
soldiers/officers of the 2nd Battalion. Some of the vehicles were replaced by 3rd Battalion or
unknown Buk vehicles. The destination of that convoy was the Millerovo military airbase;
units of the convoy were subsequently transported to a rural area to the west and southwest
of Millerovo, near the Russia-Ukraine border.
The 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy transported Buk vehicles, other military vehicles, and
soldiers/officers of the 1st Battalion. The destination of that convoy was a rural area
southwest of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky – likely a military camp in that area – near the Russia-
Ukraine border.
The soldiers of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade who were in military
service in 2013 were not involved in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy and were not deployed
to the Rostov Oblast in the summer of 2014, since their service ended late 2013 or early 2014.
However, some of these soldiers may have signed up as contract soldiers after their military
service was fulfilled.
The soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade who were in military
service in 2014 were not involved in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy. In 2014, none of them
posted a picture of a convoy, a training camp, or an area similar to the border area in the
Rostov Oblast.
Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade who were in military
service in 2014 took part in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy and were deployed in an area
west and southwest of Millerovo in the Rostov Oblast in the summer of 2014. Many soldiers
of the 2nd Battalion posted images of the convoy or of themselves in a rural area. Image
captions sometime mention a border area or the images have geotags in the Rostov Oblast.
These soldiers stayed for almost three months (from June to September 2014) in the border
area of the Rostov Oblast. Among these soldiers, it is possible that one or two contract
soldiers or reservists were part of the crew of Buk 3x2, which very likely downed MH17.
Soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade who were in military
service in 2014 took part in the 19-21 July 2014 Buk convoy and were deployed in an area
southwest of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in the Rostov Oblast in July and August 2014. Afterward,
part of the convoy was transported to Kapustin Yar, a training area near the Russia-
Kazakhstan border.
A Buk crew usually consists of two soldiers (an operator and a driver) and two officers (a
sergeant and a lieutenant). The lieutenant is the detachment commander who makes the
decision to fire a missile, as this officer is the only commissioned officer.
112 bell¿ngcat
The 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade had six missile launchers and three missile loaders in
2014. These nine vehicles were commanded by detachment commanders (lieutenants).
Bellingcat has identified ten lieutenants who were detachment commanders of Buk missile
launchers, Buk missile loaders, and a Buk Snow Drift Radar in 2014. From some of these
lieutenants, connections can likely be made to a specific missile launcher or loader.
Buk 222 was replaced in the 23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy by Buk 3x2. If Russian officers and
soldiers were part of the Buk 3x2 crew, it is very likely that the officers and soldiers who
usually operate Buk 222 were part of the Buk 3x2 crew, but there is no direct evidence to
support this conclusion.
Three battery commanders of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade (Aleksey K., Rafael A. and
Dmitry K.) were very likely serving in 2014, but it is not known which batteries they
commanded. One of these commanders was photographed together with 2nd Battalion
lieutenants in a rural area. This photograph was uploaded on 21 July 2014 and indicates their
likely presence in the Rostov Oblast in July 2014.
The battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade was very likely Dmitry T. in
2014. This commander was likely responsible for the transport of 2nd Battalion vehicles in the
23-25 June 2014 Buk convoy to the Rostov Oblast, including Buk 3x2. If the Buk crew
consisted of Russian soldiers and officers, they were likely selected by Dmitry T. and/or the
53rd Brigade commander Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev. If that is the case, then he knows the
identities of the soldiers and/or officers who operated Buk 3x2.
The brigade commander of the 53rd Brigade in 2014 has been identified by Censor.net and
Bellingcat as Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev. Since he was the highest-ranking commander of
the 53rd Brigade, it was most likely his decision to replace the 2nd Battalion Buk missile
launcher 222 with the 3rd Battalion Buk missile launcher 3x2, and to send Buk 3x2 to the
Rostov Oblast, where it was subsequently transported to Ukraine. If the Buk crew consisted
of Russian soldiers and officers, Muchkaev was responsible for selecting and transporting
Buk 3x2. He and/or Dmitry T. were likely responsible for selecting the crew of Buk 3x2.
The commander of the Air Defense of the 20th Army in 2014 was Aleksey Yuryevich Zolotov,
and the commander of the 20th Army was Alexander Pavlovich Lapin until 8 July 2014, after
which it was Alexander Yuryevich Chaiko. The commander of the Air Defense of the Western
Military District in 2014 was Andrey Anatolyevich Kokhanov, the commander of the Western
Military District in 2014 was Anatoliy Alekseyevich Sidorov in 2014, and the Chief of Staff or
First Deputy Commander of the Western Military District in 2014 was Viktor Borisovich
Astapov beginning on 21 June 2014. The commander of the Air Defense overall in 2014 was
Alexander Petrovich Leonov, and the commander of the Ground Forces overall in 2014 was
Oleg Leonydovich Salyukov. It is likely that the decision to send a Buk-M1 system to the
Rostov Oblast and a Buk missile launcher to Ukraine was made at the level of the Air Defense
of the 20th Army, the Air Defense of the Western Military District, or the overall Air Defense. It
is unclear at exactly which level the decision was made and by which commander(s).
The decision to send military equipment to the Russia-Ukraine border and to Ukraine was
made at an even higher level – the level of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, where the top
positions in 2014 were fulfilled by First Deputy Minister Arkady Viktotovich Bakhin, First
Deputy Minister Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov, Minister Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, and
President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Consistent with the
probable conclusion that the Russian Buk missile launcher 3x2 downed MH17, the Ministry of
Defense bears the main responsibility for the MH17 tragedy, shared with the military
commanders and leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.
113 bell¿ngcat
Acknowledgments
Report written by:
Daniel Romein
Review, corrections, and translations by:
Aric Toler
Nathan Patin
Iesh Lal
Research and contributions by:
Timmi Allen
Klement Anders
Eliot Higgins
Pieter van Huis
Veli-Pekka Kivimäki
Iggy Ostanin
Daniel Romein
Aric Toler
© 2015/2016, the Bellingcat MH17 Investigation Team
Annex 452
Bellingcat Investigation Team, The Lost Digit: Buk 3x2, bell¿ngcat (3 May 2016)
Annex 453
Bellingcat Investigation Team, New Google Earth Satellite Update Confirms Presence of Buk in
Eastern Ukraine, bell¿ngcat (22 June 2016)
Annex 454
International Partnership for Human Rights, Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure in Eastern
Ukraine (2017)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND
CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
IN EASTERN UKRAINE
PERIOD COVERED:
March 2014 — November 2017
IPHR - International Partnership for Human Rights
Square de l'Aviation 7A 1070 Brussels, Belgium
W IPHRonline.org
E [email protected]
@IPHR
@IPHRonline
Truth Hounds
W truth-hounds.org @truthhounds
E [email protected]
Table of contents
1. Introduction 7
1.1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
1.2. THE AUTHORS 8
1.3. SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND METHODOLOGY OF DOCUMENTATION 9
1.3.1 Data collection 9
1.3.2 Impact site documentation and analysis 10
1.3.3 Collecting physical evidence 11
1.3.4 Data analysis 11
2.
September 2015 – November 2017 13
3. Evidence of cross-border attacks by Russian armed
forces supporting the existence of an international
3.1. CONTEXT: AFRF OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA AND UKRAINIAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY 20
3.2. AFRF MOBILISATION TO THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE BORDER 23
3.2.1 AFRF troop build-up, camps and suspected artillery launch sites 23
3.2.2 AFRF Territorial Incursions and Reconnaissance Missions 29
3.2.3 Conclusion 30
3.3. DOCUMENTED CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS 31
3.3.1 Attacks on and around Kolesnykivka, Komyshne and
Yuhanovka settlements 31
3.3.2 Attacks on Milove settlement 33
3.3.3 Attacks on Krasna Talivka settlement 35
3.3.4 Attacks on Dmytrivka and Pobieda settlements 37
3.3.5 Conclusion 38
3.4. CONCLUSION 39
4. Documented attacks on civilians and civilian objects 40
4.1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 40
4.2. AVDIIVKA 43
4.2.1 Targeted Area 43
4.2.2 Description/Overview Of Attacks 44
4.2.3 Table of Documented Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Objects
in Avdiivka 46
4.2.4 Legal Assessment 52
4.2.5 Conclusion and Recommendations 52
4.3. KRASNOHORIVKA 53
4.3.1. Targeted Area 53
4.3.2. Description/Overview of Attack 53
4.3.3. Table of documented attacks on civilians and civilian objects in
Krasnohorivka 55
4.3.4. Legal Assessment 61
4.3.5 Conclusion 61
4.4. KURDIUMYVKA – ZELENOPILLYA 62
4.4.1. Targeted Area 62
4.4.2 Description/Overview of Attacks 62
4.4.3. Legal Assessment 63
4.4.4. Conclusion 63
4.5. SARTANA 63
4.5.1 Targeted Area 63
4.5.2 Description/Overview of Attack 64
4.5.3 Legal Assessment 64
4.5.4 Conclusion and Recommendations 64
4.6. POPASNA 64
4.6.1 Targeted Area 64
4.6.2 Description/Overview of Attack 65
4.6.3 Legal Assessment 66
4.6.4 Conclusion 66
4.7. TROITSKE 66
4.7.1 Targeted Area 66
4.7.2 Description/Overview of Attack 67
4.7.3 Legal Assessment 67
4.7.4 Conclusion 67
4.8. MARJINKA 68
4.8.1 Targeted Area 68
4.8.2 Description/Overview of Attack 68
4.8.3 Legal Assessment 69
4.8.4 Conclusion 70
4.9. STANYTSIA LUHANSKA – VALUISKE 70
6 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
4.9.1 Targeted Area 70
4.9.2 Description/Overview of Attacks 71
4.9.3 Legal Assessment 72
4.9.4 Conclusion and Recommendations 72
4.10. SVITLODARSK – LUHANSKE 73
4.10.1 Targeted Area 73
4.10.2 Description/Overview of Attacks 73
4.10.3 Legal Assessment 74
4.10.4 Conclusion 74
4.11. OTHER DOCUMENTED ATTACKS 74
4.11.1. Table of other attacks documented by the Authors 75
4.11.2. Table of attacks documented by other organisations 79
4.12. CONCLUSION 83
5. Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other
protected person to render certain points, areas
or military forces immune from military operations 84
5.1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 84
5.2. DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE OF UTILISING CIVILIANS AS ‘HUMAN SHIELDS 85
5.3. CONCLUSION 86
6. Conclusion and request 87
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 7
1. Introduction
1.1 Executive Summary
1. International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) and Truth Hounds (hereinafter, the Authors) present their
latest report – Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure in Eastern Ukraine. The Report sets
forth new evidence of international crimes, perpetrated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and Russianbacked
separatist militias – the so-called Donetsk Peoples’ Republic (DPR) and Luhansk Peoples’ Republic
and complements a Report published by IPHR in October 2015 – Fighting Impunity in Eastern Ukraine
(hereinafter, First Report).1 It focuses on evidence of attacks intentionally or indiscriminately directed at
civilians and/or civilian infrastructure, on the use of civilians as human shields for military operations and
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF).
2. In publishing this Report the Authors aim: (a) to provide the public and Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court (ICC Prosecutor) with evidence of concrete episodes which qualify as war crimes, namely attacks on
civilians and civilian infrastructure and the use of human shields; (b) to demonstrate the widespread nature
of such crimes and their gravity – highlighting that legal requirements for opening a full ICC investigation have
character; (d) to urge the ICC Prosecutor to seek authorisation for opening a full investigation at the earliest
opportunity to ensure accountability and to prevent the loss of key evidence; (e) to preserve key evidence for
future investigations and prosecutions in Ukraine, at the ICC or in other national or international jurisdictions.
3. 43 settlements that lie on the so-called
‘contact line’ – a de facto border between areas controlled by UAF and those controlled by Russian-backed
separatist militias – the so-called DPR and LPR. In the course of these missions, the Authors interviewed 297
witnesses and documented 208 attack impact sites, as well as collecting photographic and video evidence of
damage to civilian infrastructure, impact craters, missile remnants and documentary evidence corroborating
evidence provided by witnesses. The evidence was analysed using the ICC Statute, ICC Elements of Crimes
and applicable jurisprudence.
4. The Report is divided into three substantive sections:
domestic investigations and prosecutions (complementarity).
Section 3 sets forth evidence of cross border attacks and territorial incursions by the AFRF in June - September
2014. The aim of this section is to demonstrate that involvement of Russian artillery and troops render this
satellite imagery and social media posts reveal, to a high degree of probability, that the AFRF conducted
positions on the Russian side of the Russia-Ukraine border. In addition to constituting evidence of direct
AFRF involvement in armed attacks in the documented instances, these attacks constitute circumstantial
DPR separatist forces.
IPHR, ‘New Report: Fighting Impunity in Eastern Ukraine’, 7 Oct. 2015, available at:
impunity-in-eastern-ukraine-20151007.html (last accessed: 28/11/2017).
8 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Section 4 sets forth evidence of attacks on civilians and/or civilian infrastructure by all warring parties from
The attacks have resulted in at least 100 civilian deaths, 162 civilian injuries and hundreds of cases of total
or partial destruction of civilian property and vital infrastructure. These episodes include attacks intentionally
directed at civilians or civilian objects (in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute),
as well as attacks launched against military objectives that lack proportionality between anticipated incidental
harm to civilians/civilian objects/the environment and the military advantage sought (in violation of Article 8(2)
(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute). The Authors also note a disturbing number of attacks perpetrated against schools,
kindergartens and hospitals – amounting to a separate war crime of attacks on medical and educational
facilities under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute.
The impact sites and known military objectives have been mapped by the Authors, and given unique location
reference point. References to locations can be found in the text in this form: (Ln [Number]). The map and all
location reference points may be accessed online at: [truth-hounds.org].
artillery launch sites, military equipment and/or personnel in close proximity to civilians and civilian objects.
In so doing, the warring parties place civilians in serious danger of death and injury, as well as risking the
destruction or severe damage to important civilian infrastructure – in violation of the principle of distinction.
In this section we demonstrate that this practice, in the appropriate circumstances, amounts to a war crime
under Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) or Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the ICC Statute.
5. The Report concludes by drawing the public and ICC Prosecutor’s attention to the seriousness and widespread
nature of the crimes described herein, and requests the ICC Prosecutor to seek authorisation to launch a full
investigation into these and other crimes alleged to have taken place in Ukraine since the outbreak of the
crisis in November 2013.
1.2 The Authors
6.
Brussels. It was founded in 2008 with a mandate to empower local civil society groups and assist them in
making their concerns heard at the international level. IPHR works together with human rights groups from
team members have wide experience in international human rights work and cooperates with human rights
groups from across Europe, Central Asia and North America, helping to prepare publications and conduct
advocacy activities. Since its establishment, IPHR has carried out a series of activities aimed at assisting and
empowering local human rights groups from the Russian Federation, Central Asia and South Caucasus to
7.
Hounds team started its work as a group of activists and human rights defenders in 2008 in Georgia. Our
specialists work in human rights, training and monitoring activities in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Belarus.
The founders were among the initiators of the “Euromaidan-SOS”. In September, 2014 the team started
the Crimea, in the framework of a project of the IPHR. In Georgia, the Truth Hounds team, together with its
partners, runs the Tbilisi Shelter City project – a shelter for human rights activists from the former Soviet
union, which provides a safe environment and counselling to activists and human rights defenders operating
Truth Hounds has worked with the Council of Europe,
European Commission, OSCE/ODIHR, the International Criminal Court, and became a member of the Civic
Solidarity Platform and Coalition for the International Criminal Court.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
1.3 Sources of information and methodology of
documentation
8. The evidence of violations presented in this Report has been empirically documented by the Authors through
To ensure a methodologically consistent documentation process, IPHR developed a tailor made crime
documentation manual and a practical toolbox - the matrix of Documentation of War Crimes in IPHR’s
methodological Documentation Guide.2 The Guide includes detailed description of elements of crimes
obtained through desk research using open-source documents.
9. Investigating attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure requires the completion of several stages
establishing the
material elements of ICC Statute crimes and the linkage evidence to potential perpetrators.
DATA COLLECTION
10. The main form of data collection for the purposes of war crimes documentation is interviewing witnesses and
victims of alleged crimes. To gather witness and supporting evidence, the documentation team travels to the
alleged crime site with the view of identifying victims, witnesses and physical evidence. Witness statements,
conducted in an impartial and open manner, form the bulk of the evidence – an indispensible part of the
as reports from State and quasi-State organs (e.g. statements by representatives of the warring parties, law
enforcement agencies, international monitoring organisations, media reports).
11. The purpose of the interview is to obtain the victim’s most complete answers on the event in question. To
ensure the reliability and credibility of witness evidence, the documentation team resorts to the use of open
questions: i.e. who, what, where, when, why, how and what was the result. The following data is gathered
from every witness:
• Brief description of the interviewee, their occupation, previous occupation, education, workplace and
residence, date of birth and other personal and contact details; timing and location of the incident
with questions aimed at verifying the accuracy, reliability, credibility and sources of knowledge of that
information (e.g. proximity of date of incident to well known public holidays or events; presence of watch
or clock; daily routine; corroborating evidence such as mobile phone data);
• Other contextual data such as the prevailing meteorological conditions, quantity and quality of light,
astronomical events (e.g. position of the moon); verbal description of the location where the incident(s)
representation of the location where the incident occurred (hand-drawn map of the scene);Photo and
video evidence, captured by the respondent or his/her close relatives;
• Location of the interviewee at the time of the events (for establishing accuracy, reliability and credibility
projectile), heard (shots, explosion, whistling, hissing, creaking, rustling), and felt (vibration, oscillation,
direction, from a certain locality, a particular object, “right-left”, etc...);
10 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
• Factors identifying the types of weapons being used, as well as the witness’ own observations and
position in the armed forces, personal experience of modern weaponry, discussions with experts etc);
information on positions, movements and composition of warring parties (including the sources of such
information and factors supporting its credibility and reliability); information on the presence of military
objectives in the vicinity of the targeted area;
• Information on the nature of the targeted area (especially the presence of protected buildings such as
schools and hospitals);
• Information on whether any warning was given and if so, how it was given (e.g. alarm sound, warning
from one of the military sides, alert in the medias, rumours and where did they come from); whether the
• Information about injured civilians as a result of the attack (killed, wounded) and sources of that
information;
•
availability of corroborating evidence (e.g.: notes from doctors concerning injuries and wounds, acts of
State organs on the destruction and damage to facilities).
12. At the end of each interview, the statement is read back to (or by) the interviewee and he or she may
the interview if possible, and signed by the witness. The interviewer and the respondent sign a duplicated
form, which includes information on the potential use of the data and the duty and purposes of interviewing
is not allowed during the interview (or if unavoidable, placed on the record).
IMPACT SITE DOCUMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
13.
is visited by the documentation team. The following documentation and analysis processes are conducted on
site to determine the means and methods of the attack, its provenance as well as its impact on civilian lives
and infrastructure:
• Systematic photo and video recording of the documentation process; taking necessary measurements to
(photo backed by video) or any other information identifying the type of weapon used;
• In order to boost the accuracy, credibility and reliability of documented information, each documenter must:
- Specify the date, place and time of the recording and give their name and the names of
everyone involved in the analysis of the impact site; show a panorama of the scene, in order
e.g.: addresses on buildings, street signs or
unusual objects, etc.);
- Show impact site from the four sides (crosswise) and overall, medium, large and detailed plans;
-
-
was carried and show that the direction on camera; during the documentation and analysis of
impact sites the documenters:
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 11
- U
the direction from which they took the measurements of the crater (ex: width from east to
west);
- Show the dimensions of the entry point of the projectiles;
- Show the dimensions of the remnants left by exploding shells, the extent of damage on the
- Show the dimensions of debris and remnants, if they are present on the site of the incident, the
- Record the symbols and marks on the shells and their residues, if possible;
-
highest degree of accuracy;
- Where possible, record the coordinates of the places of documenting damages (note the GPS
coordinates to mark the place on the map, etc ).
COLLECTING PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
14. Physical evidence such as shell fragments, bullet casings and victims’ possessions damaged in attacks are
gathered by documenters where necessary and possible. Physical evidence is collected to prevent its loss and/
or damage, when documenters determine that its collection is paramount to its preservation. All necessary
measures are taken to maintain a clear and reliable chain of custody for each item collected.
15. Each physical evidence collected is attached to witness statements and other information identifying the
attack in question. Physical evidence is never considered as stand-alone proof.
16. For physical evidence handed to documenters by witnesses, the evidence is separated, placed in a sealed
bag or contained and marked with identifying information including the place, date, circumstances of
collection and contact information of the evidence provider.
17. For physical evidence collected directly by a documenter, the physical act of collecting is recorded on video.
corrosion. Where necessary, the documenters are able to testify in court regarding the evidence, the collection
and storage process and other observations made at the impact site.
DATA ANALYSIS
18. After collection, all data is organised and analysed using the framework of the ICC Statute and Elements of
Crimes. The aims of the process are to (a) obtain the most complete picture of events documented (including
contextual evidence and information on gravity and impact of attacks); (b) determine – to the standard
applicable to preliminary examinations at the ICC – whether the documented evidence reveals the existence
of an ICC Statute crime; and (c) identify gaps in the evidence and potential sources of information for bridging
19. Documenters compare the testimonies of civilian and combatant respondents in relation to the episode
independently from one another and compare the data that they have reported. In the event that the
acceptable level of consistency, the issue is considered documented. In the alternative, further investigative
steps are sought.
20. All impact sites are marked on the map, after which the intensity, provenance, means and methods of the
attack are determined using the documented data, allowing a preliminary conclusion as to the likely origin of
the attack, and the types of weapons used.
12 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
21. Based on the documented evidence, a determination is made on the harm caused to civilians and civilian
infrastructure, its extent and gravity.
22. The ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes are used to determine whether a crime has taken place. This analysis
an evaluation of the parties military necessity and actual or potential military advantage, and any evidence
23. Linkage evidence is analysed to determine those responsible by identifying the likely warring party responsible
units.
DATA VERIFICATION
24.
25.
installations and launch sites that correspond to the documented evidence and analysis.
26. Analysis of photos, videos and publications on the Internet and social networks posted by eyewitnesses of
the events.
27. Publications on the Internet and social media (photos, videos, posts) that were made by potential perpetrators
of the documented attacks.
28.
monitors (OSCE SMM, Ukraine-Russia Observation Mission), which checks data collected by documenters in
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 13
2.
November 2017
29. In Section 2 of the First Report, the Authors provided an overview of the Ukraine crisis from November
2013 to September 2015. The purpose of this section is to update the public and the ICC Prosecutor on
to provide an exhaustive account of all military action, but rather to provide an overview of events that have
Ukraine.
30. Since September 2015, the warring parties have made little or no concrete territorial acquisitions.3 The
contact line – a 480km stretch between the UAF on one hand, and the DPR and LPR on the other – has
become a de facto border. Civilians crossed this line a recorded 8,565 million times in 2016 (a two-fold
in Luhansk Province.4
31. The vast majority of military action and attacks on civilians have taken place in settlements lying directly on
characterised by intermittent artillery and mortar shelling across the contact line, mining and booby-trapping
(discussed below).
32. A full spectrum of weaponry has been employed by all parties during the documented period, ranging
inaccurate MLRS ‘Grad’. No cross-border artillery attacks from the territory of the Russian Federation have
been documented for this period, although there is substantial evidence of Russian troops, advisers, weapons
and logistical support on the territory held by separatist forces.
33. On 29 September 2015, representatives from Russia, Ukraine and pro-Russia separatist groups agreed to ‘the
withdrawal of tanks, mortars and artillery of less than 100 millimetre calibre to a distance of 15 kilometres’.5
On 1 October 2015, the leader of the DPR – Alexandr Zakharchenko – announced that separatist forces
before.6 Further talks were held in Paris and a new timetable was set for troop and equipment pullback.7
UAF and separatist forces announced the gradual withdrawal of the agreed weapons, although skirmishes
involving small arms, mortars and artillery continued on a daily basis.8
The only settlements known to have changed hands during the period of documentation are the villages of Vodianoe,
Hovoluhanskoe and Kominternove in Donetsk Province.
https://www.foundation101.org/
en/news/20170202 (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
Radio Free Europe, ‘Ukraine, Russian-backed rebels agree to withdraw weapons’, 30 Sept. 2015, available at: https://www.rferl.
org/a/ukraine-russian-backed-rebels-agree-withdraw-weapons/27278407.html (last accessed: 21/11/2017).
https://ria.ru/
world/20151001/1294481328.html (last accessed: 21/11/2017).
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/
ukraine-warring-sides-pullback-weapons-151003095557859.html (last accessed: 21/11/2017).
Radio Free Europe, ‘Ukrainian forces, rebels pull back tanks in Donetsk’, 20 Oct. 2015, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/
ukraine-forces-rebels-pull-back-tanks-in-donetsk/27316997.html (last accessed: 21/11/2017); Information Analysis Centre,
http://mediarnbo.org/2015/10/23/zvedenidani-
shhodo-situatsiyi-v-zoni-ato-23-zhovtnya/
https://novorossia.su/news/
(last accessed: 21/11/2017).
14 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
34.
made Buk missile.9
Russian Special Forces units stationed in eastern Ukraine were redeployed to Syria.10 On 26 November 2015,
Ukrainian border guards detained two AFRF members who claimed to have walked onto Ukrainian territory
‘by accident’.11 On 2 December, NATO’s Supreme Commander opined that ‘Russia is completely in control of
what is happening on the line of contact and they will use that in the future’.12 In his annual press conference
in eastern Ukraine, but denied that this equated to the presence of regular troops.13
35. On 22 December 2015, the village of Kominternove – 24km east of Mariupol – was captured by DPR forces
using tanks, armoured personnel carriers and mortar rounds.14
have been reached in Minsk on the same day for the duration of the festive period.15 The agreement was
immediately violated.1617 A
in Minsk on 2 March 2016.18 On 9 March 2016, the AFRF held large-scale military exercises involving 8500
combatants, ships and aircraft in the vicinity of its southern border with Ukraine.19 From 17 April 2016, active
from LPR positions.20
36. By 26 July 2016, the OSCE had lost all three of its surveillance drones – each one shot down over separatist-
BBC, ‘MH17 Ukraine disaster: Dutch Safety Board blames missile’, 13 Oct. 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-
34511973 (last accessed: 21/11/2017).
https://
www.wsj.com/articles/russia-said-to-redeploy-special-ops-forces-from-ukraine-to-syria-1445636834 (last accessed: 23/11/2017);
Fox News, ‘Russia said to redeploy special-ops forces from Ukraine to Syria’, 25 Oct. 2015, available at: http://www.foxnews.
com/world/2015/10/24/russia-said-to-redeploy-special-ops-forces-from-ukraine-to-syria.html (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
http://
mediarnbo.org/2015/11/27/svodnyie-dannyie-po-situatsii-v-zone-ato-27-noyabrya/?lang=ru (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-nato/russia-unlikely-to-meet-ukraine-peace-deal-deadline-nato-says-idUSKBN0TL1FA20151202 (last
accessed: 23/11/2017).
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/dec/17/vladimir-putins-annual-press-conference-live (last accessed:
23/11/2017).
https://www.0629.com.ua/
news/1069272 (last accessed: 23/11/2017); Unian, ‘Creeping Russian occupation: OSCE reports no access to Kominternove’,
23 Dec. 2015, available at: https://www.unian.info/war/1220937-creeping-russian-occupation-osce-reports-no-access-tokominternove.
html (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
https://
(last accessed:
23/11/2017).
http://
mediarnbo.org/2015/12/24/operativnaya-svodka-shtaba-ato-na-06-00-24-dekabrya/?lang=ru (last accessed: 23/11/2017) –
Jan. 2016, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/216561 (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
2015, available at: https://www.unian.net/war/1282020-v-genshtabe-rasskazali-o-dokumentah-podpisannyih-kontaktnoy-gruppoyv-
minske-2-marta-video.html (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-
35532842 (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
2016’, 20 April 2016, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/235136 (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 15
controlled territory – leaving it without long-range aerial surveillance capabilities.21 By August 2016, hostilities
a return to all-out war.22 A closed-door meeting was held at the UN Security Council on 11 August 2016
to discuss mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine, particularly in light of Russia’s allegations that
Ukraine carried out shelling and incursions into Crimea.23
37. 24
after Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko announced constitutional amendments granting autonomy to
eastern Ukraine. This was followed by a statement from the German Foreign Minister that the truce would
25
38. A major battle erupted in and around Svitlodarsk in Donetsk Province between 18 December 2016 and 22
that UAF positions were shelled from LPR artillery in Vuhlehirsk and Debaltseve,26 whilst the UAF is reported
to have shelled the LPR-controlled village of Kalynivka.27 The OSCE recorded the use of MLRS on the night
of 21 December.28
29
39. Another major battle took place between UAF and DPR forces in January and February 2017, in and around
Avdiivka in Donetsk Province. The battle coincided with US President Trump’s inauguration, and appears
to have been a tussle for control over a stretch of major highway connecting rebel-held Donetsk City with
Horlivka.30
and over 100 wounded combatants and civilians. A detailed description of the battle and associated civilian
casualties is set forth in Section 4.2 below.
40. In February 2017, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed an executive order recognising civil registration
documents issued in separatist-held areas of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities claim that this is a
violation of the Minsk agreements.31 Semen Semenchenko, a Ukrainian war veteran and MP who organised
a trade blockade between Ukraine and separatist-held territories, claimed to have stopped 16,000 train
https://www.wsj.com/articles/
keeping-an-international-eye-on-ukraine-1471376541 (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
at: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-fears-of-full-scale-war-as-casualties-mount/27910909.html (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37074732
(last accessed: 24/11/2017).
http://
html (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
https://www.rferl.org/a/
ukraine-french-german-ministers-peace-deal/27988422.html (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20161220221743/http://uatoday.tv/society/bloodiest-battle-in-5-months-ukrainiantroops-
repel-3-militant-attacks-near-svitlodarsk-849788.html (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
http://tass.com/world/920335
(last accessed: 23/11/2017).
December 2016’, 23 Dec. 2016, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/291076 (last accessed: 28/11/17).
https://www.
kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/least-22-ukrainian-soldiers-killed-russias-war-december-january.html (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/avdiivka-frontline-ukraine-war-russia-backed-separatists (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-documents/putin-orders-russia-to-recognize-documents-issued-in-rebel-held-eastukraine-
idUSKBN15X0KR (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
16 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
32 In response, DPR leader Zakharchenko announced a blockade of
all trade from Ukraine and the nationalisation of all private companies on DPR-controlled territory.33
41.
were injured in a suspected mine explosion.34
for the harvest season from 24 June 2017 to the end of August.35 Though there was a reported drop in the
which led to civilian casualties.36
42.
Ukraine from 16 August to 15 November 2015.37 Between 16 November 2015 and 15 February 2016, OHCHR
began.38 For 39
40 Between 16 August and 15 November
2017,41 193 casualties for 16 February to 15 May 2017,42 and 161 civilian casualties from 16 May to 15 August
2017.43 This brings the total of civilian casualties for the documented period to 1205. The total number of
comprising at least 2,505 civilians. The total number of people injured is 24,541, with an estimated 7,000-
9,000 of those being civilians.44
43.
45 This
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/404240.html (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
https://economics.unian.info/1806906-zakharchenko-burning-bridges-declares-own-trade-blockade-of-govt-controlled-areas.html
(last accessed: 24/11/2017).
April 2017, available at: http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/312971 (last accessed: 28/11/17).
http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), para. 22.
July 2017’, 20 July 2017, available at: http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/330981 (last accessed: 28/11/17).
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/12thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf (last accessed: 23/11/2017), para 26. N.B.: casualty
at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdf (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_14th_HRMMU_Report.pdf (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport15th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport17th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport18th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 23/11/2017), para. 32.
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 23/11/2017), paras. 34-36.
https://www.unicef.
org/infobycountry/ukraine_100889.html (last accessed: 28/11/17).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 17
46 some of whom are unaccompanied.47 Many internally displaced persons
(IDPs) are unable to return safely to their homes because the security situation continues to be volatile.
44.
housing.48
contact line.4950 the UN considers some of
these security checkpoints to be unsafe due to extreme temperatures, a lack of sanitation facilities and the
presence of mines – especially for persons with disabilities, the elderly, children and women.51 On 27 April
2016, shelling at a transport corridor killed four civilians and injured at least eight.52
45. 28,000 children living in
the settlements along the contact line,53 who are at risk of being killed and injured by attacks and mines,54
55
of contact with unexploded mines.56
children; 6 cases of illegal detention with the use of torture; 8 cases of child death and 19 of injury caused by
indiscriminate attacks on civilian objects; attacks on 79 educational institutions in 34 settlements of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.57
46. Many
continue to engage in hostilities from residential areas, placing military objectives near facilities necessary
https://www.unicef.
org/infobycountry/ukraine_100889.html (last accessed: 28/11/17).
within communities’, 26 Aug. 2016, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261176?download=true (last accessed:
28/11/17), pp. 9-10.
within communities’, 26 Aug. 2016, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261176?download=true (last accessed:
28/11/17), pp. 11, 15.
within communities’, 26 Aug. 2016, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261176?download=true (last accessed:
28/11/17), pp. 5, 21; OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017’, 15
March 2017, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport17th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), para.
11.
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
300276?download=true (last accessed: 28/11/17), p. 3.
http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), para. 91; OHCHR, ‘Report on the
human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017’, 15 March 2017, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport17th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), para. 11.
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_14th_HRMMU_Report.pdf (last accessed: 29/11/17), para. 86.
https://
www.unicef.org/eca/media_28678.html (last accessed: 28/11/17) - in 2015 more than 20 children were killed and 40 injured due
https://www.
unicef.org/ukraine/Children_of_the_Contact_Line.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), pp. 8-9.
https://
www.unicef.org/eca/media_28678.html (last accessed: 28/11/17).
http://truth-hounds.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
Zvit2017_rus_m1.pdf (last accessed 02/12/2017).
18 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
for the survival of the civilian population (see Section 5).58 Facilities such as hospitals, schools and water
treatment plants have taken direct hits from shelling.59
47.
The Donetsk water treatment plant, which provided clean water to over 600,000 people on both sides of
60 In June 2017,
shelling of a water pumping station meant that 400,000 people had their water supply interrupted for up to
10 days.61 It is also alleged that separatist groups have purposefully restricted access to water for residents
of Government-controlled areas.62
their ability to cook and store food, as well as heat and light their homes.63 For some this situation has lasted
since summer 2014.64 Certain neighbourhoods have been without electricity for long periods of time during
65
48. Access to medical care is restricted. Some medical facilities hit by shells continue to be too damaged for use,
while others are limited to only providing emergency care.66 The DPR and LPR have prevented international
humanitarian aid organisations from entering areas under their control, further restricting the availability of
medical supplies.67 A shortage of medicines, fuel and clean water puts civilians at risk of disease – 19 years
68
49. Very little progress, if any, has been achieved by Ukrainian prosecutors in bringing those responsible for
69
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-missionto-
ukraine/342121?download=true (last accessed: 29/11/17), p. 16; OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16
May to 15 August 2017’, 12 Sept. 2017, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last
accessed: 28/11/17), para. 28.
http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-missionto-
ukraine/342121?download=true (last accessed: 29/11/17), p. 16; OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16
May to 15 August 2017’, 12 Sept. 2017, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last
accessed: 28/11/17), paras. 28-29.
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
300276?download=true (last accessed: 28/11/17), p. 11.
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport19th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), para. 29.
http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_14th_HRMMU_Report.pdf (last accessed: 29/11/17), para. 15.
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
300276?download=true (last accessed: 28/11/17), p. 12.
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
300276?download=true (last accessed: 28/11/17), p. 12.
http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport16th_EN.pdf (last accessed: 28/11/17), para. 18.
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
300276?download=true (last accessed: 28/11/17), p. 14.
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
300276?download=true (last accessed: 28/11/17), p. 14; OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16
February to 15 May 2016’, 3 June 2016, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_14th_HRMMU_
Report.pdf (last accessed: 29/11/17), para. 6.
https://www.unicef.org/
eca/media_28678.html (last accessed: 28/11/17).
http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54455#.WfDMVBNSy9Y (last accessed: 23/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
3. Evidence of cross-border attacks by
Russian armed forces supporting the
existence of an international armed
50. All allegations of war crimes within the framework of the ICC Statute must demonstrate that the alleged
70 The
take place on the same territory,71 72 Thus, framing
between a State and armed opposition groups may be ‘internationalised’ through the direct intervention of
another State’s troops, an occupation or as a result of the overall control of an opposition force by another
State.73 The latter requires the foreign State to play a role in ‘organising, coordinating or planning the military
to that group’.74
51. existed on the
territory.
52. The aim of this section is to present further evidence in support of the existence of an IAC between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine. Credible and corroborated evidence documented and analysed by the
case for the existence of an IAC.75 Witness statements, artillery remnants and impact data, satellite imagery
of probability, that AFRF conducted cross-border attacks on Ukrainian territory in Luhansk Province from
July to September 2014. In addition to constituting evidence of direct AFRF involvement in armed attacks in
the documented instances, these attacks constitute circumstantial evidence of Russia’s involvement in the
this information will assist the ICC Prosecutor with the application of the correct legal framework to and the
attribution of responsibility for attacks described in the Authors’ Reports as well as war crimes documented
by other entities.
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009,
ICC- 01/04-01/06, Lubanga, Judgment, 14 March2012, para. 541.
Lubanga, Judgment,14 March2012, para. 541; ICC-01/04-01/07- 3436, Katanga, Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 1178.
para 84.
20 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
53. To demonstrate that documented evidence raises a reasonable basis to believe in Russia’s direct engagement
in cross-border attacks, the Authors present the political and military context of the attacks, evidence of AFRF
mobilisation and camp build-ups, detailed account of attacks with supporting evidence and analysis of their
provenance, as well as evidence of territorial incursions by AFRF collected by other organisations.
3.1 Context: AFRF occupation of Crimea and Ukrainian
counter-insurgency
54.
from March 2014 to September 2015. Here, the Authors’ aim is to draw the ICC Prosecutor’s attention to key
events that took place in the run up to the documented cross-border attacks, which reveal the context of
and likely motive for such attacks.
55. On 1 March 2014, following the covert extraction of Ukraine’s President Yanukovych by Russian special
forces,76 the Russian Parliament approved President Putin’s request to use military force in Ukraine.77 On the
same day, AFRF were deployed on Ukraine’s sovereign territory on the Crimean Peninsula and on 21 March
2014, the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol were annexed by the Russian
Federation in violation of UN Charter.78 On 22 March 2014, Crimea’s de facto premier Sergei Aksyonov issued
a call to arms to the people of southern and eastern Ukraine in a video released on YouTube.79
56. In April 2014, separatist forces began to seise control of administrative and security buildings across eastern
Ukraine in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Sloviansk, Horlivka and Kramatorsk, calling for independence from
Ukraine.80
Luhanska, Lysychansk Popasna, Marjinka, Savur-Mohyla, Debaltseve and other smaller towns in Donetsk
https://russia.tv/brand/show/brand_id/59195/ (last accessed:
12/06/2016); See also: BBC, “Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia’s Crimea Takeover Plot”, 9 March 2015, available at: http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 (last accessed: 20/04/2016). Also note, On 20 February 2014, whilst on a visit to
Moscow, Speaker of the Supreme Council of Crimea, Vladimir Konstantinov, announced that a worsening of the situation in
20 February 2014, available at: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/20/7015117/ (last accessed: 31/05/2016).
http://www.council.gov.ru/activity/legislation/decisions/39979/ (last accessed: 12/06/2016);
available at: https://lenta.ru/articles/2014/03/13/sovet/ (last accessed: 20/04/2016).
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_
LAW_160618/19bbbbfa6e5a06c0d9e8d958af6464287880b069/ (last accessed: 07/05/2016); BBC, “Ukraine: Putin signs Crimea
annexation”, 21 March 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26686949 (last accessed: 02/06/2016).
https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bZ4TSlE8Zs0 (last accessed: 21/06/2016); For full analysis of the annexation of Crimea and related international
crimes, please see First Report.
Luhansk districts continued to cause concerns owing to the observed presence of masked individuals in several towns of the
region, occupying several administrative buildings’, citing the towns of Kharkiv, Luhanks, Donetsk, Yenakiyeve, Debaltseve,
Horlivka, Mariupol) available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140419044139/http://www.osce.org/ukrainemonitoring/117777;
OSCE, ‘Latest from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - based on information received up until 23 April 2014, 19:00’, 24
April 2014 (citing above towns, as well as Sloviansk), available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117995; UNHRC, ‘Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine’, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/75,
and towns across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions’) available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/27/75
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 21
and Luhansk Provinces.81
on 17 July,82 UAF and pro-Kyiv proxy paramilitary groups began to close in on the cities of Luhansk and
Donetsk,83 prompting Donetsk separatist commander Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov) to call for a Russian military
intervention.84
57. It is crucial to set the cross-border attacks described below in their proper context. By mid-August 2014 an
AFRF incursion had successfully occupied and annexed the Ukrainian territories of Crimea and Sevastopol.
Meanwhile, pro-Russian separatist militias in Luhansk and Donetsk Provinces, facing a robust counterinsurgency
by the UAF, were in rapid retreat to the Russian border. By 19 August 2014, an end to the
separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine appeared imminent and multiple calls for military assistance were
made by the separatist leadership.85
(Kyiv time)’, (‘Severodonetsk… was retaken by the Ukrainian army’), available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/122077;
OSCE, ‘Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) based on information received as of 18:00hrs, 30 July
2014 (Kyiv time)’, 31 July 2014 (‘[R]egional administration’ in charge at Lysychansk), available at: http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
122145; UNHRC, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights
in Ukraine’, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/75, 19 Sep. 2014, para. 17 (‘As of 30 July 2014, “safe corridors”, unilaterally established by the
Ukrainian forces, have enabled people to leave the cities of Donetsk, Horlivka and Luhansk’) available at: http://ap.ohchr.
org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/27/75 ; Bellingcat, ‘Origin of artillery attacks on Ukrainian military positions in Eastern
Ukraine between 14 July 2014 and 8 August 2014’, 17 Feb. 2015, p. 2 (Map from National Security and Defense Council
of Ukraine showing UAF control over settlements) available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
July 2014, which led to regained control over Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, and other towns and villages in the northern part of the
Donetsk region’), available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/russia_s_path_s__to_war.pdf; (‘[T]he pro-
Russia militias under the command of Igor Girkin aka Strelkov retreated to Donetsk from the cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk,
Kostyantynivka, Artemivsk and Debaltseve.’), available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/jaroslav-koshiw/donetskseparatists-
in-dispute%E2%80%93khodakovsky-vs-strelkov
(interim results of the JIT criminal investigation presented at a conference on 28 Sep. 2016 suggest that the BUK missile that
up a list of 100 suspects, from evidence that includes intercepted phone calls), available at: https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/
; See also Bellingcat report, ‘MH17: Source of the Separatist’s Buk’, 9 Nov. 2014,
(presenting evidence that ‘separatists transported [the] Buk missile system through their territory on July 17’), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20141109132619/https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Origin-of-the-Separatists-
Buk-A-Bellingcat-Investigation1.pdf
forces have tightened their blockades around the main strongholds of the armed groups – the cities of Luhansk, Donetsk
and to a lesser extent Horlivka’), available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UkraineReport28August2014.pdf
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-rebels-military-situation-frustration-strelkov/26522352.html (last accessed: 1/11/2017).
https://www.thestar.
com/news/world/2014/08/03/prorussia_rebels_plead_for_troops_as_ukrainian_army_advances.html; Open Democracy, ‘Donetsk
separatists in dispute – Khodakovsky vs Strelkov’, 11 Aug. 2014, (‘[Leaders of the separatist movement] have repeatedly
appealed to President Putin for Russia to intervene directly’), available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/jaroslavkoshiw/
donetsk-separatists-in-dispute%E2%80%93khodakovsky-vs-strelkov; Reuters, ‘Some Ukrainian rebels vent frustration with
Putin’, 20 July 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-rebels/some-ukrainian-rebels-vent-frustrationwith-
putin-idUKKBN0FZ1ME20140730 (last accessed: 1/11/2017).
22 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
April 2014 map – each mark shows town targeted by separatists
July 2014 map – rebel held territory at time of MH17.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 23
3.2 AFRF mobilisation to the Russia-Ukraine border
58. AFRF troops and heavy artillery units began to mobilise on the Russia-Ukraine border during the Euromaidan
protests.86 On 26 February 2014, President Putin ordered 150,000 troops stationed in Western Russia to
be put on alert.87 On 24 March 2014, the Kremlin ordered large-scale military exercises on the Ukrainian
border.88 Comparative analysis of satellite imagery conducted by the Authors, Bellingcat89 and the Atlantic
Council90 clearly demonstrates heightened AFRF activity, camp build-ups and heavy artillery manoeuvres in
strategic locations along the border. Analysis of social media content and geo-tagging posts by AFRF soldiers
91 Witnesses testify to seeing and hearing
92
All evidence points to the mobilisation of a large invasion force and the existence of heavy artillery launch
sites on the Russian side of the border.
AFRF TROOP BUILD-UP, CAMPS AND SUSPECTED ARTILLERY LAUNCH SITES
59. Witness evidence and analysis of satellite imagery of the Russia-Ukraine border reveal a rapid and
unprecedented appearance of clusters of military infrastructure and equipment in the Rostov Region of
or moving in the direction of Ukraine can be clearly seen on the images, as can tracks consistent with those
60. Furthermore, by analysing the content and geo-location data of social media posts by AFRF soldiers, the
Authors are able to conclude that a large combat force, made up of specialised attacking units from various
parts of Russia, was mobilised to the Russia-Ukraine border in the summer and autumn of 2014. The Authors’
analysis reveals the presence of personnel from the following military units (m/u) mobilised to the Russia-
Ukraine border in the vicinity of Luhansk Province: m/u 30683 (288th artillery brigade based in Mulino City in
93 Images posted by
representations. December 2013 - January 2014: Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea
referendum invalid’, 27 March 2014, (‘Russian troops and armored vehicles were deployed in February [to Crimea]’), available
at: http://www.un.org.ua/en/information-centre/news/1772-2013-12-05-17-51-07; NATO, ‘North Atlantic Council statement on the
situation in Ukraine’, 2 March 2014, (‘The North Atlantic Council condemns the Russian Federation’s military escalation in
Crimea’), available at: ; The New York Times, ‘Russian troops mass
at border with Ukraine’, 13 March 2014, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/europe/ukraine.html
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tension-in-crimea-as-pro-russia-and-pro-ukraine-groups-stage-competing-rallies/
article17110382/#dashboard/follows/?cmpid=tgc
in Ukraine’s Crimea region”, 27 February 2014, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/26/world/europe/ukraine-politics/ (last
accessed: 31/05/2016).
http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10785386/Vladimir-Putin-orders-military-exercise-on-Ukraine-border-afterkillings.
html (last accessed: 26/07/2017).
at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/06/15/9629/
available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf
16, 23, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf
30683, 11659, 54164, 73582, 02511, 54046, 31135, 45767, 31134, 64055, 12128).
24 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
border.94
Map of area identifying locations of all of the below sites.
61. The Authors have documented the following AFRF camps and suspected artillery launch sites:
• Manotskyy settlement site – Located at a distance of 500-1000 meters from the Russia-Ukraine
border,95
artillery and for launching drone reconnaissance missions in August 2014.96 Ukrainian border guards
6 September 2014
these locations and retreating after each attack.97 Witnesses describe hearing sounds and seeing
smoke and dust emanating from these positions, consistent with those made by MLRS-carrying
the end of August.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 25
attacks onto Ukrainian territory from these positions.98 This testimony is corroborated by comparing
satellite imagery of this location before and after the period of suspected cross-border attacks -
satellite images taken on 6 September 2014.99 No such traces are visible on images from 17 July
2014.100
No traces are visible on satellite images taken on 17 July 2014
• Patronovka village site – Located at a distance of 1.3km from the Russia-Ukraine border;101 this
taken on 6 September 2014 shows military infrastructure and a large number of heavy-vehicle tracks
consistent with movement and manoeuvres of artillery-carrying vehicles, as well as the presence
of Makarovo and Stanytsia Luhanska located at a distance of 15km and 17km respectively) and a
command machine. No such tracks are visible on images taken on 17 July 2014.102
Four self-propelled howitzers MSTA-S and a command machine, and numerous traces. Image taken on 06 September 2014
25/07/2014, 48037’53’’ N 390 42’36’’ E
26 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
No traces or vehicle presence. Image taken on 17 July 2014
• Duby village site – Located at a distance of 12 km from the Russia-Ukraine border,103 this site
appears to have served as a large military camp and artillery launch site. Satellite imagery taken on 6
September 2014 shows military infrastructure, approximately 40 covered trucks inside the camp and
military equipment scattered around the camp on the edge of the woods to the south and east of
the camp.104
of 25km105) are visible on the satellite image from 25 July 2014.106 This information is corroborated by
area.107 Approximately 200 metres south-south-west of these units another eight military vehicles are
http://wartools.ru/sau-russia/sau-msta-s-2s19 (last
accessed: 15/11/2017).
Image taken on 06 September 2014
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 27
visible of which at least that resemble MLRS (known maximum target range of 40km) carriers.108 All
of Herasymivka located some 18.5 km away).109 The same satellite image also captured a moving
column of self-propelled 2S3 ‘Acacia’ artillery vehicles (known maximum target range 18.5 – 25km110)
111
Image taken on 25 July 2014
• Tree farm site next to Derkul village – Located at a distance of 0,76km from the Russian-Ukrainian
border.112 According to one witness, the site was used as an artillery launch site.113
• Site on Russian bank of the Siversky Donets River - Located at a distance of 1.75km from the
Russian-Ukrainian border.114 According to one witness, the site was used as a launch site for MRLS
BM-21 ‘Grad’ missiles (target range 20-45km) aimed at Ukrainian positions in and around the village
of Kolesnykivka.115
62.
border from April 2014,116 and it has been suggested that this was more than a regular military exercise.117
that it need[ed] to have an incursion into Ukraine.’118 The following AFRF sites have been documented based
on high-resolution satellite imagery analysis:
http://wartools.ru/sau-russia/sau-akatsiya-2s3 (last accessed:
01/12/17)
29 April 2014, p. 1, available at: http://www.osce.org/pc/118340?download=true
on the border With Ukraine’, FSC-PC.DEL/9/14, 8 April 2014, p. 1, available at: http://www.osce.org/fsc/117341?download=true
on the border With Ukraine’, FSC-PC.DEL/9/14, 8 April 2014, p. 1, available at: http://www.osce.org/fsc/117341?download=true
28 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
• Site in region surrounding Belgorod - Located at a distance of less than 40km from the Russian-
Ukrainian border.119 High-resolution satellite images taken on 22 and 26 March show military vehicles
120
• Site in area surrounding Novocherkassk city - Located at a distance of 50km from the Russian-
Ukrainian border.121
contained military equipment including vehicles, tents, and logistics equipment by 27 March. Tracks
and artillery pieces are also visible in the satellite images.122
• Seleznev village site - Located at a distance of 750m from the Russian-Ukrainian border.123 Satellite
imagery taken on 16 July of craters left behind after artillery attacks in the Ukraine territory of Amvrosiivka
suggests this was used an artillery launch site, and that these strikes were carried out by BM-21 Grad or
9K51M Tornado-G MLRS.124
• Pavlovka site - Located at a distance of 2km from the Russian-Ukrainian border,125 satellite imagery
taken on 16 July show this site was used to stage artillery attacks in Ukraine territory.126 The 7th Airborne
Division Unit 54801 was deployed to the Pavlovka base in June.127
• Site near Gukovo - Located at a distance of approximately 5km from the Russian-Ukrainian border.128
and Human Rights Project, Satellite imagery of the crisis in Ukraine, Part II: Border deployments (Washington: American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2014), p. 10, available at:
Deployments.pdf
of the crisis in Ukraine, Part II: Border deployments (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science,
2014), (Corroborating images and statements released by NATO that are no longer on the NATO website), pp. 9-10, available
at:
and Human Rights Project, Satellite imagery of the crisis in Ukraine, Part II: Border deployments (Washington: American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2014), p. 11, available at:
Deployments.pdf
of the crisis in Ukraine, Part II: Border deployments (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science,
2014), pp. 11-12, (Corroborating images and statements released by NATO that are no longer on the NATO website), available
at:
(Washington: Atlantic Council, 2015), p. 29, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_
Sight/HPS_English.pdf
29, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf; Bellingcat, ‘Origin of
artillery attacks on Ukrainian military positions in Eastern Ukraine between 14 July 2014 and 8 August 2014’, 17 Feb. 2015, pp.
5-9, available at:
(Washington: Atlantic Council, 2015), p. 23, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_
Sight/HPS_English.pdf
2014’, 17 Feb. 2015, p. 16, available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/bellingcat_-_origin_of_artillery_
23, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf
Ukraine between 14 July 2014 and 8 August 2014’, 17 Feb. 2015, p. 15, available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
Satellite imagery taken on 8 August of craters left behind after artillery attacks on Ukrainian territory, as
well as social media videos that have been geo-located, show that attacks by MLRSs took place.129
• Site near Kuzminsky town - Located at a distance of 46km from the Russian-Ukrainian border,130
satellite imagery and social media pictures show that hundreds of military vehicles were stationed here,
5 April, as evidenced by a large encampment of tents, trucks, and armoured vehicles,131 while the 5th Tank
Brigade was stationed here in October and November. This camp held hundreds of soldiers.132
• Kuybyshevo site - Located at a distance of 3km from the Russian-Ukrainian border,133 this site was
a large base for heavy artillery and served as a base for artillery strikes on Ukrainian territory in July
Department.134
AFRF TERRITORIAL INCURSIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
63. Witnesses observed territorial incursions by unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (drones) and AFRF military
helicopters in what appear to be reconnaissance missions into Ukrainian airspace prior to and following crossborder
attacks. A Ukrainian border guard stationed in the ‘Mountain’ camp, in the vicinity of Kolesnikovke
settlement, recalls seeing drones launched onto Ukrainian territory by AFRF personnel from the outskirts
of Manotskyy settlement in Russia throughout the shelling campaign.135 Local residents of Kolesnikovke
136 Witnesses also
observed Mi-24 and Mi-8 assault helicopters with Russian military insignia crossing into Ukrainian airspace
on 2 August 2014.137
64. Other organisations have documented AFRF territorial incursions for the purpose of reconnaissance,
including incursions by ground forces. On 25 August 2014, ten soldiers in green military uniforms with white
Ukrainian territory while conducting exercises at the border.138
65. According to NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen, on 14 August 2014 a convoy of twenty armoured
18-19, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf
(Washington: Atlantic Council, 2015), p. 11, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_
Sight/HPS_English.pdf
of the crisis in Ukraine, Part II: Border deployments (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science,
2014), pp. 13-14 (Corroborating images and statements released by NATO that are no longer on the NATO website), available
at:
13, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf
(Washington: Atlantic Council, 2015), p. 23, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_
Sight/HPS_English.pdf
pp. 23-24, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf
http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-
28934213
30 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Ukraine, while the Russian Defence Ministry denied the existence of any such convoy.139
66. Between 22 and 27 August 2014, Russian artillery, personnel, and what Russia called a “humanitarian convoy”
were reported to have crossed the border into Ukrainian territory without the permission of the Ukrainian
government. Crossings were reported to have occurred both in areas under the control of pro-Russian
forces and areas that were not under their control, such as the south eastern part of Donetsk Region, near
140
67. On 8 November 2014, OSCE monitors reported that there were large movements of unmarked heavy
equipment in separatist-held territory. These movements included armoured personnel carriers, lorries,
petrol tankers, and tanks, which were being manned and escorted by men in dark green uniforms without
insignias.141 On 12 November, NATO commander Gen Philip Breedlove stated that Russian military equipment
and Russian combat troops had been seen entering Ukraine in columns over several days.142
68. Bellingcat reports that on 29 August, Russian soldiers from m/u 54096 of the 6th Tank Brigade were involved
th Tank Brigade were
damaged or destroyed by Ukrainian forces and were photographed afterwards; markings on the tanks identify
them clearly as AFRF military vehicles. Russian servicemen of the 6th Tank Brigade also posted photographs of
themselves by a sign for the Ukrainian village Chervonosil’skoe, near Ilovaysk.143
69. Unlawful territorial incursions and reconnaissance missions by AFRF troops and unmanned aircraft further
CONCLUSION
70. AFRF troop mobilisations, camp build-ups and active artillery launch sites on the Russia-Ukraine border are
above and beyond what is considered ‘normal’ activity on the border of a neighbouring State. AFRF territorial
incursions and reconnaissance missions constitute an outright violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and
national sovereignty. Moreover, such activities documented in summer and autumn 2014 had no precedent
in the region prior to the Euromaidan events. These activities cannot be interpreted as anything other than
the deployment of a large-scale invasion force with heavy artillery cover from launch sites in the vicinity of the
Russia-Ukraine border. This deployment supports the claim of AFRF’s orchestration of and direct involvement
https://www.reuters.com/
article/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-chief/nato-saw-russian-incursion-into-ukraine-rasmussen-idUKKBN0GF12V20140815; RT News,
‘Russian Defense Ministry Denies Reports Military Column Crossed into Ukraine’, (15 Aug. 2014), available at: https://www.
rt.com/news/180584-border-russian-military-troops/
http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-
28892525; The New York Times, ‘Ukraine reports Russian invasion on a new front’, 27 Aug. 2014, (‘Andriy Lysenko, a
spokesman for the Ukrainian military in Kiev, said the Russian armored column entered the town of Amvrosiyivka, south of
Donetsk’), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html ; Bellingcat,
at: https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/russia_s_path_s__to_war.pdf (last accessed: 15/11/2017).
http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126483 (last accessed: 1/11/2017).
http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/russian-tanks-troops-crossing-into-ukraine-nato-supreme-commander (last accessed:
25.08.2017).
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/09/22/russias-6th-tank-brigade/ (last accessed 15/11/2017); Bellingcat,
‘Russia’s 6th Tank Brigade: The dead, the captured, and the destroyed tanks (Pt. 2)’, 29 Sep. 2014, available at: https://www.
bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/09/29/russias-6th-tank-brigade-pt-2/ (last accessed: 15/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 31
3.3 Documented cross-border attacks
71. The Authors have documented cross-border attacks on Ukrainian settlements of Kolesnykivka, Komyshne,
Yuhanovka, Milovne, Krasna Talivka, Dmytrivka and Pobieda in Luhansk Province from June to September
2014. Based on documented evidence, there is a reasonable basis to believe that all the attacks described
in this section originated from the territory of the Russian Federation and were perpetrated by or under the
overall control of AFRF.
ATTACKS ON AND AROUND KOLESNYKIVKA, KOMYSHNE AND YUHANOVKA
SETTLEMENTS
Satellite map showing launch sites and targeted villages.
• Targeted area: Kolesnykivka,144 Komyshne145 and Yuhanovka146 are small civilian settlements in close
proximity to the Ukraine-Russia border (0,5-3km), which runs along the Derkul River. In June 2014, a
the closest civilian dwelling) containing approximately 300 combatants.147 Two other UAF positions were
148 In July 2014, the area
was located approximately 14km from contact line between UAF and LPR forces.
• Overview of attacks: According to statements by Ukrainian border guards, initial cross-border attacks
using 82mm mortars.149 The
150
resulted in the deaths of four Ukrainian border guards.151 By August 2014, witnesses report daily artillery
32 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
152 The attacks stopped on 5 September 2014,153
154
• Means, methods and provenance of attacks: Six discarded mortar plates found on the Ukrainian side
of Derkul River and a steel cable running across the river suggest that the initial 82mm mortar attacks
were launched from this position by combatants who crossed the border and retreated back onto Russian
territory after the attack.155 Crater analysis and missile remnants indicate that subsequent attacks were
conducted using MLRS Grad rockets from the territory of the Russian Federation.156 Satellite imagery
reveals at least 150 artillery impact craters in and around Kolesnykivka, at least 70 craters in and around
the ‘Mountain’ camp, and at least 24 craters in the vicinity of the UAF checkpoint.157 Their provenance
is clearly visible from the impact angles, indicating that the vast majority of the missiles came from the
158 Crater analysis on the outskirts of Kolesnykivka
159 whereas the ‘Mountain’ and
160 Analysis of the crater depth, direction and
161 A ‘Grad’ remnant was
Russian provenance.162 The Authors documented a further Grad shell and an unexploded 122mm calibre
163 The depths and impact angles of all the documented craters164 are
consistent with geo-locations of suspected AFRF artillery launch sites described in the previous section,165
166 In light of the angle and
direction of impact, as well the proximity of targets to the Russian border, the attacks could not have
originated anywhere other than the territory of the Russian Federation.
• Damage: Two civilian dwellings were destroyed and a further 27 were partially damaged as a result of
the attacks on the three settlements.167168 At
least 13 UAF border guards were killed and 40 were injured.169
• Conclusion: Evidence documented by the Authors demonstrates, to a high degree of probability, that
in July – September 2014, Ukrainian settlements of Kolesnykivka, Komyshne and Yuhanovka and UAF
at: /pdf
at: https://www.austausch.org//pdf (last accessed 01/12/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 33
21 ‘Grad’ missiles, and that these attacks originated from the territory of the Russian Federation and
were perpetrated by the AFRF. Villages further into Ukraine that may have been targeted from the same
170
ATTACKS ON MILOVE SETTLEMENT
Satellite map showing launch sites and targeted villages.
72. The Authors have documented three separate attacks on UAF positions in and around theMilove settlement
(Luhansk Province, Ukraine) on 2 July, 8 August and 9 August 2014. Milove village (Ukraine) and Chertkovo
village (Russian Federation) are two halves of one settlement split by the Ukraine-Russia border that runs
171 At the time of the attacks, Milove was a predominantly civilian location
housing a unit of Ukrainian Air Defence forces and a Ukrainian Border Service base. In July-September 2014,
Milove was situated approximately 80km from the nearest LPR position.
3.3.2.1 Attack on Ukrainian Air Defence unit on 2 July 2014
• Targeted area: A unit of the Ukrainian Air Defence, including a radar and two administrative buildings,
is located approximately 1.5km from the Ukraine-Russia border.172
• Overview of attack: The attack took place 00:30am-1:30am on 2 July 2014. An estimated 48 rounds of
173
• Suspected provenance of attack: A sound recording of the 2 July mortar attack registered an interval
174
mortar plate tracks were found near the Ukrainian village of Yasnoprominske, situated approximately
three kilometres from the targeted area.175 The tracks leading from the border to the suspected launch
settlements in Ukraine.
02.07.14.mp4”.
34 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
site suggests the attackers crossed the border to perpetrate the mortar attack and then retreated back
across the border.176
• Damage: Evidence of damage to military objects is not available due to restricted access. No casualties
were reported.
• Conclusion: Evidence documented by the Authors demonstrates to a high degree of probability that
on 2 July 2014, a unit of the Ukrainian Air Defence was attacked using 82mm mortars from the village of
Yasnoprominske, and that combatants entered from the Russian Federation onto Ukrainian territory to
perpetrate the attack
3.3.2.2 Attack on a Ukrainian Border Service unit on 8 August 2014
• Targeted area: A unit of the Ukrainian Border Service located inside an administrative building
surrounded by civilian housing in the centre of Milove, approximately 0.45km from the Ukraine-Russia
border.177
• Overview of attack: On 8 August 2014, the Ukrainian border service base was attacked using four
rounds launched from RPO ‘Shmel’ rocket launchers, an SPG-9 73mm calibre gun, and several GP25
40mm grenades.178 Two POM-2 antipersonnel fragmentation mines were left by the attackers in the
179
• Suspected provenance of attack: Two abandoned RPO ‘Shmel’ rocket engines were found at
approximately 50 and 150 meters from the border service building and 0.4 km from the Ukraine-
Russia border.180 The fact that only the facade facing the Russian Federation was hit indicates that the
attackers crossed onto Ukrainian territory to perpetrate the attack and then retreated back onto Russian
territory.181 Based on the direction, distance and angle of attack, the only unobstructed position for the
Russian side of the border.182 The provenance of the GP-25 grenade attack has not been determined.
• Damage: The windows, facade and roof of the Ukrainian border service building were destroyed and the
interior badly damaged in the 8 August attack.183 The garage of the border service building was damaged
by GP-25 grenades.184 Four border guards were injured as a result of the POM-2 antipersonnel mine
explosion in the morning after the attack on the border guard unit.185
• Conclusion: Evidence documented by the Authors demonstrates to a high degree of probability that on
8 August 2014, a Ukrainian Border Service unit in Milove was attacked using RPO ‘Shmel’ rocket launchers,
an SPG-9 73mm calibre gun, and several GP25 40mm grenades, and that the attack originated from
territory of the Russian Federation.
https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=vZO2zuJaZPw ;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHzHRmMHId0.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 35
3.3.2.3
• Targeted area: A unit of the Ukrainian Air Defence is located approximately 1.5km from the Ukraine-
Russia border.186 Military radar and two buildings were located there.
• Overview of attack: On 9 August 2014 the Ukrainian Air Defence unit located in Milove was shelled
using large calibre artillery – the shelling occurred from 4:30 to 5:40am.187
• Suspected provenance of attack: The attack was recorded on video188 shot from the roof of a building
located in Chertkovo, approximately 300 meters east of the Russia-Ukraine border.189 Based on the time
sounds consistent with those made during the launch of heavy artillery missiles came from the east – i.e.:
from the direction of Poltava and/or Mankovo-Kalytvenskoe (both located in Russia).190 The 1.2-second lag
411 metres from the camera.191 The 26-second lag between the sound of launch and the sound of impact
is consistent with the distance of approximately 6km between the suspected launch site and the targeted
Ukrainian Air Defence unit. The depth, angle and direction of craters described by witness who attended
192
• Damage: A Ukrainian military radar station was destroyed in the attack.193
• Conclusion: Evidence documented by the Authors demonstrates to a high degree of probability that on
9 August 2014, a Ukrainian Air Defence unit located in Milove was attacked using 152-mm calibre heavy
artillery, and that these attacks originated from the territory of the Russian Federation.
73. With the closest LPR position located at a distance of 80km from the targeted area, there is a reasonable
basis to believe that all three attacks on UAF positions in Milove were perpetrated by or under the overall
control of the AFRF.
ATTACKS ON KRASNA TALIVKA SETTLEMENT
• Targeted area: The Ukrainian village of Krasna Talivka is located in the Stanytsia Luhanska region of
Luhansk Province.194 The village is located approximately 3.5km from the closest marker on the Ukraine-
Russia border, which surrounds the village on three sides. In July 2014, a border checkpoint and unit of
Ukrainian Border Service were located in the area. At the material time, the village was located 30km from
the nearest LPR position.195
• Overview of attacks: UAF positions in and around Krasna Talivka were attacked twice in the summer of
http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3412779-
karta-ato-na-1-sentiabria (last accessed: 15/11/2017).
36 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Satellite image of area of the attacks
of the Ukrainian Border Service within the space of 10 minutes.196 The second attack took place on 25
August 2014 at 3:10am. A Ukrainian Border Service team codenamed ‘Secret’ situated approximately
3km from the Ukraine-Russia border was attacked by unknown combatants.197 UAF reinforcements were
called in and the attack lasted for approximately 60 minutes.198 During the attack, witnesses observed
two AFRF MI-24 helicopters and three AFRF BTR-82A armoured vehicles crossing the border to provide
heavy-weapons cover for the attackers.199
• Suspected provenance of attacks: Both attacks took place on Ukrainian soil by combatants who
crossed the border to perpetrate the attacks and subsequently retreated back onto Russian territory.
Following the 27 June attack, two copper conductors leading towards Russia were found at the location of
the suspected launch.200
back into the Russian Federation.201 The 25 August attack took place in the vicinity of the Ukraine-Russia
border in close proximity with the AFRF camp in Derkul (see above).202 After the attack, a temporary camp
was found in the woods outside of Krasna Talivka, containing two Kalashnikov machine gun cartridges,
a sleeping bag with traces of blood, a Russian-made C-ration, binoculars, a thermal imager and a pouch
with medicines with AFRF Pskov division insignia.203
• Damage: As a result of the 27 June attack, a Ukrainian Border Service observation tower and border
guard post were destroyed and two Ukrainian border guards were wounded.204 The 25 August attack
available at: http://toparmy.ru/rossijskaya-armiya/novoe-rossijskoe-vooruzhenie/btr-82a-foto-novyj-bronetransporter-rossii.html
(last accessed: 15/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 37
resulted in the deaths of four UAF combatants, two combatants were wounded205 and four Ukrainian
Border Service vehicles destroyed.206
• Conclusion: Evidence documented by the Authors demonstrates to a high degree of probability that on
27 June and 25 August 2014, UAF positions in and around Krasna Talivka were attacked by combatants,
located at a distance of 30km from the targeted area and a reported use of MI-24 helicopters and BTR-
82A armoured vehicles in the second attack, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the attacks were
perpetrated by or under the overall control of the AFRF.
ATTACKS ON DMYTRIVKA AND POBIEDA SETTLEMENTS
Satellite map showing targeted villages.
• Targeted area: The villages of Dmytrivka207 and Pobieda208 are located in Luhansk Province approximately
40km from the Ukraine-Russia border. Predominantly civilian in character, at the material time UAF units
were stationed in both villages: a heavy artillery battalion, the 1st tank brigade and Kyiv-12 battalion in
Dmytrivka,209
210 At the time of the attacks, the closest LPR
position to these areas were between 35km and 45km respectively.211
• Overview of attacks: UAF positions in and around Dmytrivka and Pobieda were attacked using MRLS
‘Smerch’ and/or MRLS ‘Tornado-S’ loaded with cluster munitions.212 Dmytrivka was shelled from 11:00pm
on 3 September 2014 until 07:00am on 4 September in four bouts of shelling.213 Witnesses testify to the
http://gazeta.
ua/articles/np/_dmitrivka-pislya-rosijskih-smerchiv-peretvorilas-na-popelische/583104 (last accessed: 15/11/2017).
http://mediarnbo.org/2014/09/04/situatsiya-na-shodi-ukrayinina-
04-veresnya/ (last accessed: 15/11/2017).
38 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
use of cluster munitions by the attackers.214 Pobieda was shelled on 4 September 2014.215 The majority
of projectiles targeted UAF positions. Witnesses describe hearing the sound of ‘falling planes’ and loud
explosions.216217
• Suspected provenance of attacks: An unexploded projectile was documented in Dmytrivka, its shank
218
as being consistent with the Russian-made Tornado-S system,219
sold or used outside of Russia.220 The same weapon may have been used on the shelling in Pobieda,
where the angle and direction of a documented unexploded shell suggests that the attack originated
in or around the area of Stanitsa Mitiakinskaya221 – located in the Russian Federation.222 The distance
‘Smerch’ and MRLS ‘Tornado-S’. Authors observed on both shelled sites remnants of 300-mm rockets
launched from MLRS ‘Smerch/Tornado’ and containers where cluster munitions were loaded.223
• Damage:
combatants were killed; UAF military equipment and a munitions depot were destroyed.224 Civilian
buildings and infrastructure was also extensively damaged by direct hits and shrapnel.225
• Conclusion: Evidence documented by the Authors demonstrates to a high degree of probability that
on 3-4 September 2014, UAF units located in and around the villages of Dmytrivka and Pobieda were
attacked using MRLS ‘Smerch’ and/or MRLS ‘Tornado-S’ artillery, carrying cluster munitions. With the
closest LPR position located at a distance of 35km-45km from the targeted area and a reported use
of MRLS ‘Tornado-S’ artillery, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the attacks on UAF positions in
consistent with a statement by Ukrainian authorities226 and the OSCE monitoring mission.227
CONCLUSION
74. Based on evidence presented in this section, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the attacks on
Kolesnykivka, Komyshne, Yuhanovka, Milovne, Krasna Talivka, Dmytrivka and Pobieda settlements between
June and September 2014 originated from the territory of the Russian Federation and were perpetrated by
or under the overall control of AFRF.
(last accessed: 15/11/2017).
http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/news/1802.html (last accessed: 15/11/2017).
3 September 2014. Available at: http://www.osce.org/om/123151 (last accessed 15/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
3.4 Conclusion
75.
Ukraine.
76. Using open-source satellite imagery, witness statements and social media posts by AFRF soldiers, the
Authors and other organisations have documented unprecedented AFRF troop mobilisation, camp buildups
and the appearance of artillery launch sites on the Russia – Ukraine border in June to September
2014. This troop deployment was followed by reconnaissance missions and territorial incursions by troops,
helicopters and unmanned drones. The Authors have documented attacks on settlements in the vicinity
of the border - Kolesnykivka, Komyshne, Yuhanovka, Milovne, Krasna Talivka, Dmytrivka and Pobieda –
which took place between June and September 2014. Witness statements, impact crater analysis, weapon
remnants and satellite imagery analysis all point to the fact that the attacks originated on the territory of the
Russian Federation. These attacks must also be seen in the wider context – a successful AFRF incursion and
occupation of Ukrainian territories of Crimea and Sevastopol, contrasted with the rapid loss of territory by
pro-Russian separatist militias in Luhansk and Donetsk Provinces facing a robust counter-insurgency by the
77. Consequently, documented evidence of cross-border attacks demonstrates Russia’s direct engagement
228 In addition
to constituting evidence of direct AFRF involvement in armed attacks in the documented instances, these
and its overall control over LPR and DPR separatist forces.
78. The Authors respectfully request the ICC Prosecutor to take this information into consideration in determining
the applicable legal framework and attribution of responsibility for war crimes committed in the context of
para 84.
40 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
4. Documented attacks on civilians and
civilian objects
79. In this section, the Authors present evidence of documented attacks on civilians and civilian objects in Eastern
Ukraine from June 2014 to May 2017. The Authors have documented a total of 189 episodes of civilian deaths,
injuries and/or damage to civilian property resulting from attacks on 32 Ukrainian settlements, perpetrated
the ICC Statute, ICC Elements of Crimes and applicable jurisprudence. There is a reasonable basis to believe
that in the case of 134 episodes documented in 22 settlements, on or in the vicinity of the so-called ‘contact
the ICC Statute. The attacks have resulted in at least 100 civilian deaths, 162 civilian injuries and thousands
of cases of total or partial destruction of civilian property.
80. These episodes include attacks intentionally directed at the civilians or civilian objects (in violation of Articles
8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) in IAC or 8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC of the ICC Statute), as well as attacks launched against military objectives
that lack of proportionality between anticipated incidental harm to civilians/civilian objects/the environment
and the military advantage sought (in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute). The Authors also
note that a disquieting number of attacks were perpetrated against schools, kindergartens and hospitals –
amounting to a separate war crime of attacks on medical and educational facilities under Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) in
IAC and 8(2)(e)(iv) in NIAC of the ICC Statute. The most common means of attack were MRLS ‘Grad’ artillery and
mortar shells – inherently indiscriminate weapons when used against densely populated urban areas. Some
machine gun and grenade attacks have also been documented. The vast majority of documented attacks
were perpetrated by forces stationed on territory controlled by DPR or LPR forces, although a number of
attacks by the UAF have also been documented.
81.
opening a full investigation with a view to bringing those responsible to account.
4.1 Analytical framework
82.
stage, our aim is to demonstrate that events documented by the Authors satisfy the material and contextual
elements229 of one or several ICC Statute crimes to the standard required for opening a full investigation into
these events – i.e. that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
have taken place.230
83.
the ICC Statute (war crimes). The suitability of any given charge depends on factors such the prevalence of
(Situation in Georgia), para. 219.
for in the Statute. The information available to the Prosecutor is neither expected to be “comprehensive” nor “conclusive.”
It must be understood within the context in which it operates: the standard should be construed and applied against the
underlying purpose of the procedure in article 15(4) of the Statute, which is to prevent the Court from proceeding with
all the information under this standard need to necessarily point to one conclusion: ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
of Kenya,” 31 March 2010, paras. 27-35.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 41
number and nature of persons or infrastructure hit and the inferred intent of the attacker.231 The decision
direct engagement, overall control or occupation by a foreign State. A conclusive analysis of the nature of the
Authors, information provided in the First Report and Section 3 above raise a reasonable basis to believe that
an IAC has existed on the territory of Ukraine since the summer of 2014. The assessment of whether each
documented attack took part in the context or and was associated with the IAC requires the full investigative
powers of the ICC Prosecutor.
84. Consequently, each attack is documented and assessed using the following analytical framework distilled
from the ICC Statute and jurisprudence:
• Attack intentionally directed at civilians and/or civilian objects:
It must be demonstrated that the aim of the attack was the civilian population, civilians not taking direct
232 The allegation cannot be counterbalanced by invoking military
necessity,233 or excused as a reprisal.234 The presence amongst the civilian population of individuals who
235
although the Court will consider factors such as the number and the behaviour of combatants present
amongst the civilians.236 Civilians and civilian objects lose their protected status only when and for such time
that they take a direct part in hostilities.237 No evidence of actual civilian casualties is required, provided
an intention to cause casualties can be inferred.238 Such attacks may be charged under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/
(ii) in IAC and Article 8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC.239 Where attacks are intentionally directed at buildings dedicated
to religion, education, art, science, charity, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and
wounded are collected, they may be charged under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) in IAC and Article 8(2)(e)(iv) in NIAC
(provided they did not serve as military objectives at the time).240
• Failure to discriminate between military and civilian targets:
Where the attack is directed towards a legitimate military objective and simultaneously at the civilian
population or civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, the attack may be considered to be an attack
intentionally directed at civilians and charged as such under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article 8(2)(e)(i)
in NIAC,241 provided it is established that the principal target of the attack was the civilian population.242
There are no clear international guidelines for determining whether a civilian casualty was deliberately
targeted or incidental to an attack on a military objective. The ICTY Trial Chamber attempted to develop
of victims, the discriminatory character of the attack and the nature of the act: ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Katanga, 7 March 2014,
para. 807.
have been subsumed into Article 8(2)(e)(i) – see ICC-01/04-02/06, Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, para. 46.
42 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
such guidelines in Gotovina, holding that a high prevalence of BM-21 Grad and 155mm gun attacks on
civilian objects located over 200 meters from military objectives can be inferred to constitute attacks
intentionally directed at civilians.243 The so-called ‘200 Metre Standard’ was criticised on appeal but no
alternative was provided.244 Moreover, the OSCE has observed that the projectiles used in the eastern
used’.245 The question is therefore one of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis on factors such
as type of weapon used, distance from launch site, distance of impact site from the military objective
and the geographic distribution of impact sites.246 For the purposes of legal analysis in this Report, the
Authors opted for a ‘generous’ benchmark of 400 meters as a ‘permissible accuracy range’, based on
military expert testimony at the ICTY.247 Any damage beyond 400 meters from a legitimate military target
was therefore regarded as an intended attack on civilians.
• Total absence of proportionality between anticipated incidental harm to civilians and the military advantage
sought:
so disproportionate to the military objective that it reveals the author’s intention to make the civilian
population the object of his/her attack, it may be charged as such under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) in IAC and
Article 8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC.248
• Lack of proportionality between anticipated incidental harm to civilians/civilian objects/the environment and
the military advantage sought:
Where an attack is intentionally launched against a military objective, and the attacker was (or ought
to have been) aware of the incidental harm that such an attack may cause to civilians, civilian objects
or the environment, and that harm was disproportionate to the military advantage sought, it may be
of responsibility hangs on the question of proportionality – i.e. whether the accused used all available
to the civilian population.249 The indiscriminate nature of the attack relates to both the means (weapons
incapable of
this point).
http://www.
osce.org/ukraine-smm/300276?download=true (last accessed: 27/11/2017), p.4.
important precautionary measure that impacts the assessment of proportionality is the obligation on all parties to give
Customary IHL, “Rule 20: Advance Warning,” available at: https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter5_
rule20#Fn_25_10 (last accessed: 2/08/2015): Advance warning may not be required where the element of surprise is essential
to the success of an operation or to the security of the attacking forces or that of friendly forces – see Hague Regulations,
Article 26; Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(c).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 43
discriminating between targets – e.g.: cluster munitions250) and methods (e.g.: area bombardment251) of
combat.252
4.2 Avdiivka253
85. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of four on-site visits to Avdiivka on 15-17
September 2016, 13-17 February 2017, 28 February 2017 and 30 March 2017. The documenters interviewed
a total of 53 witnesses and documented 28 impact sites.
4.2.1 TARGETED AREA
86. Avdiivka is an industrial town in the Donetsk Oblast’ of Ukraine with an estimated population of 35,000.254 The
main employer and source of electrical power in Avdiivka is the Kokhsokhim factory located north-northwest
of Avdiivka (Ln 500). The town was captured by separatist forces in May 2014, and re-captured by the UAF on
29 July 2014.255 It is situated in close proximity to the DPR-controlled town of Yasinuvata (to the southeast) and
Donetsk city (to the south) – three and a half kilometres separate the southernmost buildings in Avdiivka from
the Spartak area of Donetsk city.256 Attacks on civilians in Avdiivka were documented in the First Report.257
87. 258 259
became a de facto
260 Creeping advances by the UAF in 2016 also resulted in its control
over a small stretch of the M04 highway – a road of strategic importance to DPR as it connects Donetsk city to
the DPR-held city of Horlivka.261 From January to March 2017, the UAF military presence in Avdiivka included:
• UAF quarters located to the north of the city next to the train station (Ln 201)
• UAF military checkpoint on Vorobyov street separating the old and new parts of the town with personnel
stationed in residential building nearby (Ln 202 and 203)
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects” - See Article 51(5)(a) of
Additional Protocol I; For NIAC, see See ICRC, Customary IHL, “Rule 13: Area Bombardment,” available at: https://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule13 (last accessed: 25/04/2015).
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v1_rul_rule12 (last accessed: 25 March 2015); See also Article 51(4)(b) and (c) Additional Protocol 1 and Article 8(2)(b)(xx)
ICC Statute.
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017).
http://ukurier.gov.ua/uk/news/siloviki-zvilniliavdiyivku/
( last accessed: 22/11/2017)
https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-
11e4-b234-00144feab7de (last accessed 24/11/2017)
available at: https://www.unian.ua/war/1273908-sili-ato-zaynyali-promzonu-poblizu-avdijivki-vitisnivshi-zvidti-teroristiv-video.html
(last accessed 24/11/2017)
2016, available at: https://tsn.ua/ato/ukrayinski-viyskovi-vzyali-pid-vogneviy-kontrol-yasinuvatsku-rozv-yazku-volonteri-606397.
html (last accessed 24/11/2017)
44 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
• UAF quarters based in an old orphanage building in the ‘Khimik’ area - sleeping quarters and medical
units (Ln 204)
•
Lermontov and Kolosov streets (Ln 205 and 206); the wooded area to the south-southeast (Ln 208) and
adjacent to the railway line on the southwest edge (Ln 209).
• UAF ammunition stockpile, combat vehicles and personnel positioned in the south-southeastern end of
Kolosov Street (Ln 207).262
•
4.2.2 DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS
88. Following the recapture of Avdiivka by the UAF in July 2014, civilians and civilian objects have come under
sporadic attacks from DPR positions in Donetsk city and Yasinuvata. These attacks, varying in means and
intensity, resulted in damage to civilian objects, civilian injury and loss of life.263 Aside from artillery and mortar
264
89. 26 January 2017 marked the start of a new wave of intense mortar and artillery attacks by DPR forces,
which continued on a quasi-daily basis for a month. It is unclear which side initiated this round of hostilities.
attacks, which took place shortly after the inauguration of President Trump, were aimed at testing the new US
170 vehicles with munitions and 60 with fuel had crossed over from the Russian Federation in the run-up to
these attacks as part of a plan coordinated from the Kremlin.265
90. Based on documented remnants, impact craters and witness statements, the attacks were carried out using
MLRS BM-21 Grad missiles, 125mm tank projectiles, 122mm mortar shells and 82mm mortar shells, as well
attack is clear from the angle of impact craters or the aspect of buildings hit by projectiles. All impact sites
where provenance was possible to establish point towards DPR positions in and around Donetsk city and
Yasinuvata.
91. The enclosed map of documented impact sites demonstrates the wide dispersal of attacks during the
Lermontov streets) to the southeast, the ‘Khimik’ quarter west of the railway station and locations in between
on Turgenev and Zelena streets. Attacks also took place on locations in the northeast (other end of Kolosov
and Zvodska streets), and on the Koksokhim factory in the north-northwest.
92. The OSCE has reported over 9,
266
2016); witness 0221K991 (4 July 2016).
https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/avdiivka-frontline-ukraine-war-russia-backed-separatists (last accessed: 29/11/2917) –
January 2017’, 1 February 2017, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/296961 (last accessed 24/11/2017)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 45
of 19 soldiers and 66 injured combatants, and DPR reporting 18 combatant deaths.267 The Authors have
documented at least 15 civilian deaths and 33 injuries in Avdiivka since hostilities broke out in 2014. The
greatest damage was done to civilian infrastructure, with an estimated 128 civilian residences totally or
partially destroyed, and damage incurred to a school, a kindergarten, hospital and humanitarian assistance
point. An attack on the Koksokhim coal plant on 2 February resulted in a power outage across Avdiivka,
leading to a humanitarian crisis and the emergency evacuation of civilians.268 A further immeasurable cost is
the trauma and anxiety incurred by the civilian population, in light of the persistency of shelling with highly
inaccurate weapons by the DPR, creating an atmosphere of constant fear among residents.269
, ‘ https://nyti.
ms/2k50iV1 (last accessed: 29/11/2017).
https://dt.ua/
UKRAINE/dlya-obigrivu-meshkanciv-avdiyivki-zapustyat-potuzhniy-generator-231744_.html (last accessed 24/11/2017)
https://www.afp.com/en/news/23/
ukraine-clashes-rage-third-day-sparking-eu-concern (last accessed: 24/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 46
4.2.3 TABLE OF DOCUMENTED ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS IN AVDIIVKA
CASE FILE DATE/TIME IMPACT SITE MEANS/METHOD OUTCOME EVIDENCE
221
4 August 2014
(7:30pm)
School N. 4 (Klubny lane, 1,
Ln 501) – 950m from nearest
UAF position
Two mortar shells
Projectile fragments hit
school building.
Witness Statement: 0221K936 (date, timing and intensity
of shelling, damage to property and casualties).
Video and photos of impact site:
221
10 November
2014
Water distribution point
(Ln 502) – 200m from UAF
checkpoint and 100m from
UAF quarters
projectile
Projective hit a queue of
civilians at a fresh water
distribution point killing 4
and injuring 7.
Witness Statement: 0221K902 (date, timing and intensity
of shelling and casualties).
211
24 January 2015
(4pm)/6 August
2015 (10pm)
House of Culture/library and
sewing shop (28 Karla Marksa
St. Ln 503) – 860m from UAF
checkpoint
Artillery shells from
DPR positions in
Spartak.
Severe damage to civilian/
cultural property.
Witness Statement:
about date, timing and damage to property)
Photos of impact site:
221 28 January 2015
Residential quarter – Stoiteley
kvartal (c. Ln 99) – 1.3km
from nearest UAF base,
1.9km from nearest UAF
Shelling
Civilian killed as a result of
shelling
Witness Statement: 0221K992 (date, shelling and
casualties).
118
17 February
2015
Civilian residence on 17
– close proximity to UAF
quarters
Artillery from DPR
position in Yasynuvata
Damage to civilian
property; Damage to gas
Witness statement: 0118K1010 (date, time, intensity of
shelling, damage to civilian property).
118
18 July 2015
(6:30pm)
Residential area - 44,
Zelenaya St. (Ln 70) –1.5km
from closest UAF position.
from direction of DPR
position in Yasynuvata
Civilian injured in the leg
by direct hit.
Witness statement: 0118K880 (date, timing, injury).
211
6 August 2015
(10pm)
House of Culture/library and
sewing shop (28 Karla Marksa
St. Ln 503) – 860m from UAF
checkpoint
Artillery shells from
DPR positions in
Spartak.
Severe damage to civilian/
cultural property.
Witness Statement:
about date, timing and damage to property)
Photos of impact site:
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 47
211
11 June 2016
(1pm)
Residential quarter – Krasna
St. – 1.7km from closest UAF
position.
7.62mm machine gun
Civilian child sustained
broken leg after direct hit
–.
Witness statement: 0221K985 (date, time and injury.
Photo evidence
221 4 July 2016
(6:30pm)
Civilian residence (68
Lomonosova St. Ln 504)
– 2.5km from closest UAF
position.
AK-47 machine gun
of DPR-controlled
Yasynuvata junction
Civilian sustained injury to
ear after direct hit.
Witness statement: 0221K991 (date, time and
casualties).
211 13 July 2016
(9pm)
Civilian residence on 18
Lomonosova St. st. (Ln 505)
– 2km from nearest UAF
position.
Unknown calibre
direction of DPRcontrolled
Yasinuvata
One civilian death
(standing in front of his
house at the time).
Witness statement: 0221K990 (date, time and civilian
casualty).
211 18 August 2016
Civilian residence and church
on 185, Krasna St. (Ln 49)
– 1.7km from nearest UAF
position
SPG-9 from direction
of DPR-controlled
Yakovlivka
Damage to civilian
property and building
dedicated to religion.
Witness statements: 0221K987, 0221K993
Photo evidence: P60915-135715.jpg, P60915-135707.
jpg, P60915-135701.jpg - show remnants of the shell;
from P60915-145144.jpg to P60915-135825.jpg -
the building dedicated to religion
211
14 September
2016 (12:00am;
5:10pm)
Civilian cemetery and funeral
parlour (Ln 506) – 2km from
Civilian residence (Ln 507) –
36x122-mm artillery
from direction of DPRcontrolled
Spartak
Damage to civilian objects;
Serious injury to civilian.
Witness statement: 0221K986 (date, time, intensity of
shelling, origin and damage to civilian objects);
0221K989 (date, time and injury); 0221K992 (date,
casualties, and means).
Video evidence: V60915-160816.mp4 (impact crater
analysis demonstrating shelling came from south).
Photos evidence:
craters and damage to property)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 48
221 26 January 2017
(11 pm)
Civilian residences: 23 &
27 Kolosov St. (Ln 67, 68);
71 Lermontov St. (Ln 18) –
southeast edge of town;
positions (Ln 205, 206, 208)
and disputed ‘Industrial Zone’
(Ln 17)
Heavy calibre artillery
positions – impact
craters measured up
to 6.2m across and
180cm deep.
Damage to civilian
housing: N. 23 Kolosov St.
was left without a roof and
its porch and outbuildings
were completely
destroyed; Electricity
and gas supplies were
disconnected; water in the
several buildings; central
heating boilers were
destroyed; Windows and
outbuildings destroyed at
N. 71 Lermontov St.
Witness statements
0221K878 (impact); 0221K879
Impact crater analysis
Video of impact site: V70216-122041.mp4.
221 30 January 2017
(4:30 pm)
Civilian residences: 35
Turgenev St. (Ln 69); 42
Zelena St. (Ln 70) - within
1km from the closest UAF
Koksokhim power station (Ln
500) – 2.5km from UAF base
position.
Artillery shells
of 3-4 seconds
from direction of
Yasynovata
First shell hit civilian
residence but did not
explode; second shell
destroyed summer
kitchen. Impact on
Koksokhim factory led
to power outage for
whole town. At -20C
temperatures situation
quickly turned to a
humanitarian crisis.
Witness statements: 0118K880 (time of attack);
Photo evidence
Video of impact site
SMM OSCE report: http://www.osce.org/ru/ukrainesmm/
296981
UN Report: OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine
16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017’ <http://www.
EN.pdf
Human Rights Watch: Human Rights Watch, ‘Ukraine:
Dangers, Unnecessary Delays at Crossing Points
Improve Security, Facilities Along the Line of Contact,
Facilitate Better Crossing for Civilians’ <https://www.hrw.
org/news/2017/02/17/ukraine-dangers-unnecessary-
221 31 January 2017
(7am)
Civilian residences 31
Komunalna st. (Ln 111) –
1.7km from nearest UAF
quarters; Civilian residences
on Turgenev, Zelena and
Kolosov st. (Ln 71) – close
positions.
MLRS Grad rockets
east direction (DPRcontrolled
territory)
Civilian apartments badly
damaged; One civilian
wounded.
Witness statements: 0221K881 (time of attack);
Photo evidence
Video of impact site: V70214-112040.mp4; : V70214-
171237.mp4; V70215-110254.mp4
Ukrainian police report: https://cv.npu.gov.ua/mvs/
control/donetsk/uk/publish/article/399817
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
221 1 February 2017
(from 7am)
Civilian residences: 45 Zelena
St. (Ln 72); 83 Zavodka St.
(Ln 73); 96 Zavodska St. (Ln
74); 100 Zovodska St. (Ln 75);
214 Kolosov St. (Ln 48); 84
Turgenev St. (Ln 7x6).
Targets on Kolosov and
Zavodska St. located over
2km from nearest UAF
positions.
MLRS BM 21 Grad
the east-south-east
by witnesses and
crater analysis.
Total or partial damage
caused to 52 civilian
residences;
One civilian (Ekaterina
Volkova) killed as a result
of shelling on Zavodska St.
Witness statements: 0221K882, 0221K883, 0221K884,
0221K885 (time and provenance); 0221K886 (death);
Video of impact site
Statement by Chief of police in Donetsk area:
https://www.facebook.com/Vyacheslav.Abroskin/
posts/1680505355575465
221 2 February 2017
(from 3:30am)
Civilian commerce buildings
on and around Sadova St. (Ln
77); School (Ln 106); Hospital
(Ln 108/7); Civilian residence
on 8 Mendeleev St. (Ln 78);
115; 80; 82); 9 Vorobyov St.
(Ln 79); Humanitarian aid
distribution point (Ln 81).
Targets located within 1km of
120mm mortars (8
craters measured
280cm across and
80cm deep) from
south-east direction;
Tank shells (stabiliser
DPR-controlled
Yasynuvata and/or
Yakovlivka
Total or partial damage
to civilian commerce;
Damage to school and
hospital; Damage to
civilian residences;
Damaged gas pipe;
Civilian (Elena Volkova)
killed and photojournalist
injured on Mendeleev
St..; Civilian injured on
Vorobyov St.; civilian
st.; Ambulance driver
and head of emergency
services killed in attack on
humanitarian aid point.
Witness statements: 0221K887; 0221K889 (time of
attack); 0221K890, 0221K891, 0221K889, 0221K894,
0221K894 (death and injury); 0221K892, 0221K893,
0221K899, 0221K931, 0221K891, 0221K895 (impact)
Video of impact site
: V70214-123916.mp4; V70214-122018.mp4, V70214-
Impact crater analysis: V70214-161226.mp4, V70214-
160240.mp4; V70214-092831.mp4;
221 3 February 2017
(from 10pm)
Civilian residence: 73
Soborna St. (Ln 83). 1km
from UAF quarters and 2.5km
position.
Shell hit eastern
facade of building
making a 150x150cm
hole in masonry.
Damage to civilian
residences.
Video of impact site
OSCE report:
OSCE, ‘Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission
to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of
19:30, 3 February 2017’ <http://www.osce.org/ukraine-
221 9 February 2017
(2:00pm)
Civilian residence: 14
Turgenev St. st (Ln 84) –
position.
82mm mortar shell
controlled Yasynuvata
junction
Partial damage to civilian
residence and injury to
civilian from fragments.
Witness statements: 0221K885; 0221K896
Video of impact site: V70215-102910.mp4
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 50
221 15 February
2017 (8:40pm)
Civilian residences: Kolosov
and Lermontov St. (LN 85-90;
66) – close proximity to UAF
120mm mortars from
south-east or southsoutheast
direction
(DPR-controlled
Yasynuvata/
Mineralne); grenades
Total or partial damage
to civilian residences.
Damage to electricity
supply.
Witness statements:
Video of impact site:
221 16 February
2017 (6:03pm)
Civilian commerce: 12
Gagarin St. (Ln 91); Civilian
residence: 1 Gagarin St. (Ln
123); 1 9-Kvartal St (Ln 92).
position and 0.5km from
nearest UAF quarters.
Full MLRS Grad
system used (based
on sound recorded
from DPR-controlled
Yasynuvata.
Partial damage to
civilian residences and
commerce.
One civilian death and 2
civilian injuries.
Witness statements: DU-00372, 0221K897
Video of impact site:
221 17 February
2017
Civilian residences: 81
Grushevskovo St. and 8
Uvileynyy kvartal (Ln 21) –
1.8km from nearest UAF
UAF quarters
from the southeast
(Yasynuvata).
Partial damage to civilian
residences.
Injury to two civilians.
Witness statements: 0221K898, 0221K899, 0221K932.
221 24 February
2017 (7:45pm)
Civilian residence: 68 & 59
Chernyshevsky St. (Ln 93/94);
Sportivnaya St. (Ln 95) –
located 800m – 1.5km from
122mm mortar shells
controlled Spartak
Partial damage to civilian
residences.
Witness statements: 0221K900, 0221K901
221 2 March 2017
(4:00pm)
Civilian residence: 3/5
Mendeleev St. (Ln 96-98);
School (Ln. 99); Gagarin St (Ln
100 and 101); Kindergarten
(Ln 102) – located 1.2km from
UAF quarters and 1.75km
125mm tank
from DPR-controlled
Yasynuvata
Partial damage to civilian
residence, school and
kindergarten.
Witness statements: 0221K902, 0221K903, 0221K904,
0221K905, 0221K906, 0221K907, 0221K908.
Video of impact site
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 51
N5 13 May 2017
(7pm)
Civilian residence on 53
Sopronova (Pionerskaya)
St. (Ln 326) – 2.5km from
DPR-controlled
territory
Four civilian deaths;
two civilians injured and
civilian property damaged.
Witness Statement: N005K1066 (date, timing and
intensity of shelling, damage to property and casualties).
Video evidence
civilian property and impact site anaysis demonstrating
origin of shelling; Photos and videos in folder [damage] -
show damage to civilian property.
Other sources: OSCE, ‘Ongoing Violations of
Commitments by the Russian Federation in Ukraine’,
available at: https://osce.usmission.gov/ongoing-
russia-ukraine/
N5 30 May 2017
(6:45pm)
Civilian residence/commerce
on 201 Soborna St. (Ln 327)
– 670m from nearest UAF
position (Ln 202).
82mm mortar and/
or grenade launcher
controlled territory
Serious injuries sustained
by three civilians.
Witness Statement: N005K1067 (date, timing and
intensity of shelling, damage to property and casualties).
Video evidence
52 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
LEGAL ASSESSMENT
93. Based on the information available to the Authors, following the initial skirmish for control over the town,
DPR’s main military objectives in Avdiivka in 2017 would have been to regain control of the M04 Highway,
legitimate military targets, despite their location in and around civilian residences. Based on impact crater
analysis, launch sites for the attacks were located in Donetsk city, Yasinuvata and Yakovlivka at a distance of
10-20km. Taking the upper limit of a Grad projectile’s accuracy range of 400 metres,270 any death and injury
to civilians and damage to civilian objects incidental to attacks within a 400 metre radius of these targets is
likely to be considered proportionate to the military advantage sought.
94. Conversely, attacks on the two UAF quarters nestled in densely populated areas of Avdiivka (Ln 201 and 204)
civilians and damage to civilian objects. DPR forces were (or ought to have been) cognisant of the inaccurate
nature of their weapons. Thus, they would have been well aware of the risk of incidental injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects as a result of using such weapons on densely populated areas. There is no
evidence that the UAF quarters contained any artillery units or that any attacks were launched from these
points on DPR positions. Shelling these positions would not have increased the DPR forces’ ability to regain
to civilians and damage to civilian objects within a 400-metre radius of UAF quarters should be considered
disproportionate and prosecuted under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute.271
95. Artillery attacks on civilian residences and infrastructure located at distances beyond 400 meters from any
more precise weapons such as sniper ri
were on the territory of legitimate military targets. The enclosed map demonstrates the wide dispersion of
attacks on Avdiivka over the documented period. Impact sites located outside of the accuracy range for
attacks on UAF positions went above and beyond the legitimate military advantage sought by the DPR. Of
particular note are attacks on a hospital (Ln 55), school (Ln 99), kindergarten (Ln 102) and humanitarian aid
distribution centre (Ln 81) located more than 1km from the nearest UAF position. A further example is the
30 January 2017 attack on the Koksokhim factory (Ln 500) – 2.5km from closest UAF quarters and 6km from
wide distribution of documented attacks across Avdiivka and inherently indiscriminate choice of weapons (for
urban warfare) shows the attackers’ clear disregard for civilian life and infrastructure. Intent to direct these
attacks on civilians may be inferred from the attackers’ failure to discriminate between military objectives
and civilians, or alternatively, the total absence of proportionality in their choice of targets. Consequently,
this category attacks may be prosecuted under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute.
Additionally, such attacks on the school, kindergarten and hospital, may be charged under Article 8(2)(b)(ix)
(in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
96. In light of the foregoing, the Authors submit that a number of attacks by DPR forces on civilians, civilian
residences and infrastructure in Avdiivka were in violation of the principle of distinction and constitute war
crimes under Article 8 of the ICC Statute. The Authors recommend further investigations with the view of
prosecuting those responsible for the following crimes:
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 53
• Under Art. 8(2)(b)(iv): DPR attacks targeting UAF quarters located at Ln 201-204 (provided they were
incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian infrastructure located within a 400 meter radius of
the UAF targets;
• Under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i): DPR attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure located
more than 400 meters away from any UAF positions in Avdiivka.
• Under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv): DPR attacks on educational and medical facilities in
Avdiivka.
4.3 Krasnohorivka272
97. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of
18-19 September 2015, 14-17 August 2016, 26 February 2017, 3-6 June 2017 and 16-19 October 2017. The
documenters interviewed a total of 31 witnesses and documented 39 impact sites.
4.3.1 TARGETED AREA
98. Krasnohorivka is a town of approximately 15,000 civilians,273 located in the Ukraine-controlled part of Donetsk
Province.274 Krasnohorivka sits 20km east of the centre of Donetsk City and roughly 3km from the contact line
between UAF and DPR forces. DPR-controlled Staromykhailivka is located to the east – south-east, andthe
two settlements are situated just 2km away from one another.
99. The town fell under DPR control in the spring of 2014, but was attacked and retaken by the UAF in July 2014.
DPR positions in Krasnohorivka included a tank-defended checkpoint in the north (Ln 5101), two smaller
checkpoints on the Donetsk access road to the east (Ln 222 and 511), a major outpost on the northern edge
of the town (Ln 512) and a headquarters in the centre of town (Ln 513).275 Initial UAF positions were based in
or around civilian objects – such as at school N. 2 (Ln 210) and Mayak restaurant (Ln 222). After UAF secured
control of the town, a UAF base was set up in the centre of town located on business premises (Ln 211) and
a UAF checkpoint on the southern edge of town on the road leading to Marjinka (Ln 212). The UAF maintain
from the densely populated centre of town. Krasnohorivka has six educational facilities and a hospital, all of
which have been targeted since the outbreak of hostilities.
4.3.2 DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACK
100. Krasnohorivka, a town of relatively low strategic importance to the warring parties, has been unduly
targeted throughout the period of documentation. Of the 189 attacks documented by the Authors, 39 took
place in Krasnohorivka.
101.
control of the town from DPR militias. The attack resulted in two civilian deaths and the destruction of a
school and civilian residences.276 After the UAF regained control of the settlement, DPR forces stationed in
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
54 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
Staromikhailivka began a protracted bombing campaign that has lasted up to the limit of the Authors’ current
documentation period.
102. The thrust of DPR attacks appears to have been aimed at larger buildings in the settlement, namely the
town hospital (Ln 214), schools (Ln 220, 218, 213 and 210) and the agricultural college (Ln 216). The initial
UAF bases at School n. 2 (Ln. 2) and Mayak restaurant (Ln 222) were destroyed in 2014. As illustrated in the
map of impact sites, subsequent attacks fell on the southern residential district on or around School N. 3 (Ln
213) located in the vicinity of a UAF checkpoint (Ln 212), the Sonyachna district (Ln 700) located 750m west
103. Based on documented remnants, impact craters and witness statements, the attacks were carried out
using MLRS BM-21 Grad missiles, 125mm tank projectiles, 122mm mortar shells and 82mm mortar shells. In
most cases, the provenance of the attack is clear from the angle of impact craters or the aspect of buildings
hit by projectiles, as well as witness testimony. Aside from the initial UAF attack, all other impact sites where
provenance was possible to establish point towards DPR positions in Staromikhailivka and Donetsk city.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 55
4.3.3. TABLE OF DOCUMENTED ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS IN KRASNOHORIVKA
CASE FILE DATE/TIME IMPACT SITE MEANS/METHOD OUTCOME EVIDENCE
138 13 July 2014
(4:30pm)
Residential districts:
Sonyachna and Paris
Kommuny streets – Ln
700; School N. 1 (Ln 220).
Location of DPR positions
unknown.
MLRS Grad attack
from direction of
UAF-controlled
Marjinka,
Ekaterinovka and/or
Antonovka
Two civilians killed; Damage
to civilian residential
property; Near total
destruction of School N.1.
Witness statements: 0138K919 (date, time of shelling;
0138K946 (date, time of shelling and damage; 0138K939
(civilian casualties); 0138K942 (means, origin, date, time
of attack); 0138K941 (date and means); 0138K1005 (date,
intensity of shelling, damage and casualties); 0138K947 (date
and damage); 0138K947 (origin, method, time and damage)
0138K945 (date, time, method of shelling).
Video of impact sites and crater analysis: [V60815-145823.
mp4, V60815-151238.mp4, V60816-145422.mp4] - shows
crater analysis demonstrating shell came from Ukraine
controlled territory and method of attack
civilian property.
138 31 July 2014
(10pm)
Civilian residences on 3
Linya St. and Lermontova
St. (Ln 219) – 600m from
UAF checkpoint (Ln 212).
Artillery (origin
unknown)
Damage to civilian property;
One civilian injured.
Witness statements: 0138K939 (date, time and damage);
0138K1007 (date, time, intensity of shelling, damage to
civilian property and casualties).
138 1 August
2014 (7am)
Civilian residences on
26 Lermontova St. (Ln
219) – 600m from UAF
checkpoint (Ln 212).
Artillery attack from
DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
Two civilians killed; two
civilians injured.
Witness statement: 0138K939 (date, time, damage, intensity
and casualties); N003K1090 (date, time, damage, intensity,
origin and casualties)
138 14 October
2014
Civilian residences
in Sonyachna district
(Ln 700) – 900m from
215/224); 450m from UAF
base (Ln 222).
Artillery attack from
DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
Damage to civilian property. Witness statement: 0138K941(date, origin and means).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 56
138 12 January
2015
Civilian residences on
Lermontova and 8 March
streets (Ln 219); School
#3 (Ln 213); Lenin square.
– 0.5km from closest UAF
position (Ln 212).
MLRS Grad attack
from direction of
DPR-controlled
territory
Two civilians killed; Damage
to civilian property; Damage
to school.
Witness statement: 0138K919 (date, time, intensity of
shelling, damage to civilian property and casualties);
0138K939 (damage and casualties); 0138K952 (date, time
and damage); 0138K941 (date and means).
Video of impact sites and crater analysis:
133009.mp4, V60816-133436.mp4, V60816-145014.
mp4] - shows GRAD remnants, damage and crater analysis
demonstrating origin of the attack.
school.
138 18 January
2015
Civilian market (Ln 221),
house on 8 Suvorova St.
(Ln 508) – 700m from
closest UAF position (Ln
211).
MLRS Grad attack
from direction of
DPR-controlled
Antonovka
One civilian killed; One
civilian injured Damage to
civilian market and housing.
Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, casualties and means);
N003K1088 (date, time, casualties, means and origin)
138
8 February
2015
(5:10pm)
Civilian residences on
Matrosova, Lenina,
Sverdlova streets; Church
(Ln 223) – 450m from UAF
base (Ln 211).
Artillery and mortar
(origin unknown)
Damage to civilian housing;
Damage to church.
Witness statement: 0138K919 (date, time, intensity of
shelling, damage to civilian property); 0138K941(date, time,
intensity of shelling and damage to civilian property). Video of
impact site
[V60816-084102.mp4] - shows damage to church.
138
14 February
2015
(1:20pm)
Residential dormitory for
agricultural school (Ln
216) – 1.2km from nearest
UAF positions (Ln 224).
Mortar attack (origin
unknown)
Damage to education facility
and civilian residences.
Witness statement: 0138K949 (date, time, intensity and
damage).
Photos and videos of impact site
analysis.
138 3 June 2015
(4:30am)
School N. 3 (Ln 213) –
500m from UAF checkpoint
(Ln 212)
Hospital (Ln 214) – 1.4km
civilians residences
Artillery from
direction of
DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
Thirteen hours of heavy
artillery shelling resulted
in: 7 direct hits on/partial
destruction of School N.3;
Partial destruction of a
civilian hospital (including
destruction of 2 ambulance
cars).
One civilian dead and one
seriously injured.
Witness Statement: 0138K919, 0138K950, 0138K1005 (date,
time, intensity of shelling and damage to civilian property);
0138K1004 (date, time and damage); 0138K939 (date,
damage and intensity); 0138K941 (date, time, intensity of
shelling and damage to civilian property and casualties);
0138K947 (date and damage).
Photos and videos of impact site
[V60914-113929.mp4] for school N. 3 impact site (including
impact crater analysis).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 57
138 26 July 2014
Civilian residences
in Sonyachna district
(Ln 700) – 900m from
215/224).
Artillery attack from
un-recorded origin Damage to civilian property. Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, intensity of shelling and
damage to civilian property).
138 10 August
2015 (10pm)
Civilian residences in
Sonyachna district (Ln
700) – 900m from UAF
215/224).
Artillery and/
or mortar
launched from
Staromikhailivka
Damage to civilian property. Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, time, intensity of shelling
and damage to civilian property).
138 15 August
2015
Civilian hospital (Ln 214)
– 1.4km from nearest
UAF position; Civilian
residences, market and
shop on Sovetskaya St. (Ln
221).
Artillery
launched from
Staromikhailivka
witnesses and crater
analysis).
Damage to hospital and
ambulance vehicle; Damage
to civilian properties.
Witness statements: 0138K950 (date, time, intensity of
shelling and damage to civilian property); 0138K1006 (date,
time, origin, intensity of shelling and damage); 0138K941
(date, time, intensity of shelling and damage to civilian
property).
Photos and videos of impact sites
shows damage to civilian property, remains of the shells
[V60815-151742.mp4] - shows crater analysis demonstrating
origin of attack.
138 23 August
2015 (11pm)
Civilian hospital (Ln 214)
– 1.4km from nearest
UAF position; Civilian
residences on Sovetskaya
and Mayakovskogo St. (Ln
221).
Artillery and/or
mortar attack from
DPR controlled
territory
Severe damage to roof of
civilian hospital and nearby
civilian residential properties.
Witness statement: 0138K950 (date, time, intensity of shelling
and damage to civilian property); 0138K941(date, time,
intensity of shelling and damage to civilian property). Photos
and videos of impact sites
damage to civilian property, shell remnants and impact
craters.
138 9 April 2016
Civilian hospital (Ln 214) –
1.4km from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
Mortar shells
Damage to civilian hospital
(broken windows, walls and
stairs).
Witness statement: 0138K950 (date, time, intensity of shelling
and damage to civilian property).
Photos and videos of impact site
shows damage to civilian property, remnants and craters.
138 3 June 2016
Civilian residences on
Paris Kommuna St. (Ln
63) – 470m from UAF
checkpoint.
Unrecorded means
and origin Damage to civilian property.
Witness statement: 0138K919 (date, time, intensity of shelling
and damage to civilian property).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 58
138 15 June 2016
Civilian residences on 7
Sonyachna St. (Ln 217);
School N.1 (Ln 220) –
770m from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
Tank attack from
DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
(based on crater
analysis)
Destruction of 3 civilian
apartments; 1 civilian
injured; Damage to school.
Witness statement: 0138K946 (date, time of shelling,
casualties and damage); 0138K942 (date, means, origin, date,
time of attack); 0138K1005 (origin and means); 0138K948
(date and time of attack); 0138K941 (date, time, intensity
of attack and damage to civilian property); 0138K947 (date,
time, casualties and damage); 0138K945 (time of attack,
casualties and damage to civilian property).
Photos: [Sunny-7 folder ] - shows damage to civilian property
and remains of shell.
Videos
114511.mp4, V60813-120214.mp4, V60813-120401.mp4,
V60814-102532.mp4, V60814-102813.mp4] - shows damage
to property and impact crater.
Document and videosL
medicine epicrisis and interview of the victim.
138 17 June 2016
Civilian residences (Ln
217); School N.1 (Ln 220) –
760 meters from nearest
UAF position (Ln 215).
Unrecorded means;
Originated from
DPR-controlled area
(probably Donetsk
City)
Damage to civilian property
and school.
Witness statement: 0138K942 (origin, date of attack);
0138K941 (date of attack).
138 20 June 2016
Civilian residences on
Sonyachna St. (Ln 217);
2 Suvorova St. (Ln 508);
School N. 1 – 770m from
nearest UAF position.
Unrecorded means
and origin
Two civilians injured;
Damage to civilian property;
damage to school.
Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, time, intensity of attack,
damage to civilian property and casualties); 0138K947 (date,
casualties and damage).
138 27 June – 4
July 2016
Civilian residences in
Vostochniy district and
School N. 1 (Ln 220) –
760m from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
course of 6 days.
Damage to civilian property
and school.
Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, time, intensity of shelling
and damage to civilian property and casualties).
138 12 July 2016
School N. 1 (Ln 220) –
760m from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
shells). Damage to school. Witness statement: 0138K942(date and intensity of attack).
138 26 July 2016
Civilian residence at 7,
Sonyachna st. (Ln 217) –
770m from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
Damage to civilian property.
Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, time, intensity of shelling
and damage to civilian property).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
138 28 July 2016
Civilian hospital (Ln 214) –
1.2km from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
Structural damage to
hospital.
Witness statement: 0138K950 (date, time, intensity, means
and damage to civilian property).
Photos and videos
civilian property, remains of the shells and craters.
138 30 July 2016
Civilian hospital (Ln 214) –
1.2km from nearest UAF
position (Ln 215).
Damage to hospital.
Witness statement: 0138K950 (date, time, intensity, method
of shelling and damage to civilian property).
138 5 August
2016
Civilian residences and
education facility on 2,
Vostochnaya (Ln 217) and
7, Sonyachna streets (Ln
220) – 760m from nearest
UAF position.
from DPR controlled
territory (based on
crater analysis)
Damage to agricultural
college and civilian property.
Witness statement: 0138K941 (date, time, intensity of attack
and damage to civilian property).
Photos and videos
damage to civilian property and crater analysis.
138 7 August
2016
Agricultural school (Ln
216) and civilian hospital
(Ln 214) – 1.2km from
nearest UAF position (Ln
215).
from DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
(based on crater
analysis).
Damage to school and
hospital buildings.
Witness statement: (date, time, intensity, means of attack
and damage to civilian property; 0138K1004 (time, damage,
means and origin of attack); 0138K1005 (damage to civilian
property; 0138K949 (date, time, intensity and damage);
0138K941 (date, time, intensity of attack and damage to
civilian property).
Photos and videos
damage to civilian property and crater analysis; Videos in
mp4] - show damage to civilian property and crater analysis.
[V60815-114244.mp4, V60815-114837.mp4] - shows crater
analysis and shell remnants that allow to conclude origin of
attach was DPR-controlled territory. Video [V60815-115523.
mp4] - shows mortar shell remnants and crater analysis that
testify attack was conducted with 82-mm mortar from DPRcontrolled
territory.
138 9/10 August
2016
Civilian residences
(Nakhimova and
Ostrovskovo St. – Ln 509);
Stadium and morgue –
1km from nearest UAF
position (Ln 224).
Damage to civilian property
Witness statement: 0138K1005 (date and means of attack);
0138K941 (date, time, intensity of attack and damage to
civilian property).
N3 5 February
2017
Civilian residence on 57
Shkilna St. (Ln 14) – 450m
from UAF checkpoint
Artillery or 122mm
mortar Damage to civilian property Witness statement: N003K1062 (date, time, intensity of
attack and damage to civilian property).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 60
138 6 February
2017
Civilian residence at
16, 8th March st (Ln
5101) – 560m from UAF
checkpoint (Ln 212).
Damage to civilian property
Witness statement: 0138K1002 (date, time, damage to civilian
property);
Photos and video
damage to civilian property.
138 10 February
2017
Civilian residence on
Shkilna St. (Ln 14)
and road connecting
Krasnahorivka and
Marjinka – 450m from
UAF checkpoint (Ln 212).
from DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
Two civilians injured;
Damage to civilian property.
Witness statement:
casualties).
138 18 February
2017
Civilian residences on
Shkilna St. (Ln 16) – 450m
from UAF checkpoint (Ln
212).
from DPR-controlled
Staromikhailivka
Damage to civilian property.
Witness statement: 0138K917 (date, timing, damage and
intensity of attack); 0138K918 (date, timing, damage and
intensity of attack).
Videos
138 24 February
2017
Civilian residence on
Shkilna St. (Ln 16) – 450m
from UAF checkpoint (Ln
212).
Damage to civilian property.
Witness statement: 0138K918 and 0138K919 (date, time and
damage to civilian property).
N3 25 May 2017
Civilian hospital (Ln
214); Agricultural
school (Ln 216) and
civilian residences on
Lomonosova, Voroshylova
and Khmerlnitskogo
streets – 1.2km from
nearest UAF positions (Ln
215 and Ln 224).
Grad P artillery
(leaving craters 5m
in diameter and 2m
deep) – from DPR
controlled territory
(Petrovskiy district).
Damage to hospital, school
and civilian property.
Witness statement: N003K1063 (date, time intensity of attack,
damage to civilian property and origin; 0138K941 (origin,
date, time, intensity of attack, damage to civilian property;
T3K951 (date, intensity of attack, damage to civilian property).
N3 28 May 2017
Civilian hospital (Ln
214); Civilian residences
on Pervomayskaya,
Voroshylova and Tolstovo
St. (Ln 221) – 1.2km from
nearest UAF position (Ln
215, Ln 224).
Grad P artillery
(leaving craters 5m
in diameter and 2m
deep) – from DPR
controlled territory
(Petrovskiy district).
Damage to hospital and
civilian property.
Witness statement: N003K1063 (date, time intensity of
attack, damage to civilian property and origin; 0138K941
(origin, date, time, intensity of attack, damage to civilian
property; T3K951 (date, time, intensity of attack, damage to
civilian property).
Photos and videos: in [Damage-property] - show damage
fragments.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 61
4.3.4. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
104. It is assumed that the main objective of the UAF attack was to push out DPR militias and regain control of
hit a school (Ln 220). The nearest DPR positions at the time were situated 200 and 500 meters away. Even if
DPR forces or weapons were located in the vicinity at the time, the choice of weapon (Grad BM-21 rockets) to
attack a densely populated area demonstrates a disregard for civilian life and property. It may be argued that
the incidental loss of life (two civilians were killed) and destruction of civilian property (School N.1 and blocks
of these attacks will largely depend on evidence of military necessity and available alternatives (if any).
105. DPR attacks on the southern quarter of Krasnohorivka were most likely aimed at the UAF checkpoint
on the road leading to Marjinka (Ln 212). The UAF checkpoint may be considered as a legitimate military
objective. Nevertheless, the checkpoint did not represent a serious threat or military advantage to DPR
forces on account of the small number of soldiers performing largely policing functions there.277 The use of
Grad artillery and mortar shells to target a military objective of low strategic importance located next to a
densely populated civilian area is clearly disproportionate. All the above-documented impact sites in this area
are located within 400-500 meters of the checkpoint – at or beyond the outer limit of the acceptable margin
of error for the means used. DPR forces knew or ought to have been well aware of the imprecise nature of
the weapons and the likelihood of incidental loss of life and injury to civilians. At the very least, these attacks
278 Further, the
Authors would argue that the persistence of DPR attacks on the area throughout the documentation period
was not merely ‘incidental loss’. Intent to direct these attacks towards civilians may be inferred from the
attackers’ failure to discriminate between military objectives and civilians, or alternatively, the total absence of
proportionality in their choice of targets. Consequently, this category attacks may also be prosecuted under
Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute.
106. DPR attacks on Sonyachna district (Ln 700), the agricultural college (Ln 216), and the town’s hospital (Ln
214) may be explained by the location of UAF artillery positions on the eastern outskirts of Krasnohorivka
(Ln 215 and 224). Nevertheless, these civilian objects were located between 760m and 1.2km from the UAF
positions – i.e. well beyond the acceptable accuracy range for the Grad BM-21 rockets and mortars used to
perpetrate the attacks (particularly given the relatively close range of DPR launch sites in Staromikhailivka).
Moreover, the persistence of these attacks, particularly on the schools and hospital, raise questions as to
whether DPR forces were aiming at the UAF positions at all. Consequently, intent to direct these attacks on
civilians may be inferred from the attackers’ failure to discriminate between military objectives and civilians,
or alternatively, the total absence of proportionality in their choice of targets. This category attacks may be
prosecuted under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute. Moreover, the persistent attacks
on the town’s hospital, schools and agricultural college may also be charged under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) (in IAC)
and Article 8(2)(e)(iv) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
4.3.5. CONCLUSION
107. In light of the foregoing, the Authors submit that the above-documented attacks by UAF and DPR forces on
civilians, civilian residences and infrastructure in Krasnohorivka were in violation of the principle of distinction
and constitute war crimes under Article 8 of the ICC Statute. The Authors recommend further investigations
with a view to prosecuting those responsible for the following crimes:
62 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
• Under Art. 8(2)(b)(iv): UAF attack on 13 July 2014 presumably targeting DPR positions in the town,
which resulted in foreseeable and disproportionate incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian
infrastructure;279
• Under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii), Article 8(2)(e)(i) and/or Art. 8(2)(b)(iv): DPR attacks on civilians and civilian
infrastructure located more than 400 meters away from any UAF positions in Krasnohorivka.
• Under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv): DPR attacks on educational and medical facilities in
Krasnohorivka.
4.4 Kurdiumyvka - Zelenopillya280
108. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of two on-site visits to Kurdiumyvka on 27
February 2017 and 14 March 2017. The documenters interviewed a total of eight witnesses and documented
16 impact sites.
4.4.1. TARGETED AREA
109. Kurdiumyvka is a small settlement of 893 inhabitants281 located on Ukrainian-controlled territory in
Donetsk Province.282 Kurdiumyvka is adjoined to the east by the small village of Zelenopillya. The area is
situated approximately 4km from the village of Zaitseve (on either side of the contact line from spring 2015
and DPR-controlled territory prior to that283) to the south-south east, 20km north-northwest of the city of
Horlivka (a DPR stronghold) and 12km northwest of Ukrainian-controlled Bakhmut City. At the time of the
attacks, there were no UAF units or equipment in or around Kurdiumyvka and Zelenopillya, and no other
known objects of strategic importance.
4.4.2. DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS
110. At 10:00am on 31 January 2015, a MLRS Grad attack on the village of Kurdiumyvka and the adjoining
attack originated from the DPR-controlled town of Horlivka.284 On 15 June 2015, another missile attack from
DPR-held territory damaged three civilian properties
resident.285 The nearest UAF position was over 6km away.
111. At approximately 9:00pm on 6 February 2017, DPR forces began shelling civilian residences on Vatutin,
Zavodska and Sevastopolska streets (Ln 22-37; 59).286 Witnesses report that approximately 30 artillery shells
30 seconds between the sound of launch and impact.287 All 16 documented impact craters288 were 2.6 to 2.8
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 63
289 All craters consistently indicate launch sites
290 The
attack on Kurdiumyvka resulted in the deaths of six civilians, as well as damage to civilian residences and
infrastructure.291
4.4.3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
112. At the time of the attacks, Kurdiumyvka and adjoining Zelenopillya were undefended civilian settlements
with no UAF presence or installations. It appears this location was attacked purely because it has the
line in DPR-controlled part of Zaitseve and Horlivka. The artillery attacks on 31 January 2015, 15 June 2015
and 6 February 2017 presented no concrete military advantage to DPR forces and served no legitimate
as attacks intentionally directed at civilians and/or civilian objects – in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC)
or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
4.4.4. CONCLUSION
113. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that those responsible for the intentional attack on
civilians and civilian objects in Kurdiumyvka and Zelenopillya on 31 January 2015, 15 June 2015 and 6 February
ICC Statute.
4.5 Sartana292
114. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of an on-site visit to Sartana on 1 March
2017. The documenters interviewed a total of 4 witnesses and documented six impact sites.
4.5.1. TARGETED AREA
115. Sartana is a settlement in Ukrainian-controlled part of Donetsk Province with a population of approximately
10,700 inhabitants. Sartana is located 8.5km from the contact line between UAF and DPR forces.293 It sits 6km
from the eastern outskirts of the city of Mariupol. The area is subject to frequent high-intensity combat,294
295 There were no UAF
positions in Sartana and no UAF units or equipment in the settlement on the day of the attack. The closest
UAF position is a temporary UAF artillery launch site located at a distance of 1.5 and 2km from Sartana.296 The
http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/
125545 (a MLRS Grad attack on Sartana targeting a funeral procession on 14 October 2014 which resulted in the deaths
of seven civilians).
295Witness statement: 0256K914
64 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
4.5.2. DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACK
116. On 3 February 2017, Sartana was attacked by DPR forces using MLRS Grad rockets and artillery guns. The
correction.297
civilian residences and infrastructure, damaging houses, farm buildings and agricultural machinery on and
around Severnaya Street (Ln 1).298 Impact crater analysis determined that the projectiles originated from an
73).299
117. The second volley of projectiles hit at 11:05pm.300
one minute between each launch, presumably for recalibration.301 The attacks damaged civilian residences
302
4.5.3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
118. At the time of the attack, Sartana was an undefended civilian settlement with no UAF presence or
installations. The artillery attacks on 3 February 2017 presented no concrete military advantage to DPR
forces and served no legitimate military objective – a grave violation of the principle of distinction. The attack
recalibration strongly indicate the intentional nature of the attacks. Consequently, the events on 3 February
Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
4.5.4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
119. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that those responsible for the intentional attack on
8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
4.6 Popasna303
120. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
September 2016, 30-31 October 2016, 27 March 2017, 9-11 September 2017. The documenters interviewed
a total of 11 witnesses and documented 10 impact sites.
4.6.1. TARGETED AREA
121. Popasna is a settlement in Ukrainian-controlled part of Luhansk Province with an estimated population of
22,000 civilians.304 It is situated approximately 5km from the contact line between UAF and LPR forces305 and
Witness statement: 0256K914
Video of impact crater analysis: IMG_1675.MOV; IMG_1672.MOV.
https://dn.npu.gov.ua/uk/publish/article/402653 (last accessed:
29/11/2017).
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 65
approximately 10km from LPR-stronghold of Pervomaysk.306 The main industrial employer is a civilian ‘VRZ’
factory (Ln 314). The settlement was overrun by LPR separatists in April 2014 and retaken by the Ukrainian
Donbas Battalion on 22 July 2014.307
122. There is one known UAF artillery launch site on the north-eastern outskirts of Popasna (Ln 248), situated
approximately 1.4km from the nearest residential area. The UAF also has two checkpoints in Popasna – one
on the eastern edge of town (Ln 244) and another on the southern edge (Ln 243).
4.6.2. DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACK
123.
direction of UAF-controlled Bakhmut to attack LPR positions in the settlement. Damage to a civilian dwelling
(Ln 333), located 100 meters from an LPR base (Ln 335), was documented on 18 July 2014.308All subsequent
attacks on civilians and civilian objects documented by the Authors were perpetrated by LPR forces stationed
in LPR-controlled territory, primarily Pervomaysk.
124. On 26 November 2014, an MLRS Grad attack from Pervomaysk landed in the heart of the town (Ln 313),
(Ln 248).309 A further string of documented heavy artillery attacks were launched at Popasna by LPR forces
injury and extensive damage to civilian residences and a school. The shelling targeted a residential area on
the southern edge of town, hitting residential multi-stories (Ln 338, 343)310 and a school (Ln 339)311 located
600-700m from an UAF checkpoint (Ln 243). In addition, a residential area in the north east of Popasna
(Ln 336), located 960m from the nearest UAF position, was hit twice in two days.312 On 15 February 2015, a
further MLRS Grad attack hit a residential dwelling (Ln 247) located 1.8km from the nearest UAF position (Ln
243).313 The same area was subsequently hit using 152mm high-explosive projectiles launched from LPRcontrolled
Irmino and/or Kalinove on 24 August 2016, resulting in the destruction of civilian property.314
125. On 15 October 2016 a volley of eight 122-mm mortars launched from LPR-controlled territory hit
Popasna railway hospital, located approximately 450m away from an UAF checkpoint.315 On 18 October
https://www.pravda.
com.ua/news/2014/07/22/7032683/ (last acessed 26/11/2017)
N010K1075 (date, origin and damage).
MOV] - shows damage to civilian property and impact site analysis.
impact site analysis.
66 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
2016, a residential area on the eastern edge of Popasna was hit with 122mm mortars from Pervomaysk,
injuring one civilian and damaging civilian property. The nearest UAF position was 1km away.316
126. On 2 March 2017, an artillery attack using 152mm high-explosive projectiles launched from LPR-controlled
territory hit a civilian residence located just under 2km from the nearest UAF position.317
4.6.3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
127. The UAF attack of 18 July 2014 was evidently aimed at destroying the LPR base in Popasna. The incidental
damage to a civilian residence located 100m from the LPR position is likely to be deemed proportionate to
the military objective sought.
128.
of the town and away from densely populated areas. The loss of life and damage to civilian objects resulting
from MLRS Grad, high-explosive and mortar attacks by LPR forces happened at distances of 450m and 3km
from UAF positions. With Pervomaysk being located a mere 10km away, none of the attacks can be regarded
as proportionate incidental damage. At such distances, even a weapon as inaccurate as the MLRS Grad
should produce a smaller error radius. Thus, it may be inferred that LPR forces responsible for launching this
attack either intended to direct the attack against the civilian area, or alternatively, failed to take measures to
discriminate between civilian objects and military targets, in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i)
of the ICC Statute.
4.6.4. CONCLUSION
129. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that LPR forces responsible for launching attacks on
or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute. Furthermore, LPR forces liability should also be considered
under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute – attacks directed at educational and medical
facilities.
4.7 Troitske318
130. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of one on-site visit to Troitske on 27 March
2017. The documenters interviewed a total of seven witnesses and documented six impact sites.
4.7.1. TARGETED AREA
131. Troitske is a village in Ukraine-controlled part of Lugansk Province (Popasna Rayon) with an estimated
population of 1400 civilians.319 It is situated approximately 15km from the LPR-stronghold of Pervomaysk,320
321
MOV] - show damage to civilian property and impact site analysis.
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 67
132.
positions surround the settlement, located to the south, north and east of the village at a distance of 2km
from the centre of the village (Ln 306, 307, 308, 309, 312). No UAF positions or personnel were located in the
settlement itself.
4.7.2. DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACK
133.
a school (Ln 305) was hit in a MLRS attack launched by LPR forces. The nearest UAF position was 1.9km
away.322 Between 21 January and 15 February 2015, Troitske was attacked continuously from LPR positions
three serious injuries and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, including 122 civilian houses, a school,
church and administrative buildings (approximate position Ln 310).323 The nearest UAF positions were at
least 1.9km away.
134. Further artillery and mortar attacks hit a total of six civilian residences (Ln 311) and a clinic (Ln 113) on 18
August 2016,324 29 January 2017,325 2 February 2017326 and 4 February 2017.327 In all documented cases, the
impact sites were located between 800m and 2.2km from the nearest UAF positions.
4.7.3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
135. The shelling of Troitske by LPR forces appears to have been aimed at the circle of UAF positions located
at a radius of 2km from the centre of the village. Most attacks appear to have originated in LPR-controlled
miss their targets by 800m-2.2km cannot be regarded as proportionate incidental damage. It may therefore
be inferred that LPR forces responsible for launching this attack either intended to direct the attack against
the civilian area, or alternatively, failed to take measures to discriminate between civilian objects and military
targets, in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute.
4.7.4. CONCLUSION
136. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that LPR forces responsible for launching attacks on
(date, time, intensity of shelling, damage to civilian property and UAF positions); 026K956 (date, time, intensity of shelling,
(day, time, intensity of shelling, damage to civilian property and casualties); 0260K967 (date, time, intensity of shelling, damage
to civilian property and UAF positions); 026K956 (date, time, intensity of shelling, damage to civilian property and method of
damage to civilian property.
demonstrating origin of shelling.
to civilian property and crater analysis demonstrating origin and method of shelling.
68 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute. Furthermore, liability of LPR attackers should also be
considered under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute – attacks directed at educational
and medical facilities.
4.8 Marjinka328
137. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
12 September 2016, 16-19 December 2016, 26 February 2017, 04-06 June 2017 and 13 July 2017. The
documenters interviewed a total of 22 witnesses and documented 23 impact sites.
4.8.1. TARGETED AREA
138. Marjinka is a settlement of about 9,500 civilians,329 situated on the contact line between UAF and DPR
forces330 – the de facto border separates Marjinka and the adjoining DPR-controlled village of Oleksandrivka
on its eastern outskirts. To the northwest, Marjinka borders Petrovskyi district, a DPR stronghold. DPR forces
August 2014. The settlement is situated approximately 23km west-southwest of the centre of Donetsk City.
139. A major UAF-DPR checkpoint is located to the south of the settlement (Ln 231). Other UAF checkpoints
are located along or in close proximity to the contact line (Ln 227, 334), and UAF forces regularly patrol the
line itself. A UAF base is located on the southern outskirts (Ln 225), and another on the northern outskirts of
the settlements (Ln 229). A DPR military base is located 400 meters away from the closest civilian dwelling in
Marjinka (Ln 228).
4.8.2. DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACK
140. As part of its push to regain control over separatist-captured territory, the UAF attacked Marjinka using
heavy artillery from its positions in Pobyeda331 and Konstantinovka332 in July and early August 2014. Four
civilians died and civilian residences (Ln 59) and a school (Ln 240) were badly damaged as a result of MLRS
Grad attacks by the UAF on 11 July 2014, 19/21 July 2014 and early August 2014.333
141. After the town’s recapture by the UAF, DPR forces stationed in Oleksandrivka and Petrovskiy district
regularly attacked Marjinka using artillery, tanks and machine guns. DPR artillery attacks on 7 January 2015
resulted in the destruction of civilian property (Ln 242) some 430 meters from the nearest UAF position (Ln
229).334 On 25 January 2015, a DPR artillery attack damaged a school (Ln 240) located 450m from the nearest
UAF base.335
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
means of attack); 0134K954 (date, time of attacks, damage to civilian property); 0134920 (date, time, intensity of attacks,
school property.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
some 800 meters from the nearest UAF position.336 From 3 June 2015, DPR forces made several unsuccessful
attempts to recapture Marjinka, killing at least 28 people (including 9 civilians).337 The documented attacks
resulted in civilian deaths, injuries and damage to civilian property, however all impact sites documented by
the Authors were located in close proximity to UAF positions.338
142. In the autumn of 2016, a new round of attacks on Marjinka from DPR-controlled territory resulted in
further civilian injuries and damage to civilian infrastructure. Many of these attacks targeted the numerous
UAF positions situated on or near the contact line.339 Nevertheless, a 120mm artillery shelling on 16 August
2016 resulted in the destruction of a civilian residence (Ln 232) located some 500m from a UAF base (Ln
225).340 On 30 August 2016, another DPR artillery attack resulted in the destruction of three civilian residences
(Ln 226) located 1km from the nearest UAF position (Ln 227).341 On 14 November 2016, school N. 1 (Ln
240) was once again hit by DPR-launched 122mm mortar shells.342 At the time, the school was 620m away
from the nearest UAF position (Ln 225). The school was attacked once again in June 2017, this time with an
143. On 2 February 2017 at 7:30pm, a residential quarter in the northwest of Marjinka was attacked from
DPR positions to the east, using small-calibre artillery. The attack resulted in damage to civilian property on
Pervomayska and Horkoho streets (Ln 7-11).343 Analysis of the impact site and shell fragment recovered from
the site344 indicates that the attack was conducted using 30mm BMP-2 cannon. At the time of the attack,
approximately 1,4km away (Ln 229).
4.8.3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
144.
have the misfortune of living there are entitled to the protection of international humanitarian law and,
crucially, the principle of distinction. The number and density of UAF combatants in Marjinka would render
in injury to civilians and destruction of civilian objects go beyond the lawful parameters of ‘incidental loss’.
2015, available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/162116 (last accessed: 3/11/2017); Witness statements: 0134K1016 (date,
intensity of attacks and damage to property); 0134K953 (location of UAF base); N003K1064 (date, time of attacks, damage
to civilian property); N003K1065 (date, time of attacks, intensity, means, damage to civilian property). Videos and photos in
folder [damage] - show damage to civilian property. Videos and photos in folder [shell-remains] - show measurement of the
shell that hit house.
December 2016.
origin of the attack.
70 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
145. UAF attacks in July and early August 2014 merit further investigation to establish the location of DPR
positions at the time of the attacks. The UAF weapon of choice – MLRS Grad – is highly inaccurate and
therefore inherently indiscriminate when used in densely populated areas. Serious questions remain as to
the suitability and proportionality of using this type of weapon in urban warfare in eastern Ukraine.
146. Although the majority of DPR attacks on Marjinka throughout 2015 and 2016 were aimed at legitimate
UAF targets, a number of attacks documented above veered beyond the lawful limit of ‘incidental loss’. The
Authors submit that all artillery attacks on civilian objects located 400m or more from known UAF positions
attacks intentionally directed at civilians and/or civilian objects were in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC)
or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
147. The attacks that took place on 2 February 2017 targeted a civilian residential area, situated at a distance
of 1km from the nearest UAF military objective. The BMP-2 cannon used to perpetrate the attack has a range
of 4km and an accuracy range well below 1km when stationary. Consequently, it may be inferred that DPR
forces responsible for launching this attack either intended to direct the attack against the civilian area, or
alternatively failed to take measures to discriminate between civilian objects and military targets, in violation
of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute.
4.8.4. CONCLUSION
148. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that those responsible for launching attacks on civilians
and civilian objects in Marjinka from July 2014 to June 2017, targeting areas situated more than 400 meters
Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC). Furthermore, the liability of DPR forces responsible for the attacks against schools
and kindergartens should also be considered under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute –
attacks directed at educational facilities.
Stanytsia Luhanska – Valuiske345
149. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of three on-site visits to Stanytsia Luhanska
and Valuiske on 1-6 November 2015, 16-19 December 2015, 07 April 2016. The documenters interviewed a
total of 35 witnesses and documented 19 impact sites. 4.9.1 Targeted Area
TARGETED AREA
150. Stanytsia Luhanska is a settlement of 13,700 inhabitants346 located on Ukraine-controlled territory in
Luhansk Province.347 The town is situated approximately 15km from LPR-controlled Luhansk City to the
southwest (8km between the nearest buildings), and 17km from the closest marker on Ukraine-Russian
border. The south and southwest edge of Stanytsia Luhanska is between 500m and 1.5km from Seversky
Donets River that forms the contact line between UAF and LPR forces since August 2014. Stanytsia Luhanska
villages of Makarove and Valuiske are located to the east-north-east of Stanytsia Luhanska and form one
continuous semi-urban settlement with Stanytsia Luhanska.
151. At the time of the July 2014 attack, the only known military objectives in or around the settlement were
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 71
an LPR checkpoint on the bridge over the Seversky Donets River (Ln 516), situated approximately 530m from
the southwest edge of the settlement and 3,7km from the impact sites on and around Ostrovskogo street
(Ln 517), as well as the LPR base in the police headquarters building (Ln 518). Following the UAF takeover
edge of town at the intersection of Schevchenko and Moskva-Donbass streets (Ln 519). There are no known
military objectives in Valuiske – the closest UAF position is located at a distance of 2,5km from the settlement
(Ln 520).
DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS
152.
rockets onto the town’s police headquarters (Ln 518) and civilian residences on Ostrovskogo Street (Ln 517).348
from these aircraft.349 Video taken directly after the attack shows missile remnants from the attacks, which
350
station or targeted civilians residences on the day of the attack.351 As a result of the attack, 11 civilians lost
their lives, 16 were seriously injured352 and 11 civilian residences were badly damaged or destroyed.353
153. As they lost control over the settlement, LPR separatist forces launched an MLRS Grad attack on Kalinina
and Krupskoy streets (Ln 521 - residential area on the southern edge of town approximately 1km from the
nearest UAF position) on 18 August 2014. The attack resulted in the deaths of four civilians.354 Following the
recapture of Stanytsia Luhanska by the UAF on 21 August 2014, the settlement came under sustained artillery
attack from LPR positions. On 24 August 2014, the town was shelled resulting in three civilian injuries.355
On the same day, the town’s hospital (Ln 522) was shelled with at least 22 mortar shells (122mm calibre),
damaging 356 The hospital was located approximately 2.5km
from the nearest UAF position at the time of the attack, but may have been visited by a company of UAF
soldiers several hours prior to the attack.357 On 29 August 2014, the town was shelled again using MLRS Grad
missiles from the direction of LPR-controlled Nikolayevka,358 resulting in damage to civilian property.359
154. On 2 September 2014, an MLRS Grad attack originating from LPR-controlled Vesela Hora and/or Krasniy
Shevchenko, Moskva-Donbass, Barabashova and Karl Marx streets (Ln 525).360 The shelling also resulted
in the partial destruction of school n.2 (Ln 524) and a forestry museum (Ln 523).361 A UAF checkpoint and
of Schevchenko and Moskva-Donbass streets (Ln 519),362 between 300m and 1km away from the impact
72 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
sites. Sporadic artillery and mortar attacks on Stanytsia Luhanska from LPR-controlled territory took place
throughout January 2015, damaging civilian housing and a school.363
155. Civilian objects in Valuiske – residential blocks and a kindergarten (Ln 526) – were hit in a series of mortar
and MLRS Grad attacks on 18 October 2014, 4 December 2014, 15 February 2015 and 22 August 2015. The
attacks, originating from LPR-controlled territory across the Siversky-Donets River, resulted in at least one
civilian being seriously injured and the damage and/or destruction of civilian property. All impact sites were
located at least 1km away from the nearest UAF position.364
LEGAL ASSESSMENT
156. At the time of the July 2014 UAF attack, there were no LPR combatants or military equipment inside
Stanytsia Luhanska – the closest LPR position being at least 2km away. It is conceivable that the attack by
UAF aircraft, particularly on the police headquarters building, was conducted under the assumption that
LPR combatants were still in the building. As a result, it may be argued that the attack was not intentionally
directed at civilians and civilian objects. However, this attack was clearly not based on sound intelligence of
LPR combatant positions in the settlement. Moreover, the use of unguided missiles launched from assault
aircraft on a densely populated urban area implies that the UAF had no intention of discriminating between
any potential LPR combatants and civilians in the area. Therefore, as a minimum, in perpetrating this attack,
the UAF displayed a total absence of proportionality between anticipated incidental harm to civilians and the
military advantage sought – in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC
Statute.
157. Artillery and mortar attacks on civilian areas by LPR separatists during and after the UAF recapture of
Stanytsia Luhanska and Valuiske also demonstrate a marked absence of ability or desire to discriminate
between military objectives and civilian objects. Instead, these attacks bare the hallmark of reprisals for the
loss of territory. Distances between UAF positions and impact sites range from 300m to 2.5km. Whereas it
may be argued that hits on civilian areas within 400m of UAF infantry armored vehicle launch sites constitute
proportionate incidental collateral damage to the military objective sought, any damage and injury caused
beyond that distance demonstrates the attackers’ unwillingness or inability to discriminate between civilians
and combatants – either in their choice of weaponry or in the way they use it. Therefore, attacks that caused
damage to civilian areas beyond the acceptable accuracy range should be regarded as a failure to discriminate
between civilians and combatants, or at the very least, a total absence of proportionality between anticipated
incidental harm to civilians and the military advantage sough - in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC) or
Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
158. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that those responsible for the intentional UAF attack on
Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
159. Likewise, the Authors recommend that those responsible for the intentional LPR attacks on civilians and
civilian objects located 400m and beyond UAF artillery positions in Stanitsia Luhanska in August-September
(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
160. Furthermore, the liability of LPR forces responsible for the attacks on schools and hospitals should also
0204K822 (attack on school on 26 January 2015); 0204K802, 0204K822 (attack on 31 January 2015).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 73
be considered under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute – attacks directed at educational
and medical facilities.
Svitlodarsk - Luhanske365
161. The information and analysis provided below is based on documentation by Truth Hounds Documentation
Field Mission on behalf of the Authors, conducted in the course of three on-site visits to Svitlodarsk on 28-
30 December 2016, 12-16 and 28 March 2017. The documenters interviewed a total of 18 witnesses and
documented eight impact sites.
4.10.1. TARGETED AREA
162. Svitlodarsk is a small urban settlement located in the Ukraine-controlled part on Donetsk Province on the
banks of the Luhan River,366 with a population of 12,000 civilians.367 The town is adjoined by the settlement
of Luhanske to the north, with a population of 2200 civilians.368 The settlements are situated 14km from
DPR-controlled Vuhlehirsk, 18km from the strategic city of Debaltseve and 20km from the DPR stronghold of
Horlivka.
163. Svitlodarsk and Luhanske are encircled by UAF positions (Ln 276, 282, 274, 275, 289) – the distance
between UAF positions and civilian objects in Svitlodarsk and Luhanske ranges from 2.5km to 5km. There are
no known UAF objectives inside the two settlements. In February 2015, DPR forces were stationed 4km from
the centre of Svitlodarsk (Ln 526).
4.10.2. DESCRIPTION/OVERVIEW OF ATTACKS
164. F rom 24 January 2015 to 29 January 2015 the area was subject to intense shelling campaign by DPR
forces usingMLRS Grad and mortars . In Svitlodarsk, this resulted in severe damage to a hospital (Ln 280),
kindergarten (Ln 283), school (Ln 284) and a number of civilian commercial and residential properties. A
nurse was killed as a result of the attack on the hospital.369 In Luhanske, a hospital, kindergarten and several
civilian properties were severely damaged in the shelling, resulting in the death of three civilians and injuries
to two others.370 UAF positions were located at a distance of 2.5km and 5km from the impact sites.
165. Svitlodarsk was again attacked by DPR forces on 9 February 2015, injuring three civilians and resulting in
the destruction of a shop (Ln 277) and civilian residences.371 A DPR attack on 13 February 2015 resulted in the
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2017/zb_chnn_0117.pdf (last accessed 25/11/2017)
(date, time, intensity of shelling, damage to civilian property); 0079K1093 (date, time, intensity of shelling, damage to civilian
property and casualties); 0237K960 (date, time, damage to civilian property); 00791094 (date, time, intensity of shelling,
damage to civilian property); 0237K1040 (date, time, intensity of shelling, means, damage to civilian property); 0237K963
damage to the property of hospital.
(casualties and time of incident; 0238K1049 (date, time of shelling, damage to civilian property and casualties). Videos
to civilian property); 0237K1041 (date, time, origin, damage to civilian property and casualties); 0237K1043 (time, intensity of
shelling, damage to property, casualties). Video [V70316-115859.mp4] - shows damage to civilian property.
74 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
partial or total destruction of a shop, four residential blocks, a school and a kindergarten.372 A further attack
residential properties were hit.373 During all of the above cases, UAF positions were located at a distance of
2.5km and 5km from the impact sites.
166.
territory in Mironivka landed on a civilian residential property in Svitlodarsk, injuring two civilians. The nearest
DPR position at the time of the attack was 4km away (Ln 526).
4.10.3. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
167. At the time of all above-documented attacks, there were no UAF troops or positions in Svitlodarsk and
Luhanske, giving them the status of undefended civilian settlements. The fact that a UAF base, checkpoint
does not change the status of the settlements. At such distances, there is no excuse for failing to distinguish
between military and civilian objects. Thus, MLRS Grad and mortar attacks perpetrated on the settlements
on 24 January to 29 January 2015, 9 February 2015 and 13 February 2017 presented no concrete military
advantage to DPR forces and served no legitimate military objective – a grave violation of the principle of
distinction. Similarly, with the nearest DPR position being 4km from the settlements, the 19 February 2015
artillery attack by the UAF was in violation of the principle of distinction. Consequently, the attacks can be
(in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) (in NIAC) of the ICC Statute.
4.10.4. CONCLUSION
168. In light of the foregoing, the Authors recommend that those DPR and UAF combatants responsible
for launching attacks on civilians and civilian objects in Svitlodarsk and Luhanske in January and February
Furthermore, the liability of DPR forces should also be considered under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv)
of the ICC Statute – attacks directed at educational and medical facilities.
Other documented attacks
169. The Authors have documented further attacks on civilian objects, which may amount to war crimes under
the ICC Statute as direct or indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. Due to the comparatively small
their evidence of these attacks in table form. This is not intended to detract for the seriousness of these
attacks, nor in any way suggest a lesser criminal liability of those responsible.
0237K960 (damage to civilian property); 0237K959 (origin, damage to civilian property, date, time, intensity of shelling);
0237K1042 (date, time, damage to civ property, origin); 0237K962 (date, time, damage to civ property); 0137K957 (date, time,
intensity of shelling, damage to civilian property); 0237K956 (date, time, intensity of shelling, damage to civilian property).
Videos [V70316-110452.mp4, V70317-143558.mp4] - crater analysis. Video [ V70316-111409.mp4] - demonstrates means of
shelling and N-E direction of shelling. Video [V70315-151629.mp4] - demonstrates that multi-storey 47 (P286) was damaged
shelling from DPR.
to civilian property); 0237K1045 (date, time, intensity of shelling and damage to civilian property); 0238K976 (date, timing,
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 75
4.11.1. TABLE OF OTHER ATTACKS DOCUMENTED BY THE AUTHORS
CASE FILE DATE/TIME IMPACT SITE MEANS/ METHOD OUTCOME LEGAL ASSESSMENT EVIDENCE
204
28
November
2014
Ambulance vehicle
travelling on Road P22
between Stanytsia
Luhanska and Luhansk
City (attack began after
vehicle passed LPR
checkpoint)
Mortar attack on
vehicle from Ukrainecontrolled
territory.
Once vehicle passed
LPR checkpoint mortar
vehicle until it reached
a turning.
Doctor sustained
injuries to both legs.
Vehicle damaged
from shrapnel.
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC.
Witness statement: 0204K813 (date,
timing, origin, method, damage and
casualties).
211/221
6 December
2014; 29
October
2014; 8
February
2015; 18
July 2016.
Novomykhailivka (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Donetsk
Province) - hospital,
church and civilian
residences. Nearest UAF
500 meters from impact
sites.
Mortar and MLRS
Grad attacks on civilian
objects from DPRcontrolled
territory.
Damage to hospital,
church and civilian
residences. Four
civilians wounded.
Lack of proportionality
between anticipated
incidental harm to
civilians/civilian objects/
the environment and
the military advantage
sought in violation of
Article 8(2)(b)(iv); Possible
attack directed against
medical facilities under
Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or
Article 8(2)(e)(iv).
Witness statements: 0221K872 (timing
and intensity of shelling, damage to
property and her injuries; 0221K873
(date, timing, intensity of shelling, damage
to property and casualties);
0221K847 (date, timing and intensity
of shelling, damage to property and
casualties; 0221K982 (time, intensity of
shelling, damage to property); 0221K983
(timing, intensity, casualties and damage);
0221K984 (date, timing, intensity,
casualties and damage);
0221K871 (timing, direction and intensity
of shelling, casualties); 0221K873
casualties.
Video evidence: [ V60913-110940.
mp4 ] - shows impact crater analysis
demonstrating origin; [ VID00034.MP4
] - shows damage to property, victim’s
injuries, impact places.
Photos evidence: [ P60913-105316.jpg,
P60913-105336.jpg, P60913-105347.jpg
] - shows medical documents of victim
injuries; [ P60913-112335.jpg ] - shows
damage to property.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 76
246
18 and 20
October
2014
Novotroitske (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Donetsk
Province) - kindergarten
(Ln 295), farm (Ln 291),
civilian residences.
Nearest UAF positions (Ln
294, 292, 293) between
600m and 1.3km from
impact sites.
MLRS Grad attacks
on civilian objects
from DPR-controlled
territory.
Two civilians dead;
Three civilians
injured; Damage
to kindergarten;
Damage to farm;
Damage to over 100
civilian residences.
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects OR
failure to discriminate
between civilian and
military objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC.
Witness statements: 0246K1051 (date,
time, intensity of shelling, damage
to civilian property and casualties);
0246K1052 (date, timing of shelling,
damage to civilian property); 0246K1053
(date, timing of shelling, damage to
civilian property and casualties);
0246K1050 (date, time, intensity of
shelling, damage to civilian property and
casualties)..
Videos and photo evidence
MOV] - show damage to kindergarten
and demonstrate origin of the attack;
hole demonstrating origin of the attack.
All photos and videos in folder show
damage to civilian property.
N6
3 August
2014; 8
December
2014; 29
April 2015;
13 August
2015.
part of Donetsk Province)-
school (Ln 328) and civilian
residences. The nearest
UAF position was located
1.43km away from impact
sites (Ln 329).
Artillery attack from
DPR-controlled
territory.
Severe damage to
school structure;
Damage to civilian
residences
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC and/or
attack directed against
educational facilities
under Article 8(2)(b)(ix)
or Article 8(2)(e)(iv).
Witness statement: N006K1068 (date,
time, intensity of shelling, damage to
civilian property).
Video evidence
school and crater analysis demonstrating
origin of the attack.
N9
19
December
2015
Novgorodske (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Donetsk
Province) - kindergarten
(Ln 332) in. Nearest UAF
position was located
2.36km from impact site
(Ln 316).
82mm mortar attack
(exact origin unknown)
Damage to
kindergarten
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC and/or
attack directed against
educational facilities
under Article 8(2)(b)(ix)
or Article 8(2)(e)(iv).
Witness statement: N009K1071 (date,
time, intensity and damage).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 77
N12 31 May
2015
Zajtseve (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Donetsk
in. Nearest UAF position
was 970m from impact
site (Ln 343).
Mortar attack (exact
origin unknown). Injured civilian.
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i) in IAC and Article 8(2)
(e)(i) in NIAC.
Witness statements: N012K1079;
N012K1080 (date, time, intensity of
shelling and casualties); N012K1081 (date
and casualties).
injury.
N11
8 November
2014; 24
April 2015;
August
2015.
Chermalyk (Ukrainecontrolled
part of
Donetsk Province) -
kindergarten (Ln 344),
school, agricultural school
(Ln 347) and civilian
properties (Ln 345) in
Nearest UAF position was
1.1km away (Ln 346; 348).
BPM-1 infantry vehicle
cannon or similar
from DPR-controlled
territory.
One civilian dead,
two injured; Damage
to kindergarten,
school, agricultural
school and several
civilian residences.
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC and/or
attack directed against
educational facilities
under Article 8(2)(b)(ix)
or Article 8(2)(e)(iv).
Witness statements: N012K1082 (date,
time, intensity of shelling, damage and
casualties);
N012K1083 (date, time, damage and
casualties); N012K1084 (time, origin and
intensity of shelling, casualties.
Video evidence
damage to school property. Photos
jpg
jpg
to kindergarten property; Photos in
show damage to civilian property and
documents of death.
227
22 August
2016, 16
October
2016, 28
October
2016; 1
March 2017.
Zolote-4 (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Luhansk
Province) – civilian
residences (Ln 267, 266,
269). Nearest UAF position
was a checkpoint between
300 and 500m away.
AGS-15 grenade
launcher and high
calibre machine gun
from LPR-controlled
territory.
One civilian dead and
one injured.
Lack of proportionality
between anticipated
incidental harm to
civilians/civilian objects/
the environment and
the military advantage
sought in violation of
Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
Witness statement
0227K925, 0227K926, 0227K1036 (date,
time, intensity of attack, damage to
civilian property, casualties and origin of
attack);
0227K1034 (date, time, intensity of
attack, damage to civilian property and
casualties).
Video evidence
show method, origin of attack. Video
civilian property.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 78
228
8 August
2016; 29
August
2016.
Toretsk (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Donetsk
Province) – civilian
residences (Ln 270, 271).
Nearest UAF position was
1.33km.
Artillery and/or mortar
from DPR-controlled
territory (Horlivka).
Seven civilians
injured; Civilian
residences damaged.
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC.
Witness statement: 0228K1037 (date,
time, intensity of shelling, damage
to civilian property and casualties);
0228K1038, 0228K1039 (date, time,
intensity of shelling, damage to civilian
property, origin and casualties).
Video evidence
show damage to civilian property Video
civilian property.
261 8 November
2016
Novgorodske (Ukrainecontrolled
part of Donetsk
Province) – civilian
residences (Ln 318).
Nearest UAF position was
1km away (Ln 316).
122mm mortar or
artillery launched
from DPR-controlled
Horlivka.
One civilian dead;
Five civilian houses
damaged.
Attack intentionally
directed at civilians and/
or civilian objects in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)
(i)/(ii) in IAC and Article
8(2)(e)(i) in NIAC.
Witness statement:0261K1059 (date, time
of shelling, damage to civilian property
and casualties); 0261K1060 (date, time
of shelling, damage to civilian property,
casualties, origin and means of shelling).
0261K1061 date, time of shelling, damage
to civilian property).
Photos
damage to civilian property.
Videos
civilian property, crater analysis.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR
TABLE OF ATTACKS DOCUMENTED BY OTHER ORGANISATIONS
170.
legal assessment of potential criminal liability connected to these events. Nevertheless, the events described below appear, on the face of it, to constitute direct
or indiscriminate attacks on civilians and vital civilian infrastructure, and therefore merit further investigation by the ICC Prosecutor.
LOCATION/ EVENT DATE IMPACT ON CIVILIANS OVERVIEW SOURCE
Avdiivka Shelling on
May 13
May 13
2017 4 people killed
On 14 May , the SMM reported that four people were killed
led separatist control – exploded on a house in Avdiivka.
Tragically, this latest instance of Russian-led forces shelling
civilian targets left two small girls orphaned. The SMM
reported on 13 May on the death of a non-combatant
male while under medical care for wounds sustained in the
attacks on the civilians and end this senseless violence.
OSCE, ‘Ongoing Violations of International
Commitments by the Russian Federation
in Ukraine’ <https://osce.usmission.gov/ongoing-
principles-russia-ukraine/> Accessed 26 July 2017.
Dokuchaievsk power
station shelling 15-Apr-16
Damage to civilian
objects crucial to the
survival of the civilian
population
In the Government controlled village of Stepne, residents
have had no access to water since the local power station
in Dokuchaievsk was damaged by shelling on 15 April 2016.
Water pipes across territory controlled by the LPR have been
severely damaged due to shelling, limiting access to water for
the population.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15
November 2016’ <http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport16th_EN.pdf>
Accessed 19 July 2017
hospital shelling
24-Jun-16
and 23 Jul-
16
Hospital shelling while
60 patients receiving
treatment
On 24 June 2016, the children’s ward of a polyclinic on
windows, damaging doors and the heating system. On 23 July
2016, Hospital No. 21 in Kuibyshevskii district of Donetsk city
to the medical needs of 60 patients. Two patient rooms and
the surgical ward were
OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine
16 May to 15 August 2016 ‘ <http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/
Ukraine15thReport.pdf> Accessed 25 July 2017
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 80
Horlivka residential
areas explosions 04-Jul-16
On 4 July the SMM recorded two explosions assessed as
outgoing mortar rounds from a residential area in “DPR”-
controlled Horlivka where the SMM had also observed two
sets of fresh tracks indicating that the weapons had moved
from a nearby industrial complex with large storage facilities
civilians in eastern Ukraine’ <http://www.
osce.org/ukraine-smm/300276?download=true>
Accessed 26 July 2017
Mykytivka in Horlivka
school shelling
9-10 July
2016
20 local residents
shelled while hiding in
school
On the night of 9-10 July 2016, a school in Sakhanka, School
No. 84 in Mykytivka in Horlivka, and School No. 7 in Horlivka
were damaged by shelling. At the time, approximately 20 local
residents were hiding in the basement of School No. 84 in
Mykytivka. When visiting the schools in late July 2016, OHCHR
their vicinity.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August
2016 ‘ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Countries/UA/Ukraine15thReport.pdf> Accessed 25
July 2017
Makiivka,
Dokuchaievsk and
Marinka School
Shelling
13-14
September
2016 to 4
October
2016
Unrecorded
Between 13 and 14 September, two schools in territory
under ‘Donetsk people’s republic’-control were hit; School
No. 44 in Makiivka was shelled, and bullets from small arms
hit School No. 3 in Dokuchaievsk during the school day. On
4 October, School No. 2 in Government-controlled Marinka
was shelled. The following day, on 5 October, schools No. 77,
explosion.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15
November 2016’ <http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport16th_EN.pdf>
Accessed 19 July 2017
Donetsk Water and
heating cut from
shelling
Feb-17 1 million residents
Around 1 million people in areas of Donetsk City outside
Government control were left without water or heat for 24
hours following the shelling, which had damaged electricity
heating supply. Temperatures were frigid, with civilians facing
-20 degrees Celsius without adequate shelter, heat or access
to water — all essential for survival.
United Nations, ‘Thousands of Civilians
Risk Losing Access to Basic Necessities
as Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine,
Security Council Told’ <https://www.un.org/
press/en/2017/sc12704.doc.htm> Accessed 26 July
2017
Maiorsk checkpoint
shelling with civilians
queuing nearby
27-Oct-16 No casualties reported
On 27 October, the Maiorsk checkpoint was closed due
in the evening another entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka
launcher. The same checkpoint was shelled on the night of 8
November, while civilians were queuing nearby. No casualties
were reported.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15
November 2016’ <http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport16th_EN.pdf>
Accessed 19 July 2017
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 81
Water supply to
Toretsk; Gas supply
to Marjinka and
Krasnohorivka
22-Nov-16
40,000 residents left
with no access to water
for 10 days; 15,000
residents left with no
central gas supply for
two years.
On 22 November 2016, damage to a water pipeline running
through the ‘no-man’s land’ left 40,000 residents of the
Government-controlled town of Toretsk with no access to
forces in Avdiivka and the DPR armed groups in Yasynuvata
repeatedly disrupted the services of the Donetsk Filter
Station which serves 345,000 people on both sides of the
contact line. Also, continuous shelling has obstructed the
restoration of gas supplies for about 15,000 people living in
the Government-controlled Marjinka and Krasnohorivka. The
gas supply to the two towns stopped more than two years
ago due to shelling damage.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine
16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017’
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/
UAReport17th_EN.pdf>
Donetsk
indiscriminate
shelling power and
water supply cut
January and
February
2017
1.1 million residents
deprived of water
In Donetsk region, shelling in January and February 2017
damaged water pipes, depriving 1.1 million residents on
both sides of the contact line of access to water for periods
of between one and three days, and compromised the
sustainable supply of clean water to Mariupol city.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine
16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017’
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/
UAReport17th_EN.pdf>
Donestsk Filtration
System shelling
and Mariupol water
supply
January
2017 -
795,000 civilians
dependent on water
facilities
Indiscriminate shelling and the presence of Ukrainian Armed
Forces and armed groups near water facilities in Donetsk
region continued to have a detrimental impact on the supply
of water on both sides of the contact line. The Donetsk
Filtration Station, which serves 345,000 people1 in Avdiivka,
Yasynuvata and parts of Donetsk, stopped operations six
times during the reporting period due to renewed shelling
and resulting damage. Each such incident resulted in water
supply interruptions on both sides of the contact line and
threatened the life and physical integrity of employees.
Mariupol, where nearly 450,000 people currently reside, has
back-up reservoir since January 2017 due to damage to the
South Donbas water pipeline. Another concern is shelling
in the vicinity of the First Lift Pumping Station of the South
Donbas water pipeline. This facility is an essential part of
stations which, in turn, process water for over one million
people living on both sides of the contact line, from Mariupol
in the south to the northwestern border of Donetsk region.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15
May 2017 ‘ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Countries/UA/UAReport18th_EN.pdf> Accessed 24
July 2017
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 82
Dolomitne projectile
home destruction 10-Apr-17 Elderly couple’s home hit
by projectile
On 10 April, in Dolomitne, where OHCHR observed the
presence of armed groups close to residential houses, the
home of an elderly couple was hit by a projectile and burned
down. When visiting shelled areas in territory controlled by
armed groups, OHCHR often noted fresh traces of heavy
vehicles, indicating the recent presence of armed formations.
OHCHR, ‘Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15
May 2017 ‘ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Countries/UA/UAReport18th_EN.pdf> Accessed 24
July 2017
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 83
Conclusion
171. The Authors have documented evidence of 134 episodes, which took place in 22 settlements on or in the
vicinity of the ‘contact line’ between the UAF and separatist forces (DPR and LPR). The attacks resulted in at
least 100 civilian deaths, 162 civilian injuries and hundreds of cases of total or partial destruction to civilian
dwellings and vital infrastructure.
172. Using the ICC Statute, ICC Elements of Crimes and applicable jurisprudence, the Authors have determined
that evidence supporting these attacks supports a reasonable basis to believe that the attacks amount to
war crimes under Article 8 of the ICC Statute – either as attacks intentionally directed against the civilians
and/or civilian objects (Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) or Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute), or as attacks launched against
military objectives that lack of proportionality between anticipated incidental harm to civilians/civilian objects/
the environment and the military advantage sought (in violation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute).
Furthermore, a large number of attacks were directed at medical and educational facilities, which amounts
to a separate crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the ICC Statute.
173. The Authors respectfully request the ICC Prosecutor to launch a full investigation into all of the abovedocumented
episodes, with the view of bringing those responsible to justice.
84 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
5. Utilizing the presence of a civilian
or other protected person to render
certain points, areas or military forces
immune from military operations
174.
positioning artillery launch sites, military equipment and/or personnel in close proximity to civilians and
civilian objects. In so doing, the warring parties place civilians in serious danger of death and injury as well as
risking the destruction or severe damage to civilian dwellings and important infrastructure – in violation of
the principle of distinction. Using the civilian population as ‘human shields’ in this manner to render certain
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations is a war crime under the ICC statute in both
IAC, and indirectly in NIAC. The Authors respectfully request the ICC prosecutor to investigate this practice
with the view of bringing those responsible to account.
5.1 Analytical framework
175. Using civilians as ‘human shields’ to prevent attacks against military objects is a serious violation of the
Geneva Conventions374 and amounts to a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the ICC Statute (in IAC).
According to the ICC Elements of Crimes, the prosecution must establish that the perpetrator ‘moved or
otherwise took advantage of the location of one or more civilians or other [protected] persons [intending]
to shield a military objective from attack or shield, favour or impede military operations’.375
is wide enough to include displacing civilians to military installations, as well as the placement of military
equipment and personnel at or in close proximity to civilian objects and/or densely populated civilian areas.
on a case-by-case basis. Important factors to consider include the types and known accuracy of weapons
used by the warring parties, the parties’ access to information on the presence and concentration of civilians,
and their practical ability to position military objectives in alternative locations.
176. There is no requirement to show that actual harm was caused to the civilians in question. According to
the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaskic:
‘Using protected [persons] as human shields constitutes a violation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
regardless of whether those human shields were actually attacked or harmed. Indeed, the prohibition is designed
to protect [protected persons] from being exposed to the risk of harm, and not only to the harm itself.’376
177.
overriding principle of distinction dictates that ‘the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
general protection against the dangers arising from military operations’.377 Accordingly, the ICRC considers
the prohibition against using civilians and protected persons as human shields to be applicable in NIAC by
virtue of customary international law.378 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Blaskic agreed with this assessment
and determined that using protected persons as human shields amounts to the war crime of inhuman or
Geneva Conventions.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule97 (last accessed:
16/11/2017).
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 85
cruel treatment in NIAC.379 Accordingly, the Authors respectfully submit that using the civilian population as
‘human shields’ to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations is a war
crime in NIAC under Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the ICC Statute.
5.2 Documented evidence of utilising civilians as ‘human
shields’
178.
LPR and DPR forces – have regularly placed military equipment and/or personnel on or in the vicinity of
civilian objects and in densely populated civilian areas.
179.
380
180. The Authors note that the following instances of using civilians as ‘human shields’ is likely to amount to
the mere ‘tip of the iceberg’ in what appears to be a widespread practice:
• On 2 June 2014, a group of LPR combatants attacked a Ukrainian border post in Luhansk City from
the roofs of surrounding civilian multi-story residences with civilians still present in the buildings.381 The
assault lasted for two days.382
• On 30 October 2014, the UAF positioned a military base on the premises of a school in Krasnohorivka (Ln
218) for several months, leading to the school’s partial destruction.383
•
150 meters away from the densely populated Kamyanyi Brid district of Luhansk.384, 385
•
at a civilian clinic in Stanytsia Luhanska,386 depriving it of its protected status. The clinic was subsequently
shelled by the LPR.387
• On 5 June 2015, UAF used the premises of a school in Marjinka (Ln 238) to repel an attack by DPR forces.388
• On 23 August 2016, a school in Marjinka (Ln 238) was partially damaged in an attack by DPR forces on a
UAF checkpoint (Ln 239) positioned 100 meters away.389
http://www.
osce.org/ukraine-smm/300276?download=true (last accessed: 27/11/2017), p.4.
school.
Case
86 IPHR . TRUTH HOUNDS . ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
• On 13 January 2017, an attack on a UAF base in Novoselivka positioned 100 meters away from a block of
civilian houses led to extensive damage to civilian property (Ln 103).390
181. Moreover, civilian lives and infrastructure are not only threatened by permanent or semi-permanent
military installations such as military quarters, bases, checkpoints and stationary launch sites. As observed
by the OSCE, ‘civilians have reported that the shelling occurred overnight and that they often saw equipment
brought in for these purposes, or that members of “DPR” and “LPR” armed formations had approached them
controlled by the UAF).391
5.3 Conclusion
182. As demonstrated by the examples above, the practice of placing military objectives (personnel, equipment
warring parties throughout the entire period of documentation. The Authors note that the above-mentioned
examples are but a small sample of the practice of using human shields, which appears to be ubiquitous.
183. Such practices unnecessarily endanger civilian lives and infrastructure – exposing them to indiscriminate
attacks, particularly in light of the inaccurate nature of the weapons deployed by all sides. Moreover, the
presence of armed positions in populated areas increases other risks and hardships for civilians. As pointed
out by the OSCE, ‘[o]n both sides of the contact line residents have complained of being harassed by members
bad behaviour towards the local population’.392
184. The Authors respectfully submit that there is a reasonable basis to believe that placing military equipment
the war crime of using civilians as human shields (Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the ICC Statute in IAC), or in the
alternative, as inhuman or cruel treatment (Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the ICC Statute in NIAC). Consequently, the
Authors respectfully request the ICC Prosecutor to investigate all such instances with the view of prosecuting
those responsible.
show damage to civilian property.
http://www.
osce.org/ukraine-smm/300276?download=true (last accessed: 27/11/2017), p.4.
http://www.
osce.org/ukraine-smm/300276?download=true (last accessed: 27/11/2017), p.5.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN EASTERN UKRAINE . TRUTH HOUNDS . IPHR 87
6. Conclusion and request
185.
as well as information obtained from other organisations, the Authors have applied the ICC Statute, ICC
Elements of Crimes and applicable jurisprudence to conclude that there is a reasonable basis to believe the
• That from June to September 2014, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation attacked Ukrainian
settlements and military positions on the territory of Ukraine, in a series of cross-border attacks. These
• That at least 134 attacks on civilians and/or civilian objects taking place in 22 settlements may amount to
war crimes as attacks intentionally directed at civilians under Article 8(2)(b)(i)/(ii) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(i)
(in NIAC) or as indiscriminate attacks under Article 8(2)(b)(iv). In addition, some of these attacks may also
amount to attacks intentionally launched at medical, educational and/or religious facilities under Article
8(2)(b)(ix) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(e)(iv) (in NIAC).
•
protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations, in
violation of Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) (in IAC) or Article 8(2)(c)(i) (in NIAC).
186. Documented attacks resulted in at least 100 civilian deaths, 162 civilian injuries and hundreds of cases of
total or partial destruction to civilian dwellings and vital infrastructure. Moreover, behind every documented
resulted in more than 10,000 deaths, the displacement of 1.5 million civilians (including 220,000 children)
placing military equipment and personnel in civilian areas.
187. For all of the above reasons, the Authors respectfully urge the ICC Prosecutor to seek authorisation
to open a full investigation into the Situation on Ukraine, with a view to bringing those responsible for war
crimes and crimes against humanity to justice.
© IPHR 2017. All rights reserved
Volume XII - Annexes 435-454