Volume XI - Annexes 374-489

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
REJOINDER
Submitted by the Russian FederationVolume XI(Annexes 374 - 489)10 March 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME XI Annexes 374-489 Annex 374 Dutch National Police, Official Report on the Crew and two DPR Separatist Leaders, 7 October 2019. Annex 375 Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, Applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20, Further Observations of the Russian Government on Admissibility (Regarding East Ukraine), 8 November 2019. Annex 376 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20), Letter, 10 June 2021. Annex 377 The Dutch Public Prosecution Service, Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial – part 2 (10 March 2020). Annex 378 Hromadske, Deadly "Friendly Fire": Why 5 Policemen Were Killed in Knyazhychi (4 December 2016). Annex 379 UNIAN, Kholodnytskyi Accuses Sytnyk of Using National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine for Revenge and “Satisfying His Own Complexes” (19 September 2018). Annex 380 Hromadske, Budanov about Denis Kireev's death: "He was killed in an SBU car" (22 January 2023). Annex 381 MK.ru, SBU: Slavyansk ‘people's mayor’ discussed with Russian GRU officer how to get rid of MP Rybak's corpse (24 April 2014). Annex 382 Gazeta.ua, Farmer Was Kidnapped from His Car in the Middle of the Road (19 August 2016). Annex 383 Interfax-Ukraine, Farmer was robbed at night in Zaporozhskaya Oblast (8 August 2017). Annex 384 Hromadske, Odessa Tragedy: Why the Court Acquitted the “Anti-Maidan Activists” (22 September 2017). Annex 385 RIA Novosti, Investigative Committee reveals new details of investigation into Andrei Stenin's death (2 August 2017). Annex 386 Fishki.net, Ukraine draws in BUK missile defence systems to Donetsk Oblast (8 March 2014). Annex 387 UNIAN, The Ukrainian air forces receive reconditioned Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system (photo) (6 June 2014).
Annex 388 UNIAN, Ukraine's first reconditioned Buk-M1 SAMS tested in Khmelnytchyna (27 June 2014). Annex 389 Dutch National Police Crime Squad, Official Report Concerning the Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System, 7 October 2019. Annex 390 JIT, Transcript of press conference JIT MH17, 8 February 2023. Annex 391 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation, 28 September 2016. Annex 392 Joint Investigation Team, Report, Findings of the JIT MH17 investigation into the crew members of the Buk TELAR and those responsible in the chain of command, 8 February 2023. Annex 393 Flight Safety Foundation, Factual inquiry into the airspace closure above and around eastern Ukraine in relation to the downing of Flight MH17, January 2021. Annex 394 Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice, United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 1994. Annex 395 Commonwealth Secretariat, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions. Annex 396 Max Van Der Werff, MH17 properly investigated? Annex 397 YouTube, (English) Vitaly Nayda. UCMC, 19th of July 2014 (19 July 2014). Annex 398 TSN, In Lvov Protesters Seize Main Law Enforcement Buildings and Weapons Arsenal (19 February 2014). Annex 399 Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities (8 September 2020). Annex 400 Federal Law No. 402-FZ “On Peculiarities of the Legal Regulation of Relations in the Field of Mass Media in Connection with the Admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the Establishment of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol as New Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation”, 1 December 2014. Annex 401 Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012. Annex 402 Defusing the Nuclear Threat, Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation (19 June 2014).
Annex 403 Statement of the Council of Crimean Tatars under the auspices of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, 6 March 2023. Annex 404 The Kremlin, News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks (18 February 2022). Annex 405 Sharij.net, BOEING. The bird has come (10 August 2020). Annex 406 Roskomnadzor, Report on Registration of Media Outlets, 2016. Annex 407 Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/7790/16, Judgment, 15 June 2016. Annex 408 Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/10009/16, Judgment, 30 June 2016. Annex 409 Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/9327/16, Judgment, 30 June 2016. Annex 410 Commercial Court of Lugansk Region, Case No. 913/1184/16, Judgment, 21 November 2016. Annex 411 Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/3455/15, Judgment, 18 February 2016. Annex 412 Commercial Court of Zaporozhye Region, Case No. 908/286/15-g, Judgment, 5 March 2015. Annex 413 Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/1544/14, Judgment, 12 May 2014. Annex 414 Commercial Court of Poltava Region, Case No. 917/482/17, Judgment, 23 May 2017. Annex 415 Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/2849/16, Judgment, 17 November 2016. Annex 416 Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/3531/15, Judgment, 3 March 2016. Annex 417 Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/2456/15, Judgment, 11 January 2016. Annex 418 Commercial Court of Lugansk Region, Case No. 913/638/17, Judgment, 7 September 2017. Annex 419 Commercial Court of Lugansk Region, Case No. 913/639/17, Judgment, 14 September 2017. Annex 420 Commercial Court of Lugansk Region, Case No. 913/511/17, Judgment, 27 July 2017.
Annex 421 Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/13519/17, Judgment, 6 October 2017. Annex 422 Severodonetsk City Court of Lugansk Oblast, Case No. 428/5927/20, Judgment, 31 July 2020. Annex 423 Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/44/16, Judgment, 27 April 2016. Annex 424 Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/7494/16, Judgment, 6 September 2016. Annex 425 Moscow Circuit Commercial Court, Resolution, 18 October 2021, Case No. А40-207643/2020. Annex 426 Darnitsky District Court of Kyiv, Case No. 753/23764/15-k, Judgment, 28 December 2015. Annex 427 Kyivskiy District Court of Kharkov, Case No. 640/9543/15-k, Judgment, 3 June 2015. Annex 428 Sosnovsky District Court of Cherkassy, Case No. 712/8363/15-k, Judgment, 17 February 2016. Annex 429 Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 1-kp/243/378/2014, Sentence, 7 November 2014. Annex 430 SMIDA, Information on the volumes of production and sales of the main types of products (3 February 2023). Annex 431 SMIDA, Business profile (3 February 2022). Annex 432 Oktyabrsky District Court of Saint Petersburg, Case No. 2-323/2021, Decision, 19 May 2021. Annex 433 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling N 2450-O Dismissing a Complaint Filed by Alexander Ivanovich Kolpakidi and Sergey Vasilyevich Nikolayev Against an Alleged Infringement Of Their Constitutional Rights By Articles 1(3) And 13 Of Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activities”, 27 October 2015. Annex 434 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 137-O-O Dismissing a Complaint Filed by E.D. Bzarova, E.L. Kesayeva, V.A. Nazarov and E.L. Tagayeva Against an Alleged Infringement of Their Constitutional Rights by Article 14(2) of the Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism”, 19 February 2009. Annex 435 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 1873-O Dismissing a Complaint Filed by Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova
Against an Alleged Infringement of Her Constitutional Rights by Article 213(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 25 September 2014. Annex 436 OVDInfo, What is Article 20.2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences? Annex 437 Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court, Case No. A83-112/2014, Resolution, 31 July 2014. Annex 438 Slavyansk City Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 243/3885/14, Sentence, 5 November 2014. Annex 439 Central Municipal District Court of Gorlovka, Donetsk Region, Case No. 253/12580/13-k, Sentence, 18 April 2014. Annex 440 Selydovo City Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 1-kp/242/341/14, Sentence, 24 December 2014. Annex 441 Commentary of Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to OSCE A. K. Lukashevich for the 6th Anniversary of the Reunification of Crimea with Russia, 18 March 2020. Annex 442 Judicial Statistics of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences, Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, 2021. Annex 443 Administration of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Resolution No. 128 “On Approval of the Regulations on the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Mass Events in the Territory of the Municipality of City District of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea”, 23 March 2015. Annex 444 Law of Ukraine No 2704-VIII “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language”, 25 April 2019. Annex 445 Law of Ukraine No. 3759-XII “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, 21 December 1993. Annex 446 Law of Ukraine No 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”, 1 July 2021. Annex 447 Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg, Case No. 2a-863/22, Decision, 15 March 2022. Annex 448 Evpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No.2a-1433/2021, Decision, 22 September 2021. Annex 449 Topchikhinsky District Court of the Altai Krai, Case No. 2a-161/2021, Decision, 4 June 2021. Annex 450 Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Case No.2a-1105/2022, Decision, 21 February 2022.
Annex 451 Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a-4159/16, Decision, 30 September 2016. Annex 452 Yalta City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a-2964/2022, Decision, 29 July 2022. Annex 453 RG, The Supreme Court of Ukraine did not recognize as Nazi the symbols of the SS Division “Galichina” (6 December 2022). Annex 454 Ukraine’s General Attorney Office Letter No. 19/1/1-24020-19, 9 February 2022. Annex 455 Russian Federation General Attorney, Request for assistance No. 82/2-1382-2020, 23 September 2021. Annex 456 Law of Ukraine No. 638-IV “On the fight against terrorism”, 20 March 2003. Annex 457 Protocol of 28 March 1997 to the Minsk Convention of 22 January 1993 on legal aid and legal relations in civil, family and criminal cases. Annex 458 Commissioner for Human Rights in Donetsk People’s Republic, Letter No. 4/04-8408, 5 December 2022. Annex 459 Commissioner for Human Rights in Lugansk People’s Republic, Letter No. 851, 8 December 2022. Annex 460 Ukrinform, “Batkivshchyna” Deputy Was Brutally Tortured by Foreign Saboteurs Before His Death (22 April 2014). Annex 461 Kharkov Region Prosecutor’s office’s website, Prosecutor’s Office prevents contract killing of farmer (photos, video) (10 December 2018). Annex 462 Ukraine National Police Facebook account, The National Police of Ukraine’s Press-service (6 April 2022). Annex 463 Wikipedia, Schematic diagram of the battle on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov, 14/15 March 2014 (23 September 2019). Annex 464 RIA, Ukraine Announces Near-Total Blocking of Access to Russian Websites (20 April 2022). Annex 465 TASS, Re-Broadcasting of 15 Russian Channels Was Banned in Ukraine (9 September 2014). Annex 466 RT, Ukraine Issues New Ban on Russian Language (16 August 2022). Annex 467 KyivPost, Russian Language Excluded from Kyiv State Schooling (11 November 2022).
Annex 468 Law of Ukraine No. 743-VII “On Preventing the Prosecution and Punishment of Persons in Connection with the Events that Occurred during Peaceful Assemblies and on Invalidating Certain Laws of Ukraine”, 21 February 2014. Annex 469 Law of Ukraine No. 1680-VII “On the Special Procedure for Local Self-Government in Certain Areas of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions”, 16 September 2014. Annex 470 Law of Ukraine No. 2268-VIII “On the Peculiarities of the State Policy on Ensuring Ukraine’s State Sovereignty Over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Lugansk Regions”, 18 January 2018. Annex 471 Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 795-IX “On Calling Regular Local Elections in 2020”, 15 July 2020. Annex 472 Metapicz, Metadata for the Picture of Alleged Launch Site Image. Annex 473 Pictures.reuters.com, Members of a “Maidan” self-defence battalion take part in a training at a base of Ukraine's National Guard near Kiev (31 March 2014). Annex 474 Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014. Annex 475 Explosive Ordnance Guide for Ukraine, GICHD, 2022. Annex 476 Selidovo City Court of Donetsk region, Case No. 242/2571/14-к Sentence of 24 December 2014. Annex 477 FY 2016 Results Corporate Presentation DTEK Energy B.V., April 2017. Annex 478 Photo of remains of the rocket part of 122 Grad MLRS projectile in the pavement at Andrey Linev Street, opposite the western end of the house at 79A. Annex 479 VPK News, Even school buses have been mobilised in Ukraine (14 April 2021). Annex 480 Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 1822-VIII “On Establishing Ukrainian Volunteer Day Kyiv”, 17 January 2017. Annex 481 State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, Information for MFA (from 2014 to 2022 and plans for 2023). Annex 482 Roskomnadzor, List of existing media outlets operating in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and/or Sevastopol fully or primarily in Ukrainian and/or Crimean Tatar from 18 March 2014 until present time.
Annex 483 Decree of the Acting President of Ukraine No. 405/2014 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine dated 13 April 2014 “On Urgent Measures to Overcome the Terrorist Threat and Preserve the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”, 14 April 2014. Annex 484 Facebook, Ruslan Balbek, Forum of the Crimean Tatar Social-Political Powers, Declaration (17 August 2019). Annex 485 DTEK Energy B.V. Abbreviated IFRS Consolidated Financial Statements, 31 December 2015. Annex 486 Working Program in the subject “Mother tongue (Ukrainian)” for grades 5-9. Annex 487 Avdet, Appeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives (11 February 2013). Annex 488 Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Resource Center present information on human rights in Crimea to the world (7 November 2017). Annex 489 A. Arefiev, Russian language in the Ukrainian Republic, Center for Social Forecasting and Marketing - Russian language in former Soviet republics, 2012.
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Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, Applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20,
Further Observations of the Russian Government on Admissibility (Regarding East Ukraine),
paras. 390402,
8 November 2019
(excerpt)

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Application no. 8019/16 TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS UKRAINE V. RUSSIA ____________________________________ FURTHER OBSERVATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ON ADMISSIBILITY (REGARDING EAST UKRAINE) ____________________________________ Moscow 8 November 2019
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146 388. This site is an archive and mirror site, so that it is not possible to use the youtubedl programme to extract data about the video and/or audio files that link to the archived YouTube page. 389. However, the archived version of the YouTube page contains sourcecode, which includes a link to two archived YouTube files, one video and one audio.253 390. Before addressing the data associated with these files, it is necessary to note a feature of YouTube. When a file is uploaded to YouTube, it is encoded in a Google format compatible with YouTube’s systems. The encoding date should conform to the upload date. Conceivably, it could be later, if there were a good reason for reencoding the file later. It could not be earlier. 391. Remarkably, the encoded date of the video file is given as follows: “Encoded date: UTC 20140716 16:42:05” This is the day before MH17 was shot down. This corresponds to 18.42 in Ukraine, on 16 July 2014. This is not a mistake. The audio file has the same encoded date as follows: “Encoded date: UTC 20140716 16:42:05 It is an IsoMedia File Produced by Google. https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182910/https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=vlOqhnodT70 (Annex 114). 253 Archived version of Snizhne video, available via web.archive at https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182911oe_/http://r4snjc47eu7r.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?source=youtube&ratebypass=yes&ipbits=0&key=cms1&ip=207.241.237.109&sver=3&expire=1405645200&signature=1ED048BC6D3F6C25759EE327C6FC1517009105DC.7DE8CBD5D9E79BA8D787EBD557BDFFCE20033448&itag=22&id=oAPHyJEk_j_4LJ366fT0YvQ5m5p6ZsBmyTpsc4Nkbqzwv&upn=2oOfsu1kfbM&fexp=901803%2C902408%2C908584%2C910118%2C913430%2C924213%2C924217%2C924222%2C927622%2C930008%2C931975%2C934024%2C934030%2C941366%2C948110&sparams=expire,id,initcwndbps,ip,ipbits,itag,ratebypass,source,upn&signature=&redirect_counter=1&req_id=93d58e95421a03e4&cms_redirect=yes&ms=tsu&mt=1405621710&mv=m&mws=yes, through which the video file in Annex 114 was uploaded. The file size is 4,716,676 bytes, the SHA1 hash sum is “AE8045E87EBDC8BC46228F32BC1AC37A5D9F9DE3” (See data reproduced at para. 1 in Anonymous Expert Report, Annex ER1).
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147 392. It follows inexorably that the earliest available video and audio files of the BUK allegedly near Snizhne were uploaded onto YouTube on 16 July 2014. This is totally incompatible with the Bellingcat and JIT narrative, and JIT’s reliance on an anonymous witness who allegedly saw the BUK in the area on 17 July 2014 with the BUK allegedly having travelled from the Russian border “along a certain route … in the previous hours”254. 393. Currently, on YouTube, there is a video called “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014”255. It has the file name: MiI9szWLs4. 394. This video is recorded as having been uploaded by Brown Moses on 17 July 2014 – in other words, Eliot Higgins still in his Syria guise, although Bellingcat got underway on 14 July 2014. It is important to note a number of points. (1) As noted above, the YouTube link in fact goes to a number of files, and YouTube chooses which to present to a user clicking the link according to various factors, like the speed of their connection and the characteristics of their device. (2) The best quality file is identified as the one with the Format Code 22. (3) This file has an encoded date of 14 August 2017, three years after the uploaded date, and the name is different. It is recorded as being “an ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.” (4) The file is poor quality with a resolution of 408 x 720. (5) It has a length of 35 seconds, 267 milliseconds with a frame rate of 15 frames per second (“FPS”) (which, curiously, is 4 milliseconds shorter than the parallel audio file).256 395. The encoded date of 14 August 2017 means that the file currently on YouTube is not the file uploaded by Brown Moses. It also 254 Mentioned at 1 minute 30 seconds into a JIT video presentation “MH17 Animation regarding the transport route and the launch site”, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sf6gJ8NDhYA (Annex 116). 255 Video “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014”, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiI9szWLs4 (Annex 117). 256 See data reproduced at para. 2 in Anonymous Expert Report (Annex ER1).
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148 obscures the original encoded date of the earliest video – 16 July 2014 – as set out above. 396. There is a further oddity in relation to the Brown Moses/Bellingcat version. Whilst the first uploaded version has gone, there is an archive link – again at archive.org – to an archive of the original “Brown Moses” YouTube page, which was archived on 18 July 2014.257 That archived link contains a link to what should be an archived version of the video, archived on the same date. However, the version of the video at the archived link was archived on 17 December 2014.258 This is difficult to understand, and the effect is that even the version claimed by Eliot Higgins is not presently available. 397. There is a further YouTube version of the Snizhne video and also uploaded, supposedly, on 17 July 2014 with the title “AA “BUK” vehicle ProKremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”259. (1) Again, the YouTube link goes to a number of files. (2) Again, the best quality file has the Format Code 22. (3) Again, its encoding date is different from the upload date – 14 August 2017 – three years after the loss of MH17. (4) This file however, has better (apparent) quality, with a resolution of 1280 x 720. 257 Archived video “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014”, available via web.archive at https://web.archive.org/web/20140718170501/https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=MiI9szWLs4 (Annex 118). 258 See https://web.archive.org/web/20141217165205oe_/https://r5snjc47eu7d.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?upn=iMaooo3AkqM&sparams=dur,expire,id,initcwndbps,ip,ipbits,itag,mm,ms,mv,ratebypass,requiressl,source,upn&requiressl=yes&expire=1418856715&itag=22&key=cms1&dur=35.317&fexp=900718%2C927622%2C930676%2C932404%2C936102%2C9405587%2C943917%2C947209%2C947218%2C948124%2C952302%2C952605%2C952901%2C955301%2C957103%2C957105%2C957201&id=oAIErnszNaqW5w_9GtCoHpG2JRnFHsMa46BGyV3GaulYr&sver=3&signature=239CCA1930B253AC56F5A01AD6469F3C6B76FA39.4CD617B7F83FC1B64C360E092C5E468639C9F495&ratebypass=yes&ipbits=0&ip=207.241.237.141&source=youtube&signature=&redirect_counter=1&req_id=41363a279adaa3ee&cms_redirect=yes&mm=26&ms=tsu&mt=1418835074&mv=m. (Annex 118). 259 Video “AA ‘BUK’ vehicle ProKremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkgwxxhJlk4 (Annex 119). See data reproduced at para. 3 in Anonymous Expert Report (Annex ER1).
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149 (5) It has a length of 35 seconds, 271 milliseconds with a frame rate of 29.970 FPS – virtually double the Brown Moses version, so frames have been added. (6) Interestingly, the audio file has a different encoding date: 26 August 2016. Again it is an ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. (7) This video is recorded as having been uploaded by Euromaydan – again, not a disinterested source. 398. If this is a version of the Brown Moses video, or some common underlying file, this EuroMaydan version has been cropped, and it has undergone stabilisation, with more frames added, to make it smoother. 399. A yet further version of the Snizhne video was supposedly uploaded on 14 October 2015. Again, the title is “AA BUK vehicle ProKremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”260. (1) Again the YouTube link goes to a number of files. (2) The best has the Format Code 18. (3) The quality is poor – a resolution of only 640 x 360. (4) It has a length of 35 seconds 202 milliseconds with 29.970 FPS. (5) The audio file has an encoded date of 14 October 2015, consistent with the video file. Its title is ISO Media File produced by Google, 5112011 indicating that it was encoded by Google, apparently using software from 2011. Oddly, this has a duration of 35 seconds 270 milliseconds – longer than the video file. 400. Interestingly, this date of 14 October 2015 is the earliest encoded date amongst current versions of the Snizhne video on YouTube. Oddly, the quality of this video is the lowest. Better versions appear later. 260 Video (2) “AA ‘BUK’ vehicle ProKremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxZhjyZILgU (Annex 120). See data reproduced at para. 4 in Anonymous Expert Report (Annex ER1).
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150 401. Once again, it is unclear why there has been a cleaning of the earliest files uploaded. One obvious purpose might be to hide the date problem in relation to the encoding and uploading of the Snizhne video above. Another, may be to obstruct forensic analysis. It will be recalled that forensic analysis is already obstructed by the mere uploading to social media, because the social media strips away data in a “lossy” compression process which removes data important for forensic examination. Obviously, eliminating the earliest versions of files make it even more difficult to identify when, where and why changes may have been made. 402. The Snizhne video deserves forensic attention, because it contains faults and possible artefacts that suggest falsification. 3.11.1.1. The Vertical Line Artefact 403. In order to create a fake video of a BUK travelling along a road, a process of layering would have been required: filming of the background; insertion of the BUK layer; and addition of a foreground layer. 404. In this video, a tree in the foreground has not been rendered correctly in all frames of the video as the BUK launcher supposedly crosses behind it. A vertical line appears, part of the tree disappears and there is a hard line of contrast between the remaining vegetation and part of the BUK launcher.261 261 “MH17: The Buk videos are fake”, energia.su, 23 February 2016, available at https://energia.su/mh17/buk_vids/fake_buk_vids.html (Annex 121).
Annex 376 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20), Letter, 10 June 2021

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Mr Andrey Mikhailovich FEDOROVHead of the Office of theRepresentative of the Russian Federationat the European Court of Human Rights14 Zhitnaya str.119991 MoscowRUSSIAGRAND CHAMBERECHR-LE21.14G10 June 2021BY E-TRANSMISSION ONLYUkraine and the Netherlands v. Russia(applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20) Dear Sir,I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 May 2021 containing your Government’s further memorials on the above case together with the accompanying documents and with a USB key containing some of the annexes; and of your subsequent letter of 7 June 2021 asking to receive the additional written observations of your Government and the Government of the Netherlands as soon as practicable. A copy has been sent to the Governments of Ukraine and the Netherlands for information.I enclose, for information, the further memorials of the Governments of Ukraine and the Netherlands dated 21 May 2021 together with accompanying documents.Following the receipt of the parties’ further memorials, the formal written procedure is now closed.I would inform you that the President of the Court has refused to grant the Ukrainian Government’ request to file an expert report by Mr Elliot Higgins, the founder and Director of Bellingcat.I would also inform you that, following the completion of the formal written procedure stage, the President of the Court has directed that an oral hearing on the admissibility of the above applications shall take place on 24 November 2021. In setting this date, the President has had regard to the nature of the cases pleaded by the parties and, in particular, to the substantial factual disputes between the parties and the significant amount of factual material submitted by the parties both in the memorials and in annexes. As your Government and the Government of Ukraine both declined, in their respective letters of 2 September 2019 and 30 August 2019, an opportunity to test the factual evidence prior to the admissibility hearing, the Court will be required to reach the factual findings necessary at this stage based solely on the material in the written file. As a result, additional time will be needed to prepare the file for the admissibility hearing. Please note that the President has also taken account of and allowed for the change of representative of your Government.
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- 2 -Finally, the President has decided that any comments the parties may wish to make in reply to each other’s observations should be included in their oral pleadings at the public hearing on the above mentioned date. Further details concerning the hearing will follow in due course.I enclose copies of my letters of today’s date to the other parties, for information.Yours faithfully{Søren PrebensenDeputy Grand Chamber RegistrarEnc.
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Mr Ivan LISHCHYNAAgent of the Government of Ukrainebefore the European Court of Human RightsMinistry of Justice13 Gorodetsky Str.01001 KyivUKRAINEGRAND CHAMBERECHR-LE21.14R10 June 2021BY E-TRANSMISSION ONLY AND BY POSTUkraine and the Netherlands v. Russia(applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20)Dear Sir,I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 May 2021 containing your Government’s further memorials on the above case together with the accompanying documents. A copy has been sent to the Governments of the Russian Federation and the Netherlands for information.I enclose, for information, the further memorials of the Governments of the Russian Federation and the Netherlands dated 21 May 2021 together with accompanying documents (and a DVD disc containing some of the annexes); and a letter of 7 June 2021 from the Government of the Russian Federation.Following the receipt of the parties’ further memorials, the formal written procedure is now closed.I would inform you that your request to file an expert report by Mr Elliot Higgins, the founder and Director of Bellingcat, by 31 July 2021 has been refused by the President of the Court. I refer in this connection to the Court’s letter of 15 May 2019 in which your Government and the Government of the Russian Federation were invited to provide submissions to the Court on what should be the format of any fact-finding in respect of the admissibility of the application. In reply, in their respective letters of 30 August 2019 and 2 September 2019, your Government and the Government of the Russian Federation expressed the view that there was no need for the Court to hear oral testimony to test the evidence at the admissibility stage. In fact, in its letter, your Government insisted that the parties should confine any documentary evidence to their written submissions on admissibility and there was no need for the Court to take oral testimony during the pre-admissibility phase. In light of your position in this respect and considering that your Government has had every opportunity to submit any expert reports they considered necessary or desirable in the form of an annex to their memorials during the written procedure, further exchanges of (expert) evidence at this stage are not in the interests of the proper administration of justice and would cause further delays in the examination of the case (Rule 38 § 1, second sentence, of the Rules of Court).I would also inform you that following the completion of the formal written procedure stage, the President of the Court has directed that an oral hearing on the admissibility of the
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- 2 -above applications shall take place on 24 November 2021. In setting this date, the President has had regard to the nature of the cases pleaded by the parties and, in particular, to the substantial factual disputes between the parties and the significant amount of factual material submitted by the parties both in the memorials and in annexes. As your Government and the Government of the Russian Federation have both declined an opportunity to test the factual evidence prior to the admissibility hearing, the Court will be required to reach the factual findings necessary at this stage solely based on the material in the written file. As a result, additional time will be needed to prepare the file for the admissibility hearing.Finally, the President has decided that any comments the parties may wish to make in reply to each other’s observations should be included in their oral pleadings at the public hearing on the above mentioned date. Further details concerning the hearing will follow in due course.I enclose copies of my letters of today’s date to the other parties, for information.Yours faithfully,{ignature_p_1}Søren PrebensenDeputy Grand Chamber RegistrarEnc.
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Ms Babette KOOPMANAgent of the Government of the Kingdom of theNetherlandsMinistry of Foreign Affairs (DJZ/IR)Postbus 200612500 EB DEN HAAGTHE NETHERLANDSGRAND CHAMBERECHR-LE21.14R10 June 2021BY E-TRANSMISSION ONLY AND BY POSTUkraine and the Netherlands v. Russia(applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20)Dear Sir,I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 May 2021 containing your Government’s further memorials on the above case together with the accompanying documents.A copy has been sent to the Governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine for information.I enclose, for information, the further memorials of the Governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine dated 21 May 2021 together with accompanying documents (and a DVD disc containing some of the annexes); and a letter of 7 June 2021 from the Government of the Russian Federation.Following the receipt of the parties’ further memorials, the formal written procedure is now closed.I would inform you that the President of the Court has refused to grant the Ukrainian Government’s request to file an expert report by Mr Elliot Higgins, the founder and Director of Bellingcat.I would also inform you that following the completion of the formal written procedure stage, the President of the Court has directed that an oral hearing on the admissibility of the above applications shall take place on 24 November 2021. In setting this date, the President has had regard to the nature of the cases pleaded by the parties and, in particular, to the substantial factual disputes between the parties and the significant amount of factual material submitted by the parties both in the memorials and in annexes. As the Governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, in their respective letters of 2 September 2019 and 30 August 2019 (copies enclosed), both declined an opportunity to test the factual evidence prior to the admissibility hearing, the Court will be required to reach the factual findings necessary at this stage based solely on the material in the written file. As a result, additional time will be needed to prepare the file for the admissibility hearing.
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- 2 -Finally, the President has decided that any comments the parties may wish to make in reply to each other’s observations should be included in their oral pleadings at the public hearing on the above mentioned date. Further details concerning the hearing will follow in due course.I enclose copies of my letters of today’s date to the other parties, for information.Yours faithfully,Søren PrebensenDeputy Grand Chamber RegistrarEnc.
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The Dutch Public Prosecution Service, Status of the investigation and position on the progress of
the trial – part 2 (10 March 2020)

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Status of the investigation and position on the
progress of the trial - part 2 (10-3-2020)
Pronounced before the full-bench chamber of The Hague district court.
We will now explain what applications we are making in regard to further investigation. On certain
points, we will also explain that we seek no further investigation, as we do not believe that it would
add anything meaningful to the case file. We will explain our thinking because we believe that the
defence or the court may take a different view. By indicating at this early stage the areas in the case
file where further investigation may be considered, we aim to facilitate the progress of the
investigation. We also believe this will help enable the court to arrive at an opinion. After all, the
court itself has a responsibility to ensure that the trial is sufficiently comprehensive, and it can
order further investigation ex proprio motu.[1]
We are applying for further investigation only in the case against Pulatov. In major criminal cases
with multiple defendants, investigation in the case against one defendant is often ordered in the
cases against the other defendants as well, even if those other defendants have not requested it.
There is a practical reason for such parallel investigation: if other defendants should later request
such investigation, it does not need to be carried out all over again.
In this case, the Public Prosecution Service would explicitly recommend that this not be done,
because of the differences between the trials in absentia of Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko on
the one hand, and the defended action involving Pulatov on the other. If further investigation in
the case against Pulatov is simultaneously allowed in the cases against the other defendants, this
could lead to a situation in which the other defendants who are currently abroad have to be
notified in writing about various investigative activities, particularly with regard to threatened
witnesses (article 226b, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and expert witnesses
(article 228, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Experience has taught us that
sending formal notifications to the other three defendants by means of requests for legal assistance
is extraordinarily time-consuming and seldom successful. This results in unnecessary delay. We
must assume on the basis of the case file that the three other defendants are aware of this criminal
trial but have chosen not to participate in it. If investigation in the case against Pulatov should
result in information that is relevant to the cases against the other defendants, that information
can be added to their case files too. Any exculpatory information will in any event be added to their
files. If the position of the three defendants should change in the future, and they should wish to
participate in their trial after all, they can still invoke all of their rights as defendants (see article
280, paragraph 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Until such time we will submit applications
for further investigation only in the case against Pulatov, and we ask the court not to order further
investigation ex proprio motu in the cases against the other defendants.
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We will now discuss the following categories in turn:further investigation by experts of intercepted telephone conversations;further investigation by experts of visual materials;witnesses to be examined further;viewing of the reconstruction of MH17.Intercepted phone conversationsEarlier we explained our comprehensive approach to validating the intercepted phoneconversations that Ukraine provided. As far as the Public Prosecution Service is concerned, theauthenticity and content of the intercepted calls have hence been investigated as fully as possible,using different methods. We do not rule out further investigation, but we consider that it wouldonly be meaningful if it were based on serious and concrete new information about the interceptedcalls.As to the question of whether new information about the intercepted phone conversations does ordoes not warrant further investigation, it is necessary to look critically at the source of that newinformation. Specific accusations of manipulation are for example contained in a report by theMalaysian investigator A. Rosen that was published online. The investigation team analysed thatreport and added it to the case file. The following elements are worthy of note:Rosen investigated videos posted by the SBU on YouTube containing fragments of interceptedcalls. In other words, this was not an investigation of the intercepted calls themselves. This leadsfor example to the – unsurprising – conclusion that the conversations in the YouTube videos hadbeen edited. That conclusion is undoubtedly true, but it says nothing about the completeintercepted conversations that are contained in the case file and have been thoroughlyinvestigated.Rosen writes that access to the original material – the intercepted calls – is necessary to be able todraw conclusions about its authenticity and that he does not have access to that material, but thengoes on nevertheless to draw numerous conclusions about the authenticity of the conversationfragments. We cannot reconcile these assertions.Finally, Rosen labels at least one conversation as fake and inauthentic, but one of the participantshas publicly confirmed that he took part in that conversation. This is a conversation of 17 July 2014involving a certain Kozytsin. In an interview with a journalist from VICE News, the separatistKozytsin acknowledged that he took part in that conversation and explained how, in his view, itshould be interpreted. Our conclusion at this stage, based on these findings, is that Rosen's report may say somethingabout the clips in the YouTube videos that he investigated, but this report does not provide anycompelling reason to doubt the authenticity of the intercepted calls included in the investigation. AStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 2 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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specialist in forensic speech analysis from the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) informed us ofways to investigate the authenticity of intercepted conversations, referring to Rosen's report as anexample of how not to go about this task. This NFI specialist said of Rosen's report:‘A proper investigation of authenticity must be carried out on the basis of a specific manipulationhypothesis and, where possible, using the alleged original recordings. Rosen's report fails tocomply with either principle. The report's findings therefore have no relevance to question whetherthe underlying intercepted conversations are authentic.’We therefore see no reason in Rosen’s report to apply for further investigation.We enquired among specialists about how further investigation into disputed interceptedconversations could be carried out in a meaningful way. The following picture emerged. Generalaccusations of manipulation – such as the contention that all intercepted calls have been falsified –cannot be meaningfully investigated. But specific and concrete information can. If suchinformation comes to light, preferably as a result of a suspect adopting a specific position on anintercepted conversation attributed to them, there are various ways in which it could beinvestigated. Technical investigation of alleged anomalies or abnormalities, such as noises that canbe heard or an alleged lack of background noise, can be carried out by forensic experts. Moretechnical further investigation into the authenticity of conversations could be conducted by havinga Russian-speaking forensic audio specialist assess one or more conversations regarding issuessuch as possibly illogical sentence structure or word order in sentences that were spoken. Aninvestigation of this kind could possibly be carried out in one of the Baltic states. We expect thatRussian-speaking forensic audio specialists can be found there who can carry out expertinvestigation into this case with sufficient impartiality. Finally, it would be logical to also performtactical investigation into the disputed conversations. This involves analysing, with reference toother information from the investigation, whether – in the light of the conversation's content –there is reason to believe that a conversation has been manipulated.In short, we are not now applying for further investigation into the authenticity of interceptedconversations in the case file because we believe these conversations have been investigatedsufficiently. At this time we see no information that is sufficiently specific and objective to cause usto doubt that authenticity. If nevertheless an intercepted conversation is disputed in a sufficientlyspecific manner, on the basis of a serious source, we will gladly express a view on what kind ofmeaningful investigation thereof can be performed. In order to facilitate the progress of theseproceedings, we have already obtained information about how meaningful further investigationcould be performed if the court should deem such investigation necessary. In view of the time suchfurther investigation would be likely to take, it is important to decide on this matter as soon aspossible. With this in mind, it is especially relevant to ascertain whether the defendants, andPulatov in particular, dispute specific intercepted conversations.Photographic and video materialStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 3 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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We now come to the possible investigation of photographic and video material. The case filecontains seven videos and three photographs of the TELAR, which according to the investigationwere made on 17 and 18 July 2014 in eastern Ukraine. We have already explained with reference toone photograph how we validated these images. Again, further investigation is only meaningful ifthere are sufficient and concrete indications that these images have been manipulated.Image manipulationThe Russian Ministry of Defence alleges that a number of these images have been manipulated. Itmade this claim at a press conference on 17 September 2018.The allegation of manipulation provided food for thought. With regard to a video of the TELAR inLuhansk, the Russian Ministry of Defence said on 21 July 2014 that the image was accurate, butthat the recording had not been made in Luhansk but in Krasnoarmiysk, a town that was under thecontrol of the Ukrainian armed forces. That assertion was based on an address that was, it wassaid, on an advertising sign. That address cannot be seen on the video itself. Geolocationtechniques drawing on specific characteristics of the video revealed that the video had indeed beenmade in Luhansk and not, as claimed by the Russian authorities in their press conference, inKrasnoarmiysk. At the press conference held four years later the location of the recording was notdiscussed, and the claim was made that the images themselves had been manipulated.This was not the first about-turn on the part of the Russian Ministry of Defence. On 21 July 2014and 26 September 2016 it offered contradictory interpretations of the same radar plots: first itclaimed that the reflections were from a Ukrainian fighter aircraft, and subsequently it said theywere from debris from flight MH17. At the same press conference on 21 July 2014, the RussianMinistry of Defence also presented satellite photographs purportedly showing a Ukrainian Buksystem that disappeared from view near Donetsk prior to 17 July 2014, reappeared on 17 July 2014near Zaroshchenske and disappeared again a day later. In so doing it suggested that the missingUkrainian Buk system was responsible for downing flight MH17. Satellite images from theEuropean Space Agency and Google Earth and meteorological investigation by the KNMIdemonstrated that the Russian photographs could not have been taken on the dates claimed.There was therefore every reason to be sceptical about the Ministry of Defence’s latest allegationsin 2018 that the images of the TELAR had been manipulated. Anyone who falsifies evidence andrepeatedly produces contradictory versions of events cannot be considered the best source toevaluate the authenticity of other evidence. Nevertheless, these images and the Russian claimsconcerning them were referred to experts at the NFI. According to the NFI, there are noindications that the disputed images were manipulated.Shortly before this hearing began we learned of new Russian accusations of manipulation. They areincluded in the written statement of the Russian Federation of 31 December 2019 in proceedingsbefore the European Court of Human Rights. Those proceedings were initiated against the Russianstate by various next of kin of victims of the downing of flight MH17. In this written statement, theStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 4 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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Russian Federation asserts that other images of the TELAR were also ‘fake’. It even alleged a seriesof manipulated images, a ‘false digital story’.The Russian Federation's written statement presents various images. With the exception of aphotograph and a video of a TELAR moving under its own power in Snizhne, these images hadalready been mentioned by the Russian Ministry of Defence and investigated specifically by theNFI. That investigation satisfactorily refuted the Russian claims. According to the NFI, there areno indications of manipulation. That leaves the photograph and the video of the TELAR inSnizhne. They had not been disputed before. Various comments are made about how thephotograph was exhibited in a JIT presentation, but the statement does not explain why the imageitself is allegedly a fake. Specific, alleged indications of manipulation are only mentioned in respectof the video in Snizhne.We asked ourselves whether these claims warranted further investigation of the images.Specifically, we considered how far we should go in validating images, what further investigationinto image manipulation would add to the investigation that has already been performed, and howseriously we can still take Russian accusations in the light of all the demonstrable untruths alreadypropagated by the Russian authorities in recent years. Nevertheless, at this early stage of theseproceedings we consider that it still makes sense to have this specific example of alleged imagemanipulation investigated by experts. If such an investigation begins promptly it need not hold upthese proceedings.MetadataThis investigation only examined metadata on original image files such as photographs and videos.Investigating other files would have served no purpose because metadata can change whenresaving, sending or uploading files on services such as YouTube. In such cases, therefore,metadata sheds little light on when an image file was created or modified.The Russian Federation’s written statement in the ECtHR proceedings claims that a YouTubeversion of the video of the TELAR in Snizhne gives 16 July 2014 as its ‘encoded date’, i.e. one daybefore the downing of flight MH17 and the making of the other images of the TELAR. The RussianFederation argues that the encoded date can never be earlier than the date on which the video isactually uploaded, and consequently the video must already have been uploaded on 16 July 2014.That does not tally with the findings of the investigation. We can point to other evidence fromvarious sources of a TELAR moving under its own power through Snizhne on 17 July 2014. We arealso curious as to why a video which – if the Russian Federation is to be believed – was produced‘with a propaganda motive’ on the part of the JIT was made on a date that is not consistent withthe ‘propaganda’ message. At the same time, expert knowledge is needed to respond to thesubstance of this point concerning the encoded date. The NFI report referred to earlier does notaddress this new question. We would like this point also to be referred to an expert.Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 5 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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Conclusion photographic and video materialIn brief, in regard to investigation of photographic and video material, we see grounds for anapplication for referral to the examining magistrate to order an expert examination of the video ofthe TELAR in Snizhne. Specifically, this examination should address:possible indications of image manipulation of the two versions of the same video of the TELAR inSnizhne included in the case file, partly in the light of the claims made by the Russian Federation;the contention that the version referred to by the Russian Federation of the same video mustalready have been uploaded on 16 July 2014 and hence must have been recorded before then.WitnessesWe now come to the further examination of witnesses by the examining magistrate. We havealready explained that we are now making applications for the further examination of witnessesbecause of the expected preparation time that will be required. In this regard, moreover, weexpressly reserve the option of applying later, during the pre-trial review, for more witnessexaminations. First we will indicate the security issues surrounding the further examination ofwitnesses. We will then set out, in respect of several witnesses, the grounds on which we areapplying for them to be examined further.We will always refer to witnesses as ‘he’. If the identity of a witness is protected, it is possible that afemale witness is being referred to. References to ‘he’ must therefore be understood to mean ‘he orshe’.ProcedureWe have already explained why the examining magistrate decided not to include the identity ofdozens of witnesses in the case file. The threat from the DPR in eastern Ukraine and the fact thatthe Russian Federation is going to great lengths to conceal its involvement in this case havesignificant consequences for the investigative activities that still need to be carried out in thecoming period. Every effort will have to be made to ensure witnesses can be heard safely. The safe examination ofwitnesses whose identity has been protected on the orders of the examining magistrate will not bepossible in court. We must be mindful of the fact that anonymous witnesses can only be safelyexamined by the examining magistrate without the defence and the Public Prosecution Servicebeing present. After all, in view of the nature of the threat, the mere fact of the time and place of awitness examination becoming known could give rise to an unacceptable security risk. That riskdoes not arise if the examining magistrate hears witnesses at a time – over an extended period –and in a manner unknown to others, on the basis of written questions from the Public ProsecutionService and the defence. Previously, the examining magistrate considered it necessary to removefrom the case file the dates of the interviews conducted under article 226a of the Code of CriminalStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 6 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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Procedure because those dates could provide clues to the identity of witnesses. That risk will be nodifferent now.The Public Prosecution Service considers that the examining magistrate is ideally placed to decidehow new witnesses can be safely heard, while at the same time ensuring the defence can exerciseits right to examine witnesses. The examining magistrate is in possession of the most informationand has by now acquired considerable experience in examining threatened witnesses in this case.Referral to the examining magistrate will in any case be required in respect of all witnesses whoseidentity has been protected under article 149b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because anassessment will have to be made of how they can be examined in a manner consistent with theearlier decision to omit their identity from the case file.It would not be logical for the panel of judges hearing this case to designate one of its own numberas examining magistrate. If it were subsequently to be determined that defence counsel and thePublic Prosecutor may not be present at the examination of a witness, which is the expectation,that judge may no longer take part in the trial (article 316 paragraph 2 of the Code of CriminalProcedure). If the court were to take cognizance of information that cannot be added to the casefile for security reasons, it would find itself in the unfortunate situation of knowing more about awitness than the defence does. This strikes us as undesirable. The Public Prosecution Servicewould therefore express its opposition in advance to the possible designation as examiningmagistrate of one of the judges hearing this case.If the examining magistrate decides to examine witnesses without the Public Prosecution Serviceand the defence being present, it is conceivable that several rounds of written questions may beneeded for some witnesses. It goes without saying that this will have an impact on the time it takesfor the examining magistrate to hear witnesses. For witnesses who have not been heard before bythe examining magistrate, an assessment will have to be made of how the process should bemanaged in practical and procedural terms, and time-consuming procedures under article 226a ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure may have to be followed. Given also that in many cases theexamining magistrate will have to find an extremely discreet manner of acquiring the necessaryinternational legal assistance for these examinations, it is clearly vital that they can begin thisimportant task as soon as possible.In this process, the basic principle must of course be to amply facilitate the defence in the exerciseof its right to examine witnesses. Given the exceptional security risks in this case, careful accountmust be taken of a fair weighing of the interests at stake when determining how the defence will beable to exercise that right. In this case file we see no witnesses who could be viewed in due courseas ‘sole and decisive’ within the meaning of the case law of the ECtHR. The anonymous witnessesin this case file are a considerable group of witnesses who in particular can provide statementsabout the delivery and removal of the Buk TELAR and the firing of the Buk missile. There is nosingle witness in the case file in its current form whose testimony could be considered potentiallydecisive for a conviction. This circumstance is relevant to weighing, on the one hand, the interestsStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 7 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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of the defendants in having witnesses examined and, on the other hand, the interests of witnessesin giving evidence in a safe manner.M58The case file contains statements from witness M58. This witness eventually put their name to astatement, but at this stage of the proceedings we see no reason to disclose that name. This witnessstates, in summary, that in the summer of 2014 they were operating as a Russian volunteer in aseparatist unit in the self-declared republic of Donetsk. They indicate that, on 17 July 2014, at thetime flight MH17 was downed, they were at a crossroads south of Snizhne, in the vicinity of a BukTELAR at the moment a missile was launched. They, together with others, were given the task ofguarding the site. This witness also talks about other separatists who were at the launch site, andabout various details of that location. M58 states that those present were initially pleased becausethey were told that a military transport plane had been shot down. However, when the first peoplereturned from the crash site they said that it was a civilian aircraft.In view of the content of M58's statement and their personal situation, specific measures havebeen taken to protect them. These protection measures have an impact on M58’s (further) effectiveavailability to the investigation, the court, the Public Prosecution Service and the defence. For thisreason M58 was examined in October 2019 by the examining magistrate. These sessions took placewithout the defence or the Public Prosecutor being present and were filmed. Measures were takento conceal M58's identity on the recording. Experience shows that it is beneficial to the safety ofprotected witnesses to examine them as soon as possible because the process – especially in casesin which there is great media interest – can draw attention to such witnesses.The Public Prosecution Service is applying for a further examination by the examining magistrateso that the Public Prosecution Service and, if desired, the defence can put questions to this witness.The witness's statements are consistent and clear, but there are a number of subsidiary pointswhere they leave questions open, for example concerning the dates of a number of events in therun-up to 17 July 2014. The Public Prosecution Service would also like to ask further questionsabout what the witness observed at the launch site, for example concerning the people who werepresent. The witness addresses these points at certain moments. He states, for example, that herecognised Russian accents among the military personnel present at the launch site, that Russianmilitary personnel were present with the Buk and that he heard from his companions that peoplefrom the FSB were present at the shooting down of the aeroplane.The audiovisual recordings of the examination of M58 are in the possession of the examiningmagistrate. The Public Prosecution Service requests that the court instruct the examiningmagistrate to make a compilation of relevant parts of the recordings that, having regard to thesecurity measures in place to protect the witness, could be added to the case file and if desiredcould be shown in court. The examining magistrate should take account the viewponts of thePublic Prosecution Service and the defence when selecting, on the basis of the official report ofStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 8 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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statement, the relevant parts of the examination.We assume that safety considerations will make it impossible to examine M58 in court. The priordisclosure of the time and place of the examination in court and the associated travel requiredwould pose too great a security risk. If the court were to consider an examination in court wewould ask it to consider seeking the views of the examining magistrate at an early stage on whetherthis can be done in a responsible manner. This is because of the importance, for security reasons,of not examining a witness like M58 more often than necessary.S21 and S07Witness S21 states, in summary, that in the summer of 2014 they belonged to a separatist unit thatwas operating in the area around Donetsk. They reported to the defendant Kharchenko. S21'sduties included manning checkpoints, patrolling, and guarding locations and assets. On the daythat flight MH17 was downed, S21 was deployed together with others in the evening to transport aBuk TELAR from Snizhne. They transferred the TELAR to others in the vicinity of Debaltseve.Witness S07 stated that they too were active in the period in question in a separatist unit that wasunder the leadership of Kharchenko. S07 is not very specific about his activities on 17 July 2014.S21 stated that S07 was also present when the Buk TELAR was removed after the downing of flightMH17. S07 did not acknowledge this when interviewed.The Public Prosecution Service wishes to question S07 further on this point and put S21’sstatements to them. The Public Prosecution Service would also like to ask S21 questions arisingfrom the statements given by S07 and M58. For example, M58 describes the situation at the launchsite and in the surrounding area, and the people who were present. S21 was also present at theselocations.S17, S27 and S32Witness S17 was interviewed in 2015. In their statement they describe being shown a video on 17July 2014, before the downing of flight MH17, in which an air-defence system resembling a tankcould be seen. The person who had recorded the video had done so earlier that day. In themeantime, of course, several images from 17 July 2014 showing a Buk TELAR have come to light.The Public Prosecution Service would like to put further questions to S17 in order to determinewhether the video concerns one of these images.Witness S27 was also interviewed in 2015. According to their statement they saw a Buk TELAR attwo different moments and locations on 17 July 2014. One of those locations is Illicha Avenue inDonetsk. A photograph of the Buk TELAR was also taken there. S27 also describes the people whowere with the Buk TELAR and recognises specific uniforms they wore. S27's statement also refersto conversations with people who heard the missile being launched. The Public Prosecution Servicewould like to interview S27 in more detail about the grounds on which S27 concluded that a BukTELAR was involved. At the current stage of the investigation the Public Prosecution Service wouldStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 9 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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also like to ask S27 more specifically about the people with the Buk TELAR.S32 stated in 2016 that, in July 2014, they filmed a BUK with an accompanying convoy using theirdashboard camera, and had someone else upload it on YouTube.All three of these witnesses were interviewed quite some time ago, and have not yet beeninterviewed by the Public Prosecution Service. With respect to all three witnesses, we had intendedto apply earlier – before June 2019 – for them to be examined by the examining magistrate on thebasis of article 226a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When we were preparing theseapplications, however, it transpired that it was not feasible to speak to the witnesses at that time,because they could no longer be contacted or could not be examined by the examining magistratein a manner that would ensure their safety.This situation may now have changed with the passage of time. We believe it is necessary for theexamining magistrate to hear these three witnesses now, if possible, in a safe manner, either inaccordance with the procedure under article 226a of the Code of Criminal Procedure or otherwise.Further questions can then be put by the Public Prosecution Service and the defence and, if theexamination is conducted in accordance with the procedure under article 226a of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, the examining magistrate may carry out an investigation of witness reliabilityon the basis of article 226e of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statements of all three of thesewitnesses are important as regards to the assessment of the video and photographic materialrelating to the Buk TELAR in the case file. As we have just explained, doubt has been cast in somequarters as to the authenticity of this video and photographic material. It therefore makes clearsense for these witnesses to be examined in more detail.ViewingLastly there is the possibility of a viewing of the wreckage. Giving the court, the defence and thePublic Prosecution Service the opportunity to see the wreckage of MH17 for themselves woulddeepen their insight into the forensic case file. In that way the participants in the proceedingswould be able to get a sense of the perforations and pitting on the left side of the aircraft, and of thevarious pieces of wreckage where the fragments struck and were removed that show similarities toa Buk missile of the 9M38 series. A viewing would help create that broader picture of the damage,as it is difficult to capture it effectively in photographs. The case file includes a 3D reconstructionof the wreckage. It provides a clearer picture than photos do, but it still does not give the sameimpression as viewing the wreckage in person would.The reconstruction made by the OVV of the front of the aircraft is in Gilze-Rijen: the outside of thecockpit, the business class section and a small part of the economy class section. Most of the piecesof wreckage in which fragments were found that match parts of a Buk missile can be seen in thisreconstruction. Only the left wing, in which several such pieces were found, is stored at a differentlocation. The same goes for the various larger and smaller fragments that match various parts of aBuk missile, both visually and in terms of element composition. They were removed not only fromStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 10 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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the wreckage, but also from the bodies of victims and the crew’s flight documents. Larger partswere found separately at the crash site. These parts, which are thought to be from a missile, arestored elsewhere. The same goes for the parts of the various dismantled and detonated referencemissiles from Ukraine and Finland, which were compared to the fragments found, and thealuminium witness plates used for the arena tests. We believe the photos in the case files provide aclear enough picture of these, so they do not need to be viewed in person. If necessary, smallerfragments can be shown in the courtroom at a later date. A viewing of the reconstruction willsuffice to create a broader picture of the damage. We therefore apply to the court to move thehearing to the hangar at Gilze-Rijen Air Base at a date to be determined. If the court would preferto view the other items we just mentioned that are stored elsewhere, it can of course decide that exproprio motu.Such a viewing will require sufficient familiarity with the forensic case file on the part of thedefence. A viewing could therefore also take place in June or even later. In this case, too, we thinkit would be desirable for the court to make a decision now, so that the necessary logisticpreparations can be made and the further scheduling of hearings can take account of it.Access to documents for Pulatov’s counselThis brings us to the issue of access to documents. As we have noted, the Public ProsecutionService will actively offer the defence access to various documents that are not in the case filebecause we did not consider them relevant, but about which the defence may think differently.After all, in assembling the case file we have not yet been able to take into account any defencefrom Pulatov, as none has been disclosed so far. The defence is also free to request, giving reasons,access to other documents that are not in the case file, to substantiate specific defences. The casefile sets out why several specified documents have not been included. If the defence wishes toaccess such documents, that is of course possible. The Public Prosecution Service would onlyrefuse such a request if that were necessary on serious grounds (article 187d of the Code ofCriminal Procedure), such as the safety of witnesses or the interests of the ongoing investigationinto other persons of interest. If the Public Prosecution Service and the defence disagree as towhether such access can be given, the court will decide. To expedite these proceedings, the PublicProsecution Service proposes that the examining magistrate be instructed to rule, in betweenhearings, on behalf of the court on any objection the defence may lodge against any refusal on thepart of the Public Prosecution Service to give them access. We think that this, too, would be in theinterests of the investigation and of the progress of the trial.Translation for Pulatov’s counselIt may also be in the interests of the defence to have a translation of case documents. Before thishearing, the Public Prosecution Service provided a Russian translation of the notice of summonsand accusation and the general account. That account is a detailed summary of the case fileStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 11 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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comprising (in the Dutch version) 147 pages. This took a considerable amount of time. In addition,the Public Prosecution Service has undertaken to provide a Russian translation of the personalcase file: an overview of the investigation with regard to the defendant Pulatov of (in the Dutchversion) 68 pages. This translation is nearly completed. After the defence notified the court thatthey would act as counsel, the Public Prosecution Service also added to the case file the audio filesof the intercepted telephone conversations most relevant to the evidence, so that the defence wouldhave access to the original Russian-language audio files. This too will help the defendant gaininsight into important evidence against him.The Public Prosecution Service believes that these documents will provide the defendant withsufficient insight into the charges and the evidence adduced by the Public Prosecution Service. Onthe basis of these documents and the further discussion of other information in the case file in theconsultations with his counsel (with the aid of an interpreter or his Russian lawyer), the defendantshould be able to carefully determine the course of action he wishes to adopt during theproceedings. It can then be assessed on the basis of specific, substantiated requests whether it is inthe interests of the defendant to have Russian translations of other documents.Before this hearing, the Public Prosecution Service already discussed the fact with the defence thatany requests for translation of additional documents must always explain why the defenceconsiders translation necessary. This is in accordance with Dutch (article 32a, paragraph 1 of theCode of Criminal Procedure) and European legislation. According to the relevant EuropeanDirective, these must be documents which are essential to ensure that the defendant is able toexercise their right of defence (article 3, paragraph 1 of Directive 2010/64/EU). Documents orparts of documents to which this does not apply, need not be translated (article 3, paragraph 4 ofthe Directive).From this point onwards any requests for translation will have to be submitted to the court. Here,too, we propose that the court instruct the examining magistrate to decide, in between hearings, onbehalf of the court on any requests for translation from the defence, in order to expedite theproceedings.Next of kinLike the defendants, the victims’ next of kin also have certain rights. For instance, they too areentitled to gain access to case documents, in so far as that is in their interests (article 51b,paragraphs 1 and 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Certain documents may be relevant to anystatement they wish to make in exercising their right to address the court, or to the substantiationof any claims for damages.On the other hand, in providing copies of case documents to next of kin the Public ProsecutionService must take into account possible consequences for the present criminal proceedings. Onaccount of the exceptional media interest in this case and the large number of next of kin, there is areal chance that case documents may end up in the public domain. We believe it would not be inStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 12 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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the interest of due process if this were to occur before those case documents had been examined ata public hearing. The Public Prosecution Service therefore adopts a restrictive approach vis-à-visthe provision of case documents to next of kin, assessing each request individually in terms ofwhether there are arguments in favour of deviating from that general restrictive approach.In view of the interests of the next of kin, we do believe we can provide a copy of the summary ofthe investigation (the general account), as soon as the consideration of the merits has taken place.We have previously undertaken to do so. We have also undertaken to ensure in any event that theywill receive that summary no later than four weeks before they are asked to submit their claim. Tothat end, sufficient time – at least four weeks – will have to be scheduled between the completionof the consideration of the merits and the submission deadline for the claims of injured parties.Now that the hearing is under way, the court will have to decide on any requests for access to orcopies of case documents. We hold the view that the rights of next of kin are best served when asubstantial presentation of several parts of the case file is given during the preliminary phase of thetrial. We will elaborate on this.In addition to the right to information, the next of kin also have the right to be heard in courtduring the criminal proceedings and the right to claim damages. The next of kin have been askedabout this, and as it stands, 49 persons wish to exercise their right to be heard in court, 84 wish tosubmit a claim as an injured party and 82 wish to submit a victim impact statement. This is just afirst estimate. All next of kin are free to change their minds on this matter. In the interests of theprocess, it would be our preference for the next of kin to exercise their right to be heard in courtbefore the closing statements. The same goes for the first clarification of the claim for damages.We would ask the court to take the above into account when scheduling the rest of the trial.Looking ahead to the consideration of the meritsWe would like to conclude with a look ahead to the assessment of the merits of the case. It is partlyinfluenced by the way efforts to establish the truth in this case have been obstructed over the years,since 17 July 2014.Over the past few years, public awareness of the dangers of disinformation has grown.‘Disinformation’ is the deliberate, often covert, dissemination of misleading information, with theaim of damaging (inter alia) the public debate, democratic processes and the rule of law. Thesedays, states try to exert influence and mislead by means of manipulated information. Democraticstates that respect the rule of law now widely recognise that disinformation forms a serious threatto the stability and quality of democracy, the rule of law and an open society. Like the EuropeanUnion[2] and many other countries, the Dutch government has taken measures to counter thedangers of disinformation campaigns.[3]After MH17 was shot down, a disinformation campaign began that continues to this day. Usingopen sources and intercepted telephone conversations we can pinpoint the start of that campaignStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 13 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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very precisely. In the first few hours after the crash, what little information existed was still beingshared without any kind of filtering. For instance, the pro-Russian television station LifeNewsreported as follows on 17 July from 16.34, i.e. within 15 minutes of the crash:‘Rebels inform us that they have succeeded in downing another transport aircraft of the Ukrainianair force. This occurred above the city of Torez in the self-proclaimed Republic of Donetsk. Thiswas around 5.00 Moscow time. An AN-26 was flying over the city. A missile suddenly penetratedthe aircraft. An explosion followed and the aircraft began to fall. Black smoke could be seen in theair. The AN-26 fell down on the side of the mine and the residential areas. I would add that Torezis not far from the town of Snizhne and the Saur-Mogila hill. These areas are controlled by rebels.’It can be noted that in this early media coverage important elements are mentioned that came tobe established later on in the investigation: the involvement of the ‘rebels’, who apparentlythemselves claimed to journalists that they shot the aircraft down; the use of the missile; and thelink with the area around Snizhne, which was controlled by the ‘rebels’. Only the nature of thedowned aircraft was incorrect.There is more evidence in the case file that the DPR openly claimed to have shot down an aircraftshortly after the crash of MH17. For instance, a photographer who was in the area described in aWorld Press video interview how he was phoned by the press spokesperson of the separatists afterthe crash of MH17, who told him that they had shot down a military aircraft belonging to Ukraine.He received this phone call before it became known what type of aircraft had been shot down.When it became clear in the following hours that the target hit was not a military aircraft butcivilian flight MH17, the disinformation campaign started immediately. The pro-Russian televisionstations changed their reporting. On LifeNews, for example, by around six o’clock the claim by the‘rebels’ and the eyewitnesses about the missile were gone entirely. Instead it was reported at 18.02that MH17 had been shot down with an S-300 missile system belonging to the Ukrainian armedforces. Just under half an hour later, that version was replaced by the report that the Boeing hadbeen shot down by a Ukrainian fighter aircraft, which was then in turn shot down by the ‘people’sarmy’.A few days later, the Russian Ministry of Defence adopted this line of reporting, in a pressconference in 21 July 2014 which we have referred to before. During that press conference theMinistry suggested two scenarios, saying on the one hand that MH17 may have been shot down bya Ukrainian fighter aircraft; and on the other hand pointing to a Ukrainian Buk system. From thenon, both scenarios were maintained by, among others, the Ministry of Defence, Buk manufacturerAlmaz Antey, the Russian criminal investigation authority, the deputy Prosecutor General, theMinister of Foreign Affairs and the foreign ministry spokesperson. Until mid-2015, an attack by aUkrainian fighter aircraft was the dominant scenario. Once the OVV published its draft and finalreport, however, the emphasis shifted to a Ukrainian Buk missile. Various interpretations weregiven as to what type of missile and what type of warhead were thought to have been used, and itwas repeatedly asserted that the Russian armed forces no longer used those types. As of 26Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 14 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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September 2016, the scenario of a Ukrainian fighter aircraft faded into the background. That is thedate on which it was announced that Russian radar data had been found, and that those radarimages did not show a fighter aircraft. From then on, the Ukrainian Buk missile became thedominant scenario. This was confirmed in 2018 by the presentation of documents that allegedlyshow that the Buk missile responsible was delivered to a Soviet unit in Soviet Ukraine as early as1986. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the missile remained there all that time. Thesame line was taken by the Russian deputy Prosecutor General in early 2019. He too pointed to theevidence of it being a Ukrainian missile. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation has continued tokeep both options open: its response in the proceedings before the ECtHR only went as far asreferring to the ‘alleged shooting down of MH17 by a BUK missile’. To this very day, the Russianauthorities have never taken a definitive position on what exactly they think happened on 17 July2014.The Russian narrative is aimed solely at sowing doubt about the evidence pointing to a RussianBuk missile and at disqualifying the JIT’s investigation. For instance, the JIT has been accused ofbeing biased, using falsified information and not taking the Russian information seriously. At thesame time, the Russian authorities have provided plainly incorrect information about satellite andradar images, while refusing to provide any information about the Buk TELAR that was identifiedin the JIT’s investigation as being the system used to shoot down MH17. In 2019, the deputyProsecutor General stated that there was no reason to interview Russian citizens, as there was noevidence of their involvement. [4] He did, however, ask the Dutch Minister of Justice and Securityto transfer the prosecution of the three Russian suspects to the Russian Federation.The fate of flight MH17 has become known as a textbook example of a disinformation campaign bythe Russian government. It is clear we have not yet seen the end of it. In a letter to parliament in2019, the Dutch government said the following on this issue:‘One of the subjects about which disinformation is deliberately being disseminated is MH17. As theMinister of Justice and Security, as the coordinating minister for state threats, said during hismeeting with the parliamentary committee on national security and crisis management, theoriesabound about the circumstances of the crash. Many of those theories have proven to be untrue. Insome cases it transpired they had been created deliberately in order to sow confusion. On behalf ofthe government the Minister of Justice and Security has said before that in the run-up to andduring the criminal proceedings with regard to MH17 we must be prepared for disinformationaimed at adversely affecting the criminal proceedings and undermining trust in the independentjudiciary.’ [5]That warning turned out to be justified. Shortly before the hearing, a number of documents fromthe JIT’s investigation were made public on a website.[6] One of those documents is part of animage report by the Australian Federal Police. It discusses the metadata of four digital image filesof the TELAR that were found on the internet. They are two photos from Paris Match of a TELARon a trailer behind a Volvo lorry in Donetsk, a photo of a TELAR on a trailer in Torez and a photoStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 15 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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of a TELAR moving under its own power in Snizhne. The leaked part of this report mentions themetadata of these files. According to the Australian investigators these files ‘appear to have beenmanipulated’, because the ‘modified’ date of the files is earlier than the ‘created’ date. That is not aconclusion about actual manipulation, because such differences can be due to image files being re-saved, transmitted or uploaded. The Australian investigators say as much themselves: ‘Variousreasons could explain why this is so [...].’ More important is the fact that over the years much moreinvestigation has been conducted of these images than this report from 2015 shows. For instance,the video has been secured from which the two Paris Match stills were taken. Investigation of thisvideo has shown that according to the metadata it was shot on 17 July 2014 at 10.23.54 at a GPSlocation on Makeevka Highway in Donetsk. On the basis of the shadows in the footage, the KNMIestimated that the video had been shot at around the same time. A comparison of visual elementsin the footage with Google Streetview confirmed the same location. The NFI investigated this videoand found no indications of manipulation. In addition the presence of the TELAR at this location isconfirmed by witness statements and telecom data. The other two photos in the Australian report,taken in Torez and Snizhne, were also subject to more in-depth investigation, which showed thatthese photos were made public as early as 17 July 2014. That is earlier than the Australian reporthad been able to establish on the basis of the metadata. These photos were validated too, by meansof investigation by the KNMI, comparison with information on Google Streetview, witnessstatements and telecom data. So although the published Australian report does show how criticallythe JIT has assessed the evidence obtained, it has now been superseded by all the validation thathas taken place in the years since the report was drawn up.Incidentally, the full version of that report mentions another video file: a video shot in Zuhres. Thispart of the report was not published on the website in question. According to the information inthe original report, this video was shot on 17 July 2014 at 11.37.58 local time, at a GPS location inZuhres. This information is confirmed by other sources in the case files.Apparently the website saw reason to publish only those investigation results that could be used tosuggest visual material had been manipulated. Parts of the report that confirm the authenticity of avideo were not published. This website’s goal is therefore not to share information in a responsible,journalistic manner, but rather to spread disinformation.This is borne out by two other leaked documents, which are in the case file. These are officialreports by the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) that provideinformation about the locations of Ukrainian and Russian Buk systems in the region where MH17was shot down. These two leaked reports refer to a previous report which clearly states that thismilitary information is limited to locations where ‘activity [involving Buk systems] has beenobserved over longer periods of time in June and July 2014’. So the MIVD does not conclude thatthere was no Russian Buk system present in eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014, as suggested by thewebsite. The MIVD report concerns only locations where Buk systems were stationed for longerperiods of time. Short operations, whereby a Buk system is delivered, used and removedStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 16 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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immediately, fell outside the scope of the MIVD’s observations, as described in the reports.Last Saturday, the makers of this website have made public new documents. These were minutes ofa closed JIT-meeting. These minutes contain what has been brought up by us earlier: that the JIT-countries deliberated about what investigative work could be done. Such meetings are not relevantto this trial. What is relevant, is the investigative work that has actually been conducted. You willfind this in the case files. It is apparent that we can expect further publications like these in thecourse of the proceedings.We have looked at how these documents could have been obtained. Only the Netherlands,Belgium, Australia and Malaysia had access to all the published documents. So far none of thesefour JIT states has been able to identify any leaks. There are indications, however, of previousattempts by the Russian GRU to hack the Malaysian police and attorney general’s office. On 4October 2018 the Dutch and UK authorities held a press conference on the thwarted GRU cyberoperation that had targeted the OPCW in The Hague. The Dutch Ministry of Defence announcedthat one of the Russian intelligence officers involved in this operation had previously been active inMalaysia, targeting the MH17 investigation.[7] This was confirmed by the UK authorities. Theysaid the GRU operation in Malaysia was aimed at obtaining information about the MH17investigation from the Malaysian attorney general’s office and the Malaysian police.[8] Given thesecircumstances, we must take into account the possibility that the published documents wereobtained following a successful GRU hacking operation in one of the four JIT countries mentionedabove. In this respect, we note that information about anonymous threatened witnesses has beenstored at another, more heavily secured, digital location than the documents that have beendisclosed thus far. At this stage, there are no indications that information about such witnesses hasfallen in the wrong hands. The cynical disinformation campaign regarding the fate of flight MH17, which has gone on formore than five years now, places a heavy strain on many of the next of kin. As we already stressedin our opening statement, the next of kin of victims of serious offences deserve to receive clarityabout what happened and who is responsible, at the earliest possible moment. Especially ifgovernment authorities are involved.One of the next of kin has worded this appropriately in a Dutch newspaper last week:“On 17 July 2014, 298 people lost their lives in a violent manner. 80 of them were children. Forsuch a loss, the scale of human emotion is insufficient. That is the immensity of the MH17 tragedy.Just as immense is the importance of this trial. The question of why happened what happened isparticularly significant to the next of kin. Their questions are still as numerous as their grieving isdeep. The truth also lays the necessary legal foundation for justice and accountability”.[9]For many next of kin such information it is an important step in the grieving process. Due to thelarge number of next of kin in this case, that information cannot be shared with them in a meetingwith the Public Prosecutor; it has to be done at the public hearing, as soon as the proceedings willStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 17 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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allow.But there is also a wider public interest in the swift sharing of information at this hearing. In thecase of grave human rights violations such as in this case, not only the next of kin but the widerpublic too have a right to know what happened and who is responsible. The ECtHR has said thefollowing in this respect:‘Furthermore, where allegations of serious human rights violations are involved in theinvestigation, the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the case does notbelong solely to the victim of the crime and his or her family but also to other victims of similarviolations and the general public, who have the right to know what has happened. An adequateresponse by the authorities in investigating allegations of serious human rights violations maygenerally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the ruleof law and in preventing any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. Forthe same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or itsresults to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory […]’.[10]Partly for that reason, the JIT has previously shared a limited amount of information about thecause of the crash of flight MH17.In 2006 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also pointed out the right ofnext of kin and the wider public to the truth following grave human rights violations. That includesnot only information about the circumstances, but also about the ‘progress and results of theinvestigation’.[11]Thus, international human rights bodies emphasise the right of the next of kin and the public toinformation, including during the investigation. Of course a balance must be struck between therights of the next of kin and the public on the one hand, and the defendants’ rights on the other.But especially in a criminal trial during which disinformation is constantly being spread, placing aheavy strain on the next of kin, the shutters cannot be kept down much longer.We have to assume that further investigation in this case will not be completed before the end ofthis year. The consideration of the merits will therefore not begin until some point in 2021. In themeantime, the disinformation campaign will no doubt continue.And in the meantime, there are also ongoing proceedings against the Russian Federation, broughtbefore the ECtHR by next of kin. The Dutch government has announced it will intervene in thosecases. In those proceedings too, the Russian state has cast doubts on the evidence in the case file ofthe criminal trial. We have already discussed the allegations that visual material was manipulated.The next of kin have contacted us, asking how they are meant to respond to these allegations ifthey have no access to the case file. The Public Prosecution Service is authorised to disclosecriminal case information, but has been cautious in doing so, in the interest of due process. Wehope that we do not have to disclose information until that information has been discussed at apublic hearing. That way the court retains control of the case file. But the longer it takes before theStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 18 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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consideration of the merits can begin, the more compelling the interests in other proceedingsbecome. The next of kin will then have to be given the opportunity to refute any unjustifiedaccusations of manipulation of visual material before the ECtHR. They will have to be able toadduce information in those proceedings about the validation of intercepted telephoneconversations and the results of the extensive forensic investigation. If such subjects cannot bediscussed at the hearing in June, there is a reasonable chance that the Public Prosecution Servicewill have to consent to disclosing that information on the basis of requests by next of kin on thegrounds of section 39f, subsection 1 of the Judicial Data and Criminal Case Information Act.[12]This would be beyond the scope of the court.Lastly, there is the size and the complexity of the case file to consider. It contains informationabout how radar systems work, the capabilities of the Buk missile system, the forensicinvestigation and vast amounts of Ukrainian telecom data. In addition, it reports on the extensiveinvestigation by the JIT into scenarios other than the one named in the indictment: the possibilityof an explosion inside the aircraft, of an attack by a fighter aircraft and of a Buk missile fired fromUkrainian territory. These are all complex issues that must be discussed at the hearing but are notdirectly related to the defendants’ involvement.If we look at all of this in conjunction – the disinformation campaign, next of kin’s and broaderpublic’s right to information, the exceptional public interest in this case, the ongoing stateresponsibility procedures and the size of the case file – we believe there is reason to adopt a stagedapproach to this trial.By that we mean that the consideration of the merits should take place in several stage. Forinstance, the alternative scenarios that are not under discussion or the (technical) subjects withregard to which the investigation has already been completed could be discussed in terms of meritsat the hearings in June or September.If the defence agrees with the Public Prosecution Service that an explosion on board MH17 or anattack by a fighter aircraft can be ruled out, the court could already discuss those matters at thehearing. There would be nothing strange about that: these scenarios have previously been rejectedby the OVV, and the Russian Federation now appears to have abandoned them as well. By nowthere is even more objective evidence ruling out these scenarios: forensic evidence and primaryradar data. Or to put it another way: if the defence wanted to hear eyewitnesses of an attack by afighter aircraft, it would be the same as hearing a so-called eyewitness to a stabbing in a case wherethe victim had died of bullet wounds. So those alternative scenarios could be discussed at an earlierstage.The same goes for other subjects. If the defence agrees with the Public Prosecution Service thatevery possible forensic investigation has been conducted, or that no more investigation is neededinto radar data and the functioning of the TELAR, the court could already discuss theseinvestigation results. Even if the Public Prosecution Service and the defence were to disagree aboutthe interpretation of these investigation results, that would not preclude consideration of theStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 19 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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merits in this respects. The court can, for example, discuss which radar data has been sought afterby the Prosecution Service, which data has been received, and the expert analysis conducted inrelation to the data. This is all included in the case files. The court can present this factualinformation, or ask the Prosecution Service to elaborate on this information. Should the defenceand prosecution differ in their views on the evidential value of this radar data, this can be debatedduring later stages of this trial.An approach in stages is in the interests of progress in the proceedings and the right to informationof the next of kin and the wider public. It will put people’s minds at ease and provide clarity;without such a prior discussion the public will struggle to follow what is being discussed at thehearings. To our minds such a state of affairs is not reconcilable with the requirements of‘accessibility’ and ‘scrutiny’ which the ECtHR sets in cases like these.[13]It is also in the interests of the defendants and of the quality of the hearing. It will focus the debatebetween the Public Prosecution Service and the defence: the most important points will bediscussed last.It will also clamp down on the disinformation campaign. In so far as the court examines the casefile in stages, the public will be able to gain timely knowledge of the indications for variousscenarios and of incriminating or exculpatory evidence. On the basis of that information the publicwill be able to come to an informed opinion step by step.We therefore request the court to consider such an approach in stages, once it is known what thedefence’s course of action during the proceedings will be. The court could set a deadline before thenext pre-trial review hearing by which the Public Prosecution Service and the defence have to statein writing what they wish to have investigated in relation to the whole case file or at least partsthereof. On the basis of those wishes, the court could decide what subjects require furtherinvestigation and what subjects can already be discussed in the pre-trial review process. The courtcould consider examining certain subjects itself, or first inviting the Public Prosecution Service andthe defence to put forward their standpoints.Conclusion and applicationsIn the case against Pulatov we apply on the grounds of article 328 of the Code of CriminalProcedure for the following:1. that the hearing be moved to Gilze-Rijen Air Base for a viewing of the reconstruction of flightMH17, at a date to be determined by the court;2. referral to the examining magistrate of the following:a. the examination of witnesses M58, S07, S17, S21, S27 and S32 in a safe manner, to bedetermined by the examining magistrate;b. the composition of a video recording of the previous examination of witness M58, after theStatus of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 20 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
Annex 377
defence and the Public Prosecution Service have had the opportunity to express their wishes withregard to that composition;c. that an expert be requested to investigate:possible indications of manipulation of visual material with regard to two versions of the samevideo of the TELAR in Snizhne (included in the case file), partly in the light of the assertions by theRussian Federation;the contention that the version referred to by the Russian Federation of the same video mustalready have been uploaded on 16 July 2014 and hence must have been recorded before then;d. the setting of a deadline by which Pulatov’s counsel must comment, with reasons, regarding:Pulatov’s wish to be examined as a witness at the hearing or by the examining magistrate and hiswillingness to answer questions at that time;Pulatov’s (possible) disputing of one or more intercepted telephone conversations, of which theaudio files have been provided;e. the (possible) preparations for examining Pulatov as a witness;f. further decisions on:a possible objection by the defence to possible (partial) refusal by the Public Prosecution Service togive the defence access to documents that are not part of the case file; andpossible requests by the defence for translation of case documents.In addition we request that the court consider:3. in the case against Pulatov, setting a deadline in good time before the hearing in June by whichthe Public Prosecution Service and the defence state in writing what they wish to have investigatedin relation to the whole case file or at least parts thereof; and4. on the basis of those wishes, deciding which subjects can be discussed in terms of merits in thecases against Pulatov, Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko at the hearings in June and September.Footnotes[1] E.g. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 116, nr. 3, p. 3 (“De rechter heeft een zelfstandigeverantwoordelijkheid voor de deugdelijkheid, volledigheid en grondigheid van het onderzoek datonder zijn leiding plaats vindt. Hij dient daarbij “the best available evidence” na te streven.”) andKamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 271, nr. 1, p. 9.[2] E.g. https://euvsdisinfo.eu.[3] E.g. Kamerbrief Beleidsinzet bescherming democratie tegen desinformatie, 18 October 2019,https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/10/18/kamerbrief-over-Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 21 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
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beleidsinzet-bescherming-democratie-tegen-desinformatie.[4] https://ria.ru/20190121/1549650959.html. English translation at: https://sputniknews.com/interviews/201901211071672704-mh17-crash-jit-russian-prosecutor/?utm_source=https://t.co/7F1ipQFzqy&utm_medium=short_url&utm_content=k6vB&utm_campaign=URL_shortening.[5] Kamerbrief Beleidsinzet bescherming democratie tegen desinformatie, 18 October 2019, p. 5.At https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/10/18/kamerbrief-over-beleidsinzet-bescherming-democratie-tegen-desinformatie.[6] us4.campaign-archive.com/?e=&u=055d0542fc506a8c7b6067843&id=098c0bc601.[7] https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/10/04/mivd-verstoort-russische-cyberoperatie-bij-de-organisatie-voor-het-verbod-op-chemische-wapens.[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/minister-for-europe-statement-attempted-hacking-of-the-opcw-by-russian-military-intelligence.[9] volkskrant.nl/cs-b7cbc2fe.[10] ECHR, Al Nashiri against Poland (Nr. 28761/11 July 2014, at 495.[11] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the right to thetruth, E/CN.4/2006/91, para. 38 (8 February 2006).[12] E.g. Appeals Court The Hague, 23 November 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO4912, at4.1-4.7.[13] E.g. ECHR (grand chamber), Güzelyurtlu and Others tegen Cyprus and Turkije (Nr.36925/07), 29 January 2019, r.o. 219.Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - par...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 22 из 2207.03.2023, 16:32
Annex 378 Hromadske, Deadly “Friendly Fire”: Why 5 Policemen Were Killed in Knyazhychi (4 December 2016) (translation)

Annex 378
Translation
Hromadske, Deadly "Friendly Fire": Why 5 Policemen Were Killed in Knyazhychi (4 December
2016), available at: https://hromadske.ua/posts/specoperaciya-knyazhichi-vbivstvo-policeiskih.
Deadly "friendly fire": Why 5 policemen were killed in Knyazhychi
The prosecutor's office will investigate the shootout between law enforcement officers. The police
themselves will conduct an internal review
On the night of December 4, a shooting took place in the village of Knyazhychi near Kiev between
police officers, criminal investigation operatives, and members of the Rapid Operational Response
Unit (KORD) special forces. The shootout allegedly took place during a special operation to detain
a particularly dangerous gang of criminals. As a result of the "friendly fire", 5 people were killed:
two from the security police, two operatives and one KORD special forces officer. The media also
reported a sixth victim, but this information has not been confirmed. According to the National
Police, the perpetrators were directly related to law enforcement.
The press service of the Kiev regional prosecutor's office later reported on its website that KORD
officers were the first to open fire on their colleagues, and that the security police and criminal
investigation officers began to shoot back.
Advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs Anton Gerashchenko was the first to report the tragic
shooting. According to him, the Kiev Criminal Investigation Department was working to detain a
dangerous gang of robbers who had been systematically robbing homes in Kiev and Kiev region.
"That night, the Criminal Investigation officers received operational information that another
robbery could take place in the village of Knyazhychi. The detention team of the Criminal
Investigation and the KORD special forces went there. On a street in the village of Knyazhychi,
police scouts were stationed in a private house under construction, whose task was to monitor the
situation and give a command to detain the bandits," Gerashchenko wrote.
The minister's advisor claims that law enforcement officers planned to carry out a classic operation
to detain a gang of robbers. However, in one of the neighbouring houses "the burglar alarm went off
automatically". It was a country house at 22 Korneychuk Street. There is an unfinished building
next to it, where, according to Gerashchenko, the covert surveillance was conducted.
A unit of the state security service arrived at the scene, noticed and detained two police scouts.
"At the same time, the capture group apparently decided that the intelligence officers were in
trouble, captured by the criminals who had discovered them, and drove a minibus to the street
where the security police detained the police scouts," Gerashchenko wrote.
Then a shootout ensued between the security police officers and the capture group, which,
according to eyewitnesses, lasted less than a minute but took away five lives.
"There was a car, the lights were on and people were running. I heard about 20 to 30 seconds of
machine gun fire. After that I heard an explosion. They say it was a stun grenade. Later, I saw this
car (of the security police - ed.). I can't say that it was completely riddled with bullets, but the glass
Annex 378
was smashed," a local resident Sergey told "Hromadske". His house is located 100 meters away from the shooting scene. "It is possible that a stun grenade was used under the car to neutralise those who were in it - and these may have been criminals - as the KORD officers thought," Nikolay Zhukovych, a spokesman for the Kiev regional police department, told "Hromadske". At the same time, he did not answer whether the leadership of the security police knew about the special operation. "The security police received a signal about the alarm at 22 Korneychuk Street. After that, a group was sent. Whether they knew about the special operation or not will be the subject of investigation," he concluded. Photo from Facebook by Anton Gerashchenko Four of the five people killed in Knyazhychi were shot dead in a marked State Protection Service car, according to a spokesman for the Kiev regional police department. "There were police officers in the car, and it was shot. The police guarded it," Zhukovych said. Now it has been taken away by a tow truck. Thus, apparently, two officers of the State Guard and two intelligence officers were fatally wounded in the car. The fire was apparently from the KORD special forces. The robbers themselves, according to the Interior Ministry, heard the shooting and fled. They were detained on their way to Kiev. The police claim that the three robbers were traveling in two large Toyota Land Cruiser 200 jeeps. Artem Shevchenko, Director of the Communications Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, explained on "Hromadske" TV that the criminals were well trained and changed cars. "It was a very wellarmed and organised gang. They left in several cars, changing them," Shevchenko said. In the evening of December 4, acting head of the National Police Vadim Troyan said during a meeting with the president that the gang consisted of several people, including those already convicted of robbery and people who worked or were related to law enforcement agencies. However, Troyan did not specify which ones. The head of the National Police also reported that all members of the criminal gang had been detained. The operational video footage shows the aforementioned Toyota Land Cruiser jeeps, as well as many weapons. However, in a conversation with "Hromadske" journalists, law enforcement experts called the official version of the Ministry of Internal Affairs absurd. In particular, according to Denys Kobzin, director of the Kharkov Institute for Social Research, the information from Anton Gerashchenko "does not stand up to criticism" and was made public in order to hide the real circumstances of the tragic conflict between law enforcement officers. One of the most likely causes of the tragedy is the lack of coordination and proper interaction between law enforcement agencies during such special operations. The former head of the criminal police and now the head of the Zakarpatskaya Regional State Administration, Gennadiy Moskal, claims that the tragedy occurred because of the lack of coordinated actions between law enforcement agencies.
Annex 378
"Before the special operation, headquarters should have been set up to monitor the operation
around the clock and respond to calls that were not foreseen in the plan. This headquarters should
have known that an alarm went off in the house next door, and the security police arrived at the
scene. It should have immediately warned both the leadership of the security police that a special
operation of the criminal investigation was being prepared nearby and its operatives that the
security police would be on the scene. The Prosecutor General's Office should answer these
questions during the investigation of the tragedy, but I am 99.9 percent sure that there was neither
a plan for a special operation nor the headquarters itself!" Moskal wrote on Facebook.
According to him, now the security police are not subordinated to the Kiev regional police, which
was supposed to prepare the special operation, but are directly subordinated to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs:
"Therefore, when the security guards went to the house where the alarm went off, they did not know
that there were operatives waiting for armed bandits nearby. And the operatives did not know about
the security police," Moskal added.
At the same time, according to Vadym Bartenev, former commander of the "Titan" special police
unit, the security police should not have known about the special operation, as such events are held
in secret.
"When the criminal police conduct a special operation, they don't report it, and they shouldn't,
because it's a specific operation. They report only to their superiors. We live in such times that
information could leak out, even by accident. Of course, the criminals would know about it. That is
why such operations are conducted in secret. It was like that before, and it is like that now,"
explains the former "Titan" commander.
According to him, security police officers usually arrive in uniform and in cars with identification
marks. Therefore, the criminal police officers had to see them:
"I don't know who opened fire first, but when the criminal police officers were detained, they had to
introduce themselves and say that a special operation was being conducted here. It was not difficult
to contact the management, who would have confirmed that an operation was underway," Bartenev
said.
Who will be held responsible?
At present, the police leadership is trying not to disclose information about the causes and
consequences of the shooting, saying that the details of the tragedy will be made public after the
investigation. The prosecutor's office will investigate the shootout between law enforcement
officers. The police officers themselves will conduct an internal review, the results of which will be
submitted to the prosecutor's office for legal assessment. Several highprofile
statements have
already been made, including President Petr Poroshenko and Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko's
assurances that they are taking personal control of the investigation into the killing of the five police
officers.
The President expressed hope that the National Police and other law enforcement agencies will
draw appropriate conclusions that will prevent miscalculations in planning in the face of the
increased danger of robberies and the availability of a large number of weapons.

Annex 379
UNIAN, Kholodnytskyi Accuses Sytnyk of Using National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
for Revenge and “Satisfying His Own Complexes” (19 September 2018)
(translation)

Annex 379
Translation
UNIAN, Kholodnytskyi Accuses Sytnyk of Using National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine for
Revenge and “Satisfying His Own Complexes” (19 September 2018), available at:
https://www.unian.ua/politics/amp-10267230-holodnickiy-zvinuvativ-sitnika-u-vikoristanninabu-
zadlya-pomsti-ta-zadovolennya-vlasnih-kompleksiv.html.
Kholodnytskyi accuses Sytnyk of using National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine for revenge and "satisfying his own complexes»
UNIAN editorial office
The Specialized AntiCorruption
Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) emphasised that Artem Sytnyk's further
stay as the head of the bureau is incompatible with the tasks of the law enforcement agency.
Nazar Kholodnytskyi and Artem Sytnyk had a final row. / UNIAN
The director of the National AntiCorruption
Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Artem Sytnyk, is using the
agency under his control to take revenge and satisfy his complexes.
According to a UNIAN correspondent, the head of the Specialized AntiCorruption
Prosecutor's
Office, Nazar Kholodnytskyi, said this at a briefing on today's incident between NABU special forces
and SAPO employees.
"What the NABU director is doing, using it for his own revenge and to satisfy his own insignificant
complexes of the NABU as an institution, is unacceptable," said the head of the SAPO.
Annex 379
According to Kholodnytskyi, "NABU detectives often conduct investigations of poor quality," but he hopes that the SAPO will support the results of such investigations in courts. At the same time, he assured that the SAPO would not do this. "There is an ongoing attack on the SAPO, which does not allow to detain innocent people. We will make such facts public, as it is no longer possible to tolerate this," he said. Kholodnytskyi also criticised the work of NABU detectives as unprofessional: "And when they write works of art instead of evidence in suspicions, and then say that we are slowing down something, this is not the best way to show that we are fighting and everyone else is interfering. We approve all suspicions where there is sufficient data to approve them and will send such cases to court," summarised the SAPO head. Meanwhile, in a commentary posted on Facebook, the SAPO called on international partners "not to fall for Artem Sytnyk's provocations" and to provide an objective assessment of today's events. "Such a person's tenure as director of the NABU is incompatible with the tasks of the said law enforcement agency," the statement said. As UNIAN reported, today, September 19, Kholodnytskyi reported an attempt to install a wiretap in the SAPO office. He hinted that NABU might be behind it. In their turn, NABU representatives stated that they did not install bugging devices in the SAPO, and no one detained their employees for this. Later, the SAPO reported a conflict with NABU employees near its office after a new wiretap was found in the courtyard. According to the SAPO, NABU employees found illegally installed means of covertly collecting information in the courtyard of the prosecutor's office, after which the car was blocked by the National Police and the State Protection Department for urgent investigative and procedural actions. "In order to save the employees from exposure, from the detection of illegal and unregistered means of information gathering, Artem Sytnyk (NABU Director) used a law enforcement unit of the NABU, which, using firearms, used violence against law enforcement officers, damaged the property of citizens, preventing the conduct of investigative actions," the SAPO said. The prosecutor's office also reported that NABU employees ran over other law enforcement officers, causing bodily harm and damaging citizens' property.
Annex 380
Hromadske, Budanov about Denis Kireev's death: "He was killed in an SBU car"
(22 January 2023)
(translation)

Annex 380
Translation
Hromadske, Budanov about Denis Kireev's death: "He was killed in an SBU car" (22
January 2023), available at: https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/budanov-o-gibeli-denisakireeva-
byl-ubit-v-mashine-sbu.
Budanov about Denis Kireev's death: "He was killed in an SBU
car".
Banker Denis Kireev
Wikipedia
The head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine Kirill Budanov said that banker
Denis Kireev was killed in a car of the Security Service of Ukraine on March 5, 2022.
The GUR head said it in an interview with Radio Svoboda. "I share the opinion and believe the
facts that Mr. Kireev was killed in an SBU car when they (SBU officers ed.)
were on a task
related to him. This fact is recorded, it is in the materials of the investigation. Everything else is
investigated by the SBU. I have no right to comment on this information. The fact that he was
killed by officers in that car is a fact," Budanov said.
He added that Kireev was the SBU’s agent and was, according to Budanov, detained by
members of the SBU's Alfa special unit about 200 metres from the SBU headquarters.
Annex 380
‘The facts are as follows: a man who was on his way to the SBU building at the invitation of the SBU, is intercepted 200 metres from the building, taken a little further than that building, and then the corpse is thrown into the street. These are the facts,’ the intelligence chief noted. Budanov also said in an interview that he spoke with the then head of the SBU, Ivan Bakanov, afterwards, and it was ‘the last conversation with him,’ at which ‘he was unable to explain anything properly’ about Kireev's death. The head of the SBU said that he had sent Kireev to Gomel to negotiate with the Russian side in spring 2022 in order ‘to drag out the process and buy time, because Mr. Kireev personally knew two people from that negotiation process who represented the Russian side. According to the head of the intelligence service, he is sure that Kireev was not a spy and ‘no one expected such a reaction’ from SBU officers towards the SBU officer. We shall remind you that the advisor to the head of the presidential office, Mikhail Podolyak, earlier said that the death of banker Denis Kireev was due to poor coordination of the Ukrainian special services at the beginning of a fullscale Russian invasion. He stressed that Kireev was not a Russian agent. What is known about Kireev? The Wall Street Journal found out that Kireev had connections in Russian and Ukrainian business and financial sectors. According to the WSJ, Budanov became interested in these connections in 2021. In the spring of that year, when Russia began amassing troops on the border with Ukraine, Budanov suggested that Kireev cooperate with Ukrainian intelligence. He encouraged the banker to use his connections to infiltrate Russian military intelligence. ‘He had the necessary circle of acquaintances. Financial transactions were conducted through him. So he communicated with everyone, including very influential people,’ Budanov told reporters. According to the WSJ, Kireev agreed to cooperate. So the security team took Kireev to Kharkov, and from there the banker travelled to Russia with another intelligence officer. A few days later, Kireev returned and reported back to Budanov, according to intelligence sources. Kireev learned from his sources that Moscow was preparing for an invasion and told Budanov so. And on February 23, Kireev gave Budanov an update: Russian President Vladimir Putin had given the order for an invasion in the morning. At the start of the fullscale war, Kireev was involved in negotiations with the Russian side. According to the WSJ, the banker agreed to take part in the talks despite the fact that it was risky, as he had been maintaining ties in both Ukraine and Russia for some time. Ukrainian media quoted sources in early March 2022 as saying that Kireev was shot dead by the SBU during his detention. He was allegedly suspected of high treason. But there was no official proof of this. Subsequently, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry reported about three reconnaissance officers who had died while carrying out special tasks while defending Ukraine. Among them was Denis Kireev.
Annex 381
MK.ru, SBU: Slavyansk ‘people's mayor’ discussed with Russian GRU officer how to get rid of
MP Rybak's corpse (24 April 2014)
(translation)

Annex 381
Translation
MK.ru, SBU: Slavyansk ‘people's mayor’ discussed with Russian GRU officer how to get rid
of MP Rybak's corpse (24 April 2014), available at:
https://www.mk.ru/incident/article/2014/04/24/1019785-sbu-narodnyiy-mer-slavyanskaobsuzhdal-
s-ofitserom-gru-rf-kak-izbavitsya-ot-trupa-deputata-ryibaka.html.
SBU: Slavyansk ‘people's mayor’ discussed with Russian GRU
officer how to get rid of MP Rybak's corpse
Photo: AP
The Ukrainian security services have released an audio recording of a conversation about
a highprofile
murder.
In a recording provided by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the leader of the
Russian saboteurs asks the ‘people's mayor’ of Slavyansk to ‘deal with the dead body", to which
the mayor replies: ‘With the corpse? I’ll go right now and solve the issue of burying that
rooster.’ Besides, Lieutenant Colonel Bezler of the Russian GRU discusses the kidnapping of the
Gorlovka MP.
The SBU suspects the leader of the Donbass people's militia and Slavyansk ‘people's
mayor’ Vyacheslav Ponomaryov, Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Chief Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) Igor Bezler (personal callsign ‘Bes’) and GRU officer Igor Strelkov in direct
involvement in the recent brutal murder of Gorlovka city council member Vladimir Rybak.
To confirm its ‘suspicions’, the SBU released an audio recording of talks in which Ponomaryov,
Bezler and Strelkov discuss Rybak's murder. In particular, it can be heard how the ‘people's
mayor’ of Slavyansk discusses with the head of Russian saboteurs where to dispose of the
corpse. Strelkov asks Ponomaryov to ‘deal with the corpse’ (‘Slava, please deal with the corpse.
Take him away from us quickly. It lies around and stinks here’), to which he replies: ‘With the
corpse? I’ll go right now and solve the issue of burying that rooster.’ Besides, Lieutenant
Colonel Bezler of the Russian GRU discusses the kidnapping of the Gorlovka MP.
To remind, on 17 April, a local town council member from the Fatherland party Vladimir Rybak,
who had earlier torn the flag of the selfproclaimed
Donetsk people's republic from the building
of Gorlovka Town Council and was generally known for his sympathies for Maidan (he had
organized rallies ‘For United Ukraine’ in Gorlovka), was kidnapped in Donetsk Oblast.
According to a witness and CCTV footage, four men in camouflage and wearing masks forced
him into a car and drove him away in an unknown direction.
On 19 April, the bodies of the MP and another man were found in a river near the town of
Slavyansk. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the cause of the both
victims’ death is combined body injury due to torture, followed by the drowning of unconscious
victims who were still alive.
On 23 April, the SBU released the assumed version of the murder. According to the SBU,
Lieutenant Colonel Bezler of the Russian GRU instructed the head of the selfproclaimed
Annex 381
Gorlovka police to ‘neutralize’ Rybak. He ordered a Russian serviceman to kidnap the MP, put him in a car, take him to an agreed location and beat him up. Bezler planned to visit the place himself where the MP was being held. In his turn, ‘Strelok’ (Igor Strelkov) ordered to take Rybak to the separatists' headquarters in Slavyansk in order to talk to him personally. Later, Strelkov instructed the ‘people's mayor’ of Slavyansk Vyacheslav Ponomaryov to remove the body of the murdered Rybak from the headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian GRU Igor Bezler had appeared already in the Ukrainian media before. In mid-April, a video appeared on the Internet showing a man introducing himself as ‘a lieutenant colonel of the Russian army’, who was speaking to police officers after the Gorlovka department of the Interior Ministry had come under the control of the self-defence forces. Ukrainian media later recognized this man in camouflage as local resident Igor Bezler. As reported by the UNIAN news agency, citing the Donetsk portal Ostrov, earlier Bezler ‘was director of the Prostor undertaker’s bureau in Gorlovka, from which he was fired in 2012 for stealing 38 fences and monuments, as well as for extorting money from elderly people for a place in the cemetery. Meanwhile, according to the Internet portal URA-Inform, Bezler is indeed a retired lieutenant colonel, however not of the Russian but of the Ukrainian special forces.
Annex 382 Gazeta.ua, Farmer Was Kidnapped from His Car in the Middle of the Road (19 August 2016) (translation)

Annex 382
Translation
Gazeta.ua, Farmer Was Kidnapped from His Car in the Middle of the Road (19 August 2016),
available at: https://m.gazeta.ua/articles/np/_fermera-vikrali-z-mashini-posered-trasi/718318.
Farmer was kidnapped from his
car in the middle of the road
Vladimir Zorenko, 64, from the village of
Verbovatovka, Yurievsky district,
Dnepropetrovsk region, was abducted by
unknown persons in the middle of the highway.
His Hyundai jeep with the doors open was found on
the PavlogradLozova
highway. One shoe was lying
next to it. The man has a farm and volunteers to help
the military in the ATO.
This was told to Gazeta.ua by the wife of the
missing man, Tatiana Ivanovna.
"Around 10:00 p.m. on August 17, Volodya said he was going to check on the farm. He often went
to the tractor yard to check on the work of the tractor drivers. He was dressed in work clothes. He
got into his car and drove away. From there, he called his son and said he would be there in half an
hour. When he did not arrive, my son called back. The phone was already turned off. The head of
security at our farm went to look for Vladimir. Within a few minutes, he reported that he had found
the car. It was on the highway, near the turnoff to the farm," says Tatiana Ivanovna.
The family immediately called the police and filed a missing persons report. However, there has
been no news so far. The relatives themselves are considering several versions.
"There are constant raider attacks on our farm. We know who organises them, we have been suing
this man for years. A week ago, 40 people came with weapons, attacked the mechanised site, and
took the sprayer for the fields. The police did not react in any way. Another version is volunteer
activity. From the very beginning of the ATO, we have been helping the military with food and
clothing. And the third is an active civic position. He is a fighter for truth and justice. I think the
man came around a bend, saw a man lying on the road, stopped, and that's how he was kidnapped,"
the woman adds.
The villagers say that Zorenko is responsible for the village's development. He built 9 houses for his
workers, renovated the club and gym, built a fountain, and repaired the roads. So they are ready to
go in search of their fellow villager themselves.
Author: Anna BOVA

Annex 383 InterfaxUkraine, Farmer was robbed at night in Zaporozhskaya Oblast (8 August 2017) (translation)

Annex 383
Translation Interfax-Ukraine, Farmer was robbed at night in Zaporozhskaya Oblast (8 August 2017), available at: https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/440950.html. Farmer was robbed at night in Zaporozhskaya Oblast Interfax-Ukraine 05:32 08.08.2017 A farmer was robbed at night in Zaporozhskaya Oblast. In the village of Matveyevka, Volnyanka district, Zaporozhskaya Oblast, unidentified persons in balaclavas on the night of Monday broke into the house of a local farmer, tied up the owners and stole a safe with $500 thousand. ‘Around 1 a.m. on August 7, three masked intruders broke into the home of a farmer born in 1964. They tied him up, as well as his wife, and demanded to show them the place where they were hiding the money. The criminals took a safe from the house, which the landlady said contained $500,000 that the couple had accumulated over 20 years of farming,’ said Ekaterina Lyudvik, head of the Communications Department of the Chief Directorate of the National Police in Zaporozhskaya Oblast. She said that the criminals had fled the scene. Criminal proceedings have been opened under Article 187.4 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (robbery aimed at the theft of property on a large/very large scale, or committed by an organized group, or combined with inflicting grievous bodily harm.) An investigation is under way. According to fellow villagers of the robbed farmer, he had recently sold his rapeseed crop, and the criminals might have found out about the deal.

Annex 384
Hromadske, Odessa Tragedy: Why the Court Acquitted the “Anti-Maidan Activists”
(22 September 2017)
(translation)

Annex 384
Translation
Hromadske, Odessa Tragedy: Why the Court Acquitted the “Anti-Maidan Activists” (22
September 2017), available at: https://hromadske.ua/amp/posts/odeska-trahediia-sudvypravdav-
antymaidanivtsiv.
Odessa tragedy: Why the court acquitted the “anti-Maidan
activists”
On 18 September 2017, the court delivered the first verdict in the May 2 case. It only concerned the
episode in the area of Grecheskaya Square, where the first clashes occurred and six people died. All
19 defendants were acquitted.
"Pokos-8! Pokos-8! Help is needed! We were ambushed! I have four 200s. - Roger that! Hold out
for twenty minutes. The helicopter is on its way to you!"
This is the third time in half an hour that such a "ringtone" has been heard from the speaker of
Aleksandr Sukhanov's phone. "It's an army memorabilia. It's a radio interception of the 18th Special
Forces group of the Russian GRU, which was ambushed," he explains.
Sukhanov is one of 19 antiMaidan
activists accused of organising mass clashes on May 2 in the
center of Odessa. He is a former soldier of the Russian Internal Troops, a participant in the war in
Chechnya. He became a Ukrainian citizen in 2005. In the spring of 2014, he was the deputy
commandant of the antiMaidan
camp on Kulikovo Pole.
On May 2, 2014, massive clashes broke out between supporters of Euromaidan and representatives
of the antiMaidan
movement in the city center and on Kulikovo Pole. The result was a fire in the
Trade Union Building. That day, 48 people died and more than 200 were injured.
Sukhanov and a group of his "subordinates" were detained on the afternoon of May 2, 2014, in the
Athens shopping center, not far from the site of the confrontation. They were detained before the
events on Kulikovo Pole and the fire in the Trade Union Building. He spent the next year and a half
in a pretrial
detention center, then was released from custody to house arrest.
We are talking to Sukhanov in a forest on the outskirts of Odessa. It was here that some antiMaidan
protesters moved from the city center, namely Kulikove Pole, on 1 May 2014, the day
before the tragedy.
"If the court of appeal confirms the decision of the court of first instance, I plan to move to Russia. I
do not know what I will do there. I will definitely not go into politics," says Sukhanov.
Aleksandr Sukhanov is one of 19 antiMaidan
activists accused of organising mass clashes on May
2 in the center of Odessa.
The acquittal
On 18 September 2017, the court delivered the first verdict in the May 2 case. It concerned only the
episode in the area of Grecheskaya Square, where the first clashes occurred and six people died. All
19 defendants were acquitted.
The case was considered by the court of Chernomorsk (formerly Illichivsk). Odessabased
journalist Tatiana Gerasimova came to the hearings every morning.
Annex 384
"Every day there were new witnesses and documents. The judges organised the process in such a way that everything was continuous and consistent. Observers and participants in the trial could see with their own eyes the wretchedness of the prosecution," the journalist says. Together with her colleagues, Gerasimova created the May 2 Expert Group. For several years, they collected and processed photos and videos, talked to participants in those events, and conducted examinations. Last year, the group published a reconstruction film about the events of May 2, as well as the role of participants in the clashes from both the Euromaidan and antiMaidan sides. "The prosecutor's office has not proved anything of what they (the anti-Maidan protesters - ed.) were charged with. For example, that they seized the Athens shopping center, allegedly resisted the police, smashed cars, and threw stones," Gerasimova said. Odessa journalist Tatiana Gerasimova and her colleagues created the May 2 Expert Group in Odessa, which has been collecting and processing materials about the events of May 2 for several years, and created a reconstruction film. The acquittal of 19 defendants was announced in 4 hours. The court concluded that the investigation in the case was poorly conducted and pointed to a number of shortcomings and gaps in the investigative actions. For example, during the investigation, only one police officer out of those who were present on Grecheskaya Square was questioned. The court was also not satisfied with the photo and video materials provided by the prosecution. According to the court, the prosecutor's office could not confirm that the photos and videos depicted the defendants. Responsibility for the investigation Ruslan Forostiak, an advisor to the chief of police of Odessa region, is convinced that law enforcement officers should not be held responsible for the failed investigation. It is worth noting that in the spring of 2014, Forostiak was one of the leaders of the Odessa Euromaidan. "The case file and indictment were sent to court back in 2014. All this time they have been considered in courts. Therefore, I do not understand how today's police or today's prosecutors can have any responsibility for the assessment or quality of the investigation," Forostiak said. Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko said that the prosecution would appeal and demand a new trial in the court of first instance. "The court refused to accept, from our point of view, absolutely reasonable evidence of the involvement of individuals in the events in question - video of the events, testimony of witnesses who identify specific defendants, and the confession of one of those who was on the side of the Russian Spring and exposes like-minded people. But the court refused to accept all of this," Lutsenko said on September 20 during a speech in Dnepr, Ukrinform reports. The captain of separatism On September 18, as soon as the judges finished reading the verdict, representatives of the Security Service of Ukraine entered the courtroom and detained two acquitted antiMaidan activists Russian Yevgeny Mefyodov and Ukrainian Sergey Dolzhenkov, aka "Captain Cocoa," who was one of the leaders of the Odessa antiMaidan. The judges read out the acquittals of 19 accused antiMaidan activists, two of whom were immediately detained by the SBU Russian Yevgeny Mefyodov (bottom left) and Serhiy Dolzhenkov (bottom right): Mikhail Steckel/RadioSvoboda.org. They were both charged with separatism. At the same time, clashes broke out near the court building. Representatives of rightwing radical organisations fought with the National Guard.
Annex 384
"I wouldn't look for constructive things in these clashes. This fight is just an expression of
indignation of society," says Sternenko. At the time of the May 2 events, he was one of the leaders
of the Odessabased
Right Sector. Today, Sternenko positions himself as a public activist. He is
known for organising rallies against the performance of Russian stars in Odessa.
"Most of those in the dock are ordinary participants in the events. But Mefyodov and Dolzhenkov
are figures of higher importance. They (the anti-Maidan activists - ed.) and the others had to be
tried in different criminal proceedings," Sternenko explains.
Waiting for the appeal
The key question in the case of the events on Grecheskaya Street is who is to blame for the deaths
of six people? The investigation suspects Vitaliy Budko, nicknamed "Boatswain," on the part of the
antiMaidan
protesters. Video footage shows him firing a weapon that looks like a Kalashnikov
assault rifle. After the events of May 2, Budko fled Ukraine. It is not known exactly where he is
hiding.
There is also an accused in the shooting from the Euromaidan side, Sergey Khodiyak. According to
the investigation, a man resembling him fired from a balcony in the direction of the antiMaidan
participants on Grecheskaya Street. Since April 2015, the court has not started hearing the case on
the merits: either the judge recused himself or the prosecutor's office took the indictment back for
revision.
We tried to contact Khodiyak for a comment. But he refused to talk to us.
The acquitted antiMaidan
activists are now awaiting an appeal, which they believe should put an
end to their involvement in the May 2 tragedy.
Several other separate criminal cases are being investigated into the events of May 2. In particular,
the fire in the Trade Union Building on Kulikovo Pole, where 42 people died, as well as the case of
the former head of the Odessa regional police, Petr Lutsiuk, and his deputy for public security,
Dmitriy Fuchezhi.
The investigation is also looking into the inaction of rescuers in the first minutes of the fire in the
Trade Union Building, where former head of the Odessa regional Ministry of Emergency Situations
Vladimir Bodelan is accused.
Both Bodelan and Fuchezhi fled the country.

Annex 385 RIA Novosti, Investigative Committee reveals new details of investigation into Andrei Stenin's death (2 August 2017) (translation)

Annex 385
Translation RIA Novosti, Investigative Committee reveals new details of investigation into Andrei Stenin's death (2 August 2017), available at: https://ria.ru/20170802/1499592355.html. Investigative Committee reveals new details of investigation into Andrei Stenin's death MOSCOW, 2 Aug - RIA Novosti. The Investigative Committee has revealed details of the investigation into the murder of Russia Today photo correspondent Andrei Stenin, who died in August 2014 while on a business trip to Donbass. The evening of his death Andrei Stenin's last war As the investigation established, in the evening of August 6 the photo correspondent was driving a Renault Logan as part of a convoy of refugees along the SnezhnoyeDmitrovka road. To the northwest of Dmitrovka, the Ukrainian military, presumably the 79th Aeromobile Brigade, opened fire on the convoy using IFVs and a tank. ‘More than ten vehicles carrying civilians were destroyed as a result of the shelling. Several people managed to escape and hide in the roadside woodland,’ Svetlana Petrenko, the agency's spokeswoman, told RIA Novosti. After the shooting, the attackers inspected the cars and then purposely burned them down to hide traces of the mass shooting of civilians. ‘Not only did they inspect the destroyed cars and bodies of the dead, but according to eyewitnesses, they also loaded things from the destroyed cars into their vehicles and searched the bodies of the dead,’ Petrenko added.

Annex 386
Fishki.net, Ukraine draws in BUK missile defence systems to Donetsk Oblast (8 March 2014)
(translation)

Annex 386
Translation Fishki.net, Ukraine draws in BUK missile defence systems to Donetsk Oblast (8 March 2014), available at: https://fishki.net/1249959-ukraina-podtjagivaet-v-doneckuju-oblast-zrk--buk.html. Ukraine draws in BUK missile defence systems to Donetsk Oblast George Bush 8 March 2014 20:36 A resident of Gorlovka, on his way to work in Soledar, encountered an entire column of military machines. The description of the video shows that the man met the convoy at around 4am near the KNAUF plant in Soledar.
Annex 386
According to experts, they are Buk surface-to-air missile systems. To note, those are the same systems that successfully shot down several Russian planes in Georgia in 2008. At the same time… The Ukrainian 95th Airmobile Brigade stationed in Zhytomyr is leaving its permanent base in full alert today, and is likely headed to Crimea. Video footage published on the Internet captures military equipment and soldiers leaving the base. ‘There were about 200 vehicles and 50 APCs, and this is just the beginning,’ eyewitnesses note. PS: Talked to a friend from Zhytomyr from 95th, and he said: ‘We will not surrender Crimea!’
Annex 387
UNIAN, The Ukrainian air forces receive reconditioned Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system
(photo) (6 June 2014)
(translation)

Annex 387
Translation
UNIAN, The Ukrainian air forces receive reconditioned Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system
(photo) (6 June 2014), available at: https://www.unian.net/army/926317-vozdushnyie-silyiukrainyi-
poluchili-otremontirovannyiy-zenitnyiy-raketnyiy-kompleks-buk-m1-foto.html.
The Ukrainian air forces receive reconditioned Buk-M1 antiaircraft
missile system (photo)
UNIAN
The reconditioned Buk-M1 / Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
A commission comprising representatives of the antiaircraft
missile forces of the Air Force of
Ukraine, the Scientific Centre of Kharkov Air Force University, specialists of the military unit
where it will be deployed, and the repair enterprise have completed an operational check of the
repaired machine.
The Air Force Command noted that BukM1
was the latest antiaircraft
missile system of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces that had been mastered at Ukroboronprom repair enterprises. The
difficulty was that, unlike many other weapons and pieces military equipment, antiaircraft
missile systems of that type had never before been developed, produced or repaired in Ukraine.
Annex 387
Buk-M1 was never developed or repaired in Ukraine before / Ministry of Defence of Ukraine ‘In the near future the first BukM1 antiaircraft missile system repaired in Ukraine will be put on combat duty,’ reported Major General Dmitry Karpenko, Head of AntiAircraft Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. ‘The signing of the acceptance act shows that the domestic enterprise has mastered the repair of antiaircraft missile systems of this type.’ Combat-ready Buk-M1 / Ukrainian Ministry of Defence
Annex 388
UNIAN, Ukraine's first reconditioned Buk-M1 SAMS tested in Khmelnytchyna (27 June 2014)
(translation)

Annex 388
Translation
UNIAN, Ukraine's first reconditioned Buk-M1 SAMS tested in Khmelnytchyna (27 June
2014), available at: https://www.unian.net/army/933846-na-hmelnitchine-ispyityivayutpervyiy-
otremontirovannyiy-v-ukraine-zrk-buk-m1.html.
Ukraine's first reconditioned Buk-M1 SAMS tested in
Khmelnytchyna
17:22, 27.06.14
Buk-M1 is being tested / Ministry of Defence
These SAMS are among the latest models of weapons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, repair of
which was mastered by Ukroboronprom. The difficulty was that, unlike many other types of
armaments and military equipment, those types of SAMS had never been developed or repaired
in Ukraine. The repair of antiaircraft
missile systems in Ukraine prompted specialists of
Ukroboronprom to carry out not only the organization of repair work. Key electronic
components of such complexes are now manufactured only in Russia, or are not manufactured at
all. Ukroboronservis has successfully dealt with the task and in cooperation with partners and
supplires mastered the repair not only of chassis, but also of hightech
units and assemblies.
Specialists of the state enterprise carried out a complex set of works to replace such units with
similar ones produced in Ukraine.
‘The equipment is in fully serviceable condition, the repair has been carried out with high
quality, at a sufficiently high level,’ said the deputy commander of the unit for armament.
The Regiment's Acting Commander emphasized that after completion of the acceptance tests the
reconditioned BukM1
SAMS will be ready for combat duty in the antiaircraft
defence system
of the state.

Annex 389
Dutch National Police Crime Squad, Official Report Concerning the Buk SurfacetoAir
Missile
System, 7 October 2019

Annex 389
Annex 389
Annex 389
Annex 389
Annex 390
JIT, Transcript of press conference JIT MH17, 8 February 2023

Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12 Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023
read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa… 1/15
1. Home
2. Topics
3. Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023
On this page you can read the full transcript of the press conference of the JIT MH17, held in
The Hague on February 8th, 2023, including the media that was presented.
Good morning,
We are meeting here today to update you, possibly for the last time, about the criminal
investigation into the downing of flight MH17. This summer it will be nine years since 298
passengers lost their lives. As in previous years, we stand here together as members of the Joint
Investigation Team (JIT). We would like to thank Eurojust, as the JIT’s dedicated partner, for
facilitating this event.
In 2016 and 2018 we told you about how the MH17 disaster came about, and in 2019 we explained
that three Russians and a Ukrainian were suspected of being responsible for the downing of the
aircraft. In July 2014 these men were military leaders of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic,
the DPR. On 9 March 2020 the criminal trial of these four defendants began in the Netherlands. On
17 November 2022 The Hague District Court found three of them – Igor Girkin, Sergei Dubinskiy
and Leonid Kharchenko – guilty of downing flight MH17, resulting in the deaths of all 298 persons
on board, and the murders of those persons. The court sentenced the three men to life in prison. The
fourth defendant, Oleg Pulatov, was acquitted. No appeal was lodged against these judgments.
In addition to considering the culpability of members of the DPR, the JIT conducted a wideranging
investigation into the crew of the Buk TELAR and the parties responsible for providing the
weapon. To this end the investigation team issued various witness appeals, and in 2021 it launched
a media and letter campaign, aimed at residents of Kursk and members of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade (AAMB). Various witnesses were interviewed, including members of the 53rd
AAMB. In addition, the team reviewed a large number of intercepted phone conversations and
other telecom data. It also investigated satellite images, gathered information about military radar
systems, conducted covert investigative activities with the authorisation of the examining
magistrate, and examined both public and classified sources in depth. The JIT also received
information from the European Space Agency and the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and
Security Service (MIVD).
The investigation has now reached its limit: all leads have been exhausted. The investigation is
therefore being suspended. At the present time the findings are insufficient for the prosecution of
new suspects. We will be making the findings of the investigation public. That is the purpose of the
presentation for the next of kin, this press conference, and the report that will be published today. In
this way we are complying with our national and international obligations to keep both the next of
kin and the public at large informed. This information may also be relevant to the ongoing state
responsibility proceedings.
We will now present a summary of the report. We will be sharing the main findings of the
investigation into the crew, their superiors and the parties responsible for providing and deploying
the Buk TELAR. For reasons of security and privacy, we are not able to release all the information
uncovered in the investigation. This decision is also motivated by the possibility of further
investigation and future prosecutions. We will not be mentioning any individuals by name, except
Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8
February 2023
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…2/15for public figures or in cases where the relevant names have already been made public. All of themshould be considered innocent until a court finds that the reverse has been proven. We will start with the further investigation into the origin of the Buk TELAR that was used to shootdown MH17 and the crew members and their superiors. We will then discuss those responsible forsupplying the weapon system, and finally we will turn our attention to the parties involved in thedeployment of the Buk TELAR.This presentation is based on the facts established by the court in its judgment of 17 November.Specifically, the court held that:as of mid-May 2014, the Russian authorities exerted far-reaching control over theconflict being waged by the DPR;the Buk TELAR used to shoot down MH17 came from the Russian Federation,complete with a crew;everyone who made a contribution to the deployment of the Buk TELAR bearsresponsibility for the downing of MH17;the exact actions of the crew during the launch of the Buk missile at MH17 areunknown, nor is it known who gave the order to fire; to this day, the Russian authorities continue to deny any involvement in the conflict ineastern Ukraine and they have presented falsified evidence on multiple occasions. The court also concluded that the images of the Buk TELAR captured in Ukraine on 17 and 18 July2014 are authentic. As a result, they could be used for identification purposes. As the JIT haspreviously explained, this Buk TELAR has 15 specific features. A Buk TELAR with the samefeatures was found to be part of a Russian military convoy, originating in Kursk, which followed asoutherly route along the Russian-Ukrainian border from 23 to 25 June 2014. We call it BukTELAR ‘3X2’ because of the markings on its left side. The JIT was able to establish that thisweapon system was from the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk. Characteristics Buk TELARIn order to determine why flight MH17 was shot down, an investigation was conducted into theidentity of the crew and their superiors. After all, they should be able to answer that question. Acomplicating factor was the absence of any telecommunications involving the crew. The telephonenumber which the court attributed to a crew member was active in Ukraine only on 17 July. Thisnumber was not tapped, nor was it in contact with any numbers that were tapped. This is why we first looked at the composition and organisation of the 53rd Brigade, which consistsof approximately 700 people: conscripts, contract soldiers and officers. In 2014 the 53rd AAMBconsisted of a staff and communications company, a technical support company and three
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…3/15operational battalions. Each battalion has a full Buk system consisting of 11 Buk vehicles: acommand vehicle, a radar vehicle, three launch vehicles without radar (the TELL), and six launchvehicles with radar (the TELAR). A battalion is led by a commander and his deputy, and has itsown staff. Each battalion is divided into three companies. A company consists of two TELARs andone TELL. BattalionCompanyAs the court established, MH17 was shot down by a Buk TELAR. Generally, the crew of thisweapon system consists of four personnel: a commander, a first and second operator and a driver.The commander is in charge of the vehicle and communicates with the battalion or brigadecommand. He is the only person on board who is authorised to launch a missile. In 2014, Colonel Sergei Muchkaev was in charge of the 53rd Brigade. According to Russianmilitary law, as commander he was responsible for carrying out operational missions and keepingtrack of his units’ position. At that time Muchkaev was under the command of the Chief of theGeneral Staff of the Russian armed forces and the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu.Both are subordinate to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimin Putin.That concludes the matter of formal authority, which is not necessarily the same thing as de factocontrol over the deployment of the Buk TELAR. We will return to this point later. We will begin byfocusing on various deployments of the 53rd AAMB in the summer of 2014. With the help of
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…4/15transport orders found in electronic mailboxes of several individuals, including officers of the 53rdAAMB, we were able to gain insight into the movement of equipment and personnel from theBrigade’s base to the border region with Ukraine, at three points in time: from 23 June, 15 July and19 July 2014. In late September 2014, equipment and personnel were transported back to Kursk.Buk-TELAR ‘3X2’ was part of the first convoy, which left on 23 June. The orders revealed that thisconvoy took two days to travel to its final destination at the Ukrainian border. Near that location,the Buk TELAR and its crew were picked up in the early hours of 17 July 2014. The next day theywere handed over at that same location.53rd AAMB Route 1st convoy 23-25 June 2014There is a great deal of photo and video footage of this convoy of 23 June. The route described inthe orders matches the route shown in this visual material. And the number plates listed in theorders also match the number plates on these images. These images also show six Buk TELARs,complete with vehicle numbers. One of them is Buk TELAR ‘3X2’. The other identifiable Bukvehicles each have a vehicle number beginning with ‘2’. The first digit of the vehicle number refersto the battalion. This means that Buk-TELAR ‘3X2’ came from the 3rd battalion, whereas the otherBuk vehicles came from the 2nd battalion. License platesThe orders contain no information about the objective of the deployment near the Ukrainian border.A document from 2017 from the commander of the 53rd AAMB refers to ‘strategic exercises onunknown terrain’ in 2014.
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…5/15On 17 July 2014, the Buk TELAR that shot down MH17 was captured on film multiple times. Thisvisual material reflects what was discussed in intercepted telephone conversations. Images of theTELAR helped shed light on the involvement of Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko. The lastimage of the Buk TELAR was captured on the morning of 18 July, in Luhansk.Last recordings Buk TELARSince images of the TELAR could also shed light on its crew, the investigation also looked intohow the TELAR was transported after being returned to Russia: by rail, by road or by air. Noindications were found that would point to rail transport. The JIT does, however, have a satellitephoto from 20 July taken in the vicinity of Millerovo which shows a single covered vehicle on alow loader. You see that image on the left. The shape and dimensions of this covered vehicle areconsistent with the covered vehicles that were observed on a satellite image of the 53rd AAMB’sbase shortly before the departure of the 1st battalion. You see that image on the right.Sattelite imagesIn addition, on 20 July a photo was posted to social media of a covered Buk TELAR on a truck.This truck was also part of the convoy in June that included TELAR ‘3X2’. It could not bedetermined if one of the images just shown includes TELAR ‘3X2’.
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…6/15Covered Buk TELARThe investigation into the TELAR’s possible removal by air determined that on the morning of 18July two Ilyushin Il-76s were on stand-by at the nearby military airfield in Rostov-on-Don. An Il-76 is capable of transporting a TELAR. A day later only one of these aircraft was observed there. Itwas not possible to determine what happened to the other one and whether it was used to disposeTELAR ‘3x2’. At various points on 18 July, starting at 06:08, an Il-76 was observed at the Kurskmilitary airfield, always seemingly at the same spot.Ilyushin 76In any case the Ilyushin sitting at this airfield at 06:08 could not be the one from Rostov-on-Donthat transported the Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ to Kursk: the ‘3X2’ crossed the border around 06.00 andthus could not have been flown to Kursk by 06:08. It could not be determined for certain if theTELAR ‘3X2’ was transported by air.In summary, the investigation was unable to establish what happened to the TELAR after it arrivedin Russia. This brings us to the crew. The orders concerning the first convoy, which included Buk TELAR‘3X2’, contain no information about the accompanying crew. Documents from the second convoyshow that as of 15 July at least 193 military personnel belonging to the 53rd were deployed to thesame border region. They must have arrived there before Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ crossed the border on
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…7/1517 July, and for that reason they were included in the investigation of the crew. These 193individuals were mentioned by name. Most belonged to the 1st battalion, while a smaller numberwere part of the 2nd and 3rd battalions. These include members of the staff, such as Commander Muchkaev. Although it is plausible thatMuchkaev knew about his brigade’s deployment of the Buk TELAR by virtue of his position, thereare no concrete indications of this. Nor is there any telecom data. It is not possible to confirmMuchkaev’s presence in the border region around the time of the downing of MH17. It was notpossible to question him during the criminal proceedings because Russia would not allow it.All military personnel of the 53rd AAMB for whom there were indications that they may have beenin the border region when the Buk TELAR was deployed were investigated further. Of that number,35 officers were considered capable, on the basis of their rank and position, of operating a BukTELAR. Seven other soldiers were found to have worked as a Buk TELAR operator or as thedriver of a Buk vehicle. These findings do not, however, rule out the possibility that there wereother officers with the same skills, or operators or drivers, in the border region.In the course of the investigation a number of current and former members of the 53rd AAMB weretracked down and examined. Those individuals also provided information without knowing that itwould end up in the hands of the investigation team. This was the only reason that several of themstated that they had been in Ukraine in the summer of 2014 during their time with the 53rd AAMB.Investigators were unable to confirm this information through direct questioning. One of them saidthat he was very afraid and unwilling to take any more risks. He was unwilling or unable to sayanything about the crew. There are also chat records involving (former) members of the 53rd AAMB, which point to thepresence of a number of military personnel of the 3rd battalion in the Russian-Ukrainian borderregion in July 2014. They reportedly left separately for a secret destination. These unnamedcontract soldiers were under the command of an officer who was mentioned by rank and name. Theinvestigation revealed the identity of this officer. At the time he was a member of the personal staffof the brigade commander Muchkaev. It could not be determined whether this officer was presentin the border region on 17 July 2014. Notably, this officer appears in photos on social media after17 July wearing two military decorations: one for the development of, and combat operations with,a Buk system, and another for extraordinary service with the Russian security service FSB.Information provided by a witness points in another direction. This witness said to have heard fromsomeone in the Russian army that four people attached to the 53rd AAMB were involved in thedowning of the Boeing. These four comprised the crew of the Buk. The witness in questionmentions two names. The examining magistrate investigated the witness and determined, on thebasis of his or her position, that he or she would have been capable of obtaining this information.The two names given match those of two officers of the 53rd AAMB. It has been established that atleast one of them was deployed in the border region in the summer of 2014. Both were members ofthe 2nd company of the 2nd battalion. In an information report by the SBU, one of the officers named by the witness was mentioned as acrew member who had gone drinking with the separatist Tsemakh after the downing of MH17. Awitness confirmed this, but did not name the crew member in question. Tsemakh was examined bythe JIT on multiple occasions. He disputes having had any contact with the crew, and denies anyinvolvement in the downing of MH17. The investigation yielded insufficient indications pointing toTsemakh’s criminal involvement. In summary, a total of three names of officers emerge who may have been involved in the downingof MH17. However, to date the investigation has not been able to find any further confirmation ofthis. The Russian authorities have refused to answer any questions about the crew, as they maintainthat there was never any Russian Buk TELAR in eastern Ukraine.
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08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…8/15Finally, on 17 July and 25 September 2022 names and photos circulated on Twitter concerning fourmembers of the 2nd battalion who were said to have shot down MH17. The investigation teamobtained the information that formed the basis of these tweets. This includes a 2015 personnel listfor the 53rd AAMB, which was already known to the JIT, and passport information. On the basis ofthis information and the findings of its own investigation, the JIT concluded that there were noindications that these four individuals were involved in the downing of MH17. We will now consider how the Buk TELAR was supplied to the DPR. The court has establishedthat as of mid-May 2014 the Russian Federation and Ukraine were involved in an internationalarmed conflict in eastern Ukraine because the Russian authorities had overall control over thefighting in the DPR. DPR leaders were in close contact with the Russian Presidential ExecutiveOffice, Kremlin advisers and the Russian intelligence services. Staff members of these governmentbodies also came up in the JIT’s investigation into the decision-making process about the provisionof the Buk TELAR to the DPR. The main source for this is telecom data involving both interceptedphone conversations from the case file and new conversations. A number of conversations arementioned in the report, and we will play excerpts from them shortly.We will discuss the findings of the investigation in chronological order, starting with the arrival ofthe Russians Girkin and Borodai in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014, in the immediate wake ofthe establishment of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (the DPR). On 12 April Girkin crossed intoUkraine from Crimea and was appointed ‘Minister of Defence’. He was followed a short time laterby Borodai, who was given the role of ‘Prime Minister’ of the DPR. Both men had previously beeninvolved in the annexation of Crimea, by their own account as advisers of the Russian SergeiAksyonov, the so-called prime minister of Crimea. While in Ukraine Borodai and Girkin stayed incontact with Aksyonov. In June 2014 there was heavy fighting between the Ukrainian army and troops of the DPR andother separatists of the Luhansk People’s Republic (the LPR). During this fighting both the DPRand LPR requested heavier weaponry, including better anti-aircraft systems. For example, Plotnitskiy, the so-called defense minister of the LPR, speaks in Russia in June 2014with the military intelligence service GRU and asks for heavier air defense weapons to beprovided. Girkin, the minister of defense of the DPR, makes the same request. When his headquarters inSlavyansk, came under fire in early June 2014, Girkin told Aksyonov that they needed ‘decent anti-aircraft systems with trained personnel’. The investigation carried out shows that from the second half of July 2014 several Buk-TELARshave been delivered to the separatists, including the Buk-TELAR that shot down flight MH17. The investigation was able to shed some light on Russian decision-making process regarding thedelivery of heavier anti-aircraft systems to the separatists.When Girkin requested for ‘decent anti-aircraft systems with trained personnel’, Aksyonov repliedto Girkin that on Tuesday he was where he needed to be given the situation, that a jointcoordination centre had been set up, and that the necessary documents for the support were alreadybeing drawn up. He said that he still needed to wait because ‘they’ were in different places andwould be away for two days. It is known from another conversation that Aksyonov was in Sochi on Tuesday 3 June. Accordingto the Kremlin, Putin was there on that day as well. On 5 and 6 June, Putin was in France for the D-Day commemoration, together with various world leaders.
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08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-februa…9/15D-Day CommemorationIn a conversation of 7 June, Aksyonov’s assistant mentioned that the decision to provide supporthad been postponed by a week because there was only one person who could make that decision:not a general or Minister of Defence, but the person who was directly accountable to the peopleand who was currently at a summit in France. We will now play a part of this conversation. Press conference - Joint IPress I……Voice recording‘Sh…defence minister’ would appear to refer to Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defence. The next day, Aksyonov’s aide took part in a similar conversation, in which he said that his bossesneeded another week because there was only one person who could make that decision and whowas responsible, and he was in France. We will now play a part of that conversation. Press conference - Joint IPress I……Voice recordingIn the second half of June 2014, Aksyonov and the deputy head of the GRU, Alexei Dyumin,requested a political decision on providing the ‘people’s Army’ in Donbas with heavier anti-aircraftsystems, such as an S-200 or Buk system. This happened at a meeting at the Presidential ExecutiveOffice in Moscow. The Presidential Executive Office is a state body that assists the Russianpresident; it played an active role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014. The request byAksyonov and Dyumin was supported by Vladislav Surkov, an adviser to Putin, and Konstantin
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-febru…10/15Malofeev, an oligarch who was involved in the annexation of Crimea. A contributing factor in thisregard is that separatists had previously shot down a large military transport aircraft. Following thatincident, the Ukraine armed forces had started flying at higher altitudes. This was why theseparatists needed air defences with a greater range. At this meeting at the Presidential Executive Office a written resolution was adopted to submit therequest for heavier anti-aircraft systems to Shoigu and President Putin. The request was granted. Itis not known if a Buk system was specifically mentioned in this request.The investigation showed that the aforementioned meeting at the Presidential Executive Office, inwhich the participants discussed providing heavier anti-aircraft systems to the DPR, must havetaken place between 14 and 30 June 2014. In that period, i.e. from 14 to 19 June, Borodai was inMoscow, as was the separatist Fominov. During their time in Moscow, both Borodai and Fominovspoke in intercepted conversations about meetings and discussions, including a big meeting on 19June, which revolved around support, believed to be of a military nature, and which was ultimatelygranted. In a closed meeting with members of the Duma on 19 June, Shoigu reported that the armed forceswere ready to carry out any task given by ‘the leadership of the country and the commander-in-chief’, in other words: by Putin. According to the Kremlin, that evening the Russian SecurityCouncil held a meeting on ‘the situation in southeastern Ukraine’. It is not known if the subject of aheavier anti-aircraft system, such as a Buk, was discussed. In any event, a short time later, heaviermilitary materiel, including tanks, was delivered. And on 23 June a large military convoy departed for the Ukrainian border, including the BukTELAR which was used to shoot down MH17 on 17 July. To this day, it has not been establishedwhether a decision had already been made before the departure of the convoy about supplying thisBuk TELAR to the DPR, or whether this decision was not made until later.At that time, Surkov, a key adviser of Putin’s, worked at the Presidential Executive Office, wherethe meeting about air support was held. He is believed to have been put in charge of Donbas affairsin July 2014. According to Girkin, Surkov had the ‘tactical command’ and ‘managed’ ‘the situationin Ukraine in his capacity as adviser to Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin]’. In an interview, Borodaisaid that Surkov was the most senior Russian official involved in the matter and that Surkov, asaide to the president, reported directly, and on a regular basis, to Putin. Borodai’s phone datarevealed that he was in contact with Surkov nearly every day – and sometimes multiple times a day– except when he, Borodai, was in Moscow. In intercepted telephone conversations, Surkovcoordinated a variety of issues with Borodai, such as the encirclement of Slavyansk, theestablishment of an additional security service, payments and the intransigent attitude of a DPRcommander. In addition, when Borodai sought to coordinate with Moscow about the delivery ofrefrigerated rail containers containing the bodies of the victims and the black boxes from MH17,his first point of contact was Surkov.This brings us to the position of President Putin. As we have noted, intercepted conversationsrevealed that the decision about whether to provide military support lay with Putin. There is alsospecific information showing that a request to supply the separatists with heavier anti-aircraftsystems was submitted to Putin and that the request was granted. Other sources as well point to thepresident’s personal involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, mainly in a behind-the-scenescapacity. For example, although on 24 June 2014 Putin publicly asked the Russian FederationCouncil to rescind the resolution that gave him the authority to conduct a military intervention inUkraine, it remained abundantly clear to the DPR that the Russian president was still involved inthe conflict. There are also indications that Putin wished to be briefed in detail about the course ofthe conflict, for example the downing of a Ukrainian helicopter. The Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk also passed on messages from the president withinstructions that the DPR must respect a ceasefire. Medvedchuk also spoke with Borodai about anupcoming prisoner swap, in his own words ‘at the request of the president’.
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-febru…11/15Later, Medvedchuk was mentioned by Putin himself in a conversation with Plotnitskiy, at that timethe so-called prime minister of the LPR. On 15 November 2017 Putin was personally briefed by Plotnitskyi about the ‘military component’ and asked him about Medvedchuk’s ‘initiative’ for aprisoner exchange. We will now play the entire conversation. Press conference - Joint IPress I……Voice recordingThis conversation from 2017 is in keeping with the findings of late June 2014, which showed thatPutin was personally involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. It is also in keeping with a witnessstatement to the effect that the same individual, Plotnitskiy, carried an encrypted phone containingdirect numbers for President Putin. As the JIT repeatedly discovered, not everyone was equallydisciplined when it came to security of communications. That concludes the matter of supplying the Buk TELAR. The JIT previously also conducted aninvestigation into the parties responsible for the deployment of that Buk TELAR on 17 July 2014.Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko have already been convicted, but the investigation has looked atother individuals as well. One of them is the aforementioned Borodai. Beginning on 6 July 2014, over a week after the arrival of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ at the border,changes were made to the military and political structure of the DPR. Russian generals were sent toeastern Ukraine for the purpose of forming a joint staff for coordinating the military operations ofthe DPR and LPR. It remains unclear how much actual influence they exerted in July 2014. Girkinhas said that he did not receive any instructions from this staff. In the run-up to the offensive south of Snizhne, Girkin regularly conferred with ‘Moscow’. Duringthis period, as well as in June and August, Borodai was in almost daily contact with someone hedescribed to others as ‘the commander of this operation’ and ‘the one who makes all the decisions’.This person has been identified by the investigation team as Andrei Burlaka, an FSB general whowas first deputy to the head of the FSB Border Service. The investigation showed that in variouscases Burlaka gave orders to Borodai and was directly involved, from the Russian Federation, ininternal DPR affairs. Burlaka also gave direct instructions to subordinates of Girkin’s, which Girkinfor his part accepted. Burlaka also appeared to have information about the military deployment ineastern Ukraine. For example, on 16 July, Borodai called Burlaka and asked him if it was possiblethat ‘our helicopters’ were carrying out an attack in the vicinity of ‘Maryinka’. At that pointBurlaka asked Borodai to turn on the phone’s encryption mode, as he would always do when thelatter called him. We will now play that conversation. Press conference - Joint IPress I……Voice recordingFrom 14 July there was heavy fighting south of Snizhne between the Ukrainian troops and theDPR. The court has established that the Buk TELAR was deployed in the context of this fighting.
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-febru…12/15The planning and execution of this DPR offensive were in the hands of Girkin, Dubinskiy, Pulatovand Kharchenko, among others. Borodai was also present and was briefed on the DPR’s militaryprogress during the fighting. There are no indications that Borodai was personally overseeingcombat operations. When the offensive stalled and the DPR fighters came under fire, a request was made for a Buksystem and that request was granted. When the Buk TELAR was brought into Donetsk on themorning of 17 July, Dubinskiy made arrangements for its deployment. At that moment Borodai andGirkin were also at DPR headquarters. The investigation team was unable to determine whetherBorodai was aware at that time of the availability of this Buk TELAR. Borodai did, however, speakto Burlaka on the phone more than 20 times on 17 July. Because these calls took place onencrypted telephones, the substance of the conversations is unknown. No conversations involvingBorodai or Burlaka about the downing of MH17, or the request for, delivery or removal of the BukTELAR were intercepted. Nor is there any evidence that Borodai was in the vicinity of Girkin andDubinskiy when they were dealing with the removal of the Buk. Now we will talk about the opportunities for investigation and prosecution. The JIT’s investigationhas reached its limits. As things now stand, this leads to the following conclusions:All relevant and available telecom data has now been analysed. The JIT has investigated everythingit can without the cooperation of the Russian authorities and without jeopardising people’s safety.Any further evidence must be sought in the Russian Federation. And for this the JIT is dependenton the cooperation of the Russian authorities or Russian (insider) witnesses. Such witnesses cannotspeak freely and would expose themselves to major security risks if they were to talk to the JIT. Tothis day, the Russian authorities continue to deny – contrary to the established facts – anyinvolvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine on and around 17 July 2014. On multiple occasionsthe Russian Federation has provided the JIT with falsified evidence exonerating itself. At othertimes the authorities simply refused to provide any information. The Russian authorities have alsopublicly cast doubt on the court’s judgment. Relations with the Russian Federation havedeteriorated further since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The investigation’s findings to date do not provide sufficient grounds for prosecution. There areeither formal obstacles to a prosecution, or the necessary lawful and convincing evidence islacking. We will explain that shortly.First, let’s consider the crew of the Buk TELAR and their superiors. These military superiorsinclude the commander of the 53rd AAMB, the Minister of Defence and – as commander-in-chief –the Russian president. Second-hand information was obtained about the possible involvement of three current or formerofficers of the 53rd AAMB. This information is ambiguous, and thus far it cannot be confirmed toan adequate extent. Since it has not yet been possible to establish the identity of the Buk TELARcrew members, it is not possible to establish why they fired a Buk missile at MH17. Nor do weknow who gave them their orders and what those orders entailed. It remains unclear who knewwhat in the Russian military chain of command about the downing of flight MH17 and what degreeof say they actually had regarding it. Prosecution of the crew and their superiors in the militarychain of command is therefore impossible because the evidence that has been gathered is not strongenough to be lawful and convincing. Furthermore, as members of the regular armed forces of the Russian Federation, the crew membersand their superior officers may be able to claim combatant immunity. This is a rule of internationallaw that stipulates that countries may not prosecute each other’s military personnel. The immunitycontinues to apply even after the individual concerned has left the armed forces. Combatants can be prosecuted for war crimes. However, without concrete information about thecircumstances in which the decision was made to fire the Buk missile at MH17, it cannot bedetermined whether the downing of MH17 was a war crime.
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-febru…13/15And now let us turn to those responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR. As the district court held, in the circumstances in question it may be assumed that ‘anyone whohelped facilitate the deployment of this weapon’ had both intent and premeditation in respect ofunlawfully causing the crash of flight MH17 and the death of everyone on board.There are strong indications that a decision was made at presidential level, by president Putin, tosupply the DPR with the Buk TELAR, or in any event, a heavier air defence system. Although wespeak of strong indications, the high bar of complete and conclusive evidence is not reached.Furthermore, in addition to the possibility of combatant immunity, the president of the RussianFederation also enjoys, at the very least, immunity under international law in view of his positionas head of state. Under Dutch law, heads of state cannot be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever,even war crimes. This immunity applies for as long as Putin is head of state. The investigation into the decision-making about provision of the missile produced other namesbesides Putin, including Aksyonov, Surkov, Dyumin and Shoigu. In the case of Aksyonov, Surkovand Dyumin there are indications that they supported the request for a heavier air-defence systemand arranged for it to be submitted to Shoigu and Putin. The question is whether, in doing so, theyalso have a criminal responsibility for the deployment of this weapon. In any event, they had noactual decision-making power about whether to provide a Buk TELAR. That authority lay at ahigher level. In order to determine whether they were sufficiently helpful in facilitating theeventual deployment of the Buk TELAR that their actions constituted criminal aiding and abetting,further and more concrete evidence is needed. There is therefore insufficient evidence as yet tohold them criminally liable for the downing of MH17. In the case of Shoigu, there is a lack of clarity about whether, as Minister of Defence, he haddecision-making power when it came to supplying the Buk TELAR. The investigation mainlyfound indications that this was ultimately the president’s decision, and not Shoigu’s. This meansthat there is no concrete evidence for his criminal involvement in providing the weapon that shotdown MH17. Apart from the evidential problem both Dyumin, as deputy head of the GRU, and Shoigu, asMinister of Defence, may be able to claim combatant immunity. Then there is Borodai: he held various consultations with Russian officials in Moscow about theprovision of military equipment. Since it could not be clearly determined whether thoseconsultations concerned the provision of a Buk system, he cannot be held responsible for itsdelivery. This brings us to the parties involved in the actual deployment of the Buk TELAR. Theinvestigation did not uncover any concrete instructions given by Russian generals or other Russianofficials regarding the deployment of the Buk TELAR.There were, however, indications of a direct, de facto chain of command between FSB generalBurlaka and DPR leaders Borodai and Girkin. It is not clear whether Burlaka was involved in acriminal capacity in the deployment of the Buk TELAR. Since he used a secure line, the contentsof his phone conversations are not known. Conversations held by other parties about Burlaka showthat his orders to Borodai and to Girkin’s subordinates related to internal conflicts and dynamicsamong DPR commanders, as well as the provision of equipment. However, nothing was said aboutproviding a heavier air defence system.Borodai’s role primarily seemed to involve administration, logistics and military support. He madearrangements for support from Russia, but when it came to operational military commands, hewould refer people to Girkin. Although he was present at the Girkin’s headquarters that morningand although he was in regular contact with Burlaka by phone on 17 July 2014, the investigationwas unable to establish that Borodai and Burlaka had advance knowledge of the availability of theBuk TELAR. Nor could any involvement on his part in the removal of the weapon be established,following the downing on MH17. Therefore, in contrast to the conclusion of the district court in
Annex 390
08.03.2023, 12:12Transcript of press conference JIT MH17 on 8 February 2023read://https_www.politie.nl/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.politie.nl%2Fen%2Finformation%2Ftranscript-of-press-conference-jit-mh17-on-8-febru…14/15Girkin’s case, it is not possible at this time to provide lawful and convincing evidence that Borodaiand Burlaka were able to decide on the deployment and use of the Buk TELAR and that theyaccepted that deployment and use. Nor is it possible to prove that they deliberately aided andabetted the downing of MH17 in another way.This brings us to the conclusion of this presentation. After more than eight-and-a-half years, the JIT has exhausted all scope for investigation. Theinvestigation will therefore now be suspended. Despite the complex context, the JIT achieved agreat deal. The findings of the investigation do not provide sufficient grounds for the prosecution ofnew individuals. This does not mean, however, that the JIT is closing the case. The phone line forwitnesses and the MH17 website will remain active, so that any insider witnesses who might wishto tell their story in the future will be able to do so. With this in mind, the JIT agreement will alsobe renewed. New information or a change in circumstances may give reason to resume theinvestigation or institute new criminal proceedings. The bar for establishing individual criminal liability is high. At present we cannot reach that bar forthe various individuals discussed, but the picture that the investigation has given us of Russianinvolvement could play a key role in the state responsibility proceedings. We know that theanswers to our questions can be found in Russia. As we have said many times before, solving thesekinds of crimes takes patience and endurance. Just consider the Lockerbie case, in which a suspectwas recently arrested – after 34 years. In that spirit the JIT remains dedicated to the MH17investigation.Thank you for your attention.
Annex 391 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation, 28 September 2016

Annex 391
JIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminalinvestigation (28-09-2016)Today, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) presents the first results of the criminal investigationinto the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. In the JIT Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, theNetherlands and Ukraine are working together.Extensive and complex investigationThis is an extensive and complex investigation. To illustrate this, I herewith you some figures thatmay demonstrate the scope of the investigation:For quite some time, between 100 and 200 investigators and other experts of the JIT have beenworking on the case and currently, on a daily basis almost 100 investigators, public prosecutorsand other experts are still working on the case.During the past two years, dozens of containers with thousands of wreckage parts were examinedin detail, piece by piece. Of those parts, 1448 were processed in a databank as being relevant to theinvestigation.Sixty requests for legal assistance were sent to more than twenty countries and we receivedreactions on many of them.Twenty weapon systems were examined.Five billion internet pages were recorded and assessed for their relevant content.Half a million videos and photographs were examined in detail and saved, and more than twohundred witnesses were heard.In addition, approximately 150.000 intercepted telephone calls were listened in on, summarisedand assessed for their relevance and authenticity. After this, more than 3500 interceptedconversations were processed entirely, translated and analysed. All this was recorded in more than6000 official reports.Earlier, the Dutch Safety Board (OVV) presented their investigation results. And furthermore,many journalists carried out their own investigations, as did research collectives like Bellingcat.This resulted in different scenarios and theories being raised, both in the media and on theinternet.The criminal investigation focusses on truth finding and its ultimate goal is tracing andprosecuting the perpetrators. The big difference with a journalistic documentary or an internet-based investigation report is that in our case conclusions based on probability will not suffice. Themost important in the JIT investigation is that we can substantiate our conclusions with legal andJIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 1 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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convincing evidence. In doing so the bar is high: the evidence must stand before a court. We areconfident that the evidence which we have collected removes any kind of doubt about the cause ofthe crash. Of course, ultimately it will be up to the court to render a final judgment.In the meantime we have collected so much evidence that we – as announced earlier – can answerthe question as to which weapon was used and, even more important, where this weapon waslaunched exactly. The investigation into those responsible is a matter for the long haul and willtake more time.Normally we exercise restraint when it comes to disclosing interim findings in ongoinginvestigations; we only present our investigation results in the court room. But this case has such aprofound impact worldwide that we have looked at possibilities to present the results of thecriminal investigation at an earlier stage. We cannot and do not want to tell you everything yet; inthat case we would run the risk of playing into the perpetrators’ hands. Also, we will not show allour evidence. We have made a selection that is meant to illustrate how we reached our conclusions.First, we will discuss the different scenarios which have been investigated and how we reached ourconclusions with respect to these scenarios.After that, we will discuss the results from the investigation with regard to the weapon and thelaunch site.At the end, we will briefly discuss the further investigation into the perpetrators.The presentation will provide information about the progress in the investigation. We also want toexplain that in the meantime we have gathered sufficient evidence to build a criminal case whichwill demonstrate the cause of the crash without any doubt.The investigation into different scenariosThe JIT has carried out the investigation as broadly as possible and has investigated differentscenarios. Although early in the investigation one scenario seemed the most likely one, it wasimportant to keep investigating the other possibilities carefully. After all, it had to be anunprejudiced and impartial investigation. In future court proceedings those other scenarios maypossibly play a role as well, because they might be presented by the defendants and their lawyers asalternative possibilities. In that case the Prosecution will have to be able to demonstrate that theydid not take place.Two scenarios could be ruled out quickly, as already mentioned previously. This concerned thepossibility of an accident caused by technical or human failure, and the possibility of a terroristattack from inside the aircraft. We have investigated both scenarios and there were no indicationsfor these scenarios. The OVV had already drawn this conclusion on 13 October of last year.Then, two scenarios remained:First, the possibility that flight MH17 had been shot down by another airplane equipped with aJIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 2 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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weapon system. This is the air-to-air scenario.In the investigation so far, we have come to the conclusion that we can also rule out the air-to-airscenario.What follows is the explanation about how we reached that conclusion.If flight MH17 would have been shot down by another airplane, this plane would have been shownon the radar images. There has been quite some discussion about the radar data. The JIT hasacquired sufficient and crucial radar images. These images were made available to the JIT by bothUkraine and the Russian Federation. Recently, through intensive investigation, the JIT foundanother video file containing relevant primary radar data of the area which had been recorded by amobile radar in Ukraine. At the time, this radar was used to test new software. Although it had alimited range, it still detected flight MH17 and this completes the image further.As far as we are concerned, the discussion about the radar images can be concluded. Today wewish to emphasize that the material that we now have is more than sufficient to draw conclusionsin the criminal investigation. For building up a solid criminal file, it will not be necessary to gathermore evidentiary material.In addition to the radar images that we have, witnesses have been heard, such as the air trafficcontrollers who were working at that time; the JIT has an audio file of the conversations betweenthe Ukrainian air traffic controllers and the airplanes that passed through the Ukrainian airspaceon 17 July 2014, including flight MH17.All these data together provide a sufficiently complete picture of the air traffic in the direct vicinityof flight MH17 and based on this picture the JIT concludes that there was no other aircraft flying inthe vicinity of flight MH17 that could have shot it down. This conclusion in itself can already ruleout that scenario.The Russian Federation mentioned last week that they have found ‘new’ primary radar images.Based on those images even the Russian Federation concludes that there was no second airplanethat could have shot down MH17.Moreover, there is much other evidence that contributes to the evidence of the final scenario,being: Flight MH17 was shot down by a ground based air defence system.On the basis of a large amount of evidence we can conclude that this is indeed the scenario whichtook place.The results of the criminal investigation with regard to the weapon used and the location fromwhere this weapon was fired will be illustrated with the aid of three videos in which we show aselection of our evidentiary material. For a part real images will be shown, for another part therewill be animated images, i.e. images created by us. In this respect, two remarks. In some of theintercepted telephone conversations, names of certain persons are mentioned. This does not meanthat these persons are automatically suspects. The other remark concerns the spelling of place-JIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 3 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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names in Eastern Ukraine. Some place-names are spelled differently, which is partly due to thedifferences in Ukrainian and Russian.ContextIn the explanation of the situation in Eastern Ukraine in July 2014, the word ‘separatists’ is usedregularly. The JIT believes it is important to explain that the term separatists refers to any person,regardless of his nationality or citizenship, who is fighting against the Ukrainian governmenttroops in Eastern Ukraine.In July 2014, heavy fighting was going on in the area southeast of Donetsk. The pro-Russianfighters were engaged in an offensive to force a passage to the border with the Russian Federationsouth of the conflict zone. During these fights, the Ukrainian army carried out many air strikes inorder to stop this offensive. The pro-Russian fighters suffered greatly: there were many losses,both human and material. Intercepted telephone conversations show that during the days prior to17 July, the pro-Russian fighters mentioned that they needed better air defence systems to defendthemselves against these air strikes. In this respect, a BUK was discussed explicitly. Fact is that aBUK has a higher range than the air defence systems in use by the separatists at that moment, suchas the Strela and Igla.This can be illustrated with several intercepted conversations between two Russian speakingpersons, who are fighting on the side of the pro-Russian fighters. These conversations are relevantto the investigation and took place in the evening of 16 July and the early morning of 17 July 2014.The above shows that the pro-Russian fighters were in great need of a BUK air defencesystem and that it was actually delivered.WeaponBased on the results of the criminal investigation it can be concluded that flight MH17 was shotdown on 17 July 2014 by a missile of the 9M38 series, launched by a BUK TELAR. This isconsistent with the conclusions drawn by the OVV of 13 October 2015. The BUK TELAR wasbrought in from the territory of the Russian Federation and subsequently also taken back to theRussian Federation.In the animation it was explained how the weapon works. This is important to know in thecriminal investigation and also to determine the question of guilt.Forensic investigationIn the investigation we have made extensive use of forensic research. Partly thanks to thisresearch, we have been able to establish that flight MH17 was shot down by a missile from the9M38 series.In the next animation it is explained how the forensic investigation has contributed to thisJIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 4 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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conclusion.In addition to the forensic investigation, so-called Arena tests were performed. This means that agroup of forensic experts from the JIT countries detonated a warhead and a complete missile in aprepared test environment. In this test environment aluminium panels, simulating an aircraft wall,were placed around the warhead and the missile. Surrounding the test area measuring equipmentincluding high-speed cameras had been installed.During these arena tests several measurements were carried out, such as the velocity of thefragments from the warhead after detonation. Also, the damage pattern became visible by theperforations of flying fragments from the warhead and the missile in aforementioned aluminiumpanels. The results of these tests were compared with other investigation data, including thedifferent metal parts which were found during the forensic investigation. The main purpose ofthese tests was calculating the trajectory of the missile and comparing the nature of the damagewith the traces found at the crash site.The route and launch siteThe BUK TELAR that was used was brought into Eastern Ukraine from the territory of the RussianFederation. The investigation team has been able to make an accurate reconstruction of a largepart of the route which was followed by the BUK TELAR and accompanying vehicles. Initially, wedid this mainly based on intercepted telephone conversations and videos and photographs on thesocial media. Following the call for witnesses last year, several witnesses replied and wereinterviewed by the JIT. They also stated that they had seen the BUK TELAR driving by.The JIT investigated several possible launch locations, including two locations in the vicinity of thetown of Zaroschenke or Zaroshchenskoye. Among other locations, this area was indicated by theRussian Ministry of Defence as being the launch site. It was also mentioned that this area wasallegedly controlled by Ukraine. However, the investigation showed that this was not the launchlocation. And besides this, it appeared that this area was not being controlled by Ukraine, but bypro-Russian fighters. To illustrate this there is the following intercepted telephone conversationbetween two pro-Russian fighters.This conversation took place in June 2015 and is about the information that apparently wasdistributed at that time, saying that the Boeing (flight MH17) was allegedly shot down from the cityof Zaroshchenskoye (or: Zaroschenke) by an air defence system. One of the participants in thatconversation knows for sure that Zaroshchenske was not the launch site and that, at the time,Zaroshchenske was not controlled by the pro-Russian fighters. The JIT also has other evidence insupport of these conclusions.This conversation took place in June 2015 and is about the information that apparently wasdistributed at that time, saying that the Boeing (flight MH17) was allegedly shot down from the cityof Zaroshchenskoye (or: Zaroschenke) by an air defence system. One of the participants in thatJIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 5 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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conversation knows for sure that Zaroshchenske was not the launch site and that, at the time,Zaroshchenske was not controlled by the pro-Russian fighters. The JIT also has other evidence insupport of these conclusions.In order to establish the exact location of the launch site, the JIT conducted different kinds ofinvestigations. These investigative activities were carried out Ukraine, Belgium, Australia and theNetherlands and involved forensic, tactical and digital investigations. Among other activities, ateam of specialists visited the disaster area in June 2015. Ground samples were taken at differentlocations that were regarded as possible launch sites. These samples were examined in detail bythe Dutch Forensic Institute (NFI). Network measurements were also carried out on the spot inorder to determine the locations, as well as the range of the telephone towers. Furthermore, allkinds of visual material was evaluated and checked for authenticity. Witnesses were interviewed aswell, among others by a Dutch Investigating Judge.During the past two years, the investigation team collected a large quantity of evidentiary materialabout the launch site. Our conclusion is that the location of the launch site is an agricultural fieldnear Pervomaiskiy. It concerns a field of approximately 500 x 600 metres. This is the highest spotin the area within a radius of 5 kilometres. The farmland is surrounded by trees, except for thewestern side. Previously the OVV had already concluded that the missile must have been launchedfrom an area of 320 square kilometres south east of Grabovo. The farmland near Pervomaiskiy islocated in this area.This conclusion is supported by the material which the investigation team recently obtained fromthe United States and the European Space Agency. I will explain this briefly.USIn response to a Dutch request for legal assistance, the US submitted a report in which theypresent their assessment of the information regarding the shooting down of flight MH17. Thisreport can be used in court. The conclusion of the American authorities is that flight MH17 wasshot down by an SA-11 surface-to-air missile, i.e. a BUK-missile, which was launched from a siteabout six kilometres south of the village of Snizhne in Eastern Ukraine. This is consistent with thedistance to aforementioned launch site near Pervomaiskiy. The US also explain how they reachedthis conclusion. In addition, they mention that they are sure of the fact that the Ukrainian airdefence systems could not have done it and that an air-to-air scenario is impossible.The Dutch Military Intelligence Service (MIVD) and the (Dutch) National Public Prosecutor onTerrorism have been able to view the underlying state-secret (intelligence) material and based onthat information and the explanation provided, they support the fact that this conclusion is drawn.ESAThe European Space Agency (ESA) has aided the investigation team extensively in the search forrelevant images from satellites. This has shown to be of great value: Not only did ESA obtainimages of all relevant civilian satellites, but they also have experts who have assessed these images.JIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 6 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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The conclusions drawn by ESA confirm the conclusions of the investigation team with regard tothe launch site.In the following animation we will show a selection from our investigation results.ConclusionsBased on the above the JIT concludes that flight MH17 was shot down on 17 July 2014 by a missileof the 9M38 series, launched by a BUK TELAR, from farmland in the vicinity of Pervomaiskiy (or:Pervomaiskyi). At that time, the area was controlled by pro-Russian fighters. Furthermore, theinvestigation also shows that the BUK TELAR was brought in from the territory of the RussianFederation and subsequently, after having shot down flight MH17, was taken back to the RussianFederation.Those involvedSo much for our conclusions regarding what happened. Probably not everything of this, is new. Butwhat matters today is that the criminal investigation has now advanced to the point where we cansubstantiate abovementioned conclusions with evidence. Of course, at the end of the day it is up toa court to render judgment.What remains is the answer to the question: who were responsible for this? Which persons wereinvolved in the delivery, security and removal of the BUK TELAR and/or the shooting down flightMH17? In this part of the investigation significant progress has been made during the past twoyears, but more investigation is needed. Now that we know for sure what happened to flight MH17,in the coming period the investigation can fully focus on the answers to these kinds of questions.Although today we have not been able to provide investigation results regarding the perpetrators,we can say that in the meantime, we have identified approximately 100 persons who in one way orthe other can be linked to the crash of flight MH17 or the transport of the BUK. We have been ableto establish the identity of these 100 persons, whom we found through different sources such asintercepted telephone conversations and witness statements. This concerns people who haveplayed an active role in getting hold of the BUK TELAR and organising the transport to the launchlocation. There are also persons who had a facilitating or supporting role. This group includes thepeople who escorted the transport of the BUK TELAR.These persons are not automatically suspects. To assess whether persons who were involved actedculpably, and can therefore be regarded as suspects, it is important to get a better picture of thechain of command with regard to the use of the weapon. Who gave the orders for the delivery ofthe BUK TELAR? Who gave the order to shoot down MH17? Did the crew take their own decisionor did they execute a command from higher up? What did the persons who were involved in thisoperation know? All these kinds of circumstances play a role when answering the question whethersomeone should be regarded as a witness or as a suspect.JIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 7 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
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It is important to the JIT to gain more insight into the role of the different parties involved, whichis also the reason why today, we once more call witnesses to report to us. In particular we inviteinsider witnesses, who can tell us more about the role that different persons have played, to reportto the JIT.Ukrainian law provides for lower sentences, and in certain circumstances relief from criminalliability, for those who cooperate with the investigation. Information about how to report as awitness can be found on the website of the JIT. Furthermore, this afternoon we will post a number of intercepted telephone conversations on thewebsite of the JIT, requesting information about certain participants in those conversations.Anyone who knows who these persons are, is requested to report this to the JIT.Finally, the question as to how long will it take to conclude the criminal investigation cannot beanswered yet. It depends on further developments in the investigation and the witnesses we canstill hear. After today, this investigation will continue unabated.In view thereof, the JIT agreement that was to expire next month, was extended. We will continueas a Joint Investigation Team to see this important investigation to a good end.N.B. The animations have been included for illustrative purposes only. They are not intended to bean exact rendering of the results of the investigation. This is due, in part, to considerationsregarding confidentiality of witness identities and investigative methods.JIT presentation of first results of the MH17 criminal investigation (2...https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-...Стр. 8 из 808.03.2023, 12:14
Annex 392 Joint Investigation Team, Report, Findings of the JIT MH17 investigation into the crew members of the Buk TELAR and those responsible in the chain of command, 8 February 2023

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February 2023
Report
Findings of the JIT MH17
investigation into the crew
members of the Buk TELAR and
those responsible in the chain of
command
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 Table of contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Judgment of The Hague District Court 7 2.1 Involvement of Russian authorities in DPR armed conflict 7 2.2 Russian origin of the Buk TELAR 12 2.3 Buk TELAR with crew 13 2.4 Responsibility for deployment of Buk TELAR and launch of Buk missile 15 2.5 Denial and obstruction by the Russian Federation 18 2.6 Conclusion 19 3 Origin of the Buk TELAR 20 3.1 Identification of the Buk TELAR 20 3.2 Military unit 21 4 Crew of the Buk TELAR and commanders 22 4.1 Scope of the investigation 22 4.2 Composition and organisation of the 53rd AAMB 23 4.3 Military command structure 24 4.4 Deployment of the 53rd AAMB 24 4.4.1 Movement of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ and other Buk vehicles to the border region 25 4.4.2 Withdrawal of Buk vehicles of the 1st and 2nd battalions 27 4.4.3 Possible removal of TELAR ‘3X2’ from 18 July 2014 27 4.4.4 Summary 29 4.5 The Buk TELAR’s target identification systems 30 4.6 Crew members and commanders of the 53rd AAMB 30 4.6.1 Brigade commander Muchkaev 31 4.6.2 Wider circle of possible crew members 31 4.6.3 Members of the 3rd battalion under the command of an officer 33 4.6.4 Officers of the 2nd battalion 34 4.6.5 Request for legal assistance sent to the Russian Federation 35 4.6.6 Tweet about crew 35 4.6.7 Summary 35
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 5 Delivery of the Buk TELAR 36 5.1 April-May 2014: relationship between Aksyonov and DPR leaders 36 5.2 Separatists requested Russian air-defence systems 37 5.3 First half of June 2014: Russian discussions about supplying the DPR with weapons 38 5.4 14-30 June 2014: Russian meeting to discuss the provision of anti-aircraft systems 41 5.5 Surkov’s position 42 5.6 14-30 June 2014: Russian talks about arms deliveries 44 5.7 Putin’s position 46 5.8 Summary 49 6 Other parties involved in the deployment of the Buk TELAR 51 6.1 Late June to early July 2014: Russia exerts more influence over DPR 51 6.2 6 to 14 July 2014: planning DPR offensive 54 6.3 14 to 16 July 2014: start of DPR offensive 55 6.4 Burlaka's position 56 6.5 Borodai's position 57 6.6 16 to 17 July 2014: deployment of the Buk TELAR 58 6.7 17 July 2014: after the downing of flight MH17 59 6.8 Summary 61 7 Options with regard to investigation and prosecution 63 7.1 Investigative options 63 7.2 Prosecution options 64 7.2.1 Buk TELAR crew members and their superior officers 64 7.2.2 Parties responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR 65 7.2.3 Parties jointly responsible for deployment of Buk TELAR 66 7.3 Conclusion 66
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 4 MH17 Report 1 Introduction On 17 July 2014 Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 crashed in eastern Ukraine, as a result of which all 298 passengers and crew were killed. The victims were nationals of the Netherlands, Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, the Philippines, Canada, New Zealand, Vietnam, Israel, Italy, Romania, the United States and South Africa. The countries that lost nationals in the crash joined together to conduct a joint investigation. This led to the establishment of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT), an international body made up of investigators from the Netherlands, Australia, Malaysia, Belgium and Ukraine. Over the course of the investigation, the JIT published findings – firstly in 2016 and 2018, in regard to the circumstances of the crash; and secondly in 2019, in regard to the three Russians and one Ukrainian suspected of being responsible for the downing of flight MH17. In July 2014, these four suspects were military commanders of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). On 19 June 2019 the Dutch Public Prosecution Service decided to prosecute these four individuals for the downing of flight MH17. Dutch criminal proceedings against these four DPR fighters began on 9 March 2020. On that first day of the trial, the Public Prosecution Service explained why it had decided to prosecute these four commanders and no other members of the DPR. That assessment has not changed. On 17 November 2022, The Hague District Court found three of the four defendants – Igor Girkin, Sergei Dubinskiy and Leonid Kharchenko – guilty of causing flight MH17 to crash, resulting in the deaths of all 298 occupants, and of the murder of those occupants.1 The court sentenced those three defendants to life imprisonment. The fourth defendant, Oleg Pulatov, was acquitted.2 No appeal has been lodged against this judgment. Besides examining the degree of responsibility borne by members of the DPR for the downing of flight MH17, the JIT also investigated the crew of the Buk TELAR (the missile launch vehicle used to hit MH17) and those responsible for supplying this weapon system. This investigation has been ongoing, and has now reached its limits: all investigative options have now been exhausted. The investigation will therefore be suspended. The investigation resulted in various findings, but they do not at this time provide any basis for new prosecutions. In the interests of the next of kin and the general public, the JIT and the Dutch Public Prosecution Service will make these findings public. In doing so, they are complying with national and international obligations to keep the next 1 Judgments of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12216/12217/12218. 2 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12219.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 5 MH17 Report of kin3 and the general public4 informed. In addition, the JIT is aware that state responsibility proceedings are under way, and that this information could be relevant in that connection. This report does not explain every detail of the investigation conducted by the JIT. There are various interests preventing such a step, such as the security and privacy of relevant individuals, potential further investigation and any prosecution that might occur in the future. However, the JIT is disclosing findings that could provide more insight into the factual circumstances in which flight MH17 was shot down, and the potential level of responsibility that various parties may bear for the crash. No names are mentioned in this report unless they have previously been publicly disclosed in this context (for example in relation to the criminal proceedings, a previous witness appeal by the JIT or public-domain publications by third parties), or they concern individuals known to the public whose identities can be deduced from the context of the findings. In each case, the JIT has weighed up the rights of the next of kin and the general public to information and the interests of the individuals concerned. Everyone referred to in this report – regardless of whether or not they are mentioned by name – is innocent until the court finds, by final and unappealable judgment, that the reverse has been proven. Lastly, where most of the people mentioned are concerned (apart from Girkin, Dubinskiy, Kharchenko and Pulatov), it has not been possible for the JIT to get their side of the story. This is because these individuals could not be traced, or are located in the Russian Federation and the Russian authorities have provided no effective cooperation in respect of the investigation. In some cases, contact with the JIT would also expose an individual to security 3 In accordance with article 51aa, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; article 51ac, paragraphs 1 and 2 (d, e and f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; Victims’ Rights Instructions, Chapter 4, Public Prosecution Service; Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012, consideration (26) (‘When providing information, sufficient detail should be given to ensure that victims are treated in a respectful manner and to enable them to make informed decisions about their participation in proceedings. (…) This is equally relevant for information to enable a victim to decide whether to request a review of a decision not to prosecute’) and (27) (‘In exceptional cases, for example due to the high number of victims involved in a case, it should be possible to provide information through the press, through an official website of the competent authority or through a similar communication channel'; Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (see e.g. ECtHR 29 January 2019, 36925/07 (Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey), §219: ‘(…) the investigation must be accessible to the victim’s family to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests’); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the right to the truth’, E/CN.4/2006/91, paragraph 38 (‘the material scope of the right to the truth has also expanded to include other elements. These may be summarized as the entitlement to seek and obtain information on: the causes leading to the person’s victimization (…) and the identity of perpetrators’); 4 ECtHR 11 July 2014, 28761 (Al Nashiri v. Poland), § 495: ‘Furthermore, where allegations of serious human rights violations are involved in the investigation, the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the case does not belong solely to the victim of the crime and his or her family but also to other victims of similar violations and the general public, who have the right to know what has happened’); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the right to the truth E/CN.4/2006/91, paragraph 58 (‘The right to the truth also has a societal dimension: society has the right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes, as well as the circumstances and the reasons for which aberrant crimes came to be committed, so that such events do not reoccur in the future.’)
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 6 MH17 Report risks. In one or two cases, a relevant individual has already commented publicly on the findings of the JIT investigation. If so, that response is included in the report. Below (in Chapter 2) the report will first reflect on the facts which were established by The Hague District Court by final and unappealable judgment on the basis of the JIT investigation, and which provide the point of departure for the present report. It will next discuss the findings that arose from the JIT’s detailed investigation into the precise origin of the Buk TELAR used to down MH17 (Chapter 3), the Buk TELAR’s crew and their superior officers (Chapter 4), the individuals responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR (Chapter 5) and other individuals involved in the Buk TELAR’s deployment (Chapter 6). Lastly the report will set out why the JIT and the Dutch Public Prosecution Service see no more grounds for further investigation or prosecution (Chapter 7). Although the investigation has now been suspended, the case file will not be permanently closed. Any new information will be assessed by the JIT, and altered circumstances may prompt the resumption of the investigation.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 7 MH17 Report 2 Judgment of The Hague District Court In its judgment5 of 17 November 2022, the court established various facts on the basis of the JIT’s investigation and the criminal proceedings. These facts are important for the interpretation of the JIT’s additional findings. 2.1 Involvement of Russian authorities in DPR armed conflict The district court first established that, from mid-May 2014, the Russian authorities had such far-reaching involvement in the DPR conflict in eastern Ukraine that the Russian Federation exercised overall control over the DPR. The court referred in this regard to the fact that several DPR leaders had close ties and maintained contacts with individuals in the Russian intelligence services, the Russian Presidential Executive Office and advisers from the Kremlin. What is more, various DPR leaders were themselves Russian and had a Russian military background. The court further established that in the course of their contacts with senior figures in the Russian Federation the DPR leaders frequently requested assistance, including military equipment, and that such assistance was provided. According to the court there are ‘ample indications’ that the Russian Federation adopted a coordinating role and issued instructions to the DPR. Lastly, the court referred to evidence of mutually coordinated military actions by the DPR and Russian Federation. In this connection the court cited reports by various organisations about Russian military personnel regularly crossing the border, and cross-border attacks and intercepted telephone conversations by DPR members, including Dubinskiy and Pulatov, about Russian shelling. See the following considerations given in the judgment: The background of members of the DPR Several of the leaders of the DPR at the time were Russian nationals, and a number of them also had a background in the Russian armed forces. For example, the accused Girkin, at the time Minister of Defence of the DPR, is a Russian national, served in the Russian intelligence agency (FSB) and took part in the wars in Chechnya, Transnistria and Bosnia. His deputy in the DPR and ‘head of intelligence’ in the DPR, the accused Dubinskiy, is also a Russian national, has a background in the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) and took part in the wars in Afghanistan, North Ossetia and Chechnya. It is not always clear, however, in what capacity the leaders within the DPR were involved in the DPR. Although several of them indicate that they were retired (reservists) in the Russian Federation and came to Ukraine independently and voluntarily, it is not clear whether this is actually the case or whether they were sent there by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Based on intercepted 5 The judgments in the cases against the four defendants are cited as a single judgment in this report because the same facts are established in them. For easy reference, this report consistently refers to the judgment in the case against Igor Girkin (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:14037).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 8 MH17 Report conversations, at least some of them appear to have had a close connection with the Russian Federation. For example, there was communication between the leaders of the DPR and Surkov, who was then the closest adviser to the Russian President Vladimir Putin, regarding appointments to several ministerial posts within the DPR. In an intercepted conversation recorded on 16 May 2014, Borodai said that the government (of the DPR) was about to be announced, that Moscow had surprised him, and that he would be appointed Prime Minister, much to the disappointment of another individual who had arrived in eastern Ukraine from Moscow. Borodai was indeed appointed Prime Minister of the DPR shortly after this intercepted conversation took place. On 15 May 2014, a conversation was intercepted between Borodai and the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the DPR regarding the appointment of a named individual to the post of Minister of the Interior; during that conversation, it was said that the candidate in question “suits Moscow” and that the “Moscow Generals” agreed. In another conversation later that day in which the same Chairman of the Supreme Council took part, he also said that the list of government posts for “the hero city” should not be made longer and that one named individual would certainly not sit on the Security Council because he had not been approved by Moscow. Furthermore, the person who at that time was Minister of Culture of the DPR stated in a witness interview that the Deputy Prime Ministers of the DPR came from Moscow and had significant influence over the functioning of the DPR. Around the period to which the charges relate, several of the leaders of the DPR maintained ties with individuals from Russian intelligence agencies, the President’s office, and Kremlin advisers. Intercepted conversations regularly contain references to contacting “Moscow”. One example is a conversation between Dubinskiy and Bezler on 4 July 2014, in which Dubinskiy says that Girkin has been in touch with Moscow, and that Moscow does not want Sloviansk to be surrendered. The court also refers to a conversation that Girkin had on 10 July 2014 in which he told Dubinskiy that he was constantly on the telephone trying to get in touch with Moscow to report on the situation. Contact was maintained with various high-ranking individuals in the Russian Federation, sometimes using special communication channels (“the Glass”) and secure telephones supplied by the Russian Federation. For example, Borodai, the leader of the DPR, was in almost daily contact with Surkov between 20 June 2014 and August 2014. In an interview on 16 June 2014, Borodai referred to Surkov as “our man in the Kremlin”. It is the opinion of the court that these references to “Moscow” and “the hero city” cannot be interpreted in any way other than as references to the seat of government, and are therefore understood to refer to the authorities of the Russian Federation. Support In their communications with senior figures within the Russian Federation, the leaders of the DPR regularly requested support such as the manpower, military equipment and requisite training. This support was indeed provided. Statements made by representatives and reports by organisations such as NATO, the UN Security Council, the US State Department, the OSCE, and Human Rights Watch all mention the supplies and arms provided to the separatists from the Russian Federation. There are also references to convoys of military weapons which were said to have been brought across the border. This is consistent with what can be heard in intercepted conversations. For example, in one conversation intercepted on 12 June 2014, Dubinskiy says that it has become clear that Russia will provide support, including heavy weapons; in another conversation on 20 June 2014, Kharchenko tells Dubinskiy that the second convoy that came across the border is not what they were expecting; and on 15 July 2014, Girkin
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 9 MH17 Report mentions expecting a shipment – a big thing that will be very good for “us” and which will need to be received at the border. Although intercepted conversations do not always reveal whether the weapons and supplies mentioned came from private providers or from the Russian government, the Minister of Culture of the DPR stated that Borodai forwarded requests for weapons from the Council of Ministers of the DPR to the GRU. Following approval by the GRU, the weapons were brought into Ukraine via the “Black Zero” (by which the court understands: illegal border crossing). The court also notes that NATO repeatedly called on the Russian Federation to stop providing support and weapons to the Ukrainian separatists. Witness statements also mention funding for the DPR provided by the Russian Federation. For example, the person who at that time was Minister of Labour and Welfare of the DPR stated that the person who arranged the funding received it with the cooperation of the Russian President’s office and that the Russian Federation had been funding the DPR since at least the summer of 2014. Support coming from the Russian Federation is also mentioned in intercepted conversations. For example, in a conversation on 13 July 2014, one fighter for the DPR complained about the situation with kit and salaries, to which the response was that “they” are going to Rostov today for a shipment. The intercepted conversations do not generally mention the source of funding within the Russian Federation directly, other than to state that this was often routed via Rostov. The court concludes that this is a reference to the Russian city of Rostov. Several witness statements mention military training programmes for DPR fighters which took place in the Russian Federation. This often involved training in Rostov (again, the Russian city). Intercepted conversations also include references to training programmes and a training camp. In one conversation that was intercepted on 2 July 2014, separatists talked about their urgent need for manpower and when the “men from the camp” will arrive, and on 3 July 2014, a fighter from the DPR said that the guys went “across the river” to train. Again, it is not always clear whether this training was provided privately or organised by or on behalf of the Russian authorities. However, one conversation by the person who at that time was Minister of Defence of the LPR, with which the DPR was cooperating, makes a clear reference to the role of the Russian GRU in this. In that conversation on 15 July 2014, the Minister was told about a training programme that was being provided for ten persons, to which the Minister replied that this should be done through the GRU. Some of the witness statements also reveal the involvement of Russian bodies in training programmes. For example, witness M58, who will be discussed later, stated that he was taken to the FSB and then to a camp in Rostov, Russia, where he received training. After that he was taken to the Donbas region. Coordination and instructions Of particular relevance to the question of whether there was overall control – regardless of the background of the members of the DPR and the Russian Federation’s support for the DPR – is whether the Russian Federation assumed a coordinating role and issued instructions to the DPR. It is the opinion of the court that the case file contains abundant evidence for this. As indicated previously, many intercepted conversations include reports to “Moscow” or people working for “Moscow” regarding the situation on the ground, such as setbacks and successes. A number of intercepted conversations also attest to planning on the part of the authorities of the Russian Federation. For example, in a conversation intercepted on 3 July 2014, Surkov informed Borodai that Antyufeev (court: who became Deputy Prime Minister for State Security of the DPR shortly thereafter) was on his way to Borodai and that “they” will be leaving for the south on Saturday so that they will be ready for combat. Later, on 11 July 2014, Surkov told Borodai that he had spoken to those in charge of “this whole military story”
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 10 MH17 Report and that they had indicated that they were making preparations and they were going to accelerate everything. Additionally, on 10 July 2014, a leader of the DPR called to say that he had received an order in Moscow to form the first Cossack Regiment of Novorossiya. Intercepted conversations also mention Moscow’s role in specific operations. In a conversation regarding Sloviansk intercepted on 4 July 2014, a DPR commander says there has been communication with Moscow, but that Moscow does not want Sloviansk to be surrendered. The DPR’s Minister of Defence, the accused Girkin, stated in an interview given in July 2014 that this order was not followed because no concrete support was forthcoming. In a telephone conversation on 18 July 2014, two members of the DPR discussed the encirclement of a Ukrainian brigade. One of the two interlocutors stated that he had been in contact with Moscow and that Moscow had indicated that the lives of the soldiers should be spared. In a similar vein, a series of telephone calls between Borodai and a Russian number made on 21 July 2014 is noteworthy. Borodai wanted to speak to the boss, but the boss was not available. Increasingly insistently, Borodai asked if the boss could call him back because he needed advice and instructions on how to handle certain aspects of the MH17 disaster, such as the refrigerated trucks and the black box. Borodai would also like to receive talking points for a press conference. Borodai noted at that point that he assumed that “our neighbours” would want to say something about this matter. It is the court’s opinion that the fact that Borodai talked about “our neighbours” and asked about “the boss”, even though he himself was the highest-ranking person within the DPR, confirms that the boss he was referring to was a representative of the authorities of the Russian Federation. Direct participation of the Russian Federation Reports and communications from various organisations mention shelling and artillery fire on Ukrainian territory, which is said to have been carried out from the Russian Federation. From the first half of July 2014 onwards, Russian soldiers would regularly move across the border and cross-border attacks would take place. One investigation by the International Partnership for Human Rights indicates that there was artillery fire on a Ukrainian encampment close to the border with the Russian Federation in early July 2014, and in an official notice issued on 16 November 2016 the Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service also states that, between 11 July 2014 and 17 July 2014, rocket artillery units located in Ukrainian territory close to the Russian border fired on unknown targets in Ukraine. According to the report, the vehicle tracks and traces of firing found showed that artillery installations entered Ukraine from Russian territory. Witnesses have also provided statements regarding Russian equipment manned by Russian military personnel, which crossed the border, fired shells and then returned. Intercepted conversations also confirm that such strikes took place. For example, in a conversation between two members of the DPR intercepted on 12 July 2014, the interlocutors mention that Russia had finally begun to open fire on the Ukrainian armed forces. In another conversation intercepted on 16 July 2014, two members of the DPR - namely the accused Dubinskiy and Pulatov - discuss the problems they were having because they were under fire. Pulatov indicated that Russia could let loose, to which Dubinskiy replied that he has indicated positions on the map that will be sent to Moscow. In a conversation on 17 July 2014, accused Dubinskiy said that Russia intended to fire on their positions from its side. These conversations are just a few examples of a number of similar intercepted conversations in the case file. All of this indicates not only some form of parallel direct involvement but also, and more importantly, coordinated military activities by the DPR and the Russian Federation. To date, the Russian authorities have denied any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine during
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 11 MH17 Report the period in question. However, with respect to the foregoing, the court finds that the case file certainly shows that funding, men, training, weapons and goods were all provided to the DPR by the Russian Federation. In addition, as of mid-May 2014 at the latest, the Russian Federation had a decisive influence on appointments to several senior positions within the DPR, including those of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. This gave the Russian authorities considerable influence over the leadership of the DPR. The fact that the Russian Federation did indeed exercise influence is apparent from the fact that the Russian authorities were involved, at times directly, in coordinating and carrying out military activities even prior to the crash of flight MH17. In view of the above, the court concludes that the Russian Federation exercised overall control over the DPR from mid-May 2014, at least until the crash of flight MH17. This means that the armed conflict, which was non-international in geographic terms, was internationalised and was therefore an international armed conflict. The court therefore finds that on 17 July 2014, an international armed conflict between Ukraine and the DPR was taking place on Ukrainian territory, and that the DPR was under the overall control of the Russian Federation.6 6 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:14037, 4.4.3.1.3.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 12 MH17 Report 2.2 Russian origin of the Buk TELAR The court also established that the Buk TELAR that was used to shoot down flight MH17 came from the Russian Federation. The weapon was transported by DPR fighters in the night of 16-17 July 2014, and after MH17 had been shot down it was quickly taken back to the Russian Federation. On the morning of 18 July 2014 the Buk TELAR was handed over and taken to the Russian Federation at the Ukrainian-Russian border near the village of Severniy. See for example the following considerations by the court: Then around nine o’clock in the morning, a single Buk M is delivered to Donetsk by Bibliothekar, on a trailer. The Buk comes from the Russian Federation and, on Dubinskiy's orders, travels directly to Pulatov in the corridor, where it will solve the problems of bombardment by high-flying Sushkas. Kharchenko receives the instruction from Dubinskiy to escort the Buk, to position it in the vicinity of Pervomaiske and to guard it there with his men. (…) During the night and early morning of 18 July 2014, there is much telephone traffic about the removal of the Buk TELAR. The calls take place between the persons responsible for the removal, men of the DPR and the LPR, who are in contact with each other, and also with the two crew members present, but also at the level of the Ministers of Defence of the DPR and the LPR. In that process, a misunderstanding arises about the escorting of the Buk TELAR from the border between the DPR and the LPR, up to the agreed end point: the border with the Russian Federation at Severniy. Girkin becomes very angry at Dubinskiy, and instructs him to sort it out. Dubinskiy attempts to get this done via Kharchenko. However, the misunderstanding is not solved overnight, as the telephones prove unreachable. In the early morning it becomes clear that, under the escort of Bibliothekar, the Buk TELAR has been taken to the Russian border and has arrived there. Only when that becomes clear are Dubinskiy and Girkin at ease. (…) The court concludes from the foregoing that in the night of 16 to 17 July 2014, DPR fighters delivered a Buk TELAR from the Russian Federation. The need for anti-aircraft artillery of this kind had long been felt, and following heavy fighting on 16 July 2014, whereby the DPR suffered heavy losses without being able to effectively defend itself, the system was more than welcome. The Buk TELAR that was delivered in the night and early morning was therefore sent on, immediately following its receipt in the morning of 17 July 2014, to the front line on the corridor between Snizhne and the border with the Russian Federation to the south of Snizhne, and in the afternoon of 17 July 2014 was deployed in the area occupied by the DPR near Pervomaiskyi in their fight against the Ukrainian army. As a consequence of that deployment, not a Sushka, but flight MH17 was downed and the 298 occupants of that flight were killed. After it became clear that this disaster had been caused by the deployment of the Buk TELAR, the said weapon was rapidly returned to the Russian Federation, in the expectation of preventing an international outcry.7 7 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 6.2.4.4
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 13 MH17 Report 2.3 Buk TELAR with crew The district court established not only that the Buk TELAR had come from the Russian Federation, but also that it was accompanied by a full crew. As early as 8 June 2014, Girkin reported to the self-proclaimed prime minister of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, that the DPR needed air defence weapons with a greater range than MANPADS, as well as trained crews to operate them. On 16 July 2014, when the situation was becoming dire for the DPR, the requested weapon was provided: a Buk TELAR with crew. Pulatov called the telephone number of one of the crew members when the weapon was being transported to Ukraine and when it was being returned to Russia. Immediately after MH17 had been shot down, one crew member initially remained behind at the launch location, but ultimately the crew travelled back to the Russian Federation, together with the trailer-mounted Buk TELAR. This is shown by the following facts as established by The Hague District Court: The intercepted conversations and visual material, viewed also in the context of the aforementioned evidence, lead the court to conclude that after a period of ceasefire, fighting between the separatists and the Ukrainian army resumed in late June - early July 2014, and that the separatists were suffering from the bombing and shelling by the Ukrainian army. On 8 June 2014, by which time he had been active in eastern Ukraine, operating from Sloviansk, for about eight weeks, Girkin already reports this fact in a conversation with Aksenov, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea who requested Girkin to become actively involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine Girkin mentions to Aksenov the need for military support from the Russian side, in order to achieve success in the conflict against Ukraine. This includes air defence weapons, including systems with a longer range than Manpads. Girkin wants the desired military equipment to be supplied accompanied by trained crew, because the DPR has no time for training. Aksenov is working on the request, and assistance and coordination from Russia appear to be forthcoming. (…) It is also clear from the intercepted conversations that the fighting is arduous; enemy positions cannot be broken through, and the Ukrainians are carrying out air strikes with Sushkas, and continuous artillery fire by the Ukrainians has led to many deaths and injuries on the side of the DPR. (…) The DPR fighters can do nothing against the Sushkas: although two Sushkas are downed by them that day with their Manpads, for the most part the Sushkas fly too high to strike them with the means available to the DPR. Especially because the Strela is also broken. The Strela is due to be removed for repair in the coming night (the night of 16-17 July 2014), Pulatov reports to Dubinskiy. For that reason, Pulatov has no need for tanks, but for decent anti-aircraft defence, he informs Dubinskiy. Dubinskiy then expresses the wish to DPR fighter Sanych to receive a Buk, which he could then send to the corridor that morning, otherwise the prospects do not look good. Dubinskiy tells Pulatov that if he receives delivery of a Buk M that night, then it will be sent directly to Pulatov and that the said Buk M is their only hope. In light of the difficult course of the conflict, caused by heavy artillery fire and air strikes, and Dubinskiy's and Pulatov's complaints about the situation, the wish to have a Buk M must be seen as an expression of the desire to have access to a larger and more powerful weapon in order to be able to defend themselves against the constant Ukrainian (air) attacks. A Buk M would be very suitable for that purpose.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 14 MH17 Report (…) While the Buk TELAR is en route from the Furshet to Pervomaiskyi, Pulatov makes three unsuccessful attempts to call a telephone number ending in -6335. In the court's opinion, it is sufficiently established that this is the number of a crew member of the Buk TELAR. This follows from the fact that at the moment Pulatov calls this number, the called telephone communicates with a transmission mast on Gagarina Street in Snizhne, and at that precise moment, according to intercepted conversations and the aforementioned video footage, a Buk TELAR is driving under its own power along Gagarina Street in Snizhne towards Pervomaiskyi. This fact, in combination with the fact that historical telecom traffic of that evening shows that - after Kharchenko has requested him to contact the crew of the Buk TELAR because a crew member has been left behind at the launch site - Pulatov made four calls to this number within more than ten minutes, convincingly demonstrates in the opinion of the court that this must have been the number on which a crew member of the Buk TELAR could be reached. All the more so since this number was only in use on 17 July 2014. (…) As already indicated above, immediately following the crash of MH17, attention was focused on securing the Buk TELAR, but that changes after several hours, and orders are given to remove the Buk TELAR. All these conversations take place after the conversations about which aeroplane was shot down by the Buk TELAR of the DPR fighters. Because he is too busy because of the crash of MH17, at half past eight Girkin instructs Dubinskiy to evacuate the Buk TELAR and to remove it to the border between the DPR and the LPR, where it will be picked up. The court deduces from this that before issuing this instruction, Girkin must have been in contact with the LPR, which is shown to be the case later that evening. Dubinskiy immediately makes a start on carrying out this instruction and notifies Kharchenko that the Buk TELAR must be taken to the region border and that a trailer will be provided for that purpose. When Kharchenko sets to work and wishes to pick up the Buk TELAR at the checkpoint, he hears from his subordinate that the Buk TELAR has already left for Snizhne under its own power. A short time later, it emerges that one of the crew members has been left behind at the checkpoint. Kharchenko instructs his subordinate to take the crew member to the Furshet and asks Pulatov to seek contact on this matter with the other crew members of the Buk TELAR. However, these attempts are unsuccessful.8 (…) Witness S21, call sign ‘Leshy’, is one of the people whom Kharchenko tasked with the removal. Witness S21 provided a statement about the progress of the first part of the journey. He stated that the Buk TELAR had been driven into Snizhne on a trailer with a white cab and was to be taken from Snizhne to Krasnyj Luch, where escorting would be handed over to others. S21 states that the plan for handing over the escorting of the Buk TELAR then changed and he travelled with the Buk TELAR as far as Debaltseve, after which the crew continued travelling with the trailer itself towards Luhansk. They knew the way from there. This statement is corroborated both by the content of several intercepted 8 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 6.2.2.4.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 15 MH17 Report conversations on S21’s phone and by the transmission mast data, in which the route driven by S21 can be traced from Snizhne via Krasnyj Luch to Debaltseve. Although S21 did not comment on the further route towards the border with the Russian Federation, he did state that the crew wanted to follow the familiar route. The court considers that the route from Debaltseve via Luhansk corresponds to the route very likely to have been taken the day before on the outward journey. The following evidence confirms that this route was followed on the return journey. In a conversation between Bibliothekar and Dubinskiy, Bibliothekar said he had removed ‘the box’ and that it was now there, in that area. A minute later, Dubinskiy called Girkin and told him that Bibliothekar had personally taken it there. The court understands this to mean that the Buk TELAR had been taken across the border into the Russian Federation. Bibliothekar’s telephone pinged several transmission masts on the route between Debaltseve and Luhansk that night, placing the telephone – and thus also the Buk TELAR – in Luhansk at 04:51, after which the telephone continued moving eastwards. The court has established that the Buk TELAR that was in Pervomaiskyi that night, at that time, was travelling in that direction through Luhansk and thus can be seen in this video. This Buk TELAR was captured in various kinds of visual material on the morning of 17 July 2014 as it made its way to Pervomaiskyi. A simple comparison of the number of missiles on the Buk TELAR shows that one missile was missing that night, after the disaster, a missile that had still been present that morning, before the disaster.9 2.4 Responsibility for deployment of Buk TELAR and launch of Buk missile In its judgment the district court also referred to the broader responsibility for the deployment of the Buk TELAR and the downing of flight MH17. In this regard the court established that the use of a Buk TELAR requires a well-trained crew and proper preparation, and that the launch of a Buk missile must follow a specific procedure. This means that a Buk missile cannot be fired by accident or on a whim. Furthermore, according to the district court, the downing of an aircraft flying at high altitude will inevitably result in the death of everyone onboard. According to the court, the crew had no justification whatsoever for shooting down aeroplanes or other aircraft in eastern Ukraine. Since the deployment of the Buk TELAR in this case was not intended to be a deterrent but was intended to actually shoot down aircraft, with all the consequences that would entail, the district court concluded that the crew of the Buk TELAR and anyone who contributed to the deployment of this weapon had deliberately (and with premeditation) caused an aircraft to crash and the deaths of everyone onboard. In this connection the court held that the actions of the crew when firing the Buk missile at MH17 could not be established, nor could the identity of the individual who gave the order to fire. Furthermore, it could not be established whether the missile was deliberately fired at a civil aircraft, or whether it was launched in the belief that MH17 was a military aircraft. The court considers it completely implausible that a deliberate decision was made to shoot down a civil aircraft, and it is plausible that MH17 was shot down by mistake. See the district court’s following considerations in the judgment: 9 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:14037, 6.2.2.4
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 16 MH17 Report Why was MH17 downed: intent, unlawfulness and premeditation The court notes - along with the prosecution and counsel for defendant Pulatov - that the actions of the crew of the Buk TELAR when launching the Buk missile at MH17 cannot be established on the basis of the case file. The case file also fails to identify who gave the instruction to launch a missile, and why that order was given. The court has found that the Buk missile was fired from a farm field near Pervomaiskyi and that that area was under the control of the DPR at the time. The Buk TELAR was deployed in the DPR's fight against the Ukrainian armed forces, to bring down Ukrainian military aircraft. Indeed, DPR forces were suffering greatly from air strikes by Ukrainian military aircraft. In what is known as the target acquisition process that precedes the firing of a weapon such as a Buk TELAR, a target is identified in order to achieve a certain effect. The target is then checked, and a decision is made whether or not to fire a missile. These steps and decisions are not only related to the technical functioning of a weapon system such as a Buk TELAR, but are also prescribed for participating in hostilities, according to international humanitarian law (the law of war) Consideration must also be given to whether the deployment of the weapon will or can result in damage to unintended objects or victims. This may lead to the decision to abandon or abort deployment of the weapon, for example, if it is recognised that the target is in fact a civil aircraft. The case file contains no information about what occurred in the Buk TELAR just before the Buk missile was fired. Therefore, the court cannot determine whether a civil aircraft was deliberately shot at or whether the missile was fired in the assumption that MH17 was a military aircraft. However, the court can determine the following. A Buk weapon system is primarily intended to be used to shoot down (enemy) aircraft. The death of enemy occupants may also be an intended purpose of shooting down the aircraft, but it need not be. Due to the enormous destructive power of the weapon and its effects, which effects the court itself observed during its inspection of the reconstruction, and the weapon’s great altitude range, the likelihood of those on board the aircraft surviving the attack is nil, and anyone deploying a specialised, expensive weapon such as a Buk TELAR is aware of this. Operating a Buk TELAR requires a well-trained crew. Furthermore, the weapon cannot be casually deployed. Deployment demands the necessary preparation, including designation of and transport to a location where the weapon can be used. Making the system ready and the actual firing of a missile follow a set procedure, described previously. It is precisely this extensive preparation, consisting of many steps, that leads to the conclusion that the opportunity existed to think about and consider the intended act. The court finds it plausible that that opportunity was indeed used. This means that the firing of a Buk missile is neither accidental nor does it happen on a whim. Instead, it is very deliberate and well-considered, according to a set method of operation (prescribed by technical requirements) Therefore, in the court's opinion, it can be said that there was intent and a certain deliberation concerning the firing of the missile at the target in question, and that the nature of the weapon and the purpose of its use mean that it is clear what the consequences of the intended firing would be, namely, the destruction and crashing of the aircraft and, in all probability, the death of all those on board.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 17 MH17 Report Bringing down this aeroplane, which was flying at an altitude of ten kilometres, in this way, in the opinion of the court, automatically would lead to the death of all those on board. Legally speaking, this means that the intention of the crew of the Buk TELAR was to take the lives of those on board of this aircraft and that this was done with premeditation. There is no evidence of any indication to the contrary to which more weight should be given. Also, the intention of the crew was to cause this aircraft to crash by firing a Buk missile, although this was likely to endanger the lives of the occupants of said aircraft, as a result of which 298 people died. The crew was in no way justified in shooting down aircraft, meaning the unlawfulness of that action is a given. Since the deployment of a Buk TELAR in this context was aimed at downing one or more aircraft with all that this entails, it must be assumed that the aforementioned intent and premeditation were present not only on the part of those who fired the missile, but also on the part of anyone who contributed to making the deployment of this weapon possible. As previously considered, there is no indication that those who played a role in enabling the deployment of this weapon assumed that the weapon would not actually be deployed. That they contributed to that deployment with the intention that it would bring down a military aircraft and not a civil aircraft does not change this, as will be explained below. Mistake scenario Before the court addresses the question of whether these charges can be proven with regard to the accused, the court will consider whether the possibility or even likelihood that it was thought that the aircraft that was shot down was a military aircraft, and that there was no intention to strike a civil aircraft (error in objecto/persona), is of any significance in assessing intent in this criminal case. First and foremost, the court considers it completely implausible that a civil aircraft was deliberately downed. Not only because it is impossible to see what purpose that would have served, but also because neither the case file nor the trial provide any indication of this. On the contrary, the statement of M58, who was present in the field, and the telephone reactions following the downing of MH17 rather show that those involved initially thought that they had succeeded in shooting down a Ukrainian military aircraft. A mistake being made is something the court does find plausible, especially in a situation where only a Buk TELAR operating independently is being used and no other aircraft are flying nearby with which the target can be compared. Therefore, the court will proceed on the assumption that it was believed a military aircraft was being downed. In a situation where the wrong target is mistakenly impacted in the execution of a crime, case law of the Netherlands Supreme Court, among others, holds the physical perpetrator of the crime responsible without prejudice. The reasoning here is that in the crime of murder, the intent is to kill another person with premeditation, and if it turns out afterwards that not the intended person, but another person was killed, the definition of the offence is still met, namely that another person was intentionally killed. In the court's view, this also applies to intentionally and unlawfully causing an aircraft to crash. If in retrospect it turns out that a different type of aircraft than the intended type was shot down, the definition of the offence is still met. The fact of the matter is that, in the absence of combatant privilege, killing a soldier warrants punishment as much as killing a civilian, and shooting down a military aircraft warrants punishment as much as shooting down a civil aircraft. Further, if the intention was to shoot down an aeroplane that should not have been shot down and an aeroplane was shot down that should not have been shot down, then, at the very least, the substantial likelihood of killing people who also should not have been killed was accepted. In the eyes of the law, there is no difference between the two aircraft, nor the status of those on board. Therefore, the mistake does not negate the intent or premeditation.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 18 MH17 Report (…) In the court's opinion, it is incorrect to impose the requirement of conditional intent or a different degree of culpability in the case of a remote participant - unlike in the case of a physical perpetrator - when determining whether a mistake made by the physical perpetrator can be imputed to this remote participant. After all, it is equally true that these remote participants knowingly played a role in a crime. The fact that the execution of that crime mistakenly involved the wrong victim should not absolve the participant of responsibility any more than the physical perpetrator. In concrete terms, those who have played a criminally culpable role in the deployment of a Buk TELAR with the purpose of shooting down a military aircraft (a similarly proscribed act) are therefore responsible for the consequences of that unlawful deployment for that reason alone, even if the crew of the Buk TELAR mistakenly shot down a civil aircraft instead of a military aircraft in the execution of that crime. (…) Contributing to this is the fact that the evidence shows that this particular Buk TELAR was deployed in the fight that the DPR was waging against the Ukrainian military authorities, and indeed, this Buk TELAR was used to fire a missile from an area held by the separatists in combat to establish a corridor that was of great importance to those separatists (and their battle). Indeed, the corridor connected the part of the Donbas that the separatists already controlled to the Russian Federation, providing a direct and short supply route for equipment to the occupied Donbas area. In light of the DPR's objective of achieving greater independence from Ukraine, by force if necessary, whereby control and authority had already been taken (in part of) the Donbas, the Buk TELAR was an essential weapon to achieve that goal, given Ukraine’s military air superiority in the conflict on the days around 17 July 2014, specifically in the area around Snizhne. Thus, all actions related to obtaining and deploying the said Buk TELAR contributed towards the realisation of the DPR's goal. As a result, it can be stated that the Buk TELAR, regardless of who concretely had authority and command over its deployment and regardless of the specific instructions given to its crew, was for the use and benefit of the DPR.10 In the course of the investigation conducted over the past eight-and-a-half years, the JIT has been unable to find sufficient information regarding these three points (deliberate attack versus mistake; the crew’s actions when launching the missile; order to fire). This report will describe the findings of the JIT’s investigation into the Buk TELAR, its crew, their superior officers and those responsible for supplying and deploying the Buk TELAR. 2.5 Denial and obstruction by the Russian Federation Contrary to the established facts, the Russian authorities have to date denied any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014. They also deny any involvement in the downing of flight MH17. In its judgment the district court established that on multiple occasions the Russian authorities presented falsified evidence in support of this denial: 10 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:14037, 6.2.5.3.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 19 MH17 Report The authorities of the Russian Federation, to which Almaz-Antey is affiliated, have - as the court has found above - wrongly denied any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In addition, they have denied any involvement in the MH17 disaster. In the context of that denial, the authorities of the Russian Federation have repeatedly presented evidence that sought to show that the Ukrainian authorities, rather than the authorities of the Russian Federation, were responsible for the MH17 disaster. On several occasions, however, this so-called evidence was found to have been falsified or there were evident traces of manipulation.11 This stance by the Russian authorities has also had an adverse effect on the investigation into the crew, their superior officers and those responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR to the DPR. It has not been possible to conduct any investigative activities in the Russian Federation, and questions about Russian involvement posed in the context of a request for legal assistance remain unanswered. 2.6 Conclusion In summary, the district court established that: - the Russian authorities had far-reaching involvement in the DPR conflict from mid May 2014; - the Buk TELAR used to down flight MH17 came from the Russian Federation accompanied by a crew; - anyone who contributed to the deployment of the Buk TELAR bears responsibility for the downing of flight MH17; - the specific actions of the crew when firing the Buk missile, and the identity of the individual who gave the order to fire, are not known. - it is completely implausible that a deliberate decision was made to shoot down a civil aircraft, and it is likely that MH17 was hit by mistake; - contrary to the established facts, the Russian authorities have to date denied any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine and on multiple occasions have presented falsified evidence. These facts, as established by the district court, are relevant to the interpretation of the investigation findings discussed below. 11 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:14037, 6.3.2.5.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 20 MH17 Report 3 Origin of the Buk TELAR The district court established, on the basis of various evidence gathered by the JIT, that the Buk TELAR used to shoot down MH17 had come from the Russian Federation. The JIT conducted a detailed investigation into the unit to which this Buk TELAR belonged. 3.1 Identification of the Buk TELAR During the criminal proceedings the Public Prosecution Service extensively discussed the investigation into the unit to which the Buk TELAR belonged.12 The identification of the Buk TELAR took place in several steps. First, the video footage and photos taken of the Buk TELAR in Ukraine on 17 and 18 July 2014 were investigated. The court designated this material as authentic images of the Buk TELAR used to down MH17, and included those images in the evidence. These images can therefore also be used to identify the Buk TELAR. The visual material from Donetsk, Makeevka, Torez and Luhansk is of such a high quality that a total of 15 specific features of the TELAR are recognisable. On the basis of both the combination and location of these 15 features, it is possible to identify the Buk TELAR. To determine the origin of the TELAR, the JIT went in search of other visual material of a TELAR with exactly the same combination of features. In the process, investigators located visual material of a Russian military Buk convoy that had moved from Kursk in the Russian Federation in a southerly direction along the Russian-Ukrainian border from 23 to 25 June 2014. The last images of the convoy, which comprised a complete Buk system13 including six TELARs, were captured in Millerovo, in the Russian Federation. The visual material consists of 21 video files and nine social media posts containing one or more images. The convoy includes a Buk TELAR with a tactical vehicle number on the left-hand side beginning with 3, followed by a small white stripe and ending in 2. This vehicle is referred to hereafter as ‘3X2’. This Russian Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ had 14 of the 15 specific features of the Buk TELAR used to down flight MH17. The 17-18 July 2014 images of the Buk TELAR used to down MH17 do not show a vehicle number on the left-hand side, only a diagonal stripe and a small white stripe. Investigation has revealed that when a vehicle is to be deployed in an operation, it is common practice to sand away or paint over the tactical vehicle number so that it cannot be identified. In both its form and location, the 15th specific feature of this Buk TELAR – the remnants of a tactical vehicle number on the left-hand side in the form of a diagonal stripe and a small white stripe – precisely matches the ‘2’ and the abovementioned 'small white stripe’ of the vehicle number of the Russian Buk TELAR ‘3X2’. Thus, the Buk TELAR which was used to shoot down MH17 and which is visible on the images captured in Ukraine on 17 and 12 Explanatory notes on the investigation into the main scenario (hearing of 8-10 June 2020) and the public prosecutor's closing speech (hearing of 20-22 December 2021). 13 See section 4.2 for explanation of further information concerning the Buk system.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 21 MH17 Report 18 July 2014 matches all 15 specific features of the Buk TELAR '3X2’ visible on the images filmed in the Russian Federation between 23 and 25 July 2014. The third and final step was to investigate the uniqueness of this match in respect of the 15 specific features. To do so, investigators searched for Buk TELARs other than '3X2’ with the same combination of specific features. First, they assembled a data set of around 1.3 million images of possible Ukrainian and Russian Buk systems. An automated search tool developed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute was used to search within these images. This automated search resulted in 463,584 images that potentially showed all or part of a TELAR. Each of these images was then examined by eye for the presence of a Buk TELAR. This manual search resulted in 2,481 images showing one or more Ukrainian and Russian Buk TELARS (or parts thereof). Each of these 2,481 images was examined to determine whether the aforementioned 15 specific features were present. The outcome of this examination was that no Buk TELARs with the same combination of features as the TELAR in the Ukrainian visual material from 17 and 18 July 2014 and the ‘3X2’ in the Russian visual material from 23 to 25 July 2014 were found in these images. 3.2 Military unit Investigators next tried to determine which unit this Russian Buk-TELAR ‘3X2’ belonged to. To this end, they looked at the images from 23 to 25 June 2014 and social media posts. It was an eye-catching convoy which attracted considerable attention. Over the course of its journey, the convoy was captured in various photos and videos, which were later found online. One video of the convoy, filmed on 24 June 2014, showed five number plates belonging to the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (AAMB). The 53rd AAMB works with Buk systems and its base is located in Marshala Zhukova, near Kursk. The brigade is sometimes also identified by its military postcode 32406. This convoy's route was reconstructed using geolocation of the images filmed between 23 and 25 June 2014. This showed that the convoy of 23 to 25 June 2014 had travelled from Kursk in a southerly direction along the Russian-Ukrainian border. The convoy was last visually documented in the Russian town of Millerovo in the Rostov region. In addition to visual material, a large number of social media posts regarding this convoy were found online. These messages were posted by military personnel of the 53rd AAMB and their relatives, among others. The content of these messages show that the convoy in question was from the 53rd AAMB from Kursk and was travelling to the Rostov region. On the basis of these findings, the JIT concluded that the Buk TELAR that downed flight MH17 had come from the 53rd AAMB from Kursk in the Russian Federation.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 22 MH17 Report 4 Crew of the Buk TELAR and commanders In its judgment, the court not only noted that the Buk TELAR that shot down MH17 was from the Russian Federation, but also that it came to Ukraine with a crew. It also noted that, after the downing of MH17, the Buk TELAR returned with its crew to the Russian Federation. The JIT assumes that the crew and the Buk TELAR belonged to the same military unit. The court also established that it was unknown who had given the relevant orders to the crew, what they entailed and why the crew fired a Buk missile at MH17 at that particular moment. The court agreed with the JIT’s conclusion that the crew used the Ukrainian phone number ending in -6335. In order to find the answer to the question of why flight MH17 was shot down and who can be held responsible, an investigation was conducted into the identities of the crew members and their superiors. After all, they should be able to answer that question. The following section first discusses the scope of the investigation. Then it highlights the findings of the investigation into the composition and organisation of the 53rd AAMB, the military command structure, the deployment of the 53rd AAMB at the Russian-Ukrainian border, the methods used to identify the Buk TELAR and the possible crew members of the Buk TELAR and their immediate commanders. 4.1 Scope of the investigation A complicating factor in this investigation was the absence of any telecommunications with the crew. The phone number ending in -6335 was active in Ukraine only on 17 July 2014. This number was not tapped, and its user was not in contact with any numbers that were being tapped; only one call was made on 17 July 2014 involving this number. The content of this one call is unknown. So there are no conversations involving the crew that could shed light on their identities or the circumstances under which they fired the Buk missile. Nor are there any conversations in which the crew’s identities or the reasons for firing the missile are discussed. Unlike the investigation into the DPR fighters responsible, in which intercepted phone conversations formed the bulk of the evidence, there was no relevant telecom data in the investigation into the crew, their assignment and their immediate commanders. Other investigation methods and various sources were used – where necessary with authorisation from the examining magistrate – in order to acquire information from and about military personnel of the 53rd AAMB. For instance, the JIT gained access to the contents of a number of inboxes, two of which belong to officers of the 53rd Brigade. These inboxes contained transport orders and other documents that proved relevant to the investigation into the 53rd AAMB’s activities in the summer of 2014. Specifically, the material concerned a number of long deployments in the Russian region bordering the Donbas in eastern Ukraine. The route taken by Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ to that border region was instrumental in the investigation into the crew members and their commanders. That route could possibly be used to identify the individuals involved, as was done in the investigation into the DPR fighters. The same is true for the route taken by Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ after
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 23 MH17 Report the downing of flight MH17, after it crossed the Russian border. The investigation into these routes is described in this report. An extensive investigation of public sources also took place. This included the securing of satellite images. In addition, satellite images were made available by the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the European Space Agency (ESA). The range of military and other radar systems positioned in the Russian Federation was also investigated. The JIT also issued several calls for witnesses, both online and in video messages and letters. Many witnesses were interviewed as part of the investigation into the crew, including members of the 53rd AAMB. In so far as they yielded relevant information, those interviews are discussed in this report. In addition, the social media accounts of members and former members of the 53rd AAMB were monitored and travel movements were traced. This social media investigation verified the above-mentioned orders, among other things. On the basis of the investigation results, several military personnel were identified and it was established that several members of the 53rd AAMB, who were not mentioned by name in the orders, were deployed in the border region at the time of the downing of MH17. In order to be able to interpret the findings, an investigation was conducted into the composition and organisation of the 53rd AAMB and the Russian military command structure. 4.2 Composition and organisation of the 53rd AAMB The 53rd AAMB, which is part of the Russian army, is responsible for operational air defence in a particular area. In 2014 the 53rd AAMB consisted of a staff and communications company, a technical support company and three operational battalions. The full brigade comprises over 700 active personnel (conscripts, contract soldiers and officers). The battalions carry out the air defence tasks. Each battalion has a full Buk system consisting of 11 Buk vehicles: a command vehicle (CP), a radar vehicle (TAR), three launch vehicles without radar (TELL) and six launch vehicles with radar (TELAR). Secured documents from March 2015 showed that each battalion had 123 positions for conscripts, contract soldiers and officers. A battalion is commanded by a battalion commander and his deputy and has its own battalion staff. Each battalion is divided into three companies (referred to as batteries). Each company has two TELARs and one TELL and is commanded by two officers. The command vehicles (CP) and the radar vehicle (TAR) serve all three companies. The court’s judgment proceeds from the assumption that one (autonomous) Buk TELAR was deployed. As a rule, the crew of a Buk TELAR consists of four personnel: a commander, a first and second operator and a driver. The commander is in charge of the vehicle and communicates with the battalion or brigade command. He is the only person on board who is authorised to launch a missile. For this purpose he has a ‘commander’s key’, which is needed to carry out a launch. The commander is an officer who has completed a five-year training programme in which he has
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 24 MH17 Report learned how to command all types of Buk vehicle. An operator is responsible for reading out the systems and adjusting them where necessary. His tasks can also be carried out by the commander. An operator is usually a contract soldier or a conscript. Operator training takes two months and focuses on a specific type of Buk vehicle. Drivers are also often contract soldiers or conscripts. In addition to driving the vehicle, they must also be able to maintain and repair it. The investigation did not yield any information about driver training. 4.3 Military command structure In 2014, the commander of the 53rd AAMB was Colonel Sergei Muchkaev. Under Russian military law, the commander is the sole person responsible for the conduct of military operations, and he can be expected to know the current status of his unit.14 The 53rd AAMB is responsible for air defence in the area under the responsibility of the 20th Guards Army in the Western Military District of the Russian armed forces. If a unit of the 53rd AAMB carries out operational tasks outside its own district, responsibility for those tasks lies with the leadership of the district in question. In the case of the deployment of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ in 2014, that means the leadership of the Southern Military District. The commander of this district is under the command of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces and the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu. The Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defence, for their part, are subordinate to the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. As commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces, President Putin has ultimate military authority.15 Formal authority does not automatically lead to actual control over the deployment of the Buk TELAR. Chapter 5 discusses the investigation into the Russian decision to provide a Buk TELAR and crew to the DPR. 4.4 Deployment of the 53rd AAMB It follows from the images and social media posts discussed earlier that the convoy with Buk TELAR ‘3x2’ was a convoy of the second battalion of the 53rd AAMB, which drove from its military home base near Kursk to Millerovo between 23 and 25 June 2014. Various documents were secured from the available in-boxes, including transport orders and related documents, addressed to Russian military personnel who in 2014 were working for regional military traffic units (the 47th and 56th VAI), but also documents that can be linked to the personnel and materiel department of the 53rd AAMB. In the summer of 2014, the 47th and 56th VAI were involved in escorting various 53rd AAMB transports, including the convoy that travelled from 23 to 25 June 2014. It is clear from the available documents that the final destination of this convoy was Nizhnemityakin, a village 14 Articles 75 and 76 of the Presidential law of November 2007, No. 1495 (adjusted on 21-02-2019), established as general military legislation of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. 15 http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/president/authority/commander (last consulted on 5 December 2022)
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 25 MH17 Report southwest of Millerovo. Nizhnemityakin is around 15 kilometres from the Ukrainian border and around 40 kilometres from the Ukrainian border crossing at Severniy. This is where the Buk TELAR and its crew were handed over by a DPR fighter with call sign Bibliothekar on the morning of 18 July 2014. Near that location, that same Bibliothekar collected the Buk TELAR and crew in the early morning of 17 July 2014, after it had been brought over the border from the Russian Federation. 4.4.1 Movement of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ and other Buk vehicles to the border region On the basis of the above-mentioned Russian military orders and other sources, an investigation was conducted into this movement of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ from the brigade base in Kursk to the border region. The whereabouts of Buk TELAR ‘3x2’ in the period from 25 June 2014 until the moment it crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border in the early morning of 17 July 2014 were investigated as well. An investigation was also carried out to find out what could have happened to this TELAR after it returned to the Russian Federation via the Ukrainian-Russian border crossing at Severniy on the morning of 18 July 2014. In addition the team investigated which members of personnel of the 53rd AAMB went to the border region in that period. All of this was done on the basis of the notion that having a solid grasp of the Buk TELAR’s movements could shed light on the crew. The JIT confirmed the authenticity of these orders and documents on the basis of their provenance and validated the contents by comparing them with other sources. These orders and documents concern, among other things, various deployments of the 53rd AAMB in the summer of 2014. The orders relate to the transport of materiel and personnel from the military home base in Marshala Zhukova (near Kursk) to the border region with Ukraine on three occasions: from 23 June 2014, from 15 July 2014 and from 19 July 2014. These documents also contain information about the return of personnel and materiel from Volchenskiy, south of Millerovo, and Glubokiy to the home base in late September and early October 2014. Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ was part of the convoy of 23 June 2014. The orders show that on 23 June 2014, personnel and materiel of the 53rd AAMB, escorted by the 47th and 56th VAI, left the military base in Kursk and drove for two days to the final destination of Nizhnemityakin in the Rostov region. The route described in the orders matches the route that can be deduced from the available images of this convoy. Those images show 11 combat vehicles which together form a Buk battalion: a command vehicle (CP), a radar vehicle (TAR), three launch vehicles without radar (TELL) and six launch vehicles with radar (TELAR). These Buk vehicles were transported by road on Kamaz tractor-trailer combinations, the visible number plates of which matched the registration numbers listed in the orders. Vehicle numbers can be seen in the images on nine of the eleven Buk vehicles. One of them is Buk TELAR ‘3X2’. The other eight identifiable Buk vehicles each have a vehicle number beginning with ‘2’. The first digit of a vehicle number denotes the battalion to which the vehicle belongs. This means that Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ was from the 3rd battalion, whereas the other Buk vehicles in this convoy were from the 2nd battalion. The second digit of the vehicle number denotes one of the three companies (or batteries) of the battalion in question, and the third digit (which for a TELAR is always a 1 or a 2) denotes one of the two TELARs of the company (or battery) in question. The vehicle numbers of the six Buk TELARs of the 2nd battalion are therefore 211, 212, 221, 222, 231 and 232. The first convoy, from 23 to 25 June 2014, indeed included five TELARs with vehicle
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 26 MH17 Report numbers 211, 212, 221, 231 and 232, but no TELAR with vehicle number 222. The sixth TELAR in this convoy is the ‘3X2’, and it appeared to be in the convoy in place of the TELAR with vehicle number 222. The orders contain no information about the objective of the deployment of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ and other materiel near the Ukrainian border. It is known, however, that as early as February 2014 Putin gave the order ‘to conduct a sudden comprehensive check of the combat readiness of the troops/forces from Western Military District and Central Military District and some military branches' and that in March 2014 Minister of Defence Shoigu announced ‘surprise exercises’. On 1 June 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defence also announced that from that day onwards more than 300 exercises would be conducted throughout the summer. Shoigu then reported on 19 June 2014, at a private meeting with several members of the Duma, that the armed forces were ready to fulfil any task given by ‘the country leadership and supreme commander’. A document from the commander of the 53rd AAMB of November 2017 discusses the history of the brigade. For the year 2014 it mentions ‘strategic exercises in unknown territory’. In 2018, in a request for legal assistance, the Public Prosecution Service asked the Russian Federation where the Buk TELAR with vehicle number ‘3X2’ was in the period between 23 June and 23 July 2014. This question remained unanswered. According to the Russian authorities there was no evidence pointing to the presence of any Russian Buk TELAR in eastern Ukraine, and therefore there was no reason to answer the question about the whereabouts of the TELAR bearing the number ‘3X2’ between 23 June and 23 July 2014. According to the orders, on 15 July 2014 a convoy consisting of 48 passenger and transport vehicles left for the same border region. These orders do not mention Buk vehicles. These orders and other documents do show, however, that from 15 July 2014 a total of 193 military personnel of the 53rd AAMB were deployed to a place south of Millerovo, presumably Volchenskiy. In order to verify the orders, the investigation also looked at the orders relating to the convoy of 19 July 2014. These orders concern the transport of, among other things, 10 Buk vehicles to the border region. It follows from other documents and secured images that these were vehicles from the 1st battalion. A satellite photo of the home base of the 53rd AAMB of 18 July 2014 shows loaded tractor-trailer combinations lined up. Images from 19 and 20 July 2014 show 11 Kamaz tractor-trailer combinations, carrying 10 Buk vehicles and one armoured vehicle. The route that these vehicles took matches the route described in the orders. The vehicles described in the orders also match the images. As mentioned above, the 53rd AAMB consists of three battalions. It follows from the combination of the orders and the secured images that the 1st and 2nd battalions were deployed in the summer of 2014. Nothing specific was found that would point to the movement of any other vehicles of the 3rd battalion to the border except ‘3X2’.16 The conclusion that the 3rd battalion was not independently deployed follows from the investigation of public sources. In the summer of 2014, Russian students underwent training with the 53rd AAMB. The photos they posted on VK show 16 It should be noted that the convoy of 19 July 2014 included two covered Buk TARs. As the vehicle numbers of these TARs are not visible, it is not known to which battalion they belong.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 27 MH17 Report vehicles of the 3rd battalion. Their posts mentioned that the photos were taken at the home base of the 53rd AAMB in the period from 22 June to 25 July 2014. 4.4.2 Withdrawal of Buk vehicles of the 1st and 2nd battalions A memorandum was found with the orders, with information about the withdrawal of personnel and materiel of the 53rd AAMB, including the Buk vehicles. The memorandum is dated 23 September 2014 and signed by the acting commander of the 53rd AAMB. It refers to ‘combat directive 399’ of the command centre of the Western Military District. According to this directive of the Western Military District, the staff and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 53rd AAMB were to be withdrawn to the brigade base near Kursk between 26 September and 1 October 2014. As regards the Buk vehicles, the order says that one command vehicle, one radar vehicle, two TELLs and four TELARs of the 1st battalion were to be removed and one command vehicle, one radar vehicle, three TELLs and five TELARs of the 2nd battalion. The memorandum contains no information about the removal of the sixth TELAR of the 2nd battalion, which was transported to the deployment area in the convoy from 23 to 25 June 2014. Nor does it contain any information about the second radar vehicle and the fifth TELAR, which according to previous orders were transported to the deployment area in the convoy of 19 July 2014. According to the memorandum, all the Buk vehicles were to be transported by rail, and not – as on the way to the deployment area – by road. To this end they were ordered to rendezvous on 27 September 2014 at the ’field positions of the 1st battalion’, two kilometres southeast of Volchenskiy. The memorandum also says that the 9M38 Buk missiles of the 1st and 2nd battalion would be dismantled on 24 and 25 September 2014. The Buk vehicles that were to be removed were to rendezvous on 27 September 2014 near Volchenskiy. The JIT asked ESA about the availability of satellite images of the vicinity of Volchenskiy and the route from Volchenskiy to Kursk in the period from 27 September to 2 October 2014, as mentioned in the memorandum. There are no images of this route with sufficiently high resolution available for the period in question, with the exception of a satellite image of 29 September 2014. That image shows around 100 military vehicles lined up in rows near a railway line near Likovsky, around six kilometres southeast of Volchenskiy. No Buk TELARs can be identified in that satellite image. A comparison of satellite pictures of the home base of the 53rd AAMB from 27 July and 2 October 2014 shows a substantial increase in the number of vehicles present on 2 October compared with 27 July 2014. 4.4.3 Possible removal of TELAR ‘3X2’ from 18 July 2014 On the basis of the investigation it is plausible that the deployed Buk vehicles of the 1st and 2nd battalions returned to the home base of the 53rd AAMB in Kursk in late September 2014. However that does not necessarily mean that the Buk TELAR with which MH17 was shot down also returned to base at that time. It could also have been removed separately and at a different time. As mentioned earlier, the memorandum about the withdrawal of the 1st and 2nd battalions shows that one of the Buk TELARs of the 2nd battalion did not return to base. As noted above, the transport of the Buk TELAR to the deployment area was instrumental to the investigation into the crew and their commanders; the same applies to its removal after the
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 28 MH17 Report downing of flight MH17. The JIT therefore investigated what happened after 18 July 2014 to the Buk TELAR that shot down MH17. It took into account the possibility that this weapon was brought back to the home base in Kursk shortly after the downing of MH17. It investigated the various ways in which this removal could have been carried out: by road, rail or air. Due to the possibility that the removal took place by road, the JIT asked ESA about the availability of satellite images of the route between Severniy and Kursk from 18 July 2014 onwards. ESA’s response was that it only had satellite images of Kursk air base. These images will be discussed later. For now it suffices to say that no Buk TELAR can be seen on them. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) provided a satellite photo from 20 July 2014 at 08:41, which shows a military site near Millerovo. A covered object can be seen on a low-loader. No other covered vehicles or low-loaders are visible on this satellite image. The external characteristics and dimensions of this covered object match those of covered vehicles on low-loaders that are visible in the satellite image of the home base of the 53rd AAMB of 18 July 2014 that was discussed previously. In addition, on 20 July 2014 a photo was posted on VK showing a covered military vehicle on a low-loader with a Kamaz truck. It is not known where or when this photo was taken. The outlines of the covered vehicle match those of a covered Buk TELAR in a video of 20 July 2014 showing the convoy delivering Buk vehicles of the 1st battalion. The registration number of the Kamaz truck on the VK photo does not appear in the video of the convoy of the 1st battalion, nor is it on the list of registration numbers in the transport orders for this convoy. A Kamaz truck with the same registration number as the one in the VK photo does appear in visual material from 23 June 2014 of the convoy of the 2nd battalion which delivered Buk TELAR ‘3X2’. On that occasion this truck was transporting an uncovered Buk TELAR; the photo from 20 July 2014 was therefore not taken during this previous convoy. The JIT has not been able to find any further information about this VK photo and satellite photo of a covered vehicle on a low-loader. Witnesses were interviewed about the possible removal of the TELAR that downed MH17. One of them was S31. Witness S31 stated that, shortly after the downing of MH17, he spoke with a DPR fighter who was involved in the local air defence in Snizhne: Vladimir Tsemakh. This witness heard from Tsemakh that after the downing he had looked after a depressed crew member of the Buk and given him liquor. According to Tsemakh this crew member was later picked up by a vehicle, and left for Russia. The Buk was loaded on to a truck and taken away in the direction of Rostov. Tsemakh was interviewed about this by the JIT, and he disputed witness S31’s version of events. There is a marshalling yard a few hundred metres south of the location where the aforementioned covered vehicle was sitting on a low-loader on 20 July 2014. A railway line runs past the military base of the 53rd AAMB in Marshala Zhukhova, with a branch that leads to the military site. The JIT investigated whether Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ returned to base by rail in the period after the downing, but found no evidence for this. Lastly, the JIT considered the possibility that the Buk TELAR that downed MH17 was removed by plane. It is clear from telecom data that this Buk TELAR must have crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border on 18 July 2014 at around 06:00. According to the MIVD, on 18 July 2014 at 04:21 there were two Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft, which are capable of transporting a Buk TELAR, at the nearest air base, at Rostov-on-Don. On 19 July 2014 at 16:10 only one of those two aircraft was
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 29 MH17 Report still at this air base. That means that the other aircraft left the air base in the meantime. According to satellite images from ESA and Google Earth and information from the MIVD, on 18 July 2014 at 06:08, 10:27, 11:44, around midday and at 14:31 there was an Ilyushin Il-76 at a military air base in the vicinity of the home base of the 53rd AAMB at Kursk. The aircraft appears to be in the same spot at each time. ESA did not observe any similar aircraft at this air base in the period from 2010 to 2014 (inclusive). Assuming the Buk TELAR returned to the Russian Federation on 18 July 2014 at around 06:00, it could certainly not have been delivered to the air base at Kursk at 06:08. The flight distance from this air base to the air base at Rostov-on-Don is estimated at 600 kilometres. To date, the JIT has not been able to find any further information about the possible removal of the Buk TELAR by air. After the video recorded in Luhansk in the early morning of 18 July 2014, the investigation found no further visual material that recognisably showed the Buk TELAR that downed MH17. 4.4.4 Summary Starting on 23 June 2014, Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ travelled for two days in a convoy of the 2nd battalion of the 53rd AAMB to the region bordering the Donbas. Six Buk TELARs were transported in that convoy, one of which has been identified as the Buk TELAR that downed MH17: TELAR ‘3X2’. The JIT investigated what happened to Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ after the downing of flight MH17. It is clear from telecom data that it returned to the Russian Federation via the Severniy border crossing at around 06:00 on 18 July 2014. According to witness S31 the TELAR was transported to Rostov by truck. The JIT tried to trace its subsequent movements in the Russian Federation, investigating whether it was transported by road, rail or air. No evidence was found of transport by rail. The JIT did, however, secure a satellite photo of 20 July 2014 of the Millerovo area, showing one covered vehicle on a low-loader, the shape and dimensions of which match the covered vehicles observed on 18 July 2014 in a satellite image of the home base of the 53rd AAMB. On 20 July 2014, an image was posted on social media of one covered Buk TELAR on a Kamaz truck. That same truck was part of the convoy of the 2nd battalion that departed on 23 June 2014 and which included TELAR ‘3X2’. It could not be established whether the covered vehicle in the satellite image was the same vehicle as the covered TELAR in the VK photo, nor whether it was TELAR ‘3X2’. An investigation into the possibility of removal by air yielded the following results. When TELAR ‘3X2’ crossed the Russian border on the morning of 18 July 2014, there were two Il-76s at the nearest military air base at Rostov-on-Don, which are capable of transporting a TELAR. The next day only one of these Il-76s was observed at this air base. It could not be established where the other Il-76 went. On 18 July 2014, at several points in time from 06:08 onwards, an Il-76 was observed at the military air base at Kursk. This Il-76 appeared to be in the same spot every time. ESA had not observed this before in satellite images of this location in the period from 2010 to 2014 (inclusive). The Il-76 that was present at this air base at 06:08 can in any case not have been an Il-76 from the air base at Rostov-on-Don that had transported Buk TELAR ‘3x2’ to Kursk, as TELAR ‘3X2’ crossed the border at Severniy at around 06:00 and can therefore not have been taken to Kursk by plane at 06:08.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 30 MH17 Report The Russian authorities have refused to answer the question of where Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ was in the period from 23 June to 23 July 2014. The memo concerning the withdrawal of the Buk vehicles of the 1st and 2nd battalions from 27 September 2014 onwards shows that one of the Buk TELARs of the 2nd battalion did not return to base. Whether this was TELAR ‘3X2’ has so far not been established. 4.5 The Buk TELAR’s target identification systems As part of the investigation into the question of why MH17 was downed, the JIT looked at the target identification options available to the crew of a Buk TELAR. Targets can be identified by linking up with an external radar system or by using either the TELAR’s own radar, a military identification system that uses a transponder (Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system) or the TELAR’s camera. The Buk TELAR’s IFF system can only identify military allies (friendly aircraft). Enemy aircraft and civilian aircraft are not recognised as ‘friends’, and the system thus designates them as ‘foes’. In addition, on a cloudy day like the afternoon of 17 July 2014, the TELAR’s camera cannot be used. In such cases, the crew can use the TELAR’s own radar to identify or further identify a target. The radar can be used to establish the target’s speed, altitude, heading and manoeuvrability. If several objects are detected and compared, the (relative) size of the target can also be established. Using the radar makes the Buk TELAR vulnerable, as it allows the TELAR to be detected too. For that reason, in enemy territory the TELAR’s own radar is generally used as little as possible. Besides the TELAR’s own radar, external radar data can also be used. The investigation showed that several (military) radar systems in the Russian Federation covered the airspace where MH17 was flying. Investigative activities also showed that from May 2014 onwards current Russian radar information was being shared with the ‘people’s army’ in eastern Ukraine. The investigation could not establish whether this was also done on 17 July 2014 and whether that radar information – or other information relating to the target – reached the crew of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’. The investigation therefore did not provide clarity as to what target information the crew of Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ had on 17 July 2014 when they fired the Buk missile. Nor did the investigation provide clarity regarding any possible assignment the crew was sent to Ukraine to carry out. At the very least, this information would be known to the crew and their commanders. 4.6 Crew members and commanders of the 53rd AAMB The orders concerning the convoy that left the home base of the 53rd AAMB on 23 June 2014, which included Buk TELAR ‘3X2’, do not contain any information about (the identities of) possible crew members who travelled with ‘3X2’ between 23 and 25 June 2014. Orders and other documents have been secured, however, that show that from 15 July 2014 at least 193 military personnel of the 53rd AAMB were deployed to a place south of Millerovo, presumably Volchenskiy. That is the region to which the 2nd battalion travelled earlier. Given the contents of these orders and documents, these military personnel must have arrived in the border region before Buk TELAR ‘3x2’ and its crew crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border in the early morning of 17 July 2014. They too were therefore included in the investigation into the crew.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 31 MH17 Report These documents mention the 193 military personnel by name. On the basis of an investigation of other available documents and public sources, including social media, several of these military personnel can be linked to the 1st battalion and a small number to the 2nd and 3rd battalions. 4.6.1 Brigade commander Muchkaev These deployed military personnel include several staff members, including the aforementioned commander of the brigade, Muchkaev. In the criminal trial against Pulatov the court ordered that Muchkaev be interviewed as a witness. In response to a request by the examining magistrate, the Russian authorities indicated on 3 December 2021 that this interview could not take place, because they said the questions to be put to Muchkaev concerned ‘military matters, to which a duty of confidentiality applies in accordance with Russian law’ and an interview could ‘compromise the state secrets of the Russian Federation’. It was possible in the course of the investigation, however, to interview Muchkaev’s grandfather, who lived in Latvia until his death. He stated that he had heard from his daughter that his grandson Muchkaev was not involved in the downing of MH17. An investigation into the MH17 disaster was said to have been conducted in the Russian Federation and that investigation was said to have exonerated his grandson. The grandfather also stated that he had not seen his grandson for years and that they seldom spoke. According to him he never spoke about MH17 with his grandson. Although it is plausible, in view of his role and responsibility, that Muchkaev was aware of the deployment of a Buk TELAR of his brigade on Ukrainian territory, the investigation found no specific evidence of this. There is no telecom data from which this could be deduced. Nor was it possible to confirm Muchkaev’s presence in the border region at the time of the downing of flight MH17. 4.6.2 Wider circle of possible crew members All military personnel of the 53rd AAMB for whom there were indications that they may have been in the border region when the Buk TELAR was deployed were investigated further. This includes both military personnel who travelled with the convoy of 23 June 2014 to that border region and military personnel who left the base in Kursk on 15 July 2014. Thirty-five officers among them could be expected, in view of their ranks and positions, to be capable of operating a Buk TELAR. However, these findings do not rule out the possibility that there were more officers present in the border region with the same skills. It was established that seven other military personnel for whom there were indications that they were in the border region worked as an operator in a Buk TELAR or as the driver of a Buk vehicle. This also does not rule out the possibility that there were other operators or drivers present. A number of members of the 53rd AAMB were tracked down and interviewed as part of the investigation. The investigation team obtained a large number of chat messages. The participants in these chats include former members of the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (AAMB). In one of these chats a former member of the 53rd AAMB said, in response to questions about other people who were on deployment with him near the border with Ukraine in the summer of 2014, that everyone had to sign a confidentiality declaration. He denied having been in Ukraine during that deployment.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 32 MH17 Report In another chat, individual A discussed their chat contact with another former member of the 53rd AAMB. The investigation team has been in contact with this former member of the 53rd AAMB and interviewed him as witness G8010. During this chat, individual A says that G8010 wrote to A that he had been in Ukraine three times and that in the summer of 2014 the 2nd battery of the 2nd battalion was based near Yelan in Rostov province.17 The 3rd battery was based around five kilometres from Patronovka and the 1st battery possibly near Voikova, Duby or Mityakinskaya. Individual A sent part of his/her chat conversations with G8010 along. In one of the chats, G8010 says he has no information about the ‘Volvo’ or other moments related to ‘the case’. It can be deduced from the context that ‘the case’ refers to the MH17 investigation. Various media previously reported on the delivery of the Buk TELAR on a trailer pulled by a white Volvo truck. Witness G8010 confirmed to the investigation team that he was part of the 53rd AAMB in the summer of 2014. He told the investigation team that he was part of the convoy that left the base in Kursk on 23 June 2014. According to G8010, the final destination of this convoy was not revealed to contract soldiers or conscripts, but they ended up based in woods that were surrounded by agricultural fields. There were no houses or villages in the vicinity. G8010 spoke about his duties, but stated that he knew nothing about the specific mission. According to him such information was not shared by the officers. This interview ended abruptly, because the connection was lost due to a technical problem. After that point, the investigation team was no longer able to contact G8010. In addition, the investigation team received information from another soldier of the 53rd AAMB: witness S45. By means of covert investigative activities, the investigation team established that S45 said that he was in Ukraine for six months, deep in the forests of the Donbas. According to S45 the 53rd AAMB’s presence in Ukraine was a secret because there was no official armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. For that reason it was also forbidden to be in contact with Ukrainians. The locations where S45 was based were always remote and scattered along the border. It was established that S45 stated that ‘the incident with the Boeing’ took place while he was in Ukraine. He was aware of rumours that his unit was responsible for it, but he did not believe that MH17 was downed by a Buk. The people who work with these systems know exactly how a Buk-M1 works and he thought a mistake would be unlikely. According to S45, people pointed to his unit in relation to the Boeing because they were the closest to the crash site. The distance was sufficient to be able to down an aircraft, in part because there was radar and a command post present. S45 said he knew nothing about the downing of the Boeing; he saw only a field, trees and combat materiel. While he was in Ukraine, several combat vehicles were brought from Russia to Ukraine and his unit also downed planes and a helicopter, but he said that he personally had not seen any shooting. During police interviews, S45 told a different version of events. In those interviews he stated that in the summer of 2014 he had taken part in a deployment from the base in Kursk. He changed location during this deployment. He said the deployment had lasted several weeks and he did not know anymore exactly where he had been. The journey took at least 24 hours and rumour had it that Rostov was their destination. The base consisted of tents and a shower. There were no towns in the vicinity; there were fields everywhere and narrow wooded areas between the fields. When 17 ‘Battery’ means the same as ‘company’ here. A battalion consists of three companies. Each company has two Buk TELARs and one Buk-TELL.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 33 MH17 Report MH17 was downed, S45 was deployed in a field, but he did not see a launch. By his own account S45 was not in Ukraine. He did not even see any combat aircraft or helicopters being downed during the field exercises. The combat vehicles of his battery18 were not moved. Officers would sometimes leave, but not for long. In the police interview, S45 was unable to confirm the information that had been received from him during covert investigative activities. Nor was he able to answer the question of who the crew members were. He said he might have known, but he was unable to remember a lot of names. He stated that he was very scared and that he could no longer take any risks. 4.6.3 Members of the 3rd battalion under the command of an officer Through witness S28, the investigation team came into contact with another member of the 53rd AAMB: M1. Witness S28 stated that he made contact with military personnel of the 53rd AAMB via the social media platform VKontakte (VK), using the name ‘Anastasia’. S28 was in contact via online chats with one of them, M1, for about a month. At the time, M1 no longer worked for the 53rd AAMB. Investigation has shown that in the summer of 2014 the chat contacts mentioned by S28 were indeed conscripts in the 2nd battalion of the 53rd AAMB and that they were part of the convoy from 23 to 25 June 2014 that also included Buk TELAR ‘3X2’. Witness S28 made screenshots of parts of the chats and provided them to the JIT. His computer was seized by the Russian authorities. In the chats provided by S28, M1 wrote that he served together with another soldier, referred to here as M2, in the 2nd battalion and that together with M2 he drove past Millerovo and Kamensk and spent three months in the woods near Kuybyshevo. On the way towards Rostov, three contract soldiers travelled with them who went in a different direction after Millerovo. These contract soldiers were under the command of an officer, whose name and rank were mentioned by M1. When asked where those contract soldiers went, M1 answered that that was a big secret and that he could say nothing about it or he would get his head chopped off. He said he could give a clue though, and then quoted a song in which a soldier is ordered to go west. When S28 (still under the name ‘Anastasia’) responded by asking whether he meant blue-yellow and then sent a picture of the Ukrainian flag, M1 responded that ‘Anastasia’ was not only beautiful but also clever. According to S28, M1 told him that he had left Kursk with his colleagues around 23 June 2014. Contract soldiers and one Buk vehicle also travelled with them. After Kuybyshevo they split up and spread out to move to the border. The Buk were divided among several locations. M1 also told S28 about a large exercise area between Millerovo and Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy. He said the materiel would be parked there until it was due to go to the Ukrainian border. M1 and his colleagues stayed there for several days, after which they were sent into the woods on the border with Ukraine. It was a considerable distance from populated areas, but close to Kuybyshevo. S28 also stated that M1 told him that two Buk systems had to be sent back to barracks after only two weeks because they had technical problems and could not be repaired in the field. Witness M1 confirmed to the investigation team that in 2014 he was a soldier in the 53rd AAMB and that he had been using the account with which S28 chatted for 10 years. However, M1 denied 18 ‘Battery’ means the same as ‘company’ here. A battalion consists of three companies. Each company has two Buk TELARs and one Buk-TELL.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 34 MH17 Report having chatted with ‘Anastasia’, claimed that the chats were fake and refused to answer further questions. An investigation into the officer whose name and rank M1 mentioned (to S28) and who he said was in command of the Buk crew led to his identification. On 17 July 2014 this officer was a member of the personal staff of brigade commander Muchkaev. It could not be established whether this officer was in the border region on 17 July 2014. In photos on social media after 17 July 2014 this officer is wearing two decorations: one for the development of and combat operations with a Buk system and the other for extraordinary service with the Russian security service FSB. Given his staff position in the 53rd AAMB, this officer would not, as a rule, be eligible for a medal for combat action with a Buk unless he had actually taken part in that action. FSB decorations are not usually awarded to military personnel, and they are awarded on fixed dates. Since this officer entered service, this decoration has been awarded only once: on 21 July 2014, i.e. four days after the downing of flight MH17. According to M1’s chat messages that were provided by S28, this officer was in command of crew members of the 3rd battalion. 4.6.4 Officers of the 2nd battalion Information obtained from witness S42 points in a different direction. This witness stated that they had heard from someone in the Russian army that four people serving in the 53rd AAMB were involved in the downing of the Boeing. These four people together formed the crew of the Buk. After the downing of MH17, the crew returned to the 53rd AAMB’s camp in Kamensk-Shaktinskiy. S42 was able to name two of the four crew members. The examining magistrate established that investigation of various sources had confirmed that S42 had been in a position to obtain the information that they provided. The investigation also revealed that the names given by S42 matched those of two officers of the 53rd AAMB. On the basis of investigation of social media it was established that one of these officers was actually deployed to the border region in the summer of 2014. Both officers were members of the 2nd company of the 2nd battalion. An information report by the SBU identifies one of the officers named by S42 as the person with whom Tsemakh had been drinking after MH17 was shot down. According to the aforementioned witness S31, he heard from Tsemakh that after the downing he had looked after a depressed crew member of the Buk and given him liquor. Tsemakh disputes the claim he was in contact with one or more crew members and denies any involvement in the downing of MH17. The investigation yielded insufficient indication of criminal involvement on his part. So far the investigation has found no further confirmation of the information that S42 and S28 received from third parties concerning possible involvement of the three officers named by them in the downing of MH17. Witness S45 was unable or unwilling to name any crew members. Calls for witnesses issued by the JIT in 2018 and 2019 and a media and letter campaign in 2021, aimed personally at the residents of Kursk and members of the 53rd AAMB, yielded no new information about the identities of the crew members. Nor did investigation of public and non-public sources lead to further confirmation of the statements of S42 or S28.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 35 MH17 Report 4.6.5 Request for legal assistance sent to the Russian Federation Lastly, in a request for legal assistance in 2018 the Public Prosecution Service asked the Russian Federation to identify the crew members of the Buk TELAR with vehicle number ‘3X2’ in the period from 23 June to 23 July 2014. The Russian authorities were unwilling to answer this question either, as according to them there was no evidence for the presence of any Russian Buk TELAR in eastern Ukraine. 4.6.6 Tweet about crew The JIT took note of messages posted on Twitter on 17 July and 25 September 2022 which included photos and the names of four members of the 2nd battalion who allegedly shot down MH17.19 The investigation acquired the information that formed the basis for these posts. It included a personnel list (with which the investigation team was familiar) of the 53rd AAMB from 2015 and passport details of members of the 53rd AAMB. On the basis of this information and the results of its own investigation, the JIT concluded that nothing could be found that pointed to involvement on the part of these four persons in the downing of MH17. 4.6.7 Summary In summary, in the course of the investigation 42 military personnel of the 53rd AAMB were identified who were deployed in the border region at the time of the downing of flight MH17 and who, in view of their ranks and positions, could be expected to be capable of operating or driving a Buk TELAR. The investigation yielded concrete indications of involvement on the part of three specific officers in the downing of flight MH17. Two of them are mentioned as crew coming from the 2nd battalion, a third person as accompanist of crew coming from the 3rd battalion. The crew cannot be identified unequivocally and beyond doubt on the basis of the current investigation results. Furthermore, the results do not rule out the possibility that military personnel other than the three named officers were part of the crew. 19 See the Twitter account @daniel_romein.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 36 MH17 Report 5 Delivery of the Buk TELAR In its judgment the court held that as of the second half of May 2014 the Russian authorities were deeply involved in the DPR's conflict, during which the Buk TELAR was deployed and flight MH17 was shot down. In that connection the court referred to the close ties between DPR leaders and individuals in the Russian Presidential Executive Office, advisers to the Kremlin, and the Russian intelligence services. Staff of these Russian government bodies also turned up in the JIT's investigation into who was responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR to the DPR. This chapter describes the findings of that investigation. The provision of the Buk TELAR is a separate matter from its actual deployment (as established by the court) by Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko. The findings of the investigation into other parties who may bear joint responsibility for that deployment is discussed in the next chapter. The main source of information for the investigation into the delivery of the Buk TELAR is telecom data, including intercepted phone conversations that were previously included in the case file. In its judgment the court explained how it came to the conclusion that these intercepted conversations were authentic.20 The same arguments apply to the intercepted conversations that were not included in the case file and are first mentioned in this report. For ease of reading, the investigation findings will be discussed in chronological order: from the arrival of the Russians Girkin and Borodai in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 to discussions inside the Russian Federation about arms deliveries to the DPR and the transportation of the Buk TELAR to the Russian-Ukrainian border in late June 2014. 5.1 April-May 2014: relationship between Aksyonov and DPR leaders On 7 April 2014 an armed group occupied the offices of the regional government in the city of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, proclaiming the establishment of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). Five days later, on 12 April, a group occupied the city of Slavyansk. That same day Girkin crossed over [into Ukraine] from Crimea. From that point on he was in command of the DPR fighters, first as ‘commander of the Donbas People’s Militia’ and later as ‘Minister of Defence’ and ‘commander-in-chief of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic’. Not long after that, Borodai followed him from Crimea to eastern Ukraine, where he assumed the role of ‘prime minister’ of the DPR. Before arriving in eastern Ukraine, the two men, Girkin and Borodai, were involved in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. By their own admission, there were there as advisers of the Russian Sergei Aksyonov.21 As of late February 2014, he was the self-styled premier of Crimea. According to the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, Russia made the decision to annex Crimea in the night of 22 February and the early hours of 23 February 2014. Putin was personally involved in operational decisions related to Russia units. For example, 20 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 5.6. 21 https://ria.ru/20190619/1555717877 (last accessed on 8 December 2022).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 37 MH17 Report he ordered Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu to deploy an intelligence division and elite troops. On 18 March Putin concluded an ‘agreement’ with Aksyonov (and two other leaders) on the ‘accession’ of the ‘Republic of Crimea’ to the Russian Federation. Within three days this agreement was ratified by Russia and the annexation was enshrined in law. On 14 April Aksyonov was appointed by Putin as leader of Crimea. In the months following their arrival in eastern Ukraine, Borodai and Girkin remained in contact with Aksyonov. For example, on 13 April 2014, the day of his arrival in Slavyansk, Girkin received a call from Borodai in Moscow at 15:09:07. Borodai passed the phone to Konstantin Malofeev, a Russian oligarch who was also involved in the annexation of the Crimea. Girkin said that they had managed to repel a Ukrainian attack. Malofeev then asked if he had already reported this to Aksyonov. When Girkin said that he had not been able to reach him yet, Malofeev replied that he had a meeting with Aksyonov in Moscow the next day and that Girkin needed to contact him before then. 5.2 June 2014: Separatists request Russian air-defence systems In June 2014 there was heavy fighting between the Ukrainian army and troops of the DPR and LPR. During this fighting both the DPR and LPR requested heavier weaponry, including better anti-aircraft systems. The investigation carried out shows that from the second half of July 2014 several Buk-TELARs have been delivered to the separatists, including the Buk-TELAR that shot down flight MH17. 22 One witness stated that in May and June 2014 meetings were held in the Russian cities of Rostov and Kamensk-Shakhtinsky at which Plotnitskiy (at that time the ‘Minister of Defence’ of the LPR) and an as-yet unidentified GRU general were present. At a meeting in June, Plotnitskiy said that the portable air-defence systems (PZRKs) were no longer effective because aircraft were flying at higher altitude and heavier materiel was needed to shoot them down. After this discussion, the GRU general said that he would personally explain the situation to the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, shortly. The GRU general also said that they could already supply light weapons, and were indeed doing so, but that heavier weapons could only be supplied once the separatists had captured weapons of that kind too. That way, Russia would be able to deny having supplied any weapons. In early June, the DPR made a similar request for heavier anti-aircraft systems. At that time Slavyansk, where Girkin had his headquarters, was under fire. On 8 June (at 11:30:47) Girkin called Aksyonov’s deputy. Girkin said that the Ukrainian ‘enemy’ was numerically superior and that they needed Russian support. He said they needed ‘decent anti-aircraft systems manned by trained personnel’ and asked the deputy to pass this request on to Aksyonov, the first in command (‘Pervyi’): 22 For example, it can be deduced from intercepted conversations that a Buk-TELAR was delivered to the LPR in the night of 13 to 14 July, that this system was leaking oil and caught fire and an attempt was made to remove this vehicle.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 38 MH17 Report (...) B: [Inaudible] Sergey brought me [...], told me you wanted to get hold of me to share some information. C: Now I wouldn't call that "sharing information"... In fact, this information is widely- known, and it reads that, err... that if no large-scale support arrives in the nearest time, the, err... they will smother/strangle (...). What we need is truly large-scale support, what [...] is already not sufficient. Err... Giving [...] by dribs and drabs - as they do it now - can't make any difference anymore. We are outnumbered by the enemy. Me, I've been around long enough and I can still hold ground here some time, but if they keep it at this pace and launch an offensive against other towns and cities where people are unprepared and have no combat experience, they're going to crush them flat in no time. And then they will crush flat me, of course. If the issue of Russian support - air cover, or at least artillery support - is not dealt with, then we will not be able to hold ground here in the East, no way. ... First, back when this support was needed in large numbers, as much as possible, they didn't provide it; and what they are giving now is what we needed a month back. B: Uh-huh. C: Now all we get is only enough to barely get by, nothing more. We will not be able to turn the tide in any significant way, and they will be squeezing us on all fronts. В: I see. C: Hello? B: Yes, yes, I'm following you, I'm following. C: We need anti-tank artillery, we need tanks, we need decent anti-aircraft defense - because we can't last on MANPADS alone any more - all manned with trained personnel, of course, seeing as we have, and will have, no time to train them. That's it... For example, four tanks are simply sitting on positions short of Semionovka and firing on (...) positions from a distance safe for the rear. They've kept it this way for three days now. But I have no single anti-tank canon to counter them. Just now they were pounding the center of the city/town with howitzers, fired 30 rounds, some exploded nearby, just 150 meters short of my headquarters. But I cannot reach them because they're too far, in terms of range. That's it. And that's the case everywhere. The entire Ukrainian army... [...] B: Yes, yes, I get that. Yes, yes. C: Now that's the message to get across. Sooner or later they will have to make a decision anyway, but by then a considerable part of the militia will be destroyed and the front line will be pushed away to somewhere behind Donetsk, to the east. C: Now that's the story. B: OK... C: I'd ask you to get this across to Pervyi. B: Yes, I get that. OK. Will do. (…) 5.3 First half of June 2014: Russian discussions about supplying the DPR with weapons A little more than 15 minutes later (on 8 June at 11:46:33), Aksyonov himself called Girkin back. Aksyonov said that he was aware of the situation and that he had informed others. He was
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 39 MH17 Report awaiting a response and had another meeting that evening to discuss the required support. He told Girkin that he would be in touch after the meeting. Aksyonov also said that a ‘joint coordination centre’ had been set up for this situation, and that the necessary documents were already being drawn up: (…) D: Hey there, Igorioha. Good job, you're in your usual self, as I see. Now, in a nutshell, here's the story: on Tuesday I went to, err... to where I was supposed to go in the light of this situation... If it weren't for all those visits yesterday and today which, err, prevented [...] from coordinating action / briefing in relation to the picture... At 22 or so tonight I'll get in touch with... well, with those who are, err... who have already made this decision. Just now... C: Uh-huh. D: ...just now I got a visit from those who had worked here - you surely know all of them in the line of this situation... C: Well, yes, yes. D: Now all of them have already received the entire picture. I mean, all who sort of been to both buildings back then, err... Well you remember... С: I see what you mean. D: Yes, everyone has received the picture. I mean, we... I will need you to [...] over the same channel/line at 22-22:30 today, me and you will need to talk over the same chonnel/line. I will then coordinate/brief you openly, and... There's already a person and a joint coordination center in place that are dealing with this situation... I mean those who are/have been coordinating this picture - I just don't want to give surnames openly over the phone. С: I understand. OK, I'll be available at that time. But, in general, do you understand what the situation is like and that [...inaudible]? D: I do understand what the situation is like, Igor. Listen up, that's right what I told them on Tuesday, that if we don't take certain steps... I mean, I was, err, where I was sort of supposed to be in the light of this situation, and the message I brought along was that if no concrete steps are taken, then we're going to sort of lose all these commodity markets which we're sort of speaking about in terms of this picture. C: OK then, they just [...inaudible]... D: That's what I was saying: we're about to lose these commodity markets. Well, me and you, we understand what that means. C: Yes, yes. D: And I sort of made it clear for [...], and right in my presence the guy rang up another pal who is responsible for the conduct of [...], then I had a talk with him about it one's again on Wednesday, and then with Kostia on Thursday, and today I'm still waiting - it's just because all of them are gone for two days, were in different places, and that's why, err, that's why they asked to sort of [...] for these two days because of this picture. Anyway, the documents necessary for the support are already being prepared... I will also be [...] about all this stuff tonight, I will be coordinating/briefing Kostia, err, Kostia's man, err, in relation to all this cookery. And at 22-22:30 today I will coordinate/brief you on all points of contact necessary for the entry. C: OK, I'll be waiting for you call. (…)
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 40 MH17 Report On 19 June 2019 the JIT released this conversation as part of an appeal for witnesses. In response, Aksyonov told RIA Novosti that he ‘supported and would always support’ the separatists and that other than that he had not ‘dusted off any missiles or readied them for launch’.23 In summary: in this conversation of 8 June 2014 Aksyonov informed Girkin that the previous Tuesday (i.e. 3 June) he had already gone where he needed to go given the situation, that on that Tuesday he said that ‘concrete steps’ urgently had to be taken and that the documents for the requested support had already been drawn up, but that he still had to wait because ‘they’ were in different places and would be away for two days. Another phone conversation involving one of Aksyonov’s aides showed that on Tuesday 3 June 2014 Aksyonov was in Sochi for a brief visit. According to news releases from the Kremlin, Putin was also in Sochi that day, and in the days that followed, the president travelled on to Astrakhan (4 June) and then to France (5-6 June), for the joint D-Day commemoration with various world leaders.24 In another phone conversation involving the same aide, on 7 June 2014 (18:11:23), this individual explained the Russian decision-making process with regard to military support. The aide said he got ‘a beating’ because he had said that they were thinking too slowly. He went on to say that the decision to provide support had been postponed by a week, because there was only one person who could make that decision: not a general or the Minister of Defence, but the person who was directly accountable to the people and who was currently at a summit in France: (…) A: There is such ... there is such a situation: I got a beating today because err … I said ‘you are thinking too slowly’. I say: “Kozitsyn took 1 out of 3 border posts there, and people need to be armed so that they can keep this post. Well, this is the border, everything is open”. B: Uh-huh. A: I got such a beating, you won't believe it. It turns out, you know…. you ... let me tell you briefly so that you understand. B: Okay. A: It turns out there, that the information I gave you ... I spoke with err... three people, remember, the last one? In the Council of Ministers? B: Yes, yes, yes. A: Those people flew to Moscow, received ... asked for a pause for a week, so that ... this is Pervyi/Number One who makes a personal decision. The Number One. B: Uh-huh, I get it. A: They beat the fuck out of me today. They said that there is no general, no minister, no sh ... defense minister. This is all about… this is about… Well, how to say? As they said, wait… Number One is the person who answers to the people personally, you know? He makes a decision. And since there is now this summit in France ... 23 https://ria.ru/20190619/1555717877.html?in=t ((last accessed on 8 December 2022). 24 See www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45821, www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45825, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832, www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45827 (last accessed on 23 June 2021).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 41 MH17 Report B: Uh-huh, uh-huh. A: He ... he has to give the go-ahead for all of this. Can you imagine what the level is? (…) ‘Sh…defense minister’ would seem to be a reference to Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defence. A day later, on 8 June at 21:24:18 (i.e. after Aksyonov’s conversation with Girkin about the deferred decision on the request for military support), Aksyonov’s aide had a similar conversation in which he said that his superiors had flown up and back to deliver their report, but that they still needed an additional week because there was only one person who could make that decision, and he was in France: (…) A: You know, there is still such a problem that our err ... bosses, they absolutely do not see any connection at all. They just got on the plane, then left, then reported, then back. It takes a lot of time. B: Well yes, it is ... A: They told me that the decision was positive. Well, they asked for another week, so that ... because the First is in err ... well, France. He’s the only one, he’s the only one who makes the decision, nobody else. (…) A: I … I hinted there: let's hurry up, because really such a chance cannot be lost, because the border is still under control, we need to help there. They beat the fuck out of me, they yelled at me: you don't understand, that … you ... you just don't … Don't you understand that only the First gives instructions? Before he gets it, it's time. Who the hell are you? As I understand it, there is only one person responsible, only Number One, you know? That’s all. It is done as he says. B: I see. Nobody decides anything except him, damn. (…) 5.4 14-30 June 2014: Russian meeting to discuss the provision of anti-aircraft systems Investigators gained some degree of insight into the Russian decision-making process regarding the delivery of heavier anti-aircraft systems to the separatists. The investigation yielded specific information pointing to the following scenario. In June 2014 Aksyonov and the deputy head of the GRU, Alexei Dyumin, requested a political decision on providing the ‘People’s Army’ in Donbas with a heavier anti-aircraft system, such as an S-200 or Buk system. This happened at a meeting at the Presidential Executive Office in Moscow. The Presidential Executive Office is a Russian state agency that supports the president and which is responsible for drafting and implementing legislation. In 2014 the Presidential Executive Office played an active role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This is apparent from a number of sources, including emails from that period from Vladislav Surkov, who was at that time a member of the Executive Office and a key adviser to Putin, and Aleksei Chesnakov, a former member of the
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 42 MH17 Report Executive office and in 2014 the director of a political consultancy that worked with this body.25 Surkov is also known as the architect of the Minsk agreements of September 2014 and February 2015.26 In a 2016 photo taken at the Ukraine talks in Berlin, Surkov can be seen sitting between President Putin and German chancellor Angela Merkel.27 So it was at this meeting in June 2014 at the Presidential Executive Office that Aksyonov and Dyumin requested a political decision on the delivery of a heavier anti-aircraft system, such as an S-200 or a Buk system, to the ‘People’s Army’ in Donbas. This request was supported by Malofeev and Surkov. Representatives of the FSB, the GRU and the defence ministry are also present during the meeting. This meeting resulted in a written resolution to submit the request to supply heavier anti-aircraft systems to the ‘People’s Army’ to Minister of Defence Shoigu and President Putin. Surkov and Aksyonov were the driving force behind this request. It is unknown if the request explicitly referred to a Buk. One of the arguments underlying the request for heavier anti-aircraft systems was that the separatists had previously shot down a large military transport aircraft, an Ilyushin-76, with IGLAs (MANPADS) and that the Ukrainian armed forces were now prepared for this eventuality and had started flying at higher altitudes. This meant that there was now a need for air defences with a greater range. It is important to note in this regard that the Ukrainian armed forces were also using such a system, meaning that it could appear as if the DPR had captured it from them. The defence ministry was reluctant to provide anti-aircraft systems to the separatists because this could entail risks to its own (Russian) aircraft. Nevertheless, in the end the request was granted. According to the investigation the meeting at the Presidential Executive Office took place some time in June 2014. Other sources show that the aforementioned Ilyushin-76 was shot down with a MANPADS on 14 June 2014. All 49 Ukrainian military personnel on board were killed.28 It can therefore be concluded that the meeting must have taken place sometime between 14 and 30 June 2014. 5.5 Surkov’s position According to the aforementioned investigation findings, in June 2014 Surkov and Aksyonov were working to help get heavier anti-aircraft systems to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. The request to that effect was submitted to Minister Shoigu and President Putin. The request was granted. 25 https://static.rusi.org/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf (last accessed on 5 December 2022); https://cpkr.ru/content/about-us (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 26 Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men (2016), p. 291. 27 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/26/kremlin-puppet-masters-leaked-emails-vladislav-surkov-east-ukraine (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 28 See also the Ukrainian judgment of 15 March 2021, which can be consulted at https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/95638731.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 43 MH17 Report Surkov was Putin’s adviser and worked at the Presidential Executive Office. According to Russia specialist Anna Matveeva, Surkov was given control of Donbas affairs in July 2014, taking over from Aksyonov, Malofeev and others.29 According to Girkin, Surkov had ‘tactical command’ and ‘managed’ ‘the situation in Ukraine in his capacity as adviser to Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin]’.30 In an interview on 28 November 2014, Borodai said that Surkov was the most senior Russian official to deal with this issue and that Surkov, as the president's aide, regularly reported to Putin about it directly.31 In a phone conversation that took place on 25 June 2014 (11:30:38) with the aforementioned Chesnakov,32 Borodai said that the ‘head of the government administration' had called him twice that day. Borodai's telephone data shows that he had been phoned twice that morning by the number used by Surkov. The other party to the conversation with Borodai – Chesnakov – was at that time the independent adviser to the Presidential Executive Office and closely involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.33 Borodai’s telephone data shows that as far back as 11 June 2014 (22:52), Borodai was in contact with Surkov’s number almost every day, and sometimes multiple times a day, with the exception of the periods that Borodai was in Moscow. During an interview in June 2021, Surkov said that his own contribution to the situation in eastern Ukraine was ‘significant’, and in fact ‘many times more significant (…) than many people could imagine. Both for the Russian state and for Ukraine.’34 In Surkov’s inbox an email was found from 13 May 2014, in which Malofeev proposed several candidates for positions in the DPR government. A number of them had been screened by Malofeev and his associates (‘us’). The JIT compared the content of these emails with other emails and confirmed their authenticity. For example, during this period, participants in various intercepted phone conversations spoke about lists of names for the DPR's ‘government’ and ‘security council’. The then ‘Minister of Culture’ of the DPR told the JIT that Russia exercised full control over DPR affairs. According to this DPR minister the ‘deputy prime ministers’ of the DPR received their instructions from Moscow. At the Kremlin in late 2017 Surkov awarded decorations to Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organisation, for downing a Ukrainian helicopter and two Ukrainian combat aircraft on 12 and 16 July 2014. This emerged from statements given by two members of the Wagner Group as part of a covert operation by the SBU, the Ukrainian security service. The same two individuals also provided documents, showing their nomination for the decorations. In intercepted phone conversations Surkov coordinated various matters with Borodai, such as the encirclement of Slavyansk, the establishment of an additional security service, payments, and the intransigent attitude of DPR commander Igor Bezler. When Borodai sought to coordinate with Moscow about the delivery of refrigerated rail containers containing the bodies of the victims and the black boxes from MH17, his first point of contact was Surkov. If Borodai was unable to reach him, he would call Chesnakov again to ask him to have ‘the boss’ (i.e. Surkov) call him back as soon as possible. 29 A. Matveeva, Through Times of Trouble: Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine explained from within (2019), p. 277. 30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a0mIzX5TssA (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 31 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ug0w6PH2Hyc (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 32 See section 5.4. 33 https://chesnakov.ru/about/ (last accessed on 5 December 2022); http://cpkr.ru/about (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 34 https://youtu.be/gYuqBK83l3o (last accessed on 14 June 2021).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 44 MH17 Report 5.6 14-30 June 2014: Russian talks about arms deliveries The aforementioned meeting at the Presidential Executive Office in which the participants discussed the provision of heavier anti-aircraft systems must, as previously noted, have taken place between 14 and 30 June 2014. The Buk TELAR used to shoot down MH17 was part of a convoy that departed from Kursk on 23 June 2014 and arrived at the Russian-Ukrainian border on 25 June. The investigation into the Russian decision-making process in the period between 14 and 30 June 2014 revealed that in the night of 12 to 13 June 2014, Borodai travelled from Snizhne in eastern Ukraine to the Russian city of Rostov, and that he was in Moscow from 14 to 19 June. In a telephone conversation on 14 June 2014 (15:08:19), Borodai said that he was near Staraya Square in Moscow, where the Presidential Executive Office is located. During this visit in June 2014 there was no telephone contact with Surkov, Chesnakov and other Russian users of the same consecutive series of encrypted-phone numbers, which Borodai ordinarily called with great regularity. On the second day of his visit to Moscow, Borodai spoke on the phone with a separatist (15 June 2014, 16:41:34) telling him that he would be back soon, with ‘gifts’ (‘So I will come with gifts’). On 17 June (16:55:18) Borodai spoke on the phone with another separatist and told him: ‘Moreover, I met some of our mutual friends. (…) We had a good talk.’ Borodai (B) said the same thing on 18 June (20:52:32) to a certain ‘Luna’ (A) whose telephone was transmitting to telephone masts in Snizhne at that moment. Borodai told Luna that he was waiting and that he hoped to see him again soon. He would bring ‘the salary’ and said that there were many ‘parcels and gifts’ for everyone. According to Borodai the trip had been a success: (…) B: Look. I'll bring you the salary. It’s just that it will be partially in dollars, partially in rubles. (…) Or do you need it in dollars? A: No, no, better in our, native (…). I need to pay (…) out to people. (…) B: (…) I get it. I understood. Okay, I hope to see you very soon.(…) I'm just waiting, so to speak. A: (…) The main thing is that big brothers ...(…) so that our big brothers don't forget about us. (…) I will call you back tomorrow, err ... if there are any parcels. B: Err … I actually sit on it - on this parcel, as they say. (…) There will be parcels. I have a huge amount of parcels and gifts for everyone here, damn it. A: (…) It was nice to hear you. (…) The trip was effective. That’s important. B: Yes, yes. Quite effective. (…) Borodai’s stay in Moscow was confirmed by the OSCE in reports of 18 and 19 June 2014.35 During the same period another separatist, Aleksei Fominov, was in Moscow. On 18 June Fominov called from Moscow to an unknown fellow fighter, who indicated that they needed uniforms. Fominov responded that he would be back the following day and would bring uniforms with him. 35 OCSE report of 18 June 2014, https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/119945 (last accessed on 5 December 2022).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 45 MH17 Report Fominov also asked if they had any ‘heavy stuff’. When that proved not to be the case, Fominov said that he had just set off and would try to get the ‘green light’ for that (18 June 2014, 12:47:00). In the evening (18 June 2014, 22:09:40) Fominov reported that he had just been to his fifth meeting and that he wasn’t getting anywhere with the ‘hardware issue’. Another meeting was scheduled to the next day (i.e. 19 June), ‘a big one’: (…) A: (…) Have just been at the fifth meeting! Just stepped outside. A fellow dropped in to have a word. It was the fifth bloody meeting and it looks like ... {sighing} The fucking hardware issue gets nowhere. I'm tired as fuck. To make matters worse, they clash with each other (…). Basically, there is a proposal... There will be a meeting tomorrow. B: I see. A: A big one. (…) The next morning Fominov reported that the people in Moscow had a lot of questions for him, ‘in particular, the people who are above everyone’ (19 June 2014, 10:44:34). In a call later that day (17:27:42) Fominov (A) said that he was on his way to the man who was sending ‘stuff’. A fellow fighter (B) told him how difficult the situation on the front was and said that they need anything they could get: (…) A: I’m on my way to see the man who promised us […] so many times. The one who’s sending [stuff] to Igor. (…) When I get there, I’ll try to explain it. [That] if they don’t come up with anything by the end of today—{unintelligible}, whatever it takes them—then they and {unintelligible} people can say goodbye to the factory. I’m right on my way to see them. See? It seems like they don’t get it. B: Do your best. We need everything we can get. (…) [When you see] the comrades from the other side, spread a map in front of them and show them what length of the frontline is being held by us and by him. (…) There’re as many as 46 tanks, 6 fucking SAUs and 31 motherfucking BTRs near us already. A: (…) Fuck, fuck, fuck... But just you wait, I was just talking to, um… I’m in the meeting with all those people who make decisions on {unintelligible} (…). (…) Later that evening (19 June 2014, 23:05:31), Fominov (B) called the DPR commander Bezler (A) and asked if there was still heavy fighting going on. Bezler said that this was the case.36 Fominov 36 During the first hearing in the criminal trial (9 March 2020), the Public Prosecution Service spoke about an intercepted telephone conversation that Bezler took part in on 17 July 2014, in which the other party to the call announced that a ‘bird’ would be coming his way. In that connection the Public Prosecution Service remarked that an extensive investigation had been conducted into both this conversation and Bezler as an individual. That investigation was not able to confirm that this conversation had actually contributed to the downing of flight MH17. Moreover, the investigation showed that there was so little time between this conversation and the launch of the Buk missile that it was doubtful that the conversation could have contributed to the downing of the aircraft.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 46 MH17 Report asked him to hold their position for another two or three days because ‘some very good decisions’ had been made: (…) A: (…) Will you be able to hold the ground? B: I don’t know. We have to. (…) A: Some very good decisions have been made about everyone/everything. (…) I mean, some really good decisions. Well, at least a day or two or three? B: We’ll do our best. (…) In summary: Borodai and Fominov were both in Moscow until 19 June and spoke on the phone about meetings and discussions that had occurred about (apparent) military support, with an ultimately positive result. On 19 June 2014, at a private meeting with several members of the Duma, Shoigu reported that the armed forces were ready to carry out any task issued by ‘the country leadership and supreme commander’. According to the Kremlin, a meeting of the Russian Security Council was held on the evening of 19 June 2014 on ‘the situation in southeastern Ukraine’.37 It is unclear exactly what sort of material the ‘parcels and gifts’ and ‘hardware’ referred to by Borodai and Fominov consisted of, but it can be inferred from other intercepted conversations that deliveries of heavier military equipment, including tanks, started shortly after their visit to Moscow. It is unknown if the topic of heavier anti-aircraft systems, such as a Buk, came up. One witness did state that large amounts of military equipment arrived after the arrival of a GRU general on 20 or 21 June 2014. This equipment crossed the Russian border into Ukraine at Orekhovka (near Severniy). The GRU general, who was referred to as ‘Andrei Ivanovich’ and was identified by the JIT as Oleg Ivanovich Ivannikov, was there as an adviser to Plotnitskiy, but also chaired the meetings conducted with LPR commanders. Ivannikov also commanded the private military force Wagner, which entered Ukraine at the same time as him. A few days later, on 23 June 2014, a Buk convoy departed for the Ukrainian border. The convoy included the Buk TELAR that was transported across the border in the night of 16 to 17 July 2014 and was used to shoot down MH17. It has yet to be determined whether it had been decided to deliver this Buk TELAR to the DPR prior to the convoy’s departure, or whether this decision was only made later, after the deployment of the 53rd AAMB to the border. 5.7 Putin’s position In the aforementioned intercepted conversations from early June 2014, participants stated that the decision to provide more far-reaching military support to the DPR and LPR lay with Putin. In addition, specific information was found that a request to provide separatists with heavier anti-aircraft systems had been submitted to Putin. Other sources as well point to the Russian 37 https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45943 (last accessed on 23 November 2020).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 47 MH17 Report president’s personal involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, mainly in a behind-the-scenes capacity. For example, although on 24 June 2014 Putin publicly asked the Russian Federation Council to rescind the resolution that gave him the authority to conduct a military intervention in Ukraine,38 it remained clear to the DPR that the Russian president was still involved in the conflict. In a conversation that took place the following day, 25 June 2014 (23:20:46), a fellow fighter asked Borodai if it was true that ‘Uncle Vova’ was refusing to help: he had seen that in the news. Borodai replied that this was not true, and that these were just normal ‘diplomatic manoeuvres’. Borodai then said to the other party: ‘You’re here for a reason, and I'm here for a reason.’ ‘Vova’ is a diminutive of ‘Vladimir’, Putin’s first name. In addition, there are indications that Putin wished to be briefed in detail about the course of the conflict and the military results achieved by the DPR and LPR. For example, intercepted phone conversations show that on 25 June 2014 Borodai was questioned from Moscow about the downing of a Ukrainian helicopter, which he was unaware of at the time. First, Borodai received a call about this (on 25 June 2014, 07:49:17) by a member of the Russian Federation Council. Borodai said that he knew nothing about the downing of a helicopter, though he did say that ‘the air poses a big problem for us, since, naturally, we’ve got no aviation of our own’. The member of the Federation Council thanked Borodai and said that he now had a general idea of what he wanted to talk about in his speech. According to the Kremlin website, on 26 June 2014, a day after this conversation between Borodai and a member of the Federation Council, Putin had a meeting with the Security Council (which the speaker of the Federation Council is a permanent member of) devoted to the situation in Ukraine.39 In the early afternoon, after the telephone conversation with the member of the Federation Council, Borodai was called again (25 June 2014, 12:38:53), this time by Viktor Medvedchuk, a Russian-born former Ukrainian politician and representative of the DPR and LPR in peace talks. Medvedchuk told Borodai: ‘Sasha, they’re asking – for the, um, report to V.V./VV report – what our account [of events] is in relation to the helicopter.’ Borodai responded by saying that he did not know and asked if the matter could wait. Medvedchuk wanted to have the information for ‘V.V.’ as soon as possible. In a later conversation it became clear who was being referred to by ‘V.V.’. That same evening, at 21:59:22, Medvedchuk and Borodai talked about the ongoing talks with Ukraine. Medvedchuk then said he needed to go to Moscow for a meeting with ‘the leader’. According to him, ‘the chief himself’, namely ‘V.V.’, picked Rostov as the location for the meeting. The next day Medvedchuk met with this ‘V.V.’ This can only be Russian president Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who – as is customary in Russia – is also referred to in other conversations by his first name and patronymic or his initials. By his own account, Medvedchuk needed to report to this ‘V.V.’ in June 2014 about an air defence-related incident: the downing of a Ukrainian helicopter. 38 www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46057 (last accessed on 16 September 2019). 39 https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46082 (last accessed 23 November 2020).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 48 MH17 Report In conversations on 27 June 2014 (23:29:20 and 23:38:00), Medvedchuk told Borodai that he had just been called by ‘our president’, who had indicated that Girkin and Pavel Gubarev (the self-proclaimed governor of the DPR) had been saying that they did not intend to honour the ceasefire. According to Borodai, Girkin had said that he was respecting the ceasefire but would not allow himself to be provoked. Medvedchuk said that Girkin would have to publicly support the ceasefire, and Borodai promised that Girkin would do so. In addition, Medvedchuk spoke to Borodai about an upcoming prisoner exchange. He then said that Borodai would get their 'lists’ and that Borodai would have to try to give them ‘counter lists'. In that connection Medvedchuk specifically asked about a Ukrainian ‘female pilot’ by the name of ‘Nadezhda Savchenko’. Public sources indicate that this woman had been taken prisoner by the DPR a short time before. Apparently ‘the OSCE’ would have to be contacted the next day about her and the ‘lists’. According to Medvedchuk, this was ‘at the president’s request’. Medvedchuk was later mentioned by Putin himself in a conversation with the so-called prime minister of the LPR, Igor Plotnitskiy, on 15 November 2017 (20:42:49). In this conversation Putin (B3) was personally informed by Plotnitskiy (A) about the ‘military component’ and asked him about Medvedchuk’s ‘initiative’ for a prisoner exchange: A: Hello? B1: Igor Venediktovich? A: Yes. B1: Hello. You are speaking to Moscow, on the special phone line40. Vladimir Vladimirovich41 would like to talk to you. (…) A: Thank you. Ok. B1: Did I understand it correctly? Am I connected with the telephone of mr. Plotnitskiy? A: That is correct. Yes. B1: One moment, I’ll connect you. A: That’s fine. B2: Hello? A: Hello B2: Igor Venediktovich, hello. You are speaking with Mamakin [phonetic transcription], the secretary to Vladimir Vladimirovich. One moment please and I’ll connect you. A: Yes, please, that’s fine. B3: Hello? A: Yes, good evening. B3: Igor Venediktovich, good day. A: Yes. B3: Good afternoon, hello. A: Yes, hello, Mr President. B3: How are you doing? A: Thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich. I'm fine. B3: So things are going okay then. And what are your thoughts on this…ʻmilitary component’? 40 Special telephone line, the so-called ‘spetscommutator’ is the Kremlin telephone line. 41 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 49 MH17 Report A: I think the ʻmilitary componentʼ is at a pretty good level on our side. Though there are certain weak points... [interruption – sentence not completed] B3: Have things intensified? A: At times it’s heavier, but that's due to the occasional movement of various military units, or to shifting out units with fresh troops, but there hasn’t been anything too intense yet, thank God. B3: And what about the socioeconomic situation? A: We have a fairly good handle on the socioeconomic situation, and we are levelling up in all kinds of ways. But obviously living conditions leave something to be desired, and we have questions about and suggestions for improving living conditions, but we haven’t always been able to resolve these issues. B3: Well, I’ve already said it to Aleksandr Vladimirovich, and maybe we can... I can ask colleagues who are helpful to you in various areas to draw up a supplemental report with regard to the situation there. And then we can meet to discuss this, all right? A: Thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Maybe it would be possible to discuss this face to face? B3: That’s what I said. That we can discuss this later on in a face-to-face meeting. A: Thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich. B3: Igor Venediktovich, I also wanted to address Medvedchuk’s initiative regarding a prisoner exchange. You’ve probably heard about that. A: Yes of course. Yes of course Vladimir Vladimirovich. B3: What’s your opinion about it? A: I'm completely in favour, since Ukraine has been blocking the normal prisoner exchange for a year. Our inhabitants form an overwhelming majority there. Here the ratio is around 1 to 10. And they of course suffer within the four walls. That’s not only a matter of speech, they truly suffer. I have seen how they are being held. It is incomparable to how their people are being held in our territory. So this initiative is a relief for us, if we can get our people out of their territory. B3: Igor Venediktovich, in that case we still need to work out a few additional details. I’ll ask my people to assist you where necessary in both word and deed. A: Thank you! B3: Thank you very much. That’s it and I wish you the best. A: Thank you. Bye. B3: Bye. This conversation from 2017 is in keeping with the aforementioned findings of late June 2014, which showed that Putin was personally involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. It is also in keeping with a witness statement to the effect that the same individual, Plotnitskiy, carried an encrypted phone containing direct numbers for President Putin, Shoigu and Surkov. As the JIT repeatedly discovered, not everyone was equally disciplined when it came to security of communications. 5.8 Summary In an intercepted conversation in early June 2014, Aksyonov, the Russian leader of Crimea, spoke about a ‘joint coordination centre’ for Russian military support for the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In addition, it is clear from various intercepted conversations that during this period that decisions
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 50 MH17 Report were being made at presidential level about such military support. According to an aide of Aksyonov’s, it was not the defence minister but the president himself who made these decisions. Other intercepted conversations also show that Putin was personally involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. On 8 June 2014 Girkin asked Aksyonov for broader military support, including ‘decent anti-aircraft systems manned by trained personnel’. According to Aksyonov the necessary documents had already been drawn up at that time. At some point in the second half of June, Aksyonov and Dyumin, the deputy head of the GRU, submitted a request for heavier anti-aircraft systems at a meeting at the Russian Presidential Executive Office. This request was supported by Malofeev, an oligarch, and Surkov, a member of the Presidential Executive Office and adviser to Putin. This meeting was also attended by representatives of the FSB and the Ministry of Defence. The meeting resulted in the submission of the request for heavier anti-aircraft systems to Minister of Defence Shoigu and President Putin. This request was granted. During this same period, from 14 to 19 June 2014, Borodai was in Moscow, on the same city square where the Presidential Executive Office is located. By his own account, Borodai was there, arranging ‘parcels and gifts’ for his fellow DPR fighters. Besides Borodai there was also another separatist in Moscow who took part in phone conversations about meetings and discussions regarding military support. It is unknown if heavier anti-aircraft systems, such as Buks, were mentioned in these discussions. Intercepted phone conversations show that shortly after their visit to Moscow, other heavier military materiel was delivered to the DPR, including artillery. A short time later, on 23 June 2014, the Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ departed for the Russian-Ukrainian border from its home base in Kursk, as part of the second Buk battalion of the 53rd AAMB.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 51 MH17 Report 6 Other parties involved in the deployment of the Buk TELAR As well as investigating the Buk TELAR's crew, their direct superiors and those responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR, the JIT also investigated the parties responsible for the deployment, on 17 July 2014, of that Buk TELAR, which was used to shoot down flight MH17. Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko have already been convicted of deploying this weapon by the district court. The investigation was broader, however, and also encompassed other individuals who may have been jointly responsible for the Buk TELAR's deployment on 17 July 2014. Once again, telecom data was the key source of evidence in this regard, and use was made of intercepted phone conversations previously included in the prosecution file and authenticated by the district court. The same arguments regarding the recordings’ authenticity apply to the intercepted phone conversations that had not yet been included in the file and which are discussed for the first time in this report. In the interests of clarity the investigation findings will be discussed in chronological order, from the arrival of the Buk TELAR at the Russian-Ukrainian border until shortly after the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. 6.1 Late June to early July 2014: Russia exerts more influence over DPR As the Buk TELAR convoy travelled from Kursk to the border between 23 and 25 June 2014, the conflict in eastern Ukraine had come to a temporary halt. On 20 June, Ukraine announced a week-long ceasefire. When the ceasefire expired, fighting resumed on the DPR's northwestern and southern fronts. In July this fighting intensified further. In this period the Russian Federation began exerting more influence over the DPR. Changes were made to the military structure in eastern Ukraine. This is made clear, for example, by an intercepted conversation between two DPR commanders from 1 July 2014 (22:08:05) (…) B: As the Commandant of Makeyevka, I’d very much like to know that. I want to know what we’re moving towards. A: We’re moving towards unity of command. What happens next is a bunch of men with a mandate from Shoigu will arrive and kick the local warlords the fuck out of the units B: - Uh-huh. A: ...and then people from Moscow will take charge. (...) B: (...) I need to know one thing: who shall I fucking report to when it happens? A: You will report to the Minister of Defense. (...) Minister of Defense of the DPR. (...) our Minister of Defense is Strelkov, and our Commander-in-Chief-like any other President or Prime Minister - is Borodai. (...) Strelkov can give you orders, of course - and he’ll certainly do so, as the war minister. No one else can give you orders. Well, Borodai, as the Prime Minister, can give your orders directly. In that case, you will have to comply.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 52 MH17 Report (…) In an intercepted conversation on 4 July 2014 (22:07:21) Dubinskiy confirmed these planned changes to the DPR's structure. In that conversation he explained that Alexander Borodai was in Moscow to discuss this situation. In another conversation that day, Dubinskiy said that once Borodai returned they would have more information ‘on the commanders, on the political structure.’ Borodai was indeed in Moscow during the first week of July 2014. On 6 July 2014, by his own account, he was in the vicinity of the Kremlin in Moscow, where he was dealing with ‘other matters on a larger scale'. The individuals Borodai spoke to there can be deduced from various intercepted phone calls from the previous week. In a conversation on 30 June 2014 (20:25:28), for example, Borodai can be heard in the background saying that their funds are running out and that sooner or later he will have to go to Moscow for a few days. He indicates that he has a meeting scheduled: ‘With our [inaudible] portrait; with Vladimir Vladimirovich.’ This is President Putin's first name and patronymic. The words ‘our portrait’ seem to refer to Putin's portrait, which hangs in every Russian government building. Three days later, on 3 July 2014 (20:28:19), Borodai called Vladislav Surkov. In this conversation, Borodai says that he has been summoned unexpectedly and will hopefully be able to present a report in person. In intercepted conversations the next day, Dubinskiy says that Borodai is in Moscow in connection with changes to the political and military leadership within the DPR. Borodai's visit fits within a recurring pattern of trips to the Russian Federation by him and other DPR leaders. During this visit, Borodai had no phone contact with Surkov, Chesnakov or other Russian users of a series of consecutive encrypted phone numbers,42 while at other times Borodai was in regular phone contact with them. During this trip, Borodai designated Girkin as the day-to-day leader of the DPR in his absence. For example, in phone conversations on 6 July 2014 (14:55:54 and 21:05:15) Borodai referred someone to Girkin to resolve a certain problem, since he himself was not ‘in the region’. However, Girkin's resolution of such problems did not always run smoothly. The next day, on 7 July 2014 (10:31:19), another DPR fighter complained to Borodai that Girkin had ordered him to release a prisoner. Borodai explains that his and Girkin's hands are tied. The decision to release this man was not Girkin's. ‘Unfortunately [this came] from Moscow.’ Borodai then says that he and Girkin are ‘one and the same’: they have the same leader. While Borodai was in Moscow, a number of Russian generals arrived in eastern Ukraine. One of them was known to the separatists as Delfin and was identified by the JIT.43 From a conversation 42 This is a series of Russian phone numbers with the same initial nine digits (792653185XX). Only the last two digits are different. 43 During the first hearing of the criminal proceedings (9 March 2020) the Public Prosecution Service discussed the possible involvement of Delfin and another Russian officer with the call sign Orion. The Public Prosecution Service explained that in 2016 the JIT suspected, on the basis of several intercepted phone conversations, that these individuals had played a role in the downing of flight MH17, but that further investigation had revealed no evidence of
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 53 MH17 Report on 9 July 2014 it emerged that Delfin had been appointed head of the general staff of the so-called South East Army, which was based in Krasnodon, Ukraine. It appears that the aim was that this body would serve as the joint staff for the ‘armed forces’ of the DPR and LPR, and the activities of both groups would be coordinated from within it. In addition, it seems that a joint ‘Army of Novorossiya’ was to be formed under the leadership of a Russian general named Travkin. This individual was also identified by the JIT. Until 2010 he was a major general in the Russian military intelligence service (GRU). In a conversation on 10 July at 10:20:01, the previously mentioned Fominov indicated that in Moscow he was instructed to form the first ‘Cossack Regiment of Novorossiya’. He had received the approval of the ‘commander’ (here he is probably referring to Travkin). In another conversation (on 17 July 2014 at 12:29:51) Travkin is referred to as ‘commander-in-chief’. Another commander who arrived in eastern Ukraine in early July 2014 and worked in the newly established general staff was Elbrus. This individual was identified by the JIT. According to Alexander Khodakovskiy, DPR commander of the Vostok Battalion, Elbrus was from ‘Vympel’ a special unit of the FSB. In December 2014 Girkin spoke about his relationship with the general staff in July 2014. ‘I was in regular contact with the staff, which became operational in mid-July, consisted of several retired generals and colonels, and was intended to serve as an umbrella organisation that would unify the Republics’ various commanders. Still, my contacts with the staff were of no use to me, as I received no instructions from them. What I did was inform the general staff every day about the situation in the areas at the front where the units under my command were fighting.’44 And regarding the question of whether this general staff had any influence or useful purpose, Girkin responded as follows: ‘I don’t know. What I can say is that I think the situation was terrible for them. These people were used to a constant flow of normal supplies, facilities, understanding, but they had none of that, and the way I see it, they just got lost in the situation. That situation required people with leadership skills, and these people were just staff functionaries who weren’t capable of leading anyone, compelling them, subjecting them to authority.’45 Borodai’s telecom data shows that on the night of 9 to 10 July 2014, he was back in eastern Ukraine. Various phone conversations revealed that after his return certain changes were indeed made to the DPR command structure. On 10 July 2014 at 01:00:48, for example, Borodai said that he had returned with around 10 'apparent' civilians in his wake, who were accompanied by a security escort. In the same conversation, Borodai also said that there would be changes to their ‘government’, as new members had arrived. They would quickly alleviate the miserable situation there (in eastern Ukraine). After arriving in Donetsk, Borodai urgently wanted to speak with Girkin. relevant involvement in the downing of the aircraft. This situation has not changed since 9 March 2020. Further study of the findings of the investigation has only cast more doubt on previous indications. https://theins.ru/politika/83281 (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 45 https://theins.ru/politika/83281 (last accessed on 5 December 2022)
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 54 MH17 Report On 10 July 2014, Girkin and Borodai gave a joint press conference in which Borodai introduced Girkin as ‘commander of the armed forces of the DPR, Minister of Defence of the DPR and head of the Security Council of the Donetsk People’s Republic.’ Borodai also said he was happy that he and Girkin were part of this new constellation. In response to a question about what he had done in Moscow, and whom he had spoken to there, Borodai gave the following answer: ‘Personally I feel I achieved sufficient success in the consultations. As for who I spoke to – of course, I won’t say, because that falls under military secrets. But nevertheless, I believe the consultations were successful, and I’m counting on the support of the Russian Federation in the very short term. The Russian people are already giving us enormous support, with both volunteers and humanitarian aid, and I think this support will only increase.’46 Next, Borodai said that he could not discuss the precise details of this support, but he noted that ‘the consultations led to good results’. During the press conference Girkin explained the establishment of the general staff as follows: ‘In short, at the moment a general staff is being set up for the armed forces of the DPR and the LPR. The headquarters of the general staff has already been determined. The formation of this organisation is practically complete. The joint administration of Novorossia will be established soon. That is all I can say at this time.’47 6.2 6 to 14 July 2014: planning DPR offensive During the press conference Girkin also described where the front line was located on 10 July 2014: running alongside Shakhtarsk, Torez and Snizhne. According to Girkin, the heaviest fighting on the southern front line was concentrated near Saur-Mogila and Stepanovka, where prolonged artillery fire from both sides was ongoing. In early July 2014 the DPR began preparing an offensive to the south of Snizhne. Following a meeting of the staff led by Girkin, on 6 and 7 July 2014 Pulatov conducted reconnaissance activities from south of Snizhne to the Russian border.48 During the press conference Girkin said that the heaviest fighting was concentrated in this area. On 10 July Girkin was frequently on the phone with ‘Moscow’. In a conversation at 14:18:37, for example, an assistant of Girkin can be heard telling Dubinskiy that Girkin is currently on the phone with Moscow and that it is important. Later that day, at 17:22:16, Girkin himself tells Dubinskiy that he is constantly on the phone, trying to get hold of Moscow. By his own account he wants to report on the situation. Borodai subsequently phones the commander of Snizhne. He tells him he will be coming by with Girkin tomorrow and assures the commander he will receive military equipment, arms and money. Borodai says he has it all. 46 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-Z_dJRHfB8 (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 47 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-Z_dJRHfB8 (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 48 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 55 MH17 Report Later that evening a briefing took place between Girkin and all the commanders. Borodai was present, and Dubinskiy was also urged to come to the meeting. At 23:37:32 Dubinskiy asked a subordinate to urgently fetch a map of Snizhne and the area to the south and southeast of the city. According to Dubinskiy these were ‘operation instructions’. 6.3 14 to 16 July 2014: start of DPR offensive From 14 July there was heavy fighting between Ukrainian troops and the DPR in the area south of Snizhne. On 14 July Dmitrovka was bombarded by the Ukrainian air force. In the night of 14 to 15 July the separatists attacked checkpoints near Stepanovka, and the next day this village was captured. Preparations were also made to attack Marinovka. In the evening of the 14th, for example, Girkin called the commander of Snizhne and told him that Marinovka would have to be taken the next morning and that the commander’s troops would have to support this effort. Ultimately, Marinovka was not attacked until the day after, on the morning of 16 July 2014. The previous night (15 to 16 July) a meeting took place. The attendees included Girkin, Borodai, the commander of Snizhne and the commander of the Oplot Battalion The fact that something was afoot was made clear by subsequent intercepted phone conversations. Borodai, for example, called a subordinate to ensure the availability of sufficient ambulances to extract casualties, and doctors to treat them. In the early hours of the morning (02:22:34) the Oplot Battalion commander told Girkin’s assistant that the offensive would begin in a few hours. In the early morning of 16 July 2014 Marinovka, a village four kilometres from the Russian border, was attacked by the DPR. The attack was launched from newly captured Stepanovka and Saur-Moglia, the hill that had been captured earlier. The troops commanded by Kharchenko and Pulatov played a key role in this attack.49 Girkin and Borodai were also at the front that day. A video filmed on the morning of 16 July shows Girkin and Borodai being interviewed in the vicinity of Marinovka. In the interview Girkin talks about dead and wounded fighters on the DPR side. In addition, an intercepted phone conversation with the Oplot Battalion commander on the same day (08:17:08) shows Girkin and Borodai received a detailed briefing on the battalion’s progress in the fighting. Girkin then tells the commander that Marinovka has been captured and that they are now trying to advance further. Later, in the afternoon (15:45:30) Borodai confirms that Girkin’s troops have made territorial gains that day: ‘(…) Stepanovka and – what’s its name – Maryinka are currently occupied by Strelkov’s units’.50 The investigation showed that Borodai meant Marinovka when he referred to ‘Maryinka’, and that he got this place name wrong on other occasions too. 49 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, consideration 6.2.4.4 50 See also intercepted conversation (09:25:29) in which Borodai tells Zakharchenko: ‘Run around and wave your hats, eh? Well that’s not a good idea, naturally. Stay put for now, we’ll figure out something… other than running around and waving your hats. (…) So the bottom-line is, three out of four tanks you had in Maryinka are now out of action.’
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 56 MH17 Report 6.4 Burlaka's position During an intercepted phone conversation on 16 July 2014 at 08:17:08, the Oplot Battalion commander told Borodai and Girkin that a helicopter had just flown overhead. It was flying on a zig-zagging course to the east, in the direction of Luhansk. Next Borodai called a person known as ‘Vladimir Ivanovich’ and asked him whether it was possible that 'our helicopters’ were carrying out an attack on ‘Maryinka’. ‘Vladimir Ivanovich’ reacted to this comment as he always did when Borodai called him: he asked Borodai to switch on the phone's encryption mode. The phone’s scrambler was then switched on, making it impossible to listen in to the rest of the conversation. The person whom Borodai addressed as Vladimir Ivanovich was identified by the investigation team as Andrei Burlaka, an FSB general who was first deputy to the head of the FSB Border Service. The investigative collective Bellingcat had previously reached the same conclusion,51 following a JIT witness appeal in November 2019 in which information about ‘Vladimir Ivanovich’ was released.52 From June to mid-August 2014, Borodai was in almost daily contact with Burlaka. Borodai described him to others as ‘the commander of this operation’ and ‘the one who makes all the decisions’. Burlaka used an encrypted phone whose number was from the same series as those used by Borodai, Surkov and Chesnakov.53 The investigation revealed that on several occasions Burlaka gave Borodai instructions and directly intervened from the Russian Federation with regard to internal DPR matters. Burlaka's actions on 1 July 2014 are an example of this. Recorded conversations on that date show that a conflict arose that day between Borodai and Bezler, prompted by the storming of the interior ministry building in Donetsk by troops under Bezler's command. Borodai called Burlaka and Surkov in connection with this conflict. Since the discussion took place on encrypted phone lines, the substance of their discussions is not known, but Borodai told others that he was instructed by Burlaka to ensure, by force of arms, that Bezler did not seize the interior ministry building. He was also instructed to ‘destroy’ him. The conflict was ultimately resolved after Burlaka spoke to one of Bezler's subordinates. Burlaka appears to have had some say over not only Borodai's position, but Girkin's as well. On 11 July 2014 at 20:15:41, for example, a DPR fighter told Burlaka that Girkin had placed his group under the command of another separatist and asked Burlaka whether he should obey Girkin's instructions. Burlaka answered in the affirmative. In another case, Burlaka interfered with Girkin's equipment supplies. On 31 July 2014 at 00:56:38, Girkin was told that a convoy of 'seven boxes’ had been supplied, but that Burlaka had instructed that two of them must be supplied to another party. Affronted, Girkin responded that Burlaka should be giving such instructions to Girkin himself and not issuing commands to his people directly. 51 https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/04/28/Burlaka/ (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 52 https://www.politie.nl/en/information/witness-appeal-crash-mh17-nov-19.html (last accessed on 5 December 2022). 53 This is a series of Russian phone numbers with the same initial nine digits (792653185XX). Only the last two digits are different.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 57 MH17 Report Furthermore, telecom data shows that in the course of 16 July 2014 various separatist leaders and leaders of the Krasnodon general staff held meetings with Burlaka, a ‘higher-ranking boss’ ‘who flew over from Moscow’. These meetings took place at a location on the Russian side of the Russian-Ukrainian border. The investigation produced no information about what was discussed at these meetings. 6.5 Borodai's position As the so-called prime minister of the DPR, Borodai was in close contact with Burlaka and Surkov during this period. The contacts between Burlaka and Surkov concerned developments in the theatre of operations, the delivery of military equipment, and administrative matters, such as the establishment of an extra security service and the intransigent attitude of DPR commander Bezler. Surkov also concerned himself with the composition of Borodai's government. In an intercepted conversation on 25 June 2014 (23:20:46) about Putin (‘Uncle Vova’), Borodai said that he was in eastern Ukraine for a reason. Borodai was thus a key link in the chain between the DPR and Moscow. Various intercepted phone conversations show that Borodai was receiving instructions from Burlaka. In one conversation, on 3 July 2014 at 13:26:36, a Russian fighter described Borodai's position as follows: ‘Nah, look, he says things he’s told to say, do you know what I mean? (…) He says things that are dictated from Moscow. He’s an appointee, you see?’ In intercepted conversations Borodai is sometimes described as commander-in-chief. For example, in a phone conversation on 4 August 2014 (23:53:53), a little over two weeks after the downing of MH17, Dubinskiy reported that he had been promoted to major general three days earlier on the orders of ‘Commander-in-Chief’ Borodai, who in turn was confirming the order of ‘VVP’. 'VVP’ is a common abbreviation of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Girkin is also described as commander-in-chief of the DPR. Girkin gave himself this title in the witness statement he gave to the Russian authorities on 6 February 2015. During a joint press conference on 10 July 2014, Borodai presented Girkin as ‘commander of the armed forces of the DPR, Minister of Defence of the DPR and head of the Security Council of the Donetsk People's Republic’. It is not always clear how such titles relate to one another within the DPR. In intercepted phone conversations, Borodai does not come across as the commander-in-chief. When it comes to the DPR's actual military operations, and particularly the planning and execution of the offensive to the south of Snizhne, nothing was found indicating that Borodai was the person in command on the ground. Phone intercepts do show that he was kept informed about military results, but not that he directed combat activities himself, as Girkin did. Borodai did not appear to know the name of Marinovka, where the DPR, under Girkin's command, launched its southern offensive (‘(...) Stepanovka and – what’s its name – Maryinka are currently occupied by Strelkov’s units’). In addition, during the offensive of 16 July 2014 (08:17:08) Borodai passed the phone to Girkin when the Oplot Battalion commander reported on the resistance his troops were encountering. Girkin responded that the commander should press on. When the same commander phoned Borodai over an hour later (09:25:29) to report that several of his tanks had been disabled and asked what the plan was, or whether new orders were coming, Borodai responded that they would think of something, and then handed the phone to Girkin.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 58 MH17 Report 6.6 16 to 17 July 2014: deployment of the Buk TELAR After the capture of Marinovka, the DPR offensive ground to a halt. The DPR could not break through the Ukrainian positions and had to contend with Ukrainian air strikes and constant artillery fire, which resulted in many dead and wounded on the DPR side. As the district court established in its judgment, in the night of 16 to 17 July 2014 Pulatov reported to Dubinskiy that he needed not tanks, but decent anti-aircraft defence. After this, Dubinskiy spoke to a comrade and expressed his desire to obtain a Buk that he could send to the front that morning, because otherwise the prospects did not look good. Dubinskiy told Pulatov that if they did manage to get hold of a ‘Buk M’, it would immediately be sent to Pulatov, and that this Buk was their only hope.54 On the morning of 17 July 2014 Girkin received a report that they had suffered a total defeat on a plateau. At 08:27:03 Girkin passed this report from the front on to Borodai and asked him whether he had a fully charged phone he could use to report over an encrypted line. When Borodai answered that he did indeed have a fully charged phone available, Girkin asked him to send it to him, and said he would wait to receive it. Half an hour later (at 08:59:28), one of the phones used by Borodai called Burlaka’s number. This conversation could not be intercepted because it took place over an encrypted line, but the conversation lasted 296 seconds. At around 09.00 that morning, a Buk TELAR was delivered in Donetsk. At that time, Dubinskiy was with Girkin at DPR headquarters in Donetsk. Kharchenko joined them, and Dubinskiy instructed him to escort the Buk TELAR further, position it in the vicinity of Pervomaiske, and have his men guard it there. That morning, Borodai's phone was transmitting to the same phone mast as those of Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko: the mast at Schorsa Street in Donetsk. The DPR headquarters building is located within range of this phone mast. Furthermore, it appears that Borodai did indeed visit Girkin to bring him a fully charged encrypted phone, as discussed in the earlier phone call at 08:27:03. At 08:58:02 one of Girkin’s subordinates was summoned to Girkin's office. In an intercepted conversation at 09:33:12 the same subordinate informed another separatist that Borodai was with him at that time. This indicates that Girkin and Borodai were that morning at the same location as that where Dubinskiy was instructed to deploy the Buk TELAR that had been received. According to the district court, it is impossible to satisfactorily establish, however plausible it may be, that at this moment (or at any other time prior to the downing of flight MH17) Girkin was aware of the availability of a Buk TELAR.55 The same must apply here to Borodai. In the same period that Dubinskiy was at headquarters arranging orders for Bibliothekar, Pulatov and later Kharchenko to ensure that the Buk TELAR reached its intended destination,56 Borodai was in phone contact with Burlaka. They had two conversations: one at 09:24:11 lasting 95 seconds, and another at 09:35:06, lasting 322 seconds. On the same day, 17 July 2014, Borodai had phone 54 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 6.2.4.4 55 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 6.2.5.3 56 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 6.2.4.4
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 59 MH17 Report contact with Burlaka on more than 20 occasions. The substance of these conversations is not known because they were conducted using encrypted phones. It is therefore not clear whether these conversations involved the further deployment of the Buk TELAR. Recorded phone conversations conducted by Borodai on 17 July 2014 concerned matters other than the deployment of the Buk TELAR. For example, at 13:11:06 he spoke with Medvedchuk about a planned meeting via video link with the OSCE, which neither of them would be participating in. In this call, Borodai and Medvedchuk jokingly note that they have both received the same ‘directive’ not to attend the meeting. Less than half an hour later (at 13:36:50), Borodai is called by a DPR fighter who complains that things are taking too long, that they have more than enough manpower, and that some of the weapons have been taken. He ‘doesn’t get it at all’, and wonders what is going on. Borodai responds that he must follow Girkin’s orders. 6.7 17 July 2014: after the downing of flight MH17 After the downing of flight MH17, no phone conversations conducted by Borodai or Burlaka concerning the deployment or removal of a Buk or the downing of the aircraft were intercepted either. However, Borodai’s intercepted conversations include discussions of the impact and aftermath of the disaster. On 17 July 2014 at 23:43:37, Borodai (A) called the commander of the Oplot Battalion (B). This conversation shows that Borodai has just been at the crash site and is currently en route to DPR headquarters in Donetsk. (…) A: Where are you? Where are you now? B: I’m waiting for the minister. I’ll bring him with me and come to you. A: To me? Where? There? I’ve already left there. B: In that case, first I’ll take the minister there, and after that I’ll come to you. (...) Because the Minister of Health damn well needs to be present at the Boeing crash location. A: You need to come to me, but first I need to swing by the esbushka.57 (…) During this conversation shortly before midnight on 17 July 2014, Borodai’s phone was transmitting to phone masts in Makeeva, near Donetsk. From 00:03:27 on 18 July 2014, his phone was transmitting to a mast on Schorsa Street in Donetsk, near DPR headquarters. At 00:10:19 Borodai (A) received a phone call from Chesnakov (B), who worked with Surkov. In this call, Borodai informs Chesnakov that he has just returned from the crash site. Chesnakov asks him about communications on the establishment of an investigation headquarters and contacts with international organisations and the victims’ next of kin: (…) B: Sorry to call so late. I was told you were up. A: Yes, of course I’m up. I’ve just come back. From the beautiful places. 57 ‘Esbushka’ of ‘eSBeUshka’ is the nickname of the SBU building that was occupied by the DPR and was being used as the DPR's headquarters.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 60 MH17 Report B: I’ve got two questions to ask. Number one: they say it works out very well there in terms of information; I mean you say right things. A: Well, we can find more… B: Yeah. A: … on top of everything else. B: Yeah. Look, there’s a request. Is it possible to spread the information immediately about the decision for you to establish a headquarters for the investigation… A: OK. B: … so that you engage with all international organizations, and relatives of those killed, and others. A: Yes. Yes. (…) Shortly thereafter, in a phone call at 00:32:32, Dubinskiy told a comrade that Borodai was currently with Girkin. It is not clear what Borodai and Girkin discussed at that time. Around this time, Dubinskiy’s phone was transmitting to phone masts in the same vicinity as the DPR’s headquarters. Between 00:18:56 and 02:03:16 Borodai’s phone was no longer active. His whereabouts in this time period are therefore unknown. From 02:03:16 his phone was transmitting to a mast at a different location. The DPR’s headquarters building is located outside the range of this mast. No indication was found that Borodai was involved in the removal of the Buk TELAR that shot down MH17. Girkin initially instructed Dubinskiy to remove the Buk TELAR at 20:30:52 on 17 July 2014. Dubinskiy passed on this instruction to Kharchenko. At 23:32:34 Kharchenko told Dubinskiy that the Buk convoy had left Snizhne. At this point Borodai was not yet at DPR headquarters. It was only later that night, starting at 01:47:32, that Girkin and Dubinskiy got involved again in the removal of the Buk TELAR. During the ongoing removal operation, Borodai’s phone was no longer active or was at a different location to Girkin and Dubinskiy. The next and last-known conversations conducted by Borodai about MH17 took place on 21 July 2014. At that time, the affected countries and several international organisations were trying to gain access to the disaster area in order to repatriate the victims’ remains and conduct an investigation. On the morning of 21 July 2014 Borodai called Surkov eight times but was unable to reach him. Next Borodai (A) called Chesnakov (B) at 12:45:43 and said that he wished to speak to ‘the boss’ about the departure of the refrigerated rail container (‘reefer’) containing victims’ remains, the transfer of the black boxes, and points of contact for his upcoming press conference: A: (…) (…) three Dutch experts arrived today, and I hope that twelve more Malaysian experts will arrive any time soon. (…) And then there’re some Red Cross representatives. All of them are eager to get work done, so we’ll take all of them to the scene and to the reefer, but after that they all want us to send that reefer en route to Kharkov. (…)…and it is my understanding that [our] colleagues, if you will, also support it—am I right? I mean, [we] support [the decision] to send that reefer to Kharkov, but not until an official handover ceremony has taken place and a corresponding document has been signed—(…)…saying that we have handed over so-and-so many bodies of the victims and so-and-so many other things. (…) Is this the correct standpoint?
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 61 MH17 Report B: A: B: To me, it is. Well, I’d like to have a consultation—(…)…and to discuss it directly with the boss. (…) And as soon as possible. But I absolutely can’t get him on the phone, I get cut off all the time. Maybe he can try? (…) Now, about the [black] boxes that I have in my possession: I will hand them over to no one else but ICAO representatives, do I get it right? (…) And those will have to come here to get them. Uh-huh. But to be honest, I’d like a consultation to clear this out completely. (…) May I ask [that he] calls me back at the earliest opportunity, because I’ve got to be at another press conference any time soon. (…) [I need] to know my talking points (…) For I assume our neighbors will be saying something [on the matter]. (…) After this, Borodai tried calling Surkov twice, again without success. At 17:32:10, Borodai told Chesnakov that he urgently needed to speak to ‘the boss’, because he really needed to know to whom he should hand over the black boxes and the victims’ remains. Later in the evening of 21 July 2014, at around 23:00, Borodai gave a press conference at which he announced that the train containing victims’ bodies would be travelling to Kharkiv and handed over the black boxes from flight MH17 to Malaysian investigators.58 6.8 Summary From 6 July 2014, over a week after the arrival of the Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ at the Russian-Ukrainian border, changes were made to the DPR’s military and political structure. Russian generals travelled to Ukraine to form a joint general staff that would coordinate the military operations of the DPR and LPR. Their degree of actual influence in July 2014 remains unclear. Girkin said that he received no instructions from this general staff. There are however indications that Borodai received instructions from the FSB general Burlaka. As of June 2014 he and Borodai were in daily contact. Burlaka also gave instructions directly to Girkin’s subordinates, a situation which Girkin accepted. Burlaka's instructions to Borodai and to Girkin’s subordinates related to internal conflicts and dynamics between DPR commanders, and to the provision of equipment. The investigation uncovered no concrete instructions from Russian generals or other Russian officials concerning the deployment of the Buk TELAR. The Buk TELAR was deployed as part of the armed conflict taking place to the south of Snizhne. The planning and execution of this DPR offensive was the responsibility of Girkin, Dubinskiy, Pulatov and Kharchenko (among others). Borodai was also present, and was kept informed about the military results in the course of the fighting. There are no indications that Borodai himself directed any combat activities. He was not familiar with the place name Marinovka, where on 16 July 2014 Girkin was leading the DPR offensive. When asked operational questions he passed the 58 See e.g. The Guardian’s liveblog of 21 July 2014: https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/21/mh17-disaster-ukraine-obama-live-updates (last accessed on 5 December 2022).
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 62 MH17 Report telephone to Girkin. And when a DPR fighter asked him on the afternoon of 17 July 2014 what was going on, Borodai replied that he must follow Girkin’s orders. When the offensive stalled and the DPR fighters came under fire, a Buk system was requested and received. Once the Buk TELAR had arrived in Donetsk, Dubinskiy arranged its deployment. At that time, Borodai and Girkin were in the same DPR headquarters building. As the district court held in Girkin’s case, it is not possible to establish whether Borodai was aware at that time of the Buk TELAR’s availability. While Dubinskiy was making phone calls from headquarters about the deployment of the Buk TELAR, Borodai spoke to Burlaka on the phone twice. Over the course of the entire day (17 July) Borodai had more than 20 phone conversations with Burlaka. Since those calls took place on encrypted phones, the substance of these conversations is not known. There are no intercepted phone conversations involving Borodai or Burlaka about the downing of flight MH17 or about the request for, or the supply and removal of, the Buk TELAR. Nor is there any evidence that Borodai was in the vicinity of Girkin and Dubinskiy when they were dealing with the removal of the Buk. There are however intercepted conversations which show that he concerned himself with the impact and aftermath of the downing of flight MH17. On 17 July 2014, for example, he was present at the crash site, and he tried to contact Surkov about the transfer of victims’ remains and the aircraft’s black boxes.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 63 MH17 Report 7 Options with regard to investigation and prosecution The JIT investigation regarding the crew of the Buk TELAR used to down flight MH17, their superior officers, the parties responsible for supplying the weapon system and other parties involved in the weapon’s deployment on 17 July 2014 has now reached its limits. As things now stand, the JIT and the Dutch Public Prosecution Service have reached the following conclusions. 7.1 Investigative options All the available telecom data of relevant individuals has now been analysed. The JIT has investigated this case as thoroughly as it reasonably can without the cooperation of the Russian authorities. In this connection, the investigation team has had to take account of the major security risks facing its sources. Any new evidence in the investigation must be sought in the Russian Federation. In order to obtain new evidence the JIT would have to rely on the cooperation of the Russian authorities or Russian (insider) witnesses. Under the current Russian regime the latter are not able to speak freely, and would expose themselves to major security risks if they were to talk to the JIT. To this day, the Russian authorities continue to deny – contrary to the established facts – any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine on and around 17 July 2014. Since that date, the Russian Federation has on multiple occasions presented – and provided to the JIT – falsified evidence exonerating itself. At other times, the Russian authorities have refused to provide information. For example, they refused to answer questions posed by the Public Prosecution Service in 2018 about the whereabouts of the Buk TELAR ‘3X2’ in the period from 23 June to 23 July 2014 and the identity of its crew members. They also refused to allow the 2021 request of the examining magistrate to examine the commander of the 53rd AAMB. Since the start of the JIT investigation the Russian authorities have publicly cast doubt on its findings. They did the same with the district court’s judgment of 17 November 2022.59 Relations with the Russian Federation have deteriorated further since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. There is now no prospect of receiving the kind of open-minded cooperation necessary to continue the investigation. 59 https://www.interfax.ru/russie/873011, 17 November 2022: (translated from Russian) ‘Moscow called the decision of the Hague court in the MH17 case politically motivated. The Russian Foreign Ministery does not consider the verdict of the court in The Hague, which sentenced Russians Igor Girkin and Sergey Dubinskiy and Ukrainian Leonid Kharchenko to life imprisonment in absentia in the criminal “case MH17”, impartial. “We deeply regret that the District Court of The Hague has disregarded the principles of impartial justice in favor of the current political situation, thus causing a serious reputational blow to the entire judicial system of the Netherlands,” the Ministry said in a statement. (…) According to the Foreign Ministry, “both the course and the results of the proceedings indicate that it was based on a political order to reinforce the version promoted by The Hague and its associates in the Joint Investigation Team about Russia’s involvement in the tragedy.” (…).’ See also: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-will-examine-dutch-couts-position-mh17-2022-11-17/; https://tass.com/pressreview/1538645.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 64 MH17 Report 7.2 Prosecution options The investigation's findings to date do not provide sufficient grounds for prosecution. There are either formal obstacles to a prosecution, or the necessary lawful and convincing evidence is lacking. 7.2.1 Buk TELAR crew members and their superior officers The investigation into the crew of the Buk TELAR used to down MH17 produced second-hand information about the possible involvement of three former officers of the 53rd AAMB. This information is ambiguous, and thus far it cannot be confirmed to an adequate extent. Since it has not yet been possible to establish the identity of the Buk TELAR crew members, it is not possible to prove via this line of enquiry why they fired a Buk missile at MH17. It is equally impossible to establish whom they received which orders from. Nor could this information be found by other means. It therefore remains unclear what the crew's superior officers in the Russian military chain of command knew about the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 or what degree of say they actually had regarding it. These superior officers included the commander of the 53rd AAMB, the Russian Minister of Defence and – as commander-in-chief – the Russian President. Furthermore, as members of the regular armed forces of the Russian Federation, the crew members and their superior officers may be able to claim combatant immunity. Such immunity applies to violence committed as a combatant, and it continues to apply after the individual concerned has left the armed forces. It is open to question whether a claim of combatant immunity in this case would have any chance of succeeding. After all, to this day the Russian Federation continues to deny that the Russian armed forces were involved in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in July 2014, or in the downing of flight MH17. Unlike in the case of the four DPR fighters who were prosecuted previously, limits to Dutch jurisdiction under international law may be a barrier to the prosecution of the crew members and their superior officers. Whether combatant status can also be claimed by a defence minister and a president in the role of commander-in-chief is a matter of academic debate. The answer may depend in part on the circumstances of the case. In the present case, it may be relevant that, on 17 July 2014, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu held the military rank of general, and that President Putin, as commander-in-chief, was personally involved behind the scenes in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Even if the Buk TELAR crew and their superior officers were entitled to claim combatant immunity, such a claim would not stand in the way of a war crimes prosecution. Combatants and non-combatants alike can be prosecuted for war crimes. However, without concrete information about the circumstances in which the decision was made to fire the Buk missile at MH17, it is not easy to determine whether the downing of MH17 was a war crime. The district court held that it is completely implausible that a civilian aircraft was deliberately shot down and that it is plausible that MH17 was shot down by mistake. As a consequence there appears to be limited scope for instituting criminal proceedings in respect of a war crime.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 65 MH17 Report 7.2.2 Parties responsible for supplying the Buk TELAR As the district court held, in the circumstances in question it may be assumed that ‘anyone who helped facilitate the deployment of this weapon’ had both intent and premeditation in respect of unlawfully causing the crash of flight MH17 and the death of everyone on board.60 The investigation produced strong indications that a decision on providing the Buk TELAR – or in any event a heavier air defence system with a higher range – to the DPR was taken at presidential level. Although the investigation produced strong indications, the high bar of complete and conclusive evidence is not reached. Furthermore, whether or not he is entitled to claim combatant immunity, the president of the Russian Federation, as head of state, is in any event immune under international law from prosecution. Under Dutch law, a head of state cannot be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever, even a war crime (article 8d of the Criminal Code and section 16 of the International Crimes Act). This immunity applies for as long as Putin remains head of state. In addition to Putin, several other individuals have emerged who were involved in making the decision to supply the separatists in eastern Ukraine with the Buk TELAR. These individuals include Sergei Aksyonov, Vladislav Surkov, Alexei Dyumin and Sergei Shoigu. There are indications that Aksyonov, Surkov and Dyumin supported the DPR's request for a heavier air defence system and (along with other individuals) decided to present the request to Shoigu and Putin. The question is whether, in doing so, they also have a criminal responsibility for the deployment of this weapon. In any event, they had no actual decision-making power about whether to provide a Buk TELAR. That authority lay at a higher level. Therefore, were they sufficiently helpful in facilitating the eventual deployment of the Buk TELAR that their actions constituted criminal aiding and abetting? For such a charge, further and more concrete evidence is needed concerning their own part – and that of others – in the decision-making process related to the possible provision of the Buk TELAR. There is therefore insufficient evidence as yet to hold them criminally liable for the downing of MH17. What is more, Dyumin, as deputy head of Russia's military intelligence service (GRU), may be entitled to claim combatant immunity. The same goes for Shoigu, as noted above. In addition it is open to question whether Shoigu – alongside Putin – had actual decision-making power when it came to supplying the Buk TELAR. After all, the investigation produced indications that this was ultimately the president's decision, and not – as noted in an intercepted phone conversation – that of a general or defence minister named ‘Sh...’. Was he therefore sufficiently helpful in facilitating the eventual deployment of the Buk TELAR that his actions could be described as criminal aiding and abetting? Regarding Shoigu, too, more – and more concrete – evidence is needed concerning his own part in the decision-making process regarding the supply of the Buk TELAR. Lastly, Alexander Borodai and Aleksei Fominov held consultations with Russian officials in Moscow about the provision of military equipment. Since it could not be clearly determined whether those 60 Judgment of The Hague District Court, 17 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2022:12217, 6.3.2.4.
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Public Prosecution Service | JIT MH17 66 MH17 Report consultations concerned the supply of a Buk system, these individuals cannot be held responsible for its delivery. 7.2.3 Parties jointly responsible for deployment of Buk TELAR Finally, the investigation included other individuals who could – in addition to Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko – be held criminally liable for the deployment of the Buk TELAR in eastern Ukraine. The investigation did not uncover any concrete instructions given by Russian generals or other Russian officials regarding the deployment of the Buk TELAR. There were however indications of a direct, de facto chain of command between FSB general Andrei Burlaka and DPR fighters Borodai and Girkin. Within this chain of command, Burlaka gave orders to Borodai and to subordinates of Girkin, orders which Girkin in turn accepted. It is not clear whether Burlaka, acting in his command role, was involved in a criminal capacity in the deployment of the Buk TELAR. Since he used a secure line, the contents of his phone conversations are not known. Conversations held by other parties about Burlaka show that his orders to Borodai and to Girkin's subordinates related to internal conflicts and dynamics among DPR commanders, as well as the provision of equipment. Nothing was said about providing a heavier air defence system. Substantive conversations held by Borodai, the so-called prime minister of the DPR, have been located, however. These show that his role primarily involved administration, logistics and military support. When it came to operational military orders, Borodai would refer people to Girkin. In Moscow Borodai held consultations about providing military equipment, but it is not known whether this included a heavier air defence system. On the basis of the information obtained, it is not possible to establish that Borodai and Burlaka had advance knowledge of the Buk TELAR's availability. Nor are there any concrete indications – unlike in Girkin's case – that Borodai and Burlaka directed combat activities themselves, requested a heavier air defence system themselves, and later worked to get rid of the Buk TELAR once it had been used. Therefore, in contrast to the conclusion of the district court in Girkin's case, it is not possible at this time to provide lawful and convincing evidence that Borodai and Burlaka were able to decide on the deployment and use of the Buk TELAR and that they accepted that deployment and use. Nor is it possible to prove that they deliberately aided and abetted the downing of MH17 in another way. 7.3 Conclusion After working for over eight-and-a-half years, the JIT sees no further scope for investigation. The investigation will therefore be suspended. The investigation produced various findings, but these do not provide any grounds for prosecuting new individuals. Although the investigation is being suspended, the JIT is not closing the case. New information or a change in circumstances may give reason to resume the investigation or institute new criminal proceedings.
Annex 393 Flight Safety Foundation, Factual inquiry into the airspace closure above and around eastern Ukraine in relation to the downing of Flight MH17, January 2021 (excerpt)

Annex 393
Factual inquiry into the airspace closure
above and around eastern Ukraine in
relation to the downing of Flight MH17
Flight Safety Foundation
JANUARY 2021
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i |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table of ContentsAbout Flight Safety Foundation ........................................................................................................................................................1Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................................2Purpose .........................................................................................................................................................................................................2Background ...................................................................................................................................................................................................2Scope .............................................................................................................................................................................................................2Inquiry Limitations ........................................................................................................................................................................................3Hostile Events Analysis: 1985–2020 ..............................................................................................................................................................4Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–2014 ..............................................................................................................................................................5Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern Ukraine .................................................................................................................................7Collecting Information About Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat Awareness .........................................................................................8Ukraine Awareness of Threat to Civil Aircraft ................................................................................................................................................10Russian Federation Awareness of Threat to Civil Aircraft ..............................................................................................................................121. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................141.1. Purpose ................................................................................................................................................................................................141.2. Background ..........................................................................................................................................................................................141.3. Scope ...................................................................................................................................................................................................151.4. Inquiry Limitations ...............................................................................................................................................................................151.5. Definitions ...........................................................................................................................................................................................162. Overall Framework ..................................................................................................................................................................173. Hostile Events Analysis: 1985–2020 .........................................................................................................................................193.1. Purpose of the Hostile Events Analysis .................................................................................................................................................193.2. Hostile Events Sample ..........................................................................................................................................................................203.3. Airspace Restrictions and Hostile Events ..............................................................................................................................................203.4. Targeted Aircraft ..................................................................................................................................................................................203.5. Capability to Attack ..............................................................................................................................................................................253.6. Risk and Capability Engagement Altitude ............................................................................................................................................263.7. Intentional vs. Unintentional Attack .....................................................................................................................................................273.8. Hostile Events and Conflict Zone Flights ...............................................................................................................................................274. Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–2014 ..........................................................................................................................................284.1. Purpose of the Conflict Zones Analysis .................................................................................................................................................284.2. Conflict Zones Sample ..........................................................................................................................................................................284.3. Conflict Zone Indicators ........................................................................................................................................................................284.4. Overview of the Conflict Zone Analysis .................................................................................................................................................304.5. Discussion of the Conflict Zone Analysis ...............................................................................................................................................325. Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern Ukraine .............................................................................................................345.1. Objectives of the Airspace Restrictions Analysis ...................................................................................................................................345.2. Scope of the Airspace Restrictions Analysis ..........................................................................................................................................345.3. Technical Background...........................................................................................................................................................................345.3.1. Background ..............................................................................................................................................................................345.3.2. Airspace Sovereignty, FIRs and ATS Routes ...............................................................................................................................34
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ii |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175.3.3. Airspace Restrictions.................................................................................................................................................................345.3.4. NOTAM ......................................................................................................................................................................................355.4. Analysis of the NOTAMs ........................................................................................................................................................................365.5. Adopted Format for NOTAM Description ...............................................................................................................................................365.6. Ukraine Airspace Restrictions Timeline .................................................................................................................................................375.6.1. NOTAM A0820/14, Issued on 24 April 2014 ...............................................................................................................................375.6.2. NOTAM A0942/14, Issued on 05 May 2014 ...............................................................................................................................385.6.3. NOTAM A1219/14, Issued on 02 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................395.6.4. NOTAM A1229/14, Issued on 03 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................405.6.5. NOTAM A1231/14, Issued on 04 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................415.6.6. NOTAM A1234/14, Issued on 04 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................425.6.7. NOTAM A1236/14, Issued on 04 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................435.6.8. NOTAM A1255/14, Issued on 05 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................445.6.9. NOTAM A1256/14, Issued on 05 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................455.6.10. NOTAM A1383/14, Issued on 26 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................465.6.11. NOTAM A1384/14, Issued on 26 June 2014 ...............................................................................................................................475.6.12. NOTAM A1492/14, Issued on 14 July 2014 ................................................................................................................................485.6.13. NOTAM A1493/14, Issued on 14 July 2014 ................................................................................................................................495.6.14. NOTAM A1507/14, Issued on 17 July 2014 after the Downing of Flight MH17 ..........................................................................505.6.15. NOTAM A1517/14, Issued on 17 July 2014 after the Downing of Flight MH17 ..........................................................................515.7. Russian Federation Airspace Restrictions Timeline ...............................................................................................................................525.7.1. NOTAM V6158/14, Issued on 17 July 2014 ................................................................................................................................525.7.2. NOTAM A2681/14, Issued on 16 July 2014 ................................................................................................................................545.8. Summary of the Airspace Restriction Timeline Prior to the Downing of Flight MH17 ...........................................................................556. Collecting and Analysing Information About Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat Awareness ................................................586.1. Information Collection Framework .......................................................................................................................................................586.2. Public Information Collection and Analysis ..........................................................................................................................................596.2.1. Objective, Process and Structure ...............................................................................................................................................596.2.2. Sources of Information .............................................................................................................................................................596.2.3. Findings and Analysis: Publicly Available Conflict Information .................................................................................................596.2.4. Statements from Ukraine and the Russian Federation ..............................................................................................................616.2.5. Presence of Air Defence Systems in Eastern Ukraine .................................................................................................................636.2.6. Post Flight MH17 Assessments .................................................................................................................................................656.3. Standard Procedures Questionnaire .....................................................................................................................................................676.4. Threat Knowledge Questionnaire .........................................................................................................................................................696.5. Inquiry Into Ukraine Standard Procedures and Threat Knowledge ........................................................................................................706.6. Inquiry into Russian Federation Standard Procedures and Threat Knowledge ......................................................................................757. Discussion on Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat Awareness ..............................................................................................807.1. Discussion Framework ..........................................................................................................................................................................807.2. Risk Analysis and Decision-Making Responsibilities .............................................................................................................................807.3. Risk Assessment ...................................................................................................................................................................................817.4. Ukraine Awareness of Threat to Civil Aircraft ........................................................................................................................................847.5. Russian Federation Awareness of Threat to Civil Aircraft .......................................................................................................................85
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iii |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Appendix A Conflict zones case studies .............................................................................................................................................87Bosnian war 1992–1997 .............................................................................................................................................................................87Croatian war 1991–1995 .............................................................................................................................................................................90Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) .....................................................................................................................................................93Egypt (Sinai) ................................................................................................................................................................................................95Georgia-Russia 2008 ....................................................................................................................................................................................98Iraq war 1991 ............................................................................................................................................................................................101Iraq war 2003–2011 ..................................................................................................................................................................................104Kosovo–Allied Force 1999 .........................................................................................................................................................................107Libya 2011 .................................................................................................................................................................................................110Slovenia 1991 ............................................................................................................................................................................................113Afghanistan 2001–present ........................................................................................................................................................................116Armenia Azerbaijan ...................................................................................................................................................................................119Ivory Coast 2002–2004 ..............................................................................................................................................................................122Indonesia (Aceh) 1990–1998 ....................................................................................................................................................................125Mali 2012–2015 ........................................................................................................................................................................................128Georgian Civil Wars 1991–1993 .................................................................................................................................................................132Appendix B Questionnaire Responses: Russian Federation standard procedures and threat knowledge ............................................134Appendix C Clarifying Questions Responses from Russian Federation ..............................................................................................150Appendix D Questionnaire Responses: Ukraine standard procedures and threat knowledge .............................................................153Appendix E Clarifying Questions Responses from Ukraine ...............................................................................................................169References ....................................................................................................................................................................................171
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1 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17About Flight Safety FoundationFlight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit, international organization exclusively chartered to provide impartial research, education, advocacy, and communications in the field of aviation safety. Founded in 1947, the Foundation brings together aviation profession-als from all sectors to help solve safety problems facing the industry. With membership throughout the world, the Foundation brings an international perspective to aviation issues for its members, the media and the traveling public.The Foundation is in a unique position to identify global safety issues, set priorities and serve as a catalyst to address these concerns through data collection and infor-mation sharing, training, safety standards, best practices and toolkits. The Foundation strives to bridge proprietary, cultural and political differences in the common cause of advancing global aviation.Many of the safety issues the Foundation has addressed over the decades have evolved as air travel has grown and technology and training have improved. The stellar safety record of the aviation industry speaks to the progress that has been made.One of the issues that the Foundation has focused on involves the risk to airliners that fly over conflict zones. Threats to commercial aviation due to hostile activity in conflict regions around the world are a continuing concern. In 2020, there were two such occurrences. On 8 January 2020, Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 was shot down shortly after takeoff from Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport, resulting in 176 fatalities. On 4 May 2020, an East African Express Airways aircraft was shot down on approach to Berdale airport in Somalia, resulting in six fatalities.The Foundation has long been involved in working to mitigate civil aviation conflict zone risk. In August 2014, just weeks after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, the Foundation’s chair-man was chosen to lead the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones. The ICAO Task Force pro-duced important recommendations to mitigate the risks to civil aviation which were incorporated into ICAO’s Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over and Near Conflict Zones.The Foundation continues its global campaign on heightened awareness of, and action on, conflict zone risk to civil aviation. Within the context of a still-prominent risk, this report attempts to advance the understanding of risk assessment of attacks from the ground on civil aircraft and on the state processes for integrated airspace security risk assessment.Flight Safety Foundation Headquarters701 N. Fairfax Street, Suite 250 Alexandria, VA 22314 USA Tel. +1 703.739.6700 flightsafety.orgFlight Safety Foundation European Regional OfficeRue de la Fuseé, 96B-1130 Brussels, BelgiumFlight Safety Foundation Basic Aviation Risk Standard (BARS) Program OfficeLevel 16356 Collins StreetMelbourne VIC 3000 Australia
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2 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYExecutive SummaryPurposeFlight Safety Foundation (the Foundation) conducted an inquiry into the circumstances that led to a partial closure of the airspace above and adjacent to eastern Ukraine in the three-month period prior to the 17 July 2014 shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.The intent of the inquiry was to analyse airspace closure decisions made by authorities in both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and to understand the processes used in making those decisions as well as the information on which the decisions were based. The elements of the inquiry are defined further in the Scope.BackgroundOn 17 July 2014, Flight MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was downed over eastern Ukraine, where, at the time, an armed conflict was taking place. Tragically, all 298 passengers and crew lost their lives. While there were other losses of airliners as a result of military conflict over the previous decades, the loss of Flight MH17 con-stituted a watershed moment that galvanized the interna-tional community to proactively address the continuing threat to civil aviation arising from conflict zones.In July 2014, the United Nations Security Coun-cil adopted a resolution related to the downing of Flight MH17. This was followed by an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State letter, issued to draw the attention of ICAO Member States to the international provisions specifying state responsibilities with respect to the safety and security of civil aircraft operating in airspace affected by conflict.ICAO established a senior-level Task Force to address issues related to the safety and security of civil aircraft operating in airspace affected by conflict. The chairman of the Foundation’s Board of Governors was elected as the chairman of the Task Force. The Task Force developed a report, which included recommendations to address the threat of military conflict to civil aviation. It urged the international community to implement protocols to prevent similar events from happening. These recom-mendations included threat assessment, sharing of threat information, and timely and effective management of aircraft operations and airspace.The 36-state ICAO Council reviewed the report of the Task Force and in October 2014, approved the conflict zone work program. The Council also unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the downing of Malay-sia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine.The technical investigation into the causes of the Flight MH17 crash was conducted by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) after Ukraine delegated this authority to the Netherlands. The report of the DSB aimed at answering four key questions:• What caused the crash of Flight MH17?• How and why were decisions made to use Flight MH17’s flight route?• How is the decision-making process related to flying over conflict zones generally organized?• What lessons can be learned from the investigation to improve flight safety and security?The final report by the DSB was published on 13 October 2015.Foundation research builds upon the information contained in the DSB’s report and attempts to enlarge the scope and deepen understanding of the factual circum-stances underlying the airspace restrictions both above the territory of Ukraine and above the territory of the Russian Federation.ScopeThis inquiry is focused on the factual circumstances surrounding the decision-making regarding the closure of airspace above and around eastern Ukraine from 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure
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3 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYof that airspace after the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. In addition, this inquiry will provide contextual background, through a representative inventory of state practices 20 to 30 years prior to 2014, regarding the use by civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones.This inquiry was conducted from April 2020 to Janu-ary 2021.The scope of the inquiry did not include drawing (normative) conclusions on the question of whether, prior to the moment of the downing of Flight MH17, respon-sible authorities did or did not take adequate measures to prevent the downing of the aircraft.The following elements were covered within the scope of the inquiry:• A study of previous hostile events and state practice in regard to the use by civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones.• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure of airspace above eastern Ukraine as of 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure of airspace above the territory of the Russian Fed-eration bordering eastern Ukraine as of 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.In this report, in accordance with ICAO and the other referenced sources, the terms “airspace restriction”1 and “airspace closure”2 are used interchangeably. Wherever applicable, these terms are used with the addition of their vertical limits.Inquiry LimitationsThere are a number of limitations associated with carrying out this inquiry that should be considered. The limitations are related to the characteristics of the scope, purpose, and approach to the inquiry and to the sources and quality of information available for use in the inquiry. Readers of the report should keep in mind the following:• The findings about airspace closure decisions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation are based on two specific sources of information: (a) public source information available during 2020 discovered by the Foundation and (b) information received by the Foundation from Ukraine and the Russian Federa-tion through responses to questionnaires. Other sources of information, such as private sources and 1 As described in ICAO “Air Traffic Services Planning Manual”2 As used in ICAO “Aeronautical Information Services Manual”information from intelligence services, were not available for the inquiry.• The findings from the hostile events analysis and from the historical conflict zones analysis are based on the information discovered by the Foundation from public sources.• The inquiry into airspace closure decisions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation is focused on information about: (a) the threat awareness of the authorities responsible for airspace security risk analysis and decision-making and not about the potential threat awareness of other entities within each government, and (b) facts reported publicly by organisations and authorities and does not include conclusions and inferences from these facts made by organisations and authorities.• The inquiry was carried out remotely due to COV-ID-19 travel restrictions. The Foundation requested access to engage directly with identified relevant au-thorities and specialists in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which would have been possible through teleconferencing or video conferencing. Ultimately, Ukraine and the Russian Federation preferred pro-viding information through written questionnaires developed by the Foundation. Information was transmitted via the respective diplomatic channels. The Foundation does not have visibility on how the information was collected and processed within the relevant authorities in the two countries.• The process of sending questionnaires, waiting for the written responses and then processing those re-sponses took considerable time and limited the num-ber of iterations to two — the first set of questions to each state and then a set of clarifying questions to each. These circumstances limited the depth of the inquiry.• While the findings about airspace closure decisions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the find-ings from the historical conflict zones analysis are for the defined time periods ending on 17 July 2014, numerous changes have been implemented since then, including changes initiated by ICAO, sovereign states, aviation authorities, airlines, and air naviga-tion service providers. The findings are not directly transferable to the current practices.• Because six years have passed since the downing of Flight MH17, it is more challenging to obtain information on procedures, decisions and practic-es in place at the time in 2014. Key personnel and decision makers who were in place in 2014 may not
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4 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYbe in place now. We do not have independent verifi-cation about whether our questions were answered by people knowledgeable about the decision-making processes and practices in place prior to the downing of Flight MH17.Hostile Events Analysis: 1985–2020At the outset of the project, the Foundation gathered and analysed data on 57 hostile events involving civil avia-tion in and around conflict zones over a 35-year period beginning in 1985. The period was selected based on the information for the hostile events that the Foundation was able to collect. Included in the sample were intentional and unintentional attacks from the ground on commer-cial air transport and general aviation operations. Hostile events, as illustrated in Figure 1, are the intentional or unintentional engagement of a capability to attack3 against civil aviation.Hostile events are “the tip of the iceberg,” and for each hostile event that occurred, there were many more precur-sor situations that sometimes were and sometimes were not associated with a conflict zone (for example, a terrorist act not in a conflict zone).In order to study the conflict zones, it is necessary to study their potential worst outcome — hostile events. Additionally, considering that most hostile events are as-sociated with flights in nonrestricted airspace, this part of the inquiry was an important source of information about the failure of state practices to restrict the airspace.The results of the hostile events analysis show that most hostile events took place over conflict zones when the airspace was not restricted.3 E.g., MANPADS or surface-to-air missilesFinding 1: Foundation analysis shows that most of the hostile events involving surface-to-air attacks against civil aviation flights that took place during the period of 1985‒2020 could have been prevented by restricting the airspace above or around the conflict zone and by adherence to the restrictions.The Foundation’s research showed that man-portable air defence systems, or MANPADS, usually relatively small, shoulder-launched weapons capable of reaching 15,000 ft, are the most common weapon used against civil aviation. (See, in Figure 2 (p. 5), the number of events in the sample associated with a given capability to attack.) MANPADS generally are easier to obtain and use than larger, non-man-portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, which are technically more complex, more difficult to op-erate and can reach targets at much higher altitudes.However, the size of most MANPADS warheads (less than 2 kg [4 lb] for some common MANPADS) means that a catastrophic outcome — i.e., the aircraft being shot down — is not certain. By comparison, the SAM events identified show that a catastrophic outcome from a successful attack is highly probable, at least in part because of the larger war-head (as much as 70 kg [154 lb] in some missiles).Finding 2: Based on an analysis of reported surface-to-air attacks against civil aviation flights for the period of 1985‒2020, MANPADS are the most common weapon used against civil aviation. MANPADS are generally easier to obtain and use than larger, non-portable SAM systems. However, the size of most MANPADS war-heads means that a catastrophic outcome is not certain. By comparison, the SAM events identified show that a Figure 1Hostile Events PyramidHostile eventsCapability and intent to attackCapability and factors for an unintentional attackSituations or zones with capability to attack aircraft in ight
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5 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYcatastrophic outcome from an effective attack is highly probable. The presence of SAMs should therefore be a key indicator in any airspace risk analysis and avoid/overfly decision.Information about the engagement altitude was found in 34 of the 57 hostile events in the Foundation’s “Hostile Events in Civil Aviation” database. Four of the events occurred above Flight Level (FL) 250 and 19 occurred be-low FL 50. Five occurrences, which are depicted in red in Figure 3 (p. 6), were identified as involving a SAM attack. The occurrences depicted in blue involved a capability to attack other than a SAM.Table 1 (p. 6) presents information about unintentional attack occurrences extracted from the Foundation data-base. There are eight such events identified and all but one involved military misidentification of the target’s identity and/or intentions. The remaining 49 events involved ei-ther an intentional attack or events for which the Founda-tion did not find information regarding intent.Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–2014Apart from hostile events, the Foundation built an inven-tory of state practices up to 25 years prior to 2014 regard-ing the use by civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones. Among other things, the Foundation focused on determining the presence of air defence equipment (both air-to-air and surface-to-air) during a conflict and the restrictions applicable to the use of the airspace.Within the context of this study, the purpose of the conflict zones analysis was to set data-defined context for 4 25,000 ft (7,600 m)other research components by providing an overview of state practices regarding airspace restrictions above and/or around conflict zones.Conflict zones were selected by choosing those cases in which security risk for civil aircraft above FL 2504 could be reasonably expected. This was determined by the overall objective of the inquiry, which focuses on threats to civil aviation above airspace that was already closed to civil aviation in Ukraine and the Russian Federation prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and above the altitude where MANPADS can pose a risk.In total, 16 conflict zones were selected, based on the information available for the studied period and where there was a reasonable expectation, prior to commencing the analysis, of the existence of capability to attack at altitudes above FL 250. The selected conflict zones were reviewed relative to a set of 10 pre-determined “indica-tors of likelihood of attack,” such as the capability to at-tack a target in flight above FL 250 (e.g., the presence of surface-to-air missiles), the known intent to attack and the missile operators’ experience and chain of command. For each of the 16 selected conflict zones, the Founda-tion researched the actual airspace restrictions and used proprietary risk analysis algorithms to assess the overall likelihood of attack on civil aircraft. The intent was to set data-defined context for other research components by providing an overview of state practices regarding airspace restrictions above and/or around conflict zones. The results of the analysis are summarised in Table 4 (p. 31) of the report.Figure 2Number of Events in the Sample Associated With a Given Capacity to Attack051015Number of events202530MANPADS30Small arms and light weapons14SAM4Other 2Not known7Continued on p. 7
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6 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYFigure 3Altitude Distribution19801985199019952000Year20052010201520202025050001000015000200002500030000350004000045000Altitude (
ft)Corporate jet, 1999Sibir Airlines, 2001MH17, 2014Ukraine International Airlines, 2020Iran Air, 1988SAM attackOther than SAM attackTable 1Unintentional Acts and Their ContextDateStateUnintentional Act Aircraft Operator PerpetratorAltitude Killed/Injured/Uninjured11-Jun-87AfghanistanMisidentified as a Russian IL14.Bakhtar Afghan Hezb-i-Islamin/k53/2/003-Jul-88IranMilitary misidentified target as a descending Iranian F-14.Iran AirU.S. Navy 13,500 ft290/0/029-Aug-99EthiopiaMilitary targeting error after proceeding into NOTAM closed airspace. Corporate JetsEthiopian Army FL 4102/0/004-Oct-01Black SeaMilitary exercise missile overshot intended target at 18 nm (33 km) by 140 nm (259 km) after locking onto it. Sibir Airlines Ukraine Armed Forces FL 360 78/0/0 26-Jan-15 Iraq Probably accidental, rounds from nearby social event. FlyDubai n/k <2,000 ft 0/2/X 08-Jan-20 Iran Military misidentified aircraft as a hostile target. Ukraine International Iranian Armed Forces 8,100 ft 176/0/0 04-May-20 Somalia Military misidentified going-around aircraft as a suicide plane.Ethiopian troops as part of AMISOM 2.230 ft 6/0/0 25-May-20 Somalia Military misidentified aircraft and opened fire. Aeronav/Kenya School of Flying Ethiopian troops as part of AMISOM <1,200 ft 0/0/XAMISOM = African Union Mission to Somalia; FL = Flight Level; n/k = not known; NOTAM = notice to airmen
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7 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Foundation concluded that restricting the airspace above conflict zones is a very effective measure to reduce the assessed likelihood of attack against civil flights. As illustrated in Figure 4, in the studied sample, there were eight cases in which an entity (the sovereign state or a third party) introduced partial or full airspace restrictions. This comparative assessment of likelihood of attack with and without airspace restrictions reveals that in six of the eight cases where airspace restrictions were introduced, the assessed likelihood of attack against civil aviation was reduced considerably.However, the Foundation did not find a uniform prac-tice of states closing their own airspace when there were indications of a likelihood of attack against civil aircraft. Of the 16 studied conflict zones, there were only two instances in which the sovereign state responsible for that airspace completely closed its own airspace (Figure 5).Finding 3: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the period of 1990‒2014 did not identify a uniform practice of states closing their own airspace when there were indications of a likelihood of attack against civil aircraft in the context of an armed conflict on the territory of that state.Finding 4: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the period of 1990‒2014 identified that, on the rare occasions when a state restricted its own airspace above FL 250, it was associated with the loss of effective con-trol over the relevant airspace by the state.Also, when a state does restrict its own airspace above FL 250, or such a restriction is imposed by a third party (such as in the introduction of a “no fly zone” by an entity like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the predominant concerns are the security of military oper-ations and of the population rather than the security of civil aviation.Finding 5: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the period of 1990‒2014 identified that whenever a state closed or restricted its own airspace above FL 250, or such a restriction was imposed by a third party, the predominant concerns were the security of military op-erations and of the population rather than the security of civil aviation.Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern UkraineAfter setting the wider background of the inquiry by char-acterising the historical occurrences of hostile events and the state practices of airspace management over conflict zones, the Foundation focused on airspace restrictions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation immediately prior to the downing of Flight MH17. The Foundation considered studying the airspace restrictions timeline and specifics to be important because restrictions are the main outcome of airspace restrictions decision-making, which is the focus of this inquiry.Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation introduced restrictions on the airspace above and around eastern Ukraine, but neither state completely closed its airspace above or near the conflict zone before the downing of Flight MH17. The airspace in question was first restricted up to FL 260 and subsequently, but before the downing of Flight MH17, up to FL 320. These airspace restrictions were promulgated with notices to airmen (NOTAMs).The Foundation analysed 1,310 NOTAMs regarding their relevance to the studied area and time. It selected 15 NOTAMs to be analysed in detail.Figure 4Eight Cases of Airspace RestrictionsLikelihoodremained high (1)Likelihoodremained low (1)Likelihood reducedfrom high to low(6)Figure 5Sample of 16 Conflict ZonesPartially restricted (1)Airspacerestricted (2) Others’restrictions (5)No restriction (8)
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8 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYIn the NOTAMs in which Ukraine placed a partial restriction on airspace in the Dnepropetrovsk Flight Information Region (FIR), it did not provide any reasons for the restriction or any reference to incidents involving military aircraft in the airspace.The DSB report on the crash of Flight MH17 provides information about the reasons the Ukrainian authorities restricted the airspace up to FL 260, promulgated with NOTAMs A1255/14 and A1256/14, issued on 5 June 2014. The provided reasons were not related to the security risk from attacks from the ground to civil aircraft overflying the area. The airspace was restricted to enable military aeroplanes to fly at an altitude that was considered safe from attacks from the ground and to eliminate the risk that they would encounter civil aeroplanes, which flew above FL 260, according to the DSB report.The reasons the Ukrainian authorities increased the up-per limit of the restricted airspace to an altitude of 32,000 ft (FL 320) were not provided in the respective NOTAMs (A1492/14 and A1493/14). The DSB report said the rea-son for increasing the upper limit of the restricted airspace “was intended to increase the altitude buffer between military and civil aircraft.”The Russian Federation, on the other hand, cited international flight safety as a reason when it closed its affected air traffic services (ATS) routes up to FL 320. In two NOTAMs (V6158/14, A2681/14) published on 16 July 2014, the Russian Federation said that to ensure interna-tional flight safety, it was closing the ATS routes “due to combat actions on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Russian Federation.”Prior to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, the two referenced Russian Federation NOTAMs were the only identified, specific warnings related to the security of civil aviation in the Dnepropetrovsk and Rostov-on-Don FIRs.Collecting Information About Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat AwarenessIn order to discuss the airspace closure decisions made by authorities in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the Foundation looked for information about the relevant authorities’ threat awareness for the referenced airspace that was not restricted.The threat information is of different types. In respect to the capability to attack, the threat information can in-volve what authorities said they knew about the weapons that could pose a potential threat to civil aviation above FL 320. Or it can consist of information about the weap-ons that was available in the public space, such as on social media, without indications of whether relevant authorities knew about it. The source of information can be tradition-al media and/or social media or private information from intelligence services. These different types of information imply different degrees of confidence about authority awareness or the veracity of the information. For these reasons, the threat information is categorised conceptually in Figure 6 as follows:• Foresight knowledge of threat information: quadrant 1. This is information that was known prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about the presence of weapons.• Hindsight knowledge of threat information: quadrant 2. This is information that was made known after the downing of Flight MH17 about the presence of weapons. In Figure 6Information Collection FrameworkInformation published (made available) prior to Flight MH17 downingWhat did the responsible State (authorities) know before Flight MH17 downing about the presence of air defense equipmentHindsight knowledge of authorities awarenessInformation published (made available) after Flight MH17 downingForesight knowledge of threat informationHindsight knowledge of threat informationInformation about presence of air defense equipement prior to Flight MH17 downingForesight knowledge of authorities awareness1234
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9 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYgeneral, this type of information gives less confi-dence about potential threat awareness of relevant authorities because it is just information about what has been seen, heard or otherwise discovered but made known only after the downing of Flight MH17.• Foresight knowledge of authorities’ awareness: quadrant 3. This is information that was known prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about what the relevant authorities knew about the presence of weapons. In general, this type of information gives the most confidence about potential threat awareness because it is mainly self-reporting by relevant authorities about their knowledge prior to the downing of Flight MH17 — hence clear of any hindsight bias.• Hindsight public knowledge of authorities’ awareness: quadrant 4. This is information that was made known after the downing of Flight MH17 about what the relevant authorities knew before the downing of Flight MH17 about the presence of weapons.With the above-described four types of information, the Foundation looked at two main sources of information:• Publicly available information from primarily online media, including Ukrainian and Russian news services and other news aggregation sites, inter-nationally available aviation trade media, govern-ment announcements and news releases, as well as information available on social media, including Twitter and Facebook, and in the DSB accident investigation report.• The responses from Ukraine and the Russian Federa-tion to the standard procedure and threat knowledge questionnaires that were specifically developed for this inquiry and to the subsequent responses to some clarifying questions. The Russian Federation and the Ukrainian governments were approached with and responded to the information collection template containing the questionnaires. Following the analysis of the information received, the Foundation conclud-ed that there are number of questions that remain open and formulated and received answers to some additional clarifying questions.To ensure a systematic coverage and a comprehensiveness of the information collection, we identified the need to use certain standard process descriptions when drafting the information collection questionnaires. For that purpose, we used the Foundation’s “best process” description that is based on our accumulated experience and analyses up to the moment of this inquiry. Namely, the Foundation’s integrated standard for airspace security risk assessment, as illustrated in Figure 7, addresses the five main func-tions to be assigned to one or more different authorities, organised as an integrated process and performed within a given sovereign state.The Foundation standard defines a statewide process for airspace security risk management that is distribut-ed around different authorities and organisations, yet functional from end to end. In this way, the organisational scope of the process is not restricted to the more tradition-al perspective of civil-military aviation coordination (e.g, Figure 7Flight Safety Foundation Integrated Standard for Airspace Security Risk AssessmentA.Threat watchB.Threat analysisC.Risk analysisD.Decision-makingE.Promulgation
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10 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYsome state intelligence functions may not be attributed to military authorities).Each of the five functions of the integrated standard for airspace security risk assessment targets a particular step from the risk assessment process and contains three or four specific sub-functions that are formulated as ques-tions in our questionnaires.One important part of our inquiry was identifying when information about the threat reaches:• Those responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace over a conflict zone; and,• Those establishing restrictions of airspace in a con-flict zone.This is illustrated in Figure 8, which outlines the respec-tive stages of the Foundation’s Integrated Standard for Airspace Security Risk Assessment.5Threat information reaching the risk analysis and deci-sion-making steps (C and D) in the process is the Foun-dation’s criterion for threat awareness at the level of the statewide process. Using this criterion, unverified social media posts, other media reports or the potential presence of information in intercepted but unprocessed commu-nications do not represent sufficient facts for realistic 5 Each step in the risk assessment process is defined in Section 6.3.threat awareness. This is because verified threat awareness is not available to those responsible for risk analysis and decision-making.Ukraine Awareness of Threat to Civil AircraftThe discussion on threat awareness is twofold — a discussion on reported threat awareness (concerning quadrants 3 and 4 in Figure 6) and a discussion on po-tential threat awareness (concerning quadrants 1 and 2 in Figure 6).The discussion on the reported threat awareness is about what authorities said they knew about the threat that could reach an altitude higher than FL 320. We studied what authorities said in public (both before and after the downing of Flight MH17) and what they said in response to our questionnaires. This discussion is differ-ent from what information was available in the public and private space (on social media, in other publications and in intelligence) about a threat.The Foundation’s research did not find any instances be-fore (quadrant 3 in Figure 6) the downing of Flight MH17 in which Ukrainian authorities publicly acknowledged the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence systems capable of reaching an altitude greater than FL 320.Figure 8Criterion for Threat AwarenessA.Threat watchB.Threat analysisC.Risk analysisD.Decision-makingE.PromulgationSocial mediaPublic and private sourcesOther actors’ informationAdjacent airspaceVerifying the informationUnintentional attack factorsCoordination and analysisPotential consequencesRisk assessmentRisk mitigationsConict zone decisionAdjacent FIR coordinationImplement the decisionPublish or not and howSpecial advisories and threat informationThreat awareness of authorities responsible for risk analysis and decision-making
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11 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Foundation identified from information made publicly known after (quadrant 4 in Figure 6) the downing of Flight MH17 that some Ukrainian authorities (coun-terintelligence services) suspected the presence of air defence equipment that could reach high altitudes — “first information ‘hinting’ at a Buk launcher in the possession of the non-state forces was received on 14 July and came from counterintelligence units.”6 This information corresponds to Group A of the Foundation Standard, namely threat watch, as shown in Figure 8.However, no facts were found that this information had been verified per the functions in Group B from the Foundation Standard — “But we could not confirm directly that it was Buk missile launcher that trespassed illegally [in] Ukrainian territory.”7 Similarly, no facts were found by the Foundation to indicate that the information was disseminated throughout the statewide process to reach the authorities responsible for risk assessment and deci-sion-making regarding airspace closure.Finding 6: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Ukrainian authorities responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those estab-lishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone8 were aware of a threat to civil aviation before the downing of Flight MH17.The discussion of the potential threat awareness is about what information existed in the public and private space (social media, other publications, and intelligence sources) about a weapon. This discussion is not about the reported threat awareness of the relevant authorities (discussed previously).It is clear from publicly available information that the conflict in eastern Ukraine was in an active combat phase in the weeks prior to the downing of Flight MH17.Both the Ukrainian military and armed non-state forces were using small arms, heavy calibre machine guns, artillery, anti-tank weapons, tanks and various air defence systems. In addition, Ukraine was employing rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft for transport and attack purposes; Ukraine alleged that Russian aircraft also had been used to attack Ukrainian aircraft. Ukraine apparently had some success attacking non-state ground forces with aircraft and also suffered numerous aircraft losses.There was a widespread belief among Ukraine and Western states that the Russian Federation was supplying 6 19 July 2014 news conference featuring Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelligence for the Ukrainian State Security Service, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWtH8AA42Fc&feature=share7 19 July 2014 news conference featuring Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelligence fora the Ukrainian State Security Service https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWtH8AA42Fc&feature=share8 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.9 For more details see Section 6.2.10 On 28 September 2016, during the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) presentation of the first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation, it was revealed that more than 150,000 telephone calls were intercepted.weapons, including heavy weapons, and personnel to support armed non-state forces in the conflict area. But as the DSB report stated: “despite the Western political and military focus on the conflict, its escalation and its air com-ponent, none of the politicians or authorities quoted publicly made a connection between the military developments in the eastern part of Ukraine and risks to civil aviation.”There were numerous reports about the presence of heavy weapons in the region, such as tanks, MANPADS, artillery and large calibre machine guns. However, there were few reports in the public space about armed non-state forces possessing weapons with a capability to attack above FL 320.9 There are conflicting accounts relating to the altitude of a Ukrainian An-26 when it was shot down on 14 July, although the aircraft was thought by some to have been brought down with a SAM system.The most notable publicly available information about the capability to attack at high altitudes before the down-ing of Flight MH17 was from social media posts about Buk missile systems. Some of these posts were about the movement of Buk batteries in the Russian territory bor-dering Ukraine and some were about Buk missile systems being observed in eastern Ukraine a few hours before the downing of Flight MH17. The Foundation acknowledges that these were just a few instances of published social media posts out of probably millions of posts made in the region at that time. It should also be stressed that the veracity of published social media accounts is difficult to establish.In addition, the Foundation did not identify any infor-mation available in the public space prior to the attack that would have verified the reports about the capability to attack above FL 320. The identified number of examples of publicly available information indicating the potential capability to attack above FL 320 were few, relative to the volume of all the publicly available information about the conflict zone at the time.With hindsight, some facts made available after the downing of Flight MH17 pointed to the possibility for some authorities to have processed information and understood that there may have been a threat to civil aviation. Namely, these are the 150,000 telephone con-versations10 intercepted and the counterintelligence field information discussed previously.However, without knowing the actual technological capabilities and preparedness to process on time these
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12 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYintercepted telephone conversations and social media posts, it is not possible for the Foundation to conclude that the Ukrainian authorities had the means to verify the intelligence and coordinate dissemination of the informa-tion so as to form a more accurate assessment of the risk to civil aviation and to completely close the airspace in time to prevent the attack on Flight MH17.Finding 7: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Ukrainian authorities responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establish-ing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone11 could have had a proper awareness of the high-altitude threat.Russian Federation Awareness of Threat to Civil AircraftSome of the western part of the Rostov-on-Don FIR airspace of the Russian Federation was in close proximity to the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. Because of its close proximity to the conflict zone, the airspace could have been affected by a threat to civil aviation originating from a potential presence in the conflict zone of long-range air defence equipment not controlled by government forces.The possibility of a threat to civil aviation was acknowl-edged in the Russian Federation’s NOTAMs (V6158/14 and A2681/14) closing the airspace up to FL 320. It should be noted that an air defence equipment threat reaching FL 320 could also reach the airspace immediately above FL 320.12The reasons for restricting their airspace, reported by the Russian Federation in an answer to a Foundation question, cited as a justification some statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation prior to the Flight MH17 downing. These statements refer to only low-altitude threats of artillery shootings.Responding to a Foundation query regarding the reason for selecting the upper limit for the airspace restriction, the Russian Federation acknowledged that the airspace has been closed up to FL 320 and that this limit was the same as the one indicated in the Ukrainian NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 and justified the decision in the fact that “Rosaviatsiya did not have any other, more or less credible information provided by the Ukrainian side, which would allow to forecast the vertical limit of the hazard zone for civil aviation flights.”In response to Foundation’s query on this matter, the Russian Federation indicated that authorities did not have any information regarding the presence of air defence equipment in the territory of Ukraine that was not con-trolled by the armed forces of the Ministry of Defence of 11 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.12 For example, as reported in the DSB report “The Buk surface-to-air missile system is able to engage targets at altitudes up to 70,000 or 80,000 feet.”13 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.14 The JIT, comprised of representatives from the Netherlands, Australia, Malaysia, Belgium and Ukraine, is conducting a criminal investigation into the crash.15 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-investigation-jit-mh17/speakers-text-jit-mh17-press-meeting-24-5-2018Ukraine and that could strike targets in the Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250.The Foundation did not obtain satisfactory clarifi-cations from the Russian Federation about the Russian authorities’ knowledge of any intent to attack with air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and that could have reached the respective airspace in Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250 in eastern Ukraine.The Foundation’s research did not find any other in-stances in which Russian Federation authorities publicly acknowledged before or after the downing of Flight MH17 the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence systems capable of reaching an altitude greater than FL 320.Finding 8: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Russian Federation authorities responsible for ana-lysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone13 were aware of a threat to civil aviation before the downing of Flight MH17.With regards to any Russian Federation potential threat awareness, the information identified in the public space, and already listed in the discussion about Ukraine, was also available to the Russian Federation, including the so-cial media posts. However, it is assumed in this study that the Russian Federation did not have access to intercepted telephone conversations and intelligence information available to the Ukrainian authorities.Another set of facts from the public information is associated with the Joint Investigation Team (JIT)14 that points at a request by the non-state armed forces for a Buk and at the transport of a Buk in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The JIT reported:15 “After an extensive and labor-intensive comparative investigation, in which many Buk-TELARs were involved, the JIT has come to the con-clusion that the Buk-TELAR that shot down Flight MH17 comes from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, or the 53rd Brigade from Kursk in the Russian Federation. This 53rd Brigade is a unit of the Russian armed forces.” This JIT conclusion has been denied by the Russian Federation.However, the purpose of the present analysis is to identify if the relevant authorities responsible for risk analysis and decision-making could have had a proper threat awareness irrespective of the origin of the weapon system. The Foun-dation did not identify sufficient facts to indicate that such threat awareness existed among relevant authorities.Apart from the discussion on the accessibility of the information, another important aspect of the Russian
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13 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17EXECUTIVE SUMMARYFederation risk analysis and decision-making can be de-duced from the Russian Federation standard procedure and decision-making protocols. In response to a Foundation in-quiry relating to standard procedures and threat knowledge, the Russian Federation stated that, “Threats to air traffic safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR stemmed from the danger-ous activities in the area of responsibility of the adjacent Dne-propetrovsk FIR.” Further, it was also stated that “all possible risk factors for an unintended attack should be considered” and that “such preparations should include an assessment of the risk to civil aircraft operations due to a military conflict or incidents of unlawful interference with civil aviation.”After acknowledging the source of the threat in the neighbouring territory and, in general the need to consider all risk factors, the Russian Federation did not 16 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.acknowledge the responsibility to determine the risk fac-tors for an unintentional attack in Russian Federation air-space originating from the close proximity to the conflict zone in the eastern Ukraine. With respect to the issue of which authorities were responsible, the response was: “The state responsible for compliance with the rules for the intro-duction of restrictions on the use of airspace over an armed conflict zone (Ukraine, in relation to the MH17 crash).”Finding 9: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that the Russian Federation authorities responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establishing restriction of airspace in a con-flict zone16 could have had a proper awareness of the high-altitude threat.
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14 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH171 | INTRODUCTION1. Introduction17 This inquiry was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as announced in the letter the Minis-try sent to the Netherlands’ House of Representatives om 1 May 2020: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/05/01/kamerbrief-inzake-diverse-onderwerpen-inzake-mh17-dossier.1.1. PurposeThe Foundation conducted an inquiry17 into the cir-cumstances that led to a partial closure of the airspace above and adjacent to eastern Ukraine in the three-month period prior to the 17 July 2014 shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.The intent of the inquiry was to analyse airspace closure decisions made by authorities in both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and to understand the processes used in making those decisions as well as the information on which the decisions were based.1.2. BackgroundOn 17 July 2014, Flight MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was downed over eastern Ukraine where, at the time, an armed conflict was taking place. Tragically, all 298 passengers and crew lost their lives. While there have been other losses of airliners as a result of military conflict over the previous decades, the loss of Flight MH17 constituted a watershed moment that galvanized the inter-national community to proactively address the continuing threat to civil aviation arising from conflict zones.In July 2014, the United Nations Security Coun-cil adopted a resolution related to the downing of Flight MH17. This was followed by an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State letter, issued to draw the attention of ICAO Member States to the international provisions specifying state responsibilities with respect to the safety and security of civil aircraft operating in airspace affected by conflict.ICAO established a senior-level Task Force to address issues related to the safety and security of civil aircraft operating in airspace affected by conflict. The chairman of the Foundation’s Board of Governors was elected chair-man of the Task Force. The Task Force developed a report, which included recommendations to address the threat of military conflict to civil aviation. It urged the international community to implement protocols to prevent similar events in the future. These recommendations included threat assessment, sharing of threat information, and timely and effective management of aircraft operations and airspace.The 36-state ICAO Council reviewed the report of the Task Force and in October 2014 approved the con-flict zone work program. The Council also unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the downing of Malay-sia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine.The technical investigation into the causes of the Flight MH17 crash was conducted by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) after Ukraine delegated this authority to the Netherlands. The report of the DSB aimed at answering four key questions:• What caused the crash of Flight MH17?• How and why were decisions made to use Flight MH17’s flight route?• How is the decision-making process related to flying over conflict zones generally organized?• What lessons can be learned from the investigation to improve flight safety and security?The final report by the DSB was published on 13 October 2015. With regard to the first question, the DSB deter-mined that the cause of the crash was the detonation of a warhead above the left side of the cockpit. The weapon used was a 9N314M-model warhead carried on the 9M38 series of missiles, as installed on the Buk surface-to-air (SAM) missile system.With regard to the second question, the DSB’s report provides an overview of the precise flight path followed by Flight MH17 as well as the different airspace restrictions that were imposed over time, both above the territory of Ukraine and above the territory of the Russian Federation. The report also provides information about possible risks for civil aviation in those areas during the relevant period and measures that were taken in that regard.Foundation research builds upon the information contained in the DSB’s report and attempts to enlarge the scope and deepen understanding of the factual circum-stances underlying the airspace restrictions both above the territory of Ukraine and above the territory of the Russian Federation.Civil aviation accidents caused by attack from the ground continue to happen. During 2020, there were two such occurrences. On 8 January 2020, Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 was shot down shortly after takeoff from Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport, resulting in 176 fatalities. On 4 May 2020, an East African Express Airways aircraft was shot down on approach to Berdale airport in Somalia, resulting in six fatalities. Threats to com-mercial aviation due to hostile activity in conflict regions around the world are a continuing concern. The Founda-tion continues its global campaign to encourage heightened awareness and action on this matter.
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15 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH171 | INTRODUCTIONWithin the context of a still prominent risk, this report also attempts to advance further the understanding of risk assessment of attack from the ground on civil aircraft and on the state processes for integrated airspace security risk assessment.1.3. ScopeThis inquiry is focused on the factual circumstances surrounding the decision-making regarding the closure of airspace above and around eastern Ukraine from 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of that airspace after the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. In addition, this inquiry will provide contextual background, through a representative inventory of state practices 20 to 30 years prior to 2014, regarding the use by civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones.This inquiry was conducted from April 2020 to Janu-ary 2021.The scope did not include drawing (normative) conclu-sions on the question of whether, prior to the moment of the downing of Flight MH17, responsible authorities did or did not take adequate measures to prevent the downing of the aircraft.The following elements were covered within the scope of the inquiry:• A study of previous hostile events and state practice in regard to the use by civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones.• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure of airspace above eastern Ukraine as of 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure of airspace above the territory of the Russian Fed-eration bordering eastern Ukraine as of 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.1.4. Inquiry LimitationsThere are a number of limitations associated with carrying out this inquiry that should be considered. The limitations are related to the characteristics of the scope, purpose, and approach to the inquiry and to the sources and quality of information available for use in the inquiry. Readers of the report should keep in mind the following:• The findings about airspace closure decisions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation are based on two specific sources of information: (a) public source information available during 2020 discovered by the Foundation and (b) information received by the Foundation from Ukraine and the Russian Federation through responses to questionnaires. Other sources of information, such as private sources and information from intelligence services, were not available for the inquiry.• The findings from the hostile events analysis and from the historical conflict zones analysis are based on the information discovered by the Foundation from public sources.• The inquiry into airspace closure decisions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation is focused on information about: (a) the threat awareness of the authorities responsible for airspace security risk analysis and decision-making and not about the potential threat awareness of other entities within each government, and (b) facts reported publicly by organisations and authorities and does not include conclusions and inferences from these facts made by organisations and authorities.• The inquiry was carried out remotely due to COV-ID-19 travel restrictions. The Foundation requested access to engage directly with identified relevant au-thorities and specialists in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which would have been possible through teleconferencing or video conferencing. Ultimately, Ukraine and the Russian Federation preferred pro-viding information through written questionnaires developed by the Foundation. Information was transmitted via the respective diplomatic channels. The Foundation does not have visibility on how the information was collected and processed within the relevant authorities in the two countries.• The process of sending questionnaires, waiting for the written responses and then processing those re-sponses took considerable time and limited the num-ber of iterations to two — the first set of questions to each state and then a set of clarifying questions to each. These circumstances limited the depth of the inquiry.• While the findings about airspace closure decisions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the find-ings from the historical conflict zones analysis are for the defined time periods ending on 17 July 2014, numerous changes have been implemented since then, including changes initiated by ICAO, sovereign states, aviation authorities, airlines, and air naviga-tion service providers. The findings are not directly transferable to the current practices.• Because six years have passed since the downing of Flight MH17, it is more challenging to obtain information on procedures, decisions and practic-es in place at the time in 2014. Key personnel and decision makers who were in place in 2014 may not
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16 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH171 | INTRODUCTIONbe in place now. We do not have independent verifi-cation about whether our questions were answered by people knowledgeable about the decision-making processes and practices in place prior to the downing of Flight MH17.1.5. DefinitionsFor the purpose of this report, existing ICAO definitions were adopted [1]. When the following terms are used in this document, they have the following meanings:Air-to-air missiles (AAMs) — Missiles fired at an aircraft from another aircraft.Civil aircraft — Non-state aircraft (pursuant to Article 3 of the Chicago Convention). This could include passenger airliners, cargo aircraft and business or private aircraft.Conflict zones — Airspace over areas where armed conflict is occurring or is likely to occur between militarized par-ties and is also taken to include airspace over areas where such parties are in a heightened state of military alert or tension, which might endanger civil aircraft.Hazard — A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems) — Shoul-der-launched surface-to-air missiles. These are widely available in many countries, particularly in conflict areas; 18 As described in ICAO “Air Traffic Services Panning Manual”19 As used in ICAO “Aeronautical Information Services Manual”are portable; and can be used with relatively limited train-ing. MANPADS are capable of bringing down aircraft, but not of reaching cruising altitudes.Overflying — Passing over terrestrial areas (land or sea) at cruising altitude.Risk — The potential for an unwanted or calculated out-come resulting from an occurrence. Risk can be estimated by considering the likelihood of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences or impacts.Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) — Any weapon that may be fired at an aircraft from the ground (including MAN-PADS), but in this context, is taken to mean advanced military equipment that is capable of attacking airborne targets at altitudes of at least 25,000 ft.Threat — A man-made occurrence, individual, entity or action that has, or indicates, the potential to harm life, in-formation, operations, the environment and/or property.Vulnerability — Factors or attributes that render an en-tity, asset, system, network or geographic area open to successful exploitation or attack or susceptible to a given threat or hazard.In this report, in accordance with ICAO and the other refer-enced sources, the terms “airspace restriction”18 and “airspace closure”19 are used interchangeably. Wherever applicable, these terms are used with the addition of their vertical limits.
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17 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH172 | OVERALL FRAMEWORK2. Overall Framework20 Some anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) systems are capable of reaching cruising levels, but these are generally of lower lethality than SAMs and are dis-counted from this analysis.The conceptual framework for this study is provided in Figure 9 below.The conceptual framework defines two study spaces: risk situation and state practices. These study spaces are described below.Risk situation defines the objective evolution of the cir-cumstances associated with civil aviation security or safety risk above conflict zones. It should be noted that the ICAO definition of conflict zones (CZ) is restrictively confined to armed conflict that is occurring or is likely to occur between militarized parties. The conceptual framework acknowledges that there may be other situations (OS) that do not fall within the ICAO CZ definition but that can still be associated with civil aviation security threats. An example of an OS is a situation associated with insurgents or terrorists that is not an armed conflict.A security threat (ST) can be associated with conflict zones or other situations and can be assessed with the help of the following groups of indicators:• Capability to attack — this study will not exclude other capabilities but will be mainly focused on the presence of long-range SAMs and AAMs that can hit an aircraft flying at cruising level20.• Intent to attack — the plan for a deliberate act against civil aviation• Possibility of an unintentional attack — shaped by the presence of one or more risk factors.• Conflict parties’ command and control — the rigor-ousness and reliability of the command and control procedures and practices for authorizing a capability launch.A security threat associated with a security risk situation may be dormant and never materialise. Whenever it is actively manifested, however, the security threat usually materialises in a hostile event (HE). Hostile events are intentional or unintentional engagement of a capability against civil aviation. Hostile events can lead to aircraft damage and/or injuries to flight crew and/or passengers, but also can be inconsequential.A hostile event and, in some instances, the actions of the involved actors to manage the security threat, can lead to safety hazards (SH) that are part of the overall consequence of a risk situation and may need also to be assessed. An example of a safety hazard is a civil flight in dangerous proximity to military flights.State practices (SP) are the actions of bodies and organi-sations authorised by the state to manage the airspace over which the state has sovereignty. It should be noted that state practices can be explicitly coded into rules and procedures but also can be an implicitly established way of working.Figure 9Study Conceptual FrameworkSHHESTCZNOOSPRSPRelated safety hazardIntentCapability: SAM, AAM, MANPADSUnintentional attack riskCommand and control factorsHostile eventCivil aviation security threatCONFLICT ZONEOTHER SITUATIONSNormal operationsPublished airspace restrictionsSTATE PRACTICES(decisions taken)State practicesRisk situationInformation
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18 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH172 | OVERALL FRAMEWORKAirspace published restrictions (PR), as part of air-space management practices, are normally promulgated through:• Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs), which generally are used for information of a permanent or lasting nature, as well as for temporary changes of long duration; or• Notices to airmen (NOTAMs), which are used to disseminate information of a temporary nature and of short duration or when operationally significant permanent changes, or temporary changes of long duration, are made at short notice. NOTAMs do not include extensive text and/or graphics.State practices also may concern airspace over which the state does not have sovereignty and may be directed at aircraft operators that have been issued an air operator certificate (AOC) by that state (authority). In this case, the state may elect to publish various forms of state advisories or restrictions covering operations in particular airspace. These advisories and restrictions are outside the scope of this study.Optimally, and as shown in Figure 9, for states to determine what type of state practice to apply to a given risk situation, they need to possess information about the elements of the risk situation — such as information about the characteristics of the conflict zone and the level of escalation; information about the existing security threat as determined by the presence of intent, capability, risk factors for an unintentional attack, command and control rigorousness and reliability; and information about previ-ous hostile events.This study will use the above-defined framework to ana-lyse the threat and the corresponding airspace restrictions.
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19 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH173 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020 3. Hostile Events Analysis: 1985–202021 E.g. MANPADS or SAMs3.1. Purpose of the Hostile Events AnalysisAt the outset of the project, the Foundation gathered and analysed data on 57 hostile events involving civil avia-tion in and around conflict zones over a 35-year period beginning in 1985. The period was selected based on the information for the hostile events that the Foundation was able to collect. Included in the sample were intentional and unintentional attacks from the ground on commercial air transport and general aviation operations. Hostile events, as illustrated in Figure 10, are the intentional or unintentional engagement of a capability to attack21 against civil aviation.Within the context of this study, the purpose of the hostile events analysis is twofold: to provide an empirically based context for the study and to inform the selection of conflict zones for further analysis. These two purposes are explained further.The analysis of civil aviation hostile events would pro-vide the necessary, data-defined context for the conflict zone security risk situation. In order to study the con-flict zones, it is necessary to study their potential worst outcome — hostile events. Additionally, considering that most hostile events are associated with flights in nonre-stricted airspace, this part of the inquiry was an important source of information about the failure of state practices to restrict the airspace.The security threat associated with a security risk situation may be dormant and may never materialise. Whenever it is actively manifested, however, the securi-ty threat usually materialises in a hostile event. Hostile events, as illustrated in Figure 10 below, are the intentional or unintentional engagement of a capability against civil aviation. Hostile events can lead to hull loss, multiple fa-talities, aircraft damage and/or injuries to flight crew and/or passengers, but they also can be inconsequential (i.e., a failed attack).Hostile events are “the tip of the iceberg,” and for each hostile event that occurred, there were many more precur-sor situations that sometimes were and sometimes were not associated with a conflict zone (for example, a terrorist act not in a conflict zone).For each hostile event that occurred, there were many more precursor situations with factors that could lead to a hostile event — capability and intent to attack and/or capability and factors for an unintentional attack — were present, but the situation did not actually result in a hos-tile event. This is represented in the security threat layer of the security risk pyramid in Figure 10.At the bottom of the security risk pyramid, there are multiple states and zones where the capability to attack aircraft in flight exists but where there is neither an intent to attack nor factors for unintentional attack. In general, the higher the situation is on the security risk pyramid, the higher is the associated security risk. One can study all types of situations associated with the above-illustrated security risk pyramid, including its lower layer of “normal situations” or the higher risk situations represented by the upper layers.This study proposes an analysis of the “tip of the pyr-amid” — the hostile events. It is acknowledged that this is the least populated layer of the security pyramid, and Figure 10Hostile Events PyramidHostile eventsCapability and intent to attackCapability and factors for an unintentional attackSituations or zones with capability to attack aircraft in ight
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20 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH173 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020 because of that, the associated sample will be the smallest. However infrequent, hostile events are the actual mani-festation of the security threat and their study, together with the airspace-related information, is necessary but not entirely sufficient for a systematic, fact-based and da-ta-driven study of conflict zone state practices.The second purpose of the hostile events analysis is to inform the selection of conflict zones for further analysis. Conflict zones belong to the second layer of the securi-ty risk pyramid and occur more frequently than hostile events because there are more situations in which both the capability and intent to attack or capability and factors for unintentional attack are present.The hostile events analysis can clearly indicate some (but not all) conflict zones with either intent to attack or present factors for an unintentional attack.3.2. Hostile Events SampleThe sample of hostile events was selected in compliance with the following study-specific requirements:• Attack occurred during the review period, 1985–2020.• Attack involved civil aviation flights, including commercial air transport (both scheduled and non-scheduled) and general aviation (for example non-commercial business aviation, aerial work and pleasure flying).• Global scope.• Attack could be either intentional or unintentional.• Attacks considered were not restricted to a specific capability to attack (for example, MANPADS or SAMs) in order not to restrict the possibility for comparative analysis.Using publicly available resources and a dedicated Foundation database of “hostile events in civil aviation” and considering the above-defined scope of the sample, research concluded that there were at least 57 occurrences during the studied period.An extract from the Foundation database of hostile events is provided in Table 2 (p. 21).3.3. Airspace Restrictions and Hostile EventsAirspace restrictions analysis is a key element of this study. The results of the hostile events analysis, illus-trated in Figure 11 below, show that most hostile events took place over conflict zones when the airspace was not restricted.There was only one occurrence in the analysed sample (29 August 1999, Ethiopia) that took place in previously closed airspace. In this case, a business jet deviated from its route and flew deep inside the Ethiopian no-fly zone from Eritrea’s airspace and was shot down by Ethiopian military with SA2 and/or SA3 SAMs.Only eight occurrences out of the sample of 57 events are not associated with conflict zone and/or insurgency activity and, because of that, could have not been prevented by an restricting the airspace above and around a conflict zone.Finding 1: Foundation analysis shows that most of the hostile events involving surface-to-air attacks against civil aviation flights that took place during the period of 1985‒2020 could have been prevented by restricting the airspace above or around the conflict zone and by adherence to the restrictions.3.4. Targeted AircraftAn analysis of the hostile events indicates that turbo-props are a more frequent target than jets, as can be seen Figure 11Airspace Restrictions30240012No restrictions No information about airspace restriction identiedAirspace closedAbove FL 250Below FL 25005101520253035
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21 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table 2An Extract from FSF “Hostile Events in Civil Aviation” DatabaseDateStateConsequences Aircraft Operator Capability PerpetratorFlight phase Altitude Type Killed/Injured/Uninjured04-Apr-85GreeceFuselage holed, no explosionRoyal Jordanian AirlinesRPG7Abu Nidal and Black SeptemberTakeoffGroundB7270/0/7504-Sep-85AfghanistanHit after climbing overhead KDH before setting course, fire, subsequent crash. Bakhtar Afghan Shorts BlowpipeHezb-i-Islami factionEn route12,500 ft AN2652/0/008-Jun-86AngolaVeer off and wing fire during landing due to damage.TAAGUIDMUNITALanding n/kL1000/0/516-Aug-86SudanCrashedSudan AirwaysSA-7 SPLAInitial climb<3,000ftF2760/0/005-May-87SudanCrashedSASCO Air CharterMANPADSSPLAInitial climbn/kC40413/0/011-Jun-87AfghanistanCrashedBakhtar Afghan MANPADSHezb-i-IslamiEn routen/kAN2653/2/014-Oct-87AngolaNo. 3 engine hit, caught fire, subsequent crash. ZimexMANPADSMPLA or UNITAClimb 5,000 ftL100 6/0/006-Nov-87MozambiqueCrashedAir MalawiMANPADSMozambique Armed ForcesEn routen/kSC710/0/003-Jul-88IranCrashed, missiles fired from ship; flight on airway A59 in accordance with Iranian ATC clearance.Iran Air2 x SM2U.S. Navy Climb 13,500 ftA300290/0/010-Dec-88PakistanCrashedAriana Afghann/kPakistan Armed ForcesEn routen/kAN2625/0/0xx Feb-89AngolaRight wing fire; return to Dundo airport where wing burned off — whole later replaced.TransAfrikMANPADSUNITAEn routen/kL1000/0/X08-Apr-89AngolaNo. 2 engine disabled and smoke on flight deck; crash landing and fire destroyed aircraft.TransAfrikSmall armsUNITAApproach<2,000 ftL1000/0/405-Sep-89 U.S. Aircraft hit by gunshot while landing, bullet pierced door and grazed passenger’s head. USAir Small arms Landing 0/1/?? 21-Dec-89SudanCrashedMSFSA7SPLATakeoff/ initial climb<1,000ftBN24/0/028-Dec-89RomaniaCrashed after suspected missile exploded in vicinity causing LOC; cause initially hidden by Romania, revealed in 2014.TAROMMANPADSn/kEn routen/kAN247/0/0AMISOM = African Union Mission to Somalia; ATC = air traffic control; CAA = civil aviation authority; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; KDH = Ahmad Shah Baba International Airport; LOC = loss of control; MANPADS = man-portable air defence system; MEG = Malange Airport; MLPA = People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola; n/k = not known; NOTAMs = notices to airmen; RTO = rejected takeoff; SPLA = South Sudan People’s Defence Forces; UNITA = National Union for the Total Independence of Angola3 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020
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22 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table 2An Extract from FSF “Hostile Events in Civil Aviation” Database (continued)DateStateConsequences Aircraft Operator Capability PerpetratorFlight phase Altitude Type Killed/Injured/Uninjured05-Jan-90AngolaEmergency landing after no. 4 engine hit and collateral damage to no. 3engine 3, returned to land.Angola Air Charter SA7?UNITAClimbn/kL1000/0/712-Jun-90AfghanistanTwo engines shut down, then emergency landing on unpaved runway en-route.Aeroflot RaytheonFIM-92 Stingern/kEn routeFL255IL760/0/1013-Feb-91AngolaDamaged on final, normal landing completedTransAfrikn/kUNITAApproachn/kDC8n/k16-Mar-91AngolaCrashedTransAfrikStingerUNITAEn routeFL170L1009/0/029-Mar-91AngolaHit left wing/engine; flight completed. ZimexMANPADSUNITAEn routen/kDHC60/0/1110-Jul-91PeruBoth pilots killed by police gunfire just after takeoff, 13 passengers killed in subsequent crash. AerochasquiSmall armsIllegal action by National PoliceInitial climb75ftC21215/0/010-Sep-91RwandaMinor aircraft damage; flight completed. Scibe Airlift Cargo ZaireMANPADSRPFEn routen/kF270/0/1417-Sep-91SomaliaEmpennage hit, temp LOC, recovery and diversion to Djibouti.Zimex MANPADSn/kEn route9,600 ftD2280/0/528-Jan-92Azerbaijan Attackers targeted aircraft after “assuming” it was carrying weapons.Azal Azerbaijan AirlinesHeat seeking missileArmenian Resistance En routen/kMI844/0/0 27-Mar-92Azerbaijan Middle engine disabled, resultant fire, diversion to Yerevan completed.Armenian AirlinesGunfireAzerbaijan Air ForceInitial climbn/kYK400/0/3409-May-92Azerbaijan Both pilots injured; aircraft caught fire and diverted to Sisian, Armenia; crash landing. Ararat AviaSu25Azerbaijan Air ForceEn routen/kYK400/0/33 29-May-92AfghanistanMissile hit runway ahead of aircraft, one pilot injured by shrapnel from explosion, but landing completed. Afghan president on board.Ariana AfghanMANPADSn/kApproach700 ftT1540/0/1727-Aug-92TurkeyContinued to destination with nine bullet holes in fuselage.THYGunfirePKKInitial climb<3,000 ftA3100/0/12823-Jan-93AngolaNo. 3 propeller blown off, returned to land, no other damage.TransAfrikRPGUNITAInitial climb<2,000 ftL1000/0/X26-Apr-93AngolaLeft engine hit, turned back but crew conducted forced landing in field. for UNWFPMANPADSUNITAEn routeFL160AN121/2/5AMISOM = African Union Mission to Somalia; ATC = air traffic control; CAA = civil aviation authority; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; KDH = Ahmad Shah Baba International Airport; LOC = loss of control; MANPADS = man-portable air defence system; MEG = Malange Airport; MLPA = People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola; n/k = not known; NOTAMs = notices to airmen; RTO = rejected takeoff; SPLA = South Sudan People’s Defence Forces; UNITA = National Union for the Total Independence of Angola3 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020
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23 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table 2An Extract from FSF “Hostile Events in Civil Aviation” Database (continued)DateStateConsequences Aircraft Operator Capability PerpetratorFlight phase Altitude Type Killed/Injured/Uninjured21-Sep-93GeorgiaMissile fired from boat; LOC, crashed. Transair GeorgiaStrela-2 (SA7)Abkhazian InsurgentsApproach1,000 ftT13427/0/022-Sep-93GeorgiaDamaged on short final, crash landed on runway, fire destroyed aircraft. Orbi Georgian AWn/kAbkhazian Insurgents Approachn/kT154108/24/028-Jan-95AngolaRight engine hit just after takeoff, followed by crash landing.SALRaytheon FIM-92 StingerUNITAEn route<1,500 ftBE202/0/402-Sep-98AngolaEngine fire, initial attempt to divert to MEG but then forced landing. PermtransaviaMANPADSUNITAEn routen/kAN2624/0/029-Sep-98Sri LankaCrashedGomelavian/kLTTEClimbFL140AN2455/0/010-Oct-98DRCAttempted crash landing in jungle after the rear engine was struck.Lignes Aeriennes CongolaisesStrela-2 (SA7)Tutsi MilitiaClimb<6,000ftB72741/0/014-Dec-98AngolaCrashed Khors Airn/kUNITAEn routeFL150AN1210/0/026-Dec-98AngolaCrashed TransAfrikanti-aircraft missileUNITAEn routen/kL10014/0/002-Jan-99AngolaCrash landing in enemy-held territory during turnback. TransAfrikMANPADSUNITAEn routen/kL1009/0/012-May-99AngolaEngine hit; forced landing; crew captured by UNITA.Volga Atlantic ALMANPADSUNITAEn routen/kAN260/0/401-Jul-99AngolaCrashedSavanairMANPADSUNITAEn routen/kAN121/0/429-Aug-99EthiopiaHit by proximity missile after proceeding into NOTAM-closed airspace. Corporate JetsSAMEthiopian Army Targeting ErrorEn routeFL410LJ452/0/031-Oct-00AngolaCrashed (UNITA claimed shoot down; CAA and military blamed a technical problem).Ancargo NS n/kUNITAEn routen/kAN2649/0/004-Dec-00BurundiFlight continued to normal landing, 13 bullet holes in fuselage.SabenagunfireInsurgentsApproach350ftA3320/2/16808-Jun-01AngolaAircraft from World Food Program hit in one engine; crew regained control and landed safely at Luena.TransAfrik anti-aircraft missileRebels (Unita admitted the attack) En route—Approach FL 150, 15000 ft (16,404 ft) B727 0/0/3 AMISOM = African Union Mission to Somalia; ATC = air traffic control; CAA = civil aviation authority; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; KDH = Ahmad Shah Baba International Airport; LOC = loss of control; MANPADS = man-portable air defence system; MEG = Malange Airport; MLPA = People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola; n/k = not known; NOTAMs = notices to airmen; RTO = rejected takeoff; SPLA = South Sudan People’s Defence Forces; UNITA = National Union for the Total Independence of Angola3 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020
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24 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table 2An Extract from FSF “Hostile Events in Civil Aviation” Database (continued)DateStateConsequences Aircraft Operator Capability PerpetratorFlight phase Altitude Type Killed/Injured/Uninjured04-Oct-01Black SeaOn Airway B145; crashed, missile fired from Feodosia overshot intended target at 18 nm by 140 nm after locking onto it. Sibir Airlines S-200 (SA5c)Ukraine Armed Forces En route FL360 T154 78/0/0 28-Nov-02KenyaMissile missed the airplane, no damage; pilot decided to continue to Tel Aviv. Not a conflict zone.Arkia 2 SA-7 - Strela 2 al-Qaida Initial climb 3000ft B757 0/0/271 22-Nov-03IraqContinued with wing fire, no hydraulics, no fight controls; turned back, flapless only thrust-controlled landing, gravity drop for landing gear, runway excursion.European Air Transport (DHL)SA14 - Strela 3Insurgents Climb 8000ft A300 0/0/3 09-Mar-07SomaliaProjectile hit aircraft on the left hand side of fuselage near main landing gear. Fire caused smoke inside the airplane, which landed safely.TransAVIAexport Airlines most likely an RPGRebels on a boat. Islamist militia claimed the attack Approach 490 ft Il-76TD 0/0/15 23-Mar-07 Somalia Crashed TransAviaExport Airlines n/k Rebels on boat Initial climb <3,000 ft IL76 11/0/0 15-Oct-09Colombia Flight. SADELCA gunfire FARC En route n/k DC3 0/1/X 17-Apr-13 Libya Bullet entered flight deck. Buraq Air gunfire n/k Approach 2,000ft B738 0/0/155 24-Jun-14 Pakistan 15-plus bullets; 2 cabin crew,1 passenger hit; passenger died. PIA gunfire n/k Approach n/k A310 1/2/187 26-Jan-15 Iraq 3-4 bullet holes FlyDubai Small Arms Fire n/k Approach <2,000ft B738 0/2/X 08-Jan-20 Iran Proximity missile; aircraft destroyed, Ukraine International Airlines 2x TorM1 (SA15) Iranian Armed Forces Climb 8,100ft B738 176/0/0 04-May-20 Somalia Going around because of animals on or near the runway; soldiers believed it was a suicide plane and shot it down. African Express Airways or East African Express ZU-23 anti-aircraft cannon Ethiopian troops stationed as part of AMISOM Approach 2.230ft E120 6/0/0 25-May-20 Somalia Continued for a landing. All occupants disembarked uninjured. The aircraft sustained damage bybullets penetrating wings and cabin. Aeronav/Kenya School of Flying Small arms fire Ethiopian troops misidentified the aircraft and opened fire Approach <1,200ft L410 0/0/XAMISOM = African Union Mission to Somalia; ATC = air traffic control; CAA = civil aviation authority; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; KDH = Ahmad Shah Baba International Airport; LOC = loss of control; MANPADS = man-portable air defence system; MEG = Malange Airport; MLPA = People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola; n/k = not known; NOTAMs = notices to airmen; RTO = rejected takeoff; SPLA = South Sudan People’s Defence Forces; UNITA = National Union for the Total Independence of Angola3 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020
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25 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH173 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020 in Figure 12. A possible explanation is that turboprops fly lower and slower than jets, including during their approach to land or initial climb following takeoff. The slower speed and engine signature make them easier to hit with less sophisticated and more readily available weapons (MANPADS vs. SAMs).While potential launch areas around airports can be more easily secured and protected against attackers, the relatively low cruising altitudes of turboprops are within the engage-ment altitude limits for some MANPADS. Data reviewed show that of the 32 occurrences involving turboprops, only nine were during approach to land or initial climb phases of flight and 20 were during the en route phase.Also, turboprop-powered aircraft often are used for humanitarian aid/relief flights and in various government utility operations, which often occur in circumstances where security and political stability are sub-optimal.3.5. Capability to AttackThe Foundation’s research showed MANPADS are the most common weapon used against civil aviation. Figure 13 shows the number of events in the sample associated with a given capability to attack. MANPADS generally are easier to obtain and use than larger, non-man-portable SAM systems.However, the size of the warhead for most MANPADS (less than 2 kg for some common MANPADS) and their typical infrared homing guidance, which biases attacks toward aircraft engines, means that a catastrophic out-come (i.e., the aircraft being shot down) is not certain. By comparison, the four SAM events identified (five, includ-ing Flight MH17) show that a catastrophic outcome from an effective SAM attack is highly probable, at least in part because of the larger warhead (as much as 70 kg in some missiles).It also should be noted that small arms attacks against aircraft at lower altitudes likely are the most frequent form of attack simply because of the prevalence of these weap-ons across the world. However, it is extremely difficult to accurately target an aircraft in flight with small arms, such as assault rifles; any damage tends to be minor; and attacks are difficult to detect. Therefore, it is noted that the number of small arms attacks in our sample may not be representative of the overall population of such events in the world.Figure 12Type of AircraftOther (2)Jet (23)Turboprop (32)Figure 13Number of Events in the Sample Associated With a Given Capacity to Attack051015Number of events202530MANPADS30Small arms and light weapons14SAM4Other 2Not known7
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26 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH173 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020 Finding 2: Based on an analysis of reported surface-to-air attacks against civil aviation flights for the period of 1985‒2020, MANPADS are the most common weapon used against civil aviation. MANPADS are generally easier to obtain and use than larger, non-portable SAM systems. However, the size of most MANPADS war-heads means that a catastrophic outcome is not certain. By comparison, the SAM events identified show that a catastrophic outcome from an effective attack is highly probable. The presence of SAMs should therefore be a key indicator in any airspace risk analysis and avoid/overfly decision.3.6. Risk and Capability Engagement AltitudeIn 34 of the hostile events in the Foundation “Hostile Events in Civil Aviation” database, information about the engagement altitude was found. The engagement altitude for the hostile events in the Foundation database is presented in Figure 14. The Flight MH17 event is also indicated on the figure for reference.Three (four, including the Flight MH17 event, which was not considered in the hostile events analysis) of the events occurred above Flight Level (FL) 250 and 19 oc-curred below FL 50.There were five occurrences, depicted in red in Figure 14, identified as involving a SAM attack. Two of these events (Iran Air, 1988, and Ukraine International Airlines, 2020) occurred within the limits of MANPADS engage-ment altitude. The occurrences depicted in blue involved capability to attack other than a SAM.From the analysis, it appears that MANPADS range can be greater than sometimes assumed. A U.S. government assessment, published in July 2011, stated that MANPADS could “strike aircraft flying at altitudes up to approximately 15,000 feet at a range of up to 3.2 miles [5.9 km].” However, data associated with a 1990 attack on an IL-76 in Afghani-stan recorded its altitude when hit by a U.S.-manufactured Raytheon FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS missile as FL 255. In this case, the missile was fired from high terrain. Therefore, the launch altitude for MANPADS can have a significant effect on their range and maximum engagement altitude.It can be concluded that a reliable initial assessment of risk to airspace users demands an accurate up-to-date assessment of any effective capability in the hands of po-tential non-state aggressors and state actors.The analysis of the engagement altitude, the associat-ed phase of flight and the typical cruising altitude for an involved type of aircraft reveals that FL 250 is well selected Figure 14Altitude Distribution19801985199019952000Year20052010201520202025050001000015000200002500030000350004000045000Altitude (
ft)Corporate jet, 1999Sibir Airlines, 2001MH17, 2014Ukraine International Airlines, 2020Iran Air, 1988SAM attackOther than SAM attack
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27 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH173 | HOSTILE EVENTS ANALYSIS: 1985–2020 for studying the security risk for aircraft at a cruising level that does not include the risk of MANPADS.3.7. Intentional vs. Unintentional AttackThe two origins of risk to airspace users are “intentional act” and “unintentional act.” State perpetrators’ acts are generally associated with the latter explanation. And while irregular perpetrators also make targeting errors, in some regional conflict zones, an intent to bring down civil trans-port aircraft has featured prominently in their actions.In terms of consequences, the most difficult to predict risk with the most serious consequences is error by those controlling the offensive capability of well-armed states. Recent history shows that this capability can sometimes be inadequately controlled both during training exercises and when applying the “offensive engagement approv-al” process in the general context of growing political instability.Table 3 presents information about unintentional attack occurrences extracted from the Foundation database. There are eight such events identified and all but one involved military misidentification of the target identity and/or intentions. The remaining 49 events involved ei-ther an intentional attack or events for which the Founda-tion did not find information regarding intent.The capability of “irregular perpetrators” is likely to be less than that of states unless states are pursuing an aggres-sive policy objective by equipping irregulars with offensive capability much greater than they normally would possess (older versions of MANPADS with less than current front-line capability, for example).3.8. Hostile Events and Conflict Zone FlightsThe analysis of the Foundation database sample suggests that the primary risk of overflying conflict zones at high cruising altitudes is the mis-targeting of long-range air-burst missiles. Based on our sample, these long-range mis-siles are unlikely to be in the possession of non-state actors.Information about the risk of flight within a conflict zone is usually disseminated with a NOTAM.The hostile events analysis identified several conflict zones where either an obvious intent to attack or factors for an unintentional attack existed. These zones, listed be-low, were considered candidates for further conflict zone analysis as part of the study.• Afghanistan;• Georgia during civil war, 1991‒1993;• Iraq;• Libya;• Democratic Republic of the Congo; and,• Nagorno-Karabakh war.Angola, where a number of attacks occurred, including the TransAfrik event noted above, was reviewed for inclu-sion, but is not included in the final list because the parties involved did not have a capability to attack aircraft flying at cruise altitude.Table 3Unintentional Acts and Their ContextDateStateUnintentional Act Aircraft Operator PerpetratorAltitude Killed/Injured/Uninjured11-Jun-87AfghanistanMisidentified as a Russian IL14.Bakhtar Afghan Hezb-i-Islamin/k53/2/003-Jul-88IranMilitary misidentified target as a descending Iranian F-14.Iran AirU.S. Navy 13,500 ft290/0/029-Aug-99EthiopiaMilitary targeting error after proceeding into NOTAM closed airspace. Corporate JetsEthiopian Army FL 4102/0/004-Oct-01Black SeaMilitary exercise missile overshot intended target at 18 nm (33 km) by 140 nm (259 km) after locking onto it. Sibir Airlines Ukraine Armed Forces FL 360 78/0/0 26-Jan-15 Iraq Probably accidental, rounds from nearby social event. FlyDubai n/k <2,000 ft 0/2/X 08-Jan-20 Iran Military misidentified aircraft as a hostile target. Ukraine International Iranian Armed Forces 8,100 ft 176/0/0 04-May-20 Somalia Military misidentified going-around aircraft as a suicide plane.Ethiopian troops as part of AMISOM 2.230 ft 6/0/0 25-May-20 Somalia Military misidentified aircraft and opened fire. Aeronav/Kenya School of Flying Ethiopian troops as part of AMISOM <1,200 ft 0/0/XAMISOM = African Union Mission to Somalia; n/k = not known; NOTAM = notice to airmen
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28 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH174 | CONFLICT ZONES ANALYSIS: 1990–2014 4. Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–20144.1. Purpose of the Conflict Zones AnalysisWithin the context of this study, the purpose of the conflict zones analysis was to set data-defined context for other research components by providing an overview of state practices regarding airspace restrictions above and/or around conflict zones. Among other things, the Founda-tion focussed on determining the presence of air defence equipment (both air-to-air and surface-to-air) during a conflict and the restrictions that were applicable to the use of the airspace.4.2. Conflict Zones SampleConflict zones were selected in the following manner:• Based on publicly available information for the major conflict zones in the world.• Conflict zones were active during the period 1990‒2014.• There was a reasonable expectation, prior to com-mencing the analysis, of the existence of capability to attack at altitudes above FL 250. As defined previous-ly, the scope of the study is determined by the overall objective of the research related to Flight MH17 and does not include the risk from MANPADS. In this respect, the study scope is restricted to the airspace management state practices for cruising altitudes that are more than 25 000 ft above ground level. FL 250 is also the altitude limit that is often used in state advi-sories or restrictions for operations in particular air-space with regard to risk associated with MANPADS.Following the above-outlined study-specific requirements, and including the results of the hostile events analysis, the conflict zones selected for analysis are:• Bosnian war, 1992‒1997.• Croatian war, 1991‒1995.• Democratic Republic of the Congo — it is to be noted that this conflict zone is the only one from the sample for which the analysis concluded that there was low likelihood of the presence of capability to attack above FL 250. However, the analysis is kept in the sample to provide context and perspective.• Egypt (Sinai).• Georgia-Russia, 2008.• Iraq war, 1991.• Iraq war, 2003–2011.• Kosovo, Allied Force 1999.• Libya, 2011.• Slovenia, 1991.• Afghanistan, 2001‒present.• Armenia Azerbaijan.• Ivory Coast, 2002‒2004.• Indonesia (Aceh), 1990‒1998.• Mali, 2012‒2015.4.3. Conflict Zone IndicatorsThe situation in each conflict zone was reviewed relative to a set of 10 predetermined “indicators of likelihood of attack,” such as the presence of SAMs capable of reaching a target in flight above FL 250.Each of the indicators is considered as a question with possible answers numbered from 1 to 3. The number of the answer is an indication of likelihood, with 1 indicat-ing, in general and with all other conditions being equal, the lowest likelihood of attack. The higher the number of the answer, the greater is the indication of the likelihood of attack.The indicators are defined as follows:A. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.C. Military air transport activities ‒ Use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly when they operate near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes):1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment (by at least one party).D. Military air combat activities ‒ Use of military air-craft in a combat role or for hostile reconnaissance
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29 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH174 | CONFLICT ZONES ANALYSIS: 1990–2014 by at least one party in the conflict. This could include remotely piloted (unmanned) aircraft:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without any publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with a single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-re-lated incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information about capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles (AAMs) launched from fight-er aircraft (and no SAMs) and/or some indica-tion (but not full certainty) of long-range SAMs that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.3. Long-range SAMs that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electron-ic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF); or secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces or an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces and an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions, if any):1. No air traffic or only occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example, traffic restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including interna-tional overflightsThe 10 indicators belong to groups of indicators defined in Section 2 that characterise the security threat. Each of the 10 indicators can belong to more than one group as follows:• Capability to attack: indicators D, F and G.• Intent to attack: indicators E and I.• Possibility for an unintentional attack: indicators B, C, D, G, H and J.• Conflict parties’ command and control: indicators A, B and H.One of the indicators, “The capability to attack by at least one party,” is used as the primary filter, because the presence of an air defence system (surface-to-air or air-to-air) that can reach aircraft above FL 250 is an enabling risk factor at that altitude. The only possible exception would be an aircraft emergency such as an engine failure requiring a drift-down or an aircraft pressurisation failure leading to an emergency descent within the range of lower altitude capability to attack.Other indicators of likelihood of attack were considered. Within them are some indirect indicators that are based on others’ risk analyses. Examples of such indicators are the behaviour of large airlines and/or airlines with better access to risk information and the information from un-derwriting companies.Detailed information about conflict zones is now generated globally by the insurance industry and is used to determine underwriting risk for so-called “war risk insurance” on an hour-by-hour basis. The risk assessments are used to set premiums for a given route, whether for overflight or landing, and underwriters may even refuse to insure an operator if the risk is considered to be unaccept-ably high. Sudden increases, sustained high premiums or refusals of coverage may therefore provide a useful indicator of overflight risk before formal airspace closures
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30 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH174 | CONFLICT ZONES ANALYSIS: 1990–2014 or NOTAM warnings are issued. Operators will balance insurance costs against the cost of flying a less efficient avoidance route as part of their own risk assessment for a given flight; however, state authorities can lawfully direct their certificated operators to avoid a given area regardless of any efficiency penalties.The indicators based on the behaviour of airlines and underwriters, although considered important in gener-al, were not retained for the conflict zone risk analysis because of the lack of access to such historical information for the studied conflict zones.Apart from the conflict zone likelihood of attack, and within the context of this study, there is another important indicator — the indicator of airspace restrictions. This indicator describes when airspace restrictions were intro-duced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the sovereign authority (state) re-sponsible for the airspace.• Restrictions by others — third parties (for example, introducing a no-fly zone) and/or neighbouring states.4.4. Overview of the Conflict Zone AnalysisTable 4 (p. 31) provides an overview of the analysed con-flict zones.The individual indicators of likelihood of attack (A to J) are coloured to illustrate how each contributes to the overall likelihood of attack. Green boxes indicate a low contribution to the likelihood, red boxes indicate a high contribution to the likelihood and yellow means a medi-um contribution to the likelihood.The overall likelihood of attack is defined qualitatively as follows:• High means a very plausible scenario that includes the presence of civil aircraft operations and evidence of capability and intent to attack or high indication of likelihood of unintentional attack.• Low means a scenario with no information about ca-pability to attack or without civil aircraft operations or low indication of unintentional attack.• Medium means a scenario that is not covered by the either the high or low likelihood to attack definitions.The overall likelihood of attack is not just a simple aggregation of the 10 indications of likelihood of attack provided by the 10 individual indicators. For example, the indicator “capability to attack by at least one party,” apart from influencing the risk factors for an unintentional attack, is also a key filtering factor that, in the beginning of the risk analysis, defines with its indication the subsequent course of the risk analysis. Indeed, if in a given conflict zone there is (certainty of) no capability to attack above FL 250, then there is no need to analyse the other indica-tors, and the likelihood of attack there can be considered to be low.Another example of the complex interactions of the indicators and their influence on the likelihood of attack can be illustrated by discussing the “intent to attack” and “capability to attack” indicators. High likelihood of attack is determined not simply by the intent of one of the con-flict parties to attack, but also by their capability to attack at that altitude.Similarly, fusing the information from the six indica-tors related to the likelihood of unintentional attack only makes sense when military aviation assets are in posses-sion of the enemies of the parties that possess capability.With the aim of providing an overall assessment of the likelihood of attack in a conflict zone while at the same time addressing all the complexities related to the inter-actions of the individual indicators in their influence the likelihood of attack, the Foundation used proprietary risk analysis algorithms. The algorithms were parametrised to assess the overall likelihood of attack above FL 250, and the results are provided in Table 4.Using the algorithms, two sets of assessment were per-formed — one factoring the civil aviation traffic volume for the situation after introducing the airspace restrictions (if any), and the other for assessing the situation as if airspace restrictions were not in effect. The latter assess-ment is hypothetical and is not the same as the assessment of the likelihood before the introduction of the airspace restrictions. The reason for that is because before the introduction of airspace restrictions, many of the other indicators were often also different — the military combat activities have not commenced, the armed conflict scale was still to be seen and the attacks on military aircraft were still to be performed.For each set of assessments, separate “algorithm runs” were performed for each credible capability to attack. Here are some examples of risk scenarios that determine separate runs of the algorithm:• Long-range SAM capability of one conflict party that could result in intentional or unintentional attack against civil aircraft;• AAM capability of a party that could result in inten-tional or unintentional attack against civil aircraft; and,• A scenario (specific to the mountainous terrain in places like Afghanistan) where MANPADS can reach above FL 250.The overall likelihood for a given set of algorithm runs is determined by the highest risk assessed for the scenarios within the set. For example, in a given set (with or without airspace restrictions), if the likelihood of attack associated
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31 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table 4Overview of the Conflict Zone AnalysisAirspace Restrictions above FL 250No informationCommand and control factorsHigh likelihood indicationRisk factors for an unintentional attackMedium likelihood indicationCapability to attack Low likelihood indicationIntent to attack Overall indication of likelihood of attack above FL 250 A. PartiesB. Armed conflict scale and/or tensionsH. SAM operators’ experience and chain of commandC. Military air transport activitiesJ. Civil aircraft operations (with airspace restrictions)D. Military air combat activitiesG. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft F. Capability to attack by at least one partyE. Known attacks I. Known intent to attack (civil a/c)With actual airspace restrictionsWithout airspace restrictionsBosnian war 1992-1997Others’ restrictionsCroatian war 1991-1995Partially restrictedDemocratic Republic of the CongoNo restrictionEgypt (Sinai)No restrictionsGeorgia-Russia 2008No restrictionIraq war 1991Others’ restrictionsIraq war 2003-2011Others’ restrictionsKosovo, Allied Force 1999Others’ restrictionsLibya 2011Others’ restrictionsSlovenia 1991RestrictedAfghanistan 2001- present No restrictionsArmenia AzerbaijanRestrictedIvory Coast 2002-2004No restrictionIndonesia (Aceh) 1990-1998No restrictionMali 2012-2015No restrictionGeorgian civil wars 1991-93No restriction4 | CONFLICT ZONES ANALYSIS: 1990–2014
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32 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH174 | CONFLICT ZONES ANALYSIS: 1990–2014 with air-to-air unintentional attack is assessed as medi-um and the likelihood of attack with long range SAMs is assessed as high, then the likelihood of attack for the set is considered high. This is intuitively logical because for an aircraft operator and the general public, what is important is not how the attack will be performed but the likelihood of attack when flying in a given airspace.4.5. Discussion of the Conflict Zone AnalysisIn this section, we analyse the data in Table 4 and draw conclusions based on the historical evidence and our expert analysis.In analysing these conflict zones, sometimes the evi-dence and expert interpretations led to clear conclusions, and in other cases, due to lack of information, a conclu-sion could not be definitively established.The overview of the conflict zones analysis provided in Table 4 reveals (see the two columns under the common title “Overall indication of likelihood of attack above FL 250”) that in the studied sample there are only two conflict zones where a state completely closed its own airspace. These are the conflict zones of “Slovenia, 1991” and “Armenia-Azerbaijan.”In one conflict zone, “Croatian war, 1991‒1995,” the air-space was partially closed. In five of the analysed conflict zones, the airspace was closed by other states or organisa-tions and not the sovereign state — for example by a U.N. Security Council resolution, as in the case of “Libya, 2011,” or by the neighbouring states, as in the case of “Kosovo, Allied Force, 1999.”For eight conflict zones, either there were no airspace restrictions or no information about airspace restrictions could be found.The analysis of airspace restrictions for the studied sam-ple of 16 conflict zones is illustrated in Figure 15.Overall, there are 11 conflict zones with medium or high indication of likelihood of attack without airspace restrictions. Of these 11 conflict zones, there was only one instance in which the sovereign state responsible for that airspace introduced airspace restrictions — see Figure 16.Finding 3: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the period of 1990‒2014 did not identify a uniform practice of states closing their own airspace when there were indications of a likelihood of attack against civil aircraft in the context of an armed conflict on the territory of that state.In the few cases in the sample where states partially or completely closed their airspace, this was often asso-ciated with the loss of effective control over the relevant airspace by the state — Yugoslavia with the “Croatian war, 1991‒1995” and with “Slovenia, 1991” and the conflict zone “Armenia-Azerbaijan.”Finding 4: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the period of 1990‒2014 identified that, on the rare occasions when a state restricted its own airspace above FL 250, it was associated with the loss of effective con-trol over the relevant airspace by the state.Whenever a state closes or restricts its own airspace above FL 250, or such a restriction is imposed by a third party (such as in the introduction of a “no fly zone” by an entity like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the predom-inant concerns historically have related to the security of military operations, military aircraft traversing airspace, and the protection of ground infrastructure and of the Figure 15Sample of 16 Conflict ZonesPartially restricted (1)Airspacerestricted (2) Others’restrictions (5)No restriction (8)Figure 1611 Conflict Zones With Medium or High Indications of Likelihood of Attack Without Airspace RestrictionsOthers’restrictions (5)No restrictions (4)Partiallyrestricted (1)Restricted bythe state (1)
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33 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH174 | CONFLICT ZONES ANALYSIS: 1990–2014 population rather than the security of the civil aviation. In-deed, looking at the publicly available sources, U.N. Security Council resolutions and/or the introduction of no-fly zones, no information was found referring to the protection of civil aviation whenever airspace was restricted or closed.Finding 5: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the period of 1990‒2014 identified that whenever a state closed or restricted its own airspace above FL 250, or such a restriction was imposed by a third party, the predominant concerns were the security of military op-erations and of the population rather than the security of civil aviation.In the studied sample, there were eight cases in which an entity (the sovereign state or a third party) introduced partial or full airspace restrictions. These restrictions were for the conflict zones “Bosnian war, 1992‒1997,” “Croatian war, 1991‒1995,” “Iraq war, 1991,” “Iraq war, 2003-2011,” “Kosovo, Allied Force, 1999,” “Libya, 2011,” “Slovenia, 1991” and “Armenia-Azerbaijan.”Two sets of overall indication of likelihood of attack above FL 250 for these conflict zones were compared. These two sets of assessment include one that factors in the civil aviation traffic volume for the situation after introducing the airspace restrictions (if any), and the other that assesses the situation as if airspace restrictions were not in effect.This comparison reveals that in six of the eight cases in which airspace restrictions were introduced, the assessed likelihood of attack against civil aviation was reduced considerably. (See Figure 17)The likelihood of attack for the conflict zone “Slovenia, 1991” without airspace restrictions was assessed as low, and because of that, it can be argued that the restrictions were not necessary for the purpose of protecting civil aircraft at cruising altitudes above FL 250.Figure 17Eight Cases of Airspace RestrictionsLikelihoodremained high (1)Likelihoodremained low (1)Likelihood reducedfrom high to low(6)
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34 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5. Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern Ukraine5.1. Objectives of the Airspace Restrictions AnalysisAfter setting the wider background of the inquiry by char-acterising the historical occurrences of hostile events and the state practices of airspace management over conflict zones, the Foundation focused on airspace restrictions in Ukraine and the Russian Federation immediately prior to the downing of Flight MH17. The Foundation considered studying the airspace restrictions timeline and specifics to be important because restrictions are the main outcome of airspace restrictions decision-making, which is the study focus of this inquiry.5.2. Scope of the Airspace Restrictions AnalysisThe scope of the airspace restrictions analysis is defined as follows:• The analysed information is from NOTAMs.• Information was sourced and analysed for the period from 1 March 2014 up to and including the mo-ment of complete closure of the respective airspace subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.• The respective airspace is contained in the Dnepro-petrovsk Flight Information Region (FIR), UKDV, and in the Rostov-on-Don FIR, URRV (which bor-ders the UKDV FIR).• The specific focus of the analysis is on the restric-tions above FL 250.5.3. Technical Background5.3.1. BackgroundThe situation at the time involved several airspace restric-tions, introduced by both Ukraine and Russian Federa-tion, of airspace above and around eastern Ukraine. These airspace restrictions were promulgated with NOTAMs. To introduce the technical context of airspace restrictions, what follows is a short overview of airspace restrictions as a measure and of NOTAMs as aeronautical information products that are often used to promulgate this measure.5.3.2. Airspace Sovereignty, FIRs and ATS RoutesStates have sovereignty over the airspace above their territory and exercise complete and exclusive control of it. As provided in reference [2]: “For reasons of safety, a state may impose limitations on the use of its airspace and determine along which routes and at which minimum altitude aircraft may fly within that airspace. The manag-ing state can also partly or fully close its airspace if this is necessary for safety reasons.”Global airspace is divided by ICAO into nine air naviga-tion regions. Airspace is divided further into FIRs. An FIR is an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting service are provided. The nature and scope of air traffic services, which include the flight information service and alerting service, are defined in Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Air Traffic Services. In some cases, FIRs are split vertically into lower and upper sections. The lower section remains referred to as an FIR, but the upper portion is referred to as an upper information region (UIR).Each FIR is managed by a controlling authority that has responsibility for ensuring that air traffic services are provided to the aircraft flying within it. Smaller countries may have one FIR in the airspace above them and larger countries may have several. Airspace over international waters (e.g., the oceans) is typically divided into FIRs that are delegated to controlling authorities within countries that border it.Airspace within an FIR is usually divided into airspace structural elements. The airspace structural elements vary in their function, size and classification. Classifications determine the rules for flying within a part of airspace and whether it is controlled or uncontrolled airspace. Aircraft flying in controlled airspace must follow instructions from air traffic controllers. Air traffic control’s main purpose is preventing collisions between aircraft. Aircraft flying in uncontrolled airspace are not provided with air traffic control services.One airspace structural element, particularly impor-tant for flights overflying a given territory, is an air traffic services (ATS) route.An ATS route is a specified route designed for channel-ling the flow of traffic as necessary for the provision of air traffic services. ATS routes serve a purpose similar to that of roads on the ground. ATS routes are also used to plan the trajectory of flights that are recorded in flight plans.Flight plans are documents filed by a pilot or flight dispatcher prior to departure which indicate the airplane’s planned route or flight path. Flight plan format is speci-fied in ICAO Doc 4444, “Air Traffic Management.” Flight plans, among other things, have to ensure that the planned airplane flight trajectory respects all airspace constraints, including airspace restrictions known at the time the flight plan is filed.5.3.3. Airspace RestrictionsAirspace restrictions can be introduced by sovereign states at different time horizons and different levels of airspace management.Published airspace restrictions, as part of airspace management practices, are normally promulgated through Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs) or through
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35 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE NOTAMs. AIPs are generally used for information of a permanent or lasting nature, as well as for temporary changes of long duration while NOTAMs are used to dis-seminate information of a temporary nature and of short duration or when operationally significant permanent changes, or temporary changes of long duration, are made at short notice.Airspace restriction for a given airspace can be effective-ly introduced by describing the three-dimensional bound-aries of the airspace and specifying the time validity of the restrictions. In the same way, wherever only ATS routes are used for civil aviation flight planning, the restriction of the ATS route segments that pass through a given airspace has the same effect as restricting the airspace volume.Airspace restrictions are a key constraint for flight plan-ning. Aircraft operators or specialised third parties plan the flight trajectory considering the constraints imposed by the airspace restrictions. Flight planning is often performed with the help of specialised software applications that pro-cess the requested flight trajectory though the airspace and other constraints to find an optimal flight trajectory.5.3.4. NOTAMA NOTAM is a notice containing information concerning the establishment, condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely knowl-edge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations. NOTAMs do not include extensive text and/or graphics.NOTAMs are issued by national authorities for a num-ber of reasons, such as:• Hazards such as air shows, parachute jumps and glid-er or micro-light flying;• Flights by important people such as heads of state;• Closed runways, taxiways, etc;• Unserviceable radio navigational aids;• Military exercises with resulting airspace restrictions;• Unserviceable lights on tall obstructions;• Temporary erection of obstacles near airfields (e.g., cranes).For reasons of conciseness and precision, NOTAMs are encoded, although the code is usually sufficiently self-evi-dent to allow the user to identify a hazard.NOTAMs are communicated by the issuing agency us-ing the fastest available means to all addressees for whom the information is assessed as being of direct operational significance, and who would not otherwise have at least seven days’ prior notification.Flight crew access to current NOTAMs during pre-flight planning may be via airport flight briefing facilities provided for all aircraft operators or via an alternative system provided by their company to provide access only to NOTAMS relevant to their intended flight.NOTAMs are published using all upper-case letters. NOTAMs comprise up to eight items, which are identified by letters: Q, A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Individual items are often omitted if unnecessary or inappropriate.The NOTAM first line contains NOTAM identification (series, sequence number and year of issue), the type of operation (NEW, REPLACE, or CANCEL), as well as a reference to a previously issued NOTAM, if relevant.Item Q contains a comprehensive description of infor-mation contained within the NOTAM. It consists of up to eight fields separated by a stroke (/). This information is repeated in the text of the NOTAM. Some authorities do not include Item Q in NOTAMs.The first field of Item Q is the abbreviation of the FIR for which the subject of the information in the NOTAM is located geographically. For example, “UKDV” identifies the Dnipropetrovsk FIR.The second field in Item Q is the NOTAM code. All NOTAM code groups contain a total of five letters and the first letter is always the letter Q. The second and third letters identify the subject, and the fourth and fifth letters denote the status or condition of the subject. For example, QARLC code identifies “subject ATS routes” (“AR”) “closed” (“LC”); QRTCA code identifies “temporary restricted area” (“RT”) “activated” (“CA”); QRAXX identifies “airspace reservation” (“RA”) “in plain language“ (“XX”). Another example of Q code from the studied NOTAMs is QFALT that identifies “aerodromes” (“FA”) “limited to…” (“LT”).The third field in Item Q identifies the subject traffic. For example, “IV” identifies instrument (“I”) and visual (“V”) traffic.The fourth field in Item Q identifies the purpose of the NOTAM. For example, “NBO” identifies: (N), NOTAM selected for the immediate attention of flight crewmem-bers; (B) , NOTAM of operational significance selected for preflight information bulletin entry; and (O), NOTAM concerning flight operations.The fifth field in Item Q identifies the scope of the NO-TAM. For example, “E” identifies en-route scope.The sixth and seventh fields in item Q identify lower and upper limits. The lower and upper limits are only expressed in flight levels (FL) and express the actual vertical limits of the airspace area without the addition of buffers. In the case of navigation warnings and airspace restrictions, values entered shall be consistent with those provided under NOTAM Items F and G. For example, “260/320” identifies lower and upper limits from FL 260 to FL 320. If the subject does not contain specific height information, “000” is used for lower and “999” for upper limits as default values.The eighth field in Item Q identifies the coordinates and/or the radius that defines the subject of the information in
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36 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE the NOTAM. For example, “4820N03716E119” identifies a circle with centre 4820N and 03716E and radius of 119 nm (220 km).Item A is the 4-letter ICAO code for the location — the affected aerodrome or FIR for the NOTAM.Item B is the 10-figure group that indicates the year, month, date and time at which any change to already published information comes into force. Alternatively, the date/time group may be written in plain language.Item C is the 10-figure group giving the year, month, date and time at which the NOTAM ceases to have effect. Item C may be omitted if the information is permanent, or “PERM” (permanent) or “UFN” (until further notice) may be inserted.Item D gives the schedule of dates and times when the NOTAM will be active.Item E describes, in plain language but using simple abbreviations where appropriate, the nature of the event that is the subject of the NOTAM. It is in English but can be abbreviated.Items F and G, when present, indicate the lower and upper limit of activity of navigation warnings or airspace restrictions. If the lower limit is ground level, Item F is usually omitted, but “SFC” (surface) or “GRD” (ground) may be inserted.5.4. Analysis of the NOTAMsThe studied NOTAMs were extracted from the European AIS Database (EAD) archive for the studied period (1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of com-plete closure of the respective airspace subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014). The selected NOTAMs for URRV FIR and UKDV FIR, start from 01 January 2014 to make sure that NOTAMs that had been created earlier and that were still valid after 01 March 2014 are also included in this extraction. The archive facility has limited extraction capabilities as compared to the production system for more recent periods. The initially extracted files included all NOTAMs (i.e., the files were not limited to those involving airspace restrictions above FL 250) because it was not possible to make such a specific extraction from the NOTAM archive. However, the NO-TAM text allowed for more filtering to narrow the search as needed for the scope of the analysis.The search of NOTAMs for the studied period identi-fied 291 NOTAMs for the Dnepropetrovsk UKDV FIR. Of these NOTAMs, 96 concerned airspace restrictions. Airspace restrictions above FL 250 were defined in 39 NOTAMs. Analysis of the geographical coverage of these 39 NOTAMs resulted in the final selection of 15 NOTAMs that were analysed and for which an illustration map was produced.Similarly, the search of NOTAMs for the studied period identified 1019 NOTAMs for the Rostov-on-Don FIR URRV. Of these NOTAMs, 799 concerned airspace re-strictions. Airspace restrictions above FL 250 were defined in 37 NOTAMs. Analysis of the geographical coverage of these 37 NOTAMs resulted in the final selection of two NOTAMs that were analysed and for which an illustration map was produced. The final 15 NOTAMs for UKDV FIR and 2 NOTAMs for URRV FIR are represented in the next sections.5.5. Adopted Format for NOTAM DescriptionThe 17 NOTAMs analysed are further described sepa-rately. Each NOTAM description is provided in a separate subsection of this report that contains the NOTAM con-tent, an illustration map of the restricted airspace elements introduced by the NOTAM (where the illustration is approximate and the maps cannot be used for navigation or other purposes) and the description of the restrictions the NOTAM introduces.The description of the restrictions includes the validi-ty of the NOTAM, the description of the restriction, the description of any exemptions provided (e.g., for state aircraft) and the altitude limits.The restrictions promulgated by the studied NOTAMs are two types — restricting ATS routes or restricting three-dimensional area of airspace. The restricted ATS routes are depicted on the illustration map as lines, and the restricted areas are depicted as polygons.The illustrations of the restrictions of the ATS routes use different colours. These colours do not have any specific significance and are only used to help the reader identify similarity between the different restrictions. For example, the illustrations of the restrictions of NOTAM A0942/14 and NOTAM A0820/14 depict a line in the same colour that illustrate the same restricted ATS route.
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37 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6. Ukraine Airspace Restrictions Timeline5.6.1. NOTAM A0820/14, Issued on 24 April 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A0820/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0400 UTC on 26 April 2014 until 1800 UTC on 08 May 2014.• For a defined segment of ATS route (MASOL-EDU-GO-LUGAT T242).• Closed daily from 0400 UTC until 1800 UTC.• From 3050 m above mean sea level to FL 350 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA0820/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /100/350/4915N03848E056A) UKDV B) 1404260400 C) 1405081800D) DAILY 0400-1800E) SEGMENT ATS ROUTE MASOL-EDUGO-LUGAT T242 CLOSED.FM 3050M AMSL UP TO FL350.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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38 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.2. NOTAM A0942/14, Issued on 05 May 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A0942/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0400 UTC on 12 May 2014 until 1800 UTC on 20 May 2014.• For a defined segment of ATS route (MASOL-EDU-GO-LUGAT T242).• Closed daily from 0400 UTC until 1800 UTC.• From 3050 m above mean sea level to FL 350 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA0942/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /100/350/4915N03848E056A) UKDV B) 1405120400 C) 1405201800D) DAILY 0400-1800E) SEGMENT ATS ROUTE MASOL-EDUGO-LUGAT T242 CLOSED.FM 3050M AMSL UP TO FL350.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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39 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.3. NOTAM A1219/14, Issued on 02 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1219/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1540 UTC on 02 June 2014 until 1700 UTC on 03 June 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (LS-DIMAB A83, TOMKA-NALEM L32, AMPUL-LUGAT M996, LUSIG-GUKOL M996, LS-IRBAT P851, EDUGO-NALEM T242, DW-LUGAT W533, TOROS-BESPI W533, BELOL-LUGAT W633).• Closed.• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1219/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/280/4839N03844E069A) UKDV B) 1406021540 C) 1406031700E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:LS-DIMAB A83TOMKA-NALEM L32AMPUL-LUGAT M996LUSIG-GUKOL M996LS-IRBAT P851EDUGO-NALEM T242DW-LUGAT W533TOROS-BESPI W533BELOL-LUGAT W633FROM SFC TO FL280.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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40 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.4. NOTAM A1229/14, Issued on 03 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1229/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1801 UTC on 03 June 2014 until 1700 UTC on 04 June 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (LS-DIMAB A83, TOMKA-NALEM L32, AMPUL-LUGAT M996, LUSIG-GUKOL M996, LS-IRBAT P851, EDUGO-NALEM T242, DW-LUGAT W533, TOROS-BESPI W533, BELOL-LUGAT W633).• Closed.• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1229/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/280/4839N03844E069A) UKDV B) 1406031801 C) 1406041700E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:LS-DIMAB A83TOMKA-NALEM L32AMPUL-LUGAT M996LUSIG-GUKOL M996LS-IRBAT P851EDUGO-NALEM T242DW-LUGAT W533TOROS-BESPI W533BELOL-LUGAT W633FROM SFC TO FL280.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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41 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.5. NOTAM A1231/14, Issued on 04 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1231/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1200 UTC on 04 June 2014 until 1700 UTC on 04 June 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (LS-DIMAB A83, TOMKA-NALEM L32, LUSIG-GUKOL M996, LS-IRBAT P851, EDUGO-NALEM T242, TOROS-BESPI W533, BELOL-LUGAT W633).• Closed.• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1231/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/280/4839N03844E069A) UKDV B) 1406041200 C) 1406041700E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:LS-DIMAB A83TOMKA-NALEM L32LUSIG-GUKOL M996LS-IRBAT P851EDUGO-NALEM T242TOROS-BESPI W533BELOL-LUGAT W633.FROM SFC TO FL280.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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42 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.6. NOTAM A1234/14, Issued on 04 June 2014Restrictions• The NOTAM A1234/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1600 UTC on 04 June 2014 until 2359 UTC on 05 June 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (IRBAT-SODRA P851, TOMKA-KW L32, INSUM-LUSIG G476).• Closed.• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1234/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/280/4910N03640E064A) UKDV B) 1406041600 C) 1406052359E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:IRBAT-SODRA P851TOMKA-KW L32INSUM-LUSIG G476.FROM SFC TO FL280.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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43 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.7. NOTAM A1236/14, Issued on 04 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1236/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1640 UTC on 04 June 2014 until 2359 UTC on 05 June 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (LS-DIMAB A83, TOMKA-NALEM L32, LUSIG-GUKOL M996, LS-IRBAT P851, EDUGO-NALEM T242, TOROS-BESPI W533, BELOL-LUGAT W633).• Closed.• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1236/14 NOTAMR A1231/14Q) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/280/4839N03844E069A) UKDV B) 1406041640 C) 1406052359E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:LS-DIMAB A83TOMKA-NALEM L32LUSIG-GUKOL M996LS-IRBAT P851EDUGO-NALEM T242TOROS-BESPI W533BELOL-LUGAT W633.FROM SFC TO FL280.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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44 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.8. NOTAM A1255/14, Issued on 05 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1255/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0000 UTC on 06 June 2014 until 2359 UTC on 30 June 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (KHR-GOBUN A137 LS-TP A83, RUBES-FASAD B493 OL-GIN-MASOL G476, KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NA-LEM L32, DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984, DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987, LI-OLGIN M995 KHR-GUKOL M996, LS-LI P851 MASOL-LUGAT T242, PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA W533, LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546, ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624, RUBES-LUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W644).• Closed.• From surface to FL 260 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1255/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/260/4829N03721E114A) UKDV B) 1406060000 C) 1406302359E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:KHR-GOBUN A137 LS-TP A83RUBES-FASAD B493 OLGIN-MASOL G476KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NALEM L32DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987LI-OLGIN M995 KHR-GUKOL M996LS-LI P851 MASOL-LUGAT T242PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA W533LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624RUBES-LUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W644.FROM SFC TO FL260.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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45 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.9. NOTAM A1256/14, Issued on 05 June 2014Restrictions• The NOTAM A1256/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0000 UTC on 06 June 2014 until 2359 UTC on 30 June 2014.• For a defined by geographic coordinates area border-ing Russian Federation.• From surface to FL 260 inclusive.• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.• Civil aircraft need permission to fly in the area from the headquarter of the armed forces of Ukraine not less than one day before the flight.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1256/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QRAXX/IV/NBO/W /000/260/4833N03731E111A) UKDV B) 1406060000 C) 1406302359E) TEMPORARY RESERVED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES:501900N 0364942E 490600N 0365000E 481520N 0360510E475542N 0355136E 472200N 0363900E 465400N 0370500E464700N 0373000E 465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324ETHEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT501900N 0364942E.AUTHORIZED FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.FOR FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT NEED HAVE PERMISSION HEADQUARTERS OF ARMED FORCES UKRAINE NOT LESS ONE DAY BEFORE FLIGHT.F) SFC G) FL260)Note: The Illustration is approximate
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46 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.10. NOTAM A1383/14, Issued on 26 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1383/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0000 UTC on 01 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 28 July 2014.• For a defined by geographic coordinates area border-ing Russian Federation.• From surface to FL 260 inclusive.• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.• Civil aircraft need permission to fly in the area from the headquarters of the armed forces of Ukraine not less than one day before the flight.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1383/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QRAXX/IV/NBO/W /000/260/4833N03731E111A) UKDV B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359E) TEMPORARY RESERVED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES:501900N 0364942E 490600N 0365000E 481520N 0360510E475542N 0355136E 472200N 0363900E 465400N 0370500E464700N 0373000E 465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324ETHEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT501900N 0364942E.AUTHORIZED FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.FOR FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT NEED HAVE PERMISSIONHEADQUARTERS OF ARMED FORCES UKRAINE NOT LESSONE DAY BEFORE FLIGHT.F) SFC G) FL260Note: The Illustration is approximate
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47 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.11. NOTAM A1384/14, Issued on 26 June 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1384/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0000 UTC on 01 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 28 July 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (KHR-GOBUN A137 LS-TP A83, RUBES-FASAD B493 OL-GIN-MASOL G476, KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NA-LEM L32, DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984, DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987, LI-OLGIN M995 KHR-GUKOL M996, LS-LI P851 MASOL-LUGAT T242, PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA W533, LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546, ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624, RUBES-LUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W6440).• Closed.• From surface to FL 260 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1384/14 NOTAMNQ) UKXX/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /000/260/4829N03721E114A) UKDV UKFV B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:KHR-GOBUN A137 LS-TP A83RUBES-FASAD B493 OLGIN-MASOL G476KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NALEM L32DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987LI-OLGIN M995 KHR-GUKOL M996LS-LI P851 MASOL-LUGAT T242PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA W533LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624RUBES-LUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W644.FROM SFC TO FL260.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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48 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.12. NOTAM A1492/14, Issued on 14 July 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1492 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1800 UTC on 14 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 14 August 2014 (estimated duration).• For a defined by geographic coordinates area border-ing Russian Federation.• From FL 260 to FL 320 inclusive.• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1492/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /260/320/4822N03807E095A) UKDV B) 1407141800 C) 1408142359ESTE) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR DNIPROPETROVSKBOUNDED BY COORDINATES:495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N 0370253E471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E 465900N 0382000E470642N 0381324E THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARYUNTIL POINT 495355N 0380155E.RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.F) FL260 G) FL320Note: The Illustration is approximate
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49 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.13. NOTAM A1493/14, Issued on 14 July 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1493/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1800 UTC on 14 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 14 August 2014.• For defined segments of ATS routes (T242 NALEM MASOL M996 ABUGA GUKOL, G476 MASOL OL-GIN W533 TOROS KUBIR, L32 NALEM KW P851 LS NESLO, A83 LS DIMAB L980 GANRA TAMAK, W538 GANRA FASAD W633 LUGAT MAKAK, L69 LAMIV GONED W644 DON GETBO, M70 BULIG TAMAK B493 PODOL FASAD, L984 BULIG FAS-AD W531 KOVIL PW, M136 MEBAM DON M995 OLGIN PENAK, L140 KOVIL FASAD).• Closed.• From FL 260 to FL 320 inclusive.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1493/14 NOTAMNQ) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E /260/320/4820N03716E119A) UKDV B) 1407141800 C) 1408142359ESTE) SEGMENTS OF ATS ROUTES CLOSED:T242 NALEM MASOL M996 ABUGA GUKOLG476 MASOL OLGIN W533 TOROS KUBIRL32 NALEM KW P851 LS NESLOA83 LS DIMAB L980 GANRA TAMAKW538 GANRA FASAD W633 LUGAT MAKAKL69 LAMIV GONED W644 DON GETBOM70 BULIG TAMAK B493 PODOL FASADL984 BULIG FASAD W531 KOVIL PWM136 MEBAM DON M995 OLGIN PENAKL140 KOVIL FASAD.FM FL260 UP TO FL320.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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50 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.14. NOTAM A1507/14, Issued on 17 July 2014 after the Downing of Flight MH17RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1507/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 1500 UTC on 17 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 17 August 2014.• For a defined by geographic coordinates area border-ing Russian Federation.• Closed.• From FL 320 to unlimited.• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1507/14 NOTAMQ) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /320/660/4822N03807E095 A) UKDVB) 1407171500 C) 1408172359ESTE) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR DNIPROPETROVSK BOUNDED BY COORDINATES :495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N 0370253E 471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E 465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324E THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495355N 0380155E.RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.F) FL320 G) UNLNote: The Illustration is approximate
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51 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.6.15. NOTAM A1517/14, Issued on 17 July 2014 after the Downing of Flight MH17RestrictionsThe NOTAM A1517/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0005 UTC on 18 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 17 August 2014.• For a defined by geographic coordinates area border-ing Russian Federation.• Closed.• From surface to unlimited.NOTAM content and illustration mapA1517/14 NOTAMQ) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/660/4801N03731E117A) UKDV UKFVB) 1407180005 C) 1408172359E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 495428N 0380202E 490600N 0365000E 481520N 0360510E 475542N 0355136E 460809N 0370518E 464700N 0373000E 465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324ETHEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495428N 0380202E CLOSED.F) SFC G) UNLNote: The Illustration is approximate
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52 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.7. Russian Federation Airspace Restrictions Timeline5.7.1. NOTAM V6158/14, Issued on 17 July 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM V6158/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0000 UTC on 17 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 31 August 2014.• Reason provided was “due to combat actions on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Rus-sian Federation, to ensure international flight ATS routes closed as follows: –A100 MIMRA - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), B145 KANON - ASMIL, G247 MIMRA - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA), A87 TAMAK - SARNA, A102 PENEG - NALEM, A225 GUKOL - ODETA, A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB), B493 FASAD - ROS-TOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), B947 TAMAK - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), G118 LATRI - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA), G534 MIMRA - TOROS, G904 FASAD - SUTAG, R114 BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA)-NA-LEM — from surface to FL320. –Departures from/arrivals to Rostov-on-Don arrivals departures to/from Moscow FIR carried out along ATS route G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI — on assigned FL. –Departures from Rostov-on-Don arrival depar-tures to Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along ATS route A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM on FL340 and above. –Arrivals to Rostov-on-Don arrivals departures from Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along ATS route 712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) then NOTAM content and illustration mapV6158/14 NOTAMNQ)URRV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E/000/530/4818N04023E095A) URRV B) 1407170000 C) 1408312359ESTE) DUE TO COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE NEAR THE STATE BORDER WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FACTS OF FIRING FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE TOWARDS THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TO ENSURE INTL FLT SAFETY, ATS RTE SEGMENTS CLSD AS FLW:A100 MIMRA - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), B145 KANON - ASMIL, G247 MIMRA - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA), A87 TAMAK - SARNA, A102 PENEG - NALEM, A225 GUKOL - ODETA, A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB), B493 FASAD - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), B947 TAMAK - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), G118 LATRI - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA), G534 MIMRA - TOROS, G904 FASAD - SUTAG, R114 BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA)-NALEM.SFC - FL320.DEP FM/ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO/FM MOSCOW FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI ON ASSIGNED FL.DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNEPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND ABOVE.ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNEPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) ON FL330 AND ABOVE.F)SFC G)FL530)Note: The Illustration is approximate
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53 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE direct to THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) on FL330 and above.• From surface to FL 530.Items F and G as well as the information in the sixth and seventh fields in item Q identify lower and upper limits as surface and FL 530. This, in fact, means total closure of the airspace. Item E, which describes the nature of the restriction, in fact describes four different restrictions and specifies different altitude limits for each of them. Specif-ically, for the restrictions affecting ATS routes that are in the area bordering Ukraine, the first part of item E defines surface to FL 320 as height limits.As provided in reference [3] about the information in items F and G:“These items are normally applicable to navigation warn-ings or airspace restrictions and are usually part of the PIB entry.”It is to be noted that reference [3] was published in 2018 and prior to that, the referred provisions were not with the status of “procedures.” For example, reference [4], pub-lished in 2003, provides:“Items F) and G). These items are normally applicable to navigation warnings or airspace restrictions, but can be used for any other applicable subjects, and are usually part of the PIB entry.”
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54 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.7.2. NOTAM A2681/14, Issued on 16 July 2014RestrictionsThe NOTAM A2681/14 introduced restrictions:• Valid from 0000 UTC on 17 July 2014 until 2359 UTC on 31 August 2014.• Reason provided was “due to combat actions on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Rus-sian Federation, to ensure international flight safety departures from/arrivals to Rostov-na-Donu.”• For arrivals and departures to/from Moscow FIR that are carried out along the ATS routes: –G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI - Restricted on assigned FL. –Departures from Rostov-on-Dan arrivals and departures to Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along ATS route A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) — NALEM — on FL340 and above. –Arrivals to Rostov-on-Dan arrivals and depar-tures from Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along ATS route A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) then direct to KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) — on FL 330 and above.NOTAM content and illustration mapA2681/14 NOTAMNQ) URRV/QFALT/IV/NBO/A /000/999/4716N03949E005A) URRR B) 1407170000 C) 1408312359ESTE) DUE TO COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE NEAR THE STATE BORDER WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FACTS OF FIRING FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE TOWARDS THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TO ENSURE INTL FLT SAFETY DEP FM/ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO/FM MOSCOW FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE:G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI ON ASSIGNED FL.DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNEPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND ABOVE.ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNEPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB(KA) ON FL330 AND ABOVE.Note: The Illustration is approximate
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55 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE 5.8. Summary of the Airspace Restriction Timeline Prior to the Downing of Flight MH17This section describes the timeline of 13 selected NO-TAMs for UKDV FIR and two NOTAMs for URRV FIR that were issued prior to the downing of Flight MH17. Each NOTAM was described separately previously in this report but, in Table 5 below, we provide an overall sum-mary of the timeline. There are two NOTAMs for UKDV FIR that are included in the individual descriptions of NOTAMs previously in this report, but which are not in-cluded here because they were issued after the downing of Flight MH17 and have no relevance to its trajectory. Those two NOTAMs promulgated closure of the airspace.Each of the selected NOTAMs is described with the date on which it was issued, its identification number, period of validity, reference to the restriction it imposes and the up-per and lower limits of the restriction. Additionally, in the table, there are three more descriptors for each NOTAM — concerning the overlap of the Flight MH17 trajectory with the NOTAM restriction. The horizontal overlap descriptor whether the Flight MH17 trajectory passed through the geographical region of the restriction, without considering the altitude or the time of the restriction. For example, NOTAM A1256/14 close an area that overlaps with the Flight MH17 planned trajectory and because of that, the horizontal overlap descriptor is “yes.” Similarly, the altitude and time overlap descriptors specify whether the altitude and time validity of the restriction concern the Flight MH17 trajectory. In the case of NOTAM A1256/14, the restricted airspace upper limit is FL 260 and the time Table 5NOTAM Restrictions TimelineDate NOTAMValid fromValid untilRestrictionLower limitUpper limitOverlap with MH17 trajectoryHorizontalAltitudeTime24-April-14A0820/14Ukraine04:00 UTC 26-April-1418:00 UTC 08 May 2014Segment of ATS route closed daily 04:00-18:00 UTC3,050 meters above mean sea levelFL 350NoNoNo05-May-14A0942/14 Ukraine04:00 UTC 12-May-1418:00 UTC 20-May-14Segment of ATS route closed daily 04:00-18:00 UTC3,050 meters above mean sea levelFL 350NoNoNo02-June-14A1219/14 Ukraine15:40 UTC 02-June-1417:00 UTC 03-June14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 280NoNoNo03-June-14A1229/14 Ukraine18:01 UTC 03-June-1417:00 UTC 04June-14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 280NoNoNo04-June-14A1231/14 Ukraine18:01 UTC 03-June-1417:00 UTC 04-June-14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 280NoNoNo04-June-14A1234/14 Ukraine16:00 UTC 04-June-1423:59 UTC 05-June-14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 280NoNoNo04-June-14A1236/14 Ukraine16:40 UTC 04-June-1423:59 UTC 05-June-14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 280NoNoNo05-June-14A1255/14 Ukraine00:00 UTC 06-June-1423:59 UTC 30-June-14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 260No NoNo05-June-14A1256/14 Ukraine00:00 UTC 06-June-1423:59 UTC 30-June-14Area closedSurfaceFL 260YesNoNo26-June-14A1383/14 Ukraine00:00 UTC 01-July-1423:59 UTC 28-July-14Area closedSurfaceFL 260YesNoYes26-June-14A1384/14 Ukraine00:00 UTC 01-July-1423:59 UTC 28-July-14Segment of ATS route closedSurfaceFL 260NoNoYes14-July-14A1492/14 Ukraine18:00 UTC 14-July-1423:59 UTC 14-Aug-14Area closedFL 260FL 320YesNoYes14-July-14A1492/14 Ukraine18:00 UTC 14-July-1423:59 UTC 14-Aug-14Segment of ATS route closedFL 260FL 320YesNoYes16-July-14V6158/14 Russia00:00 UTC 17-July-1423:59 UTC 3-Aug-14Segment of ATS route closedn/kn/kYesn/kYes16-July-14A2681/14 Russia00:00 UTC 17-July-1423:59 UTC 3-Aug-14Segment of ATS route closedFL 330/340-NoYes YesATS = air traffic services; FL = flight level; n/k = not known; NOTAM = notice to airmen; UTC = coordinated universal time
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56 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE of the validity of the restriction is before the downing of Flight MH17; because of that, the altitude and time over-lap descriptors are “no.”The last two rows in the table provide a description of the two selected NOTAMs issued by the Russian Fed-eration. In the case of these two NOTAMs, the overlap of the NOTAM restriction is assessed against what Flight MH17’s trajectory would have been if the aircraft was not downed. In other words, it is an assessment of the extrapolated trajectory on the basis of the flight plan.In the table, for NOTAM V6158/14 the lower and upper limits of the restriction validity it is noted “n/k” — signi-fying “not known.” This is because, as explained further in the detailed description of this NOTAM, there are internal contradictions about its altitude limits.Of particular interest for the purpose of this inquiry are the airspace restrictions prior to the downing of Flight MH17 for which there was a horizontal overlap of their boundaries with either the trajectory of Flight MH17 or its extrapolated trajectory. In fact, these are restrictions for the geographical area where Flight MH17 was downed. The following is a summary of these restrictions.On 5 June 2014, NOTAM A1256/14, issued by Ukraine, promulgated airspace restrictions to civil aviation in the airspace area above the eastern part of Ukraine from the ground up to 26,000 ft (FL 260). The restrictions were valid from 0000 UTC on 06 June. At the same time, NO-TAM A1255/14 promulgated airspace restrictions for ATS route segments in the same part of Ukraine, valid from the same time and to the same altitude as the area restriction. As reported by reference [2]: “This enabled military aer-oplanes to fly at an altitude that was considered safe from attacks from the ground and eliminated the risk that they would encounter civil aeroplanes, which flew above FL 260. The authorities automatically assumed that aeroplanes fly-ing at a higher altitude than that considered safe for military aeroplanes, were also safe.”On 26 June 2014, NOTAMs A1383/14 and A1383/14, is-sued by Ukraine, extended the time validity of the airspace restrictions of NOTAMs A1256/14 and A1255/14 from 1 July until and including 28 July 2014.On 14 July 2014, NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14, issued by Ukraine and valid from 18:00 UTC 14-July in-creased the upper limit of the restricted airspace imposed on civil aviation to 32,000 ft (FL320). In comparison with NOTAM A1255/14 that was issued on 5 June, NOTAM A1493/14 introduced airspace restrictions above a smaller area (covering the same part in the east part of Ukraine, bordering the Russian Federation but less area to the west). Similarly, in comparison with NOTAM A1256/14, NOTAMs A1492/14 introduced restrictions to more ATS route segments. As reported by reference [2]: “The exact underlying reason for this decision remains unclear.”On 16 July 2014, NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/A, issued by the Russian Federation, promulgated airspace restrictions to civil aviation in the Rostov-on-Don FIR airspace area that borders the Dnipropetrovsk FIR area in the eastern part of Ukraine. The restrictions were valid from 0000 UTC on 17 July. Both NOTAMs refer to the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine as the reason for their issue: “Due to combat actions on the territory of the Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federa-tion and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of the Russian Federation, to ensure intl flt safety [international flight safety].”However, in NOTAM V6158/14, there are some contra-dictions about the lower and upper limits of the restriction. Items F and G, as well as the information in the sixth and seventh fields in item Q, identify lower and upper limits as surface and FL 530. This, in fact, means total closure of the airspace. Item E, which describes the nature of the restric-tion, outlines four different restrictions and specifies dif-ferent altitude limits for each of them. For the restrictions affecting ATS routes that are in the area bordering Ukraine, the altitude limits provided in item E of the NOTAM are the same as the altitude limits of NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 issued by Ukrainian authorities — FL 320.The contradiction in the altitude limits of NOTAM V6158/14 was apparently not identified or not identified as critical during the flight planning of the Flight MH17 trajectory when the software analysed the trajectory against the airspace constraints. It is to be noted, as reported in reference [2], that not only Malaysia Airlines, but almost all airlines, including airlines domiciled in the Russian Federation, that used routes over the conflict zone continued to do so during the period in which the armed conflict was expanding into the airspace, and the contra-diction in the altitude limits of NOTAM V6158/14 was immaterial in their flight route planning.In summary:• Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation issued restrictions on the airspace above and around eastern Ukraine, but neither state completely closed their airspace above or near the conflict zone at that time. The situation at the time involved several airspace restrictions, introduced by both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, of airspace above and around eastern Ukraine. The airspace in question was first restricted up to FL 260 and subsequently, but before the downing of Flight MH17, up to FL 320.• In the NOTAMs in which Ukraine placed a partial restriction on airspace in the Dnepropetrovsk FIR, it did not provide any reasons for the restriction nor any reference to incidents involving military aircraft in the airspace.
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57 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH175 | AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS OVER AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE • The DSB report on the crash of Flight MH17 pro-vides information about the reasons the Ukrainian authorities restricted the airspace up to FL 260 prom-ulgated with NOTAMs A1255/14 and A1256/14 issued on 05 June 2014. The provided reasons were not related to the security risk from attacks from the ground to civil aircraft overflying the area. The airspace was restricted to enable military aeroplanes to fly at an altitude that was considered safe from at-tacks from the ground and to eliminate the risk that they would encounter civil aeroplanes, which flew above FL 260, according to the DSB report.• The reasons the Ukrainian authorities increased the upper limit of the restricted airspace to 32,000 ft (FL 320) were not provided in the respective NOTAMs (A1492/14 and A1493/14). The DSB report provided that increasing the upper limit of the restricted airspace “was intended to increase the altitude buffer between military and civil aircraft.”• The Russian Federation, on the other hand, cited in-ternational flight safety as a reason when it closed its affected ATS routes up to FL 320. In two NOTAMs (V6158/14, A2681/14) published on 16 July 2014, the Russian Federation said that to ensure international flight safety, it was closing the ATS routes “due to combat actions on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Russian Federation.”• Prior to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, the two referenced Russian Federation NO-TAMs were the only identified, specific warnings related to the security of civil aviation in the Dnepro-petrovsk and Rostov-on-Don FIRs.
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58 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESS6. Collecting and Analysing Information About Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat Awareness6.1. Information Collection FrameworkIn order to discuss the airspace closure decisions made by authorities in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the Foundation looked for information about the relevant authorities’ threat awareness for the referenced airspace that was not restricted.The threat information is of different types. In respect to capability to attack, the threat information can be about what authorities said they knew about the weapons that could pose a potential threat to civil aviation above FL 320. Or it can consist of information about the weap-ons that appeared in the public space (such as on social media) without indications of whether relevant authorities knew about it. The source of information can be tradition-al and/or social media or it can be private information from intelligence services. These different types of information imply different degrees of confidence about authority awareness or the veracity of the information. For these reasons, the threat information is categorised conceptually in Figure 18 as follows:• Foresight knowledge of threat information: quadrant 1. This is information that was known prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about the presence of weapons.• Hindsight knowledge of threat information: quadrant 2. This is information that was made known after the downing of Flight MH17 about the presence of weapons. In general, this type of information gives less confi-dence about potential threat awareness of relevant authorities because it is information about what has been seen, heard or otherwise discovered, but, in this case, it was made known only after the downing of Flight MH17.• Foresight knowledge of authorities’ awareness: quadrant 3. This is information that was known prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about what the relevant authorities knew about the presence of weapons. In general, this type of information gives the most confidence about potential threat awareness be-cause it is mainly self-reporting by relevant authori-ties about their knowledge prior to the downing of Flight MH17 — and therefore clear of any hindsight bias.• Hindsight public knowledge of authorities’ awareness: quadrant 4. This is information that was made known after the downing of Flight MH17 about what the relevant authorities knew before the downing of Flight MH17 about the presence of weapons.With the above-described four types of information, the Foundation looked at two main sources of information:• Publicly available information from primarily online media, including Ukrainian and Russian news services and other news aggregation sites, internationally available aviation trade media, government announce-ments and news releases; and information available on social media, including Twitter and Facebook.• The responses from Ukraine and the Russian Federa-tion to the standard procedure and threat knowledge Figure 18Information Collection FrameworkInformation published (made available) prior to Flight MH17 downingWhat did the responsible State (authorities) know before Flight MH17 downing about the presence of air defense equipmentHindsight knowledge of authorities awarenessInformation published (made available) after Flight MH17 downingForesight knowledge of threat informationHindsight knowledge of threat informationInformation about presence of air defense equipement prior to Flight MH17 downingForesight knowledge of authorities awareness1234
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59 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSquestionnaires that were specifically developed for this inquiry and to the subsequent responses to some clarifying questions. The Russian Federation and the Ukrainian governments were approached with and responded to the information collection template containing the questionnaires. Following the analysis of the information received, the Foundation con-cluded that there were a number of questions that remained open and formulated and received answers to some additional clarifying questions.6.2. Public Information Collection and Analysis6.2.1. Objective, Process and StructureThe objective of this part of the study was to perform an inquiry to establish an overview of what information was publicly available in Ukraine and the Russian Federation — prior to the moment of the downing of Flight MH17 — about the presence of air defence equipment that had a reach beyond that part of the airspace (above FL 320) that was closed to civil aviation and which therefore could pose a threat to civil aviation. That would mean that, because of the partial closure of the airspace by Ukraine, MANPADS were no longer a threat to civil airliners transiting the airspace, apart from the hypothetical case of an emergency landing.To perform this inquiry, the Foundation analysed information available primarily in online media, includ-ing Ukrainian and Russian news services and other news aggregation sites, internationally available aviation trade media, government announcements and news releases, as well as information available on social media, includ-ing Twitter and Facebook. Where it was determined that certain articles or social media posts were duplicated or published by multiple outlets, efforts were made to access the article/post via the original media in which they were published.Information that was not available in English was trans-lated using Google Translate.The timeframe for the analysis was early June 2014 until the moments just before the downing of Flight MH17. Post-Flight MH17 investigative media reports and post-event aggregations of social media posts made in the days before the downing of Flight MH17 also were reviewed to get a comprehensive picture of what was known publicly before the event. The analysis was conducted as objective-ly as possible and with an awareness that hindsight bias could impact the results of this analysis, or of the results of the post-event reporting and inquiries.The Foundation conducted a review of what was public-ly known in Ukraine and the Russian Federation about the threat to aircraft flying above FL 250. We first examined what information was in the public space about the con-flict and then what information was in the public space about the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that had a capability to attack beyond that part of the airspace that was closed to civil aviation. Factual information gathering efforts focused specifically on the UKDV Dnipropetrovsk FIR, which covers the airspace in eastern Ukraine.For the purposes of this study, the information collect-ed about what was publicly known in Ukraine and the Russian Federation about the threat to aircraft is systemat-ically covering the four threat information categories from Figure 18.6.2.2. Sources of InformationBefore the downing of Flight MH17, information about the conflict in eastern Ukraine was widely available publicly, both in traditional media outlets and on social media platforms. Military and diplomatic developments and the situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine were written about extensively in the international media as well as by national news services/websites in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Articles, videos, photographs and other imagery appeared regularly in news outlets includ-ing the Guardian, Al Jazeera, Reuters, New York Times, BBC, Washington Post, TASS, Interfax News Agency, UN-IREX, 62.ua, Kyiv Post and Financial Times. Articles and other information also were published on nontraditional, news- and information-oriented media platforms, such as Mashable and Buzzfeed. Information, videos and photos related to the conflict in eastern Ukraine also were posted in social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook.Aviation media, referred to as trade media, also pub-lished numerous articles about the conflict and its impact. Trade media focuses its coverage on specific industries and usually is consumed by people and organizations within the industry covered (in this case airlines, avia-tion and transportation regulators, air navigation service providers [ANSPs], aviation-related organizations such as ICAO and the International Air Transport Association [IATA], and by other aviation stakeholders) as well as by general media organisations looking for deeper insight into aviation issues and/or material for articles. Trade me-dia outlets that published eastern Ukraine-related articles during the period under review included FlightGlobal, Aviation International News and Aviation Week.6.2.3. Findings and Analysis: Publicly Available Conflict InformationThe situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine in the weeks prior to 17 July was one of escalating military conflict that made attacks on military aviation likely and posed at least a nominal threat to local civil aviation. On 20 June 2014, the online Kyiv Post published an Inter-fax-Ukraine article under the headline “Aviation Service revokes certificate from three airports in eastern Ukraine
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60 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSuntil situation stabilizes.”22 Interfax-Ukraine, a subsidiary of the Moscow-based Interfax News Agency, reported that the authority said the airports, which it did not identify, were closed by relevant NOTAM.The brief article also reported the following: “At the same time, the airspace above Donbas is open. The service said that UkSATSE [Ukraine State Air Traffic Services Enterprise] fully ensures the safety of air traffic over the territory. There are restrictions on movement of aircraft in the border area of 100 km– flights at altitudes below 7,900 meters are banned.”At the beginning of July, a reported 10-day truce in the region was ended, likely increasing tensions and military action in the area. In an editor’s note on 2 July 2014, the Kyiv Post said that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshen-ko had resumed, on 1 July, a military offensive against the armed non-state forces in eastern Ukraine, ending a 10-day declared truce that Ukrainian authorities said was violated more than 100 times by the irregular forces, who killed 27 Ukrainian troops.Separately, Voice of America (VOA) reported on 7 July that Poroshenko had refused to extend what it described as a “unilateral cease-fire” and ordered troops to advance.23 The Kyiv Post, VOA and other media outlets reported that Ukrainian forces were making progress in attempts to regain control of the region.Airstrikes were a significant element of Ukraine’s military effort against the armed non-state forces. For example, on 13 July, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (RNBO) said in a briefing that the “active phase” of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine was in process and that the day before the air force had made five airstrikes against the opposition. According to RNBO spokesman Andriy Lysenko, “The first airstrike was directed at a terrorist stronghold near Ly-sychansk. Several dozens of militants were struck, as well as their equipment. The second airstrike was fired at a militant base near Holmovskyi, Horlivskyiraion. Up to 30 terrorists, 2 ‘Grad’ systems, 2 anti-aircraft installations and 6 military machines were destroyed. The third airstrike was fired at a concentration of militants near Rovenky; up to 10 terror-ists were killed, a ‘Grad’ system was destroyed and several military machines taken out of order. The fourth strike was aimed at a militant base near Torez. Data on the amount of casualties is being ascertained. The fifth airstrike was 22 https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2014/RNBO_map_21_07_eng.jpg23 https://www.voanews.com/europe/retreating-ukraine-rebels-dig-donetsk24 http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/15/nsc-news-analysis-center-briefing-at-12-00-july-13-2014/?lang=en25 Aviation Week and Space Technology, p. 27, 23 June 2014.26 https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/29/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html27 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine.html?28 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/heavy-fighting-in-eastern-ukraine-as-government-restarts-active-phase-of-anti-terror-operation-350453.htmlperformed near the barrow of Savur-mohyla, near Donetsk. A stronghold with a group of terrorists, armored vehicles, munitions and weapons was struck. Data on the amount of their casualties is being ascertained.”24At the same time, the armed non-state forces made clear through their statements and actions the intent to target Ukrainian military aircraft. Multiple Ukrainian military aircraft flying in eastern Ukraine were shot down by armed non-state forces and these events were widely reported. Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reported in its 23 June 2014 issue that the Ukraine military had lost a mix of 10 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft since early May 2014.25The weapons used against the Ukrainian aircraft were variously reported to be rockets, rocket-propelled gre-nades, anti-aircraft weapons, a large calibre machine gun, shoulder-fired missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. It is unclear to the Foundation researchers whether references to surface-to-air missiles refer to SAM systems, to the smaller MANPADS, or a combination of the two. Report-ed events reviewed included the following:• On 29 May 2014, CNN.com reported that acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov told the country’s parliament that a Ukrainian military helicopter had been shot down near Slovyansk with a rocket-propelled grenade, that at least 14 people were killed and that armed non-state forces claimed responsibility.26• In a mid-June article that referenced the reported downing of Ukrainian military helicopters, the New York Times said that the armed non-state forces first said they used rocket-propelled grenades “but later admitting to possessing guided missiles.”27• On 3 June 2014, the Kyiv Post published a report from Russia’s Interfax News Agency that the self-pro-claimed “people’s mayor” of Sloviansk said that armed non-state forces there had shot down a Ukrainian military Su-25, which is a single seat, twin engine jet aircraft used for close air support, and a helicopter.28• On 14 June 2014, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence released a statement that on the night of 13‒14 June, armed non-state forces fired an anti-aircraft weapon and large calibre machine gun at an Air Force IL-76
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61 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESStransport aircraft landing at Luhansk airport.29 The Kyiv Post reported on 14 June that 49 servicemen were killed in the attack. It also reported that Ukrain-ian Foreign Minister Andriy Deshchysia wrote on Twitter that the plane had been hit by a rocket.30 In its reporting on the attack, The New York Times said that the aircraft had been brought down by a “shoul-der-fired missile,” but quoted the military wing of the Ukrainian prosecutor general’s office as saying the IL-76 was brought down with an “antiaircraft rocket system.”31 The New York Times also reported that “[s]eparatists from the self-declared People’s Republic of Luhansk confirmed that they had shot down the jet and said that all military airplanes in the area, which is near the border with Russia, were targets.”• On 24 June, a Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopter was shot down outside the “rebel-held” city of Solviansk when it was hit be a rocket shortly after takeoff, accord-ing to BBC and other reports. 32 In its reporting, the Kyiv Post said the helicopter had been brought down by armed non-state forces “using surface-to-air-missiles.”33 According to the report, it was the third Ukrainian MI-8 to have been shot down since mid-April.• On 12 July, Interfax-Ukraine reported that the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic claimed to have shot down a Ukrainian Su-25, but the Ukrainian government denied the report.34For the purposes of this study, the most significant of the pre-Flight MH17 attacks on Ukraine’s military aircraft occurred on 14 July, when a twin-turboprop An-26 mil-itary transport was shot down near Luhansk. In a state-ment available on its website, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence said the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 6,500 m (21,327 ft), that its defeat by a MANPADS was impossi-ble, and that the aircraft “was shot down by another, more powerful missile weapon, which was probably used from the Russian Federation.” (Google Translate)35The RNBO said in a 14 July briefing: “The airplane was apparently flying at 6,500 meters, a height at which no 29 https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/06/14/vijskovo-transportnij-litak-povitryanih-sil-zbrojnih-sil-ukraini-il-76/30 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/ukraines-politicians-and-foreign-diplomats-react-emotionally-to-the-bloodiest-day-in-war-against-separatism-351848.html31 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=032 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-2800299333 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/toll-rises-to-174-killed-with-deaths-of-23-servicemen-from-june-19-24-353645.html34 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/donetsk-separatists-say-they-shot-down-ukrainian-military-plane-kyiv-denies-claim-355767.html35 https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/07/14/chleni-ekipazhu-litaka-povitryanih-sil-zs-ukraini-an-26-vijshli-na-zvyazok-z-generalnim-shtabom/36 http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/15/nsc-news-analysis-center-briefing-at-17-00-july-14-2014/?lang=en37 https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/07/14/fierce-fighting-near-rebel-held-city-in-ukraine38 http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/15/nsc-news-analysis-center-briefing-at-17-00-july-15-2014/?lang=en39 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukrainian-air-force-flights-in-anti-terrorist-operation-area-resumed-356248.htmlportable Zenit rocket launcher that is available to the terror-ists today could have hit the craft. That is, the AN-26 was hit from a more powerful weapon that was used most likely from inside Russian Federation territory. Based on available data provided by the Ukrainian pilots, two versions are pos-sible: the shot came from a modern ground-to-air Pantsyr [Armor] gun or from a homing rocket of the X-24 air-to-air class from a Russian aircraft that could have taken off from Milierovo Airport.”36However, a London-based defence analyst said in an Associated Press report on the An-26 downing that the aircraft likely was not flying at 6,500 meters, but a lower altitude, and that the An-26 probably was shot down by a MANPADS.37In the “Review report arising from the crash of flight MH17” the Dutch Review Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services reported that, “According to the MIVD, the wreckage and the eyewitnesses supported the fact that the aircraft was shot out of the air by a MAN-PADS from Ukrainian territory. This would only have been possible if the Antonov were flying substantially lower than 6,200 or 6,500 metres. Another possibility was that a short-range, vehicle- borne anti-aircraft system had been used. The MIVD’s information does indicate the use of a powerful anti-aircraft system.” This report is published in the appendices of the Dutch Safety Board Flight MH17 investigation report.On 15 July, the RNBO said in a briefing that the com-mission set up to determine why the AN-26 crashed had completed its investigation and would report the results separately. Significantly, during the same briefing, the RNBO said that because of the investigation, ATO flights were being temporarily halted.38 The flights were resumed shortly thereafter.39The Foundation found no information in the public space that would indicate intent to attack civilian aircraft.6.2.4. Statements from Ukraine and the Russian FederationAs the situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine inten-sified in the weeks before the downing of Flight MH17, the governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation
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62 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSmade frequent statements, often blaming each other for the ongoing conflict.The Ukraine government regularly released information about the conflict, such as which units were involved in combat and where, what progress was made against the armed non-state forces, the number of combat casualties among Ukraine’s military and police forces, and some-times names and photos of the dead and wounded. It also alleged that Russian weapons and other equipment was moving from the Russian Federation into eastern Ukraine.On 9 July, Interfax-Ukraine reported (as published in the Kyiv Post) RNBO spokesman Andriy Lysenko saying Ukraine had “unquestionable evidence” that Russia was supporting illegal armed formations.40 “In particular, yes-terday during a press conference in Donetsk, the leaders of the militants confirmed that they receive armoured vehicles, artillery systems, antitank, anti-aircraft and small arms from Russia. We have reported this many times. Now the militants themselves have openly admitted it,” he said at a briefing in Kyiv. On the same day, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence said that armed non-state forces tried to deploy two BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers to attack ATO force positions.On 11 July, six days before the downing of Flight MH17, the RNBO released a map on its website that showed “the situation in the Eastern regions of Ukraine.”41 The map purported to represent the situation on the ground in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, with areas controlled by the government and areas under the control of armed non-state forces delineated. Also marked were airports, sites of battles and the general location of armed non-state forces. (An updated map released on 21 July 2014 showed the Flight MH17 crash site located within a section of the Donetsk Oblast that was under the control of armed non-state forces.42)Ukraine also made a number of public statements about capturing weapons and munitions used by, or intended for use by, armed non-state forces operating in the region. On 11 July, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry said the ATO forces seized four armoured vehicles, three tanks, three Grad multiple rocket launchers and mortars, an IMR com-bat engineering vehicle, 31 MANPADS, 26 anti-tank guid-ed missiles (ATGMs), 101 small arms and nearly 300,000 40 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/lysenko-security-council-has-more-evidence-of-russias-sponsoring-mili-tants-355334.html41 https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2014/RNBO_map_11_07_eng.jpg42 https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2014/RNBO_map_21_07_eng.jpg43 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/defense-ministry-ukrainian-forces-seize-large-amount-of-militants-arms-in-do-netsk-region-355624.html44 https://www.unian.ua/politics/939080-kolona-zi-100-odinits-tehniki-vnochi-namagalasya-prorvatis-v-ukrajinu-z-rosiji-rnbo.html45 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/situation-in-luhansk-and-donetsk-regions-remains-volatile-osce-356153.html46 https://zik.ua/en/news/2014/07/15/34_tanks_34_spags_and_2_apcs_marched_from_luhansk_to_donetsk_eyewitness_report_50605147 http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/17/nsc-news-analysis-center-briefing-at-17-00-july-17-2014/?lang=en48 https://www.mid.ru/tr/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/-/asset_publisher/t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/53734rounds of ammunition for them, as well as 27 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.43 While the report mentioned MANPADS it did not mention SAMs.The UNIAN news agency reported on 13 July that a convoy of 100 units of equipment tried to enter Ukraine from Russia near the village of Izvarine in the Luhansk region.44 The information was attributed to an RNBO spokesman at a press briefing.Ukraine also passed information to observers. In a 15 July article in the Kyiv Post, it was reported that “a senior military Ukrainian officer speaking to the [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Mon-itoring Mission (SMM)] on 13 July, stated that a column of tanks and other military hardware had entered Ukraine from the Russian Federation at the Zelenopillia border crossing point on that day.”45In a 15 July article about dozens of tanks, self-propelled artillery and two armoured personnel carriers moving from Luhansk to Donetsk, Zik reported that Ukraine’s presidential administration deputy head Valery Chaly said the conflict looks increasingly like a Russian invasion of Ukraine.46 On the same day, Interfax-Ukraine reported that an RNBO spokesman said that Russia continues to “concentrate its troops on the state border of Ukraine.”“The battle for control over the state border of Ukraine continues,” the RNBO said on 17 July. “The situation has been deteriorating as the Russian Federation continues to build up its Armed Forces near the Ukrainian border. More and more attacks on the positions of Ukraine’s border units and ATO forces are coming from within Russian territory.”47For its part, the Russian Federation issued a number of complaints about Ukrainian forces attacking customs and border checkpoints along the Ukraine-Russia border and Ukrainian artillery shells landing in the Russian Feder-ation. Statements issued by the Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) often included details on casualties among Ukraine and Russian civilians, as well as descrip-tions of damage to buildings and infrastructure.On 28 June, the Russian Federation “expressed a decisive protest with regard to such provocations of Ukraine, which grossly violate the fundamental principles of international law” after a Russia border checkpoint purportedly was at-tacked by Ukrainian forces.48 “We are especially concerned
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63 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSthat there were Ukrainian refugees, nationals of that country there at that time,” the MFA said. “Missiles also hit the nearby populated areas in the territory of the Russian Federation.”In a statement on 10 July about Ukrainian forces firing artillery at the Gukovo checkpoint on the border, the MFA said: “If such cases are repeated, all the responsi-bility for their consequences will be imposed on the Kiev authorities.”49On 12 July, TASS reported the MFA as saying, “Russia demands Ukraine stop shelling of the Russian territory and violating the Russian border” after Russian border guards came under small arms fire.The MFA issued a statement on 13 July alleging the Ukrainian army had shelled Donetsk in Russia’s Rostov region with high explosive shells, killing one Russian na-tional and serious injuring two others. In a protest lodged with a Ukrainian diplomat, the MFA said, “Russia insists again that Ukraine immediately takes decisive measures to stop any provocations of this kind.” The MFA also said the incident shows that tensions in the area of the Rus-sia-Ukraine border “have dangerously escalated and may have irreversible consequences, for which Ukraine will be held responsible.”50A tweet attributed to the MFA’s Twitter account (@mfa_Russia) said, “Russia vows tough response to Ukraine’s military border shelling.”On 14 July, Russia invited OSCE observers to the Donestsk and Gukovo checkpoints on the Russia-Ukraine border “in a show of good will and without waiting for ceasefire,” the MFA said in a statement.51 “We are convinced that this step will contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for an end to the violence as soon as possible and the start of an inclusive and transparent Ukraine-wide dialogue according to the Geneva Statement of the 17 April and the Berlin Declaration of the 2 July,” the ministry said.Russia also complained of attacks by Ukrainian forces on areas of eastern Ukraine controlled by armed non-state forces. “The approaches to the Nikolayevka Village, 15 km from Slavyansk, are subjected to massive shooting by Grad 49 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/67808550 https://www.mid.ru/tr/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/-/asset_publisher/t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/677956?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_t2GCdmD8RNIr&_101_INSTANCE_t2GCdmD8RNIr_languageId=en_GB51 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/67790752 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/67916453 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/67974154 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/67868655 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-jets-bomb-gunmen-seized-donetsk-airport-349476.html56 https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-russia/cameron-points-finger-at-russia-over-hi-tech-arms-in-ukraine-idUKK-BN0EM1732014061157 https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-britain-russia/cameron-points-finger-at-russia-over-hi-tech-arms-in-ukraine-idUKK-BN0EM1732014061158 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0multi-launch missile systems, tanks and mortars,” the MFA said on 2 July.52 A day earlier, it had said, “Let us recall the criminal air strike on the 2 June by Ukrainian Air Forces on the building of the Lugansk regional administration, which killed 8 people and injured 28.”53 On 5 July, the MFA referenced Ukrainian security forces using heavy arma-ments and military aviation, “as a result of which civilians, including children, die.”546.2.5. Presence of Air Defence Systems in Eastern UkraineA variety of heavy weapons were reported to be present in eastern Ukraine.The OSCE said in the 16 May OSCE Daily Report that the head of the regional police reported that armed non-state forces in the area comprised about 1,000 individu-als armed with a variety of weapons, from Kalashnikov assault rifles to anti-aircraft missile launchers.In late May 2014, it was reported that Ukrainian mil-itary aircraft attacked armed non-state forces that had seized Donetsk airport and that a combat helicopter had destroyed a “surface-to-air missile system at the airport that was being used by” the armed non-state forces.55In early June 2014, then-U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron was reported to have said that armed non-state forces in eastern Ukraine were being supplied with sophisticated weapons, such as MANPADS.56 “What I said to (Russian) President Putin is that … it is noticeable that the so-called rebels have, for instance, very technical, hi-tech weapons such as MANPADS (portable surface-to-air mis-siles) and it is hard to believe that they can be coming from anywhere else,” Cameron said in the British Parliament.57Also in June, The New York Times reported the U.S. State Department had said that three T-64 tanks, sever-al BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and other military vehicles had been sent to the armed non-state forces from across the border with the Russian Federation near Luhansk, supporting accusations made by the Ukrainian government.58The newspaper also reported that then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called Russian Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov to “complain about Russia’s arms shipments” to the non-state forces in eastern Ukraine. Also, the State
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64 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSDepartment released photographs of three Russian tanks it said were sent from southwest Russia to Ukraine. In response to the call, Russia’s MFA released a summary of the call, but it did not specifically the address subject of weapons crossing the border from Russia into Ukraine.Around the same time, Al Jazeera America quoted a U.S. State Department spokesperson as saying, “Ukraine’s interior minister said three tanks crossed the border from Russia yesterday. … Internet videos showed this same type of tank that departed southwest Russia moving through multiple cities in eastern Ukraine.”59In late June 2014, U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breed-love, at the time the supreme allied commander Europe of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), said that the armed non-state forces in eastern Ukraine were being supplied with heavy anti-aircraft weapons.60 He also said that training missions being carried out by forces from the Russian Federation along the eastern Ukraine border included the use of vehicle-borne anti-air missiles. The U.S. Naval Institute News, which reported Breedlove’s comments on its website on 30 June 2014, also said, “But despite the confirmed deliveries of the anti-aircraft weap-ons and training by Russian forces, Breedlove was wary of making the connection between the separatists’ weapon stockpiles and the recent shootdown of Ukrainian military aircraft.”In response to Breedlove’s comments, the Russian Federation MFA said, “We believe that it is absolutely inadmissible, when such a highly ranked military represent-ative becomes drawn into the information and propaganda campaign, distributing false data about the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border.”61The then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt described the Russian frontier as “a sieve for tanks and missile systems, and MANPADS and money and mercenar-ies and all kinds of instability.”62The Ukrainian military possessed SAM systems, includ-ing Buk M-1 missile launchers, and while the armed non-states forces did not operate aircraft, there was concern that Ukrainian anti-aircraft defence systems had been seized by the armed non-sate forces. In late June, there was a report that a Ukrainian SAM system had been captured by armed non-state forces. The Kyiv Post reported on 30 June that armed non-state forces had seized control 59 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/13/ukraine-retakes-mariupol.html60 https://news.usni.org/2014/06/30/u-s-european-commander-russia-supplying-anti-aircraft-weapons-ukrainian-separatists61 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/67923662 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/as-america-celebrates-pyatt-touts-us-ukraine-successes-354593.html63 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/militants-claim-control-over-air-defense-regiment-in-donetsk-353995.html64 https://www.62.ua/news/565758/zahvacennyj-v-donecke-boevikami-dnr-zenitnyj-raketnyj-kompleks-buk-v-nerabocem-sostoanii65 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/civilians-caught-in-the-crossfire-as-rockets-rain-down-on-rebel-held-cities-355836.html66 https://www.unian.ua/politics/939080-kolona-zi-100-odinits-tehniki-vnochi-namagalasya-prorvatis-v-ukrajinu-z-rosiji-rnbo.html67 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/zik-34-tanks-and-34-spags-marched-from-luhansk-to-donetsk-eyewitness-says-356121.htmlof “military unit No. A-1402” in Donetsk.63 The report described the unit as a surface-to-air missile regiment equipped with Buk self-propelled missile systems.An ATO spokesman confirmed a “partial capture” of the military unit. The spokesman confirmed the Buk unit was located in the A-1402 unit, but said it was not work-ing. When asked if the attackers could fix the unit, he said, “I don’t think they need it.”64On 13 July, the Kyiv Post reported, “Columns of dozens of armoured personnel vehicles, artillery and Grad rocket systems were observed moving north from the seaside city of Mariupol and west from the direction of Krasnoarmiysk towards Donetsk this week.”65Between 13 July and 15 July, both the UNIAN News Agency (translated using Google Translate) and ZIK reported dozens of pieces of heavy equipment, including tanks, self-propelled artillery, and armoured personnel carriers in the Luhansk region.66, 67After the An-26 was shot down on 14 July, a Kyiv Post journalist tweeted a link from the “presidential website” that the transport was shot down by an advanced missile system “likely from Russia.” On 15 July, Pyatt tweeted that Russia had transferred ex-USSR military equipment to fighters around Donetsk. Also on 15 July, Pyatt tweeted there was no evidence that Russian support for the armed non-state forces had ceased.Information on weapons system in or near eastern Ukraine also could be found on Twitter. In late June, a journalist tweeting under the Twitter handle @Julian-Roepcke said, “#Breaking #Russia moving the “9K37M1 Buk”(?!?!) system through #Stary_Oskol towards #Ukraine.” The tweet included a link to a YouTube video that no longer is available. The next day, @JulianRoepcke tweet-ed “#BREAKINGNEWS THE “9K37M1 BUK CONVOY MADE IT TO THE #UKRAINIAN_BORDER IN #BELGO-ROD OBLAST.” On 16 July, he tweeted that the Russian army had moved “high end #SAM systems to the Ukr. NORTHERN border.”Another Twitter source, @ostro_v, as reported and translated into English during the Flight MH17 criminal prosecution in the court sessions of the District court of The Hague said, “In Donetsk, at the Intersection of Ilyich Avenue at 9.15, there was a “Buk” on a tractor, surrounded
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65 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSby militiamen.” The tweet was posted at 12:34 on 17 of July 2014, a few hours before the downing of Flight MH17.68Also available online on Censor.net.ua was a video of Russian tanks at the Donbas arena, home of the Shakhtar Donetsk professional football club from Donetsk, Ukraine. According to Censor.net, on July 15 there were three tanks and self-propelled artillery near the stadium.On 28 September 2016, during the Joint Investiga-tive Team (JIT) presentation of the first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation, it was revealed that more than 150,000 telephone calls were intercepted. The Foundation does not know if, in the period prior to the downing of Flight MH17, Ukrainian security services were equipped, prepared and directed to process these calls and identify potential threats.One relevant intercepted conversation was shared during Flight MH17 criminal prosecution in the court sessions of the District court of The Hague:69“The next morning, 17 July 2014, at 09.23.13, Dubinskiy again called Semenov. Dubinskiy said his Buk-M had ar-rived that night and needed to be transported in Semenov’s convoy. Dubinskiy asked where the Buk should be taken so it could join the convoy.“At 09.54.08, in a telephone conversation with Kharch-enko, Dubinskiy told him to go to Pervomaiske and set himself up there. His orders were to guard ‘the thing’ which he would soon be ‘driving’ and, after that, to stay in reserve. Dubinskiy told him that Pulatov would also be coming to him.“In a telephone conversation that followed this one, one minute later, Dubinskiy ordered Pulatov to go with Kharch-enko and the others to the area around Pervomaiske and Pervomaiskyi. His job was to guard and ‘organise’ the Buk which was now being ‘driven’ by Kharchenko. Pulatov was told to ensure the Buk was guarded and organised, and to keep an open corridor so as to ensure a smooth delivery.“At 12.42.57 Pulatov called Kharchenko. Kharchenko told Pulatov that he and the ‘toy’ were near the Furshet, a supermarket in the centre of Snizhne. Pulatov asked him to wait there, saying that he would come to him.“Shortly after flight MH17 was downed, at 16.48.44, Kharchenko called Dubinskiy, saying that they were ‘on the spot’ and had just downed a Sushka. Dubinskiy ordered Kharchenko to come ‘here’ and to leave a company in charge of guarding the Buk.68 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecution-and-trial/court-sessions-june-2020/investigation-on-the-main-scenario69 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecution-and-trial/court-session-26-june-202070 https://interfax.by/news/policy/v_mire/1161813/71 Ibid72 https://mashable.com/2014/07/17/malaysia-airlines-ukraine-russia-rebel/73 Ibid74 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/malaysian-airlines-plane-buk-missile“Kharchenko: We are on the spot. We’ve already brought down one Sushka.“Dubinskiy: Well done! Attaboys! Well… You’ve brought down one Sushka. Well done! Lionia, tell me…”6.2.6. Post Flight MH17 AssessmentsEvidence of a Buk Battery in DonetskIn the hours and days after the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July, there were multiple reports about a Buk missile system or systems being seen in eastern Ukraine. An advisor to Ukraine’s minister of internal affairs said on the 112 Ukraine television channel that the Ukrainian military had “recorded the fact” of the missile’s launch. He also said there was a large amount of military equipment in the re-gion, “including the Buk missile system, which was spotted today in the morning in the area of Ternovoye.”70 Interfax Ukraine also cited a Ukrainian official as saying that in the morning of 17 July, before Flight MH17 was shot down, local residents had seen the Buk being transferred to Torez to Snezhnoe.71Immediately after the downing, one of the leaders of the Donetsk’s People’s Republic, said through his VK account, “We did warn you, do not fly in our sky,” according to a 17 July article on Mashable.72 The post was deleted when word began to circulate that the plane shot down was an airliner and not a Ukrainian military aircraft. Another DPR leader denied his forces had a weapon capable of bringing down an airliner.73In its early articles on the Flight MH17 downing, The Guardian reported that a military specialist who monitors social media in Ukraine said an armed non-state force had been sighted with a Buk system at Torrez just hours before the event.74 The Guardian article also said an Associated Press reporter reported seeing a Buk in Snizhne. In the same article, The Guardian reported that armed non-state forces “based in eastern Ukraine are said to have been shooting at planes and helicopters with Buk missiles over the last week in an attempt to achieve mastery of the airspace.”Three days after the downing, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that social media reports and U.S. surveil-lance put the missile system in question in the vicinity of the crash before the downing. “It is pretty clear that this was a system from Russia, transferred to separatists. We know with confidence that the Ukrainians did not have such
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66 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSa system anywhere near the vicinity at that point of time,” Kerry was quoted as saying.75On 19 July 2014, at a news conference in Kiev, Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelligence for the Ukrainian State Security Service, showed a photograph of Buk sys-tem on a street in Torez, Ukraine. He also showed photos of a Buk system and other military vehicles heading to the Ukraine border with the Russian Federation. In re-sponse to a question, he said the armed non-state forces operating in eastern Ukraine possessed at “least three Buk M-1” missile systems because three systems crossed back across the border into the Russian Federation early on the morning of 18 July. In response to another question, Nayda said the first information “hinting” at a Buk launcher in the possession of the armed non-state forces was received on 14 July and came from counterin-telligence units who got the information from the field. “But we could not confirm directly that it was Buk missile launcher that trespassed illegally [in] Ukrainian territory,” he said.76, 77On 22 July, The Guardian reported: “[A]s several wit-nesses told the Guardian, they had seen what appeared to be a Buk missile launcher in the vicinity of the crash site last Thursday (17 July). … The sightings back up a number of photographs and videos posted online that put the Buk system close to the crash site on the day of the disaster. Just before lunchtime last Thursday, prior to the Malaysia Airlines plane’s takeoff, a Buk was driven through Gagarin Street, one of the central thoroughfares of Torez, witnesses said.”78The Financial Times said the background to the down-ing included “a concerted anti-aircraft campaign waged by rebel militias in eastern Ukraine.” The article also said that on 29 June, an official account of the Donetsk armed non-state group tweeted a picture of Buk missile launch-er accompanied by text that said the launch was in their possession.79 The website Vesti.ru published an article on 29 June under the headline “The sky over Donetsk will be protected by Buk anti-missile systems” about the capture of the A-1402 air defence unit previously referenced.80 At his 19 July news briefing, Nayda said the captured Buk system was not operational, having been disabled in March 2014.Bellingcat InvestigationBefore the official accident investigation was completed by the Dutch Safety Board, the most compelling investigative 75 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/20/mh17-kerry-evidence-ukrainian-separatists76 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWtH8AA42Fc&feature=share77 https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-knew-of-separatists-air-defense-capabilities-say-officials-140578150878 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/22/ukraine-sightings-missile-launcher-mh1779 https://www.ft.com/content/7efea166-0e68-11e4-b1c4-00144feabdc080 https://www.vesti.ru/article/185079381 https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-investigation/82 Ibid83 Ibidreport was published by Bellingcat, which describes itself as an “independent international collective of researchers, investigators and citizen journalists using open source and social media investigation to probe a variety of subjects.” Bellingcat’s 35-page investigative report, which was re-leased on 8 November 2014, concluded:“It is the opinion of the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team that there is undeniable evidence that separatists in Ukraine were in control of a Buk missile launcher on July 17th and transported it from Donetsk to Snizhne on a trans-porter. The Buk missile launcher was unloaded in Snizhne approximately three hours before the downing of MH17 and was later filmed minus one missile driving through separa-tist-controlled Luhansk.”81“The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team also believes the same Buk was part of a convoy travelling from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk to near the Ukraini-an border as part of a training exercise between June 22nd and July 25th, with elements of the convoy separating from the main convoy at some point during that period, including the Buk missile launcher filmed in Ukraine on July 17th. There is strong evidence indicating that the Russian military provided separatists in eastern Ukraine with the Buk missile launcher filmed and photographed in eastern Ukraine on July 17th.”82The Bellingcat report, “Origin of the Separatists’ Buk, A Bellingcat Investigation,” traces the Buk system’s move-ments in Donetsk on 17 July using photographs and videos posted on social media sites. Bellingcat said its investigators used a variety of tools to establish where the images were recorded and the approximate time.“Along with these eyewitness reports [social media postings], journalists have since visited the city and received confirmation of the convoy sightings on July 17. Journalists from the Guardian and Buzzfeed visited Torez on July 22nd and interviewed locals who confirmed both the time and route the Buk missile launcher took through Torez on the way to Snizhne along the H21 motorway,” the report said.83Much of the Bellingcat report was dedicated to tracking the Buk launcher, then part of a larger convoy, as it moved from Kursk, Russia, to the Ukrainian border as part of a training exercise in the latter half of June 2014. “Using a wide variety of open sources, it has been possible for the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team to collect evidence of the movements of the convoy, the purpose of the convoy,
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67 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSits links to the 53rd Brigade, and evidence that confirms that one of the Buk missile launchers in the convoy was the same Buk missile launcher filmed and photographed in Ukraine on July 17, 2014, travelling from Donetsk to Luhansk through separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine.”84Again, Bellingcat investigators pieced together videos, photos and other social media posts to track and verify the movements of the convoy and of the specific Buk launcher that has been implicated in the downing of Flight MH17.The videos of the convoy moving from Kursk to the border with Ukraine were available online before the shootdown. The same missile launcher reportedly was later transported back to the Russian Federation with a missile missing.Dutch Safety BoardIn its accident report, the Dutch Safety Board noted re-ports that circulated in the media, including social media, in the months prior to 17 July, about the presence of weap-ons, including surface to air missiles, in the possession of the armed non-state forces fighting the Ukraine govern-ment in the eastern part of the country. The DSB report also noted the concerns expressed by Western diplomats, politicians and military leaders about weapons possibly being supplied by the Russian Federation to armed non-state forces in eastern Ukraine.“The precise nature, scope and operational level of the military capacities of the various parties involved in the conflict around 17 July 2014 are not easy to establish by the Dutch Safety Board, even in retrospect. Although various media reported on the possible weapons capability in the area in the months prior to the crash, they do not constitute validated and verified information. In addition, based on open sources it is not possible to establish with certainty what equipment was involved and to what extent this equip-ment was operational,” the DSB report says.Flight MH17 Joint Investigation Team (JIT)The JIT, comprised of representatives from the Neth-erlands, Australia, Malaysia, Belgium and Ukraine, is conducting a criminal investigation into the crash. As a result of the investigation, the Dutch Prosecution Service is prosecuting four individuals for their involvement in bringing down Flight MH17.85The JIT has concluded that Flight MH17 was brought down by a missile launched from a Buk Telar transport-ed from the Russian Federation to a farm field in east-ern Ukraine and that, at the time of the downing, was 84 Ibid85 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-investigation-jit-mh1786 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-investigation-jit-mh17/speakers-text-jit-mh17-press-meeting-24-5-201887 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-investigation-jit-mh17jit-presentation-first-results-mh17-criminal-investigation-28-9-2016controlled by the armed non-state forces. After firing, the Buk was transported back to Russia missing a missile.The JIT investigation verified a number of the Bellingcat findings regarding the source of the Buk Telar in Kursk and its ultimate destination in Ukraine.“After an extensive and labor-intensive comparative in-vestigation, in which many BUK-TELARs were involved, the JIT has come to the conclusion that the BUK-TELAR that shot down flight MH17 comes from the 53rd Anti Aircraft Missile Brigade, or the 53rd Brigade from Kursk in the Rus-sian Federation. This 53rd Brigade is a unit of the Russian armed forces. In 2014, the 53rd Brigade consisted of three operational battalions. It employs several hundred people in staff, supporting and operational units,” the JIT said.86 “Earlier, the investigation collective Bellingcat came up with the same conclusion.”The JIT investigation determined through intercepted telephone conversations that during the days prior to 17 July, “the pro-Russian fighters mentioned that they needed better air defence systems to defend themselves against these [Ukrainian military] air strikes. In this respect, a BUK was discussed explicitly. Fact is that a BUK has a higher range than the air defence systems in use by the separatists at that moment, such as the Strela and Igla.”876.3. Standard Procedures QuestionnaireTo ensure systematic coverage and comprehensive infor-mation collection, we identified the need to use certain standard or good process descriptions when drafting the information collection questionnaires. For that purpose, we used the Foundation best process description that is based on our accumulated experience and analyses up to the moment of this inquiry.Namely, the Foundation’s integrated standard for air-space security risk assessment, as illustrated in Figure 19 (p. 68), addresses the five main functions to be assigned to one or more different authorities, organised as an integrat-ed process and performed within a given sovereign state:A. Threat watch — roles, responsibilities, procedures and processes for monitoring for potential threats to civil aviation.B. Threat analysis — roles, responsibilities, procedures and processes for threat analysis, including capabili-ty of attack, intent to attack, risk factors for uninten-tional attack, and for validating the information.C. Risk analysis — roles, responsibilities, procedures and processes for analysing the security risk includ-ing potential consequences.
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68 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSD. Decision-making — roles, responsibilities, proce-dures and processes for airspace management in relation to security threats to civil aviation, includ-ing deciding airspace restrictions and closure of airspace.E. Promulgation — roles, responsibilities, procedures and processes for communicating airspace man-agement decision-making, including decisions on the communication tools (e.g., NOTAMs) used, composition of the communication message and verification of adherence to international standards and procedures for aeronautical information.The Foundation standard defines a statewide process for airspace security risk management that is distributed around different authorities and organisations yet func-tional from end to end. In this way, the organisational scope of the process is not restricted to the more tradition-al perspective of civil-military aviation coordination (e.g., some state intelligence functions may not be attributed to military authorities).Each of the five functions of the integrated standard for airspace security risk assessment targets a particular step from the risk assessment process and contains three or four specific sub-functions that are formulated as ques-tions in the Foundation questionnaires.The questions used in the inquiry are:A. Threat watch:• Q1 — Social media: Is information in social media including information about capability of attack and/or intent to attack civil aircraft, used as a trigger for security threat analysis for civil aviation?• Q2 — Public and private sources: What are the sources of public and private threat information and what are the processes for gathering information relative to civil aviation security (including in a conflict zone)?• Q3 — Other actors’ information: What is the level of involvement of airlines, air navigation service pro-viders (ANSPs), the military, adjacent states and/or other states publishing advisories in gathering information about aviation security (including infor-mation for conflict zones)?B. Threat analysis:• Q4 — Adjacent airspace: What are the procedures for routine review and analysis of NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent FIRs to ensure civil aircraft security?• Q5 — Verifying the information: What is the process for deciding on source credibility and for verifying information, including information on capability of attack and intent to attack, relative to an active armed conflict that could impact civil aviation?• Q6 —Unintentional attack factors: What are the deter-mining risk factors for unintentional attack that may result in civil aviation not being allowed to fly over a conflict zone? For example, scale of the conflict, military air transport or air combat activities, pre-vious attacks against aircraft, level of training and Figure 19Flight Safety Foundation Integrated Standard for Airspace Security Risk AssessmentA.Threat watchB.Threat analysisC.Risk analysisD.Decision-makingE.Promulgation
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69 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSexperience of SAM operators, level of robustness of command and control mechanism for authorising launch, civil aviation flight proximity to strategic assets, technical capability of SAMs to distinguish between civil and military aircraft.C. Risk analysis:• Q7 — Coordination and analysis: What organizations are involved, how do they coordinate, and what is the process for determining acceptable security risk levels in civil aviation airspace over a conflict zone? Note: These are general security level targets to be met, if specified, that are not specific to an event or situation.• Q8 — Potential consequences: What is the process of de-termining how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information in a conflict zone? For example, what part of the airspace, what altitudes or types of aircraft?• Q9 — Risk methodology: What analysis methodology or risk matrix is used to assess the likelihood of a threat presenting itself and the potential consequences for civil aircraft flying over the conflict zone?• Q10 — Risk mitigations: What is the process to deter-mine security mitigations that would permit civil aviation to overfly a conflict zone?D. Decision-making:• Q11 — Normal times decision-making: What are your normal (not during conflict) criteria for establishing restriction or segregation of airspace and what are the coordination procedures both internally and externally?• Q12 — Conflict zone decision-making: What are the decision processes for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace in a conflict zone? What are the ANSP and military coordination procedures for active civil flights and their safety?• Q13 — Adjacent FIR coordination: What organisations are involved and what are the procedures for coordinat-ing airspace restrictions in the conflict zone among adjacent FIRs?E. Promulgation:• Q14 — Publish or not, and how: What is the process to decide if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and to choose the communication tool for it (e.g., NOTAMs, AIC)?• Q15 — Verify and validate: What organisations are in-volved in and what are the processes used to prepare, 88 After the downing of Flight MH17verify if ICAO Aeronautical Information Service procedures and terminology are used, validate for correctness and transmit aeronautical information to its users (e.g., airlines and ANSPs)?• Q16 — Special advisories and threat information: What are the procedures for disseminating civil aviation security threat information to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?In total, 16 question groups (as listed above) were for-mulated in the questionnaire. In addition, five detailed questions were asked for each of the 16 question groups:• Answer: Provide a brief overall answer to the question.• Responsible: Describe which authorities/organisations are responsible for the activities associated with the respective question.• References: Provide specific references to legislation, requirements and other provisions that define the responsibilities and the process.• Process and timeline: Describe the process (including its inputs/outputs) to perform the associated activi-ties, including the processing time.• Changes after 17 July 201488: Describe the changes, if any, to the requirements and the process that took place after 17 July and the reasons for the change.6.4. Threat Knowledge QuestionnaireTo perform the inquiry into whether Ukraine and the Russian Federation knew of the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that had a reach beyond the part of the airspace that was closed for civil aviation and therefore could pose a threat to civil aviation, we devel-oped a questionnaire similar to the one described above. While the standard procedures questionnaire described above probed the statewide airspace security risk assess-ment process in general, the threat knowledge question-naire described below asked how the integrated airspace security risk assessment actually worked from 01 March 2014 until just prior to the Flight MH17 downing. The questions used in the threat knowledge questions are as follows:• Describe what civil aviation threat information on social media about the presence of air defence equipment or intent to attack was identified by which authority.• Describe what other sources of civil aviation threat information about the presence of air defence equip-ment and intent to attack were identified by which authority.
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70 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESS• Describe specifically what airlines, ANSPs, the military, adjacent states, or other states publishing advisories were used as a source for what informa-tion about security risk for civil aircraft.• Describe what civil aviation security threat informa-tion was identified by which authority based on the NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restric-tions for adjacent FIRs.• How was the security threat information verified, how was the source judged for credibility, and by what authority/organisation? What were the results of the credibility decision and the verification?• Describe what risk factors for unintentional attack were identified by what authority/organisation.• Describe what organisations determined the ac-ceptable security risk levels for civil aircraft. How this was determined and what were the determined acceptable security levels?• Describe the impact analysis results, if any — how civil aviation can be affected based on threat infor-mation — for airspace, altitudes or type of aircraft.• Describe if and how risk was assessed and what levels of security risk were determined for what airspace, what altitudes or what type of aircraft.• Describe if and what security mitigations were deter-mined that would permit civil aviation to overfly the conflict zone.• Describe who made what decisions for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segre-gation of airspace.• Describe what coordination took place between the ANSP and the military regarding the security threats.• Describe if and how the airspace restrictions were coordinated with the adjacent FIRs and what organi-sations were involved in the coordination.• Describe how it was decided if there was a need for aeronautical information publication and how the communication tool (e.g., NOTAMs, aeronautical information circular) was chosen.• Describe what organisations were involved in the aeronautical information preparation, verification of whether ICAO AIS procedures and terminology were used, and validation for correctness and trans-mission of aeronautical information to users.• Describe if and how civil aviation security threat information, apart from the AIS, was disseminated to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR.6.5. Inquiry Into Ukraine Standard Procedures and Threat KnowledgeFor the purpose of information collection, the Ukrainian government identified a focal point within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An information collection template was sent to the identified focal point. The information collection template integrated in one table both the stand-ard procedures questionnaire and the threat knowledge questionnaire.Ukraine responded to the questionnaire, and the re-sponses as received are included in Appendix D. Hereafter, we provide a question-by-question discussion about the responses received.Q1 — Social media threat watchThe response confirms that information from “open sources, including social media” is used in the assessment of threats to civil aviation “in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.”The document provided by Ukraine as Annex 3 to the responses says that the input information for the State Avi-ation Administration and Integrated Civil-Military System “for detection of possible threats for civil aircraft operation is the information provided by the Military Force Operation HQ [headquarters] and/or appropriate command/control military units.” The document further says that informa-tion received from open sources is “verified by intelligence.” The response does not explicitly answer the question about whether the information in social media is used as a trigger for analysis of threats to civil aviation.Many organisations are identified as responsible for the process. Apart from the Security Service, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Internal Affairs, the response also identifies as responsible the State Aviation Administra-tion, airport operators, aircraft operators and ANSPs. The response does not explain how all these organisations are responsible for social media monitoring and identification of potential threat information.According to the response, the State Aviation Adminis-tration of Ukraine “constantly conducts a general assess-ment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers; and other sources, social media included.”In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the response notes that the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine “used information on threats to civil aviation security from the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence agencies of Ukraine, and other sources.” The response says that the “information is the one marked ‘For official use (restricted)”
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71 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSbut also notes that the information “is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing 777-200.”There is no information provided in the answer regard-ing what social media civil aviation threat information about the presence of air defence equipment or intent to attack was identified by which authority.For this report, it is of specific interest what social me-dia threat information was available to which organisation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, including social media posts about Buk missile systems being seen. For example, @ostro_v, as reported and translated into English during the Flight MH17 criminal prosecution in the court sessions of the District court of The Hague, said, “In Donetsk, at the Intersection of Ilyich Avenue at 9.15, there was a “Buk” on a tractor, surrounded by militiamen.” The tweet was posted at 12:34 on 17 of July 2014, a few hours before the downing of Flight MH17.89Additionally, it is of interest what and when the social media threat information was analysed, validated and propagated to those responsible for threat analysis in the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.Based on the analysis of the response, it was decided to ask a clarifying question seeking information about what social media threat information was identified by which organisation prior to the downing of Flight MH17.Q2 — Public and private sources threat watchThe response states that “Information from all available sources is used to assess threats to civil aviation security in accordance with relevant regulatory document.” The response provides a list of many organisations, including “international civil aviation organisations” but does not elaborate on which organisation is responsible for collect-ing what type of public and private information.In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the response repeats the answer to Q1 while adding the “civil aviation authorities of foreign states [and] international civil aviation organizations” as sources of threat information used by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine. The response notes again that that the information “is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.”The document provided by Ukraine as Annex 3 to the responses says, “Military Force Operation HQ and/or ap-propriate command/control military units obtain informa-tion from intelligence and combat units. It is able to detect the threats stemming from weapon involved in the conflict.” As reported in the document, the obtained information is validated “by intelligence” and used by the State Aviation 89 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecution-and-trial/court-sessions-june-2020/investigation-on-the-main-scenario90 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecution-and-trial/court-session-26-june-2020Administration and Integrated Civil-Military System as input in the detection of possible threats.For this report, it is of specific interest what information was available to which organisation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, including:• Information about what weapon was used in the attack on a Ukraine An-26 military transport aircraft that occurred on 14 July.• Threat information contained in 150,000 intercepted telephone conversations mentioned on 28 September 2016 during the JIT presentation of the first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation, namely the exchange in the morning of 17 July 2014 between Dubinskiy, Semenov, Kharchenko and Pulatov about the presence in eastern Ukraine of a Buk-M.90• Threat information described by Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelligence for the Ukrainian State Security Service, on 19 July 2014 at a news confer-ence in Kiev that the first information “hinting” at a Buk launcher in the possession of the armed non-state forces was received on 14 July.Based on the analysis of the response, it was decided to ask a clarifying question seeking information on what public and private sources of threat information were identified by which organisation prior to the downing of Flight MH17.Q3 — Other actors’ information threat watchThe response states, “National airlines, air navigation service providers, the military and law enforcement agen-cies are involved in gathering information about aviation security.” The response does not elaborate on the actual process and timeline but says again that the “State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security.”In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the response notes again that the informa-tion “is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing 777-200.”Q4 — Adjacent airspace threat analysisThe response states, “Information pertaining to NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs) is constantly reviewed and analyzed in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.”The response says that the “State Aviation Administra-tion of Ukraine; Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers constantly review and analyze NOTAMs, security
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72 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSwarnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight infor-mation regions.”In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the response notes again that the informa-tion “is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.”Q5 — Threat analysis: Verifying the informationThe response states that “information on threats to civil aviation security is analyzed, verified and assessed in ac-cordance with relevant regulatory documents.”The document provided by Ukraine as Annex 3 to the responses says that the information obtained by the Mili-tary Force Operation HQ and/or appropriate command/control military units is verified “by intelligence.” As the re-sponses identify more actors that can be potential sources of threat information, including airport operators, ANSPs and aircraft operators, it is not clear if all the information is verified “by intelligence” before the State Aviation Ad-ministration of Ukraine performs threat and risk analysis.The response notes that the information on possible threats “to aircraft flights in areas of military conflicts is intelligence one” and that the procedure for determining the reliability of the source of information depends on the method of obtaining such information and the type of information source. It is further noted that this informa-tion is classified.In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the response notes that the information was analysed, verified and assessed by the “Security Service of Ukraine, the ministry of Defence of Ukraine, and the For-eign Intelligence Service of Ukraine.” It is further noted that this information is classified.For this report, and without prejudice to the classified information, it is of specific interest what information was transmitted to the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine for threat analysis and when.Based on the analysis of the response, it was decided to ask a clarifying question seeking to understand what verified and unverified threat information became known by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.Q6 — Threat analysis: Risk factors for unintentional attackThe response says, “According to relevant regulatory documents, all factors that pose a potential threat to civil aviation security are taken into account when establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace over or near areas of military conflicts.”Many organisations are identified as responsible for the process. Apart from the Security Services, Ministry of Defence, Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine and Ministry of Internal Affairs, the response also identifies as responsible the State Aviation Administration and ANSPs.The response does not provide information on what risk factors for unintentional attack were identified by what authority/organisation prior to the downing of Flight MH17. The response only notes, “According to the established procedures, on the basis of available informa-tion, appropriate restrictions and prohibitions on the use of airspace were established.”For this report, it is of specific interest if the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, within the process of “constantly conducting a general assessment of threats,” also assesses the risk factors of unintentional attack and what specifically this assessment was prior to the downing of Flight MH17.Based on the analysis of the response, it was decided to ask a clarifying question seeking information on what risk factors for unintentional attack became known by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and how the associated security risk was assessed?Q7 — Risk analysis: Coordination and analysis of ac-ceptable security risk levelsMuch like previous questions, the response notes that “the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation se-curity in coordination with the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine [and] air navigation service providers” and that the detailed infor-mation is specified in the final report of the investigation of the Flight MH17 crash.In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the response notes again that the informa-tion “is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.” The same statement is provided by Ukraine as an answer to the detailed question about how the process actually worked prior to the downing of Flight MH17 in all the next question groups and is not repeated in the following discussion.Q8 — Risk analysis: Potential consequencesThe response states that “the State Aviation Administra-tion of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine, Foreign Intel-ligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defence of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine [and] air navigation service providers, and makes a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace.”The document provided by Ukraine as Annex 3 to the responses notes, while referring to the threat informa-tion provided from military units, that “the nature of the threat, the volume of the airspace which is hazardous to civil aircraft, and the expected period of the threat existence are
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73 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSindicated.” This information implies that part of the po-tential consequences is determined already by the military units as threat information provider.Q9 — Risk analysis: Risk methodologyThe response notes that “an analysis methodology or risk matrix used to assess the likelihood of a threat and potential consequences for civil aircraft has been developed and ap-proved in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.”In respect to the situation prior to the downing of Flight MH17, the specific question is if and how the risk was assessed and what levels of security risk were deter-mined. As reported previously, the State Aviation Admin-istration of Ukraine was responsible to “constantly conduct a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security.”Additionally, the information provided by the Ukraine as Annex 3 says that the information about the identified threats or potential threats for civil aircraft operations “arising from armed conflict zone is immediately to be provided” to the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and Integrated Civil Military System “by Military Force Operation HQ and/or appropriate command/control mili-tary units.”Q10 — Risk analysis: Risk mitigationsThe response notes, “In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation se-curity on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and makes a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace.”Q11 — Decision-making: Normal times decision-makingThe response notes, “Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are established by the State Aviation Ad-ministration of Ukraine or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military System at the request of the competent authorities and users of airspace.”Q12 — Decision-making: Conflict zone decision-makingThe response notes, “Procedures for decision-making and civil- military coordination in the introduction of bans, restrictions and terms on the use of airspace are established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents” The response further notes that the “prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are established by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military System at the request of the competent authorities and users of airspace.”Additionally, the document provided by Ukraine as An-nex 3 to the responses says that, based on the information received from Military Force Operation HQ and/or appro-priate command/control military units, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Joint Civil-Military System “will urgently set an appropriate restriction, where the civil aircraft flights are prohibited.”Further, the “area which is hazardous to civil aircraft” is defined through:• “assessment of type of military operations;• “determination the geographical area of the conflict;• “determination of weapon that has been identified in the area of the conflict;”• “location of the Ukrainian military combat units and its[their] weapon that are involved in armed conflict;• “determination of the maximum vertical and hori-zontal measures of effective range of the weapon;• “determination the area which is affected by weap-on as sum of determined geographical conflict area dimensions and affected vertical and horizontal range of weapon;• “determination of buffer taking into consideration national requirements regarding segregation dangerous activity from civil aircraft operations, possible changes of military operations and time needed for proper modification of airspace restriction;• “permanent analysis and assessment of information regarding situation near and within area of conflict to ensure that established restriction protects civil aircraft operations.”Q13 — Decision-making: Adjacent FIR coordinationThe response notes that the information “pertaining to restrictions on the use of airspace is published in aeronauti-cal information documents and provided to the competent authorities of adjacent states.”Q14 — Promulgation: Publish or not, and howThe response notes that “Aeronautical information is published by the decision of the State Aviation Administra-tion of Ukraine in coordination with the state authorities concerned.”Q15 — Promulgation: Verify and validateThe response notes that the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, and air navigation service providers “in accordance with their com-petence, check draft documents of aeronautical information published by the Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) according to the decision of the State Aviation Administra-tion of Ukraine and provided to airspace users.”
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74 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSQ16 — Promulgation: Special advisories and threat informationThe response notes, “The procedure for conveying informa-tion on threats to civil aviation security to airspace users is determined and carried out by the State Aviation Adminis-tration of Ukraine [and] the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, including via air navigation service providers.”Following the analysis of the information received from Ukraine, we concluded that a number of questions remain open. However, to respect the timeline of our inquiry, we decided to concentrate only on specific clarifying questions.All questions refer to:• Information, knowledge or decisions immediately prior to the downing of Flight MH17.• The airspace of eastern Ukraine in the Dnipropetro-vsk FIR (UKDV).• The following clarifying questions (CQs) were formulated and subsequently communicated to Ukraine. By the time this report was finalised, a re-sponse to the clarifying questions from Ukraine had not been received.The answers from Ukraine to the clarifying questions were received after the requested time for providing a response and when the content of this report had been already finalised. Therefore, the responses to the clarifying questions were only cross-checked against the findings of the report but no discussion or other content in respect of the clarifying questions to Ukraine were provided in this report. The responses from Ukraine as received are included in Appendix E.CQ1 — On 17 July 2014, before the downing of Flight MH17, a post from @ostro_v (as reported and translated into English during the Flight MH17 crimi-nal prosecution court sessions at The Hague) said, “In Donetsk, at the Intersection of Ilyich Avenue at 9.15, there was a “Buk” on a tractor, surrounded by militiamen.” Was that Twitter post known about prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and by which state authorities?CQ2 — Apart from what is referred to in CQ1, what other social media threat information about the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority? This includes social media posts about a BUK missile system being seen.CQ3 — What weapon was used in the attack on a Ukraine An-26 military transport aircraft that occurred on 14 July? What knowledge of this weapon did the au-thorities responsible for security risk analysis have prior to the downing of the Flight MH17?CQ4 — What authority or authorities knew prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about the threat information contained in the 150,000 intercepted telephone conversa-tions mentioned on 28 September 2016, during the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) presentation of the first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation, namely the ex-change in the morning of 17 July 2014 between Dubinskiy, Semenov, Kharchenko and Pulatov about [the] presence in eastern Ukraine of Buk-M?CQ5 — What authority or authorities knew prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about the threat information described by Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelligence for the Ukrainian State Security Service, on 19 July 2014 at a news conference in Kiev, that the first information “hint-ing” at a Buk launcher in the possession of the armed non-state forces was received on 14 July? Did State Aviation Administration of Ukraine know prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about this information?CQ6 — Apart from what is referred to in CQ1, CQ3, CQ4 and CQ5, what other threat information about the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority prior to the downing of Flight MH17?CQ7 — What intent to attack aircraft in eastern Ukraine with air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority prior to the downing of Flight MH17?CQ8 — What threat information about the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was known and how did it become known by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17? How was the associated security risk assessed and what airspace management decision was taken?CQ9 — What risk factors for unintentional attack became known by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and how did this information affect their security risk assessment?CQ10 — The Netherland DSB investigation report notes that, “After an emergency beacon was activated at around 1320, indicating that flight MH17 had crashed, UkSATSE made the decision at 1500, at the tactical level, to also restrict the airspace above FL 320.” It could be deduced that UkSATSE was responsible for threat and risk analysis, but the responses received notes that “the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security.” In that respect, which authority was responsible prior to the
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75 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSdowning of Flight MH17 for the threat and risk analysis and assessment?6.6. Inquiry into Russian Federation Standard Procedures and Threat KnowledgeFor the purpose of information collection and in a manner similar to the approach with Ukraine, the Russian Feder-ation government was approached with the information collection template.The Russian Federation responded with a letter with responses to the questionnaire. The responses from the Russian Federation as received are included in Appendix B. Hereafter, we provide a question-by-question discussion on the received responses. The following discussion on the received responses is based on analysis of the respons-es provided in Russian and on the unofficial translation in English.Q1 — Social media threat watchThe response highlights, and basically repeats ICAO guid-ance and notes some documentation but does not directly answer the question. The referenced ICAO documents are manuals that in the ICAO nomenclature of documents contain guidance material, which is advisory in nature. This study is not a normative analysis of compliance but, as some of the references used in the answers from the Russian Federation are ICAO documents, we have used content from these documents as a context in our discus-sion of the responses.ICAO Doc 9554, Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations and Guidance on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management, deals with safety measures relating to military activities potentially hazard-ous to civil aircraft operations. Its focus is on coordination between military authorities and ATS authorities and units, identification of civil aircraft, warnings and navi-gational assistance and air traffic restrictions. One part in the document deals with special measures in the event of armed conflicts or the potential of armed conflicts. It includes a provision that “the responsibility for instituting special measures to ensure the safety of international civil aircraft operations remains with the States responsible for providing air traffic services in the airspace affected by the conflict, even in cases where co-ordination is not initiated or completed.” The reference is to “airspace affected by the conflict” and not only restricted to the airspace above the conflict. Although the “responsibility for initiating the co-ordination process rests with the States whose military forces are engaged in the conflict” it is clearly outlined that action should be taken “…even in cases where co-ordina-tion is not initiated or completed.” The fact that the Russian Federation issued NOTAMs restricting Russian Federation airspace referenced ongoing conflict in the neighbouring state is an indication that a threat originating from neigh-bouring state territory was identified.ICAO Doc 9554 further provides that, “Based on the information which is available, the State responsible for providing air traffic services should identify the geographical area of the conflict, assess the hazards or potential hazards to international civil aircraft operations, and determine whether such operations in or through the area of conflict should be avoided or may be continued under specified conditions.” This text is used verbatim from the Russian Federation response to the question.It is clear that the State affected by the conflict should use the information that it is available. However, there is no information provided in the answer regarding if and what social media civil aviation threat information about the presence of air defence equipment or intent to attack was identified by which authority. Also, no information was provided in the answer about if, in general, infor-mation in social media is used as a trigger for security threat analysis, which authority is responsible for it and how the process works. In terms of responsible authori-ty, the answer only provides that these are “[c]ompetent authorities that exchange information related to aviation security.”Q2 — Public and private sources threat watchThe response highlights ICAO guidance. Information was provided by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noting that information about the presence of air defence systems in the region should have been provided by the competent authorities of Ukraine on whose territory an armed conflict took place. It was stated as a response to Q2 that there were threats to civil aviation safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR that originated from “hazardous ac-tivities in the area of responsibility of the adjacent Dnepro-petrovsk FIR.”The sources of the threat information used by Rosav-iatsiya, the Federal Air Transport Agency “when taking a decision to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 on 16 July, 2014” are identified by the answers as “informa-tion provided by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which it was possible to conclude that the rules for the use of airspace of the Russian Federation had been violated.” Three specific statements of the Ministry of For-eign Affairs of the Russian Federation were identified in the response as sources — statement No. 1570 of 28 June 2014, statement No. 1678 of 10 July 2014 and statement No.1688 of 13 July 2014. When examining the content of the referenced statements, it was observed that the threats described in the statements were about low altitude artillery and high explosive shell shootings. However, the restrictions introduced by the Russian Federation were up to FL 320, not commensurate to the referenced low altitude threat.
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76 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSThere is also no information provided in the answer about which authority is responsible for the public and private sources threat watch and how the process works. In terms of responsible authority, the answer only provides that these are “[c]ompetent authorities that exchange infor-mation related to aviation security.”Q3 — Other actors’ information threat watchThe information provided yields little about the actual process, but states clearly that airlines, ANSPs, and adja-cent States have no role in the production of information. It was reported that Rosaviatsiya produces information based on receiving information on military activity haz-ardous to flight safety.It was stated that Rosaviatsiya promulgated restriction while “Airlines, military or other organizations were not in-volved in the issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14.” This does not correspond to provisions in the referenced ICAO Doc 9554, which says, “If the necessary information is not forthcoming from the States whose military authorities are engaged in the armed conflict, the State responsible for providing air traffic services should ascertain the nature and scope of the hazards or potential hazards from other sources, such as aircraft operators, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA), adjacent States or in some cases the relevant ICAO regional office.”Q4 — Adjacent airspace threat analysisThe Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation” manages the process, and there are several documents driving the process for routine review and analysis of NOTAMs. The rules are reported to be contained in the document “Organization of Planning the Use of Airspace of the Russian Federation.” The answer highlighted again that the only threats identified “to air traffic safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR originated from hazardous activities in the area of responsibility of the adjacent FIR of Dnepro-petrovsk.” The reason for restricting the Russian airspace with NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 was “[b]ased on the available reliable information.” There are no further explanations about what this “reliable information” was, but there is a reference to the statements from Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were quoted above in the answer to Q2.Q5 — Threat analysis: Verifying the informationThe response notes that there is no reason to doubt the information coming from the Russian Ministry of For-eign Affairs. Rosaviatsiya was identified in the response as the re-sponsible authority for threat information verification and for deciding on the source credibility.There is an important addition to the already quoted statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The addition points to the actual decision-making process to restrict the airspace, namely, “The initiative to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 concerning the Rostov-on-Don FIR came on July 12, 2014 from the Rosaviatsiya Southern Interregional Territorial Administration (responsible for the Rostov-on-Don FIR) due to the aggravated situation in the areas bordering on Ukraine, the use of various types of weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces.”Q6 — Threat analysis: Risk factors for unintentional attackThe response highlights that “[a]ll possible risk factors for an unintended attack should be considered” and that “[s]uch preparations should include an assessment of the risk to civil aircraft operations due to a military conflict or incidents of unlawful interference with civil aviation.”The response does not provide information about which authority in the Russian Federation is responsible for determining the risk factors for unintentional attack for the (adjacent to the conflict zone) airspace that is affected by the conflict. Instead, the response states that this should be “[t]he state responsible for compliance with the rules for the introduction of restrictions on the use of airspace over an armed conflict zone (Ukraine, in relation to the MH17 crash).”The response notes that adherence by Ukraine to ICAO rules in force at the time of the crash “would have allowed the aviation authorities of Ukraine to come to a decision on the need to stop civil aviation flights over the conflict zone and avoid the crash of flight MH17.”Further, the response notes that “[i]nformation, includ-ing the official one, about the presence of a certain type of weapons in the conflict zone, as well as incidents with the use of these weapons, should have been considered sufficient by Ukraine to make decisions.” This implies that there was available and “sufficient” threat information for Ukraine to make a decision “on the need to stop civil aviation flights over the conflict zone and avoid the crash of flight MH17.” A question arises about whether such information was known by the Russian Federation. This was raised in the set of clarifying questions submitted after the analysis of the questionnaire responses and described later in this report. Clarifying questions were asked about knowledge of both capability and intent to attack.Q7 — Risk analysis: Coordination and analysis of ac-ceptable security risk levelsMuch like the answer to Q6, the response notes that the “responsibility for initiating the coordination process lies with the State on whose territory an armed conflict is taking place.” Further, information is provided again about the reasons for airspace restriction: “NOTAMs V6158/14 and
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77 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSA2681/14 with restrictions on the use of the airspace of the Rostov-on-Don FIR were issued due to the hostilities on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation, as well as the shelling of Russian territory from the territory of Ukraine.”Q8 — Risk analysis: Potential consequencesThe response refers to ICAO documents and notes that Rosaviatsiya used information from the Russian Foreign Ministry to develop the NOTAM “[d]ue to the hostilities ongoing on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation.”There is no actual response as to the “process” used or as to the responsible authorities.Q9 — Risk analysis: Risk methodologyThe response notes that it is not known what process Ukraine used, further accentuating its position to point to Ukraine for many parts of the airspace security risk assessment process without considering the role of the adjacent states with airspace affected by the conflict. There are notes that information can be found in the answers to question Q7 and Q8.Q10 — Risk analysis: Risk mitigationsThe response repeats reference to ICAO and notes that information can be found in the answers to question Q5 and Q12.Q11 — Decision-making: Normal times decision-makingThe response notes the presence of several documents that should contain the information requested includ-ing, but not limited to, “Organization of Planning the Use of Airspace of the Russian Federation.” Some high-level information is provided regarding the general process for “organisation of the use of airspace.”As responsible authorities, the response names Rosav-iatsiya and Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federa-tion.” Additionally, “A user of airspace whose activity poses a threat to the safety of airspace use” is also identified with the responsible authorities.Q12 — Decision-making: Conflict zone decision-makingThe response again drives responsibility to Ukraine, noting that there were no armed conflicts in the Rostov-on-Don Flight Information Region (FIR). It was stated that the conflict zone decision-making process “has no differences from the one specified in the answer to question Q11.”The threat from the proximate conflict zone was again established as a legitimate reason to close the airspace: “the imposition of restrictions … was motivated by the reaction to hazardous activities for flights in the neighboring State.” Further, it is stated that the “initiative to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 related to the Rostov-on-Don FIR came from the Southern Interregional Territorial Adminis-tration of Rosaviation on July 12, 2014, due to the aggra-vated situation in the border areas with Ukraine, the use of various types of weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces (statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia No. 1570 dated June 28, 2014, No. 1678 dated July 10, 2014, No. 1688 dated July 13, 2014).”Based on the analysis of the response, it was decided to ask a clarifying question seeking information on the precise threat that required airspace restriction over the territory of the Russian Federation up to FL 320 but not above.The consideration for the clarifying question is based on the references to the statements (1570-28-06-2014, 1678-10-07-2014 and 1688-13-07-2014) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federations that refer to low-altitude artillery shootings.Q13 — Decision-making: Adjacent FIR coordinationThe response notes the area of flight information in which the armed conflict was taking place was not in the Russian Federation. Therefore, it reiterates the position that Russia had no responsibility for “safe passage” through an FIR outside its jurisdiction. There is a long argument about the Ukrainian restriction of airspace above FL 320 while reserving the airspace underneath for military aviation operations. The argument provided by the Russian Feder-ation is that FL 320 and FL 330 are separated by 1,000 ft, which in reduced vertical separation airspace (RVSM) is not sufficient vertical separation between non-RVSM and RVSM-equipped and certified aircraft. This argument is not related to the subject and the scope of this study.Q14 — Promulgation: Publish or not, and howThe response repeats the reference to various documents and answers in Q11 and Q12.Responsible authorities are identified as:• Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya);• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federa-tion”; and,• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Infor-mation Centre” Airspace user, whose activities create a hazard to the safe use of airspace.Q15 — Promulgation: Verify and validateThe response notes that information is contained in various referenced documents. In terms of verification and validation, it was only stated that “after receiving raw
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78 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSaeronautical data and raw aeronautical information, the aeronautical information authority shall verify, register and process them” and that “[i]f the raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information do not meet the requirements, the aeronautical information authority shall send them back to the providers (compilators) of raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information for refinement.”Q16 — Promulgation: Special advisories and threat informationThe response references ICAO guidance and other docu-mentation and notes the process for producing NOTAMs. It mentions that the Russian aircraft operators are respon-sible for collecting and disseminating information.Following the analysis of the information received from the Russian Federation, we concluded that there are a number of questions that remain open. However, to respect the timeline of our inquiry, we decided to concen-trate only on some CQs. The CQs were formulated and subsequently communicated to the Russian Federation.The Russian Federation replied with a letter contain-ing responses to the clarifying questions. The responses from the Russian Federation as received are included in Appendix C. Hereafter, we provide a question-by-ques-tion discussion of the received responses. The discussion is based on analysis of the responses provided in Russian and on the unofficial translation in English.CQ1 — What threat information about the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in URVV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority?The response clearly answers that “Russian authorities did not have any information regarding the presence of air defence equipment on the territory of Ukraine that was not controlled by the armed forces of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and which could hit targets in the Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250.”The response also notes that “Rosaviatsiya identified a threat to flight safety itself due to Ukraine’s regular shooting of the Russian border areas.”Additionally, the response provides that “it is incorrect to focus only on threats posed exclusively by air defence sys-tems capable of hitting targets at high altitudes.” However, security risk for civil aviation at low altitude is outside the scope of this inquiry.The response also provides discussion, in the same manner as the answers to the questionnaire mentioned earlier, that the way the buffer zone for protecting the military operations has been defined by Ukraine would, in accordance with the relevant Ukrainian provisions for RVSM airspace, require 600 m (2,000 ft) separation between the upper limit of the reserved airspace and aircraft above it. However, this issue is outside the scope of the present inquiry. Moreover, air defence equipment that can reach FL 330 would be reasonably expected to be able to reach FL 340 as well.CQ2 — What intent to attack with air defence equip-ment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in URVV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority?The response says, “When taking a decision to issue NO-TAM V6158/14, the Russian airspace authorities did not have information that governmental or non-governmental entities on the territory of Ukraine deployed air defence equipment capable of downing aircraft at high altitudes in the conflict zone and could use it in the armed conflict by mistake or negligence.”The answer does not respond to the question about known intent but provides an answer to another question — about knowledge of air defence equipment deployment.What can also be seen in the answer is that it is not referring to the defined time period in the request to the Russian Federation, namely “for the period of 1 March 2014 and up to and including the moment of complete closure of the airspace subsequent to the downing of MH17.” Instead, the answer restricts the referenced time to “[w]hen taking a decision to issue NOTAM V6158/14.” That NOTAM was issued on 16 July 2014 and it is not known when exactly the decision to issue it was taken.Additionally, the question asks about knowledge of any authority and the answer refers only to “the Russian airspace authorities.”In summary, it can be concluded that the question about Russian authorities’ knowledge of intent to attack was not answered.CQ3 — What were the specific reasons for restricting the airspace with NOTAM V6158/14, why were there several restrictions in one NOTAM, and to which of the restrictions in the NOTAM apply the items F) and G), specifying surface as lower height limit and FL 530 as upper height limit?As a reason for airspace closure, the response referenc-es the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “information concerning the risks to people and objects on the territory of the Russian Federation.” This information as provided in the answers to the other questions is on the basis of some statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the threat is identified as low-level artillery shootings. For the specific reason to close the airspace, the answer refers again to the reasons provided in NOTAM V6158/14: “Due to combat actions on the territory of the Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation
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79 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH176 | COLLECTING AND ANALYSING INFORMATION ABOUT UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSand the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of the Russian Federation.”In respect to the altitude restrictions in NOTAM V6158/14, the response provides that the relevant air-way restriction for Flight MH17’s planned trajectory was from ground surface to FL 320 as provided in item E) of the NOTAM. The response answers that the information in the NOTAM items Q), F) and G) for restriction from ground to FL 530 Is “concerning the use of the arrival/exit routes to and from the Rostov-on-Don airport” that are not related to Flight MH17’s planned trajectory. The Russian language version of the answer provides explanation about the upper limit of FL 530 as the maximum available Flight Level as per the Russian Federation Aeronautical Informa-tion Publication (AIP).CQ4 — NOTAM V6158/14 promulgated, among other things, a restriction with an upper height limit of FL 320, referring to “the facts of firing from the ter-ritory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Russian Federation.” What was the precise threat that required airspace restriction over the territory of the Russian Federation up to FL 320 but not above, considering that in the references you provided the statements (1570-28-06-2014, 1678-10-07-2014 and 1688-13-07-2014) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federations refer to low-altitude artillery shootings?The answer highlights that the Ukrainian NOTAMs used to restrict the airspace did not provide the reason for it.The answer highlights some instances of GPS signal jamming over eastern Ukraine, reported by “Russian air companies” and reported airspace violations.The answer points again to the Russian Ministry of For-eign Affairs statements about low-level threats as a reason for airspace closure.The answer explained the selection of FL 320 as an upper limit to the airspace restriction, “same as in the Ukrainian NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14,” because “Rosaviatsiya did not have any other, more or less credible information provided by the Ukrainian side, which would allow [it] to forecast the vertical limit of the hazard zone for civil aviation flights.”
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80 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH177 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESS7. Discussion on Ukraine and Russian Federation Threat Awareness7.1. Discussion FrameworkThis section discusses the Foundation’s observations regarding Ukraine and Russian Federation threat aware-ness prior to the downing of Flight MH17. The threat was associated with the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that could reach civil aircraft operating above the airspace that was closed to them. Discussion of the publicly available information about the capability to attack which could have contributed to threat awareness for the relevant authorities is related mainly to quadrants 1 and 2 from Figure 18 and discussion regarding what rel-evant Ukrainian and Russian Federation authorities knew about the threat is related to quadrants 3 and 4.One important part of our inquiry was identifying when information about the threat reached:• Those responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace over a conflict zone, and• Those establishing restrictions of airspace in a con-flict zone.This is illustrated in Figure 20, where the respective stages from the Foundation’s Integrated Standard for Airspace Security Risk Assessment are outlined.Threat information reaching the Risk Analysis and De-cision-Making steps (C and D) in the process is the Foun-dation’s criterion for threat awareness at the level of the statewide process. Using this criterion, unverified social media posts, other media reports or the potential presence of information in intercepted but unprocessed commu-nications do not represent sufficient facts for realistic threat awareness. This is because verified threat awareness is not available to those responsible for risk analysis and decision-making.7.2. Risk Analysis and Decision-Making ResponsibilitiesTo use the criterion for threat awareness at the level of the statewide process in a reliable manner, it is necessary to identify which authorities are responsible for assessing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and which are responsible for establishing restrictions or segregations of airspace in a conflict zone.With respect to Ukraine, UkSATSE and SASU, as stated in the DSB Investigation report section 6.1, are responsi-ble for airspace management at the tactical, pre-tactical and strategic levels. As noted in 6.2 of the DSB report — the process for threat analysis and coordination for Figure 20Criterion for Threat AwarenessA.Threat watchB.Threat analysisC.Risk analysisD.Decision-makingE.PromulgationSocial mediaPublic and private sourcesOther actors’ informationAdjacent airspaceVerifying the informationUnintentional attack factorsCoordination and analysisPotential consequencesRisk assessmentRisk mitigationsConict zone decisionAdjacent FIR coordinationImplement the decisionPublish or not and howSpecial advisories and threat informationThreat awareness of authorities responsible for risk analysis and decision-making
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81 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH177 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSthe airspace below FL 260 involved discussion between Ukrainian military authorities and UkSATSE about the accidents involving military aeroplanes being shot down and a request on 5 June 2014 from the military authorities “…to restrict civil aviation’s use of the airspace below FL260 to protect military aircraft from these attacks and to be able to give priority to air force operations….”In summary, the overall process as described in the DSB report was “…that the Ukrainian Air Force submitted the request to UkSATSE for further processing of the temporary airspace restriction below FL260. UkSATSE processed this request and sent it to the military authorities for verifica-tion. Once the General Staff agreed to the details, it sent the request to the Ukrainian aviation authority, SASU.”It is important to note that the process referenced in the DSB report did not describe any analysis of the threat to civil aviation but instead considered the military authori-ties’ analysis of the threat to military aviation. “…[T]hose responsible at UkSATSE stated that they had no influence on the decision to restrict the use of airspace,” the report said.In the responses Ukraine provided to the standard procedure and decision-making questionnaire, SASU was clearly identified as the authority that “constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defence of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers; and other sources, social media included.”From the statement in the DSB report that “[a]fter an emergency beacon was activated at around 13.20, indicating that flight MH17 had crashed, UkSATSE made the decision at 15.00, at the tactical level, to also restrict the airspace above FL320.” It could be deduced that UkSATSE was among the authorities responsible for the airspace closure decision-making related to civil aircraft security risk. This was confirmed91 through answers to our directed ques-tions — “Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are established by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Mili-tary System at the request of the competent authorities and users of airspace.”Additionally, the DSB report said that “UkSATSE has the mandate to close or restrict parts of the airspace for brief periods of time at the tactical level. Airspace closures and restrictions at the strategic or pre-tactical levels are coordi-nated by Ukraerocenter and the State Aviation Administra-tion (SASU) in close cooperation with the General Staff of the Armed Forces. SASU exercises decisive authority with regard to airspace closures.”With respect to the Russian Federation, the risk analysis and decision-making authorities have been identified 91 Considering that the DSB report identified Integrated Civil-Military ATM System of Ukraine “… as part of the UkSATSE air traffic control service”from the responses received to the standard procedure and decision-making questionnaire. No answer was provided relative to the responsible authorities for risk analysis.For the security of airspace decision processes in the Russian Federation, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace in a conflict zone, the identified authorities are:• The Federal Agency for Air Transport (Rosaviatsiya). Rosaviatsiya is the Russian government agency re-sponsible for overseeing the civil aviation industry in Russia. It is also called the Russian Federation Civil Aviation Administration.• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation.”• As reported in the response: “A user of airspace whose activity poses a threat to the safety of airspace use.”7.3. Risk AssessmentAs part of a systemic assessment of threat awareness, the intent of this analysis is to understand if it was theoret-ically possible for the risk to commercial aviation to be assessed in the specific circumstances leading up to the downing of Flight MH17.Threat, as per the Foundation methodology, is com-posed of four distinct factors (that collectively may give rise to threat to civil aviation): capability, intent, possibility for an unintentional attack and the conflict parties’ com-mand and control. Capability includes weapon technical means and human capacity and capability to operate the technical system. Without the intent to use the capability, there is no threat unless the use of the capability is acci-dental. Whilst the use of a weapon system can be deliber-ate at the operator level, this may be contrary to the true intent at a political-military strategic level.It is key to note that the continuous assessment of the security risk for civil aviation defined in the Foundation’s Integrated Standard for Airspace Security Risk Assessment uses as inputs information about the four distinct factors of the threat and not only information about capability to attack. Indeed, one may not have information about capa-bility to attack but all the other factors may combine in a way that increases the assessed risk levels to close to critical. In other words, a state may not be aware of a capability to attack and still can perform a meaningful risk analysis.It follows also that awareness of a capability is not suffi-cient in itself to fully inform a judgment about the risk of an attack. Without indications of intent, such as uncon-strained hostilities (e.g. war) or political statements, any judgment of risk must consider other factors, including whether the capability is under suitable control.
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82 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH177 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSLack of suitable control would be a significant aggra-vating factor and, similarly, poor operator training would arguably increase the risk of a possibility of unintentional attack. The question then arises as to how a controlling authority could come to a valid conclusion on risk without access to sophisticated and timely intelligence.To understand the risk, Table 6 (p. 83) provides an overview of the indicators of likelihood of attack for the airspace of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the same format the other conflict zones were investigated. This presentation can also allow those interested to com-pare the different assessments.There are some important caveats to be introduced here.Two assessments were made — one with hindsight knowledge and one with foresight knowledge.The assessment made with hindsight knowledge is a reflection after the fact, in which the results of how the situation evolved are known and many of the associated factors have surfaced over time. This is not the same as the situation seen in foresight from the perspective of a reasonable person that:• Detects many weak signals that are shaping countless possibilities on how the situation may evolve in the future, and• Needs to make a decision under pressure of time and with limited information.Another caveat relates to the Foundation’s use of a contemporary risk assessment methodology and algo-rithms that were not available at the time. The hindsight caveat is the most crucial. Because the hindsight analysis was performed after the event, it relies on the view of a knowledgeable person who possessed all the information. However, much of the most relevant information only became available after the downing of Flight MH17, and that knowledge would at the time have been distributed amongst several authorities. For example, because it is now known that Flight MH17 was downed by a missile, the capability to attack clearly existed at the time whether this was known to the authorities or not.The hindsight assessment describes the risk that would have been assessed had all the information detection, processing and coordination functioned perfectly. This understanding will allow the reader to assess the now exposed gaps against an ideally functioning process.With this hindsight in mind, the situation in each air-space (Ukrainian and Russian Federation) was reviewed relative to the set of 10 pre-determined “indicators of likelihood of attack.”In the specific case of the Russian Federation assess-ment, apart from the risk factors in the adjacent Ukrainian airspace, the physical proximity and the range of the threat indicates that the conflict zone was close enough to affect Russian Federation airspace.In the Foundation algorithm, the capability to attack by at least one party is used as the primary indicator of likelihood of attack, because the presence of an air defence system that can target aircraft above FL 250 is the key ena-bling risk factor. As mentioned above, it is considered that long-range SAMs capable of hitting an aircraft at cruising level were presentThe next indicator of likelihood of attack relates to civil aircraft operations over or close to a conflict zone at high altitude; based on the information provided in the DSB in-vestigation report, it is accepted that there was substantial traffic volume, including international overflights.Another key indicator of likelihood of attack in the algorithm sequence involves known intent to attack. It is clear from reviewing publicly available information that armed non-state forces operating in eastern Ukraine had the motivation and intent to target Ukrainian military aircraft operating in the region. Those forces also repeat-edly demonstrated their capability to successfully attack helicopters and low-flying fixed-wing military aircraft with an assortment of weapons, including MANPADS and other anti-aircraft defence systems. There were no known attacks on civilian aircraft in the region and no publicly available information about intent to attack civil aviation.The next indicator of likelihood of attack involves military aviation activities, and more specifically, the fact that military aviation was being operated by Ukrainian government forces and there was more than occasional use of military aircraft to transport ground troops or mili-tary equipment.There was a widely reported conflict between a state (Ukraine) and armed non-state forces. The armed conflict involved medium to large scale military activities and heightened political tension.The risk assessment algorithm subsequently examines the risk factors for unintentional attack. The studied situation shown in Table 6, apart from the already mentioned indi-cators, assesses SAM operators’ experience and the chain of command and capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft. When in the algorithm we assess the scenario of an unintentional attack, and considering that the attack actually took place, these factors with hindsight are assessed to be to be low level of control and marginal capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft.Finally, it seems unlikely that there were large or medi-um scale military air combat activities above FL 250 in the airspace above eastern Ukraine.In the hindsight assessment, the analysed set of risk factors for unintentional attack, in their aggregation, point to a very high likelihood for unintentional attack and high risk at high altitudes without airspace restriction. This resultant risk is illustrated in the Table 6 column “Overall indication of likelihood of attack above FL 320” in the sub-column “Without airspace restrictions.”
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83 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17Table 6Overview of the Conflict Zone Hindsight and Foresight AnalysesAirspace Restrictions above FL 320No informationCommand and control factorsHigh likelihood indicationRisk factors for an unintentional attackMedium likelihood indicationCapability to attack Low likelihood indicationIntent to attack Overall indication of likelihood of attack above FL 320 A. PartiesB. Armed conflict scale and/or tensionsH. SAM operators’ experience and chain of commandC. Military air transport activitiesJ. Civil aircraft operations (with airspace restrictions)D. Military air combat activitiesG. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft F. Capability to attack by at least one partyE. Known attacks I. Known intent to attack (civil a/c)With actual airspace restrictionsWithout airspace restrictionsHindsight AssessmentAssessment of the likelihood of attack in eastern Ukraine airspace No restrictionsAssessment of the likelihood of attack in Russian Federation airspace No restrictionsForesight Assessment with low indication of capability to attackAssessment of the likelihood of attack in eastern Ukraine airspaceNo restrictionsAssessment of the likelihood of attack in Russian Federation airspaceNo restrictionsForesight Assessment with medium indication of capability to attackAssessment of the likelihood of attack in eastern Ukraine airspaceNo restrictionsAssessment of the likelihood of attack in Russian Federation airspaceNo restrictionsForesight Assessment with medium indication of capability to attackAssessment of the likelihood of attack in eastern Ukraine airspaceNo restrictionsAssessment of the likelihood of attack in Russian Federation airspaceNo restrictions7 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESS
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84 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH177 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSIn the assessment scenario that includes the actual air-space restrictions, the aggregated likelihood for uninten-tional attack is still very high and the overall likelihood of attack is high because the actual airspace restrictions are up to FL 320 and the overflying aircraft are still exposed to the threat. This resultant risk is illustrated in the Table 6 column “Overall indication of likelihood of attack above FL 320” in the sub-column “With actual airspace restrictions.”Knowing that Flight MH17 was downed, in hindsight, it is no surprise that the risk assessment algorithms conclud-ed that the likelihood of attack was high and there was a need for Ukrainian and Russian Federation authorities to close the airspace.Therefore, the Foundation performed a second assess-ment — a foresight assessment — from the perspective of the reasonably available information prior to the downing of Flight MH17. The indicators about SAM operators’ experience and the chain of command and capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft are assessed to be to be low level of control and marginal ca-pability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft. As described in the analysis of conflict zones during the 1990–2014 period, even without the hindsight knowledge of the attack, and to be conservative in the risk assess-ment, we could consider the indicator to be associated with irregular forces that do not have an organised specific reporting channel, a protocol for authorising SAM attack or a capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft as regular military forces would have.The main difference from the already described as-sessment with hindsight knowledge using the set of 10 pre-determined “indicators of likelihood of attack” is the information available about the capability to attack civil aviation above FL 320.As shown in Table 6, the aggregated risk factors for an unintentional attack and command and control factors (that are the same for the hindsight and for the foresight assessments) are almost at the maximum possible level. In such a situation, the assessed risk is therefore extremely sensitive to any information about capability to attack.In such a situation, following the Foundation’s method-ology, the indicator of capability to attack should not be considered as a binary choice of “present” or “not present.” Instead, the indicator of capability to attack should be considered as a likelihood range. If the capability to attack indicator is assessed as low, then the overall risk would be also low. But if the indicator of capability to attack is assessed as medium or high, then (considering that almost all the other factors are high) the resultant overall likeli-hood of attack will also be high — see Table 6. This makes 92 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWtH8AA42Fc&feature=share93 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWtH8AA42Fc&feature=sharethe discussion about threat awareness very crucial for understanding the risk management.In summary, the Foundation finds that in a situation in which risk is highly dependent on an uncertain factor such as capability to attack, the risk assessment should take the side of caution when there is information about capability to attack that is not necessarily certain and validated but that is characterised to be above a pre-defined threshold level of certainty — e.g. unverified intelligence reports.7.4. Ukraine Awareness of Threat to Civil AircraftThe discussion on the threat awareness is twofold — a discussion on reported threat awareness (concerning Quadrants 3 and 4 in Figure 18) and a discussion on the potential threat awareness (concerning Quadrants 1 and 2 in Figure 18).The discussion on the reported threat awareness is about what authorities said they knew about the threat at an altitude above FL 320. We studied what authori-ties said in public (both before and after the downing of Flight MH17) and their responses to our questionnaires. This discussion is different from what information was available in the public and private space about a threat (so-cial media, other publications and intelligence).The Foundation’s research did not find any instances be-fore (quadrant 3 in Figure 18) the downing of Flight MH17 in which Ukrainian authorities publicly acknowledged the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence systems capable of reaching an altitude greater than FL 320.The Foundation identified from information made publicly known after (quadrant 4 in Figure 18) the downing of Flight MH17 that some Ukrainian authorities (counterintelligence services) suspected the presence of air defence equipment that could reach high altitudes — “first information ‘hinting’ at a Buk launcher in the possession of the non-state forces was received on 14 July and came from counterintelligence units.”92 This information corresponds to Group A from the Foundation Standard, namely threat watch as shown in Figure 20.However, no facts were found that this information had been verified per the functions in Group B from the Foundation Standard — “But we could not confirm directly that it was Buk missile launcher that trespassed illegally [in] Ukrainian territory.”93 Similarly, no facts were found by the Foundation that the information was disseminated through the statewide process to reach the authorities responsible for risk assessment and decision-making regarding airspace closure.Finding 6: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Ukrainian authorities responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those
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85 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH177 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSestablishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone94 were aware of a threat to civil aviation before the down-ing of Flight MH17.The discussion on the potential threat awareness is about what information existed in the public and private space about a weapon. This discussion is not about the reported threat awareness of relevant authorities (already discussed previously).It is clear from publicly available information that the conflict in eastern Ukraine was in an active combat phase in the weeks prior to the downing of Flight MH17.Both the Ukrainian military and armed non-state forces were using small arms, heavy calibre machine guns, artillery, anti-tank weapons, tanks, and various air defence systems. In addition, Ukraine was employing rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft for transport and attack purposes; Ukraine alleged that Russian aircraft also had been used to attack Ukraine aircraft. Ukraine apparently had some success attacking non-state ground forces with aircraft and also suffered a number of aircraft losses.There was a widespread belief among Ukraine and Western states that the Russian Federation was supplying weapons, including heavy weapons, and personnel to support armed non-state forces in the conflict area. But as the DSB report stated, “despite the Western political and military focus on the conflict, its escalation and its air com-ponent, none of the politicians or authorities quoted publicly made a connection between the military developments in the eastern part of Ukraine and risks to civil aviation.”There were numerous reports about the presence of heavy weapons in the region, such as tanks, MANPADS, artillery and large calibre machine guns. However, there were relatively few reports in the public space about armed non-state forces possessing weapons with a capability to attack above FL 320. For example, there are conflicting ac-counts relating to the altitude at which a Ukrainian An-26 was flying when it was shot down on 14 July, although the aircraft was thought by some to have been brought down with a SAM system.The most notable publicly available information about the capability to attack at high altitudes before the down-ing of Flight MH17 was from social media posts about Buk missile systems. Some of these posts were about the movement of Buk batteries in Russian territory bordering Ukraine and some were about Buk missile systems being observed in eastern Ukraine a few hours before the down-ing of Flight MH17. The Foundation acknowledges that these were just a few instances of published social media 94 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.95 On 28 September 2016, during the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) presentation of the first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation, it was revealed that more than 150,000 telephone calls were intercepted.96 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.97 For example, as reported in the DSB report “The Buk surface-to-air missile system is able to engage targets at altitudes up to 70,000 or 80,000 feet.”posts out of probably millions of posts from the region at that time. It should also be stressed that it is difficult to establish the veracity of published social media accounts.In addition, the Foundation did not identify any informa-tion available in the public space that would have verified the reports about the capability to attack above FL 320 prior to the Flight MH17 attack taking place. The identified num-ber of cases of publicly available information indicating the potential presence of capability to attack above FL 320 were occasional relative to the volume of all the publicly available information about the conflict zone at the time.With hindsight, some facts made available after the downing of Flight MH17 pointed to the possibility for some authorities to have processed information and understood that there may have been a threat to civil aviation. Namely, these are some of the 150,000 telephone conversations95 intercepted and the counterintelligence field information discussed previously.However, without knowing the actual technological capabilities, preparedness and direction to process on time these intercepted telephone conversations and social me-dia posts, it is not possible for the Foundation to conclude that the Ukrainian authorities had the means to verify the intelligence and coordinate dissemination of the informa-tion so as to form a more accurate assessment of the risk to civil aviation and to have completely closed the airspace in time to prevent the attack on Flight MH17.Finding 7: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Ukrainian authorities responsible for analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establish-ing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone96 could have had a proper awareness of the high-altitude threat.7.5. Russian Federation Awareness of Threat to Civil AircraftSome of the western part of the Rostov-on-Don FIR airspace of the Russian Federation was near the conflict zone in the eastern Ukraine. Because of its close proximity to the conflict zone, the airspace could have been affected by a threat to civil aviation originating from a potential presence in the conflict zone of long-range air defence equipment not controlled by government forces.The possibility of a threat to civil aviation was acknowl-edged in NOTAMs (V6158/14 and A2681/14) issued by the Russian Federation that closed the airspace up to FL 320. It should be noted that an air defence equipment threat reaching FL 320 could also reach the airspace im-mediately above FL 320.97
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86 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH177 | DISCUSSION ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION THREAT AWARENESSThe reasons for restricting their airspace, reported by the Russian Federation in an answer to a Foundation directed question, cited statements made by the coun-try’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to the downing of Flight MH17. These statements refer only to low altitude threats from artillery.Responding to a Foundation query regarding the reason for selecting the upper limit for the airspace re-striction, the Russian Federation acknowledged that the airspace was closed up to FL 320 and that this altitude limit was the same as the one indicated in the Ukrainian NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 and that “Rosaviatsi-ya did not have any other, more or less credible informa-tion provided by the Ukrainian side, which would allow to forecast the vertical limit of the hazard zone for civil aviation flights.”In response to the Foundation’s query on this matter, the Russian Federation indicated that authorities did not have any information regarding the presence of air defence equipment on the territory of Ukraine that was not con-trolled by the armed forces of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and which could strike targets in the Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250.The Foundation did not obtain satisfactory clarifications from the Russian Federation about any of the Russian authorities’ knowledge of intent to attack with air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250 in eastern Ukraine.The Foundation’s research did not find any other instances where Russian Federation authorities publicly acknowledged before or after the downing of Flight MH17 the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence systems capable of reaching an altitude of greater than FL 320.Finding 8: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Russian Federation authorities responsible for ana-lysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone98 were aware of a threat to civil aviation before the downing of Flight MH17.With regard to any Russian Federation potential threat awareness, the information identified in the public space, and already listed in the discussion about Ukraine, was also available to the Russian Federation, including the so-cial media posts. However, it is assumed in this study that the Russian Federation did not have access to intercepted telephone conversations and intelligence information available to the Ukrainian authorities.98 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.99 The JIT, comprised of representatives from the Netherlands, Australia, Malayasia, Belgium and Ukraine, is conducting a criminal investigation into the crash.100 https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-investigation-jit-mh17/speakers-text-jit-mh17-press-meeting-24-5-2018101 Responsible authorities are defined in detail in Section 7.2.Another set of facts from the public information is associated with the JIT99 that points to a request by the armed non-state forces for a Buk and to the movement of a Buk in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The JIT reported100: “After an extensive and labor-intensive comparative investigation, in which many BUK-TELARs were involved, the JIT has come to the conclusion that the BUK-TELAR that shot down flight MH17 comes from the 53rd Anti Aircraft Missile Brigade, or the 53rd Brigade from Kursk in the Russian Federation. This 53rd Brigade is a unit of the Russian armed forces.” This JIT conclusion has been disputed and denied by the Russian Federation.However, the purpose of the present analysis is to iden-tify if the relevant authorities responsible for risk analysis and decision-making could have had a proper threat awareness irrespective of the origin of the of the weapon system. The Foundation did not identify sufficient facts that such threat awareness existed to relevant authorities.Apart from the discussion on the accessibility of the information, another important aspect of the Russian Fed-eration risk analysis and decision-making can be deduced from the Russian Federation standard procedure and deci-sion-making protocols. In response to a Foundation inquiry relating to standard procedures and threat knowledge, the Russian Federation stated: “Threats to air traffic safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR stemmed from the dangerous activities in the area of responsibility of the adjacent Dnepropetrovsk FIR.” Further, it was stated that “[a]ll possible risk factors for an unintended attack should be considered” and that “[s]uch preparations should include an assessment of the risk to civil aircraft operations due to a military conflict or incidents of unlawful interference with civil aviation.”After acknowledging the source of the threat in the neighbouring territory and, in general the need to consid-er all risk factors, the Russian Federation did not acknowl-edge the responsibility to determine the risk factors for an unintentional attack in Russian Federation airspace originating from the close proximity to the conflict zone in the eastern Ukraine. With respect to the issue of which authorities were responsible, the response was: “The state responsible for compliance with the rules for the introduc-tion of restrictions on the use of airspace over an armed conflict zone (Ukraine, in relation to the MH17 crash).”Finding 9: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that Russian Federation authorities responsible for analys-ing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone101 could have had a proper awareness of the high-altitude threat.
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87 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESAppendix A Conflict zones case studiesBosnian war 1992–1997Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Conflict between states.The conflicting parties in the Bosnian war were: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Herzeg-Bosnia, Republika Srpska, Serbian Krajina, Western Bosnia, FR Yugoslavia.NATO Operation Deny Flight and Operation Deliberate Force.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.There were more than 20 large military operations or battles during the war, including the siege of Sarajevo.On 29 August 1995 Operation Deliberate Force was launched by NATO involving 400 aircraft and over 3,515 sorties. It continued until 20 September 1995.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party.More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).In 1992 the United Sates recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and soon after began airlifting food and supplies from Italy.United Nations forces took control of the Sarajevo airport and authorized an international airlift of humanitarian supplies.United States launched Operation Provide Promise on 3 July 1992 to provide airlift.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities.Military combat activities involving multiple reginal parties and NATO. E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.On 3 September 1992 an Italian Air Force (Aeronautica Militare Italiana) G.222 was shot down when approaching Sarajevo airfield while conducting a United Nations relief mission. It crashed 18 miles (29 km) from the airfield.On 28 February 1994, six Republika Srpska Air Force J-21 Jastreb jets were engaged, and four of them shot down, by NATO warplanes from the U.S. Air ForceOn 16 April 1994 a Sea Harrier of the UK Royal Navy 801 Naval Air Squadron, operating from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, was brought down by a Igla-1 surface-to-air missile fired by the Army of Republika Srpska while attempting to bomb two Bosnian Serb tanks over Gorazde.On 28 May 1995 a Mi-17 was shot down by a missile from an 2K12 Kub mobile SAM launcher. The attack killed the Bosnian Minister Irfan Ljubijankić, a few other politicians, and the helicopter’s Ukrainian crew.On 2 June 1995 a US Air Force F-16C was shot down at 6000 meters altitude by a missile launch from an 2K12 Kub mobile SAM launcher.On 30 August 1995 a French Air Force Dassault Mirage 2000N was shot down by SAM-14 or DCA after bomb release on munition storage — Deny Flight mission. F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude.2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”) mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet low to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from air attack.
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88 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESBosnian war 1992–1997 (continued)G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported only by radar tracks — for some of the armed forces.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.SAMs in the possession of poorly trained, inexperienced personnel OR an absence of robust command and control procedures for authorizing launch.The SAMs (2K12 Kub mobile SAM) were in possession of the Army of Republika Srpska forces.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.No or occasional traffic after the restrictions.Before the airspace closure the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized by considerable overflight traffic volume, with overflights from Turkey, Greece, Middle East and Asia Pacific to Central and Western Europe. Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)None2. OthersNote:Closure of the whole airspace for civil flights occurred in 1992.Airspace below FL285 was closed from 1997.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Reason for airspace closure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the war, which started in Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 April 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina independence was proclaimed in March 1992. There were no aviation authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina who would issue any official document.The former Yugoslavia had SAMs and there was threat of their use. In addition, NATO was in the air.Signing of the Dayton peace accord in November 1995 enabled negotiation on limited opening of Bosnia and Herzegovina airspace — upper airspace above FL 285 in 1997. Lower airspace was closed at NATO’s request. NATO used this airspace for their operations.
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89 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESBosnian war 1992–1997 (continued)Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.The first step in the closure of airspace was done indirectly. Namely, the two neighboring states, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (successor Serbia), and Croatian aviation authorities stopped the traffic to/from Bosnia and Herzegovina. This essentially closed the airspace for international traffic.In March 1993, the United Nations passed Resolution 816, which banned all flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina not authorized by the United Nations. It also authorized NATO to enforce the ban on military flights by shooting down violators. At the request of UN Security Council, NATO declared ‘Operation Deny Flight’ and a ‘no fly zone’.In 1997 FRY, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO signed agreement on the opening of the airspace above FL285 for commercial air traffic. It was agreed that ATM would be provided by Belgrade and Zagreb ACCs, while Search and Rescue was provided by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operational boundary for the traffic above FL285 was on the old FIR boundary between Belgrade and Zagreb FIR. It was 40NM west of Sarajevo and Mostar. The whole airspace below FL 285 was controlled by NATO Stabilization Forces (SFOR).PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.FRY and Croatia published NOTAMs (references not available).NATO published information as well (references not available).Opening of the airspace above FL285 was done by the NOTAM coordinated between FRY, Croatia and supported by the assistance of EUROCONTROL (references not available).NotesOther relevant informationLOAs were signed between all actors in the opening of Bosnia and Herzegovina airspace for civilian traffic.References:U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War, March 1991U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Combat forces in former Yugoslavia, July 1993Daniel L. Haulman, Air Force historical Research Agency, MANNED AIRCRAFT LOSSES OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1994–1999, October 2009Jaffe S., Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, 2015
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90 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESCroatian war 1991–1995Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.The conflicting parties in the Croatian war from 1991 until 1995 were Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krjina, Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia, Republika Srpska, Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Western Slavonia.The war lasted from 31 March 1991 until 12 November 1995.This conflict was fought by the defence forces of the Croatian government initially against the Yugoslav Army (JNA) until 1992 and local Serbian forces formed as the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) until 1995.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency or small-scale military activities.The Yugoslav People’s Army tried to keep Croatia within Yugoslavia by occupying all of Croatia.After this was unsuccessful self-proclaimed proto-state Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) was established within Croatia.After the ceasefire of January 1992 and international recognition of the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign state the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed.The military activities became largely intermittent in the following three years.In 1995, Croatia launched two major offensives known as Operation Flash and Operation Storm, and effectively the war was ended.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.On 23 August 1991 Croatian forces shot down two Yugoslav G-2 Galeb fighter aircraft using shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles.On 27 December 1991, the Croatian An-2 was shot down during a bombing mission by a SA-6 SAM missile by Republika Srpska.On 7 January 1992, an Italian Army Agusta-Bell AB-206L LongRanger helicopter, operating as a European Community Monitor Mission and carrying five European Community observers was downed by a Yugoslav Air Force Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21,On 31 July 1994 Air Ukraine An-26 was shot down and crashed.
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91 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESCroatian war 1991–1995 (continued)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude.Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:At the start of the war, the Yugoslav national air defence force possessed more than 100 search radars, eight battalions of SA-2s, six battalions of SA-3s, one battalion of SA-5s, four battalions of SA-6/11s, and 15 regiments of anticraft guns. For support of army, there were also SA-9, SA-13 mobile IR-guided SAMs, and thousands of SA-7 and SA-16 shoulder-fired SAMs.S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA2) is a Soviet-designed, high-altitude air defence system with engagement altitude of 82,000ft.S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet-made SAM system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft.S-200 (NATO reporting name SA-5) is a very long range, medium-to-high altitude SAM system to defend large areas from bomber attack or other strategic aircraft. It has an engagement altitude of 130,000 ft.2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”) low- to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from air attack with engagement altitude, depending on the modification, of up to 46,000ft.Other capabilities for lower altitudes: 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13), 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14), 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) and mobile AAA batteries (multiple types).Republika Srpska2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”) mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet low to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from air attack.Croatian Army:The Croatian Army was developed and equipped during the war.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.SAMs in the possession of poorly trained, inexperienced personnel OR an absence of robust command and control procedures for authorizing launch.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.
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92 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESCroatian war 1991–1995 (continued)J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Small to moderate traffic volume.Considerable traffic volume before the restrictions. Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)None2. OthersPartial restriction.Croatian airspace was closed for eight months, starting from August 1991 preceded on 25 June 1991 by a declaration of independence by Croatia.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.References not found.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process. References not found.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.References not found. NotesOther relevant informationReferences:U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War, March 1991Adria Airways Kronika 1991U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Combat forces in former Yugoslavia, July 1993Daniel L. Haulman, Air Force historical Research Agency, MANNED AIRCRAFT LOSSES OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1994–1999, October 2009
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93 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups.Second Congo War, pitting Congolese forces against rebels and soldiers backed by Uganda and Rwanda, ended in 2002/2003. In 2013, a UN offensive force and Congolese army defeated rebel group M23 Movement. However, more than 100 armed groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was driven out of Uganda in the late 1990s, are believed to operate in the eastern region of the DRC. ADF has pledged allegiance to ISIL (ISIS) but researchers say there is no evidence of close collaboration. More than 16,000 UN peacekeepers are stationed in the country as part of what is described as a stabilization mission. There also is tension with neighbouring Rwanda.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency or small-scale military activities.DRC military is primarily ground-based. DRC military and UN Peacekeepers are battling insurgent groups in eastern DRC.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.DRC military currently has about a dozen transport aircraft.UN peacekeeping force has 11 fixed wing and 30 rotary wing aircraft.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250No military air combat activities.Insurgents not known to have aircraft. DRC forces have six fixed wing and eight rotary wing attack aircraft, but most combat activities seem restricted to ground operations.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with single reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.In Oct. 1998, a 727 crashed after reportedly being struck by a MANPADS while in-flight. Various accounts put death toll at 40 or 41. (In a 1999 incident, a Fokker F27 was struck by gunfire and a possible RPG while parked at an airport.)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.No information about capability to attack with range above FL 250DRC military has 53 “rocket projectors,” which are most likely RPGs.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.NA
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94 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (continued)H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces, primarily ground forces, and no evidence of SAMs.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Know intent to attack military aircraft.Assume that insurgents/rebels would attack DRC military aircraft if opportunity presented itself.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Moderate traffic volume, mainly restricted to arrivals and departures.Most traffic seems to be internal or with other countries in the region.Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)None.2. OthersNone.Note:DRC has not issued any NOTAMs referring to the conflict.FAA previously has issued warnings to U.S. operators advising them to make sure they are informed about the current situation before flying in that area, but there are no current (June 2020) warnings active.EASA does not currently have any Conflict Zone Information Bulletins active regarding the DRC.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.References not found.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process. References not found.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.References not found. NotesOther relevant informationIn 2015, DRC signed an agreement with Harris Corp. to upgrade the country’s ATC system.
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95 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESEgypt (Sinai)Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Ongoing conflict pitting Egyptian armed forces, including army, air force and police, against IS of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Wilayah Sinai. Wilayat Sinai emerged as a terrorist organization in the Sinai Peninsula following a popular uprising and subsequent overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.In November 2014, Wilayat Sinai declared its allegiance to the Islamic State and has since claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including an attack on a mosque that killed more than 300 people, the April 2017 attack on Coptic churches that killed at least 44 people, the December 2016 attack on a Coptic chapel in Cairo that killed at least 25 people, and the October 2015 downing (with a planted IED) of a Russian A321 that killed all 224 people aboard. B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.In addition to attacks referenced in A., two coordinated attacks in one day in Oct. 2014 killed 33 Egyptian security personnel in the Sinai Peninsula. Rocket propelled grenades were used in one of the attacks.Scale and pace of operations increased in 2018 during government offensive prior to presidential election.Scale of conflict has been influenced by pressure from other States, including the U.S. and Israel.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipmentEgypt has a more than 40 C-130Hs and C-295 cargo transports, as well as smaller utility aircraft. Use likely dictated by launching of govt. offensives and/or in response to attacks by insurgents.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Egyptian AF has a range of fighters (including F-16s, Mirages, Rafales and MiG-29s) and attack helicopters and has been accused of using air launched cluster bombs in Sinai.Media reports include a number of references to air attacks, including one that killed eight Mexican tourists.There also have been reports of Israeli warplanes attacking ISIL in Sinai with the secret approval of Egypt; Egypt has denied the reports.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.In addition to claimed IED attack on a Russian airliner in 2015, current FAA background information says in June 2015 ISIS fired rockets toward El Gora Airport (HEGR) in northern Sinai, fired at Egyptian military aircraft with small arms and used MANPADS to shoot down a military helicopter flying at low altitude.In late 2013, the Dutch government informed Dutch carriers about a threat specifically targeting civil aviation.Although MANPADS have not been used to target civil aircraft in the Sinai, extremists/militants could potentially do so at any time with little or no warning, says FAA.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Egyptian navy has ships equipped with French-made VL (vertically launched)-MICA SAMs that can reach 30,000 ftEgyptian military also has long-range, Russian-made SAMs and a large fleet of a fighter aircraft, including F-16s, Mirages, Rafales and MiG-29s.
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96 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESEgypt (Sinai) (continued)G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and elec-tronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.Egyptian military has differential capability. Unknown for ISIL.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forcesEgypt has a modern, well-equipped military. Scattered media reports allege that ISIS/ISIL may possess a few SAMs, but that has not been confirmed.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.ISIL laid claim to the Oct. 2015 downing of a Russian airliner with an IED planted on board, which, if true, demonstrates an intent to attack civil aircraft.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.No information availableAirspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)None2. OthersNoneNote:Airspace restrictions and warnings regarding the Cairo FIR (bellow FL 250/260), particularly involving the northern Sinai region, have been issued since 2014 by Egypt, EASA, Germany the U.S. and U.K.EASA Conflict Zone Information Bulletin current in effect (June 2020)FAA KICZ NOTAM A0040/20 in effect until March 2021Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.A since cancelled EASA SIB advised against operating lower than 25,000 ft AGL because of a threat from “dedicated aircraft weaponry.” Germany advised operators not to plan and conduct flights below FL260 “due to potentially hazardous situation within FIR Cairo; also warned of potential risk during takeoff/landing at all north Sinai airports within FIR Cairo.Current FAA NOTAM says: “plan to exercise extreme caution during flight operations due to ongoing fighting between military forces and extremist/militant elements and the continuing extremist threat to civil aviation, which involves a variety of anti-aircraft-capable weapons, including MANPADS, anti-tank missiles, small-arms fire, and indirect fire weapons, such as mortars and rockets targeting aircraft and Sinai airports. “
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97 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESEgypt (Sinai) (continued)Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.FAA KICZ NOTAM A0040/20EASA CZIB-2017-09R5
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98 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESGeorgia-Russia 2008Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.The conflicting parties in the Georgia-Russia war in 2008 were Georgia, Russia and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.The war lasted from 7 until 12 of August 2008.This conflict took place in the Transcaucasia region.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large scale military activities.In July and August 2008 there was growing tension between Georgian and South Ossetian Forces. On 8 August Georgia launched an air and land assault on Tskhinvali. The Russians responded with air attacks on Georgian forces and Russian forces entered South Ossetia. C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment. D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250.After initial use Georgian forces almost completely withdrew their aircraft. E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.Russia lost six planes in Georgia. Friendly forces likely shot down three or four of the six aircraft Russia lost in the war. “Identify Friend or Foe” (IFF) systems didn’t work.On 8 August 2008 Russian Su-25 was shot down after it came under friendly fire from a MANPADS as it was overflying the positions of Russian troops in South Ossetia.On 9 August 2008 Russian Tu-22M3 heavy bomber was shot down by Georgian Air Defenses (possibly by Buk-M1 SAM).On 9 August 2008 Russian Su-24M frontline bomber was shot down from a Georgian Air Defenses.On 9 August 2008 Russian Su-25 was hit by a Georgian MANPADS that hit the left engine; subsequently, while returning to base at an altitude of 1000 meters, a second MANPADS missile struck the right engine, leaving the plane without thrust and the aircraft crashed.On 9 August 2008 Russian Su-25 attack aircraft was shot down by friendly fire. It was hit from a Russian ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled air defense artillery system covering the Gufti bridge.On 9 August 2008 Russian Su-24M frontline bomber aircraft was shot down by friendly fire.On 11 August 2008 Russian Su-25 attack aircraft was shot by friendly fire. SU-25 attacked by mistake Russian forces and Russian soldiers returned fire from man-portable SAM systems. One of the missiles damaged the plane’s right engine, which burst into flames. The aircraft was barely able to return to its base.
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99 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESGeorgia-Russia 2008 (continued)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude.Russian Federation possess multiple types of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude. However, there were reports that Russian military forces in the war did not have long-range surface-to-air missiles that could be fired beyond the air-defence zones of an adversary.At least one 9K37 Buk was captured by Russian and Russian backed forces during the war.Georgia:9K37 Buk (NATO reporting name SA-11 Gadfly, SA-17 Grizzly) is a Soviet medium-range SAM designed to counter cruise missiles, smart bombs, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. It has an engagement altitude of 20,000ft.9K330 Tor (NATO reporting name SA-15 “Gauntlet”) is a Soviet all-weather low to medium altitude, short-range surface-to-air missile system designed for destroying airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and short-range ballistic threats. It has an engagement altitude of 46,000ft.SPYDER (Surface-to-air PYthon and DERby) is an Israeli short and medium range mobile air defence system. It has an engagement altitude of 30,000 ft or 52,000 ft depending on the modification.S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) is Soviet-made a mobile SAM system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft.Other capabilities include up to three Osa-AK/AKM SAM system batteries, a large number of man-portable SAM systems, as well as a few С-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g. identification, friend or foe (IFF), SSR).The Georgian air-defence early-warning and command-control tactical system was linked via Turkey to a NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE), which provided Georgia with intelligence during the conflict.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust command and control procedures for authorizing launch.At least one 9K37 Buk was captured by Russian and Russian-backed forces during the war.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.
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100 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESGeorgia-Russia 2008 (continued)J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Moderate traffic volume, mainly restricted to arrivals and departures.Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)None2. OthersNo information foundNo NOTAMs issued by Georgia regarding the conflict were identified. It is assumed that airspace above FL 250 was not restricted to civil aviation.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.n/aDecision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process. n/aPromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.n/a NotesOther relevant informationReferences:“Air power in Russia’s Georgian campaign August 2008,” Pathfinder, Air power development centre bulletin, October 2008Pukhov R., The Tanks of August, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Moscow, Russia, 2010Cohen A., Hamilton R., The Russian military and the Georgian war: lessons and implications, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2011
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101 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIraq war 1991Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.The Persian Gulf War, also known as “The Gulf War,” was a conflict between Iraq and 34 other countries, led by the United States. The conflicting parties were: The Allied Coalition Forces consisting of 34 nations and the Iraqi Armed Forces (Army, Air Force, Navy, Iraqi Republican Guard).The conflict started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, with the Allied Coalition military offensive beginning January 16, 1991. The official ceasefire was declared February 28, 1991.102B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities.The Allied Coalition’s Operation Desert Storm involved approximately 750,000 troops. The coalition aerial strike-force comprised over 2,250 combat aircraft (including 1,800 US aircraft). By contrast, the Iraqi Forces were estimated to be 1,000,000 personnel, having 934 combat-capable aircraft (including trainers) of which 550 were operational.The air campaign of the Gulf War was an extensive aerial bombing campaign. The Coalition of the Gulf War flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs, widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure.103C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).More than 145 C-130 aircraft deployed in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The C-130s flew 46,500 sorties and moved more than 209,000 people and 300,000 tons of supplies within the theater. C-141 aircraft operated 8,536 strategic airlift missions, followed by the C-5 with 3,770; the KC-10 with 379 and the C-9 with 209. UK C-130, VC10 and L1011 Tristar also operated across the operational area.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Military air combat activities.Military combat activities involving the Allied Coalition and the Iraqi Air Force.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.Military armed conflict existed throughout the airspace. UNSCR 678 authorised use of all necessary means to force Iraqi forces out of Kuwait after 15 Jan 1991. Widely reported by international media.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Both parties in this conflict had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region with SAM and air-to-air missiles.104102 Mockaitis, Thomas R.: Iraq War Encyclopedia ABC-CLIO, 2013103 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War_air_campaign104 Mockaitis, Thomas R.: Iraq War Encyclopedia ABC-CLIO, 2015, pg.18
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102 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIraq war 1991 (continued)G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g. identification, friend or foe (IFF), SSR).H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.While the actual war lasted a brief time, there was evidence of command and control breakdown of the Iraqi military in the latter stages of the conflict.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.An effective state of war existed through the period.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Small to moderate traffic volume.Several factors greatly reduced the amount of traffic in Iraqi airspace during the wartime months. The combination of restrictions and, among other things, large increases in insurance rates encouraged many operators to route around the region.105Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersThe Iraqi airspace had been severely restricted by a combination of sanctions into/out of Iraq, as well as restrictions imposed by the UN regarding overflights. In September of 1990, UN resolution 670 established restrictions of operations into and out of Iraq, allowing only UN humanitarian operations.106During the conflict, the Allied Command limited overflights to those above FL200 and restricted certain airways.The two no-fly zones, one in the north and another in the south of Iraq, were unilaterally created by the US, Britain and France soon after the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq was banned from using all aircraft, including helicopters, in the air exclusion zones.105 Jafe, Steven D.: Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, Routledge, 2015, pg. 177106 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/97522?ln=en
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103 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIraq war 1991 (continued)Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Military wartime operations area.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.No documentation of decisions by Iraqi government can be found. The airspace limitations were driven by UN, Allied, US and European authorities. Certain restrictions existed limiting traffic above FL200, with numerous sectors prohibited. PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.NOTAM and EUROCONTROL AIM.NotesOther relevant information
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104 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIraq war 2003–2011Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.The Iraq War, also known as the Second Gulf War or Operation Freedom, began on 20 March 2003 when the U.S., joined by the U.K. and several coalition allies, launched a “shock and awe” bombing campaign. In December of 2011, the US announced “official withdrawal” of troops from Iraq.107Conflict related to a destabilization of the nation and region continues to this day. B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities.At the time of invasion, the Allied forces were comprised of 1801 aircraft and approximately 767,000 troops. The overall number of sorties flown in the decade of war is not available. However, there were a 20, 228 sorties flown during the initial phases of the war between March 19 and April 18, 2003.The status of the Iraqi Air Force was poorly documented in the open literature. The capabilities of the Iraqi Forces were greatly impacted by the Gulf War and a total of 390 aircraft were believed to be operational at the end of 2002.108The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the Iraqi troops prior to the 2003 invasion to number 538,000 (Iraqi Army 375,000, Iraqi Navy 2,000, Iraqi Air Force 20,000 and air defense 17,000, the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam 44,000, and Republican Guard 80,000.109C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).A wide array of allied military transport aircraft numbering more than 800 were deployed to support the invasion in 2003.The Iraqi Air Force was not a factor in the conflict.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Military air combat activities.Large scale military air combat activities across Iraq and in neighbouring countries and sea areas (not Syria or Iran). E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported incident/accident for military (or civil) aviation.Military conflict existed throughout the airspace, widely reported by international media. F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Both parties in this conflict had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region.Coalition forces deployed multiple fighters with a capability to attack air targets at all altitudes.107 Mockaitis, Thomas R.: Iraq War Encyclopedia ABC-CLIO, 2013108 https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2003/July%202003/0703Numbers.pdf109 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq#Preparations_for_war
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105 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIraq war 2003–2011 (continued)G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and elec-tronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.Capability existed on both sides.110Extensive use of SAMs by the Iraqi military. Iraq fired approximately 1,600 radar guided SAMs during the invasion, failing to down a single allied aircraft.US Patriot batteries mistakenly shot down a UK Tornado GR4 and a USN FA-18 in separate friendly fire incidents.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.Iraqi military forces were openly motivated to attack allied aircraft. Reports indicate that Saddam Hussein personally encouraged the shooting of allied aircraft, offering $5000 to any unit that shot down a US aircraft and $2500 to any soldier capturing a pilot.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Small to minimal traffic volume.Iraq airspace was closed to civilian traffic at the beginning of the war. Coalition forces, in collaboration with ICAO and other stakeholders, opened the airspace to civil overflights in August 2003, leading to overflight traffic increasing. However, the development of optional routes around the airspace limited the number.Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersSeveral national aviation authorities and third-party organisations closed Iraq airspace to civilian traffic at the beginning of the war. Coalition forces, in collaboration with ICAO and other stakeholders opened the airspace to civil overflights in August 2003.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Military operations area.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.No documentation of decisions by Iraqi government can be found. The airspace limitations were driven by national organisations outside Iraq and by international coalition forces.110 Mockaitis, Thomas R.: Iraq War Encyclopedia ABC-CLIO, 2015, pg.18
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106 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIraq war 2003–2011 (continued)PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.NOTAM and EUROCONTROL AIM.ICAONotesOther relevant information
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107 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESKosovo–Allied Force 1999Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Conflict between states.The conflicting parties in the Kosovo war were: Kosovo Liberation Army, Republic of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO (since 24 March 1999). It started in late February 1998 and lasted until 11 June 1999.In early 1998, violence erupted within Kosovo between Yugoslavian (Serb) forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, passed on 23 September 1998, demanded a ceasefire in Kosovo. On 13 October 1998, NATO’s North Atlantic Council authorized activation orders for air strikes. The crisis intensified in November and December 1998. NATO launched Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities.Operation Allied Force involved close to 1000 NATO aircraft in an air campaign that lasted 78 days. NATO flew more than 38,000 sorties, of which 10,484 were strike sorties.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).3 x AWACS overland orbits manned 24-hrs.EC–130s served as Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).C–17, C–5 Galaxy and C–130 were used to transport cargo into certain airfields.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities.Military combat activities involving multiple regional parties and NATO.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported incident/accident for military (or civil) aviation.On 24 March 1999 two Yugoslav Air Force MiG-29s were shot down by two USAF F-15Cs with AMRAAM missiles. Different sources claim one of the MiG-29s was downed by friendly ground fire.On 24 March 1999, during Operation Allied Force, a Dutch F-16AM J-063 shot down a Yugoslavian MiG-29 with an AMRAAM missile. The pilot of the stricken jet ejected safely.On 26 March 1999 two Yugoslavian MiG-29s were shot down by two USAF F-15Cs with AMRAAM missiles.On 27 March 1999 an American F-117A Nighthawk stealth bomber was shot down over Belgrade by a Soviet-made S-125E SAM. The pilot ejected safely and the plane’s wreckage was recovered by Serbian special forces.On 2 May 1999 a USAF F-16CG was shot down over Serbia. It was downed by an S-125 Neva SAM (NATO: SA-3) near Nakucani. The pilot ejected and was later rescued by a combat search-and-rescue mission.On 4 May 1999 a lone Yugoslav MiG-29 attempted to intercept a large NATO formation that was returning to base. It was engaged by a pair of USAF F-16CJs from the 78th Fighter Squadron and shot down with an AIM-120, killing the pilot. The falling wreckage was hit by a Strela 2M fired by the Yugoslav army in error.On 4 May 1999 a Yugoslav Mi-8T was shot down by a French Super Etendard.
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108 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESKosovo–Allied Force 1999 (continued)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Both parties in this conflict had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region.Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA2) is a Soviet-designed, high-altitude air defence system with engagement altitude of 82,000 ft.S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3), that shot down American F-117A Nighthawk stealth bomber, F-16 and possibly some UAVs, mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet surface to air missile system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft.2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub“ (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”) low to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from air attack with engagement altitude, depending on the modification, of up to 46,000ft.Other capabilities for lower altitudes: 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13), 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14), 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) and mobile AAA batteries (multiple types)Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft.Multiple NATO fighters with radar and IR AAMs.SAM capability for warships in the region — DDGs (guided missile destroyers) protecting the carrier group.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g. identification, friend or foe (IFF), SSR).H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.No civil aircraft operations during the airspace restrictions.Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights prior the restrictions.The airspace of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was characterized by considerable overflight traffic volume, with overflights from Turkey, Greece, Middle East and Asia Pacific to Central and Western Europe.
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109 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESKosovo–Allied Force 1999 (continued)Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. Others24 Mar 1999–10 June 1999The entire airspace of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, parts of southern Hungary, western Romania and Bulgaria, northern Greece, entire airspace over Albania and almost entire airspace over Adriatic Sea was closed.The airspace closure was immediately associated with Operation Allied Force and there were no prior airspace restrictions for the period of escalation starting in 1998.The airspace of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was opened for civilian traffic in Sep 1999.An air security zone, including the airspace of Kosovo, remained closed for civil aircraft until 3 April 2014.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.NATO air strikes.NATO aircraft and Tomahawk missiles from the air and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia air defence systems from the ground.US Navy Carrier Air Group in Adriatic Sea.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.Decision to close the described airspace came from all neighbouring states in order to stop the traffic to/from/over Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.Technical support provided by EUROCONTROL. All flight plans to/from and over Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were rejected.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.NOTAM and EUROCONTROL AIM.A substantial preparation with the inclusion of all states whose airspace was used by NATO air forces.EUROCONTROL participated in coordination and provided technical support.NotesOther relevant informationReferences:U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War, March 1991U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Combat forces in former Yugoslavia, July 1993Daniel L. Haulman, Air Power History, “The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia 1999,” Summer 2015Daniel L. Haulman, Air Force historical Research Agency, MANNED AIRCRAFT LOSSES OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1994–1999, October 2009
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110 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESLibya 2011Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Conflict between states.The conflicting parties in the Kosovo war were: Kosovo Liberation Army, Republic of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO (since 24 March 1999). It started in late February 1998 and lasted until 11 June 1999.In early 1998, violence erupted within Kosovo between Yugoslavian (Serb) forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, passed on 23 September 1998, demanded a ceasefire in Kosovo. On 13 October 1998, NATO’s North Atlantic Council authorized activation orders for air strikes. The crisis intensified in November and December 1998. NATO launched Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities.Operation Allied Force involved close to 1000 NATO aircraft in an air campaign that lasted 78 days. NATO flew more than 38,000 sorties, of which 10,484 were strike sorties.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).3 x AWACS overland orbits manned 24-hrs.EC–130s served as Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).C–17, C–5 Galaxy and C–130 were used to transport cargo into certain airfields.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities.Military combat activities involving multiple regional parties and NATO.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported incident/accident for military (or civil) aviation.On 24 March 1999 two Yugoslav Air Force MiG-29s were shot down by two USAF F-15Cs with AMRAAM missiles. Different sources claim one of the MiG-29s was downed by friendly ground fire.On 24 March 1999, during Operation Allied Force, a Dutch F-16AM J-063 shot down a Yugoslavian MiG-29 with an AMRAAM missile. The pilot of the stricken jet ejected safely.On 26 March 1999 two Yugoslavian MiG-29s were shot down by two USAF F-15Cs with AMRAAM missiles.On 27 March 1999 an American F-117A Nighthawk stealth bomber was shot down over Belgrade by a Soviet-made S-125E SAM. The pilot ejected safely and the plane’s wreckage was recovered by Serbian special forces.On 2 May 1999 a USAF F-16CG was shot down over Serbia. It was downed by an S-125 Neva SAM (NATO: SA-3) near Nakucani. The pilot ejected and was later rescued by a combat search-and-rescue mission.On 4 May 1999 a lone Yugoslav MiG-29 attempted to intercept a large NATO formation that was returning to base. It was engaged by a pair of USAF F-16CJs from the 78th Fighter Squadron and shot down with an AIM-120, killing the pilot. The falling wreckage was hit by a Strela 2M fired by the Yugoslav army in error.On 4 May 1999 a Yugoslav Mi-8T was shot down by a French Super Etendard.
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111 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESLibya 2011 (continued)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Both parties in this conflict had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region.Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:Crotale, SA-7 Grail, SA-9/SA-13 SAMs, and AA guns in Army service. A separate Air Defence Command had SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-5 Gammon, and SA-8b Gecko, plus guns.S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA2) is a Soviet-designed, high-altitude air defence system with engagement altitude of 82,000 ft. S-75 — 6 Brigades with 18 launchers each;S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet SAM system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft. S125 — 9 Brigades with 12 launchers each;S-200 (NATO reporting name SA-5) is a very long range, medium-to-high altitude SAM system to defend large areas from bomber attack or other strategic aircraft with engagement altitude of 130,000 ft. S-200– 8 battalions of six launchers each at four sites and an estimated 380 missiles.The Crotale EDIR (“InfraRed Differential Ecartometry”) is an all-weather short-range anti-air missile, originally developed by France, which can be used to intercept low-flight anti-ship missiles and aircraft with engagement altitude of up to 30,000 ft. Crotale — nine acquisition and 27 firing units.The 9K33 Osa (NATO reporting name SA-8 Gecko) is a mobile, low-altitude, short-range tactical surface-to-air missile system designed in the Soviet Union with engagement altitude of 39,000 ft. 9K33 Osa/ SA-8 Gecko — 509K38 Igla (NATO reporting name SA-18 Grouse) is a Russian/Soviet man-portable infrared homing surface-to-air missile with and engagement altitude of 11,000 ft. 9K38 Igla — 380;50 2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”) low to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from air attack with engagement altitude, depending on the modification, of up to 46,000 ft.Other capabilities for lower altitudes: 200 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14) — 278;The National Transitional Council of Libya — The National Liberation Army:9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7)NATO:NATO had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.NATO had more sophisticated capabilities to differentiate. H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.
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112 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESLibya 2011 (continued)I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.No or occasional traffic after the restrictions.Moderate traffic volume, including international overflights prior the restrictions.The infrastructure of Libya’s air traffic control has largely been destroyed and only sporadic military air activities are conducted. On 18 March the Libyan airspace was closed from some neighbours. Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersOn 18 March the Libyan airspace was closed, supported by countries with neighbouring airspace, to all traffic, reacting to a U.N. resolution.Beginning in early November 2011, a step-by-step approach has been followed for a safe transition of airspace, owing to the coordination between ICAO, EUROCONTROL, and the respective civil aviation authorities concerned (Malta, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) and air traffic services over the central Mediterranean high seas and Libyan territory, as follows:Phase 1. The current situation, following the end of the no-fly zone in November, allowed the reopening of the main airports of Tripoli International, Tripoli Mitiga, Sabha, Benghazi and Misratah to civilian traffic.Phase 2. On 1 February 2012, two contingency north/south overflight routes were opened, allowing gradually increasing traffic as deemed necessary. The remaining routes will be released by the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority as soon as the operational conditions are fulfilled.Phase 3. From 1 April to 3 May 2012, aviation authorities added more routes to the overflight system, and reopened new airports on a regular basis with their associated contingency routes. Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011. The resolution authorised member states to establish and enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, and to use “all necessary measures” to prevent attacks on civilians. The resolution was the legal basis for military intervention by the forces of NATO.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.Decision to close the described airspace came from all neighbouring states.Technical support provided by EUROCONTROL.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.NOTAM and EUROCONTROL actions.NotesOther relevant informationReferences:UN Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011UN Security Council, Resolution 2009 (2011), 16 September 2011Jaffe S., Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, 2015
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113 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESSlovenia 1991Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.The conflicting parties in the Slovenian war in 1991 were Slovenia and Yugoslavia. The belligerents Slovenian Territorial Defence and Slovenian police on one side and the Yugoslav People’s Army on the other side.The war lasted from 27 June 1991 until 7 July 1991, when the Brioni Accords were signed. B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency or small-scale military activities.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale military air combat activities.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with single reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.On 27 June 1991, the Slovenian Territorial Defence shot down two Yugoslav People’s Army helicopters with SA-7 missiles.
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114 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESSlovenia 1991 (continued)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude.Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:At the start of the war, the Yugoslav national air defence force possessed more than 100 search radars, eight battalions of SA-2s, six battalions of SA-3s, one battalion of SA-5s, four battalions of SA-6/11s, and 15 regiments of anticraft guns. For support of the army, there were also SA-9, SA-13 mobile IR-guided SAMs, and thousands of SA-7 and SA-16 MANPADS.S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA2) is a Soviet-designed, high-altitude air defence system with engagement altitude of 82,000 ft.S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet-made SAM system with engagement altitude of 59,000ft.S-200 (NATO reporting name SA-5) is a very long range, medium-to-high altitude SAM system to defend large areas from bomber attack or other strategic aircraft. It has an engagement altitude of 130,000ft.2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”) low- to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from air attack with engagement altitude, depending on the modification, of up to 46,000 ft.Other capabilities for lower altitudes: 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13), 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14), 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) and mobile AAA batteries (multiple types).Slovenian Territorial Defence:9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9) is a mobile, short-range, low altitude infra-red guided surface-to-air missile system and shoulder-fired 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7).G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.
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115 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESSlovenia 1991 (continued)J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.No or occasional traffic.Moderate traffic volume, including international overflights prior the restrictions.Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)On 26 June, at 1330, the Ljubljana airport and the airspace above Slovenia was closed by the federal air traffic control.The federal air traffic control closed FIR Zagreb on 31 August at 15:00.On 1 September at 0930 FIR Zagreb was opened.On 15 September FIR Zagreb was again closed at 14:52.After the airports in Ljubljana and Zagreb were closed, and because of the serious threat of further attacks in Slovenia by the federal army, high increases in insurance premiums for individual flights in Croatia and because of all the general uncertainties, the management of Adria Airways decided to transfer its operations abroad after 8 July 1991. Adria aircraft landed at airports in Klagenfurt, Frankfurt and Vienna.On 15 January 1992 an agreement was reached with Austria for provision of air traffic control in Slovenian airspace. At midnight on 22 January 1992 Slovenian airspace was opened when an agreement between Slovenian and Austrian aviation authorities came into force.The Ljubljana airport was shutdown, with rare exceptions, until February 1992.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.The reason for the initial restrictions was “technical shortcomings.”The closure of airspace followed immediately after 25 June when Slovenia passed its act of independence and coincided with a plan the Slovenian government had already put into action to seize control of the republic’s border posts and the international airport.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.The Brioni Declaration stated in the paragraph on air transport that there is only one air traffic control for the whole of Yugoslavia and that all domestic and international air traffic through Yugoslavia would be supervised and provided by the competent federal authority.Subsequently, in January 1992 Slovenia agreed with Austria for the provision of air traffic control.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.References not found. NotesOther relevant informationReferences:U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War, March 1991Adria Airways Kronika 1991U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Combat forces in former Yugoslavia, July 1993Daniel L. Haulman, Air Force historical Research Agency, MANNED AIRCRAFT LOSSES OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1994–1999, October 2009
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116 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESAfghanistan 2001–presentLikelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).Afghan fighter presence 1989-2001, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) capable of reaching cruising levels and MANPADS that, because of the specific high terrain, could reach cruising altitudes as well.2001 — Coalition fighter presence.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio. (Applicable only to coalition forces)CAUTION: Use of MANPADS and AAA by insurgent or irregular forces limited to visual differentiation
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117 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESAfghanistan 2001–present (continued)H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launchResidual Strela and Stinger MANPADS, plus possible AAA.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.Known intent to attack civil aircraft.Multiple engagements by Pakistan forces of Afghan aircraft straying into northern Pakistan airspace during late 1980s.https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/22/world/afghanistan-reports-30-dead-on-plane-downed-by-pakistan.htmlMultiple engagements of military traffic by irregular forces within Afghanistan during Russian occupation up to 1989.Multiple low-altitude engagements by irregular forces since 2001.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersNo information foundNote:No formal airspace closures. Area was voluntarily avoided by civil traffic during Soviet occupation. Coalition air ops from 2001India permanent NOTAM dated 3 Apr 2001, overflight of Taliban-held territory prohibited, traffic would be denied future access to Indian airspace. Still valid. (VI G0047/01)Extant overflight warnings by NOTAM from USA,UK, France, Germany, advising min altitude 25,000 AGL, (FL330 for USA and Germany) https://www.easa.europa.eu/domains/air-operations/czibs/czib-2017-08r5Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Presence of anti-aviation weapons within Kabul FIR. USA NOTAM references potential for engagement by certain MANPADS below FL 330.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.National advisories only. Standard decision-making from appropriate national authorities.No warnings issued by Afghan government.
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118 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESAfghanistan 2001–present (continued)PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.NOTAM, AIS. Germany NOTAM: B0437/20. USA A0038/20. UK AIP ENR 1.4.5 valid from 8 Oct 2015 https://www.aurora.nats.co.uk/htmlAIP/Publications/2018-11-08-AIRAC/html/eAIP/EG-ENR-1.1-en-GB.html NotesOther relevant informationReferences:Jaffe S., Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, 2015
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119 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESArmenia AzerbaijanLikelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between states.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.After the 2016 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes, in which an estimated 350 troops and civilians from both sides were killed, Azerbaijan declared a unilateral cease fire (the clashes started when Azerbaijani forces launched strikes to regain control of territory controlled by the Armenia-backed breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh.)The two countries are still technically at war and the Azerbaijani government regularly threatens to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by military forceThe Four-Day War, or April War, began along the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact on 1 April 2016 with the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army, backed by the Armenian Armed Forces, on one side and the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on the other.The clashes have been defined as “the worst” since the 1994 ceasefire agreement signed by Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).The scale of the military actions, the number of forces and combat equipment involved, such as heavy artillery, including use of cluster munition, tanks, air forces and suicide drones, as well as the statements of Azerbaijani officials clearly indicate that the events of 2–5 April were not a spontaneous escalation, but a carefully planned and prepared military operation, aimed at resolving the Karabakh conflict by the use of force. D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale military air combat activities.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.February 2017 — Fighting flares up in Nagorno-Karabakh between the Azerbaijani army and ethnic Armenian troops along the line separating them.Azerbaijan’s air force was composed of 45 combat aircraft which were often piloted by experienced Russian and Ukrainian mercenaries from the former Soviet military. They flew mission sorties over Karabakh with such sophisticated jets as the MiG-25 and Sukhoi Su-24 and with older-generation Soviet fighter bombers, such as the MiG-21.Several were shot down over the city by Armenian forces and according to one of the pilots’ commanders, with assistance provided by the Russians. Many of these pilots risked the threat of execution by Armenian forces if they were shot down. The setup of the defense system severely hampered Azerbaijan’s ability to carry out and launch more air strikes.Azerbaijani fighter jets attacked civilian airplanes too. An Armenian civil aviation Yak-40 plane traveling from Stepanakert airport to Yerevan with total of 34 passengers and crew was attacked by an Azerbaijani SU-25. Though suffering engine failure and a fire in rear of the plane, it eventually made a safe landing in Armenian territory
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120 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESArmenia Azerbaijan (continued)F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude.Azerbaijani MiG-25 was shot down near Cherban on 20 August 1992 by an SA-7A MANPADS.Azerbaijani Su-22 was shot down on 19 February 1994 over Verdenisskiy by an SA-14 MANPADS.Azerbaijani Su-25 flown by Kurbanov was shot down over Mkhrdag on 13 June 1992 by a MANPADS.Azerbaijani Su-25 shot down near Malibeili on 10 October 1992 using MANPADS.Azerbaijan: BUK SAM, S-300PMU2, Perchora-T 2M SAMArmenia: BUK, OSA, Pechora-T2M, 2K11Krug, SA-13 Gopher, KUB-M-3, S-300PS, S-300PT-1G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and elec-tronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry said its forces on May 15, 2017 “destroyed an Osa air defense system along with its crew.” The ministry added that the system’s deployment near the line of control was a “provocation” and a threat to Azerbaijani aircraft.All versions of the 9K33 feature all-in-one 9A33 transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles which can detect, track and engage aircraft independently or with the aid of regimental surveillance radars. The six-wheeled transport vehicles BAZ-5937 are fully amphibious and air transportable. The road range is about 500 km.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft — reference 1991 hostile events sample.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.No traffic after the restrictions.Moderate traffic volume, mainly restricted to arrivals and departures to airports prior to the restrictions. Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)RestrictedA0024/11 NOTAMN Q) UBBA/QRPXX/IV/NBO/W /000/999/3936N04642E045 A) UBBA B) 1102111240 C) PERM E) ACCORDING TO AIP OF AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC REF.ENR 5.1 DUE TO CONFLICT SITUATION THE PROHIBITED AREA UBP3 GND/UNL IS ESTABLISHED OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE NAGORNY KARABAKH AND CONTROLLED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN. INTERCEPTION OF OFFENDERS BY THE AIR FORSE IS MANDATORY ACTION F) GND G) UNL
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121 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESArmenia Azerbaijan (continued)Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.ConflictDecision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.ICAO NOTAM A0024/11 NOTAMN Q) UBBA/QRPXX/IV/NBO/W /000/999/3936N04642E045NotesOther relevant informationReferences: wikipedia.org. wikipedia.org/wiki/missile_systemWordpress.com Russian supplied defense systemsHoge, James F. (2010). The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate. Council on Foreign Relations,Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia. London: Europa Publications. 2002. p. 77., cfr.org
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122 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIvory Coast 2002–2004Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Official government forces, the National Army (FANCI), also called loyalists, formed and equipped essentially since 2003.Mercenaries recruited by president Gbagbo:• Belarusian pilots;• Former combatants of Liberia, including under-17 youths, forming the so-called “Lima militia”;• New Forces (Forces Nouvelles, FN), ex-northern rebels;• Liberian government forces;• French military forces: troops sent within the framework of Operation Unicorn and under UN mandate (UNOCI);• Soldiers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), White helmets, also under the UN;• NATO forces.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency or small-scale military activities.Mutiny in Abidjan by soldiers unhappy at being demobilized grows into full-scale rebellion, with Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement rebels seizing control of the north. They launched attacks in many cities, including Abidjan. Attacks were launched almost simultaneously in most major cities; the government forces maintained control of Abidjan and the south, but the new rebel forces had taken the north and based themselves in Bouake. Particular importance for the case study is the 2004 French–Ivorian clashes that represent air-to-air capability to attack. C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).Evidence of NATO and French mobilized and airborne force movement and deployments. D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities.Military combat activities involving multiple regional parties and NATO.French forces conducted attacks on airports destroying SU25s and helicopters are shot down.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.On 4 November 2004, Gbagbo ordered the counter-offensive to the rebel town of Bouaké to be backed by air strikes. France does not react but on 5 November put three Dassault Mirage F.1 jet fighters based in nearby Gabon on standby.On 6 November, two Ivorian Sukhoi Su-25 bombers, crewed by two Belarusian mercenaries and two Ivorian pilots, fired on the Ivorian rebels led by Issiaka Ouattara. One of the bombers attacked the French peacekeeping position in the town at 1 pm, killing nine French soldiers and wounding 31. The Ivorian government claimed the attack on the French was unintentional, but the French insisted that the attack had been deliberate. F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).
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123 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIvory Coast 2002–2004 (continued)G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Moderate traffic volume, mainly restricted to arrivals and departures to airports prior to the restrictions. Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersNo information foundNote:Airport closures likely during raidsReasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.State authorities and on-site commanders had the authority to make assessments and decisions regarding military threats.
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124 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIvory Coast 2002–2004 (continued)PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.No evidence of airspace closures or restrictions other than those cited for Port Bouët Airport. NotesOther relevant informationReferences: “Cote d’Ivoire, since 2002.” Acig.org. “Civil War in Côte d Ivoire (Ivory Coast Civil War).” The Polynational War Memorial, www.war-memorial.net. Retrieved 5 June 2017. Asante, Molefi Kete (2014). The History of Africa: The Quest for Eternal Harmony. New York and London: Routledge. State.gov
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125 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIndonesia (Aceh) 1990–1998Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Conflict was between the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which wanted autonomy, and the Indonesian state, which wanted centralized control.Separatist struggle waged for more than 30 years. After a period of dormancy, GAM re-emerged in the late 1980s, after sending combatants to Libya for training, by attacking police stations and military installations.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency or small-scale military activities.In 1989, Jakarta responded to the expansion of GAM (some of the guerrillas were trained in Lybia) by launching a large-scale counter insurgency campaign. Aceh was officially transformed into a ‘Military Operations Area’ (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM), widely understood as the imposition of martial law, for the next decade. Some scholars, however, question whether the DOM designation is correct. Unclear how many Indonesian troops were stationed in Aceh during DOM, but most sources estimate that about 12,000 security forces personnel were involved.DOM formally lifted in 1998.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.Indonesian Air Force, as of 2002, contained two squadrons of C-130s, a number of small transport and rotary-wing aircraft; and three Boeing 737s used for sea surveillance.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.Indonesian Air Force operated a mix of Western- and Russian-built aircraft, including F-5s, F-16s and Su-30s.No information could be found on extent to which these and other combat aircraft were used.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.Low-flying Indonesian military helicopters and fixed-wing observation planes likely would have been GAM targets, but no incidents uncovered during research. Military or civil aircraft operating at cruise altitude would have been out of the reach of insurgent weapons.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).Heaviest weapons GAM rebels possessed were grenade launches and MANPADSIndonesian military has a mix of Western- and Soviet/Russian-made weapons systems, including naval vessels with SAMs and combat aircraft with air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capability.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and elec-tronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.No sufficient informationIndonesian military and civil authorities have ability to differentiate. No indication that GAM could differentiate.
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126 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIndonesia (Aceh) 1990–1998 (continued)H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces.Indonesia has traditional military command structure.GAM rebels were irregular forces with some training from Libya. I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.In 2000, which is two years after the period in review, two chartered aircraft carrying oil field workers were hit by small arms fire, including one aircraft that was hit while it was taxiing, resulting in two injuries.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Because of the number of islands in the Indonesian archipelago, the country has a well-developed and busy air transport system. Its proximity to Singapore and Malaysia, both of which have a lot of aviation traffic, and its location in a fast-growing region of the world result in a great deal of traffic. Indonesia tightly controls overflights.Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersNo information foundReasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.Information on decision-making during this period was not available, but generally speaking it is a process complicated by the proximity of Singapore and Malaysia and the high level of air traffic in the region. According to at least one document, Indonesia’s military pilots must seek clearance from ATC at Singapore’s Changi Airport before taking off on training flights. There is tension between Singapore and Indonesia over FIRs and control of sovereign airspace.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.
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127 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESIndonesia (Aceh) 1990–1998 (continued)NotesOther relevant informationReferences:Miller, Michelle Ann. “The Conflict in Aceh: context precursors and catalysts,” Accord 20, p. 12–15.Pan, Esther, Backgrounder, “Indonesia: The Aceh Peace Agreement,” last updated 15 Sept. 2005.Rabasa, Angel and Haseman, John, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics and Power, Rand National Security Research Division, 2002.Schulze, Kirsten E., The Free Aceh Movement: Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, Policy Studies 2, East-West Center, ISBN 1-932728-03-1 (online version), 2004.Developing Countries Studies Center, “Singapore FIR Takeover Plan: Avoid the 1995 Experience,” accessed 12 June 2020.
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128 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESMali 2012–2015Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.In January 2012 the Northern Mali Conflict or Mali Civil War started when several insurgent groups (mainly MNLA [National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad] and Ansar Dine) began fighting against the Malian government for independence for north Mali. On 5 April the MNLA proclaimed the independence of northern Mali from the rest of the country. However, by 17 July 2012, the MNLA had lost control of most of northern Mali’s cities. The government of Mali asked for foreign military help to re-take the north. On 11 January 2013, the French military began operations against the Islamists. Forces from other African Union states were deployed shortly after. By 8 February, the Islamist-held territory had been re-taken by the Malian military, with help from the international coalition. However, attacks against the Malian military continued until a peace deal between the government and Tuareg rebels was signed on 18 June 2013. On 26 September 2013 the rebels pulled out of the peace agreement and fighting continued. Despite a peace accord was signed on 15 April 2015, low-level fighting continues.B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.French military intervention: Operation Serval from 11 January 2013 till 15 July 2014.US forces arrived in Niger in early 2013 to support the French military intervention in Mali; 150 US personnel set up a surveillance drone operation over Mali that was conducted out of Niamey. As of 2017, there are about 800 US troops in Niger, the majority of whom are construction crews working to build up a second drone base in northern Niger. C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipmentD. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.In January one Malian Air Force MIG-21 jet was shot down by the Tuareg.On 11 January 2013, a French Army Gazelle helicopter was shot down by small arms fire.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).
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129 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESMali 2012–2015 (continued)G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.Differentiation — fighter jets.H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forces. I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Known intent to attack military aircraft.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).
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130 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESMali 2012–2015 (continued)Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersNo information foundNote:27/02/2017 The Algerian CAA has published in 2012 airspace closures along their southern border due to the conflict.FAA (27/02/2017)Feb 27th, 2017: The FAA issued warnings for Kenyan and Malian airspace, warning US operators of the potential dangers in operating through both the Nairobi and Malian FIR’s.Published on Feb 26th, the new advice also adds new language with clarification of the type of weapons and phases of flight that the FAA is concerned about, specifically:• fire from small arms,• indirect fire weapons (such as mortars and rockets), and• anti-aircraft weapons such as MANPADS.The scenarios considered highest risk include:• landings and takeoffs,• low altitudes, and• aircraft on the ground.The FAA uses the same wording for both Kenya and Mali.The updated guidance is intended for US operators and FAA License holder.Warnings are addressing flights below FL300/26072502017 (referring to EASA CZIB No 2017-01R1 and FAA warningEASA 29/04/2020–31/1072020This CZIB was issued on the basis of information available to EU Member States and EU institutions.The presence of terrorist groups with access to anti-aviation weaponry is assessed to pose a HIGH risk to operations within the portion of the Niamey FIR, which is situated above Mali territory, at altitudes below FL 250. Terrorist groups continue attacks on the country with the risk of mortar shelling on airstrips and airports.Additionally, the Agency draws the attention of the aviation community to the above referenced information, copies of which are attached to this CZIB.France (AIC 08/20) 09/04/2020–ongoingFrom 09/04/2020 and until further notice, French air carriers and aircraft owners registered in France are requested to ensure that their aircraft maintain at all times a flight level above or equal to FL320 in the part of the Niamey FIR (DRRR) located above the Malian territory.Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.Rebels were expected to possess MANPADSWith instability in the Sahel-Saharan region, fears were growing al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) could have acquired portable surface-to-missiles from Libya.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.AIC, warnings by FAA, EASA CZIB
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131 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESMali 2012–2015 (continued)NotesOther relevant informationReferences:https://www.eurasiareview.com/31012012-loose-libyan-missiles-threaten-air-traffic/https://safeairspace.net/mali/https://www.easa.europa.eu/domains/air-operations/czibs/czib-2017-01r7https://ops.group/blog/fresh-warnings-as-faa-clarifies-weapons-risk-in-kenya-mali-airspace/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-arms-un/libya-arms-fueling-conflicts-in-syria-mali-and-beyond-u-n-experts-idUSBRE93814Y20130409
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132 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESGeorgian Civil Wars 1991–1993Likelihood of attack indicatorsA. Parties:1. Conflict between states.2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.Conflict involved multiple players during the period in question; first it involved the newly independent state of Georgia against separatists from South Ossetia, which had previously declared itself an autonomous Soviet Republic. A three-way power struggle involving Georgian, Ossetian and Soviet military forces broke out. The first democratically elected president of Georgia lost power in a coup; his armed attempts to regain power were later defeated. Also during this time, separatists from the Abkhasia region, with help from Russian troops, fought against Georgia. B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing political tension.3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political tension.Armed conflict involved multiple players, including Russia, and military equipment left over from the Soviet military.C. Military air transport activities:1. Military air transport activities not reported.2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment.3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party).More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at least one party.D. Military air combat activities:1. No military air combat activities.2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities above FL 250.3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular activities above FL 250Georgian Su-25s flew more than 200 sorties during conflict in Abkhazia region.Helicopters also were used extensively.E. Known attacks:1. Conflict area without publicly reported security incidents involving military and civil aviation.2. Conflict area with single security-related reported incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.3. Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incident/accident involving military (or civil) aviation.Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents involving military (or civil) aviation.A number of military aircraft, including both fighters and helicopters, were shot down during the conflicts.Two civil type aircraft, a Tu-134 and a Tu-154, also were attacked on consecutive days in Sept. 1993, resulting in 135 fatalities.F. Capability to attack by at least one party:1. No information for capability to attack with range above FL 250.2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising level.Long-range SAMs were in the Georgian arsenal and Georgian military aircraft were brought down by what are believed to have been SAMs, leading to speculation that Russian military units were supporting separatists.G. Capability to differentiate between civil and military aircraft:1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and non-cooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.
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133 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX A | CONFLICT ZONES CASE STUDIESGeorgian civil wars 1991–1993 (continued)H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of command:1. Regular forces.2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces AND an absence of robust SAM/AAM command and control procedures for authorizing launch.Regular forcesSAMs also possibly in the possession of irregular forces and/or irregular forces supported by regular forces.I. Known intent to attack:1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.A Tu-134 and a Tu-154 in flight were attacked by separatists in Sept. 1993 resulting in 135 fatalities.J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict zone (with and without the airspace restrictions if any):1. No or occasional traffic.2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).3. Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.Small to moderate traffic volume (for example restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).Airspace ClosureAirspace restrictionsDescribes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved over time including:• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state).• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or neighboring states.1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the state)No information found2. OthersNote:During the period there were civil aircraft shot down in the airspace over Abkhazia. Reasons for airspace restrictionsDescribes the reasons for airspace restrictions, weapons known to be in the area and their range/capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether there was concern about unintentional attack.No information available.Decision-makingDescribes the source(s) of the threat information; who made the decision regarding the restrictions and with whom was the decision coordinated; was the decision-making process different from the normal or standard airspace decision-making process.No information available.PromulgationDescribes how the restrictions were published, number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.No information available.NotesOther relevant informationReferences:Web.archive.orgU.S. Institute of Peace, The Intra-Georgian civil war and The Georgian-Abkhas conflict, accessed June 2020.
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134 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEAppendix B Questionnaire Responses: Russian Federation standard procedures and threat knowledgeThis appendix contains the responses received from the Russian Federation to standard procedures and threat knowl-edge questionnaire. The responses are provided as received without additional editing or modification. Note: Unofficial translation from Russian.Q1. Is information in social media used as a trigger for security threat analysis for civil aviation, including infor-mation about capability of attack and/or intend to attack civil aircraft?Answer:Analysis of flight safety threats is carried out on the basis of ICAO documents which address flight safety in the ar-eas of military and other kinds of danger for civil aviation, including ICAO Doc 9554.Responsible:Competent authorities that exchange information related to aviation security.References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc 8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition 1990.Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, ICAO Doc 9426, First Edition (Provisional), 1984.Process and timeline:Preparations for activities that pose a potential hazard to civil aircraft over the territory of states or the open sea are coordinated with relevant competent air traffic service authorities. This coordination is carried out sufficiently in advance to ensure timely publication of information concerning such activities in accordance with existing regulations.Such coordination is aimed at providing optimal con-ditions that will allow to avoid the creation of hazards for civil aircraft and minimize interference with the normal conduction of flights by such aircraft. If activities that pose a potential hazard to civil aircraft are conducted on a regular or ongoing basis, special committees should be established, as appropriate, to ensure the necessary coordi-nation of the needs of all stakeholders.States should make preparations, if necessary, to ensure that timely action is taken in case of unforeseen circum-stances. Such preparations should include a risk assess-ment to civil aircraft due to a military conflict or acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation. Preparatory ac-tivities should include development of special contingency plans in case of natural disasters, public health emergen-cies, military conflicts or acts of unlawful interference in the activities of civil aviation, which may affect the use of airspace for flights of civil aircraft and/or provision of air traffic services and support services.Authorized air traffic service bodies organize and implement close cooperation with the military authorized bodies responsible for activities that may affect the flights of civil aircraft. Air traffic service authorities and relevant military authorities reach an agreement regarding the immediate exchange of information related to the safe and unhindered performance of civil aircraft flights.Based on the information available, the state responsible for air traffic service should determine the geographic area of the conflict, assess the danger or potential danger to civil aircraft of international aviation and determine whether to avoid flights in or through the conflict area or whether flights may continue under certain conditions. Thereafter, an international NOTAM containing necessary information, recommendations and security measures to be taken should be issued; it should be updated as events evolve.In general, planning is a dynamic process in which facts are identified, existing or newly proposed methods are checked and information is sought. It is also an ongoing process that requires insight, imagination and courage to interpret existing data and to develop concepts in order to prove and defend one’s beliefs. […] Due attention should also be paid to the often conflicting requirements with regard to special military flights and allocation of some airspace for national security.Actual implementation:Describe here what social media civil aviation threat information about presence of air defense equipment or intent to attack was identified by which authority.Information is used in accordance with ICAO rules.Changes after 17 July 2014:The use of Doc 10084 “Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones.”
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135 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ2. What are the sources of public and private threat information and the processes for gathering information relative to civil aviation security (including in a conflict zone)?Answer:The source selection process is described in ICAO docu-ments. Recommended procedures with regard to collec-tion and use of information on threats originating from armed conflict zones are discussed in ICAO Doc 9554.The threats to air traffic safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR originated from hazardous activities in the area of responsibility of the adjacent Dnepropetrovsk FIR. There were no armed conflicts within Rostov-on-Don flight information region (FIR).Responsible:Competent authorities that exchange information related to aviation security.References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc 8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition 1990.Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, ICAO Doc 9426, First Edition (Provisional), 1984.Process and timeline:The final DSB report does not contain analysis of the extent to which Ukraine’s actions met the ICAO standards. It only contains a reference to the fact that “the initiative to restrict airspace use originated from the military au-thorities” and that “based on Ukrainian legislation, there were no grounds for full closure of the airspace above the eastern part of Ukraine to civil aviation” (paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 of the final DSB report).When taking a decision to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 on 16 July, 2014, Rosaviatsiya used informa-tion provided by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which it was possible to conclude that the rules for the use of airspace of the Russian Federation had been violated:a) Shooting at checkpoint Gukovo with missiles also hitting the nearby populated areas in the territory of the Russian Federation (statement No. 1570 of 28 June 2014);b) Another shooting at checkpoint Gukovo (statement No. 1678 of 10 July 2014);c) The Ukrainian Army shelled Donetsk, in the Rostov Region, using high-explosive shells, a missile hit a res-idential house, one person died (statement No.1688 of 13 July 2014).Actual implementation:Describe here what other sources of civil aviation threat information about presence of air defense equipment and intent to attack was identified by which authority.Information about the presence of air defense systems in the region should have been provided by the competent authorities of Ukraine on whose territory an armed con-flict took place. Information on the required actions on the Ukrainian part can be found in the answer to Q1.Changes after 17 July 2014:Based on the available reliable information, the Russian side issued NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 to provide secure flights within Rostov-on-Don FIR.
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136 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ3. What is the level of involvement of airlines, air navigation service providers (ANSPs), the military and ad-jacent states or other states publishing advisories in gathering information about aviation security (including information for conflict zones)?Answer:The source selection process is described in ICAO doc-uments. Recommended procedures with regard to collec-tion and use of information on threats originating from armed conflict zones are discussed in ICAO Doc 9554.Information on the basis for the issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 is contained in the answer to Q2.Responsible:The competent authorities and the procedure for their interaction are considered in ICAO documents (references to some documents are given below).References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc 8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition 1990.Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, ICAO Doc 9426, First Edition (Provisional), 1984.Process and timeline:Airlines, military or other organizations were not involved in the issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14.Rosaviatsiya practices to release urgent information reports and instructions for the Russian exploiters of aircraft in case of receiving information on the military activity hazardous to flight safety. For instance, Rosaviatsi-ya’s telegrams containing information on tense situation in India’s, Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s airspace (information of 27 February 2019), hazardous situation to flight safety in Yemen’s airspace (information of 3 April 2015), and in Libya’s airspace (information of 2 February 2015).Actual implementation:Describe specifically what airlines, air navigation service provider (ANSP), the military and adjacent states or other states publishing advisories were used as a source for what information about security risk for civil aircraft.Information provided by the Russian Ministry of For-eign Affairs was used to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 (See the answer to Q2).Changes after 17 July 2014:Issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 due to reasons mentioned in the answer to Q2.
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137 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ4. What are the procedures for routine review and analysis of NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restric-tions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs) to ensure civil aircraft security?Answer:The process conforms to ICAO rules.Responsible:Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Man-agement Corporation of the Russian Federation.”References:Federal Rules on the Use of the Air Space of the Russian Federation approved by Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 138 of 11 March 2010.Federal Aviation Rules “Organization of Planning the Use of Airspace of the Russian Federation” approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation No. 6 of 16 January 2012.Process and timeline:Coordination of airspace use is carried out in order to en-sure the activity declared by airspace users depending on the evolving air, meteorological, air navigation situation and in accordance with state priorities in airspace use.Strategic, pre-tactical and tactical (current) planning of airspace use, as well as coordination of airspace use is based on information:• reports on plans (schedules, timing) of airspace use, including reports on plans for international and do-mestic flights of aircraft on air traffic service routes, flights of aircraft outside air traffic service routes and use of restricted areas;• on permissions (issued by corresponding federal executive bodies) for international flights and on cancellation of such permissions;• on prohibitions and restrictions on the use of airspace;• on permissions to use airspace in prohibited zones and restricted zones from persons in whose interests such zones are established, and on cancellation of such permissions;• on the movement of aircraft in airspace;• on the beginning and end of activities related to the use of airspace that are not related to the performance of flights by aircraft.Actual implementation:Describe what civil aviation security threat information was identified by which authority based on the NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent fight information regions FIRs.When planning the use of airspace, Ukraine’s NOTAM restrictions on the use of flight levels for flights on air routes entering the airspace of the Russian Federation were applied. There were no other warnings on aviation security from Ukraine.The proximity of possible flight altitudes of Ukrain-ian military aircraft (according to Ukraine’s NOTAMs 1492/14 and 1493/14) up to level 320 (for example, for flight MH17 at level 330) was a sufficient reason for the aviation authorities of Ukraine to close the airspace over the armed conflict zone.The threats to air traffic safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR originated from hazardous activities in the area of re-sponsibility of the adjacent FIR of Dnepropetrovsk. There were no armed conflicts in the flight information region (FIR) of Rostov-on-Don. Based on the available reliable information, the Russian side issued NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 to ensure flight safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR.Changes after 17 July 2014:NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 were issued for the reasons indicated in the answer to question Q2.
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138 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ5. What is the process for deciding on the source credibility and for verifying information, including information on capability of attack and intent to attack, relative to an active armed conflict that could impact civil aviation?Answer:The Russian Federation used the information of the Rus-sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14.Responsible:Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya).References:Instructions for the development, establishment, introduc-tion and removal of temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions, approved by Order of the Min-istry of Transport of Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.Joint Order of Federal Air Navigation Agency (Rosaer-onavigatsya) and the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 139/202 “On the organization of activities to issue notices to aviation personnel (NOTAM)” dated December 29, 2007.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Document No. 9554, First Edition 1990.Process and timeline:The texts of statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: No. 1570 of June 28, 2014, No. 1678 of July 10, 2014, and No. 1688 of July 13, 2014 were published on the Russian Foreign Ministry official website.Actual implementation:How was the security threat information verified, the source judged for credibility, and by what authority / organization? What were the results of the credibility decision and the verification?Rosaviatsiya has no reason to doubt the reliability of the information officially published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was used to issue NOTAMs in accordance with ICAO rules.Changes after 17 July 2014:The initiative to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 concerning the Rostov-on-Don FIR came on July 12, 2014 from the Rosaviatsiya Southern Interregional Territorial Administration (responsible for the Rostov-on-Don FIR) due to the aggravated situation in the areas bordering on Ukraine, the use of various types of weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces (statements by the Russian MFA No. 1570 of June 28, 2014, No. 1678 of July 10, 2014, and No. 1688 of July 13, 2014).
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139 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ6. What are the determining risk factors for unintentional attack that may not allow civil aviation to fly over a conflict zone? For example, scale of the conflict, military air transport or air combat activities, previous attacks against aircraft, level of training and experience of SAM operators, level of robustness of command and control mechanism for authorizing launch, civil aviation flight proximity to strategic assets, technical capability of SAMs to distinguish between civil and military aircraft.Answer:Threats to air traffic safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR stemmed from the dangerous activities in the area of re-sponsibility of the adjacent Dnepropetrovsk FIR, where an armed conflict was taking place, which required coordina-tion of the relevant Ukrainian authorities.Information, including official one, about the presence of a certain type of weapons in the conflict zone, as well as incidents with the use of these weapons, should have been considered sufficient by Ukraine to make decisions.For making decisions, the procedures described in ICAO documents, including Document No. 9554, should be used.Consistent adherence by Ukraine to ICAO rules (in force at the time of the crash) would have allowed the aviation authorities of Ukraine to come to a decision on the need to stop civil aviation flights over the conflict zone and avoid the crash of Flight MH17.Responsible:The state responsible for compliance with the rules for the introduction of restrictions on the use of airspace over an armed conflict zone (Ukraine, in relation to the Flight MH17 crash).References:Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Document No. 9554, First Edition 1990.Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management, ICAO Circular No. 330.Process and timelineAll possible risk factors for an unintended attack should be considered. ICAO instruments require interoperability between military and civilian authorities. States should undertake preparatory measures as necessary to ensure that contingencies are dealt with in a timely manner. Such preparations should include an assessment of the risk to civil aircraft operations due to a military conflict or incidents of unlawful interference with civil aviation. Preparatory activities should include the development of special contingency plans for military conflicts or acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation that may affect the use of airspace for civil aircraft and/or the provision of air traffic and support services.ICAO documents state that, whatever the circumstances of a crisis, the development of contingency plans would greatly contribute to an increased level of coordination between civilian and military bodies.The first step in the normal coordination process is transmission or delivery of a message detailing the pro-posed activity to the appropriate authority or ATM units. This message should describe the nature of the activity, ge-ographical area(s) affected, including its/their horizontal and vertical dimensions, the anticipated date(s), start time and duration of the activity, any special security meas-ures to be undertaken when necessary; and the means and methods of coordination between the military units involved and ATM units concerned, including the use of radio communications.Where feasible, a flight level should be established at or above which civil aircraft can continue to operate nor-mally without being exposed to hazards. In areas where most civil aircraft will be in the en-route phase, this flight level should ideally be at or below the lowest cruise level normally used.Actual implementation:Describe what risk factors for unintentional attack were identified by what authority / organization. See examples of risk factors listed in Q6.The aviation authorities of Ukraine had to adhere to the procedures described, in particular, in ICAO documents.Information on the reasons for and process of deciding to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 is contained in the answer to questions Q5 and Q12. Changes after 17 July 2014:There were no changes.
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140 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ7. What organizations are involved, how do they coordinate, and what is the process for determining accept-able security risk levels in civil aviation airspace over a conflict zone?Note: These are general security level targets to be met if specified, that are not specific to an event or situation.Answer:The process should be in conformity with ICAO regula-tions, including ICAO Document 9554.The Russian Federation used the information of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14.There were no armed conflicts in the Rostov-on-Don flight information region (FIR). The armed clashes took place on the territory of Ukraine.Responsible:Authorized bodies of the State on whose territory an armed conflict has arisen (Ukraine, in relation to the Flight MH17 crash).References:Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Document No. 9554, First Edition 1990.Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management, ICAO Circular No. 330.Process and timeline:Responsibility for initiating the coordination process lies with the State on whose territory an armed conflict is taking place. States providing air traffic management in conflict-affected airspace are responsible for taking special measures to ensure the safety of international operation of civil aircraft, even when coordination has not been initiated or completed. Based on the information available, the State responsible for air traffic management should define the geographic area of the conflict, assess the haz-ard or potential hazard to the international operation of civil aircraft, and determine whether flights in or over the conflict area should be avoided or may continue subject to certain conditions. Then an international NOTAM should be issued containing the necessary information, recom-mendations and security measures to be taken; it should be updated subsequently to follow the developments.Actual implementation:Describe what organisations determined the acceptable security risk levels for civil aircraft. How this was determined and what were the determined acceptable security levels?There were no armed conflicts within the Rostov-on-Don FIR. NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 with restrictions on the use of the airspace of the Rostov-on-Don FIR were issued due to the hostilities on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation, as well as the shelling of Russian territory from the territory of Ukraine.Changes after 17 July 2014:There were no changes in the Russian regulations.
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141 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ8. What is the process of determining how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information in a con-flict zone? For example, what part of the airspace, what altitudes or types of aircraft?Answer:The process must be in conformity with ICAO regula-tions, including Document No. 9554.Responsible:Competent authorities and airspace users exchanging information related to aviation safety.References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Docu-ment No. 8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Document No. 9554, First Edition 1990.Process and timeline:Rosaviatsiya used information from the Russian Foreign Ministry for NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14.Actual implementation:Describe what were the impact analysis results, if any—how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information — what airspace, what altitudes or type of aircraft.NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 included a text to explain the reason for issuing the NOTAM, “Due to the hostilities ongoing on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation, as well as the shelling of Russian territory from the territory of Ukraine,” and their scope was also defined.Changes after 17 July 2014:Based on the available reliable information, the Russian side issued NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 to ensure flight safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR.
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142 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ9. What analysis methodology or risk matrix is used to assess the likelihood of a threat presenting itself and the potential consequences for civil aircraft flying over the conflict zone?Answer:The process should be in line with ICAO rules, including document No. 9554.The armed conflict took place on the territory of Ukraine, so it is not known how the Ukrainian authorities conducted the relevant analysis and risk assessment.Responsible:Competent authorities of the State on the territory of which the armed conflict took place (Ukraine, in relation to Flight MH17 plane crash).References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO docu-ment No. 8126, Sixth Edition — 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Mil-itary Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO document No. 9554, First Edition — 1990.Process and timeline:See the answers to Q7 and Q8.Actual implementation:Describe if and how risk was assessed and what levels of security risk were determined for what airspace, what altitudes or what type of aircraft.See the answers to Q7 and Q8.Changes after 17 July 2014:Information on the reasons for and the decision process of releasing NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 can be found in the answers to question Q5 and Q12.
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143 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ10. What is the process to determine security mitigations that would permit civil aviation to overfly a conflict zone?Answer:The process should be in line with ICAO rules, including document No. 9554.Responsible:Competent authorities and airspace users exchanging information related to aviation security.References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO docu-ment No. 8126, Sixth Edition — 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO document No. 9554, First Edition — 1990.Actual implementation:Describe if and what security mitigations were deter-mined that would permit civil aviation to overfly the conflict zone.See answers to Q7, Q8 and Q9.Changes after 17 July 2014:Information on the reasons for and the decision process of releasing NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 can be found in the answers to question Q5 and Q12.
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144 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ11. What are your normal (not during conflict) criteria for establishing restriction or segregation of airspace and what are the coordination procedures both internally and externally?Answer:The process is in line with ICAO rules.Responsible:• Rosaviatsiya• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”• A user of airspace whose activity poses a threat to the safety of airspace use.References:Federal Law No. 60-FZ, “The Aviation Code of the Rus-sian Federation” of March 19, 1997.Chapter VI, “Prohibition or restriction of the use of airspace” of the Federal Rules on the Use of the Air Space of the Russian Federation approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 138 of March 11, 2010.Federal Aviation Regulations, “Organization of Planning the Use of Airspace of the Russian Federation” approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 6 dated January 16, 2012.Guidelines for the development, establishment, introduc-tion and removal of temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions, approved by Order of the Min-istry of Transport of Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.Joint order of Rosaeronavigation and the Ministry of Transport of Russia from No. 139/202 “On the Organiza-tion of activity on publication of notices for the aviation personnel (NOTAM)” dated December 29, 2007.Process and timeline:Organization of the use of airspace provides for safe, cost-effective and regular air traffic, as well as other activi-ties to use airspace. The organization of the use of airspace is carried out by the authorized body in the field of airspace use, the authorities of the unified system of air traffic man-agement, as well as bodies of users of airspace — air traffic service (flight management) in the designated zones and areas. The use of airspace or certain areas thereof may be prohibited or restricted.If there is a need to use airspace by two or more airspace users at the same time, prohibition or restriction of their activities in certain areas of the airspace of the Russian Federation in accordance with state priorities in the use of airspace is established by introducing temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions.Submissions for the establishment of temporary and local regimes shall be submitted by users of airspace via the aircraft terrestrial data transmission network and telegraph messages or in hard copy, including facsimile communication to the relevant centers of the Unified Sys-tem. The submissions shall provide reliable and complete information on the planned activities to use airspace.The terms are determined by the Guidelines for the development, establishment, introduction and removal of temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restric-tions, approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.The coordination of the use of airspace ensures efficient and flexible use and includes:• ensuring the safety of airspace use in case of changes in the air, meteorological and aeronautical environ-ment through the implementation of the authorities of the Unified System centers on air space redistribu-tion in accordance with the state priorities;• timely introduction and removal of bans and restric-tions in the optimal airspace related to temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;• providing an opportunity to use the airspace of re-stricted areas, the validity of which is limited by time period.Actual implementation:Not applicable—no answer required.Changes after 17 July 2014:There were no changes to the regulatory documents
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145 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ12. What are the decision processes for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace in a conflict zone? What are the ANSP and military coordination procedures for active civil flights and their safety?Answer:The process is in line with ICAO rules.There were no armed conflicts in the Rostov-on-Don Flight Information Region (FIR).Responsible:• Rosaviatsiya• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”• A user of airspace whose activity poses a threat to the safety of airspace use.References:Federal Law No. 60-FZ “The Aviation Code of the Russian Federation” of March 19, 1997.Chapter VI “Prohibition or restriction of the use of airspace” of the Federal Rules on the Use of the Air Space of the Russian Federation approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 138 of March 11, 2010.Federal Aviation Regulations “Organization of Planning the Use of Airspace of the Russian Federation” approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 6 dated January 16, 2012.Guidelines for the development, establishment, introduc-tion and removal of temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions, approved by Order of the Min-istry of Transport of Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.Joint order of Rosaeronavigation and the Ministry of Transport of Russia from No. 139/202 “On the Organiza-tion of activity on publication of notices for the aviation personnel (NOTAM)” dated December 29, 2007.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO document No. 9554, First Edition — 1990.Process and timeline:The process has no differences from the one specified in the answer to question Q11.Procedures for issuing NOTAMs on changes in air navigation data that need to be issued immediately are further defined in the Joint order of Rosaeronaviga-tion and the Ministry of Transport of Russia from No. 139/202 “On the Organization of activity on publication of notices for the aviation personnel (NOTAM)” dated December 29, 2007.Actual implementation:Describe who took what decisions for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace. Describe what coordination took place between the ANSP and military regarding the security threats.Since March 1, 2014 and up to the present time, there has been no armed conflict in the Rostov-on-Don Flight Information Region (FIR). The imposition of restrictions (NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14) on the use of part of the airspace of the Rostov-on-Don FIR was motivated by the reaction to hazardous activities for flights in the neighbouring State.The airspace above the conflict zone was above the territory of Ukraine, therefore, decisions on flight safe-ty should have been made by Ukrainian competent authorities.Based on the information which is available, the State responsible for air traffic services should identify the geo-graphical area of the conflict, assess the hazards or poten-tial hazards to international civil aircraft operations, and determine whether such operations in or through the area of conflict should be avoided or may be continued under spec-ified conditions. An international NOTAM containing the necessary information, advice and security measures should then be issued. If the necessary information is not provided by States whose military authorities are involved in an armed conflict, the State responsible for providing air traffic control is advised to establish the nature and degree of hazard or po-tential hazard from other sources, such as aircraft operators, IATA, IFALPA, neighbouring States or ICAO.The initiative to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 related to the Rostov-on-Don FIR came from the Southern Interregional Territorial Administration of Rosaviation on July 12, 2014 due to the aggravated situa-tion in the border areas with Ukraine, the use of various types of weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces (state-ments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia No. 1570 dated June 28, 2014, No. 1678 dated July 10, 2014, No. 1688 dated July 13, 2014).NOTAM should contain information on the hazard that is the subject of the message. Based on this, a text explaining the reason for issuing NOTAM was included in NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14: “Due to the hostilities ongoing on the territory of Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation, as well as the shelling of Rus-sian territory from the territory of Ukraine.”Changes after 17 July 2014:There were no changes.
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146 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ13. What organisations are involved and what are the procedures for coordinating airspace restrictions in the conflict zone among adjacent FIRs?Answer:The area of flight information in which the armed conflict was taking place was not in the Russian Federation.Ukraine has not published information about the rea-sons for the restrictions imposed by NOTAM.Responsible:Competent authorities and airspace users exchanging information related to aviation security.References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO docu-ment No. 8126, Sixth Edition — 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO document No. 9554, First Edition — 1990.Process and timeline:Aeronautical data and information should be complete, timely and of the required quality. In the presence of sources of hazard to air navigation, as well as the estab-lishment of prohibited areas, hazardous areas or zones of restriction, the issuance of NOTAMs is required.The text of a NOTAM is generated using the values/uniform abbreviated phraseology required for the ICAO NOTAM code, supplemented by ICAO abbreviations, dash numbers, discriminant, indexes, callsigns, frequen-cies, numbers and plain text [1].NOTAMs shall contain information about the hazard, operating condition or mode of operation of the means that are the subject of the message.An example of information on the hazard to be included in NOTAMs relating to an armed conflict zone is given in Appendix “B” of the document [2].Actual implementation:Describe if and how the airspace restrictions were coordinated with the adjacent FIRs and what organisations were involved in the coordination.Ukraine has full sovereignty over its airspace. There was no additional information from the Ukrainian aviation authorities about the hazards other than those published in Ukrainian issued NOTAMs.Published by the Russian side NOTAMs on July 16, 2014 were available for the Ukrainian side (see the answer to question Q12).Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:According to the DSB Final Report, the investigation found that Ukraine had made a decision to issue NOTAMs to restrict access to the airspace below FL320 based on the ne-cessity to “set additional buffer zone FL260-FL320 in order to ensure flight safety of civil aircraft related to operations of the state aircraft of Ukraine within the prohibited airspace” (para. 6.3, p. 196 of the DSB Final Report).The contents of NOTAMs does not allow to set the altitude for a buffer zone.According to the latest NOTAM issued by Ukraine on 14 July 2014, military aircraft could operate at the levels up to FL320, resulting in a 300-meter altitude difference between a military aircraft and a civil aircraft flying at an altitude of 10050 meters (Flight MH17 was at FL330), which complied with the reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM). Furthermore, FL320 is part of the RVSM airspace that is subject to the ICAO rules establish-ing special security measures and requirements for aircraft on-board equipment, cabin crew and ground personnel training, as well as accuracy and reliability characteristics of the ground equipment.Military aircraft do not fall under the requirements for the on-board equipment for RVSM flights. Besides, military aircraft are not subject to the height keeping re-quirements. Therefore, they cannot fly in RVSM airspace without special procedures applied.Paragraph 5.2.5. of the Manual on a 300 m (1000 ft) Vertical Separation Minimum Between FL 290 and FL 410 Inclusive (ICAO Doc 9574) points out the need to develop procedures to accommodate military flight operations that do not meet the equipment requirements but are carried out at FL 290. Possible methods include:a) the provision of temporary airspace reservations;b) the provision of block altitudes;c) the provision of special routes applicable only to mili-tary aircraft; andd) the provision of special routes applicable to air traffic requiring a 600 m (2 000 ft) VSM above FL 290.Therefore, Ukraine, when issuing a NOTAM permitting military aircraft flights at the levels up to FL320 inclusive, failed to consider or implement the ICAO requirements in question. UkSATSE and the civil aviation authority of Ukraine had to make a decision prohibiting the use of airspace by civil aircraft above the armed conflict zone.
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147 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ14. What is the process to decide if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and to choose the communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs, АIС)?Response:The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.Responsible:• Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya)• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Infor-mation Centre”• Airspace user, whose activities create a hazard to the safe use of airspace.References:Federal Law No. 60-FZ “The Air Code of the Russian Federation” of 19 March 1997.Federal Rules for the Use of the Airspace of the Russian Federation approved by Resolution No. 138 of the Govern-ment of the Russian Federation of 11 March 2010.Federal Aviation Regulations “Airspace Use Planning in the Russian Federation” approved by Order No. 6 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 16 January 2012.Instruction on the development, establishment, imple-mentation and removal of temporary, local and short-term restrictions approved by Order No. 171 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 27 June 2011.Joint order No. 139/202 of the Federal Aeronautical Agen-cy and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Feder-ation on “Organizing the Issuance of Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs)” of 29 December 2007.Process and timeline:The process is described in the response to Q11.To ensure planning of airspace use, the Unified System centers employ an aviation ground data and telegraph net-work, public telephone network, restricted telephone and/or telegraph network, and the Internet, as well as receive information in paper format, including fax. Planning of airspace use is carried out in the Unified System centers equipped with automated airspace use planning systems using the said systems.Actual implementation:Describe how it was decided if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and how it was chosen what communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs AIC).The decision-making process regarding the issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 is described in the response to Q12.Changes introduced after 17 July 2014: No changes have been introduced.
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148 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ15. What organisations are involved in and what are the processes to prepare, verify if ICAO AIS procedures and terminology are used, validate for correctness and transmit aeronautical information to the users of it (e.g. airlines and ANSPs)?Response:The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.Responsible entity:• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Infor-mation Centre”References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc 8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition, 1990.Federal Aviation Regulations “Requirements for legal enti-ties and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial air transport operations. Form of and procedure for issuing a document verifying compliance of legal entities and indi-vidual entrepreneurs performing commercial air transport operations with the requirements set out in federal aviation regulations” approved by Order No. 246 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 13 August 2015.Federal Aviation Regulations “Preparation for and performance of civil aircraft operations in the Russian Federation” approved by Order No. 128 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 July 2009.Procedure for production and rules for provision of aeronautical information approved by Order No. 305 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 October 2014.Process and timeline:Production of aeronautical information includes com-pilation (generation) of raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information, their submission to the aero-nautical information authority, subsequent processing and verification by the aeronautical information authority and transmission to the users of the official aeronautical data and official aeronautical information, processors of the official aeronautical data and official aeronautical information, and providers of the official aeronautical information and official aeronautical data. After receiving raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical informa-tion, the aeronautical information authority shall verify, register and process them for inclusion in the AIP of Russia, Annex to the AIP of Russia, notices transmitted via communication channels and containing information about the condition of the aeronautical equipment and airspace structure elements that are crucial to be timely warned of for the personnel involved in the performance of aircraft operations, and NOTAMs and AICs, as well as provision to the users of the official aeronautical data and official aeronautical information, processors of the official aeronautical data and official aeronautical information, and providers of the official aeronautical data. If the raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information do not meet the requirements, the aeronautical information authority shall send them back to the providers (com-pilators) of raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information for refinement.Actual implementation:Please describe the organizations involved in the preparation of aeronautical information, verification of the use of the ICAO AIS procedures and terminology, and validation of the correctness and transmission of the aeronautical information to its users.• Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya)• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Infor-mation Centre”Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:No changes have been introduced.
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149 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX B | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: RUSSIAN FEDERATION STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGEQ16. What are the procedures for disseminating civil aviation security threat information to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?Response:The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.Responsible:• Aircraft operator• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Infor-mation Centre”References:Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc 8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-tions, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition, 1990.Federal Aviation Regulations “Requirements for legal en-tities and individual entrepreneurs performing commer-cial air transport operations. Form of and procedure for issuing a document verifying compliance of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial air transport operations with the requirements set out in federal aviation regulations” approved by Order No. 246 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 13 August 2015.Federal Aviation Regulations “Preparation for and performance of civil aircraft operations in the Russian Federation” approved by Order No. 128 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 July 2009.Procedure for preparation and rules for provision of aeronautical information approved by Order No. 305 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 October 2014.Process and timeline:The aeronautical information authority publishes aer-onautical information documents containing official aeronautical information and official aeronautical data. Official aeronautical information is issued as a NOTAM if the raw aeronautical information is of temporary and short-term nature or if permanent or long-term tempo-rary changes that are important in terms of operation are urgently introduced, with the exception of extensive text and/or graphic materials. The aeronautical information authority issues NOTAMs, as well as checklists of valid NOTAMs and NOTAM checklists. NOTAMs are trans-mitted as one communication message via AFS.Russian aircraft operators, including those performing international flights, shall ensure provision of aeronautical information to the cabin crews. In case of commercial air transport operations, the operator ensures during the preparation for the flight that the cabin crew is provided with aeronautical and meteorological information.Actual implementation:Please describe whether and, if so, how the civil aviation security threat information was disseminated to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?All users of the airspace of the Russian Operation were sent NOTAM V6158/14 via the AFTN channel in tele-gram No. 141707 of 16 July 2014 and NOTAM A2681/14 in telegram No. 161709 of 16 July 2014.Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:No changes have been introduced.
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150 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX C | CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RESPONSES FROM RUSSIAN FEDERATION Appendix C Clarifying Questions Responses from Russian FederationThis appendix contains the responses received from the Russian Federation to clarifying questions. The responses are provided as received without additional editing or modification. Note: Unofficial translation from Russian.CQ1. What threat information about the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in URVV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority?Answer:The Russian authorities did not have any information regarding the presence of air defense equipment on the territory of Ukraine that was not controlled by the armed forces of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and which could hit targets in the Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250.Statements by Ukraine’s officials implied that Ministry of Defence of Ukraine delivered different types of weap-ons, including combat aircraft, to the armed conflict zone. In accordance with ICAO Rules, Ukrainian authorities were responsible for obtaining, analyzing and disseminat-ing flight safety information over armed conflict zone.NOTAMs (A1383/14, A1384/15, A1492/14, A1493/14) issued by Ukraine mentioned only flights of state air-craft as a source of threat to flight safety of civil aircraft. The real situation in eastern Ukraine differed from the information presented in NOTAMs. Therefore, as it was outlined in the answer to Q2 of the Questionnaire of 4 September 2020, Rosaviatsiya identified a threat to flight safety itself due to Ukraine’s regular shooting of the Rus-sian border areas.We would deem it important to draw the Flight Safety Foundation’s attention to the fact that it is incorrect to focus only on threats posed exclusively by air defense systems capable of hitting targets at high altitudes when assessing flight safety risks over eastern Ukraine. The same mistake was made in the final DSB report where the analysis of the actions and decisions taken by the Ukrainian side was focused on the speculation that the AN-26 aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had been downed on 14 July 2014 with some “heavy weapon” (pages 181–185, Section 5.3).The final DSB report concludes that the reason why Ukraine restricted the use of the airspace below FL320 remains unclear (page 10, Subsection “Ukraine’s airspace management,” paragraph two).In April 2014, the Ukrainian authorities declared areas in eastern Ukraine “an anti-terrorist operation zone.” Regulation on the Use of Airspace of Ukraine approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No. 401 of 29 March 2002 (https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/401-2002-%D0%BF#Text) did not provide for pro-cedures in case of internal armed conflicts.As it was found out during the investigation of Flight MH17 crash, due to the operational use of the aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MIG-29, SU-27, SU-25 aircraft), larger airspace in Denepropetrovsk FIR was reserved by issuing NOTAMs from 29 June to 14 July 2014 by the necessity to set “a buffer zone” FL260-FL320 (page 196, Section 6.3, paragraph two).Regulation No. 401 of 29 March 2002 contains a defini-tion of the term “a buffer zone” which is a part of the air-space around restricted areas, hazardous areas, prohibited areas and areas related to temporarily reserved airspace intended to ensure safety requirements while carrying activities related to the use of airspace in the mentioned areas and beyond them. However, Regulation No. 410 of 29 March 2002 does not describe the order of buffer zones settings.Ukraine did not publish information regarding “the buffer zone” around the conflict zone. Moreover, NO-TAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 issued by the Ukraine did not prohibit state aircraft to fly between FL260 and FL320. In this connection, it is still unclear how the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine was going to provide and the Ukraer-ocenter to control the observance of the so-called “buffer zone.”Clarifications concerning the reasons for issuing NO-TAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 on setting “a buffer zone” provided during the investigation of Flight MH17 crash, give grounds for assuming that military activity in the armed conflict zone related to the military aviation flights was more dangerous than it was reflected in NOTAMs.In accordance with para. 12.2. of the Rules for the Performance of Flights and Air Traffic Management in the Airspace of Ukraine with a Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum approved by Order of the Ministry of Trans-port of Ukraine No. 9 of 11 January 2002, “The required vertical separation minimum between the vertical limits of the restricted and reserved airspace and other aircraft not engaged in such activities and flying in airspace with RVSM should be: 600 meters (2000 feet) above the upper limit of the zone of the aforementioned activities for the upper limits at FL290 and above; …”(https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0041-02#Text).Therefore, given FL320 which is, according to NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14, the upper limit of the restricted zone, civil aircraft could fly in this area at no less than FL340, i.e. Flight MH17 authorised by the Ministry of
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151 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX C | CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RESPONSES FROM RUSSIAN FEDERATION Internal Affairs of Ukraine at FL330 did not answer the safety requirements over the armed conflict zone. The investigation conducted by the DSB did not establish the reason why the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine allowed the Flight MH17 to proceed at an altitude lower than provided for by the Ukrainian legislation.CQ2. What intent to attack with air defence equip-ment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in URVV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority?Answer:When taking a decision to issue NOTAM V6158/14, the Russian airspace authorities did not have information that governmental or non-governmental entities on the territory of Ukraine deployed air defense equipment capable of downing aircraft at high altitudes in the conflict zone and could use it in the armed conflict by mistake or negligence.Responsibility for assessing the intent to use air de-fense equipment by governmental and non-governmental armed groups on the territory of Ukraine rests with the Ukrainian authorities. This follows from the recommen-dations given in para. 10.2 of ICAO Document 9554: “The responsibility for initiating the co-ordination process rests with the States whose military forces are engaged in the conflict. The responsibility for instituting special measures to ensure the safety of international civil aircraft opera-tions remains with the States responsible for providing air traffic services in the airspace affected by the conflict, even in case where co-ordination is not initiated or completed.”CQ3. What were the specific reasons for restricting the airspace with NOTAM V6158/14, why were there several restrictions in one NOTAM, and to which of the restrictions in the NOTAM apply the items F) and G), specifying surface as lower height limit and FL530 as upper height limit?Answer:In the period from March to August 2014 analysed by the Foundation, there were no armed conflicts on the territory of the Russian Federation adjacent to the state border with Ukraine. However, statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided information con-cerning the risks to people and objects on the territory of the Russian Federation and in its airspace and in this regard, Rosaviatsiya took preventive flight safety measures (issuance of NOTAMSs V6158/14 and A2681/14).The specific reason for airspace restrictions imposed by NOTAM V6158/14 is stated in the field E) of the NOTAM: “Due to combat actions on the territory of the Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of the Russian Federation….” This explanation was included in the NOTAM subject to the requirements of ICAO Rules, including para. 6.3.8. of ICAO Document 8126 and recommendations given in Appendix B to ICAO Document 9554.Items Q), F) and G) of NOTAM V6158/14 stated that it applied to the airspace from the ground to FL530. How-ever, regarding the airway sections adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation listed in the field E), the stated height limit was “SFC — FL320” which correspond-ed to the upper limit on the use of airways in NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 published earlier (on 14 July 2014) by Ukraine.The difference in the upper limit values of the airspace restrictions is related to the information published in the second part of the field E) of the NOTAM, concerning the use of the arrival/exit routes to and from the Rostov-on-Don airport from and to the Dnepropetrovsk flight information region (FIR), with FL340 and above stated (FL330 and above respectively). Therefore, when writing the NOTAM, the maximum value of the highest possible FL530 for the airways sections used for the departure (ar-rival) from (to) the Rostov-on-Don airport, was chosen.Flight MH17 following airway L980 in the airspace of Ukraine to the compulsory reporting point TAMAK and further, according to the flight plan, from the waypoint TAMAK, following airway A87 in the Russian airspace, was subject to NOTAM V6158/14 restrictions for the air-space below FL 320 (airway section “A87 TMAK — SAR-NA” stated in NOTAM V6158/14).The content of the field E) of NOTAM V6158/14 consists of two parts the first one concerns restrictions on airway sections, while the second one concerns those on approach and exit routes to and from the area of Rostov-on-Don airport (URRR). Meanwhile, the second part regarding Rostov-on-Don airport was repeated in NOTAM A2681/14.CQ4. NOTAM V6158/14 promulgated, among oth-er things, a restriction with an upper height limit of FL320 referring to “…the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Russian Federation….” What was the precise threat that required airspace restriction over the territory of the Russian Federation up to FL320 but not above, considering that in the references you provided the statements (1570-28-06-2014, 1678-10-07-2014 and 1688-13-07-2014) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federations refer to low altitude artillery shootings?Answer:NOTAMs A1383/14, A1384/14, A1387/14, A1389/14, A1492/14, and A1493/14 issued by the Ukrainian side did not contain information concerning the nature of the
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152 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX C | CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RESPONSES FROM RUSSIAN FEDERATION military actions as required by the ICAO Rules, including para. 6.3.8. of ICAO Document 8126 and recommenda-tions given in Appendix B to ICAO Document 9554. From the Ukrainian NOTAMs, it formally followed that they were in order to ensure state aviation flights.However, the use of different types of weapons and methods of warfare (flights with the use of combat aviation weapons; tanks and artillery shooting; jamming support) in close proximity to the territory of the Russian Federation, not declared in the NOTAM, pointed to the fact that the Ukrainian authorities did not fulfil the re-quirements of the ICAO Rules, according to which, co-or-dination is aimed at providing optimal conditions which allow to avoid the creation of hazards to civil aircraft and minimizing interference with the normal flight operations of such aircraft.For instance:• On 24 April 2014, one of the Russian air companies informed Rosaviatsiya of disappearing GPS signal when flying within the Dnepropetrovsk FIR area of responsibility. Navigation equipment resumed its work after entering the airspace of the Russian Federation;• On 5 June 2014, the Ukrainian plane SU-27 violated the state border by trespassing over the Russian bor-der and going 1.5km deep into the Russian territory in the area of the populated area Kuybyshevo (the Rostov region). On 12 June 2014, in the same area, a MI-8 helicopter with Ukrainian symbols flying at the height of 50m trespassed into the airspace of the Rus-sian Federation going up to 3km deep into it (extract from the Statement by the Russian MFA No. 1422 of 14 June 2014).As it was mentioned earlier in the answers to Questions No. 1 and 2, proceeding from the information in the latest statements by the Russian MFA (No. 1570 of 28 June 2014, N0. 1678 of 10 July 2014, No. 1688 of 13 July 2014), Rosaviatsiya decided to partially close the airspace in the Rostov-on-Don FIR area of responsibility.FL320 was taken as the limit for the NOTAM V6158/14, same as in the Ukrainian NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14. The decision to set a vertical limit of FL320 was taken as Rosaviatsiya did not have any other, more or less credible information provided by the Ukrainian side, which would allow to forecast the vertical limit of the hazard zone for civil aviation flights.
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153 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Appendix D Questionnaire Responses: Ukraine standard procedures and threat knowledgeThis appendix contains the responses received from Ukraine to standard procedures and threat knowledge question-naire. The responses are provided as received without additional editing or modification.Q1. Is information in social media used as a trigger for security threat analysis for civil aviation, including infor-mation about capability of attack and/or intend to attack civil aircraft?Answer:Information from open sources, including social media, is used in the assessment of threats to civil aviation security in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• airport operators;• aircraft operators;• air navigation service providers.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March 20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rele-vant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO Doc 8973.Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navi-gation service providers; and other sources, social media included.Actual implementation:Describe here what social media civil aviation threat information about presence of air defense equipment or intent to attack was identified by which authority.According to the established procedures, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine used information on threats to civil aviation security from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence agencies of Ukraine, and other sources. This information is the one marked “For official use (restricted).” The in-formation mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:Have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• Amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities”;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243
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154 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q2. What are the sources of public and private threat information and the processes for gathering information relative to civil aviation security (including in a conflict zone)?Answer:Information from all available sources is used to assess threats to civil aviation security in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. Also, when assessing the threats to civil aviation security, they consider the in-formation pertaining to restrictions on flights in certain areas from international civil aviation organizations and civil aviation authorities of other states (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• airport operators; aircraft operators;• air navigation service providers;• civil aviation authorities of foreign states;• international civil aviation organizations.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March 20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rele-vant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO Doc 8973.Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air naviga-tion service providers; civil aviation authorities of foreign states; international civil aviation organizations.Actual implementation:Describe here what other sources of civil aviation threat information about presence of air defence equipment and intent to attack was identified by which authority.According to the established procedures, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine used information on threats to civil aviation security from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence agencies of Ukraine, civil aviation authorities of foreign states; international civil aviation organizations. This in-formation is the one marked “For official use (restricted).” The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures pertaining to gath-ering and analyzing information about threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Avia-tion, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities”;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Lev-el of Threat to Civil Aviation Security if Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No 356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243
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155 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q3. What is the level of involvement of airlines, air navigation service providers (ANSPs), the military and ad-jacent states or other states publishing advisories in gathering information about aviation security (including information for conflict zones)?Answer:National airlines, air navigation service providers, the military and law enforcement agencies are involved in gathering information about aviation security. According to relevant regulatory documents, information received from adjacent or other states (if available) is taken into consideration as well.(Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no con-cept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• airport operators; aircraft operators;• air navigation service providers;• civil aviation authorities of foreign states;• international civil aviation organizations.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March 20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rele-vant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO Doc 8973.Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air naviga-tion service providers; civil aviation authorities of foreign states; international civil aviation organizations.Actual implementation:Describe specifically what airlines, air navigation service provider (ANSP), the military and adjacent states or other states publishing advisories were used as a source for what information about security risk for civil aircraft.According to the established procedures, the State Avi-ation Administration of Ukraine used information on threats to civil aviation security from national airlines, air navigation service providers, the military and law enforce-ment agencies, considering information from adjacent or other states (if available) as well.This information is the one marked “For official use (re-stricted).” The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzo-eksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures pertaining to gath-ering and analyzing information about threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Aviation, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities”;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Lev-el of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No 356, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243
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156 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q4. What are the procedures for routine review and analysis of NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restric-tions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs) to ensure civil aircraft security?Answer:Information pertaining to NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs) is constantly reviewed and analyzed in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• aircraft operators;• air navigation service providers;• EUROCONTROL.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11, 15 and 17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 8126, Cir 330Process and timeline:State Aviation Administration of Ukraine; Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft opera-tors; air navigation service providers constantly review and analyze NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs). EUROCONTROL analyzes such information in order to provide centralized services related to flight planning and air traffic flow management.Actual implementation:Describe what civil aviation security threat information was identified by which authority based on the NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent fight information regions FIRs.According to the established procedures, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine; Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft oper-ators; air navigation service providers constantly review and analyse NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs). EUROCONTROL analyzes such information in order to provide centralized services related to flight planning and air traffic flow management. The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures pertaining to gath-ering and analyzing information about threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 15, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, and current legisla-tion. In particular, the following have been adopted:• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Security Aviation of Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Infor-mation Service Provision,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
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157 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q5. What is the process for deciding on the source credibility and for verifying information, including infor-mation on capability of attack and intent to attack, relative to an active armed conflict that could impact civil aviation?Answer:Information on threats to civil aviation security is ana-lyzed, verified and assessed in accordance with relevant regulatory documents (additional information is provided in Appendix 3).Responsible:• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of UkraineReferences:The detailed process of gathering, analyzing, verifying and assessing information is classified. The general provisions related to this process are specified in the following legis-lative documents:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine” (as amended), “On Op-erational and Investigative Activities” (as amended), “On Counterintelligence activities” (as amended);• Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Regula-tions regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coor-dination groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine,” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).• Regulations on the unified state system of prevention, response and cessation of terrorist acts and minimiza-tion of their consequences, approved by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated February 18, 2016 No 92.• Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communi-cations of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), reg-istered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended);• classified internal departmental documents.Process and timeline:Information on possible threats to aircraft flights in areas of military conflicts is intelligence one. The procedure for determining the reliability of the source of information depends on the method of obtaining such information and the type of information source. This information is classified.Actual implementation:How was the security threat information verified, the source judged for credibility, and by what authority / organization? What were the results of the credibility decision and the verification?The information was analyzed, verified and assessed by the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. This information is classified.Changes after 17 July 2014:Based on the adopted Decree of the President of Ukraine dated 30.03.2018 No 116/2018 “On approval of the Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council “On large-scale anti-terrorist operation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (restricted), the Law of Ukraine dated 21.06.2018 No 2469-VIII “On the National Security of Ukraine,” Law of Ukraine dated 17.09.2020 No 912-IX “On Intelligence,” appropriate amendments have been made to the following legislation:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities”;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII.• Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Regula-tions regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coor-dination groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine,” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).• Regulations on the unified state system of prevention, response and cessation of terrorist acts and minimiza-tion of their consequences, approved by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated February 18, 2016 No 92.Ukraine has adopted the Order of the Ministry of In-frastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 17.06.2020 No356, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No960/35243.Also, some classified internal departmental documents have been amended.
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158 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q6. What are the determining risk factors for unintentional attack that may not allow civil aviation to fly over a conflict zone? For example, scale of the conflict, military air transport or air combat activities, previous attacks against aircraft, level of training and experience of SAM operators, level of robustness of command and control mechanism for authorizing launch, civil aviation flight proximity to strategic assets, technical capability of SAMs to distinguish between civil and military aircraft.Answer:According to relevant regulatory documents, all factors that pose a potential threat to civil aviation security are taken into account when establishing restrictions, prohi-bitions and terms on the use of airspace over or near areas of military conflicts. (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”). (Additional information is provided in Appendix 3).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330Process and timelineIn accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air nav-igation service providers, and make a decision on establish-ing restrictions and prohibitions on the use of airspace.The information mentioned above is specified in the fi-nal report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014Actual implementation:Describe what risk factors for unintentional attack were identified by what authority / organization. See examples of risk factors listed in Q6According to the established procedures, on the basis of available information, appropriate restrictions and prohi-bitions on the use of airspace were established.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering and analyzing information about threats to civil aviation se-curity, risk assessment and implementation of prohibitions, restrictions and terms on the use of airspace, have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recom-mended Practices Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Conven-tion on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities.”• Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
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159 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q7. What organizations are involved, how do they coordinate, and what is the process for determining accept-able security risk levels in civil aviation airspace over a conflict zone?Note: These are general security level targets to be met if specified, that are not specific to an event or situation.Answer:According to relevant regulatory documents, the process of determining the acceptable level of civil aviation safety risks is carried out within appropriate coordination based on an analysis of available threat information (along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March 20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended);Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security in coordina-tion with the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelli-gence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers.The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malay-sia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Actual implementation:Describe what organisations determined the acceptable security risk levels for civil aircraft. How this was determined and what were the determined acceptable security levels?According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding risk assess-ment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recom-mended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Conven-tion on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Inves-tigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities.”Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the tempo-rarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Lev-el of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
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160 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q8. What is the process of determining how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information in a con-flict zone? For example, what part of the airspace, what altitudes or types of aircraft?Answer:The process of determining how civil aviation can be af-fected based on threat information has been implemented on the basis of relevant regulatory document (Additional information is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401;Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a gener-al assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Min-istry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace. The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200, https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Actual implementation:Describe what were the impact analysis results, if any — how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information — what airspace, what altitudes or type of aircraft.According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200, https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding risk assess-ment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recom-mended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Conven-tion on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities.”Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the tempo-rarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Lev-el of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
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161 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q9. What analysis methodology or risk matrix is used to assess the likelihood of a threat presenting itself and the potential consequences for civil aircraft flying over the conflict zone?Answer:An analysis methodology or risk matrix used to assess the likelihood of a threat and potential consequences for civil aircraft has been developed and approved in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (Along with this, atten-tion ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence• Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401;Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rele-vant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO Doc 8973.Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace. The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Actual implementation:Describe if and how risk was assessed and what levels of security risk were determined for what airspace, what altitudes or what type of aircraft.According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding risk assess-ment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities.”Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the tempo-rarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Lev-el of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954;• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508.
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162 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q10. What is the process to determine security mitigations that would permit civil aviation to overfly a conflict zone?Answer:The process to determine security risk mitigations has been established on the basis of the analysis of identified threats in accordance with relevant regulatory docu-ments. (To answer this question, the phrase “Security risk mitigations” has been used instead of the phrase “security mitigations”). (Additional information is provided in Ap-pendix 3). (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401;Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended).These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330Process and timeline:In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis of information received from the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace. The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Actual implementation:Describe if and what security mitigations were determined that would permit civil aviation to overfly the conflict zone.According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding securi-ty risk mitigations based on identified threats to civil aviation have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Avia-tion, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been amended:• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities.”Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the tempo-rarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
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163 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q11. What are your normal (not during conflict) criteria for establishing restriction or segregation of airspace and what are the coordination procedures both internally and externally?Answer:Criteria for the implementation of appropriate restrictions and reservations of airspace and coordination procedures have been established in accordance with relevant regula-tory documents.Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers;• air space users.References:Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).Instruction on planning and usage of temporarily re-served airspace and conditional ATS routes, approved by decree of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine 22.05.2006 No 354These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 2, 11 and 15, Doc 9426, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330, documents of EUROCONTROL, and EU legislation.Process and timeline:Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are es-tablished by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military System at the request of the competent authorities and users of airspace.The detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Actual implementation:Not applicable—no answer required.According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding the implementation of appropriate restrictions and reserva-tions of airspace, with ensuring appropriate coordination procedures, have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 2, 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066 documents of EURO-CONTROL, and with current national and EU legislation considered. In particular, the following have been adopted:• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
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164 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q12. What are the decision processes for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace in a conflict zone? What are the ANSP and military coordination procedures for active civil flights and their safety?Answer:Procedures for decision-making and civil- military coordi-nation in the introduction of bans, restrictions and terms on the use of airspace are established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (Additional information is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Security Service of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers;• air space users.References:Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).Instruction on planning and usage of temporarily re-served airspace and conditional ATS routes, approved by decree of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine 22.05.2006 No 354“Instructions on the organization of interaction between the bodies of the joint civil-military air traffic manage-ment system of Ukraine and the governing bodies of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” dated 29.02.2012;These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 2, 11 and 15, Doc 9426, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330, documents of EUROCONTROL, and EU legislation.Process and timeline:Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are es-tablished by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military System at the request of the competent authorities and users of airspace.The detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Actual implementation:Describe who took what decisions for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace. Describe what coordination took place between the ANSP and military regarding the security threats.According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding the im-plementation of appropriate restrictions and terms on the use of airspace, with ensuring civil-military coordination, have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 2, 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066 documents of EUROCONTROL, and with current national and EU legislation considered. In particular, the following have been adopted:• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698;• New edition of “Instructions on the organization of interaction between the bodies of the joint civil-mil-itary air traffic management system of Ukraine and the governing bodies of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” dated 29.02.2012.
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165 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q13. What organisations are involved and what are the procedures for coordinating airspace restrictions in the conflict zone among adjacent FIRs?Answer:According to relevant regulatory documents, procedures for informing about the establishment of restrictions on the use of airspace in FIRs, including ones that belong to adjacent are states, introduced in appropriate writ-ten agreements between area control centers, as well as between authorities responsible for air traffic management in adjacent states. (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:The Air Code of Ukraine.Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).Rules of flights and air traffic service in the classi-fied airspace of Ukraine, approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine 16.04.2003 No293.These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 15, Doc 9426, documents of EUROCONTROL.Process and timeline:Information pertaining to restrictions on the use of airspace is published in aeronautical information doc-uments and provided to the competent authorities of adjacent states.Actual implementation:Describe if and how the airspace restrictions were coordinated with the adjacent FIRs and what organisations were involved in the coordination.According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding the dissemination of information about implementation of appropriate restrictions and reservations of airspace, with ensuring appropriate coordination procedures, have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066 documents of EUROCONTROL. In particular, the following have been adopted:• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Infor-mation Service Provision,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.
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166 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q14. What is the process to decide if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and to choose the communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs, АIС)?Response:The decision-making process on the need to publish aero-nautical information and the procedure for its publication has been established in accordance with relevant regulato-ry documents.Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:The Air Code of Ukraine.Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 15, Doc 9554, Doc 8126, documents of EUROCONTROL.Process and timeline:Aeronautical information is published by the decision of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine in coordina-tion with the state authorities concerned.Actual implementation:Describe how it was decided if there is a need for aero-nautical information publication and how it was chosen what communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs AIC).According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding the pub-lication of aeronautical information have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, doc-uments of EUROCONTROL, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Infor-mation Service Provision,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.
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167 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q15. What organisations are involved in and what are the processes to prepare, verify if ICAO AIS procedures and terminology are used, validate for correctness and transmit aeronautical information to the users of it (e.g. airlines and ANSPs)?Response:The processes of preparation, verification and application of ICAO procedures and terminology, confirmation of correctness and transfer of aeronautical information to its users have been established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.Responsible entity:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers;• EUROCONTROL;• ICAO.References:The Air Code of Ukraine.Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).These documents are developed in accordance with rele-vant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 15, Doc 8126, and EU legislation.Process and timeline:The State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, the Minis-try of Defense of Ukraine, and air navigation service pro-viders in accordance with their competence, check draft documents of aeronautical information published by the Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) according to the decision of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and provided to airspace users.The State Aviation Administration of Ukraine supervis-es the established procedures.Actual implementation:Please describe the organizations involved in the preparation of aeronautical information, verification of the use of the ICAO AIS procedures and terminology, and validation of the correctness and transmission of the aeronautical information to its users.According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding the publi-cation of aeronautical information and dissemination of information among users have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on Interna-tional Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, documents of EUROCONTROL, and current legislation. In particu-lar, the following have been adopted:• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Infor-mation Service Provision,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.
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168 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX D | QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES: UKRAINE STANDARD PROCEDURES AND THREAT KNOWLEDGE Q16. What are the procedures for disseminating civil aviation security threat information to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?Response:The procedure for disseminating information about threats to the civil aviation security has been established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).Responsible:• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;• air navigation service providers.References:Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Pro-gram” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 29.03.2002 No 401;Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registra-tion No 542/13809 (as amended);Rules of flights and air traffic service in the classified airspace of Ukraine, approved by the order of the Ministry of Trans-port and Communications of Ukraine 16.04.2003 No293.Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Or-der of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).These documents are developed in accordance with rel-evant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11, 15 and 17, ICAO Doc 8973, Doc 8126, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, and documents of EUROCONTROL.Process and timeline:The procedure for conveying information on threats to civil aviation security to airspace users is determined and carried out by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, including via air navigation service providers.Actual implementation:Please describe whether and, if so, how the civil aviation security threat information was disseminated to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?According to the established procedures, the detailed in-formation is specified in the final report on the investiga-tion of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:National regulations and procedures regarding dissemination of information about threats to civil aviation security have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 15, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, the documents of EUROCONTROL, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No. 1965-VIII;• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated 17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dat-ed 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No 1056/32508;• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Ser-vice,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Infor-mation Service Provision,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.Appendixes to the responses provided by Ukraine:1) Ukrainian proposals based on recommendations made by DSB in the Final Report on the Crash of Malaysia Airlines, Flight MH172) Progress overview of ICAO conflict zone working programme 2017-2020.3) General information on setting the Prohibited/Re-stricted Airspace over armed conflict zones.The information from appendixes to the responses provided by Ukraine has been included in the discussion of the specific answers wherever the appendix was referred by Ukraine.
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169 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX E | CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RESPONSES FROM UKRAINEAppendix E Clarifying Questions Responses from UkraineThis appendix contains the responses received from Ukraine to clarifying questions. The responses are provid-ed as received without additional editing or modification.CQ1 — On 17 July 2014, before the downing of Flight MH17, a post from @ostro_v (as reported and translated into English during the Flight MH17 criminal prosecution court sessions at The Hague) said, “In Donetsk, at the Intersection of Ilyich Avenue at 9.15, there was a “Buk” on a tractor, surrounded by militiamen.” Was that Twitter post known about prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and by which state authorities?Answer:At the time of the downing of MH17 flight, there were no means for real-time analysis of the content of all social networks.CQ2 — Apart from what is referred to in CQ1, what other social media threat information about the pres-ence in eastern Ukraine of air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority? This includes social media posts about a BUK missile system being seen.Answer:At the time of the downing of the flight MHl7 there were no technical means for real-time analysis of all social networks.CQ3 — What weapon was used in the attack on a Ukraine An-26 military transport aircraft that occurred on 14 July? What knowledge of this weapon did the authorities responsible for security risk analysis have prior to the downing of the Flight MH17?Answer:An-2b aircraft flew along the state border and due to a missile hit, his crew was forced to land. Ukraine did not have access to the aircraft after it crashed in territory controlled by pro-Russian armed forces. Based on the available information, there was a belief that the plane was hit by an air-to-air missile.CQ4 — What authority or authorities knew prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about the threat information contained in the 150,000 intercepted telephone con-versations mentioned on 28 September 2016, during the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) presentation of the first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation, namely the exchange in the morning of 17 July 2014 between Dubinskiy, Semenov, Kharchenko and Pula-tov about [the] presence in eastern Ukraine of Buk-M?Answer:The analysis of the specified telephone conversations was made after the event.CQ5 — What authority or authorities knew prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about the threat information described by Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelli-gence for the Ukrainian State Security Service, on 19 July 2014 at a news conference in Kiev, that the first information “hinting” at a Buk launcher in the posses-sion of the armed non-state forces was received on 14 July? Did State Aviation Administration of Ukraine know prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about this information?Answer:There was no confirmation of the mentioned information, therefore, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine did not have information about the presence of the “Buk” missile system in the conflict zone.CQ6 — Apart from what is referred to in CQ1, CQ3, CQ4 and CQ5, what other threat information about the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence equip-ment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority prior to the downing of Flight MH17?Answer:There was no such information.CQ7 — What intent to attack aircraft in eastern Ukraine with air defence equipment that was not con-trolled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which authority prior to the downing of Flight MH17?Answer:There was no such information.CQ8 — What threat information about the presence of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by government forces and which could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was known and how did it become known by the State Aviation Administration
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170 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17APPENDIX E | CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RESPONSES FROM UKRAINEof Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17? How was the associated security risk assessed and what airspace management decision was taken?Answer:There was no information on the presence of air defense systems in pro-Russian armed formations with the possi-bility of defeat above the FL 250 echelon.CQ9 — What risk factors for unintentional attack became known by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and how did this information affect their security risk assessment?Answer:Prior to the crash of MH17, the State Aviation Adminis-tration of Ukraine was unaware of the threat of an unin-tentional attack above the FL 250 echelon.CQ10 — The Netherland DSB investigation report notes that, “After an emergency beacon was activated at around 1320, indicating that flight MH17 had crashed, UkSATSE made the decision at 1500, at the tactical level, to also restrict the airspace above FL 320.” It could be deduced that UkSATSE was respon-sible for threat and risk analysis, but the responses received notes that “the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security.” In that respect, which authority was responsible prior to the downing of Flight MH17 for the threat and risk analysis and assessment?Answer:UkSATSE made a decision at the tactical level to limit the airspace above the FL320 echelon as an immediate response to the disappearance of the MH17 aircraft, as stated in paragraph 6.3 of Part B of the final report of the MH17 crash investigation issued by the Dutch Safety Board. This fact is fully consistent with the information set out in section 6.1 of the Final Report.
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171 |FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | FACTUAL INQUIRY INTO THE AIRSPACE CLOSURE ABOVE AND AROUND EASTERN UKRAINE IN RELATION TO THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17REFERENCESReferences[1] ICAO, 2018, Doc 10084 “Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones,” Second Edition, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, Quebec, Canada[2] Dutch Safety Board, 2015, “Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014,” The Hague, The Netherlands[3] International Civil Aviation Organisation, Doc 10066 “Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Aeronautical Information Management,” First Edition 2018, Mon-treal, Canada[4] International Civil Aviation Organisation, Doc 8126 “Aeronautical Information Services Manual,” Sixth Edition 2003, Montreal, Canada

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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice, United
States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking,
1994

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United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down
Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking
The A ircraft S abotage A ct o f 1984 applies to the police and m ilitary personnel o f foreign governments.
In particular, the Act applies to the use o f deadly force by such foreign governmental actors against
civil airc ra ft in flight th at are suspected o f transporting illegal drugs There is accordingly a substantial
risk that United States Government o fficers and employees who provide flight tracking info
rm ation or c erta in oth er forms of a ss istance to the aerial inte rdic tion programs o f foreign
governments that have destroyed such a ircraft, or that have announced an intent to do so, would be
aid in g and ab etting con d u ct that violated th e Act.
July 14, 1994
M e m o r a n d u m O p i n io n f o r t h e D e p u t y A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l *
This memorandum summarizes our earlier advice concerning whether and in
what circumstances United States Government (“USG”) officers and employees
may lawfully provide flight tracking information and other forms of technical assistance
to the Republics of Colombia and Peru. The information and other assistance
at issue have been provided to the aerial interdiction programs of those two
countries for the purpose of enabling them to locate and intercept aircraft suspected
of engaging in illegal drug trafficking.
Concern over the in-flight destruction of civil aircraft as a component of the
counternarcotics programs of foreign governments is not novel. In 1990, soon
after the inception of the USG assistance program, the United States made an oral
demarche to the Colombian government informing that government that Colombian
use of USG intelligence information to effect shootdowns could result in the
suspension of that assistance.
More recently, we understand that the government of Peru has used weapons
against aircraft suspected of transporting drugs and that the government of Colombia
has announced its intention to destroy in-flight civil aircraft suspected of
involvement in drug trafficking. The possibility that these governments might
use the information or other assistance furnished by the United States to shoot
down civil aircraft raises the question of the extent to which the United States and
its governmental personnel may lawfully continue to provide assistance to such
programs.
On May 1, 1994, in light of these concerns, the Department of Defense suspended
a variety of assistance programs. Thereafter, in a draft opinion, an interagency
working group concluded that the United States aid was probably unlawful.
Editors Note: In response to this opinion, Congress enacted Pub. L. No 103-337, § 1012, 108 Stat
2663, 2837 (1994) (codified at 22 U S C § 2291-4 (1994)).
148
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United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug TraffickingIn addition to the Chicago Convention, the United States has ratified the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 567, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971) (“the Montreal Convention”). Article 1 of the latter Convention specifies certain substantive offenses against civil aircraft: in particular, Article 1,1 (b) states that “[a]ny person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally . . . destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight.” Article 1,2 makes it an offense to attempt to commit a previously enumerated offense, or to be an accomplice of an offender.8 Further, Article 10 requires states “in accordance with international and national law,” to “endeavour to take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing” substantive offenses.The Montreal Convention imposes on states certain duties with respect to offenders or alleged offenders. Article 3 declares that the contracting states “undertaken to make the offences mentioned in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties.” This obligation is specified by requiring states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over certain offenses (Article 5), to take custody of alleged offenders within their territory (Article 6), and either to extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case to their competent authorities for prosecution (Article 7). Further, states have the obligation to report the circumstances of an offense, and the results of their extradition or prosecution proceedings, to the ICAO (Article 13).Nearly all nations with a significant involvement in air traffic are parties to the Montreal Convention, and have thus incurred the responsibility to execute it. The United States implemented the Convention in 1984 by enacting the Aircraft Sabotage Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 2011-2015, 98 Stat. 1837, 2187-90(1984). Congress specifically stated that legislation’s purpose was “to implement fully the [Montreal] Convention . . . and to expand the protection accorded to aircraft and related facilities.” Id. § 2012(3); see also S. Rep. No. 98-619 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3682.9 The criminal prohibition now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) was enacted as part of that legislation.Comp. L J 513,519-20 (1994) But see D J Hams, Cases and Materials on International Law 221 (4th ed 1991)8 In general, the furnishing of information or assistance to another nation in circumstances that clearly indicate a senous risk that the information or assistance will be used by lhat nation to commit a wrongful act may itself be a wrongful act under international law. Cf Article 27 of the International Law Commission's Draft Convention on State Responsibility, which provides that “[a]id or assistance by a State to another State, if it is established that it is rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act earned out by the latter, itself constitutes an internationally wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute the breach of an international obligation ” Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, [1980] 2 YB Int'l L Comm’n 33, U.N. Doc. A/35/10.9 It is undoubtedly within Congress's power to provide that attacks on civil aircraft should be criminal acts under domestic law, even if they were committed extratemtonally and even absent any special connection between this country and the offense An attack on civil aircraft can be considered a crime of “universal concern' to the community of nations See United States v Yums, 924 F 2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991),151
Annex 395 Commonwealth Secretariat, Implementation Kits for the International CounterTerrorism Conventions

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75
CHAPTER FOUR
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS
AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION 1971
(‘Montreal Convention’)
1. The offence established by the Hague Convention requires the seizure of, or
other exercise of control over, an aircraft in flight, or an attempt to do so. It can be
committed only by a person on board the aircraft. Similarly, the conduct of an
accomplice must also take place on board. These limitations restrict the scope of the
offence. In particular they exclude from its ambit cases where force is applied from
outside the aircraft. Moreover, the offence under the Hague Convention does not
extend to acts of sabotage and destruction of aircraft. Unhappily, such conduct has
occurred frequently. Between 1949 and 1970, 22 aircraft were destroyed and over
400 persons killed as a result of the detonation of explosives on board. A further
treaty was therefore needed to co-ordinate means for the deterrence and punishment
of such acts.
2. ICAO convened a diplomatic conference at Montreal and on 23 September
1971 it adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation. The Convention entered into force on 26 January 1973. As
of September 2002 it had 176 Parties, including 47 Commonwealth States. The
United Kingdom ratified the Convention on 25 October 1973 also in respect of all its
overseas territories. A number of them have since attained independence, some of
which have formally succeeded to the Convention. The text of the Convention is at
page 83 below, and the complete list of signatures, ratifications and accessions,
territorial extensions and successions as of September 2002 is at page 90 below.
Object and scope of the Convention
3. The approach adopted by the Montreal Convention is very similar to that of
the Hague Convention and many of their provisions are identical. The Montreal
Convention begins by establishing a number of offences (Article 1). Each Party is
required to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the offences in certain defined circumstances (Article 4). Each Party, if satisfied that
the circumstances so warrant, is under a duty to take an alleged offender into custody
or to take other measures to secure the presence of the person (Article 6). A Party in
whose territory an alleged offender is found is under a duty, if it does not extradite to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article
7). The Convention also deals with extradition (Article 8).
4. The Convention applies to civil aircraft only, not to aircraft used in
military, customs or police services (Article 4(1)). This provision is identical to
Article 1(4) of the Tokyo Convention39 and Article 3(2) of the Hague Convention.
5. The acts (except those concerning air navigation facilities in Article
1(1)(d)) set out in Article 1 are only offences under the Convention in the following
circumstances:
39 For more details see page 12, para 3, above.
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101NOTES 1. Date of commencement or procedure by which the Statute is to be brought into force. 2. Name of country. 3. List relevant offences in law of acceding State. 4. The Montreal Convention is intended to apply only to civil aircraft and provides that it shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services. (Article 4(1)). This provision is, therefore, not required in order to ensure compliance with the Montreal Convention. However, similar provisions have been included in enacting legislation in a number of Commonwealth States. 5. Maximum penalty. 6. The Attorney General or other responsible Law Officer. The purpose of this provision is to prevent prosecutions for infringements of this Statute without the consent of the Government. 7. Extradition Act or other relevant Statute or law. 8. Specify how notification is to be made e.g. by publication in official government publication. 9. Specify manner of application e.g. by publication in official government publication.
Annex 396 Max Van Der Werff, MH17 properly investigated?

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MH17 properly investigated?
In this article the contents of four leaked MH17 Joint Investigation Team documents
are analysed by me on behalf of Bonanza Media:
DOC 1. Is a ‘Record Of Interview’ (ROI) between an of􀀁cer of the Australian Federal
Police and journalist Billy Six.
DOC 2. As part of ‘OPERATION AVANELLA’ imagery specialist Shaun Ellis and
geospatial specialist Tim Johns from Australia examined four images.
DOC 3. WITNESS TESTIMONY is a Record Of Interview with a witness refuting the
claim Ukrainian Air Force did not 􀀂y.
DOC 4 . LETTER about BUK Positions from the Dutch Military Information and
Investigation Service legal affairs department addressed to the public prosecutor at
the National Prosecutor’s Of􀀁ce on Counter Terrorism.
BILLY SIX
DOC 1.
MAX VAN DER WERFF
MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werff https://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOC
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One of the unpublished documents is a ‘Record Of Interview’ (ROI) between anof􀀁cer of the Australian Federal Police and journalist Billy Six. The latter con􀀁rmed tome he was interviewed a day before the Dutch Safety Board held a press conferenceon 13 October 2015. This information matches with the transcript mentioning 12October 2015 as the date of the ROI, a strong indication that the batch of JITdocuments leaked to us is authentic.The full 15 page record can be read here (PDF link).The words “Not to be shared with Ukraine” might come as a surprise for some, butexactly the same precondition I made before agreeing to be interviewed by Dutchof􀀁cers of the MH17 Joint Investigation Team myself. The of􀀁cers assured meUkraine will have no access to my data.DOC 2. OPERATION AVANELLAMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 2 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Between 22 April 2015 and 2 July 2015 “in the matter of AFP Case Reference No.5667342 (Operation AVANELLA)” took place. Imagery specialist Shaun Ellis andgeospatial specialist Tim Johns from Australia examined four images related to thisoperation.Metadata and assessments mentioned in their report.Quote:“NOTE: Metadata contains General: Image, Video and Audio information. Metadatashould only be used as a guide as data 􀀁elds can be altered manually. The followingMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 3 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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extraction has been selected for this report:File Name: Donetsk01.jpgFile type: JPEG 􀀁leFile size: 470 kbDimensions: 1380 x 945Date created: 24/07/2014, 1:41:30PMModi􀀁ed: 24/07/2014, 7:42:38PMFile Name: Donetsk02.jpgFile type: JPEG 􀀁leFile size: 303 kbDimensions: 940 x 626Date created: 30/06/2015, 10:53:51PMModi􀀁ed: 19/08/2014, 10:41:42PMFile Name: Snizhne01.jpgFile type: JPEG 􀀁leFile size: 157 kbDimensions: 800 x 1423Date created: 30/06/2015, 10:54:09PMModi􀀁ed: 20/08/2014, 12:09:08PMFile Name: Torez.jpgFile type: JPEG 􀀁leFile size: 130 kbDimensions: 1024 x 768Date created: 30/06/2015, 10:54:09PMModi􀀁ed: 18/07/2014, 5:52:04PMThe extracted metadata from these four 􀀁les appears to have been manipulated. Forexample, the date modi􀀁ed is prior to the date the 􀀁le was created. Various reasonscould explain why this is so, none can be proved without additional information. Theimage dimensions vary suggesting that the images have been cropped. The image􀀁les are small also suggesting the 􀀁les have been resaved to be smaller and are notprimary images that were taken.”End quote.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 4 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Let’s split up this information in smaller bits and have a closer look.Files Donetsk02.jpg, Snizhne01.jpg and Torez.jpg have been created 30 June 2015.That is two days before the end of Operation AVANELLA. Writers of the report surelywould have mentioned if the images were created later than they conducted theiranalysis. Therefore it is fair to assume the image 􀀁les were analyzed by them after 30June 2015.Thus two questions come to mind:Why nearly a year passed before the Australian police obtained and analyzed theseimages?Why would the Australian police waste precious time and resources analyzing fournon primary images?The ‘Donetsk01.jpg’ was published by the French magazine Paris Match in smallformat on 23 July 2014, eight days after the tragedy. The Donetsk02.jpg’ was alsopublished by Paris Match on 25 July 2014.That these are non primary images is very obvious since the Paris Match logo wasinserted into the originals and had then to be resaved.More important, Paris Match star reporter Alfred de Montesquiou claimed the 􀀁rstpublished image was taken in Snizhne he later had to correct to Donetsk, about 70kilometers to the west. Then the story changed again and it was explained that not aParis Match journalist but a freelancer had taken the images, which later again waschanged into the story that a hired driver of the French journalists crew had taken avideo and went back to the hotel in Donetsk to show it to the French who initially didnot pay much attention to it.Who is this driver?Why Paris Match only published two images but not the video?And, why were the Australians analyzing non primary images/screenshots and notthe ‘originals’ from Paris Match even a year after the tragedy?MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 5 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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The Snizhne01.jpg image analyzed by the AFP team has dimensions 800 x 1423.Visually identical image (with dimensions 337 x 600 pixels) was posted on Twitter on17 July 2014 by an anonymous account named GirkinGirkin. Aspect ratios of 800 x1423 and 337 x 600 are the same.Note. The process of downsizing photos reduces the pixel count used by objects inthe photo. Together with artifcial noise, this process can be used to conceal some ofthe object’s details. Most importantly, if something was added to the photo withPhotoshop and had 􀀂aws visible to the naked eye, resizing it to a smaller size mayeither hide the 􀀂aws or make them less obvious.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 6 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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In the documentary “MH17 – Call for Justice” a witness testi􀀁es and explains whyimage Torez.jpg could not have been taken on 17 July 2014.Same questions as for Snizhne01.jpg:Where is the original image, when was it taken, who took it?andWhy is the date modi􀀁ed prior to the date the 􀀁le was created?For more detailed information about issues with these four images I refer toexaminations of evidence from social media by Sergey Mastepanov published June2015 and October 2015.DOC 3. WITNESS TESTIMONY (refuting the claim Ukrainian Air Force did not 􀀁y)MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 7 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Record Of Interview Nr 26DLPRPrimo4905 was conducted by a Dutch police of􀀁ceron 28 July 2015. Interviewee is a male witness from Ukraine. Prior to the interviewthe witness has sent an email on 2 April 2015 with following content:“Good day. I want to tell you something about that happened in the town of Torez lastsummer. It was 17 July around 17:00hrs (I cannot exactly recall) local time. At thatpoint in time I was beside my house in the village of Krupskoje (This village comesunder the town of Torez). There was military activity at the time, aircraft were circlingoverhead all day (􀀁ghter jets of the Ukrainian BBC (remark translator: airforce).Before that Boeing fell down, I heard a very loud bang over my head. I saw that thesky was overcast. Between the clouds I saw something falling down. I focussed onthis object and when the airplane was no longer in the clouds I saw it was an airlinercoming down. A couple of minutes before the fall, I saw a 􀀁ghter jet in the sky, whichcircled over the town. No missiles were 􀀁red from the surface, in the town.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 8 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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This photograph that served as evidence of the missile is erroneous, since thephotograph showed different weather conditions. Because at that time the sky wasrather heavily overcast. The position of the sun in that photograph is unlike the sunyou see at 17:00hrs. In the evening. I can clarify this / tell you in a simpler way, at thatmoment no sun could be seen because of the clouds. In the photograph you can seemy village, in the centre, store nr. 95 and the MTC tower (remark translator: MTC =telephone antenna of company from Moscow).*privacy sensitive information deleted by me*That photo was taken from the location of a lot of farms. After this Boeing wentdown, I went with my father to the crash site by car. When we arrived, everything wascordonned off and we were not allowed to go further. In the ploughed 􀀁eld next tothe road I saw 2 naked dead bodies. I cannot tell anything else about this.”Comment: The reporting of􀀁cer contacted the witness by telephone in presence of aRussian interpreter on 28 July 2015. The witness speaks Russian only and aninterpreter translates everything the witness and the criminal of􀀁cer say.C = criminal investigatorW = witnessI = interpreter[…]C :How many airplanes did he see?I :How many aircraft were in the air at that moment?W :Two airplanes were audible, not the big one, the Boeing, but fighter jets were audible sincethese were constantly flying overhead, the noise had already become familiar.I :Two fighter jets, that is what I could clearly hear, so not the sound of the Boeing. Why?Because where we live the fighter jets were in the sky on a daily basis, so then youimmediately recognize them as fighter jets.C :And this sound was not different from the fighter jets?I :Did the sound resemble the sound of fighter jets or didn’t it?W :The exact sound of fighter jets and it was not on its own, there were two of them.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 9 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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I :It was the sound of fighter jets.W :One of them [interpreter: fighter jets]I :Hold on, please, the sound of fighter jets. There were two fighter jets in the skyI :What else? Please continue what you stated.W :The sound of fighter jets flying overhead, and after that…at some point they were,I wasoutside at that point, there was a bang overhead, a very loud bang. And after that Ideliberately started gazing at the sky, at what [had] exploded over my head and I saw a vaportrail in the sky. Whether the smoke came from the airplane or from a missile, or was from amissile.. [interpreter inaudible] but in between the clouds..was just a trail.I :I have not been able to understand this. You said: “was the smoke..the trail came from theairplane or from a missile, you were unable to tell”?W :Yes, it was a trail, I saw it between the clouds, there were heavy clouds.I :One moment you saw a trail in the clouds. One moment.I :So, fighter jets in the sky, I could clearly hear that. At some point there was a bang. I wasoutside at that moment and was obviously curious to know where that sound came from. Ilooked up to the sky, it was very cloudy that day, and I saw a clear trail, but I do not know if itwas the trail of an airline or a missile, I do not know this. But I could clearly see a trail.C :What exactly does he mean when he says a trail? Can he describe the sound of theexplosion?I :You were telling about a trail. What kind of trail was that? Could you describe it? And thesound of the explosion, can you describe that as well? So in short: the sound and the trail.W :It was a loud bang, a heavy bang, because..how can I describe that more clearly…this herein the chest was thumping, a very loud bang, not clear but rather muffled [interpreter:subdued??], a muffled loud bang.I :One moment, a loud bang, but it was somewhat muffled, as if it was a thump, not like…clear,but really a muffled bang. And what about the trail?MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 10 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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W :The trail was, if you…I saw this from the ground, which was roughly about 200 meters. Ifyou…look at the trail from the ground. And it was white.I :What colour?W :It was white.I :Clear in white.W :Not dark or turbid…not grey but in white.I :So you were looking up and you saw a white-coloured trail, about 200 meters in length. DidI understand that correctly?W :Yes.I :I looked up in the sky and saw a white-coloured trail of about 200 meters in length, so it wasnot gray or what have you, it was white.W :White. Was it horizontal or vertical trail?I :This trail. What was the line of the trail in the sky, was it horizontal or vertical?W :The trail was horizontal, but not in a line, it was already blurred, maybe because I saw ittoo late. The trail of..a bit already..it was no longer straight line.I :That was not a line, it was already a bit blurred, as if all of it had dispresed a bit, may be Isaw the trail late, I don’t know, but I did not see one straight line, but [it was] rather a bitblurry.W :Matches the photograph this gentleman forwarded, of which he said that photograph cannotbe fully correct as there where heavier clouds [remark translator Dutch-English: this isprobably the criminal investigator speaking, not the witness]I :You sent us a photograph, correct?W :Yes, I sent that photograph to refute the allegation that it could have been launched frommy village. From a Buk or something like that.*privacy sensitive information deleted by me*MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 11 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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I :That is my village.*privacy sensitive information deleted by me*And I sent that photograph especially to refute the allegations that the missiles was supposedlylaunched from my village.[…]W :The trail I have told you about, wether that was the trail of a missile or of an airplane wasnot clear to me. With my eyes I searched for the cause. I looked at the sky and saw this planecoming down.I :Do you refer to the Boeing?W :Yes, I saw the Boeing and how it was falling down from the sky. I saw it crashing down, thesmoke coming from the airplane went up.. black smoke. I saw something after it [interpreter:airplane] had come down, it looked like strips of ribbons, they came down.I :Ribbons?W :Ribbons, long white ribbons.I :one moment. So, a loud bang, I looked up and saw [interpreter: inaudible] some kind of trailfrom a missile or an aircraft, I cannot define it. I saw the Boeing falling down, so basically fromthe sky it came down and I saw black smoke and after the aircraft had crashed, I saw whiteribbons in the sky, they were also falling down.[…]Connection was cut due to technical problems.End of transcription.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 12 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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This is the image the witness sent by email to the Investigation team. He mistakenlythinks on internet is claimed a missile was 􀀁red from his village (visible in the image)while the appointed launch location is about nine kilometers away near the village ofPervomaiskyi.Map: left bottom crash site Grabovo, white line is line of sight from where image wastaken to the alleged launch 􀀁eld. Witness lives in village Krupskoie, which lies exactlyon the line of sight and right behind the village is the highest point which blocks theview of what’s behind it.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 13 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Important is what the witness saw and heard himself, he:• reports 2 􀀁ghter jets in the sky, which circled over the town a few minutes before theBoeing went down.• heard a loud bang over his head, looked at the sky and saw a HORIZONTAL whitetrail. (unclear remains in what direction he looked when he saw the trail)• watched the Boeing coming down• describes long white ribbons coming down after the crash. This matches with whathas been reported by the Dutch Safety Board (appendix K page 73) and identi􀀁ed astextile rolls.DOC 4. LETTER about BUK Positions (Russian and Ukranian)Letter from the Dutch Military Information and Investigation Service legal affairsdepartment addressed to the public prosecutor at the National Prosecutor’s Of􀀁ceon Counter Terrorism.Date 21 September 2016Re Of􀀁cial NoticeHerewith I am informing, pursuant to Section 38 of the Intelligence and SecurtyServices Act 2002, of data that is possibly of importance for the criminalinvestigation into the crashing of 􀀂ight MH17.In addition to my of􀀁cial notice of 24 June 2015 MIVD has, on the basis of reliablesources and analyses of locations relating to the 9K37M1 Buk-M1 (SA-11A GADFLY)that were listed in the of􀀁cial notice of 24 June 2015, examined whether 9A310M1MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 14 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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radar and launch vehicles on these locations could have been involved in the downingof MH17.In addition, MIVD looked into the other ground based air defence systems present inthe region in July 2014 and that were, as far as operational deployability,speci􀀁cations, performance and location goes, capable of hitting 􀀂ight MH17.In July 2014 the Ukrainian armed forces had operational S-300PS Volkhov-M6systems (referred to as SA-10B GRUMBLE by NATO) at their disposal.In July 2014 operational S-300 PM2 Favorit [systems] (referred to as SA-20BGARGOY by NATO) of the Russian armed forces were present the border region withUkraine.The table below lists the 9K37M1 Buk-M1 systems (referred to as SA-11A GADFLY byNato) mentioned in my of􀀁cial notice of 24 June 2015, including their operationalstatus, deployability and distance to the point of impact with 􀀂ight MH179K37M1 Buk-M1 Air Defence Systems present in the region (range 42km).COUNTRY LOCATION DATE 2014 DISTANCE1 Ukraine 48°36’38.00″N 39°14’00.00″E No 67 km2 Ukraine 48°5’58.00″N 37°45’13.00″E No 66 km3 Ukraine 47° 6’25.00″N 37°28’28.00″E No 135 km4 Ukraine 45°13’11.00″N 33°22’42.00″E June + July 515 km5 Ukraine 49° 0’34.00″N 37°18’42.00″E June + July 137 km6 Ukraine 48°42’23.00″N 37°38’1.00″E June + July 98 km7 Ukraine 48°13’14.00″N 36° 1’20.00″E June + July 191 km8 Ukraine 47°58’12.00″N 36°34’26.00″E June + July 154 km9 Russia 48°44’14.00″N 40° 1’36.00″E 11 – 19 July 122 km10 Russia 48°38’54.00″N 39°50’18.00″E From 18 July 106 kmMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 15 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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11 Russia 48°17’51.00″N 40° 4’42.00″E From 20 July 108 kmFrom the table it becomes apparent that 􀀂ight MH17 was 􀀂ying beyond the range ofall identi􀀁ed and operational Ukrainian and Russian locations where 9K37M1 Buk M1systems were deployed.In view of the locations of the systems identi􀀁ed and the speed with which these canbe moved, as well as the nature, development and con􀀂ict and border zone of the􀀁ght against the separatists on July 2014 it is unlikely that a 9A310M1 launch vehicleoriginating from the Ukrainian armed forces could have been moved in time for 􀀂ightMH17 to come within its range and be hit.All operational Ukrainian S-300PS Volkov-M6 identi􀀁ed were at least 250 kms awayfrom the point were MH17 was hit. The S-300PS Volkov-M6 system has a maximumrange of 75kms. On this basis MIVD draws the conclusion that S-300PS Volkhov-M6system was not used for the downing of 􀀂ight MH17.The only operational system identi􀀁ed with a range wide enough to shoot down 􀀂ightMH17 concerned two Russian S-300PM2 Favorit systems near the Russian town ofRostov na Donu. MIVD does have (partner) information that would indicate the use ofthe 36N85 (referred to as TOMB STONE by NATO) 􀀁re control radar for the guidanceof and/or launch of a surface-to-air missile from the 48NS series (referred to asGARGOYLE by NATO) on 17 July 2014.These locations are in the immediate vicinity of large population centres and thelaunch of a missile would most likely have led to messages on social media or otherpublic media. MIVD is not aware of such publications.By order of theTHE MINISTER OF DEFENCEThe Director of the Military Intelligence and Security ServiceO. EichelsheimMajor generalEnd of Of􀀂cial Notice.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 16 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Plotting the given coordinates of eleven locations on a map gives this result:Green pin : crash site GrabovoYellow pins: Ukrainian Buk M1 locations according to MIVD.Blue pins : Russian Buk M1 locations according to MIVD.Yellow line : Border Ukraine – RussiaOne of the conclusions that can be drawn from this Of􀀁cial Notice by the DutchMilitary Intelligence and Security Service is that on the basis of sources it considersreliable it “becomes apparent that 􀀂ight MH17 was 􀀂ying beyond the range of allidenti􀀁ed and operational Ukrainian and Russian locations where 9K37M1 Buk M1systems were deployed.”The main conclusion: the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service on 21September 2016 (ONE WEEK before the JIT press-conference on 28th September2016!) had no information from any reliable source that any Russian Buk-M1 hadcrossed the border with Ukraine during any time during the con􀀂ict.How is that possible?When we zoom in on the map and look at the three locations (blue pins) of RussianBuk-M1 we notice these three locations are not only too far from the crash site, buteven on the Russian side of the border.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 17 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Now let’s have a closer look at Location (10) 48°38’54.00″N 39°50’18.00″E whereaccording to MIVD a Buk-M1 was stationed 18 July 2014 and onwards is only 6,8kmfrom the border with Ukraine.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 18 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Google Earth has limited options to chose satellite images by date. We checked thislocation and four different dates showed:28 June 2014 – no vehiclesMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 19 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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2 July 2014 – 8 vehicles visibleMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 20 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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17 July 2014 – no vehiclesMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 21 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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25 July 2014 – no vehiclesMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 22 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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No Google Earth data for 18 July 2014 is available for this location.Striking is the fact that the Dutch military has detailed information about positions ofmobile Russian Buk system positions thus not stationed on their regular bases, whilemost Ukrainian Buks are only mentioned at stationary positions at their militarybases.Is it credible Ukraine kept almost all its Buk systems at their bases and did not at anymoment during the ‘Anti Terrorist Operation'(ATO) move its air defense assets tomobile locations outside their bases? How likely is that, knowing 12 July 2014Ukrainian air defense forces have been put on full combat alert?Coming back to the question raised at the beginning of this article: was MH17properly investigated?From the analyses I conducted over the years I have substantiated doubts and thecontent of the freshly leaked information from these four documents only makes mydoubts stronger.MH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 23 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
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Stay tuned and subscribe to the Bonanza Media newsletters for more to come.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Please keep Bonanza Media going! Donation options:https://www.patreon.com/bonanzamediahttps://www.paypal.me/bonanzamediaBank transfer: M.B.W. van der WerffIBAN NL77 INGB 00076630 89UNCATEGORIZEDMH17 properly investigated? – Max van der Werffhttps://maxfromthewharf.com/5510-2/#DOCСтр. 24 из 2408.03.2023, 12:33
Annex 397 YouTube, (English) Vitaly Nayda. UCMC, 19th of July 2014 (19 July 2014)

Annex 397
Excerpt
Transcript
YouTube, (English) Vitaly Nayda. UCMC, 19th of July 2014 (19 July 2014), available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWtH8AA42Fc&feature=share
Transcript (19:00 – 20:00)
[…]
[19:00]
Back to your information that the rebels have in their possession at least three BUKM1
missile
systems. You showed us on your slide an apparent confirmation of the receipt of one BUKM1.
Can you tell us when your intelligence information shows their first receipt of their first missile
system. When they came across your border?
[19:26]
Annex 397
The first information…Let's say hinting or giving the first information was on July 14th, but we could not confirm directly that it was BUKmissile launch that trespassed illegally Ukrainian territory. It was counterintelligence units who got this information from the field. And right now, we know for sure that three missile launchers…BUKM1, they left territory of Ukraine. This information is confirmed. [20:00] […]
Annex 398 TSN, In Lvov Protesters Seize Main Law Enforcement Buildings and Weapons Arsenal (19 February 2014) (translation)

Annex 398
Translation
TSN, In Lvov Protesters Seize Main Law Enforcement Buildings and Weapons Arsenal (19
February 2014), available at: https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/u-lvovi-protestuvalniki-zahopili-golovnibudivli-
silovikiv-ta-arsenal-zbroyi-335205.html.
In Lvov protesters seize main law enforcement buildings and
weapons arsenal
TSN editorial office
After the siege and storming, activists seized a number of law enforcement buildings.
Activists in Lvov have taken control of the city prosecutor's office, the police department building,
the SBU headquarters and the military unit No. 4114 of the Internal Troops of Ukraine.
The protesters seized the prosecutor's office and settled on all floors, throwing documents and
criminal cases out of the windows. At the same time, another group of Lvov activists seized the
building of the regional office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In addition, after a long siege, the protesters entered the territory of the military unit No. 4114 of the
Internal Troops of Ukraine, located on Stryiskaya Street. According to ZAXID.NET
correspondents, there are about 10 thousand people on the street near the unit. Some buildings on its
territory are on fire.
At the same time, there is no unified leadership in the crowd, and while some activists are trying to
extinguish the fire, others continue to throw Molotov cocktails.
As a result of the negotiations between the protesters and the leadership of the military unit, an
agreement was reached that the security forces would leave the military unit unarmed and the
arsenal would be sealed.
Lvov activists also took control of the regional SBU building, which was stormed by about two
hundred people. Reportedly, no resistance was offered by the Security Service. Currently, tires are
burning under the windows of the SBU headquarters, and paper and portraits of Viktor Yanukovych
are flying out of the windows.
Administrative buildings were also seized in Ternopol, where outraged protesters set fire to a police
station and stormed the regional state administration with Molotov cocktails.

Annex 399
Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a
tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? (8 September 2020)

Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06 Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…
https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m… 1/12
INSIGHTS
Can new educational reforms in
Ukraine be seen as a tool for
forced assimilation of national
minorities?
VALERY ENGEL · SEPTEMBER 8, 2020
Introduction
 
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…2/12The crisis in Ukraine has several aspects. One of the most important problemsis the issue of language. The law “on education”, adopted in 2017, as well as thelaw “ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language“,adopted in 2019, actually introduced a ban on obtaining secondary education inany languages except Ukrainian, as well as on the use of other languages in theprocess of contacting the authorities. In addition, the law imposed signi􀂦cantrestrictions on the work of the mass-media in the languages of nationalminorities.The ban on teaching minority languages in secondary education within Ukraineis especially alarming, since it directly affects the self-identi􀂦cation of childrenfrom families of national minorities. Indeed, not only the general educationallevel of the child, but also their feeling of belonging to a particular social groupdepends on the language in which the child’s intellectual and conceptualapparatus will be formed.The Politics of Linguistics and Childhood DevelopmentThe child’s intellectual and conceptual apparatus revolve around their primaryknowledge about the world around them at an objective level. If this knowledgeis formed in a non-native language, then there is an obvious tendency to changeidenti􀂦cation towards an intellectual internal habit of this non-native language.If knowledge is not formed in their native language at all, then this language isgradually lost by the child and will be replaced by a non-native language, andthe processes of (forced) assimilation in this case will be more active.In the event that a child from a family of national minorities does not have achoice of the language of primary education and he is obliged to study in thelanguage of the ethnic majority, there is a threat of forced assimilation, which isprohibited by international law and by the recommendations of variousinternational organizations.
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…3/12This is exactly what the Ukrainian government is accused of by opponents ofthe language reform in Ukraine inside the country. The same position was takenby the governments of a number of other countries. For example, the Russianleadership saw this as discrimination against the Russian linguistic minority,even Hungary declared discrimination against Hungarians in this country andblocked Ukraine’s participation in joint activities with NATO. Moreover, thegovernments of Romania, Moldova and a number of other countries have alsovoiced their disquiet on the issue.Meanwhile, the Ukrainian o􀂨cial authorities deny the forcible assimilation ofnational minorities, saying that the reform is being carried out in their interests,in strict accordance with the international obligations of Ukraine, and thelinguistic minorities, especially Russians, with the Ukrainian governmentalleging that the Russian linguistic minority has made a ‘free choice’ for a longtime in favor of the Ukrainization in state school education.The purpose of this article is to dispassionately understand how this is true.After all, if minorities choose assimilation themselves (and then this is acompletely normal phenomenon), the level of their knowledge of the statelanguage has de facto increased, and in general the reform leads to an increasein the quality of education, then some may argue that all the statements ofopposition of the reform may possibly miss a bene􀂦cial side effect of thereforms.Recently, the Ukrainian Institute of Politics (Director Mr. Ruslan Bortnik) sentformal inquiries and received responses from two of Ukraine’s main think-tanksdealing with education in the country. We are talking about the Ukrainian Centerfor the Assessment of the Quality of Education and the Institute of EducationalAnalytics. The main statistics on secondary education in Ukraine areconcentrated in this two institutions and forms the basis of our analysis.
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…4/12How many schools and students are there in the Ukraine??First, we need to understand what overall dynamics exist in terms of thenumber of students and schools themselves in Ukraine. From present data itfollows that the total number of schools in Ukraine decreased from 21,276 in2004 to 15,000 in 2020. The overall drop in the number of schools was 29.8%.Of these, about a third – 2,232 schools – dropped out of statistics due to theloss of control over Crimea, as well as parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in2014. The total number of secondary educational institutions in the countrydecreased by 6,276 in 16 years.At the same time, the population of Ukraine decreased over the same period by5,720,000 people or by 12% (excluding Crimea).At the same time, the total number of students decreased from 5,563,530 in2004 to 4,072,559 children in 2020. Moreover, the reduction was progressiveand sustained until 2014, when Ukraine lost control over schools in Crimea andin the separatist regions of the LPR / DPR. In 2014 the number of pupils inschools in Ukraine, according to statistics, decreased to 3,675,076 people, butthen the numbers gradually went up.Thus, in general, we see that the rate of reduction of secondary educationalinstitutions in Ukraine does not correspond to the rate of general decline in thepopulation. Consequently, due to the loss of Crimea and part of the Donbass,the objective aging of the population were not the main reasons for thereduction in the number of secondary educational institutions. In all likelihood,the main reason is the so-called “densi􀂦cation” of educational institutions,when two or more schools are combined into one, which entails an increase inthe number of classrooms, but allows to reduce the cost of education. Actually,this is not hidden and is an explicit policy of the Ministry of Education andScience itself.
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…5/12Statistics of Ukrainian Educational Delivery in Different LanguagesAgainst this backdrop, it is interesting to trace Ukrainian dynamics of thenumber of schools and the number of students by the primary language inwhich it is delivered. Schools with the Ukrainian as the primary language ofeducational delivery suffered the least from the general reduction in schools. Ifin the 2004-05 academic year their number of schools was 17,044, then in2019-20 the total number of such educational institutions was 13,584 units.Moreover, until the 2008-09 academic year, their number, albeit insigni􀂦cantly,was growing. The peak was in 2006-07, when 17,117 Ukrainian-languageschools functioned in the country. But since 2008 their number has beensteadily decreasing. It is interesting that the upheaval of 2014 had absolutelyno in􀂧uence on this process. If from 2008 to 2014 the number of Ukrainianschools decreased from 85 to 300 units per year, then after 2014 the decreasewas from 200 to 600 educational institutions per year. The average rate ofreduction ranged from 0.5% in 2011 to 4% in 2018.The number of Russian schools declined at a much more rapid pace. In the2004-05 academic year, the number of schools with Russian as the primarylanguage of education in Ukraine was 1,555 units. Until 2014, it steadilydecreased – down to the target 􀂦gure of 2020 in 1,275 schools, i.e. an averageof 4-5% per year. In 2014, the number of Russian schools fell sharply by morethan two times – to 621 schools – primarily due to the withdrawal from thestatistics of the Crimea and parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, wherethe majority of the Russian-speaking population lives. However, until 2017, thenumber of Russian schools declined by no more than 5.3% per year. The turningpoint began in 2016, when it became clear that a ban on teaching in thelanguages of national minorities was being prepared, and the Ukrainianauthorities did not hide the fact that the educational reform was primarilydirected against the Russian language, and not against the languages of the EUcountries. As a result, already in 2017-18, the number of Russian-language
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…6/12schools was arti􀂦cially reduced by 15.5%, and in 2018-19, it was reducedfurther by 58.8%. In the 2019-20 academic year, their number in Ukraine was125 units. Thus, from 2004 to 2020, the number of Russian schools in Ukrainehas decreased 12 times.At the same time, one must understand that the reform does not destroyschools of national minorities as such. Yes, according to the law of Ukraine “oneducation”, the education in the languages of national minorities has remainedsince 2018 only in elementary school, i.e. from 􀂦rst to fourth grades. Indeed,from September 1, 2020, it is planned to transfer all Russian-language schoolsto full teaching in Ukrainian, and schools in the languages of the EuropeanUnion will be transferred to Ukrainian from September 1, 2023. But this doesnot mean that schools of national minorities should disappear. They willremain, albeit in a truncated form. In particular, it will be possible to study intheir native language and literature in the language of a national minority.However, no other school, except the Russian one, experienced such a sharpreduction. For example, the Hungarian school system lost eight schools by2014, but by 2019-20, their number increased again by six units. As a result, if in2004 the number of Hungarian schools was 74, then in 2020, it was 72. Thenumber of Polish schools did not decrease at all, and also one German-speaking school appeared. The Romanian school also experienced a reduction,but by less than 30%. If in 2004 there were 95 of them, then in 2020, there wasonly 68. Finally, the number of schools in the Moldovan language hasdecreased by four times (from eight to only two).So, Russian schools have experienced the greatest reduction. Meanwhile, aspart of the entire population, Russian is one of the two most commonlanguages of communication among the population of Ukraine. During the2001, the All-Ukrainian Population Census showed 29.6% of participants namedRussian as their native language, including 14.8% of Ukrainians. However,
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…7/12independent estimates show a much greater prevalence of the Russianlanguage and its actual predominance over Ukrainian; this is because Russianis underestimated census results are usually explained by the fact that manypeople who consider themselves Ukrainians named Ukrainian as their nativelanguage because of their national identity, although their 􀂦rst language (or oneof their native languages) is Russian. It is also worth adding that in 2012-2018,in accordance with the 2012 law “On the Foundations of State LanguagePolicy“, it was the o􀂨cial language in the southern and eastern regions of thecountry. The law was repealed in 2018, but has only effectively ceased tooperate since 2014.Now let’s see what is the situation with the number of students in thelanguages of education? The number of students in Ukrainian schools hasdecreased over 15 years from 4,408,567 in 2004 to 3,753,305 in the 2019-20academic year, i.e. a decrease of 14.8%. The number of students in Russianschools in 2004 was 1,242,764, and in 2019, it was 281,257 students, that is, anoverall decrease of 77.3%. The decline took place in waves, and in some years,for example, in 2011/12 and 2013/14, it grew. The main drop in numberscoincided with the 2014/15 academic year, when Crimea and the territories ofthe self-proclaimed DPR-LPR did not record the statistics. Then the number ofstudents was reduced by almost half – from 703,572 to 356,262 children. Afterthat, it gradually decreased by about 1.5% until 2018, when the new law “OnEducation” came into force. After that, in 2019-2020, the drop in the number ofstudents in Russian-language schools was 8% and 12%, respectively.Interestingly, the number of students in Hungarian schools has not decreasedby much. It slowly but purposefully decreased from 2004 (19,996 people) to2014 (15,001 students), and then went up and reached 17,192 students. Asharp decrease in line with the decrease in the number of schools occurredwith students of secondary educational institutions in the Moldovan languageof education. From 6,128 students in 2004 to 2,498 in 2019, or by 59.2%. The
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…8/12number of children studying in Romanian schools decreased at a slightlyslower pace – from 26,400,000 in 2004 to 16,100,000 in 2020. However, itshould be said that in 2018/19 and in the 2019/20 academic years, the numberof students in Romanian schools remained practically unchanged.The only exception to the negative dynamics of the number of students inUkrainian schools by language of education is the Crimean Tatar classes.Speci􀂦cally, classes (not schools), since after 2014, when Ukraine lost politicaland military control over Crimea, the schools of the peninsula no longerappeared in o􀂨cial statistics, but Crimean Tatar classes were created inordinary schools. This practice began in 2017, when the 􀂦rst 11 students ofsuch classes were recorded. Their number increased to 53 people in 2019.Thus, the number of students in all schools in Ukraine, regardless of thelanguages of education, with the exception of the Crimean Tatars has beenfalling over 16 years. However, how did the number of schools decrease inproportion to the number of students?Is there a basis for a social inquiry into national minority schools in Ukraine?If we compare the number of schools with the number of students, we will seea critical overcrowding of two schools; those with Russian and Moldovan as theprimary language of education. In 2020, one Russian school had on the average2,250 pupils, and one Moldovan school had 1,200 pupils. This is compared withone Ukrainian school which usually has an average of 276 children. Thus, thepupil density of Russian schools today is eight times that of its Ukrainianspeaking counterparts, and for Moldovan-speaking schools, it’s four timeshigher than that of Ukrainian ones. The pupil density of all other schools is notso signi􀂦cant in comparison with Ukrainian ones, and sometimes it is evenless. For example, the pupil populations of Hungarian and Romanian schools islower than that of Ukrainian ones – on average 208 and 236 students per
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-m…9/12school, respectively, the workload of Polish schools is less than in two timeshigher than that of Ukrainian ones, etc.Of course, the events of 2014 hit Russian schools the most. Roughly after theloss of Crimea and the separation of parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions,Ukraine lost approximately 650 Russian-teaching schools. But another 496(80% of the rest) were transferred to the status of bilingual or Ukrainian-speaking in six years! But, as can be seen from the above 􀂦gures, the socialdemand for education in Russian has not decreased. Consequently, thereduction of Russian schools on such a scale clearly did not meet the interestsof the Russian-speaking population and was an arti􀂦cial step towards the defacto forced assimilation.This conclusion is also prompted by the difference in the transition period tothe Ukrainian language for schools of education in the languages of the EUcountries (􀂦ve years) and in other languages, which actually include schools inRussian and Moldovan languages (two years), 􀂦xed in the new law “OnEducation “and in the law “On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainianlanguage as a state language.” Therefore, the authorities’ assurances thatRussian-speaking citizens of Ukraine voluntarily choose the Ukrainian languageof education do not stand up to criticism.Thus, the main victim of the educational reform was precisely the Russianlinguistic minority of this country. The decline in all other schools was broadlyin line with the decline in the number of children wishing to study in their nativelanguages. This is a de􀂦nite merit of both the communities themselves, whomanaged to 􀂦ght for their rights in an organized manner, and their countries oforigin from among the EU members. It was the tough position of Romania andespecially Hungary that forced the Ukrainian authorities to make concessionsto the so-called “EU languages”. That is why the Moldovan community suffered
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-…10/12also, as their language, like Russian, does not belong to this group oflanguages.Considering this, as well as the high level of social demand for the nativelanguage among the national minorities of Ukraine, it can be argued that theeducational reform in this country is aimed at their forcible assimilation.National minorities themselves speak of this. In particular, in July 2020, the“National Council of Romanians in Ukraine” complained to the Romanianauthorities about the violation of the rights of their community to education intheir native language and administrative reform projects. They stated that theywere subjected to systematic forced Ukrainization in all spheres. This wasreported by the Romanian service of Radio Liberty. It is safe to say that thesame is happening with respect to other national minorities.Conclusion: What about the quality of education?Another question we can posed is: Can it be argued that, in spite of everything,the educational reform gives an overall increase in the quality of education, atleast in schools in the Ukrainian language? Unfortunately, the answer here is“no”. Despite the fact that the reform will end for Russian and Moldovanschools on September 1, 2020, when the teaching of general educationsubjects in their native language will be completely prohibited there, and for allother schools of national minorities on September 1, 2023, the transition periodalready allows preliminary conclusions to be drawn.This is how the Ukrainian Institute of Politics evaluates this experience. In theirresearch “Dynamics of the number of schools and students by languages ofinstruction in Ukraine“, the experts of the Institute write:“Simultaneously with the reduction in the number of schools, the densi􀂦cationof the number of students in classes and the elimination of education in
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-…11/12Russian, the results of external independent testing of students are alsodeteriorating: -if in 2008 only 4.58% did not pass Mathematics, in 2014 – 6.07%, then in 2019 – more than 18%; -in 2008, 9.73% of students did not passPhysics, in 2019 – 14.97%; -in 2008, did not pass the Ukrainian language andliterature 8, 81%, in 2019 – 14.97%; – in 2008, 9.09% did not pass the History ofUkraine, in 2019 – 16.22%. We also observe a sharp increase in the number ofstudents who did not pass mathematics and physics … “And what about theUkrainian language? To what extent has the reform improved the knowledge ofUkrainian by pupils of national minority schools? “Despite the allegedlypromoting the Ukrainian language policy of Ukraine,” says the analytical note ofthe Ukrainian Institute of Politics, “the test results in the Ukrainian languagealso worsened: the number of those who could not pass the Ukrainian languagein the exam has almost doubled since 2008 , and the growth in the number ofthose who did not pass began after 2017 – that is, after the adoption of the law“On Education.” It is likely that the adoption of the new spelling in 2019 will evenmore negatively affect this indicator if its norms are used on exam – becauseof their arti􀂦ciality and inconsistency with the living Ukrainian language.”Thus, it can be assumed that the full implementation of the 2019 reform willlead not only to the forcible assimilation of national minorities, but also to aneven greater backwardness of children and, as a result, to a further loss of theircompetitiveness in the labor market of Ukraine.Dr Valery Engel is a Senior Fellow at CARR and President of the EuropeanCentre for Democracy Development in Latvia. See full pro􀂦le here.
Annex 399
09.03.2023, 00:06Can new educational reforms in Ukraine be seen as a tool for forced assimilation of national minorities? – Centre for Analysi…https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/09/08/can-new-educational-reforms-in-ukraine-be-seen-as-a-tool-for-forced-assimilation-of-national-…12/12© Valery Engel. Views expressed on this website are individual contributors anddo not necessarily re􀂧ect that of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right(CARR). We are pleased to share previously unpublished materials with thecommunity under creative commons license 4.0 (Attribution-NoDerivatives).Views expressed on this website are individual contributors and do notnecessarily re􀂧ect that of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). Weare pleased to share previously unpublished materials with the community undercreative commons license 4.0 (Attribution-NoDerivatives).Related Topics#EDUCATION#FORCIBLE ASSIMILATION#LANGUAGE#POLITICS OF LINGUISTICS#RUSSIAN LANGUAGE#SCHOOL#UKRAINEValery EngelSerious Issue. Serious Analysis.
Annex 400 Federal Law No. 402FZ “On Peculiarities of the Legal Regulation of Relations in the Field of Mass Media in Connection with the Admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the Establishment of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol as New Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation”, 1 December 2014 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 400
Excerpt
Translation
Federal Law No. 402-FZ “On Peculiarities of the Legal Regulation of Relations in the
Field of Mass Media in Connection with the Admission of the Republic of Crimea to the
Russian Federation and the Establishment of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City
of Sevastopol as New Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation”, 1 December 2014.
1 December 2014 No. 402FZ
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FEDERAL LAW
ON PECULIARITIES OF
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF MASS MEDIA IN
CONNECTION WITH THE ADMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA TO
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CRIMEA AND THE FEDERAL CITY OF SEVASTOPOL AS NEW
CONSTITUENT ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Adopted by
the State Duma
on 19 November 2014
Approved by
the Federation Council
on 26 November 2014
<…>
Article 2. Peculiarities of the Legal Regulation of Relations in the Field of Mass Media
in the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol
1. Those mass media outlets whose products are intended for distribution in the Republic of
Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as constituent entities of the Russian Federation
may be registered and get licences for TV and radio broadcasting in the Republic of Crimea
and the federal city of Sevastopol without the need to pay a fee until 1 April 2015.
2. Those mass media outlets registered by Ukrainian governmental authorities shall be
permitted to distribute their products, including TV and radio broadcasting, in the Republic
of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol pursuant to their documents received from
such authorities, until 1 April 2015.
3. In connection with the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and
the establishment of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as new
Annex 400
constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation may issue resolutions on matters of the legal regulation of relations in the field of mass media, including TV and radio broadcasting.
Annex 401 Federal Law No. 273FZ “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 401
Excerpt
Translation
Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On Education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012.
Federal Law No. 273-FZ dated 29 December 2012
(as amended on 29 December 2022)
“On Education in the Russian Federation”
(as amended and supplemented; effective from 11 January 2023)
[…]
Article 14. Language of Education
1. In the Russian Federation, education in the state language of the Russian Federation as
well as a choice of the language of instruction and upbringing shall be guaranteed to the
extent of the opportunities provided by the educational system.
2. In educational organisations, educational activities shall be carried out in the state
language of the Russian Federation, unless otherwise provided in this Article. The state
language of the Russian Federation as part of the governmentaccredited
educational
programmes shall be taught and studied in accordance with the federal state and other
applicable educational standards.
3. In stateowned
and municipal educational organisations located in a Republic of the
Russian Federation, the teaching and study of the state languages of such Republic may
be introduced in accordance with the laws of such Republic. The state languages of the
Republics of the Russian Federation shall be taught and studied as part of governmentaccredited
educational programmes in accordance with the federal state and other
applicable educational standards. The state languages of the Republics of the Russian
Federation may not be taught or studied in prejudice to the teaching and studying the state
language of the Russian Federation.
4. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to obtain preschool,
primary
general and basic general education in their native language(s) from among the languages
of the peoples of the Russian Federation as well as the right to study their native
language(s) from among the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, including
Russian as a mother tongue, to the extent of the opportunities provided by the educational
system, in accordance with the procedures established by the education laws. The exercise
of those rights shall be ensured by establishing the necessary number of relevant
educational organisations, classes and groups as well as by enabling the functioning
thereof. The native languages from among the languages of the peoples of the Russian
Federation, including Russian as a native language, shall be taught and studied as part of
the governmentaccredited
educational programmes, in accordance with the federal state
and other applicable educational standards.
(as amended by Federal Law No. 317FZ
dated 3 August 2018)
Annex 401
(see the unamended text) 5. Education may be obtained in a foreign language in accordance with an educational programme and in the manner prescribed by the education laws and the local regulations adopted by an organisation carrying out educational activities. 6. The language(s) of education shall be prescribed by local regulations to be adopted by an organisation carrying out educational activities under the educational programmes it implements, in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation. The language of education as well as the native language from among the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, including Russian as the native language, and the state languages of the Republics of the Russian Federation to be studied shall be freely chosen upon request of the parents (legal representatives) of minor students when admitted (transferred) for training under preschool educational programmes or governmentaccredited primary general or basic general educational programmes. (as amended by Federal Law No. 317FZ dated 3 August 2018) (see the unamended text)
Annex 402 Defusing the Nuclear Threat, Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation (19 June 2014)

Annex 402
08.03.2023, 16:18 Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation | Defusing the Nuclear Threat
https://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/transcript-of-estonian-fm-bombshell-revelation/ 1/6
Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation
Posted on June 19, 2014 by Martin Hellman
My March 6 post introduced the bombshell revelation contained in Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet’s
intercepted, leaked, and authenticated phone conversation, in which he says, “there is now stronger and stronger
understanding that behind [the] snipers … it was not Yanukovych, but it was somebody from the new coalition.” I
have been surprised not to be able to find a complete transcript of the almost 11 minute conversation, so I
produced one and include it immediately after my signature line below. I believe it to be at least 99% accurate, but
if anyone finds an error or has a different interpretation of what was said, please post it as a comment, indicating
where in the YouTube audio it is located. Some other useful information:
1. German public television sent an investigative reporting team, which interviewed wounded protesters and
gathered other evidence. They independently concluded that there was a serious possibility that Paet’s allegation
was correct. See my April 14 post for details and links.
2. Mainstream American media continue to either ignore this significant evidence, or to cover it in misleading
ways. In particular, as of this writing (11:30 PM PDT on 19 JUNE 2014):
A Google search for the words Paet Ashton Kiev produced no relevant hits within the New York Times web
site. The same was true for the Wall Street Journal, and TIME magazine.
The Los Angeles Times covered the conversation only once, on May 20, over two months after the information
surfaced. Even then, the article misrepresented the content of the conversation by concluding, “But the pair
[Paet and Ashton] discussed only the conspiracy theories, according to the 11-minute call posted on YouTube
and confirmed by Estonia.” Read the transcript, or even better listen to the YouTube audio, and reach your
own conclusion.
The Daily Beast (formerly Newsweek magazine) also delayed coverage of the conversation, this time by several
weeks, on March 30. The article presents photographs which it says “appear to reveal the truth about who
carried out the shootings in Independence Square on that day.” But the alleged truth here is that “Russian
trained killers” were responsible, not violent elements within the protesters, as claimed by Paet. The article
refers to Paet’s allegation as “a weird post-script” to the massacre. The article quotes Dr. Olga Bogomolets as
saying that, “she has no idea how Paet could think that was what she was saying.” But, as the transcript below
shows, Paet never said that Bogomolets was the source of the allegation that the snipers were from the new
coalition. That is an understandable inference from the order in which he says things, but it is not what he
said. Furthermore, Paet’s allegation is a “declaration against interest,” which deserves investigation, especially
in light of the corroborating investigative report by German public television mentioned above. Another Daily
Beast article a few days later similarly does not give the allegation the credence it deserves, and again focuses
on Dr. Bogomolets denial.
Coverage in the Washington Post was similarly delayed until March 25 and April 3, and emphasized that the
call was “presented to appear more controversial than they should,” or Dr. Bogomolets’ denial.
The Christian Science Monitor’s coverage was slightly better, but still inadequate. It was prompt (March 8),
but started with the Ukrainian government’s allegation that Russia was responsible for the snipers. Only later
does it get to Paet’s allegation.
Defusing the Nuclear Threat
You are the key to defusing the nuclear
threat.
Annex 402
08.03.2023, 16:18Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation | Defusing the Nuclear Threathttps://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/transcript-of-estonian-fm-bombshell-revelation/2/63. My June 4 post presents strong evidence that the new Ukrainian government’s National Guard haskilled unarmed protesters – behavior that, in February, President Obama said would not be tolerated byYanukovych.Martin HellmanBEGIN TRANSCRIPT OF PAET-ASHTON 26 FEB 2014 CONVERSATION[NOTE: Words in square brackets with question marks on either side of them are ones where I was not certain,for example [?Regane?]. Times are noted at a number of points in the transcript to ease correspondence with theYouTube audio.]0:00 phone rings, and a woman answers in a foreign language.Man 1: Hello. Good afternoon, madam. This is [?Regane?] from the Center Action Service.Woman 1: Yes, yes, hello.Man 1: Surely, hello. (laughs) Should we go … you think it’s going to be possible straight away?Woman 1: To connect to Mr. Paet?Man 1: Yes.Woman 1: Yes, yes.Man 1: So please go on. I am connecting with the Lady Ashton cabinet. [Catherine Ashton is EU Commissioner forExternal Relations.]Woman 1: Yes, thank you.Man 1: You’re welcome. (0:34)Woman 2: Yes, hello. This is Miriam speaking.Man 1: Yes, it is for the conference with the Estonian Foreign Minister. They are on line. Please stay on.Woman 1: Hello. [Note: Women 1 and 2, here and below, may be new participants, but it does not affect theconversation.]Woman 2: Yes, hello. Can you put me through please?Woman 1: Yes, I will connect you to Minister Paet. One moment.Woman 2: Thank you. 1:02music plays while they are on hold, phone rings 1:20Woman 2: Hello, minister?Paet: Hello.
Annex 402
08.03.2023, 16:18Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation | Defusing the Nuclear Threathttps://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/transcript-of-estonian-fm-bombshell-revelation/3/6Woman 2: Hi. I put you through. Thank you very much.Paet: Yes, thank you.phone rings 1:37Paet: Hello.long silence 1:54phone ringsAshton 2: Hello.Paet: Hello.Ashton: Hello, how are you?Paet: I am fine.Ashton: Good.Paet: And you? 2:00Ashton: Good. I am good. I just wanted to catch up with you on what you thought when you were there.Paet: oK, yes. I returned last night already, so that I was one day.Ashton: Yeah. Impressions?Paet: Impressions are sad.Ashton: Um hum.Paet: I met with representatives of Regions Party [originally Yanukovych’s party, but it had dissociated from himby this point in time], also new coalition representatives, and also civil society [Ukrainian non-governmentalorganizations or NGOs]. There is this lady called Olga [Dr. Olga Bogomolets, who was tending to woundedprotesters] who is head of the doctors. Yes, yes. You know her?Ashton: I do. 2:30Paet: Yes, so that, well, my impression is indeed sad that there is, well, no trust towards also these politicians whowill return now to the coalition. Well, people from Maidan and from civil society, they say that they knoweverybody who will be in new government – all these guys have a dirty past. 2:52Ashton: YeahPaet: So that, well, they made some proposals to the same Olga and some others from civil society to join newgovernment. But this Olga, for example, she says directly that she is ready to go to the government only in the caseif she can take with her, her team of foreign experts to start real health care reforms. 3:16Ashton: Yeah.
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08.03.2023, 16:18Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation | Defusing the Nuclear Threathttps://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/transcript-of-estonian-fm-bombshell-revelation/4/6Paet: So that, well, basically, it is that the trust level is absolutely low. On the other hand, all the securityproblems, this integrity problems, Crimea, all this stuff. Regions Party was absolutely upset. They say that, well,they accept, they accept this that now there will be new government. And there will be external elections. Butthere is enormous pressure against members of parliament – that there are uninvited visitors during the night …to party members.Well, journalists … some journalists who were with me, they saw during the day that one member of parliamentwas just beaten in front of the parliament building by these guys with the guns on the streets. 4:10Ashton: Yeah.Paet: So that all this mess is still there. And, of course, this Olga and others from civil society, they were absolutelysure that people will not leave the streets before they see that the real reforms will start. So that it’s not enoughthat there is just change of government. So that that is the main impression. 4:27So that, from EU’s and also well Estonia’s point of view, of course, we should ready to put this financial packagetogether. Also together with others. This very clear message is needed that it’s not enough that there is change ofgovernment, but they say real reforms – you know, real action to increase the level of trust. Otherwise, it will endbadly.Because the Regions Party also said that, well, we will see that if the people from the eastern part of Ukraine willreally wake up, and will start to demand their rights. Some people also with me, they were also in Donetsk. Therepeople said that, well, we can’t wait. How long still the occupation of Ukraine lasts in Donetsk. That it is realRussian city, and we would like now to see that, well, Russia will take over. So that well … short impressions. 5:26Ashton: No, very, very interesting. I just had a big meeting here with Olli Rehn [EU Commissioner for Economicand Monetary Affairs] and the other commissioners about what we can do. I mean, we’re working on financialpackages – short, medium, long-term. Everything from how we get money in quickly. How we support the IMF.And how we get a kind of … investment packages and business leaders and so on. 5:49On the political side, we’ve worked [?out?] what resources we have got, and I offered to civil society, and toYatsenyuk [Aresniy Yatsenyuk became the interim prime minister when what is now the “new coaltion” becamethe interim Ukrainian government] and Klitchko [Vitali Klitchko, one of the leaders of the new coalition, a formerboxer, and now mayor of Kiev], and everybody I met yesterday: “We can offer you people who know how to dopolitical and economic reform. The countries that are closest to Ukraine have been going through dramaticchanges and have done big political and economic reforms. So we have got loads of experience to give you, whichwe’re happy to give.”I said to the people in Maidan, “Yes, you want real reforms, but you’ve got to get through the short-term first. Soyou need to find ways in which you can establish a process that will have anticorruption at its heart, that will havepeople working alongside until the elections, and that you could be confident in the process. 6:41Then I said to Olga, “You may not be Health Minister now, but you need to think about becoming Health Ministerin the future, because people like you are going to be needed to be able to get and make sure that [?reform?] happens.I also said to them, “If you simply barricade the buildings now, and the government doesn’t function, we cannotget money in, because we need a partner to partner with. 7:04Paet: Absolutely.
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08.03.2023, 16:18Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation | Defusing the Nuclear Threathttps://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/transcript-of-estonian-fm-bombshell-revelation/5/6Ashton: And I said to the opposition leaders, shortly to become government, “You need to reach out to Maidan.You need to be, you know, engaging with them. You also need to get ordinary police officers back on the streetsunder a new sense of their roles, so that people feel safe. 7:21I said to the Party of the Regions people, “You have to go and lay flowers for the people [who] died. You have toshow that you understand what you have … what has happened here. Because what you were experiencing isanger of people who have seen the way that Yanukovych lived and the corruption. And they assume you are all thesame.” 7:40And, also the people who have lost people and who feel that, you know, he ordered that to happen. There is quite alot of shock I think in the city. A lot of sadness and shock, and that is going to come out in some very strange waysif they are not careful. I think all of us, we just have to work on this. We did a big meeting here today to try and getthis in place.But, yeah, very interesting, your observations. 8:04Paet: It is. And, well, actually, the only politician [whom] the people from civil society mentioned positively wasPoroshenko [Petro Poroshenko, known as “the chocolate king” was elected president of Ukraine in the May 25election].Ashton: Yeah, yeah. 8:15Paet: So that he has some sort of, how to say, trust among all this Maidan people and civil society. 8:20And, in fact, what was quite disturbing, the same Olga told that, well, all the evidence shows that people who werekilled by snipers, from both sides, among policemen and then people from the streets, that they were the samesnipers, killing people from both sides. [8:38]Aston: Well, that’s … yeah.Paet: So that, then she also showed me some photos. She said that as [a] medical doctor she can, you know, saythat it is the same handwriting, the same type of bullets, and it’s really disturbing that now the new coalition, thatthey don’t want to investigate what exactly happened. [8:58] So that there is now stronger and strongerunderstanding that behind [the] snipers, they were … it was not Yanukovych, but it was somebody from the newcoalition. [9:10]Ashton: I think we do want to investigate. I mean, I didn’t pick that up. It’s interesting. Gosh. 9:14Paet: Yeah. So that it was [?indeed?] disturbing that, if it starts now to live its own life very powerfully, that italready discreditates [sic] from [the] very beginning also this new coalition. 9:24Ashton: I mean this is what they have got to be careful of as well, that they need to demand great change, but theyhave got to let the Rada [Ukrainian Parliament] function. If the Rada doesn’t function, then they have completechaos. So that, it’s all, you know, being an activist and a doctor is very, very important. But it means that you’renot a politician. And somehow they’ve got to come to a kind of accommodation for the next few weeks, which ishow the country is actually going to run. And then we get the elections and things can change. And that’s, I think,going to be quite pop… I am planning to go back early next week, probably on Monday. 9:55Paet: It’s really important that now, well, people from Europe and also [the] West show up there so that it’sabsolutely…
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08.03.2023, 16:18Transcript of Estonian FM Bombshell Revelation | Defusing the Nuclear Threathttps://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/transcript-of-estonian-fm-bombshell-revelation/6/6About Martin HellmanI am a professor at Stanford University, best known for my invention of public key cryptography -- the technology that protectsthe secure part of the Internet, such as electronic banking. But, since 1982, my primary interest has been how fallible humanbeings can survive possessing nuclear weapons, where even one mistake could be catastrophic. My latest project is a book, co-written with my wife Dorothie, with the audacious subtitle "Creating True Love at Home & Peace on the Planet." It's on Amazonand a free PDF can be downloaded from its website: https://anewmap.com.View all posts by Martin Hellman →Ashton: Well, [?Verislav?] is going with the Visegrad Group [an alliance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,and Slovakia] Friday. Friday, Saturday. William Haig (unintelligible) on Sunday. I will be back again Monday.Paet: Yes, I heard also that Canadian Minister is going on Friday. And yesterday also William Burns [the AmericanDeputy Secretary of State] was there, so we met …Ashton: Yes, I saw Bill.Paet: We met also with Burns there in Kiev yesterday.Ashton: Yeah, good. Yeah, I didn’t know that John Baird was going. I will get hold of him. Okay, my friend. It wasgreat to talk to you. 10:26Paet: Well, thanks for these comments, and wish you well. Nice Australia.Ashton: Yeah. What?Paet: Nice Australia. Enjoy!Ashton: I am not going to go. I got to delay it because I’m going to do more Ukraine instead.Paet: OK, good, good.Ashton: All right, my friend …Paet: OK. Thank you. Thank you. And all the best to you. Bye.Ashton: Bye.END OF TRANSCRIPT This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged Catherine Ashton, critical thinking, Kiev, martin hellman, nuclear risk, russia, snipers, stanford, ukraine, Urmas Paet, war andpeace. Bookmark the permalink.Defusing the Nuclear ThreatBlog at WordPress.com.
Annex 403 Statement of the Council of Crimean Tatars under the auspices of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, 6 March 2023 (translation)

Annex 403
Translation
Statement of the Council of Crimean Tatars under the auspices of the Head of the Republic
of Crimea, 6 March 2023.
Statement
of the Council of Crimean Tatars
under the auspices of the Head of the Republic of Crimea
6 March 2023 Simferopol
The Republic of Crimea since 2014 is part of a large and closeknit
Russian family. Great
opportunities and prospects are now open for us. In the Republic of Crimea, as in our entire
multinational
country, there are no discrimination of any type, rights and freedoms of all are
guaranteed regardless of their race, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation, the maintenance and
development of cultural and linguistic diversity is enshrined at the constitutional and legislative
levels.
Decree No. 268 of 21 April 2014 of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On
Measures of Rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German
peoples and State Support of their Revival and Development’ was an important event in the life
of the Republic of Crimea: the good name of deported peoples of Crimea was restored, and the
act of deportation recognized as a crime.
The reunification of Crimea and Russia has brought much good. Crimean Tatars, along
with all other Crimeans, obtained an opportunity to revive, keep up and develop their own
language, history and culture, broadcast the national and cultural originality of the Crimean Tatar
people. The Crimean Tatar language is recognized as one of the state languages of the Republic
of Crimea. Socially important literature is published in Crimean Tatar; Crimean Tatar mass
media are active in their business.
The Head of the Republic of Crimea declares holidays and off days on the main Muslim
holidays OrazaBairam
and KurbanBairam
every year; the Republic of Crimea celebrates freely
and widely traditional Crimean Tatar holidays: spring holidays of Navrez and Khydyrlez, the
Day of Crimean Tatar Flag, the Day of Crimean Tatar Letters and Culture, the autumn holiday of
Derviza.
Crimean Tatars enjoy all the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation. Within the
framework of the state national policy of the Russian Federation, systematic work is performed
to realize infrastructure development projects aimed at the provision and improving the places of
compact residence of rehabilitated peoples: kindergartens, schools, houses of culture, roads, gas,
water, drainage and electricity supply networks are built. Citizens from among rehabilitated
peoples of Crimea are provided with housing, land plots, receive compensations for the
connection to gas, drainage and electricity networks.
Under the auspices of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and with
support from the Head of the Republic of Crimea, construction is being carried out of a cathedral
mosque of Crimea in the city of Simferopol. The cathedral mosque will be the biggest temple in
the peninsula.
Decree of the Head of Republic of Crimea No. 93u
dated 29.03.2018 created the Council
of Crimean Tatar under the auspices of the Head of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter – the
‘Council’). The members of the Council were elected at the extraordinary meeting of the
Qurultay of Crimean Muslims from among distinguished and influential workers of science,
education, culture, religion, sports and other spheres.
One of the areas of activity of the Council is effective implementation in the Republic of
Crimea of Decree 268 dated 21.04.2014 of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On Measures
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of Rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and State Support of their Revival and Development’ in terms of restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of Crimean Tatars subjected to illegal deportation and ethnicitybased political repressions. The Council invites representatives of state authorities, members of local selfgoverning bodies and nongovernmental organizations, experts and lawyers, specialists in various spheres and others to work in cooperation with it, which makes the work of the Council more effective and fruitful. At the present time, the Council is an influential and effective collegial, deliberative and consultative body of Crimean Tatars under the auspices of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, with the main objective of monitoring of Crimean Tatar people problems in Republic of Crimea and assisting in solution thereof, planning and realization of a set of measures aimed at restoring historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Crimean Tatar nation. Crimean Tatars take active part in social and political life of the Republic of Crimea and develop civic society institutions, being an inseparable part of the political, social, economic and cultural life of the Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation. We, members of the Council of Crimean Tatars under the auspices of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, do not support members of the Mejlis organization (banned in the Russian Federation) and its provocative actions, and call on Crimeans to not trust declarations of pseudoleaders using the Crimean Tatar issue to destabilize the social and political situation. The Council categorically disagrees with the thesis that some refuges from Crimea, calling themselves ‘leaders’ and ‘chairpersons’ of various kinds of foreign nongovernmental formations of a private nature, pose as representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, which lives in its homeland. Former members of the Mejlis (banned in the Russian Federation) R. Chubarov, M. Dzhemilev, L. Islyamov, E.Bariev and other betrayers of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people, who are in Ukraine, Turkey and some other European countries now, act in the interests and under direction of Kiev, actively disseminate false information about the situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Those individuals do not live in Crimea and do not represent interests of Crimean Tatars, so their unilateral declarations, statements and sayings about the situation in Crimea cannot be considered true and reflecting the real situation of the Crimean Tatar people living in Crimea. Those functionaries mislead the international community with their untrue words in relation to the rights and interests of Crimean Tatars and the status of the Crimean Tatar historical heritage in Crimea. They are not authorized to make any statements and speak on international platforms and at organizations on behalf of the Crimean Tatar people. Openly illegal actions in the form of energy, food and water blockades organized with active participation of the aforesaid persons caused hardships and tribulations for the entire population of Crimea, including Crimean Tatars. But in spite of the fact that those provocations were aimed at inciting national enmity and discord between the peoples of Crimea, they have not succeeded, and made Crimeans even more unified. The said persons try to continue their extremist activities in Crimea: they threaten physical reprisals against representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, and perform actions aimed at the creation of an atmosphere of enmity and interethnic discord between the Crimean Tatar people and other ethnicities. The Council considers declarations and statements of Ukraine, as well as former members of the (banned in the Russian Federation) Mejlis R. Chubarov, M. Dzhemilev, L. Islyamov, E.Bariev about discrimination of Crimean Tatars false, and declares that all issues related to the realization of rights and interests of Crimean Tatars are dealt with in interaction with the power bodies of the Republic of Crimea and multiple ethnic communities of the peninsula. Emirali Seitibraimovich Chairman of the Centralised religious organization ‘Spiritual
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ABLAYEV Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Tavrida Muftiyat)’, Mufti of Muslims of Crimea, Deputy Chair of the Council Chingiz Fevzievich YAKUBOV Rector of the State Budgetary Institution of higher education of the Republic of Crimea ‘Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University’ CSci (Engineering), Assistant Professor, Deputy Chair of the Council Lemara Sergeyevna SELENDILI DSci (Philology), Professor of the department of Crimean Tatar philology, Institute of Philology, Federal State Autonomous Educational institution of higher education ‘V.Vernadsky Crimean Federal University’, Secretary of the Council Elmira Ebazerovna ABIBULLAYEVA Head of Ismail Gasprinskiy Memorial Museum, State Budgetary Institution of the Republic of Crimea ‘Bakhchisarai History, Culture and Archeological MuseumReserve’, member of the Council Aider Ametovich ADJIMAMBETOV Executive secretary of the Mufti of Muslims of Crimea Ruslan Takyatovich BAIROV Deputy Mufti of Muslims of Crimea, member of the Council Zenife Emiraliyevna VELI Head of the department for organization of religious events of the Centralised religious organization ‘Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Tavrida Muftiyat)’, member of the Council Aider Suleimanovich ISMAILOV Deputy Mufti of Muslims of Crimea, member of the Council Rustem Abdullayevich KAZAKOV Olympic champion in GrecoRoman wrestling, President of the regional NGO ‘Crimean Federation of the Kuresh national wrestling’, member of the Council Refik Dzaferovich KURTSEITOV Head of the department of social sciences and humanities of the State Budgetary Institution of higher education of the Republic of Crimea ‘Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University’, CSci (Sociology), Assistant Professor, member of the Council Ervin Kyazimovich MUSAYEV Advisor to the Head of the Republic of Crimea, director of the Institute of Media Communications and Design, Federal State Autonomous Educational institution of higher education ‘V.Vernadsky Crimean Federal University’, CSci (Economics), Assistant Professor, member of the Council Liliya Amzayevna MUSTAFAYEVA DoctorinChief, State Budgetary Healthcare Institution of the Republic of Crimea ‘Consultative and Diagnostic Centre for Deported Peoples”, member of the Council Aider Akhtemovich TIPPA Chairman of the State Committee for Interethnic Affairs of the Republic of Crimea, member of the Council Safie Lyumanovna EMINOVA Director, State Budgetary Healthcare Institution of the Republic of Crimea ‘Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage’, member of the Council

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Kremlin, News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks (18 February 2022)

Annex 404
February 18, 2022 17:00 The Kremlin, Moscow
News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks
Vladimir Putin and President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko held
a joint news conference following Russian-Belarusian talks.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the President of the Republic
of Belarus for accepting my invitation and coming to Moscow today.
We understand that the President has a very busy schedule right now, in connection
with the necessary preparations for an important domestic event: the upcoming
nationwide referendum of the new version of the Belarusian Constitution
on February 27. Of course, we wish our Belarusian friends success in holding it.
Let me note that our talks today were held in a constructive, business-like and friendly
atmosphere, like we have had for many, many years.
As both sides have stressed many times, Russia and Belarus are good neighbours,
close allies and strategic partners. We are deeply connected by a common history,
moral values and family ties. Diverse bilateral cooperation is always built
on the principles of mutual respect, support and consideration of each other’s
interests.
Of course, we have always paid and will pay special attention to the expansion of trade
and economic ties. Despite the coronavirus-related difficulties, trade is growing: it
increased by more than a third in 2021, or 34.4 percent, and amounted to a significant
amount of US$38.5 billion.
Almost half of all products manufactured in Belarus are exported to Russia, and Russia
News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russia http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809
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is a leading investor in the real sector of the Belarusian economy. Russian investmentaccounts for about 30 percent of total foreign investment in Belarus. And we willcertainly try to create even more comfortable conditions for the business communitiesof the two countries and encourage entrepreneurial initiatives.Of course, matters related to building the Union State and promoting integration withinit were among the central topics in our talks with the President of Belarus.We carefully studied the progress of implementing the strategic decisions approvedat the November 4, 2021, meeting of the Union State Supreme State Council. We alsodiscussed efforts to implement the 28 sectoral programmes of the Unionand in general the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the Union State. Duringthe talks, we noted that the 28 programmes we are talking about build on our long-standing cooperation and integration efforts in the relevant fields.Both sides noted that relevant agencies of Russia and Belarus have been workingtogether effectively on promoting integration across the board. The high-level groupfor coordinating our integration cooperation has been gathering momentum. It helda regular meeting in mid-December.Our respective governments have also maintained close contact. Let me remind youthat our prime ministers held eight meetings last year. In fact, they remain in touchconstantly, almost on a weekly basis, if necessary.Of course, Mr Lukashenko and I keep the implementation of integration-relatedprocess under our personal control. We can outline several areas where we haveachieved tangible progress recently.In particular, in the transport and logistics sector there was a significant increasein transits of Belarusian exports in many categories across Russian territory to thirdcountries. We will continue our consistent efforts to build a common freightand passenger market within the Union State.In the lending and financial sector, we have been cooperating to overcomeand minimise the consequences of illegitimate sanctions imposed by some countrieswith a view to worsening the socioeconomic situation in our countries.News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 2 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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In addition, we have been working on integrating our payment systems and creatinga new payment framework, as well as harmonising tax, customs, and labour lawsof the two countries, and unifying our markets in the gas, oil, petrochemical,and electric power sectors.I would like to note that our joint efforts to implement the economic agendaof the Union State are ultimately designed to ensure economic growth and to improvethe living standards of our people.Our other major integration projects have the same goals. I am referringto the Eurasian Economic Union, in the framework of which we are creating a trulycommon Eurasian market for goods, services, capital and workforce. It is importantthat all EAEU member states feel the practical effects of these processes.During our talks today we had an in-depth discussion on strengthening the commondefence space of Russia and Belarus. We have agreed to continue takingthe necessary collective measures to ensure the security of our two states in lightof the growing military activity of the NATO states on the external border of the UnionState.In this context, we praised the Allied Resolve 2022 military exercises, the active phaseof which will run until February 20 in Belarus. I would like to point out that theseexercises are purely defensive and do not threaten anyone. As you know, the defenceministries of our two states in due time announced the essence and goals of theseplanned – I would like to emphasise this – planned manoeuvres. As the Presidentof Belarus, who attended them, said today, many foreign representatives and militaryattachés are attending the exercises and can see the whole thing with their own eyes.Responding to a request from President Lukashenko, I talked about my recentmeetings with foreign leaders on the provision by the US and NATO of long-termand legally binding security guarantees for Russia. We believe it is both logicaland understandable that this issue also concerns our Belarussian allies.We discussed the situation with Russia’s requests for the West, the most importantof which concern NATO’s non-expansion, the non-deployment of strike weaponssystems in close proximity to the Russian border, and the return of the bloc’s militarypotential and infrastructure in Europe to the state of 1997 when the Russia-NATONews conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 3 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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Founding Act was signed.As I said earlier, unfortunately, the United States and other members of the alliance donot appear ready to sincerely consider these three pivotal elements of our initiative.At the same time, they have advanced a number of ideas of their own concerningEuropean security, specifically, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,and military transparency, which Russia is open to discussing. We are ready to continuethe negotiation track provided that all items are considered in their entirety,in conjunction with Russia’s main proposals, which are an unconditional priority for us.President Lukashenko and I touched on the intra-Ukrainian conflict as well.The settlement process remains stalled; despite all our efforts, neither the contactsat the level of advisers to the leaders of the Normandy Format countries northe consultations with our partners are helping.Kiev is not complying with the Minsk Agreements and, in particular, is strongly opposedto a direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk. Kiev is essentially sabotagingthe agreements on amending the Constitution, on the special status of Donbass,on local elections and on amnesty – on all the key items in the Minsk Agreements.Besides, basically, human rights are massively and systematically violated in Ukraine,and discrimination against the Russian-speaking population is being fixedat the legislative level.The President of Belarus and I agreed that the Minsk Agreements are the keyto restoring civil peace in Ukraine and relieving tension around that country. All Kievneeds to do is sit down at the negotiating table with representatives of Donbassand agree on political, military, economic and humanitarian measures to endthe conflict. The sooner this happens, the better. Unfortunately, right now, we arewitnessing the opposite – the situation in Donbass is worsening.In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to Mr Lukashenko for our productivecooperation. I am confident that today’s talks will serve to further strengthen the entirescope of allied relations between Russia and Belarus. Tomorrow, as we agreed, we willtake part in several regular events related to our joint military activities.Go ahead please, Mr President.News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 4 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko: Friends,Our meeting with President Putin is taking place against the backdropof an unprecedented escalation of military-political tensions in the world,as the President just said.Considering the urgency of the situation, the President and I have devoted muchattention today to this issue and discussed potential joint actions as a responseto the aggressive behaviour of our Western partners. I would like to emphasise onceagain: nobody wants a war, or even an aggravation of the situation or any conflict. We,Russians and Belarusians, do not need this.As people well versed in this issue, you probably understand that this no longerdepends even on our neighbours, including Ukraine. You also see clearly whothe escalation of tensions near our borders depends on. For the first time in decades,we have found ourselves on the threshold of a conflict that could, unfortunately, pullmuch of the entire continent into a maelstrom.We are seeing the irresponsibility and, excuse me for being blunt, stupidity of someWestern politicians at its best. There is no logic or reasonable explanationfor the conduct of the leaders of neighbouring countries, their truly morbid desireto walk the edge.The President of Russia has very mildly described the aggravation of the situationin Donbass. Unfortunately, it is true. People there are ready to flee the area and areprobably already fleeing, as we know. This is not normal. I have the impression thatsome politicians who hold high and responsible positions in the so-called free worldare simply pathologically dangerous to both their associates and, most importantly,to their own people.As you heard, Union Resolve 2022, Belarusian-Russian joint military exercises, will endin a few days. Tomorrow, Mr Putin and I will hold joint events in the Russian Federation,about which the media will be informed.As for the 2022 exercises that are nearing completion, I explained the basic pointof this. The President just talked about it: given the growing military threat on ourborders and the pumping of Ukraine with weapons, Belarus and Russia are compelledNews conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 5 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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to look for adequate means of repelling a potential attack on their borders, includingon our borders, the southern borders for Belarus. There is nothing surprising aboutthis, we are looking at these borders in the south of Belarus – they are almost 1,500km long. We are concentrating on this to defend ourselves; we are looking for pointswhere we should basically build our defences.Belarus and the Russian Federation have a common air defence system, a jointregional military force, that is, a joint army, joint training centres, and finally, there isthe Military Doctrine of the Union State. We have never hidden these documentsor these areas of activity from anyone, everyone knows this.This is why it was our joint situational decision to hold these exercises. We conductthese exercises as transparently as possible in our own territory; we are not hidinganything from anyone; everything happens in full view of an entire army of attachésand the press.In talking about foreign policy we have not forgotten the Union State integrationprocess. Four and a half months have passed since the Declaration of the Union StateSupreme State Council was signed. It approved the main directionsfor the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the Union Statefor 2021–2023 as well as the 28 Union State programmes.These programmes are about 30 percent complete. A lot has been said about what hasbeen done under these programmes and how, as Mr President said just now.In particular, we are focusing on the following areas: taxation, customs cooperation,and establishing a common gas market.By the way, those who have moved the war of sanctions to the front lines will sufferequally, if not much more. This is a subject that President Putin and I have paid specialattention to because this banditry and attempt to impose an economic war on us – ithas already broken out – has cost us a lot. Of course, we have already learned howto counter the sanctions; as we have said, we have become stronger, as our bilateraltrade shows. Nevertheless, we still have to focus a lot on countering the pressuresof the sanctions. We have discussed this in detail.I am grateful to the President of Russia – to you, Mr Putin – for the instructions youhave just passed to the Russian leadership in my presence, without hiding anything.News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 6 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
Annex 404
I would like to thank you for this.It is clear that we, Russians and Belarusians, will survive this hybrid war. We can seehow our cooperation has improved in industry; there are dozens of new goodsin the structure of our trade; and foreign trade is diversifying. The world is big: you can’tlock all the gates and you can’t block all transport routes.Another part of our talks was devoted to the economy. It is gratifying that we did so welllast year. Despite the pandemic and various virus strains, we increased our tradeto almost 40 billion. And this is something to be taken into account, and then exportsand imports between people – there are no borders between Belarus and Russia – thisis billions of dollars too. It is important that both the Belarusian and Russianeconomies grew throughout the year in terms of gross domestic product, industrialproduction, and in many other areas of the real sector of the economy.Of course, we talked more about problem areas not about our successes. There arefewer of them, but they still exist. We discussed measures to support the economy,strengthen financial stability, increase business activity, and develop cooperation.Naturally, I informed the President of Russia of how Belarus is preparing for the mostimportant political event – the constitutional referendum. We will hold it with dignity,in the interests of the Belarusian people, and this will in no way contradict our relationswith brotherly Russia.The West is actively trying if not to destabilise then to at least aggravate the situationin the country with the help of our defectors. However, they have no illusions thatthe events of August 2020 will be repeated. This is important because it strengthensour confidence that together we will be able to overcome the most difficult situations,confront any challenge or threat and build a common future. And no one should expectus to back down from any difficulty, challenge or problem.Let me repeat what I just said: we do not want war, but if someone refuses to be still,our response will be asymmetric. Anyone in the world can understand this. And in thissituation, in protecting the security of our peoples in our states, we will actappropriately.The President of Russia noted, and I absolutely agree with him: they are trying to tearNews conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 7 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
Annex 404
us apart, to separate us, not only Russia and Belarus, but all those states that are seton unity. This is the wrong approach: it will never work. Kazakhstan is evidence of this.We appreciate that.Thank you for your attention.Kommersant newspaper correspondent Andrei Kolesnikov: You recently said that ifthe West remains aggressive, you will be an eternal president. In this connection, howdo you assess the Belarusian people’s chances of losing you? I think they areincreasingly more negligible.And a question for the President of Russia. Mr President, how did you “survive”Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the previous night?Thank you.Vladimir Putin: Let me go first, if you do not mind.I just did not pay attention to it. There is a lot of fake news, and constantly reacting to itis not worth it.We are doing what we feel we need to do, and we will keep going this way. Of course,we are watching the developments in the world and around us; however, we have clearand understandable benchmarks corresponding to the national interestsof the Russian people and the Russian state.Alexander Lukashenko: Mr Putin, we did not invade Ukraine, and the poor things areso upset, they are looking for a new pretext to push Ukraine into some sortof provocations.As to my, pardon me, tenure in office, we will just discuss it with the elder brotherand make a decision. Why are you worrying? Everything will be all right. As to yourwords (you said it right, I am even surprised that these words come from Kommersant)that those people’s chances of breaking Belarusians’ forces are negligible as you said.It cannot be said any better.And they will get more negligible further, they will not make it. And it has nothing to doNews conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 8 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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with the Belarusian people, that we are allegedly a dictatorship and bend, pressureand persecute. It is fiction. Nobody pressures or persecutes anyone – we are justappropriately responding to those who push, used to push, towards a coup d’étatin Belarus. That is the agenda as it is. They wanted to repeat exactly what they didin Ukraine; they failed and will fail again. I had a reason to mention Kazakhstan, itincluded.Alyona Syrova: STV Channel.Mr Lukashenko, Mr Putin, my question is addressed to both of you.You mentioned in your speeches the sanction war waged against us and against you.We see the pressure being systematically ramped up. The latest is the closureof potassium fertiliser transit. Russia is being threatened with preventive sanctionsnever seen before.And here is the question in this regard. Mr Lukashenko, you said a number of decisionsand orders have been made right now, during the talks. How do you see possible anti-sanction counteractions? We often say that the power is in cooperation in the contextof integration, so in the context of countering the sanctions, where is cooperationand who can help us here?Vladimir Putin: We must help ourselves in this respect, and this is the goal of ourcurrent meeting. We primarily focused, as Mr Lukashenko has already said,on economic issues, on issues of economic cooperation.The President of Belarus was very eloquent. He said the world is big, and one cannotput a lock on everything. This is exactly what it is in reality, and I join this assessment.We talked about the entire range of problems, including the one you mentioned. I willnot go into detail now, but there is always a solution.As for what direction we should move in overall – I have already talked about thisand would like to emphasise it again. First, this sanctions pressure is absolutelyillegitimate. This is a gross violation of international law. Those who talk about this lawcare about it only when they stand to benefit. When there is nothing to gain, theyconveniently forget all norms of international public law. We understand this perfectlywell. Unfortunately, we have lived in this paradigm for many, many years becauseNews conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 9 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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the powers that be believe they run the show and always interpret everything in theirown favour, ignoring the interests of others. The only way out is to grow stronger fromwithin, primarily in the economy.You are talking about sanctions. They will be imposed in any event. Whether there issome excuse today, for instance, linked with the events in Ukraine, or there is noexcuse – one will be found because the goal is different. The goal is to impedethe development, in this case, of Russia and Belarus. Those who pursue this objectivewill always come up with an excuse to introduce various restrictions. I will repeat thatthese restrictions are illegitimate. They amount to unfair competition.In fact, this is the whole point. In the past eight years, Russia has done much in thisarea, and this is called import substitution. We have not done everything we planned,but we have accomplished more than 90 percent of the tasks we set for ourselves. Westill have to do more, and this is called enhancing economic sovereignty.Many countries of the world, even US allies, are facing today’s restrictions. But theysimply shut their mouth and bear it. As I said many, many years ago, nobody likes this.Nobody likes secondary sanctions or direct sanctions pressure. This boil will certainlyburst eventually.It is important for us today to enhance our economic sovereignty and be morecompetent and up to date. We must give new impetuses to the modern areasof economic progress: digitalisation, artificial intelligence and genetics, to name a few.This is a complicated and big job – it is impossible to resolve this issue overnight, butwe must move in this direction.The integration processes we are dealing with are aimed at precisely this goal –to become more competitive. Proceeding from this, we will be striving to improvethe living standards of our people.I think this is all that may be said in the format of a news conference.Alexander Lukashenko: What was the general idea for our talks? In short, we mostlytalked about economic issues, including pressure from the sanctions. The Presidentjust said what it was about: no matter what we do and no matter how hard we try to doanything – though we think, first, in terms of our interests and our people and so on –News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 10 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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they will find a pretext for pushing this economic war further, regardless. These are notsimply sanctions – rather, an economic war unleashed against our alliance – this isthe gist of the matter.As for some details, the Russian President preferred to omit them – some particularlyimportant issues were discussed in detail. For example, you raised the issueof potassium fertilisers: I am grateful to the President for his instructions,as I requested.We need a port. In violation of international agreements, we have been denied accessto the ports we used to use. This is not the right approach: no country that has a coasthas the right to cut access to the sea to a landlocked country. Take Russia, which hasan outlet to the sea – it does not deny anyone access to the sea. Lithuania, Latviaand Ukraine have closed their routes to the sea [for us]. This is a violation. I just wantedto refresh your memory.The Russian President issued an instruction – I asked him about this – to let Russiahelp us, without foot-dragging and red tape, to build a port terminal for our use near StPetersburg and use it to tranship millions of tonnes of cargo; it is not a matterof funding – we have money to do this. He gave instructions in my presence to beginconstruction without delay. We will tranship millions of tonnes of cargo over 12 to 18months – I do not know how long exactly; you can ask the ambassador who is sittingover there and who has been dealing with this issue. But if we withdraw from Ukraineand Lithuania – revenue from the transhipment of our cargo used to make up 30percent of the latter’s budget – we will never go back.We will hold out. It was the right thing to say that no matter what the situation is like,sanctions also mean new opportunities and, most importantly, the opportunityto engage in import substitution – we will make do. President Putin says that [Russia’simport substitution objectives] have been 90 percent achieved, so cooperationbetween Belarus and Russia will take care of the remaining 10 percent. We will finda way out of this situation one way or another. Even when it comes to the mostsensitive things for us, Belarusians and especially Russians, like the most cutting-edgeand sophisticated technologies. We can produce anything.Which country was the first to release a vaccine when the pandemic started? It wasRussia. Russia supplied the vaccine to Belarus and then we started producing it.The Russian President said: “You did well!” We have already produced about 2.5 millionNews conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 11 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
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Publication statusdoses in Belarus using Russian technology. We are also developing our owntechnology. Have we coped with this? We have. We will also cope with other issues.Thank you.Published in sections: News, TranscriptsPublication date: February 18, 2022, 17:00Direct link: en.kremlin.ru/d/67809News conference following Russian-Belarusian talks • President of Russiahttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67809Стр. 12 из 1208.03.2023, 16:22
Annex 405 Sharij.net, BOEING. The bird has come (10 August 2020) (translation)

Annex 405
Transcript
Translation
Sharij.net, BOEING. The bird has come (10 August 2020), available at:
https://sharij.net/boing-ptichka-priletela.
Transcropts (translation)
[…]
[05:03]
A plane has just been shot down. The Minera group. It went down outside Yenakiyevo.
[05:11]
Pilots? Where are the pilots?
[05:13]
They went looking for and making photos of a downed plane. It smokes…
[05:16]
Annex 405
How many minutes has it been? [05:19] Well, thirty minutes ago somewhere. [05:23] This was published by the Security Service of Ukraine. And this is what the Ukrainian Security Service, the Ukrainian state, came up with to try to "push" Dutch justice. There is a full record. [05:37] Yes, Vasiliy Nikolaevich. [05:39] Igor, tell me, what is this all about <…>? [05:42] Yes, that's it <…> Crimea, it's... it's all right. [05:45] Ahh... I... got it. <…>. [05:47] A plane has just been shot down. The Minera group. It went down outside Yenakiyevo. [05:54] Pilots? Where are the pilots? [05:58] They went looking for and making photos of a downed plane. It smokes… [06:00] How many minutes has it been? [06:03] Well, thirty minutes ago somewhere. [06:05] It was about half an hour ago, yeah. Which one? Another "SU"?
Annex 405
[06:06] Yes. It was "SU"… [06:08] Which one? Another "SU"? The SU was shot down. But of course, in order not to say that the SU had been shot down, the SBU cut out this part of the footage. This means: The SBU clearly knew what it was talking about. Nevertheless, it blatantly falsified this evidence. They also talked about ejected pilots. It is clear that pilots could not have ejected from a passenger plane. […]

Annex 406
Roskomnadzor, Report on Registration of Media Outlets, 2016
(translation)

Annex 406
Translation
Roskomnadzor, Report on Registration of Media Outlets, 2016, available at:
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/smi-registation/p885/.
Mass Media Registrations in 2016
The Department of Permits, Monitoring and Supervision in Mass Communications (the
“Department”) and the territorial offices of the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (“Roskomnadzor”) perform their
functions related to the registration of printed and electronic mass media outlets (“media”) in
accordance with Russian Federation Law No. 2124I
dated 27 December 1991 “On Mass
Media” (the “Mass Media Law”) and the Administrative Regulations for the Provision by the
Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media
of the Governmental Service Related to the Registration of Mass Media as approved by Russian
Communications Ministry Order No. 362 dated 6 April 2012.
1.1. Media Registrations by Roskomnadzor’s Central Office
As of 31 December 2016, the total number of the media outlets registered with the Unified AllRussian
Register of Mass Media amounted to 80,606 – 4% less than in 2015 (83,884).
In the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016, the Department received 1,518 (5,926) applications
for media (re)registrations – 20% less (1% more) than in the same period of 2015 (1,903
(5882)). 1,063 (3,573), 365 (1,747) and 90 (606) of those applications were filed for initial
registrations, re-registrations and amendments to previously issued registration
certificates, respectively.
In the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016, 981 (3,621) registration certificates were issued. In the
4th quarter (12 months) of 2015, 1,320 (3,738) registration certificates were issued.
The number of media outlets registered in the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016 as compared to
2014 and 2015 as split by form of distribution is shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Key indicator 2014 Q4
(12 months)
2015 Q4
(12 months)
2016 Q4
(12 months)
Indicators characterising the scope of registration activities
Total registrations, including: 1,013 (3,617) 1,320 (3,738) 981 (3,621)
printed media 502 (1,893) 766 (1,868) 354 (1,766)
news agencies 26 (67) 32 (73) 14 (58)
electronic media 160 (587) 183 (601) 133 (525)
online media 325 (1,070) 339 (1,196) 480 (1,272)
In the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016, 4 (17) duplicates of media (re)registration certificates
were issued – 20% (6%) less than in the same period of 2015 (5 (18)).
Annex 406
2 In the reporting period of 2016, the Department excluded 547 (2,020) media from the Unified AllRussian Register of Mass Media, including: 73 (351) media outlets excluded by court orders; and 474 (1,669) media outlets excluded by decisions of their founder(s) – 29.3% (36.5%) more than in the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2015 (423 (1,282)). Comparative details of media closures are shown in Table 2 below. Table 2 Reason for exclusion 2015 Q4 2016 Q4 12 months of 2015 12 months of 2016 Court order 137 73 360 351 Decision by the founder(s) 286 474 922 1,669 1.2. Media Registrations by Roskomnadzor’s Territorial Offices In the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016, Roskomnadzor’s territorial offices received 711 (2,895) applications for media (re)registrations – 15% (22%) less than in the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2015 (834 (3,729)). 303 (1,360), 333 (1,269) and 75 (266) of those applications were filed for initial registrations, re-registrations and amendments to previously issued registration certificates, respectively. In the reporting period (12 months) of 2016, 660 (2,651) registration certificates were issued. In the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2015, 795 (3,371) registration certificates were issued. Thus, the number of registration certificates issued decreased by 17% (21%). In the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016, Roskomnadzor’s territorial offices excluded 968 (4,028) media from the Unified AllRussian Register of Mass Media, including: 288 (1,583) media outlets excluded by court orders; and 680 (2,445) media outlets excluded by decisions of their founder(s). In the same period of 2015, Roskomnadzor’s territorial offices excluded 1,389 (4,825) media from the Unified AllRussian Register of Mass Media, including: 614 (2,440) media outlets excluded by court orders; and 775 (2,385) media outlets excluded by decisions of their founder(s). Thus, the number of the media outlets excluded from the Unified AllRussian Register of Mass Media by Roskomnadzor’s territorial offices in the 4th quarter (12 months) of 2016 decreased by 30.4% (16.5%) compared to Q4 (12 months) 2015.
Annex 406
Annex 407 Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/7790/16, Decision, 15 June 2016 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 406
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/7790/16, Decision, 15 June 2016, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/58490173.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF KIEV
01030, Kiev, 44V
B. Khmelnytskoho Street, tel. (044) 2841898,
Email:
[email protected]
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
15.06.2016 Case No. 910/7790/16
Claimant Public Joint Stock Company “Ilyich Iron and Steel Works of Mariupol”
Respondent Public Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Railways”
[…]
On 25.07.2014, DTEK Rovenkianthracite LLC sent car No. 62110754, consignment note No.
51542678 (anthracite, cargo weight 70,000 kg, determined by the sender on car scales) from the
Lobovskie Kopy station to the MariupolSort
station of the Donetsk railway to the recipient Public
Joint Stock Company “Ilyich Iron and Steel Works of Mariupol”.
[…]
As established by the court, on 25.07.2014 DTEK Rovenkianthracite LLC made the shipment car
No. 62110754 according to consignment note No. 51542678 (anthracite, cargo weight 70,000 kg,
determined by the sender on the car scales) from the station Lobovskie Kopy to the MariupolSort
station of the Donetsk railway to the recipient Public Joint Stock Company “Ilyich Iron and Steel
Works of Mariupol”.
[…]

Annex 408
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/10009/16, Decision, 30 June 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 408
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/10009/16, Decision, 30 June 2016, available at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/58808523.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF KIEV
01030, Kiev, 44V
B. Khmelnytskoho Street, tel. (044) 2841898,
Email:
[email protected]
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
30.06.2016 Case No. 910/10009/16
Claimant Public Joint Stock Company “Mariupol Metallurgical Factory n.a. Ilyich”
Respondent Public Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Railways”
[…]
As established by the court, 25.07.2014 DTEK Rovenkianthracite LLC sent cars No. 53602272,
No. 56964265, No. 56953185 and No. 58916560 with consignment note No. 51549178 (anthracite,
cargo weight of 70,000 kg in each of the wagons, determined by the sender on the car scales) from
Faschevka station to MariupolSort.
Station of Donetsk railway to the recipient Public Joint Stock
Company “Ilyich Iron and Steel Works of Mariupol”.
[…]

Annex 409
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/9327/16, Decision, 30 June 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 409
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/9327/16, Decision, 30 June 2016, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/58808518.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF KIEV
01030, Kiev, 44V
B. Khmelnytskoho Street, tel. (044) 2841898,
Email:
[email protected]
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
30.06.2016 Case No. 910/9327/16
Claimant Public Joint Stock Company “Ilyich Iron and Steel Works of Mariupol”
Respondent Public Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Railways”
[…]
As established by the court, on 22.12.2015 and 23.12.2015 DTEK Rovenkianthracite LLC sent
cars No. 53626935 and No. 53115473, respectively, with consignment note No. 50641489
(anthracite, cargo weight of 70,000 kg in each of the wagons, determined by the sender on the car
scales) from Faschevka station to MariupolSort.
Station of Donetsk railway to the recipient Public
Joint Stock Company “Mariupol Metallurgical Factory n.a. Ilyich”.
[…]

Annex 410
Commercial Court of Lugansk Region, Case No. 913/1184/16, Decision, 21 November 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 410
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Lugansk Region, Case No. 913/1184/16, Decision, 21 November 2016,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/62911633.
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
21 November 2016 Case No. 913/1184/16
Proceedings No. 1/913/1184/16
According to the claim of the claimant Public Joint Stock Company "Ukrainian Railways", Kiev,
represented by the regional branch "Pridneprovsk Railway" PJSC "Ukrainian Railway", Dnepr,
to the defendant Private JointStock
Company "Krasnodonugol", Severodonetsk, Lugansk region
[…]
Thus, when considering the case, the court found that during the passage of coal cars No. 61871950
according to consignment notes No. 52488616 and No. 66647843, according to consignment note
No. 52457439 on the route from Krasnodon station of the Donetsk railway to PJSC MK "Azovstal"
overhang control of the specified cars was carried out.
[…]

Annex 411
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/3455/15, Decision, 18 February 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 411
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/3455/15, Decision, 18 February 2016,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/56514743.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF DONETSK REGION
61022, Kharkov, Nauki Avenue, 5
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
18.02.2016 Case No. 905/3455/15
Economic Court of Donetsk Region composed of Judge Ovsyannikova O. V.,
with the secretary of the court session Voronoi I. V.,
having considered in open court session in the premises of the Commercial Court the case on the
claim
Public Joint Stock Company "Ukrainian Railways" represented by a regional branch
"Pridneprovsk Railway" of Public Joint Stock Company "Ukrainian Railways", Dnepropetrovsk
to Public Joint Stock Company "Mine Management "Donbass",
[…]
On 23 June 2015 Public Joint Stock Company "Mine Management "Donbass" (consignor) shipped
tgrade
coal to the address of Public Joint Stock Company "Centrenergo Trypilska TES"
(consignee) in car No. 67891077 under consignment note No. 52379773 from Nizhnekrinka
station to the Trypolska Dneprovskoye
station.
[…]

Annex 412
Commercial Court of Zaporozhye Region, Case No. 908/286/15g,
Decision, 5 March 2015
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 412
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Zaporozhye Region, Case No. 908/286/15-g, Decision, 5 March 2015,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/43033419.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF ZAPOROZHYE REGION
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
05.03.2015 Case No. 908/286/15g
according to the claim of the state enterprise "Pridneprovsk Railway" (49600, Dnepropetrovsk,
Karl Marx Avenue, 108)
to the defendant: Public Joint Stock Company "Mine Management "Donbass" (83059, Donetsk
city, Budyonnovsky district)
[…]
According to the railway consignment note No. 50854777, on 10.07.2014, the consignor, PJSC
“Mine Administration “Donbass”, sent car No. 68719327 with the cargo, coal of the Tlow
grade.
0200.,
from the departure station of Nizhnekrynka of the Donetsk Railway to the consignee, PJSC
Centrenergo Zmiyevskaya TPP, to the station of Lyman of the Southern Railway. According to
the cars and items list 19, 24 of the rail waybill, the weight of the cargo in car No. 65296154 was
71,000 kg, and the weight of the tare was 20,900 kg.
[…]

Annex 413
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/1544/14, Decision, 12 May 2014
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 413
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/1544/14, Decision, 12 May 2014,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/38632669.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF DONETSK REGION
83048, Donetsk, Artema str., 157, tel. 381-88-46
DECISION
in the name of Ukraine
12.05.2014 Case No. 905/1544/14
The Commercial Court of the Donetsk Region, composed of judge Yu.V. Sych,
with the secretary of the court session L.M. Shchytova,
having considered the case materials in an open court session
according to the lawsuit of Public Joint Stock Company “Kharkov Machine-Building Plant “Svet
Shakhtyora”, Kharkov (identification code 00165712)
against the defendant Public Joint Stock Company “O.F. Zasiadko Mine”, Donetsk (identification
code 00174846)
regarding recovery of principal debt in the amount of UAH 499,860.00, inflation in the amount
of UAH 4,745.19, penalty in the amount of UAH 32,151.83, 3% per annum in the amount of
UAH 7,671.13.
on behalf of the plaintiff: did not arrive
on behalf of the defendant: Tsikra K.O. under power of attorney No. 45/Юр dated 18.03.2013.
On 15.07.2013, Public Joint Stock Company “Kharkov Machine-Building Plant “Svet Shakhtyora”
(contractor) and Public Joint Stock Company “O.F. Zasiadko Mine” (customer) concluded
agreement No. 38/715 for the repair of products (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement),
under the terms of which the contractor undertakes at its own risk and at the request of the
customer to perform repair work of products from its own materials in the range, in quantities
and within the terms specified by the parties in the specifications attached to the Agreement,
which are integral parts thereof (clause 1.1. of the Agreement).

Annex 414
Commercial Court of Poltava Region, Case No. 917/482/17, Decision, 23 May 2017
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 414
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Poltava Region, Case No. 917/482/17, Decision, 23 May 2017, available at:
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/66713571.
COMMERCIAL COURT
OF POLTAVA REGION
36000, Poltava, Zyhina str., 1 tel. (0532) 610-421, fax (05322) 2-18-60, E-mail
i n b o x @ p l . a r b i t r . g o v . u a
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF
UKRAINE
23.05.2017 Case No. 917/482/17
According to the lawsuit of Private Enterprise “Poltava Enterprise of Geophysical Works”, Komarova
str., 9-A, Poltava, 36008
against S tate Enterpr i se “Pol tava Depa r tment o f Geophysical Works”,
Zavodskaya st r . , 16, Pol tava , 36007
regarding recovery of UAH 259,990.23.
Judge Semchuk O.S.
FOUND:
On 21 June 2016, agreement No. 21/06 was concluded between State Enterprise “Poltava Department of
Geophysical Works” (customer) and Private Enterprise “Poltava Enterprise of Geophysical Works”
(contractor) for the performance of industrial, geophysical and blasting works (hereinafter referred to as
the Agreement, a copy of which is in the case file).
According to clause 5.4 of the Agreement, the parties agreed that for the performance of works, the
customer makes
advance payment in the amount of 100% of the cost of explosive materials. Payment of the cost of the
completed works in accordance with the Agreement is made by the customer on the basis of the invoice
issued by the contractor and the certificate of acceptance of the completed works signed by PERSON_1 by
transferring funds (including the advance payment) to the contractor's current account.

Annex 415
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/2849/16, Decision, 17 November 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 415
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/2849/16, Decision, 17 November 2016, available
at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/62910967.
Court proceedings number: not specified
COMMERCIAL COURT OF DONETSK REGION
61022, Kharkov, Nauky Ave., 5
DECISION
in the name of Ukraine
17.11.2016 Case No. 905/2849/16
Judge of the Commercial Court of Donetsk region Filimonova O.Yu., having considered the case materials
in an open court session
according to the lawsuit of Private Joint Stock Company “Donetskstal” Metallurgical Plant”,
Donetsk
against State Enterprise “Donetsk Railway”, Donetsk
regarding recovery of UAH 56,356.79.
FOUND:
Agreement No. 3300006639 dated 30.04.2015 for the delivery services was concluded between Limited
Liability Company “INCOSTEEL GROUP” (supplier) and Private Joint Stock Company “Donetskstal”
Metallurgical Plant” (buyer), on the basis of which the supplier undertakes to transfer to the ownership
of the buyer iron ore billets (hereinafter referred to as the Goods) produced by PJSC “SEVHOK”, and the
buyer undertakes to accept the specified Goods and pay for them under the conditions provided for in
the Agreement and specifications thereto.

Annex 416
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/3531/15, Decision, 3 March 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 416
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/3531/15, Decision, 3 March 2016, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/56421088.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF DONETSK REGION
61022, Kharkov, Nauky Ave., 5
DECISION
in the name of Ukraine
03.03.2016 Case No. 905/3531/15
The commercial court of Donetsk region composed of: Judge Ovsiannikova O.V.,
with the secretary of the court session Voronii I.V.,
having considered in an open court session in the premises of the commercial court the case according to the
lawsuit of Limited Liability Company “Transport and Forwarding Company “Energotrans”, Kiev
against Private Joint Stock Company “Donetskstal” Metallurgical Plant”, Donetsk
regarding recovery of UAH 150,118.56, -
Limited Liability Company “Transport and Forwarding Company “Energotrans” filed a lawsuit against Private Joint
Stock Company “Donetskstal” Metallurgical Plant” for the recovery of UAH 150,118.56, of which: UAH
146,223.05 in penalties, UAH 3,895.51 per annum.
On 31 October 2014, the parties concluded agreement No. 31/10/2014/30212ds for the provision of services,
according to clause 1.1 of which the Forwarder (plaintiff) undertook to arrange transshipment from rail and road
transport to export sea vessels, and export from the ports of the Customer's imported bulk cargoes, the Customer
(defendant) undertook to pay for the work performed and the services provided to SE “Berdiansk MTP”.

Annex 417
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/2456/15, Decision, 11 January 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 417
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/2456/15, Decision, 11 January 2016,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/54985154.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF DONETSK REGION
61022, Kharkov, Lenina Ave., 5
DECISION
in the name of Ukraine
11.01.2016 Case No. 905/2456/15
Plaintiff: Private Joint Stock Company “Ukrenergotrans”, Dnepropetrovsk against the defendant:
State Enterprise “Donetsk Railway”, Donetsk,
regarding recovery of UAH 211,778.42.
Judge Matiukhin V.I.
As can be seen from the case materials and established by the decision of the commercial court
of the Zaporozhye region dated 09.06.2015 and by the resolution of the Donetsk Court of Appeal
dated 31.08.2015 in case No. 908/1964/15г,
remained unchanged by the decision of the
Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine dated 11 November 2015, in which State Enterprise
“Donetsk Railway” was the defendant, and PrJSC “Ukrenergotrans” was a third party without
independent claims on the subject of the dispute on the side of the plaintiff, Public Joint Stock
Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” (not a party to this case), “on 22 July 2014, from
the Buchach station of the Lvov Railway to the Komunarsk station of the Donetsk Railway under
railway waybill No. 38091500 to the consignee: PJSC “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” the
cargo was sent: metallurgical raw dolomite,
according to the list in six railway cars: No. 52728854, 53549077, 53517934, 53585691,
52749330, 52728284. PrJSC “Ukrenergotrans” has been identified as the payer according to this
railway invoice.

Annex 418
Commercial Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 913/638/17, Decision, 7 September 2017
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 418
1 of 7 2/16/2023, 6:44 PM
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 913/638/17, Decision, 7 September 2017, available
at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/68781545.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF LUHANSK REGION 61022, Kharkov, Nauki Ave., 5,
tel./fax 702-10-79 [email protected]
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
DECISION
07 September 2017 Case No. 913/638/17
Proceedings No. 4/913/638/17
According to the lawsuit of
Limited Liability Company “PSK-Kharkov”, Zaliutynska Str.,
against Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine”, Severodonetsk, Luhansk region
regarding recovery of UAH 124,190. 93
Judge of the Commercial Court of Luhansk Region - Starkova H. M.
Secretary of the court session Rochniak T. S.
The court session was attended by:
мon behalf of the plaintiff - PERSON_1, power of attorney No. w/o No. dated 25.07./2017;
on behalf of the defendant - the representative did not arrive.
Circumstances of the case: Limited Liability Company “PSK-Kharkov” filed a lawsuit against Public Joint-
Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine”, asking the court to recover from the defendant the
debt due to agreement No. 5356-АМК-2460-2014-усл dated 11.12. 2014 for the provision of services for
the creation of scientific and technical products in the amount of UAH 124,198. 66, of which: debt under
the agreement in the amount of UAH 94,000. 00, inflation charges in the amount of UAH 24,244. 85, 3%
per annum in the amount of UAH 5,953. 81
Agreement No. 5356-АМК-2460-2014-усл dated 11.12.2014 for the provision of services for the
creation of scientific and technical products (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), according to
which the customer instructs and is obliged to pay in accordance with section 2 of the Agreement the
works on the development of design documentation, and the contractor undertakes the execution and
transfer to the customer of the working documentation for the implementation of LOMAS waste gas
analysis systems for converters No. 1 and No. 2 of the oxygen conversion workshop at PJSC “Alchevsk
Metallurgical Combine”.

Annex 419
Commercial Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 913/639/17, Decision, 14 September 2017
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 419
1 of 9 2/16/2023, 6:47 PM
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 913/639/17, Decision, 14 September 2017, available
at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/68963844.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF LUHANSK REGION 61022, Kharkov, Nauki Ave., 5,
tel./fax 702-10-79 [email protected]
IN THE NAME OF
UKRAINE
DECISION
14 September 2017 Case No. 913/639/17
Proceedings No. 33/913/639/17
According to the lawsuit of Limited Liability Company “PSK-Kharkov”, Kharkov
against Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine”, Severodonetsk, Luhansk Region,
regarding recovery of UAH 26,985.03.
Judge Drahnievich O.V.
Secretary of the court session Medunytsia R.I.
The court session was attended by:
on behalf of the plaintiff - PERSON_1, a representative by proxy dated 25.07.2017,
on behalf of the defendant - the representative did not arrive.
MERITS OF THE CASE:
Limited Liability Company “PSK-Kharkov” filed a lawsuit with the Commercial Court of Luhansk Region
against Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” on the basis of agreement No. 5377-
АМК-797-2015-усл dated 20.07.2015 for the provision of services for the development of work
documentation
for recovery of funds in the amount of UAH 26,985.03, of which:
FOUND:
On 20 July 2015, agreement No. 5377-АМК-797-2015-усл for the provision of services for the
development of working documentation was concluded between Limited Liability Company “PSKKharkov”
(hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) as the contractor and Public Joint Stock Company
“Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) as the customer (case
sheets 26-29).
According to the subject matter of the agreement, the customer instructs and undertakes to pay in
accordance with section 2
Annex 419
2 of 9 2/16/2023, 6:47 PM of the agreement for works on the development of design documentation, and the contractor undertakes the execution and transfer to the customer of the work documentation for the change of the structures of the U-5 gallery of CPS No. 1 of coke and by-product plant of PJSC “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine”.
Annex 420 Commercial Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 913/511/17, Decision, 27 July 2017 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 420
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 913/511/17, Decision, 27 July 2017, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/68038819.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF LUHANSK REGION 61022, Kharkov, Nauki Ave., 5,
tel./fax 702-10-79 [email protected]
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
DECISION
27 July 2017 Case No. 913/511/17
Proceedings No. 16/913/511/17
According to the lawsuit of Limited Liability Company “Ventan”, Kramatorsk, Donetsk region
against Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine”, Severodonetsk, Luhansk region
regarding recovery of UAH 676,220.09.
Judge Shelikhina R.M.
Secretary of the court session Sokruta N.M.
The parties in the case concluded agreement No. АМК-1788-2014-пдр dated 13 June 2014 (hereinafter
referred to as the Agreement), on the basis of which the contractor (plaintiff) undertakes to perform, for
the benefit of the customer (defendant), works on the replacement of reinforced concrete slabs with
metal shields, provided for by specified Agreement, and the customer (defendant) undertakes to accept
and pay the cost of the performed works under the conditions and in the order specified by the
Agreement.

Annex 421
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/13519/17, Decision, 6 October 2017
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 421
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/13519/17, Decision, 6 October 2017, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/69544181.
COMMERCIAL COURT of KIEV 01030, Kiev, B. Khmelnytskogo Str., 44-B, tel. (044) 284-18-98, E-mail:
[email protected]
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
06.10.2017 Case No. 910/13519/17
According to the lawsuit of Private Joint Stock Company “Ukrenergotrans” against Public Joint Stock
Company “Ukrainian Railways” for the renewal of excessively accrued and debited funds in the amount
of UAH 108,046.20 on the personal account. Judge Pidchenko Yu.O.
FOUND:
On 30 December 2015, Public Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Railways” (hereinafter referred to as the
Contractor) and Private Joint Stock Company “Ukrenergotrans” (hereinafter referred to as the
Forwarder) signed agreement No. DF/3-90020 on the arrangement of cargo transportation and
settlement for the transportation and services provided by the railway (hereinafter referred to as the
Agreement), the subject matter of which is the settlement by the Forwarder with the Contractor for the
services provided by the latter for the transportation of cargo, empty own and leased railway cars and
other services to the Consignors/Consignees (hereinafter referred to as the Cargo Owners) (clause 1.1.
of the Agreement).
Thus, the plaintiff points out that on 9 February 2017, the defendant, at the Komunarsk station accepted
for transportation to Romania through the border crossing Vadul-Siret (forwarder: CFR) cargo, namely
flat rolled iron or non-alloy steel with a width of 600 mm or more, hot-rolled, non-plated, uncoated,
other than separately allocated (GNV - 72089080, ЕТСНВ - 324239), weighing totally 328,810 kg.
Transportation was carried out in five of the plaintiff's own operational cars No. 56690639 (cargo weight
67,554 kg), No. 52749124 (cargo weight 65,938 kg), No. 53572533 (cargo weight 64,429 kg), No.
52984598 (cargo weight 65,182 kg), No. 52725603 (cargo weight 65,707 kg) according to railway
waybills No. 48356554, 48355796, 48355879, 48355838 dated 9 February 2017 and railway waybill No.
48368179 dated 10 February 2017, and the consignor was Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk
Metallurgical Combine” (hereinafter referred to as the Consignor).

Annex 422
Severodonetsk City Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 428/5927/20, Sentence, 31 July 2020
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 422
Excerpt
Translation
Severodonetsk City Court of Luhansk Region, Case No. 428/5927/20, Sentence, 31 July 2020,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/90750643.
Court sentence No. 90921696 dated 31.07.2020, Severodonetsk City Court of Luhansk Region — case No.
428/5927/20
The National Emblem of Ukraine
Criminal proceedings No. 1-ks/428/3616/2020
Case No. 428/5927/20
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
31 July 2020 Severodonetsk
Investigating judge of Severodonetsk City Court of the Luhansk Region I.S. Posokhov, with the participation of court
session secretary P.V. Koliadintseva, representative of the property owner lawyer S. Bielakh, prosecutor of the
Luhansk Region Prosecutor's Office A.Yu. Zinkovskyi, after considering the petition of lawyer Sergey Sergeevich
Bielakh in the interests of the Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” on the cancellation of
the seizure of property,
FOUND:
On 24.07.2020, the investigating judge of the Severodonetsk City Court received a petition from the lawyer Serhii
Serhiiovych Bielakh on behalf of the Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” to cancel the
seizure of property.
On 29 December 2017, PJSC “AMC” represented by the director of the legal department of the “Industrial Union of
Donbass” Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the “IUD” Corporation), the representative of PJSC “AMC” by
proxy S.V. Tkachenko appealed to the Main Directorate of the National Police in the Luhansk Region with a
statement about the commission of a criminal offense, in which he reported that, starting from 18 December 2017,
the property of PJSC “AMC”, located at: Luhansk region, Alchevsk, Shmidta Str., 4 (buildings, machinery, office
equipment, vehicles, primary accounting, reporting, permitting, contractual documentation, raw materials,
inventory), is illegally owned and controlled by unidentified persons, representatives of the so-called “Luhansk
People's Republic” and representatives of the organization with uncertain legal status “Vneshtorgservis”.
On 18 January 2018, “IUD” Corporation, which is the majority shareholder of PJSC “AMC”, by letter No. 337/04
notified the state authorities and local self-government bodies about the loss of control over production assets
belonging to PJSC “AMC” and that PJSC “AMC” (legal entity) does not carry out any commercial, production,
financial operations in Alchevsk (location of the industrial complex of the metallurgical combine), does not carry
out, and until the moment of restoration of control over production assets in Alchevsk, does not intend to carry out
the import or export of any products, goods, and material valuables from Alchevsk across the demarcation line in
the area of the Anti-Terrorist Operation or across sections of the state border of Ukraine that are temporarily
outside the control of the State Border Service of Ukraine and the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine.
PJSC “AMC” declares that it is the owner of Metallurgical Products, which was seized by the Resolution dated 30
Annex 422
October 2018, and has the right to file a motion to cancel the seizure of property. All this indicates that in the future there is no need to seize the Metallurgical Products, which was seized by the decision of the Lysychansk City Court dated 30 October 2018 in case No. 415/8777/18. APPROVED: To grant the petition of the lawyer Sergey Sergeevich Bielakh in the interests of Public Joint Stock Company “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” to cancel the seizure of the property. https://youcontrol.com.ua/ru/catalog/company_details/05441447/To cancel the seizure of metallurgical products of PJSC “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” (EDRPOU code 05441447), which was on the COMET vessel under the flag of Liberia in the SE “Mariupol Sea Trade Port”, with a total weight of 3,102.182 tons (net) or 3,105.771 tons (gross), namely: hot-rolled steel sheet with cut edges weighing 2,393.764 tons (net) and flat rolled steel from unalloyed steel weighing 708.418 tons (net), imposed by the decision of the investigative judge of the Lysychansk City Court of the Luhansk Region dated 30.10.2018 in case No. 415/8777/18, which prohibited to dispose of and use this property. https://youcontrol.com.ua/ru/catalog/company_details/05441447/To return to the owner, PJSC “Alchevsk Metallurgical Combine” (EDRPOU code 05441447) the metallurgical products that were on the COMET vessel under the flag of Liberia in the SE “Mariupol Sea Trade Port”, with a total weight of 3,102.182 tons (net) or 3,105.771 tons (gross), namely: hot-rolled steel sheet with trimmed edges weighing 2,393.764 tons (net) and non-alloy steel flat products weighing 708.418 tons (net).
Annex 423
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/44/16, Decision, 27 April 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 423
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 905/44/16, Decision, 27 April 2016, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/57613978.
COMMERCIAL COURT OF DONETSK REGION
61022, Kharkov, Nauki Ave., 5
DECISION
in the name of Ukraine
27.04.2016 Case No. 905/44/16
The Commercial Court of Donetsk Region, composed of judge O.M. Skovorodina.
with the secretary of the court session Sapozhnikova Yu.B.
in the case according to the lawsuit of: Public Joint Stock Company ”Yenakiive Metallurgical Plant”,
Mariupol
against defendant 1: Public Joint-Stock Company “Ukrainian Railway”, Kiev
against defendant 2: State Enterprise “Donetsk Railway”, Donetsk
regarding the recovery of cargo deficiency in the amount of UAH 20,206.49
On the basis of contract No. 13-001768 dated 31.05.2013 concluded between PJSC ”Yenakiive Metallurgical
Plant” and Metinvest International S.A., on 22.06.2015 according to railway waybill No. 52483062, PJSC
”Yenakiive Metallurgical Plant” (consignor) sent steel wire rods from the Yasinuvata station of the Donetsk
Railway to the Mariupol-Port-Export station of the Donetsk Railway to the address of “METINVEST-SHIPPING” LLC
(consignee) in car No. 62468145, with a total weight of 60,350 kg. According to consignment note No. 52483062,
the cargo is marked and loaded into the cars by the consignor.
According to consignment note No. 52483062, the weight in car No. 62468145 is 60,350 kg net.

Annex 424
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/7494/16, Decision, 6 September 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 424
Excerpt
Translation
Commercial Court of Kiev, Case No. 910/7494/16, Decision, 6 September 2016, available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/61318480
COMMERCIAL COURT of KIEV 01030, Kiev, B. Khmelnytskogo str., 44-B, tel. (044)
284-18-98, E-mail: [email protected]
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
06.09.2016 Case No. 910/7494/16
According to the lawsuit of Public Joint Stock Company ”Yenakiive Metallurgical Plant”, Donetsk
region
against Public Joint-Stock Company “Ukrainian Railway”, Kiev
regarding compensation for damages, the price of the claim is UAH 57,392.05.
Judge Palamar P.I.
In April 2016, Public Joint-Stock Company “Yenakiive Metallurgical Plant” applied to the court with the
above claim.
The plaintiff noted that in order to fulfill contract No. 13-001768 dated 31 May 2013 concluded between
the plaintiff and “Metinvest International S.A.”, on 29 November 2015 the plaintiff sent railway cars No.
62314315, 59725937 with steel wire rods weighing 132,950 kg from the Yasinuvata station of the
Donetsk Railway to the Mariupol-Port station of the Donetsk Railway to the address “Metinvest
International S.A.”. During the control weighing on the route at the Polohy station of the Prydniprovska
Railway, a shortage of cargo was established in the indicated cars with a total weight of 8,030 kg, which
exceeds the norm of the maximum discrepancy in the determination of the cargo, which is 0.5% of the
cargo weight for this type of cargo.

Annex 425
Moscow Circuit Commercial Court, Case No. А40207643/
2020 Resolution, 18 October 2021
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 425
Excerpt
Translation
Moscow Circuit Commercial Court, Case No. А40-207643/2020, Resolution, 18 October 2021.
106958_2167409
MOSCOW CIRCUIT
COMMERCIAL COURT
________________________________________________________________________________
9 Seleznyovskaya st., GSP4,
Moscow, Russia, 127994,
official website: http://www.fasmo.arbitr.ru email:
[email protected]
RESOLUTION
City of Moscow
18.10.2021 Case No. А40207643/
2020
The operative part of the ruling was announced 11.10.2021
The full text of the ruling was published 18.10.2021
The Moscow Circuit Commercial Court, composed of:
presiding judge Yartsev D.G.,
judges: Kochergina E.V., Yadrentseva M.D,
with the participation of:
on the part of claimant: "LeaderTrade"
Limited Liability CompanyGalkina
V.V., by proxy dated
11 January 2021;
on the part of defendant: "Raiffeisenbank" Joint Stock Company Potrebich
A.V., by proxy dated 16
December 2020;
having examined on October 11, 2021 the cassation appeal of JointStock
Company "Raiffeisenbank"
for the judgment of the Commercial Court of the City of Moscow dated 30 April 2021 and the ruling
of the Ninth Commercial Appeal Court dated 22 July 2021
on the claim brought by "LeaderTrade"
Limited Liability Company against the jointstock
company
"Raiffeisenbank"
to declare the actions unlawful
ESTABLISHED:
[…]
Annex 425
The courts of the first and appellate instances, having investigated and evaluated the evidence presented in the case in accordance with the provisions of Article 71 of the Russian Federation Code of Procedure in Commercial Courts, guided by the provisions of Articles 309, 845, 849, 854, 858, 864 of the Russian Federation Civil Code, Article 7 of Federal Law No. 115FL "On Counteracting the Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminal Proceeds and Financing of Terrorism" of 07 August 2001, having found that the defendant had not submitted evidence in the case file that the plaintiff's transactions had been found suspicious, nor had it submitted a decision by an authorised body to block the account or a court order, they concluded that the bank's actions were unlawful and therefore declared the claims to be satisfied. […] The arguments of the cassation appeal should be dismissed because the courts rightly proceeded from the fact that the defendant did not provide evidence in the case file that the client (the plaintiff) has been found to have carried out suspicious transactions. The courts have not found any evidence that the plaintiff's transactions were deemed suspicious or on any other grounds not in compliance with Federal Law No 115FL "On Counteracting the Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminal Proceeds and Financing of Terrorism" of 7 August 2001. […] HELD: To leave the Judgment of the Commercial Court of the City of Moscow dated 30 April 2021 and the Ruling of the Ninth Commercial Appeal Court dated 22 July 2021 on the case No. A40207643/2020 without amendment, to leave the cassation appeal without satisfaction. Presiding Judge D.G. Yartsev Judges: E.V. Kochergina M.D. Yadrentseva
Annex 426
Darnytskyi District Court of Kiev, Case No. 753/23764/15k,
Sentence, 28 December 2015
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 426
Excerpt
Translation
Darnytskyi District Court of Kiev, Case No. 753/23764/15-k, Sentence, 28 December 2015, available
at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220620180444/https:/reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/54799070.
DARNYTSKYI DISTRICT COURT OF KIEV
Case No. 753/23764/15k
proceedings No. 1kp/
753/884/15
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
28 December 2015 Darnytskyi District Court of Kiev composed of:
presiding judge Schasna T.V.
with the participation of the prosecutor Rybyzant T.L.
with the participation of the secretary Pushniak A.M.
with the participation of the defenders PERSON_2,
PERSON_3,
PERSON_4
having held a preparatory meeting in the video conference mode in an open court session in the courtroom in
Kiev, in the criminal proceedings regarding:
PERSON_5, INFORMATION_1, citizen of Ukraine, Ukrainian, native of Luhansk, residing at
ADDRESS_3, no prior convictions, accused under part 2, Art. 258 5
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
PERSON_6, INFORMATION_4, citizen of Ukraine, Ukrainian, native of Luhansk, registered in Luhansk,
ADDRESS_1, residing at ADDRESS_4, no prior convictions, accused of 2, Art. 2585
of the Criminal Code
of Ukraine,FOUND:
In February 2015, PERSON_5, knowing about the shortage of cash in the financial market of the
temporarily occupied territory of the Luhansk region, the lack of banking institutions of Ukraine and
problems with providing the members of the terrorist organization “LPR” with the necessary cash, with prior
collusion with PERSON_7 and other persons, deliberately created in the territory of Luhansk financial
institution of the terrorist organization “LPR” under the name “First Financial Center”, which began its
illegal activities on 2 March 2015 at the address: Luhansk, Radianska str., 54, and in July 2015 it was
renamed as “First Commercial Center”.
At the same time, PERSON_5, together with PERSON_7 and other unknown persons, in order to create
imaginary financial wellbeing
and stability in the territory temporarily controlled by the terrorist
organization “LPR” and for their own enrichment, organized the work of the “First Commercial Center”
under the guise of a financial services company: issuance of cash in Ukrainian and Russian currencies from
their bank accounts to members of the terrorist organization “LPR”, payment of transfers from the territory
of Russia and Ukraine, crediting of funds to current accounts, currency exchange, topup
of mobile phones,
with retention of interest for the services provided.

Annex 427
Kievskyi District Court of Kharkov, Case No. 640/9543/15k,
Sentence, 3 June 2015
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 427
Excerpt
Translation
Kievskyi District Court of Kharkov, Case No. 640/9543/15-k, Sentence, 3 June 2015, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170130000418/https:/reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/44613302.
Case No. 640/9543/15-k
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
03.06.2015 Kievskyi District Court of Kharkov composed of:
presiding judge Senatorov V.M.
with the secretary Serhieieva N.S.
with the participation of the prosecutor Bondarenko A.O.
having considered in the preparatory court session in the premises of the Kievskyi District Court of
Kharkov indictment in criminal proceedings No. 22015220000000211 dated 22.05.2015 on charges of:
PERSON_1, INFORMATION_1, native of Diakove village, Antratsyt district, Luhansk region, citizen of
Ukraine, secondary technical education, not working, married, no prior convictions, registered at the
address: ADDRESS_1, actually residing at: ADDRESS_2,
in the commission of the crime provided for in part 2, Art. 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, -
FOUND:
A plea agreement was reached during pre-trial proceedings.
At the court hearing, it was established that PERSON_1 at the end of December 2014 / a more precise
date was not established during the pre-trial investigation / in a telephone conversation with a member
of the terrorist organization “Luhansk People's Republic” hereinafter referred to as the “LPR” /, the head
of the “LPR” Cossacks, PERSON_2, offered to provide the latter and other members of the terrorist
organization “LPR” with means of communication in the form of starter packages of mobile operators
and “vouchers” for topping-up accounts, in order to provide the specified persons with uninterrupted
mobile communication during combat duty in the territory controlled by militants of the terrorist
organization “LPR”, coordination of joint actions, etc.
Further, PERSON_1 in mid-January 2015 / a more precise date was not established during the pre-trial
investigation / while staying in Kharkov, realizing his criminal intent, aimed at material support of the
terrorist organization “LPR”, in the territory of the “Barabashova” shopping center in Kharkov, from a
previously unknown person selling in the absence of a certain trading point, purchased starter packages
of the mobile operator of Ukraine “MTS” and “vouchers” for topping-up the account of the mobile
operator of Ukraine “MTS” in the amount of UAH 30,000 with the purpose of their further transfer to
PERSON_2, having spent his own savings.
Annex 427
Subsequently, at the end of January 2015 / a more precise date was not established during the pre-trial investigation /, PERSON_1 sent part of the starter packages of the mobile operator of Ukraine “MTS” and “vouchers” for topping-up the account of the mobile operator of Ukraine “MTS” purchased under the specified circumstances, in the total amount of UAH 20,000, from Kharkov to Rovenky, Luhansk region, by transferring to PERSON_3, a driver of a shuttle taxi, who followed the specified route without informing about his criminal intentions. At the same time, PERSON_1 kept a part of the starter packages of the mobile operator of Ukraine “MTS” and “vouchers” for topping-up the account of the mobile operator “MTS” in the amount of UAH 10,000, for their further transfer at the request of representatives of the terrorist organization “LPR”, for the purpose of its material support. JUDGED: To approve the plea agreement concluded on 23 May 2015 between the prosecutor of the Kharkov region Prosecutor's Office V. Lymar and the accused PERSON_1 in criminal proceedings No. 22015220000000211 dated 22 May 2015. To find PERSON_1 guilty of commission of the crime provided for in part 2, Art. 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and sentence him to 5 / five / years of imprisonment in accordance with Art. 77 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine without confiscation of property.
Annex 428
Sosnovskyi District Court of Cherkassy, Case No. 712/8363/15k,
Sentence, 17 February 2016
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 428
Excerpt
Translation
Sosnovskyi District Court of Cherkassy, Case No. 712/8363/15-k, Sentence, 17 February 2016,
available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170514054232/https:/reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/56349134.
Case No. 712/8363/15-k
Proceedings No. 1kp/712/48/16
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
On 17 February 2016, the Sosnovskyi District Court of Cherkassy composed of:
presiding judge: S.M. Bashchenko,
with the secretary - Yu.L. Liakhovetska,
with the participation of: prosecutor V.V. Kryvenko, V.V. Kolomiiets, O.A. Tkachenko,
defense counsel PERSON_1
having considered in an open court session in the courtroom in Cherkassy, in the order of special
court proceedings, criminal proceedings No. 2201425000000025 regarding
PERSON_2, INFORMATION_1, born on INFORMATION_2, citizen of Ukraine, Ukrainian, married,
INFORMATION_3, with no dependent minor children, registered at: INFORMATION_4, residing at:
INFORMATION_5, no prior convictions, since 13.11.2014 has been wanted all over Ukraine, since
04.12.2014 has been wanted interstate,
on suspicion of committing criminal offenses provided for in part 2, Art. 258-5, part 2, Art. 110, part 2,
Art. 109 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine,-
FOUND:
In May 2014, PERSON_2, under the influence of pro-Russian propaganda spread on various Internet
sites and Russian TV channels available for viewing in the territory of Ukraine, with the aim of further
providing material support to the terrorist organization “DPR”, while staying at his actual place of
residence at the address: INFORMATION_6, using the Internet, established contact with a member of
the anti-crisis council of the “DPR”, responsible for the logistical support of illegal paramilitary
formations of the specified terrorist organization, PERSON_3, with whom he agreed to collect and
transfer to the city controlled by terrorists, Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, of civilian and military clothing,
medicines and medical products.
In the period of May-July 2014, PERSON_2, in fulfillment of previous agreements with PERSON_3,
independently and through his acquaintances, purchased medicines and medical products in the
Annex 428
pharmacies of Cherkassy: painkillers, antiseptics, hemostatics, blood transfusion systems etc., as well as purchased civilian clothes in stock stores of Cherkassy: t-shirts, pants and jackets of green and black colors, for their subsequent transfer to PERSON_3 for the purpose of further use by militants of the illegal paramilitary formations of the terrorist organization “DPR”. On 29 May 2014, PERSON_2, continuing the implementation of his criminal intent, aimed at the material support of the terrorist organization “DPR”, while staying at his actual place of residence at the address: Cherkassy, Lisova str., house 27, packed the medicines and medical products purchased under the above-described circumstances into a postal package, and on the same day in the premises of the Cherkassy representative office of the courier service LLC “Nova-Poshta”, located at the address: Cherkassy, Shevchenko blvd., house 150, sent the specified postal package with a total weight of 10 kg to Kramatorsk in the name of PERSON_3.
Annex 429 Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 1kp /243/378/2014, Sentence, 7 November 2014 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 429
Excerpt
Translation
Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 1-kp/243/378/2014, Sentence, 7
November 2014, available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/41273251.
1kp/
243/378/2014
243/5919/14
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
On November 07, 2014, the Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region composed of:
presiding judge PERSON_
1 ,
with the secretary PERSON_2 ,
prosecutor PERSON_3 ,
the accused PERSON_4 ,
defense counsel PERSON_5 ,
Having considered in an open preparatory court session in the mode of video conference in courtroom
No. 3 of the Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region criminal proceedings No.
12014220320001407 on the charges of
PERSON_4, INFORMATION_1, born in Slaviansk, Donetsk region, a citizen of Ukraine, with a
vocational education, married, unemployed, with one minor child, VAT NUMBER_1, previously not
previously convicted, registered and living at: ADDRESS_1 , since 10 September 2014 he has been
detained in custody in the conditions of a pretrial
detention centre No. 27 in Kharkov.
in committing a criminal offence under Part 2 of Article 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, ESTABLISHED:
The plea agreement dated 16 October 2014 was reached during the pretrial
investigation.
According to the indictment, PERSON_4 is accused of committing a criminal offence under Part 2
of Art. 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, i.e. participation in the activities of armed groups not
provided for by the laws of Ukraine on the following grounds:
In early April 2014, on the territory of Donetsk region of Ukraine, a citizen of the Russian Federation
PERSON_6 and other unidentified persons created an armed formation not provided for by the laws
of Ukraine to forcibly support the government of the illegal selfproclaimed
socalled
"Donetsk
People's Republic", which had an organised militarytype
structure, namely, unity of command,
subordination, clear hierarchy and discipline, was armed with firearms, explosives, and had heavy
military weapons and military equipment. In addition, the said formation defined the mechanism of
joining it, the procedure for service, and each structural unit was assigned tasks of daily activities,
Annex 429
which consisted of providing military support to illegally created structures of the DPR, suppressing organised resistance of the population in the occupied territory, deporting the population of Donetsk region, establishing martial law, confronting law enforcement agencies of the state executive power of Ukraine, destroying their manpower and material resources. These formations were deployed in different settlements and localities of Donetsk region and had a common leadership coordination. […] HELD: The plea agreement dated 16 October 2014, concluded between the prosecutor of the Izium Interdistrict Prosecutor's Office of Kharkov region and PERSON_9 and PERSON_4, to be approved. PERSON_4, INFORMATION_1, to be found guilty of committing a crime under Part 2 of Art. 260 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. In accordance with the requirements of Articles 75, 76 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, to release the convicted PERSON_4 from serving his sentence, with probation period of 3 years, imposing on him the obligation not to leave Ukraine for permanent residence without the permission of the criminal executive inspection; to notify the criminal executive inspection of changes in place of residence, work or study; periodically appear for registration with the criminal executive inspection. To cancel the preventive measure in the form of detention imposed on PERSON_4, releasing PERSON_4 from custody immediately. The verdict may be appealed to the Court of Appeal of Zaporozhye region through the Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region within 30 days from the date of its pronouncement, and by a person in custody within the same period from the moment of delivery of a copy of the court decision. Judge of Slavyansky District Court of Donetsk Region PERSON_1
Annex 430
SMIDA, Information on the volumes of production and sales of the main types of products
(3 February 2023)
(translation)

Annex 430
Translation
SMIDA, Information on the volumes of production and sales of the main types of products (3
February 2023), available at:
https://smida.gov.ua/db/emitent/year/xml/showform/53850/169/templ.
We make
information available
Agency News Databases Services Web sites Support Office SMIDA XML Enter EDRPOU
Regulatory information (XML)
Information on the volumes of production and sales of the main types of products.
Item
No.
Main type of
products
Volume of production Volume of sold products
in kind (physical
unit of
measurement)
in cash (UAH
thousand)
as a percentage of
all manufactured
products
in kind (physical
unit of
measurement)
in cash (UAH
thousand)
as a percentage of
all manufactured
products
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1
Coal concentrate
Ж grade (thousand
tons)
751.7 thousand
tons 927,304.1 90.37 730.8 thousand
tons 675,667.3 66.48
* The main types of products are indicated, which make up more than 5% of the total volume of manufactured products in cash.
** Physical unit of measurement (please, specify): pieces, tons, kilograms, meters, etc.
Agency News Databases Services Web sites Support
© 2010-2023 — Agency for the Development of the Infrastructure of the Stock Market of
Ukraine Our projects: www.emitent.net.ua, www.stockmarket.gov.ua
When using site materials, a hyperlink to http://smida.gov.ua is mandatoryhttp://smida.gov.ua/
Contacts:
+38 044 498 38 15/16
+38 044 586 43 94
+38 044 287 56 70
[email protected]

Annex 431
SMIDA, Business profile (3 February 2022)
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 431
Excerpt
Translation
SMIDA, Business profile (3 February 2022), available at:
https://smida.gov.ua/db/emitent/year/xml/showform/53850/156/templ.
Regulatory information (XML) – Smida
Business profile
Public Joint Stock Company “O.F. Zasiadko Mine” was founded in the process of privatization
in accordance with Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Privatization of State Property”, the
Procedure for the Transformation in the Process of Privatization of Leased Enterprises and
Enterprises with a Mixed Form of Ownership into Open Joint Stock Companies, approved by
Resolution of the CMU No. 1099 dated 11.09.1996, orders of the State Property Fund of Ukraine
No. 444 dated 29.03.2011, No. 744 dated 19.05.2011 and the minutes of the founding meeting of
the founders on the establishment of Public Joint Stock Company “O.F. Zasiadko Mine” dated
19.05.2011. PJSC was created on the basis of stateowned
property, which was leased by the
“O.F. Zasiadko Mine” Lessee Organization and property of the “O.F. Zasiadko Mine” Lessee
Organization through the transformation of the “O.F. Zasiadko Mine” Leasing Enterprise into a
public joint stock company. Public Joint Stock Company О.F. Zasiadko Mine” is one of the
largest coal mining enterprises of Ukraine. The main product is coal concentrate of the “Zh”
grade, which is produced from coal mined at a depth of 1,0001,300
meters under difficult
natural conditions. The mine field is located in the central part of the DonetskMakeevka
geological and industrial district.
[…]
The main suppliers of mining equipment are PJSC “Mining Machinery”, OJSC “Yasynuvata
MachineBuilding
Plant”, TC “Krasnyi Luch MachineBuilding
Plant”.

Annex 432
Oktyabrsky District Court of Saint Petersburg Case No. 2323/
2021 Decision, 19 May 2021
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 432
Excerpts
Translation
Oktyabrsky District Court of Saint Petersburg, Case No. 2-323/2021, Decision, 19 May 2021,
available at: https://oktibrsky--
spb.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=655332825
&case_uid=c6b88830-6cdf-4698-8bde-87adea5e50ce&delo_id=1540005&new.
Unique identification number 8RS001601202000510980
Case No. 2323/
2021
19 May 2021
JUDGEMENT
IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Oktyabrsky District Court of Saint Petersburg, as composed of:
presiding judge Litvinenko E.V,
with the secretary Bulgakova V.A.
Having heard in the public court proceedings the civil case on the claim brought by NAME1
against NAME4, Private Company NAME4, NAME2, and NAME3 on the declaration of the
information untrue and discrediting their honour and dignity, and to charge them with refutation, and
to pay compensation for moral damage and costs,
ESTABLISHED:
NAME1 applied to Oktyabrsky District Court of of Saint Petersburg with claim against
NAME4, Private Company NAME4, NAME2, NAME3 in which with regard to clarification pursuant
to Article 39 of the Civil Procedural Code of the Russian Federation dated DAY.MONTH.YEAR:
To declare the information spread in the articles called "Identification of separatists involved in
shooting down MH17" and "A little bird flew to you", placed in the Internet on the addresses:
<address>.
[…]
HELD:
[…]
Oblige NAME4 (Stichting Bellingcat) Registration Number in the Dutch Business Register
(KvK) 72136030, located at 1069CD, The Netherlands, <address> (Keurenplein, 41, 1069CD
Amsterdam, the Netherlands), Private Limited Company by guarantee Bellingcat; Registration
Number in the UK Company Register; address: United Kingdom, <address>, 6th Office 3rd floor, 37
New Walk, Leicester, United Kingdom, LEI 6TU within five working days from the entry into force
of the court decision to refute the information distributed in the articles titled "Identification of
separatists involved in shooting down MH17" and "A little bird flew to you", posted on the Internet
at the addresses: <address> that contain information not corresponding to reality and defaming honor
and dignity of NAME1, by publishing in the same font as the texts of articles on the Internet at
https://ru.bellingcat.com under the title: "Refutation of information contained in the Bellingcat reports
entitled "Identification of separatists involved in shooting down MH17" and "The bird flew to you"
(Bellingcat investigation)" of the resolution part of this decision.
To exact from funds of NAME4 (Stichting Bellingcat) Registration Number in the Dutch
Business Register (KvK) 72136030, located at 1069CD, The Netherlands, <address> (Keurenplein,
Annex 432
41, 1069CD Amsterdam, the Netherlands) in favour of NAME1 the compensation for moral damage in the amount of 150 000 rubles, the state fee in the amount of 1 700 rubles. To exact from funds of Private Company NAME4 (Private Limited Company by guarantee Bellingcat; Registration Number in the UK Company Register; address: United Kingdom, <address>, 6th Office 3rd floor, 37 New Walk, Leicester, United Kingdom, LEI 6TU) in favour of NAME1 the compensation for moral damage in the amount of 150 000 rubles, the state fee in the amount of 1 700 rubles. To exact from NAME3 (Pieter van Huis) in favor of NAME1 compensation for moral damage in the amount of 40,000 rubles and state fee in the amount of 200 rubles. The remaining part of the claim shall be dismissed. The decision may be appealed to the Saint Petersburg City Court by filing an appeal through the court that rendered the decision within one month after the date the court decision is rendered in final form. The reasoned judgment is drawn up on DAY.MONTH.YEAR Judge: Litvinenko E.V.
Annex 433
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling N 2450O
Dismissing a Complaint Filed
by Alexander Ivanovich Kolpakidi and Sergey Vasilyevich Nikolayev Against an Alleged
Infringement Of Their Constitutional Rights By Articles 1(3) And 13 Of Federal Law “On
Counteracting Extremist Activities”, 27 October 2015
(translation)

Annex 433
Translation
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling N 2450-O Dismissing a Complaint
Filed by Alexander Ivanovich Kolpakidi and Sergey Vasilyevich Nikolayev Against an
Alleged Infringement Of Their Constitutional Rights By Articles 1(3) And 13 Of Federal
Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activities”, 27 October 2015.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RULING
No. 2450-O dated 27 October 2015
DISMISSING A COMPLAINT FILED BY ALEXANDER IVANOVICH
KOLPAKIDI AND SERGEY VASILYEVICH NIKOLAYEV AGAINST AN
ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
BY ARTICLES 1(3) AND 13 OF FEDERAL LAW “ON COUNTERACTING
EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES”
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation consisting of Presiding Judge V.D. Zorkin
and Judges K.V. Aranovsky, A.I. Boytsov, N.S. Bondar, G.A. Gadzhiyev, Y.M. Danilov, L.M.
Zharkova, G.A. Zhilin, S.M. Kazantsev, M.I. Kleandrov, S.D. Knyazev, A.N. Kokotov, L.O.
Krasavchikova, S.P. Mavrin, N.V. Melnikov, Yu.D. Rudkin, O.S. Khokhryakova and V.G.
Yaroslavtsev considered the possibility to accept the complaint filed by A.I. Kolpakidi and S.V.
Nikolayev for consideration at a session of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
and
found as follows:
1. In their complaint filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,
A.I. Kolpakidi and S.V. Nikolayev, who have been convicted of committing the crimes
criminalised by Article 282(2)(b) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,
challenge the constitutionality of Article 1(3) of Federal Law No. 114FZ
dated 25 July
2002 “On Counteracting Extremist Activities”, which defines the terms “extremist
materials”, and Article 13 of said Federal Law, which establishes a procedure for
recognising information materials as extremist and specifies the effects of such
recognition.
The complainers allege that the provisions they challenge contradict those of Articles 13,
18, 19, 28, 29 and 44 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation to the extent that they
recognise as extremist materials and prohibit the dissemination as well as the production
and storage for the purposes of dissemination but not for the purposes of propaganda or
agitation inciting racial, national or religious hatred or enmity any documents or
publications (works of literature, sciences or art) intended for publication that contain any
thirdparty
extremist materials, including those created by the leaders of the German
National Socialist Workers’ Party and the Italian Fascist Party, and, to the extent that the
provisions they challenge recognise as extremist and prohibit the dissemination as well
as the production and storage for the purposes of dissemination any works of the leaders
of the German National Socialist Workers’ Party and the Italian Fascist Party, irrespective
of when they were created. In addition, the complainers allege that Article 13 of the
Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activities” does not comply with the
Constitution of the Russian Federation as it requires documents and publications (works
of literature, science or art) intended for publication but not for propaganda inciting racial,
Annex 433
national or religious hatred or enmity to be included on the federal list of extremist materials and copies thereof to be seized. 2. Having examined the materials submitted, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation finds no grounds for accepting this complaint for consideration. 2.1. Since the Russian Federation, as a democratic state governed by the rule of law, is obliged to ensure the recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, the unity of the status of an individual across its territory, the protection of other constitutional values such as the sovereignty and state integrity of the Russian Federation, the unity of its system of state power, the delimitation of competences and powers between the Russian Federation and its constituent entities and the unity of its economic space (according to Articles 1(1), 2, 3(1), 4, 5(1), 5(3), 8(1), 11(3), 15(1) and 15(2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), and the exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms must not infringe the rights and freedoms of other persons (according to Article 17(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), the Constitution of the Russian Federation provides for a possibility to restrict rights and freedoms to the extent necessary to protect the foundations of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of other persons and to ensure the national defence and security of the state (according to Article 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). Said constitutional requirements are consistent with the standards enshrined in international legal instruments, which, while proclaiming the right of everyone to freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, the right to freely keep one’s convictions and the right to freely express one’s opinions, including the freedom to seek, receive and disseminate various information and ideas by any means irrespective of national borders, simultaneously establish that the exercise of those rights and freedoms may be subject to certain restrictions prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, including for the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order, for preventing disorders or crimes or for protecting health, morals or the rights of other persons (according to Articles 18, 19 and 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). Furthermore, as directly follows from the foundations of the constitutional system enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, there is a need to take adequate measures to protect it as well as the duty of the state to establish legal mechanisms contributing to the maximum extent possible to public security, the prevention and suppression of crimes and the preclusion of their negative effects on the personal rights and interests protected by law (according to Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 137OO dated 19 February 2009). Accordingly, if, when exercising his or her constitutional rights and freedoms (including freedom of thought and speech, freedom of creativity, right to have and disseminate and right to act in accordance with hir or her convictions), a person infringes rights and freedoms of other persons and such infringement (irrespective of whether it is directed against specific persons or public order in general) is socially dangerous and unlawful, the infringer may be held liable under public (including criminal) law in order to protect
Annex 433
public interests (according to Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
No. 1873O
dated 25 September 2014).
2.2. Criminal liability may only be considered lawfully established and complying with the
provisions of Articles 19, 54 and 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation if it
is commensurate with the nature and social danger of the criminalised act and the
constituent features of said act the presence of which in said act, while constituting a
ground for criminal liability, makes it possible to distinguish it from other unlawful and,
even more so, lawful acts are precisely and unambiguously defined in a criminal law that
consistently fits into the general system of legal regulation (according to Resolution of
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 22P
dated 16 July 2015).
As repeatedly stated by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the
requirement of certainty of legal rules and their consistency in the general system of legal
regulation becomes particularly important in relation to criminal law, which is by its legal
nature an extreme (exclusive) means by which the state reacts to instances of unlawful
behaviour for the purposes of protection of public relations if such protection cannot be
properly ensured only with the help of other legal rules; therefore, any crime as well as
the punishment therefor must be clearly specified in law so that, based directly on the text
of the relevant rule – if necessary, with the help of its interpretation by courts – everyone
can foresee the criminal effects of his or her actions (omissions) (according to Resolutions
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Nos. 8P
dated 27 May 2008, 15P
dated 13 July 2010, No. 18P
dated 17 June 2014, etc.).
Under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the criminality, punishability and
other effects under criminal law of an act may only be specified by said Code (according
to Article 3(1) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) and the commission of an
act containing all elements of an offence criminalised by said Code shall be recognised
as a ground for criminal liability (according to Article 8 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation).
The provisions of Articles 1(3) and 13 of the Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist
Activities” being challenged only reveal the concept of extremist materials as used for the
purposes of this Federal Law and establish a procedure recognising information materials
as extremist and determine the effects of such recognition but do not specify the elements
of a crime (according to Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No.
1819O
dated 16 July 2015), including those provided for in Article 282 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, which imposes a liability for actions aimed at inciting
hatred or enmity or humiliating the dignity of a person or a group of persons on the
grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or belonging to a
social group, which are committed publicly or through the use of mass media or any
information and telecommunication networks, including the Internet.
In its Ruling No. 1053O
dated 2 July 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation stated that, when applying the provisions of Articles 1(1) and 1(3) of the
Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activities”, the courts should proceed from
the fact that one mandatory feature of this type of extremism (extremist) materials shall
be an explicit or veiled contradiction of the relevant actions (documents) to the
constitutional prohibitions of incitement of hatred, enmity and discord and propaganda of
social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority the existence of which shall be
Annex 433
determined with due regard for all significant circumstances of each particular case (the form and content of activities or information, the addressees, target orientation and sociopolitical context thereof, the presence of a real threat, including that caused by calls for unlawful encroachments on constitutionally protected values, substantiation or justification of the commission thereof, etc.); the freedoms of conscience, religion and speech and the right to disseminate information may not be restricted by way of antiextremist law in respect of any activity or information on the sole ground that these do not fit into any generally accepted ideas, disagree with any wellestablished traditional views or opinions, come into conflict any moral or cultural opinions or any moral and/or religious preferences, otherwise it will mean a deviation from the constitutional requirement of necessity, proportionality and fairness of restrictions on human and civil rights and freedoms, which, by implication of the legal opinion expressed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in a number of its judgments that remain valid, is addressed, as follows from Articles 18, 19(1) and 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, not only to the legislators but also to the law enforcement authorities, including the courts (according to Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 4P dated 14 February 2013, Rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Nos. 484OP dated 2 April 2009, No. 323O dated 5 March 2013, etc.). That said, Plenary Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11 dated 28 June 2011 “On Judicial Practices in Criminal Cases on Extremist Crimes” directs the courts to take into account that the crime criminalised by Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation may only be committed with the direct intent and aim of inciting hatred or enmity or humiliating the dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or belonging to any social group; the question of whether the mass dissemination of any extremist materials included on the published federal list of extremist materials constitutes such crime or an administrative offense (according to Article 20.29 Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation) shall be resolved depending on the intent of the person disseminating such materials; if a person disseminates any extremist materials included on the published federal list of extremist materials with the aim of inciting hatred or enmity or humiliating the dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or belonging to a social group, the acts done by such person shall entail criminal liability under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; any expression of any judgments or conclusions using any facts of interethnic, interfaith or other social relations in scientific or political discussions or texts with no aim of inciting hatred or enmity or humiliating the dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or belonging to a social group shall not constitute such crime (according to Article 8 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). Accordingly, the legal provisions being challenged, while acting in the system of legal regulation, do not imply criminal liability for the dissemination of any information which is not aimed at inciting hatred or enmity or humiliating the dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or belonging to a social group. 2.3. The seizure of information materials recognised as extremist by a court decision under Article 13(3) of the Federal Act “On Counteracting Extremist Activities” shall not be
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related to the application of liability for any offence but shall be a coercive measure of
state response aimed at eliminating access to such materials and preventing the threat of
any negative impact thereof on the constitutionally protected values is provided with the
necessary guarantees of judicial protection of the property rights of the owner of the
relevant materials and as such does not go beyond the constitutionally permissible limits
of restriction of human and civil rights and freedoms (according to Ruling of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 1053O
dated 2 July 2013).
Consequently, the rules challenged by the complainers may not be regarded as infringing
their constitutional rights in the aspect they indicate and, therefore, their complaint may
not be accepted for consideration by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
as it fails to meet the criterion of admissibility as enshrined in the Federal Constitutional
Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”.
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Articles 43(2), 79(1), 96 and 97 of the Federal
Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”, the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation hereby
rules
1. That the complaint filed by Alexander Ivanovich Kolpakidi and Sergey Vasilyevich
Nikolayev be dismissed as it fails to meet the requirements for a complaint filed with the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to be recognised as admissible as imposed
by the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation”; and
2. That this Ruling issued by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on said
complaint be final and not subject to appeal.
V.D. ZORKIN,
Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation

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Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 137OO
Dismissing a Complaint
Filed by E.D. Bzarova, E.L. Kesayeva, V.A. Nazarov nd E.L. Tagayeva Against an Alleged
Infringement of Their Constitutional Rights by Article 14(2) of the Federal Law “On Combating
Terrorism”, 19 February 2009
(translation)

Annex 434
Translation
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 137-O-O Dismissing a
Complaint Filed by E.D. Bzarova, E.L. Kesayeva, V.A. Nazarov and E.L. Tagayeva
Against an Alleged Infringement of Their Constitutional Rights by Article 14(2) of the
Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism”, 19 February 2009.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RULING
No. 137-O-O dated 19 February 2009
DISMISSING A COMPLAINT FILED BY E.D. BZAROVA, E.L. KESAYEVA,
V.A. NAZAROV AND E.L. TAGAYEVA AGAINST AN ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ARTICLE 14(2) OF THE FEDERAL
LAW “ON COMBATING TERRORISM”
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation consisting of Presiding Judge V.D. Zorkin
and Judges N.S. Bondar, G.A. Gadzhiyev, Y.M. Danilov, L.M. Zharkova, G.A. Zhilin, S.M.
Kazantsev, M.I. Kleandrov, S.D. Knyazev, L.O. Krasavchikova, S.P. Mavrin, N.V. Melnikov,
Y.D. Rudkin, N.V. Seleznyov, A.Y. Sliva, V.G. Strekozov, O.S. Khokhryakova and V.G.
Yaroslavtsev considered the possibility to accept the complaint filed by Ms. E.D. Bzarova,
Ms. E.L. Kesayeva, Mr. V.A. Nazarov and Ms. E.L. Tagayeva for consideration at a session
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and
found as follows:
1. In their complaint filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,
E.D. Bzarova, E.L. Kesayeva, V.A. Nazarov and E.L. Tagayeva challenge the
constitutionality of Article 14(2) of Federal Law No. 130FZ
dated 25 July 1998 “On
Combating Terrorism”, which prohibits those people negotiating with terrorists from
considering the possibility to meet their political demands as a condition for them to
stop their act of terrorism.
According to the complainers who were recognised as victims of the act of terrorism
that took place in the town of Beslan in the period from 1 to 3 September 2004, the rule
of law they are challenging infringes the rights of people to life, liberty and personal
privacy and contradicts Article 20(1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as it
served an obstacle to negotiations with the terrorists who had made no demands other
than political ones.
2. Having examined the materials submitted by the complainers, the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation finds no grounds for accepting their complaint for
consideration.
2.1. As a democratic federative state governed by the rule of law, the Russian Federation is
obliged to ensure the recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights
and freedoms, the unity of the status of an individual across its territory as well as the
protection of other constitutional values such as the sovereignty and state integrity of
the Russian Federation, the unity of its system of state power, the delimitation of
competences and powers between the Russian Federation and its constituent entities, the
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unity of its economic space, and its national defence and security (according to Articles 1(1), 2, 3(1), 4(1), 4(2), 5(1), 5(3), 8(1), 11(3), 15(1), 15(2) and 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). The Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibits any activities aimed at forcibly changing the foundations of the constitutional order or violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining the security of the state, or inciting social, racial, national and religious discord from being carried out in the Russian Federation; any governmental and local authorities, officials, citizens and associations thereof shall be obliged to comply with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the laws (according to Articles 13(5) and 15(2)). By virtue of Articles 16(1) and 135 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the provisions of its Chapter 1 shall constitute the foundations of the constitutional order in the Russian Federation and may only be amended by adopting a new Constitution of the Russian Federation. As directly follows from the foundations of the constitutional system enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, there is a need to take adequate measures to protect it as well as the duty of the state to establish legal mechanisms contributing to the maximum extent possible to public security, the prevention and suppression of crimes and the preclusion of their negative effects on the personal rights and interests protected by law. By implication of the aforementioned constitutional provisions, it also follows that it shall be inadmissible for representatives of the state power to take any actions contributing, whether directly or indirectly, to a change of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation. 2.2. As indicated in the report of the Policy Working Group on the Role of the United Nations in Relation to Terrorism (dated 6 August 2002), terrorism is currently used as a strategy (Clause 11) and in most cases is essentially a political act (Clause 13). According to the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism as approved by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, “states, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from… acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts” (Clause 4 of the Declaration) and “take promptly all steps necessary to implement the existing international conventions on this subject to which they are parties, including the harmonization of their domestic legislation with those conventions” (Clause 5(e) of the Declaration). The unequivocal condemnation of the acts, methods and practices of terrorism was reaffirmed by the State Members of the United Nations in the Supplementary Declaration to the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism as approved by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, which emphasised the obligation of states to cooperate in preventing, suppressing and eliminating terrorism in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law (Clauses 1 and 5 of the Supplementary Declaration). Confirming the urgent need to combat by all means all forms and manifestations of terrorism, which reduces stability in the world and poses a serious and growing threat to the exercise of human rights and to the social and economic development of states, the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1624 (2005) adopted on 14 September 2005 stresses the importance of taking appropriate measures at the national and international levels to protect the right to life. Article 4(1) of the Council of the
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European Union Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism says
that each member state shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or
aiding or abetting a terrorist offence is made punishable.
Thus, various international documents orient states to conduct an uncompromising fight
against terrorism, stressing the inadmissibility of meeting the political demands of
terrorists, prescribing the use of a set of legal, political, socioeconomic,
propagandistic
and other measures to counter terrorism for protecting individuals and society from the
threats it generates, induce to a voluntarily renouncement of acts of terrorism, and
prevent the effects of terrorism.
2.3. Terrorism is an ideology of violence and a practice of influencing the decisionmaking
by governmental or local authorities or international organisations, which are associated
with intimidation of people and/or other forms of unlawful violent actions (according to
Article 3 of Federal Law No. 35FZ
dated 6 March 2006 “On Counteracting
Terrorism”), and an “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organise, plan,
aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act” (according to Article 1
of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism as
ratified by Federal Law No. 3FZ
dated 10 January 2003). Thus, terrorism is associated
by its nature with an impact on the political sphere that is aimed at changing the
constitutional principles of the organisation of the state and society, including the
derogation or abolition of human and civil rights and freedoms.
Therefore, the rule of law being challenged here (as well as a similar provision
contained in Article 16(2) of the Federal Law “On Counteracting Terrorism” the
adoption of which resulted in the Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism” having lost
its force), which prohibits negotiations with terrorists on the fulfilment of their political
demands as encroaching on basic constitutional values, intrinsically constitutes a
guarantee of those values. This provision does not imply any refusal to recognise and
protect human rights and freedoms or any disregard for the life and health of persons in
suppressing an act of terrorism. Otherwise it would contradict both Articles 1, 2, 15 and
17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 2 of the Federal Law “On
Counteracting Terrorism”, which provides, among the other basic principles of
counteracting terrorism, that fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms shall be
ensured and protected and that the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of
those persons exposed to terrorist danger shall be a priority.
2.4. The legislative provision on the inadmissibility of considering any political demands
made by terrorists when negotiating with them, while also being addressed in many
respects to the perpetrators of such crimes, has a preventive nature and is a measure to
prevent acts of terrorism pursuing political goals by making such goals unachievable
and such acts useless.
A strategy for holding negotiations with terrorists in a specific situation to preserve the
life and health of people should be chosen with due regard for the fact that any
discussion of the possibility to meet the political demands of terrorists and, moreover,
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any concessions to them in this regard would not help minimise the consequences of terrorism but, on the contrary, can aggravate the terrorist threat, strengthen the agitation and propaganda effect of the act of terrorism, stimulate new acts of terrorism and, eventually, cause them to transform into a mechanism for politically manipulating the state, which would run contrary to the very principles of the existence of a democratic state based on the rule of law. T hus, Article 14(2) of the Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism” is designed to prevent the terrorist threat and, accordingly, to ensure the security of individuals and preserve people’s lives, i.e. is consistent with the constitutionally significant objectives and may not be regarded as infringing the complainers’ constitutional rights. The balance of constitutional values when a decision is made to hold negotiations cannot be revealed by legal means alone. Therefore, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is not competent to assess the legality, reasonability or expediency of any actions taken or decisions taken by any executive authorities or their officials during a counterterrorist operation, including the method (force or negotiations) of suppressing an act of terrorism they chose in the end or their tactics of arranging for and holding any negotiations with terrorists. In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Articles 40(2), 43(1)(2), 79(1), 96 and 97 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation hereby rules: 1. That the complaint filed by E.D. Bzarova, E.L. Kesayeva, V.A. Nazarov and E.L. Tagayeva be dismissed as it fails to meet the requirements for a complaint filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to be recognised as admissible as imposed by the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”; and 2. That this Ruling issued by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on said complaint be final and not subject to appeal. V.D. ZORKIN, Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Y.M. DANILOV, Registrar Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
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Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 1873O
Dismissing a Complaint
Filed by Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova Against an Alleged Infringement of Her
Constitutional Rights by Article 213(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation,
25 September 2014
(translation)

Annex 435
Translation
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 1873-O Dismissing a
Complaint Filed by Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova Against an Alleged
Infringement of Her Constitutional Rights by Article 213(2) of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation, 25 September 2014.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RULING
No. 1873-O dated 25 September 2014
DISMISSING A COMPLAINT FILED BY NADEZHDA ANDREYEVNA
TOLOKONNIKOVA AGAINST AN ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT OF HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ARTICLE 213(2) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation consisting of Presiding Judge V.D. Zorkin
and Judges K.V. Aranovsky, A.I. Boytsov, N.S. Bondar, G.A. Gadzhiyev, Y.M. Danilov,
L.M. Zharkova, G.A. Zhilin, S.M. Kazantsev, M.I. Kleandrov, S.D. Knyazev, A.N. Kokotov,
L.O. Krasavchikova, S.P. Mavrin, N.V. Melnikov, Yu.D. Rudkin, N.V. Seleznyov,
O.S. Khokhryakova and V.G. Yaroslavtsev considered the possibility to accept the complaint
filed by N.A. Tolokonnikova for consideration at a session of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation and
found as follows:
1. In her complaint filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,
N.A. Tolokonnikova challenges the constitutionality of the Article 213(2) of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which imposes a liability for an act of
hooliganism committed by a group of persons in conspiracy or as an organised group or
involving resistance to a representative of authorities or other person performing his or
her duties to protect public order or suppress violations of public order.
As follows from the materials submitted, the judgment rendered by the Khamovniki
District Court of Moscow on 17 August 2012 sentenced N.A. Tolokonnikova to two
years in prison for committing hooliganism as part of a group of persons in conspiracy
on the grounds of religious hatred and enmity and on motives of hatred against a social
group, i.e. the crime criminalised by Article 213(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation. Based on the aggregate of the evidence examined, the Khamovniki District
Court of Moscow stated in its judgment that the act incriminated to N.A. Tolokonnikova
and two other convicts was expressed in the arrangement for and commission in a
public place (an Orthodox church) of actions grossly violating public order and dictated
by their desire to oppose themselves to those persons attending the temple for their
religious feelings, demonstrate a dismissive attitude towards them, namely by shouting
swear phrases and words insulting the feelings of those present and by carrying out
other emphatically vulgar and deliberately provocative actions (such as imitation of
dances and infliction of blows against imaginary opponents) that were inadmissible and
unacceptable, given the fact that said public place was specially intended for religious
rites and ceremonies, thereby breaching the generally recognized rules of conduct. The
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Criminal Bench of the Moscow City Court checked the arguments put forward in the cassation appeals by the convicts and their lawyers, including the alleged absence of elements of a crime in the act, and issues a cassation ruling dated 10 October 2012 finding the qualification of the act committed to be correct and leaving the judgment rendered against N.A. Tolokonnikova intact. The applicant alleges that Article 213(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not comply with Articles 14, 15, 19, 54(2) and 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as it disproportionately restricts the freedom of expression and allows recognising a violation of religious norms as that of public order and establishing the criminal nature of any acts on the basis of their perception by a majority of the population as unacceptable. 2. Having examined the materials submitted within the limits of its powers relating exclusively to matters of law and not implying any assessment of facts in all cases where this falls within the competence of other courts or other bodies (pursuant to Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”), the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation finds no grounds for accepting this complaint for consideration. 2.1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, while establishing that people and their rights and freedoms are the highest value and recognising ideological diversity as a foundation of the constitutional order, guarantees everyone freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or jointly with others any religion or no religion at all and the right to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious or other beliefs and act in accordance therewith, freedom of thought and speech, and the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information by any lawful means (according to Articles 2, 13(1), 28, 29(1) and 29(4)), which, along with other rights and freedoms, including the right to association and freedom of activity of public associations (according to Article 30(1)), specify the meaning, content and application of laws and the activities of legislative, executive and local authorities and are ensured by justice (Article 18) (according to Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 1053O dated 2 July 2013). By implication of the aforementioned constitutional provisions as interpretated by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, matters concerning the religious selfdetermination of a person, the role and significance of religion in personal and public life as well as specific approaches to and value judgments on topical problems of a social, moral, ethical and other nature as formed as part of certain religious movements are recognised as an integral part of the constitutional legal order based on which freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any religion or no religion at all and the right to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious and other beliefs and act in accordance therewith are ensured (Article 28 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). That said, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, while imposing no ideological or ideological criteria or restrictions for freedom of speech and freedom of dissemination of information, including religious ones, and implying no imposition by a majority of their beliefs or preferences on a minority, precludes any prohibition of public discussions on religious topics, including free expression of opinions, whether critical or others, concerning the nature and content of the activities of religious organisations, provided
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that the participants in such discussions should take into account the sensitive nature of the issues under discussion, which may directly affect the religious dignity of other persons professing a particular religion, so that any form of presentation of information relating to the religious sphere that insults public morality is any case unacceptable in relation to the religious beliefs of both a majority of members of society and those of its members having other religious preferences or not professing any religion at all. Accordingly, where a particular method of disseminating information, including given the circumstances of the place and time of such dissemination, is based on a demonstrative gross disregard for the socially accepted concepts of acceptable behaviour in specific places, including religious ones, has no aesthetic or artistic value and is offensive in itself, such activities go beyond the limits of the lawful exercise of freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Given the fact that the Russian Federation, as a democratic state governed by the rule of law, is obliged to ensure the recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, the unity of the status of an individual across its territory, the protection of other constitutional values such as the sovereignty and state integrity of the Russian Federation, and the unity of the system of state power, the delimitation of competences and powers between the Russian Federation and its constituent entities, the unity of the economic space (according to Articles 1(1), 2, 3(1), 4, 5(1), 5(3), 8(1), 11(3), 15(1) and 15(2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), and that the exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms must not infringe the rights and freedoms of other persons (Article 17(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), the Constitution of the Russian Federation provides for a possibility to restrict rights and freedoms to the extent necessary to protect the foundations of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of other persons and to ensure the national defence and security of the state (according to Article 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). Said constitutional requirements are consistent with the standards enshrined in international legal instruments, which, while proclaiming the right of everyone to freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, the right to freely keep one’s convictions and the right to freely express one’s opinions, including the freedom to seek, receive and disseminate various information and ideas by any means irrespective of national borders, simultaneously establish that the exercise of those rights and freedoms may be subject to certain restrictions prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, including for the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order, for preventing disorders or crimes or for protecting health, morals or the rights of other persons (according to Articles 18, 19 and 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). Furthermore, as directly follows from the foundations of the constitutional system enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, there is a need to take adequate measures to protect it as well as the duty of the state to establish legal mechanisms contributing to the maximum extent possible to public security, the prevention and suppression of crimes and the preclusion of their negative effects on the personal rights and interests protected by law (according to Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 137OO dated 19 February 2009).
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Accordingly, if, when exercising his or her constitutional rights and freedoms (including freedom of thought and speech, freedom of creativity, right to have and disseminate and right to act in accordance with hir or her convictions), a person infringes rights and freedoms of other persons and such infringement (irrespective of whether it is directed against specific persons or public order in general) is socially dangerous and unlawful, the infringer may be held liable under public (including criminal) law in order to protect public interests. 2.2. When considering matters of criminal liability, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation noted that the imposition of prohibitions and sanctions for violation thereof by law may not be arbitrary. The use of criminal liability is justified by the need to achieve the goals specified in Article 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation to protect the foundations of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of other persons and to ensure the national defence and the security of the state. That said, the institutions envisaged by criminal law for protecting individuals, society and the state against criminal encroachments and for preventing crimes must be based on the constitutional principles of justice and proportionality of criminal liability to the values protected by criminal law and the constitutional guarantees given to individuals in this area of relations under public law must be unconditionally observed (according to the Preamble and Articles 18, 19(1), 19(2), 49(1), 50(1), 54 and 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). When exercising their powers to determine the content of criminal law and to establish the criminality and punishability of certain socially dangerous acts, the federal legislators shall take into account the prevalence of such acts, the significance of the legally protected values they encroach on and the materiality of the harm they cause as well as the impossibility of overcoming them by other legal means (according to Resolutions of the Constitutional Courts of the Russian Federation Nos. 3P dated 19 March 2003 and 7P dated 27 June 2005). These requirements are also applicable to Article 213 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which is intended to protect public order under criminal law in line with the goals enshrined in Article 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and imposes, in Article 213(1), criminal liability for hooliganism, i.e. gross violation of public order, which expresses a clear disrespect for society and is committed with the use of weapons or objects used as weapons or on the grounds of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity or hatred or enmity towards a social group, and, in Article 213(2), criminal liability for the same act committed by a group of persons in conspiracy or as an organised group or involving resistance to a representative of authorities or other person performing his or her duties to protect public order or suppress violations of public order. 2.3. As repeatedly noted by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, any offence as well as the punishment therefor must be clearly specified by law so that, based directly on the text of the relevant rule – if necessary, with the help of its interpretation by courts – everyone can foresee the criminal effects of his or her actions (omissions) (according to Resolutions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Nos. 9P dated 27 May 2003, No. 8P dated 27 May 2008, 15P dated 13 July 2010, etc.). Thus, the implementation of the principles of justice (according to the Preamble of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 6 of the Criminal Code of the
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Russian Federation) and equality of all before law and courts (according to Article 19 of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 4 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation) is ensured in relations under criminal law.
According to Article 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the criminality,
punishability and other criminal legal effects of an act may only be specified by said
Code (according to Article 3(1) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) and the
application of criminal law by analogy shall be prohibited (according to Article 3(2) of
the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). However, those requirements for the
quality of a criminal law do not mean no evaluative or generally accepted concepts
(categories) that allow taking into account the need for the effective application of
prohibitions imposed by criminal law to an unlimited number of specific legal situations
may be used that in formulating its provisions (according to Rulings of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Nos. 441O
dated 4 December 2003,
260OO
dated 15 April 2008, 484OP
dated 2 April 2009, 1561OO
dated 25
November 2010, 572OO
dated 21 April 2011, 323O
dated 5 March 2013, etc.).
Article 213 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which imposes a criminal
liability for hooliganism the elements of which – namely, “gross violation of public
order”, “obvious disrespect for society”, “religious hatred or enmity”, etc. – are
established with due regard for the historical and cultural heritage of the peoples of
Russia, the generally accepted rules of conduct existing at the present stage of the
development of society, the assessed materiality of the breaches of such rules, and the
way in which a person exercises his or her rights and freedoms, shall also be applied in
conjunction with the aforementioned opinions expressed by the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation and with due regard for the facts of each particular case (despite
the fact that, in accordance with Article 15(2) of Federal Law No. 125FZ
dated 26
September 1997 “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, the state
shall also respect the internal regulations of religious organisations, provided that those
regulations do not contradict the laws of the Russian Federation).
In addition, when deciding whether the defendant’s actions involve a gross violation of
public order expressing a clear disrespect for society, the courts shall be obliged to take
into account the manner, time and place of the commission as well as the intensity,
duration and other circumstances thereof, assess and indicate in their judgments what
exactly such gross violation of public order was expressed in, and what circumstances
indicated such clear disrespect of society, which disrespect is associated in law
enforcement practices with a deliberate violation of generally recognised standards and
rules of conduct dictated by the desire to oppose himself or herself to and demonstrate a
dismissive attitude towards others. When qualifying the actions taken by a guilty person
as hooliganism committed by a group of persons in conspiracy, one should take into
account the requirements imposed by Article 35(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation and the fact that a prior agreement must be reached not only for any of the
accomplices to commit such joint hooligan acts but also to use weapons or objects used
as weapons or to commit such acts on the grounds of political, ideological, racial,
national or religious hatred or enmity or on the grounds of hatred or enmity against a
social group. The actions taken by other participants who were not bound by any
conspiracy and did not use weapons or objects used as weapons or who did not commit
the criminal acts on the grounds of political, ideological, racial, national or religious
hatred or enmity or on the grounds of hatred or enmity towards any social group shall
Annex 435
not constitute hooliganism (according to Clauses 1 and 5 of Plenary Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 45 dated 15 November 2007 “On the Judicial Practices in Criminal Cases of Hooliganism and Other Crimes Committed out of Hooligan Motives”). Thus, the rule of criminal law being challenged here does not contain any uncertainty as a result of which a person would be deprived of the opportunity to realise the wrongfulness of his or her act and to foresee his or her liability therefor and which would prevent that rule from being uniformly understood and applied by law enforcement authorities, nor may it be considered as infringing the complainer’s rights in her particular case. In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Articles 43(2), 79(1), 96 and 97 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation hereby rules 1. That the complaint filed by Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova be dismissed as it fails to meet the requirements for a complaint filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to be recognised as admissible as imposed by the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation”; and 2. That this Ruling issued by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on said complaint be final and not subject to appeal. V.D. ZORKIN, Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
Annex 436
OVDInfo, What is Article 20.2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences?
(translation)

Annex 436
􀀃
􀀃
Translation
OVDInfo, What is Article 20.2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences?, available
at: https://data.ovdinfo.org/20_2/#/regions/RU.
What is Article 20.2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences?
Article 20.2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (violation of the established
rules for holding assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches, and pickets by a participant of
a public event) has been used as an indispensable tool for prosecuting participants and
organisers of protest actions.
During the 18 years from the early 2004 to the end of 2021, Russian courts have considered
76,826 cases under this article and found 52,259 people guilty of violating the rules for
holding public events. The fines totalled RUB 421,384,069.
Meanwhile, the number of characters in the text of the Article has quadrupled (from 1,068 to
4,360), while the number of sections has increased from three to ten. Separate penalties are
now imposed for events held without permission, for participating in such events, and for
“involving a minor” in participation of such activities. The minimum fine for participating in
such event has increased from RUB 1,000 to RUB 10,000. The administrative arrest,
previously applied only to unauthorised actions near nuclear facilities, is now applicable
under almost all the sections of the Article, namely under eight out of ten. In 2012, penalty in
the form of a compulsory community service was introduced.
Since mid2014,
any person committing a “repeated” violation of Article 20.2 of the Code of
Administrative Offences faces a fine of RUB 150,000 to RUB 300,000, a compulsory
community service for a period of 40 to 200 hours, or an administrative arrest for 15 to 30
days (Article 20.2(8) of the Code of Administrative Offences). Criminal liability was
introduced for a “repeated” violation, with a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment
(Article 212.1 of the Code of Criminal Offences).
On this page, we are publishing data pertaining to the cases under Article 20.2 of the Code of
Administrative Offences heard in courts during the last 18 years, from the beginning of 2004
until the end of 2021. Here you can find out how many cases of violations at public events
have been heard in courts and what decisions have been issued by the courts in different years
and in different regions.
REGIONS DYNAMICS Q&A ANALYTICS INPUT DATA
Year
2021
Metrics
Number of
cases per
100,000 people
Annex 436
􀀃􀀃 Москва Moscow СанктПетербург St. Petersburg Севастополь Sevastopol Вся Россия All Russia All regions (12.87) Years 2020,2021 DOWNLOAD DATA Metrics 2020 2021 Total cases submitted 3,881 18,812 Cases resubmitted 439 1,689 Total cases heard (according to the number of persons) 3,786 18,792 Percentage of cases among the total number of cases under Article 20.2 across Russia 100 100 Number of cases per 100,000 people 3 13 Number of persons convicted 2,454 15,601 Cases returned to correct detention report noncompliances 845 1,798 Cases transferred to another jurisdiction 92 755 Cases dismissed, including dropped administrative charges 395 637 Cases dismissed upon submission 0 1 Number of arrestees 233 2,200 Compulsory community service 147 676
Annex 436
􀀃
􀀃
Number of people who have been fined 2,062 12,709
Average fine 16,260 13,300
The amount of fines imposed by decisions issued
in the reporting period
33,528 169,029
600 731
The ratio of the amount of fines to the total amount
of fines under Article 20.2 in Russia
100 100
Methodology
We have obtained the regional breakdown of the Article 20.2 data from a copy available at the
federal repository of statistical data of the Judicial Department at the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation. The statistics are available only for the cases heard under this Article in
whole, without a breakdown for individual sections.
Our estimates use data on the population of Russia’s entities from the Federal State Statistics
Service (Rosstat). Population data as of the 1st of January for the period from 2010 to 2019
have been taken from a Wikipedia article titled “Population – Population of the Entities of the
Russian Federation” which refers to Rosstat. Population data for 20042009
have been taken
from the Russia’s Demographic Yearbook. These two sources use different population data
formats: in the former, the data are presented with an accuracy of 1, while in the latter they
are accurate to 1,000 people.
The metrics taken from the statistical reports of the Judicial Department have been shortened
for ease of reading. The full description is provided below:
• Total cases heard (according to the number of persons): “Total cases heard (according
to the number of persons)”, “Number of persons convicted”, “Total number of persons
sanctioned”
• “Cases returned to correct detention report noncompliances”:
“Cases returned to
correct detention report noncompliances
(as per the fourth paragraph of Article
29.4(1) of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences)”
• “Cases transferred to another jurisdiction”: “Cases transferred to another jurisdiction”
• “Cases dismissed, including dropped administrative charges”: “Cases dismissed for
other reasons, including dropped administrative charges (incl. verbal warnings),
released from penalty”
• “Cases dismissed upon submission”: “Cases dismissed upon submission to prosecutor,
to preliminary investigation authority, to investigative authority” 1
• “Number of people who have been fined”: “Administrative penalty / basic punishment
/ fine imposed”
• “Compulsory community service”: “Administrative penalties / basic punishment /
compulsory community service imposed”
• “The amount of fines imposed by judgments issued in the reporting period”: “The
amount of fines (in rubles) imposed by judgments issued in the reporting period (trial
courts)
• “Number of arrests”: “Administrative penalties / basic punishment / administrative
arrest imposed”
• “Total cases submitted”: “Total cases submitted during the reporting period”
• “Cases resubmitted”: “Cases resubmitted from column 2: due to change of
jurisdiction, after correction of detention reports, after cancellation of resolution /
decision”
Annex 436
􀀃􀀃 We have modified some of the data as follows: • Data on the KomiPermyak Autonomous District (two persons arrested in 2004) which became part of the Perm Krai, have been included in the Perm Krai data; • Data on the West Siberian Military Circuit Court have been deleted (one case was returned in 2012 to correct the detention report); • Data for the 3rd Military Circuit Court has been deleted (1 person fined RUB 5,000 in 2014); • Data for the Leningrad Military Circuit Court has been deleted (one case received in 2018). We calculated the parameters titled “Percentage of cases among the total number of cases under Article 20.2 across Russia”, “Average fine”, “The ratio of the amount of fines to the total amount of fines under Article 20.2 in Russia”, and “Number of cases per 100,000 people”; the last of them has been calculated using Rosstat’s data. We added Rosstat population data for the autonomous districts that have been included in larger regions to the data for the respective regions: • The Taimyr (DolganoNenets) and Evenki autonomous districts have been included in the count for the Krasnoyarsk Krai; • The UstOrdynsky Buryat Autonomous District as part of the Irkutsk Region; • The KomiPermyak Autonomous District as part of the Perm Region; • The Koryak District as part of the Kamchatka Krai; • The Aginsky Buryat Autonomous District as part of the Transbaikal Krai. __________________________ 1 In 2004, the wording of this metric was: “The proceedings have been terminated / upon the transfer of the case to the prosecutor, internal affairs bodies, or public organisations”
Annex 437
Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court, Case No. A83112/
2014, Resolution, 31 July 2014
(translation)

Annex 437
Translation
Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court, Case No. A83-112/2014, Resolution, 31 July 2014,
available at: https://21aas.arbitr.ru/node/13305.
SEVASTOPOL COMMERCIAL APPEAL COURT
21 Suvorova Street, Sevastopol, 299011, tel.: (0692) 546249,
fax: (0692) 547495
Email:
[email protected]
RESOLUTION
IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
City of Sevastopol
31 July 2014 Case No. A83-112/2014
The operative provisions of this Resolution were pronounced on 31 July 2014.
This Resolution was prepared in full on 31 July 2014.
The Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court consisting of Presiding Judge Y.V. Borisova,
Judge K.V. Volkov and Judge V.I. Gontar, with Secretary E.A. Ischenko keeping records of
the proceedings, in the presence of:
Natalia S. Bogatykh acting for Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, a stateowned
enterprise, as the plaintiff, pursuant to her Power of
Attorney No. 892 dated 13 May 2014; and
Andrei V. Bespoyasny acting for Black Sea TV & Radio Company, a limited liability
company, as the defendant, pursuant to his unnumbered power of attorney dated 21 March
2014,
considered in curia the appeal lodged by Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea against the ruling issued by the Commercial Court of the
Republic of Crimea (consisting of Jude N.M. Lagutina) on 30 June 2014 in case No. A83112/
2014 instituted on the statement of claim filed by Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea against Black Sea TV & Radio Company, seeking to
recover a certain debt allegedly owed by Black Sea TV & Radio Company to Radio and TV
Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the petition for interim
measures filed by Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
in respect of said debt, and
FOUND AS FOLLOWS:
On 7 May 2014, Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
as the plaintiff filed with the Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea a statement of
claim against Black Sea TV & Radio Company as the defendant, seeking to recover RUB
3,152,347.84 (case file vol. 1, pages 6 through 10).
Annex 437
On 27 June 2014, the plaintiff filed a petition (No. A831062/2014) for interim measures in the form of a seizure of all movable and immovable properties of the defendant, reasoned by the fact that the defendant does not recognise and is reluctant to repay its debt (case file vol. 1, pages 105 through 110). By its ruling issued on 30 June 2014 in case No. A83112/2014, the Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea dismissed the petition for interim measures (case file vol. 1, pages 137 through 141) because the plaintiff had not provided the Court with any evidence showing that a failure to take the interim measures sought could make it difficult or impossible to enforce a judgment and could cause significant damage to the plaintiff, any evidence showing that the defendant intended to sell its properties or any evidence showing that the interim measures sought were proportionate to the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff disagreed with the ruling issued by the Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea and on 9 July 2014 lodged an appeal with the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court, asking it to set said ruling aside and grant its petition for interim measures (case file vol. 2, pages 1 and 2). In its appeal, the plaintiff alleges the debt owed to it by the defendant in a total amount exceeding RUB 3,000,000 significantly worsens the financial condition of the plaintiff and deprives it of the possibility to timely make current payments and pay wages to its employees. In addition, no evidence exists that the defendant has been reregistered as a legal entity under Russian laws, which raises doubts as to its intention to repay the debt. The plaintiff believes the defendant may fail to be reregistered or may establish a legal entity not legally succeeding to Black Sea TV & Radio Company. By its ruling issued on 21 July 2014, the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court accepted this appeal for proceedings and scheduled it to be heard on 31 July 2014 by a panel of judges consisting of Presiding Judge Y.V. Borisova, Judge V.I. Gontar, and Judge K.V. Volkov. During the appellate hearing, the attorney for the plaintiff sustained the arguments put forward in the appeal and asked that the interim measures sought be taken, alleging that the defendant acted in bad faith and stressing the need for those interim measures. The attorney for the defendant challenged the appeal, alleging that the conclusions drawn by the Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea in its ruling under appeal fully complied with the applicable rules of both procedural and substantive law and insisting that there are no grounds for the interim measures to be taken in this case. Having examined the case file, discussed the arguments put forward in the appeal, heard the explanations of the parties to the proceedings, and checked if the firstinstance court correctly applied the applicable rules of substantive and procedural law and if its conclusions were supported by the facts of the case, the panel of judges of the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court concludes that the appeal should be granted and the ruling issued by the firstinstance court should be set aside for the following reasons. It was found that Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Black Sea TV & Radio Company on 30 March 2007 entered into Agreement No. 02/012007 for the provision of TV programme distribution services (case file vol. 1, pages 37 through 40). Under Articles 4.1 and 4.4 of said Agreement, the plaintiff agreed to provide
Annex 437
services in accordance with the defendant’s weekly programme schedule. The plaintiff
undertook to provide the defendant, upon its request, protocols of routine control
measurements of the broadcasting equipment as frequently and detailed as prescribed the
applicable operating instructions, provided that the defendant pays in due time and has no
debt to the plaintiff (case file vol. 1, page 38).
Article 4.6 of Agreement No. 02/012007
stipulated that if Black Sea TV & Radio Company
fails to repay its debt for the services actually provided for it in an accounting month the next
month, the plaintiff may suspend the provision of its services upon fivedays
prior written
notice to the defendant until the debt is repaid (case file vol. 1, page 38).
According to Articles 5.3 and 11.1 of Agreement No. 02/012007,
the defendant should pay
the plaintiff for the services provided for it thereunder by prepaying 25% of the average
monthly price of the services as stated in Annex 1 to the Agreement. Such prepayment should
be made to the plaintiff’s current account by the 10th day of each accounting month. For each
day of the delay in payment, a penalty should accrue on the total amount of the debt in an
amount of double the discount rate set by the National Bank of Ukraine for the day of such
accrual. No reorganisation,
change of the name or change in the legal form, ownership
pattern or legal status of the plaintiff or the defendant should affect the effectiveness of the
Agreement or the rights and obligations of the parties thereto (case file vol. 1, pages 39 and
40).
The Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea also found that, according to the invoices
issued by the plaintiff, the debt owed by Black Sea TV & Radio Company to Radio and TV
Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for the services provided totalled
UAH 2,123,502.62. Given the partial payment by the defendant for the services provided for
it by the plaintiff under Agreement No. 02/012007,
the services provided by the plaintiff for
the defendant for the period from July 2013 through December 2013 remain unpaid for in a
total amount of UAH 972,507.79, which is equal to RUB 3,014,774.15.
In addition to the claim to recover this amount from the defendant, the plaintiff also claimed
that inflationary charges and a late payment charge of 3% per annum should be applied in the
calculation of the debt for the delay by the defendant in performing its payment obligations.
Assuming that the enforcement of a potential judgment recovering said amount may be
difficult or impossible and in Resolution to prevent significant damage to it, Radio and TV
Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea lodged with the Commercial
Court of the Republic of Crimea a petition for interim measures to be taken by seizing all
immovable and movable properties owned by Black Sea TV & Radio Company, namely its
nonresidential
premises, technical and electronic facilities, and equipment, as well as the
movable properties owned by certain third parties, including the TV image transmitters
located in the cities and towns of Simferopol, Kerch, Sevastopol, Krasnoperekopsk,
Yevpatoria, Alushta, Belogorsk, Dzhankoi, Yalta, Sudak, Alupka and Chernomorskoye, and
in the village of Petrovka in the Krasnogvardeiskoye District.
The plaintiff asks that all these properties be transferred to it to be kept in custody for the
purposes of their preservation and subsequent assessment.
The firstinstance
court dismissed the petition for interim measures as unfounded and
disproportionate.
Annex 437
Having checked the correctness of the judicial conclusions drawn in the firstinstance court’s ruling under appeal and examined the circumstances of the dispute and the possible ways to resolve it, the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court disagrees with the conclusions drawn by the firstinstance court, considers it possible for the plaintiff’s claims to be secured in the way suggested by the plaintiff and finds the seizure of the defendant’s properties to be a valid interim measure. Those conclusions drawn by the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court are based on the fact that such interim measures are provided for by Articles 90 and 91 of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation as well as on the facts found by the Court. More specifically, as appears from the case file, the defendant admitted its debt in its Letters Nos. 131220/03, 140114/02 and 140428/01 (case file vol. 1, pages 94 and 116 through 119) and confirmed its obligations by sending its debt repayment schedule (case file vol. 1, page 120). Moreover, in its Letter No. 40506/01yu dated 6 May 2014, the defendant offered to repay its debt under Agreement No. 02/012007 dated 30 March 2007 by a single payment and asked the plaintiff to issue an invoice for such payment. On 12 May 2014, the plaintiff issued and sent to the defendant Invoice No. SF0000880 for RUB 3,014,774.15 (case file vol. 1, page 121). However, as follows from the statement of defence dated 19 June 2014 (No. 23810/2014), the defendant did not recognise its debt and asked the firstinstance court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for recovering the same (case file vol. 1, pages 103 and 104). The Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court believes the circumstances described above indicate a change in the defendant’s position in this dispute, which change may raise doubts as to its willingness to perform its obligations and also allows the Court to assume that it may be difficult or impossible to enforce a judgment rendered in this case. It should be noted that by the hearing date of this appeal the defendant has submitted no evidence showing that it had repaid its debt, and its last payment for the services was made on 20 February 2014. The plaintiff’s bank accounts have not been credited with any money from the defendant, as evidenced by the certificate of debt and bank statements (case file vol. 1, pages 112 and 113). The aforementioned circumstances also give reason to believe that a failure to apply interim measures may make it difficult or impossible to enforce a judgment and deprive the plaintiff of the possibility to recover the money due and payable to it for the services provided. According to Article 90 of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, a commercial court may, upon a petition of a party to the proceedings or, in certain cases, another person, apply urgent interim measures to secure the claim or the property interests of the petitioner. Such interim measures may be applied at any stage of the proceedings, provided that a failure to do so may make it difficult or impossible to enforce a judgment, including if such judgment is supposed to be enforced outside of the Russian Federation or to any significant damage from being caused to the petitioner. Article 91(1)(1) of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation provides that interim measures may include a seizure of any money (including any money to be received by
Annex 437
a bank account) or other properties belonging to the defendant and held by the defendant or
other persons.
Clause 10 of RF Supreme Commercial Court Plenary Resolution No. 55 dated 12 November
2006 “On the Application of Interim Measures by Commercial Courts” states that, in
accordance with Article 92(2)(5) of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian
Federation, any petitioner must substantiate the reasons for requesting interim measures.
Commercial courts should take into account that interim measures constitute an expedited
remedy and, therefore, do not require the provision of any evidence to the extent necessary to
substantiate the claims or defences of a party to a dispute on the merits of such dispute. The
petitioner must provide evidence of the existence of the disputed or infringed right and the
infringement itself.
In determining whether to apply or refrain from applying any interim measures, a commercial
court must assess the validity of the petitioner’s arguments about the need for such interim
measures.
In this regard, when assessing the petitioner’s arguments in accordance with Article 90(2) of
the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, commercial courts should, in
particular, bear in mind:
• reasonableness and relevancy of the petitioner’s request for such interim measures;
• the likelihood of a significant damage to the plaintiff in the event of a failure to apply
such interim measures;
• the need to balance the interests of the parties concerned; and
• the need to prevent any public or thirdparty
interests from being infringed in applying
such interim measures.
In addition, when considering petitions for any interim measures, any court shall assess
whether such interim measures sought by the petitioner are related and proportionate to the
subject matter of the claim raised by the plaintiff and how such interim measures will secure
the actual achievement of the goals thereof as required by Article 90(2) of the Commercial
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.
Given the fact that the amount claimed to be recovered from the defendant is material to the
plaintiff and there are reasons to believe that the defendant has no sufficient amount of money
to pay it in full and the fact that the defendant challenged the claim (in its statement of
defence), the panel of judges of the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court finds it reasonable
to apply interim measures in the form of a seizure of all movable and immovable properties of
the defendant.
The firstinstance
court’s conclusions that the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence
showing that the defendant owns the properties mentioned in the petition and that there is no
evidence showing that the interim measures sought are proportionate to the plaintiff’s claims
are erroneous as the ownership and real value of those properties may be determined by a
bailiff during enforcement proceedings.
Annex 437
The legal position set forth in this Resolution is similar to the judicial practices of commercial courts in the Russian Federation in resolving similar disputes (see, e.g., Krasnodar Territorial Commercial Court Judgment No. A329816/2012 dated 23 November 2012, RF Supreme Commercial Court Ruling No. VAS10080/13 dated 31 June 2013, and RF Supreme Commercial Court Ruling No. VAS2350/14 dated 14 March 2014). The panel of judges of the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court rejects the defendant’s arguments that the properties (transmitters) are in possession of the plaintiff as evidenced by the relevant claims raised by the defendant as irrelevant to the subject matter of this dispute and indicating the existence of a dispute between the parties arising from the Agreement for the provision of telecommunication services. The panel of judges of the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court also finds the defendant’s arguments about the disproportionality of the interim measures sought groundless as the case file contains no information about any valuation of the properties as of the date of this trial. In addition, the application of said interim measures will not infringe the rights or legitimate interests of the defendant. According to Article 272(4)(3) of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, having considered an appeal against a ruling issued by a firstinstance commercial court, a commercial court may set such ruling aside in whole or in part and resolve the matter on its merits. Since the conclusions drawn up by the firstinstance court in its ruling are not supported by the found facts of the case and the firstinstance court incorrectly applied the applicable rules of procedural law, said ruling must be set aside and the plaintiff’s appeal must be satisfied. Pursuant to Articles 90, 91, 93, 96, 266, 271, 258, 270(3), 270(4), 272(4)(3) and 319 of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the Sevastopol Commercial Appeal Court hereby RESOLUTIONS That the appeal lodged by Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea be satisfied; That the ruling issued by the Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea on 30 June 2014 in case No. A83112/2014 be set aside; That the petition for interim measures lodged by Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in case No. A83112/2014 instituted on the statement of claim filed by Radio and TV Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea against Black Sea TV & Radio Company, seeking to recover a certain debt, be satisfied; That all immovable properties, namely nonresidential premises, and movable properties, namely technical and electronic facilities and equipment, owed by Black Sea TV & Radio Company (EGRPOU No. 22322589) having its registered office located at 4 Radio Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea as well as the following movable properties held by the following third parties, namely:
Annex 437
• ТV1000/
III TV transmitter located in the Simferopol Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (14 Studencheskaya Street, Simferopol);
• ТV1000/
IVV
TV transmitter located in the Kerch Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (144 Ordzhonikidze Street, Kerch);
• ТV1000/
IVV
TV transmitter located in the Sevastopol Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (96 Pobedy Street, Sevastopol);
• ТV1000/
IIII
TV transmitter located in the Krasnoperekopsk Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (105 Tavricheskaya Street, Krasnoperekopsk);
• ТV200/
IVV
TV transmitter located in the Yevpatoria Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (11 Razdolnoye Highway, Yevpatoria);
• ТV200/
IVV
TV transmitter located in the Novaya Petrovka Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (A. Yegudin Quarter, Petrovka, Krasnogvardeiskoye
District);
• ТV200/
IIII
TV transmitter located in the Alushta Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (13 SergeyevaTsenskogo
Street, Alushta);
• ТV200/
IIII
TV transmitter located in the Belogorsk Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (34 Tolstogo Street, Belogorsk);
• ТV200/
IIII
TV transmitter located in the Dzhankoy Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (20 Krainyaya Street, Dzhankoi);
• ТV200/
IIII
TV transmitter located in the Parkovoye Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (9 Parkovoye Highway, Yalta);
• ТV200/
IIII
TV transmitter located in the Sudak Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (33 Vostochnoye Highway, Sudak);
• ТV500
TV transmitter located in the Chernomorskoye Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (Chernomorskoye, 10th km of the ChernomorskoyeYevpatoria
Highway); and
• ТV100/
IVV
TV transmitter located in the Alupka Radio and TV Transmitting
Centre/Radio Relay Station (52 Lenina Street, Alupka),
be seized;
That the movable properties listed above be transferred to custody of Radio and TV
Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (EGRPOU No. 01190126)
having its registered office located at 13 Baturina Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea; and
That the Commercial Court of the Republic of Crimea issue a writ of execution.
Annex 437
This Resolution shall become effective as soon as it is issued and may be appealed in accordance with Article 9 of Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation No. 6FKZ dated 21 March 2014 “On the Admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the Establishment of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol as New Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation” in accordance with the rules set by Chapter 36 of the Commercial Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. This Resolution shall be enforced immediately in accordance with the procedure prescribed for the enforcement of commercial court decisions and may not be suspended when appealed. Y.V. Borisova, Presiding Judge K.V. Volkov, Judge V.I. Gontar, Judge
Annex 438
Slavyansk City Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 243/3885/14, Sentence, 5 November 2014
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 438
Excerpt
Translation
Slavyansk City Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 243/3885/14, Sentence, 5 November 2014,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/43033419.
Proceedings No.1kp/
243/305/2014
Case number 243/3885/14
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
On 05 November 2014, the Judicial Panel of Slavyansk City Court of Donetsk Region composed of:
The presiding judge, PERSON_1, and
Judges, PERSON_2 and PERSON_3;
with secretary: PERSON_4
with the participation of the prosecutor, PERSON_5 –
Victims: PERSON_6, PERSON_7
The accused: PERSON_8, PERSON_9, PERSON_10
Defense counsel for the accused: PERSON_11,
PERSON_12, PERSON_13
[….]
ESTABLISHED THAT:
[….]
Annex 438
On April 01, 2013, at approximately 15:00, PERSON_18 and PERSON_10 arrived together, in a car CHEVROLET AVEO SF69Y ZNG, license plate number_1, driven by PERSON_23, at the house located at ADDRESS_7, where PERSON_8 and a person the criminal case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings were present. After drinking alcohol together, PERSON_8, PERSON_18, PERSON_10, and the person the criminal case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, in the above car driven by PERSON_23 went to the place of residence of the person the criminal case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings at ADDRESS_8. On the same day, at approximately 16:00, PERSON_8, PERSON_9, the person the criminal case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, PERSON_10, and PERSON_23 arrived at the above address. Leaving the car on Donbasenergo Street between house No. 27 and the bank of the Kazenyi Torets River, the latter began to climb the stairs to the apartment ADDRESS_9 in the abovementioned house. At the same time, PERSON_8 had an intention to murder PERSON_23 in order to take possession of the car CHEVROLET AVEO SF69Y ZNG", license plate NUMBER 1 owned by PERSON_26, which at that time was used by PERSON_23. PERSON_8 informed PERSON_24 of his criminal intent and entered into a criminal conspiracy with him to carry out this intent. Following that, acting intentionally and in order to carry out his criminal intent to kill PERSON_23 for the purpose of seizing PERSON_26's car, PERSON_8 while in the hall of the apartment ADDRESS_10, acting together with PERSON_9, struck PERSON_23 in the occipital region of the head with a hammer, and PERSON_18 struck PERSON_23 four times in the chest with a sharp object, causing the latter to sit down on the sofa. At this time, the person the criminal case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings left the apartment, and PERSON_10 went to the kitchen, where stayed all the time. Then PERSON_18 stabbed PERSON_23 in the neck with scissors, and PERSON_8 struck PERSON_23 on the head with the butt of an ax. As a result, PERSON_23 fell to the floor near the sofa. Continuing his actions, PERSON_8 took a kitchen knife from the kitchen and stabbed PERSON_23 in the heart. By their intentional unlawful actions, PERSON_8 and PERSON_18 inflicted to the victim, PERSON_23, bruised wounds of the scalp, hemorrhages in the soft tissues of the head from the side of its inner surface in the wounds plane, an open traumatic brain injury in the form of multiple comminuted fracture of the skull cup, subdural hemorrhage, subarachnoid traumatic hemorrhage, stab wounds of the left half of the chest penetrating into the left pleural cavity, with damage to the left lung and hemothorax, stab wounds of the back of the neck and chest, and abrasion of the chest, which are classified as serious bodily injuries posing a threat to life at the time of their infliction. The victim, PERSON_23, died on the spot from the injuries; the cause of death was the open traumatic brain injury: multiple comminuted fracture of the skull cup, subdural hemorrhage, and subarachnoid traumatic hemorrhage. Following that, at about 21:00 on April 01, 2013, PERSON_8, motivated by greed, again conspired with PERSON_10 and PERSON_9 to illegally seize PERSON_26's car. At that time, in order to achieve their criminal intent, PERSON_8, together with PERSON_10 and PERSON_21, came to the car "CHEVROLET AVEO SF69Y ZNG", license plate number NUMBER_2, worth UAH 44,355, which was on Donbasenergo Street between house No. 27 and the bank of the Kazenyi Torets River, in the city of Slavyansk, and taking advantage of the fact that the car doors were unlocked, entered the cabin, where PERSON_8 got behind the wheel of the car, and PERSON_10, together with PERSON_21, got into the passenger seats. However, PERSON_8 was unable to start the engine, after which PERSON_18, with the aim of illegally seizing the vehicle, together with PERSON_10, began to push the vehicle driven by PERSON_8. After pushing the car about 510 meters and failing to start the engine, PERSON_8, PERSON_10, and PERSON_9 left the car and fled the crime scene.
Annex 438
Also, at about 22:00 on April 01, 2013, PERSON_10, who was in a state of intoxication and was together with PERSON_9 and PERSON_8, PERSON_23 in the apartment at ADDRESS_10, where he witnessed the premeditated murder of PERSON_23 committed by PERSON_9 together with PERSON_8. Realizing that an extremely serious crime was committed, PERSON_10, who had not promised them in advance to hide traces of the crime, deliberately helped PERSON_9 and PERSON_8 to get rid of the corpse of PERSON_23. Thus, PERSON_10, together with PERSON_8 and PERSON_9, took the corpse of PERSON_23 out of the apartment at ADDRESS_10 and, trying to hide it, moved it to the Kazenyi Torets River, where they drowned it in the water and thus destroyed the traces of the crime. Also, at about 21:00 on April 01, 2013, PERSON_17, who was in a state of intoxication and was near the car CHEVROLET AVEO SF69Y, ZNG", license plate number NUMBER_1, which was on Donbasenergo Street between house number 27 and the bank of the Kazeny Torets River, had an intention to secretly steal property of another. Following that, PERSON_18, acting intentionally and for motives of gain, taking advantage of the fact that the doors of the above car were not locked, reentered the cabin of the above car, from where he secretly stole property belonging to PERSON_23, namely, a Pioneer navigation device worth UAH 384.00, after which he fled the crime scene and disposed of the stolen property at his discretion, causing to PERSON_23 financing damage in the amount of UAH 384. [….] The Sentence was delivered and signed in the deliberations room in one counterpart. The presiding judge: PERSON_1 Judge PERSON_2 Judge PERSON_53

Annex 439
Central Municipal District Court of Gorlovka, Donetsk Region, Case No. 253/12580/13k,
Sentence, 18 April 2014
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 439
Excerpt
Translation
Central Municipal District Court of Gorlovka, Donetsk Region, Case No. 253/12580/13-k, Sentence,
18 April 2014, available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/38320990.
[…]
Judge: PERSON_1
18 April 2014
Case No. 253/12580/13k
SENTENCE
In the name of Ukraine
On April 18, 2014, the Central Municipal District Court of Gorlovka, Donetsk Region, composed of:
the presiding judge, PERSON_1,
with a secretary, PERSON_2,
with the participation of the prosecutor, PERSON_3,
and the accused, PERSON_4,
Having considered in an open court session in the city of Gorlovka the criminal case based on the charges
against
PERSON_4, INFORMATION_1, a native of the town of Yenakiyevo, Donetsk Region, a citizen of
Ukraine; with higher education; who is employed as first category engineer at the Capital Construction
Department of the Gorlovka City Council; married; not previously convicted; who is registered and resides
at the following address: ADDRESS_1 , .
in
connection with an offense stipulated in Article 367(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the court
HAS ESTABLISHED THAT:

Annex 440
Selydovo City Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 1kp/
242/341/14, Sentence,
24 December 2014
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 440
Excerpt
Translation
Selydovo City Court of Donetsk Region, Case No. 1-kp/242/341/14, Sentence, 24 December
2014, available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/38320990.
Proceedings No. 242/2571/14k
Case No. 1kp/
242/341/14
SENTENCE
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
December 24, 2014, city of Selydovo
Selydovo City Court of Donetsk
Region composed of:
the presiding judge PERSON_1,
with the secretary, PERSON_2,
Having considered in an open court session in courtroom No. 1 of the Selydovo City Court of
Donetsk Region criminal case No. 12014050500000560 against PERSON_3,
INFORMATION_1, a native of the village of Nizhnyaya Maktoma, Almetyevsky district,
Tatarstan, a citizen of Ukraine; completed secondary vocational education; unemployed; not
married; has a dependent daughter, PERSON_4, INFORMATION_2 , not previously convicted
as per the requirements of Article 89 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine; who is registered and
resides at the following address: ADDRESS_1, who
is accused under Article 146(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine;
with the participation of the parties to the criminal proceedings: prosecutor, PERSON_5, the
accused, PERSON_3, the defense counsel, PERSON_6, and the victim, PERSON_7
HAS ESTABLISHED THAT:
On March 18, 2014, at about 21:20 (the exact time has not been established), the accused,
PERSON_3, near the house at ADDRESS_2, in collusion with a person the case against whom
has been separated into separate proceedings, committed an illegal abduction of an individual
in collusion with a group of persons, which was accompanied by causing physical suffering to
the victim.
[…]
Annex 440
The person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings made a phone call to the victim, PERSON_7, with whom he was talking for some time via mobile phone. After he introduced himself as Ruslan, he learned that she was going from her place of work at the Central OreDressing Plant "Ukraine" in the city of Ukrainsk, Donetsk region, to her place of residence at: ADDRESS_3. Then PERSON_3 and the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, having previously distributed roles among themselves, without informing PERSON_8 of their further roles, agreed that PERSON_3 would observe PERSON_7 all the way from work to her home, and then force her to the car of the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, who would be waiting for them in his car near the Raduga store located on Oktyabrskaya Street in the city of Ukrainsk, Donetsk region. PERSON_3, picking up a metal chain that he had prepared in advance to overcome the resistance of PERSON_7, went to the territory of the Central OreDressing Plant "Ukraine", where he saw PERSON_7 leaving the checkpoint and followed her. When PERSON_7 was on her way, PERSON_3, at approximately 21:20 (the exact time has not been established), while near the house at ADDRESS_2, with the aim of illegally abducting PERSON_7, in collusion with the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, deliberately threw a metal chain around PERSON_7's neck, over her clothes, thereby inflicting physical pain to PERSON_7, and threatened her with further physical violence if she screamed. PERSON_7, fearing for her life and health, agreed to comply with the conditions of PERSON_3, who soon removed the chain from her neck, took her by the hand and led her to a place agreed with the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings. Since the movement of the victim, PERSON_7, was effectively restricted from that time on, the illegal collusive abduction committed by a group of persons was completed. While standing near the Raduga store located on Oktyabrskaya Street in Ukrainsk, Donetsk region, PERSON_3, threatening PERSON_7 with physical violence, pulled a hat she was wearing over her eyes, limiting her ability to see the environment, and ordered her to get into a car GAZ21 Volga, license plate No. NUMBER_1. After that, PERSON_7 got into the car in the rear passenger seat, while PERSON_3 sat on her right and PERSON_8 was already sitting on her left. Then PERSON_3 grabbed and held PERSON_7's hands with both hands, and the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, while being in the driver's seat tied the victim's hands with a jeans belt and pulled her hat over PERSON_7's eyes, thereby limiting her ability to see and move her hands. After that, the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings drove the car to the city of Selidovo, Donetsk region, where he dropped off PERSON_9 on the way and continued to drive. Stopping on Gaidar Street in the city of Selydovo, Donetsk region, the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, put PERSON_7 off the car, untied her eyes and hands, and then took her to his place of residence, at: ADDRESS_4, leaving PERSON_3 waiting for him in the car. After some time, the accused PERSON_3 stopped waiting for PERSON_10 and went home. […] He knows from his wife's words that on 18.03.2014, when she was standing near her house after work, she was approached by an unfamiliar elderly man who pulled a hat over her eyes, put a metal chain around her neck and forced her into a car. Then, in the same car, she was abducted and transported to the house of PERSON_11 in the town of Selidovo. Previously, he had had a conflict with PERSON_11's adopted son. PERSON_11's adopted son is serving a sentence in prison for inflicting bodily harm on him. Prior to this incident, PERSON_11 had
Annex 440
threatened him by phone that he would rape his wife. He believes that his wife's abduction was
related to PERSON_11's threats.
[…]
HAS RULED THAT:
PERSON_3 shall be found guilty as charged under Article 146(2) of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine and shall be sentenced to two years' imprisonment under Article 146(2) of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine.
Until the Sentence enters into legal force, the measure of restraint in respect of PERSON_3
shall remain the same, i.e. personal recognizance.
PERSON_3's term for serving punishment shall run from the moment of his detention.
[…]
Judge

Annex 441
Commentary of Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to OSCE A. K.
Lukashevich for the 6th Anniversary of the Reunification of Crimea with Russia, 18 March 2020
(translation)

Annex 441
Translation
Commentary of Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to OSCE A. K.
Lukashevich for the 6th Anniversary of the Reunification of Crimea with Russia, 18
March 2020.
Russian Federation commentary for the 6th anniversary of the reunification of
Crimea with Russia
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE ORGANISATION FOR
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
Commentary
of Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
A. K. LUKASHEVICH
18 March 2020
For the 6th anniversary of Crimea's reunification with Russia
March 18 marks the sixth anniversary of an important historical event for our country:
the reunification of Crimea with Russia.
Crimea today is a dynamically developing Russian region. The social and economic
measures taken by the federal and Crimean authorities since reunification to improve the quality
of life of the population have greatly contributed to this. The Federal Targeted Programme
"Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol",
which runs until 2022, has been implemented for the sixth year in a row and is worth about 1
trillion roubles. It aims to solve the peninsula's most pressing problems of water and energy
supply and to improve the transport infrastructure. Thus, in 2018, the highway section of the
Crimean Bridge was put into operation and a year later train services were opened. On 7 March
2020, the first rail bus went between Crimea and Krasnodar Krai over the bridge.
The Republic of Crimea's foreign trade turnover increased by almost 20% last year.
Interest grows in the Yalta Economic Forum every year. In 2014, the year of reunification, it
The OSCE Secretariat bears no responsibility for the content of this document
and circulates it without altering its content. The distribution by OSCE
Conference Services of this document is without prejudice to OSCE decisions, as
set out in documents agreed by OSCE participating States.
SEC.DEL/96/20
18 March 2020
Annex 441
was attended by 600 participants from 12 countries, while in 2019 it was attended by over 4,500 people from 89 countries. Another priority area is the preservation and development of the historical unity of the multinational people of the peninsula. This activity is effective and fruitful. According to a survey conducted in September 2019 by the AllRussian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, 89% of Crimeans said that there are no interethnic conflicts in Crimea. 93% described interethnic relations as friendly. Similar figures were obtained in the survey conducted by experts of the Ismail Gasprinskiy Crimean Media Centre. In addition, 81% of those interviewed in the regional survey assessed the changes that are now taking place as positive and noted that the situation had started to change for the better. In order to strengthen peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups, in December 2019, the Council for Interethnic and Interconfessional Relations was established by the Head of the Republic of Crimea. In addition to representatives of authorities, it includes heads of national cultural autonomies of Crimea, religious leaders, and members of the Public Chamber of Crimea. By the way, there are 22 registered national public organisations in Crimea, 80 local and 14 regional national cultural autonomies representing 19 nationalities. Mass awarenessraising events are held on a regular basis to promote national cultures, traditions and religions. For example, more than 300 ethnocultural events took place last year, 47 of which were held with the financial and organisational support of the Crimean authorities. Six national cultural associations received grants for projects to strengthen interethnic concord and preserve ethnocultural identity. They include the local Armenian national cultural autonomy of Simferopol city district, the Simferopol City Public Organisation "Jewish Student Cultural Centre "Hillel", the Regional National Cultural Autonomy of Greeks in the Republic of Crimea "Tavrida", the Public Organisation "Journalist Initiative", the Simferopol Jewish National Cultural Autonomy and the Regional Bulgarian National Cultural Autonomy of the Republic of Crimea named after Paisiy Hilendarski. The House of Peoples' Friendship" continues to operate in Simferopol, the capital of the Republic of Crimea, and Millet television channel and Vatan Sedasi radio station operate there as part of Public Crimean Tatar Television and Radio Company" operates. Considerable work is done by Ismail Gasprinskiy Media Centre, which is the main support platform for national print media. A Ukrainianlanguage information portal, Pereyaslavska Rada 2.0, is in operation. The successful operation of the abovementioned national institutions clearly demonstrates the fictitious character of statements about the "oppression" of journalists and media in this region of Russia. With the support of the Crimean authorities, national holidays and festivals are celebrated on a regular basis. For example, the Crimean Tatar "Khydyrlez", the Ukrainian "Obzhynki", and the "Blossom of Crimean Cultures" competition. Last year, over a dozen Days of National Culture took place, including Days of Armenian, Bulgarian, Korean, French, Crimean, Belarusian, Karaite, Ukrainian, Estonian, Czech, Crimean Tartar, Greek and Italian Culture. The Crimeans take an active part in them with great pleasure. Events are also held to commemorate the birthdays of famous personalities. The birthdays of the Ukrainian poets Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko are widely celebrated with the support of the Ukrainian Community of Crimea. This year, largescale celebrations will take place to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Crimean Tartar AmetKhan Sultan, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, an Honoured test pilot of the USSR. Thus, it is safe to say that representatives of all ethnic groups in multiethnic Crimea can enjoy all rights. Since Crimea's reunification with Russia, Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar have become official languages in the Republic of Crimea. There are various opportunities to study
Annex 441
these languages in schools and universities. The study of native languages takes various forms:
they are studied as a subject, at an advanced level, on an elective basis and in extracurricular
activities. In accordance with the Law on Education, Crimeans choose a language of instruction
or study for their children by submitting a written application.
The tourist flow is growing. The total number of tourists that visited Crimea in 2019
was 7.3 million. This is 9.3% more than in 2018. At the same time, the number of Ukrainian
citizens visiting the Russian peninsula has been growing every year. While in 2014 and 2015
there were about 400,000 of them, in 2019 there were more than a million.
These facts confirm the openness and allround
development of this Russian region. It
is now safe to say that the integration of the peninsula into the socioeconomic
and legal space
of Russia is complete. Following their historic decision on reunification, the Crimeans can fully
enjoy their rights in accordance with the Constitution and the international human rights
commitments of the Russian Federation, including those undertaken through the OSCE.
The positive changes taking place were detailed in statements made by representatives
of Crimea who were speaking at the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting
(Warsaw, 1627
September 2019). We urge all those interested in the situation in this region of
our country to draw on firsthand
information. We once again invite representatives of OSCE
participating States, the OSCE's executive structures, parliamentarians and NGOs to visit the
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in accordance with the procedures established in Russia.

Annex 442
Judicial Statistics of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences, Article 20.1 of the
Code of Administrative Offences, 2021
(translation)

Annex 442
Translation
Judicial Statistics of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences, Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, 2021, available
at: https://stat.апи-пресс.рф/stats/adm/t/31/s/1.
JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Administrative Offences
Data for Selected Offences
Year Description Cases
handled
Those
penalised
Proportion
of those
penalised
Those
acquitted
Proportion
of those
acquitted
Those
penalised
by a fine
Amount
of fines
(thousand
roubles)
Administrative
arrest
Deprivation of
right/
disqualification
Expulsion Suspension
of activities
Confiscation Average
amount of fine
(thousand
roubles)
2021
Disorderly
conduct (20.1,
Code of
Administrative
Offences)
157,630 149,658 94.0 1,021 0.0 70,815 61,540 78,731 0 0 0 0 0

Annex 443
Administration of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Resolution No. 128 “On
Approval of the Regulations on the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Mass Events in the
Territory of the Municipality of City District of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea”,
23 March 2015
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 443
Excerpt
Translation
Administration of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Resolution No. 128
“On Approval of the Regulations on the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Mass
Events in the Territory of the Municipality of City District of Simferopol of the Republic
of Crimea”, 23 March 2015, available at: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/446299067.
Resolution of the Administration of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea
“On Approval of the Regulations on the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Mass
Events in the Territory of the Municipality of City District of Simferopol of the Republic
of Crimea” No. 128 dated 23 March 2015.
[…]
3. Procedure for Organizing and Holding Mass Events
3.2. A joint mass event with a common theme and a single scenario plan may be held if
such event is initiated by public associations, individuals and sectoral (functional) bodies of
the Administration of the City of Simferopol.
[…]

Annex 444
Law of Ukraine No 2704VIII
“On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the
State Language”, 25 April 2019
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 444
Excerpt
Translation
Law of Ukraine No 2704-VIII “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as
the State Language”, 25 April 2019, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-
19#Text.
[…]
LAW OF UKRAINE
On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as
State Language
(Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada (BVR), 2019, No. 21, p.81)
Article 9. Persons Obliged to Speak the State Language and Use It in the Performance of
Official Duties
1. The following persons shall be obliged to speak the state language and use it in the
performance of their official duties:
1) The President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the First Vice Prime Minister of
Ukraine, Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine, other members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,
first deputy ministers and deputy ministers, heads of other central executive bodies and their
deputies, the Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine and his deputies, the Secretary of
the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and his deputies, the Head of the Security
Service of Ukraine and his deputies, the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine and
his deputies, the General Prosecutor and his deputies, heads of regional and local prosecutor's
offices, head of the Specialized AntiCorruption
Prosecutor's Office and his deputies, members of
the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine, Chairman and other members of the Accounting
Chamber, Chairman of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, other authorized state officials
of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, heads of territorial offices of the Antimonopoly
Committee of Ukraine, members of the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption, members
of the National Commission on State Language Standards, members of the Central Election
Commission, members of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting,
members of national commissions for regulation of natural monopolies, members of the National
Securities and Stock Market Commission, members of the National Commission for State
Regulation of Financial Services Markets, members of other state collegial bodies, the Head of the
State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine and his deputies, the Head of
the State Property Fund of Ukraine and his deputies, permanent representatives of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and of the President of Ukraine in the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the Director of the National AntiCorruption
Bureau of Ukraine,
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Commissioner for Human Rights and his representatives, the
Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and his deputies, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and his deputies, the ministers of the Autonomous
Annex 444
Republic of Crimea, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and his deputies. {Clause 1 of part one of Article 9 as amended by Law No. 113-IX dated 19.09.2019} 2) deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, deputies of local councils, officials of local selfgovernment bodies; 3) civil servants; 4) heads of local state administrations, their first deputies and deputies; 5) employees of the National Bank of Ukraine; 6) officers performing military service on a contract basis; 7) commanding staff (senior and middle commanders) of the National Police, other law enforcement and intelligence agencies and officials of other agencies who are awarded special ranks; 8) persons holding the rank of private and warrant and noncommissioned officers of the National Police, other law enforcement and intelligence agencies and other bodies to whom special ranks are assigned; 9) prosecutors; 9-1 ) judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine; {Part one of Article 9 is supplemented with paragraph 9-1 under Law No. 2846-IX of 13.12.2022} 10) judges elected or appointed in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine who administer justice on a professional basis, members and disciplinary inspectors of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, and members of the High Council of Justice; 11) attorneys; 12) notaries; 13) heads of educational institutions of all forms of ownership; 14) teaching, academic and research staff, except for foreigners or stateless persons who are invited to educational and/or research institutions and work on a temporary basis as teaching, academic or research workers or teachers of a foreign language; 15) medical workers at state and municipal healthcare institutions; 16) officials and officers of enterprises, institutions and organisations of state and municipal forms of ownership not specified in subparagraphs 1 through 15 of part one of this Article, except for persons who are not citizens of Ukraine. 2. Persons running for election or appointment to the positions specified in part one of this Article shall be required to speak the state language. Article 21. State Language in the Sphere of Education 1. The language of the educational process in educational institutions shall be the state language. The state guarantees to every citizen of Ukraine the right to receive formal education at all levels (preschool, general secondary, vocational (including technical), preuniversity and higher
Annex 444
vocational education), as well as outofschool
and postgraduate education in the state language in
state and municipal educational institutions.
Persons belonging to national minorities of Ukraine are guaranteed the right to study in
municipal educational institutions for preschool
and primary education in the language of the
respective national minority of Ukraine, along with the state language. This right shall be realised
by creating separate classes (groups) with instruction in the language of the relevant national
minority of Ukraine, along with the state language, in accordance with the law and shall not apply
to classes (groups) with instruction in the state language.
Persons belonging to the indigenous peoples of Ukraine are guaranteed the right to study in
communal preschool
and general secondary education institutions in the language of the
respective indigenous people of Ukraine, along with the state language. This right shall be realised
by creating separate classes (groups) with instruction in the language of the respective indigenous
people of Ukraine, along with the state language, in accordance with the law and shall not apply
to classes (groups) with instruction in the state language.
Persons belonging to indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine are guaranteed
the right to study the language of the respective indigenous people or national minority of Ukraine
in communal general secondary education institutions or through national cultural societies.
Persons with hearing impairments are guaranteed the right to study in sign language and to
learn Ukrainian sign language.
2. Educational institutions shall ensure compulsory study of the state language, in particular,
vocational (including technical), vocational preuniversity
and higher education institutions, to the
extent allowing for professional activity in the chosen field using the state language.
Persons belonging to indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine and foreigners
and stateless persons shall be provided with appropriate conditions for learning the state language.
3. The language of an external independent assessment based on the results of complete
secondary education and of entrance examinations shall be the state language, except for an
external independent assessment in relation to foreign languages.
4. The state shall promote the study of languages of international communication, primarily
English, in state and municipal educational institutions.
5. In educational institutions, in accordance with their educational programme, one or more
disciplines may be taught in two or more languages: the state language, English, or other official
languages of the European Union.
6. At the request of applicants for vocational (including technical), professional preuniversity
and higher education, educational institutions shall create opportunities for them to study the
language of an indigenous people or national minority of Ukraine as a separate discipline.
7. Teaching of a foreign language in educational institutions and foreign language courses
shall be conducted in the respective foreign language or state language.
8. The state shall facilitate the establishment and operation of educational institutions abroad
where education is provided in the state language or where the state language is studied.
9. The specifics of the use of languages in certain types and at certain levels of education shall
be determined by special laws.
Article 22. State Language in the Field of Science
1. The language of science in Ukraine shall be the state language.
Annex 444
2. Scientific publications shall be published in the state language, English and/or other official languages of the European Union. In the case of publication in English and/or other official languages of the European Union, the materials published shall be accompanied by an abstract and a list of keywords in the state language. 3. Dissertations of persons obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Doctor of Arts, or Doctor of Sciences or, in cases provided for by law, scientific papers in the event of defence of scientific achievements published in the form of a monograph or a set of articles in domestic and/or international peerreviewed professional publications, as well as abstracts and reviews of opponents, shall be written in the state language or in English. For articles published in international professional journals in languages other than English, the Special Academic Council may, by its decision, oblige the author to provide a translation or a brief abstract of the article in the state language. 4. Public defence of a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy or Doctor of Arts, public defence of scientific achievements in the form of a dissertation or a published monograph, or a set of articles for the degree of Doctor of Sciences shall be carried out in the state language or, at the request of the applicant, in English. 5. The language of public scientific events (scientific conferences, round tables, symposia, workshops, scientific schools, etc.) may be the state language and/or English. The language of public scientific events on the subject of a particular foreign language (linguistics) or foreign literature may be the relevant foreign language. If the scientific event is held in a foreign language, the organisers shall so inform those attending the event in advance. In such case, translation into the state language shall not be mandatory. 6. Under no circumstances may a person participating in any public scientific event be deprived of the right to use the state language. Article 24. State Language in the Field of Television and Radio Broadcasting 1. Broadcasting organisations shall broadcast in the state language. The Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting" establishes the mandatory (minimum) volume of broadcasting in the state language for television and radio broadcasting organisations of certain categories. Article 25. State Language in Print Media 1. Print media in Ukraine shall be published in the state language. Print media may be published in languages other than the state language, provided that the respective edition in a foreign language is published simultaneously with such edition in the state language. All language versions shall be published under the same title and correspond to each other in terms of content, volume and printing method, and their editions shall be numbered using the same publication numbers and be published on the same day. 2. The distribution of print media published in languages other than the state language by subscription shall be allowed if their founders (cofounders) provide the possibility of subscribing to the same publication in the state language in Ukraine. 3. The founders (cofounders) of print media shall produce, publish and deliver a mandatory copy of documents (issues of print media) in the state language in the manner prescribed by law. 4. In each place of distribution of print media, print media in the state language shall account for at least 50 per cent of the titles of print media distributed in that place.
Annex 444
In the place of distribution of print media published in a language other than the state
language, such mass media shall be distributed in the state language.
5. The requirements of parts one and two and paragraph two of part four of this Article shall
not apply to print media published exclusively in the Crimean Tatar language, other languages of
indigenous peoples of Ukraine, English, or any other official language of the European Union,
regardless of whether they contain texts in the state language, and to scientific publications, the
language of which is determined by Article 22 of this Law.
In such case, a mandatory copy of the documents provided for in part three of this Article
shall be produced, published and delivered in the respective language.

Annex 445
Law of Ukraine No. 3759XII
“On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, 21 December 1993
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 445
Excerpt
Translation
Law of Ukraine No. 3759-XII “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, 21 December 1993,
available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3759-12#Text.
LAW OF UKRAINE
On Television and Radio Broadcasting
(Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1994, No. 10, p. 43)
[…]
The broadcaster shall have no right to distribute audiovisual
works that: deny or
justify the criminal nature of the communist totalitarian regime of 19171991
in
Ukraine or the criminal nature of the National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regime;
create a positive image of persons who held senior positions in the Communist
Party (the position of the secretary of a district committee or a higher position), the
highest authorities and governments of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR (USSR), or
other union and autonomous Soviet republics (except in cases related to the
development of the Ukrainian science and culture) or employees of Soviet state
security agencies; or justify the activities of Soviet state security agencies, the
establishment of Soviet power in the territory of Ukraine or in certain
administrative and territorial units or the persecution of participants in the struggle
for independence of Ukraine in the XX century.

Annex 446
Law of Ukraine No. 1616IX
“On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”, 1 July 2021
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 446
Excerpt
Translation
Law of Ukraine No 1616-IX “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”, 1 July 2021, available at:
https://ips.ligazakon.net/document/view/T211616?utm_source=jurliga.ligazakon.net&utm_med
ium=news&utm_content=jl03&_ga=2.132976974.1354839119.1668871241-
51954790.1668871241
LAW OF UKRAINE
On the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine
The Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, in order to promote the consolidation and development of
the Ukrainian nation, as well as the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious
identity of all indigenous peoples of Ukraine, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and
the laws of Ukraine, international treaties of Ukraine ratified by the Verkhovnaya Rada of
Ukraine on the basis of the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, relying on
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and taking into consideration Resolution of the
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 1140-VII "On the Statement of the Verkhovnaya Rada of
Ukraine on Guaranteeing the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People within the Ukrainian State"
dated 20 March 2014, adopts this Law defining the rights of indigenous peoples of Ukraine and
the specifics of their implementation.
[…]
Article 1: The Concept of Indigenous People of Ukraine
1. An indigenous people of Ukraine is an autochthonous ethnos that has formed in the territory of
Ukraine and is a carrier of a distinctive language and culture, has traditional, social, cultural or
representative bodies, selfidentifies
as an indigenous people of Ukraine, constitutes an ethnic minority
within its population and does not have its own state formation outside Ukraine.
2. The indigenous peoples of Ukraine that formed in the territory of the Crimean Peninsula are the
Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks.
3. The representative bodies of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine are relevant representative
institutions established by the indigenous peoples, which, in accordance with the Constitution and the
laws of Ukraine, are empowered to represent such indigenous peoples and make decisions on their
behalf (hereinafter referred to as representative bodies).

Annex 447
Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg, Case No. 2a863/
22, Decision, 15 March 2022
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 447
Excerpt
Translation
Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg, Case No. 2a-863/22, Decision, 15 March
2022.
сase No. 2a863/
22
Unique case identifier 78RS000301202200052212
15 March
2022
DECISION
In the name of the Russian Federation
Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg represented by the presiding judge
Matusyak T.P.,
with the secretary Romanova A.K,
Having heard in public proceedings the administrative case on the administrative claim of the
Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information
Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol against the
founder of the print media newspaper "Krymskoe Vremya" on the recognition of the
registration of the mass media outlet invalid.
[…]
By virtue of an Article 15 of the Law of the Russian Federation dated December 27, 1991
No.21241
"On Mass Media" the registration of a mass media outlet can be annulled only by
the court through administrative legal proceedings on the application of the registering body in
the event of:
1) if the information submitted by the applicant to the registering body in accordance
with an Article 10 of this Law does not correspond to actual information;
2) if the mass media outlet is not published or not broadcast for more than one year;
3) if the charter of the editorial office or the contract replacing it has not been sent to the
registering body within three months from the date of first publication (broadcast) of the
mass media outlet;
4) in case of reregistration
of a mass media outlet.
[…]
Thus, based on the totality of evidence presented in the case materials, the court considers
reasonable the argument of the administrative plaintiff that the mass media outlet the
newspaper "Krymskoe Vremya" is not distributed, that is, it is not published (not broadcast).
This is the basis for satisfaction of the administrative claim.
Considering all the aforementioned and guided by Articles 150, 175180
of the
Administrative Court Procedure Code of Russian Federation, the court
HELD:
To declare the registration of the printed media newspaper "Krymskoe Vremya"
(certificate of registration of a mass media outlet series PI No. TU 9100369,
issued by the
Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information
Annex 447
Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol dated 26.07.2019) invalid. The judgement may be appealed to the Saint Petersburg City Court within one month from the date of the final issuance of the judgement. Judge: [signature] T.P. Matusiak
Annex 448 Evpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No.2a1433/2021 Decision, 22 September 2021 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 448
Excerpt
Translation
Evpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No.2a-1433/2021, Decision, 22 September
2021.
Unique case identifier No.91RS000901202100237987
case No.2a1433/
2021
22 September 2021 City of Evpatoria
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Evpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea presided by judge Kamenkova I.A. with
the secretary Osminina N.V., having heard in public proceedings the administrative case on the
administrative claim of the Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications,
Information Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol
against the founder of the printed media newspaper "Obozreniye Krymskikh Del" Nikityuk
Alla
Nikolaevna to invalidate the registration of the printed media,
[…]
By virtue of an Article 15 of the Law of the Russian Federation dated December 27, 1991
No.21241
"On Mass Media", the registration of a mass media outlet can be invalidated only by a
court through administrative proceedings at the request of the registering body in case if the outlet
is not published (not broadcast) for more than one year.
[…]
THE COURT HELD:
To satisfy the administrative claim of the Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol against the founder of the printed media newspaper "Obozreniye Krymskikh Del" Nikityuk
Alla Nikolaevna to invalidate the registration of the printed media.
To declare the registration of a mass media outlet, a newspaper "Obozreniye Krymskikh Del"
series PI No.TU 9100008
of July 31, 2014, issued by The Department of the Federal Service for
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media in the Republic of Crimea
and the Сity of Sevastopol to the founder of the print media newspaper "Obozreniye Krymskikh Del"Nikityuk
Alla Nikolaevna invalid.
To charge the founder of the print media newspaper "Obozreniye Krymskikh Del" Alla
Nikityuk with a state fee of 2,000 (two thousand) roubles 00 kopecks to the local budget.
The decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea through the
Evpatoria City Court of the Republic of Crimea within one month from the date of its rendering.
The judge [signature] I.A. Kamenkova

Annex 449 Topchikhinsky District Court of the Altai Krai, Case No. 2a161/2021, Decision, 4 June 2021 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 449
Translation
Topchikhinsky District Court of the Altai Krai, Case No. 2a-161/2021, Decision, 4 June 2021.
Case No. 2a161/
2021
22RS005301202100018451
DECISION
In the name of the Russian Federation
4 June 2021 Topchikha village
Topchikhinsky District Court of the Altai Krai composed of:
presiding judge Kernechishina I.M.
with the secretary Vystavkyna E.A,
having heard in public proceedings the administrative case on the administrative claim of the
Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and
Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol against Gromov Sergey Borisovich
to recognise the registration of the radio channel "Yevpatoria.FM" invalid,
[…]
By virtue of paragraph 2 of section 1 of Article 15 of the above mentioned Law the registration
of the mass media outlet can be declared invalid only through administrative proceedings at the
request of registering body in case if the outlet is not published (not broadcast) for more than one
year.
[…]
According to the statement of the branch of Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The General
Radio Frequency Centre" in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol dated 18.12.2020 as a result of
the monitoring of the frequency band from 23.12.2020 to 25.12.2020 88108
MHz band in the cities
of Alushta, Armyansk, Dzhankoy, Yevpatoria, Kerch, Simferopol, Sudak, Feodosia, Yalta,
Krasnoperekopsk, the operation of "Yevpatoria.FM" radio channel was not detected. Search engines
"Yandex" and "Google" did not contain information about the broadcast of this radio channel. There
is an indication that the media have not been broadcast for more than a year.
[…]
THE COURT HELD:
To satisfy the administrative claim.
To invalidate the registration of the radio channel "Yevpatoria.FM" (registration certificate EL
No. TU9100115
of 26.02.2015, issued by the Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol).
The judgment may be appealed to the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Altai Krai
Court through the Topchikhinsky District Court within one month from the date of its rendering.
The judge [signature] I. M. Kernechishina

Annex 450 Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a1105/2022, Decision, 21 February 2022 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 450
Excerpt
Translation
Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Case No.2a-
1105/2022, Decision, 21 February 2022.
Case No.2a1105/
2022
Unique case identifier 91R5000301202100729513
DECESION
IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
21 February 2022 City of Simferopol
The Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, as composed of: the
presiding judge Gordienko
O.L., with the secretary Ilchenko
E.S., having heard in public
proceedings the administrative case on the administrative claim of the Department of the Federal
Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of the
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol against the founder of the radio channel "Russkiy
Kurier" Limited
Liability Company "Krymskaya informacionnaya kompaniya" to recognise the
registration of the mass media outlet invalid,
[…]
By virtue of paragraph 2 of section 1 of Article 15 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On
Mass Media" the registration of the mass media outlet can be declared invalid only through
administrative proceedings at the request of registering body in case if the outlet is not published
(not broadcast) for more than one year.
[…]
The fact that the radio channel is not broadcast for more than one year is also confirmed by the
statement of the branch of Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The General Radio Frequency Centre"
in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol No10921
dated 25.10.2021, drawn up on the basis of the
act of radio control measures No.91428800
dated 25.10.2021, and on the basis of checking the radio
broadcasting through telecommunications (through the Internet).
Thus, on the basis of planned systematic observation in relation to the aforementioned mass
media outlet in the implementation of state supervision of compliance with the legislation of the
Russian Federation in the sphere of mass information and mass communications, television
broadcasting and radio broadcasting, there were signs of the absence of broadcasting of the radio
channel for more than one year.
[…]
THE COURT HELD:
To satisfy the administrative claim of the Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol.
To invalidate the registration of the media outlet radio
channel "Russkiy Kurier", certificate
of registration series EL No.FS7760748,
issued on 09.02.2015 by the Department of the Federal
Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of the
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.
Annex 450
The decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea through Central District Court of the city of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea within one month from the date of its final rendering. The judge [signature] O.A. Gordienko The judgment is rendered by the court in final form on 09.03.2022 (minus the nonworking days).
Annex 451 Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a4159/16 Decision, 30 September 2016 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 451
Excerpt
Translation
Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a-4159/16,
Decision, 30 September 2016.
Case 2a4159/
16
DECISION
IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
On September 30, 2016 the Central District Court of the City of Simferopol of Republic of
Crimea composed of:
presiding judge Karalash Z.Y.,
with the secretary Borovikova I.Y,
with the presence of the representative of the administrative plaintiff Pospekhova E.N.,
having heard in public proceedings the case on the administrative claim of Federal Service for
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media against the LLC
"RosKrymMedia Production" to invalidate the certificate of registration of the mass media outlet
"Izumrudnaya volna" issued by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information
Technology and Mass Media series El No. FS 7764342
dated 25.12.2015,
[…]
By virtue of the provisions of Article 15 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Mass
Media", a registration certificate for a media outlet can be invalidated only by court through
administrative proceedings at the request of the registering body in case if the outlet is not published
(not broadcast) for more than one year.
Taking into account that it was established in the court hearing that the mass media outlet
"Izumrudnaya volna" has not been broadcast for more than one year, the claims of the administrative
plaintiff are to be satisfied.
Guided by Articles 175180
of the Administrative Court Procedure Code of the Russian
Federation, the court
held:
The administrative claim of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications,
Information Technology and Mass Media to be satisfied.
To declare invalid the registration certificate of the mass media outlet "Izumrudnaya volna"
series El No. FS 7764342
dated 25.12.2015, issued by the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media.
The decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea through the
Central District Court of Simferopol within one month from the date the date of its rendering in final
form.
The presiding judge [signature] Z.Y.
Karalash
The decision in final form was rendered on 5 October 2016.

Annex 452 Yalta City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a2964/2022, Decision, 29 July 2022 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 452
Excerpt
Translation
Yalta City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a-2964/2022, Decision, 29 July 2022.
Case No. 2a2964/
2022
91R5002401202200344975
DECISION
In the name of the Russian Federation
29 July 2022 City of Yalta
The Yalta City Court of the Republic of Crimea as composed of: presiding judge Altunin A.V.,
with the secretary Tolstikova E.M.,
having heard in public proceedings the administrative case on the claim of the Federal Service
for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media against the founder
of the print media almanac "ALMNACH "YALTINSKIY LUK / YALTA SMOTRI" ALMANAC
YALTA ONION / YALTA LOOK" FedorovMoskvitin
Vadim Gennadievich on the recognition of
the registration of the mass media outlet invalid.
[…]
By virtue of paragraph 2 of section 1 of Article 15 of the Law of Russian Federation dated
December 27, 1991 No. 21241
the registration of the mass media outlet can be declared invalid only
through administrative proceedings at the request of registering body in case if the outlet is not
published (not broadcast) for more than one year.
During the period from 05.05.2022 to 06.05.2022 the Department of the Federal Service for
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of the Republic of Crimea
and the City of Sevastopol conducted a planned systematic observation of the printed mass media
outlet almanac
"ALMNACH "YALTINSKIY LUK / YALTA SMOTRI" ALMANAC YALTA
ONION / YALTA LOOK" for compliance with the legal prerequisites regarding mass media.
In the course of the inspection, it was found that there was a violation of the prerequisites of
the Law of the Russian Federation "On Mass Media" dated December 27, 1991 No. 21241
which
was expressed in the fact that the printed mass media outlet almanac
"ALMNACH "YALTINSKIY
LUK / YALTA SMOTRI" ALMANAC YALTA ONION / YALTA LOOK" has not been published
for more than one year. The printed edition was not released for retail sale, and no mandatory copies
of the printed edition were supplied to "ITARTASS"
Federal State Unitary Enterprise and the
"Russian State Library" Federal State Budgetary Institution. A search on the Internet resources
Yandex and Google revealed that the print mass media outlet is not active.
The above circumstances are confirmed by the report of the leading specialist of the Department
of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media
of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol E.E. Zubenko dated 06.05.2022. No. 464dn,
the statement of the branch of Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The General Radio Frequency
Centre" in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol dated 21.04.2022 No.04422,
letters of "ITARTASS"
Federal State Unitary Enterprise dated 29.04.2022 No.984izh/
22 and "Russian State Library"
Federal State Budgetary Institution dated 27.04.2022 No.RKN9852022.
[…]
Since the founder of the print mass media outlet is not exercising his right to produce and
disseminate mass information, the court, guided by section 12 of Article 8, by paragraph 2 of section
Annex 452
1 of Article 15 of the Law of Russian Federation dated December 27, 1991 No. 21241 recognizes the registration of this mass media outlet as invalid. […] the Court held: to satisfy the claim of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media. to declare the registration of the print media almanac "ALMNACH "YALTINSKIY LUK / YALTA SMOTRI" ALMANAC YALTA ONION / YALTA LOOK" (certificate of registration dated 13.11.2017, series PI No. FS: 7771437) invalid.
Annex 453 RG, The Supreme Court of Ukraine did not recognize as Nazi the symbols of the SS Division “Galichina” (6 December 2022) (translation)

Annex 453
Translation
RG, The Supreme Court of Ukraine did not recognize as Nazi the symbols of the SS Division
“Galichina” (6 December 2022), available at: https://rg.ru/2022/12/06/verhovnyj-sud-ukrainyne-
priznal-nacistskoj-simvoliku-divizii-ss-galichina.html.
Ukraine's Supreme Court does not recognise symbols of the SS
division "Galicia" as Nazi
Maria Krylova
In May 2020, the Kiev District Administrative Court ruled that the conclusion of the Ukrainian
Institute of National Remembrance that the symbols of the 14th Grenadier Division of the SS
"Galicia" troops were not Nazi was illegal. In the autumn of the same year, the court of appeal
reversed the decision of the first instance.
And now the Supreme Court of Ukraine has recognised the decision of the court of appeal as
lawful. The lawyer Vyacheslav Yakubenko representing interests of the Ukrainian Institute of
National Memory said that symbols of division "Galicia" were not Nazi, i.e. were not banned in
Ukraine.
The SS division "Galicia" was created in the spring of 1943 from among Ukrainian nationalists. Its
fighters were involved in punitive operations and the killing of Soviet soldiers and civilians.
The SS troops, of which the "Galicia" Division was a part, were declared a criminal organisation by
the Nuremberg Tribunal. Nevertheless, in some Ukrainian cities there are streets named after
"Galicia". The last Ukrainian SS man from this division died in 2020 and was buried with honours
in Ivano-Frankovsk.

Annex 454
Ukraine’s General Attorney Office Letter No. 19/1/1-24020-19, 9 February 2022
(translation)

Annex 454
Translation
Ukraine’s General Attorney Office Letter No. 19/1/1-24020-19, 9 February 2022.
PROCURATURE OF UKRAINE
PROSECUTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE
__________________________________________________________________
Ulitsa Reznitskaya, 13/15, Kiev, 01011; fax: (044) 280-26-03
e-mail: [email protected], web: www.gp.gov.ua; EDRPOU 0034051
09.02.2022 No. 19/1/1-24020-19
In response to: 82/2-1382-2020 of 23.09.2021
To: Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation,
Chief Directorate of International Legal Cooperation
Address: B.Dmitrovka, 14a, Moscow, Russia, GSP-3, 125993
The Prosecutor General’s Office hereby sends materials collected in the process of
fulfilling the request for legal assistance in case No.11802007703000377.
At the same time please be informed that items 3 and 4 of the request cannot be fulfilled
based on Art.19 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and
Criminal Matters (1993) and Art.2 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (1959).
Annex: on 13 pages.
Acting Head of the Directorate of Legal Assistance,
Department of International Legal Cooperation (signature) Oleg Gladkikh
(Round Seal)

Annex 455
Russian Federation General Attorney, Request for assistance No. 82/2-1382-2020,
23 September 2021
(translation)

Annex 455
Translation
Russian Federation General Attorney, Request for assistance No. 82/2-1382-2020,
23 September 2021.
Prosecutor General’s Office
of Ukraine
Department of International Legal Cooperation
Address: Ulitsa Reznitskaya, 13/15, Kiev, 01011
23.09.2021 82/2-1382-2020
The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the
Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters
dated 22.01.1993, International Convention on Countering the Financing of Terrorism dated
09.12.1999 and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, dated 14.12.1973, hereby requests legal
assistance in criminal case No.11802007703000377 concerning a crime punishable under
Art.360.2 (Assault on a representative of a foreign state, or on a staff member of an international
organisation that enjoys international protection) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
The circumstances of the crime in question and the requested legal assistance are set out
in the attached Annex.
Please fulfill the request in the shortest possible time and send collected materials to the
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation at: Ulitsa B. Dmitrovka, 15a, Moscow,
Russia, GSP-3, 125993.
On all issues that may arise in the process of handling the request please contact us at email
[email protected].
We thank you in advance for cooperation and hereby confirm our readiness to assist the
competent authorities of Ukraine in similar or any other matters in accordance with the
international treaties of which Russia and Ukraine are participants, as well as the law of the
Russian Federation.
Annex: on 14 pages.
Deputy Head of the Chief Directorate of International Legal Cooperation and Head of the
Department of Legal Assistance and Law Enforcement Cooperation
(signature) P.A. Litvishko
Annex 455
Ex. by O.V.Salnikova, tel. +7(495) 986-34-41
Annex 455
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (IC OF RUSSIA)
________________________________________________________________________
Tekhnicheskiy Pereulok, 2 Moscow, Russia, 105005
24.08.2021 No. 11802007703000377
To: Competent authorities of Ukraine
REQUEST
for legal assistance
The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation is investigating criminal case
No.11802007703000377 initiated 27.11.2018 in respect of unidentified persons suspected of
committing a crime under Art. 360.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, based on
the fact of an assault on the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kharkov (hereinafter
– the ‘Consulate’).
The investigation has found out that on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019, unidentified persons,
including among them participants of Ukrainian organisations ‘National Corps’ and ‘People’s
Militia’, acting as a group upon prior collusion, for the purpose of complicating international
relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, twice committed assaults on the building
of the Consulate at: Ukraine, Kharkov, Ulitsa Olminskogo, 22, in the course of which they threw
pyrotechnic products, smoke bombs, eggs and other items into its territory thereby disrupting the
normal course of work of a Russian foreign institution on said days.
The aforementioned persons definitely knew that the Consulate building in Kharkov
enjoyed international protection and immunities in accordance with Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations dated 18.04.1961 and Art.1 of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents (1973).
The statutes of limitation for the crimes under Art. 360.2 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation, in accordance with the law of the Russian Federation, have not yet lapsed.
In accordance with Art.12.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, foreign
citizens that do not reside permanently in the Russian Federation, having committed a crime
beyond the Russian Federation boundaries, are subject to criminal liability under the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation in cases provided for in an international treaty of which the
Russian Federation is a party, or another international document comprising obligations
recognized by the Russian Federation in the sphere of relations regulated by this Code, if foreign
citizens that do not reside permanently in the Russian Federation have not been convicted in the
foreign country and in respect of whom criminal action is initiated in the Russian Federation.
In accordance with Art.3 of the Federal Law No.35-FZ dated 06.03.2006 “On Countering
Terrorism”, terrorist activity is one that comprises, inter alia, organization, planning, preparation,
financing and carrying out of a terrorist act, propaganda of terrorist ideas, dissemination of
materials or information calling for terrorist activity or substantiating or justifying the need for
such activity.
According to Art.24.1 of the Federal Law No.35-FZ dated 06.03.2006 “On Countering
Terrorism”, the formation and activities of organizations whose goals or actions are aimed at
propaganda, justification or support of terrorism or commission of crimes under Arts. 205, 206,
208, 211, 277-280, 282.1, 282.2 and 360 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, are
prohibited in the Russian Federation.
The actions of unidentified persons who took part in the assaults on the Consulate related
to the organization, planning, preparation, financing and carrying out of the assaults, fall under
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the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973) and International Convention on Countering the Financing of Terrorism (1999), that provide, inter alia, for sanctions against persons financing terrorist crimes aimed at diplomatic or consulate representative organizations. The investigation has found out that one of the participants of the aforesaid actions of 26.11.2028 and 08.02.2019 near the Consulate was one Konstantin Vitalyevich Nemichev, citizen of Ukraine, born 10.01.1996 in Kharkov, Ukraine. The preliminary investigation bodies of the Russian Federation have been earlier informed by the competent bodies of Ukraine in response to previous requests for legal assistance (response No.14/1/1-24020-19 dated 03.05.2019, response No.14/1/1-24813-19 dated 02.08.2019) that law enforcement bodies of Ukraine conducted a pre-trial investigation in criminal case No.12018220490005058 concerning the fact of the assault on the Consulate on 26.11.2018, and also that no information has been entered in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations of Ukraine related to the assault of 08.02.2019. Thus, in accordance with Art.56.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, K.V. Nemichev has the status of a witness and enjoys the rights under Art. 56.4 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. At this time, for the purpose of identifying all circumstances of the crime under investigation, there is a need for performing certain procedural acts in Ukraine. Based on the above and guided by the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (1993), International Convention on Countering the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), as well as Arts. 453 and 454 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, I HEREBY REQUEST: 1. To provide information on the results of the pre-trial investigation under criminal case No.12018220490005058 and of any charges brought against anyone committing the aforesaid crime. 2. To inform if K.V.Nemichev has been charged under criminal case No. 12018220490005058, and if yes, under what article of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and to provide copies of procedural decisions taken in relation to him, and copies of documents containing evidence of the crimes committed by him. 3. To explain to K.V.Nemichev, against signature, the provisions of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation and Constitution of the Russian Federation stated below, providing us with the originals of the corresponding documents: - rights of a witness provided in Art.56.4 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation; - provisions of Art.307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation related to the criminal liability for the provision of consciously false testimony; - provisions of Art.308 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation related to the criminal liability for refusing to testify; - provisions of Art.51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, according to which he is not obliged to testify against himself, his spouse and other close relatives; - provisions of Art.18 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, according to which he is entitled to testifying in his native language or another language he knows, and to using the services of an interpreter free of charge;
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- provisions of Chapter 16 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation regulating the procedure for complaining against actions and decision of the court and officials responsible for the criminal proceedings. 4. To interrogate K.V.Nemichev in the capacity of a witness under case No. 11802007703000377 with regard to the following issues: - find out the main information on his biography, stating places of residence, study, work, service in the Armed Forces, family status, chronic diseases, possible head injuries, - what countries he is citizen of, where and under what circumstances he received citizenship, - find out his current employment, job responsibilities, if he is a member of any party or movement, - what he knows about the facts of assault on the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kharkov; if he has relevant information, find out circumstances of the assaults. - Who is the organizer of the assaults on the Consulate on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019? What was the source of financing thereof? - What was the chronology of the assaults on the Consulate on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019? - Who took part in the assaults on the Consulate on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019? Personal data of the persons who threw items at the building and the territory of the Consulate on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019? - What was the purpose of the assaults on the Consulate on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019? - What can he relate on where and with whom he was on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019, and what was he busy with? - What does he know of the Ukrainian organizations ‘National Corps’ and ‘People’s Militia’, their makeup and leaders? Does he occupy any post in said organizations? If yes, which specifically? What are his responsibilities? - What are the main goals and objectives of the NGOs ‘National Corps’ and ‘People’s Militia’? - Please attach copies of documents to the witness interrogation protocol identifying his person and Ukrainian, or any other, citizenship (passport). 5. To obtain information on ‘National Corps’ and ‘People’s Militia’, their makeup, leaders and copies of founding documents from the corresponding competent bodies of Ukraine. Information in this Request is confidential and is intended only for official use, as it constitutes secrecy of investigation. For our part, we guarantee that any information received by us as a result of the request will not be handed over to third persons, will be used only in the interests of the investigation of the criminal case, and will not entail damage to the sovereignty, security and public order of Ukraine. Please execute materials collected in the course of fulfilling this request in printed form or attach print copies, certifying them with a seal and signature of the responsible person, and send them to the Directorate of International Legal Cooperation of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation at address: 195995, Russia, Moscow, Pereulok Tekhnicheskiy, 2. Annex: - extract from the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on 1 p., - witness acknowledgment form under Art. 56.4 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation on 1 p.,
Annex 455
- witness acknowledgment form under Art. 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on 1 p., - witness acknowledgment form under Art. 308 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on 1 p., - witness acknowledgment form under Art. 51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on 1 p., - witness acknowledgment form under Ch. 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation on 1 p., - witness acknowledgment form under Ch. 16 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation on 4 pp., (total of 10 pages). Senior Investigator of the Chie Investigative Directorate Major of Justice (signature) O.Yu. Lukoyanova (Seal)
Annex 456 Law of Ukraine No. 638-IV “On the fight against terrorism”, 20 March 2003 (translation)

Annex 456
Excerpt
Translation
Law of Ukraine No. 638-IV “On the fight against terrorism”, 20 March 2003, available at:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/638-iv.
LAW OF UKRAINE
On the Fight Against Terrorism
(Vedomosti of Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine (VVR), 2003, No. 25, p.180)
[…]
Article 24. Responsibility of an organisation for terrorist activities
An organisation that is accountable for commission of a terrorist act and is declared as a terrorist
organisation by a decision of the court, shall be dissolved and its property shall be seized.
If a court of Ukraine, including in accordance with its international legal obligations, recognises
the activities of an organisation (its branch, affiliate, representative office) registered outside Ukraine
as terrorist, the activities of this organisation in Ukraine are prohibited, its Ukrainian branch (affiliate
or representative office) is dissolved by court order and its property and the property of the
organisation which is located in Ukraine is seized.
A petition to declare the organisation accountable for terrorism activities shall be submitted to the
court by the General Prosecutor, prosecutors of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, cities
of Kiev and Sevastopol in accordance with the procedure established by law.
{Part three of Article 24 as amended by Law No. 1798-VIII of 21 December 2016}
[…]

Annex 457
Protocol of 28 March 1997 to the Minsk Convention of 22 January 1993 on legal aid and legal
relations in civil, family and criminal cases
(translation)

Annex 457
Translation
Protocol of 28 March 1997 to the Minsk Convention of 22 January 1993 on legal aid and legal
relations in civil, family and criminal cases.
PROTOCOL
of 28 March 1997
TO THE CONVENTION ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL RELATIONS
IN CIVIL, FAMILY AND CRIMINAL CASES OF 22
JANUARY 1993
The States that parties to the Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and
Criminal Cases of 22 January 1993
have agreed to make the following additions and amendments to the above-said Convention:
[…]
6. Article 17 shall be supplemented with a sentence that reads as follows:
"Where documents are executed in the official languages of the Contracting Parties, certified
Russian translation shall be attached to them."
[…]
Done in Moscow on 28 March 1997 in one original counterpart in the Russian language. The
original shall be kept at the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
which shall deliver a certified copy thereof to each State that is signatory to this Protocol.
for the Republic of Azerbaijan
A. ALIYEV
for the Republic of Armenia
L. Ter-PETROSYAN
for the Republic of Belarus
A. LUKASHENKO
for Georgia
E. SHEVARDNADZE
for the Republic of Kazakhstan
N. NAZARBAEV
For the Kyrgyz Republic
A. AKAYEV
Annex 457
For the Republic of Moldova P. LUCHINSKY for the Russian Federation B. YELTSIN For the Republic of Tajikistan E. RAKHMONOV for the Republic of Uzbekistan I. KARIMOV for Ukraine L.KUCHMA
Annex 458 Commissioner for Human Rights in Donetsk People’s Republic, Letter No. 4/04-8408, 5 December 2022 (translation)

Annex 458
Translation
Commissioner for Human Rights in Donetsk People’s Republic, Letter No. 4/04-8408, 5
December 2022.
From Commissioner for Human Rights
[email protected]
Subject Response to 23579 dp
of 01.12.2022 Date Tue, 06
Dec 2022, 10:41:59
То ԁр@mid.ru
Respectfully,
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Donetsk People's Republic
Official website: http:ombudsman-dnr.ru
[email protected]
Tel. numbers:
071-301-73-52 (phoenix) General reception
071-404-69-29 (phoenix) Missing persons
Re provision of information.pdf (5917 Kb)
Annex 458
[letterhead of the Commissioner for Human Rights ] Ref. No. 4/04-8408 of 05 December 2022 In reply to No. 23579/dp of 01 December 2022 To the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation M. Y. Galuzin Re provision of information Dear Mikhail Yurievich, In response to your request (ref. No. 2 2-2294 el. of 01.12.2022) received by the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Donetsk People's Republic (hereinafter, the Commissioner) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, I advise you of the following. Regarding the list of persons on whom information is requested, the Commissioner has information concerning Sergei Aleksandrovich Bashlykov, born on 27.10.1986, who was exchanged as part of the exchange of detainees between Ukrainian state and the Donetsk People's Republic, which took place on 29 December 2019. The agreement on this exchange was reached in the course of the work of the humanitarian subgroup of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk and was enshrined in the Protocol of 23.12.2019 signed, among others, by the representative of Ukraine L. M. Kuchma (Annex 1). No representatives of the Russian Federation were signatories to the aforementioned Protocol, as the Russian Federation was guaranteeing the implementation of the Minsk agreements in the negotiation process and was not a party to the armed conflict. S. A. Bashlykov, a private entrepreneur, was detained on 26 February 2015. The reason for the inclusion of the latter on the list of the persons that the Donetsk People's Republic was searching for on the territory of Ukraine is a request of his father, Alexander Bashlykov, who reported by telephone about the illegal detention of his son after the terrorist attack on 22 February 2015 during the "Dignity March" near the Palace of Sports in Kharkov. According to his father, S.A. Bashlykov was "in the wrong place at the wrong time". After he was detained, he was charged with crimes under Art. 258 (3) and Art. 263(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Negotiations regarding the exchange of S.A. Bashlykov had been underway since 2015. On the eve of the exchange, which took place on 27 December 2017, the Ukrainian side excluded S. A. Bashlykov from the exchange list, giving as a reason for this that the persons "who have not been procedurally cleared" may not be transferred. From the date of detention until 28 December 2019, S.A. Bashlykov's criminal case was at the trial stage. More than forty court hearings took place, but the detainee could not be found guilty. And only after agreements on the exchange were reached, the latter was sentenced to life imprisonment with confiscation of property based on the verdict of the Frunzensky Court in Kharkov dated 28 December 2019. He was released from custody the
Annex 458
same day on personal recognizance (Annex 2) and taken to the Maiorsk checkpoint for a transfer to DPR territory as part of the exchange. The fact that after lengthy court proceedings S. A. Bashlykov was convicted one day before the exchange raises doubts. It was subsequently established that SBU officers exerted psychological pressure on the detainees, offering them to sign an indictment in exchange for their release through the transfer to the DPR. This is not an isolated case and the number of the persons exchanged on 29 December 2019 who were convicted on the last day is 7 (Annex 3). It is worth noting that those who refused to sign the indictment had their pretrial restraint changed to personal recognizance within the shortest time possible (Annex 4). Such facts are set out in the United Nations "REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UKRAINE, 16 NOVEMBER 2019 TO 15 FEBRUARY 2020", Impact of the simultaneous release of detainees on the rule of law: "The simultaneous release of detainees on 29 December 2019 raises a number of human rights concerns in the sphere of administration of justice. Firstly, the release of individuals prosecuted for, or convicted of, human rights violations may deprive victims of justice, truth and redress. Secondly, the procedure under which individuals on trial were released may negatively affect their right to liberty should they appear for future trial hearings. These concerns had already been highlighted following the previous simultaneous release on 27 December 2017. At least 47 detainees released and transferred to territory controlled by the self-proclaimed ‘republics’ had been convicted of various crimes and were serving their sentences. Notably, three men had been convicted of setting off an explosion at a pro-Maidan rally in Kharkiv on 22 February 2015 which killed two men, a boy and a police officer. On 28 December 2019, a court in Kharkiv found the three defendants guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. However, contrary to normal practice, the court released them from custody under a personal commitment to remain in their place of official residence pending the entry into force of the verdict. The authorities have allowed them to avoid serving their sentences and paying damages to the victims. OHCHR notes that although the simultaneous release of detainees is aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation, it should be balanced with Ukraine’s obligations to investigate and prosecute human rights violations and ensure victims’ right to an effective remedy". I think it is important to inform you that during this period of the armed conflict in Donbas since 2014, there have been mass arrests, on Ukrainian territory, of citizens not involved in the armed conflict in order to replenish the "exchange fund". As an example, the events of May 2014 in Odessa, when mass arrests of citizens who actively expressed their position against the war in Donbas were carried out. Guided by humanitarian considerations, representatives of the Donetsk People's Republic decided to include those citizens on the list of persons searched for on Ukrainian territory. Many participants in those events were subsequently transferred to the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics as part of exchanges. Arbitrary detentions of civilians, including those detained after the aforementioned terrorist attack, are also reflected in the UN report "ARBITRARY DETENTION, TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE, 2014-2021": "On 26 February 2015, SBU arrested three men in Kharkiv, and accused them of planting an improvised explosive device during a ‘Dignity March’ on 22 February 2015, which detonated, killing four civilians and injuring more than
Annex 458
ten. SBU officers brought the three men straight to the Kharkiv SBU premises. There, SBU officers hit one man on the back and head with a rifle butt and then subjected him to a mock execution. The officers told him he would not make it out alive if he did not agree to cooperate and to incriminate himself." The use of torture and ill-treatment of detainees is another not insignificant factor that guided representatives of the DPR in requesting from the Ukrainian side a transfer of persons detained for supporting the Republics. As of today, the situation with the use of physical coercion remains unchanged. A quote from the UN report: "OHCHR monitored the situation in Alekseyevskaya Correctional Colony No. 25 (Kharkiv region) and visited the colony on 10 January 2019 after concerns were raised about the use of torture and ill-treatment. OHCHR received reports alleging that inmates were subjected to intense beatings, in particular with various objects, strangulation, rape and threats of rape, as well as other forms of sexual violence, including forced nudity. Correctional officers who may have been involved in the torture and ill-treatment are still working at the colony". OHCHR estimates that around 60 per cent of all conflict-related detentions in custody by government actors between 2014 and 2021 (approximately 2,300) were arbitrary because they did not meet safeguards requirements under international human rights law, despite being codified in national law. Most of these occurred during the first phase of the conflict (2014-2015). I would also like to note that the Ukrainian side has not only detained people not involved in the armed conflict in Donbas, but has also requested an exchange of persons detained before the beginning of the conflict and convicted under articles of the Criminal Code relating to general crimes. Thus, on 29 December 2019, A. P. Sadovsky, who on 21 April 2014 had committed a robbery attack on a currency exchange office, during which he seized cash in an especially large amount, and also murdered a pregnant woman, the cashier, and subsequently burned her body, was transferred to Ukraine. Another example is V. N. Syryk, who, on 18 February 2019, by previous concert of a group of persons, committed forcible embezzlement of property belonging to P. by illegally entering the residence of the latter and using violence not dangerous to health, and thereby caused financial damage to the latter. Additionally, I would like to advise that M. Kovtun, V. Dvornikov and V. Tetyutsky were participants in the same events in Kharkov and were participants in the exchange between the Lugansk People's Republic and the Ukrainian state and subsequently transferred to the LPR territory. Commissioner for Human Rights in the Donetsk People's Republic D. V. Morozova Prepared by N.A. Sementsova +7 (949) 332-19-34
Annex 458
ANNEX 1 The Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of representatives of some of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine, agreed as follows: • A release of persons is to be carried out as per the agreed lists of "all identified persons for all identified persons " at the Maiorsk checkpoint on 29 December 2019 at 11:00 am Kiev time; • The persons who are released as a result of the pretrial restraint in their respect being changed to personal recognizance are to be granted the right to apply to a court for a hearing of their criminal case in absentia. In the case of a guilty verdict, after its entry into force, a pardon procedure will be applied to such a person, guaranteeing the release of the convicted person from subsequent criminal punishment; • The parties will ensure that all proceedings are completed as soon as possible and inform the TAG Humanitarian Working Group of the stages of the proceedings in relation to each person on the release and exchange lists; • The process of exchanging "all identified persons for all persons identified as of 29 December 2019" will be deemed to have been completed when all commitments made by the parties are fulfilled in full. 23 December 2019
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Annex 2 Directly to the place of residence of the applicant Kharkov, Dostoevskogo Street, 10, apt. .4; Actual place of residence: Kharkov, Frunze Prospect, 45 (village, district, town, region, Autonomous Republic of Crimea. state) Ticket for _____________ station Money for the ticket in the amount of REMARK(S): Chief accountant (Signature) Passport series no. (Please check that you have your passport)) A prophylactic medical examination for tuberculosis was conducted on 24.02.2019 3436 NOTICE OF RELEASE Part« B" Serie HAR ____ _ No. ______________ 02044 Issued to citizen Bashlikov Sergiy Oleksandrovych (Name, surname and father's name)) Date of birth Place of birth 27.10.1986 (date, month, year) Kharkov (village, district, municipality,-region , Autonomous Republic of Crimea, state) Citizenship Ukraine Previous convictions Not previously convicted Convicted on 28.12.2019 by the Frunzensky District Court, Kharkov, under Articles 27(5),258(3),263(1),70(1),72(5) of Ukrainian Criminal Code With confiscation of property He (she) has been detained in custody at the facilities of the State Criminal Investigation Department __ from 26 02 2015 to 28 12 2019 Released on personal recognizance On the basis of the judgment of the Frunzensky District Court of Kharkov of 28.12.2019
Annex 458
Annex 3 No. FULL NAME Date of birth 1 Bondarenko Eduard Evgenievich 24.07.1961 2 Zhadko Denis Valeryevich 02.10.1980 3 Zabolotsky Gennady Gennadievich 07.02.1988 4 Mastikasheva Daria Dmitrievna 01.12.1987 5 Pastukhov Sergey Anatolievich 02.03.1982 6 Selyanov Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich 28.07.1972 7 Chernikova Galina Aleksandrovna 10.02.1994
Annex 458
Annex 4 No. FULL NAME Date of birth Articles under which charges were brought 1 Abbasov Rustam Nuridin oglu 05.12.1991 Part 2 of Art. 28; Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 2 of Art. 258; Part 2 of Art. 263-1 2 Abroskin Pavel Mikhailovich 21.06.1989 para. 1 of Part 2 of Art. 115; para. 5 of Part 2 of Art. 115; para. 12 of Part 2 of Art. 115; Part 2 of Art. 262; Part 3 of Art. 365 3 Bashlykov Sergey Alexandrovich 27.10.1986 Part H of Art. 258; Part 1 of Art. 263 4 Biryukov Vyacheslav Stanislavovich 05.03.1990 Part 5 of Art. 27; Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 1 of Art. 2639; Part 2 of Art. 187; Part 3 of Art. 258 5 Bondarenko Eduard Evgenievich 24.07.1961 Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 2 of Art. 263-1; Part 3 of Art. 258 6 Busygin Anatoly 16.09.1984 Art. 115(2)(9); Art. 115(2)(12); Art. 115(3) Art. 185 7 Butrimenko Nikolai Alexandrovich 01.08.1955 Part H of Art. 258; Part 1 of Art. 115; Part 2 of Art. 258-5 8 Veselov Sergey Alexandrovich 29.01.1980 Part 1 of Art. 15; Part 1 of Art. 258; Part 2 of Art. 258; Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 1 of Art. 396 9 Gratov Valery Aleksandrovich 22.04.1952 Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 4 of Art. 358 10 Grubnik Vladimir Yurievich 23.03.1983 Part 1 of Art. 258-3, Part 2 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 14, Part 2 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 263, Part 2 of Art. 263-1 11 Dakar Alexander Vinustovich (Krinari Artur Abdulayevich, born 05.09.1967). 29.12.1958 Part 2 of Art. 15, Part 2 of Part 1 of Art. 115, Part 1 of Art. 263 12 Djadan Igor Ivanovich 16.06.1964 Part 2 of Art. 258; Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 2 of Art. 110; Part 1 of Art. 298; Part 1 of Art. 338; Part 1 of Art. 294 Art. 294 13 Djimiev Murat Georgievich 11.01.1966 Part 2 of Art. 28; Art. 194(2); Part 1 of Art. 263; Art. Art. 14; Part 2 of Art. 258 14 Dolgosheya Vladislav Ruslanovich 24.04.1996 Part 1 of Art. 258-3, Part 2 of Art. 15, Part 2 of Art. 113, Part 1 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 263 15 Dolgosheya Ruslan Bronislavovich 25.12.1973 Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 2 of Art. 15; Part 2 of Art. 113, Part 1 of Art. 258. Part 1 of Art. 263
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16 Dolzhenkov Sergey Alexandrovich 03.01.1988 Art. 110(2), Art. 14(1), Art. 294(1), Art. 109(1) 17 Druzhinin Evgeny Ivanovich 29.03.1975 Art. 115(5)(6); Art. 187(4); Art. 258(3); Art. 258(1); Art. 263(1); Art. 289(3) 18 Yevtukhov Vyacheslav Viktorovich 12.11.1981 Part 1 of Art. 15; Part 1 of Art. 258; Part 2 of Art. 258; Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 1 of Art. 396 19 Yefimov Sergey Viktorovich 18.11.1976 Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 1 of Art. 263; par. 1.6.9.12 of Part 2 of Art. 115; Part 3 of Art. 289; Part 2 of Art. 15; Paragraph 13 of Part 2 of Art. 115, Art. 348 20 Zhadko Denis Valeryevich 02.10.1980 Part 1 of Art. 258-3 21 Zabolotsky Gennady Gennadyevich 07.02.1988 Part 1 of Art. 258-3 22 Zinchenko Sergei Pavlovich 27.09.1990 Para. 1 of Part 2 of Art. 115; para. 5 of Part 2 of Art. 115; para. 12 of Part 2 of Art. 115; Part 2 of Art. 262; Part 3 of Art. 365 23 Kazansky Nikolay Aleksandrovich 18.06.1969 Part 2 of Art. 294; Part 1 of Art. 14, Part 1 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 258-3, Part 1 of Art. 263 24 Kosinov Vadim Aleksandrovich 27.07.1987 Part 2 of Art. 260 of the CC of Ukraine 25 Mazur Oleg Vladimirovich 02.08.1965 Part 2 of Art. 15, Part 1 of Art. 113, Part 1 of Art. 258-3, Part 1 of Art. 263 26 Marchenko Svetlana Viktorovna 08.02.1966 Part 1 of Art. 258-3 27 Mastikasheva Daria Dimitrievna 01.12.1987 Part 2 of Art. 28; Part 1 of Art. 111; Part 1 of Art. 263 28 Melnik Miroslav Valerievich 20.12.1993 Part 2 Art. 258 29 Novikov Dmitriy Anatolievich 05.05.1988 Art. 258-3(1), Art. 437(2), Art. 332-1(2), Art. 28(2) 30 Pastukhov Sergey Anatolievich 02.03.1982 Part 2 of Art. 28, Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 3 of Art. 258; Part 3 of Art. 185 31 Petrikov Sergey Andreevich 11.04.1983 Part 2 Art. 28; Part 1 Art. 263; Part 1 Art. 14; Part 2 Art. 258; Part 2 Art. 263-1 32 Podmazko Evgeny Sergeevich 06.04.1969 Part 2 of Art. 15, Part 1 of Art. 14, Part 2 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 258-3 33 Selyatenko Nikolai Nikolayevich 31.01.1967 Part 1 Art. 14; Part 1 Art. 258-3, Part 2 Art. 258, Part 1 Art. 263 34 Selyanov Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich 28.07.1972 Part 1 of Art. 258-3 35 Slivko Maxim Aleksandrovich 03.12.1973 Art. 258(2), Art. 263(1) 36 Skripnik Viktor Aleksandrovich 28.05.1987 Part 1 of Art. 258-3; Part 1 of Art. 263; Paragraph 6 of Part 2 of Art. 115; Part 2
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of Art. 187; Part 3 of Art. 289; Part 5 of Art. 27, Part 3 of Art. 258 37 Stelnikovich Aleksandr Vladimirovich 15.12.1992 Part 2 of Art. 187, Part 1 of Art. 258-3, Part 1 of Art. 263, Part 3 of Art. 258 38 Titov Mikhail Aleksandrovich 20.03.1978 Part 2 of Art. 115; para. 12 of Part 1 of Art. 263; Part 3 of Art. 187; Part 2 of Art. 289; Part 2 of Art. 260 39 Tolkushchy Roman Viktorovich 30.07.1979 Part 1 of Art. 258-3 40 Udovenko Igor Vasilievich 16.11.1963 Part 2 of Art. 15; Part 2 of Art. 14; Part 1 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 258-3 41 Foteva Ekaterina Iordanovna 18.12 1979 Part 2 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 258-3 42 Chernikova Galina Aleksandrovna 10.02.1994 Part 1 of Art. 258-3 43 Chubarova Larisa Viktorovna 27.06.1969 Part 1 of Art. 110, Part 1 of Art. 263, Part 4 of Art. 260 44 Shevtsov Alexander Evgenievich 05.02.1960 Part 1 of Art. 258, Part 1 of Art. 258-3, Part 1 of Art. 263, Part 1 of Art. 263-1 45 Shilin Sergey Viktorovich 14.09.1984 Part 2 of Art. 189; Art. 348; Part 2 of Art. 289; Part 2 of Art. 185; Part 2 of Art. 260; Part 1 of Art. 189; Part 1 of Art. 125
Annex 459 Commissioner for Human Rights in Lugansk People’s Republic, Letter No. 851, 8 December 2022 (translation)

Annex 459
Translation
Commissioner for Human Rights in Lugansk People’s Republic, Letter No. 851, 8 December
2022.
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE LUGANSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
3 Square of Heroes of the Great Patriotic War, Lugansk, Lugansk People's
Republic, 91000
e-mail: [email protected]; Tel.: (0642) 58-41-04
08 December 2022 No. 851
In reply to No. 23579/dp dated 01 December 2022
To the Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
M. Yu. Galuzin.
Dear Mikhail Yurievich,
In 2019, it was Olga Anatolievna Kobtseva, who was in charge of the
exchange of prisoners of war in the territory of the Lugansk People's Republic as the
head of the working group on the exchange of prisoners of war. In this regard, the
documents that served as the basis for the inclusion of V. N. Dvornikov, M. A. Kovtun
and V. V. Tetyutsky on the exchange lists may be in Ms Kobtseva's possession.
At the same time, based on information provided by the Ministry of State
Security of the Lugansk People's Republic, I advise the following:
As part of the exchange of prisoners of 29.12.2019, 63 persons held by the
Ukrainian side were delivered to the territory of the Lugansk People's Republic,
including Vladimir Nikolayevich Dvornikov, born 13.06.1978, Marina Anatolyevna
Kovtun, born 03.06.1957, and Viktor Viktorovich Tetyutsky, born 05.05.1982.
After their arrival in the territory of the Lugansk People's Republic, the above
persons were questioned about the circumstances of their detention in Ukraine.
In the course of the questioning it was established that V. N. Dvornikov, M.
A. Kovtun and V. V. Tetyutsky had taken an active civic position after the protests on
Independence Square in Kiev and had joined the anti-nationalist movements "Oplot",
"Antimaidan" and "Kharkov-3a"; they had therefore come under the radar of the
Ukrainian special services and were subsequently detained by Ukrainian Security
Service officers in the city of Kharkov.
In the course of the investigative actions, the Ukrainian Security Service
officers seized ammunition and explosives at the places of residence of V. N.
Annex 459
Dvornikov, M. A. Kovtun and V. V. Tetyutsky, who denied the possession of these items (which they said had been planted by officers of the Ukrainian Security Service). While in detention, V.N. Dvornikov, M.A. Kovtun and V.V. Tetyutsky were subjected to torture, torment and psychological pressure. All persons confessed and incriminated themselves under threats to family and friends and torture. When visited by employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross, V. N. Dvornikov and V. V. Tetyutsky requested their assistance and were subsequently put on the exchange list. Also, during the visit of Tony Frisch, representative of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, M. A. Kovtun confirmed her consent to the inclusion and was included on the exchange list. I have no other information regarding the grounds for and circumstances of the inclusion of the above persons on the POW exchange list. Yours faithfully, Commissioner V. A. Serdyukova
Annex 460 Ukrinform, “Batkivshchyna” Deputy Was Brutally Tortured by Foreign Saboteurs Before His Death (22 April 2014) (translation)

Annex 460
Translation
Ukrinform, "Batkivshchyna" Deputy Was Brutally Tortured by Foreign Saboteurs Before His
Death (22 April 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140611192438/http:/www.ukrinform.ua/ukr/newsdeputata_bat
kivshchini_pered_smertyu_po_zviryachomu_katuvali_inozemni_diversanti_1931671.
"Batkivshchyna" deputy was brutally tortured by foreign
saboteurs before his death
According to investigators, the separatists who seized the building of the Security Service in
Slaviansk are involved in the murder of Gorlovka City Council member Vladimir Rybak.
This was reported by the press service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
"Today, the body of one of the two victims found in the Torets River near the village of
Raygorodok, Donetsk region, was identified. He was a deputy of Gorlovka City Council from the
Batkivshchyna party, Vladimir Rybak," the Interior Ministry said in a statement.
"The cause of death of both victims is a combined trauma to the body as a result of torture, followed
by drowning of the still alive unconscious victims," the police added.
At the same time, journalist Yuriy Butusov, citing a source in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, said
that the two abductees were severely tortured.
"They were tortured terribly. It is better not to see these photos. It was done not by people, but by
animals. They burned them with fire, cut them with knives... Experts show that it is a purely
"Caucasian pattern" ... There are two witnesses who saw how these people were tortured in a
building controlled by the "little green men", that they were the ones who guarded the torture
room," Butusov wrote on his Facebook page.
As Ukrinform previously reported, a local resident filed a statement about the abduction with the
Central City District Police Department in Gorlovka. According to him, on April 17, around 18.00,
he was walking down the street with Rybak when a car stopped near them, unknown people got out,
put the deputy in the car and drove away

Annex 461
Kharkov Region Prosecutor’s office’s website, Prosecutor’s Office prevents contract killing of
farmer (photos, video) (10 December 2018)
(translation)

Annex 461
Translation
Kharkov Region Prosecutor’s office’s website, Prosecutor’s Office prevents contract killing of
farmer (photos, video) (10 December 2018), available at:
https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=241335.
Prosecutor's Office prevents contract murder of farmer (photos, video)
Investigators from the regional prosecutor's office, together with the Security Service of Ukraine in
the region, prevented the contract killing of a 42-year-old businessman from Zmiev.
According to the investigation, the organiser of the crime was an acquaintance of the victim. The
farmers had longstanding friendly and business relations. They often quarrelled over money. The
51-year-old suspect worked with the victim's company, so he was well aware of the farmer's wealth.
After another quarrel over debts and financial obligations, the business partner decided to kidnap
his friend and kill him after the victim had transferred his assets to him.
To do this, the offender used his friends to find a "killer" who was offered to kidnap the farmer.
During the negotiations with the contractor, the man discussed methods of intimidation and torture
of the victim. He suggested using a soldering iron, and if the torture did not work, he would kill the
victim's family. The customer also insisted that the kidnapped person "was not supposed to get out
alive".
The suspect promised to pay the executor well as soon as the entrepreneur's assets were transferred
to him. He gave about 30 thousand grivnas to solve the so-called "organisational" issues in the case
alone. The money was spent on transportation costs and mobile communications. In addition, the
"killer" rented a house in Kharkov, where the bloody massacre was to take place.
During the special operation, the operatives imitated the kidnapping of a farmer. The contractor
informed the victim where he was. The customer came to the rented house to personally extort
money from the entrepreneur. He was detained there red-handed.
The man was served a notice of suspicion of committing crimes under Part 3 of Art. 27, Part 2 of
Art. 146, Part 3 of Art. 27, Part 1 of Art. 15, Clause 6, Part 2 of Art. 115 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine (organisation of kidnapping, organisation of attempted murder for hire for mercenary
purposes).
At the request of the Prosecutor's Office, the court has chosen a custodial detention as a measure of
restraint without the right to be released on bail.

Annex 462
Ukraine National Police Facebook account, The National Police of Ukraine’s Press-service (6
April 2022)
(translation)

Annex 462
Translation
Ukraine National Police Facebook account, The National Police of Ukraine’s Press-service (6
April 2022), available at: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1113881682488692.
National Police of Ukraine
6 April 2022
People were shot in a car and then burned: Kharkov police detained one of the participants in the
crime.
The court took him into custody. Five more of his accomplices fled to the territory temporarily
occupied by the enemy.
The operatives of the Strategic Investigations Department in Kharkov region of the National Police
and investigators established the circumstances of the incident, each member of the group, the
purpose of the crime and their location.
The incident occurred on March 23, 2022, in the Velykyi Burluk district. A group of young men
stole equipment with grain from a farm. The owner and his two employees began to chase the
intruders. The young men left the machinery and fled. However, they soon returned to take
revenge.
They made an ambush on the approach to the village. As soon as the car drove into the village,
they shot at it with automatic weapons they had taken from a broken military convoy. Later, they
took the car to another place and set it on fire along with the three victims, simulating death as a
result of shelling. The victims included three citizens born in 1967, 1993 and 2004.
On April 5, in Poltava, operatives of the Strategic Investigations Department in Kharkov and
Poltava regions, with the force support of Rapid Operational Response Unit (KORD) soldiers,
detained one of the criminals.
According to police, his five accomplices fled to the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy.
Based on the evidence, the investigators of the Kharkov Regional Police Investigation Department
served the detainee a notice of suspicion under clauses 1, 12, part 2 of Article 115 (premeditated
murder) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
A custody was chosen as a measure of restraint against the suspect.
За скоєне зловмисникам може загрожувати позбавлення волі від 10-ти до 15-ти років або
довічне ув’язнення. The perpetrators may face punishment from 10 to 15 years or life
imprisonment for the crime.
The Kharkov Regional Prosecutor's Office is in charge of the proceedings
Department of Strategic Investigations of the National Police of Ukraine

Annex 463 Wikipedia, Schematic diagram of the battle on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov, 14/15 March 2014 (23 September 2019) (translation)

Annex 463
Translation
Wikipedia, Schematic diagram of the battle on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov, 14/15 March 2014
(23 September 2019), available at:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%91%D1%96%D0%B9_%D0%BD%D0%B
0_%D0%A0%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D1%9
6%D0%B9.jpg.
File: Battle on Rymarskaya street.jpg
From Wikimedia Commons, the free media repository

Annex 464
RIA, Ukraine Announces Near-Total Blocking of Access to Russian Websites (20 April 2022)
(translation)

Annex 464
Translation
RIA, Ukraine Announces Near-Total Blocking of Access to Russian Websites (20 April 2022),
available at: https://ria.ru/20220420/sayty-1784463195.html.
Ukraine announces near-total blocking of access to Russian
websites
Rada says it has almost completely blocked access to Russian websites in Ukraine
© RIA Novosti / Stringer
The building of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Archive photo.
MOSCOW, 20 Apr - RIA Novosti. Verkhovnaya Rada deputy and head of the Digital Infrastructure
Subcommittee Aleksandr Fedienko ("Servant of the People") said on Wednesday that access to
Russian Internet resources was almost completely blocked in Ukraine.
"Our operators, following the decision of the National Coordination Centre, which issued the
relevant order, have blocked the entire cyberspace of the Russian Federation. It is practically
impossible to open any Russian website from the territory of Ukraine," Fedienko said on the
"Ukraine 24" TV channel.
Earlier, a representative of the Russian delegation to the UN, Yaroslav Yeremin, said that a largescale
information war has been launched against Russia, with Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia in the vanguard, while other European countries and the USA are also actively involved in
the anti-Russian campaign.
In his words, a total censorship of the information space is being imposed without any attempts to
justify it, making it impossible for most citizens of Ukraine and other countries to obtain objective
data on the course of the Russian military operation and to distinguish fakes from reliable
information.

Annex 465
TASS, Re-Broadcasting of 15 Russian Channels Was Banned in Ukraine (9 September 2014)
(translation)

Annex 465
Translation
TASS, Ukraine Bans Retransmission of 15 Russian TV Channels (9 September 2014), available
at: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1430068.
Ukraine bans retransmission of 15 Russian TV channels
TASS
KIEV, 9 September. /ITAR-TASS/. The Kiev District Administrative Court has banned
rebroadcasting of 15 Russian channels in the country's air and cable networks, the National
Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine said. This was reported by the press service
of the council, citing its head Yuriy Artemenko. "At this stage, the monitoring of Ukrainian and
Russian-language channels, which are of an information and journalistic nature, is being carried
out," Artemenko said.
The banned channels include "Channel One. Worldwide Network", "RTR-Planeta", "NTV-Mir",
"Russia 24", TVCI, "Russia 1", NTV, TNT, "Peterburg-5", "Zvezda", REN TV, RBC-TV,
LifeNews, RT (Russia Today) and "History".
Earlier, representatives of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council together with
the Ministry of Internal Affairs inspected about 5,000 public establishments to check compliance
with the requirement to ban retransmission of Russian channels. The checks were carried out in
hotels, holiday camps, entertainment and other public establishments.
Russian-language TV channels shut down in Ukraine
On 14 August, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine obliged
providers to switch off the Russian-language version of the Euronews TV channel.
According to the first deputy head of the organisation, Olga Gerasymyuk, the Russian-language
version of Euronews "is a product of the Russian editorial office and has a propaganda nature".
In July, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine banned the
broadcasting of five Russian TV channels because of "content that does not comply with the
Ukrainian law on television". The ban was imposed on RBC TV, "RTR-Planeta", "NTV-Mir,"
"Russia 24" and "TV Center - International". In May, it was reported that the Ukrainian State
Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting demanded a ban on broadcasting Russian films
about the army. According to the agency, they "praise the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation".

Annex 466
RT, Ukraine Issues New Ban on Russian Language (16 August 2022)

Annex 466
09.03.2023, 17:02 Ukraine issues new ban on Russian language
read://https_www.rt.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rt.com%2Frussia%2F560957-ukraine-schools-russian-courses%2F 1/1
Russian language and literature courses will no longer be taught in Ukraine, according to an
updated curriculum posted by the Ministry of Education on its website on Tuesday.
Among the courses excluded were ‘Russian and Foreign Literature’, ‘Russian language for general
educational institutions with instruction in Russian’ for grades 5-9, and instruction in Ukrainian or
Russian for grades 10-11.
While nearly all Russian and Belarusian books will be dropped from the school program, the
ministry notes that it will allow some works by authors who wrote in Russian but whose “life and
work were closely connected with Ukraine,” such as Nikolay Gogol and Mikhail Bulgakov.
According to the updated curriculum, foreign literature courses in Ukrainian schools will now
focus on works by writers such as Jean de La Fontaine, O. Henry, Anna Gavalda, and Joseph Roth.
The ministry also announced that it will be updating history courses in Ukrainian schools “to take
into account new historiographic developments.” Specifically, it will update courses on Ukrainian
and world history for grades 6 to 11 to include the ongoing military conflict between Kiev and
Moscow.
Last month, Ukrainian officials introduced a new stage of the law on ‘Ensuring the functioning of
the Ukrainian language as a state language’, which introduces fines for speaking Russian. The law
applies to workers in institutions such as government agencies, education, science, and media.
“Citizens of the country must use the Ukrainian language in all aspects of social life,” the
commissioner for the protection of the state language, Taras Kremen, explained, calling on people
to report offenders to local law enforcement.
Russian is a native language in much of Ukraine and predominant in many cities in both the east
and south of the country. However, Kiev has been taking steps to outlaw its use in most fields.
Moscow has expressed concern for years over the clampdown on Russian. Last September, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that “discrimination against the Russian language in Ukraine
has reached the scale of a disaster.”
Ukraine issues new ban on Russian language

Annex 467 KyivPost, Russian Language Excluded from Kyiv State Schooling (11 November 2022)

Annex 467
Home / Ukraine / Russian Language Excluded from Kyiv State Schooling
Russian Language Excluded
from Kyiv State Schooling
Kyiv City Council has completely excluded the Russian language from being taught as part of the
curricula at municipal institutions of preschool and general secondary education. According to the Kyiv
by Kyiv Post | November 11, 2022, 2􀀁17 pm
Photo: Kyiv City Council
EN
War Ukraine World Economics Videos Opinions Classi􀀁eds
KYIV
    COPY LINK
Kyiv City Council has completely excluded the Russian language from being taught as part
of the curricula at municipal institutions of preschool and general secondary education.
According to the Kyiv City Council’s press service, Kyiv City Council held a vote on
Thursday, Nov. 10, in which 64 local lawmakers of the 120-member council approved the
exclusion of Russian language from local schooling.
Russian Language Excluded from Kyiv State Schooling https://www.kyivpost.com/post/4902
Стр. 1 из 4 09.03.2023, 17:05
Annex 467
According to local lawmaker Vadym Vasylchuk, who is also chairman of the StandingCommittee on Education and Science, Family, Youth, and Sports, in the current conditionsof war with the Russian Federation, it is inappropriate and incorrect to conduct theeducational process and study of Russian in preschool and general secondary educationinstitutions that belong to the communal property of the territorial community of Kyiv.“Russian leaders have stated repeatedly that ‘Russia reaches as far as the Russian languageis spread.’ In this regard, the deputy corps of Kyiv City Council has adopted a decision thatwill enable it to avoid escalation of tension in society and step up protection of theeducational space of Kyiv from the hybrid in􀀂uences of the aggressor state. Language doesmatter, and in wartime it is a matter of national security,” Vasylchuk said.He added that the decision provides for carrying out organizational and legal actions totransitional groups and classes from Russian to Ukrainian, the state language.Kyiv City Council also plans to introduce a moratorium on the public use of Russian-language cultural products in the capital.At the end of June, Odesa Region and the city of Mykolaiv removed Russian from theirschool curriculum.RELATED ARTICLESRussian Language Excluded from Kyiv State Schoolinghttps://www.kyivpost.com/post/4902Стр. 2 из 409.03.2023, 17:05
Annex 468 Law of Ukraine No. 743-VII “On Preventing the Prosecution and Punishment of Persons in Connection with the Events that Occurred during Peaceful Assemblies and on Invalidating Certain Laws of Ukraine”, 21 February 2014 (translation)

Annex 468
3/9/23, 10:16 PM About preventing res... | on February 21, 2014 No. 743-VII (Print version)
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/743-18/print 1/3
T H E L AW O F U K R A I N E
On the prevention of prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took
place during peaceful assemblies, and recognition of certain laws of Ukraine as having lost their
validity
(Information of the Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No. 12, Article 186)
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decrees:
I. Article 1. Exonerate from criminal responsibility in the manner and under the conditions
specified by this Law, persons who were participants in the mass protest actions that began on
November 21, 2013, and are:
suspected or accused (defendants) of committing, between November 21, 2013 and the date of
entry into force of this Law, including actions that contain signs of criminal offenses provided for in
Articles 109, 112, 113, 121, 122, 125, 128, 129, 146, 147, 151
1
, 161, 162, 170, 174, 182, 185, 186,
187, 189, 194, 195, 196, 197 - 1 , 231, 236, 239, 241, 255, 256, 257
258
, 258
1
, 258
2
, 258
3
, 258
4
,
258
5
, 259, 260, 261, 264, 267, 270, 270
1
, 277, 279, 280, 286, 289, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 304,
325, 335, 336, 337, 341, 342, 343. . _ _
persons who have committed actions that may contain signs of criminal offenses provided for in
the above-mentioned articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, provided that the actions of these
persons are related to participation in mass protests.
Close relevant criminal proceedings.
For the purpose of this Law, a person's participation in mass protests is confirmed by his
statement to the relevant body or official.
Article 2. Exempt from punishment in the form of deprivation of liberty for a certain period of
time and from other punishments not related to deprivation of liberty, in the manner and under the
conditions determined by this Law, persons who have been convicted of the crimes provided for in
Article 1 of this Law.
Article 3. Close criminal proceedings initiated in connection with the crimes provided for in
Article 1 of this Law, in which no person has been notified of suspicion.
Article 4. Exempt from administrative liability persons who were participants in mass protests
that began on November 21, 2013, for committing any administrative offenses provided for by the
Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses during the period from November 21, 2013 to the date of
entry into force of this Law offenses , provided that these offenses are related to mass protest actions,
in the manner specified by this Code.
Article 5. Execution of this Law in terms of exemption from criminal liability and punishment of
persons specified in Articles 1 and 2 of this Law is entrusted to the courts, and in terms of closure of
criminal proceedings specified in Article 3 of this Law - to prosecutor's offices.
Enforcement of this Law in terms of exemption from administrative liability of the persons
specified in Article 4 of this Law is entrusted to the courts.
Article 6. This Law is applied:
1) in relation to suspects, criminal proceedings against whom are being conducted by pre-trial
investigation bodies, - by a court within the territorial jurisdiction of which pre-trial investigation is
being carried out, at the request of the suspect, his defense counsel, legal representative or prosecutor,
who conducts procedural management of relevant pre-trial investigations; relevant petitions are
submitted without conducting a full pre-trial investigation;
2) in relation to the accused (defendants), in respect of whom criminal proceedings are conducted
by the court and have not been considered before the entry into force of this Law, as well as in relation
to the accused (defendants), in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been considered, but the
verdicts have not gained legal force, - by courts carrying out the relevant court proceedings, at the
request of the accused (defendant), his defense counsel, legal representative, or the prosecutor who
maintains the state prosecution;
3) with respect to convicted persons - by the courts that passed the relevant sentences, at the
request of the convicted person, his defense counsel, legal representative or the prosecutor who
maintained the state prosecution;
4) within the framework of criminal proceedings provided for in Article 3 of this Law, by the
prosecutor, who carries out procedural management of relevant pre-trial investigations, without
conducting a full pre-trial investigation.
Article 7. The question of the application of this Law shall be decided by the court in a court
session. Non-arrival at the court session of persons who were duly informed about the place and time
of consideration of the issue does not prevent the court session from being held.
Translation
Law of Ukraine No. 743-VII "On the prevention of prosecution and punishment of
persons in connection with the events that took place during peaceful assemblies, and
recognition of certain laws of Ukraine as having lost their validity", 21 February 2014,
available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/743-18
Annex 468
3/9/23, 10:16 PMAbout preventing res... | on February 21, 2014 No. 743-VII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/743-18/print2/3Article 8. Provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On the Application of Amnesty in Ukraine" , theCriminal Code of Ukraine , the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine , the Code of Ukraine onAdministrative Offenses may be applied during the implementation of this Law to the extent that itdoes not contradict it.Article 9. Prohibit the collection, registration, accumulation, storage, adaptation, change, renewal,use and distribution (distribution, sale, transfer) of personal data of persons who were participants inthe mass protest actions that began on November 21, 2013, which were obtained in connection withthe participation of these persons in protest actions. These personal data are subject to destruction inaccordance with the procedure established by law.Article 10. Officials and officials who fail to comply with this Law within one month from thedate of entry into force of this Law shall be subject to mandatory prosecution in the mannerdetermined by the laws of Ukraine.II. FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS1. Recognize as invalid:Law of Ukraine "On Elimination of Negative Consequences and Prevention of Persecution andPunishment of Persons for Events that Occurred During Peaceful Assemblies" dated December 19,2013 No. 712-VII;Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Elimination of NegativeConsequences and Prevention of Persecution and Punishment of Persons for Events That OccurredDuring Peaceful Assemblies" dated January 16, 2014 No. 731-VII ;Law of Ukraine "On Elimination of Negative Consequences and Prevention of Persecution andPunishment of Persons for Events That Occurred During Peaceful Assemblies" dated January 29, 2014No. 737-VII.2. The Prosecutor General of Ukraine shall immediately, but no later than the next day after thedate of entry into force of this Law, instruct lower-level prosecutors, who carry out proceduralmanagement of pre-trial investigations, to petition the courts, within whose territorial jurisdiction pre-trial investigations are conducted, for exemption from criminal prosecution liability, as well as frompunishing the persons specified in Articles 1 and 2 of this Law, as well as taking procedural actionsand making procedural decisions regarding the closure of criminal proceedings provided for in Article3 of this Law.Prosecutors must immediately, from the day after the date of entry into force of this Law, file apetition with the courts within the territorial jurisdiction of which the pre-trial investigation is beingconducted, for exemption from criminal liability, as well as from punishment of the persons specifiedin Articles 1 and 2 of this Law , as well as perform procedural actions and make procedural decisionsregarding the closure of criminal proceedings provided for in Article 3 of this Law.Courts must immediately, but no later than the next day from the date of receipt of the petition ofthe suspect, the accused (defendant), the convicted person, his defender, legal representative, theperson against whom an administrative penalty has been applied, or the prosecutor for exemption fromcriminal and administrative liability, as well as from punishment of persons , specified in Articles 1and 2 of this Law, to carry out its review.3. Authorities and their officials (officials), enterprises, institutions, organizations of all forms ofownership are prohibited from discriminating, persecuting and prosecuting persons for theirparticipation in mass protests that began on November 21, 2013 and continued until the date of entryinto force of this by law4. The provisions of this Law apply to the criminal proceedings, information about which wasentered into the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations under No. 12013110100018056 onDecember 6, 2013, against Viktor Mykolayovych Smaliy, born on August 25, 1976, for thecommission of a criminal offense provided for in the second part of Article 15, Article 377 of theCriminal Code of Ukraine , and on the criminal proceedings that were opened against Lutsenko YuryVitaliyovych, born on December 14, 1964, for the commission of a criminal offense provided for inArticle 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.5. This Law enters into force on the day following its publication.ActingPresident of Ukraine,Chairman of the VerkhovnaRadaof UkraineO.TURCHINOVKyiv,February 21, 2014No. 743-VIIOn the prevention of prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with events that tookplace during peaceful assemblies, and recognition of certain laws of Ukraine as having lost theirvalidity Law of Ukraine on February21, 2014 No. 743-VIIAdoption on February 21, 2014Direct link :https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/743-18Legislation of Ukraineas of March 9, 2023valid
Annex 468
3/9/23, 10:16 PMAbout preventing res... | on February 21, 2014 No. 743-VII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/743-18/print3/3Publications of documentVoice of Ukraine on February 27, 2014 — No. 37Government courier on February 28, 2014 — No. 39Офіційний вісник України on March 7, 2014 — 2014, № 18, page 11, article 528, код акта 71632/2014Відомості Верховної Ради України on March 21, 2014 — 2014, № 12, page 784, article 186

Annex 469 Law of Ukraine No. 1680-VII “On the Special Procedure for Local Self-Government in Certain Areas of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions”, 16 September 2014 (translation)

Annex 469
3/9/23, 10:17 PM About a special order... | on September 16, 2014 No. 1680-VII (Print version)
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1680-18/print 1/3
{With changes introduced in accordance with Laws
No. 256-VIII dated 17.03.2015 , VVR, 2015, No. 17, Article 125,
No. 2167-VIII dated 06.10.2017 , VVR, 2017, No. 40-41, Article 384,
No. 2588 -VIII from 04.10.2018 , VVR, 2018, No. 42, art. 333
No. 364-IX from 12.12.2019 , VVR, 2020, No. 14, art. 82
No. 1078-IX from 15.12.2020 , VVR, 2021, no. 16, Article 143
No. 1930-IX dated 02.12.2021 }
This Law defines the temporary procedure for the organization of local self-government, the
activities of local self-government bodies in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions with the
aim of creating conditions for the fastest possible normalization of the situation, restoration of law and
order, constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as the rights and legitimate interests of
legal entities, creating conditions for return of residents to forcibly abandoned places of permanent
residence, their reintegration, as well as for the restoration of life in settlements in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions and the development of territories.
Article 1. In accordance with this Law, a special procedure for local self-government is
temporarily introduced from the date of its entry into force, taking into account the provisions of the
Law of Ukraine "On Creating the Necessary Conditions for the Peaceful Settlement of the Situation in
Certain Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts" until December 31, 2022 inclusive in separate districts
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which include districts, cities, towns, villages determined by the
decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as separate districts of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions).
{Article 1 as amended by Law No. 2167-VIII of October 6, 2017 ; as amended in accordance with
Laws No. 2588-VIII dated 04.10.2018 , No. 364-IX dated 12.12.2019 , No. 1078-IX dated 15.12.2020 ,
No. 1930-IX dated 02.12.2021 }
Article 2. The legislation of Ukraine in certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
during the period of validity of the special order of local self-government shall be in effect taking into
account the features specified by this Law.
Article 3. The state guarantees, in accordance with the law, the prevention of criminal
prosecution, criminal and administrative liability and punishment of persons participating in the events
on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Authorities and their officials, enterprises, institutions, organizations of all forms of ownership are
prohibited from discriminating, persecuting and holding persons accountable for the events that took
place in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Article 4. The state guarantees, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Principles of State
Language Policy", the right to linguistic self-determination of every resident in certain districts of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions regarding the language they consider to be their native language, the
choice of the language of communication, the free use of Russian and any other language in public and
private life, study and support of Russian and any other language, their free development and equality.
Local self-government bodies, local bodies of executive power in the manner and within the
limits of the powers provided for by the Law of Ukraine "On the Principles of State Language Policy",
other laws of Ukraine, international treaties of Ukraine, the binding consent of which has been granted
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, contribute in certain districts Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to use
Russian and other languages in oral and written form in the field of education, in mass media and
create opportunities for their use in the activities of state authorities and local self-government bodies,
in judicial proceedings, in economic and social activities, during cultural events events and in other
spheres of social life.
Article 5. In certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, local self-government is carried
out in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine by relevant territorial communities
directly and through local self-government bodies.
The powers of deputies of local councils and officials elected in extraordinary elections,
appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this Law, cannot be prematurely terminated.
In some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the laws of Ukraine introduce a special procedure
for appointing heads of prosecutor's offices and courts, which provides for the participation of local
self-government bodies in solving these issues.
Article 6. In order to ensure coordinated activities of local self-government bodies and central
and local executive bodies to ensure the development of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, ministries, other central bodies of executive power may
enter into agreements with relevant local self-government bodies regarding economic, social and
cultural development of individual districts.
Law of Ukraine No. 1680-VII"About the special order of local self-government in certain districts
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions" 16 September 2014, available at: https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18
T H E L AW O F U K R A I N E
About the special order of local self-government in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
(Reports of the Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No. 45, Article 2043)
Translation
Annex 469
3/9/23, 10:17 PMAbout a special order... | on September 16, 2014 No. 1680-VII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1680-18/print2/3The initiative regarding the conclusion of an agreement on the economic, social and culturaldevelopment of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions belongs to the relevant local self-government bodies.In order to conclude an agreement on the economic, social and cultural development of certaindistricts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, local self-government bodies submit to the Cabinet ofMinisters of Ukraine, ministries, other central bodies of executive power proposals on issues ofdevelopment of certain districts that need to be resolved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,ministries, other central bodies executive authorities, implementation of joint projects of thegovernment and local self-government bodies. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, a ministry,another central body of the executive power considers the submitted proposals and, within ten daysfrom the date of receipt of such proposals, opens the consultation procedure with representatives oflocal self-government bodies of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, interested businessentities, and the public.In the course of consultations, representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, ministries,other central bodies of executive power and local self-government bodies of certain districts ofDonetsk and Luhansk regions, interested subjects, representatives of the public are preparing a draftagreement on the economic, social and cultural development of certain districts of Donetsk andLuhansk regions.The agreement on the economic, social and cultural development of certain districts of Donetskand Luhansk regions enters into force on the day of its approval by the Cabinet of Ministers ofUkraine, the ministry.The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine monitors the implementation by the executive authorities ofthe agreements concluded regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain districtsof Donetsk and Luhansk regions, listens to their reports, and takes, in accordance with the law,measures to ensure the parties' implementation of the agreements concluded.Article 7. The state supports the socio-economic development of certain districts of Donetsk andLuhansk regions.State support consists in the introduction by law of economic and investment activities differentfrom the general economic regime aimed at the restoration of industrial facilities, transport and socialinfrastructure, housing stock, reorientation of industrial potential, creation of new jobs, attraction ofinvestments and loans for restoration and development objects located in separate districts of Donetskand Luhansk regions.In order to implement sustainable socio-economic development of certain districts of Donetsk andLuhansk regions, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "OnState Target Programs", approves the state target program, which defines measures, tasks andindicators aimed at creating conditions for comprehensive and balanced territorial development ,restoration of production and export potential, ensuring the effective use of resource and industrialpotential, the needs of the population of the relevant territories for high-tech competitiveenvironmentally friendly products, high-quality services, creating a favorable environment forattracting investments and optimal implementation of investment activities, expanding the scope ofemployment by creating new jobs .The Law on the State Budget of Ukraine provides annually for expenditures aimed at statesupport for the socio-economic development of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.Ukraine guarantees the identification of such expenses of the general fund of the State Budget ofUkraine as protected expenses, the amount of which cannot be changed in the event of a reduction inthe approved budget allocations.Article 8. Executive bodies promote the development of cross-border cooperation in certaindistricts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions aimed at solving common development problems,strengthening and deepening good-neighborly relations between territorial communities, local self-government bodies of certain districts with administrative and territorial units of the RussianFederation on the basis of agreements on cross-border cooperation concluded by territorialcommunities, local self-government bodies, local executive bodies of Ukraine and territorialcommunities within the competence established by law.Article 9. In some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, by decision of the city, village, andvillage councils, people's militia units are created, which are entrusted with the task of protectingpublic order in the settlements of these districts.The coordination of the activities of the people's militia units for the protection of public order inpopulated areas is carried out by the relevant village, settlement, and city mayor.People's militia units are formed on a voluntary basis from the number of citizens of Ukraine whopermanently live in the respective settlements of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.People's militia units, during the protection of public order, exercise the powers provided for themby the laws of Ukraine.The village, settlement, and city mayor informs the local population about the formation andactivities of the people's militia units through mass media.Article 10. Final provisions1.This Law enters into force on the day of its publication.2.In accordance with paragraph 30 of the first part of Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, toappoint extraordinary elections of deputies of district, city, district in cities, village, village councils,village, village, city heads in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions for Sunday, December7, 2014.The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, within the limits of its authority, to take urgent measures toensure the financing of extraordinary elections, specified in the first paragraph of this clause, at theexpense of the reserve fund of the State Budget of Ukraine .
Annex 469
3/9/23, 10:17 PMAbout a special order... | on September 16, 2014 No. 1680-VII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1680-18/print3/33.The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should urgently, with the participation of local self-government bodies of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, prepare and submit draft lawsto the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for consideration and ensure the adoption of subordinate legal actsarising from this Law.4.Articles 2-9 of this Law shall be effective from the date of acquisition of powers by local self-government bodies in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, elected at extraordinaryelections held in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, this and other laws of Ukraine, incompliance with the principles of general, equal, free and transparent elections, as well as publicityand openness of the election process as the main principles of electoral law, established by theConstitution of Ukraine and international treaties of Ukraine, which establish universally recognizedinternational standards for ensuring human rights and are part of the national legislation of Ukraine,including with mandatory observance of OSCE standards regarding conducting democratic elections,with the provision of:participation in election observation by international impartial observers, in particular from theOSCE Bureau of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Congress of Local and RegionalAuthorities of the Council of Europe, other international organizations and foreign states, as well asother official observers;safe operating conditions and unimpeded participation of official observers in the electionprocess;withdrawal of all illegal armed formations, their military equipment, as well as militants andmercenaries from the territory of Ukraine;preventing illegal interference in the election process, including by illegal armed groups;compliance with the principles of political pluralism and multipartyism, equal rights andopportunities to participate in the election process;freedom of pre-election campaigning, equal opportunities of access to mass media and, for thispurpose, restoration of Ukrainian television and radio broadcasting, circulation of Ukrainian printmass media throughout the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;observance of guarantees of free expression of will and secret voting, electoral rights of internallydisplaced persons who were forced to leave their places of residence in certain areas of Donetsk andLuhansk regions;transparent counting of votes, establishment of voting results and results of local elections.{Article 10 is supplemented by clause 4 in accordance with Law No. 256-VIII dated 03.17.2015 }5.The special procedure for the activities of local self-government bodies in certain districts ofDonetsk and Luhansk regions provided for by this Law shall be implemented exclusively by local self-government bodies elected at extraordinary elections appointed and held in accordance with theConstitution of Ukraine, this and other laws of Ukraine .{Article 10 is supplemented by clause 5 in accordance with Law No. 256-VIII dated 03.17.2015 }President of UkraineP.POROSHENKOKyiv,September 16, 2014No. 1680-VIIПро особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької таЛуганської областейLaw of Ukraine on September 16, 2014 № 1680-VIIRevision on December 18, 2021, on the basis — 1930-IXDirect link:https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1680-18Legislation of Ukraineas of March 9, 2023validPublications of documentГолос України on October 18, 2014 — № 201Урядовий кур'єр on October 22, 2014 — № 195Офіційний вісник України on October 31, 2014 — 2014, № 85, page 9, article 2386, код акта 74320/2014Відомості Верховної Ради України on November 7, 2014 — 2014, № 45, page 2996, article 2043

Annex 470 Law of Ukraine No. 2268-VIII “On the Peculiarities of the State Policy on Ensuring Ukraine’s State Sovereignty Over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Lugansk Regions”, 18 January 2018 (translation)

Annex 470
3/9/23, 10:20 PM About the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print 1/11
{With changes introduced in accordance with Laws
No. 113-IX dated 19.09.2019 , VVR, 2019, No. 42, Article 238
No. 948-IX dated 03.11.2020 }
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
based on the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine and the Constitution of Ukraine ,
emphasizing that the sovereignty of Ukraine extends to its entire territory, which is integral and
inviolable within the internationally recognized state border,
guided by the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Relating to Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations of October 24, 1970, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe of August 1, 1975 ,
based on the fact that in accordance with points "a" , "b" , "c" , "d" and "g" of Article 3 of
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the United Nations General Assembly "Definition of aggression" of
December 14, 1974 the use of armed force by the Russian Federation against Ukraine constitutes a
crime of armed aggression and grossly violates the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in
Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons dated
December 5, 1994 and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and
the Russian Federation dated May 31, 1997,
considering that the date of the beginning of the occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine, in
particular the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, is determined by the Law of
Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily
Occupied Territory of Ukraine",
confirming the Address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the United Nations, the European
Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly, national parliaments of the
world countries on the recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state, approved by the
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from January 27, 2015 No. 129-VIII, and the Statement
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Repelling the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation and
Overcoming Its Consequences" , approved by Resolution No. 337-VIII of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine dated April 21, 2015,
noting that in light of the provisions of the IV Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its annex: Provisions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land dated October 18,
1907, the Geneva Convention for the Protection of the Civilian Population in Time of War dated
August 12, 1949 and of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
concerning the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977,
one of the consequences of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was the
temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine,
not recognizing the temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian
Federation,
based on the provisions of the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly "On the
Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" dated March 27, 2014 No. 68/262, which emphasize the illegitimacy
of holding a referendum in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and call on the international
community not to recognize any change in the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol based on the results of the said referendum,
taking into account the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations "The state of
affairs in the field of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
(Ukraine)" dated December 19, 2016 No. 71/205 and dated December 19, 2017 No. 72/190, which
recognize the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as territory temporarily
occupied by the Russian Federation,
confirming the inalienable sovereign right of Ukraine to restore and preserve its territorial
integrity within the internationally recognized state border, including the territory of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,
noting that the armed aggression of the Russian Federation began with unannounced and covert
incursions into the territory of Ukraine by units of the armed forces and other law enforcement
agencies of the Russian Federation, as well as by organizing and supporting terrorist activities,
Law of Ukraine No. 2268-VIII "About the peculiarities of the state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of
Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions", 18 January 2018,
available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18
T H E L AW O F U K R A I N E
{The law became invalid on the basis of Law No. 2217-IX dated 04/21/2022 }
About the peculiarities of the state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied
territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
(Information of the Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2018, No. 10, Article 54)
Translation
Annex 470
3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print2/11taking into account that the Russian Federation commits the crime of aggression against Ukraineand carries out the temporary occupation of part of its territory with the help of the armed forces of theRussian Federation, consisting of regular units and units subordinated to the Ministry of Defense ofthe Russian Federation, units and special formations subordinated to other forces agencies of theRussian Federation, their advisers, instructors and irregular illegal armed formations, armed gangs andgroups of mercenaries created, subordinated, managed and financed by the Russian Federation, as wellas with the help of the occupation administration of the Russian Federation, which consists of its statebodies and structures, functionally responsible for management of the temporarily occupied territoriesof Ukraine, and self-proclaimed bodies under the control of the Russian Federation,who usurped theperformance of official functions in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine,noting that the actions of the Russian Federation on the territory of certain districts of Donetskand Luhansk regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol grossly violatethe principles and norms of international law, in particular by: systematic non-compliance with thecease-fire regime and continued shelling of civilian objects and infrastructure, causing numerousvictims among the civilian population, servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other militaryformations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine; continuation of the practice of illegaldetention and detention of Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied territories, their illegalremoval and detention in the territory of the Russian Federation; efforts to spread Russian legislation,including tax legislation, on the territory of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, of theAutonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, making illegal demands for the re-registration of enterprises and collection of funds in favor of the occupation administration of theRussian Federation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in the Autonomous Republicof Crimea and the city of Sevastopol; the introduction of the Russian ruble as a single currency in theterritory of certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimeaand the city of Sevastopol; the arbitrary application of Russian educational standards in educationalinstitutions, the introduction of "external management" at enterprises in certain districts of Donetskand Luhansk regions, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and therecognition of illegal identification documents and vehicle registration marks in the territory of certaindistricts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol;organizing and carrying out forced disappearances, torture, inhumane treatment or punishment,extrajudicial executions against the civilian population, Ukrainian servicemen and hostages,remaining committed to the course of political and diplomatic settlement of conflicts based on theprinciples and norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations ,confirming the inalienable sovereign right of Ukraine to self-defense in accordance with Article51 of the Charter of the United Nations,confirming the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the withdrawal of Ukraine fromcertain obligations defined by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and theConvention on the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" , approved by Resolution of theVerkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated May 21, 2015 No. 462-VIII,considering that the peculiarities of the legal regime on the territory of the Autonomous Republicof Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are determined by the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rightsand Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine",adopts this Law, which aims to determine the specifics of the state policy to ensure the statesovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.Article 1. As of the date of adoption of this Law, parts of the territory of Ukraine over which thearmed forces of the Russian Federation and the occupation administration of the Russian Federationhave established and exercise general control are recognized as temporarily occupied territories in theDonetsk and Luhansk regions, namely:1) land territory and its internal waters within the boundaries of individual districts, cities, townsand villages of Donetsk and Luhansk regions;2) internal sea waters adjacent to the land territory specified in clause 1 of this part;3) the subsoil under the territories defined by clauses 1 and 2 of this part, and the airspace abovethese territories.The borders and list of districts, cities, towns and villages, parts of their territories, temporarilyoccupied in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions , are determined by the President of Ukraine at therequest of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, prepared on the basis of proposals of the General Staffof the Armed Forces of Ukraine.Article 2. The legal status of the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhanskregions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the legal regime inthese territories are determined by this Law, the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rights andFreedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine" , otherlaws of Ukraine, international treaties, the binding consent of which was given by the Verkhovna Radaof Ukraine, principles and norms of international law.The temporary occupation by the Russian Federation of the territories of Ukraine defined by thefirst part of Article 1 of this Law, regardless of its duration, is illegal and does not create any territorialrights for the Russian Federation.The activities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the occupation administration ofthe Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are contrary to the norms ofinternational law, are illegal, and any act issued in connection with such activities is invalid and doesnot create any legal consequences, except for documents, which confirm the fact of the birth or deathof a person in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which areattached in accordance with the application for the state registration of the birth of a person and theapplication for the state registration of the death of a person.
Annex 470
3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print3/11Responsibility for material or non-material damage caused to Ukraine as a result of the armedaggression of the Russian Federation rests with the Russian Federation in accordance with theprinciples and norms of international law.Within the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, there is a specialprocedure for ensuring the rights and freedoms of the civilian population, defined by this Law, otherlaws of Ukraine, international treaties, the binding consent of which was given by the Verkhovna Radaof Ukraine, principles and norms of international law.Individuals, regardless of their stay on the register as internally displaced persons or theiracquisition of a special legal status, and legal entities retain the right of ownership and other propertyrights to property, including immovable property, including land plots located on temporarily occupiedterritories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, if such property is acquired in accordance with thelaws of Ukraine.The state of Ukraine, territorial communities of villages, towns, cities located in the temporarilyoccupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, state authorities, local self-governmentbodies and other subjects of public law retain ownership rights, other real rights to property, includingfor real estate, including land plots located in temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhanskregions.The procedure for the regulation of transactions and the exercise of the rights of subjects, definedin parts six and seven of this article, defined by the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rights andFreedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine" ,applies, subject to the necessary changes (mutatis mutandis), to the temporarily occupied territories ofUkraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, except for the procedure for the entry of persons to andfrom the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which is established inaccordance with this Law, and the procedure for the territorial jurisdiction of cases of defendantslocated in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions regional courts,established in accordance with the Law of Ukraine"On the implementation of justice and criminalproceedings in connection with the anti-terrorist operation".Article 3. The state policy for ensuring the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarilyoccupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is based on the Constitution and laws ofUkraine, international treaties, the binding consent of which was given by the Verkhovna Rada ofUkraine, principles and norms of international law.Article 4. The goals of the state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in thetemporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are:1) liberation of temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and restorationof constitutional order in these territories;2) protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals and legal entities;3) ensuring the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine.Article 5. In order to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupiedterritories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, state authorities and their officials, acting on the basis,within the limits of authority and in the manner provided by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine :1) take measures to protect the rights and freedoms of the civilian population;2) carry out, in compliance with Ukraine's international obligations, international treaties, thebinding consent of which has been given by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the principles and normsof international law, political-diplomatic, sanctioning and other measures aimed at restoring theterritorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognized state border ;3) take measures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deter armed aggression ofthe Russian Federation;4) develop the defense and security potential of Ukraine with the involvement of state resourcesand international aid in order to repel the armed aggression of the Russian Federation;5) use the mechanisms of bilateral international cooperation, international organizations andinternational judicial bodies with the aim of preserving and strengthening the sanctions applied to theRussian Federation by members of the international community, as well as bringing guilty persons tocriminal responsibility for crimes against peace, human security and international legal order.{Clause 5 of the first part of Article 5 as amended in accordance with Law No. 948-IX datedNovember 3, 2020 }Article 6. The main areas of protection of the rights and freedoms of the civilian population in thetemporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are:1) protection of fundamental political and civil rights and freedoms of a person;2) taking measures for the release by the Russian Federation, the occupation administration of theRussian Federation of all illegally detained and detained citizens of Ukraine;3) assistance in ensuring the restoration of violated material rights;4) facilitating the provision of socio-economic, ecological and cultural needs, in particularthrough the implementation of measures determined by the central executive body of Ukraine, whichensures the formation and implementation of state policy on temporarily occupied territories, inaccordance with the relevant decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;5) provision of legal and humanitarian aid, including with the involvement of international aid, inparticular the provision of medical and social services in territories controlled by Ukraine;6) promoting the maintenance of cultural ties;7) ensuring access to educational institutions and mass media of Ukraine.
Annex 470
3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print4/11Peculiarities of the realization of other rights and freedoms of the civilian population and thecommission of criminal acts in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhanskregions are determined by the laws of Ukraine.The procedure for the entry of persons and the movement of goods to the temporarily occupiedterritories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the exit of persons and the movement of goodsfrom such territories shall be established in accordance with this Law.The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine takes all measures provided for by the legislation of Ukraineto protect the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen, in particular, it constantly monitors thestate of compliance with the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen and documents the facts ofviolations of such rights and freedoms in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, based on theresults of which it publishes and provides appropriate information to international organizations in thefield of protection of human rights and freedoms and takes the necessary measures for the formation ofan interdepartmental coordinating body with the aim of summarizing the legal position of the state onthe issue of repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and preparing aconsolidated claim of Ukraine to the Russian Federation regarding the implementation of itsinternational legal responsibility for armed aggression against Ukraine.The Human Rights Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine exercises parliamentarycontrol over the observance of the constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen in thetemporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and, if necessary, presents aspecial report to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the state of observance of the rights and freedomsof a person and a citizen in these territories .Ukraine is not responsible for the illegal actions of the Russian Federation or its occupationadministration in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions or for illegaldecisions taken by them.Article 7. In order to ensure national security, in particular state, economic, informational,humanitarian and ecological, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation inthe Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the bodies of the security and defense sector, other state bodies ofUkraine, their officials carry out measures to restore territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as ensurethe comprehensive development of security, economic, information and telecommunication, social andhumanitarian infrastructure in the territories adjacent to the temporarily occupied territories in theDonetsk and Luhansk regions, implement measures to strengthen the defense and security capabilitiesof Ukraine in accordance with the strategic defense planning documents.The Russian Federation as an occupying power in accordance with the IV Hague Convention onthe Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War onLand dated October 18, 1907, the Geneva Convention for the Protection of the Civilian Population inTime of War dated August 12, 1949 year and the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions datedAugust 12, 1949, relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I),dated June 8, 1977 is responsible for violations of the protection of the rights of the civilianpopulation.The fact of the final withdrawal and complete absence of all armed formations of the RussianFederation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in accordance with the procedure specified by thisLaw is established by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Minister of Internal Affairs ofUkraine by means of a joint submission to the President of Ukraine, who makes the appropriatedecision solely on this basis.Article 8. To ensure national security and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of theRussian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions:1) The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in agreement with the relevant leaders,engages and uses forces and means (personnel and specialists of individual divisions, military units,weapons, military equipment, special vehicles and vehicles, means of communication andtelecommunications, other material and technical means) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, othermilitary formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine (the Security Service of Ukraine,the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the NationalGuard of Ukraine, the State Border Service of Ukraine, the State Guard of Ukraine, the State SpecialTransport Service), special law enforcement agencies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, theNational Police of Ukraine, intelligence agencies of Ukraine, the central executive body,thatimplements state policy in the field of civil protection, as well as employees of health care institutions;{Clause 1 of the first part of Article 8 as amended in accordance with Law No. 113-IX datedSeptember 19, 2019 }2) in the security zones adjacent to the area of hostilities, there is a special procedure, whichprovides for the provision of security and defense sector bodies and other state bodies of Ukraine withspecial powers necessary for the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense,repulse and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation. The boundaries of the security zonesadjacent to the area of hostilities are determined by the Chief of the General Staff - the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the request of the Commander of the Joint Forces;3) in the area of implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repel anddeter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the possibilityof exercising by authorized persons of pre-trial investigation bodies and the prosecutor's office powersin criminal proceedings regarding offenses committed in the area of implementation of the specifiedmeasures, in particular due to the mandatory admission of inquirers, investigators and prosecutors tothis area, as well as providing them with appropriate assistance. The admission of inquirers,investigators and prosecutors to the area of implementation of measures to ensure national security anddefense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhanskregions is carried out in accordance with the procedure determined by the Commander of the JointForces.{The first part of Article 8 is supplemented by paragraph 3 in accordance with Law No. 948-IXdated November 3, 2020 }
Annex 470
3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print5/11Provision of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations formed in accordance withthe laws of Ukraine (the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Service of Special Communicationsand Information Protection of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Service ofUkraine, the Office of the State Security of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service), lawenforcement of special-purpose bodies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the National Policeof Ukraine, intelligence agencies of Ukraine, the central executive body that implements state policyin the field of civil protection, employees of health care institutions with the necessary means andresources is carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.{Part two of Article 8 as amended by Law No. 113-IX dated 09/19/2019 }The initiation and completion of measures to ensure national security and defense, repel and deterarmed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are determined byseparate decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.Article 9. Strategic management of the forces and means of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, othermilitary formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs ofUkraine, the National Police of Ukraine, the central executive body that implements state policy in thefield of civil protection, which are involved in the implementation of measures with ensuring nationalsecurity and defense, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in theDonetsk and Luhansk regions, is carried out by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.Management of the forces and means of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formationsformed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, theNational Police of Ukraine, the central executive body that implements state policy in the field of civilprotection, which are involved in the implementation of measures to ensure national security andDefense, repulse and deterrence of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation directly in theDonetsk and Luhansk regions is carried out by the Commander of the United Forces, who is appointedby the President of Ukraine on the proposal of the Chief of the General Staff - the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.The commander of the joint forces exercises his authority through the Joint OperationalHeadquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The powers of the Commander of the Joint Forces aredetermined by the Regulation on the Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,which is developed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and approved by the SupremeCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the request of the Minister of Defense ofUkraine.The Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, through the relevant militarymanagement bodies, plans, organizes and monitors the implementation of measures to ensure nationalsecurity and defense, repulse and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk andLuhansk regions, directs, coordinates and controls the activities of the military civil or militaryadministrations (if they are formed) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions on issues of national security anddefense.Military personnel, employees of law enforcement agencies and other persons who are involvedin the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deter armedaggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, for the duration of suchmeasures, are subordinate to the Commander of the Joint Forces, whose decision is bindingmandatory.The interference of any persons, regardless of their position, in the management of measures toensure national security and defense, repel and contain the armed aggression of the Russian Federationin the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is not allowed.Article 10. In the event of the expansion of the armed aggression of the Russian Federationbeyond the borders of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Donetsk andLuhansk regions, the forces and means specified in Article 8 of this Law, in the manner established byArticle 9 of this Law.Article 11. The legal basis for repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the RussianFederation and restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine is the Constitution of Ukraine , thelegislation of Ukraine and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.Article 12. Entry of persons and movement of goods to temporarily occupied territories inDonetsk and Luhansk regions and exit of persons and movement of goods from such territories arecarried out through entry-exit control points.In the event of a real threat to the life and health of persons crossing the demarcation line, thecommander of the joint forces has the right to restrict the entry of these persons to the temporarilyoccupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions for the period of existence of this threat.The procedure for the entry of persons, the movement of goods to the temporarily occupiedterritories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and the exit of persons and the movement of goodsfrom such territories are determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.The presence of persons not involved in such activities in the area of implementation of measuresto ensure national security and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation inthe Donetsk and Luhansk regions may be temporarily limited by the Commander of the United Forcesfor the period of such activities.The legal requirements of officials involved in the implementation of measures to ensure nationalsecurity and defense, repel and contain the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetskand Luhansk regions are mandatory for citizens and officials.In order to ensure the vital interests of society and the state during the repulsion of armedaggression in security zones adjacent to the area of hostilities, military personnel, law enforcementofficers and persons specified in Article 8 of this Law are involved in the implementation of measuresto ensure national security and defense , repulsion and deterring the armed aggression of the RussianFederation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in accordance with the Constitution and legislation ofUkraine have the right to:
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3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print6/111) in case of extreme necessity, use weapons and special means against persons who havecommitted or are committing offenses or other actions that prevent the fulfillment of the legalrequirements of persons involved in the implementation of measures to ensure national security anddefense, repulse and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhanskregions, or actions related to an unauthorized attempt to penetrate into the area of implementation ofthe specified measures;2) detain and deliver the persons specified in clause 1 of this part to the authorities of the NationalPolice of Ukraine;3) check citizens' and officials' identity documents, and in the absence of documents - detain themfor identification purposes;4) carry out a personal inspection of citizens, an inspection of their possessions, vehicles anditems transported by them;5) temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on streets and roads,prevent vehicles and citizens from entering certain areas and objects, remove citizens from certainareas and objects, tow away vehicles;6) enter (penetrate) residential and other premises, land plots belonging to citizens, the territoryand premises of enterprises, institutions and organizations, inspect vehicles for the implementation ofmeasures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deter armed aggression of the RussianFederation Federations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions;7) use means of communication and vehicles for official purposes, including special onesbelonging to citizens (with their consent), enterprises, institutions and organizations, except forvehicles of diplomatic, consular and other representative offices of foreign states and internationalorganizations.Article 13. Final and transitional provisions1. This Law enters into force on the day following its publication.2. By this Law, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, in accordance with paragraph 9 of the first part ofArticle 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, approves the decision of the President of Ukraine on the useof the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations formed in accordance with the laws ofUkraine, adopted in accordance with paragraph 19 of the first part of Article 106 of the Constitution ofUkraine, for repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetskand Luhansk regions and ensuring the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupiedterritories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.3. This Law applies without prejudice to the inalienable sovereign right of Ukraine to the territoryof the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol temporarily occupied by theRussian Federation and measures aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine within itsinternationally recognized state border.4. Make changes to the following legislative acts of Ukraine:1) in the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of War Veterans, Guarantees of Their Social Protection"(Vedomosti Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1993, No. 45, Article 425 with the following amendments):a) in paragraph 19 of the first part of Article 6:add the first paragraph with the words "in the implementation of measures to ensure nationalsecurity and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk andLuhansk regions, ensure their implementation, being directly in the districts and during theimplementation of the specified measures";the second paragraph should be read as follows:"The procedure for granting the status of a participant in hostilities to the persons specified in thefirst paragraph of this clause, the categories of such persons and the terms of their participation(ensuring the conduct) in the anti-terrorist operation, in measures to ensure national security anddefense, repel and deter the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhanskregions, as well as the areas of the anti-terrorist operation are determined by the Cabinet of Ministersof Ukraine. The areas of implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repulseand deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation are determined in accordance with the Law ofUkraine "On Peculiarities of State Policy to Ensure State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the TemporarilyOccupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts".specified in the first paragraph of this clause,shall be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine";b) in part two of Article 7:in point 11the words "as well as employees of enterprises, institutions, organizations who wereinvolved in ensuring the anti-terrorist operation and became disabled as a result of injury, contusion ormutilation received during the implementation of the anti-terrorist operation directly in the districtsand during its implementation" shall be replaced by the words "under the time of direct participation inthe implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repel and deter armedaggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, being directly in thedistricts and during the implementation of the specified measures, as well as employees of enterprises,institutions, organizations that were involved in ensuring carrying out an anti-terrorist operation, toensure the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense,repelling and deterringthe armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and becamedisabled as a result of injury, contusion, mutilation or illness received during the implementation ofanti-terrorist operations directly in the districts and during its implementation, during theimplementation of measures to ensure the national of security and defense, repelling and deterring thearmed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, being directly in thedistricts and during the implementation of the specified measures";while ensuring the implementationof measures to ensure national security and defense, repelling and deterring armed aggression of theRussian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, being directly in the districts and during theimplementation of the specified measures";while ensuring the implementation of measures to ensure
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3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print7/11national security and defense, repelling and deterring armed aggression of the Russian Federation inthe Donetsk and Luhansk regions, being directly in the districts and during the implementation of thespecified measures";Paragraph 14 should be read as follows:"14) persons who voluntarily ensured (or voluntarily participated in ensuring) the conduct of ananti-terrorist operation, the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repeland deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (includingvolunteering) and became persons with disabilities as a result of injury, contusion, mutilation ordisease received during the implementation of an anti-terrorist operation, being directly in the districtsand during its implementation, during the implementation of measures to ensure national security anddefense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions,being directly in the districts and during the implementation of the specified measures";c) in Clause 13 of Article 9:add the first paragraph with the words "who were involved and directly participated in ensuringthe implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repel and deter armedaggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, being directly in thedistricts and during the implementation of the specified measures, in the order established legislation";the second paragraph should be read as follows:"The procedure for granting the status of a participant in the war to the persons specified in thefirst paragraph of this clause, the categories of such persons, the terms of their participation inensuring the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation, in ensuring the implementation of measures toensure national security and defense, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the RussianFederation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the regions of the anti-terrorist operation aredetermined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The regions of implementation of measures toensure national security and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation aredetermined in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On Peculiarities of State Policy to Ensure StateSovereignty of Ukraine in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions";d) in Clause 1 of Article 10:the fifth paragraph should be amended as follows:"families of persons who voluntarily ensured (or voluntarily participated in ensuring) the conductof an anti-terrorist operation, implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense,repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions(including volunteer activities) and died (missing), died as a result of injury, contusion, mutilation ordisease received during the implementation of an anti-terrorist operation (including theimplementation of volunteer activities), being directly in the districts and during its implementation,during the implementation of measures to ensure the national security and defense,repelling anddeterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions(including the implementation of volunteer activities), being directly in the districts and during theimplementation of the specified measures";in the eighth paragraph of the word "and died (missing), died as a result of injury, contusion ormutilation received during direct participation in an anti-terrorist operation, ensuring itsimplementation, being directly in the areas of the anti-terrorist operation during its implementation, aswell as the families of employees enterprises, institutions, organizations that were involved in ensuringthe conduct of an anti-terrorist operation and died (missing), died as a result of injuries, contusions ormutilations received while ensuring the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation directly in the districtsand during its implementation" replace with the words "in the implementation of measures forensuring national security and defense, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the RussianFederation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, ensuring their implementation,while being directly inthe areas and during the implementation of the specified measures, and died (missing), died as a resultof injury, contusion, mutilation or disease received during direct participation in the anti-terroristoperation, ensuring its implementation, while being directly in the areas of the anti-terrorist operationduring its period conducting, during direct participation in the implementation of measures to ensurenational security and defense, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federationin the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in ensuring their implementation, being directly in the districtsand during the implementation of the specified measures, as well as families employees of enterprises,institutions, and organizations that were involved in ensuring the anti-terrorist operation,ensuring theimplementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repelling and deterring armedaggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and died (missing), died as aresult of injury, contusion, mutilation or disease received during the implementation of an anti-terroristoperation directly in the districts and during its implementation, ensuring the implementation ofmeasures to ensure national security and defense, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of theRussian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, being directly in the districts and during theimplementation of the specified measures";injuries or diseases received during the implementation ofan anti-terrorist operation directly in the districts and during its implementation, ensuring theimplementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repelling and deterring the armedaggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, while being directly in thedistricts and during the period implementation of the specified measures";injuries or diseases receivedduring the implementation of an anti-terrorist operation directly in the districts and during itsimplementation, ensuring the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense,repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhanskregions, while being directly in the districts and during the period implementation of the specifiedmeasures";2) in the Law of Ukraine "On Local Self-Government in Ukraine" (Vedomosti Verkhovna Rada ofUkraine, 1997, No. 24, Article 170 with the following amendments):a) add the first sentence of the second part of Article 42 with the words "or the Law of Ukraine"On the Legal Regime of Martial Law";
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3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print8/11b) in Article 78 :Clause 3 of the first part shall be amended as follows:"3) provided by the laws of Ukraine "On military-civilian administrations" , "On the legal regimeof martial law";in part five, replace the word "relevant military-civilian administration" with the words "relevantmilitary-civilian, military administration";c) in Article 79 :in the second paragraph of the second part of the word "in the case stipulated by the Law ofUkraine "On military-civilian administrations" replace the words "in the cases stipulated by the lawsof Ukraine "On military-civilian administrations" and "On the legal regime of martial law" ;in paragraph 3 1 of part eleven, the word "relevant military-civilian administration" should bereplaced by the words "relevant military-civilian, military administration";d) in Article :add the second paragraph of the second part with the following content:"The powers of the headman may be prematurely terminated also in the case provided for by theLaw of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law";in part seven :in paragraph 5, replace the words "the second part of this article" with the words "the firstparagraph of the second part of this article";add item 6 with the following content:"6) on the basis specified in the second paragraph of the second part of this article - from the dateof entry into force of the act of the President of Ukraine on the formation of the relevant militaryadministration of the settlement (settlements)";3) in the Law of Ukraine "On Military-Civil Administrations" (Reports of the Verkhovna Rada ofUkraine, 2015, No. 13, Article 87, No. 40-41, Article 382; 2016, No. 10, Article 108):a) in the preamble, replace the words "in the area of the anti-terrorist operation" with the words"in the area of repelling the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, in particular in the area of theanti-terrorist operation";b) in the first part of Article 1:in the first paragraph, replace the words "in the area of the anti-terrorist operation" with the words"in the area of repelling the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, in particular in the area of theanti-terrorist operation";in the second paragraph:after the words "as part of the Anti-terrorist Center under the Security Service of Ukraine" add thewords "(in the case of their formation to fulfill the powers of the relevant bodies in the area of the anti-terrorist operation) or as part of the Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (inthe case of their creation to fulfill the powers relevant authorities in the area of implementation ofmeasures to ensure national security and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of the RussianFederation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions)";after the words "participation in countermeasures" add the words "acts of armed aggression" andafter the words "catastrophes in the area" - the words "repulse of the armed aggression of the RussianFederation, in particular";c) in Article 3 :the fourth part after the words "with the Anti-terrorist Center under the Security Service ofUkraine" should be supplemented with the words "(in the case of formation to fulfill the powers ofrelevant authorities in the area of the anti-terrorist operation) or with the Joint OperationalHeadquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (in the case of formation to fulfill the powers of relevantbodies in the area of implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repel anddeter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions)";add part six with the words "and in the event of the formation of military-civilian administrationsto carry out the powers of relevant bodies in the area of measures to ensure national security anddefense, repulse and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhanskregions - at the request of the Commander of the United Forces" ;in part eight, replace the words "the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the Security Serviceof Ukraine at the request of the head of the relevant military-civilian administration" with the words"at the request of the head of the relevant military-civilian administration, the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center at the Security Service of Ukraine, and in the case of the formation of military-civilianadministrations of populated areas to carry out the powers of the relevant bodies in the area of measures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deter armed aggression of the RussianFederation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - the Commander of the United Forces";in part nine :in the first sentence, replace the words "and if the relevant regional military-civilianadministrations have not been formed - the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the SecurityService of Ukraine" with the words "if the relevant regional military-civilian administrations have notbeen formed - the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the Security Service of Ukraine, and in thecase the formation of military-civilian administrations of settlements, district military-civilian
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3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print9/11administrations to fulfill the powers of relevant bodies in the area of implementing measures to ensurenational security and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in theDonetsk and Luhansk regions - Commander of the United Forces";the second sentence should be supplemented with the words "and in the event of the formation ofmilitary-civilian administrations to fulfill the powers of the relevant bodies in the area of implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deter armedaggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - the Commander of theUnited Forces";add a new paragraph with the following content to part eleven after the third paragraph:"The powers of military-civilian administrations of settlements, district, regional military-civilianadministrations are also terminated in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime ofMartial Law".In this regard, the fourth paragraph shall be considered the fifth paragraph;in part thirteen, replace the words "by the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the SecurityService of Ukraine at the request of the head of the relevant military-civilian administration withoutcompetitive selection" with the words "without competitive selection at the request of the head of therelevant military-civilian administration by the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center at the SecurityService of Ukraine, and in the case of formation of military-civilian administrations of settlements tofulfill the powers of relevant bodies in the area of implementation of measures to ensure nationalsecurity and defense, repel and deter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk andLuhansk regions - by the Commander of the United Forces";d) the first paragraph of the first part of Article 5, after the words "with the Anti-Terrorist Centerunder the Security Service of Ukraine", add the words "and in the case of the formation of military-civilian administrations to exercise the powers of the relevant bodies in the area of implementingmeasures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deter armed aggression of the RussianFederation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - in agreement with the Commander of the combinedforces";e) in Article 6 :the second part should be written as follows:"2. The military-civilian administration of the settlement (settlements) is headed by the head, whois appointed and dismissed by the head of the relevant regional military-civilian administration inagreement with the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the Security Service of Ukraine, and in thecase of the formation of a military-civilian administration settlement (settlements) to exercise thepowers of relevant bodies in the area of measures to ensure national security and defense, repulse anddeter armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - in agreementwith the Commander of the Joint Forces. If the relevant regional military-civilian the administration isnot formed,the head of the military-civilian administration of the settlement (settlements) is appointedand dismissed by the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the Security Service of Ukraine, and inthe case of the formation of the military-civilian administration of the settlement (settlements) toexercise the powers of the relevant authorities in the area of implementation of measures with ensuringnational security and defense, repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federationin the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - by the Commander of the United Forces";repulse andcontainment of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions -by the Commander of the United Forces";repulse and containment of the armed aggression of theRussian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - by the Commander of the United Forces";point 10 of part three after the words "for the period until completion" add the words "repulse ofthe armed aggression of the Russian Federation, in particular";e) to exclude the second part of Article 7;4) in the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" (Annuals of the Verkhovna Radaof Ukraine, 2015, No. 28, Article 250):a) in Article 4 :add the first paragraph of part three with the words "or termination of their powers in accordancewith the law";the first sentence of the fourth part, after the words "within the terms established by the Law ofUkraine "On Local Self-Government in Ukraine", add the words "or the termination of their powers inaccordance with the law";supplement with part nine of the following content:"9. In connection with the formation of military administrations of settlements, the powers of themilitary-civilian administrations of these settlements are terminated from the day the relevant militaryadministration begins to exercise its powers.In the case of the formation of district, oblast military administrations, on the day of entry intoforce of the act of the President of Ukraine on their formation, the powers of the respective district,oblast military-civilian administrations shall be terminated";b) Article 28 shall be supplemented with paragraph 2 1 of the following content:"2 1. In the case of the introduction of martial law in certain localities in connection with thearmed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions:1) on the day of entry into force of the act of the President of Ukraine on the establishment of amilitary administration, the following powers shall be terminated in accordance with this Law:of the regional council, its executive apparatus, officials and officials of local self-governmentwho work in these bodies, - in case of formation of the corresponding regional military administration;
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3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print10/11of the district council, its executive apparatus, officials and officials of local self-government whowork in these bodies, - in case of formation of the corresponding district military administration;village, settlement, city, district councils in cities (in the case of their creation) councils, theirexecutive bodies, village, settlement, city mayors, other officials and officials of local self-governmentwho work in these local self-government bodies, elders - in the case of the formation of a militaryadministration of the relevant settlement (settlements);2) district, oblast military administrations exercise in the relevant territory, together with thepowers of local state administrations, the powers to introduce and implement measures of the legalregime of martial law, and also exercise the powers provided for in clauses 1-10 of part three of Article15 of this Law;3) military administrations of settlements, district, regional military administrations exercise theirpowers until the day of the first meeting of the first session of the corresponding council elected afterthe abolition of martial law;4) direction, coordination and control over the activities of regional military administrations inmatters of defense, public order and security, the implementation of measures of the legal regime ofmartial law are carried out by the United Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraineunder the general leadership of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and in othermatters - The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine within its powers; direction, coordination and controlover the activities of district military administrations in matters of defense, public order and security,implementation of martial law measures are carried out by regional military administrations, and inother matters by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, regional state administrations within theirpowers;5) The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine exercises the powers provided for in clauses1, 3, and 4 of Article 14 of this Law, as well as the organization of training and implementation ofgeneral leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, units, units and bodies of other military formationsformed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine and law enforcement agencies during theirimplementation of measures of the legal regime of martial law;6) The commander of the joint forces directs the forces and means of the Armed Forces ofUkraine, other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, which are directlyinvolved in the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, repulse and deterarmed aggression of the Russian Federation and the legal regime of military state, through the relevantbodies of military administration";5) clause 3 of the first part of article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rights andFreedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine"(Vidomosti Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2014, No. 26, Article 892) shall be amended as follows:"3) subsoil under the territories specified in clauses 1 and 2 of this part, and the airspace abovethese territories";6) Article 28 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine (Vedomosti of the Verkhovna Rada ofUkraine, 2017, No. 48, Article 436) shall be supplemented with a new part of the following contentafter the sixteenth part:"17. Lawsuits for the protection of violated, unrecognized or disputed rights, freedoms or interestsof natural persons (including compensation for damage caused as a result of restrictions on theexercise of the right to own real property or its destruction, damage) in connection with the armedaggression of the Russian Federation, armed conflict, temporary occupation of the territory of Ukraine,emergency situations of a natural or man-made nature can also be presented at the place of residenceor stay of the plaintiff";7) the first part of Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine "On Court Fees" (Vedomosti Verkhovna Radaof Ukraine, 2012, No. 14, Article 87 with subsequent amendments) shall be supplemented withparagraphs 21 and 22 of the following content:"21) applicants - in cases of applications for the establishment of facts of legal significancesubmitted in connection with armed aggression, armed conflict, temporary occupation of the territoryof Ukraine, emergency situations of a natural or man-made nature that led to forced resettlement fromtemporarily occupied the territory of Ukraine, death, injury, captivity, illegal deprivation of liberty orkidnapping, as well as violation of the right of ownership of movable and/or immovable property;22) plaintiffs - in cases of claims against the aggressor state of the Russian Federation forcompensation for property and/or moral damage caused in connection with the temporary occupationof the territory of Ukraine, armed aggression, armed conflict that led to forced resettlement from thetemporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, death, injury, captivity, illegal deprivation of liberty orkidnapping, as well as violation of the right to ownership of movable and/or immovable property";8) Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On Combating Terrorism" (Vedomosti Verkhovna Rada ofUkraine, 2003, No. 25, Article 180) shall be supplemented by the tenth paragraph with the followingcontent:"an anti-terrorist operation can be carried out simultaneously with repelling armed aggression inaccordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and/or under the conditions of theintroduction of martial law or a state of emergency in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine andthe legislation of Ukraine."5. To establish that specific features of the activities of higher education institutions and scientificinstitutions displaced from the temporarily occupied territory are regulated by Articles 2 and 5 1 of theLaw of Ukraine "On Temporary Measures for the Period of the Anti-Terrorist Operation".6. Acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, as well as restrictions put into effect by decisionsof the President of Ukraine, shall apply until the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopts any decisionsregarding the application of the provisions of this Law.
Annex 470
3/9/23, 10:20 PMAbout the peculiarities of the state... | on January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/2268-19/print11/117. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine within one month from the date of entry into force of thisLaw:to bring its normative legal acts into compliance with this Law;to ensure that the ministries and other central bodies of executive power bring their regulatoryacts into compliance with this Law.President of UkraineP. POROSHENKOKyiv,January 18, 2018No. 2268-VIIIПро особливості державної політики із забезпечення державного суверенітету України натимчасово окупованих територіях у Донецькій та Луганській областяхLaw of Ukraine on January 18, 2018 № 2268-VIIILoss of force on May 7, 2022, on the basis — 2217-IXDirect link:https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/2268-19Legislation of Ukraineas of March 9, 2023invalidPublications of documentГолос України on February 23, 2018 — № 37Урядовий кур'єр on February 28, 2018 — № 41Офіційний вісник України on March 6, 2018 — 2018, № 19, page 7, article 630, код акта 89242/2018Відомості Верховної Ради України on March 9, 2018 — 2018, № 10, page 67, article 54

Annex 471 Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 795-IX “On Calling Regular Local Elections in 2020”, 15 July 2020 (translation)

Annex 471
3/9/23, 10:22 PM About the appointment of regular me... | on July 15, 2020 No. 795-IX (Print version)
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/795-20/print 1/2
R E S O L U T I O N o f
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
About the appointment of the next local elections in 2020
(Information of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VVR), 2020, No. 33, Article 230)
In accordance with paragraph 30 of the first part of Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the
second part of Article 194 of the Election Code of Ukraine, guided by the fifth part of Article 8 of the
Law of Ukraine "On ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime in the
temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine", Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine On the peculiarities of the
state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions", the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine
Regarding the Determination of Territories and Administrative Centers of Territorial Communities",
Articles 1 , 3Law of Ukraine "On Military-Civil Administrations", Decree of the President of Ukraine
dated February 7, 2019 No. 32/2019 "On the boundaries and list of districts, cities, towns and villages,
parts of their territories, temporarily occupied in Donetsk and Luhansk regions".
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decrees :
1. Schedule regular elections of deputies of local councils and village, settlement, and city heads
(except those specified in clauses 2 and 3 of this Resolution) for Sunday, October 25, 2020.
2. Elections of deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, deputies
of local councils and heads of villages, towns, and cities in the temporarily occupied territories of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and in certain districts, cities, towns, and
villages of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are not scheduled or held.
3. Due to the impossibility of ensuring the representation of common interests of territorial
communities of villages, towns and cities of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, elections of deputies of
Donetsk and Luhansk regional councils are not appointed and are not held.
4. Elections of deputies of local councils and village, township, city mayors, not appointed in
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Resolution, will be appointed in the order and terms
established by separate laws, under the conditions of: cessation of the temporary occupation and armed
aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and Namely: withdrawal of all illegal armed
formations managed, controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, Russian occupation forces,
and their military equipment from the territory of Ukraine; restoration of full control of Ukraine over
the state border of Ukraine; disarmament of all illegal armed formations and mercenaries operating in
the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; restoration of the constitutional system and law and
order in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; ensuring the safety of citizens of Ukraine,
5. Regular local elections will not be held in the case of the appointment of the first elections of
deputies of the respective local councils and village, settlement, city heads on October 25, 2020.
6. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:
1) take measures within the limits of authority to ensure financing of local elections on October
25, 2020 at the expense of the State Budget of Ukraine ;
2) together with the Central Election Commission, develop measures and recommendations aimed
at preventing the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) during local elections on October 25,
2020, taking into account the requirements of the Election Code of Ukraine ;
3) make a calculation and estimate expenses for the provision of measures specified in sub-item 2
of this item.
7. The Central Election Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure established by the
legislation of Ukraine, take measures regarding the financial and logistical support for the preparation
and holding of the elections provided for in paragraph 1 of this Resolution, at the expense of the State
Budget of Ukraine .
8. This Resolution enters into force on the day following its publication.
Chairman of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine
D. RAZUMKOV
Kyiv,
July 15, 2020
No. 795-IX
On the appointment of regular local elections in 2020
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 15, 2020 No. 795-IX
Adoption on July 15, 2020
Direct link:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/795-20
Legislation of Ukraine
as of March 9, 2023
valid
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 795-IX "About the appointment of
the next local elections in 2020", 15 July 2020, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
laws/show/795-IX#Text
Translation
Annex 471
3/9/23, 10:22 PMAbout the appointment of regular me... | on July 15, 2020 No. 795-IX (Print version)https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/795-20/print2/2Publications of documentГолос України on July 22, 2020 — № 125Офіційний вісник України on August 4, 2020 — 2020, № 60, page 171, article 1902, код акта 100178/2020Відомості Верховної Ради України on August 14, 2020 — 2020, № 33, page 5, article 230
Annex 472 Metapicz, Metadata for the Picture of Alleged Launch Site Image

Annex 472
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Annex 473 Pictures.reuters.com, Members of a “Maidan” self-defence battalion take part in a training at a base of Ukraine's National Guard near Kiev (31 March 2014)

Annex 473
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Annex 474 Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014 (translation)

Annex 474
Translation
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014, available at: http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/802-VII.
RESOLUTION of
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine
On the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
(Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada (BVR), 2014, No. 12, p.204)
{For more information, see VR Resolutions
No. 1526-VII of 19.06.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 32, p.1149
No. 1660-VII of 02.09.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 40, p. 2022
No. 10-VIII of 02.12.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 52, p.2063
No. 11-VIII of 02.12.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 52, p. 2064}
In accordance with clause 12 of part one of Article 85, part four of Article 114 of the Constitution of
Ukraine, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine resolves:
{For dismissal of members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, see VR Resolution No. 11-VIII
dated 02.12.2014}
1. Appoint:
{Vitaliy Yarema was dismissed from the post by the Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No.
1526-VII of 19.06.2014;
{ Volodymyr Borysovich Groysman was dismissed from office as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine - Minister
of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine by Resolution of the
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 10-VIII of 02.12.2014};
Aleksandr Maksymovich Sych as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine;
Arsen Borysovich Avakov as Minister of Internal Affairs;
Dmitry Sergeyevich Bulatov as Minister of Youth and Sports of Ukraine;
Maksym Yuriyevich Burbak as Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine;
Lyudmyla Leontyevna Denisova as Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine;
Sergey Myronovich Kvit as Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine;
Andrey Vladimirovich Mokhnyk as Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine;
Oleg Stepanovich Musiy as Minister of Healthcare of Ukraine;
Yevgeniy Mikhailovich Nyshchuk as Minister of Culture of Ukraine;
Pavel Petrenko as Minister of Justice of Ukraine;
Yuriy Vasylyevich Prodan, Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine;
Ostap Mikhailovich Semerak, Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
Ihor Aleksandrovich Shvayka as the Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine;
{The resignation of Sheremet Pavlo Mykhailovich as the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of
Ukraine was accepted in accordance with the Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 1660-VII
dated 02.09.2014};
Annex 474
Aleksandr Shlapak as Minister of Finance of Ukraine. 2. This Resolution shall enter into force upon its adoption. Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine O. TURCHINOV Kiev 27 February 2014 No. 802-VII
Annex 474
On the Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine of
27.02.2014 No. 802-VII Wording of 02.12.2014, grounds - 10-
VIII, 11-VIII
Permanent address: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/802-18
Legislation of Ukraine as of 08.03.2023 in force
Publications of the document
• The Voice of Ukraine of 01.03.2014 - No. 39, /
Special Issue /.
• Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine of
21.03.2014 - 2014, no. 12, pp. 807, Article 204

Annex 475 GICHD, Explosive Ordnance Guide for Ukraine, 2022.

Annex 475
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
GUIDE FOR UKRAINE
FIRST EDITION
Annex 475
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThis guide was developed by Roly Evans and Bob Seddon with the support of Jovana Carapic and Tammy Hall.GICHD would like to especially thank Sean Moorhouse for his advice during the development of this guide. Thanks also to John Montgomery, the Danish EOD and Search Center, the Dutch EOD Center and Kdo Kamir for their kind support to the CORD database and this guide.Explosive Ordnance Guide for Ukraine, GICHD, 2022 © GICHDThe content of this publication, its presentation and the designations employed do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) regarding the legal status of any country, territory or armed group, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All content remains the sole responsibility of the GICHD.Cover: OF-25 projectile. Ukraine. April 2022. Image © Sean Moorhouse.
Annex 475
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES10MON-50Image © Danish EOD and Search Center ORDNANCE SUB-CATEGORYAnti-Personnel Directional FragmentationEXPLOSIVE FILL (g)700g PVV-5AAUW (g)2000gDIMENSIONS (mm)226x156x66COUNTRY OF ORIGINRussia/BulgariaFUZEMUV/VPF/EPDr/NM with MD-5 MON stands for ‘Mina Oskolochnaya Napravlennogo’ and was developed as a Soviet version of the M18 Claymore. It is a directional fragmentation anti-personnel mine. It has a plastic casing, either green or brown in colour. On the concave side will be printed MON-50 with respective factory markings. For Russian version, on the other convex side the phrase “К ПРОТИВНИКУ” (k protivniku, “towards enemy”) may be printed onto the plastic in black. The mine contains 700g of Plastichnym Vzryvchatym Veshchestvom - 5A (PVV-5A), an RDX based plastic explosive with 20% plasticiser.The two detonator cavities enables two different means of initiation. For example the mine could be set for command initiation in one fuze well, and victim initiation by means of trip wire in another. For command initiation this mine is often used with the NM electrical initiator. For tripwire initiation, the MUV series of mechanical switches is most often used.There have been recent reports that MON-50 and MON-90 AP mines have been found with anti-handling (tilt) devices in Ukraine or protected by ‘keeper’ anti-personnel blast mines. MON-50 mines in Ukraine have also been placed on top of ML-8 anti-lift initiators. Consideration should be given to pulling these devices using hook and line if boobytraps are suspected.
Annex 475
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES 11MON-90Image © Fenix InsightORDNANCE SUB-CATEGORYAnti-Personnel Directional FragmentationEXPLOSIVE FILL (g)6200g PVV-5AAUW (g)12100gDIMENSIONS (mm)345x202x153COUNTRY OF ORIGINRussia/BulgariaFUZEMUV/VPF/EPDr/NM with MD-5 This is a larger version of the MON-50, with a greater range. The MON-90 designation indicates an effective range of 90m.Unlike the MON-50, the MON-90 is not equipped with scissor legs. It is only equipped with a tree spike mounting. The MON-90 comes with a distinctive case (the same size as an 82mm mortar case) with an aiming marker indentation on the lid that braces the mine. Sometimes the MON-90 can be found deployed on this storage box.As with the MON-50 the mine has two fuze wells with M-10 threads enabling employment of two different fuze types. The mine’s fragmentation consists of 2,000 pieces of chopped steel, each 7 mm long. For command initiation this mine is often used with the NM electrical initiator. For tripwire initiation, the MUV series of mechanical switches is most often used.The mine is typically a green base colour with black, stencilled markings. MON-90 and the batch number is stencilled on the rear of the body.
Annex 475
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES12MON-100Left, INERT MON-100 with INERT MUV-1 fuze. Image © Kdo Kamir Right, Image © Danish EOD and Search CenterORDNANCE SUB-CATEGORYAnti-Personnel Directional FragmentationEXPLOSIVE FILL (g)2000g TNTAUW (g)5000gDIMENSIONS (mm)236x83COUNTRY OF ORIGINRussiaFUZEMUV/VPF/EPDr/NM with MD-5 The MON-100 is the second-largest in the MON series, with the 100 designation indicating its intended lethal range of 100 metres. The MON-100 and the MON-200 are both large cylindrical directional fragmentation mines that are distinctly different from the smaller MON-50 and MON-90. The mine has a single fuze well in the centre of the concave face of the body. It can hold either electrical or non-electric detonators. It has a U-shaped, metal, frame, fitted with a spike for mounting. The metal frame has 2 pivots, which allow the mine to be aimed in a specific direction. The mine is also fitted with a canvas carrying handle on the side of the body. The mine’s fragmentation consists of 400 pieces of chopped steel, each 10 mm long. The fragmentation is set into a resin matrix, immediately behind the convex side of the mine body. Owing to its size, the mine is typically command initiated, usually with an NM type initiator, but it could also be tripwire initiated, usually with an MUV-type mechanical switch.
Annex 475
ANTI-VEHICLE MINES 24TM-62MImage © Danish EOD and Search Center ORDNANCE SUB-CATEGORYAnti-Vehicle MineEXPLOSIVE FILL (g)7500g TNTAUW (g)9500gDIMENSIONS (mm)320x128COUNTRY OF ORIGINRussiaFUZEMVCh-62 / MVP-62The TM-62M is a metal-bodied, AV, blast mine, which was developed from the earlier TM-57. The mine has a single, large, bakelite, central fuze well, with a metal-cased booster screwed onto the bottom of the fuze well. Like all other mines in the TM-62 series, the TM-62M will accept all fuzes that were developed for the TM-62 series, the TM-72 series and the TM-80 series of mines. Therefore, potentially this mine can be fitted with a range of magnetic influence fuzes. The TM-62M is typically fitted with the pressure-actuated, MVCh-62 pressure fuze, which contains a cocked-striker retained by ball bearings. It is armed by removing the safety clip from the arming button. This begins a clockwork arming delay where a spring-loaded striker moves from the horizontal to the vertical and in line with the detonator. Once armed a weight greater than 150 kg will initiate the fuze.The image above shows the mine with an MVP minimum metal fuze. If deployed in the field in this way, it would be a waste of a fuze and would indicate a potential lack of training or lack of alternative fuzes for those who emplaced the mine.The TM-62M is confirmed as being widely used in Ukraine since 2014. It is known to be used at roadblocks among other locations.
Annex 476 Selidovo City Court of Donetsk region, Case No. 242/2571/14-k, Sentence of 24 December 2014 (excerpt, translation)

Annex 476
1 of
Excerpt
Translation
Selidovo City Court of Donetsk region, Case No. 242/2571/14-k, Sentence of 24 December 2014,
available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/42086406.
Proceedings No. 242/2571/14-k
Case No. 1-kp/242/341/14
VERDICT
IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE
December 24, 2014, city of Selydovo
Selydovo City Court of Donetsk Region
composed of:
the presiding judge PERSON_1,
with the secretary, PERSON_2,
Having considered in an open court session in courtroom No. 1 of the Selydovo City Court of Donetsk
Region criminal case No. 12014050500000560 against PERSON_3, INFORMATION_1, a native of the
village of Nizhnyaya Maktoma, Almetyevsky district, Tatarstan, a citizen of Ukraine; completed secondary
vocational education; unemployed; not married; has a dependent daughter, PERSON_4,
INFORMATION_2 , not previously convicted as per the requirements of Article 89 of the Criminal Code
of Ukraine; who is registered and resides at the following address: ADDRESS_1, -
who is accused under Article 146(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine;
with the participation of the parties to the criminal proceedings: prosecutor, PERSON_5, the accused,
PERSON_3, the defense counsel, PERSON_6, and the victim, PERSON_7
HAS ESTABLISHED THAT:
On March 18, 2014, at about 21:20 (the exact time has not been established), the accused, PERSON_3,
near the house at ADDRESS_2, in collusion with a person the case against whom has been separated into
separate proceedings, committed an illegal abduction of an individual in collusion with a group of persons,
which was accompanied by causing physical suffering to the victim.
[…]
The person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings made a phone call to the
victim, PERSON_7, with whom he was talking for some time via mobile phone. After he introduced
himself as Ruslan, he learned that she was going from her place of work at the Central Ore-Dressing Plant
"Ukraine" in the city of Ukrainsk, Donetsk region, to her place of residence at: ADDRESS_3. Then
PERSON_3 and the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, having
previously distributed roles among themselves, without informing PERSON_8 of their further roles, agreed
Annex 476
2 of that PERSON_3 would observe PERSON_7 all the way from work to her home, and then force her to the car of the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, who would be waiting for them in his car near the Raduga store located on Oktyabrskaya Street in the city of Ukrainsk, Donetsk region. PERSON_3, picking up a metal chain that he had prepared in advance to overcome the resistance of PERSON_7, went to the territory of the Central Ore-Dressing Plant "Ukraine", where he saw PERSON_7 leaving the checkpoint and followed her. When PERSON_7 was on her way, PERSON_3, at approximately 21:20 (the exact time has not been established), while near the house at ADDRESS_2, with the aim of illegally abducting PERSON_7, in collusion with the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, deliberately threw a metal chain around PERSON_7's neck, over her clothes, thereby inflicting physical pain to PERSON_7, and threatened her with further physical violence if she screamed. PERSON_7, fearing for her life and health, agreed to comply with the conditions of PERSON_3, who soon removed the chain from her neck, took her by the hand and led her to a place agreed with the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings. Since the movement of the victim, PERSON_7, was effectively restricted from that time on, the illegal collusive abduction committed by a group of persons was completed. While standing near the Raduga store located on Oktyabrskaya Street in Ukrainsk, Donetsk region, PERSON_3, threatening PERSON_7 with physical violence, pulled a hat she was wearing over her eyes, limiting her ability to see the environment, and ordered her to get into a car GAZ-21 Volga, license plate No. NUMBER_1. After that, PERSON_7 got into the car in the rear passenger seat, while PERSON_3 sat on her right and PERSON_8 was already sitting on her left. Then PERSON_3 grabbed and held PERSON_7's hands with both hands, and the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, while being in the driver's seat tied the victim's hands with a jeans belt and pulled her hat over PERSON_7's eyes, thereby limiting her ability to see and move her hands. After that, the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings drove the car to the city of Selidovo, Donetsk region, where he dropped off PERSON_9 on the way and continued to drive. Stopping on Gaidar Street in the city of Selydovo, Donetsk region, the person the case against whom has been separated into separate proceedings, put PERSON_7 off the car, untied her eyes and hands, and then took her to his place of residence, at: ADDRESS_4, leaving PERSON_3 waiting for him in the car. After some time, the accused PERSON_3 stopped waiting for PERSON_10 and went home. […] He knows from his wife's words that on 18.03.2014, when she was standing near her house after work, she was approached by an unfamiliar elderly man who pulled a hat over her eyes, put a metal chain around her neck and forced her into a car. Then, in the same car, she was abducted and transported to the house of PERSON_11 in the town of Selidovo. Previously, he had had a conflict with PERSON_11's adopted son. PERSON_11's adopted son is serving a sentence in prison for inflicting bodily harm on him. Prior to this incident, PERSON_11 had threatened him by phone that he would rape his wife. He believes that his wife's abduction was related to PERSON_11's threats. […] HAS RULED THAT: PERSON_3 shall be found guilty as charged under Article 146(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and shall be sentenced to two years' imprisonment under Article 146(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Until the verdict enters into legal force, the measure of restraint in respect of PERSON_3 shall remain the same, i.e. personal recognizance.
Annex 476
3 of PERSON_3's term for serving punishment shall run from the moment of his detention. […] Judge

Annex 477
DTEK Energy B.V., FY 2016 Results Corporate Presentation DTEK Energy B.V., April 2017

Annex 476
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Annex 478
Photo of remains of the rocket part of 122 Grad MLRS projectile in the pavement at Andrey
Linev Street, opposite the western end of the house at 79A
(translation)

Annex 478
Translation
Photo of remains of the rocket part of 122 Grad MLRS projectile in the pavement at Andrey
Linev Street, opposite the western end of the house at 79A, available at:
https://lostarmour.info/articles/obstrel-kvartalov-mirnyy-i-gaevogo-goroda-luganska-sprimeneniem-
rszo-grad-14-iyulya-2014-goda#.
Figure 12 - Photo of remains of the rocket part of 122 Grad MLRS projectile in the pavement at
Andrey Linev Street, opposite the western end of the house at 79A.

Annex 479
VPK News, Even school buses have been mobilised in Ukraine (14 April 2021)
(translation)

Annex 479
Translation
VPK News, Even school buses have been mobilised in Ukraine (14 April 2021), available at:
https://vpk.name/news/500051_na_ukraine_mobilizovali_dazhe_shkolnye_avtobusy.html.
Even school buses have been mobilised in Ukraine
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
The Ukrainian military will travel around Donbass in a yellow KAVZ-39765 school
bus. One such vehicle was spotted on a train carrying various equipment to
Donbass. The train arrived at the Rozovka station.
Despite the assurances of #Ukrainian authorities that the use of force in #Donbass is impossible,
the Ministry of Defence of #Ukraine continues to pull trains with equipment into the JFO zone.
On April 10, 2021, arrived at the Rozovka station of Donetsk railway for unloading.
pic.twitter.com/wGztAwTzTv
- Sukhoi Su-57 Felon (@I30mki) April 12, 2021
Such, so to speak, camouflage has sparked a heated discussion on social media. Many are
outraged at the provocative actions of the Ukrainian armed forces. Indeed, if something goes
wrong, they can always claim that a civilian vehicle was fired upon.
Others joke caustically, noting that Kiev's officials in uniform are forced to mobilise anything that
can move, even ordinary civilian vehicles, for the war.
In principle, Ukrainian formations have been seen doing similar things before. Thus, at the height of
the hostilities, a convoy of GAZ-66 vehicles with the appropriate insignia was engaged in towing twin
small-calibre ZU-23-2 automatic cannons. If we talk about this echelon, other non-military vehicles
such as Bogdan buses, off-road vehicles etc. are also present on the platforms.
There is also a lot of military equipment: BRDM-2 armoured reconnaissance and patrol vehicles,
light MT-LB tracked transporters, anti-aircraft guns.
Alexei Brusilov

Annex 480
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 1822-VIII “On Establishing Ukrainian Volunteer
Day”, 17 January 2017
(translation)

Annex 480
Translation
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Resolution No. 1822-VIII “On Establishing Ukrainian
Volunteer Day”, 17 January 2017, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1822-
19#Text.
On Establishing Ukrainian Volunteer Day
Document 1822-VIII; in effect; up-to-date version – Adopted on
17.01.2017
RESOLUTION
Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine
On Establishing Ukrainian Volunteer Day
In order to honor the courage and heroism of the defenders of Ukraine's
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; to promote further
strengthening of the patriotic spirit in society; to heighten public attention to
and provide more care for members of volunteer formations; and to support
the initiative of the public, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine hereby resolves
that:
1. The Day of Ukrainian Volunteer in Ukraine be introduced, which is to be
celebrated annually on March 14.
2. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine be recommended to develop, with the
involvement of the public and active members of volunteer formations who
participated in the Revolution of Dignity, and, within one month from the
date of adoption of this Resolution, approve a comprehensive plan of
measures for celebrating the Day of Ukrainian Volunteer at the state level
by providing, in particular: the holding of annual events to properly honor
the feats of Ukrainian volunteers; the holding of thematic events devoted
to mass public protests in educational institutions, military units, and
cultural institutions;
3. The implementation of this Resolution be overseen by the Verkhovna Rada
Committee on National Security and Defense and the Verkhovna Rada
Committee on Veterans, Combatants, Participants of the Anti-Terrorist
Operation and People with Disabilities.
Annex 480
4.This Resolution shall enter into force from the date of its adoption.Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of UkraineA. PARUBIYKiev17 January 2017No. 1822-VIII
Annex 481
State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, Information for MFA
(from 2014 to 2022 and plans for 2023)
(translation)

Annex 481
Translation
State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, Information for
MFA (from 2014 to 2022 and plans for 2023).
Information for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(from 2014 to 2022 and plans for 2023)
1. Interethnic relations (events, grant support)
As part of the implementation of the State programme of the Republic of Crimea to
strengthen the unity of the Russian nation and ethnocultural development of the peoples of
Russia ‘Republic of Crimea - territory of interethnic harmony’, various forms of support for
ethnic and cultural NGOs are provided.
(a) Grant support for the activities of ethnic cultural autonomies and non-governmental
organizations (NGO) has been available since 2017.
For example, in 2017 the Yalyboyu-South Bank Social Support Fund received a subsidy
of RUB 270,000.00 for the implementation of the ‘Colours of the Peoples of the South Bank’
project.
In 2018, the Regional NGO ‘Ukrainian Community of Crimea’ received a subsidy in the
amount of RUB 2,508,490.00 to support the operation of the first Ukrainian-language network
resource ‘Pereyaslavska Rada 2.0’.
In 2020, the Crimean Regional NGO for Cultural Education of Children ‘Armanchyk’
was granted a subsidy in the amount of RUB 392,800.00 for the implementation of the project
‘Children's Games of Crimean Tatars as part of the cultural heritage of the peoples of Crimea’.
In 2020 and 2022, a subsidy in the amount of RUB 2,000,000.00 (each year) was granted
to the Regional NGO ‘Ukrainian Community of Crimea’ to support the operation of the first
Ukrainian-language network resource ‘Pereyaslavska Rada 2.0’.
In 2021, subsidies were granted to:
Regional NGO ‘Ukrainian Community of Crimea’ for the implementation of the project
‘Publication of the magazine “Krimsyogodni” in Ukrainian, in the amount of RUB 500,000.00;
Crimean Regional NGO for Cultural Education of Children ‘Armanchyk’ for the project
‘Tuvgyan tilnin baylygy - Wealth of Native Language’ in the amount of RUB 460,000.00;
In 2022, the Crimean Regional NGO for Support and Development of Crimean Tatar
Culture and Art received a subsidy for the project ‘Ana Tili’ in the amount of RUB 450,000.00.
In total, from 2017 to 2022 the State Committee of the Republic of Crimea supported 49
projects in various spheres. About RUB 19 mln was allocated from the budget of the Republic of
Crimea for the implementation of these projects.
In 2018, 2020, and 2022, the Regional NGO ‘Ukrainian Community of Crimea’ received
subsidies for the creation and operation of the first Ukrainian-language network resource
‘Pereyaslavska Rada 2.0’ to a total amount of RUB 6,508,490.00.
In the sphere of preserving ethnic cultures and traditions of the peoples living in the
territory of the Republic of Crimea and strengthening interethnic relations, cooperation has been
established between autonomous ethnic cultural organizations and NGOs with the State
Budgetary Institution of the Republic of Crimea ‘People's Friendship House’.
Over the entire period of its existence, the People's Friendship House has signed c. 100
cooperation agreements with ethnic cultural organizations and friendship houses in other federal
subjects of the Russian Federation.
Annex 481
Under these agreements, the People's Friendship House provides ethnic cultural NGOs with financial, organizational, methodological and advisory support in conducting ethnic cultural events every year. For example, approximately 70 events a year are held at the national level to promote the national cultures and traditions of the peoples of Crimea, and some 230 events are held at the municipal level. Traditional holidays of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians are celebrated annually in the Republic of Crimea, and events are held to mark memorable dates: - Crimean Tatar national holiday ‘Khydyrlez’ (not held in 2020-2022 due to measures to prevent the spread of coronavirus infection); - Crimean Tatar national holiday ‘Derviza’ (held from 2020); - Muslim holiday Kurban-Bairam (Eid al-Fitr) (annually); - Republican Festival-Contest of Crimean Tatar Culture ‘Kefe Gulleri’ (2015, 2018-2019, since 2020 annually), - V Regional Festival of Crimean Tatar Culture ‘Ichki Nagmeleri’ (2015); - Republican festival-competition of Crimean Tatar culture ‘Qirim Naghmeleri’ (since 2020 annually); - Events dedicated to the Day of Revival of the Rehabilitated Peoples of Crimea (annually); - Days of Crimean Tatar letters and culture (annually since 2019); - Events dedicated to the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Deportation from Crimea (annually); - T.G. Shevchenko’s Memorial Day within the framework of the Days of Ukrainian Culture in Crimea (annually); - Festival of Ukrainian culture ‘Obzhynki’ (annually); - Event dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the birth of Lesya Ukrainka, within the framework of the Days of Ukrainian Culture (2021). In 2015 and 2020, events were held at the Republican level dedicated to the 95th and 100th anniversary of twice Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan. The most significant event was the opening of the monument to Amet-Khan Sultan on the namesake square in Simferopol on Amet-Khan Sultan's birthday. In 2018, events dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of the military fighter pilot, Colonel Emir-Usein Chalbash, were held at the republican level. In 2017 and 2021, commemorative events dedicated to the 165th anniversary and 170th anniversary of the outstanding Crimean Tatar enlightener Ismail Gasprinsky were held at the republican level. High-level events dedicated to the anniversaries of the prominent Crimean Tatar figures Yuriy Osmanov, Akim Dzhemilev, Seytumer Emin were also held. In 2021, ceremonial events were held in Crimea on the 110th anniversary of the outstanding embroiderer Vera Roik. The 18th of May, in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Crimea ‘On Holidays and Commemorative Dates’ of 29.12.2014, was declared the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Deportation. Every year, in accordance with this Law, the State Committee of Crimea for Interethnic relations, in order to prepare events in Crimea to commemorate the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Deportation, develops and adopts an order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea approving the plan of commemorative events. 2. Resettlement of the rehabilitated peoples of Crimea (the ‘Ensuring interethnic harmony’ section of the State Programme of the Russian Federation ‘Social and economic
Annex 481
development of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol’, purchase of housing, material assistance, compensations). With coordination by the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea under the ‘Ensuring interethnic harmony’ section of the State Programme of the Russian Federation ‘Social and economic development of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol’, 74 housing, social, communal (engineering) and road infrastructure facilities worth c. RUB 17.3 bn were designed and constructed between 2014 and 2022 to ensure improvement in the standard of living of citizens from among the rehabilitated peoples of Crimea in places of their compact residence. To date, 46 of the 74 facilities have been commissioned, making it possible to improve the level of development in some 35 areas of compact settlement: - Four pre-school educational organizations have been opened, with 1,300 places, in the city of Simferopol (Fontany, Lugovoye and Khoshkeldy conglomerates), the city of Bakhchisaray and Simferopol District (Molodezhnoye urban settlement); - 76.9 km of gas supply networks were commissioned in the city of Simferopol (Beloe-4 conglomerate), in Sudak (Suuk-Su, Alchak, Asret conglomerates), in Feodosia (Chelnokova conglomerates), in Simferopol District (Molodezhnoye urban settlement, Akropolis, Aykavan, Beloe-6 conglomerates); - 73.7 km of power supply networks put into operation in the city of Simferopol (Lugoye-2, Bespalova street), in Feodosia (Chelnokova conglomerate and Greek quarter), in Belogorsk district (Nizhnie Oreshniki village), in Simferopol District (Aykavan, Beloye-6, two conglomerates in Levadki, ‘Vasiet’ conglomerate Stroganovkaarray ‘Buki’ conglomerate in Dobroye, ‘New’ conglomerate in Mirnoye); - 49 km of water supply networks were commissioned in the city of Simferopol (Bespalova Street), in Feodosia (Chelnokova and Greek Quarter conglomerates), in Simferopol district (Stroganovka-1,2,3 stages, two conglomerate in Urozhaynoye village); - 15.8 km of sewerage networks were commissioned in the city of Simferopol (Kamenka and Ak-Mechet conglomerates); - 21.7 km of paved roads commissioned in Yevpatoria (microdistricts ‘Ismail-bey’ and Sputnik-2), in Simferopol (microdistricts ‘Fountains’ and ‘Ak-mechet’), in Simferopol district (transit road through ‘Beloye-6’, ‘Aykavan’ and ‘Beloye-5’ conglomerates of Simferopol, Rodnikovo Village conglomerate ‘Temelli’, Molodezhnoye urban settlement). From 2014 to 01.01.2023, 739 families received housing within the framework of measures for the improvement of housing conditions under the Federal Target Programme and Republican Targeted Investment Programme (RAIP). In 2022, construction of multi-unit residential houses was completed in: Yevpatoriya city (108 flats), Orekhovo village, Saki district (72 flats, of which 35 flats were distributed), Simferopol city (72 flats), Krasnoperekopsk city (72 flats). The planned time for distribution of the remaining 289 flats built in 2022 is the first half of 2023. Moreover, there are plans to complete another 12 multi-unit housing projects under the State Programme (1262 flats): - Alushta (72 flats), - Bakhchisaray (168 flats), - Dzhankoy (72 flats), - Saki (36 flats), - Simferopol (162 flats), - Feodosia (72 flats), - Kerch (72 flats), - Sudak (72 flats), - Kirovsky district (48 flats),
Annex 481
- Leninsky district (48 flats), - Simferopol district (2 houses with 160 flats each), - Yalta (120 flats). …The ‘Revival’ museum, including lightly coloured marble pillars and a sculptural image ‘Prayer’ made of steel bars, in the form of hands folded in prayer, and the park area, symbolise the restoration of rights and revival of rehabilitated peoples in the Crimea. The Museum houses a thematic exhibition dedicated to the memory of victims of the deportation of the peoples of Crimea. The building was constructed as part of the Republican Targeted Investment Programme (RAIP). Project cost: RUB 451,675 mln. Construction site: near the railway station ‘Siren’ of Bakhchisarai district (village of Zheleznodorozhnoye). Chief administrator of the budget funds: Ministry of Construction and Architecture of the Republic of Crimea. 6. Language preservation (publication of socially significant literature, development of national mass media) In 2015, Directive of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea №291-r of 02.04.2015, established the State Autonomous Institution of the Republic of Crimea ‘Ismail Gasprinskiy Media Centre’, which provides preparation and publication of socially important literature, as well as print media in native languages of the peoples of Crimea. Over the entire period of its activity, the institution has published 220 books with a total number of copies over 80,000, and supported the publication of 15 print media in native languages, including: 1. Newspaper ‘Meraba’ 2. Newspaper ‘Yan'y Dyunya’ (New World) 3. Newspaper ‘Sholam’ 4. Newspaper ‘Tavrika’ 5. Newspaper ‘Izvor’ 6. Newspaper ‘Hoffnung’ 7. Newspaper ‘Black Sea Cossack Herald’ 8. Newspaper ‘Krimskiy Vysnik’ 9. Magazine ‘Our Crimea’ 10. Magazine ‘Yildiz’ (The Star) 11. Magazine ‘We Are the Youth Magazine of Crimea’ 12. Magazine ‘Dove Massis’ 13. Magazine ‘Arzy’ 14. Magazine ‘Ana tili ojalaryna’ (For Native Language Teachers) 15. Magazine ‘Krym’. Books published by Ismail Gasprinskiy Media Centre in 2015-2022 in the Crimean Tatar language and on Crimean Tatar issues Number of books Total number of copies Total cost, RUB 2015 10 5700 734,290.00 2016 14 4100 778,940.00 2017 27 9000 1,897,093.01 2018 19 8900 1,945,819.00 2019 26 11700 2,442,450.00
Annex 481
2020 18 6600 1,817,325.00 2021 20 6400 2,277,797.00 2022 16 4800 1,540,250.00 TOTAL: 150 57200 13,433,964.01 Books published by Ismail Gasprinskiy Media Centre in 2015-2022 in the Ukrainian language and on Ukrainian issues Number of books Total number of copies Total cost, RUB 2018 1 300 280,000.00 2019 1 500 92,000.00 2020 3 1100 147,100.00 2021 2 700 296,032.00 TOTAL: 7 2600 815,132.00 7. Information on students instructed in the state languages of the Republic of Crimea (Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar) in general education institutions of the Republic of Crimea in 2022/2023 academic year In the school year 2022/2023, there are 545 general educational organizations in the Republic of Crimea with 230,300 students. Education is provided in the three state languages of the Republic of Crimea - Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar. There are 528 general educational institutions with instruction in Russian. 16 general educational organizations provide instruction in the Crimean Tatar language (261 classes, 5,462 students). Moreover, 119 Crimean Tatar language classes have been opened in 21 general educational organizations with Russian as the language of instruction (1,905 students). One general educational organization with Ukrainian as the language of instruction (9 classes, 182 students) continues to function in Feodosia. Besides, a Ukrainian language class has been opened at the Simferopol Academic Gymnasium (15 students). Thus, 222,800 students are taught in Russian (96.7% of the total number), 7,300 students - in Crimean Tatar (3.2%), and 197 students - in Ukrainian (0.1%). In the school year 2022/2023, seven native languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation living in the Republic of Crimea are taught and studied in the general education institutions of the Republic of Crimea: - Armenian (134 students) - Bulgarian (49 students) - Greek (142 students) - Crimean Tatar (33,351 students) - German (117 students) - Russian (178,454 students) - Ukrainian (3,486 students).
Annex 481
In the school year 2022/2023, 78,600 children (of preschool age) attend 562 educational organizations of the Republic of Crimea with programmes of preschool education, of whom 72,600 (98.33 per cent) are instructed in Russian, 1,300 (1.63 per cent) in Crimean Tatar, and 31 (0.04 per cent) in Ukrainian. 8. ‘Kalga-Sultan’ According to information of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the object of cultural heritage ‘Site of urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (place of probable location of the palace of Kalga-Sultan)’ is included in the list of newly identified objects of archeological heritage in the Republic of Crimea by Order No. 41 of 27.03.2018 of the State Committee for Cultural Heritage Protection of the Republic of Crimea. 9. Construction of the Multi-ethnic Youth Centre at Fevzi Yakubov KIPU The main administrator of budget funds is the Ministry of Construction and Architecture of the Republic of Crimea, the customer/developer is GKU RC ‘Investment and Construction Directorate of the Republic of Crimea’. Contractor: ‘StroyTechImport’ LLC, State Contract No. 191/EP-SMR of 23.05.2022, amount - RUB 532.88 mln. Construction readiness - 53%. Commissioning according to schedule - December 2026. Technical and economic information about the facility: - Building area - 22 437 sq.m; - Student dormitory for 725 persons; - Administrative and household floor; - Infirmary (first-aid station); - Winter garden; - Snack bars on the floors. 10. Hajj Since 2014, the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, in accordance with the Action Plan of assistance in the organization and conduct of Hajj by Muslims of Crimea, coordinates, on an annual basis, the interaction of the relevant ministries and departments of the Republic of Crimea (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transport, Interregional Department of Rospotrebnadzor for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, etc.) with the CRO ‘Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol’ on the preparation and accomodating pilgrims for Hajj (obtaining Russian passports, vaccination and medical checkups, visa support, transfer, other practical issues). A total of 3,062 pilgrims from the Republic of Crimea performed Hajj from 2014 to 2022. The Hajj trip of Crimean Muslims helps to meet the confessional needs of Crimeans, preserves the traditions of good neighbourhood, and contributes to further successful integration of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea into the Muslim community of the Russian Federation. 11. National and cultural autonomies, NGO, local autonomies As of 16 February 2023, there were 13 registered regional and 73 local national-cultural autonomies in the Republic of Crimea and some 25 non-profit ethnic and cultural organizations. According to the available data, there are 14 active Crimean Tatar organizations (see attached), the NGO ‘Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians of the Republic of Crimea “Ukrainian Community of Crimea”’, and three local Ukrainian national-cultural autonomies: - NGO ‘Local national-cultural autonomy of Ukrainians of the city of Simferopol’; - NGO ‘Local national-cultural autonomy of Ukrainians of Nizhnegorod District’; - NGO ‘Local national-cultural autonomy of Ukrainians of Simferopol District’.
Annex 481
12. Construction of the Cathedral Mosque in Simferopol The construction of the main mosque of Crimea is nearing completion. The builders have opened the facade of the building and removed the temporary fence. Major construction works are to be completed by the end of the year. Cast-iron fence sections, external communication networks, marble fencing and columns have been installed. Inside the mosque building, installation of air-conditioning system has been completed. Finishing works are carried out in the guest and administrative buildings. Every day, more than 120 people are at work on the site. The investor of the project is a non-profit organization ‘The Fund of Support of Socio-Cultural Projects’. All works are supported by the Government of the Republic of Crimea and monitored by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol. The completion of all works at the construction of the Complex is planned for the second half of 2023. As of now, the construction readiness is more than 85%. Additional Information: In accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, all peoples living in the Republic of Crimea enjoy equal rights and freedoms in the matters of satisfying ethno-religious needs, preservation and development of national identity, traditions and languages. The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea proclaims three State languages (Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar). The traditional Christian and Muslim holidays of Easter, Holy Trinity Day, Eid al-Fitr (Kurban-Bairam) and Oraza al-Fitr (Oraza-Bairam) are officially declared annual non-working days for all Crimean residents. Under current legislation, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, as all other peoples of the Russian Federation, enjoy equal rights to use their mother tongue and freely choose their language of communication, education, instruction and creative expression. All peoples of the Russian Federation are guaranteed the right to preserve their native language and to create conditions for its study and development. The following cultural institutions operate in the Republic of Crimea: the Crimean Tatar State Academic Musical Drama Theatre, the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage and the Museum's structural subdivisions (the Museum of twice Hero of the Soviet Union Amet Khan Sultan, the memorial complex ‘The Way of Revival of the Peoples of Crimea’ in the village of Syuren, Bakhchisarai district). Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 507-r of 9 June 2015 ‘On creation of the autonomous non-profit organization “Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Company”’ created ‘Millet’ TV channel and ‘Vatan-Sedasy’ radio in the Republic of Crimea, whose main purpose is to provide services for the production and distribution of TV and radio channels providing in-depth and comprehensive coverage of social, political, economic and cultural life of the Republic of Crimea, prompt information about events in the Republic of Crimea and beyond in all spheres of interest to the Crimean Tatar people, predominantly in Crimean Tatar, as well as perform other tasks in providing TV broadcasting services. There is a hall of Ukrainian embroidery history in the Crimean Ethnographic Museum in Simferopol, and a house-museum of Lesya Ukrainka in the city of Yalta near the monument to Lesya Ukrainka.

Annex 482
Roskomnadzor, List of existing media outlets operating in the territory of the Republic of Crimea
and/or Sevastopol fully or primarily in Ukrainian and/or Crimean Tatar from 18 March 2014
until present time
(translation)

Annex 482
Translation
Roskomnadzor, List of existing media outlets operating in the territory of the Republic of
Crimea and/or Sevastopol fully or primarily in Ukrainian and/or Crimean Tatar from 18
March 2014 until present time.
MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS MEDIA OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and
Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor)
DEPUTY HEAD
________________________________________________________________________
Kitaigorodskiy Proyezd, 7/2, Moscow, 109992
Tel./fax (495) 122-25-21; http://rkn.gov.ru
No. 04SV-12354 dated 15.02.2023
On the provision of materials for case
“Ukraine vs Russian Federation” in
the International Court of Justice
To: <…>,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation
Dear Mikhail Yuryevich,
The Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and
Mass Communications has considered Letter #1572/dp dated 31 January 2023 on the provision
of materials under the case of ‘Ukraine vs Russian Federation’ in the International Court of
Justice and hereby sends the requested materials (see attached).
Annexes:
1. List of active mass media performing activities in the Republic of Crimea and/or the city
of Sevastopol – 1 *xls file;
2. List of mass media having performed activities in the Republic of Crimea and/or the city
of Sevastopol – 1 *xls file;
3. Court decisions – 6 *pdf files.
Yours,
(digital signature) <…>
Ex. by <…>
Tel. <…>
Annex 482
Annex No. 1 List of existing media outlets operating in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and/or Sevastopol fully or primarily in Ukrainian and/or Crimean Tatar from 18.03.2014 until present time No. Name of media outlet Certificate number (registration number) Date of registration Form of periodic distribution Editorial address Subject matter and/or specialisation of the media Languages Territory of distribution 1 TVCh. EL No. TU 91 - 00266 14.04.2016 TV channel 296400, Republic of Crimea, Chernomorskiy District, Chernomorskoye Urban-type Settlement (uts), Kirov street, 17 Social, economic, sports, cultural and educational, advertising in accordance with Russian advertising legislation Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 2 BONUM INITIUM PI No. TU 91 - 00194 08.06.2015 print media, collection 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, 8, Uchebny per. Educational media. Cultural and educational, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 3 News Front TV EL No. FS 77 - 68770 17.02.2017 TV channel 295034, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Strelkovaya str., 57 Informational and analytical, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation Bulgarian, English, French, German, Russian, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, Serbian, Spanish, Turkish, Ukrainian Russian Federation, foreign countries
Annex 482
4 Ana tili ojalaryna PI No. TU 91 -
00342 12.04.2018 print media
magazine
295048, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Uchebny per., 8
Educational media.
Educational,
Scientific and
Methodological,
Advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Russian, Crimean
Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea
5
Bulletin of
Physiotherapy and
Balneology
PI No. FS 77 - 61831 18.05.2015 print media
magazine
295006, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol, Lenina
Blvd., 5/7
Scientific, advertising
in accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
6 Visit to every home PI No. TU 91 -
00112 26.02.2015 print media
newspaper
297400, Republic
of Crimea,
Evpatoria, Frunze
str., 28/41 a, 102
Advertising and
entertainment and
information
English, Russian,
Crimean Tatar,
Ukrainian
Republic of Crimea
7 Showcase of western
Crimea
PI No. TU 91 -
00113 26.02.2015 print media
newspaper
297400, Republic
of Crimea,
Evpatoria, Frunze
str., 28/41 a, 102
Advertising and
entertainment,
advertising over 40%
English, Russian,
Crimean Tatar,
Ukrainian
Republic of Crimea
8
Issues of Crimean
Tatar Philology,
History and Culture
PI No. TU 91 -
00192 08.06.2015 print media
collection
295015, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Uchebny per., 8
Educational media.
Educational, cultural
and awarenessraising,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Crimean Tatar,
Ukrainian
Republic of Crimea
9 Voice of Crimea new PI No. FS 77 - 60738 11.02.2015 print media
newspaper
297577, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol district,
Pionerskoe village,
B.Chichibabin str.
11
Socio-political,
cultural and
educational
Russian, Crimean
Tatar, Ukrainian
Republic of
Crimea, Sevastopol
Annex 482
10 Humanitarian paradigm EL No. FS 77 - 70608 03.08.2017 Online edition 298670, Republic of Crimea, Yalta, Koreiz uts, Sevastopolskoe Shosse, 1, fl. 3 Informational, nature of information: scientific, popular science, scientific-practical, literary-publicistic, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation, foreign countries 11 Humanities PI No. FS 77 - 61793 18.05.2015 print media magazine 298635, Republic of Crimea, Yalta, Sevastopolskaya str. 2A Scientific, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation, foreign countries 12 Sunrise of Siwash Valley PI No. TU 91 - 00387 21.01.2021 print media newspaper 296100, Republic of Crimea, Dzhankoy, Krymskaya str., 75 Informational, informational-analytical, journalistic, cultural-educational, entertainment, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Dzhankoy and Dzhankoy District (Republic of Crimea)
Annex 482
13
Proceedings of the
Crimean
Astrophysical
Observatory
PI No. FS 77 - 69531 25.04.2017 print media
magazine
298409, Republic
of Crimea,
Bakhchisarai
district, Nauchniy
uts.
Results of original
research on stellar
physics, relativistic
astrophysics, highenergy
astrophysics,
galactic and
extragalactic physics,
solar and solar system
bodies physics,
astrometry, celestial
mechanics, upper
atmosphere physics,
and geodynamics
English, Russian,
Ukrainian
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
14
Engineering and
Pedagogical Herald:
Light Industry
PI No. 91 - 00191 08.06.2015 print media
almanac
295015, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Uchebny per., 8
Educational media.
Educational, cultural
and awarenessraising,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Crimean Tatar,
Ukrainian
Republic of Crimea
15
Information and
computer technology
in the economy,
education and social
sphere
PI No. 91 - 00251 19.02.2016 print media
magazine
295015, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Uchebny per., 8
Educational media.
Publication of
scientific research on
issues related to
information and
computer technology
and innovative
approaches in the
economy,
management, social
sphere and education,
advertising in
accordance with the
legislation of the
Russian Federation on
advertising
English, Russian,
Crimean Tatar,
Ukrainian
Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
16 Information and methodological magazine ‘ARTEC - SO-BYTIE’ PI No. FS 77 - 71963 26.12.2017 print media magazine 298645, Republic of Crimea, Yalta, Gurzuf uts., Leningradskaya str., 41 Educational media. Educational, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation 17 Yildiz PI No. 91 - 00296 27.02.2017 print media magazine 295048, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Trubachenko Street, 23 A Literary and artistic, advertising in accordance with Russian advertising legislation Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 18 Key to your future profession PI No. TU 91 - 00193 08.06.2015 print media collection 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per., 8 Educational media. Cultural and educational, educational, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 19 Crimea 24 EL No. FS 77 - 59765 30.10.2014 TV channel 295001, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Studencheskaya str., 14 Information and analysis, cultural and educational, entertainment, music, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Russian Federation
Annex 482
20 Crimea Point EL No. FS 77 -
59762 30.10.2014 Radio channel
295001, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Studencheskaya
str., 14
Information and
analysis, cultural and
educational, music
and entertainment,
socio-ecoNomic,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Russian, Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek,
Crimean Tatar,
German, Ukrainian
Russian Federation
21 Crimea today IA No. FS 77 -
78535 29.06.2020 News agency
295011, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Samokisha str., 30
Informational and
analytical, cultural
and educational,
cultural, public
information, sociopolitical,
political,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
22 Crimean Magazine EL No. FS 77 -
83636 26.07.2022 Online edition
295011, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Kozlova str. 45A
Socio-political,
ecoNomic, spiritualeducational,
cultural,
infotainment,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Russian, English,
Ukrainian , Crimean
Tatar
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
Annex 482
23 Crimean Journal of Experimental and Clinical Medicine PI No. FS 77 - 61787 18.05.2015 print media magazine 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Lenina Blvd., 5/7 Scientific, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation 24 Crimean Therapeutic Journal PI No. FS 77 - 61812 18.05.2015 print media magazine 295006, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Lenina Blvd., 5/7 Scientific, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation 25 Crimean Tatar Philology: Problems of Research and Teaching PI No. TU 91 - 00307 29.05.2017 print media magazine 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per., 8 Cultural and educational media. Cultural-educational The publications reflect the results of scientific research on educational and cultural-educational issues related to Crimean Tatar, Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian, English philology, No advertising English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Turkish, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
26 Qirim PI No. TU 91 -
00155 10.04.2015 print media
newspaper
295000, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol, Karl
Liebknecht St., 14,
apt. 14
Cultural and
educational, sociopolitical,
socioecoNomic,
historical
and local history,
coverage of the
activities of state and
executive authorities
of the Republic of
Crimea
Russian, Crimean
Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea
27 World of nations EL No. FS 77 -
66126 20.06.2016 Online edition
298670, Republic
of Crimea, Yalta,
Koreiz uts.,
Sevastopolskoe sh.
1, fl. 3
Informational,
spiritual-educational,
cultural-educational,
scientific-popular and
scientific-practical
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Armenian,
Bulgarian, Czech,
English, French,
German, Greek,
Russian, Italian,
Chinese, Crimean
Tatar, Moldovan,
Polish, Spanish,
Ukrainian
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
28 The Sea EL No. FS 77 -
63539 30.10.2015 Radio channel
295001, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Studencheskaya
str., 14
Information, cultural
and educational,
entertainment,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Russian, Crimean
Tatar, Ukrainian Russian Federation
29 Nova-Press EL No. FS 77 -
82217 23.11.2021 Online edition
295034, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Dzerzhinskogo
Street, 10
Socio-political, social,
human rights,
entertainment,
statistical
Russian, Ukrainian,
Crimean Tatar
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
Annex 482
30 SPECIAL OPINION ONLINE EL No. FS 77 - 77822 19.02.2020 Online edition 299009, Sevastopol city, Geroev Sevastopolya str. 22 Informational and analytical, public English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation, foreign countries 31 Pedagogical experimentation: approaches and challenges PI No. 91 - 00242 24.12.2015 print media collection 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per., 8 Educational media. Educational Educational and cultural-educational nature of publications highlighting features of planning the course of a pedagogical experiment, its organisation, conduct and data processing, cultural-educational Educational and cultural-educational nature of publications highlighting features of planning the course of a pedagogical experiment, its organisation, conduct and data processing, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
32 First Crimean EL No. FS 77 -
59764 30.10.2014 TV channel
295001, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Studencheskaya
str., 14
Information and
analysis, cultural and
educational,
entertainment, music,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Russian, Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek,
Crimean Tatar,
German, Ukrainian
Russian Federation
33 The Right Choice PI No. FS 77 - 83906 12.09.2022 print media
newspaper
296400, Republic
of Crimea,
Cheromorskiy
District,
Chernomorskoye
village, Rybatskaya
str. 34A
Analytical,
informational,
informationalanalytical,
political,
work, career, legal,
advertising in
accordance with
Russian advertising
legislation
Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation
34
Challenges of
modern teacher
education
PI No. FS 77 - 61807 18.05.2015 print media
collection
298635, Republic
of Crimea, Yalta,
Sevastopolskaya
str. 2A
Scientific English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
35
Path to pedagogics:
problems and
solutions
PI No. TU 91 -
00189 08.06.2015 print media
collection
295015, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Uchebny per. 8
Educational media.
Educational, culturaleducational,
theory,
history and
contemporary
problems of
pedagogy, advertising
in accordance with the
legislation of the
Russian Federation on
advertising
English, Russian,
Crimean Tatar,
Ukrainian
Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
36 Radio ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda. Crimea’. EL No. FS 77 - 60749 09.02.2015 Radio channel 295011, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Sergeyeva-Tsenskogo St., 12/4, entrance 1 Informational, cultural, educational, musical, recreational Russian, Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, German, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol 37 Radio Crimea EL No. FS 77 - 59761 30.10.2014 Radio channel 295001, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Studencheskaya str. 14 Information and analysis, cultural and educational, music and entertainment, socio-ecoNomic, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation Russian, Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, German, Ukrainian Russian Federation 38 SPRAVEDLIVAYA RUSSIA in the Republic of Crimea PI No. TU 91 - 00386 12.01.2021 print media newspaper 295011, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Gorkogo St., 24/13 bld. 19 Socio-political, informational, advertising in accordance with Russian advertising legislation Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Sevastopol, Republic of Crimea 39 Northern Tavrida PI No. TU 91 - 00395 01.02.2022 print media newspaper 25, block 40, General Koryavko Microdistrict, Armyansk, Republic of Crimea, 296012. Socio-political Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
40 Rural worker of
Crimea
PI No. TU 91 -
00312 31.08.2017 print media
newspaper
295006, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Pavlenko str., 1,
office 410
Socio-political,
cultural and
educational,
placement of
regulatory documents
of public authorities
and local authorities,
advertising in
accordance with the
legislation of the
Russian Federation on
advertising
Russian, Crimean
Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea
41
Tavrichesky Herald
of Computer Science
and Mathematics
PI No. FS 77 - 61826 18.05.2015 print media
magazine
295007, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Akademika
Vernadskogo Ave.
4
Scientific, advertising
in accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
42 Tavrida Medical and
Biological Bulletin PI No. FS 77 - 61811 18.05.2015 print media
magazine
295006, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol, Lenin
str. 5/7
Scientific, advertising
in accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
43
Scientific Notes of
the Crimean
Engineering and
Pedagogical
University
PI No. FS 77 - 62022 17.06.2015 print media
magazine
295015, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Uchebny per. 8
Educational, cultural
and awareness-raising
nature of research
publications in
ecoNomics, technical
sciences, professional
pedagogy
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
Annex 482
44 Scientific Notes of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University. Series: Biological Sciences PI No. TU 91 - 00264 08.06.2015 print media magazine 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per. 8 Educational media. Educational, cultural and awareness-raising, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 45 Scientific Notes of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University. Series: Philology. History PI No. TU 91 - 00185 08.06.2015 print media magazine 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per. 8 Educational media. Educational, cultural and awareness-raising, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 46 Scientific Notes of the Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Biology. Chemistry PI No. FS 77 - 61791 18.05.2015 print media magazine 295007, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Akademika Vernadskogo Ave. 4. Scientific, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation 47 Scientific Notes of the V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Historical Sciences PI No. FS 77 - 61819 18.05.2015 print media magazine 295007, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Akademika Vernadskogo Ave. 4 Scientific, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation
Annex 482
48
Scientific Notes of
the V.I. Vernadsky
Crimean Federal
University.
Sociology.
Pedagogy.
Psychology
PI No. FS 77 - 61813 18.05.2015 print media
magazine
295007, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Yaltinskaya Street,
20, Bldg. 2, aud.
308
Scientific, advertising
in accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
49
Scientific Notes of
the Vernadsky
Crimean Federal
University.
Philological Sciences
PI No. FS 77 - 61821 18.05.2015 print media
magazine
295007, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Akademika
Vernadskogo Ave.
4
Scientific, advertising
in accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
50
Scientific Notes of
the V.I. Vernadsky
Crimean Federal
University.
Philosophy. Political
science. Culturology
PI No. FS 77 - 61823 18.05.2015 print media
magazine
295007, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Yaltinskaya Street,
20, Bldg. 2, aud.
308
Scientific, advertising
in accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
English, Russian,
Ukrainian Russian Federation
Annex 482
51 Scientific Notes of the Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Juridical Sciences PI No. FS 77 - 61832 18.05.2015 print media magazine 295007, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Akademika Vernadskogo Ave. 4 Scientific, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Ukrainian Russian Federation 52 Man-Nature-Society: Theory and practice of life safety, ecology and valeology PI No. TU 91 - 00186 08.06.2015 print media collection 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per. 8 Educational media. Educational, cultural and awareness-raising, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 53 January pedagogical readings PI No. TU 91 - 00190 08.06.2015 print media collection 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Uchebny per. 8 Educational media. Educational, cultural and awareness-raising, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation English, Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian Republic of Crimea 54 ‘Source of wisdom’ PI No. TU 91 - 00172 24.04.2015 print media magazine 295001, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Kurchatov Street, 4 Religious Islamic, cultural and educational, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising Russian, Crimean Tatar Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
55 ‘Heed.’ PI No. TU 91 -
00171 24.04.2015 print media
newspaper
295001, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Kurchatov Street, 4
Religious Islamic,
cultural and
educational,
advertising in
accordance with the
legislation of the
Russian Federation on
advertising
Russian, Crimean
Tatar Republic of Crimea
56 Armanczyk PI No. FS 77 - 61125 03.04.2015 print media
magazine
295006, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Dolgorukovskaya
St., 14 bld. 16
Media for children.
An informative and
educational magazine
for children to learn
and improve their
native Crimean Tatar
language
Russian, Crimean
Tatar
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
57
Bakhchisarai district
newspaper Glory to
Labour
PI No. TU 91 -
00287 23.12.2016 print media
newspaper
298403, Republic
of Crimea,
Bakhchisarai,
Simferopolskaya
str., 32A
Socio-political,
advertising in
accordance with
Russian advertising
legislation
Russian, Crimean
Tatar Republic of Crimea
58 Vatan sedasi EL No. FS 77 -
81700 19.08.2021 Radio channel
295015, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Kozlova str. 45A,
offices 186, 186A,
187, 187A, 187B,
196, 197, 198, 200,
201, 290, 291, 292
Information and
analysis, cultural and
entertainment, music,
advertising in
accordance with the
advertising legislation
of the Russian
Federation
Russian, Crimean
Tatar, Turkish
Russian Federation,
foreign countries
59 Arzy magazine PI No. TU 91 -
00097 31.12.2014 print media
magazine
295024, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol,
Kestane Street, 7
Socio-political, fiction
and journalism,
women's magazine
Russian, Crimean
Tatar Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
60 Meraba PI No. 91 - 00245 18.01.2016 print media newspaper 295048, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Trubachenko Street, 23A Socio-political, advertising in accordance with Russian advertising legislation Russian, Crimean Tatar Republic of Crimea 61 Millet EL No. FS 77 - 81699 19.08.2021 TV channel 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Kozlova str. 45A, offices 186, 186A, 187, 187A, 187B, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 290, 291, 292 Information and analysis, cultural and entertainment, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation Russian, Crimean Tatar Russian Federation, foreign countries 62 Millet EL No. FS 77 - 81701 19.08.2021 Online edition 295015, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Kozlova str. 45A, offices 186, 186A, 187, 187A, 187B, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 290, 291, 292 Information and analysis, cultural and entertainment, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation Russian, Crimean Tatar Russian Federation, foreign countries 63 Us! Crimean Youth Magazine PI No. TU 91 - 00397 12.07.2022 print media magazine 295048, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Trubachenko Street, 23A Educational media. Cultural and educational, advertising in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on advertising Russian, Crimean Tatar Republic of Crimea 64 Suvdag sesi PI No. 91 - 00161 15.04.2015 print media newspaper 298000, Republic of Crimea, Sudak, Oktyabrskaya str. 36 Information, socio-political, advertising in accordance with the advertising legislation of the Russian Federation Crimean Tatar Republic of Crimea
Annex 482
65 JANI DUNYA PI No. TU 91 -
00323 30.10.2017 print media
newspaper
295000, Republic
of Crimea,
Simferopol, Gorky
str. 23/3,
Socio-political,
advertising in
accordance with
Russian advertising
legislation
Crimean Tatar Republic of Crimea

Annex 483
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 405/2014 “On the Decision of the National Security and
Defence Council of Ukraine dated 13 April 2014 “On Urgent Measures to Overcome the
Terrorist Threat and Preserve the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”, 14 April 2014
(translation)

Annex 483
3/10/23, 1:55 AM About the decision of the Council of the Nation... | on April 14, 2014 No. 405/2014 (Print version)
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/405/2014/print 1/1
Decree
of the President of Ukraine
On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of
Ukraine dated April 13, 2014 "On urgent measures to overcome
the terrorist threat and preserve the territorial integrity of
Ukraine"
In accordance with Articles 107 and 112 of the Constitution of Ukraine, I decree :
1. To implement the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated April
13, 2014 "On urgent measures to overcome the terrorist threat and preserve the territorial integrity of
Ukraine" (attached, secretly).
2. Control over the implementation of the decision of the National Security and Defense Council
of Ukraine put into effect by this Decree shall be entrusted to the Secretary of the National Security
and Defense Council of Ukraine.
3. This Decree enters into force from the day of its publication.
Acting
President of Ukraine,
Chairman of the Verkhovna
Rada
of Ukraine
O.TURCHINOV
Kyiv,
April 14, 2014
No. 405/2014
Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 13 квітня 2014 року "Про
невідкладні заходи щодо подолання терористичної загрози і збереження територіальної
цілісності України"
Decree of the President of Ukraine on April 14, 2014 № 405/2014
Adoption on April 14, 2014
Direct link:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/405/2014
Legislation of Ukraine
as of March 10, 2023
valid
Publications of document
Офіційний вісник Президента України on April 14, 2014 — 2014, № 14, page 3, article 745
Translation
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 405/2014 “On the Decision of the National Security and
Defence Council of Ukraine dated 13 April 2014 “On Urgent Measures to Overcome the Terrorist
Threat and Preserve the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”, 14 April 2014, available at: https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/405/2014#text.

Annex 484 Facebook, Ruslan Balbek, Forum of the Crimean Tatar Social-Political Powers, Declaration (17 August 2019) (translation)

Annex 484
Translation
Facebook, Ruslan Balbek, Forum of the Crimean Tatar Social-Political Powers, Declaration
(17 August 2019), available at:
https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid031LDapErFLdRtZmnJVUqtfcUsS
zefqQZNcEPCvdVagh8MM9CaYvf57UDFEJJ84gntl&id=100009094776367&mibextid=Ni
f5oz.
Ruslan Balbek - A forum was held today...
Ruslan Balbek
A forum of public and political forces of the Crimean Tatar people was held today.
Around 500 delegates from different regions of the peninsula gathered to discuss the
development prospects of the Republic of Crimea. Participants included leading Crimean
Tatar organizations, heads of Crimean Tatar institutions, KIPU professors, and
representatives of Crimean Tatar intellectuals and clergy.
Most of those present were candidates for parliament from different regions. At the event,
the participants got to know each other and felt that they were not alone, but could become
part of a single constructive force.
For the first time, the Crimean Tatars are not running in opposition but in tandem with the
ruling party. ‘United Russia was the only party that gave Crimean Tatars passable spots on
the party list’!
The guests of honour included Haji Emirali Ablaev, Mufti of Crimea and Sevastopol,
Lenur Abduramanov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Crimea,
representatives of the Crimean Tatar Council under the President of Crimea, representatives
of the Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar People "Qirim" and myself.
It was a common thread running through the forum that the Crimean Tatar people
are going through one of the periods of their development. Over the past 5 years so much
has been done that was not done in several decades before - the Cathedral Mosque is being
built, the Khan’s Palace is being renovated and restored, a polyethnic centre is being
completed, kindergartens, schools and FAPs have been opened, large-scale projects such as
the Crimean bridge, the Simferopol airport, a modern high-tech Semashko hospital, the
Tavrida federal highway, two major power plants and much, much more have been
implemented.
Crimean Tatars have been rehabilitated, roads are being built in places of compact
residence, and gas, electricity and water supply lines are being laid. Housing is being built,
and financial assistance is allocated annually to complete the construction of a house…
Of course, this gives rise to gratitude - to our President, the federal centre and the
Head of the Republic Sergei Aksyonov.
The forum participants expressed their support for the course chosen by the Russian
president and the Head of the Republic of Crimea. At the end, they prepared an appeal to
their compatriots to participate in the elections on the single voting day of 8 September
2019. You can read the appeal in the files attached to this publication.

Annex 485
DTEK Energy B.V., Abbreviated IFRS Consolidated Financial Statements, 31 December 2015

Annex 485
DTEK Energy B.V.
Abbreviated IFRS Consolidated Financial Statements
31 December 2015
Annex 485
DTEKEnergyB.V.NotestotheAbbreviatedConsolidatedFinancialStatements–31December201551TheOrganisationanditsOperationsDTEKEnergyB.V.(the“Company”)isaprivatelimitedliabilitycompanyincorporatedintheNetherlandson16April2009.TheCompanywasrenamedon19September2014anditsformernamewasDTEKHoldingsB.V.TheCompanywasformedthroughthecontributionbySystemCapitalManagementLimitedandInvestComServicesLimitedoftheir100%equityinterestinDTEKHoldingLimited,aCyprusregisteredentityandpredecessortotheCompany.TheCompanyanditssubsidiaries(togetherreferredtoas“theGroup”or“DTEK”)arebeneficiallyownedbyMr.RinatAkhmetov,throughvariousentitiescommonlyreferredtoasSystemCapitalManagement(“SCM”).Mr.AkhmetovhasanumberofotherbusinessinterestsoutsideoftheGroup.RelatedpartytransactionsaredetailedinNote8.At19ofSeptember2014theCompany’simmediateparenthaschanged;thenewparentisDTEKB.V.DTEKEnergyB.V.isaverticallyintegratedpowergeneratinganddistributiongroup.ItsprincipalactivitiesarecoalminingforfurthersupplytoitspowergeneratingfacilitiesandfinallydistributionofelectricitytoendcustomersprimarilyinUkraine.TheGroup’scoalmines,powergenerationplantsanddistributionfacilitiesarelocatedintheDonetsk,Dnipropetrovsk,Lugansk,Lviv,Ivano-Frankivsk,Vinnitsya,ZaporizhzhyaandKyivregions,andtheCityofKyivinUkraine,andRostovregionofRussianFederation.TheGroupsellsall,withtheexceptionofthenon-controlledterritory(seeNote2),electricitygeneratedtoEnergorynokSE,thestate-ownedelectricitymeteringanddistributionpool,atpricesdeterminedbasedonthecompetitivepoolmodeladoptedbytheNationalCommissionforStateRegulationofEnergyandPublicUtilitiesinUkraine.TheGroup’sdistributionentitiesthenrepurchaseelectricityforsupplytofinalcustomers.Theprincipalsubsidiariesarepresentedbelow:Name/Segment%interestheldasat31DecemberCountryofincorporation20152014CoalminingandpowergenerationDTEKPavlogradugolPJSC99.9299.92UkraineDTEKMineKomsomoletsDonbassaPJSC95.3195.31UkraineDTEKDobropolskayaCEPPJSC60.0660.06UkraineDTEKOktyabrskayaCEPPJSC60.8560.85UkraineBilozerskaMineALC95.4495.44UkraineMospinoCPELLC99.0099.00UkrainePershotravenskyRMZLLC99.0099.00UkraineTehrempostavkaLLC100.00100.00UkraineCCMKurahovskayaLLC99.0099.00UkraineCCMPavlogradskayaLLC99.0099.00UkraineDTEKDobropolyeugolLLC100.00100.00UkraineDTEKRovenkiantracyteLLC100.00100.00UkraineDTEKSverdlovantracyteLLC100.00100.00UkrainePubliccompanyDon-Anthracite100.00100.00RussianFederationPublicMiningCorporationObukhovskaya100.00100.00RussianFederationSulinathraciteLLC100.00100.00RussianFederationDTEKDniproenergoPJSC73.5473.54UkraineDTEKZakhidenergoPJSC72.2472.24UkraineDTEKSkhidenergoLLC100.00100.00UkraineDTEKHungaryPowerTradeLLC100.00100.00HungaryDTEKTradingLimited100.00100.00CyprusDTEKTradingSA100.00100.00SwitzerlandPowerTradeLLC100.00100.00UkraineInterenergoservisLLC99.0099.00UkraineDTEKScientificandProjectCentreLLC100.00100.00UkraineDTEKTradingLLC100.00100.00UkraineElectricitydistributionDTEKEnergougolENEPJSC95.1995.19UkraineDTEKDonetskoblenergoPJSC71.3571.35UkraineDTEKPowerGridLLC100.00100.00UkraineDTEKDniprooblenergoPJSC51.6651.66UkraineDTEKKrymenergoPJSC57.7057.70UkraineKyivenergoPJSC72.3972.39UkraineRenewablepowergenerationWindPowerLLC-100.00UkraineOtherDTEKFinanceB.V.100.00100.00NetherlandsDTEKFinancePLC100.00100.00UnitedKingdomDTEKInvestmentsLtd100.00100.00UnitedKingdomDTEKHoldingsLimited100.00100.00CyprusDTEKServisLLC99.0099.00UkraineDTEKLLC100.00100.00UkraineSotsisLLC99.0099.00UkraineElektronaladkaLLC99.0099.00Ukraine
Annex 485
DTEKEnergyB.V.NotestotheAbbreviatedConsolidatedFinancialStatements–31December201561TheOrganisationanditsOperations(Continued)TheCompanyisregisteredatSchipholBoulevard231TowerB,5thfloor,1118BH,LuchthavenSchiphol,theNetherlands.TheaddressofUkrainian’sheadoficeis57LvaTolstogostr,01032KyivUkraine.Asat31December2015,theGroupemployedapproximately117thousandpeople(31December2014:128thousandpeople).In2013theGroupinitiatedareorganisationprojectaimedtoseparatethestrategicfunctions(suchasdevelopmentofnewbusinesses)fromoperationalfunctions.Accordingtotheproject,strategicfunctionsshouldbeconcentratedonthelevelofstrategicholding(DTEKBV)andtheoperationalfunctions–onthelevelofthreesubholdings:DTEKEnergy,DTEKOil&GasandDTEKRenewables.On18December2013theSupervisoryboardofDTEKHoldingsB.V.,approvedthereorganisationplan.Asat31December2014,theGrouphasseparatedfollowingcompanies:DTEKOil&GasBV,NaftogazvydobuvaniaPrJSCandDTEKNeftegazLLC-intotheOilandgasholding,andDTEKRenewablesBV,OrlovskayaWEPLLCandPrimorskayaWEPLLC-intotheRenewableenergyholding,undercontrolofthenewParent–DTEKBV.On9March2015theGrouphasfinalisedtransferofWindPowerLLCtoDTEKRenewablesBV.2OperatingEnvironmentoftheGroupTherecentpoliticalandeconomicinstabilityinUkrainehascontinuedin2015andhasledtoadeteriorationofStatefinances,volatilityoffinancialmarkets,illiquidityoncapitalmarkets,higherinflationandadepreciationofthenationalcurrencyagainstmajorforeigncurrencies.InMarch2014variouseventsinCrimealedtotheannexationofCrimeatotheRussianFederation.TheGrouphadanelectricitydistributionbusinessinCrimeaandthiswasexpropriatedbythelocalauthoritiesinJanuary2015,resultinginalossofUAH1,470millionrecordedintheconsolidatedincomestatementas“Lossofcontroloversubsidiary”.GrossamountofassetsandliabilitiesderecognisedwasUAH1,888millionandUAH546million,respectively(Note9,Note14,Note15,Note20andNote23).ManagementanalysedlegalobligationsoftheCrimeabranchandcontinuedtocarryinitsbalancesheetonlytheliabilitiesthattheyhavelegalobligationfor.CumulativeamountoftheexchangedifferencesrelatingtoDTEKKrymenergoPJSC,whichwaspreviouslyrecognisedinothercomprehensiveincomeintheamountofUAH135millionwasreclassifiedfromequitytoprofitorloss.Further,in2014armedforcesobtainedcontroloverpartsoftheDonetskandLuganskregionsineasternUkraine.TherelationshipsbetweenUkraineandtheRussianFederationworsenedandremainedstrained.On1January2016,theagreementonthefreetradeareabetweenUkraineandtheEUcameintoforce.TheRussiangovernmentreactedtothiseventbyimplementingatradingembargoonmanykeyUkrainianexportproducts.Inresponse,theUkrainiangovernmentimplementedsimilarmeasuresagainstRussianproducts.TheGrouphasanumberofmines,generationplantsandelectricitydistributioncompanieslocatedin,ornearto,thepartsoftheDonetskandLuganskregionswheretherehasbeenarmedconflict.Theserepresenttwelveoutofthirtyonemines(representing13%oftotalproperty,plantandequipment),fouroutoftwelvegenerationplants(representing18%oftotalproperty,plantandequipment,9%ofrevenueand10%oftradereceivables)andthreeofthesixelectricitydistributioncompanies(representing3%oftotalproperty,plantandequipment,14%ofrevenueand15%oftradereceivables).WhiletherehasbeennosignificantdamagetotheGroup’sassetsasaresultofmilitaryaction,frommid2014volumesandactivityattheseassetshasbeennegativelyimpactedbythesituationwhichcontinuestodate.Despitethechallengesmanagementstillhavecontrolovertheseassetsandoverseestheiroperations.Thenegativeimpactonvolumesandactivityhasbeencausedprimarilybydisruptionsininfrastructure(railtransportationinhibitingthemovementofcoal)andtoalesserextentthedirectimpactofmilitaryaction.Thishasresultedinareductionofelectricityproduction(inparticular,fortheyearended2015,electricityproductionoffourpowerplantslocatedin,ornearto,theconflictregions,hasdecreasedby23%comparedwiththerespectivetwelvemonthsperiodended31December2014).Further,thesituationhasimpactedtheabilityofsomecustomerstopayresultinginincreasedallowanceforimpairmentandalsothegeneraldemandforelectricityintheseregions.ManagementhavesoughttoactivelymanageandlimittheimpactoftheseeventsontheGroup’soperationsbyutilisingalternativetransportationroutesforcoaltoitsgenerationstations.ThepoliticalandeconomicinstabilityhavehadanadverseeffectontheUkrainianfinancialmarkets,resultinginahamperingofabilityofUkrainiancompaniesandbankstoobtainfundingfromtheinternationalcapitalandloanmarkets.ThishascontributedtoasignificantdevaluationoftheHryvnyaagainstmajorcurrencies.ThegovernmentofUkraineissuedaresolutionwherebystartingfrom1May2015theEnergymarketofUkrainewasdividedintothecontrolledandnon-controlledterritory.Fromthisdate,thegovernmenttakesnoresponsibilityforthesupplyofelectricityandsettlementofdebtsbetweengenerationanddistributionentitiesinthenon-controlledterritory.Suchrelationshipsaretoberegulatedbymultilateralcontracts.Thegovernmentduring2015havebeenmoreassertiveintheirattemptstoregulatetheenergysectorthroughthesettingoftariffs,increaseduseofnuclear,andregulatinggasdeliveries.During2015,agovernmentregulationwasintroducedrestrictingtheexportofanthracitecoal.Suchrestrictionwaspartiallyliftedasof1January2016,allowingtheexportofsteelgradeanthracitecoal.
Annex 485
DTEKEnergyB.V.NotestotheAbbreviatedConsolidatedFinancialStatements–31December2015174CriticalAccountingEstimatesandJudgements(Continued)Thefairvaluesobtainedusingdepreciatedreplacementcostarevalidatedusingdiscountedcashflowmodels(incomeapproach,Level3),andareadjustedifthevaluesobtainedusingincomeapproacharelowerthanthoseobtainedusingdepreciatedreplacementcostorindexationofcarryingamounts(i.e.thereiseconomicobsolescence).Keyinputsintodiscountedcashflowmodelsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedforgoodwillimpairmenttesting(Note11).Theresultsofthisrevaluationofproperty,plantandequipmentaredisclosedfurtherinNote9.Changesintheaboveestimatesandjudgmentscouldhaveamaterialeffectonthefairvalueofproperty,plantandequipment,which,however,isimpracticabletoquantifyduetowidevarietyofassumptionsandassetsbeingvalued.Theestimatesusedtoassessthefairvalueofproperty,plantandequipmentareimpactedbytheuncertaintycausedbyeventsinEasternUkraine,includingimportantlyfutureplannedproduction(seediscussionofoperatingenvironmentinNote2).Recognitionofrevenueandfairvalueofliabilitiesinthenon-controlledterritory.AsdiscussedinNote2theareaofthenon-controlledterritorywasseparatedfromtheUkrainianenergymarketinMay2015.Aseriesofmultilateralcontractsweresetupbetweenthetwopowergeneratorsinthearea(oneofwhich,ZuTES,isasubsidiary)andthepowerdistributors(thelargestofwhichisDTEKDonetskoblenergoPJSC,alsoasubsidiary).Thesecontractsstatethatthedistributorsneedtopaytothegeneratorsforelectricitypurchasedinthesameproportionasthatpaidbyendconsumersofelectricity.ManagementhaveassessedtherequirementsofIAS18fortherecognitionofrevenueandIFRS13fortheassessmentoffairvalueofliabilitiesincurred.Withrespecttorevenuerecognitionmanagementhasrecognisedrevenueforcertainlargeandregularpayers.Revenueisrecognisedwithrespecttoothercustomersonacashbasis.UnrecognisedrevenueamountstoUAH1,815millionfortheyearended31December2015(2014:nil).InaccordancewithIFRSliabilitiesareinitiallyrecognisedattheirfairvalue.Managementhavedeterminedthatthefairvalue(contractuallyenforceableamountofpayables)ofliabilitieswithrespectofpurchasesofelectricityofthepowerdistributorsissubstantiallylessthantheirnominalamount.Inaccordancewiththeexistingcontractthecontractuallyenforceabaleamountistiedtothecollectionsfromtheendcustomersbeinglessthan50%ofthenominalamountofthepayable.Managementhaveassessedthefairvalueofliabilitieswithrespecttopowerpurchasesbythepowerdistributorsbasedonanticipatedandfactualcollectionsfromendcustomers.Anyincreaseordecreaseincollectionswouldhaveasimilarimpactonrevenues,expenses,assetsandliabilities.ThebasisforthisaccountingiswithrespecttotheabilityoftheGrouptoenforcethemultilateralcontractssigned.Managementareconfidentthatthesemultilateralcontractsarelegallyenforceableandtheywillbeupheldifchallanged.ThedifferencebetweenthenominalvalueandfairvalueisUAH821million.Impairmentoftradeandotheraccountsreceivable.Managementestimatesthelikelihoodofthecollectionoftradeandotheraccountsreceivablebasedonananalysisofindividualaccounts.Factorstakenintoconsiderationincludeanageinganalysisoftradeandotheraccountsreceivableincomparisonwiththecredittermsallowedtocustomers,andthefinancialpositionofandcollectionhistorywiththecustomer.Shouldactualcollectionsbelessthanmanagement’sestimates,theGroupwouldberequiredtorecordanadditionalimpairmentexpense.Theestimatesusedtoassessmenttheimpairment(ifany)oftradeandotheraccountsreceivableforthoseentitieslocatedinEasternUkraineareimpactedbygreateruncertaintythaninotherareas(seediscussionofoperatingenvironmentinNote2).Post-employmentandotheremployeebenefitobligations.Managementassessespost-employmentandotheremployeebenefitobligationsusingtheProjectedUnitCreditMethodbasedonactuarialassumptionswhichrepresentmanagement’sbestestimatesofthevariablesthatwilldeterminetheultimatecostofprovidingpost-employmentandotheremployeebenefits.SincetheplanisadministeredbytheState,theGroupmaynothavefullaccesstoinformationandthereforeassumptionsregardingwhen,orif,anemployeetakesearlyretirement,whethertheGroupwouldneedtofundpensionsforex-employeesdependingonwhetherthatex-employeecontinuesworkinginhazardousconditions,thelikelihoodofemployeestransferringfromStatefundedpensionemploymenttoGroupfundedpensionemploymentcouldallhaveasignificantimpactonthepensionobligation.Thepresentvalueofthepensionobligationsdependsonanumberoffactorsthataredeterminedonanactuarialbasisusinganumberofassumptions.Themajorassumptionsusedindeterminingthenetcost(income)forpensionsincludethediscountrateandexpectedsalaryincreases.Anychangesintheseassumptionswillimpactthecarryingamountofpensionobligations.Sincetherearenolong-term,highqualitycorporatebondsissuedinUkrainianHryvnias,significantjudgementisneededinassessinganappropriatediscountrate.KeyassumptionsandsensitivitiesarepresentedinNote21.Deferredtaxassetrecognition.Thenetdeferredtaxassetrepresentsincometaxesrecoverablethroughfuturedeductionsfromtaxableprofitsandisrecordedinthebalancesheet.Deferredtaxassetsarerecordedtotheextentthatrealisationoftherelatedtaxbenefitisprobable.Indeterminingfuturetaxableprofitsandtheamountoftaxbenefitsthatareprobableinthefuture,managementmakesjudgementsandappliesestimationbasedonhistorictaxableprofitsandexpectationsoffutureincomethatarebelievedtobereasonableunderthecircumstances.
Annex 485
DTEKEnergyB.V.NotestotheAbbreviatedConsolidatedFinancialStatements–31December20153315CashansCashEquivalents(Continued)Asat31December2015,cashandcashequivalentsofUAH108millionweredenominatedinUSdollars(31December2014:UAH1,955million),UAH3millionweredenominatedinEUR(31December2014:UAH465million),UAH9millionweredenominatedinRUB(31December2014:UAH394million).Asat31December2015and2014,notermdepositswithoriginalmaturityoflessthanthreemonthswerepledgedascollateralforborrowingsorbankguaranteesreceived.AsresultoflossofcontroloversubsidiarytheGroupderecognisedUAH246millionofcashandcashequivalents.Asat31December2015therewerenorestrictedcashpledgedundercashpoolingarrangementsasacollateralforborrowings(31December2014:UAH2,386million).ForthepurposesofcashflowstatementmovementofrestrictedcashundercashpoolingarrangementsinamountofUAH2,386millionisnotincludedininvestingactivityandisoffsetwithincreaseofrelatedborrowings.Asat31December2015,restrictedcashintheamountofUAH16millionusedtocoverletterofcreditforpurchaseofequipment(31December2014:UAH315millionwerepledgedascollateralforbankborrowings).Forthepurposesofthecash-flowstatementsthisamountisnotincludedincashandcashequivalentsbalance.Thebankbalancesandtermdepositsareneitherpastduenorimpaired.Analysisbycreditqualityofbankbalancesandtermdepositsisasfollows:20152014InmillionsofUkrainianHryvniaBankbalancespayableondemandTermdepositsRestrictedcashBankbalancespayableondemandTermdepositsRestrictedcashRatingbyMoody'sInvestorsService-A2rated---1---A3rated63--776-315-Ba2rated18-----Baa2rated---207--Ba3.uarated---2-9-Carated12515----CCC1------CAA1---120---Caa3rated---2,8251,0681,993RatedbyFitchRatings-AAA(UKR)---303-400-Non-rated*491-11249--Total6819164,2961,0752,717*Non-ratedbanksrankinthetop10Ukrainianbanksbysizeoftotalassetsandcapital(perNationalBankofUkraine).16DiscontinuedoperationsInMarch2015,followingareorganisationplan,theGrouphasseparatedDTEKOil&GasBV,NaftogazvydobuvaniaPrJSCandDTEKNeftegazLLC–intoaseparateOilandgassub-holding,andDTEKRenewablesBV,WindPowerLLC,OrlovskayaWEPLLCandPrimorskayaWEPLLC-intoaseparateRenewableenergysub-holding.AllareunderthecontrolofthenewParent–DTEKBV.ThecompletiondateforthetransferofOilandgassub-holdingwason19September2014andthecompletiondateforthetransferofWindPowerLLCbeingpartofRenewableenergysub-holdingwas9March2015.SeparationofWindPowerLLCwaspartofmandatoryapprovalandtheplanwasformalisedinMarch2015.In2015theGroupobtainedacashconsiderationofUAH434millionresultingfromdemergerofWindPowerLLC.Bothdemergerswereaccountedforasareorganisationofentitiesundercommoncontrol.Thedifferencesbetweencarryingamountsoftheassetstransferredandconsiderationreceivedfromthedemergerofsubsidiarieswereaccountedfordirectlyinequity.Asallentitiesmentionedabovewerepartofasinglereorganisationplantoseparatetheselinesofbusiness,theresultofallsuchoperationsisseparatedintheincomestatementandpresentedasdiscontinuedoperations.Comparativeinformationfor2014wasadjustedtopresentWindPowerLLCoperationsasadiscontinuedoperationsinadditionaltoDTEKOil&GasBVoperationswhichwerealreadypresentedasdiscontinuedin2014.
Annex 485
DTEKEnergyB.V.NotestotheAbbreviatedConsolidatedFinancialStatements–31December20153416DiscontinuedOperations(Continued)InmillionsofUkrainianHryvniaNoteWindPowerLLCMarch2015DTEKOilandgasandDTEKRenewablesSeptember2014Property,plantandequipment94,9578,594Intangibleassets1010364Deferredincometaxassets627-Tradeandotherreceivables1311,585Loansprovidedtorelatedparties1,1462,140Financialinvestment–current-261Inventories137Cashandcashequivalents102Non-currentborrowings19(4,905)-Non-currentloansfromrelatedparties(2,724)(4,326)Deferredconsideration-(4,450)Provisionsforotherliabilitiesandcharges22(2)(1,102)Deferredincometaxliability-(1,456)Otherfinancialliabilities-current-(368)Currentborrowings19(644)-Currentloansfromrelatedparties(121)-Tradeandotherpayables(132)(130)Currentincometaxpayable-(77)Othertaxespayable(22)(165)Totalcarryingamountofnetassetsdemerged(1,668)909Non-controllinginterest-3,950TotalcarryingamountofnetassetsdemergedattributabletoEquityholdersoftheCompany(1,668)(3,041)TherewasanintragroupguaranteeprovidedbyasubsidiaryofDTEKEnergyGrouptotheWindPowerLLCwhichwaseliminatedatconsolidationinpreviousperiods.UponWindPowerLLCdemergertheGrouprecognisedaliabilityforapartyoutsideoftheGroupbeingthefairvalueofthisguaranteeinamountofUAH49million.AsdiscussedinNote3,theGrouphasrecordedthelossondemergerofthesubsidiariesbeingthedifferencebetweenthenetassetsderecognisedfairvalueofrecognisedguaranteeandconsiderationreceiveddirectlyinequity.Analysisoftheresultofdiscontinuedoperationsisasfollows:InmillionsofUkrainianHryvnia20152014Revenue2713,279Costofsales(114)(1,170)Otherincomeandexpenses,includingforeignexchangeloss,net(2,187)(5,506)Lossbeforetaxfromdiscontinuedoperations(2,030)(3,397)Incometax365151Lossaftertaxfromdiscontinuedoperations(1,665)(3,246)Lossisattributableto:EquityholdersoftheCompany(1,665)(3,760)Non-controllinginterest-514Revenueofdiscontinuedoperationsin2015doesnotincludeinter-companyrevenue(2014:UAH2,038million).Analysisofthecashflowsofdiscontinuedoperationsisasfollws:InmillionsofUkrainianHryvnia20152014Netcashgeneratedfromoperatingactivities2851,699Netcashusedininvestingactivities(1,020)(2,097)Netcashgeneratedfromfinancingactivities734393Netdecreaseincashandcashequivalents(1)(5)17ShareCapitalTheauthorisedsharecapitalofDTEKEnergyB.V.equalstofullypaidsharecapitalandcomprises3,000ordinaryshareswithaparvalueofEuro10.0pershareintotalamountofEuro30,000.Allsharescarryonevote.
Annex 486
Working Program in the subject “Mother tongue (Ukrainian)” for grades 5-9
(translation)

Annex 486
1
Translation
Working Program in the subject “Mother tongue (Ukrainian)” for grades 5-9.
MUNICIPAL BUDGETARY GENERAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION "SCHOOL No. 20 of Theodosia, the Republic of Crimea"
WORK PROGRAMME
FSES-2021
The subject "Native (Ukrainian) language"
For grades 5-9
Teacher:
CONSIDERED
at the meeting of the
Ministry of Education
Minutes № ____
of___________
Head of MO
_________________
Gorbunova I.P.
AGREED
Deputy Director for
Learning and
Development
_______________
Panchenko T. P.
APPROVED
Deputy Director for Learning
and Development
___________________
Usenko T. S.
Order № ____ of
_________ 2022г.
Annex 486
2 Gorbunova I.P. 2022 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Federal State budgetary institution "Federal Institute of Native Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation APPROVED BY THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL METHODOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION FOR GENERAL EDUCATION, Minutes 4/22 of August 01, 2022 , EXEMPLARY WORK PROGRAMME THE SUBJECT "NATIVE (UKRAINIAN) LANGUAGE" FOR GRADES 5-9 OF BASIC GENERAL EDUCATION
Annex 486
3 Moscow, 2022 According to the FSES of BGE, the subject "Native Language" is included in the subject area "Native Language and Native Literature" and is mandatory. The subject "Native (Ukrainian) language" is allocated 2 hours per week in all grades of basic general education, 68 hours per year. The total amount of time for the five years of study from grades 5 to 9 is roughly 340 hours. 5th grade – 68 hours 6th grade – 68 hours 7th grade – 68 hours 8th grade – 68 hours 9th grade – 68 hours

Annex 487
Avdet, Appeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives (11 February 2013)
(translation)

Annex 487
3/9/23, 9:04 AM Appeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives - avdet.org
https://avdet.org/2013/02/11/obrashhenie-k-prezidentu-ukrainy-o-sovete-predstavitelej/ 1/4
Appeal to the President of Ukraine on the
Council of Representatives
11.02.2013 13:04
STATEMENT OF
THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF OKND
"On the so-called Council of representatives of the Crimean Tatar
people"
Recently, a meeting of the so-called Council of Representatives of
the Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine took
place.
The President of Ukraine, in accordance with the Constitution of
Ukraine, of course, has the right to create various advisory bodies,
including representative ones.
MENU
Translation
Avdet, Appeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives (11 February
2013), available at: https://avdet.org/2013/02/11/obrashhenie-k-prezidentu-ukrainy-osovete-
predstavitelej/.
Annex 487
3/9/23, 9:04 AMAppeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives - avdet.orghttps://avdet.org/2013/02/11/obrashhenie-k-prezidentu-ukrainy-o-sovete-predstavitelej/2/4However, in accordance with the norms of international law, whichprovide, among other things, the right of indigenous peoples toparticipate in decision-making on issues that affect their interests,they exercise this right through representatives elected by themaccording to their own procedures.By Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 518/99 dated May 18,1999 “On the Council of Representatives of the Crimean TatarPeople”, the Council of Representatives of the Crimean TatarPeople was established under the President of Ukraine as aconsultative and advisory body. It included all members of theMejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, elected by the Kurultai of theCrimean Tatar people.Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 873/2010 dated August 26,2010 “Issues of the Council of Representatives of the CrimeanTatar People” amended the Regulations on the Council ofRepresentatives of the Crimean Tatar People, excluding theprinciple of delegation by the Crimean Tatars of representativeselected by them according to their own procedures and replacing itwith the principle of appointment. In fact, it became the Council ofRepresentatives of the President of Ukraine for some CrimeanTatars.This is not the first attempt to create pseudo-representative bodiesof the Crimean Tatars to create a split among the Crimean Tatars.At one time, in the same way, in the order of appointment, underthe chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, the “Council ofElders” L. Grach was established, whose most faithful companionwas L. Bezaziev.In connection with the latest developments around the newlyappointed body, the Central Council of the OKND declares:
Annex 487
3/9/23, 9:04 AMAppeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives - avdet.orghttps://avdet.org/2013/02/11/obrashhenie-k-prezidentu-ukrainy-o-sovete-predstavitelej/3/4- the so-called Council of representatives of the Crimean Tatarpeople under the President of Ukraine V.F. Yanukovych cannotrepresent the interests of the Crimean Tatar people, and hismembers, appointed from above, represent in the Council only theirpersonal approaches and positions that are convenient for thosewho appointed them;- the only body that has the right to represent the Crimean Tatarpeople is the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, elected by theKurultai of the Crimean Tatar people, whose delegates arepopularly elected by the Crimean Tatars themselves.Chairman of the Organization of the Crimean National MovementE. Khairedinov____________________________________________________________President of UkraineYanukovych V.F.AppealIslyam-Terek regional Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.year 2013. The participation of the Ukrainian state in the settlementof the Crimean Tatars returning to their homeland has significantlydecreased. For 22 years of Ukraine's independence, not a singlelaw aimed at restoring the rights of the Crimean Tatar people hasbeen adopted. Moreover, starting from 2010, civil servants –Crimean Tatars – were dismissed from their positions in Crimea,who by their activities demonstrated the ability to adequately and
Annex 487
3/9/23, 9:04 AMAppeal to the President of Ukraine on the Council of Representatives - avdet.orghttps://avdet.org/2013/02/11/obrashhenie-k-prezidentu-ukrainy-o-sovete-predstavitelej/4/4adequately represent state institutions in the democratictransformations of the state that chose the European path ofdevelopment.Recently, Crimea has become an unstable region of Ukraine.Provocative actions against the Crimean Tatar people are regularlyorganized and carried out in the autonomy: pogroms of places ofcompact residence of the Crimean Tatars by the so-called RussianUnity party, monuments in cemeteries are destroyed, mosques areset on fire, exhibitions of Stalinism are held by the Russianorganization The Essence of Time. The "cleansing" of people'scadres in the civil service continues.2013 is the year of the chairmanship of the OSCE by our state. Thismakes it possible to monitor their legal framework for compliancewith generally recognized European standards, thereby increasingthe chance of signing an Association Agreement with the EuropeanUnion. Consequently, the issues of restoring the rights of theCrimean Tatar people in their homeland will ensure their securityand become a guarantee of the development of Ukraine as a wholeas a democratic state.The Islyam-Terek Regional Mejlis calls on all authorities in Ukraineto be tolerant towards the citizens of Ukraine - the Crimean Tatars,to restore their rights, to carry out activities preceding xenophobia,ethnic hatred and racial intolerance.Author: Editorial AvdetEditorial AVDET View all posts by the author Editorial Avdet02/11/2013Societyissue_6 , address to the president , council of representatives//
Annex 488 Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Resource Center present information on human rights in Crimea to the world (7 November 2017) (translation)

Annex 488
Translation
Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Information Policy of
Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Resource Center present
information on human rights in Crimea to the world (7 November 2017), available at:
https://mkip.gov.ua/news/2062.html.
Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Resource Center present
information on human rights in Crimea to the world
Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and
Crimean Tatar Resource Center present information on human rights in Crimea to
the world
On November 6, the "Ukrinform" news agency hosted an event entitled "Protecting Human Rights
and De-occupying Crimea through Public Diplomacy".
Thanks to the project "Protection of human rights and de-occupation of Crimea through public
diplomacy", implemented by the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine together with the
Crimean Tatar Resource Center and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, information about
human rights violations in Crimea has become available to the international community.
Speaking to the diplomats about the events of recent years in Ukraine, Emine Dzhaparova noted
that the non-violent resistance, which is traditional for Crimean Tatars, is now formalised, among
other things, through the tools of public diplomacy.
"This is a low-level advocacy campaign involving representatives of the Mejlis, national NGOs, a
number of activists, journalists and human rights defenders. The advantage is that Crimean Tatars
are direct witnesses and targets of the Russian occupier. Therefore, this is a powerful reinforcement
of Ukraine's official diplomacy based on preventing the recognition of the occupation and restoring
territorial integrity. Secondly, it is due to the active participation of Crimean Tatars as citizens of
Ukraine, indigenous residents of Ukrainian Crimea, in international platforms," Dzhaparova said.
She added that Russia cannot distort reality by showing Crimean Tatars "happy" with the Russian
reality, which it is obviously trying to do. At the same time, it integrates "correct" and loyal people
into the government.
Eskender Bariev, member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Chairman of the Board of the
Crimean Tatar Resource Center: "Thanks to the project "Protection of human rights and deoccupation
of Crimea through public diplomacy" we were able to bring information about human
rights violations in Crimea to the international community and expand the circle of friends of the
Crimean Tatars," said Bariev.
Annex 488
According to him, for a year and a half, the project participants participated in the work of various international platforms - the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, considering it important to regularly and systematically "convey information about the real situation and the repressive actions that took place in Crimea." An 8-minute film "Public Democracy of the Crimean Tatars" was shown at the press conference, summarising the project and announcing its future goals. Participants: Emine Dzhaparova, First Deputy Minister of Information Policy of Ukraine; Eskender Bariev, member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Head of the Board of the Crimean Tatar Resource Center; Elvir Sahirman, Crimean Tatar activist.
Annex 489
A. Arefiev, Russian language in the Ukrainian Republic, Center for Social Forecasting and
Marketing - Russian language in former Soviet republics, 2012
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 489
Excerpt
Translation
A. Arefiev, Russian language in the Ukrainian Republic, Center for Social Forecasting and
Marketing - Russian language in former Soviet republics, 2012.
Russian language in the Ukrainian Republic
Russian language in the Ukrainian Republic
A. Arefiev
(Part of the chapter: "Russian language in former Soviet republics". Published in: Russian
language at the turn of XX - XXI centuries [Electronic source] -M.: Center for Social Forecasting
and Marketing, 2012. pp. 48-62)
[…]
Russian language dominates the Ukrainian segment of the Internet as well. Thus, among 11.3
million Internet users in 2010, more than 80% made requests in Russian. The share of Ukrainian
citizens who use Ukrainian on the Internet is approximately 14%. The largest share of Russianspeaking
Internet users is in Crimea (only 3.7% of its population makes requests in Ukrainian) and
Donetsk region (94% of Russian users and 6% of Ukrainian users). In Kiev, where more than half
of all Internet users in Ukraine are concentrated, the share of those who choose Ukrainian for the
Internet is only 13%. The maximum share of Ukrainian-language Internet users is in Ivano-
Frankovsk region (33%), Ternopol region (31%) and Lvov region (28.9%).
[…]