Volume XI - Annexes 359-434

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XI OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 359 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FAFT Recommendations (2012)
Annex 360 FATF, Special Recommendation III: Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets
(Text of the Special Recommendation and Interpretative Note) (October 2001, as
updated, adopted, and published February 2012)
Annex 361 International Maritime Organization, Report of the Ad Hoc Preparatory
Committee on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 2nd Session, 18–22 May 1987, IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5
Annex 362 NATO, NATO – Ukraine Cooperation in the Military Sphere (2012)
Annex 363 NATO, Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document (10 January
2012)
Annex 364 NATO Allied Command Operations, NATO Releases Imagery: Raises Questions
on Russia’s Role in Providing Tanks to Ukraine (14 June 2014)
Annex 365 Allied Powers Europe, New Satellite Imagery Exposes Russian Combat Troops
Inside Ukraine (28 August 2014)
Annex 366 NATO, NATO Standard, AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (April
2016)
Annex 367 NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping (undated)
Annex 368 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-484-1964 to Russian Federation Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (28 July 2014)
Annex 369 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (12 August 2014)
Annex 370 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2185 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (22 August 2014)
Annex 371 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (29 August 2014)
Annex 372 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2529 to Russian Federation Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (10 October 2014)
Annex 373 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 13355 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (14 October 2014)
Annex 374 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2717 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (3 November 2014)
Annex 375 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14587 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (24 November 2014)
Annex 376 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (31 July 2015)
Annex 377 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 13457 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (15 October 2015)
Annex 378 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-610-954 to the Russian Federation Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (19 April 2016)
Annex 379 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 8808 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (23 June 2016)
Annex 380 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2049 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (31 August 2016)
Annex 381 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14426 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (3 October 2016)
Annex 382 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-194/510-2518 to the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (2 November 2016)
Annex 383 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14284 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (11 November 2016)
Annex 384 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 16886 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (30 December 2016)
Annex 385 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-663-82 to the Russian Federation Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (13 January 2017)
Annex 386 Intercepted Conversation of Igor Bezler (17 April 2014)
Annex 387 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.22-3958/0/6 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB (22 May 2014)
Annex 388 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-4016/0/16-14 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB (24 May 2014)
Annex 389 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-4289/0/6 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB (3 June 2014)
Annex 390 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. F/42-3243 to the Russian Border Directorate of
the FSB (5 June 2014)
Annex 391 Intercepted Conversation Between Igor Girkin, Viktor Anosov, and Mykhaylo Sheremet
(11:30:47, 8 June 2014)
Annex 392 Protocol of Intercepted Conversations of Sergey Glazyev, Advisor to Russian President
Putin (12 June 2014)
Annex 393 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-5504/0/6-14 to the Russian Border
Directorate of the FSB (13 July 2014.)
Annex 394 Intercepted Conversation Between “Khmuryi” and “Sanych” (19:09:20, 16 July 2014)
Annex 395 Intercepted Conversation Between “Krot” and “Ryazan” (21:32:39, 17 July 2014)
Annex 396 Intercepted Conversation Between “Krot” and “Zmey” (13:09:27, 17 July 2014)
Annex 397 Intercepted Conversation Between “Khmuryi” and “Bibliotekar” (09:22:19, 17 July
2014)
Annex 398 Intercepted Conversation Between “Khmuryi” and “Buriatik” (09:08:26, 17 July 2014)
Annex 399 Intercepted Conversation Between “Krot” and “Khmuryi” (07:41:06, 18 July 2014)
Annex 400 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000292 (4
September 2014) (concerning Zhironovsky)
Annex 401 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014050000000015
(30 September 2014).
Annex 402 Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 to the Ukrainian
State Border Guard (delivered 11 October 2014)
Annex 403 Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 26-1209 to the Ukrainian State
Border Guard (7 November 2014)
Annex 404 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000293 (11
November 2014)
Annex 405 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000291 (3
December 2014)
Annex 406 Ukraine State Border Service Letter No. 72/36-994-73 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and annexes (10 December 2014)
Annex 407 Intercepted conversation between DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (code name “Gorets”) and
DPR representative M. Vlasov (code name “Yuga”) 1(7:56:46, 23 January 2015)
Annex 408 Intercepted Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015)
Annex 409 Meta data for Conversation Between Phone Numbers 380993641081 and
380508065681 (13:21:45, 24 January 2015)
Annex 410 Meta data for Conversation Between Phone Numbers 380993641081 and
380993648631 (09:13:32, 24 January 2015)
Annex 411 Intercepted Conversation between Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and Grynchev (“Terek”)
(08:54:19, 24 January 2015)
Annex 412 Intercepted Conversation between Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and Grynchev (“Terek”)
(09:11:34, 24 January 2015)
Annex 413 Intercepted Conversation between Evdotiy (“Pepel”) and Kirsanov (10:36:40, 24
January 2015)
Annex 414 Intercepted Conversation between Kirsanov and Ponomarenko (“Terrorist’) (10:38:14,
24 January 2015)
Annex 415 Intercepted Conversation between Kirsanov and Ponomarenko (“Terrorist”) (11:04:12,
24 January 2015)
Annex 416 Intercepted Conversation between Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and Yaroshuk (14:12:12, 24
January 2015)
Annex 417 Intercepted Conversation between Grynchev (“Terek”) and Vlasov (“Yugra”) (12:57:55,
24 January 2015)
Annex 418 Intercepted Conversation between Evdotiy (“Pepel”) and Ponomarenko (“Terrorist”)
(18:00:22, 23 January 2015)
Annex 419 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000266 (2
July 2015)
Annex 420 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000245 (3
July 2015)
Annex 421 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000283 (3
July 2015)
Annex 422 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000286 (3
July 2015)
Annex 423 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 42014000000000457
(28 July 2015)
Annex 424 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-157-2015 (17
August 2015)
Annex 425 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-158-2015 (17
August 2015)
Annex 426 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-159-2015 (17
August 2015)
Annex 427 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 42014000000000457 (15
September 2015)
Annex 428 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. No. 82/1-5444-14
(dated 23 October 2015, sent 6 November 2015).
Annex 429 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 82/1-759-16 (14
September 2016)
Annex 430 Intercepted Conversations of Yuriy Shpakov (16 September 2016)
Annex 431 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22015050000000021 (23
March 2017)
Annex 432 Email Communication Between Evgeny Manuylov and “[email protected]” (12
October 2017)
Annex 433 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22015000000000001 (14
November 2017)
Annex 434 Consolidated Banking Records of Transfer Between the Fund and the State Bank of the
LPR (various dates)

Annex 359
FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation: The FAFT Recommendations (2012)

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀦􀀄􀁤􀀦􀀃􀁚􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄂􀆟􀅽􀅶􀆐
Updated February 2018
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and
promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing
and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are
recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard.
For more information about the FATF, please visit the website: www.fatf-gafi.org
This document and/or any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty
over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any
territory, city or area.
Citing reference:
FATF (2012-2018), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation, FATF, Paris, France,
www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.html
© 2012-2018 FATF/OECD. All rights reserved.
No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission.
Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to
the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France
(fax: +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: [email protected]).
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED BY THE FATF PLENARY IN FEBRUARY 2012
Updated February 2018
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
􀂤 2012-2018 3
CONTENTS
List of the FATF Recommendations 4
Introduction 6
FATF Recommendations 9
Interpretive Notes 29
Note on the legal basis of requirements
on financial institutions and DNFBPs 108
Glossary 110
Table of Acronyms 125
Annex I: FATF Guidance Documents 126
Annex II: Information on updates made
to the FATF Recommendations 127
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
4 􀂤 2012-2018
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
Number Old Number1
A – AML/CFT POLICIES AND COORDINATION
1 - Assessing risks & applying a risk-based approach *
2 R.31 National cooperation and coordination
B – MONEY LAUNDERING AND CONFISCATION
3 R.1 & R.2 Money laundering offence *
4 R.3 Confiscation and provisional measures *
C – TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION
5 SRII Terrorist financing offence *
6 SRIII Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing *
7 Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation *
8 SRVIII Non-profit organisations *
D – PREVENTIVE MEASURES
9 R.4 Financial institution secrecy laws
Customer due diligence and record keeping
10 R.5 Customer due diligence *
11 R.10 Record keeping
Additional measures for specific customers and activities
12 R.6 Politically exposed persons *
13 R.7 Correspondent banking *
14 SRVI Money or value transfer services *
15 R.8 New technologies
16 SRVII Wire transfers *
Reliance, Controls and Financial Groups
17 R.9 Reliance on third parties *
18 R.15 & R.22 Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries *
19 R.21 Higher-risk countries *
Reporting of suspicious transactions
20 R.13 & SRIV Reporting of suspicious transactions *
21 R.14 Tipping-off and confidentiality
Designated non-financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)
22 R.12 DNFBPs: Customer due diligence *
23 R.16 DNFBPs: Other measures *
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
􀂤 2012-2018 5
E – TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
OF LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
24 R.33 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons *
25 R.34 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements *
F – POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Regulation and Supervision
26 R.23 Regulation and supervision of financial institutions *
27 R.29 Powers of supervisors
28 R.24 Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs
Operational and Law Enforcement
29 R.26 Financial intelligence units *
30 R.27 Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities *
31 R.28 Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities
32 SRIX Cash couriers *
General Requirements
33 R.32 Statistics
34 R.25 Guidance and feedback
Sanctions
35 R.17 Sanctions
G – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
36 R.35 & SRI International instruments
37 R.36 & SRV Mutual legal assistance
38 R.38 Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation *
39 R.39 Extradition
40 R.40 Other forms of international cooperation *
1. The ‘old number’ column refers to the corresponding 2003 FATF Recommendation.
* Recommendations marked with an asterisk have interpretive notes, which should be read in
conjunction with the Recommendation.
Version as adopted on 15 February 2012.
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
6 􀂤 2012-2018
INTRODUCTION
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the
Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The mandate of the FATF is to set standards and to promote
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money
laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation, and other related threats to the
integrity of the international financial system. In collaboration with other international
stakeholders, the FATF also works to identify national-level vulnerabilities with the aim of
protecting the international financial system from misuse.
The FATF Recommendations set out a comprehensive and consistent framework of measures which
countries should implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as
the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Countries have diverse legal,
administrative and operational frameworks and different financial systems, and so cannot all take
identical measures to counter these threats. The FATF Recommendations, therefore, set an
international standard, which countries should implement through measures adapted to their
particular circumstances. The FATF Recommendations set out the essential measures that countries
should have in place to:
􀂄 identify the risks, and develop policies and domestic coordination;
􀂄 pursue money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of
proliferation;
􀂄 apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated
sectors;
􀂄 establish powers and responsibilities for the competent authorities (e.g.,
investigative, law enforcement and supervisory authorities) and other
institutional measures;
􀂄 enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership
information of legal persons and arrangements; and
􀂄 facilitate international cooperation.
The original FATF Forty Recommendations were drawn up in 1990 as an initiative to combat the
misuse of financial systems by persons laundering drug money. In 1996 the Recommendations
were revised for the first time to reflect evolving money laundering trends and techniques, and to
broaden their scope well beyond drug-money laundering. In October 2001 the FATF expanded its
mandate to deal with the issue of the funding of terrorist acts and terrorist organisations, and took
the important step of creating the Eight (later expanded to Nine) Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing. The FATF Recommendations were revised a second time in 2003, and these,
together with the Special Recommendations, have been endorsed by over 180 countries, and are
universally recognised as the international standard for anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
􀂤 2012-2018 7
Following the conclusion of the third round of mutual evaluations of its members, the FATF has
reviewed and updated the FATF Recommendations, in close co-operation with the FATF-Style
Regional Bodies (FSRBs) and the observer organisations, including the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations. The revisions address new and emerging threats,
clarify and strengthen many of the existing obligations, while maintaining the necessary stability
and rigour in the Recommendations.
The FATF Standards have also been revised to strengthen the requirements for higher risk
situations, and to allow countries to take a more focused approach in areas where high risks remain
or implementation could be enhanced. Countries should first identify, assess and understand the
risks of money laundering and terrorist finance that they face, and then adopt appropriate measures
to mitigate the risk. The risk-based approach allows countries, within the framework of the FATF
requirements, to adopt a more flexible set of measures, in order to target their resources more
effectively and apply preventive measures that are commensurate to the nature of risks, in order to
focus their efforts in the most effective way.
Combating terrorist financing is a very significant challenge. An effective AML/CFT system, in
general, is important for addressing terrorist financing, and most measures previously focused on
terrorist financing are now integrated throughout the Recommendations, therefore obviating the
need for the Special Recommendations. However, there are some Recommendations that are unique
to terrorist financing, which are set out in Section C of the FATF Recommendations. These are:
Recommendation 5 (the criminalisation of terrorist financing); Recommendation 6 (targeted
financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing); and Recommendation 8 (measures to
prevent the misuse of non-profit organisations). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is
also a significant security concern, and in 2008 the FATF’s mandate was expanded to include dealing
with the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To combat this threat, the FATF
has adopted a new Recommendation (Recommendation 7) aimed at ensuring consistent and
effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions when these are called for by the UN
Security Council.
The FATF Standards comprise the Recommendations themselves and their Interpretive Notes,
together with the applicable definitions in the Glossary. The measures set out in the FATF Standards
should be implemented by all members of the FATF and the FSRBs, and their implementation is
assessed rigorously through Mutual Evaluation processes, and through the assessment processes of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – on the basis of the FATF’s common
assessment methodology. Some Interpretive Notes and definitions in the glossary include examples
which illustrate how the requirements could be applied. These examples are not mandatory
elements of the FATF Standards, and are included for guidance only. The examples are not intended
to be comprehensive, and although they are considered to be helpful indicators, they may not be
relevant in all circumstances.
The FATF also produces Guidance, Best Practice Papers, and other advice to assist countries with
the implementation of the FATF standards. These other documents are not mandatory for assessing
compliance with the Standards, but countries may find it valuable to have regard to them when
considering how best to implement the FATF Standards. A list of current FATF Guidance and Best
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
8 􀂤 2012-2018
Practice Papers, which are available on the FATF website, is included as an annex to the
Recommendations.
The FATF is committed to maintaining a close and constructive dialogue with the private sector,
civil society and other interested parties, as important partners in ensuring the integrity of the
financial system. The revision of the Recommendations has involved extensive consultation, and
has benefited from comments and suggestions from these stakeholders. Going forward and in
accordance with its mandate, the FATF will continue to consider changes to the standards, as
appropriate, in light of new information regarding emerging threats and vulnerabilities to the global
financial system.
The FATF calls upon all countries to implement effective measures to bring their national systems
for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation into
compliance with the revised FATF Recommendations.
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
􀂤 2012-2018 9
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. AML/CFT POLICIES AND COORDINATION
1. Assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach *
Countries should identify, assess, and understand the money laundering and terrorist
financing risks for the country, and should take action, including designating an authority or
mechanism to coordinate actions to assess risks, and apply resources, aimed at ensuring the
risks are mitigated effectively. Based on that assessment, countries should apply a risk-based
approach (RBA) to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and
terrorist financing are commensurate with the risks identified. This approach should be an
essential foundation to efficient allocation of resources across the anti-money laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the implementation of riskbased
measures throughout the FATF Recommendations. Where countries identify higher
risks, they should ensure that their AML/CFT regime adequately addresses such risks. Where
countries identify lower risks, they may decide to allow simplified measures for some of the
FATF Recommendations under certain conditions.
Countries should require financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs) to identify, assess and take effective action to mitigate their money
laundering and terrorist financing risks.
2. National cooperation and coordination
Countries should have national AML/CFT policies, informed by the risks identified, which
should be regularly reviewed, and should designate an authority or have a coordination or
other mechanisms that is responsible for such policies.
Countries should ensure that policy-makers, the financial intelligence unit (FIU), law
enforcement authorities, supervisors and other relevant competent authorities, at the policymaking
and operational levels, have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to
cooperate, and, where appropriate, coordinate and exchange information domestically with
each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to
combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. This should include cooperation and coordination between relevant
authorities to ensure the compatibility of AML/CFT requirements with Data Protection and
Privacy rules and other similar provisions (e.g. data security/localisation).
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
10 􀂤 2012-2018
B. MONEY LAUNDERING AND CONFISCATION
3. Money laundering offence *
Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of the Vienna Convention and the
Palermo Convention. Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious
offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences.
4. Confiscation and provisional measures *
Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the Vienna Convention, the
Palermo Convention, and the Terrorist Financing Convention, including legislative measures,
to enable their competent authorities to freeze or seize and confiscate the following, without
prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties: (a) property laundered, (b) proceeds from, or
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in money laundering or predicate offences, (c)
property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of
terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations, or (d) property of corresponding value.
Such measures should include the authority to: (a) identify, trace and evaluate property that is
subject to confiscation; (b) carry out provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to
prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such property; (c) take steps that will prevent or
void actions that prejudice the country’s ability to freeze or seize or recover property that is
subject to confiscation; and (d) take any appropriate investigative measures.
Countries should consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to
be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction (non-conviction based confiscation), or
which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable
to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their
domestic law.
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
􀂤 2012-2018 11
C. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION
5. Terrorist financing offence *
Countries should criminalise terrorist financing on the basis of the Terrorist Financing
Convention, and should criminalise not only the financing of terrorist acts but also the
financing of terrorist organisations and individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a
specific terrorist act or acts. Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as
money laundering predicate offences.
6. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing *
Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with United
Nations Security Council resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism
and terrorist financing. The resolutions require countries to freeze without delay the funds or
other assets of, and to ensure that no funds or other assets are made available, directly or
indirectly, to or for the benefit of, any person or entity either (i) designated by, or under the
authority of, the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, including in accordance with resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor
resolutions; or (ii) designated by that country pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001).
7. Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation *
Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with United Nations
Security Council resolutions relating to the prevention, suppression and disruption of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing. These resolutions require
countries to freeze without delay the funds or other assets of, and to ensure that no funds and
other assets are made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, any person or
entity designated by, or under the authority of, the United Nations Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Non-profit organisations *
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to non-profit
organisations which the country has identified as being vulnerable to terrorist financing
abuse. Countries should apply focused and proportionate measures, in line with the riskbased
approach, to such non-profit organisations to protect them from terrorist financing
abuse, including:
(a) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
(b) by exploiting legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the
purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures; and
(c) by concealing or obscuring the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate
purposes to terrorist organisations.
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
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12 􀂤 2012-2018
D. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
9. Financial institution secrecy laws
Countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation
of the FATF Recommendations.
CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE AND RECORD-KEEPING
10. Customer due diligence *
Financial institutions should be prohibited from keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in
obviously fictitious names.
Financial institutions should be required to undertake customer due diligence (CDD)
measures when:
(i) establishing business relations;
(ii) carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated threshold
(USD/EUR 15,000); or (ii) that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16;
(iii) there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or
(iv) the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously
obtained customer identification data.
The principle that financial institutions should conduct CDD should be set out in law. Each
country may determine how it imposes specific CDD obligations, either through law or
enforceable means.
The CDD measures to be taken are as follows:
(a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable,
independent source documents, data or information.
(b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity
of the beneficial owner, such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who
the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this should include
financial institutions understanding the ownership and control structure of the
customer.
(c) Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and
intended nature of the business relationship.
(d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of
transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the
transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the
customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of
funds.
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Financial institutions should be required to apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d)
above, but should determine the extent of such measures using a risk-based approach (RBA)
in accordance with the Interpretive Notes to this Recommendation and to Recommendation 1.
Financial institutions should be required to verify the identity of the customer and beneficial
owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting
transactions for occasional customers. Countries may permit financial institutions to complete
the verification as soon as reasonably practicable following the establishment of the
relationship, where the money laundering and terrorist financing risks are effectively
managed and where this is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business.
Where the financial institution is unable to comply with the applicable requirements under
paragraphs (a) to (d) above (subject to appropriate modification of the extent of the measures
on a risk-based approach), it should be required not to open the account, commence business
relations or perform the transaction; or should be required to terminate the business
relationship; and should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the
customer.
These requirements should apply to all new customers, although financial institutions should
also apply this Recommendation to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk,
and should conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times.
11. Record-keeping
Financial institutions should be required to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary
records on transactions, both domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly
with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to
permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency
involved, if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.
Financial institutions should be required to keep all records obtained through CDD measures
(e.g. copies or records of official identification documents like passports, identity cards,
driving licences or similar documents), account files and business correspondence, including
the results of any analysis undertaken (e.g. inquiries to establish the background and purpose
of complex, unusual large transactions), for at least five years after the business relationship is
ended, or after the date of the occasional transaction.
Financial institutions should be required by law to maintain records on transactions and
information obtained through the CDD measures.
The CDD information and the transaction records should be available to domestic competent
authorities upon appropriate authority.
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ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR SPECIFIC CUSTOMERS AND ACTIVITIES
12. Politically exposed persons *
Financial institutions should be required, in relation to foreign politically exposed persons
(PEPs) (whether as customer or beneficial owner), in addition to performing normal customer
due diligence measures, to:
(a) have appropriate risk-management systems to determine whether the customer or the
beneficial owner is a politically exposed person;
(b) obtain senior management approval for establishing (or continuing, for existing
customers) such business relationships;
(c) take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds; and
(d) conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.
Financial institutions should be required to take reasonable measures to determine whether a
customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or a person who is or has been entrusted with
a prominent function by an international organisation. In cases of a higher risk business
relationship with such persons, financial institutions should be required to apply the
measures referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d).
The requirements for all types of PEP should also apply to family members or close associates
of such PEPs.
13. Correspondent banking *
Financial institutions should be required, in relation to cross-border correspondent banking
and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal customer due diligence
measures, to:
(a) gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the
nature of the respondent’s business and to determine from publicly available
information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, including
whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation
or regulatory action;
(b) assess the respondent institution’s AML/CFT controls;
(c) obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent
relationships;
(d) clearly understand the respective responsibilities of each institution; and
(e) with respect to “payable-through accounts”, be satisfied that the respondent bank has
conducted CDD on the customers having direct access to accounts of the
correspondent bank, and that it is able to provide relevant CDD information upon
request to the correspondent bank.
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Financial institutions should be prohibited from entering into, or continuing, a correspondent
banking relationship with shell banks. Financial institutions should be required to satisfy
themselves that respondent institutions do not permit their accounts to be used by shell
banks.
14. Money or value transfer services *
Countries should take measures to ensure that natural or legal persons that provide money or
value transfer services (MVTS) are licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for
monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant measures called for in the FATF
Recommendations. Countries should take action to identify natural or legal persons that carry
out MVTS without a license or registration, and to apply appropriate sanctions.
Any natural or legal person working as an agent should also be licensed or registered by a
competent authority, or the MVTS provider should maintain a current list of its agents
accessible by competent authorities in the countries in which the MVTS provider and its
agents operate. Countries should take measures to ensure that MVTS providers that use
agents include them in their AML/CFT programmes and monitor them for compliance with
these programmes.
15. New technologies
Countries and financial institutions should identify and assess the money laundering or
terrorist financing risks that may arise in relation to (a) the development of new products and
new business practices, including new delivery mechanisms, and (b) the use of new or
developing technologies for both new and pre-existing products. In the case of financial
institutions, such a risk assessment should take place prior to the launch of the new products,
business practices or the use of new or developing technologies. They should take appropriate
measures to manage and mitigate those risks.
16. Wire transfers *
Countries should ensure that financial institutions include required and accurate originator
information, and required beneficiary information, on wire transfers and related messages,
and that the information remains with the wire transfer or related message throughout the
payment chain.
Countries should ensure that financial institutions monitor wire transfers for the purpose of
detecting those which lack required originator and/or beneficiary information, and take
appropriate measures.
Countries should ensure that, in the context of processing wire transfers, financial institutions
take freezing action and should prohibit conducting transactions with designated persons and
entities, as per the obligations set out in the relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions, such as resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions, and resolution
1373(2001), relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing.
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RELIANCE, CONTROLS AND FINANCIAL GROUPS
17. Reliance on third parties *
Countries may permit financial institutions to rely on third parties to perform elements (a)-(c)
of the CDD measures set out in Recommendation 10 or to introduce business, provided that
the criteria set out below are met. Where such reliance is permitted, the ultimate
responsibility for CDD measures remains with the financial institution relying on the third
party.
The criteria that should be met are as follows:
(a) A financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately obtain the
necessary information concerning elements (a)-(c) of the CDD measures set out in
Recommendation 10.
(b) Financial institutions should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of
identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD
requirements will be made available from the third party upon request without delay.
(c) The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated,
supervised or monitored for, and has measures in place for compliance with, CDD and
record-keeping requirements in line with Recommendations 10 and 11.
(d) When determining in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be
based, countries should have regard to information available on the level of country
risk.
When a financial institution relies on a third party that is part of the same financial group, and
(i) that group applies CDD and record-keeping requirements, in line with Recommendations
10, 11 and 12, and programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing, in
accordance with Recommendation 18; and (ii) where the effective implementation of those
CDD and record-keeping requirements and AML/CFT programmes is supervised at a group
level by a competent authority, then relevant competent authorities may consider that the
financial institution applies measures under (b) and (c) above through its group programme,
and may decide that (d) is not a necessary precondition to reliance when higher country risk
is adequately mitigated by the group AML/CFT policies.
18. Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries *
Financial institutions should be required to implement programmes against money
laundering and terrorist financing. Financial groups should be required to implement groupwide
programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing, including policies and
procedures for sharing information within the group for AML/CFT purposes.
Financial institutions should be required to ensure that their foreign branches and majorityowned
subsidiaries apply AML/CFT measures consistent with the home country
requirements implementing the FATF Recommendations through the financial groups’
programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing.
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19. Higher-risk countries *
Financial institutions should be required to apply enhanced due diligence measures to
business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, and financial
institutions, from countries for which this is called for by the FATF. The type of enhanced due
diligence measures applied should be effective and proportionate to the risks.
Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by
the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call
by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the
risks.
REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS
20. Reporting of suspicious transactions *
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the
proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by
law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU).
21. Tipping-off and confidentiality
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be:
(a) protected by law from criminal and civil liability for breach of any restriction on
disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or
administrative provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the FIU, even if
they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless
of whether illegal activity actually occurred; and
(b) prohibited by law from disclosing (“tipping-off”) the fact that a suspicious transaction
report (STR) or related information is being filed with the FIU. These provisions are
not intended to inhibit information sharing under Recommendation 18.
DESIGNATED NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONS
22. DNFBPs: customer due diligence *
The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations
10, 11, 12, 15, and 17, apply to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)
in the following situations:
(a) Casinos – when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above the
applicable designated threshold.
(b) Real estate agents – when they are involved in transactions for their client concerning
the buying and selling of real estate.
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(c) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones – when they engage in any
cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated
threshold.
(d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – when they
prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following
activities:
􀂄 buying and selling of real estate;
􀂄 managing of client money, securities or other assets;
􀂄 management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
􀂄 organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of
companies;
􀂄 creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and
buying and selling of business entities.
(e) Trust and company service providers – when they prepare for or carry out
transactions for a client concerning the following activities:
􀂄 acting as a formation agent of legal persons;
􀂄 acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a
company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other
legal persons;
􀂄 providing a registered office, business address or accommodation,
correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any
other legal person or arrangement;
􀂄 acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust
or performing the equivalent function for another form of legal arrangement;
􀂄 acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for
another person.
23. DNFBPs: Other measures *
The requirements set out in Recommendations 18 to 21 apply to all designated non-financial
businesses and professions, subject to the following qualifications:
(a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should be
required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they
engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d)
of Recommendation 22. Countries are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting
requirement to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, including
auditing.
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(b) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be required to report
suspicious transactions when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer
equal to or above the applicable designated threshold.
(c) Trust and company service providers should be required to report suspicious
transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a transaction
in relation to the activities referred to in paragraph (e) of Recommendation 22.
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E. TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL PERSONS AND
ARRANGEMENTS
24. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons *
Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for money laundering
or terrorist financing. Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or
accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. In particular, countries that have legal
persons that are able to issue bearer shares or bearer share warrants, or which allow nominee
shareholders or nominee directors, should take effective measures to ensure that they are not
misused for money laundering or terrorist financing. Countries should consider measures to
facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information by financial institutions and
DNFBPs undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and 22.
25. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements *
Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal arrangements for money
laundering or terrorist financing. In particular, countries should ensure that there is adequate,
accurate and timely information on express trusts, including information on the settlor,
trustee and beneficiaries, that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent
authorities. Countries should consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership
and control information by financial institutions and DNFBPs undertaking the requirements
set out in Recommendations 10 and 22.
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F. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPETENT AUTHORITIES, AND OTHER
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
26. Regulation and supervision of financial institutions *
Countries should ensure that financial institutions are subject to adequate regulation and
supervision and are effectively implementing the FATF Recommendations. Competent
authorities or financial supervisors should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to
prevent criminals or their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of, a
significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in, a financial institution.
Countries should not approve the establishment, or continued operation, of shell banks.
For financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, the regulatory and supervisory
measures that apply for prudential purposes, and which are also relevant to money
laundering and terrorist financing, should apply in a similar manner for AML/CFT purposes.
This should include applying consolidated group supervision for AML/CFT purposes.
Other financial institutions should be licensed or registered and adequately regulated, and
subject to supervision or monitoring for AML/CFT purposes, having regard to the risk of
money laundering or terrorist financing in that sector. At a minimum, where financial
institutions provide a service of money or value transfer, or of money or currency changing,
they should be licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring and
ensuring compliance with national AML/CFT requirements.
27. Powers of supervisors
Supervisors should have adequate powers to supervise or monitor, and ensure compliance by,
financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing,
including the authority to conduct inspections. They should be authorised to compel
production of any information from financial institutions that is relevant to monitoring such
compliance, and to impose sanctions, in line with Recommendation 35, for failure to comply
with such requirements. Supervisors should have powers to impose a range of disciplinary
and financial sanctions, including the power to withdraw, restrict or suspend the financial
institution’s license, where applicable.
28. Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs *
Designated non-financial businesses and professions should be subject to regulatory and
supervisory measures as set out below.
(a) Casinos should be subject to a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime that
ensures that they have effectively implemented the necessary AML/CFT measures. At
a minimum:
􀂄 casinos should be licensed;
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􀂄 competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to
prevent criminals or their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner
of, a significant or controlling interest, holding a management function in, or
being an operator of, a casino; and
􀂄 competent authorities should ensure that casinos are effectively supervised for
compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
(b) Countries should ensure that the other categories of DNFBPs are subject to effective
systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with AML/CFT requirements. This
should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This may be performed by (a) a
supervisor or (b) by an appropriate self-regulatory body (SRB), provided that such a
body can ensure that its members comply with their obligations to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing.
The supervisor or SRB should also (a) take the necessary measures to prevent
criminals or their associates from being professionally accredited, or holding or being
the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management
function, e.g. through evaluating persons on the basis of a “fit and proper” test; and (b)
have effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in line with Recommendation
35 available to deal with failure to comply with AML/CFT requirements.
OPERATIONAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
29. Financial intelligence units *
Countries should establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that serves as a national centre
for the receipt and analysis of: (a) suspicious transaction reports; and (b) other information
relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and for
the dissemination of the results of that analysis. The FIU should be able to obtain additional
information from reporting entities, and should have access on a timely basis to the financial,
administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to undertake its functions
properly.
30. Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities *
Countries should ensure that designated law enforcement authorities have responsibility for
money laundering and terrorist financing investigations within the framework of national
AML/CFT policies. At least in all cases related to major proceeds-generating offences, these
designated law enforcement authorities should develop a pro-active parallel financial
investigation when pursuing money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist
financing. This should include cases where the associated predicate offence occurs outside
their jurisdictions. Countries should ensure that competent authorities have responsibility for
expeditiously identifying, tracing and initiating actions to freeze and seize property that is, or
may become, subject to confiscation, or is suspected of being proceeds of crime. Countries
should also make use, when necessary, of permanent or temporary multi-disciplinary groups
specialised in financial or asset investigations. Countries should ensure that, when necessary,
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cooperative investigations with appropriate competent authorities in other countries take
place.
31. Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities
When conducting investigations of money laundering, associated predicate offences and
terrorist financing, competent authorities should be able to obtain access to all necessary
documents and information for use in those investigations, and in prosecutions and related
actions. This should include powers to use compulsory measures for the production of
records held by financial institutions, DNFBPs and other natural or legal persons, for the
search of persons and premises, for taking witness statements, and for the seizure and
obtaining of evidence.
Countries should ensure that competent authorities conducting investigations are able to use
a wide range of investigative techniques suitable for the investigation of money laundering,
associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. These investigative techniques include:
undercover operations, intercepting communications, accessing computer systems and
controlled delivery. In addition, countries should have effective mechanisms in place to
identify, in a timely manner, whether natural or legal persons hold or control accounts. They
should also have mechanisms to ensure that competent authorities have a process to identify
assets without prior notification to the owner. When conducting investigations of money
laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, competent authorities
should be able to ask for all relevant information held by the FIU.
32. Cash couriers *
Countries should have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of
currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including through a declaration system and/or
disclosure system.
Countries should ensure that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or
restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected to be related to
terrorist financing, money laundering or predicate offences, or that are falsely declared or
disclosed.
Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to
deal with persons who make false declaration(s) or disclosure(s). In cases where the currency
or bearer negotiable instruments are related to terrorist financing, money laundering or
predicate offences, countries should also adopt measures, including legislative ones consistent
with Recommendation 4, which would enable the confiscation of such currency or
instruments.
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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
33. Statistics
Countries should maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness
and efficiency of their AML/CFT systems. This should include statistics on the STRs received
and disseminated; on money laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions
and convictions; on property frozen, seized and confiscated; and on mutual legal assistance or
other international requests for cooperation.
34. Guidance and feedback
The competent authorities, supervisors and SRBs should establish guidelines, and provide
feedback, which will assist financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and
professions in applying national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing, and, in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.
SANCTIONS
35. Sanctions
Countries should ensure that there is a range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, available to deal with natural or legal
persons covered by Recommendations 6, and 8 to 23, that fail to comply with AML/CFT
requirements. Sanctions should be applicable not only to financial institutions and DNFBPs,
but also to their directors and senior management.
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G. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
36. International instruments
Countries should take immediate steps to become party to and implement fully the Vienna
Convention, 1988; the Palermo Convention, 2000; the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, 2003; and the Terrorist Financing Convention, 1999. Where applicable, countries
are also encouraged to ratify and implement other relevant international conventions, such as
the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 2001; the Inter-American Convention
against Terrorism, 2002; and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 2005.
37. Mutual legal assistance
Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest possible range of
mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering, associated predicate offences and
terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and related proceedings. Countries should
have an adequate legal basis for providing assistance and, where appropriate, should have in
place treaties, arrangements or other mechanisms to enhance cooperation. In particular,
countries should:
(a) Not prohibit, or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on, the provision
of mutual legal assistance.
(b) Ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the timely prioritisation and
execution of mutual legal assistance requests. Countries should use a central authority,
or another established official mechanism, for effective transmission and execution of
requests. To monitor progress on requests, a case management system should be
maintained.
(c) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the
offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
(d) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that laws
require financial institutions or DNFBPs to maintain secrecy or confidentiality (except
where the relevant information that is sought is held in circumstances where legal
professional privilege or legal professional secrecy applies).
(e) Maintain the confidentiality of mutual legal assistance requests they receive and the
information contained in them, subject to fundamental principles of domestic law, in
order to protect the integrity of the investigation or inquiry. If the requested country
cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it should promptly inform the
requesting country.
Countries should render mutual legal assistance, notwithstanding the absence of dual
criminality, if the assistance does not involve coercive actions. Countries should consider
adopting such measures as may be necessary to enable them to provide a wide scope of
assistance in the absence of dual criminality.
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Where dual criminality is required for mutual legal assistance, that requirement should be
deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both countries place the offence within the same
category of offence, or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that both
countries criminalise the conduct underlying the offence.
Countries should ensure that, of the powers and investigative techniques required under
Recommendation 31, and any other powers and investigative techniques available to their
competent authorities:
(a) all those relating to the production, search and seizure of information, documents or
evidence (including financial records) from financial institutions or other persons, and
the taking of witness statements; and
(b) a broad range of other powers and investigative techniques;
are also available for use in response to requests for mutual legal assistance, and, if consistent
with their domestic framework, in response to direct requests from foreign judicial or law
enforcement authorities to domestic counterparts.
To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to devising and applying
mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests of
justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country.
Countries should, when making mutual legal assistance requests, make best efforts to provide
complete factual and legal information that will allow for timely and efficient execution of
requests, including any need for urgency, and should send requests using expeditious means.
Countries should, before sending requests, make best efforts to ascertain the legal
requirements and formalities to obtain assistance.
The authorities responsible for mutual legal assistance (e.g. a Central Authority) should be
provided with adequate financial, human and technical resources. Countries should have in
place processes to ensure that the staff of such authorities maintain high professional
standards, including standards concerning confidentiality, and should be of high integrity and
be appropriately skilled.
38. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation *
Countries should ensure that they have the authority to take expeditious action in response to
requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property laundered;
proceeds from money laundering, predicate offences and terrorist financing; instrumentalities
used in, or intended for use in, the commission of these offences; or property of corresponding
value. This authority should include being able to respond to requests made on the basis of
non-conviction-based confiscation proceedings and related provisional measures, unless this
is inconsistent with fundamental principles of their domestic law. Countries should also have
effective mechanisms for managing such property, instrumentalities or property of
corresponding value, and arrangements for coordinating seizure and confiscation
proceedings, which should include the sharing of confiscated assets.
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39. Extradition
Countries should constructively and effectively execute extradition requests in relation to
money laundering and terrorist financing, without undue delay. Countries should also take all
possible measures to ensure that they do not provide safe havens for individuals charged with
the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations. In particular, countries
should:
(a) ensure money laundering and terrorist financing are extraditable offences;
(b) ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the timely execution of
extradition requests including prioritisation where appropriate. To monitor progress
of requests a case management system should be maintained;
(c) not place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on the execution of requests;
and
(d) ensure they have an adequate legal framework for extradition.
Each country should either extradite its own nationals, or, where a country does not do so
solely on the grounds of nationality, that country should, at the request of the country seeking
extradition, submit the case, without undue delay, to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request. Those authorities should take their
decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence
of a serious nature under the domestic law of that country. The countries concerned should
cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the
efficiency of such prosecutions.
Where dual criminality is required for extradition, that requirement should be deemed to be
satisfied regardless of whether both countries place the offence within the same category of
offence, or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that both countries
criminalise the conduct underlying the offence.
Consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, countries should have simplified
extradition mechanisms, such as allowing direct transmission of requests for provisional
arrests between appropriate authorities, extraditing persons based only on warrants of
arrests or judgments, or introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive
formal extradition proceedings. The authorities responsible for extradition should be
provided with adequate financial, human and technical resources. Countries should have in
place processes to ensure that the staff of such authorities maintain high professional
standards, including standards concerning confidentiality, and should be of high integrity and
be appropriately skilled.
40. Other forms of international cooperation *
Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can rapidly, constructively and
effectively provide the widest range of international cooperation in relation to money
laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. Countries should do so both
spontaneously and upon request, and there should be a lawful basis for providing
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cooperation. Countries should authorise their competent authorities to use the most efficient
means to cooperate. Should a competent authority need bilateral or multilateral agreements
or arrangements, such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), these should be
negotiated and signed in a timely way with the widest range of foreign counterparts.
Competent authorities should use clear channels or mechanisms for the effective transmission
and execution of requests for information or other types of assistance. Competent authorities
should have clear and efficient processes for the prioritisation and timely execution of
requests, and for safeguarding the information received.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES TO THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 1
(ASSESSING RISKS AND APPLYING A RISK-BASED APPROACH)
1. The risk-based approach (RBA) is an effective way to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing. In determining how the RBA should be implemented in a sector, countries should
consider the capacity and anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism
(AML/CFT) experience of the relevant sector. Countries should understand that the discretion
afforded, and responsibility imposed on, financial institutions and designated non-financial
bodies and professions (DNFBPs) by the RBA is more appropriate in sectors with greater
AML/CFT capacity and experience. This should not exempt financial institutions and DNFBPs
from the requirement to apply enhanced measures when they identify higher risk scenarios.
By adopting a risk-based approach, competent authorities, financial institutions and DNFBPs
should be able to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money laundering and terrorist
financing are commensurate with the risks identified, and would enable them to make
decisions on how to allocate their own resources in the most effective way.
2. In implementing a RBA, financial institutions and DNFBPs should have in place processes to
identify, assess, monitor, manage and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks.
The general principle of a RBA is that, where there are higher risks, countries should require
financial institutions and DNFBPs to take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate those
risks; and that, correspondingly, where the risks are lower, simplified measures may be
permitted. Simplified measures should not be permitted whenever there is a suspicion of
money laundering or terrorist financing. Specific Recommendations set out more precisely
how this general principle applies to particular requirements. Countries may also, in strictly
limited circumstances and where there is a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist
financing, decide not to apply certain Recommendations to a particular type of financial
institution or activity, or DNFBP (see below). Equally, if countries determine through their
risk assessments that there are types of institutions, activities, businesses or professions that
are at risk of abuse from money laundering and terrorist financing, and which do not fall
under the definition of financial institution or DNFBP, they should consider applying
AML/CFT requirements to such sectors.
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A. Obligations and decisions for countries
3. Assessing risk - Countries1 should take appropriate steps to identify and assess the money
laundering and terrorist financing risks for the country, on an ongoing basis and in order to:
(i) inform potential changes to the country’s AML/CFT regime, including changes to laws,
regulations and other measures; (ii) assist in the allocation and prioritisation of AML/CFT
resources by competent authorities; and (iii) make information available for AML/CFT risk
assessments conducted by financial institutions and DNFBPs. Countries should keep the
assessments up-to-date, and should have mechanisms to provide appropriate information on
the results to all relevant competent authorities and self-regulatory bodies (SRBs), financial
institutions and DNFBPs.
4. Higher risk - Where countries identify higher risks, they should ensure that their AML/CFT
regime addresses these higher risks, and, without prejudice to any other measures taken by
countries to mitigate these higher risks, either prescribe that financial institutions and
DNFBPs take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate the risks, or ensure that this
information is incorporated into risk assessments carried out by financial institutions and
DNFBPs, in order to manage and mitigate risks appropriately. Where the FATF
Recommendations identify higher risk activities for which enhanced or specific measures are
required, all such measures must be applied, although the extent of such measures may vary
according to the specific level of risk.
5. Lower risk - Countries may decide to allow simplified measures for some of the FATF
Recommendations requiring financial institutions or DNFBPs to take certain actions, provided
that a lower risk has been identified, and this is consistent with the country’s assessment of its
money laundering and terrorist financing risks, as referred to in paragraph 3.
Independent of any decision to specify certain lower risk categories in line with the previous
paragraph, countries may also allow financial institutions and DNFBPs to apply simplified
customer due diligence (CDD) measures, provided that the requirements set out in section B
below (“Obligations and decisions for financial institutions and DNFBPs”), and in paragraph 7
below, are met.
6. Exemptions - Countries may decide not to apply some of the FATF Recommendations
requiring financial institutions or DNFBPs to take certain actions, provided:
(a) there is a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist financing; this occurs in
strictly limited and justified circumstances; and it relates to a particular type of
financial institution or activity, or DNFBP; or
(b) a financial activity (other than the transferring of money or value) is carried out by a
natural or legal person on an occasional or very limited basis (having regard to
quantitative and absolute criteria), such that there is low risk of money laundering and
terrorist financing.
1 Where appropriate, AML/CFT risk assessments at a supra-national level should be taken into account
when considering whether this obligation is satisfied.
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While the information gathered may vary according to the level of risk, the requirements of
Recommendation 11 to retain information should apply to whatever information is gathered.
7. Supervision and monitoring of risk - Supervisors (or SRBs for relevant DNFBPs sectors)
should ensure that financial institutions and DNFBPs are effectively implementing the
obligations set out below. When carrying out this function, supervisors and SRBs should, as
and when required in accordance with the Interpretive Notes to Recommendations 26 and 28,
review the money laundering and terrorist financing risk profiles and risk assessments
prepared by financial institutions and DNFBPs, and take the result of this review into
consideration.
B. Obligations and decisions for financial institutions and DNFBPs
8. Assessing risk - Financial institutions and DNFBPs should be required to take appropriate
steps to identify and assess their money laundering and terrorist financing risks (for
customers, countries or geographic areas; and products, services, transactions or delivery
channels). They should document those assessments in order to be able to demonstrate their
basis, keep these assessments up to date, and have appropriate mechanisms to provide risk
assessment information to competent authorities and SRBs. The nature and extent of any
assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing risks should be appropriate to the
nature and size of the business. Financial institutions and DNFBPs should always understand
their money laundering and terrorist financing risks, but competent authorities or SRBs may
determine that individual documented risk assessments are not required, if the specific risks
inherent to the sector are clearly identified and understood.
9. Risk management and mitigation - Financial institutions and DNFBPs should be required to
have policies, controls and procedures that enable them to manage and mitigate effectively
the risks that have been identified (either by the country or by the financial institution or
DNFBP). They should be required to monitor the implementation of those controls and to
enhance them, if necessary. The policies, controls and procedures should be approved by
senior management, and the measures taken to manage and mitigate the risks (whether
higher or lower) should be consistent with national requirements and with guidance from
competent authorities and SRBs.
10. Higher risk - Where higher risks are identified financial institutions and DNFBPs should be
required to take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate the risks.
11. Lower risk - Where lower risks are identified, countries may allow financial institutions and
DNFBPs to take simplified measures to manage and mitigate those risks.
12. When assessing risk, financial institutions and DNFBPs should consider all the relevant risk
factors before determining what is the level of overall risk and the appropriate level of
mitigation to be applied. Financial institutions and DNFBPs may differentiate the extent of
measures, depending on the type and level of risk for the various risk factors (e.g. in a
particular situation, they could apply normal CDD for customer acceptance measures, but
enhanced CDD for ongoing monitoring, or vice versa).
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 3
(MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCE)
1. Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the Vienna
Convention) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
(the Palermo Convention).
2. Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to
including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may be described by
reference to all offences; or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences; or to
the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach); or to a
list of predicate offences; or a combination of these approaches.
3. Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should, at a minimum,
comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious offences under their national law,
or should include offences that are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year’s
imprisonment, or, for those countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their
legal system, predicate offences should comprise all offences that are punished by a minimum
penalty of more than six months imprisonment.
4. Whichever approach is adopted, each country should, at a minimum, include a range of
offences within each of the designated categories of offences. The offence of money laundering
should extend to any type of property, regardless of its value, that directly or indirectly
represents the proceeds of crime. When proving that property is the proceeds of crime, it
should not be necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offence.
5. Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in another
country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted a
predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide that the only
prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate offence, had it occurred
domestically.
6. Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to persons who
committed the predicate offence, where this is required by fundamental principles of their
domestic law.
7. Countries should ensure that:
(a) The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of money laundering may be
inferred from objective factual circumstances.
(b) Effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions should apply to natural
persons convicted of money laundering.
(c) Criminal liability and sanctions, and, where that is not possible (due to fundamental
principles of domestic law), civil or administrative liability and sanctions, should apply
to legal persons. This should not preclude parallel criminal, civil or administrative
proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in which more than one form of
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liability is available. Such measures should be without prejudice to the criminal
liability of natural persons. All sanctions should be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive.
(d) There should be appropriate ancillary offences to the offence of money laundering,
including participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempt, aiding
and abetting, facilitating, and counselling the commission, unless this is not permitted
by fundamental principles of domestic law.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATIONS 4 AND 38
(CONFISCATION AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES)
Countries should establish mechanisms that will enable their competent authorities to effectively
manage and, when necessary, dispose of, property that is frozen or seized, or has been confiscated.
These mechanisms should be applicable both in the context of domestic proceedings, and pursuant
to requests by foreign countries.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 5
(TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCE)
A. Objectives
1. Recommendation 5 was developed with the objective of ensuring that countries have the legal
capacity to prosecute and apply criminal sanctions to persons that finance terrorism. Given
the close connection between international terrorism and, inter alia, money laundering,
another objective of Recommendation 5 is to emphasise this link by obligating countries to
include terrorist financing offences as predicate offences for money laundering.
B. Characteristics of the terrorist financing offence
2. Terrorist financing offences should extend to any person who wilfully provides or collects
funds or other assets by any means, directly or indirectly, with the unlawful intention that
they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part: (a) to carry
out a terrorist act(s); (b) by a terrorist organisation; or (c) by an individual terrorist.
3. Terrorist financing includes financing the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than
their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist
training.
4. Criminalising terrorist financing solely on the basis of aiding and abetting, attempt, or
conspiracy is not sufficient to comply with this Recommendation.
5. Terrorist financing offences should extend to any funds or other assets, whether from a
legitimate or illegitimate source.
6. Terrorist financing offences should not require that the funds or other assets: (a) were
actually used to carry out or attempt a terrorist act(s); or (b) be linked to a specific terrorist
act(s).
7. Countries should ensure that the intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of
terrorist financing may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
8. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions should apply to natural persons
convicted of terrorist financing.
9. Criminal liability and sanctions, and, where that is not possible (due to fundamental principles
of domestic law), civil or administrative liability and sanctions, should apply to legal persons.
This should not preclude parallel criminal, civil or administrative proceedings with respect to
legal persons in countries in which more than one form of liability is available. Such measures
should be without prejudice to the criminal liability of natural persons. All sanctions should be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
10. It should also be an offence to attempt to commit the offence of terrorist financing.
11. It should also be an offence to engage in any of the following types of conduct:
(a) Participating as an accomplice in an offence, as set forth in paragraphs 2 or 9 of this
Interpretive Note;
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(b) Organising or directing others to commit an offence, as set forth in paragraphs 2 or 9 of
this Interpretive Note;
(c) Contributing to the commission of one or more offence(s), as set forth in paragraphs 2
or 9 of this Interpretive Note, by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.
Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) be made with the aim of
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity
or purpose involves the commission of a terrorist financing offence; or (ii) be made in
the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist financing offence.
12. Terrorist financing offences should apply, regardless of whether the person alleged to have
committed the offence(s) is in the same country or a different country from the one in which
the terrorist(s)/terrorist organisation(s) is located or the terrorist act(s) occurred/will occur.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 6
(TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS RELATED TO TERRORISM
AND TERRORIST FINANCING)
A. OBJECTIVE
1. Recommendation 6 requires each country to implement targeted financial sanctions to
comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions that require countries to freeze,
without delay, the funds or other assets, and to ensure that no funds and other assets are
made available to or for the benefit of: (i) any person2 or entity designated by the United
Nations Security Council (the Security Council) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, as required by Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor
resolutions3; or (ii) any person or entity designated by that country pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1373 (2001).
2. It should be stressed that none of the obligations in Recommendation 6 is intended to replace
other measures or obligations that may already be in place for dealing with funds or other
assets in the context of a criminal, civil or administrative investigation or proceeding, as is
required by Recommendation 4 (confiscation and provisional measures)4. Measures under
Recommendation 6 may complement criminal proceedings against a designated person or
entity, and be adopted by a competent authority or a court, but are not conditional upon the
existence of such proceedings. Instead, the focus of Recommendation 6 is on the preventive
measures that are necessary and unique in the context of stopping the flow of funds or other
assets to terrorist groups; and the use of funds or other assets by terrorist groups. In
determining the limits of, or fostering widespread support for, an effective counter-terrorist
financing regime, countries must also respect human rights, respect the rule of law, and
recognise the rights of innocent third parties.
2 Natural or legal person.
3 Recommendation 6 is applicable to all current and future successor resolutions to resolution 1267(1999)
and any future UNSCRs which impose targeted financial sanctions in the terrorist financing context. At
the time of issuance of this Interpretive Note, (February 2012), the successor resolutions to resolution
1267 (1999) are resolutions: 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526
(2004), 1617 (2005), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), and 1989
(2011).
4 Based on requirements set, for instance, in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)(the Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) (the Palermo Convention), which contain obligations
regarding freezing, seizure and confiscation in the context of combating transnational crime.
Additionally, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)(the
Terrorist Financing Convention) contains obligations regarding freezing, seizure and confiscation in the
context of combating terrorist financing. Those obligations exist separately and apart from the
obligations set forth in Recommendation 6 and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions related
to terrorist financing.
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B. IDENTIFYING AND DESIGNATING PERSONS AND ENTITIES FINANCING
OR SUPPORTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
3. For resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions, designations relating to Al-Qaida
are made by the 1267 Committee, and designations pertaining to the Taliban and related
threats to Afghanistan are made by the 1988 Committee, with both Committees acting under
the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. For resolution 1373 (2001),
designations are made, at the national or supranational level, by a country or countries acting
on their own motion, or at the request of another country, if the country receiving the request
is satisfied, according to applicable legal principles, that a requested designation is supported
by reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that the proposed designee
meets the criteria for designation in resolution 1373 (2001), as set forth in Section E.
4. Countries need to have the authority, and effective procedures or mechanisms, to identify and
initiate proposals for designations of persons and entities targeted by resolution 1267 (1999)
and its successor resolutions, consistent with the obligations set out in those Security Council
resolutions5. Such authority and procedures or mechanisms are essential to propose persons
and entities to the Security Council for designation in accordance with Security Council listbased
programmes, pursuant to those Security Council resolutions. Countries also need to
have the authority and effective procedures or mechanisms to identify and initiate
designations of persons and entities pursuant to S/RES/1373 (2001), consistent with the
obligations set out in that Security Council resolution. Such authority and procedures or
mechanisms are essential to identify persons and entities who meet the criteria identified in
resolution 1373 (2001), described in Section E. A country’s regime to implement resolution
1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions, and resolution 1373 (2001), should include the
following necessary elements:
(a) Countries should identify a competent authority or a court as having responsibility for:
(i) proposing to the 1267 Committee, for designation as appropriate, persons or
entities that meet the specific criteria for designation, as set forth in Security
Council resolution 1989 (2011) (on Al-Qaida) and related resolutions, if that
authority decides to do so and believes that it has sufficient evidence to support
the designation criteria;
(ii) proposing to the 1988 Committee, for designation as appropriate, persons or
entities that meet the specific criteria for designation, as set forth in Security
Council resolution 1988 (2011) (on the Taliban and those associated with the
Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of
Afghanistan) and related resolutions, if that authority decides to do so and
believes that it has sufficient evidence to support the designation criteria; and
5 The relevant Security Council resolutions do not require countries to identify persons or entities and
submit these to the relevant United Nations Committees, but to have the authority and effective
procedures and mechanisms in place to be able to do so.
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(iii) designating persons or entities that meet the specific criteria for designation, as
set forth in resolution 1373 (2001), as put forward either on the country’s own
motion or, after examining and giving effect to, if appropriate, the request of
another country, if the country receiving the request is satisfied, according to
applicable legal principles, that a requested designation is supported by
reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that the
proposed designee meets the criteria for designation in resolution 1373 (2001),
as set forth in Section E.
(b) Countries should have a mechanism(s) for identifying targets for designation, based on
the designation criteria set out in resolution 1988 (2011) and resolution 1989 (2011)
and related resolutions, and resolution 1373 (2001) (see Section E for the specific
designation criteria of relevant Security Council resolutions). This includes having
authority and effective procedures or mechanisms to examine and give effect to, if
appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanisms of other countries
pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001). To ensure that effective cooperation is developed
among countries, countries should ensure that, when receiving a request, they make a
prompt determination whether they are satisfied, according to applicable (supra-)
national principles, that the request is supported by reasonable grounds, or a
reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that the proposed designee meets the criteria
for designation in resolution 1373 (2011), as set forth in Section E.
(c) The competent authority(ies) should have appropriate legal authorities and
procedures or mechanisms to collect or solicit as much information as possible from
all relevant sources to identify persons and entities that, based on reasonable grounds,
or a reasonable basis to suspect or believe, meet the criteria for designation in the
relevant Security Council resolutions.
(d) When deciding whether or not to make a (proposal for) designation, countries should
apply an evidentiary standard of proof of “reasonable grounds” or “reasonable basis”.
For designations under resolutions 1373 (2001), the competent authority of each
country will apply the legal standard of its own legal system regarding the kind and
quantum of evidence for the determination that “reasonable grounds” or “reasonable
basis” exist for a decision to designate a person or entity, and thus initiate an action
under a freezing mechanism. This is the case irrespective of whether the proposed
designation is being put forward on the relevant country’s own motion or at the
request of another country. Such (proposals for) designations should not be
conditional upon the existence of a criminal proceeding.
(e) When proposing names to the 1267 Committee for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions
List, pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions, countries
should:
(i) follow the procedures and standard forms for listing, as adopted by the 1267
Committee;
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(ii) provide as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in
particular, sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and
positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and to
the extent possible, the information required by Interpol to issue a Special
Notice;
(iii) provide a statement of case which contains as much detail as possible on the
basis for the listing, including: specific information supporting a determination
that the person or entity meets the relevant criteria for designation (see Section
E for the specific designation criteria of relevant Security Council resolutions);
the nature of the information; supporting information or documents that can be
provided; and details of any connection between the proposed designee and any
currently designated person or entity. This statement of case should be
releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being
confidential to the 1267 Committee; and
(iv) specify whether their status as a designating state may be made known.
(f) When proposing names to the 1988 Committee for inclusion on the Taliban Sanctions
List, pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and its successor resolutions, countries
should:
(i) follow the procedures for listing, as adopted by the 1988 Committee;
(ii) provide as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in
particular, sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and
positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and to
the extent possible, the information required by Interpol to issue a Special
Notice; and
(iii) provide a statement of case which contains as much detail as possible on the
basis for the listing, including: specific information supporting a determination
that the person or entity meets the relevant designation (see Section E for the
specific designation criteria of relevant Security Council resolutions); the nature
of the information; supporting information or documents that can be provided;
and details of any connection between the proposed designee and any currently
designated person or entity. This statement of case should be releasable, upon
request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being confidential to
the 1988 Committee.
(g) When requesting another country to give effect to the actions initiated under the
freezing mechanisms that have been implemented pursuant to resolution 1373
(2001), the initiating country should provide as much detail as possible on: the
proposed name, in particular, sufficient identifying information to allow for the
accurate and positive identification of persons and entities; and specific information
supporting a determination that the person or entity meets the relevant criteria for
designation (see Section E for the specific designation criteria of relevant Security
Council resolutions).
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(h) Countries should have procedures to be able to operate ex parte against a person or
entity who has been identified and whose (proposal for) designation is being
considered.
C. FREEZING AND PROHIBITING DEALING IN FUNDS OR OTHER ASSETS OF DESIGNATED
PERSONS AND ENTITIES
5. There is an obligation for countries to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay
against persons and entities designated by the 1267 Committee and 1988 Committee (in the
case of resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions), when these Committees are
acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. For resolution
1373 (2001), the obligation for countries to take freezing action and prohibit the dealing in
funds or other assets of designated persons and entities, without delay, is triggered by a
designation at the (supra-)national level, as put forward either on the country’s own motion
or at the request of another country, if the country receiving the request is satisfied, according
to applicable legal principles, that a requested designation is supported by reasonable
grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that the proposed designee meets the
criteria for designation in resolution 1373 (2001), as set forth in Section E.
6. Countries should establish the necessary legal authority and identify domestic competent
authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing targeted financial sanctions, in
accordance with the following standards and procedures:
(a) Countries6 should require all natural and legal persons within the country to freeze,
without delay and without prior notice, the funds or other assets of designated
persons and entities. This obligation should extend to: all funds or other assets that
are owned or controlled by the designated person or entity, and not just those that can
be tied to a particular terrorist act, plot or threat; those funds or other assets that are
wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated persons or
entities; and the funds or other assets derived or generated from funds or other assets
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by designated persons or entities, as well as
funds or other assets of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of,
designated persons or entities.
(b) Countries should prohibit their nationals, or any persons and entities within their
jurisdiction, from making any funds or other assets, economic resources, or financial
or other related services, available, directly or indirectly, wholly or jointly, for the
benefit of designated persons and entities; entities owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by designated persons or entities; and persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of, designated persons or entities, unless licensed, authorised or
6 In the case of the European Union (EU), which is a supra-national jurisdiction under Recommendation 6,
the EU law applies as follows. The assets of designated persons and entities are frozen by the EU
regulations and their amendments. EU member states may have to take additional measures to
implement the freeze, and all natural and legal persons within the EU have to respect the freeze and not
make funds available to designated persons and entities.
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otherwise notified in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions (see
Section E below).
(c) Countries should have mechanisms for communicating designations to the financial
sector and the DNFBPs immediately upon taking such action, and providing clear
guidance, particularly to financial institutions and other persons or entities, including
DNFBPs, that may be holding targeted funds or other assets, on their obligations in
taking action under freezing mechanisms.
(d) Countries should require financial institutions and DNFBPs7 to report to competent
authorities any assets frozen or actions taken in compliance with the prohibition
requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including attempted
transactions, and ensure that such information is effectively utilised by the competent
authorities.
(e) Countries should adopt effective measures which protect the rights of bona fide third
parties acting in good faith when implementing the obligations under
Recommendation 6.
D. DE-LISTING, UNFREEZING AND PROVIDING ACCESS TO FROZEN FUNDS OR OTHER ASSETS
7. Countries should develop and implement publicly known procedures to submit de-listing
requests to the Security Council in the case of persons and entities designated pursuant to
resolution 1267(1999) and its successor resolutions that, in the view of the country, do not or
no longer meet the criteria for designation. In the event that the 1267 Committee or 1988
Committee has de-listed a person or entity, the obligation to freeze no longer exists. In the
case of de-listing requests related to Al-Qaida, such procedures and criteria should be in
accordance with procedures adopted by the 1267 Committee under Security Council
resolutions 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1989 (2011), and any
successor resolutions. In the case of de-listing requests related to the Taliban and related
threats to the peace, security and stability of Afghanistan, such procedures and criteria should
be in accordance with procedures adopted by the 1988 Committee under Security Council
resolutions 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), and any
successor resolutions.
8. For persons and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), countries should
have appropriate legal authorities and procedures or mechanisms to delist and unfreeze the
funds or other assets of persons and entities that no longer meet the criteria for designation.
Countries should also have procedures in place to allow, upon request, review of the
designation decision before a court or other independent competent authority.
9. For persons or entities with the same or similar name as designated persons or entities, who
are inadvertently affected by a freezing mechanism (i.e. a false positive), countries should
develop and implement publicly known procedures to unfreeze the funds or other assets of
7 Security Council resolutions apply to all natural and legal persons within the country.
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such persons or entities in a timely manner, upon verification that the person or entity
involved is not a designated person or entity.
10. Where countries have determined that funds or other assets of persons and entities
designated by the Security Council, or one of its relevant sanctions committees, are necessary
for basic expenses, for the payment of certain types of fees, expenses and service charges, or
for extraordinary expenses, countries should authorise access to such funds or other assets in
accordance with the procedures set out in Security Council resolution 1452 (2002) and any
successor resolutions. On the same grounds, countries should authorise access to funds or
other assets, if freezing measures are applied to persons and entities designated by a
(supra-)national country pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) and as set out in resolution
1963 (2010).
11. Countries should provide for a mechanism through which a designated person or entity can
challenge their designation, with a view to having it reviewed by a competent authority or a
court. With respect to designations on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, countries should inform
designated persons and entities of the availability of the United Nations Office of the
Ombudsperson, pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009), to accept de-listing petitions.
12. Countries should have mechanisms for communicating de-listings and unfreezings to the
financial sector and the DNFBPs immediately upon taking such action, and providing adequate
guidance, particularly to financial institutions and other persons or entities, including
DNFBPs, that may be holding targeted funds or other assets, on their obligations to respect a
de-listing or unfreezing action.
E. UNITED NATIONS DESIGNATION CRITERIA
13. The criteria for designation as specified in the relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions are:
(a) Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and their successor
resolutions8:
(i) any person or entity participating in the financing, planning, facilitating,
preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the
name of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms
and related materiel to; recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities
of Al-Qaida, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof9; or
8 Recommendation 6 is applicable to all current and future successor resolutions to resolution
1267(1999). At the time of issuance of this Interpretive Note, (February 2012) , the successor resolutions
to resolution 1267 (1999) are: resolutions 1333 (2000), 1367 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526
(2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), and 1989 (2011).
9 OP2 of resolution 1617 (2005) further defines the criteria for being “associated with” Al-Qaida or Usama bin
Laden.
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(ii) any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any person or
entity designated under subsection 13(a)(i), or by persons acting on their behalf
or at their direction.
(b) Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) and their successor
resolutions:
(i) any person or entity participating in the financing, planning, facilitating,
preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the
name of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms
and related materiel to; recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities
of those designated and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and
security of Afghanistan; or
(ii) any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any person or
entity designated under subsection 13(b)(i) of this subparagraph, or by persons
acting on their behalf or at their direction.
(c) Security Council resolution 1373 (2001):
(i) any person or entity who commits or attempts to commit terrorist acts, or who
participates in or facilitates the commission of terrorist acts;
(ii) any entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any person or entity
designated under subsection 13(c) (i) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) any person or entity acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, any person or
entity designated under subsection 13(c) (i) of this subparagraph.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 7
(TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS RELATED TO PROLIFERATION)
A. OBJECTIVE
1. Recommendation 7 requires countries to implement targeted financial sanctions10 to comply
with United Nations Security Council resolutions that require countries to freeze, without
delay, the funds or other assets of, and to ensure that no funds and other assets are made
available to, and for the benefit of, any person11 or entity designated by the United Nations
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, pursuant to Security
Council resolutions that relate to the prevention and disruption of the financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.12
2. It should be stressed that none of the requirements in Recommendation 7 is intended to
replace other measures or obligations that may already be in place for dealing with funds or
other assets in the context of a criminal, civil or administrative investigation or proceeding, as
is required by international treaties or Security Council resolutions relating to weapons of
mass destruction non-proliferation.13 The focus of Recommendation 7 is on preventive
measures that are necessary and unique in the context of stopping the flow of funds or other
assets to proliferators or proliferation; and the use of funds or other assets by proliferators or
proliferation, as required by the United Nations Security Council (the Security Council).
10 Recommendation 7 is focused on targeted financial sanctions. These include the specific restrictions set
out in Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (see Annex B paragraphs 6(c) and (d)). However, it should
be noted that the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions are much broader and prescribe
other types of sanctions (such as travel bans) and other types of financial provisions (such as activitybased
financial prohibitions, category-based sanctions and vigilance measures). With respect to targeted
financial sanctions related to the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other types
of financial provisions, the FATF has issued non-binding guidance, which jurisdictions are encouraged to
consider in their implementation of the relevant UNSCRs.
11 Natural or legal person.
12 Recommendation 7 is applicable to all current Security Council resolutions applying targeted financial
sanctions relating to the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, any future successor
resolutions, and any future Security Council resolutions which impose targeted financial sanctions in the
context of the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the time of issuance of this
Interpretive Note (June 2017), the Security Council resolutions applying targeted financial sanctions
relating to the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are: resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017). Resolution
2231 (2015), endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, terminated all provisions of resolutions
relating to Iran and proliferation financing, including 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
1929 (2010), but established specific restrictions including targeted financial sanctions. This lifts
sanctions as part of a step by step approach with reciprocal commitments endorsed by the Security
Council. Implementation day of the JCPOA was on 16 January 2016.
13 Based on requirements set, for instance, in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004)
and 2235 (2016). Those obligations exist separately and apart from the obligations set forth in
Recommendation 7 and its interpretive note.
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B. DESIGNATIONS
3. Designations are made by the Security Council in annexes to the relevant resolutions, or by
the Security Council Committees established pursuant to these resolutions. There is no
specific obligation upon United Nations Member States to submit proposals for designations
to the Security Council or the relevant Security Council Committee(s). However, in practice,
the Security Council or the relevant Committee(s) primarily depends upon requests for
designation by Member States. Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) provides that the
relevant Committee shall promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and its successor resolutions.
Resolution 2231 (2015) provides that the Security Council shall make the necessary practical
arrangements to undertake directly tasks related to the implementation of the resolution.
4. Countries could consider establishing the authority and effective procedures or mechanisms
to propose persons and entities to the Security Council for designation in accordance with
relevant Security Council resolutions which impose targeted financial sanctions in the context
of the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, countries
could consider the following elements:
(a) identifying a competent authority(ies), either executive or judicial, as having
responsibility for:
(i) proposing to the 1718 Sanctions Committee, for designation as appropriate,
persons or entities that meet the specific criteria for designation as set forth in
resolution 1718 (2006) and its successor resolutions14, if that authority decides
to do so and believes that it has sufficient evidence to support the designation
criteria (see Section E for the specific designation criteria associated with
relevant Security Council resolutions); and
(ii) proposing to the Security Council, for designation as appropriate, persons or
entities that meet the criteria for designation as set forth in
resolution 2231 (2015) and any future successor resolutions, if that authority
decides to do so and believes that it has sufficient evidence to support the
designation criteria (see Section E for the specific designation criteria associated
with relevant Security Council resolutions).
(b) having a mechanism(s) for identifying targets for designation, based on the
designation criteria set out in resolutions 1718 (2006), 2231 (2015), and their
successor and any future successor resolutions (see Section E for the specific
designation criteria of relevant Security Council resolutions). Such procedures should
ensure the determination, according to applicable (supra-)national principles,
whether reasonable grounds or a reasonable basis exists to propose a designation.
14 Recommendation 7 is applicable to all current and future successor resolutions to resolution
1718 (2006). At the time of issuance of this Interpretive Note (June 2017), the successor resolutions to
resolution 1718 (2006) are: resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013),
resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016) and resolution 2356 (2017).
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(c) having appropriate legal authority, and procedures or mechanisms, to collect or solicit
as much information as possible from all relevant sources to identify persons and
entities that, based on reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis to suspect or believe,
meet the criteria for designation in the relevant Security Council resolutions.
(d) when deciding whether or not to propose a designation, taking into account the
criteria in Section E of this interpretive note. For proposals of designations, the
competent authority of each country will apply the legal standard of its own legal
system, taking into consideration human rights, respect for the rule of law, and in
recognition of the rights of innocent third parties.
(e) when proposing names to the 1718 Sanctions Committee, pursuant to resolution
1718 (2006) and its successor resolutions, or to the Security Council, pursuant to
resolution 2231 (2015) and any future successor resolutions, providing as much detail
as possible on:
(i) the proposed name, in particular, sufficient identifying information to allow for
the accurate and positive identification of persons and entities; and
(ii) specific information supporting a determination that the person or entity meets
the relevant criteria for designation (see Section E for the specific designation
criteria of relevant Security Council resolutions).
(f) having procedures to be able, where necessary, to operate ex parte against a person or
entity who has been identified and whose proposal for designation is being
considered.
C. FREEZING AND PROHIBITING DEALING IN FUNDS OR OTHER ASSETS
OF DESIGNATED PERSONS AND ENTITIES
5. There is an obligation for countries to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay
against persons and entities designated:
(a) in the case of resolution 1718 (2006) and its successor resolutions, by the Security
Council in annexes to the relevant resolutions, or by the 1718 Sanctions Committee of
the Security Council15; and
(b) in the case of resolution 2231 (2015) and any future successor resolutions by the
Security Council,
when acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
15 As noted in resolution 2270 (2016) (OP32) this also applies to entities of the Government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or the Worker’s Party of Korea that countries determine are
associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by
resolution 1718 (2006) and successor resolutions.
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6. Countries should establish the necessary legal authority and identify competent domestic
authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing targeted financial sanctions, in
accordance with the following standards and procedures:
(a) Countries16 should require all natural and legal persons within the country to freeze,
without delay and without prior notice, the funds or other assets of designated
persons and entities. This obligation should extend to: all funds or other assets that
are owned or controlled by the designated person or entity, and not just those that can
be tied to a particular act, plot or threat of proliferation; those funds or other assets
that are wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated
persons or entities; and the funds or other assets derived or generated from funds or
other assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by designated persons or
entities, as well as funds or other assets of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or
at the direction of designated persons or entities.
(b) Countries should ensure that any funds or other assets are prevented from being made
available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or
for the benefit of designated persons or entities unless licensed, authorised or
otherwise notified in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions (see
Section E below).
(c) Countries should have mechanisms for communicating designations to financial
institutions and DNFBPs immediately upon taking such action, and providing clear
guidance, particularly to financial institutions and other persons or entities, including
DNFBPs, that may be holding targeted funds or other assets, on their obligations in
taking action under freezing mechanisms.
(d) Countries should require financial institutions and DNFBPs17 to report to competent
authorities any assets frozen or actions taken in compliance with the prohibition
requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including attempted
transactions, and ensure that such information is effectively utilised by competent
authorities.
(e) Countries should adopt effective measures which protect the rights of bona fide third
parties acting in good faith when implementing the obligations under
Recommendation 7.
(f) Countries should adopt appropriate measures for monitoring, and ensuring
compliance by, financial institutions and DNFBPs with the relevant laws or
16 In the case of the European Union (EU), which is considered a supra-national jurisdiction under
Recommendation 7 by the FATF, the assets of designated persons and entities are frozen under EU
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Council decisions and Council regulations (as amended). EU
member states may have to take additional measures to implement the freeze, and all natural and legal
persons within the EU have to respect the freeze and not make funds available to designated persons and
entities.
17 Security Council resolutions apply to all natural and legal persons within the country.
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enforceable means governing the obligations under Recommendation 7. Failure to
comply with such laws, or enforceable means should be subject to civil, administrative
or criminal sanctions.
D. DE-LISTING, UNFREEZING AND PROVIDING ACCESS TO FROZEN FUNDS OR OTHER ASSETS
7. Countries should develop and implement publicly known procedures to submit de-listing
requests to the Security Council in the case of designated persons and entities, that, in the
view of the country, do not or no longer meet the criteria for designation. Once the Security
Council or the relevant Sanctions Committee has de-listed the person or entity, the obligation
to freeze no longer exists. In the case of resolution 1718 (2006) and its successor resolutions,
such procedures and criteria should be in accordance with any applicable guidelines or
procedures adopted by the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1730 (2006) and any
successor resolutions, including those of the Focal Point mechanism established under that
resolution. Countries should enable listed persons and entities to petition a request for
delisting at the Focal Point for de-listing established pursuant to resolution 1730 (2006), or
should inform designated persons or entities to petition the Focal Point directly.
8. For persons or entities with the same or similar name as designated persons or entities, who
are inadvertently affected by a freezing mechanism (i.e., a false positive), countries should
develop and implement publicly known procedures to unfreeze the funds or other assets of
such persons or entities in a timely manner, upon verification that the person or entity
involved is not a designated person or entity.
9. Where countries have determined that the exemption conditions set out in
resolution 1718(2006) and resolution 2231 (2015) are met, countries should authorise access
to funds or other assets in accordance with the procedures set out therein.
10. Countries should permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to
resolution 1718 (2006) or resolution 2231 (2015) of interests or other earnings due on those
accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the
date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided
that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions
and are frozen.
11. Freezing action taken pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and continued by
resolution 2231 (2015), or taken pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), shall not prevent a
designated person or entity from making any payment due under a contract entered into prior
to the listing of such person or entity, provided that:
(a) the relevant countries have determined that the contract is not related to any of the
prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training,
financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in
resolution 2231 (2015) and any future successor resolutions;
(b) the relevant countries have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly
received by a person or entity subject to the measures in paragraph 6 of Annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015); and
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(c) the relevant countries have submitted prior notification to the Security Council of the
intention to make or receive such payments or to authorise, where appropriate, the
unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten
working days prior to such authorisation.18
12. Countries should have mechanisms for communicating de-listings and unfreezings to the
financial sector and the DNFBPs immediately upon taking such action, and providing adequate
guidance, particularly to financial institutions and other persons or entities, including
DNFBPs, that may be holding targeted funds or other assets, on their obligations to respect a
de-listing or unfreezing action.
E. UNITED NATIONS DESIGNATION CRITERIA
13. The criteria for designation as specified in the relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions are:
(a) On DPRK - Resolutions 1718 (2006), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016):
(i) any person or entity engaged in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK)’s nuclear-related, other WMD-related and ballistic missile-related
programmes;
(ii) any person or entity providing support for DPRK’s nuclear-related, other WMDrelated
and ballistic missile-related programmes, including through illicit
means;
(iii) any person or entity acting on behalf of or at the direction of any person or
entity designated under subsection 13(a)(i) or subsection 13(a)(ii)19;
(iv) any legal person or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any
person or entity designated under subsection 13(a)(i) or subsection 13(a)(ii)20;
(v) any person or entity that has assisted in the evasion of sanctions or in violating
the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
(vi) any person or entity that has contributed to DPRK’s prohibited programmes,
activities prohibited by the DPRK-related resolutions, or to the evasion of
provisions; or
18 In cases where the designated person or entity is a financial institution, jurisdictions should consider the
FATF guidance issued as an annex to The Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, adopted in June
2013.
19 The funds or assets of these persons or entities are frozen regardless of whether they are specifically
identified by the Committee. Further, resolution 2270 (2016) OP23 expanded the scope of targeted
financial sanctions obligations under resolution 1718 (2006), by applying these to the Ocean Maritime
Management Company vessels specified in Annex III of resolution 2270 (2016).
20 Ibid.
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(vii) any entity of the Government of the DPRK or the Worker’s Party of Korea, or
person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by any entity
owned or controlled by them, that countries determine are associated with the
DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by
resolution 1718 (2006) and successor resolutions.
(b) On Iran - Resolution 2231 (2015):
(i) any person or entity having engaged in, directly associated with or provided
support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities contrary to Iran’s
commitments in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the
involvement in procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials
and technology specified in Annex B to resolution 2231 (2015);
(ii) any person or entity assisting designated persons or entities in evading or acting
inconsistently with the JCPOA or resolution 2231 (2015); and
(iii) any person or entity acting on behalf or at a direction of any person or entity in
subsection 13(b)(i), subsection 13(b)(ii) and/or subsection 13(b)(iii), or by any
entities owned or controlled by them.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 8
(NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS)
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Given the variety of legal forms that non-profit organisations (NPOs) can have, depending on
the country, the FATF has adopted a functional definition of NPO. This definition is based on
those activities and characteristics of an organisation which put it at risk of terrorist financing
abuse, rather than on the simple fact that it is operating on a non-profit basis. For the
purposes of this Recommendation, NPO refers to a legal person or arrangement or
organisation that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as
charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out
of other types of “good works”. Without prejudice to Recommendation 1, this
Recommendation only applies to those NPOs which fall within the FATF definition of an NPO.
It does not apply to the entire universe of NPOs.
2. NPOs play a vital role in the world economy and in many national economies and social
systems. Their efforts complement the activity of the governmental and business sectors in
providing essential services, comfort and hope to those in need around the world. The FATF
recognises the vital importance of NPOs in providing these important charitable services, as
well as the difficulty of providing assistance to those in need, often in high risk areas and
conflict zones, and applauds the efforts of NPOs to meet such needs. The FATF also recognises
the intent and efforts to date of NPOs to promote transparency within their operations and to
prevent terrorist financing abuse, including through the development of programmes aimed
at discouraging radicalisation and violent extremism. The ongoing international campaign
against terrorist financing has identified cases in which terrorists and terrorist organisations
exploit some NPOs in the sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage
terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organisations and operations. As well,
there have been cases where terrorists create sham charities or engage in fraudulent
fundraising for these purposes. This misuse not only facilitates terrorist activity, but also
undermines donor confidence and jeopardises the very integrity of NPOs. Therefore,
protecting NPOs from terrorist financing abuse is both a critical component of the global fight
against terrorism and a necessary step to preserve the integrity of NPOs and the donor
community. Measures to protect NPOs from potential terrorist financing abuse should be
targeted and in line with the risk-based approach. It is also important for such measures to be
implemented in a manner which respects countries’ obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations and international human rights law.
3. Some NPOs may be vulnerable to terrorist financing abuse by terrorists for a variety of
reasons. NPOs enjoy the public trust, have access to considerable sources of funds, and are
often cash-intensive. Furthermore, some NPOs have a global presence that provides a
framework for national and international operations and financial transactions, often within
or near those areas that are most exposed to terrorist activity. In some cases, terrorist
organisations have taken advantage of these and other characteristics to infiltrate some NPOs
and misuse funds and operations to cover for, or support, terrorist activity.
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B. OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
4. The objective of Recommendation 8 is to ensure that NPOs are not misused by terrorist
organisations: (i) to pose as legitimate entities; (ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits
for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (iii)
to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, but
diverted for terrorist purposes. In this Interpretive Note, the approach taken to achieve this
objective is based on the following general principles:
(a) A risk-based approach applying focused measures in dealing with identified threats of
terrorist financing abuse to NPOs is essential given the diversity within individual
national sectors, the differing degrees to which parts of each sector may be vulnerable
to terrorist financing abuse, the need to ensure that legitimate charitable activity
continues to flourish, and the limited resources and authorities available to combat
terrorist financing in each country.
(b) Flexibility in developing a national response to terrorist financing abuse of NPOs is
essential, in order to allow it to evolve over time as it faces the changing nature of the
terrorist financing threat.
(c) Past and ongoing terrorist financing abuse of NPOs requires countries to adopt
effective and proportionate measures, which should be commensurate to the risks
identified through a risk-based approach.
(d) Focused measures adopted by countries to protect NPOs from terrorist financing
abuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities. Rather, such
measures should promote accountability and engender greater confidence among
NPOs, across the donor community and with the general public, that charitable funds
and services reach intended legitimate beneficiaries. Systems that promote achieving a
high degree of accountability, integrity and public confidence in the management and
functioning of NPOs are integral to ensuring they cannot be abused for terrorist
financing.
(e) Countries are required to identify and take effective and proportionate action against
NPOs that either are exploited by, or knowingly supporting, terrorists or terrorist
organisations taking into account the specifics of the case. Countries should aim to
prevent and prosecute, as appropriate, terrorist financing and other forms of terrorist
support. Where NPOs suspected of, or implicated in, terrorist financing or other forms
of terrorist support are identified, the first priority of countries must be to investigate
and halt such terrorist financing or support. Actions taken for this purpose should, to
the extent reasonably possible, minimise negative impact on innocent and legitimate
beneficiaries of charitable activity. However, this interest cannot excuse the need to
undertake immediate and effective actions to advance the immediate interest of
halting terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support provided by NPOs.
(f) Developing cooperative relationships among the public and private sectors and with
NPOs is critical to understanding NPOs’ risks and risk mitigation strategies, raising
awareness, increasing effectiveness and fostering capabilities to combat terrorist
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financing abuse within NPOs. Countries should encourage the development of
academic research on, and information-sharing in, NPOs to address terrorist financing
related issues.
C. MEASURES
5. Without prejudice to the requirements of Recommendation 1, since not all NPOs are
inherently high risk (and some may represent little or no risk at all), countries should identify
which subset of organisations fall within the FATF definition of NPO. In undertaking this
exercise, countries should use all relevant sources of information in order to identify features
and types of NPOs, which, by virtue of their activities or characteristics, are likely to be at risk
of terrorist financing abuse.21 It is also crucial to identify the nature of threats posed by
terrorist entities to the NPOs which are at risk as well as how terrorist actors abuse those
NPOs. Countries should review the adequacy of measures, including laws and regulations, that
relate to the subset of the NPO sector that may be abused for terrorism financing support in
order to be able to take proportionate and effective actions to address the risks identified.
These exercises could take a variety of forms and may or may not be a written product.
Countries should also periodically reassess the sector by reviewing new information on the
sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities to ensure effective implementation of
measures.
6. There is a diverse range of approaches in identifying, preventing and combating terrorist
financing abuse of NPOs. An effective approach should involve all four of the following
elements: (a) sustained outreach, (b) targeted risk-based supervision or monitoring,
(c) effective investigation and information gathering and (d) effective mechanisms for
international cooperation. The following measures represent examples of specific actions that
countries should take with respect to each of these elements, in order to protect NPOs from
potential terrorist financing abuse.
(a) Sustained outreach concerning terrorist financing issues
(i) Countries should have clear policies to promote accountability, integrity and
public confidence in the administration and management of NPOs.
(ii) Countries should encourage and undertake outreach and educational
programmes to raise and deepen awareness among NPOs as well as the donor
community about the potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to terrorist financing
abuse and terrorist financing risks, and the measures that NPOs can take to
protect themselves against such abuse.
(iii) Countries should work with NPOs to develop and refine best practices to
address terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities and thus protect them from
terrorist financing abuse.
21 For example, such information could be provided by regulators, tax authorities, FIUs, donor organisations or law
enforcement and intelligence authorities.
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(iv) Countries should encourage NPOs to conduct transactions via regulated
financial channels, wherever feasible, keeping in mind the varying capacities of
financial sectors in different countries and in different areas of urgent charitable
and humanitarian concerns.
(b) Targeted risk-based supervision or monitoring of NPOs
Countries should take steps to promote effective supervision or monitoring. A “onesize-
fits-all” approach would be inconsistent with the proper implementation of a riskbased
approach as stipulated under Recommendation 1 of the FATF Standards. In
practice, countries should be able to demonstrate that risk-based measures apply to
NPOs at risk of terrorist financing abuse. It is also possible that existing regulatory or
other measures may already sufficiently address the current terrorist financing risk to
the NPOs in a jurisdiction, although terrorist financing risks to the sector should be
periodically reviewed. Appropriate authorities should monitor the compliance of NPOs
with the requirements of this Recommendation, including the risk-based measures
being applied to them.22 Appropriate authorities should be able to apply effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations by NPOs or persons acting on
behalf of these NPOs.23 The following are some examples of measures that could be
applied to NPOs, in whole or in part, depending on the risks identified:
(i) NPOs could be required to license or register. This information should be
available to competent authorities and encouraged to be available to the
public.24
(ii) NPOs could be required to maintain information on: (1) the purpose and
objectives of their stated activities; and (2) the identity of the person(s) who
own, control or direct their activities, including senior officers, board members
and trustees. This information could be publicly available either directly from
the NPO or through appropriate authorities.
(iii) NPOs could be required to issue annual financial statements that provide
detailed breakdowns of incomes and expenditures.
(iv) NPOs could be required to have appropriate controls in place to ensure that all
funds are fully accounted for, and are spent in a manner that is consistent with
the purpose and objectives of the NPO’s stated activities.
(v) NPOs could be required to take reasonable measures to confirm the identity,
credentials and good standing of beneficiaries25 and associate NPOs and that
22 In this context, rules and regulations may include rules and standards applied by self-regulatory organisations and
accrediting institutions.
23 The range of such sanctions might include freezing of accounts, removal of trustees, fines, de-certification, delicensing
and de-registration. This should not preclude parallel civil, administrative or criminal proceedings with
respect to NPOs or persons acting on their behalf where appropriate.
24 Specific licensing or registration requirements for counter terrorist financing purposes are not necessary. For
example, in some countries, NPOs are already registered with tax authorities and monitored in the context of
qualifying for favourable tax treatment (such as tax credits or tax exemptions).
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they are not involved with and/or using the charitable funds to support
terrorists or terrorist organisations26. However, NPOs should not be required to
conduct customer due diligence. NPOs could be required to take reasonable
measures to document the identity of their significant donors and to respect
donor confidentiality. The ultimate objective of this requirement is to prevent
charitable funds from being used to finance and support terrorists and terrorist
organisations.
(vi) NPOs could be required to maintain, for a period of at least five years, records of
domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify
that funds have been received and spent in a manner consistent with the
purpose and objectives of the organisation, and could be required to make these
available to competent authorities upon appropriate authority. This also applies
to information mentioned in paragraphs (ii) and (iii) above. Where appropriate,
records of charitable activities and financial operations by NPOs could also be
made available to the public.
(c) Effective information gathering and investigation
(i) Countries should ensure effective cooperation, coordination and informationsharing
to the extent possible among all levels of appropriate authorities or
organisations that hold relevant information on NPOs.
(ii) Countries should have investigative expertise and capability to examine those
NPOs suspected of either being exploited by, or actively supporting, terrorist
activity or terrorist organisations.
(iii) Countries should ensure that full access to information on the administration
and management of a particular NPO (including financial and programmatic
information) may be obtained during the course of an investigation.
(iv) Countries should establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that, when there
is suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that a particular NPO: (1) is
involved in terrorist financing abuse and/or is a front for fundraising by a
terrorist organisation; (2) is being exploited as a conduit for terrorist financing,
including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures, or other forms of
terrorist support; or (3) is concealing or obscuring the clandestine diversion of
funds intended for legitimate purposes, but redirected for the benefit of
terrorists or terrorist organisations, that this information is promptly shared
with relevant competent authorities, in order to take preventive or investigative
action.
25 The term beneficiaries refers to those natural persons, or groups of natural persons who receive charitable,
humanitarian or other types of assistance through the services of the NPO.
26 This does not mean that NPOs are expected to identify each specific individual, as such a requirement would not
always be possible and would, in some instances, impede the ability of NPOs to provide much-needed services
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(d) Effective capacity to respond to international requests for information about an NPO of
concern. Consistent with Recommendations on international cooperation, countries
should identify appropriate points of contact and procedures to respond to
international requests for information regarding particular NPOs suspected of
terrorist financing or involvement in other forms of terrorist support.
D. RESOURCES FOR SUPERVISION, MONITORING, AND INVESTIGATION
7. Countries should provide their appropriate authorities, which are responsible for supervision,
monitoring and investigation of their NPO sector, with adequate financial, human and
technical resources.
Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation
Appropriate authorities refers to competent authorities, including regulators, tax authorities, FIUs,
law enforcement, intelligence authorities, accrediting institutions, and
potentially self-regulatory organisations in some jurisdictions.
Associate NPOs includes foreign branches of international NPOs, and NPOs with which
partnerships have been arranged.
Beneficiaries refers to those natural persons, or groups of natural persons who receive
charitable, humanitarian or other types of assistance through the services
of the NPO.
Non-profit organisation or
NPO
refers to a legal person or arrangement or organisation that primarily
engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable,
religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the
carrying out of other types of “good works”.
Terrorist financing abuse
refers to the exploitation by terrorists and terrorist organisations of NPOs
to raise or move funds, provide logistical support, encourage or facilitate
terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorists or terrorist
organisations and operations.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 10
(CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE)
A. CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE AND TIPPING-OFF
1. If, during the establishment or course of the customer relationship, or when conducting
occasional transactions, a financial institution suspects that transactions relate to money
laundering or terrorist financing, then the institution should:
(a) normally seek to identify and verify the identity27 of the customer and the beneficial
owner, whether permanent or occasional, and irrespective of any exemption or any
designated threshold that might otherwise apply; and
(b) make a suspicious transaction report (STR) to the financial intelligence unit (FIU), in
accordance with Recommendation 20.
2. Recommendation 21 prohibits financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees
from disclosing the fact that an STR or related information is being reported to the FIU. A risk
exists that customers could be unintentionally tipped off when the financial institution is
seeking to perform its customer due diligence (CDD) obligations in these circumstances. The
customer’s awareness of a possible STR or investigation could compromise future efforts to
investigate the suspected money laundering or terrorist financing operation.
3. Therefore, if financial institutions form a suspicion that transactions relate to money
laundering or terrorist financing, they should take into account the risk of tipping-off when
performing the CDD process. If the institution reasonably believes that performing the CDD
process will tip-off the customer or potential customer, it may choose not to pursue that
process, and should file an STR. Institutions should ensure that their employees are aware of,
and sensitive to, these issues when conducting CDD.
B. CDD – PERSONS ACTING ON BEHALF OF A CUSTOMER
4. When performing elements (a) and (b) of the CDD measures specified under
Recommendation 10, financial institutions should also be required to verify that any person
purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised, and should identify and verify the
identity of that person.
C. CDD FOR LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
5. When performing CDD measures in relation to customers that are legal persons or legal
arrangements28, financial institutions should be required to identify and verify the identity of
27 Reliable, independent source documents, data or information will hereafter be referred to as
“identification data.”
28 In these Recommendations references to legal arrangements such as trusts (or other similar
arrangements) being the customer of a financial institution or DNFBP or carrying out a transaction,
refers to situations where a natural or legal person that is the trustee establishes the business
relationship or carries out the transaction on the behalf of the beneficiaries or according to the terms of
the trust. The normal CDD requirements for customers that are natural or legal persons would continue
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the customer, and understand the nature of its business, and its ownership and control
structure. The purpose of the requirements set out in (a) and (b) below, regarding the
identification and verification of the customer and the beneficial owner, is twofold: first, to
prevent the unlawful use of legal persons and arrangements, by gaining a sufficient
understanding of the customer to be able to properly assess the potential money laundering
and terrorist financing risks associated with the business relationship; and, second, to take
appropriate steps to mitigate the risks. As two aspects of one process, these requirements are
likely to interact and complement each other naturally. In this context, financial institutions
should be required to:
(a) Identify the customer and verify its identity. The type of information that would
normally be needed to perform this function would be:
(i) Name, legal form and proof of existence – verification could be obtained, for
example, through a certificate of incorporation, a certificate of good standing, a
partnership agreement, a deed of trust, or other documentation from a reliable
independent source proving the name, form and current existence of the
customer.
(ii) The powers that regulate and bind the legal person or arrangement (e.g. the
memorandum and articles of association of a company), as well as the names of
the relevant persons having a senior management position in the legal person or
arrangement (e.g. senior managing directors in a company, trustee(s) of a trust).
(iii) The address of the registered office, and, if different, a principal place of
business.
(b) Identify the beneficial owners of the customer and take reasonable measures29 to
verify the identity of such persons, through the following information:
(i) For legal persons30:
(i.i) The identity of the natural persons (if any – as ownership interests can be
so diversified that there are no natural persons (whether acting alone or
together) exercising control of the legal person or arrangement through
ownership) who ultimately have a controlling ownership interest31 in a
legal person; and
to apply, including paragraph 4 of INR.10, but the additional requirements regarding the trust and the
beneficial owners of the trust (as defined) would also apply.
29 In determining the reasonableness of the identity verification measures, regard should be had to the
money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by the customer and the business relationship.
30 Measures (i.i) to (i.iii) are not alternative options, but are cascading measures, with each to be used
where the previous measure has been applied and has not identified a beneficial owner.
31 A controlling ownership interest depends on the ownership structure of the company. It may be based on
a threshold, e.g. any person owning more than a certain percentage of the company (e.g. 25%).
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(i.ii) to the extent that there is doubt under (i.i) as to whether the person(s)
with the controlling ownership interest are the beneficial owner(s) or
where no natural person exerts control through ownership interests, the
identity of the natural persons (if any) exercising control of the legal
person or arrangement through other means.
(i.iii) Where no natural person is identified under (i.i) or (i.ii) above, financial
institutions should identify and take reasonable measures to verify the
identity of the relevant natural person who holds the position of senior
managing official.
(ii) For legal arrangements:
(ii.i) Trusts – the identity of the settlor, the trustee(s), the protector (if any), the
beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries32, and any other natural person
exercising ultimate effective control over the trust (including through a
chain of control/ownership);
(ii.ii) Other types of legal arrangements – the identity of persons in equivalent
or similar positions.
Where the customer or the owner of the controlling interest is a company listed on a stock
exchange and subject to disclosure requirements (either by stock exchange rules or through
law or enforceable means) which impose requirements to ensure adequate transparency of
beneficial ownership, or is a majority-owned subsidiary of such a company, it is not necessary
to identify and verify the identity of any shareholder or beneficial owner of such companies.
The relevant identification data may be obtained from a public register, from the customer or
from other reliable sources.
D. CDD FOR BENEFICIARIES OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
6. For life or other investment-related insurance business, financial institutions should, in
addition to the CDD measures required for the customer and the beneficial owner, conduct the
following CDD measures on the beneficiary(ies) of life insurance and other investment related
insurance policies, as soon as the beneficiary(ies) are identified/designated:
(a) For beneficiary(ies) that are identified as specifically named natural or legal persons or
legal arrangements – taking the name of the person;
(b) For beneficiary(ies) that are designated by characteristics or by class (e.g. spouse or
children at the time that the insured event occurs) or by other means (e.g. under a
will) – obtaining sufficient information concerning the beneficiary to satisfy the
32 For beneficiary(ies) of trusts that are designated by characteristics or by class, financial institutions
should obtain sufficient information concerning the beneficiary to satisfy the financial institution that it
will be able to establish the identity of the beneficiary at the time of the payout or when the beneficiary
intends to exercise vested rights.
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financial institution that it will be able to establish the identity of the beneficiary at the
time of the payout.
The information collected under (a) and/or (b) should be recorded and maintained in
accordance with the provisions of Recommendation 11.
7. For both the cases referred to in 6(a) and (b) above, the verification of the identity of the
beneficiary(ies) should occur at the time of the payout.
8. The beneficiary of a life insurance policy should be included as a relevant risk factor by the
financial institution in determining whether enhanced CDD measures are applicable. If the
financial institution determines that a beneficiary who is a legal person or a legal arrangement
presents a higher risk, then the enhanced CDD measures should include reasonable measures
to identify and verify the identity of the beneficial owner of the beneficiary, at the time of
payout.
9. Where a financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs 6 to 8 above, it should
consider making a suspicious transaction report.
E. RELIANCE ON IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION ALREADY PERFORMED
10. The CDD measures set out in Recommendation 10 do not imply that financial institutions have
to repeatedly identify and verify the identity of each customer every time that a customer
conducts a transaction. An institution is entitled to rely on the identification and verification
steps that it has already undertaken, unless it has doubts about the veracity of that
information. Examples of situations that might lead an institution to have such doubts could
be where there is a suspicion of money laundering in relation to that customer, or where there
is a material change in the way that the customer’s account is operated, which is not
consistent with the customer’s business profile.
F. TIMING OF VERIFICATION
11. Examples of the types of circumstances (in addition to those referred to above for
beneficiaries of life insurance policies) where it would be permissible for verification to be
completed after the establishment of the business relationship, because it would be essential
not to interrupt the normal conduct of business, include:
􀂄 Non face-to-face business.
􀂄 Securities transactions. In the securities industry, companies and
intermediaries may be required to perform transactions very rapidly,
according to the market conditions at the time the customer is contacting
them, and the performance of the transaction may be required before
verification of identity is completed.
12. Financial institutions will also need to adopt risk management procedures with respect to the
conditions under which a customer may utilise the business relationship prior to verification.
These procedures should include a set of measures, such as a limitation of the number, types
and/or amount of transactions that can be performed and the monitoring of large or complex
transactions being carried out outside the expected norms for that type of relationship.
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G. EXISTING CUSTOMERS
13. Financial institutions should be required to apply CDD measures to existing customers33 on
the basis of materiality and risk, and to conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at
appropriate times, taking into account whether and when CDD measures have previously
been undertaken and the adequacy of data obtained.
H. RISK BASED APPROACH34
14. The examples below are not mandatory elements of the FATF Standards, and are included for
guidance only. The examples are not intended to be comprehensive, and although they are
considered to be helpful indicators, they may not be relevant in all circumstances.
Higher risks
15. There are circumstances where the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is higher,
and enhanced CDD measures have to be taken. When assessing the money laundering and
terrorist financing risks relating to types of customers, countries or geographic areas, and
particular products, services, transactions or delivery channels, examples of potentially
higher-risk situations (in addition to those set out in Recommendations 12 to 16) include the
following:
(a) Customer risk factors:
􀂄 The business relationship is conducted in unusual circumstances (e.g.
significant unexplained geographic distance between the financial
institution and the customer).
􀂄 Non-resident customers.
􀂄 Legal persons or arrangements that are personal asset-holding vehicles.
􀂄 Companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form.
􀂄 Business that are cash-intensive.
􀂄 The ownership structure of the company appears unusual or excessively
complex given the nature of the company’s business.
(b) Country or geographic risk factors:35
􀂄 Countries identified by credible sources, such as mutual evaluation or
detailed assessment reports or published follow-up reports, as not having
adequate AML/CFT systems.
33 Existing customers as at the date that the national requirements are brought into force.
34 The RBA does not apply to the circumstances when CDD should be required but may be used to
determine the extent of such measures.
35 Under Recommendation 19 it is mandatory for countries to require financial institutions to apply
enhanced due diligence when the FATF calls for such measures to be introduced.
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􀂄 Countries subject to sanctions, embargos or similar measures issued by, for
example, the United Nations.
􀂄 Countries identified by credible sources as having significant levels of
corruption or other criminal activity.
􀂄 Countries or geographic areas identified by credible sources as providing
funding or support for terrorist activities, or that have designated terrorist
organisations operating within their country.
(c) Product, service, transaction or delivery channel risk factors:
􀂄 Private banking.
􀂄 Anonymous transactions (which may include cash).
􀂄 Non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions.
􀂄 Payment received from unknown or un-associated third parties
Lower risks
16. There are circumstances where the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing may be
lower. In such circumstances, and provided there has been an adequate analysis of the risk by
the country or by the financial institution, it could be reasonable for a country to allow its
financial institutions to apply simplified CDD measures.
17. When assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks relating to types of
customers, countries or geographic areas, and particular products, services, transactions or
delivery channels, examples of potentially lower risk situations include the following:
(a) Customer risk factors:
􀂄 Financial institutions and DNFBPs – where they are subject to requirements
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the
FATF Recommendations, have effectively implemented those requirements,
and are effectively supervised or monitored in accordance with the
Recommendations to ensure compliance with those requirements.
􀂄 Public companies listed on a stock exchange and subject to disclosure
requirements (either by stock exchange rules or through law or enforceable
means), which impose requirements to ensure adequate transparency of
beneficial ownership.
􀂄 Public administrations or enterprises.
(b) Product, service, transaction or delivery channel risk factors:
􀂄 Life insurance policies where the premium is low (e.g. an annual premium
of less than USD/EUR 1,000 or a single premium of less than USD/EUR
2,500).
􀂄 Insurance policies for pension schemes if there is no early surrender option
and the policy cannot be used as collateral.
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􀂄 A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement
benefits to employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction
from wages, and the scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a
member’s interest under the scheme.
􀂄 Financial products or services that provide appropriately defined and
limited services to certain types of customers, so as to increase access for
financial inclusion purposes.
(c) Country risk factors:
􀂄 Countries identified by credible sources, such as mutual evaluation or
detailed assessment reports, as having effective AML/CFT systems.
􀂄 Countries identified by credible sources as having a low level of corruption
or other criminal activity.
In making a risk assessment, countries or financial institutions could, when appropriate, also
take into account possible variations in money laundering and terrorist financing risk
between different regions or areas within a country.
18. Having a lower money laundering and terrorist financing risk for identification and
verification purposes does not automatically mean that the same customer is lower risk for all
types of CDD measures, in particular for ongoing monitoring of transactions.
Risk variables
19. When assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks relating to types of
customers, countries or geographic areas, and particular products, services, transactions or
delivery channels risk, a financial institution should take into account risk variables relating to
those risk categories. These variables, either singly or in combination, may increase or
decrease the potential risk posed, thus impacting the appropriate level of CDD measures.
Examples of such variables include:
􀂄 The purpose of an account or relationship.
􀂄 The level of assets to be deposited by a customer or the size of transactions
undertaken.
􀂄 The regularity or duration of the business relationship.
Enhanced CDD measures
20. Financial institutions should examine, as far as reasonably possible, the background and
purpose of all complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions,
which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose. Where the risks of money laundering or
terrorist financing are higher, financial institutions should be required to conduct enhanced
CDD measures, consistent with the risks identified. In particular, they should increase the
degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether
those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. Examples of enhanced CDD
measures that could be applied for higher-risk business relationships include:
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􀂄 Obtaining additional information on the customer (e.g. occupation, volume
of assets, information available through public databases, internet, etc.), and
updating more regularly the identification data of customer and beneficial
owner.
􀂄 Obtaining additional information on the intended nature of the business
relationship.
􀂄 Obtaining information on the source of funds or source of wealth of the
customer.
􀂄 Obtaining information on the reasons for intended or performed
transactions.
􀂄 Obtaining the approval of senior management to commence or continue the
business relationship.
􀂄 Conducting enhanced monitoring of the business relationship, by increasing
the number and timing of controls applied, and selecting patterns of
transactions that need further examination.
􀂄 Requiring the first payment to be carried out through an account in the
customer’s name with a bank subject to similar CDD standards.
Simplified CDD measures
21. Where the risks of money laundering or terrorist financing are lower, financial institutions
could be allowed to conduct simplified CDD measures, which should take into account the
nature of the lower risk. The simplified measures should be commensurate with the lower
risk factors (e.g. the simplified measures could relate only to customer acceptance measures
or to aspects of ongoing monitoring). Examples of possible measures are:
􀂄 Verifying the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner after the
establishment of the business relationship (e.g. if account transactions rise
above a defined monetary threshold).
􀂄 Reducing the frequency of customer identification updates.
􀂄 Reducing the degree of on-going monitoring and scrutinising transactions,
based on a reasonable monetary threshold.
􀂄 Not collecting specific information or carrying out specific measures to
understand the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship,
but inferring the purpose and nature from the type of transactions or
business relationship established.
Simplified CDD measures are not acceptable whenever there is a suspicion of money
laundering or terrorist financing, or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply.
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Thresholds
22. The designated threshold for occasional transactions under Recommendation 10 is
USD/EUR 15,000. Financial transactions above the designated threshold include situations
where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear
to be linked.
Ongoing due diligence
23. Financial institutions should be required to ensure that documents, data or information
collected under the CDD process is kept up-to-date and relevant by undertaking reviews of
existing records, particularly for higher-risk categories of customers.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 12
(POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS)
Financial institutions should take reasonable measures to determine whether the
beneficiaries of a life insurance policy and/or, where required, the beneficial owner of the
beneficiary are politically exposed persons. This should occur at the latest at the time of the
payout. Where there are higher risks identified, in addition to performing normal CDD
measures, financial institutions should be required to:
a) inform senior management before the payout of the policy proceeds; and
b) conduct enhanced scrutiny on the whole business relationship with the policyholder,
and consider making a suspicious transaction report.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 13
(CORRESPONDENT BANKING)
The similar relationships to which financial institutions should apply criteria (a) to (e)
include, for example those established for securities transactions or funds transfers, whether
for the cross-border financial institution as principal or for its customers.
The term payable-through accounts refers to correspondent accounts that are used directly by
third parties to transact business on their own behalf.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 14
(MONEY OR VALUE TRANSFER SERVICES)
A country need not impose a separate licensing or registration system with respect to natural
or legal persons already licensed or registered as financial institutions (as defined by the
FATF Recommendations) within that country, which, under such license or registration, are
permitted to perform money or value transfer services, and which are already subject to the
full range of applicable obligations under the FATF Recommendations.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 16
(WIRE TRANSFERS)
A. OBJECTIVE
1. Recommendation 16 was developed with the objective of preventing terrorists and other
criminals from having unfettered access to wire transfers for moving their funds, and for
detecting such misuse when it occurs. Specifically, it aims to ensure that basic information on
the originator and beneficiary of wire transfers is immediately available:
(a) to appropriate law enforcement and/or prosecutorial authorities to assist them in
detecting, investigating, and prosecuting terrorists or other criminals, and tracing
their assets;
(b) to financial intelligence units for analysing suspicious or unusual activity, and
disseminating it as necessary, and
(c) to ordering, intermediary and beneficiary financial institutions to facilitate the
identification and reporting of suspicious transactions, and to implement the
requirements to take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting
transactions with designated persons and entities, as per the obligations set out in the
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 1267 (1999)
and its successor resolutions, and resolution 1373 (2001) relating to the prevention
and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing.
2. To accomplish these objectives, countries should have the ability to trace all wire transfers.
Due to the potential terrorist financing threat posed by small wire transfers, countries should
minimise thresholds taking into account the risk of driving transactions underground and the
importance of financial inclusion. It is not the intention of the FATF to impose rigid standards
or to mandate a single operating process that would negatively affect the payment system.
B. SCOPE
3. Recommendation 16 applies to cross-border wire transfers and domestic wire transfers ,
including serial payments, and cover payments.
4. Recommendation 16 is not intended to cover the following types of payments:
(a) Any transfer that flows from a transaction carried out using a credit or debit or
prepaid card for the purchase of goods or services, so long as the credit or debit or
prepaid card number accompanies all transfers flowing from the transaction.
However, when a credit or debit or prepaid card is used as a payment system to effect
a person-to-person wire transfer, the transaction is covered by Recommendation 16,
and the necessary information should be included in the message.
(b) Financial institution-to-financial institution transfers and settlements, where both the
originator person and the beneficiary person are financial institutions acting on their
own behalf.
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5. Countries may adopt a de minimis threshold for cross-border wire transfers (no higher than
USD/EUR 1,000), below which the following requirements should apply:
(a) Countries should ensure that financial institutions include with such transfers: (i) the
name of the originator; (ii) the name of the beneficiary; and (iii) an account number
for each, or a unique transaction reference number. Such information need not be
verified for accuracy, unless there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist
financing, in which case, the financial institution should verify the information
pertaining to its customer.
(b) Countries may, nevertheless, require that incoming cross-border wire transfers below
the threshold contain required and accurate originator information.
C. CROSS-BORDER QUALIFYING WIRE TRANSFERS
6. Information accompanying all qualifying wire transfers should always contain:
(a) the name of the originator;
(b) the originator account number where such an account is used to process the
transaction;
(c) the originator’s address, or national identity number, or customer identification
number36, or date and place of birth;
(d) the name of the beneficiary; and
(e) the beneficiary account number where such an account is used to process the
transaction.
7. In the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number should be included
which permits traceability of the transaction.
8. Where several individual cross-border wire transfers from a single originator are bundled in a
batch file for transmission to beneficiaries, they may be exempted from the requirements of
paragraph 6 in respect of originator information, provided that they include the originator’s
account number or unique transaction reference number (as described in paragraph 7 above),
and the batch file contains required and accurate originator information, and full beneficiary
information, that is fully traceable within the beneficiary country.
D. DOMESTIC WIRE TRANSFERS
9. Information accompanying domestic wire transfers should also include originator information
as indicated for cross-border wire transfers, unless this information can be made available to
the beneficiary financial institution and appropriate authorities by other means. In this latter
36 The customer identification number refers to a number which uniquely identifies the originator to the
originating financial institution and is a different number from the unique transaction reference number
referred to in paragraph 7. The customer identification number must refer to a record held by the
originating financial institution which contains at least one of the following: the customer address, a
national identity number, or a date and place of birth.
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case, the ordering financial institution need only include the account number or a unique
transaction reference number, provided that this number or identifier will permit the
transaction to be traced back to the originator or the beneficiary.
10. The information should be made available by the ordering financial institution within three
business days of receiving the request either from the beneficiary financial institution or from
appropriate competent authorities. Law enforcement authorities should be able to compel
immediate production of such information.
E. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ORDERING, INTERMEDIARY AND BENEFICIARY FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
Ordering financial institution
11. The ordering financial institution should ensure that qualifying wire transfers contain
required and accurate originator information, and required beneficiary information.
12. The ordering financial institution should ensure that cross-border wire transfers below any
applicable threshold contain the name of the originator and the name of the beneficiary and
an account number for each, or a unique transaction reference number.
13. The ordering financial institution should maintain all originator and beneficiary information
collected, in accordance with Recommendation 11.
14. The ordering financial institution should not be allowed to execute the wire transfer if it does
not comply with the requirements specified above.
Intermediary financial institution
15. For cross-border wire transfers, financial institutions processing an intermediary element of
such chains of wire transfers should ensure that all originator and beneficiary information
that accompanies a wire transfer is retained with it
16. Where technical limitations prevent the required originator or beneficiary information
accompanying a cross-border wire transfer from remaining with a related domestic wire
transfer, a record should be kept, for at least five years, by the receiving intermediary financial
institution of all the information received from the ordering financial institution or another
intermediary financial institution.
17. An intermediary financial institution should take reasonable measures to identify crossborder
wire transfers that lack required originator information or required beneficiary
information. Such measures should be consistent with straight-through processing.
18. An intermediary financial institution should have effective risk-based policies and procedures
for determining: (i) when to execute, reject, or suspend a wire transfer lacking required
originator or required beneficiary information; and (ii) the appropriate follow-up action.
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Beneficiary financial institution
19. A beneficiary financial institution should take reasonable measures to identify cross-border
wire transfers that lack required originator or required beneficiary information. Such
measures may include post-event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible.
20. For qualifying wire transfers, a beneficiary financial institution should verify the identity of
the beneficiary, if the identity has not been previously verified, and maintain this information
in accordance with Recommendation 11.
21. A beneficiary financial institution should have effective risk-based policies and procedures for
determining: (i) when to execute, reject, or suspend a wire transfer lacking required
originator or required beneficiary information; and (ii) the appropriate follow-up action.
F. MONEY OR VALUE TRANSFER SERVICE OPERATORS
22. Money or value transfer service (MVTS) providers should be required to comply with all of
the relevant requirements of Recommendation 16 in the countries in which they operate,
directly or through their agents. In the case of a MVTS provider that controls both the
ordering and the beneficiary side of a wire transfer, the MVTS provider:
(a) should take into account all the information from both the ordering and beneficiary
sides in order to determine whether an STR has to be filed; and
(b) should file an STR in any country affected by the suspicious wire transfer, and make
relevant transaction information available to the Financial Intelligence Unit.
Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation
Accurate is used to describe information that has been verified for accuracy.
Batch transfer is a transfer comprised of a number of individual wire transfers that are
being sent to the same financial institutions, but may/may not be
ultimately intended for different persons.
Beneficiary refers to the natural or legal person or legal arrangement who is
identified by the originator as the receiver of the requested wire
transfer.
Beneficiary Financial
Institution
refers to the financial institution which receives the wire transfer from
the ordering financial institution directly or through an intermediary
financial institution and makes the funds available to the beneficiary.
Cover Payment refers to a wire transfer that combines a payment message sent directly
by the ordering financial institution to the beneficiary financial
institution with the routing of the funding instruction (the cover) from
the ordering financial institution to the beneficiary financial institution
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Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation
through one or more intermediary financial institutions.
Cross-border wire transfer refers to any wire transfer where the ordering financial institution and
beneficiary financial institution are located in different countries. This
term also refers to any chain of wire transfer in which at least one of the
financial institutions involved is located in a different country.
Domestic wire transfers refers to any wire transfer where the ordering financial institution and
beneficiary financial institution are located in the same country. This
term therefore refers to any chain of wire transfer that takes place
entirely within the borders of a single country, even though the system
used to transfer the payment message may be located in another
country. The term also refers to any chain of wire transfer that takes
place entirely within the borders of the European Economic Area
(EEA)37.
Intermediary financial
institution
refers to a financial institution in a serial or cover payment chain that
receives and transmits a wire transfer on behalf of the ordering
financial institution and the beneficiary financial institution, or another
intermediary financial institution.
Ordering financial
institution
refers to the financial institution which initiates the wire transfer and
transfers the funds upon receiving the request for a wire transfer on
behalf of the originator.
Originator refers to the account holder who allows the wire transfer from that
account, or where there is no account, the natural or legal person that
places the order with the ordering financial institution to perform the
wire transfer.
Qualifying wire transfers means a cross-border wire transfer above any applicable threshold as
described in paragraph 5 of the Interpretive Note to
Recommendation 16.
Required is used to describe a situation in which all elements of required
information are present. Subparagraphs 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c) set out the
required originator information. Subparagraphs 6(d) and 6(e) set out
the required beneficiary information.
37 An entity may petition the FATF to be designated as a supra-national jurisdiction for the purposes of and
limited to an assessment of Recommendation 16 compliance.
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Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation
Serial Payment refers to a direct sequential chain of payment where the wire transfer
and accompanying payment message travel together from the ordering
financial institution to the beneficiary financial institution directly or
through one or more intermediary financial institutions (e.g.
correspondent banks).
Straight-through
processing
refers to payment transactions that are conducted electronically
without the need for manual intervention.
Unique transaction
reference number
refers to a combination of letters, numbers or symbols, determined by
the payment service provider, in accordance with the protocols of the
payment and settlement system or messaging system used for the wire
transfer.
Wire transfer refers to any transaction carried out on behalf of an originator through
a financial institution by electronic means with a view to making an
amount of funds available to a beneficiary person at a beneficiary
financial institution, irrespective of whether the originator and the
beneficiary are the same person.38
38 It is understood that the settlement of wire transfers may happen under a net settlement arrangement.
This interpretive note refers to information which must be included in instructions sent from an
originating financial institution to a beneficiary financial institution, including through any intermediary
financial institution, to enable disbursement of the funds to the recipient. Any net settlement between the
financial institutions may be exempt under paragraph 4(b).
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 17
(RELIANCE ON THIRD PARTIES)
1. This Recommendation does not apply to outsourcing or agency relationships. In a third-party
reliance scenario, the third party should be subject to CDD and record-keeping requirements
in line with Recommendations 10 and 11, and be regulated, supervised or monitored. The
third party will usually have an existing business relationship with the customer, which is
independent from the relationship to be formed by the customer with the relying institution,
and would apply its own procedures to perform the CDD measures. This can be contrasted
with an outsourcing/agency scenario, in which the outsourced entity applies the CDD
measures on behalf of the delegating financial institution, in accordance with its procedures,
and is subject to the delegating financial institution’s control of the effective implementation
of those procedures by the outsourced entity.
2. For the purposes of Recommendation 17, the term relevant competent authorities means (i)
the home authority, that should be involved for the understanding of group policies and
controls at group-wide level, and (ii) the host authorities, that should be involved for the
branches/subsidiaries.
3. The term third parties means financial institutions or DNFBPs that are supervised or
monitored and that meet the requirements under Recommendation 17.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 18
(INTERNAL CONTROLS AND FOREIGN BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES)
1. Financial institutions’ programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing should
include:
(a) the development of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate
compliance management arrangements, and adequate screening procedures to ensure
high standards when hiring employees;
(b) an ongoing employee training programme; and
(c) an independent audit function to test the system.
2. The type and extent of measures to be taken should be appropriate having regard to the risk
of money laundering and terrorist financing and the size of the business.
3. Compliance management arrangements should include the appointment of a compliance
officer at the management level.
4. Financial groups’ programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing should be
applicable to all branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of the financial group. These
programmes should include measures under (a) to (c) above, and should be appropriate to
the business of the branches and majority-owned subsidiaries. Such programmes should be
implemented effectively at the level of branches and majority-owned subsidiaries. These
programmes should include policies and procedures for sharing information required for the
purposes of CDD and money laundering and terrorist financing risk management. Group-level
compliance, audit, and/or AML/CFT functions should be provided with customer, account,
and transaction information from branches and subsidiaries when necessary for AML/CFT
purposes. This should include information and analysis of transactions or activities which
appear unusual (if such analysis was done); and could include an STR, its underlying
information, or the fact that an STR has been submitted. Similarly, branches and subsidiaries
should receive such information from these group-level functions when relevant and
appropriate to risk management. Adequate safeguards on the confidentiality and use of
information exchanged should be in place, including to prevent tipping-off. Countries may
determine the scope and extent of this information sharing, based on the sensitivity of the
information, and its relevance to AML/CFT risk management.
5. In the case of their foreign operations, where the minimum AML/CFT requirements of the
host country are less strict than those of the home country, financial institutions should be
required to ensure that their branches and majority-owned subsidiaries in host countries
implement the requirements of the home country, to the extent that host country laws and
regulations permit. If the host country does not permit the proper implementation of the
measures above, financial groups should apply appropriate additional measures to manage
the money laundering and terrorist financing risks, and inform their home supervisors. If the
additional measures are not sufficient, competent authorities in the home country should
consider additional supervisory actions, including placing additional controls on the financial
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group, including, as appropriate, requesting the financial group to close down its operations in
the host country.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 19
(HIGHER-RISK COUNTRIES)
1. The enhanced due diligence measures that could be undertaken by financial institutions
include those measures set out in paragraph 20 of the Interpretive Note to
Recommendation 10, and any other measures that have a similar effect in mitigating risks.
2. Examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries include the
following, and any other measures that have a similar effect in mitigating risks:
(a) Requiring financial institutions to apply specific elements of enhanced due diligence.
(b) Introducing enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of
financial transactions.
(c) Refusing the establishment of subsidiaries or branches or representative offices of
financial institutions from the country concerned, or otherwise taking into account the
fact that the relevant financial institution is from a country that does not have
adequate AML/CFT systems.
(d) Prohibiting financial institutions from establishing branches or representative offices
in the country concerned, or otherwise taking into account the fact that the relevant
branch or representative office would be in a country that does not have adequate
AML/CFT systems.
(e) Limiting business relationships or financial transactions with the identified country or
persons in that country.
(f) Prohibiting financial institutions from relying on third parties located in the country
concerned to conduct elements of the CDD process.
(g) Requiring financial institutions to review and amend, or if necessary terminate,
correspondent relationships with financial institutions in the country concerned.
(h) Requiring increased supervisory examination and/or external audit requirements for
branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in the country concerned.
(i) Requiring increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to
any of their branches and subsidiaries located in the country concerned.
There should be effective measures in place to ensure that financial institutions are advised of
concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems of other countries
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 20
(REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS)
1. The reference to criminal activity in Recommendation 20 refers to all criminal acts that would
constitute a predicate offence for money laundering or, at a minimum, to those offences that
would constitute a predicate offence, as required by Recommendation 3. Countries are
strongly encouraged to adopt the first of these alternatives.
2. The reference to terrorist financing in Recommendation 20 refers to: the financing of terrorist
acts and also terrorist organisations or individual terrorists, even in the absence of a link to a
specific terrorist act or acts.
3. All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless
of the amount of the transaction.
4. The reporting requirement should be a direct mandatory obligation, and any indirect or
implicit obligation to report suspicious transactions, whether by reason of possible
prosecution for a money laundering or terrorist financing offence or otherwise (so called
“indirect reporting”), is not acceptable.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATIONS 22 AND 23
(DNFBPS)
1. The designated thresholds for transactions are as follows:
􀂄 Casinos (under Recommendation 22) - USD/EUR 3,000
􀂄 For dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones when engaged
in any cash transaction (under Recommendations 22 and 23) -
USD/EUR 15,000.
Financial transactions above a designated threshold include situations where the transaction
is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked.
2. The Interpretive Notes that apply to financial institutions are also relevant to DNFBPs, where
applicable. To comply with Recommendations 22 and 23, countries do not need to issue laws
or enforceable means that relate exclusively to lawyers, notaries, accountants and the other
designated non-financial businesses and professions, so long as these businesses or
professions are included in laws or enforceable means covering the underlying activities.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 22
(DNFBPS – CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE)
1. Real estate agents should comply with the requirements of Recommendation 10 with respect
to both the purchasers and vendors of the property.
2. Casinos should implement Recommendation 10, including identifying and verifying the
identity of customers, when their customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above
USD/EUR 3,000. Conducting customer identification at the entry to a casino could be, but is
not necessarily, sufficient. Countries must require casinos to ensure that they are able to link
customer due diligence information for a particular customer to the transactions that the
customer conducts in the casino.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 23
(DNFBPS – OTHER MEASURES)
1. Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as
independent legal professionals, are not required to report suspicious transactions if the
relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional
secrecy or legal professional privilege.
2. It is for each country to determine the matters that would fall under legal professional
privilege or professional secrecy. This would normally cover information lawyers, notaries or
other independent legal professionals receive from or obtain through one of their clients: (a)
in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their client, or (b) in performing their task of
defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration or
mediation proceedings.
3. Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants
to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatory organisations, provided that there are
appropriate forms of cooperation between these organisations and the FIU.
4. Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants acting as
independent legal professionals seek to dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this
does not amount to tipping-off.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 24
(TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL PERSONS)
1. Competent authorities should be able to obtain, or have access in a timely fashion to,
adequate, accurate and current information on the beneficial ownership and control of
companies and other legal persons (beneficial ownership information39) that are created40 in
the country. Countries may choose the mechanisms they rely on to achieve this objective,
although they should also comply with the minimum requirements set out below. It is also
very likely that countries will need to utilise a combination of mechanisms to achieve the
objective.
2. As part of the process of ensuring that there is adequate transparency regarding legal persons,
countries should have mechanisms that:
(a) identify and describe the different types, forms and basic features of legal persons in
the country.
(b) identify and describe the processes for: (i) the creation of those legal persons; and (ii)
the obtaining and recording of basic and beneficial ownership information;
(c) make the above information publicly available; and
(d) assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with different
types of legal persons created in the country.
A. BASIC INFORMATION
3. In order to determine who the beneficial owners of a company are, competent authorities will
require certain basic information about the company, which, at a minimum, would include
information about the legal ownership and control structure of the company. This would
include information about the status and powers of the company, its shareholders and its
directors.
4. All companies created in a country should be registered in a company registry.41 Whichever
combination of mechanisms is used to obtain and record beneficial ownership information
(see section B), there is a set of basic information on a company that needs to be obtained and
recorded by the company42 as a necessary prerequisite. The minimum basic information to be
obtained and recorded by a company should be:
39 Beneficial ownership information for legal persons is the information referred to in the interpretive note to
Recommendation 10, paragraph 5(b)(i). Controlling shareholders as referred to in, paragraph 5(b)(i) of the
interpretive note to Recommendation 10 may be based on a threshold, e.g. any persons owning more than a certain
percentage of the company (e.g. 25%).
40 References to creating a legal person, include incorporation of companies or any other mechanism that is used.
41 “Company registry” refers to a register in the country of companies incorporated or licensed in that country and
normally maintained by or for the incorporating authority. It does not refer to information held by or for the
company itself.
42 The information can be recorded by the company itself or by a third person under the company’s responsibility.
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(a) company name, proof of incorporation, legal form and status, the address of the
registered office, basic regulating powers (e.g. memorandum & articles of association),
a list of directors; and
(b) a register of its shareholders or members, containing the names of the shareholders
and members and number of shares held by each shareholder43 and categories of
shares (including the nature of the associated voting rights).
5. The company registry should record all the basic information set out in paragraph 4(a) above.
6. The company should maintain the basic information set out in paragraph 4(b) within the
country, either at its registered office or at another location notified to the company registry.
However, if the company or company registry holds beneficial ownership information within
the country, then the register of shareholders need not be in the country, provided that the
company can provide this information promptly on request.
B. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION
7. Countries should ensure that either: (a) information on the beneficial ownership of a company
is obtained by that company and available at a specified location in their country; or (b) there
are mechanisms in place so that the beneficial ownership of a company can be determined in a
timely manner by a competent authority.
8. In order to meet the requirements in paragraph 7, countries should use one or more of the
following mechanisms:
(a) Requiring companies or company registries to obtain and hold up-to-date information
on the companies’ beneficial ownership;
(b) Requiring companies to take reasonable measures44 to obtain and hold up-to-date
information on the companies’ beneficial ownership;
(c) Using existing information, including: (i) information obtained by financial institutions
and/or DNFBPs, in accordance with Recommendations 10 and 2245; (ii) information
held by other competent authorities on the legal and beneficial ownership of
companies (e.g. company registries, tax authorities or financial or other regulators);
(iii) information held by the company as required above in Section A; and (iv)
available information on companies listed on a stock exchange, where disclosure
requirements (either by stock exchange rules or through law or enforceable means)
impose requirements to ensure adequate transparency of beneficial ownership.
43 This is applicable to the nominal owner of all registered shares.
44 Measures taken should be proportionate to the level of risk or complexity induced by the ownership structure of the
company or the nature of the controlling shareholders.
45 Countries should be able to determine in a timely manner whether a company has an account with a financial
institution within the country.
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9. Regardless of which of the above mechanisms are used, countries should ensure that
companies cooperate with competent authorities to the fullest extent possible in determining
the beneficial owner. This should include:
(a) Requiring that one or more natural persons resident in the country is authorised by
the company46, and accountable to competent authorities, for providing all basic
information and available beneficial ownership information, and giving further
assistance to the authorities; and/or
(b) Requiring that a DNFBP in the country is authorised by the company, and accountable
to competent authorities, for providing all basic information and available beneficial
ownership information, and giving further assistance to the authorities; and/or
(c) Other comparable measures, specifically identified by the country, which can
effectively ensure cooperation.
10. All the persons, authorities and entities mentioned above, and the company itself (or its
administrators, liquidators or other persons involved in the dissolution of the company),
should maintain the information and records referred to for at least five years after the date
on which the company is dissolved or otherwise ceases to exist, or five years after the date on
which the company ceases to be a customer of the professional intermediary or the financial
institution.
C. TIMELY ACCESS TO CURRENT AND ACCURATE INFORMATION
11. Countries should have mechanisms that ensure that basic information, including information
provided to the company registry, is accurate and updated on a timely basis. Countries should
require that any available information referred to in paragraph 7 is accurate and is kept as
current and up-to-date as possible, and the information should be updated within a
reasonable period following any change.
12. Competent authorities, and in particular law enforcement authorities, should have all the
powers necessary to be able to obtain timely access to the basic and beneficial ownership
information held by the relevant parties.
13. Countries should require their company registry to facilitate timely access by financial
institutions, DNFBPs and other countries’ competent authorities to the public information
they hold, and, at a minimum to the information referred to in paragraph 4(a) above.
Countries should also consider facilitating timely access by financial institutions and DNFBPs
to information referred to in paragraph 4(b) above.
D. OBSTACLES TO TRANSPARENCY
14. Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of bearer shares and bearer share
warrants, for example by applying one or more of the following mechanisms: (a) prohibiting
46 Members of the company’s board or senior management may not require specific authorisation by the company.
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them; (b) converting them into registered shares or share warrants (for example through
dematerialisation); (c) immobilising them by requiring them to be held with a regulated
financial institution or professional intermediary; or (d) requiring shareholders with a
controlling interest to notify the company, and the company to record their identity.
15. Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shares and nominee
directors, for example by applying one or more of the following mechanisms: (a) requiring
nominee shareholders and directors to disclose the identity of their nominator to the
company and to any relevant registry, and for this information to be included in the relevant
register; or (b) requiring nominee shareholders and directors to be licensed, for their
nominee status to be recorded in company registries, and for them to maintain information
identifying their nominator, and make this information available to the competent authorities
upon request.
E. OTHER LEGAL PERSONS
16. In relation to foundations, Anstalt, and limited liability partnerships, countries should take
similar measures and impose similar requirements, as those required for companies, taking
into account their different forms and structures.
17. As regards other types of legal persons, countries should take into account the different forms
and structures of those other legal persons, and the levels of money laundering and terrorist
financing risks associated with each type of legal person, with a view to achieving appropriate
levels of transparency. At a minimum, countries should ensure that similar types of basic
information should be recorded and kept accurate and current by such legal persons, and that
such information is accessible in a timely way by competent authorities. Countries should
review the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with such other legal
persons, and, based on the level of risk, determine the measures that should be taken to
ensure that competent authorities have timely access to adequate, accurate and current
beneficial ownership information for such legal persons.
F. LIABILITY AND SANCTIONS
18. There should be a clearly stated responsibility to comply with the requirements in this
Interpretive Note, as well as liability and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, as
appropriate for any legal or natural person that fails to properly comply with the
requirements.
G. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
19. Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide international cooperation in
relation to basic and beneficial ownership information, on the basis set out in
Recommendations 37 and 40. This should include (a) facilitating access by foreign competent
authorities to basic information held by company registries; (b) exchanging information on
shareholders; and (c) using their powers, in accordance with their domestic law, to obtain
beneficial ownership information on behalf of foreign counterparts. Countries should monitor
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the quality of assistance they receive from other countries in response to requests for basic
and beneficial ownership information or requests for assistance in locating beneficial owners
residing abroad.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 25
(TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS)
1. Countries should require trustees of any express trust governed under their law to obtain and
hold adequate, accurate, and current beneficial ownership information regarding the trust.
This should include information on the identity of the settlor, the trustee(s), the protector (if
any), the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries, and any other natural person exercising
ultimate effective control over the trust. Countries should also require trustees of any trust
governed under their law to hold basic information on other regulated agents of, and service
providers to, the trust, including investment advisors or managers, accountants, and tax
advisors.
2. All countries should take measures to ensure that trustees disclose their status to financial
institutions and DNFBPs when, as a trustee, forming a business relationship or carrying out an
occasional transaction above the threshold. Trustees should not be prevented by law or
enforceable means from providing competent authorities with any information relating to the
trust47; or from providing financial institutions and DNFBPs, upon request, with information
on the beneficial ownership and the assets of the trust to be held or managed under the terms
of the business relationship.
3. Countries are encouraged to ensure that other relevant authorities, persons and entities hold
information on all trusts with which they have a relationship. Potential sources of information
on trusts, trustees, and trust assets are:
(a) Registries (e.g. a central registry of trusts or trust assets), or asset registries for land,
property, vehicles, shares or other assets.
(b) Other competent authorities that hold information on trusts and trustees (e.g. tax
authorities which collect information on assets and income relating to trusts).
(c) Other agents and service providers to the trust, including investment advisors or
managers, lawyers, or trust and company service providers.
4. Competent authorities, and in particular law enforcement authorities, should have all the
powers necessary to obtain timely access to the information held by trustees and other
parties, in particular information held by financial institutions and DNFBPs on: (a) the
beneficial ownership; (b) the residence of the trustee; and (c) any assets held or managed by
the financial institution or DNFBP, in relation to any trustees with which they have a business
relationship, or for which they undertake an occasional transaction.
5. Professional trustees should be required to maintain the information referred to in paragraph
1 for at least five years after their involvement with the trust ceases. Countries are encouraged
to require non-professional trustees and the other authorities, persons and entities
mentioned in paragraph 3 above to maintain the information for at least five years.
47 Domestic competent authorities or the relevant competent authorities of another country pursuant to an
appropriate international cooperation request.
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6. Countries should require that any information held pursuant to paragraph 1 above should be
kept accurate and be as current and up-to-date as possible, and the information should be
updated within a reasonable period following any change.
7. Countries should consider measures to facilitate access to any information on trusts that is
held by the other authorities, persons and entities referred to in paragraph 3, by financial
institutions and DNFBPs undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and
22.
8. In the context of this Recommendation, countries are not required to give legal recognition to
trusts. Countries need not include the requirements of paragraphs 1, 2 and 6 in legislation,
provided that appropriate obligations to such effect exist for trustees (e.g. through common
law or case law).
Other Legal Arrangements
9. As regards other types of legal arrangement with a similar structure or function, countries
should take similar measures to those required for trusts, with a view to achieving similar
levels of transparency. At a minimum, countries should ensure that information similar to that
specified above in respect of trusts should be recorded and kept accurate and current, and
that such information is accessible in a timely way by competent authorities.
International Cooperation
10. Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide international cooperation in
relation to information, including beneficial ownership information, on trusts and other legal
arrangements on the basis set out in Recommendations 37 and 40. This should include (a)
facilitating access by foreign competent authorities to any information held by registries or
other domestic authorities; (b) exchanging domestically available information on the trusts or
other legal arrangement; and (c) using their competent authorities’ powers, in accordance
with domestic law, in order to obtain beneficial ownership information on behalf of foreign
counterparts.
Liability and Sanctions
11. Countries should ensure that there are clear responsibilities to comply with the requirements
in this Interpretive Note; and that trustees are either legally liable for any failure to perform
the duties relevant to meeting the obligations in paragraphs 1, 2, 6 and (where applicable) 5;
or that there are effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or
administrative, for failing to comply.48 Countries should ensure that there are effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, for failing to
48 This does not affect the requirements for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for failure to
comply with requirements elsewhere in the Recommendations.
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grant to competent authorities timely access to information regarding the trust referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 5.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 26
(REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS)
Risk-based approach to Supervision
1. Risk-based approach to supervision refers to: (a) the general process by which a supervisor,
according to its understanding of risks, allocates its resources to AML/CFT supervision; and
(b) the specific process of supervising institutions that apply an AML/CFT risk-based
approach.
2. Adopting a risk-based approach to supervising financial institutions’ AML/CFT systems and
controls allows supervisory authorities to shift resources to those areas that are perceived to
present higher risk. As a result, supervisory authorities can use their resources more
effectively. This means that supervisors: (a) should have a clear understanding of the money
laundering and terrorist financing risks present in a country; and (b) should have on-site and
off-site access to all relevant information on the specific domestic and international risks
associated with customers, products and services of the supervised institutions, including the
quality of the compliance function of the financial institution or group (or groups, when
applicable for Core Principles institutions). The frequency and intensity of on-site and off-site
AML/CFT supervision of financial institutions/groups should be based on the money
laundering and terrorist financing risks, and the policies, internal controls and procedures
associated with the institution/group, as identified by the supervisor’s assessment of the
institution/group’s risk profile, and on the money laundering and terrorist financing risks
present in the country.
3. The assessment of the money laundering and terrorist financing risk profile of a financial
institution/group, including the risks of non-compliance, should be reviewed both
periodically and when there are major events or developments in the management and
operations of the financial institution/group, in accordance with the country’s established
practices for ongoing supervision. This assessment should not be static: it will change
depending on how circumstances develop and how threats evolve.
4. AML/CFT supervision of financial institutions/groups that apply a risk-based approach
should take into account the degree of discretion allowed under the RBA to the financial
institution/group, and encompass, in an appropriate manner, a review of the risk assessments
underlying this discretion, and of the adequacy and implementation of its policies, internal
controls and procedures.
5. These principles should apply to all financial institutions/groups. To ensure effective
AML/CFT supervision, supervisors should take into consideration the characteristics of the
financial institutions/groups, in particular the diversity and number of financial institutions,
and the degree of discretion allowed to them under the RBA.
Resources of supervisors
6. Countries should ensure that financial supervisors have adequate financial, human and
technical resources. These supervisors should have sufficient operational independence and
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autonomy to ensure freedom from undue influence or interference. Countries should have in
place processes to ensure that the staff of these authorities maintain high professional
standards, including standards concerning confidentiality, and should be of high integrity and
be appropriately skilled.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 28
(REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF DNFBPS)
1. Risk-based approach to supervision refers to: (a) the general process by which a supervisor or
SRB, according to its understanding of risks, allocates its resources to AML/CFT supervision;
and (b) the specific process of supervising or monitoring DNFBPs that apply an AML/CFT
risk-based approach.
2. Supervisors or SRBs should determine the frequency and intensity of their supervisory or
monitoring actions on DNFBPs on the basis of their understanding of the money laundering
and terrorist financing risks, and taking into consideration the characteristics of the DNFBPs,
in particular their diversity and number, in order to ensure effective AML/CFT supervision or
monitoring. This means having a clear understanding of the money laundering and terrorist
financing risks: (a) present in the country; and (b) associated with the type of DNFBP and
their customers, products and services.
3. Supervisors or SRBs assessing the adequacy of the AML/CFT internal controls, policies and
procedures of DNFBPs should properly take into account the money laundering and terrorist
financing risk profile of those DNFBPs, and the degree of discretion allowed to them under the
RBA.
4. Supervisors or SRBs should have adequate powers to perform their functions (including
powers to monitor and sanction), and adequate financial, human and technical resources.
Countries should have in place processes to ensure that the staff of those authorities maintain
high professional standards, including standards concerning confidentiality, and should be of
high integrity and be appropriately skilled.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 29
(FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS)
A. GENERAL
1. This note explains the core mandate and functions of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) and
provides further clarity on the obligations contained in the standard. The FIU is part of, and
plays a central role in, a country’s AML/CFT operational network, and provides support to the
work of other competent authorities. Considering that there are different FIU models,
Recommendation 29 does not prejudge a country’s choice for a particular model, and applies
equally to all of them.
B. FUNCTIONS
(a) Receipt
2. The FIU serves as the central agency for the receipt of disclosures filed by reporting entities.
At a minimum, this information should include suspicious transaction reports, as required by
Recommendation 20 and 23, and it should include other information as required by national
legislation (such as cash transaction reports, wire transfers reports and other threshold-based
declarations/disclosures).
(b) Analysis
3. FIU analysis should add value to the information received and held by the FIU. While all the
information should be considered, the analysis may focus either on each single disclosure
received or on appropriate selected information, depending on the type and volume of the
disclosures received, and on the expected use after dissemination. FIUs should be encouraged
to use analytical software to process information more efficiently and assist in establishing
relevant links. However, such tools cannot fully replace the human judgement element of
analysis. FIUs should conduct the following types of analysis:
􀂄 Operational analysis uses available and obtainable information to identify
specific targets (e.g. persons, assets, criminal networks and associations), to
follow the trail of particular activities or transactions, and to determine
links between those targets and possible proceeds of crime, money
laundering, predicate offences or terrorist financing.
􀂄 Strategic analysis uses available and obtainable information, including data
that may be provided by other competent authorities, to identify money
laundering and terrorist financing related trends and patterns. This
information is then also used by the FIU or other state entities in order to
determine money laundering and terrorist financing related threats and
vulnerabilities. Strategic analysis may also help establish policies and goals
for the FIU, or more broadly for other entities within the AML/CFT regime.
(c) Dissemination
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4. The FIU should be able to disseminate, spontaneously and upon request, information and the
results of its analysis to relevant competent authorities. Dedicated, secure and protected
channels should be used for the dissemination.
􀂄 Spontaneous dissemination: The FIU should be able to disseminate
information and the results of its analysis to competent authorities when
there are grounds to suspect money laundering, predicate offences or
terrorist financing. Based on the FIU’s analysis, the dissemination of
information should be selective and allow the recipient authorities to focus
on relevant cases/information.
􀂄 Dissemination upon request: The FIU should be able to respond to
information requests from competent authorities pursuant to
Recommendation 31. When the FIU receives such a request from a
competent authority, the decision on conducting analysis and/or
dissemination of information to the requesting authority should remain
with the FIU.
C. ACCESS TO INFORMATION
(a) Obtaining Additional Information from Reporting Entities
5. In addition to the information that entities report to the FIU (under the receipt function), the
FIU should be able to obtain and use additional information from reporting entities as needed
to perform its analysis properly. The information that the FIU should be permitted to obtain
could include information that reporting entities are required to maintain pursuant to the
relevant FATF Recommendations (Recommendations 10, 11 and 22).
(b) Access to Information from other sources
6. In order to conduct proper analysis, the FIU should have access to the widest possible range of
financial, administrative and law enforcement information. This should include information
from open or public sources, as well as relevant information collected and/or maintained by,
or on behalf of, other authorities and, where appropriate, commercially held data.
D. INFORMATION SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
7. Information received, processed, held or disseminated by the FIU must be securely protected,
exchanged and used only in accordance with agreed procedures, policies and applicable laws
and regulations. An FIU must, therefore, have rules in place governing the security and
confidentiality of such information, including procedures for handling, storage, dissemination,
and protection of, as well as access to such information. The FIU should ensure that its staff
members have the necessary security clearance levels and understanding of their
responsibilities in handling and disseminating sensitive and confidential information. The FIU
should ensure that there is limited access to its facilities and information, including
information technology systems.
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E. OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
8. The FIU should be operationally independent and autonomous, meaning that the FIU should
have the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the autonomous
decision to analyse, request and/or disseminate specific information. In all cases, this means
that the FIU has the independent right to forward or disseminate information to competent
authorities.
9. An FIU may be established as part of an existing authority. When a FIU is located within the
existing structure of another authority, the FIU’s core functions should be distinct from those
of the other authority.
10. The FIU should be provided with adequate financial, human and technical resources, in a
manner that secures its autonomy and independence and allows it to conduct its mandate
effectively. Countries should have in place processes to ensure that the staff of the FIU
maintain high professional standards, including standards concerning confidentiality, and
should be of high integrity and be appropriately skilled.
11. The FIU should also be able to make arrangements or engage independently with other
domestic competent authorities or foreign counterparts on the exchange of information.
F. UNDUE INFLUENCE OR INTERFERENCE
12. The FIU should be able to obtain and deploy the resources needed to carry out its functions,
on an individual or routine basis, free from any undue political, government or industry
influence or interference, which might compromise its operational independence.
G. EGMONT GROUP
13. Countries should ensure that the FIU has regard to the Egmont Group Statement of Purpose
and its Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units for Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing Cases (these documents set out important guidance
concerning the role and functions of FIUs, and the mechanisms for exchanging information
between FIUs). The FIU should apply for membership in the Egmont Group.
H. LARGE CASH TRANSACTION REPORTING
14. Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where financial institutions
and DNFBPs would report all domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed
amount.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 30
(RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES)
1. There should be designated law enforcement authorities that have responsibility for ensuring
that money laundering, predicate offences and terrorist financing are properly investigated
through the conduct of a financial investigation. Countries should also designate one or more
competent authorities to identify, trace, and initiate freezing and seizing of property that is, or
may become, subject to confiscation.
2. A ‘financial investigation’ means an enquiry into the financial affairs related to a criminal
activity, with a view to:
􀂄 identifying the extent of criminal networks and/or the scale of criminality;
􀂄 identifying and tracing the proceeds of crime, terrorist funds or any other
assets that are, or may become, subject to confiscation; and
􀂄 developing evidence which can be used in criminal proceedings.
3. A ‘parallel financial investigation’ refers to conducting a financial investigation alongside, or in
the context of, a (traditional) criminal investigation into money laundering, terrorist financing
and/or predicate offence(s). Law enforcement investigators of predicate offences should
either be authorised to pursue the investigation of any related money laundering and terrorist
financing offences during a parallel investigation, or be able to refer the case to another
agency to follow up with such investigations.
4. Countries should consider taking measures, including legislative ones, at the national level, to
allow their competent authorities investigating money laundering and terrorist financing
cases to postpone or waive the arrest of suspected persons and/or the seizure of the money,
for the purpose of identifying persons involved in such activities or for evidence gathering.
Without such measures the use of procedures such as controlled deliveries and undercover
operations are precluded.
5. Recommendation 30 also applies to those competent authorities, which are not law
enforcement authorities, per se, but which have the responsibility for pursuing financial
investigations of predicate offences, to the extent that these competent authorities are
exercising functions covered under Recommendation 30.
6. Anti-corruption enforcement authorities with enforcement powers may be designated to
investigate money laundering and terrorist financing offences arising from, or related to,
corruption offences under Recommendation 30, and these authorities should also have
sufficient powers to identify, trace, and initiate freezing and seizing of assets.
7. The range of law enforcement agencies and other competent authorities mentioned above
should be taken into account when countries make use of multi-disciplinary groups in
financial investigations.
8. Law enforcement authorities and prosecutorial authorities should have adequate financial,
human and technical resources. Countries should have in place processes to ensure that the
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staff of these authorities maintain high professional standards, including standards
concerning confidentiality, and should be of high integrity and be appropriately skilled.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 32
(CASH COURIERS)
A. OBJECTIVES
1. Recommendation 32 was developed with the objective of ensuring that terrorists and other
criminals cannot finance their activities or launder the proceeds of their crimes through the
physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments.
Specifically, it aims to ensure that countries have measures to: (a) detect the physical crossborder
transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments; (b) stop or restrain
currency and bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected to be related to terrorist
financing or money laundering; (c) stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments
that are falsely declared or disclosed; (d) apply appropriate sanctions for making a false
declaration or disclosure; and (e) enable confiscation of currency or bearer negotiable
instruments that are related to terrorist financing or money laundering.
B. THE TYPES OF SYSTEMS THAT MAY BE IMPLEMENTED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF CASH
COURIERS
2. Countries may meet their obligations under Recommendation 32 and this Interpretive Note
by implementing one of the following types of systems. However, countries do not have to use
the same type of system for incoming and outgoing cross-border transportation of currency or
bearer negotiable instruments:
Declaration system
3. All persons making a physical cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable
instruments (BNIs), which are of a value exceeding a pre-set, maximum threshold of
USD/EUR 15,000, are required to submit a truthful declaration to the designated competent
authorities. Countries may opt from among the following three different types of declaration
system: (i) a written declaration system for all travellers; (ii) a written declaration system for
those travellers carrying an amount of currency or BNIs above a threshold; and (iii) an oral
declaration system. These three systems are described below in their pure form. However, it
is not uncommon for countries to opt for a mixed system.
(a) Written declaration system for all travellers: In this system, all travellers are required to
complete a written declaration before entering the country. This would include
questions contained on common or customs declaration forms. In practice, travellers
have to make a declaration whether or not they are carrying currency or BNIs (e.g.
ticking a “yes” or “no” box).
(b) Written declaration system for travellers carrying amounts above a threshold: In this
system, all travellers carrying an amount of currency or BNIs above a pre-set
designated threshold are required to complete a written declaration form. In practice,
the traveller is not required to fill out any forms if they are not carrying currency or
BNIs over the designated threshold.
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(c) Oral declaration system for all travellers: In this system, all travellers are required to
orally declare if they carry an amount of currency or BNIs above a prescribed
threshold. Usually, this is done at customs entry points by requiring travellers to
choose between the “red channel” (goods to declare) and the “green channel” (nothing
to declare). The choice of channel that the traveller makes is considered to be the oral
declaration. In practice, travellers do not declare in writing, but are required to
actively report to a customs official.
Disclosure system
4. Countries may opt for a system whereby travellers are required to provide the authorities
with appropriate information upon request. In such systems, there is no requirement for
travellers to make an upfront written or oral declaration. In practice, travellers need to be
required to give a truthful answer to competent authorities upon request.
C. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS APPLICABLE TO BOTH SYSTEMS
5. Whichever system is implemented, countries should ensure that their system incorporates the
following elements:
(a) The declaration/disclosure system should apply to both incoming and outgoing
transportation of currency and BNIs.
(b) Upon discovery of a false declaration/disclosure of currency or bearer negotiable
instruments or a failure to declare/disclose them, designated competent authorities
should have the authority to request and obtain further information from the carrier
with regard to the origin of the currency or BNIs and their intended use.
(c) Information obtained through the declaration/disclosure process should be available
to the FIU, either through a system whereby the FIU is notified about suspicious crossborder
transportation incidents, or by making the declaration/disclosure information
directly available to the FIU in some other way.
(d) At the domestic level, countries should ensure that there is adequate coordination
among customs, immigration and other related authorities on issues related to the
implementation of Recommendation 32.
(e) In the following two cases, competent authorities should be able to stop or restrain
cash or BNIs for a reasonable time, in order to ascertain whether evidence of money
laundering or terrorist financing may be found: (i) where there is a suspicion of money
laundering or terrorist financing; or (ii) where there is a false declaration or false
disclosure.
(f) The declaration/disclosure system should allow for the greatest possible measure of
international cooperation and assistance in accordance with Recommendations 36 to
40. To facilitate such cooperation, in instances when: (i) a declaration or disclosure
which exceeds the maximum threshold of USD/EUR 15,000 is made; or (ii) where
there is a false declaration or false disclosure; or (iii) where there is a suspicion of
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money laundering or terrorist financing, this information shall be retained for use by
competent authorities. At a minimum, this information will cover: (i) the amount of
currency or BNIs declared, disclosed or otherwise detected; and (ii) the identification
data of the bearer(s).
(g) Countries should implement Recommendation 32 subject to strict safeguards to
ensure proper use of information and without restricting either: (i) trade payments
between countries for goods and services; or (ii) the freedom of capital movements, in
any way.
D. SANCTIONS
6. Persons who make a false declaration or disclosure should be subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal civil or administrative. Persons who
are carrying out a physical cross-border transportation of currency or BNIs that is related to
terrorist financing, money laundering or predicate offences should also be subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, and should
be subject to measures, consistent with Recommendation 4, which would enable the
confiscation of such currency or BNIs.
7. Authorities responsible for implementation of Recommendation 32 should have adequate
financial, human and technical resources. Countries should have in place processes to ensure
that the staff of these authorities maintain high professional standards, including standards
concerning confidentiality, and should be of high integrity and be appropriately skilled.
E. GOLD, PRECIOUS METALS AND PRECIOUS STONES
8. For the purposes of Recommendation 32, gold, precious metals and precious stones are not
included, despite their high liquidity and use in certain situations as a means of exchange or
transmitting value. These items may be otherwise covered under customs laws and
regulations. If a country discovers an unusual cross-border movement of gold, precious metals
or precious stones, it should consider notifying, as appropriate, the Customs Service or other
competent authorities of the countries from which these items originated and/or to which
they are destined, and should cooperate with a view toward establishing the source,
destination, and purpose of the movement of such items, and toward the taking of appropriate
action.
Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation
False declaration refers to a misrepresentation of the value of currency or BNIs being
transported, or a misrepresentation of other relevant data which is
required for submission in the declaration or otherwise requested by
the authorities. This includes failing to make a declaration as required.
False disclosure refers to a misrepresentation of the value of currency or BNIs being
transported, or a misrepresentation of other relevant data which is
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Glossary of specific terms used in this Recommendation
asked for upon request in the disclosure or otherwise requested by the
authorities. This includes failing to make a disclosure as required.
Physical cross-border
transportation
refers to any in-bound or out-bound physical transportation of
currency or BNIs from one country to another country. The term
includes the following modes of transportation: (1) physical
transportation by a natural person, or in that person’s accompanying
luggage or vehicle; (2) shipment of currency or BNIs through
containerised cargo or (3) the mailing of currency or BNIs by a natural
or legal person.
Related to terrorist
financing or money
laundering
when used to describe currency or BNIs, refers to currency or BNIs that
are: (i) the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in,
the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations; or
(ii) laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences,
or instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of
these offences.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 38
(MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE: FREEZING AND CONFISCATION)
1. Countries should consider establishing an asset forfeiture fund into which all, or a portion of,
confiscated property will be deposited for law enforcement, health, education, or other
appropriate purposes. Countries should take such measures as may be necessary to enable
them to share among or between other countries confiscated property, in particular, when
confiscation is directly or indirectly a result of coordinated law enforcement actions.
2. With regard to requests for cooperation made on the basis of non-conviction based
confiscation proceedings, countries need not have the authority to act on the basis of all such
requests, but should be able to do so, at a minimum in circumstances when a perpetrator is
unavailable by reason of death, flight, absence, or the perpetrator is unknown.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 40
(OTHER FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION)
A. PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO ALL FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Obligations on requesting authorities
1. When making requests for cooperation, competent authorities should make their best efforts
to provide complete factual and, as appropriate, legal information, including indicating any
need for urgency, to enable a timely and efficient execution of the request, as well as the
foreseen use of the information requested. Upon request, requesting competent authorities
should provide feedback to the requested competent authority on the use and usefulness of
the information obtained.
Unduly restrictive measures
2. Countries should not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on the
provision of exchange of information or assistance. In particular competent authorities should
not refuse a request for assistance on the grounds that:
(a) the request is also considered to involve fiscal matters; and/or
(b) laws require financial institutions or DNFBPs (except where the relevant information
that is sought is held in circumstances where legal privilege or legal professional
secrecy applies) to maintain secrecy or confidentiality; and/or
(c) there is an inquiry, investigation or proceeding underway in the requested country,
unless the assistance would impede that inquiry, investigation or proceeding; and/or
(d) the nature or status (civil, administrative, law enforcement, etc.) of the requesting
counterpart authority is different from that of its foreign counterpart.
Safeguards on information exchanged
3. Exchanged information should be used only for the purpose for which the information was
sought or provided. Any dissemination of the information to other authorities or third parties,
or any use of this information for administrative, investigative, prosecutorial or judicial
purposes, beyond those originally approved, should be subject to prior authorisation by the
requested competent authority.
4. Competent authorities should maintain appropriate confidentiality for any request for
cooperation and the information exchanged, in order to protect the integrity of the
investigation or inquiry49, consistent with both parties’ obligations concerning privacy and
data protection. At a minimum, competent authorities should protect exchanged information
in the same manner as they would protect similar information received from domestic
sources. Countries should establish controls and safeguards to ensure that information
exchanged by competent authorities is used only in the manner authorised. Exchange of
49 Information may be disclosed if such disclosure is required to carry out the request for cooperation.
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information should take place in a secure way, and through reliable channels or mechanisms.
Requested competent authorities may, as appropriate, refuse to provide information if the
requesting competent authority cannot protect the information effectively.
Power to search for information
5. Competent authorities should be able to conduct inquiries on behalf of a foreign counterpart,
and exchange with their foreign counterparts all information that would be obtainable by
them if such inquiries were being carried out domestically.
B. PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO SPECIFIC FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
6. The general principles above should apply to all forms of exchange of information between
counterparts or non-counterparts, subject to the paragraphs set out below.
Exchange of information between FIUs
7. FIUs should exchange information with foreign FIUs, regardless of their respective status; be
it of an administrative, law enforcement, judicial or other nature. To this end, FIUs should
have an adequate legal basis for providing cooperation on money laundering, associated
predicate offences and terrorist financing.
8. When making a request for cooperation, FIUs should make their best efforts to provide
complete factual, and, as appropriate, legal information, including the description of the case
being analysed and the potential link to the requested country. Upon request and whenever
possible, FIUs should provide feedback to their foreign counterparts on the use of the
information provided, as well as on the outcome of the analysis conducted, based on the
information provided.
9. FIUs should have the power to exchange:
(a) all information required to be accessible or obtainable directly or indirectly by the FIU
under the FATF Recommendations, in particular under Recommendation 29; and
(b) any other information which they have the power to obtain or access, directly or
indirectly, at the domestic level, subject to the principle of reciprocity.
Exchange of information between financial supervisors50
10. Financial supervisors should cooperate with their foreign counterparts, regardless of their
respective nature or status. Efficient cooperation between financial supervisors aims at
facilitating effective AML/CFT supervision of financial institutions. To this end, financial
supervisors should have an adequate legal basis for providing cooperation, consistent with
the applicable international standards for supervision, in particular with respect to the
exchange of supervisory information related to or relevant for AML/CFT purposes.
50 This refers to financial supervisors which are competent authorities.
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11. Financial supervisors should be able to exchange with foreign counterparts information
domestically available to them, including information held by financial institutions, and in a
manner proportionate to their respective needs. Financial supervisors should be able to
exchange the following types of information when relevant for AML/CFT purposes, in
particular with other relevant supervisors that have a shared responsibility for financial
institutions operating in the same group:
(a) Regulatory information, such as information on the domestic regulatory system, and
general information on the financial sectors.
(b) Prudential information, in particular for Core Principle Supervisors, such as
information on the financial institution’s business activities, beneficial ownership,
management, and fit and properness.
(c) AML/CFT information, such as internal AML/CFT procedures and policies of financial
institutions, customer due diligence information, customer files, samples of accounts
and transaction information.
12. Financial supervisors should be able to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts,
and, as appropriate, to authorise or facilitate the ability of foreign counterparts to conduct
inquiries themselves in the country, in order to facilitate effective group supervision.
13. Any dissemination of information exchanged or use of that information for supervisory and
non- supervisory purposes, should be subject to prior authorisation by the requested financial
supervisor, unless the requesting financial supervisor is under a legal obligation to disclose or
report the information. In such cases, at a minimum, the requesting financial supervisor
should promptly inform the requested authority of this obligation. The prior authorisation
includes any deemed prior authorisation under a Memorandum of Understanding or the
Multi-lateral Memorandum of Understanding issued by a core principles standard-setter
applied to information exchanged under a Memorandum of Understanding or the Multi-lateral
Memorandum of Understanding.
Exchange of information between law enforcement authorities
14. Law enforcement authorities should be able to exchange domestically available information
with foreign counterparts for intelligence or investigative purposes relating to money
laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing, including the identification
and tracing of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.
15. Law enforcement authorities should also be able to use their powers, including any
investigative techniques available in accordance with their domestic law, to conduct inquiries
and obtain information on behalf of foreign counterparts. The regimes or practices in place
governing such law enforcement cooperation, such as the agreements between Interpol,
Europol or Eurojust and individual countries, should govern any restrictions on use imposed
by the requested law enforcement authority.
16. Law enforcement authorities should be able to form joint investigative teams to conduct
cooperative investigations, and, when necessary, countries should establish bilateral or
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multilateral arrangements to enable such joint investigations. Countries are encouraged to
join and support existing AML/CFT law enforcement networks, and develop bi-lateral
contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies, including placing liaison officers abroad, in
order to facilitate timely and effective cooperation.
Exchange of information between non-counterparts
17. Countries should permit their competent authorities to exchange information indirectly with
non-counterparts, applying the relevant principles above. Indirect exchange of information
refers to the requested information passing from the requested authority through one or
more domestic or foreign authorities before being received by the requesting authority. Such
an exchange of information and its use may be subject to the authorisation of one or more
competent authorities of the requested country. The competent authority that requests the
information should always make it clear for what purpose and on whose behalf the request is
made.
18. Countries are also encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of information
directly with non-counterparts.
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LEGAL BASIS OF REQUIREMENTS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND DNFBPS
1. All requirements for financial institutions or DNFBPs should be introduced either (a) in law
(see the specific requirements in Recommendations 10, 11 and 20 in this regard), or (b) for all
other cases, in law or enforceable means (the country has discretion).
2. In Recommendations 10, 11 and 20, the term “law” refers to any legislation issued or
approved through a Parliamentary process or other equivalent means provided for under the
country’s constitutional framework, which imposes mandatory requirements with sanctions
for non-compliance. The sanctions for non-compliance should be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive (see Recommendation 35). The notion of law also encompasses judicial decisions
that impose relevant requirements, and which are binding and authoritative in all parts of the
country.
3. The term “Enforceable means” refers to regulations, guidelines, instructions or other
documents or mechanisms that set out enforceable AML/CFT requirements in mandatory
language with sanctions for non-compliance, and which are issued or approved by a
competent authority. The sanctions for non-compliance should be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive (see Recommendation 35).
4. In considering whether a document or mechanism has requirements that amount to
enforceable means, the following factors should be taken into account:
(a) There must be a document or mechanism that sets out or underpins requirements
addressing the issues in the FATF Recommendations, and providing clearly stated
requirements which are understood as such. For example:
(i) if particular measures use the word shall or must, this should be considered
mandatory;
(ii) if they use should, this could be mandatory if both the regulator and the
regulated institutions demonstrate that the actions are directly or indirectly
required and are being implemented; language such as measures are
encouraged, are recommended or institutions should consider is less likely to be
regarded as mandatory. In any case where weaker language is used, there is a
presumption that the language is not mandatory (unless the country can
demonstrate otherwise).
(b) The document/mechanism must be issued or approved by a competent authority.
(c) There must be sanctions for non-compliance (sanctions need not be in the same
document that imposes or underpins the requirement, and can be in another
document, provided that there are clear links between the requirement and the
available sanctions), which should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. This
involves consideration of the following issues:
(i) there should be an adequate range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sanctions available if persons fail to comply with their obligations;
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(ii) the sanctions should be directly or indirectly applicable for a failure to comply
with an AML/CFT requirement. If non-compliance with an AML/CFT
requirement does not have a sanction directly attached to it, then the use of
sanctions for violation of broader requirements, such as not having proper
systems and controls or not operating in a safe and sound manner, is
satisfactory provided that, at a minimum, a failure to meet one or more
AML/CFT requirements could be (and has been as appropriate) adequately
sanctioned without a need to prove additional prudential failures unrelated to
AML/CFT; and
(iii) whether there is satisfactory evidence that effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions have been applied in practice.
5. In all cases it should be apparent that financial institutions and DNFBPs understand that
sanctions would be applied for non-compliance and what those sanctions could be.
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GENERAL GLOSSARY
Terms Definitions
Accounts References to “accounts” should be read as including other similar business
relationships between financial institutions and their customers.
Accurate Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Agent For the purposes of Recommendations 14 and 16, agent means any natural or
legal person providing MVTS on behalf of an MVTS provider, whether by
contract with or under the direction of the MVTS provider.
Appropriate
authorities Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 8.
Associate NPOs Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 8.
Batch transfer Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Bearer
negotiable
instruments
Bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs) includes monetary instruments in bearer
form such as: traveller’s cheques; negotiable instruments (including cheques,
promissory notes and money orders) that are either in bearer form, endorsed
without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such form
that title thereto passes upon delivery; incomplete instruments (including
cheques, promissory notes and money orders) signed, but with the payee’s
name omitted.
Bearer shares Bearer shares refers to negotiable instruments that accord ownership in a legal
person to the person who possesses the bearer share certificate.
Beneficial owner Beneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately51 owns or
controls a customer52 and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction
is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate
effective control over a legal person or arrangement.
Beneficiaries Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 8.
Beneficiary The meaning of the term beneficiary in the FATF Recommendations depends on
the context:
􀂄 In trust law, a beneficiary is the person or persons who are entitled to
the benefit of any trust arrangement. A beneficiary can be a natural or
legal person or arrangement. All trusts (other than charitable or
51 Reference to “ultimately owns or controls” and “ultimate effective control” refer to situations in which
ownership/control is exercised through a chain of ownership or by means of control other than direct
control.
52 This definition should also apply to beneficial owner of a beneficiary under a life or other investment
linked insurance policy.
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Terms Definitions
statutory permitted non-charitable trusts) are required to have
ascertainable beneficiaries. While trusts must always have some
ultimately ascertainable beneficiary, trusts may have no defined existing
beneficiaries but only objects of a power until some person becomes
entitled as beneficiary to income or capital on the expiry of a defined
period, known as the accumulation period. This period is normally coextensive
with the trust perpetuity period which is usually referred to in
the trust deed as the trust period.
􀂄 In the context of life insurance or another investment linked insurance
policy, a beneficiary is the natural or legal person, or a legal
arrangement, or category of persons, who will be paid the policy
proceeds when/if an insured event occurs, which is covered by the
policy.
Please also refer to the Interpretive Notes to Recommendation 16.
Beneficiary
Financial
Institution
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Competent
authorities
Competent authorities refers to all public authorities53 with designated
responsibilities for combating money laundering and/or terrorist financing. In
particular, this includes the FIU; the authorities that have the function of
investigating and/or prosecuting money laundering, associated predicate
offences and terrorist financing, and seizing/freezing and confiscating criminal
assets; authorities receiving reports on cross-border transportation of currency
& BNIs; and authorities that have AML/CFT supervisory or monitoring
responsibilities aimed at ensuring compliance by financial institutions and
DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements. SRBs are not to be regarded as a
competent authorities.
Confiscation The term confiscation, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the
permanent deprivation of funds or other assets by order of a competent
authority or a court. Confiscation or forfeiture takes place through a judicial or
administrative procedure that transfers the ownership of specified funds or
other assets to be transferred to the State. In this case, the person(s) or
entity(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time
of the confiscation or forfeiture loses all rights, in principle, to the confiscated or
forfeited funds or other assets. Confiscation or forfeiture orders are usually
linked to a criminal conviction or a court decision whereby the confiscated or
53 This includes financial supervisors established as independent non-governmental authorities with
statutory powers.
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Terms Definitions
forfeited property is determined to have been derived from or intended for use
in a violation of the law.
Core Principles Core Principles refers to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Objectives and
Principles for Securities Regulation issued by the International Organization of
Securities Commissions, and the Insurance Supervisory Principles issued by the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors.
Correspondent
banking
Correspondent banking is the provision of banking services by one bank (the
“correspondent bank”) to another bank (the “respondent bank”). Large
international banks typically act as correspondents for thousands of other banks
around the world. Respondent banks may be provided with a wide range of
services, including cash management (e.g. interest-bearing accounts in a variety
of currencies), international wire transfers, cheque clearing, payable-through
accounts and foreign exchange services.
Country All references in the FATF Recommendations to country or countries apply
equally to territories or jurisdictions.
Cover Payment Please refer to the IN. to Recommendation 16.
Criminal activity Criminal activity refers to: (a) all criminal acts that would constitute a predicate
offence for money laundering in the country; or (b) at a minimum to those
offences that would constitute a predicate offence as required by
Recommendation 3.
Cross-border
Wire Transfer
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Currency Currency refers to banknotes and coins that are in circulation as a medium of
exchange.
Designated
categories of
offences
Designated categories of offences means:
􀂄 participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering;
􀂄 terrorism, including terrorist financing;
􀂄 trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling;
􀂄 sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children;
􀂄 illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
􀂄 illicit arms trafficking;
􀂄 illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;
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Terms Definitions
􀂄 corruption and bribery;
􀂄 fraud;
􀂄 counterfeiting currency;
􀂄 counterfeiting and piracy of products;
􀂄 environmental crime;
􀂄 murder, grievous bodily injury;
􀂄 kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking;
􀂄 robbery or theft;
􀂄 smuggling; (including in relation to customs and excise duties and
taxes);
􀂄 tax crimes (related to direct taxes and indirect taxes);
􀂄 extortion;
􀂄 forgery;
􀂄 piracy; and
􀂄 insider trading and market manipulation.
When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences
under each of the categories listed above, each country may decide, in
accordance with its domestic law, how it will define those offences and the
nature of any particular elements of those offences that make them serious
offences.
Designated nonfinancial
businesses and
professions
Designated non-financial businesses and professions means:
a) Casinos54
b) Real estate agents.
c) Dealers in precious metals.
d) Dealers in precious stones.
e) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and
accountants – this refers to sole practitioners, partners or employed
professionals within professional firms. It is not meant to refer to
‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other types of businesses,
54 References to Casinos throughout the FATF Standards include internet- and ship-based casinos.
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Terms Definitions
nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may already
be subject to AML/CFT measures.
f) Trust and Company Service Providers refers to all persons or businesses
that are not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations, and
which as a business, provide any of the following services to third
parties:
􀂄 acting as a formation agent of legal persons;
􀂄 acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or
secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar
position in relation to other legal persons;
􀂄 providing a registered office; business address or accommodation,
correspondence or administrative address for a company, a
partnership or any other legal person or arrangement;
􀂄 acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an
express trust or performing the equivalent function for another
form of legal arrangement;
􀂄 acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee
shareholder for another person.
Designated
person or entity
The term designated person or entity refers to:
(i) individual, groups, undertakings and entities designated by the
Committee of the Security Council established pursuant to
resolution 1267 (1999) (the 1267 Committee), as being individuals
associated with Al-Qaida, or entities and other groups and
undertakings associated with Al-Qaida;
(ii) individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated by the
Committee of the Security Council established pursuant to
resolution 1988 (2011) (the 1988 Committee), as being associated
with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and
security of Afghanistan, or entities and other groups and undertakings
associated with the Taliban;
(iii) any natural or legal person or entity designated by jurisdictions or a
supra-national jurisdiction pursuant to Security Council resolution
1373 (2001);
(iv) any individual, natural or legal person or entity designated for the
application of targeted financial sanctions pursuant to Security Council
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Terms Definitions
resolution 1718 (2006) and any future successor resolutions by the
Security Council in annexes to the relevant resolutions, or by the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718
(2006) (the 1718 Sanctions Committee) pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1718 (2006); and
(v) any natural or legal person or entity designated for the application of
targeted financial sanctions pursuant to Security Council resolution
2231 (2015) and any future successor resolutions by the Security
Council.
Designation The term designation refers to the identification of a person55, individual or
entity that is subject to targeted financial sanctions pursuant to:
􀂄 United Nations Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and its
successor resolutions;
􀂄 Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), including the
determination that the relevant sanctions will be applied to the
person or entity and the public communication of that
determination;
􀂄 Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and any future
successor resolutions;
􀂄 Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and any future
successor resolutions; and
􀂄 any future Security Council resolutions which impose targeted
financial sanctions in the context of the financing of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
As far as Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and any future successor
resolutions are concerned, references to “designations” apply equally to “listing”.
Domestic Wire
Transfer
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Enforceable
means
Please refer to the Note on the Legal Basis of requirements on Financial
Institutions and DNFBPs.
Ex Parte The term ex parte means proceeding without prior notification and participation
of the affected party.
Express trust Express trust refers to a trust clearly created by the settlor, usually in the form of
a document e.g. a written deed of trust. They are to be contrasted with trusts
55 Natural or legal.
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Terms Definitions
which come into being through the operation of the law and which do not result
from the clear intent or decision of a settlor to create a trust or similar legal
arrangements (e.g. constructive trust).
False declaration Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 32.
False disclosure Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 32.
Financial group Financial group means a group that consists of a parent company or of any other
type of legal person exercising control and coordinating functions over the rest
of the group for the application of group supervision under the Core Principles,
together with branches and/or subsidiaries that are subject to AML/CFT policies
and procedures at the group level.
Financial
institutions
Financial institutions means any natural or legal person who conducts as a
business one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of
a customer:
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.56
2. Lending.57
3. Financial leasing.58
4. Money or value transfer services.59
5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards,
cheques, traveller's cheques, money orders and bankers' drafts, electronic
money).
6. Financial guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit,
derivatives etc.);
(b) foreign exchange;
(c) exchange, interest rate and index instruments;
(d) transferable securities;
(e) commodity futures trading.
56 This also captures private banking.
57 This includes inter alia: consumer credit; mortgage credit; factoring, with or without recourse; and
finance of commercial transactions (including forfeiting).
58 This does not extend to financial leasing arrangements in relation to consumer products.
59 It does not apply to any natural or legal person that provides financial institutions solely with message or
other support systems for transmitting funds. See the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16.
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Terms Definitions
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services
related to such issues.
9. Individual and collective portfolio management.
10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of
other persons.
11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf
of other persons.
12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment
related insurance60.
13. Money and currency changing.
Foreign
counterparts
Foreign counterparts refers to foreign competent authorities that exercise
similar responsibilities and functions in relation to the cooperation which is
sought, even where such foreign competent authorities have a different nature
or status (e.g. depending on the country, AML/CFT supervision of certain
financial sectors may be performed by a supervisor that also has prudential
supervisory responsibilities or by a supervisory unit of the FIU).
Freeze In the context of confiscation and provisional measures (e.g., Recommendations
4, 32 and 38), the term freeze means to prohibit the transfer, conversion,
disposition or movement of any property, equipment or other instrumentalities
on the basis of, and for the duration of the validity of, an action initiated by a
competent authority or a court under a freezing mechanism, or until a forfeiture
or confiscation determination is made by a competent authority.
For the purposes of Recommendations 6 and 7 on the implementation of
targeted financial sanctions, the term freeze means to prohibit the transfer,
conversion, disposition or movement of any funds or other assets that are
owned or controlled by designated persons or entities on the basis of, and for
the duration of the validity of, an action initiated by the United Nations Security
Council or in accordance with applicable Security Council resolutions by a
competent authority or a court.
In all cases, the frozen property, equipment, instrumentalities, funds or other
assets remain the property of the natural or legal person(s) that held an interest
in them at the time of the freezing and may continue to be administered by third
parties, or through other arrangements established by such natural or legal
person(s) prior to the initiation of an action under a freezing mechanism, or in
accordance with other national provisions. As part of the implementation of a
freeze, countries may decide to take control of the property, equipment,
instrumentalities, or funds or other assets as a means to protect against flight.
60 This applies both to insurance undertakings and to insurance intermediaries (agents and brokers).
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Terms Definitions
Fundamental
principles of
domestic law
This refers to the basic legal principles upon which national legal systems are
based and which provide a framework within which national laws are made and
powers are exercised. These fundamental principles are normally contained or
expressed within a national Constitution or similar document, or through
decisions of the highest level of court having the power to make binding
interpretations or determinations of national law. Although it will vary from
country to country, some examples of such fundamental principles include rights
of due process, the presumption of innocence, and a person’s right to effective
protection by the courts.
Funds The term funds refers to assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal
documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital,
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets.
Funds or other
assets
The term funds or other assets means any assets, including, but not limited to,
financial assets, economic resources (including oil and other natural resources),
property of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable,
however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including
electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such funds or other assets,
including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques,
money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, or letters of credit, and any
interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by
such funds or other assets, and any other assets which potentially may be used
to obtain funds, goods or services.
Identification
data
The term identification data refers to reliable, independent source documents,
data or information.
Intermediary
financial
institution
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
International
organisations
International organisations are entities established by formal political
agreements between their member States that have the status of international
treaties; their existence is recognised by law in their member countries; and
they are not treated as resident institutional units of the countries in which they
are located. Examples of international organisations include the United Nations
and affiliated international organisations such as the International Maritime
Organisation; regional international organisations such as the Council of Europe,
institutions of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe and the Organization of American States; military
international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
economic organisations such as the World Trade Organisation or the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, etc.
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Terms Definitions
Law Please refer to the Note on the Legal Basis of requirements on Financial
Institutions and DNFBPs.
Legal
arrangements
Legal arrangements refers to express trusts or other similar legal arrangements.
Examples of other similar arrangements (for AML/CFT purposes) include
fiducie, treuhand and fideicomiso.
Legal persons Legal persons refers to any entities other than natural persons that can establish
a permanent customer relationship with a financial institution or otherwise own
property. This can include companies, bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt,
partnerships, or associations and other relevantly similar entities.
Money
laundering
offence
References (except in Recommendation 3) to a money laundering offence refer
not only to the primary offence or offences, but also to ancillary offences.
Money or value
transfer service
Money or value transfer services (MVTS) refers to financial services that involve
the acceptance of cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of
value and the payment of a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a
beneficiary by means of a communication, message, transfer, or through a
clearing network to which the MVTS provider belongs. Transactions performed
by such services can involve one or more intermediaries and a final payment to
a third party, and may include any new payment methods. Sometimes these
services have ties to particular geographic regions and are described using a
variety of specific terms, including hawala, hundi, and fei-chen.
Non-conviction
based
confiscation
Non-conviction based confiscation means confiscation through judicial
procedures related to a criminal offence for which a criminal conviction is not
required.
Non-profit
organisations
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 8.
Originator Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Ordering
financial
institution
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Payable-through
accounts
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 13.
Physical crossborder
transportation
Please refer to the IN. to Recommendation 32.
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Terms Definitions
Politically
Exposed Persons
(PEPs)
Foreign PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent
public functions by a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of
government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials,
senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials.
Domestic PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted domestically with
prominent public functions, for example Heads of State or of government, senior
politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of
state owned corporations, important political party officials.
Persons who are or have been entrusted with a prominent function by an
international organisation refers to members of senior management, i.e.
directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent functions.
The definition of PEPs is not intended to cover middle ranking or more junior
individuals in the foregoing categories.
Proceeds Proceeds refers to any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly,
through the commission of an offence.
Property Property means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal,
moveable or immoveable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or
instruments evidencing title to, or interest in such assets.
Qualifying wire
transfers
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Reasonable
measures
The term Reasonable Measures means: appropriate measures which are
commensurate with the money laundering or terrorist financing risks.
Related to
terrorist
financing or
money
laundering
Please refer to the IN. to Recommendation 32.
Required Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 16.
Risk All references to risk refer to the risk of money laundering and/or terrorist
financing. This term should be read in conjunction with the Interpretive Note to
Recommendation 1.
Satisfied Where reference is made to a financial institution being satisfied as to a matter,
that institution must be able to justify its assessment to competent authorities.
Seize The term seize means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or
movement of property on the basis of an action initiated by a competent
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Terms Definitions
authority or a court under a freezing mechanism. However, unlike a freezing
action, a seizure is effected by a mechanism that allows the competent authority
or court to take control of specified property. The seized property remains the
property of the natural or legal person(s) that holds an interest in the specified
property at the time of the seizure, although the competent authority or court
will often take over possession, administration or management of the seized
property.
Self-regulatory
body (SRB)
A SRB is a body that represents a profession (e.g. lawyers, notaries, other
independent legal professionals or accountants), and which is made up of
members from the profession, has a role in regulating the persons that are
qualified to enter and who practise in the profession, and also performs certain
supervisory or monitoring type functions. Such bodies should enforce rules to
ensure that high ethical and moral standards are maintained by those practising
the profession.
Serial Payment Please refer to the IN. to Recommendation 16.
Settlor Settlors are natural or legal persons who transfer ownership of their assets to
trustees by means of a trust deed or similar arrangement.
Shell bank Shell bank means a bank that has no physical presence in the country in which it
is incorporated and licensed, and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial
group that is subject to effective consolidated supervision.
Physical presence means meaningful mind and management located within a
country. The existence simply of a local agent or low level staff does not
constitute physical presence.
Should For the purposes of assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations, the
word should has the same meaning as must.
Straight-through
processing
Please refer to the IN. to Recommendation 16.
Supervisors Supervisors refers to the designated competent authorities or non-public bodies
with responsibilities aimed at ensuring compliance by financial institutions
(“financial supervisors” 61) and/or DNFBPs with requirements to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing. Non-public bodies (which could include
certain types of SRBs) should have the power to supervise and sanction financial
institutions or DNFBPs in relation to the AML/CFT requirements. These nonpublic
bodies should also be empowered by law to exercise the functions they
perform, and be supervised by a competent authority in relation to such
functions.
61 Including Core Principles supervisors who carry out supervisory functions that are related to the
implementation of the FATF Recommendations.
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Terms Definitions
Targeted
financial
sanctions
The term targeted financial sanctions means both asset freezing and prohibitions
to prevent funds or other assets from being made available, directly or
indirectly, for the benefit of designated persons and entities.
Terrorist The term terrorist refers to any natural person who: (i) commits, or attempts to
commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts ; (iii) organises or
directs others to commit terrorist acts ; or (iv) contributes to the commission of
terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose where the
contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist
act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.
Terrorist act A terrorist act includes:
(a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in
one of the following treaties: (i) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (1970); (ii) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971); (iii) Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973); (iv) International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages (1979); (v) Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (1980); (vi) Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988); (vii) Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(2005); (viii) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (2005);
(ix) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(1997); and (x) International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999).
(b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.
Terrorist
financing
Terrorist financing is the financing of terrorist acts, and of terrorists and
terrorist organisations.
Terrorist
financing abuse
Please refer to the IN to Recommendation 8.
Terrorist
financing offence
References (except in Recommendation 4) to a terrorist financing offence refer
not only to the primary offence or offences, but also to ancillary offences.
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Terms Definitions
Terrorist
organisation
The term terrorist organisation refers to any group of terrorists that: (i)
commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist
acts; (iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (iv) contributes
to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of
furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group
to commit a terrorist act.
Third parties
For the purposes of Recommendations 6 and 7, the term third parties includes,
but is not limited to, financial institutions and DNFBPs.
Please also refer to the IN to Recommendation 17.
Trustee The terms trust and trustee should be understood as described in and consistent
with Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the law applicable to trusts and their
recognition62.
Trustees may be professional (e.g. depending on the jurisdiction, a lawyer or
trust company) if they are paid to act as a trustee in the course of their business,
or non-professional (e.g. a person acting without reward on behalf of family).
Unique
transaction
reference
number
Please refer to the IN. to Recommendation 16.
Without delay The phrase without delay means, ideally, within a matter of hours of a
designation by the United Nations Security Council or its relevant Sanctions
Committee (e.g. the 1267 Committee, the 1988 Committee, the 1718 Sanctions
Committee). For the purposes of S/RES/1373(2001), the phrase without delay
62 Article 2 of the Hague Convention reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "trust" refers to the legal relationships created – inter-vivos or
on death - by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the
benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.
A trust has the following characteristics -
a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee's own estate;
b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another person on behalf of the
trustee;
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to manage, employ or
dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the trust and the special duties imposed upon him
by law.
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the trustee may himself have
rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trust.
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Terms Definitions
means upon having reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or
believe that a person or entity is a terrorist, one who finances terrorism or a
terrorist organisation. In both cases, the phrase without delay should be
interpreted in the context of the need to prevent the flight or dissipation of funds
or other assets which are linked to terrorists, terrorist organisations, those who
finance terrorism, and to the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and the need for global, concerted action to interdict and disrupt
their flow swiftly.
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TABLE OF ACRONYMS
AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism
(also used for Combating the financing of terrorism)
BNI Bearer-Negotiable Instrument
CDD Customer Due Diligence
DNFBP Designated Non-Financial Business or Profession
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
IN Interpretive Note
ML Money Laundering
MVTS Money or Value Transfer Service(s)
NPO Non-Profit Organisation
Palermo Convention The United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime 2000
PEP Politically Exposed Person
R. Recommendation
RBA Risk-Based Approach
SR. Special Recommendation
SRB Self-Regulatory Bodies
STR Suspicious Transaction Report
TCSP Trust and Company Service Provider
Terrorist Financing
Convention
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism 1999
UN United Nations
Vienna Convention The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances 1988
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ANNEX I: FATF GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The FATF has published a large body of Guidance and Best Practices papers which can be found at:
www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/guidance/.
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ANNEX II: INFORMATION ON UPDATES MADE TO THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
The following amendments have been made to the FATF Recommendations since the text was
adopted in February 2012.
Date Type of amendments Sections subject to amendments
Feb 2013 Alignment of the Standards
between R.37 and R.40
􀂄 R.37(d) – page 27
Insertion of the reference that DNFBP secrecy or
confidentiality laws should not affect the provision
of mutual legal assistance, except where the
relevant information that is sought is held in
circumstances where legal professional privilege or
legal professional secrecy applies.
Oct 2015 Revision of the Interpretive
Note to R. 5 to address the
foreign terrorist fighters
threat
􀂄 INR.5 (B.3) – page 37
Insertion of B.3 to incorporate the relevant element
of UNSCR 2178 which addresses the threat posed
by foreign terrorist fighters. This clarifies that
Recommendation 5 requires countries to
criminalise financing the travel of individuals who
travel to a State other than their States of residence
or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration,
planning, or preparation of, or participation in,
terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of
terrorist training.
Existing B.3-11 became B.4-12.
Jun 2016 Revision of R. 8 and the
Interpretive Note to R. 8
􀂄 R.8 and INR.8 – pages 13 and 54-59
Revision of the standard on non-profit organisation
(NPO) to clarify the subset of NPOs which should be
made subject to supervision and monitoring. This
brings INR.8 into line with the FATF Typologies
Report on Risk of Terrorist Abuse of NPOs
(June 2014) and the FATF Best Practices on
Combatting the Abuse of NPOs (June 2015) which
clarify that not all NPOs are high risk and intended
to be addressed by R.8, and better align the
implementation of R.8/INR.8 with the risk-based
approach.
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Date Type of amendments Sections subject to amendments
Oct 2016 Revision of the Interpretive
Note to R. 5 and the
Glossary definition of
‘Funds or other assets’
􀂄 INR. 5 and Glossary – pages 37 and 121
Revision of the INR.5 to replace “funds” with “funds
or other assets” throughout INR.5, in order to have
the same scope as R.6. Revision of the Glossary
definition of “funds or other assets” by adding
references to oil and other natural resources, and to
other assets which may potentially be used to
obtain funds.
Jun 2017 Revision of the Interpretive
Note to R.7 and the
Glossary definitions of
“Designated person or
entity”, “Designation” and
“Without delay”
􀂄 INR. 7 and Glossary – pages 45-51, 114-115 and
123
Revision of the INR.7 and consequential revisions of
the Glossary definitions of “Designated person or
entity”, “Designation” and “Without delay” to bring
the text in line with the requirements of recent
United Nations Security Council Resolutions and to
clarify the implementation of targeted financial
sanctions relating to proliferation financing.
Nov 2017 Revision of the
Interpretive Note to
Recommendation 18
􀂄 INR.18 – page 77
Revision of INR.18 to clarify the requirements on
sharing of information related to unusual or
suspicious transactions within financial groups. It
also includes providing this information to
branches and subsidiaries when necessary for
AML/CFT risk management.
Nov 2017 Revision of
Recommendation 21
􀂄 R. 21 – page 17
Revision of R. 21 to clarify the interaction of R. 18
requirements with tipping-off provisions.
Feb 2018 Revision of
Recommendation 2
􀂄 R. 2 – page 9
Revision of R. 2 to ensure compatibility of AML/CFT
requirements and data protection and privacy
rules, and to promote domestic inter-agency
information sharing among competent authorities.
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Annex 360
FATF, Special Recommendation III: Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets (Text of the
Special Recommendation and Interpretative Note) (October 2001, as updated, adopted, and
published February 2012)

FATF Special Recommendation III: Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets
Text of the Special Recommendation and Interpretative Note
See also: The full text of the IX Special Recommendations
Return to Special Recommendations page
Special Recommendation III : Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets
Each country should implement measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists,
those who finance terrorism and terrorist organisations in accordance with the United Nations
resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.
Each country should also adopt and implement measures, including legislative ones, which would
enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in,
or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations.
Interpretative Note to
Special Recommendation III: Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets
Objectives
1. FATF Special Recommendation III consists of two obligations. The first requires jurisdictions to
implement measures that will freeze or, if appropriate, seize terrorist-related funds or other
assets without delay in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions.
The second obligation
of Special Recommendation III is to have measures in place that permit a jurisdiction to seize or
confiscate terrorist funds or other assets on the basis of an order or mechanism issued by a
competent authority or a court.
2. The objective of the first requirement is to freeze terrorist-related funds or other assets based on
reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that such funds or other assets
could be used to finance terrorist activity. The objective of the second requirement is to deprive
terrorists of these funds or other assets if and when links have been adequately established
between the funds or other assets and terrorists or terrorist activity. The intent of the first
objective is preventative, while the intent of the second objective is mainly preventative and
punitive. Both requirements are necessary to deprive terrorists and terrorist networks of the
means to conduct future terrorist activity and maintain their infrastructure and operations.
Scope
3. Special Recommendation III is intended, with regard to its first requirement, to complement the
obligations in the context of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions relating to the
prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts—S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor
resolutions, [1] S/RES/1373(2001) and any prospective resolutions related to the freezing, or if
appropriate seizure, of terrorist assets. It should be stressed that none of the obligations in Special
1 of 8
T
Recommendation III is intended to replace other measures or obligations that may already be in
place for dealing with funds or other assets in the context of a criminal, civil or administrative
investigation or proceeding.[2] The focus of Special Recommendation III instead is on the
preventative measures that are necessary and unique in the context of stopping the flow or use of
funds or other assets to terrorist groups.
4. S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001) differ in the persons and entities whose funds or other
assets are to be frozen, the authorities responsible for making these designations, and the effect
of these designations.
5. S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor resolutions obligate jurisdictions to freeze without delay the
funds or other assets owned or controlled by Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, or persons
and entities associated with them as designated by the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban
Sanctions Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (the
Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee), including funds derived from funds or other assets
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their
direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds or other assets are made available,
directly or indirectly, for such persons’ benefit, by their nationals or by any person within their
territory. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee is the authority responsible for
designating the persons and entities that should have their funds or other assets frozen under
S/RES/1267(1999). All jurisdictions that are members of the United Nations are obligated by
S/RES/1267(1999) to freeze the assets of persons and entities so designated by the Al-Qaida and
Taliban Sanctions Committee. [3]
6. S/RES/1373(2001) obligates jurisdictions [4] to freeze without delay the funds or other assets of
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the
commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons;
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities,
including funds or other assets derived or generated from property owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such persons and associated persons and entities. Each individual jurisdiction has the
authority to designate the persons and entities that should have their funds or other assets frozen.
Additionally, to ensure that effective co-operation is developed among jurisdictions, jurisdictions
should examine and give effect to, if appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing
mechanisms of other jurisdictions. When (i) a specific notification or communication is sent and (ii)
the jurisdiction receiving the request is satisfied, according to applicable legal principles, that a
requested designation is supported by reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or
believe that the proposed designee is a terrorist, one who finances terrorism or a terrorist
organisation, the jurisdiction receiving the request must ensure that the funds or other assets of
the designated person are frozen without delay.
Definitions
7. For the purposes of Special Recommendation III and this Interpretive Note, the following
definitions apply:
a) The term freeze means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of funds
or other assets on the basis of, and for the duration of the validity of, an action initiated by a
competent authority or a court under a freezing mechanism. The frozen funds or other assets
remain the property of the person(s) or entity(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds
or other assets at the time of the freezing and may continue to be administered by the
financial institution or other arrangements designated by such person(s) or entity(ies) prior to
the initiation of an action under a freezing mechanism.
b) The term seize means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of funds
or other assets on the basis of an action initiated by a competent authority or a court under a
freezing mechanism. However, unlike a freezing action, a seizure is effected by a mechanism
that allows the competent authority or court to take control of specified funds or other assets.
The seized funds or other assets remain the property of the person(s) or entity(ies) that held
an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time of the seizure, although the
competent authority or court will often take over possession, administration or management
of the seized funds or other assets.
2 of 8
a) Authority to freeze, unfreeze and prohibit dealing in funds or other assets of
designated persons. Jurisdictions should prohibit by enforceable means the transfer,
conversion, disposition or movement of funds or other assets. Options for providing the
authority to freeze and unfreeze terrorist funds or other assets include:
8. In order to fulfil the preventive intent of Special Recommendation III, jurisdictions should
establish the necessary authority and adopt the following standards and procedures to freeze the
funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist organisations in
accordance with both S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001):
c) The term confiscate, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent
deprivation of funds or other assets by order of a competent authority or a court. Confiscation
or forfeiture takes place through a judicial or administrative procedure that transfers the
ownership of specified funds or other assets to be transferred to the State. In this case, the
person(s) or entity(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time
of the confiscation or forfeiture loses all rights, in principle, to the confiscated or forfeited
funds or other assets. [5]
d) The term funds or other assets means financial assets, property of every kind, whether
tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or
instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such
funds or other assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank
cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, or letters of credit, and any
interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by such funds or
other assets.
e) The term terrorist refers to any natural person who:
(i) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts [6] by any means, directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully;
(ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts or terrorist financing;
(iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts or terrorist financing; or
(iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts or terrorist financing by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim
of furthering the terrorist act or terrorist financing or with the knowledge of the intention of
the group to commit a terrorist act or terrorist financing.
f) The phrase those who finance terrorism refers to any person, group, undertaking or other
entity that provides or collects, by any means, directly or indirectly, funds or other assets
that may be used, in full or in part, to facilitate the commission of terrorist acts, or to any
persons or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons, groups,
undertakings or other entities. This includes those who provide or collect funds or other
assets with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts.
g) The term terrorist organisation refers to any legal person, group, undertaking or other entity
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a terrorist(s).
h) The term designated persons refers to those persons or entities designated by the Al-Qaida
and Taliban Sanctions Committee pursuant to S/RES/1267(1999) or those persons or entities
designated and accepted, s appropriate, by jurisdictions pursuant to S/RES/1373(2001).
i) The phrase without delay, for the purposes of S/RES/1267(1999), means, ideally, within a
matter of hours of a designation by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. For the
purposes of S/RES/1373(2001), the phrase without delay means upon having reasonable
grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that a person or entity is a terrorist, one
who finances terrorism or a terrorist organisation. The phrase without delay should be
interpreted in the context of the need to prevent the flight or dissipation of terrorist-linked
funds or other assets, and the need for global, concerted action to interdict and disrupt their
flow swiftly.
Freezing without delay terrorist-related funds or other assets
3 of 8
(i) empowering or designating a competent authority or a court to issue, administer and
enforce freezing and unfreezing actions under relevant mechanisms, or
(ii) enacting legislation that places responsibility for freezing the funds or other assets of
designated persons publicly identified by a competent authority or a court on the person or
entity holding the funds or other assets and subjecting them to sanctions for
non-compliance.
The authority to freeze and unfreeze funds or other assets should also extend to funds or
other assets derived or generated from funds or other assets owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by such terrorists, those who finance terrorism, or terrorist organisations.
Whatever option is chosen there should be clearly identifiable competent authorities
responsible for enforcing the measures.
The competent authorities shall ensure that their nationals or any persons and entities
within their territories are prohibited from making any funds or other assets, economic
resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, wholly or
jointly, for the benefit of: designated persons, terrorists; those who finance terrorism;
terrorist organisations; entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons
or entities; and persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons
or entities.
b) Freezing procedures. Jurisdictions should develop and implement procedures to freeze
the funds or other assets specified in paragraph (c) below without delay and without giving
prior notice to the persons or entities concerned. Persons or entities holding such funds or
other assets should be required by law to freeze them and should furthermore be subject to
sanctions for non-compliance with this requirement. Any delay between the official receipt
of information provided in support of a designation and the actual freezing of the funds or
other assets of designated persons undermines the effectiveness of designation by affording
designated persons time to remove funds or other assets from identifiable accounts and
places. Consequently, these procedures must ensure
(i) the prompt determination whether reasonable grounds or a reasonable basis exists to
initiate an action under a freezing mechanism and
(ii) the subsequent freezing of funds or other assets without delay upon determination that
such grounds or basis for freezing exist. Jurisdictions should develop efficient and effective
systems for communicating actions taken under their freezing mechanisms to the financial
sector immediately upon taking such action.
As well, they should provide clear guidance, particularly financial institutions and other
persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or other assets on obligations in
taking action under freezing mechanisms.
c) Funds or other assets to be frozen or, if appropriate, seized. Under Special
Recommendation III, funds or other assets to be frozen include those subject to freezing
under S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001). Such funds or other assets would also
include those wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated
persons. In accordance with their obligations under the United Nations International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) (the Terrorist
Financing Convention (1999)), jurisdictions should be able to freeze or, if appropriate, seize
any funds or other assets that they identify, detect, and verify, in accordance with
applicable legal principles, as being used by, allocated for, or being made available to
terrorists, those who finance terrorists or terrorist organisations. Freezing or seizing under
the Terrorist Financing Convention (1999) may be conducted by freezing or seizing in the
context of a criminal investigation or proceeding. Freezing action taken under Special
Recommendation III shall be without prejudice to the rights of third parties acting in good
faith.
d) De-listing and unfreezing procedures. Jurisdictions should develop and implement
publicly known procedures to consider de-listing requests upon satisfaction of certain
criteria consistent with international obligations and applicable legal principles, and to
unfreeze the funds or other assets of de-listed persons or entities in a timely manner. For
persons and entities designated under S/RES/1267(1999), such procedures and criteria
4 of 8
should be in accordance with procedures adopted by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Committee under S/RES/1267(1999).
e) Unfreezing upon verification of identity. For persons or entities with the same or
similar name as designated persons, who are inadvertently affected by a freezing
mechanism, jurisdictions should develop and implement publicly known procedures to
unfreeze the funds or other assets of such persons or entities in a timely manner upon
verification that the person or entity involved is not a designated person.
f)
Providing access to frozen funds or other assets in certain circumstances. Where
jurisdictions have determined that funds or other assets, which are otherwise subject to
freezing pursuant to the obligations under S/RES/1267(1999), are necessary for basic
expenses; for the payment of certain types of fees, expenses and service charges, or for
extraordinary expenses, [7] jurisdictions should authorise access to such funds or other
assets in accordance with the procedures set out in S/RES/1452(2002) and subject to
approval of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. On the same grounds,
jurisdictions may authorise access to funds or other assets, if freezing measures are applied
pursuant to S/RES/1373(2001).
g) Remedies. Jurisdictions should provide for a mechanism through which a person or an
entity that is the target of a freezing mechanism in the context of terrorist financing can
challenge that measure with a view to having it reviewed by a competent authority or a
court.
h) Sanctions. Jurisdictions should adopt appropriate measures to monitor effectively the
compliance with relevant legislation, rules or regulations governing freezing mechanisms by
financial institutions and other persons or entities that may be holding funds or other assets
as indicated in paragraph 8(c) above. Failure to comply with such legislation, rules or
regulations should be subject to civil, administrative or criminal sanctions.
5 of 8
6 of 8
9. Consistent with FATF Recommendation 3, jurisdictions should adopt measures similar to those set
forth in Article V of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (1988), Articles 12 to 14 of the United Nations Convention on
Transnational Organised Crime (2000), and Article 8 of the Terrorist Financing Convention (1999),
including legislative measures, to enable their courts or competent authorities to seize and
confiscate terrorist funds or other assets.
Seizure and Confiscation
[1] When issued, S/RES/1267(1999) had a time limit of one year. A series of resolutions have been
issued by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to extend and further refine provisions of
S/RES/1267(1999). By successor resolutions are meant those resolutions that extend and are directly
related to the original resolution S/RES/1267(1999). At the time of issue of this Interpretative Note,
these resolutions included S/RES/1333(2000), S/RES/1363(2001), S/RES/1390(2002) and
S/RES/1455(2003). In this Interpretative Note, the term S/RES/1267(1999) refers to
S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor resolutions.
[2] For instance, both the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988) and UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) contain
obligations regarding freezing, seizure and confiscation in the context of combating transnational crime.
Those obligations exist separately and apart from obligations that are set forth in S/RES/1267(1999),
S/RES/1373(2001) and Special Recommendation III.
[3] When the UNSC acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolutions it issues are mandatory
for all UN members.
[4] The UNSC was acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in issuing S/RES/1373(2001) (see
7 of 8
previous footnote).
[5] Confiscation or forfeiture orders are usually linked to a criminal conviction or a court decision
whereby the confiscated or forfeited property is determined to have been derived from or intended for
use in a violation of the law.
[6] A terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in one
of the following treaties: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999).
[7] See Article 1, S/RES/1452(2002) for the specific types of expenses that are covered.
Also available:
Recommandation spéciale III du GAFI: Gel et confiscation des biens des terroristes (French)
Related documents:
9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (English)
International Best Practices: Freezing of Terrorist Assets (Special Recommendation III) (English)
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Annex 361
International Maritime Organization, Report of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2nd Session, 18–22
May 1987, IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5

Annex 362
NATO, NATO – Ukraine Cooperation in the Military Sphere (2012)

NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the military sphere - Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/military[6/6/2018 4:20:54 PM]
Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Homepage Sitemap Shortcuts Find an Embassy 􀉆􀉨􀉜􀉚
, Kyiv 23:20
Ukraine and NATO / NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the military sphere
NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the military sphere
The cooperation in the military sphere is carried out in pursuance of the tasks outlined in Annual National Programme for
NATO – Ukraine cooperation within the framework of Working plans of NATO – Ukraine Military Committee and Individual
Partnership and Cooperation Programme.
The said documents provide for implementation of a wide spectrum of tasks in the short term. Main of which are:
Strengthening of defence and operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the current security
conditions;
Obtaining the interoperability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with NATO’s military units;
Promoting reform and professionalization of Ukrainian army, implementation of the best military standards;
Ensuring the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in NATO-led peacekeeping operations, involvement in
NATO Response Force.
Within the framework of military cooperation with NATO, Armed Forces of Ukraine are also involved in a number of
Alliance’s projects and initiatives that are aimed at increasing their operational and defence capabilities.
Since 2004, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are taking part in Operational Capability Concept. This concept was created to
improve the level of interoperability between the units of partner states that are participating in NATO “Partnership for
Peace” program and NATO member-states, to enhance their operational capabilities through the use of leading armies’
standards in training and combat work.
A number of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are declared to participate in the project; these units are trained by
NATO standards and are appropriately assessed. The above allows such units to participate in NATO-led operations and
training exercises, and to get involved in operational duty in multinational military forces of high readiness (led by NATO,
EU, and UN).
Since 2008, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are taking part in NATO Air Situational Data Exchange Program. The program
was launched in 2001 to cooperate in countering air terrorism.
Participation in the program allows for the exchange of data on air situation in the western and southern regions of Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, Hungary and Ukraine, and over the Black Sea region. Data exchange is carried out
automatically through the contact points of reception and transmission of information in the cities of Lviv and Odesa
(Ukraine), Veszprem (Hungary) and Erzurum (Turkey).
In 2012, the Armed Forces of Ukraine joined the Connected Forces Initiative.
The main aim of this initiative is to improve interoperability and increase the ability of NATO’s and partners’ militaries to
work together when performing tasks in multinational operations.
Main elements of the Connected Forces Initiative:
Enhanced training of troops and individual training of the personnel with the most effective use of NATO training
institutions and centres of excellence;
Ukraine and NATO
NATO – Ukraine
cooperation within
“Partnership for Peace”
Cooperation in defense and
security sector reform
NATO – Ukraine
cooperation in the military
sphere
Ukraine’s activity within
Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Cooperation in civil
emergency planning
Cooperation in science and
environmental spheres
The parliamentary
dimension of NATO –
Ukraine cooperation
Ukraine`s contribution to
NATO peace-support
activities
NATO – Ukraine
commission
About Ukraine About Mission Ukraine and NATO Press Center Documents
NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the military sphere - Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/military[6/6/2018 4:20:54 PM]
Increasing the number of military exercises, especially involving NATO Response Force (NRF);
More efficient use of modern technology to facilitate interoperability and integration of required capabilities.
In 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine joined the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. The initiative was started to preserve
and further develop operational interoperability of NATO member-states and partner countries after the end of NATO-led
operation in Afghanistan.
The initiative aims to support the development, diversification and the increase of the list of partner capabilities, which are
certified and ready to participate in NATO-led operations and the NRF. Achieving interoperability with NATO partners as
part of this initiative is carried out in three dimensions: technical, operational and doctrinal interoperability.
NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the military sphere - Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/military[6/6/2018 4:20:54 PM]
NATO – Ukraine cooperation in the military sphere - Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
https://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/military[6/6/2018 4:20:54 PM]
© 2012 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. All rights reserved.
Annex 363
NATO, Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document (10 January 2012)

6/6/2018 NATO - Topic: Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document (country, name & date)
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_82584.htm 1/2
Signatures
of Partnership for Peace Framework Document
Countries Signed by Date
Albania PDT Sali Berisha 23.02.94
Armenia FM Vahan Papazian 05.10.94
Austria FM Alois Mock 10.02.95
Azerbaijan PDT Geidar Aliyev 04.05.94
Belarus FM Uladzmir Syanko 11.01.95
Bosnia and Herzegovina PDT Nebojša Radmanović 14.12.06
Bulgaria PDT Jelu Jelev 14.02.94
Croatia FM Tonino Picula 25.05.00
Czech Republic PM Vaclav Klaus 10.03.94
Estonia FM Jüri Luik 03.02.94
Finland FM Heikki Haavisto 09.05.94
Georgia FM A.Chikvaidze 23.03.94
Hungary FM Jeszensky 08.02.94
Ireland FM Andrews 01.12.99
Kazakhstan FM Saudabayev 27.05.94
Kyrghyz Republic PDT Askar Akayev 01.06.94
Latvia PM Valdis Birkavs 14.02.94
Lithuania PDT Brazauskas 27.01.94
Malta DPM/FM Guido de Marco 26.04.95
Moldova PDT Mircea Snegur 16.03.94
Montenegro PDT Filip Vujanovic 14.12.06
Poland PM Pawlak 02.02.94
Romania FM Melescanu 26.01.94
Russia FM Andrei Kozyrev 22.06.94
Serbia PDT Boris Tadić 14.12.06
Slovakia PM Meciar 09.02.94
Slovenia PM Janez Drnovsek 30.03.94
Sweden FM Margaretha Af Ugglas 09.05.94
Last updated: 10 Jan. 2012 11:23
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6/6/2018 NATO - Topic: Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document (country, name & date)
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Switzerland FM F. Cotti 11.12.96
Tajikistan AMB. Sharif Rahimov 20.02.02
The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
Head of Government
Crvenkovski Branko
15.11.95
Turkmenistan DPM B. Shikmuradov 10.05.94
Ukraine FM Zlenko 08.02.94
Uzbekistan FM Saidmukhtar Saidkasimov 13.07.94
1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
2. These countries joined NATO on 16 March 1999
3. These countries joined NATO on 29 March 2004
4. These countries joined NATO on 1 April 2009
5. This country joined NATO on 5 June 2017
1
Annex 364
NATO Allied Command Operations, NATO Releases Imagery: Raises Questions on Russia’s Role
in Providing Tanks to Ukraine (14 June 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀃􀀃􀀄
􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀍􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀁􀀂􀀋􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀔􀀕􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀘􀀌
􀀂􀀖􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀙􀀐􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀂􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀞􀀅􀀃􀀟􀀞􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀡􀀤􀀢􀀣􀀠􀀠􀀥􀀣􀀡􀀦􀀞􀀧􀀄􀀄􀀨􀀒􀀞􀀞􀀋􀀩􀀖􀀪􀀗􀀋􀀄􀀖􀀪􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀞􀀌􀀄􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀫􀀖􀀗􀀫􀀐􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀫􀀎􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀫􀀟􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀫􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀪􀀋􀀌􀀨􀀬
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􀀮􀀯􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀱􀀁􀀲􀀰􀀳􀀴􀀍􀀝􀀵􀀁􀀫􀀁􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀓􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀷􀀌􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀃􀀊􀀖􀀅􀀸􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀕􀀟􀀊􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀟􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀐􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀏
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􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀥􀀡􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀑􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀂􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀚􀀫􀀗􀀋􀀫􀀹􀀖􀀗􀀕􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀊􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀱􀀁􀀟􀀕􀀄􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃
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􀀍􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀶􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀤􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃 􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀱􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀃􀀊􀀓􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗
􀀋􀀗􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀨􀀕􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀖􀀨􀀌􀀁􀀟􀀋􀀩􀀜􀀁􀀶􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀍􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀄􀀃􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀛􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀋􀀊􀀱􀀁􀀺􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌
􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀓􀀚􀀃􀀛􀀪􀀁
􀀉􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀢􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀃􀀗􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀃􀀛􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛
􀀥􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀑􀀁􀀃􀀻􀀕􀀓􀀨􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀕􀀩􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀎􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀱􀀁􀀊􀀓􀀜􀀃􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀛􀀓􀀩􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀗􀀄
􀀎􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀑􀀁􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀁
􀀉􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀠􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀶􀀓􀀩􀀓􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀚􀀃􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀩􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀌􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃
􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀹􀀖􀀚􀀼􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀜􀀑􀀑􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀩􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀱􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀅􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀄􀀐􀀖􀀊􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀖􀀫􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀖􀀫􀀩􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀃􀀛
􀀽􀀙􀀃􀀖􀀨􀀊􀀃􀀘􀀌􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀨􀀕􀀟􀀊􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀳􀀕􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀜􀀪􀀾􀀁􀀁􀀮􀀓􀀏􀀧􀀄􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀗􀀁􀀌􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀩􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀮􀀗􀀓􀀼􀀧􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀗
􀀵􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀜􀀋􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀐􀀁􀀹􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀌􀀜􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀛􀀖􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀁􀀟􀀃􀀋􀀐􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀩􀀋􀀎􀀖􀀕􀀶􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀊􀀓􀀜􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀖􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀑􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀋􀀗
􀀎􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀍􀀗􀀁􀀶􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀱􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀑􀀁􀀛􀀖􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀱􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀌􀀩􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀓􀀩􀀌􀀁􀀕􀀌􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀑􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀃
􀀓􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀊􀀚􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀋􀀟􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀌􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀿􀀐􀀓􀀎􀀃􀀋􀀪􀀁
􀀁
􀀫􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀶􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀌
􀀢􀀞􀀤
􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀓􀀏􀀗􀀓􀀶􀀓􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀻􀀕􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀁􀀐􀀖􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀶􀀋􀀩􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀄􀀋􀀟􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀑􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌
􀀓􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀊􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀎􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀎􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀃􀀻􀀕􀀓􀀨􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀓􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀶􀀓􀀩􀀓􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀃􀀃􀀗
􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀃􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀎􀀓􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀌􀀓􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀏􀀋􀀐􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀁􀀐􀀖􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀿􀀐􀀓􀀎􀀃􀀋􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀟􀀐􀀓􀀗􀀏
􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀶􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀊􀀓􀀏􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀶􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀃􀀗􀀌􀀕􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀁􀀨􀀕􀀟􀀊􀀓􀀩􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀋􀀩􀀩􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀄􀀋􀀟􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀪􀀁
􀀍􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀶􀀓􀀐􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀱􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀅􀀖􀀕􀀊􀀛􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀃􀀌􀀩􀀋􀀊􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀐􀀓􀀌􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀚􀀓􀀖􀀊􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀶
􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀁􀀴􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀪􀀁
􀁀􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀛􀀋􀀑􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀁􀀮􀀃􀀩􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀴􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀁􀀃􀀬􀀨􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀌􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀋􀀏􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀕􀀐􀀏􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀎􀀨􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀃
􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀛􀀐􀀋􀀅􀀋􀀊􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀎􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀩􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀨􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀶􀀊􀀖􀀅􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀶􀀓􀀏􀀧􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀩􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃
􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀃􀀬􀀃􀀐􀀩􀀓􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀶􀀊􀀕􀀃􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀎􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀑􀀁􀀛􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀓􀀐􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀋􀀨􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀕􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀁􀀚􀀓􀀖􀀊􀀃􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀯􀀃
􀀩􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃 􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀁁􀀃􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀎􀀃􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀴􀀃􀀗􀀃􀀚􀀋􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀎􀀎􀀓􀀄􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀏􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀄
􀀓􀀎􀀨􀀊􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀨􀀊􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀁􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀨􀀃􀀋􀀩􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀑􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀎􀀪
􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀶􀀖􀀊􀀊􀀖􀀅􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀊􀀖􀀑􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀌􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀃􀀋􀀐􀀁􀀂􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀖􀀚􀀫􀀗􀀋􀀫􀀹􀀖􀀗􀀕􀀱􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀌􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀧􀀅􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀪
􀀴􀀐􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀢􀀁􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀊􀀃􀀶􀀄􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀑􀀁􀀥􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀊􀀖􀀑􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀎􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀅􀀋􀀌
􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀊􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀩􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀘􀀌􀀁􀀟􀀕􀀓􀀊􀀛􀀫􀀕􀀨􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀩􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀌􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀩􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀓􀀌
􀀋􀀨􀀨􀀐􀀖􀀬􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀦􀁂􀀁􀁃􀀓􀀊􀀖􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀷􀁃􀀵􀀸􀀱􀀁􀀶􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀹􀀖􀀚􀀼􀀧􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀜􀀑􀀑􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀩􀀐􀀖􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀪􀀁􀀲􀀑􀀁􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀱􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀁄􀀡􀀁􀁃􀀵􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃
􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀟􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀪􀀁􀀙􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀆􀀉􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀷􀀵􀀲􀀈􀀸􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀎􀀓􀀛􀀛􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀤􀀱
􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀱􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀄􀀕􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀎􀀓􀀊􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀁􀀯􀀖􀀅􀀃􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀱􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀐􀀓􀀚􀀋􀀊􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀺􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀱􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀧
􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀗􀀄 􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀑􀀁􀀥􀀡􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀧􀀄􀀱􀀁􀀛􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀱􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀛􀀓􀀩􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀱􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃
􀀢􀀡􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀁􀀷􀀥􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀃􀀛􀀱􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀅􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀸􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀃􀀬􀀄􀀁􀀏􀀐􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀃
􀀎􀀖􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀄􀀋􀀓􀀊􀀪
􀀠􀀞􀀤
􀀁
􀀴􀀐􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀎􀀖􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀄􀀋􀀓􀀊􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀖􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀐􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀱􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀁􀀩􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀅􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀩􀀄􀀕􀀋􀀊􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀢􀀡
􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀪􀀁􀀷􀀈􀀖􀀨􀀁􀀊􀀃􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀸􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀐􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀪􀀁􀀷 􀀈􀀅􀀖􀀁􀀐􀀓􀀏􀀧􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀌􀀸􀀁􀁁􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃
􀀄􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀪􀀁􀀁􀀷􀀲􀀖􀀄􀀄􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀊􀀃􀀶􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀄􀀸􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀐􀀃􀀃􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀳􀀖􀀅􀀁􀀳􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀖􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀶􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀯􀀃􀀋􀀚􀀑
􀀰􀀻􀀕􀀓􀀨􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀈􀀐􀀋􀀗􀀌􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀐􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀎􀀃􀀄􀀧􀀖􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀎􀀖􀀚􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀐􀀖􀀋􀀛􀀁􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀐􀀜􀀌􀀪
􀀥􀀞􀀤
􀀁
􀀴􀀐􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀥􀀁􀀫􀀁􀁅􀀓􀀛􀀃􀀖􀀁􀀨􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀱􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀗􀀁􀀠􀀁􀀈􀀫􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀛􀀐􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀧􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀜􀀓􀀓􀀚􀀜􀀋􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀄
􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀃􀀩􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀮􀀚􀀃􀀐􀀛􀀊􀀖􀀚􀀋􀀁􀀮􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀹􀀖􀀗􀀟􀀋􀀌􀀕􀀁􀀇􀀚􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀩􀀩􀀖􀀎􀀨􀀋􀀗􀀓􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀟􀀑􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀚􀀃􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀶􀀊􀀑􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀶􀀊􀀋􀀏􀀪
􀀙􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀚􀀃􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀚􀀃􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀌􀀓􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀚􀀃􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀃􀀻􀀕􀀓􀀨􀀎􀀃􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀋􀀄􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀃
􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀊􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀿􀀐􀀓􀀎􀀃􀀋􀀪
􀀣􀀞􀀤
􀀁
􀀴􀀐􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀣􀀁􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀩􀀖􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀖􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀜􀀃􀀗􀀁􀀶􀀐􀀖􀀎􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀚􀀓􀀛􀀃􀀖􀀁􀀨􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀃􀀐􀀗􀀃􀀄􀀁􀀭􀀕􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀢􀀢􀀱􀀁􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀣􀀱􀀁􀀌􀀧􀀖􀀅􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀫􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀐􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀗􀀏
􀀄􀀧􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀧􀀁􀀮􀀗􀀓􀀼􀀧􀀗􀀃􀀱􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀙􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀁􀀋􀀊􀀌􀀖􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀁􀀎􀀋􀀐􀀜􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀌􀀁􀀖􀀗􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀪
􀁂􀀞􀀤
􀀴􀀐􀀋􀀨􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀁􀁂􀀁􀀫􀀁􀀈􀀧􀀃􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀶􀀓􀀗􀀋􀀊􀀁􀀕􀀗􀀩􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀶􀀓􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀏􀀃􀀌􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀨􀀓􀀩􀀄􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀓􀀋􀀗􀀁􀀈􀀫􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀅􀀓􀀄􀀧􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀊􀀖􀀗􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀫􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀛􀀐􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀐􀀖􀀕􀀏􀀧􀀁􀀮􀀗􀀓􀀼􀀧􀀗􀀃􀀱
􀀝􀀜􀀐􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀃􀀪􀀁􀀙􀀊􀀃􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀖􀀄􀀃􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀛􀀓􀀶􀀶􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀗􀀩􀀃􀀁􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀄􀀧􀀃􀀁􀀨􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀄􀀁􀀌􀀩􀀧􀀃􀀎􀀃􀀌􀀪
􀀇􀀩􀀩􀀖􀀐􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀁􀀄􀀖􀀁􀀉􀀨􀀃􀀗􀀁􀀮􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀩􀀃􀀁􀀐􀀃􀀨􀀖􀀐􀀄􀀓􀀗􀀏􀀱􀀁􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀓􀀋􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀨􀀨􀀐􀀖􀀬􀀓􀀎􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀠􀀱􀀡􀀡􀀡􀀁􀀈􀀫􀀤􀀣􀀁􀀵􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀁􀀲􀀋􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀃􀀁􀀈􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀅􀀧􀀓􀀩􀀧􀀁􀀓􀀄􀀁􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀁􀀨􀀧􀀋􀀌􀀃􀀛
􀀖􀀕􀀄􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀌􀀃􀀐􀀚􀀓􀀩􀀃􀀁􀀋􀀗􀀛􀀁􀀅􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀊􀀋􀀄􀀃􀀛􀀁􀀶􀀖􀀐􀀁􀀛􀀃􀀌􀀄􀀐􀀕􀀩􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀪􀀁􀀍􀀄􀀁􀀓􀀌􀀁􀀧􀀓􀀏􀀧􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀊􀀓􀀜􀀃􀀊􀀑􀀁􀀋􀀁􀀊􀀋􀀐􀀏􀀃􀀁􀀗􀀕􀀎􀀟􀀃􀀐􀀁􀀖􀀶􀀁􀀄􀀋􀀗􀀜􀀌􀀁􀀋􀀐􀀃􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀊􀀊􀀁􀀖􀀨􀀃􀀐􀀋􀀄􀀓􀀖􀀗􀀋􀀊􀀪
􀀮􀀄􀀖􀀐􀀑􀀁􀀟􀀑􀀁􀀮􀀯􀀇􀀙􀀰􀀁􀀙􀀕􀀟􀀊􀀓􀀩􀀁􀀇􀀶􀀶􀀋􀀓􀀐􀀌􀀁􀀉􀀶􀀶􀀓􀀩􀀃
􀀤􀀞􀀤
Annex 365
Allied Powers Europe, New Satellite Imagery Exposes Russian Combat Troops Inside Ukraine
(28 August 2014)

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀙􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀓
􀀊􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀂􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀝􀀃􀀂􀀘􀀝􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀡􀀟􀀢􀀠􀀣􀀠􀀣􀀤􀀥􀀤􀀞􀀝􀀦􀀇􀀇􀀑􀀧􀀝􀀝􀀓􀀦􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀨􀀖􀀆􀀇􀀒􀀨􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀝􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀩􀀓􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀩􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀩􀀂􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀂􀀓􀀩􀀍􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀩􀀪􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀩􀀇􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀩
􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀩􀀕􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂
􀀫􀀒􀀋􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀬􀀍􀀪􀀦􀀉􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀬􀀍􀀪􀀦􀀉􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀄􀀄􀀝􀀄􀀄􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖
􀀗􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀙􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀄􀀊􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂
􀀞􀀮􀀄􀀬􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥
􀀍􀀋􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀕􀀖􀀗􀀍􀀄􀀯􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀙􀀰􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀕􀀍􀀓􀀚􀀆􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀞􀀮􀀄􀀬􀀕􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀖􀀌􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀉􀀌􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀂
􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀬􀀕􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀇􀀱􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀑􀀉􀀪􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀈􀀲􀀩􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀭􀀒􀀎
􀀇􀀦􀀍􀀒􀀕􀀌􀀦􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀎􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀖􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀪􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀓􀀇􀀆􀀘􀀈􀀉􀀓􀀦􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀍􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂
􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀳􀀍􀀆􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀚􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨
􀀴􀀕􀀇􀀪􀀦􀀄􀀵􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀚􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀶􀀂􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀁􀀉􀀪􀀒􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀜􀀱􀀄􀀚􀀉􀀍􀀂􀀪􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀋􀀑􀀍􀀂􀀦􀀂􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀗􀀍􀀉􀀓􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀷􀀆􀀖􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇
􀀗􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀸􀀗􀀗􀀰􀀷􀀗􀀹􀀱􀀄􀀬􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀗􀀒􀀋􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀉􀀍􀀋􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀃􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀙􀀰􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀬􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀂􀀓
􀀦􀀆􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀂􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀂􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀲􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀒􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀨
􀀺􀀰􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀆􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀂􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀂􀀓􀀪􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀭􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀒􀀲
􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀻􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀲􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀼􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀄􀀵􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀚􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀶􀀂􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀜􀀨􀀄􀀺􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀂􀀚
􀀇􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀚􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀂􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀈􀀚􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀂􀀽􀀕􀀉􀀑􀀑􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀑􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀦􀀂􀀆􀀭􀀎
􀀃􀀂􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀻􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀉􀀌􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀱􀀼􀀄􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀨
􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀪􀀍􀀂􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀪􀀇􀀉􀀭􀀉􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀄􀀘􀀕􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀉􀀑
􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀪􀀂􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀓􀀪􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀓􀀨
􀀺􀀾􀀂􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀇􀀂􀀪􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀽􀀕􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀭􀀆􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀪􀀈􀀕􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀲􀀂􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀎􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀋􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀱
􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀋􀀒􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀆􀀖􀀓􀀲􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀼􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀉􀀚
􀀵􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀚􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀶􀀂􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀜􀀨􀀄􀀺􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀓􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖
􀀪􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀒􀀒􀀑􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀜􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀕􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀪􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀌􀀍􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀱􀀼􀀄􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀨
􀀬􀀈􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀕􀀘􀀓􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀪􀀇􀀉􀀭􀀉􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀿􀀆􀀪􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍
􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀙􀀰􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀂􀀭􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀪􀀇􀀉􀀭􀀉􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀚􀀕􀀪􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀚􀀉􀀍􀀂􀀪􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀍􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂
􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀓􀀇􀀆􀀘􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀇􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀌􀀎􀀨
􀀺􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀉􀀖􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀈􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀘􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀪􀀦􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀕􀀋
􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀱􀀄􀀃􀀦􀀉􀀪􀀦􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀕􀀍􀀍􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀲􀀆􀀭􀀒􀀕􀀍􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀱􀀺􀀄􀀵􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀆􀀚􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀶􀀂􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀙􀀆􀀜􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀉􀀚􀀨
􀀺􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀁀􀀓􀀄􀀕􀀈􀀇􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀋􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀭􀀉􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀈􀀉􀀪􀀇
􀀉􀀖􀀚􀀂􀀲􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀃􀀦􀀉􀀪􀀦􀀄􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀕􀀈􀀇􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀲􀀕􀀍􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀚􀀎􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀒􀀑􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀺􀀄􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀨
􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀚􀀂􀀑􀀂􀀖􀀚􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀍􀀋􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀋􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀂􀀖
􀀆􀀈􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀪􀀦􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀬􀀙􀀰􀀨􀀄􀀬􀀚􀀚􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀋􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀂􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀚􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀉􀀲􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀚􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚
􀀂􀀽􀀕􀀉􀀑􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀨􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀚􀀂􀀑􀀂􀀖􀀚􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀂􀀚􀀧􀀄􀀦􀀇􀀇􀀑􀀧􀀝􀀝􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀨􀀚􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀌􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂􀀨􀀪􀀒􀀋
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀁􀀈􀀉􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀊􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀆􀀉􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀏􀀔
􀀄
􀀘􀀂􀀙􀀂􀀅􀀏􀀂􀀑􀀋􀀚􀀑􀀛􀀅􀀜􀀂􀀙􀀙􀀉􀀜􀀂􀀑􀀖􀀝􀀅􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀟􀀑􀀠􀀡􀀑􀀢􀀣􀀌􀀣􀀏􀀜􀀑􀀠􀀤􀀥􀀦
􀀠􀀝􀁁
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁂􀀠􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀠􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀭􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀋􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀈􀀲􀀩􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂
􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀳􀀍􀀆􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀚􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀄􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀒􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀓􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀆􀀓
􀀪􀀆􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀞􀀠􀀄􀀬􀀕􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀂􀀽􀀕􀀉􀀑􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀪􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀭􀀂
􀀖􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀎􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀖􀀂􀀇􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀲􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀍􀀒􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀨
􀀞􀀝􀁁
􀀄
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁂􀀞􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀞􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀈􀀲􀀩􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀑􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀍􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀳􀀍􀀆􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀚􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨
􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀍􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀌􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀭􀀂􀀦􀀉􀀪􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀦􀀉􀀪􀀦􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀎􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀇􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀈􀀉􀀂􀀓􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀉􀀓
􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀲􀀉􀀌􀀕􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀲􀀂􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀆􀀈􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀆􀀖􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀓􀀓􀀂􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀍􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀚􀀱
􀀉􀀖􀀚􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀇􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀜􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀋􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀕􀀍􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀘􀀕􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀈􀀚􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀨􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀓􀀎􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀜􀀂
􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀪􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀕􀀇􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀪􀀉􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀁃􀀕􀀦􀀆􀀖􀀓􀀜􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀖􀀿􀀕􀀖􀀪􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀆
􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀒􀀲􀀲􀀂􀀖􀀓􀀉􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀂􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀘􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀜􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀂􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀪􀀉􀀇􀀎􀀨
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁂􀀤􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂
􀀤􀀝􀁁
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀤􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀪􀀈􀀕􀀚􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀑􀀉􀀪􀀇􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀸􀀈􀀂􀀲􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀇􀀹􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀒􀀎􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀚􀀂
􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀔􀀒􀀓􀀇􀀒􀀭􀀩􀀒􀀖􀀩􀀴􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀐􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀤􀀠􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀍􀀄􀁁􀀟􀀄􀀜􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀋􀀂􀀇􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀲􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂
􀀴􀀒􀀭􀁄􀀦􀀆􀀖􀀓􀀜􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀪􀀍􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀨
􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀂􀀲􀀇􀀄􀀃􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀠􀀢􀀄􀁅􀀕􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀆􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀓􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀂􀀋􀀑􀀇􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓
􀀇􀀉􀀋􀀂􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀍􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀇􀀄􀀃􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀆􀀜􀀂􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀃􀀒􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀦􀀓􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀄􀀬􀀕􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀆􀀋􀀂
􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀋􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀋􀀒􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀒􀀖􀀖􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀍􀀌􀀒􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀕􀀪􀀜􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀚
􀀆􀀪􀀪􀀒􀀋􀀋􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀈􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀄􀀪􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀂􀀖􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀋􀀕􀀈􀀇􀀉􀀑􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀂􀀖􀀪􀀆􀀋􀀑􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆
􀀦􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨􀀄􀀷􀀆􀀖􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀑􀀈􀀒􀀎􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀲􀀂􀀃
􀀜􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀋􀀂􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀘􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀇􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀖􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀕􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀇􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀉􀀆􀀈􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀦􀀂􀀈􀀋
􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀦􀀩􀀘􀀆􀀪􀀜􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀉􀀇􀀓􀀨􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀌􀀖􀀉􀀲􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀋􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀪􀀒􀀋􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀆􀀲􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚
􀀦􀀂􀀈􀀉􀀪􀀒􀀑􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀲􀀉􀀂􀀈􀀚􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀒􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂 􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀨􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀕􀀖􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀖􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀪􀀍􀀆􀀲􀀇􀀄􀀍􀀒􀀕􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀪􀀍􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖
􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀓􀀑􀀆􀀪􀀂􀀨
􀀅􀀒􀀋􀀂􀀄􀀂􀀽􀀕􀀉􀀑􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀆􀀪􀀍􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀂􀀽􀀕􀀉􀀑
􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨􀀄􀁆􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀋􀀒􀀖􀀇􀀦􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀓􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀦􀀂􀀆􀀭􀀎
􀀂􀀽􀀕􀀉􀀑􀀋􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀋􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀜􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀋􀀒􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀭􀀂􀀦􀀉􀀪􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀇􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀋􀀕􀀈􀀇􀀉􀀑􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀍􀀒􀀪􀀜􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀖􀀪􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀓􀀨􀀄􀀬􀀉􀀍􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀲􀀂􀀖􀀓􀀂
􀀓􀀎􀀓􀀇􀀂􀀋􀀓􀀄􀀦􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀈􀀓􀀒􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀂􀀖􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀂􀀭􀀂􀀖􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀈􀀈􀀒􀀃􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀚􀀒􀀃􀀖􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀷􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀆􀀉􀀍􀀈􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀲􀀈􀀉􀀌􀀦􀀇
􀀷􀀫􀀠􀀣􀀨
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁂􀀥􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂
􀀥􀀝􀁁
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀥􀀱􀀄􀀪􀀆􀀑􀀇􀀕􀀍􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀞􀀤􀀄􀁅􀀕􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀞􀀟􀀠􀀥􀀱􀀄􀀚􀀂􀀑􀀉􀀪􀀇􀀓􀀄􀀃􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀘􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀐􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀠􀁁􀀤􀀋􀀋􀀄􀀞􀀅􀀠􀀢􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀈􀀲􀀩􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚
􀀌􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀳􀀕􀀎􀀘􀀎􀀓􀀦􀀂􀀭􀀒􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀕􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀥􀀄􀀋􀀉􀀈􀀂􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀡􀀨􀁁􀀄􀀜􀀉􀀈􀀒􀀋􀀂􀀇􀀍􀀂􀀓􀀱􀀄􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂
􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀘􀀒􀀍􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀱􀀄􀀖􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀭􀀉􀀈􀀈􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀗􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀭􀀒􀀖􀀎􀀉􀀄􀁇􀀦􀀒􀀭􀀇􀀂􀀖􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀍􀀇􀀦􀀱􀀄􀀚􀀉􀀍􀀂􀀪􀀇􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀚􀀓
􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀸􀀓􀀂􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀍􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀚􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀹􀀨􀀄􀀅􀀂􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁁􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀭􀀉􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀃􀀦􀀂􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀕􀀖􀀓
􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀕􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀨
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁂􀁁􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀭􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀴􀀉􀀌􀀉􀀇􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀶􀀈􀀒􀀘􀀂
􀀊􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀁁􀀄􀀓􀀦􀀒􀀃􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀉􀀚􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀭􀀂􀀍􀀭􀀉􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀪􀀈􀀕􀀚􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀉􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀈􀀲􀀩􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀈􀀈􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀌􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀲􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀄􀀥􀀨􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀇􀀂
􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀒􀀍􀀇􀀦􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀚􀀉􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀄􀀒􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀆􀀌􀀂􀀱􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀚􀀄􀀍􀀂􀀋􀀂􀀋􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀒􀀍􀀉􀀂􀀖􀀇􀀆􀀇􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀨􀀄􀀊􀀇􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀍
􀀇􀀦􀀆􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀍􀀒􀀋􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀈􀀒􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀒􀀖􀀱􀀄􀀉􀀇􀀄􀀃􀀒􀀕􀀈􀀚􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀋􀀑􀀒􀀓􀀓􀀉􀀘􀀈􀀂􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀙􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀲􀀉􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀨􀀄􀀙􀀦􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀉􀀓􀀄􀀪􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀎􀀄􀀁􀀰􀀙􀀄􀀆􀀖
􀀂􀀐􀀂􀀍􀀪􀀉􀀓􀀂􀁈􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀄􀀌􀀕􀀖􀀓􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀄􀀘􀀂􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀕􀀓􀀂􀀚􀀄􀀇􀀒􀀄􀀓􀀕􀀑􀀑􀀒􀀍􀀇􀀄􀀓􀀂􀀑􀀆􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀓􀀇􀀄􀀲􀀒􀀍􀀪􀀂􀀓􀀄􀀒􀀑􀀂􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀉􀀖􀀌􀀄􀀉􀀖􀀄􀀇􀀦􀀂􀀄􀀇􀀂􀀍􀀍􀀉􀀇􀀒􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀒􀀲􀀄􀀛􀀜􀀍􀀆􀀉􀀖􀀂􀀨
􀁁􀀝􀁁

Annex 366
NATO, NATO Standard, AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (April 2016)

Annex 367
NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping (undated)

1
􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁏􀁎􀁄􀁑􀁖
For more than five years, Russian and NATO soldiers
have worked together in NATO-led peacekeeping
operations in the Balkans, initially in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and later in Kosovo as well. Over the
years, this on-going partnership has gone from
strength to strength as Russian and NATO
peacekeepers have together risen to the challenge of
restoring stability and bringing peace to this troubled
part of the world, forging increasingly durable
relationships in the process. Relations and mutual
understanding between Russian and NATO troops on
the ground — many of whom patrol, live and serve
together in complex and difficult circumstances —
have continued to improve.
Russia contributes by far the largest non-NATO
contingent to the NATO-led peacekeeping forces.
Russian troops make up some 1,200 of the 20,000
􀀱􀀤􀀷􀀲􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀝
􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊
peacekeepers in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some 3,150 of the more
than 40,000 deployed in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in
Kosovo and neighbouring countries. Moreover, as a
result of linguistic, cultural and religious affinities,
Russian peacekeepers have brought an additional
dimension to both SFOR and KFOR and have been
able to play an especially important role.
Russian peacekeepers have accomplished their
missions with military professionalism, discipline
and even-handedness, and are working closely with
the other NATO and non-NATO militaries deployed
in the Balkans. In addition to bringing peace and
stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the
Balkan peacekeeping missions have enabled Russian
and NATO militaries to build a greater understanding
of one another and make significant advances in
interoperability. Over the months and years in both
SFOR and KFOR, Russian and NATO peacekeepers
Partners in peacekeeping: Russian and NATO soldiers have worked together in the Balkans for more than five years.
2
have developed techniques and procedures that
should enable their forces to work effectively together
in complex and difficult situations in the future.
Russian peacekeepers serving in the Balkans have
had the opportunity to get to know how NATO works
and acts. In this way, they have seen for themselves
that NATO is a transparent alliance, dealing with a
wide range of complex issues and happy to work with
and consult partner countries to build durable
solutions. As changes in regime in both Croatia and
Yugoslavia improve the prospects for peace
throughout the Balkans, Russia and NATO have a
special responsibility to seize these new
opportunities. Moreover, the experience of working
together in SFOR and KFOR provides an excellent
basis from which Russia and NATO can develop
further military-to-military cooperation.
􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁎􀁈􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖
Russian diplomacy helped end the conflicts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Kosovo and create the
conditions for the establishment of SFOR and KFOR.
The terms of Russia’s participation in both
peacekeeping missions recognise the importance of
the country’s contribution to the peace settlements.
They are different to those of every other partner
nation and are regulated by special agreements.
An agreement governing the command and control
relationship between the Russian brigade and NATO
in SFOR, jointly developed by senior US and Russian
officials, was approved by the North Atlantic
Council, NATO’s supreme decision-making body, in
November 1995. Under the terms of this historic
agreement, a Russian general, based at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) in
Mons, Belgium, serves as a Special Deputy to the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR),
responsible for advising SACEUR on all matters
concerning Russia’s participation in SFOR. Russian
peacekeepers in SFOR’s Multinational Division
North (MND North) receive their orders and
instructions from SACEUR through the Russian
Deputy, and are under the tactical control of the US
general in charge of MND North for day-to-day
operations. The Russian general works out strategic
􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀀩􀀲􀀵
A brigade of Russian peacekeepers has been based in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the US sector, Multinational Division
North, since January 1996. Currently numbering some 1,200 airborne troops, the brigade has an area of responsibility
covering 1,750 kilometres and including 75 kilometres of the inter-entity boundary line, running between the predominantly
Croat and Muslim Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska.
About 30 US soldiers are permanently stationed at the Russian brigade’s headquarters in Ugljevik, living, eating and
sleeping in identical conditions
to their Russian colleagues,
and a dozen or so
Russian soldiers are permanently
stationed at the
Multinational Division
North headquarters near
Tuzla. Russian and
American soldiers patrol
together and both sides
say that their cooperation
in SFOR has been a unique
and positive learning
experience. The achievement
of NATO-Russian
cooperation in SFOR was
recognised in The NATORussia
Founding Act, the
1997 agreement between
Russia and the Atlantic
Alliance.
0 50 100
0 31 62
Croatia
Montenegro
Serbia
Mostar
Sarajevo
Bihac
Banja Luka
Brcko
Ugljevik
Tuzla
Km
Miles
© Olivier Neola
Republika Srpska
Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina
3
and operational issues with SACEUR and the SHAPE
staff. Meanwhile, the commander of the Russian
brigade on the ground in Bosnia coordinates day-today
operations with the US general commanding
MND North.
The terms of Russia’s participation in KFOR are
governed by an agreement worked out in Helsinki in
June 1999. Under this agreement, Russian
peacekeepers are deployed in three sectors, in the USled
Multinational Brigade East, the French-led
Multinational Brigade North and the German-led
Multinational Brigade South. The Russian general at
SHAPE is therefore, at the same time, the deputy to
SACEUR responsible for Russian participation in
SFOR and the representative of the Russian Ministry
of Defence for Russian KFOR matters.
􀀰􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖
Both SFOR and KFOR are seeking to build a security
environment in which all citizens, irrespective of their
ethnic origins, can live in peace and, with
international aid, democracy can begin to grow. Both
peacekeeping missions include contingents from both
NATO and partner countries.
SFOR is the legal successor to IFOR, the
Implementation Force, which deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in December 1995 in the wake of the
Dayton Agreement, the peace accord ending the
Bosnian War. IFOR had a one-year mandate to
oversee implementation of the military aspects of the
peace agreement — bringing about and maintaining
an end to hostilities; separating the armed forces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two entities, the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska;
overseeing the transfer of territory between the two
entities, according to the peace agreement; and
moving the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into
approved storage sites.
Preserving a secure environment remains SFOR’s
core mission, but as conditions within Bosnia and
Herzegovina have improved, SFOR has been able to
assist civilian implementation of the peace
agreement. Today, SFOR figures actively in efforts to
help refugees and displaced persons return to their
homes and is working on ways of reforming the
Bosnian military — currently divided into three
ethnically based, rival armies (Bosnian Muslim, Croat
and Serb) — in such a way as to avert any prospect of
renewed conflict. UN Security Council Resolution
􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀮􀀩􀀲􀀵
Currently numbering some
3,150, the Russian contingent
is composed of airborne
forces. According to the terms
of a June 1999 agreement,
they are deployed in three
sectors in the US-led
Multinational Brigade East, in
the French-led Multinational
Brigade North, and in the
German-led Multinational
Brigade South. Russia also
has significant responsibilities
at Slatina airport, near
Pristina, working together
with NATO forces, and
Russian representatives are
located at KFOR headquarters.
American, French and German
soldiers are attached to
Russian units and vice versa
to ensure smooth communication
and cooperation.
0 25 50
0 15.5 31
* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutuional name
Montenegro
Serbia
Albania
The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia*
Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
Pec
Mitrovica
Prizren
Gnjilane
Slatina Airport
Pristina
Km
Miles
© Olivier Neola
4
􀀸􀀶􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖
General Wesley Clark, then
Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, presented US
medals to five Russian
peacekeepers in December
1999. The soldiers, all from
the Russian 13th Tactical
Group which was then based
in KFOR’s Multinational
Brigade East, put their lives
at risk to rescue an American
colleague who had stepped
on a mine. In spite of great
personal danger, the Russian
soldiers entered an area
known to be mined, administered
emergency first aid and
helped evacuate the severely
wounded sergeant to a US
field hospital.
1088 of December 1996 gives SFOR a UN mandate
not just to maintain peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but also, where necessary, to enforce it. As the
security situation has improved, the number of troops
has been reduced. The current level of about 20,000
is significantly lower than the 32,000 deployed
between December 1996 and November 1999, and
only a third of the 60,000 deployed in IFOR. All 19
NATO and 13 partner countries contribute personnel
to SFOR.
KFOR deployed in June 1999 in accordance with UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 and a Military-
Technical Agreement with the Yugoslav Army. Its
responsibilities include deterring renewed hostility
and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb
forces; establishing a secure environment and
ensuring public safety and order; demilitarising the
Kosovo Liberation Army, the Kosovar Albanian
military; supporting the international humanitarian
effort; and coordinating with, and supporting, the
international civil presence, the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
KFOR’s 40,000 plus troops come from all 19 NATO
member states as well as 18 partner countries. They
conduct between 500 and 750 patrols every day,
guard more than 550 key sites, and man more than
200 vehicle checkpoints. KFOR is helping build the
Kosovo Protection Corps, a local civil-emergency
force, which will in time be accountable to the
province’s democratically elected leadership. KFOR
troops also patrol Kosovo’s borders and internal
boundary with Serbia and man eight crossing points.
OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS
NATO
B-1110 Brussels
Belgium
Fax : 32-(0)2-707 1252
E-Mail : [email protected]
HTTP : //WWW.NATO.INT/
This text is not a formally agreed NATO document and, therefore, does not necessarily represent
the official views of individual member governments on all policy issues discussed.
Annex 368
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-484-1964 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(28 July 2014)

Unofficial translation
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
# 72/22-484-1964
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and deems it necessary to state the
following.
The Ukrainian Side has sent repeated demarches, protests and diplomatic notes to
the Russian Side regarding the facts of terrorism and other crimes falling under the 1999
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Just
recently, notes #610/22-110-1833 dated 23.07.2014, #610/22-110-1827 dated
22.07.2014, #610/22-110-1805 dated 17.07.2014, #610/22-110-1804 dated 17.07.2014,
#610/22-110-1798 dated 16.07.2014, #610/22-110-1695 dated 04.07.2014, #610/22-
110-1592 dated 21.06.2014 informed about the international illegal acts.
The Ukrainian Side informs that in view of the above-mentioned facts, units of
the Security Service of Ukraine and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine opened
criminal proceedings, in particular, based on crimes provided for in Section IX of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine, which established criminal responsibility, inter alia, for
terrorism financing.
The Ukrainian Side states that circumstances established in the course of the said
criminal proceedings, as well as other facts available, demonstrate that the actions by the
Russian Side, including by citizens of the Russian Federation, are directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and willfully aimed at provision or collection of funds with the intention that
they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out terrorism as prohibited according to the said Convention.
The Ukrainian Side also declares that inactivity and absence of any reaction of the
Russian Side with regard to the facts embodied in the said notes represent violation of
international legal obligations of the Russian Side.
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖
􀀲􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
The Ukrainian Side stresses that under the 1999 International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism the Russian Side must take measures as
necessary in accordance with its domestic legislation in order to investigate the facts
contained in the information provided by the Ukrainian Side, as well as conduct criminal
prosecution of persons related to the financing of terrorism.
In this regard, the Ukrainian Side proposes the Ukrainian Side to conduct
negotiations on the interpretation and implementation of the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, in particular, as regards the
unfaltering fulfillment of the obligations of the Russian Federation under that
international treaty.
Kyiv, July 28, 2014
Annex 369
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12 August
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Unofficial translation
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
# 72/22-620-2087
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and has the honor to make a
statement about offences in the context of the 2000 International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the Convention,
committed by citizens of the Russian Federation and legal entities registered and/or
located in its territory.
Article 2 of the Convention provides that any person commits an offence within
the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be
used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out,
inter alia, any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.
In this regard, the Ukrainian side once again states that, from March 2014,
terrorist organizations “Donetsk People’s Republic”, hereinafter referred to as the DPR,
and “Lugansk People’s Republic”, hereinafter referred to as the LPR, have been
operating illegally in the territory of Ukraine; they intentionally and consciously carry
out in the territory of Ukraine terrorist acts aimed at intimidation of population, killing
of civilian population, causing grave bodily injury to civilian population, seizure of
hostages and administrative buildings of state and local authorities in order to compel
the Ukrainian Government to do acts aimed at toppling constitutional order in Ukraine,
recognition of the terrorist organizations, and other acts that threaten Ukraine’s
territorial integrity and security.
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖
􀀲􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
In this context, we inform that the Ukrainian side has evidence of participation of
citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation in the carrying out of offences
identified in Article 2 of the Convention. Based on the available evidence, which are not
limited to the facts below and information on acts that led to initiation of relevant
proceedings and pre-trial investigation by the Ukrainian side, we bring the following to
the notice of the Russian side the following.
On May 30, 2014, in the vicinity of the state border of Ukraine with the Russian
Federation in the area of responsibility of Dyakove border guard unit, Kuligina O.I., a
citizen of the Russian Federation, consciously, illegally and intentionally took part in the
loading of weapons and ammunition, smuggled from the territory of the Russian
Federation to the territory of Ukraine, to GAZel truck, for the purpose of their use by
terrorist organizations of DPR and LPR in order to carry out the said terrorist acts that
represent offences under the Convention and treaties listed in the Annex thereto.
According to the information available to the Ukrainian side, citizens of the
Russian Federation Zhukovsky Olexandr Grygorovych, born on September 12, 1986,
resident of Saint Petersburg, and Rayevsky Anton Arkadiyovych, born on March 11,
1985 in the city of Bolkhov, Oryol Oblast, consciously, illegally and intentionally took
part in the operations of terrorist organization of DPR, and conducted acts aimed at
provision and collection of funds with the intention that they should be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be used to carry out terrorist activity of DPR in the territory
of Ukraine. In particular, the said individuals maintain their own pages in Vkontakte
social network (http://vk.com/juchkovsky, 􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁙􀁎􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀒􀈺􀉧􀉬􀉨􀉧􀁂􀉊􀉚􀉟􀉜􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣),
which contain personal data, photo and video materials that evidence that these
individuals directly and/or indirectly, illegally and intentionally conduct in the territory
of the Russian Federation acts aimed at collection of funds with the intention or in the
knowledge that they should be used (provided), fully or partially, to procure weapons,
ammunition or other military equipment and means for their use by terrorist
organizations in the territory of Ukraine for the purpose of carrying out the
abovementioned terrorist acts that represent offences under the Convention and treaties
listed in the Annex thereto.
It is also established that citizens of the Russian Federation Melkov Olexiy
Valeriyovych, Pyletska Olga Volodymyrivna, Kutyumova Tetyana Mykhailivna,
Yaralov Dmytro Olexiyovych and Ovsyannikova Ganna Volodymyrivna carry out
financing of terrorism in the territory of Ukraine and systematically, consciously and
intentionally transfer funds for this purpose using Kolibri and Zolota Korona payment
systems to the accounts opened in PAT Bank Kredyt Dnipro (MFO 305749) and PAT
Terra Bank (MFO 306801). The said funds are transferred to Saralpova Laura, a citizen
of the Russian Federation, who receives them in cash over the counters of the said bank
institutions. In such manner, between March 1, 2013 and February 1, 2014, the said
citizen obtained funds from abroad in the total amount over 150 million Russian rubles.
According to the information available to the Ukrainian side, these funds are used, fully
or partially, to procure weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and means
for the purpose of their use by terrorist organizations in the territory of Ukraine for the
purpose of carrying out the abovementioned terrorist acts that represent offences under
the Convention and treaties listed in the Annex thereto.
In addition, according to the information available to the Ukrainian side, the
following citizens of the Russian Federation take active part in the financing of terrorist
activity in the territory of Ukraine: Malofeyev Kostyantyn, founder of Marshal Capital
investment fund and co-owner of VAT Rostelecom, Bushmakov Dmytro, owner of
forum at http://antikvariat.ru, and Salakhutdinov Kostyantyn, born on February 27,
1983. The said individuals directly and/or indirectly, illegally and intentionally conduct
acts aimed at collection of funds with the intention or in the knowledge that they should
be used (provided), fully or partially, to procure weapons, ammunition or other military
equipment and means for their use by terrorist organizations in the territory of Ukraine
for the purpose of carrying out the abovementioned terrorist acts that represent offences
under the Convention and treaties listed in the Annex thereto.
Article 5 of the Convention provides that each State Party, in accordance with its
domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity
located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity,
committed an offence set forth in Article 2.
Proceeding from the requirements of the Convention, the Ukrainian side has
established several facts evidencing the participation of legal entities, registered in the
territory of the Russian Federation or operating in the territory of Ukraine occupied by
the Russian Federation contrary to the basic norms and principles of international law, in
the financing of terrorist organizations in the territory of Ukraine. In particular,
electronic wallets that were created to finance the terrorist activity of DPR and LPR in
the territory of Ukraine, and are used to transfer money from the territory of the Russian
Federation (Yandex: 410012230108475, WebMoney: R218190032954,
R361724168952, R108809709974) were identified. Cards that are used to direct funds
for the financing of terrorist organizations in the territory of Ukraine (Sberbank RF card
(VISA) 4276 4100 1211 9997; card number 6762 8038 8923 1835 34 emitted by OAO
Sberbank Rosii) were identified. Information was obtained about the collection of funds
by activists of Liberation Movement Russian Sector – Ukraine for the financing of
terrorist organizations in the territory of Ukraine (Beneficiary bank Sberbank Rosii,
RCBIC 044525225, corresponding account 30101810400000000225 Operations
Department Moscow, tax payer number 7707083893, tax registration reason code
775003035, Russian Classification of Objects of Administrative-Territorial Divisions
45286580000, beneficiary: Khyzhnyak Sergey Igorevich, account number 4082 0810
6382 6060 0708.
According to the information available to the Ukrainian side, the Coordination
Center for Assistance to Novorossia, which has its representative offices in the Russian
Federation (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Irkutsk) is one of the centers of financing and
provision of assistance to the operations of terrorist organizations in the territory of
Ukraine. The said organization uses accounts and electronic payment system identifiers
opened in the name of Markov Olexiy Gennadiyovych.
The Ukrainian side states that the abovementioned acts and facts demonstrate the
commitment of offences under the Convention by individuals and legal entities of the
Russian Federation.
In this regard, the Ukrainian side calls on the Russian side to take all practically
possible measures to:
􀁸 establish its jurisdiction over the individuals and legal entities related to
offences as demonstrated by the facts provided (Article 7 of the Convention);
􀁸 identify, detect and freeze or seize any funds used or allocated for the purpose
of committing the offences as demonstrated by the facts provided (Article 8 of
the Convention);
􀁸 investigate the facts provided (Article 9 of the Convention);
􀁸 prohibit in the territory of the Russian Federation illegal activities of persons
and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in
the commission of offences as demonstrated by the facts provided (Article 18
of the Convention);
􀁸 require financial institutions and other professions involved in the financing of
terrorist operations in the territory of Ukraine to utilize the most efficient
measures available for the identification of their usual or occasional customers,
as well as customers in whose interest accounts are opened, and to pay special
attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report transactions
suspected of stemming from a criminal activity (Article 18 of the Convention).
The Ukrainian side turns the attention of the Russian side to its international legal
obligations regarding cooperation to prevent the offenses identified in the Article 2 of
the Convention, and, proceeding from its deep concern with the escalation of terrorist
acts in all its forms and displays in Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts, requests to inform the
Ukrainian side as soon as possible about steps taken by the Russian side in the
framework of fulfillment of its international legal obligations and to provide the greatest
measure of assistance, including assistance in obtaining additional evidence in the
possession of the Russian side necessary for the investigation of the abovementioned
facts (Articles 12 and 18 of the Convention).
Kyiv, August 12, 2014

Annex 370
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2185 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (22 August
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Unofficial translation
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
#72/22-620-2185
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and in addition to its verbal
note #72/22-484-1964 dated 28 July 2014 and #72/22-620-2087 dated 12 August
2014 deems it necessary to once again make a statement about facts demonstrating
the offences described in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the Convention, committed
on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or by citizens of the Russian
Federation.
Article 2 of the Convention provides that any person commits an offence
within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds (assets of every
kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable) with the intention
that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in
part, in order to carry out, inter alia, any other act intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part
in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
In this regard, the Ukrainian side once again states that, from March 2014,
terrorist organizations “Donetsk People’s Republic”, hereinafter referred to as the
DPR, and “Lugansk People’s Republic”, hereinafter referred to as the LPR, have
been operating illegally in the territory of Ukraine; they intentionally and
consciously carry out in the territory of Ukraine terrorist acts aimed at intimidation
of population, killing of civilian population, causing grave bodily injury to civilian
population, seizure of hostages and administrative buildings of state and local
authorities, provoking of an armed conflict in order to compel the Ukrainian
Government to do acts aimed at changing constitutional order in Ukraine and its
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖
􀀲􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
territorial boundaries, and other acts that threaten Ukraine’s territorial integrity and
security.
In this context, we inform that the Ukrainian side has evidence that
unidentified individuals by unlawful means, directly or indirectly, intentionally
move military equipment from the territory of the Russian Federation to the
territory of Ukraine, carry out financing of military training of terrorists, provide
logistical support to terrorists, and send terrorists to the territory of Ukraine for the
purpose of taking part in the terrorist activity of DPR and LPR. Based on the
available information, which is not limited to the facts and circumstances below
regarding acts that led to initiation of relevant investigation by the Ukrainian side,
we bring to the notice of the Russian side the following.
On 14 August 2014, The Guardian’s correspondent Shaun Walker and The
Telegraph’s Roland Oliphant became witnesses to the crossing of the Ukraine-
Russia border from the territory of the Russian Federation by a column of combat
vehicles carrying official Russian plates that included at least 23 armored
personnel carriers and military trucks.
The above information was confirmed also by the operative data of
Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Center headquarters according to which it was established
that a column of armored personnel carriers and Ural military trucks had crossed
the state border of Ukraine.
The next day, 15 August 2014, the so-called Prime Minister of DPR
O.Zakharchenko in his statement at a DPR meeting
(http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1380942-echo/ confirmed the above
information and acknowledged the circumstances described therein. In particular,
O.Zakharchenko said that as of 15 August 2014 ‘they had reserves of 150 combat
vehicles, including 30 tanks, as well as 1200 fighters who had trained four months
on the territory of the Russian Federation’.
The Ukrainian side has all grounds to state that the above information
testifies to the fact that unidentified individuals, acting on the territory of the
Russian Federation, by permission and/or support and/or in the knowledge of
bodies of government of the Russian Federation, directly or indirectly, unlawfully
and intentionally provide or collect funds with the intention that they should be
used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry
out military training of terrorists, hire mercenaries, provide them with logistical
support, procure and move combat vehicles, weapons and terrorists into Ukraine’s
territory.
The Ukrainian side states that relocation from the territory of the Russian
Federation of combat vehicles, provision of funds for military training of terrorists
and logistical support thereof, as well as sending of terrorists, combat vehicles and
weapons from the territory of the Russian Federation into the territory of Ukraine
for the purpose of taking part in the terrorist activity of DPR and LPR are acts that
constitute elements of an offence within the meaning of this Convention.
In this regard, the Ukrainian side calls on the Russian side to take all
practically possible measures to:
􀁸 establish its jurisdiction over the individuals and legal entities related to
offences as demonstrated by the facts provided (Article 7 of the
Convention);
􀁸 identify, detect and freeze or seize any funds used or allocated for the
purpose of committing the offences as demonstrated by the facts
provided (Article 8 of the Convention);
􀁸 investigate the facts provided (Article 9 of the Convention);
􀁸 prohibit in the territory of the Russian Federation illegal activities of
persons and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize
or engage in the commission of offences as demonstrated by the facts
provided (Article 18 of the Convention).
The Ukrainian side invites the attention of the Russian side to its
international legal obligations regarding the cooperation to prevent the offenses
identified in the Article 2 of the Convention, and, proceeding from its deep concern
with the escalation of terrorist acts in all their forms and displays in Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, requests to inform the Ukrainian side as soon as
possible about steps taken by the Russian side in the framework of fulfillment of
its international legal obligations and to provide the greatest measure of assistance,
including assistance in obtaining additional evidence in the possession of the
Russian side necessary for the investigation of the abovementioned facts (Articles
12 and 18 of the Convention).
Kyiv, 22 August 2014

Annex 371
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Unofficial translation
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
# 72/22-620-2221
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and in addition to the Notes
number 72/22-484-1964 of July 28, 2014, 72/22-620-2087 of August 12, 2014 and Note
number 72/22-620-2185 of August 22, 2014, considers it necessary to make a statement
about offences in the context of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the Convention, committed by
citizens of the Russian Federation and legal entities registered and/or located in its
territory.
Article 2 of the Convention provides that any person who commits an offense
under this Convention if by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
intentionally provides funds (assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible,
movable or immovable) or conducts their collection with the intention that they will be
used or in the knowledge that they will be used in whole or in part, to commit, inter alia,
any other act intended to cause death of any civilian or any other person who is not
actively involved in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or cause her grievous
bodily harm, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context is to intimidate
a population or compel a government or an international organization to do any act or
refrain from it.
In this regard, the Ukrainian Side once again makes a statement that since March
2014 there are illegal terrorist organizations "Donetsk People's Republic" (hereinafter -
"DNR") and "Lugansk People's Republic" (hereinafter - the "LNR") in Ukraine who
intentionally and knowingly committed on the territory of Ukraine terrorist attacks
aimed at intimidating the population, killing civilians, causing them grievous bodily
harm, hostage-taking and occupation of administrative buildings of state and local
government, provoking a military conflict to force the Ukrainian Government to act
aimed at changing the constitutional order, territorial structure and other actions that
threaten the territorial integrity and national security of Ukraine.
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖
􀀲􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
In this context, we announce that the Ukrainian Side has information that indicates
the participation of citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation in the crimes
defined in Article 2 of the Convention.
Based on the available information presented below, that is not limited to facts
and circumstances of the act, which Ukrainian party investigates, we bring to the
attention of the Russian Side the following.
The information, which is available for Ukrainian Side, indicates a conscious,
deliberate and illegal participation in the financing of terrorist activities on the territory
of Ukraine the following citizens of Russian Federation:
• Andrei Gennadiyevich Lazarchuk, born 02/06/1958, using the card No. 6761
9600 0480 6606 issued by OJSC "Sberbank of Russia";
• Nina Igorevna Lotysh, using card No. 4524 3402 8121 9690 issued by OJSC
"Sberbank of Russia";
• Vadim Yuriyevich Kunayev, born 11/30/1977, using the account No. 4276 3800
9734 2310, opened in PJSC "Subsidiary Bank of Sberbank of Russia".
Article 5 of the Convention provides that each state – participant of the
Convention in accordance with the principles of its domestic legal measures in order to
be able to bring legal entity located on its territory or organized under its laws to liability
in case of person responsible for the management of the entity or control of it, in that
capacity, committed an offense referred to Article 2 of the Convention.
Based on the requirements of the Convention Ukrainian Side established a number
of facts that confirm the participation of legal entities registered in the Russian
Federation in the financing of terrorist organizations in Ukraine. In particular, the data
confirms the financing of terrorist organizations "DNR" and "LNR" on the territory of
Ukraine through accounts opened in Russian bank OJSC "Sberbank of Russia" and its
100% subsidiary bank in Ukraine PJSC "Subsidiary Bank of Sberbank of Russia".
In particular, PJSC "Subsidiary Bank of Sberbank of Russia" issued bank cards, which
were used to cash funds with the intention or in the knowledge to finance the terrorist
acts mentioned above, which constitute an offense under the Convention and treaties
listed in the Annex to it, with the numbers: 4524 3402 2066 5169, 4276 8520 2945
1583, 5469 5200 1521 3218, 6761 9600 0064 9159 79 6761 9600 0473 0324 65 4276
3800 7124 2122, 4276 3800 7124 2122, 4276 5200 1124 6069.
PJSC "Subsidiary Bank of Sberbank of Russia" has opened for Tatiana
Mykhailovna Azarova the account No. 26204000938850 and card account No.
26259000938850, which knowingly, unlawfully and intentionally used by the mentioned
person to raise funds used to finance terrorist activities on the territory of Ukraine. With
the same purpose, the funds are used from the card No. 6762 8038 8923 1835 34 issued
by OJSC "Sberbank of Russia" (Russian Federation).
Financing of terrorist organizations is also provided through the accounts of the
payment system of the Russian company JSC NKO "Yandex.Money» No.
410011081905147,410012278488127 and 410012032729068.
The Ukrainian Side states that the above acts and facts prove the commission of
individuals and legal entities of the Russian Federation crimes within the context of the
Convention. In this regard, the Ukrainian Side urges the Russian Side to take all
practically possible measures to:
• to establish jurisdiction over the individuals and entities involved in crimes,
which prove the above facts (Article 7 of the Convention);
• identify, detect and freeze or seize any funds used or allocated for the purpose of
committing the offences as demonstrated by the facts provided (Article 8 of the
Convention);
• to investigate the facts provided (Article 9 of the Convention);
• to prohibit on the territory of the Russian Federation illegal activities of persons
and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the
commission of offences as demonstrated by the facts provided (Article 18 of the
Convention);
• commitment to the above financial institutions and other organizations
participating in the financing of terrorist activities on the territory of Ukraine, to take the
most effective of existing measures to identify their regular or occasional customers as
well as customers in whose accounts are opened, and pay special attention to unusual
suspicious transactions and report transactions that may be related to criminal activity
(Article 18 of the Convention).
The Ukrainian Side turns the attention of the Russian Side to its international legal
obligations regarding cooperation to prevent the offenses identified in the Article 2 of
the Convention, and, proceeding from its deep concern with the escalation of terrorist
acts in all its forms and displays in Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts, requests to inform the
Ukrainian Side as soon as possible about steps taken by the Russian Side in the
framework of fulfillment of its international legal obligations and to provide the greatest
measure of assistance, including assistance in obtaining additional evidence in the
possession of the Russian Side necessary for the investigation of the abovementioned
facts (Articles 12 and 18 of the Convention).
Kyiv, August 29, 2014
Annex 372
Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2529 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(10 October 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
Unofficial translation
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
# 72/22-620-2529
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and in addition to
Diplomatic Notes # 72/22-484-1964 dated 28 July 2014, # 72/22-620-2087 dated
12 August 2014, # 72/22-620-2185 dated 22 August 2014, # 72/22-620-2221 dated
29 August 2014, # 72/22-620-2406 dated 24 September 2014, and # 72/22-620-
2495 dated 7 October 2014, has the honor to make a statement about offences
within the meaning of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the Convention, committed by
the Russian Side.
Article 2 of the Convention provides that any person commits an offence
within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides funds – assets of every kind, whether
tangible or intangible, movable or immovable – realizes, organizes, directs or
facilitates a collection of funds with the intention that they should be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out, inter
alia, any act intended to cause death to a civilian, or to any other person not taking
an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause serious
bodily injury to such person when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context,
is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
In this regard, the Ukrainian Side states once again that, from March 2014,
terrorist organizations “Donetsk People’s Republic”, hereinafter referred to as the
DPR, and “Luhansk People’s Republic”, hereinafter referred to as the LPR, have
been operating illegally in the territory of Ukraine: they intentionally and
consciously carry out in the territory of Ukraine terrorist acts aimed at intimidation
of population, killing of civilian population, causing grave bodily injury to civilian
population, seizure of hostages and administrative buildings of state and local
authorities, instigating a military conflict in order to compel the Government of
Ukraine to do acts aimed at toppling constitutional order in Ukraine, territorial
2
system, and at other actions that threaten Ukraine’s territorial integrity and
security.
In this regard, the Ukrainian Side declares that, by acting through its
government bodies, authorized persons, legal entities and individuals which are
authorized to fulfill public functions, terrorist organizations which act under the
instruction and control of the Russian Side, the Russian Federation commits
offences within the meaning of the Convention.
The position of the Ukrainian Side proceeds from the assumption that, using
unlawful means, directly or indirectly, intentionally, the Russian Side sends
military weaponry, finances training of terrorists within its own territory, as well as
in the territory of Ukraine, supplies them with materials, transports them in the
territory of Ukraine in order to take in the terrorist activity of the DPR and LPR
etc.
International wrongful acts of the Russian Side and/or acts of the terrorist
organizations, which operate under the control and direction of the Russian
Federation, are confirmed, inter alia, by facts and circumstances as follows.
According to operational information of the Headquarters of the Anti-
Terrorist Center of Ukraine, within the end of September – the beginning of
October 2014, there were documented multiple illegal transfers of military
weaponry and goods across the state border of Ukraine from the territory of Rostov
region of the Russian Federation; those weaponry and goods are designated for
logistical support of DPR’s and LPR’s units which use them against forces
involved in the Anti-terrorist operation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
Ukraine, in particular:
1) on 16 August 2014:
- 50 armored personnel carriers, 30 curtain-sided military trucks, two
GAZ-66 trucks, and one UAZ vehicle near the border crossing
checkpoint “Izvaryne”;
- three BM-21 “Grad” multiple launch rocket systems accompanied by two
buses and five tanks near the village of Dibrovka;
2) on between 4 and 9 October 2014:
- a column of three tanks and three military trucks near the town of
Novoazovsk in Donetsk region;
- a column of ten buses, which have carried 300 soldiers, six military
trucks, one petrol tank lorry, one armored personnel carrier, and two
3
armored off-road vehicles near the border crossing checkpoint
“Izvaryne”.
In this regard, it must be stated that, according to facts and information
available to the Ukrainian Side, the following officials of the Russian Federation,
against whom criminal investigations have been launched, take part in financing of
the terrorist activity in the territory of Ukraine:
- Mr. Sergei Kuzhegetovich Shoigu, Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation;
- Mr. Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, Vice-Chairman of the State Duma
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
- Mr. Sergey Mikhailovich Mironov, member of the State Duma the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
- Mr. Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov, member of the State Duma the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
In particular, according to evidence available to the Ukrainian Side, in May
2014, Mr. Zhirinovsky supplied the terrorist organization LPR with a “Tiger”
military off-road vehicle.
The Ukrainian Side calls once again on the Russian Side to take all feasible
measures in order to terminate acts that constitute offences within the meaning of
the Convention, as well as provide appropriate assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition
of such acts in the future.
In this regard, the Ukrainian Side reserves to itself the right to demand
restitution from the Russian Side of damage caused by its acts that constitute
offences within the meaning of the Convention.
Kyiv, 10 October 2014

Annex 373
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 13355 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 October
2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀨􀀬􀀪􀀱􀀃􀀤􀀩􀀩􀀤􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱
#13355
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its compliments
to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and in response to the Embassy's note No.
6111/22-012-3682 dated October 3, 2014 has the honor to inform that the Russian
side has accepted for consideration the topics suggested by the Ukrainian side for
discussion at consultations on interpretation and implementation of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism dated
December 9, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation informs the Ukrainian
side about the need to provide the Russian side with factual data on the issues
brought up in the notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine No. 72/22-
484-1964 dated July 28, 2014, No. 72/22-620-2087 dated August 12, 2014, No.
72/22-620-2185 dated August 22, 2014, No. 72/22-620-2221 dated August 29,
2014, No. 72/22-620-2406 dated September 24, 2014, No. 72/22-620-2443 dated
September 30, 2014, No. 72/22-620-2495 dated October 7, 2014 and No. 72/22-
620-2529 dated October 10, 2014, as well as to hand over to the Russian
Federation the criminal cases brought by Ukrainian law enforcement authorities
against Russian citizens and individuals permanently residing in Russia, such as
mentioned and identified in the notes of the Ukrainian side, in the order set forth in
the Commonwealth of Independent States' Convention on Legal Assistance and
Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated January 22, 1993.
The Russian side reserves the right to expand the agenda of the Russian-Ukrainian
consultations.
􀀨􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
The Russian side proceeds from the fact that in the absence of adequate security
conditions in Kyiv, as shown by the attack against the Embassy of the Russian
Federation on June 14, 2014, the consultations cannot be held in the Ukrainian
capital. In view thereof, the Russian side suggests holding the consultations in
Moscow.
Nothing in this note shall prejudice the position of the Russian Federation
regarding the statements and claims contained in the aforementioned notes of the
Ukrainian side.
The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the
assurances of its high consideration.
Moscow, October 14, 2014
Annex 374
Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2717 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
# 72/22-620-2717
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and, in addition to the notes
verbales #72/22-484-1964 dated July 28, 2014, #72/22-620-2087 dated August 12,
2014, #72/22-620-2185 dated August 22, 2014, #72/22-620-2221 dated August 29,
2014, #72/22-620-2406 dated September 24, 2014, #72/22-620-2495 dated October 7,
2014, and #72/22-620-2529 dated October 10, 2014 has the honour to make, once again,
a statement about systematic offences being committed by the Russian Federation within
the meaning of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the Convention.
Article 2 of the Convention provides that any person commits an offence within
the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds (assets of every kind, tangible or
intangible, movable or immovable) or organizes, manages or facilitates their collection
with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used,
in full or in part, in order to carry out, inter alia, any other act intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
The Ukrainian Side once again makes a statement that since March 2014 there are
illegal terrorist organizations "Donetsk People's Republic" (hereinafter - "DNR") and
"Lugansk People's Republic" (hereinafter - the "LNR") in Ukraine who intentionally and
knowingly committed on the territory of Ukraine terrorist attacks aimed at intimidating
the population, killing civilians, causing them grievous bodily harm, hostage-taking and
occupation of administrative buildings of state and local government, provoking a
military conflict to force the Ukrainian Government to act aimed at changing the
constitutional order, territorial structure and other actions that threaten the territorial
integrity and national security of Ukraine.
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖
􀀲􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
In relation to this, the Ukrainian Side states that the Russian Federation acting by
means of its governmental bodies, agents, physical and legal persons entrusted with
performing functions of a state, as well as by means of the terrorist organizations, which
act under management and control of the Russian Side, commit offences within the
meaning of the Convention.
The position of the Ukrainian Side is that the Russian Side, inter alia, wilfully and
illegally, directly and indirectly provides and collects funds, namely sends the military
equipment and arms, organizes logistic support, provides for training and financing of
the terrorists in its territory and in the territory of Ukraine, for their logistic support and
transfer to Ukraine’s territory etc. in the knowledge that the mentioned funds are to be
used, in full or in part, by the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR in order to carry out
offences within the meaning of the Convention.
The offences committed by the Russian Side and/or terrorist organizations acting
under management and control of the Russian Side are proved, inter alia, by the
following facts and circumstances.
According to operational data of Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Center Headquarters
between October 10 and 14, 2014 the funds collection and transmitting towards the
support of the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR was reported, as well as continued
illegal relocation of the military equipment and cargo through the state border of
Ukraine from the territory of the Russian Federation, to which there is evidence as
follows:
- a team consisting of up to 100 (one hundred) people, having been trained at the
training centre of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Federation in
Rostov-on-Don, financed by the Russian Federation and equipped by Russian
arms, arrived from the territory of the Russian Federation to Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine for supporting the terrorist organizations DPR and
LPR;
- a procurement convoy consisting of up to 30 (thirty) GAZel microbuses loaded
with Russian ammunitions and equipment arrived from the territory of the
Russian Federation to the vicinity of Alchevsk community;
- the agents of the Ministry of Defence, Federal Security Service, Ministry of
Emergency Response of the Russian Federation collect the funds for
supporting the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR, aimed at conspiratorial
procurement of the military cargo from Russia to the hot-spot – inclusive of
arms and ammunitions, as well as armoured vehicles. Under co-ordination of
the Russian citizen O.Zhuchkovsky (permanently registered in St. Petersburg)
yet another batch of ‘aid’ was procured to the mercenaries in the vicinity of
Snizhne – Stechkin automatic guns (APS) with ammunitions, knives, various
means for communication and protection, sleeping bags, army boots, fuel, etc;
- according to the message communicated by the so-called ‘minister of
education’ of the DPR I.Kostenko, the Russian banks have opened
corresponding accounts for the so-called ‘ministry of education and science’ of
the DPR, which allows for direct financial transfers to the pro-Russian terrorist
groups.
The abovementioned funds were used by the terrorist organizations DPR and LPR
for committing terrorist attacks in Ukraine’s territory, namely:
- the terrorists of the so-called 32nd division of the ‘Don Cossack Host’ deployed
near the cities of Pervomaisk and Stahanov, fired over 20 salvoes and
performed the artillery attacks using the Russian multiple rocket launch
systems BM-21, 29, 30, 31 and 32 towards the checkpoints of Ukraine’s
National Guard in the vicinity of Bakhmutka;
- on September 11, 2014 the use of the modern magnetic resonance arms
procured by the Russian Side was reported to take place near Debaltseve in
Donetsk oblast.
Taking into account the abovementioned, the Ukrainian Side calls, once again, on
the Russian Side to employ all the possible means for terminating the offences that bear
elements of the crimes within the meaning of the Convention, and to provide the
adequate assurances and safeguards that they shall never happen in the future.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine persistently demands that the Russian
Federation immediately stops intruding into Ukraine’s internal affairs and financing
terrorism, and provides the adequate assurances and safeguards that the abovementioned
offensive activity shall never take place again.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine also demands that the Russian Side
provides full restitution for the damage that was caused by the abovementioned activity.
Kyiv, November 3, 2014

Annex 375
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14587 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (24
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀨􀀬􀀪􀀱􀀃􀀤􀀩􀀩􀀤􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱
􀀆􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀘􀀛􀀚􀀒􀉞􀉧􀉜
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its compliments
to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and in response to the note # 6111/22-012-
4012 of October 31, 2014, has the honor to inform about the following.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation considers it
inappropriate for the Ukrainian side to use in the official diplomatic
correspondence imaginary facts and groundless accusations and underlines the
need to observe the generally accepted norms of diplomatic correspondence as well
as to provide unbiased and well grounded information. In particular, this refers to
the statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding
involvement of bodies of government of the Russian Federation in "kidnapping,
torturing and using other inhumane forms of treatment" against Ukrainian citizens,
as well as about "aggressive attitude" of Russians towards Ukrainian citizens.
The Russian side underlines the undeniable fact of attack on the Embassy of Russia
in Kyiv and its destruction by aggressive extreme-right groups under Ukraine
authority’s nonfeasance that is an example of obvious security threat to any official
Russian-Ukrainian events in this city.
In this regard, given the fact that the Ukrainian side is not prepared to hold bilateral
consultations in Moscow, the Russian side suggests, as a compromise option, to
hold the consultations in Minsk (Belarus).
The Russian side proposes the agenda for the bilateral consultations with the
Ukrainian side as follows:
- Exchange of information under the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 on persons who committed or reportedly
committed crimes in the sphere of terrorism financing within the territory of
Ukraine or Russia;
- Implementation of cooperation and improvement of mechanisms of mutual
assistance under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism of 1999 with respect to criminal investigation and criminal
prosecution including extradition procedures, with respect to crimes in the sphere
of terrorism financing;
- Security situation for Russian citizens in Kyiv and for Ukrainian citizens in
Moscow (including diplomatic personnel);
- International fundamental legal principles of countering terrorism financing in
the context of Russia-Ukraine relationship;
- Measures to increase efficiency of criminal investigations in the area of
financing of terrorism.
The Russian side notes that the fact of discussion of certain issues during
consultations does not predetermine that they shall fall under the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999.
In view of the fact that the Ukrainian side has initiated the consultations we would
like to request information about the planned composition of the Ukrainian
delegation in order to determine the appropriate level of representation of the
Russian side.
Considering the need to form the interdepartmental delegation and tackle the
related logistical matters, the Russian side proposes to hold the above-mentioned
consultations in Minsk during the week that begins on December, 22 this year.
The Russian side draws attention of the Ukrainian side to the fact that the response
to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s note No 10􀀗􀀚􀀔􀀒􀉞􀉧􀉜􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃
was received only on September, 30 this year. Thus, the Russian side can not agree
with the assumption expressed by the Ukrainian side that there was an "unfounded
delay" in the setting up of venue and date for the consultations.
The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the
assurances of its high consideration.
Moscow, November 24, 2014
Annex 376
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31
July 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀷􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚
􀀆􀀔􀀓􀀗􀀗􀀛􀀒􀉞􀉧􀉜
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its
compliments to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and in response to the notes of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine #610/22-110-1591 dated June 21, 2014,
#610/22-110-1798 dated July 16, 2014, #610/22-110-1804 and #610/22-110-1805
dated July 17 2014, #72/22-484-1964 dated July 28, 2014, #72/22-620-2087 dated
August 12, 2014, #72/22-620-2185 dated August 22, 2014, #72/22-620-2221 dated
August 29, 2014, #72/22-620-2406 dated September 24, 2014, #72/22-620-2495
dated 7, 2014 and #72/22-620-2529 dated October 10, 2014, #72/22-620-2717
dated November 3, 2014, #72/22-620-2732 dated November 4, 2014, #72/22-620-
351 dated February 13, 2015, #72/22-620-352 dated February 13, 2015, #72/22-
620-1069 dated May 7, 2015, #72/22-484-1103 dated May 13, 2015 has the honor
to inform on the following.
The Russian Party expresses gratitude to the Ukrainian Party for all
information provided that may be relevant to the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 (the Convention).
The Russian Party checks all data received from the Ukrainian Party through
diplomatic channels in the spirit of constructiveness and good faith and sends
written information on the actions taken by the Russian competent authorities in
addition to the information previously given to the Ukrainian Party in the course of
the Russian-Ukrainian consultations on issues related to the Convention, pursuant
to the reached arrangements with Ukrainian Party during these consultations.
The Russian Party informs the Ukrainian Party that it continues to check
other data presented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine's notes. In this
connection the Russian Party presumes that the Ukrainian Party will respond as
soon as possible to the Russian specifying request for legal aid dated May 21, 2015
urged to present the additional information necessary for effective actions on the
data received from the Ukrainian Party, and fulfill other arrangements reached
during bilateral consultations, including the submission to Russian competent
authorities of the relevant requests for legal aid in the framework of applicable
international agreements on all the facts mentioned in the notes of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, as well as the provision of written explanations on
treating the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic as
"terrorist organizations" (including the relevant legislation and court decisions).
The Russian Party also expects that the Ukrainian Party in the spirit of
constructiveness and good faith will investigate the facts stated in the note
#􀀜􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀒􀉞􀉧􀉜􀀃 􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀖􀀓􀀏􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀃 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation and will inform the Russian Party about the results.
The Russian Party shares the view of the Ukrainian Party on the necessity
to continue the consultative process. In this regard the Russian Party offers to
organize a third round of consultations on issues related to the Convention in the
city of Minsk during the week, commencing on October 5, 2015. The Russian
Party offers the following agenda of consultations.
1. Progress of the implementation of the agreements reached in
the first and second rounds of consultations.
2. Discussion of the specific facts, which may be qualified as terrorist
financing within the meaning of Convention.
3. The implementation of co-operation and improvement mechanisms of
mutual assistance under the Convention in regard with criminal investigations or
criminal harassment, including extradition proceedings, related to crimes in the
sphere of financing of terrorism.
4. The international legal elements to combat the financing of terrorism.
Nothing in this note is without prejudice to the position of the
Russian Party in respect of applications and approvals contained in the mentioned
notes of the Ukrainian Party and it does not prejudge the question of whether or
not certain situations are subject of the Convention.
The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the
assurances of its highest consideration.
Moscow, July 31 2015
􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗 􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁇 􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁗 􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜
􀀆 􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃
􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀊􀁖􀀃
􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁈
􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀏
􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀑 􀀆􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀐
􀀔􀀘􀀜􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
The mentioned facts are in the process of investigation, criminal case
#2014797021 initiated on June 20, 2014 and based on provisions of section
􀀖􀀃 􀂆􀀖􀀓􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁖􀀃 􀂩􀉚􀂪􀀏􀀃 􀂩􀉛􀂪􀀏􀀃 􀂩􀉟􀂪􀀏􀀃 􀂩􀉠􀂪􀀋􀀃 􀀅􀁄􀀅􀀏􀀃 􀀅􀁅􀀅􀀏􀀃 􀀅􀁉􀀅􀀏􀀃 􀀅􀁋􀀅􀀌􀀃 􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀕􀀃􀀃
§105 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
December 25, 2014 the investigator of the Investigation Department
adopted the decision on prosecution (in absentia) of Mr.A.N. Grischenko,
Commander of the 72nd Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as an
accused one in 8 episodes of criminal activity.
February 4, 2015 Leninsky District court in the city of Rostov-on-Don
chose for the accused A.N.Grishchenko a measure of punishment in the
form of detention for a period of one month from the month starting from
the day of his arrest. The latter is put on the international wanted list.
􀀕􀀑 􀀆􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀐
􀀔􀀚􀀜􀀛􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
1. During visit of the location at 26/3 Molodogvardeiskaya Street,
Moscow it has been found that the building with this number does not
exist.According to the information of State Budgetary Institution for the city
of Moscow "Mosgor BTI" the property with the above specified address
has not been registered, destroyed or renamed with Moscow Register of
Housing and Nonresidential Buildings. According to the response to the
request of the Department of Federal Tax Service in the city of Moscow
of June 25, 2015 the Unified State Register of Legal Entities does not
contain any records about the organization "Voenkomat (Military
Recruitment Office) of People's Militia of Donbas ".
2. According to the information received from St.Petersburg Federal
Tax Service Department the Unified State Register of Legal Entities for
the city of St.Petersburg does not contain any records about the Military
Patriotic Club "Reserve"
􀀖􀀑 􀀆􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀔􀀔􀀓􀀐
􀀔􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
1. According to the response to the request 11 persons with personal
data related to 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁜􀁆􀁋 􀀳􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁙 reside in the Russian
Federation. According to the records of Russian Emergency Situations
Ministry it does not have in the operational management any warehouse
space in the city of Shakhty and Neklinovsky district of Rostov region,
Russia.
No personal or business contacts with Mr.Eduard Anatoliyevych Popov
have been recorded. Storage of goods belonging to the latter, including
ones with military purpose, was not carried out.
2. According to the response to the request 4 citizens with personal data
related to 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀤􀁏􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁌􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁙􀁜􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀰􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁙 reside at the territory of the
Russian Federation. The Russian database does not contain any records for
􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁌􀀃 􀀳􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁄􀁕. To establish full personal data of these
persons was not possible.
􀀗􀀑 􀀆􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀐
􀀕􀀓􀀛􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
1. In the course of the investigative and operational proceedings
it was found that a citizen with personal data related to 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀤􀁏􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀀪􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁜􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁎􀁒􀁙􀁖􀁎􀁜 does not exist in the Russian Federation.
To establish the location of 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀤􀁑􀁗􀁒􀁑 􀀤􀁅􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋 􀀵􀁄􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁖􀁎􀁜 is not
possible at current time.
Social network "VKontakte" contains link
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁙􀁎􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀒􀈺􀉧􀉬􀉨􀉧􀁂􀉊􀉚􀉟􀉜􀉫􀉤􀉢􀉣􀀃 􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀔􀀖􀀓􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
above mentioned personal data.
At the same time any information, including social networks,
testifying Mr.Anton A.Raevsky's actions related to the acquisition of
weapons and ammunition for the purpose of their use by "terrorist
organizations" in the South-east of Ukraine is not available.
2. According to the information available, 􀀰􀁖􀀑􀀲􀀑􀀬􀀑􀀮􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁄 was
detained by the Ukrainian border protection officers in May, 2014, in the
area of the locality of "Biryukovo" at the time of transportation of
weapons as indicated by the Ukrainian Part.
3. It has been ordered to establish the full personal data of
Mr.A.V.Melkov, Ms.O.V.Piletskaya, Ms.T.M.Kutyumova,
Mr.D.A.Yaralov, Mr.A.V.Postnikov and Ms.A.V.Ovsyannikova as well as
of the belonging of the accounts to the latest above mentioned persons.
4. In the course of the investigative and operational proceedings
concerning 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀥􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁒􀁙"s activities, who has
been accused in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine's note of
committing acts of collection and provision of means of financing of the
so-called terrorist organizations, Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk
People's Republic Republic, it was found that Mr.Dmitry A. Bushmakov
has dual citizenship (citizen of Belarus and Russia (Russian citizenship
acquired in July, 2014) is CEO of the business company
(L.L.C."Leibstandart"), which specializes exclusively in buying and selling
of antiques.
As it follows from the interrogation of Mr Dmitry A. Bushmakov
in summer 2014 on his company's forum at forum-antikvariat.ru there
appeared a message in section for discussion the situation in Ukraine that
those representatives of Donetsk People's Republic militia who
distinguished themselves in battle would be awarded with crosses similar
to St. George Cross of the First World War.
In this connection, D.A.Bushmakov in his messages suggested not to
make new crosses, but buy them in his shop, since such crosses for the
purposes of historic reconstruction and movies were and are available for
sale in his shop. In this connection, Mr.D.A.Bushmakov in his messages
suggested not to make new crosses, but buy them in his shop, since such
crosses for the purposes of historic reconstruction and movies were and are
available for sale in his shop. After a few days, an unknown young man in
civilian clothes came at the shop and without announcing his name bought
at least 50 copies of pectoral crosses (the Order of Saint George of
4th,3rd,2nd , 1st grade). It is not determined whether this person is connected
in any way with Mr.Bushmakov, Donetsk People's Republic or Lugansk
People's Republic. Mr.D.A.Bushmakov did not have any political,
ideological reasons; he acted exclusively in the framework of his
commercial activities.
He did not have any personal, business or financial relations with the
representatives of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's
Republics and did not rendered any assistance to them.
It was not possible to identify the location of 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀮􀀑 􀀹􀀑􀀰􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁈􀁙 and
􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀮􀀑􀀶􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁎􀁋􀁘􀁗􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁙.
5. As it follows from the interrogation of 􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀤􀀑􀀪􀀑􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁒􀁙 the charity
fund "Assistance Coordination Center of New Russia" is officially
registered with the Ministry of Justice in the city of Barnaul, the Altai
Territory. It has two offices in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Its premises
were provided free of charge. Current banking accounts of the fund were
opened in the banks in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the fund does not have
electronic accounts.
Mr.A.G.Markov was a member of the board of trustees of the fund. One
of the managers of the fund was Mr.Alexander Lyubimov.
The aim of the fund was to provide charitable assistance to refugees
from the territory of the south-east of Ukraine. The fund was financed
exclusively through donations or personal funds of its members. The
functioning point for collection of humanitarian aid is located at 40
Volochayevskaya Street, Moscow. Clothes, food, hygiene items, baby food
are being collected. Military items are not acquired, the volunteers to
participate in hostilities are not recruited. Mr.A.G.Markov does not know
􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀶􀀑􀀬􀀑􀀮􀁋􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁑􀁜􀁄􀁎. Mr.A.G.Markov did not fund the militia of the
Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics.
It was not possible to find out the full personal data and location of
􀀰􀁕􀀑􀀬􀀑􀀮􀁋􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁑􀁜􀁄􀁎. Information about the involvement of these individuals
in financing of the militia of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics
during the relevant detective work has not been received.
􀀘􀀑 􀀆􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕􀀐􀀙􀀕􀀓􀀐
􀀕􀀕􀀕􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀏􀀃
􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
The investigative and operational work to identify the persons
mentioned in the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, as
well as the details of their bank accounts is being processed at current time.

Annex 377
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 13457 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15 October
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

tel: + 7 (495) 629-47-04; 629-33-42
􀁉􀉚􀉯􀀝 + 7 (493) 629-46-81
e-mail: [email protected]
www.mfa.gov.ua/russia
October 20, 2015 no. 6111/ 72 - 110 – 3024.
􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀸􀀵􀀪􀀨􀀱􀀷􀀄
Re: a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
In response to Note no. 72/22-620-2245 of September 15, 2015, please, find attached
the original of Note no. 13457/dnv of October 15, 2015 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation, which the Embassy has just received, regarding the consent of the
Russian side to hold the third round of Ukrainian-Russian consultations on the matters
concerning the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of
1999.
Appendix: the aforementioned, on 3 sheets
􀀤􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃charge d’affaires 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄 [signature] 􀀵􀀑􀀃􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁌􀁐􀁆􀁋􀁜􀁑􀁖􀁎􀁜􀁜
Sent to:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
􀀨􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀸􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀃
􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃
􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃
Leontyevskiy Pereulok 18,
Moscow, 125009
􀀨􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀸􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀃
􀀬􀀱􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀵􀀸􀀶􀀶􀀬􀀤􀀱􀀃
􀀩􀀨􀀧􀀨􀀵􀀤􀀷􀀬􀀲􀀱􀀃
Leontyevskiy Pereulok 18,
Moscow, 125009
No. 13457/dnv
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its compliments to the
Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and in response to the Embassy’s note, No. 6111/22-012-2666 dated
September 15, 2015, hereby informs the Embassy as follows.
The Russian Party consents to the holding of a third round of Russian-Ukrainian consultations
regarding issues of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (the Convention) during the week commencing October 26, 2015, and proposes October
29, 2015 as the specific date [for the consultations].
The Russian Party does not see any need to move the consultations from Minsk (Belarus) to
Baku (Azerbaijan). The Ministry proceeds from the assumption that from a logistical point of view,
Minsk is preferable for both delegations and allows Russian-Ukrainian contact to be brought about
with the maximally effective use of financial and time resources. In addition, the selection of Minsk
as the location for the consultations can be explained by the firmly established nature of this
conference venue, both for consultations on
TO THE EMBASSY OF UKRAINE
Moscow
2
issues connected to the Convention and on issues within the framework of the Contact Group on
Ukraine.
The Ministry would again draw the Ukrainian Party’s attention to the inadmissibility of using
fictitious information and unsubstantiated accusations in official diplomatic correspondence.
Violating the generally accepted procedure for state-to-state communication does not contribute to an
effective dialogue.
The Russian Party would stress that the Russian-Ukrainian consultations involve a discussion
of concrete facts connected to the Convention, and should not serve as a platform for advancing
patently false claims and still less for deliberate provocation.
The Russian Party therefore awaits with interest from the Ukrainian Party concrete materials
containing factual data in substantiation of the statements made by the Ukrainian Party regarding the
new issues for discussion at the consultations. In the absence of such materials, the discussion will a
priori be pointless, which would be at odds with the focus agreed between the Russian and Ukrainian
Parties on the constructive nature of the consultations. The Russian Party proposes that the Ukrainian
Party send such materials via the established channels within the framework of the existing
international treaties between the Parties on legal assistance and criminal law cooperation, as was
previously agreed between the Parties. Following a careful examination of the materials, the Russian
Party will be ready to provide corresponding comments.
The Ministry would again draw attention to the fact that the actual discussion of any issues
during the consultations or in the exchange of notes between the Parties does not pre-determine the
issue of
3
their regulation by the Convention, and likewise the existence or absence of a dispute on the
application or interpretation of the Convention.
Nothing contained in this note prejudices the position of the Russian Party in respect of the
statements and claims of the Ukrainian Party set forth in the exchange of notes on this matter.
The Ministry wishes to avail itself of the opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances
of its highest consideration.
Moscow, October 15, 2015
[seal:] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation No. 1
Annex 378
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-610-954 to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(19 April 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀰􀀬􀀱􀀬􀀶􀀷􀀵􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀩􀀲􀀵􀀨􀀬􀀪􀀱􀀃􀀤􀀩􀀩􀀤􀀬􀀵􀀶􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀸􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀨
􀊋 72/22-610-954
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and, in reference to the
negotiations concerning interpretation and implementation of the 1999
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(hereinafter, the “Convention”), has the honour to state the following.
The Ukrainian Side recalls that it has sent numerous diplomatic notes to the
Russian Side in connection with the negotiations concerning the Convention,
including, but not limited to, diplomatic notes 􀊋 610/22-110-1591 June 21, 2014,
􀊋􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀕-110-1695 July 4, 2014, 􀊋 610/22-110-1798 July 16, 2014, 􀊋610/22-
110-1805 July 17, 2014, 􀊋􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀕-110-1827 July 22, 2014, 􀊋􀀙􀀔􀀓􀀒􀀕􀀕-110-1833
July 23, 2014, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-484-1964 July 28, 2014, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2087 August 12,
2014, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2185 August 22, 2014, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2221 August 29, 2014,
􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2406 September 24, 2014, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2443 September 30, 2014,
􀊋􀀃 􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2495 October 7, 2014, 􀊋􀀃 􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2529 October 10, 2014, 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-2674 October 29, 2014, 􀊋􀀃 􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2717 November 3, 2014, 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-2732 November 4, 2014, 􀊋􀀃 72/22-620-3008 December 8, 2014, 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-3114 December 19, 2014, 􀊋􀀃 􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-48 January 13, 2015, 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-352 February 13, 2015, 􀊋􀀃 􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-351 February 13, 2015, 􀊋􀀃
610/22-110-504 April 2, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-967 April 24, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-
1069 May 7, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-484-1103 May 12, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-1233 May 27,
2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-1407 June 11, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2245 September 15, 2015,
􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2363 September 25, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2583 October 23, 2015, 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-2604 October 23, 2015, 􀊋􀀃 72/22-620-2605 October 23, 2015, 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-2894 November 23, 2015, 􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-264 February 10, 2016, and 􀊋􀀃
72/22-620-533 February 29, 2016.
The Ukrainian Side further recalls that the parties have engaged in four
rounds of negotiations concerning the Convention in Minsk, Belarus, on January
22, 2015, July 2, 2015, October 29, 2015, and March 17, 2016.
Ukraine reiterates its view, expressed throughout the negotiation process,
that the Russian Federation bears international responsibility for acts in violation
of the Convention, and must make appropriate reparation to Ukraine. The Russian
Federation has violated the Convention by intentionally providing support,
including by supplying weapons, to terrorist organizations operating on Ukrainian
territory. With this Russian state support, those terrorist organizations have
committed numerous attacks on Ukrainian soil, including the shoot-down of a
civilian aircraft (Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17); the shelling of civilians in
Kramatorsk, Mariupol, and Volnovakha; the bombing of civilians in Ukrainian
cities, including Kharkiv; and similar illegal acts. The Russian Federation has
provided support to terrorist organizations with the knowledge that it would be
used to perpetrate such attacks and that civilians would be killed or injured as a
result. In addition to its responsibility for financing terrorist acts, the Russian
Federation has failed to afford Ukraine the greatest measure of assistance in
investigating the financing of terrorism; failed to cooperate in the prevention of
the financing of terrorism; and violated other obligations under the Convention.
Ukraine regrets that despite an extensive negotiation process lasting nearly
two years, the parties have not made meaningful progress in resolving their
dispute concerning the Convention. The Ukrainian Side observes that the Russian
Side has demonstrated no willingness to address Ukraine’s claims of international
responsibility, and has refused repeated requests to discuss important aspects of
the dispute. Ukraine is compelled to conclude that the process of negotiations
concerning the parties’ disputes under the Convention has failed, and that further
attempts to negotiate would be futile. Ukraine has also determined that further
delay in invoking its right to resolution of the dispute through mandatory
procedures, while the Russian Federation continues to engage in breaches of the
Convention and refuses to engage in meaningful discussion on responsibility for
past breaches, would be prejudicial to its rights and important national interests.
Accordingly, pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Financing Terrorism
Convention, Ukraine requests the Russian Federation to submit the dispute to
arbitration under terms to be agreed by mutual consent.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine avails itself of this opportunity
to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation the
assurances of its highest consideration
Kyiv, 19 April 2016
Annex 379
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 8808 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (23
June 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

No. 8808
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its compliments to the
Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and in response to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine No. 72/22-620-915 of April 13, 2016 and No. 72/22-620 954 of April 19, 2016,
concerning issues related to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (The Convention), has the honour to inform the following.
The Russian Side expresses its perplexity and regret due to the unexpected refusal by the
Ukrainian Side from consultations under the Convention.
The Ukrainian Side’s decision to break from consultations before all the work on the execution
of Ukrainian and Russian requests shows unwillingness of the Ukrainian Side to cooperate
constructively with the Russian Side under the Convention and motivation of the Ukrainian Side
to use consultations as a formal pretext to institute arbitration or apply to the ICJ.
The Russian Side does not see any grounds for a dispute concerning interpretation or application
of the Convention and confirms its commitments to comply with its obligations under the
Convention. However, the Ukrainian Side’s systematic unwillingness to engage in constructive
cooperation with the Russian Side, faithfully hold consultations, to comply with the agreed
arrangements during the consolations, including its unilateral misrepresentation of the discussion
held during the consultations and positions of the Parties, prevents to set up the conditions for
impartial assessment of claims made by the Ukrainian Side.
The Russian Side offers to the Ukrainian Side to return to the constructive dialog, to continue
cooperation within agreed arrangements, and to hold the next fifth round of bilateral
consultations concerning issues relation to the Convention on July 21 or 22, or on the week
starting from July 25 this year in Minsk.
However, without prejudice to the above-mentioned position, the Russian Side is ready to
discuss issues concerning setting up arbitration as proposed by the Ukrainian Side taking into
account the provisions of Article 24 of the Convention.
The Ministry stresses that the fact of discussion of any issue during the consultations and in
diplomatic correspondence between the Parties, neither prejudges that the issues fall under the
Convention, nor demonstrates the existence of a dispute on application or interpretation of the
Convention.
Nothing in this note is in prejudice to the position of the Russian Side concerning statements and
assertions of the Ukrainian Side that were set out in the relevant diplomatic correspondence.
The Ministry avails of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy its assurance of its highest
considerations.
June 23, 2016
Annex 380
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2049 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31
August 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀊋􀀃􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2049
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine presents its compliments to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and, in reference to the parties’ dispute concerning
interpretation and implementation of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter, the “Convention”), has the honour to state the
following.
The Ukrainian Side refers to its note No. 72/22-620-954 of April 19, 2016, in which it
informed the Russian Side of its conclusion that the parties’ extensive negotiations concerning
the Convention have become futile, and proposed to submit the dispute to arbitration. The
Ukrainian Side recalls that the Russian Side provided no response to this note until June 23,
2016, and in its eventual response did not state clearly whether it was willing to proceed to
arbitration. Instead, the Russian Side proposed to hold a further round of negotiations. The
Ukrainian Side promptly responded and reiterated its conclusion that the negotiations had failed.
At the same time, in a spirit of good faith, the Ukrainian Side agreed to participate in the further
round of negotiations proposed by the Russian Side, without prejudice to the Ukrainian proposal
of April 19, 2016 to submit the dispute to arbitration, and without withdrawing that proposal.
The Ukrainian Side recalls that on August 4, 2016, the parties met in Minsk, Belarus for
the further round of negotiations the Russian Side had requested, at which the parties also
engaged in a preliminary discussion of arbitration. The Russian Side continued to refuse to
discuss central aspects of the dispute. In the view of the Ukrainian Side, the Russian Side
remained unwilling to attempt in good faith to achieve a negotiated resolution. The Ukrainian
Side was confirmed in its conclusion, previously expressed in its note of April 19, 2016, that its
attempt to reach a negotiated resolution to the dispute had failed and that further negotiations
were futile.
The Russian Side also did not communicate a clear position regarding arbitration of the
parties’ dispute. The Ukrainian Side stated its view that the parties should first agree to proceed
to arbitration, and then discuss the details of the organization of the arbitration. The Russian Side
referred to the Ukrainian Side’s “unilateral” right to proceed to arbitration, but did not clearly
state its agreement to participate in an arbitration under the Convention. ithout prejudice to its
view that the Russian Side should first unequivocally agree to proceed to arbitration, the
Ukrainian Side nonetheless offered its initial views on the organization of the arbitration. The
Russian Side provided no comment on the organization of the arbitration, but requested to
receive the Ukrainian Side’s proposal in writing. he Ukrainian Side accordingly provides this
response.
As the Ukrainian Side has previously stated, its view is that the first step in negotiating
the arbitration is for the Russian Side to expressly agree to proceed to arbitration and commit that
it will participate in the arbitration, provided the remaining details of the organization of the
arbitration are subsequently agreed to by the parties. The Ukrainian Side further considers that,
if the Russian Side is prepared to agree to participate in an arbitration, the parties should agree
that the arbitration should be held through the mechanism of an ad hoc chamber of the
International Court of Justice constituted pursuant to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the
Court, and a Special Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation negotiated and
executed for that purpose.
The Ukrainian Side considers that in view of the important public international law
questions presented by this arbitration, including the first opportunity for an international
tribunal to interpret and apply the Convention, an arbitral tribunal constituted for this case should
involve significant participation of judges of the International Court of Justice. Constituting the
tribunal under the auspices of an ad hoc chamber would efficiently serve this goal.
If the Russian Side agrees that an ad hoc Chamber would be an appropriate mechanism
for the arbitration of this matter, it would next be necessary to negotiate and agree to the details
of the organization of the arbitration. The issues that would be appropriate for discussion at
that phase include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
􀁸 The parties should both agree to participate fully in the arbitration; to timely make all
submissions required by the applicable rules and the tribunal’s orders; to accept as
binding the tribunal’s judgment, including its determinations concerning jurisdiction and
international responsibility; and to commit to honoring any relief ordered by the tribunal.
In this respect the Ukrainian Side notes the recent practice of the Russian Federation of
not participating in international arbitrations in which it is a respondent, including the
Arctic Sunrise case under the Convention, and various arbitrations under the bilateral
investment treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian Side
would consider it inappropriate and prejudicial if the Russian Side were to negotiate the
organization of an arbitration and then refuse to participate. In view of the past practice
of the Russian Side, the Ukrainian Side proposes that any agreement establishing an
arbitration should include a provision committing both sides to full participation and to
comply with the decisions of the tribunal, with advance consent that the dispute should
automatically be referred to the International Court of Justice for resolution if either party
violates this undertaking.
􀁸 The parties should negotiate both the size and composition of the tribunal. The Ukrainian
Side’s initial view is that the tribunal should consist of five or seven judges of the
International Court of Justice. The Ukrainian Side further considers that the parties
should endeavor to select the members of the tribunal by mutual agreement.
􀁸 The parties should negotiate the timing of written proceedings, including submissions on
any admissibility objections. The Ukrainian Side’s preliminary view is that in order to
reach an expeditious conclusion to the matter, the parties should agree to include both
admissibility and merits submissions together in the same written pleadings, rather than
bifurcating the proceedings and addressing admissibility questions separately.
The Ukrainian Side invites the reactions of the Russian Side to these details regarding the
organization of an arbitration to hear the dispute between the parties under the Convention. If
the Russian Side confirms in writing that it agrees to submit the matter to arbitration and it will
participate in arbitral proceedings constituted under the auspices of an ad hoc chamber of the
International Court of Justice, it would then be appropriate to discuss additional organizational
details regarding the arbitration between the parties. The Ukrainian Side considers that the
parties should then develop detailed proposals concerning all aspects of the organization of the
arbitration, including but not limited to the composition of the tribunal, and should at that stage
arrange a meeting to discuss the organization of the arbitration.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation the assurances of its highest consideration
Kyiv, August 31, 2016

Annex 381
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14426 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3
October 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀊋􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀕􀀙􀀒dnv
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
presents its compliments to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow and,
in response to diplomatic note 􀊋􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-2049 of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine dated August 31, 2016, on the issues
related to the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, and 􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀊋􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀕􀀕􀀒􀁇􀁙􀁑􀀃􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
September 19, 2016, has the honor to inform the Embassy of the
following.
The Russian side takes note, that in note verbale 􀊋􀀚􀀕􀀒􀀕􀀕-620-
2049 dated August 31, 2016, it was requested to share its view in
respect of the explanations of the Ukrainian side on the issue of 'the
organization of arbitration for the settlement of the dispute between
the parties in accordance with the Convention'.
In particular, the Ukrainian side claimed that, in its opinion, "if
the Russian Federation is ready to agree on the arbitration, the Parties
shall reach an agreement, that the arbitration shall take place using the
mechanism of ad hoc Chamber of the International Court of Justice
established in accordance with the part 2 of Article 26 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice and based on a special arrangement
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation agreed upon and
concluded between the Parties for this purpose". Besides, the
Ukrainian side claimed that "if the Russian side confirms in writing its
consent to refer the dispute to the arbitration, and agrees to take part in
the arbitration established within the framework of an ad hoc
Chamber of the International Court of Justice, it would be expedient
for the Parties to further discuss other issues related to the
organization of the arbitration".
􀀷􀀲􀀃􀀷􀀫􀀨􀀃􀀨􀀰􀀥􀀤􀀶􀀶􀀼􀀃􀀲􀀩􀀃􀀸􀀮􀀵􀀤􀀬􀀱􀀨􀀃
􀀰􀀲􀀶􀀦􀀲􀀺
We are puzzled by the position of Ukraine which, apparently,
intends to discuss the organization of the arbitration only in case when
the Russian Federation agrees to participate in the 'arbitration
proceeding' at an ad hoc Chamber of the International Court of
Justice.
First of all, the Russian Federation wishes to draw attention once
again that under the paragraph 1 of Article 24 of ICSFT a dispute shall
be referred to the arbitration 'upon the request of any' ICSFT Member
States. The Article 24 does not contain a requirement that another
Party must make any additional statement to enable the discussion of
the Parties on the organization of the arbitration for which the Russian
Federation has repeatedly given its consent. Imposition of such a
requirement undermines the previous discussions.
Additionally, the Russian Federation does not consider the
settlement of dispute by ad hoc Chamber of the International Court of
Justice a form of arbitration either in the context of Article 24 of
ICSFT, or in a broader sense.
Firstly, ad hoc Chamber of the International Court of Justice is
not an arbitration: in accordance with Article 26 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, such an ad hoc Chamber is a form of
work of the International Court of Justice. The composition of a
Chamber is finally determined by the International Court of Justice
which is not bound by any decision of the parties on this matter. Such
a Chamber also acts on the basis of the Statute of the Court, not an
arbitration agreement between parties. Finally, in accordance with
Article 27 of the Statute of the Court, a judgment rendered by a
Chamber is considered as rendered by the Court; a Chamber itself
cannot render a judgment.
Secondly, under Article 90 of the ICJ Rules, proceedings at the
Chambers are subject to the provisions of the ICJ Rules. This deprives
the Parties of one of the main advantages of the arbitration - the
possibility to agree on the procedure of the dispute settlement.
Although under Article 101 of the ICJ Rules, parties to a dispute may
propose modifications and additions to some (not all) rules of the
Court or a Chamber, the wording of this article is explicit that a
decision on this matter is taken totally at the discretion of the Court or
its Chambers.
Accordingly, the modes for the dispute settlement proposed by
Ukrainian Side, virtually, constitute a reference of the case for
consideration by the International Court of Justice, but not the
arbitration.
ICSFT provides for that any dispute between its states parties
which cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable
period of time, ‘shall be submitted to arbitration upon the request of
one of them’. The reference of a dispute to the International Court of
Justice is envisaged in Article 24 of ICSFT only at later stage after all
the preconditions have been fulfilled.
The Russian Side expresses a hope, that the Ukrainian Side,
within the framework of negotiations on the organization of
arbitration under the Article 24 of ICSFT, will not insist that the
Parties should agree to refer the dispute to an ad hoc Chamber of the
International Court of Justice. If Ukrainian Side continues to adhere to
this position, it would undermine the nature of the negotiations,
which, in such case, cannot be regarded as negotiations on the
organization of arbitration, and the request of the Ukrainian Side to
submit the dispute to arbitration will not be deemed as such within the
meaning of Article 24 of ICSFT ab intio.
Nevertheless, the Russian Side does not exclude the possibility to
consider the issue of the establishment of a Chamber in accordance
with the part 2 of Article 26 of the Stature of International Court of
Justice at appropriate time, in particular: when the parties fail to reach
an agreement on the organization of arbitration after bona fide
negotiations on this issue have been conducted. However, at this
moment both Parties are to take all efforts to reach an agreement on
the modality of arbitration, but not to try to submit the dispute directly
to the International Court of Justice fully omitting the procedure of
arbitration.
On its part, in full compliance with the position expressed in note
􀊋8808/dnv dated June 23, 2016, and confirmed during the fifth round
of consultations on August 4, 2016, and which was further underlined
􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀊋􀀔􀀖􀀖􀀕􀀒􀁇􀁑􀁙 dated September 19, 2016, the Russian Side
expresses again its consent to discuss the organization of the
arbitration. Certainly, it is made without prejudice to any objections in
respect of jurisdiction or admissibility, which the Russian Side might
claim during the arbitration proceeding, including on its position about
the absence of a dispute between the Parties on the interpretation and
application of ICSTF within the meaning of its Article 24. In order to
expedite the discussion, the Russian Side transmits hereinafter a draft
bilateral Arbitration Agreement and draft Rules of the Arbitration
Procedure, prepared on the basis of the model of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration. The Russian Side is open for the discussion of the draft
documents mentioned above as well as for proposals of Ukraine on
possible changes to the draft documents.
At the same time, without prejudice to its consent on the
discussion of the organization of arbitration, the Russian Side
continues to believe that any disagreements between the Parties can be
settled by the means of consultations. The Russian Side is ready to
continue the consultations at any time.
In order to conduct constructive discussions of the organization
of arbitration and other issues related to the ICSFT, the Russian Side
proposes to hold the sixth round of bilateral consultations in Minsk,
October 13-14, 2016.
The Ministry draws attention once again that the fact of the
discussion of any issues during the consultations as well as in the
diplomatic correspondence between the Parties can predetermine
neither the issue of their regulation by the ICSFT, nor the existence of
a dispute on interpretation and application of the ICSFT.
Nothing in the present note can prejudice the position of the
Russian Side in respect of the claims and allegations of the Ukrainian
Side contained in the diplomatic correspondence on this matter.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation avails
itself of this opportunity to renew the assurance of its highest
consideration.
Moscow, October 3, 2016

Annex 382
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-194/510-2518 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2
November 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Annex 383
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14284 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (11
November 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀍓􀍳􀍶􀍴􀍺􀍶􀈀􀍴􀋇􀋔􀋐􀋆􀀃
􀀃
􀀃 􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀐􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂕􀂖􀂔􀂛􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀉􀂑􀂔􀂇􀂋􀂉􀂐􀀃􀀄􀂈􀂈􀂃􀂋􀂔􀂕􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀕􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀉􀂇􀂆􀂇􀂔􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂒􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂇􀂐􀂖􀂕􀀃􀂋􀂖􀂕􀀃
􀂅􀂑􀂏􀂒􀂎􀂇􀂏􀂇􀂐􀂖􀂕􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀈􀂏􀂄􀂃􀂕􀂕􀂛􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀘􀂍􀂔􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂇􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀀐􀂑􀂕􀂅􀂑􀂙􀀃􀂃􀂐􀂆􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂒􀂑􀂐􀂕􀂇􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂐􀂑􀂖􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃
􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀐􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂕􀂖􀂔􀂛􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀉􀂑􀂔􀂇􀂋􀂉􀂐􀀃􀀄􀂈􀂈􀂃􀂋􀂔􀂕􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀘􀂍􀂔􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂇􀀃􀍓􀍹􀍴􀈀􀍴􀍴􀇦􀍳􀍻􀍶􀈀􀍷􀍳􀍲􀇦􀍴􀍷􀍳􀍺􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀑􀂑􀂘􀂇􀂏􀂄􀂇􀂔􀀃􀍴􀇡􀀃
􀍴􀍲􀍳􀍸􀇡􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂐􀂅􀂇􀂔􀂐􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀌􀂐􀂖􀂇􀂔􀂐􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀂃􀂎􀀃􀀆􀂑􀂐􀂘􀂇􀂐􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂗􀂒􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀗􀂇􀂔􀂔􀂑􀂔􀂋􀂕􀂏􀀃
􀀉􀂋􀂐􀂃􀂐􀂅􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀈋􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀆􀂑􀂐􀂘􀂇􀂐􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀈌􀇡􀀃􀂊􀂃􀂕􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂊􀂑􀂐􀂑􀂗􀂔􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂋􀂐􀂈􀂑􀂔􀂏􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀈􀂏􀂄􀂃􀂕􀂕􀂛􀀃􀂃􀂄􀂑􀂗􀂖􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃
􀂈􀂑􀂎􀂎􀂑􀂙􀂋􀂐􀂉􀇤􀀃
􀀃 􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀕􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃􀂙􀂇􀂎􀂅􀂑􀂏􀂇􀂕􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂃􀂖􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀘􀂍􀂔􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃􀂕􀂇􀂐􀂖􀀃􀂋􀂖􀂕􀀃􀂘􀂋􀂇􀂙􀂕􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀇲􀂅􀂑􀂔􀂇􀀃
􀂒􀂔􀂋􀂐􀂅􀂋􀂒􀂎􀂇􀂕􀇳􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂐􀂅􀂇􀂔􀂐􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂔􀂉􀂃􀂐􀂋􀂜􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂃􀂔􀂄􀂋􀂖􀂔􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂈􀂑􀂎􀂎􀂑􀂙􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂃􀂉􀂔􀂇􀂇􀂏􀂇􀂐􀂖􀀃
􀂖􀂊􀂃􀂖􀀃􀂊􀂃􀂆􀀃􀂄􀂇􀂇􀂐􀀃􀂔􀂇􀂃􀂅􀂊􀂇􀂆􀀃􀂆􀂗􀂔􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂐􀂕􀂗􀂎􀂖􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀂕􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀋􀂃􀂉􀂗􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀀒􀂅􀂖􀂑􀂄􀂇􀂔􀀃􀍳􀍺􀂖􀂊􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂋􀂕􀀃
􀂛􀂇􀂃􀂔􀇤􀀃􀀃􀀗􀂃􀂍􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂋􀂐􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂃􀂅􀂅􀂑􀂗􀂐􀂖􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀘􀂍􀂔􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀇯􀂕􀀃􀂒􀂑􀂕􀂋􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀇡􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀕􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃􀂙􀂋􀂎􀂎􀀃􀂔􀂇􀂘􀂋􀂕􀂇􀀃
􀂋􀂖􀂕􀀃􀂒􀂔􀂑􀂒􀂑􀂕􀂃􀂎􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂔􀂉􀂃􀂐􀂋􀂜􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂃􀂔􀂄􀂋􀂖􀂔􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂃􀂐􀂆􀀃􀂙􀂋􀂎􀂎􀀃􀂕􀂇􀂐􀂆􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀘􀂍􀂔􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃􀂃􀀃
􀂔􀂇􀂘􀂋􀂕􀂇􀂆􀀃􀂘􀂇􀂔􀂕􀂋􀂑􀂐􀇤􀀃
􀀃 􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀕􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂈􀂈􀂇􀂔􀂕􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂊􀂑􀂎􀂆􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂐􀂇􀂚􀂖􀀃􀂏􀂇􀂇􀂖􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂆􀂋􀂕􀂅􀂗􀂕􀂕􀀃􀂈􀂗􀂔􀂖􀂊􀂇􀂔􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃
􀂑􀂔􀂉􀂃􀂐􀂋􀂜􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂃􀂔􀂄􀂋􀂖􀂔􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀀇􀂇􀂅􀂇􀂏􀂄􀂇􀂔􀀃􀍳􀍴􀇡􀀃􀍴􀍲􀍳􀍸􀇡􀀃􀂈􀂔􀂑􀂏􀀃􀍳􀍲􀀃􀂃􀇤􀂏􀇤􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀍸􀀃􀂒􀇤􀂏􀇤􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃
􀀋􀂃􀂉􀂗􀂇􀇡􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀑􀂇􀂖􀂊􀂇􀂔􀂎􀂃􀂐􀂆􀂕􀇤􀀃
􀀃 􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀐􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂕􀂖􀂔􀂛􀀃􀂆􀂔􀂃􀂙􀂕􀀃􀂃􀂖􀂖􀂇􀂐􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂐􀂅􀂇􀀃􀂃􀂉􀂃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂃􀂖􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂈􀂃􀂅􀂖􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂆􀂋􀂕􀂅􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂃􀂐􀂛􀀃
􀂋􀂕􀂕􀂗􀂇􀂕􀀃􀂆􀂗􀂔􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂐􀂕􀂗􀂎􀂖􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀂕􀀃􀂃􀂕􀀃􀂙􀂇􀂎􀂎􀀃􀂃􀂕􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂆􀂋􀂒􀂎􀂑􀂏􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂅􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂔􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂒􀂑􀂐􀂆􀂇􀂐􀂅􀂇􀀃􀂄􀂇􀂖􀂙􀂇􀂇􀂐􀀃
􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀓􀂃􀂔􀂖􀂋􀂇􀂕􀀃􀂅􀂃􀂐􀀃􀂒􀂔􀂇􀂆􀂇􀂖􀂇􀂔􀂏􀂋􀂐􀂇􀀃􀂐􀂇􀂋􀂖􀂊􀂇􀂔􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂋􀂕􀂕􀂗􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀂋􀂔􀀃􀂔􀂇􀂉􀂗􀂎􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂄􀂛􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀇡􀀃􀂐􀂑􀂔􀀃
􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂇􀂚􀂋􀂕􀂖􀂇􀂐􀂅􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂃􀀃􀂆􀂋􀂕􀂒􀂗􀂖􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂋􀂐􀂖􀂇􀂔􀂒􀂔􀂇􀂖􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂃􀂐􀂆􀀃􀂃􀂒􀂒􀂎􀂋􀂅􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀌􀀆􀀖􀀉􀀗􀇤􀀃
􀀅􀂛􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂕􀂃􀂏􀂇􀀃􀂖􀂑􀂍􀂇􀂐􀇡􀀃􀂐􀂑􀂖􀂊􀂋􀂐􀂉􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂒􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂇􀂐􀂖􀀃􀂐􀂑􀂖􀂇􀀃􀂅􀂃􀂐􀀃􀂒􀂔􀂇􀂌􀂗􀂆􀂋􀂅􀂇􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂒􀂑􀂕􀂋􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃
􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀕􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂒􀂇􀂅􀂖􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂅􀂎􀂃􀂋􀂏􀂕􀀃􀂃􀂐􀂆􀀃􀂃􀂎􀂎􀂇􀂉􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀂕􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀘􀂍􀂔􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀖􀂋􀂆􀂇􀀃
􀂅􀂑􀂐􀂖􀂃􀂋􀂐􀂇􀂆􀀃􀂋􀂐􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂆􀂋􀂒􀂎􀂑􀂏􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂅􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂔􀂔􀂇􀂕􀂒􀂑􀂐􀂆􀂇􀂐􀂅􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂋􀂕􀀃􀂏􀂃􀂖􀂖􀂇􀂔􀇤􀀃
􀀗􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀐􀂋􀂐􀂋􀂕􀂖􀂔􀂛􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀀉􀂑􀂔􀂇􀂋􀂉􀂐􀀃􀀄􀂈􀂈􀂃􀂋􀂔􀂕􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀀕􀂗􀂕􀂕􀂋􀂃􀂐􀀃􀀉􀂇􀂆􀂇􀂔􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀀃􀂃􀂘􀂃􀂋􀂎􀂕􀀃􀂋􀂖􀂕􀂇􀂎􀂈􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂋􀂕􀀃
􀂑􀂒􀂒􀂑􀂔􀂖􀂗􀂐􀂋􀂖􀂛􀀃􀂖􀂑􀀃􀂔􀂇􀂐􀂇􀂙􀀃􀂖􀂊􀂇􀀃􀂃􀂕􀂕􀂗􀂔􀂃􀂐􀂅􀂇􀀃􀂑􀂈􀀃􀂋􀂖􀂕􀀃􀂊􀂋􀂉􀂊􀂇􀂕􀂖􀀃􀂅􀂑􀂐􀂕􀂋􀂆􀂇􀂔􀂃􀂖􀂋􀂑􀂐􀇤􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀐􀂑􀂕􀂅􀂑􀂙􀇡􀀃􀀑􀂑􀂘􀂇􀂏􀂄􀂇􀂔􀀃􀍳􀍳􀇡􀀃􀍴􀍲􀍳􀍸􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃􀀃

Annex 384
Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 16886 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (30
December 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

#16866/2􀈾􀉋􀉇􀈽
The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presents its compliments to
the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow and in response to the diplomatic note of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine #72/22-194/510-2718 of November 24, 2016, concerning issues
related to the International Convention on Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (the
Convention) has the honour to inform the Embassy the following.
The Russian Side studied carefully proposals of the Ukrainian Side presented in its
diplomatic note #72/22-194/510-2518 of November 2, 2016. The Russian Side is ready to accept
most of these proposals in order to agree on the organization of arbitration. As the Russian Side
explained during the meeting on October 18, 2016, it prefers to hold a discussion on the
organization of arbitration based on draft documents that could govern the arbitration
proceedings. Therefore, the Russian Side forwards herewith a draft arbitration agreement and
rules of procedure there were amended, inter alia, to incorporate Ukraine’s proposals to the
extent they are acceptable to the Russian Side.
For your convenience, below we provide a list of amendments that we introduced to the
draft arbitration agreement and rules of procedure that take account of Ukraine’s proposals (the
numbering in the list is based on the numbering proposed by Ukraine in its diplomatic note).
1. Transparency. This principle is acceptable. Articles 20(4) and 25 of the rules of
procedure were amended accordingly. The amendments are intended to ensure an
appropriate balance between public hearings, effective arbitration proceedings and
preservation of confidential information.
2. Applicable Law. This provision has already been addressed in previous drafts of
arbitration agreement and rules of procedure. Nevertheless, we introduced
additional amendments to emphasize that we accepted this proposal. Corresponding
amendments were introduced to article 3(3) of the draft arbitration agreement and
article 30 of the rules of procedure. These amendments provide that arbitration
tribunal applies rules and principles of international law.
3. Composition of the Tribunal. This proposal is acceptable in most of its part. Article
3(1) of the draft arbitration agreement and articles 5 and 6 of the rules of procedure
were accordingly amended. The Russian Side shares Ukrainian Side’s preference
that the parties agree on the composition of arbitration. However, the Russian Side
considers that the parties shall not limit its choice to the judges of the ICJ. The
Russian Side notes that it is usual practice of interstate arbitrations to appoint
arbitrators who are not judges of the ICJ.
4. Cost Efficiency. The cost efficiency principle is acceptable. This principle is
reflected in redrafted article 14(1) of the rules of procedure and article 38 of the
rules of procedure. Some other amendments introduced by the Russian Side could
provide for additionally cost savings for arbitration. If the Ukrainian Side has
additional proposals that could minimize the cost burdens on arbitration, the Russian
Side is ready to consider them as fast as possible.
5. Participation in the Arbitration. Article 3(2) of the draft arbitration agreement was
amended. We also suggest taking a note of article 22 of the rules of procedure.
6. Enforcement of Arbitral Decision. We suggest taking a note of the article 3(6) of
the draft arbitration agreement. The Russian Side does not understand how the
Ukrainian Side’s proposal concerns the organization of arbitration, subject of the
discussion, and potential agreement between the parties under article 24 of the
Convention because this proposal relates to the enforcement of an arbitral decision.
Specifically, parties’ rights provided by the U.N. Statute, including the right to vote
in the Security Council, do not concern the organization of arbitration and, therefore,
do not fall within the scope of the discussion. If the Ukrainian Side believes that
these issues fall under the scope of article 24 of the Convention, the Russian Side
expects to hear detailed explanations of the Ukrainian Side in this issue.
7. Timely Resolution of the Dispute. We accept the principle that the arbitration
should be structured in order to ensure efficiency and timely resolution of the
dispute. The amendments introduced in articles 6(3), 17(1) and 18 of the draft rules
of procedure provide different rules to incorporate proposals of the Ukrainian Side
and to safeguard each party right to introduce its position.
8. Provisional Measures. We accept the principle that the tribunal should have the
power to issue an award of provisional measures. The draft rules of procedures
were amended with a new article 26 on provisional measures.
9. Possible Participation of Interested Parties. We accept the principle that the tribunal
should have the power to grant requests by interested third states to intervene in the
proceeding. However, the Russian Side is unaware of any precedent in interstate
arbitration practice for such rules. The rules of procedure were amended with a new
article 27. This provision allows setting up conditions and procedures that allow
other states to participate in the proceedings. The Russian Side notes that it is
extremely unusual for interstate arbitration practice for other parties than the states
to the proceedings.
10. Entry into Force. We accept the principle that the arbitration agreement shall enter
into force without unreasonable delay. The corresponding amendments were
introduced to the final provisions of the draft arbitration agreement dealing with
entering into force and article 4 of the draft arbitration agreement was deleted. As
the Russian Side explained during the meeting on October 18, 2016, according to
the Russian legislation, if the arbitration agreement is signed, it will be a subject of
ratification before it enters into force. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take all
steps within its powers to facilitate the radiation of the agreement and to speed up
the process. However, the Russian Side proceeds from the understanding that if the
arbitration agreement is signed, none of the parties will go to the ICJ during before
the parties comply with its internal procedures.
The Russian Side offers to hold a meeting to continue a discussion on the organization of
arbitration. This meeting will allow the parties to explain their proposals and discuss their
implementation. The Russian Side suggests holding the meeting on a week of January 23-29,
2017, in The Hague.
The Ministry avails of this opportunity to renew its highest consideration to the Embassy.
Moscow, December 30, 2016

Annex 385
Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-663-82 to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(13 January 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Annex 386
Intercepted Conversation of Igor Bezler (17 April 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀓􀀗􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀔􀀙􀀝􀀓􀀘􀀝􀀓􀀗 (duration 00:00:36) subscriber of the telephone number
380637138843 (I. N. Bezler) called to the subscriber of the telephone number
380994550769 (unidentified man, “Fedorovich”):
Fedorovich — Yes, Igor Nickolaevich.
Bezler — Fedorovich, look, Rybak is making provocations at the rally,
wants to enter the city administration, take off the flag of the Donetsk Republic and
hang the Ukrainian one again. Can you send a patrol group, slow down this guy a
little bit, because we're checking cars here, based on information...
Fedorovich — Just a minute, I'll ask people now. Alright, now just a second.
Bezler — Alright, thank you.
􀀔􀀚􀀑􀀓􀀗􀀑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀔􀀚􀀝􀀖􀀕􀀝􀀖􀀕 ( duration 00:01:20) subscriber of the telephone number
380662444230 (unidentified man, “Oleg Vladimirovich") called to the subscriber
of the telephone number 380637138843 (I. N. Bezler):
Bezler — Oleh, I'm listening.
􀉈􀀑􀈼􀀑􀀃- Hello, Igorek, listen, Rybak wants that flag, he is trying ... People are
fucking defending it right in the city administration, do not let him fucking pass.
Bezler (says aside) — Call “Alpha”, call “Alpha” immediately.
O. V. – Hello.
Bezler – Yes, I understood. Wait now. Wait now, wait now, wait now,
Vladimirovich. Is he inside of the city administration?
O. V. – Yes. I’m here now.
Bezler (talking on another telephone) – Alpha, listen carefully, go inside of
the city administration, Rybak is fucking misbehaving there.
O. V. – Right now.
Bezler (talking on another telephone) – Listen, go inside of the city
administration, Rybak is misbehaving there, people are trying to restrain him there.
Press him!
O. V. – Let them not press him heavily, let them just bring him out and
that’s fucking it.
Bezler (talking on the telephone) – Look, look, guys, guys, press him
slightly, get him into your car and take him fucking further out, fucking further out.
And then, stop and tell me where I should come. Do you understand? Do it. Bye.
􀀃

Annex 387
Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.22-3958/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the
FSB (22 May 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting:] May 22
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
Extremely urgent
Attn: First Deputy Director of the
Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.M. Dorokhin
Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],
In follow-up to Letter No. 0.42-3946/0/6-14 of May 22, 2014 of the State Border
Guard Service of Ukraine, please be informed that, according to available intelligence,
groups of Cossacks plan to illegally cross the state border in the direction of Gukovo
(Russia) - Sverdlovsk (Ukraine) and also in the direction of Mozhaevka (Russia) -
Gerasimovka (Ukraine).
In light of the foregoing, please take steps to prevent the illegal crossing of the border
by individuals and vehicles, and also inform the Ukrainian side about the preventative
measures taken by you.
Please also be informed that at 12:25 a.m. on May 22, 2014, the Stanichno-Luganskoe
border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under an armed
attack with the use of grenades, automatic assault rifles, and team weapons. As a
result of this armed conflict, 5 border guards sustained gunshot and shrapnel wounds,
including Lieutenant-General Valeriy Alexandrovich Subotin, Chief of the Border Guard
Service Directorate.
In light of the increasingly more frequent incidents involving the use of weapons in
frontier regions of Ukraine, please support the initiatives of the Ukrainian side to hold
meetings at the level of border guard representatives as well as representatives of
operative units of border guard services of Ukraine and the Russian Federation with a
view to arranging operative interaction and preventing illegal crossings of the state
border, including by armed individuals and vehicles.
First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin􀀃
􀀃
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-3958/0/6-14 of May 22, 2014
Serhiy Oleksandrovych Morozov

Annex 388
Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-4016/0/16-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of
the FSB (24 May 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting:] May 24, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-1016/0/16-14 of May 24, 2014
Extremely urgent
Attn: First Deputy Director of the
Border Guard Service of the Federal
Security Service of Russia, Colonel-
General V.M. Dorokhin
Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],
This is to inform you that despite the fact that the Russian side has been provided with
information about the increasingly more frequent attempts to prepare illegal crossings
of the Ukrainian-Russian state border as well as actual illegal crossings, at 3:55 a.m.
on May 24, 2014, a border patrol of the Dmitrovka border guard unit of the Donetsk
border guard detachment detected (using thermal imaging cameras) movement of a
convoy of 5 trucks and 2 passenger cars 800 meters away in the direction of Novaya
Nadezhda (Russia) – Dubrovka (Ukraine) in Russian territory in the direction of the
state border of Ukraine, which was reported to the unit of the Border Guard Service of
the Russian Federation.
Nonetheless, at 4:20 a.m. the convoy of 5 KamAZ trucks and an UAZ minivan and a
NIVA passenger car crossed the state border and made it across the trench in
Ukrainian territory. A large-caliber machine gun was mounted on one of the KamAZ
trucks, while other vehicles carried armed individuals.
In light of the foregoing and in the interests of ensuring the safety of civilians in
frontier regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as well as representatives of the
border guard services of our countries, I would like to call your attention to the
extreme need to urgently implement a set of measures to stabilize the situation in the
jointly protected sector of the state border, prevent illegal crossings of the state
border and smuggling of weapons and ammunition.
First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Colonel-General [Signature] P.A. Shisholin

Annex 389
Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-4289/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the
FSB (3 June 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
􀀃
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of
the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Colonel-General,
Based on information from reliable sources, please be informed that a large group of
800 armed individuals are planning to break through the joint Ukrainian-Russian state
border in the direction of Ukraine on or around June 3-4, 2014 within the strip of land
between Millerovo (Russia) - Dyakovo (Ukraine), Kuibyshevo (Russia) - Dmitrovka
(Ukraine).
It is not to be ruled out that this group of individuals might commit acts of extremism
on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and in other directions within Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts on their way to their final destinations – the cities of Donetsk and
Mariupol.
I urge you to react to this information and make every possible effort to deter and
prevent criminal activity on the Ukrainian-Russian state border.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
O.V. Derkach, 527-63-92
􀎀􀀬􀄂􀅶􀄚􀇁􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀎁􀀃􀀺􀆵􀅶􀄞􀀃􀏯􀍕􀀃􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰
􀀳
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-4289/0/6 of June 3, 2014

Annex 390
Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. F/42-3243 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB
(5 June 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting] June 5, 2014
Copy No. __
STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF
UKRAINE
BORDER GUARD REPRESENTATIVE OF
UKRAINE IN THE DONETSK SECTOR
June 5, 2014, No. F/42-3243
150A Gagarina Street, Mariupol, 87521
Phone: 51-31-74, fax: (0629) 51-31-74
Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko,
Border Guard Representative of the
Russian Federation in the Rostov
Sector
105 Nansena Street, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation,
fax: 8-107-(863) 287-93-00
Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],
This is to respectfully inform you that, according to available intelligence, a convoy of
8 BTR armored personnel carriers with armed personnel is currently proceeding from
the city of Taganrog (Russia) toward Ukraine with the intention of crossing the state
border presumably in sectors supervised by the Amvrosievka and Dmitrovka units of
the state border guard service.
I provide this information so you could take steps to prevent the violation of the state
border regime.
Best regards,
Deputy Border Guard Representative of Ukraine
in the Donetsk Sector
Lieutenant Colonel [Signature] V.V. Galetskiy
June 5, 2014

Annex 391
Intercepted Conversation Between Igor Girkin, Viktor Anosov, and Mykhaylo Sheremet
(11:30:47, 8 June 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Time: June 8, 2014, 11:30:47
Duration: 0:03:48
MSISDN: 380930721558
Direction: Outgoing
Calling parties: <380962662006>
Type: Audio ON
SMS text: "
MMS text: "
Cells: <20534_26157><20534_2 6006><20534_26157>
DTMF:
Call forwarding:
IMEI: 353630053787960
IMSI: 255062004220169
Comment: "
Session ID: 1443196 Object ID: 3627 Call ID: 49055
Operator ID=1766; Name=otpz 1; Last Name=otpz 1
Selection attribute NUMBER=380930721558; Number Type = MSISDN
At 11:30:47 hours on June 8, 2014 (duration: 00:03:48), Nos made a call from the
mobile number 380930721558 (location: 40 Shevchenka Street, Slovyansk, Donetsk
Oblast) to M.S. Sheremet at his mobile number 380962662006 (location:17 Kirova
Prospect, Simferopol, Autonomous Republic of Crimea):
Designations: “Strelok” – Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, d.o.b.
December 17, 1970, citizen of the Russian Federation (terrorist group leader);
“Nos” – Viktor Yuriyovych Anosov, d.o.b. October 31, 1965, citizen of
Ukraine/Russia (“chief of counterintelligence” in the so-called “Strelok’s Group”);
Mykhaylo Serhiyovych Sheremet, d.o.b. May 25, 1971, aide to so-called
Crimean Prime Minister Aksenov.
Sheremet: Hello.
Nos: Hello. Please hold for a moment. Now.
Sheremet: Yes.
Nos: Hello.
Sheremet: Hello. Hello Igor!
Nos: On the line? I’m putting him on the phone.
Sheremet: Yes.
Nos puts Strelok on the phone.
Strelok: Yes, speaking.
Sheremet: Hello Igor. Mikhail here. You should remember me. I’m the aide to
the number one.
Strelok: Yes, I’m listening, Mikhail.
Sheremet: Igor, Sergey here tells me you wanted to get in touch and share some
information.
Strelok: Well, there is nothing to share. It’s common knowledge that they will
crush us unless we receive extensive backup in the immediate future. There is
nothing more. We need truly extensive material support. What are we have is no
longer adequate... To give it to us one teaspoon at a time, like now... Is not going
to help. The proportion of forces of the enemy is much larger. I can hang on for
some more time just because I have entrenched here.
But if they mount an offensive on the other towns at the same pace, they will
quickly run them into the ground with the kind of untrained personnel untested
by fire that we have. Naturally, they will then run me into the ground as well. If
the issue of the Russian help is not resolved, the issue of the air cover, or at least
of the support of artillery, we are not going to be able to keep the East We won’t
hold on to it for sure. First of all, when we needed that extensive support the
most, they were not giving it to us. And what they are giving to us now was needed
a month ago. All that this is good for now is to keep our pants from dropping to
the ground, so to speak. We will not be able to somehow turn the situation around.
They will now begin putting a squeeze on us from every direction.
Sheremet: I see.
Strelok: Hello.
Sheremet: Yes, yes, I hear you.
Strelok: We need, we need... We need the anti-tank artillery, need tanks, need
normal air defense weapons. Shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launchers
are no longer sufficient. Needless to say, we need all of this along with trained
professionals, because we do not and will not have time to train them. For
example, I am now facing 4 tanks in the field outside Semenovka. They are staying
out of the reach of our anti-tank guided missiles and simply shoot up our
positions. They have been doing so for 3 days. Meanwhile, I don’t have a single
anti-tank cannon to fight them. They have just pummeled the city center from
howitzers. They have just fired 30 shells, explosions took place nearby, merely 50
meters away from my headquarters. And I can’t get to them because they are
staying out of reach. This is happening everywhere. They are now simply... the
entire Ukrainian Army (unintelligible).
Sheremet: Yes, yes, I understand.
Strelok: Simply all of it.
Sheremet: Yes, yes.
Strelok: This information must be delivered, because the decision will have to be
made sooner or later anyway. [In the latter case] it will have to be made when
most of the rebels will be eliminated and the frontline will be pushed somewhere
beyond Donetsk, to the East.
Sheremet: Uh-huh.
Strelok: That’s the situation. I am asking you to deliver this to the number one.
Sheremet: Yes, I understand. Good. Got it.
Strelok: That’s all. Stay in touch. Thank you.
Sheremet: Hang in there.
Annex 392
Protocol of Intercepted Conversations of Sergey Glazyev, Advisor to Russian President Putin (12
June 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Counterintelligence Department
33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601
Phone: (044) 256-92-73
June 24, 2014 No. 2/1/4-27333
Re: No. ________ of ______
Copy No. 1
Attn: Major General V.V. Vovk, Chief of
the Central Investigative Directorate of
the Security Service of Ukraine
[Partly illegible stamp: 4440, June 26, 2014.
Primary sheets: 2. Additional sheets: 22]
Regarding the crime detected
Dear Vasyl Vasyliovych [Mr. Vovk],
The Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine has an alleged crime
committed by Russian citizen
Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, d.o.b. January 1,
1961, born in Zaporizhia, registered in Moscow,
who serves as advisor to the Russian President
(diplomatic passport: 100100066, international
passports: 4508388509, 514893523,
633721903).
Acting in the interests of Russia’s geopolitical interests relating to Ukraine and looking to
install levers of influence on the public authorities and administrations of Ukraine, S. Glazyev
is attempting to use Ukrainian public figures and politicians (V. Medvedchuk, P. Symonenko,
O. Tsariov, I. Markov, V. Holenko, etc.) as well as public and religious figures (V. Kaurov, A.
Novikov, O. Nohinsky, etc.), who support the anti-Ukrainian stance of the Russian Federation
against our state.
S. Glazyev has been using his connections with K. Zatulin, Director of the Institute of CIS
Member States, and O. Nohinsky, Chairman of the Management Board of the Customs Union
Suppliers Association, to provide funding for representatives of the pro-Russian public
organizations Oplot, Odeska Druzhyna, Union of Orthodox Citizens, and others. He
coordinated their involvement in anti-government rallies in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts, and
facilitated the armed annexation of Crimea.
In addition, as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict unfolds, S. Glazyev has been supporting the
illegal activities of the self-proclaimed prime minister of Crimea, S. Aksenov, and leaders of
the DNR and LNR terrorist organizations – P. Gubarev and V. Bolotov.
His actions foment public disturbances, armed resistance against representatives of the
incumbent authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, and facilitates severe crimes
committed by representatives of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the Central
Investigative Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army against the fundamentals
of Ukraine’s national security, human lives and health.
The information gathered proves that S. Glazyev has organized and is involved in acts that
harm the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine, as well as acted to
organize public disturbances in the territory of Ukraine’s southeastern regions.
This is to inform you that grounds exist for commencing a pretrial investigation.
􀏮􀀃
􀀃
Attachment:
1. Record of secret surveillance No. 2/1/4-25971 of June 12, 2014, unclassified, on thirty-one
(31) pages, copy No. 1, with the attachment of a Verbatim DVD-R disk registered at the
Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine under No. 1528 of March
12, 2014, unclassified.
Best regards,
Chief of Department
Major General [Signature] V. Kondratyuk
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Seal for Documents No. 5]
􀏯􀀃
􀀃
[Page 3]
[Handwriting: Unclassified]
Classified
Copy No. 1
[Seal: Classified Information Unit,
Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine]
RECORD
of the results of secret surveillance
Kyiv June 12, 2014
Started at 9:30 a.m. on June 12, 2014. Ended at 6 p.m. on June 12, 2014.
I, Lieutenant Colonel V.V. Drahan, Operational Consultant and Expert with the 4th Unit of the
Counterintelligence and Detective Directorate of the Counterintelligence Department of the
Security Service of Ukraine, have prepared this record in my office No. 123 pursuant to the
provisions of Clause 6, Article 7 of the Law of Ukraine On Counterintelligence Activities and
the January 31, 2014 ruling No. 01-892tst of A.V. Chernushenko, Presiding Judge of the Kyiv
Court of Appeals, based on the findings of secret surveillance operations conducted by the
Surveillance Department of the Security Service of Ukraine, which involved wiretapping the
telecom networks between January 31, 2014 and March 31, 2014. This record has been
prepared to the effect that the surveillance operations produced factual evidence that can be
used, under Clause 1 of Article 10 of the Law of Ukraine On Operative and Detective
Activities to begin a pretrial investigation against Russian citizen Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev,
d.o.b. January 1, 1961, and against his contacts among Ukrainian citizens and foreign
nationals.
The secret surveillance materials were received from the Surveillance Department of the
Security Service of Ukraine and are stored on a DVD-R disk No. 1528 “t” of March 12, 2014.
Transcript of information gathered during the surveillance operation:
Date: February 27, 2014
Time: 10:36:50
Duration: 0:01:35
MSISDN: 79859698761 (mobile phone of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties: 380630300033 (Tamara)
FO: Front Office of Mr. Glazyev. Good afternoon!
T: Hello miss. My name is Tamara. I’m calling from Kharkiv for Sergey Yuryevich on behalf of
Evgeny Vladimirovich Zhylin from Oplot. They had a certain conversation, and we need an
answer. This is with regard to Kharkiv. Could you ask him, please.
FO: Hold on a second.
S.G.: Hello.
T: Hello, Sergey Yuryevich! My name is Tamara. I’m calling on behalf of Evgeny
Vladimirovich Zhylin from Oplot, Kharkiv, regarding the budget for people. We emailed it to...
Sokolov.
S.G.: Yes. I gave your details, including his details, to our people in charge of this matter.
They should be contacting you. They will be contacting him.
T: Fine. Thank you very much. Sorry to bother.
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Seal for Documents No. 5]
[Stamp: Appendix to Incoming Ref. No. 4440]
􀀃
􀏰􀀃
􀀃
[Page 4]
Date: February 27, 2014
Time: 14:07:11
Duration: 0:5:35
Target: 79859698761 (mobile phone of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Parties: 79859698761, 79857629993 (mobile phone used by
Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
S.G.: Hello.
K.Z.: Hello Sergey. Well, I spoke to Kolesnichenko. He is playing Cicero, escorting all sorts of
our delegations through Sevastopol. When I told him he needed to move out to Simferopol,
he is clearly avoiding this mission. I think that he, just like many others, is thinking more about
his own prospects. He was like: “I need to consult people. I don’t know what happened. I
wasn’t informed...”. I tell him: “Let me explain it to you”. And he’s like: “No, I need to consult
my own people...” and so forth.
S.G.: With whom?
K.Z.: With some people of his. With the people he maintains contact with. Anyhow, he isn’t too
keen on going to Simferopol. This is what concerns him. Tell me: Is Tsariov coming or not?
S.G.: I talked to our leader of the “Service”. So far they advise him to refrain from coming.
K.Z.: I see. This brings us to the third question I asked you. We’re out! We have already “used
up all our ammo”, so to speak. In other words, we need somewhere around thirty or fifty grand
immediately, at the very least. This is needed to... Not only to... Scouts have joined us here.
The thing we discussed: Kharkiv and Odesa. We are forced to dole out to them...
S.G.: What about the friend? What? Is he pretending like this does not concern him?
K.Z.: To be honest, he needs the relevant order to be issued. Issue it. I have already been
using the Western Union payment system to wire money from my Institute. I have already
gone $5,000 out of pocket.
S.G.: What amount do you need?
K.Z.: I’m thinking. Taking into account our potential costs – up to 50 grand by tomorrow. Here.
Onsite. So we could... There is another important aspect. All scouts from other missions here
are rattling their shields and shouting: “We are ready for tomorrow, the day after tomorrow...”
and so forth. What is our tactic? Send them in right away or wait until next week?
S.G.: No, we can’t wait. Send them in right away. Whoever is ready, let them go.
K.Z.: But all they are capable of is just hot air.
S.G.: Only you should know about it... Look here. If you have such volunteers...
K.Z.: At least we have them in Kharkiv and Odesa.
S.G.: At the very least, they need to be documented. By the way, can you send me their last
names?
K.Z.: ... The one we worked with... that Oplot... the one you met with. In Odesa, it’s Odeska
Druzhyna.
S.G.: Are you sure that Oplot is capable...?
K.Z.: They are saying that they are keeping people in the square.
S.G.: Fine. I will check again.
K.Z.: I have them partly satisfied. But their appetites are much larger and they keep broaching
these issues. As for Odesa, I think that on account of the special nature of this city we should
first consult Kivalov in Moscow.
S.G.: I will hold consultants in both cases.
K.Z.: I spoke to the Metropolitan. I did not discuss this subject with the Metropolitan. I offered
him a little support because he lost some of his enthusiasm...
S.G.: There have been media reports along the lines of “The Presidium of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea addressed citizens regarding the unconstitutional coup, bandit groups,
etc.” They are calling a referendum on this issue... a rather strange issue... “Improvement of
the status of the autonomy and broadening of powers”.
K.Z.: What’s with the government? Will it meet in session?
􀏱􀀃
􀀃
There is already a crowd gathered out front. There are close to six thousand people right now.
All of them with Russian flags. There are also some talking heads. But there is no trace of
either Tsekov or Aksenov nearby.
S.G.: I’ll be damned! How long have we been feeding them? Oh well.
K.Z.: Yes. Take care, bye.
[Page 5]
Date: February 27, 2014
Time: 14:45:58
Duration: 00:02:00
Target: 79859698761 (mobile phone of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Parties: 79859698761, 79857629993 (mobile phone used by Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
K.Z.: Hello Sergey.
S.G.: Yes.
K.Z.: I wanted to tell you something. We have a petition from the Supreme Council of Crimea.
52 council members gathered inside. In other words, they have a quorum. Our friends believe
that they will be voting for Aksenov’s government.
S.G.: That’s crazy. But that doesn’t make sense.
K.Z.: Well yes. At any rate, this is what our friend Anatoly told me. They discussed this.
S.G.: Does this mean that they assume responsibility for him?
K.Z.: I don’t know. That’s what I was told. I did not pry so as not to make the situation any
tenser. As for Nalivaychenko and Avakov, there is no clarity. 36 minutes ago his press
secretary was taking questions from journalists and said she was not authorized to tell them
where he was. In Crimea or Kyiv.
S.G.: No. He is there for now. We are monitoring this situation.
K.Z.: What do you mean? Did he simply not take the flight?
S.G.: It’s just that they have not made the decision yet. Oh well. It would be better if he didn’t
fly. Why the hell is he needed there? Keep me informed. They are patching me through
quickly for now... so I will be able to report...
[Page 6]
Date: February 27, 2014
Time: 19:59:09
Duration: 00:03:45
Target: 79857687453 (mobile phone used by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Outgoing
Parties: 79857629993 (mobile phone used by Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
K.Z.: Yes.
S.G.: Konstantin, they have started forming the new executive authorities there. Judging by
Aksenov’s statements, it’s some kind of a coordination council?! It’s important that they don’t
forget our “Kmyrik” [translator’s note: the name “Knyrik” is incorrectly transcribed hereinafter.
This is in reference to Konstantin Sergeyevich Knyrik] and the people in the streets, because
they do not trust Aksenov and could disperse.
K.Z.: Tell you what: I am going there tomorrow morning, so I will try to get involved in that
process by as much as possible.
S.G.: We need people in the streets to delegate their representatives to these executive
authorities.
K.Z.: I hear you.
S.G.: Otherwise, they can give up and disperse. This risk exists, you know. They don’t like
him.
K.Z.: We are in a bit of trouble with Aksenov, I think.
􀏲􀀃
􀀃
S.G.: Hang on. By the way, I just got a message. Kunitsyn got appointed as the president’s
envoy by that guy, what’s his name, who came to you. By the way, did he come or not? Or is
it unknown?
K.Z.: I have not been able to find out until now, which is why I left.
S.G.: Well, we don’t know at all either. Long story short, Kunitsyn and Aksenov now rule
Crimea. Of course, this is very strange considering the relationship...
K.Z.: They rule. They hardly rule because Kunitsyn...
S.G.: Formally speaking.
K.Z.: Well, they do not want to recognize Kunitsyn as a representative.
S.G.: That’s clear, but still they have a close bond, and this is suspicious, of course. That’s
why the guys want everything to be done openly in a way that’s understandable to everybody,
and they want to be part of that coordination council, or whatever that new government is
called.
K.Z.: It's the government. It's not the coordination council...
S.G.: Somebody mentioned the words “coordination council” or something.
K.Z.: No. Chalyi has a coordination council in Sevastopol. He chairs the coordination council.
S.G.: Apparently, he decided to do the same thing after Chalyi’s fashion. As long as this is not
called a council of ministers, which would be wrong. It has to be called properly.
K.Z.: I only heard about a government. Did somebody say it was a coordination council?
S.G.: Well, Aksenov gave a speech addressing some military personnel and said: “Now we
are the power. If you disagree, disarm and leave. If you agree, let us serve the people of
Crimea”. He made this statement. It was broadcast on television. He went on to say:
“Tomorrow our coordination council will decide how to form the government”.
K.Z.: This is exactly as you presumed. I think that he will now legitimize this story about this
third, third, third...
S.G.: We need to keep this under control to make sure all of our people are included,
especially that “Knyrik”.
K.Z.: You know what? This story with Aksenov is actually a gamble.
S.G.: It’s a gamble. I agree.
K.Z.: At some point. I talked to someone here, and they asked me: “Listen, has anybody
worked with him? Because word has it that...”. Anatoly... Why are you asking me this
question? You have suggested him to me. You asked me to work with him. I worked with him.
He does not deserve complete trust.
S.G.: We should ask Konstantinov who recommended [Aksenov] to him and how it
happened. But I think if he misbehaves he will be dismissed just as easily as he was
appointed.
K.Z.: First of all, I want to arrange a meeting with Konstantinov and gain confidence in this
matter...
S.G.: ... to get them to include all of our people...
K.Z.: I will try. I will try.
S.G.: Take care, bye.
[Page 7]
Date: February 27, 2014
Time: 23:39:44
Duration: 00:02:22
Target: 79857687453 (mobile phone used by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Outgoing
Parties: 79857629993 (mobile phone used by Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
K.Z.: Hello.
S.G: Has the situation quieted down there, Konstantin?
K.Z.: Looks like it has. It’s been an hour since I got off the phones. I spoke to people’s
representatives who came to us here: Vasilyev, Rodnina, Valuev, Tereshkova, and so forth.
Our plan for tomorrow is to go there together to sort out all those issues. I gave them all the
􀏳􀀃
􀀃
latest updates, including about the threat of... They updated me on the Kovel-Simferopol
train... To the best of my understanding, all is well so far. At any rate, there haven’t been any
more contacts and everything is normal.
S.G.: Do they have an understanding who to appoint to lead the uniformed services?
K.Z.: No. We haven’t gotten to the particulars yet, you see. Or they don’t discuss the
particulars with me, at any rate...
S.G.: Then I will raise this question tomorrow.
K.Z.: In reality, by all accounts the attitude toward all those appointments is very fuzzy.
Nobody is discussing this seriously.
S.G.: We need to discuss all this with Konstantinov urgently. Because there’s nobody else
except you there...
K.Z.: I plan to go there tomorrow to discuss all of this with Konstantinov.
S.G.: One man you know will be flying over there tomorrow. He will call you. I gave him your
number. He will simply say his name. Be sure to meet with him. You know each other and will
see eye to eye. If you do, this situation can be considered resolved.
K.Z.: When is he arriving?
S.G.: He is arriving around 3-4 p.m.
K.Z.: It’s the second flight.
S.G.: Probably.
K.Z.: I will be in Simferopol since early morning.
S.G.: Well, it’s a process... I think that if he joins it and you manage to agree, we will stabilize
the situation completely.
K.Z.: At any rate, we will try.
[Page 8]
Date: February 28, 2014
Time: 07:52:47
Duration: 00:01:59
Target: 79857687453 (mobile phone used by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Outgoing
Parties: 79857629993 (mobile phone used by Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
K.Z.: Yes.
S.G.: Hello Konstantin!
K.Z.: Hi!
S.G.: I sent you a text message. Apparently, those women will be buried soon. We need to
have all of this properly covered in terms of propaganda. Portray them as heroes and so forth.
Anyway, this is a high-profile event, and it’s important how it’s going to be handled.
K.Z.: When? Is it today?
S.G.: Well, they died yesterday. They are not buried on the same day. Usually on the third
day.
K.Z.: I know when they died.
S.G.: I don’t know for sure. I think it’s easy to find out. The Supreme Council observed a
minute of silence. Arrange a mourning ceremony, to make it a solemn event and have them
declared heroes of the resistance movement. Something along those lines. It’s a very
important aspect that we do not forget our victims...
Give me some pointers how I should speak to Aksenov, because we are prepared to provide
experts, primarily legal experts who would draft resolutions and laws. We can now launch... I
would like to coordinate with the leader... the Crimea Development Corporation project
urgently. Everything is ready on our end for this. Everything was in place there. Plus, the
customs authorities must be taken under control to prevent them from stealing. Anyway, there
are lots of issues. We have human resources and we need them to deploy there urgently.
Don’t feel uncomfortable because of their passports.
K.Z.: Fine, fine.
S.G.: Call me to help me understand your systems of relations with them there.
􀏴􀀃
􀀃
K.Z.: I will be in Simferopol at ten or a little past eleven.
[Page 9]
Date: February 23, 2014
Time: 08:34:48
Duration: 00:03:31
Target: 79857687453 (mobile phone used by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Outgoing
Parties: 79857629993 (mobile phone used by Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
K.Z.: Yes.
S.G.: Konstantin, I have at least one nominee for the ministry for emergency management.
He is a good personal friend of mine. He used to head the Crimean ministry for emergency
management at one time. He was then demoted... By Yushchenko... He never got reinstated.
His name is Razumovskiy. Nikolay Ivanovich Razumovskiy.
K.Z.: Fine.
S.G.: He is a professional. He used to serve as the minister for emergency management in
that same position. And those guys who worked with us. Remember? Knyrik and company.
They gave us their list of ten people. I will forward it to you so you can have it handy.
K.Z.: My Gmail account is [email protected]􀀑
S.G.: We need this guy who worked with us, that Knyrik. Also Sliusarenko. We want them to
go to you and participate in negotiations. They have been actually standing there for two
days. Act according to the situation.
K.Z.: The stumbling block here are intolerant relations within the Russian movement.
S.G.: I understand all of this perfectly. But Sliusarenko doesn’t. I shouldn’t have told you
about Sliusarenko. We should focus on Knyrik, I suppose. You have Pershikov, Knyrik there.
K.Z.: Well, Pershikov also has quite a history with that one.
S.G.: Fine. I spoke to Orestovich. We have reached a mutual understanding on the staffing
issues. In other words, I will duplicate everything for them. I baffled them. I told them that they
needed appoint their people for the uniformed services by the end of day, while we need to
focus on the social and economic block. There’s also the Central Electoral Committee to think
about.
K.Z.: ... Fine, but tell me: Do you think I should approach Yakovlev with this issue?
S.G.: Well, he’s apparently in charge there among them.
K.Z.: No, I mean...
S.G.: Staffing issues?
K.Z.: Material, material issues.
S.G.: Material issues? First of all, I got approached by one man today. He can solve all of
those issues in one fell swoop. But his format of involvement needs to be discussed with him.
He fears that we would mess about for three months and then abandon all of this. This is his
biggest concern.
K.Z.: His involvement in what? ... Specifically in the government?
S.G.: No, he did not put it like that. He didn’t even mention it. He just wants to understand...
K.Z.: Let him contact me.
S.G.: And Yakovlev must be approached about the other issues. Because the leader told me
yesterday that everything has been set in motion.
K.Z.: Well, as of yesterday I know what he had and how much. At least, according to him.
S.G.: Well, I think it did not reach him yesterday yet. I think he should have everything today.
[Page 10]
Date: February 28, 2014
Time: 09:09:59
Duration: 00:01:49
􀏵􀀃
􀀃
Target: 79857687453 (mobile phone used by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Outgoing
Parties: 79857629993 (mobile phone used by Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin)
S.G.: Konstantin! Look here. I have just contacted Medvedchuk. They will come forward with
their proposals. Their incumbent minister of justice of Crimea (the one who served under
Mogiliov) is Sergey Vladimirovich Korovchenko. He is their man. They speak well of him. He
said that they would put a team together. We need that Korovchenko... Since he’s already the
minister of justice of Crimea, we need him to stay there...
K.Z.: But I don’t know how this Korovchenko behaved himself.
S.G.: Konstantin, I understand.
K.Z.: I arranged a meeting. I’m on my way there. I will be there around eleven. He is very
tense because they will be approving the cabinet members at 3 p.m. Miscellaneous
consultants are in progress as we speak. Well, it’s best to delay it until the last day, actually.
S.G.: Ask about Korovchenko.
K.Z.: Fine, I will ask him.
S.G.: I have two nominees for whom I vouch: Korovchenko is from Medvedchuk. Meanwhile,
I’ve known Razumovskiy well for many years.
K.Z.: Medvedchuk disappeared at the very height of the moment.
S.G.: He may have vanished, but his legal team is not bad. He fully supports our position.
Most importantly, he can speak to Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] anytime he wants. He is an
important channel of influence.
K.Z.: I see.
S.G.: And this... will be useful.
K.Z.: Fine, I understand, good.
S.G.: Take care.
[Page 11]
Date: March 1, 2014
Time: 16:03:26
Duration: 00:04:28
Target: 74956064302 (office phone of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Parties: 380673463746 - Kirill Alexandrovich Frolov
FO: Good afternoon, I’m listening.
K.F.: Sergey Yuryevich?
FO: No. Who’s speaking?
K.F.: Kirill Frolov.
FO: Yes, Kirill.
K.F.: I’d like to report on the rally in Odesa.
FO: Where?
K.F.: In Odesa.
FO: Aha, yes, yes, Kirill. Hold on a second.
S.G.: Hello.
K.F.: Sergey Yuryevich, I’m reporting. There were very many people. You can say 40,000. A
full square. About that Anton... Most importantly, he invited the “liberators” of the Supreme
Council of Crimea to liberate Odesa. There are roadblock on approaches to Odesa Oblast.
You have the resolution in your mailbox. We have inserted all the relevant details. Only your
version says that it is a resolution of the Union of Orthodox Citizens. Now you have to add in
the heading that it's a resolution of the Union of Orthodox Citizens and a resolution of the
People’s Assembly of Odesa. This is to... (unintelligible) on the Internet. Only you can
disseminate this now.
S.G.: I don’t have this in my mailbox yet.
􀏭􀏬􀀃
􀀃
K.F.: How so? I sent it in the afternoon! But from a different address (gives the address):
“Valeriy Russkiy...”.
S.G.: Ah, Valeriy, I see it.
K.F.: I need to add that this is a resolution of the People’s Assembly. Plus, we have capable
people with whom we can work. We are flying to Moscow tomorrow at 5:30 p.m. You asked
me. I rallied the people...
S.G.: First of all, this is only the beginning of the process. The Regional Council has not
gathered yet and has not passed a resolution to the effect that they do not consider the Kyiv
authorities to be legitimate, and in accordance with the recommendations of the Kharkiv
Congress...
K.F.: Yes... They are afraid, and it’s not clear if they can assemble next week.
S.G.: That’s the whole point. You can’t disperse. You have to take over this Regional Council,
assemble its members, and force them to pass resolutions.
K.F.: But for this to happen, we need several people to fly over here and give clear
instructions. Moreover, you told me to bring them!
S.G.: Listen, I... the situation is evolving. They took over the Regional Council in Kharkiv as
well as in Donetsk. You have to take control of the Regional Council and assemble the
people’s representatives!
K.F.: I understand.
S.G.: And do not disperse until then. If you assemble again in a week, Banderovites with the
police will gather there and will not let anyone through.
K.F.: Well, yes. If I’m going to bring people tomorrow, then when? You could see them in the
morning and they would return.
S.G.: Listen! Why do they need to come now? They need to take over the Regional Council,
assemble the council members, pass resolutions, and only then send an envoy here, if
necessary. Or do you expect us to send people there?
K.F.: All understood.
S.G.: Don’t delay! You have to make... act decisively! The way they did in Kharkiv and
Donetsk. Our guys have already taken over the regional councils there. You have to do the
same thing here. You have to take control of the Regional Council and assemble the people’s
representatives. Do not disperse. Go forward. If you just talk and disperse, this will end in
failure.
[Page 13]
Date: March 1, 2014
Time: 16:50:22
Duration: 00:04:02
MSISDN: 74956064302 (office phone of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties: 380673463746 - Kirill Alexandrovich Frolov, Denis
S.G.: Hello.
K.F.: Sergey Yuryevich, I would ask you to say a few words to people who could...
S.G.: Hello.
D. Hello, Sergey Yuryevich. My name is Denis. I am from Odesa. We have people who are
ready to act, in principle, but we need some specific, clear, understandable
recommendations. Who will support what? Will we have guarantees that a couple of buses
from Kyiv will not drive up here tomorrow and...
S.G.: I can say the following. First, our Federation Council is now voting, has voted already,
on the presidential decree on the use of...
D. We know, we know.
S.G.: You know, don’t you? This is therefore very serious and you will be supported. Don’t
worry. Second, it is very important for us to have people make appeals to Putin. Mass appeals
directly addressed to him with a request to protect them. Appeals to Russia, and so forth.
Third... you already have this petition at the rally. The third aspect is that resolutions of
􀏭􀏭􀀃
􀀃
regional councils are very important for us. It is therefore very important for the regional
council to assemble now. And in order for it to assemble, you have to do the same thing they
did in Kharkiv. People entered the council in Kharkiv, kicked all of the Banderovites out, found
a weapons cache there and are now disarming it. The council will assemble and appeal to our
president as well. We also need a resolution of the regional council to the effect that they do
not recognize the legitimacy of the Kyiv authorities, that they are criminals, and so forth. It is a
very important aspect: the regional council should be taken over to enable council members
to gather. You also need to explain to council members that they must come and vote in this
situation. Those who don’t show up to vote should be branded as traitors, Banderovites,
fascists, and so forth, with all the attendant consequences. As people's representatives, they
must assume responsibility for the situation in Odesa Oblast. They were elected by the
people to make decisions. You simply need to explain to them in no uncertain terms that they
are obligated to come to the regional council and pass the relevant resolution. Meanwhile,
you should naturally protect them against pressure from Banderovites, to give the assurances
that the situation is safe. Accordingly, all of the relevant buildings should be taken under
control.
D. I hear you. Look here. First, we are prepared for this, but we need to understand the
timeline. We can arrange this today. Or do we have time until tomorrow?
S.G.: In theory, you have time, but it’s better to have everything done by tomorrow morning so
the council would be confronted with facts.
D. So after taking over the building we will call the regional council session, right? We will
invite council members and ask them to vote.
S.G.: Yes, yes, yes. You will simply bring them. The same way this was done by those...
Those in doubt should be simply taken by their collar and brought forcibly.
D. Fine, I understand. Then we gather for an emergency session and... Fine, Sergey
Yuryevich.
S.G.: And stay in touch with... Kirill. Pass the phone to Kirill, I will tell him who to stay in touch
with.
D. Hang on.
K.F.: Yes.
S.G.: Hello, Kirill! Do you know Marat, who’s in charge of television here?
K.F.: Yes, of course.
S.G.: You must stay in touch with him in all matters relating to coordination. Keep me
informed as well, but, in principle, he set about facilitating this entire operation there, and Oleg
Markov is there with him.
K.F.: Is he with him? So I will bring all guys to Marat. Can you tell him to expect my call?
S.G.: Agreed, bye.
[Page 17]
Date: March 1, 2014
Time: 17:58:59
Duration: 0:5:29
Target: 79859698761 (mobile phone used by S.Yu. Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Parties: 380954411871 (Arina, Luhansk)
A.: I am meeting him in an hour. Should I call you in an hour then? Or perhaps I should write
it down now while you dictate...
S.G.: Item one. We are proceeding from the Kharkiv Accords, that is, from the resolution of
the Kharkiv Congress. Regional councils are the only legitimate public authorities... hang on
(answers another call). Hello, Anatoly Petrovich. Hi! Do you see what is happening? Our task
for now is... I can’t reach Boguslaev on the phone. He vanished somewhere. Sometimes he
answers the phone, sometimes he doesn’t. Nikolay Ivanovich left. We agreed that Boguslaev
would arrive on Monday and we would meet with him. Unfortunately, no time is left until
Monday. The entire operation will be over on Monday. It is very important for us to have them
􀏭􀏮􀀃
􀀃
give us their people in Zaporizhia so they would take to the square, drive the Banderovites out
of the regional administration and the regional council, where they barricaded themselves,
and follow the Kharkiv scenario. Long story short, if they don’t do it, we understand... they can
do this easily but they are hiding somewhere. If they don’t do it, we will treat them
accordingly... They have 1,500 people and they can easily do this. Nobody will resist. The
Kharkiv people even did this. Unarmed self-defense athletes simply came and kicked those
Banderovites out. Do you see? Why is Zaporizhia quiet? Where have they gone? We
definitely know that he has 1,500 people. Where are they? Where are the Cossacks? He is
our chief partner there, after all. I have orders to raise everybody, raise the people. People
should gather in the square and ask Russia for help against the Banderovites. Specially
trained people should drive Banderovites out of the regional council building and then gather
the council and create an executive authority. The regional council will pass on executive
power to it and subordinate the police to this new authority. We need all of this... Listen, if they
don’t do this, to hell with them. Nobody will speak to them here. I have direct orders from the
leadership: to raise people in Ukraine wherever we can. This means we need to get people
into the streets, just like they did in Kharkov, and do so as soon as possible. Because, you
see, the president has signed the decree. The operation has been set in motion. There are
already reports of the military moving out. Why are they sitting there? We can’t do this
forcibly. We use the force only to rally the people’s support and nothing more. If there are no
people, what kind of support is there to speak of? Listen, tell him that the country’s fate is at
stake and we are in the middle of a war. That’s why every step should be aligned... he has
tremendous resources, and we know it.
S.G.: Hello.
A.: Yes.
S.G.: Well, do you understand, in general? The regional council should assemble now and,
according to the Kharkiv accords, pass a resolution denouncing the Kyiv authorities as
illegitimate. Third, if the governor refuses to obey the regional council, a new executive body
should be formed and given authority over all the regional uniformed services, and instructed
to petition Russia and the president personally with a request for protection against fascists
and rapists who usurped power in Kyiv, and hang on. Notably, there should be as many
people as possible in the square, who will appeal to Russia and our president for help. All of
this should be recorded by TV channels and broadcast as extensively as possible. We should
then hang on until reinforcements arrive. Your situation is the easiest of all. If they rose even
in Kharkiv and Odesa, you are really close there. Even coal miners have taken over
government buildings in Donetsk. Anyway, you have to do this today. Assemble them today
to ensure that these resolutions are passed tomorrow preferably. Tell them that it’s our
sweeping policy all over Ukraine. Let them follow these recommendations. They should call
me, if necessary.
A.: I understand everything, fine.
S.G.: (Says goodbye)
[Page 20]
Date: March 1, 2014
Time: 18:38:50
Duration: 00:01:26
Target: 79859698761 (mobile phone of S.Yu. Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Parties: 380954411871 – Arina, Luhansk. Valeriy Nikolaevich Golenko, d.o.b. May 6, 1958,
native of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Luhansk Regional Council.
V.G.: Sergey Yuryevich, this is Valeriy Nikolaevich speaking. Well, I have just spoken to
Arina. She told me...
V.G.: Well, this is actually our policy. We are guided by the principle whereby
only regional councils are the legitimate public authorities. We are prepared to offer all kinds
of assistance. Tell me what kind of assistance you need. The regional council must gather
􀏭􀏯􀀃
􀀃
officially and declare that the Kyiv authorities are illegitimate. The way they did in Kharkiv. In
fact, the Kharkiv Accords should be put in effect, the way it was done in Crimea. Essentially,
we are also struggling in Kharkiv to assemble the regional council. The most important aspect
is a petition to our president and Russia with a request for assistance, along with a formal
resolution to the effect that Ukraine has no legitimate authorities other than regional councils.
This means that the executive authorities must be fully and entirely subordinated to the
regional council in this situation.
V.G.: I understand. We will have support. Yes, along those lines?
V.G.: Absolutely. Whatever support you need, tell us.
(Say goodbyes)
[Page 21]
Date: March 1, 2014
Time: 19:11:54
Duration: 0:06:39
MSISDN: 380676379746.
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties: 74959212145 (office phone (front office) of S.Yu. Glazyev; O.A. Tsariov
speaks on the phone) 380676345227
I.S.: Yes, yes.
O.Ts.: So what is happening over there, Igor.
I.S.: So the Union of Soviet Officers assembled one rally of some 3,000 people next to the
opera theater. They called, wanted to see. Then some 1,000 people gathered near the
Monument to Lenin. Then I got a call from Dima Kashik, who said that some 300 fighters...
O.Ts.: Banderovites...
I.S.: ... are on their way to defend the administration. They are armed. Then I got a call from
the young people’s movement. Do you remember those crazies taking care of children?
Some 1,000 people, who are allegedly not natives of Dnipropetrovsk, raised a flag over the
city council.
O.Ts.: 1,000 people but not natives of Dnipropetrovsk?
I.S.: Well, they say they are not natives of Dnipropetrovsk, but I don’t think so.
O.Ts.: Then I just got a call from Ivan. He assembled a two-pronged procession that will
march on the Cabinet of Ministers... based on lists. They will block the city council session so
as not to provoke...
I.S.: What do you mean by “based on lists”?
O.Ts.: If the election takes place. I was simply interrupted.
I.S.: Did they pass a law that the new election can only happen based on party rosters?
O.Ts.: No, they have not yet.
I.S.: What about a draft of this law?
O.Ts.: Just the draft. But it’s not a law yet.
I.S.: And so?
O.Ts.: We only started our conversation.
I.S.: So is Alexander doing something there? Who is in the regional council anyway?
O.Ts.: First, Udod submitted his resignation in the regional council but then withdrew it.
I.S.: Who is sitting there?
O.Ts.: He is practically not there. The office is sealed.
I.S.: Who is inside the building?
O.Ts.: It was guarded by Banderovites.
I.S.: Did Banderovites also guard the regional administration?
O.Ts.: Yes, the same thing. Until today. How today will end is anyone’s guess... both in the
regions and in Dneprodzerzhinsk, and in Marganets, and in Novomoskovsk. People in
Novomoskovsk defended both the monument and all the other aspects. Today I got a call
from Novomoskovsk. By the way, there are not that many nominees so far, but I still need...
I.S.: Give me a nominee, I will...
􀏭􀏰􀀃
􀀃
O.Ts.: Give me a little more time.
I.S.: Just a ballpark.
O.Ts.: In reality, I don’t see any nominees among the members of public organizations
managed by us so far. Give me a little... I will call you... Literally...
I.S.: So nobody? Yes? Fedyakin?
O.Ts.: It’s a funny suggestion from the perspective of our cause. If you look at him as a
kamikaze who will do... This can also be Katya, who is unhinged to some extent. And from the
viewpoint of our cause... We need elites to accept them if we are doing this for the long term.
I.S.: I will consider every possible option now. Starting from Lyubonenkov, and so forth... I
realize that...
O.Ts.: Well, we...
I.S.: Don’t care, I understand.
O.Ts.: No. Oleg Anatolyevich, we will have a team... I don’t need a thousand years, of
course... Give me at least... If this is needed for the cause and personally for you, I am
ready...
I.S.: If I go now, I will not be able to later go there... We need to organize everything in one
place, such as a single committee, and which point it would be interesting to head this
committee. I don’t need the region if I previously dreamed of...
O.Ts.: No, no, no. Do not oversimplify things. No matter how things play out, this is the key
aspect that... Anyway, if it's an all-stakes game and you clearly see that this is needed for the
cause, you can make a decision...
I.S.: But then... You should then assemble all those people. Start making calls so we could
bring 10,000 people out into the streets. And estimate the budget you need
in order to have your people take over the regional administration and the regional council.
O.Ts.: I understand the task. It’s just that...
I.S.: We can’t authorize more than $300,000...
O.Ts.: To give you an understanding, we had numerous calls prior to that.
I.S.: Think about it, join the process, and I will get in touch with you in 30 minutes. I would like
this to happen quickly. For example, if you could assemble the team by tomorrow. Or by
Monday.
O.Ts.: I understand.
[Page 23]
Date: March 1, 2014
Time: 21:02:29
Duration: 00:02:56
Target: 74959212145 (office phone (front office) of S.Yu. Glazyev; O.A. Tsariov speaks on
the phone)
Direction: Incoming. Parties: 380675117444
FO: Hello.
T: Hello. Gvardeyskoe has been put on alert. The military are boarding buses and trains with
military hardware.
FO: Hold on a second. Who is this?
T: I need to speak to Oleg, if possible.
FO: Hang on a second.
O.Ts.: Hello.
T: Hello. Oleg, this is Tigran.
O.Ts.: Why are you calling from this phone?
T: You call me from this phone, so I’m calling back. Is it safe to speak or...?
O.Ts.: Well, yes. This is my office phone. I sent you a text message. Your number was busy.
T: Yes, I decided not to wait. Look here. The military personnel from Gvardeyskoe have been
put on alert. They are leaving now. They are boarding buses and loading hardware on a train.
They are headed in the direction of Crimea. Now they will try to block roads for civilians. All
officers do not want to go.
􀏭􀏱􀀃
􀀃
O.Ts.: Let them go and switch over to the Crimean side. Not a problem!
T: They are asking for help to stop them from leaving.
O.Ts.: Uh-uh.
T: So there. That’s what I wanted to let you know right away.
O.Ts.: Call Igor Skozhutin. Do you have his number?
T: No. I don’t know who he is.
O.Ts.: Arrange to work with him. I will now give you his number (dictates): 060...
T: Egor just called our guys and has also been asking for help.
O.Ts.: Tell him to call Igor Skozhutin. Okay?
T: Another question. Regarding the number of people. There are about fifty professionals
here in Dnipropetrovsk. There are 200 more men in Kirilovka.
O.Ts.: You have to assemble all people.
T: They are also professionals. Well, just like me...
O.Ts.: Our task is this: Zaporizhia should come immediately after Odesa, Donetsk, Luhansk,
and Kharkiv.
T: Zaporizhia...
O.Ts.: That is to say, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia. That’s why you should assemble people
and arm yourselves. Those bastards are arming themselves and that's the worst...
T: I know.
O.Ts.: I will be with you.
T: It's just that I. I also want to go to Crimea. I need to meet and talk with people there. I could
also talk with you for coordination. The fact is that it seems that they have already posted
roadblocks in Chongar to screen...
O.Ts.: I can meet only on our side. On our...
T: No, no, I mean to say that they posted roadblocks on the Russian side. Not on our,
Ukrainian side.
O.Ts.: Yes, go there. If anything, I have phone numbers of politicians and no the military. It’s
a long link, just so you understand.
T: I understand. We will talk in any case. Fine. Then I’m leaving tonight.
O.Ts.: Uh-uh.
[Page 26]
Date: March 2, 2014
Time: 13:23:13
Duration: 00:07:23
Target: 74959212145 (mobile phone of S.Yu. Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming
Parties: 380487143 036 - Valeriy Kaurov.
S.T.: Hello.
V.K.: Hello.
S.T.: Valeriy Vladimirovich, this is Sergey Tkachuk, Glazyev’s assistant.
V.K.: Yes, Sergey. I explained the situation to Sergey Yuryevich. Should I repeat it for you?
S.T.: If possible, give me the gist. Although he outlined it for me, but...
V.K.: Yes, it's best to have this straight from the horse's mouth. The situation is as follows.
The first point: the Metropolitan has given me a blessing for all operations, including a
repetition of the Crimean scenario. I’ve been contacted by people who are ready to solve the
issue with the uniformed services to get them to switch over to our side, given the same
guarantees that were offered to the uniformed services in Crimea. This means Berkut and so
forth. The second point: we have several hundred “Spartans” who are ready to take over the
regional administration or the regional council. We are considering taking them over
simultaneously or just one. We will most probably take over the regional council so as not to
scatter our forces, although the mayor's office is a completely separate citadel. We will
demand a session, an extraordinary session. The Metropolitan is a regional council member
there on the Party of the Regions’ roster. In addition to the issues raised in Crimea, one of the
􀏭􀏲􀀃
􀀃
issues is, unconditionally, a referendum. First: denunciation of the illegitimate authorities.
Second: recognition of Yanukovych as president and implementation of Decree No. 90, and,
undoubtedly, the institution of another municipal special forces unit, that is, a unit named
Berkut subordinated to the regional authorities. This would enable these people to operate in
a legitimate framework. However, for this to happen we need to hold the fort for a few days
until we assemble the session – from the time we take over the building until the resolution is
passed. Meanwhile, the situation has deteriorated. In what way? First of all, our “Spartans”
have nothing. They do not have the "arguments” that Crimeans had – I mean friends from the
Russian self-defense. Second, we have no resources to buy our won stuff and own
something of our own as a way to stimulate people. Even though the people are patriots, you
still realize the world we live in. The fact that we have nothing, is a drawback. Another
drawback is the group that goes by the name of people’s initiative led by Anton Davidchenko,
who has been rocking the boat in the city all this time, and people have come to rely on him.
He and eight more people are snitches. In other words, he has no reputation in his circles.
That’s why yesterday at the rally he prevented me from calling upon the people to follow the
“Crimea-2” scenario in no uncertain terms. In doing so, he staged a provocation to keep me
from addressing the crowd. He disrupted my speech and gave these people one week to
think. Not surprisingly, they regrouped and a new governor has arrived today. We went to see
Skorik. He categorically refuses to cooperate with either side... “I will take care of banking.
They have already dispatched a new man. Let him handle this”. ... We told him: “We’ll give
you guarantees. Russia will not let you in harm’s way!” “No, I can’t, I don’t want to, I’m afraid”.
He totally bailed. We have a man from there. He's already in the city. Second: Reznik (a
regional general) is also away from the city. He is in Crimea and fears for his life, and for good
reason. A new general has already come here. That’s why we are running out of time. We
can’t count on Davidchenko. It is useless to rely on the guys running around in camouflage
suits with wooden sticks. He will bail on us immediately. We will have a hard time proving to
the city where his reputation came from, that he is a collaborationist. We will lose everything.
In order words, he accomplished his mission to discredit us. We can’t... him openly now... We
are now thinking of taking over the building, addressing the city through the mass media
controlled by us, so he will be either forced to join us or he will expose himself. In this way,
people will gravitate toward me thanks to my reputation and standing in the city. We will also
raise the believers. We will create a living shield for those “Spartans”. We will get the police on
our side. These are the things we need. First: we need serious guarantees for Berkut.
Somebody has to voice them. Somebody has to be here, a representative who can be
trusted. This representative has to arrive here immediately. He has to be here already and not
be just an empty space. This would enable us to take over the building “with arguments”.
There are two police units in the regional council. We know that much.
S.T.: Everything is clear. I understand. The most important thing now is contacts – how we
can contact the people who will handle this.
V.K.: We stopped by at the place of one of our fighters, a priest at the missionary department,
and called you from his phone number. We will be calling you regularly from different
locations. We will get some Intertelecom SIM cards now. We will think of something.
S.T.: Yes, so you can be directly contacted by those who will provide...
V.K.: They should call my number. You should call us at this number. I will look for a way to do
this. 067-487-43-70. You spoke about support for your Edinoe Otechestvo [Single
Fatherland] portal. We really like your writing. We share these ideas. We know that you
posted an ad asking for donations for the portal. We want to arrange a visit to you... Call us
when you... you know. I will then see the caller's number and will call you back at it.
S.T.: All understood.
V.K.: Moreover, if the people arrive and call you... we will make arrangements. I will call you
from a different number and say: “we will meet there and there”.
S.T.: Agreed. Yes. Everything is clear. Good.
[Page 30]
􀏭􀏳􀀃
􀀃
Date: March 3, 2014
Time: 16:56:30
Duration: 00:02:25
MSISDN: 79857687453 (mobile phone of S.Yu. Glazyev)
Direction: Incoming. Calling parties: 380938994410 (Denis)
Denis called the number of S.Yu. Glazyev, introduced himself as a representative of Kirill
Frolov, and asked to be patched through to S.Yu. Glazyev.
D. Hello, miss. Is this the front office of Sergey Yuryevich?
FO: Yes.
D. Please pass on this information. Mass clashes with Banderovites are planned in Odesa.
Are you familiar with this word?
FO: Yes, I am.
D. I represent Odeskaya Druzhina. Sergey Yuryevich knows who I am. We have been
keeping in touch... Please somehow relay my request to have volunteers mobilized to help
us. Let them think where to get them. It is obvious that the other side has a force advantage.
I’m getting my information from various reliable sources. We have our own intelligence
service working here, something like an analytical department. They are coming to Odesa
from all regions. That’s why we are already prepared to announce that we need Russian
protection. Let them make a decision because there will be bloodshed today or tomorrow.
This is very serious.
FO: Well... (the lady is writing down the information)
D. Look here. The Right Sector and defenders of the city – Odeskaya Druzhina are gathered
outside the regional administration today. If possible, we will repel any attacks, but we need
the kind of scenario they had in Sevastopol – “support from volunteers”. I will say no more. It’s
all clear as it is. Let him contact me.
(Denis then proceeds to say that he called several times today).
D. -... I called several times but could not reach him. Sergey Yuryevich called me back, but I
was speaking to Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin. I think you should relay this fresh information
straight to Sergey Yuryevich.
(Say goodbyes)
[Page 31]
Date: March 6, 2014
Time: 09:18:37
Duration: 0:04:39
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties: 74956064302 (S.Yu. Glazyev)
380652555500 (Sergey Valeryevich Aksenov)
- First front office. Good morning.
- Hello. We are calling from Moscow. It’s the front office of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, advisor
to President Putin. Sergey Yuryevich wanted to speak to you...
- Come again. Whose front office is this? I can’t hear you properly.
- The front office of Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, Presidential Administration, Moscow. Sergey
Yuryevich wanted to speak to Sergey Valeryevich.
- Give me his title again. May I check?
- Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, advisor...
- Glazin?
- Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, advisor to the Russian President.
- I’m just thinking whether Sergey Valeryevich can speak now. He is busy.
- I can leave you our phone number.
- Hang on for a second. I will patch you through.
S.A.: Hello.
􀏭􀏴􀀃
􀀃
S.G.: Sergey Valeryevich, hello. This is the front office of Mr. Glazyev calling. May I patch you
through to Sergey Yuryevich?
S.A.: Yes, yes.
S.G.: I wanted to share some ideas.
S.A.: Yes, yes.
S.G.: First, I think that the referendum issues were not formulated properly. This is not just my
opinion. We are thinking of a way to phrase those questions so that they would be understood
by people unambiguously. It’s just that many will simply not vote for the words “as part of
Ukraine”.
S.A.: No, they don’t intend to be a part of Ukraine. In other words, we do not expect them to
vote for Ukraine today. It’s just that our colleagues are working there. Five groups have
landed there. There are your fellow countrymen from different organizations, who brought the
final materials approved by the State Duma in terms of their compatibility with the relevant
Duma legislation.
S.G.: Who is responsible for that there?
S.A.: One group came from Volodin. The deputy there is Alexey, who directly... They brought
the prepared draft. We acted on its basis. S.G.: I understand. I will contact Volodin then.
S.A.: Yes, please talk to him. In other words, they brought ready drafts. I have not seen them
yet. They worked with Konstantinov through the night on this particular situation.
S.G.: Fine. Then I will take care of it now. Second, I have a request for you. You have Oleg
Tsariov over there in Crimea now.
S.A.: Yes. I know him.
S.G.: He is the only Ukrainian Parliament member whom we can fully trust.
S.A.: No, Oleg is a great guy. I kind of...
S.G.: Yes. It's just that he has been expressing our position during all those months of
resistance, and did so in a consistent and unyielding manner. I request that you find the time
to see him.
S.A.: No problem. But only after the session, if possible. We have a session scheduled for 10
a.m. The most important thing for me is to hold the session. We will get in touch after 12 p.m.
and...
S.G.: So can I call you in the afternoon today?
S.A.: Of course.
S.G.: He is saying he has a question “about the prosecutor’s office”. This is because the
prosecutor's office continues to follow orders from the Kyiv authorities.
S.A.: I am aware of the situation. People are now blocking the prosecutor's office.
S.G.: Here's another meaningful question. Back under Dzharty, we prepared a proposal
regarding the Crimean Development Corporation. We have all the legal paperwork for it
ready. The idea is for Crimea to join this corporation by contributing land. Vnesheconombank
would extend a loan of USD 10 billion. Then we... for the development of Crimea.
S.A.: Yes, yes.
S.G.: I propose resuming this matter.
S.A.: Let’s discuss it. Of course, with pleasure.
S.G.: I will then gather a package of documents for you and send it over.
S.A.: Thank you very much. Of course. Thank you very much. We will appreciate it.
S.G.: It would make sense to revive the Crimean Development Agency that had once existed.
S.A.: Fine. Fine. Yes.
S.G.: I wanted to ask: Have you filled the positions with the customs and tax service? Do you
need assistance?
S.A.: Not yet. So far, no. We are not worried about staff now.
The most important thing is to suppress all of the remaining resistance and take the situation
under our control. So we are waiting. We will bring it under control today. We don’t have the
staff yet. Nobody has been appointed.
S.G.: Fine. Fine.
S.A.: Thank you very much.
􀏭􀏵􀀃
􀀃
Attachment: DVD-R No. 1528 of March 12, 2014, “Classified” [Handwriting: unclassified], 1
copy.
Operative Consultant and Expert
with the 4th Unit of the Counterintelligence and Detective Directorate of the
Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant Colonel [Signature] V. Drahan
June 12, 2014
AGREED:
Chief of the 4th Unit of the Counterintelligence and Detective Directorate of the
Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
Colonel [Signature] R.
Kalchenko
June 12, 2014
Deputy Chief of Department
Chief of the Counterintelligence and Detective Directorate of the Counterintelligence
Department of the Security Service of Ukraine
Colonel [Signature] V.
Prykhodko
June 12, 2014
[Handwriting: 21114-25971]

Annex 393
Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-5504/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of
the FSB (13 July 2014.)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting:] July 13, 2014
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
Phone: (38044) 239-85-75
Fax: (38044) 239-84-80
Email: [email protected]
www.dpsu.gov.ua
[Handwriting:] Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-5564/0/6-14 of July 13, 2014
Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief
of the Border Guard Service of the
Federal Security Service of Russia,
Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov
Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],
This is to inform you that at 12:45 p.m. (Kyiv time) on July 13, 2014, up to 100 trucks
and armored vehicles illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine at the Izvarino-
Donetsk border crossing point in the sector supervised by the Luhansk Border Guard
detachment from the territory of the Russian Federation. During this time, intense
artillery fire targeted units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the state border line.
The Ukrainian units opened fire in return, as a result of which some of the intruding
vehicles returned to Russian territory.
Unfortunately, the Russian side continues to violate international laws and bilateral
agreements, thereby reinforcing our confidence that the actions of the Russian side
should be treated as those of an enemy and not a partner.
The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reserves the right to
blame the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia for possible
consequences in the Ukrainian and Russia cross-border region.
Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn
S.O. Morozov, +38 044 527 63 92

Annex 394
Intercepted Conversation Between “Khmuryi” and “Sanych” (19:09:20, 16 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Excerpt from transcripts of conversations intercepted
during covert intelligence operations
Time: July 16, 2014, 19:09:20
Duration: 0:03:21
MSISDN: 380631213401
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties:
<380639602502>
Type:
Audio ON
SMS text: “
MMS text: “
Cells: <20542 00211>
DTMF:
Call forwarding:
IMEI: 449191722435490
IMSI: 255061015419577
Comment: "
Session ID: 13079650
Object ID: 8895 Call ID:
41624
Operator ID=2015: Name =otpz 8; Last Name =otpz 8
Selection attribute: NUMBER =380631213401; Number Type=MSISDN
At 19:09:20 hours on July 16, 2014 (duration: 0:03:21), Khmuryi
received a call on his mobile number 380631213401 (location: 46
Shchorsa Street, Donetsk) from Sanych from his mobile number
380639602502 (location: 113 Elevatorna Street, Donetsk):
Khmuryi: Yes, Sanych, I’m all ears.
Sanych: Is it safe to speak, Sergey Nikolaevich?
Khmuryi: Yes, speaking.
Sanych: Two questions. We have intelligence that heavy vehicles of the
Ukrainian Army and what seems like GRAD systems are moving from the
direction of Alexeyvka.
Khmuryi: Where is Alexeyevka? Just a second... (unintelligible).
Sanych: Alexeyevka is down there, look. Heavy vehicles and GRAD
systems are moving. Skif recommended our people to dig in deeper
there. Look, we can send two mobile intensive care units to you there.
Khmuryi: Yes.
Sanych: They have doctors onboard. If necessary, we can send them
somewhere to that area, at least to the area of Snezhnoe...
Khmuryi: Aha, hang on, hang on. From the direction of Alexeyevskoe or
Alexeyvka.
Sanych: Alexeyevskoe, Alexeyevskoe...
Khmuryi: Aha, they are heading toward Grigorovka. They are creating
a formation. Surely you understand that we have just cut off their only
exit from the “pocket”. Right.
Sanych: Well, yes, yes. Just tell them to dig in deeper there because
they are coming.
Khmuryi: They are digging in. My recon battalion is there now, but this
is not our job, of course. We captured Maryinovka today and Gorki. The
infantry is landing there already. But the most important thing now is
that we have gotten in touch with Moscow...
We need to pound those two batteries in Grigorovka now. Do you
understand? Otherwise they will... It’s their only way out of the pocket.
Do you see? They are stunned [swearing] to see us encircle them. Do you
understand? How is that even possible? How should they break out of it?
The ones who are now in Grigorovka are running out of ammo. They have
less than one set of ammunition left for their self-propelled guns. Screw
it, Sanych, I don’t even know if my men will be able to hold there today
or not. They start coming down on them with Grads, I’ll be left without my
reconnaissance battalion and the spetsnaz company. This shit is fucked
up. Oh crap…
Sanych: And…
Khmuryi: And there's nothing we can do about it... Now, Grads are
something we can fucking bear with, but if Sushkas strike in the
morning... If I can receive a Buk in the morning and send it over there,
that’d be good. If not, things will go totally fucked up. I am going there
myself at night, so...
Sanych: So you're here for now, right?
Khmuryi: When you left, I had a two-hour nap and then I went there.
We took over the hills there and Marinovka itself. Then I left. And after
that the planes -- the Sushkas -- came back. They were attacking from 5
or 6 kilometers, because they couldn’t even hear them.
Sanych: Dead right. I saw them flying in that direction all night long
and…
Khmuryi: That’s it… They came down on them real hard.
Sanych: Real hard…
Khmuryi: Yes, yes, yes.
Sanych: Well, look here, Nikolayevich, if you need . . . , we’ll send it . .
. over to your area . . .
Khmuryi: [Speaks to somebody else] If this is what I think it is, I will
shoot you, Sergey. If this is from those thirty sets, I will simply shoot
you. I’m telling you like it is.
Sanych, I’m having an argument here.
Sanych: Hm.
Khmuryi: I will call you back in a moment.
Annex 395
Intercepted Conversation Between “Krot” and “Ryazan” (21:32:39, 17 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

File: “380660827518-2014.07.17-21.32.39-81”
Target: 380660827518
MSISDN: 380660827518
IMEI: 35690703373870
IMSI: 255014170827518
Date: July 17, 2014
Time: 21:32:39
Duration: 0:0:46
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties: 380505574532
Type: Audio. Answered
Location:
town of Snezhnoe. 13 Militseyska Street, Donetsk Oblast (OGPO No. 15)
vil Pervomayske, Snezhnoe, Donetsk Oblast, 17-A Adoradskogo Street (ShSU-7 Brick Plant)
At 21:32:39 hours on July 17, 2014 (duration: 0:00:46), Krot received a
call on his mobile number 380660827518 (location: 13 Militseyskaya
Street, Snezhnoe, Donetsk Oblast) from Ryazan from his mobile number
380505574532 (location: 13 Militseyskaya Street, Snezhnoe, Donetsk
Oblast):
Krot: Yes, Ryazan.
Ryazan: Hello, commander. Have you already left, yes?
Krot: Me? Yes. I have left for my task, you — for yours.
Ryazan: I got it. Within that very region or not?
Krot: No. I’m not within that region. I’m to the other direction.
Ryazan: A fighter has got lost there from this one . . . . He has . . . lost his
crew.
Krot: What a launcher?
Ryazan: From a Buk.
Krot: From a Buk?
Ryazan: Yes.
Krot: And where is he?
Ryazan: Here he is standing at the checkpoint.
Krot: Take him and bring in here. . . . I’ll be waiting for him in Snizhne near
the petrol station.
Ryazan: Fine.

Annex 396
Intercepted Conversation Between “Krot” and “Zmey” (13:09:27, 17 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

File: “380660827518-2014.07.17-13.09.27-27”
Target: 380660827518
MSISDN: 380660827518
􀀬􀉆􀈿􀀬􀀝􀀃􀀖􀀘􀀙􀀜􀀓􀀚􀀓􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀖􀀛􀀚􀀓
IMSI: 255014170827518
Date: July 17, 2014
Time: 13:09:27
Duration: 0:0:53
Direction: Incoming
Calling parties: 380500372376
Type: Audio, Answered
Location:
43 Krestyanskaya Street, Snezhnoe, Donetsk Oblast (Univermag);
13 Militseyskaya Street, Snezhnoe, Donetsk Oblast (OGPO No. 15)
At 13:09:27 hours on July 17, 2014 (duration: 0:00:53), Krot received a call
on his mobile number 380660827518 (location: 43 Krestyanskaya Street,
Snezhnoe, Donetsk Oblast) from Zmey from his mobile number
380500372376 (location: 43 Krestyanskaya Street, Snezhnoe, Donetsk
Oblast):
Krot: Yes, Oleg?
Zmey: Yes, Lionya. Listen . . . it turns to be the last checkpoint leaving
Snizhne before Stepanivka . . . to the left . . . Is my sense of direction correct?
Krot: You have to go rightwards in Stepaninka and across the field to this
fuckng what’s it . . . this fucking Snizhne?
Zmey: Yes.
Krot: So, go to Snizhne. I’ll give you further directions there.
Zmey: Got it. Ok. So it’s the first roadblock from Pervomaysk if they
explained it to me correctly.
Krot: We are actually somewhere there in that area. We’ll meet up there.
Zmey: Uh-huh, take care. Over and out.
Krot: Take care.

Annex 397
Intercepted Conversation Between “Khmuryi” and “Bibliotekar” (09:22:19, 17 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Time: July 17, 2014, 09:22:19
Duration: 0:00:45
MSISDN: 380631213401
Direction: Outgoing
Calling parties: <380665441455>
Type: Audio ON
SMS text: "
MMS text: "
Cells: <20542_00213>
DTMF:
Call forwarding:
IMEI: 355711020336760
IMSI: 255061015419577
Comments: "
Session ID: 13214655
Object ID: 8895
Call ID: 47513
Operator ID=2015; Name =otpz8; Last Name =otpz8
Selection attribute: NUMBER =380631213401; Number Type=MSISDN
At 09:22:19 hours on July 17, 2014 (duration: 0:00:45), Khmuryi made a call
from his mobile number 380631213401 (location 46 Shchorsa Street, Donetsk)
to Bibliotekar on his mobile number 380665441455 (location: 99 Illicha
Prospect, Donetsk):
Bibliotekar: Hello.
Khmuryi: Hello, where are you now anyway?
Bibliotekar: Hello, Nikolayich.
Khmuryi: Did you bring me one or two, would you tell me?
Bibliotekar: Just one for now because they had a misunderstanding, and they
did not send our low loader here.
Khmuryi: I understand.
Bibliotekar: So we offloaded it and drove it here under its own power.
Khmuryi: Did it come in self-propelled mode? Or on a lowbed semitrailer?
Bibliotekar: It crossed, crossed the line.
Khmuryi: Aaaah, and now you brought it on a lowbed semitrailer, yes?
Bibliotekar: Yes, yes, yes.
Khmuryi: Look here, don’t send it anywhere now. I’ll say now where it should
go. It will go together with the Vostok tanks. Do you understand?
Bibliotekar: Uh-huh. Hello. I understand.
Khmuryi: Stay in touch, uh-huh.
Bibliotekar: Fine. Over and out. Uh-huh.

Annex 398
Intercepted Conversation Between “Khmuryi” and “Buriatik” (09:08:26, 17 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Time: 07/17/2014 9:08:26 a.m.
Duration: 0:01:08
MSISDN: 380631213401
Direction: Incoming
Participants in the connection: <380665441455>
Type: AudioON
SMS text: “
MMS text: “
Cells: <20542_00213><20542_00217><20542_00043><20542_00217><20542_00213>
DTMF:
Transfer:
IMEI: 355711020336760
IMSI: 255061015419577
Comments: “
Session ID: 13210920
ObjID: 8895
CallID: 47311
Operator ID=2015; Name=otpz8; Last Name=otpz8
NUMBER selection signature=380631213401; Number Type=MSISDN
07/17/2014 at 9:08:26 a.m. (Duration 0:01:08) to 􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜 on the mobile number
380631213401 (location: 46 Bulvar Schorsa, Donetsk), called by 􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀃from the telephone
number 380665441455 (location: 111 Prospekt Illicha, Donetsk):
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 (away from the phone): Guys, we need to brake, need to brake…need to brake,
we’ll be in the left row, we’ll take all of it up . . . (indecipherable) that…in the left, stop here
in the left, fuck…you’re going right
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 Yes, yes, I’m listening to you, Buriatik.
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Hello, Nikolayich [sic]. And where should we unload this beauty, . . . ?
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 Which one? This one?
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Yes, yes, the one I brought with me. I’m already in Donetsk.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 The one that I thought about, yes? The one is M?
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Yes.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 DM.
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Yes, yes, yes, yes. Buk.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 Oops, BM. Yes, yes, yes. I got it.
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Buk, buk, buk.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 So, so, so. And is it on whatsit a truck?
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Yes, it’s on whatsit . . . it needs to be unloaded somewhere in order to hide it.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝􀀃Is it with a crew?
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Yes, it’s with a crew.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 You don’t need to hide it anywhere. It will go there now. Did you understand
where?
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 I understood, but they need at least . . . time so that they had a look at it.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 Who?
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Hello, hello.
􀀮􀁋􀁐􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀝 And there, Cripes. Wait, wait, Buriatik.
􀀥􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁎􀀝 Aha.

Annex 399
Intercepted Conversation Between “Krot” and “Khmuryi” (07:41:06, 18 July 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Time: July 18, 2014,
07:41:06 Duration:
0:02:14 MSISDN:
380631213401
Direction: Outgoing
Calling parties: <380660827518>
Type: Audio ON SMS text: “
MMS text: “
Cells:
<20542_01387x20542_04807><20542_04803><20542_04807><20542_01387x20542_04803>
<20542_04807><20542_04803><20542_04807><20542_04803>
DTMF:
Call forwarding:
IMEI:
355711020336760
IMSI:
255061015419577
Comments: “
Session ID: 13539806 Object ID: 8895 Call ID: 62836
Operator ID=2015: Name =otpz8; Last Name =otpz8
Selection attribute NUMBER=380631213401; Number Type = MSISDN
At 07:41:06 hours on July 18, 2014 (duration: 0:02:14), Khmuryi made
a call from his mobile number 380631213401 (location: 9-A Ionina
Street, Donetsk) to Krot on his mobile number 380660827518 (location:
17-A Adoradskogo Street, vil. Pervomayske, Snizhne):
Krot: Good morning, Nikolaevich!
Khmuryi: Good morning. What happened yesterday was messed up
[swearing]. I am speechless.
Krot: What happened?
Khmuryi: Where is he, your comrade from yesterday? Leshyi. Is he
back? There were some confusing movements yesterday [swearing]. Tell
me what happened yesterday.
Krot: They brought the vehicle up to the crossroad, left it there, the lads
went on themselves.
Khmuryi: Well.
Krot: So, the vehicle has left in the correct direction and arrived
successfully. That’s it.
Khmuryi: I see.
Krot: There were strange incoming calls which began suddenly from 10
persons.
Khmuryi: Who were those 10?
Krot: Err… There were different incoming calls to his phone from people
who begun to introduce themselves… err… one and then the second, then
the third, then the fourth… He told that he was pissed off… Later, Strelkov
began to phone up…
Khmuryi: So?
Krot: He introduced himself.
Khmuryi: And he turned off his fucking telephone. Fucking shit… err…
and we don’t know at all where the vehicle is.
Krot: The vehicle is in Russia.
Khmuryi: Fucking shit… err… yesterday night I told that we didn’t know.
Annex 400
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000292 (4
September 2014) (concerning Zhironovsky)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

1
[stamp:]
Ukraine Security Service
[illegible]
􀀷􀁒􀀝􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀜􀀕
􀀮􀁌􀁈􀁙 􀀶􀁈􀁓􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
The Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine Security Service is conducting a
pretrial investigation of criminal proceeding No. 12014000000000292 of 7/24/2014 against
Russian Federation citizen V.V. Zhirinovsky on suspicion of a crime under art. 258-3, part 1 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine (UK Ukraine).
The Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine Security Service requests that the
competent authorities of the Russian Federation keep the contents of this request confidential as
far as possible in accordance with Russian Federation law, since the disclosure of this request
could make it difficult to gather evidence in the criminal proceeding.
Said criminal proceeding is not pursuing any political objectives.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine SS guarantees that the information
obtained as a result of the execution of this commission will be used exclusively for the pretrial
investigation of criminal proceeding No. 12014000000000292 of 7/24/2014 and its consideration
in court.
The pretrial investigation of the criminal proceeding has established that in March 2014,
in unclear circumstances, while in Lugansk Region, V.D. Bolotov and other unidentified
persons, motivated by personal rejection of the current government in Ukraine, set up a terrorist
organization which, from March 2014 to the present, has been operating in Lugansk Region,
imperiling normal social activity, destabilizing economic and socio-political life, disrupting the
normal functioning of social and economic institutions, engendering an atmosphere of
vulnerability of the population of said region, etc.
The mission of said terrorist organization, according to the criminal intent of V.D.
Bolotov and its other unidentified cofounders, is to use weapons, cause explosions and commit
2
[stamp:]
Ukraine Security Service
[illegible]
arson, kidnap and murder citizens, as well as carry out other criminal actions that serve to
endanger the life and health of people, cause significant property damage and other grave
consequences to jeopardize public safety, terrorize the population, provoke armed conflict by
calling for the entry of Russian Federation troops into Lugansk Region, cause international
complications, destabilize the socio-political situation in the region and the government in
particular, influence the activity of the governmental authorities and local self-government, as
well as expose the public to the political views of the terrorists that the government in Ukraine is
illegitimate.
The ultimate goal of the creation and activity of said terrorist organization, according to
the criminal plan of the persons who founded, direct and/or participate in it, is to overthrow the
existing constitutional order and change the borders of the territory or the national borders of
Ukraine by illegally creating a government entity in Lugansk Region, a so-called Lugansk
People’s Republic.
From April 2014 to the present, while in the Russian Federation, Vladimir Volfovich
Zhirinovsky, Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, has
been providing material assistance to the activity of said terrorist organization, that is, a crime
under art. 258-3 of the UK Ukraine.
On 5/6/2014, while in the Russian Federation and in the presence of Russian reporters
and other citizens, V.V. Zhirinovsky publicly declared his intention to hand over to the extralegal
armed groups operating in Ukraine a Tigr light tactical vehicle belonging to him, Russian
Federation state registration number UE986K (region 77) to be used during armed hostilities
against the Ukraine Armed Forces.
On 5/7/2014 at 6:10 PM, unidentified persons in camouflage and masks arrived at the
Izvarino customs entry point in 4 minivans, crossed the border of Ukraine and the Russian
Federation in the direction of the latter, and secured the unlawful entry of said vehicle into
Ukraine.
On 7/31/2014, the pretrial investigation of criminal proceeding No. 12014130010000249
prepared and cleared with the supervisor of the proceeding a notification to Deputy of the State
Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation V.V. Zhirinovsky that he is suspected
of having committed a crime under art. 258-3, part 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
3
[stamp:]
Ukraine Security Service
[illegible]
In light of the foregoing and governed by the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal
Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of January 22, 1993, for the purpose of ensuring
a comprehensive, complete and objective investigation of criminal proceeding No.
12014000000000292 of 7/24/2014, the Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine
Security Service is seeking legal assistance in this criminal proceeding and requesting that a
number of procedural actions be carried out in the Russian Federation:
􀀔􀀑 Serve 􀀹􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀹􀁒􀁏􀁉􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀽􀀫􀀬􀀵􀀬􀀱􀀲􀀹􀀶􀀮􀀼􀀏􀀃year of birth 􀀗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀙, native of Alma-
Ata of the Kazakh SSR, registered at 14 ul. Nezhinskaya, Moscow, citizen of the Russian
Federation, with a notice of suspicion in the commission of a crime under art. 258-3, part 1 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine, and obtain from him the relevant acknowledgement on the second
copy of the notice of suspicion.
􀀕􀀑 Serve V.V. Zhirinovsky with a memorandum on the procedural rights and obligations
of suspects, and obtain from him the relevant acknowledgement on the second copy of the
memorandum.
􀀖􀀑 Present copies of the registration documents for the Tigr vehicle, Russian Federation
state registration number UE986K (region 77), and establish the current and previous owners of
this vehicle.
In accordance with art. 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, the prosecution
has the right during evidence gathering to request from government agencies, enterprises,
institutions, and organizations documents and records that are of relevance to the criminal
proceeding.
􀀗􀀑 Question as witnesses employees of the border and customs services of the Russian
Federation who were on duty on 5/7/2014 at the Donetsk customs checkpoint regarding the ways
and means by which the above vehicle crossed the national border of the Russian Federation,
attaching copies of the documentary evidence for the following questions:
- To whom and on what basis does the Tigr, Russian Federation state registration number
UE986K (region 77), belong?
- When and under what circumstances did the vehicle, Russian Federation state
registration number UE986K (region 77), cross the national border of the Russian Federation?
- Who accompanied the Tigr, Russian Federation state registration number UE986K
(region 77)?
- Was the customs control procedure complied with when the above vehicle crossed the
border?
4
[stamp:]
Ukraine Security Service
[illegible]
- Who was driving the vehicle and were there any passengers in the passenger
compartment?
- Was there any cargo in the passenger compartment of the vehicle?
- What was the purpose of the crossing of the Russian Federation national border by the
Tigr, Russian Federation state registration number UE986K (region 77)?
- Did the Tigr, Russian Federation state registration number UE986K (region 77), reenter
from Ukraine, when, who was driving the vehicle, and what was in its passenger
compartment?
- Has a criminal case been opened, was an internal investigation carried out in response to
the illegal crossing of the Russian Federation national border by the Tigr, Russian Federation
state registration number UE986K (region 77)?
- Any other matters that may arise during witness questioning.
􀀘􀀑 Question TV reporters from Rossiya, Life News, and Ren TV, and Komsomolskaya
Pravda newspaper as witnesses in the following matters:
- where and when did V.V. Zhirinovsky give an interview in which he stated his
intentions to provide the Tigr to members of the LPR terrorist organization;
- during the interview, did V.V. Zhirinovsky state the purpose of transporting and using
the Tigr in Ukraine;
- any other questions that will arise during the interrogation;
􀀙􀀑 Identify the persons who were at the Donetsk customs checkpoint on 5.7.2014 at 6:10
PM and secured the illegal entry of the Tigr, Russian Federation state registration number
UE986K (region 77), into the Ukraine and question them as witnesses on the following matters:
- For what purpose was the witness near the national border of Ukraine with the Russian
Federation on 5.7.2014 at 6:10 PM not far from the Izvarino customs checkpoint?
- On whose orders did he come to said location?
- Does he know the personal details of the other persons who were at said location with
him?
- What does he know about the crossing of the border between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation by said vehicle and who was driving it during said event?
- What does he know about the subsequent direction of travel of said vehicle in Ukraine
and who was driving it?
5
[stamp:]
Ukraine Security Service
[illegible]
- Does he know the location of said vehicle and for what purpose and by whom it is being
used?
- Any other matters that may arise during witness questioning.
􀀚􀀑 Request copies of the identity documents of Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, date of
birth 4/25/1946, that confirm his place of registration and residence and place of employment, as
well as statements from state medical institutions of Moscow, Russian Federation, regarding
V.V. Zhirinovsky’s having been under the care of a drug therapist or psychiatrist, and references
from his employer and place of residence.
If necessary when conducting the procedural actions, allow witnesses to review the
information in the laser disc video files.
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀝 unless contrary to Russian Federation law,
please carry out the requested procedural actions in accordance with Ukraine law.
Please affix the official seal of the executor’s department to the documents obtained
when executing the commission.
The reason for the procedural actions in the Russian Federation is the need for a rapid and
complete investigation of the criminal proceeding.
When questioning the witnesses, please explain to them their rights under articles 18, 65,
66 and 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine and article 63 of the Constitution of
Ukraine.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine Security Service guarantees that
any evidence and information obtained during the provision of international legal assistance will
be used exclusively in this criminal proceeding and will not be used for political, military or
other purposes.
If there are any questions concerning this commission or its execution, contact Lieutenant
Colonel of Justice Viktor Petrovich Makedonsky, senior major case investigator of the Central
Investigations Department of the Ukraine Security Service, at +380-44-256-90-74.
If circumstances arise that prevent said procedural actions, please contact us at the
Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine Security Service, 33 ulitsa Vladimirskaya,
Kiev 01601.
6
Attachment:
􀀔􀀑 Extracts from the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine (article 2, 18, 40, and
93), 3 pages;
􀀕􀀑 Extracts from the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine (articles 18, 42, 50,
65, 66, 67, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224, and 276-279) and extracts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine
(articles 384, 385 and 387) and the Constitution of Ukraine (article 63), 12 pages;
􀀖􀀑 Extract from the Criminal Code of Ukraine (articles 110-2, 258-3, and 260), 3
pages;
􀀗􀀑 Two copies of a notice of suspicion of 7/31/2014 in Ukrainian with a
translation into Russian, 20 pages;
􀀘􀀑 Two copies of a memorandum on the procedural rights and obligations of
suspects in Ukrainian with a translation into Russian, a total of 16 pages;
􀀙􀀑 A laser disc with a recording of the public speeches of V.V. Zhirinovsky and
V.D. Bolotov, 1 item.
􀀯􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈 􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀔
􀁒􀁉 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖 􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈 [signature] 􀀹􀁌􀁎􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁎􀁜
[stamp:]
Ukrainian Security Service
[illegible]
􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀧
􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉
􀀳􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖
􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁕 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 [signature] 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁜􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑
7
[illegible] [coat of arms] [illegible]
8/31/2015 [signature]
[bar code]
[illegible]
􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀘􀁄􀀃􀁘􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁎􀁄
􀀪􀀶􀀳􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄
8/17/2015 No. 87-158-2015
􀀵􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑 14/2/2-30438-14
Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine
To: Head of the Department of International
and Legal Cooperation
A.V. Kovalenko
[illegible]
Dear Aleksandr Vladimirovich,
The Office of the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation respectfully advises that
the request of the Central Investigations Department of the Ukraine Security Service regarding
legal assistance in criminal proceeding No. 12014000000000292 has been reviewed.
Said request cannot be fulfilled on the grounds of art. 2 “b” of the European Convention
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of 4/20/1959, art. 19 of the Convention on
Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 1/22/1993, and
art. 457, part 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, since the rendering
of the requested assistance may harm the sovereignty, security and other vital interests of the
Russian Federation.
Attachment: 42 pages, compact disc in an envelope.
Head of the Department of
International Cooperation for
Major Cases (with the standing
of a directorate) of the General
Directorate for International
Cooperation
[stamp:]
Office of the General Prosecutor
of the Russian Federation,
OGRN [Primary State
Registration Number]
1037739514196
[signature]
D.E. Grunis
[stamp:] Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine
No. 262281-15 Date 8/28/2015
[bar code]
􀀤􀀵􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 052478 Office of the General Prosecutor of
the Russian Federation
No. Isorg- 87-8582-15/3357
8
[coat of arms]
􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀘􀁄􀀃􀁘􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁎􀁄
􀀪􀀶􀀳􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄
2/8/2016 No. 87-158-2015
􀀵􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑 14/3-35vikh-15
[bar code]
To: V.N. Shokin
Prosecutor General
of Ukraine
Dear Viktor Nikolaevich,
Your letter of 9/14/2015 regarding the refusal of the Office of the General Prosecutor of
the Russian Federation to fulfill requests for legal assistance in criminal proceedings Nos.
22014000000000234, 12014000000000292, 12014000000000293, and 12014000000000291 has
been reviewed.
There are no grounds for reconsidering said decisions, therefore the requests of the
Ukrainian investigative agencies are being returned unfulfilled.
We also advise that the applicable international treaties do not contain a requirement to
specify the reason for the application of the grounds for refusing to provide legal assistance.
Attachment: 120 pages, 1 disc.
Deputy Prosecutor General
of the Russian Federation
[stamp:]
Office of the General Prosecutor
of the Russian Federation,
OGRN [Primary State
Registration Number]
1037739514196
[signature]
S.G. Kekhlerov
[stamp:] Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine
No. 36816-16 Date 2/22/2016
[bar code]
􀀤􀀵􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃 028897 Office of the General Prosecutor of
the Russian Federation
No. 87-158-2015/Nd3731-16
Annex 401
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014050000000015 (30
September 2014).
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀔􀀃
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
REQUEST
for International Legal Assistance
Kyiv September 30, 2014
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine assures the Federal
Security Service of the Russian Federation of its profound respect and invokes the Convention
on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters of January 23,
1993 in requesting international legal assistance in Criminal Case No. 22014050000000015
involving alleged crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 109, Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article
109, Part 2 of Article 110, Part 2 of Article 201, Part 3 of Article 258, Part 1 of Article 258-3,
Part 1 of Article 263, Part 1 of Article 294, Part 3 of Article 15, Part 1 of Article 294, Part 5 of
Article 27, Part 1 of Article 294, Article 341, Part 2 of Article 345, and Part 3 of Article 357 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is requesting the
relevant authorities of the Russian Federation to keep the contents of this request confidential
to the extent practicable under the law of the Russian Federation, since disclosure of
information contained in this request may complicate the process of gathering evidence
relevant to these criminal proceedings.
The criminal investigation has ascertained that in May-June 2014 O.I. Kulygina, acting jointly
with Ukrainian citizens V.F. Chernyak, S.V. Suvorov, A.N. Levkin, and Yu.A. Lukashov,
assisted the terrorist organization Donetsk People’s Republic. While committing the crime, she
coordinated her actions with leaders of the terrorist organization according to the established
criminal plan with the intention of putting up armed resistance against representatives of the
incumbent authorities in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, intimidating the population,
committing serious and grave crimes against the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine,
human lives and health, by enabling the transfer and smuggling of firearms, ammunition, and
explosives from Russia to Ukraine.
Specifically, on May 30, 2014, while acting on a criminal pact aimed at facilitating the
operations of the above-mentioned terrorist organization, O.I. Kulygina along with the
above-mentioned individuals loaded weapons and ammunition into GAZEL vans near the state
border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the area of responsibility of the
Dyakovo border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment of the State Border
Guard Service of Ukraine, specifically: 27 AK-74 assault rifles, 4 PK machine guns, 5 SVD
sniper rifles, 5 RPG-26 grenade launchers, 2 PM pistols, 102 F-1 hang grenades, 95 RGD-5
hang grenades, 74 crates with ammo (22 crates with 7.62 mm ammo, 40 crates with 12.7 mm
ammo, 12 crates with 5.45 mm ammo, and 5 boxes with ammo), 36 AK-74 magazines, 9 SVD
magazines, 2 calibrated anti-aircraft sights, 1 stun grenade, 2 bore-sighting tubes for a
Kalashnikov machine gun, which they smuggled into Ukraine. Subsequently, O.I. Kulygina and
said individuals transported said weapons and ammo to be handed over to representatives of
the terrorist organization “Donetsk People’s Republic”.
The above-mentioned items are weapons and ammunition, according to ballistic forensic
expert opinion No. 86/6 of July 16, 2014 and explosive forensic expert opinion No. 92/6-128/6
of July 21, 2014.
􀀃
􀀕􀀃
The above-mentioned circumstances indicate that the actions of O.I. Kulygina demonstrate
elements of a crime falling under Part 1 of Article 2581 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, i.e.
organizational and other assistance for the operations of a terrorist organization.
On June 11, 2014, Russian citizen Olga Ivanovna Kulygina, d.o.b. September 14, 1972, with
her registered address of residence at 43 Leninskiy Prospect, apartment 17, Moscow, Russian
Federation, was notified of being suspected of having committed a crime falling under Part 1 of
Article 2583 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Article 2583. Creation of a Terrorist Group or Terrorist Organization
1. Creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization, leadership of or participation in said
group or organization, as well as organizational or other assistance for the creation or
operations of the terrorist group or terrorist organization –
are punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years.
2. Exemption from criminal liability for acts mentioned in Part 1 of this article shall be granted
to a person (other than the organizer or leader of the terrorist group or terrorist organization)
who has voluntarily notified the law enforcement authority about the relevant terrorist activity,
thereby helping put an end to such activity or solve crimes associated with the creation or
operation of said group or organization, as long as this person has not committed another
crime.
In the interests of a full, objective, and impartial pretrial investigation of said crime, a need has
arisen to verify through the relevant law enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation the
facts of I.O. Kulygina’s involvement in illegal paramilitary groups, prior convictions for illegal
possession or weapons or ammunition, instances of her crossing the state border of the
Russian Federation in the direction from and into the Russian Federation, as well as a need to
obtain documented evidence pertaining to this citizen and characterizing her personality and a
need to question her next of kin.
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal
Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters of January 22, 1993, we hereby request that
you review this request and provide international legal assistance in criminal case No.
22014050000000015 in the form of conducting the following procedural formalities in the
territory of the Russian Federation:
1. Request from the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation information about the
complete biography and address of residence of Russian citizen Olga Ivanovna Kulygina, with
her registered address of residence at 43 Leninskiy Prospect, apartment 17, Moscow, Russian
Federation;
2. Make available to us the certified copies of documents proving or disproving the
involvement of O.I. Kulygina in illegal paramilitary groups;
3. Make available to us information about whether or not O.I. Kulygina has been
prosecuted for illegal possession of weapons and ammunition;
4. Make available to us information about crossings by citizen O.I. Kulygina of the state
border of the Russian Federation in the direction from and into the Russian Federation during
the period since January 1, 2011 until present;
􀀖􀀃
5. Obtain from the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation certificates issued by
drug abuse specialists or psychiatrists about registration with the relevant prevention centers,
a certificate listing the family members, and letters of reference characterizing O.I. Kulygina at
her address of residence and place of employment;
6. Identify and question as witnesses the next of kin of O.I. Kulygina (the list of questions
is attached);
Unless this contravenes the law of the Russian Federation, we request that you carry out the
requested procedural formalities in keeping with the requirements of Ukrainian law.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine would like to assure
you that this request has been prepared strictly in accordance with Ukrainian laws by a duly
authorized officer within the scope of his authority. Investigative activities in the territory of
the Russian Federation are needed to ensure a comprehensive, full, and objective
investigation of the circumstances relevant to the criminal proceedings.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine guarantees that any
evidence or information received as part of international legal assistance will be used
exclusively in the context of this criminal case and will not be used for political, military, or
other objectives. Any original documents presented will be returned promptly as soon as they
no longer become necessary.
Should you have any questions about honoring this request, do not hesitate to call the duty
officer of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine at +380 (44)
279-66-31.
If you are unable to honor this request, kindly inform us about the reasons preventing its
performance and the conditions under which it can be honored.
Please honor this request in the Russian language.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine would like to use this
opportunity to express it profound respect for the Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation.
Attachments:
- Excerpts from the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine on [blank] pages;
- List of questions to be posed to the next of kin of O.I. Kulygina, on [blank] pages.
Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit
of the 4th Department at the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
of the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Captain of Justice [Signature] V. Glushchenko
[Seal: Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine]
APPROVED BY
Senior Prosecutor with the Department
for Procedural Guidance and State Prosecution
in Criminal Cases Against Crime Rings,
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
Councilor of Justice [Signature] S. Zuzak
􀀗􀀃
Annex 402
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 to the Ukrainian State
Border Guard (delivered 11 October 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting:] October 11, 2014
Federal Security Service
of the Russian Federation
[Handwriting:] Attn: V.O. Subotin, A.M. Zarytskyi. Please continue work
[Signature] October 13, 2014
Attn: Deputy Director
of the International Law Department
– Chief of the International
Cooperation Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine
Major-General A.M. Zaritskiy
[Handwriting: illegible] [Signature]
Re: No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 of October 7, 2014
Dear Anatoly Mikhaylovich [Mr. Zaritskiy],
The leadership of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia
has decided to conduct further legal due diligence at institutions of the Russian
Federation of the Ukrainian side’s proposals regarding joint border control at specific
border crossing points in Russian territory and coordinated (joint) monitoring of the
situation along the Russian-Ukrainian sector of the state border outside border
crossing points from Russian territory.
In light of this, until this activity has been completed, we believe that the meeting of
experts of border guard services of Russian and Ukraine scheduled for October 16,
2014 at the Nekhoteyevka-Goptovka border crossing point is premature.
We will inform you additionally about the new date and venue of the consultations.
First Deputy Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate
Major General [Signature] V.I. Ulyanov
October 11, 2014
No. 3/165
􀀃
􀏮􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting:] October 11, 2014
[Handwriting:] Attn: O.O. Morozov, for your consideration
[Signature]
Federal Security Service
of the Russian Federation
Attn: Deputy Director
of the International Law Department
– Chief of the International
Cooperation Directorate
of the State Border Guard Service of
Ukraine
Major-General A.M. Zaritskiy
Re: No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 of October 7, 2014
Dear Anatoly Mikhaylovich [Mr. Zaritskiy],
The leadership of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia
has decided to conduct further legal due diligence at institutions of the Russian
Federation of the Ukrainian side’s proposals regarding joint border control at specific
border crossing points in Russian territory and coordinated (joint) monitoring of the
situation along the Russian-Ukrainian sector of the state border outside border
crossing points from Russian territory.
In light of this, until this activity has been completed, we believe that the meeting of
experts of border guard services of Russian and Ukraine scheduled for October 16,
2014 at the Nekhoteyevka-Goptovka border crossing point is premature.
We will inform you additionally about the new date and venue of the consultations.
First Deputy Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate
Major General [Signature] V.I. Ulyanov
October 11, 2014
No. 3/165
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Incoming Ref. No. 36588/0/3-14 of October 13, 2014
Received via email
on October 13, 2014 at 10 a.m.
O.H. Tumanyan [Signature]
Annex 403
Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 26-1209 to the Ukrainian State Border Guard
(7 November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
Ruslan Koloskov <No subject> [Handwriting:] November 7, 2014
FROM: Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russian in Rostov Oblast
Phone: 88632679838 JULY 29, 2014 4:08 p.m. PAGE 1
Fax without follow-up original
FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BORDER DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIAN IN
ROSTOV OBLAST
November 7, 2014 No. 26/1209
Rostov-on-Don, 344011
Attn: Chief of the Eastern Regional
Directorate of the Border Guard Service of
Ukraine
Major-General A.A. Binkovskyi
7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkov, 61045,
Ukraine
Re: No. 4765 of November 6, 2014
Dear Alexander Antolyevich [Mr. Binkovskiy],
This is to respectfully inform you that decisions to clear the passage of vehicles
transporting cargo for employees of state oversight agencies of Ukraine are outside
the scope of authority of the border representative of the Russian Federation and the
border directorate.
We propose initiating a resolution of this issue at the level of border agencies of the
two states parties.
Head of Directorate
Major-General [Signature] A.P. Ektov
[Scanned image info: Ectov to Binkovskyi-07-11-14.jpg. Download. Upload to cloud. 1
of 4. All attachments]

Annex 404
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000293 (11
November 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀷􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀷
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈
􀀮􀁌􀁈􀁙 􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine hereby
presents its compliments to the competent authorities of the Russian Federation and, on the basis of the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated
01.22.1993 and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters dated 04/20/1959,
would request international legal assistance in Criminal Proceedings No. 12014000000000293.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine would ask
that the competent authorities of the Russian Federation keep the contents of this request confidential,
as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, insofar as disclosure of the
information contained in this request may complicate the gathering of evidence in the criminal
proceedings.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine is
conducting a pre-trial investigation, as part of the consolidated Criminal Proceedings No.
12014000000000293, entered in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations of Ukraine on
07/25/2014, in relation to the funding by S.M. Mironov, the Chairman of the “A Just Russia” political
party in the Russian Federation, of extralegal armed groups, into a criminal offence under Part 3 of
Article 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter, the CC of Ukraine).
The pre-trial investigation established that S.M. Mironov, as a deputy of the State Duma of the
Russian Federation and the head of the “A Just Russia” political party faction within this legislative
body of the Russian Federation, acting by prior concert with V.D. Bolotov, the head of the “Lugansk
People’s Republic” extralegal armed group and other unidentified persons, funded this armed group
under the following circumstances.
During the period from February through May 2014, on the territory of the Lugansk Region,
V.D. Bolotov, by prior concert with unidentified persons, set up an extralegal armed group – the
“Lugansk People’s Republic” (hereinafter, the “LPR”), which has a military-type organizational
􀏮􀀃
structure: unity of command, subordination, discipline, in which military training is carried out and
which is illegally armed with serviceable firearms, explosives and other weapons.
The “LPR” extralegal armed group performs actions aimed at seizing the territory of the
Lugansk Region of Ukraine, its retention, forceful support for the self-proclaimed government agencies
on the territory of this region, and armed resistance against the lawful authorities of Ukraine with the
extermination of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine,
the law-enforcement agencies and the civilian population.
The functioning of the “LPR” is secured through the provision to it of funding and supplies of
weapons, ammunition, explosives and military equipment. These actions violate the safe living
environment of the citizens of Ukraine, namely the safety of their lives and health, the security of other
of society’s values, they cause considerable material harm and facilitate the creation of a threat of dire
consequences and bring about such consequences.
It has been established that S.M. Mironov, a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation
and the head of the “A Just Russia” political party faction within this legislative body of the Russian
Federation, with the aim of securing the functioning of the “LPR”, during the period from February
through May 2014, entered into a criminal conspiracy with V.D. Bolotov, the head of the extralegal
armed group, and reached agreement with him on the funding by S.M. Mironov of the “Lugansk
People’s Republic”.
With the aim of disguising the unlawful actions and making them appear legitimate, S.M.
Mironov arranged for a meeting to be held, on 05/22/2014, in Moscow, of the Presidium of the Central
Council of the “A Just Russia” political party, at which the decision was taken to fund the “LPR” under
the guise of “providing targeted material assistance to our fraternal people – the citizens of the Lugansk
and Donetsk People’s Republics”. This decision was documented in Address No. SM-22/05-566 dated
05/22/2014, entitled “A Message from Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the A JUST RUSSIA Political
Party, to the Citizens of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, in Connection with the Escalation
of the Humanitarian Situation in the Area of the Armed Resistance in Ukraine”, which was signed by
S.M. Mironov.
During this same period, with the aim of raising funds to finance the “LPR” and disguising the
criminal actions, S.M. Mironov, by prior concert with unidentified persons, involved the “Fair Aid”
international public organization in these unlawful activities. S.M. Mironov posted the account details
of this organization on the official website of the “A Just Russia” political party of the Russian
Federation (URL: http://www.spravedlivo.ru/). These bank accounts were used for the receipt of funds
􀏯􀀃
which S.M. Mironov used to fund the “Lugansk People’s Republic”.
Continuing his criminal actions aimed at funding the “Lugansk People’s Republic” extralegal
armed group and involving in this other persons, including politicians and businessmen of the Russian
Federation, on 06/10/2014, from 10.33am to 10.43am, whilst at the rostrum of the State Duma of the
Russian Federation at 1 Okhotny Ryad St., Moscow, Russian Federation, S.M. Mironov called for a
“corridor” to be created from the Russian Federation to the Lugansk Region, through which “technical
and other required aid” would be provided by Russia to the “Lugansk People’s Republic”. In other
words, S.M. Mironov effectively called upon the State Duma of the Russian Federation to secure the
ability for his unhampered funding of the “Lugansk People’s Republic”.
In implementing his criminal intentions aimed at securing the functioning of the “LPR” and the
commission of offenses against public security and other offenses on the territory of Ukraine, S.M.
Mironov, using, inter alia, the aforementioned criminal mechanisms for raising funds, as well as other
material resources, during the period from 05/22/2014 through 07/05/2014, by prior concert with V.D.
Bolotov, the head of the “Lugansk People’s Republic”, and other unidentified persons, funded the
aforementioned extralegal armed group.
These circumstances are confirmed by the materials obtained during the pre-trial investigation.
Thus, S.M. Mironov, by prior concert with V.D. Bolotov and other unidentified persons,
committed an offence, manifested in the funding of the “Lugansk People’s Republic” extralegal armed
group.
On 08/01/2014 a notice of suspicion was drawn up in respect of:
􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁎􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀓􀀕􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀔􀀜􀀘􀀖 in the town of Pushkin, Pushkinsky
District, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, a
citizen of the Russian Federation, a deputy of the
State Duma of the Russian Federation and the
leader of the “A Just Russia” political party faction
within this legislative body of the Russian
Federation,
on suspicion of having carried out deliberate actions, manifested in the funding of an extralegal armed
group, i.e., a criminal offense under Part 3 of Article 260 of the CC of Ukraine.
􀏰􀀃
The need has now arisen for procedural actions to be carried out in the Russian Federation to
clarify and explore in detail the circumstances under which the criminal offense was committed.
We guarantee that the criminal proceedings are not aimed at political persecution. We also
assure [you] that all the materials obtained during the performance of the instruction will be used
exclusively in order to establish the objective truth during these criminal proceedings.
On the basis of the above, guided by the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations
in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated 01/22/1993 and the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters dated 04/20/1959, we would ask that you consider this request and
provide international legal assistance in Criminal Proceedings No. 12014000000000293, which
comprises the performance in the Russian Federation of the following procedural actions:
1. The questioning as witnesses of officials from the “Fair Aid” international public
organization, namely the directors, accountants and lawyers of this organization, appending supporting
documents. During the questioning, the following issues must be clarified:
- when, by whom and with what purpose was the “Fair Aid” international public
organization created, what is the sphere and type of its activities? Has the organization carried out
activities in the territory of Ukraine, when and which activities? Where is this organization actually
located and where is it legally registered, who is currently its director and founder?
- are the following details posted on the official website of the “A Fair Russia” political
party the details of the “Fair Aid” international public organization:
Details of Bank VTB 24 for
transfers in rubles
Recipient: “Fair Aid”
international public
organization
INN [Taxpayer ID]:
7705044627
KPP [Tax Registration Code]:
770501001
Bank: Bank VTB 24 (CJSC),
Moscow
BIC: 044525716
INN: 7710353606
Correspondent account:
30101810100000000716
Settlement account: Rubles
(RUR)
40703810300000006541
Details of Bank VTB 24 for
transfers in dollars
Recipient: “Fair Aid”
international public
organization
INN: 7705044627
KPP: 770501001
Bank: Bank VTB 24 (CJSC),
Moscow
BIC: 044525716
INN: 7710353606
SWIFT: CBGURUMMXXX
Current account: Dollars
(USD)
40703840600000006541
Transit account: Dollars (USD)
40703840900001006541
Details of Bank VTB 24 for
transfers in Euro
Recipient: “Fair Aid”
international public
organization
INN: 7705044627
􀏱􀀃
KPP: 770501001
Bank: Bank VTB 24 (CJSC),
Moscow
BIC: 044525716
INN: 7710353606
SWIFT: CBGURUMMXXX
Current account: Euros (EUR)
40703978200000006541
Transit account: Euros (EUR)
40703978500001006541
- was permission granted to the “Fair Aid” international public organization for the
posting of these details on this website, and if so, then when and with what purpose and when were they
posted?
- were funds received in the aforementioned bank account following its posting on the
website of the “A Just Russia” party, if so, then from whom, in what amount, and by whom and how
were they spent?
- what does S.M. Mironov have to do with the “Fair Aid” international public
organization, did he take part in (issue instructions in relation to) the distribution of the monetary and
other resources of the organization received in the aforementioned account, and if so, in what
connection?
Other issues will also have to be explored should they arise during questioning.
2. By submitting requests to the corresponding authorities, the obtaining of copies of the
identity documents of the suspect, Sergey Mikhailovich Mironov, born on 02/14/1953, his place of
residence, certificates from state medical institutions from a psychiatrist and a substance abuse
professional, as well as character references from his place of residence and place of work. Official
information will also have to be obtained regarding whether S.M. Mironov has been held criminally
liable in the Russian Federation, and copies of the corresponding procedural decisions.
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀝 provided this does not contravene the laws of the
Russian Federation, we would ask that the requested procedural actions be carried out in compliance
with the requirements of the laws of Ukraine.
I would request that the documents obtained in performing the instruction be certified with the
official seal of the subdivision of the executor.
The performance of the investigative actions in the Russian Federation is driven by the need to
ensure a rapid, full and unbiased investigation into the criminal proceedings.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine guarantees
that any evidence and information received in the rendering of the international legal assistance will be
used exclusively in these criminal proceedings and will not be used for political, military or other
purposes.
􀏲􀀃
Should any questions arise concerning this instruction or its performance, please contact Police
Major Vitaly Mitrofanovich Ovdiyenko, Senior Special Cases Investigator of the Central Investigations
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on his work phone number +380-44-256-15-
09 or by e-mail: [email protected].
Should circumstances arise which mean that these procedural actions cannot be performed,
please notify us at: Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, 10
Akademika Bogomoltsa St., Kiev 01601.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine wishes to
take this opportunity to present its compliments to the law-enforcement agencies of the Russian
Federation.
􀀨􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀝
1. Excerpts from Articles 2, 40, 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine on 2 pages;
2. Excerpts from Articles 18, 42, 50, 65, 66, 67, 95, 104, 106, 223 and 224 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of Ukraine and excerpts from Articles 384, 385 and 387 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine
and from Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine on 11 pages;
3. Excerpt from Article 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine on 1 page.
􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕 [signature] 􀀹􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀲􀁙􀁇􀁌􀁜􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒
􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀧
􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀪􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕
􀀳􀁕􀁈􀀐􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 [signature] 􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒
􀏳􀀃
14/3 [official emblem]
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀘􀁄􀀃􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀀑􀀏
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀶􀀳􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄
17.08.2015 No. 87-159-2015
To No. 14/2/2-30446-14
[illegible] 08/31/2015 [signature]
[barcode]
117553 534216
To A.V. Kovalenko
Head of the Department of International Legal
Cooperation
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
[illegible]
Dear Aleksandr Vladimirovich,
The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation presents its compliments to the
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and hereby states that the request of the Central Investigations
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine for legal assistance to be rendered in Criminal
Proceedings No. 12014000000000293 has been reviewed.
It will not be possible to comply with this request on the grounds provided by Article 2(b) of
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters dated 04/20/1959, Article 19 of
the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated
01/22/1993, and Part 4 of Article 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation,
insofar as the rendering of the requested assistance could harm the sovereignty, security and other
material interests of the Russian Federation.
Enclosures: on 20 pages.
Head of the Department of
International Cooperation in
Special Cases (Administrative Rights)
of the Chief Administration for
International Legal Cooperation [signature] D.E. Grunis
[seal:] [Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Primary State Registration No.
1037733614196]
AR No. 052484
[stamp and barcode:] Office of the General Prosecutor Of Ukraine No. 262297-15 on 08.28.215
[stamp:] Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation
No. [illegible] 87-8584-15/3319

Annex 405
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000291 (3
December 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀀃
􀀷􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀷
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈
􀀮􀁌􀁈􀁙 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine hereby
presents its compliments to the competent authorities of the Russian Federation and, on the basis of the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated
01/22/1993 and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters dated 04/20/1959,
would request international legal assistance in Criminal Proceedings No. 12014000000000291.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine would ask
that the competent authorities of the Russian Federation keep the contents of this request confidential,
as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, insofar as disclosure of the
information contained in this request may complicate the gathering of evidence in the criminal
proceedings.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine is
conducting a pre-trial investigation, as part of the consolidated Criminal Proceedings No.
12014000000000291, entered in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations of Ukraine on
07/24/2014, in relation to the funding by G.A. Zyuganov, the Chairman of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, of extralegal armed groups, into a criminal offence
under Part 3 of Article 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter, the CC of Ukraine).
The pre-trial investigation established that G.A. Zyuganov, as a deputy of the State Duma of
the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation, acting by prior concert with V.D. Bolotov, the head of the “Lugansk People’s
Republic” extralegal armed group, funded this armed group under the following circumstances.
During the period from February through May 2014, on the territory of the Lugansk Region,
V.D. Bolotov, by prior concert with unidentified persons, set up an extralegal armed group – the
“Lugansk People’s Republic” (hereinafter, the “LPR”), which has a military-type organizational
structure: unity of command,
[stamp:][illegible]
􀏮􀀃
􀀃
subordination, discipline, in which military training is carried out and which is illegally armed with
serviceable firearms, explosives and other weapons.
The nature of the missions and methods with which this extralegal armed group is tasked and
the resources it uses are militarized. Specifically, the “LPR” is tasked with seizing the territory of the
Lugansk Region of Ukraine, its retention, forceful support for the self-proclaimed government agencies
on the territory of this region, and armed resistance against the lawful authorities of Ukraine with the
extermination of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine,
the law-enforcement agencies and the civilian population.
The functioning of the “LPR” is secured through the provision to it of funding and supplies of
weapons, ammunition, explosives and military equipment.
It has been established that G.A. Zyuganov, a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian
Federation and the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation, with the aim of securing the functioning of the “LPR”, during the period from February
through May 2014, entered into a criminal conspiracy with V.D. Bolotov, the head of the extralegal
armed group, and reached agreement with him on the funding by G.A. Zyuganov of the “Lugansk
People’s Republic”.
With the aim of disguising the unlawful actions and making them appear legitimate, with the
aim of raising funds to finance the “LPR”, an announcement was posted on the official website of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (URL: http://kprf.ru/international/ussr/132221.html),
entitled “Fundraising for humanitarian aid to the residents of the South-East of Ukraine”, with the
following contents: “The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is
raising funds for humanitarian aid to the residents of the South-East of Ukraine. Funds should be
transferred to the account of the “Russky Lad” [Russian Accord] Russian National Constructive
Movement as specified in the attached file.” These bank accounts were used for the receipt of funds
which G.A. Zyuganov used to fund the “Lugansk People’s Republic”.
Continuing his criminal actions aimed at securing the functioning of the “LPR” and the
commission by the armed group of offenses against public security and other offenses on the territory
of Ukraine, G.A. Zyuganov, using, inter alia, the aforementioned criminal mechanisms for raising funds,
at the expense of these funds as well as other material resources, during the period from 05/22/2014
through 07/05/2014, by prior concert with V.D. Bolotov, the head of the “Lugansk People’s Republic”,
and other unidentified persons, funded the aforementioned extralegal armed group.
[stamp:][illegible]
􀏯􀀃
􀀃
Thus, G.A. Zyuganov, by prior concert with V.D. Bolotov and other unidentified persons,
funded the “Lugansk People’s Republic” extralegal armed group.
On 08/01/2014 a notice of suspicion was drawn up in respect of:
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁑􀁄􀁇􀁜􀀃 􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀀽􀁜􀁘􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃 􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀓􀀙􀀑􀀕􀀙􀀑􀀔􀀜􀀗􀀗 in the village of Mymrino, Khotinetsky
District, Oryol Region of the Russian Federation, a
citizen of the Russian Federation, a deputy of the
State Duma of the Russian Federation, the
Chairman of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation,
on suspicion of having carried out deliberate actions, manifested in the funding of an extralegal armed
group, i.e., a criminal offense under Part 3 of Article 260 of the CC of Ukraine.
The need has now arisen for procedural actions to be carried out in the Russian Federation to
clarify and explore in detail the circumstances under which the criminal offense was committed.
We guarantee that the criminal proceedings are not aimed at political persecution, that this
criminal offense is not a tax or political offense, and that it is not linked to political violations. We also
assure [you] that all the materials obtained during the performance of the instruction will be used
exclusively in order to establish the objective truth during these criminal proceedings.
On the basis of the above, guided by the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations
in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated 01/22/1993 and the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters dated 04/20/1959, we would ask that you consider this request and
provide international legal assistance in Criminal Proceedings No. 12014000000000291, which
comprises the performance in the Russian Federation of the following procedural actions:
1. The questioning as witnesses of officials from the “Russky Lad” Russian National
Constructive Movement, namely the directors, accountants and lawyers of this organization, appending
supporting documents. During the questioning, the following issues must be clarified:
- when, by whom and with what purpose was the “Russky Lad” Russian National
Constructive Movement created, what is the sphere and type of its activities? Has the organization
carried out activities in the territory of Ukraine, when and which activities? Where
[stamp:][illegible]
􀏰􀀃
􀀃
is this organization actually located and where is it legally registered, who is currently its director and
founder?
- are the following details posted on the official website of the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation the details of the “Russky Lad” Russian National Constructive Movement:
􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀝􀀃“RUSSKY LAD” MOVEMENT,
􀀬􀀱􀀱􀀃􀀾􀀷􀁄􀁛􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀬􀀧􀁀􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀝􀀃7733191599,
􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀝􀀃40703810038040005729,
􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁎􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀝􀀃SBERBANK OF RUSSIA OJSC,
Moscow, Subsidiary Office No. 01827,
􀀥􀀬􀀦􀀝 044525225,
􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁎􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁜􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀝􀀃
3010181040000000025?
- was permission granted to the “Russky Lad” Russian National Constructive Movement
for the posting of these details on this website, and if so, then when and with what purpose and when
were they posted?
- were funds received in the aforementioned bank account following its posting on the
website of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, if so, then from whom, in what amount, and
by whom and how were they spent?
- what does G.A. Zyuganov have to do with the “Russky Lad” Russian National
Constructive Movement, did he take part in (issue instructions in relation to) the distribution of the
monetary and other resources of the organization received in the aforementioned account, and if so, in
what connection?
Other issues will also have to be explored should they arise during questioning.
􀀕􀀑 By submitting requests to the corresponding authorities, the obtaining of copies of the
identity documents of the suspect, Gennady Andreyevich Zyuganov, born on 06/26/1944, his place of
residence, certificates from state medical institutions from a psychiatrist and a substance abuse
professional, as well as character references from his place of residence and place of work. Official
information will also have to be obtained regarding whether G.A. Zyuganov has been held criminally
liable in the Russian Federation, and copies of the corresponding procedural decisions.
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀝 provided this does not contravene the laws of the
Russian Federation, we would ask that the requested procedural actions be carried out in compliance
with the requirements of the laws of Ukraine.
I would request that the documents obtained in performing the instruction be certified with the
official seal of the subdivision of the executor.
The performance of the investigative actions in the Russian Federation is driven by the need to
ensure a rapid, full and unbiased investigation into the criminal proceedings.
[stamp:][illegible]
􀏱􀀃
􀀃
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine guarantees
that any evidence and information received in the rendering of the international legal assistance will be
used exclusively in these criminal proceedings and will not be used for political, military or other
purposes.
Should any questions arise concerning this instruction or its performance, please contact Police
Major Artem Sergeyevich Tarasenko, Senior Special Cases Investigator of the Central Investigations
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on his work phone number +380-44-254-78-
57 or by e-mail: [email protected].
Should circumstances arise which mean that these procedural actions cannot be performed,
please notify us at: Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, 10
Akademika Bogomoltsa St., Kiev 01601.
The Central Investigations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine wishes to
take this opportunity to present its compliments to the law-enforcement agencies of the Russian
Federation.
􀀨􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀝
1. Excerpts from Articles 2, 40, 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine on 2 pages;
2. Excerpts from Articles 18, 42, 50, 65, 66, 67, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224, 566 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, excerpts from Articles 185-3 and 185-4 of the Code of Administrative
Offenses of Ukraine and excerpts from Articles 384, 385 and 387 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and
from Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine on 13 pages;
3. Excerpt from Articles 110-2 and 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine on 3 pages;
􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕 [signature] 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒
[seal:] [illegible]
􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀧
􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀪􀁘􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕
􀀳􀁕􀁈􀀐􀀷􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 [signature] 􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒
[seal:] [Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine]
􀏲􀀃
􀀃
14/3 [official emblem]
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀘􀁄􀀃􀀥􀀑􀀃􀀧􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁎􀁄􀀃􀀶􀁗􀀑􀀏
􀀰􀁒􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀶􀀳􀀐􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀘􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄
17.08.2015 No. 87-157-2015
To No. 14/2/2-30451-14
[illegible]
[barcode]
117553 676213
To A.V. Kovalenko
Head of the Department of International Legal
Cooperation
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
[illegible]
Dear Aleksandr Vladimirovich,
The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation presents its compliments to the
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and hereby states that the request of the Central Investigations
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine for legal assistance to be rendered in Criminal
Proceedings No. 12014000000000291 has been reviewed.
It will not be possible to comply with this request on the grounds provided by Article 2(b) of
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters dated 04/20/1959, Article 19 of
the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters dated
01/22/1993, and Part 4 of Article 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation,
insofar as the rendering of the requested assistance could harm the sovereignty, security and other
material interests of the Russian Federation.
Enclosures: on 23 pages.
Head of the Department of
International Cooperation in
Special Cases (Administrative Rights)
of the Chief Administration for
International Legal Cooperation [signature] D.E. Grunis
[seal:] Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Primary State Registration No.
1037733614196
AR No. 052483
[stamp:] [illegible]
[stamp:] Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation
No. [illegible] 87-8585-15/3319
Annex 406
Ukraine State Border Service Letter No. 72/36-994-73 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
annexes (10 December 2014)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Annex 407
Intercepted conversation between DPR advisor O. Tsapliuk (code name “Gorets”) and DPR
representative M. Vlasov (code name “Yuga”) 1(7:56:46, 23 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀕􀀗􀁂􀀓􀀔􀁂􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀁂􀁂􀀔􀀚􀁂􀀘􀀙􀁂􀀗􀀙􀁂􀁂􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗􀁂􀀋􀉋􀈻􀈾􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀘􀀜􀀙􀀜􀀗􀀘􀁂􀀓􀀓􀀑􀁚􀁄􀁙
Time: 24.01.2015 17:56:46
Duration: 0:00:49
MSISDN: 380932804204
Direction: Incoming
Connection participants: <380993641081>
Type􀀝􀀃􀈺􀉭􀉞􀉢􀉨􀀲􀀱
Text SMS: ''
􀉌􀉟􀉤􀉫􀉬􀀃􀀰􀀰􀀶􀀝􀀃􀀊􀀊
Cells:
DTMF:
Forwarding:
IMEI:
IMSI: 255062024424560
Comments: 'shln: first "collective farm" gone (Don2)'
Id of session: 95766303
ObjId: 39939
CallId: 7283
Operator 􀀬􀀧􀀠􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀞􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪􀀞􀀯􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪
Sign of selection NUMBER=380932804204;NumberType=MSISDN
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Hello Max!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Hello!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 -Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Yes!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Max, listen, the first “kolkhoz”, what does your guide say? Left, crossed over?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Yes, everything left. Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Are you sure?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - The guide …Yes, sure. The guide says that the last vehicle has left, yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - And the second?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Not yet. I’ll tell you as soon as it leaves.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - The second… No, tell the second that as soon as they cross over, they should stay
there and wait, somebody else is heading over there.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - And stand…wait?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Yes, yes, yes. Reach out and wait there, somebody is heading towards them. And the
first “kolkhoz” already left, right?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Yes. Left, yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Good. Bye.

Annex 408
Intercepted Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

1
Copy No. 1
Ruben – 1
Terek -2 􀀵􀀨􀀳􀀲􀀵􀀷
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖
Kyiv August 16, 2017
Commenced at 09:30 AM on 08/16/17 Ended at 5:00 p.m. on 08/16/17
I, First Lieutenant R.O. Narusevych, a detective with Section 4, of the 2nd Counterintelligence Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine, in Office No. 415-1 (5/7 vul. Patorzhynskoho, Kyiv), pursuant to Article 7(6) of
the Law of Ukraine “On Counterintelligence Activity” and the rulings of Deputy Chairman of the Kyiv Court of
Appeal M.V. Pryndyuk No. 01-851tst of 10/15/14 (valid from 10/15/14 to 12/15/14), No. 01-10468tst of 12/10/14
(valid from 12/10/14 to 02/10/15), No. 01-1062tst and No. 01-1060tst of 02/04/15 (valid from 02/04/15 to 04/04/15),
No. 01-2436tst of 03/26/15 (valid from 03/26/15 to 05/26/15), No. 01-5440tst of 07/07/15 (valid from 07/07/15 to
09/07/15), of Chairman of Kyiv Court of Appeal A.V. Chernushenko No. 01-3998tst of 05/20/15 (valid from 05/20/17
to 07/20/17), of Investigating Judge of the Kyiv Court of Appeal V.P. Hlynyanyi No. 01-6836tst of 08/27/15 (valid
from 08/27/15 to 10/27/15), of Investigating Judge of the Kyiv Court of Appeal Ya.V. Holovachov No. 01-8319tst of
10/19/15 (valid from 10/19/15 to 12/19/15), and based on the results of technical field investigative actions taken by
the Department of Technical Field Operations of the Security Service of Ukraine during the period from 11/28/14 to
12/12/15 in telecommunications systems and channels in order to identify signs or instances of terrorist and other
unlawful activity, prepared this report about factual information obtained in the course of such actions that, according
to Article 10(1) of the Law of Ukraine “On Operational Investigative Activity” and Article 256(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine, may be used in the course of the pre-trial investigation in Criminal Proceeding No.
220150500000000457 against unidentified persons complicit in the activity of the terrorist organization “DPR”
[Donetsk People’s Republic] who used the cellphone numbers 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀕􀀙􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀏􀀃 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀛􀀘􀀖􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀘􀀏􀀃 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔􀀏􀀃
􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔􀀏􀀃and 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖.
The materials of the technical field investigative actions were received from the Department of Technical
Field Operations of the Security Service of Ukraine on a CD-R, registry No. 5390 dated 06/19/17, and a DVD-R,
registry Nos. 5359, 5363, 5360, 5352, and 5361 dated 06/19/17, marked “classified” (declassified pursuant to Acts of
the Expert Committee on Secrets of the 2nd Counterintelligence Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine Nos.
2/2/8-20881, 2/2/8-20880, 2/2/8-20882, 2/2/8-20876, and 2/2/8-20877 dated 08/01/17, approved by First Deputy
Director of the Security Service of Ukraine Colonel-General V.V. Makikov on 08/07/17).
1. At 07:54:11 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:52) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀗􀀚􀀖􀀙􀀖􀀜􀀕, which is used by
an 􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝􀀃Yes.
[stamp:] Exhibit to incoming No. 7456 08/21/07
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Only not on this one, on the military one.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝􀀃I understand exactly what you mean. M-hmm.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃OK, come on.
30. At 17:12:27 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:48) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀖􀀕􀀕􀀛􀀚􀀓, which is used
by an 􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, what’s the outcome?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 We just pulled in (inaudible word). We reported to “Pepel.” 􀃆 spotter
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Have you arrived? [illegible handwritten text]
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 We’ve reached you (inaudible word) and reported to Pepel.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 So where are you now?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 I’m heading back to my position.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What for?
2
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 To pick up (inaudible word), to pick up the umm… We have assembly at a quarter to 10:00,
right?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, come on over by 21:00, all of you.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 By 21:00?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
31. At 17:59:51 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 02:22) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used by
a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person by the name
of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Max, you have the information. Did you get shelled by Grad rocket launchers today?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, we did.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃And, any casualties?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, one advisor and one Russian.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Uh-huh, I see.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 They counted and updated them, it’s 100%. So there you go. They were working out there in the field.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃You know what pisses me off? How the Ukrainian artillerymen hit their target and leave a bunch of corpses.
The way the DPR artillerymen shoot, damn it, they don’t get within 300 meters. That really bothers me and gets on
my nerves. Did you get the DMK [airborne meteorological station]? I mean, not the DMK, the wind rifles? Do you
have wind rifles?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Of course we do.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Are you counting (inaudible word)
[handwritten:] an airborne meteorological
station [text cut off] against the wind [text cut
off]
[handwritten:] WR - a wind
rifle shoots [text cut off]
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I’m constantly creating ranging points, but I don’t just fire for nothing. Always from (inaudible word).
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃No, I understand. After all, you are (inaudible word). And when it isn’t possible to create (inaudible word)?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I still have buyers??. I won't have cartridges until tomorrow. What’s-his-name, my boss, will deliver
them to me. You know how he is.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 It’s always like that with him. I start with the guns, then up from there.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Get the cartridges at the warehouse.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. I’ll definitely do that.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Get another little gun, too.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Understood.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Where did you get that gun? Did they drive it over?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, they did.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃I see, I see.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, they drove it over to me and said, “Use it as much as you want.”
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃You’ll take it away later?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, I’ll leave it here. I mean, it isn’t mine. It belongs to the local guys.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Ah, I see. Ok, well, that’s it. So, everything is in force. I won't say out loud over the phone what we were
talking about today.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What do you mean? Where will they be? Are your guys flying over?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃I called over there where I was supposed to. I’ll try to let them know to go there, where you’re going now.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, gotcha. Understood, uh-huh.
36. At 20:19:41 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:50) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used by
a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person by the name
of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
3
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 It’s me!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Max, look – our guys are insisting on the first option, which was in the morning.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Which is down below, which is down below, further south.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, understood. I’m carrying it out.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Now look, Max, these organisms will be coming one by one. One will be there earlier, the second a little
later, so the first ones you meet are picking up their own and transporting them. That means the guys you’re meeting
don't have any. You can contact me by air (inaudible word),
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, of course. I’m on my way. I’m running, I’m running. I’m running already.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Ok, let’s get in touch.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes, yes.
40. At 20:56:05 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:20) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀛􀀘􀀖􀀖􀀙􀀛􀀘, which is used by
an 􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with
the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Should we wait, or are we going?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Go. Meet them. Everyone should meet their own.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Ok, understood.
41. At 21:19:21 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:39) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀛􀀜􀀕􀀖, which is used by
an 􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with
the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Hello, Ivanovich? Hi, the canisters 􀃆Uragans? are under (inaudible) to save them, there aren’t any.
None at all.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I understand. Ok, I hear you, my friend.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 The bad weather is going to fuck things up, only tomorrow.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I understand, ok, all right.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Ok, bye.
􀀰􀁄􀁛 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
45. At 21:23:22 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:27) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used by
an unidentified person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, tell all of your people, all of your people and what’s-his-name, Ruben, and all of your people at
Kuznetsy, that everything has changed, at Kuznetsy.
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Uh-huh, understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, everything has changed. Uh-huh.
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Uh-huh.
46. At 21:29:30 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 00:48) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀔􀀛􀀕􀀔􀀖􀀕􀀓, which is used by
an unidentified person with call sign 􀂳􀀶􀁋􀁕􀁄􀁐􀂴􀀃[“Scar”], calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀑􀂴 In the course of the conversation, “Shram” hands the receiver
to 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀶􀁋􀁕􀁄􀁐􀂴: Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Shram,” wait at Kuznetsy.
􀂳􀀶􀁋􀁕􀁄􀁐􀂴􀀝􀀃At Kuznetsy?
4
61. At 23:32:27 on 01/23/2015 (session duration 01:04) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀘􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀙􀀚, which is used by
an 􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Yes!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Are “Terek” and “Ruben” far away from you?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Yes!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Where are they?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 They went to get their parents.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Their parents? What parents?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 I mean, their relatives.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What relatives?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 The ones we’re supposed to meet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Fuck, and where are you?
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Well, in front of the spot where we’re supposed to meet them.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Shit. What the fuck? They need to get in touch with me right away. Right away. I mean right away!
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I mean right away.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 I got it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye.
􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀝 Uh-huh.
72. At 03:46:57 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:29) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign “Yugra,” calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖, which is used by a
person with call sign 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 So, what, are you on site then?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes. We’re talking now.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 One. One or two?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Two.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, I see. Uh-huh.
73. At 03:50:48 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:42) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖, which is used by a
person with call sign 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? What did you call for? Hello!
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You called?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 We’re basically starting to get drawn in now. 􀃆 either into the territory or into the [illegible] zone
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I see. No, tell your people to report to me, damn it. Why they hell aren’t they saying anything?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Well (inaudible) we’re now (inaudible).
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 All right. And you had to find it in any case. Ok, I understand.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Got it. Ok, bye.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
74. At 03:54:35 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:38) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used by a
person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello!
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Yes, I’m listening.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, what do you want?
5
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃No, you told me to call back, so I’m calling.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, damn it, somehow I don’t even… Well, do you need to say a word there yet or what?
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Not yet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No one’s there yet?
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃No, they were here. But, you know, they’re standing deeper down over there.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And when will that (inaudible)?
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃They’ll be here in a minute. They’re about to head out.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah, but you'll call me, right? Uh-huh.
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Uh-huh, yes, yes, yes.
75. At 04:44:16 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:301) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello!
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 So, how’s it going over there?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Well, we’re encountering “family” along the way.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah, you're still encountering them, huh?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye. Have a good night.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Uh-huh.
76. At 05:01:33 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:31) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used by a
person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello!
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃“Ruben” met the last “family,” going home.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I see. And you?
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Not yet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, but you saw them, right? You saw yours?
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Huh?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You saw them, right?
􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀝􀀃Well, they’re there, yes. They’re transporting something for now.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok.
77. At 05:02:00 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:12) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign “Yugra,” calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello!
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃I’ve encountered the “family.”
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Got it, uh-huh.
78. At 05:02:21 on 01/24/2015 ((session duration 00:27) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign “Yugra,” calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖, which is used by
a person with call sign 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello!
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 They took everything away,
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, that’s just the first ones. What about the second ones?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 The second ones, who the fuck knows.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 But you said two, damn it. I reported two, damn it (inaudible).
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 (inaudible) I’ll tell you everything when I get there.
6
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. Ok, bye.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
79. At 05:06:54 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:24) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖, which is used by a
person with call sign 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 - (speaks off to the side: I’ll fucking – how soon will he arrive, damn it? My damn brain is starting…)
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, how soon will you arrive?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 We’re already (inaudible) we’ll get in the second one now and I’ll drive over to you.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, uh-huh. Good.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
80. At 05:10:39 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:30) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ruben, you need to go to the “flower beds” 􀃆 artillery positions, you need to go to the “flower beds” right
away. Hello?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃I, umm, I’ll stop by the house 􀃆 staging area/[illegible] and head right over there.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, well, to the “flower beds,” yes, then get right over there.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Yes, yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Terek” told you, right? At 7:30 already.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Yes, yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, Ok, bye. Uh-huh.
81. At 05:25:28 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:36) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign “Yugra,” calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used by a
person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes, hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Are you with “Terek”?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Who?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Are you with “Terek,” I said?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes. He went down below. For the “guests,” I mean. I’m citing up above and waiting.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah, well, call me when you’ve, umm, really got them and start taking them out.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Go straight to the “flower beds.” Ok?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok, ok.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 All right, bye. Let him know. Tell him to call me back.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok.
82. At 05:43:45 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:56) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖, which is used by a
person with call sign 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 They stole enough for one “unit.” I can't see the second one at all yet, damn it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, but what did you tell me? You told me at 4:30 that there were still two, damn it. I reported that
there were still two. What the fuck (inaudible)
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 There were still two standing there. We fucking…, damn it, there were still two.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And where did the second one go?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 The second one? The second one is being filled 􀃆 filled with fuel, damn it
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What’s it doing?
7
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Getting filled.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah, I see.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 So it isn’t even on the horizon.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No. And at 4:30, where the hell were they at 4:30?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 We were standing in the courtyard and talking shit with the chief of staff and commander, the big big
commander. Well, and both the first and second were there.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Huh. Both the first and the second?
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes. The first had already been fueled up, damn it, but the second one had just started.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok. I understand. Uh-huh, bye.
83. At 05:46:07 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:42) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀜􀀕􀀗􀀖􀀖, which is used by a
person with call sign 􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes!
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 Well, at least let me know the decision, because the first “farm” has already headed north. It hasn’t arrived
yet. So does it make any sense to start the work today or to hide them in a stack somewhere?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What the hell should I report? They’ve already given me an assignment. What they hell should I tell
them? They’re going to be fucking around, working in the fucking daytime.
􀂳􀀤􀁏􀁄􀁑􀂴􀀝 I (inaudible) that well. I’ll be right there.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok.
84. At 05:55:10 on 01:24:2015 (session duration 00:45) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used by a
person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Did you meet them?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 No, there aren’t any “guests” yet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 (off to the side): you say he’s not here yet, he’s right here on the phone, waiting – he’s not here yet.
No, what’s-his-name hasn’t arrived yet, right. Well, he came without the equipment. Do you understand? So there you
go. He’s supposedly doing reconnaissance, everything’s there, damn it, and we’re supposed to go there, right? That’s
my understanding, because I can't say everything over the cell phone.
85. At 05:57:07 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:49) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Hello!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, Rubenchik, you have to go to the “flower beds” right away, right? To the flower beds.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃I’m processing 􀃆 [illegible handwriting] half the “family” right now, and half the “family” went straight away to the
“flower beds.”
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, you have to go to the “flower beds” then, everyone, right
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃To the flower beds.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And when will you be ready to report to me? Hello?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Ok, understood, understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Just be quick. They, those shitheads over there are fucking killing me already. Ok?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃I understand, damn it. We just don’t have enough damn time.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, I understand everything. I understand.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃As let you know as soon as the flags 􀃆 [illegible handwriting] ready.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 As soon as you're ready, uh-huh.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃Yes, yes, yes.
96. At 07:19:10 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:41) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by
a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀀏􀂴 calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used by
an unidentified person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀀑􀂴 The subscribers have the following conversation:
8
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Are you all done? Where are you now?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃I met the “family” and crossed the, umm, “ribbon”􀃆border. That’s it, “Zhulyen” and I are driving straight
over to the, um…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃To work.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 How soon will you be on site – at the “flower beds” – approximately?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃I don’t know. In about 40 minutes, probably.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You'll be at the “flower beds” in forty minutes. Ok, I’m reporting in forty…
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃Because, because they’re vehicles with carburetors.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I understand, uh-huh. Ok, bye.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃Uh-huh Ural 375 with carburetor
113. At 08:10:27 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:36) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? About how soon will you be ready?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃I don’t know. I’m just approaching Bezymennoye at the moment.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Just Bezymennoye?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Motherfucker. Got it. Ok.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝􀀃Uh-huh
114. At 08:14:02 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 01:06) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Where did you leave it to work?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 In Markino. Call “Oka”, he’ll tell you. He’s there with them.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 In Markino? Why in the world, why so far away, huh?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Where else should we put them?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Closer. What the hell? I’m getting fucking shot. Closer…
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Closer? Where closer?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, well, where I said, that’s where. Let’s not say the name of the town out loud.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 You mean in daylight (inaudible).
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, that’s fucking right. We’re under pressure from up top. And why the fuck should they spend
half the day driving back and forth?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yeah?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, and the fuel, they’ll use up all the fuel. Go ahead and pull it over there where I said. At least for
one. Well, pull it over there for one volley, for one. Call “Oka” and tell him to pull it closer for one volley.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Fuck.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Come on, come on. Let’s go.
121. At 08:52:33 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:33) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used by a
person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
[illegible] +1020
[illegible] +0.23
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 How much more time do you need?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 That’s it, we’ve already done it – plus 1,020, plus 0.23.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 That doesn’t matter. When will you be ready?
9
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, one – in about five minutes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, report back to me in five minutes. Ok? Ok, bye.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 One?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, one, then a second and immediately fucking reload. Got it?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Got it.
122. At 08:53:45 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:20) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Which, umm, garden should we take?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 “Concentrated” or what?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Do “concentrated”, of course.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Or “correct”? parallel
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Concentrated”
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hurry up.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 (off to the side) “Concentrated battery of 4-6 units
123. At 08:58:27 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:16) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Shit, I… He screwed up. The comrade. Then one who isn’t a comrade, damn it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What are you saying? What’s going on over there? How’s it going?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 One is ready.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Got it. I’ll let him know.
124. At 08:58:57 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:49) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃I’m listening, go ahead.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 One is ready.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 I know one is ready. When will number two be ready?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 He said in 5-7 minutes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 5-7 minutes? Got it. Do they have (inaudible)?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What? I didn’t get that.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Wait, wait until number two is ready, report back when it’s ready, and open fire on my command.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Got it, Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 “Cosmos”, “Cosmos”, “Cosmos” 􀃆 satellite communications , they need to deploy it. They need to deploy
“Cosmos”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. Got it.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Tell them about “Cosmos”. They brought “Cosmos” with them, right? They did bring it, didn’t they? They
should deploy it, damn it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Understood, understood.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Ok, let’s go. And then whoever reloads…
125. At 09:01:24 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:36) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
10
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 When you’re ready with two, shell the shit out of them, get out to reload, and as soon as you're done
firing let me know. Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝. So I shouldn’t wait for the command? Fire as soon as we’re ready?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, when you're ready. Then give me a report. Go out and tell them yourself that they need to deploy
some fricking “Cosmos”. They brought it with them. Go on. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 What did they bring?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 They brought something called “Cosmos” with them. “Cosmos” Ask them.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Go on, go on.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well everything (inaudible)
126. At 09:05:02 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:30) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝􀀃I forgot to tell you – one of them didn’t go off. - Shell?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 That’s no big deal. Ok, keep working, all right?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Listen, another thing, if it’s, so to speak, not just one, but all of them, if the “traverse” is kaput on all of them.
􀃆 whole pack of shells
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, I understand. I understand. Keep working.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 If anything happens, I just (inaudible)
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Maybe.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Do you understand?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, come on, let’s go. Let’s go.
127. At 09:07:50 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 01:06) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes, Max?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 It’s me.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 So, is number two ready?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Just one more minute. We expect it any moment now. It’s a matter of seconds. Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Give the order – “Fire” with one battery.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 “Fire”. Then let them follow up with the other one. When number two is done firing, damn it, let me know.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 􀀼􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀉌􀁋􀁈􀁜􀂶􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁋-huh, all done. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Well, let them load it then and take up a firing position.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes. Understood.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Your “Terek” needs to go up to the senior officer of that “farm”… He’s just hanging around by the battery
commander.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes. They (inaudible).
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Tell him to go over to the senior officer. Are the batteries far away from each other?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, I’m positioning them normally, so they’re about a kilometer or a kilometer and a half apart. So
there you have it.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 (inaudible)
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well of course. What else is the commander supposed to do?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 He needs to get over to the senior officer, damn it. What the fuck is he doing with the battery commander?
I need “Lisai”, damn it. Do you understand? Do you understand? All right.
128. At 09:10:08 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 01:00) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴, The subscribers have the following conversation:
11
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, what’s happening over there?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, number two (inaudible).
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Then work with that one, work with that one. Once. Do you understand? That’ll be a follow-up. Listen
to me, then you’ll have to find the senior officer. You'll need to get right over to him. Over there.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 (inaudible) probably stayed, damn it. I’m not driving over there now.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Is he far away?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, of course, he’s at 60, damn it. No fucking way. That’s fucking bullshit.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The most senior officer didn’t go? Is that right?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, I’m telling you, he’s at fucking “sixty”, at that…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Understood. So how more time does number two need?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I don’t know. That “Korpan” guy is calling me again, damn it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, understood. Look, finish working on number one, then go and reload. And follow up with number
two. Understood? Tell “Zhulyen” to call me back. Ok, bye.
129. At 09:13:11 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:27) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀜, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀝 “Oka”, do you know where there commanding officer is?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀀝 I don’t know. I took as much as I needed and came here.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀝 Ok, get in there right away!
130. At 09:13:32 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:20) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I’m ready with number two.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, shell the shit out of them!
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, I’m not going to do it quietly. You’ll probably hear it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, go ahead, and leave right away. Let’s go!
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Understood.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Get out of there and reload right away. Let’s go.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Got it.
131. At 09:15:04 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:22) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 (inaudible) leave, no?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 No, especially at the same time.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye.
136. At 09:33:21 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:43) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Yeah?
12
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ruben, how many of them did you meet? At what time did the column cross the you-know-what 􀃆
border with it? At what time exactly did they arrive with the equipment? What time was it, exactly?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 About 6:30.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 It was somewhere around 6:25, right?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, fine. That’s exactly how they arrived, right? Ok, thanks.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 You can check with “Terek”, too.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, thanks. Bye.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Bye.
137. At 09:34:22 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:33) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person
by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person
with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Zhulik, tell me exactly, at what time did that, you know, “farm” arrive? What time did it cross, that
first vehicle, when did it cross the “ribbon” 􀃆 border? I mean, roughly. What time was it, exactly?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 I can’t say exactly. “Shram” went down there below. I was standing up top and waiting.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, how much later was it when they arrived, when they started crossing, time-wise?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Around 8:00, roughly.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, understood. Uh-huh, bye.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
168. At 11:46:09 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 01:05) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? How much more do you need?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Huh?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 How much more time? Before moving out?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, number one is almost all ready. We have…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 We have about five more to put in. 􀃆 five shells [illegible]
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And number two?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 As for number two, I’m walking over to them now.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Tell them to hurry up, friend. I’m already getting… They’re already reaming me out. Ah, when will
it start to smoke. Ok, come on.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, they’re really running around. They brought two cases…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Don't give me any details. Not on the phone.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 You know perfectly well…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You know perfectly well. Come on, I mean, basically… Hello? What the hell?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes, ok.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Come on, you need to move out faster. Let me know when you move out. Faster, faster.
169. At 11:57:31 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:23) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, I’m listening!
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, I’m ready with one 􀃆 65M. As for number two􀃆45M [illegible], four of them are ready.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Damn! Hurry up with the rest. I’m already getting… damn it, the shit is really hitting the fan up here,
buddy. Come on.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Understood
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, all right. Bye.
13
170. At 12:01:46 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:28) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛 with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Is it going to take you much longer, buddy?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Well, I’m just finishing up the last one. They’re a little slow somehow, damn it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yeah? Well, come on, Sanechek, hurry them along, hurry them along, buddy.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 I’m hurrying them…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You have to, you have to.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 He and “Gora” just – and I was running. Uh-huh. I’m doing it, I’m doing it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Come on, come on. We need it all already. They’re screaming their heads off over there, damn it.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Understood, Ok.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Come on.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 We’ll speed it up now.
171. At 12:07:19 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:36) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀜, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? “Oka”, go ahead and pull up the next ones. Understood? Over here. Hello?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, I understand. That’s what I’ll do.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Come one, pull them over. The next ones, right?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Closer would be even better. Understood? Closer. Because I’m getting fucked from every side here.
Hello?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, Ok. Yes, yes, yes, understood.
172. At 12:13:24 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:11) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀜􀀕, which is used
by a person by the name of Oleksandr with the call sign 􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁄􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, I’m listening.
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁄􀂴􀀝􀀃I see you called.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Everything is fine. Do your thing. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, understood.
173. At 12:17:50 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:24) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Zhulyen”, how much more time do you need, buddy?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 About 5-7 more minutes and we’ll be moving out.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, move faster yourselves, and hurry them along, ok? We’ve got to move faster, brothers. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Understood, understood.
174. At 12:19:45 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:37) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Rubenchik”, how’s it going over there. Have you started yet?
14
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 I was driving them back after they got lost. That’s why, damn it… Now they’re back on track.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah, is everything ok?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, load them and get the fuck back over there, ok?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 I didn’t catch that.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Just load. Call me when you’re moving out. Ok?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Ah, ok. Yes.
175. At 12:46:41 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:28) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes, hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 So, is it ready yet?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, we’re on our way, we're on our way.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok.
176. At 12:49:39 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:40) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I’m at the “flower bed”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 But “Zhulyen”, but “Zhulyen” just left.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I know, understood. Uh-huh. Ok.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 So, what should I do? Whenever I’m ready?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, no. Wait for him for now… Check your corrections. Do you hear what I’m saying?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, distance-wise – zero, and to the right – zero twenty-eight 􀃆 tighten 28 notches [illegible]
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Have you already counted?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Good, all right. Uh-huh. Ok.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 So, should I wait or…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Wait, wait for him.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I mean, I’m standing right out in the open.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I’ll call you right back. Ok, uh-huh.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
177. At 12:51:35 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:52) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes, Max?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes, Max, yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 So, one of them is already at the “flower bed”. The second is on its way.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 And the first 200? The 200?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The 200, well, it’s also being readied… It’s being filled up.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 I didn’t get that.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The 200 is being loaded.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 They’re loading it, huh? For a third run.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. Hello?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, that…
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes.
15
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Should he wait for the second one, or can he go ahead?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 He doesn’t need to wait. Let him fire and go reload again. Complete the assignment and go load. Come on,
faster, come on. So, look, record the time…
178. At 12:52:41 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:20) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Thirteen fifty-two. Write it down. Fire. Thirteen fifty-two.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Thirteen fifty-two. Got it, yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes. That’s the first battery. Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes.
179. At 12:57:55 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:20) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 So, what’s the…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Are you ready?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, in a minute.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, ok, as soon as…
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Open fire right away, right? And then I pull out again.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, pull out. Yes. Ok.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. And report back.
180. At 13:01:37 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:48) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I’m on my way.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, so, you fired everything already? Yes?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes, I’m on my way already.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, so tell me the first time you fucking fired.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 What do you mean?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The first time, when did you fire the first time? What time was it?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 How many went off?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No. I’m asking you at what time you fired the first time, you fucking shithead.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I don’t remember anymore.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Roughly.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 (speaking aside to another person) At what time did we shoot? The first time. What time was it when we
fired? (Then continues speaking with Max “Yugra”): Somewhere around nine or ten, I don’t remember.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Let’s say nine fifty-eight, ok?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh
181. At 13:15:28 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:42) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Ruben”, the very first one. You were working then. Can you remember the time? What time was it?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Let’s see, we pounded them around 8:55.
16
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, got it. Eight, right?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Fifty-five.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Eight fifty. Ok. Got it. That’s all clear.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Uh-huh.
182. At 13:21:08 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:23) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Did you fire?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 No, I’m about to arrive already.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Who just fired?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I don’t know, maybe “Zhulyen”?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, fine. Uh-huh.
183. At 13:21:08 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:38) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀘􀀙􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Did you just fire?
􀂳􀀽􀁋􀁘􀁏􀁜􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, let’s go. Pull out.
184. At 13:22:42 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:28) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Another one finished firing.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 So, at what time?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Fourteen…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Let’s write 14:22.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. That’s all. It’s being reloaded. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes (inaudible)
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
185. At 13:23:44 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:50) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a person
by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀙􀀙􀀕􀀙􀀕􀀗􀀗􀀖􀀜, which is used by a person
with the call sign 􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀃􀀾􀂳􀀺􀁌􀁏􀁇􀂴􀁀􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, I’m listening.
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝􀀃Hello, “Mirza”?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝 Hello? So, there’s another set of bearings. Pichikus Station on the other side of Kalchik…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝 Look on the map. They’re raining down Grad shells on Mariupol from there…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝 And there’s a fucking 8-axle Smerch standing there. How the fuck it…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, I got it. Understood. Tell me again, friend.
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝 There’s a station called Pichikus, the other side of Kalchik.
17
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “P.I.C.H.I.K.U.S.” Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝 The other side of Kalchik. It’s toward Volnovakha. I mean, if your heading up the Odessa Highway from
Mariupol. Right there, around there, is Kalchik, and there, if you’re driving…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 So it’s called “Pichikus”.
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁎􀁜􀁜􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. Ok, bye.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
186. At 13:26:23 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:46) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Your targets for the next run is “one hundred seven” and “one hundred nine”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “One hundred seven” and “one hundred nine”.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I think what’s-his-name, “Zhulyen”, was just working on “one hundred nine”. Repeat?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Ok. Then everything on “one hundred seventh”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Both, right? Ok, understood.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, on “one hundred seventh”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Did everything work out with the corrections?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 We’re about to find out.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, ok, call me after.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Just a second, wait just a second! I’ll call you right back, ok!
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Ok!
197. At 14:19:42 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:22) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of “􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, hide the division so it isn’t visible. Do you understand?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Get the divisions out of there. The mission is on its way, do you understand?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Load everything up and hide it, understood? So that it isn’t visible. Tell “Rizhy”, too. Put the whole
fucking lot in the sheds.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You got it, right? Hurry up.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Got it.
198. At 14:20:21 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:46) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 (speaking aside: Get everything the fuck out of there. Everyone load up and hide.) (Then converses
with “Terek”).
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Terek”, listen! Everyone needs to load up and hide all the vehicles. Do you understand? Drive them
into the sheds. Got it? The OSCE mission is coming, do you understand?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Do you understand or not? Hide both batteries. Everything…
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Maybe I, maybe I, maybe I, umm… Load as much as possible and get out?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, load it and hide it. Do you understand?
18
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok. Well, yes. In principle, that’s right. Make the decision, finish loading up if something happens.
Put everything in the shed. You got it, right?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes, I got it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 (inaudible) especially.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Get out and hide, do you understand? Hurry up.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Do it.
199. At 14:23:51 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:29) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of “􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Did you get through to “Rizhy”?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 He isn’t answering my fucking calls!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Keep calling, keep calling. This is very important. He’s going to get busted over there…
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Call him, call him. As soon as you’ve hidden, report back to me, buddy. Ok, bye.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Bye.
200. At 14:27:31 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:54) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴, and hands the phone to someone by the name of 􀀲􀁏􀁈􀁎􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁕􀀑 The subscribers
have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Terek”, so, you need to remove those “centipedes” 􀃆 Uragans and hide them there. So that nobody
sticks their noses in anywhere. In the woods somewhere. And everything else is clear, right?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I didn’t get that, I didn’t get that.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hide the “centipedes” first of all. Do you understand?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The “centipedes”, yes. And everything else, so they’re completely gone. Even in the woods over there,
ok, and nobody should come out. Don’t drive down these road in the “centipedes” – that would be a fuck-up! You can
let the “supply train” on the road. That’s how…
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And these fucking “butterflies” – you understand, right?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I’m driving them over there, over there. I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, be careful (inaudible).
201. At 14:29:06 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:31) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of “􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑”. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 The fucking bastard isn’t answering the phone.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, keep calling the faggot. Shit, otherwise we're going to be fucked!
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 It’s ringing. He not answering the fucking phone!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Keep calling the idiot, keep calling. Uh-huh.
19
202. At 14:34:54 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:41) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Rubinchik, did you get through yet?
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Fuck no!
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Fucking idiot! He’s a goner. That…
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 I can’t believe he hasn’t shown up.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes! The fucking idiot better turn up. Do you understand? Keep calling him. And, in general we need
to save – umm, those “centipedes” need to go in the woods, damn it, but let the supply vehicles go. Got it? The main
thing is to get rid of the “centipedes”. Uh-huh.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 I understand, I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. Just hide them in the ravine, so they aren’t visible. Here and there.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Everything’s fine here. The sheds are…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye. Uh-huh. Keep calling that idiot.
􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀀝 Uh-huh.
203. At 14:36:45 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 01:10) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀘􀀕􀀗􀀕􀀙􀀚, which is used
by a person with the call sign “􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴 [“Redhead”]. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Hello? Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? Hide so no one can see you, especially the “centipedes”. Do you understand? In the fucking
ravine, got it? Hello?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Yes, I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hurry up.
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Right away. We’ll be ready soon.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You don’t have to be ready! What the fuck do you mean, “ready”? Hurry the fuck up and hide. Take
it away so no one can see it, so no one can fucking see you. Do you understand? What the fuck do you mean, “ready”?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, come on, but let the supply vehicles go wherever the fuck they want. Do you understand? The
supply vehicles over there. But these, hide them so they can't be seen from the road, nothing anywhere. Do you
understand? In the ravine. Everyone just sit in the vehicles.
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 And wait for further orders, right?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes! Wait for further orders. Just stay in contact. Do you understand? Wait, even if you have to spend
all night there, do you understand. Ok, that’s all.
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Yes, I understand.
At 14:38:14 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:11) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used by a
person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 I got through to him
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yeah, me too. Go on, report back as soon as you're hidden. Go on. Ok?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. Ok.
205. At 14:39:14 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:50) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
20
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 As soon as you’re hidden, report back to me. Just make sure no one finds you, not even Mandalay.
Ok?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 And in the sheds? In the sheds?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, just be careful. Hurry up, speed everything up. Have you cleared the fuck out yet?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Not yet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What the hell? I’m already, I’m already… Well? Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Mine is, mine is standing on the dirt, in Kardashinka.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 I understand. Cover that one, and (inaudible) take it away already, move it out through the outskirts
of the village, especially the “centipede”…
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Get all of the fucking “centipedes” out of there. And you can seat the fucking retards up top on those
boxes. Let’s go!
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Understood.
209. At 15:11:19 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:30) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, Rubinchik! Tell me that’s it. Tell all the guys, tell the guys, once it’s dark, they can come out
carefully. Well, pull them out and take them over to “zero”. Got it?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. That’s everything, for sure?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, that’s everything for sure. Ok, bye.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Got it.
210. At 15:11:58 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:36) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, look, “Terek”, wait until dark and take them all out to “zero”. Understood?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello. What, am I supposed to go back now? I just turned around and I’m driving…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Shit, what the hell am I going to do (inaudible)
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 No, no, so what am I…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hide them well. Hide them, wait for dark, and once it’s dark go quietly to “zero”. Ok?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Understood.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Only when it’s pitch dark.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Ok.
211. At 15:18:31 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:32) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? It’s going to be pitch dark there by 18:00. At 18:00 start carefully moving toward “zero”. To
“zero”. Ok?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 At 18:00.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. Well, it’s going to be dark already, right?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, yeah. Well, I’ll see how things look then.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝. Ok. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
212. At 15:19:16 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:37) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
21
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? So, as soon as it gets dark – 18:00, 18:15, start moving toward “zero”.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes. Tell me instead – they’re wondering if everything is ok over there?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, I’ll tell you later. Come on, keep working. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 People are wondering over there, damn it. Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 All right. Well, everything is fine over in your direction.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok, got it.
213. At 15:44:45 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:36) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Rubenchik, have you left yet?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 No.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah. Rubenchik – you and “Rizhy”, pound the same targets you hit before. Pound them and
immediately pull back to “zero”. Got it? Hello?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes. Got it.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, ok. Here’s your assignment: Call “Rizhy”, go out and pound them, got it? Then immediately
report back to me. The same targets you fired on earlier, yes. Ok. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok, got it.
214. At 15:45:36 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:32) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, “Terek”, go ahead and start moving to “zero” in about 15 minutes. All right.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 But I haven’t even arrived yet?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Arrived where?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 In Markino.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 All right, I’m going to keep it short: start the movement in about 15 minutes. Ok, bye.
230. At 17:00:41 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:34) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Did you take it away?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I’m just pulling up now.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. And those – the rest of his “farm”?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I don’t know yet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. But has it started moving yet? Can you find out? I’m asking you for real.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Ok, hang on. Let me just get out first.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
231. At 17:04:27 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:23) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok, I’m walking away.
22
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Come on, run! Fly over there to your guys. Find out where your guys are standing, ok. I mean, the
“farm”…
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The second one.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Take them over there.
232. At 17:07:17 of 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:27) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Do you know where the “supply train” is?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Huh?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 The “supply train”, do you know where it is?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Try calling “Oka”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Try calling “Oka”. I…
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, fine. All right, bye.
233. At 17:07:59 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:39) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀜, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Oka”, where’s the “supply train”?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, we're making our way gradually.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You’re already on your way there? Yes?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You’re taking everything, right? You're taking everything, right?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes. Are we the first ones?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. How much longer will it take you?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, about 10-15 minutes if make a straight line.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye.
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 At least.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, ok.
234. At 17:13:37 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 01:44) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, hello?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Listen, can you somehow explain, in rough terms, what the hell happened over there and why they can't
carry out a basic task? Where’s your what’s-his-name, “Rubin”, and “Terek”, damn it?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 They all moved out. I reported everything over the phone. I fulfilled my orders.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 How could you have reported over the phone if they are reporting that they haven’t done a damn thing yet?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 By the way, that’s what I told them. I’m telling you, I fulfilled (inaudible). I reported ten minutes ago.
I reported where the unit is now (inaudible)
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 I see that. I see that. Did you report the number of kilometers?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, I’m not talking about the number of kilometers. How many kilometers from (inaudible) to
“zero”, depending where, how far away they are now. It’s “Gorets”…. Yes!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Listen, wait. Listen, damn it. Calm the hell down. Turn off the damn adrenaline. Max, turn off your damn
adrenaline. Just calm down. Those idiots who stayed there, are they all moving out?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, they’re moving out.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 The “supply train” – is the “supply train” moving out?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, it’s moving out.
23
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 The first “kolkhoz’s” supply train?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Is the second half of the second “kolkhoz” moving out?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. Yes, it’s moving out.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 They’re carrying out all the orders and starting to move, right?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes. Of course, yes. All of them.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Listen, is your guide there? Is he with them to the end or not?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 They’re still leading them. They all have a guide.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Ok, they’re in touch, I see. Regarding the first “kolkhoz”, I understand where they’re located. Tell them to
let me know roughly when the second one reaches the same spot at the first one.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Absolutely, absolutely.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Ok. That’s all. I’m hanging up.
235. At 17:17:52 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:50) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀛􀀚􀀔􀀔􀀗􀀛􀀚, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀑􀀃The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 “Rizhy”, are you there now?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Call “Ruben”. Meet up and head over there. Got it?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Umm… where exactly?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What do you mean, “where”? There, damn it. Where do you think?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Ah, I understand.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Call “Ruben”, got it?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Ok.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Have they brought the “supply train” up yet?
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Well, we dragged all of our own stuff over here.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok. That’s all fine. Ok, wait for “Ruben” get the fuck over there.
􀂳􀀵􀁌􀁝􀁋􀁜􀂴􀀝 Got it.
236. At 17:19:04 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:34) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀜, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, when will you get there?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 We're just pulling up. We’ll be there in 3-4 minutes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And that’s it, you’re going to let them go, right?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, bye.
237. At 17:21:58 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:27) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Umm… The “centipedes” have left.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝. Uh-huh. He says he’ll be there shortly.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Somewhere, damn it. I don’t even know where he called from.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 He called, huh?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Only there was nobody here. We had to remove the gate bar.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, that’s all fine. Uh-huh.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Are there any ABATO guys over there? No?
24
239. At 17:28:17 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:14) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀜, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok, I brought them.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 I brought them, I brought them.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Let them go there, let them go, then.
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, yes, yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. They all came, right? All of them?
240. At 17:29:50 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:51) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀙􀀖􀀖􀀚􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀜, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, yes?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello? Has everyone left? Nobody stayed behind?
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, yes, the column is passing by.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, I understand. Any broken ones? Fuck, I’m asking that.
􀂳􀀲􀁎􀁄􀂴􀀝 I, I was at the head. I’ll let them past, then I’ll come back and report.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. Ok, bye.
241. At 17:40:16 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:24) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀛􀀙􀀖􀀔, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝􀀃Yes?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 I’ve escorted them all.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 They’ve all moved out?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Yes.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 And what’s left?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 Well, the last one has moved out. He said that was all, he was the last.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Good, ok.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀝 So, should I go home then?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, go back to your place. Uh-huh.
242. At 17:56:43 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:53) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗, which is used
by a person with the call sign 􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Hello, Max?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Hello.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Max, listen, the first “kolkhoz” is yours. What does your guide say? Has it left? Has it crossed?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, it has all left. Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 For sure?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, for sure. The guide says the last vehicle has left, yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 And the second?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Not yet. As soon as it leaves, I’ll let you know.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 The second… No, tell the second that as soon as they cross, they should immediately form up and wait
there. People are on their way to meet them.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 But they’re standing…
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Yes. They’re contacting us. They’re standing and waiting there, and people are on their way to meet them.
But the first “kolkhoz” has left, right?
25
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, it has left.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴􀀝 Good, ok.
243. At 17:57:50 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:41) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, “Ruben”, have they arrived yet?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 I’m about to see them off already.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 No, no, no. Tell the senior officer, tell the senior officer to go out past, well, past the “ribbon”.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok. Hello? And tell him to wait there for his, well, tell him to go drive a bit further out and wait, and
then make contact. Tell him the make contact. Got it?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Does he know who to contact?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, he knows. He knows who to contact. And it’s not at all…
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ok.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Got it.
244. At 17:58:41 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:27) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes, as soon as they go out, as soon as they get up there, well, as soon as they go out there, past the,
umm…
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Past the thing. They should stand up so as to be visible, understood? And then they should make
contact. Report back to me when they’ve moved out. Ok, let’s go.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok.
245. At 17:59:25 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:25) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Hello, Ruben. There are three of our guys there, three of our guys. Three of our young guys. Take
them with you, ok?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh, ok.
246. At 18:00:07 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:19) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀑 The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 They’re there, umm, well, they’re standing at the post. Ok?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Uh-huh. I understand.
247. At 18:06:05 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:25) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
26
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Hello?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, have they moved out yet?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Not yet.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 What’s going on?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 They’re about to arrive, they’re about to arrive.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Ah, in Kuznetsy, right? Ok.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 All right, bye.
248. At 18:10:02 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:19) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀜􀀕􀀏􀀃which is used
by a person with the call sign “􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀀅. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀂴􀀝􀀃This is “Andyr”. I just wanted to clarify, what am I supposed to pass on for nineteen thirty?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Don’t pass anything on yet. Later, at the next capture, you’ll do it.
􀂳􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀂴: Ok.
249. At 18:26:00 on 01/24/2015 (session duration 00:32) cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀙􀀗􀀔􀀓􀀛􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃with the call sign 􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴, calls cellphone number 􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀓􀀜􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀔, which is used
by a person by the name of 􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴. The subscribers have the following conversation:
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Yes?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Ok, I sent the “family”.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 You told them to stop over there, in the bare patch.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Yes, Yes. I told them to stop and call. Listen, what about those other three at the post?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Can you pick them up and bring them here to us?
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Where?
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 Well, to “one”.
􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁅􀁈􀁑􀂴􀀝 Oy! Ok, I’ll pick them up.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴􀀝 All right.
The disks accompanying the transcript also contain other materials that may have a bearing on Criminal
Proceeding No. 22015050000000047.
􀀨􀁛􀁋􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁗􀀝 CD-R, registry No. 5390 dated 06/19/17; DVD-R, registry Nos. 5361, 5352, 5360, 5363, 5359 (six) items,
declassified.
􀀧􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀗
􀀕􀁑􀁇 􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀯􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗 [signature] 􀀵􀀑􀀃􀀱􀁄􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁜􀁆􀁋
August 16, 2017
Registry No. 2/2/5-4998
Annex 409
Meta data for Conversation Between Phone Numbers 380993641081 and 380508065681
(13:21:45, 24 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

380993641081-2015.01.24-13.21.45-273.wav
Object: 380993641081
MSISDN: 380993641081
IMEI: 35628805016889
IMSI: 255012940641081
Date: 24.01.2015
Time: 13:21:45
Duration: 0:0:39
Direction: Outgoing
Participants: 380508065681
􀉌􀉢􀉩􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁒􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁖􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇
Location:
village of Bezimennoe, Novoazovskiy district, Donetsk region, 51 Silskohospodarska Str (agro
production facility No 5)

Annex 410
Meta data for Conversation Between Phone Numbers 380993641081 and 380993648631
(09:13:32, 24 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

380993641081-2015.01.24-09.13.32-584.wav
Object: 380993641081
MSISDN: 380993641081
IMEI: 35628805016889
IMSI: 255012940641081
Date: 24.01.2015
Time: 9:13:32
Duration: 0:0:21
Direction: Incoming
Participants: 380993648631
Type: Audio, Answered
Location:
village of Bezimennoe, Novoazovskiy district, Donetsk region, 51 Silskohospodarska Str (agro
production facility No 5)

Annex 411
Intercepted Conversation between Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and Grynchev (“Terek”) (08:54:19, 24
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀕􀀗􀁂􀀓􀀔􀁂􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀁂􀁂􀀓􀀛􀁂􀀘􀀗􀁂􀀔􀀜􀁂􀁂􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗􀁂􀀋􀉋􀈻􀈾􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀘􀀘􀀘􀀜􀀛􀀚􀀓􀁂􀀓􀀓􀀑􀁚􀁄􀁙
Time: 24.01.2015 08:54:19
Duration: 0:00:45
MSISDN: 380932804204
Direction: Outgoing
Participants of connection: <380993648631>
Type􀀝􀀃􀈺􀉭􀉞􀉢􀉨􀀲􀀱
Text SMS: ''
Text MMS: ''
Cells: <20511_00227><20511_00223>
DTMF:
Forwarding:
IMEI:
IMSI: 255062024424560
Comment: 'shln: "Terek" on the position (mar2)'
Id of session: 95470762
ObjId: 39939
CallId: 427230
Operator ID=439;Name=save;LastName=save
Sign of selection NUMBER=380932804204;NumberType=MSISDN
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Terek!
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Speaking!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Terek! This is Gorets.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Yes, yes, yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- This is Gorets. So, tell me, are you in position?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- How soon will you be ready?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Well, the first one will be ready in about five minutes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- And the second one?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- The second [Unclear].
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Listen, do you have “Belozer”? “Belozer”, do you have a secure connection,
telephone? “Belozer”?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- No.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- You don’t? No, not you, those who arrived. Do those who arrived have “Belozer”?
Do they have “Belozer”?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- [asking someone else:] do you have “Belozer”? [now addressing “Gorets”:] - He does
not, he says.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- No “Belozer”, understood. [talking to someone else:] Hello! Yes, yes, yes.

Annex 412
Intercepted Conversation between Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and Grynchev (“Terek”) (09:11:34, 24
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Time: 24.01.2015 09:11:34
Duration: 0:01:14
MSISDN: 380932804204
Direction: Outgoing
Connection Participants: <380993648631>
Type􀀝􀀃􀈺􀉭􀉞􀉢􀉨􀀲􀀱
Text SMS: ''
Text MMS: ''
Cells: <20511_00227><20511_00223><20511_00226><20511_00227>
DTMF:
Forwarding:
IMEI:
IMSI: 255062024424560
Comment: 'shln: "Terek" on preparedness of batteries (mar2)'
Id of session: 95478144
ObjId: 39939
CallId: 427291
Operator 􀀬􀀧􀀠􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀞􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪􀀞􀀯􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪
Sign of selection NUMBER=380932804204;NumberType=MSISDN
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Hello!
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Yes, so, are you ready, Terek?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- The first one, the second one…
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- And the second one?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- It’s running a little bit slow.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Well, I need [someone] senior. Don’t hang out in that battery, everything is fine in
this battery. Find the other battery, where are their seniors located, damn it? On that battery?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Between us, between us is about two kilometers.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Yes. So, take a car and drive there.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- I’m, I’m, I’m not in that area, I'm…
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- I understand, I understand. So, drive to the second, can you drive to the second area?
To the second area? Or you can’t?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- And what if I leave and [unclear].
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- No, no, and who’s from that battery?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- “Zhulyen” is there.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- “Zhulyen”?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Meaning the local fellow, yes? Local, local.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Yes, yes, yes.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- And do you [Unclear]
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- No, I have already received an order. I’m finishing work and leaving, and the
second…
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Yes, yes, yes.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- So it will follow right after
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Right after.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- I’m leaving [Unclear].
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- Good.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- [Unclear]
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- That’s it, start discharging the task. I’ll report that I opened fire, bye.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴- Got it.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴- [to someone else:] Hello.
Annex 413
Intercepted Conversation between Evdotiy (“Pepel”) and Kirsanov (10:36:40, 24 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

380993641092-2015.01.24-10.36.40-46.wav
Object: 380993641092
MSISDN: 380993641092
IMEI: 86362301593840
IMSI: 255012940641092
Date: 24.01.2015
Time: 10:36:40
Duration: 0:1:2
Direction: Incoming
Participants: 380507037316
Type: Audio, Answered
Location:
village of Bezimennoe, Novoazovskiy district, Donetsk region, 51 Silskohospodarska Str (agro
production facility No 5)
Azimuth: 150
LAC:0, CELL:0
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Yes!
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Alexander, well… Too far, too far, too far - overdid it.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Tell me, what’s going on there?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - What’s going on? Long story short, everything flew over, and it went on
houses… on houses, on nine-story buildings, on private residences, the Kievskiy market, in
short. And…
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀐 And what’s the direction of fire, tell me?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - The direction of fire is from …. as if, as if, as if, it sticks out as if
Vinogradnoye, from there, that side.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌􀀃􀀐 I don’t fucking understand… Oy-oy-oy-oy-oy… Ok, anyway, bye.

Annex 414
Intercepted Conversation between Kirsanov and Ponomarenko (“Terrorist’) (10:38:14, 24
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀕􀀗􀁂􀀓􀀔􀁂􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀁂􀁂􀀔􀀓􀁂􀀖􀀛􀁂􀀔􀀗􀁂􀁂􀀧􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁗􀁖􀁎􀁂􀀖􀀗􀀕􀀚􀀘􀀚􀀓􀁂􀀋􀉋􀈻􀈾􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀗􀀚􀀗􀀘􀀔􀀔􀀘􀁂􀀓􀀓􀀑􀁚􀁄􀁙
Time: 24.01.2015 10:38:14
Duration: 0:04:18
MSISDN: 380633427570
Direction: Outgoing
Connection participants: <380936255484>
􀀷􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀝􀀃􀈺􀉭􀉞􀉢􀉨􀀃􀀲􀀱
Text SMS: ''
text MMS: ''
Cells: <20508_20926><20508_20272><20508_20922><20508_20041><20508_20921>
DTMF:
Forwarding:
IMEI: 861188024350070
IMSI: 255061035199627
Comment: 'update shia aleksander overdid it; it overflew by 1 km shia (mar3)'
ID of session: 95521234
ObjId: 45489
CallId: 48250
􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀬􀀧􀀠􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀞􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪􀀞􀀯􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪
Selection sign NUMBER=380633427570;NumberType=MSISDN
[Sound of a telephone call]
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Yes, hello.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Good morning.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Yes.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Look what Aleksander has done.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Yes.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 It’s a totally fucking disaster here.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 What?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 The damn market, nine story high-rise buildings, private houses. All the shit
was fucked up.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Are you serious?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 It fucking overflew. Overflew by approximately a kilometer.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 To Vostochnyi?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Yes, yes. The Kievskiy market, school No. 5, nine-story high-rise buildings,
right into the courtyards, fuck, the utility building. It fucking went and fell as far as
Olimpiyskaya. Fucking fuck. Basically, they overflew the entire Vostochnyi.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Oh, fucking shit.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 There…
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 What?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 No, never mind.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Oh, the ukrops will do good PR now.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 They are shooting, so fucking shooting
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝…
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 The windows blew out of the buildings. The cars. Lots of burned.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Cars?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Yes, there are fuck probably more than ten of them.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 That doesn’t fucking matter.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 I agree. But Vostochnyi seriously fucking suffered.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 How about the check point?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Untouched motherfucker!
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 It sucks!
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Hey, listen, the ukrops are shooting, they are shooting from… tell me…
from-from-from Talakovka. From there. Orlovskoe, Talakovka. So, they were removing all that
all the night on open trucks.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 What are they removing?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Tanks, cannons, fuck and all kind of other shit.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 Whole?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Whole. Something broken, something whole. They are removing it on open
trucks. Even fucking now.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 I fucking told him that it is going to be difficult there without
eyes. But “No.”
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Fuck, he is such a bitch, too. He had the fucking “eyes.” What the fuck is he
doing? He is practicing in [incomprehensible term].
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 What?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 I fucking called him. He is totally fucking shocked. He calls me and says:
What the fuck is going on? He says: I have so much fucking information, and it is all different. I
drove there now, and I see that it is totally fucking messed up. If Grad landed, of course the
windows got blown out. That’s what is happening now.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 No injured people, right?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 There are, why not? Dead bodies are laying fucking everywhere.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 …
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 There are dead bodies lying around the market. Who knows what’s
happened. Who knows what’s happening at the fucking market and in the stores. The stores in
the market are burning. No one knows what’s happening in the apartments, because the ninestory
high-rise buildings are standing there without any fucking window glass from the first story
to the ninth.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 …..
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀝 Ok, brother. I will call you later.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌􀀝 This is fucking awful fuck. Ok, ok.
Annex 415
Intercepted Conversation between Kirsanov and Ponomarenko (“Terrorist”) (11:04:12, 24
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

24_01_2015__11_04_12__Donetsk_6255484_(SBD)205653518_00.wav
Time: 24.01.2015 11:04:12
Duration: 0:02:38
MSISDN: 380936255484
Direction: Incoming
Connection participants: <380633427570>
Type: AudioON
SMS text: ''
MMS text: ''
Cells: <20510_03232><20510_03235><20510_03232><20510_03235><20510_00333>
DTMF:
Forwarding:
IMEI: 357817050140520
IMSI: 255062064578259
Comments: ' shia [sic] summary report ukr column heading for Gnutovo shia[sic] (mar3)􀉫'
Session ID: 95533795
ObjId: 46986
CallId: 123644
Operator ID=439;Name=􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪;LastName=􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪
Selection marker NUMBER=380936255484;NumberType=MSISDN
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Hello. Well, he says, he says they’re shooting. But it’s that guy who works in
the store. He says some fighters stopped to get some butter, and, well, he started chatting with them,
and they say, basically, that, well, one way or another, they removed the hardware from here to
Mariupol. I mean, Mariupol, damn it. And they say, He says a column of our guys is headed to
Gnutovo to meet them. They say they’re going in…
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - So the Ukrop column is heading toward Gnutovo.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Yes, to meet them.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - I see. To meet them… And did they take our flags…?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - I don’t know (laughs).
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Did they take bread, salt?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - I don’t know, I don’t know, damn it. I don’t know…
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Well, they’re shooting. You can hear it.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - So basically that sucks.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - And that one, it poured out from there, after all.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Yeah, Talakovka unleashed a bombardment first thing in the morning.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - I know.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - And then Vostochnyi.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Let the fucking bitches be more afraid.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Well, yes.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - It just fucking sucks, you know that they’re forcing people to
leave now, and they’re going to sit there.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Yeah. That’s right. And the people there, I tell you, they’re leaving in droves.
In droves!
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Well, naturally. And they’re going to sit there. Do you
understand?
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - That’s right.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - They’ll leave the nine-story building and go. Well, now I’ve
made up my mind. I’ll have a word …
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Uh-huh.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Take care.
􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙 - Ok, bye.
Annex 416
Intercepted Conversation between Tsapliuk (“Gorets”) and Yaroshuk (14:12:12, 24 January
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀕􀀗􀁂􀀓􀀔􀁂􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀁂􀁂􀀔􀀗􀁂􀀔􀀕􀁂􀀔􀀕􀁂􀁂􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗􀁂􀀋􀉋􀈻􀈾􀀌􀀕􀀓􀀘􀀚􀀘􀀕􀀖􀀗􀁂􀀓􀀓􀀑􀁚􀁄􀁙
Time: 24.01.2015 14:12:12
Duration: 0:00:27
MSISDN: 380932804204
Direction: Incoming
Participants of connection: <79262391058>
Type􀀝􀀃􀈺􀉭􀉞􀉢􀉨􀀲􀀱
Text SMS: ''
Text MMS: ''
Cells: <20511_00227><20511_00223>
DTMF:
Forwarding:
IMEI:
IMSI: 255062024424560
Comment: 'shln: leaving (mar2)'
Id of session: 95640594
ObjId: 39939
CallId: 25833
Operator 􀀬􀀧􀀠􀀗􀀖􀀜􀀞􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪􀀞􀀯􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀱􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀠􀉫􀉨􀉯􀉪
􀉉􀉪􀉢􀉡􀉧􀉚􀉤􀀃􀉨􀉬􀉛􀉨􀉪􀉚􀀃􀀱􀀸􀀰􀀥􀀨􀀵􀀠􀀖􀀛􀀓􀀜􀀖􀀕􀀛􀀓􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀗􀀞􀀱􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀷􀁜􀁓􀁈􀀠􀀰􀀶􀀬􀀶􀀧􀀱
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Hello, hello, hello, no connection, no connection, no…
􀀼􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁋􀁘􀁎􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀶􀀑 - Gorets, listen to me carefully, so, that’s it for now, stop.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - Yes!
􀀼􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁋􀁘􀁎􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀶􀀑􀀃- Let them leave somewhere.
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - I understood you, got it, got it, got it!
􀀼􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁋􀁘􀁎􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀶􀀑􀀃- Did you understand who?
􀂳􀀪􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀂴 - I understood who! Understood, understood. That’s it. I’m giving an order. I know, I
hear you, I hear you. [Unclear.]

Annex 417
Intercepted Conversation between Grynchev (“Terek”) and Vlasov (“Yugra”) (12:57:55, 24
January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

380993641081-2015.01.24-12.57.55-262.wav
Object: 380993641081
MSISDN: 380993641081
IMEI: 35628805016889
IMSI: 255012940641081
Date: 24.01.2015
Time: 12:57:55
Duration: 0:0:24
Direction: Incoming
Participants: 380993648631
Type: Audio, Answered
Location:
LAC:0, CELL:0
village of Bezimennoe, Novoazovskiy district, Donetsk region, 51 Silskohospodarska Str (agro
production facility No 5)
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴 - Hello.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - So what … Are you ready?
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴􀀃- Well, in a minute.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Ok, come on, as soon as …
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴 - Immediately open fire, clear? ... And I leave again.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴- Yes, leave. Yes, do it.
􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁎􀂴 - Yep.
􀀰􀁄􀁛􀀃􀂳􀀼􀁘􀁊􀁕􀁄􀂴 - Yep. And report.

Annex 418
Intercepted Conversation between Evdotiy (“Pepel”) and Ponomarenko (“Terrorist”) (18:00:22,
23 January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

380958533685-2015.01.23-18.00.22-539.wav
Object: 380958533685
MSISDN: 380958533685
IMEI: 86629801127381
IMSI: 255011750533685
Date: 23.01.2015
Time: 18:00:22
Duration: 0:1:44
Direction: Incoming
Participants: 380936255484
Type: Audio, Answered
Location:
village of Bezimennoe, Novoazovskiy district, Donetsk region, 51 Silskohospodarska Str (agro
production facility No 5)
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Yes!
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Little brother, so, did he give it to you?
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - No.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - He says - I sent him everything.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Ah, he had sent it to me before you called.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - I see, so is everything is ok?
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Yes, yes, yes. Yes, little brother.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Because I’m looking at it right fucking now.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Yep.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - You’re going to make everything happen, right?
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Yes, yes.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - When are you starting today, are we going to “perform”?
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Yes.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - It’s fucking seven already…
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - As if I cared!
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - You are always fucking working at night.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Well, yeah. This is already becoming a good habit.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Come on, fucking start earlier. I want to fucking hit them,
fuck.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Well see… I’m not working alone.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - I understand, come on, let’s start.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - [Laughing] Be patient, be patient.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 -
Fucking crush it, I fucking asked you, that one, fucking Vostochniy.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Well…
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - There is fucking a big fucking distance to the houses, little
brother!
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - I will, I’ll do Vostochniy tonight as well, don’t worry.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - So that I can fucking come in there and fucking clean it up. I
don’t give a fuck, we don’t give a fuck whether we can, or cannot … we fuck them in their
fucking ass!
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - [Laughing]
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Take over and that’s fucking it. … That’s the only way.
Come on, I’m waiting for it tonight.
􀀨􀁙􀁇􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀲􀀑􀀰􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀳􀁈􀁓􀁈􀁏􀂴􀀌 - Okay, okay.
􀀳􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀀶􀀑􀀯􀀑􀀃􀀋􀂳􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀂴􀀌 - Bye.
Annex 419
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000266 (2 July
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

1
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
Request
for Legal Assistance
in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266
Kyiv July 2, 2015
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266 of July
24, 2014, in which Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev is suspected of having committed
crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3 and Part 1 of Article 346 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine, which he continues to commit at present.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
requesting the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation to keep the contents
of this request confidential to the extent practicable under the law of the Russian
Federation, since disclosure of information contained in this request may complicate
the process of gathering evidence relevant to the criminal proceedings.
These criminal proceedings are not politically motivated.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that information received through this request will be used exclusively
for the pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266 of July 24,
2014 and during the court hearing of the case.
The pretrial investigation of the criminal case has ascertained that in late
February 2014 Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev, acting on orders from individuals in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation who have not been identified by the pretrial
investigation with the intent to disrupt public safety, intimidate the population,
provoke an armed conflict, a complication of international relations, and influence
the decisions made by national and local government agencies of Ukraine, arrived
in Ukraine with the intention of committing acts of terror in Donetsk Oblast.
In March-April 2014, A.I. Mozhaev and other individuals who have not been
identified by the pretrial investigation formed a terrorist group as part of which they
have been directly involved in the commission of crimes. They are also knowingly
committing an aggregate of actions needed to support the criminal activity of said
group.
2
Specifically, they supply the resources and weapons required for committing
crimes, find accommodation and vehicles for group members, establish and
maintain contacts with Ukrainian and Russian citizens with a view to creating
conditions instrumental to the plotting and commission of acts of terrorism in
Donetsk Oblast, armed resistance, illegal obstruction and interference with the
official duties of law enforcement officers and military personnel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation.
Furthermore, on May 28, 2014, A.I. Mozhaev, as an active member of the
terrorist organization that plotted and committed acts of terrorism in Donetsk
Oblast, engaged in armed resistance, illegal obstruction and interference with the
official duties of law enforcement officers and military personnel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation, while acting out of his
own motives and his personal rejection of the state authorities in Ukraine, made a
death threat against Ukrainian Parliament member and presidential election
contender Petro Poroshenko during a video interview distrusted over the Internet,
specifically by being posted on the www.youtube.com website.
As part of the pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No.
220140500000000015, a notice of suspicion was prepared on June 16, 2014 and
approved by the procedural supervisor in respect of Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev to
the effect that he is suspected of having committed crimes falling under Part 1 of
Article 258-3 and Part 1 of Article 346 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
Under Clause 4 of Part 1 of Article 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, the investigation of a criminal case must prove circumstances influencing
the severity of the criminal offense committed, the circumstances characterizing the
accused individual’s personality, aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
circumstances that rule out criminal liability, or circumstances that serve as
grounds for discontinuation of criminal proceedings.
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the Convention on Legal Aid and
Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of January 22, 1993, seeking to
ensure a swift, full, and objective investigation of Criminal Case No.
22014000000000266 of July 24, 2014, the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine is requesting legal assistance in this criminal case and
asking for a number of procedural formalities to be carried out in the territory of
the Russian Federation:
1. Request from the relevant authorities information about the address of
registration of Alexander Ivanovich Mozhaev, d.o.b. September 21, 1977,
information about his possible registration with drug abuse, mental or neurological
disease prevention centers, information about the Russian citizen’s internal
passport and international passport issued to him, and copies of A.I. Mozhaev’s
requests to be issued said documents.
3
2. Request information from the relevant authorities about any prior record
of criminal or administrative offenses committed by Alexander Ivanovich Mozhaev,
d.o.b. September 21, 1977, including possession or storage of weapons. If
information to this effect is available, request copies of verdicts or rulings issued in
respect of A.I. Mozhaev from the relevant judicial authorities.
3. Request from the relevant border control authorities information about
crossings by Alexander Ivanovich Mozhaev, d.o.b. September 21, 1977, of the state
border of the Russian Federation during the period from January 1, 2014 until
present, including the time of crossing, the border crossing point, and direction.
4. Request from the relevant authorities information about military service by
Alexander Ivanovich Mozhaev, d.o.b. September 21, 1977 (under contract or
conscription), including the time of service and military unit, the position held, the
period of service, and reasons for discharge.
5. Request from the relevant operational units of the law enforcement
agencies information about the potential involvement of Alexander Ivanovich
Mozhaev, d.o.b. September 21, 1977, in the operations of illegal paramilitary
groups in both the Russian Federation and abroad. If such information is available,
provide specific names of such groups.
6. Request information from the relevant government agencies whether or
not any criminal proceedings against A.I. Mozhaev [translator’s note: the name
appearing in the original is “R.Z. Khalikov”, presumably a clerical error] are ongoing
in connection with his involvement in the terrorist organization “Donetsk People's
Republic” in Ukrainian territory.
7. Identify and question as witnesses the next of kin of Alexander Ivanovich
Mozhaev, d.o.b. September 21, 1977, about his biographical data and information
characterizing him, and also about his whereabouts.
Under Article 93 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, in the process of
gathering evidence the prosecutor may request documents and information
relevant to the criminal proceedings from government agencies, businesses,
institutions, and organizations.
Procedure for honoring the request: unless this contravenes the law of
the Russian Federation, we request that you carry out the requested procedural
formalities in keeping with the requirements of Ukrainian law.
Please certify the documents obtained while honoring this request with the
official seal of the issuing department.
Investigative activities in the territory of the Russian Federation are needed
to ensure a swift and full investigation of the criminal case.
While questioning witnesses, we request that you explain to them their rights
under Articles 18, 65, 66, 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, and Article
63 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
4
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that any evidence or information received as part of international legal
assistance will be used exclusively in the context of this criminal case and will not
be used for political, military, or other objectives.
Should you have any questions about this request or it performance, do not
hesitate to contact Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Denis Leonidovich Ladonko, Senior
Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, at +380-44-255-82-68.
Should any circumstances arise preventing you from carrying out the
requested procedural formalities, please notify us at 33 Vladimirskaya Street, Kyiv,
01601, Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
Attachment:
1. Excerpt from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 2, 18, 40, and
93) on 3 pages;
2. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 50, 65, 66,
67, 95, 104, 106, 223, and 224), excerpts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine
(Articles 384, 385, and 387) and from the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 63)
on 9 pages.
3. Excerpt from the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Articles 258-3 and 346) on 1
page.
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
with the 3rd Unit of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant Colonel of Justice [Signature] Denis Leonidovich
Ladonko
APPROVED BY
Senior Prosecutor with the Department
for Procedural Guidance and State Prosecution
in Criminal Cases Against Crime Rings,
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
Councilor of Justice [Signature] Sergey Alexandrovich Zuzak
5
[Handwriting: illegible name. Please prepare a report for the minister. March 18, 2016]
[Signature]
Prosecutor General's Office of the
Russian Federation
15a Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street, Moscow,
Russia, GSP-3, 125993
March 4, 2016 No. 82/1-5094-15
Re: No. 14/3-31155-15
Prosecutor General's Office of
Ukraine
Attn: Mr. A.V. Kovalenko, Chief of
the Directorate for International
Legal Cooperation
[Handwriting: illegible name. For review.
March 18, 2016]
[Signature]
Dear Aleksandr Vladimirovich [Mr. Kovalenko],
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation presents its compliments
to the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and would like to make it known that
the request for legal assistance in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266 has been
reviewed.
It follows from the text of the request that the Central Investigative Directorate of
the Security Service of Ukraine is conducting a pretrial investigation of a criminal
case in which Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev is suspected of having committed crimes
falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3 and Part 1 of Article 346 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine.
The initiator has requested information about said person to be obtained from
government agencies.
Meanwhile, contrary to the requirements of Clause (d), Part 1, Article 7 of the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal
Matters of January 23, 1993, the request for legal assistance fails to provide
information about the place of birth of A.I. Mozhaev.
Item 6 of the request contains a request to obtain information from the relevant
government agencies whether or not any criminal proceedings against I.V. Girkin
are ongoing in connection with his involvement in the terrorist organization
“Donetsk People's Republic” in Ukrainian territory.
However, the request for legal assistance fails to state how these criminal
proceedings are relevant to the person in question.
In light of this, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation would like
to suggest that you additionally send to us the information needed to honor this
request.
Chief of Legal Assistance Directorate
at the Central Directorate for
International Legal Cooperation [Signature] I.D. Kamynin
6
[Seal: Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. Primary State Registration
Number [OGRN]: 1037739514196]
AP No. 669277 [Stamp: Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine. No. 57770-16 of March 18, 2016]
[Stamp: Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. No. 81/1-5094-2015/Nd7695-16
7
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
Request
for Legal Assistance
in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266
(SUPPLEMENT)
Kyiv April 18, 2016
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266 of July
24, 2014, in which Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev is suspected of having committed
crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3 and Part 1 of Article 346 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine, which he continues to commit at present.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
requesting the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation to keep the contents
of this request confidential to the extent practicable under the law of the Russian
Federation, since disclosure of information contained in this request may complicate
the process of gathering evidence relevant to the criminal proceedings.
These criminal proceedings are not politically motivated.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine guarantees
that information received through this request will be used exclusively for the
pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266 of July 24, 2014
and during the court hearing of the case.
The pretrial investigation of the criminal case has ascertained that in late February
2014 Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev, acting on orders from individuals in Ukraine and
the Russian Federation who have not been identified by the pretrial investigation
with the intent to disrupt public safety, intimidate the population, provoke an
armed conflict, a complication of international relations, and influence the decisions
made by national and local government agencies of Ukraine, arrived in Ukraine with
the intention of committing acts of terror in Donetsk Oblast.
In March-April 2014, A.I. Mozhaev and other individuals who have not been
identified by the pretrial investigation formed a terrorist group as part of which they
have been directly involved in the commission of crimes. They are also knowingly
committing an aggregate of actions needed to support the criminal activity of said
group.
8
Specifically, they supply the resources and weapons required for committing
crimes, find accommodation and vehicles for group members, establish and
maintain contacts with Ukrainian and Russian citizens with a view to creating
conditions instrumental to the plotting and commission of acts of terrorism in
Donetsk Oblast, armed resistance, illegal obstruction and interference with the
official duties of law enforcement officers and military personnel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation.
Furthermore, on May 28, 2014, A.I. Mozhaev, as an active member of the
terrorist organization that plotted and committed acts of terrorism in Donetsk
Oblast, engaged in armed resistance, illegal obstruction and interference with the
official duties of law enforcement officers and military personnel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation, while acting out of his
own motives and his personal rejection of the state authorities in Ukraine, made a
death threat against Ukrainian Parliament member and presidential election
contender Petro Poroshenko during a video interview distrusted over the Internet,
specifically by being posted on the www.youtube.com website.
As part of the pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No.
220140500000000015, a notice of suspicion was prepared on June 16, 2014 and
approved by the procedural supervisor in respect of Russian citizen A.I. Mozhaev to
the effect that he is suspected of having committed crimes falling under Part 1 of
Article 258-3 and Part 1 of Article 346 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
On July 27, 2015, a request for legal assistance in Criminal Case No.
22014000000000266 was sent to the relevant authorities of the Russian
Federation.
On March 4, 2016, following the review of the above-mentioned request, the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation sent its Letter No. 82/1-5094-
15 retesting additional information needed to honor the request.
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the Convention on Legal Aid and
Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of January 22, 1993, seeking to
ensure a swift, full, and objective investigation of Criminal Case No.
22014000000000266 of July 24, 2014, the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine is providing the information needed to carry out
procedural formalities in the territory of the Russian Federation:
1. Alexander Ivanovich Mozhaev was born on September 21, 1977 in the
town of Belorechensk, Krasnodar Krai, Russian Federation, and holds Russian
citizen’s passport 03 10 571208 issued on October 26, 2010 by the Krasnodar Krai
Headquarters of the Federal Migration Service of Russia in the Belorechensk
District, division code: 230-021.
9
2. Ravil Zakarievich Khalikov, born on February 23, 1969 in the village of
Beloziorye, Romodanovskiy District, Republic of Mordovia, Russian Federation, is
involved in the creation and operation of the terrorist organization known as
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and is suspected in the context of Criminal Case No.
22014000000000502 of having committed a crime falling under Part 1 of Article
258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. He is the former Prosecutor General and
First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Donetsk People's Republic.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that any evidence or information received as part of international legal
assistance will be used exclusively in the context of this criminal case and will not
be used for political, military, or other objectives.
Should you have any questions about this request or it performance, do not
hesitate to contact Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Denis Leonidovich Ladonko, Senior
Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine, at +380-44-256-96-77.
Should any circumstances arise preventing you from carrying out the
requested procedural formalities, please notify us at 33 Vladimirskaya Street, Kyiv,
01601, Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
with the 3rd Unit of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant Colonel of Justice [Signature] Denis Leonidovich
Ladonko
10
[Handwriting: illegible. April 26, 2016]
[Stamp: Records Management Department. Outgoing correspondence. April 26,
2016. Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine]
April 26, 2016 14/3-31155-15
82/1-5094-15 of March 4, 2016
Prosecutor General’s Office of
the Russian Federation
Attn: I.D. Kamynin, Chief of
Legal Assistance Directorate
at the Central Directorate for
International Legal Cooperation
15a Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street,
Moscow, Russia, GSP-3, 125993
Dear Igor Dmitrievich [Mr. Kadymin],
The Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation and would like to bring the
following to your attention.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000266, in
which A.I. Mozhaev is suspected of having committed crimes falling under Part 1 of
Article 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization) and Part 1 of
Article 346 (threat of violence or actual violence committed against a government
or public figure) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
In the course of the investigation, a need has arisen to carry out procedural
formalities in the Russian Federation, in light of which the Prosecutor General's
Office of Ukraine sent a request for legal assistance in criminal proceedings to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation under the cover of Letter No.
14/3-31155-15 of July 27, 2015.
In response to your request of March 4, 2016, we are sending additional
information provided by the pretrial investigation authority.
Attachment: on 3 pages.
Best regards,
Chief of the Directorate for
International Legal Cooperation [Signature] A. Kovalenko
Typed by: Helbak, +38 044-596-73-92
[Signature]
[Stamp: Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, No. 14/3-59807-out of April 26, 2016]
Annex 420
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000245 (3 July
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

1
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Central Investigative Directorate
33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601. Fax: (044) 279-66-31. Phone: (044) 255-84-88
www.ssu.gov.ua Email: [email protected] Code per National Classification of Businesses and Organizations: 00034074
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
Request
for Legal Assistance
in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000245 of July 25, 2014
Kyiv July 3, 2015
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
invokes the provisions of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal
Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters of January 23, 1993 and
addresses the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation with a request for
legal assistance in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000245 of July 25, 2014
registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations in connection with
alleged crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 2 of Article 110, Part
2 of Article 28, and Part 1 of Article 109 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
These criminal proceedings are not politically motivated.
Circumstances of the criminal offense:
The pretrial investigation has ascertained that A.Yu. Boroday, while
being a radically-minded individual who rejects the state authorities in Ukraine
and disagrees with the protesters’ calls for European integration of Ukraine,
believing that the Ukrainian Parliament illegitimately empowered the Ukrainian
Parliament Speaker to act in the capacity of the Ukrainian President, being a
supporter of criminal activity conducted by P.Yu. Gubarev, and supporting the
criminal acts committed by the terrorist group led by I.V. Girkin, decided to
resist the national and local government agencies with a view to forcibly
disrupting the constitutional system and usurping state power in Ukraine.
Beginning in April 2014, he was an active participant of meetings of the
so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (hereinafter “DNR”), which took place on
the premises of the captured Donetsk Regional State Administration at 32
Bulvar Pushkina, Donetsk.
2
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
Between April 7, 2014 and May 11, 2014, A.Yu. Boroday, acting in
collusion with D.V. Pushilin, A.E. Purgin, and other accomplices in the crime,
acting in contravention of Part 3 of Article 2, Article 73, Clause 2 of Part 1 of
Article 85, and Article 132 of the Constitution of Ukraine, Clause 2 of Part 3 of
Article 3, and Articles 6, 18, 27 of the Law of Ukraine On the National
Referendum of Ukraine, organized and held in Donetsk Oblast an illegal
referendum that approved an unlawful decision to declare the sovereignty of
the illegitimate quasi-state entity known as the “DNR”.
On April 14, 2014, assisted by A.Yu. Boroday, D.V. Pushilin, A.E. Purgin,
and other unidentified individuals, the illegitimate government agencies of the
DNR approved and published the draft of the “DNR Constitution”. According to
its text, state power in the “DNR” is represented by the so-called: “Supreme
Council of the DNR”, “Council of Ministers of the DNR”, and “Security Council of
the DNR”.
Subsequently, D.V. Pushilin and A.E. Purgin, being aware that A.Yu.
Boroday was an active opponent of the incumbent authorities in Ukraine, does
not recognize Ukraine as a state, and supports the annexation of Ukraine’s
southeast to the Russian Federation, offered him to become the Prime Minister
of the so-called “DNR”, i.e. become one of its leaders. A.Yu. Boroday knowingly
agreed to this proposal and on May 16, 2014 the 3rd session of the DNR
Supreme Council elected him as the Prime Minister of the DNR, with a relevant
announcement made through the mass media.
Subsequently, speaking in a news conference on May 17, 2014 in
Donetsk, A.Yu. Boroday stated that the authorities of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” were preparing a request for the Russian Foreign Ministry with a
proposal to join the Russian Federation or deploy Russian military bases in its
territory, and also announced the union of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s
Republics.
In doing so, A.Yu. Boroday and other accomplices in this crime made an
unconstitutional declaration (specifically in a manner that violates Articles 5,
140 and 141 of the Constitution of Ukraine, according to which the only bodies
of state power at the regional level are regional councils elected by regional
residents by exercising universal, equal, and direct voting rights through a
secret ballot on the last Sunday of October in the fifth year of office of the
relevant regional council and nobody may usurp state power) of the creation of
illegitimate bodies of state power of the unlawfully declared illegitimate
quasi-state entity known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” in the place of the
existing legitimate bodies of national and local government specified in Articles
118 and 140 of the Constitution of Ukraine – the Donetsk Regional State
Administration and the Donetsk Regional Council, respectively. In other words,
they committed acts aimed at forcible disruption of the constitution system
and usurpation of state power.
3
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
Continuing his criminal activity, A.Yu. Boroday (being an active member
of the terrorist organization known as the “DNR”, its main goal being to change
the boundaries of the territory and the state borders of Ukraine and create the
illegitimate quasi-state entity “DNR”) in April-May 2014 deliberately acted to
change the boundaries of the territory and the state borders of Ukraine in
violation of the procedure prescribed by the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as
made public calls for such acts to be committed.
Specifically, throughout May 2014, A.Yu. Boroday was in Slovyansk,
Donetsk Oblast, and publicly addressed rallies and mass gatherings of
Slovyansk residents, urging them to hold a referendum and declare the
sovereignty of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” as well as calling for its
annexation to the Russian Federation.
While bringing to life their common criminal plan aimed at changing the
boundaries of Ukraine’s territory, A.Yu. Boroday repeatedly appeared in the
mass media where he covered the operations of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic”, denied Ukraine’s existence as a nation state, and called for the need
to annex the territory of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” to the Russian
Federation.
Also, while in Donetsk on May 11, 2014, A.Yu. Boroday (acting in
collusion with other terrorist group members in contravention of Part 3 of
Article 2, Article 73, Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 85, and Article 132 of the
Constitution of Ukraine, Clause 2 of Part 3 of Article 3, and Articles 6, 18, 27 of
the Law of Ukraine On the National Referendum of Ukraine) organized a
referendum on May 11, 2014 in the territory of Donetsk Oblast, which
approved the illegal decision to declare the sovereignty of the “DNR”.
It has also been determined that in March-May 2014, a terrorist
organization was formed in Donetsk Oblast – the so-called “Donetsk People’s
Republic”, which commits acts of terrorism, intimidation of the population, and
takes over administrative buildings of national and local government agencies,
which destabilizes the social and political situation in the country. The
overriding goal of the activities of said terrorist organization is to change the
boundaries of the territory and the state border of Ukraine and create an illegal
quasi-state entity called the “DNR”, whose leaders include P.Y. Gubarev, A.E.
Purgin, D.V. Pushilin, I.V. Girkin, S.A. Zdryliuk, I.N. Bezler, and other
unidentified individuals.
In early March 2014, A.Yu. Boroday—being a radically-minded individual
who rejects the state authorities in Ukraine, and acting knowingly to change
the boundaries of the territory and the state border of Ukraine—became a
member of the terrorist organization “DNR”, and throughout March-May 2014
participated in the activities of said terrorist organization, providing
organizational and other support for its operations.
4
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
Specifically, beginning in April 2014 A.Yu. Boroday was an active
participant of “DNR” meetings held on the premises of the captured Donetsk
State Regional Administration at 34 Bulvar Pushkina, Donetsk, where he met
its leaders: D.V. Pushilin, A.E. Purgin, and other members of said terrorist
organization.
Notably, unidentified individuals, being aware that A.Yu. Boroday was an
active opponent of the incumbent authorities in Ukraine, does not recognize
Ukraine as a state, and supports the annexation of Ukraine’s southeast to the
Russian Federation, offered him to become the Prime Minister of the so-called
“DNR”, i.e. become its active member and one of its leaders. A.Yu. Boroday
knowingly agreed to this proposal, thereby voluntarily agreeing to participate
in the terrorist organization, provide organizational and other support for its
operations, and on May 16, 2014 the 3rd session of the DNR Supreme Council
elected him as the Prime Minister of the DNR, with a relevant announcement
made through the mass media. Subsequently, he coordinated his actions as a
member of the terrorist organization with other accomplices in this crime.
According to the criminal plan coordinated with other accomplices in this
crime, A.Yu. Boroday was tasked with the following duties, inter alia:
􀀐 Representation of the “DNR” in relations with the Russian Federation and
negotiations with Russian officials;
􀀐 Arranging negotiations regarding the annexation of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts to the Russian Federation;
􀀐 Coordination of activities of “DNR” members in Donetsk with other
accomplices in this crime located in the Russian Federation;
􀀐 Organizational and other support for the operations of said terrorist
organization.
On June 10, 2014, in connection with the above-mentioned facts of criminal
activity A.Yu. Boroday was notified that he is suspected of having committed
crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3 (creation of a terrorist group or
terrorist organization, leadership of said group or organization or participation
therein, as well as organizational and other support for the creation or
operations of the terrorist group or organization); Part 2 of Article 110 (acts
committed repeatedly with a view to changing the territorial boundaries or the
state borders of Ukraine in contravention of the procedure prescribed by the
Constitution of Ukraine, as well as repeated public calls or dissemination of
materials with calls inciting such acts); Part 2 of Article 28 and Part 1 of Article
109 (acts committed by a group of persons acting in collusion with the aim of
forcibly modifying or disrupting the constitutional system or usurping state
power, as well as collusion to commit such acts) of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine.
5
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
On June 11, 2014, the suspect A.Yu. Boroday was put on a wanted list
due to the fact that his whereabouts were unknown.
On February 18, 2015, the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Kyiv allowed
A.Yu. Boroday to be arrested and brought before the court to choose a
measure of pre-trial restriction against him in the form of placement in
custody.
Subject matter and reason for the request:
In order to conduct a full, comprehensive, and objective pretrial
investigation, the Ukrainian pretrial investigation authority needs obtain
information characterizing the suspect in this criminal case – Russian citizen
Alexander Yuryevich Boroday, born on July 25, 1972 in Moscow, Russian
Federation.
In light of the foregoing and bearing in mind the fact that investigative
activities need to be conducted in Russian territory in order to ascertain
circumstances instrumental to establishing the objective truth in this criminal
case, expose the guilty parties, and bring them to criminal account, we hereby
invoke the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family,
and Criminal Matters of January 23, 1993 and request that you perform the
following:
1. Request from the relevant authorities information about the address of
registration of A.Yu. Boroday, information about his possible registration
with drug abuse, mental or neurological disease prevention centers,
information about the Russian citizen’s internal passport and
international passport issued to him.
2. Request information about any prior criminal or administrative liability
records of A.Yu. Boroday, including for possession or storage of firearms,
from the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation. If
information to this effect is available, request copies of verdicts or
rulings issued in respect of A.Yu. Boroday from the relevant judicial
authorities.
3. Request from the relevant border control authorities information about
crossings by A.Yu. Boroday of the state border of the Russian Federation
during the period from January 1, 2014 until present, including the time
of crossing, the border crossing point, and direction of the crossing of the
state border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
6
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
4. Request from the relevant authorities information about military service
by A.Yu. Boroday (under contract or conscription), including the time of
service and military unit, the position held, the period of service, and
reasons for discharge.
5. Request from the relevant operational units of the law enforcement
agencies information about the potential involvement of A.Yu. Boroday
in the operations of illegal paramilitary groups in both the Russian
Federation and abroad.
6. Identify and question as witnesses the friends and next of kin of A.Yu.
Boroday about his biographical data and information characterizing him,
and also about his whereabouts.
Let us assure you that the materials received will be used
exclusively in the pretrial investigation and judicial examination of
this criminal case.
Unless this contravenes the law of the Russian Federation, we request that
you carry out the requested procedural formalities in keeping with the
requirements of Ukrainian law (excerpts of the relevant articles are enclosed);
specifically, the questioning of the witness should be documented in a record,
stating the information required under Article 104 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Ukraine, and in keeping with the procedure prescribed by Article 224 of
the same code.
Before commencing the questioning, the provisions of Article 63 of the
Constitution of Ukraine and Articles 65 (witness), 66 (rights and obligations of
the witness), and 67 (liability of the witness) of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine regarding the rights, obligations, and liability of the witness must be
explained to the witness.
The witness must also be informed that he or she may be brought to
criminal account for knowingly giving false testimony or refusing to testify
under Articles 384 and 385 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The witness must affix a handwritten signature to the record of questioning,
thereby acknowledging awareness of the provisions of the above-mentioned
articles of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code and the
Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
would like to assure you that this request has been prepared strictly in
accordance with Ukrainian laws by a duly authorized officer within the scope of
his authority.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine would like to use this opportunity to express its gratitude for
a favorable decision to honor the request for mutual legal assistance
and would yet again like to use this opportunity to express its
profound respect for the relevant authorities of the Russian
Federation and offer assurances that all materials obtained through
this request will be used exclusively in the investigation of said
criminal case and its examination in court.
7
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
Our address: 33 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine.
If you are unable to honor this request, kindly inform us about the
reasons preventing its performance and the conditions under which it can be
performed by contacting Anatoly Vasilyevich Zhernov, Senior Investigator of
High-Profile Cases at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀎􀇯􀀛􀀃􀀋􀀓􀀗􀀗􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀘-51-62 or fax number
+38 (044) 279-66-31. The email address of the Central Investigative
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is [email protected].
Attachment:
1. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 2, 18,
40, and 93) on 3 pages;
2. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 65, 66,
67, 95, 104, 106, 223, 224); excerpts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine
(Articles 384, 385, 387) and the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 63) on a
total of 8 pages;
3. Excerpts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Articles 28, 109, 110, and
258-3) on 2 pages.
Best regards,
Senior Investigator with the 3rd Operations Unit
of the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
at the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [Signature] Anatoly Vasilyevich Zhernovoy
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
“APPROVED”
Senior Prosecutor with the Department
for Procedural Guidance and State Prosecution
in Criminal Cases Against Crime Rings,
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
Junior Councilor of Justice [Signature] Oleg Valeryevich
Mazur
[Seal: Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine]
8
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Investigative Directorate]
Prosecutor General's Office of the
Russian Federation
15a Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street, Moscow,
Russia, GSP-3, 125993
November 18, 2016 No. 82/1-5095-15
Re: No. 14/3-31144-15
Prosecutor General's Office of
Ukraine
Attn: Mr. E.S. Pikalov,
Chief of Directorate for
International Legal Cooperation
and European Integration
Dear Evgeny Sergeyevich [Mr. Pikalov],
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation presents its
compliments to the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and, invoking the
European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases of April 20,
1959 and the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil,
Family, and Criminal Cases of January 23, 1993, is hereby forwarding the
materials obtained while performing the request of the relevant authorities of
Ukraine for legal assistance in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000245 against
A.Yu. Bezler.
Attachment: on 3 pages.
Best regards,
Acting Chief of the Legal Assistance Directorate
at the Central Directorate for International Legal Cooperation
[Signature] A.M. Tychinin
[Illegible seal]
Typed by: E.B. Stepanova
Phone: (495) 982-41-55
AC No. 419727 [Stamp: Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine. No. 272913-16 of December 2, 2016]
[Stamp: Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. No. 82/1-5095dsp-2015/Nd41450-16
Annex 421
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000283 (3 July
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀔􀀃
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
Request
for Legal Assistance
in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000283
Kyiv July 3, 2015
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000283 of
July 25, 2014, in which Russian citizen Igor Nikolaevich Bezler is suspected of
having committed crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 1 of Article
294, Part 3 of Article 258, Article 341, Article 348, and Article 349 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
requesting the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation to keep the contents
of this request confidential to the extent practicable under the law of the Russian
Federation, since disclosure of information contained in this request may
complicate the process of gathering evidence relevant to the criminal proceedings.
These criminal proceedings are not politically motivated.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that information received through this request will be used exclusively
for the pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22014000000000283 of July 25,
2014 and during the court hearing of the case.
The pretrial investigation has ascertained that in late February 2014
Russian citizen Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, acting on orders from individuals in the
Russian Federation who have not been identified by the pretrial investigation with
the intent to disrupt public safety, intimidate the population, provoke an armed
conflict, a complication of international relations, and influence the decisions
made by national and local government agencies of Ukraine, arrived in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea with the intention of forming a terrorist group and
committing acts of terror in Ukrainian territory, organizing public disturbances,
capturing administrative buildings, endangering the lives of law enforcement
officers, and taking law enforcement officers hostage.
During the period from March to April 2014, I.V. Girkin—while staying in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and concealing his identity under the name of
Igor Ivanovich Strelkov and the alias (code name) “Strelok”—found and recruited
for his terrorist group Russian citizen Igor Nikolaevich Bezler (code name “Bes”),
Ukrainian citizen Sergey Anatolyevich Zdryliuk (code name “Abver”), as well as
other individuals who have not been identified by the pretrial investigation, who
joined a criminal conspiracy to commit acts of terror in Ukrainian territory,
particularly in Donetsk Oblast.
􀀕􀀃
Also in March-April 2014, I.V. Girkin—while operating as part of the terrorist
group he formed—organized the commission of crimes as a result of which the
members of his terrorist group obtained firearms, ammunition, means of
communication, motor vehicles, and cash as well as created other conditions
essential to the operation of this group.
Also, while acting on the criminal plan devised in advance and known to all
members of the terrorist group, in April 2014 I.N. Bezler arrived in Donetsk Oblast
with the intention of organizing public disturbances in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and
other population centers in Donetsk Oblast, which were accompanied by physical
violence, riotous damage, arson, destruction of property, takeovers of buildings
and facilities, resistance against the authorities with the use of weapons and other
items used in lieu of weapons.
To this end, I.N. Bezler and other members of the terrorist group led by I.V.
Girkin established contact with local residents, who acted out of personal motives
driven by rejection of the legitimate government in Ukraine and provided them
with weapons prepared in advance. Afterwards, I.N. Bezler along with other
terrorist group members supported with force the actions of local residents who
resisted the authorities with the use of weapons, organized public disturbances in
the town of Slovyansk, during which administrative buildings were taken over and
property of the town hall, municipal department of the Directorate of the
Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the municipal department of the
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine was destroyed.
At around 9:00 a.m. on April 13, 2014, I.N. Bezler, acting in collusion with
the above-mentioned individuals and other terrorist group members and using a
vehicle prepared in advance with the intention of committing the crime,
discharged weapons and committed an act of terrorism that resulted in the death
of Security Service of Ukraine officer G.V. Bilichenko and severe injuries to
Security Service of Ukraine officers G.I. Kuznetsov, A.Yu. Dubovik, and A.I.
Kuksa, who were performing their official duties in the context of the Anti-Terrorist
Operation.
Also, in April 2014, I.N. Bezler—acting in collusion with other terrorist group
members while in Donetsk Oblast—devised a detailed plan to capture
administrative buildings of the municipal department of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the town hall in Slovyansk. To this
end, I.N. Bezler—acting in collusion with I.V. Girkin, S.A. Zdryliuk, and other
terrorist group members—used firearms on April 12, 2014 to take over a
government building – the building of the Slovyansk Municipal Department of the
Central Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk Oblast,
located at 30 Lenina Street, Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast, the building of the
Slovyansk Municipal Department of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine located at 32 Karla Marxa Street, as well as the building of
Slovyansk Town Hall located at 2 Ploshchad Oktyabrskoy Revolutsiyi, Slovyansk,
Donetsk Oblast.
􀀖􀀃
Subsequently, on April 13, 2014, I.N. Bezler—while acting with other
terrorist group members according to a pre-devised plan to kill law enforcement
officers participating in the Anti-Terrorist Operation—used vehicles and automatic
firearms prepared in advance to commit an attack outside the town of Slovyansk
on law enforcement officers performing their official duties in the context of the
Anti-Terrorist Operation, and more specifically committed the murder of Security
Service of Ukraine officer G.V. Bilichenko and an attempted murder of Security
Service of Ukraine officers G.I. Kuznetsov, A.Yu. Dubovik, and A.I. Kuksa.
Also, while acting on a pre-devised criminal plan known to all terrorist group
members, on April 26, 2014 I.N. Bezler—acting in collusion with I.V. Girkin, S.A.
Zdryliuk, and other terrorist group members who have not been identified by the
pretrial investigation in the town of Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, used firearms and
vehicles prepared in advance to take Security Service of Ukraine officers R.M.
Kiyashko, S.P. Potemskiy, and E.Yu. Varyinskiy hostage and then transported
them to the town of Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast.
Subsequently, on April 27, 2014, I.V. Girkin—while acting on a pre-devised
criminal plan known to I.N. Bezler, S.A. Zdryliuk, and other terrorist group
members and looking to force the law enforcement agencies to act in certain ways
in the interests of the terrorist group members as a condition for the release of
R.M. Kiyashko, S.P. Potemskiy, and E.Yu. Varyinskiy taken hostage the other
day—spoke in a LifeNews TV channel broadcast and confirmed that said
individuals had been taken hostage. He also made known the specific conditions
for their release.
In the course of the pretrial investigation of the criminal case, on May 3,
2014 a notice of suspicion was prepared and approved by the procedural
supervisor against Russian citizen Igor Nikolaevich Bezler, d.o.b. December 30,
1965 (holder of Russian citizen's passport 1102600442), born in Simferopol,
residing at 33-A Rudakova Street, Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, to the effect that he
is suspected of having committed crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part
1 of Article 294, Part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
On August 13, 2014 a notice of suspicion was prepared and approved by the
procedural supervisor against Russian citizen Igor Nikolaevich Bezler, d.o.b.
December 30, 1965 (holder of Russian citizen's passport 1102600442), born in
Simferopol, residing at 33-A Rudakova Street, Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, to the
effect that he is suspected of having committed crimes falling under Articles 341,
348, and 349 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
􀀃
􀀗􀀃
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the Convention on Legal Aid and
Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of January 22, 1993, seeking to
ensure a comprehensive, full, and objective investigation of Criminal Case No.
22014000000000283 of July 25, 2014, the Central Investigative Directorate of
the Security Service of Ukraine is requesting legal assistance in this criminal case
and asking for a number of procedural formalities to be carried out in the territory
of the Russian Federation:
1. Request information about the address of registration of I.N. Bezler from
the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation;
2. Request information about I.N. Bezler’s registration with any drug abuse or
mental and neurological disease control centers from the relevant
government agencies of the Russian Federation;
3. Request information about the Russian citizen’s passport and an
international passport received by I.N. Bezler as well as copies of
applications requesting the issuance of said passports from the relevant
government agencies;
4. Request information about any prior criminal or administrative liability
records of I.N. Bezler, including for possession or storage of firearms, from
the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation. If this
information is confirmed, request copies of court verdicts or rulings from
the relevant judicial institutions;
5. Request information from the relevant government agencies whether or not
any criminal proceedings against I.N. Bezler are ongoing in connection with
his involvement in the terrorist organization “Donetsk People's Republic” in
Ukrainian territory;
6. Request from the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation
information about instances in which I.N. Bezler crossed the state border of
the Russian Federation during the period from January 1, 2014 until
present, including information about the time of the crossing, the border
crossing point, and the direction of movement upon crossing the state
border between the Russian Federation and Ukraine;
7. Request from the relevant government agencies information about I.N.
Bezler’s service in the army (compulsory, under contract), including the
time and place of service, position held, military rank, period of service, and
reason for discharge;
8. Request from the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation
information about I.N. Bezler’s potential involvement in the operations of
illegal paramilitary groups both in the Russian Federation and abroad.
9. Identify and question as witnesses the close friends and next of kin of I.N.
Bezler about his biographical information, his character profile, as well as
his actual whereabouts during the period from January 1, 2014 until
present.
Procedure for honoring the request: unless this contravenes the law of the
Russian Federation, we request that you carry out the requested procedural
formalities in keeping with the requirements of Ukrainian law.
􀀘􀀃
Please certify the documents obtained while honoring this request with the
official seal of the issuing department.
Investigative activities in the territory of the Russian Federation are needed
to ensure a swift and full investigation of the criminal case.
While questioning witnesses, we request that you explain to them their
rights under Articles 18, 65, 66, 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, and
Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that any evidence or information received as part of international legal
assistance will be used exclusively in the context of this criminal case and will not
be used for political, military, or other objectives.
Should you have any questions about this request or it performance, do not
hesitate to contact Major of Justice Igor Romanovich Ivashko, Senior Investigator
of High-Profile Cases at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine, at +380-44-255-51-62.
Should any circumstances arise preventing you from carrying out the
requested procedural formalities, please notify us at 33 Vladimirskaya Street,
Kyiv, 01601, Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
Attachment:
1. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 2, 18, 40,
and 93) on 3 pages;
2. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 65, 66, 67,
95, 104, 106, 223, and 224), excerpts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine
(Articles 384, 385, and 387) and from the Constitution of Ukraine (Article
63) on 8 pages;
3. Excerpt from the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Articles 258-3, 258, 294, 341,
348, and 349) on 3 pages.
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
of the 3rd Unit at the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
of the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [Signature] Igor Romanovich Ivashko
APPROVED BY
Senior Prosecutor with the Department of Procedural Guidance
and State Prosecution in Criminal Cases Against Crime Rings
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
Councilor of Justice [Signature] Vladimir Anatolyevich Vlasok
[Seal: Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine]

Annex 422
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000286 (3 July
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀔􀀃
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Central Investigative Directorate]􀀃
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
Request
for Legal Assistance
in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000286
Kyiv July 3, 2015
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
conducting a pretrial investigation in Criminal Case No. 22014000000000286 of July
25, 2014, in which Russian citizen Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin is suspected of having
committed crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 1 of Article 294, Part 3 of
Article 258, Article 341, Article 348, and Article 349 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is
requesting the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation to keep the contents of
this request confidential to the extent practicable under the law of the Russian
Federation, since disclosure of information contained in this request may complicate
the process of gathering evidence relevant to the criminal proceedings.
These criminal proceedings are not politically motivated.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that information received through this request will be used exclusively for
the pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No. 22014000000000286 of July 25, 2014
and during the court hearing of the case.
The pretrial investigation has ascertained that in late February 2014 Russian
citizen Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, acting on orders from individuals in the Russian
Federation who have not been identified by the pretrial investigation with the intent to
disrupt public safety, intimidate the population, provoke an armed conflict, a
complication of international relations, and influence the decisions made by national
and local government agencies of Ukraine, arrived in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea with the intention of forming a terrorist group and committing acts of terror in
Ukrainian territory, organizing public disturbances, capturing administrative
buildings, endangering the lives of law enforcement officers, and taking law
enforcement officers hostage.
During the period from March to April 2014, I.V. Girkin—while staying in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and concealing his identity under the name of Igor
Ivanovich Strelkov and the alias (code name) “Strelok”—found and recruited for his
terrorist group Russian citizen Bezler (code name “Bes”), Ukrainian citizen Sergey
Anatolyevich Zdryliuk (code name “Abver”), as well as other individuals who have not
been identified by the pretrial investigation, who joined a criminal conspiracy to
commit acts of terror in Ukrainian territory, particularly in Donetsk Oblast.
􀀃
􀀕􀀃
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Central Investigative Directorate]􀀃
Also in March-April 2014, I.V. Girkin—while operating as part of the terrorist
group he formed—organized the commission of crimes as a result of which the
members of his terrorist group obtained firearms, ammunition, means of
communication, motor vehicles, and cash as well as created other conditions essential
to the operation of this group.
Also, while acting on the criminal plan devised in advance and known to all
members of the terrorist group, in April 2014 I.V. Girkin arrived in Donetsk Oblast
with the intention of organizing public disturbances in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and
other population centers in Donetsk Oblast, which were accompanied by physical
violence, riotous damage, arson, destruction of property, takeovers of buildings and
facilities, resistance against the authorities with the use of weapons and other items
used in lieu of weapons.
To this end, I.V. Girkin and other members of the terrorist group led by him
established contact with local residents, who acted out of personal motives driven by
rejection of the legitimate government in Ukraine and provided them with weapons
prepared in advance. Afterwards, I.V. Girkin along with other terrorist group
members supported with force the actions of local residents who resisted the
authorities with the use of weapons, organized public disturbances in the town of
Slovyansk, during which administrative buildings were taken over and property of the
town hall, municipal department of the Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of
Internal Affairs, and the municipal department of the Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine was destroyed.
At around 9:00 a.m. on April 13, 2014, I.V. Girkin, acting in collusion with the
above-mentioned individuals and other terrorist group members and using a vehicle
prepared in advance with the intention of committing the crime, discharged weapons
and committed an act of terrorism that resulted in the death of Security Service of
Ukraine officer G.V. Bilichenko and severe injuries to Security Service of Ukraine
officers G.I. Kuznetsov, A.Yu. Dubovik, and A.I. Kuksa, who were performing their
official duties in the context of the Anti-Terrorist Operation.
Also, in April 2014, I.V. Girkin—acting in collusion with other terrorist group
members while in Donetsk Oblast—devised a detailed plan to capture administrative
buildings of the municipal department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security
Service of Ukraine, and the town hall in Slovyansk. To this end, I.V. Girkin—acting in
collusion with I.N. Bezler, S.A. Zdryliuk, and other terrorist group members—used
firearms on April 12, 2014 to take over a government building – the building of the
Slovyansk Municipal Department of the Central Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry
of Internal Affairs in Donetsk Oblast, located at 30 Lenina Street, Slovyansk, Donetsk
Oblast, the building of the Slovyansk Municipal Department of the Donetsk Oblast
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine located at 32 Karla Marxa Street, as well
as the building of Slovyansk Town Hall located at 2 Ploshchad Oktyabrskoy
Revolutsiyi, Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast.
􀀃
􀀖􀀃
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Central Investigative Directorate]􀀃
Subsequently, on April 13, 2014, I.V. Girkin—having devised a detailed plan to
assassinate law enforcement officers participating in the Anti-Terrorist Operation and
acting in collusion with other terrorist group members according to a pre-devised
plan—used vehicles and automatic firearms prepared in advance to commit an attack
outside the town of Slovyansk on law enforcement officers performing their official
duties in the context of the Anti-Terrorist Operation, and more specifically committed
the murder of Security Service of Ukraine officer G.V. Bilichenko and an attempted
murder of Security Service of Ukraine officers G.I. Kuznetsov, A.Yu. Dubovik, and A.I.
Kuksa.
Also, while acting on a pre-devised criminal plan known to all terrorist group
members, on April 26, 2014 I.V. Girkin—while in Donetsk Oblast and acting in
collusion with I.N. Bezler, S.A. Zdryliuk, and other terrorist group members who have
not been identified by the pretrial investigation in the town of Horlivka, Donetsk
Oblast, used firearms and vehicles prepared in advance to take Security Service of
Ukraine officers R.M. Kiyashko, S.P. Potemskiy, and E.Yu. Varyinskiy hostage and
then transported them to the town of Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast.
Subsequently, on April 27, 2014, I.V. Girkin—looking to force the law
enforcement agencies to act in certain ways in the interests of the terrorist group
members as a condition for the release of R.M. Kiyashko, S.P. Potemskiy, and E.Yu.
Varyinskiy taken hostage the other day—spoke in a LifeNews TV channel broadcast
and confirmed that said individuals had been taken hostage. He also made known the
specific conditions for their release.
In the course of the pretrial investigation of the criminal case, on May 3, 2014
a notice of suspicion was prepared and approved by the procedural supervisor against
Russian citizen Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, d.o.b. December 17, 1970, born in the
Russian Federation, with his registered address at 8-B Shenkurskiy Proyezd,
apartment 136, Moscow, to the effect that he is suspected of having committed
crimes falling under Part 1 of Article 258-3, Part 1 of Article 294, Part 3 of Article 258
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
On August 13, 2014 a notice of suspicion was prepared and approved by the
procedural supervisor against Russian citizen Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, d.o.b.
December 17, 1970, born in the Russian Federation, with his registered address at
8-B Shenkurskiy Proyezd, apartment 136, Moscow, to the effect that he is suspected
of having committed crimes falling under Articles 341 and 349 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine.
􀀃
􀀗􀀃
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Central Investigative Directorate]􀀃
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the Convention on Legal Aid and Legal
Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of January 22, 1993, seeking to ensure a
comprehensive, full, and objective investigation of Criminal Case No.
22014000000000286 of July 25, 2014, the Central Investigative Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine is requesting legal assistance in this criminal case and
asking for a number of procedural formalities to be carried out in the territory of the
Russian Federation:
1. Request information about the address of registration of I.V. Girkin from the
relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation;
2. Request information about I.V. Girkin’s registration with any drug abuse or
mental and neurological disease control centers from the relevant government
agencies of the Russian Federation;
3. Request information about the Russian citizen’s passport and an international
passport received by I.V. Girkin as well as copies of applications requesting the
issuance of said passports from the relevant government agencies;
4. Request information about any prior criminal or administrative liability records
of I.V. Girkin, including for possession or storage of firearms, from the relevant
government agencies of the Russian Federation. If this information is
confirmed, request copies of court verdicts or rulings from the relevant judicial
institutions;
5. Request information from the relevant government agencies whether or not
any criminal proceedings against I.V. Girkin are ongoing in connection with his
involvement in the terrorist organization “Donetsk People's Republic” in
Ukrainian territory;
6. Request from the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation
information about instances in which I.V. Girkin crossed the state border of the
Russian Federation during the period from January 1, 2014 until present,
including information about the time of the crossing, the border crossing point,
and the direction of movement upon crossing the state border between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine;
7. Request from the relevant government agencies information about I.V. Girkin’s
service in the army (compulsory, under contract), including the time and place
of service, position held, military rank, period of service, and reason for
discharge;
8. Request from the relevant government agencies of the Russian Federation
information about I.V. Girkin’s potential involvement in the operations of illegal
paramilitary groups both in the Russian Federation and abroad.
9. Identify and question as witnesses the close friends and next of kin of I.V.
Girkin about his biographical information, his character profile, as well as his
actual whereabouts during the period from January 1, 2014 until present.
Procedure for honoring the request: unless this contravenes the law of the
Russian Federation, we request that you carry out the requested procedural
formalities in keeping with the requirements of Ukrainian law.
􀀃
􀀘􀀃
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine, Central Investigative Directorate]􀀃
Please certify the documents obtained while honoring this request with the
official seal of the issuing department.
Investigative activities in the territory of the Russian Federation are needed to
ensure a swift and full investigation of the criminal case.
While questioning witnesses, we request that you explain to them their rights
under Articles 18, 65, 66, 61 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, and Article 63
of the Constitution of Ukraine.
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
guarantees that any evidence or information received as part of international legal
assistance will be used exclusively in the context of this criminal case and will not be
used for political, military, or other objectives.
Should you have any questions about this request or it performance, do not
hesitate to contact Major of Justice Igor Romanovich Ivashko, Senior Investigator of
High-Profile Cases at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine, at +380-44-255-51-62.
Should any circumstances arise preventing you from carrying out the
requested procedural formalities, please notify us at 33 Vladimirskaya Street, Kyiv,
0160, Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
Attachment:
1. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 2, 18, 40, and
93) on 3 pages;
2. Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 65, 66, 67, 95,
104, 106, 223, and 224), excerpts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Articles
384, 385, and 387) and from the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 63) on 8
pages;
3. Excerpt from the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Articles 258-3, 258, 294, 341, 348,
and 349) on 3 pages.
Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases
of the 3rd Unit at the 1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate
of the Central Investigative Directorate
of the Security Service of Ukraine
Major of Justice [Signature] Igor Romanovich Ivashko
APPROVED BY
Senior Prosecutor with the Department of Procedural Guidance
and State Prosecution in Criminal Cases Against Crime Rings
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine
Councilor of Justice [Signature] Vladimir Anatolyevich Vlasok
[Seal: Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine]

Annex 423
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 42014000000000457 (28 July
2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[seal:] GENERAL PROSECUTOR OF UKRAINE
􀀷􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀷
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀗􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀗􀀘􀀚
Kyiv July 28, 2015
The General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine presents its complements to the competent
authorities of the Russian Federation and on the basis of the 1993 Convention on Legal
Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters, and the 1959 European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters submits a request for international legal
assistance in criminal proceeding No. 42014000000000457 of May 31, 2014 for criminal
offenses under Article 258(3), Article 15(3) [sic] Article 258-3(1), Article 260(5), Article 263(1),
Article 437(2) and Article 447(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐
􀀔􀀑 An act of terrorism, that is, the use of weapons, explosion, fire or other actions that
have exposed human life or health to danger or caused significant property damage or other
grave consequences, where such actions sought to violate public security, intimidate the
population, provoke an armed conflict, international tension, or to exert influence on decisions
made or actions taken or not taken by state or local government authorities, officials and officers
of such bodies, associations of citizens, legal entities, or to attract attention of the public to
certain political, religious or other convictions of the culprit (terrorist), and also a threat to
commit such acts for the same purposes, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to ten years with or without
confiscation of property.
2
􀀃
[seal:] GENERAL PROSECUTOR OF UKRAINE
􀀕􀀑 The same actions, if repeated or committed by a group of persons by prior conspiracy,
or where these actions caused significant property damage or other grave consequences, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to twelve years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀖􀀑 The actions provided for by the first and second parts of this article, which caused the
death of a person, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years, or life
imprisonment with or without confiscation of property.
􀀗􀀑 Fourth part of Article 258 deleted on the basis of Law No. 170-V of September 21,
2006
􀀘􀀑 Fifth part of Article 258 deleted on the basis of Law No. 170-V of September 21, 2006
􀀙􀀑 A person shall be discharged from criminal liability for any action provided for by the
first part of this article with respect to threatening to commit an act of terrorism if before being
notified that he or she was suspected of committing a crime, he or she has voluntarily reported it
to a law enforcement authority and assisted in its termination or disclosure if as a result of this
and the measures taken the danger for human life and health or the causing of significant
property damage or the occurrence of other grave consequences were prevented, if his or her
actions contain no elements of another crime.
(Article 258 as amended in accordance with Law No. 1689-VII of October 7, 2014)
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀛􀀐􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀑 Establishing, leading or participating in a terrorist group or terrorist organization, and
also providing organizational or other assistance in the establishment or operation of a terrorist
group or terrorist organization, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀕􀀑 A person, other than an organizer or leader of a terrorist group or terrorist organization,
shall be discharged from criminal liability for any action provided for by the first part of this
article, if he or she has voluntarily reported the terrorist operation to a law enforcement authority
and assisted in its termination or the disclosure of criminal offenses related to the establishment
or operation of such group or organization, if his or her actions contain no elements of another
crime.
3
􀀃
[seal:] GENERAL PROSECUTOR OF UKRAINE
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀓􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏 􀀳􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖
􀀔􀀑 The creation of paramilitary groups in contravention of Ukrainian laws or participation
in their operations –
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of two to five years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀕􀀑 Creation of armed groups in contravention of Ukrainian laws or participation in their
operations, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀖􀀑 Leadership of the groups mentioned in the first or second parts of this article,
financing, supplying weapons, ammunition, explosives or military equipment to these groups, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to ten years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀗􀀑 Participation in attacks on businesses, institutions, organizations or private individuals
as a member of the groups provided for by the first or second parts of this article, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to twelve years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀘􀀑 The action provided for by the fourth part of this article which caused the death of
people or other grave consequences, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years with or without
confiscation of property.
􀀙􀀑 A person who was a member of the groups mentioned in this article shall be
discharged from criminal liability under this article for actions provided for by the first or second
parts of this article if he or she has voluntarily left such group and reported its existence to the
state or local government authorities.
􀀱􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀑
􀀔􀀑 Paramilitary groups shall mean groups that have a military organizational structure,
namely: unity of command, subordination and discipline, and perform military exercises, line
training or physical drills.
􀀕􀀑 Armed groups shall mean military groups that are illegally armed with firearms,
explosives or other weapons fit for use.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀀫􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀨􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖
􀀔􀀑 Carrying, storing, purchasing, producing, repairing, transferring or selling firearms
(other than smoothbore hunting guns), ammunition, explosive substances or explosive devices
without a permit required by law, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years.
4
􀀃
[seal:] GENERAL PROSECUTOR OF UKRAINE
􀀕􀀑 Carrying, producing, repairing or selling of daggers, Finnish knives, brass knuckles or
other sidearms without a permit required by law, -
shall be punishable by a fine of up to fifty tax-free minimum incomes, or public work for
a term of one hundred twenty to two hundred forty hours, or restraint of liberty for a term of two
to five years, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.
􀀖􀀑 A person who committed a crime provided for by the first or second parts of this article
shall be discharged from criminal liability if he or she voluntarily surrendered the weapons,
ammunition, explosive substances or explosive devices to the authorities.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑 􀀤􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕
􀀔􀀑 Planning, preparation or initiation of an aggressive war or armed conflict, or conspiring
to take such actions, -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to twelve years.
􀀕􀀑 Waging an aggressive war or aggressive military operations -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀗􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖
1. Recruiting, financing, supplying and training of mercenaries for the purpose of using
them in armed conflicts of other states or violent actions aimed at overthrowing of government
or violation of territorial integrity, and also the use of mercenaries in armed conflicts or
operations -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years.
2. Participation in armed conflicts of other states for the purpose of pecuniary
compensation without authorization obtained from appropriate government authorities -
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to ten years.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁗
􀀔􀀑 A criminal attempt shall mean a directly intended act (action or omission) made by a
person and aimed directly at the commission of a criminal offense provided for by the relevant
article of the Special Part of this Code, where this criminal offense has not been consummated
for reasons beyond that person’s control.
􀀕􀀑 A criminal attempt shall be consummated where a person has completed all such
actions as he or she deemed necessary for the consummation of an offense; however, the offense
was not completed for reasons beyond that person’s control.
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􀀖􀀑 A criminal attempt shall be unconsummated where a person has not completed all such
actions as he or she deemed necessary for the consummation of the offense due to reasons
beyond that person’s control.
The pretrial investigation found that pursuant to clauses 1 and 2 of the Memorandum on
Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of December 5, 1994, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America assured
Ukraine of their obligation according to the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975 to respect the independence, sovereignty
and existing borders of Ukraine, committed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons would
ever be used against Ukraine other than for the purposes of self-defense or otherwise in
accordance with the United Nations Charter.
In accordance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, all Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
According to United Nations General Assembly Declaration 36/103 of December 9, 1981
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States and
Resolutions 2734 (XXV) of December 16, 1970 containing the Declaration on the Strengthening
of International Security; 2131 (XX) of December 21, 1965 containing the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974 containing a definition of
aggression, it has been determined that none of the states shall have the right to intervene or
interfere in any form or for any reason in the internal and foreign affairs of other states. Duties
have been set forth for states to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation;
from the promotion, encouragement or support of secessionist activities; to prevent on its
territory the training, financing and recruitment of mercenaries, or the sending of such
mercenaries into the territory of another State.
In addition, Articles 1-5 of United Nations General Assembly Declaration No. 3314
(XXIX) of December 14, 1974 specifies that, inter alia:
- aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State;
- the first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.
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Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall qualify as an act of
aggression:
- The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or
any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
- Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the
use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
- The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
- An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air
fleets of another State;
- The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with
the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the
agreement;
- The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third
State;
- The sending by or on behalf of the State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above.
No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military, or otherwise,
may serve as a justification for aggression.
Articles 1-3 of the Constitution of Ukraine specify that Ukraine is a sovereign and
independent, democratic, social, and rule of law state. The sovereignty of Ukraine extends to its
entire territory, which is integral and inviolable within the existing border. The person, his life
and health, honor and dignity, inviolability, and safety are considered the greatest social value in
Ukraine.
In accordance with Article 68 of the Constitution of Ukraine, each person shall strictly
comply with the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine and not infringe the rights and
freedoms, honor, and dignity of other people.
According to Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Defense of Ukraine,” 􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃is the use by another state or group of states of armed force against Ukraine. Any of
the following actions shall be considered armed aggression against Ukraine:
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- invasion or attack by the armed forces of another state or group of states of the territory
of Ukraine, and also occupation or annexation of part of the territory of Ukraine;
- the blockade of the ports, coasts, or airspace, disruption of the communications of
Ukraine by the armed forces of another state or group of states;
- the attack by the armed forces of another state or group of states on the land, marine or
air forces or civil marine or air fleets of Ukraine;
- the sending by another state or on its behalf of armed groups of regular or irregular
forces committing acts of armed force against Ukraine that are of such a serious nature that it is
equivalent to the actions listed in paragraphs five through seven of this article, including the
significant participation of the third state in such actions;
- the actions of another state or states which allow its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of a third state, to be used by that third state or states to take the actions listed in
paragraphs five through eight of this article;
- the use of divisions of the armed forces of another state or group of states which are
within the territory of Ukraine in accordance with international treaties concluded with Ukraine
against a third state or group of states, other violation of the terms of such treaties or extension of
the stay of such divisions in Ukraine beyond the termination of said treaties.
􀀤􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃is an armed group of a foreign state that
has a permanent or temporary organization, belongs to the infantry (land), marine, air or special
forces of that state, is armed with light weapons or heavy military equipment falling under the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, is under the command of a person responsible
to his state and the laws of Ukraine for the conduct of his subordinates who are obligated to
comply with internal discipline, the laws of Ukraine and the norms of international law.
Order No. 1505 of the President of the Russian Federation of November 9, 2012
appointed commander of the Central Military District of the Russian Federation Colonel General
V.V. Gerasimov to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (hereinafter the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).
In accordance with clauses 1, 6, 7, 9, 20, and 21 of the Regulations on the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation approved by Decree No. 631 of the President of
the Russian Federation on July 23, 2013, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation is the central authority of military administration of the Russian Federation Ministry
of Defense and the principal command and control body of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation.
The key tasks and functions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation are:
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- the organization of planning and centralized battlefield management of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation;
- the organization of the use of the Armed Forces, other forces, military groups, agencies,
and special groups in accordance with the defense plan of the Russian Federation;
- the organization of strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and their administration,
supporting cooperation with other forces and military groups, agencies and special groups during
deployment;
- projecting the development of military assets, assessing the nature of present-day and
projecting possible armed conflicts, ways and forms of military actions, and ways of waging
them, and forming a strategy for the armed defense of the interests of the state;
- the organization of cooperation with military Cossack societies;
- the organization of distribution of arms, specialized military equipment and supplies
among the different types of forces of the Armed Forces and forces that are not among the
Armed Forces.
According to clauses 25-30 of the Regulations, the Chief of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation heads the General Staff, oversees the administration of
the staff, issues orders and directives, provides instructions; in carrying out the decisions of the
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation issues orders to persons subordinate to the
Minister in his name; organizes and monitors their performance. The instructions of the Chief of
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must be carried out by the
deputy Defense Ministers of the Russian Federation, commanders in chief of the forms of Armed
Forces, commanders of the forces of military districts, types of forces of the Armed Forces,
central military administration agencies, military administration agencies, major formations of
military units, and organizations of the Armed Forces.
Considering the above, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation V.V. Gerasimov is a military official of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
who is vested with administrative and management functions and is authorized to make military
planning and control decisions to use the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other forces,
military groups, agencies, and special groups.
In 2013, in connection with the democratic processes that were occurring in the territory
of Ukraine, V.V. Gerasimov and other officials of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation unidentified by the pretrial investigation and subordinate to him conceived of
a criminal intent to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to change the borders
of the territory, and to violate the procedure established by the Constitution of Ukraine.
With the objective of carrying out this intent, officials of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation under the direct command of V.V. Gerasimov devised a
criminal plan that involved, in order to achieve the military and political objectives of the
Russian Federation simultaneously with the use of political, diplomatic, economic, and
informational means, and the use of covert means, which consisted in using the protest potential
of the population of the southeastern regions of Ukraine,
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[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine
in forming under the information influence of the internal opposition to create a permanent active
front throughout the territory of Ukraine.
In order to carry out these criminal actions, V.V. Gerasimov initiated an expansion of the
powers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which consisted of
coordinating the activity of all the federal executive authorities of the Russian Federation and
was reflected in the Regulations on the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation approved by Decree No. 631 of the President of the Russian Federation of July 23,
2013.
The reasons for implementing this plan were Ukraine’s course of development toward
integration with Europe, preparation for signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine
and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and its member states, which
the higher military command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, V.V. Gerasimov,
considered a direct threat to the economic and geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation
that would contribute to loss of influence over the political processes in Ukraine and would keep
it from controlling its economic activity, would lead to closer cooperation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to meet the criteria necessary to acquire membership in
that organization, and denunciation of the agreements on temporary stationing of the Russian
Federation Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine.
Then, from December 2013 through February 2014, in order to secure approval and
support by the citizens of the Russian Federation and residents of the southeastern regions of
Ukraine for the criminal acts aimed at violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Ukraine and restoring the influence and importance of the Russian Federation on the world stage,
the mass media were used to conduct subversive information and propaganda activity.
To wit, with the help of all types of Russian Federation media resources, there began a
negative distortion of the events on “Euromaidan” as a mistaken European vector of
development of Ukraine’s foreign relations. By means of distortion, false interpretation, and
packaging of information in order to change the awareness and attitude of Russian Federation
citizens and local residents of the southeastern regions of Ukraine as to the authenticity and
importance of the events that were actually occurring in Ukraine, the representatives of
opposition forces were portrayed as supporters of nationalistic views and of structuring the
Ukrainian state based on the principles of ideas of ethnic self-awareness and identity, participants
of the mid-20th century national liberation movement (the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists], the UNA [Ukrainian National Assembly]) were portrayed as supporters and
followers of Fascism, and there was propaganda of their inferiority based on ideological and
political beliefs.
Then V.V. Gerasimov, by issuing orders to his subordinate service members of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, organized the training, financing and material support
(supply of weapons, ammunitions, military equipment and other assets) of the “Russian Sector”
and “Oplot” armed criminal groups. These extralegal armed groups, under the direct leadership
of reconnaissance and sabotage groups headed by career officers of the Main Intelligence
Directorate
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of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Cossack
paramilitary groups. and the “Vostok” battalion made up of Russian Federation citizens planned
and created the controlled “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Lugansk People’s Republic” anticonstitutional
terrorist organizations.
During April 2014, with the objective of carrying out the criminal plan of waging an
aggressive war intended to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine and to change the borders of
its territory and to carry out the criminal orders of V.V. Gerasimov, the above-mentioned
extralegal armed groups took over administrative buildings and key military and civilian
infrastructure on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, including armed attacks on
military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine located in those regions.
Then, on April 7, 2014 and April 27, 2014, the creation of the so-called “Donetsk
People’s Republic” and “Lugansk People’s Republic,” which are essentially terrorist
organizations, was unconstitutionally declared.
With the objective of assisting in the creation of the so-called “Donetsk People’s
Republic” and “Lugansk People’s Republic” and their terrorist activity, on the orders of V.V.
Gerasimov, massive relocations of groups of forces near the border of Ukraine were
accomplished to quickly increase the forces and assets of those terrorist organizations.
Furthermore, on April 24, 2014 V.V. Gerasimov announced military training exercises of
battalion tactical groups of mixed forces of the Southern and Western Military Districts of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in connection with the escalation of the situation in the
southeast of Ukraine, during the conduct of which in the Russian districts bordering the Donetsk
and Lugansk regions, in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov regions, and in
Krasnodar Kray, more than one hundred Russian military bases were relocated and heavy
military equipment (tanks, as well as helicopters and airplanes) and a contingent of 30,000 to
40,000 service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were concentrated on
their territory.
On April 7, 2014, an antiterrorist operation was commenced in the Donetsk and Lugansk
regions on the proposal of the director of the Antiterrorism Center in the Security Service of
Ukraine and coordinated with the chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine.
On April 13, 2014, due to the increase in separatist speeches and takeovers of
government institutions in the east of Ukraine, the acting President of Ukraine approved in
Decree No. 405/2014 of April 14, 2014 the decision of the Council of National Security and
Defense of Ukraine “On Immediate Measures to Overcome the Threat of Terrorism and Preserve
the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” and Ukraine commenced a wide-reaching antiterrorist
operation (hereinafter the ATO) involving the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the territory of the
Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
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In performance of that decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of
Ukraine, the Command and Control Headquarters for the ATO on the territory of the Donetsk
and Lugansk regions developed several action plans for using the forces and assets of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine and other armed groups, which provided for the conduct of offensive raid,
storm, guarding, and defensive actions on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics.
As a result of planning and implementing those plans, during May-July 2014 the ATO
forces took control of about 70 percent of the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions,
liberated a considerable number of cities and population centers from control of the so-called
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Lugansk People’s Republic” and extralegal armed groups,
and controlled the main transportation lines.
In particular, from May through July 2014 the Antiterrorist Operation forces liberated a
number of population centers: Stanichno-Luganskoye, Schastye, Severodonetsk, Lisichansk,
Rubezhnoye, Siversk, Yampol, Krasny Liman, Kremenna, Artemevsk, Soledar, Slavyansk,
Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka, Druzhkovka, Dzerzhinsk, Uglegorsk, Debaltsevo, Krasnoarmeisk,
Dimitrov, Volnovakha, Novotroitskoye, Starobeshevo, Komsomolskoye, Kuteinikovo,
Avdeevka, Mariupol, and the left bank districts of Lugansk Region to the north of the Siverskiy
Donetsk River.
At the same time, the Donetsk Region cities of Lugansk and Gorlovka and part of the city
of Donetsk were blocked.
During the period from August 8 through August 23, 2014, with the objective of carrying
out the criminal plan to wage an aggressive war, a plan that was intended to violate the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and change the borders of its territory, in order to cause significant losses to
the ATO forces, massive artillery missile bombardments were systematically done from the
combat vehicles BM-21 “Grad” (Index GRAU 9K51), BM-30 “Smerch” (Index GRAU 9K58),
and 9G140 “Uragan” (Index GRU 9K57) from the Russian Federation territory of the ATO
forces’ positions in the directions of Saur-Mohyla-Uspenski-Amvrosievka.
Between August 12 and August 23, 2014, according to the decision of the Command and
Control Headquarters of the ATO on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, an
operation was planned from August 11, 2014, to crush the main forces of the extralegal armed
groups (hereinafter extralegal armed groups) in the cities of Yenakievo, Gorlovka, Pervomaisk,
and Stakhanov and in nearby districts; to fully block the cities of Lugansk, Donetsk, and
Makeevka; to tighten the outer circle of isolation and restore the operations of the government
authorities and local government in districts that were liberated; to carry out information
influence measures on the population of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
There were plans to complete the security sweep of extralegal armed groups from the city
of Ilovaisk in Donetsk Region and take control of the city on August 12 and August 13, 2014.
This would have caused a total blocking of extralegal armed groups in the city of
Donetsk from the south and would have contributed to moving the forces and assets of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine in the direction
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of the city of Zugres, and other forces and assets in the direction of Khartsyzsk-Zugres from the
north with the objective of fully blocking and liberating the population center of Donetsk from
the extralegal armed groups.
Divisions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, special-purpose militia divisions, and a
special-purpose battalion of the National Guard of Ukraine took part in carrying out the
operation to crush the main forces of the extralegal armed groups in the city of Ilovaisk, Donetsk
Oblast, and to take control of it.
In performance of the decision of the Command and Control Headquarters of the ATO,
as at August 7-8, 2014, divisions of the 40th battalion of territorial defense of the 17th separate
mechanized brigade blocked the city of Ilovaisk, thereby securing control over the main
transportation lines, and the special-purpose militia divisions and special-purpose battalion of the
National Guard of Ukraine took control of the western part of the city of Ilovaisk by taking
offensive action.
Representatives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who
have not been identified by the pretrial investigation, carrying out the extralegal orders of V.V.
Gerasimov, coordinating and managing the actions of the extralegal armed groups, with the
objective of containing the ATO forces’ offensive in the direction of the city of Ilovaisk and not
allowing the city of Donetsk to be surrounded, continued to augment the capabilities of the
extralegal armed groups by providing military equipment, arms, ammunition, and supplies in the
area of the Donetsk Region cities of Ilovaisk, Shakhtersk, Torez, and Snezhnoye.
Between August 12, 2014 and August 23, 2014, the main forces of the extralegal armed
groups were used to maintain control of the city of Ilovaisk.
As at August 23, 2014, the special-purpose militia divisions with the support of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine continued offensive actions in the city of Ilovaisk.
Thus, the Decision of the Command and Control Headquarters of the ATO regarding
taking the city of Ilovaisk using the forces and assets of the Armed Forces of Ukraine involving
other armed groups was essentially completed, and considering the conditions of the situation, it
was predicted that the city would be finally taken over and the extralegal armed groups
eliminated by the end of August 2014.
Recognizing the importance of controlling the city of Ilovaisk, which would enable the
ATO forces on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions to surround the terrorist groups
in the city of Donetsk, in violation of the requirements of clauses 1 and 2 of the Memorandum on
Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of December 5, 1994, the principles of the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975, and the requirements of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, V.V. Gerasimov decided to initiate and wage an aggressive war
against Ukraine by way of the involvement and subsequent invasion by separate divisions of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation located in districts near the borders of the Donetsk and
Lugansk regions, and to march them across the territory of Ukraine to the area of the city of
Ilovaisk to provide military support for the controlled terrorist organizations.
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[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine
Thus, from August 7 through August 11, 2014, the groups of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation were strengthened along the State Border of Ukraine; this included up to 32
battalion task groups and three company task groups. The total number of personnel was at least
45,100 individuals, and there were up to 160 tanks, up to 1,360 infantry fighting vehicles
(armored vehicles), up to 350 units of artillery, up to 130 multiple rocket launcher systems, and
up to 192 military airplanes and 137 helicopters.
At the same time, measures intended to both support the activity of the controlled
terrorist organizations and to prepare the forces, assets and tactical scenarios for possible
invasion of the territory of Ukraine continued to be carried out.
In order to prepare for the waging of an aggressive war, the military equipment of three
battalion task groups (total military service personnel under contract with the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation of more than 3,500 individuals, who had at their disposal around 60
tanks, 320 infantry fighting vehicles (armored vehicles), 60 cannon, including up to 16 antitank
cannon and up to 45 mortar launchers), was prepared in advance by the Russian Federation
military personnel by removing all military symbols that would indicate that it belonged to the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Furthermore, with the objective of misleading the command of the Command and
Control Headquarters of the ATO, military signs similar to those that were used to identify the
armed forces and assets of the ATO were placed on the military equipment.
On August 24, 2014 at 01:00, A.V. Nemolyaev, commander of the 331st Guards
Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation (military unit 71211, permanent location 8-a ul. Skvortsova, Kostroma, Russian
Federation), whose division was located at the time of the training exercises near the village of
Novoandrianovka, Matveevo-Kurganskiy District, Rostov Region, Russian Federation, carrying
out the extralegal order of the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation regarding initiating and waging an aggressive war against Ukraine by invading the
Donetsk Region with forces of battalion task groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation and marching them across the territory of Ukraine to the area of the city of Ilovaisk
for armed support of the controlled terrorist organizations, put the divisions of the created
tactical exercise battalions on military alert and gave orders to his subordinate military divisions
to march across the state border with Ukraine in the area of the population centers Pobeda-
Berestovoye of the Starobeshevskiy District of the Donetsk Region to the city of Ilovaisk,
Donetsk Region, with the objective of surrounding and crushing the ATO armed groups on the
territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
On August 24, 2014 at 02:45, contract service members of the 331st Guards Airborne
Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
(military unit 71211), namely: assistant machine gunner of the 3rd airborne company junior
sergeant Ye.V. Pochtoev, squad leader V.V. Savosteev [sic], private first class A.E. Kuzmin,
deputy combat vehicle commander gunner private first class S.A. Arkhipov, deputy combat
vehicle commander gunner private first class
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I.I. Romantsev, rifleman sergeant S.A. Smirnov, sergeant A.N. Generalov, machine gunner
private A.V. Garyashin, senior sapper rifleman private first class I.V. Melchakov, and combat
vehicle gunner private first class A.V. Mitrofanov, with other servicemen of the tactical training
battalion of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation not identified by the pretrial investigation on 40 units of
military equipment (BMB-2 and BTRD) totaling around 400 people in cooperation with other
military divisions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation as part of three battalion
tactical groups, total military service personnel under contract with the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation of more than 3,500 individuals, who had at their disposal around 60 tanks,
320 infantry fighting vehicles (armored vehicles), 60 cannons, including up to 16 antitank
cannons and up to 45 mortar launchers, acting intentionally, aware that military aggression of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation resulted in the death on a daily basis of a significant
number of citizens of Ukraine, realizing the clear criminality of the order of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, assuming the possibility of grave consequences in
the form of the death of service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and civilian population
as a result of its actions, 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃 in the area of the
population centers Pobeda-Berestovoye of the Starobeshevskiy District of Donetsk Region.
In doing so they understood that together with other Russian Federation military service
members they were violating the state structure and order established by Articles 1-3 and 68 of
the Constitution of Ukraine, infringing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine to
change the borders of its territory and expand the influence of the state in which they were doing
military service, on a administrative territorial unit of Ukraine, directly violating the
requirements of clauses 1 and 2 of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with
Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of December 5,
1994 and violated the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe of August 1, 1975, the requirements of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Articles 1-3
and 68 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
These persons thereby violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,
changed the borders of its territory and violated the procedure established by the Constitution of
Ukraine.
On the same day, at around 16:00, near the population center of Zerkalnoye of the
Amvrosievskiy District of Donetsk Region, service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation Ye.V. Pochtoev, V.V. Savosteev [sic], A.E. Kuzmin, S.A. Arkhipov, I.I. Romantsev,
S.A. Smirnov, A.N. Generalov, A.V. Garyashin, I.V. Melchakov, and A.V. Mitrofanov were
detained by service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
As a result of the above-mentioned actions, the group of forces of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, special-purpose militia divisions, and National Guard of Ukraine that were in the area
of the city of Ilovaisk were surrounded by divisions of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation (in the South and Southwest) and extralegal armed groups (in the West, North, and
East).
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[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine
On August 29, 2014, service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who were
surrounded attempted to break out of their encirclement in two columns in certain directions of
movement. As a result of taking these actions, both columns were ambushed and came under fire
by divisions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and extralegal armed groups in the
area of the population centers Starobeshevo, Chumaki, Novodvorskoye, Agronomicheskoye,
Mnogopolye, Chervonoselskoye, Osykovoe, and Novokaterinovka.
The criminal actions of V.V. Gerasimov and his subordinate service members of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the extralegal armed groups controlled by him
caused 􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃in the form of 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀖􀀙􀀙􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖 of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine and employees of special-purpose militia divisions involved in
conducting the ATO on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, 􀀗􀀕􀀜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏 and property damage in the form of destroying
military equipment of Ukraine, weapons, and other military assets for the total amount of
􀀕􀀜􀀛􀀏􀀕􀀜􀀕􀀏􀀜􀀘􀀘􀀑􀀖􀀚􀀃􀁋􀁕􀁜􀁙􀁑􀁄􀀑
Subsequently, these service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as a
result of being exchanged for service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who had been
taken prisoner, according to the certificates of entry (return) to the Russian Federation issued on
August 30, 2014 by the General Consulate of Russia in the city of Kharkov, crossed the border
of Ukraine and departed for the territory of the Russian Federation.
On July 28, 2015 a written charge sheet was drawn up in this criminal proceeding for
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Valeriy Vasilievich
Gerasimov and service members of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Svir
Order of the Red Banner and Order of Kutuzov, second degree, airborne division named after the
70th anniversary of Great October: Yegor Valerievich Pochtoev, Artem Eduardovich Kuzmin,
Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Savasteev, Sergey Aleksandrovich Arkhipov, Ivan Igorevich
Romantsev, Sergey Alekseevich Smirnov, Aleksey Nikolaevich Generalov, Andrey Valerievich
Garyashin, Ivan Vasilievich Melchakov, and Artem Valerievich Mitrofanov.
The currently effective Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regulates the procedure for
an investigator or prosecutor delivering a written charge sheet directly to the person mentioned in
the charge sheet. If it is not possible to deliver the written charge sheet directly to the person
mentioned therein, the investigator or prosecutor shall use other means provided for by the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine to deliver the charge sheets (Articles 135-136).
Considering that the above-mentioned individuals are on the territory of the Russian
Federation, it has become necessary to submit a request for international legal assistance to the
competent authorities of the Russian Federation: to deliver the written charge sheets to V.V.
Gerasimov, Ye.V. Pochtoev, A.E. Kuzmin, V.V. Savasteev,
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[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine
S.A. Arkhipov, I.I. Romantsev, S.A. Smirnov, A.N. Generalov, A.V. Goryashin, I.V.
Melchakov, and A.V. Mitrofanov; to advise the suspects of their rights under Article 42 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine; to deliver instructions on the procedural rights and
obligations of a suspect; to ensure the right to a defense.
On the basis of the above, according to the 1993 Convention on Legal Assistance and
Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters and the 1959 European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine submits
a request to the competent authorities of the Russian Federation 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊:
􀀔􀀑 To determine the place of residence (stay) and deliver the written charge sheet to 􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃 􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁒􀁙, having promptly advised him in doing so of his rights under Article 42 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Enclosure 1); to deliver to V.F. [sic] Gerasimov
instructions on the procedural rights and obligations of a suspect (Enclosure 2).
After advising him of his rights, explain in detail to the suspect V.V. Gerasimov each of
these rights of a suspect upon his request.
􀀕􀀑 To determine the place of residence (stay) and deliver the written charge sheets to
service members of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Svir Order of the
Red Banner and Order of Kutuzov, second degree, airborne division named after the 70th
anniversary of Great October:
􀀐 􀀼􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀳􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁗􀁒􀁈􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀞
􀀐 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀃􀀨􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁝􀁐􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀖􀀞
􀀐 􀀹􀁏􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀹􀁜􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀚􀀞
􀀐 􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁈􀁎􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁎􀁋􀁌􀁓􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀔􀀞
􀀐 􀀬􀁙􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀬􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀵􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀞
􀀐 􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁈􀁎􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀶􀁐􀁌􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀙􀀞
􀀐 􀀤􀁏􀁈􀁎􀁖􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀱􀁌􀁎􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀙􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀙􀀞
􀀐 􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀪􀁄􀁕􀁜􀁄􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀗􀀞
􀀐 􀀬􀁙􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁏􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁎􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀘􀀞
􀀐 􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁕􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀜􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀛􀀙􀀏
Having promptly advised them in doing so of their rights under Article 42 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Ukraine (Enclosures 3-12); to deliver to each of them instructions on the
procedural rights and obligations of a suspect (Enclosures 13-22).
After advising them of their rights, explain in detail to the suspects each of these rights of
a suspect upon their request.
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[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine
􀀖􀀑 To obtain from the individuals listed in items 1 and 2, after delivery to them of the
charge sheets and instructions on the rights of the suspect, their petitions, and statements,
including regarding whether they have a chosen or appointed defender ensuring their rights to
professional legal assistance (including free of charge at the expense of the state of Ukraine).
I also ask that you advise whether currently effective Russian Federation legislation on
the territory of the Russian Federation provides for the conduct of questioning of the individuals
listed in items 1-2 of the request as suspects in order to execute the request for international legal
assistance.
The information received by the Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine will be used
only in this criminal proceeding and if and when it is tried in court.
This criminal proceeding does not pursue political objectives and is not political in
nature.
Please send documents received in the course of executing the request to the address:
Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, 13/15 ul. Reznitskaya, Kyiv, Ukraine, 01011.
Should you have any questions regarding this request or its execution, please contact
prosecutor of the department of procedural management of pretrial investigation and support for
the public prosecution in criminal proceedings of the investigative division of the department of
procedural management of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Office of the General
Prosecutor of Ukraine Roman Aleksandrovich Bagrienko at the telephone number
+380445967210.
If it is not possible to comply with this request, please advise us of the reasons preventing
it from being executed and the conditions in which it can be executed.
The Office of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine thanks you in advance for a favorable
resolution of the request.
Enclosures: 1) Enclosure 1 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for V.V.
Gerasimov on 14 pages in two copies;
2) Enclosure 2 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights and
obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
3) Enclosure 3 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for Ye.V. Pochtoev
on 13 pages in two copies;
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[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine
4) Enclosure 4 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for A.E. Kuzmin
on 13 pages in two copies;
5) Enclosure 5 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for V.V. Savasteev
on 13 pages in two copies;
6) Enclosure 6 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for S.A. Arkhipov
on 13 pages in two copies;
7) Enclosure 7 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for I.I. Romantsev
on 13 pages in two copies;
8) Enclosure 8 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for S.A. Smirnov
on 13 pages in two copies;
9) Enclosure 9 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for A.N. Generalov
on 13 pages in two copies;
10) Enclosure 10 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for A.V.
Goryashin on 13 pages in two copies;
11) Enclosure 11 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for I.V.
Melchakov on 13 pages in two copies;
12) Enclosure 12 mentioned in the Request: written charge sheet for A.V.
Mitrofanov on 13 pages in two copies;
13) Enclosure 13 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
14) Enclosure 14 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
15) Enclosure 15 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
16) Enclosure 16 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
17) Enclosure 17 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
18) Enclosure 18 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
19) Enclosure 19 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
20) Enclosure 20 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
21) Enclosure 21 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
19
􀀃
22) Enclosure 22 mentioned in the Request: instructions on the procedural rights
and obligations of a suspect on seven pages in two copies;
23) Excerpts from the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Code of Ukraine and
the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine on 21 pages.
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃 􀀰􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈 [signature] 􀀵􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒
[seal:] General Prosecutor of Ukraine

Annex 424
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-157-2015 (17 August 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[ . . . ]
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation sends its compliments to the
Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and states that the request of the Main Investigation
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine for legal assistance with criminal
proceeding No. 12014000000000291 has been reviewed.
This request cannot be executed based on the provisions of Article 2 “b” of the European
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of April 20, 1959, Article 19 of the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of
January 22, 1993, and Part 4, Article 457, of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, because the requested assistance may harm the sovereignty, security and other vital
interests of the Russian Federation.
[ . . . ]

Annex 425
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-158-2015 (17 August 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[ . . . ]
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation sends its compliments to the
Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and states that the request of the Main Investigation
Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine for legal assistance with criminal proceeding
No. 12014000000000292 has been reviewed.
This request cannot be executed based on the provisions of Article 2 “b” of the European
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of April 20, 1959, Article 19 of the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of
January 22, 1993, and Part 4, Article 457, of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, because the requested assistance may harm the sovereignty, security and other vital
interests of the Russian Federation.
[ . . . ]

Annex 426
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-159-2015 (17 August 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[ . . . ]
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation sends its compliments to the
Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and states that the request of the Main Investigation
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine for legal assistance with criminal
proceeding No. 12014000000000293 has been reviewed.
This request cannot be executed based on the provisions of Article 2 “b” of the European
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of April 20, 1959, Article 19 of the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of
January 22, 1993, and Part 4, Article 457, of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation, because the requested assistance may harm the sovereignty, security and other vital
interests of the Russian Federation.
[ . . . ]

Annex 427
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 42014000000000457 (15
September 2015)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[Handwriting: final version]
To the Relevant Authorities
of the Russian Federation
REQUEST
for International Legal Assistance in a Criminal Case
No. 42014000000000457
Kyiv September 15, 2015
The Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine presents its compliments to the
relevant authorities of the Russian Federation and, invoking the Convention on
Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters of
1993 and the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Cases of 1959, is hereby requesting international legal assistance in Criminal
Case No. 42014000000000457.
This criminal case was registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial
Investigations of Ukraine on May 31, 2014 in connection with suspected crimes
punishable under Part 2 of Article 28, Part 2 of Article 437; Part 2 of Article 28,
Part 1 of Article 258-3; Part 2 of Article 28, Part 1 of Article 263; Part 2 of
Article 332-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. A pretrial investigation of the
case is being conducted by the Investigative Department of the Main Military
Prosecutor's Office of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine.
Article 28. Crime committed by a group of people, by a group of
people acting in collusion, by an organized group, or by a criminal
organization
1. A crime shall be found to have been committed by a group of people if it
involves several perpetrators (two or more) who did not act in collusion.
2. A crime shall be found to have been committed by a group of people
acting in collusion it has been perpetrated jointly by several individuals (two or
more) who agreed to commit it in advance, i.e. before committing the crime.
3. A crime shall be found to have been committed by an organized group if
it has been prepared or perpetrated by several individuals (three or more),
who previously formed a stable association to commit this and other crime(s),
who are acting on a common plan with the allocation of functions among group
members toward the achievement of this plan known to all group members.
4. A crime shall be found to have been committed by a criminal
organization if it has been perpetrated by a stable hierarchical association of
several individuals (three or more), whose members or structural components
colluded to engage in joint activity directly aimed at committing severe or
grave crimes by members of this organization, or to lead or coordinate the
criminal activity of other individuals, or to support the operation of both this
criminal organization and other criminal groups.
1
Article 258-3. Creation of a Terrorist Group or Terrorist Organization
1. Creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization, leadership of or
participation in said group or organization, as well as organizational or other
assistance for the creation or operations of the terrorist group or terrorist
organization –
are punishable by incarceration for eight to fifteen years, with or without
confiscation of property.
2. Exemption from criminal liability for acts mentioned in Part 1 of this article
shall be granted to a person (other than the organizer or leader of the terrorist
group or terrorist organization) who has voluntarily notified the law
enforcement authority about the relevant terrorist activity, thereby helping
put an end to such activity or solve crimes associated with the creation or
operation of said group or organization, as long as this person has not
committed another crime.
Article 263. Illegal handling of weapons, ammunition, or explosives
1. Possession, storage, acquisition, transfer, or sale of firearms (other than
smooth-bore hunter shotguns), live ammunition, explosives, or explosive
devices without a permit prescribed by law –
are punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years.
2. Possession, manufacture, repairs, or sale of daggers, switchblades, brass
knuckles, or other melee weapons without a permit prescribed by law –
are punishable by a fine of up to 50 tax exempt minimum personal incomes or
120 to 240 hours of community service, or arrest for a term of three to six
months, or restriction of freedom for a term of two to five years, or
incarceration for a term of up to three years.
3. A person who committed crimes listed under Parts 1 or 2 of this article shall
be exempted from criminal liability of this person has voluntarily surrendered
to the authorities such weapons, ammunition, explosives, or explosive
devices.
Article 437. Planning, Preparation, Initiation, and Conduct of an
Aggressive War
2
[Page 3 omitted]
... Ukraine – a paramilitary group called the “People’s Resistance of Donbas”.
After illegally arming themselves with military vehicles, artillery, firearms, and
other kinds of weapons, members of this illegal group united to resist the
public authorities of Ukraine, infringe on the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine by illegally creating a new quasi-state entity in the territory
of Donetsk Oblast.
The pretrial investigation has also ascertained that Russian citizen Vladimir
Alexandrovich Starkov (ID badge of a serviceman of the Russian Armed
Forces: F-549345), while serving in the military in the position of chief of the
missile and artillery armaments service at the 3rd Directorate of the 12th
Command Reserve of Military Unit 89462 of the Russian Armed Forces and
while being stationed at the site of said military unit in Novocherkassk, Rostov
Oblast, Russian Federation, on one of the days in early March 2015 received a
clearly criminal order from unidentified Russian army officers to invade (along
with other servicemen of the Russian Army) into Ukrainian territory and join
the terrorist organization “Donetsk People’s Republic” as well as commit other
crimes.
On March 4, 2015, V.A. Starkov—while realizing the apparent criminal nature
of said orders and understanding that combat operations activities of the
terrorist organization “Donetsk People’s Republic” in Ukrainian territory would
claim many lives and have other severe consequences—voluntarily and
unquestioningly agreed to fulfill the orders he received and commit crimes in
Ukrainian territory.
Specifically, on March 4, 2015 V.A. Starkov illegally crossed the state border
into the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine in order to harm the interests
of Ukraine by participating in the activities of the terrorist organization
“Donetsk People's Republic”. In other words, he invaded the territory of
Ukraine while being a serviceman of another country – the Russian Federation.
He did so while following clearly criminal orders of Russian Army officers and
acting in collusion with other 73 unidentified servicemen of the Russian Army
within an unidentified segment of the Ukrainian-Russian border that is not
controlled by the public authorities of Ukraine, in violation of the requirements
of the Interim Procedure for Monitoring the Movement of Individuals, Motor
Vehicles, and Cargo Along the Line of Contact in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,
approved by Order No. 27og of January 22, 2015 of the Anti-Terrorist Center of
the Security Service of Ukraine, specifically: outside border crossing points
and without a passport (or an equivalent ID), and also with registration of his
(V.A. Starkov’s) details in the electronic registry.
4
[Page 5 omitted]
... remote RGD-5 grenades (without fuses) rigged with an explosive charge
(TNT) and unified fuses of an UZRGM-2 hang grenade (totaling 200 pcs); 43
crates with 5.45x39 mm cartridges (totaling 91,800 cartridges); 13 crates with
7.62x54 mm cartridges (totaling 11,466 cartridges); 57 crates with 12.7x108
mm cartridges (totaling 8,800 cartridges); One 7.62x54 mm cartridge marked
with 85*188; 6 factory cardboard boxes with 9x18 mm cartridges (totaling 96
cartridges), which he stored in the compartment of the same vehicle.
By knowingly committing these acts, V.A. Starkov became directly involved in
the activities of the terrorist organization “Donetsk People’s Republic” and in
an aggressive war against Ukraine while acting on clearly criminal orders from
Russian Army officers who have not been identified by the pretrial
investigation.
However, at around 10 p.m. on July 25, 2015, V.A. Starkov together with G.A.
Iotko were detained near the village of Beriozovoe, Maryinka District, Donetsk
Oblast by officers of the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine while illegally
transporting said ammunition without a permit prescribed by the law in a
KAMAZ truck with the number plates DK 2095, whereupon said firearms and
ammunition were seized from them.
According to expert examination conducted as part of the pretrial investigation
of the criminal case, the weapons seized from V.A. Starkov and G.A. Iotko on
July 25, 2015 are firearms that can be used for the purpose intended, while live
ammunition sized from them are can be used for their intended purpose as live
ammunition.
In connection with the above-mentioned circumstances of criminal activity, on
September 15, 2015 Russian citizen Vladimir Alexandrovich Starkov, d.o.b.
April 29, 1978, was notified that he is suspected of having committed crimes
punishable under Part 2 of Article 28, Part 2 of Article 437; Part 2 of Article 28,
Part 1 of Article 258-3; Part 2 of Article 332-1, Part 2 of Article 28, and Part 1
of Article 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
In light of the foregoing, a need has arisen during the pretrial investigation of
this criminal case to obtain evidence documenting V.A. Starkov’s service in the
Russian Armed Forces, and to question as witnesses the commanders of
Military Unit 89462 of the Russian Armed Forces regarding the circumstances
under which orders were issued for V.A. Starkov to cross the state border of
Ukraine to participate in the activities of the terrorist organization “Donetsk
People’s Republic”.
Furthermore, Article 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine stipulates
that circumstances characterizing the personality of the defendant must be
proven in the context of criminal proceedings; hence the need to obtain the
relevant documents.
PROCEDURAL FORMALITIES REQUESTED:
6
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the European Convention on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases of 1959 and the Convention on Legal
Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters of 1993,
we hereby request that you review this request and provide international legal
assistance in criminal case No. 42014000000000457 of May 31, 2014 in the
form of conducting the following procedural formalities in the territory of the
Russian Federation:
1. Carry out every possible procedural formality to obtain certified copies of
identity documents of Vladimir Alexandrovich Starkov, d.o.b. April 29, 1978,
proving his address of registration and actual residence and also containing
information about his place of employment (service), marital status, level of
education, prior convictions, certificates issued by drug abuse specialists or
psychiatrists about registration of V.A. Starkov with the relevant state
prevention centers, and letters of reference from the place of employment
(service) and residence.
2. Carry out every possible procedural formality to obtain from the relevant
units of the Russian Armed Forces duly certified copies of the officer’s ID,
contracts for military service in the Russian Armed Forces, and lists of official
duties of Major V.A. Starkov, a serviceman of Military Unit 89462, as well as
copies of travel authorizations, orders, and other administrative documents
based on which said serviceman of the Russian Armed Forces was in Ukrainian
territory between March 2015 and June 25, 2015.
3. Carry out every possible procedural formality to identify the commanders of
Military Unit 89462 of the Russian Armed Forces, including the chief of staff
and the chief of the HR department, other commanders who are associated in
any way with the military service of V.A. Starkov and his deployment to
Ukraine. Also, question them as witnesses by asking the following questions
according to the procedure described below:
􀀐 At which military unit is the witness located at the time of questioning?
What are his official duties?
􀀐 When and by whose order was the witness appointed to the position
currently held?
􀀐 What educational institution did the witness graduate from and when?
What education and specialty did the witness receive? When was the witness
conscripted for military service? Where and in what position?
􀀐 What is the previous place of service and position? What were the official
duties of the witness? What is the number of the military unit and its address?
􀀐 Where, since when, in what position and rank did V.A. Starkov serve in
the military? What is his military specialty?
7
􀀐 What official duties did V.A. Starkov perform while serving in the
military? Which document defines those duties?
􀀐 Who owns the Russian Army serviceman’s ID with the personal number
F549345?
􀀐 Where, when, and under what circumstances was it decided to deploy
(dispatch, send) V.A. Starkov for military service in Ukraine, including in
Donetsk Oblast? To what end was V.A. Starkov deployed to serve in Ukrainian
territory?
􀀐 Based on which specific administrative documents issued by the military
command was the decision made to arrange the deployment of V.A. Starkov
for military service in Ukrainian territory?
􀀐 How many servicemen of Military Unit 89462 were deployed to Ukraine
together with V.A. Starkov?
􀀐 With whom and based on which administrative documents, including
guidelines and orders, were the issues of V.A. Starkov's crossing of the state
border of Ukraine coordinated?
􀀐 How were servicemen of the Russian Ministry of Defense serving in
Ukrainian territory, including V.A. Starkov, paid their fees?
􀀐 Which administrative document governs the procedure for paying fees to
said individual?
PROCEDURE FOR HONORING THE REQUEST:
Unless this contravenes the law of the Russian Federation, we request that you
carry out the requested procedural formalities in keeping with the
requirements of Ukrainian law.
When requesting from the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation the
documents characterizing the personality of V.A. Starkov, one should be
guided by the provisions of Article 93 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, according to which documents can be requested and received by an
investigator or prosecutor from national and local government agencies,
enterprises, institutions, and organizations.
The following must be done when questioning individuals as witnesses:
1. Begin the questioning of the witness by ascertaining his full name, current
address, date and place of birth.
Inform the witness that he is not obligated to answer questions about himself,
his next of kin, and family members. The witness must also be informed that
he can be brought to criminal account for knowingly giving false testimony and
for refusing to testify. In addition, please explain to the witness his other rights
and obligations under Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.
While questioning witnesses, we request that you explain to them their rights
under Articles 18, 65, 66, 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, and
Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
8
Witnesses should also be warned about liability for knowingly giving false
testimony or refusing to testify under existing criminal laws of Ukraine, which
must be stated in the record of questioning and signed for.
2. Pose to the witness the questions that need to be answered.
3. Formalize all of the above-mentioned information in the form of a record of
questioning. The record must include: 1) personal details provided by the
witness; 2) a statement to the effect that the relevant authority of the Russian
Federation has notified the witness that he may refrain from answering
questions about himself, his family members and next of kin; however,
answers to all other questions must be truthful, or else the witness may be
brought to criminal account; 3) the questions asked and answers given.
4. Subsequently; 1) read aloud for the witness the questions and answers
written down; or 2) ask the witness to personally review all of the questions
and answers documented in the record.
5. State in the record of questioning whether the representative of the relevant
authority of the Russian Federation read aloud the questions and answers for
the witness or if the witness reviewed them personally.
6. Every page of the record of witness questioning must be signed by the
person who offered testimony as a witness. The record must then be signed by
a representative of the relevant authority of the Russian Federation who
conducted the questioning.
7. We request that you videotape and questioning of witnesses.
Please certify the documents obtained while honoring this request with the
official seal of the issuing department.
FINAL PROVISIONS:
The Prosecutor General’s Office would like to assure you that this request has
been prepared strictly in accordance with Ukrainian laws by a duly authorized
officer within the scope of his authority.
Investigative activities in the territory of the Russian Federation are needed to
ensure a swift, full, and impartial investigation of the criminal case.
Honoring of this request will not harm the sovereignty, security, public order,
or other vital interests of the country. Neither is it in contravention of the basic
principles of Russian legislation.
Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine guarantees that any evidence or
information received as part of international legal assistance will be used
exclusively in the context of this criminal case and will not be used for political,
military, or other objectives.
Should you have any questions regarding this request or the procedure for
honoring it, do not hesitate to contact Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Andrey
Nikolaevich Tkachenko, Deputy Chief of the Investigative Department at the
Directorate for Investigation of Crimes Against Fundamentals of National
Security of Ukraine, Peace, Safety of Mankind, and International Law and
Order at the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the Prosecutor General's Office
9
of Ukraine. Alternatively, please contact Lieutenant of Justice Alexander
Alexandrovich Klimovich, Prosecutor with the Department of Procedural
Guidance of Pretrial Investigation and State Prosecution in Criminal
Proceedings of the Investigative Department at the Directorate for
Investigation of Crimes Against Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine,
Peace, Safety of Mankind, and International Law and Order at the Main Military
Prosecutor's Office of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, at
+380-44-242-03-41.
If you are unable to honor this request, kindly inform us about the reasons
preventing its performance and the conditions under which it can be honored.
Attachments:
􀀐 Excerpts from the Constitution of Ukraine on 1 page;
􀀐 Excerpts from the Criminal Code of Ukraine on 6 pages;
􀀐 Excerpt from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine on 1 page.
Procedural Supervisor of Criminal Proceedings:
Prosecutor with the Department of Procedural Guidance of Pretrial
Investigation and State Prosecution in Criminal Proceedings of the
Investigative Department at the Directorate for Investigation of Crimes
Against Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine, Peace, Safety of
Mankind, and International Law and Order at the Main Military Prosecutor's
Office of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine
[Signature] A. Klimovich
[Seal: Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine]
10
Annex 428
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. No. 82/1-5444-14 (dated 23
October 2015, sent 6 November 2015).
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀔􀀃
􀀃
[Handwriting: O. Bomaniuk. Please process thoroughly. November 9, 2015]
[Signature]
Prosecutor General's Office of the
Russian Federation
15a Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street, Moscow,
Russia, GSP-3, 125993
October 23, 2015 No. 82/1-5444-14
Re: No. 14/2/2-30440-14
Prosecutor General's Office of
Ukraine
Attn: Mr. A.V. Kovalenko, Chief of
the Directorate for International
Legal Cooperation
[Handwriting: M.R. Shekeryak. Notify the initiator
and prepare a response to the Russian Prosecutor’s
Office. November 11, 2015]
Dear Aleksandr Vladimirovich [Mr. Kovalenko],
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation presents its
compliments to the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and would like to make it
known that the request of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service
of Ukraine for legal assistance in Criminal Case No. 22014050000000015 has been
reviewed.
It follows from the text of the request that in May-June 2014 Russian citizen
O.I. Kulygina, acting jointly with Ukrainian citizens V.F. Chernyak, S.V. Suvorov, A.N.
Levkin, and Yu.A. Kukashov, assisted the terrorist organization Donetsk People’s
Republic. While committing the crime, she coordinated her actions with leaders of the
terrorist organization according to the established criminal plan with the intention of
putting up armed resistance against representatives of the incumbent authorities in
Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, intimidating the population, committing serious and
grave crimes against the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine, human lives
and health, by enabling the transfer and smuggling of firearms, ammunition, and
explosives from Russia to Ukraine.
After reviewing the request we found that this request (to the extent of the
request for information about the instances in which “citizen O.I. Kulygina” crossed
the state border during the period since January 1, 2011) contains a request for a
procedural formality that is irrelevant to the subject matter of the pretrial
investigation being conducted by the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security
Service of Ukraine.
The request initiator has also requested certified copies of documents proving
or disproving the involvement of O.I. Kulygina in illegal paramilitary groups. However,
the request fails to state which procedural or other formalities should be carried out in
order to provide legal assistance.
􀀃
AP No. 509116 [Stamp: Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine. No. 318379-15 of November 6, 2015]
[Stamp: Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. No. 81/2-5444-2014/Nd36315-15
􀀃
􀀃
􀀃
􀀕􀀃
􀀃
We also find it impossible at this time to honor the request in terms of
identifying and questioning the next of kin of O.I. Kulygina as witnesses.
According to the requirements of Clause (d), Part 1, Article 7 of the Convention
on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Cases of January
23, 1993, the request must state: the first names and last names of witnesses, their
address of residence, and in the case of criminal cases – also the date and place of
birth. The request in question lacks the above-mentioned information.
In light of this, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation would
like to suggest that you additionally send to us the information that we need to further
review your request for legal assistance. Also present copies of official documents
based on which the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic has been declared a
terrorist organization in Ukrainian territory.
Chief of Legal Assistance Directorate
at the Central Directorate for
International Legal Cooperation [Signature] I.D. Kamynin
[Seal: Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation. Primary State
Registration Number [OGRN]: 1037739514196]
Annex 429
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 82/1-759-16 (14 September
2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[ . . . ]
The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation sends its compliments to the
General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine and in accordance with the Convention on Legal
Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of January 22, 1993, and the
European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of April 20, 1959, hereby
requests clarification of the requests of the Internal Investigations Division of Ukraine in the
Poltava Province for legal assistance on the criminal proceedings against V. A. Trifonov and
I. O. Sokolov.
Information provided by the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine on July 8, 2016
regarding No. 14/3-25775-16 indicates that the procedure for declaring a terrorist organization is
established by the Ukrainian Law “On Combating Terrorism.”
In pursuance of the requirements of this law, the “Luhansk Peoples Republic” was
declared a terrorist organization based on court decisions. According to the information received,
electronic copies of the court decisions are contained in the Unified State Register of Judicial
Decisions of Ukraine.
The letter we received lacks information regarding the specific finding on which the
declaration of the “Luhansk Peoples Republic” as a terrorist organization is based.
In addition, the copies of the Ukrainian court decisions we received have not been
translated into Russian. Also, they contain no information regarding the persons on which
sentence was passed.
Please also send us the documents we need to continue reviewing your requests for legal
assistance.
[ . . . ]

Annex 430
Intercepted Conversations of Yuriy Shpakov (16 September 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀏭􀀃
􀁞􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚􀆵􀅯􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏭􀀃
􀁚􀀜􀀒􀁋􀁚􀀘􀀃
􀁋􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁚􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀄂􀀃􀁤􀄞􀄐􀅚􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀀃􀀯􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀀜􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃
􀀃
􀀒􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀼􀇇􀅝􀇀􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀀃􀏭􀏲􀍕􀀃􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃
􀀃
􀀑􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏵􀀃􀄂􀍘􀅵􀍘􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏭􀏲􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀜􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏯􀏬􀀃􀄂􀍘􀅵􀍘􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏭􀏲􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃
􀀃
􀀯􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀇌􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀏴􀍕􀀃􀏮􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀘􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞􀀃􀍾􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍿􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀁞􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅽􀆌􀀃􀀾􀅝􀄞􀆵􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄂􀅶􀆚􀀃􀁚􀍘􀁋􀍘􀀃􀁅􀄂􀆌􀆵􀆐􀄞􀇀􀇇􀄐􀅚􀍕􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏰􀏭􀏱􀍲􀏭􀀃􀍾􀏱􀍬􀏳􀀃􀁗􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇌􀅚􀇇􀅶􀆐􀅬􀅽􀅐􀅽􀀃􀁞􀆚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀆚􀍿􀍕􀀃
􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆐􀆵􀄂􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀄􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅯􀄞􀀃􀏳􀍾􀏲􀍿􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀾􀄂􀇁􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀍞􀁋􀅶􀀃􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍟􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃
􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀘􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇􀀃􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀼􀇇􀅝􀇀􀀃􀀒􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀄􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅯􀀃􀁄􀍘􀁳􀍘􀀃􀁗􀆌􀇇􀅶􀄚􀇇􀆵􀅬􀍕􀀃
􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏴􀏱􀏬􀏵􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍿􀍖􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏭􀏬􀏰􀏳􀏬􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀀃
􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍿􀍖􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏬􀏮􀍘􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏭􀏬􀏲􀏬􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏬􀏮􀍘􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍿􀍖􀀃
􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏬􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏲􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏮􀏰􀏯􀏯􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏬􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏲􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏲􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍿􀍖􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏬􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏯􀏵􀏵􀏱􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀀃
􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏬􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍿􀍖􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏱􀏰􀏰􀏯􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍿􀍖􀀃
􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅩􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀼􀇇􀅝􀇀􀀃􀀒􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀄􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅯􀀃􀁺􀄂􀍘􀁳􀍘􀀃􀀧􀅯􀇇􀅶􀇇􀄂􀅶􀇇􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏬􀏴􀍘􀏮􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲
􀏲􀏴􀏯􀏴􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏬􀏴􀍘􀏮􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀍿􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏵􀏱􀏳􀏲􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃
􀏬􀏮􀍘􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍿􀍖􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅩􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀼􀇇􀅝􀇀􀀃􀀒􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀄􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅯􀀃􀁺􀄂􀍘􀁳􀍘􀀃􀀧􀅽􀅯􀅽􀇀􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅽􀇀􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏭􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀀃􀍲􀏴􀏯􀏭􀏳􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏭􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀀃􀍿􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏮􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏰􀏱􀏯􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃
􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏮􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍿􀍕􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀄚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏮􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏬􀏯􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍖􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅩􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀼􀇇􀅝􀇀􀀃􀀒􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀄􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅯􀀃􀁄􀍘􀁳􀍘􀀃􀁗􀆌􀇇􀅶􀄚􀇇􀆵􀅬􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏴􀏱􀏭􀏭􀁤􀆐􀁤􀀃􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃
􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀍿􀍕􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀄚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏬􀏳􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆐􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀆚􀄞􀄐􀅚􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄂􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀆐􀇇􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆐􀀃
􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀅯􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀆐􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅯􀄂􀇁􀄨􀆵􀅯􀀃􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀄚􀀃
􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀏮􀏳􀍘􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏬􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍕􀀃􀆉􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅐􀄞􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄞􀄨􀄨􀄞􀄐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃
􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀀃􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄂􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀀄􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅯􀄞􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍾􀏭􀍿􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀾􀄂􀇁􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃
􀍞􀁋􀅶􀀃􀀯􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍟􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀄􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅯􀄞􀀃􀏮􀏱􀏲􀍾􀏭􀍿􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀀒􀅽􀄚􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅯􀀃􀁗􀆌􀅽􀄐􀄞􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆉􀆌􀄞􀍲􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅯􀀃􀀒􀄂􀆐􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏮􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏮􀏭􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃
􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆐􀆚􀀃􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀀘􀁅􀁚􀀃􀍾􀀘􀅽􀅶􀄞􀆚􀆐􀅬􀀃􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐􀀃􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍿􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀍾􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀀃
􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄞􀅯􀅯􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆌􀀃􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌􀀃􀁄􀁤􀁞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀀃 􀁄􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀄞􀄐􀅚􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀄞􀄐􀅚􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃
􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄂􀀃􀀘􀁳􀀘􀍲􀁚􀀃􀄚􀅝􀆐􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀁅􀅽􀆐􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏰􀏵􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏱􀏮􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏭􀏭􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃􀍾􀆚􀅽􀀃
􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀀘􀀼􀁚􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏭􀏬􀏲􀏵􀏭􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏬􀏱􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍿􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆐􀀃􀍞􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆌􀄞􀆚􀍟􀀃􀍾􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆐􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀀃􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏮􀍬􀏮􀍬􀏴􀍲
􀏭􀏲􀏵􀏭􀏱􀇀􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀏭􀏲􀏵􀏭􀏲􀇀􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏭􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀏭􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍖􀀃􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍗􀏯􀏭􀍗􀏯􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃
􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀎀􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅵􀆉􀍗􀎁􀀃 􀁄􀄂􀅝􀅶􀀃􀀯􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀀘􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞􀀃
􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀁋􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃
􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀁤􀅽􀀃􀀯􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏳􀏲􀏬􀏬􀀃
􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀀃 􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏮􀀃
􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏱􀏬􀏰􀏱􀏯􀏵􀏭􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃
􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏱􀏮􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅯􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀅶􀇇􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅶􀄞􀄂􀆌􀀃􀀘􀅽􀅬􀆵􀄐􀅚􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅵􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀇇􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄚􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍕􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀇁􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀄞􀆌􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄏􀅯􀆵􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀄂􀆐􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄂􀍙􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀄂􀆉􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕􀀃􀎀􀄏􀆵􀆚􀎁􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅝􀇀􀇀􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆌􀄂􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄂􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀆉􀅝􀄐􀅬􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍙􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆌􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄏􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃􀀬􀅽􀅯􀄚􀀃􀅚􀅝􀅵􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄂􀀃􀆐􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃
􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍕􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍖􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀀃􀍾􀁗􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀁳􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏬􀏳􀍗􀏰􀏯􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏴􀏳􀏰􀏲􀏲􀏴􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏮􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏵􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀾􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀎀􀅝􀆐􀎁􀀃􀏵􀏰􀏵􀏮􀍘􀀃􀀘􀅝􀄚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀏵􀏮􀍲􀏵􀏰􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏵􀏰􀍲􀏵􀏮􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍿􀀃􀀬􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀏵􀏰􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀑􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇌􀅽􀇀􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄞􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀑􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇌􀅽􀇀􀇇􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀅽􀄨􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀀘􀅽􀅬􀆵􀄐􀅚􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃
􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀑􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇌􀅽􀇀􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀅽􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄨􀄂􀆌􀅵􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀎀􀀯􀆚􀍛􀆐􀎁􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀎁􀍕􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉􀍕􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅶􀄂􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅽􀍕􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄞􀅵􀆐􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄂􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀄐􀅬􀀃􀎀􀅝􀆚􀎁􀍕􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍙􀀃􀄨􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄂􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍙􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀎀􀇇􀅽􀆵􀎁􀀃􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍕􀀃􀅝􀄨􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃
􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀏮􀀃􀅬􀅝􀅯􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍖􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀑􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇌􀅽􀇀􀇇􀍕􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀎁􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆌􀇇􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏯􀀃
􀄏􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅝􀄚􀄚􀅯􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀘􀅽􀅬􀆵􀄐􀅚􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀀃􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀍖􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀆵􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅵􀅝􀇆􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍙􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀎀􀅝􀆐􀎁􀀃􀏵􀏮􀏵􀏰􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅵􀅝􀇆􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍍􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀀾􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀎀􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀎁􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄂􀆉􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅽􀅽􀎁􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅯􀅽􀇁􀀃􀄚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆐􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀄚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀀑􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇌􀅽􀇀􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀀘􀅽􀅬􀆵􀄐􀅚􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀀘􀅽􀅬􀆵􀄐􀅚􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀍖􀀃􀆐􀅽􀀃􀅝􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀏵􀏮􀍲􀏵􀏰􀀃􀆐􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏵􀏯􀀃
􀆐􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏵􀏮􀍲􀏵􀏰􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀅯􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍲􀏵􀏯􀀃􀆐􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏯􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏰􀏮􀍗􀏰􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏴􀏰􀏰􀏬􀏭􀏯􀏮􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏳􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀄂􀅶􀍲􀁞􀄂􀅶􀇇􀄐􀅚􀀃􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀆵􀅚􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅵􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍘􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀀄􀁞􀀄􀁗􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏰􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍟􀀃􀍾􀁴􀅽􀅯􀄨􀍿􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀀃􀎀􀆐􀅝􀄐􀎁􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏰􀏳􀍗􀏰􀏯􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏲􀏮􀏯􀏲􀏮􀏴􀏲􀏰􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃
􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏳􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆌􀅝􀀃􀁅􀅝􀅬􀅽􀅯􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄐􀅚􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅽􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅽􀍛􀄐􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀀺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇇􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅚􀅝􀅵􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍘􀀃􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏰􀀃
􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅬􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏱􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍖􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀀃􀍾􀁗􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏰􀏴􀍗􀏯􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏭􀏳􀏮􀏲􀏰􀏬􀏰􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏰􀏲􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃
􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆚􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄚􀆌􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀎀􀅽􀍛􀄐􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀎁􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀅯􀇇􀀃􀎀􀇁􀄞􀎁􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀅶􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀅝􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀀃􀅐􀅝􀄨􀆚􀆐􀀃􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍖􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇􀎁􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅐􀆵􀅝􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀆐􀀃
􀎀􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀎁􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀎀􀄚􀅽􀎁􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀎁􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀎀􀅽􀍛􀄐􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀎁􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀜􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀁋􀀼􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏲􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏱􀏯􀍗􀏬􀏮􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏬􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃􀁴􀄂􀅝􀆚􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅵􀄞􀍕􀀃􀎀􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀎁􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏳􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏱􀏰􀍗􀏱􀏰􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏲􀏮􀏬􀏯􀏯􀏮􀏭􀏭􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏭􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏱􀀃
􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍍􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀀜􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏴􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏱􀏱􀍗􀏯􀏮􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏱􀏰􀏭􀏭􀏬􀏴􀏯􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏰􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀄚􀄞􀆵􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅝􀄚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄞􀇇􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅶􀅽􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚􀀃􀄞􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍙􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃􀁤􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏵􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃
􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏭􀍗􀏱􀏲􀍗􀏱􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏵􀏬􀏰􀏳􀏴􀏯􀏯􀏯􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏮􀀃
􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏭􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍕􀀃􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍕􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀀃􀅐􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆵􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅩􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞􀀃􀅶􀅽􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀍘􀀃􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅚􀍕􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀍕􀀃􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄚􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀄨􀅝􀅐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆐􀅚􀎎􀆚􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀅵􀇇􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨􀀃􀄞􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃􀁅􀅽􀀃
􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀀃􀍾􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀆌􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐􀍿􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀄂􀄐􀅬􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀅵􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀦􀎎􀄐􀅬􀍊􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀦􀎎􀄐􀅬􀍕􀀃􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍍􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏲􀀃
􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀍛􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅯􀀃
􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅚􀅽􀆌􀆌􀅽􀆌􀍊􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆚􀀃􀁋􀅵􀆵􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅶􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍘􀀃􀀾􀅽􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄚􀅽􀆵􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍕􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍖􀀃􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄨􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄂􀇇􀍖􀀃􀀯􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅐􀆵􀅝􀄚􀄞􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅽􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅐􀆵􀅝􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅽􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅐􀆵􀅝􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀁺􀄂􀆐􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀍕􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀎎􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄚􀅽􀆵􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅯􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏬􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏬􀏬􀍗􀏬􀏳􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏰􀏱􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅚􀄞􀄂􀆌􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇇􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏯􀍗􀏬􀏬􀀃􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅽􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚􀍕􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃􀁴􀄂􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅯􀅽􀄂􀄚􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏭􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏭􀏯􀍗􀏮􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏲􀏰􀏵􀏳􀏯􀏲􀏰􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏵􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆐􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅵􀅽􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀀃􀎀􀅝􀆚􀎁􀀃
􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄚􀆐􀀃􀀑􀄞􀆌􀄞􀇌􀅽􀇀􀅽􀍘􀀃􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍘􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍘􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀀃􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃􀀺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆵􀆐􀀃􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅚􀄂􀅯􀆚􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀍘􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏳􀀃
􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏮􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀀃􀍾􀀘􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏭􀏲􀍗􀏯􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏲􀏭􀏮􀏳􀏭􀏱􀏱􀏬􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏭􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀇁􀄂􀇀􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅶􀅐􀆚􀅚􀍍􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀍍􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀏭􀏯􀏲􀍲􀏭􀏮􀏮􀍲􀆵􀆉􀆉􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀍘􀀃􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁞􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏯􀏲􀍲􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀀃􀍾􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍿􀍕􀀃􀏭􀏯􀏲􀍲􀏭􀏬􀏬􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀍾􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀍗􀀃
􀀒􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍊􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏯􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏭􀏵􀍗􀏬􀏴􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏬􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍊􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀀃􀍾􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀀾􀅽􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍊􀍿􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏰􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀀃􀍾􀀘􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏮􀏯􀍗􀏬􀏲􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏱􀏲􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏴􀀃
􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀬􀅽􀅯􀄚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀍕􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄞􀍕􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍘􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘􀀃􀁅􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀎁􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍘􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶􀀃􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀦􀎎􀄐􀅬􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀍾􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀆐􀅽􀆌􀆌􀇇􀍘􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄂􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏱􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀀃􀍾􀁗􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏮􀏰􀍗􀏭􀏵􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏴􀏳􀏰􀏲􀏲􀏴􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏳􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏳􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀎀􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆚􀎁􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀎀􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆚􀎁􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍘􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀀃􀍾􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀍕􀀃􀀯􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀎀􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆚􀎁􀍕􀀃􀀯􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅬􀍿􀍕􀀃􀏯􀏴􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀄂􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅽􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏬􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀀄􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀏭􀏬􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀀯􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅬􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀀄􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀆉􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀍊􀍿􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀅚􀅽􀇁􀀃􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀅚􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅯􀅝􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆵􀆌􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀀯􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀆵􀆐􀀃􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏭􀏱􀏬􀀃􀄨􀆵􀆌􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀏭􀏱􀏬􀀃􀄨􀆵􀆌􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃􀀺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀜􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀍊􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍕􀀃􀏮􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀎀􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀎁􀍍􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏵􀀃
􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀀃􀎀􀆐􀅝􀄐􀎁􀍘􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀆵􀆉􀍍􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀍘􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍕􀀃􀅽􀅚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀀃􀏯􀏬􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀏯􀏬􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍕􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅚􀄞􀄂􀆌􀍍􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀅚􀅽􀇁􀀃􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕􀀃􀎀􀇇􀅽􀆵􀎁􀀃􀅚􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀀑􀀼􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀀑􀀼􀍕􀀃􀅚􀅝􀆚􀀃􀀑􀀼􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀄏􀅝􀆌􀄚􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅝􀆌􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀆚􀅽􀅽􀍘􀀃􀀾􀅽􀅽􀅬􀍕􀀃􀎀􀀯􀎁􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀜􀇆􀅝􀆚􀀃􀏯􀍕􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀏰􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀎀􀀯􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀎁􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀀃􀎀􀆚􀆵􀄏􀄞􀆐􀎁􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅶􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄚􀅽􀆵􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍕􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅶􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀆉􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅐􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀏯􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀎀􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀎁􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀍿􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏲􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏯􀏮􀍗􀏮􀏵􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏲􀏰􀏵􀏳􀏯􀏲􀏰􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄐􀆵􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀍊􀀃􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏳􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀀃􀍾􀀘􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏰􀏲􀍗􀏬􀏲􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏭􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏬􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏮􀍕􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅝􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀆐􀄂􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀇁􀆐􀀃􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅚􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀍕􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯􀍍􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏬􀀃
􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅯􀅽􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀎀􀄂􀅶􀄚􀎁􀀃􀆉􀆵􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄂􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄏􀅯􀄂􀅶􀅬􀀃􀆐􀅵􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏰􀏴􀍲􀏭􀏲􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄚􀅝􀅐􀅝􀆚􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏴􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏯􀍗􀏱􀏰􀍗􀏭􀏭􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏱􀏭􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅐􀅽􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀎀􀁴􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀎁􀀃􀅯􀅽􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁅􀅽􀀃􀄞􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀅽􀀃􀇁􀄞􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏭􀏵􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀀃􀍾􀁗􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏯􀍗􀏱􀏱􀍗􀏭􀏰􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏴􀏳􀏰􀏲􀏲􀏴􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏰􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀄐􀆵􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄐􀅚􀀃􀍾􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀀯􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅬􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄐􀅚􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁤􀇁􀅽􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍕􀀃􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅵􀄂􀇇􀄏􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀎀􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆚􀎁􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀍍􀀃􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀎀􀅯􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀎁􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍿􀀃􀄞􀇆􀆉􀅯􀅽􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍙􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅐􀅽􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄞􀇆􀆉􀅯􀅽􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅶􀀃􀄨􀄞􀄞􀅯􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄞􀇆􀆉􀅯􀅽􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀍲􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀍲􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍘􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅯􀅝􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀬􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅵􀆵􀄐􀅚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏮􀏬􀏬􀍍􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀆵􀆐􀀃􀏮􀏬􀏬􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃􀁋􀅽􀆉􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆵􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃􀄞􀅯􀆐􀄞􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄞􀀃􀅶􀅽􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄞􀇆􀆉􀅯􀅽􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏭􀀃
􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆚􀀃􀁄􀆵􀅬􀅚􀅽􀅵􀅽􀅯􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄞􀇇􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅶􀆚􀍍􀀃􀁴􀄞􀍛􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄂􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄂􀅯􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀀃􀎀􀆉􀄂􀅝􀆌􀀃􀅽􀄨􀎁􀀃􀄞􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏬􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀀃􀍾􀁗􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏬􀏮􀍗􀏭􀏰􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏴􀏳􀏰􀏲􀏲􀏴􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏰􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁅􀅽􀇁􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚􀀃􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀍕􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆉􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀄨􀆵􀆌􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀎀􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀎁􀍕􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃
􀆉􀅯􀆵􀆐􀀃􀏭􀏱􀏬􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅚􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅐􀆵􀇇􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄏􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀀃􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅽􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀆐􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄚􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅵􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃􀀧􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅯􀆵􀆐􀀃􀏭􀏱􀏬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅵􀅽􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃􀁺􀅽􀆵􀀃
􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀍍􀀃􀀃
􀍾􀀯􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀆵􀅶􀍊􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁺􀅽􀆵􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄂􀄐􀆚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀍍􀀃􀁺􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀅽􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀆌􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄂􀄐􀆚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆌􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀎀􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀎁􀍕􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄂􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁅􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀀃􀍾􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍗􀀃􀁞􀄞􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆚􀍘􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀄞􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁤􀇁􀅽􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀍾􀁋􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀍕􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀀃􀏯􀏱􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏯􀏱􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀏯􀏱􀏬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀏭􀀃􀇀􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍍􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀍊􀀃
􀁳􀅽􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍕􀀃􀄐􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀄞􀍊􀀃
􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍗􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅯􀅽􀄂􀄚􀍊􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏮􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏭􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏱􀏯􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏮􀏯􀏭􀏳􀏭􀏯􀏮􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏭􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀾􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅶􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅚􀅝􀅯􀅯􀍕􀀃􀎀􀄂􀅶􀄚􀎁􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀄐􀀃􀅐􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃
􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆵􀆐􀍘􀀃􀁄􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀀃􀄨􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆌􀆚􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀦􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆌􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀇇􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍕􀀃􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀇇􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀏭􀏵􀏴􀆚􀅚􀍕􀀃􀅝􀄨􀀃􀎀􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀎁􀀃􀄨􀄂􀄐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍛􀆐􀀃􀄂􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀄞􀅯􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀘􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀍾􀀯􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇆􀅝􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅝􀅯􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅬􀅝􀅯􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀆚􀇁􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅽􀍿􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍕􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀏭􀀃􀅬􀅝􀅯􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍗􀀃􀏭􀀃􀅬􀅵􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏮􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀀄􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅯􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃
􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀀄􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏯􀏭􀍗􀏱􀏮􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏲􀏮􀏬􀏯􀏯􀏮􀏭􀏭􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀀄􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅯􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀀄􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅯􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀍊􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅯􀍕􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅽􀆵􀄐􀅚􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍘􀀃􀀾􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅚􀅝􀅵􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄂􀄐􀆚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀀃􀀄􀁞􀀄􀁗􀍘􀀃
􀀄􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅯􀍗􀀃􀁚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏯􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃
􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏯􀏱􀍗􀏯􀏲􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏲􀏮􀏲􀏭􀏲􀏵􀏳􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏳􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏯􀀃
􀀃
􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃
􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍙􀀃
􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀄞􀅯􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀄞􀆚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀀄􀁞􀀄􀁗􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍘􀀃􀁋􀅶􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏰􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏯􀏲􀍗􀏭􀏵􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏴􀏴􀏭􀏴􀏱􀏯􀏴􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏳􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀍕􀀃􀁅􀅝􀅬􀅽􀅯􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄐􀅚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄏􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃
􀎀􀄏􀇇􀎁􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀄂􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍕􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍕􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏱􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀀃􀍾􀀘􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏰􀏯􀍗􀏰􀏳􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏴􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀍾􀁨􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀁤􀆵􀅯􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅬􀅝􀀃􀎀􀍞􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀁤􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍟􀍍􀀃􀍴􀁤􀆌􀍘􀀃􀁅􀅽􀆚􀄞􀎁􀀃􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅝􀄐􀅬􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍘􀀃􀀬􀅽􀇁􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄂􀀃􀇀􀄞􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀄂􀇇􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄂􀀃􀇀􀄞􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅯􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆐􀄞􀍘􀀃􀀜􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀏮􀏮􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁋􀇀􀄞􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅽􀆵􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏲􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏰􀀃
􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏱􀏭􀍗􀏰􀏲􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏲􀏰􀏵􀏳􀏯􀏲􀏰􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏲􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏳􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏱􀏮􀍗􀏮􀏳􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏲􀏮􀏲􀏭􀏲􀏵􀏳􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏮􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀅚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃􀁴􀅚􀅽􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄞􀍘􀀃􀎀􀀬􀄞􀎁􀀃􀅚􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄚􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍛􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀎀􀀯􀎁􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏮􀏴􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏱􀍗􀏮􀏵􀍗􀏬􀏵􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏮􀏭􀏴􀏬􀏭􀏵􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏰􀏰􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀅽􀇁􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍍􀀃􀀄􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆐􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀄚􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀇁􀄂􀇇􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀆐􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁋􀅚􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏱􀀃
􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀎀􀁴􀄞􀎁􀀃􀄏􀅯􀄞􀇁􀀃􀄂􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅝􀄂􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀅚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍘􀀃􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚􀀃􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀦􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅐􀆵􀇇􀆐􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀅽􀆉􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀑􀅯􀄞􀇁􀀃􀅝􀆚􀀃􀆵􀆉􀍍􀀃􀀧􀅽􀅽􀄚􀀃􀄏􀅽􀇇􀆐􀍊􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁗􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅽􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍕􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀆐􀇁􀄞􀄞􀆚􀍘􀀃
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􀏮􀏵􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏲􀍗􀏭􀏰􀍗􀏰􀏵􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏮􀏯􀏭􀏳􀏭􀏯􀏮􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏱􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅶􀀃􀀯􀀃􀅐􀅽􀀃􀅚􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆌􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄨􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄚􀅽􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆌􀇇􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀆵􀆐􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆉􀆵􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀁞􀅯􀄂􀇀􀅶􀅽􀇇􀄞􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀁞􀆵􀆌􀅐􀄞􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆐􀀃􀆉􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀅯􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇􀀃􀁳􀄂􀆐􀅝􀅯􀇇􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄐􀅚􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀅶􀅽􀆚􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍕􀀃􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏯􀏬􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏲􀍗􀏮􀏴􀍗􀏮􀏵􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏵􀏱􀏬􀏰􀏯􀏲􀏭􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏱􀏰􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅯􀍊􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆌􀄂􀍕􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏱􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀆵􀆚􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃􀎀􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀎁􀀃􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅬􀄞􀇇􀆐􀍙􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍍􀀃􀀬􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇􀀃􀅐􀆵􀅶􀆐􀀃􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀀃􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅯􀍕􀀃􀄏􀆵􀆚􀀃􀀯􀀃􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅬􀀃􀅚􀄞􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀀃􀅐􀆵􀅶􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅽􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅶􀄚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄞􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅽􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀀃􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀆉􀅯􀄂􀄐􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀍘􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄚􀅝􀄚􀅶􀍛􀆚􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀆉􀅯􀄂􀄐􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏯􀏭􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏲􀍗􀏱􀏰􀍗􀏬􀏴􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏱􀏬􀏰􀏱􀏯􀏵􀏭􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏲􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏯􀏯􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆌􀄂􀍊􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅯􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀅽􀀃􀅝􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄨􀎎􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀇇􀆵􀆐􀅚􀅬􀄂􀀃􀇁􀅚􀅽􀀃􀆐􀅚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚􀀃􀁳􀅽􀅯􀅶􀅽􀇀􀄂􀅬􀅚􀄂􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀀘􀅽􀅬􀆵􀄐􀅚􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀀃􀆚􀅽􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆐􀅚􀎎􀆚􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄏􀅽􀆐􀆐􀍛􀀃􀎀􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞􀎁􀀃􀆐􀅽􀅽􀅶􀍘􀀃􀁤􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀅚􀄂􀆐􀀃􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀀃􀄂􀆐􀅬􀄞􀄚􀀃􀅵􀄞􀍘􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄏􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀆵􀆚􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕􀀃􀀯􀀃􀄂􀅵􀀃􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀀬􀄞􀄂􀄚􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕􀀃􀀯􀍛􀅯􀅯􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀍘􀀃􀁤􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀆚􀀃􀅝􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏯􀏮􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏯􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏳􀍗􀏰􀏵􀍗􀏬􀏴􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏱􀏬􀏰􀏱􀏯􀏵􀏭􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏬􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏭􀏱􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁴􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀆚􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀆉􀅯􀄂􀄐􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀧􀅽􀀃􀎀􀆐􀄞􀄞􀎁􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍘􀀃􀁋􀅶􀀃􀅵􀇇􀀃􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀏯􀏯􀍘􀀃􀀾􀀜􀀧􀀜􀁅􀀘􀍗􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀍶􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍖􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀀃􀍾􀀘􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐􀍿􀍶
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁞􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀅶􀀃􀏬􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕􀀃􀄂􀆚􀀃􀏭􀏬􀍗􀏱􀏭􀍗􀏬􀏭􀍕􀀃􀄂􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀇁􀄂􀆐􀀃􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏱􀏬􀏵􀏲􀏬􀏰􀏴􀏭􀏲􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍟􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀅽􀄏􀅝􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏬􀏲􀏯􀏳􀏰􀏵􀏬􀏳􀏭􀏵􀀃􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚􀀃􀄏􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀀃
􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀀃􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀀃􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀀃􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀍞􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍟􀍖􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃
􀍾􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗􀀃􀏭􀀃􀅵􀅝􀅶􀀃􀏮􀏳􀀃􀆐􀄞􀄐􀍿􀍗􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍕􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁺􀄞􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁞􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅵􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀀃􀄐􀆌􀄞􀇁􀆐􀍕􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀀃􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆵􀆉􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃
􀇁􀄞􀀃􀅐􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅽􀆵􀆚􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀇇􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐􀀃􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁨􀅚􀍲􀅚􀆵􀅚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀏭􀍘􀏱􀀃􀅬􀅵􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀏮􀀃􀅬􀅵􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀒􀅽􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀍍􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀀃􀍾􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍿􀀃􀆚􀅽􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚􀍙􀀃􀅚􀅽􀇁􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇􀀃􀎀􀅵􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀆌􀎁􀀃􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀀃􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚􀀃􀇁􀄞􀀃􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀍍􀀃􀀬􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍙􀀃􀅚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅽􀍊􀀃
􀀃 􀀃
􀏭􀏳􀀃
􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀏲􀏬􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀏲􀏬􀀃􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀘􀅝􀆐􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀀃􀏲􀏬􀍕􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁤􀅝􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍍􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀀃􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕􀀃􀅐􀄞􀆚􀀃􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀀄􀁞􀀄􀁗􀍘􀀃􀀑􀄂􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀀃􀅽􀅶􀀃􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄏􀇇􀍘􀀃􀁤􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄂􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀄞􀍕􀀃􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃
􀏲􀏬􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀀄􀀃􀆚􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅯􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀏭􀏮􀏬􀍕􀀃􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀀃􀏲􀏬􀀃􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶􀀃􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉􀀃􀏲􀏬􀀃􀅝􀅶􀀃􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀁋􀆉􀄂􀆐􀅶􀇇􀍗􀀃􀁚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀁺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀍗􀀃􀁤􀄂􀅬􀄞􀀃􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀀃 􀀄􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍕􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄚􀅝􀆐􀅬􀆐􀀃􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀀃􀄂􀆌􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄞􀇀􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀀃􀄨􀅽􀆌􀀃􀄂􀆐􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃
􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆐􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀄐􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀀃􀄂􀅶􀄚􀀃􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆉􀄞􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌􀆐􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀀃 􀀄􀄚􀄚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀆵􀅵􀍗􀀃􀏮􀀃􀍾􀆚􀇁􀅽􀍿􀀃􀀘􀁳􀀘􀍲􀁚􀆐􀍕􀀃􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀁅􀅽􀆐􀍘􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏰􀏵􀍕􀀃􀏯􀏴􀏱􀏮􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏭􀏭􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍕􀀃􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚􀍘􀀃
􀀃
􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀇌􀄞􀄚􀀃􀁋􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀀃􀏴􀍕􀀃􀀃
􀏮􀅶􀄚􀀃􀀘􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞􀀃􀍾􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍿􀀃􀀃
􀅽􀄨􀀃􀆚􀅚􀄞􀀃􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀀃􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀀃􀅽􀄨􀀃􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕􀀃􀀃
􀁞􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅽􀆌􀀃􀀾􀅝􀄞􀆵􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄂􀅶􀆚􀀃 􀀃 􀎀􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀎁􀀃 􀀃 􀁚􀍘􀁋􀍘􀀃􀁅􀄂􀆌􀆵􀆐􀄞􀇀􀇇􀄐􀅚􀀃
􀀃
􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀀃􀏭􀏲􀍕􀀃􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀀃
􀀃
􀁚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀀃􀁅􀅽􀍘􀀃􀏮􀍬􀏮􀍬􀏴􀍲􀏯􀏭􀏴􀏮􀏱􀀃
􀀃

Annex 431
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22015050000000021 (23 March
2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀷􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀀵􀀨􀀴􀀸􀀨􀀶􀀷
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀯􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘􀀓􀀘􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀕􀀔
City of Kyiv March 23, 2017
The Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine is conducting a
pretrial investigation of Criminal Case No.
22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, in which Ukrainian citizen Yu.N. Shpakov is suspected
of having committed crimes punishable under Part 3 of Article 258 and Part 1 of Article 2583 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine, and Russian citizen A.A. Sinelnikov is suspected of having committed
crimes falling under Part 3 of Article 27, Part 3 of Article 258, Part 1 of Article 2583, and Part 2 of
Article 437 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and a crime punishable under Part 2 of Article 438 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁐
􀀔􀀑 An act of terrorism, i.e. the use of weapons, staging of an explosion, perpetration of arson
or other acts endangering human lives or health or causing material property data or other severe
consequences, committed with the intention of disrupting public safety, intimidating the population,
provoking an armed conflict or a complication of international relations, or influencing decisions or
actions (omission to act) on the part of national or local government agencies or their officials,
associations of citizens, or legal entities, or with the intention of drawing public attention to specific
political, religious, or other views of the perpetrator (terrorist), as well as threats to commit said acts
with the same objective –
are punishable by incarceration for five to ten years, with or without confiscation of
property.
􀀕􀀑 The same acts committed repeatedly or by a group of persons acting in collusion, or if
they caused material property damage or other severe consequences –
are punishable by incarceration for seven to twelve years, with or without confiscation of
property.
􀀖􀀑 Acts mentioned in Parts 1 and 2 of this article, which have resulted in the death of a
person –
are punishable by incarceration for ten to fifteen years or life in prison, with or without
confiscation of property.
(Part 4 of Article 258 was removed by Law No. 170-V of September 21, 2006)
(Part 5 of Article 258 was removed by Law No. 170-V of September 21, 2006)
􀀙􀀑 A person shall be exempted from criminal liability for the act indicated in Part 1 of this
article to the extent of a threat to commit an act of terrorism if, prior to receiving a notice of
suspicion of
2
having committed this crime, this person has voluntarily reported this crime to a law enforcement
agency, helped put an end to or solve this crime, where such actions and the subsequent measures
taken have prevented danger to human lives or health or material property damage or the
occurrence of other severe consequences, as long as this person has not committed another crime.
(Article 258 as amended by Law No. 1689-VII of October 7, 2014)
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀛􀀖􀀑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑
􀀔􀀑 Creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization, leadership of or participation in said
group or organization, as well as organizational support or other facilitation of the creation or
operations of the terrorist group or terrorist organization –
are punishable by incarceration for eight to fifteen years, with or without confiscation of
property.
􀀕􀀑 Exemption from criminal liability for acts mentioned in Part 1 of this article shall be
granted to a person (other than the organizer or leader of the terrorist group or terrorist organization)
who has voluntarily notified the law enforcement authority about the relevant terrorist activity,
thereby helping put an end to such activity or solve crimes associated with the creation or operation
of said group or organization, as long as this person has not committed another crime.
(The Code was supplemented with Article 2583 by Law No. 170-V of September 21, 2006;
as amended by Law No. 2258-VI of May 18, 2010, Law No. 1689-VII of October 7, 2014)
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁊􀁊􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕
􀀔􀀑 Planning, preparation, or initiation of an aggressive war or military conflict as well as
involvement in a conspiracy to do so –
are punishable by imprisonment for seven to twelve years.
􀀕􀀑 Conduct of an aggressive war or aggressive combat operations –
is punishable by imprisonment for ten to fifteen years.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀖􀀛􀀑􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁕
􀀔􀀑 Cruel treatment of prisoners of war or civilian population, forcible resettlement of civilian
population to perform forced labor, theft of national landmarks in the occupied territory, use of the
means of warfare prohibited by international law,
3
other violations of laws and customs of war prescribed by international treaties ratified as binding
by the Ukrainian Parliament, as well as issuance of orders to commit such acts –
are punishable by imprisonment for eight to twelve years.
􀀕􀀑 The same acts associated with homicide –
are punishable by imprisonment for ten two fifteen years or life in prison.
􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀚􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁜􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀔􀀑 In addition to the perpetrator, accomplices in a crime include the organizer, the instigator,
and the accessory.
􀀕􀀑 The perpetrator (co-perpetrator) is a person who committed a crime punishable under this
Code jointly with other criminal actors, either directly or by using other individuals who are not
criminally punishable under law for the crime committed.
􀀖􀀑 The organizer is a person who organized the commission of the crime(s) or supervised the
preparation or commission of the crime(s). The organizer is also a person who created an organized
group or criminal organization or headed it, or the person that provided funding or organized
concealment of the criminal activity of the organized group or criminal organization.
􀀗􀀑 The instigator is a person who caused another accomplice to commit a crime through
persuasion, bribery, threat, coercion or otherwise.
􀀘􀀑 An accessory is a person who facilitated the commission of a crime by other accomplices
by providing advice, instructions, resources or tools or by eliminating obstacles, as well as a person
who made a promise in advance to conceal a criminal, weapon, or tool used to commit the crime,
evidence of the crime, or items obtained in a criminal manner, to acquire or sell said items or
otherwise facilitate the concealment of the crime.
􀀙􀀑 Concealment of a criminal, weapon, or tool used to commit the crime, evidence of the
crime or items obtained in a criminal manner, or acquisition or sale said items shall not constitute
complicity in the crime if such acts had not been promised in advance. Individuals who committed
such acts shall be criminally punishable only in the instances specified in Articles 198 and 396 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
􀀚􀀑 A promise given prior to commission of a crime not to disclose the crime reliably known
to be prepared or committed shall not constitute complicity in the crime. Such individuals shall be
criminally punishable only in the instances where the act committed by them contains elements of
another crime.
The pretrial investigation has ascertained that, according to Clauses 1, 2 of the
Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons dated December 5, 1994, the United States
4
of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act (of
August 1, 1975) to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine
and reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against
Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
According to Item 4 of Part 2 of the UN Charter, all [UN] Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
The UN General Assembly Declaration No. 36/103 of December 9, 1981 on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, recalling its
resolution No. 2734 (XXV) of December 16, 1970 containing the Declaration on the Strengthening
of International Security, and its resolution No. 2131 (XX) of December 21, 1965 containing the
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, declares that no State has the right to intervene
or interfere in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other
States. The declaration sets forth the duties of States to refrain from: military intervention,
subversion, and military occupation; promotion, encouragement or support of secessionist activities;
allowing its territory to be used for the training, financing and recruitment of mercenaries, or the
sending of such mercenaries into the territory of another State.
In addition, Articles 1-5 of the UN General Assembly Declaration No. 3314 (XXIX) of
December 14, 1974 offer the following definitions, inter alia:
- Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State;
- The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall qualify as an act of
aggression:
- The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or
any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
5
- Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the
use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
- The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
- An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air
fleets of another State;
- The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with
the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the
agreement;
- The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another
State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
- The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise,
may serve as a justification for aggression.
Articles 1 - 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine define that Ukraine is a sovereign, independent,
democratic, social, and law-governed state. Ukraine’s sovereignty covers all of its territory, which
is integral and inviolable within its existing boundaries. Human beings, their lives and health, honor
and dignity, inviolability and safety are recognized as the highest social value in Ukraine.
According to Article 68 of the Constitution of Ukraine, everybody must unquestioningly
respect the Constitution of Ukraine and laws of Ukraine and refrain from infringing on the rights
and freedoms, honor and dignity of other people.
According to Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine On Defense of Ukraine, armed aggression is
the use of armed force against Ukraine by another state or group of states. Any of the following acts
constitutes armed aggression against Ukraine:
- invasion or attack by the armed forces of another state or group of states in Ukrainian
territory, as well as occupation or annexation of a part of Ukrainian territory;
- blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
- attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of
another State;
- sending by another State or on its behalf of armed groups of regular or irregular forces that
commit acts of use of armed force against Ukraine,
6
the nature of which is serious to a point where they are equivalent to the acts listed in paragraph 5 to
7 of this article, including significant involvement of a third State in such acts;
- actions by another State (or States) permitting its territory made available to a third State to
be used by said third State(s) to commit acts listed in paragraph 5 - 7 of this article;
- use of the armed forces of another State or group of States stationed in Ukrainian territory in
Ukrainian territory under international treaties signed with Ukraine against a third State or group of
States, other violations of the terms of such treaties, or continued stay of the relevant units in
Ukrainian territory after termination of said treaties;
The pretrial investigation has ascertained that in March-April 2014 a stable hierarchical
structure was formed in Donetsk, Ukraine – a terrorist organization known as the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” (hereinafter “the DNR”), whose members in Ukrainian territory are engaged in
committing acts of terrorism, intimidation, homicides, takeovers of administrative buildings of
national and local government agencies, as well as other severe and grave crimes, thereby
destabilizing the social and political situation in the country.
The overriding goal of said terrorist organization is forcible change and disruption of the
constitutional system, usurpation of state power in Ukraine, and change of the territorial boundaries
and state border of Ukraine by creating the illegitimate state entity called the “DNR”.
This terrorist organization is stable and has a clearly defined hierarchy and structure
consisting of a political wing and an army wing, with the functions allocated among its members in
accordance with the joint criminal plan.
Leaders of the wings are tasked with managing and organizing activities and monitoring the
operations of the accomplices in the crime subordinated to them with the help of group leaders
within said wings.
The “DNR” has a stable list of leaders of said terrorist organization, who maintain close
relations, with members of the political and army wings centrally subordinated to organization
leaders, along with a plan of criminal activity and clear allocation of the functions of members
toward the accomplishment of this plan.
According to the joint criminal plan, the members of the political wing are also tasked with:
- creating the so-called bodies of state power of the “DNR” and organizing their activities;
- issuing regulatory acts of legislation on behalf of the illegitimate bodies of state power of
the “DNR”;
7
- holding an illegal referendum in Donetsk Oblast to proclaim the sovereignty of the
illegitimate state entity known as the “DNR”;
- conducting propaganda among the population extolling the terrorist organization “DNR” in
order to persuade them to join said terrorist organization and win support for their activities among
residents of Ukraine’s eastern regions;
- arranging the collection and receipt of material and financial aid from other terrorist
organization members and individuals loyal toward its activities, as well as distributing such aid;
- arranging interactions with the illegal state entity “Luhansk People’s Republic” and its
leaders in order to coordinate acts aimed at disrupting the constitutional system and usurping state
power of Ukraine as well as acts aimed at changing the territorial boundaries and state border of
Ukraine in contravention of the Constitution of Ukraine;
- arranging interactions with international supporters of this criminal activity with a view to
coordinating their activity, receiving financial and humanitarian aid and weapons, as well as
recruiting foreign nationals to resist the law enforcement agencies and Armed Forces of Ukraine;
- arranging interactions with the local and international mass media in order to use them for
propaganda, coverage of “DNR” activities, discrediting of the Ukrainian authorities and individuals
involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation, and to perpetuate beliefs among the local population about
the legitimate nature of their activities, as well as to use them to incite the public to disrupt the
constitutional system and usurp state power in Ukraine and commit acts aimed at changing the
territorial boundaries and state border of Ukraine in contravention of the procedure prescribed by
the Constitution of Ukraine;
- providing financial aid and organizational assistance to members of the army wing of the
“DNR” in order to support their criminal activity;
- providing “DNR” members with vehicles, insignia, and propaganda materials.
According to the joint criminal plan, the members of the army wing are tasked with:
- organizing and conducting armed resistance, illegal interference and obstruction of the
official duties of personnel of law enforcement agencies and servicemen of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation;
- forming groups of supporters of criminal activity of the “DNR”, arming said individuals
and managing their activities in order to resist representatives of the Ukrainian authorities and
prevent the law enforcement agencies and Armed Forces of Ukraine from putting an end to the
criminal activity;
8
- forming illegal paramilitary groups and participating in their activities;
- recruiting new members for the army wing of the “DNR” and managing their activities;
- capturing population centers, buildings, military units, and other facilities in Donetsk
Oblast;
- committing acts of terrorism and sabotage in Ukrainian territory;
- seizing weapons and otherwise obtaining ammunition, explosives, military vehicles, motor
vehicles, as well as building reinforcements in order to resist the personnel involved in the Anti-
Terrorist Operation as well as to support their continued criminal activity;
- abducting people to collect ransom and intimidate residents who support the incumbent
government of Ukraine;
- providing armed support for members of the political wing as they hold an illegal
referendum in Donetsk Oblast to proclaim the sovereignty of the illegitimate state entity known as
the “DNR”, as well as securing and guarding the buildings and premises occupied by them;
- arranging deliveries of weapons, ammunition, explosives, military vehicles, and allocating
them among terrorist organization members, etc.
The Anti-Terrorist Operation has been conducted in Donetsk Oblast since April 14, 2014
with the intention of putting an end to the operations of the terrorist organization “Donetsk People’s
Republic” pursuant to Ukrainian President's Decree No. 405/2014 of April 14, 2014 On the April
13, 2014 Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine ‘On Urgent Measures
to Overcome the Terrorist Threat and Preserve the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’.
It has also been ascertained that Russian citizen A.A. Sinelnikov, born in 1964, served in the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and has the military rank of colonel. Between 2002 and
2007 he served as deputy commander of the 28th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade stationed in
Ekaterinburg, Russian Federation, and commanded the same brigade between 2008 and 2010. After
retiring from the military, he served as the military commissioner of Penza Oblast, Russian
Federation, since February 11, 2011 until October 2014. He was decorated with the order “For
Courage” and departmental awards of the Russian Armed Forces for meritorious service.
In November 2014, A.A. Sinelnikov returned to military service and was transferred to the
Southern Military Command Region of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
It was then that A.A. Sinelnikov, acting on orders from his command and realizing the
illegal nature of the activities of the terrorist organization “DNR”, secretly arrived in the territory of
Donetsk Oblast controlled by said terrorist organization
9
and joined its ranks. To maintain secrecy and conceal the involvement of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation in the armed conflict in Ukraine’s east on the side of the terrorist organization,
he received and used the code name of “Zakhar”.
Between November 2014 and July 18, 2015, A.A. Sinelnikov stayed in Donetsk Oblast and
occupied the following position within the terrorist organization “DNR”: “Commander-Supervisor
of the 5th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade (hereinafter “5th SMIB”) of the 1st Army Corps
(hereinafter “1st AC”) of the Ministry of Defense of the DNR”.
In this position, A.A. Sinelnikov performed the following duties: organized armed resistance
against personnel of the law enforcement agencies and servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation; conducted training for units, battalion commanders and
their deputies, kept the brigade in a state of battle readiness, managed its combat training and
personnel outreach; commanded operations to capture population centers, buildings, and other
facilities in the territory of Donetsk Oblast; managed deliveries of weapons, ammunition,
explosives, and military vehicles and their allocation among members of the terrorist organization
“DNR”, organized acts of terrorism and sabotage in Ukrainian territory, etc.
Specifically, on January 13, 2015, acting with the intention of disrupting public safety,
intimidating the population, provoking an armed conflict, a complication of international relations,
influencing decisions by the Ukrainian authorities and forcing them to act in a certain manner, A.A.
Sinelnikov arranged for his subordinates to commit an act of terrorism – an artillery attack on a
roadblock of the Ukrainian Armed Forces while civilians were at the roadblock among other
individuals.
To this, A.A. Sinelnikov gave a criminal order to launch an artillery attack on the
roadblock of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to his subordinate – Yu.N. Shpakov, the so-called
“Commander of the 1st Battalion of the 5th SMIB of the 1st AC of the DNR”, who operated under
the code name of “Yust”.
At around 2 p.m. on January 13, 2015, while carrying out their joint criminal plan and
acting on orders from A.A. Sinelnikov, his subordinates – terrorists of the so-called “Angely Ada
[Angels of Hell] rocket missile division” commanded by Yu.N. Shpakov fired 88 unguided 120-mm
high-explosive fragmentation shells M-21-OF (product 9 M22U) from three BM-21 GRAD
multiple rocket launchers at once.
This attack targeted the premises of a roadblock of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the N-
20 Slovyansk-Mariupol motor road in the vicinity of the fixed Road Post No. 5 of the State Traffic
Inspectorate Directorate of the Donetsk Oblast Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine.
At this roadblock, one of the missiles damaged an “i-Van 􀉌􀈺􀉌􀈺􀀃A0718” “Zlatoustovka-
Donetsk” commuter bus, state number plates 􀈺􀉇􀀓􀀜􀀛􀀘􀈺􀈺􀀏􀀃 en route from Volnovakha in the
direction of Buhas, Donetsk Oblast,
10
whose passengers were in the process of passport control.
The following 12 civilians died of their wounds: Larisa Ivanovna Starchak, born in 1944,
Olga Nikolaevna Shudykina, born in 1956, Inna Alexandrovna Kornilova, born in 1994, Tatyana
Viktorovna Morgasyuk, born in 1960, Alexander Alexandrovich Morgasyuk, born in 1957, Mariya
Mikhaylovna Grinnik, born in 1965, Roman Anatolyevich Kolomoyets, born in 1988, Vladislav
Alexandrovich Polyakov, born in 1986, Dmitry Viktorovich Dukov, born in 1976, Nataliya
Mikhaylovna Kazeko, born in 1982, Anastasia Vladimirovna Lazutkina, born in 1990, and Anatoly
Ivanovich Karpov, born in 1954. The following 19 civilians sustained wounds of varying severity:
Nina Mikhaylovna Malakhova, born in 1938, Anna Mikhaylovna Karmatskaya, born in 1959,
Margarita Nikolaevna Dolgosh, born in 1963, Vitaliy Stanislavovich Liutyi, born in 1966, Vladimir
Alexeyevich Khlepytko, born in 1986, Valeriy Pavlovich Zubkov, born in 1950, Galina Vasilyevna
Kovalenko, born in 1954, Taisiya Alexandrovna Kusmarova, born in 1952, Vladimir Grigoryevich
Kolodiazhnyi, born in 1955, Yuriy Vladimirovich Bakhal, born in 1962, Elena Sergeyevna
Krivobedraya, born in 1950, Olga Anatolyevna Kukuyuk, born in 1983, Andrey Vladimirovich
Pavlov, born in 1984, Evgeny Alexandrovich Baldin, born in 1979, Ekaterina Vasilyevna
Litvinenko, born in 1985, Vladimir Anatolyevich Guban, born in 1955, Snezhana Anatolyevna
Koriska, born in 1971, Tatyana Iosifovna Nikitenko, born in 1952, and Vladislav Yuryevich Voron,
born in 1974.
Subsequently, while staying in Ukrainian territory until July 18, 2015, Colonel A.A.
Sinelnikov—an active officer of the Russian Armed Forces—repeatedly issued orders to his
subordinates to put up armed resistance against Anti-Terrorist Operation forces and commanded the
activities of members of the terrorist organization “DNR” during combat operations against law
enforcement agencies and Armed Forces of Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation in
Ukraine’s east.
A.A. Sinelnikov was granted a leave of absence on July 18, 2015, during which he returned
to the Russian Federation. After his leave, he was appointed to a senior position with the staff of the
Central Military Command Region of the Russian Armed Forces.
On February 27, 2017, a written notice of suspicion was prepared as part of this criminal
case against Russian citizen Anatoly Alexandrovich Sinelnikov, an employee of the combat training
directorate of the Central Military Command Region of the Russian Armed Forces.
The existing Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine prescribes the procedure for serving a
written notice of suspicion by the investigator or prosecutor directly on the person named in the
notice of suspicion. If the notice of suspicion cannot be served directly on the person named in the
notice of suspicion, the investigator or prosecutor must use other methods provided for in the
Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine to serve the notice (Articles 135-136).
11
Considering that A.A. Sinelnikov took a leave of absence on July 18, 2015 and left for the
Russian Federation, after which he was appointed to a position with the Central Military Command
Region of the Russian Armed Forces, i.e. is currently in Russian territory, a need has arisen to
approach the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation for international legal assistance: to
serve the written notice of suspicion on the suspect, A.A. Sinelnikov, and inform the suspect about
his rights available under Article 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine; to serve the
pamphlet listing the procedural rights and obligations of the suspect; to ensure the right to defense
and subsequently question him as a suspect.
In light of the foregoing, the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine invokes the 1993 Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and
Criminal Matters and the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases
and requests that the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation do the following:
􀀔􀀑 Explain the rights of the suspect to A.A. Sinelnikov according to provisions of criminal
procedure law of Ukraine as long as doing so does not contravene the laws of the Russian
Federation.
􀀕􀀑 Serve the pamphlet listing the procedural rights and obligations of a suspect on A.A.
Sinelnikov against signed receipt according to provisions of criminal procedure law of Ukraine as
long as doing so does not contravene the laws of the Russian Federation. Return one copy of the
pamphlet listing the procedural rights and obligations of a suspect signed by A.A. Sinelnikov to the
Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.
􀀖􀀑 Serve the notice of suspicion on A.A. Sinelnikov against signed receipt according to
provisions of criminal procedure law of Ukraine as long as doing so does not contravene the laws of
the Russian Federation. Return one copy of the notice of suspicion signed by A.A. Sinelnikov to the
Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine. Also, bearing in mind that
criminal procedure laws of Ukraine make it obligatory for a defense attorney to participate in
criminal proceedings involving grave crimes, please arrange for the suspect’s defense attorney to be
present during this procedural formality.
􀀗􀀑 Question A.A. Sinelnikov as a suspect in the presence of his defense attorney according
to the following procedure (unless it contravenes the laws of the Russian Federation) by asking him
the following questions:
- When exactly, for what reason, and under what circumstances did the suspect decide to
oppose the national and local government agencies of Ukraine, put up armed resistance against
personnel of the law enforcement agencies and
12
servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and become one of the active members of the terrorist
organization “DNR”, whose overriding goal is to forcibly change and disrupt the constitutional
system, usurp state power in Ukraine, change the territorial boundaries and state border of Ukraine,
and create the illegitimate state entity “DNR”?
- For what purpose did the suspect use the code name of “Zakhar”?
- What acts, when and under what circumstances did the suspect commit in order to
accomplish the above-mentioned criminal objectives?
- Whom of the organizers and active members of the terrorist organization “DNR” is the
suspect familiar with and cooperated with to achieve the criminal objectives? It should be suggested
that the suspect enumerate all of the individuals known to him who are involved in the activities of
the terrorist organization “DNR”, including their full identity information.
- Is the suspect acquainted with representatives of the terrorist organization “DNR” by the
names of M.G. Tikhonov, Yu.N. Shpakov, and A.V. Zakharchenko? If so, when and under what
circumstances did he get to know them and what kind of relations does he maintain with them?
- When in Ukraine, did the suspect stage explosions, commit arson, and put up armed
resistance, illegal interference with and obstruction of the official duties of representatives of the
law enforcement agencies and Armed Forces of Ukraine involved in the Anti-Terrorist Operation?
If so, when, where, and under what circumstances? Who else was involved in these criminal
activities in addition to the suspect?
- Who supervised the activities of the suspect in the territory temporarily controlled by the
terrorist organization “DNR”? What were his tasks?
- Was the suspect involved in battles against Anti-Terrorist Operation forces in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts? If so, when and where exactly and under what circumstances?
- Did the suspect and his subordinates – militants of the illegal paramilitary group “5th
SMIB of the 1st AC of the DNR Ministry of Defense” take part in combat operations against ATO
forces in Donetsk Oblast in the vicinity of the population centers of Dokuchaevsk, Elenovka, and
Volnovakha? If so, when exactly and under what circumstances?
- Who guided the operations of militants subordinated to the suspect during the artillery
attack on the roadblock of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on January 13, 2015, which killed 12
civilians and inflicted wounds of varying severity in 19 more civilians? Who did the suspect instruct
to launch this artillery attack and from whom did he receive this order?
- Is the suspect aware which specific militants in the so-called missile division “Angely
Ada” [Angels of Hell] carried out the artillery attack on the roadblock of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine on January 13, 2015? If so, what exactly does he know about these individuals?
13
The list of questions is not exhaustive, while the manner in which they must be asked is
mandatory. In light of this, depending on the questioning tactics and the information to be obtained
during questioning, the scope of questions may be modified or expanded, while the manner in which
they are asked may be chosen by the investigator.
􀀘􀀑 Request certified copies of documents proving the identity of Russian citizen Anatoly
Alexandrovich Sinelnikov, born in 1964 in the village of Naumkino, Shemysheysk District, Penza
Oblast, Russian Federation, who is serving in the military in the Central Military Command
Region of the Russian Ministry of Defense stationed at 71 Lenina Prospect, Ekaterinburg, Russian
Federation, and evidencing the address of his registration and residence, providing information
about his place of employment, marital status, level of education, any prior convictions, record of
administrative or criminal liability, as well as certificates issued by drug abuse specialists or
psychiatrists about registration with the relevant state prevention centers, and letters of reference
from the place of employment and residence.
􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀝 unless this contravenes the law of the Russian
Federation, we request that you carry out the requested procedural formalities in keeping with the
requirements of Ukrainian law.
Investigative activities in the territory of the Russian Federation are needed to ensure a swift
and full investigation of the criminal case.
When conducting the procedural formalities with the suspect:
- Begin the questioning of the suspect by ascertaining his full name, current address, date
and place of birth;
- Inform the suspect that he has the right to refrain from saying anything regarding
suspicions against him and refuse to answer questions at any time. In addition, please explain to the
suspect his other rights and obligations under Article 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine;
- Ask the questions that need to be answered;
- Formalize all of the above-mentioned information in the form of a record of questioning,
the form of which is attached to this request;
- Subsequently: 1) Read aloud the questions and answers enclosed with the request for the
suspect; or 2) Ask the suspect to personally review all of the questions and answers documented in
the record;
- State in the record of questioning whether the representative of the relevant authority of
the Russian Federation read aloud the questions and answers for the suspect or if the suspect
reviewed them personally;
- Every page of the record of suspect questioning must be signed at the bottom of the page.
The record must then be signed by a representative of the relevant authority of the Russian
Federation who conducted the questioning.
Please certify the documents obtained while honoring this request with the official seal of
the issuing department.
14
The information received by the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine will be used exclusively in the context of this criminal case and its hearing in court.
This criminal case is not politically motivated.
Please send the documents obtained while performing this request to the following address:
33 Vladimirskaya Street, Kyiv, 01601, Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine.
Should you have any questions regarding this request or how to honor it, please contact
Dmitry Vladimirovich Ziuzia, Senior Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the 5th Department of the
1st Pretrial Investigation Directorate of the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service
of Ukraine at: +380-44-255-52-63.
If you are unable to honor this request, kindly inform us about the reasons preventing its
performance and the conditions under which it can be honored.
Attachments:
􀀔􀀑 Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 2, 18, 40, and 93) on
______ pages.
􀀕􀀑 Excerpts from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (Articles 42, 52, 95, 104, 105,
106, 111, 223, 224, and 276-279) and from the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 63) on
__ pages.
􀀖􀀑 A notice of suspicion against A.A. Sinelnikov – 2 copies in Ukrainian and 2 copies in
Russian, on a total of __ pages.
􀀗􀀑 Pamphlet listing the procedural rights and duties of the suspect – 2 copies in Ukrainian
and 2 copies in Russian, on a total of ____ pages.
􀀘􀀑 Form of the witness questioning record in the Russian language.
􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀘􀁗􀁋 􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀔􀁖􀁗 􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀯􀁌􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀃􀀃
􀀧􀀑􀀃􀀽􀁌􀁘􀁝􀁌􀁄
􀀤􀀳􀀳􀀵􀀲􀀹􀀨􀀧􀀝
􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀊􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈 􀀲􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁄􀁇􀁄
􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁂􀁂􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚
Annex 432
Email Communication Between Evgeny Manuylov and “[email protected]” (12 October 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀩􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀝 􀇭􀈊􀈋􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈑 􀇴􀈈􀈕􀈛􀈑􀈓􀈖􀈊
􀀷􀁒􀀝 􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀘
􀀶􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀝 􀀋􀇺􀀕􀀌 􀇷􀈓􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈒􀈐􀁂􀈖􀈚􀁂􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀔􀀚􀁂􀀚􀈠􀈚􀈛􀈒􀀑􀁓􀁇􀁉􀀏 􀇸􀈈􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀁂􀇺􀀕􀁂􀈖􀈒􀈚􀈧􀈉􀈘􀈤􀀖􀀑􀁛􀁏􀁖􀁛
􀀧􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀝 􀀷􀁋􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁇􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀲􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀚􀀃􀀖􀀝􀀕􀀖􀀝􀀔􀀘􀀃􀀤􀀰
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀝 􀇷􀈓􀈈􀈚􀈍􀈎􀈒􀈐􀁂􀈖􀈚􀁂􀀔􀀕􀀑􀀔􀀓􀀑􀀔􀀚􀁂􀀚􀈠􀈚􀈛􀈒􀀑􀁓􀁇􀁉
􀇸􀈈􀈙􀈗􀈘􀈍􀈌􀈍􀈓􀈍􀈕􀈐􀈍􀁂􀇺􀀕􀁂􀈖􀈒􀈚􀈧􀈉􀈘􀈤􀀖􀀑􀁛􀁏􀁖􀁛
􀉋 􀉭􀉜􀉚􀉠􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉟􀉦,
􀈿􀉜􀉝􀉟􀉧􀉢􀉣 􀉆􀉚􀉧􀉭􀉣􀉥􀉨􀉜
[email protected]

Annex 433
Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22015000000000001 (14
November 2017)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

1
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine. Investigative Department] [Handwriting: True to original] [Signature]
SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE
Central Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine
in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
56 Yaroslava Mudroho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, 84300. Phone (06264) 3-03-33
www.ssu.gov.ua, email: [email protected]. Code in the Uniform State Register of Businesses and Organizations
of Ukraine: 20001504
November 14, 2017, No. 56/13-6101nt Re: No. [blank] of [blank]
To the relevant authorities
of the Russian Federation
REQUEST
for International Legal Assistance
Mariupol November 14, 2017
The Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblast expresses respect for the Prosecutor General's Office of the
Russian Federation and invokes the 1993 Convention on Legal Assistance and
Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters to respectfully request
international legal assistance in Criminal Case No. 22015000000000001
registered on January 5, 2015 in the Uniform State Register of Pretrial
Investigations, in which G.L. Kornilov is suspected of having committed a
criminal offense falling under Part 1 of Article 258-5 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine (funding of a terrorist organization).
The Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblast requests the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation to
keep the contents of this request confidential to the extent practicable under
the law of the Russian Federation, since disclosure of information contained in
this request may complicate the process of gathering evidence relevant to the
criminal proceedings.
The Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblast is investigating Criminal Case No. 22015000000000001, in
which Gleb Leonidovich Kornilov, d.o.b. November 21, 1985, is suspected of
having committed a crime falling under Part 1 of Article 258-5 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (an excerpt from the Criminal Code of Ukraine is attached).
A pretrial investigation of this criminal case has ascertained that since August
2014 (the exact date has not been determined by the pretrial investigation)
until present Russian citizen G.L. Kornilov, Leader of the Novorossiya
Security Service of Ukraine
Re: Incoming Ref. No. 3080-r
April 2, 2018
2
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine. Investigative Department] [Handwriting: True to original] [Signature]
Assistance Foundation (“Svoyik Ne Brosayem” [Our people don’t get left
behind] Foundation to Assist Refugees, Fellow Compatriots, and
Russian-Speaking Population, registered at 1 Akademika Vinogradova Street,
Office No. 270, Moscow, Russian Federation, primary state registration
number 1147799012151, website: http://spasidonbass.ru), intending to
support financially the terrorist organizations of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”, has been supplying military
uniforms, ammunition, military personal protective equipment, means of radio
communication and medications to members of said terrorist organizations
operating in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
Material damage caused to the state of Ukraine by this criminal offense is
currently being assessed.
The pretrial investigation authority is suspecting G.L. Kornilov of having
committed acts aimed at delivering supplies to representatives of the
above-mentioned terrorist organizations, who have in turn been committing
acts of terrorism since April 7, 2014 until present in the territory of Ukraine
with a view to disrupting public safety, intimidating the population, provoking
an armed conflict and a complication of international relations, and also
pressuring national or local government agencies as well as officials of said
agencies into making certain decisions.
In light of the foregoing and considering the available evidence of the criminal
case, on November 14, 2017 a notice of suspicion was issued against Gleb
Leonidovich Kornilov, d.o.b. November 21, 1985, to the effect that he is
suspected of having committed a criminal offense falling under Part 1 of Article
258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, specifically: funding of terrorism, i.e.
acts committed with a view to providing material resources to an individual
terrorism or a terrorist group (organization), as well as facilitation of an act of
terrorism by supplying military uniform and ammunition, military personal
protective equipment, means of radio communication and medications to
representatives of the combat wing of the so-called “DNR” and “LNR”, which
have been declared to be terrorist organizations pursuant to Paragraph 19 of
Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine On Combating Terrorism.
In November 14, 2017 the notice of suspicion of having committed a criminal
offense falling under Part 1 of Article 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine was
mailed to the address of registration of suspect G.L. Kornilov, specifically 23
Akademika Volgina, building 1, apartment 179, Moscow, Russian Federation,
and also via the available electronic means of communication at the email
address [email protected] in order to notify G.L. Kornilov that he is a
suspect under applicable laws of Ukraine.
According to Clause 4 of Part 1 of Article 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Ukraine, the circumstances characterizing the personality of the defendant and
suspect must be proven in the context of a criminal investigation.
3
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine. Investigative Department] [Handwriting: True to original] [Signature]
To ensure a comprehensive, full, and objective investigation of the
circumstances of the criminal offense, a need has now arisen to request
information characterizing the personality of the suspect – Russian citizen Gleb
Leonidovich Kornilov, d.o.b. November 21, 1985 (Russian taxpayer
identification number 7728503466280, with his registered address of
residence at 23 Akademika Volgina, building 1, apartment 179, Moscow,
Russian Federation).
Bearing in mind the foregoing and invoking the Convention on Legal Assistance
and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Matters of 1993, we hereby
request that you review this request and provide international legal assistance
in criminal case No. 22015000000000001 in the form of conducting the
following procedural formalities in the territory of the Russian Federation:
Request from the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation and send to
our address the following materials:
􀀐 A letter of reference issued in respect of G.L. Kornilov by the local
housing management office along with a certificate listing his family members;
􀀐 A certificate of receipt by G.L. Kornilov of a Russian citizen's internal
passport and international passport as well as duly certified copies of said
passports;
􀀐 A certificate proving G.L. Kornilov’s registration at her address of
residence;
􀀐 Certificates issued by the local mental disease and drug abuse
prevention centers in the area where G.L. Kornilov resides along with
information whether or not he has an active file with said prevention centers (if
so, specify the date of registration and diagnosis);
􀀐 Information about any prior criminal record of G.L. Kornilov (if such
information is available, request from the relevant authorities and send to our
address certified copies of verdicts issued by courts of the Russian Federation
as well as letters of reference issued by penitentiary facilities where G.L.
Kornilov may have served his sentences), as well as information about any
instances of G.L. Kornilov having been brought to administrative account;
􀀐 Information about any crossings by G.L. Kornilov of the state border
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine between April 7, 2014 and this
day;
􀀐 Information from agencies of the Federal Security Service (Ministry of
Internal Affairs) of the Russian Federation about G.L. Kornilov’s involvement in
activities of terrorist organizations or groups, extremist religious
organizations.
The Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblast would like to assure you that this request has been prepared
strictly in accordance with Ukrainian laws by a duly authorized officer within
the scope of his authority.
Investigative activities in the territory of the Russian Federation are needed to
ensure a comprehensive, full, and objective investigation of the circumstances
relevant to the criminal proceedings.
4
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine. Investigative Department] [Handwriting: True to original] [Signature]
The Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblast guarantees that any evidence or information received as part
of international legal assistance will be used exclusively for purposes of
gathering evidence in the context of this criminal case and will not be used for
political, military, or other objectives.
Should you have any questions regarding this request or its performance, do
not hesitate to contact Lieutenant Andrey Dmitrievich Nazaruk, investigator
with the Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol,
Donetsk Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, at: phone number: +38-0629-47-03-25, fax
number: +380629-47-03-75, email address: [email protected].
If you are unable to honor this request, kindly inform us about the reasons
preventing its performance and the conditions under which it can be honored.
The Investigative Office of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol, Donetsk
Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblast would like to use this opportunity to express its respect for the
relevant authorities of the Russian Federation and its willingness to provide
reciprocal legal assistance should they ever request it.
Attachments:
􀀐 Excerpt from the Criminal Code of Ukraine – 2 pages;
􀀐 Excerpt from the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine – 4 pages;
􀀐 Excerpt from the Law of Ukraine On Combating Terrorism – 4 pages.
Investigator with the Investigative Office
of the 2nd Directorate (stationed in Mariupol,
Donetsk Oblast) of the Central Directorate of Security Service of Ukraine in
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast
Lieutenant [Signature] A.D. Nazaruk
[Seal: Security Service of Ukraine. Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the
Security Service of Ukraine]
“APPROVED”
Department Prosecutor
at the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office
Junior Councilor of Justice [Signature] S.S. Knysh
Annex 434
Consolidated Banking Records of Transfer Between the Fund and the State Bank of the LPR
(various dates)This document has been translated from its original language into English, an
official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
1
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 41 06/01/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One billion thirty-eight million three hundred forty-five thousand six hundred nine rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy
Otechestvennoy Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2710 (pension fund allowance))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
2
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 42 06/01/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Seventy-one million three hundred eighty-five thousand seven hundred twenty-six rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s
Republic//Luhansk People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev
Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 (allowance for Social Security Fund))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
3
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 43 06/01/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Three hundred fifty thousand rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s
Republic//Luhansk People’s Republic, 3a ploschad
Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 (subsidy for state enterprise
Uglerestrukturizatsiya))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
4
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 44 06/01/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Thirty-seven million nine hundred six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s
Republic//Luhansk People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev
Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2110, 2120, 2240 (wages, wage withholding,
bank services))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
5
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 45 06/01/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One million rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s
Republic//Luhansk People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev
Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 3110 (procuring computers for online education))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
6
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 127 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One billion three hundred seventy-seven million eight hundred twenty-nine thousand fiftyfour
rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2710 (pension fund allowance))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
7
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 128 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Forty-five million ninety-three thousand seven hundred seventy-nine rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 (allowance for Social Security Fund))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
8
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 129 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Nine million six hundred forty thousand seventy-three rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2610, 3210 (subsidy for state enterprise
Uglerestrukturizatsiya))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
9
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 130 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Four million thirty thousand eight hundred fifty-one rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282, cultural program)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
10
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 131 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Sixteen million two hundred fifty thousand nine hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2730, Social security: replacing rations
with cash)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
11
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 132 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Eleven thousand fifty-three rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282, Humanitarian program (media support))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
12
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 133 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Three million six hundred seventy-six thousand six hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy
Otechestvennoy Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610, Payments to citizens finding themselves in
difficult life situations)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
13
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 134 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One million two hundred eighty-four thousand rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2730, 2282, 2240, 2210, Humanitarian program:
event-related expenses)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
14
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 135 11/02/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Eight hundred seven thousand eight hundred fourteen rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2250, 2282, Humanitarian program:
expenses related to integration measures)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
15
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 114 10/04/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Twenty-five million nine hundred sixty-two thousand one hundred fifty-six rubles and 09
kopecks
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Compensation of difference in rates to pay
for water consumption)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
16
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 136 11/07/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Twenty-five million four hundred eleven thousand nine hundred eighty-two rubles and 83
kopecks
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Compensation of difference in rates to pay
for water consumption)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
17
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 137 11/07/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Ninety-three thousand four hundred twenty-three rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282 Humanitarian program (media support))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
18
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 138 11/07/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One thousand rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic
Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2250, 2282 Humanitarian program:
expenses related to integration measures)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
19
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 115 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Seven hundred twenty-nine million seven hundred twenty-three thousand six hundred
seventy-five rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2710 (Pension Fund allowance))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
20
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 116 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Thirty-five million eight hundred twenty thousand seventy rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 (allowance for Social Security Fund))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
21
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 117 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Twenty-nine million nine hundred ninety-one thousand six hundred seventy-five rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2270 (payment for utilities and energy carriers))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
22
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 118 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Five hundred million rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2110, 2120, 2240 (wages, wage withholding,
bank services))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
23
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 119 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Sixteen million two hundred fifty thousand nine hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2240, 2730 Social Security: replacing rations
with cash)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
24
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 120 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Fifty-six thousand three hundred thirty-nine rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282 Humanitarian program (media support))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
25
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 121 10/12/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Four million six hundred twenty-eight thousand four hundred eighty rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Payments to citizens finding themselves in
difficult life situations)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
26
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 99 09/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Twenty-two million six hundred nineteen thousand one hundred twenty-seven rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2610, 3210 (subsidy to state enterprise
Uglerestrukturizatsiya))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
27
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 100 09/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Four hundred twenty-eight million one hundred seventy-two thousand five hundred sixtyseven
rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2110, 2120, 2240 (wages, wage withholding,
bank services))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
28
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 101 09/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Five thousand eighty-one rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic
Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2730 Social Security: replacing rations
with cash)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
29
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 102 09/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Four million one hundred eighty-three thousand seven hundred fifty rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Payments to citizens finding themselves in
difficult life situations)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
30
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 103 09/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One hundred ninety-one thousand seven hundred forty-seven rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2250, 2282 Humanitarian program:
expenses related to integration measures)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
31
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 104 09/25/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Three million five hundred thirty-four thousand three hundred forty rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Payments to citizens finding themselves in
difficult life situations)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
32
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 105 09/25/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Two million seven hundred twenty-four thousand six hundred fourteen rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282 Communications (Television and radio
broadcast and rebroadcast program))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
33
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 106 09/25/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Four million seven hundred ninety-two thousand five hundred eighty-nine rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282 (Cultural program))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
34
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 78 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Three hundred ninety-four million one hundred forty thousand rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2710 (Pension Fund allowance))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
35
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 79 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Thirty-five million seven hundred fifty-seven thousand eight hundred twenty-seven rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2270 (payment for utilities and energy carriers)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
36
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 80 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Twenty-one million thirty-three thousand four hundred sixty-two rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2610, 3210 (subsidy for state enterprise
Uglerestrukturizatsiya))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
37
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 81 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Six hundred ninety-three million seven hundred ninety thousand three hundred eightyeight
rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2110, 2120, 2240 (wages, wage withholding,
bank services))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
38
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 82 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Two million seven hundred thirty-four thousand seven hundred seventy-eight rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282 Communications (Television and radio
broadcast and rebroadcast program))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
39
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 83 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Forty-two thousand four hundred twenty rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2730 Social Security: replacing rations
with cash)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
40
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 84 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One hundred ninety-four thousand five hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2282 Humanitarian program (media support))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
41
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 85 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One million two hundred eighty-five thousand six hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2730, 2240 Payments to miners (1st-category
disability, Heroes of Socialist Labor, members of the Order of Mining Glory))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
42
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 86 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Three million one hundred eight thousand nine hundred ninety-six rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Payments to citizens finding themselves in
difficult life situations)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
43
____________________ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 87 08/14/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Six hundred thirty-two thousand nine hundred fifty rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2250, 2282 Humanitarian program:
expenses related to integration measures)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
_______________________________
L.S.
_______________________________
44
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 69 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One billion thirty-nine million four hundred nineteen thousand three hundred thirty rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2710 (Pension Fund allowance))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:15 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823591
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:48 p.m. GMT+03:00
45
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 70 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Eight million two hundred eighty-one thousand forty-six rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 (allowance for Social Security Fund))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:15 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823592
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:48 p.m. GMT+03:00
46
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 71 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Fourteen million nine hundred sixty-five thousand eight hundred sixty-six rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2730 Social Security: replacing rations
with cash)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:15 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823593
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00
47
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 72 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Six hundred eighteen thousand four hundred forty-three rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2240, 2250, 2282 Humanitarian program:
expenses related to integration measures)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:14 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823594
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00
48
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 73 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Two hundred ninety thousand rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2730, 2282, 2240, 2210 Humanitarian program:
event-related expenses)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:14 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823595
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00
49
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 74 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
One million fifty thousand four hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Payments to citizens finding themselves in
difficult life situations)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:14 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823596
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00
50
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 75 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Three million three hundred two thousand four hundred rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2730, 2240 Payments to miners (1st-category
disability, Heroes of Socialist Labor, members of the Order of Mining Glory))
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:13 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823601
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00
51
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 76 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Twenty million six hundred thousand rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification code 2610 Compensation of difference in rates to pay
for water consumption)
Payment Purpose
Signatures Bank Stamps
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:13 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823602
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00
52
_____08/03/2017_____ ______________________
Payment rec’d by bank Payment debited from acct.
BANK TRANSFER ORDER # 77 08/03/2017 Electronic
Date Payment Type
Amount Written
Out
Seven million three hundred forty-nine thousand seven hundred sixteen rubles
INN 0061102447 KPP Amount
Ministry of Finance of Luhansk People’s Republic//Luhansk
People’s Republic, 3a ploschad Geroev Velikoy Otechestvennoy
Voyny, Luhansk// Acct #
Payer
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payer’s Bank
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK COMMERCIAL
BANK LLC
BIC
Acct #
Payee’s Bank
INN 0061102720 KPP Acct #
State Bank of the Luhansk People’s Republic
Type
Deadline
Purpose Priority
Payee Code Reserved
{VO60075} Transfer of funds to be applied to the LNR Ministry of Finance current account 25205001020003
MFO 400008 USRLE 61102447 (Expense classification codes 2610, 3210 (subsidy for state enterprise
Uglerestrukturizatsiya))
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK LLC
ACCEPTED
08/03/2017
BIC 001001105
Corr. acct. 30101810100000000105
E-SIGNATURES VALID
L.S.
Delivered via “iBank 2” system on 08/03/2017 2:13 p.m. GMT+03:00 E-SIGNATURES
VALID
Document ID: 823603
Yana Aleksandrovna Shevtsova
Elena Aleksandrovna Bondareva
E-signature verification key 1: 1499854151492282
E-signature verification key 2: 1499693878346241
Printed 08/03/2017 at 4:49 p.m. GMT+03:00